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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/21417-8.txt b/21417-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ada46bd --- /dev/null +++ b/21417-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,19487 @@ +Project Gutenberg's Forty-Six Years in the Army, by John M. Schofield + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Forty-Six Years in the Army + +Author: John M. Schofield + +Release Date: May 11, 2007 [EBook #21417] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK FORTY-SIX YEARS IN THE ARMY *** + + + + +Produced by Ed Ferris + + + + + +Transcriber's note: + + Footnotes are at the end of the chapter. + + Right-hand-page heads are set right-justified before the appropriate + paragraphs. + + Small caps have been transcribed as upper-and-lower-case, except + the page heads. + + The dieresis is transcribed by a preceding hyphen. + + Non-standard spellings: partizan, despatch, Kenesaw, skilful, + practised, intrenchments, brevetted, reconnoissance, Chili, envelop. + + LoC call number: E467.1.S35 A2 + + Submitted May 11th, 2007 + + +FORTY-SIX YEARS +IN THE ARMY + + +[Frontispiece] +FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY FALK. +[Facsimile Signature] +J.M.Schofield + + +THIS VOLUME IS DEDICATED TO THE YOUNG CITIZENS WHOSE PATRIOTISM, +VALOR AND MILITARY SKILL MUST BE THE SAFEGUARD OF THE INTERESTS, +THE HONOR AND THE GLORY OF THE AMERICAN UNION + + +FORTY-SIX YEARS +IN THE ARMY + +BY +LIEUTENANT-GENERAL +JOHN M. SCHOFIELD + +NEW YORK +THE CENTURY CO. +1897 + + +Copyright, 1897 +by The Century Co. + +The De Vinne Press. + + +PREFACE + +Most of the chapters constituting the contents of this volume, were +written, from time to time, as soon as practicable after the events +referred to, or after the publication of historical writings which +seemed to me to require comment from the point of view of my personal +knowledge. They were written entirely without reserve, and with +the sole purpose of telling exactly what I thought and believed, +not with any purpose of publication in my lifetime, but as my +contribution to the materials which may be useful to the impartial +historian of some future generation. These writings had been put +away for safe-keeping with "instructions for the guidance of my +executors," in which I said: + +"All the papers must be carefully revised, errors corrected if any +are found, unimportant matter eliminated, and everything omitted +which may seem, to a cool and impartial judge, to be unjust or +unnecessarily harsh or severe toward the memory of any individual. +I have aimed to be just, and not unkind. If I have failed in any +case, it is my wish that my mistakes may be corrected, as far as +possible. I have not attempted to write history, but simply to +make a record of events personally known to me, and of my opinion +upon such acts of others, and upon such important subjects, as have +come under my special notice. It is my contribution to the materials +from which the future historian must draw for his data for a truthful +history of our time." + +Now, in the winter of 1896-97, I have endeavored to discharge, as +far as I am able, the duty which I had imposed on my executors, +and have decided to publish what I had written in past years, with +corrections and comments, while many of the actors in the great +drama of the Civil War are still living and can assist in correcting +any errors into which I may have fallen. + +After my chapters relating to the campaign of 1864 in Tennessee +were in type, the monograph by General J. D. Cox, entitled "Franklin," +was issued from the press of Charles Scribner's Sons. His work +and mine are the results of independent analysis of the records, +made without consultation with each other. + + +TABLE OF CONTENTS + +Chapter I. Parentage and Early Life--Appointment to West Point-- +Virginian Room-Mates--Acquaintance with General Winfield Scott--Character +of the West Point Training--Importance of Learning how to Obey--A +trip to New York on a Wager--The West Point Bible-class--Dismissed +from the Academy Without Trial--Intercession of Stephen A. Douglas +--Restoration to Cadet Duty--James B. McPherson--John B. Hood-- +Robert E. Lee. + +Chapter II. On Graduating Leave--Brevet Second Lieutenant in the +2d Artillery at Fort Moultrie--An Officer's Credit Before the War-- +Second Lieutenant in the 1st Artillery--Journey to Fort Capron, +Florida--A Reservation as to Whisky--A Trip to Charleston and a +Troublesome Money-Bag--An "Affair of Honor"--A Few Law-books--An +Extemporized "Map and Itinerary"--Yellow Fever--At A. P. Hill's +Home in Virginia--Assigned to Duty in the Department of Philosophy +at West Point--Interest in Astronomy--Marriage--A Hint from Jefferson +Davis--Leave of Absence--Professor of Physics in Washington +University. + +Chapter III. Return to Duty--General Harney's Attitude--Nathaniel +Lyon in Command--Defense of the St. Louis Arsenal--Service as +Mustering Officer--Major of the First Missouri--Surrender of Camp +Jackson--Adjutant-general on Lyon's Staff--A Missing Letter from +Frémont to Lyon--Lyon's Reply--Battle of Wilson's Creek--Death of +Lyon--A Question of Command During the Retreat--Origin of the +Opposition of the Blairs to Frémont--Affair at Fredericktown. + +Chapter IV. Halleck Relieves Frémont of the Command in Missouri-- +A Special State Militia--Brigadier-General of the Missouri Militia +--A Hostile Committee Sent to Washington--The Missouri Quarrel of +1862--In Command of the "Army of the Frontier"--Absent Through +Illness--Battle of Prairie Grove--Compelled to be Inactive-- +Transferred to Tennessee--In Command of Thomas's Old Division of +the Fourteenth Corps--Reappointed Major-General--A Hibernian +"Striker." + +Chapter V. In Command of the Department of the Missouri--Troops +Sent to General Grant--Satisfaction of the President--Conditions +on which Governor Gamble would Continue in Office--Anti-Slavery +Views--Lincoln on Emancipation in Missouri--Trouble Following the +Lawrence Massacre--A Visit to Kansas, and the Party Quarrel There +--Mutiny in the State Militia--Repressive Measures--A Revolutionary +Plot. + +Chapter VI. A Memorandum for Mr. Lincoln--The President's Instructions +--His Reply to the Radical Delegation--The Matter of Colored +Enlistments--Modification of the Order Respecting Elections Refused +--A Letter to the President on the Condition of Missouri--Former +Confederates in Union Militia Regiments--Summoned to Washington by +Mr. Lincoln--Offered the Command of the Army of the Ohio--Anecdote +of General Grant. + +Chapter VII. Condition of the Troops at Knoxville--Effect of the +Promotion of Grant and Sherman--Letter to Senator Henderson--A +Visit from General Sherman--United with his other Armies for the +Atlanta Campaign--Comments on Sherman's "Memoirs"--Faulty Organization +of Sherman's Army--McPherson's Task at Resaca--McPherson's +Character--Example of the Working of a Faulty System. + +Chapter VIII. Sherman's Displeasure with Hooker growing out the +Affair at Kolb's Farm--Hooker's Despatch Evidently Misinterpreted +--A Conversation with James B. McPherson over the Question of +Relative Rank--Encouraging John B. Hood to become a Soldier--Visit +to the Camp of Frank P. Blair, Jr.--Anecdote of Sherman and Hooker +under Fire--The Assault on Kenesaw--Tendency of Veteran Troops-- +The Death of McPherson before Atlanta--Sherman's error in a Question +of Relative Rank. + +Chapter IX. The Final Blow at Atlanta--Johnston's Untried Plan of +Resistance--Hood's Faulty Move--Holding the Pivot of the Position +--Anecdotes of the Men in the Ranks--Deferring to General Stanley +in a Question of Relative Rank--The Failure at Jonesboro'--The +Capture of Atlanta--Absent from the Army--Hood's Operations in +Sherman's Rear--Sent Back to Thomas's Aid--Faulty Instructions to +Oppose Hood at Pulaski--At Columbia--Reason of the Delay in Exchanging +Messages. + +Chapter X. Hood Forces the Crossing of Duck River--Importance of +Gaining Time for Thomas to Concentrate Reinforcements at Nashville +--The Affair at Spring Hill--Incidents of the Night Retreat--Thomas's +Reply to the Request that a Bridge be Laid over the Harpeth--The +Necessity of Standing Ground at Franklin--Hood's Formidable Attack +--Serious Error of Two Brigades of the Rear-Guard--Brilliant Services +of the Reserve--Yellow Fever Averted--Hood's Assaults Repulsed-- +Johnston's Criticism of Hood--The Advantage of Continuing the +Retreat to Nashville. + +Chapter XI. The Correspondence with General Thomas previous to +the Battle of Franklin--The Untenable Position at Pulaski--Available +Troops which were not Sent to the Front--Correspondence with General +Thomas--Instructions Usually Received too Late--Advantage of Delaying +the Retreat from Duck River--No Serious Danger at Spring Hill-- +General Thomas Hoping that Hood might be Delayed for Three Days at +Franklin. + +Chapter XII. After the Battle of Franklin--The Arrival at Nashville +--General Thomas's Greeting--A Refreshing Sleep--Services of the +Cavalry Corps and the Fourth Army Corps--Hood's Mistake after +Crossing Duck River--An Incident of the Atlanta Campaign Bearing +on Hood's Character--An Embarrassing Method of Transmitting Messages +in Cipher--The Aggressive Policy of the South. + +Chapter XIII. Grant Orders Thomas to Attack Hood or Relinquish +the Command--Thomas's Corps Commanders Support Him in Delay--Grant's +Intentions in Sending Logan to Relieve Thomas--Change of Plan before +the Battle of Nashville--The Fighting of December 15--Expectation +that Hood would Retreat--Delay in Renewing the Attack on the 16th +--Hopelessness of Hood's Position--Letters to Grant and Sherman-- +Transferred to the East--Financial Burden of the War--Thomas's +Attitude toward the War. + +Chapter XIV. Hood's Motive in Attempting the Impossible at Nashville +--Diversity of Opinions Concerning that Battle--No Orders on Record +for the Battle of December 16--That Battle due to the Spontaneous +Action of Subordinate Commanders--Statements in the Reports of the +Corps Commanders--Explanation of the Absence of Orders--The +Phraseology of General Thomas's Report. + +Chapter XV. General Thomas's Indorsement on the Report of the +Battle of Franklin--Courtesies to Him in Washington--Peculiarities +of the Official Records in Regard to Franklin and Nashville-- +Documents Which Have Disappeared from the Records--Inconsistencies +in General Thomas's Report--False Representations Made to Him-- +Their Falsity Confirmed by General Grant. + +Chapter XVI. Sherman's "March to the Sea"--The Military Theory On +Which It Was Based--Did It Involve War or Statesmanship?--The +Correspondence Between Grant and Sherman, and Sherman and Thomas-- +The Effect of Jefferson Davis's Speech on Sherman--Rawlins's Reported +Opposition to the March, and Grant's Final Judgment On It. + +Chapter XVII. Sherman's Purpose in Marching to the Sea--His +Expectations that the Change of Base Would Be "Statesmanship," If +Not "War"--The Thousand-Mile March of Hood's Men to Surrender to +Sherman--The Credit Given by Grant to Sherman--"Master of the +Situation"--The Fame of Sherman's Grand Marches--His Great Ability +as a Strategist. + +Chapter XVIII. Transfer of the Twenty-Third Corps to North Carolina +--Sherman's Plan of Marching to the Rear of Lee--The Surrender of +J. E. Johnston's Army--Authorship of the Approved Terms of Surrender +--Political Reconstruction--Sherman's Genius--Contrast Between +Grant and Sherman--Halleck's Characteristics--His Attempt to Supplant +Grant--Personal Feeling in Battle--The Scars of War. + +Chapter XIX. The Restoration of Civil Government in the Southern +States--The Course Pursued in North Carolina--An Order from General +Grant in Regard to Cotton and Produce--Suggestions for the +Reorganization of Civil Government--A Provisional Governor for +North Carolina. + +Chapter XX. French Intervention in Mexico--A Plan to Compel the +Withdrawal of the French Army--Grant's Letter of Instructions to +General Sheridan--Secretary Seward Advocates Moral Suasion--A +Mission to Paris With That End in View--Speechmaking at the American +Thanksgiving Dinner--Napoleon's Method of Retreating with Dignity +--A Presentation to the Emperor and Empress. + +Chapter XXI. Reconstruction in Virginia--The State Legislature +Advised to Adopt the Fourteenth Amendment--Congressional Reconstruction +as a Result of the Refusal--The Manner in Which the Acts of Congress +Were Executed--No Resort to Trial by Military Commission--The +Obnoxious Constitution Framed by the State Convention--How Its +Worst Feature Was Nullified--Appointed Secretary of War. + +Chapter XXII. Differences Between the Commanding General of the +Army and the War Department--General Grant's Special Powers--His +Appointment as Secretary of War _Ad interim_--The Impeachment of +President Johnson--Memorandum of Interviews with William M. Evarts +and General Grant in Regard to the Secretaryship of War--Failure +of the Impeachment Trial--Harmony in the War Department--A New +Policy at Army Headquarters. + +Chapter XXIII. Assignment to the Department of the Missouri--A +Cordial Reception from Former Opponents in St. Louis--Origin of +the Military School at Fort Riley--Funeral of General George H. +Thomas--Death of General George G. Meade--Assigned to the Division +of the Pacific--A Visit to Hawaii--Military Men in the Exercise of +Political Power--Trouble with the Modoc Indians--The Canby Massacre. + +Chapter XXIV. Superintendent at West Point--General Sherman's +Ulterior Reasons for the Appointment--Origin of the "Department of +West Point"--Case of the Colored Cadet Whittaker--A Proposed Removal +for Political Effect--General Terry's Friendly Attitude--A Muddle +of New Commands--Waiting Orders, and a Visit to Europe--Again in +Command in the West--The Establishment of Fort Sheridan at Chicago. + +Chapter XXV. The Death of General Hancock--Assigned to the Division +of the Atlantic--Measures for Improving the Sea-Coast Defense-- +General Fitz-John Porter's Restoration to the Army--President of +the Board Appointed to Review the Action of the Court Martial-- +General Grant's Opinion--Senator Logan's Explanation of His Hostile +Attitude Toward General Porter. + +Chapter XXVI. The Death of General Sheridan--His Successor in +Command of the Army--Deplorable Condition of the War Department at +the Time--A Better Understanding Between the Department and the +Army Commander--General Sheridan's Humiliating Experience--The +Granting of Medals--The Secretary's Call-Bell--The Relations of +Secretary and General--Views Submitted to President Cleveland--The +Law Fixing Retirement for Age--An Anecdote of General Grant. + +Chapter XXVII. President of the New Board of Ordnance and +Fortifications--Usefulness of the Board--Troubles with the Sioux +Indians in 1890-1891--Success of the Plan to Employ Indians as +Soldiers--Marriage to Miss Kilbourne--The Difficulty with Chili in +1892. + +Chapter XXVIII. Services of the Army During the Labor Strikes of +1894--Military Control of the Pacific Railways--United States Troops +in the City of Chicago--Orders Sent to General Miles, and his +Reports--The Proclamation of the President--Instructions to Govern +the Troops in Dealing with a Mob--The Duties of the Military +Misunderstood--Orders of the President in Regard to the Pacific +Railways. + +Chapter XXIX. Lessons of the Civil War--Weakness of the Military +Policy at the Outbreak of the Rebellion--A Poor Use of the Educated +Soldiers of the Army--Military Wisdom Shown by the Confederate +Authorities--Territorial Strategy--General Military Education +Indispensable to Good Citizenship--Organization of the National +Guard--General Grant Without Military Books--Measures Necessary to +the National Defense. + +Chapter XXX. The Financial Lesson of the Civil War--Approaching +Bankruptcy of the Government near the Close of the War--The Legal- +Tender Notes an Injury to the Public Credit--A Vicious Clause in +the Constitution--No Prejudice in the Army Against Officers Not +Educated at West Point--The Need of a Law Reforming the Relations +Between the President and the Commander of the Army--Devotion to +the Chosen Leader in Times of Public Peril. + +Chapter XXXI. General Sherman's Friendship--His Death--General +Grant's Recognition of Services--His Great Trait, Moral and +Intellectual Honesty--His Confidence in Himself--Grant, Like Lincoln, +a Typical American--On the Retired List of the Army--Conclusion. + +Index. + + +FORTY-SIX YEARS +IN THE ARMY + + +FORTY-SIX YEARS +IN THE ARMY + +CHAPTER I +Parentage and Early Life--Appointment to West Point--Virginian Room- +Mates--Acquaintance with General Winfield Scott--Character of the +West Point Training--Importance of Learning how to Obey--A trip to +New York on a Wager--The West Point Bible-class--Dismissed from +the Academy Without Trial--Intercession of Stephen A. Douglas-- +Restoration to Cadet Duty--James B. McPherson--John B. Hood--Robert +E. Lee. + +I was born in the town of Gerry, Chautauqua County, New York, +September 29, 1831. My father was the Rev. James Schofield, who +was then pastor of the Baptist Church in Sinclairville, and who +was from 1843 to 1881 a "home missionary" engaged in organizing +new churches and building "meeting-houses" in Illinois, Iowa, and +Missouri. My mother was Caroline McAllister, daughter of John +McAllister of Gerry. We removed to Illinois in June, 1843, and, +after a short stay in Bristol, my father made a new home for his +family in Freeport, where he began his missionary work by founding +the First Baptist Church of that place. + +In all my childhood and youth I had what I regard as the best +possible opportunities for education, in excellent public schools +where the rudiments of English were taught with great thoroughness, +and in a fair amount of all kinds of manly sports, and in hard +work, mainly on the farm and in building a new home, which left no +time and little inclination for any kind of mischief. At sixteen +years of age I spent three months in surveying public lands in the +wilds of northern Wisconsin, and at seventeen taught district school +in the little town of Oneco. By that time I had chosen the law as +my profession, and was working hard to complete the preparatory +studies at my own expense. + + APPOINTMENT TO WEST POINT + +The winter's school term in Oneco having closed early in the spring +of 1849, I returned to Freeport and resumed my struggle with Latin. +Then an unforseen event turned the course of my life. The young +man who had been appointed to West Point from our district only a +year or two before had failed to continue his course in the Military +Academy. Thus a vacancy occurred just at the close of Mr. Thomas +J. Turner's term in Congress. There was no time for applications +or for consultation. He must select another candidate to enter +the following June, or leave the place to be filled by his successor. +Fortunately for me, Mr. Turner, as one of the public-school directors, +had been present at an examination where the subject with which I +had to deal was mathematical; if he had caught me at Latin, the +result must have been fatal to all my prospects. Besides, Mr. +Turner had heard from his brother James of the stamina I had shown +in the public land-surveying expedition; and also from my father +of my determination to get a good education before beginning the +study of law. So he brought me a cadet appointment when he came +home, and said he believed a boy with that record could get through +West Point, the training there being, in his opinion, a good +preparation for the study of law. + +The little savings from all my past work had been invested in a +piece of land which was sold to fit me out for my journey to West +Point, including some inexpensive visits en route. I reported at +the Academy on June 1, 1849, with less than two dollars in my +pocket, which I conscientiously deposited with the treasurer, as +required by the regulations. My reception was of the most satisfactory +character. William P. Curlin of the second class, and Hezekiah H. +Garber of the third, both from Illinois, found me out very soon +after I reported, took me under their protection in a brotherly +way, and gave me some timely advice--not to take too seriously any +little fun the "men" might make of my blue dress-coat and fancy +gilt buttons, or anything like that; but I never experienced anything +even approaching to hazing. My rather mature appearance may have +had something to do with the respect generally paid me. It was +true I was only seventeen years and nine months old, as recorded +in the register, but my experience may have had some visible effect. + +I was assigned to a room in the old South Barracks, which were +demolished the next year. My room-mates were Henry H. Walker and +John R. Chambliss, two charming fellows from Virginia. We had +hardly learned each other's names when one of them said something +about the "blank Yankees"; but instantly, seeing something that +might perhaps have appeared like Southern blood in my face, added, +"_You_ are not a _Yankee!_" I replied, "Yes, I am from Illinois." +"Oh," said he, "we don't call Western men Yankees." In that remark +I found my mission at West Point, as in after life, to be, as far +as possible, a peacemaker between the hostile sections. If the +great West could have been heard, and its more dispassionate voice +heeded, possibly peace might have been preserved. + +My experience at West Point did not differ in many particulars from +the general average of cadet life, but a few incidents may be worthy +of special mention. My experience in camp was comparatively limited. +The first summer I was on guard only once. Then the corporal of +the grand rounds tried to charge over my post without giving the +countersign, because I had not challenged promptly. We crossed +bayonets, but I proved too strong for him, and he gave it up, to +the great indignation of the officer of the day, who had ordered +him to charge, and who threatened to report me, but did not. That +night I slept on the ground outside the guard tents, and caught +cold, from which my eyes became badly inflamed, and I was laid up +in the hospital during the remainder of my encampment. On that +account I had a hard struggle with my studies the next year. While +sitting on the east porch of the hospital in the afternoon, I +attracted the kind attention of General Winfield Scott, who became +from that time a real friend, and did me a great service some years +later. + + CHARACTER OF THE WEST POINT TRAINING + +In our third-class encampment, when corporal of the guard, I had +a little misunderstanding one night with the sentinel on post along +Fort Clinton ditch, which was then nearly filled by a growth of +bushes. The sentinel tore the breast of my shell-jacket with the +point of his bayonet, and I tumbled him over backward into the +ditch and ruined his musket. But I quickly helped him out, and +gave him my musket in place of his, with ample apologies for my +thoughtless act. We parted, as I thought, in the best of feeling; +but many years later, a colonel in the army told me that story, as +an illustration of the erroneous treatment sometimes accorded to +sentinels in his time, and I was thus compelled to tell him I was +that same corporal, to convince him that he had been mistaken as +to the real character of the treatment he had received. + +That third-class year I lived in the old North barracks, four of +us in one room. There, under the malign influence of two men who +were afterward found deficient, I contracted the bad habit of +fastening a blanket against the window after "taps," so that no +one could see us "burning the midnight oil" over pipes and cards. +The corps of cadets was not as much disciplined in our day as it +is now. If it had been, I doubt if I should have graduated. As +it was, I got 196 demerits out of a possible 200 one year. One +more "smoking in quarters" would have been too much for me. I +protest now, after this long experience, that nothing else at West +Point was either so enjoyable or so beneficial to me as smoking. +I knew little and cared less about the different corps of the army, +or about the value of class standing. I became quite indignant +when a distinguished friend rather reproved me for not trying to +graduate higher--perhaps in part from a guilty conscience, for it +occurred just after we had graduated. I devoted only a fraction +of the study hours to the academic course--generally an hour, or +one and a half, to each lesson. But I never intentionally neglected +any of my studies. It simply seemed to me that a great part of my +time could be better employed in getting the education I desired +by the study of law, history, rhetoric, and general literature. +Even now I think these latter studies have proved about as useful +to me as what I learned of the art and science of war; and they +are essential to a good general education, no less in the army than +in civil life. I have long thought it would be a great improvement +in the Military Academy if a much broader course could be given to +those young men who come there with the necessary preparation, +while not excluding those comparatively young boys who have only +elementary education. There is too much of the "cast-iron" in this +government of law under which we live, but "mild steel" will take +its place in time, no doubt. The conditions and interests of so +vast a country and people are too varied to be wisely subjected to +rigid rules. + +But I must not be misunderstood as disparaging the West Point +education. As it was, and is now, there is, I believe, nothing +equal to it anywhere in this country. Its methods of developing +the reasoning faculties and habits of independent thought are the +best ever devised. West Point _training_ of the mind is practically +perfect. Its general discipline is excellent and indispensable in +the military service. Even in civil life something like it would +be highly beneficial. In my case that discipline was even more +needed than anything else. The hardest lesson I had to learn was +to submit my will and opinions to those of an accidental superior +in rank, who, I imagined, was my inferior in other things, and it +took me many years to learn it. Nothing is more absolutely +indispensable to a good soldier than perfect subordination and +zealous service to him whom the national will may have made the +official superior for the time being. I now think it one of the +most important lessons of my own experience that, while I had no +difficulty whatever in securing perfect subordination and obedience +in a large public school when I was only seventeen years old, or +ever afterward in any body of troops, from a squad of cadets up to +a body of men, others did not find it by any means so easy to +discipline me. What I needed to learn was not so much how to +command as how to obey. + +My observation of others has also taught much the same lesson. +Too early independence and exercise of authority seem to beget some +degree of disrespect for the authority of others. I once knew a +young major-general who, in his zeal to prevent what he believed +to be the improper application of some public funds, assumed to +himself the action which lawfully belonged to the Secretary of War. +The question thus raised was considered paramount to that of the +proper use of the funds. The young officer lost his point, and +got a well-merited rebuke. But it is not to be expected that +complete military education can be obtained without complete military +experience. The rules of subordination and obedience _in_ an army +are so simple that everybody learns them with the utmost ease. +But the relations between the army and its administrative head, +and with the civil power, are by no means so simple. When a too +confident soldier rubs up against them, he learns what "military" +discipline really means. It sometimes takes a civilian to "teach +a soldier his place" in the government of a republic. If a soldier +desires that his own better judgment shall control military policy, +he must take care not to let it become known that the judgment is +his. If he can contrive to let that wise policy be invented by +the more responsible head, it will surely be adopted. It should +never be suspected by anybody that there is any difference of +opinion between the soldier and his civil chief; and nobody, not +even the chief, will ever find it out if the soldier does not tell +it. The highest quality attributed to Von Moltke was his ability +to make it clearly understood by the Emperor and all the world that +the Emperor himself commanded the German army. + + A TRIP TO NEW YORK ON A WAGER + +My constitutional habit once led me into a very foolish exploit at +West Point. A discussion arose as to the possibility of going to +New York and back without danger of being caught, and I explained +the plan I had worked out by which it could be done. (I will not +explain what the plan was, lest some other foolish boy try it.) +I was promptly challenged to undertake it for a high wager, and +that challenge overcame any scruple I may have had. I cared nothing +for a brief visit to New York, and had only five dollars in my +pocket which Jerome N. Bonaparte loaned me to pay my way. But I +went to the city and back, in perfect safety, between the two roll- +calls I had to attend that day. Old Benny Havens of blessed memory +rowed me across the river to Garrison's, and the Cold Spring ferryman +back to the Point a few minutes before evening parade. I walked +across the plain in full view of the crowd of officers and ladies, +and appeared in ranks at roll-call, as innocent as anybody. It is +true my up-train did not stop at Garrison's or Cold Spring, but +the conductor, upon a hint as to the necessity of the case, kindly +slackened the speed of the express so that I could jump off from +the rear platform. In due time I repaid Bonaparte the borrowed +five dollars, but the wager was never paid. The only other bet I +made at West Point was on Buchanan's election; but that was in the +interest of a Yankee who was not on speaking terms with the Southerner +who offered the wager. I have never had any disposition to wager +anything on chance, but have always had an irresistible inclination +to back my own skill whenever it has been challenged. The one +thing most to be condemned in war is the leaving to chance anything +which by due diligence might be foreseen. In the preparations for +defense, especially, there is no longer any need that anything be +left to chance or uncertainty. + + THE WEST POINT BIBLE-CLASS + +I attended the Bible-class regularly every Sunday after I went to +West Point, and rejoiced greatly in that opportunity to hear the +Scriptures expounded by the learned doctor of divinity of the +Military Academy. I had never doubted for a moment that every word +of the Bible was divinely inspired, for my father himself had told +me it was. But I always had a curious desire to know the reason +of things; and, more than that, some of my fellows were inclined +to be a little skeptical, and I wanted the reasons with which I +could overwhelm their unworthy doubts. So I ventured to ask the +professor one Sunday what was the evidence of divine inspiration. +He answered only what my father had before told me, that it was +"internal evidence"; but my youthful mind had not yet perceived +that very clearly. Hence I ventured very modestly and timidly to +indicate my need of some light that would enable me to see. The +learned doctor did not vouchsafe a word in reply, but the look of +amazement and scorn he gave me for my display of ignorance sealed +my lips on that subject forever. I have never since ventured to +ask anybody any questions on that subject, but have studied it out +for myself as well as I could. Soon after that the doctor preached +a sermon in which he denounced skepticism in his own vigorous terms, +and consigned to perdition all the great teachers of heresy, of +whom he mentioned the names--before unheard, I am sure, by the +great majority of cadets, thought their works were to be found in +the West Point and all other public libraries. I never looked into +any of those books, though other cadets told me that they, at his +suggestion, had sought there for the information the good doctor +had refused to give us. I have never, even to this day, been +willing to read or listen to what seemed to me irreverent words, +even though they might be intended to convey ideas not very different +from my own. It has seemed to me that a man ought to speak with +reverence of the religion taught him in his childhood and believed +by his fellow-men, or else keep his philosophical thoughts, however +profound, to himself. + +Another sermon of the good doctor of divinity, which I did not +happen to hear, on the Mosaic history of creation, contained, as +stated to me, a denunciation of the "God-hating geologists." That +offended me, for I had, in common with all the other cadets, learned +greatly to admire and respect our professor of geology. So I did +not go to the Bible-class any more. But the professor of ethics +continued to drive his fine fast horse, much the best one on the +Point, and I believe the best I had ever seen. Hence he continued +to enjoy my esteem, though perhaps he did not know it. + +Near the beginning of the last year of my cadet life an event +occurred which very nearly proved fatal to my prospects, and I have +often wondered that it did not have some effect on my hopes. But, +singularly enough, I never had a moment's doubt or anxiety as to +the final result. It was then the custom for candidates to report +on June 1, or within the next few days. They were organized into +sections, and placed under the instruction of cadets selected from +the second class to prepare them, as far as possible, for examination +about the middle of the month. I was given charge of a section in +arithmetic, and have never in all my life discharged my duty with +more conscientious fidelity than I drilled those boys in the subject +with which I was familiar, and in teaching which I had had some +experience. We had gone over the entire course upon which they +were to be examined, and all were well prepared except two who +seemed hopelessly deficient upon a few subjects which they had been +unable to comprehend. Not willing to omit the last possible effort +in behalf of those two boys, I took them to the blackboard and +devoted the last fifteen or twenty minutes before the bugle-call +to a final effort to prepare them for the ordeal they must face +the next morning. While I was thus employed several of my classmates +came into the room, and began talking to the other candidates. +Though their presence annoyed me, it did not interfere with my +work; so I kept on intently with the two young boys until the bugle +sounded. + + DISMISSED FROM THE ACADEMY WITHOUT TRIAL + +I then went to my quarters without paying any attention to the +interruption, or knowing anything of the character of what had +occurred. But one of the candidates, perhaps by way of excuse for +his failure, wrote to his parents some account of the "deviltry" +in which my classmates had indulged that day. That report found +its way to the War Department, and was soon followed by an order +to the commandant of cadets to investigate. The facts were found +fully to exonerate me from any participation in or countenance of +the deviltry, except that I did not stop it; and showed that I had +faithfully done my duty in teaching the candidates. After this +investigation was over, I was called upon to answer for my own +conduct; and, the names of my guilty classmates being unknown to +the candidates, I was also held responsible for their conduct. I +answered by averring and showing, as I believed, my own innocence +of all that had been done, except my neglect of duty in tolerating +such a proceeding. My conscience was so clear of any intentional +wrong that I had no anxiety about the result. But in due time +came an order from the Secretary of War dismissing me from the +academy without trial. That, I believe, shocked me a little; but +the sense of injustice was too strong in my mind to permit of a +doubt that it would be righted when the truth was known. I proposed +to go straight to Washington and lay the facts before the government. +Then I realized for the first time what it meant to have friends. +All my classmates and many other cadets came forward with letters +to their congressmen, and many of them to senators whom they happened +to know, and other influential men in Washington. So I carried +with me a great bundle of letters setting forth my virtues in terms +which might have filled the breast of George Washington with pride. + +There was no public man in Washington whom I had ever seen, and +probably no one who had ever heard of me, except the few in the +War Department who knew of my alleged bad conduct. The Secretary +of War would not even see me until I was at last presented to him +by an officer of the army. Then he offered me his forefinger to +shake, but he could give me no encouragement whatever. This was +after I had been in Washington several weeks. My congressman, Mr. +Campbell, who had succeeded Mr. Turner, and several others received +me kindly, read my letters, and promised to see the Secretary of +War, which no doubt they did, though without any apparent effect. +The only result was the impossible suggestion that if I would give +the names of my guilty classmates I might be let off. I had made +an early call upon the "Little Giant," Senator Douglas, to whom I +had no letter, and whom I had never met; had introduced myself as +a "citizen of Illinois" in trouble; and had told my story. He said +he was not on good terms with that administration, and preferred +not to go near the War Department if it could be avoided, but if +it proved necessary to let him know. Hence, after all else failed, +including my personal appeal, which I had waited so long to make, +I told Mr. Douglas all that had occurred, and suggested that there +was nothing left but to "put in the reserve," as the tacticians +call it. He replied: "Come up in the morning, and we will go to +see about it." On our way to the War Department the next morning, +the senator said, "I don't know that I can do anything with this +---- Whig administration"; but he assured me all should be made +right in the next. That seemed to me the kind of man I had looked +for in vain up to that time. I waited in the anteroom only a few +minutes, when the great senator came out with a genial smile on +his face, shook me warmly by the hand, and bade by good-by, saying: +"It is all right. You can go back to West Point. The Secretary +has given me his promise." I need not go into the details of the +long and tedious formalities through which the Secretary's promise +was finally fulfilled. It was enough to me that my powerful friend +had secured the promise that, upon proof of the facts as I had +stated them, I should be fully exonerated and restored to the +academy. I returned to West Point, and went through the long forms +of a court of inquiry, a court martial, and the waiting for the +final action of the War Department, all occupying some five or six +months, diligently attending to my military and academic duties, +and trying hard to obey all the regulations (except as to smoking), +never for a moment doubting the final result. That lesson taught +me that innocence and justice sometimes need powerful backing. +Implicit trust in Providence does not seem to justify any neglect +to employ also the biggest battalions and the heaviest guns. + + JAMES B. McPHERSON + +During all that time I continued to live with my old room-mate, +James B. McPherson, in a tower room and an adjoining bedroom, which +LaRhett L. Livingston also shared. I had been corporal, sergeant, +and lieutenant up to the time of my dismissal; hence the duties of +private were a little difficult, and I found it hard to avoid +demerits; but with some help from our kind-hearted inspecting +officer, Milton Cogswell,--bless his memory!--I contrived to get +off with 196 demerits in a possible 200 that last year. In a mild +way, McPherson was also a little under a cloud at that time. He +had been first captain of the battalion and squad marcher of the +class at engineering drill. In this latter capacity he also had +committed the offense of not reporting some of the class for +indulging in unauthorized sport. The offense was not so grave as +mine, and, besides, his military record was very much better. So +he was let off with a large demerit mark and a sort of honorable +retirement to the office of quartermaster of the battalion. I +still think, as I did then, that McPherson's punishment was the +more appropriate. Livingston was one of those charming, amiable +fellows with whom nobody could well find any fault, though I believe +he did get a good many demerits. He also seemed to need the aid +of tobacco in his studies. William P. Craighill, who succeeded +McPherson as first captain, had no fault whatever, that I ever +heard of, except one--that was, standing too high for his age. He +was a beardless youth, only five feet high and sixteen years old +when he entered the academy; yet he was so inconsiderate as to keep +ahead of me all the time in everything but tactics, and that was +of no consequence to him, for he was not destined to command troops +in the field, while, as it turned out, I was. It has always seemed +to me a little strange that the one branch which I never expected +to use afterward was the only study in which I graduated at the +head. Perhaps McPherson and Craighill thought, as I did, that it +made no difference where I stood in tactics. + +Among all the tactical officers of our time, Lieutenant John M. +Jones was esteemed the most accomplished soldier and tactician, +and the most rigid but just and impartial disciplinarian. It had +been my good fortune to enjoy his instruction while I was private, +corporal, sergeant, and lieutenant, and I fully shared with others +in the above high estimate of his character. I even flattered +myself that my soldierly conduct in all that time had not escaped +his favorable notice. When my case was before the court of inquiry +in the summer of 1852, the professors who had been called to testify +gave me a high character as a faithful, diligent student. When +Lieutenant Jones was called to testify as to my character as a +soldier, he replied that, in his opinion, it was very bad! While +I was not a little surprised and disappointed at that revelation +of the truth from the lips of the superior whom I so highly respected, +and did not doubt for a moment his better judgment, I could not be +unmindful of the fact that the other tactical officers did not know +me so well and had not so high a reputation as Lieutenant Jones in +respect to discipline; and I felt at liberty to avail myself, in my +own interest, of the opportunity suggested by this reflection. +Hence, when, after my complete restoration to the academy in January, +I found my demerits accumulating with alarming rapidity, I applied +for and obtained a transfer to Company C, where I would be under +Lieutenant Cogswell and Cadet Captain Vincent, my beloved classmate, +who had cordially invited me to share his room in barracks. + + ROBERT E. LEE + +John B. Hood was a jolly good fellow, a little discouraged at first +by unexpected hard work; but he fought his way manfully to the end. +He was not quite so talented as some of his great associates in +the Confederate army, but he was a tremendous fighter when occasion +offered. During that last period of our cadet life, Colonel Robert +E. Lee was superintendent of the academy; he was the personification +of dignity, justice, and kindness, and he was respected and admired +as the ideal of a commanding officer. Colonel Robert S. Garnett +was commandant of cadets; he was a thorough soldier who meted out +impartial justice with both hands. At our last parade I received +"honorable mention" twice, both the personal judgment of the +commandant himself. The one was for standing at the head of the +class in tactics; the other, for "not carrying musket properly in +ranks." Who can ever forget that last parade, when the entire +class, officers and privates together, marched up in line and made +their salute to the gallant commandant! To a West-Pointer no other +emotion equals it, except that of victory in battle. + + +CHAPTER II +On Graduating Leave--Brevet Second Lieutenant in the 2d Artillery +at Fort Moultrie--An Officer's Credit Before the War--Second +Lieutenant in the 1st Artillery--Journey to Fort Capron, Florida-- +A Reservation as to Whisky--A Trip to Charleston and a Troublesome +Money-Bag--An "Affair of Honor"--A Few Law-books--An Extemporized +"Map and Itinerary"--Yellow Fever--At A. P. Hill's Home in Virginia +--Assigned to Duty in the Department of Philosophy at West Point-- +Interest in Astronomy--Marriage--A Hint from Jefferson Davis--Leave +of Absence--Professor of Physics in Washington University. + +An old army colonel many years ago described a West Point graduate, +when he first reported for duty after graduating leave, as a very +young officer with a full supply of self-esteem, a four-story +leather trunk filled with good clothes, and an empty pocket. To +that must be added, in my case, a debt equal to the full value of +trunk and clothes and a hundred dollars borrowed money. My "equipment +fund" and much more had been expended in Washington and in journeys +to and fro during the period of administrative uncertainty in +respect to the demands of discipline at West Point. Still I had +so good a time, that graduating leave, as any millionaire in the +United States. My good father was evidently disturbed, and began +to fear--for the first time, I think--that I was really going to +the bad! His worst fears as to the possible effects of a military +education had, after all, been realized! When I showed him the +first check from New York, covering my pay account for July, he +said that it was enough to ruin any boy in the world. Indeed, I +myself was conscious of the fact that I had not done a stroke of +work all that month for those sixty-five and a half dollars; and +in order that my father might be convinced of my determination not +to let such unearned wealth lead me into dissipation, I at once +offered to lend him fifty dollars to pay a debt due to somebody on +the Freeport Baptist meeting-house. Confidence was thereby +restored. + + BREVET SECOND LIEUTENANT + +My first orders assigned me to duty at Fort Moultrie, South Carolina, +as brevet second lieutenant in the 2d Artillery. The steamer landed +me at Charleston, September 29, 1853, the day I became twenty-two +years of age. The next morning I found myself without money enough +to pay my hotel bill and take me over to Sullivan's Island, but +pay was due me for September. Upon inquiry, I found that the +paymaster was not in the city, but that he kept his public funds +in the Bank of South Carolina. Being unacquainted with any of the +good people of Charleston, the well-known rules of banks about +identification seemed a serious obstacle. I presented my pay +account at the bank, informing the cashier with a confident air +that I was well aware of the fact that the major's money was there, +but that the major himself was out of town. The accomplished +cashier, after scrutinizing me for a time, handed me the money. +My older brother officers at the fort had a good laugh at what they +were pleased to call my "brass"; but I consoled myself with the +reflection that I had found out that my face was good for something. +It is an instructive fact that before the Civil War an officer of +the army needed no indorser anywhere in this country. His check +or his pay account was as good as gold. All that was required was +identification. It is lamentably true that such has not been the +case since the war. + +I found only one officer on duty with my battery at Fort Moultrie, +and he was awaiting my arrival so that he might go on leave. He +turned over the command with a manifestation of confidence which +surprised me at the time, but which was fully explained the next +day. In the morning the first sergeant reported to me, with the +quarterly and monthly returns prepared for my signature, and made +out more beautifully than anything in writing I had ever before +seen, and explained to me in detail all the business affairs of +the battery, as if he were reporting to an old captain who had just +returned from a long leave of absence. Next to General Scott and +Colonel Lee, with whom I had the honor of some acquaintance, I was +quite sure there stood before me the finest-looking and most +accomplished soldier in the United States Army. What a hard time +young officers of the army would sometimes have but for the old +sergeants! I have pitied from the bottom of my heart volunteer +officers whom I have seen starting out, even in the midst of war, +with perfectly raw regiments, and not even one old sergeant to +teach them anything. No country ought to be so cruel to its soldiers +as that. + +In September we had the usual artillery target practice, which was +afterward recalled to my mind many times by the bombardment of Fort +Sumter in 1861 by the same guns I had used in practice, and at the +same range. Then came the change of stations of troops, which took +the Moultrie garrison to Florida, and some of the 1st Artillery to +their place. For a time the fort was left without garrison except +a few officers who were awaiting the arrival of their regiment. +I also was ordered to remain until I "got off my brevet" and was +appointed "full second" in the 1st Artillery. It had been a yellow- +fever summer, and the cottages on Sullivan's Island were even more +fully occupied than usual, mostly by families of planters from the +rice plantations of South Carolina. Hospitality was unbounded, +and of the most charming character. Nothing I have experienced at +home or in the great capitals of Europe has surpassed or dimmed +the memory of that first introduction to Southern society. + + JOURNEY TO FORT CAPRON, FLORIDA + +In December, 1853, the order came announcing my appointment as +second lieutenant, 1st Artillery, and directing me to join Battery +D at Fort Capron, Indian River, Florida. A steamer took me to +Palatka, stopping a short time at Jacksonville, which was then +little more than a landing on the St. John's River. After a week's +delay at Palatka, another little mail-steamer carried me and few +other passengers up the river to lake Monroe, whence a mule served +for transportation across to New Smyrna, on Mosquito Lagoon, opposite +the inlet. It was a great day's sport going up the river. The +banks seemed almost lined with alligators, and the water covered +with water-fowl of all kinds, while an occasional deer or flock of +turkeys near by would offer a chance shot. At New Smyrna Mrs. +Sheldon provided excellent entertainment during the ten days' +waiting for the mail-boat down Mosquito Lagoon and Indian River, +while Mr. Sheldon's pack of hounds furnished sport. At length old +Captain Davis took the mail and my baggage and me on board his +sloop, bound for Fort Capron, opposite the mouth of Indian River. +He divided his time fairly between carrying the United States mail +and drinking whisky, but he never attempted to do both at the same +time. I am not sure but it was the captain's example which first +suggested to me the rule which I adopted when commanding an army +in the field--to do no drinking till after the day's fighting was +over. But, in fact, I never liked whisky, and never drank much, +anyhow. + +We arrived in twenty-five days from Charleston, which was regarded +as a very satisfactory journey. At the fort I found Captain and +Brevet-Major Joseph A. Haskin, commanding; First Lieutenant A. P. +Hill, afterward lieutenant-general in the Confederate army; Dr. A. +J. Foard, assistant surgeon; and my classmate Livingston, brevet +second lieutenant; besides sixteen enlisted men--rather a close +approximation to the ideal of that old colonel who once said the +army would be delightful if it were not for the ---- soldiers. +But that was changed after a while by the arrival of recruits-- +enough in one batch to fill the battery full. The battery had +recently come from the gulf coast, where yellow fever had done +destructive work. I was told that there happened to be only one +officer on duty with the battery--a Lieutenant somebody--when the +fever broke out, and that he resigned and went home. If that is +true, I trust he went into the Civil War and got killed in battle; +for that was the only atonement he could possibly make for leaving +his men in that way. But such cases have been exceedingly rare, +while those of the opposite extreme have not been uncommon, where +officers have remained with the sick and died there, instead of +going with the main body of their men to a more healthy place. +The proper place for a line officer is with the fighting force, to +care for it and preserve its strength by every means in his power, +for war may come to-morrow. The surgeons and their assistants must +and do fully care for the sick and wounded. + +Life at Fort Capron was not by any means monotonous. It was varied +by sailing, fishing, and shooting, and even the continuity of sport +was broken twice a month, generally, by the arrival of the mail- +boat. But at length this diversion failed us. Some difference +occurred between the United States Post-office Department and the +mail-contractor on the St. John's River, and we got no mail for +three months. Then the commanding officer ordered me to go to +Charleston by the sloop that had brought us supplies, and bring +back the mail by the regular route. I made the round trip in little +more than a month. That same paymaster whom I had found away from +his post on my first arrival in Charleston intrusted to me a carpet- +bag full of gold and silver, to pay off the garrison for the past +six months, with as much advance pay as the officers would consent +to take, so that he would not have to make the trip down for a long +time to come. I had to carry the money-bag and a revolver about +with me for twenty-five days or more. I have never consented to +handle Uncle Sam's money since that time. + + AN "AFFAIR OF HONOR" + +It was during that short visit to Charleston that I became engaged, +for the first and only time, in an "affair of honor." A young man +who had been in my class at West Point, but had resigned before +the class had graduated, came to me at the hotel, and asked me, as +his "friend," to deliver a note he held in his hand. I replied: +"Yes. If you will place yourself in my hands and do what I decide +is honorable and right, I will be your friend. Tell me about it." +My condition was accepted without reserve. My friend, whose home +was in a distant city, had been in Charleston some weeks, and had +spent all the money he had and all he could borrow. He was on the +eve of negotiating a further loan from a well-known banker when +the son of that banker, who had met my friend about town, told his +father the plain truth about my friend's habits and his probable +value as a debtor. The negotiation was ended. My friend had become +a stranger in a strange land, without the means to stay there any +longer or to go home. It was a desperate case--one which could +not be relived by anything less than the blood of the young "villain" +who had told his father that "infamous"--truth! I replied: "Yes, +that is a bad case; we will have to fix that up. How are you off +at home?" He said the "old man" had plenty of money, but had sent +him enough to come home once or twice before, and would not send +any more. Upon further inquiry, I found that my friend's hotel +bill and expenses home would amount to a little less than the sum +I had just drawn on my pay account up to date; so I handed him the +money, saying that he could return it when convenient, and his +"honor" was fully satisfied. I never afterward heard anything from +him about that money, and my tailor had to wait a little longer +for his pay; but I had done my duty, as I understood it, under the +code of honor. I saw that friend once afterward. He went into +the army in 1861, accidentally shot himself, and died miserably on +the march, an old musket-barrel, placed there by my order, marking +his grave by the wayside. It was not granted to him, poor fellow! +to fight a battle for his country. + +I took with me to Florida some law-books--Blackstone, Kent, and a +few others: so few, indeed, that I learned them nearly all by heart; +then, for want of anything better, I read over the entire code of +the State of Florida. Several times in after years I found it +necessary, in order to save time, to repeat to great lawyers the +exact words of the Constitution of the United States; but their +habit was much the better. It is seldom wise to burden the memory +with those things which you have only to open a book to find out. +I recollect well that answer once made by William M. Evarts, then +attorney-general of the United States, to my inquiry whether he +would give me, offhand, the law on a certain point, to save the +time requisite for a formal application and answer in writing. He +said if it was a question of statute law he would have to examine +the books, but if only a question of common law he could make that +as well as anybody. But I had nothing better to do for a time in +Florida, and when I got out I did not find my memory half so much +overloaded with law as my blood was with malarial poison. Luckily, +I got rid of the poison after a while, but held on to the law, and +I never found it did me any harm. In fact, I would advise all +young officers to acquire as much of it as they can. + + AN EXTEMPORZIED "MAP AND ITINERARY" + +In the winter of 1853-4 there was an armed truce between the United +States of America and the Seminole nation. A new policy was soon +inaugurated, which had for its object to establish a complete line +of posts across the State from Jupiter to Lake Okeechobee, and +thence westward to the gulf, so as more securely to confine the +Seminoles within the Everglade region, although, so far as I know, +nobody then wanted the use of that more northern part of this vast +territory. The first step was to reopen the old military road from +the mouth of Indian River across to the Kissimmee River, and thence +to Tampa. Being the second lieutenant of the single company, I +was given the privilege of doing that work, and nine men and one +wagon were assigned me for that purpose. I spent the larger part +of my time, going and coming, in hunting on either the right or +left of the road, thereby obtaining all the deer and turkeys the +command could consume, but paying very little attention to the road +itself, in utter disregard of the usual military rule which requires +that a sketch be made and an itinerary kept of all such marches. +Hence I was a little puzzled when Acting-Inspector-General Canby, +from Washington, wanted to go across from Indian River to Tampa, +and called on me for a copy of my map and itinerary. But I had +stood very high in drawing at West Point, and could not allow myself +to be disturbed in any such way as that; so I unlocked what little +recollection I had of the route and my general knowledge of the +country, and prepared a very beautiful map and a quite elaborate +itinerary, with which the inspector-general seemed greatly pleased. +But I took great care, in addition, to send a man with him who had +been with me, and who was a good guide, so I felt quite safe +respecting any possible imperfections that the inspector-general +might find in my work. I never heard anything more about that +matter until General Sherman and I met General Canby at Portland +in 1870. At that time we had a little laugh at my expense respecting +the beauty of that map of mine, and the accuracy with which I had +delineated the route. But as I was then a major-general, and Canby +was a brigadier-general under my command, I was not subjected to +the just criticism I deserved for having forgotten that map and +itinerary at the time I made the march. + + YELLOW FEVER + +The next step in the strategical operations designed by the War +Department for Florida was the occupation of Fort Jupiter, and the +construction of a new post there, reopening the old military road +of General Jessup and building a block-house on the bank of Lake +Okeechobee, similar work to be undertaken from the other shore of +the lake westward. The work was commenced about midwinter of 1854- +5, and it was my privilege to do it. When the hot weather came on +at Jupiter, fever began to break out among the troops. Jupiter +Inlet had been closed for several years, and the water had become +stagnant. Within a very few weeks, every man, woman, and child +was down, or had been down, with fever. The mortality was such +that there were hardly enough strong men remaining to bury the +dead. As soon as I had sufficiently recovered to go in a boat to +Fort Capron, the major sent me back with all the convalescents that +were fit to be moved, and soon afterward broke up that pest-house +at Jupiter and moved the command back to Capron. So far as I know, +Fort Jupiter was never again occupied, and I think the block-house +on Lake Okeechobee was never completed. At all events, as good +luck would have it, I got through with my part of the work and was +ordered out of Florida before the Seminoles found out what the +plans of the War Department were. My old friend and companion +George L. Hartsuff, who had like duty to perform on the west side +of the lake, was attacked by the Indians and severely wounded, +several of his men being killed. He and a few others made their +escape. Hartsuff was one of the strongest, bravest, finest soldiers +I ever knew, and one of my most intimate friends; but, unlike +myself, he was always in bad luck. He got caught by the Seminoles +in Florida; was shipwrecked on Lake Michigan; came very near dying +of yellow fever; and after organizing the Twenty-third Army Corps +and commanding it for a time, finally died of the wounds he had +received in Florida. + +I had a new and peculiar experience at Fort Capron during my +convalescence. I had there twenty-five or thirty convalescent +soldiers, and no doctor, but an intelligent hospital steward. I +was like the lawyer who was asked to say grace at the table of one +of his wealthy clients, and who was unwilling to admit, under such +circumstances, that there was any one thing he could not do. So +I had sick-call regularly every morning, carefully questioned every +patient as to his symptoms, and told the steward what to give him, +taking care not to prescribe anything which some doctor had not +tried on me. All my patients got well. At length A. P. Hill came +up from Jupiter, on his way home on sick-leave. At Capron he had +a relapse, and was desperately ill. I had to send a barge to +Jupiter for some medicine which he knew was necessary. Mr. Jones, +the sutler, and some of the men helped me to nurse him night and +day for a long time. At length he recovered so far as to continue +his journey. + +About the same time came orders promoting me to first lieutenant +and detailing me for duty at West Point. So Hill and I came out +of Florida together. On board the St. John's River steamer I had +a relapse, and was very ill. Hill cared for me tenderly, kept me +at Savannah awhile, and then some days at Charleston, where I became +so much better that he ventured to leave me long enough to go over +to Fort Moultrie to see some of our brother officers. While he +was away I became so ill again that the doctor had to put me under +the influence of chloroform. When Hill came back in the evening +he cursed himself for all that was mean in the world for having +left me even for an hour. That's the kind of friends and comrades +soldiers are! As soon as I was well enough to travel, Hill took +me to his home at Culpeper Court-House in Virginia. There they +kept me quite a long time. That dear old gentleman, his father, +brought to my bedside every morning a brandy mint-julep, made with +his own hand, to drink before I got up. Under its benign influence +my recovery was very rapid. But let none of my young friends forget +that the best gifts of Providence are those most liable to be +abused. The wise Virginian never offered me too many of them. By +the first of December Hill and I went together to West Point, I to +report for duty, and he to visit his numerous warm friends at that +delightful station. There we parted, in December, 1855, never to +meet again. With the glad tidings from Virginia that peace was +near, there came to me in North Carolina the report that Lieutenant- +General A. P. Hill had been killed in the last battle at Petersburg. +A keen pang shot through my heart, for he had not ceased to be +esteemed as my kind friend and brother, though for four years +numbered among the public enemy. His sense of duty, so false in +my judgment, I yet knew to be sincere, because I knew the man. I +wish all my fellow-citizens, North and South, East and West, could +know each other as well as I knew A. P. Hill. + + IN THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY AT WEST POINT + +I was assigned to duty in the department of philosophy, under +Professor W. H. C. Bartlett, one of the ablest, most highly esteemed, +and most beloved of the great men who have placed the United States +Military Academy among the foremost institutions of the world. At +first it seemed a little strange to be called back, after the lapse +of only two years, to an important duty at the place where my +military record had been so "bad." But I soon found that at West +Point, as elsewhere, the standard of merit depended somewhat upon +the point of view of the judge. A master of "philosophy" could +not afford to look too closely into past records in other subjects. +Besides, philosophers know, if others do not, that philosophers +are sure to profit by healthful experience. I never had any more +trouble at West Point, though I did have much difficulty in helping +younger men out. I had the great good fortune never to be compelled +to report a cadet for any delinquency, nor to find one deficient +in studies, though I did sometimes have, figuratively speaking, to +beat them over the head with a cudgel to get in "phil" enough to +pass the academic board. + +I had then a strong impression, which has grown still stronger with +time, that "equations A and B" need not be developed very far into +the "mechanics of molecules" to qualify a gallant young fellow for +the command of a squadron of cavalry; but this is, in fact, generally +and perfectly well understood at West Point. The object there is +to develop the mental, moral, and physical man to as high a degree +as is practicable, and to ascertain his best place in the public +service. It is only the hopelessly incorrigible in some respect +who fall by the way. Even they, if they have stayed there long +enough, are the better for the training they have received. + +In this congenial work and its natural sequence I formed for the +first time the habit of earnest, hard mental work to the limit of +my capacity for endurance, and sometimes a little beyond, which I +have retained the greater part of my life. After the short time +required to master the "Analytical Mechanics" which had been +introduced as a text-book since I had graduated, and a short absence +on account of my Florida debility, which had reduced me to 120 +pounds in weight, I began to pursue physics into its more secret +depths. I even indulged the ambition to work out the mathematical +interpretation of all the phenomena of physical science, including +electricity and magnetism. After three years of hard labor in this +direction, I thought I could venture to publish a part of my work +in book form, and thus submit it to the judgment of the able +scientists whose acquaintance I had made at the meetings of the +American Association for the Advancement of Science.( 1) + + INTEREST IN ASTRONOMY + +While I was engaged in this work upon physics, a young gentleman +named Drown came to West Point, and asked me to give him some +private lessons in mechanics and astronomy, to perfect his +qualifications as a teacher. I went over those subjects with him +in about one hundred lessons, including a few in practical astronomy. +He was the most ardent student I have ever known. Like, I doubt +not, all the most earnest seekers for divine truth, in whatever +way revealed to man, he would not be satisfied with his own perception +of such truth unless he could feel it "burn in his brain." In that +brief experience I became for the first time intensely interested +in practical astronomy, about which I had thought little before, +although I had had sole charge of the observatory for some time. +I have always since given Professor Drown credit for teaching me +practical astronomy by first leading me to the discovery that I +had a natural taste and aptitude for such work, theretofore +unsuspected. That new "lead" was followed with all possible zeal, +day and night, for many months, until all the instruments in the +observatory, fixed and movable, including the old mural circle, +had gone through a season's work. Although my scientific experience +has been very limited, I do not believe anything else in the broad +domain of science can be half so fascinating as the study of the +heavens. I have regretted many times that necessity limited my +enjoyment of that great pleasure to a very few years instead of a +lifetime. + +In that West Point observatory I had one of the many opportunities +of my life--one which I always enjoyed--of protecting the unfortunate +from the stern decree of "justice." The old German custodian came +to me one morning in great distress, saying that he had let the +"astronomical chronometer" run down, and that the professor would +kill him. I went with him to the transit tower, made an observation, +and set the chronometer. The professor never knew the difference +till I told him, after the lapse of time named in the military +statute of limitations. Then he seemed to rejoice as much as I +over the narrow escape of his faithful subordinate. The professor +was not half as stern as he sometimes appeared to be. + +I need hardly say that in the midst of these absorbing occupations +I forgot all about the career I had chosen in my boyhood. The law +had no longer any charms for me. Yet I found in after life far +more use for the law than for physics and astronomy, and little +less than for the art and science of war. + +In June, 1857, I married Miss Harriet Bartlett, the second daughter +of my chief in the department of philosophy. Five children were +born to us, three of whom--two sons and one daughter--grew to +maturity and survive their mother, who died in Washington soon +after I was assigned to the command of the army, and was buried at +West Point by the side of our first-born son, who had died in 1868, +soon after I became Secretary of War. + +In the summer of 1860 came the end of my term of duty at West Point. +My taste for service in the line of the army, if I ever had any, +was gone; and all hope of promotion, if I ever had any, was still +further away. I had been for more than four years about nineteenth +first lieutenant in my regiment, without rising a single file. I +was a man of family, and had already become quite bald "in the +service of my country." There was no captaincy in sight for me +during the ordinary lifetime of man, so I accepted the professorship +of physics in Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri. But Mr. +Jefferson Davis, an intimate friend of my father-in-law, gave me +a timely hint that promotion might be better in a year or two; and +his bitterest personal enemy, General Scott, gave me a highly +flattering indorsement which secured leave of absence for a year. +Thus I retained my commission. + + PROFESSOR OF PHYSICS IN WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY + +As the period of the Civil War approached a very large part of my +time was occupied in reading and studying, as coolly as possible, +every phase of the momentous questions which I had been warned must +probably be submitted to the decision of war. Hence, when the +crisis came I was not unprepared to decide for myself, without +prejudice or passion, where the path of duty lay, yet not without +some feeling of indulgence toward my brother officers of the army +who, as I believed, were led by the influence of others so far +astray. I took an early occasion to inform General Scott of my +readiness to relinquish my leave of absence and return to duty +whenever my services might be required, and I had the high honor +of not being requested to renew my oath of allegiance. + +My life in St. Louis during the eight months next preceding the +Civil War was of great benefit to me in the delicate and responsible +duties which so soon devolved upon me. My connection with Washington +University brought me into close relations with many of the most +patriotic, enlightened, and, above all, unselfish citizens of +Missouri. Some of them were of the Southern school of politics, +but the large majority were earnest Union men, though holding the +various shades of opinion then common on the question of slavery. +By long and intimate intercourse, in the joint prosecution of the +work of the highest philanthropy, such men had learned to respect +the sincerity of each others's adverse convictions, and had become +the exact exemplars of the many shades of honest, patriotic Unionism +so clearly described in 1863 by President Lincoln in his letter to +a delegation of partizans who had not learned that principle of +charity which seems to have been born in the great martyr of +freedom. + +Would that I could do fitting honor to the names of those patriots, +nearly all of whom have gone to their rest, including Dr. Elliot, +President of Washington University. James E. Yeatman, President +of the Sanitary Commission, still lives to honor his country and +the great cause of humanity of which he was the faithful and +efficient servant. I did not meet Hamilton R. Gamble until after +he had become governor. I shall have occasion to say more of him +later. He was the foremost champion of the Union cause in Missouri, +and the most abused by those who were the loudest in their professions +of loyalty. Of the younger generation, I will mention only one, +whose good deeds would otherwise never be known. While himself +absent in the public service, wherein he was most efficient, he +made me occupy his delightful residence near Lafayette Park, and +consume all the products of his excellent garden. We knew each +other then only as fellow-workers in the Union cause, but have been +the most devoted friends from that day to this. The name of that +dear friend of mine is Charles Gibson. Among the earliest and most +active leaders in the Union cause in Missouri, I must not fail to +mention the foremost--Frank P. Blair, Jr. His patriotism and +courage were like a calcium light at the head of the Union column +in the dark days and nights of the spring of 1861. + +[( 1) Much of my time in St. Louis during the winter preceding the +Civil War was spent in revising this work, preparing illustrations, +and getting it ready for the press. Then it was packed up in a +box and carefully stored away in the St. Louis Arsenal, to abide +the results of war.] + + +CHAPTER III. +Return to Duty--General Harney's Attitude--Nathaniel Lyon in Command +--Defense of the St. Louis Arsenal--Service as Mustering Officer-- +Major of the First Missouri--Surrender of Camp Jackson--Adjutant- +general on Lyon's Staff--A Missing Letter from Frémont to Lyon-- +Lyon's Reply--Battle of Wilson's Creek--Death of Lyon--A Question +of Command During the Retreat--Origin of the Opposition of the +Blairs to Frémont--Affair at Fredericktown. + +When it became probable that military force would be required by +the government to maintain its authority in the Southern States, +I informed the War Department of my readiness to return to duty +whenever my services might be required, and was instructed to await +orders in St. Louis. Upon President Lincoln's first call for +volunteers, I was detailed to muster in the troops required of the +State of Missouri. With the order of detail was furnished a copy +of the old instructions for mustering into service, etc., which +required me to call upon the governor of Missouri for the regiments +to be mustered, and to accept only fully organized regiments. It +was well and publicly known that the executive of Missouri was +disloyal to the United States, and that compliance with the +President's demand for volunteers was not to be expected from the +State government; yet my instructions authorized me to take no +action which could be effective under such circumstances, and the +then department commander, Brigadier-General William S. Harney, +would not consent that any such action be taken without orders from +Washington. I called upon Governor Jackson for his regiments, but +received no reply. + + RETURN TO DUTY + +In my visit to General Harney after the attack on Fort Sumter, I +urged the necessity of prompt measures to protect the St. Louis +Arsenal, with its large stores of arms and ammunition, then of +priceless value, and called his attention of a rumor of an intended +attack upon the arsenal by the secessionists then encamped near +the city under the guise of State militia. In reply, the general +denounced in his usual vigorous language the proposed attempt upon +the arsenal; and, as if to clinch his characterization of such a +"---- outrage," said: "Why, the State has not yet passed an +ordinance of secession; she has not gone out of the Union." That +did not indicate to me that General Harney's Union principles were +quite up to the standard required by the situation, and I shared +with many others a feeling of great relief when he was soon after +relieved, and Captain Nathaniel Lyons succeeded to the command of +the department. Yet I have no doubt General Harney was, from his +own point of view, thoroughly loyal to the Union, though much imbued +with the Southern doctrines which brought on secession and civil +war. His appropriate place after that movement began was that of +the honorable retirement in which he passed the remainder of his +days, respected by all for his sterling character and many heroic +services to his country. + +Two days later, Captain Lyon, then commanding the St. Louis Arsenal, +having received from the War Department authority to enroll and +muster into the service the Missouri volunteers as they might +present themselves, I reported to him and acted under his orders. +Fortunately, a large number of the loyal citizens of St. Louis had, +in anticipation of a call to take up arms in support of the +government, organized themselves into companies, and received some +instruction in tactics at their places of secret nightly meeting +in the city. On the other hand, the organized militia of the State, +mostly disloyal, were in the city of St. Louis near the arsenal, +which contained many thousand muskets, and which was defended by +only a small body of regular troops. There was great danger that +the arsenal would follow the fate of the public arsenals in the +more Southern States. To avert this danger was the first great +object. + +Upon receipt of the necessary authority by Captain Lyon, I was +called out of church on Sunday morning, April 21, and the loyal +secret organizations were instructed to enter the arsenal at night, +individually, each member being furnished with a pass for that +purpose. The mustering officer employed himself all night and the +following day in distributing arms and ammunition to the men as +they arrived, and in stationing them along the arsenal walls. Thus +the successful defense of the arsenal was secured, though its +garrison was neither mustered into service nor organized into +regiments, nor even enrolled. The organization of the volunteers +now began, the mustering officer superintending the election of +officers, enrolling the men, and perfecting the organization in +conformity to the militia laws of the State. + +On June 4 I transmitted to the adjutant-general "the muster-rolls +of five regiments of infantry; of four rifle battalions of two +companies each, attached to the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th regiments; of +one artillery battalion of three companies; and of a company of +pioneers"; also "the muster-roll of Brigadier-General Lyon's staff, +mustered by himself." Accompanying the muster-rolls was a return +showing the strength of each regiment and of the brigade. + +Lyon had previously been elected brigadier-general of the brigade +the regiments of which I had mustered in, but I had no authority +to muster in a brigadier-general and staff. + + MAJOR OF THE FIRST MISSOURI + +The Missouri United States Reserve Corps, organized in St. Louis +about the same time, consisting of five regiments, was mustered +into service by General Lyon, under special authority from the War +Department. Upon the cordial invitation of the officers of the +1st Regiment, I accepted the place of major of that regiment, +mustered myself into service as such, and devoted all the time that +could be spared from my mustering duties to instructing the officers +in tactics and military administration--a labor which was abundantly +repaid by the splendid record soon made by that regiment. + +On June 24 I made a full report to the adjutant-general of the +discharge of my duties as mustering officer, including three new +regiments of three years' volunteers whose muster would be completed +in a few days. With this report my connection with that service +was terminated. On the following day I was relieved from mustering +duty, and at General Lyon's request was ordered to report to him +at Boonville, remaining with him as adjutant-general and chief of +staff until his death at Wilson's Creek. + +The foregoing account gives the organization (the strength was +about 14,000) of the volunteer force with which the war in Missouri +was begun. To this was added Lyon's company of the 2d Infantry, +a detachment of regular recruits, about 180 strong, commanded by +Lieutenant Lothrop, and Totten's battery of the 2d United States +Artillery. Lyon, who, as described, had been elected brigadier- +general of the militia, was on May 17 appointed by the President +to the same grade in the United States volunteer forces; and when, +on May 30, General Harney was relieved from the command of the +Department of the West, General Lyon became the commander of that +department. + +General Lyon was a man of ability and scholarly attainments, an +earnest patriot, keenly alive to the nature and magnitude of the +struggle in which the country was about to engage, and eager to +take the initiative as soon as he had at his command sufficient +force to give promise of success. To his keen foresight the State +militia at Camp Jackson, near St. Louis, though a lawful State +organization engaged in its usual field exercises, was an incipient +rebel army which ought to be crushed in the bud. This feeling was +shared by the more earnest Union men of St. Louis, who had the +confidence of the President and were in daily consultation with +Lyon; while the more prudent or conservative, hoping to avoid actual +conflict in the State, or at least in the city, advised forbearance. +Subsequent events showed how illusive was the hope of averting +hostilities in any of the border States, and how fortunate it was +that active measures were adopted at once. + +On May 10 General Lyon marched out with the force then organized, +surrounded Camp Jackson, and demanded its surrender. The militia +commander, Brigadier-General Daniel M. Frost, after protesting in +vain against the "wrong and insult" to his State, seeing resistance +hopeless, surrendered his command, about 1500 men, with their arms +and munitions of war. After the surrender, and while preparations +were making to conduct the prisoners to the arsenal, some shots +were fired upon our troops from a crowd that had assembled round +the camp-ground. The fire was returned by some of the troops, in +spite of all efforts of the officers to prevent it, and a number +of persons, mostly inoffensive, were killed and wounded. In this +affair I was designated by General Lyon to receive the surrender +of the commander of Camp Jackson and his troops, and to take charge +of the prisoners, conduct them to the arsenal, and the next day to +parole them. I extended to the commander and other officers the +courtesy of permitting them to retain their swords, and treated +the prisoners in such a manner as to soothe somewhat their intensely +excited feelings. One of the colonels, not anticipating such +courteous treatment, had broken his sword and thrown the pieces +upon the ground, rather than surrender it to the hated Yankees. + + ADJUTANT-GENERAL ON LYON'S STAFF + +The possession of St. Louis, and the supremacy of the national +authority therein, being now secured, General Lyon directed his +energies toward operations in the interior of the State. On June +13 he moved up the Missouri River with the 1st Missouri Volunteers, +Totten's battery of the 2d United States Artillery, one company of +the 2d United States Infantry, two companies of regular recruits, +and nine companies of the 2d Missouri Volunteers, and attacked the +enemy under Sterling Price on the 17th, near Boonville, and gained +an easy victory. The loss on our side was two killed and nine +wounded; that of the enemy, ten killed and a number of prisoners. + +I joined General Lyon at Boonville on June 26, and began duty as +his adjutant-general. Preparations were now made as rapidly as +possible to push operations into the southwestern part of Missouri. +A force consisting of about 1500 infantry and one battery of four +guns, under Colonel Franz Sigel, was sent from St. Louis, via Rolla, +to Springfield; while a force of regular troops under Major Samuel +D. Sturgis, 1st Cavalry, consisting of one company of the 2d +Dragoons, four companies of the 1st Cavalry, Du Bois's battery of +four guns, three companies of the 1st Infantry, two companies of +the 2d Infantry, some regular recruits, the 1st and 2d Kansas +Infantry, and one company of Kansas Cavalry Volunteers, was ordered +from Fort Leavenworth to join General Lyons's immediate command, +en route to Springfield. General Lyon's march was begun on July +3, and Major Sturgis joined him at Clinton, Mo., on the 4th. The +command reached Springfield on July 13, and there met Colonel +Sigel's brigade, which we learned had pushed as far to the front +as Newtonia, but, meeting a superior force of the enemy at Carthage +on July 5, had fallen back to Springfield. General Lyons's intention +was, upon effecting this junction with Sturgis and Sigel, to push +forward and attack the enemy, if possible, while we were yet superior +to him in strength. He had ordered supplies to be sent from St. +Louis via Rolla, but they remained at Rolla, the railroad terminus, +for want of wagon transportation. The troops had to live upon such +supplies as could be obtained from the country, and many of them +were without shoes. A continuous march of more than two or three +days was impossible. General Lyon's force was rapidly diminishing, +and would soon almost disappear by the discharge of the three +months' men, while that of the enemy was as rapidly increasing and +becoming more formidable by additions to its supplies of arms and +ammunition. General Lyon made frequent appeals for reinforcements +and for provisions, but received little encouragement, and soon +became convinced that he must rely upon the resources then at his +command. He was unwilling to abandon southwestern Missouri to the +enemy without a struggle, even though almost hopeless of success, +and determined to bring on a decisive battle, if possible, before +his short-term volunteers were discharged. Learning that the enemy +was slowly advancing from the southwest by two or three different +roads, Lyon moved out, August 1, on the Cassville road, had a +skirmish with the enemy's advance-guard at Dug Springs the next +day, and the day following (the 3d) again at Curran Post-office. +The enemy showed no great force, and offered but slight resistance +to our advance. It was evident that a general engagement could +not be brought on within the limits of time and distance to which +we were confined by the state of our supplies. It was therefore +determined to return to Springfield. + +General Lyon was greatly depressed by the situation in which he +was placed, the failure of expected reinforcements and supplies +from St. Louis, and an evidently strong conviction that these +failures were due to a plan to sacrifice him to the ambition of +another, and by a morbid sensitiveness respecting the disaster to +the Union people of southwestern Missouri, (who had relied upon +him for protection) which must result from the retreat of his army. +Lyon's personal feeling was so strongly enlisted in the Union cause, +its friends were so emphatically his personal friends and its +enemies his personal enemies, that he could not take the cool, +soldierly view of the situation which should control the actions +of the commander of a national army. If Lyon could have foreseen +how many times the poor people of that section were destined to be +overrun by the contending forces before the contest could be finally +decided, his extreme solicitude at that moment would have disappeared. +Or if he could have risen to an appreciation of the fact that his +duty, as the commander in the field of one of the most important +of the national armies, was not to protect a few loyal people from +the inevitable hardships of war (loss of their cattle, grain, and +fences), but to make as sure as possible the defeat of the hostile +army, no matter whether to-day, to-morrow, or next month, the battle +of Wilson's Creek would not have been fought. + + A MISSING LETTER FROM FRéMONT TO LYON + +On August 9 General Lyon received a letter from General John C. +Frémont, then commanding the department, which had been forwarded +to him from Rolla by Colonel John B. Wyman. The letter from General +Frémont to Colonel Wyman inclosing that to General Lyon appears +among the published papers submitted by Frémont to the Committee +on the Conduct of the War in the early part of 1862, but the +inclosure to Lyon is wanting. The original letter, with the records +to which it belonged, must, it is presumed, have been deposited at +the headquarters of the department in St. Louis when the Army of +the West was disbanded, in the latter part of August, 1861. Neither +the original letter nor any copy of it can now (July, 1897) be +found. It can only be conjectured what motive caused General +Frémont to omit a copy of the letter from the papers submitted to +the committee, which were at the time strongly commented upon in +Congress, or what caused to be removed from the official files the +original, which had again come into his possession. + +General Lyon's answer to this letter, given below, the original +draft which was prepared by me and is yet in my possession, shows +that Frémont's letter to Lyon was dated August 6, and was received +on the 9th. I am not able to recall even the substance of the +greater part of that letter, but the purport of that part of it +which was then of vital importance is still fresh in my memory. +That purport was instructions to the effect that _if Lyon was not +strong enough to maintain his position as far in advance as +Springfield, he should fall back toward Rolla until reinforcements +should meet him_. + +It is difficult to see why General Frémont did not produce a copy +of those instructions in his statement to the committee. It would +have furnished him with the best defense he could possibly have +made against the charge of having sacrificed Lyon and his command. +But the opinion then seemed so strong and so nearly universal that +Lyon's fight at Wilson's Creek was a necessity, and that Frémont +ought to have reinforced him before that time at any cost, that +perhaps Frémont had not the courage to do what was really best for +his own defense, namely, to acknowledge and maintain that he had +ordered Lyon to fall back, and that the latter should have obeyed +that order. + + LYON'S REPLY + +At my suggestion, General Lyon instructed me to prepare an answer +to General Frémont's letter on the morning of August 9. He altered +the original draft, in his own hand, as is shown in the copy +following; a fair copy of the letter as amended was then made, and +he signed it. + + "Springfield, Aug. 9, 1861. +"General: I have just received your note of the 6th inst. by special +messenger. + +"I retired to this place, as I have before informed you, reaching +here on the 5th. The enemy followed to within ten miles of here. +He has taken a strong position, and is recruiting his supplies of +horses, mules, and provisions by forays into the surrounding country; +his large force of mounted men enabling him to do this without +annoyance from me. + +"I find my position extremely embarrassing, and am at present unable +to determine whether I shall be able to maintain my ground or be +forced to retire. I can resist any attack from the front, but if +the enemy moves to surround me I must retire. I shall hold my +ground as long as possible, [and not] _though I may without knowing +how far_ endanger the safety of my entire force with its valuable +material, _being induced by the important considerations involved +to take this step. The enemy yesterday made a show of force about +five miles distant, and has doubtless a full purpose of making an +attack upon me_. + + "Very respectfully your obedient servant, + "N. Lyon, + "Brigadier-General Vols., Commanding. +"Major-General J. C. Frémont, + "Comdg. Western Department, St. Louis, Mo." + +The words in my handwriting which were erased ("and not" in brackets) +and those substituted by General Lyon, given in italics, clearly +express the difference of opinion which then existed between us +upon the momentous question which we had then been discussing for +several days, namely: What action did the situation require of +him as commander of the army? + +I was then young and wholly inexperienced in war; but I have never +yet seen any reason to doubt the correctness of the views I then +urged with even more persistence than my subordinate position would +fully justify. And this, I doubt not, must be the judgment of +history. The fruitless sacrifice at Wilson's Creek was wholly +unnecessary, and, under the circumstances, wholly unjustifiable. +Our retreat to Rolla was open and perfectly safe, even if began as +late as the night of the 9th. A few days or a few weeks at the +most would have made us amply strong to defeat the enemy and drive +him out of Missouri, without serious loss to ourselves. Although +it is true that we barely failed winning a victory on August 10, +that was, and could have been, hoped for only as a mere possibility. +Lyon himself despaired of it before the battle was half over, and +threw away his own life in desperation. In addition to the depressing +effect of his wounds, he must probably have become convinced of +the mistake he had made in hazarding an unnecessary battle on so +unequal terms, and in opposition to both the advice of his subordinates +and the instructions of his superior. But this is only an inference. +After Lyon had with the aid of Sigel (as explained hereafter) +decided to attack, and arranged the plan, not a word passed between +him and me on the question whether an attack should be made, except +the question: "Is Sigel willing to undertake this?" and Lyon's +answer: "Yes; it is his plan." + +We went forward together, slept under the same blanket while the +column was halted, from about midnight till the dawn of day, and +remained close together nearly all the time until his death. But +he seemed greatly depressed, and except to give orders, hardly +uttered a word save the few I have mentioned in this narrative. + +He was still unwilling to abandon without a desperate struggle the +country he had occupied, thought the importance of maintaining his +position was not understood by his superior commander, and in his +despondency believed, as above stated, that he was the intended +victim of a deliberate sacrifice to another's ambition. He determined +to fight a battle at whatever risk, and said: "I will gladly give +my life for a victory." + + BATTLE OF WILSON'S CREEK + +The enemy had now concentrated his forces, and was encamped on +Wilson's Creek, about ten miles from Springfield. There had been +some skirmishing between our reconnoitering parties and those of +the enemy during the past few days, and a general advance had been +determined on for the night of August 8, but it was postponed on +account of the fatigued condition of the troops, who had been +employed that day in meeting a reconnaissance of the enemy. The +attack was finally made at daylight on the morning of the eventful +August 10. + +The plan of battle was determined on the morning of the 9th, in a +consultation between General Lyon and Colonel Sigel, no other +officers being present. General Lyon said, "It is Sigel's plan," +yet he seemed to have no hesitation in adopting it, notwithstanding +its departure from accepted principles, having great confidence in +Sigel's superior military ability and experience. Sigel's brigade, +about 1200 strong, was to attack the enemy's right, while Lyon, +with the main body, about 4000 strong, was to attack the enemy's +left. The two columns were to advance by widely separated roads, +and the points of attack were so distant that communication between +the two columns was not even thought of. The attack was made, as +intended, by both columns at nearly the same instant, and both +drove the enemy from his advanced position, Sigel even occupying +the enemy's camp. Here he was soon after assailed by a superior +force, and driven from the field with the loss of his artillery +and 292 men killed, wounded, and missing. He did not appear upon +the scene again that day, and the result of his attack was unknown +to any one in the other column until after the close of the battle. +The main body, under Lyon's immediate command, made no general +advance from the position first gained, but maintained that position +against several fierce assaults. The enemy manifestly did not make +good use of his superior numbers. He attacked us in front several +times, but with a force not greatly superior to our own, and was +invariably repulsed. Our men fought extremely well for raw troops, +maintaining their ground, without any cover whatever, against +repeated assaults for six hours, and losing in killed and wounded +fully _one third of their number_. General Lyon received two +wounds, one in the leg and one in the head, about the middle of +the engagement; he then became more despondent than before, apparently +from the effects of his wounds, for there appeared nothing in the +state of the battle to dishearten a man of such unbounded courage +as he undoubtedly possessed. A portion of our troops had given +away in some disorder. Lyon said: "Major, I am afraid the day is +lost." I looked at him in surprise, saw the blood trickling down +his face, and divining the reason for his despondency, replied: +"No, General; let us try it again." He seemed re-encouraged, and +we then separated, rallied, and led forward the only troops then +not in action--two regiments. Lyon was killed at the head of one +of these regiments while exposing himself with utter recklessness +to the enemy's fire. + + DEATH OF LYON + +When Lyon and I separated, he to lead the attack in which he fell, +I reformed the other regiment and led it into action, giving the +command "Charge!" as soon as we came within plain view of the enemy, +hoping to try conclusions with the bayonet, with which we were much +better supplied than they. That regiment advanced in splendid +style until it received the enemy's fire, then the command "Charge!" +was forgotten, and the regiment halted and commenced firing. Thus +I found myself "between two fires." But the brave boys in my rear +could see me, and I don't believe I was in any danger from their +muskets, yet I felt less "out of place" when I had passed around +the flank of a company and stood in rear of the line. I there +witnessed, for the only time in my experience, one of those remarkable +instances of a man too brave to think of running away, and yet too +much frightened to be able to fight. He was loading his musket +and firing in the air with great rapidity. When I took hold of +his arm and shook him, calling his attention to what he was doing, +he seemed as if aroused from a trance, entirely unconscious of what +had happened. + +This circumstance recalls the familiar story of two comrades in +the ranks, the one apparently unmoved, the other pale and trembling. +The first said: "Why, you seem to be scared!" "Yes," replied the +other; "if you were half as scared as I am, you would run away!" + +A few minutes later I went toward the right to rejoin my chief, +and found his lifeless body a few feet in rear of the line, in +charge of his faithful orderly, Lehman, who was mourning bitterly +and loudly the death of the great soldier whom he adored. At that +supremely critical moment--for the fight was then raging with great +fury--my only thought was the apprehension that the troops might +be injuriously affected if they learned of the death of the commander +who had so soon won their profound respect and confidence. I chided +poor Lehman for his outcry, and ordered that the body be taken +quietly to the rear, and that no one be told of the general's death. + +Thus fell one of our bravest and truest soldiers and patriots, a +man who had no fear of death, but who could not endure defeat. +Upon Lyon's fall, Major Sturgis became the senior officer of military +education and experience present. Several of the senior volunteer +officers had been wounded and carried from the field. Who was the +actual senior in rank on the ground was not easy to ascertain in +the midst of a fierce engagement. It was no time to make experiments +with untried military genius. + +I captured a "secesh" horse found running loose,--for my own horse +had been killed and I had been afoot quite a long time,--mounted +him, and as son as the state of the contest would permit, I rode +to Major Sturgis, informed him of Lyon's death, and told him he +must assume the command, which he accordingly did. It afterward +appeared that there was one lieutenant-colonel of volunteers +remaining on the field, but neither he nor any one else thought of +questioning the propriety of Major Sturgis's taking the command. +Soon after Lyon's death the enemy was repulsed, but then seemed to +gather up all his remaining strength for a last effort. His final +attack was heavier than any of the preceding, but it was more firmly +met by our troops and completely repulsed. There is probably no +room for doubt that the enemy was beaten if we had but known it; +but the battle-field was covered with timber and underbrush, so +that nothing could be seen beyond a few hundred yards. Our troops +were nearly out of ammunition, and exhausted by a night march and +by six hours' hard fighting without breakfast. + +It did not seem possible to resist another such attack as the last, +and there was no apparent assurance that another would not be made. +Hence Major Sturgis decided to withdraw from the field while he +was free to do so. The movement was effected without opposition, +the wounded were brought off, and the command returned to Springfield +in the afternoon. This retreat was undoubtedly an error, and the +battle of Wilson's Creek must be classed as a defeat for the Union +army. The error was a failure to estimate the effect that must +have been produced upon the enemy as well as upon ourselves by so +much hard fighting. It was only necessary to hold our ground, +trusting to the pluck and endurance of our men, and the victory +would have been ours. Had Lyon, who was in the front of the line +of battle when wounded as well as when killed, appreciated this +fact and acted upon it, instead of throwing his life away, it is +safe to say he would have won a brilliant victory. + + A QUESTION OF COMMAND DURING THE RETREAT + +On the march from the battle-field the main body was joined by the +remnant of Sigel's brigade, which had made a complete circuit in +rear of the enemy's position. They were without brigade or regimental +commanders, and were escorted by a troop of regular cavalry. On +our arrival in Springfield it was found that Colonel Sigel and +Colonel Salomon, commanding the 5th Missouri Regiment, of Sigel's +brigade, had arrived in town some hours before. Major Sturgis then +relinquished the command to Colonel Sigel, and it was determined +to retreat toward Rolla next morning. Sigel's brigade was placed +in advance, and Sturgis's brigade of regulars was assigned the +important post of rear-guard. This order of march was continued +during three days, and the march was so conducted that while the +advance would reach camp at a reasonable hour and be able to get +supper and rest, the rear-guard, and even the main body, would be +kept in the road until late in the night, and then, unable to find +their wagons, be compelled to lie down without food. The clamor +for relief from this hardship became so general that Major Sturgis +determined to resume the command, justifying this action upon the +ground that Colonel Sigel, although mustered into the United States +service, had no commission from any competent authority. Colonel +Sigel protested against this assumption of Major Sturgis, but the +latter was so manifestly sustained by the great majority of the +officers of the army that Colonel Sigel quietly submitted. + +One of Sigel's officers proposed that the question of title to the +command be put to a vote of the assembled officers. Sturgis objected +on the ground that the vote might possibly be in favor of Sigel. +"Then," said Sturgis, "some of you might refuse to obey my orders, +and I should be under the necessity of shooting you." + +The march was continued under Sturgis's command, and the column +arrived at Rolla on August 19, nine days after the battle. Here +the little Army of the West, after its short but eventful career, +disappeared in the much larger army which Major-General Frémont +was then organizing.( 1) + +My knowledge of the operations conducted by General Frémont in +Missouri is so slight that I must confine myself to some account +of those minor affairs with which I was personally concerned. + +My duties as assistant adjutant-general ceased when Major Sturgis +resumed command on August 13. I then took command of my regiment, +the 1st Missouri, the colonel and lieutenant-colonel being absent, +the latter on account of wounds received at Wilson's Creek. Soon +after our arrival at Rolla the regiment was ordered to St. Louis, +to be converted into an artillery regiment. I was employed in the +reorganization and equipment of batteries until September 16, when +General Frémont ordered me to visit Cincinnati, Pittsburg, Washington, +West Point, and such other places in the East as I might find +necessary, to procure guns, harness, etc., to complete the equipment +of the regiment. + +While in St. Louis after the battle of Wilson's Creek, I learned +much in confirmation of the opinion of the character and ability +of General Frémont which had very generally been held in the army. + + ORIGIN OF THE OPPOSITION OF THE BLAIRS TO FRéMONT + +Immediately after my arrival Colonel Frank P. Blair, Jr., said he +wanted me to go with him to see Frémont; so we went the next morning. +The headquarters palace was surrounded by a numerous guard, and +all ingress by the main entrance appeared to be completely barred. +But Blair had some magic word or sign by which we passed the +sentinels at the basement door. Ascending two flights of stairs, +we found the commanding general with a single secretary or clerk +occupying the suite of rooms extending from front to rear of the +building. The general received me cordially, but, to my great +surprise, no questions were asked, nor any mention made, of the +bloody field from which I had just come, where Lyon had been killed, +and his army, after a desperate battle, compelled to retreat. I +was led at once to a large table on which maps were spread out, +from which the general proceeded to explain at length the plans of +the great campaign for which he was then preparing. Colonel Blair +had, I believe, already been initiated, but I listened attentively +for a long time, certainly more than an hour, to the elucidation +of the project. In general outline the plan proposed a march of +the main Army of the West through southwestern Missouri and +northwestern Arkansas to the valley of the Arkansas River, and +thence down that river to the Mississippi, thus turning all the +Confederate defenses of the Mississippi River down to and below +Memphis. As soon as the explanation was ended Colonel Blair and +I took our leave, making our exit through the same basement door +by which we had entered. We walked down the street for some time +in silence. The Blair turned to me and said: "Well, what do you +think of him?" I replied, in words rather too strong to repeat in +print, to the effect that my opinion as to his wisdom was the same +as it had always had been. Blair said: "I have been suspecting +that for some time." + +It was a severe blow to the whole Blair family--the breaking, by +the rude shock of war, of that idol they had so much helped to set +up and make the commander of a great army. From that day forward +there was no concealment of the opposition of the Blairs to Frémont. + +I had another occasion at that time to learn something important +as to Frémont's character. He had ordered me to convert the 1st +Regiment of Missouri Volunteer Infantry into an artillery regiment. +I had organized eight batteries and used all the field-guns I could +get. There remained in the arsenal a battery of new rifled guns +which Frémont had purchased in Europe. I applied to him personally +for those guns, telling him I had a well-disciplined company of +officers and men ready to man them. He gave me the order without +hesitation, but when I went to the arsenal I found an order there +countermanding the order he had given me. I returned to headquarters, +and easily obtained a renewal of the order to issue the guns to +me. Determining to get ahead this time, I took the quickest +conveyance to the arsenal, but only to find that the telegraph had +got ahead of me--the order was again countermanded. The next day +I quietly inquired at headquarters about the secret of my repeated +disappointment, and learned that some foreign adventurer had obtained +permission to raise a company of artillery troops and wanted those +new rifled guns. It was true the company had not been raised, but +I thought that would probably make no difference, so I never +mentioned the matter to the general again. Instead I planned a +flank movement which proved far more successful than the direct +attack could possibly have been. I explained to General Frémont +the great need of field-guns and equipment for his army, and +suggested that if ordered East I might by personal efforts obtain +all he needed. He at once adopted my suggestion, bade me sit down +at a desk in his room and write the necessary order, and he signed +it without reading. I readily obtained twenty-four new rifled +Parrott guns, and soon had them in service in the Western Department, +in lieu of the six guns I had failed to get from the St. Louis +Arsenal. + +When I had accomplished this duty and returned to St. Louis, where +I arrived in the early part of October, 1861, General Frémont had +taken the field in the central part of Missouri, with the main body +of his army, in which were eight batteries of my regiment. I was +instructed to remain in St. Louis and complete the organization +and equipment of the regiment upon the arrival of guns and equipments +procured in the East. + + AFFAIR AT FREDERICKTOWN + +It was while waiting for the expected guns that a demand for +artillery came from Colonel W. P. Carlin, commanding a brigade at +Pilot Knob and threatened with an attack by a Confederate force +under Jeff. Thompson. The latter had already made a raid in Carlin's +rear, and interfered seriously with the communication to St. Louis. +In the nervous condition of the military as well as the public mind +at that time, even St. Louis was regarded as in danger. + +There was no organized battery in St. Louis, but there were officers +and men enough belonging to the different batteries of the 1st +Missouri, and recruits, to make a medium-sized company. They had +been instructed in the school of the piece, but no more. I hastily +put them upon the cars, with four old smooth-bore bronze guns, +horses that had never been hitched to a piece, and harness that +had not been fitted to the horses. Early next morning we arrived +at the Big River where the bridge had been burned, unloaded the +battery and horses by the use of platforms extemporized from railroad +ties, hitched up, and forded the river. On the other side we +converted platform-cars into stock-cars, loaded up, and arrived at +Pilot Knob the next morning (October 20). The enemy was understood +to be at Fredericktown, about twenty miles distant, and Colonel +Carlin determined to march that night and attack him at daylight +the next morning. Carlin's command consisted of the 8th Wisconsin +Volunteers, 21st Illinois Volunteers, parts of the 33d and 38th +Illinois Volunteers, 350 of the 1st Indiana Cavalry, one company +of Missouri Cavalry, and six pieces of artillery (including two +old iron guns which he had managed to make available in addition +to the four from St. Louis). His total force was about 3000 men. +The enemy's strength was supposed to be about the same, but it +turned out that he had only four old iron guns, so we had the +advantage of him in artillery at least. + + AFFAIR AT FREDERICKTOWN + +The head of our column reached the vicinity of Fredericktown some +time before daylight, and the troops lay upon their arms until +dawn. Upon entering the town in the morning, no enemy was found, +and citizens reported that he had marched south the day before. +The troops were ordered to rest in the village, and Colonel Carlin, +who was not well, went to bed in the hotel. Some hours later, I +think near noon, Colonel J. B. Plummer, with a brigade of infantry +and two pieces of artillery from Cape Girardeau, arrived at +Fredericktown. I am not aware whether this junction was expected +by the respective commanders, or what orders they had received from +department headquarters. Soon after Colonel Plummer arrived I was +summoned to the presence of the two commanders and requested to +decide a question of rank between them. It appeared that Colonel +Carlin had the older date as colonel of volunteers, while Colonel +Plummer was commanding, by special assignment of General Frémont, +a brigade in which at least one of the colonels was senior, not +only to him, but also to Colonel Carlin. It was clear enough that +according to the Articles of War this senior colonel of the Cape +Girardeau brigade should command the combined forces; but that +would be in plain disregard of General Frémont's order, the authority +for which nobody knew, but in comparison with which the Articles +of War or the Army Regulations were at that time regarded as +practically of trifling consequence. The question was settled, or +rather avoided (for there was no satisfactory settlement of it), +by the proposition that Colonel Plummer, who proposed to go in +pursuit of the enemy, should take with him, besides his own brigade, +such portion of Colonel Carlin's as he (Plummer) thought necessary, +Colonel Carlin, who was sick, remaining behind with the remainder. +Accordingly, early in the afternoon Plummer's column started in +pursuit. It had hardly got well out of the village when the head +of column received a volley from the enemy drawn up in line of +battle. How long the enemy had been in that position I have never +learned; but it is certain that his presence there was not even +suspected by our commander, who supposed him to be in full retreat. +This mistake, however, did not seem to cost us anything, except +perhaps the loss of a few men at the head of the column in the +first volley. Colonel Plummer quickly formed his troops; Carlin +jumped out of bed and galloped to the front, followed by those who +had remained in town. The volunteers, who had not yet been in +battle, threw off their knapsacks, blankets, and overcoats, and +went into action most gallantly. The engagement was sharp for a +few moments, and resulted in considerable loss on both sides; but +the enemy soon gave way and retreated in disorder. The pursuit +was continued several miles, and until near night, when a recall +was ordered, and our troops returned to the town to pick up their +trappings and get their supper. + +The next morning Colonel Plummer continued his pursuit. I left my +extemporized battery, under Captain Manter, with Colonel Carlin, +and returned to St. Louis.( 2) + +[( 1) My official report and others are published in the War Records, +Vol. III.] + +[( 2) For the official reports, see the War Records, Vol. III.] + + +CHAPTER IV +Halleck Relieves Frémont of the Command in Missouri--A Special +State Militia--Brigadier-General of the Missouri Militia--A +Hostile Committee Sent to Washington--The Missouri Quarrel of +1862--In Command of the "Army of the Frontier"--Absent Through +Illness--Battle of Prairie Grove--Compelled to be Inactive-- +Transferred to Tennessee--In Command of Thomas's Old Division of +the Fourteenth Corps--Reappointed Major-General--A Hibernian +"Striker." + +On November 19, 1861, Major-General H. W. Halleck relieved Major- +General Frémont of the command of the Department of the Mississippi. +On November 21 I was appointed brigadier-general of volunteers, +and reported to General Halleck for duty. + +In the spring of 1861 a convention of the State of Missouri had +assembled at St. Louis to consider the question of secession, and +had decided to adhere to the Union. Nevertheless, the governor, +Claiborne Fox Jackson, and the executive officers had joined the +rebellion and fled from the State. The convention reassembled on +July 20, and organized a provisional government. Hamilton R. Gamble +was chosen provisional governor, and intrusted with very large +powers. He was a sterling patriot, a man of ability and of the +highest character in his public and private relations, much too +conservative on the questions of States' rights and slavery to suit +the "radical" loyalists of that time, but possessing probably in +a higher degree than any other citizen of Missouri the confidence +of all classes of Union men in the State. + + A SPECIAL STATE MILITIA + +One of Governor Gamble's first important public acts was to seek +and obtain from President Lincoln authority to raise a special +force of State militia, to be employed only in defense of the State, +but to be paid, equipped, and supplied in all respects by the United +States. This force was to be organized in conformity with the +militia laws of the State, was to include an adjutant-general, a +quartermaster-general, and three aides-de-camp to the governor, +one major-general and his staff, and a brigadier-general and staff +for each brigade. The number of regiments, aggregate strength and +arms of service were not specified. + +By the terms of this arrangement the force would remain subject to +the governor's command; but at the suggestion of Major-General +McClellan, then general-in-chief, to avoid possible conflict of +command it was stipulated by the President that the commanding +general of the department should be ex-officio major-general of +the militia. And it is due to the memory of Governor Gamble to +say that although partizan enemies often accused him of interfering +with the operations of the militia in the interest of his supposed +political views, there never was, while I was in command of the +militia, the slightest foundation for such accusation. He never +attempted to interfere in any manner with the legitimate exercise +of the authority of the commanding general, but was, on the contrary, +governed by the commander's views and opinions in the appointment +and dismissal of officers and in other matters in which his own +independent authority was unquestioned. This authority, given by +the President, was subsequently confirmed by act of Congress, by +which the force was limited to 10,000 men. + +As stated above, I was appointed brigadier-general, to date from +November 21, 1861; and on November 27 was assigned by General Halleck +to the "command of all the militia of the State," and charged with +the duty of raising, organizing, etc., the special force which had +been authorized by the President. + +The organization of the militia was not completed until about the +middle of April, 1862, when the aggregate force was 13,800 men, +consisting of fourteen regiments and two battalions of cavalry +(mounted riflemen), one regiment of infantry, and one battery of +artillery. But the troops were enrolled mainly in the districts +where their services were required. As rapidly as companies were +organized and equipped, they were put in the field with the United +States troops then occupying the State, and thus rapidly acquired, +by active service with older troops, the discipline and instruction +necessary to efficiency, so that by the time the organization was +completed this body of troops was an efficient and valuable force. + + BRIGADIER-GENERAL OF THE MISSOURI MILITIA + +My official report, made on December 7, 1862,( 1) to the department +commander and the general-in-chief, gives a detailed account of +the purely military operations of that period. But many matters +less purely military which entered largely into the history of that +time deserve more than a passing notice. + +During the short administration of General Frémont in Missouri, +the Union party had split into two factions, "radical" and +"conservative," hardly less bitter in their hostility to each other +than to the party of secession. The more advanced leaders of the +radicals held that secession had abolished the constitution and +all laws restraining the powers of the government over the people +of the Confederate States, and even over disloyal citizens of States +adhering to the Union. They advocated immediate emancipation of +the slaves, and confiscation by military authority of all property +of "rebels and rebel sympathizers"--that is to say, of all persons +not of the radical party, for in their partizan heat they disdained +to make any distinction between "conservatives," "copperheads," +and "rebels." So powerful and persistent was the radical influence +that even so able a lawyer as Edwin M. Stanton, then Secretary of +War, was constrained to send an order to the commander of the +District of Missouri, directing him to execute the act of Congress +of July 17, 1862, relative to the confiscation of property of +persons engaged in the rebellion, although the law provided for +its execution in the usual way by the judicial department of the +government, and gave no shadow of authority for military action. + +It is only necessary here to remark that the order was not, as it +could not be lawfully, obeyed. Action under it was limited to the +securing of property subject to confiscation, and liable to be +removed or otherwise disposed of, and the collection of evidence +for the use of the judicial officers. The following is Secretary +Stanton's order sent by telegraph, September 5, 1862: + +"It is represented that many disloyal persons residing at St. Louis +and elsewhere in your command are subject to the provisions of the +Confiscation Act, and that it would be expedient to enforce against +them the provisions of that act. You are instructed to enforce +that act within your command, and will please send directions for +that purpose to your provost-marshal." + +In compliance with the Secretary's instructions, I issued an order, +on September 11, providing for the action above stated, and no +further. + +These instructions from the Secretary of War were subsequently +repudiated by President Lincoln; but in the meantime they produced +serious evil under my successor, who fully enforced them by apparently +committing the national administration to the extreme radical +doctrine, and making the military commander in Missouri appear to +be acting not in harmony with the President's views. So far as I +know, this subject does not appear to have been submitted to the +President until some time in 1863, after Major-General Curtis, as +department commander, had for some months carried out the radical +theory of military confiscation, and I, as his successor, had put +a stop to it. Then an appeal was made to the President, and he, +in his celebrated letter of instructions of October 1, 1863, directed +the military to have nothing to do with the matter. + +The State administration of Missouri, under its conservative +governor, was of course sternly opposed to this radical policy, +including the forced liberation of slaves, for which there was at +that time no warrant of law or executive authority. A simple sense +of duty compelled the military commander to act in these matters +more in harmony with the State government than with the radical +party, and in radical eyes he thus became identified with their +enemies, the conservatives. + +This gave rise on August 4, 1862, to a meeting of prominent citizens +of St. Louis, who adopted resolutions, of the most important of +which the following was reported to be a true copy: + +"_Resolved_, That a committee of gentlemen be requested to go to +Washington City to urge upon the President the appointment of a +commander of the military forces of this State who will, under +instructions, act with vigor in suppressing the guerillas of this +State, and with authority to enlist the militia of the State into +the service of the United States." + + A HOSTILE COMMITTEE SENT TO WASHINGTON + +The chair appointed, as the committee to go to Washington, Henry +T. Blow, John C. Vogle, I. H. Sturgeon, and Thomas O'Reilley, and +authorized Mr. Blow to add to this committee any other "true Union +man" who would go. Who, if any, besides Messrs. Blow, Vogle, and +O'Reilley actually composed the committee, I was never informed. +On August 10, Halleck, then general-in-chief, telegraphed me from +Washington: "There is a deputation here from Colonel Blair and +others asking for your removal on account of inefficiency." + +Colonel Blair happened into my office a few minutes after the +receipt of the despatch on the 11th, and I handed it to him. He +at once said in substance, and with feeling: "That is not true. +No one is authorized to ask in my name for your removal"; and he +sent a despatch to that effect to General Halleck. + +The next day (August 12) despatches were exchanged between General +Halleck and Colonel Blair, of which the latter furnished me a copy, +inclosed with the following note from himself: + + "St. Louis, Mo., August 13th, '62. +"Brig.-Gen'l Schofield. + +"Dear Schofield: I inclose you a copy of a despatch (marked 'A') +received yesterday from Major-General Halleck, and my answer thereto, +marked 'B'. + + "Yours, + "Frank P. Blair, Jr." + +Copy "A." + +"To Hon. F. P. Blair, + + "August 12, 1862. + "(By telegraph from War Dep't.) + "Washington, 12:50 P.M. +"The committee from St. Louis--Henry T. Blow, John C. Vogle, and +Thomas O'Reilley--told me, in presence of the President, that they +were authorized by you to ask for Gen. Schofield's removal for +inefficiency. The Postmaster-General has to-day sent me a letter +from Mr. ----, asking that you be put in Gen. Schofield's place. +There has been no action in this or on the papers presented by the +above-named committee. + + "H. W. Halleck, + "General-in-chief." + +Copy "B." + + "St. Louis, Mo., August 12th, 1862. +"Major-General Halleck, + "General-in-chief, Washington City, D. C.: + +"I despatched to you yesterday, and wrote the Postmaster-General +last week. Let the letter be submitted to you. Nobody is authorized +to ask in my name for Gen'l Schofield's removal. I think the State +military organization should be abandoned as soon as practicable, +and a military commander, in this State, authorized to act without +respect to Gov. Gamble. I do not want the place, but want the +commander in the State to be instructed to act without any regard +to the State authorities. + + "Frank P. Blair, Jr." + +The foregoing gives, so far as I know it, the essence of the Missouri +quarrel of 1862. I have never had the curiosity to attempt to +ascertain how far the meeting of August 4 was hostile to me +personally. + +During the time, subsequent to General Halleck's departure for +Washington, July 23, 1862, that the Department of the Mississippi +was left without any immediate commander, there appears to have +been a contest in Washington between the military and the political +influence, relative to the disposition to be made of that important +command. The following from General Halleck to me, dated September +9, 1862, indicates the situation at that time: + +"(Unofficial.) + +"My dear Gen'l: + +"There has been a strong political pressure of outsiders to get +certain parties put in command of new Dep'ts to be made out of the +old Dep't of the Miss. The presence of the enemy and the danger +of the capital have for the moment suspended these political +intrigues, or rather prevented the accomplishment of their objects. +If any one of our Western Gen'ls would do something creditable and +brilliant in the present crisis, it would open the way to a new +organization such as it should be. + +"From the position of St. Louis as the source of supplies, Missouri +ought not to be separated from Arkansas and western Tennessee. +What will be done in the matter I do not know. + + "Yours truly, + "H. W. Halleck." + +None of "our Western generals" had then done anything very "creditable +and brilliant." Even Grant was the object of grave charges and +bitter attacks. Powerful influences were at work to supersede him +in command of the army in west Tennessee. Had there been any +available general at that time capable of commanding public +confidence, the military idea would doubtless have prevailed, but +in the absence of such a leader the politicians triumphed in part. + + IN COMMAND OF THE "ARMY OF THE FRONTIER" + +The old department, called Department of the Mississippi, was +divided, and Major-General Samuel R. Curtis was assigned to command +the new Department of the Missouri, composed of the territory west +of the Mississippi River. For some months the radicals had it all +their own way, and military confiscation was carried on without +hindrance. + +When this change occurred I was in the field in immediate command +of the forces which I had assembled there for aggressive operations, +and which General Curtis named the "Army of the Frontier." My +official report of December 7, 1862, gave a full account of the +operations of that army up to November 20, when sickness compelled +me to relinquish the command. + +As will be seen from that report and from my correspondence with +General Curtis at that time, it was then well known that the enemy +was concentrating in the Arkansas valley all the troops he could +raise, and making preparations to return across the Boston Mountains +and "dispute with us the possession of northwestern Arkansas and +southwestern Missouri"; and I had placed my troops where they could +live to a great extent on the country, and quickly concentrate to +meet the enemy when he should advance. But General Curtis ordered +me to move north and east with two divisions, leaving Blunt with +one division to occupy that country. It was on this return march +that I was overtaken by a severe attack of bilious fever. + +As my official report of December 7, 1862, is published in Volume +XIII of the War Records, I make no reference here to the operations +covered by it. That able and impartial historian, the Comte de +Paris, published a very accurate history of the operations in +Missouri in the summer of 1862, in which he paid me the compliment, +which a soldier values so highly, of saying that I was free from +partizan passion. + +It was during my absence through illness that Hindman made his +expected advance. Blunt's division was encamped at Cane Hill, and +Hindman crossed the mountains at Lee's Creek, aiming to reach +Blunt's rear, cut off his retreat, and overwhelm him. + + BATTLE OF PRAIRIE GROVE + +Fortunately, Blunt had received information in advance of the +intended movement, and had called the two divisions from Missouri +to his support. These two divisions, under General Herron, were +encamped at Wilson's Creek, a distance of about 116 miles. On the +morning of December 3 they began their march to join General Blunt. +They had reached a point about six miles south of Fayetteville, +when, unexpectedly to both, Herron's and Hindman's heads of column +met at Prairie Grove about seven o'clock in the morning of December +7, and the engagement commenced immediately. Blunt, hearing the +sound of battle, moved rapidly toward Prairie Grove and attacked +the enemy's left. The battle lasted all day, with heavy losses on +both sides, and without any decided advantage to either side. At +dark the enemy still held his position, but in the morning was +found to be in full retreat across the mountains. A portion of +our troops occupied the battle-field of Prairie Grove when I resumed +command on December 29, and the remainder were making a raid to +the Arkansas River, where they destroyed some property, and found +that Hindman had retreated toward Little Rock. It was evident that +the campaign in that part of the country for that season was ended. +The question was "What next?" I took it for granted that the large +force under my command--nearly 16,000 men--was not to remain idle +while Grant or some other commander was trying to open the Mississippi +River; and I was confirmed in this assumption by General Curtis's +previous order to march eastward with two divisions, which order, +though premature when given, might now be renewed without danger. +At once, therefore, I set to work to organize a suitable force, +including the Indian regiments, to hold the country we had gained, +and three good divisions to prosecute such operations as might be +determined on, and at once commenced the march north and east toward +the theater of future active operations. + +Although I had at first esteemed General Blunt much more highly +than he deserved, and had given him most liberal commendation in +my official report for all he had done, I became satisfied that he +was unfit in any respect for the command of a division of troops +against a disciplined enemy. As was my plain duty, I suggested +confidentially to General Curtis that the command of a division in +the field was not General Blunt's true place, and that he be assigned +to the District of Kansas, where I permitted him to go, at his own +request, to look after his personal interests. General Curtis +rebuked me for making such a suggestion, and betrayed my confidence +by giving my despatch to James H. Lane, senator from Kansas, and +others of Blunt's political friends, thus putting me before the +President and the United States Senate in the light of unjust +hostility to gallant officers who had just won a great victory over +the enemy at Prairie Grove. The result of this, and of radical +influence in general, was that my nomination as major-general of +volunteers, then pending in the Senate, was not confirmed, while +both Blunt and Herron were nominated and confirmed as major- +generals! + +Such as Lane and Blunt were the men who so long seemed to control +the conduct of military affairs in the West, and whom I found much +more formidable enemies than the hostile army in my front. Herron +I esteemed a very different man from Blunt, and thought he would, +with experience, make a good division commander. But circumstances +occurred soon after which shook my confidence in his character as +well as in that of General Curtis. Herron and some of his staff- +officers were subpoenaed, through department headquarters, as +material witnesses for the defense in the case of an officer on +trial before a military commission. They failed to appear. Soon +after, when Herron was assigned to command the Army of the Frontier, +he "dissolved" the commission "for the present," adding: "The +court will be reassembled by order from these headquarters in the +field when witnesses not at present to be had can be brought +forward." Upon learning this, after I assumed command of the +department I ordered Herron to report for duty to General Grant +before Vicksburg. In the meantime Herron wrote to the War Department +protesting against serving under me as department commander, and +got a sharp rebuke from the President through the Secretary of War. +This brief explanation is all that seems necessary to show the +connection between the several events as they appear in the official +records. + + COMPELLED TO BE INACTIVE + +After the battle of Prairie Grove, being then in St. Louis, I asked +General Curtis to let me go down the Mississippi and join the +expedition against Vicksburg, saying that as Blunt and Herron had +won a battle in my absence, I did not wish to resume command over +them. But Curtis would not consent to this; he said he wanted me +to command the Army of the Frontier. He thus invited the confidence +which he afterward betrayed, and for which he rebuked me. I felt +outraged by this treatment, and thereafter did not feel or show +toward General Curtis the respect or subordination which ought to +characterize the relations of an officer toward his commander. +This feeling was intensified by his conduct in the Herron affair, +and by the determination gradually manifested not to permit me or +my command to do anything. He for a long time kept up a pretense +of wanting me to move east or west, or south, or somewhere, but +negatived all my efforts actually to move. The situation seemed +to me really unendurable: I was compelled to lie at Springfield +all the latter part of winter, with a well-appointed army corps +eager for active service, hundreds of miles from any hostile force, +and where we were compelled to haul our own supplies, in wagons, +over the worst of roads, 120 miles from the railroad terminus at +Rolla. I could not get permission even to move nearer the railroad, +much less toward the line of which the next advance must be made; +and this while the whole country was looking with intense anxiety +for the movement that was to open the Mississippi to the Gulf, and +the government was straining every nerve to make that movement +successful. Hence I wrote to General Halleck the letters of January +31, 1863, and February 3. These appear to have called forth some +correspondence between Generals Halleck and Curtis, of which General +Halleck's letter of February 18 was the only part that came into +my possession.( 2) This account was written several years before +the War Records were published. + +In my letter of January 31, I said: + +"Pardon me for suggesting that the forces under command of Davidson, +Warren, and myself might be made available in the opening of the +Mississippi, should that result not be accomplished quickly. . . ." + +The immediate result of this correspondence was that some troops +were sent down the river, but none of my command, while two divisions +of the latter were ordered toward the east. This march was in +progress when Congress adjourned. The Senate not having confirmed +by appointment as major-general, the time of my temporary humiliation +arrived. But I had not relied wholly in vain upon General Halleck's +personal knowledge of my character. He had not been able fully to +sustain me against selfish intrigue in Kansas, Missouri, and +Washington; but he could and did promptly respond to my request, +and ordered me to Tennessee, where I could be associated with +soldiers who were capable of appreciating soldierly qualities. +One of the happiest days of my life was when I reported to Rosecrans +and Thomas at Murfreesboro', received their cordial welcome, and +was assigned to the command of Thomas's own old division of the +Fourteenth Corps. One of the most agreeable parts of my whole +military service was the thirty days in command of that division +at Triune, and some of my strongest and most valued army attachments +were formed there. + +But that happy period of soldier life was brief. Early in May +President Lincoln reappointed me major-general, with original date, +November 29, 1862, and ordered me back to the old scene of unsoldierly +strife and turmoil in Missouri and Kansas. + + A HIBERNIAN "STRIKER" + +In 1861 and 1862 I had a Hibernian "striker" who had been a soldier +of the old mounted rifles, and had been discharged on account of +a wound received in an Indian fight, but was yet well able to +perform the duties of an officer's servant in the field. His care +of his master's property, and sometimes of the master himself, was +very remarkable. In the midst of the battle of Wilson's Creek the +horse I was riding was killed, and I called in vain for my spare +horse. From the best information obtained I concluded that both +the horse and my faithful orderly had been killed, and I sincerely +mourned my loss. But after the fight was over I found my man +quietly riding the spare horse along with the troops, as if nothing +unusual had happened. When I upbraided him for his conduct and +demanded to know where he had been all that time, he replied: "Ah, +Major, when I saw the one horse killed I thought I'd better take +the other to a place of safety!" + +Where my efficient assistant obtained his supplies I never knew, +but he would fill without delay any requisition I might make, from +a shoe-string to a buffalo-robe. One day in 1862 I found in my +camp trunk several pairs of shoulder-straps belonging to the grades +of captain, major, and lieutenant-colonel. As I was then a brigadier- +general, I inquired of my man why he kept those badges of inferior +grades. He replied: "Ah, General, nobody can tell what may happen +to you." When, only a few months later, after having been promoted +to the rank of major-general I was again reduced to that of brigadier- +general, I remembered the forethought of my Irish orderly. + +[( 1) See War Records, Vol. XIII, p. 7.] + +[( 2) The whole correspondence may be found in the War Records, +Vol. XXII, part ii.] + + +CHAPTER V +In Command of the Department of the Missouri--Troops Sent to General +Grant--Satisfaction of the President--Conditions on which Governor +Gamble would Continue in Office--Anti-Slavery Views--Lincoln on +Emancipation in Missouri--Trouble Following the Lawrence Massacre +--A Visit to Kansas, and the Party Quarrel There--Mutiny in the +State Militia--Repressive Measures--A Revolutionary Plot. + +On May 24, 1863, I relieved General Curtis in command of the +Department of the Missouri. In his instructions of May 22, General +Halleck said: + +"You owe your appointment entirely to the choice of the President +himself. I have not, directly or indirectly, interfered in the +matter. But I fully concur in the choice, and will give you all +possible support and assistance in the performance of the arduous +duties imposed upon you." + + IN COMMAND OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI + +A few days later I received the following significant letter from +the President: + + "Executive Mansion, Washington, May 27, 1863. +"General J. M. Schofield: + +"My dear Sir: Having relieved General Curtis and assigned you to +the command of the Department of the Missouri, I think it may be +of some advantage for me to state to you why I did it. + +"I did not relieve General Curtis because of any full conviction +that he had done wrong by commission or omission. I did it because +of a conviction in my mind that the Union men of Missouri, +constituting, when united, a vast majority of the whole people, +have entered into a pestilent factional quarrel among themselves-- +General Curtis, perhaps not of choice, being the head of one faction, +and Governor Gamble that of the other. After months of labor to +reconcile the difficulty, it seemed to grow worse and worse, until +I felt it my duty to break it up somehow; and as I could not remove +Governor Gamble, I had to remove General Curtis. + +"Now that you are in the position, I wish you to undo nothing merely +because General Curtis or Governor Gamble did it, but to exercise +your own judgment and _do right_ for the public interest. + +"Let your military measures be strong enough to repel the invader +and keep the peace, and not so strong as to unnecessarily harass +and persecute the people. It is a difficult rôle, and so much +greater will be the honor if you perform it well. If both factions, +or neither, shall abuse you, you will probably be about right. +Beware of being assailed by one and praised by the other. + + "Yours truly, + "A. Lincoln." + +In acknowledging the President's letter on June 1, I concluded by +saying: + +"I have strong hopes that the Missouri State Convention, at its +approaching session, will adopt such measures for the speedy +emancipation of slaves as will secure the acquiescence of the large +majority of Union men, though perhaps not quite satisfactory to +either extreme. If this hope be realized, one of my most embarrassing +difficulties will be removed, or at least greatly diminished." + +The military problem in that department, as understood by me and +by my superiors in Washington, was at that time a comparatively +simple one, though my predecessor in command of the department +entertained different views. With my views of the military situation, +whether confined to my own department or extended to embrace the +entire country, there was but one course to pursue, namely, to send +all available forces to assist in the capture of Vicksburg and the +opening of the Mississippi to the gulf. After that I could easily +operate from points on the Mississippi as a base, capture Little +Rock and the line of the Arkansas, and then make that river the +base of future operations. + +Hence, in response to a request from General Halleck, I at once +sent to General Grant and other commanders at the front all the +troops I could possibly spare, saying at the same time that this +would leave me very weak, but that I was "willing to risk it in +view of the vast importance of Grant's success." + +Thus I began my military operations by stripping the department of +troops to the lowest possible defensive limit. But this was what +I had so earnestly urged before, when in a subordinate position; +and I was glad to do it when the responsibility rested upon me. +My loss of troops to Grant was returned with interest as soon as +practicable after Vicksburg had fallen, and I was then able to +advance a large force, under General Steele, for the capture of +Little Rock, resulting in holding the entire line of the Arkansas +River from that time forward. + +At the time I had met General Grant but once, and then only for a +moment, and I have always assumed that the timely aid sent him at +Vicksburg was the foundation for the kind and generous friendship +and confidence which he ever afterward manifested toward me, and +which, with the like manifestations of approval from President +Lincoln, are to me the most cherished recollections of my official +career. + + TROOPS SENT TO GENERAL GRANT + +The appreciation of my action in Washington was expressed by General +Halleck in a letter dated July 7, 1863, in which he said: "The +promptness with which you sent troops to General Grant gave great +satisfaction here"; and by the President himself, in a letter to +the "Hon. Charles D. Drake and others, committee," dated October +5, 1863, in which he wrote: "Few things have been so grateful to +my anxious feelings as when, in June last, the local force in +Missouri aided General Schofield to so promptly send a large general +force to the relief of General Grant, then investing Vicksburg and +menaced from without by General Johnston." + +It would have been impossible for me to send away more than a small +part of those troops if I had not been able to replace them by +Missouri militia. This General Curtis had probably been unable to +do because of the unfortunate antagonism between him and the State +government; and perhaps this much ought to be said in explanation +of his apparently selfish policy of retaining so many idle troops +in Missouri. For my part, I could see neither necessity nor excuse +for quarreling with the governor of Missouri, and thus depriving +myself and the nation of his legitimate aid. Governor Gamble was +perhaps "behind the times" in his views on the slavery question, +although decidedly in favor of gradual emancipation; and he was +utterly intolerant of those radical schemes for accomplishing ends +by lawless means, then so loudly advocated. I thought at the time +a more radical policy might possibly tend to harmonize the Union +factions and allay the excitement, and frequently told Governor +Gamble that it would be necessary to adopt a policy on the negro +question more in harmony with the views of the administration and +of the Northern people. To this the governor assented, and seemed +desirous of going as far in that direction as he could carry the +Union people of Missouri with him. From his seat in the State +Convention at Jefferson City he made a speech advocating emancipation +in a much shorter period than the convention could finally be +prevailed upon to adopt, while I was using my personal influence +with members to the same end. + +But it soon became evident that nothing would satisfy the radical +leaders short of the overthrow of the existing State government; +that a reconciliation of the quarrel between the "pestilent factions" +( 1) in Missouri, so much desired by Mr. Lincoln, was exactly what +the radicals did not want and would not have. Satisfied of this +and disgusted with the abuse heaped upon him by men who owed him +warm and honest support, Governor Gamble tendered his resignation +to the convention, then in session. His resignation was not +accepted, and by a "majority of the convention and multitudes of +private citizens" he was requested to withdraw it. In this request +I united, for I could see no possibility of improvement under any +governor that the convention--a very conservative body--might elect, +while the result might be confusion worse confounded. + + CONDITIONS OF GOVERNOR GAMBLE'S CONTINUING + +The governor submitted to me the following letter including conditions +upon which he would consent to continue in office: + +"Major-General Schofield. + +"General: For the purpose of restoring order and law and maintaining +the authority of the Federal and State governments in the State of +Missouri, it is necessary that we have an understanding as to the +most important measures to be adopted. + +"I have tendered my resignation as governor, and have been requested +to withdraw it on the ground that it is necessary to the peace and +quiet of the State that I remain in office. In this request you +have united with a majority of the convention and multitudes of +private citizens. I am willing to accede to the request, and, if +an ordinance of emancipation is passed, to remain in office, if on +the part of the government I can be sure of its co-operation in my +efforts to preserve the peace and remove all causes of dissension +and dissatisfaction from among the people. + +"I think it necessary that the following measures be adopted by +you as the commanding general of the department: + +"_First_. That it be distinctly made known that the provisional +government of the State is the government recognized by the government +of the United States, and that any attempt, in any way, to interfere +by violence, or by tumultuous assemblages, or in any other unlawful +manner, will be suppressed by the power of the government of the +United States. + +"_Second_. That the functions of civil government of the State +will be supported and upheld, and that the process of the State in +civil and criminal matters may be executed in all posts and +encampments of the troops of the United States, and that resistance +thereto by military persons shall be punished. + +"_Third_. That no recruiting of negroes within this State shall +be recognized, unless the persons recruiting them shall be able to +produce the written permission of the governor of the State; and +that any person attempting to recruit without such permission, if +he be in the military service shall be immediately prohibited from +all such conduct, and if in civil life shall be proceeded against +by the State authorities, without any interference by the military. + +"_Fourth_. That no countenance or encouragement shall be given to +provost-marshals, or others in military authority, in any proceedings +against the property of citizens, slaves included, upon the ground +of its being liable to confiscation; but the confiscation shall be +executed by the civil officers of the United States, as is directed +by the authorities at Washington. + +"When we arrive at a perfect understanding between ourselves, I am +willing to put myself in the same boat with you, and we will sink +or swim together. If you should be censured or removed from this +command because of what is done to carry these propositions into +effect, I will abandon office immediately . . . " + +To this I replied verbally that I could not enter into any agreement +as to the policy to be pursued by me as commander of the department; +that I must hold myself free to pursue such course as circumstances +should from time to time indicate, or such as might be ordered by +the President; my policy would be indicated from time to time by +my general orders; in some respects it would doubtless conflict +with that submitted by his Excellency. Nevertheless the governor +finally consented to withdraw his resignation. + +The convention at length passed an ordinance providing for the +gradual extinction of slavery in the State, and adjourned. The +feeling of bitterness between the opposing factions rather increased +than diminished during its session. + + ANTI-SLAVERY VIEWS + +The following letter to my friend Mr. Williams, which was published +in the New York and St. Louis papers with my consent, made sufficiently +clear the views I then entertained upon the slavery question, and +left no reasonable ground for any emancipationist to quarrel with +me on that subject, however much he may have been dissatisfied with +the action of the convention,--just as my letter of June 1 to the +President left him no room for doubt--if, indeed, he had entertained +any before--upon the question then deemed so important: + + "Headquarters, Dep't of the Missouri, + "St. Louis, June 1, 1863. +"J. E. Williams, Esq. + "Pres't Metropolitan Bank, New York. + +"My dear Sir: Professor Bartlett has informed me of the interest +you have manifested in my promotion and connection with this +department, and, above all, that you have done me the kindness to +assert my soundness on the important question of the day. + +"You are right in saying that I was an anti-slavery man, though +not an abolitionist, before the war. These terms have greatly +enlarged their relative meaning since the rebellion broke out. I +regard universal emancipation as one of the necessary consequences +of the rebellion, or rather as one of the means absolutely necessary +to a complete restoration of the Union--and this because slavery +was the great cause of the rebellion, and the only obstacle in the +way of a perfect union. The perception of these important truths +is spreading with almost astounding rapidity in this State. I have +great hope that the State Convention, which meets on the 15th +instant, will adopt some measure for the speedy emancipation of +slaves. If so, our difficulties will be substantially at an end. + +"When the popular mind seizes a great principle and resolves to +carry it into execution, it becomes impatient of the restraints +imposed by existing laws, and in its haste to break down the barriers +which stand in the way of its darling object, becomes regardless +of all law, and anarchy is the result. This is our difficulty +here. The people will have freedom for the slave. No law of the +United States nor of Missouri, nor yet any order of the President, +meets the case. + +"The loyal slave-owner demands that his rights _under the law_ be +protected. Let us have an ordinance of the State Convention which +will satisfy the demands of the popular mind, and no loyal man will +murmur. + +"You can imagine with what deep interest I look forward to the +legal settlement of this question, so deeply involving the success +of the great cause for the time being intrusted to my care. + +"In Arkansas and other States to which the President's proclamation +applies, so far as I have observed, no such difficulty exists. +The loyal people accept the decree without complaint, perfectly +willing to give up all they have for the Union. So much the greater +honor is due them for this cheerful sacrifice because they do not +and cannot be expected to appreciate and understand the principle +of freedom as it is impressed upon the loyal heart of the North. + +"Please accept my thanks for your kindness, and believe me, + + "Yours very truly," +(Signed) "J. M. Schofield." + +On June 20, I telegraphed to Mr. Lincoln: + +"The action of the Missouri State Convention upon the question of +emancipation will depend very much upon whether they can be assured +that their action will be sustained by the General Government and +the people protected in their slave property during the short time +that slavery is permitted to exist. Am I authorized in any manner, +directly or indirectly, to pledge such support and protection? + +"The question is of such vital importance to the peace of Missouri +that I deem it my duty to lay it before your Excellency." + + LINCOLN ON EMANCIPATION IN MISSOURI + +The following reply from the President fairly illustrates the wisdom +and justice of his views, and shows how perfectly I was in accord +with him in my desire to do what was wisest and best for the peace +of Missouri: + + "Executive Mansion, Washington, June 22, 1863. +"Genl. John M. Schofield. + +"My dear Sir: Your despatch, asking in substance whether, in case +Missouri shall adopt gradual emancipation, the General Government +will protect slave-owners in that species of property during the +short time it shall be permitted by the State to exist within it, +has been received. + +"Desirous as I am that emancipation shall be adopted by Missouri, +and believing as I do that _gradual_ can be made better than +_immediate_, for both black and white, except when military necessity +changes the case, my impulse is to say that such protection would +be given. I cannot know exactly what shape an act of emancipation +may take. If the period from the initiation to the final end should +be comparatively short, and the act should prevent persons being +sold during that period into more lasting slavery, the whole world +would be easier. I do not wish to pledge the General Government +to the affirmative support of even temporary slavery, beyond what +can be fairly claimed under the Constitution. I suppose, however, +this is not desired; but that it is desired for the military force +of the United States, while in Missouri, not to be used in subverting +the temporarily reserved legal rights in slaves during the progress +of emancipation. This I would desire also. I have very earnestly +urged the slave States to adopt emancipation; and it ought to be, +and is, an object with me not to overthrow or thwart what any of +them may in good faith do to that end. You are therefore authorized +to act in the spirit of this letter, in conjunction with what may +appear to be the military necessities of your department. + +"Although this letter will become public at some time, it is not +intended to be made so now. + + "Yours truly, + "A. Lincoln." + +My impression is that the nature of this quarrel in Missouri was +not fully understood at the time in Washington, as General Halleck +wrote me that neither of the factions was regarded as really friendly +to the President. But my belief is that they were then, as they +subsequently proved to be, divided on the Presidential question as +well as in State politics; that the conservative were sincere in +their friendship and support of Mr. Lincoln, and desired his +renomination, while the radicals were intriguing for Mr. Chase or +some other more radical man. + +This struggle between extreme radicalism and conservatism among +the Union men of Missouri was long and bitter, but I have nothing +to do with its history beyond the period of my command in that +department. It resulted, as is now well known, in the triumph of +radicalism in the Republican party, and the consequent final loss +of power by that party in the State. Such extremes could not fail +to produce a popular revulsion, and it required no great foresight +to predict the final result. + + TROUBLE FOLLOWING THE LAWRENCE MASSACRE + +The factions in Missouri gave the military commander trouble enough +in 1863; but to that was added the similar and hardly less troublesome +party quarrel in Kansas. I cannot give a more accurate account of +the complicated situation there than by quoting from my correspondence +and journal of that period. On August 28 I wrote to President +Lincoln as follows: + +"In reply to your telegram of the 27th, transmitting copy of one +received from two influential citizens of Kansas, I beg leave to +state some of the facts connected with the horrible massacre at +Lawrence, and also relative to the assault made upon me by a certain +class of influential politicians. + +"Since the capture of Vicksburg, a considerable portion of the +rebel army in the Mississippi valley has disbanded, and large +numbers of men have come back to Missouri, many of them doubtless +in hope of being permitted to remain at their former homes in peace, +while some have come under instructions to carry on a guerilla +warfare, and others, men of the worst character, become marauders +on their own account, caring nothing for the Union, nor for the +rebellion, except as the latter affords them a cloak for their +brigandage. + +"Under instructions from the rebel authorities, as I am informed +and believe, considerable bands, called "Border Guards," were +organized in the counties of Missouri bordering upon Kansas, for +the ostensible purpose of protecting those counties from inroads +from Kansas, and preventing the slaves of rebels from escaping from +Missouri into Kansas. These bands were unquestionably encouraged, +fed, and harbored by a very considerable portion of the people of +those border counties. Many of those people were in fact the +families of these "bushwhackers," who are brigands of the worst +type. + +"Upon the representation of General Ewing and others familiar with +the facts, I became satisfied there could be no cure for this evil +short of the removal from those counties of all slaves entitled to +their freedom, and of the families of all men known to belong to +these bands, and others who were known to sympathize with them. +Accordingly I directed General Ewing to adopt and carry out the +policy he had indicated, warning him, however, of the retaliation +which might be attempted, and that he must be fully prepared to +prevent it before commencing such severe measures. + +"Almost immediately after it became known that such policy had been +adopted, Quantrill secretly assembled from several of the border +counties of Missouri about 300 of his men. They met at a preconcerted +place of rendezvous near the Kansas line, at about sunset, and +immediately marched for Lawrence, which place they reached at +daylight the next morning. They sacked and burned the town and +murdered the citizens in the most barbarous manner. + +"It is easy to see that any unguarded town in a country where such +a number of outlaws can be assembled is liable to a similar fate, +if the villains are willing to risk the retribution which must +follow. In this case 100 of them have already been slain, and the +remainder are hotly pursued in all directions. If there was any +fault on the part of General Ewing, it appears to have been in not +guarding Lawrence. But of this it was not my purpose to speak. +General Ewing and the governor of Kansas have asked for a court of +inquiry, and I have sent to the War Department a request that one +may be appointed, and I do not wish to anticipate the result of a +full investigation. . . . + +"I am officially informed that a large meeting has been held at +Leavenworth, in which a resolution was adopted to the effect that +the people would assemble at a certain place on the border, on +September 8, for the purpose of entering Missouri to search for +their stolen property. Efforts have been made by the mayor of +Leavenworth to get possession of the ferry at that place, for the +purpose of crossing armed parties of citizens into north Missouri. + +"I have strong reasons for believing that the authors of the telegram +to you are among those who introduced and obtained the adoption of +the Leavenworth resolution, and who are endeavoring to organize a +force for the purpose of general retaliation upon Missouri. Those +who so deplore my 'imbecility' and 'incapacity' are the very men +who are endeavoring to bring about a collision between the people +of Kansas and the troops under General Ewing's command. + +"I have not the 'capacity' to see the wisdom or justice of permitting +an irresponsible mob to enter Missouri for the purpose of retaliation, +even for so grievous a wrong as that which Lawrence has suffered. + +"I have increased the force upon the border as far as possible, +and no effort has been, or will be, spared to punish the invaders +of Kansas, and to prevent such acts in the future. The force there +has been all the time far larger than in any other portion of my +department, except on the advanced line in Arkansas and the Indian +Territory. . . . + +"P. S. Since writing the above I have received the 'Daily Times' +newspaper, published at Leavenworth, containing an account of the +meeting referred to, and Senator Lane's speech, which I have the +honor to inclose herewith for your information." + +In a letter of that same date (August 28), Governor Carney informed +me, among other things, that "after the fearful disaster at Lawrence +and on the return of our troops who had pursued Quantrill and his +murderous band, General Ewing and General James H. Lane met at +Morristown and spent the night together. The latter returned to +Lawrence and called a mass meeting, at which he defended General +Ewing and made an intensely bitter speech against you. Yesterday +he arrived in this city, and soon after caused to be issued a +placard stating he would address the citizens on war matters. +There are two parties here--one for and the other against Ewing. +That against him is headed by Mr. Wilder, member of Congress, and +by Mr. Anthony, mayor of this city. This division put General Lane +in this dilemma here, that he could not defend Ewing as he had done +in Lawrence, and hence he devoted his whole attention to you. The +more violent of the men opposing you are for independent raids into +Missouri. How far General Lane encouraged this class you must +judge from the facts I have stated and from the inclosed speech. +To give tone and distinction to the meeting, General Lane offered +a resolution calling upon the President to relieve you, affirming +that there could be no safety in Kansas, no help for Kansas, unless +this was done. . . . You will judge from the facts stated, from +the course pursued by General Lane at Lawrence, and from his speech +here, how far General Ewing is your friend or fit to command this +district." + +On August 31, I started for the scene of the agitation. The +following extracts from my journal reveal the situation: + +"_Sept_. 2.--Reached Leavenworth at five o'clock A. M. Stopped at +the Planters' Hotel; was called upon by Governor Carney and several +of his political friends. Discussed at much length the condition +of affairs in the District of the Border. Carney is an aspirant +for the United States Senate. Intends to run against Lane. Desires +to kill off Ewing, considering him a formidable rival, or at least +a supporter of Lane. Ewing has determined not to be a candidate +at the next election, and will not commit himself in support of +either Carney or Lane. Desires to keep on good terms with Lane +because he thinks Lane will probably be re-elected. Carney +understands Ewing as supporting Lane, or at least of having withdrawn +in Lane's favor. In fact, Ewing refuses an alliance with Carney. +Carney therefore desires to kill Ewing. Lane finds it to his +interest to sustain Ewing so long as Schofield commands the +department. Ewing is a better man for Lane than any other Schofield +would be likely to give him. Lane's desire is to remove Schofield +and get in his place a general who would place Kansas under command +of one of Lane's tools, or a man who could be made one by Lane; +therefore Lane defends Ewing and concentrates his attack upon +Schofield. . . . + +"Asked and obtained a long private interview with Lane. Went over +the whole ground of his hostility to Genl. S. during the past year. +Showed him the injustice he had done Genl. S., and how foolish and +unprofitable to himself his hostility had been. He stated with +apparent candor that he had bent the whole energies of his soul to +the destruction of Genl. S.; had never labored harder to accomplish +any object in his life. Said he had been evidently mistaken in +the character and principles of Genl. S., and that no man was more +ready than he to atone for a fault. We then approached the subject +of the invasion of Missouri by the people of Kansas. Genl. Lane +still adheres to his design of collecting the people at Paola and +leading them on an expedition "for the purpose of searching for +their stolen property." He professes his ability to control the +people; that he would be answerable, and offered to pledge himself +to Genl. S. and the government that they should do nothing beyond +that which he declares as the object of the expedition. . . . + +"Lane was informed that Genl. S. would go to Kansas City the next +day, and Lane replied that he intended to go also. It was agreed +that both should go the next morning and converse with Genl. Ewing +on the subject. The same evening Genl. Lane made a public speech +in Leavenworth, in which he urged the people to meet at Paola, and +assured them that the department and district commanders would not +interfere with the proposed expedition; on the contrary, that both +would countenance and co-operate with it. He also proclaimed the +object to be to lay waste the border counties of Missouri and +exterminate the disloyal people. This statement, following an +interview on that subject, was calculated to mislead a large number +of well-disposed people who would not for a moment think of acting +in opposition to military rules, and to greatly increase the number +of people who would assemble at Paola, and seriously complicate +the difficulty. + +"In the evening had another interview with Gov. Carney and some of +his friends. My main object was to secure the full co-operation +of the State government in preventing the invasion of Missouri. +For this purpose I had to consult to a considerable degree the +political views and aims of the governor and his friends. Their +object was, of course, to make out of Lane's project as much capital +as possible against him. It was held by many of them that Lane +had no serious design of entering Missouri; that he expected, of +course, that the military authorities would forbid it; and that he +would yield as a military necessity, and thus gain with his people +additional ground for condemnation of the department commander, +while he had the credit of having done all he possibly could to +enable them to 'recover their stolen property.' . . . Viewing +matters in this light, the governor and his advisers were strongly +inclined to the opinion that the surest way of making capital for +themselves out of Lane's move was to let him go on with it, without +any interference on their part, confident that it would turn out +a grand humbug. . . . After reaching Kansas City and talking with +Genl. Ewing, I replied to the governor, accepting the services of +as many of his troops as he and Genl. Ewing should deem necessary +for the protection of all the towns in Kansas near the border, +stating that with Kansas so protected, Genl. Ewing would not only +carry out his order for the expulsion of disloyal persons, but also +in a short time drive out the guerillas from his district and +restore peace. In addition to this, I wrote the governor a private +letter urging him to issue his proclamation discouraging the Paola +meeting and warning his people against any attempt to go into +Missouri, and informing him I would issue an order forbidding armed +men not in the regular military service from crossing the line. + +"_Sept_. 4--I received the governor's reply that he would issue +his proclamation as requested, and also asking permission to publish +a letter which I had written him on August 29, in reply to one from +him regarding these matters. This permission was granted. + +"My order was also published declaring that the militia of Kansas +and Missouri would be used only for the defense of their respective +States; that they should not pass from one State into the other +without express orders from the district commander; that armed +bodies of men _not_ belonging to the United States troops, or to +the militia placed under the orders of the department commander by +the governors of their respective States, should not, under any +pretext whatever, pass from one State into the other. + + VISIT TO KANSAS, AND THE PARTY QUARREL THERE + +"In the evening of the 3d I sent a despatch to the general-in-chief +[Halleck], informing him that the Paola movement was under the +control and guidance of Lane, and that I should not permit them to +enter Missouri; that Lane said he would appeal to the President; +that I did not apprehend a hostile collision; but that a despatch +from the President or the Secretary of War (to Lane) would aid me +much in preventing difficulty. + +"If such despatch should be sent, I request to be informed of its +purport. No reply received from the general-in-chief up to this +time (1 P. M., Sept 5). . . . + +"_Sept_. 6--Lane failed to meet me at Kansas City, according to +agreement. My correspondence with Governor Carney relative to the +Lawrence massacre and the Paola movement appeared in the Leavenworth +papers of yesterday; also my order forbidding armed citizens from +crossing into Missouri. + +"The governor's proclamation did not appear according to promise; +probably he may have decided to defer it until after the Paola +meeting, as a means of making capital against Lane. + +"A private letter from one of Governor Carney's advisers was received +yesterday (5th), dated the 3d, but evidently written in the evening +of the 4th or morning of the 5th, which indicated that Carney does +not intend to publish a proclamation, for the reason that Lane +desires to force him to do it. . . . + +"Went to Westport yesterday. Met several of the leading loyal +citizens; all agree that Genl. Ewing's order No. 11 is wise and +just--in fact a necessity. I have yet to find the first loyal man +in the border counties who condemns it. They are also warm in +their support of Genl. Ewing, and deprecate his removal. I am +satisfied he is acting wisely and efficiently. . . . + +"The radicals in Missouri condemn him (Ewing) as one of my friends; +the conservatives, because he is a Kansas man, and more especially +because of his order No. 11, and similar reasons and radical +measures. For a time this will weaken me very much, and possibly +may cause my overthrow. This risk I must take, because I am +satisfied I am doing the best for the public good, and acting +according to my instructions from the President. I seem in a fair +way to reach one of the positions referred to in the President's +letter of instructions, viz: That in which both factions will +abuse me. According to the President's standard, this is the only +evidence that I will ever have that I am right. It is hardly +possible that I will ever reach a point where both will commend +me. . . . + +"_Sept_. 8--Went to Independence yesterday, in company with Genl. +Ewing; . . . made a few remarks to quite a large assemblage of +people, which were well received; was followed by Genl. Ewing in +an appropriate speech, which produced a good effect. + +"Have determined to modify General Ewing's order, or rather he will +modify it at my suggestion, so that no property shall be destroyed. +I deem the destruction of property unnecessary and useless. The +chief evil has resulted from the aid given to guerillas in the way +of information conveyed by disloyal people, and by preparing their +food for them. This evil is now removed. Forage and grain cannot +be destroyed or carried away to such an extent as materially to +cripple them. I will as far as possible preserve the property of +all loyal people, with the view of permitting them to return as +soon as the guerillas shall be driven out. Property of known rebels +will be appropriated as far as possible to the use of the army and +loyal people who are made destitute. None will be destroyed. + +"Had a long interview this morning with Mayor Anthony of Leavenworth +and a number of influential citizens of that place. Anthony was +arrested and sent to this place yesterday by a detective in the +employ of Genl. Ewing. The arrest was without authority, and Genl. +Ewing promptly discharged the mayor. The object of the citizens +was to obtain a revocation of martial law in Leavenworth, and come +to a correct understanding as to the relation between the military +and civil authorities in that town, so as to prevent difficulty in +future. The whole matter was satisfactorily arranged. . . . + +"So far as can be learned, no people have gone from Leavenworth to +the Paola meeting, and it is probable the whole affair will amount +to nothing. Believing that the trouble here is substantially over, +I propose to start for St. Louis to-morrow morning." + + MUTINY IN THE STATE MILITIA + +A regiment of enrolled militia ordered to New Madrid to relieve +the 25th Missouri, in order that the latter might go to reinforce +General Steele in Arkansas, mutinied after they had gone on board +the steamer, brought the boat ashore, and went to their homes. +The provost guard of St. Louis was sent to arrest them. News having +come of the capture of Little Rock, the two enrolled militia +regiments in St. Louis were dismissed, except the mutineers, who +were kept at hard labor for some time, and the leaders tried for +mutiny. + +This mutiny was caused by the efforts of the radical papers and +politicians, who had for some time openly opposed the organization +of the provisional regiments, and encouraged the men to mutiny. + +I published an order enforcing martial law against all who should +incite mutiny among the troops, and through General Halleck obtained +the President's approval of this order, but did not find it necessary +to make that approval public until it was made known by the President +himself. + +In writing to General Halleck on September 20, I said: + +"I inclose herewith a copy of an order which I have found it +necessary to publish and enforce. The revolutionary faction which +has so long been striving to gain the ascendancy in Missouri, +particularly in St. Louis, to overthrow the present State government +and change the policy of the national administration, has at length +succeeded so far as to produce open mutiny of one of the militia +regiments and serious difficulties in others. + +"I inclose a number of slips from papers published in Missouri, to +show the extent to which this factious opposition to the government +has been carried. The effect already produced is but natural, and +the ultimate effect will be disastrous in the extreme, unless a +strong remedy be applied speedily. + +"Out of consideration for popular opinion and the well-known wishes +of the President relative to freedom of speech and of the press, +I have forborne until, in my belief, further forbearance would lead +to disastrous results. I am thoroughly convinced of the necessity +for prompt and decided measures to put down this revolutionary +scheme, and my sense of duty will not permit me to delay it longer. +It is barely possible that I may not have to enforce the order +against the public press. They may yield without the application +of force; but I do not expect it. The tone of some of their articles +since the publication of the order indicates a determination to +wage the war which they have begun to the bitter end. This +determination is based upon the belief that the President will not +sustain me in any such measures as those contemplated in the order. +A distinct approval by the President of my proposed action, and a +knowledge of the fact here, would end the whole matter at once. +I desire, if possible, to have such approval before taking action +in any individual case. Indeed, I believe such approval would +prevent the necessity for the use of force. It is difficult, I am +aware, for any one at a distance to believe that such measures can +be necessary against men and papers who claim to be 'radically +loyal.' The fact is, they are 'loyal' only to their 'radical' +theories, and are so 'radical' that they cannot possibly be 'loyal' +to the government. . . ." + + A REVOLUTIONARY PLOT + +These men were styled "revolutionists" not without sufficient cause. +It was currently reported that they had in 1861 conceived the +elevation of Frémont to a dictatorship. In 1862, and again in +1863, they invented a scheme for the violent overthrow of the +provisional State government and the existing national administration +in Missouri. The first act of the program was to seize and imprison +Governor Gamble and me. In 1862 some of them committed the +indiscretion of confiding their plans to General Frank P. Blair, +Jr., who at once warned me of it, but refused to give me the names +of his informers or of the leaders. He said he could not do so +without breach of confidence, but that he had informed them that +he should give me warning and expose the individuals if any further +steps were taken. Here the matter ended. + +In 1863 I received warning through the guard stationed at my +residence in the suburbs of the city, with which the revolutionists +had the folly to tamper in their efforts to spread disaffection +among my troops. This discovery, and the premature mutiny of the +regiment ordered to New Madrid, nipped the plot in the bud. I +refer to the circumstances now only to show that I was not unjust +in my denunciation of the "revolutionary faction" in Missouri. + +In General Halleck's letter of September 26, inclosing the President's +written approval of my general order, he said: + +". . . Neither faction in Missouri is really friendly to the +President and administration; but each is striving to destroy the +other, regardless of all other considerations. In their mutual +hatred they seem to have lost all sense of the perils of the country +and all sentiment of national patriotism. Every possible effort +should be made to allay this bitter party strife in that State." + +In reply, September 30, I expressed the following opinion: + +". . . I feel compelled to say that I believe you are not altogether +right in your information about the factions in Missouri. If the +so-called 'claybank' faction are not altogether friendly to the +President and administration, I have not been able to discover it. +The men who now sustain me are the same who rallied round Lyon and +sustained the government in the dark days of 1861, while the leaders +of the present 'charcoal' faction stood back until the danger was +past. I believe I have carried out my instructions as literally +as possible, yet I have received a reasonable support from one +faction and the most violent opposition from the other. I am +willing to pledge my official position that those who support me +now will support me in the execution of any policy the President +may order. They are the real friends of the government. It is +impossible for me to be blind to this fact, notwithstanding the +existence, to some extent, of the factional feeling to which you +allude." + +The improvement produced by the order was so decided that publication +of the President's approval was thought unnecessary. It only became +public through his letter of October 1, 1863, of which he gave a +copy to the radical delegation. + +In September the governor of Missouri placed all the militia of +the State, including those not in active service, under my command. +I published orders intended to control their action and prevent +interference with political meetings; also to secure freedom of +voting at the coming election in November. Several militia officers +guilty of such interference were dismissed, which produced a +wholesome effect. + +[( 1) The division of the Union party into radicals and conservatives, +or "charcoals" and "claybanks," originated during the administration +of General Frémont.] + + +CHAPTER VI +A Memorandum for Mr. Lincoln--The President's Instructions--His +Reply to the Radical Delegation--The Matter of Colored Enlistments +--Modification of the Order Respecting Elections Refused--A Letter +to the President on the Condition of Missouri--Former Confederates +in Union Militia Regiments--Summoned to Washington by Mr. Lincoln +--Offered the Command of the Army of the Ohio--Anecdote of General +Grant. + +On October 1, 1863, I furnished the following memorandum to the +Hon. James S. Rollins, M. C., for the information of the President. +It was doubtless seen by the President before the date of his letter +to the radical delegation, quoted further on. + +"The radicals urge as evidence of Genl. Schofield's misrule that +Missouri is in a worse condition than at any time since the rebellion; +that he has failed to use the troops at his disposal to put down +the rebellion. This charge is false, unless it be admitted that +the radicals are rebels. It is true that the State is in a bad +condition, and it is equally true that this condition is directly +brought about by professed Union men--radicals. + +"There has been no time since the beginning of the war when there +were so few armed rebels or guerillas in Missouri as at the present +time. The only trouble at all worth mentioning in comparison with +what the State has suffered heretofore is the lawless acts of +radicals in their efforts to exterminate or drive out all who differ +from them in political sentiment. This lawlessness is instigated, +encouraged, and applauded by the radical press and leaders. Every +effort to put down this lawlessness is denounced by the radicals +as persecution of loyal men. When Genl. Curtis relinquished command +he had in Missouri and Kansas 43,000 men; Genl. Schofield retained +in these States only 23,000. Of the remaining 20,000, he sent some +reinforcements to Genl. Rosecrans and a large force to Genl. Grant, +to assist in the capture of Vicksburg; and with the remainder and +a force equivalent to the one sent to Genl. Grant, returned by him +after the fall of Vicksburg, he has reclaimed all Arkansas and the +Indian Territory. + +"The radicals denounce Genl. Schofield because of his relations to +the State government. It is true that those relations have been +most cordial, but it is not true that his policy has been controlled +or materially influenced by Gov. Gamble. Gov. Gamble has not sought +to exercise any such control. He, without hesitation, placed all +the militia in active service under Genl. S.'s command, and yielded +to him the control of all military operations. As an example to +illustrate the truth of this statement: Genl. S. required the +militia to obey the 102d Article of War; although they were not in +the service of the United States, and although they constituted +the only force in the State capable of arresting fugitive slaves +with any certainty, no complaint was made by the State government. +No military force is used in this department for the return of +fugitives. All assertions to the contrary are false. On the +contrary, it has been invariably held by Genl. Schofield and Col. +Broadhead that free papers given under Genl. Curtis were to be held +valid, even though wrongfully given, the negroes having been the +slaves of loyal men. So also when the slaves of loyal men have, +by mistake or otherwise, been enlisted in colored regiments, Genl. +Schofield has invariably held that they have been made free by +their enlistment, and cannot be returned to their masters or +discharged from the service. + + A MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LINCOLN + +"It cannot be denied that Genl. Schofield's whole influence has +been in favor of emancipation. He did all in his power to secure +the passage of an ordinance of emancipation by the late State +Convention. The leaders of the present 'charcoal' faction, who +now war on Genl. Schofield, are not the men who sustained the +government at the beginning of the war. The men who now support +Genl. S. are the identical ones who stood around Lyon and sustained +the government in the dark days of 1861. They are the true friends +of the government; men who stand between the rebels on one side +and the radical revolutionists on the other; the men who maintain +the Constitution, uphold the laws, and advocate justice to all men. +If sustained by the President, they will rally to their standard +all the best men of the State, of both parties. + +"Secession is dead in Missouri. As a party the secessionists are +utterly without influence. The degree of support which they will +hereafter give to the government will depend upon its policy. If +the radicals triumph, the enemies of the government will be increased +both in numbers and bitterness. If a wise and just policy be +pursued, every respectable man in the State will soon be an active +supporter of the government, and Missouri will be the most loyal +State in the Union. + +"This, in fact, is the cause of the present fierce action of the +radicals. They know they must get the power at once, or there will +soon be an overwhelming loyal party opposed to them. The 'claybank' +leaders control all the conservative elements in the State, and +give to Genl. S., as the representative of the President, an honest +support. They will continue to support him in the execution of +any policy the President may order to be carried out. They sustain +him, and will sustain him in future, although they may not approve +all his acts, because it is their duty to the government." + +About the last of September a radical delegation of about one +hundred members from Missouri and Kansas went to Washington to urge +my removal from command in Missouri. The President sent me the +following instructions, and made a reply to the delegation, also +given below: + + "Executive Mansion, Washington, D. C., Oct. 1, 1863. +"General John M. Schofield. + +"Sir: There is no organized military force in avowed opposition +to the General Government now in Missouri; and if any such shall +reappear, your duty in regard to it will be too plain to require +any special instructions. Still, the condition of things both +there and elsewhere is such as to render it indispensable to maintain +for a time the United States military establishment in that State, +as well as to rely upon it for a fair contribution of support to +the establishment generally. Your immediate duty in regard to +Missouri now is to advance the efficiency of that establishment, +and to use it, as far as practicable, to compel the excited people +there to leave one another alone. + +"Under your recent order, which I have approved, you will only +arrest individuals, and suppress assemblies or newspapers, when +they may be working palpable injury to the military in your charge; +and in no other case will you interfere with the expression of +opinion in any form, or allow it to be interfered with violently +by others. In this you have a discretion to exercise with great +caution, calmness, and forbearance. + +"With the matters of removing the inhabitants of certain counties +_en masse_, and of removing certain individuals from time to time, +who are supposed to be mischievous, I am not now interfering, but +am leaving to your own discretion. + +"Nor am I interfering with what may still seem to you to be necessary +restrictions upon trade and intercourse. + +"I think proper, however, to enjoin upon you the following: Allow +no part of the military under your command to be engaged in either +returning fugitive slaves, or in forcing or enticing slaves from +their homes; and, so far as practicable, enforce the same forbearance +upon the people. + +"Report to me your opinion upon the availability for good of the +enrolled militia of the State. + +"Allow no one to enlist colored troops, except upon orders from +you, or from here through you. + +"Allow no one to assume the functions of confiscating property, +under the law of Congress or otherwise, except upon orders from +here. + +"At elections see that those, and only those, are allowed to vote +who are entitled to do so by the laws of Missouri, including, as +of those laws, the restriction laid by the Missouri Convention upon +those who may have participated in the rebellion. + +"So far as practicable, you will, by means of your military force, +expel guerillas, marauders, and murderers, and all who are known +to harbor, aid, or abet them. But, in like manner, you will repress +assumptions of unauthorized individuals to perform the same service, +because, under pretense of doing this, they become marauders and +murderers themselves. + +"To now restore peace, let the military obey orders, and those not +of the military leave each other alone, thus not breaking the peace +themselves. + +"In giving the above directions, it is not intended to restrain +you in other expedient and necessary matters not falling within +their range. + + "Your obt. servt., + "A. Lincoln." + + THE PRESIDENT'S INSTRUCTIONS + +I wrote in my journal, under date of October 2: + +"Colonel Du Bois, Captain Benham, and Captain Howard, who were sent +to inspect in Genl. Ewing's and Genl. Blunt's districts, have +returned. They report affairs in Blunt's district in a disgraceful +condition. I have determined to relieve Blunt, and propose to send +McNeil to Fort Smith. I telegraphed my intentions to Genl. Halleck +this morning, and asked for a general officer to command one of +the two districts. Soon after I received a despatch from the +President saying Genl. Halleck had shown him my despatch, and +adding: 'If possible, you better allow me to get through with a +certain matter here before adding to the difficulties of it. +Meantime supply me with the particulars of Maj.-Genl. Blunt's case.' + +"I replied: 'I will forward the papers in Genl. Blunt's case, and +defer action until I know your pleasure regarding it. I desire, +if possible, to diminish and not increase your difficulties. This +is one reason why I informed Genl. Halleck what I thought it +necessary to do.' Have since received a despatch from Genl. Halleck +saying that he had ordered Brig.-Genl. J. B. Sanborn from Vicksburg +to report to me for duty. + +"Have received a letter from Atty.-Genl. Bates, dated Sept. 29, +saying I need have no fear of the result of the efforts of the +radical delegation. + +"On Sept. 30 I received a despatch from the President transmitting +the false report from Leavenworth that Col. Moss, of the militia, +was driving out Union families from Platt and Union counties. +After full inquiry from Col. Guitar, Genl. Ewing, and Col. Williams +at St. Joseph, have replied to the President, informing him that +the report is false, and a base attempt of my enemies to influence +his action." + +Under date of October 4, I wrote in my journal: + +"The address presented to the President by the radical delegation +from Missouri was published in the 'Democrat' last evening. I +telegraphed the President last night that 'so much of it as relates +to me is not only untrue in spirit, but most of it is literally +false. If an answer or explanation is on any account desirable, +I shall be glad to make it.' To-day I received from the President +a despatch saying: 'Think you will not have just cause to complain +of my action. . . . '" + + THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY TO THE RADICAL DELEGATION + +The next day the President made this reply to the radical +delegation: + + "Executive Mansion, Washington, D. C., October 5, 1863. +"Hon. Charles D. Drake and Others, Committee. + +"Gentlemen: Your original address, presented on the 30th ultimo, +and the four supplementary ones, presented on the 3d inst., have +been carefully considered. I hope you will regard the other duties +claiming my attention, together with the great length and importance +of the documents, as constituting a sufficient apology for my not +having responded sooner. + +"These papers, framed for a common object, consist of the things +demanded, and the reasons for demanding them. + +"The things demanded are: + +"_First_. That General Schofield shall be relieved and General +Butler be appointed as commander of the Military Department of +Missouri. + +"_Second_. That the system of enrolled militia in Missouri may be +broken up, and national forces be substituted for it; and, + +"_Third_. That at elections persons may not be allowed to vote +who are not entitled by law to do so. + +"Among the reasons given, enough of suffering and wrong to Union +men is certainly, and I suppose truly, stated. Yet the whole case +as presented fails to convince me that General Schofield, or the +enrolled militia, is responsible for that suffering and wrong. +The whole can be explained on a more charitable and, as I think, +a more rational hypothesis. + +"We are in civil war. In such cases there always is a main question; +but in this case that question is a perplexing compound--Union and +slavery. It thus becomes a question not of two sides merely, but +of at least four sides, even among those who are for the Union, +saying nothing of those who are against it. Thus, those who are +for the Union _with_, but not _without_, slavery; those for it +_without_, but not _with_; those for it _with_ or _without_, but +prefer it _with_; and those for it _with_ or _without_, but prefer +it _without_. Among these again is a subdivision of those who are +for _gradual_, but not for _immediate_, and those who are for +_immediate_, but not for _gradual_, extinction of slavery. + +"It is easy to conceive that all these shades of opinion, and even +more, may be sincerely entertained by honest and truthful men; yet +all being for the Union, by reason of these differences each will +prefer a different way of sustaining the Union. At once sincerity +is questioned and motives are assailed; actual war coming, blood +grows hot and blood is spilled. Thought is forced from old channels +into confusion; deception breeds and thrives; confidence dies, and +universal suspicion reigns. Each man feels an impulse to kill his +neighbor, lest he be first killed by him. Revenge and retaliation +follow, and all this, as before said, may be among honest men only. +But this is not all. Every foul bird comes abroad, and every dirty +reptile rises up. These add crime to confusion. Strong measures +deemed indispensable, but harsh at best, such men make worse by +maladministration. Murders for old grudges and murders for pelf +proceed under any cloak that will best cover for the occasion. + +"These causes amply account for what has occurred in Missouri, +without ascribing it to the weakness or wickedness of any general. +The newspaper files--those chronicles of current events--will show +that evils now complained of were quite as prevalent under Frémont, +Hunter, Halleck, and Curtis as under Schofield. + +"If the former had greater force opposed to them, they had also +greater forces with which to meet it. When the organized rebel +army left the State, the main Federal force had to go also, leaving +the department commander at home relatively no stronger than before. + +"Without disparaging any, I affirm with confidence that no commander +of that department has, in proportion to his means, done better +than General Schofield. + +"The first specific charge against General Schofield is that the +enrolled militia was placed under his command, when it had not been +placed under the command of General Curtis. + +"That, I believe, is true; but you do not point out, nor can I +conceive, how that did or could injure loyal men or the Union cause. + +"You charge that upon General Curtis being superseded by General +Schofield, Franklin A. Dick was superseded by James O. Broadhead +as provost-marshal-general. No very specific showing is made as +to how this did or could injure the Union cause. It recalls, +however, the condition of things, as presented to me, which led to +a change of commanders for the department. + +"To restrain contraband intelligence and trade, a system of searches +seizures, permits, and passes had been introduced by General Frémont. +When General Halleck came, he found and continued the system, and +added an order, applicable to some parts of the State, to levy and +collect contributions from noted rebels to compensate losses and +relieve destitution caused by the rebellion. The action of General +Frémont and General Halleck, as stated, constituted a sort of system +which General Curtis found in full operation when he took command +of the department. That there was a necessity for something of +the sort was clear; but that it could only by justified by stern +necessity, and that it was liable to great abuse in administration, +was equally clear. Agents to execute it, contrary to the great prayer, +were led into temptation. Some might, while others would not, resist +that temptation. It was not possible to hold any to a very strict +accountability; and those yielding to the temptation would sell +permits and passes to those who would pay most, and most readily, +for them, and would seize property and collect levies in the aptest +way to fill their own pockets; money being the object, the man +having money, whether loyal or disloyal, would be a victim. This +practice doubtless existed to some extent, and it was a real +additional evil that it could be, and was, plausibly charged to +exist in greater extent than it did. + + THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY TO THE RADICAL DELEGATION + +"When General Curtis took command of the department, Mr. Dick, +against whom I never knew anything to allege, had general charge +of this system. A controversy in regard to it rapidly grew into +almost unmanageable proportions. One side ignored the necessity +and magnified the evils of the system, while the other ignored the +evils and magnified the necessity, and each bitterly assailed the +motives of the other. I could not fail to see that the controversy +enlarged in the same proportion as the professed Union men there +distinctly took sides in two opposing political parties. I exhausted +my wits, and very nearly my patience also, in efforts to convince +both that the evils they charged on each other were inherent in +the case, and could not be cured by giving either party a victory +over the other. + +"Plainly the irritating system was not to be perpetual, and it was +plausibly urged that it could be modified at once with advantage. +The case could scarcely be worse; and whether it could be made +better, could only be determined by a trial. In this view, and +not to ban or brand General Curtis, or to give a victory to any +party, I made the change of commander for the department. I now +learn that soon after this change Mr. Dick was removed, and that +Mr. Broadhead, a gentleman of no less good character, was put in +the place. The mere fact of this change is more distinctly complained +of than is any conduct of the new officer, or other consequences +of the change. + +"I gave the new commander no instructions as to the administration +of the system mentioned, beyond what is contained in the private +letter, afterward surreptitiously published,( 1) in which I directed +him to act solely for the public good, and independently of both +parties. Neither anything you have presented me, nor anything I +have otherwise learned, has convinced me that he has been unfaithful +to this charge. + +"Imbecility is urged as one cause for removing General Schofield; +and the late massacre at Lawrence, Kansas, is pressed as evidence +of that imbecility. To my mind that fact scarcely tends to prove +the proposition. That massacre is only an example of what Grierson, +John Morgan, and many others might have repeatedly done on their +respective raids, had they chosen to incur the personal hazard and +possessed the fiendish hearts to do it. + +"The charge is made that General Schofield, on purpose to protect +the Lawrence murderers, would not allow them to be pursued into +Missouri. While no punishment could be too sudden or too severe +for those murderers, I am well satisfied that the preventing of +the remedial raid into Missouri was the only safe way to avoid an +indiscriminate massacre there, including probably more innocent +than guilty. Instead of condemning, I therefore approve what I +understand General Schofield did in that respect. + +"The charges that General Schofield has purposely withheld protection +from loyal people, and purposely facilitated the objects of the +disloyal, are altogether beyond my power of belief. I do not +arraign the veracity of gentlemen as to the facts complained of, +but I do more than question the judgment which would infer that +those facts occurred in accordance with the _purposes_ of General +Schofield. + +"With my present views, I must decline to remove General Schofield. +In this I decide nothing against General Butler. I sincerely wish +it were convenient to assign him to a suitable command. + +"In order to meet some existing evils, I have addressed a letter +of instructions to General Schofield, a copy of which I inclose to +you. + +"As to the 'enrolled militia,' I shall endeavor to ascertain better +than I now know what is its exact value. Let me say now, however, +that your proposal to substitute national forces for the enrolled +militia implies that in your judgment the latter is doing something +which needs to be done, and if so, the proposition to throw that +force away, and supply its place by bringing other forces from the +field, where they are urgently needed, seems to me very extraordinary. +Whence shall they come? Shall they be withdrawn from Banks, or +Grant, or Steele, or Rosecrans? + +"Few things have been so grateful to my anxious feelings as when, +in June last, the local force in Missouri aided General Schofield +to so promptly send a large general force to the relief of General +Grant, then investing Vicksburg and menaced from without by General +Johnston. Was this all wrong? Should the enrolled militia then +have been broken up, and General Herron kept from Grant to police +Missouri? So far from finding cause to object, I confess to a +sympathy for whatever relieves our general force in Missouri, and +allows it to serve elsewhere. I, therefore, as at present advised, +cannot attempt the destruction of the enrolled militia of Missouri. +I may add that, the force being under the national military control, +it is also within the proclamation in regard to the _habeas corpus_. + +"I concur in the propriety of your request in regard to elections, +and have, as you see, directed General Schofield accordingly. I +do not feel justified to enter upon the broad field you present in +regard to the political differences between radicals and conservatives. +From time to time I have done and said what appeared to me proper +to do and say. The public knows it all. It obliges nobody to +follow me, and I trust it obliges me to follow nobody. The radicals +and conservatives each agree with me in some things and disagree +in others. I could wish both to agree with me in all things; for +then they would agree with each other, and would be too strong for +any foe from any quarter. They, however, choose to do otherwise, +and I do not question their right; I, too, shall do what seems to +be my duty. I hold whoever commands in Missouri, or elsewhere, +responsible to me, and not to either radicals or conservatives. +It is my duty to hear all; but at last, I must, within my sphere, +judge what to do and what to forbear. + + "Your obt. servt., + "A. Lincoln." + + THE MATTER OF COLORED ENLISTMENTS + +On October 13, I wrote in my journal: + +"The radical delegation has returned from Washington very much +crestfallen. It is generally conceded that they have accomplished +nothing. Nothing official is yet known on the subject. . . . + +"Lane spoke at Turner's Hall last evening; no disturbance; was +silent on the subject of the department commander. He informed me +yesterday, through Major Vaughan, that he had stopped the war upon +me, and intended hereafter not to oppose me unless circumstances +rendered it necessary. Said the President told him that whoever +made war on General Schofield, under the present state of affairs, +made war on him--the President. Said he never had made war on +General S., 'except incidentally.' + +"_Oct_. 14--Received yesterday an order from Genl. [Lorenzo] Thomas +appointing officers for the 1st Regt. Mo. Volunteers, of African +descent, and directing that they be detailed to raise the regiment. + +"Have telegraphed to the War Department for instructions as to the +mode of raising these troops, referring to a letter I wrote to Col. +Townsend on the subject on the 29th of September. In that letter +I explained the difficulty of raising such troops in Missouri, +unless it be done without regard to the claims of loyal slave- +owners. I also recommended that all able-bodied negroes be enlisted, +receipts given as a basis for payment to loyal owners, and suggested +that those of unquestioned loyalty might be paid at once from the +substitute fund. No answer has been received to that letter. + +"Some months ago I wrote to the Secretary of War, asking instructions +about the negro question. No answer. The Hon. Secretary seems +determined to make me deal with that question on my own responsibility. +It is very natural, but hardly just to me." + +I had issued an order respecting elections, in accordance with the +President's instructions. A personal request was made to me for +a modification of the order. The following letter was written in +reply to that request: + + "Headqrs., Department of the Missouri, + "St. Louis, Oct. 24th, 1863. +"Hon. C. Drake, St. Louis. + +"Sir: After full consideration of the subject of our conversation +this morning, I am of the opinion that no further orders upon the +subject of the election are necessary. The law which provides the +manner in which soldiers shall vote, and directs how the judges of +election shall be appointed, is as binding upon all persons to whom +it relates as any order would be. + +"Genl. Order No. 120 also alludes to the subject of soldiers voting, +I think, in sufficiently strong terms, although it is taken for +granted in that order that officers will do their duty in giving +their men an opportunity to vote. Moreover, any failure on their +part to do their whole duty in this regard would be a clear violation +of Genl. Order 101. I believe there is no ground for apprehension +that officers will neglect their duty regarding the election. If +anything is needed, it is that the troops be given full information +through the daily papers, which they all read, of their duties and +privileges under the laws. + +"From the short examination I have been able to give, I am of the +opinion that the Act of the General Assembly changing the mode of +voting does not apply to soldiers voting at the company polls; that +the ordinance of the convention remains unrepealed. + +"This, however, is a question which I will not presume to decide +or to refer to even in an order. + +"I return herewith the copy of Laws of Missouri which you were so +kind as to lend me. + + "Very respectfully your obt. servt., + "J. M. Schofield, Major-Genl." + + A LETTER ON THE CONDITION OF MISSOURI + +On October 25 I wrote to Mr. Lincoln in regard to a reorganization +of the militia of northwestern Missouri, which had been made for +the purpose of suppressing the lawlessness that had prevailed there +under the name of "loyalty," saying: + +"I take the liberty of sending you a letter which I have this day +received from Hon. Willard P. Hall, Lieut.-Governor of Missouri. + +"It may be of interest to you, as showing the good effect of the +stringent measures which I felt compelled to adopt in some portions +of Missouri, and of the firm support you have given me. + +"The immediate effect, as might have been expected, was a terrible +storm, but it has passed away, I hope never to return. + +"The State is now in far better condition than it has been at any +time during the war. + +"I have issued an election order in compliance with your instructions, +with which all parties express themselves well satisfied. It seems +I have at last succeeded in doing one thing which nobody can find +fault with. + +"Shelby's raid has terminated with a loss of about one half of the +men with which he entered the State, and _he received no recruits_ +except the robbers under Quantrill and Jackman. These left the +State with him. This fact is gratifying as showing that the rebel +power in Missouri is completely broken. + +"Whatever may be the secret feelings of the former secessionists +of Missouri, their influence now, so far as it is exerted at all, +is for peace and submission to the national authority. All that +is now necessary to secure peace to Missouri, with the possible +exception of occasional raids from Arkansas, is union among the +loyal people. I shall spare no effort to reconcile their differences +as far as possible, or at least to restrain their quarrel within +peaceable limits. The additional strength your support has given +me will enable me to do this far better then before. My radical +friends now exhibit some disposition to stop their war upon me, +and I shall certainly not give them any good reason for continuing +it. The honest enthusiasts on the subject of liberty, who compose +the respectable portion of this party, are already well disgusted +with their lawless brethren who have brought such odium upon them, +and now begin to realize the necessity of sustaining men in enforcing +the laws. + +"Whatever may be the result of the pending election, I believe the +most serious danger is already past. + +"I shall not fail to exercise great forbearance in enforcing +restrictions upon speech and the press. I have enforced my order +in only one case, and that so clear that the offender fully confessed +and asked pardon on any terms. It will not probably be necessary +for me to exercise any control over the press hereafter. + +"Your accurate appreciation of the real difficulty here, and the +strong and generous manner in which you have sustained me, will do +more good in Missouri than to have doubled the troops under my +command. This I hope soon to show you by sending additional forces +to the front." + +With the above letter to the President I inclosed the following: + + "St. Joseph, Mo., Oct. 21st, 1863. + +"General: It is with very great pleasure that I can inform you of +the satisfactory condition of things in this section of Missouri. +There is more security for men and property in northwestern Missouri +than there has been since the rebellion began. There is not a +spark of rebellious feeling left here, and all citizens seem to +be, and I believe are, ready to discharge all the duties of loyal +men. + +"The people are truly grateful to you for your efforts to protect +them, and you may rest assured will never fail you in any emergency. + + "Yours truly, + "Willard P. Hall +"Major-Genl. Schofield, etc." + + A LETTER ON THE CONDITION OF MISSOURI + +The following was written by me, November 1, 1863, to Mr. James L. +Thomas of St. Louis, in answer to what was understood to be an +attempt to obtain some expression of partizan preference as between +the "pestilent factions": + +"In reply to your letter of Oct. 30th, I will state that in some +important particulars you entirely misapprehend my remarks made +during our conversation on the 29th. I spoke of the lawless acts +committed in some portions of Missouri by men claiming to be radicals +and acting in the name of radicalism; and asserted that leading +men and papers of the party had failed to do their duty by disavowing +and frowning down this lawlessness; that in this course they had +been guilty of great folly, and had brought odium upon their party +in Missouri and throughout the country; that they had injured rather +than advanced the cause of emancipation. I made no remarks relative +to the radical party, nor to radicals as a party of class of +citizens. I spoke of those men and papers who by tolerating and +encouraging lawlessness in the name of radicalism had done so much +towards producing trouble in the State. + +"It is perhaps natural that any honest man should feel, as you +propose, to disown a party in which such abuses are tolerated, but +I cannot see the propriety of so doing. Would it not be much wiser +and more patriotic to endeavor to purify the party, to bring it +back to the high principles upon which it was founded, and to rid +it of the elements which have disgraced those principles? + +"Our conversation on the 29th was regarded by me as confidential, +and I still desire it to be so regarded by you, and also this +letter. No possible good can result from a public discussion by +me of such matters. + +"You are aware that as department commander I have nothing to do +with politics, nor with offenders as members of any party. I shall +unquestionably, upon proper proof, punish all who have been, or +may hereafter be, guilty of the crimes you mention, without regard +to the party they may belong to; but I do not propose to condemn +any party or class of men because of the guilt of one or any number +of its members. When I find men acting wrongfully or unwisely to +the prejudice of the Union cause, I endeavor, within my proper +sphere, to correct or restrain them by appropriate means according +to circumstances. Whether my influence thus exerted inures to the +benefit of one party or another is a question which I cannot take +into consideration. + +"My dealing is with individuals, not with parties. Officially I +know nothing of radicals or conservatives. The question with me +is simply what individuals obey the laws and what violate them; +who are for the government and who against it. The measures of +the President are my measures; his orders, my rule of action. +Whether a particular party gains strength or loses it by my action +must depend upon the party, and not upon me." + + FORMER CONFEDERATES IN UNION MILITIA REGIMENTS + +At this time occurred the following exchange of letters with the +President: + +"(Private and confidential.) + + "Executive Mansion, Washington, Oct. 28th, 1863. +"General John M. Schofield: There have recently reached the War +Department, and thence been laid before me, from Missouri, three +communications, all similar in import and identical in object. +One of them, addressed to nobody, and without place or date, but +having the signature of (apparently) the writer, is a letter of +eight closely written foolscap pages. The other two are written +by a different person at St. Joseph, Mo., and of the date, +respectively, October 12th and 13th, and each inclosing a large +number of affidavits. + +"The general statements of the whole are that the Federal and State +authorities are arming the disloyal and disarming the loyal, and +that the latter will all be killed or driven out of the State unless +there should be a change. + +"In particular, no loyal man who has been disarmed is named, but +the affidavits show, by name, forty-two persons as disloyal who +have been armed. They are as follows: [Names omitted.] + +"A majority of these are shown to have been in the rebel service. +I believe it could be shown that the government here has deliberately +armed more than ten times as many captured at Gettysburg, to say +nothing of similar operations in East Tennessee. These papers +contain altogether thirty-one manuscript pages, and one newspaper +in extenso; and yet I do not find it anywhere charged in them that +any loyal man has been harmed by reason of being disarmed, or that +any disloyal one has harmed anybody by reason of being armed by +the Federal or State government. + +"Of course I have not had time to carefully examine all; but I have +had most of them examined and briefed by others, and the result is +as stated. The remarkable fact that the actual evil is yet only +anticipated--inferred--induces me to suppose that I understand the +case. But I do not state my impression, because I might be mistaken, +and because your duty and mine is plain in any event. + +"The locality of nearly all this seems to be St. Joseph and Buchanan +County. I wish you to give special attention to this region, +particularly on Election day. Prevent violence, from whatever +quarter, and see that the soldiers themselves do no wrong. + + "Yours truly, + "A. Lincoln." + + "Hdqrs., Dept. of the Missouri. + "St. Louis, Nov. 9th, 1863. +"Mr. President: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of +your confidential letter dated Oct. 28th, and containing the names +of men enlisted in the militia of northwest Missouri who are said +to have been disloyal. + +"On my visit to Kansas and northwest Missouri during the troubles +there in September last, I examined personally into the difficulties +in Platte, Buchanan, and other western counties, and learned fully +their nature and origin. I at once ordered the reorganization of +the militia, which created so much commotion for a time, but which +has restored that portion of the State to a condition of profound +peace. + +"I have watched the progress of affairs there closely, and have +kept myself fully advised of all the facts. It is true that about +twice as many former rebels as were named by your informants are +in the militia organization, amounting to from five to ten per +cent. of the whole. It is also true that a very much larger number +of returned Missouri rebels have enlisted in the Kansas Volunteers, +and, so far as I know, are faithful, good soldiers. + +"The rule I established for the militia organization in northwest +Missouri was that the officers should be of undoubted loyalty, +original Union men, and that both officers and privates, as far as +possible, should be men of wealth and respectability, whose all +depended upon the preservation of peace. + +"The former sufferings of these men from the lawlessness which has +so long existed on the border made them willing to do military duty +to save from destruction or loss what property they had left. I +have yet to hear the first report of a murder, robbery, or arson +in that whole region since this new organization was made. The +late election was conducted in perfect peace and good order. There +is not the slightest pretense from any source of any interference +or other misconduct on the part of any of the troops. I have not +deemed it necessary to be very particular about the antecedents of +troops that are producing such good results. If I can make a +repentant rebel of more service to the government than a man who +never had any political sins to repent of, I see no reason for not +doing so. Indeed, I take no little satisfaction in making these +men guard the property of their more loyal neighbors, and in holding +their own property responsible for their fidelity. + +"I have the satisfaction of reporting to you that the late election +in all parts of the State passed off in perfect quiet and good +order. I have heard of no disturbance of any kind anywhere. The +aggregate vote, I think, shows that the purity of the ballot-box +was preserved in a remarkable degree. If the loyal people all +voted, few or no rebels did. + +"The prospects of future peace in this State are highly encouraging. + + "I am very respectfully your obt. servt., + "J. M. Schofield, Maj.-Genl. +"To the President." + +I had abundant reason to be satisfied with the result of this +controversy, so far as it concerned me, and with the condition of +the department when it terminated, near midwinter. Yet I was +satisfied some change was impending, and cared not how soon it +might come, now that my administration had been fully vindicated. +In fact, such a command was not at all to my taste, and I had always +longed for purely military service in the field, free from political +complications. It was therefore with sincere pleasure that I +received, in December, a summons from the President to come to +Washington. + + SUMMONED TO WASHINGTON BY MR. LINCOLN + +But before relating the circumstances of my visit to the President, +I must refer to an incident which occurred a short time before I +left St. Louis, and which I was afterward led to suspect was the +immediate cause of the President's desire to see me. + +The Missouri legislature was in session and balloting for a United +States senator. The legislature was divided into three parties-- +radicals, conservative Republicans, and Democrats, or "copperheads," +neither strong enough to elect without a fusion with one of the +others. A union of the radicals and the conservatives was, of +course, most desired by the administration; but their bitterness +had become so great that either would prefer a bargain with the +Democrats rather than with the other. The Hon. E. B. Washburne, +representative in Congress from Illinois, made an opportune visit +to St. Louis about this time, procured an interview with me at the +house of a common friend, and led me into a frank conversation +relative to this political question. I told him candidly that in +my opinion the desired union of radicals and conservatives was +impossible, for they were more bitterly opposed to each other then +either was to the Democrats. Mr. Washburne went to Washington, +and reported to the President that I was opposed to the much-desired +radical and conservative union in Missouri, and was using my +influence to prevent it. So opposite was this to the truth that +I had even written a letter to my friend Colonel J. O. Broadhead, +the conservative candidate, asking him to withdraw in favor of the +radical candidate, as a means of bringing about the harmony so much +desired by the President. This letter was not sent, because the +telegraphic reports from Jefferson City showed that it was too late +to do any good; but it was handed to Colonel Broadhead on his return +to show him my wishes in the matter. + +Upon my first visit to the President, he repeated to me this +Washburne story, without, however, intimating that he attached much +weight to it. I at once replied by giving him the simple facts +about my conversation with Washburne, and what my true position +was on that question. Mr. Lincoln promptly dismissed the subject +with the words: "I believe you, Schofield; those fellows have been +lying to me again." + +Mr. Lincoln undoubtedly referred here to a previous incident which +was related to me by the Hon. James S. Rollins, member of Congress +from Missouri, one of the truest and most truthful men in the world, +as having occurred in his presence. Some men from Missouri had +prevailed upon Mr. Rollins to introduce them to the President, to +whom they wished to represent the condition of affairs in Missouri +as viewed from their standpoint. After listening to their story, +the President opened the little right-hand drawer of his desk, took +out a letter from me, and read it to them. He then said: "_That_ +is the truth about the matter; you fellows are lying to me." + +Determined to leave no room for doubt in the President's mind, I +telegraphed to St. Louis and got the Broadhead letter; but by the +time it arrived I had become so satisfied of Mr. Lincoln's confidence +that I did not think it worth while to show it to him. + +I remained at the capital several weeks, and had full conversations +with the President on public affairs. The political situation was +a perplexing one. The state of parties in the West seemed that of +inextricable confusion, which Mr. Lincoln and his friends were +anxious to unravel, if possible, before the next Presidential +nomination. In Missouri the faction which had been friendly to me +was also a supporter of Mr. Lincoln, while the radicals were opposed +to him. In Kansas, on the contrary, the so-called Lane and Carney +factions, while vying with each other in professions of radicalism, +were divided in the opposite manner. The former supported the +President, but was bitterly hostile to me, while the latter was +friendly to me and opposed to Mr. Lincoln. I frankly told the +President that it was impossible for me to reconcile these differences +--indeed, that I did not believe any general in the army could, as +department commander, satisfy the Union people of both Kansas and +Missouri; neither the man nor the policy that would suit the one +would be at all satisfactory to the other. Mr. Lincoln had evidently +already arrived at much the same conclusion, and soon determined +to divide the old Department of the Missouri into three departments, +and try to assign to each a commander suited to its peculiarities. +But Mr. Lincoln declared decidedly to me, and to my friends in the +Senate, that he would make no change until the Senate united with +him in vindicating me by confirming my nomination as major-general, +then in the hands of the Military Committee of the Senate, and that +he would then give me a more important command. + + OFFERED THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY OF THE OHIO + +A large majority--indeed, all but some half-dozen--of the Senate +were known to be favorable to the confirmation; but this small +minority had control of the Military Committee, and were consequently +able to delay any report of the case to the Senate, and thus to +thwart the President's wishes. + +The matter stood thus for nearly a month, and seemed no nearer +solution than at first, when a despatch was received in Washington +from General Grant, then commanding the Military Division of the +Mississippi, saying it was necessary to relieve General Foster, on +account of ill-health, from the command of the Department and Army +of the Ohio, and to appoint a successor. Upon being asked whom he +wanted for that command, Grant replied: "Either McPherson or +Schofield." + +Among the changes then known in Washington to be in the near future +was Grant's elevation to the command of "all the armies," to be +naturally followed by Sherman's succession to that of the Division +of the Mississippi, and McPherson's to that of the Army of the +Tennessee. But Grant alone, perhaps, had no right to anticipate +those changes, hence he gave his just preference to my senior, +McPherson. + +Halleck handed me Grant's despatch, and asked me how I would like +that. I replied: "That is exactly what I want; nothing in the +world could be better." He then told me to take the despatch to +the President, which I immediately did, and in handing it to him +said: "If you want to give me that, I will gladly take all chances +for the future, whether in the Senate or elsewhere." Mr. Lincoln +replied in his characteristic way: "Why, Schofield, that cuts the +knot, don't it? Tell Halleck to come over here, and we will fix +it right away." I bade the President adieu, and started at once +for St. Louis, to turn over my command and proceed to my new field +of duty. + +I saw Mr. Lincoln only once after that time. That was when, just +a year later, I was passing through Washington with the Twenty- +third Corps, and called merely to pay my respects. The President +greeted me with the words: "Well, Schofield, I have n't heard +anything against you for a year." Apparently, the great trouble +to him with which I had been so closely connected, if not the cause, +was uppermost in his mind. + +With Mr. Lincoln I had no personal acquaintance, having met him +but once, previous to the visit above described. But in assigning +me to the command in Missouri he had, contrary to the usual custom, +written for me his own instructions, thus inviting my fullest +confidence. I had availed myself of this to tell him everything +without reserve, and he appeared never to doubt the exact truth of +my statements. + + ANECDOTE OF GENERAL GRANT + +My personal acquaintance with General Grant was equally limited-- +we having met but once, and for only a moment. He knew me only by +reputation. I never had any conversation or correspondence with +him on the subject, but presume he knew something about the trouble +I was in, had not forgotten the aid I sent him at Vicksburg, and +believed I would do what was right to the best of my ability. I +have had abundant reasons for believing that he never felt disappointed +in his trust and confidence. + +General Halleck knew me much better, having been my immediate +commander in Missouri in 1861 and 1862. Although on one or two +occasions he seemed a little harsh in respect to unimportant matters, +he was uniformly kind, considerate, and unwavering in his personal +and official support. + +The Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, expressed his confidence and +approval; said he was opposed to any change; that it was the +President's affair, with which he had nothing to do. I got the +impression that he regarded the whole scheme as a political one, +in which he took no interest, and with which he felt no sympathy. + +In St. Louis I met General Grant, who was then so soon to be assigned +to the command of "all the armies of the United States," and for +the first time really became acquainted with him. We were together +much of the time for several days and nights. The citizens of St. +Louis entertained the general in a most magnificent manner. At a +grand banquet given in his honor, at which I sat on his right, he +did not even touch one of the many glasses of wine placed by the +side of his plate. At length I ventured to remark that he had not +tasted his wine. He replied: "I dare not touch it. Sometimes I +can drink freely without any unpleasant effect; at others I cannot +take even a single glass of light wine." A strong man, indeed, +who could thus know and govern his own weakness! In reply to the +toast in his honor, he merely arose and bowed without saying a +word. Then turning to me, he said it was simply impossible for +him to utter a word when on his feet. As is well known, the great +general finally overcame his reserve. + +It was very difficult for me to comprehend the political necessity +which compelled Mr. Lincoln to give his official countenance to +such men as Lane and Blunt in Kansas, but such necessity was thought +to exist. I suppose that a great statesman should use in the best +way he can the worst materials as well as the best that are within +his reach, and, if possible, make them all subserve the great +purposes he has to accomplish. + +The old department was cut up, the Lane faction in Kansas was given +the man of its choice--General Curtis; Missouri was placed alone +under General Rosecrans--not Butler, as the radicals had asked; +Arkansas, having no voice in the matter, was left under the soldier, +General Steele, then in command there; and I left them all without +regret and with buoyant hopes of more satisfactory service in a +purely military field. + +[( 1) By a radical newspaper.] + + +CHAPTER VII +Condition of the Troops at Knoxville--Effect of the Promotion of +Grant and Sherman--Letter to Senator Henderson--A Visit from General +Sherman--United with his other Armies for the Atlanta Campaign-- +Comments on Sherman's "Memoirs"--Faulty Organization of Sherman's +Army--McPherson's Task at Resaca--McPherson's Character--Example of +the Working of a Faulty System. + +I arrived at Knoxville, Tennessee, on February 8, 1864, and the +next day relieved General John G. Foster. The troops then about +Knoxville were the Ninth Corps, two divisions of the Twenty-third, +and about one thousand cavalry and two divisions of the Fourth +Corps; the latter belonged to the Department of the Cumberland, +but had been left with General Burnside after the siege of Knoxville +was raised by General Sherman. + +The Ninth and Twenty-third Corps were reduced in effective strength +to mere skeletons, the former reporting present for duty equipped +only 2800 men, and the latter 3000 men; and these had for a long +time been living on half rations or less, and were generally far +less than half clad, many of them being entirely without shoes. +The remainder of these troops were disabled by wounds, sickness, +lack of food or clothing, or were employed in the care of the sick +or on extra duty. + +Many thousands of dead horses and mules were scattered round the +town, while the few remaining alive were reduced to skeletons. Of +about 30,000 animals with which General Burnside had gone into East +Tennessee, scarcely 1000 remained fit for service; while his army +of over 25,000 men had been reduced to not more than 7000 fit for +duty and effective for service in the field. Such was the result +of the siege of Knoxville, and such the Army of the Ohio when I +became its commander. + +But the splendid victory gained a short time before at Chattanooga +had raised the blockade upon our line of supply, and the railroad +to Chattanooga and Nashville was soon opened, so that our starving +and naked troops could begin to get supplies of food and clothing. +The movement of the first train of cars was reported by telegraph +from every station, and was eagerly awaited by the entire army. +When the locomotive whistle announced its approach, everybody turned +out to welcome it with shouts of joy. It proved to consist of ten +car-loads of horse and mule shoes for the dead animals which strewed +the plains! Fortunately the disgust produced by this disappointment +was not of long duration. The next train, which followed very +soon, contained coffee, sugar, and other articles to gladden the +hearts of hungry soldiers. + +The Confederate army under Longstreet still remained in East +Tennessee. A movement had recently been made by our troops, under +the immediate command of General John G. Parke (General Foster +being too lame to take the field in person), to drive Longstreet +out. But the movement had failed, the troops returning to Knoxville +with the loss of considerable material. In consequence of this, +much anxiety was felt in Washington regarding the situation in East +Tennessee. It was even apprehended that Knoxville might be in +danger; and an advance of Longstreet's force to Strawberry Plains, +where he laid a bridge over the Holston and crossed a part of his +troops, seemed to give some ground for such apprehensions. + + CONDITION OF THE TROOPS AT KNOXVILLE + +The miserable condition of our troops, the season of the year, the +almost total lack of means of transportation for supplies and of +a pontoon bridge to cross the river, rendered any considerable +movement on our part impossible. But to relieve the existing +apprehension, I determined to assume the offensive at once, and to +maintain it as far as possible. + +Early in February General Grant had proposed to give me 10,000 +additional troops from General Thomas's army at Chattanooga, and +to let me begin the campaign against Longstreet at once. But on +February 16 he informed me that the movement would have to be +delayed because of some operations in which General Thomas was to +engage. Nevertheless, I advanced on the 24th with what force I +had, at the same time sending a reconnaissance south of the French +Broad River to ascertain the nature of a hostile movement reported +in that direction. + +Upon our advance, Longstreet's troops withdrew across the Holston +and French Broad and retreated toward Morristown. His advance had +evidently been intended only to cover an attempted cavalry raid +upon our rear, which the high water in the Little Tennessee rendered +impracticable. + +We now occupied Strawberry Plains, rebuilt the railroad bridge, +pushed forward the construction of a bateau bridge which had been +commenced, in the meantime using the bateaux already constructed +to ferry the troops across the river. In this manner we were able +to advance as far as Morristown by February 29 with sufficient +force to reconnoiter Longstreet's position. This reconnaissance +demonstrated that the enemy held Bull's Gap, and that his entire +force was grouped about that strong position. The object of this +movement having been accomplished without loss, our troops retired +to New Market to await the arrival of the troops to be sent by +General Thomas, the completion of the railroad bridge, and other +necessary preparations for the expected campaign. + +On March 12 another reconnaissance was made as far as Bull's Gap, +which was found to be still occupied by the enemy, although reliable +information indicated that Longstreet was preparing for, and had +perhaps already begun, his movement toward Virginia. Although his +force, if concentrated, was much superior to mine, I determined to +endeavor to take advantage of his movement to attack his rear. My +advance held Morristown; all the troops were ordered forward to +that place, and preparations were made for an attack, when, on the +15th, orders came from General Grant to send the Ninth Corps to +the Army of the Potomac. + +Such a reduction of my command, instead of the expected reinforcement, +left me wholly unable to do more than observe Longstreet as he +leisurely withdrew from Tennessee and joined Lee in Virginia, and +prepare for the campaign of the coming summer, the nature of which +I could then only conjecture. + + EFFECT OF THE PROMOTION OF GRANT AND SHERMAN + +This entire change of program doubtless resulted from the promotion +of General Grant to lieutenant-general and commander-in-chief, and +General Sherman to his place in command of the Military Division +of the Mississippi, which occurred at that time. The change of +plans was undoubtedly wise. The Confederate government could not +afford to leave Longstreet's force in East Tennessee during the +summer. He must join Lee or Johnston before the opening of the +summer campaign. It was not worth while for us to expend time and +strength in driving him out, which ought to be devoted to preparations +for vastly more important work. I felt disappointed at the time +in not having an opportunity of doing something that would silence +my enemies in Washington, who were not slow to avail themselves of +any pretext for hostile action against me. It was not difficult +to manufacture one out of the public reports of what had been done, +or not done, in East Tennessee, and the Military Committee of the +Senate reported against the confirmation of my appointment as major- +general. Of this I was informed by my friend Senator J. B. Henderson, +in a letter urging me to "whip somebody anyhow." This information +and advice elicited a long reply, from which the following are +extracts, which expressed pretty fully my views and feelings on +the subject, and which, with events that soon followed, ended all +trouble I ever had with that august body, the United States Senate. + +I recollect in this connection a very pertinent remark made by +General Grant soon after he became President. My nomination as +major-general in the regular army, with those of Sherman and Sheridan +as general and lieutenant-general, had been sent to the Senate and +returned approved so promptly as to occasion comment. I remarked +that it had on one occasion taken me a year and a half to get +through the Senate. President Grant, as he handed me my commission, +replied: "Yes; and if your conduct then had been such as to avoid +that difficulty with the Senate, you would probably never have +received this commission at all." I have no doubt he was right. +To have pleased the radical politicians of that day would have been +enough to ruin any soldier. + + LETTER TO SENATOR HENDERSON + + "Headquarters, Army of the Ohio, + "Knoxville, Tenn., April 15, 1864. +"Dear Senator: I have just received your letter of the 7th informing +me that the Military Committee has reported against my nomination, +and urging me to 'whip somebody anyhow.' I am fully aware of the +importance to me personally of gaining a victory. No doubt I might +easily get up a little 'claptrap' on which to manufacture newspaper +notoriety, and convince the Senate of the United States that I had +won a great victory, and secure my confirmation by acclamation. +Such things have been done, alas! too frequently during this war. +But such is not my theory of a soldier's duties. I have an idea +that my military superiors are the proper judges of my character +and conduct, and that their testimony ought to be considered +satisfactory as to my _military qualities_. + +"I have the approval and support of the President, the Secretary +of War, General Halleck, General Grant, and General Sherman. I am +willing to abide the decision of any one or all of them, and I +would not give a copper for the weight of anybody's or everybody's +opinion in addition to, or in opposition to, theirs. + +"If the Senate is not satisfied with such testimony, I can't help +it. I never have and never will resort to 'buncombe' for the +purpose of securing my own advancement. If I cannot gain promotion +by legitimate means, I do not want it at all. . . . In all this +time I have yet to hear the first word of disapproval, from my +superior officer, of any one of my military operations (unless I +except Curtis, who disapproved of my pursuing Hindman so far into +Arkansas), and in general have received high commendation from my +superiors, both for my military operations and administration. I +would rather have this record without a major-general's commission, +then to gain the commission by adding to my reputation one grain +of falsehood. . . . + +"Grant was here in the winter, and Sherman only a few days ago. +They are fully acquainted with the condition of affairs. I have +been acting all the time under their instructions, and I believe +with their entire approval. They are generally understood to be +men whose opinions on military matters are entitled to respect. +I cannot do more or better than refer the Senate to them. + +"One thing is certain: I shall not be influenced one grain in the +discharge of my duty by any questions as to what action the Senate +may take on my nomination. . . . If the Senate is not satisfied as +to my past services, why not wait until they can know more? I am +tired enough of this suspense, but still am perfectly willing to +wait. In fact, I have become, in spite of myself, very indifferent +on the subject. I am pretty thoroughly convinced that a major- +general's commission is not worth half the trouble I and my friends +have had about mine, and I feel very little inclination to trouble +them, or even myself, any more about it. + +"The Senate has its duty to perform in this matter, as well as +myself and my superior officers. If senators are not willing to +act upon the concurrent testimony of all my superior officers as +to what services I have rendered, I shall not condescend to humbug +them into the belief that I have done something which I really have +not. + +"You ask me what are the prospects of putting down the rebellion. +I answer unhesitatingly that when the management of military matters +is left to military men, the rebellion will be put down very quickly, +and not before. I regard it as having been fully demonstrated that +neither the Senate, nor the House of Representatives, nor the +newspapers, nor the people of the United States, nor even all of +them together, can command an army. I rather think if you let +Grant alone, and let him have his own way, he will end the war this +year. At all events, the next ninety days will show whether he +will or not. + +"I find this letter is both too long and too ill-natured. I feel +too much as if I would like to 'whip somebody anyhow,' so I will +stop where I am. Let me hear from you again soon. + + "Yours very truly, + "J. M. Schofield. +"Hon. J. B. Henderson, + "U. S. Senate, Washington, D. C." + +Of course I knew the advice of my friend Senator Henderson was not +intended to be taken seriously, but only as expressing his view, +much the same as my own, of the then existing situation in the +Senate. But it gave me, all the same, the opportunity I wanted to +give his brother senators, through him, "a piece of my mind." + +General Sherman, on a visit to Knoxville about the end of March, +a few days before the date of the foregoing letter, disclosed to +me his general plans for the coming campaign, and the part I was +expected to take in it. + +It would be difficult to give an adequate conception of the feeling +of eager expectation and enthusiasm with which, having given my +final salutation to my "friends" in the Senate, I entered upon the +preparations for this campaign. Of its possible results to the +country there was room in my mind only for confidence. But for +myself, it was to decide my fate, and that speedily. My reputation +and rank as a soldier, so long held in the political balance, were +at length to be settled. The long-hoped-for opportunity had come, +and that under a general whose character and ability were already +established, and of the justice of whose judgment and action +regarding his subordinates there could be no reason for doubt in +my mind. My command was to be mostly of veteran troops, and not +too large for my experience. Its comparative smallness was a source +of satisfaction to me at that time, rather than anything like +jealousy of my senior brother commanders of the Cumberland and +Tennessee. + +My first care was to provide my men with all necessary equipments +for the campaign, and to fill up the ranks by calling in all +absentees. It was a refreshing sight to see the changed aspect +and feeling of the gallant little army as it marched with full +ranks and complete equipment, newly clad, from Knoxville toward +Dalton. + +My next thought was to win the respect and confidence of my men. +An opportunity to do this was speedily afforded in the delicate +operations in front of Dalton. The result may perhaps be fairly +expressed in the words of an old soldier who was overhead to say +as I passed his regiment that day under fire: "It is all right, +boys; I like the way the old man chaws his tobacco." From that +day forward I felt that the Twenty-third Corps confided in me as +I did in them. I never had any doubt they would do just what I +expected them to do, and would take it for granted that it was "all +right." + +It is with greatest pleasure that I record here the just tribute +paid to that splendid body of men by General Sherman about the +close of the Atlanta campaign: "The Twenty-third Corps never failed +to do all that was expected of it." + + COMMENTS ON SHERMAN'S "MEMOIRS" + +And it is with equal pleasure that I record the just and generous +treatment shown by General Sherman toward me from the beginning of +that campaign. Although much my senior in years, experience, and +reputation, he never showed that he was aware of it, but always +treated me as his peer. In his official reports and his memoirs +he has never been unkind or unjust, though it has never been his +habit to bestow much praise on individuals, or to think much of +the rewards due his subordinates, generally giving credit as justly +due to troops rather than to commanders. It would be impossible +for me not to cherish feelings of strong affection for my old +commander, as well as the profound respect due his character as a +man and solider, and his brilliant genius. + +If anything I may say in criticism of General Sherman's acts or +words shall seem unkind or be considered unjust, I can only disclaim +any such feeling, and freely admit that it would be wholly unworthy +of the relations that always existed between us. I write not for +the present, but for the future, and my only wish is to represent +the truth as it appears to me. If I fail to see it clearly, I do +but condemn myself. History will do impartial justice. Having +been in a subordinate position in the campaigns of 1864 in Georgia +and Tennessee, I shall not attempt to write a full account of those +campaigns, but shall limit myself to such comments as seem to me +to be called upon the already published histories of those +campaigns. + +In estimating the merits of Sherman's "Memoirs,"( 1) it should be +remembered that he does not, and does not claim to, occupy the +position of a disinterested, impartial historian. He writes, not +for the purpose of doing equal and exact justice to all actors in +a great historical drama, but for the purpose of elucidating his +own acts and motives, and vindicating himself against the harsh +criticism and censure which have followed some of his most important +transactions. However unconscious General Sherman himself may have +been of the influence of such motives, their existence was natural, +even inevitable, and they have manifestly given their coloring to +all of the memoirs. This should not occasion surprise, nor even +regret, much less be held to justify unkind criticism. It is +desirable for the future historian to have the view of the chief +actor in any portion of history taken from his own standpoint. It +is only by a critical, laborious and honest comparison of this view +with those of other actors and eye-witnesses that impartial history +may ultimately be written. + +My present purpose is simply to direct attention to some points in +the history of those campaigns of General Sherman in which I was +one of his principal subordinates, upon which the views of others +were at the time, or have since been, different from his own. In +what I have to say the motive of self-vindication can have little +or no influence; for, with some unimportant exceptions, General +Sherman does relatively full justice to me and to the little army +which I had the honor to command. I shall speak mainly of the acts +of others, especially the noble dead. + + FAULTY ORGANIZATION OF SHERMAN'S ARMY + +I must preface my remarks by observing that the organization of +Sherman's army during the Atlanta campaign was extremely faulty, +in that the three grand divisions were very unequal in strength, +the Army of the Cumberland having nearly _five times_ the infantry +strength of the Army of the Ohio, and more than twice that of the +Army of the Tennessee, even after the junction of Blair's corps. +The cavalry, of which two divisions belonged to the Army of the +Ohio, always acted either under the direct orders of General Sherman +or of the nearest army commander, according to the flank on which +it was operating. This inequality resulted from the fact that +Sherman's army was composed of three separate armies, or such +portions of them as could be spared from their several departments, +united for that campaign. General Thomas was, naturally enough, +disinclined to part with any of his troops, and the troops did not +wish to be separated from the old army in which they had won so +much honor, nor from the commander whom they revered. Besides, +General Thomas had had much greater experience in the command of +troops in the field than I, and General Sherman, if he thought of +it at all, may well have doubted the wisdom of diminishing the +command of the one to increase that of the other. I do not know +whether this matter was discussed at all before the opening of the +campaign, certainly not by me, who would have been restrained by +motives of delicacy, if by no other, from mentioning it. But in +fact my ambition was then limited to fighting well and successfully +with the single corps under my command. It was only after experience +had drawn attention more pointedly to the evils resulting from +faulty organization, and success had inspired legitimate confidence, +that this subject became matter of much thought and some discussion. + +But this faulty organization continued to the end of the Atlanta +campaign, and was, as I think will clearly appear, one of the causes +of many of the partial failures or imperfect successes that +characterized our operations. General Thomas's command often proved +unwieldy and slow from being larger than one man could handle in +a rough and in many places densely wooded country, while the others +were frequently too small for the work to be done. It was often +attempted to remedy this defect by ordering a division or corps of +the Army of the Cumberland to "co-operate with" or "support" one +of the others in making an attack; but military experience has +shown that "co-operate" and "support" mean, in general, to do +nothing effective. The corps commanders, generally, not being in +the habit of acting independently, and not being in direct +communication with the general-in-chief, and hence not familiar +with his plans and views, would not act with the necessary promptness +or vigor; and not regarding themselves as absolutely under the +orders of the general they were directed to support, they would +not obey his orders or requests unless they were in accord with +their own views; while one of these corps commanders, General +Sherman says, manifested an ambition to get one of the separate +armies under his command and win a victory on his "own hook." But +General Sherman fails to state that he encouraged all this by his +own now well-known erroneous opinion upon the question of the +relative rank of army and corps commanders; that this vital question +was evaded until its decision in a special case--that of Stanley +and Schofield--became absolutely necessary, and was then decided +erroneously, the error resulting in failure and great disappointment +to Sherman. Had this question been decided at an early day according +to the plain import of the law, as was afterward done by the War +Department, and orders given to corps commanders to obey instead +of "co-operate" or "support," much trouble would have been avoided. + +First among the most important events of the Atlanta campaign were +the operations about Dalton and Resaca. Here I have always thought +General Sherman committed the mistake, so common in war (and, as +I believe, not infrequently afterward committed by himself and +others in the Union armies), of assigning to too small a force the +main attack upon the vital point of an enemy's position. McPherson +had only about 22,000 infantry, while Sherman estimated Johnston's +force at about 60,000. Thomas's position in front of Rocky-face +Ridge was virtually as unassailable as that of Johnston behind it. +The only weak point of our position was that of two divisions of +the Twenty-third Corps on our left, north of Dalton. Had those +divisions been attacked, as Sherman apprehended, they might have +suffered severely, but would have drawn off force enough from the +enemy to increase largely the probabilities of success in the attack +in Johnston's rear. One half of Sherman's infantry was ample for +the demonstration in front of Dalton. At least one half should +have been sent through Snake Creek Gap to strike the enemy's rear. +There was no necessity to attack Resaca at all, and experience has +shown what terrible losses a small force in a strongly fortified +position may inflict upon a very large attacking force. Two or +three brigades could have invested Resaca, with the garrison it +then held, while a force large enough to hold its ground against +Johnston's whole army could have been put upon the railroad between +Resaca and Dalton. The result would then, in all probability, have +been what Sherman expected. Indeed, the fate of Johnston's army +might perhaps have been decided then and there. + + McPHERSON'S TASK AT RESACA + +Sherman certainly cannot be suspected of wishing to do injustice +to the memory of McPherson, for he loved and respected him most +highly, and mourned his death with evident sincerity. But I think +he is in error in saying that "at the critical moment McPherson +seems to have been a little timid." I believe the error was +Sherman's, not McPherson's; that McPherson was correct in his +judgment, which certainly was mine (after passing over the same +ground and fighting the battle of Resaca), that his force was +entirely too small for the work assigned it. I had not the same +opportunity General Sherman had of judging of McPherson's qualities +as a commander; but I knew him well and intimately, having sat upon +the same bench with him at West Point for four years, and been his +room-mate for a year and a half. His was the most completely +balanced mind and character with which I have ever been intimately +acquainted, although he did not possess in a very high degree the +power of invention or originality of thought. His personal courage +seemed to amount to unconsciousness of danger, while his care of +his troops cannot, I believe, be justly characterized otherwise +than as wise prudence. I consider this to be only a just tribute +to the memory of the nearest and dearest friend of my youth. + +If McPherson had commanded one third of the army, he might, with +a corps of Thomas's army in close support, have felt strong enough +to occupy and hold a position between Dalton and Resaca. As it +was, Thomas should have followed close upon his rear through Snake +Creek Gap, with two corps. The distance between the two wings of +the army would have been so short and the ground between them so +impassable to the enemy as to give us practically a continuous line +of battle, and Thomas's two corps in the valley of the Connasauga +near Tilton would have been in far better position to strike the +retreating enemy when he was compelled to let go of Dalton, than +they were in front of Rocky-face Ridge. Impartial history must, +I believe, hold Sherman himself mainly responsible for the failure +to realize his expectations in the first movement against Johnston. + + MCPHERSON'S TASK AT RESACA + +It seems at least probable that at the beginning of the movement +against Dalton, Sherman did not fully understand the character of +the enemy's position; for his plan clearly appears to have been to +make the main attack in front at the moment Johnston should be +compelled to let go from his stronghold by reason of McPherson's +operations in his rear; while McPherson, after breaking the railroad +and then falling back for security to the Gap, should strike Johnston +in flank during the confusion of retreat. + +The nature of the position rendered this plan impracticable for +producing any important result. Had McPherson broken the road ever +so "good" and then fallen back to the Gap as ordered, Johnston +could have moved his main army to Resaca that night, and at daylight +the next morning Sherman would have found in the enemy's trenches +at Dalton only a skirmish-line which would have leisurely retreated +before him to the new position at Resaca. The result would have +been essentially the same as that which was actually accomplished. + +Indeed, as it now seems clearly to appear to General Sherman, the +only possible mode of striking an effective blow at Dalton was to +capture Resaca or seize and hold a point on the road in rear of +Dalton, and _not_ to break the road and fall back as McPherson was +ordered to do. If Sherman had seen this clearly at the time, it +is inconceivable that he would have sent less than one fourth of +his army to execute the all-important part of the plan. And now +he judges McPherson as manifesting timidity ( 2) because he did +not at the critical moment attempt to accomplish, with his +comparatively small force, what Sherman should have ordered to be +done by a much larger force. + +A very bold, independent commander might have attempted, whether +successful or not, what Sherman thinks McPherson ought to have done +at Resaca; and, as Sherman says, such an opportunity does not occur +twice in the life of any man. But McPherson was a subordinate in +spirit as well as in fact, and cannot fairly be charged with timidity +for not attempting what he was not ordered to do, and what, in +fact, was no part of the plans of his superior so far as they were +indicated in his orders. + +If McPherson had assaulted Resaca, it is possible, but only possible, +that he might have succeeded. There were some cases during the +Civil War where intrenchments hastily constructed and imperfectly +defended were carried by assault; many more where the assault +failed; and, I believe, not one case where intrenchments carefully +prepared in advance, with obstructions in front, and defended by +a force commensurate with the extent of the line, like those at +Resaca, were successfully assaulted. + +It is true that McPherson's force was vastly superior to the single +brigade that held Resaca that day, but that practically amounts to +nothing. A single division would have been as good for such an +assault as two corps. Beyond a reasonable proportion, say of three +or four to one, numbers amount to nothing in making such an assault. +It would be physically possible for numbers to succeed in such a +case if their immediate commander was willing to sacrifice them +and they _were willing to be sacrificed_. But considering the +general unwillingness among commanders and men to sacrifice or to +be sacrificed beyond what seems to them a reasonable expenditure +of life for the object to be gained, success is _morally_ impossible, +or very nearly so, in an assault such as would have been required +to capture Resaca on May 9, 1864. Clearly, such an assault should +not be attempted except as the only chance of victory; and then +the subordinate officers and men should be clearly informed precisely +what they are expected to do, and made to understand the necessity +for so great and unusual a sacrifice. In that case, brave and true +men will make the sacrifice required, provided their pluck holds +out long enough; and that no man is wise enough to predict, even +of himself, much less of a large number of men. + + McPHERSON'S TASK AT RESACA + +The only chance of success was to invest Resaca on the west and +north, and put between the investing line and Dalton troops enough +to hold their ground against the main body of Johnston's army; and +this must have been done in a single day, starting from the débouché +of Snake Creek Gap, the troops moving by a single, common country +road. Johnston's whole army, except a small rear-guard, would by +the use of three roads have been in position to attack McPherson +at dawn of day the next morning, while the main body of Sherman's +army was far away on the other side of Rocky-face. Or if McPherson +had not held the entire natural position as far east as the Connasauga +River, Johnston could have passed round him in the night. It seems +to me certain that McPherson's force was too small to have taken +and held that position. Indeed it does not seem at all certain +that, however large his force might have been, he could have put +troops enough in position before night to accomplish the object of +cutting of Johnston's retreat. The case was analogous to that of +Hood's crossing Duck River in November of that year, and trying to +cut off our retreat at Spring Hill. There was simply not time +enough to do it in that one day, and if not done in one day it +could not be done at all. + +So that it does not seem at all certain that this, which was +"Thomas's plan" to throw the entire Army of the Cumberland on the +road in Johnston's rear and thus cut off his retreat, would have +succeeded any better than Sherman's, yet it gave greater promise +of success, and therefore ought to have been tried. It is at least +probable that Johnston's view of the case (see his "Narrative," +pages 15, 16, 17) is the correct one: That, with his thorough +knowledge of the ground, ample roads, and means of early information, +together with our ignorance of the ground and our extremely deficient +roads, he could have defeated any possible attempt to cut him off +from Resaca. + +To illustrate the faulty system of organization and command which +characterized the Atlanta campaign, I will now refer to an incident +of the operations about Dallas, it being next in order of date of +those I wish to consider. General Sherman does not allude to it +at all in his "Memoirs." + +Near the close of the operations about Dallas, the Twenty-third +Corps was moved to our left, under instructions from General Sherman +to endeavor to strike the enemy's right flank. A division of the +Army of the Cumberland was ordered to "support" the Twenty-third +Corps. There were no roads available, and the country was in the +main densely wooded. The head of the column was directed by the +compass toward a point where our maps, the general topography of +the country, and the enemy's known position indicated that his +right must probably rest. After a laborious march through dense +undergrowth, during which our skirmish-line was lost in the woods +and another deployed to replace it, we struck an intrenched line +strongly held, and a sharp action ensued. The Twenty-third Corps +was deployed as far to the left as possible, and the skirmishers +reported that they had reached the extremity of the enemy's intrenched +line, but could not overlap it. At this moment the division of +the Army of the Cumberland came up in splendid style, and _massed_ +immediately in the rear of our left, in "close supporting distance," +and under a pretty heavy fire. I first sent a staff officer and +then went myself to the division commander, explained the situation, +and asked him to put in a brigade on my left and turn the enemy's +flank so as to give us a footing beyond his parapet. He replied +that he was ordered by General Thomas only to "support" me, and +that he would do no more. The day was already far advanced, and +before I could bring troops from another part of my line darkness +came on, and the action ended for the day. By the next morning I +had brought another division of the Twenty-third Corps to the flank, +and General Sherman arrived on the ground. By his personal orders +this division was pushed straight through the woods to a point in +the enemy's rear, on the road leading from Dallas to Acworth, which +point it reached without any opposition, and there intrenched. +That night Johnston abandoned his lines. An inspection of the +enemy's intrenchments demonstrated that our skirmishers were right, +and that a single brigade on our left would have been ample to turn +the enemy's flank and open the way to victory. The above facts +were immediately reported to Sherman and Thomas. I do now know +what action, if any, was taken upon them. + + EXAMPLE OF THE WORKING OF A FAULTY SYSTEM + +I refer to this incident, not as especially affecting the military +reputation of any officer one way or the other, but to illustrate +the working of a faulty system. Under proper organization and +discipline, any division commander could hardly have failed with +that fine division to do all that was desired of him that day. I +believe that division commander's commission as major-general of +volunteers was anterior in date to mine, and he, no doubt, with +General Sherman and some others, thought he was not subject to my +orders. + +[( 1) The following was written in 1875, soon after the appearance +of the first edition.] + +[( 2) In the revised edition, Vol. II, p. 34, General Sherman +substitutes "cautious" for "timid."] + + +CHAPTER VIII +Sherman's Displeasure with Hooker growing out the Affair at Kolb's +Farm--Hooker's Despatch Evidently Misinterpreted--A Conversation +with James B. McPherson over the Question of Relative Rank-- +Encouraging John B. Hood to become a Soldier--Visit to the Camp of +Frank P. Blair, Jr.--Anecdote of Sherman and Hooker under Fire-- +The Assault on Kenesaw--Tendency of Veteran Troops--The Death of +McPherson before Atlanta--Sherman's error in a Question of Relative +Rank. + +In the affair at Kolb's Farm, on June 22, Hascall's division of +the Twenty-third Corps was abreast of and connecting with Hooker's +right, while his advance-guard was many yards in advance of the +line, when the enemy's attack at the Kolb House began. The first +attack fell upon this advance-guard, the 14th Kentucky Volunteers, +which gallantly held its ground until twice ordered to retire and +join the main line. In the meantime Hascall's line had been formed +in prolongation of Hooker's and covered with the usual hastily +constructed parapets, and three brigades of Cox's division had been +ordered forward to protect Hascall's right. The attack was repulsed +with ease, and there was no ground for apprehension about the safety +of my immediate flank, much less of Hooker's, after the arrival of +Cox's division, which occurred before the hour of Hooker's signal- +despatch to Sherman expressing anxiety about our extreme right. +On the following morning we reoccupied the ground held by the 14th +Kentucky at the opening of the engagement, and not only did I offer +to show General Sherman that the dead of my "advance division were +lying farther out than any of Hooker's," but he actually rode with +me over the ground, and saw the dead of the 14th Kentucky lying in +advance of Hooker's picket-line. + + SHERMAN'S DISPLEASURE WITH HOOKER + +My impression is that Hooker, in his signal-despatch of 5:30 P. M., +saying, "We have repulsed two heavy attacks, and feel confident, +our only apprehension being for our extreme right flank. Three +entire corps are in front of us,"( 1) meant by "our extreme right +flank" not his own right, but mine--that is, the _extreme_ right +of the entire line; for at the time of that despatch nearly my +whole corps was strongly posted on Hooker's right, and was well +"refused," forming a strong right flank. This General Hooker well +knew. But the Sandtown Road leading to our rear, on which Cox's +division had been posted until Johnston's attack made it necessary +to close him up on Hascall, was now less strongly guarded. I +believe that General Hooker had conceived the idea, as indicated +by his despatch to Sherman, that Johnston had drawn his main force +from around Kenesaw, and was about to strike our extreme right. +I recollect that I was all the time on the watch for such a blow, +but relied upon my cavalry to give me some warning of it, and made +it a rule to be always as well prepared for it as I could. Being +habitually on the flank, I had got used to that sort of thing, +while Hooker, having been habitually in the center with his flanks +well protected, was more nervous about having them exposed. At +all events, I did not regard the situation at the Kolb House as +anything unusual, and did not think of mentioning it in such a +light to General Sherman; while General Hooker, with a sort of +paternal feeling of seniority, may have thought it his duty to take +care of the whole right wing of the army, and to advise the general- +in-chief of the supposed danger to our "extreme right flank." + +There occurred on that occasion one of those little and seemingly +trifling incidents which never escape the memory, and are always +a source of pride, especially to those who are comparatively young. +When Sherman read Hooker's despatch, which he interpreted as meaning +that my corps was not in position to protect Hooker's flank, he +said in substance, if not literally, and with great emphasis: +"That is not true. I sent Schofield an order to be there. I know +he received the order, for his initials, in his own hand, are on +the envelop which the orderly brought back, and I know he is there. +Hooker's statement is false." What a delight it was to execute +the orders of a chief who manifested such confidence! + + HOOKER'S DESPATCH EVIDENTLY MISINTERPRETED + +I do not remember that I was "very angry" about Hooker's despatch, +as General Sherman says (Vol. II, page 59), though I think Sherman +was. Indeed, he had more reason to be angry than I; for the fact, +and evidence of it, were so plain that the Twenty-third Corps had +done its duty as ordered, that if Hooker's despatch was meant to +imply the contrary, which I doubt, that was a cause of anger to +the general-in-chief, whom he had unnecessarily alarmed, rather +than to me, who had no apprehension of being suspected by the +general-in-chief of having failed in my duty. + +In fact, I do not recollect having seen Hooker's despatch at all +until I saw it quoted in Sherman's "Memoirs." My recollection is +that Sherman told me, on his visiting us the next day, that he had +received during the battle a despatch from Hooker to the effect +that his flank was unprotected. In reply to this I explained to +General Sherman where my troops had been during the engagement, +and showed him the dead of the 14th Kentucky lying on the advanced +ground they had held while Hascall's division was forming. I +believe that if I had seen Hooker's despatch at the time, I should +have interpreted it then, as I do now, as referring, not to his +immediate right, but to the extreme right of the line. I do not +recollect any words, "pretty sharp" or otherwise, between General +Hooker and myself on that subject, and do not believe it was ever +mentioned between us. In short, I do not think I was present at +the interview in the "little church" described by General Sherman +(Sherman's "Memoirs," Vol. II, page 59). I have an impression that +General Hascall was there, and that it is to him General Sherman +refers. I believe the Kolb House difficulty was almost entirely +a misapprehension between General Sherman and General Hooker. Why +this mistake was not explained at the time or afterward I do not +know, unless it was that the feelings of those two gentlemen toward +each other were unfavorable to any such explanation. + +I will add that General Hooker and I were together both before and +after the opening of the Kolb House engagement. He knew perfectly +well where my troops were, and what they were doing, and it seems +to me utterly impossible that he can have meant by his despatch +what General Sherman understood it to mean. + +My despatches of that date to Sherman show that I had no special +apprehension even in respect to our extreme right flank, and that +I doubted the report that one whole corps was in our front. + +My orders on that day,( 2) show that Hascall was up with Hooker at +the intersection of the Marietta and Powder Spring roads, near the +Kolb House, as early as 3 P. M., and that Cox was ordered up with +three brigades at 4:15 P. M., _before the assault began_. Cox +arrived with the head of his column during the enemy's attack, and +was directed by me in person where and how to put his troops in +position. Hence I think I must be right in the inference that in +Hooker's despatch to Sherman of 5:30 P. M., the words "our extreme +right flank" must have been intended to refer to _my_ extreme right, +and not _his_. He was simply unduly apprehensive for the safety +of the extreme right flank of the army, not of his own corps in +particular. My report to General Sherman at 9 P. M. simply shows +that I did not share that apprehension; that, instead of believing +there were "three entire corps in front of us," I doubted whether +there was even all of Hood's corps. + +General Hooker's habit of swinging off from the rest of General +Thomas's army, and getting possession of roads designated for +McPherson or for me, was a common subject of remark between Sherman, +Thomas, McPherson, and myself; and his motive was understood to +be, as General Sherman states, to get command of one of the armies, +in the event of battle, by virtue of his senior commission. But +the subject was never mentioned between General Hooker and me, and +he never even approximated to giving me an order. No doubt he +entertained the opinion that he would have a right to give orders +to either General McPherson or myself under certain circumstances +likely to arise, for General Sherman entertained the same opinion. +What General Thomas thought on the question I never knew. My own +opinion and McPherson's were decidedly the contrary. + + CONVERSATION OVER THE QUESTION OF RELATIVE RANK + +In the final movement which resulted in the withdrawal of Johnston's +army from Kenesaw, the Army of the Tennessee passed by the right +flank of my infantry line along the famous Sandtown Road. While +this was going on, McPherson and I sat on our horses together a +long time, observing the movement and renewing the familiar +intercourse of our youth. We had a long and free conversation on +a great variety of subjects--a rare opportunity for commanders, +even in the same army, where their troops were generally from ten +to twenty miles apart in line of battle. One of the first subjects +that came up was that question of relative rank; for our troops +had "met" and were then "doing duty together," in the language of +the old article of war. But the subject was quickly dismissed with +the remark, made almost simultaneously by both, that such a question +could not possible cause any difficulty between us. McPherson had +the senior commission of major-general, and I the senior assignment +as army commander. Perhaps it would have puzzled even Halleck to +frame a satisfactory decision in that peculiar case. I had long +before determined what my decision would be if that question ever +became a practical one between McPherson and myself on the field +of battle. I would have said, in substance at least: "Mac, just +tell me what you want me to do." + +As we sat together that day, McPherson confided to me the secret +of his marriage engagement, for the purpose, as he stated, of +inquiring whether, in my opinion, he could before long find a chance +to go home and get married. I told him I thought that after the +capture of Atlanta operations would be suspended long enough for +that. But my dear and noble friend was killed in the next great +battle. After Atlanta had fallen I went home, as McPherson would +doubtless have done if he had lived; but our common friend and +classmate Hood cut the visit so short that there would have been +little time for marriage festivities. + +McPherson, among other high qualities, was one of the most generous +men I ever knew. He was remarkably skilful in topographical drawing, +etching, lettering, and all other uses of the pen. Although at +the head of the class and a most conscientious student whose time +was very valuable to himself, he would spend a very large part of +that precious time in "lettering" problems for classmates who needed +such help. For this reason and others he was, by common consent +of all the classes, the most popular man in the corps. I could +not compete with "Mac" at all in the lettering business, but I +tried to follow his good example, in my own way, by helping the +boys over knotty points in "math" and "phil." I had taught district +school one winter before going to West Point, and hence had acquired +the knack of explaining things. + +Hood was not well up in mathematics. The first part of the course +especially he found very hard--so much so that he became discouraged. +After the unauthorized festivities of Christmas, particularly, he +seemed much depressed. On the 26th he asked me which I would prefer +to be, "an officer of the army or a farmer in Kentucky?" I replied +in a way which aroused his ambition to accomplish what he had set +out to do in coming to West Point, without regard to preference +between farming and soldiering. He went to work in good earnest, +and passed the January examinations, though by a very narrow margin. +From that time on he did not seem to have so much difficulty. When +we were fighting each other so desperately fifteen years later, I +wondered whether Hood remembered the encouragement I had given him +to become a soldier, and came very near thinking once or twice that +perhaps I had made a mistake. But I do not believe that public +enmity ever diminished my personal regard for my old friend and +classmate. + + VISIT TO THE CAMP OF FRANK P. BLAIR, JR. + +In thinking of McPherson, I recall an interesting incident connected +with Frank P. Blair, Jr.'s arrival with his corps about June 9, +referred to by General Sherman (Vol. II, page 24). For some reason +we had an afternoon's rest the day after Blair arrived; so I rode +over to his camp--seven or eight miles, perhaps--to greet my old +friend. McPherson, to whose army Blair's corps belonged, and other +officers were there. To our immense surprise, Blair had brought +along great hogsheads of ice and numerous baskets of champagne, as +if to increase the warmth of our welcome. Of course we did not +disdain such an unusual treat in the enemy's country. About sunset +McPherson invited me to visit his camp, and we started off at a +full gallop, which we kept up all the way, yet it was some time +after dark when we reached the headquarters of the Army of the +Tennessee. A good camp supper was awaiting us, with jolly young +officers to make it merry. It was not until supper was ended that +I began to realize the necessity of a night's march to get back to +my own camp. As our infantry line was twenty miles long, and the +cavalry stretched it out on either flank as many more, my single +orderly was quite sufficient protection from any attack by the +enemy; but the Georgia bushes, brambles, and mud, combined with +the absence of any known road, constituted an enemy hard to overcome. +However, by the aid of the compass which I have always carried in +my head since I used to hunt in the wilds of the West, I got back +to camp, and went to bed, taking care not to observe the time of +night by my watch. + +As I have said, I was often much annoyed by General Hooker's corps +getting possession of roads which had been designated for mine to +advance upon, thus greatly delaying my movements. But it is but +just to say that this is susceptible of an explanation much more +creditable to General Hooker than that given by General Sherman. +General Thomas's army was so large that he could never get his +three corps into position as soon as expected by the use of the +roads designated for him. Hence, when Hooker was not in advance +he would "switch off" and hunt for another road to the right or +left, and thus sometimes strike in ahead of McPherson or me, and +leave us no road at all to move on. In fact, the army was so large +and the roads were so few that our movements were often painfully +slow and tedious, and General Hooker's motive may have been only +to get ahead and bring his corps into action or to the position +assigned to it in whatever way he could. + + ANECDOTE OF SHERMAN AND HOOKER UNDER FIRE + +The first time I ever saw General Sherman and General Hooker +together, or got even a suspicion that their personal relations +were other than the most satisfactory, was at Resaca. Cox's division +had gained possession of some portions of the enemy's outer works, +so that from a bald hill just in rear of our line some parts of +the main line of defense could be distinctly seen. Upon my informing +General Sherman of this, he soon appeared on the ground, accompanied +or closely followed by a large number of general and staff officers. +Besides Sherman, Thomas, Hooker, and Newton, a score of others were +there, all eager to see what they could of the now famous stronghold +which McPherson had refrained from assaulting. I led them to the +hill, on which a few dead trees were still standing, and from which +the much-desired view could be obtained. Of course all were on +foot, yet they were too numerous not to attract the attention of +the enemy. Very soon the sound of musketry in front, then not very +heavy, was varied by the sharp explosion of a shell overhead, and +fragments of branches of dead trees came falling all around. A +general "scatteration" occurred in all directions save one. Newton +and I, who were conversing at the time, quietly stepped aside a +few paces out of the line of fire, where we were much safer than +we would have been in full retreat, and then turned round to see +what had become of our companions. All save two had disappeared, +even Thomas having abandoned the field, probably for the first and +only time in his life. But still there, on the bald hill, in full +view of the hostile artillery, were the two already highly +distinguished generals, Sherman and Hooker, both alike famous for +supreme courage, striding round the ground, appearing to look at +nothing in particular and not conversing with each other, but +seeming at least a foot taller than usual, each waiting for the +other to lead off in retreat. After quite a long continuance of +this little drama, which greatly entertained Newton and me, the +two great soldiers, as if by some mysterious impulse,--for they +did not speak a word,--simultaneously and slowly strode to the +rear, where their horses were held. I cheerfully gave the "Johnny +Rebs" credit for the courtesy of not firing another shot after they +saw the effect of the first, which I doubt not was intended only +as a gentle hint that such impudence in Yankees was not to be +tolerated. Yet a single shell from the same direction,--probably +from the same battery,--when we were moving into action that morning, +exploded near my head, and killed the aide who was riding behind +me.( 3) My too numerous staff and escort had attracted attention. +I had at Dalton a few days before forbade the staff and escort to +follow me into action, unless specially ordered to do so; but they +had not so soon learned the lesson which the sad casualty at Resaca +taught them. It was then early in the campaign. Later, both +generals and orderlies had learned to restrain somewhat their +curiosity and their too thoughtless bravery. The perfect old +soldier has learned to economize the life and strength of men, +including his own, with somewhat the same care that he does those +of artillery horses and transportation mules. It is only the young +soldier who does not know the difference between husbanding the +national resources and showing cowardice in face of the enemy. + +At Wilson's Creek, where the brave Lyon was killed in August, 1861, +and where the gallant volunteers on both sides had fought with +almost unexampled courage, standing up to their work all the time, +until one third of their numbers were killed or wounded, and their +forty rounds of ammunition gone, the little companies of old, +regular Indian-fighters had been deployed as skirmishers in close +order, behind trees and bushes and hillocks, and had suffered +comparatively small losses. The following colloquy occurred between +one of them and a volunteer whose cartridge-box, as he was proud +to show, was empty. Volunteer: "How many shots did _you_ fire?" +Old soldier (looking into his cartridge-box): "I fired just +nineteen." Volunteer: "And how many rebs do you think you killed?" +Old soldier: "I guess I killed about nineteen." + +One beautiful, quiet Sunday afternoon, in front of Atlanta, when +even the pickets were respecting the Sabbath day, my headquarters +band, which had been playing selections of sacred music, easily +heard on the other side of the lines, struck up a favorite Southern +air of quite a different character. Quickly came a shell crashing +through the trees far over our heads. The band as quickly took +the hint and changed the tune. Such little "courtesies" from our +"friends the enemy" were not at all uncommon in the short intervals +of rest from deadly work. + + THE ASSAULT ON KENESAW + +General Sherman says in Vol. II, page 60, of his "Memoirs": + +"During the 24th and 25th of June, General Schofield extended his +right as far as prudent, so as to compel the enemy to thin out his +lines correspondingly, with the intention to make two strong assaults +at points where success would give us the greatest advantage. I +had consulted Generals Thomas, McPherson, and Schofield, and we +all agreed that we could not with prudence stretch out any more, +and therefore there was no alternative but to attack 'fortified +lines'--a thing carefully avoided up to that time." + +The first sentence literally means that I extended my right "with +the intention," _on my part_, "to make two strong assaults," etc. +But that is a mere verbal error. General Sherman, of course, meant +to say that the intention was his. + +The second sentence is, perhaps, ambiguous. At least it has been +construed to mean more than the truth. It is undoubtedly true that +"we all agreed that we could not with prudence stretch out any +more," but we did not agree in the conclusion "and therefore there +was no alternative," etc. + +Indeed, such conclusion was extremely illogical, as was demonstrated +a few days later, when one of the other "alternatives" was adopted +with success. This successful movement was essentially the same +as that which had been previously made to dislodge the enemy from +Dalton, and that by which Sherman's army had been transferred from +New Hope Church to the railroad in front of Allatoona, as well as +that by which Atlanta was afterward captured. Hence the existence +of this "alternative" could not have been unthought of by any of +us at the time of the assault on Kenesaw. + +But there was another alternative in this and similar cases, which +was much discussed at various times during the campaign. Its +practicability can be judged of only upon general principles, for +it was never tried. It was to detach two or three corps, nearly +half our army (which was about double the strength of the enemy), +make a detour wide enough to avoid his fortifications, and strike +directly at his flank and rear. Such a movement, it was urged, at +Dalton, Kenesaw, or Atlanta would have compelled Johnston to fight +a battle on equal terms with one half of Sherman's army, while he +had to hold his parapets against the other half. Whatever else +may be said of this proposed movement, it would undoubtedly have +been more hazardous and much more decisive, one way or the other, +than any of the plans actually adopted. It certainly promised +success proportionate to the cost, instead of a costly failure, +which the assault of fortified lines had almost invariably proved +to be. + +I did not see Thomas or McPherson for some days before the assault, +but I believe their judgment, like mine, was opposed to it. +Undoubtedly it was generally opposed, though deferentially as became +subordinates toward the commanding general. The responsibility +was entirely Sherman's, as he afterward frankly stated; and I +presume he did not mean to imply otherwise by the language used in +his "Memoirs" above quoted (Vol. II, page 60). General Sherman's +orders, issued on June 24 (Special Field Orders, No. 28), directed +each of the three armies to make an attack (under the word "assault" +for Thomas and "attack" for McPherson and me). I had made all +preparations to carry out the order on my part. Being visited by +General Sherman a day or two before the date named for the execution +of the order (June 27), I explained to him what I had done, and +how little hope there was of success, on account of the smallness +of my reserve to push the advantage even if we should break the +line, when he at once replied that it was not intended that I should +make an attack in front, but to make a strong demonstration in my +front, and gain what advantage I could on the enemy's flank. During +the day Cox's division forced the passage of Olley's Creek and +secured a position on the head of Nickajack, which was spoken of +by Sherman as the only success of the day. + + TENDENCY OF VETERAN TROOPS + +There were doubtless many occasions in the Atlanta campaign when +the enemy's intrenchments could have been assaulted with success. +These were when the position had been but recently occupied and +the fortifications were very slight. After several days' occupation, +as at the points attacked by Thomas and McPherson, the lines became +impregnable. Frequent efforts were made, and by none more earnestly +than by General Sherman, to press the troops to a vigorous assault +of the enemy's position under the favorable circumstances above +referred to. But the general feeling of the army, including not +only privates, but officers of nearly all grades, was undoubtedly +opposed to such attacks. The notion was very prevalent that there +was no necessity of fighting the enemy on unequal terms. When +attacked, either with or without cover, the troops would fight with +the most determined valor, and almost invariably with success. So +when attacking the enemy in open ground there was no lack of energy +or pluck. But we lose one of the most important lessons of the +war if we fail to remember and appreciate the fact that our veteran +troops are very loath to make an attack where they believe they +have not a fair chance of success. This feeling must be attributed, +not to a lack of high soldierly qualities, but to intelligence and +good sense. The veteran American soldier fights very much as he +has been accustomed to work his farm or run his sawmill: He wants +to see a fair prospect that it is "going to pay." His loyalty, +discipline, and pluck will not allow him under any circumstances +to retreat without orders, much less to run away; but if he encounters +a resistance which he thinks he cannot overcome, or which he thinks +it would "cost too much" to overcome, he will lie down, cover +himself with a little parapet, and hold his ground against any +force that may attempt to drive him back. This feeling of the +soldier is an element in the problem of war which cannot be ignored. +The general who, with such an army, would win the full measure of +success due to greatly superior numbers, must manoeuver so as to +compel the enemy to fight him on approximately equal terms, instead +of assaulting fortifications where, against modern weapons, numbers +are of little or no avail. In the days of the bayonet successful +tactics consisted in massing a superior force upon some vital point, +and breaking the enemy's line. Now it is the fire of the musket, +not the bayonet, that decides the battle. To mass troops against +the fire of a covered line is simply to devote them to destruction. +The greater the mass, the greater the loss--that is all. A large +mass has no more chance of success than a small one. That this is +absolutely true since the introduction of breech-loaders is probably +not doubted by any one; and it was very nearly true with the muzzle- +loading rifles used during our late war, as was abundantly demonstrated +on many occasions. + +I have always believed that the true tactics of our late war, +whenever our force was double that of the enemy (as it sometimes +was and always should have been at all points where decisive +movements were to be made), were to throw one half the force upon +the enemy's rear, so as to compel him to attack that force or else +retreat by side roads with loss of trains and artillery. This +would doubtless have been a bold departure from the ancient tactics, +which had not yet been proved obsolete. Yet I always thought it +strange that our leading generals were unwilling to attempt it. +Had Sherman divided his army in such a way, and struck at Hood's +rear, he might have found a chance to destroy that army as well as +the railroads in Georgia. + + THE DEATH OF McPHERSON BEFORE ATLANTA + +The death of McPherson, on July 22, was felt by all to be an +irreparable loss, and by none more so than by General Sherman, who +manifested deep feeling when the body was brought to the Howard +House, east of Atlanta. I recollect well his remark to the effect +that the whole of the Confederacy could not atone for the sacrifice +of one such life. + +My recollection of some of the incidents of that day differs in +some respects from that of General Sherman. As soon as it was +known that the Army of the Tennessee was heavily engaged I drew +out of line the larger part of my troops, leaving the picket-line +in position, with strong reserves behind the parapets, and massed +them near my left, ready to send reinforcements to the Army of the +Tennessee if necessary, or to form a temporary left flank if the +line on my left should be broken, as it was late in the day, as +described by General Sherman.( 4) + +When that break was made in the line immediately to the left of +mine, I had a rare opportunity of witnessing Sherman's splendid +conduct as a simple soldier, the occasion for which occurs so rarely +to the general-in-chief of a great army. Sherman at once sent to +me for _all my artillery_, which responded to his call at a full +gallop. He led the batteries in person to some high, open ground +_in front of our line_ near the Howard House, placed them in +position, and directed their fire, which from that advanced position +enfiladed the parapets from which our troops had been driven, and +which the enemy then occupied. With the aid of that terrible raking +fire, the division of Union troops very quickly regained the +intrenchments they had lost. General Sherman, on page 81, Vol. +II, gives me the credit due to himself for that soldierly conduct +as an artillery commander. I was occupied in forming my infantry +reserve to meet the enemy if Logan's troops did not drive them +back. Only my artillery was used in restoring this broken line, +because Logan's infantry proved sufficient without further aid. +This action of mine was taken with General Sherman's knowledge and +approval, and was the correct thing to do, for the reason that the +ground in my front was such as to make both my position and that +of the enemy practically unassailable. I had no apprehension of +an attack in my front, and there was no question of my attempting +to "make a lodgment in Atlanta" that day, as stated by Sherman in +Vol. II, page 80. + +It was proposed by me that my reserve and Thomas's should go the +assistance of the Army of the Tennessee, either directly or, better +still, by making a counter-attack in front of the right of that +army, which, if successful, would cut off the hostile force then +attacking in left. Sherman replied, as I recollect, that he had +asked Thomas to send some troops to the left, and the latter had +replied that he had none to spare. Without these the proposition +to make a counter-attack could not be entertained. But my memory +is only that of conversations with General Sherman during the day, +and he ought to be much better informed than I concerning what +passed between General Thomas and himself. I recollect that General +Sherman during the day expressed something like a wish to "let the +Army of the Tennessee fight its own battle," but in his statement +of motive for so doing I think he does that army injustice. My +impression was, and is, that they would have been very glad of +assistance, and that timely help would have increased the fraternal +feeling between the armies, instead of creating unworthy jealousy. + +I cannot but believe, as I then thought, that we were losing a +great opportunity that day. A large force of the enemy had made +a wide circuit from his defenses about Atlanta and attacked our +left several miles distant. We there had a chance to fight him on +equal terms. I thought, and still think, we ought to have concentrated +a large part of Thomas's force and mine near the Howard House, and +made a strong counter-attack upon this attacking column of the +enemy, with the hope of cutting it off from Atlanta. Instead of +this, Thomas spent the day in efforts to "make a lodgment in Atlanta" +over well-prepared fortifications which the Georgia militia could +hold against him about as well as the veteran Confederate troops. + +The movement of August 4 and 5 was designed to be substantially +what had been frequently suggested, but which I have heretofore +referred to as having never been tried, with the exception that +the attacking force was not to sever its connection with the main +body, and hence might not reach far enough to strike an exposed +flank of the enemy. But even with this modification I thought the +movement ought to have a fair chance of success. That movement +was not suggested by me in any way, and, so far as I know, not by +General Thomas. I believe it originated entirely with General +Sherman. I never heard of it until I received his orders. There +was no "argument" by me of the question of relative rank, as +suggested by General Sherman (Vol. II, page 99). + + SHERMAN'S ERROR IN A QUESTION OF RELATIVE RANK + +The positions of the troops when the order for the movement was +made rendered it convenient that the Twenty-third Corps be put in +first,--that is, next to the right of General Thomas's troops then +in position,--while the Fourteenth Corps, commanded by General John +M. Palmer, was relied upon to develop rapidly to our right and +endeavor to strike the enemy's flank before he could extend his +intrenched line far enough to meet and resist our attack. It was +not until some time after my orders for this movement had been +issued and should have been in progress of vigorous execution that +I received the first intimation that the question of rank had been +raised, as stated by General Sherman, and that my orders had simply +been transmitted to the division commanders of the Fourteenth Corps. + +It cannot for a moment be admitted that any share of the blame for +that failure attaches to the Fourteenth Corps, as such. Nor do I +believe with General Sherman that its slowness on that occasion +was due to anything "imbibed" from General Thomas. + + SHERMAN'S ERROR IN A QUESTION OF RELATIVE RANK + +My own view of military duty was different from that entertained +by the commander of the Fourteenth Corps, as was shown in my +subsequent action, hereinafter referred to, when I was ordered to +report to and act under the orders of General Stanley. But if the +distinguished statesman who then commanded the Fourteenth Corps +fell into error at that time, he has doubtless since regretted it +far more than any other man could possible do; and he has many +times atoned for that error by the great services to the country +which he has continued to render up to the present time. + +The primary and principal cause of this and all similar difficulties +during the Atlanta campaign was the grave error of opinion which +disregarded the special rank of army and department commanders +given them by the President's assignment under the law, and the +still graver error of judgment in leaving such an important question +open until the eve of battle, in the "hope that there would be no +necessity for making this decision." This error seems incomprehensible +when it is considered that it in effect nullified the President's +selection of army and department commanders at the most important +of all moments, the crisis of battle, by making these commanders +subject to the orders of any general of older commission whose +troops happened to be adjacent to theirs. + +In the midst of battle, when the orders of a common superior cannot +be obtained in time to meet an emergency, the highest commander +present must give the necessary orders and must be obeyed. This +is probably the gravest responsibility of war. Yet Sherman's +opinion and decision would have placed this responsibility, not +upon the army commander who had been selected by the President, +upon the advice of the general-in-chief, under an act of Congress +passed especially for the purpose, but upon some one who through +political influence or otherwise had got an earlier commission of +major-general. So many of the latter had proved to be unqualified +for responsible command that Congress had enacted a special law +authorizing the President to supersede such prior commissions and +assign commanders of armies or army corps in the field and in any +department whom he deemed competent.( 5) Palpable as this fallacy +seems, yet it was adhered to until overruled by the War Department. + +It is proper for me to add that I had at that time but a very slight +personal acquaintance with General Palmer. However, I knew him +well by reputation, and esteemed him highly. General Thomas, +especially, had given me a high estimate of his character and +abilities. If there was any cause of jealousy or ill-feeling +between us, I never suspected it. + +[( 1) War Records, Vol. XXXVIII, part iv, p. 558.] + +[( 2) War Records, Vol. XXXVIII, part iv, pp. 566 and 568.] + +[( 3) Captain A. H. Engle, who was killed at Resaca, was a most +charming and talented youth, only twenty years of age. That was +his first battle. He was caterer of the headquarters mess. That +morning, before leaving camp, Captain Engle made out all his accounts +and handed them, with the money for which he was responsible, to +another staff officer, saying that he was going to be killed that +day.] + +[( 4) Vol. II, pp. 80, 81.] + +[( 5) Reference is made here to the 122d Article of War, and the +resolution of Congress especially intended to modify it in respect +to command in any "field or department," approved April 4, 1862.] + + +CHAPTER IX +The Final Blow at Atlanta--Johnston's Untried Plan of Resistance-- +Hood's Faulty Move--Holding the Pivot of the Position--Anecdotes +of the Men in the Ranks--Deferring to General Stanley in a Question +of Relative Rank--The Failure at Jonesboro'--The Capture of Atlanta +--Absent from the Army--Hood's Operations in Sherman's Rear--Sent +Back to Thomas's Aid--Faulty Instructions to Oppose Hood at Pulaski +--At Columbia--Reason of the Delay in Exchanging Messages. + +When all our efforts to accomplish decisive results by partial +operations upon the flanks had failed, this question was much +discussed: What more decisive movement shall next be made for the +capture of Atlanta? There were practically but two propositions +to be considered: That of General Sherman, which was adopted with +success; and that heretofore referred to as having never been tried, +to detach two or more corps to make a lodgment on the railroad at +or below East Point, and then compel the enemy to come out of +Atlanta and endeavor to regain control of his only line of supply, +or abandon that city altogether. General Sherman thought it too +hazardous to detach two corps, though he was willing for me to +undertake it with one. In fact, this feeling marked General +Sherman's action throughout the campaign. He had no hesitation in +detaching a small force, the loss of which would still leave him +greatly superior in numbers to the enemy, or a very large force +under his own command, leaving the enemy to the care of the smaller +part, as in his march to Savannah. General Thomas, on the contrary, +thought the movement proposed by General Sherman "extra hazardous," +as Sherman says in his "Memoirs" (Vol. II, page 106). I did not +regard either of them as very hazardous, and upon consideration +rather preferred General Sherman's, because I thought it could not +fail to be decisive of the capture of Atlanta, while the other +might fail if not executed with promptness and vigor, and this, +experience had warned us, we could not be quite sure of. + + JOHNSTON'S UNTRIED PLAN OF RESISTANCE + +Some time after the war, that very able commander General Joseph +E. Johnston told me that in his judgment Sherman's operations in +Hood's rear ought not to have caused the evacuation of Atlanta; +that he (Johnston), when in command, had anticipated such a movement, +and had prepared, or intended to prepare, to oppose it by constructing +artillery redoubts at all suitable points in the rear of Atlanta, +as well as in front, which redoubts could be very speedily connected +by infantry intrenchments whenever necessary; that he aimed to keep +on longer than Sherman's army could subsist on the contents of +their wagons and haversacks; and that Sherman could not possibly +hold all the railroads leading into Atlanta _at the same time_, nor +destroy any one of them so thoroughly that it could not be repaired +in time to replenish Johnston's supplies in Atlanta. + +Here is presented a question well worthy of the candid study of +military critics. Whatever may be the final judgment upon that +question, it seems perfectly clear that Johnston's plan of defense +ought at least to have been tried by his successor. If Hood had +kept all his troops in compact order about Atlanta, he would have +been in the best possible condition to resist Sherman if the latter +turned back from Jonesboro' and attacked Atlanta from the rear, or +to strike Sherman's rear or flank in full force if he made any +other movement. The division of Hood's forces at that time, one +part holding on to Atlanta while the other went to _head off_ +Sherman, was the worst disposition that could have been made. + +As related to me personally by General Sheridan,--for I have not +yet studied the Virginia campaigns so thoroughly as to justify me +in speaking from the records,--it was a similar mistake on the part +of the Confederate cavalry commander J. E. B. Stuart, in trying to +get between Sheridan and Richmond, which gave Sheridan the advantage +and led to Stuart's defeat. Stuart had ridden hard all night, and +got between Sheridan and Richmond, his men and horses exhausted, +while Sheridan had been resting and feeding his own men and animals. +In the morning Sheridan "rode over" his exhausted antagonist. +These are among the many cases where exaggerated ideas of the +importance of places have led to the defeat of armies. I knew +Stuart well at West Point, he having been in the class next to +mine. He then gave promise of his future as a cavalry leader. + +The only specially hazardous part of Sherman's movement was that +which would fall to my lot--namely, to hold the "pivot" against a +possible attack of Hood's whole army while Thomas and Howard should +swing round it, and then draw out and join them after the swing +was made. Upon my reporting that I was perfectly willing to +undertake this task, and had no doubt of the ability of my corps +to accomplish it, all question about making the movement appeared +to be settled, and it was at once ordered. Hood did not avail +himself of his opportunity to attack me when alone, either in +position or in motion, hence my part of the movement proved easiest +of all. + +I had placed my corps in a completely inclosed field-work, large +enough to contain all my trains, and strong enough to resist any +attack from a greatly superior force until Sherman's movement could +be accomplished. + + ANECDOTES OF THE MEN IN THE RANKS + +I recollect even to this day a little incident of that time which +was, at least to me, both amusing and instructive. After receiving +Sherman's orders, which meant "suspend aggressive work and go to +fortifying," I was directing the laying out of the new work at the +most important part of the line, and the men had been ordered to +commence digging, when I heard an old volunteer, as he laid aside +his gun and put off his accoutrements with manifest reluctance, +say, _sotto voce:_ "Well, if digging is the way to put down the +rebellion, I guess we will have to do it." Our old soldiers had +a "mind of their own," and were not afraid to let their commanders +know it; yet they were essentially as thoroughly subordinate and +reliable as any troops any general ever had the honor to command. + +I now recall another incident which occurred a few days earlier, +in which a young Indiana volunteer was somewhat less respectful, +though he had no idea whom he was addressing, nor, probably, any +thought whatever about "relative rank." I had come out from my +tent, before sunrise in the morning, and was performing my morning +ablutions in the ordinary camp basin, preparatory to putting on my +outer clothing. None of my "people" were yet up, and the night +sentinel of my camp was a little way off. There came up a weary, +belated soldier who had, perhaps, been trudging along much of the +night, trying to overtake his regiment. I heard him ask in a loud +voice: "Where is the 128th Indiana?" Not supposing the question +was addressed to me, I did not look up. Then came in still louder +tones and in an amended form which left no room for doubt as to +whom it was addressed: "I mean you old fellow there with the red +shirt! Where is the 128th Indiana?" + +If from lapse of time my memory may not be exact as to the number +of the regiment, I am sure no apology is necessary to the gallant +128th. It was, anyhow, one of those very high-numbered new Indiana +regiments which had recently joined the army. The young soldier +was sent to the headquarters escort, given his breakfast, and +carried along until his regiment was overtaken. + +The Twenty-third Corps reached the railroad about the close of day +on August 31, having time to do no more than intrench our positions. +The orders that day and night were urgent to make the destruction +of the railroad thorough and extensive. This was evidently General +Sherman's primary object, showing a doubt in his mind whether the +effect of his movement would be the speedy abandonment of Atlanta, +or whether he would have to trust to his destruction of the railroad +to accomplish that object. + +Late in the night of the 31st, after General Stanley and I, who +were encamped near together, had gone to sleep, we received despatches +from General Sherman stating in effect that as we were too far from +the main body of the army to receive orders from him or General +Thomas, our two corps must act on the morrow under the orders of +the highest commander present, and that General Stanley, having +the older commission, was that highest commander. I was therefore +directed to report to General Stanley and act under his orders. +I replied to General Sherman that while I differed from him in +opinion upon the question of relative rank, I would for the present +cheerfully abide his decision and execute his orders. Early the +next morning, before I had time to report to General Stanley, he +appeared at my camp, evidently much disturbed by the orders he had +received. He said General Sherman was wrong; that he was not +entitled to the command and did not want it; and urged me to accept +the chief command, and let him act under my orders. I replied that +General Sherman's order was imperative, and I could not relieve +him (General Stanley) from the responsibility of executing it. It +was all wrong, but there was no present remedy, and he must do the +best he could. The position of his corps on the right made it +necessary that it should have the advance in the day's movement, +while I would follow close after and support him under all +circumstances. + + THE FAILURE AT JONESBORO' + +So we started early in the morning to execute Sherman's orders-- +thoroughly to destroy the railroad, and close down on Thomas toward +Jonesboro'. That morning, as Sherman says (Vol. II, page 107), +"Howard found an intrenched foe (Hardee's corps) covering Jonesboro'," +and "orders were sent to Generals Thomas and Schofield to turn +straight for Jonesboro', tearing up the railroad track as they +advanced." But of course, as General Sherman had anticipated, such +orders could not reach me in time to do any good. They were not +received until after the affair at Jonesboro' was ended. But +hearing the sound of battle in our front, I rode rapidly forward +to the head of Stanley's column, which was then not advancing, made +inquiries for that officer, and was informed that he was trying to +find General Thomas to get orders. I immediately brought my infantry +of the Twenty-third Corps out of the road occupied by Stanley's +corps, moved it to the front through woods and fields, and endeavored +to find a way by which I could reach the enemy's flank or rear, +riding so far ahead with a few staff officers and orderlies that +I escaped very narrowly being captured by the enemy. Finally, near +dark, General Stanley's troops began to deploy and attack the enemy; +and as there were more troops on the ground than could possibly be +used that day, I could do not more than stand and watch their +movements, as I did with intense interest until my medical director, +Dr. Hewit, one of the bravest and coolest men I ever knew, called +my attention to the fact that the place was much too hot for a +general and his staff who had nothing to do there. I believe if +General Sherman had been in our place he would have thought it +"more than a skirmish-line" (Vol. II, page 108) in Stanley's front +that gave us that fire both of musketry and artillery which my +staff officers have frequently spoken of as one of the ugliest they +ever experienced. General Stanley's fault was, not that he deployed +his troops, but that he did not put them in at once when he arrived +on the ground, instead of waiting for orders. But General Stanley, +whose gallantry was never questioned, was a subordinate in experience. +He had but recently risen to the command of a corps, and had been +little accustomed to act on his own responsibility. Feeling +overburdened with the responsibility wrongfully thrust upon him +that day, he naturally sought relief from it by reporting for orders +to General Thomas as soon as his corps was reunited to the main +army. + +The failure at Jonesboro', as at so many other places, was due to +that erroneous interpretation of the law that threw the supreme +responsibility at the crisis of battle upon untried and (in this +case) unwilling shoulders, or else left the lawful commander without +recognized authority, to beg in vain of others to "co-operate" with +him. + + THE CAPTURE OF ATLANTA + +During the night of August 31 others besides General Sherman were +too restless and impatient to sleep (Vol. II, page 108). The sounds +of explosion in Atlanta were distinctly heard, and the flashes of +light distinctly seen. With the compass for direction and the +watch for intervals of time between flash and sound, there was no +difficulty in locating their origin at Atlanta. An untutored farmer +may well have thought "these sounds were just like those of a +battle," but a practised ear could not have failed to note the +difference. First there would come an explosion louder and unlike +the report of one or several guns, and this would be followed by +numerous smaller, sharper, and perfectly distinct reports, quite +unlike that of musketry, which could not be mistaken for anything +but the explosion of shells. There could be no room for doubt that +these lights and sounds meant the destruction in Atlanta of magazines +or carloads of fixed ammunition, and hence that Hood was abandoning +that place. I reported my observations and conclusion to General +Sherman, but he "still remained in doubt." The doubt was to me +incomprehensible; but perhaps that was because I had no doubt from +the start, whether I was right or wrong, what the result would be. +My period of elation was when we got firm hold of the railroad at +Rough and Ready. Hood having failed to attack our exposed flank +during the movement, the fall of Atlanta was already an accomplished +fact with me when Sherman was still in doubt, as well as when Thomas +thought the news "too good to be true." But the above is worthy +of noting only as a necessary introduction to something far more +important. + +Hood's army was now divided and scattered over a distance of thirty +miles, one corps below Jonesboro' being just driven from its ground +with considerable loss and in retreat to Lovejoy's, the main body +leaving Atlanta and stretched along the road toward McDonough; +while Sherman's whole army, except Slocum's corps, was in compact +order about Jonesboro', nearly in a straight line between Atlanta +and Lovejoy's. This seemed exactly the opportunity to destroy +Hood's army, if that was the objective of the campaign. So anxious +was I that this be attempted that I offered to go with two corps, +or even with one, and intercept Hood's retreat on the McDonough +road, and hold him until Sherman could dispose of Hardee or interpose +his army between him and Hood. But more prudent counsels prevailed, +and we remained quietly in our camps for five days, while Hood +leisurely marched round us with all his baggage and Georgia militia, +and collected his scattered fragments at Lovejoy's. + +Atlanta had become, like Richmond, in popular estimation the real +objective of military operations. The public lost sight of the +fact that it was armies in the field, and not fortified places, +which gave strength to the rebellion; and apparently even prominent +generals, if they did not share the popular delusion, at least +recognized its value. The capture of Atlanta was enough to meet +the "political necessity," make "the election of Mr. Lincoln +certain," and win rejoicings and congratulations from all parts of +the North! It was not worth while to run any risk of trying to do +more at that time! It had to be left for two of Sherman's corps, +after the other four had gone on "the march to the sea," to fight +Hood at Columbia and Spring Hill, hurl him back from Franklin, and +then, with reinforcements not equal to half what Sherman had taken +away, to overwhelm him at Nashville. Why was not this done with +a much larger force under Sherman at Atlanta? This is one of the +questions for the future historian to discuss. + +During our rest near Lovejoy's, General Sherman requested me to +give him a statement in writing of my dissent from his decision +upon the question of relative rank, which I did. This he submitted +to the War Department for decision, as a "question of rank that +had arisen between Generals Schofield and Stanley." At this General +Stanley was very indignant, as well as at General Sherman's censure +of his conduct on September 1; for the reason that no question of +rank had been raised by us, and the command was thrust upon him in +opposition to his wish and in violation of the law as he understood +it. In due time came the decision of the War Department, written +by General Halleck, sustaining the view of the law Stanley and I +had taken, and reversing that of General Sherman; also kindly +commending my action in waiving the question during active +operations. + +It was by virtue of the above decision of the War Department that +I, instead of General Stanley, had command of the force that in +the following November, 1864, opposed Hood's advance from the +Tennessee River and repulsed his fierce assault at Franklin. + + ABSENT FROM THE ARMY + +As I was absent from the army on business connected with my department +during most of Hood's raid upon the railroad in the rear of Atlanta +(Sherman having announced his purpose to let his army rest during +that time), I have little to say in respect to the operations +resulting therefrom. But some things in Sherman's account seem to +require a little elucidation. + +Being informed by General Sherman of Hood's movement, I hurried to +the front and tried to reach the army by a special train with a +small guard from Cleveland, Tenn., but met, October 13, the head +of Hood's column at Dalton, where several trains of cars with +supplies and men without arms returning from furlough on their way +to Sherman had been stopped by the reported approach of Hood. I +ordered all back to Cleveland, and we barely had time to escape +capture by Hood's cavalry. On arriving at Cleveland, I reported +by telegraph to General Thomas, then at Nashville; and he desired +me to go to Chattanooga, take command of the troops there, and +prepare to defend that place, which it was thought Hood might +attempt to take by a _coup de main_, or to co-operate with Sherman. +As General Sherman says (Vol. II, page 156), "Hood had broken up +the telegraph, and thus had prevented quick communication"; but +through my own scouts and spies I was able to keep track of Hood's +movements. As soon as he turned westward I determined to move with +the troops, when no longer necessary to the defense of Chattanooga, +rapidly to Trenton and Valley Head, seize the passes through the +Lookout range, and prevent Hood's escape in that direction, presuming +that Sherman would intercept his retreat down the Chattanooga +valley. I sent a courier to General Sherman informing him of my +purpose, and informed General Thomas by telegraph. But the latter +disapproved my plan, and directed me to move to defend Caperton's +Ferry. This is what General Sherman refers to in his despatch of +October 16: "Your first move on Trenton and Valley Head was right; +the move to defend Caperton's Ferry is wrong. Notify General Thomas +of these, my views." But the difference between right and wrong +proved immaterial, since Hood was left free to escape down the +Chattanooga valley. Why this was done, or why Sherman did not want +to force the enemy east, by Spring Place, into the barren mountains, +where Johnston would have been compelled to go if McPherson's move +on Resaca in May had been successful, seems a mystery. The +explanation is probably to be found in Sherman's wish that Hood +would go where he would not be compelled to follow, and thus would +leave him (Sherman) a clear road for his march to the sea. Indeed +the conviction seems irresistible that Sherman and Hood could hardly +have acted in more perfect concert if they had been under the same +commander. The one did exactly what the other wanted, and the +other took care not to interfere with his movement. + +At the close of the Atlanta campaign, I promised General Sherman +that I would, as soon as I should be able to do so, write a full +critical history of that campaign as a text-book for military +students. I have not yet found time to fulfil that promise. The +foregoing pages were intended, when written, as only a very partial +fulfilment of that task, and that almost entirely of one side of +it--far the most difficult side. The other side is so easy, +comparatively, and is already so familiar to military students, +that further elucidation now seems hardly necessary. Yet I hope, +as a labor of love, if for no other reason, to present my impressions +of those grand tactical evolutions of a compact army of one hundred +thousand men, as I witnessed them with the intense interest of a +young commander and student of the great art which has so often in +the history of the world determined the destinies of nations. + + HOOD'S OPERATIONS IN SHERMAN'S REAR + +After the capture of Atlanta, in September, 1864, General Sherman +proposed to give his army rest for a month while he perfected his +plans and preparations for a change of base to some point on the +Atlantic or the gulf, in pursuance of the general plan outlined by +General Grant before the Atlanta campaign was opened in May. But +the Confederate commander took the initiative, about September 20, +by moving his army around Sherman's right, striking his railroad +about Allatoona and toward Chattanooga, doing some damage, and then +marching off westward with the design of transferring the theater +of war from Georgia to Alabama, Mississippi, or Tennessee. + +Sherman very promptly decided not to accept that challenge to meet +Hood upon a field chosen by the latter, but to continue substantially +the original plan for his own operations, having in view also new +ulterior plans opened to him by this erratic movement of his +adversary. An essential modification of the original plan, to meet +the unexpected movement of Hood, was to send back into Tennessee +force enough, in addition to the troops then there and others to +be assembled from the rear, to cope with Hood in the event of his +attempting the invasion of Tennessee and Kentucky, or to pursue +and occupy his attention if he should attempt to follow Sherman. +General George H. Thomas, commanding the Department of the Cumberland, +whose headquarters were at Nashville, was already at that place, +and was directed by General Sherman to assume command of all the +troops in the three departments under Sherman's command, except +those with the latter in Georgia, and to direct the operations +against Hood. + +Thomas had in his department at that time only the garrisons and +railroad guards which had been deemed essential during the preceding +operations in Georgia; and many of those were soon to be discharged +by expiration of their terms of enlistment, their places to be +supplied by new regiments coming from the rear. General A. J. +Smith's corps, then in Missouri, about ten thousand strong, was +ordered to Tennessee, and Sherman also ordered Stanley, with the +Fourth Corps, about twelve thousand men, to return from Georgia to +Tennessee and report to Thomas. Stanley had started by rail to +Tullahoma, and was to march, as he did, from the latter point to +Pulaski, Tennessee, which had been selected as the point of +concentration for Thomas's forces. This was the situation when I +returned to the army and reported in person to General Sherman. + +Under Sherman's promise of a month's rest for his army, I had gone +back to attend to the business of my department, as General Thomas +had also done, and hence was in the rear when Hood made his raid +upon Sherman's railroad. Upon reporting to General Sherman near +the end of October, I learned for the first time his purpose to +march to Savannah, and what troops he had provided for Thomas in +Tennessee. I told Sherman, with that perfect candor which he always +invited, that in my opinion Thomas's force was much too small; that +Hood evidently intended to invade Tennessee; and that he would not +be diverted from his purpose by Sherman's march in the opposite +direction, but would, on the contrary, be encouraged thereby to +pursue his own plan. Hence I requested Sherman to send me back +with the Twenty-third Corps to join Thomas. Sherman at first +appeared to understand my suggestions as a desire to be left in +Tennessee instead of Thomas, the latter to go with Sherman. But +I explained to him emphatically that such was not my thought. I +took it for granted that Thomas was to command the army in Tennessee, +and I wanted only to go back and help him because he would, in my +opinion, have to do the fighting while Sherman's march would be +unopposed. Sherman then replied that he must have three grand +divisions, under Slocum, Howard, and myself, to make his army +complete, and that he could not spare me; and he gave no indication +of concurrence in my opinion that he ought to send back more troops. + + SENT BACK TO THOMAS'S AID + +After leaving General Sherman that afternoon and returning to my +own camp, I wrote him a letter giving a special reason why my corps, +rather than any other, should be sent back to Tennessee in order +that it might be filled up my new regiments which had been ordered +from the North. No answer came to these suggestions until I had +made three days' march toward Atlanta, _en route_ for Savannah. +Then I received an order, October 30, to march to the nearest point +on the railroad, and report by telegraph to General Thomas for +orders. + +At first General Thomas ordered me to move by rail to Tullahoma, +and then march across to Pulaski, as Stanley was doing. But just +then Forrest with his cavalry appeared at Johnsonville, on the +Tennessee River west of Nashville, and destroyed a great quantity +of property, General Thomas not having sufficient force available +to oppose him; hence on November 3 Thomas ordered me to come at +once by rail to Nashville with my corps, where I reported to him +with the advance of my troops on November 5. He then ordered me +to go at once with some of my troops to Johnsonville and dispose +of the Confederate cavalry there, and then to return to Nashville +and proceed to Pulaski, to take command of all the troops in the +field, which would then include the Fourth Corps, my own Twenty- +third, except the detachment left at Johnsonville, and the cavalry +watching Hood toward Florence. My duty at Johnsonville, where I +left two brigades, was soon disposed of; and I then returned to +Nashville, and went at once by rail to Pulaski, arriving at that +place in the evening of November 13. + +Some so-called histories of the Tennessee campaign have been based +upon the theory that I was marching from Georgia to Tennessee, to +unite my corps with General Thomas's army at Nashville, when I +encountered Hood at Franklin, and after a sharp contest managed to +elude him and continue my march and unite with the Army of the +Cumberland at Nashville. Hence I wish to point out clearly that +I had been with the entire Twenty-third Corps to Nashville, with +a part of it to Johnsonville and back to Nashville, and thence to +Columbia and near Pulaski, all by rail; that all of the Army of +the Cumberland then in Tennessee was the Fourth Corps and the +cavalry at and near Pulaski; that General Thomas placed those troops +under my command, and that they remained so until after the battle +of Franklin, November 30, and the retreat to Nashville that night; +and that General Thomas did not have an army at Nashville until +December 1. I had united with Thomas's troops two weeks before +the battle of Franklin, and was commanding his army in the field +as well as my own during that time. If the historians had read +the records ( 1) they could not possibly have fallen into such a +mistake. + + FAULTY INSTRUCTIONS TO OPPOSE HOOD AT PULASKI + +Before reaching Pulaski I was furnished with an order from General +Thomas's headquarters assigning me to the command in the field, by +virtue of my rank as a department commander, and a copy of instructions +which had already been telegraphed to General Stanley at Pulaski. +I assumed command in the morning of November 14. The moment I met +Stanley at Pulaski, in the evening of November 13, he called my +attention to the faulty position of the troops and to an error in +General Thomas's instructions, about which I then knew nothing +because I was unacquainted with the geography of the surrounding +country. Upon Stanley's statement, I halted Cox's division of the +Twenty-third Corps a few miles north of Pulaski so that the troops +might be the more readily placed as the situation required when I +had time to consider it. No part of the Twenty-third Corps actually +went to Pulaski, although that was the place to which General Thomas +had ordered it. + +On the 19th General Thomas repeated to me the same orders he had +sent to General Stanley, in these words: "If the enemy advances +in force, as General Hatch believes, have everything in readiness +either to fight him at Pulaski if he advances on that place, or +cover the railroad and concentrate at Columbia, should he attempt +to turn your right flank. . . ."( 2) I then telegraphed General +Thomas, November 20, pointing out the faulty nature of the position +selected by him for the troops at Pulaski, and the danger that must +be incurred in attempting to carry out his instructions to fight +Hood at Pulaski if he should advance upon that place; also suggesting +what seemed to be the best way to avoid that difficulty. General +Thomas very promptly approved these suggestions, and thus ended +the embarrassment occasioned by the faulty instructions. But his +official report on that point has made it necessary for me to +comment upon it more fully later. + +The season of Hood's invasion of Tennessee was extremely unfavorable +for aggressive operations, and hence correspondingly favorable for +the defense. The ordinary country roads were almost impassable, +while the turnpikes were in good condition. As we held the crossing +of the Tennessee River at Decatur, Hood was compelled to cross at +the Shoals below, and to advance over those very bad roads; hence +we had ample time in which to make the necessary dispositions to +oppose him. + +Our cavalry gave us accurate information that the enemy was advancing +on the 21st, when Cox, with Wagner in support, was ordered to +interpose between the enemy's cavalry and Columbia; while Stanley, +with two divisions of the Fourth Corps, marched from Pulaski to +that place, and our cavalry moved on the enemy's right to cover +the turnpike and railroad. The whole army was in position at +Columbia, November 24, and began to intrench. Hood's infantry did +not appear in sight until the 26th. Cox had a brush with the +enemy's cavalry, which had driven in one of our cavalry brigades. +That action was magnified at the time, and afterward, into evidence +of a race between our troops and the enemy for the possession of +Columbia. In fact, Ruger's troops at Columbia were quite capable +of holding that place against Forrest, and Hood's infantry was not +within a day's march of either Cox or Stanley until after both had +reached Columbia. + +We held our intrenched position in front of Columbia until the +evening of November 27, inviting an attack, and hoping that Thomas +would arrive with, or send, reinforcements in time to assume the +offensive from Columbia; but reinforcements did not come, and the +enemy did not attack. It became evident that Hood's intention was +not to attack that position, but to turn it by crossing Duck River +above; hence the army was moved to the north bank of the river in +the night of the 27th. It was still hoped that the line of Duck +River might be held until reinforcements could arrive. General +Thomas was very urgent that this should be done, if possible, as +the arrival of General A. J. Smith's corps from Missouri had been +expected daily for some time, when General Thomas intended, as it +was understood, to come to the front in person with that corps and +all the other troops he could assemble in his department, take +command, and move against the enemy. + + REASON OF THE DELAY IN EXCHANGING MESSAGES + +About that time was disclosed one of those contrivances by which +the non-military agencies of government interfere with the operations +of armies. The War Department telegraph corps alone was intrusted +with the cipher in which General Thomas and I could communicate +with each other by telegraph. Neither he, nor I, nor any of our +staff officers were permitted to know the telegraph code. The work +was so badly done that from eight to forty-eight hours were occupied +in sending and delivering a despatch. Finally the cipher-operator +attached to my headquarters in the field deserted his post and went +to Franklin, so that the time required for a messenger to ride from +Franklin to my position in the field was added to the delay caused +by deciphering despatches. From all this it resulted that my +superior at Nashville was able to give me little assistance during +the critical days of that campaign. It has been generally supposed +that I was all that time acting under orders or instructions from +General Thomas, and his numerous despatches have been quoted in +"histories" as evidence in support of that supposition. The fact +is that I was not only without any appropriate orders or instructions +nearly all the time, but also without any timely information from +General Thomas to guide my action. + +This fact appears to have been fully recognized by General Thomas +in his official report, wherein he made no mention of any orders +or instructions given by him during the progress of those operations, +but referred only to "instructions already given" before I went to +Pulaski, and said: "My plans and wishes were fully explained to +General Schofield, and, as subsequent events will show, properly +appreciated and executed by him."( 3) + +[( 1) War Records, Vol. XLV.] + +[( 2) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, p. 944.] + +[( 3) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part I, p. 590.] + + +CHAPTER X +Hood Forces the Crossing of Duck River--Importance of Gaining Time +for Thomas to Concentrate Reinforcements at Nashville--The Affair +at Spring Hill--Incidents of the Night Retreat--Thomas's Reply to +the Request that a Bridge be Laid over the Harpeth--The Necessity +of Standing Ground at Franklin--Hood's Formidable Attack--Serious +Error of Two Brigades of the Rear-Guard--Brilliant Services of the +Reserve--Yellow Fever Averted--Hood's Assaults Repulsed--Johnston's +Criticism of Hood--The Advantage of Continuing the Retreat to +Nashville. + +In the afternoon of November 28 I received information that the +enemy's cavalry had forced the crossing of Duck River above Columbia, +and driven our cavalry back; and, about two o'clock that night, +that prisoners reported the enemy laying pontoon bridges, and that +Hood's infantry would begin to cross that morning. The army was +ready to march at a moment's notice. It could have retired to +Spring Hill or to Franklin without molestation or delay, but that +would have given the enemy the crossing of Duck River at Columbia +and the turnpike road for his advance with his artillery and trains. +There was no assurance that Thomas had assembled any of his expected +reinforcements at Nashville or elsewhere. It was known that orders +had been given some days before looking to concentration of some +of the troops in his department somewhere, but what had been +accomplished I was not informed. About A. J. Smith I was in a like +state of uncertainty. Only one thing was clear, and that was that +I must hold Hood back, if possible, until informed that Thomas had +concentrated his troops; for if I failed in that, Hood would not +only force me back upon Nashville before Thomas was ready to meet +him there, but would get possession of the Chattanooga Railroad, +and thus cut off the troops coming to Nashville from that direction. +After considering the matter some time in the night, I decided to +hold on at least until morning. Early in the morning a brigade of +infantry was sent up the river to reconnoiter and watch the enemy's +movements; at the same time Stanley was ordered, with two divisions +of his corps, back to Spring Hill, to occupy and intrench a position +there covering the roads and the trains, which were ordered to be +parked at that place, and General Thomas H. Ruger was ordered to +join him. + + IMPORTANCE OF GAINING TIME FOR THOMAS + +About 8 A. M. on the 29th came a despatch from Thomas, dated 8 P. M. +of the day before, conveying the information that Smith had not +arrived, and saying nothing about any other reinforcements, but +expressing the wish that the Duck River position be held until +Smith arrived; and another despatch designating Franklin, behind +the Harpeth River, as the place to which I would have to retire if +it became necessary to fall back from Duck River. I then decided +to hold on to the crossing of Duck River until the night of the +29th, thus gaining twenty-four hours more for Thomas to concentrate +his troops. I did not apprehend any serious danger at Spring Hill; +for Hood's infantry could not reach that place over a wretched +country road much before night, and Stanley, with one division and +our cavalry, could easily beat off Forrest. Hence I retained +Ruger's division and one of Stanley's, and disposed all the troops +to resist any attempt Hood might make, by marching directly from +his bridges upon my position on the north bank of Duck River, to +dislodge me from that position. That was his best chance of success, +but he did not try it. + +Stanley arrived at Spring Hill in time to beat off Forrest and +protect our trains. Then he intrenched a good position in which +to meet Hood's column when it should arrive, which it did late in +the afternoon. They had a hard fight which lasted until about +dark. Much bitter controversy arose between Hood and some of his +subordinates because of their failure to dislodge Stanley's division +and get possession of the turnpike at Spring Hill. While I have +no wish to take any part in that discussion, I must say that I +think the mistake was Hood's. I think he attempted a little longer +march, over a very bad road, than could be made in so short a time. +The 29th of November is a very short day, and the march of troops +across pontoon bridges and through deep mud is very slow. If Hood +had turned down the north bank of Duck River, across the fields, +which were no worse than his road, he could have got into a fight +about noon; but he thought, according to his own account in "Advance +and Retreat," that he was deceiving me by his thundering demonstrations +at Columbia, and that I did not know he was marching to Spring +Hill. He thought he was going to "catch me napping," after the +tactics of Stonewall Jackson, while in fact I was watching him all +day. Besides, Hood went to bed that night, while I was in the +saddle all night, directing in person all the important movements +of my troops. Perhaps that is enough to account for the difference +between success and failure, without censuring subordinate commanders. +Mine did all I could have asked anybody to do that night. + + THE AFFAIR AT SPRING HILL + +As soon as I was satisfied that Hood was gone to Spring Hill and +would not attack me on the bank of Duck River, I took the head of +my troops--Ruger's division--and marched rapidly to Spring Hill, +leaving staff officers to give orders to the other division commanders +to follow immediately in proper order as then formed in line. +These orders were somehow misunderstood. The order of march was +reversed, and the troops, except Ruger's, and Whitaker's brigade +of Kimball's division, did not move at once. But the delay did no +harm, and I did not know of the mistake until several days afterward. +If Hood had only known of that mistake, he might have troubled me +no little, perhaps, by pushing a column across from his camp, south +of Whitaker's right flank at Spring Hill, until it reached the +Columbia turnpike. But I had prepared even for that, as well as +I could, by sending a company of infantry to occupy the only cross- +road I could see near Spring Hill as we approached that place. I +ordered the captain of that company to hold that road at all hazards +until he was relieved by my orders! Some of Hood's troops "relieved" +him next morning! We have to do cruel things sometimes in war. +On arriving at Spring Hill, Whitaker's brigade was put in line on +the right of the troops then in position, so as to cover the turnpike +on which we were marching. This was about dark. In a few minutes +the Confederate camp-fires were lighted a few hundred yards in +front of that brigade. It was a very interesting sight, but I +don't think any of Whitaker's men cared to give the Confederates +a similar view of them. + +After stopping to see Stanley a few minutes, and learning that some +of Forrest's troopers had been seen at Thompson's Station, three +miles farther north, about dusk, I went with Ruger's division to +drive them off and clear the way to Franklin. To my great surprise, +I found only smouldering fires--no cavalry. This was where our +men passed so close to the "bivouac" that they "lighted their pipes +by the enemy's camp-fires"; and that is the way romance is woven +into history! But I took it for granted that the famous Forrest +must be on my road somewhere; for he was there in the afternoon, +and I had no cavalry anywhere near to drive him away. I could not +take time to go with or send infantry to find out where he was. +But I had with me my headquarters troop and as gallant an aide-- +Captain William J. Twining--as ever wore spur. Twining was the +same gallant and accomplished aide and officer of the corps of +engineers, now dead, who afterward made the famous ride of one +hundred and ten miles, through the enemy's country in North Carolina, +to carry a despatch from me to Sherman. He was a commissioner of +the District of Columbia at the time of his death. I ordered them +to go at full gallop down the pike to Franklin, and to ride over +whatever might be found in their way. I sat motionless on my horse +at Thompson's Station until the clatter of hoofs on that hard road +died out in the distance, and I knew the road was clear. I did +not tell the brave Twining the object of that ride, but simply to +report the situation to General Thomas by telegraph from Franklin, +and if any troops were at that place, as had been reported, to +order them forward at once. I had not yet determined whether I +could continue the retreat that night, or whether it might be +necessary to fight Hood at Spring Hill the next day. In either +case the troops at Franklin, if any were there, might be useful. + + INCIDENTS OF THE NIGHT RETREAT + +Upon returning to Spring Hill near midnight, I found my column from +Duck River there in compact order. As the road was clear and the +Confederates all sound asleep, while the Union forces were all wide +awake, there was no apparent reason for not continuing the march +that night. A column of artillery and wagons, and another of +infantry, moved side by side along the broad turnpike, so that if +the redoubtable Forrest should wake up and make his appearance +anywhere, he would be quickly brushed away. It was reported that +he did attack somewhere in the night, but I heard nothing of it at +the time, perhaps because I was sleeping quietly on my horse as we +marched along! + +I arrived at Franklin with the head of my column a short time before +the dawn of day, November 30; indicated to General J. D. Cox, +commanding the Twenty-third Corps, the line upon which the troops +were to be formed; and intrusted to him the formation, as the +several divisions of both corps should arrive, General Stanley +being in the rear directing the operations of the rear-guard. The +Twenty-third Corps occupied the center of the line crossing the +Columbia turnpike, and extended to the river on the left, while +the Fourth Corps was to extend the line to the river on the right. +Fortunately the natural position was such that Kimball's division +of the Fourth Corps was sufficient, leaving both Wood's and Wagner's +in reserve. I then gave my undivided attention to the means of +crossing the Harpeth River. + +Two days before I had telegraphed to General Thomas suggesting that +he have a pontoon bridge laid at Franklin, to which he replied: +"You can send some of the pontoons you used at Columbia to Franklin +to lay a bridge there."( 1) General Thomas or his staff should +have known that it was utterly impossible for me to use the pontoons +which I had at Columbia. Those pontoons were heavy wooden bateaux, +and there were no wagons to transport them, the train that brought +them there having been taken away, it is presumed by his order, +certainly not by mine. Hence I was compelled to burn that pontoon +bridge as well as the railroad bridge (partially) when my troops +retreated from Ducktown. But even if this were not all true, Thomas +knew the enemy was already crossing Duck River on my flank, and +that I must speedily take up a new position behind the Harpeth, +and that I desired him to provide the means for my army to cross +that river. It was a reasonable inference that I should not have +asked him to send another bridge if I already had one that I could +use. Besides, I was commanding General Thomas's army, operating +in his department, wherein I had no control of anything in rear of +the troops under my charge. It was his duty to foresee and provide +for all the necessities that might arise in the rear of the army +in the field. I telegraphed him again for a bridge at the Harpeth +on the 29th, when I found that retreat was inevitable, but he +apparently did not get that despatch. He nevertheless sent bridge +material by rail to Franklin, where it arrived on the morning of +November 30, too late for the pontoons to be used, though the +flooring was useful in covering the railroad bridge and the burned +wagon-bridge. I found also on the south side of the river a very +large park of wagons belonging to the Department of the Cumberland, +which, as well as my own trains and artillery, must be crossed over +before I could withdraw my troops to the north side. The troops +were very much fatigued by their long night march, rendering +considerable rest indispensable. Hence there could not be much +time in which to prepare defensive works with such obstructions as +to insure successful defense against a very heavy assault. But, +much more serious, Hood might cross the river above Franklin with +a considerable force of infantry, as well as with all his cavalry, +before I could get my materials over and troops enough to meet him +on the north side. The situation at Franklin had become vastly +more serious than that at Columbia or Spring Hill, and solely +because of the neglect of so simple a thing as to provide the bridge +I had asked for across the Harpeth. If that had been done, my +trains could have passed over at once, and the entire army could +have crossed before Hood reached Franklin. + + THE NECESSITY OF STANDING GROUND AT FRANKLIN + +To meet this greatest danger, Wood's division of the Fourth Corps +was crossed to the north side to support the cavalry in holding +the fords above, if that should become necessary; while Wagner's +division, which had acted as rear-guard from Spring Hill, was +ordered to remain far enough in front of the line to compel Hood +to disclose his intention to attack in front or to turn the position, +and was to retire and take its position in reserve at the proper +time, if the enemy formed for attack. Only one of those three +brigades--Opdycke's--came in at the proper time and took its +appropriate place; and that, it was asserted, and no doubt truly, +was by the brigade commander's own volition, he having been a +soldier enough to know his duty in such a case, without the necessity +for any orders. The other two brigades remained in their advanced +position until they were run over by the enemy. Much idle controversy +was indulged in among officers of the Fourth Corps and others in +respect to the action of those two brigades. The only proper way +to settle such a question was by a court-martial. As the corps +passed from my command the next morning, and had been under by +orders only a few days, I have never made any effort to fix, even +in my own mind, the responsibility for that blunder. + +By great exertion on the part of the engineers, the means of crossing +the river were at length provided. The supports of the burned +wagon-bridge were still standing at a level with the surface of +the water. They were timbered and planked over, and the railroad +bridge was also covered with planking, thus giving us two passable +bridges. The trains had all been crossed over, and a part of the +artillery. Orders had been issued for the troops to begin crossing +at dark, when Hood disclosed his purpose to attack. The artillery +was ordered back to its position in line, and General Stanley and +I, who were then together on the north side of the river, rode +rapidly to our posts, he to his corps on the south side, and I to +the high redoubt on the north bank, overlooking the entire field. + +There I witnessed the grandest display possible in war. Every +battalion and battery of the Union army in line was distinctly +seen. The corps of the Confederate army which were advancing or +forming for the attack could also be seen, though less clearly on +account of their greater distance, while the Confederate cavalry +could be dimly discerned moving to the fords of the river above +Franklin. Only a momentary view was permitted of this scene of +indescribable grandeur when it was changed into one of most tragic +interest and anxiety. The guns of the redoubt on the parapet of +which I stood with two or three staff officers had fired only a +few shots over the heads of our troops at the advancing enemy when +his heavy line overwhelmed Wagner's two brigades and rapidly followed +their fragments in a confused mass over our light intrenchments. +The charging ranks of the enemy, the flying remnants of our broken +troops, and the double ranks of our first line of defense, coming +back from the trenches together, produced the momentary impression +of an overwhelming mass of the enemy passing over our parapets. + + HOOD'S FORMIDABLE ATTACK + +It is hardly necessary to say that for a moment my "heart sank +within me." But instantly Opdycke's brigade and the 12th and 16th +Kentucky sprang forward, and steadily advanced to the breach. Up +to this moment there had been but little firing at that point, +because of our own troops and the enemy coming in pell-mell; hence +there was not much smoke, and the whole could be seen. But now +all became enveloped in a dense mass of smoke, and not a man was +visible except the fragments of the broken brigades and others, +afterward known to be prisoners, flocking to the rear. A few +seconds of suspense and intense anxiety followed, then the space +in the rear of our line became clear of fugitives, and the steady +roar of musketry and artillery and the dense volume of smoke rising +along the entire line told me that "the breach is restored, the +victory won"! That scene, and the emotion of that one moment, were +worth all the losses and dangers of a soldier's lifetime. + +It would hardly be possible to frame language that would do more +than justice to the magnificent conduct of Emerson Opdycke's brigade +and Laurence H. Rousseau's 12th Kentucky and John S. White's 16th +Kentucky, which were also in reserve, and their commanders, in that +battle. Their action was beyond all praise, and nothing that can +justly be said in respect to the battle can detract one iota from +their proud fame. Yet the light in which the part acted by Opdycke's +brigade (the others not being mentioned) is presented by some +"historians," to the prejudice, relatively, of other portions of +the army and of their commanders, is essentially false. It is +represented as something purely spontaneous, out of the ordinary +course, not contemplated in the dispositions made for battle, +unforseen and unexpected; in short, something more--yes, vastly +more--than the reasonable duty of the brigade; or, "beyond all +power of generalship to mold the battle or control its issue, the +simple charge of Opdycke's brigade stands in boldest relief." The +same might be said with equal truth of the action of any brigade +upon which devolves the assault of defense of the key of a military +position. The success or failure of "generalship to mold the battle +or control its issue" depends absolutely upon the action of such +brigades, their doing, or failure to do, the duty belonging to the +position to which they are assigned. Every soldier in the army +knew what his duty was in such a case--knew for what he had been +placed in that position. It would have been strange indeed if the +gallant commander of that brigade had waited for orders from some +higher officer to move "forward to the lines." As well might the +commander of a brigade in line wait for orders from the general-in- +chief before commencing to fire on the advancing enemy. + +The highest tribute that can be paid to Opdycke's brigade is the +just and true one, that it did exactly the duty assigned it in the +plan of battle, and did that duty nobly and with complete success. +That other brigades did the same is sufficiently shown by the fact +that twenty battle-flags were captured by a single brigade of the +Twenty-third Corps on the same part of the line, and that the 12th +and 16th Kentucky regiments relatively suffered equally heavy losses +in killed and wounded with those of Opdycke.( 2) + + SERIOUS ERROR OF TWO BRIGADES + +As before stated, the dispositions for defense contemplated the +whole of Wagner's division as the reserve to support the center, +that being the only part of the line upon which the enemy would +have time to make a heavy assault that day. This provision for an +ample reserve had been made after full consideration and before +Wood's division was ordered to the north side of the river, which +was after the day was well advanced and the enemy's cavalry had +begun to threaten the crossing above. The blunder respecting the +two brigades of Wagner's division came near being disastrous, and +the repulse of the assault in spite of that blunder makes it highly +probable that if the dispositions ordered had been properly made, +the repulse of the enemy would have been easy beyond reasonable +doubt. Yet it would be difficult to find a fairer chance of success +in a direct assault upon troops in position. Our intrenchments +were of the slightest kind, and without any considerable obstructions +in front to interfere seriously with the assault. The attack, no +less than the defense, was characterized by incomparable valor, +and the secret of its failure is to be found in one of the principles +taught by all military experience--the great superiority in strength +of a fresh body of troops in perfect order over another in the +state of disorder which necessarily results from even the most +successful assault. There was really no comparison, in effective +strength, between Opdycke's orderly and compact brigade and the +confused mass of Confederates that were crossing over our parapet. +The result was nothing extraordinary or at all unprecedented. It +was but one of the numerous proofs afforded by military history of +the value of that prudent maxim in the art of war which dictates +the placing of a suitable reserve in close support of that portion +of a defensive line which is liable to heavy assault. + +The surprising conduct of the commanders of the two brigades of +Wagner's division which were run over by the enemy, and of the +division commander himself, whatever may be true as to the conflicting +statements published in respect to their action, is one of the +strongest possible illustrations of the necessity of the higher +military education, and of the folly of intrusting high commands +to men without such education, which, fortunately for the country +and the army, is rarely learned by experience, but must be acquired +by laborious study of the rules and principles laid down by standard +authors as derived from the practice and teachings of the great +masters of the art of war in all ages. A well-educated officer, +either as brigade or division commander, would not have needed +orders from any source to tell him what to do in that emergency. +He would have known so surely what his duty was that he would have +retired at the proper time behind the main line, without ever +thinking whether or not he had orders to do so. As well might I +have waited for orders from General Thomas to retire across the +Harpeth after my duty on the south side of that river had been +accomplished. The cases are closely parallel. Any unofficial +discussion of the question of responsibility for the sacrifice of +those two brigades is idle. According to the established rules of +war, those three commanders ought to have been tried by court- +martial, and, if found guilty, shot or cashiered, for sacrificing +their own men and endangering the army. One example of such +punishment would do much to deter ignorant and incompetent men from +seeking high commands in the field. But the discipline of the +volunteer army of a republic must, it appears, inevitably be, +especially in respect to officers of high rank, quite imperfect, +although it may become in respect to the great mass of the troops, +as ours certainly did, exceedingly efficient. + +In the Atlanta campaign I sent a division commander to the rear in +permanent disgrace for sacrificing his men in a hopeless assault +upon a fortified line, contrary to the general orders and instructions +which General Sherman had published before the opening of the +campaign. But I never heard of another similar case of even +approximate justice to an officer of high rank. It is a striking +proof of the evil effect of war upon the minds and passions of men, +not only of those who are engaged in it, but even more upon those +who see it from a distance, that commanders are often severely +condemned for prudent care of the lives of men under their command, +who have no choice but to march blindly to death when ordered, +while the idiotic sacrifice of the bravest and noblest of patriotic +soldiers is loudly applauded as a grand exhibition of "gallantry" +in action. If George H. Thomas had had no other title to honor or +fame, he would have deserved the profound gratitude of the American +people, and a very high place among the country's patriots and +heroes, for the reason that while he never yielded ground to an +attacking foe, he never uselessly sacrificed the life of a soldier. + +It is a sin for a soldier to throw away his own life. It is not +his, but belongs to his country. How much greater sin and crime +in an officer the throw away the lives of a thousand men! If he +threw away a thousand dollars, he would be court-martialed and +cashiered. Are not the soldiers of a republic worth even a dollar +apiece! Patriotism and courage exist in great abundance in the +breasts of young Americans. All they need is instruction, discipline, +a little experience, such as our greatest soldier said he himself +needed at first, and, above all, intelligent leadership, which can +be acquired only by military education, to make them the best +soldiers the world has ever known. + + YELLOW FEVER AVERTED + +When I joined my company as second lieutenant in Florida in the +winter of 1853-4, I found the company had been reduced to one lance- +sergeant, two lance-corporals, and thirteen privates. Yellow fever +had done its deadly work. But that lesson was not lost. In later +years, upon the approach of that enemy, which could not be conquered +even by the highest science then known or practised, the troops +were marched a few miles into the pure air of the piney woods, +where the dreaded fever could not reach them. At the close of the +epidemic season which occurred when I had the honor to command the +army, I had the great satisfaction of reporting that not a single +soldier had been killed by that most dreaded of all enemies, and +the even greater satisfaction of reporting that those bravest of +the brave, the surgeons who volunteered to go into the very midst +of the camp of the enemy that does not respect even the red cross, +to minister to those who had been stricken down and to study the +nature of the disease for the future benefit of the army and of +mankind, had also been unharmed. As chief of those I do not hesitate +to name the present surgeon-general of the army, George M. Sternberg. +Yet how many of the noblest soldiers of humanity have given their +lives in that cause! + +Hood's assault at Franklin has been severely criticized. Even so +able a man as General J. E. Johnston characterizes it as a "useless +butchery." These criticisms are founded upon a misapprehension of +the facts, and are essentially erroneous. Hood must have been +fully aware of our relative weakness in numbers at Franklin, and +of the probable, if not certain, concentration of large reinforcements +at Nashville. He could not hope to have at any future time anything +like so great an advantage in that respect. The army at Franklin +and the troops at Nashville were within one night's march of each +other; Hood must therefore attack on November 30, or lose the +advantage of greatly superior numbers. It was impossible, after +the pursuit from Spring Hill, in a short day to turn our position +or make any other attack but a direct one in front. Besides, our +position, with a river in our rear, gave him the chance of vastly +greater results, if his assault were successful, than could be hoped +for by any attack he could make after we had crossed the Harpeth. +Still more, there was no unusual obstacle to a successful assault +at Franklin. The defenses were of the slightest character, and it +was not possible to make them formidable during the short time our +troops were in position, after the previous exhausting operations +of both day and night, which had rendered some rest on the 30th +absolutely necessary. + + HOOD'S ASSAULTS REPULSED + +The Confederate cause had reached a condition closely verging on +desperation, and Hood's commander-in-chief had called upon him to +undertake operations which he thought appropriate to such an +emergency. Franklin was the last opportunity he could expect to +have to reap the results hoped for in his aggressive movement. He +must strike there, as best he could, or give up his cause as lost. +I believe, therefore, that there can be no room for doubt that +Hood's assault was entirely justifiable. It may have been faulty +in execution, in not having been sufficiently supported by a powerful +reserve at the moment of first success. I have not the means of +knowing the actual facts in this regard; but the result seems to +render such a hypothesis at least probable, and the rapidity and +impetuosity of Hood's advance and assault add to that probability. + +It is interesting to consider what would probably have been the +march of events if we had retreated from Duck River in the night +of November 28, upon first learning that Hood had forced the crossing +of that river. We would have reached Franklin early on the 29th, +could have rebuilt the bridges and crossed the Harpeth that day +and night, and Hood could not have got up in time to make any +serious attack that day. So far as our little army was concerned, +for the moment all would have been well. But Hood would have been +in front of Franklin, with his whole army, artillery, and ammunition- +trains, by dawn of day on the 30th; he could have forced the crossing +of the Harpeth above Franklin early that day, compelled us to retire +to Nashville, and interposed his cavalry between Nashville and +Murfreesboro' that night or early on December 1. Thus Thomas's +remaining reinforcements from the south and east would have been +cut off, and he might have been attacked in Nashville, not later +than December 2, with several thousand fewer men than he finally +had there, a large part of his army--A. J. Smith's three divisions +--not fully ready for battle, and with fewer effective cavalry; +while Hood would have had his whole army, fresh and spirited, +without the losses and depression caused by its defeat at Franklin, +ready to attack an inferior force at Nashville or to cross the +Cumberland and invade Kentucky. In short, the day gained at Duck +River and Spring Hill was indispensable to Thomas's success. The +time gained by that "temerity" made success _possible_. The +additional time and relative strength gained by Hood's disastrous +repulse at Franklin made final success easy and certain. A retreat +at any time before nine o'clock A. M. on the 29th would have led +to substantially the same result as if begun at 2 A. M. + +If the plan adopted and ordered early in the morning of November +29 had been carried out, by which the line of Duck River would have +been abandoned in the middle of that day, the head of column from +Spring Hill would have arrived at Franklin about midnight, expecting +to cross the Harpeth without delay; but, under the conditions +actually found to exist at Franklin, not much progress toward +providing the means of crossing the Harpeth could have been made +before daylight in the morning; therefore our condition for battle +at Franklin would not have been materially different, in time or +otherwise, from what it actually was. Hood's artillery, as well +as his infantry, could have reached Spring Hill before daylight on +the 30th, and would have had practically a clear road to Franklin; +for the enemy's superior cavalry having been interposed between +our cavalry and infantry, it was necessary for our infantry, +artillery, and trains to retreat from Spring Hill to Franklin in +one compact column. A small force could not have been left at +Spring Hill, as had been suggested, to delay Hood's advance, because +of the imminent danger that it would be attacked in flank and rear +by the enemy's cavalry, and thus cut off and captured; hence Hood +could have made his attack at Franklin about noon, instead of at +4:30 P. M., and with a large force of artillery as well as of +infantry. Such an attack would, of course, have been far more +formidable than that which was actually made; whether it could have +been successfully resisted from noon until dark can only be +conjectured. It is sufficient here to note that the delay of Hood's +advance very greatly diminished the force of his attack at Franklin, +besides making his arrival before that place so late that he could +not turn that position that day by crossing the Harpeth above. +The tenacity with which the crossing of Duck River at Columbia was +held was well rewarded at Franklin. + + THE ADVANTAGE OF CONTINUING THE RETREAT + +The question has been raised whether we ought not to have held our +position in front of Franklin after having repulsed Hood's attack +and inflicted such heavy losses upon his troops. General Sherman +himself impliedly made this suggestion when he expressed the opinion +that Thomas ought to have turned on Hood after his repulse at +Franklin; and General Jacob D. Cox, who had been in the thickest +of the fight all the time, with high soldierly instinct sent me, +by one of my staff officers, the suggestion that we stay there and +finish the fight the next day. A fight to a finish, then and there, +might quite probably have given us the prize. But the reasons for +declining that tempting opportunity for complete victory will, I +believe, seem perfectly clear when fully stated. + +In anticipation of orders from General Thomas to fall back to +Nashville that night, the trains had been ordered to the rear before +the battle began, so as to clear the way for the march of our +troops, and to render impossible any interference by the enemy's +cavalry. Our ammunition had been well-nigh exhausted in the battle +at Franklin, as is shown by my telegram to General Thomas to send +a million rounds to Brentwood, thinking he might want me to hold +Hood there until he could get A. J. Smith's troops in position and +supplied with ammunition. If I had needed any such warning, that +given me by the general in his despatch,( 3) "But you must look +out that the enemy does not still persist," would have been sufficient +to deter me from fighting him the next day with my "back to the +river." Besides, it is not easy to estimate at midnight exactly +the results of a desperate battle then just terminated. But all +this is insignificant when compared with the controlling reason. +I had then fully accomplished the object (and I could not then know +how much more) for which the command in the field had for a time +been intrusted to me. My junction with reinforcements at Nashville +was assured, as also the future success of the army under my superior +in command. Why run any further risk? If it had been possible +for me, at that moment of supreme satisfaction, to have had any +thought of self, I might perhaps have considered the project of +turning upon my adversary at dawn the next morning, in hope of +routing his dispirited army. But if any man thinks such a thought +possible under such circumstances, he knows nothing about the +character of a patriotic soldier. If the troops I then had at +Franklin had been the sole reliance for ultimate success in the +campaign, nothing could have been clearer than my duty to turn and +strike with all my might at dawn the next day. + +(A copy of all the correspondence between General Thomas and myself, +with annotations showing the time of receipt of the several despatches +from General Thomas, thereby showing their influence upon my actions, +has been placed on file at the War Department. These copies of +despatches, with annotations, are intended mainly for the military +student who may care to make a close and critical study of such +military operations. The original records of such correspondence +are often worse than useless, for the reason that the exact time +of sending and receipt of a despatch is so often omitted. All sent +or received the same day are frequently printed in the records +indiscriminately, so that the last if as likely to come first as +otherwise; and, sometimes, historians have used despatches as if +they had been received at the time they were sent, though in fact +many hours or some days had elapsed. My annotations were made in +1882-3, at Black Point, San Francisco, California, with the assistance +of my ever faithful and efficient aide, Colonel William M. Wherry, +now lieutenant-colonel of the 2d United States Infantry, and were +attached to the copies of the records in 1886.) + +[( 1) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, p. 1108.] + +[( 2) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, pp. 241 and 413. The loss at +Franklin of Opdycke's six regiments was 205, while the 12th and +16th Kentucky regiments lost 106 men.] + +[( 3) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, p. 1171.] + + +CHAPTER XI +The Correspondence with General Thomas previous to the Battle of +Franklin--The Untenable Position at Pulaski--Available Troops which +were not Sent to the Front--Correspondence with General Thomas-- +Instructions Usually Received too Late--Advantage of Delaying the +Retreat from Duck River--No Serious Danger at Spring Hill--General +Thomas Hoping that Hood might be Delayed for Three Days at Franklin. + +I will now add to the foregoing sketch what seems to me necessary +to a full understanding of the operations preceding and immediately +following the battle of Franklin, referring briefly, as necessary +to an exact understanding of some things that occurred, to the +relation in which I stood to General Thomas. He was my senior by +thirteen years as a graduate of the Military Academy, where I had +known him well as my highly respected instructor. He had won high +distinction in Mexico, and had been twice brevetted for gallant +services in that war. He had seen far more service in the field +than I had, and in much larger commands, though almost always under +the immediate command of a superior--Buell, Rosecrans, and Sherman. +Even in the Atlanta campaign, then recently ended, his command was +nearly five times as large as mine. In 1864 he had already become +a brigadier-general in the regular army, having risen to that rank +by regular stages, while I was only a captain thirty-three years +of age. It will also be necessary for the reader to realize that +when I asked for and received orders to report with the Twenty- +third Corps to General Thomas in Tennessee, I felt in the fullest +degree all the deference and respect which were due to his seniority +in years and rank and services. + +When I went back to Tennessee my only anxiety respecting the +situation, so far as General Thomas's personality affected it, was +on account of his constitutional habit of very deliberate action. +I was apprehensive that, in some emergency created by the action +of the daring and reckless, though not over-talented, antagonist he +would have to meet, General Thomas might not be able to determine +and act quickly enough to save from defeat his army, then understood +to be so far inferior to the enemy in numerical strength. I had +far too high an opinion of his capacity as a general to doubt for +a moment that with sufficient time in which to mature his plans to +resist Hood's invasion and to execute those plans so far as was in +his power, he would do all that the wisest generalship could +suggest. + +I will also refer to the official returns of that period, which +show what troops General Thomas had elsewhere in his department +and available for service, as well as the effective strength of +the force then under my immediate command in the field, and that +of General A. J. Smith's three divisions, which had been ordered +from Missouri to join the forces of General Thomas. In his entire +department, excluding the Fourth and Twenty-third Corps in the +field, the infantry and artillery force, present for duty equipped, +officers and men, November 20, 1864, amounted to 29,332; the two +corps in the field, to 24,265; and A. J. Smith's corps, to about +10,000. The entire cavalry force, mounted and equipped, was about +4800; that unmounted, about 6700. + + THE CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL THOMAS + +It is necessary to exclude from this statement of troops available +for service in middle Tennessee those in Kentucky and East Tennessee, +belonging to the Department of the Ohio, for the reason that just +at that time unusual demand was made upon those troops for service +in East Tennessee, where some of the State forces had met with +disaster. This probably accounts in part for the discrepancies in +General Sherman's estimates referred to later. + +Hood's forces were then understood by General Thomas to consist of +from 40,000 to 45,000 infantry and artillery, and 10,000 to 12,000 +cavalry, including Forrest's command. I find from General Sherman's +despatch to Thomas, dated October 19, that his estimate of Hood's +strength, October 19, 1864, was about 40,000 men of all arms. + +I do not find in General Thomas's report or despatches any exact +statement of his own estimate; but the following language in his +official report of January 20, 1865, seems quite sufficiently +explicit on that point: "Two divisions of infantry, under Major- +General A. J. Smith, were reported on their way to join me from +Missouri, which, with several one-year regiments then arriving in +the department, and detachments collected from points of minor +importance, would swell my command, when concentrated, to an army +nearly as large as that of the enemy. Had the enemy delayed his +advance a week or ten days longer, I would have been ready to meet +him at some point south of Duck River. . . . " + +This must of course be accepted as General Thomas's own estimate +of the enemy's strength, on which his own action was based. And +it should be remembered that military operations must be based upon +the information then in possession of the commander, and just +criticism must also be based upon his action upon that information, +and not upon any afterward obtained. + +General Sherman estimated the force left with Thomas ( 1) at about +45,000 (exclusive of the Fourth and Twenty-third Corps, and Smith's +corps coming from Missouri), in which he included about 8000 or +10,000 new troops at Nashville, and the same number of civil +employees of the quartermaster's department. The Fourth and Twenty- +third corps he estimated at 27,000 men, and Smith's at 10,000, and +the cavalry in the field at 7700. All this was sufficiently accurate +if no account were taken of men unfit for duty or not equipped. +But the official returns show that the number of officers and men +present for duty equipped amounted to 49,322 in the department, +and in the two corps in the field to 24,265, and in the cavalry in +the field, to 4800. There were therefore the following discrepancies +in Sherman's estimate, due in part to the discharge of men whose +terms had expired, as well as to the usual number of men not equipped +for duty in the ranks: In the troops in the department, a discrepancy +of 8000; in the army corps in the field, 2735; in the cavalry in +the field, 2900 ( 2)--a total discrepancy of 13,635. That is to +say, Sherman's own estimate was in excess of Thomas's actual strength +by a force greater than either of the two army corps he sent back +to help Thomas. If he had sent back another large corps,--say the +Fourteenth, 13,000 strong, having besides the moral strength due +to the fact that it was Thomas's old corps,--the discrepancy in +his own estimate would doubtless have been sufficiently overcome, +and the line of Duck River at least, if not that of the Tennessee, +as Sherman had assured Grant, would have been securely held until +A. J. Smith arrived and Thomas could assume the offensive. + +Hood's force was ready to invade Tennessee in one compact army, +while Thomas then had in the field ready to oppose it a decidedly +inferior force, even admitting the lowest estimate made of that +hostile army. + + THE UNTENABLE POSITION AT PULASKI + +The superiority of the enemy's cavalry made it necessary that the +garrisons of all essential posts and the guards of important railroad +bridges should be strong enough to resist attack from a large force +of dismounted cavalry and light artillery, so long as Thomas was +compelled to remain on the defensive. The records of that time +indicate that Thomas then appreciated, what mature consideration +now confirms, that if Hood's advance had induced him (Thomas) to +draw off sufficient troops from garrisons and railroad guards to +enable him to give battle on equal terms to Hood at Pulaski or +Columbia, a raid by Hood's cavalry would probably have resulted in +the destruction or capture of nearly everything in the rear, not +only in Tennessee, but also in Kentucky, except perhaps Nashville +and Chattanooga. It was only wise forethought which suggested that +such might be the nature of Hood's plans, especially in view of +the season of the year and the condition of the roads, which made +aggressive operations of a large army, where all the hard roads +were held by the opposing forces, extremely difficult. The official +returns, now published in the War Records,( 3) show that the troops +were sufficient only for the purpose of garrisons and guards and +defensive action in the field until after the arrival of A. J. +Smith; and this is true even if Hood's cavalry force was no larger +than that which now appears from Forrest's report--5000; for Forrest +might easily have got a day or two the start of his pursuer at any +time, as had often been done on both sides during the war. + +It is true that Sherman's instructions to Thomas appear to have +contemplated the possibility, at least, that Thomas might be reduced +to the extreme necessity of holding Nashville, Chattanooga, and +Decatur defensively, even during a long siege, and of abandoning +all points of less importance than the three named, so that all +the garrisons of such minor points and all the railroad guards +might be concentrated with the garrisons of these three important +strategic points, for their defense during a siege. This must of +course have referred to the defensive period of the campaign only, +for the moment that Thomas's reinforcements should enable him to +assume the offensive all the necessities above referred to must +have disappeared. It must, I think, be admitted as beyond question +that, in view of his daily expectation of the arrival of A. J. +Smith's troops from Missouri, Thomas was perfectly right in not +acting upon Sherman's suggestion of extreme defensive action, and +thus abandoning his railroad to destruction. + +If, on the other hand, Thomas's reinforcements had arrived in time +to enable him to take the initiative by moving against Hood from +Pulaski or Columbia, then he might have drawn quite largely from +his garrisons in the rear to reinforce his army in the field, since +his "active offensive" operations would have fully occupied Hood's +cavalry, and thus have prevented a raid in Thomas's rear. But +until he was strong enough to advance, unless forced to the extreme +necessity of defending Nashville, Chattanooga, and Decatur, and +abandoning all else, Thomas could not prudently have reduced his +garrisons or guards. + +I knew nothing at that time of Sherman's instructions to Thomas, +and little about the actual strength of Thomas's garrisons and +railroad guards. But I was under the impression that some +reinforcements must be available from his own department, and felt +a little impatient about the long delay in their arrival, and hence +telegraphed General Thomas, November 24, suggesting the concentration +of R. S. Granger's troops and those along the railroad. The +despatches to me at that time, to be found in the War Records,( 4) +fully show the earnest determination of General Thomas to send +forward reinforcements as soon as possible, and even in detail, +and to fight Hood at or near Columbia. Indeed, those despatches +misled me somewhat as to what I might expect. + + AVAILABLE TROOPS NOT SENT TO THE FRONT + +Notwithstanding this earnest desire, General Thomas does not appear +to have realized the existence of a force available for the purpose +he had in view. The railroad guards from Atlanta to Chattanooga +or Dalton, withdrawn after Sherman started on his march, and +convalescents, men returning from furlough and others going to the +front, but failing to reach Sherman's army in time, all assembled +at Chattanooga, made a surplus force at that point of about 7000 +men.( 5) Some of these troops had been sent to East Tennessee, as +well as all the mounted troops available in Kentucky, for the +purpose of retrieving the disaster which had befallen the Tennessee +military governor's troops there, under Gillem. But all sent from +Chattanooga had been returned by November 21, about the time when +Hood's advance from Florence had become certainly known. Yet it +does not appear that General Thomas even inquired what force was +available at Chattanooga until November 25, when, in reply to a +telegram, he learned that Steedman could raise 5000 men (in fact, +7000), in addition to all necessary garrisons and guards, "to +threaten enemy in rear," in case he should "get on Chattanooga +railroad." It may then (November 25) have been too late to send +those 5000 or 7000 men to the line of Duck River, or perhaps even +to Franklin. They were sent to Nashville, reaching there after +the battle of Franklin. If they had been ordered to Columbia by +rail, via Nashville, as soon as Hood's advance was known to General +Thomas, they must have reached Duck River some time before Hood +attempted to cross that stream. This addition to the Fourth and +Twenty-third Corps would have raised the infantry in the field to +nearly an equality with that of Hood in fact, though not nearly to +what Hood's force was then supposed to be. That increased force +would doubtless have made it possible to prevent Hood from crossing +Duck River anywhere near Columbia for several days, and perhaps to +force him to select some other line of operations, or to content +himself with sending his cavalry on another raid. In any case, +the arrival of A. J. Smith a few days later would have enabled +Thomas to assume the aggressive before Hood could have struck a +serious blow at Thomas's army in the field. In view of the earnest +desire of General Thomas to reinforce the army in the field at +Columbia, there does not appear to be any rational explanation of +the fact that he did not send those 7000 men from Chattanooga to +Columbia. His own report states the fact about those "7000 men +belonging to his [General Sherman's] column," but does not give +any reason why they were not used in his "measures to act on the +defensive." As General Thomas says: "These men had been organized +into brigades, to be made available at such points as they might +be needed." At what other point could they possibly be so much +needed as that where the two corps were trying to oppose the advance +of the enemy long enough for Thomas to get up his other reinforcements? + + AVAILABLE TROOPS NOT SENT TO THE FRONT + +General Thomas appears to have been puzzled by doubt whether Hood +would aim for Nashville or some point on the Nashville and Chattanooga +Railroad, and not to have realized that his own plan should have +been to concentrate all his available force into one army, so as +to move against the enemy with the greatest possible force, no +matter what the enemy might do. With the exception of those 7000 +men belonging to Sherman's column, Thomas had for necessary garrisons +and railroad guards essentially the same number of men as had been +employed in that service all the preceding summer,--no more and no +less,--and the necessity for that service had not been very much +diminished, except at and about Decatur, Stevenson, and Tullahoma, +which Hood's advance from Florence had rendered of no further +consequence at that time. But the 7000 men available at Chattanooga +ought unquestionably to have been sent to Columbia, or at least +moved up to Nashville or Franklin, where they could "join the main +force," as suggested in my despatch of November 24 to Thomas,( 6) +instead of being left in Chattanooga "to threaten enemy in rear."( 7) +As suggested in my despatch of November 24, R. S. Granger's force +and others along the railroad south of Duck River, as well as +Steedman's, might have joined the main force at Columbia, if orders +had been given in time, thus increasing the army in the field by +fully 10,000 men. + +If R. S. Granger's force had been left at Decatur, it would have +drawn off from Hood's invading army at least an equal force to +guard his bridges at Florence, or else would have destroyed those +bridges and cut off his retreat after the battle of Nashville. +This was practically what had been suggested by Sherman in his +instructions to Thomas. But the withdrawal of Granger's troops +and their detention at Murfreesboro', instead of sending them to +"join the main force," served no good purpose at the time, and +prevented their use in the capture of Hood's defeated and retreating +troops. The failure to make this timely concentration was the one +great fault in Thomas's action, instead of his delay in attacking +at Nashville, for which he was so much criticized. But Hood's +repulse at Franklin had made this previous mistake a matter of past +history, and hence it was lost sight of in view of the imminent +danger afterward supposed to exist at Nashville, just as the +brilliant victory at Nashville was accepted as demonstrating the +wisdom of all that had gone before, even including Sherman's division +of his army between himself and Thomas before his march to the sea. +Such is the logic of contemporaneous military history! + +In my long conversations with General Grant on the steamer _Rhode +Island_ in January, 1865, I explained to him fully the error into +which he had been led in respect to Thomas's action or non-action +at Nashville in December, and he seemed to be perfectly satisfied +on that point. But he did not ask me anything about what had +occurred before the battle of Franklin, and hence I did not tell +him anything. + +In connection with the action of General Thomas previous to the +battle of Franklin, the following instructions from General Sherman +on October 31 are important: "You must unite all your men into +one army, and abandon all minor points, if you expect to defeat +Hood. General Schofield is marching to-day from here. . . . "( 8) +Again, on the same date, he telegraphed: "Bear in mind my instructions +as to concentration, and not let Hood catch you in detail."( 9) + +Sherman thus gave the most emphatic warning against the mistake +which Thomas nevertheless made by failing to concentrate all his +own available troops until it was too late to meet Hood's advance, +thus leaving two corps to bear the entire brunt of battle until +the crisis of the campaign was passed at Franklin. + + CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL THOMAS + +The following correspondence relating to the command of an army in +the field, to increasing the Fourth and Twenty-third corps, and to +the use to be made of R. S. Granger's troops, and the reason why +Thomas should assume the offensive as soon as possible, is also +important, especially as showing that Sherman expected the two +corps to be increased to 50,000 men, and that Thomas should command +in person: + + "Kingston, November 7, 1864, 10 A. M. +"Major-General Thomas: Despatch of 12:30 P. M. yesterday received. +General Schofield is entitled to the command [over Stanley] by +virtue of a recent decision of the War Department. I would advise +you to add to those corps new regiments until they number 25,000 +men each. If Beauregard advances from Corinth, it will be better +for you to command in person. Your presence alone will give +confidence. Granger should continue all the time to threaten the +rear, and as soon as possible some demonstration should be made +from the direction of Vicksburg against the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. +Also I want you to assume the offensive as quick as possible, as +I have reason to believe all of Beauregard's army is not there, +but that he has also divided his forces. + + "W. T. Sherman, Major-General."(10) +On the same day Thomas telegraphed to Sherman in reply to the above: + +"It is, and always has been, my intention to command the troops +with me in person. My object in giving the preference to General +Schofield [over Stanley] was merely that he should exercise command +should accidental circumstances prevent my presence."(11) + +Sherman and Thomas were equally right--Sherman in saying "It will +be better for you to command in person. Your presence alone will +give confidence"; and Thomas in replying, "It is, and always has +been, my intention to command the troops with me in person." The +proper place for a general-in-chief is with his army in the field, +where battles are to be fought, and not in the rear, where there +is little to do but to assemble reinforcements, which his chief of +staff could do as well as he. Thomas could have reached the army +at Columbia by rail in two hours, and at Franklin in one hour; yet +he left a subordinate to fight against a superior force, while he +remained in Nashville until he had collected there an army superior +to that of his adversary. But General Thomas must have had some +reason which seemed to him good and sufficient for his absence from +the field. He was the last man in the world to shrink from his +duty in battle. + +Before the above correspondence between General Sherman and General +Thomas was known to me I had written the following: "The relations +existing between General Thomas and me, and the confidence he had +shown in all his despatches, commencing with those received at +Pulaski, left little room for hesitation or doubt about doing, in +every emergency, what my own judgment dictated, as if I had been +in chief command, confident of the approval which he so fully +expressed after the events. Yet my experience then, as always, +led me to the opinion that it is better for the general-in-chief, +in all operations of a critical nature, to be present with the +troops in the field, if possible; he must be able to act with more +confidence than any subordinate can possibly feel. He was the sole +judge as to the necessity of his remaining in Nashville, and no +good reason could now be given for questioning the correctness of +his judgment. It is only intended as an expression of a general +rule for the consideration of military students." + + CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL THOMAS + +General Thomas's orders to General D. S. Stanley upon his being +sent to Pulaski, and his subsequent orders to me, dated November +19, to fight the enemy at Pulaski if he advanced against that place, +were, as shown in the following despatch from me, quite inapplicable +to the then existing situation: + + "Pulaski, November 20, 1864. +"Major-General Thomas: After full consideration I am of the opinion +that this is not the best position for the main body of our troops, +at least so long as we are inferior in strength to the enemy. If +Hood advances, whether his design be to strike this place or +Columbia, he must move via Lawrenceburg on account of the difficulty +of crossing Shoal Creek. Under cover of his cavalry, he can probably +reach Lawrenceburg without our knowledge, and move his forces a +day's march from that point toward Columbia before we could learn +his designs, and thus reach that point ahead of us; or he might +move upon this place, and while demonstrating against it throw his +forces on to the pike north of us, and thus cut us off from Columbia +and from our reinforcements. Lynnville would be free from these +objections as a point of concentration for our forces. On the +other hand, a force at this point covers the Nashville and Chattanooga +Railroad to the best advantage; but a brigade in the inclosed works +at this place could hold out against any force until relieved, +while the main force at Lynnville would be sure of concentrating +with the troops in the rear. I respectfully submit these views +for your consideration. + + "J. M. Schofield, Major-General." + +To this General Thomas replied at once: + + "Nashville, November 20, 1864. +"General Schofield: Your despatch of 2 P. M. this day just received. +Two other despatches of to-day were received previous to this one. +Do you mean that one brigade in the intrenchments at Pulaski could +hold out for a week? The reason I ask is, General Smith cannot +get here before next Friday. If one brigade can hold the fortifications +of Pulaski for a week or ten days, you are authorized to leave a +brigade or a division there, and concentrate the rest of your force +at Lynnville preparatory to support Hatch, or fall back on Columbia, +whichever may be necessary. Part of Ruger's troops will start for +Columbia to-night, the remainder at two o'clock to-morrow, and the +railroad superintendent says he will have them at Columbia by to- +morrow night. The very moment Smith's troops arrive I will start +them for Columbia. In any event, all surplus transportation should +be sent to Columbia. I have just received General Hatch's of this +P. M., and it seems from it that Hood is advancing. His movements +will indicate to you what disposition you should make--whether to +concentrate at Columbia or remain at Lynnville. If Hood's entire +army should advance, you must use your own discretion as to holding +the fortifications at Pulaski or withdrawing the troops. + + "Geo. H. Thomas, Major-General." + +General Thomas thus gave me the full freedom of action demanded by +the situation in which I was placed, in lieu of his previous +embarrassing orders about fighting the enemy at Pulaski. + +The following correspondence,(12) with the above, shows the situation +as reported by me to General Thomas, and his "plans and wishes" as +then explained to me immediately before and after Hood began his +advance: + + "Thomas to Schofield. + "November 24, 1864. +". . . Have the fords above Columbia as well guarded as you can, +and I think you will then have checked the advance of Hood, and we +shall have time to get up our reinforcements." + + "Schofield to Thomas. + "November 24, 1864, 1:39 P. M. +"Do you think it important to hold Columbia? My force is not large +enough to cover the town and railroad bridge. I can hold a shorter +line covering the railroad bridge, leaving the town and railroad +depot outside; but in any case the enemy can turn the position by +crossing above or below, and render my withdrawal to the north bank +very difficult. Please give me your views soon." + + "Thomas to Schofield. + "November 24, 1864. +"If you cannot hold Columbia, you had better withdraw to the north +bank of the river. From the description given I supposed the line +was sufficiently short to enable you and Stanley to hold it securely +and have a reserve. But it is better, of course, to substantially +check the enemy than to run the risk of defeat by risking too much. +Where is Stanley? Is he with you?" + + CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL THOMAS + + "Schofield to Thomas + "Columbia, November 24, 1864, 8:30 P. M. +"I have examined the ground and considered the situation carefully. +My troops are in position on the outer line, covering the railroad +depot and bridge, and pretty well intrenched. The line is too +long; yet if Hood wishes to fight me on it to-morrow, I am willing. +I think he will attack to-morrow, if at all. If he does not, I +must prepare to meet any attempt to cross Duck River above or below. +For this purpose I am preparing an interior line covering the +railroad bridge, which can be held by about seven thousand men, +which I propose to occupy, and put the rest of my troops and material +on the north bank of the river, ready to move as may be necessary. +With the fords guarded, as will then be practicable, I think Hood +cannot get the start of me. I think it best not to risk much now; +for a few days' delay, if we concentrate rapidly, will make us +strong enough to drive Hood back. My theory is that he will operate +against the Chattanooga Railroad, and I do not see how we can save +it from some damage at least. But if we concentrate Granger's +troops and those along the road promptly, so that they can join +the main force, there can be no doubt of the final result. Please +inform me whether my proposed arrangements meet with your approval." + + "Thomas to Schofield + "Nashville, November 24, 1864. +". . . Can you not cover the pontoon bridge with a bridge-head, +and hold it so as to preserve the bridge for crossing whenever we +get ready to advance? General Rousseau informed me that the +blockhouses protecting the railroad bridge cannot be reached by +the enemy's artillery; therefore the enemy could not get near enough +to the bridge to destroy it if the blockhouses are held. . . ." + +As stated in my official report, I did prepare and hold a bridge- +head covering both the railroad and the pontoon bridges over Duck +River at the same time, for which purpose I floated the pontoons +down the river to a point near the railroad bridge, having found +that the blockhouses referred to by General Rousseau could not be +made available for the protection of the pontoon bridge where it +before was--at the crossing of the turnpike. I abandoned that +bridge-head on the night of November 27, upon receipt of information +leading me to believe that Hood intended to cross Duck River above +Columbia. + +On November 25 General Thomas telegraphed me, in the following +terms, his approval of the dispositions I had made, and the +information that he had already ordered the concentration of troops +which I suggested in my despatch of the 24th: + +"Your cipher despatch of 8:30 P. M. is just received; some difficulty +in transmission the cause. Your arrangements are judicious and +approved. I gave orders two days ago to make the concentration +you suggest, and hope it will be nearly or quite completed to-day. +Will telegraph you further this morning." + +This despatch was more than twelve hours in transmission. + +Again, November 26, I reported the situation at Columbia, and my +action, as follows; also suggesting that infantry be sent forward +at once: + +"The enemy has kept up a strong demonstration with dismounted +cavalry since yesterday morning. He now shows a column of infantry +on the Mount Pleasant pike, about three miles distant. I cannot +yet tell how great the force. I have drawn my force in the interior +line, and will fight him there. If you have any infantry available, +I think it should be sent forward at once." + +Yet no infantry reinforcements were sent, although the "7000 men" +at Chattanooga could easily have reached Columbia before that time. + +At 8 A. M. the next day General Thomas replied as follows: + +"Your despatch of 10 A. M. yesterday received. I will send you +all the available infantry force I can raise. I expect some of +Smith's command here to-day, and will send it forward as rapidly +as possible. Sent you two regiments of cavalry day before yesterday, +two yesterday, and will send another to-day. If you can hold Hood +in check until I can get Smith up, we can whip him." + +Thus it appears that even as late as November 27 General Thomas +had not thought of sending the 7000 men at Chattanooga to "join +the main force," although so anxious that I should hold Hood in +check until he could get Smith up. He was still relying entirely +upon A. J. Smith, whose advance, so surely expected on the 25th, +was still expected on the 27th. It seems incredible that General +Thomas had not thought of sending Steedman's troops from Chattanooga, +instead of waiting for the uncertain arrival of A. J. Smith. + + DELAYING THE RETREAT FROM DUCK RIVER + +On November 27 I received an important despatch from General Thomas, +dated November 25. It was written under the apprehension that +Hood's design might be to move upon the Nashville and Chattanooga +Railroad, as I had suggested to Thomas on the 24th, and informed +me fully of his plans and instructions to meet such a movement, +requesting me to give him my views in reply. In that despatch +General Thomas said: + +"In case you have to move to the north bank of Duck River, I wish +you to keep some cavalry on the south side to observe and delay +Hood's advance on the Chattanooga Railroad as much as possible. +I hope to have five regiments of Granger's troops in Murfreesboro' +to-day. Have made arrangements for Milroy to fall back to +Murfreesboro' or this side of Duck River also, if the enemy advances. +The cavalry on the south side of Duck River should cover the +approaches to Shelbyville, and cross at that place, and hold the +bridge in case of an advance in force. I have asked General Steedman +how large a force he can raise to threaten the enemy's rear, should +he get on the Chattanooga road, and expect an answer soon. About +1000 of Hatch's cavalry have arrived here from Memphis, dismounted, +but they will be mounted here as soon as possible and sent to the +front; three regiments should start to-day, making about 1000 men. +I have not heard from any of Smith's troops yet; some of them will +surely be here to-day. If Hood moves on the Chattanooga road, I +will send Smith to Murfreesboro', as we shall be enabled thereby +to concentrate more rapidly. If you can hold Hood on the south +side of Duck River, I think we shall be able to drive him back +easily after concentrating. Answer, giving your views." + +Although that despatch of the 25th was not deciphered so as to be +read by me until the 27th, forty-eight hours after it was sent, +nevertheless it gave me timely information that Thomas had concentrated +all his available troops (except Steedman's, which he appears to +have overlooked until the 25th, and about which I had no knowledge) +at Murfreesboro', from which place they could "join the main force," +as I had suggested, in a few hours, either by rail or by wagon- +road, as circumstances might indicate. I was also led to infer +from Thomas's language on the 25th--"Some of them [A. J. Smith's +troops] will surely be here to-day"--that on the 27th Smith's corps +was already at Nashville, and that Thomas was only waiting for +information respecting the enemy's designs to select his point of +concentration and order all his available troops to join the army +in the field at that point. And it was still expected on the 27th +that this junction might be effected on the north bank of Duck +River, opposite Columbia. Hence I telegraphed General Thomas, +November 27, at 12:30 P. M.: + +"The enemy has made no real attack, and I am satisfied he does not +intend to attack. My information, though not very satisfactory, +leads me to believe that Hood intends to cross Duck River above +Columbia, and as near it as he can. I shall withdraw to the north +bank to-night and endeavor to prevent him from crossing. Wilson +is operating mainly on my left, with a portion of his command south +of the river. I have no late information from him. I have succeeded +in getting your cipher of the 25th translated. I believe your +dispositions are wise." + + DELAYING THE RETREAT FROM DUCK RIVER + +It appears from his despatch of November 25 that Thomas hoped we +might be able to hold the line of Duck River from Columbia as far +east as Shelbyville, as well as west to the Tennessee River. +Although this proved to be impracticable on account of the enemy's +superiority in cavalry at that time, the point (Murfreesboro') +which Thomas had selected for his concentration was far enough to +the rear of that line (Duck River) to make the concentration certain +if orders were given in due time. + +I learned in the afternoon of November 27, by General Thomas's +despatch of 8 A. M., already quoted, that A. J. Smith's troops were +not, as I had supposed, already in Nashville, but that some of them +were expected there that day, and would come forward to join me at +once. + +In the morning of November 28, at 8:45, I reported my withdrawal +to the north side of the river, saying: + +"My troops and material are all on the north side of Duck River. +The withdrawal was completed at daylight this morning without +serious difficulty. Cox holds the ford in front of Columbia, and +Ruger the railroad bridge, which I partially destroyed. Stanley +is going into position a short distance in rear of Cox. I think +I can now stop Hood's advance by any line near this, and meet in +time any distant movement to turn my position. I regret extremely +the necessity of withdrawing from Columbia, but believe it was +absolute. I will explain fully in time. Reinforcements will have +to march from Spring Hill or Thompson's Station. Supplies should +be sent to Thompson's Station." + +After withdrawing to the north bank of Duck River I telegraphed on +the morning of November 28: + +"I am in doubt whether it is advisable, with reference to future +operations, to hold this position or to retire to some point from +which we can move offensively. Of course we cannot recross the +river here. I could easily have held the bridge-head at the +railroad, but it would have been useless, as we could not possibly +advance from that point. Please give me your views and wishes." + +This was answered by General Thomas at "8 P. M.," the answer being +received by me next morning, November 29. + +It is thus seen that up to the morning of November 28 I was still +hoping for reinforcements on the line of Duck River, and thought +I could stop Hood's advance by any line near the Columbia and +Franklin pike, which I then held, as well as meet in good time any +distant movement to turn my position. Accordingly, at 9:10 A. M. +that day I telegraphed to General Thomas: + +"I have all the fords above and below this place well watched and +guarded as far as possible. Wilson is operating with his main +force on my left. The enemy does not appear to have moved in that +direction yet to any considerable distance. I will probably be +able to give you pretty full information this evening. Do you not +think the infantry at the distant crossings below here should now +be withdrawn and cavalry substituted? I do not think we can prevent +the crossing of even the enemy's cavalry, because the places are +so numerous. I think the best we can do is to hold the crossings +near us and watch the distant ones." + +But I learned soon after noon of the same day that our cavalry +found the fords so numerous that they could hardly watch them all, +much less guard any of them securely; and a little later I learned +that the enemy's cavalry had forced a crossing at some point only +a few miles above, between Huey's Mill and the Lewisburg-Franklin +pike. At 2:30 P. M. I telegraphed General Thomas: + +"The enemy was crossing in force a short distance this side of the +Lewisburg pike at noon to-day, and had driven our cavalry back +across the river on the pike at the same time. The force is reported +to be infantry, but I do not regard it as being probable. Wilson +has gone with his main force to learn the facts, and drive the +enemy back, if possible." + + DELAYING THE RETREAT FROM DUCK RIVER + +In the appendix to General Thomas's report the date of the above +despatch is given as "3:30 A. M." It was answered by General Thomas +at "10:30 P. M." and his answer was received by me November 29 (no +hour mentioned in the records). The Department of the Ohio records +say that I sent it at "2:30 P. M." The appendix to my report +mentions the date "November 29," but does not give the hour. My +official report, as published, also says this information was +received "about 2 A. M. on the 29th"; but this is evidently a +clerical error: Clearly the report should read, "about 2 P. M. on +the 28th." + +But our cavalry was unable to drive that of the enemy back, and +hence Hood was free to lay his pontoon bridge and cross his infantry +and artillery at any point above Columbia. We had not been able +to hold even the crossings near us. + +The same day, November 28, at 4 P. M., I telegraphed: + +"If Hood advances on the Lewisburg and Franklin pike, where do you +propose to fight him? I have all the force that is necessary here, +and General Smith's troops should be placed with reference to the +proposed point of concentration." + +And again, at 6 P. M.: + +"The enemy's cavalry in force has crossed the river on the Lewisburg +pike, and is now in possession of Rally Hill. + +"Wilson is trying to get on to the Franklin road ahead of them. +He thinks the enemy may swing around in behind him and me, and +strike Spring Hill, and wants Hammond's brigade to halt there. +Please give it orders if you know where it is. Also, I think it +would be well to send A. J. Smith's force to that place." + +In the night of November 28-9, about 2 A. M., I received the report +of the cavalry commander, conveying the information given him by +prisoners that the enemy had commenced to bridge the river near +Huey's Mill, and urging the necessity of immediate retreat to +Franklin.(13) The staff officer who handed me the despatch called +my attention especially to the words urging immediate action, and +I considered the subject quite a long time. But there did not seem +to me to be any necessity for such haste. The enemy could not +accomplish much before morning. It would then be early enough to +decide what must be done. Besides, it was not yet certain that +Hood was attempting to cross his infantry at Huey's Mill. The +vigorous action of his cavalry might be intended only to induce me +to fall back, and thus give him the use of the crossing at Columbia, +and of the turnpike from that place, for the movement of his +infantry, artillery, and trains. + +In the morning, November 29, I sent a brigade of infantry toward +Huey's Mill to reconnoiter and report the enemy's movements. At +the same time Stanley was ordered to Spring Hill, with two divisions +of his corps, to occupy and intrench a good position commanding +the roads at that place and protecting the trains and reserve +artillery which had been ordered to be parked there. Ruger's +division of the Twenty-third Corps, except one regiment, was ordered +to follow Stanley. The army was ready to occupy Spring Hill in +full force, and in ample time to meet any possible movement of the +enemy either on that place or, by the Lewisburg pike, on Franklin. + +In my orders to Ruger, dated 8 A. M., directing him to move at once +to Spring Hill, he was ordered to leave one regiment to guard the +river until dark and then join him at Spring Hill. It was then +intended, in any event, to hold Spring Hill until the morning of +November 30. At the same time Ruger was directed to order his +troops guarding the river below to march at once for Franklin. + + DELAYING THE RETREAT FROM DUCK RIVER + +But very soon after these orders were issued--that is, soon after +8 A. M.--a courier from Franklin brought me the two following +despatches from General Thomas: + + "Franklin, November 28, 1864. + "(By telegraph from Nashville, 9 P. M.) +"To Major-General Schofield: + +"If you are confident you can hold your present position, I wish +you to do so until I can get General Smith here. After his arrival +we can withdraw gradually and invite Hood across Duck River, and +fall upon him with our whole force, or wait until Wilson can organize +his entire cavalry force, and then withdraw from your present +position. Should Hood then cross river, we can surely ruin him. +You may have fords at Centreville, Bean's [Beard's] Ferry, Gordon's +Ferry, and Williamsport thoroughly obstructed by filling up all +the roads leading from them with trees, and then replace your +infantry by cavalry. Send an intelligent staff officer to see that +the work is properly done. As soon as relieved, concentrate your +infantry; the cavalry will be able to retard, if not prevent, Hood's +crossing, after the roads are thoroughly obstructed, if they do +their duty. The road leading from Centreville to Nashville should +be thoroughly obstructed. I am not sure but it would be a good +plan to invite Hood across Duck River if we can get him to move +toward Clarksville. Is there no convenience for unloading beyond +Thompson's Station? + + "Geo. H. Thomas, Major-General, Commanding."(14) + +The published records give this despatch as having been sent at "8 +P. M." The Department of the Cumberland records say that it was +telegraphed in cipher to Franklin at 9 P. M., and there deciphered +and sent by courier to my position near Columbia. The records do +not show the hour of receipt by me; but my reply to General Thomas +of 8:30 A. M., November 29, and my orders to Ruger of 8 and 8:45 +A. M., and to Stanley before and after 8 A. M., and my despatch to +Wilson of 8:15 A. M., fix the time of the receipt by me of this +despatch from General Thomas at a few minutes after 8 A. M., November +29. + +The other despatch was as follows: + + "(U. S. Military Telegraph.) + "Franklin, Tenn., November 28, 1864. + "(By telegraph from Nashville. 9:30 P. M.) +"To Major-General Schofield: + +"Your despatch of 3:30 [2:30] P. M. just received. If Wilson cannot +succeed in driving back the enemy, should it prove true that he +has crossed the river, you will necessarily have to make preparation +to take up a new position at Franklin, behind Harpeth, [while] +immediately, if it become necessary, to fall back. + + "(Signed) Geo. H. Thomas, Major-General, Commanding." + +The records of the Department of the Cumberland merely state that +this despatch was sent in "cipher." The appendix to my report +gives the hour "9:30 P. M." The appendix to General Thomas's report +fixes it at "10:30 P. M." The despatch from General Thomas to +General Halleck of 10 P. M., November 28, forwarding my despatch +of "8:45 A. M.," indicates that at 10 P. M. Thomas had not received +my report of "2:30 P. M." Hence "10:30 P. M.," as given by General +Thomas, must be the correct hour of the above despatch. It was +answered by me, together with the preceding telegram, at 8:30 A.M., +November 29; and was probably received by me at the same time +as the previous despatch,--very soon after 8 A. M.,--as indicated +by my despatch to Wilson of 8:15 A. M. + +I thus learned, a short time after eight o'clock on the morning of +the 29th, that A. J. Smith had not yet arrived at Nashville, and +that the position behind the Harpeth River at Franklin was that to +which I must retire when compelled to fall back. + + DELAYING THE RETREAT FROM DUCK RIVER + +(Another despatch from Thomas, dated November 28, 10 A. M., appears +in the records, in which he said: ". . . General Smith will certainly +be here in three days. . . ." But when that despatch reached my +headquarters in the field, the cipher-operator had left his post +and gone to Franklin. Hence the despatch could not be read by me +in time to be of any service. The records do not show when I +received it.) + +I was then confronted with the grave question, How long might it +be possible to hold Hood back, and thus gain time for Thomas to +get up his reinforcements? By holding on to the crossing of Duck +River at Columbia until dark that night, and thus preventing Hood +from using the turnpike for the movement of his artillery and trains +until the next day, we would practically gain twenty-four hours; +for he could not move them readily over his mud road from Huey's +Mill. To do this, I must not only head Hood off at Spring Hill, +but defeat any attempt he might make to dislodge me from the north +bank of Duck River. + +Early on November 29, I sent the following brief despatch in reply +to both of those which had been received a few minutes before from +General Thomas: + +"The enemy's cavalry has crossed in force on the Lewisburg pike, +and General Wilson reports the infantry crossing above Huey's Mill, +about five miles from this place. I have sent an infantry +reconnaissance to learn the facts. If it proves true, I will act +according to your instructions received this morning. Please send +orders to General Cooper,(15) via Johnsonville. It may be doubtful +whether my messenger from here will reach him." + +The appendix to General Thomas's report says that I sent this +despatch at "8:30 A. M." The appendix to my report says "8:20 A.M." +This despatch was evidently in answer to those from General +Thomas of 8 P. M. and 10:30 P. M., November 28, as indicated by my +orders to Stanley and Ruger, and my despatch of 8:15 A. M. to +Wilson. + +Soon after 10 A. M., November 29, the first report from the brigade +sent toward Huey's Mill showed that the enemy's infantry was crossing +the river at that place. That report is not found in the records, +and I do not recollect its words. But it did not produce the +impression upon my mind that Hood's movement was so rapid or +energetic as to prevent me from doing what seemed of such vital +importance. Therefore I decided not to yield my position unless +compelled by force to do so. While considering this question I +had detained one of Stanley's two divisions (Kimball's), and had +suspended the orders for Ruger's division to march to Spring Hill. +When the decision was reached, I put Kimball's and Wood's divisions +in position between Duck River and Rutherford's Creek, and Ruger's +north of that creek, to resist any attempt the enemy might make +upon our position. I then sent the following to Stanley at Spring +Hill: + + "Near Columbia, Tenn., November 29, 1864, 10:45 A. M. +"Major-General Stanley, Commanding Fourth Army Corps. + +"General: General Wood's reconnoissance shows a considerable force, +at least, on this side of the river. I have halted Kimball's +division this side of the creek and put it in position. I will +try to hold the enemy until dark, and then draw back. Select a +good position at Spring Hill, covering the approaches, and send +out parties to reconnoiter on all roads leading east and southeast. +Try to communicate with Wilson on the Lewisburg pike. Tell him to +cover Franklin and Spring Hill, and try not to let the enemy get +between us. + + "Very respectfully, + "J. M. Schofield, Major-General." + + NO SERIOUS DANGER AT SPRING HILL + +The situation early in the morning had been a very simple one, free +from any embarrassment or unusual danger. If the plan then decided +on and ordered had been carried out, three divisions of infantry +and nearly all the artillery of the army would have been in position +at Spring Hill and well intrenched long before the head of Hood's +infantry column, without any artillery, came in sight of that place +late in the afternoon. That position would have been secured beyond +doubt until the next morning. The other two divisions (Cox's and +Wood's) would have withdrawn from Duck River and marched to Spring +Hill early in the afternoon, before the enemy could seriously +interfere with them. Ruger's one regiment, without impedimenta, +was directed to march along the railway track to Spring Hill, and +thus avoid any interference from the enemy. The army would have +marched to Franklin early in the night of the 29th, instead of +after midnight as it actually did. That would have given the enemy +the afternoon and night in which to lay his pontoons and cross his +artillery and trains at Columbia. But that would not have been a +serious matter, in view of the situation as it was understood by +me up to about 8 A. M. of the 29th; for the information I had +received up to that hour justified the belief that both A. J. +Smith's troops and those concentrated at Murfreesboro' would meet +me at Franklin, or perhaps at Spring Hill, where we would be able +to give battle to the enemy on equal terms. + +But in view of the information received by me after eight o'clock +that morning, and the altered plan decided on soon after ten o'clock, +the situation became very materially different. Under this plan +the army must be ready to encounter a formidable enemy either in +the position then occupied on Duck River, or at some point on the +road between that place and Spring Hill. Hence I determined to +keep the main body of troops together, and trust to Stanley's one +division to hold Spring Hill until the army should reach that point. +That is to say, I decided to take the chances of a pitched battle +at any point the enemy might select between Duck River and Spring +Hill, as well as that of holding the latter place with one division +against any hostile force which might reach it before dark. + +There was no anxiety in my mind about what might happen at Spring +Hill after dark. The danger which actually developed there between +dark and midnight--of which I knew nothing until several days +afterward--resulted entirely from faulty execution of my orders. + +I arrived at Spring Hill at dusk with the head of the main column, +having ordered all the troops to follow in close order, and (except +Ruger's troops, which I took to Thompson's) to form line on the +right of Stanley's division at Spring Hill, covering the pike back +toward Columbia. Cox's division, being the last, was to form our +extreme right. In that contemplated position, if Hood had attacked +at any time in the night we would have had decidedly the advantage +of him. I had no anxiety on that point. When informed, about +midnight, that Cox had arrived, I understood that my orders had +been exactly executed, and then ordered Cox to take the lead and +the other divisions to follow, from the right by the rear, in the +march to Franklin. + +But it happened that only Whitaker's brigade of Kimball's division, +to which I gave the orders in person, followed Ruger's. Hence +that one brigade was the only force we had in line between Hood's +bivouac and the turnpike that night. If that fact had been known +to the enemy, the result would have been embarrassing, but not very +serious. If the enemy had got possession of a point on the pike, +the column from Duck River would have taken the country road a +short distance to the west of Spring Hill and Thompson's Station, +and marched on it to Franklin. The situation at Spring Hill in +the night was not by any means a desperate one. Veteran troops +are not so easily cut off in an open country. + + NO SERIOUS DANGER AT SPRING HILL + +The annotation upon the copy filed in the War Department of the +order actually given to the troops on November 29 explains how that +mistake occurred. In brief, the draft of an order prepared in +writing for another purpose, but not issued, was by some unexplained +blunder substituted for the oral orders actually dictated to a +staff officer. It was an example of how the improvised staff of +a volunteer army, like the "non-military agencies of government," +may interfere with military operations. + +The serious danger at Spring Hill ended at dark. The gallant action +of Stanley and his one division at that place in the afternoon of +November 29 cannot be over-estimated or too highly praised. If +the enemy had gained a position there in the afternoon which we +could not have passed round in the night, the situation would then +have become very serious. But, as I had calculated, the enemy did +not have time to do that before dark, against Stanley's stubborn +resistance. + +The following, from the official records, has been quoted as an +order from General Thomas to me, though I never received it, the +enemy's cavalry having got possession of the road between Franklin +and Spring Hill: + + "Nashville, November 29, 1864, 3:30 A. M. +"Major-General Schofield, near Columbia: + +"Your despatches of 6 P. M. and 9 P. M. yesterday are received. +I have directed General Hammond to halt his command at Spring Hill +and report to your for orders, if he cannot communicate with General +Wilson, and also instructing him to keep you well advised of the +enemy's movements. I desire you to fall back from Columbia and +take up your position at Franklin, leaving a sufficient force at +Spring Hill to contest the enemy's progress until you are securely +posted at Franklin. The troops at the fords below Williamsport, +etc., will be withdrawn and take up a position behind Franklin. +General A. J. Smith's command has not yet reached Nashville; as +soon as he arrives I will make immediate disposition of his troops +and notify you of the same. Please send me a report as to how +matters stand upon your receipt of this. + + "Geo. H. Thomas, + "Major-General U. S. Vols., Commanding."(16) + +This despatch does not appear upon any of the records as having +been received by me. If it was telegraphed in cipher to Franklin, +and there deciphered and sent by courier, this should have reached +me not long after noon. But the courier was probably driven back +or captured by the enemy's cavalry, who had possession of the direct +road, near Spring Hill, about noon. + +If any "orders" had been necessary in such a case, they had been +rendered unnecessary by Hood's movement to cross Duck River, of +which I had already learned at 2 A. M. of the same day (November +29). The only question in my mind that General Thomas could solve +--namely, to _what place_ I must retire--was settled by his despatch +of 10:30 P. M., November 28, above quoted, received by me about +8 A. M. of the 29th. But there still remained the question _when_ +I must do it; and that I must solve myself, for General Thomas was +much too far away, and communication was much too slow and uncertain, +for him to give me any help on that subject. + +I had received information of Hood's movement at 2 A. M., _six +hours earlier_, and I had ample time to get out of his way before +morning. After 8 A. M. it would, of course, not have been so easy. +Yet a retreat to Franklin that day (November 29), commencing at +eight or nine in the morning, and across the Harpeth that night, +would not have been at all difficult or dangerous. There would +have been some fighting with Hood's cavalry, but little or none +with his infantry. Hood would have had to lay a pontoon bridge at +Columbia, after my rear-guard had withdrawn, before his advance +from that point could begin; and, as events proved, he could not +reach Spring Hill by his mud road from Huey's Mill until late in +the afternoon. I had time to pass Spring Hill with my entire army +before Hood's infantry advance-guard could reach that place. Hence +I had ample time to consider the mathematical and physical questions +involved before deciding finally that I would not let Hood drive +me back from Duck River that day. But I did not at any time +contemplate a retreat that day farther back then Spring Hill, as +is shown by my direction to Ruger to have his regiment from Ducktown +join him there that night. + + NO SERIOUS DANGER AT SPRING HILL + +I am entirely willing to leave to intelligent military criticism +any question in respect to the accuracy of my calculations, also +the question whether I was justifiable, under the conditions then +existing or understood to exist respecting Thomas's preparations +in the rear to fight a decisive battle, in taking the risks, which +are always more or less unavoidable, of failure in the execution +of plans based upon so close an estimate of what could be done by +my adversary as well as by myself. I content myself with the simple +remark that, in my opinion, if my own orders had been carried out +as I gave them, and my reasonable suggestion to my superior in the +rear to bridge the Harpeth at Franklin had been promptly acted on, +there would have been far less risk of failure than must frequently +be incurred in war. + +If I had had satisfactory assurance of the timely arrival of +sufficient reinforcements on the line of Duck River, I would have +been justified in dividing my infantry into several detachments to +support the cavalry in opposing the crossing of Duck River at the +numerous places above Columbia. But, sooner or later, Hood could +have forced a crossing at some one of those places, and thus have +interposed a compact body of troops, larger than my entire army, +between my detachments. If that had occurred before my reinforcements +arrived, I would have been caught in the worst possible condition. +Hence, in the absence of certain information in respect to when +reinforcements would arrive, and their aggregate strength, a division +of my force was inadmissible. An inferior force should generally +be kept in one compact body, while a superior force may often be +divided to great advantage. + +I now direct attention to the correspondence between General Thomas +and myself, on November 30, before the battle of Franklin, showing +that he was not ready for battle at Nashville, and his desire that +I should, if possible, hold Hood back three days longer; and showing +that my estimate of the importance of time when I was at Columbia +was by no means exaggerated; also showing General Thomas's views +and mine of the military situation before the battle, and the action +then determined on and ordered and partially executed by the movement +of trains toward Nashville before the battle opened. The results +of the battle were not such, even if they had been fully known at +the time, as to have rendered admissible any change in those orders. + + "Nashville, [November] 30, [1864,] 4 A. M. +"Captain A. J. Twining, Franklin: + +"Your despatch of 1 A. M. to-day is received. Please inform General +Schofield that Major-General Smith's troops have just arrived at +the levee and are still on boats, and that it is impossible for +them to reach Franklin to-day. He must make strong efforts to +cover his wagon-train, protecting it against the enemy, as well as +to reach Franklin with his command and get into position there. +I will despatch him further in a few hours. + + "Geo. H. Thomas" + + HOPING TO DELAY HOOD FOR THREE DAYS AT FRANKLIN + +The next despatch from General Thomas was at 10:25 A. M. By that +time he had received two more despatches from me, as follows, I +having arrived at Franklin between 4 and 5 A. M.: + + "Franklin, November 30, 1864, 5 A. M. +"Have just seen your despatch to Captain Twining of 4 A. M. If +Smith is not needed for the immediate defense of Nashville, I think +he had better march for Franklin at once. He could at least cover +my wagon-train if I have to fall back from here." + + "Franklin, November 30, 1864, 5:30 A. M. +"I hope to get my troops and material safely across the Harpeth +this morning. We have suffered no material loss so far. I shall +try and get Wilson on my flank this morning. Forrest was all around +us yesterday, but we brushed him away in the evening and came +through. Hood attacked in the front and flank, but did not hurt +us." + +This last despatch was written before daylight, on my arrival at +Franklin, before I learned that there were no bridges across the +river. If pontoons had been laid or the wagon and railroad bridges +improved on the 29th, as was done by me after my arrival, all could +have crossed by noon of the 30th. + +General Thomas's reply of 10:25 A. M. was as follows: + +"Your despatches of 5:30 and 5:50, and Wilson's despatches, forwarded +by you, have been received. It will take Smith quite all day to +disembark; but if I find there is no immediate necessity to retain +him here, will send him to Franklin or Brentwood, according to +circumstances. If you can prevent Hood from turning your position +at Franklin, it should be held; but I do not wish you to risk too +much. I send you a map of the environs of Franklin." + +Again I telegraphed at 9:50 A. M.: + +"My trains are coming in all right, and half of the troops are here +and the other half about five miles out, coming on in good order, +with light skirmishing. I will have all across the river this +evening. Wilson is here, and has his cavalry on my flank. I do +not know where Forrest is. He may have gone east, but, no doubt, +will strike our flank and rear again soon. Wilson is entirely +unable to cope with him. Of course I cannot prevent Hood from +crossing the Harpeth whenever he may attempt it. Do you desire me +to hold on here until compelled to fall back?" + +And at 11 A. M. I telegraphed: "Troops and trains in all right." + +At noon I answered as follows General Thomas's last despatch: + +"Your despatch of 10:25 A. M. is received. I am satisfied that I +have heretofore run too much risk in trying to hold Hood in check +while so far inferior to him in both infantry and cavalry. The +slightest mistake on my part, or failure of a subordinate, during +the last three days might have proved disastrous. I don't want to +get into so tight a place again; yet I will cheerfully act in +accordance with your views of expediency, if you think it important +to hold Hood back as long as possible. When you get all your troops +together, and the cavalry in effective condition, we can easily +whip Hood, and, I believe, make the campaign a decisive one. Before +that, the most we can do is to husband our strength and increase +it as much as possible. I fear the troops which were stationed on +the river below Columbia will be lost. I will get my trains out +of the way as soon as possible, and watch Hood carefully. Possibly +I may be able to hold him here, but do not expect to be able to do +so long." + +This despatch shows not only my opinion at that time of the kind +of "place" I had been in, but my belief that the character of that +situation had been due largely to Thomas's action in leaving me +without the expected reinforcements, and in not providing the means +of crossing the Harpeth River. + + HOPING TO DELAY HOOD FOR THREE DAYS AT FRANKLIN + +The following seems to show that General Thomas did not even then +see the importance of prompt concentration of all his available +force in front of the enemy, but expected me, with two corps, to +fight the entire hostile force until he could complete his +concentration at Nashville. Even before the battle of Franklin he +seems to have thought he could take his time to concentrate, +reorganize his cavalry, and then "try Hood again." + + "Nashville, November 30, 1864. +"Major-General Schofield, Franklin: + +"General Smith reported to me this morning that one division of +his troops is still behind; we must therefore try to hold Hood +where he is now until those troops can get up, and the steamers +return. After that we will concentrate here, reorganize our cavalry, +and try Hood again. Do you think you can hold Hood at Franklin +for three days longer? Answer, giving your views; and I should +like to know what Wilson thinks he can do to aid you in holding +Hood. + + "Geo. H. Thomas, + "Major-General U. S. Vols, Commanding." + +Thereupon, in the following telegram, dated 3 P. M., I proposed +Brentwood as a point where A. J. Smith's and all the other troops +could surely unite with mine: + +"I have just received your despatch asking whether I can hold Hood +here three days. I do not believe I can. I can doubtless hold +him one day, but will hazard something in doing that. He now has +a large force, probably two corps, in my front, and seems preparing +to cross the river above and below. I think he can effect a crossing +to-morrow in spite of all my efforts, and probably to-night, if he +attempts it. A worse position than this for an inferior force +could hardly be found. I will refer your question to General Wilson +this evening. I think he can do very little. I have no doubt +Forrest will be in my rear to-morrow, or doing some greater mischief. +It appears to me that I ought to take position at Brentwood at +once. If A. J. Smith's division and the Murfreesboro' garrison +join me there, I ought to be able to hold Hood in check for some +time. I have just learned that the enemy's cavalry is already +crossing three miles above. I will have lively times with my trains +again." + +This despatch gives a very accurate estimate of the true situation +at that time, except perhaps that I did not then fully appreciate +how much our cavalry had gained in effective strength by the +reinforcements that had joined the corps in the field during the +retreat. I judged by the experience of the previous day (November +29). But the result was very different in the afternoon of the +30th, when our cavalry repulsed and drove back that of the enemy; +at the same time the infantry assault was repulsed at Franklin. +There was no apprehension of the result of an attack in front at +Franklin, but of a move of Hood to cross the river above and strike +for Nashville before I could effect a junction with the troops then +at that place. + +The following despatches must have been sent either during the +progress of the battle, or very soon afterward: + +"Please send A. J. Smith's division to Brentwood early to-morrow +morning. Also please send to Brentwood to-morrow morning 1,000,000 +rounds infantry ammunition, 2000 rounds 3-inch, and 1000 rounds +light twelve artillery." + +In reply to my advice, the following order to fall back to Nashville +was sent by Thomas _before_ the battle, but was received by me +_after_ the heavy fighting had ceased. Communication was interrupted +for a short time during the transfer of the telegraph station from +the town of Franklin to a place on the north side of the Harpeth, +rendered necessary by the battle. + + "Nashville, November 30, 1864. +"Your despatch of 3 P. M. is received. Send back your trains to +this place at once, and hold your troops in readiness to march to +Brentwood, and thence to this place, as soon as your trains are +fairly on the way, so disposing your force as to cover the wagon- +train. Have all railroad trains sent back immediately. Notify +General Wilson of my instructions. He will govern himself accordingly. +Relieve all garrisons in blockhouses and send back by railroad +trains last over the road. Acknowledge receipt. + + "Geo. H. Thomas, Major-General." + + HOPING TO DELAY HOOD FOR THREE DAYS AT FRANKLIN + +The following is my first report to General Thomas, sent immediately +after the battle: + +"The enemy made a heavy and persistent attack with about two corps, +commencing at 4 P. M. and lasting until after dark. He was repulsed +at all points with very heavy loss--probably five or six thousand +men. Our losses probably not more than one fourth that number.(17) +We have captured about one thousand men, including one brigadier- +general. Your despatch of this P. M. is received. I had already +given the orders you direct, and am now executing them." + +Before the battle, and in anticipation of the order from General +Thomas, the trains had been sent back and the preparations made +for the army to retire to Brentwood, the troops to commence +withdrawing from the line on the south side of the river immediately +after dark. In consequence of the battle, the movement of the +troops was suspended until midnight. General Thomas promptly +replied to my first report in these words: + +"Your telegram is just received. It is glorious news, and I +congratulate you and the brave men of your command; but you must +look out that the enemy does not still persist. The courier you +sent to General Cooper, at Widow Dean's, could not reach there, +and reports that he was chased by rebel cavalry on the whole route, +and finally came into this place. Major-General Steedman, with +five thousand men, should be here in the morning. When he arrives +I will start General A. J. Smith's command and General Steedman's +troops to your assistance at Brentwood." + +[( 1) See his "Memoirs," Vol. II, pp. 162, 163.] + +[( 2) It appears from General Thomas's report that he did have in +his department, by November 29, the mounted cavalry force stated +by General Sherman--viz., 7700; but only 4800 of that force joined +the army in the field before the enemy forced the crossing of Duck +River. The remaining 2900 were not available for service in the +field until after the crisis of the campaign was passed so far as +the cavalry could affect it.] + +[( 3) See. Vol. XLV, parts I and ii.] + +[( 4) See Vols. XXXIX and XLV.] + +[( 5) See General Thomas's report: War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, +p. 33.] + +[( 6) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, p. 1017.] + +[( 7) Thomas to Steedman, November 25: War Records, Vol. XLV, part +I, p. 1050.] + +[( 8) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part iii, p. 535.] + +[( 9) _Ibid_., p. 536.] + +[(10) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part iii, p. 685.] + +[(11) _Ibid_.] + +[(12) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I.] + +[(13) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, p. 1143.] + +[(14) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, p. 1108.] + +[(15) Cooper commanded the brigade guarding the river below +Columbia.] + +[(16) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, p. 1137.] + +[(17) At that time I did not know of our loss in prisoners, having +thought nearly all of Wagner's two brigades had come in with those +I had seen running to the rear.] + + +CHAPTER XII +After the Battle of Franklin--The Arrival at Nashville--General +Thomas's Greeting--A Refreshing Sleep--Services of the Cavalry +Corps and the Fourth Army Corps--Hood's Mistake after Crossing Duck +River--An Incident of the Atlanta Campaign Bearing on Hood's +Character--An Embarrassing Method of Transmitting Messages in Cipher +--The Aggressive Policy of the South. + +Early the next morning (December 1), after receiving at Brentwood +oral orders from General Thomas to continue the retreat to Nashville, +I lay on the ground until the main body of the troops had passed +and I had learned from the cavalry and from the infantry rear-guard +that nothing could occur in the rear which would require my attention. +I then rode forward and reported to General Thomas, whom I found +waiting for me at the place he had selected for the Twenty-third +Corps in the defensive line about Nashville. He greeted me in his +usual cordial but undemonstrative way, congratulated me, and said +I had done "well." I have often thought that I may not have shown +due appreciation of his kindness at that moment, for I did not then +feel very grateful to him; but he gave no indication that he +thought me unappreciative of his approbation. On the contrary, he +said in the kindest manner that I appeared "tired." To which I +replied, "Yes, I am very tired." That was about all the conversation +we had that day. + + AFTER THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN + +As soon as I saw that my troops were moving into the position he +had indicated to the division commanders before my arrival, I rode +to the hotel in Nashville, went to bed, and slept from about noon +of the 1st, without awakening to full consciousness, until about +sunset the next day. I only hope my weary soldiers enjoyed their +rest as much as I did mine, for they must have needed it even more. +When I awoke after that thoroughly refreshing sleep the annoyance +I had felt on account of the embarrassments experienced during the +retreat was replaced by reflections of a much more satisfactory +character. From that time forward my relations with General Thomas +were of the same cordial character as they always had been; and I +was much gratified by the flattering indorsement he placed on my +official report, of which I then knew the substance, if not the +exact words. + +The Fourth Army Corps and the cavalry corps of the Military Division +of the Mississippi having been under my command during only the +few days occupied in the operations between Pulaski and Nashville +(November 14 to December 1), no reports of the operations of those +two corps were ever made to me after the close of that brief period. +Hence it was not possible for me to give any full account of the +distinguished services of those two corps. The cavalry were never +seen by me. They were far in front or on the flank, doing all the +"seeing" for me, giving me information of vital importance in +respect to the enemy's movements. How important that information +was then regarded may be learned by a perusal of the despatches to +and from General Thomas during those days of anxious uncertainty +as to the enemy's plans. I believe no cavalry ever performed that +important service more efficiently. At no time in that short +campaign did I suffer any inconvenience from lack of information +that cavalry could possibly give. If it is true that the operations +of our cavalry were to some extent influenced by apprehension of +a cavalry raid on Nashville or other vital point in our rear, that +was only what General Thomas had been apprehending all the time, +and to meet with which he had assembled eight thousand troops in +Nashville, perhaps not informing the commander of his own cavalry +of that fact quite as early as he might have done.( 1) + +In fact, the redoubtable Forrest had become famous, and his troopers +were esteemed a very large factor in the problem then undergoing +solution--greater in some respects, as I have pointed out, than +the events justified. In my report of the battle of Franklin I +gave all the information in my possession of the gallant action of +our cavalry in driving that of the enemy back across the Harpeth +at the very time when his infantry assault was decisively repulsed. + +I have always regarded it as a very remarkable, and to me a very +fortunate, circumstance that the movements of my infantry columns +were at no time seriously interfered with by the enemy's more +numerous cavalry--not even at Spring Hill, where Stanley was attacked +by cavalry as well as infantry. Hence I have had no inclination +to make any investigation respecting the details of the action of +troops, only temporarily under my command, whose gallant conduct +and untiring vigilance contributed all that was needed to the +complete success of the military operations intrusted to my immediate +direction by our common superior, the department commander. I have +now, as always heretofore, only words of highest praise for the +services of the cavalry corps under my command. + +The Fourth Corps was under my own eye nearly all the time; and +sometimes, in emergencies, I even gave orders directly to the +subordinate commanders, without the formality of sending them +through the corps commander. Hence I have spoken of that corps +with the same freedom as of my own Twenty-third; and I hope I have +not failed to give, so far as the very restricted scope of my +account would permit, full justice to that noble corps of veteran +soldiers, as well as to its officers. As I have had special occasion +to say of the action of Opdycke's brigade and of the 12th and 16th +Kentucky of the Twenty-third Corps at Franklin, the conduct of +those troops was beyond all praise. + + HOOD'S MISTAKE AFTER CROSSING DUCK RIVER + +I believe little disputes always arise out of the honorable rivalry +which exists between bodies of troops acting together in a great +battle. Franklin was no exception to that general rule. For the +purpose of "pouring oil on the troubled waters" after Franklin, I +said that in my opinion there was glory enough won in that battle +to satisfy the reasonable ambition of everybody who was on the +field, and of some who were not there, but who were at first given +"the lion's share"; but if the disputants were not satisfied with +that, they might take whatever share of credit was supposed to be +due to me, and divide it among themselves. I was then, as I am +now, perfectly satisfied with the sense of triumph which filled my +soul when I saw my heroic comrades hurl back the hosts of rebellion +with slaughter which to some might seem dreadful, but which I +rejoiced in as being necessary to end that fratricidal war. It is +not worth while to conceal the fact that most earnest patriotism +sometimes arouses in the soldier's breast what might seem to be a +fiendish desire to witness the slaughter of his country's enemies. +Only a soldier of fortune or a hireling can be a stranger to such +feelings. Yet I aver that I had not the slightest feeling of +personal enmity toward my old friend and classmate General Hood, +or his comrades. It was the "accursed politicians" who had led +them into such a fratricidal strife who were the objects of our +maledictions. But even that feeling has been softened by time, +and by reflection upon the deeper and more remote causes of the +war, and that the glorious fruits of final victory have amply +repaid, and will continue to repay in all time, for all those +immense sacrifices and sufferings. + +Hood undoubtedly made a mistake in his plan of operations after he +crossed Duck River above Columbia on the night of November 28-9. +His march on Spring Hill would have been the best _if it had +succeeded_. But he failed to estimate accurately what he could +accomplish in a short winter day over a very bad road. In a long +day of summer, with that road in the usual summer condition, he +might have reached Spring Hill early in the afternoon, with force +enough to accomplish his purpose before night, if he had found a +single division, or even two divisions, there. But he failed simply +because he tried to do what was not possible. + +When Hood crossed the river he was not more than five miles (his +own journal says three) from the left flank of my position on the +north bank. The intervening space was open fields, not much, if +any, more difficult for the march of infantry than the dirt road +he actually used. If he had moved directly upon my flank, he could +have brought on a general engagement about noon, with a force at +least equal to mine. In anticipation of such a movement, I sent +a brigade toward Huey's Mill to watch Hood's movements, and formed +line of battle facing in that direction and covering the turnpike +to Spring Hill, for which purpose I detained one of the two divisions +of Stanley's corps which, at first, had been ordered to Spring +Hill. I was willing to fight Hood in that position, and expected +to do so. But I felt relieved when I found he had undertaken the +much more difficult task of marching to Spring Hill, where I believed +sufficient preparations had been made to oppose him until I could +reach that place by a broad macadamized road over which I could +march rapidly by day or by night. + +I now believe my judgment at that time was correct: That what I +had most to apprehend was not an attempt to get in my rear at Spring +Hill, but one to dislodge me from my position on Duck River by +defeating me in open battle. But I believed I could fight Hood, +even where I was, from noon until dark, and then retreat to Spring +Hill or Franklin in the night. At least I was willing to try it +rather than disappoint the expectation of General Thomas that I +would hold Hood in check until he could concentrate his reinforcements. +It seems to me clear that Hood's best chance at Duck River was to +force a general engagement as early in the day as possible, so as +to occupy the attention of all my infantry while his superior +cavalry was sent to occupy some point in my rear, and try to cut +off my retreat in the night. Perhaps Hood did not appreciate the +very great advantage a retreating army has in the exclusive use of +the best roads at night, especially when the nights are long and +the days correspondingly short--an advantage which cannot be overcome +by any superiority of numbers in the pursuing force, except by a +rapid circuitous march of a detachment. + + HOOD'S MISTAKE AFTER CROSSING DUCK RIVER + +As illustrating my accurate knowledge of Hood's character before +we ever met in battle, the following incident seems worthy of +mention. When Sherman's army, after crossing the Chattahoochee +River, was advancing on Atlanta,--my troops being in the center,-- +General Sherman was on the main road, a little in rear of me. My +advance-guard sent back to me an Atlanta paper containing an account +of the visit of President Davis, and the order relieving General +Johnston and assigning General Hood to the command of the army. +General Sherman erroneously says one of General Thomas's staff +officers brought him that paper. General Thomas was then off to +the right, on another road. I stopped until Sherman came up, and +handed him the paper. After reading it he said, in nearly, if not +exactly, the following words: "Schofield, do you know Hood? What +sort of a fellow is he?" I answered: "Yes, I know him well, and +I will tell you the sort of man he is. He'll hit you like h--l, +now, before you know it." Soon afterward, as well described by +Sherman, the sound of battle to our right gave indication of the +heavy attack Hood's troops made upon Thomas's advancing columns +that day, which failed of serious results, as I believe all now +admit, mainly if not entirely because Thomas himself was near the +head of the column which received the first blow. Soon after, a +still more heavy attack was made on the Army of the Tennessee, our +extreme left, which resulted in one of the severest and most closely +contested battles of the war, and in which the knightly McPherson +was killed. + + METHOD OF TRANSMITTING MESSAGES IN CIPHER + +Under the system enforced by the War Department in 1864-5, the +commanders of troops in the field were compelled to communicate +with each other either in plain language which the enemy could read +if a despatch fell into his hands, or else in a cipher which neither +of the commanders nor any of their staff officers could decipher. +They were made absolutely dependent upon the cipher-operators of +the telegraph corps. Of course all this cipher correspondence +between commanding generals was promptly transmitted to the War +Department, so that the Secretary could know what was going on as +well as anybody. Whatever may have been the object of this, perhaps +not difficult to conjecture, its effect was to make rapid correspondence +in cipher impossible when rapidity was most important and secrecy +most necessary. In previous years I and one at least of my staff +officers were always familiar with the cipher code, so that we +could together, as a rule, quickly unravel a knotty telegram. +Indeed, I once had to decipher a despatch to which I had no key, +except I knew from internal evidence that it must be under the War +Department code, though written in a different key. It was a +despatch from Grant, who was then besieging Vicksburg. It had been +sent to Memphis by steamer, and thence by telegraph to St. Louis, +the place from which Grant's army drew its supplies. A cipher +despatch sent under the circumstances from Grant to me, who was +not at that time under his command, must necessarily be of great +importance. My staff officer at once informed me that it was in +some key different from that we had in use. So I took the thing +in hand myself, and went to work by the simplest possible process, +but one sure to lead to the correct result in time--that is, to +make all possible arrangements of the words until one was found +that would convey a rational meaning. Commencing about 3 P. M., +I reached the desired result at three in the morning. Early that +day a steamer was on the way down the river with the supplies Grant +wanted. I never told the general how he came to get his supplies +so promptly, but I imagined I knew why he had telegraphed to me +rather than to the quartermaster whose duty it was to furnish +supplies for his army--and a most capable and efficient quartermaster +he was. I had only a short time before voluntarily sent General +Grant 5000 men, and I inferred that there was some connection +between the incidents. + +The immense change in the whole military situation which was produced +in a few minutes at Franklin (for the contest there was in fact +decided in that time, by the recovery of the breach in the line), +and that by a battle which had not been contemplated by either +General Thomas or myself (that is, on the south side of the Harpeth +River, with that stream in the rear of the army), nor yet by General +Hood until he saw the apparent opportunity to destroy his adversary; +and the fact that that dangerous situation had been produced and +the battle rendered necessary by slight accidents or mistakes which +might easily have been foreseen or avoided, cannot, it seems to +me, but produce in every thoughtful mind some reflection upon the +influence exercised by what is called "accident" or "chance" in +war. The "fortune of war" was, upon the whole, always in my favor, +in spite of adverse accidents; yet I have always acted upon the +principle that the highest duty of a commander is to anticipate +and provide for every possible contingency of war, so as to eliminate +what is called chance. + + THE AGGRESSIVE POLICY OF THE SOUTH + +Both Johnston and Hood refer in their narratives to the earnest +desire of their commander-in-chief, President Davis, that the army +they in succession commanded should undertake an aggressive campaign. +Johnston demonstrated that, under the circumstances existing while +he was in command, such an undertaking could not possibly have been +successful. Hood tried it under far more favorable circumstances, +and yet he failed, as had every former attempt of the Confederate +armies. The result in every case was costly failure, and in the +last overwhelming defeat. How much greater would have been the +military strength of the South if those losses had been avoided, +and how much greater would have been her moral strength if she had +maintained from the start a firm, consistent, and humane defensive +policy! How long would the conservative people of the North have +sustained the "invasion" of States where the people were fighting +only to "defend their homes and families." Did not the South throw +away a great moral advantage when it waged aggressive war upon the +North? No doubt it was necessary at first, from the secession +point of view, to "fire the Southern heart" by attacking Fort +Sumter. And, also from that point of view, that attack was fully +justifiable because that fort was in "Confederate" territory. The +invasions of Maryland and Pennsylvania were far different, and much +more so were the relentless guerrilla war waged in the border +States, attended with horrible massacres like that of Lawrence, +Kansas, which, though no one charges them to the government or +generals of the South, were unavoidable incidents of that species +of warfare; and the inhuman cruelties incidentally suffered by +Union prisoners. + +It is true that the slavery question was a very powerful factor in +our Civil War, and became more and more so as the war progressed. +But opinion on that question at the North was very far from unanimous +at the first, and it is a fair and important question how far the +growth of sentiment in the free States in favor of emancipation +was due to the slaveholders' method of carrying on the war. + +My desire here is to refer to these questions solely from the +military point of view, and for the consideration of military +students. The conditions upon which depends success or failure in +war are so many,--some of them being more or less obscure,--that +careful study of all such conditions is demanded of those who aspire +to become military leaders. + +[( 1) See Thomas's despatch of 8 P. M., November 29, to Colonel H. +C. Wharton, Wilson's staff officer: War Records, Vol. XLV, part +I, p. 1146.] + + +CHAPTER XIII +Grant Orders Thomas to Attack Hood or Relinquish the Command-- +Thomas's Corps Commanders Support Him in Delay--Grant's Intentions +in Sending Logan to Relieve Thomas--Change of Plan before the Battle +of Nashville--The Fighting of December 15--Expectation that Hood +would Retreat--Delay in Renewing the Attack on the 16th--Hopelessness +of Hood's Position--Letters to Grant and Sherman--Transferred to +the East--Financial Burden of the War--Thomas's Attitude toward +the War. + +The perilous character of the situation in Tennessee, in which it +was left by Sherman's premature start for the sea and Thomas's +tardy concentration of troops, wholly disappeared with the repulse +of Hood at Franklin. There was no further obstacle to the +concentration of Thomas's forces at Nashville, the organization +and equipment of his army, and the necessary preparations to assume +the offensive. Hood's army was too much shattered and crippled to +make any serious movement for some days, during which it was easy +for Thomas to prepare for battle all his troops except the cavalry, +of which latter, however, it required a longer time to complete +the remount. Indeed, Thomas could have given battle the second or +third day after Franklin with more than a fair prospect of success. + +Considering the feeling of nervous anxiety which prevailed in +Washington and throughout the country at the time, possibly he +ought to have assumed the offensive on the 2d or 3d of December. +But that state of anxiety was at first unknown at Nashville, even +to General Thomas, and was never fully appreciated or understood. +No one at Nashville, so far as I am aware, shared that feeling. +We knew, or thought we knew, that Hood could do nothing, unless it +were to retreat, before we would be prepared to meet him, and that +every day's delay strengthened us far more that it possibly could +him. His operations, which were closely watched every day, indicated +no intention to retreat; hence all at Nashville awaited with +confidence the period of complete preparation which was to give us +the decisive victory. + + THOMAS TO ATTACK HOOD OR RELINQUISH THE COMMAND + +The anxiety felt elsewhere, especially by General Grant, was probably +due to some doubt of the wisdom of Sherman's plan of going off with +his main army before disposing of Hood, contrary to Grant's first +advice; to the discovery of Sherman's error in supposing he had +left Thomas in complete condition to cope with Hood; to some +misapprehension as to the degree in which the situation in Tennessee +had been changed by the battle of Franklin; as well as to lack of +confidence in General Thomas on account of his well-known deliberation +of thought and action. + +Little was known of this state of anxiety by me, or, I believe, by +the corps commanders, until December 9, when General Thomas, calling +us together at his headquarters, informed us that he was ordered +to attack Hood at once or surrender his command (not saying to +whom), and asked our advice as to what he ought to do. One of the +officers present asked General Thomas to show us the order, which +he declined to do. This confirmed the belief which I had at first +formed that the successor named by General Grant could be no other +than myself--a belief formed from the fact that I was, next to +General Thomas, the highest officer in rank on the ground where +immediate action was demanded, and from my knowledge of General +Grant's confidence, which belief has since been fully justified by +the record. This, as I conceived, imposed upon me the duty of +responding at once to General Thomas's request for advice, without +waiting for the junior members of the council, according to the +usual military custom. Hence I immediately replied: "General +Thomas, I will sustain you in your determination not to fight until +you are fully ready." All the other commanders then promptly +expressed their concurrence. + +I do not know whether or not my declaration of purpose to sustain +General Thomas was made known to General Grant, or to any one in +Washington, either then or afterward. I have never made any inquiry +on that subject. Of course such information must have been conveyed +confidentially and indirectly, if at all, and hence would probably +not appear in the official records, though despatches and letters +marked "confidential" are sometimes published as official. I have +only conjectured that some knowledge of my opinion and decision +may, perhaps, have influenced General Grant's final determination +to go to Nashville himself. If some officer must go there to fight +a battle, Grant could get there about as soon as any other he could +well select. The records now published seem to verify the belief +then (December 9, 1864) existing in my mind, that I had only to +withhold my support from General Thomas in his determination to +delay, and the chief command would have fallen to my fortune, where +I believed brilliant victory was as nearly certain as anything in +war can be. But I never had the remotest idea of superseding +General Thomas. As I explained to General Sherman, I volunteered +to go back to Tennessee, not to supersede Thomas, but to help him. +I knew him and his subordinates well, as I did also the antagonist, +my West Point classmate, whom they would have to meet. I appreciated +Thomas's high qualities, his distinguished services, and, above +all, the profound affection and confidence of his troops--an element +of strength in a commander far greater than is generally understood, +even by military men, some of whom appear to be altogether ignorant +of its value as a factor in war. A doubt of our complete success +under his leadership, after our troops were united, never entered +my mind, much less a desire to diminish or dim the laurels he might +win. + + GRANT'S INTENTION IN SENDING LOGAN + +General Grant's great anxiety on account of the situation at +Nashville was manifested for several days by urgent despatches to +General Thomas to attack at once without waiting for further +preparations; then by an order to Thomas to turn over the chief +command to me, Thomas to become subordinate, which order was +suspended; and finally by starting for Nashville himself to direct +operations in person. In the meantime he ordered General John A. +Logan to go to Nashville to relieve Thomas in command of the Army +of the Cumberland, without thought, as he has said, of the question +whether Logan or myself should command the combined armies of the +Cumberland and of the Ohio. Grant had reached Washington from City +Point, and Logan had gone as far as Louisville, when the report of +Thomas's victory of December 15 made it unnecessary for either of +them to proceed farther. The following letters from Grant to Logan +are interesting as explaining the reasons and motives of his action +in sending Logan to Nashville, as well as his estimate of the +services I had rendered in the preceding operations: + + "New York, February 14, 1884. +"Hon. John A. Logan, U. S. Senate, Washington, D. C. + +"Dear Sir: In reply to your letter of the 11th, I have to say that +my response must be from memory entirely, having no data at hand +to refer to; but in regard to the order for you to go to Louisville +and Nashville for the purpose of relieving General Thomas, I never +thought of the question of who should command the combined armies +of the Cumberland and the Ohio. I was simply dissatisfied with +the slowness of General Thomas moving, and sent you out with orders +to relieve him. No doubt if the order had been carried out, the +question would immediately have arisen as to who was entitled to +the command, provided General Schofield was senior in rank to you, +which I do not know that he was. I know that his confirmation as +a major-general took place long after yours, but I do not know the +date of his commission. The question, in that case, of the command +of the whole would have been settled in a very few hours by the +use of the telegraph between Nashville and Washington. I was in +Washington when you arrived at Louisville and telegraphed me that +General Thomas had moved, and, as I remember the telegram, expressing +gratification that he had done so. I was then on my way to Nashville +myself, and remained over a day in Washington, hoping that Thomas +might still move. Of course I was gratified when I learned that +he had moved, because it was a very delicate and unpleasant matter +to remove a man of General Thomas's character and standing before +the country; but still I had urged him so long to move that I had +come to think it a duty. Of course in sending you to relieve +General Thomas, I meant no reflection whatever upon General Schofield, +who was commanding the Army of the Ohio, because I thought that he +had done very excellent service in punishing the entire force under +Hood a few days before, some twenty-five miles south of Nashville. +Very truly yours, + + "U. S. Grant + "(_per_ Frank F. Wood)." + + GRANT'S INTENTIONS IN SENDING LOGAN + + "New York, February 23, 1884. +"Gen. John A. Logan, U. S. Senate, Washington, D. C. + +"Dear General: Since I have been confined to my room I have +conducted all my correspondence through a secretary, who is a +stenographer, and he takes my dictation to the office and writes +the letters out there as dictated, and by my direction signs my +name. I intended that the letter which I wrote to you should be +brought back to me for my own signature, and I sign this myself to +show my entire responsibility for the one which you have just +received, and which I hope was satisfactory to you. + + "Very truly yours, + "U. S. Grant." + +The passion and prejudice begotten in the minds of Thomas's soldiers +and their friends by injustice, real or fancied, done or proposed +to be done to him by his superiors in rank, have rendered impossible +any calm discussion of questions touching his military career. +There is not yet, and probably will not be in our lifetime, a proper +audience for such discussion. But posterity will award justice to +all if their deeds have been such as to save their names from +oblivion. + +Time works legitimate "revenge," and makes all things even. When +I was a boy at West Point I was court-martialed for tolerating some +youthful "deviltry" of my classmates, in which I took no part +myself, and was sentenced to be dismissed. Thomas, then already +a veteran soldier, was a member of the court, and he and one other +were the only ones of thirteen members who declined to recommend +that the sentence be remitted. This I learned in 1868, when I was +Secretary of War. Only twelve years later I was able to repay this +then unknown stern denial of clemency to a youth by saving the +veteran soldier's army from disaster, and himself from the humiliation +of dismissal from command on the eve of victory. Five years later +still, I had the satisfaction, by intercession with the President, +of saving the same veteran general from assignment to an inferior +command, and of giving him the military division to which my +assignment had been ordered. When death had finally relieved him +from duty, and not till then, did I consent to be his successor. +In 1879 I had the satisfaction, after many months of patient +investigation, of rendering justice to the other of those two +unrelenting soldiers who, of all the thirteen, could not find it +in their hearts to recommend clemency to an erring youth; I was +president of the board which reversed the judgment of the court- +martial in the case of Fitz-John Porter. + +I believe it must now be fully known to all who are qualified to +judge and have had by personal association or by study of history +full opportunities to learn the truth, that General Thomas did not +possess in a high degree the activity of mind necessary to foresee +and provide for all the exigencies of military operations, nor the +mathematical talent required to estimate "the relations of time, +space, motion, and force" involved in great problems of war. His +well-known high qualities in other respects obscured these +imperfections from the great majority of those who surrounded him +during the war, and rendered the few educated soldiers who were +able to understand his true merits the more anxious to aid him and +save him from personal defeat. And no one, I am sure, of his +comrades in arms desires to detract from the great fame which is +justly his due; for, according to the best judgment of mankind, +moral qualities, more than intellectual, are the foundation of a +great and enduring fame. It was "Old Pap" Thomas, not General +Thomas, who was beloved by the Army of the Cumberland; and it is +the honest, conscientious patriot, the firm, unflinching old soldier, +not the general, whose name will be most respected in history. + + CHANGE OF PLAN BEFORE THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE + +Of the general details of the battle of Nashville I do not propose +to speak, but simply to notice a few of its most important points. +The plan of battle, as published, placed my command--the Twenty- +third Corps--in the left center of our line, where only a feint +was to be made. The Fourth Corps was to carry a salient advanced +line, while the main attack was to be made on the enemy's extreme +left by A. J. Smith's corps and the cavalry. After the order was +prepared I went to General Thomas with a map of the position showing +the exact length of the several parts of the enemy's line, and +explained to him that the force he had assigned to our left wing +was at least 10,000 men more than could be used to any advantage +unless for a real attack; and that, on the other hand, Smith's +force was not large enough for the real attack, considering the +extent of the ground occupied by the enemy on that flank. Hence +I suggested that my corps should support Smith instead of remaining +on the left of Wood. To this suggestion General Thomas readily +acceded, and orally authorized me to carry it into effect, but made +no change in his written order. The result of this change of plan +was that the close of the first day's engagement found the Twenty- +third Corps on the extreme right of our infantry line, in the most +advanced position captured from the enemy. Yet General Thomas, in +his official report, made no mention of this change of plan, but +said "the original plan of battle, with but few alterations, [was] +strictly adhered to."( 1) The "alterations" were certainly "few". +A change from 10,000 to 20,000 infantry in the main attacking force +may not properly be described as _many_ "alterations," but it looks +like one very _large_ one--sufficient, one would suppose, to +determine the difference between failure and success. + +The plan of battle issued December 14 had been matured and made +known to the principal subordinate commanders several days before, +when General Thomas intended to attack, but was prevented by the +storm. Hence there had been ample time for critical consideration +and discussion of the details of that plan, the result of which +was the modification made at the conference in the afternoon or +evening of December 14, which modification was not embodied in the +written order, but was orally directed to be carried out. If +General Thomas had caused that clerical work to be done in the +evening of December 14, his published orders and his battle of +December 15 would have been in complete harmony. There would not, +so far as I know, have been even a "few alterations." In this +connection, the difference between the "Special Field Order No. +342" of December 14, as recorded in General Thomas's order-book, +and the copy embodied in his official report, as explained in a +foot-note in the War Records, is not unimportant.( 2) In the order- +book he says: "Major-General Schofield _will mass_ the remainder +of his force in front of the works and co-operate with General +Wood, protecting the latter's left flank against an attack by the +enemy"; but in his report the words "_will move with_" are substituted +for "will mass." The latter, in military parlance, meant placing +my corps in reserve, with a view to "co-operate with General Wood," +etc., whenever such co-operation might be necessary; while the +words used in Thomas's final report meant active co-operation with +General Wood from the beginning of the engagement. In the body of +his report General Thomas spoke of the position of the Twenty-third +Corps as "in reserve," from which position it was ordered to the +right to join A. J. Smith's troops in the attack. Hence it would +seem that a position "in reserve" was what General Thomas had in +mind both when he prepared his order of battle and when he wrote +his report, and that the change to the words "will move with" was +simply a clerical error. + + EXPECTATION THAT HOOD WOULD RETREAT + +After darkness had ended the first day's battle (December 15), I +received an order in writing from General Thomas, which was in +substance to _pursue the retreating enemy_ early the next morning, +my corps to take the advance on the Granny White pike, and was +informed that the cavalry had been or would be ordered to start at +the same time by a road on the right, and cross the Harpeth below +Franklin. These orders seemed to be so utterly inapplicable to +the actual situation that I rode to the rear to where General +Thomas's headquarters were supposed to be, and there found that he +had gone back to his house in Nashville, to which place I followed +him. He appeared surprised at my suggestion that we would find +Hood in line of battle ready to receive us in the morning, or even +ready to strike our exposed right flank before we could renew the +attack, instead of in full retreat, as he had assumed. I told him +I knew Hood much better than he did, and I was sure he would not +retreat. Finally, after considerable discussion I obtained a +modification of the order so far as to direct the cavalry to remain +where it was until Hood's action should be known, and an order for +some of A. J. Smith's troops to support the right if necessary. +But no orders whatever were given, to my knowledge, looking to a +battle the next day--at least none for my troops or the cavalry. + +The next morning revealed the enemy in his new position, his left +remaining where it was the night before, in my immediate front, +but the rest of his line far back from the ground on which the +other portions of Thomas's army had passed the night. Some time +was of course required for the other corps to come up and get in +contact with the enemy, and the whole forenoon was passed by me in +impatient anxiety and fruitless efforts to get from General Thomas +some orders or authority that would enable us all to act together +--that is, the cavalry and the two infantry corps on the right. +At length the cavalry, without order from General Thomas, had worked +well round on the enemy's left so as to threaten his rear; I had +ordered Cox, commanding my right division, to advance his right in +conjunction with the movement of the cavalry, and at the proper +time to attack the left of the enemy's intrenchments covering the +Granny White pike, and that movement had commenced; while, having +been informed by General Darius N. Couch, commanding my left +division, that one of Smith's divisions was about to assault, I had +ordered Couch to support that division, which movement had also +commenced. Then General Thomas arrived near our right, where I +stood watching these movements. This, about four o'clock P. M., +was the first time I had seen or heard from General Thomas during +that day. He gave no order, nor was there time to give any. The +troops were already in motion, and we had hardly exchanged the +usual salutations when shouts to our left announced that McArthur's +division of Smith's corps had already carried the enemy's work in +its front, and our whole line advanced and swept all before it. + +In my judgment, General Thomas gave a little less than full credit +to McArthur's division, and considerably more than full justice to +the other troops, in his description of that assault, which was +distinctly seen by him and by me. + +The resistance along the whole left and center of Hood's line cannot +be said to have been strong or obstinate. Our total losses were +comparatively insignificant; and whatever may have been the appearance +to the troops under fire, to a cool observer out of the smoke the +enemy's fire seemed no more than that of an ordinary skirmish. +But with the exception of the comparatively feeble resistance of +the enemy, that splendid assault of McArthur's division, as I saw +it, was very accurately described by its gallant commander in his +official report, and also in that of General A. J. Smith. + + DELAY IN RENEWING THE ATTACK ON THE 16TH + +The fact is that Hood's left wing had been much weakened to strengthen +his right, which had been heavily pressed a short time before, as +fully described by General Thomas, and his army was already +substantially beaten. Its spirit seemed to be gone. What little +fight was left in it after November 30 had been greatly diminished +on December 15. Hood, almost alone of that army, was not whipped +until the 16th. He, the responsible leader of a desperate cause, +could not yield as long as there was a ray of hope. Under any +ordinary circumstances a commander even of the most moderate capacity +must have admitted his campaign a failure the morning after Franklin. +It would be absurd to compare the fighting of Hood's troops at +Nashville, especially on the second day, with the magnificent +assaults at Atlanta and Franklin. My own appreciation of the result +was expressed in the following despatch: + + "Headquarters, Army of the Ohio, + "December 16, 1864, 7:45 P. M. +"Major-General George H. Thomas, + "Commanding Department of the Cumberland. + +"General: I have the honor to report four pieces of artillery and +a considerable number of prisoners captured by General Cox's division +this afternoon. General Cox also reported four other pieces and +caissons captured in the valley between the hill carried by General +McArthur and that taken by General Cox. I learned, however, upon +inquiry, that General McArthur's troops claimed, and I have no +doubt justly, the honor of capturing the last four. My provost- +marshal reports seventy-four prisoners captured this P. M. I have +conversed with some of the officers captured, and am satisfied +Hood's army is more thoroughly beaten than any troops I have ever +seen. + +"I congratulate you most heartily upon the result of the two days' +operations. My messenger will wait for any orders you may have to +send me. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, + + "J. M. Schofield, Major-General." + +It now appears to be fully established by the records that Hood's +infantry force in the battle of Nashville was very far inferior to +that of Thomas, and he had sent a large part of his cavalry, with +some infantry, away to Murfreesboro'. This disparity must have +been perfectly well known to Hood, though not to Thomas. Hence it +would seem that Hood must have known that it was utterly impossible +for his army to resist the assaults which he must expect on December +16. Since all this has become known, it is impossible not to see +now that the comparatively feeble resistance offered by the +Confederate troops at Nashville was due not so much, perhaps, to +any lack of valor on the part of those troops, as to their +comparatively small numbers. I recall distinctly the conversation +I had with a Confederate field-officer a few minutes after he was +captured that day, and which I reported to General Thomas that +evening. In answer to my question as to when the Confederate troops +recognized the fact that they were beaten, he answered, "Not till +you routed us just now." I did not believe him then, for I thought +they must have recognized their defeat at Franklin, or at least on +the 15th, at Nashville. But now I think he probably told me the +exact truth. I doubt if any soldiers in the world ever needed so +much cumulative evidence to convince them that they were beaten. +"Brave boys were they!" If they had been fighting in a cause that +commanded the sympathy and support of the public conscience of the +world, they could never have been beaten; it is not necessary to +search for any other cause of the failure of the Confederate States. + + DELAY IN RENEWING THE ATTACK ON THE 16TH + +The most notable failure, on our side, of the battle of December +16 was the wasting of nearly the entire day, so that operations +ended with the successful assault at dark. What was left of Hood's +army had time to retreat across the Harpeth during the night and +destroy the bridges before the pursuit could be commenced. + +But the results of the two days' operations at Nashville were too +gratifying to admit of contemporaneous criticism. The battle has +been generally accepted as a perfect exemplification of the art of +war. It is certainly a good subject for the study of military +students, and it is partly for their benefit that I have pointed +out some of its prominent defects as I understood them. Its +commendable features are sufficiently evident; but in studying the +actions that have resulted in victory, we are apt to overlook the +errors without which the victory might have been far more complete, +or even to mistake those errors for real causes of success. + +The pursuit from Nashville was necessarily an imperfect one from +the start, simply because the successful assault having been made +at the close of day, the broken enemy had time to get across the +Harpeth and destroy the bridges before morning. The singular +blunder by which General Thomas's pontoon-train was sent toward +Murfreesboro' instead of Franklin added somewhat to the delay, but +probably did not essentially change the result. + +The state of all the roads except the one turnpike, the soft +condition of the fields everywhere, the bad weather,--rain, sleet, +and ice,--made the movements of troops which were necessary to an +effective pursuit extremely difficult, and often impossible. The +energy and determination of General Thomas and of all who could +take any active part in that pursuit were probably never surpassed +in military history, but the difficulties to be overcome were often +insurmountable. Under the conditions at that season of the year +and in that state of weather, the only possible chance of reaping +fruits commensurate with the brilliant victory at Nashville and +with the great preparations which had been made for pursuit was to +make the final assault at Nashville early enough in the day to +leave time before dark to prevent the enemy from crossing the +Harpeth and destroying the bridges. + +If Hood had retreated in the night of December 15, as Thomas presumed +he would, the result would doubtless have been even less serious +to the enemy; for he would not have suffered at Nashville the great +losses and demoralization which occurred to him on the 16th, and +would have been in better condition to make an effective retreat, +and even better able to cross the Harpeth in the night and destroy +the bridges. But this would have been difficult, if not impossible, +to prevent on the 15th, on account of the great extent and nature +of the movements necessarily required to open the battle on that +day. I now recall very distinctly the desire manifested by General +Thomas that those initial operations might, if possible, be expedited. +As we sat together on horseback just in rear of Wood's right and +of Smith's left, on ground overlooking nearly the entire field, +the general would frequently reach for my glasses, which he had +occasionally used before and said were the only field-glasses he +had ever found of much use to him, and try to peer through the +misty atmosphere far over the woods and field where his infantry +and cavalry were advancing against the enemy's left. After thus +looking long and earnestly, he would return the glasses to me, with +what seemed to be a sign of irritation or impatience, for he uttered +very few words in that long time, until late in the afternoon, +when, after using my field-glasses for the last time, he said to +me, with the energy which battle alone could arouse in his strong +nature: "Smith has not reached far enough to the right. Put in +your troops!" + +Occasionally, when a shell struck and exploded near where we were, +causing his horse to make a slight start, and only a slight one,-- +for the nature of the horse was much the same as that of the rider, +--the only change visible in the face or form of that stout-hearted +soldier was a slight motion of the bridle-hand to check the horse. +My own beautiful gray charger, "Frank Blair," though naturally more +nervous than the other, had become by that time hardly less fearless. +But I doubt if my great senior ever noticed that day what effect +the explosion of a shell produced on either the gray horse or his +rider. He had on his shoulders the responsibilities of a great +battle, while I then had better than ever before opportunity to +study the character of my chief. + + HOPELESSNESS OF HOOD'S POSITION + +A wiser commander than Hood might very probably have saved his army +from that terrible and useless sacrifice of December 16. But that +last and bravest champion of a desperate cause in the west appears +to have decided to remain and invite the total destruction of his +army. The position which the Confederates occupied in the morning +of the 16th was so close to that of more than half of the Union +troops that Hood's left could easily have been crushed by an infantry +assault and his rear reached by Thomas's cavalry before noon, and +nothing less than a miracle could have prevented the capture of +Hood's army. + +It is worthy of note as instructive comparison that on November +30 Hood advanced from Spring Hill to Franklin and made his famous +assault in just about the same length of time that it took our +troops to advance from the first to the second position at Nashville +and make the assault of December 16; and that the Fourth and Twenty- +third corps on November 29 and 30 fought two battles--Spring Hill +and Franklin--and marched forty miles, from Duck River to Nashville, +in thirty-six hours. Time is an element in military problems the +value of which cannot be too highly estimated, yet how seldom has +it been duly appreciated! + +The remnant of Hood's army having made its escape across the +Tennessee River, the pursuit terminated, and General Thomas issued +his remarkable General Orders No. 169, announcing that "the rear- +guard of the flying and dispirited enemy was driven across the +Tennessee River. . . ."( 3) + +Orders were then issued by General Thomas distributing his army +along the Tennessee River in winter quarters, and he commenced +planning a campaign for the ensuing spring, the general features +of which he telegraphed me, asking my opinion. His proposition +seemed to show so different an appreciation from my own of the +actual state of the war and of the demands of the country upon its +army at that momentous crisis, and views so different from mine in +respect to the strategic principles that should govern future +operations, that I wrote to General Grant and General Sherman, +giving them briefly my views upon the subject, and requesting an +order to join them on the Atlantic coast, to aid in terminating +the rebellion. My letter to General Grant was promptly followed +by a telegram to General Thomas directing him to send me east with +the Twenty-third Corps, which enabled me to participate in the +closing campaign of the war. + + LETTER TO GRANT + +The following are the letters, above referred to, to Grant and +Sherman, whose appreciation of the views therein expressed is +sufficiently shown by the published history of subsequent operations, +and the orders sent to Thomas by General Grant and the War Department +during that time: + + "(Unofficial.) + "Columbia, Tenn., December 27, 1864. +"Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant, Commanding U. S. Armies, City +Point, Va. + +"General: My corps was sent back to Tennessee by General Sherman, +instead of remaining with him on him march through Georgia, according +to his original design, for two reasons, viz.: First, because +General Thomas was not regarded strong enough after it became +evident that Hood designed to invade Tennessee; and, second, in +order that I might fill up my corps from the new troops then arriving +in Tennessee. These reasons now no longer exist. By uniting my +troops with Stanley's, we were able to hold Hood in check at Columbia +and Franklin until General Thomas could concentrate at Nashville, +and also to give Hood his death-blow at Franklin. Subsequent +operations have shown how little fight was then left in his army, +and have taken that little out of it. He now has not more than +fifteen thousand infantry, about ten thousand of whom only are +armed, and they greatly demoralized. With time to reorganize and +recruit, he could not probably raise his force to more than half +the strength he had at Franklin. + +"General Thomas has assigned several new regiments to my command, +and I hope soon to make them effective by distributing them in old +brigades. I will have from fifteen to eighteen thousand effective +men, two thirds of whom are the veterans of the campaigns of East +Tennessee and Georgia: A small force, it is true, yet one which +would at least be an appreciable addition to your army in Virginia +or elsewhere where decisive work is to be done. + +"It may not be practicable now for me to join General Sherman, but +it would not be difficult to transfer my command to Virginia. + +"I am aware that General Thomas contemplates a 'spring campaign' +into Alabama or Mississippi, with the Tennessee River as a base, +and believe he considers my command a necessary part of the operating +force. Without reference to the latter point, permit me to express +the opinion that such a campaign would not be an economical or +advantageous use of so many troops. + +"If aggressive operations are to be continued in the Gulf States, +it appears to me it would be much better to take Mobile and operate +from that point, thus striking vital points, if there are any such, +of rebel territory by much shorter lines. + +"But it appears to me that Lee's army is virtually all that is left +of the rebellion. If we can concentrate force enough to destroy +that, we will destroy with it the rebel government, and the occupation +of the whole South will then be but a matter of a few weeks' time. + +"Excuse, General, the liberty I have taken in expressing my views +thus freely and unsolicited. I have no other motive than a desire +for the nation's good, and a personal wish to serve where my little +command can do the most. + +"The change I suggest would of course deprive me of my department +command, but this would be a small loss to me or to the service. +The present arrangement is an unsatisfactory one at best. Nominally +I command both a department and an army in the field; but in fact +I do neither. I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient +servant, + + "J. M. Schofield, Major-General." + + LETTER TO SHERMAN + + "(Unofficial.) + "Columbia, Tenn., December 28, 1864. +"My dear General: Accept my hearty congratulations on the happy +termination of your 'pleasure excursion' through Georgia. You must +have had a merry Christmas. + +"As was predicted, you have had the fun, and we the hard work. +But altogether your plan has been a brilliant success. Hood didn't +follow _you_, . . . but he did _me_. I held him at Columbia several +days, and hurt him considerably. Finally he got across the Duck +River above, and made for Franklin via Spring Hill. I headed him +off at Spring Hill with a division, and concentrated at Franklin. +There he made the heaviest assaults I have ever seen, but was fairly +repulsed and terribly punished. In fact we pretty much knocked +all the fight out of him on that occasion, and he has shown very +little since. Now I reckon he has n't any left. + +"I barely succeeded in delaying Hood until Thomas could get A. J. +Smith and Steedman to Nashville, when he became abundantly strong, +and after getting Wilson's cavalry together moved out and gave Hood +a most thorough beating with all ease. The fact is, Hood's army +showed scarcely any fight at all. I have never seen anybody except +Jeff Thompson so easily beaten. + +"Stoneman has cleaned out Breckinridge and destroyed the salt-works +and everything else in southwest Virginia; so all together matters +are in pretty good shape in this part of the military division. + +"Thomas has given me nine new regiments, and promises three more. +These will make a pretty good division for new troops. + +"All this being true, I take it the objects for which I was left +in this part of the country have been accomplished, and I would +like very much to be with you again, to take part in the future +operations of the Grand Army. Cannot this be brought about? + +"Of course I can only conjecture what your operations will now be, +and can hardly judge of the practicability of my joining you, but +I hope I may be able to do so. I have written to General Grant on +this subject, and suggested that if I cannot reach you, I might +with propriety be sent to Virginia. I feel certain that I am no +longer needed here, for without me Thomas is much stronger than +Hood. + +"I have not talked with General Thomas on the subject, but intend +to do so as soon as I can see him.( 4) No doubt he will be opposed +to any reduction of his force, but I go for concentrating against +Lee. If we can whip him now, the rebellion will be virtually ended. + +"My corps is small, it is true, but it is 'powerful willing,' and +can help some anyhow. + +"Please present my kindest remembrances to my old comrades, and +favor me with an early reply. Yours very truly, + + "J. M. Schofield, Major-General. +"Major-General Sherman, Com'd'g, etc., Savannah, Ga." + +On my passage through Washington in January, 1865, Mr. Stanton, +the Secretary of War, confirmed the view I had taken of the situation, +and gave reasons for it before unknown to me, by telling me it was +regarded by the administration as an absolute financial necessity +that the war be ended in the campaign then about to begin. It is, +perhaps, not strange that General Thomas had not thought of this; +but it does seem remarkable that he had proposed to let a broken +and dispirited enemy have several months in which to recuperate +before annoying him any further. + +The expectation and instructions of General Grant and General +Sherman were that General Thomas should, as soon as he was ready +to take the offensive, pursue Hood into the Gulf States. General +Thomas appears to have forgotten that part of his instructions. +As soon as he had driven Hood across the river, he proposed to go +into winter quarters, and "hold the line of the Tennessee" till +some time the next spring. If General Sherman had confided to +General Thomas, as he did to General Grant, his ulterior purpose +to march from Savannah toward Richmond, for which reason he wanted +Hood kept out of his way, Thomas would have perceived the necessity +of pressing the pursuit of Hood into the Gulf States. But if Thomas +supposed, as he might naturally have done, that Sherman had only +shifted his base with a view to further operations in Georgia and +the Gulf States, under the plan of the last autumn, with which +Thomas was perfectly familiar, he may well have seen no necessity +for his pressing the pursuit beyond the Tennessee River in +midwinter. + +Some of our military operations in the Civil War remind me of the +spirit of "fair play" shown by our old doctors in the West in the +days of malarial fever. When the poison had fully developed its +power, and threatened the destruction of its victim, the good doctor +would come in and attack the enemy with heroic doses of quinine. +In a few days medical science would prevail. Then the fair-minded +physician would retire, and give the worsted malaria a chance to +recuperate and "come to time" for another attack; and so on +indefinitely until either the man or the malaria--often the man-- +finally got "knocked out." It was not until after much study and +some practice of the art of war that I conceived for myself the +idea of giving the enemy of my youth, which still clung to me, no +chance to recover after I once got him down. He has never got the +better of me since. + + THOMAS'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE WAR + +Had Thomas's plan been carried out, he would have been ready, with +a fine army splendidly equipped and supplied, to start from the +Tennessee River to invade the Gulf States, as had been done the +year before, just about the time the plans actually adopted resulted +in the surrender of all the Confederate armies. In Thomas's mind +war seems to have become the normal condition of the country. He +had apparently as yet no thought of its termination. The campaign +from the Tennessee River as a base had then become, like the "autumn +manoeuvers" of an European army, a regular operation to be commenced +at the proper time every year. In his general order of December +29, he said the enemy, "unless he is mad, must forever relinquish +all hope of bringing Tennessee again within the lines of the accursed +rebellion"; but the possible termination of that rebellion appeared +to be a contingency too remote to be taken into account in planning +future military operations. + +[( 1) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, p. 39.] + +[( 2) See Vol. XLV, part I, p. 37.] + +[( 3) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, p. 50.] + +[( 4) I did not see General Thomas after this letter was written.] + + +CHAPTER XIV +Hood's Motive in Attempting the Impossible at Nashville--Diversity +of Opinions Concerning that Battle--No Orders on Record for the +Battle of December 16--That Battle due to the Spontaneous Action +of Subordinate Commanders--Statements in the Reports of the Corps +Commanders--Explanation of the Absence of Orders--The Phraseology +of General Thomas's Report. + +The official records, Hood's statement, and Sherman's estimate, +made at the time, agree pretty closely in placing Hood's infantry +force at about 30,000 men when he crossed the Tennessee and began +his advance toward Nashville. He lost a considerable number at +Spring Hill on November 29, and over 6000, besides thirteen general +officers, at Franklin on November 30. Therefore 24,000 must be a +liberal estimate of his infantry strength after the battle of +Franklin. The infantry strength of the Fourth and Twenty-third +corps did not exceed 22,000 present for duty equipped, of which +one brigade (Cooper's) of the Twenty-third was sent by General +Thomas to guard the fords of Duck River below Columbia, and did +not rejoin the corps until after the battle of Franklin. Hence +Hood's infantry force at Columbia and Franklin was nearly one half +greater then mine. The disparity in cavalry was still greater at +first, but was reduced very considerably by the arrival of cavalry +sent from Nashville by General Thomas, especially Hammond's brigade, +which arrived in the field on the 29th, too late to assist in +holding the line of Duck River. + + HOOD'S MOTIVE AT NASHVILLE + +It follows that Hood had an opportunity to conduct operations +against an adversary of, at the most, only two thirds his own +strength in infantry and in cavalry--an opportunity such as had +never before been presented to any Confederate general. That he +thought his chance a very brilliant one is not remarkable. If he +could cut off my retreat or force me to a pitched battle, he had +full reason to hope for the most decisive results. This fact should +be given full weight in connection with the question why Hood did +not avoid intrenched positions and make a raid into Kentucky, which +he could easily have done at that time, because Thomas was not yet +ready to meet him in the open field. The moral effect of such a +raid would, of course, have been very great; but it must have proved +disastrous in the end, for the reason that Thomas would in a short +time have had in Hood's rear a far superior force to cut off his +retreat and force him to a decisive battle; whereas if Hood could +defeat and seriously cripple, if not destroy, the only organized +army in the field then opposed to him, he could afterward attend +to Thomas's scattered detachments in succession, or invade Kentucky, +as he might think expedient. As Hood was operating in the country +of his own friends, he did not lack full and accurate information +of the strength and movements of his adversary. Indeed, we were +also fully informed in due time of all of Hood's movements, but +overestimated his strength because we did not have friends residing +in his camps. + +But the defeat of Hood at Franklin, and Thomas's concentration of +troops at Nashville, completely reversed the situation. When Hood +recovered from the blow received at Franklin sufficiently to make +any further move, he found himself confronted no longer by an +inferior force, but by one of more than twice his own strength in +infantry, and not far, if at all, inferior to him in cavalry. The +artillery in the field is not specially considered in any of these +estimates, because it was ample in quantity and efficient in quality +on both sides, and need not be compared. This formidable army was +now in Hood's immediate front at Nashville, while the important +strategic points of Murfreesboro' and Chattanooga were strongly +garrisoned and fortified, and the railroads strongly guarded. It +had become too late for Hood to attempt a raid into Kentucky. +Thomas would have been close upon his rear with an army at least +twice as strong, with all the important points in Tennessee still +securely held. But successful operations against Nashville were +far less possible to Hood than an invasion of Kentucky. While no +commander could possibly think of destroying his own army by +assaulting a fortified place in which the garrison was more than +double his own strength, or indulge the hope of any valuable results +from a less than half investment of such a place, so bold a commander +as Hood might possibly attempt a raid into Kentucky, as the only +thing he could possibly do except retreat across the Tennessee +River, and thus abandon his cause as lost. It was this view of +the situation by General Grant and the authorities in Washington +that caused such intense anxiety on account of the delay of General +Thomas in attacking Hood at Nashville. It was perfectly evident +that Thomas could beat Hood whenever he chose to attack him, and +that Hood must be fully aware of that fact. Hence it was naturally +apprehended that Hood would either make a raid into Kentucky or +else retreat across the Tennessee River without suffering any +further damage. To those who were watching Hood closely at Nashville, +and especially to those who understood his character, there seemed +no ground for either apprehension. All his operations indicated +a serious attempt to besiege Nashville, though it was impossible +to imagine what he could hope to accomplish, unless it was to wait +in the most convenient place while his adversary, with all the +great resources of the country at his back, got ready to crush him. + + HOOD'S MOTIVE AT NASHVILLE + +As stated in his report, Thomas estimated Hood's strength as being +at least equal to his own, and with all the deliberation of his +nature, he insisted upon making the full preparations which he +considered essential to success not only in battle, but in pursuit +of a defeated enemy. From his point of view, Thomas was unquestionably +right in his action. How he came to make so great an overestimate +of the Confederate strength, in view of the means of information +in his possession and the estimate General Sherman had given him +before he started for Savannah, it is difficult to conjecture. +But the fact is now beyond question that Thomas made all those +elaborate preparations to attack an enemy of less than half his +own strength, under the belief that his adversary was at least +equal in strength to himself. That Hood then knew his own exact +strength is a matter of course, and that he did not underestimate +the strength of his adversary is almost equally certain. During +the two weeks in which his army lay in front of Nashville, if not +before, he must have ascertained very closely the strength of the +Union forces in his front. Hence Hood's "siege" of Nashville for +two weeks could not be regarded otherwise than as a stupendous +farce, were it not for the desperate bravery with which he thus +kept up the appearance of still fighting for a lost cause rather +than be the first to admit by his own action that it was indeed +lost. It is now well known that the feeling among the Southern +people and that of some of the highest officers of the Confederate +government made it impossible for any officer of their army to +admit in any public way the failure of the Confederacy until after +the enforced surrender of Lee's army in Virginia. Indeed, it +required much moral courage on the part of General Johnston +voluntarily to enter into a capitulation even after the capture of +Lee. + +This is unquestionably the explanation of Hood's desperate act in +waiting in front of Nashville and inviting the destruction or +capture of his army. The crushing blow he there received was like +a death-blow delivered by a giant full of strength and vigor upon +a gladiator already beaten and reduced in strength nearly to +exhaustion. Sherman was not very far wrong when he said that "the +battle of Nashville was fought at Franklin." The gladiator had +been reduced to less than one third of his former strength by a +long series of combats with a more powerful antagonist all the past +summer, and finally by his unexpected repulse at Franklin. It +required only one or two more blows from the powerful enemy at +Nashville to complete his destruction. Any estimate of the battle +of Nashville which fails to take into account the foregoing facts +must be essentially erroneous, and it is not doing any honor to +the great soldier who fought that battle to compare it with his +previous achievements when he heroically met and defeated superior +numbers of fresh and vigorous troops. + +A wide diversity of opinion has always existed among military men +in respect to the battle of Nashville, ranging all the way from +the view taken in historical accounts heretofore published to the +opinion expressed by General Sherman, in language intended of course +to be hyperbolical, namely that "the battle of Nashville was fought +at Franklin." The truth is to be found somewhere between these +two extremes. But the exact truth respecting that battle can +perhaps hardly yet be told. I will, however, state such facts of +my own knowledge and experience, and make such references to data +to be found in the voluminous records, as it seems to me may assist +the future historian, together with such comments as I deem +appropriate upon the information now available. As will be explained +hereafter, some important documents which originally formed part +of the records have disappeared therefrom. Their influence upon +historical opinion, if ever recovered, may now only be suggested. + + NO ORDERS FOR THE BATTLE OF DECEMBER 16 + +It must be observed as a very notable fact that the official records, +replete with orders and instructions issued every day, and almost +every hour, contain no record whatever of any written order or +instructions from General Thomas, given after the close of operations +on December 15, for the operations which actually took place the +next day. The only indications in the records, so far as I have +been able to discover, that any orders were given by General Thomas, +either orally or in writing, on the night of December 15, are the +following "orders of the day" for the Fourth Army Corps, issued by +General Wood after a personal interview with General Thomas that +night; the order in writing from General Thomas to General Wilson, +December 15; and the despatch from General Wilson to myself, dated +December 16, 10:10 A. M. They are as follows: + + "Headquarters Fourth Army Corps, + "Near Nashville, Tenn., December 15, 1864, 11:20 P. M. +"Orders of the day for the Fourth Army Corps for to-morrow, December +16, 1864: + +"If the enemy is in their front at daylight to-morrow morning, +division commanders will advance at that time, attack, and carry +whatever may be before them. If the enemy retreats to-night, we +will follow them. General Elliott, commanding Second Division, +will cross to the east of the Franklin pike, then move southward +parallel to it. He will deploy two regiments, connect with +skirmishers, and the rest of his division will move by flank. +General Kimball will follow, then General Beatty. The batteries +attached to each division to-day will accompany them to-morrow. +Ten ambulances and five ammunition-wagons will follow each division. + + "By the order of Brigadier-General Wood: + "J. S. Fullerton, + "Lieutenant-Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General." + + "Headquarters, Department of the Cumberland, + "Nashville, Tenn., December 15, 1864. +"Major-General J. H. Wilson, Commanding Cavalry Corps, Military +Division of the Mississippi. + +"General: I am directed by the major general commanding to say to +you that you will remain in your present position until it is +satisfactorily known whether the enemy will fight or retreat. In +case he retreats, you will move your command on the Hillsborough +pike across the Harpeth, and then take the most direct road or +roads to the Franklin pike, and endeavor to capture or destroy the +enemy's trains in their rear. + +"I have the honor to be, General, very respectfully your obedient +servant, + + "Robt. H. Ramsey, Assistant Adjutant-General." + +Both of these orders indicate a not unnatural state of doubt as to +whether the enemy would "fight or retreat." The former directs +what is to be done by the Fourth Corps in either case, while the +latter directs what shall be done in case the enemy retreats, but +says nothing about what shall be done if he does not retreat. + + "Hdqrs. Cavalry Corps, Mil. Div. of the Mississippi, + "In the Field, December 16, 1864, 10:10 A. M. +"Major-General Schofield, Commanding Twenty-third Army Corps. + +"General: The regiment sent to the Granny White pike reports it +strongly picketed toward us, with troops moving to our left. This +is probably Chalmers' division. I have heard nothing from Johnson +this morning; but, from what General Croxton reports, there is no +doubt that Chalmers crossed the Hardin pike, moving toward Brentwood. +The country on the left of the Hillsboro' pike, toward the enemy's +left, is too difficult for cavalry operations. It seems to me if +I was on the other flank of the army I might do more to annoy the +enemy, unless it is intended that I shall push out as directed last +night. + + "Very respectfully, + "J. H. Wilson, Brevet Major-General." + "(Indorsement.) +"Respectfully forwarded to Major-General Thomas. + + "J. M. Schofield, Major-General." + + NO ORDERS FOR THE BATTLE OF DECEMBER 16 + +This last, while showing that General Wilson had not received at +10:10 A. M. on the 16th any orders from General Thomas later than +that above quoted, appears to indicate that he had received some +previous order, referred to in the words "unless it is intended +that I shall push out as directed last night"; for the order above +quoted from the records did not indicate any intention that he +should "push out" unless the enemy was in retreat. + +An order in writing, as heretofore stated, was received by me very +soon after dark on the 15th. It has disappeared from the official +records, both those of General Thomas and mine. If any other orders +were issued by General Thomas, I have no personal knowledge of the +fact. + +In my judgment, whatever orders were issued by General Thomas on +the night of December 15 or in the morning of the 16th are essential +to truthful history; and I am sure they must have been more creditable +to General Thomas, though they may have been based upon erroneous +foresight of the enemy's action, which is necessarily very common +in war, than the absence from the records of any orders from him +to govern the operations of the army the next day, and the fact, +which appears from the records, that some of the troops at least +did not receive any orders from General Thomas, at any time, upon +which they could act on December 16. + +It seems at least strange that this absence of orders given in the +night of the 15th or morning of the 16th should have passed without +comment, especially in view of the very full orders issued on the +14th and in the night of the 16th. + +It will also be observed that General Thomas, in his official report +of the battle of Nashville, dated January 20, 1865, makes no mention +of any orders issued in the night of December 15 or morning of the +16th. He simply says in that regard: "The whole command bivouacked +in line of battle during the night on the ground occupied at dark, +whilst preparations were made to renew the battle at an early hour +on the morrow"; but does not say what those preparations were. +Then, after describing what had been done in the forenoon of the +16th, he says: "As soon as the above dispositions were completed, +and having visited the different commands, I gave directions that +the movement against the enemy's left flank should be continued"; +but no sub-report mentions the receipt of any such directions. +The report then proceeds to give a graphic and, I believe, nearly +accurate though brief description of what followed. + +It may also be observed that in my official report of the battle +of Nashville, dated December 31, 1864, the following appears: "In +the night of the 15th I waited upon the major-general commanding +at his headquarters, and received his orders for the pursuit of +the enemy on the following day." This report was, of course, before +General Thomas when he wrote his own, and had necessarily been read +by him and doubtless by some of his staff officers; yet no reference +was made in his report to the subject referred to in the words +above quoted from mine. These facts from the records may perhaps +be accepted as sufficient indication of the general purport of +whatever orders were issued in the night of the 15th, after the +close of that day's operations, and sufficient evidence that no +orders of a general character were given by General Thomas, either +oral or written, on the 16th until after he had "visited the +different commands." + + NO ORDERS FOR THE BATTLE OF DECEMBER 16 + +The report of General Steedman, dated January 27, 1865, says: +"December 16, at 6 A. M., in obedience to the orders of Major- +General Thomas, my command moved on the enemy's works." It is not +stated whether these orders were oral or written. No copy of them +appears in the records, nor any mention of a personal interview +with General Thomas or any of his staff. (Steedman was the man +who published a falsehood about an alleged telegram from me to +Grant about Thomas. See page 296.) + +General T. J. Wood's report, dated January 5, 1865, after describing +the operations of the morning of December 16, says: "After the +dispositions above recounted had been made, the commanding general +joined me near our most advanced position on the Franklin pike, +examined the positions of the troops, approved the same, and ordered +that the enemy should be vigorously pressed and unceasingly harassed +by our fire. He further directed that I should be constantly on +the alert for any opening for a more decisive effort, but for the +time to bide events. The general plan of the battle for the +preceding day--namely, to outflank and turn his left--was still to +be acted on. Before leaving me, the commanding general desired me +to confer with Major-General Steedman, whose command had moved out +that morning from Nashville by the Nolensville pike, and arrange +a military connection between his right and my left." This appears +from General Wood's report to have occurred a short time before +noon, and seems to have been the first information given to any of +the corps commanders of the general plan of operations for December +16. General Wood's report does not suggest that even he, who had +visited the commanding general the night before, had been given +any information about any such general plan; and that statement of +Wood's, "the general plan of the battle for the preceding day-- +namely, to outflank and turn his left--was still to be acted on," +was written many days after the battle, and then did not say that +General Thomas had at any time so ordered. + +In the report of General A. J. Smith, dated January 10, 1865, occurs +the following: "About 3 P. M. (December 10) General McArthur sent +word that he could carry the hill on his right by assault. Major- +General Thomas being present the matter was referred to him, and +I was requested to delay the movement until he could hear from +General Schofield, to whom he had sent. . . . General McArthur, +not receiving any reply, and fearing that if the attack should be +longer delayed the enemy would use the night to strengthen his +works, directed the first brigade (Colonel W. L. McMillen, 95th +Ohio Infantry, commanding) to storm the hill on which was the left +of the enemy's line," etc. This statement, which appears to be +nowhere dissented from, seems to show that very nearly the hour of +the day--not very long after 3 P. M.--when was initiated by General +McArthur the general attack which resulted in the brilliant and +final success of the day; that this initial movement was not made +in pursuance of any orders or directions from General Thomas, but, +on the contrary, during a period in which General Thomas had +requested General Smith to "delay the movement." + +General Wilson's report, dated December 21, says: "About 4:30 P. M. +the enemy, pressed in front, flank, and rear, broke in disorder. +Croxton's brigade, which had been held in reserve on the Hillsboro' +pike, as soon as the success of these dispositions had become +apparent was ordered to march rapidly across the country to the +Granny White pike, and beyond the right flank of Hammond's brigade; +but owing to the lateness of the hour and heaviness of the road +over which he was compelled to move, he secured but few prisoners." +This report also seems to be silent in respect to any order from +General Thomas. + +There was another good reason why the cavalry secured but few +prisoners at that time: There were very few left to secure behind +_that part_ of the line, the infantry having captured nearly all +of them. + + STATEMENTS IN THE REPORTS OF CORPS COMMANDERS + +My own official report, dated December 31, gave the following +account of the operations of December 16, to the accuracy of which +no exception was taken by General Thomas. The only order therein +mentioned as coming from General Thomas was that received in the +night of the 15th, "for the pursuit of the enemy on the following +day." + +"In the night of the 15th I waited upon the major-general commanding +at his headquarters, and received his orders for the pursuit of +the enemy on the following day. Our operations during the 15th +had swung the right and right center forward so that the general +direction of the line was nearly perpendicular to that before the +attack; only the right was in contact with the enemy, and was +therefore much exposed. Apprehensive that the enemy, instead of +retreating during the night, would mass and attack our right in +the morning, I requested that a division of infantry be sent to +reinforce the right, which was ordered accordingly from Major- +General Smith's command. In response to this order, General Smith +sent five regiments and a battery (about 1600 men), which were put +in reserve near the right. In the morning it was found that the +enemy still held his position in our front, of which the hill in +front of General Couch was the key, and had thrown up considerable +breastworks during the night. He had also increased the force on +his left during the night, and continued to mass troops there during +the early part of the day. During the morning, therefore, our +operations were limited to preparations for defense and co-operation +with the cavalry, which was operating to strike the Granny White +pike in rear of the enemy. About noon, the troops on my left +(Generals Smith and Wood) having advanced and come in contact with +the enemy in his new position, the enemy again withdrew from his +left a considerable force to strengthen his right and center, when +I ordered General Cox to advance in conjunction with the cavalry, +and endeavor to carry a high wooded hill beyond the flank of the +enemy's intrenched line, and overlooking the Granny White pike. +The hill was occupied by the enemy in considerable force, but was +not intrenched. My order was not executed with the promptness or +energy which I had expected, yet probably with as much as I had +reason to expect, considering the attenuated character of General +Cox's line and the great distance and rough ground over which the +attacking force had to move. The hill was, however, carried by +General Wilson's cavalry (dismounted), whose gallantry and energy +on that and other occasions which came under my observation cannot +be too greatly praised. + +"Almost simultaneously with this attack on the extreme right, the +salient hill in front of General Couch was attacked and carried by +General Smith's troops, supported by a brigade of General Couch's +division; and the fortified hill in front of General Cox, which +constituted the extreme flank of the enemy's intrenched line, was +attacked and carried by Colonel Doolittle's brigade of General +Cox's division, the latter capturing eight pieces of artillery and +200 to 300 prisoners. These several successes, gained almost +simultaneously, resulted in a complete rout of the enemy. The +cavalry had cut off his line of retreat by the Granny White pike, +and such of his troops as were not captured on the line could only +escape by climbing the Brentwood Hills. It is believed all of the +artillery along the left and center of the enemy's line fell into +our hands. Our troops continued the pursuit across the valley and +into the Brentwood Hills, when darkness compelled them to desist, +and they bivouacked for the night." + +In the histories of the battle of Nashville heretofore published, +it appears to have been assumed that the plan of battle issued to +the troops before the movement of December 15 was equally applicable +to the operations of the 16th, was so understood by the subordinate +commanders, and was the authoritative guide for their action during +the entire day of the 16th. Hence it has seemed to me necessary +to direct attention to the above extracts from the official records, +as well as to give my own personal recollections, for the benefit +of future historians. + + EXPLANATION OF THE ABSENCE OF ORDERS + +Unquestionably the _general plan_ of battle embraced in the orders +of December 14 for the attack on the 15th was well applicable to +the situation which actually existed in the morning of the 16th. +It was requisite only to direct in what manner the several corps +of the army should act in _concert_ in the _changed situation_ of +both armies, as had so clearly been done for the 15th, in the +_situation then existing_. But the detailed orders requisite for +such joint action given in the plan for the battle of the 15th, +were _absolutely inapplicable_ in most essential particulars to +the situation of the 16th, or to the battle actually fought on that +day. In view of the fact that much time had very wisely been spent +by General Thomas in remounting his cavalry and in making all other +preparations necessary to insure not only the defeat, but the +destruction or capture of the enemy, and of the further fact that +the operations of the 15th had so damaged the enemy that his retreat +that night was thought at least probable, if not certain, it hardly +seems possible that General Thomas could have been willing to +postpone a renewal of the attack until he could have time to visit +"the several commands" in person, and see for himself what the +situation actually was the next day, as if the operations he had +to determine on and order were the original plans of a battle yet +to be opened, instead of the final blow to be struck against an +enemy already substantially beaten and quite probably already in +full retreat. + +The only possible explanation of this very remarkable absence of +timely orders from General Thomas for the battle of December 16, +and of the long delay on that day, seems to be found in his well- +known constitutional habit, sometimes spoken of by his brother +officers who had long been familiarly acquainted with him. Unless +the opinions of those familiar acquaintances and friends were +substantially erroneous, General Thomas's habit of great deliberation +did not permit him to formulate in the night of December 15 the +comparatively simple orders requisite for the several corps to +_resume_, in the morning of the 16th, the movement "against the +enemy's left flank," which he says he "directed" to be "continued" +some time in _the afternoon_ of that day--so late, however, that +some of the troops, at least, becoming impatient at the long delay, +did not wait even for the orders they had asked for, but initiated +on their own responsibility the action which resulted in victory +before any directions whatever from General Thomas had reached +them. Or else, if General Thomas had clearly in his mind the +appropriate action of his several corps suggested by the condition +of the enemy _as he himself had seen it_ just before dark, or as +it might be modified during the night, he must, it would seem, have +felt so sure of Hood's retreat in the night that he did not think +it worth his while to give any orders except for pursuit. However +this may be, it seems to be clearly established by the records that +the movements which prepared the way for the final assault, and +that assault itself, were both made under the orders of subordinates, +and not in obedience to any orders or directions from General +Thomas, nor in accordance with any general plan which he had informed +them was to be the guide for their action that day. + +The battle of the 15th was fought in very close conformity to the +plan prepared, some time before the 14th, doubtless by General +Thomas himself, though spoken of by General Wood, in his confidential +letter of the 14th to Thomas, as "our plan," and modified at the +conference which was called that day upon the suggestion of Wood +in that confidential letter, and, as he said, "at the instance of +Schofield and Smith."( 1) But the battle of the 16th appears to +have been emphatically a battle of the troops themselves, acting +under the independent orders of their own subordinate commanders, +with such co-operation and support as they had arranged among +themselves, in the absence of any orders or instructions from their +common superior. + + THE PHRASEOLOGY OF GENERAL THOMAS'S REPORT + +It seems proper for me to say that I have never claimed for myself +any part of the credit due to subordinates that day (December 16). +Having failed in the night of December 15 to obtain any appropriate +orders for my action, or for the conjoint action of the corps on +my right and left, and also to obtain any such orders on the 16th, +the only orders I gave were those to support the movements on my +right and left initiated by the subordinate commanders there. For +this action General Thomas, in his report, gave the full credit +due to my troops, and, inferentially at least, more than was due +to me. I must also add, in order that there may be no misunderstanding +on the subject, that General Thomas also gave full credit to me +and to the Twenty-third Corps for the part we took in the battle +of December 15. + +The only special credit to which I have thought myself entitled in +respect to Nashville was for two incidental services which General +Thomas did not seem to think worthy even of mention. They were, +in fact, only such services as any efficient staff officer possessed +of unusual knowledge of the character and habits of the opposing +commander could have rendered to General Thomas as well as I could. +The two services referred to were the suggestion relative to the +change in the details of the plan of battle for December 15, by +which the infantry attacking force on our right was increased from +about ten thousand to nearly twenty thousand men; and the information +I gave to General Thomas, in the night of the 15th, that Hood would +not retreat without another fight, about which I had not the +slightest doubt, and which seemed to me more important than the +information I had given about the relative lengths of the several +parts of the enemy's line of defense and of his (General Thomas's) +line of attack, as proposed in his written orders. But these little +services, not worthy of mention in terms of special praise, seemed +to me worthy of record, especially the latter, since I had made a +long ride in a dark night, after having already been in the saddle +from daylight till dark, to carry the information to the commanding +general in person, and try to convince him of its correctness. + +A single word signifies sometimes much more than is imagined by +him who uses it. If General Thomas had said _resumed_ instead of +"continued," his statement of what he said he "directed" would have +corresponded very nearly with what was actually done after those +directions were given on December 16. But the continuation, at 3 +or 4 P. M. of one day, of action which had been suspended at +nightfall the preceding day, hardly accords with the rule of accuracy +which is demanded in maturely considered military reports. Indeed, +when a military movement is suspended at nightfall on account of +darkness, it is properly spoken of as _resumed_, not "continued," +even at daylight. The word "continued" was used to express what +was directed to be done at three or four o'clock in the afternoon +--"the movement against the enemy's left flank," which was not any +movement that had been going on that day and which could therefore +be continued, but the movement which, in fact, had ended the day +before in a very important success which had materially altered +the military situation under which the orders for the previous day +had been given. Hence the use of the word "continued" furnishes +food for thought. To have _resumed_, some time in the afternoon, +those operations of the preceding day would have been to state that +they had been suspended, not only during the night on account of +darkness, but during the greater part of the next day for no apparent +reason. That would have been manifestly inconsistent with the +theory that the operations of the second day were only a continuation +of those of the first, all in accordance with the plan of battle +published two days before, upon which theory the reports of General +Thomas and of some of the sub-commanders appear to have been based. +The logical conclusion of this reflection, in view of all the facts +now established by the records, seems to be that the plan of battle +for December 16 was matured and published to the army, as well as +to the world at large, some time after the event. + + THE PHRASEOLOGY OF GENERAL THOMAS'S REPORT + +It may be worthy of note that none of the officers whose reports +reveal their ignorance of that plan belonged to the Army of the +Cumberland, with which General Thomas had so long been identified. + +[( 1) War Records, Vol. XVL, part ii, p. 184.] + + +CHAPTER XV +General Thomas's Indorsement on the Report of the Battle of Franklin +--Courtesies to Him in Washington--Peculiarities of the Official +Records in Regard to Franklin and Nashville--Documents Which Have +Disappeared from the Records--Inconsistencies in General Thomas's +Report--False Representations Made to Him--Their Falsity Confirmed +by General Grant. + +After I parted from General Thomas in Tennessee, having at our last +meeting there congratulated him on his well-deserved promotion to +the highest permanent grade, that of major-general in the regular +army, I had no further official intercourse with him, and, so far +as I can recollect, did not see him until after June 1, 1868, when +I entered the War Department. During the intervening time--more +than three years--my attention had been absorbed by important +duties, including a mission to France in defense of the then violated +"Monroe doctrine," and command in Virginia during a part of the +period of "reconstruction." I had not even seen the official +reports of the campaign in Tennessee, they having been made public +while I was in Europe. + + GENERAL THOMAS'S INDORSEMENT + +Some time in 1868-9 a staff officer in the War Department brought +to my notice the indorsement made by General Thomas on my report +of the battle of Franklin, and of the preceding operations from +the time when, by his order, I assumed command of the army in the +field, as follows: + + "Headquarters, Department of the Cumberland, Nashville, Tenn., + December 7, 1864. +"Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general of the army, +cordially recommending the gallantry and skill of Major-General +Schofield to the commendation of the War Department. + + "Geo. H. Thomas, + "Major-General U. S. Volunteers, Commanding." + +Of course I was much gratified by this high commendation, of which +I had never before seen the text, though I had known the substance. +I was also shown the telegram from General Thomas to Secretary +Stanton recommending that I and Stanley be brevetted one grade in +the regular service for our conduct at Franklin. As I received, +a short time after that recommendation was made, the appointment +of brigadier-general in the regular service, I supposed that General +Thomas had based his recommendation for brevet upon his knowledge +or belief that I had been, or soon would be, appointed brigadier- +general. Hence I had the great satisfaction of believing that I +owed my brevet of major-general in the regular army, at least in +part, to General Thomas's recommendation. + +I cannot now recollect whether or not I saw at that time General +Thomas's report of the operations in Tennessee. If I did, there +was nothing in it to attract my special attention, as I was too +much occupied with the important affairs of the time to think or +care very much about anything that was already three years old. + +My relations with General Thomas during that time--the winter and +spring of 1868-9, when he was, by my selection, president of a very +important military court, with General Hancock and General Terry +as the other members, and General Holt as the judge-advocate--were +very cordial, at least on my part. He was my guest at a large +dinner given to the members of the President's cabinet and the +Diplomatic Corps, to which the only other gentlemen invited were +Generals Thomas and Hancock, as a special mark of distinction to +two of my brother officers in the army. When General Grant was +inaugurated President I went with General Sherman in person to ask +the President to give General Thomas command of the Division of +the Pacific, which I had before proposed for him, but which the +President had designated for me, under the impression that General +Thomas did not want it. + +A few days after that we went to our respective commands--General +Thomas to San Francisco, and I to Fort Leavenworth. From that time +we had no official or personal relations or correspondence during +the short remainder of his life. + +In respect to what was made public during that brief period, I long +since refused to believe that the superior officer whom I had always +so highly respected could possibly have been capable, in his own +mind and heart, of doing me the grievous wrong which I at one time +believed he had done. I now add, as the result of calm and +dispassionate judgment, that any criticism at that time, even under +great provocation, that could seem unkind, not to say unjust, to +that noble, patriotic, and brave soldier, from any source, not +excluding myself, was wholly unjustifiable and worthy only of +condemnation. His great services had entitled him to the kindest +possible consideration of any imperfections, either real or supposed, +in his military operations. + + PECULIARITIES OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS + +Now, in this winter of 1896-7, I have made a careful examination, +for the first time since the events, of all the published records +of the campaign of 1864 in Tennessee, for the purpose of doing +exact justice to the principal actors in that campaign, so far as +it is possible for me to do so. In this examination I have discovered +some things that have surprised me, but they have not altered my +deliberate judgment of the character of the great soldier under +whom I had the honor to serve in that campaign. I refer to them +only for the consideration of others. + +(1) In the report of General Thomas dated January 20, 1865, covering +the entire period of the campaign, including both the battles of +Franklin and Nashville, in his commendation of subordinates he made +no distinction between the corps commanders who had served immediately +under him and only in the battle of Nashville, and the army commander +who, besides the like service at Nashville, had commanded the army +in the field, in the absence therefrom of General Thomas, up to +and including the battle of Franklin, where signal victory had +prepared the way for the less difficult but brilliant success of +General Thomas at Nashville. + +(2) In the first letter from General Thomas recommending promotions +for service in the campaign, containing the names of a large number +of officers, no mention was made of my name or that of General +Stanley, who had been conspicuous for gallantry at Spring Hill and +at Franklin, where he was wounded. + +(3) In a telegram from the Secretary of War calling for recommendations +for promotion, General Thomas had been informed that while there +was no vacancy in the grade of major-general (the last having, in +fact, been given to General Thomas himself), there were then two +vacancies in that of brigadier-general; and it was after the receipt +of that information, and in view of all it might be understood to +imply, that General Thomas sent his telegram to the Secretary of +War recommending that Stanley and I be brevetted one grade in the +regular service, not, as he had said in his indorsement on my report +of the battle of Franklin, for "skill," but for "good conduct." +As General Thomas well knew, I was then only a captain in the +regular army. Hence he recommended me for the brevet of major-- +that is, of commander of a single battalion of four companies--for +my services in command of an army of thirty thousand men, including +artillery and cavalry. + +(4) The telegram from General Thomas to Secretary Stanton recommending +those brevets for Stanley and me was dated December 31, 1864, 5 P. M., +while my general report including that of the battle of Nashville +bears the same date without hour, but may have been, and probably +was, received by General Thomas before he sent his telegram +recommending my promotion. + +(5) Neither the report of General Thomas nor of any of his corps +commanders made any mention of order for "pursuit" in the morning +of December 16, and General Thomas himself in his report took no +notice whatever of the glaring discrepancy between my report and +some of the others, nor of any facts demonstrated or suggested by +the correspondence which was made a part of my report, nor made +any mention of the change in his plan of battle for December 15, +which was made the day before. + +(6) In the publication of my report in the War Records there is a +foot-note which says that the orders and correspondence referred +to are not found with the report filed in the War Department--a +fact similar to that which I had found in respect to my own retained +copies of orders and correspondence, which I understood had been +carefully locked up in a strong leather trunk ever since I left +Washington in March, 1869, but which had nevertheless mysteriously +disappeared. + +In that report of mine was a reference to the modification made in +General Thomas's published plan of battle for December 15, though +no intimation that it was made at my suggestion; also the statement +that I had, after the close of the battle of December 15, "waited +upon the commanding general and received his orders for the pursuit," +but no mention of the previous written orders to the same effect, +which had become obsolete by operation of the subsequent orders +received in person. There were attached to my report, and made a +part thereof, copies of all the orders and correspondence in my +possession relating to the battles of Franklin and Nashville, and +to the preceding operations of that campaign, including those about +the false position of the troops at Pulaski, those about the +concentration of the troops in Thomas's department, that about the +need of a pontoon bridge at Franklin, that about punishing the +telegraph-operator by whose desertion I was deprived of communication +with General Thomas during the most critical part of the campaign, +and, probably, the order in writing which I had received from +General Thomas after the battle of December 15. But of course +there were no copies of orders or despatches which I had _not_ +received; and the desertion of my telegraph-operator and the +operations of Forrest's cavalry in my rear had made it probable +that there must have been some such despatches sent but not received. +There were no annotations or other suggestions as to their significance +attached to any of those copies at that time. They were simply +included, without comment, as an essential part of the report. +The explanations found in this volume were made many years +afterward. + +In respect to the appendix to my report, I am now compelled to call +attention to the fact that it was an absolute necessity. I could +not possibly have made a truthful and rational report which would +have stood the test of a just criticism without reference to the +documents in that appendix; and it was far more respectful to +General Thomas simply to attach the documents, leaving him to make +any explanations he might think necessary, then to call attention +myself to the necessity for any such explanations. It would have +been impossible to give any rational explanation of the false +position occupied by the troops at Pulaski up to the very last +moment of safety except by reference to Thomas's orders to Stanley +and me, and the subsequent correspondence on that subject. Stanley, +with the blunt frankness justified by comradeship, had pointed it +out to me the moment we met at Pulaski, while I was governed by +the utmost delicacy in discussing the question with General Thomas, +so as to avoid suggesting to him that he had made a mistake. Yet +so evident was the mistake that I stopped the advance of the Twenty- +third Corps some miles north of Pulaski, and no part of that corps +actually went to that place. Cox was sent back to a point where +he could interpose between Hood and Columbia, and Ruger was stopped +at Columbia. + +The great tenacity with which I held on at Columbia and on the +north bank of Duck River could not have been justified except by +reference to the despatches showing Thomas's wishes and his assurance +of reinforcements at those points. If I had been free to do so, +nothing could have been plainer than my duty to have fallen back +behind the Harpeth when I found that Thomas could not or would not +reinforce me on the line of Duck River, and before Hood could +endanger my retreat. Hence I was compelled to include in the +history of that retreat the entire record of facts relating to it. + +Again, necessity was the only possible excuse for fighting the +battle of Franklin on the south side of the Harpeth, where defeat +would have been disastrous; and that necessity had arisen absolutely +and solely from the want of a bridge across that river, which I +had suggested that General Thomas place there. It was not possible +for me, without utter disregard for the truth of history as well +as for my own military reputation, to attempt to conceal those +facts. + + DOCUMENTS WHICH DISAPPEARED FROM THE RECORDS + +It must seem remarkable that in my report, dated December 7, of +operations from November 14 to December 1, 1864, including the +battle of Franklin, on which General Thomas placed his indorsement +commending my "skill," no mention whatever was made of any orders +or instructions from General Thomas. The simple fact was that I +could not have quoted the orders and instructions General Thomas +had given me for my guidance during those operations without implied +criticism of General Thomas; hence it was then thought best to omit +any reference to any such orders or instructions, and to limit the +report to a simple recital of the facts, thus making the report +strictly truthful so far as concerned my own action and that of +the troops under my command, without any reference whatever to my +superior at Nashville, under whose orders I was supposed to be +acting; and that report of December 7 appeared to be entirely +satisfactory to General Thomas in that respect as well as in all +others. But when the time came to make my final report of the +entire campaign, which must go upon the public records as my full +and exact contribution to the history of military operations in +which I had taken an important part, truth and justice to all +required me to make the records complete so far as lay in my power; +and if there was anything in the record, as submitted by me to +General Thomas, to which he took exception, it was as plainly his +duty to truth and justice to place those exceptions also on the +public records. So far from suggesting in my final report any +possible criticism of General Thomas, I put the best possible +construction upon all the despatches I had received from him, by +accepting them together as showing me that his object was "to hold +the enemy in check" until he (Thomas) could concentrate his +reinforcements, and not to fight Hood at Pulaski, as he (Thomas) +had at first ordered. I simply submitted to him the plain record, +with the best possible construction I could put upon it, and that +only so far as it was necessary for me to construe it to give the +general basis of my action. If any official duty remained to be +done in that regard, that duty devolved on General Thomas, not on +me. + +In my final report, dated December 31, 1864, I said, as above +indicated, that my instructions from the major-general commanding +were embraced in a telegram to General Stanley (dated November 8), +in which General Thomas said, "Should the enemy overpower them [the +cavalry] and march on Pulaski, you must hold that place," "a copy +of which was furnished with the order to assume command at Pulaski, +and subsequent despatches, explaining that the object was to hold +the enemy in check, should he advance, long enough to enable General +A. J. Smith's corps, then expected from Missouri, to reach Nashville, +other troops in the Department of the Cumberland to be concentrated, +and General Wilson's cavalry to be remounted and fitted for the +field. The reinforcements thus expected were about equal to the +force we then had in the field, and would make our entire force, +when concentrated, equal, or somewhat superior, to that of the +enemy. To effect this concentration was therefore of vital +importance, a consideration to which all others were secondary. +This required that the enemy's advance should be delayed as much +as possible, and at the same time a decisive battle avoided, unless +it could be fought on favorable terms." + +I refrained from quoting either of the despatches from General +Thomas,--that dated November 8 to Stanley, or that dated 19, +repeating in substance that of the 8th,--or my reply of November +20 pointing out the reasons by the position at Pulaski was a false +one to occupy under the circumstances; and I still think, as I then +thought, that that was done as delicately as possible so as to +avoid suggesting to General Thomas that I thought his order a +blunder. His reply of the same date shows that he so appreciated +it. This despatch last referred to from General Thomas, and all +the other correspondence after I reached Pulaski, fully justified +to me in the statement made in my report, above mentioned, as to +whence I derived my information of his plans. + + INCONSISTENCIES IN GENERAL THOMAS'S REPORT + +But in the report of General Thomas dated January 20, 1865, appears +the following: "Directions were then sent to General Schofield to +leave a sufficiently strong force for the defense of that point, +and with the balance of his command proceed to carry out the +instructions already given him, viz., to join the Fourth Corps at +Pulaski, and assume command of all the troops in the vicinity, +watch the movements of Hood, and retard his advance into Tennessee +as much as possible, without risking a general engagement, until +Maj.-Gen. A. J. Smith's command could arrive from Missouri, and +Maj.-Gen. J. H. Wilson could have time to remount the cavalry +regiments dismounted to furnish horses for Kilpatrick's division, +which was to accompany General Sherman in his march through Georgia. +. . . My plans and wishes were fully explained to General Schofield, +and, as subsequent events will show, properly appreciated and +executed by him." + +Thus, General Thomas, being fully satisfied with the operations of +the troops while under my immediate command in the field, asserted +that those operations were based upon his "plans and wishes," which +had been "fully explained" to me _before I went to Pulaski_, and +"properly appreciated," instead of upon what I had gathered from +General Thomas's orders to Stanley and subsequent orders to me +about fighting Hood at Pulaski, absolutely contradictory to that +stated in his report, "without risking a general engagement," and +his assent to my _radically different_ suggestions made _after I +assumed command at Pulaski_, as stated in my report. It is not +incumbent upon me to try to reconcile this statement in General +Thomas's report with the correspondence, above referred to, found +in the official records; and I see no reason for desiring any +further corroboration of the strict accuracy of the contrary +statement made by me in my report. I am entirely willing to leave +any discussion of that subject to others. + +In view of the fact that I was not one of General Thomas's corps +commanders, but an army commander, holding the same grade of command, +by special assignment of the President under the law, as General +Thomas himself, he might without military impropriety have left to +me in his report, as he had before done in fact, whether intentionally +or not, the entire responsibility of the operations of the army +under my immediate command from Pulaski to Nashville. The record +shows that, from the necessities of the case, I was compelled to +act, and did act, upon my own judgment from the beginning to the +end, not only without any timely orders, but generally without +timely or accurate information from General Thomas; and that he +approved, from time to time and finally, all that I had done. The +question as to why he afterward claimed that all had been done in +pursuance of his plans and wishes, fully explained to me _in +advance_, I must leave to others. He was certainly under no official +obligation to take upon himself any such responsibility. It may +be true, as General Sherman said and General Thomas admitted, that +it was his duty to take command in the field himself. But it was +not his duty, being in the rear, to hamper the actual army commander +in the field with embarrassing orders or instructions, nor to take +upon himself the responsibility of failure or success. If I had +failed in those hazardous operations, nobody could have held General +Thomas responsible, unless for neglect of duty in not commanding +himself in person, or in not sending me possible reinforcements. +No obedience to any erroneous orders or instructions of his, sent +from a distance whence the actual situation could not be seen as +clearly as at the front, could have justified me in case of failure. +The actual commander of an army in the field must act upon his own +judgment and responsibility, though with due deference to the plans +and wishes of his superior, so far as they are made known to him, +having in view the general object of a campaign. This sound military +principle appears to have been fully recognized by General Thomas +when he made his report. He only claimed that his "plans and wishes +were fully explained" and "properly appreciated and executed," not +that he had given any specific orders or instructions. Why, then, +did he assert, in contradiction of my statement previously made to +him, and in contradiction of the official record I had submitted +to him with that statement in my report, that those "plans and +wishes" of his had been "fully explained" to me _before_ instead +of _after_ I went to Pulaski? What possible difference could it +have made to General Thomas, personally or officially, whether the +records showed that his plans and wishes were made known to me +before or after I assumed command, provided they were received by +me in due time for my action? What possible motive could General +Thomas have had in putting on the public records what was in +substance a flat contradiction of an official statement I had made +to him with full documentary evidence to support it, and that in +the absence of any possible ground for his own contradictory +statement, except his own recollection of some conversation we may +have had more than two months before, in which he might have +explained to me his "plans and wishes"? I cannot believe that +General Thomas ever consciously did any such thing. That feature +of the report must have had some other author besides George H. +Thomas. It is true that the orders telegraphed to me by General +Thomas, November 19, "to fight him [Hood] at Pulaski, if he advances +against that place," were inconsistent with the statement in his +report that he had fully explained to me his plans and wishes as +specified in that report, and in plain disregard of the general +principle recognized in his report, as well as likely to lead to +disastrous results if obeyed. But those orders were on the records, +and could not be expunged, even if such a man as General Thomas +could possibly have wished to expunge anything from his official +record. Hence, I repeat, that feature of the report signed by +General Thomas could not have been his. + + INCONSISTENCIES IN GENERAL THOMAS'S REPORT + +In this connection it is to be observed that General Thomas had +not, at the time I went back to report to him in Tennessee, any +anxiety about his inability to cope with Hood after the arrival of +the Twenty-third Corps. He had assured General Sherman of his +entire confidence.( 1) He had ordered me to march, as Stanley had +done, from Tullahoma to Pulaski; but the action of Forrest at +Johnsonville about that time caused General Thomas to change his +orders and hurry me by rail to Nashville, and thence to Johnsonville, +with the advance of my troops, he wishing to see me in person as +I passed through Nashville.( 2) It would not be an unreasonable +presumption that the burden of conversation in that brief interview +was in respect to the alarming condition of Johnsonville at that +time, rather than in respect to some future defensive operations +against Hood, then hardly anticipated. Indeed, the entire +correspondence of that period, including that which occurred between +General Thomas and General Sherman, about which it is important to +note that I knew nothing at that time, shows that General Thomas +then expected to concentrate his troops at Columbia or Pulaski, or +both, in a very short time, take command in the field in person, +and begin aggressive operations against Hood. It seems extremely +probable that General Thomas had given very little thought at that +time to the subject of defensive action, except as against what +that troublesome cavalryman Forrest might do. It seems far more +probable from the record that General Thomas's "plans and wishes" +in respect to defensive action against Hood's advance into Tennessee, +which I had so "properly appreciated and executed," were, like the +plans of the battle of December 16 at Nashville, matured after the +event, or at least after Hood's advance into Tennessee had actually +begun, and after I had, in my telegram to General Thomas of November +20, pointed out to him the dangers of his previous plan, telegraphed +to me the day before. + +I do not think much importance is generally to be attached to what +any man may or may not recall to memory after the lapse of many +years, although the recollection of a recent event, repeated in +the memory, for good and sufficient reasons, very frequently during +a long time, may continue to be very accurate. However this may +be, perfect candor compels me to say here that I have never been +able to recall any conversation with General Thomas at any time in +respect to his plans or wishes in the event of Hood's advance from +the Tennessee before Thomas was ready to assume the offensive. I +now believe, as I always have done, that the only information I +ever received from General Thomas on that subject was that contained +in the telegraphic correspondence quoted in this volume. There is +now no doubt in my mind, and, so far as I can recall, never has +been any, that when I met General Thomas at Nashville, on my way +to Johnsonville, he expected A. J. Smith to arrive from Missouri +very soon, when he intended to concentrate all his available troops +at Columbia and Pulaski, take command in person, and move against +Hood; and that he considered his orders of November 8 to Stanley, +to fight Hood at Pulaski or Columbia, as Hood might elect, until +he (Thomas) could get there with reinforcements, all the orders +that could be necessary, even if Hood did get a little the start +of him. The records seem to show, still further, that even after +Hood's plans of aggression had developed so long in advance of +Thomas's preparations to meet him, Thomas did not then see the +great danger that might result from obedience to his orders of +November 8 to Stanley, and even went so far as to repeat those +orders to me on the 19th; but that he promptly corrected that +mistake when I pointed it out to him, and then authorized me to +act upon my own judgment. + +Now, at this late day, when I am so much older than General Thomas +was at the time of these events, I feel at liberty to discuss them +without reserve. I am not criticizing the acts of my official +superior. In my mature judgment, General Thomas was not justifiable, +in 1864-1865, in claiming the credit for what had been done by his +inferior in rank in actual command of the army in the field while +General Thomas himself was absent. + + INCONSISTENCIES IN GENERAL THOMAS'S REPORT + +So, in respect to the battle of Nashville, it would have been +utterly impossible to have given any rational explanation of the +action of my troops on December 15 under the published orders for +that battle. Hence I alluded, as lightly as possible, to the +modification in those orders which accounted for what I had done, +but gave no hint of the fact that I had suggested that modification. +I cannot now recollect whether I had any expectation at that time +in respect to what General Thomas would say on that subject in his +report; but, in my opinion, his well-known character would have +been fully justified the expectation that he would say in substance +that the foregoing plan of battle, which had been previously +prepared, was so far modified, upon the suggestion of General +Schofield and with the concurrence of other commanders, as to order +the Twenty-third Corps to a position in rear of our right, from +which it could reinforce the main attack on the enemy's left, +instead of to the reserve position on the left of the Fourth Corps. +It does not seem to me that a veteran general could have suffered +in his own estimation or in that of the world by such an act of +justice or generosity to a young subordinate. But the plain, +unavoidable truth is that General Thomas said in his report, besides +his statement about the "few alterations": "Finding General Smith +had not taken as much distance to the right as I expected he would +have done, I directed General Schofield to move his command (the +Twenty-third Corps) from the position in reserve to which it had +been assigned over to the right of General Smith . . ."--leaving +it necessarily to be inferred that "the position in reserve" referred +to was that to which it had been assigned in the published orders, +and that the Twenty-third Corps moved "over" from that position +"to the right of General Smith" after General Thomas gave directions +to that effect in the afternoon of December 15. Whereas, in fact, +that corps had moved over to the right at daylight in the morning, +so as to be ready for the action which General Thomas finally +ordered; otherwise it could not possibly have moved over to Smith's +right before dark. In fact, one of the divisions (Couch's) of the +Twenty-third Corps advanced with Smith's corps, "keeping within +supporting distance," as stated in my report, so that Couch was +able to take a very important part in the attack that day; while +Cox, though much nearer than General Thomas indicated, could not +reach the right till near the close of the day's operations, though +in time to take part in the final engagement in repelling the +enemy's attempt to regain lost ground. When it is remembered that +General Thomas was at the rear of our right, where all this could +be distinctly seen, no comment seems to be necessary on this feature +of his report. + +In respect to the statement in my report that I had in the night +of December 15 "waited upon the commanding general and received +his orders for the pursuit," that was simply a fact without which +there was possible no rational explanation of what occurred, or +did not occur, the next day. I must have taken it for granted that +General Thomas would make some frank and candid explanation of all +those matters in his own report, and I could not have imagined that +I might incur his displeasure by telling the simple truth. My +opinion of his character forbade the possibility of any supposition +that he would desire to conceal anything, even if concealment were +possible, of facts to which there were so many witnesses. Hence +my astonishment at the discovery of so much that I cannot even +attempt to explain. + +It was publicly stated, soon after the death of General Thomas, +that his mortal stroke occurred when he was trying to write something +in regard to the use made of the Twenty-third Corps in the battle +of Nashville. If he then saw, as it would seem he must have done, +the wrong into which he had been betrayed, his sudden death is +fully accounted for to the minds of all who knew his true and honest +and sensitive nature. He had been betrayed by some malign influence +into an outrage upon his own great reputation which it was not +possible to explain away, while the slight wrong he had done to +me, even if he had intended it, had already proved utterly harmless. +His own great record could not possibly suffer from my discussion +of the facts, unless those facts themselves proved damaging to him; +and he had been too much accustomed to such discussion to be +disturbed thereby. There seems no possible explanation of the +great shock General Thomas received but the discovery that he had +apparently done an irreparable injury to himself. But I do not +believe General Thomas himself was the author of those acts which +were so foreign to his nature. + + FALSE REPRESENTATIONS MADE TO GENERAL THOMAS + +At Nashville, in December, 1864, and afterward, General Thomas +appears to have been made the victim of a conspiracy to poison his +mind by false accusations against his senior subordinate. A press +report of a conversation said to have taken place in San Francisco +in the year 1869, between General Thomas and General Halleck, gave +some indication of the effect which had been produced on the mind +of General Thomas. From that time forward there appeared frequent +indications of the secret operations of that conspiracy; but no +public knowledge of its character or authors came to my knowledge +until 1881, when there appeared in the "New-York Times" of June 22 +an article, copied from the Toledo "Northern Ohio Democrat," which +disclosed the character of the false accusations which had been +made to General Thomas at Nashville, and the name of their principal, +if not sole, author. That publication gave me for the first time +the means of refuting a vile slander which had been doing its deadly +work in secret for nearly seventeen years. The following correspondence +with General Grant shows the character of that slander, and its +complete refutation: + + "London, England, July 12, 1881. +"General U. S. Grant, New York, U. S. A. + +"My dear General: For a long time I have been made aware of the +fact that a base falsehood was secretly circulated throughout the +country, to the effect that while General Thomas's army was at +Nashville in December, 1864, I endeavored in some way to influence +you or somebody in Washington to remove him from the command and +to place me in his stead. I have not heretofore been able to defend +myself against this slander because of its secrecy. But now, for +the first time within my knowledge, this falsehood has made its +appearance in public print, in the form of an article in the Toledo +"Northern Ohio Democrat," copied into the "New-York Times" of June +22, of which I send you a slip. + +"You, my dear General, are probably the only man now living who is +able to make an authoritative statement of the facts in respect to +this matter, such as must be accepted without question. + +"I hope, therefore, it is not asking too much to request you to +give me, in a form which I may use publicly, a full and explicit +statement of the facts in respect to this accusation. + +"Perhaps you may also be able to recall the substance of a conversation +between you and me, on the subject of the delay of Thomas to attack +Hood at Nashville, which occurred on the naval steamer on our way +from Hampton Roads to Cape Fear River, when we went down to see +Admiral Porter and General Terry while my troops were delayed by +the ice in the Potomac. + +"In that conversation I tried to justify Thomas's delay during the +storm at Nashville, and, I thought, perhaps succeeded in modifying +to some extent your opinion on the subject. If you are able to +recollect the substance of that conversation, a statement of it +would be an effective answer to the malicious charge that I was +not faithful to Thomas as my commanding officer. + +"Not knowing where you may be when this letter reaches the United +States, I send it to Colonel Wherry, to be sent you by mail or +handed you by one of my aides, as may be most convenient. Please +do me the great favor to send to Wherry, or the other officer who +may call upon you, an answer which he may use in public refutation +of the malicious charge which has been made against me. + +"He can then send it to me. The vipers are taking advantage of my +absence to publish falsehoods and given them a long start of the +truth which must be sent in pursuit. I am, dear General, as ever, +sincerely yours, + + "J. M. Schofield." + + THEIR FALSITY CONFIRMED BY GENERAL GRANT + + "New York, August 1, 1881. +"General J. M. Schofield. + +"Dear General: Your letter of the 12th of July has just been handed +me by Colonel Wherry of your staff. I have read it carefully, +together with the article from the Toledo "Democrat." The elapse +of time since the event spoken of in that article is so great that +I feel some hesitation in answering your letter and the article +from the "Democrat" as I might do if I had access to the archives +at Washington; but, writing from memory, I think I can say with +great positiveness there was never any despatch from you to me, or +from you to any one in Washington, disparaging General Thomas's +movements at Nashville. On the contrary, my recollection is that +when I met you on your way to Wilmington, N. C., subsequent to the +battle of Nashville, you explained the situation at Nashville prior +to General Thomas's movement against Hood, with a view of removing +the feeling that I had that Thomas had been slow. I was very +impatient at that time with what I thought was tardiness on the +part of General Thomas, and was very much afraid that while he was +lying there at Nashville and not moving his army, Hood might cross +the Tennessee River either above or below the city of Nashville, +and get between him and the Ohio River, and make a retrograde +movement of our army at Nashville a necessity, and very much +embarrass and delay future operations of the armies. Laboring +under this feeling and impression, I was telegraphing General Thomas +daily, and almost hourly, urging him to move out and attack Hood, +and finally became so impatient that I contemplated his removal +and the substitution of another officer in his place; but this +feeling on my part was not added to by any despatches from any +person from the scene of action, except those from General Thomas +himself. I have certainly no recollection of receiving any despatches +from Nashville, during the time spoken of in the article in the +"Democrat," from any person but General Thomas himself. I feel +very sure that if any despatches had been received from you, I +should now recollect it; and I am free to say that it would have +created a prejudice to your disadvantage if I had received any such +despatches. This much you are at liberty to use in any way you +may deem proper. The other reflections which the author of the +article alluded to [made] against you I of course am not called +upon to say anything in regard to. The fact is, your subsequent +promotions are proof positive that I entertained none of the views +set forth to your disadvantage in this article. Very truly yours, + + "U. S. Grant." + +The article above referred to asserted that "General Thomas knew +three days before the battle of Nashville that Schofield was playing +the part of Judas by telegraphing to General Grant, at Washington, +disparaging suggestions about the action of Thomas," and pretended +to quote the language of one of those despatches, as follows: "It +is the opinion of all our officers with whom I have conversed that +General Thomas is too tardy in moving against the enemy . . . " +It is also stated that "it was known to a number of our officers +that . . . Schofield was intriguing with Grant to get Thomas +relieved, in order that he might succeed to the command of our army +as the general next in rank to Thomas, . . . and he was watched +and exposed to Thomas." + +This boastful avowal by James B. Steedman of his own crime in making +reports which were false and slanderous to his commanding general +must doubtless be accepted as conclusive proof of his own guilt. +But a statement by such a witness cannot be regarded as proof that +any other officer was guilty of the same crime. So far as I know, +no other has ever made any avowal, public or private, of his own +guilt, or that of any one else. Nor has any other, so far as I +know, denied the truth of my statements, repeated in this volume, +of what occurred in the council held at Nashville on December 9, +1864. + +It does not seem probable that one such man as James B. Steedman +could have exerted such a powerful and baneful influence over +General George H. Thomas as that which now appears to have governed +his action. There must, it would seem, have been some others, as +Steedman asserted. If so, it is time for them, if living, to come +to the front and claim their share in the work of falsifying history, +of poisoning the mind and heart of their great and noble commander, +causing his untimely death, and endangering his great reputation +as a man of honor, truth, and justice. + + THEIR FALSITY CONDEMNED BY GENERAL GRANT + +The complete refutation by General Grant of the falsehood ended +the hostility which had been shown toward me during all that time, +and gradually led to a general recognition of the truth, which had +always been known and maintained by the most ardent friends of +General Thomas, like the late General J. S. Fullerton and General +H. V. Boynton, and the staff officers and the relatives of the +general himself. Finally, when it was proposed in Congress to +recognize my past services by promotion to the grade of lieutenant- +general on the eve of my retirement from active service, not a +voice in opposition was heard from the old Army of the Cumberland; +and when we met, for the first time in many years, by their cordial +invitation, on the historic fields of Chickamauga and Chattanooga, +to dedicate those grounds as sacred to the memory of the Army of +the Cumberland and its great commander, we met again as brother +soldiers, without any trace of the bitterness which malicious +slander had for so many years sunk deep into our hearts. + +For my part, I had for many years before refused to believe that +my old commander, whom I had so faithfully served and so highly +respected, could possibly have done me in his own mind and heart +the grievous wrong which he appeared to have done. Not long after +his death, and many years before the public refutation of the +slander which he was said to have accepted and believed, I put on +record my deliberate opinion that of General Thomas's character as +a man and a soldier his warmest eulogists had not spoken too highly. +And now, no matter what injustice General Thomas may have done me +under the malign influence which surrounded him, I refuse to alter +that deliberate judgment. He is to me in memory the same noble +old soldier and commander that he was when he intrusted to me the +command of his army in Tennessee, from Pulaski through Columbia, +Spring Hill, and Franklin to Nashville, and commended all I had +done in that command. + +Truthful military history cannot be written without some criticism. +"He who never made a mistake never made war." I am keenly sensible +of the delicacy of my personal relation to the history of General +Thomas, as well as of my obligation to contribute my share to that +history, which no other man could ever do if I neglected it. I +have written it with the greatest possible care. If I have fallen +into error in anything, there are men still living who can correct +my mistakes. It will be more just to the memory of General Thomas +to publish it now than to wait until all who could correct any +errors of mine are silent in death. Thus far none of the several +friends of General Thomas to whom I have applied have been able to +give me any explanation of the record referred to which modifies +that which I have stated. If any one can suggest a more satisfactory +explanation, he will earn my gratitude. + +[( 1) See Thomas to Sherman, November 12, 1864, 8:30 A. M.: "Your +despatch of 12 last night received. I have no fear that Beauregard +can do us any harm now; and if he attempts to follow you, I will +follow him as far as possible. If he does not follow you, I will +then thoroughly organize my troops, and I believe I shall have men +enough to ruin him unless he gets out of the way very rapidly. +The country through middle Alabama, I learn, is teeming with supplies +this year, which will be greatly to our advantage. + +"I have no additional news to report from the direction of Florence. +I am now convinced that the greater part of Beauregard's army is +near Florence and Tuscumbia, and that you will at least have a +clear road before you for several days, and that your success will +fully equal your expectations."] + +[( 2) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part iii, p. 624.] + + +CHAPTER XVI +Sherman's "March to the Sea"--The Military Theory On Which It Was +Based--Did It Involve War or Statesmanship?--The Correspondence +Between Grant and Sherman, and Sherman and Thomas--The Effect of +Jefferson Davis's Speech on Sherman--Rawlins's Reported Opposition +to the March, and Grant's Final Judgment On It. + +During the Atlanta campaign the principal commanders of the army +assumed, as a matter of course, that Atlanta would be ours in due +time, and hence there was much discussion of the question, What +next? It was evident the army could not go much farther and rely +upon its present line of supply, although General Thomas said, +immediately after the capture of Atlanta, that he had "a plan for +the capture of Macon" which he would like to execute. What the +plan was he did not divulge, General Sherman turning the conversation +in another direction. At that time it was presumed Hood would +oppose whatever move was attempted, and hence a new base, to be +provided in advance, if practicable, by the capture of some place +on the gulf or on the Atlantic, was evidently essential to further +operations in Georgia. This new base being provided, Sherman could +move out from Atlanta with twenty or thirty days' supplies in +wagons, and swing round Hood so as to place his rear toward the +new base and open communication therewith. Evidently the march to +the sea, as it was actually made, was impossible, and was not +thought of until Hood moved from Sherman's front and cleared the +way. + +In the popular judgment formed immediately after important events, +success or failure is the only criterion of wisdom; but the historian +must go deeper, and consider the merits of a general plan in view +of the greater or less probability of failure of any one of its +parts. What would have been the just judgment of mankind upon +Sherman's march to the sea if Thomas had failed, as Sherman with +a much larger force had done, to destroy or seriously cripple Hood's +army? Or what, if Hood had succeeded in his projected invasion of +Kentucky--an event much less improbable than many that have actually +occurred in war? If Hood had succeeded in overwhelming the smaller +force that opposed him at Columbia, Spring Hill, and Franklin, as +he came near doing, Nashville would have fallen an easy prey, for +it was not defensible by any force Thomas then had there. Thomas's +cavalry was not yet remounted, and Forrest, with his troopers, +would have had nearly a clear field of Kentucky while Hood marched +to the Ohio. What offset to this would have been the capture of +Savannah as a "Christmas gift" to the nation? + +The situation at that time was certainly a perplexing one to Sherman. +He could not permit Hood to put him, with his superior force, on +the defensive, nor even to appear to do so for a moment; and it +was not easy for him to consent that his enemy should entirely +nullify all his elaborately considered plans for future operations +in Georgia. What operations Sherman decided on in that unprecedented +case is well known. + + SHERMAN'S "MARCH TO THE SEA" + +When Sherman cut loose and started for Savannah on November 12, he +had not, as events proved, sufficient reason for assuming "Thomas's +strength and ability to meet Hood in the open field," or even to +hold Nashville against him, much less to hold "the line of the +Tennessee River firmly," which was the condition upon which Grant +at first consented that Sherman might make "the trip to the sea- +coast."( 1) + +Thomas's concurrence in Sherman's opinion, as shown in his despatch +of November 12, simply shows that they were both in the same error; +for A. J. Smith's troops did not begin to arrive at Nashville until +the day of the battle of Franklin (November 30), and they were a +very important part of the force relied upon in Sherman's plan. +The whole fate of the Tennessee campaign was decided by the delay +of Hood at Columbia and Spring Hill and his defeat in the desperate +battle of Franklin, and this by two of Sherman's six corps, without +the aid of any of the reinforcements upon which he counted so +largely, and about which he says so much. It is not too much to +say that the hazards of that retreat from Pulaski and of the defense +at Franklin were far greater than any portion of Sherman's army +had ever before encountered, and far greater than any army ever +ought to meet except in case of necessity--hazards which, at that +stage of the war, with our vastly superior armies in the field, it +would have been inexcusable voluntarily to incur. If it is asked +why such hazard was taken, the answer has heretofore been given. +By it alone could the time be gained which was necessary for Thomas's +reinforcements to reach Nashville. The time gained was barely +sufficient; one day less might have been fatal. + +The question that at once arises is, Why have taken even a chance +of error in a matter of so vital moment--an error that might have +led to disastrous consequences? Hood was already on the Tennessee +River, preparing to cross and begin his march to Nashville. Thomas +had ready to meet him only about two thirds Hood's strength in +infantry, and less than half in effective cavalry. A few days' +delay on Sherman's part in commencing his march would have disclosed +to him the impossibility of Smith's arrival in time, and have +enabled him to send another corps from his superabundant force to +assist Thomas. Such delay of only a few days could not have been +of serious consequence in respect to Sherman's plans. The near +approach of winter was the only reason why an early start was +important; and that was not considered any very serious obstacle +to the operations of Hood or Thomas in a more unfavorable country +for winter operations. + +The railroad was in running order to Atlanta, and the enemy's +cavalry were then known to be far from it. Sherman could have kept +his army supplied, and ready to start any day he pleased. Why not +have waited to see whether Thomas could get together troops enough +to cope with Hood, and then, when sufficient preparation had been +assured to fight the enemy, and only then, start off on a march +where there was no considerable enemy to fight? + +In the estimate of time, Sherman had no right to disregard even +Thomas's well-known "slowness of thought and action," but was bound +to take that into account. + +I have never yet been able to see the wisdom of taking any hazard +of defeat in Tennessee when we had ample force at command to secure +victory there, with enough remaining to march wherever its commander +pleased through the South, except where Hood's or Lee's army might +be. By this I mean to say that three, or even two, of Sherman's +corps could have gone to Savannah, or anywhere else, just as well +as four, and thus have left Thomas force enough to make the defeat +of Hood sure beyond contingency; or that Sherman should have delayed +his march to the sea until Thomas had concentrated troops enough +to defeat Hood. + + THE MILITARY THEORY ON WHICH IT WAS BASED + +The question which now presents itself for critical consideration +is, Upon what military theory was Sherman's "march to the sea" +based? + +Sherman himself explains it as a change of base, and he estimates +its value in comparison with that of his subsequent operations in +the ratio of one to ten. But why those subsequent operations, or +a change of base with a view to any such ulterior purpose? Grant +had not at that time even suggested the need of Sherman's aid +against Lee, and events proved that no such need existed. When +Sherman started for Savannah from Atlanta, the Confederate force +in the Gulf States was quite equal to Lee's army in Virginia, while +Grant's army was larger than Sherman's. Could Sherman have +contemplated at that time such a thing as going to Grant's assistance, +where he was not needed, and leaving Hood's army behind him? + +A change of base to Savannah or Mobile had been contemplated as a +probable necessity of future operations in Georgia or in the Gulf +States, upon the capture of Atlanta; but that of course upon the +supposition that there would still be a formidable army of the +Confederacy in those States against which operations were to be +conducted. When that Confederate army, under Hood, marched toward +the west, with the evident intention to carry the war into Tennessee +and Kentucky, why a change of base by Sherman in the opposite +direction, to Savannah? + +Sherman appears to have supposed at first that Hood would follow +him when he started on his march through Georgia, as Hood had +supposed that Sherman would follow him into Tennessee. Was there +any more reason for the one supposition than the other? Ought not +Sherman as well as Hood to have known his antagonist better than +such a supposition would imply? Was it not extremely unreasonable +to suppose that Hood, after he had marched hundreds of miles west +from Atlanta and reached the base of his projected operations in +Tennessee, would turn back and follow Sherman at such a distance +in his rear? It is perfectly evident that such a stern-chase by +Hood was contemplated only as a bare possibility, not by any means +as a probable result of Sherman's march. It could have had no +influence in forming Sherman's final determination to make that +march. In fact, the march does not appear to have been finally +decided on--certainly it was not commenced--until Hood had gone so +far in the opposite direction as to make his pursuit of Sherman +out of the question, and had fully disclosed his plan to invade +Tennessee. It was surely, therefore, an extraordinary spectacle +to see the main Union army marching where there was no considerable +hostile force to meet it, leaving a comparatively small detachment +to cope with the formidable enemy! + +Of course Sherman could not fall back into Tennessee, and thus let +Hood put him on the defensive, even for a short time. He could +afford only to send back a detachment large enough to enable Thomas, +with the other forces he could assemble, to hold Nashville and +prevent Hood from crossing the Cumberland. This is virtually but +little more than what Sherman did in that regard. + + THE MILITARY THEORY ON WHICH IT WAS BASED + +There then remained to Sherman practically only one line of action +at all consistent with the dictates of established principles in +the conduct of a military campaign: That was to strike with his +superior remaining force for Hood's rear, south of the Tennessee +River. Such a movement could have been commenced immediately upon +Hood's march in that direction. Supplies would have been drawn, +first from Chattanooga, and afterward from Stevenson, and then from +Decatur, Sherman's line of supply being thus very much shortened. +A small detachment at Atlanta could have destroyed the works of +military value in that place, and the railroad thence back to +Chattanooga, being completely covered in this work by Sherman's +army, without delaying its march a single day. Sherman could thus +have easily struck Hood south of the Tennessee before the latter +could have made his preparations for crossing that river. Indeed, +with Sherman marching in that direction, even so bold a man as Hood +could hardly have been so reckless as to have crossed the Tennessee; +and if he had, his destruction must have been sure. Hence the +least result would have been simply to transfer the theater of +operations from Georgia to Alabama, or perhaps to Mississippi, and +greatly to shorten Sherman's line of supply. And what possible +difference could it make in which part of the revolted States the +theater of war might be, so long as the Confederate army, to destroy +which was the only important object of a campaign, was there? To +avoid a transfer of the battlefield from Georgia to Alabama or +Mississippi, was it wise to run the risk of transferring it to +Kentucky or Ohio? Perhaps no movement which could have been +contemplated by the Confederate authorities would have been more +greatly to Sherman's advantage over Hood than the one they adopted. + +I cannot better show my own exact impression at the time respecting +the operations of Sherman and Hood in 1864, than by an illustration +that will be at once appreciated on every farm in America. When +two fighting-cocks meet for the first time, battle is joined without +delay, and is prosecuted with all possible vigor and skill. If +the result is decisive the victor's triumph is loudly proclaimed, +while the defeated combatant, with lowered crest, seeks safety in +flight. If, on the contrary, the result is a drawn battle, the +two antagonists, as if by common consent, slowly separate, carrying +their heads high, and sharply watching each other. When distance +has assured the close of that contest, they severally go to feeding, +as if nothing unusual had happened, or else march off to seek some +less formidable foe. Neither utters a note of defiance until he +is well beyond the other's reach. + +The correspondence between Grant and Sherman, especially the letters +from Grant of September 12, and from Sherman of September 20, both +carried by Grant's staff officer, Colonel Horace Porter, show a +complete understanding of the situation at that time, and perfect +accord in respect to the operations appropriate to that situation.( 2) +Savannah was to be captured, if practicable, by military and naval +forces from the east, and Sherman was so to manoeuver in respect +to Hood's army as to swing round the latter and thus place himself +in position to open communication with Savannah as his new base. +This was the simple, logical plan dictated by the situation, which +had for a long time been considered and worked out after weighing +all the advantages and disadvantages of other possible plans. + +But very soon after Sherman despatched his letter of September 20 +by Colonel Porter, Hood commenced his movement to Sherman's rear, +and then far to the west, which was designed to and did radically +change the military situation in view of which the carefully matured +plan described in Sherman's letter of September 20 had been formed. +Sherman, as clearly appears from his despatches later than September +20, considered long and apparently with great doubt what change +ought to be made in his own plans in consequence of the altered +situation due to the unexpected movements of his enterprising +adversary. That some very important change in Sherman's plans was +imperative was a matter of course. A general cannot well make his +own plans entirely upon his own theory as to what his enemy will +or ought to do, but must be governed in some measure by what the +other actually does. General Sherman evidently perceived quite +clearly what established rules of action required to be done, and +General Grant even more clearly, as was shown in his despatches of +October 11, 1864, and others. + + THE MILITARY THEORY ON WHICH IT WAS BASED + +It seems hardly possible to speak seriously of many of the reasons +given by Sherman for finally deciding to leave his old adversary +to the care of Thomas's inferior force. He said, for instance, in +his despatch to Grant of November 2: "If I could hope to overhaul +Hood, I would turn against him with my whole force. . . . No single +army can catch him."( 3) Sherman had been "catching" Hood with a +single army all summer, and without the slightest difficulty. What +reason had he to conclude that it would be impossible to do so +later? As my experience proved, it was as easy to "catch" him in +November, though with a smaller force, as it had been in July and +August with a much larger force, and Thomas had the same experience +in December. As Sherman knew from his own experience, as well as +I, whether the pursuing force was larger or smaller, Hood was about +the easiest man in the world to "catch," even by a "single" army. +But Sherman had under his command at that time, in Georgia and +Tennessee, as he said with great emphasis and confidence, two +armies, each larger than Hood's, even assuming the largest estimate +then made of the strength of Hood's army. It appears that Sherman +gave Hood credit at that time for only thirty thousand infantry, +besides cavalry.( 4) If that was his estimate, then he had at +least three or four armies (including the reinforcements he counted +on for Thomas in Tennessee), each equal in strength to Hood's. Is +it possible Sherman thought he could not catch Hood with three or +four armies? But another despatch from Sherman, dated November 2, +seems to show that his estimate of Hood's army was more than 50,000, +instead of 30,000; for in that despatch he said in substance that +unless he drew Slocum's corps back from Atlanta, and abandoned that +place, his army would be inferior to Hood's.( 5) Now Slocum's +corps numbered 10,000 men, and Sherman marched to the sea with +60,000 after stripping down to the best possible fighting condition. +Hence Sherman, after sending back the Fourth and Twenty-third corps +to Thomas, and leaving out Slocum's corps, had 50,000 men, and +therefore according to this reckoning Hood had _more_ than 50,000. +Forty thousand would have been a reasonable estimate for Sherman +to have made of Hood's strength, with his more accurate knowledge +than any of his subordinate commanders could have. But, somehow, +the estimate of Hood's force at that time accepted by Thomas and +his subordinates in Tennessee was 45,000, besides cavalry, which +as understood to be 10,000, or even 12,000 including Forrest's +separate command. But even this was less than half of Sherman's +two armies. + +Sherman made no attempt to "catch" Hood during his raid in Sherman's +rear in September, 1864, nor to interfere with his movement to the +west. In his "Memoirs,"( 6) Sherman says: "At first I thought of +interposing my whole army in the Chattooga Valley, so as to prevent +Hood's escape south. . . . He would be likely to retreat eastward +by Spring Place, which I did not want him to do." Even thus early +in the game Sherman saw the opportunity Hood was probably going to +give him to make his projected change of base to Savannah, and +hence he took care not to prevent Hood from completing his "co- +operative" movement. + +Sherman determined to destroy Atlanta and his railroad back to +Chattanooga, abandon entirely his former base of operations and +line of supply, and assume a new base of future operations on the +Atlantic or the gulf. In other words, Sherman decided that he +could not attempt to hold any part of the territory he had conquered +in the Atlanta campaign; that conquest was valuable only in the +opportunity it gave him to destroy everything of military importance +in that territory--that is, Atlanta and the railroads. The question +then arises, What possible difference could it make in which +direction he moved after having decided not to hold any part of +that territory, but to destroy it? Why would a move toward the +west any more than a move toward the east have the appearance of +losing all that had been gained, after he had destroyed it? The +simple fact is, the Confederate commander had abandoned Georgia to +its fate in the vain hope of putting Sherman on the defensive, not +realizing, apparently, that Sherman had ample force for defensive +purposes, besides an army superior to Hood's for aggressive +operations. The Southern army was thus placed where Sherman could +operate against it by a much shorter line, and hence with a much +larger force, if that was what he wished to do. He could at the +same time, if he thought it necessary or desirable, inflict upon +Georgia the destruction which the Confederate commander wanted to +prevent, but had in fact invited by abandoning that State, and that +without materially impairing the strength of his (Sherman's) main +army operating against the main force of the enemy. As suggested +by Grant, a cavalry raid through Georgia would have accomplished +that destruction as well as a march of 60,000 men. Hence, in the +light of all that appears in the records up to the time when Sherman +actually started on his march, no valid military reason had been +given why Sherman should not have sent a cavalry raid into Georgia, +as Grant suggested, to destroy everything there, and thus negative +Mr. Davis's promise of protection, while he (Sherman) pursued +relentlessly the strictly military plan Grant had prescribed for +him to break up Hood's army or capture it, which Sherman had yet +failed to accomplish. + +Manifestly some other motive besides the motives stated in Sherman's +telegraphic despatches must have decided him to carry out his plan +to make the march to the sea. + +The boastful assurance and threat of the Confederate commander-in- +chief,( 7) referred to by Sherman, gave at least some reason for +Sherman's defiant response by himself marching through Georgia +instead of sending a subordinate; and the partial execution of that +threat by Forrest's cavalry, referred to in Sherman's despatch of +November 1 to Grant, gave a strong reason for Sherman's eager +determination to march at once, without waiting for anything but +his own preparations. In his article, "The Grand Strategy of the +Last Year of the War,"( 8) Sherman reveals one of the reasons for +his haste in starting on his march. "How free and glorious I felt," +he says, "when the magic telegraph was cut, which prevented the +possibility of orders of any kind from the rear coming to delay or +hinder us!" A letter written by Sherman to Grant, November 6, on +the eve of his start for the sea, also gave reasons, other than +military, for his famous march. In Sherman's "Memoirs" no quotation +is made from this letter,( 9) and it is referred to very briefly +without giving any suggestion of its important contents. + +General Sherman thus stated his reasons for writing that letter: +"I have heretofore telegraphed and written you pretty fully, but +I still have some thoughts in my busy brain that should be confided +to you as a key to future developments." + + DID IT INVOLVE WAR OR STATESMANSHIP? + +Then Sherman explained, with the art of which he was master, clearly, +logically, and convincingly, the reasons for the operations of his +army from the fall of Atlanta down to the time of his writing, by +which he had completely defeated his adversary's designs, closing +with the following language: + +"Now, as to the second branch of my proposition, I admit that the +first object should be the destruction of that army; and if Beauregard +moves his infantry and artillery up into that pocket about Jackson +and Paris, I will feel strongly tempted to move Thomas directly +against him, and myself move rapidly by Decatur and Purdy to cut +off his retreat. . . . These are the reasons which have determined +my former movements." + +General Sherman then continues by explaining the reasons which +induced him not to carry out the movement above suggested. + +Now come the reasons for the future movements upon which Sherman +had then fully decided, after having obtained General Grant's +consent, and which he was about to begin. After stating what he +had done "in the last ten days" to prepare for his march, he said: + +"Then the question presents itself what shall be done? On the +supposition always that Thomas can hold the line of the Tennessee, +and very shortly be able to assume the offensive as against +Beauregard, I propose to act in such a manner against the material +resources of the South as utterly to negative Davis's boasted threat +and promises of protection. If we can march a well-appointed army +right through his territory, it is a demonstration to the world, +foreign and domestic, that we have a power which Davis cannot +resist. This may not be war, but rather statesmanship; nevertheless +it is overwhelming to my mind that there are thousands of people +abroad and in the South who will reason thus: If the North can +march an army right through the South, it is proof positive that +the North can prevail in this contest, leaving only open the question +of its willingness to use that power." + +It was, perhaps, not _war_, but rather _statesmanship_ upon which +Sherman was about to enter--not to defeat and destroy or capture +the Confederate armies, but to demonstrate in the most positive +manner that the "North can prevail in this contest," provided only +it is willing to use its power. And by what means was this +demonstration to be made? By marching a large army through the +South where there was and could be no Confederate army able to +oppose it, destroying everything of military value, including food, +and continuing this operation until the government and people of +the Southern States, and people abroad, should find the demonstration +convincing. Again I quote: + +"Now, Mr. Lincoln's election, which is assured, coupled with the +conclusion thus reached, makes a complete, logical whole. Even +without a battle, the result, operating upon the minds of sensible +men, would produce fruits more than compensating for the expense, +trouble, and risk." + +The election of Mr. Lincoln meant, of course, continued ascendancy +of the "war party" at the North, and that, coupled with the conclusion +above reached, made, as Sherman so forcibly stated it, "a complete, +logical whole." + +General Sherman then went on to give in his masterly way the +advantages and disadvantages of the several objectives open to him +as the goal of his march, reserving to himself finally the choice +between three,--Savannah, Mobile, and Pensacola,--trusting to +Richmond papers to keep Grant well advised of his movements and of +his final choice of the objective; and then, near the close of this +letter, in discussing the military aspects of his proposed march, +upon which he was about entering, he reverted to the old theory of +the line of the Tennessee--"on the supposition always that Thomas +can hold the line of the Tennessee, and very shortly be able to +assume the offensive as against Beauregard." + + DID IT INVOLVE WAR OR STATESMANSHIP? + +It is impossible not to admire the thoroughness with which Sherman +had considered all possible or even imaginary difficulties in his +way, nor to suppress a smile at the supreme confidence with which +he set out, with sixty thousand of the best soldiers in the world, +upon a march through a fine healthy country laden with abundance +of supplies for men and animals, at a time when only two armies in +the South were strong enough to offer him any serious opposition, +both of them farther from his line of march than he was from his +goal when he started, one besieged by Grant in Petersburg, and the +other already commencing an aggressive campaign against Thomas in +Tennessee! It is equally impossible to speak seriously of the +apprehension of some geographers and logisticians that Hood would +interfere in some way with Sherman's march through Georgia. Hood +could not have got within two hundred miles of Sherman before the +latter had destroyed as much of Georgia as he wished, and then +captured Savannah. Of course Sherman was not disturbed by any +apprehension that Hood might possibly oppose the march to Savannah. +He could have meant by what he said in his despatches on the subject +only that Hood would be compelled by "public clamor" to return to +Georgia to defend that State against Sherman's _further_ operations. +Hence his strong insistence that Thomas pursue Hood with energy, +and thus keep him out of his (Sherman's) way. + +It had never occurred to me, if the fact ever existed, that the +rebellion could not be suppressed by crushing or capturing the +Confederate armies, or that our vastly superior military strength +must necessarily be employed in crushing the Southern people, +however much they might deserve crushing, or else that we must give +up the contest. Yet while I never saw the necessity for what +Sherman called "statesmanship" rather than "war," I would never +have hesitated for a moment to say, what I now repeat, if it really +was necessary, in order to put down the rebellion and restore the +Union, to destroy all the property in the South, in the name of a +just and beneficent God, destroy it all! Hence my objection to +Sherman's plans was based upon my conviction that such plans were +not at that time, and never had been, necessary. Yet such plans +are legitimate and often necessary, and no man is wise enough to +tell in advance whether they may prove to be necessary or not. +The surest way to reach results is the way Sherman adopted. In +either a civil or foreign war, such methods may be very bad policy; +but very few men are cool-headed enough in civil war, even if wise +enough, to see what good policy dictates, and this is even more +true of men at a distance than of those at the front. Men who have +been fighting most of the time for three or four years generally +become pretty cool, while those in the rear seem to become hotter +and hotter as the end approaches, and even for some time after it +is reached. They must in some way work off the surplus passion +which the soldier has already exhausted in battle. Whatever may +be true as to Sherman's methods before Lee surrendered, the +destruction inflicted on the South after that time was solely the +work of passion, and not of reason. Of this last Sherman was +innocent. + +Sherman's destruction of military supplies and railroads did +undoubtedly render impossible any great prolongation of the war, +if that would otherwise have been possible; but it did not materially +hasten the actual collapse of the rebellion, which was due to +Grant's capture of Lee's army. Besides, if Grant had not captured +Lee, Sherman would. Lee could not possibly have escaped them both. +Hence Sherman's destruction of property in Georgia, South Carolina, +and North Carolina did not hasten the end of the rebellion. If +General Sherman was, at the time he planned his march to the sea, +informed of the nearly bankrupt condition of the United States +treasury, that fact went far toward justifying his action in leaving +as small a force as possible with Thomas, and even in starting on +his march before Thomas was fully ready to meet Hood. For to make +his demonstration early enough and as convincing as possible to +the people of the South and all the world, it was important to move +at once, and to show that his march was not a mere rapid _raid_, +but a deliberate march of a formidable army capable of crushing +anything that might get in its way, and that without waiting for +anything that might occur in its rear. Such a march of such an +army might well have been sufficient to convince everybody that +the United States had the military power to crush the rebellion, +and even destroy everything in the South, before the world should +find out that the resources of the government had been exhausted, +and that the United States had not the financial strength necessary +to make any further military use of the million of men they then +had on the muster- and pay-rolls. To have given the still more +convincing proof of the power of the Union, by destroying one of +the Confederate armies, would have taken a longer time. + + CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GRANT AND SHERMAN + +The following despatches fully show Sherman's first plan, assented +to by Grant, the essential feature of which was that Thomas should +be able to "hold the line of the Tennessee firmly," and the +corresponding information and instructions to Thomas: + + "Sherman to Grant + "Cartersville, Ga., October 10, 1864, 12 M. +". . . Hood is now crossing the Coosa, twelve miles below Rome, +bound west. If he passes over to the Mobile and Ohio road, had I +not better execute the plan of my letter sent by Colonel Porter, +and leave General Thomas with the troops now in Tennessee to defend +the State? He will have an ample force when the reinforcements +ordered reach Nashville." + + "Grant to Sherman + "City Point, Va., October 11, 1864, 11 A. M. +"Your despatch received. Does it not look as if Hood was going to +attempt the invasion of middle Tennessee? . . . If he does this, +he ought to be met and prevented from getting north of the Tennessee +River. If you were to cut loose, I do not believe you would meet +Hood's army. . . . Hood would probably strike for Nashville, thinking +by going north he could inflict greater damage upon us than we +could upon the rebels by going south. If there is any way of +getting at Hood's army, I would prefer that, but I must trust to +your own judgment. I find I shall not be able to send a force from +here to act with you on Savannah. Your movements, therefore, will +be independent of mine, at least until the fall of Richmond takes +place. I am afraid Thomas, with such lines of road as he has to +protect, could not prevent Hood going north. With Wilson turned +loose with all your cavalry, you will find the rebels put much more +on the defensive than heretofore." + + "Sherman to Grant. + "October 11, 1864, 10 A. M. +"Hood moved his army from Palmetto Station across by Dallas and +Cedartown, and is now on the Coosa River, south of Rome. He threw +one corps on my road at Acworth, and I was forced to follow. I +hold Atlanta with the Twentieth Corps, and have strong detachments +along my line. These reduce my active force to a comparatively +small army. We cannot remain now on the defensive. With 25,000 +men, and the bold cavalry he has, he can constantly break my road. +I would infinitely prefer to make a wreck of the road and of the +country from Chattanooga to Atlanta, including the latter city, +send back all my wounded and worthless, and, with my effective +army, move through Georgia, smashing things to the sea. Hood may +turn into Tennessee and Kentucky, but I believe he will be forced +to follow me. Instead of being on the defensive, I would be on +the offensive; instead of guessing at what he means to do, he would +have to guess at my plans. The difference in war is full 25 per +cent. I can make Savannah, Charleston, or the mouth of the +Chattahoochee. Answer quick, as I know we will not have the +telegraph long."(10) + + "Grant to Sherman. + "October 11, 1864, 11:30 P. M. +"Your despatch of to-day received. If you are satisfied the trip +to the sea-coast can be made, holding the line of the Tennessee +firmly, you may make it, destroying all the railroad south of Dalton +or Chattanooga, as you think best." + + + CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN SHERMAN AND THOMAS + + "Sherman to Thomas. + "October 20, 1864. +". . . I want all things bent to the following general plan of +action for the next three months. Out of the forces now here and +at Atlanta I propose to organize an efficient army of from 60,000 +to 65,000 men, with which I propose to destroy Macon, Augusta, and, +it may be, Savannah and Charleston, but I will always keep open +the alternatives of the mouth of Appalachicola and Mobile. By this +I propose to demonstrate the vulnerability of the South, and make +its inhabitants feel that war and individual ruin are synonymous +terms. To pursue Hood is folly, for he can twist and turn like a +fox and wear out any army in pursuit. To continue to occupy long +lines of railroads simply exposes our small detachments to be picked +up in detail, and forces me to make countermarches to protect lines +of communication. I know I am right in this, and shall proceed to +its maturity. As to detail, I propose to take General Howard and +his army, General Schofield and his, and two of your corps, viz., +Generals Davis and Slocum. . . . I will send General Stanley, with +the Fourth Corps, across by Will's Valley and Caperton's to Stevenson +to report to you. . . . I want you to retain command in Tennessee, +and before starting I will give you delegated authority over +Kentucky, Mississippi, Alabama, etc., whereby there will be unity +of action behind me. I will want you to hold Chattanooga and +Decatur in force, and on the occasion of my departure, of which +you shall have ample notice, to watch Hood close. I think he will +follow me, at least with his cavalry, in which event I want you to +push south from Decatur and the head of the Tennessee for Columbus, +Miss., and Selma, not absolutely to reach those points, but to +divert or pursue according to the state of facts. If, however, +Hood turns on you, you must act defensively on the line of the +Tennessee. . . . I do not fear that the Southern army will again +make a lodgment on the Mississippi. . . . The only hope of a Southern +success is in the remote regions difficult of access. We have now +a good entering wedge, and should drive it home. . . ." + + "Sherman to Grant. + "Gaylesville, Ala., October 22, 1864. +"I feel perfectly master of the situation here. I still hold +Atlanta and the road, with all bridges and vital points well guarded, +and I have in hand an army before which Hood has retreated +precipitately down the valley of the Coosa. It is hard to divine +his future plans; but by abandoning Georgia, and taking position +with his rear to Selma, he threatens the road from Chattanooga to +Atlanta, and may move to Tennessee by Decatur. He cannot cross +the Tennessee except at Muscle Shoals, for all other points are +patrolled by our gunboats. I am now perfecting arrangements to +put into Tennessee a force able to hold the line of the Tennessee +whilst I break up the railroad in front of Dalton, including the +city of Atlanta, and push into Georgia, and break up all its +railroads and depots, capture its horses and negroes, make desolation +everywhere, destroy the factories at Macon, Milledgeville, and +Augusta, and bring up with 60,000 men on the sea-shore about Savannah +or Charleston. I think this far better than defending a long line +of railroad. I will leave General George H. Thomas to command all +my division behind me, and take with me only the best fighting +material." + + CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GRANT AND SHERMAN + +But a few days later Sherman had made a radical change in his +previous plan. He telegraphed Grant, from Rome, Georgia, November +1, as follows: + +"As you foresaw, and as Jeff. Davis threatened, the enemy is now +in the full tide of execution of his grand plan to destroy my +communications and defeat this army. His infantry, about 30,000, +with Wheeler's and Roddey's cavalry, from 7000 to 10,000, are now +in the neighborhood of Tuscumbia and Florence, and, the water being +low, is able to cross at will. Forrest seems to be scattered from +Eastport to Jackson, Paris, and the lower Tennessee; and General +Thomas reports the capture by him of a gunboat and five transports. +General Thomas has near Athens and Pulaski Stanley's corps, about +15,000 strong, and Schofield's corps, 10,000, en route by rail, +and has at least 20,000 to 25,000 men, with new regiments and +conscripts arriving all the time; also Rosecrans promises the two +divisions of Smith and Mower, belonging to me, but I doubt if they +can reach Tennessee in less than ten days. If I were to let go +Atlanta and north Georgia and make for Hood, he would, as he did +here, retreat to the southwest, leaving his militia, now assembling +at Macon and Griffin, to occupy our conquests, and the work of last +summer would be lost. I have retained about 50,000 good troops, +and have sent back full 25,000; and having instructed General Thomas +to hold defensively Nashville, Chattanooga, and Decatur, all strongly +fortified and provisioned for a long siege, I will destroy all the +railroads of Georgia and do as much substantial damage as is +possible, reaching the sea-coast near one of the points hitherto +indicated, trusting that General Thomas, with his present troops +and the influx of new troops promised, will be able in a very few +days to assume the offensive. Hood's cavalry may do a good deal +of damage, and I have sent Wilson back with all dismounted cavalry, +retaining only about 4500. This is the best I can do, and shall, +therefore, when I get to Atlanta the necessary stores, move as soon +as possible." + +To that despatch General Grant replied, November 2: + +"Your despatch of 9 A. M. yesterday is just received. I despatched +you the same date, advising that Hood's army, now that it had worked +so far north, be looked upon more as the objective. With the force, +however, you have left with Thomas, he must be able to take care +of Hood and destroy him. I do not really see that you can withdraw +from where you are to follow Hood without giving up all we have +gained in territory. I say, then, go as you propose." + +Thus Grant gave his assent to Sherman's proposition that Nashville, +Chattanooga, and Decatur be held defensively, even during a long +siege if necessary, instead of the line of the Tennessee, as at +first insisted on by General Grant. Yet Grant's assent was given +in view of Sherman's trust that Thomas would be able _in a very +few days_ to assume the offensive. + +Sherman's despatch to Thomas of the same date (November 1) instructed +him as to the policy then determined on, in lieu of that which had +contemplated holding the line of the Tennessee firmly, as follows: + +"Despatch of last night received. The fact that Forrest is down +about Johnsonville, while Hood, with his infantry, is still about +Florence and Tuscumbia, gives you time for concentration. The +supplies about Chattanooga are immense, and I will soon be independent +of them; therefore I would not risk supplies coming in transitu +from Nashville to Chattanooga. In like manner, we have large +supplies in Nashville, and if they be well guarded, and Hood can't +get our supplies, he can't stay in Tennessee long. General Schofield +will go to you as rapidly as cars can take him. I have no doubt, +after the emergency is past, and the enemy has done us considerable +damage, reinforcements will pour to you more than can be provided +for or taken care of. In the meantime do your best. I will leave +here to-morrow for Kingston, and keep things moving toward the +south; therefore hold fast all new troops coming to you, excepting +such as are now at Chattanooga, to whom I will give orders." + +Yet in his letter to Grant, five days later, Sherman reverts to +the original plan: "On the supposition, always, that Thomas can +hold the line of the Tennessee." + +November 7, Sherman telegraphed Grant: ". . . On that day [November +10] or the following, if affairs should remain as now in Tennessee, +I propose to begin the movement which I have hitherto fully described +. . ." To which despatch General Grant replied: ". . . I see no +present reason for changing your plan. . . ." + +General Grant does not refer to the later despatches in his general +report, July 22, 1865, quoted in his "Memoirs," but uses the +following language: + +"With the troops thus left at his disposal, there was little doubt +that General Thomas could hold the line of the Tennessee, or, in +the event Hood should force it, would be able to concentrate and +beat him in battle. It was therefore readily consented to that +Sherman should start for the sea-coast." + + CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GRANT AND SHERMAN + +General Sherman also omits to make any reference in his "Memoirs" +to the despatches respecting a possible long siege of Nashville, +Chattanooga, and Decatur; but he says in a despatch of November 2 +to Grant, quoted in his "Memoirs": + +"If I turn back, the whole effect of my campaign will be lost. By +my movements I have thrown Beauregard [Hood] well to the west, and +Thomas will have ample time and sufficient troops to hold him until +the reinforcements from Missouri reach him. We have now ample +supplies at Chattanooga and Atlanta, and can stand a month's +interruption to our communications. I do not believe the Confederate +army can reach our railroad lines except by cavalry raids, and +Wilson will have cavalry enough to checkmate them. I am clearly +of opinion that the best results will follow my contemplated movement +through Georgia." + +The following language is found in a despatch dated November 11, +midnight, from Sherman to Thomas, which is especially important as +giving the last expression of his views of the situation, and of +what Thomas would be able to do after Sherman started for the sea: + +"I can hardly believe that Beauregard would attempt to work against +Nashville from Corinth as a base at this stage of the war, but all +information seems to point that way. If he does, you will whip +him out of his boots; but I rather think you will find commotion +in his camp in a day or two. Last night we burned Rome, and in +two or more days will burn Atlanta; and he must discover that I am +not retreating, but, on the contrary, fighting for the very heart +of Georgia. . . . These [some Confederate movements about Rome and +Atlanta] also seem to indicate that Beauregard expects me to retreat. +. . . To-morrow I begin the movement laid down in my Special Field +Orders, No. 115, and shall keep things moving thereafter. . . . By +using detachments of recruits and dismounted cavalry in your +fortifications, you will have Generals Schofield and Stanley and +General A. J. Smith, strengthened by eight or ten new regiments +and all of Wilson's cavalry. You could safely invite Beauregard +across the Tennessee River and prevent his ever returning. I still +believe, however, that public clamor will force him to turn and +follow me, in which event you should cross at Decatur and move +directly toward Selma as far as you can transport supplies. . . . +You may act . . . on the certainty that I sally from Atlanta on +the 16th instant with about 60,000 well provisioned, but expecting +to live chiefly on the country." + +The reason for this sudden and radical change of program is made +perfectly clear by Sherman's despatch of November 1 and others: +"The enemy is now in the full tide of execution of his grand plan +to destroy my communications and defeat this army." Sherman's +defiant spirit, thus aroused, brooked no delay. He would not wait +for anything but his own necessary preparations. Nashville, +Chattanooga, and Decatur could stand a long siege, and these alone +he regarded as of strategic importance. The enemy would doubtless +do "considerable damage," but afterward "reinforcements will pour +to you" (Thomas). He convinced himself that Thomas had troops +enough; but, "to make things sure," he might "call on the governors +of Indiana and Kentucky for some militia"! In the meantime, he +(Sherman) would "destroy all the railroads in Georgia and do as +much substantial damage as is possible." Thus recklessly challenged +by the Confederate chief, Sherman must not only accept that challenge, +but do it at once. Perhaps if Jefferson Davis had known William +T. Sherman as well as some of us did, he would not have uttered +that challenge. + + RAWLINS'S REPORTED OPPOSITION TO THE MARCH + +From Grant's "Memoirs"(11) it appears that General Grant not only +confirms Sherman's claim in respect to his independent authorship +of the plan, but says he (General Grant) was in favor of that plan +from the time it was first submitted to him, and credits his chief +of staff, General Rawlins, with having been "very bitterly opposed +to it," and with having appealed to the authorities at Washington +to stop it. + +This recollection of General Grant, after the lapse of so long a +time, and when he was suffering almost beyond endurance from a +fatal disease, may possibly, it seems to me, not express the views +he entertained in October, 1864, quite so fully or accurately as +his despatch of October 11, 1864, 11 A. M., to General Sherman, +heretofore quoted. + +That despatch was a literal prediction of what Hood actually did. +It was dictated by a clear military foresight, whether of Grant or +Rawlins. How far world-wide approval of Sherman's plans after +their brilliant success may have obscured the past can only be +conjectured. As distinctly stated by Grant himself soon afterward, +he clearly saw that somebody ought to be criticized; but, in view +of the results, he decided to let it pass. + +However all this may be, even my respect for the opinions of the +greatest of Union soldiers cannot alter the conclusion I have +reached after many years of study and mature consideration. I can +only say that the opinion ascribed to General Rawlins, as opposed +to General Grant's, was in my judgment the better of the two; and +that General Rawlins, though he had not the advantage of an early +military education, was a man of great natural ability, and had +learned much from more than three years' experience in war, after +which the differences in military judgment which had existed at +the beginning must have very largely, if not entirely, disappeared. +General Rawlins was my immediate successor in the War Department, +and would, I doubt not, have made a great reputation there if his +life had been prolonged. + +I believe Grant's own sound military judgment dictated his first +answer to Sherman, dissenting from the proposition to begin the +march to the sea before Hood's army was disposed of, or that result +assured. His great confidence in the genius of his brilliant +subordinate, and in Sherman's judgment that he had given Thomas +ample means to take care of Hood, no matter what that bold and +reckless adversary might do, dictated Grant's final assent to +Sherman's project. Their correspondence shows this so clearly and +fully that there would seem to be no need of my making any special +reference to it. I do so only because of the statement in General +Grant's "Memoirs." Very possibly General Grant may have meant, in +his "Memoirs," only that he approved the general project, under +the condition that sufficient force would be left "to take care of +Hood and destroy him," not caring to say anything about the +fulfillment or nonfulfillment of that condition. + +From about October 1 till the time Sherman started on his march-- +six weeks--he seems to have been so intent on the execution of that +project, and upon doing it with as large an army as possible, that +no question of military principle or of fact could be permitted to +stand in his way. He assumed and maintained throughout that the +only question was whether he should continue the aggressive, or +allow the enemy's movements to put him on the defensive, refusing +to consider any other possible plan of aggressive operations, except +for a moment in response to advice from Grant, and then brushing +it aside as impracticable.--"If I could hope to overhaul Hood," +etc. In like manner, he appears to have convinced himself that +his arrangements for direct operations against Hood by Thomas in +Tennessee were very materially more complete than they were in +fact, and he so represented the matter to General Grant. It seems +quite certain that Grant was laboring under a serious misapprehension +in respect to Thomas's condition to cope with Hood, and no doubt +Grant's subsequent impatience in respect to Thomas's action was +largely due to this fact. This point deserves close consideration. + + GRANT'S FINAL JUDGMENT ON IT + +Grant's first assent to Sherman's plan was made, October 11, on +the condition of "holding the line of the Tennessee firmly." On +October 22 Sherman telegraphed: "I am now perfecting arrangements +to put into Tennessee a force able to hold the line of the +Tennessee." + +Even as late as November 1, Grant again suggested to Sherman that +Hood ought to be his "objective," now that he "has gone so far +north." At an earlier hour the same day, in the despatch above +quoted, Sherman telegraphed, "trusting that General Thomas . . . +will be able in a very few days to assume the offensive." To this +Grant replied November 2: "With the force, however, you have left +with Thomas, he must be able to take care of Hood and destroy him." +In that despatch of November 1 Sherman had made a statement of the +troops Thomas would have, including A. J. Smith's from Missouri, +adding, "but I doubt if they can reach Tennessee in less than ten +days." Now Smith's troops did not reach Tennessee in less than +_thirty_ days instead of ten days, and after the crisis of the +campaign was passed; and the effective force in Tennessee before +Smith's arrival was 13,000 men less than Sherman had stated it. +So that the whole brunt of the fight with Hood fell upon the two +corps which Sherman had sent back, without any help from the +reinforcements upon which Sherman counted so largely. It was, in +fact, _six weeks_ instead of a "very few days" before Thomas was +able "to assume the offensive." It was not attempted to "hold the +line of the Tennessee" either "firmly" or at all. + +Having been absent from the army in the field during Hood's raid +in Sherman's rear, I knew little personally about those estimates +of the strength of the opposing forces. For the same reason, I +knew nothing of Sherman's plans or correspondence with Grant which +were considered or took place after the fall of Atlanta, though I +had been perfectly familiar with the plans discussed previous to +that time having in view a change of base to some point on the +Atlantic or on the gulf, with a view to further operations in +Georgia or the Gulf States, wherever there might be a hostile army +to operate against. Yet when I met Sherman at Gaylesburg I was +surprised to learn that he was going off to the sea with five sixths +of his army, leaving Thomas, with only one of his six corps, and +no other veteran troops then ready for field service, to take care +of Hood until he could get A. J. Smith from Missouri, incorporate +new regiments into the army and make them fit to meet the veteran +enemy, remount his cavalry, and concentrate his garrisons and +railroad guards in Tennessee! Of course I knew far less than +Sherman did about all that, for I had no responsibility and little +knowledge about Thomas's department. But I knew enough to feel +astonished when Sherman told me what he proposed to do. I plainly +told Sherman so, and urged him to send me back with my corps to +join Stanley and help Thomas.(12) + +Here arise several interesting questions which would be worthy of +consideration, although a satisfactory solution of them might not +be possible. Under Sherman's assurance as to what he had done for +Thomas in Tennessee, Grant appears to have been fully satisfied +that Thomas would be able to take care of Hood and destroy him, +thus eliminating that Confederate army from the future problem in +the Atlantic States. But could Sherman, with his more exact +knowledge of what he actually had done, have felt the same confidence? +In view of that knowledge and of the results of his own previous +operations against Hood, could he have expected any such result? +Is it not more probable that Sherman simply expected to take +advantage of Hood's temporary absence from Georgia to make his own +change of base to Savannah? Did Sherman not, in fact, really expect +Hood to follow him, even though at so great a distance, and be +prepared to resist his future operations from Savannah? Sherman +repeatedly said, in his despatches before he started, that he +believed Hood would follow him, being compelled to do so by public +clamor. What was Sherman's plan when he started for Savannah? +Was it simply to effect a change of base, or was it for well-defined +ulterior purposes? When did Sherman mature his plan to march to +Virginia, and when did that plan first dawn upon Sherman's mind? +In this connection, what significance is to be attached to the +dates of events in Tennessee, especially the battles of Franklin +and Nashville? + + GRANT'S FINAL JUDGMENT OF IT + +By the first mails which reached Sherman after he arrived on the +coast, December 14 and 15, containing letters from Grant dated +December 3 and 6, full information was received of the battle of +Franklin, which had occurred November 30. Thomas's official report +of the battle of Nashville was received by Sherman on December 24, +but rumors of that victory had reached him earlier. Sherman's +first letter to Grant, relative to future operations, written in +reply to those from Grant of December 3 and 6, was dated December +16. In that letter was mentioned Sherman's plan in the following +words: "Indeed, with my present command I had expected, upon +reducing Savannah, instantly to march to Columbia, South Carolina, +thence to Raleigh, and thence to report to you." Sherman's second +letter to Grant, on the same subject, written in reply to Grant's +letter of the 18th, was dated December 24, the day on which he +received Thomas's report of the battle of Nashville. In this letter +Sherman said: "I am also gratified that you have modified your +former orders. . . . I feel no doubt whatever as to our future +plans. I have thought them over so long and well that they appear +as clear as daylight." + +When Sherman first mentioned his future plan he knew that the +success of his past plan in Tennessee had been assured. Thomas +had succeeded in concentrating his forces at Nashville, and Hood +had suffered a severe defeat in attempting to prevent it. At the +time of Sherman's second letter, mentioning his very mature +consideration of his future plans and perfect confidence in respect +to them, he knew that Hood's army had been broken up, and had become +a small factor in the future problem. How long, and to what extent, +had Sherman anticipated these results in Tennessee, and matured +the plans of future operations, which were dependent upon those +results? I shall consider these several questions, which involve +so intimately the character of my old commander. + +[( 1) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part iii, p. 202.] + +[( 2) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part ii, pp. 364, 411.] + +[( 3) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part iii, p. 594.] + +[( 4) _ibid_., p. 576.] + +[( 5) _Ibid_., p. 594.] + +[( 6) Vol. II, p. 154.] + +[( 7) Mr. Jefferson Davis's speech. See General Sherman's "Memoirs," +Vol. II, p. 141.] + +[( 8) See the Century War Book, "Battles and Leaders of the Civil +War," Vol. IV, p. 257.] + +[( 9) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part iii, p. 658.] + +[(10) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part iii, p. 202.] + +[(11) Vol. II, pp. 374-6.] + +[(12) See my letter to General Sherman, December 28, 1864, p. 254.] + + +CHAPTER XVII +Sherman's Purpose in Marching to the Sea--His Expectations that +the Change of Base Would Be "Statesmanship," If Not "War"--The +Thousand-Mile March of Hood's Men to Surrender to Sherman--The +Credit Given by Grant to Sherman--"Master of the Situation"--The +Fame of Sherman's Grand Marches--His Great Ability as a Strategist. + +The actual result in Tennessee was more decisive than Sherman had +any good reason to expect. But he had good reason to expect, and +evidently did, that Thomas would be able, after he had concentrated +his troops, and after Hood had done considerable damage, to drive +the latter out of Tennessee and pursue him with such force and +energy as fully to occupy his attention and prevent him from +interfering in any manner with Sherman's own operations. Hence +Sherman as well as Grant had reason to assume that Hood's army +would be eliminated from the military problem in the Atlantic +States. Again, the general military situation as known to General +Sherman, or probably to anybody else, in October and November, +1864, did not indicate that Grant, with the force he then had in +Virginia, would be able to capture or destroy Lee's army. He might +undoubtedly capture Petersburg and Richmond, but Lee would probably +be able to withdraw his army toward the south, nearer to his sources +of supply, and by skilful manoeuvers prolong the contest until the +National Government might abandon it. Grant's letters at that time +confirm this view of the military situation. + +Some writers have attempted to explain and justify Sherman's action +in taking with him so large an army, while leaving Thomas one so +much smaller, on the ground that he might meet in his march to the +sea such opposition as possibly to require so large a force to +overcome it. But to any one familiar with the facts, and to no +one more than to Sherman, his army of 60,000 men was evidently all +out of proportion to any possible resistance it could meet in +Georgia. But when he should start northward from Savannah the case +would become vastly different. At any point in the Carolinas he +might possibly meet the whole of Lee's army. That is to say, +Sherman's ulterior plan could not be prudently undertaken at all +without an army as large as that with which he actually marched to +the sea, namely, 60,000 men. Indeed, as the records show, Sherman +considered a long time before he decided that he could spare the +Twenty-third Corps to go back and help Thomas. If any question +can possibly exist as to what was the essential part of Sherman's +plan in marching to Savannah, what other possible military reason +can be given for that march except to make the subsequent march to +Virginia with so large an army? Why change his base to Savannah? +What was he to operate against after he got there? + +Nothing could have been clearer to any military mind in the fall +of 1864, than that if either Lee's or Hood's army could be captured +or destroyed, the surrender of the other must necessarily follow +very quickly, and the rebellion be ended. No man could have been +more earnest than Sherman in his laudable desire to make the capture +of his own adversary the beginning of the end. Sherman's well- +known character leaves this beyond question. It is not possible +that he could have preferred a manifestation of the power of the +nation by destroying Southern property rather than by destroying +a Southern army. + + SHERMAN'S PURPOSE IN MARCHING TO THE SEA + +But there was one objection--absolutely overruling, apparently, in +Sherman's mind--to any further attempt by Sherman himself, with +the main body of his army then in Georgia, to prosecute the primary +military object of his campaign--the destruction or capture of +Hood's army. To have done so would have conceded a temporary +triumph to the chief of the Confederate armies, who had loudly +proclaimed his purpose to drive Sherman out of Georgia, and protect +that State from any further invasion. Such a concession, however +temporary, was manifestly intolerable to Sherman's mind.( 1) +Besides, Sherman had formed and announced, with Grant's cordial +concurrence, a well-matured plan of future operations. As "master +of the situation," he could afford to go on and substantially +execute that plan, or at least the primary part of it,--the change +of base,--treating almost with contempt the enemy's bold design to +thwart him. Although this must, at least for the time being, compel +him personally to forego and leave to a subordinate the primary +operations of a military campaign,--those directly against the +opposing army,--the joint action of Sherman and Grant, each with +a powerful army, directly against Lee's army in Virginia, was the +surest and probably the shortest possible way to end the war. +Hence Sherman's broad view of the entire national military situation, +including the moral aspect of it, which was then of very great +importance, gave rise to that grand conception of far-reaching +strategy which must ever stamp its author as a master of that great +art. + +Sherman having thus come to the conclusion that he personally must +abandon the attempt to "catch Hood," as he called it, his "busy +brain" did not fail to perceive every possible alternative plan of +operations. The abandonment of Georgia by Hood had completely +opened up two other alternatives, one of which was before not +possible, and the other only partly so. The one was a movement +upon Richmond or its communications to join with Grant in the +capture of Lee's army, and the other was to destroy the military +resources of the Southern Atlantic States. The first was too grand, +and perhaps might seem too visionary, to be talked about at first, +nor was any mention of it at that time necessary. Besides, events +might possibly render the march to Richmond unnecessary or +impracticable; or, possibly, Sherman might be compelled for some +reason to make his new base at Pensacola or Mobile, though he was +determined to make it at Savannah, if possible; and hence it was +necessary to have, in reserve as it were, a sufficient logical +reason for the preliminary operation, if that finally had to stand +alone. + +Again, that part of the original plan which contemplated the capture +of Savannah in advance could not be carried out. Grant could not +spare the troops from the east for that purpose. If that had been +done, Sherman could have marched to Augusta, there replenished his +supplies by the river from Savannah, and marched thence northward +by the upland route instead of through the swamps of South Carolina. +But, as it was, Sherman was, as he thought, compelled to go to +Savannah first, capture that place himself, and make that the base +for his northward march. Hence there was no need to say anything +to anybody about what further was to be done until after Savannah +was in Sherman's possession, and the time had arrived for him to +consult Grant about the future. Yet in Sherman's remarkable letter +to Grant, dated November 6, 1864,( 2) written after it was too late +to have any influence upon Grant's approval of Sherman's march, he +disclosed to Grant the ulterior object he had in view. In discussing +the reasons for selecting the route to Savannah rather than either +of the others, he said: "Incidentally I might destroy the enemy's +depots at Macon and Augusta, and reach the sea-shore at Charleston +or Savannah, from either of which points I could reinforce our +armies in Virginia." + + SHERMAN'S PURPOSE IN MARCHING TO THE SEA + +Of course Grant, no less than Sherman, must have perceived instantly +the full significance of Sherman's change of base to Savannah the +moment that move was suggested. The question in what manner that +concerted action between Grant and Sherman against Lee should be +arranged could well be considered later, after that march had been +made and a new base established at Savannah. The correspondence +between Grant and Sherman previous to Hood's march to the west, +including the letters of September 12 and 20, simply shows that +neither had at that time conceived the possibility of any movement +of Sherman toward Virginia. All their thoughts had reference to +continuing operations in the south, Sherman's most important object +being to get control of the Savannah River; or, as expressed, in +his last words: "If you can whip Lee, and I can march to the +Atlantic, I think Uncle Abe will give us a twenty days' leave of +absence to see the young folks." Their joint action against Lee +does not appear to have been suggested by either until Sherman's +letter of November 6, which was probably received by Grant after +Sherman started. + +The first thought suggested to Sherman by Hood's movement "leaving +open the road to Macon, as also to Augusta," as embodied in his +despatch to Halleck on September 25, related simply to the opportunity +thus offered to carry into effect without difficulty the original +plan of a change of base to Savannah. But when Hood's movement +had gone so far, and his designs were so fully disclosed, as +practically to eliminate his army from the problem in the Atlantic +States, Sherman determined to march as soon as possible, with the +ulterior purpose to "reinforce our armies in Virginia." He +telegraphed his determination to Grant on November 1, and on November +6 wrote him very fully, giving his reasons, including that to +reinforce Grant. Hence Sherman was well able to say at Savannah +on December 24: "I feel no doubt whatever as to our future plans. +I have thought them over so long and well that they appear clear +as daylight." + +It should be observed that Sherman's letter of November 6 to Grant +was strictly confidential. "I have still some thoughts . . . that +should be confided to you [that is, to Grant and to nobody else] +as a key to future developments." Neither Grant nor Sherman appears +to have made any use of that "key" for the public benefit. But it +now unlocks the store-house of Sherman's mind, and shows to the +world more of the real character of the great strategist than any +other public document he ever wrote. + +Then Grant was ready with his plan, first to seize and hold the +Southern railroads by which supplies could reach Lee, and second, +for Sherman and the most of his army to come to Virginia by sea, +to which Sherman responded with all the loyalty of his most loyal +nature, only mentioning incidentally his own plan. Thereupon, when +Grant gave him an invitation to speak freely, he replied as above +quoted, and explained in detail his plans for the northward march, +to "be on the Roanoke, either at Raleigh or Weldon, by the time +the spring fairly opens; and if you feel confident that you can +whip Lee outside of his intrenchments, I feel equally confident +that I can handle him in the open country." + +But Sherman's "busy brain" had provided in advance even for the +worst possible contingency--that after all his long march, however +long it might prove to be, that march might have to "stand alone" +--he might not actually take part in the capture of either of the +Confederate armies. Hence, before starting on his march, in his +letter of November 6 to Grant he explained that his march would be +"statesmanship" anyway, even if it was not "war." Sherman was not +a man to be "left out," no matter what might happen. + + SHERMAN'S PURPOSE IN MARCHING TO THE SEA + +But Sherman's good fortune was almost equal to his strategy and +his skill in marching an army. Although, as fate would have it, +he did not have a chance to assist in the capture of Lee, Thomas +had failed to obey his instructions to pursue Hood into the Gulf +states, whereby the fragments of that "broken and dispirited" army, +as Thomas well called it, were gathered together, under their old, +able commander, General Johnston, and appeared in Sherman's front +to oppose his northward march, and finally to capitulate to him at +"Bennett's House" in North Carolina. The remnant of that army +which Sherman had disdained to pursue into Alabama or Mississippi +had traveled a thousand miles to surrender to him! No story of +fiction could be more romantic than that fact of real war history. + +It was not necessary for Sherman to produce his letter of November +6, 1864; but I have quoted from it here very largely to show that +there was no possible contingency which his far-reaching mind had +not foreseen and provided for. + +Sherman's plan was so firmly fixed in his own mind, almost from +the very start, that he was determined to adhere to it in spite of +all possible opposition, even including the adverse opinions and +advice of General Grant. Hence, as was his habit in such cases, +he invented every imaginable reason, without regard to their logical +or illogical character, to convince others of the soundness of his +conclusion. But the logic of the real reasons which convinced his +own mind is, when the chaff is all winnowed away, as clear and +bright as the golden grain. + +In view of the great strategical project which Sherman had mapped +out for himself and which required a formidable army, and of his +responsibility for what might be the result of operations against +Hood in Tennessee, it was a difficult and delicate question to +decide what force he should take with him, and what send back. My +own belief always has been, and is now, that in view of his exact +knowledge of Thomas's character and habits of thought and action, +Sherman ought to have sent back another corps of veteran troops, +or else have waited to see that Thomas was actually prepared to +cope with Hood, preferably the latter, before going so far away +that he could not render him any assistance. Yet, as has heretofore +been shown, if Thomas had carried out Sherman's instructions by +promptly concentrating his troops, there would have been no risk +of serious results in Tennessee. + +In connection with Sherman's operations it is essential to bear in +mind the distinction between two radically different kinds of +strategy, one of which has for its object the conquest of territory +or the capture of places by defeating in battle or out-manoeuvering +the defending armies; while the other has for its object the +destruction or capture of those armies, resulting, of course, in +the conquest of all the enemy's territory. The first kind may be +all-sufficient, and hence best, in a foreign war having for its +object anything less than total conquest; but in the suppression +of a rebellion, as in a foreign conquest, the occupation of places +or territory ought to be entirely ignored except so far as this +contributes to the successful operation of armies against opposing +forces. This fundamental principle appears to have been duly +appreciated by the leading Union commanders near the close of the +Civil War, though not so fully in its earlier stages. Military +critics are apt to fall into error by not understanding the principle +itself, or by overlooking the change of policy above referred to. + + SHERMAN'S PURPOSE IN MARCHING TO THE SEA + +It is necessary not to confound the "march to the sea" as actually +conceived and executed by Sherman as a preliminary to the march +northward for the capture of Lee's army, with the previous far- +reaching strategic plans of Grant, of which Sherman and other chief +commanders were informed in the spring of 1864. + +Grant's plans had in view, as their great object, again to cut in +two the Confederate territory, as had been done by the opening of +the Mississippi River to the gulf. This next line of section might +be Chattanooga, Atlanta, and Savannah, or Chattanooga, Atlanta, +Montgomery, and Mobile. But with the disappearance of Hood's army +from that theater of operations, all reason for that plan of +"territorial" strategy had disappeared, and the occasion was then +presented, for the first time, for the wholly different strategical +plan of Sherman, of which Lee's army was the sole military objective. +Grant was perfectly just to himself as well as to Sherman in giving +the latter full credit for this last plan; and he modestly refrained +from any more than a brief mention of his own plans, which unforseen +events had made it unnecessary fully to execute. But history will +do justice to Grant's great strategical designs as well as to his +great achievements. I trust it may be my good fortune to contribute +something hereafter toward the payment of this debt of gratitude +which all Americans owe to the greatest soldier of the Union. + +The fact that Savannah was one of the points in both Grant's plans +and Sherman's was merely an incident, and a very unimportant one. +Indeed, after Hood got out of his way, Sherman might as well, and +I think better, have marched direct to Augusta, and thence northward, +wholly ignoring Savannah as well as Charleston, except that he +would have arrived in Virginia rather early in the season. Savannah +was a good place to go in order to spend the winter, besides +destroying Georgia en route. + +Of course it is much easier to see what might have been done than +to see in advance what can or ought to be done. But it can hardly +be believed that Sherman did not think of everything that was +possible, as well as many things that were not. At least, so simple +a proposition as the following could not have escaped his mind. + +Sherman was, as he so confidently said, absolute "master of the +situation" before he started for Savannah. Hood and Forrest had +utterly failed so to damage his communications that they could not +be put in order again in a few days. He was able, if he chose, to +remain in perfect security at Atlanta all winter, with two or three +corps, while he sent back to Thomas ample force to dispose of Hood. +Then, if the result of the operations of a larger force in Tennessee +had been as decisive as they actually were with the smaller one +Thomas had, Sherman could have recalled to Atlanta all of the troops +he had sent to Tennessee, and thus marched toward Virginia with +eighty-five or ninety or even one hundred thousand men, instead of +sixty thousand. All this could have surely been accomplished by +the middle of January, or before the time when Sherman actually +began his march from Savannah. From Atlanta to Columbia, South +Carolina, crossing the Savannah River above Augusta, is an easier +march than that from Savannah to Columbia. Or if Sherman had not +cared about paying a visit to Columbia en route, he could have +taken the much shorter "Piedmont route" to Charlotte, North Carolina, +and thence northward by whichever route he pleased. Instead of +retaining the dominant attitude of "master," Sherman lost it the +moment he started eastward with his main army, leaving an inferior +force to cope with his enemy; and the march through Georgia and +the capture of Savannah did not by any means restore that mastery +to Sherman. It was not restored until Hood was actually defeated +in Tennessee. + + THE FAME OF SHERMAN'S GRAND MARCHES + +I have referred to the possibilities of a direct march from Atlanta +via Columbia or Charlotte, with a much larger army, at exactly the +same time, for the purpose of showing that even Sherman's grand +strategic plan to assist in the capture of Lee's army did not +necessitate or justify his action in marching to Savannah and +quitting his own theater of operations before his adversary there +had been disposed of. The plan above suggested would have negatived +even more positively the boast and promise of the Confederate chief +that Sherman should be driven out of Georgia. The fact that Sherman +personally, with an army about as large as, or larger than, Hood's, +could and did remain quietly at Atlanta while one of his subordinates +disposed of Hood and his army, would have been the most emphatic +possible defeat of the Confederate plan to force him back by +operations in his rear. Only one part of Sherman's earnest desires +would have been unrealized--namely, to destroy Georgia. But even +that could have been, at least in a great measure, compensated for +by the more complete destruction of South Carolina, the cradle of +secession and rebellion. + +The more carefully Sherman's great operations are examined, the +more clearly it will appear that while his plans were magnificent, +their execution was not perfect. And this is the legitimate aim +of just military criticism, not to build up or pull down the +reputations of commanders, but to assist military students in their +efforts to perfect themselves in the art and science of war. + +Sherman's great marches, especially through the enemy's country +and over such obstacles as those found from Savannah to Goldsboro', +showed him to be a master of the auxiliary art of logistics no less +than of the great science of strategy. Even to those who have had +no means of duly appreciating the higher merits of Sherman's general +plans, his marches have seemed the wonder of the world. Yet, +strangely enough, the march through Georgia, which was in fact the +simplest thing possible, has been regarded as the great exploit, +while the vastly more difficult and important march through the +Carolinas appears to have been taken as a matter of course, perhaps +because of the conviction, which had by that time become general, +that Sherman could do anything he might undertake. + +In respect to Sherman's skill in grand tactics, I have only a few +words to say here. The part assigned him in Grant's general plan +of operations for all the armies, in 1864, in his "private and +confidential" letter of April 6, was as follows: "You I propose +to move against Johnston's army to break it up, and to get into +the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting +all the damage you can against their war resources." It is a +simple, plain matter of history that Sherman did not accomplish +the first and more important part of the task assigned him--"to +break it up"--in the four months of almost constant fighting with +Johnston's army. In the comments I have made upon the Atlanta +campaign, I believe I have shown clearly why Sherman did not +accomplish that result by the tactical operations to which he +limited himself. The manner in which that army, then under Hood +instead of Johnston, was finally broken up by Sherman's subordinates +in Tennessee, shows clearly enough what kind of modification of +Sherman's tactical methods was requisite to enable him to reach +the same result in Georgia. + + SHERMAN'S GREAT ABILITY AS A STRATEGIST + +Sherman's tactical operations during the entire Atlanta campaign +were marked by the highest degree of prudence and caution. Even +his one assault upon fortified lines at Kenesaw was no exception; +for the worst that could happen in that was what actually did +happen, namely, a fruitless loss of a considerable number of men, +yet a number quite insignificant in comparison with the total +strength of his army. Johnston displayed similar qualities in an +equal degree so long as he was in command; and his well-known +ability may have suggested to Sherman the wisdom of like prudence +in all his own operations. But Hood signalized his accession to +the command by the boldest kind of tactics, amounting even to +rashness in the commander of a force so inferior to that of his +adversary. Yet Sherman continued his own cautious methods to the +end. Even his last move, which resulted in the capture of Atlanta, +--the only one which had even the general appearance of boldness, +--was, in fact, marked by the greatest prudence throughout. The +Twentieth Corps occupied a strongly fortified bridge-head at the +Chattahoochee River, and the Twenty-third Corps another equally +strongly fortified "pivot" around which the grand wheel of the army +was made. That moving army was much larger than Hood's entire +force, and had all the advantage of the initiative, which completely +disconcerted the opposing commander, and caused him to commit a +blunder that ought to have proved fatal, namely, that of dividing +his inferior force and permitting his superior opponent to occupy +a position between the widely separated wings of his own army. +Yet Sherman refused to take any advantage of that blunder, and sat +still while Hood leisurely reunited his divided forces. + +Even if such extreme caution in handling a superior force against +such an antagonist as Johnston could be regarded as wise, it surely +could not against such an antagonist as Hood, whose character of +extreme audacity in the aggressive should have assured his destruction +by a more skilful adversary in command of a superior force. But +Sherman's own knowledge of his own impulsive nature made him unduly +distrustful of his own judgment when under great responsibility in +emergencies, and this in spite of his unusual intellectual activity +and his great confidence in his deliberately matured judgment. +This is the opinion of Sherman's character formed by me after the +closest possible observation and study. For this reason Sherman's +capacity as a tactician was not by any means equal to his ability +as a strategist. He lacked the element of confident boldness or +audacity in action which is necessary to gain the greatest results +by taking advantage of his adversary's blunders, and by tempting +or forcing his adversary into positions of which he might take +advantage. Yet Sherman was very far from lacking skill as a +tactician. Both he and Johnston might well be likened to masters +of the sword so skilful and so equally matched that neither could +give any material advantage over the other. In my opinion, their +duel of ten weeks' duration was never surpassed in the history of +the world for the masterly skill and execution with which the one +pressed the other back step by step, and the other disputed every +foot of the ground, neither giving nor attempting to make an +opportunity to strike a decisive blow. If the object of that +campaign was to capture Atlanta on the one side, and to defend it +on the other, the handling of those two splendid armies was simply +magnificent. It would be a great pity that an end was put to that +duel by the removal of Johnston, and the military world thus deprived +of a complete lesson, except for the fact that, whether or not the +contest finally resulted in the fall of Atlanta, the rebellion in +that part of the South would have been practically as far from an +end as it was the first of May! Johnston would have been there in +front of Sherman, all the same, and at least one more campaign +would have been required before the march to the sea could have +been made. + + SHERMAN'S GREAT ABILITY AS A STRATEGIST + +Although Sherman did not himself accomplish the first part of +Grant's plan in respect to Johnston's army,--namely, "to break it +up",--the second part, "to get into the interior of the enemy's +country, . . . inflicting all the damage you can against their war +resources,"( 3) was carried out as thoroughly as Grant or anybody +else could have wished. It is also true that Sherman claimed the +credit for the breaking up of Hood's army in Tennessee, while he +was marching to Savannah, as a legitimate and foreseen part of his +general plan, like his successful march and capture of Savannah. +But he appeared not to see that in such a claim he was condemning +himself for not having done with a superior force what Thomas +actually did with a smaller one. That result was, in fact, due +largely to an accident which, in the ordinary course of military +operations, ought not to have happened, and by which Hood was +tempted to make at Franklin one of those furious assaults upon +troops in position and ready to receive him which are almost always +disastrous. It was just the kind of temptation to Hood's army that +was necessary "to break it up," and it did so very effectually. +The old "Army of Tennessee," which had been so formidable, ceased +to be a formidable army on November 30. Its fighting days were +nearly over. After that it never did any fighting at all worthy +of its old record. And there was hardly a single day while Hood +was in command in the Atlanta campaign when a similar result might +not have been reached by a similar method, and that without any +risk of disaster to the Union army, because the force assaulted by +Hood might always have had a more powerful army near to hand to +support it if necessary. + +In his special field order of January 8, 1865, announcing to all +the troops of his military division the results of his great +campaign, General Sherman said: "Generals Thomas and Schofield, +commanding the departments to our rear, returned to their posts +and prepared to decoy General Hood into their meshes." If the +purpose that prompted Sherman to send me back to Tennessee was to +serve as a "decoy" to Hood, I must say that my part of the sport +would have been more enjoyable if it had taken place earlier in +the season, when Sherman was near by with his sixty thousand men +to help "bag the game." + +It has occurred to me as at least possible that Sherman's recollection +of the suggestions I had repeatedly made to him during the Atlanta +campaign may have been in his mind when he ordered me back to report +to Thomas, and when he wrote his special field order. If so, I +must protest my innocence of any intention to play the role of +"decoy" at Franklin when one of the great gunners was twenty miles +away, and the other several hundred! + +Yet, accepting even the most unfavorable view of Sherman's tactical +as well as of his strategical operations in connection with the +operations of all the other armies under Grant's general plans and +direction, there was nothing in them all that could possibly have +prevented their complete ultimate success in the capture of Lee's +army. If Grant had not captured that army, Sherman would. And +the surrender of Lee was necessarily followed by that of all the +other Confederate armies. Hence, whatever might have happened if +Sherman's great march had not been made, that march with so large +an army made the end of the rebellion in the spring of 1865 sure +beyond any possible doubt. In view of a public service so original +in its conception, so grand in its magnitude, and so brilliant in +its execution, any criticism respecting details cannot diminish +the fame of the general who planned and executed that grand campaign, +nor that of the general-in-chief, the success of whose far-reaching +plans had made the brilliant exploit of his subordinate possible. +Such criticisms are justifiable only in the interest of exact truth +and of exact military science, so that imperfections in the operations +of the greatest commanders may not be mistaken by the military +student as having been among the causes which led to success. + +[( 1) Sherman's "Memoirs," Vol. II, p. 141.] + +[( 2) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part iii, p. 658.] + +[( 3) War Records, Vol. XXXII, part iii, p. 245.] + + +CHAPTER XVIII +Transfer of the Twenty-Third Corps to North Carolina--Sherman's +Plan of Marching to the Rear of Lee--The Surrender of J. E. Johnston's +Army--Authorship of the Approved Terms of Surrender--Political +Reconstruction--Sherman's Genius--Contrast Between Grant and Sherman +--Halleck's Characteristics--His Attempt to Supplant Grant--Personal +Feeling in Battle--The Scars of War. + +Upon the termination of the campaign of 1864 in Tennessee, General +Grant ordered me, with the Twenty-third Corps, to the coast of +North Carolina, via Louisville, Cincinnati, Pittsburg, Washington, +and the sea. Under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of +War, Charles A. Dana, and the personal management of Colonel Lewis +B. Parsons of the quartermaster's department, that movement was +made without any necessity for the exercise of direction or control +on my part, in respect to routes or otherwise. I enjoyed very much +being a simple passenger on that comfortable journey, one of the +most remarkable in military history, and exceedingly creditable to +the officers of the War Department who directed and conducted it. +I did not know at the time anything about the details of the +arrangements made for transportation, nor who made them; but I have +always thought it an excellent illustration of the good results to +be obtained by a judicious distribution and division of duty, +authority, and responsibility in military operations on a large +scale. This being done under one common, competent head, to whom +all subordinates are alike responsible, the military system becomes +as nearly perfect as possible. + +While the transports were detained by an ice blockade in the Potomac, +I joined General Grant at Fort Monroe, and went with him on the +war-steamer _Rhode Island_ to Cape Fear River, where we met General +Terry and Admiral Porter, discussed the military situation, and +decided on the general plan of operations for the capture of the +defenses of Cape Fear River and the city of Wilmington, and subsequent +operations. On our return to Fort Monroe, I proceeded to Washington, +and sailed with the advance of the Twenty-third Corps, arriving at +the mouth of Cape Fear River on February 9, 1865, where we joined +General Terry, who with two divisions had already captured Fort +Fisher. I was then assigned to command the new department of North +Carolina. We turned the defenses of Cape Fear River by marching +round the swamps, and occupied Wilmington with little loss; then +we captured Kinston, after a pretty sharp fight of three days, and +occupied Goldsboro' on March 21, within one day of the time indicated +by Sherman, from Laurel Hill, N. C., March 8, for our junction at +Goldsboro'. General Sherman, who had been delayed by his battle +at Bentonville, did not reach Goldsboro' until the 23d, but the +sound of his guns on the 20th and 21st informed me that he was +near, and I put a bridge across the Neuse River, so as to go to +his assistance if necessary. After the junction at Goldsboro', I +commanded the "center," one of the three grand divisions of Sherman's +army. + +For the elucidation of some things in this campaign which have +seemed obscure, and some acts of General Sherman which have been +severely criticized, it is necessary to know the ruling ideas which +actuated him. As Sherman says, in his own estimate of the relative +importance of his march through Georgia and that through the +Carolinas, the former was only a change of base preparatory to the +latter, the great final campaign of the war, which had for its end +the defeat and capture of Lee's army. Sherman and his army expected +to share the glory of capturing Richmond and Lee's army, which had +baffled the Eastern troops for four years. This feeling in the +army was very general and very manifest at the time. + + SHERMAN'S PLAN OF MARCHING TO THE REAR OF LEE + +After the concentration at Goldsboro', Sherman's plan was to march +straight for Lee's rear at Petersburg, and he expected Johnston to +keep ahead of him and to unite with Lee for the final struggle at +or near Richmond. Grant's idea was quite different: He wanted +Sherman to keep between Lee and Johnston and prevent their union, +as well as to cut off Lee's retreat if he should escape before +Grant was ready to move, the latter alleging that he had ample +force to take care of Lee as soon as the necessary preparations +were made and the roads would permit him to move. It was this +important difference of plan that occasioned Sherman's visit to +City Point, where he hoped to gain Grant's acquiescence in his own +plans. The result was the movement ordered by Sherman on his return +to Goldsboro', which was substantially the same as that which Grant +had before proposed. Grant's immediate army proved to be, as he +predicted it would, amply sufficient for the capture of the whole +of Lee's army. Hence it is difficult to see in what respect +Sherman's campaign of the Carolinas was essential to this great +result, or proved to be more important than his march through +Georgia. Each was a great raid, inflicting immense damage upon +the enemy's country and resources, demoralizing to the people at +home and the army in Virginia, cutting off supplies necessary to +the support of the latter, possibly expediting somewhat the final +crisis at Richmond, and certainly making the subjugation more +complete of those of the Southern people who were thus made to +"feel the weight of war." Considered as to military results, +Sherman's march cannot be regarded as more than I have stated--a +grand raid. The defeat and practical destruction of Hood's army +in Tennessee was what paved the way to the speedy termination of +the war, which the capture of Lee by Grant fully accomplished; and +the result ought to have been essentially the same as to time if +Sherman's march had never been made. The capitulation of Johnston +was but the natural sequence of Lee's surrender; for Johnston's +army was not surrounded, and could not have been compelled to +surrender. Indeed Sherman could not have prevented that army from +marching back into the Gulf States and continuing the war for a +time. In military history Sherman's great march must rank only as +an auxiliary to the far more important operations of Grant and +Thomas. Sherman at the time saw clearly enough this view of the +case; hence his undeviating bent toward the final object of his +march, disregarding all minor ends--to take part in the capture of +Lee's army. + +During General Sherman's interviews with the President and General +Grant at City Point, his mind must have been absorbed with this +one idea which was the sole reason of his visit. Terms of surrender +and the policy to be pursued toward the conquered South must have +been referred to very casually, and nothing approximating instructions +on the subject can have been received or asked for by General +Sherman. Else how is it possible that the very pointed and emphatic +instructions of the President to General Grant, dated March 3, +1865,( 1) were not made known to him or the spirit of them conveyed +to him in conversation? + + THE SURRENDER OF J. E. JOHNSTON'S ARMY + +The question of the abstract wisdom of the terms of the Sherman- +Johnston "memorandum" has little to do with that of Sherman in +agreeing to it. Any person at all acquainted with the politics of +the dominant part at that time would have known that it was at +least unwise to introduce political questions at all. Besides, he +had the example of his superior, the general-in-chief, who had just +accepted the surrender of the principal Confederate army from the +Confederate generalissimo without any political conditions; and +the knowledge of President Lincoln's assassination, which must have +made the country unwilling to consent to more liberal terms than +had before been granted. Yet, however unwise Sherman's action may +have been, the uproar it created, and the attacks upon his honor +and integrity for which it was made the excuse, were utterly +inexcusable. They were probably unexampled as an exhibition of +the effect of great and unusual excitement upon the minds of men +unaccustomed to such moral and mental strain. + +The most charitable view of this matter seems also to be the most +just--namely, that the high officers of government were completely +unnerved and lost their heads under the terrible strain produced +by President Lincoln's assassination, increased somewhat, perhaps, +by a natural apprehension of what might come next. The contrast +between this state of excitement in Washington and the marked calm +that prevailed throughout the army was very instructive, and it +was difficult for any soldier to understand at that time the state +of mind in Washington. No part of the people could have felt more +deeply or with greater indignation the loss the country had suffered, +and the infamous crime by which it had been accomplished. Yet not +a ripple of excitement could be seen anywhere in the army. The +profound calm which pervades the atmosphere surrounding a great, +disciplined, self-confident army is one of the most sublime +exhibitions of human nature. + +That Sherman felt "outraged beyond measure" was natural and indeed +inevitable. He had committed an error of judgment arising from +political inexperience and a failure to appreciate the difference +between Mr. Lincoln's humane purposes toward individual Confederates +and his political policy. But the error was of the least possible +practical consequence, and there was not the slightest excuse for +making it public at the time, in violation of all rules of official +courtesy. All that it was necessary or right to do was to tell +Sherman to correct his error. + +While the effect of these ferocious bulletins received some time +later was such as General Sherman fully describes, the first effect +of the simple disapproval of the convention, both upon Sherman and +Johnston, not referred to by either in their published narratives, +may be interesting to readers of history. General Sherman was +manifestly much disappointed and mortified at the rejection of his +terms, although he had been prepared somewhat by expressions of +opinions from others in the interval, and both he and Johnston at +their last meeting seemed sad and dejected. + +To understand this, it must be remembered that Johnston's army was +not surrounded, and its surrender could not have been compelled. +Unless the terms of capitulation could be made such as the troops +themselves would be willing to accept, they would, it was apprehended, +break up into guerrilla bands of greater or less strength and carry +on the war in that way indefinitely. So strongly was I impressed +at the time with General Johnston's apprehension, that I was often +thereafter haunted in my dreams with the difficulties I was actually +encountering in the prosecution of military operations against +those remnants of the Confederate armies, in marshy and mountainous +countries, through summer heats and winter storms. It was several +years after the war that I became fully satisfied, at night, that +it was really over. + + AUTHORSHIP OF THE APPROVED TERMS OF SURRENDER + +At the time of Sherman's first interview with Johnston I hinted +that I would like to accompany him; but he desired me to remain in +immediate command, as I was next in rank, and we could not tell +what might happen. He took some others with him, but I believe +had no one present in the room to assist him in his discussion with +Johnston and Breckinridge. At his last interview I accompanied +him, by his special request. On meeting at Bennett's House, after +the usual salutations General Sherman and Johnston retired to the +conference room, and were there a long time with closed doors. At +length I was summoned to their presence, and informed in substance +that they were unable to arrange the terms of capitulation to their +satisfaction. They seemed discouraged at the failure of the +arrangement to which they had attached so much importance, apprehensive +that the terms of Grant and Lee, pure and simple, could not be +executed, and that if modified at all, they would meet with a second +disapproval. I listened to their statements of the difficulties +they had encountered, and then stated how I thought they could all +be arranged. General Johnston replied, in substance, "I think +General Schofield can fix it"; and General Sherman intimated to me +to write, pen and paper being on the table where I was sitting, +while the two great antagonists were nervously pacing the floor. +I at once wrote the "military convention" of April 26, handed it +to General Sherman, and he, after reading it, to General Johnston. +Having explained that I, as department commander, after General +Sherman was gone, could do all that might be necessary to remove +the difficulties which seemed to them so serious, the terms as +written by me were agreed to, as General Sherman says, "without +hesitation," and General Johnston, "without difficulty," and after +being copied _without alteration_ were signed by the two commanders. +Johnston's words, on handing the paper back to Sherman, were: "I +believe that is the best we can do." It was in pursuance of this +understanding that I made with General Johnston the "supplemental +terms," and gave his disbanded men the two hundred and fifty thousand +rations, with wagons to haul them, to prevent the troops from +robbing their own people, for which, in his "Narrative," he very +properly credits General Sherman. + +But I also gave to the troops from each State arms enough to arm +a guard to preserve order and protect citizens en route, the arms +so used to be turned over to United States officers after the troops +got home. This was one of the things most bitterly condemned in +Sherman's first agreement. Yet not a word was said when I did it! +It would be difficult for a soldier to imagine anything more +monstrous than the suggestion that he could not trust the officers +and men whom he had been fighting four years to go home and turn +in their arms after they had voluntarily surrendered and given +their parole of honor to do so. Yet there seem to be even in high +places some men who have no conception of the sense of honor which +exists among brave men. + +When that second "convention" was handed to General Grant the same +evening, he said that the only change he would have made would have +been to write General Sherman's name before General Johnston's. +So would I if I had thought about it; but I presume an unconscious +feeling of courtesy toward a fallen foe dictated the order in which +their names were written. + + AUTHORSHIP OF THE APPROVED TERMS OF SURRENDER + +It seems to me a little singular that neither General Sherman nor +General Johnston thought the circumstances above referred to worthy +of being preserved in memory, and I am not quite willing that +General Breckinridge shall carry off all the honor of assisting +the great commanders to make "memoranda" and "military conventions" +at "Bennett's House." But Sherman and Johnston were writing their +own defense, and it was natural that they should omit matter not +pertaining thereto. Besides, I was General Sherman's subordinate, +and owed him all the help I could give in every way. He may have +regarded my services, and perhaps justly, as little more than +clerical, after it was all over, even if he thought of the matter +at all.( 2) + +The Confederate troops were promptly furnished with all needed +supplies of food and transportation and sent in comfort to their +homes, freed from the necessity of taxing the slender resources of +the impoverished people on their routes. The surplus animals and +wagons remaining with the army were given to the people of North +Carolina in large numbers, and they were encouraged at once to +resume their industrial pursuits. In the meantime, all who were +in want were furnished with food. + +It may not be possible to judge how wise or unwise Sherman's first +"memorandum" might have proved if it had been ratified. It is +always difficult to tell how things that have not been tried would +have worked if they had been. We now know only this much--that +the imagination of man could hardly picture worse results than +those wrought out by the plan that was finally adopted--namely, to +destroy everything that existed in the way of government, and then +build from the bottom on the foundation of ignorance and rascality. + +The de facto State governments existing at the time of the surrender +would have been of infinite service in restoring order and material +prosperity, if they had been recognized by the military authority +of the United States and kept under military control similar to +that exercised by the district commissioners under the "reconstruction +acts." And such recognition would in no manner have interfered +with any action Congress might have thought it wise to take looking +to the organization of permanent governments and the admission of +senators and representatives in Congress. After two years of +"reconstruction" under President Johnson's "policy," the Southern +State governments were no better than those he had destroyed. Then +Congress took the matter in hand, and after years of labor brought +forth State governments far worse than either of those that had +been torn down. + +Party ambition on the one hand, and timidity on the other, were +the parents of these great follies. The presidential succession +was the mainspring of the first movement and of the opposition +thereto, while that and party majority in Congress were the motives +of the later "reconstruction." Both ingloriously failed, as they +deserved to do. How much stronger the Republican party would have +been if it had relied upon the loyal States which had sustained it +through the war, instead of timidly distrusting them and trying to +bolster itself up by the aid of the negro and "carpet-bag" governments +in the South! + +Political reconstruction ought not to have been thought of at the +close of the war. What was then needed was local civil government +under such military control as might be necessary, restoration of +order, industry, and material prosperity, leading to a gradual +reorganization of the society which had been completely broken up +by the war. After this had been done, and Congress had decided +upon the conditions of full restoration, it would have been time +enough to inaugurate political reconstruction. This was clear +enough at the time to those who had studied the subject and knew +by personal observation the real condition and feeling of the +Southern people. But the leading politicians of either party do +not appear to have had the wisdom and moral courage to advocate +such a policy. Both were impatient to see their party represented +on the floors of Congress by members from the South. + + POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION + +It was something of the kind above suggested which was aimed at by +Generals Sherman and Johnston, and which was deemed wise by the +leading generals both North and South. There were several conditions +in the memorandum that were clearly inadmissible, though easy of +correction without changing the essential features of the document. +This was to be expected from a hasty effort to solve a great +political problem by a man without political education or experience. +Sherman's failure was not unlike that of great politicians who +undertake to command armies. Their general ideas may be very good, +but they have no knowledge of details, and hence make mistakes +resulting in failure. + +As now seen, projected upon the dark background of the political +history of the Southern States during the twelve years from 1865 +to 1877, and compared with the plans of political doctrinaires in +1865, under the light of experience and reason, the Sherman-Johnston +memorandum and Sherman's letters of that period seem self-luminous +with political wisdom. Sherman needed only the aid of competent +military advisers in whom he had confidence to have made him one +of the greatest generals of any age, and he would have needed only +the aid of competent political advisers to have made him a great +statesman. But he looked almost with contempt upon a "staff," and +would doubtless have thought little better of a "cabinet." + +The efforts of political leaders to establish an absolutely impossible +popular government in the South seem to show the necessity of +general political education, no less than the military blunders of +the war show the necessity of general military education. If our +schools would drop from their course of studies some of the +comparatively unimportant "ologies," and substitute the qualifications +for good citizenship, the change would be greatly for the better. + +General Sherman was one of those rare actors in historic events +who require no eulogy. All his important acts were so unqualifiedly +his own, and so emphatically speak for themselves, that it is only +necessary to judge of the quality and merits of those acts. There +is no question of division of honors between him and any other +respecting any of his important operations. It is not meant by +this that he was disdainful of the advice or opinions of others. +On the contrary, although naturally impulsive and self-reliant, +his acquired habit was to study carefully and consult freely with +his subordinate commanders respecting all important movements. +Yet discussion resulted almost if not quite invariably in the +adoption of his own original plans. As to details, he was wont to +leave them very much to his subordinates, and, I think, did not +estimate very accurately the possibilities or probabilities of the +accomplishment of the details necessary to the success of his +general plans. It is certainly not too much to say that his +expectations in this regard were very frequently unrealized. But +of this it must be observed that the character of the theater of +war made the handling of a large army extremely difficult, precision +of movement impossible, and any accurate estimate of the time in +which projected operations could be accomplished by no means easy. +Criticism of General Sherman, or of his subordinates, based upon +military experience in other countries or upon the success of his +able antagonist General Johnston, to whom Sherman's difficulties +were corresponding advantages, is likely to be extremely unjust. +In short, Sherman's campaigns stand alone, without a parallel in +military history; alike unique in their conception, execution, and +final results; in most respects among the highest examples of the +art of war. Plans so general and original in conception and +successful in execution point unmistakably to a very high order of +military genius. + + SHERMAN'S GENIUS + +In the order of nature, comparison with those that follow as well +as those that precede is needed to establish the merits of any +individual. A commander may be a great captain compared with his +military predecessors, and yet some of his operations be regarded +as very faulty by more modern commanders. + +Some future historian, with the example before him of a later +chieftain who, on a similar field and under similar but improved +conditions, may have won more brilliant successes, may be able to +determine Sherman's rank among the commanders of past, present, +and future ages. + +Sufficient is not yet known in this country of the credit due any +one individual for the success achieved in the recent campaigns in +Europe to furnish the means of just comparison between the European +and American commanders of this generation. And even between Grant +and Sherman there are so few points of resemblance in military +character or methods, that they must be judged by contrasts rather +than by comparison. Hence it may always be difficult to determine +their exact relative merits as military leaders. Upon this point +I forbear, for the present, to express any opinion. + +In some other respects, Grant and Sherman were hardly less in +contrast than in their military characteristics. At the close of +the Atlanta campaign, in his letter of September 12, 1864, Grant +paid to Sherman the following generous and glowing tribute: "In +conclusion, it is hardly necessary for me to say that I feel you +have accomplished the most gigantic undertaking given to any general +in this war, and with a skill and ability that will be acknowledged +in history as unsurpassed, if not unequaled. It gives me as much +pleasure to record this in your favor as it would in favor of any +living man, myself included." + +To this Sherman replied, September 20: "In the meantime, know that +I admire your dogged perseverance and pluck more than ever." + +There has been much learned discussion of the relative merits of +McClellan's, Grant's, and other plans for the "capture of Richmond," +as if that was the object of the campaign. In fact, though the +capture of Richmond at any time during the war would have produced +some moral effect injurious to the rebellion and beneficial to the +Union in public opinion, it would have been a real injury to the +Union cause in a military sense, because it would have given us +one more important place to garrison, and have increased the length +of our line of supplies, always liable to be broken by the enemy's +cavalry. + +The worst form of operations in such a war is "territorial" strategy, +or that which aims at the capture and occupation of territory as +a primary object. The best is that which aims at the destruction +or capture of the opposing armies as the first and only important +object. Grant at Donelson, Vicksburg, and in Virginia best +illustrated this kind of strategy. + + HALLECK'S CHARACTERISTICS + +Halleck was probably the chief of the "territorial" strategists of +our Civil War period. In the winter of 1861-1862 the counties of +north Missouri bordering on the Missouri River were infested with +guerrillas. Halleck sent Pope, with a force of all arms amounting +to a considerable army, to "clear them out." Pope marched in +triumph from one end of that tier of counties to the other, and +Halleck then informed me with evident satisfaction that north +Missouri was cleared of rebels, and that the war was ended in that +part of the State! In fact, the guerrillas, "flushed" like a flock +of quail by Pope's advance-guard, had taken to the bush until the +rear-guard had passed out of sight, and then were found "feeding" +again on their old ground. + +I felt greatly complimented when Halleck, on his return from Corinth +to St. Louis, en route to Washington to take command of the army, +gave me a full explanation of his "siege of Corinth," including +his application of the standard European tactics of a former +generation, with its rule of 10,000 men to the mile in line and +regular approaches. + +I was many years younger than Halleck, Thomas, Sherman, Grant, and +the other chief commanders, and hence had much more to learn than +they. Perhaps I was also, on account of comparative youth, more +teachable. At any rate, the two lessons from Halleck above referred +to, and later experience, cause me to do "a world of thinking"; so +that I was amazed beyond expression when, in the winter of 1863- +64, just before Grant was made lieutenant-general, Halleck told me +that _his_ plan for the next campaign was to send west of the +Mississippi River force enough to finish the war in all that region +of country, and then return and clear up the States east of that +river! I said nothing, but could not help thinking that it was, +sure enough, time to have another general-in-chief of the army. +But accepting his strategic theory of operations in the American +Civil War,--territorial conquest,--his plans of campaign were +unquestionably sound. + +Halleck was, I believe, a man of great ability and of high military +education, though with little practical experience in war; yet his +peculiar views, and still more singular action, have seemed to me +very remarkable. He remained in Washington, practically inert, +while one of the great armies of which he was general-in-chief was +suffering sore reverses, almost in sight of the Capitol, and the +country's cause greatly imperiled for want of a competent commander +for that army. How could a soldier resist the impulse to "do or +die" at the head of that army? But General Halleck must have known +better than any one else at that time the limits of his own capacity. +He probably knew that even his great ability and education did not +suffice to qualify him for the command of an army in the field. +If so, his action afforded a patriotic example which some others +would have done well to imitate. + +As I have before stated, General Halleck was always kind and just +to me, so far as I ever knew, and I was much indebted to him for +support when it was needed. Now I find in the records the following +letter: + + "Richmond, Va., May 10, 1865, 10:30 A. M. +"Hon. Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War: + +"I beg leave to withdraw for the present my recommendation of +Schofield as military governor of North Carolina. It is represented +to me that he and General Blair were the principal advisers of +Sherman in his armistice with the rebel General Johnston. If so, +he is not a proper person to command in North Carolina. I therefore +suspend my recommendation for further developments. + + "H. W. Halleck, Major-General." + +The fact was that I had not been present when Sherman's memorandum +was agreed upon, had not been consulted about in any way, and knew +nothing of its character until after it had been sent to Washington. +All of this Halleck could have learned at once if he had inquired, +which he did not. So far as I know, he left on record, without +any subsequent explanation or correction, a report which was without +the slightest foundation in fact, and which he understood to be +very damaging to my reputation. Hence it seems necessary for me +to record the fact that there was no foundation for that report. +Beyond this I will only say that I think General Halleck, in this +slight matter, as in his far more serious conduct toward General +Sherman, was inexcusably thoughtless respecting the damage he might +do to the reputation of a brother soldier. The least a true man +can do is to make suitable public reparation if he has for any +reason done publicly a personal injustice. + + HALLECK'S ATTEMPT TO SUPPLANT GRANT + +I knew personally at the time the exact truth respecting the action +of General Halleck toward General Grant before the battle of Shiloh, +especially in ordering Grant to remain in the rear while General +C. F. Smith was sent with the advance of the army to Pittsburg +Landing, as described by General Grant in his "Memoirs." Halleck +hoped Smith might fight a battle and win a victory in Grant's +absence, which would naturally be followed by an order putting +Smith in command in place of Grant. But Halleck had not anticipated +Grant's soldierly action in applying to be relieved, and was not +prepared to face that emergency. As soon as Grant's application +reached St. Louis, Halleck abandoned that line of action, but he +did not abandon his purpose to supersede Grant in some way until +some time later. Whatever excuse there may have been at that time +for Halleck's opinion of Grant, nothing can be said in favor of +the method he adopted to accomplish his purpose to supersede him. + +The action of Grant in this case well foreshadowed that which +occurred when he was tendered the commission of lieutenant-general +and the command of all the armies. Grant would not hold any +commission or command without full authority to perform the duties +belonging to it. In his "Memoirs" he modestly refrains from relating +the most important part of that action, as he told it to me on the +war-steamer _Rhode Island_ the next January. Before accepting the +commission from President Lincoln, as Grant describes, he said in +substance that if it meant that he was to exercise actual command +of all the armies, without any interference from the War Department, +he was willing to accept it, otherwise he could not. To illustrate +what he meant, Grant said to me that when he was coming East to +accept that commission he determined that he would not be +"McClellanized." + +The personal observation, experience, and emotions of an individual +soldier may perhaps be interesting to the reader. I have never +been a lover of war or of strife, and have never been disposed to +seek a fight or quarrel. But when once engaged in or challenged +to battle all the combativeness in human nature is at once aroused. +It is then difficult, if not morally impossible, to decline the +challenge. At all events, that question is not even thought of at +times. One of the most difficult lessons a commander has to learn +is when to offer or accept battle, and when to refrain or decline +--that is, to be complete master of his own natural combativeness. +That courage which is the highest quality of a private or a +subordinate officer may become extremely dangerous in a commander, +unless dominated by that higher moral courage which is undisturbed +by excitement or passion. Grant probably possessed this higher +quality in a greater degree than any other commander of our time. +Sherman and Thomas also possessed it in a very high degree. In +Sherman it was the more remarkable because he was naturally impulsive, +and often manifested this trait, especially in minor matters. He +acquired the power of absolute self-command in battle. With Thomas +this quality appeared to be perfectly natural, as it did with Grant. + +Since I had to fight, I sometimes regretted that I could not have +a chance with a musket in the ranks (behind a good parapet and +"head-log," of course!), for I was a remarkably good shot in my +youth. But I never had a chance to fire a shot in battle except +once, and that was with my artillery at Fredericktown, Missouri, +where not an officer or man in the battery had any idea how to +point a field-piece and give it proper elevation according to the +distance. I quickly found the proper elevation by the means well +known to artillerists, and then directed the battery to go on firing +at that elevation, while I was called upon by the commanding officer +to devote myself to some men with muskets. I have seen this passion +so strong that a major-general commanding an army corps would +dismount and act the part of a gunner to a field-piece, apparently +oblivious to the battle raging all along the line of his corps. + + PERSONAL FEELING IN BATTLE + +Personal feeling in battle is sometimes remarkable, even to the +person himself. In my own experience, the degree of danger was +not often entirely unthought of; and in the comparatively few cases +where it was, the actual danger was much the greatest ever experienced +by me. That such should be the experience of a general in chief +command, under the responsibilities of a great battle, is natural +enough; but that the same should occur when there is little or no +responsibility seems worthy of remark in reference to its apparent +cause. In my first battle,--that of Wilson's Creek,--where I was +a staff officer under a soldier of great experience, ability, and +unsurpassed courage,--General Lyon,--I felt for a long time no +sense of responsibility whatever. I had only to convey his orders +to the troops. Yet the absorption of my mind in the discharge of +this simple duty, and in watching the progress of the battle, was +so complete that I absolutely had no thought whatever of self. +Even after Lyon had been twice wounded, both of our horses killed, +the troops on our left given way in disorder, leaving us standing +in the line, only a few feet to the left of Totten's battery, under +a murderous fire, it did not occur to me that I also might possibly +be hit. I had not even thought for a moment that the commanding +general ought not to be in such an exposed position, or that his +wounds ought to have surgical treatment! My absolute confidence +in my chief left no room in my mind for even such thoughts as those. +It was not until wounds had produced discouragement in the bravest +soul I ever knew that I was aroused to some sense of my own +responsibility as his senior staff officer, and spontaneously said: +"No, general, let us try it again." I was so much absorbed in the +battle itself at that time, and even after Lyon's death, that it +did not occur to me that wounds and death, even of the commanding +general himself, were of any consequence except as they might +influence the progress and final result of the battle. This is +the feeling that must dominate the action of every successful +commander. It is remarkable only because of its early development +in one not then under any such responsibility. + +It may not be a proper subject for criticism at this time, and +certainly is not for any that might seem harsh or unkind, yet it +is an instructive lesson which ought never to be forgotten, that +feeling and passion sometimes more than reason, sound military +principles, or wise statesmanship, dictated military as well as +political policy during and long after the Civil War. + +No doubt all are now ready to admit this in respect to the political +measures which wrought so much evil in the South during the so- +called reconstruction period. But those who are not familiar with +the facts will, I think, be amazed when they see the evidences of +this influence in military operations, and perhaps at no time more +strikingly than during the last period of the Civil War. It would +seem that the official correspondence of that period ought to be +a sufficient warning to deter any future generation from bringing +the country into a condition where even some of the most distinguished +citizens, statesmen, and soldiers seem to be governed more by +passion than by reason in the conduct of public affairs. The +inevitable horrors of war are bad enough in any case, but they are +vastly increased when the passions begotten of civil strife become +dominant. While all parts of the United States have reason for +pride in the manhood and valor of American soldiers, and in the +patriotic devotion of citizens to the cause which they believed to +be right, and profound gratitude for the restoration of the Union +of the States, the people of this entire country should bow their +heads in humiliation when they think of the general low state of +civilization which made such a war possible, and much of its conduct +the dictate of passion and hate rather than of reason or regard +for the public good. Even if it is true, as some soldier-statesmen +have said, but which I do not believe, that occasional wars are +necessary to the vitality of a nation,--necessary to keep up the +fires of patriotism and military ardor upon which the national life +depends,--let them be foreign and not civil wars. It is a great +mistake, though apparently a common one, to suppose that a country +benefits ultimately, in some mysterious way, by civil war, in spite +of all its losses during the war. That able scientist General M. +C. Meigs demonstrated years ago that this country had, in accordance +with a general law, suffered permanent national injury, irreparable +in all future time, by its Civil War, and showed very closely the +amount of that injury. + +It is, no doubt, true that the body politic, like the natural body, +may in extreme cases be so diseased either by inheritance or from +violation of natural laws, as to require the surgeon's knife to +remove the diseased part. But in such a case there is little cause +for pride except in the skill of the surgeon, and little cause for +rejoicing except in the fact that the operation was successful, +that neither the disease nor the surgeon's knife killed the patient. + +While the great Von Moltke and others were unquestionably right in +their views of the necessity for thorough preparation for war at +all times, I believe that indispensable preparation can be made in +a way vastly more satisfactory than by actual war. And this can +be done with only a trifling expenditure of treasure, and at no +cost whatever in blood or sorrow, nor in suspension of peaceful +pursuits, nor in burdensome debts, nor in enormous disbursements +for pensions. Let the schools of all kinds and all grades teach +patriotism, respect for law, obedience to authority, discipline, +courage, physical development, and the rudiments of practical +military manoeuvers; let the national and State military schools +be fostered and perfected, and the volunteer citizen soldiery given +material aid proportionate to their patriotic military zeal. Let +the fortifications of the sea-coasts and the fleets of battle-ships +and cruisers on the ocean be commensurate with the vast national +interests and honor intrusted to their protection and defense; let +the standing army be sufficient to discharge the duties which +require long and scientific education and training, and to serve +as models and instructors for the millions of young citizens: then +will the United States, by being always ready for war, insure to +themselves all the blessings of peace, and this at a cost utterly +insignificant in comparison with the cost of one great war. It is +a source of profound gratification to an old soldier who has long +worked toward this great end to know that his country has already, +in his short lifetime, come so near this perfect ideal of a peace- +loving yet military republic. Only a few more years of progress +in the direction already taken, and the usual prolongation of +natural life will yet enable me to witness the realization of this +one great object of my earthly ambition. + +[( 1) War Records, Vol. XLVI, part ii, p. 802.] + +[( 2) For the military convention of April 26, 1865, signed by +Sherman and Johnston, and the supplemental terms, signed by Johnston +and Schofield, see War Records, Vol. XLVII, part iii, pp. 313, 482.] + + +CHAPTER XIX +The Restoration of Civil Government in the Southern States--The +Course Pursued in North Carolina--An Order from General Grant in +Regard to Cotton and Produce--Suggestions for the Reorganization +of Civil Government--A Provisional Governor for North Carolina. + +Being in command in North Carolina at the close of the war, I was +connected for a short period with the very earliest consideration +of the vital question of the restoration of civil government in +the Southern States, in which I acted a more important part at a +later period. The moment the surrender of Johnston's army made it +evident that the end was near, the question arose, and was much +discussed among some of the prominent officers, as to the status +of the negroes in the South. The position was promptly taken by +me, as the responsible commander in North Carolina, that the question +at that time was solely one of fact. The President's proclamation +of emancipation was virtually a military order to the army to free +all the slaves in the insurgent States as rapidly as military +operations should bring them within its control. Whatever the +legal effect of the proclamation upon the status of slaves not +within the reach of the army when it was issued, there could be no +question of its binding obligation, as an order to the army, to be +executed and made practically effective as rapidly as it came within +the power of the army to execute it. Accordingly, the following +order was issued by me to give full practical effect to the +proclamation, and to maintain the freedom of all former slaves, so +long as the subject-matter should remain under military control. +This order, which was the first public official declaration on the +subject, was mentioned by one of the leading journals of New York +at the time as having at least the merit of "saving a world of +discussion." However this may be, little or no discussion followed, +and the freedom of all slaves in the States lately in insurrection +at once became an established fact. + + "(General Orders, No. 32.) + "Hdqrs. Dept. of North Carolina, Army of the Ohio, Raleigh, N. C., + April 27, 1865. +"To remove a doubt which seems to exist in the minds of some of +the people of North Carolina, it is hereby declared that by virtue +of the proclamation of the President of the United States dated +January 1, 1863, all persons in this State heretofore held as slaves +are now free, and that it is the duty of the army to maintain the +freedom of such persons. + +"It is recommended to the former owners of the freedmen to employ +them as hired servants at reasonable wages; and it is recommended +to the freedmen that, when allowed to do so, they remain with their +former masters, and labor fruitfully so long as they shall be +treated kindly and paid reasonable wages, or that they immediately +seek employment elsewhere in the kind of work to which they are +accustomed. It is not well for them to congregate about towns or +military camps. They will not be supported in idleness. + +"By command of Major-General Schofield: + "J. A. Campbell, Assistant Adjutant-General." + +On the same day I issued the following: + + "(General Orders, No. 31.) + "Hdqrs. Dept. of North Carolina, Army of the Ohio, Raleigh, N. C., + April 27, 1865. +"The commanding general has the great satisfaction of announcing +to the army and to the people of North Carolina that hostilities +within this State have definitively ceased; that for us the war is +ended; and it is hoped that peace will soon be restored throughout +our country. + +"It is now the duty of all to cultivate friendly relations with +the same zeal which has characterized our conduct of the war, that +the blessings of Union, peace, and material prosperity may be +speedily restored to the entire country. It is confidently believed +and expected that the troops of this army and the people of North +Carolina will cordially unite in honest endeavors to accomplish +this great end. + +"All good and peaceable citizens will be protected and treated with +kindness, while those who disturb the peace or violate the laws +will be punished with the severity of martial law. + +"The troops will be distributed so as best to secure the interests +of the United States government and protect the people until a +civil government can be established in harmony with the constitution +and laws of the United States. + +"The most perfect discipline and good conduct are enjoined upon +all officers and soldiers, and cordial support upon all good +citizens. + +"All who are peaceably disposed are invited to return to their +homes and resume their industrial pursuits. Such as have been +deprived of their animals and wagons by the hostile armies will be +temporarily supplied, as far as practicable, upon application to +the nearest provost-marshal, by loans of the captured property in +possession of the quartermaster's department. The needy will also +be supplied, for the time being, with subsistence stores from the +commissary department. . . . + +"By command of Major-General Schofield: + "J. A. Campbell, Assistant Adjutant-General." + +On May 4, I issued a circular to this effect: + +"Local commanders and provost-marshals will encourage all refugees, +white and colored, to return to their homes; and for this purpose +will furnish them the necessary railroad passes and subsistence. + +"Such persons must not be given passes to Raleigh or points on the +sea-coast, nor be permitted to congregate about towns or camps, +there to live in idleness." + +On May 5, I wrote to General Sherman: + +"When General Grant was here, as you doubtless recollect, he said +the lines had been extended to embrace this and other States south. +The order, it seems, has been modified so as to include only Virginia +and Tennessee. I think it would be an act of wisdom to open this +State to trade at once. I hope the government will make known its +policy as to organization of State governments without delay. +Affairs must necessarily be in a very unsettled state until that +is done. The people are now in a mood to accept almost anything +which promises a definite settlement. What is to be done with the +freedmen is the question of all, and it is the all-important +question. It requires prompt and wise action to prevent the negro +from becoming a huge elephant on our hands. + +"If I am to govern this State, it is important for me to know it +at once. If another is to be sent here, it cannot be done too +soon, for he will probably undo the most of what I shall have done. +I shall be most glad to hear from you fully when you have time to +write. . . ." + +Two days later I wrote to General Halleck: + +"I have received your despatch concerning slavery, the treatment +of freedmen, etc. I will send you my orders issued some days ago, +which agree perfectly with your views on this subject. I have not +recognized in any way any of the civil officers of the State--not +being willing to act in such matters in the absence of any indication +of the policy of the government, and taking it for granted that +instructions would be given soon. In this connection, I desire to +suggest that the sooner a military governor is appointed for this +State, and steps taken to organize a civil government, the better. +The people are now in a mood to accept anything in reason, and to +do what the government desires. If I am, by virtue of my command, +to perform the duties of military governor, I would like to know it. + +"If another is to be appointed, it ought to be done before I have +been compelled to do something which he may think it necessary to +undo. I think it would be eminently wise to retain in office +justices of the peace, sheriffs, and other inferior officers who +may prove to be loyal and worthy; but this should be done by the +military governor. I believe the administration need have no +anxiety about the question of slavery, or any other important +question, in this State. But the proper care of the freedmen should +be provided for by State legislation as soon as possible. I shall +be thankful for any information or instructions you may be able to +give me on these subjects." + +A week later more precise rules governing the freedmen were issued: + + "(General Orders, No. 46.) + "Hdqrs. Dept. of North Carolina, Army of the Ohio, Raleigh, N. C., + May 15, 1865. +"The following rules are published for the government of freedmen +in North Carolina until the restoration of civil government in the +State: + +"I. The common laws governing the domestic relations, such as +those giving parents authority and control over their children, and +guardians control over their wards, are in force. The parent's or +guardian's authority and obligations take the place of those of +the former master. + +"II. The former masters are constituted the guardians of minors +and of the aged and infirm, in the absence of parents or other +relatives capable of supporting them. + +"III. Young men and women under twenty-one years of age remain +under the control of their parents or guardians until they become +of age, thus aiding to support their parents and younger brothers +and sisters. + +"IV. The former masters of freedmen may not turn away the young +or the infirm, nor refuse to give them food and shelter; nor may +the able-bodied men or women go away from their homes, or live in +idleness, and leave their parents, children, or young brothers and +sisters to be supported by others. + +"V. Persons of age who are free from any of the obligations referred +to above are at liberty to find new homes wherever they can obtain +proper employment; but they will not be supported by the government, +nor by their former masters, unless they work. + +"VI. It will be left to the employer and servants to agree upon +the wages to be paid; but freedmen are advised that for the present +season they ought to expect only moderate wages, and where their +employers cannot pay them money, they ought to be contented with +a fair share in the crops to be raised. They have gained their +personal freedom. By industry and good conduct they may rise to +independence and even wealth. + +"VII. All officers, soldiers, and citizens are requested to give +publicity to these rules, and to instruct the freed people as to +their new rights and obligations. + +"VIII. All officers of the army and of the county police companies +are authorized and required to correct any violation of the above +rules within their jurisdictions. + +"IX. Each district commander will appoint a superintendent of +freedmen,--a commissioned officer,--with such number of assistants +--officers and non-commissioned officers--as may be necessary, +whose duty it will be to take charge of all the freed people in +his district who are without homes or proper employment. The +superintendents will send back to their homes all who have left +them in violation of the above rules, and will endeavor to find +homes and suitable employment for all others. They will provide +suitable camps or quarters for such as cannot be otherwise provided +for, and attend to their discipline, police, subsistence, etc. + +"X. The superintendents will hear all complaints of guardians or +wards, and report the facts to their district commanders, who are +authorized to dissolve the existing relations of guardian and ward +in any case which may seem to require it, and to direct the +superintendent to otherwise provide for the wards, in accordance +with the above rules. + + "By command of Major-General Schofield: + "J. A. Campbell, Assistant Adjutant-General." + +On May 29, General Grant, from Washington, ordered me to "give +every facility and encouragement to getting to market cotton and +other Southern products. Let there be no seizure of private property +or searching to look after Confederate cotton. The finances of +the country demand that all articles of export should be gotten to +the market as speedily as possible." I answered at once: + +"Your despatch concerning cotton and other products is received. +I some time ago removed all military restrictions upon trade, and +have given every facility for carrying cotton and other products +to market. The only obstacles in the way are the restrictions of +the Treasury Department. It would be a blessing to the country if +the whole system could be abolished. Now only one man in North +Carolina is authorized to buy cotton, and he does not pay money +for it. It is impossible for people to get their products to market +in this way." + +The imperative need of the Southern States at the close of the war +was temporary military government, and permission, under such full +military protection, to reorganize their civil governments. In +the following letter to General Grant, dated May 10, I submitted +by views concerning the policy that ought to be pursued: + +"I desire to submit to you my views concerning the policy that +ought to be pursued in North Carolina, leaving it to your judgment +whether or not to submit them to the President or Secretary of War. +I am now led to this mainly by a letter which I received on the +7th from Chief Justice Chase, giving some points of the policy +advocated by him, which, if adopted in this State, would in my +opinion lead to disastrous results. + +"The points I refer to are briefly as follows, viz.: + +"The organization of the State government to be left to the people +acting in their original sovereign capacity. + +"In determining the right of suffrage, the old Constitution, amended +in 1835, to be followed in preference to the new one which was in +force at the commencement of the rebellion--the object being to +give negroes the right to vote. + +"The first proposition is not, I think, open to serious objection. +With proper assistance from the military authorities, it can be +successfully carried out. + +"The second proposition is the one to which I refer as specially +objectionable, and this for two reasons. + +"First. The Constitution of the State as it existed immediately +prior to the rebellion is still the State Constitution, and there +is no power on earth but the people of the State that can alter it. + +"The operations of the war have freed the slaves in this and most +other States, and, doubtless, slavery will be constitutionally +abolished throughout the country. But the United States cannot +make a negro, nor even a white man, an elector in any State. That +is a power expressly reserved by the Constitution to the several +States. We cannot alter or amend the Constitution of North Carolina, +as it now exists, without either first altering or else violating +the Constitution of the United States. + +"If we hold that by the rebellion the States have lost their +existence as States, and have been reduced to unorganized Territories +under the absolute sovereign authority of the United States, then +undoubtedly we may declare that all inhabitants, white and black, +shall have equal political rights and an equal voice in the +organization of a State to be admitted into the Union. But I +understand President Johnson repudiates this doctrine; hence it +may be left out of the question. + +"It appears to me beyond question that the Constitution of North +Carolina is now valid and binding as the law of the State, and that +any measures for the reorganization of the State government must +be in accordance with the provisions of that instrument. This, I +am convinced, is the unanimous opinion of the leading Union men of +the State. + +"My second reason for objecting to the proposition is the absolute +unfitness of the negroes, as a class, for any such responsibility. +They can neither read nor write. They have no knowledge whatever +of law or government. They do not even know the meaning of the +freedom that has been given them, and are much astonished when +informed that it does not mean that they are to live in idleness +and be fed by the government. + +"It is true they are docile, obedient, and anxious to learn, but +we certainly ought to teach them something before we give them an +equal voice with ourselves in government. This view is so fully +recognized as correct by all who are familiar, by actual contact, +with the negro character and condition, that argument seems +superfluous. I have yet to see a single one among the many Union +men in North Carolina who would willingly submit for a moment to +the immediate elevation of the negro to political equality with +the white man. + +"They are all, or nearly all, content with the abolition of slavery. +Many of them are rejoiced that it is done. But to raise the negro, +in his present ignorant and degraded condition, to be their political +equals would be, in their opinion, to enslave them [the white +citizens]. If they did not rebel against it, it would only be +because rebellion would be hopeless. A government so organized +would in no sense be a popular government. + + THE REORGANIZATION OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT + +"After careful consideration of all the questions involved, I am +fully convinced as to the best policy to be adopted in this State, +which I will submit in outline: + +"A military governor to be appointed, who shall have command of +all the troops in the State; or the department commander be authorized +to assume, by virtue of his command, the function of military +governor, which naturally devolves upon him. + +"The military governor to declare the Constitution and laws of the +State in force immediately preceding the pretended Act of Secession +(so far as the same are not inconsistent with the Constitution and +laws of the United States and the war proclamations of the President) +to be still in force. + +"To make provisional appointments of justices of the peace, sheriffs, +and such other inferior officers as the State laws empower the +governor to appoint, to serve until the organization of a civil +government. + +"To order an enrolment of all electors who may take the President's +amnesty oath. + +"As soon as this enrolment shall be completed, to call an election +for delegates to a State convention. The qualifications of voters +and candidates to be those prescribed by the State laws, and that +they shall take the amnesty oath. All acts of the convention to +be submitted to the people, for their ratification or rejection, +at the same time with the election of governor and members of the +legislature, which would be ordered by the convention. + +"I would confidently expect a convention, so chosen, to repudiate +the doctrine of secession, abolish slavery, and fully restore the +State to its practical constitutional relations to the Government +of the United States. The people are now ripe for such action. +They only ask to know what the government desires them to do, and +how they are to do it. + +"If, however, they should fail to do this, I would regard them as +having violated their oaths, would dissolve the convention, and +hold the State under military government until the people should +come to their senses. I would have a lawful popular government or +a military government--the latter being a necessary substitute in +the absence of the former. + +"I am willing to discharge, to the best of my ability, any duty +which may properly devolve upon me. Yet if a policy so opposed to +my views as that proposed by Mr. Chase is to be adopted, I respectfully +suggest that I am not the proper person to carry it out. + +"If, however, after knowing my views fully, it be desired that I +execute the President's wishes, would it not be well for me to have +a personal interview with him, in order that I may fully understand +his plan and the principles upon which it is founded?" + +The fundamental principles of my suggestion were: + +First. The Constitution and laws as they were before secession, +modified to embrace the legitimate results of the war--namely, +national integrity and universal freedom. + +Second. Intelligent suffrage, to be regulated by the States +themselves; and + +Third. Military governments, in the absence of popular civil +governments, as being the only lawful substitute, under our system, +for a government by the people during their temporary inability, +from whatever cause, to govern themselves. + +But these constitutional methods were rejected. First came the +unauthorized system of "provisional" governors, civilians without +any shadow of lawful authority for their appointments, and their +abortive attempts at "reconstruction." + +Next the Fourteenth Amendment, disfranchising nearly all the trusted +leaders of the Southern people, and then the "iron-clad oath," +universal enfranchisement of the ignorant blacks, and "carpet-bag" +government, with all their offensive consequences. If wise +statesmanship instead of party passion had ruled the hour, how +easily could those twelve years of misrule in the South, and +consequent disappointment and shame among its authors in the North, +have been avoided! + + A PROVISIONAL GOVERNOR FOR NORTH CAROLINA + +A "provisional" governor (William W. Holden) having been appointed +for North Carolina, I relinquished command of the department in +June, 1865, to enter upon more important service in respect to the +then existing military intervention in Mexico by the Emperor of +the French. + + +CHAPTER XX +French Intervention in Mexico--A Plan to Compel the Withdrawal of +the French Army--Grant's Letter of Instructions to General Sheridan +--Secretary Seward Advocates Moral Suasion--A Mission to Paris With +That End in View--Speechmaking at the American Thanksgiving Dinner +--Napoleon's Method of Retreating with Dignity--A Presentation to +the Emperor and Empress. + +While the government of the United States was fully occupied with +the contest for the preservation of the Union, Napoleon III, Emperor +of the French, attempted to overthrow the republican government of +Mexico, and establish in its stead an empire under the Archduke +Maximilian of Austria. If the American conflict had resulted in +the triumph of secession, so also might Napoleon have succeeded in +re-establishing monarchical government on the American continent. +But from the moment when the Union of the States became reassured, +European interference in the political affairs of the American +republic became impossible. Upon this subject there appeared to +be no division of sentiment among the people of the United States. +Certainly there was none among the responsible American statesmen +of that time. It was their unanimous voice that the French +intervention in Mexico must be speedily terminated; but there was +naturally some division of opinion respecting the means by which +this should be effected. Some favored the most prompt and vigorous +military action, while others, not unmindful of the long-existing +friendship between the people of the United States and France, +preferred more peaceful measures. + + FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO + +As the first and necessary step in either line of policy, whether +for immediate active military operations or as conclusive evidence +of ultimate military purpose in aid of diplomacy, General Sheridan +was sent, with an army of about fifty thousand men, to the line of +the Rio Grande. But Sheridan's troops were Union volunteers who +had been enlisted especially for the Civil War, then terminated; +and the necessity was at once recognized of organizing a new army +for the express purpose of acting against the French army in Mexico, +in case of need. It was proposed that this new army should be +enlisted and organized under the republican government of Mexico, +the only government recognized by the United States in that country. +This course would avoid the necessity of any political action of +the government of the United States in the premises. Lieutenant- +General U. S. Grant, then commander-in-chief of the armies of the +United States, was requested to select an officer to organize and +command the proposed army. + +In June, 1865, at Raleigh, North Carolina, I received a message +from General Grant informing me of my selection, and desiring me, +if I was willing to consider the proposition, to come to Washington +for consultation on the subject. Upon my arrival in Washington, +I consulted freely with General Grant, Seńor Romero (the Mexican +minister), President Johnson, Secretary of State Seward, and +Secretary of War Stanton, all of whom approved the general proposition +that I should assume the control and direction of the measures to +be adopted for the purpose of causing the French army to evacuate +Mexico. Not much was said between me and the President or either +of his secretaries at that time about the means to be employed; +but it appeared to be understood by all that force would probably +be necessary, and for some time no other means were considered. +The subject was fully discussed with General Grant and Seńor Romero, +and I then consented to take charge of the matter, with the +understanding that I should have perfect freedom of action and +choice of means and of time, so far as circumstances would permit. +To enable me to do this, the War Department gave me leave of absence +for twelve months, with permission to go beyond the limits of the +United States and to take with me any officers of my staff whom I +might designate. It was proposed to organize in Mexican territory +an army corps under commissions from the government of Mexico, the +officers and soldiers to be taken from the Union and Confederate +forces, who were reported to be eager to enlist in such an +enterprise. + +The Mexican authorities proposed to furnish the means by which this +army should be paid and the expenses of military operations defrayed, +and to that end a loan was to be negotiated in the United States. +To facilitate the enlistment and equipment of the proposed army +corps, General Grant gave me a manuscript order, dated West Point, +July 25, 1865, addressed to General P. H. Sheridan, then commanding +the Military Division of the Gulf, with a large force near the +Mexican frontier. The following is a copy of General Grant's order: + + GRANT'S LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS TO SHERIDAN + +"Head Quarters Armies of the United States. + + "West Point, N. Y., July 25, 1865. +"Maj.-Gen. P. H. Sheridan, Com'd'g Mil. Div. of the Gulf. + +"General: Maj.-General J. M. Schofield goes to the Rio Grande on +an inspection tour, carrying with him a leave of absence for one +year, with authority to leave the United States. If he avails +himself of this leave he will explain to you the object more fully +than I could do in the limits of a letter, and much more fully than +I could do now, under any circumstances, because much that will +have to be learned to fix his determination, whether to go or not, +has yet to be found out in Washington whilst I shall be away. +This, however, I can say: Gen. Schofield's leave has been given +with the concurrence of the President, he having full knowledge of +the object. I have both written my views to the President and had +conversations with him on the subject. In all that relates to +Mexican affairs he agrees in the duty we owe to ourselves to maintain +the Monroe doctrine, both as a principle and as a security for our +future peace. + +"On the Rio Grande, or in Texas, convenient to get there, we must +have a large amount of surrendered ordnance and ordnance stores, +or such articles accumulating from discharging men who leave their +stores behind. Without special orders to do so, send none of these +articles back, but rather place them convenient to be permitted to +go into Mexico if they can be got into the hands of the defenders +of the only Government we recognize in that country. I hope Gen. +Schofield may go with orders direct to receive these articles; but +if he does not, I know it will meet with general approbation to +let him have them if contrary orders are not received. + +"It is a fixed determination on the part of the people of the United +States, and I think myself safe in saying on the part of the +President also, that an empire shall not be established on this +continent by the aid of foreign bayonets. A war on the part of +the United States is to be avoided, if possible; but it will be +better to go to war now, when but little aid given to the Mexicans +will settle the question, than to have in prospect a greater war, +sure to come if delayed until the empire is established. We want, +then, to aid the Mexican without giving cause of war between the +United States and France. Between the would-be empire of Maximilian +and the United States all difficulty can easily be settled by +observing the same sort of neutrality that has been observed toward +us for the last four years. + +"This is a little indefinite as a letter of instructions to be +governed by. I hope with this you may receive them--instructions +--in much more positive terms. With a knowledge of the fact before +you, however, that the greatest desire is felt to see the Liberal +Government restored in Mexico,--and no doubt exists of the strict +justice of our right to demand this, and enforce the demand with +the whole strength of the United States,--your own judgment gives +you a basis of action that will aid you. + +"I will recommend in a few days that you be directed to discharge +all the men you think can be spared from the Dept. of Texas, where +they are, giving transportation to their homes to all who desire +to return. You are aware that existing orders permit discharged +soldiers to retain their arms and accoutrements at low rates, fixed +in orders. + + "Very respectfully, your obt. svt., + "U. S. Grant, Lt.-Gen." + +In effect this order required General Sheridan to turn over to me +all of his volunteer troops who might wish to take part in the +Mexican enterprise, with their arms and equipments, and all +"surrendered ordnance and ordnance stores," etc., thus making it +easy for me to arm and equip at small cost the ex-Confederates and +others who would join my standard. Soon after the date of General +Grant's order to General Sheridan, and at the request of Secretary +Seward, conveyed to me by Mr. Stanton, I met Mr. Seward at Cape +May. He then proposed to me to go to France, under authority of +the State Department, to see if the French emperor could not be +made to understand the necessity of withdrawing his army from Mexico, +and thus save us the necessity of expelling it by force. Mr. Seward +expressed the belief that if Napoleon could be made to understand that +the people of the United States would never, under any circumstances, +consent to the existence in Mexico of a government established and +sustained by foreign power, he would withdraw his army from that +country. If this were done, the friendly relations between the +people of France and the United States would not be disturbed, +while the expulsion of a French army from Mexico by American +volunteers would engender great bitterness of feeling among the +French people, even if it did not lead to war between France and +the United States. + + SECRETARY SEWARD ADVOCATES MORAL SUASION + +This proposition from Mr. Seward seemed to put upon me the +responsibility of deciding the momentous question of future friendship +or enmity between my own country and our ancient ally and friend. +I had, on the one hand, full authority from the War Department and +the general-in-chief of the army, given with the knowledge and +consent of the President of the United States, to organize and +equip an army for the purpose of driving the French out of Mexico, +and on the other hand a request from the State Department to go to +France and try by peaceful means to accomplish the same end. + +As the negotiation of the Mexican loan had not made great progress, +the funds were not yet available for the support of an army. It +was expected that the actual beginning of operations on the Rio +Grande would stimulate subscriptions to the loan, yet the lack of +ready money was a sufficient cause for some delay in making the +proposed "inspection tour" to the Rio Grande; and this fact, added +to a natural love of peace rather then of war, and a due sense of +the dictates of patriotism as contrasted with mere military ambition, +determined the decision of that question. It is reason for profound +thankfulness that the peaceful course was adopted. + +In a letter dated August 4, 1865, I informed Mr. Seward of my +decision, "after mature reflection," "to undertake the mission" +which he had proposed. Mr. Seward acknowledged my letter on August +9, and on the 19th I received a telegram from the War Department +to "report at the State Department upon your [my] next visit to +Washington." This order was promptly obeyed. On August 23 the +Secretary of War sent a letter to the Secretary of State, accrediting +me as an officer of the army, in which capacity, and unofficially, +I was to be understood by the public as visiting Europe. A copy +of this letter, inclosed in one from the State Department, was sent +to Mr. Bigelow, United States minister at Paris; and similar letters +were sent to several other United States ministers in Europe. But +time passed until November 4, and thus more than two months elapsed +before the Secretary of State was ready for me to start to Europe. +Mr. Seward then gave me a confidential letter, dated November 4, +1865, addressed to Mr. Bigelow, and a letter of credit on the +Barings, and requested me to proceed on my mission. + +In his letter to Mr. Bigelow he said: "General Schofield proceeds +to Paris. He is, I believe, fully informed of the feelings and +sentiments, not only of this government, but of the American people. +I commend him to your confidence," etc. Mr. Seward explained to +me several times during this period of delay that correspondence +then going on with the French government rendered it advisable that +my visit be delayed until he should receive expected answers from +that government. The Atlantic cable did not then exist, and hence +correspondence across the ocean was necessarily slow. The expected +despatch--viz., that from the French Foreign Office to their minister +at Washington, dated October 18, 1865, and communicated to Mr. +Seward on the 29th of the same month--was no more satisfactory, +though in better tone, than those which had preceded. In effect +it demanded a recognition by the United States of the government +of Maximilian in Mexico as a condition precedent to the recall of +the French army. The time had evidently arrived when Napoleon must +be informed in language which could not be misunderstood what was +the real sentiment of the government and people of the United States +on the Mexican question. It was difficult, perhaps impossible, to +express that sentiment in official diplomatic language that an +emperor could afford to receive from a friendly power. It was +therefore desirable that the disagreeable information be conveyed +to Napoleon in a way which would command his full credence, and +which he yet need not regard as offensive. Mr. Seward's explanation +and instructions to me, after several long conversations on the +subject, were summed up in the words; "I want you to get your legs +under Napoleon's mahogany, and tell him he must get out of Mexico." + + A MISSION TO PARIS + +In my visit to Paris I was accompanied by two officers of my staff, +Brevet Brigadier-General William M. Wherry and Brevet Brigadier- +General G. W. Schofield, who had been given leave of absence for +the purpose of going with me to Mexico or elsewhere. We sailed +from New York, November 15, 1865, on the Cunard steamer _Java_, +and stayed a day in Liverpool and several days in London, where I +explained to Mr. Adams, United States minister, the purpose of my +visit. + +Mr. Adams expressed hearty sympathy with the object of my mission, +and gave cordial assent to my wish that I might feel at liberty to +consult him in regard to it at any time. + +Mr. Motley, United States minister at Vienna, whom I had the pleasure +of meeting at the residence of Mr. Adams, assured me that the +government of Austria was especially desirous of not being regarded +by the United States as responsible in any manner for the attempt +to establish an empire under the Austrian archduke in Mexico. Mr. +Motley thought a visit by me to Vienna while the Mexican question +was pending might produce undue excitement. Hence I limited my +tour in that direction to Italy. + +We proceeded to Paris on the 2d of December. Our arrival had been +preceded by vague rumors of an official mission more or less hostile +to the interests of France, which caused great excitement among +the French people and the American residents in Paris, and serious +depression of United States, Mexican, and French securities in the +financial markets of Europe. It was also understood that no little +anxiety was felt at the French court, then at Compičgne. It was +manifestly desirable to allay so far as possible this undue excitement +in the public mind. Hence I availed myself of an early opportunity, +given by the American Thanksgiving dinner at the Grand Hotel, to +intimate in unmistakable terms that my mission, if any, was one +entirely friendly to the people of France. + + SPEECHMAKING AT THE AMERICAN THANKSGIVING DINNER + +The following is a part of the account of that banquet given by +the Paris correspondent of the "New York Herald," under date of +December 8, 1865: + +"The American residents and transient sojourners in Paris celebrated +the national Thanksgiving by a grand dinner at the Grand Hotel, +which passed off in splendid style. . . . The next toast was the +long-looked-for-one of the evening, for it was known that it would +call up a distinguished guest from whom all were anxious to hear. +It was "The Army and Navy of the United States." When the band +had ceased playing "Yankee Doodle," Major-General Schofield rose +to reply to this toast, and was received with tremendous enthusiasm. +The ladies rose and waved their handkerchiefs, and gentlemen shouted +until they were hoarse. The general, after bowing his acknowledgments, +said: 'Fellow-countrymen--I want words to express to you the +satisfaction which will be felt in the heart of every soldier and +sailor when he learns the manner in which the names of the army +and navy have been received by you to-night. I will at this time +allude but briefly to one of the great lessons taught by the American +war--the grandest lesson of modern times. A great people who have +heretofore lived under a government so mild that they were scarcely +aware of its existence have found, in time of war, that government +to be one of the strongest in the world [cheers], raising and +maintaining armies and navies vaster than any ever before known +[cheers]. In point of character, in point of physical and moral +qualities, in point of discipline and of mobility in large masses, +the armies of the United States have never before been equaled +[loud cheers]. Yet this, great as it is, is not the greatest wonder +of the American war. This vast army, as soon as its work was done, +was quietly disbanded, and every man went to his home, as quietly +as the Christian goes back from church on Sabbath morning; and each +soldier re-entered upon the avocations of peace a better citizen +than he was before he became a soldier [renewed applause]. This +was the grandest lesson of the war. It shows that the power of a +nation to maintain its dignity and integrity does not result from +or depend upon its form of government; that the greatest national +strength--the power to mass the largest armies in time of war--is +entirely consistent with the broadest liberty of the citizen in +time of peace [enthusiasm]. Permit me, in conclusion, to propose +a toast which I know will be heartily responded to by every true +American--"The old friendship between France and the United States: +May it be strengthened and perpetuated!"' General Schofield's +toast was drunk with great enthusiasm, and upon his taking his seat +the applause which followed his remarks was deafening." + +The situation of Napoleon's government at that time was extremely +critical. The opposition was powerful and aggressive. The +intervention in Mexican affairs was very unpopular in France, and +yet the national pride of the people would not permit the Emperor +to yield to menace even from the United States, nor allow his army +to be driven by force from Mexico without a supreme effort to +maintain it there. Napoleon could not have submitted to such +humiliation without the loss of his throne. In short, forcible +intervention by the American people in the Mexican question, or +the public threat of such action, arousing the national pride of +France, must have led to a long and bloody war, resulting, doubtless, +in final success to America and probably in a revolution in France. + +Such a result would have been a just punishment to Napoleon for +his conduct toward the United States and Mexico during our Civil +War. But why involve the people of France and the people of the +United States in this punishment? Why make enemies of our ancient +friends? Our sister republic of Mexico must be relieved from +foreign domination, at whatever cost; but strife and lasting enmity +between the United States and France would be a fearful price to +pay for even so great a good as the freedom of Mexico. Manifestly +such extreme measures should not be resorted to until all peaceful +means had failed. Considerations of this nature determined my +course while in Paris. I had sufficient opportunity in two interviews +with Prince Napoleon, and in several conversations with officers +of high rank on the Emperor's staff, to make known to the Emperor +the views and purposes of the government and people of the United +States in respect to Mexican affairs. Our conversation was without +reserve on either side, and with the understanding that nothing +said by me would be withheld from the Emperor. + +The principal of these staff-officers was the distinguished Admiral +de la Gravičre, who had commanded the French squadron in American +waters in the early part of our Civil War and in the capture of +Vera Cruz. This gallant and honest old sailor had reported to his +government the exact truth about the enterprise which Napoleon had +undertaken when he ordered the bombardment and capture of the +Mexican seaport for the alleged purpose of collecting a French +claim--namely, that he was no better able to collect that claim +after the city was in his possession then he had been before, and +that the conquest of Mexico by the operations of a large army would +be necessary before any financial return could be expected. This +unwelcome report led to the admiral's recall to France, and he was +sent to his home in disgrace. But in due time the Emperor learned +that while all others had deceived him, the admiral had told him +the truth, whereupon he was called to Paris, restored to the +confidence of his chief, and appointed aide-de-camp on the staff +of the Emperor. Admiral de la Gravičre was a warm friend of America, +rejoiced in the triumph of the Union cause, understood and appreciated +the sentiments of the people of the United States, among whom he +had made many friends, and was a very willing medium of communication +to the Emperor of the exact attitude of the American people respecting +the Monroe doctrine, which the Emperor of the French had been +betrayed into violating through the influence of persons high in +his confidence, but governed by sordid motives. + + NAPOLEON'S METHOD OF RETREATING WITH DIGNITY + +Admiral Reno, Assistant Minister of Marine, was another of the high +French officials with whom free conversation was held. + +The fidelity with which Prince Napoleon and others reported to the +Emperor the character of the unofficial message which I had to +deliver rendered it quite unnecessary that it be delivered in +person, and quite impossible that the Emperor should be willing to +receive it in that way. Hence, though I received several intimations +that I would be invited to a private interview, no invitation came, +and none was sought. My letters from Paris to Mr. Seward, to +General Grant, and to Seńor Romero, reported the progress made, +and the nature of the situation as it then appeared to me. + +On January 22 I was present at a dinner given by Prince Napoleon +in the Palais Royal. Every shade of political opinion in Paris +was represented among the guests. Political discussion seemed to +be entirely unrestrained, with one exception, when a remark which +savored of disloyalty to the empire was rebuked by the prince. + +In the Emperor's address to the French legislature on January 22, +his future policy in respect to Mexico had been hinted at in the +words: "[Our expedition] _touche ŕ son terme_." The declared +purpose of speedily terminating the intervention in Mexico having +been applauded by all, the prince inquired pointedly of me whether, +in my opinion, the Emperor's declaration would be satisfactory to +the United States, and received the unreserved reply that it would, +as I believed, be accepted as satisfactory. + +In my report to Mr. Seward of January 24, I expressed the belief +that even his enemies in France would not be disposed to embarrass +the Emperor with respect to Mexico, "well satisfied to see him get +out of that country by any means, and thus avoid war with the United +States"; and I ventured the suggestion that "this course would also +seem wise on our part." In my letter of the same date to General +Grant I said: + +"You will get by this mail Napoleon's speech delivered at the +opening of the French legislative session. I was present and heard +the speech delivered. That part of it relating to Mexico and the +United States was received with very general tokens of approbation, +while most of the remainder met with a cold reception. I have +since heard it discussed very freely by many prominent men of all +shades of political opinion, among others the Prince Napoleon. +All seem to recognize the falsity of the Emperor's assumptions +where he says: 'In Mexico the government founded by the will of +the people is consolidating itself,' etc. Yet his statements are, +no doubt, believed by a large majority of the French people, and +therefore afford him a very good reason for yielding to the demand, +made in common by the people of France and the United States, that +his intervention in Mexico shall be brought to an end. This is +the logic of his position and the solution of his difficulty, viz.: +To assert that he has accomplished the object of his expedition to +Mexico, and hence to end it. While we laugh at the absurdity of +his premises, we can hardly find fault with his conclusion, and +hence it is not worth while to criticize any part of his argument. +Rather I think it well to let him make the most of his audacity in +the creation of convenient facts. The opinion seems to be universal +here that the Emperor is sincere in his declarations of intention +as to Mexico; indeed, that he has adopted the policy of making the +strongest possible bid for the friendship of the United States. +It is certainly easy to derive such an opinion from his speech, +and I am strongly inclined to believe it correct. Yet we cannot +forget the fact that in his speech of last year he used quite as +strong language as to the speedy termination of his Mexican +expedition. Hence I shall indulge in some doubt until I see the +actual development of his present plans. I have no idea that +Napoleon believes that Maximilian can remain long in Mexico after +the French troops are withdrawn; but it is very important for him, +in order to give some appearance of truth to his assumed grounds +of action, that Maximilian be allowed to stay there some time +without French aid. And for this reason he wants some assurance +of neutrality from the government of the United States. Prince +Napoleon and others with whom I have conversed express the decided +opinion that Maximilian will come away with Marshal Bazaine, in +spite of all the Emperor may say to induce him to try to stand +alone. This, I apprehend, will be the difficulty, and may cause +much delay, unless the United States kindly lend a helping hand. +Would it not be wise for us to abstain for a few months from all +interference, direct or indirect, and thus give Napoleon and +Maximilian time to carry out their farce? Mexico would thus be +rid of the French flag in the least possible time. If the French +troops come also, Juarez can easily dispose of Maximilian at any +time. If they succeed in getting the French troops to remain as +colonists, then the United States can easily find a good reason +for disposing of the whole matter, and Napoleon will not dare to +interfere. . . . An officer of the Emperor's household left here +about ten days ago with despatches for Mexico which, it is understood, +contained the Emperor's declaration to Maximilian of his intention +to recall his troops. This will give you some idea of the time +when the matter may be arranged if all works well." + + NAPOLEON'S METHOD OF RETREATING WITH DIGNITY + +My views relative to the purposes of the French government appear +to have been in accord with those of Mr. Bigelow at the time, as +shown in his official despatches afterward published, and adopted +by Mr. Seward in his subsequent correspondence with the French +minister at Washington. They were soon afterward confirmed by the +official announcement which the French minister was authorized to +make to the government of the United States. In fact, I was in +almost constant conference with Mr. Bigelow during that time, and +knew that my views, as communicated to Mr. Seward and General Grant, +were in close accord with his, although I could not know anything +of Mr. Bigelow's despatches to the State Department until they were +published. Mr. Bigelow's comprehension of the French view of the +Mexican question proved to be perfectly exact. While awaiting +further instructions in reply to my report of January 24, I occupied +my time in visits to the south of France, Italy, Switzerland, and +England. + +Among the personal incidents connected with my stay in Paris which +seem worthy of record were the following: + +Soon after my arrival in Paris, in company with Mr. Bigelow I called +upon Marshal Randon, Minister of War, who was the only minister of +the French government then in Paris. We were received with cold +and formal politeness. Some days later, the Emperor having returned +to Paris, and having apparently become satisfied that I was not +occupied with any designs hostile to France, I received a very +courteous letter from the Minister of War, dated December 13, and +addressed to Mr. Bigelow; and Captain Guzman, the officer therein +named, reported to me immediately. Under the guidance of this +accomplished officer I saw in the most agreeable manner all the +military establishments about Paris. These courtesies were +acknowledged in a letter dated February 25, 1866, addressed to Mr. +Bigelow. + + A PRESENTATION TO THE EMPEROR AND EMPRESS + +My presentation to the Emperor and Empress occurred at one of those +brilliant occasions at the Tuileries for which the second empire +was famous. In conversing with the Emperor, he desired to know +something of the operations of the American armies, and especially +their marvelous methods of supply at great distances from a base +of operations. + +It gives me great pleasure to record here, as I did in my correspondence +at the time, the great courtesy, the kindness, and the charming +hospitality shown me by Mr. Bigelow and his amiable family during +my stay in Paris. Mr. Adams, United States minister at London, +was also exceedingly kind, inviting a very distinguished company +to meet me at dinner, taking me to several charming entertainments, +and presenting me to the Prince of Wales, who then received in +place of the Queen. General King at Rome, and Mr. Marsh at Florence, +also entertained me very courteously during my short stay at those +places. The warmth of greeting by Americans everywhere, and the +courteous reception by all foreigners whom I met, lent a peculiar +charm to the first visit of a Union soldier among those who had +watched from a distance the great American conflict. + +I now have the satisfaction of knowing, in the light of subsequent +events, that whatever my mission to France contributed toward the +solution of the momentous question of that day was wisely directed +in the interest of peace at home, continued friendship with our +former allies, the people of France, and the relief of an American +republic from foreign domination; these great blessings were combined +in the final result. + +Too much cannot be said in praise of the able and patriotic +statesmanship displayed by Secretary Seward in his treatment of +the French violation of the Monroe doctrine. + +Early in May, 1866, I received from Mr. Seward his final reply to +my report of January 24, in which he said: "The object for which +you were detailed to visit Europe having been sufficiently +accomplished, there is considered to be no further occasion for +you to remain in that quarter in the service of this department." +Whereupon I returned to the United States, and reported at the +State Department on the 4th of June. + +The condition of the Franco-Mexican question at the time of my +return from Europe gave no further occasion for my offices in either +of the ways which had been contemplated in behalf of Mexico. +Subsequent events in Mexico included the sad fate of Maximilian +and the sadder fate of Carlotta. + + +CHAPTER XXI +Reconstruction in Virginia--The State Legislature Advised to Adopt +the Fourteenth Amendment--Congressional Reconstruction as a Result +of the Refusal--The Manner in Which the Acts of Congress Were +Executed--No Resort to Trial by Military Commission--The Obnoxious +Constitution Framed by the State Convention--How Its Worst Feature +Was Nullified--Appointed Secretary of War. + +In August, 1866, after my return from Europe, I was assigned to +command the Department of the Potomac, which included the State of +Virginia, then governed in part by the Freedmen's Bureau and in +part by the provisional government which had been organized at +Alexandria while the war was still in progress. The State had yet +to obtain from Congress a recognition of its government, which +recognition was understood to depend upon the ratification by the +State legislature of the then pending Fourteenth Amendment to the +Constitution of the United States. This subject was very fully +discussed between me and the leading members of the legislature. +I advised them to accept the proposed amendment as the only means +of saving the State from the more "radical" reconstruction under +act of Congress, which was then threatened. It was urged that +Virginia would not suffer much from the operation of the Fourteenth +Amendment, because of the general intelligence of her white population +and their superiority in numbers over the negroes--advantages which +some of the other Southern States did not enjoy; that if the Virginia +legislature would ratify the pending amendment, Congress could not +refuse to recognize the existing State government and make it +permanent; and that Virginia would thus be restored at once to her +full privileges as a State in the Union. I visited Washington, +and obtained from leading Republicans in Congress the assurance, +so far as it was in their power to give it, that such would be the +result. On my return to Richmond, it at first seemed that the +amendment would be speedily ratified. But other influences, +understood to come from some source in Washington (probably President +Johnson), finally prevailed; the amendment was rejected; and Virginia +was thus doomed to undergo "congressional reconstruction" in company +with her sister States. + + RECONSTRUCTION IN VIRGINIA + +The "policy" of President Johnson having resulted in an "irrepressible +conflict" between him and Congress, finally culminating in his +impeachment, the reconstruction of the States lately in insurrection +was undertaken by Congress. First an act dated March 2, 1867, was +passed for the military government of the "rebel States," and then +another act, dated March 23, 1867, prescribing the conditions of +organization of State governments preparatory to restoration to +the Union; the last-named act was supplemented by the act dated +July 19, 1867. All of these acts were passed over the President's +veto. They provided for the assignment of military commanders in +the several districts, with nearly absolute powers to govern those +States and direct the steps in the process of reconstruction. It +fell to my lot to command the First Military District, into which +Virginia was converted by the act of Congress. + +The terrible oppression of the Southern people embodied in those +acts of Congress has hardly been appreciated by even the most +enlightened and conservative people of the North. Only those who +actually suffered the baneful effects of the unrestrained working +of those laws can ever realize their full enormity. The radical +Congress was not content to impose upon the Southern States impartial +suffrage to whites and blacks alike. They were not content even +to disfranchise the leading rebels, according to the terms of the +Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Even those would not be +sufficient to put the Southern whites under the domination of their +former slaves and of adventurers from the North, and thus to secure +the radical supremacy in the reconstructed States. Hence another +and an enormous stride was taken, with the purpose of putting those +States under what became known as "carpet-bag" governments, so +offensive as to be nearly intolerable even to their authors. That +stride consisted in imposing the so-called "iron-clad oath" upon +all officers, of whatever grade or character, in all the former +Confederate States. That oath excluded from office not only all +who had in any way taken active part in the rebellion, but even +the most constant Union men of the South who had remained at home +during the war; for not one of them had escaped "giving aid or +comfort" in some way to those engaged in the rebellion. Even so +conspicuous a loyalist as Judge Rives, afterward United States +district judge, declared, after mature deliberation, that he could +not take that oath, although his constant fidelity to the Union +was known to all of Virginia. + +I asked this noted Union man to accept the office of chief justice +of the State, but he could not take the prescribed oath. He had +permitted his boy, about to join the Confederate army, to take +one of his horses rather than see him go afoot. Perhaps the judge +was too conscientious. But it was the evil effect of the law to +exclude the highly honorable and let the rascals in. Thus the +Union could not have the benefit of Judge Rives's eminent services +in the vital work of reconstruction, and some "carpet-bagger" had +to take his place. And thus, although the acts of Congress permitted +a majority of the whites to vote, their choice of officers was +restricted to negroes and "carpet-baggers"! To these latter, +therefore, was committed the entire work of organizing and +administering the Southern State governments, which required the +aid of the United States troops to support them, and which fell by +their own weight the moment that support was withdrawn. + + RECONSTRUCTION IN VIRGINIA + +The manner in which I executed those "reconstruction" acts of +Congress in Virginia, so as to save that State from the great evils +suffered by sister States, is perhaps an instructive part of the +history of that time. The following extracts from my orders and +correspondence clearly show the constitutional principles upon +which my administration was based. They also give the essential +points in the history of Virginia reconstruction up to the time +when the Convention had completed its work of framing a constitution. +My "General Orders, No. 1," dated Richmond, Va., March 13, 1867, +was as follows: + +"I. In compliance with the order of the President, the undersigned +hereby assumes command of the First District, State of Virginia, +under the act of Congress of March 2, 1867. + +"II. All officers under the existing provisional government of +the State of Virginia will continue to perform the duties of their +respective offices according to law, unless otherwise hereafter +ordered in individual cases, until their successors shall be duly +elected and qualified in accordance with the above-named act of +Congress. + +"III. It is desirable that the military power conferred by the +before-mentioned act be exercised only so far as may be necessary +to accomplish the objects for which that power was conferred, and +the undersigned appeals to the people of Virginia, and especially +to magistrates and other civil officers, to render the necessity +for the exercise of this power as slight as possible, by strict +obedience to the laws, and by impartial administration of justice +to all classes. . . ." + +On April 20 was issued "General Orders, No. 16": + +"I. Temporary appointments to fill vacancies which may occur in +county or city offices will, in general, be made upon the concurrent +recommendations of the County Court or City Council and of the +President of the Board of Registration ( 1) for the county or city. + +"II. The several County Courts and City Councils are requested to +confer with the Presidents of the Boards of Registration concerning +such appointments, and to agree upon a suitable person to fill any +vacancy that may occur. + +"III. The President of the Board of Registration will forward to +the assistant adjutant-general the recommendation of the court or +council, with his own indorsement thereon. + +"IV. When a County Court is not in session, a recommendation signed +by five justices, including the presiding justice, will be received +in lieu of the recommendation of the court. + +"V. County and corporation officers appointed by the commanding +general will be required to give the bonds required by law, and +will be subject to indictment for malfeasance, misfeasance, or +neglect of official duty, the same as if they had been elected by +the people." + +On May 28 was issued "General Orders, No. 31," in part as follows; + +". . . IV. The military commissioners [officers of the army] will +make a prompt report to these headquarters of each case of which +they may take jurisdiction, and the disposition made of such case. +Where parties are held for trial, either in confinement or under +bail, such full statement will be made of the facts in each case +as will enable the commanding general to decide whether the case +shall be tried by a military commission or be brought before a +civil court. + +"V. Trial by the civil court will be preferred in all cases where +there is satisfactory reason to believe that justice will be done. +But until the orders of the commanding general are made known in +any case, the paramount jurisdiction assumed by the military +commissioner will be exclusive. + +"VI. All persons, civil officers and others, are required to obey +and execute the lawful orders of the military commissioners to the +same extent as they are required by law to obey and execute writs +issued by civil magistrates. Any person who shall disobey or resist +the lawful orders or authority of a military commissioner shall be +tried by a military commission, and upon conviction shall be punished +by fine and imprisonment according to the nature and degree of the +offense. . . . + +"VII. This order will not be construed to excuse civil officers, +in any degree, from the faithful discharge of their duties. It is +intended to aid the civil authorities, and not to supersede them, +except in cases of necessity." + + NO RESORT TO TRIAL BY MILITARY COMMISSION + +No case arose in Virginia in which it was found necessary, in my +opinion, to supersede the civil authorities in the administration +of justice. Not a single citizen of that State was tried by military +commission. Yet some cases arose which well illustrate the +fascinations of absolute power to those who desire the benefit of +its exercise in its own interests. Some of the most prominent +citizens of Virginia, men who had earnestly opposed the general +policy of military government then in force, came to me to settle +their petty differences summarily. They seemed much disappointed +when I declined to adjudicate such cases, and informed them that +they must be content with the slow process of trial before their +own civil magistrates. Other orders were in part as follows: + + "Richmond, Va., July 26, 1867. +". . . III. The governor and other executive officers, the courts +of law, and councils of cities are invited to recommend suitable +persons for appointment to such offices as, under the existing laws +of Virginia, are usually filled by their appointment or upon their +nomination. . . ." + + "Richmond, Va., August 8, 1867. +". . . VI. Military commissioners are reminded that they are to +be 'governed in the discharge of their duties by the laws of +Virginia, so far as the same are not in conflict with the laws of +the United States, or orders issued from these headquarters,' and +that they are not to supersede the civil authorities, except in +cases of necessity. In such cases the action, or failure to act, +of the civil officers should be fully reported, in order that the +commanding general may hold them to a proper accountability for +any neglect of duty. . . ." + + THE OBNOXIOUS CONSTITUTION + +Upon the adjournment of the State Convention, I sent the following +letter to General Grant: + + "Richmond, Va., April 18, 1868. +"Dear General: In spite of every effort that could be made to +prevent it, the Virginia Convention has adhered to its proscriptive +measures, or rather to the most objectionable of them. + +"After every other means had failed, I even went so far as to visit +the Convention, and urge the repeal of the test oath. But what I +said seemed not to have the slightest influence. I inclose a +newspaper report, which is a pretty accurate one, of what I said, +and which will show that I have at least done my duty in that +regard, if not more. + +"The same baneful influence that secured the election of a majority +of ignorant blacks, and equally ignorant or unprincipled whites, +to the Convention, has proved sufficient to hold them firmly to +their original purpose. They could only hope to obtain office by +disqualifying everybody in the State who is capable of discharging +official duties, and all else to them was of comparatively slight +influence. Even the question whether their Constitution will be +ratified or rejected, the treat with indifference. Congress, they +say, will make it right anyway. . . . + +"Of course I may be mistaken, but my opinion is that the Constitution +must be adopted. This would not be a serious matter if it (the +Constitution) were a good one, and good officers could be elected +under it. But it seems hardly possible that the Union party can +organize upon a satisfactory basis for the election. The negroes +and their associates will doubtless insist upon unqualified +indorsement of the Constitution by their nominees. This the +respectable whites will not give. Hence the late Convention will +be reproduced in the legislature, a large majority being either +worthless radicals, white and black, or bitter opponents of +reconstruction upon the congressional plan. The danger is that we +will have on our hands, not only one big elephant in the Constitution, +but a host of little ones in the shape of officers-elect who are +not fit to be installed--a prospect not very encouraging, at least. + +"My impression is that the wisest course would be to let the thing +fall and die where it is--not submit it to the people at all. We +can then go on putting Union men in office and reorganizing the +provisional government upon a loyal basis, until the friends of +reconstruction get control of the State. Then a convention can be +called which will frame a Constitution fit to be ratified by the +people of the State and approved by Congress and the country at +large. + +"If Congress would give a little more latitude in the selection of +officers, by modifying the test oath, there would be no difficulty +in filling all the offices in the State with men who would aid +restoration. Without some such change, the work of reorganization +cannot be carried very far. The view of the question which I have +given above is, of course, the local one; but it seems to me the +national one leads to the same conclusion. I can't see how the +indorsement of such a Constitution as this one, by the Republican +party, can be otherwise than damaging to them in the North. Would +it not be wise for Congress to say at once, We reject, once and +for all, proscriptive constitutions? + +"I have written this letter merely to suggest points that occur to +me as worthy of very careful consideration. I suppose Congress +alone can determine what is to be done. + +"As explained in my official letter to-day, I feel bound to await +the action of Congress before ordering an election. The nominating +conventions of the two parties meet in Richmond on the 6th and 7th +of May. Perhaps it may be best for Congress to await their action +before determining the question. . . . " + +The newspaper clipping inclosed in the above letter to General +Grant was a report of the proceedings of the Convention which +appeared in the "Richmond Dispatch" of April 18, 1868. Several +other letters to General Grant, near the same time, explained the +situation in detail. + +As was to be expected, and in spite of any influence which the +military commander could properly exert, that proposed Constitution, +like those framed in the other States, perpetuated the worst features +of the acts of Congress. It disqualified all the respectable whites +from any active part in the government, leaving the negroes and +"carpet-baggers" full sway. So sweeping was this disqualification +that in many parts of the State not a native Virginian, white or +black, could be found who could read or write, and who would be +eligible for election or appointment to any office. In my great +anxiety to save the State from so great an evil, I went to the hall +of the Convention and explained the impossibility of organizing a +government under such a Constitution, and besought the Convention +to strike out the disqualifying clause. I was listened to with +cold respect, my advice was disregarded, and promptly after my +departure the Constitution was finally adopted, and the Convention +adjourned _sine die_. + +But the State was, nevertheless, saved from the impending disaster. +The act of Congress required that the Constitution be submitted to +the people for ratification or rejection; but Congress had failed +to appropriate money to pay the expenses of an election. If an +election was to be held, the money must be taken from the treasury +of the State, by the order of the district commander, or else +Congress must make a special appropriation for that purpose. I +declined to sanction the use of the people's money for any such +purpose, refused to order an election for ratification or rejection +of the obnoxious Constitution, and referred the matter to Congress, +with a recommendation that the people be authorized to vote separately +on the disqualifying clause--a privilege which the Convention had +denied. + + HOW ITS WORST FEATURE WAS NULLIFIED + +The radicals in Congress were so glad, apparently, of this mode of +escape from a result so obnoxious to the better sense of the Union +people at that time, that not a voice was raised in favor of the +"carpet-bag" Constitution or in disapprobation of my action in +regard to it. The instrument was permitted to rest quietly in the +pigeonhole of the district commander's desk until the next year. +Then an act was passed providing for submitting that Constitution +to the people of Virginia, with the privilege of voting separately +on the disfranchising clause, which clause they, of course, rejected. +Thus Virginia was saved from the vile government and spoilation +which cursed the other Southern States, and which the same radical +Congress and its successors sustained until the decent public +sentiment of the North would endure them no longer. + +It is, perhaps, not too much to say that if the other district +commanders had in like manner refused to make themselves parties +to the spoilation of the people placed under their charge, Congress +would have shrunk from the direct act of imposing upon them such +obnoxious governments, and the country might have been saved the +disgrace of the eight years of carpet-bag rule in the South. At +least it is certain that a large proportion of the more moderate +among the Republican majority in Congress at that time indulged +the hope that respectable governments might be organized under the +acts of Congress. But they made this difficult, if not impossible, +when they gave their assent to the amendment of those acts, prepared +by the extremest radicals, depriving the Southern whites of any +active part in the organization of their governments. Impartial +justice, as expressed in "impartial suffrage," might have led to +tolerable results even in those States where the blacks were in +the majority. But under a law which gave universal suffrage to +the blacks and disfranchised the influential whites, any tolerable +result was impossible unless under the administration of a man who +had the independence and courage to disarm such a law of its +poisonous sting. However this may be, it is certain that Virginia +owes its escape from the sad fate of her sister States to the action +of her district commander, who has abundant reason for the belief +that the good people of that State fully appreciated the fact. + + APPOINTED SECRETARY OF WAR + +With this service to the people of Virginia, my duty in that State +practically terminated. The impeachment trial of President Johnson +had reached its crisis. It had become evident to those who were +wise enough to discern the "signs of the times" that the Senate +would probably not sustain the articles of impeachment by the +necessary two-thirds majority. This would leave unsettled the +quarrel between the President and Congress over the War Department, +and that on the eve of an exciting Presidential election, in which +several of the newly reconstructed States were expected to take +part. In not one of these States was the new government able to +stand alone or to preserve the peace within its borders. A firm +and impartial administration of the War Department in the sole +interest of peace and order during the coming contest was the one +indispensable want of the country. Without that, a revival of +civil strife seemed inevitable. Under these circumstances, I was +urged to accept the office of Secretary of War, with the assurance +that in this way the contest which endangered the peace of the +country could be adjusted. I gave my consent, the nomination was +promptly sent to the Senate, and that body, in spite of its very +large majority in opposition to the President, confirmed the +appointment with almost entire unanimity. The impeachment was +dismissed, and that dangerous farce, which had come within one or +two votes of inflicting lasting disgrace upon the country, happily +came to an end. + +Upon the inauguration of the newly elected President in March, +1869, I laid down the war portfolio without having incurred censure +from either party for any of my official acts, and with the +approbation of all for impartial discharge of duty. But, apparently +lest such a thing might possibly happen again, Congress made haste +to pass a law prohibiting any army officer from thereafter holding +any civil office whatever! In 1895 that law was so modified as +not to apply to officers on the retired list! It is a singular +coincidence that I had just then been retired. + +[( 1) The presidents of Boards of Registration were army officers +detailed by me for that duty.] + + +CHAPTER XXII +Differences Between the Commanding General of the Army and the War +Department--General Grant's Special Powers--His Appointment as +Secretary of War _Ad interim_--The Impeachment of President Johnson +--Memorandum of Interviews with William M. Evarts and General Grant +in Regard to the Secretaryship of War--Failure of the Impeachment +Trial--Harmony in the War Department--A New Policy at Army +Headquarters. + +During nearly the entire history of the government of the United +States the relations between the general-in-chief, or nominal +commanding general of the army, and the War Department have been +the cause of discord, sometimes descending to bitter personal +controversy, and in a few instances leading to very serious results. + +The differences between General Scott and the Secretary became so +serious that the general removed his headquarters from Washington +to New York, and remained away from the capital several years, +until the time when civil war was imminent. General Sherman also +found it necessary to escape from an intolerable situation by +removing to St. Louis, and did not return to Washington until the +condition of the War Department led to the impeachment of the +Secretary of War. During their long absence from the capital +neither of these generals could exercise any appreciable influence +over either the administration or the command of the army. It is +thought to be worthy of note that during one of these periods of +absence of the general-in-chief the military resources of the +country were mostly placed within easy reach of those about to +engage in an effort to break up the Union, and that during the +other period corruption in the War Department led to impeachment. +It is no reflection upon the many eminent, patriotic citizens who +have held the war portfolio to say that the very few men who have +proved unworthy of that great trust would have been much less likely +to do serious harm to the public interests if they had been under +the watchful eye of a jealous old soldier, like Scott or Sherman, +who was not afraid of them. + + THE COMMANDING GENERAL AND THE WAR DEPARTMENT + +As hereafter explained, the controversy between General Grant and +the Secretary of War was the primary cause which finally led to +the impeachment of the President of the United States. The cause +of this trouble has seemed to be inherent in the form and character +of the government. An essential provision of the Constitution +makes the President commander-in-chief of the army and navy. It +is manifestly indispensable that the executive head of a government +be clothed with this authority. Yet the President is not, as a +rule, a man of military education or experience. The exigencies +of party politics also seem to require, in general, that the +Secretary of War be a party politician, equally lacking with the +President in qualifications for military command. + +The art of war has in all ages called forth the highest order of +genius and character, the great captains of the world having been +esteemed as among the greatest men. So, also, and in continually +increasing degree in modern times, the military art has called for +scientific education of the very highest character, supplemented +by practical experience. It cannot be questioned that the military +profession requires ability, education, and practical training no +less than the legal or any other profession. A Supreme Court of +the United States composed of merchants and bankers would be no +more of an anomaly than a body of general and staff officers of +like composition. The general policy of our government seems to +be based upon a recognition of this self-evident principle. We +have a national military academy and other military schools inferior +to none in the world, and well-organized staff departments which +are thoroughly efficient in war as well as in peace. The laws also +provide a due proportion of subordinate general officers for the +command of geographical departments in time of peace, or of divisions +and brigades in the field in time of war. But no provision is made +for an actual military commander of the entire army either in peace +or in war. During only a single year since the adoption of the +Constitution of the United States has this not been the fact. In +pursuance of a special act of Congress and the orders of President +Lincoln, General Grant in fact commanded "all the armies of the +United States" during the last year of the Civil War; but at no +other time has there been an actual military commander of the army +or armies whose authority as such was recognized by the War +Department. + +Why, it may be asked, this strange departure from the recognized +rule of organization in all governmental and business affairs? +Why provide educated and trained experts for all subordinate +positions, and none for the head or chief, vastly the most important +of all? + +In the first place, it is important to observe that the matter +rests absolutely in the hands of the President. Congress has no +power in the matter. To create by law a military head for the army +would be a violation of the essential provision of the Constitution +which makes the President commander-in-chief. + + GENERAL GRANT'S SPECIAL POWERS + +In the case of General Grant, Congress fully recognized this fact, +saying: "Under the direction and during the pleasure of the +President" he "may" command the armies of the United States. Even +this, if intended as conveying authority to the President, was +superfluous, and if intended as more than that would have been +unconstitutional. In fact, it was only a suggestion, intended to +be entirely within the limits of constitutional propriety, of what +was the general opinion of the people and of Congress, that after +three years of failure the President ought to select a soldier and +put him in actual command of all the armies. The President then +went far beyond the suggestion of Congress, and even to the extreme +limit of military abdication. He not only gave General Grant +absolute, independent command, placing at his disposal all the +military resources of the country, but he even denied to himself +any knowledge whatever of the general's plans. In this patriotic +act of extreme self-abnegation President Lincoln undoubtedly acted +in exact accord with what he believed to be the expressed popular +opinion, and probably in accord with his own judgment and inclination; +for no one could have been more painfully aware than he had by +that time become of the absolute necessity of having a military +man actually in control of all the armies, or more desirous than +he of relief from a responsibility to which he and his advisers +had proved so unequal. But it must be admitted that in this +President Lincoln went beyond the limit fixed by his constitutional +obligation as commander-in-chief. He would have more exactly +fulfilled that obligation if he had endeavored faithfully to +comprehend and adopt as his own all the plans proposed by his chosen +and trusted general-in-chief, guarding the latter against all +possible interference, theretofore so pernicious, from the War +Department or any other source. By such means the President could +have actually exercised the chief command imposed upon him by the +Constitution, sharing in due measure with his chief military officer +the responsibilities imposed by their high offices. In no other +way, it is believed, can the duties imposed upon a constitutional +commander-in-chief who is not possessed of military education and +experience be fully and conscientiously performed. Indeed, such +is the method pursued by great military sovereigns all over the +world, except in a few instances where the monarch believes himself, +either truly or falsely, superior in military ability to his chief +of staff. It is only in this country, where the chief of state +has generally no military training, and his war minister the same, +that a chief of staff of the army is supposed to be unnecessary. +While it is easy to understand the reasons which led to the action +of the government in the spring of 1864, it is much less easy to +understand why some reasonable approximation to that course, as +above suggested, and in accord with the practice of all military +nations, has never been adopted as a permanent system in this +country. Perhaps it may be like the case of that citizen of Arkansas +who did not mend the roof of his house when it was not raining +because it did not then need mending. But it would seem the part +of wisdom to perfect the military system so far as practicable in +time of peace rather then continue a fruitless controversy over +the exact location of an undefined and undefinable line supposed +to separate the military administration from the command in the +army, or the functions of the Secretary of War from those of the +commanding general. The experience of many years has shown that +the Secretary was sure to get on both sides of that line, no matter +where it was drawn. But it is encouraging to note that some +experiments made in more recent years, in the direction of the +generally recognized sound military system, have not proved by any +means unsatisfactory. + + GENERAL GRANT'S SPECIAL POWERS + +This chronic controversy between the military administration and +the command once gave rise to one of the most dangerous crises in +American history. The facts in respect to the origin of that crisis +soon became obscured by other events, and have never been correctly +published. + +The assassination of President Lincoln occurred a very short time +before the end of the Civil War. It appears that his successor in +the Presidential office did not withdraw any part of the supreme +authority which had been conferred upon General Grant by President +Lincoln a year before. Nevertheless, Secretary Stanton, who had +very reluctantly yielded to President Lincoln's order, began, soon +after the end of hostile operations, to resume the exercise of +those functions which had formerly been claimed as belonging to the +War Department, and which had been suspended by President Lincoln. +Stanton "boldly took command of the armies."( 1) By this General +Grant was deeply offended, and finally declared that the action of +the Secretary of War was intolerable; although he refers to it in +his "Memoirs" as "another little spat." The authority which Stanton +assumed was the constitutional authority of the commander-in-chief +of the army, a large part of which authority had been delegated by +the President to General Grant, not to Secretary Stanton. Hence +the Secretary's assumption was offensive alike to the general and +to the President. General Grant acted with great forbearance, and +endeavored to obtain from Secretary Stanton due recognition of his +rightful authority as general commanding the army, but with no +permanent effect.( 2) + +General Grant opposed the removal of Mr. Stanton by the exercise +of the President's prerogative alone, for the reason, with others, +that such action would be in violation of the Tenure-of-Office +Act.( 3) He also objected at first to either removal or suspension, +mainly for fear that an objectionable appointment might be made in +Stanton's place.( 4) But those two objections being removed by +Johnson's tender of the appointment to Grant himself, _vice_ Stanton +suspended instead of removed, General Grant gave his full countenance +and support to President Johnson in the _suspension_ of Mr. Stanton, +with a view on the part of the President to his ultimate removal, +either with the concurrence of the Senate or through a judicial +decision that the Tenure-of-Office Act was, as Johnson claimed, +unconstitutional.( 5) + +On August 12, 1867, Grant himself accepted the appointment of +Secretary of War _ad interim_, and informed Stanton that he had +done so. Stanton denied the right of the President to suspend him +without the consent of the Senate, but wrote to the President, and +to the same effect to General Grant: "But inasmuch as the general +commanding the armies of the United States has been appointed _ad +interim_, and has notified me that he has accepted the appointment, +I have no alternative but to submit, under protest, to superior +force." + +In 1866, 1867, and 1868 General Grant talked to me freely several +times of his differences with Secretary Stanton. His most emphatic +declaration on that subject, and of his own intended action in +consequence, appears from the records to have been made after +Stanton's return to the War Office in January, 1868, when his +conduct was even more offensive to Grant than it had been before +Stanton's suspension in August, 1867, and when Grant and Sherman +were trying to get Stanton out of the War Office.( 6) At the time +of General Grant's visit to Richmond, Va., as one of the Peabody +trustees, he said to me that the conduct of Mr. Stanton had become +intolerable to him, and, after asking my opinion, declared in +emphatic terms his intention to demand either the removal of Stanton +or the acceptance of his own resignation. But the bitter personal +controversy which immediately followed between Grant and Johnson, +the second attempt to remove Stanton in February, 1868, and the +consequent impeachment of the President, totally eclipsed the more +distant and lesser controversy between Grant and Stanton, and, +doubtless, prevented Grant from taking the action in respect to +Stanton's removal which he informed me in Richmond he intended to +take.( 7) + + GRANT AS SECRETARY OF WAR _AD INTERIM_ + +Of the impeachment and trial of President Johnson it is not my +province to write. My special knowledge relates only to its first +cause, above referred to, and its termination, both intimately +connected with the history of the War Department, the necessities +of which department, real or supposed, constituted the only vital +issue involved in the impeachment trial. The following memorandum, +made by me at the time, and now published with the consent of Mr. +Evarts, explains the circumstances under which I became Secretary +of War in 1868, and the connection of that event with the termination +of the impeachment trial: + + "Memorandum +"May, 1868 + +"In compliance with a written request from Mr. W. M. Evarts, dated +Tuesday, April 21, 1868, 2 P. M., I called upon that gentleman in +his room at Willard's Hotel, Washington, a few minutes before three +o'clock P. M. of the same day. + +"Mr. Evarts introduced conversation by saying something about the +approaching trial of Mr. Jefferson Davis, but quickly said that +was not what he wished to see me about. The business upon which +he wished to see me was of vastly greater importance, involving +the safety of the country and the maintenance of the Constitution. +Mr. Evarts then asked my consent that the President might at any +time before the close of the impeachment trial send my nomination +to the Senate as Secretary of War in place of Mr. Stanton. I asked +upon what ground, and for what reasons, the proposition was made, +which question was then answered in part, and in the evening of +the same day more fully, as hereafter related. It having been +announced that General Grant was waiting at the door for me, this +first interview was cut short with an agreement to renew it about +eight o'clock the same evening. Before separating I asked Mr. +Evarts whether I was at liberty to mention the subject to any other +person. Mr. Evarts replied: 'I suppose you mean General Grant.' +I said: 'Yes, my relations with General Grant, and his with the +President, are such that I do not wish to act in such a matter +without consulting him.' Mr. Evarts said he could not give consent +that any persons should be informed that such a proposition had +been made on behalf of the President, and suggested some objections +to consulting General Grant on the subject, for the reason of his +being a candidate for the Presidency, but finally intimated that +it might be well to talk to General Grant about it incidentally, +and thus learn his views. + + INTERVIEWS WITH EVARTS AND GRANT + +"While walking with General Grant after dinner the same day, I said +to him, in effect, that I had reason to believe that a proposition +like to one referred to above would probably be made to me, and +that upon the theory, as I understood, that the President would +not be convicted by the Senate, and I asked General Grant's opinion +in regard to it. General Grant replied that he had supposed there +was no reasonable doubt of the President's removal, but if that +was not the case, or if it were, he (General Grant) would be glad +to have me as Secretary of War during the remainder of the term; +that Mr. Wade would have some difficulty in making up a cabinet +for so short a portion of a term. + +"About eight o'clock P. M. of the same day (April 21) I again called +upon Mr. Evarts at the hotel, when a long conversation took place +upon the subject referred to in the morning. The substance of what +Mr. Evarts said was as follows: He was fully satisfied that the +President could not be convicted upon the evidence; if he was +removed, it would be done wholly from supposed party necessity; +that this was the opinion and feeling of a considerable number of +the ablest lawyers and statesmen among the Republican senators; +that it was his and their opinion that if the President was removed, +it would be not really from anything he had done, but for fear of +what he might do; that he (Mr. Evarts) did not believe the President +could possibly be convicted in any event, but that senators were +at a loss how to remove the apprehensions of the Republican party +as to what the President would do in case of acquittal, unless the +War Department was placed in a satisfactory condition in advance. +He said: 'A majority of Republicans in both houses of Congress +and throughout the country now regret the commencement of the +impeachment proceedings, since they find how slight is the evidence +of guilty intent. But now the serious question is, how to get out +of the scrape? A judgment of guilty and removal of the President +would be ruinous to the party, and cause the political death of +every senator who voted for it as soon as the country has time to +reflect upon the facts and appreciate the frivolous character of +the charges upon which the removal must be based. The precedent +of the impeachment and removal of the President for political +reasons would be exceedingly dangerous to the government and the +Constitution; in short, the emergency is one of great national +peril.' + +"He added that this was the view of the case entertained by several +among the most prominent Republican senators, and that from such +senators came the suggestion that my nomination as Secretary of +War be sent to the Senate, in order that the Senate might vote upon +the President's case in the light of that nomination. Mr. Evarts +believed that I was so named because my appointment would be +satisfactory to General Grant, and would give the Republican party +a sense of security as to the President's future action in reference +to the War Department and the military districts of the South; that +it was not with anybody a question of friendship or hostility toward +the President personally, for he really had no friends. That while +the Democrats in the Senate would of course vote for his acquittal, +and do their whole duty in the case, just so soon as he was removed +they would rejoice that it was done, feeling confident that it +would cause the overthrow of the Republican party and the defeat +of General Grant. Mr. Evarts was not at liberty to mention names +of senators holding these views and originating the proposition of +my nomination. + +"I suggested a number of objections, some personal as to myself, +and others of a public character, to giving my assent to the proposed +nomination, in reply to which objections many of the above statements +by Mr. Evarts were made. I then said I would again talk with +General Grant upon the subject, and give a definite reply the next +morning. About eleven o'clock the same night (April 21) I informed +General Grant at his house that the proposition above named had +been (or it would be) made to me; that it originated with Republican +senators; and I gave in substance the reasons above stated as what +I understood to be the grounds upon which the proposition was made. +I did not give any names of senators, nor the channel through which +my information or the proposition came. My remarks to General +Grant were prefaced by the statement that while I would be glad of +General Grant's advice if he felt at liberty to give it, I did not +wish to ask General Grant to commit himself in so delicate a matter +unless he desired to do so; but that the matter was one of so great +importance that I thought it my duty to tell him all about it, and +what I believed I ought to do, and leave General Grant to advise +me or not, as he thought best. I said that although the statement +of the views and wishes of senators above referred to came to me +indirectly, they came in such a way as not to permit me to doubt +their correctness, and I believed it my duty to yield to the request. +General Grant at once replied that under those circumstances he +did not see how I could do otherwise. General Grant said he did +not believe in any compromise of the impeachment question. The +President ought to be convicted or acquitted fairly and squarely +on the facts proved. That if he was acquitted, as soon as Congress +adjourned he would trample the laws under foot and do whatever he +pleased; that Congress would have to remain in session all summer +to protect the country from the lawless acts of the President; that +the only limit to his violation of law had been, and would be, his +courage, which had been very slight heretofore, but would be vastly +increased by his escape from punishment. General Grant said he +would not believe any pledge or promise Mr. Johnson might make in +regard to his future conduct. In his opinion, the only safe course, +and the most popular one, would be to remove the President. He +could understand the grounds of apprehension in the minds of some +leading Republicans, but he did not agree with them. He believed +the safest and wisest course was the bold and direct one. In this +General Grant was very emphatic; he said he would not advise me to +enter into any project to compromise the impeachment question, but +if the facts were as represented that I could not well do otherwise +than to acquiesce in the nomination. + + INTERVIEWS WITH EVARTS AND GRANT + +"The next morning (April 22), about ten o'clock, I called upon Mr. +Evarts at Willard's Hotel, and informed him that I had considered +the matter as carefully as I was able to do, and that there was +only one difficulty in my mind. That was as to what would be the +policy of the President during the remainder of his term, in the +event of his being acquitted. I mentioned some of the President's +recent acts, such as the creation of the Military Division of the +Atlantic, disregard of military usage in sending orders to army +officers out of the regular channels, etc.--acts for which no good +reason could be given, and which at least tended to create discord +and trouble. Mr. Evarts replied that he could not tell anything +about those matters, but presumed that such annoying irregularities +would disappear with the removal of their cause, namely, hostility +between the President and the Secretary of War. Mr. Evarts said +he did not see how I could satisfy myself of that subject without +a personal interview with the President, which would not be advisable +in the circumstances. I then said I did not expect any pledge from +the President, and did not expect to receive any communication from +him on the subject, either directly or indirectly; and that I was +not willing to converse with the President, nor with any other +person except Mr. Evarts, on the subject; but that I wished the +President to understand distinctly the conditions upon which I was +willing to accept the appointment, and desired Mr. Evarts to inform +the President of these conditions. If the nomination was then +made, I would take it for granted that the conditions were +satisfactory. I then said I had always been treated kindly by the +President, and felt kindly toward him; that I had always advised +him, whenever any excuse had been given for offering advice, to +avoid all causes of irritation with Congress, and try to act in +harmony with the legislative department; that I regarded the removal +of Mr. Stanton, in the way it was done, as wrong and unwise; that +I understood this proposition as coming originally from the Republican +side of the Senate, and as being accepted by the President in the +interest of peace, and for the purpose of securing harmony between +the legislative and executive departments of the government, and +a just and faithful administration of the laws, including the +reconstruction acts. I added: 'And the President knows from +General Schofield's acts what he means by this,--if, after these +conditions have been fully stated to the President, he sends my +name to the Senate, I will deem it my duty to say nothing on the +subject of accepting or declining the appointment until the Senate +has acted upon it.' + +"Mr. Evarts intimated that the above was satisfactory, and the +interview then ended." + +I returned to Richmond on Thursday, April 23, being then in command +in Virginia, executing the reconstruction acts. On the 24th the +President sent to the Senate my nomination as Secretary of War. +On the morning of the 26th I received from General Grant a confidential +letter, dated April 25, advising me under the circumstances to +decline the secretaryship in advance.( 8) + +To the above letter I sent the following letters in reply: + + "(Confidential.) + "Richmond, Va., April 26, 1868. +"Dear General: I regret exceedingly that your advice came too +late. I have already promised not to decline the nomination in +advance of any action of the Senate. + + "Yours very truly, + "J. M. Schofield, Bvt. Maj.-Gen. +"Gen'l Grant, Washington, D. C." + + "Richmond, Va., April 26, 1868. +"Dear General: I see from the papers that the President has +nominated me to the Senate as Secretary of War. You are aware that +I do not want that office; yet under existing circumstances, if +the Senate should wish me to serve I could not decline. I presume +my nomination will not be confirmed, but have no right to act upon +any such presumption. + + "Yours very truly, + "J. M. Schofield, Bvt. Maj.-Gen. +"Gen'l Grant, Washington, D. C." + + FAILURE OF THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL + +I have no means of knowing to what extent, if any, the Senate was +influenced by this nomination, but anxiety about the ultimate result +seemed to be soon allayed. About a month later a vote was taken +in the Senate, and the impeachment failed; my nomination was then +confirmed, as stated at the time, by a nearly unanimous vote of +the Senate. + +I entered upon the duties of the office as Secretary of War on the +first day of June, and continued to discharge them until a few days +after General Grant's inauguration in March. I was greeted very +cordially by the President, by all the members of his cabinet, by +General Grant, and by a large number of senators who called upon +me at the War Department. + +The duties devolved upon me were often of a very delicate character, +and it required at times no little tact to avoid serious trouble. +President Johnson's views were sometimes in direct conflict with +those which I felt compelled to maintain under the acts of Congress +affecting the States lately in rebellion; but it is due to the +memory of President Johnson to say that he did not at any time +require me to do anything contrary to my interpretation of the acts +of Congress, and the he in general acquiesced without objection in +all the measures I deemed necessary to preserve the peace and secure +a fair vote of the newly enfranchised citizens of the Southern +States in the Presidential election. The cordial assistance of +Mr. Evarts as Attorney-General was a great help to me in such +matters. When he was present I had little difficulty in respect +to the law involved in any question; but when he happened to be +absent, and I was compelled to stand alone against all the cabinet, +or all who chose to take any interest in the question, it was hard +work. But I always carried the day--at least, in act if not in +argument. The President never decided against me. He thus fulfilled +to the letter the implied promise made when he submitted my nomination +to the Senate. + +If there ever had been any real ground for the wide-spread apprehension +of criminal purpose on the part of President Johnson, certainly +all indication of any such purpose disappeared with the failure of +his impeachment and the settlement of the long-standing controversy +respecting the War Department. The so-called reconstruction laws, +which the President so emphatically condemned as being unconstitutional, +were carried out without any further objection from him; the +Presidential election in the Southern States was conducted with +perfect good order; a free ballot and a full count were secured +under the supervision and protection of the army--a thing supposed +to be so dangerous to the liberties of a free people. This and +many other examples in the history of this country, from the time +when Washington surrendered his commission to the Continental +Congress down to the present time, show that a "free people" have +nothing to fear from their army, whether regular, volunteer, or +militia; the soldiers are, in fact, among the most devoted and +loyal citizens of the republic, and thoroughly imbued with the +fundamental principle of subordination of the military to the civil +power. + + HARMONY IN THE WAR DEPARTMENT + +With General Grant my relations while in the War Department were +of the most satisfactory character. As a candidate for the +Presidency, and as President-elect, he naturally desired to be as +free as possible from the current duties of his office as general +of the army, and he was absent from Washington much of the time, +his chief of staff, General Rawlins, remaining there to promulgate +orders in his name. Thus it devolved upon me to exercise all the +functions of "commander-in-chief of the army"--functions which it +is usually attempted to divide among three,--the President, the +Secretary of War, and the general-in-chief,--without any legal +definition of the part which belongs to each. Of course "the +machine" ran very smoothly in the one case, though there had been +much friction in the other. + +In compliance with the wish of General Grant, I remained in office +under him for a few days, for the purpose of inaugurating the system +which he hoped would end the long-standing controversy between the +War Department and the headquarters of the army. The order which +was issued assigning General Sherman to command the entire army, +staff as well as line, was prepared by me under General Grant's +instructions, and the draft of the order was approved by him as +expressing the views he had maintained when he was general-in-chief. +As President he very soon yielded to the opposite views, and caused +the order to be amended accordingly. + +That General Sherman then entertained views of his authority which +were too broad, as General Grant had also done, is no doubt true; +but it ought not to have been very difficult to correct such errors. +It was easier to take away all administrative authority and all +command over the general staff of the army, and the latter course +was adopted. The ancient controversy was up to 1888 no nearer +settlement than it was in 1869, though in General Sheridan's time +some progress had been made in the persistent efforts to deprive +the general-in-chief of the little authority which had been left +to General Sherman. General Sheridan had, with his usual gallantry +and confidence, renewed the contest, but had been worsted in his +first encounter with the Secretary, and then gave up the struggle. + +Upon my assignment to the "command of the army" in 1888, I determined +to profit so far as possible by the unsatisfactory experience of +Generals Scott, Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan--at least so far as +to avoid further attempts to accomplish the impossible, which +attempts have usually the result of accomplishing little or nothing. +In fact, long study of the subject, at the instance of Generals +Grant and Sherman, earnest efforts to champion their views, and +knowledge of the causes of their failure, had led me to the conclusion +heretofore suggested, namely, that under the government of the +United States an actual military commander of the army is not +possible, unless in an extreme emergency like that which led to +the assignment of Lieutenant-General Grant in 1864; and that the +general-in-chief, or nominal commanding general, can at most be +only a "chief of staff,"--that or nothing,--whatever may be the +mere title under which he may be assigned to duty by the President. + + A NEW POLICY AT ARMY HEADQUARTERS + +As the first step in the experimental course decided upon, I sent +an order in writing to the adjutant-general, directing him never, +under any circumstances, to issue an order dictated by me, or in +my name, without first laying it before the Secretary of War; and +I made it known to all the staff that I disclaimed the right to +issue any order to the army without the knowledge of the President +or the Secretary. I also forbade the issuing of any order in my +name without my knowledge. The first rule was easy, the latter +very difficult, to enforce. I found, with no little surprise, that +the office of the "commanding general" usually learned for the +first time of routine orders issued in his name by seeing them +published in the New York papers the next day; and it was quite +difficult at first to make it distinctly understood that such a +practice could not be tolerated. In fact, it became necessary to +call attention to the question of veracity involved in such a use +of the general's name. Such was the condition the War Department +had reached. The adjutant-general had acquired the habit of issuing +nearly all his orders to the army without the knowledge of any one +of his superiors--the President, the Secretary of War, or the +general-in-chief. In fact, the adjutant-general had in practice +come very near being "commander-in-chief." + +Some time and much patience were required to bring about the +necessary change, but ere long the result became very apparent. +Perfect harmony was established between the War Department and the +headquarters of the army, and this continued, under the administrations +of Secretaries Proctor, Elkins, and Lamont, up to the time of my +retirement from active service. During all this period,--namely, +from 1889 to 1895, under the administrations of Presidents Harrison +and Cleveland,--the method I have indicated was exactly followed +by the President in all cases of such importance as to demand his +personal action, and some such cases occurred under both administrations. +The orders issued were actually the President's orders. No matter +by whom suggested or by whom formulated, they were in their final +form understandingly dictated by the President, and sent to the +army in his name by the commanding general, thus leaving no possible +ground for question as to the constitutional authority under which +they were issued, nor of the regularity of the methods, in conformity +with army regulations, by which they were communicated to the army. + +It is, I think, to be hoped that the system thus begun may be fully +developed and become permanent, as being the best practicable +solution of a long-standing and dangerous controversy, and as most +in accord with the fundamental principles of our constitutional +government, under which the President, whether a soldier or a +civilian, is in fact as well as in name the commander-in-chief of +the army and navy. + +[( 1) Grant's "Memoirs," Vol. II, p. 105.] + +[( 2) Grant's "Memoirs," Vol. II, pp. 104, 105; Sherman's "Memoirs," +second edition, Vol. II, pp. 446-450.] + +[( 3) See General Grant's letter to President Andrew Johnson, August +1, 1867, in McPherson's "History of Reconstruction," p. 307.] + +[( 4) See General Grant's letter to President Andrew Johnson, +February 3, 1868, in McPherson's "History of Reconstruction," p. +286.] + +[( 5) Sherman's "Memoirs," second edition, Vol. II, p. 241; and +McPherson's "History of Reconstruction," pp. 282-293.] + +[( 6) Sherman's "Memoirs," second edition, Vol. II, pp. 422-424.] + +[( 7) The records of the Peabody trustees show that their meeting +in Richmond, when General Grant was present, occurred January 21 +and 22, 1868.] + +[( 8) From all circumstances it is fair to assume that General +Grant's change of attitude was owing to his opinion as to the effect +the nomination would have upon the impeachment proceedings.] + + +CHAPTER XXIII +Assignment to the Department of the Missouri--A Cordial Reception +from Former Opponents in St. Louis--Origin of the Military School +at Fort Riley--Funeral of General George H. Thomas--Death of General +George G. Meade--Assigned to the Division of the Pacific--A Visit +to Hawaii--Military Men in the Exercise of Political Power--Trouble +with the Modoc Indians--The Canby Massacre. + +When I went into the War Office in 1868, the cordial greeting +extended from all quarters was exceedingly gratifying to me, and, +I thought, highly honorable to those gentlemen, especially in the +Senate, who had so long opposed me, only one of whom, I believe, +failed to call at the office and express a kindly welcome; and that +one was so great a man, in his own estimation, I flattered myself +that was the only reason he had not called to greet me. So when +I returned to St. Louis in March, 1869, the good citizens of that +place gave me a banquet and a most cordial welcome, in which all +participated, save one, of those who had seemed to be my most bitter +enemies in 1862 and 1863. It was especially noteworthy that the +Hon. Charles D. Drake, who had been chairman of the large delegation +which went to Washington, and one of the recognized leaders in the +movement, to obtain my removal from the command in Missouri, was +among the most cordial in his expressions of esteem and regard from +March, 1869, up to the time of his death, at which time I was in +command of the army. But his principal associate, the Hon. Henry +T. Blow, could not forgive me, for what thing especially I do not +know, unless for my offense in arresting a "loyal" editor, for +which he denounced me in a telegram to the President. That was, +no doubt, a very grave offense, but a natural one for a young +soldier. Indeed, old as I am now, and much sad experience as I +have had with the press, I would probably do the same thing again. +That "loyal" editor, professing the greatest zeal for the Union +cause and devotion to the National Government, had published, in +a city under martial law, a confidential letter from the President, +the commander-in-chief of the army, to the commanding general of +that department. The ever kind and indulgent President was only +too willing to overlook such an offense on the part of one who +professed to be a friend of the Union. But a soldier could not +overlook such an outrage as that upon his commander-in-chief, and +upon the cause he was sworn to defend. Though his respect for a +free press be profound, there are some kinds of freedom which must, +in time of war, be crushed, even though the soldier himself may +also be crushed. A soldier who is not ready to meet his fate in +that way, as well as in battle, is not fit to command. + + ASSIGNMENT TO THE DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI + +In President Grant's order of March, 1869, assigning the general +officers to commands, the Department of the Missouri again fell to +my lot. I relieved Lieutenant-General Sheridan, who took command +of the Division of the Missouri, and removed his headquarters from +St. Louis to Chicago, which then became for the first time the +principal military center of all the Western country. These +arrangements were intended to be as nearly permanent as practicable, +so that all might have a period of comparative rest after the eight +years of war and strife. I then reverted, for the first time in +those eight years, to the thoughts and ambitions of my youth and +young manhood, for I had grown much older in that time. First was +the ambition, inherited from my grandfather McAllister, to acquire +a farm big enough to keep all the neighbors at a respectful distance. +In company with my brother and another officer, I bought in Colorado +a ranch about ten miles square, and projected some farming and +stock-raising on a large scale. My dream was to prepare a place +where I could, ere long, retire from public life and pass the +remainder of my days in peace and in the enjoyment of all those +out-of-door sports which were always so congenial to me. But events +"over which I had no control" soon defeated that scheme. That, +like all the other plans of my own invention, came to naught. The +ranch was sold, and I got out of it, as I always tried to do, about +as much as I had put in. + +Upon a suggestion from General Henry J. Hunt, the famous chief of +artillery, when I was in the War Department, I ordered a light- +artillery school to be established at Fort Riley, Kansas. Also, +upon his suggestion, I directed that the four batteries which were +to compose that school should be supplied with carbines, so that +they might serve as cavalry when necessary to protect the neighboring +settlements against Indian raids, and thus overcome any objection +which might be urged on the ground that the barracks at Fort Riley +were needed for cavalry. The school was organized, under Colonel +John Hamilton; the batteries did good service as cavalry in the +summers of 1869 and 1870; and all was working, as I thought, in a +highly satisfactory manner so long as I remained in command of that +department. But after I went to California, for some inscrutable +reason the school was broken up and the batteries again scattered +to separate posts. + + ORIGIN OF THE MILITARY SCHOOL AT FORT RILEY + +When that department again came under by command, as part of the +Division of the Missouri, and General Sheridan was in command of +the army, a move was made by somebody to get possession of that +splendid military reservation of Fort Riley for some other purpose. +Hence it became necessary to manifest in some more striking way +the importance of that place for military uses. The occasion had +again come for carrying out that scheme which Hunt and I had devised +for doing what was so much needed for the artillery. Fortunately, +General Sheridan wanted also to do something beneficial for the +cavalry, in which he felt much the same special interest that I +did in the artillery. So a sort of alliance, offensive and defensive, +was formed, which included as its most active and influential member +Senator Plumb of Kansas, to obtain the necessary funds and build +a suitable post and establish at Fort Riley a school of cavalry +and light artillery. The result finally attained, when I was in +command of the army, is well known, and is an honor to the country. + +The department headquarters were removed to St. Louis during the +winter of 1869-70 to make room at Fort Leavenworth for the cavalry +who had been on the plains during the summer. I then had the +pleasure of renewing the intimate friendships which had been formed +between 1860 and 1863 in that most hospitable city. Even those +ties which had been so rudely severed by war in the spring of 1861 +were restored and became as strong as ever. I found that the memory +of a little humanity displayed in mitigating somewhat the horrors +of war had sufficed to obliterate in those few years the recollection +of a bitter sectional enmity; while, on the other hand, a record +of some faithful service far enough from their eyes to enable them +to see it without the aid of a microscope, and the cooler judgment +of a few years of peace, had so far obscured the partizan contests +of a period of war that none were more cordial friends in 1869 than +those who had seemed bitterest enemies six years before. Human +nature is not half so bad as it sometimes pretends to be. As a +rule, it would be pretty good all the time if men could only keep +cool. Among all the enjoyments of that season in St. Louis, that +which left the deepest impression on my memory, as has always been +the case with me, was the sport at Hat Island, under the management +of that most genial of companions, Ben Stickney. We hunted with +hounds before breakfast every morning, and shot water-fowl from +breakfast till supper. What was done after supper has never been +told. What conclusive evidence of the "reversionary" tendency in +civilized man to a humbler state! He never feels so happy as when +he throws off a large part of his civilization and reverts to the +life of a semi-savage. The only thing that saves him from total +relapse is the fact that he takes with him those little comforts, +both liquid and solid, which cannot be found in the woods. He thus +keeps up the taste that finally draws him back again to a civilized, +or, more accurately, semi-civilized life. If any sportsman knows +any better reason than that for not living like a savage when in +his hunting-camp, I would like him to give that reason to me! + +We returned to Fort Leavenworth in the spring, and expected to make +that our permanent home. Some necessary improvements had been made +in the quarters during the winter, and no one could have desired +a more comfortable residence, more congenial companionship, or more +agreeable occupation than that of guarding and protecting the infant +settlements of industrious but unarmed and confiding people rapidly +spreading far out upon the plains. With my cavalry and carbined +artillery encamped in front, I wanted no other occupation in life +than to ward off the savage and kill off his food until there should +no longer be an Indian frontier in our beautiful country. + + FUNERAL OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS + +But soon after my pickets were put out on the plains, there came +the sad news of the sudden death, in San Francisco, of my old +commander, General George H. Thomas. His body was brought east to +Troy, New York, for interment. All his old companions, including +President Grant, assembled to pay the last tribute of respect and +honor to that noble old soldier, whose untimely death was deeply +mourned by all. It was a most impressive scene, All the high +commanders of the vast army which had been disbanded five years +before assembled around the grave of one of their number. The hero +was buried, as he had lived, honored by all who knew him, and +mourned by the nation he had so faithfully served. + +Immediately after the funeral of General Thomas there was, if I +recollect rightly, a large assembly, in Philadelphia, of the Society +of the Army of the Potomac. General Grant and General Sherman were +there, and we met at an early dinner at the house of General Meade, +who had been designated by General Sherman to succeed General Thomas +in command of the Division of the Pacific. After dinner General +Meade took me to drive through Fairmount Park, in which he was +greatly interested as president of the commission having it in +charge. He explained to me the great sacrifice he would make in +giving up command of the Division of the Atlantic, and his congenial +occupation and pleasant home in Philadelphia, where he was best +known and most highly respected, and where, as I could see in +driving along, almost everybody recognized and saluted him. I +thought he had indeed better reason to feel satisfied with his home +than any other man I had known. But he, too, great and brave +soldier, was given but little longer to enjoy the high honors he +had so nobly won in command of the Army of the Potomac. When I +had so far recovered from a severe attack of pneumonia as to be +permitted to look for the first time at a morning paper, one of +the first things that attracted by attention was the death of +General Meade, from the same disease, the day before. + +Of course the President did not hesitate to accede to General +Meade's desire, for he had given him, only a year before, the +division of his choice. As is well known, the relations between +General Meade and General Hancock were not at that time quite +satisfactory. As I knew the exact truth at the time, I think it +my duty to state that General Grant believed that General Hancock +had not at one time shown that degree of subordination which a +soldier ought always to feel. But to the honor of both be it said +that their difference was ere long removed, and General Hancock +was assigned to command the Division of the Atlantic, according to +his rank. In the meantime, it fell my lot to take the Division of +the Pacific, which I had a year before gladly relinquished in favor +of General Thomas. + +Soon after my arrival in San Francisco, General Sherman met me +there, and we went together, by sea, to Oregon, where we met General +Canby, then commanding the Department of the Columbia. We ascended +the Columbia River to Umatilla, and rode by stage from that place +to Kelton, on the Central Pacific Railroad, seven hundred and fifty +miles. After a visit to Salt Lake City, we returned to St. Louis, +where I had some work to complete as president of a board on tactics +and small arms, upon the completion of which I returned to San +Francisco. + +In the summer of 1871, after the great earthquake of that year, I +made a trip across the Sierra to Camp Independence, which had been +destroyed, to consider the question of rebuilding that post. Of +the buildings, brick or adobe, not one remained in condition to be +occupied. Very fortunately, all in the garrison had received timely +warning from the first shock, so that none were injured by the +second and third shocks, which tumbled everything to the ground. +Some thirty people living in small adobe houses in Owens River +valley were killed. Sounds like heavy artillery in the distance +were still heard at intervals after our arrival. For many miles +along the length of the valley a great crevasse had been formed by +the upheaval, which must have been many feet in height. In the +subsidence one side had fallen several feet lower than the other, +and at a place where the crack crossed the wagon-tracks a horizontal +motion of several feet had taken place, the road marking its +permanent effect. + + ASSIGNED TO THE DIVISION OF THE PACIFIC + +We ascended Owens River valley to the source of that stream, +recrossed the mountains by the "bloody" cańon, and descended through +the great Yosemite valley, which from the higher altitude looked +like a little "hole in the ground." That was the least interesting +of all my four visits to that wonderful work of nature. Our round +trip occupied about seven weeks. + +At our last camp, in Tuolumne meadows, some time in August, after +the temperature had been above eighty degrees in the daytime, it +fell below thirty at night. I contracted a cold which developed +into pneumonia, from which I did not recover for many months. It +was during my convalescence that I went with Colonel B. S. Alexander +to the Hawaiian Islands, under an arrangement previously made with +the War Department. + +It was the year 1872 when I and Colonel Alexander, the senior +engineer officer on the Pacific coast, who had applied to the War +Department and obtained an order to visit the Hawaiian Islands for +the purpose of reporting to the War Department, confidentially, +the value of those islands to the United States for military and +naval purposes, went to Hawaii with Rear-Admiral Pennock on the +flag-ship _California_, and returned, three months later, on the +war-steamer _Benicia_. During our stay we visited the largest +island of the group,--Hawaii,--and its principal seaport,--Hilo,-- +and the great crater of Kilauea. We made a careful examination of +the famous harbor of Pearl River, in the island of Oahu, a few +miles from Honolulu, including a survey of the entrance to that +harbor and an estimate of the cost of cutting a deep ship-channel +through the coral reef at the extremity of that entrance toward +the sea. + +At that time the young king Lunalilo had just ascended the throne +made vacant by the death of the last of the ancient reigning house +of Hawaii. The policy of the preceding king had been annexation +to the United States; but the new sovereign and his advisers were +opposed to that policy, although very friendly to Americans, and +largely controlled by their influence in governmental affairs. It +was manifest that the question of annexation ought not to be +discussed at that time, but that action ought to be taken at once +to secure to the United States the exclusive right to the use of +Pearl River harbor for naval purposes, and to prepare the way to +make annexation to the United States sure in due time. This could +readily be done by making such concessions in favor of the products +of Hawaiian industries as would develop the resources of the islands +and increase their wealth, all of which would be to the ultimate +benefit of the United States when the islands should become a part +of this country. + + A VISIT TO HAWAII + +The continuous and rapid decay of all the ancient families of +chiefs, from which alone would the people ever think of electing +a king or a queen, and the notorious corruption in blood and +character of the few remaining half-castes nominally belonging to +those ancient families, made it plain to all that the monarchical +government must soon die a natural death, or become so intolerably +corrupt as to make its overthrow inevitable. Americans by birth +or descent were then, and had been for a long time, the controlling +element in the government. While perfectly faithful to that +government, they had lost none of their love for their native +country, and looked forward with confidence to the time when the +islands, like ripe fruit, should fall into the lap of their beloved +mother. These American Hawaiians were men of very high character, +and much above the average of intelligence even in this country. +They had no desire to force the ripening of the fruit, but were +perfectly content to bide the course of nature, which must of +necessity produce the result in no long time. + +It seems to me a very narrow view of the intelligence of the people +of this country which suggests any serious difficulty in the +government of outlying possessions which are essentially military +and naval outposts simply because their heterogeneous populations +are not yet capable of self-government, or fit for admission to +the Union as a State. If the Territorial system to which the +country is accustomed is not appropriate in any special case, and +the prejudice against a military government is regarded as +insurmountable, we have an example in the present government of +the District of Columbia,--one of the best and most economical in +the world,--which would require very slight modification to make +it perfectly applicable to any of the islands of the Atlantic, the +Pacific, or the gulf which may be acquired by this country. I do +not believe any man worthy of the title of statesman will admit +for a moment that the United States cannot govern, and govern well, +any national outposts or other possessions which the interests of +the country may require it to hold. In fact, it seems an almost +self-evident proposition that a government, under exclusive national +authority, exercised over comparatively small districts of country +and small population, under the constant observation of the people +and public press of the entire country, is more likely to be just +and pure than any other. Responsibility to a local constituency +undoubtedly has great advantages, but responsibility to the government +and entire people of the United States has vastly greater. + +When it was proposed to me in Virginia, in 1867, that I become a +candidate for the United States Senate under the State government +which I was trying to "reconstruct," I replied that in my opinion +the highest qualification I possessed for that difficult duty I +was then required to perform resided in the fact that there was +"nothing in the gift of Virginia which I could afford to accept." +I believe now that the highest external incentive to honorable +conduct anywhere in the world is that of responsibility to the +government and the whole people of the United States. There need +be no apprehension that any American who has a national reputation +at stake will be guilty of any of the crimes which are said to +stain the administration of viceroys in some parts of the world. +The prejudice which still exists in this country in respect to +military government is due solely to the fact that the people do +not yet appreciate the legitimate influence which they themselves +exercise over their public servants, military no less than civil. +Indeed, there is perhaps no other class of citizens so sensitive +to public criticism as those in the military service, certainly +none who value more highly their reputation for faithful and +honorable conduct in the public service. I do not hesitate to give +it as my deliberate judgment, based upon the experience of half a +century, that the best and most satisfactory government any island +of the West Indies can have in the next hundred years will be a +military government under an officer of the United States army. + +It is only an incident of despotic governments, past or present, +that soldiers have been employed to execute despotic orders. The +common inference that military government is essentially despotic +is absolutely false. On the contrary, military men are, as a rule, +the most humane. This has been most notably so in the history of +this country. Almost without exception, the soldiers of all grades +in the Union army desired to treat the conquered South with all +possible kindness and humanity, while the men who inflicted upon +the Southern people the worst form of cruelty were men who had +never fought a battle. There have been some cruel soldiers in the +world, many more cruel men who were not soldiers except perhaps in +name. Men of that character generally avoid danger. What mankind +has most to dread is the placing of military power in the hands of +men who are not real soldiers. They are quite sure to abuse it in +one way or the others, by cruelty to their own men, or else to +others. The same disregard for human life which induces an ignorant +man to take command of troops and send them to useless slaughter +may well manifest itself in barbarity toward prisoners of war or +non-combatants; but a real soldier is never guilty of either of +those crimes, which seem to me alike among the greatest in military +experience. + + TROUBLE WITH THE MODOC INDIANS + +The Modoc Indians were a brave people, and had always been friends +of the whites; but their old home in southern Oregon was rich +grazing-land, and was much coveted by the ranchmen of that region. +Hence the Modocs were induced in some way to leave their homes and +go upon the Klamath reservation. There they were starved and +generally abused until they could stand it no longer. They went +back to their old place, and declared they would die rather than +go to live with the Klamaths again. Repeated requests were made +by the Indian Bureau to the War Department to force the Modocs to +go back to the Klamaths; but this was firmly opposed by General +Canby, commanding the department; by me, who then commanded the +Division of the Pacific; and by General Sherman, commanding the +army. No such order could be obtained in the regular way. Resort +was had to an innocent old army regulation which directed department +commanders to render such military assistance as might be necessary +to enable the Indian superintendents to carry out their orders from +Washington. Without the knowledge of the President, or the Secretary +of War, or the general of the army, an order was sent from the +Indian Bureau in Washington to send the Modocs back to the Klamath +reservation, and to call on the department commander for troops to +enforce the order. General Canby, honorable and simple-hearted +man that he was, never imagined that such an order could come from +Washington, after all that had been said about it, unless with the +sanction of the highest authority and the knowledge of the War +Department. He did not even think it necessary to report to the +division commander the requisition which had been made upon him +for troops, but loyally obeyed the old regulation. The first +information that came to me was that the troops had been beaten +with heavy loss, and that many of the surrounding settlers had been +killed by the Indians. A long and bloody war ensued, with some +results which were deplorable in the extreme. General Canby's +confiding nature had led him into a terrible mistake. He had +executed an unwise regulation which placed military power in unworthy +hands, without waiting to inquire whether that power was not, in +fact, about to be unlawfully abused, and thus had become a party +to the sacrifice of many innocent lives. The brave and noble- +hearted Canby strove in every possible way to make peace with the +Modocs without further shedding of innocent blood. But the savage +red man, who had never been guilty of breaking faith with a civilized +white man, would no longer trust any one of the "treacherous race." +He paid them back "in their own coin," according to his traditional +method. Though warned of the danger, Canby went calmly into the +trap they had laid for him, in the hope that his confidence might +inspire their respect; but he was the very man whose troops had +been ordered to drive them out from their happy homes, and they +treacherously killed him. And I doubt not, if more blood must be +shed, he preferred to be the first to die. This is the true history +of the "Canby massacre." + + THE CANBY MASSACRE + +After a long contest, costing many lives, the Modocs were subdued +and made prisoners. Those Indians who had been engaged in the +massacre were tried and justly executed according to the laws of +civilized war, while those white men who, in no less flagrant +disregard of the laws of civilization, brought on the war were not +called to any account for their crime. But President Grant, when +I called his attention to the abuse of that old regulation, promptly +abolished it. Since that time, as I understand it, no man but the +head of the nation can order the army to kill unless necessary in +defense, nor determine for what purposes the army may be employed. +The people of the United States are advancing, though slowly, in +civilization. Their fundamental law has very wisely always provided +that Congress alone should have power to "declare war"; but for +many years any Indian agent, or any bloodthirsty white man on the +frontier, who chose to kill an Indian in cold blood, could inaugurate +a war without waiting to declare it, and that without the slightest +danger of punishment. A little military justice, in the absence +of any possible civil government, in what was so long called the +"Indian country" would have saved many hundreds of millions of +dollars and many thousands of lives. But the inherited prejudice +against "military despotism" has hardly yet been eradicated from +the minds of the millions of freemen who inhabit this country--as +if seventy or fifty, or even thirty, millions of people could not +defend their liberties against a little standing army! A white +murderer was long regarded as so much better than an honest Indian +that the murderer must go free because there was no judge or jury +to try him, while the Indian must be shot by the soldiers, without +trial, for trying to protect himself from murder. If the innocent +could be separated from the guilty, "plague, pestilence, and famine" +would not be an unjust punishment for the crimes committed in this +country against the original occupants of the soil. And it should +be remembered that when retribution comes, though we may not +understand why, the innocent often share the fate of the guilty. +The law under which nations suffer for their crimes does not seem +to differ much from the law of retribution which governs the savage +Indian. + +No possible plea of the demands of civilization, or of the interests +of a superior race, can be held to justify such a policy as that +long pursued by the people of this country. The natural law of +the "survival of the fittest" may doubtless be pleaded in explanation +of all that has happened; but that is not a law of Christianity, +nor of civilization, nor of wisdom. It is the law of greed and +cruelty, which generally works in the end the destruction of its +devotees. In their greedy and blind pursuit of their own prey, +they lose sight of the shark that is waiting to devour them. It +is still the "fittest" that survives. It were wiser to remember +that the shark is always well armed, and if you would survive him +you must be fitter than he. If the benign law of civilization +could be relied upon always to govern, then all would be well. +But as long as sharks still live, the cruel law of nature cannot +be ignored. The highest principles and the highest wisdom, combined, +would seem to suggest the higher law as the rule of action toward +the weaker, and the natural law as the rule for defense against +the stronger. This country has, happily, already made some progress +in both directions. If that is continued a few more years, then +all, strong as well as weak, will be glad to "arbitrate" if we ask +them to. + + +CHAPTER XXIV +Superintendent at West Point--General Sherman's Ulterior Reasons +for the Appointment--Origin of the "Department of West Point"--Case +of the Colored Cadet Whittaker--A Proposed Removal for Political +Effect--General Terry's Friendly Attitude--A Muddle of New Commands +--Waiting Orders, and a Visit to Europe--Again in Command in the +West--The Establishment of Fort Sheridan at Chicago. + +In the centennial year, 1876, I committed the mistake of my life +by consenting, in deference to the opinions and wishes of my +superiors and in opposition to my own judgment and interests, to +give up the command of a military division appropriate to my rank +of major-general, and accept a position which by law and custom +was appropriate to the rank of colonel. The following extracts +from correspondence will sufficiently explain the reasons for this +extraordinary action, and the assurances which induced it: + + "(Telegram.) + "Washington, D. C., March 28, 1876. +"General John M. Schofield, San Francisco, California: + +"Will you accept the superintendency of the military academy at +West Point? I advise it. Your rank and history will elevate it +and solve all trouble. Admiral Porter's example at Annapolis is +suggested as precedent. The President, Secretary Taft, and I are +unanimous on the wisdom and propriety of it. Advise me of your +decision as early as you can--certainly this week. You will be +subject to no supervision except by the usual board of visitors +and the general commanding the army. + + "W. T. Sherman, General." + + "(Telegram.) + "San Francisco, Cal., March 29, 1876. +"General Sherman, Washington, D. C.: + +"I appreciate the importance of the superintendency of the academy, +and the compliment paid me by the President, Secretary of War, and +yourself in desiring me to accept it. Under the circumstances I +cannot decline. . . . + + "J. M. Schofield, Major-General." + + "(Telegram.) + "Headquarters of the Army, + "Washington, D. C., March 30, 1876. +"General J. M. Schofield, San Francisco, California. + +"Despatch received, and am much pleased; think you could add new +luster to the old academy. It has always needed a head with rank +and experience, and now I am sure that the whole country will be +satisfied. . . . I am not yet resolved on my own course of action, +but will be governed by events to occur in this week. + + "W. T. Sherman, General." + + SUPERINTENDENT AT WEST POINT + + "Headquarters Mil. Div. of the Pacific, + "San Francisco, Cal., March 30, 1876. +"General Sherman, etc., Washington, D. C. + +"My dear General: I was not taken entirely by surprise by your +despatch relative to the West Point superintendency. General Grant +mentioned the subject to me soon after the war, and army officers +since that time have spoken of it often enough to keep me in mind +of the fact that I might some time be called upon to assume that +responsibility. Yet it is with a strong feeling of reluctance that +I have brought myself to regard it as a thing to be done. This +feeling results from several causes, which I desire to explain to +you, while I know you will give me credit for a desire to do what +appears best for the public service, and satisfactory to all +concerned, without too much concern for my own personal preference. + +"In the first place, I have no little doubt of the possession of +any special fitness for that position, and have pretty strong +appreciation of its difficulties and importance. I do not feel at +all confident that the flattering expectations of my friends will +be realized from my management of the academy. + +"I have been there enough to know pretty well how difficult a post +that of superintendent is, and how varied the good qualities a man +ought to possess to fit him in all respects for it. + +"Rank and reputation will of course be of some assistance, but +their good effect will be greatly impaired without the dignity of +command belonging to them. To transfer an officer of rank from a +high command and post of great responsibility and trust to one +heretofore regarded as appropriate to an inferior grade, may be +regarded as elevating the dignity of the new command, but looks +much more like degrading the officer, and to that extent impairs +the good effect desired to be produced. Besides, it is impossible +for any officer not to _feel_ that in taking such inferior command, +although it is even for the avowed purpose of raising its dignity, +that he is stooping to do so. Especially must both these effects +be produced when the assignment is only an executive act. If it +was done in pursuance of law, the case would be materially different. +. . . + +"We were all delighted at the news of your return to Washington +and the prospect of your restoration to the proper duties and +authority of general of the army; and I sincerely hope the events +to occur this week, alluded to in your telegram to-day, may be such +as to justify you in taking the course universally desired by the +army. We want our general where he can best look after all the +interests of the military service, with power to command the army +in fact as well as in name. + +"I have read with the greatest pleasure your capital speech to the +Knights of St. Patrick. + +"Please present my respectful compliments to the Secretary of War, +and my kindest regards to the President. + + "I am, dear General, as ever, truly yours, + "J. M. Schofield." + +During the Civil War the demand for the services in the field of +the most capable officers had, as was generally understood, been +prejudicial to the interests of the military academy; and this +continued some time after the close of the war, in consequence of +the unusual increase in rank of those officers who were known to +be fitted in all respects for the head of that institution. This +difficulty was increased by the very unreasonable notion that +because the law had opened the academy to the line of the army, +the superintendent must necessarily be taken from the line, and +not from the corps of engineers, although the latter contained many +officers of appropriate rank who had then added to their high +scientific ability and attainments distinguished services in the +field. Even in the line, officers were not wanting of appropriate +rank, character, ability, education, and experience to qualify them +for the duties of superintendent. For example, my immediate +predecessor, Major-General Thomas H. Ruger, then a colonel of +infantry, was in all respects highly qualified for that office; +and when I relived him I found the academy in about the same state +of efficiency which had characterized it before the war. There +was, in fact, at that time little, if any, foundation for the +assumption that the interests of the military academy required the +assignment of any officer of higher rank than colonel to duty as +superintendent of the academy. Of course I did not know this before +I went there, and it was a matter for the judgment of my superiors, +whose duty, and not mine, it was to know the facts. + + ULTERIOR REASONS FOR THE APPOINTMENT + +But General Sherman had other reasons, some of them very cogent in +his own estimation at least, for desiring my presence somewhere in +the Eastern States; and the West Point "detail" was the only way +in which that could be readily brought about. He had just been +restored, or was about to be, to the actual command of the army, +after having been practically suspended from command a long time +because of his differences with the Secretary of War. He desired +especially to bring the military academy under his command, and +appears to have been assured of President Grant's support in that +regard. General Sherman also wished me to revise the army regulations, +so as to incorporate the theory of relation between the administration +and the command which he and General Grant had maintained as the +true one, but which had generally, if not always, been opposed by +the Secretaries of War and by the chiefs of staff departments. +These were doubtless the principal reasons for General Sherman's +anxiety to have me accept the assignment to West Point. But very +soon after my arrival in the East I found that I was also expected +to preside over a board of review in the case of General Fitz-John +Porter and in that of Surgeon-General William A. Hammond; and that +my junior in rank, Major-General Irvin McDowell, could not be given +a command appropriate to his rank unless it was the division which +I had consented to vacate. Of course I could not but feel complimented +by this indication that my superiors thought me capable of doing +well so many things at once, nor yet could I fail to see that, +after all, my care of West Point had not been considered of so +vital importance, since it would not interfere with the all-important +revision of the army regulations, and the retrial of Porter and +Hammond. + +But I had given my consent, though under erroneous impressions as +to reasons and necessity, to what my superiors desired, and hence +determined to keep my thoughts to myself so long as the promises +made by General Sherman were fulfilled. But I had hardly got +settled in the academic chair before I received a great affront +from the Secretary of War, through the adjutant-general of the +army, in direct violation of General Sherman's promise that I should +"be subject to no supervision except by the usual board of visitors +and the general commanding the army." This offensive action arose +not simply from ignorance of General Sherman's promise, of which +the adjutant-general and the Secretary of War had evidently not +been informed, but from culpable ignorance of the academic regulations +on the part of the adjutant-general, and still more culpable +disregard of the invariable rule of courtesy enjoined by military +law among military men. With no little difficulty I restrained my +indignation so far as to write a calm and respectful letter to the +Secretary of War, inclosing a copy of my correspondence with General +Sherman respecting my command at West Point, and pointing out the +regulation which he or the adjutant-general had ignored, and +requesting him to submit the whole matter to the President. It is +due to the Honorable Secretary, and is a pleasure to me, to say +that he did not wait the slow course of the mail, but telegraphed +me at once that it was all a mistake, and that he made all the +amend that a gentleman could make under the circumstances. He as +well as I had been made the victim of the ignorance and discourtesy +of a staff officer, in a matter about which the Secretary of War +could of necessity know nothing unless the staff officer informed +him. But I was determined to guard against any such outrage in +the future, and hence insisted that West Point be erected into a +military department. By this means I would become entitled to the +effective intervention and protection of the general of the army. +This is the origin of that anomaly which must have puzzled many +military men, namely, the "Department of West Point." + +But I discovered in time that even this safeguard was by no means +sufficient. I had some apprehension on this subject at the start, +and telegraphed General Sherman about it; but his answer of May 25 +was accepted as sufficiently reassuring. Indeed it could hardly +have been imagined that a President of the United States would +disregard an honorable obligation incurred by his predecessor; but +before I got through with that matter I was enlightened on that +point. + + CASE OF THE COLORED CADET WHITTAKER + +In the spring of 1880 there arose great public excitement over the +case of the one colored cadet then at West Point. This cadet, +whose name was Whittaker, had twice been found deficient in studies, +and recommended by the academic board for dismissal; but had been +saved therefrom by me, in my perhaps too strong desire to give the +young colored man all possible chance of ultimate success, however +unwise his appointment to the military academy might have been. +As was stated by me at the time, in my report of the case to the +War Department, that second and unusual indulgence was based upon +the fact that he was the only representative of his race then at +the academy. Being again, for the third time, in danger of dismissal, +that colored cadet, either by his own hands, or by others with his +consent (of which he was finally convicted by a general court- +martial), was bound hand and foot and mutilated in such manner as, +while doing him no material injury, to create a suspicion of foul +play on the part of other cadets. An official investigation by +the commandant, Colonel Henry M. Lazelle, led him to the conclusion +that the other cadets had no knowledge whatever of the outrage, +and that the colored cadet himself was guilty. Not being fully +satisfied with that conclusion, I appointed a court of inquiry to +investigate the matter more thoroughly. The result of that +investigation fully sustained the finding of Colonel Lazelle, that +the colored cadet himself was the guilty person. + +But those judicial conclusions did not suffice to allay the public +clamor for protection to the recently emancipated negroes in the +enjoyment of the privileges in the national institutions for which +they had not become either mentally or morally fitted. A presidential +election was pending, and the colored vote and that in sympathy +with it demanded assurance of the hearty and effective support of +the national administration. Nothing less than a radical change +at West Point would satisfy that demand, and who could be a more +appropriate victim to offer as a sacrifice to that Moloch than one +who had already gone beyond the limits of duty, of justice, and of +wisdom in his kind treatment of the colored cadet. It was decided +in Washington that he, the over-kind superintendent himself, should +be sacrificed to that partizan clamor before the coming election. +Some rumor of this purpose had reached me, though it had been +concealed from General Sherman, who assured me that no such purpose +existed. + + GENERAL TERRY'S FRIENDLY ATTITUDE + +In General Sherman's absence, General Alfred H. Terry was chosen +to succeed me. He came to West Point, August 14, for the purpose +of learning from me in person the truth as to the assertion made +to him that the proposition to relieve me from duty at West Point +was in accord with my own wishes. When informed, as he had suspected, +that I could not possibly have expressed any such wish under the +circumstances then existing, he positively refused, like the +honorable man that he was, to be made a party to any such act of +wrong. There was not the slightest foundation in fact for the +assumption that my relief from command could be based upon my own +request, and no such reason could have been given in an order +relieving me. That assumption could have had no other apparent +motive than to induce my warm friend General Terry to accept the +appointment. As soon as he learned the truth from me, General +Terry went to Washington and exposed the falsehood of which he and +I together were the intended victims. This action of a true friend, +and the correspondence which had passed between General Sherman +and me, sufficed to prevent the consummation of the wrong which +had been contemplated. + +After the presidential election was over, and partizan passion had +subsided, I made a formal application, November 12, 1880, to be +relieved from duty at West Point on or before the first of May +following, and to be permitted to await orders until an appropriate +command became vacant. I repeatedly expressed my desire that none +of my brother officers should be disturbed in their commands on my +account, and that no new command should be created for me. I was +entirely content to await the ordinary course of events, in view +of pending legislation relative to retirements for age, and of +retirements which might be made under the laws then existing. + +My relief from West Point was effected earlier than General Sherman +or I had anticipated. Before the end of 1880 the following +correspondence passed between me and the general of the army: + + "(Confidential.) + "Headquarters, Army of the United States, Washington, D. C., + December 13, 1880. +"General J. M. Schofield, West Point, New York. + +"Dear General: General Drum has just shown me the memorandum for +orders. The President has worked out this scheme himself, without +asking my help, and I am glad of it, for I would not like to burden +my conscience with such a bungle. + +"He creates a new department out of Louisiana, Arkansas, and the +Indian Territory, to be commanded by the senior officer present. +. . . + +"You are to command the Department of Texas and this new department, +called a division, of what name I don't know. + +"Howard is to replace you at West Point. I suppose the order will +issue at once. + + "Yours truly, + "W. T. Sherman." + + "West Point, N. Y., December 14, 1880. +"General Sherman, Washington, D. C. + +"My dear General: I have received your confidential letter of +yesterday, informing me of the bungling scheme which has been worked +out without your help. I presume it would be fruitless to attempt +any opposition to the species of mania which manifests itself in +such action. It may be best to let it run its course during the +short time which must yet elapse until a reign of reason is again +inaugurated with the incoming administration. But it occurs to me +that you may be able to save the useless expense to the government +and the great inconvenience and expense to staff officers which +would necessarily result from the organization of a division which +could only last for a few months. To me personally it is a matter +of little moment; but not so with the staff officers and the military +appropriations. I am not willing to have such a thing done, even +apparently, on my account. Please advise what official action, if +any, should be taken by me in this matter. Personally I am perfectly +ready to obey the President's order, without a word of protest; +but I am not willing to be the occasion of manifest injury to the +public service, and of useless inconvenience and expense to the +officers of the general staff who must be assigned to the headquarters +of the new division. + + "Very truly yours, + "J. M. Schofield." + + A MUDDLE OF NEW COMMANDS + +But the public interests, and my desire to make my own entirely +subservient thereto, were alike disregarded. A new division was +carved out of three old ones, in violation of the plainest dictates +of military principles. The government was subjected to a worse +than useless expense of many thousands of dollars, and a number of +staff officers to like useless expense and trouble. For all this +there was no other apparent motive but to make it appear that there +were appropriate commands for all the major-generals then in active +service, and hence no reason for placing any one of them on the +retired list. As a part of that scheme, one of the most active +brigadier-generals, younger than one of the major-generals, was +selected instead of the latter to make way for an aspirant having +greater "influence." The correspondence of that period shows the +indignation felt in the army at such disregard of the just claims +of officers and of the interests of the military service. Neither +General Sherman nor any of the several higher officers at that time +could hope to derive any advantage from the passage of the act of +Congress, then pending, to retire all officers at a fixed age. On +the contrary, such a law would most probably cut them off when in +the full prime of activity and usefulness. But all were more than +willing to accept that rather than still be in a position to be +arbitrarily cut off to make place for some over-ambitious aspirant +possessed of greater influence, of whatever kind. I know perfectly +well that General Sherman was governed by a generous desire to give +General Sheridan command of the army for a number of years, while +the latter was still in the prime of life. But that he could have +done, and had announced his intention to do, by requesting to be +relieved from the command and permitted to await the President's +orders, performing such duties, from time to time, as the President +might desire of him. Such a status of high officers of great +experience, whose inspections, observations, and advice might be +of great value to the President and to the War Department, would +manifestly have been far better for the country than that of total +retirement, which deprives the President of any right to call upon +them for any service whatever, even in an emergency. This was one +of the subjects of correspondence between General Sherman and me +while I was in Europe in 1881-2. But it was finally agreed by all +concerned that it would be best to favor the uniform application +of the rule of retirement for age, so that all might be assured, +as far as possible, of a time, to which they might look forward +with certainty, when they would be relieved from further apprehension +of treatment which no soldier can justly characterize without +apparent disrespect to his official superior. + +Such treatment is indeed uncommon. The conduct of the commander- +in-chief of the army toward his subordinates has been generally +kind and considerate in this country. But the few opposite examples +have been quite enough to cloud the life of every officer of high +rank with the constant apprehension of an insult which he could +neither submit to nor resent. + +Soon after the inauguration of President Garfield, the "Division +of the Gulf" was broken up, and I was permitted to visit Europe, +as I had requested in the preceding November, until the President +should be pleased to assign me to a command according to my rank. + + "(Telegram.) + "Washington, D. C., May 3, 1861. +"General J. M. Schofield, Commanding Division, New Orleans, La.: + +"In case the President will repeal the orders creating the new +division and department, and agree to give you the Division of the +Pacific in a year, will you be willing to take your leave to go +abroad meantime? Telegraph me fully and frankly for use. + + "W. T. Sherman, General." + + WAITING ORDERS, AND A VISIT TO EUROPE + + "Headqrs. Mil. Div. Gulf, + "New Orleans, La., May 3, 1881. +"General W. T. Sherman, Washington, D. C.: + +"Your telegram of this date just received. I am debarred, by a +promise made to General McDowell about two years and a half ago, +from making any condition affecting his command of the Division of +the Pacific. If I am to displace him, it must be without regard +to any wish of mine. If it is the purpose of the President to +assign me to that command in a year, I would like to go abroad in +the meantime, as it would not be convenient to go afterward, though +I would prefer to go next year rather than this. But I cannot +afford to go on leave with reduced pay. If it is not found +practicable to give me a command according to my rank, and so +organized as to benefit rather than injure the military service, +I am willing to await orders for a year without reduction of pay. + +"This is substantially the proposition I made in my application to +be relieved from duty at West Point; and I am still willing to +abide by it, although my wishes were then disregarded, if it will +relieve the present administration from embarrassment. But I would +much prefer to have a proper command. . . . + + "J. M. Schofield, Maj.-Gen." + + "(Telegram.) + "Washington, D. C., May 5, 1881. +"General J. M. Schofield, Commanding Division, New Orleans, La.: + +"Your despatch of the third was duly received, and a copy thereof +laid before the Secretary of War, who has received the orders of +the President to repeal all parts of General Orders, No. 84, of +December 18, 1880, which refer to the Division of the Gulf and +Department of Arkansas, restoring the _status quo_ before that +order was made. You will be placed on waiting orders, with full +pay, till further orders of the President. You may take action +accordingly. + + "W. T. Sherman, General." + +My stay in Europe--from May, 1881, to May, 1882--was marked by only +one incident of special military interest. Under orders of the +War Department, upon invitation from the government of France, I +witnessed the autumn manoeuvers of the Twelfth Corps of the French +army at and about Limoges. A few other officers of our army, and +many from other countries, enjoyed the same privilege. The +operations, which were interesting and instructive, culminated in +an assault upon and the capture of Limoges. The next day the corps +was reviewed in the streets of the city. The general-in-chief and +his staff and suite rode along the line at full speed. The head +of the cavalcade, consisting of the French and American generals, +and a few other officers of high rank, came out in good order. +The others were much disordered, and so covered with dust that the +uniforms of all nations looked very much alike. The ceremony was +terminated at the public square, where the cavalry was formed along +one side, and the opposite was occupied by high officials and +prominent citizens of the town. The charge of the squadrons across +the square, halting at command within a few feet of the reviewing +general, was a fine exhibition of discipline and perfect control. + +After the review the general-in-chief made a long address to his +assembled officers, explaining in much detail the important lessors +taught by the manoeuvers. He closed with a feeling allusion to +his own mental and physical strength and vigor, which had been so +fully displayed in the last few days, and which were still at the +service of his beloved France. But the gallant old soldier was +retired, all the same, at the end of the year. Republics seem to +have much the same way of doing things on both sides of the ocean! + +A pleasing incident occurred at one time during the manoeuvers. +At the hour of halt for the midday rest a delicious repast was +served at the beautiful home of the prefect of the department, +between the two opposing lines. The tables were spread in lovely +arbors loaded with grapes. When the déjeuner was ended, speeches +were made by the distinguished prefect and the gallant general-in- +chief, to which, as senior of the visiting officers from foreign +countries, I was called upon to respond. Thus suddenly summoned +to an unwonted task, I was much too prudent to address the guests +in a language which they all understood. But by a free use of the +words and phrases which are so common in the military language of +France and of this country, linked together by as little Anglo- +Saxon as possible, I made a speech which was warmly received, and +which, after careful revision with the aid of a highly accomplished +French officer who had been educated in England as well as in +France, was made to appear pretty well when printed in both +languages. + +The charming hospitality of the general-in-chief of the Twelfth +Army Corps and of the prefect of Limoges, with all the other +incidents of the autumn manoeuvers of 1881, are an ever fresh and +pleasant memory, with the many other recollections of beautiful +France under the empire and under the republic. + + AGAIN IN COMMAND IN THE WEST + +According to the understanding expressed in my correspondence with +General Sherman of May 3, 1881, I returned from Europe at the end +of a year, and reported for duty. But in the meantime President +Garfield had been assassinated, and the bill then pending in Congress +providing for the retirement of officers at a fixed age was amended +so as to make that age sixty-four years instead of sixty-two. +Hence I continued to wait without protest until the retirement of +my junior in rank, the next autumn, for the fulfilment of General +Sherman's assurance conveyed in his despatch of May 25, 1876: "If +any hitch occurs at any future time, you can resume your present +or some command due your rank." Although this long suspension from +command was very annoying, I had the satisfaction of knowing that +none of my brother officers had been disturbed on my account. + +In the fall of 1882, I was again assigned to the command of the +Division of the Pacific, awaiting the time of General Sherman's +retirement under the law and the succession of General Sheridan to +the command of the army. Nothing of special interest occurred in +that interval. In 1883 I succeeded to the command of the Division +of the Missouri, with my headquarters in Chicago. One of the first +and most important subjects which impressed themselves upon my +attention after the generous reception and banquet given by the +citizens of that hospitable city, was the necessity for a military +post near that place. The location of Chicago makes it the most +important strategical center of the entire northern frontier. It +is also the most important center of interstate commerce and +transportation anywhere in the country. Yet in 1883 there were no +troops nearer than St. Paul, Omaha, and Leavenworth. At the time +of the railroad strikes in 1877, troops had been brought there in +time to render the necessary service, but no thought appears to +have been given to the necessity of better provision for the future. + + THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FORT SHERIDAN AT CHICAGO + +There had been in early times a military reservation at the mouth +of the Chicago River, on which old Fort Dearborn was located. But +that had become far too valuable to be retained for military use, +and no longer suitable for a military post, being in the heart of +a great city. Hence it had passed out of the hands of the government. +Upon consultation with Senator Logan and a few others, it was not +thought possible to obtain from Congress the large sum of money +necessary to buy ground for a post near Chicago; but that if the +United States owned the ground, the appropriations to build a post +could readily be obtained. Hence the subject was mentioned to a +few prominent citizens, with the suggestion that a site be purchased +by subscription and presented to the United States. I was soon +invited to meet the Commercial club at one of their monthly dinners, +where the matter was fully discussed. At another meeting, some +time later, it was made the special subject for consideration, and +this resulted in the organization of the plan to raise the money +and purchase the ground. All the eligible sites were examined, +the prices obtained, and the purchase-money pledged. Then the +proposition was submitted to the War Department and approved. +General Sheridan was sent out to select the best of the sites +offered, and his choice fell on that which all, I believe, had +esteemed the best, though the most expensive--a beautiful tract of +land of about six hundred acres, situated on the shore of Lake +Michigan twenty-five miles north of Chicago. The cost was nothing +to the broad-minded and far-sighted men of that city. The munificent +gift was accepted by Congress, and appropriations were made for +the finest military post in the country. It was appropriately +named Fort Sheridan, not only in recognition of the great services +the general had rendered to the country, but as a special and +graceful recognition of the services he had rendered Chicago in +the time of her sorest need. + +During my brief service--two years and some months--in the Division +of the Missouri, I traveled many thousands of miles, and visited +nearly all parts of that vast territory, from the Canadian line to +the Gulf of Mexico, some of which was then new to me, attending to +the ordinary routine duties of a time of comparative peace. Nothing +else occurred at all comparable in importance, in my judgment, to +the establishment of the post of Fort Sheridan. + + +CHAPTER XXV +The Death of General Hancock--Assigned to the Division of the +Atlantic--Measures for Improving the Sea-Coast Defense--General +Fitz-John Porter's Restoration to the Army--President of the Board +Appointed to Review the Action of the Court Martial--General Grant's +Opinion--Senator Logan's Explanation of His Hostile Attitude Toward +General Porter. + +In the spring of 1886 we were again called to meet around the grave +of one of the bravest and best of our companions. The almost +incomparably gallant Hancock, the idol of his soldiers and of a +very large part of the people, so perfectly stainless in life and +character that even political contest could not fan the breath of +slander, had suddenly passed away. We buried him with all honor +at his home in Pennsylvania. Again it fell to my lot--the lot so +common to the soldier--to step into the place in the ranks where +my comrade had suddenly fallen. + + ASSIGNED TO THE DIVISION OF THE ATLANTIC + +The Division of the Missouri was then larger in territory and much +larger in number of troops than that of the Atlantic, and had been +far more important. But Indian wars were, as we hoped, approaching +an end, while we also hoped that the country might soon be aroused +to the necessities of the national defense. The Division of the +Atlantic, including also the greater part of the Gulf States and +those of the northeastern frontier, would then resume its rightful +place as by far the most important of the grand military divisions +of the country. Hence I accepted without hesitation the command +of that division. My natural tastes and favorite studies had led +me largely in the direction of these modern sciences which have in +a few years imparted such enormous strides to the development of +the mechanical means of attack and defense, changing in a corresponding +degree the great problems of war. The valor of great masses of +men, and even the genius of great commanders in the field, have +been compelled to yield the first place in importance to the +scientific skill and wisdom in finance which are able and willing +to prepare in advance the most powerful engines of war. Nations, +especially those so happily situated as the United States, may now +surely defend their own territory against invasion or damage, and +the national honor and the rights of their citizens throughout the +world, by the wise scientific use of surplus revenue, derived from +high import duties if the people so please, instead of by the former +uncivilized method of sacrificing the lives of hundreds of thousands +of brave men. Far more, such sacrifice of the brave can no longer +avail. As well might it be attempted to return to hand- or ox- +power, freight-wagons and country roads, in place of the present +steam-locomotives, trains of cars, and steel tracks, for the enormous +transportation of the present day, as to rely upon the bravery of +troops for the defense of a city. + +Science has wrought no greater revolution in any of the arts of +peace than it has in the art of war. Indeed, the vast national +interests involved all over the world have employed the greatest +efforts of genius in developing the most powerful means of attack +and defense. + +Such were the thoughts with which I entered upon my duties in the +Division of the Atlantic, and such guided my action there and in +the subsequent command of the army. That not very much was +accomplished is too painfully true. Yet a beginning was at once +made, and progress, though slow, continued until the hope now seems +justified that our country may be ready before it is too late to +"command the peace" in a voice which all must heed. + +I was ably and zealously assisted in all this work by Major Joseph +P. Sanger, one of my aides until his well-merited promotion to +inspector-general. Then Captain Tasker H. Bliss took Major Sanger's +place, and helped me to carry forward the work with his well-known +ability, devotion, and industry. The army owes much to those +faithful officers, without whose help little could have been done +by me. I quote here from a memorandum, prepared at my request by +Major Sanger, showing in detail the measures taken to perfect, so +far as possible in advance, the instruction of the artillery of +the army in the service of the modern high-power armament, so that +every new gun and mortar should have, the moment it was finished +and placed in position, thoroughly qualified officers and men to +use it: + +"Major-General J. M. Schofield assumed command of the Division of +the Atlantic and Department of the East April 13, 1886; and during +the remaining months of that year, as opportunity afforded, gave +much attention to the condition of the sea-coast forts and their +garrison from the Canadian line to the Gulf of Mexico. + +"There were at this time sixty-six posts in the division, of which +twenty-seven were garrisoned and thirty-five ungarrisoned; of the +total number, fifty-one were sea-coast forts and the balance +barracks, properly speaking. Of the garrisoned forts, fifteen had +no armaments, and the armaments of all the others were the old +muzzle-loading types of low power. The efficiency of the artillery +personnel was far from satisfactory, from lack of proper instruction, +due in turn to lack of facilities. Artillery target practice, +except at Forts Monroe, Hamilton, and Wadsworth, had practically +ceased in the division; and of the forty-five companies of artillery, +comprising seventy-five per cent. of the entire artillery troops +of the army, only two batteries continually at Fort Monroe had had +annual artillery target practice during the preceding ten years, +and some of the batteries had not fired a shot. + + MEASURES FOR IMPROVING THE SEA-COAST DEFENSE + +"To remedy these defects, and at the same time provide a system of +fire control applicable to the defense of all our harbors, orders +were issued in 1887 for mapping the harbors, establishing base +lines, and arranging the extremities for the use of angle-measuring +instruments, and graduating traverse circles in azimuth. Systematic +artillery instruction and target practice were ordered, and a system +of reports suited to the preservation and utilization of all data +resulting from the firing. + +"Thus, for the first time in the history of the country, an effort +was made to establish and develop a system of artillery fire control +adapted to our fortifications and armament. In 1888 General +Schofield succeeded General Sheridan in command of the army, and +in December issued 'General Orders, No. 108' from the headquarters +of the army. This order extended to all the artillery troops of +the army the system of artillery instruction and target practice +which had been established in the Division of the Atlantic. As it +had not been found practicable to equip all the artillery posts +with the necessary appliances for carrying out the provisions of +the order, the eleven principal posts on the Eastern, Western, and +Southern coasts were designated as artillery posts of instruction, +and provided with all the guns, implements, and instruments necessary +for the instruction and target practice of such of the neighboring +garrisons as were unprovided with proper facilities. + +"To insure the proper execution of the order, there was appropriated +March 2, 1889, twenty thousand dollars to be expended under the +direct supervision of the Board of Ordnance and Fortifications, +which had been created by the Fortification Appropriation Act of +September 22, 1888, and of which General Schofield was the president. +The Army Regulations of 1889 were published on February 9, and +paragraph 382 authorized the commanding general of each geographical +division within which were the headquarters of one or more artillery +regiments to designate, with the approval of the general commanding +the army, a division inspector of artillery target practice, whose +duty it was to make inspections with a view to insuring uniform, +thorough, and systematic artillery instruction. + +"On June 11, 1889, 'General Orders, No. 49' was issued from the +headquarters of the army, in anticipation of the more complete +equipment of the artillery posts with the apparatus necessary for +the proper conduct of artillery instruction and target practice. +The course of instruction covered the use of plane tables, telescopic +and other sights, electrical firing-machines, chronographs, +velocimeters, anemometers, and other meteorological instruments, +stop-watches, signaling, telegraphy, vessel tracking, judging +distance, and, in short, everything essential to the scientific +use of the guns. By 'General Orders, No. 62, Headquarters of the +Army,' July 2, 1889, Lieutenant T. H. Bliss, Fort Artillery, Aide- +de-Camp to General Schofield commanding, was announced as inspector +of small arms and artillery practice. As an inducement to greater +application on the part of the student officers of the Artillery +School and of the Infantry and Cavalry School, the distinction of +'honor graduate' was conferred on all officers who had graduated, +or should graduate, either first or second from the Artillery +School, or first, second, or third from the Infantry and Cavalry +School: the same to appear with their names in the Army Register +as long as such graduates should continue on the active or retired +list of the army. . . ." + + FITZ-JOHN PORTER'S RESTORATION TO THE ARMY + +In August, 1886, after the passage of a bill by Congress, General +Fitz-John Porter was restored to the army, as colonel, by President +Cleveland. When I was in the War Department in 1868, General Porter +had come to me with a request that I would present his case to the +President, and recommend that he be given a rehearing. I declined +to do so, on the ground that, in my opinion, an impartial investigation +and disposition of his case, whatever were its merits, could not +be made until the passions and prejudices begotten by the war had +subsided much further than they had done at that time. In the +course of conversation I told him that while I never permitted +myself to form an opinion of any case without much more knowledge +of it than I had of his, I presumed, from the finding of the court- +martial, that he had at least been guilty of acting upon what he +supposed to be his own better judgment under the circumstances he +found to exist, instead of in strict obedience to General Pope's +orders. He said that was not the case; that he had not even +literally disobeyed orders; that in so far as he had acted upon +his own judgment, he had loyally done all that could be done to +carry out General Pope's wishes; and that all he wanted was an +opportunity to prove such to be the facts. I replied that if he +could prove what he stated beyond question, he would of course have +a case worthy of consideration--not otherwise. Nothing was said +in respect to the facts or the evidence in contravention of the +judgment of the court-martial which tried him. Hence, beyond that +above stated, I had no knowledge of his case when the board of +review, of which I was president, met in 1878 to hear the new +evidence; and I believe neither of the other members of the board +--Generals A. H. Terry and George W. Getty--was any better informed. + +The duty of the board was very different from that of a court- +martial appointed to try an original case. The accused had already +been tried and convicted. He was not to have a new trial. He +could not have any benefit whatever of any doubt that might exist +after all the evidence, old and new, had been fully considered. +He must prove his innocence positively, by absolutely convincing +evidence, or else the original judgment of the court-martial must +stand. This view of the issue was fully accepted by General Porter +and his counsel. This caused a new and peculiar duty to devolve +upon the board--at least it was so to me; that is, to find, if +possible, some view of all the evidence, or of all the facts +established by the evidence, that could be regarded as consistent +with the theory or supposition that Porter was guilty. + +When the evidence was all in, the members of the board separated +for several weeks to let each examine all the evidence and reach +his own conclusion, to be presented in form at the next meeting of +the board. I believe I devoted more earnest work to the examination +and analysis than I had ever done to any one thing before in my +life. I tried in succession every possible explanation of the +established facts, in the effort to find some one consistent with +the theory that Porter had been guilty of disobedience, as charged, +or of any other military offense. But I could not find one, except +the very patent one that he had sent despatches to Burnside which +were by no means respectful to Pope; and the board expressed an +opinion in condemnation of that, which Porter's counsel very frankly +admitted to be just. + +In the course of that long and earnest effort to find Porter guilty, +--for that is what the effort was in effect,--the whole story of +his conduct and of the operations of the two opposing armies and +the actions of other prominent officers became so clear, and his +honorable and soldierly conduct so absolutely demonstrated, that +it was exceedingly difficult, in view of all the wrong he had +suffered, to write a cold judicial statement of the facts. The +first draft was toned down in many particulars in the effort to +bring it within the strictest rules of judicial decisions. I have +sometimes thought since that if the report of the board could have +been much colder, it might have been better at first for Porter, +though less just. But I do not think he or any of his companions +and friends will ever feel like finding fault because the board +could not entirely suppress the feelings produced by their discovery +of the magnitude of the wrong that had been done to a gallant fellow- +soldier. + + GENERAL GRANT'S OPINION + +The first time I met General Grant after the decision of the board +was published was very soon after he had published in 1882 the +result of his own investigation of the case. He at once introduced +the subject, and talked about it for a long time in the most earnest +manner that I ever heard him speak on any subject. He would not +permit me to utter a single sentence until he had gone all over +the case and showed me that he understood all its essential features +as thoroughly as I did, and that his judgment was precisely the +same as that which the board had reached. He intimated very +decidedly that no impartial and intelligent military man could, in +his opinion, possibly reach any other conclusion. The general +evidently desired to make it perfectly clear that he had not adopted +the opinion of a board of which I was a member, nor that of any +one else; but that he had thoroughly mastered the case for himself, +and formed his own judgment in regard to it. I take pleasure in +recording the fact that he unquestionably had done it, and I never +knew a man who could form more positive opinions, or one who could +express them more convincingly, than General Grant. + +The board was not called upon the express any opinion respecting +the action of the court-martial upon the evidence before it, and +it would have been manifestly improper to do so. Speaking for +myself, and not for any other member of the board, I do not now +hesitate to say that the finding and sentence of the general court- +martial which tried General Fitz-John Porter were not justified by +the evidence before that court. In my judgment, formed from long +observation and much experience, the passions of warfare often +render the administration of justice impossible. A suggestion once +made to me by a man in very high military authority, that a finding +and sentence of court-martial rendered in time of war should be +regarded as _res adjudicata_, produced in my mind the painful +impression that a very great man did not find the word "justice" +anywhere in his vocabulary; and I watched for many years the +conversation and writings and public speeches of that man without +finding that he ever made use of that word, or ever gave as a reason +for doing or not doing anything that it would be just or unjust. +In his mind, whatever might have happened to any person was simply +a matter of good or bad fortune which did not concern him. He +refused even to consider the question whether injustice had or had +not been done, or whether the operation of a law was not relatively +unjust to some as compared to others. When to such natural character +and habits of thought are added the stern necessities of war as +viewed by a commander and many other officers, what possible chance +of justice can be left to an _unfortunate_ man? + +It is true that even if the life of an innocent man may have been +sacrificed under the stern necessities of discipline, that is no +more than thousands of his fellow-soldiers have suffered because +of the crimes and follies of politicians who brought on the war. +But that is no reason why his memory as well as those of his comrades +should not be finally honored, if it can be proved that, after all, +he also was innocent and brave. + +In my opinion, no government can be regarded as just to its army +unless it provides, under appropriate conditions, for the rehearing +of cases that may be tried by court-martial in time of war. Perhaps +it may most wisely be left for the President and Congress to +institute appropriate action in each individual case. That is a +matter for mature consideration. My only desire is to suggest the +necessity for some such action, whenever reasonable grounds for it +may be presented. I have no respect for the suggestions sometimes +urged that labor and expense are sufficient grounds for failure to +secure justice to every citizen or soldier of the republic, whether +at home or abroad. + + SENATOR LOGAN'S EXPLANATION + +Soon after General Logan's last election to the Senate, I had a +very interesting and unreserved conversation with him, at his house +in Chicago, in respect to his action in the Porter case. He spoke +of it with evident candor, acknowledged that his view of the case +was probably wrong, and as if to excuse his mistake, volunteered +an explanation as to how he came to take that view of it. He told +me that when he found that the case might probably come before +Congress, he wanted to prepare himself in advance as far as possible +to deal with it justly, and to defend the right effectively. Hence +he went to General Grant to obtain the best possible view of the +military questions involved. General Grant gave him the theory of +the military situation and of the operations of the opposing armies, +as well as that of Porter's own conduct, which had been presented +to, and evidently accepted by, the court-martial, as presenting +the true merits of the case. General Logan accepted that theory +as unquestionably correct, and bent all his energies to the +construction of unanswerable arguments in support of Porter's +condemnation. + +At that time neither General Grant nor General Logan knew anything +of the new evidence which was afterward submitted to the board of +review. Logan's powerful arguments in the Senate were based upon +the preconceived idea of the case, supported by such part of the +new evidence, as well as of the old, as could be made to support +that view. In reply to my statement that he had unquestionably +been led astray, he said that that was quite probable, but that +Grant was responsible, and that it was then too late to change. +I do not think that anybody will now hesitate to say that General +Grant's view of his duty in respect to this last point was the more +to be commended. But the fact I wish to record is that of Logan's +sincerity in the great efforts he had made to convict Porter on +the floor of the Senate, and his explanation of the way in which +he had been led into the greatest possible error. It suggests the +reflection that even a senator of the United States might better +form his own opinions rather than adopt those even of the highest +authority, when the only question involved is one of justice, and +not one of public policy, in which latter case differences of +opinion must of necessity be reconciled for the purpose of securing +unity of action. + +As an illustration of the necessity for an absolutely impartial +review of cases which have involved the passions of war, reference +must be made to the action of one member of the Porter court-martial +who made it generally understood that his individual opinion +supported the finding of that court. He went so far as to make +inquiries whether precedents could be found in American or English +history to sustain a member of a court-martial in publicly defending +the finding of that court, notwithstanding the oath of secrecy +imposed by law upon every member. And this same member of the +court was furnished by a very able lawyer with an argument in +support of the findings of the court, based upon a review of the +evidence submitted to the subsequent board, as if that member of +the court might make public use of that argument as his own. + + +CHAPTER XXVI +The Death of General Sheridan--His Successor in Command of the Army +--Deplorable Condition of the War Department at the Time--A Better +Understanding Between the Department and the Army Commander--General +Sheridan's Humiliating Experience--The Granting of Medals--The +Secretary's Call-Bell--The Relations of Secretary and General-- +Views Submitted to President Cleveland--The Law Fixing Retirement +for Age--An Anecdote of General Grant. + +Again, in 1888, only two years after Hancock's death, another of +our most gallant companions, the matchless Sheridan, was suddenly +stricken down, and soon passed away, before the expiration of half +the term allotted for his command of the army. As next in rank, +upon the request of the general's family and upon the order of the +Secretary of War it became my duty to arrange and conduct the +military ceremonies at the funeral. + +We buried our companion in beautiful Arlington, the choicest spot +in America for the last resting-place of a soldier. It was a bright +summer's day, and the funeral ceremonies, both religious and +military, were the most impressive I have ever seen. As a special +tribute of respect to my brother soldier, a staff officer in uniform +was sent to meet and escort the archbishop who came to celebrate +the funeral mass. + +The death of General Sheridan placed me in a position which I had +never anticipated--that of senior officer on the active list of +the army. The President had known little of me either officially +or personally, and I had some grave differences with the Secretary +of War upon subjects of great importance in my estimation, though +doubtless less in his. I had defended as well as I could, and with +some persistence, what I then believed and now know was the right, +but had been worsted, as a matter of course. It is due to the +Honorable Secretary to say that he disclaimed, many months later, +ever having knowingly given his sanction to the document announcing +one of the military doctrines which I had so persistently but +ineffectually combated. But I did not know that in August, 1888, +and he did not then know that he had been thus betrayed. Hence I +thought it quite improbable that a general holding opinions so +radically opposed to those of the Secretary of War would be called +to the command of the army. But I quietly waited in Washington +for the President's orders, neither seeking nor receiving any +opportunity for explanation of the supposed irreconcilable difference +with the Secretary of War. What occurred in that secret council- +chamber of the commander-in-chief, where the fate of so many anxious +soldiers has been sealed, I have never known or inquired; but in +no great length of time came the President's order assigning me to +the command of the army,--six or seven hours, as I afterward learned, +after it was received in the War Department and given to the press. + + DEPLORABLE CONDITION OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT + +It is not too much to say that the condition of the War Department +at that time was deplorable. It was the culmination of the +controversy respecting the relations between the administration +and the command which had lasted, with slight intermissions, for +forty years. It is not my purpose to go into the history of that +long controversy, but only to state briefly its final result, part +of which was perhaps due to General Sheridan's extreme illness for +some time before his death, and his retention in nominal command +and in the nominal administration of military justice long after +it had become impossible for him to discharge such duties intelligently. +But that result had been practically reached a long time before +General Sheridan became seriously ill. He had long ceased, as +General Sherman and General Scott had before him, not only to +command, but to exercise any appreciable influence in respect to +either the command or the administration. The only difference was +that General Scott went to New York and General Sherman to St. +Louis, while General Sheridan stayed in Washington. + +I have always understood, but do not know the fact, that in former +times the Secretary of War had exercised some intelligent control +over military affairs, so that there was at least unity in the +exercise of military authority. But in 1888 even that had ceased, +and it had been boldly announced some time before that each +departmental chief of staff, in his own sphere, was clothed with +all the authority of the Secretary of War. All that a major-general +as well as an officer of lower grade had to do was to execute such +orders as he might receive from the brigadiers at the head of the +several bureaus in Washington. It was not even necessary for those +mighty chiefs to say that their mandates had the sanction of any +higher authority. Their own fiat was all-sufficient for a mere +soldier of the line or for his commanding general, of whatever +grade of rank or of command. It is not strange that the Secretary +was finally unable to admit that he, great lawyer as he was, could +possibly have given his sanction to such an interpretation of the +law as that; but the decision was given by his order, and it governed +the army for a long time. Of course the adjutant-general became +by far the chiefest of those many chiefs; for it is his function +to issue to the army all the orders of both the Secretary of War +and the commanding general. Be it said to his credit that he did +not assume to issue orders in his own name, after the manner of +other chiefs. Like a sensible man, he was content with the actual +exercise of power, without caring to let the army know that he did +it. He had only to use the name of the Secretary or the general, +as he pleased; either would answer with the army. Of course I knew +something of this before I went to Washington, for the evidence of +it was sometimes too plain to be ignored. Yet it did seem to me +passing strange to sit in my office about noon, where I had been +all the day before, and learn from the New York papers what orders +I had issued on that previous day! Upon inquiry I was told that +that was only a matter of routine, and a rule of long standing. +But I mildly indicated that such a practice did not meet my approval, +and that I wished it changed, which was finally done, as explained +in a previous chapter. But even then I had no means of knowing +whether an order sent to me in the name of the Secretary of War +had ever been seen by him, or whether it was the work of the adjutant- +general, or the product of some joint operations of two or more of +the several chiefs, each of whom had the Secretary's authority to +do such things. At length the Secretary, though with evidently +serious misgivings respecting some deep ulterior purpose of mine, +consented that I might have an officer of the adjutant-general's +department, whom I knew, in my own office, to keep me informed of +what I was to do, and, if possible, what orders I might actually +receive from the Secretary himself, and what from the several other +heads of that hydra called the War Department. + + A BETTER UNDERSTANDING + +After that change things went on much better; but it was at best +only an armed truce, with everybody on guard, until the end of that +administration, and then it came very near culminating in a pitched +battle at the very beginning of the next. By what seemed at the +time a very sharp trick, but which may possibly have been only the +natural working of the vicious system, I was made to appear to the +new Secretary of War as having failed promptly to give effect to +an order authorized by his predecessor, but on which no authentic +marks of _his_ authority appeared, only such as might indicate that +it came from another source. But if it was a trick, it signally +failed. A few candid words from one soldier to another, even if +that other had not been a solider all his life, were quite sufficient +to dissipate that little cloud which at first had threatened a +storm. Then sunlight began to appear; and when, in due time, by +the operation of some natural laws, and some others happily enacted +by Congress, certain necessary changes came about, the sky over +the War Department became almost cloudless, and I trust it may +never again be darkened as it had been nearly all the time for +forty years. + +General Sheridan had entered upon his duties with all the soldierly +courage and confidence of his nature, declaring his purpose to +regain the ground lost by General Sherman when, to use Sheridan's +own expressive words, "Sherman threw up the sponge." He announced +his interpretation of the President's order assigning him to the +"command of the army" as necessarily including _all_ the army, not +excepting the chiefs of the staff departments; and he soon gave +evidence of his faith by ordering one of those chiefs on an inspecting +tour, or something of that kind, without the knowledge of the +Secretary of War. Thus the Secretary found the chief of one of +the bureaus of his department gone without his authority, he knew +not where. It was not difficult for the Secretary to point out to +the general, as he did in writing, in a firm, though kind and +confidential way, that such could not possibly be the true meaning +of the President's order. No attempt appears to have been made to +discuss the subject further, or to find any ground broad enough +for both Secretary and general to stand upon. Nothing further +appears to have been said or done on that subject during that +administration. But upon the inauguration of the next, the Secretary +of War sent out to all the commanding generals of the army copies +of that letter of his predecessor, in which the general-in-chief +had been so mildly and respectfully, yet so thoroughly, beaten. +The army was thus given to understand on that occasion that their +senior in command had not even been given a chance to "throw up +the sponge," as his predecessor had done, but had been "knocked +out" by the first blow. + + GENERAL SHERIDAN'S HUMILIATING EXPERIENCE + +As if that was not humiliation enough for a great soldier to bear, +whenever the Secretary went away one of the same chiefs of bureaus +that the general thought he had a right to command acted as Secretary +of War, to dominate over him! But the loyal, subordinate soldier +who had commanded great armies and achieved magnificent victories +in the field while those bureau chiefs were purveying powder and +balls, or pork and beans, submitted even to that without a murmur, +for a great lawyer had told him that such was the law, and how +could he know any better? It was only when the adjutant-general, +his own staff-officer, so made by the regulations which the general +knew, was thus appointed over him, that his soldierly spirit +rebelled. The humblest soldier of a republic could not endure +that. All this was based upon the theory that the general of the +army was not an officer of the War Department, and hence could not +be appointed acting Secretary of War. What other great department +of the government could recognize the standing army as belonging +to it, if not the Department of War? Surely the little army had +a hard time while it was thus turned out into the cold, not even +its chief recognized as belonging to any department of the government +of the country which they were all sworn to serve, but subject to +the orders of any bureau officer who happened to be the senior in +Washington in hot summer weather, when nearly all had gone to the +mountains or the sea? + +That same great lawyer announced in my hearing, very soon after +his accession to power, in response to a suggestion that war service +was entitled to weight in appointments and promotions, that in his +judgment "that book was closed." Could any one of the million of +soldiers still living, and the many more millions of patriots who +are always alive in our country, be expected to support such a +policy as that? In my opinion, that one short speech cost the +national administration more than a million of votes. Soldiers +don't say much through the press, but they quietly talk things over +around their campfires. And I hope many generations will pass away +before they and their sons will cause thus to keep alive the fires +of patriotism kindled by the great struggle for American Union. + +Thank God, that "law" did not last many years. There was great +rejoicing throughout the little army when it was again recognized +as belonging to the Department of War. But that cause of rejoicing +was soon beclouded. By another of those inscrutable dispensations +of Providence, another superior, under the title of Assistant +Secretary of War, was interposed between the commander-in-chief of +the army and the general appointed to assist him in the command. +It had been thought, and so stated in writing, that the major- +general commanding, and the ten heads of staff departments and +bureaus, with their many assistants, all educated men of long +experience in the several departments of military affairs, and some +of them tried in war, might give the Secretary all the assistance +he needed, if they were permitted to do it. But no; it appears to +have been thought that some other, who had had no education or +experience in the affairs of the War Department, could better assist +a Secretary who to similar acquired qualifications for his office +added far greater natural endowments and the just confidence of +his country. Thus the major-general was treated as much worse than +the lieutenant-general had been, as he was inferior to him in rank. +But I also submitted without a word, because it was this time +unquestionably the law as well as the will of my lawful superiors +in office. I waited as patiently as I could, as the lieutenant- +general had done, the time when by operation of law, human or +divine, welcome relief from a burdensome duty would come, upon the +official declaration that I had done, as best I could, all the duty +that God and my country required of me. + + THE GRANTING OF MEDALS + +One illustration will suffice to show the working of this new +invention by which the general-in-chief was still further removed +from the commander-in-chief, whose chief military adviser he was +supposed to be. An act of Congress authorized the President to +confer medals of honor upon soldiers of all grades who might be +most distinguished for bravery in action. It is the most highly +prized of all military rewards because given to the _soldier_, +without regard to rank, for that service which every true soldier +regards as of the greatest merit. The standard of merit deserving +that reward is essentially the same in all the armies of the +civilized world, and the medal is made of iron or bronze, instead +of anything more glittering or precious, to indicate the character +of the deed it commemorates. That standard of merit is the most +heroic devotion in the discharge of _soldierly duty_ in the face +of the enemy, that conduct which brings victory, honor, and glory +to the country for which a brave man has devoted his life in +obedience to the orders which have come down to him from the head +of the nation, which spirit of obedience and devotion creates armies +and saves nations from defeat, disaster, or domestic convulsion. +These highest tokens of a nation's honor had for many years been +given with the greatest care, after most rigid scrutiny of the +official records and all other evidence presented, laboriously +reviewed by the general-in-chief in person, recommended by him +under the universal rule of civilized nations, and approved by the +Secretary of War, whose approval is considered equivalent to the +order of the President, by which alone, under the law, a medal of +honor can be granted. But at length these carefully considered +recommendations were disapproved by the Assistant Secretary of War, +on the ground that the soldier had only done his duty! He had only +done, or heroically tried to do until stricken down by the enemy's +fire, what his commander had ordered! Some other standard of +soldierly honor was set up, not involving obedience to orders nor +discharge of duty, but instead of that some act of each soldier's +own volition, as if what a nation most highly honored was independent +action of each one of its million of soldiers, without any special +regard to the orders of the commander-in-chief or any of his +subordinate commanders! Thus the most dearly bought honor of a +citizen of this great republic, intrusted by Congress to the +commander-in-chief of the army, to be duly awarded to his subordinates, +passed into the hands of an Assistant Secretary of War, to be +awarded by him under his own newly invented theory of soldierly +merit! After a laborious but vain attempt to obtain recognition +of the time-honored standard of soldierly honor and merit, the +general-in-chief was forced to admit that the new standard set up +by the Assistant Secretary of War did not afford him any intelligible +guide by which he could be governed in making his recommendations, +and hence he requested to be relieved _by the Secretary of War_ +from consideration of such cases in future, presuming that the +vital question would thus, as a matter of course, receive the +_personal_ consideration of the _Secretary_. The formal action of +the "Secretary of War," relieving the general from that important +duty involving the honor of those under his command, was very +promptly made known to him. But now there is very good reason for +the belief that the honorable and very worthy Secretary knew nothing +at all of the whole transaction! + +It was my good fortune to have had, by close personal association, +exact knowledge of the difficulties which my predecessors had +encountered, as well as, perhaps, a more modest ambition, and hence +to avoid some of those difficulties. Yet in view of the past +experience of all commanders of the army, from that of George +Washington with the Continental Congress down to the present time, +I advise all my young brother soldiers to limit their ambition to +the command of the Division of the Atlantic or Department of the +East. But since some of them must in all probability be required +to discharge the duties of the higher position, I trust the varied +experiences of their predecessors may serve as some help to them +in the discharge of those duties, which are vastly more difficult +and far less agreeable than any other duties of an American soldier. +They are the duties which most closely concern the subordinate +relation of the military to the civil power in a republic. In that +relation I had the great good fortune to enjoy most cordial and +considerate personal treatment on the part of my distinguished +associates representing the civil power. Hence my advice to my +young military friends may be fairly regarded as based upon the +most favorable view of what any of them may reasonably expect. It +is the one position of all in the army which most severely tries +the spirit of subordination which is so indispensable in a soldier +of a republic. I have not thought it surprising that none of my +great predecessors were quite able to endure the trial. + + THE SECRETARY'S CALL-BELL + +It is there where the polished surfaces of military etiquette and +modern methods come in contact with the rough cast-iron of those +which often prevail in civil administration, and the former get +badly scratched. Military rules are invariable, with rare exceptions +understood and observed by all, while civil practice varies according +to the character and habits of the chief in authority, from those +of the illustrious Stanton, now well known in history,( 1) to the +opposite extreme of refined courtesy. Long observation and experience +have led to the belief that such rasping of feelings, too sensitive +perhaps, even more than substantial difference, has often been the +cause of discord. A single example may suffice to illustrate what +is meant. In the arrangements of the room especially designed for +the office of the Secretary of War in the splendid new State, War, +and Navy Departments building, was a great table-desk on which was +a complete system of electric buttons connected with wires leading +to bells in all the principal offices in the department, the buttons +bearing the titles of the officers at the head of the several +bureaus, etc., so that the Secretary could "ring up" any colonel, +brigadier-general, or major-general whom he wished to see, just as +a gentleman in private life does his coachman, butler, or valet. +To an army officer who had for many years, in lower grades, been +accustomed to the invariable formula, delivered by a well-dressed +soldier standing at "attention" and respectfully saluting, "The +commanding officer sends his compliments to Captain B---, and wishes +to see the captain at headquarters," the tinkling of that soft +little bell must have sounded harsh indeed after he had attained +the rank of brigadier-general. Twice only, I believe, my own old +soldier messenger who attended in the room where the telephone and +bells were located, came to my room, with an indescribable expression +on his face, and said, "The bell from the Secretary's office is +ringing!" I replied, "Indeed? Go up and inquire what it means." +Presently the Secretary's own messenger appeared, and delivered a +message in courteous terms--whether the same the Secretary had +given to him I did not know, but had reason to doubt, for I had +seen and heard the Secretary violently ring a certain bell several +times, and then say with great emphasis to his messenger, "Go and +tell ---- to come here," not even using the high military title by +which "----" was habitually addressed in the War Department. But +those uncivil methods of an imperfect civilization are gradually +passing away, and the more refined courtesies, taught, I believe, +in all our great schools as well as in the military and naval +service, are taking their place. It is now a long time since that +reform was practically complete in the War Department. + + THE RELATIONS OF SECRETARY AND GENERAL + +Thus it appeared, when I went into the office in 1888, that of my +predecessors in command of the army, Scott and Sherman had given +up the contest, Sheridan had been put quickly _hors de combat_, +while Grant alone had won the fight, and that after a long contest, +involving several issues, in which a Secretary of War was finally +removed from office with the consent of his own personal and +political friends, a President was impeached and escaped removal +from office by only one vote, and the country was brought to the +verge of another civil war. As I had helped Evarts, Seward, and +some others whose names I never knew, to "pour oil on the troubled +waters" in the time of Grant and Stanton, and to get everybody into +the humor to respond heartily to that great aspiration, "Let us +have peace," I thought perhaps I might do something in the same +direction in later years. Be that as it might, I had no desire to +try again what so many others had failed to accomplish, but thought +it better to make an experiment with a less ambitious plan of my +own, which I had worked out while trying to champion the ideas +entertained by all my predecessors. At the request of General +Grant and General Sherman, when the one was President and the other +general of the army, I studied the subject as thoroughly as I was +capable of doing, and formulated a regulation intended to define +the relations between the Secretary of War, the general of the +army, and the staff departments. I still think that plan of my +great superiors, only formulated by me, would have worked quite +satisfactorily if it could have had general and cordial support. +Yet I do not think it was based upon the soundest view of the +constitutional obligations of the President as commander-in-chief +of the army, nor at all consistent with the practice in this country +of giving the command of the army to the officer happening to be +senior in rank, without regard to the "special trust and confidence" +reposed in him by the President for the time being. It was based +too much upon the special conditions then existing, wherein the +general of the army, no less than the Secretary of War, enjoyed +the confidence of the President in the highest degree. The plan +proposed to give far too great authority to the general, if he did +not, for whatever reason, enjoy the full confidence of the President. +It also trusted too much to the ability and disinterested fidelity +of the several chiefs of the staff departments. In short, it was +based upon a supposed higher degree of administrative virtue than +always exists even in this country. + +However all this may be, the proposed regulation did not meet with +cordial support, so far as I know, from any but General Grant, +General Sherman, and General M. C. Meigs, then quartermaster-general. +The other bureau chiefs earnestly opposed it. It was near the end +of General Grant's second term, and no effort was made, so far as +I know, to adopt any regulation on the subject in the next or any +succeeding administration. The personal controversy between General +Scott and the Secretary of War many years before had resulted in +the repeal, through revision, of the old and quite satisfactory +regulation on the subject, and no other worthy of the name has ever +been adopted in its place. + +Soon after I was assigned to the command of the army I submitted, +in writing, to President Cleveland my own mature views on the +subject. They received some favorable consideration, but no formal +action, in view of the near approach of the end of his first term. +From that time till near the present the paper was in the personal +custody of the Secretary of War. What consideration, if any, it +ever received, I was never informed. But it was the guide of my +own action, at least, while I was in command of the army. It is +now on file in the War Department. It is to be hoped that some +future military and administrative geniuses, superior to any of +the last hundred years, may be able to solve that difficult problem. +I can only say that my own plan worked well enough so long as I +helped to work it. How it may be with anybody else, either under +my plan or some other, only the future can determine. I so far +succeeded that the most intelligent staff officers used to say, +"For the first time the general actually does command the army." +They saw only the results, without exactly perceiving the nature +of the motive-power. + +The way to success in rendering efficient public service does not +lie through any assumption of the authority which the nation may +have given to another, even if not most wisely, but rather in +zealous, faithful, and subordinate efforts to assist that other in +doing what the country has imposed upon him. + + THE LAW FIXING RETIREMENT FOR AGE + +A soldier may honorably crave, as the dearest object of his life, +recognition of his _past services_ by promotion to a higher grade. +That is his one reward for all he may have done. But the desire +for higher command, greater power, and more unrestrained authority +exhibits ambition inconsistent with due military subordination and +good citizenship. It is a dangerous ambition in a republic. The +highest examples of patriotism ever shown in this country have been +in the voluntary surrender of power into the hands of the people +or of their chosen representatives, not in efforts to increase or +prolong that power. Following those highest examples, in the year +1882 all the senior officers of the army, including Sherman, +Sheridan, and Hancock, united in advocating the measure then pending +in Congress, to fix a limit of age when every officer should +relinquish command and return to the ranks of private citizenship. +In doing so, nearly all of those seniors, especially Hancock, +relinquished forever all hope of rising to the command of the army. +My case was not so strong as that of Hancock, because I was younger. +But Sheridan was only six months older than I, and his "expectation +of life" was far beyond the time when I should become sixty-four +years old. Hence I cheerfully relinquished in 1882 any reasonable +ambition I may ever have had to command the army. My ultimate +succession to that command in 1888 was, like all other important +events in my personal career, unsought and unexpected. Hence +whatever I did from 1888 to 1895 was only a little "extra duty," +and I have had no reason to find fault on account of the "extra- +duty pay" which I received, though none of it was in money. I am +inclined to think it a pretty good rule for a soldier to wait until +he is "detailed," and not to try to put himself "on guard." I do +not know any case in American history where the opposite course +has not resulted in irretrievable injury to him who adopted it. +Temporary success in gaining high position, before education and +experience have given the necessary qualifications, necessarily +results finally in failure; while slower advancement, giving full +opportunities for education and experience in the duties of each +grade, insures full qualification for the next higher. American +history is full of such examples, as it is--alas! too truly--of +those cases where the highest qualifications and most becoming +modesty have not met with any appropriate advancement or other +recognition. + + AN ANECDOTE OF GENERAL GRANT + +In the official intercourse of a soldier with the great departments +of government, he often finds useful those maxims which have served +him as commander of an army in the field. The most important of +these is, not to enter a combat where he is sure to be beaten, as, +for instance, where his opponent is the judge who is to decide the +issue. As in war, so in administration, battle once joined, +questions of right become obscured. The most powerful guns and +battalions are sure to win. It is much wiser to seek an ally who +carries a heavier armament. Some subordinates of mine--clerks and +messengers, I believe--were once required to refund some money +which had been paid them on my interpretation of the law and +regulations. My careful explanation of the ground of my action +was promptly disapproved. I then requested that the money be +charged to me and the whole matter referred to Congress, in reply +to which request I was informed that the accounts had been settled. +In another case I requested that my appeal from adverse action be +submitted to President Grant, who had had occasion to know something +about me. I was requested by telegraph, in cipher, to withdraw +that appeal, as it was liable to cause trouble. Being a lover of +peace rather than war, I complied. In that perhaps I made a mistake. +If I had adhered to my appeal, it might have saved a public +impeachment. Again, I was called upon by one of the Treasury +bureaus to refund some money which had been paid me for mileage by +the Secretary of War, on the alleged ground that the Secretary +could not lawfully give me such an order. I referred the matter +to the Secretary, as one that did not concern me personally, but +which involved the dignity of the head of the War Department as +compared with that of a subordinate bureau of another department. +The Treasury official soon notified me that the account had been +allowed. To illustrate the application of the same principle under +opposite conditions, I must relate the story told of President +Grant. When informed by a Treasury officer that he could not find +any law to justify what the President had desired to be done, he +replied, "Then I will see if I can find a Treasury officer who can +find that law." Of course no change in the incumbent of that office +proved to be necessary. I have thought in several cases in later +years that Grant's military method might have been tried to +advantage. + +"Be ye wise as a serpent and harmless as a dove" is the only rule +of action I have ever heard of that can steer a soldier clear of +trouble with the civil powers of this great republic. Yet he must +sometimes, when his honor or the rights of his subordinates are +involved, make the fight, though he knows he must be beaten. A +soldier must then stand by his guns as long as he can, and it has +happened that such a fight, apparently hopeless at the time, has +given victory to a future generation. + +[( 1) Sherman's "Memoirs," second edition, Vol. II, p. 422.] + + +CHAPTER XXVII +President of the New Board of Ordnance and Fortifications--Usefulness +of the Board--Troubles with the Sioux Indians in 1890-1891--Success +of the Plan to Employ Indians as Soldiers--Marriage to Miss +Kilbourne--The Difficulty with Chili in 1892. + +Even as late as the year 1882, very high military authority in +this country advocated with great earnestness the proposition that +our old brick and stone forts, with their smooth-bore guns, could +make a successful defense against a modern iron-clad fleet! At +the same time, and even much later, high naval authority maintained +that the United States navy should be relied upon for the defense +of our many thousands of miles of sea-coast! In view of such +counsel, it does not seem strange that Congress, after all the old +ships had nearly all rotted away, began to give some attention to +a new navy, but thought little or nothing of land defenses. The +old brick and stone parapets and the cast-iron guns were still +there; none of them had become rotten, though the wooden carriages +had gone to decay, and the guns were lying on the ground! Yet, +after a long dream of security, the Great National Council announced +the decision that _something_ ought probably to be done for sea- +coast defense. Provision was made by law for a very high board, +with the Secretary of War presiding, to report to Congress what +was required--a thing which, if Congress had only known it, the +Engineer Bureau of the War Department could have reported just as +well in far less time. But a length a very able report was submitted, +which inspired the confidence of Congress. + + BOARD OF ORDNANCE AND FORTIFICATION + +In the meantime there had arisen a condition which can best be +expressed as "want of confidence" in the chief of the Ordnance +Department of the army on the part of committees of Congress. From +this it resulted that no appropriations were made for several years +for any new armament, and hence none for fortifications. Thus by +a trifle were the wheels of a great government blocked for a long +time! Yet that government still survives! Finally, in the year +1888 an act was passed creating a Board of Ordnance and Fortifications, +of which the commanding general of the army should be president, +and appropriating quite a large sum of money to be expended, under +the direct supervision of that board, to commence the work of +fortification and armament of the sea-coast. After a very careful +examination and full consideration and discussion, the board adopted +the plans prepared by the Bureaus of Engineering and Ordnance, and +the work was began and carried forward substantially the same as +if the expenditure of the appropriation had been intrusted to the +two bureaus concerned and the Secretary of War. + +The board did perform, and still continues to perform, a very +important and essential duty, and one which cannot be satisfactorily +intrusted to any one man, namely, that of deciding the delicate +and difficult questions constantly arising in respect to the +practical utility and economy of new inventions having reference +to works of defense or of attack. But these questions had no +immediate bearing whatever upon the all-important problem of the +day--to place the sea-coasts of the United States in a satisfactory +state of defense according to the best scientific methods then +known to the world. And that problem had already been solved, in +all respects save one, namely, how to get out of Congress the +necessary money to do the work? Genius will never cease to invent +something better. If we are to wait for the best, the next war +will be over long before we shall begin to prepare for it. All +great military nations had been engaged for many years in elaborate +and costly experiments, to develop the best possible means of attack +and defense, and our Engineer and Ordnance departments had not +failed to profit thereby to the fullest extent. They were ready, +without any such costly experiments, to make our defenses as good +as any in the world. Yet that work of so vital importance must be +delayed until American genius could also be assured of a chance, +at government expense, of developing something better than anybody +else in the world had done! An end was finally, in 1888, put to +that dangerous delay by the device, so happily invented by somebody +in Congress, of a Board of Ordnance and Fortification. + + USEFULNESS OF THE BOARD + +The board has also served, and will doubtless continue to serve, +another very important purpose. It brings together, in close +consideration and discussion of all details of the system of national +defense, representative officers of the engineers, the ordnance, +and the artillery, together with a representative civilian who has +become, by service in Congress, far better able than any other +member to insure that perfect understanding between the board and +the committees of Congress which is essential to harmonious action. +Above all, it has given to the commanding general an opportunity +to become perfectly familiar with all the details of the coast +defenses, and to exert a legitimate influence in making preparations +for war, which must be of vital importance to him and to the country +when he has to bear the great responsibility of command. I used +to say that it would not be just to me to deprive me of such +opportunities for education, and I doubt not all my successors will +share that feeling. Thus, what may prove to be of the greatest +benefit to the military service has finally come out of that evil +of "want of confidence" in an ordnance chief. + +When in command of the Division of the Atlantic in 1886-7, I made +a careful estimate of the aggregate strength of the war garrisons +required for the fortifications and armament recommended by the +Endicott board, and of the peace garrisons which would be absolutely +required for the care of the new works and for the instruction of +the militia artillery reserves. It was found that the addition of +two regiments to the present artillery strength of the army would +provide the requisite force. Hence a measure was formulated and +submitted to Congress to convert the present five regiments into +seven, with some proportionate reduction in the number of officers, +intended to promote efficiency and economy. That measure has +appeared to meet with the approval of nearly all concerned, but is +still pending in Congress. It is probably the most important +military measure now awaiting favorable action. The measure which +accompanies it for the reorganization of the infantry, though not +of so pressing necessity, is based upon sound military principles, +and is worthy of prompt and favorable action. + +The first introduction of the policy of confining the warlike tribes +of Indians upon very restricted reservations necessarily caused +great discontent, especially among the younger men, who where thus +cut off from the sports of the chase and the still greater sport +of occasional forays into frontier settlements, which were the only +means known in Indian custom by which a young warrior could gain +a name and a position of honor in his tribe. Either through too +limited appropriations or bad management, the provisions furnished +for the support of the Indians, in lieu of those to which they had +been accustomed, proved inadequate. This caused the spirit of +discontent to increase and to become general among all ages. The +natural result was such a threat of war from the great Sioux nation +in the winter of 1890-91 as to necessitate the concentration of +quite a large army to meet the danger of a general outbreak. In +the course of military operations, accidents rather than design on +either side occasioned some serious collisions between the troops +and the Indians, especially at Wounded Knee, resulting in desperate +conflict and much loss of life. But by very careful management on +the part of the commanding general in the field, Major-General +Miles, a general conflict was averted, and the Sioux made their +submission. They had had no general intention to go to war, if +they could avoid it without starvation. After a large sum of money +had been expended by the War Department in this way, the deficiencies +in food were supplied at about the same cost as would, if made in +advance, have removed the cause of war. The Indians gained their +point of getting as much food as they needed, and the War Department +paid the extra bills, but out of the same public treasury which +has so often been bled in that way. + + TROUBLES WITH THE SIOUX INDIANS IN 1890-91 + +It was quite beyond the power of the War Department to guard against +a recurrence of that greatest danger of Indian wars--starvation of +the Indians. But long experience and accurate knowledge of Indian +character had suggested a method by which the other cause of +discontent among the young Indian warriors might be, at least in +a great measure, removed. That was by providing a legitimate method +by which their irrepressible love of military life and exploits +might be largely gratified, and, at the same time, those ambitious +young men transferred from the ranks of more or less probable savage +enemies to the ranks of friends and practically civilized allies. +Fortunately, the strongest trait of the Indian character, namely, +fidelity to the war chief, lent itself to this project. Long +experience had shown the existence of this Indian trait. In only +one solitary instance had the Indian scouts so long employed by +the army ever proved unfaithful, though often employed in hostilities +against their own tribes. Hence, if the ardent young warriors +could be induced to enlist for three years in the army, they would, +at least for that time, be converted from enemies into allies, even +against such of their own tribes as might refuse to enlist. Of +course the army must suffer somewhat, in its effective strength +for all purposes, during this experiment; for it is evident that +a company or troop of Indians would not be quite as valuable for +general service as the same number of white men. Yet the transfer +of a few hundred of the best Sioux warriors from the Sioux side to +our side would much more than compensate for the loss of the same +number of white troops. The result of that experiment seemed to +be entirely satisfactory. At all events, there has been no great +Indian war, nor any threat of one, since that experiment was begun. +It has served to tide over the time during which the young men, +who had from earliest childhood listened to stories of the Custer +massacre and other great Indian achievements, were undergoing +transformation from the life and character of savage warriors to +those of civilized husbandmen, under the system of allotments in +severalty. When the short warlike part of the life of one generation +is past, the danger will no longer exist. + +In June, 1891, at Keokuk, Iowa, I married Miss Georgia Kilbourne, +daughter of Mrs. George E. Kilbourne of that city. Then a host of +old soldiers of the Union army reassembled to greet their comrade. + +In 1892 this country seemed to be on the verge of war with the +little republic of Chile. So confident were some officials of the +administration that war was inevitable, that I was asked to make +an estimate of the military force which would be necessary to occupy +and hold a vital point in Chilean territory until the demands of +the United States were complied with. It was assumed, of course, +that the navy could easily do all the rest. Pending the consideration +of this subject, so disagreeable to me, I had a dream which I +repeated at the time to a few intimate friends. I saw in the public +street a man holding a mangy-looking dog by the neck, and beating +him with a great club, while a crowd of people assembled to witness +the "sport." Some one asked the man why he was beating the poor +dog. He replied: "Oh, just to make him yelp." But the dog did +not "yelp." He bore his cruel punishment without a whine. Then +he was transformed into a splendid animal, one of the noblest of +his species, and the entire crowd of bystanders, with one accord, +rushing in and compelled the man to desist from beating him. + + +CHAPTER XXVIII +Services of the Army During the Labor Strikes of 1894--Military +Control of the Pacific Railways--United States Troops in the City +of Chicago--Orders Sent to General Miles, and his Reports--The +Proclamation of the President--Instructions to Govern the Troops +in Dealing with a Mob--The Duties of the Military Misunderstood-- +Orders of the President in Regard to the Pacific Railways. + +In 1894 the vast development of railroad communication between the +Mississippi valley and the Pacific Ocean, and the similar building +of new cities and founding of industrial enterprises in the region +between the Rocky Mountains and the Pacific, both in anticipation +of the future development of the country rather then in response +to any demand then existing, having been substantially completed, +or suspended for an indefinite time, a large amount of capital so +invested was found for the time unproductive, and a great number +of laborers were left in the Pacific States without any possible +employment. The great majority of these laborers were, as usual, +without any accumulated means to pay their transportation to any +other part of the country, and hence were left to drift as they +might toward the East, subsisting by whatever means they could find +during their long tramp of many hundreds of miles. Similar and +other causes had produced at the same time industrial depression +throughout the country, so that the unfortunate laborers drifting +eastward were only an additional burden upon communities already +overloaded with unemployed labor. Thus the borrowing of foreign +capital to put into unprofitable investments, and the employment +of great numbers of laborers in making premature developments, met +with the consequences which are sure to follow disregard of natural +laws. The management of the Pacific railroads did not appear to +appreciate the wisdom of mitigating, so far as was in their power, +the evil which had resulted from their own policy, by giving free +transportation to the laborers who had been stranded on the Pacific +coast. Hence all the transcontinental roads were soon blocked by +lawless seizures of trains, and suffered losses far greater than +they saved in transportation. Indeed, the requisite transportation +of destitute laborers eastward would have cost the roads practically +nothing, while their losses resulting from not providing it were +very great. Every possible effort was made for a long time to deal +effectively with this evil by the ordinary course of judicial +proceedings; but such methods proved entirely inadequate. The +government was finally compelled, in consequence of the almost +total interruption of interstate commerce and of the transportation +of the United States mails and troops, to assume military control +along the lines of all the Pacific roads, and direct the department +commanders to restore and maintain, by military force, traffic and +transportation over those roads. + + MILITARY CONTROL OF THE PACIFIC RAILWAYS + +For some time those lawless acts did not seem to result from any +general organization. But they gradually developed into the +formidable character of a wide-spread conspiracy and combination, +with recognized general leaders, to obstruct and prevent the due +execution of the laws of the United States respecting transportation +and interstate commerce. The principal center of this conspiracy, +and by far the most formidable combination, was in Chicago, where +the greatest material interests, both public and private, were at +stake, though many other important railroad centers and many thousand +miles of road were involved. There the insurrection was so great +in numbers and so violent in its acts as to require the most prompt +and energetic action of a very large force to suppress disorder, +protect public property, and execute the laws. The city police +were utterly powerless in such an emergency, and deputy United +States marshals, though employed without limit as to numbers, were +no more effective. The State militia were not called out in time +to meet the emergency. Hence nothing remained but for the National +Government to exercise the military power conferred upon it by the +Constitution and laws, so far as the same were applicable.( 1) +Fortunately, the acts of Congress passed in pursuance of the +Constitution, although never before made effective in a similar +case, were found to give ample authority for the action then +required. Fortunately, also, the wise foresight of the government +in establishing a large military post at Fort Sheridan, near Chicago, +made a regiment of infantry, a squadron of cavalry, and a battery +of artillery immediately available for service in that city. But, +unfortunately, the commanding general of that department was absent +from his command, where superior military capacity was so much +needed at that time. Although the troops west of the Mississippi +had been engaged for a long time, under the President's orders, in +overcoming the unlawful obstruction of railroad traffic above +referred to, the general appears not to have anticipated any +emergency which would in his judgment require or justify such use +of troops in his own department, and hence remained in the Eastern +States, where he had gone some time before. From this it resulted +that when the troops at Fort Sheridan were ordered into Chicago, +the execution of the order devolved upon subordinate officers, and +the troops were so dispersed as to be unable to act with the +necessary effect. + +It having become apparent that the services of troops would probably +be required in the city of Chicago, and in anticipation of orders +from the President, instructions were telegraphed on July 2 to the +commanding general of the Department of the Missouri to make +preparations to move the garrison of Fort Sheridan to the Lake +Front Park in the city. The reply of his staff-officer, Colonel +Martin, showed that the department commander, Major-General Miles, +was not in Chicago, and the adjutant-general of the army did not +know where he was, but, after several inquiries by telegraph, +learned that the general had started that afternoon from Long Island +for Washington instead of Chicago. The next day (July 3), in the +President's room at the Executive Mansion, in reply to my suggestion +that his presence was needed with his command, General Miles said +he was subject to orders, but that in his opinion the United States +troops ought not to be employed in the city of Chicago at that +time. No reply was made by the President or the Secretary of War, +who was also present, to that expression of opinion, but the +President approved my further suggestion that General Miles should +return at once to his command. The general started by the first +train, but could not reach Chicago in time to meet the emergency. +It became necessary in the judgment of the President to order the +Fort Sheridan garrison into the city in the afternoon of the same +day (July 3). + + UNITED STATES TROOPS IN THE CITY OF CHICAGO + +The instructions given the day before about moving the troops to +Lake Front Park were not complied with. From that point they could +most readily have protected the sub-treasury, custom-house, post- +office, and other United States property, and also have acted in +a formidable body at any other point where their service might +properly have been required. But instead of that, the troops were +so dispersed that they could not act with much effect anywhere, +and could give no protection whatever to the vast amount of United +States property exposed to destruction. This error appears to have +resulted in some measure from the too great deference paid by +commanding officers to the advice or wisdom of civil officers to +whom they were referred to for information, and much more from lack +of knowledge of the lawful relations existing between the national +troops and the civil authorities in this country, although those +relations had been plainly defined in an order dated May 25, quoted +below. Like ignorance in respect to the proper tactical methods +of dealing with insurrection against the authority of the United +States caused halting and ineffective action of the troops. To +correct this error and make known to all the rules which must govern +United States troops in like emergencies, the subjoined order, +dated July 9, was issued. The extracts from correspondence quoted +below, indicate the nature of the errors above referred to, and +their correction some time after the arrival of General Miles in +Chicago. + +The garrison of Fort Sheridan proved sufficient, notwithstanding +the first faulty disposition and action of troops, to hold the mob +in check until reinforcements arrived from distant stations and +the State troops were brought into effective action. Finally, the +proclamation of the President of the United States, quoted below, +which was issued at the moment when ample military forces had been +placed in position to enforce his constitutional mandates, very +quickly terminated all forcible resistance to the execution of the +laws of the United States. The same result, though perhaps with +greater destruction of life and far less destruction of property, +would probably have been accomplished in a single day by the Fort +Sheridan garrison alone, acting in one compact body, according to +the tactics prescribed for such service. If a like occasion ever +again occurs, the action of the troops will doubtless be governed +by such tactics. Delay is too dangerous in such cases. + + "(Telegram.) + "Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C., July 2, 1894. +"To the Commanding General, Department of the Missouri, Chicago, + Illinois. + +"You will please make all necessary arrangements, confidentially, +for the transportation of the entire garrison of Fort Sheridan-- +infantry, cavalry, and artillery--to the Lake Front Park in the +city of Chicago. To avoid possible interruption of the movement +by rail and by marching through a part of the city, it may be +advisable to bring them by steamboat. Please consider this matter, +and have the arrangements perfected without delay. You may expect +orders at any time for the movement. Acknowledge receipt, and +report in what manner the movement is to be made. + + "J. M. Schofield, Major-General Commanding." + + "(Telegram.) + "Chicago, Illinois, July 2, 1894. +"Adjutant-General U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.: + +"Confidential despatch this date received at three-thirty P. M. +Arrangements can be made to bring troops from Sheridan to Lake +Front Park by steamer, but there would be difficulty in disembarking +them there, as the Van Buren street viaduct has been torn down; +and, besides, transportation from barracks to pier at Sheridan +would necessarily be slow. They can be brought from Sheridan to +Lake Front direct by rail, and disembark on grounds, thus avoiding +marching through city. Suggest the latter plan as best, especially +as rail transportation is now at the post sufficient to bring the +whole command--infantry, artillery, and cavalry--as soon as they +can be loaded on cars at that point. + + "Martin, Asst. Adjt.-Genl. + "(in absence of Major-Genl. Comdg.)." + + UNITED STATES TROOPS IN THE CITY OF CHICAGO + + "(Telegram.) + "Washington, D. C., July 3, 1894, four o'clock P. M. +"To Martin, Adjutant-General, Hdqrs. Dept. of the Missouri, Chicago, + Ills. + +"It having become impracticable, in the judgment of the President, +to enforce, by ordinary course of judicial proceedings, the laws +of the United States, you will direct Colonel Crofton to move his +entire command at once to the city of Chicago, leaving the necessary +guard at Fort Sheridan, there to execute the orders and processes +of the United States court, to prevent the obstruction of the United +States mails, and generally to enforce the faithful execution of +the laws of the United States. He will confer with the United +States marshal, the United States district attorney, and Edwin +Walker, special counsel. Acknowledge receipt, and report action +promptly. + +"By order of the President: + "J. M. Schofield, Major-General." + + "(Telegram.) + "Chicago, Ills, July 4, 1894. +"Adjutant-General U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.: + +"At ten-fifteen this morning Colonel Crofton reports his command +in the city; located, infantry at Blue Island and Grand Crossing, +cavalry and artillery at stock-yards; cannot learn that anything +definite has been accomplished, but there has been no active trouble. +People appear to feel easier since arrival of troops. General +Miles is expected to arrive in city within an hour or at twelve. + + "Martin, Asst. Adjt.-Genl." + + "(Telegram.) + "Chicago, Ills., July 4, 1894. +"Adjt. Genl. U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.: + +"Returned at eleven-thirty this morning. + + "Miles, Maj.-Genl. Commanding." + + "(Telegram.) + "Chicago, Ills., July 4, 1894. +"Adjutant-General U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.: + +"Cavalry and artillery moving to the stock-yards were delayed by +obstructions placed upon the track, also cars being overturned on +track and the threatening mob in the vicinity. A report is received +that a mob of about two thousand men has gathered near Blue Island +and threatened to take that place at four o'clock this afternoon. +It is occupied by four companies of infantry. At the request of +U. S. Marshal Arnold, troops had been located at Blue Island, the +stock-yards, and the crossing at Forty-seventh street of the Lake +Shore and Rock Island railroads before my arrival, and others are +desired at South Chicago. I have directed all commanding officers +not to allow crowds or mobs to congregate about the commands in a +menacing or threatening manner, and to keep out pickets and guards; +and, after due warning, if the mobs approach the commands in a +threatening manner, they must be dispersed, even if firearms have +to be used. A large number of men in the city are wearing white +ribbon, the color ordered by Debs to indicate their allegiance to +his orders. Owing to the feeling of feverish excitement in the +city, and the large number of unoccupied, the condition of to-day +is more critical than at any other time. Most of the roads are +moving mail and passenger trains. All of the roads will attempt +to move their trains to-morrow morning. Sufficient number of men +are available and anxious to work to take the place of all the +strikers, provided proper protection can be given them. Seven +roads have moved a few cars of perishable freight. All the troops +from Sheridan are occupied, and I renew my recommendation that the +garrison be very largely increased at once to meet any emergency +that may arise. The effect of moving troops through the country, +especially from Kansas to Chicago, at this time would be desirable. + + "Nelson A. Miles, Major-General Commanding." + +Additional troops were concentrated in Chicago as rapidly as they +could be transported, until the force there aggregated about two +thousand men. More were in readiness to move if necessary. + + ORDERS SENT TO GENERAL MILES, AND HIS REPORTS + + "(Telegram.) + "Chicago, Ills., July 5, 1894. +"Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington, D. C.: + +"Owing to the excellent discipline and great forbearance of officers +and men, serious hostilities were avoided yesterday; several small +fights and affrays occurred. Matters look more favorable to-day, +although interference exists on five roads. All railroads are +endeavoring to move freight and mail trains. + + "Miles, Major-General Commanding." + + "(Telegram.) + "Chicago, Ills, July 5, 1894. +"Adjutant-General U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.: + +"The mob of several thousand are moving east along Rock Island +nearer center of city, overturning cars, burning station-houses, +and destroying property. There is a report that the mob intend +sacking some of the principal building near Rookery Building to- +night. The riot will soon embrace all the criminals of the city +and vicinity. Unless very positive measures are taken, the riot +will be beyond the control of any small force. Has the government +any additional instructions? + + "Nelson A. Miles, Major-General Commanding." + + "(Telegram--Confidential.) + "Chicago, Ills, July 5, 1894. +"Adjutant-General, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.: + +"While most of the roads are moving passenger and mail trains, +nearly all the freight trains are interfered with, and but very +few are moving. This morning a mob of over two thousand men gathered +at the stock-yards, crowded among the troops, obstructed the movement +of trains, knocked down a railroad official, and overturned some +twenty freight-cars on the track, which obstructs all freight and +passenger traffic in the vicinity of the stock-yards, and thereby +the transit of meat-trains to different parts of the country, as +well as the passenger traffic of the Rock Island Railroad. The +mob also derailed a passenger-train coming into the city on the +Pittsburg, Fort Wayne, and Chicago Railroad, and burned switches, +which destroys track. The injunction of the United States Court +is openly defied, and unless the mobs are dispersed by the action +of the police, or they are fired upon by United States troops, more +serious trouble may be expected, as the mob is increasing and +becoming more defiant. Shall I give the order for troops to fire +on mob obstructing trains? + + "Miles, Major-General Commanding." + +The following extracts from correspondence and orders, and the +proclamation of the President, with the foregoing explanation, +sufficiently indicate the methods by which the unlawful combination +in Chicago was suppressed: + + "(Telegram.) + "Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C., July 5, 1894, 10:15 + P. M. +"To Major-General Miles, Headquarters Department of the Missouri, + United States Army, Chicago, Illinois. + +"In view of the situation in Chicago, as reported in your despatches +to the adjutant-general this evening, it is your duty to concentrate +your troops so as to enable them to act effectively either in +execution of the orders heretofore given, or in protecting the +property of the United States, as in your judgment may be necessary. +In any event, the troops should not be scattered or divided into +small detachments, nor should they attempt to do service in several +places at the same time, which their numbers will not enable them +to do effectively. + +"The mere preservation of peace and good order in the city is, of +course, the province of the city and State authorities. + + "J. M. Schofield, Major-General Commanding." + + ORDERS SENT TO GENERAL MILES, AND HIS REPORTS + + "(Telegram.) + "Chicago, Ills., July 6, 1894. +"Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington, D. C.: + +"In accordance with the orders of the War Department, the troops +were sent to Blue Island, stock-yards, Grand Crossing, and Forty- +ninth street, at the request of the U. S. marshal. This disposition +was made before my arrival yesterday. The roads were obstructed +in several places by mobs; the largest and most violent gathered +near the stock-yards at noon, and gradually moved east along the +line of the Rock Island road, overturning cars, burning station- +house, roundhouse, and other property. The mob was estimated at +ten thousand men, three miles long and half a mile wide; it moved +steadily north until after dark, destroying property and setting +fires, and the cry of the mob was "To hell with the government!" +It reached Eighteenth street after dark, and then dispersed. While +this threatening movement was in action I withdrew some of the +troops on the outskirts of the city, and in the evening the battery +and one troop of cavalry, to the Lake Front Park, for the purpose +of attacking the mob should it reach the vicinity of the government +building between Adams and Jackson sts. During the afternoon, +night, and this morning I have concentrated nine (9) companies +infantry, troop cavalry, and the battery of artillery on the Lake +Front Park. This includes troops from Leavenworth and Brady. +During last night a proclamation was issued by the mayor directing +the police to disperse mobs and prevent the lawless from interfering +with railroads. If this order is executed there will be no further +trouble. One engineer has been stoned to death. During the night +a dozen fires were started in different places, but destroying very +little property, except the principal buildings of the World's Fair +and more than a hundred cars; this morning a mob has gathered near +the stock-yards in as large numbers as yesterday at this time; they +threatened to hang U. S. marshals and policemen. The law-breakers +constitute a very small percentage of the people. The mass of the +people desire the maintenance of law and order. The action of the +Chief Executive has given universal satisfaction. + + "Miles, Major-General Commanding." + + THE PROCLAMATION OF THE PRESIDENT + +"By the President of the United States of America. +"A Proclamation. + +"_Whereas_, by reason of unlawful obstructions, combinations, and +assemblages of persons, it has become impracticable, in the judgment +of the President, to enforce, by the ordinary course of judicial +proceedings, the laws of the United States within the State of +Illinois, and especially in the city of Chicago, within said State: + +"_And whereas_, for the purpose of enforcing the faithful execution +of the laws of the United States and protecting its property and +removing obstructions to the United States mails, in the State and +city aforesaid, the President has employed a part of the military +forces of the United States: + +"_Now, therefore_, I, Grover Cleveland, President of the United +States, do hereby admonish all good citizens and all persons who +may be, or may come, within the city and State aforesaid, against +aiding, countenancing, encouraging, or taking any part in such +unlawful obstructions, combinations, and assemblages; and I hereby +warn all persons engaged in, or in any way connected with, such +unlawful obstructions, combinations, and assemblages, to disperse +and retire peaceably to their respective abodes on or before twelve +o'clock noon on the ninth day of July instant. + +"Those who disregard this warning and persist in taking part with +a riotous mob in forcibly resisting and obstructing the execution +of the laws of the United States, or interfering with the functions +of the government, or destroying or attempting to destroy the +property belonging to the United States or under its protection, +cannot be regarded otherwise than as public enemies. + +"Troops employed against such a riotous mob will act with all the +moderation and forbearance consistent with the accomplishment of +the desired end; but the stern necessities that confront them will +not with certainly permit discrimination between guilty participants +and those who are mingled with them from curiosity and without +criminal intent. They only safe course, therefore, for those not +actually unlawfully participating is to abide at their homes, or +at least not to be found in the neighborhood of riotous assemblages. + +"While there will be no hesitation or vacillation in the decisive +treatment of the guilty, this warning is especially intended to +protect and save the innocent. + +"_In testimony whereof_, I have hereunto set my hand and caused +the seal of the United States to be hereto affixed. + +"Done at the city of Washington, this eighth day of July, in the +year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-four, and +of the independence of the United States the one hundred and +nineteenth. + + "Grover Cleveland. +"By the President: + "W. Q. Gresham, Secretary of State." + + "(General Orders, No. 6). + "Headquarters Department of the Missouri, Chicago, Illinois, July + 9, 1894. +"To all United States troops serving in the Department of the + Missouri. + +"The acts of violence committed during the past few days in +obstructing the mail-trains and post-roads; the blocking of the +interstate commerce; the open defiance and violation of the injunction +of the United States Court; the assaults upon the Federal forces +in the lawful discharge of their duties; the destruction, pillage, +and looting of the inland commerce property belonging to citizens +of the different States, and other acts of rebellion and lawlessness, +have been of such a serious character that the duties of the military +authorities are now clearly defined. + +"The proclamation of the President, the commander-in-chief of the +land and navy forces and the State militia when called into service, +is understood by the military to be in the interests of humanity +and to avoid the useless waste of life, if possible. _It is an +executive order for all law-abiding citizens to separate themselves +from the law-breakers and those in actual hostility to the action +of the United States Court and the laws of the National Government._ +He has defined the attitude of these law-breakers to be that of +enemies of the government, and hence it is the duty of the military +forces to aid the United States marshals to disperse, capture, or +destroy all bodies of men obstructing the mail-routes and in actual +hostility to the injunction of the United States Court and the laws +of the United States. + +"This does not change the relations of the Federal officials with +those of the local authority, as it is expected that the State and +municipal governments will maintain peace and good order within +the territory of their jurisdiction. Should they fail or be +overpowered, the military forces will assist them, but not to the +extent of leaving unprotected property belonging to or under the +protection of the United States. + +"The officer in the immediate command of troops must be the judge +as to what use to make of the forces of his command in executing +his orders, and in case serious action be required and there be +time, he will communicate with his next superior for his +instructions. + +"The earnest efforts of the law-abiding citizens have done much to +improve the condition of affairs during the last few days, and I +earnestly request all law-abiding citizens to do whatever is possible +to assist in maintaining the civil government and the authority of +the municipal, State, and Federal governments in preserving peace +and good order. + +"By command of Major-General Miles: + "J. P. Martin, Assistant Adjutant-General." + + "(General Orders, No. 23) + "Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, + July 9, 1864. +"The following instructions are published for the government of +the army: + +"A mob forcibly resisting or obstructing the execution of the laws +of the United States, or attempting to destroy property belonging +to or under the protection of the United States, is a public enemy. + +"Troops called into action against such a mob are governed by the +general regulations of the army and military tactics in respect to +the manner in which they shall act to accomplish the desired end. +It is purely a tactical question in what manner they shall use the +weapons with which they are armed--whether by the fire of musketry +and artillery, or by the use of the bayonet and saber, or by both, +and at what stage of the operations each or either mode of attack +shall be employed. + +"This tactical question must necessarily be decided by the immediate +commander of the troops, according to his best judgment of the +situation and the authorized drill regulations. + +"In the first stage of an insurrection lawless mobs are frequently +commingled with great crowds of comparatively innocent people drawn +there by curiosity and excitement, and ignorant of the great danger +to which they are exposed. Under such circumstances the commanding +officer should withhold the fire of his troops, if possible, until +timely warning has been given to the innocent to separate themselves +from the guilty. + +"Under no circumstances are the troops to fire into a crowd without +the order of the commanding officer, except that single sharp- +shooters, selected by the commanding officer, may shoot down +individual rioters who have fired upon or thrown missiles at the +troops. + +"As a general rule, the bayonet alone should be used against mixed +crowds in the first stages of a revolt. But as soon as sufficient +warning has been given to enable the innocent to separate themselves +from the guilty, the action of the troops should be governed solely +by the tactical considerations involved in the duty they are ordered +to perform. They are not called upon to consider how great may be +the losses inflicted upon the public enemy, except to make their +blows so effective as to promptly suppress all resistance to lawful +authority, and to stop the destruction of life the moment lawless +resistance has ceased. Punishment belongs not to the troops, but +to the courts of justice. + +"By command of Major-General Schofield: + "Geo. D. Ruggles, Adjutant-General." + + INSTRUCTIONS IN DEALING WITH A MOB + + "(General Orders, No. 15) + "Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, + May 25, 1894. +"The following instructions are issued for the government of +department commanders: + +"Whenever the troops may be lawfully employed, under the order of +the President, to suppress 'insurrection in any State against the +government thereof,' as provided in section 5297 of the Revised +Statutes; or to 'enforce the execution of the laws of the United +States' when 'by reason of unlawful obstructions, combinations, or +assemblages of persons' it has 'become impracticable, in the judgment +of the President, to enforce, by the ordinary course of judicial +proceedings, the laws of the United States,' as provided in section +5298 of the Revised Statutes, the troops are employed as a part of +the military power of the United States, and act under the orders +of the President, as commander-in-chief, and his military subordinates. +They cannot be directed to act under the orders of any civil officer. +The commanding officers of the troops so employed are directly +responsible to their military superiors. Any unlawful or unauthorized +act on their part would not be excusable on the ground of any order +or request received by them from a marshal or any other civil +officer. + +"By command of Major-General Schofield: + "Geo. D. Ruggles, Adjutant-General." + +It appears to have been thought in Chicago that "the request of +the United States marshal," with whom the commanding officer of +the troops had been directed to "confer," was equivalent to "orders +of the War Department," notwithstanding the order of May 25, above +quoted, strictly prohibiting any such use of the troops. Hence +the faulty disposition of the troops which was corrected when the +mob was approaching the heart of the city. Then "some of the troops +on the outskirts of the city" were withdrawn, and "in the evening +the battery and one troop of cavalry" were moved "to the Lake Front +Park, for the purpose of attacking the mob should it reach the +vicinity of the government building between Adams and Jackson sts." +And during the afternoon and night of the 5th and morning of the +6th an effective force was concentrated on the Lake Front Park, +forty-eight hours after the time when the orders from Washington +indicated that the Fort Sheridan garrison should be at that place. + + THE DUTIES OF THE MILITARY MISUNDERSTOOD + +On July 9, the day after the President had issued his proclamation, +it appeared in Chicago that "the duties of the military authorities +are now clearly defined." The President's proclamation was +"understood by the military to be in the interests of humanity," +and to concern, in some way, "the State militia," as if they had +been "called into the service" of the United States. It was "the +duty of the military forces to aid the United States marshals." +Again, "it is expected the State and municipal governments will +maintain peace and good order . . . . Should they fail or be +overpowered, the military force will assist them . . "--and this +notwithstanding the well-known law on that subject to which allusion +was made in the despatch of July 5 from the headquarters of the +army. + +The President's proclamation was strictly limited to "the purpose +of enforcing the faithful execution of the laws of the United +States, and protecting its property, and removing obstructions to +the United States mails," for which purpose the proclamation stated +"the President has employed a part of the military forces of the +United States"--not _is about to employ_, but _has employed_, under +specific orders, which were telegraphed to Colonel Martin on July +3, to do certain things which were precisely the things specified +in the proclamation of July 8, and not "to aid the United States +marshals" in doing those things or any others. Yet it was not +until July 9, six days after the order to Colonel Martin, that +those duties became "clearly defined," and then they were misunderstood +in the very essential particulars above specified. + +The lawless interruption of traffic on the Pacific roads had +continued from the latter part of April till early in July,--two +months and a half,--in spite of all the efforts to enforce the +laws, in each special case, by the ordinary course of judicial +proceedings. Yet as soon as full discretionary authority was given +to the several department commanders to act promptly as each +emergency might require, all obstruction to the operations of the +Pacific railroads rapidly disappeared. + +The ordinary course of judicial proceedings is generally far too +slow to produce satisfactory results when military force is required. +Fortunately the Constitution and laws of the United States do not +require such ineffective mixture of civil and military methods. +When the civil power ceases to be effective and the President is +required to exercise his authority as commander-in-chief of the +army, his acts become purely military, untrammeled by any civil +authority whatever. This is perhaps one of the strongest and most +valuable provisions of the Constitution and laws--one which, if +generally known, is most likely to deter the lawless from any +attempt to act in defiance of the judicial authority of the United +States. The General Order No. 15, issued at the time herein referred +to (May 25, 1894), was based upon the foregoing interpretation of +the Constitution and laws. + +Under the Constitution and existing statutes of the United States +it is not proper to use the troops, either in large or small numbers, +to "aid the United States marshals." When the civil officers, with +their civil posse, are no longer able to enforce the laws, they +stand aside, and the military power, under the orders of the +commander-in-chief, steps in and overcomes the lawless resistance +to authority. Then the civil officers resume their functions, to +make arrests of individuals, hold them in custody, and deliver them +to the courts for trial. It is not the duty of the troops in such +cases to guard prisoners who are in the custody of civil officers; +but it is the duty of the troops, if necessary, to repel by force +of arms any unlawful attempt to rescue such prisoners. This +distinction should be clearly understood by all army officers, and +it is of universal application. The duty of the army is, when so +ordered by the President, to overcome and suppress lawless resistance +to civil authority. There military duty ends, and civil officers +resume their functions. + + THE DUTIES OF THE MILITARY MISUNDERSTOOD + +The distinction between the authority of the United States and that +of the several States is so clearly defined that there can be no +possible excuse for ignorance on that subject on the part of any +officer of the army. But the relation between the civil and the +military authorities of the United States had not been clearly +defined, after the passage of the "Posse Comitatus Act," until the +order of May 25, 1894, was issued. But that can hardly excuse +continued ignorance of the law a month or more after that order +was issued; and it is worthy of note that at least one department +commander showed himself familiar with the law before the order +was issued, by correcting the mistake of a subordinate, which called +attention to the necessity of issuing some such order. + +Of course that order had the sanction of the President, after +consideration and approval by the Attorney-General, before it was +issued. + +The acts of Congress creating the Pacific railroads and making them +military roads justify and require that the government give them +military protection whenever, in the judgment of the President, +such protection is needed. It is not incumbent on the commander- +in-chief of the army of the United States to call on civil courts +and marshals to protect the military roads over which he proposes +to move his troops, whether on foot or on horseback or in cars. +It appears to have been almost forgotten that the transcontinental +railroads were built, at great expense to the national treasury, +_mainly as a military bond_ between the Atlantic States and the +Pacific States, and that this is by far their most important service, +and this explains the meaning of the language employed by the acts +of Congress creating them. + +At the time of the massacre of Chinese laborers at Rock Springs, +Wyoming, during President Cleveland's first administration, I was +ordered by the President to go to that place from Chicago and +suppress that violation of the treaty obligations between this +country and China. On my arrival at Omaha, I was informed by the +press reporters that a grand conclave at Denver that night was to +consider a proposition to order out all the train-men on the Union +Pacific Railroad the next morning, for the purpose, as I understood, +of preventing the passage of my train. I told the reporters they +might telegraph those people in Denver, but not for publication, +that I was traveling over a military road, on military duty, under +orders from the commander-in-chief of the army; that interference +with that journey would be regarded by me as an act of war, and +would be so treated. I heard no more on that subject. That +interpretation of the Pacific Railroad acts was suggested several +times, but never officially accepted until 1894. + + ORDERS OF THE PRESIDENT + +The following are in substance the orders sent on July 6 and 7, by +the President's direction, to all the department commanders in the +country traversed by the Pacific railroads, and the President's +proclamation which followed two days later, under the operation of +which traffic was resumed throughout all that vast region of country +as rapidly as trains carrying troops could be moved. No serious +opposition or resistance was offered anywhere. + + "(Telegram.) + "Headquarters of the Army, Washington, July 7, 1894. +"Brigadier-General Otis, Commanding Department of the Columbia, + Vancouver Barracks, Washington: + +"In view of the fact, as substantiated by communications received +from the Department of Justice, from military official reports, +and from other reliable sources, that by reason of unlawful +obstructions, and combinations or assemblages of persons, it has +become impracticable, in the judgment of the President, to enforce, +by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, the laws of the +United States, and to prevent obstructions of the United States +mails, and interruptions to commerce between the States, on the +line of the Northern Pacific Railroad, and to secure to the United +States the right guaranteed by section II of the act approved July +2, 1864, constituting the Northern Pacific Railroad 'a post route +and military road subject to the use of the United States for +postal, military, naval, and all other government service,' you +are directed by the President to employ the military force under +your command to remove obstructions to the mails, and to execute +any orders of the United States courts for the protection of property +in the hands of receivers appointed by such courts, and for preventing +interruption of interstate commerce, and to give such protection +to said railroad as will prevent any unlawful and forcible obstruction +to the regular and orderly operation of said road 'for postal, +military, naval, and all other government service.' + + "J. M. Schofield, Major-General Commanding." + + "(Telegram) + "Headquarters of the Army, Washington, July 7, 1894. +"Brigadier-General Otis, Commanding Department of the Columbia, + Vancouver Barracks, Washington: + +"The order of the President sent you this morning by telegraph is +the same in substance as one sent last night to General Merritt, +the purpose being to extend military protection over the entire +line of the Northern Pacific Railroad from St. Paul to Puget Sound. +In the movement of the troop-trains along the line of the road in +the execution of this order, the Department of Justice will furnish +a sufficient force of marshals to make arrests and hold prisoners +subject to the orders of the United States courts. You will please +concert with General Merritt by direct correspondence the necessary +exchanges of guards upon moving trains at the military posts in +your department and in his, nearest to each other, so that the +troops may return to their proper stations without unnecessary +delay. + + "J. M. Schofield, Major-General Commanding." + +"By the President of the United States of America. +"A Proclamation. + +"_Whereas_, by reason of unlawful obstruction, combinations, and +assemblages of persons, is has become impracticable, in the judgment +of the President, to enforce, by the ordinary course of judicial +proceedings, the laws of the United States at certain points and +places within the States of North Dakota, Montana, Idaho, Washington, +Wyoming, Colorado, and California, and the Territories of Utah and +New Mexico, and especially along the lines of such railways traversing +said States and Territories as are military roads and post routes, +and are engaged in interstate commerce and in carrying United States +mails: + +"_And whereas_, for the purpose of enforcing the faithful execution +of the laws of the United States, and protecting property belonging +to the United States or under its protection, and of preventing +obstructions of the United States mails and of commerce between +the States and Territories, and of securing to the United States +the right guaranteed by law to the use of such roads for the postal, +military, naval, and other government service, the President has +employed a part of the military forces of the United States: + +"_Now, therefore_, I, Grover Cleveland, President of the United +States, do hereby command all persons engaged in, or in any way +connected with, such unlawful obstructions, combinations, and +assemblages, to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective +abodes on or before three o'clock in the afternoon on the tenth +day of July instant. + +"_In witness whereof_, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the +seal of the United states to he hereto affixed. + +"Done at the city of Washington, this ninth day of July, in the +year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-four, and +in the independence of the United States the one hundred and +nineteenth. + + "Grover Cleveland. +"By the President: + "W. Q. Gresham, Secretary of State." + +[( 1) See the report of Attorney-General Olney, December 1, 1894, +p. 31.] + + +CHAPTER XXIX +Lessons of the Civil War--Weakness of the Military Policy at the +Outbreak of the Rebellion--A Poor Use of the Educated Soldiers of +the Army--Military Wisdom Shown by the Confederate Authorities-- +Territorial Strategy--General Military Education Indispensable to +Good Citizenship--Organization of the National Guard--General Grant +Without Military Books--Measures Necessary to the National Defense. + +In my opinion, the most important of all the lessons taught by the +Civil War is the necessity of using in the most effective manner +the means at the disposal of the government when war breaks out. +The necessity for adequate preparation is a different question, +which has been much discussed, and in regard to which some progress +has been made toward a satisfactory solution. Whatever the outcome +may be in respect to preparation for war, certainly the government +and the people ought to adopt such a policy as will lead to the +best practicable use of the preparations which have actually been +made. + +In this respect the policy adopted by the National Government in +1861 was about as weak as possible, while that of the Confederates +was comparatively strong. It is said that this weak policy was +due largely to General Scott, and grew out of his distrust of +volunteer troops; he having thought it necessary to have a considerable +body of regular troops to give steadiness and confidence to the +volunteers or militia. This is a very good theory, no doubt, +providing the regulars could be provided in advance in such numbers +as to produce the desired effect. But if that theory had been +relied upon in 1861, the "Confederate States" would have established +their independence long before the regular army could be organized +and made effective. What was demanded by the necessities of the +country in 1861 was the best large army that could be made in the +shortest possible time, not a better small army to be made in a +much longer time. + +The United States government actually had in hand the means of +creating in a very short time a far larger efficient army than the +South could possibly have raised in the same time. This means had +been provided, with great care and at great expense, through a long +term of years, by the education of young men at the Military Academy, +and their practical training in the small regular army in all kinds +of actual service, including one foreign war and almost constant +campaigns against the Indians. Nowhere in the world could have +been found a better corps of officers to organize, instruct, and +discipline new troops. Yet those officers were hardly employed at +all in that service at first, when it was of supreme importance. +Some time later, when the necessity was not so great, a few officers +of the army were permitted to accept commands in the volunteers. +Even then it often required great "influence" to secure such +"indulgences." Scores of young officers, qualified in every way +to do such service in the first six months of the war, sought in +vain for opportunities to render the valuable services for which +the government had educated them, and were compelled to drag along +four years in the discharge of duties several grades below their +qualifications. + + WEAKNESS OF THE MILITARY POLICY + +In the regular army in 1861 there were, exclusive of those who went +South, at least 600 officers who, after graduating at West Point, +had served several years with their regiments, and were well +qualified to drill a regiment and command it in battle. A large +proportion of them were fitted to command brigades, and some of +them divisions, and even army corps. The three years' volunteers +first called out could have been fully supplied with brigade, +division, and corps commanders from graduates of West Point who +were thoroughly qualified by theoretical education and established +character, and many of them by practical experience in the Mexican +war and Indian campaigns, for the instruction, discipline, and +command of troops, still leaving a sufficient number with the +regulars for efficient service. The old sergeants of the army in +1861 were relatively competent company commanders. One commissioned +officer to four companies of these veteran Indian-fighters made as +reliable a battalion as any general could wish for in the conditions +then existing. + +Experience demonstrated that a volunteer regiment could in a very +few weeks be converted into an efficient and thoroughly reliable +force in battle by a single young officer of the regular army. In +other words, by a judicious use of the small body of officers whom +the country had educated at so great an expense, a fine army of +500,000 men, or more, could have been called into service, organizied, +disciplined, and put into the field by August 1, 1861; and that +without interfering in any way with the three months' militia called +out to meet the first emergency, which militia ought, of course, +to have acted strictly on the defensive until the more permanent +force could take the field. In a few months more, certainly by +the spring of 1862, the instruction, discipline, and field experience +of the first levy would have given good officers enough to organize +and command a million more men. It required, in short, only a wise +use of the national resources to overwhelm the South before the +spring of 1863. + +The supply of arms, it is true, was deplorably deficient in 1861. +But the South was only a little better off than the North in that +regard. Besides, the National Government had command of all the +markets of the world, and of the means of ocean transportation. +It could have bought at once all the available arms everywhere, +and thus fully equipped its own troops, while preventing the South +from doing the same. Hence the excuse given at the time--namely, +want of muskets--was no excuse whatever for delay in the organization +of armies. + +The rebellion made some progress at first, and offered effective +resistance for a long time, simply because the Southern authorities +manifested greater military wisdom than the Northern. The difference +in preparations and in military training in advance was quite +insignificant. The North had many more educated and competent +military men than the South. The difference was that the South +used the few they had to the best advantage, while the North so +used only a very few of their many. + +The lesson next in importance taught by our experience is the +necessity of general military education in a country having popular +government. No man can be fully qualified for the duties of a +statesman until he has made a thorough study of the science of war +in its broadest sense. He need not go to a military school, much +less serve in the army or in the militia. But unless he makes +himself thoroughly acquainted with the methods and conditions +requisite to success in war, he is liable to do almost infinite +damage to his country. For instance, the very first success of +the Union armies--the capture of Fort Donelson--was quickly followed +by a proclamation of thanksgiving and an order to stop recruiting. +That one act of "statesmanship" cost the country untold millions +of dollars and many thousands of lives. It was necessary only to +take the ordinary military advantage of the popular enthusiasm +throughout the country after Grant's first victory to have made +the Union armies absolutely irresistible by any force the South +could raise and arm at that time. + + A POOR USE OF THE EDUCATED SOLDIERS OF THE ARMY + +There has been much irrelevant discussion about the ability or +inability of commanders in the North and South. The fact is that +political instead of military ideas controlled in a very large +degree the selection of commanders in the Union armies; while for +three whole years the authorities in Washington could not see the +necessity of unity of action in all the armies under one military +leader. It required three years of costly experience to teach the +government that simple lesson, taught in the military text-books! +As experience finally proved, there was no lack of men capable of +leading even large armies to victory; but, with few exceptions, +they were not put in command until many others had been tried. +Information as to military fitness was not sought from military +sources. If a lawyer is wanted for the supreme bench, or an engineer +to construct a great bridge, information is sought from the best +men of the profession concerned; but the opinions of politicians +were thought sufficient in determining the selection of major- +generals! + +Again, the policy of the government required the capture and +occupation of all the important seaports and other places in the +South, and the permanent occupation and protection of all the +territory gained in military operations. Until near the close of +the war, neither the public nor the government seemed to have the +remotest conception of the fundamental fact that Confederate armies, +wherever they might go, instead of places and States, were the only +real objectives. Even some of the best Union generals were +constrained to act upon this popular heresy, contrary to their own +sound military judgment and education. Yet while this erroneous +"territorial" strategy was insisted on, no adequate conception was +formed of the vastly greater force required to hold all the territory +gained, and to push aggressive operations still further into the +heart of the South. Very rarely indeed were the Union armies large +enough, until near the end of the war, to assure success. The end +finally came through a long succession of desperate battles between +forces so nearly equal that decisive victory was impossible until +the weaker side finally became exhausted. Thus the aggregate loss +in men as well as in money was vastly greater than it would have +been if the Union had put forth its full strength and ended the +rebellion in two years instead of four. + +It is true that some of the worst of these "blind guides" were men +supposed to have a very high military education. But if sound +military education had been at all general in the country, statesmen +would have known by what standard to judge of any one man's fitness +for high command. + +It is true that no amount of military education can supply the +place of military genius or create a great commander. It may +possibly happen at any time that there may not be among all the +living graduates of West Point one Grant or Sherman or Sheridan, +or one Lee or Johnston or Jackson. So much greater the need of a +well-educated staff and a well-disciplined army. Nobody is wise +enough to predict who will prove best able to command a great army. +But it is the easiest thing in the world to tell who can best create +such an army and command its subdivisions, and this is the work to +be done instantly upon the outbreak of war. The selection of +commanders for the several armies, and, above all, of a general-in- +chief, must of course be the most difficult; for it is not probable +that any man young enough will have had any experience in such +commands in this country. But even this difficulty will disappear +in a very great measure if statesmen will make the study of the +art and science of war, instead of far less important subjects, a +part of their pastime. They will thus acquire the ability to judge, +from personal acquaintance with military men and conversation with +other best informed, of the relative fitness of officers for the +highest commands. + + GENERAL MILITARY EDUCATION INDISPENSABLE + +There is no possible remedy for such evils as this country has +suffered except general military education. In my opinion, no man +is fit for a seat in Congress unless he has had such an education. +The first thing he ought to learn is the old and trite military +maxim that the only was to carry on war economically is to make it +"short, sharp, and decisive." To dole out military appropriations +in driblets is to invite disaster and ultimate bankruptcy. So it +is in respect to the necessary preparations for war in time of +peace. No man is wise enough to tell when war will come. Preparations +are made upon the theory that it may come at any time. If a hundred +millions are necessary for adequate preparation for defense, and +you have spent only fifty when war comes, you might as well have +thrown your fifty millions into the sea. There is no such thing +as partial defense in modern war. If there are weak points in your +defense, your enemy is sure to find them. Indeed, he knows about +them all the time, and will strike them at once. Then your whole +costly system will be worthless. + +What would be thought of the business capacity of a man who would +not insure his house or his store or his stock of goods against +fire because he did not happen to have money enough in bank to pay +the premium, but would have to borrow it at three per cent.? Or +of a man who would wait until he had realized the expected profit +on a commercial venture before insuring the goods? If preparation +for defense is the policy of a country, it would be little short +of blindness to delay it on account of a temporary deficiency in +the current revenue. + +All now admit that universal education is an indispensable requisite +to fitness for universal suffrage. The most serious questions upon +which a free people can be called to vote are: A question of war, +a question of preparation for war, and a question of approval and +support, or disapproval and condemnation, of an administration on +account of the mode in which war has been conducted. Can this +highest duty of the citizen be intelligently performed without +military education? A sovereign _individual_ regards this as +demanding the highest education and the ablest counsel he can +possibly obtain. Can sovereign _millions_ do it wisely without +any education whatever? I believe no proposition could possibly +be plainer than that general military education is indispensable +to good citizenship in this country, and especially to all who may +be intrusted with high responsibilities in the legislative and +executive departments of the National Government. What would be +thought of a general of the army who tried to shield himself from +censure or punishment behind his ignorance of the law? Can a +legislator be excused because he knows nothing of the art and +science of war? If there is any one offense in this country which +ought never, under any circumstances, to be pardoned, it is ignorance +in those who are trusted by the people to manage the affairs of +their government. As in the military, so in the civil departments +of government, there a few greater crimes than that of seeking and +assuming the responsibilities of an office for which the man himself +knows he is not fit. It is nearly as great as that committed by +the appointing power under similar circumstances. + + GENERAL MILITARY EDUCATION INDISPENSABLE + +A system of general military education should of course include +elementary training in all the schools, public and private, so that +every boy, before he is sixteen years old, would know how to use +the rifled musket in ranks, and be familiar with the simple evolutions +of a company and battalion. Young men never forget such training +received when they are boys. The country would have in a few years +several millions of fairly well-trained young soldiers, requiring +only competent officers and a few days drill in regimental tactics +to make a reliable army for any service this country will probably +ever require of her volunteer soldiery. If it were a question of +the invasion of a foreign country against a modern veteran army, +the case would be different. But for defense against any possible +landing of a hostile army on our shores, our available force ought +to be so overwhelming in numbers as to far more than compensate +for lack of experience. Yet it must not be forgotten that some +training is _indispensable_. No possible advantage in numbers can +overcome the disadvantage resulting from total ignorance of tactics +and of the use of the modern long-range rifle. Good parents who +apprehend evil effects from giving their boys military training +ought to reflect that the boys will go, all the same, whether +trained or not, when the country is threatened with invasion. +Then, if ignorant, the will simply be doomed to fall the victims +of skilled marksmen to whose shots they know not how to reply. +Possibly the most cruel fate which American parents could prepare +for their sons would be to keep them in ignorance of the highest +duty their country may call upon them to perform, so that, unable +to offer and effective resistance to invasion, they could only die +in a hopeless effort to do their duty as citizen soldiers and +patriots--or, worse, live only to be driven in disgrace from a +field which a little education would have enabled them gloriously +to win. + +There should be, under State authority, a general enrolment and +organization of all the young men who have received military +training, and places of rendezvous fixed at convenient centers at +or near railway-stations. Officers of all grades up to that of +colonel should be appointed in advance, and occasional musters held +under State laws, even if military exercises were not attempted. + +Our colleges and high schools, besides the military academies of +the country, are even now educating a fair percentage of young men +to be officers of such an organization of enrolled regiments as +that here suggested. This percentage could easily be increased in +accordance with the demand. Besides, the retired men of the +regiments of the National Guard in the several States might furnish +some officers for the enrolled militia. But those well-trained +and fully equipped regiments would be required to move with full +ranks at once to the place of danger. Hence their active members +would not be available in the great expansion of the army in the +first period of war. The organization of the first reserve must, +for this reason, be entirely independent of the National Guard. + +A great and very important advance has already been made in bringing +the regular army into close relations with the National Guard of +the several States, and in the employment of regular officers in +disseminating military education, both theoretical and practical, +throughout the country. These are among the most valuable services +the regular army can render in time of peace, and they should be +extended, if practicable, still further. Especially in the State +artillery, which must soon be organized for war service in the new +fortifications, instruction by regular officers will be indispensable, +and this can best be given in conjunction with the regular garrisons, +the same as in war service. It would also be well to perfect an +arrangement by which the new infantry regiments, when first taking +the field upon the breaking out of war, might be accompanied by +small bodies of regulars, to lead the way and indicate by example +what is to be done. Experience has shown that under such example +the rawest volunteers will be almost as stanch in battle as the +regulars themselves. The beneficial effect upon new troops of the +example of men who have before been in battle is very great. Hence +it is that old regiments should always be kept full by the addition +of recruits, rather than that the casualties of service be replaced +by new regiments. + + ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD + +What constitutes valuable education, military no less than civil, +is often greatly misunderstood. Elementary education and practical +training are indispensable to everybody, while higher education +may be rather injurious than beneficial, unless it is so regulated +as to elevate the reasoning faculties and independence of thought, +rather than mere acquisition of knowledge. Some notable examples +of this have appeared in the military annals of this country, and +no doubt in the civil also. Men who had become famous military +scholars were total failures in war, not only as commanders in the +field, for which no amount of theoretical education alone can +qualify a man, but also as military advisers. This was apparently +because their elaborate studies had made them mere imitators or +copyists. Whatever originality of thought or power of invention +they ever possessed had ceased to exist from disuse. They could +plan and direct a campaign with absolute accuracy, according to +the teachings of the great masters, for the well-defined purpose +upon which those teachings had been based. But when a wholly new +problem was presented to them, they had no conception of the right +mode of solving it. The plan of one great campaign was based +absolutely upon the best-approved method of capturing a certain +place, without any reference to what damage might or might not be +done to the opposing army in that operation. The plan of another +great campaign had for its sole object the conquest and permanent +occupation of a great territory, and was so conducted as to avoid +the possibility of seriously hurting the enemy in that operation. +Yet the theory upon which this last plan was based, as well as the +first, governed the policy of the government more than two years. + + GENERAL GRANT WITHOUT MILITARY BOOKS + +It was not until Grant took command of "all the armies" that the +true strategic principle governed the general military policy. In +this connection, the story told by Grant himself about his military +studies is very instructive. When asked by the representative of +some friends who wished to present him a library for his new house +in Washington, what military books he then had, so that they might +not duplicate them, he replied that he did not have any military +books, and never had any, except the West-Point text-books. No +doubt Grant might have profited from some additional study, but +none at all was far better than so much as to have dwarfed his mind +into that of an imitator of former commanders. + +The development of great military ability in Grant, as the result +of his own experience and independent thought,--that is, the +independent development of his own native military genius,--is by +far the most interesting part of his history. + +In short, the great lesson taught by our own experience is that +elementary military training should be universal, because every +young man may be called upon the perform the duties of a soldier; +that general military reading, and habits of independent thought +upon all great military subjects, should be cultivated by all who +aspire to any high place in life, because they may be called upon +to discharge the highest possible duties of good citizens in peace +or in war, namely, those connected with the national defense; that +due preparation for defense ought to be made without delay, and +the requisite means kept always ready; and, above all, that the +best method of making the quickest possible effective use of those +means ought to be fully matured and understood by all who may be +called upon to execute the orders of the government. + +It now seems to me amazing that the affairs of an enlightened nation +could have been so badly managed as to leave the secession issue +in doubt almost to the last moment of a four years' contest, as it +is now well known it was. Probably the one saving fact in all +those years was that the young soldiers of the republic--and they +were nearly all young then--knew little and cared less about the +wrangling of self-seeking politicians and visionary doctrinaires +in the rear, but fought steadily on to the end, never doubting for +a moment the final triumph. I have never been able to recall a +single instance of doubt manifested by any soldier in the field, +though I did know a very few cases of officers of considerable +rank, who thought they ought to have had more rank, who went to +the rear and said something about failure in the field. + +I believe now that it required only some _real_ emergency, such, +for instance, as the capture of Washington in July, 1863, to call +forth the power of the North and crush the rebellion in six months. +If any man thinks a great disaster would have disheartened the +North, he knows nothing of the people of our country. It was the +slow waste of enormous resources and of latent military strength +that at length made many even of the stoutest hearts begin to feel +despondent. I do not believe there was any time when the people +would not have responded with unanimity and enthusiasm to an appeal +to put forth all their strength and end the rebellion at a single +blow. + +The one lesson of reason and experience that I would impress upon +my countrymen in every possible way is, when war or insurrection +comes or is threatened, do not trifle with it. Do not invoke +judicial proceedings, or call for 75,000 men; but call for _men_, +and let them come as many as will! If some of them do not get +there in time, before it is all over, it will not cost much to send +them home again! The services of the Pennsylvania reserve, though +ready for the field, were actually, positively refused until after +the disaster of Bull Run! The greatest wonder in the history of +this wonderful republic is that the government actually survived +such a military policy as that! + +In this connection, it ought to be distinctly understood that the +great object of education at West Point and other military schools +in not to make high commanders, but to make thorough soldiers, men +capable of creating effective armies in the shortest possible time, +and of commanding comparatively small bodies of men. If great +commanders are ever again required in this country, they will come +to the front in due time. They cannot be selected in advance of +the actual trial in war. Even West Point, though one of the best +schools in the world, can at the most only lay the foundation of +a military education. Each individual must build for himself upon +that foundation the superstructure which is to mark his place in +the world. If he does not build, his monument will hardly appear +above the surface of the ground, and will soon be covered out of +sight. + +It is of vital importance that the necessity of providing for +calling into active service a very large army in the shortest +possible time be fully understood. It is assumed that every +important seaport will in time be so fortified as to be safe against +any _unsupported_ naval attack. Modern science has rendered this +easy and certain. Hence a naval attack must necessarily be supported +by the landing of a military force upon the open coast, to attack +the land defenses in reverse; and such defenses are now far more +vulnerable to attack in rear than those of former times. + + MEASURES NECESSARY TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE + +The sea-coasts of the United States are many thousand miles in +extent, and an attack may be made at any one or several of the many +important seaports in these long lines of coast. No one can +anticipate where the blow or blows may fall. Hence it is necessary +to be prepared to resist an attempt to land at any one of those +many points which are of such importance as to tempt an enemy to +attack them. The railroad facilities of the country are such that +the necessary armies can be moved to all exposed points in time to +meet any emergency. But the armies must be ready to move almost +at a moment's notice. There will be no time to organize, much less +to drill, new troops. Before that could be done, any one or two +or three of our largest seaport cities could be captured and +destroyed, and the invading forces get back again on their transports, +and under the protection of the guns of their own fleet. And even +if we had a navy more powerful than that of our enemy, it alone +could give us no adequate protection; for the enemy would be sure +to select a point of attack where our navy was not at the time, +and which it could not reach until too late. Indispensable as a +navy is to this country, it cannot act any very important part in +the defense of so extended a sea-coast unless it is many times more +powerful than any fleet which an enemy may send to attack us. The +enemy being free to choose his point of attack, we would required +at or near every one of the exposed points a fleet at least as +large as his, or in the aggregate at least five times as large. +No one, it is presumed, contemplates the creation of any such navy +as that in this country. + +Indeed, it would be the height of folly to require the navy to take +part in the defense. In a country having the situation of the +United States, the navy is the _aggressive_ arm of the national +military power. Its function is to punish an enemy until he is +willing to submit to the national demands. For this purpose entire +freedom of action is essential; also secure depots where supplies +may be drawn and where necessary repairs may be made, and harbors +where cruisers or other vessels may seek safety if temporarily +overpowered. Hence arises one of the most important functions of +the land defense: To give the aggressive arm secure bases of +operation at all the great seaports where navy-yards or depots are +located. It may be that in special cases military forces may be +needed to act in support of naval operations, or to hold for a time +important points in a foreign country; but such service must be +only auxiliary, not a primary object. Foreign conquest and permanent +occupation are not a part of the policy of this country. There is +no division of opinion among standard naval and military authorities +on this great subject; such standard authors as Rear-Admiral Walker +and Captain Mahan have clearly set forth the relative functions of +the army and navy in enforcing the military policy of the United +States. The military problem which this country must solve is to +provide such means of aggressive and defensive action as to be able +to enforce a due observance of American public law on this continent, +and, while doing this, to defend itself against insult and spoilation. +The land defenses, including torpedoes and in a few cases floating +batteries, should be entirely independent of the active navy, so +that the latter may be free to act in one compact mass against any +enemy which may anywhere oppose it. + +There will be another important necessity for very large forces of +infantry and light artillery,--that is, large in the aggregate,-- +in the event of war with even a second- or third-class naval power: +To protect our long lines of open coast and small unfortified +harbors from destruction from the guns and landing-parties of the +enemy's light-draft cruisers. This would require a "picket-line" +with considerable "reserves," several thousand miles in length. +The national pride, if not the material interests involved, would +not permit the government to submit to such destruction or spoilation +without making every possible effort to prevent it. In short, +unless the government and the people of the United States are +willing to prepare in advance for putting into the field at a +moment's notice a very large and effective army, as well as to +fortify all important seaports, they may as well make up their +minds to submit, at least for a time, to whatever indignity any +considerable naval power may see fit to inflict upon them. No half- +way measures will do any good. Fortifications without an army +would be worth no more, against any country having a considerable +army and navy, than an army without fortifications. + + +CHAPTER XXX +The Financial Lesson of the Civil War--Approaching Bankruptcy of +the Government near the Close of the War--The Legal-Tender Notes +an Injury to the Public Credit--A Vicious Clause in the Constitution +--No Prejudice in the Army Against Officers Not Educated at West +Point--The Need of a Law Reforming the Relations Between the +President and the Commander of the Army--Devotion to the Chosen +Leader in Times of Public Peril. + +Another great lesson taught by our Civil War, perhaps even more +important than any other, is the financial lesson. An established +government which has a place to maintain among the commercial +nations of the world must maintain its credit. It must purchase +its supplies and munitions of war and pay its troops in _money_. +In a great and prolonged war it is not possible for the people to +contribute all the means required at the time. The amount of +taxation would be greater than any people could bear. Hence the +government must borrow the necessary money. This cannot be done +without national credit. If credit declines, rates of interest +and discount on securities increase until the national debt reaches +its limit and no more money can be borrowed. In short, the nation +becomes bankrupt. This was the condition of the United States +before the close of the late Civil War. With a million of men on +the muster- and pay-rolls, including several great armies of veteran +troops in the field, while the Confederate army was reduced to a +very small fraction of that number, the Union cause was on the very +verge of failure, because the government could no longer raise +money to pay its troops, purchase supplies, or make any further +use of its magnificent armies. This astounding fact was confided +to the generals of the army in the winter of 1864-5 by the Secretary +of War, who then said the rebellion must be suppressed in the coming +spring campaign, or the effort abandoned, because the resources of +the treasury were exhausted. In corroboration of my recollection +of this subject, I now find the following in a private letter +written by me at that time: + + "Washington, February 3, 1865. +"There is much excitement here over the peace rumors, and it would +seem there must be good foundation for it. The President has +actually gone to Fort Monroe to meet the rebel commissioners. I +do not, however, indulge much faith in the result of these +negotiations. We will probably have to beat Lee's army before we +can have peace. There is much commotion among politicians, and +there will be a storm of some kind on the political sea if peace +is made now. On the other hand, if the war continues long, the +treasury will most likely become bankrupt. It has got far behind +already. There is no money to pay the army, and no one can tell +where it is to come from. I have succeeded in getting enough to +pay my troops, which was obtained by special arrangement with the +treasury, and as a special reward for their distinguished services. +No other troops in the country have been paid for five months, and +there is no money to pay them." + +The reasons for the deplorable condition of the United States +treasury are understood by all financiers. Yet a very large +proportion of the voting population do not appear to understand +it, or do not know the fact. People engaged in an effort to throw +off their dependency or political connection, and establish their +own independence, or a country defending itself against a powerful +adversary, may be compelled to resort to forced loans, in the +absence of national credit, to carry on the war. But in a great +country with unlimited resources, like the United States, resort +to forced loans would seem to be entirely unnecessary. However +this may be, and whatever may be the necessity in any case, a forced +loan, _without interest_, is simple robbery to the extent of unpaid +interest, even if the principal is paid. And a robber cannot expect +to have much credit left after his character becomes known to the +world. + + THE FINANCIAL LESSON OF THE CIVIL WAR + +The issue of legal-tender notes during the Civil War was of this +character. The country received a deadly blow to its financial +credit when that policy was adopted. Nations or peoples cannot, +any more than individuals, violate the established rules of honest +dealing without suffering the just penalty. If money is needed +beyond current revenues, there is no other honest way to get it +but by borrowing it at such rate of interest and upon such security +as can be agreed upon. Besides, to leave any room for doubt or +cavil about the conditions of a loan, or about the standard of +money in which principal and interest are to be paid, necessarily +arouses suspicion of bad faith, and hence destroys or seriously +injures national credit. It is now perfectly well known to all +who have taken the pains to study the subject that this false and +practically dishonest policy, however innocently it may have been +conceived, cost the United States many hundreds of millions of +dollars, and came very near bringing disaster upon the Union cause. +One of the most astounding spectacles ever presented in the history +of the world was that presented by this country. It went into the +war practically free from debt, and come out of it with a debt +which seemed very large, to be sure, and was in fact nearly twice +as large as it ought to have been, yet so small in comparison with +the country's resources that it could be paid off in a few years. +It went into the war practically without an army, and came out of +the war with its military strength not even yet fully developed. +It had more than a million of men, nearly all veterans, in the +ranks, and could have raised a million more, if necessary, without +seriously interfering with the industries of the country. Yet in +four short years a false financial policy destroyed the national +credit, brought its treasury to bankruptcy, and thus reduced a +great people to a condition in which they could no longer make any +use of their enormous military strength! This lesson ought to be +taught in every school-house in the United States, until every +child is made to understand that there is no such thing in the +world as paper money; that the only real money in the world is +standard gold and silver; that paper can be used in the place of +money only when it represents the real gold or silver in which it +can at any time be redeemed; that even gold and silver can be used +together as standard money only under the real intrinsic values as +recognized by all the world; that any attempt to force either gold +or silver into unlimited circulation, under any arbitrary ratio +different from their real ratio, is not honest; and that dishonesty +is the worst of all financial policies, as well as the most unworthy +of a civilized people. + +The laws of finance, like the laws of military strategy, were never +invented by anybody, any more than the law of gravitation or the +law of electrical attraction and repulsion. They have all been +learned by the experience and study of mankind since the dawn of +civilization. All alike are parts of the great laws of nature. +They should be carefully and diligently studied and taught in all +the schools, until the rising generation understand that all the +affairs of mankind are governed by the uniform laws established by +the great Creator and Ruler of the universe; and that self-appointed +"leaders of the people" who would entice them to follow their own +inventions cannot save them from the penalties which naturally +follow the violation of any of the laws of the universe. In short, +education,--wisely directed education,--both in science and in +morals, is the one indispensable foundation of good popular +government. The relative importance to be attached to the many +branches of popular education demands the careful consideration of +all educators, and still more the _purity_ of the doctrines taught +in all the schools. There is good reason for believe that this +last duty has been much neglected, especially in respect to financial +theories. + + A VICIOUS CLAUSE IN THE CONSTITUTION + +In this connection, it is worthy of serious consideration whether +one of the teachings of a corrupt age has not found its way into +that almost sacred writing, the Constitution of the United States. +What right has Congress, or any other department of government, or +any government on earth, to "regulate the value" of money, any more +than that of wheat or corn? Is not the real value of money, like +that of everything else, regulated by the general law of supply +and demand throughout the world? Ought not the value of money, +and what shall constitute money, be left, without governmental +interference, to be determined by the common consent of mankind? +Must not commercial intercourse among all the countries of the +world necessarily regulate all this, in spite of the decrees of +government? Ought not the function of government in this regard +to be limited to the coining of money and stamping on its face its +real value--that is, in effect, the amount of gold or silver it +actually contains? In short, is not the attempt of government to +make a certain weight of one thing equal to a certain weight of +another thing a plain violation of a natural law, and hence +necessarily vicious? Is not all our serious monetary controversy +in this country the result of vicious teaching to be found in our +own Constitution, inherited from a corrupt age, when the fiat of +a prince was thought sufficient to make a coin worth more than it +was in fact? Where did so many of the people of the United States +learn the heretical doctrine of fiat money? Is it not taught in +the Constitution of the United States? It so seems to me, and +hence it seems to me that the people should at once strike at the +very root of the evil, and eradicate from their fundamental law +the theory that the value of anything can be regulated by arbitrary +fiat, in violation of natural law. Let the people restore to +themselves their inalienable right to liberty of trade, so that +they can deal with each other in gold, or in silver, or in cotton, +or in corn, as they please, and pay in what they have agreed to +pay in, without impertinent interference from legislators or anybody +else. Then, and only then, can the monetary system of this country +be placed on a sound foundation, and all the gold or silver of our +mines, as well as all the other products of human industry, and +the people who produce or own them, become truly free. + +Another important lesson taught by our experience since the Civil +War, no less than at the commencement of that period, is that prompt +and vigorous action, in accordance with established military methods, +whenever military force must be employed, necessarily presupposes +such knowledge of the laws on the part of department and army +commanders as will justify the President in intrusting them with +discretionary authority to act without specific orders in each +case. Such emergencies as that of 1894, for example, give striking +proof of the necessity for the higher education to fit men for high +command in the army. It is not mainly a question of _military_ +education. Early deficiencies in that respect may soon be overcome +by the constant practice afforded by active service. The indispensable +necessity is for _education in general_, and especially in those +things which army officers are not habitually required to know, +but which are of vital importance to those who must, in great +emergencies, by intrusted with great responsibilities and with +discretionary authority. That very emergency of 1894 gave examples +of officers, not educated at West Point nor at any other military +school, distinguished for gallant and efficient military service +in the field, who proved to be perfectly familiar with the principles +of constitutional and military law which ought to govern the action +of troops under circumstances like those of 1894; while others, +distinguished as commanders in the field, seemed strangely ignorant +of both constitutional and military laws. It is also worthy of +remark that such necessary legal education did not appear to be +universal among the West Point graduates at that time. Some men +who are not graduates of West Point are much better qualified for +high command than some who are. + + OFFICERS NOT EDUCATED AT WEST POINT + +Much has been said about a supposed prejudice in the army against +officers who have not enjoyed the advantages of education at the +military academy. I aver, emphatically that I have never seen any +evidence of any such feeling, and I do not believe it has ever +existed to any appreciable extent. On the contrary, the general +feeling has been that of just and generous consideration for officers +who were at first laboring under that disadvantage. Some of the +most popular men in the army have been among those appointed from +civil life or from the volunteers. General Alfred H. Terry was a +fair example of this. He was a ripe scholar, a thorough lawyer, +a very laborious student of the art and science of war,--more so +than most West Point graduates,--and so modest that he hesitated +to accept the appointment of brigadier-general in the regular army, +although it had been given for so distinguished a service as the +capture of Fort Fisher, on the ground that older officers who had +devoted their whole lives to the military service were better +entitled to it. + +The general feeling in the army has no special reference to West +Point. It is a feeling, and a very strong one, in favor of +_education_, of qualification in all respects for the service which +may be required, and of that dignified self-respect and becoming +modesty which prevent an officer from desiring a position for +which he is not fully qualified, and, above all, that manly delicacy +which makes it impossible for an officer to _seek_ a position which +ought to be left to _seek him_. As well might a maiden ask a man +to marry her, or get some one else to do it for her, as a soldier +to seek in the same way a position on the staff of a general or of +the President. + +This is especially true in respect to the position of the "commanding +general," or general-in-chief, of the army. The President being, +by the Constitution, commander-in-chief of the army and navy, no +law of Congress, even with his own consent, could relieve him from +that responsibility. There is no law, and there could not +constitutionally be any law passed, establishing any such office +as that of commanding general of the army, and defining the duties +and authority attached to it. Such a law would be a clear encroachment +upon the constitutional prerogatives of the President. The only +constitutional relation in which the so-called "commanding general," +or "general-in-chief," of the army can occupy is that usually called +"chief of staff"--the chief military adviser and executive officer +of the commander-in-chief. He cannot exercise any command whatever +independently of the President, and the latter must of necessity +define and limit his duties. No other authority can possibly do +it. In this regard the President's power and discretion are limited +only by his constitutional obligation to exercise the chief command +himself. He can give his general-in-chief as much authority as he +pleases consistently with that obligation. Hence it is entirely +in the discretion of the President to define and fix the relations +which should exist between the general and the Secretary of War-- +a very difficult thing to do, no doubt,--at least one which seems +never to have been satisfactorily done by any President. The +Secretary and the general appear to have been left to arrange that +as best they could, or to leave it unarranged. However this may +be, the relations of the general to the President are, or ought to +be, of the most confidential character, no less so than those of +any member of the cabinet. And the necessity of that confidential +relation is far more important than in the case of any cabinet +officer, for the reason that it is brought into prominence in times +of great emergency, when questions of peace and war are involved, +and when the President is required to act upon momentous military +operations about which he cannot, in general, have much knowledge, +and hence must trust to the ability, judgment, discretion, and +scientific military knowledge of the general-in-chief. In such +cases the general becomes, as it were, the "keeper of the President's +conscience" in respect to the most momentous questions he can ever +have to decide. + + THE PRESIDENT AND THE COMMANDER OF THE ARMY + +It is necessarily extremely embarrassing to the President to be +compelled to place or retain in that close, confidential, and +important relation to himself an officer in whom he has not entire +confidence in all respects; or else, as the only alternative, by +selecting another, to cast a reflection upon the senior in rank, +whose soldierly character and services may have entitled him to +the highest distinction. The situation is no less embarrassing, +under the existing law and custom, to the officer who may at any +time happen to be the senior in commission. He may be compelled +to submit to the humiliation of being superseded by some junior in +rank, or else to occupy a confidential position of great importance +in the absence of that confidence which is necessary to make such +a position even tolerable to himself or to the army, which must +inevitably be deprived of his legitimate influence for good if he +does not enjoy the confidence of the President and the Secretary +of War. There can be no relief from this dilemma, so embarrassing +to both the President and the general, except by appropriate +legislation. + +The most important military reform now required in this country is +a law authorizing the President, "by and with the advice and consent +of the Senate," to appoint, not a commander of the army, but a +"general-in-chief," or "chief of staff," to aid him (the commander- +in-chief) in the discharge of his military duties. The President +ought to have the power to retire such officer at any time, with +due regard for his rank and service, and to appoint another in the +same manner. The title "commanding general of the army" is +inappropriate and misleading. There never has been any such office +in this country, except that created especially for General Grant +in 1864. The old title of "general-in-chief," given to the officer +at the head of the army before the Civil War, is the appropriate +title in this country. That officer is, in fact, the chief general, +but does not command the army. + +If it be considered the best policy to reserve the two highest +military grades,--those of general and lieutenant-general,--to be +conferred only by special act of Congress for distinguished services, +appropriate distinction may be given to the officer at the head of +the army at any time by the title of general-in-chief, with such +additional compensation as is necessary to defray his living expenses +in Washington. Neither the rank nor the pay of an officer in a +subordinate position can possibly be regarded as appropriate to +one in a higher grade of duty. Every grade of public service should +have an officer of appropriate rank and compensation, certainly +the highest in any department even more than any other. The +government of this country has not been duly regardful even of its +own dignity and self-respect, in denying to its chief military +officer appropriate rank, and in requiring him to expend all the +savings of a lifetime to maintain his official position for a few +years at the seat of government. + + THE PRESIDENT AND THE COMMANDER OF THE ARMY + +Not by any means the least benefit to be expected from a law +authorizing each President to select his chief general, would be +the education thus given to officers of the army in respect to the +relation in which they stand to the commander-in-chief, and in +respect to the reasonable limits of military ambition in a republic +where the President is and must be commander-in-chief, whether he +is a man of military education and experience or not. + +So strongly were those views impressed upon my mind by my studies +of the subject, made at the request of General Grant and General +Sherman many years ago, that when I became the senior officer of +the army I refrained scrupulously from suggesting to the President +or the Secretary of War or anybody else that I had any expectation +of being assigned to the command, or regarded myself as having any +claim to it. It seemed to me solely a question for the President +himself to decide whether or not he wanted me as his chief military +adviser and assistant, and it would have been impossible for me to +consent that anybody should try to influence his decision in my +favor. + +The duties of patriotic citizenship in time of war have not always +been duly appreciated, even by those most zealous in their loyalty +to the government. I would not detract one iota from the honor +and fame of the wise, brave, and patriotic statesmen who upheld +the hands of the great Lincoln in his struggle against the avowed +foes of the Union, and his still harder struggle with professed +patriots who wielded national influence only for evil, though under +the guise of friends of the Union. But if many thousands of those +zealous and "truly loyal Union men," many of whom I knew, could +have managed in some way to get into the ranks and get killed in +battle in the first year, I firmly believe the Union would have +been restored much sooner than it was. + +When the people have chosen their chief to lead them through the +fierce storms of civil war, he alone must guide the ship, or else +all must perish. After the storm has burst upon them it is too +late to select another pilot. Then partizan opposition, impairing +the popular strength and confidence of the leader and embarrassing +his military operations or public policy, becomes treason, and a +far more dangerous treason than any which the open sympathizers +with the public enemy could possibly commit. Those powerful leaders +of public opinion who hounded Lincoln on to measures which his far +greater wisdom and his supreme sense of responsibility told him +were unwise, deserved to be hanged, or at least to be imprisoned +until the war was over. That some of them died in shame and disgrace +upon the failure of their own selfish schemes for personal or +political aggrandizement, was only a mild measure of righteous +retribution. + +In the calm atmosphere of these later years I still think that the +course of the young soldier who had not learned any of the arts or +of the ambitions of partizan leaders, but whose only motto was "the +President's policy is my policy; his orders my rule of action," +was much more in accord with the plain duty of every citizen of +the republic. I can find in my mind or heart only contempt for +that theory of patriotic duty which sends one citizen to the front, +freely to give his life, without question, to enforce the orders +of the chosen leader of the nation, and permits another to stay at +home and bend all his efforts toward forcing the substitution of +his own egotistical views upon the country, in lieu of those which +the great leader has decided to be most wise. + +Let the names of the great war governors, and of the statesmen in +Congress and cabinet who gave all of their strength to the support +of the measures of Lincoln, stand by the side of the foremost +commanders of armies on the roll of national honor. Let the others +be covered by the mantle of charity, and quietly pass into oblivion. + + +CHAPTER XXXI +General Sherman's Friendship--His Death--General Grant's Recognition +of Services--His Great Trait, Moral and Intellectual Honesty--His +Confidence in Himself--Grant, Like Lincoln, a Typical American--On +the Retired List of the Army--Conclusion. + +General Sherman never failed to manifest his generous appreciation +of my services as one of his trusted lieutenants, from the time we +met in the field until he retired from command of the army. Our +long-standing friendship increased till the time of his death. +While I was in command of the army, General Sherman never came to +Washington without coming very promptly to see me at headquarters, +not waiting for a first visit from his junior in rank. Of course +this great and cordial courtesy was very promptly returned. Upon +the occasions of these visits at the office, the general would sit +a long time, talking in his inimitably charming manner with me and +the staff officers who came in with their morning business. Then +he would insist upon my going with him to call upon the President, +a formality which was demanded by his high sense of the respect +due from him and me together, as past and present commanding +generals, to the commander-in-chief. This high regard for military +courtesy which was a characteristic of General Sherman, though he +seemed comparatively indifferent to any lack of it toward himself, +well merits the imitation of all military men. + +The last of those visits occurred a very short time before the +general's death. He was then well aware of the weakness which so +soon proved fatal to him, and submitted like a child while I wrapped +him up before going over to the White House. Upon my suggestion +of the necessity of caution, he said "Yes," and gripping his hand +near his chest, added "It will catch me like that some time, and +I will be gone." Yet General Sherman preferred the life in New +York which was so congenial to him, rather than seek to prolong +his days in a milder climate. + +We laid him by the side of his wife, that highest type of the +Christian woman, wife, and mother. Who can ever forget that touching +scene by the grave in St. Louis? The brave young priest, the very +image in character, even more than in face, of his great father, +standing alone, without another of the priests of his church, and +daring, without ecclesiastical sanction or support, to perform the +service for the dead prescribed by his church for those who "die +in the Lord." "Worthy son of a noble sire!" What man dares to +pass judgment upon him who so mightily helped to save his country +from ruin, and to strike the shackles from millions of slaves, or +to say that he was not worthy to be numbered among those to whom +the Divine Master has said, "Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one +of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me"? + +The subject of this volume being limited to events of which I have +had personal knowledge, and it never having been my good fortune +to serve in the field with General Grant, it would be inappropriate +to make herein any general comments about his military operations. +But I cannot close this account of events so closely connected with +my own official life without making acknowledgment of my obligations +to that great-hearted man for the justice, kindness, and generosity +which he invariably manifested toward me whenever occasion offered. + + GENERAL GRANT'S RECOGNITION OF SERVICES + +It was General Grant whose voluntary application, in the winter of +1863-4, relieved me from the disagreeable controversy with partizan +politicians in Missouri, and gave me command of an army in the +field. It was upon his recommendation that my services in that +command were recognized by promotion from the grade of captain to +that of brigadier-general in the regular army and brevet major- +general for services in the battle of Franklin. It was Grant who, +upon my suggestion, ordered me, with the Twenty-third Corps, from +Tennessee to North Carolina, to take part in the closing operations +of the war, instead of leaving me where nothing important remained +to be done. It was he who paid me the high compliment of selecting +me to conduct the operations which might be necessary to enforce +the Monroe doctrine against the French army which had invaded +Mexico. It was he who firmly sustained me in saving the people of +Virginia from the worst effects of the congressional reconstruction +laws. It was he who greeted me most cordially as Secretary of War +in 1868, and expressed a desire that I might hold that office under +his own administration. And, finally, it was he who promoted me +to the rank of major-general in the regular army, the next day +after his inauguration as President. + +It was a great disappointment to me to find only casual mention of +my name in General Grant's "Memoirs." But I was not only consoled, +but moved to deep emotion when told by his worthy son, Colonel +Frederick Dent Grant, that his father had not ceased up to the last +day of his life to cherish the same kind feeling he had always +manifested toward me, and that one of his last fruitless efforts, +when he could no longer speak, was to put on paper some legible +words mentioning my name. + +General Sherman wrote that he could not understand Grant, and +doubted if Grant understood himself. A very distinguished statesman, +whose name I need not mention, said to me that, in his opinion, +there was nothing special in Grant to understand. Others have +varied widely in their estimates of that extraordinary character. +Yet I believe its most extraordinary quality was its extreme +simplicity--so extreme that many have entirely overlooked it in +their search for some deeply hidden secret to account for so great +a character, unmindful of the general fact that simplicity is one +of the most prominent attributes of greatness. + +The greatest of all the traits of Grant's character was that which +lay always on the surface, visible to all who had eyes to see it. +That was his moral and intellectual integrity, sincerity, veracity, +and justice. He was incapable of any attempt to deceive anybody, +except for a legitimate purpose, as in military strategy; and, +above all, he was incapable of deceiving himself. He possessed +that rarest of all human faculties, the power of a perfectly accurate +estimate of himself, uninfluenced by pride, ambition, flattery, or +self-interest. Grant was very far from being a modest man, as the +word modest is generally understood. His just self-esteem was as +far above modesty as it was above flattery. The highest encomiums +were accepted for what he believed them to be worth. They did not +disturb his equilibrium in the slightest degree. + + GRANT'S CONFIDENCE IN HIMSELF + +While Grant knew his own merits as well as anybody did, he also +knew his own imperfections, and estimated them at their real value. +For example, his inability to speak in public, which produced the +impression of extreme modesty or diffidence, he accepted simply as +a fact in his nature which was of little or no consequence, and +which he did not even care to conceal. He would not for many years +even take the trouble to jot down a few words in advance, so as to +be able to say something when called upon. Indeed, I believed he +would have regarded it as an unworthy attempt to appear in a false +light if he had made preparations in advance for an "extemporaneous" +speech. Even when he did in later years write some notes on the +back of a dinner-card, he would take care to let everybody see that +he had done so by holding the card in plain view while he read his +little speech. After telling a story in which the facts had been +modified somewhat to give the greater effect, which no one could +enjoy more than he did, Grant would take care to explain exactly +in what respects he had altered the facts for the purpose of +increasing the interest in his story, so that he might not leave +any wrong impression. + +When Grant's attention was called to any mistake he had committed, +he would see and admit it as quickly and unreservedly as if it had +been made by anybody else, and with a smile which expressed the +exact opposite of that feeling which most men are apt to show under +like circumstances. His love of truth and justice was so far above +all personal considerations that he showed unmistakable evidence +of gratification when any error into which he might have fallen +was corrected. The fact that he had made a mistake and that is +was plainly pointed out to him did not produce the slightest +unpleasant impression, while the further fact that no harm had +resulted from his mistake gave him real pleasure. In Grant's +judgment, no case in which any wrong had been done could possibly +be regarded as finally settled until that wrong was righted; and +if he himself had been, in any sense, a party to that wrong, he +was the more earnest in his desire to see justice done. While he +thus showed a total absence of any false pride of opinion or of +knowledge, no man could be firmer than he in adherence to his mature +judgment, or more earnest in his determination, on proper occasions, +to make it understood that his opinion was his own, and not borrowed +from anybody else. His pride in his own mature opinion was very +great; in that he was as far as possible from being a modest man. +This absolute confidence in his own judgment upon any subject which +he had mastered, and the moral courage to take upon himself alone +the highest responsibility, and to demand full authority and freedom +to act according to his own judgment, without interference from +anybody, added to his accurate estimate of his own ability and his +clear perception of the necessity for undivided authority and +responsibility in the conduct of military operations, and in all +that concerns the efficiency of armies in time of war, constituted +the foundation of that very great character. + +When summoned to Washington to take command of all the armies, with +the rank of lieutenant-general, he determined, before he reached +the capital, that he would not accept the command under any other +conditions than those above stated. His sense of honor and of +loyalty to the country would not permit him to consent to be placed +in a false position,--one in which he could not perform the service +which the country had been led to expect from him,--and he had the +courage to say so in unqualified terms. + +These are the traits of character which made Grant a very great +man--the only man of our time, so far as can be known, who possessed +both the character and the military ability which were, under the +circumstances, indispensable in the commander of the armies which +were to suppress the great rebellion. + +It has been said that Grant, like Lincoln, was a typical American, +and for that reason was most beloved and respected by the people. +That is true of the statesman and of the soldier, as well as of +the people, if it is meant that they were the highest type, that +ideal which commands the respect and admiration of the highest and +best in a man's nature, however far he may know it to be above +himself. The soldiers and the people saw in Grant or in Lincoln, +not one of themselves, not a plain man of the people, nor yet some +superior being whom they could not understand, but the personification +of their highest ideal of a citizen, soldier, or statesman, a man +whose greatness they could see and understand as plainly as anything +else under the sun. And there was no more mystery about it all in +fact than there was in the popular mind. + +Matchless courage and composure in the midst of the most trying +events of battle, magnanimity in the hour of victory, and moral +courage to compel all others to respect his plighted faith toward +those who had surrendered to him, were the crowning glories of +Grant's great and noble character. + + CONCLUSION + +On September 29, 1895, came the hour when I had done, however +imperfectly, all the duty my country required of me, and I was +placed on the retired list of the army. Having been, at appropriate +periods in my official career, by the unsolicited action of my +official superiors, justly and generously rewarded for all my public +services, and having been at the head of the army several years, +near the close of the period fixed by law for active military +service I was made the grateful recipient of the highest honor +which the government of my country can confer upon a soldier, +namely, that of appointment to a higher grade under a special act +of Congress. My public life was, in the main, a stormy one, as +this volume has, perhaps too fully, shown. Many times I felt keenly +the injustice of those who did not appreciate the sincerity of my +purpose to do, to the best of my ability, what the government +desired of me, with little or no regard for my own personal opinions +or ambitions. But I can now concede to nearly all those who so +bitterly opposed me the same patriotic motives which I know inspired +my own conduct; and I would be unworthy of my birthright as an +American citizen if I did not feel grateful to my countrymen and +to our government for all the kindness they have shown me. + + +THE END. + + +INDEX [omitted] + + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's Forty-Six Years in the Army, by John M. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Forty-Six Years in the Army + +Author: John M. Schofield + +Release Date: May 11, 2007 [EBook #21417] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK FORTY-SIX YEARS IN THE ARMY *** + + + + +Produced by Ed Ferris + + + + + +Transcriber's note: + + Footnotes are at the end of the chapter. + + Right-hand-page heads are set right-justified before the appropriate + paragraphs. + + Small caps have been transcribed as upper-and-lower-case, except + the page heads. + + The dieresis is transcribed by a preceding hyphen. + + Non-standard spellings: partizan, despatch, Kenesaw, skilful, + practised, intrenchments, brevetted, reconnoissance, Chili, envelop. + + LoC call number: E467.1.S35 A2 + + Submitted May 11th, 2007 + + +FORTY-SIX YEARS +IN THE ARMY + + +[Frontispiece] +FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY FALK. +[Facsimile Signature] +J.M.Schofield + + +THIS VOLUME IS DEDICATED TO THE YOUNG CITIZENS WHOSE PATRIOTISM, +VALOR AND MILITARY SKILL MUST BE THE SAFEGUARD OF THE INTERESTS, +THE HONOR AND THE GLORY OF THE AMERICAN UNION + + +FORTY-SIX YEARS +IN THE ARMY + +BY +LIEUTENANT-GENERAL +JOHN M. SCHOFIELD + +NEW YORK +THE CENTURY CO. +1897 + + +Copyright, 1897 +by The Century Co. + +The De Vinne Press. + + +PREFACE + +Most of the chapters constituting the contents of this volume, were +written, from time to time, as soon as practicable after the events +referred to, or after the publication of historical writings which +seemed to me to require comment from the point of view of my personal +knowledge. They were written entirely without reserve, and with +the sole purpose of telling exactly what I thought and believed, +not with any purpose of publication in my lifetime, but as my +contribution to the materials which may be useful to the impartial +historian of some future generation. These writings had been put +away for safe-keeping with "instructions for the guidance of my +executors," in which I said: + +"All the papers must be carefully revised, errors corrected if any +are found, unimportant matter eliminated, and everything omitted +which may seem, to a cool and impartial judge, to be unjust or +unnecessarily harsh or severe toward the memory of any individual. +I have aimed to be just, and not unkind. If I have failed in any +case, it is my wish that my mistakes may be corrected, as far as +possible. I have not attempted to write history, but simply to +make a record of events personally known to me, and of my opinion +upon such acts of others, and upon such important subjects, as have +come under my special notice. It is my contribution to the materials +from which the future historian must draw for his data for a truthful +history of our time." + +Now, in the winter of 1896-97, I have endeavored to discharge, as +far as I am able, the duty which I had imposed on my executors, +and have decided to publish what I had written in past years, with +corrections and comments, while many of the actors in the great +drama of the Civil War are still living and can assist in correcting +any errors into which I may have fallen. + +After my chapters relating to the campaign of 1864 in Tennessee +were in type, the monograph by General J. D. Cox, entitled "Franklin," +was issued from the press of Charles Scribner's Sons. His work +and mine are the results of independent analysis of the records, +made without consultation with each other. + + +TABLE OF CONTENTS + +Chapter I. Parentage and Early Life--Appointment to West Point-- +Virginian Room-Mates--Acquaintance with General Winfield Scott--Character +of the West Point Training--Importance of Learning how to Obey--A +trip to New York on a Wager--The West Point Bible-class--Dismissed +from the Academy Without Trial--Intercession of Stephen A. Douglas +--Restoration to Cadet Duty--James B. McPherson--John B. Hood-- +Robert E. Lee. + +Chapter II. On Graduating Leave--Brevet Second Lieutenant in the +2d Artillery at Fort Moultrie--An Officer's Credit Before the War-- +Second Lieutenant in the 1st Artillery--Journey to Fort Capron, +Florida--A Reservation as to Whisky--A Trip to Charleston and a +Troublesome Money-Bag--An "Affair of Honor"--A Few Law-books--An +Extemporized "Map and Itinerary"--Yellow Fever--At A. P. Hill's +Home in Virginia--Assigned to Duty in the Department of Philosophy +at West Point--Interest in Astronomy--Marriage--A Hint from Jefferson +Davis--Leave of Absence--Professor of Physics in Washington +University. + +Chapter III. Return to Duty--General Harney's Attitude--Nathaniel +Lyon in Command--Defense of the St. Louis Arsenal--Service as +Mustering Officer--Major of the First Missouri--Surrender of Camp +Jackson--Adjutant-general on Lyon's Staff--A Missing Letter from +Fremont to Lyon--Lyon's Reply--Battle of Wilson's Creek--Death of +Lyon--A Question of Command During the Retreat--Origin of the +Opposition of the Blairs to Fremont--Affair at Fredericktown. + +Chapter IV. Halleck Relieves Fremont of the Command in Missouri-- +A Special State Militia--Brigadier-General of the Missouri Militia +--A Hostile Committee Sent to Washington--The Missouri Quarrel of +1862--In Command of the "Army of the Frontier"--Absent Through +Illness--Battle of Prairie Grove--Compelled to be Inactive-- +Transferred to Tennessee--In Command of Thomas's Old Division of +the Fourteenth Corps--Reappointed Major-General--A Hibernian +"Striker." + +Chapter V. In Command of the Department of the Missouri--Troops +Sent to General Grant--Satisfaction of the President--Conditions +on which Governor Gamble would Continue in Office--Anti-Slavery +Views--Lincoln on Emancipation in Missouri--Trouble Following the +Lawrence Massacre--A Visit to Kansas, and the Party Quarrel There +--Mutiny in the State Militia--Repressive Measures--A Revolutionary +Plot. + +Chapter VI. A Memorandum for Mr. Lincoln--The President's Instructions +--His Reply to the Radical Delegation--The Matter of Colored +Enlistments--Modification of the Order Respecting Elections Refused +--A Letter to the President on the Condition of Missouri--Former +Confederates in Union Militia Regiments--Summoned to Washington by +Mr. Lincoln--Offered the Command of the Army of the Ohio--Anecdote +of General Grant. + +Chapter VII. Condition of the Troops at Knoxville--Effect of the +Promotion of Grant and Sherman--Letter to Senator Henderson--A +Visit from General Sherman--United with his other Armies for the +Atlanta Campaign--Comments on Sherman's "Memoirs"--Faulty Organization +of Sherman's Army--McPherson's Task at Resaca--McPherson's +Character--Example of the Working of a Faulty System. + +Chapter VIII. Sherman's Displeasure with Hooker growing out the +Affair at Kolb's Farm--Hooker's Despatch Evidently Misinterpreted +--A Conversation with James B. McPherson over the Question of +Relative Rank--Encouraging John B. Hood to become a Soldier--Visit +to the Camp of Frank P. Blair, Jr.--Anecdote of Sherman and Hooker +under Fire--The Assault on Kenesaw--Tendency of Veteran Troops-- +The Death of McPherson before Atlanta--Sherman's error in a Question +of Relative Rank. + +Chapter IX. The Final Blow at Atlanta--Johnston's Untried Plan of +Resistance--Hood's Faulty Move--Holding the Pivot of the Position +--Anecdotes of the Men in the Ranks--Deferring to General Stanley +in a Question of Relative Rank--The Failure at Jonesboro'--The +Capture of Atlanta--Absent from the Army--Hood's Operations in +Sherman's Rear--Sent Back to Thomas's Aid--Faulty Instructions to +Oppose Hood at Pulaski--At Columbia--Reason of the Delay in Exchanging +Messages. + +Chapter X. Hood Forces the Crossing of Duck River--Importance of +Gaining Time for Thomas to Concentrate Reinforcements at Nashville +--The Affair at Spring Hill--Incidents of the Night Retreat--Thomas's +Reply to the Request that a Bridge be Laid over the Harpeth--The +Necessity of Standing Ground at Franklin--Hood's Formidable Attack +--Serious Error of Two Brigades of the Rear-Guard--Brilliant Services +of the Reserve--Yellow Fever Averted--Hood's Assaults Repulsed-- +Johnston's Criticism of Hood--The Advantage of Continuing the +Retreat to Nashville. + +Chapter XI. The Correspondence with General Thomas previous to +the Battle of Franklin--The Untenable Position at Pulaski--Available +Troops which were not Sent to the Front--Correspondence with General +Thomas--Instructions Usually Received too Late--Advantage of Delaying +the Retreat from Duck River--No Serious Danger at Spring Hill-- +General Thomas Hoping that Hood might be Delayed for Three Days at +Franklin. + +Chapter XII. After the Battle of Franklin--The Arrival at Nashville +--General Thomas's Greeting--A Refreshing Sleep--Services of the +Cavalry Corps and the Fourth Army Corps--Hood's Mistake after +Crossing Duck River--An Incident of the Atlanta Campaign Bearing +on Hood's Character--An Embarrassing Method of Transmitting Messages +in Cipher--The Aggressive Policy of the South. + +Chapter XIII. Grant Orders Thomas to Attack Hood or Relinquish +the Command--Thomas's Corps Commanders Support Him in Delay--Grant's +Intentions in Sending Logan to Relieve Thomas--Change of Plan before +the Battle of Nashville--The Fighting of December 15--Expectation +that Hood would Retreat--Delay in Renewing the Attack on the 16th +--Hopelessness of Hood's Position--Letters to Grant and Sherman-- +Transferred to the East--Financial Burden of the War--Thomas's +Attitude toward the War. + +Chapter XIV. Hood's Motive in Attempting the Impossible at Nashville +--Diversity of Opinions Concerning that Battle--No Orders on Record +for the Battle of December 16--That Battle due to the Spontaneous +Action of Subordinate Commanders--Statements in the Reports of the +Corps Commanders--Explanation of the Absence of Orders--The +Phraseology of General Thomas's Report. + +Chapter XV. General Thomas's Indorsement on the Report of the +Battle of Franklin--Courtesies to Him in Washington--Peculiarities +of the Official Records in Regard to Franklin and Nashville-- +Documents Which Have Disappeared from the Records--Inconsistencies +in General Thomas's Report--False Representations Made to Him-- +Their Falsity Confirmed by General Grant. + +Chapter XVI. Sherman's "March to the Sea"--The Military Theory On +Which It Was Based--Did It Involve War or Statesmanship?--The +Correspondence Between Grant and Sherman, and Sherman and Thomas-- +The Effect of Jefferson Davis's Speech on Sherman--Rawlins's Reported +Opposition to the March, and Grant's Final Judgment On It. + +Chapter XVII. Sherman's Purpose in Marching to the Sea--His +Expectations that the Change of Base Would Be "Statesmanship," If +Not "War"--The Thousand-Mile March of Hood's Men to Surrender to +Sherman--The Credit Given by Grant to Sherman--"Master of the +Situation"--The Fame of Sherman's Grand Marches--His Great Ability +as a Strategist. + +Chapter XVIII. Transfer of the Twenty-Third Corps to North Carolina +--Sherman's Plan of Marching to the Rear of Lee--The Surrender of +J. E. Johnston's Army--Authorship of the Approved Terms of Surrender +--Political Reconstruction--Sherman's Genius--Contrast Between +Grant and Sherman--Halleck's Characteristics--His Attempt to Supplant +Grant--Personal Feeling in Battle--The Scars of War. + +Chapter XIX. The Restoration of Civil Government in the Southern +States--The Course Pursued in North Carolina--An Order from General +Grant in Regard to Cotton and Produce--Suggestions for the +Reorganization of Civil Government--A Provisional Governor for +North Carolina. + +Chapter XX. French Intervention in Mexico--A Plan to Compel the +Withdrawal of the French Army--Grant's Letter of Instructions to +General Sheridan--Secretary Seward Advocates Moral Suasion--A +Mission to Paris With That End in View--Speechmaking at the American +Thanksgiving Dinner--Napoleon's Method of Retreating with Dignity +--A Presentation to the Emperor and Empress. + +Chapter XXI. Reconstruction in Virginia--The State Legislature +Advised to Adopt the Fourteenth Amendment--Congressional Reconstruction +as a Result of the Refusal--The Manner in Which the Acts of Congress +Were Executed--No Resort to Trial by Military Commission--The +Obnoxious Constitution Framed by the State Convention--How Its +Worst Feature Was Nullified--Appointed Secretary of War. + +Chapter XXII. Differences Between the Commanding General of the +Army and the War Department--General Grant's Special Powers--His +Appointment as Secretary of War _Ad interim_--The Impeachment of +President Johnson--Memorandum of Interviews with William M. Evarts +and General Grant in Regard to the Secretaryship of War--Failure +of the Impeachment Trial--Harmony in the War Department--A New +Policy at Army Headquarters. + +Chapter XXIII. Assignment to the Department of the Missouri--A +Cordial Reception from Former Opponents in St. Louis--Origin of +the Military School at Fort Riley--Funeral of General George H. +Thomas--Death of General George G. Meade--Assigned to the Division +of the Pacific--A Visit to Hawaii--Military Men in the Exercise of +Political Power--Trouble with the Modoc Indians--The Canby Massacre. + +Chapter XXIV. Superintendent at West Point--General Sherman's +Ulterior Reasons for the Appointment--Origin of the "Department of +West Point"--Case of the Colored Cadet Whittaker--A Proposed Removal +for Political Effect--General Terry's Friendly Attitude--A Muddle +of New Commands--Waiting Orders, and a Visit to Europe--Again in +Command in the West--The Establishment of Fort Sheridan at Chicago. + +Chapter XXV. The Death of General Hancock--Assigned to the Division +of the Atlantic--Measures for Improving the Sea-Coast Defense-- +General Fitz-John Porter's Restoration to the Army--President of +the Board Appointed to Review the Action of the Court Martial-- +General Grant's Opinion--Senator Logan's Explanation of His Hostile +Attitude Toward General Porter. + +Chapter XXVI. The Death of General Sheridan--His Successor in +Command of the Army--Deplorable Condition of the War Department at +the Time--A Better Understanding Between the Department and the +Army Commander--General Sheridan's Humiliating Experience--The +Granting of Medals--The Secretary's Call-Bell--The Relations of +Secretary and General--Views Submitted to President Cleveland--The +Law Fixing Retirement for Age--An Anecdote of General Grant. + +Chapter XXVII. President of the New Board of Ordnance and +Fortifications--Usefulness of the Board--Troubles with the Sioux +Indians in 1890-1891--Success of the Plan to Employ Indians as +Soldiers--Marriage to Miss Kilbourne--The Difficulty with Chili in +1892. + +Chapter XXVIII. Services of the Army During the Labor Strikes of +1894--Military Control of the Pacific Railways--United States Troops +in the City of Chicago--Orders Sent to General Miles, and his +Reports--The Proclamation of the President--Instructions to Govern +the Troops in Dealing with a Mob--The Duties of the Military +Misunderstood--Orders of the President in Regard to the Pacific +Railways. + +Chapter XXIX. Lessons of the Civil War--Weakness of the Military +Policy at the Outbreak of the Rebellion--A Poor Use of the Educated +Soldiers of the Army--Military Wisdom Shown by the Confederate +Authorities--Territorial Strategy--General Military Education +Indispensable to Good Citizenship--Organization of the National +Guard--General Grant Without Military Books--Measures Necessary to +the National Defense. + +Chapter XXX. The Financial Lesson of the Civil War--Approaching +Bankruptcy of the Government near the Close of the War--The Legal- +Tender Notes an Injury to the Public Credit--A Vicious Clause in +the Constitution--No Prejudice in the Army Against Officers Not +Educated at West Point--The Need of a Law Reforming the Relations +Between the President and the Commander of the Army--Devotion to +the Chosen Leader in Times of Public Peril. + +Chapter XXXI. General Sherman's Friendship--His Death--General +Grant's Recognition of Services--His Great Trait, Moral and +Intellectual Honesty--His Confidence in Himself--Grant, Like Lincoln, +a Typical American--On the Retired List of the Army--Conclusion. + +Index. + + +FORTY-SIX YEARS +IN THE ARMY + + +FORTY-SIX YEARS +IN THE ARMY + +CHAPTER I +Parentage and Early Life--Appointment to West Point--Virginian Room- +Mates--Acquaintance with General Winfield Scott--Character of the +West Point Training--Importance of Learning how to Obey--A trip to +New York on a Wager--The West Point Bible-class--Dismissed from +the Academy Without Trial--Intercession of Stephen A. Douglas-- +Restoration to Cadet Duty--James B. McPherson--John B. Hood--Robert +E. Lee. + +I was born in the town of Gerry, Chautauqua County, New York, +September 29, 1831. My father was the Rev. James Schofield, who +was then pastor of the Baptist Church in Sinclairville, and who +was from 1843 to 1881 a "home missionary" engaged in organizing +new churches and building "meeting-houses" in Illinois, Iowa, and +Missouri. My mother was Caroline McAllister, daughter of John +McAllister of Gerry. We removed to Illinois in June, 1843, and, +after a short stay in Bristol, my father made a new home for his +family in Freeport, where he began his missionary work by founding +the First Baptist Church of that place. + +In all my childhood and youth I had what I regard as the best +possible opportunities for education, in excellent public schools +where the rudiments of English were taught with great thoroughness, +and in a fair amount of all kinds of manly sports, and in hard +work, mainly on the farm and in building a new home, which left no +time and little inclination for any kind of mischief. At sixteen +years of age I spent three months in surveying public lands in the +wilds of northern Wisconsin, and at seventeen taught district school +in the little town of Oneco. By that time I had chosen the law as +my profession, and was working hard to complete the preparatory +studies at my own expense. + + APPOINTMENT TO WEST POINT + +The winter's school term in Oneco having closed early in the spring +of 1849, I returned to Freeport and resumed my struggle with Latin. +Then an unforseen event turned the course of my life. The young +man who had been appointed to West Point from our district only a +year or two before had failed to continue his course in the Military +Academy. Thus a vacancy occurred just at the close of Mr. Thomas +J. Turner's term in Congress. There was no time for applications +or for consultation. He must select another candidate to enter +the following June, or leave the place to be filled by his successor. +Fortunately for me, Mr. Turner, as one of the public-school directors, +had been present at an examination where the subject with which I +had to deal was mathematical; if he had caught me at Latin, the +result must have been fatal to all my prospects. Besides, Mr. +Turner had heard from his brother James of the stamina I had shown +in the public land-surveying expedition; and also from my father +of my determination to get a good education before beginning the +study of law. So he brought me a cadet appointment when he came +home, and said he believed a boy with that record could get through +West Point, the training there being, in his opinion, a good +preparation for the study of law. + +The little savings from all my past work had been invested in a +piece of land which was sold to fit me out for my journey to West +Point, including some inexpensive visits en route. I reported at +the Academy on June 1, 1849, with less than two dollars in my +pocket, which I conscientiously deposited with the treasurer, as +required by the regulations. My reception was of the most satisfactory +character. William P. Curlin of the second class, and Hezekiah H. +Garber of the third, both from Illinois, found me out very soon +after I reported, took me under their protection in a brotherly +way, and gave me some timely advice--not to take too seriously any +little fun the "men" might make of my blue dress-coat and fancy +gilt buttons, or anything like that; but I never experienced anything +even approaching to hazing. My rather mature appearance may have +had something to do with the respect generally paid me. It was +true I was only seventeen years and nine months old, as recorded +in the register, but my experience may have had some visible effect. + +I was assigned to a room in the old South Barracks, which were +demolished the next year. My room-mates were Henry H. Walker and +John R. Chambliss, two charming fellows from Virginia. We had +hardly learned each other's names when one of them said something +about the "blank Yankees"; but instantly, seeing something that +might perhaps have appeared like Southern blood in my face, added, +"_You_ are not a _Yankee!_" I replied, "Yes, I am from Illinois." +"Oh," said he, "we don't call Western men Yankees." In that remark +I found my mission at West Point, as in after life, to be, as far +as possible, a peacemaker between the hostile sections. If the +great West could have been heard, and its more dispassionate voice +heeded, possibly peace might have been preserved. + +My experience at West Point did not differ in many particulars from +the general average of cadet life, but a few incidents may be worthy +of special mention. My experience in camp was comparatively limited. +The first summer I was on guard only once. Then the corporal of +the grand rounds tried to charge over my post without giving the +countersign, because I had not challenged promptly. We crossed +bayonets, but I proved too strong for him, and he gave it up, to +the great indignation of the officer of the day, who had ordered +him to charge, and who threatened to report me, but did not. That +night I slept on the ground outside the guard tents, and caught +cold, from which my eyes became badly inflamed, and I was laid up +in the hospital during the remainder of my encampment. On that +account I had a hard struggle with my studies the next year. While +sitting on the east porch of the hospital in the afternoon, I +attracted the kind attention of General Winfield Scott, who became +from that time a real friend, and did me a great service some years +later. + + CHARACTER OF THE WEST POINT TRAINING + +In our third-class encampment, when corporal of the guard, I had +a little misunderstanding one night with the sentinel on post along +Fort Clinton ditch, which was then nearly filled by a growth of +bushes. The sentinel tore the breast of my shell-jacket with the +point of his bayonet, and I tumbled him over backward into the +ditch and ruined his musket. But I quickly helped him out, and +gave him my musket in place of his, with ample apologies for my +thoughtless act. We parted, as I thought, in the best of feeling; +but many years later, a colonel in the army told me that story, as +an illustration of the erroneous treatment sometimes accorded to +sentinels in his time, and I was thus compelled to tell him I was +that same corporal, to convince him that he had been mistaken as +to the real character of the treatment he had received. + +That third-class year I lived in the old North barracks, four of +us in one room. There, under the malign influence of two men who +were afterward found deficient, I contracted the bad habit of +fastening a blanket against the window after "taps," so that no +one could see us "burning the midnight oil" over pipes and cards. +The corps of cadets was not as much disciplined in our day as it +is now. If it had been, I doubt if I should have graduated. As +it was, I got 196 demerits out of a possible 200 one year. One +more "smoking in quarters" would have been too much for me. I +protest now, after this long experience, that nothing else at West +Point was either so enjoyable or so beneficial to me as smoking. +I knew little and cared less about the different corps of the army, +or about the value of class standing. I became quite indignant +when a distinguished friend rather reproved me for not trying to +graduate higher--perhaps in part from a guilty conscience, for it +occurred just after we had graduated. I devoted only a fraction +of the study hours to the academic course--generally an hour, or +one and a half, to each lesson. But I never intentionally neglected +any of my studies. It simply seemed to me that a great part of my +time could be better employed in getting the education I desired +by the study of law, history, rhetoric, and general literature. +Even now I think these latter studies have proved about as useful +to me as what I learned of the art and science of war; and they +are essential to a good general education, no less in the army than +in civil life. I have long thought it would be a great improvement +in the Military Academy if a much broader course could be given to +those young men who come there with the necessary preparation, +while not excluding those comparatively young boys who have only +elementary education. There is too much of the "cast-iron" in this +government of law under which we live, but "mild steel" will take +its place in time, no doubt. The conditions and interests of so +vast a country and people are too varied to be wisely subjected to +rigid rules. + +But I must not be misunderstood as disparaging the West Point +education. As it was, and is now, there is, I believe, nothing +equal to it anywhere in this country. Its methods of developing +the reasoning faculties and habits of independent thought are the +best ever devised. West Point _training_ of the mind is practically +perfect. Its general discipline is excellent and indispensable in +the military service. Even in civil life something like it would +be highly beneficial. In my case that discipline was even more +needed than anything else. The hardest lesson I had to learn was +to submit my will and opinions to those of an accidental superior +in rank, who, I imagined, was my inferior in other things, and it +took me many years to learn it. Nothing is more absolutely +indispensable to a good soldier than perfect subordination and +zealous service to him whom the national will may have made the +official superior for the time being. I now think it one of the +most important lessons of my own experience that, while I had no +difficulty whatever in securing perfect subordination and obedience +in a large public school when I was only seventeen years old, or +ever afterward in any body of troops, from a squad of cadets up to +a body of men, others did not find it by any means so easy to +discipline me. What I needed to learn was not so much how to +command as how to obey. + +My observation of others has also taught much the same lesson. +Too early independence and exercise of authority seem to beget some +degree of disrespect for the authority of others. I once knew a +young major-general who, in his zeal to prevent what he believed +to be the improper application of some public funds, assumed to +himself the action which lawfully belonged to the Secretary of War. +The question thus raised was considered paramount to that of the +proper use of the funds. The young officer lost his point, and +got a well-merited rebuke. But it is not to be expected that +complete military education can be obtained without complete military +experience. The rules of subordination and obedience _in_ an army +are so simple that everybody learns them with the utmost ease. +But the relations between the army and its administrative head, +and with the civil power, are by no means so simple. When a too +confident soldier rubs up against them, he learns what "military" +discipline really means. It sometimes takes a civilian to "teach +a soldier his place" in the government of a republic. If a soldier +desires that his own better judgment shall control military policy, +he must take care not to let it become known that the judgment is +his. If he can contrive to let that wise policy be invented by +the more responsible head, it will surely be adopted. It should +never be suspected by anybody that there is any difference of +opinion between the soldier and his civil chief; and nobody, not +even the chief, will ever find it out if the soldier does not tell +it. The highest quality attributed to Von Moltke was his ability +to make it clearly understood by the Emperor and all the world that +the Emperor himself commanded the German army. + + A TRIP TO NEW YORK ON A WAGER + +My constitutional habit once led me into a very foolish exploit at +West Point. A discussion arose as to the possibility of going to +New York and back without danger of being caught, and I explained +the plan I had worked out by which it could be done. (I will not +explain what the plan was, lest some other foolish boy try it.) +I was promptly challenged to undertake it for a high wager, and +that challenge overcame any scruple I may have had. I cared nothing +for a brief visit to New York, and had only five dollars in my +pocket which Jerome N. Bonaparte loaned me to pay my way. But I +went to the city and back, in perfect safety, between the two roll- +calls I had to attend that day. Old Benny Havens of blessed memory +rowed me across the river to Garrison's, and the Cold Spring ferryman +back to the Point a few minutes before evening parade. I walked +across the plain in full view of the crowd of officers and ladies, +and appeared in ranks at roll-call, as innocent as anybody. It is +true my up-train did not stop at Garrison's or Cold Spring, but +the conductor, upon a hint as to the necessity of the case, kindly +slackened the speed of the express so that I could jump off from +the rear platform. In due time I repaid Bonaparte the borrowed +five dollars, but the wager was never paid. The only other bet I +made at West Point was on Buchanan's election; but that was in the +interest of a Yankee who was not on speaking terms with the Southerner +who offered the wager. I have never had any disposition to wager +anything on chance, but have always had an irresistible inclination +to back my own skill whenever it has been challenged. The one +thing most to be condemned in war is the leaving to chance anything +which by due diligence might be foreseen. In the preparations for +defense, especially, there is no longer any need that anything be +left to chance or uncertainty. + + THE WEST POINT BIBLE-CLASS + +I attended the Bible-class regularly every Sunday after I went to +West Point, and rejoiced greatly in that opportunity to hear the +Scriptures expounded by the learned doctor of divinity of the +Military Academy. I had never doubted for a moment that every word +of the Bible was divinely inspired, for my father himself had told +me it was. But I always had a curious desire to know the reason +of things; and, more than that, some of my fellows were inclined +to be a little skeptical, and I wanted the reasons with which I +could overwhelm their unworthy doubts. So I ventured to ask the +professor one Sunday what was the evidence of divine inspiration. +He answered only what my father had before told me, that it was +"internal evidence"; but my youthful mind had not yet perceived +that very clearly. Hence I ventured very modestly and timidly to +indicate my need of some light that would enable me to see. The +learned doctor did not vouchsafe a word in reply, but the look of +amazement and scorn he gave me for my display of ignorance sealed +my lips on that subject forever. I have never since ventured to +ask anybody any questions on that subject, but have studied it out +for myself as well as I could. Soon after that the doctor preached +a sermon in which he denounced skepticism in his own vigorous terms, +and consigned to perdition all the great teachers of heresy, of +whom he mentioned the names--before unheard, I am sure, by the +great majority of cadets, thought their works were to be found in +the West Point and all other public libraries. I never looked into +any of those books, though other cadets told me that they, at his +suggestion, had sought there for the information the good doctor +had refused to give us. I have never, even to this day, been +willing to read or listen to what seemed to me irreverent words, +even though they might be intended to convey ideas not very different +from my own. It has seemed to me that a man ought to speak with +reverence of the religion taught him in his childhood and believed +by his fellow-men, or else keep his philosophical thoughts, however +profound, to himself. + +Another sermon of the good doctor of divinity, which I did not +happen to hear, on the Mosaic history of creation, contained, as +stated to me, a denunciation of the "God-hating geologists." That +offended me, for I had, in common with all the other cadets, learned +greatly to admire and respect our professor of geology. So I did +not go to the Bible-class any more. But the professor of ethics +continued to drive his fine fast horse, much the best one on the +Point, and I believe the best I had ever seen. Hence he continued +to enjoy my esteem, though perhaps he did not know it. + +Near the beginning of the last year of my cadet life an event +occurred which very nearly proved fatal to my prospects, and I have +often wondered that it did not have some effect on my hopes. But, +singularly enough, I never had a moment's doubt or anxiety as to +the final result. It was then the custom for candidates to report +on June 1, or within the next few days. They were organized into +sections, and placed under the instruction of cadets selected from +the second class to prepare them, as far as possible, for examination +about the middle of the month. I was given charge of a section in +arithmetic, and have never in all my life discharged my duty with +more conscientious fidelity than I drilled those boys in the subject +with which I was familiar, and in teaching which I had had some +experience. We had gone over the entire course upon which they +were to be examined, and all were well prepared except two who +seemed hopelessly deficient upon a few subjects which they had been +unable to comprehend. Not willing to omit the last possible effort +in behalf of those two boys, I took them to the blackboard and +devoted the last fifteen or twenty minutes before the bugle-call +to a final effort to prepare them for the ordeal they must face +the next morning. While I was thus employed several of my classmates +came into the room, and began talking to the other candidates. +Though their presence annoyed me, it did not interfere with my +work; so I kept on intently with the two young boys until the bugle +sounded. + + DISMISSED FROM THE ACADEMY WITHOUT TRIAL + +I then went to my quarters without paying any attention to the +interruption, or knowing anything of the character of what had +occurred. But one of the candidates, perhaps by way of excuse for +his failure, wrote to his parents some account of the "deviltry" +in which my classmates had indulged that day. That report found +its way to the War Department, and was soon followed by an order +to the commandant of cadets to investigate. The facts were found +fully to exonerate me from any participation in or countenance of +the deviltry, except that I did not stop it; and showed that I had +faithfully done my duty in teaching the candidates. After this +investigation was over, I was called upon to answer for my own +conduct; and, the names of my guilty classmates being unknown to +the candidates, I was also held responsible for their conduct. I +answered by averring and showing, as I believed, my own innocence +of all that had been done, except my neglect of duty in tolerating +such a proceeding. My conscience was so clear of any intentional +wrong that I had no anxiety about the result. But in due time +came an order from the Secretary of War dismissing me from the +academy without trial. That, I believe, shocked me a little; but +the sense of injustice was too strong in my mind to permit of a +doubt that it would be righted when the truth was known. I proposed +to go straight to Washington and lay the facts before the government. +Then I realized for the first time what it meant to have friends. +All my classmates and many other cadets came forward with letters +to their congressmen, and many of them to senators whom they happened +to know, and other influential men in Washington. So I carried +with me a great bundle of letters setting forth my virtues in terms +which might have filled the breast of George Washington with pride. + +There was no public man in Washington whom I had ever seen, and +probably no one who had ever heard of me, except the few in the +War Department who knew of my alleged bad conduct. The Secretary +of War would not even see me until I was at last presented to him +by an officer of the army. Then he offered me his forefinger to +shake, but he could give me no encouragement whatever. This was +after I had been in Washington several weeks. My congressman, Mr. +Campbell, who had succeeded Mr. Turner, and several others received +me kindly, read my letters, and promised to see the Secretary of +War, which no doubt they did, though without any apparent effect. +The only result was the impossible suggestion that if I would give +the names of my guilty classmates I might be let off. I had made +an early call upon the "Little Giant," Senator Douglas, to whom I +had no letter, and whom I had never met; had introduced myself as +a "citizen of Illinois" in trouble; and had told my story. He said +he was not on good terms with that administration, and preferred +not to go near the War Department if it could be avoided, but if +it proved necessary to let him know. Hence, after all else failed, +including my personal appeal, which I had waited so long to make, +I told Mr. Douglas all that had occurred, and suggested that there +was nothing left but to "put in the reserve," as the tacticians +call it. He replied: "Come up in the morning, and we will go to +see about it." On our way to the War Department the next morning, +the senator said, "I don't know that I can do anything with this +---- Whig administration"; but he assured me all should be made +right in the next. That seemed to me the kind of man I had looked +for in vain up to that time. I waited in the anteroom only a few +minutes, when the great senator came out with a genial smile on +his face, shook me warmly by the hand, and bade by good-by, saying: +"It is all right. You can go back to West Point. The Secretary +has given me his promise." I need not go into the details of the +long and tedious formalities through which the Secretary's promise +was finally fulfilled. It was enough to me that my powerful friend +had secured the promise that, upon proof of the facts as I had +stated them, I should be fully exonerated and restored to the +academy. I returned to West Point, and went through the long forms +of a court of inquiry, a court martial, and the waiting for the +final action of the War Department, all occupying some five or six +months, diligently attending to my military and academic duties, +and trying hard to obey all the regulations (except as to smoking), +never for a moment doubting the final result. That lesson taught +me that innocence and justice sometimes need powerful backing. +Implicit trust in Providence does not seem to justify any neglect +to employ also the biggest battalions and the heaviest guns. + + JAMES B. McPHERSON + +During all that time I continued to live with my old room-mate, +James B. McPherson, in a tower room and an adjoining bedroom, which +LaRhett L. Livingston also shared. I had been corporal, sergeant, +and lieutenant up to the time of my dismissal; hence the duties of +private were a little difficult, and I found it hard to avoid +demerits; but with some help from our kind-hearted inspecting +officer, Milton Cogswell,--bless his memory!--I contrived to get +off with 196 demerits in a possible 200 that last year. In a mild +way, McPherson was also a little under a cloud at that time. He +had been first captain of the battalion and squad marcher of the +class at engineering drill. In this latter capacity he also had +committed the offense of not reporting some of the class for +indulging in unauthorized sport. The offense was not so grave as +mine, and, besides, his military record was very much better. So +he was let off with a large demerit mark and a sort of honorable +retirement to the office of quartermaster of the battalion. I +still think, as I did then, that McPherson's punishment was the +more appropriate. Livingston was one of those charming, amiable +fellows with whom nobody could well find any fault, though I believe +he did get a good many demerits. He also seemed to need the aid +of tobacco in his studies. William P. Craighill, who succeeded +McPherson as first captain, had no fault whatever, that I ever +heard of, except one--that was, standing too high for his age. He +was a beardless youth, only five feet high and sixteen years old +when he entered the academy; yet he was so inconsiderate as to keep +ahead of me all the time in everything but tactics, and that was +of no consequence to him, for he was not destined to command troops +in the field, while, as it turned out, I was. It has always seemed +to me a little strange that the one branch which I never expected +to use afterward was the only study in which I graduated at the +head. Perhaps McPherson and Craighill thought, as I did, that it +made no difference where I stood in tactics. + +Among all the tactical officers of our time, Lieutenant John M. +Jones was esteemed the most accomplished soldier and tactician, +and the most rigid but just and impartial disciplinarian. It had +been my good fortune to enjoy his instruction while I was private, +corporal, sergeant, and lieutenant, and I fully shared with others +in the above high estimate of his character. I even flattered +myself that my soldierly conduct in all that time had not escaped +his favorable notice. When my case was before the court of inquiry +in the summer of 1852, the professors who had been called to testify +gave me a high character as a faithful, diligent student. When +Lieutenant Jones was called to testify as to my character as a +soldier, he replied that, in his opinion, it was very bad! While +I was not a little surprised and disappointed at that revelation +of the truth from the lips of the superior whom I so highly respected, +and did not doubt for a moment his better judgment, I could not be +unmindful of the fact that the other tactical officers did not know +me so well and had not so high a reputation as Lieutenant Jones in +respect to discipline; and I felt at liberty to avail myself, in my +own interest, of the opportunity suggested by this reflection. +Hence, when, after my complete restoration to the academy in January, +I found my demerits accumulating with alarming rapidity, I applied +for and obtained a transfer to Company C, where I would be under +Lieutenant Cogswell and Cadet Captain Vincent, my beloved classmate, +who had cordially invited me to share his room in barracks. + + ROBERT E. LEE + +John B. Hood was a jolly good fellow, a little discouraged at first +by unexpected hard work; but he fought his way manfully to the end. +He was not quite so talented as some of his great associates in +the Confederate army, but he was a tremendous fighter when occasion +offered. During that last period of our cadet life, Colonel Robert +E. Lee was superintendent of the academy; he was the personification +of dignity, justice, and kindness, and he was respected and admired +as the ideal of a commanding officer. Colonel Robert S. Garnett +was commandant of cadets; he was a thorough soldier who meted out +impartial justice with both hands. At our last parade I received +"honorable mention" twice, both the personal judgment of the +commandant himself. The one was for standing at the head of the +class in tactics; the other, for "not carrying musket properly in +ranks." Who can ever forget that last parade, when the entire +class, officers and privates together, marched up in line and made +their salute to the gallant commandant! To a West-Pointer no other +emotion equals it, except that of victory in battle. + + +CHAPTER II +On Graduating Leave--Brevet Second Lieutenant in the 2d Artillery +at Fort Moultrie--An Officer's Credit Before the War--Second +Lieutenant in the 1st Artillery--Journey to Fort Capron, Florida-- +A Reservation as to Whisky--A Trip to Charleston and a Troublesome +Money-Bag--An "Affair of Honor"--A Few Law-books--An Extemporized +"Map and Itinerary"--Yellow Fever--At A. P. Hill's Home in Virginia +--Assigned to Duty in the Department of Philosophy at West Point-- +Interest in Astronomy--Marriage--A Hint from Jefferson Davis--Leave +of Absence--Professor of Physics in Washington University. + +An old army colonel many years ago described a West Point graduate, +when he first reported for duty after graduating leave, as a very +young officer with a full supply of self-esteem, a four-story +leather trunk filled with good clothes, and an empty pocket. To +that must be added, in my case, a debt equal to the full value of +trunk and clothes and a hundred dollars borrowed money. My "equipment +fund" and much more had been expended in Washington and in journeys +to and fro during the period of administrative uncertainty in +respect to the demands of discipline at West Point. Still I had +so good a time, that graduating leave, as any millionaire in the +United States. My good father was evidently disturbed, and began +to fear--for the first time, I think--that I was really going to +the bad! His worst fears as to the possible effects of a military +education had, after all, been realized! When I showed him the +first check from New York, covering my pay account for July, he +said that it was enough to ruin any boy in the world. Indeed, I +myself was conscious of the fact that I had not done a stroke of +work all that month for those sixty-five and a half dollars; and +in order that my father might be convinced of my determination not +to let such unearned wealth lead me into dissipation, I at once +offered to lend him fifty dollars to pay a debt due to somebody on +the Freeport Baptist meeting-house. Confidence was thereby +restored. + + BREVET SECOND LIEUTENANT + +My first orders assigned me to duty at Fort Moultrie, South Carolina, +as brevet second lieutenant in the 2d Artillery. The steamer landed +me at Charleston, September 29, 1853, the day I became twenty-two +years of age. The next morning I found myself without money enough +to pay my hotel bill and take me over to Sullivan's Island, but +pay was due me for September. Upon inquiry, I found that the +paymaster was not in the city, but that he kept his public funds +in the Bank of South Carolina. Being unacquainted with any of the +good people of Charleston, the well-known rules of banks about +identification seemed a serious obstacle. I presented my pay +account at the bank, informing the cashier with a confident air +that I was well aware of the fact that the major's money was there, +but that the major himself was out of town. The accomplished +cashier, after scrutinizing me for a time, handed me the money. +My older brother officers at the fort had a good laugh at what they +were pleased to call my "brass"; but I consoled myself with the +reflection that I had found out that my face was good for something. +It is an instructive fact that before the Civil War an officer of +the army needed no indorser anywhere in this country. His check +or his pay account was as good as gold. All that was required was +identification. It is lamentably true that such has not been the +case since the war. + +I found only one officer on duty with my battery at Fort Moultrie, +and he was awaiting my arrival so that he might go on leave. He +turned over the command with a manifestation of confidence which +surprised me at the time, but which was fully explained the next +day. In the morning the first sergeant reported to me, with the +quarterly and monthly returns prepared for my signature, and made +out more beautifully than anything in writing I had ever before +seen, and explained to me in detail all the business affairs of +the battery, as if he were reporting to an old captain who had just +returned from a long leave of absence. Next to General Scott and +Colonel Lee, with whom I had the honor of some acquaintance, I was +quite sure there stood before me the finest-looking and most +accomplished soldier in the United States Army. What a hard time +young officers of the army would sometimes have but for the old +sergeants! I have pitied from the bottom of my heart volunteer +officers whom I have seen starting out, even in the midst of war, +with perfectly raw regiments, and not even one old sergeant to +teach them anything. No country ought to be so cruel to its soldiers +as that. + +In September we had the usual artillery target practice, which was +afterward recalled to my mind many times by the bombardment of Fort +Sumter in 1861 by the same guns I had used in practice, and at the +same range. Then came the change of stations of troops, which took +the Moultrie garrison to Florida, and some of the 1st Artillery to +their place. For a time the fort was left without garrison except +a few officers who were awaiting the arrival of their regiment. +I also was ordered to remain until I "got off my brevet" and was +appointed "full second" in the 1st Artillery. It had been a yellow- +fever summer, and the cottages on Sullivan's Island were even more +fully occupied than usual, mostly by families of planters from the +rice plantations of South Carolina. Hospitality was unbounded, +and of the most charming character. Nothing I have experienced at +home or in the great capitals of Europe has surpassed or dimmed +the memory of that first introduction to Southern society. + + JOURNEY TO FORT CAPRON, FLORIDA + +In December, 1853, the order came announcing my appointment as +second lieutenant, 1st Artillery, and directing me to join Battery +D at Fort Capron, Indian River, Florida. A steamer took me to +Palatka, stopping a short time at Jacksonville, which was then +little more than a landing on the St. John's River. After a week's +delay at Palatka, another little mail-steamer carried me and few +other passengers up the river to lake Monroe, whence a mule served +for transportation across to New Smyrna, on Mosquito Lagoon, opposite +the inlet. It was a great day's sport going up the river. The +banks seemed almost lined with alligators, and the water covered +with water-fowl of all kinds, while an occasional deer or flock of +turkeys near by would offer a chance shot. At New Smyrna Mrs. +Sheldon provided excellent entertainment during the ten days' +waiting for the mail-boat down Mosquito Lagoon and Indian River, +while Mr. Sheldon's pack of hounds furnished sport. At length old +Captain Davis took the mail and my baggage and me on board his +sloop, bound for Fort Capron, opposite the mouth of Indian River. +He divided his time fairly between carrying the United States mail +and drinking whisky, but he never attempted to do both at the same +time. I am not sure but it was the captain's example which first +suggested to me the rule which I adopted when commanding an army +in the field--to do no drinking till after the day's fighting was +over. But, in fact, I never liked whisky, and never drank much, +anyhow. + +We arrived in twenty-five days from Charleston, which was regarded +as a very satisfactory journey. At the fort I found Captain and +Brevet-Major Joseph A. Haskin, commanding; First Lieutenant A. P. +Hill, afterward lieutenant-general in the Confederate army; Dr. A. +J. Foard, assistant surgeon; and my classmate Livingston, brevet +second lieutenant; besides sixteen enlisted men--rather a close +approximation to the ideal of that old colonel who once said the +army would be delightful if it were not for the ---- soldiers. +But that was changed after a while by the arrival of recruits-- +enough in one batch to fill the battery full. The battery had +recently come from the gulf coast, where yellow fever had done +destructive work. I was told that there happened to be only one +officer on duty with the battery--a Lieutenant somebody--when the +fever broke out, and that he resigned and went home. If that is +true, I trust he went into the Civil War and got killed in battle; +for that was the only atonement he could possibly make for leaving +his men in that way. But such cases have been exceedingly rare, +while those of the opposite extreme have not been uncommon, where +officers have remained with the sick and died there, instead of +going with the main body of their men to a more healthy place. +The proper place for a line officer is with the fighting force, to +care for it and preserve its strength by every means in his power, +for war may come to-morrow. The surgeons and their assistants must +and do fully care for the sick and wounded. + +Life at Fort Capron was not by any means monotonous. It was varied +by sailing, fishing, and shooting, and even the continuity of sport +was broken twice a month, generally, by the arrival of the mail- +boat. But at length this diversion failed us. Some difference +occurred between the United States Post-office Department and the +mail-contractor on the St. John's River, and we got no mail for +three months. Then the commanding officer ordered me to go to +Charleston by the sloop that had brought us supplies, and bring +back the mail by the regular route. I made the round trip in little +more than a month. That same paymaster whom I had found away from +his post on my first arrival in Charleston intrusted to me a carpet- +bag full of gold and silver, to pay off the garrison for the past +six months, with as much advance pay as the officers would consent +to take, so that he would not have to make the trip down for a long +time to come. I had to carry the money-bag and a revolver about +with me for twenty-five days or more. I have never consented to +handle Uncle Sam's money since that time. + + AN "AFFAIR OF HONOR" + +It was during that short visit to Charleston that I became engaged, +for the first and only time, in an "affair of honor." A young man +who had been in my class at West Point, but had resigned before +the class had graduated, came to me at the hotel, and asked me, as +his "friend," to deliver a note he held in his hand. I replied: +"Yes. If you will place yourself in my hands and do what I decide +is honorable and right, I will be your friend. Tell me about it." +My condition was accepted without reserve. My friend, whose home +was in a distant city, had been in Charleston some weeks, and had +spent all the money he had and all he could borrow. He was on the +eve of negotiating a further loan from a well-known banker when +the son of that banker, who had met my friend about town, told his +father the plain truth about my friend's habits and his probable +value as a debtor. The negotiation was ended. My friend had become +a stranger in a strange land, without the means to stay there any +longer or to go home. It was a desperate case--one which could +not be relived by anything less than the blood of the young "villain" +who had told his father that "infamous"--truth! I replied: "Yes, +that is a bad case; we will have to fix that up. How are you off +at home?" He said the "old man" had plenty of money, but had sent +him enough to come home once or twice before, and would not send +any more. Upon further inquiry, I found that my friend's hotel +bill and expenses home would amount to a little less than the sum +I had just drawn on my pay account up to date; so I handed him the +money, saying that he could return it when convenient, and his +"honor" was fully satisfied. I never afterward heard anything from +him about that money, and my tailor had to wait a little longer +for his pay; but I had done my duty, as I understood it, under the +code of honor. I saw that friend once afterward. He went into +the army in 1861, accidentally shot himself, and died miserably on +the march, an old musket-barrel, placed there by my order, marking +his grave by the wayside. It was not granted to him, poor fellow! +to fight a battle for his country. + +I took with me to Florida some law-books--Blackstone, Kent, and a +few others: so few, indeed, that I learned them nearly all by heart; +then, for want of anything better, I read over the entire code of +the State of Florida. Several times in after years I found it +necessary, in order to save time, to repeat to great lawyers the +exact words of the Constitution of the United States; but their +habit was much the better. It is seldom wise to burden the memory +with those things which you have only to open a book to find out. +I recollect well that answer once made by William M. Evarts, then +attorney-general of the United States, to my inquiry whether he +would give me, offhand, the law on a certain point, to save the +time requisite for a formal application and answer in writing. He +said if it was a question of statute law he would have to examine +the books, but if only a question of common law he could make that +as well as anybody. But I had nothing better to do for a time in +Florida, and when I got out I did not find my memory half so much +overloaded with law as my blood was with malarial poison. Luckily, +I got rid of the poison after a while, but held on to the law, and +I never found it did me any harm. In fact, I would advise all +young officers to acquire as much of it as they can. + + AN EXTEMPORZIED "MAP AND ITINERARY" + +In the winter of 1853-4 there was an armed truce between the United +States of America and the Seminole nation. A new policy was soon +inaugurated, which had for its object to establish a complete line +of posts across the State from Jupiter to Lake Okeechobee, and +thence westward to the gulf, so as more securely to confine the +Seminoles within the Everglade region, although, so far as I know, +nobody then wanted the use of that more northern part of this vast +territory. The first step was to reopen the old military road from +the mouth of Indian River across to the Kissimmee River, and thence +to Tampa. Being the second lieutenant of the single company, I +was given the privilege of doing that work, and nine men and one +wagon were assigned me for that purpose. I spent the larger part +of my time, going and coming, in hunting on either the right or +left of the road, thereby obtaining all the deer and turkeys the +command could consume, but paying very little attention to the road +itself, in utter disregard of the usual military rule which requires +that a sketch be made and an itinerary kept of all such marches. +Hence I was a little puzzled when Acting-Inspector-General Canby, +from Washington, wanted to go across from Indian River to Tampa, +and called on me for a copy of my map and itinerary. But I had +stood very high in drawing at West Point, and could not allow myself +to be disturbed in any such way as that; so I unlocked what little +recollection I had of the route and my general knowledge of the +country, and prepared a very beautiful map and a quite elaborate +itinerary, with which the inspector-general seemed greatly pleased. +But I took great care, in addition, to send a man with him who had +been with me, and who was a good guide, so I felt quite safe +respecting any possible imperfections that the inspector-general +might find in my work. I never heard anything more about that +matter until General Sherman and I met General Canby at Portland +in 1870. At that time we had a little laugh at my expense respecting +the beauty of that map of mine, and the accuracy with which I had +delineated the route. But as I was then a major-general, and Canby +was a brigadier-general under my command, I was not subjected to +the just criticism I deserved for having forgotten that map and +itinerary at the time I made the march. + + YELLOW FEVER + +The next step in the strategical operations designed by the War +Department for Florida was the occupation of Fort Jupiter, and the +construction of a new post there, reopening the old military road +of General Jessup and building a block-house on the bank of Lake +Okeechobee, similar work to be undertaken from the other shore of +the lake westward. The work was commenced about midwinter of 1854- +5, and it was my privilege to do it. When the hot weather came on +at Jupiter, fever began to break out among the troops. Jupiter +Inlet had been closed for several years, and the water had become +stagnant. Within a very few weeks, every man, woman, and child +was down, or had been down, with fever. The mortality was such +that there were hardly enough strong men remaining to bury the +dead. As soon as I had sufficiently recovered to go in a boat to +Fort Capron, the major sent me back with all the convalescents that +were fit to be moved, and soon afterward broke up that pest-house +at Jupiter and moved the command back to Capron. So far as I know, +Fort Jupiter was never again occupied, and I think the block-house +on Lake Okeechobee was never completed. At all events, as good +luck would have it, I got through with my part of the work and was +ordered out of Florida before the Seminoles found out what the +plans of the War Department were. My old friend and companion +George L. Hartsuff, who had like duty to perform on the west side +of the lake, was attacked by the Indians and severely wounded, +several of his men being killed. He and a few others made their +escape. Hartsuff was one of the strongest, bravest, finest soldiers +I ever knew, and one of my most intimate friends; but, unlike +myself, he was always in bad luck. He got caught by the Seminoles +in Florida; was shipwrecked on Lake Michigan; came very near dying +of yellow fever; and after organizing the Twenty-third Army Corps +and commanding it for a time, finally died of the wounds he had +received in Florida. + +I had a new and peculiar experience at Fort Capron during my +convalescence. I had there twenty-five or thirty convalescent +soldiers, and no doctor, but an intelligent hospital steward. I +was like the lawyer who was asked to say grace at the table of one +of his wealthy clients, and who was unwilling to admit, under such +circumstances, that there was any one thing he could not do. So +I had sick-call regularly every morning, carefully questioned every +patient as to his symptoms, and told the steward what to give him, +taking care not to prescribe anything which some doctor had not +tried on me. All my patients got well. At length A. P. Hill came +up from Jupiter, on his way home on sick-leave. At Capron he had +a relapse, and was desperately ill. I had to send a barge to +Jupiter for some medicine which he knew was necessary. Mr. Jones, +the sutler, and some of the men helped me to nurse him night and +day for a long time. At length he recovered so far as to continue +his journey. + +About the same time came orders promoting me to first lieutenant +and detailing me for duty at West Point. So Hill and I came out +of Florida together. On board the St. John's River steamer I had +a relapse, and was very ill. Hill cared for me tenderly, kept me +at Savannah awhile, and then some days at Charleston, where I became +so much better that he ventured to leave me long enough to go over +to Fort Moultrie to see some of our brother officers. While he +was away I became so ill again that the doctor had to put me under +the influence of chloroform. When Hill came back in the evening +he cursed himself for all that was mean in the world for having +left me even for an hour. That's the kind of friends and comrades +soldiers are! As soon as I was well enough to travel, Hill took +me to his home at Culpeper Court-House in Virginia. There they +kept me quite a long time. That dear old gentleman, his father, +brought to my bedside every morning a brandy mint-julep, made with +his own hand, to drink before I got up. Under its benign influence +my recovery was very rapid. But let none of my young friends forget +that the best gifts of Providence are those most liable to be +abused. The wise Virginian never offered me too many of them. By +the first of December Hill and I went together to West Point, I to +report for duty, and he to visit his numerous warm friends at that +delightful station. There we parted, in December, 1855, never to +meet again. With the glad tidings from Virginia that peace was +near, there came to me in North Carolina the report that Lieutenant- +General A. P. Hill had been killed in the last battle at Petersburg. +A keen pang shot through my heart, for he had not ceased to be +esteemed as my kind friend and brother, though for four years +numbered among the public enemy. His sense of duty, so false in +my judgment, I yet knew to be sincere, because I knew the man. I +wish all my fellow-citizens, North and South, East and West, could +know each other as well as I knew A. P. Hill. + + IN THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY AT WEST POINT + +I was assigned to duty in the department of philosophy, under +Professor W. H. C. Bartlett, one of the ablest, most highly esteemed, +and most beloved of the great men who have placed the United States +Military Academy among the foremost institutions of the world. At +first it seemed a little strange to be called back, after the lapse +of only two years, to an important duty at the place where my +military record had been so "bad." But I soon found that at West +Point, as elsewhere, the standard of merit depended somewhat upon +the point of view of the judge. A master of "philosophy" could +not afford to look too closely into past records in other subjects. +Besides, philosophers know, if others do not, that philosophers +are sure to profit by healthful experience. I never had any more +trouble at West Point, though I did have much difficulty in helping +younger men out. I had the great good fortune never to be compelled +to report a cadet for any delinquency, nor to find one deficient +in studies, though I did sometimes have, figuratively speaking, to +beat them over the head with a cudgel to get in "phil" enough to +pass the academic board. + +I had then a strong impression, which has grown still stronger with +time, that "equations A and B" need not be developed very far into +the "mechanics of molecules" to qualify a gallant young fellow for +the command of a squadron of cavalry; but this is, in fact, generally +and perfectly well understood at West Point. The object there is +to develop the mental, moral, and physical man to as high a degree +as is practicable, and to ascertain his best place in the public +service. It is only the hopelessly incorrigible in some respect +who fall by the way. Even they, if they have stayed there long +enough, are the better for the training they have received. + +In this congenial work and its natural sequence I formed for the +first time the habit of earnest, hard mental work to the limit of +my capacity for endurance, and sometimes a little beyond, which I +have retained the greater part of my life. After the short time +required to master the "Analytical Mechanics" which had been +introduced as a text-book since I had graduated, and a short absence +on account of my Florida debility, which had reduced me to 120 +pounds in weight, I began to pursue physics into its more secret +depths. I even indulged the ambition to work out the mathematical +interpretation of all the phenomena of physical science, including +electricity and magnetism. After three years of hard labor in this +direction, I thought I could venture to publish a part of my work +in book form, and thus submit it to the judgment of the able +scientists whose acquaintance I had made at the meetings of the +American Association for the Advancement of Science.( 1) + + INTEREST IN ASTRONOMY + +While I was engaged in this work upon physics, a young gentleman +named Drown came to West Point, and asked me to give him some +private lessons in mechanics and astronomy, to perfect his +qualifications as a teacher. I went over those subjects with him +in about one hundred lessons, including a few in practical astronomy. +He was the most ardent student I have ever known. Like, I doubt +not, all the most earnest seekers for divine truth, in whatever +way revealed to man, he would not be satisfied with his own perception +of such truth unless he could feel it "burn in his brain." In that +brief experience I became for the first time intensely interested +in practical astronomy, about which I had thought little before, +although I had had sole charge of the observatory for some time. +I have always since given Professor Drown credit for teaching me +practical astronomy by first leading me to the discovery that I +had a natural taste and aptitude for such work, theretofore +unsuspected. That new "lead" was followed with all possible zeal, +day and night, for many months, until all the instruments in the +observatory, fixed and movable, including the old mural circle, +had gone through a season's work. Although my scientific experience +has been very limited, I do not believe anything else in the broad +domain of science can be half so fascinating as the study of the +heavens. I have regretted many times that necessity limited my +enjoyment of that great pleasure to a very few years instead of a +lifetime. + +In that West Point observatory I had one of the many opportunities +of my life--one which I always enjoyed--of protecting the unfortunate +from the stern decree of "justice." The old German custodian came +to me one morning in great distress, saying that he had let the +"astronomical chronometer" run down, and that the professor would +kill him. I went with him to the transit tower, made an observation, +and set the chronometer. The professor never knew the difference +till I told him, after the lapse of time named in the military +statute of limitations. Then he seemed to rejoice as much as I +over the narrow escape of his faithful subordinate. The professor +was not half as stern as he sometimes appeared to be. + +I need hardly say that in the midst of these absorbing occupations +I forgot all about the career I had chosen in my boyhood. The law +had no longer any charms for me. Yet I found in after life far +more use for the law than for physics and astronomy, and little +less than for the art and science of war. + +In June, 1857, I married Miss Harriet Bartlett, the second daughter +of my chief in the department of philosophy. Five children were +born to us, three of whom--two sons and one daughter--grew to +maturity and survive their mother, who died in Washington soon +after I was assigned to the command of the army, and was buried at +West Point by the side of our first-born son, who had died in 1868, +soon after I became Secretary of War. + +In the summer of 1860 came the end of my term of duty at West Point. +My taste for service in the line of the army, if I ever had any, +was gone; and all hope of promotion, if I ever had any, was still +further away. I had been for more than four years about nineteenth +first lieutenant in my regiment, without rising a single file. I +was a man of family, and had already become quite bald "in the +service of my country." There was no captaincy in sight for me +during the ordinary lifetime of man, so I accepted the professorship +of physics in Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri. But Mr. +Jefferson Davis, an intimate friend of my father-in-law, gave me +a timely hint that promotion might be better in a year or two; and +his bitterest personal enemy, General Scott, gave me a highly +flattering indorsement which secured leave of absence for a year. +Thus I retained my commission. + + PROFESSOR OF PHYSICS IN WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY + +As the period of the Civil War approached a very large part of my +time was occupied in reading and studying, as coolly as possible, +every phase of the momentous questions which I had been warned must +probably be submitted to the decision of war. Hence, when the +crisis came I was not unprepared to decide for myself, without +prejudice or passion, where the path of duty lay, yet not without +some feeling of indulgence toward my brother officers of the army +who, as I believed, were led by the influence of others so far +astray. I took an early occasion to inform General Scott of my +readiness to relinquish my leave of absence and return to duty +whenever my services might be required, and I had the high honor +of not being requested to renew my oath of allegiance. + +My life in St. Louis during the eight months next preceding the +Civil War was of great benefit to me in the delicate and responsible +duties which so soon devolved upon me. My connection with Washington +University brought me into close relations with many of the most +patriotic, enlightened, and, above all, unselfish citizens of +Missouri. Some of them were of the Southern school of politics, +but the large majority were earnest Union men, though holding the +various shades of opinion then common on the question of slavery. +By long and intimate intercourse, in the joint prosecution of the +work of the highest philanthropy, such men had learned to respect +the sincerity of each others's adverse convictions, and had become +the exact exemplars of the many shades of honest, patriotic Unionism +so clearly described in 1863 by President Lincoln in his letter to +a delegation of partizans who had not learned that principle of +charity which seems to have been born in the great martyr of +freedom. + +Would that I could do fitting honor to the names of those patriots, +nearly all of whom have gone to their rest, including Dr. Elliot, +President of Washington University. James E. Yeatman, President +of the Sanitary Commission, still lives to honor his country and +the great cause of humanity of which he was the faithful and +efficient servant. I did not meet Hamilton R. Gamble until after +he had become governor. I shall have occasion to say more of him +later. He was the foremost champion of the Union cause in Missouri, +and the most abused by those who were the loudest in their professions +of loyalty. Of the younger generation, I will mention only one, +whose good deeds would otherwise never be known. While himself +absent in the public service, wherein he was most efficient, he +made me occupy his delightful residence near Lafayette Park, and +consume all the products of his excellent garden. We knew each +other then only as fellow-workers in the Union cause, but have been +the most devoted friends from that day to this. The name of that +dear friend of mine is Charles Gibson. Among the earliest and most +active leaders in the Union cause in Missouri, I must not fail to +mention the foremost--Frank P. Blair, Jr. His patriotism and +courage were like a calcium light at the head of the Union column +in the dark days and nights of the spring of 1861. + +[( 1) Much of my time in St. Louis during the winter preceding the +Civil War was spent in revising this work, preparing illustrations, +and getting it ready for the press. Then it was packed up in a +box and carefully stored away in the St. Louis Arsenal, to abide +the results of war.] + + +CHAPTER III. +Return to Duty--General Harney's Attitude--Nathaniel Lyon in Command +--Defense of the St. Louis Arsenal--Service as Mustering Officer-- +Major of the First Missouri--Surrender of Camp Jackson--Adjutant- +general on Lyon's Staff--A Missing Letter from Fremont to Lyon-- +Lyon's Reply--Battle of Wilson's Creek--Death of Lyon--A Question +of Command During the Retreat--Origin of the Opposition of the +Blairs to Fremont--Affair at Fredericktown. + +When it became probable that military force would be required by +the government to maintain its authority in the Southern States, +I informed the War Department of my readiness to return to duty +whenever my services might be required, and was instructed to await +orders in St. Louis. Upon President Lincoln's first call for +volunteers, I was detailed to muster in the troops required of the +State of Missouri. With the order of detail was furnished a copy +of the old instructions for mustering into service, etc., which +required me to call upon the governor of Missouri for the regiments +to be mustered, and to accept only fully organized regiments. It +was well and publicly known that the executive of Missouri was +disloyal to the United States, and that compliance with the +President's demand for volunteers was not to be expected from the +State government; yet my instructions authorized me to take no +action which could be effective under such circumstances, and the +then department commander, Brigadier-General William S. Harney, +would not consent that any such action be taken without orders from +Washington. I called upon Governor Jackson for his regiments, but +received no reply. + + RETURN TO DUTY + +In my visit to General Harney after the attack on Fort Sumter, I +urged the necessity of prompt measures to protect the St. Louis +Arsenal, with its large stores of arms and ammunition, then of +priceless value, and called his attention of a rumor of an intended +attack upon the arsenal by the secessionists then encamped near +the city under the guise of State militia. In reply, the general +denounced in his usual vigorous language the proposed attempt upon +the arsenal; and, as if to clinch his characterization of such a +"---- outrage," said: "Why, the State has not yet passed an +ordinance of secession; she has not gone out of the Union." That +did not indicate to me that General Harney's Union principles were +quite up to the standard required by the situation, and I shared +with many others a feeling of great relief when he was soon after +relieved, and Captain Nathaniel Lyons succeeded to the command of +the department. Yet I have no doubt General Harney was, from his +own point of view, thoroughly loyal to the Union, though much imbued +with the Southern doctrines which brought on secession and civil +war. His appropriate place after that movement began was that of +the honorable retirement in which he passed the remainder of his +days, respected by all for his sterling character and many heroic +services to his country. + +Two days later, Captain Lyon, then commanding the St. Louis Arsenal, +having received from the War Department authority to enroll and +muster into the service the Missouri volunteers as they might +present themselves, I reported to him and acted under his orders. +Fortunately, a large number of the loyal citizens of St. Louis had, +in anticipation of a call to take up arms in support of the +government, organized themselves into companies, and received some +instruction in tactics at their places of secret nightly meeting +in the city. On the other hand, the organized militia of the State, +mostly disloyal, were in the city of St. Louis near the arsenal, +which contained many thousand muskets, and which was defended by +only a small body of regular troops. There was great danger that +the arsenal would follow the fate of the public arsenals in the +more Southern States. To avert this danger was the first great +object. + +Upon receipt of the necessary authority by Captain Lyon, I was +called out of church on Sunday morning, April 21, and the loyal +secret organizations were instructed to enter the arsenal at night, +individually, each member being furnished with a pass for that +purpose. The mustering officer employed himself all night and the +following day in distributing arms and ammunition to the men as +they arrived, and in stationing them along the arsenal walls. Thus +the successful defense of the arsenal was secured, though its +garrison was neither mustered into service nor organized into +regiments, nor even enrolled. The organization of the volunteers +now began, the mustering officer superintending the election of +officers, enrolling the men, and perfecting the organization in +conformity to the militia laws of the State. + +On June 4 I transmitted to the adjutant-general "the muster-rolls +of five regiments of infantry; of four rifle battalions of two +companies each, attached to the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th regiments; of +one artillery battalion of three companies; and of a company of +pioneers"; also "the muster-roll of Brigadier-General Lyon's staff, +mustered by himself." Accompanying the muster-rolls was a return +showing the strength of each regiment and of the brigade. + +Lyon had previously been elected brigadier-general of the brigade +the regiments of which I had mustered in, but I had no authority +to muster in a brigadier-general and staff. + + MAJOR OF THE FIRST MISSOURI + +The Missouri United States Reserve Corps, organized in St. Louis +about the same time, consisting of five regiments, was mustered +into service by General Lyon, under special authority from the War +Department. Upon the cordial invitation of the officers of the +1st Regiment, I accepted the place of major of that regiment, +mustered myself into service as such, and devoted all the time that +could be spared from my mustering duties to instructing the officers +in tactics and military administration--a labor which was abundantly +repaid by the splendid record soon made by that regiment. + +On June 24 I made a full report to the adjutant-general of the +discharge of my duties as mustering officer, including three new +regiments of three years' volunteers whose muster would be completed +in a few days. With this report my connection with that service +was terminated. On the following day I was relieved from mustering +duty, and at General Lyon's request was ordered to report to him +at Boonville, remaining with him as adjutant-general and chief of +staff until his death at Wilson's Creek. + +The foregoing account gives the organization (the strength was +about 14,000) of the volunteer force with which the war in Missouri +was begun. To this was added Lyon's company of the 2d Infantry, +a detachment of regular recruits, about 180 strong, commanded by +Lieutenant Lothrop, and Totten's battery of the 2d United States +Artillery. Lyon, who, as described, had been elected brigadier- +general of the militia, was on May 17 appointed by the President +to the same grade in the United States volunteer forces; and when, +on May 30, General Harney was relieved from the command of the +Department of the West, General Lyon became the commander of that +department. + +General Lyon was a man of ability and scholarly attainments, an +earnest patriot, keenly alive to the nature and magnitude of the +struggle in which the country was about to engage, and eager to +take the initiative as soon as he had at his command sufficient +force to give promise of success. To his keen foresight the State +militia at Camp Jackson, near St. Louis, though a lawful State +organization engaged in its usual field exercises, was an incipient +rebel army which ought to be crushed in the bud. This feeling was +shared by the more earnest Union men of St. Louis, who had the +confidence of the President and were in daily consultation with +Lyon; while the more prudent or conservative, hoping to avoid actual +conflict in the State, or at least in the city, advised forbearance. +Subsequent events showed how illusive was the hope of averting +hostilities in any of the border States, and how fortunate it was +that active measures were adopted at once. + +On May 10 General Lyon marched out with the force then organized, +surrounded Camp Jackson, and demanded its surrender. The militia +commander, Brigadier-General Daniel M. Frost, after protesting in +vain against the "wrong and insult" to his State, seeing resistance +hopeless, surrendered his command, about 1500 men, with their arms +and munitions of war. After the surrender, and while preparations +were making to conduct the prisoners to the arsenal, some shots +were fired upon our troops from a crowd that had assembled round +the camp-ground. The fire was returned by some of the troops, in +spite of all efforts of the officers to prevent it, and a number +of persons, mostly inoffensive, were killed and wounded. In this +affair I was designated by General Lyon to receive the surrender +of the commander of Camp Jackson and his troops, and to take charge +of the prisoners, conduct them to the arsenal, and the next day to +parole them. I extended to the commander and other officers the +courtesy of permitting them to retain their swords, and treated +the prisoners in such a manner as to soothe somewhat their intensely +excited feelings. One of the colonels, not anticipating such +courteous treatment, had broken his sword and thrown the pieces +upon the ground, rather than surrender it to the hated Yankees. + + ADJUTANT-GENERAL ON LYON'S STAFF + +The possession of St. Louis, and the supremacy of the national +authority therein, being now secured, General Lyon directed his +energies toward operations in the interior of the State. On June +13 he moved up the Missouri River with the 1st Missouri Volunteers, +Totten's battery of the 2d United States Artillery, one company of +the 2d United States Infantry, two companies of regular recruits, +and nine companies of the 2d Missouri Volunteers, and attacked the +enemy under Sterling Price on the 17th, near Boonville, and gained +an easy victory. The loss on our side was two killed and nine +wounded; that of the enemy, ten killed and a number of prisoners. + +I joined General Lyon at Boonville on June 26, and began duty as +his adjutant-general. Preparations were now made as rapidly as +possible to push operations into the southwestern part of Missouri. +A force consisting of about 1500 infantry and one battery of four +guns, under Colonel Franz Sigel, was sent from St. Louis, via Rolla, +to Springfield; while a force of regular troops under Major Samuel +D. Sturgis, 1st Cavalry, consisting of one company of the 2d +Dragoons, four companies of the 1st Cavalry, Du Bois's battery of +four guns, three companies of the 1st Infantry, two companies of +the 2d Infantry, some regular recruits, the 1st and 2d Kansas +Infantry, and one company of Kansas Cavalry Volunteers, was ordered +from Fort Leavenworth to join General Lyons's immediate command, +en route to Springfield. General Lyon's march was begun on July +3, and Major Sturgis joined him at Clinton, Mo., on the 4th. The +command reached Springfield on July 13, and there met Colonel +Sigel's brigade, which we learned had pushed as far to the front +as Newtonia, but, meeting a superior force of the enemy at Carthage +on July 5, had fallen back to Springfield. General Lyons's intention +was, upon effecting this junction with Sturgis and Sigel, to push +forward and attack the enemy, if possible, while we were yet superior +to him in strength. He had ordered supplies to be sent from St. +Louis via Rolla, but they remained at Rolla, the railroad terminus, +for want of wagon transportation. The troops had to live upon such +supplies as could be obtained from the country, and many of them +were without shoes. A continuous march of more than two or three +days was impossible. General Lyon's force was rapidly diminishing, +and would soon almost disappear by the discharge of the three +months' men, while that of the enemy was as rapidly increasing and +becoming more formidable by additions to its supplies of arms and +ammunition. General Lyon made frequent appeals for reinforcements +and for provisions, but received little encouragement, and soon +became convinced that he must rely upon the resources then at his +command. He was unwilling to abandon southwestern Missouri to the +enemy without a struggle, even though almost hopeless of success, +and determined to bring on a decisive battle, if possible, before +his short-term volunteers were discharged. Learning that the enemy +was slowly advancing from the southwest by two or three different +roads, Lyon moved out, August 1, on the Cassville road, had a +skirmish with the enemy's advance-guard at Dug Springs the next +day, and the day following (the 3d) again at Curran Post-office. +The enemy showed no great force, and offered but slight resistance +to our advance. It was evident that a general engagement could +not be brought on within the limits of time and distance to which +we were confined by the state of our supplies. It was therefore +determined to return to Springfield. + +General Lyon was greatly depressed by the situation in which he +was placed, the failure of expected reinforcements and supplies +from St. Louis, and an evidently strong conviction that these +failures were due to a plan to sacrifice him to the ambition of +another, and by a morbid sensitiveness respecting the disaster to +the Union people of southwestern Missouri, (who had relied upon +him for protection) which must result from the retreat of his army. +Lyon's personal feeling was so strongly enlisted in the Union cause, +its friends were so emphatically his personal friends and its +enemies his personal enemies, that he could not take the cool, +soldierly view of the situation which should control the actions +of the commander of a national army. If Lyon could have foreseen +how many times the poor people of that section were destined to be +overrun by the contending forces before the contest could be finally +decided, his extreme solicitude at that moment would have disappeared. +Or if he could have risen to an appreciation of the fact that his +duty, as the commander in the field of one of the most important +of the national armies, was not to protect a few loyal people from +the inevitable hardships of war (loss of their cattle, grain, and +fences), but to make as sure as possible the defeat of the hostile +army, no matter whether to-day, to-morrow, or next month, the battle +of Wilson's Creek would not have been fought. + + A MISSING LETTER FROM FReMONT TO LYON + +On August 9 General Lyon received a letter from General John C. +Fremont, then commanding the department, which had been forwarded +to him from Rolla by Colonel John B. Wyman. The letter from General +Fremont to Colonel Wyman inclosing that to General Lyon appears +among the published papers submitted by Fremont to the Committee +on the Conduct of the War in the early part of 1862, but the +inclosure to Lyon is wanting. The original letter, with the records +to which it belonged, must, it is presumed, have been deposited at +the headquarters of the department in St. Louis when the Army of +the West was disbanded, in the latter part of August, 1861. Neither +the original letter nor any copy of it can now (July, 1897) be +found. It can only be conjectured what motive caused General +Fremont to omit a copy of the letter from the papers submitted to +the committee, which were at the time strongly commented upon in +Congress, or what caused to be removed from the official files the +original, which had again come into his possession. + +General Lyon's answer to this letter, given below, the original +draft which was prepared by me and is yet in my possession, shows +that Fremont's letter to Lyon was dated August 6, and was received +on the 9th. I am not able to recall even the substance of the +greater part of that letter, but the purport of that part of it +which was then of vital importance is still fresh in my memory. +That purport was instructions to the effect that _if Lyon was not +strong enough to maintain his position as far in advance as +Springfield, he should fall back toward Rolla until reinforcements +should meet him_. + +It is difficult to see why General Fremont did not produce a copy +of those instructions in his statement to the committee. It would +have furnished him with the best defense he could possibly have +made against the charge of having sacrificed Lyon and his command. +But the opinion then seemed so strong and so nearly universal that +Lyon's fight at Wilson's Creek was a necessity, and that Fremont +ought to have reinforced him before that time at any cost, that +perhaps Fremont had not the courage to do what was really best for +his own defense, namely, to acknowledge and maintain that he had +ordered Lyon to fall back, and that the latter should have obeyed +that order. + + LYON'S REPLY + +At my suggestion, General Lyon instructed me to prepare an answer +to General Fremont's letter on the morning of August 9. He altered +the original draft, in his own hand, as is shown in the copy +following; a fair copy of the letter as amended was then made, and +he signed it. + + "Springfield, Aug. 9, 1861. +"General: I have just received your note of the 6th inst. by special +messenger. + +"I retired to this place, as I have before informed you, reaching +here on the 5th. The enemy followed to within ten miles of here. +He has taken a strong position, and is recruiting his supplies of +horses, mules, and provisions by forays into the surrounding country; +his large force of mounted men enabling him to do this without +annoyance from me. + +"I find my position extremely embarrassing, and am at present unable +to determine whether I shall be able to maintain my ground or be +forced to retire. I can resist any attack from the front, but if +the enemy moves to surround me I must retire. I shall hold my +ground as long as possible, [and not] _though I may without knowing +how far_ endanger the safety of my entire force with its valuable +material, _being induced by the important considerations involved +to take this step. The enemy yesterday made a show of force about +five miles distant, and has doubtless a full purpose of making an +attack upon me_. + + "Very respectfully your obedient servant, + "N. Lyon, + "Brigadier-General Vols., Commanding. +"Major-General J. C. Fremont, + "Comdg. Western Department, St. Louis, Mo." + +The words in my handwriting which were erased ("and not" in brackets) +and those substituted by General Lyon, given in italics, clearly +express the difference of opinion which then existed between us +upon the momentous question which we had then been discussing for +several days, namely: What action did the situation require of +him as commander of the army? + +I was then young and wholly inexperienced in war; but I have never +yet seen any reason to doubt the correctness of the views I then +urged with even more persistence than my subordinate position would +fully justify. And this, I doubt not, must be the judgment of +history. The fruitless sacrifice at Wilson's Creek was wholly +unnecessary, and, under the circumstances, wholly unjustifiable. +Our retreat to Rolla was open and perfectly safe, even if began as +late as the night of the 9th. A few days or a few weeks at the +most would have made us amply strong to defeat the enemy and drive +him out of Missouri, without serious loss to ourselves. Although +it is true that we barely failed winning a victory on August 10, +that was, and could have been, hoped for only as a mere possibility. +Lyon himself despaired of it before the battle was half over, and +threw away his own life in desperation. In addition to the depressing +effect of his wounds, he must probably have become convinced of +the mistake he had made in hazarding an unnecessary battle on so +unequal terms, and in opposition to both the advice of his subordinates +and the instructions of his superior. But this is only an inference. +After Lyon had with the aid of Sigel (as explained hereafter) +decided to attack, and arranged the plan, not a word passed between +him and me on the question whether an attack should be made, except +the question: "Is Sigel willing to undertake this?" and Lyon's +answer: "Yes; it is his plan." + +We went forward together, slept under the same blanket while the +column was halted, from about midnight till the dawn of day, and +remained close together nearly all the time until his death. But +he seemed greatly depressed, and except to give orders, hardly +uttered a word save the few I have mentioned in this narrative. + +He was still unwilling to abandon without a desperate struggle the +country he had occupied, thought the importance of maintaining his +position was not understood by his superior commander, and in his +despondency believed, as above stated, that he was the intended +victim of a deliberate sacrifice to another's ambition. He determined +to fight a battle at whatever risk, and said: "I will gladly give +my life for a victory." + + BATTLE OF WILSON'S CREEK + +The enemy had now concentrated his forces, and was encamped on +Wilson's Creek, about ten miles from Springfield. There had been +some skirmishing between our reconnoitering parties and those of +the enemy during the past few days, and a general advance had been +determined on for the night of August 8, but it was postponed on +account of the fatigued condition of the troops, who had been +employed that day in meeting a reconnaissance of the enemy. The +attack was finally made at daylight on the morning of the eventful +August 10. + +The plan of battle was determined on the morning of the 9th, in a +consultation between General Lyon and Colonel Sigel, no other +officers being present. General Lyon said, "It is Sigel's plan," +yet he seemed to have no hesitation in adopting it, notwithstanding +its departure from accepted principles, having great confidence in +Sigel's superior military ability and experience. Sigel's brigade, +about 1200 strong, was to attack the enemy's right, while Lyon, +with the main body, about 4000 strong, was to attack the enemy's +left. The two columns were to advance by widely separated roads, +and the points of attack were so distant that communication between +the two columns was not even thought of. The attack was made, as +intended, by both columns at nearly the same instant, and both +drove the enemy from his advanced position, Sigel even occupying +the enemy's camp. Here he was soon after assailed by a superior +force, and driven from the field with the loss of his artillery +and 292 men killed, wounded, and missing. He did not appear upon +the scene again that day, and the result of his attack was unknown +to any one in the other column until after the close of the battle. +The main body, under Lyon's immediate command, made no general +advance from the position first gained, but maintained that position +against several fierce assaults. The enemy manifestly did not make +good use of his superior numbers. He attacked us in front several +times, but with a force not greatly superior to our own, and was +invariably repulsed. Our men fought extremely well for raw troops, +maintaining their ground, without any cover whatever, against +repeated assaults for six hours, and losing in killed and wounded +fully _one third of their number_. General Lyon received two +wounds, one in the leg and one in the head, about the middle of +the engagement; he then became more despondent than before, apparently +from the effects of his wounds, for there appeared nothing in the +state of the battle to dishearten a man of such unbounded courage +as he undoubtedly possessed. A portion of our troops had given +away in some disorder. Lyon said: "Major, I am afraid the day is +lost." I looked at him in surprise, saw the blood trickling down +his face, and divining the reason for his despondency, replied: +"No, General; let us try it again." He seemed re-encouraged, and +we then separated, rallied, and led forward the only troops then +not in action--two regiments. Lyon was killed at the head of one +of these regiments while exposing himself with utter recklessness +to the enemy's fire. + + DEATH OF LYON + +When Lyon and I separated, he to lead the attack in which he fell, +I reformed the other regiment and led it into action, giving the +command "Charge!" as soon as we came within plain view of the enemy, +hoping to try conclusions with the bayonet, with which we were much +better supplied than they. That regiment advanced in splendid +style until it received the enemy's fire, then the command "Charge!" +was forgotten, and the regiment halted and commenced firing. Thus +I found myself "between two fires." But the brave boys in my rear +could see me, and I don't believe I was in any danger from their +muskets, yet I felt less "out of place" when I had passed around +the flank of a company and stood in rear of the line. I there +witnessed, for the only time in my experience, one of those remarkable +instances of a man too brave to think of running away, and yet too +much frightened to be able to fight. He was loading his musket +and firing in the air with great rapidity. When I took hold of +his arm and shook him, calling his attention to what he was doing, +he seemed as if aroused from a trance, entirely unconscious of what +had happened. + +This circumstance recalls the familiar story of two comrades in +the ranks, the one apparently unmoved, the other pale and trembling. +The first said: "Why, you seem to be scared!" "Yes," replied the +other; "if you were half as scared as I am, you would run away!" + +A few minutes later I went toward the right to rejoin my chief, +and found his lifeless body a few feet in rear of the line, in +charge of his faithful orderly, Lehman, who was mourning bitterly +and loudly the death of the great soldier whom he adored. At that +supremely critical moment--for the fight was then raging with great +fury--my only thought was the apprehension that the troops might +be injuriously affected if they learned of the death of the commander +who had so soon won their profound respect and confidence. I chided +poor Lehman for his outcry, and ordered that the body be taken +quietly to the rear, and that no one be told of the general's death. + +Thus fell one of our bravest and truest soldiers and patriots, a +man who had no fear of death, but who could not endure defeat. +Upon Lyon's fall, Major Sturgis became the senior officer of military +education and experience present. Several of the senior volunteer +officers had been wounded and carried from the field. Who was the +actual senior in rank on the ground was not easy to ascertain in +the midst of a fierce engagement. It was no time to make experiments +with untried military genius. + +I captured a "secesh" horse found running loose,--for my own horse +had been killed and I had been afoot quite a long time,--mounted +him, and as son as the state of the contest would permit, I rode +to Major Sturgis, informed him of Lyon's death, and told him he +must assume the command, which he accordingly did. It afterward +appeared that there was one lieutenant-colonel of volunteers +remaining on the field, but neither he nor any one else thought of +questioning the propriety of Major Sturgis's taking the command. +Soon after Lyon's death the enemy was repulsed, but then seemed to +gather up all his remaining strength for a last effort. His final +attack was heavier than any of the preceding, but it was more firmly +met by our troops and completely repulsed. There is probably no +room for doubt that the enemy was beaten if we had but known it; +but the battle-field was covered with timber and underbrush, so +that nothing could be seen beyond a few hundred yards. Our troops +were nearly out of ammunition, and exhausted by a night march and +by six hours' hard fighting without breakfast. + +It did not seem possible to resist another such attack as the last, +and there was no apparent assurance that another would not be made. +Hence Major Sturgis decided to withdraw from the field while he +was free to do so. The movement was effected without opposition, +the wounded were brought off, and the command returned to Springfield +in the afternoon. This retreat was undoubtedly an error, and the +battle of Wilson's Creek must be classed as a defeat for the Union +army. The error was a failure to estimate the effect that must +have been produced upon the enemy as well as upon ourselves by so +much hard fighting. It was only necessary to hold our ground, +trusting to the pluck and endurance of our men, and the victory +would have been ours. Had Lyon, who was in the front of the line +of battle when wounded as well as when killed, appreciated this +fact and acted upon it, instead of throwing his life away, it is +safe to say he would have won a brilliant victory. + + A QUESTION OF COMMAND DURING THE RETREAT + +On the march from the battle-field the main body was joined by the +remnant of Sigel's brigade, which had made a complete circuit in +rear of the enemy's position. They were without brigade or regimental +commanders, and were escorted by a troop of regular cavalry. On +our arrival in Springfield it was found that Colonel Sigel and +Colonel Salomon, commanding the 5th Missouri Regiment, of Sigel's +brigade, had arrived in town some hours before. Major Sturgis then +relinquished the command to Colonel Sigel, and it was determined +to retreat toward Rolla next morning. Sigel's brigade was placed +in advance, and Sturgis's brigade of regulars was assigned the +important post of rear-guard. This order of march was continued +during three days, and the march was so conducted that while the +advance would reach camp at a reasonable hour and be able to get +supper and rest, the rear-guard, and even the main body, would be +kept in the road until late in the night, and then, unable to find +their wagons, be compelled to lie down without food. The clamor +for relief from this hardship became so general that Major Sturgis +determined to resume the command, justifying this action upon the +ground that Colonel Sigel, although mustered into the United States +service, had no commission from any competent authority. Colonel +Sigel protested against this assumption of Major Sturgis, but the +latter was so manifestly sustained by the great majority of the +officers of the army that Colonel Sigel quietly submitted. + +One of Sigel's officers proposed that the question of title to the +command be put to a vote of the assembled officers. Sturgis objected +on the ground that the vote might possibly be in favor of Sigel. +"Then," said Sturgis, "some of you might refuse to obey my orders, +and I should be under the necessity of shooting you." + +The march was continued under Sturgis's command, and the column +arrived at Rolla on August 19, nine days after the battle. Here +the little Army of the West, after its short but eventful career, +disappeared in the much larger army which Major-General Fremont +was then organizing.( 1) + +My knowledge of the operations conducted by General Fremont in +Missouri is so slight that I must confine myself to some account +of those minor affairs with which I was personally concerned. + +My duties as assistant adjutant-general ceased when Major Sturgis +resumed command on August 13. I then took command of my regiment, +the 1st Missouri, the colonel and lieutenant-colonel being absent, +the latter on account of wounds received at Wilson's Creek. Soon +after our arrival at Rolla the regiment was ordered to St. Louis, +to be converted into an artillery regiment. I was employed in the +reorganization and equipment of batteries until September 16, when +General Fremont ordered me to visit Cincinnati, Pittsburg, Washington, +West Point, and such other places in the East as I might find +necessary, to procure guns, harness, etc., to complete the equipment +of the regiment. + +While in St. Louis after the battle of Wilson's Creek, I learned +much in confirmation of the opinion of the character and ability +of General Fremont which had very generally been held in the army. + + ORIGIN OF THE OPPOSITION OF THE BLAIRS TO FReMONT + +Immediately after my arrival Colonel Frank P. Blair, Jr., said he +wanted me to go with him to see Fremont; so we went the next morning. +The headquarters palace was surrounded by a numerous guard, and +all ingress by the main entrance appeared to be completely barred. +But Blair had some magic word or sign by which we passed the +sentinels at the basement door. Ascending two flights of stairs, +we found the commanding general with a single secretary or clerk +occupying the suite of rooms extending from front to rear of the +building. The general received me cordially, but, to my great +surprise, no questions were asked, nor any mention made, of the +bloody field from which I had just come, where Lyon had been killed, +and his army, after a desperate battle, compelled to retreat. I +was led at once to a large table on which maps were spread out, +from which the general proceeded to explain at length the plans of +the great campaign for which he was then preparing. Colonel Blair +had, I believe, already been initiated, but I listened attentively +for a long time, certainly more than an hour, to the elucidation +of the project. In general outline the plan proposed a march of +the main Army of the West through southwestern Missouri and +northwestern Arkansas to the valley of the Arkansas River, and +thence down that river to the Mississippi, thus turning all the +Confederate defenses of the Mississippi River down to and below +Memphis. As soon as the explanation was ended Colonel Blair and +I took our leave, making our exit through the same basement door +by which we had entered. We walked down the street for some time +in silence. The Blair turned to me and said: "Well, what do you +think of him?" I replied, in words rather too strong to repeat in +print, to the effect that my opinion as to his wisdom was the same +as it had always had been. Blair said: "I have been suspecting +that for some time." + +It was a severe blow to the whole Blair family--the breaking, by +the rude shock of war, of that idol they had so much helped to set +up and make the commander of a great army. From that day forward +there was no concealment of the opposition of the Blairs to Fremont. + +I had another occasion at that time to learn something important +as to Fremont's character. He had ordered me to convert the 1st +Regiment of Missouri Volunteer Infantry into an artillery regiment. +I had organized eight batteries and used all the field-guns I could +get. There remained in the arsenal a battery of new rifled guns +which Fremont had purchased in Europe. I applied to him personally +for those guns, telling him I had a well-disciplined company of +officers and men ready to man them. He gave me the order without +hesitation, but when I went to the arsenal I found an order there +countermanding the order he had given me. I returned to headquarters, +and easily obtained a renewal of the order to issue the guns to +me. Determining to get ahead this time, I took the quickest +conveyance to the arsenal, but only to find that the telegraph had +got ahead of me--the order was again countermanded. The next day +I quietly inquired at headquarters about the secret of my repeated +disappointment, and learned that some foreign adventurer had obtained +permission to raise a company of artillery troops and wanted those +new rifled guns. It was true the company had not been raised, but +I thought that would probably make no difference, so I never +mentioned the matter to the general again. Instead I planned a +flank movement which proved far more successful than the direct +attack could possibly have been. I explained to General Fremont +the great need of field-guns and equipment for his army, and +suggested that if ordered East I might by personal efforts obtain +all he needed. He at once adopted my suggestion, bade me sit down +at a desk in his room and write the necessary order, and he signed +it without reading. I readily obtained twenty-four new rifled +Parrott guns, and soon had them in service in the Western Department, +in lieu of the six guns I had failed to get from the St. Louis +Arsenal. + +When I had accomplished this duty and returned to St. Louis, where +I arrived in the early part of October, 1861, General Fremont had +taken the field in the central part of Missouri, with the main body +of his army, in which were eight batteries of my regiment. I was +instructed to remain in St. Louis and complete the organization +and equipment of the regiment upon the arrival of guns and equipments +procured in the East. + + AFFAIR AT FREDERICKTOWN + +It was while waiting for the expected guns that a demand for +artillery came from Colonel W. P. Carlin, commanding a brigade at +Pilot Knob and threatened with an attack by a Confederate force +under Jeff. Thompson. The latter had already made a raid in Carlin's +rear, and interfered seriously with the communication to St. Louis. +In the nervous condition of the military as well as the public mind +at that time, even St. Louis was regarded as in danger. + +There was no organized battery in St. Louis, but there were officers +and men enough belonging to the different batteries of the 1st +Missouri, and recruits, to make a medium-sized company. They had +been instructed in the school of the piece, but no more. I hastily +put them upon the cars, with four old smooth-bore bronze guns, +horses that had never been hitched to a piece, and harness that +had not been fitted to the horses. Early next morning we arrived +at the Big River where the bridge had been burned, unloaded the +battery and horses by the use of platforms extemporized from railroad +ties, hitched up, and forded the river. On the other side we +converted platform-cars into stock-cars, loaded up, and arrived at +Pilot Knob the next morning (October 20). The enemy was understood +to be at Fredericktown, about twenty miles distant, and Colonel +Carlin determined to march that night and attack him at daylight +the next morning. Carlin's command consisted of the 8th Wisconsin +Volunteers, 21st Illinois Volunteers, parts of the 33d and 38th +Illinois Volunteers, 350 of the 1st Indiana Cavalry, one company +of Missouri Cavalry, and six pieces of artillery (including two +old iron guns which he had managed to make available in addition +to the four from St. Louis). His total force was about 3000 men. +The enemy's strength was supposed to be about the same, but it +turned out that he had only four old iron guns, so we had the +advantage of him in artillery at least. + + AFFAIR AT FREDERICKTOWN + +The head of our column reached the vicinity of Fredericktown some +time before daylight, and the troops lay upon their arms until +dawn. Upon entering the town in the morning, no enemy was found, +and citizens reported that he had marched south the day before. +The troops were ordered to rest in the village, and Colonel Carlin, +who was not well, went to bed in the hotel. Some hours later, I +think near noon, Colonel J. B. Plummer, with a brigade of infantry +and two pieces of artillery from Cape Girardeau, arrived at +Fredericktown. I am not aware whether this junction was expected +by the respective commanders, or what orders they had received from +department headquarters. Soon after Colonel Plummer arrived I was +summoned to the presence of the two commanders and requested to +decide a question of rank between them. It appeared that Colonel +Carlin had the older date as colonel of volunteers, while Colonel +Plummer was commanding, by special assignment of General Fremont, +a brigade in which at least one of the colonels was senior, not +only to him, but also to Colonel Carlin. It was clear enough that +according to the Articles of War this senior colonel of the Cape +Girardeau brigade should command the combined forces; but that +would be in plain disregard of General Fremont's order, the authority +for which nobody knew, but in comparison with which the Articles +of War or the Army Regulations were at that time regarded as +practically of trifling consequence. The question was settled, or +rather avoided (for there was no satisfactory settlement of it), +by the proposition that Colonel Plummer, who proposed to go in +pursuit of the enemy, should take with him, besides his own brigade, +such portion of Colonel Carlin's as he (Plummer) thought necessary, +Colonel Carlin, who was sick, remaining behind with the remainder. +Accordingly, early in the afternoon Plummer's column started in +pursuit. It had hardly got well out of the village when the head +of column received a volley from the enemy drawn up in line of +battle. How long the enemy had been in that position I have never +learned; but it is certain that his presence there was not even +suspected by our commander, who supposed him to be in full retreat. +This mistake, however, did not seem to cost us anything, except +perhaps the loss of a few men at the head of the column in the +first volley. Colonel Plummer quickly formed his troops; Carlin +jumped out of bed and galloped to the front, followed by those who +had remained in town. The volunteers, who had not yet been in +battle, threw off their knapsacks, blankets, and overcoats, and +went into action most gallantly. The engagement was sharp for a +few moments, and resulted in considerable loss on both sides; but +the enemy soon gave way and retreated in disorder. The pursuit +was continued several miles, and until near night, when a recall +was ordered, and our troops returned to the town to pick up their +trappings and get their supper. + +The next morning Colonel Plummer continued his pursuit. I left my +extemporized battery, under Captain Manter, with Colonel Carlin, +and returned to St. Louis.( 2) + +[( 1) My official report and others are published in the War Records, +Vol. III.] + +[( 2) For the official reports, see the War Records, Vol. III.] + + +CHAPTER IV +Halleck Relieves Fremont of the Command in Missouri--A Special +State Militia--Brigadier-General of the Missouri Militia--A +Hostile Committee Sent to Washington--The Missouri Quarrel of +1862--In Command of the "Army of the Frontier"--Absent Through +Illness--Battle of Prairie Grove--Compelled to be Inactive-- +Transferred to Tennessee--In Command of Thomas's Old Division of +the Fourteenth Corps--Reappointed Major-General--A Hibernian +"Striker." + +On November 19, 1861, Major-General H. W. Halleck relieved Major- +General Fremont of the command of the Department of the Mississippi. +On November 21 I was appointed brigadier-general of volunteers, +and reported to General Halleck for duty. + +In the spring of 1861 a convention of the State of Missouri had +assembled at St. Louis to consider the question of secession, and +had decided to adhere to the Union. Nevertheless, the governor, +Claiborne Fox Jackson, and the executive officers had joined the +rebellion and fled from the State. The convention reassembled on +July 20, and organized a provisional government. Hamilton R. Gamble +was chosen provisional governor, and intrusted with very large +powers. He was a sterling patriot, a man of ability and of the +highest character in his public and private relations, much too +conservative on the questions of States' rights and slavery to suit +the "radical" loyalists of that time, but possessing probably in +a higher degree than any other citizen of Missouri the confidence +of all classes of Union men in the State. + + A SPECIAL STATE MILITIA + +One of Governor Gamble's first important public acts was to seek +and obtain from President Lincoln authority to raise a special +force of State militia, to be employed only in defense of the State, +but to be paid, equipped, and supplied in all respects by the United +States. This force was to be organized in conformity with the +militia laws of the State, was to include an adjutant-general, a +quartermaster-general, and three aides-de-camp to the governor, +one major-general and his staff, and a brigadier-general and staff +for each brigade. The number of regiments, aggregate strength and +arms of service were not specified. + +By the terms of this arrangement the force would remain subject to +the governor's command; but at the suggestion of Major-General +McClellan, then general-in-chief, to avoid possible conflict of +command it was stipulated by the President that the commanding +general of the department should be ex-officio major-general of +the militia. And it is due to the memory of Governor Gamble to +say that although partizan enemies often accused him of interfering +with the operations of the militia in the interest of his supposed +political views, there never was, while I was in command of the +militia, the slightest foundation for such accusation. He never +attempted to interfere in any manner with the legitimate exercise +of the authority of the commanding general, but was, on the contrary, +governed by the commander's views and opinions in the appointment +and dismissal of officers and in other matters in which his own +independent authority was unquestioned. This authority, given by +the President, was subsequently confirmed by act of Congress, by +which the force was limited to 10,000 men. + +As stated above, I was appointed brigadier-general, to date from +November 21, 1861; and on November 27 was assigned by General Halleck +to the "command of all the militia of the State," and charged with +the duty of raising, organizing, etc., the special force which had +been authorized by the President. + +The organization of the militia was not completed until about the +middle of April, 1862, when the aggregate force was 13,800 men, +consisting of fourteen regiments and two battalions of cavalry +(mounted riflemen), one regiment of infantry, and one battery of +artillery. But the troops were enrolled mainly in the districts +where their services were required. As rapidly as companies were +organized and equipped, they were put in the field with the United +States troops then occupying the State, and thus rapidly acquired, +by active service with older troops, the discipline and instruction +necessary to efficiency, so that by the time the organization was +completed this body of troops was an efficient and valuable force. + + BRIGADIER-GENERAL OF THE MISSOURI MILITIA + +My official report, made on December 7, 1862,( 1) to the department +commander and the general-in-chief, gives a detailed account of +the purely military operations of that period. But many matters +less purely military which entered largely into the history of that +time deserve more than a passing notice. + +During the short administration of General Fremont in Missouri, +the Union party had split into two factions, "radical" and +"conservative," hardly less bitter in their hostility to each other +than to the party of secession. The more advanced leaders of the +radicals held that secession had abolished the constitution and +all laws restraining the powers of the government over the people +of the Confederate States, and even over disloyal citizens of States +adhering to the Union. They advocated immediate emancipation of +the slaves, and confiscation by military authority of all property +of "rebels and rebel sympathizers"--that is to say, of all persons +not of the radical party, for in their partizan heat they disdained +to make any distinction between "conservatives," "copperheads," +and "rebels." So powerful and persistent was the radical influence +that even so able a lawyer as Edwin M. Stanton, then Secretary of +War, was constrained to send an order to the commander of the +District of Missouri, directing him to execute the act of Congress +of July 17, 1862, relative to the confiscation of property of +persons engaged in the rebellion, although the law provided for +its execution in the usual way by the judicial department of the +government, and gave no shadow of authority for military action. + +It is only necessary here to remark that the order was not, as it +could not be lawfully, obeyed. Action under it was limited to the +securing of property subject to confiscation, and liable to be +removed or otherwise disposed of, and the collection of evidence +for the use of the judicial officers. The following is Secretary +Stanton's order sent by telegraph, September 5, 1862: + +"It is represented that many disloyal persons residing at St. Louis +and elsewhere in your command are subject to the provisions of the +Confiscation Act, and that it would be expedient to enforce against +them the provisions of that act. You are instructed to enforce +that act within your command, and will please send directions for +that purpose to your provost-marshal." + +In compliance with the Secretary's instructions, I issued an order, +on September 11, providing for the action above stated, and no +further. + +These instructions from the Secretary of War were subsequently +repudiated by President Lincoln; but in the meantime they produced +serious evil under my successor, who fully enforced them by apparently +committing the national administration to the extreme radical +doctrine, and making the military commander in Missouri appear to +be acting not in harmony with the President's views. So far as I +know, this subject does not appear to have been submitted to the +President until some time in 1863, after Major-General Curtis, as +department commander, had for some months carried out the radical +theory of military confiscation, and I, as his successor, had put +a stop to it. Then an appeal was made to the President, and he, +in his celebrated letter of instructions of October 1, 1863, directed +the military to have nothing to do with the matter. + +The State administration of Missouri, under its conservative +governor, was of course sternly opposed to this radical policy, +including the forced liberation of slaves, for which there was at +that time no warrant of law or executive authority. A simple sense +of duty compelled the military commander to act in these matters +more in harmony with the State government than with the radical +party, and in radical eyes he thus became identified with their +enemies, the conservatives. + +This gave rise on August 4, 1862, to a meeting of prominent citizens +of St. Louis, who adopted resolutions, of the most important of +which the following was reported to be a true copy: + +"_Resolved_, That a committee of gentlemen be requested to go to +Washington City to urge upon the President the appointment of a +commander of the military forces of this State who will, under +instructions, act with vigor in suppressing the guerillas of this +State, and with authority to enlist the militia of the State into +the service of the United States." + + A HOSTILE COMMITTEE SENT TO WASHINGTON + +The chair appointed, as the committee to go to Washington, Henry +T. Blow, John C. Vogle, I. H. Sturgeon, and Thomas O'Reilley, and +authorized Mr. Blow to add to this committee any other "true Union +man" who would go. Who, if any, besides Messrs. Blow, Vogle, and +O'Reilley actually composed the committee, I was never informed. +On August 10, Halleck, then general-in-chief, telegraphed me from +Washington: "There is a deputation here from Colonel Blair and +others asking for your removal on account of inefficiency." + +Colonel Blair happened into my office a few minutes after the +receipt of the despatch on the 11th, and I handed it to him. He +at once said in substance, and with feeling: "That is not true. +No one is authorized to ask in my name for your removal"; and he +sent a despatch to that effect to General Halleck. + +The next day (August 12) despatches were exchanged between General +Halleck and Colonel Blair, of which the latter furnished me a copy, +inclosed with the following note from himself: + + "St. Louis, Mo., August 13th, '62. +"Brig.-Gen'l Schofield. + +"Dear Schofield: I inclose you a copy of a despatch (marked 'A') +received yesterday from Major-General Halleck, and my answer thereto, +marked 'B'. + + "Yours, + "Frank P. Blair, Jr." + +Copy "A." + +"To Hon. F. P. Blair, + + "August 12, 1862. + "(By telegraph from War Dep't.) + "Washington, 12:50 P.M. +"The committee from St. Louis--Henry T. Blow, John C. Vogle, and +Thomas O'Reilley--told me, in presence of the President, that they +were authorized by you to ask for Gen. Schofield's removal for +inefficiency. The Postmaster-General has to-day sent me a letter +from Mr. ----, asking that you be put in Gen. Schofield's place. +There has been no action in this or on the papers presented by the +above-named committee. + + "H. W. Halleck, + "General-in-chief." + +Copy "B." + + "St. Louis, Mo., August 12th, 1862. +"Major-General Halleck, + "General-in-chief, Washington City, D. C.: + +"I despatched to you yesterday, and wrote the Postmaster-General +last week. Let the letter be submitted to you. Nobody is authorized +to ask in my name for Gen'l Schofield's removal. I think the State +military organization should be abandoned as soon as practicable, +and a military commander, in this State, authorized to act without +respect to Gov. Gamble. I do not want the place, but want the +commander in the State to be instructed to act without any regard +to the State authorities. + + "Frank P. Blair, Jr." + +The foregoing gives, so far as I know it, the essence of the Missouri +quarrel of 1862. I have never had the curiosity to attempt to +ascertain how far the meeting of August 4 was hostile to me +personally. + +During the time, subsequent to General Halleck's departure for +Washington, July 23, 1862, that the Department of the Mississippi +was left without any immediate commander, there appears to have +been a contest in Washington between the military and the political +influence, relative to the disposition to be made of that important +command. The following from General Halleck to me, dated September +9, 1862, indicates the situation at that time: + +"(Unofficial.) + +"My dear Gen'l: + +"There has been a strong political pressure of outsiders to get +certain parties put in command of new Dep'ts to be made out of the +old Dep't of the Miss. The presence of the enemy and the danger +of the capital have for the moment suspended these political +intrigues, or rather prevented the accomplishment of their objects. +If any one of our Western Gen'ls would do something creditable and +brilliant in the present crisis, it would open the way to a new +organization such as it should be. + +"From the position of St. Louis as the source of supplies, Missouri +ought not to be separated from Arkansas and western Tennessee. +What will be done in the matter I do not know. + + "Yours truly, + "H. W. Halleck." + +None of "our Western generals" had then done anything very "creditable +and brilliant." Even Grant was the object of grave charges and +bitter attacks. Powerful influences were at work to supersede him +in command of the army in west Tennessee. Had there been any +available general at that time capable of commanding public +confidence, the military idea would doubtless have prevailed, but +in the absence of such a leader the politicians triumphed in part. + + IN COMMAND OF THE "ARMY OF THE FRONTIER" + +The old department, called Department of the Mississippi, was +divided, and Major-General Samuel R. Curtis was assigned to command +the new Department of the Missouri, composed of the territory west +of the Mississippi River. For some months the radicals had it all +their own way, and military confiscation was carried on without +hindrance. + +When this change occurred I was in the field in immediate command +of the forces which I had assembled there for aggressive operations, +and which General Curtis named the "Army of the Frontier." My +official report of December 7, 1862, gave a full account of the +operations of that army up to November 20, when sickness compelled +me to relinquish the command. + +As will be seen from that report and from my correspondence with +General Curtis at that time, it was then well known that the enemy +was concentrating in the Arkansas valley all the troops he could +raise, and making preparations to return across the Boston Mountains +and "dispute with us the possession of northwestern Arkansas and +southwestern Missouri"; and I had placed my troops where they could +live to a great extent on the country, and quickly concentrate to +meet the enemy when he should advance. But General Curtis ordered +me to move north and east with two divisions, leaving Blunt with +one division to occupy that country. It was on this return march +that I was overtaken by a severe attack of bilious fever. + +As my official report of December 7, 1862, is published in Volume +XIII of the War Records, I make no reference here to the operations +covered by it. That able and impartial historian, the Comte de +Paris, published a very accurate history of the operations in +Missouri in the summer of 1862, in which he paid me the compliment, +which a soldier values so highly, of saying that I was free from +partizan passion. + +It was during my absence through illness that Hindman made his +expected advance. Blunt's division was encamped at Cane Hill, and +Hindman crossed the mountains at Lee's Creek, aiming to reach +Blunt's rear, cut off his retreat, and overwhelm him. + + BATTLE OF PRAIRIE GROVE + +Fortunately, Blunt had received information in advance of the +intended movement, and had called the two divisions from Missouri +to his support. These two divisions, under General Herron, were +encamped at Wilson's Creek, a distance of about 116 miles. On the +morning of December 3 they began their march to join General Blunt. +They had reached a point about six miles south of Fayetteville, +when, unexpectedly to both, Herron's and Hindman's heads of column +met at Prairie Grove about seven o'clock in the morning of December +7, and the engagement commenced immediately. Blunt, hearing the +sound of battle, moved rapidly toward Prairie Grove and attacked +the enemy's left. The battle lasted all day, with heavy losses on +both sides, and without any decided advantage to either side. At +dark the enemy still held his position, but in the morning was +found to be in full retreat across the mountains. A portion of +our troops occupied the battle-field of Prairie Grove when I resumed +command on December 29, and the remainder were making a raid to +the Arkansas River, where they destroyed some property, and found +that Hindman had retreated toward Little Rock. It was evident that +the campaign in that part of the country for that season was ended. +The question was "What next?" I took it for granted that the large +force under my command--nearly 16,000 men--was not to remain idle +while Grant or some other commander was trying to open the Mississippi +River; and I was confirmed in this assumption by General Curtis's +previous order to march eastward with two divisions, which order, +though premature when given, might now be renewed without danger. +At once, therefore, I set to work to organize a suitable force, +including the Indian regiments, to hold the country we had gained, +and three good divisions to prosecute such operations as might be +determined on, and at once commenced the march north and east toward +the theater of future active operations. + +Although I had at first esteemed General Blunt much more highly +than he deserved, and had given him most liberal commendation in +my official report for all he had done, I became satisfied that he +was unfit in any respect for the command of a division of troops +against a disciplined enemy. As was my plain duty, I suggested +confidentially to General Curtis that the command of a division in +the field was not General Blunt's true place, and that he be assigned +to the District of Kansas, where I permitted him to go, at his own +request, to look after his personal interests. General Curtis +rebuked me for making such a suggestion, and betrayed my confidence +by giving my despatch to James H. Lane, senator from Kansas, and +others of Blunt's political friends, thus putting me before the +President and the United States Senate in the light of unjust +hostility to gallant officers who had just won a great victory over +the enemy at Prairie Grove. The result of this, and of radical +influence in general, was that my nomination as major-general of +volunteers, then pending in the Senate, was not confirmed, while +both Blunt and Herron were nominated and confirmed as major- +generals! + +Such as Lane and Blunt were the men who so long seemed to control +the conduct of military affairs in the West, and whom I found much +more formidable enemies than the hostile army in my front. Herron +I esteemed a very different man from Blunt, and thought he would, +with experience, make a good division commander. But circumstances +occurred soon after which shook my confidence in his character as +well as in that of General Curtis. Herron and some of his staff- +officers were subpoenaed, through department headquarters, as +material witnesses for the defense in the case of an officer on +trial before a military commission. They failed to appear. Soon +after, when Herron was assigned to command the Army of the Frontier, +he "dissolved" the commission "for the present," adding: "The +court will be reassembled by order from these headquarters in the +field when witnesses not at present to be had can be brought +forward." Upon learning this, after I assumed command of the +department I ordered Herron to report for duty to General Grant +before Vicksburg. In the meantime Herron wrote to the War Department +protesting against serving under me as department commander, and +got a sharp rebuke from the President through the Secretary of War. +This brief explanation is all that seems necessary to show the +connection between the several events as they appear in the official +records. + + COMPELLED TO BE INACTIVE + +After the battle of Prairie Grove, being then in St. Louis, I asked +General Curtis to let me go down the Mississippi and join the +expedition against Vicksburg, saying that as Blunt and Herron had +won a battle in my absence, I did not wish to resume command over +them. But Curtis would not consent to this; he said he wanted me +to command the Army of the Frontier. He thus invited the confidence +which he afterward betrayed, and for which he rebuked me. I felt +outraged by this treatment, and thereafter did not feel or show +toward General Curtis the respect or subordination which ought to +characterize the relations of an officer toward his commander. +This feeling was intensified by his conduct in the Herron affair, +and by the determination gradually manifested not to permit me or +my command to do anything. He for a long time kept up a pretense +of wanting me to move east or west, or south, or somewhere, but +negatived all my efforts actually to move. The situation seemed +to me really unendurable: I was compelled to lie at Springfield +all the latter part of winter, with a well-appointed army corps +eager for active service, hundreds of miles from any hostile force, +and where we were compelled to haul our own supplies, in wagons, +over the worst of roads, 120 miles from the railroad terminus at +Rolla. I could not get permission even to move nearer the railroad, +much less toward the line of which the next advance must be made; +and this while the whole country was looking with intense anxiety +for the movement that was to open the Mississippi to the Gulf, and +the government was straining every nerve to make that movement +successful. Hence I wrote to General Halleck the letters of January +31, 1863, and February 3. These appear to have called forth some +correspondence between Generals Halleck and Curtis, of which General +Halleck's letter of February 18 was the only part that came into +my possession.( 2) This account was written several years before +the War Records were published. + +In my letter of January 31, I said: + +"Pardon me for suggesting that the forces under command of Davidson, +Warren, and myself might be made available in the opening of the +Mississippi, should that result not be accomplished quickly. . . ." + +The immediate result of this correspondence was that some troops +were sent down the river, but none of my command, while two divisions +of the latter were ordered toward the east. This march was in +progress when Congress adjourned. The Senate not having confirmed +by appointment as major-general, the time of my temporary humiliation +arrived. But I had not relied wholly in vain upon General Halleck's +personal knowledge of my character. He had not been able fully to +sustain me against selfish intrigue in Kansas, Missouri, and +Washington; but he could and did promptly respond to my request, +and ordered me to Tennessee, where I could be associated with +soldiers who were capable of appreciating soldierly qualities. +One of the happiest days of my life was when I reported to Rosecrans +and Thomas at Murfreesboro', received their cordial welcome, and +was assigned to the command of Thomas's own old division of the +Fourteenth Corps. One of the most agreeable parts of my whole +military service was the thirty days in command of that division +at Triune, and some of my strongest and most valued army attachments +were formed there. + +But that happy period of soldier life was brief. Early in May +President Lincoln reappointed me major-general, with original date, +November 29, 1862, and ordered me back to the old scene of unsoldierly +strife and turmoil in Missouri and Kansas. + + A HIBERNIAN "STRIKER" + +In 1861 and 1862 I had a Hibernian "striker" who had been a soldier +of the old mounted rifles, and had been discharged on account of +a wound received in an Indian fight, but was yet well able to +perform the duties of an officer's servant in the field. His care +of his master's property, and sometimes of the master himself, was +very remarkable. In the midst of the battle of Wilson's Creek the +horse I was riding was killed, and I called in vain for my spare +horse. From the best information obtained I concluded that both +the horse and my faithful orderly had been killed, and I sincerely +mourned my loss. But after the fight was over I found my man +quietly riding the spare horse along with the troops, as if nothing +unusual had happened. When I upbraided him for his conduct and +demanded to know where he had been all that time, he replied: "Ah, +Major, when I saw the one horse killed I thought I'd better take +the other to a place of safety!" + +Where my efficient assistant obtained his supplies I never knew, +but he would fill without delay any requisition I might make, from +a shoe-string to a buffalo-robe. One day in 1862 I found in my +camp trunk several pairs of shoulder-straps belonging to the grades +of captain, major, and lieutenant-colonel. As I was then a brigadier- +general, I inquired of my man why he kept those badges of inferior +grades. He replied: "Ah, General, nobody can tell what may happen +to you." When, only a few months later, after having been promoted +to the rank of major-general I was again reduced to that of brigadier- +general, I remembered the forethought of my Irish orderly. + +[( 1) See War Records, Vol. XIII, p. 7.] + +[( 2) The whole correspondence may be found in the War Records, +Vol. XXII, part ii.] + + +CHAPTER V +In Command of the Department of the Missouri--Troops Sent to General +Grant--Satisfaction of the President--Conditions on which Governor +Gamble would Continue in Office--Anti-Slavery Views--Lincoln on +Emancipation in Missouri--Trouble Following the Lawrence Massacre +--A Visit to Kansas, and the Party Quarrel There--Mutiny in the +State Militia--Repressive Measures--A Revolutionary Plot. + +On May 24, 1863, I relieved General Curtis in command of the +Department of the Missouri. In his instructions of May 22, General +Halleck said: + +"You owe your appointment entirely to the choice of the President +himself. I have not, directly or indirectly, interfered in the +matter. But I fully concur in the choice, and will give you all +possible support and assistance in the performance of the arduous +duties imposed upon you." + + IN COMMAND OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI + +A few days later I received the following significant letter from +the President: + + "Executive Mansion, Washington, May 27, 1863. +"General J. M. Schofield: + +"My dear Sir: Having relieved General Curtis and assigned you to +the command of the Department of the Missouri, I think it may be +of some advantage for me to state to you why I did it. + +"I did not relieve General Curtis because of any full conviction +that he had done wrong by commission or omission. I did it because +of a conviction in my mind that the Union men of Missouri, +constituting, when united, a vast majority of the whole people, +have entered into a pestilent factional quarrel among themselves-- +General Curtis, perhaps not of choice, being the head of one faction, +and Governor Gamble that of the other. After months of labor to +reconcile the difficulty, it seemed to grow worse and worse, until +I felt it my duty to break it up somehow; and as I could not remove +Governor Gamble, I had to remove General Curtis. + +"Now that you are in the position, I wish you to undo nothing merely +because General Curtis or Governor Gamble did it, but to exercise +your own judgment and _do right_ for the public interest. + +"Let your military measures be strong enough to repel the invader +and keep the peace, and not so strong as to unnecessarily harass +and persecute the people. It is a difficult role, and so much +greater will be the honor if you perform it well. If both factions, +or neither, shall abuse you, you will probably be about right. +Beware of being assailed by one and praised by the other. + + "Yours truly, + "A. Lincoln." + +In acknowledging the President's letter on June 1, I concluded by +saying: + +"I have strong hopes that the Missouri State Convention, at its +approaching session, will adopt such measures for the speedy +emancipation of slaves as will secure the acquiescence of the large +majority of Union men, though perhaps not quite satisfactory to +either extreme. If this hope be realized, one of my most embarrassing +difficulties will be removed, or at least greatly diminished." + +The military problem in that department, as understood by me and +by my superiors in Washington, was at that time a comparatively +simple one, though my predecessor in command of the department +entertained different views. With my views of the military situation, +whether confined to my own department or extended to embrace the +entire country, there was but one course to pursue, namely, to send +all available forces to assist in the capture of Vicksburg and the +opening of the Mississippi to the gulf. After that I could easily +operate from points on the Mississippi as a base, capture Little +Rock and the line of the Arkansas, and then make that river the +base of future operations. + +Hence, in response to a request from General Halleck, I at once +sent to General Grant and other commanders at the front all the +troops I could possibly spare, saying at the same time that this +would leave me very weak, but that I was "willing to risk it in +view of the vast importance of Grant's success." + +Thus I began my military operations by stripping the department of +troops to the lowest possible defensive limit. But this was what +I had so earnestly urged before, when in a subordinate position; +and I was glad to do it when the responsibility rested upon me. +My loss of troops to Grant was returned with interest as soon as +practicable after Vicksburg had fallen, and I was then able to +advance a large force, under General Steele, for the capture of +Little Rock, resulting in holding the entire line of the Arkansas +River from that time forward. + +At the time I had met General Grant but once, and then only for a +moment, and I have always assumed that the timely aid sent him at +Vicksburg was the foundation for the kind and generous friendship +and confidence which he ever afterward manifested toward me, and +which, with the like manifestations of approval from President +Lincoln, are to me the most cherished recollections of my official +career. + + TROOPS SENT TO GENERAL GRANT + +The appreciation of my action in Washington was expressed by General +Halleck in a letter dated July 7, 1863, in which he said: "The +promptness with which you sent troops to General Grant gave great +satisfaction here"; and by the President himself, in a letter to +the "Hon. Charles D. Drake and others, committee," dated October +5, 1863, in which he wrote: "Few things have been so grateful to +my anxious feelings as when, in June last, the local force in +Missouri aided General Schofield to so promptly send a large general +force to the relief of General Grant, then investing Vicksburg and +menaced from without by General Johnston." + +It would have been impossible for me to send away more than a small +part of those troops if I had not been able to replace them by +Missouri militia. This General Curtis had probably been unable to +do because of the unfortunate antagonism between him and the State +government; and perhaps this much ought to be said in explanation +of his apparently selfish policy of retaining so many idle troops +in Missouri. For my part, I could see neither necessity nor excuse +for quarreling with the governor of Missouri, and thus depriving +myself and the nation of his legitimate aid. Governor Gamble was +perhaps "behind the times" in his views on the slavery question, +although decidedly in favor of gradual emancipation; and he was +utterly intolerant of those radical schemes for accomplishing ends +by lawless means, then so loudly advocated. I thought at the time +a more radical policy might possibly tend to harmonize the Union +factions and allay the excitement, and frequently told Governor +Gamble that it would be necessary to adopt a policy on the negro +question more in harmony with the views of the administration and +of the Northern people. To this the governor assented, and seemed +desirous of going as far in that direction as he could carry the +Union people of Missouri with him. From his seat in the State +Convention at Jefferson City he made a speech advocating emancipation +in a much shorter period than the convention could finally be +prevailed upon to adopt, while I was using my personal influence +with members to the same end. + +But it soon became evident that nothing would satisfy the radical +leaders short of the overthrow of the existing State government; +that a reconciliation of the quarrel between the "pestilent factions" +( 1) in Missouri, so much desired by Mr. Lincoln, was exactly what +the radicals did not want and would not have. Satisfied of this +and disgusted with the abuse heaped upon him by men who owed him +warm and honest support, Governor Gamble tendered his resignation +to the convention, then in session. His resignation was not +accepted, and by a "majority of the convention and multitudes of +private citizens" he was requested to withdraw it. In this request +I united, for I could see no possibility of improvement under any +governor that the convention--a very conservative body--might elect, +while the result might be confusion worse confounded. + + CONDITIONS OF GOVERNOR GAMBLE'S CONTINUING + +The governor submitted to me the following letter including conditions +upon which he would consent to continue in office: + +"Major-General Schofield. + +"General: For the purpose of restoring order and law and maintaining +the authority of the Federal and State governments in the State of +Missouri, it is necessary that we have an understanding as to the +most important measures to be adopted. + +"I have tendered my resignation as governor, and have been requested +to withdraw it on the ground that it is necessary to the peace and +quiet of the State that I remain in office. In this request you +have united with a majority of the convention and multitudes of +private citizens. I am willing to accede to the request, and, if +an ordinance of emancipation is passed, to remain in office, if on +the part of the government I can be sure of its co-operation in my +efforts to preserve the peace and remove all causes of dissension +and dissatisfaction from among the people. + +"I think it necessary that the following measures be adopted by +you as the commanding general of the department: + +"_First_. That it be distinctly made known that the provisional +government of the State is the government recognized by the government +of the United States, and that any attempt, in any way, to interfere +by violence, or by tumultuous assemblages, or in any other unlawful +manner, will be suppressed by the power of the government of the +United States. + +"_Second_. That the functions of civil government of the State +will be supported and upheld, and that the process of the State in +civil and criminal matters may be executed in all posts and +encampments of the troops of the United States, and that resistance +thereto by military persons shall be punished. + +"_Third_. That no recruiting of negroes within this State shall +be recognized, unless the persons recruiting them shall be able to +produce the written permission of the governor of the State; and +that any person attempting to recruit without such permission, if +he be in the military service shall be immediately prohibited from +all such conduct, and if in civil life shall be proceeded against +by the State authorities, without any interference by the military. + +"_Fourth_. That no countenance or encouragement shall be given to +provost-marshals, or others in military authority, in any proceedings +against the property of citizens, slaves included, upon the ground +of its being liable to confiscation; but the confiscation shall be +executed by the civil officers of the United States, as is directed +by the authorities at Washington. + +"When we arrive at a perfect understanding between ourselves, I am +willing to put myself in the same boat with you, and we will sink +or swim together. If you should be censured or removed from this +command because of what is done to carry these propositions into +effect, I will abandon office immediately . . . " + +To this I replied verbally that I could not enter into any agreement +as to the policy to be pursued by me as commander of the department; +that I must hold myself free to pursue such course as circumstances +should from time to time indicate, or such as might be ordered by +the President; my policy would be indicated from time to time by +my general orders; in some respects it would doubtless conflict +with that submitted by his Excellency. Nevertheless the governor +finally consented to withdraw his resignation. + +The convention at length passed an ordinance providing for the +gradual extinction of slavery in the State, and adjourned. The +feeling of bitterness between the opposing factions rather increased +than diminished during its session. + + ANTI-SLAVERY VIEWS + +The following letter to my friend Mr. Williams, which was published +in the New York and St. Louis papers with my consent, made sufficiently +clear the views I then entertained upon the slavery question, and +left no reasonable ground for any emancipationist to quarrel with +me on that subject, however much he may have been dissatisfied with +the action of the convention,--just as my letter of June 1 to the +President left him no room for doubt--if, indeed, he had entertained +any before--upon the question then deemed so important: + + "Headquarters, Dep't of the Missouri, + "St. Louis, June 1, 1863. +"J. E. Williams, Esq. + "Pres't Metropolitan Bank, New York. + +"My dear Sir: Professor Bartlett has informed me of the interest +you have manifested in my promotion and connection with this +department, and, above all, that you have done me the kindness to +assert my soundness on the important question of the day. + +"You are right in saying that I was an anti-slavery man, though +not an abolitionist, before the war. These terms have greatly +enlarged their relative meaning since the rebellion broke out. I +regard universal emancipation as one of the necessary consequences +of the rebellion, or rather as one of the means absolutely necessary +to a complete restoration of the Union--and this because slavery +was the great cause of the rebellion, and the only obstacle in the +way of a perfect union. The perception of these important truths +is spreading with almost astounding rapidity in this State. I have +great hope that the State Convention, which meets on the 15th +instant, will adopt some measure for the speedy emancipation of +slaves. If so, our difficulties will be substantially at an end. + +"When the popular mind seizes a great principle and resolves to +carry it into execution, it becomes impatient of the restraints +imposed by existing laws, and in its haste to break down the barriers +which stand in the way of its darling object, becomes regardless +of all law, and anarchy is the result. This is our difficulty +here. The people will have freedom for the slave. No law of the +United States nor of Missouri, nor yet any order of the President, +meets the case. + +"The loyal slave-owner demands that his rights _under the law_ be +protected. Let us have an ordinance of the State Convention which +will satisfy the demands of the popular mind, and no loyal man will +murmur. + +"You can imagine with what deep interest I look forward to the +legal settlement of this question, so deeply involving the success +of the great cause for the time being intrusted to my care. + +"In Arkansas and other States to which the President's proclamation +applies, so far as I have observed, no such difficulty exists. +The loyal people accept the decree without complaint, perfectly +willing to give up all they have for the Union. So much the greater +honor is due them for this cheerful sacrifice because they do not +and cannot be expected to appreciate and understand the principle +of freedom as it is impressed upon the loyal heart of the North. + +"Please accept my thanks for your kindness, and believe me, + + "Yours very truly," +(Signed) "J. M. Schofield." + +On June 20, I telegraphed to Mr. Lincoln: + +"The action of the Missouri State Convention upon the question of +emancipation will depend very much upon whether they can be assured +that their action will be sustained by the General Government and +the people protected in their slave property during the short time +that slavery is permitted to exist. Am I authorized in any manner, +directly or indirectly, to pledge such support and protection? + +"The question is of such vital importance to the peace of Missouri +that I deem it my duty to lay it before your Excellency." + + LINCOLN ON EMANCIPATION IN MISSOURI + +The following reply from the President fairly illustrates the wisdom +and justice of his views, and shows how perfectly I was in accord +with him in my desire to do what was wisest and best for the peace +of Missouri: + + "Executive Mansion, Washington, June 22, 1863. +"Genl. John M. Schofield. + +"My dear Sir: Your despatch, asking in substance whether, in case +Missouri shall adopt gradual emancipation, the General Government +will protect slave-owners in that species of property during the +short time it shall be permitted by the State to exist within it, +has been received. + +"Desirous as I am that emancipation shall be adopted by Missouri, +and believing as I do that _gradual_ can be made better than +_immediate_, for both black and white, except when military necessity +changes the case, my impulse is to say that such protection would +be given. I cannot know exactly what shape an act of emancipation +may take. If the period from the initiation to the final end should +be comparatively short, and the act should prevent persons being +sold during that period into more lasting slavery, the whole world +would be easier. I do not wish to pledge the General Government +to the affirmative support of even temporary slavery, beyond what +can be fairly claimed under the Constitution. I suppose, however, +this is not desired; but that it is desired for the military force +of the United States, while in Missouri, not to be used in subverting +the temporarily reserved legal rights in slaves during the progress +of emancipation. This I would desire also. I have very earnestly +urged the slave States to adopt emancipation; and it ought to be, +and is, an object with me not to overthrow or thwart what any of +them may in good faith do to that end. You are therefore authorized +to act in the spirit of this letter, in conjunction with what may +appear to be the military necessities of your department. + +"Although this letter will become public at some time, it is not +intended to be made so now. + + "Yours truly, + "A. Lincoln." + +My impression is that the nature of this quarrel in Missouri was +not fully understood at the time in Washington, as General Halleck +wrote me that neither of the factions was regarded as really friendly +to the President. But my belief is that they were then, as they +subsequently proved to be, divided on the Presidential question as +well as in State politics; that the conservative were sincere in +their friendship and support of Mr. Lincoln, and desired his +renomination, while the radicals were intriguing for Mr. Chase or +some other more radical man. + +This struggle between extreme radicalism and conservatism among +the Union men of Missouri was long and bitter, but I have nothing +to do with its history beyond the period of my command in that +department. It resulted, as is now well known, in the triumph of +radicalism in the Republican party, and the consequent final loss +of power by that party in the State. Such extremes could not fail +to produce a popular revulsion, and it required no great foresight +to predict the final result. + + TROUBLE FOLLOWING THE LAWRENCE MASSACRE + +The factions in Missouri gave the military commander trouble enough +in 1863; but to that was added the similar and hardly less troublesome +party quarrel in Kansas. I cannot give a more accurate account of +the complicated situation there than by quoting from my correspondence +and journal of that period. On August 28 I wrote to President +Lincoln as follows: + +"In reply to your telegram of the 27th, transmitting copy of one +received from two influential citizens of Kansas, I beg leave to +state some of the facts connected with the horrible massacre at +Lawrence, and also relative to the assault made upon me by a certain +class of influential politicians. + +"Since the capture of Vicksburg, a considerable portion of the +rebel army in the Mississippi valley has disbanded, and large +numbers of men have come back to Missouri, many of them doubtless +in hope of being permitted to remain at their former homes in peace, +while some have come under instructions to carry on a guerilla +warfare, and others, men of the worst character, become marauders +on their own account, caring nothing for the Union, nor for the +rebellion, except as the latter affords them a cloak for their +brigandage. + +"Under instructions from the rebel authorities, as I am informed +and believe, considerable bands, called "Border Guards," were +organized in the counties of Missouri bordering upon Kansas, for +the ostensible purpose of protecting those counties from inroads +from Kansas, and preventing the slaves of rebels from escaping from +Missouri into Kansas. These bands were unquestionably encouraged, +fed, and harbored by a very considerable portion of the people of +those border counties. Many of those people were in fact the +families of these "bushwhackers," who are brigands of the worst +type. + +"Upon the representation of General Ewing and others familiar with +the facts, I became satisfied there could be no cure for this evil +short of the removal from those counties of all slaves entitled to +their freedom, and of the families of all men known to belong to +these bands, and others who were known to sympathize with them. +Accordingly I directed General Ewing to adopt and carry out the +policy he had indicated, warning him, however, of the retaliation +which might be attempted, and that he must be fully prepared to +prevent it before commencing such severe measures. + +"Almost immediately after it became known that such policy had been +adopted, Quantrill secretly assembled from several of the border +counties of Missouri about 300 of his men. They met at a preconcerted +place of rendezvous near the Kansas line, at about sunset, and +immediately marched for Lawrence, which place they reached at +daylight the next morning. They sacked and burned the town and +murdered the citizens in the most barbarous manner. + +"It is easy to see that any unguarded town in a country where such +a number of outlaws can be assembled is liable to a similar fate, +if the villains are willing to risk the retribution which must +follow. In this case 100 of them have already been slain, and the +remainder are hotly pursued in all directions. If there was any +fault on the part of General Ewing, it appears to have been in not +guarding Lawrence. But of this it was not my purpose to speak. +General Ewing and the governor of Kansas have asked for a court of +inquiry, and I have sent to the War Department a request that one +may be appointed, and I do not wish to anticipate the result of a +full investigation. . . . + +"I am officially informed that a large meeting has been held at +Leavenworth, in which a resolution was adopted to the effect that +the people would assemble at a certain place on the border, on +September 8, for the purpose of entering Missouri to search for +their stolen property. Efforts have been made by the mayor of +Leavenworth to get possession of the ferry at that place, for the +purpose of crossing armed parties of citizens into north Missouri. + +"I have strong reasons for believing that the authors of the telegram +to you are among those who introduced and obtained the adoption of +the Leavenworth resolution, and who are endeavoring to organize a +force for the purpose of general retaliation upon Missouri. Those +who so deplore my 'imbecility' and 'incapacity' are the very men +who are endeavoring to bring about a collision between the people +of Kansas and the troops under General Ewing's command. + +"I have not the 'capacity' to see the wisdom or justice of permitting +an irresponsible mob to enter Missouri for the purpose of retaliation, +even for so grievous a wrong as that which Lawrence has suffered. + +"I have increased the force upon the border as far as possible, +and no effort has been, or will be, spared to punish the invaders +of Kansas, and to prevent such acts in the future. The force there +has been all the time far larger than in any other portion of my +department, except on the advanced line in Arkansas and the Indian +Territory. . . . + +"P. S. Since writing the above I have received the 'Daily Times' +newspaper, published at Leavenworth, containing an account of the +meeting referred to, and Senator Lane's speech, which I have the +honor to inclose herewith for your information." + +In a letter of that same date (August 28), Governor Carney informed +me, among other things, that "after the fearful disaster at Lawrence +and on the return of our troops who had pursued Quantrill and his +murderous band, General Ewing and General James H. Lane met at +Morristown and spent the night together. The latter returned to +Lawrence and called a mass meeting, at which he defended General +Ewing and made an intensely bitter speech against you. Yesterday +he arrived in this city, and soon after caused to be issued a +placard stating he would address the citizens on war matters. +There are two parties here--one for and the other against Ewing. +That against him is headed by Mr. Wilder, member of Congress, and +by Mr. Anthony, mayor of this city. This division put General Lane +in this dilemma here, that he could not defend Ewing as he had done +in Lawrence, and hence he devoted his whole attention to you. The +more violent of the men opposing you are for independent raids into +Missouri. How far General Lane encouraged this class you must +judge from the facts I have stated and from the inclosed speech. +To give tone and distinction to the meeting, General Lane offered +a resolution calling upon the President to relieve you, affirming +that there could be no safety in Kansas, no help for Kansas, unless +this was done. . . . You will judge from the facts stated, from +the course pursued by General Lane at Lawrence, and from his speech +here, how far General Ewing is your friend or fit to command this +district." + +On August 31, I started for the scene of the agitation. The +following extracts from my journal reveal the situation: + +"_Sept_. 2.--Reached Leavenworth at five o'clock A. M. Stopped at +the Planters' Hotel; was called upon by Governor Carney and several +of his political friends. Discussed at much length the condition +of affairs in the District of the Border. Carney is an aspirant +for the United States Senate. Intends to run against Lane. Desires +to kill off Ewing, considering him a formidable rival, or at least +a supporter of Lane. Ewing has determined not to be a candidate +at the next election, and will not commit himself in support of +either Carney or Lane. Desires to keep on good terms with Lane +because he thinks Lane will probably be re-elected. Carney +understands Ewing as supporting Lane, or at least of having withdrawn +in Lane's favor. In fact, Ewing refuses an alliance with Carney. +Carney therefore desires to kill Ewing. Lane finds it to his +interest to sustain Ewing so long as Schofield commands the +department. Ewing is a better man for Lane than any other Schofield +would be likely to give him. Lane's desire is to remove Schofield +and get in his place a general who would place Kansas under command +of one of Lane's tools, or a man who could be made one by Lane; +therefore Lane defends Ewing and concentrates his attack upon +Schofield. . . . + +"Asked and obtained a long private interview with Lane. Went over +the whole ground of his hostility to Genl. S. during the past year. +Showed him the injustice he had done Genl. S., and how foolish and +unprofitable to himself his hostility had been. He stated with +apparent candor that he had bent the whole energies of his soul to +the destruction of Genl. S.; had never labored harder to accomplish +any object in his life. Said he had been evidently mistaken in +the character and principles of Genl. S., and that no man was more +ready than he to atone for a fault. We then approached the subject +of the invasion of Missouri by the people of Kansas. Genl. Lane +still adheres to his design of collecting the people at Paola and +leading them on an expedition "for the purpose of searching for +their stolen property." He professes his ability to control the +people; that he would be answerable, and offered to pledge himself +to Genl. S. and the government that they should do nothing beyond +that which he declares as the object of the expedition. . . . + +"Lane was informed that Genl. S. would go to Kansas City the next +day, and Lane replied that he intended to go also. It was agreed +that both should go the next morning and converse with Genl. Ewing +on the subject. The same evening Genl. Lane made a public speech +in Leavenworth, in which he urged the people to meet at Paola, and +assured them that the department and district commanders would not +interfere with the proposed expedition; on the contrary, that both +would countenance and co-operate with it. He also proclaimed the +object to be to lay waste the border counties of Missouri and +exterminate the disloyal people. This statement, following an +interview on that subject, was calculated to mislead a large number +of well-disposed people who would not for a moment think of acting +in opposition to military rules, and to greatly increase the number +of people who would assemble at Paola, and seriously complicate +the difficulty. + +"In the evening had another interview with Gov. Carney and some of +his friends. My main object was to secure the full co-operation +of the State government in preventing the invasion of Missouri. +For this purpose I had to consult to a considerable degree the +political views and aims of the governor and his friends. Their +object was, of course, to make out of Lane's project as much capital +as possible against him. It was held by many of them that Lane +had no serious design of entering Missouri; that he expected, of +course, that the military authorities would forbid it; and that he +would yield as a military necessity, and thus gain with his people +additional ground for condemnation of the department commander, +while he had the credit of having done all he possibly could to +enable them to 'recover their stolen property.' . . . Viewing +matters in this light, the governor and his advisers were strongly +inclined to the opinion that the surest way of making capital for +themselves out of Lane's move was to let him go on with it, without +any interference on their part, confident that it would turn out +a grand humbug. . . . After reaching Kansas City and talking with +Genl. Ewing, I replied to the governor, accepting the services of +as many of his troops as he and Genl. Ewing should deem necessary +for the protection of all the towns in Kansas near the border, +stating that with Kansas so protected, Genl. Ewing would not only +carry out his order for the expulsion of disloyal persons, but also +in a short time drive out the guerillas from his district and +restore peace. In addition to this, I wrote the governor a private +letter urging him to issue his proclamation discouraging the Paola +meeting and warning his people against any attempt to go into +Missouri, and informing him I would issue an order forbidding armed +men not in the regular military service from crossing the line. + +"_Sept_. 4--I received the governor's reply that he would issue +his proclamation as requested, and also asking permission to publish +a letter which I had written him on August 29, in reply to one from +him regarding these matters. This permission was granted. + +"My order was also published declaring that the militia of Kansas +and Missouri would be used only for the defense of their respective +States; that they should not pass from one State into the other +without express orders from the district commander; that armed +bodies of men _not_ belonging to the United States troops, or to +the militia placed under the orders of the department commander by +the governors of their respective States, should not, under any +pretext whatever, pass from one State into the other. + + VISIT TO KANSAS, AND THE PARTY QUARREL THERE + +"In the evening of the 3d I sent a despatch to the general-in-chief +[Halleck], informing him that the Paola movement was under the +control and guidance of Lane, and that I should not permit them to +enter Missouri; that Lane said he would appeal to the President; +that I did not apprehend a hostile collision; but that a despatch +from the President or the Secretary of War (to Lane) would aid me +much in preventing difficulty. + +"If such despatch should be sent, I request to be informed of its +purport. No reply received from the general-in-chief up to this +time (1 P. M., Sept 5). . . . + +"_Sept_. 6--Lane failed to meet me at Kansas City, according to +agreement. My correspondence with Governor Carney relative to the +Lawrence massacre and the Paola movement appeared in the Leavenworth +papers of yesterday; also my order forbidding armed citizens from +crossing into Missouri. + +"The governor's proclamation did not appear according to promise; +probably he may have decided to defer it until after the Paola +meeting, as a means of making capital against Lane. + +"A private letter from one of Governor Carney's advisers was received +yesterday (5th), dated the 3d, but evidently written in the evening +of the 4th or morning of the 5th, which indicated that Carney does +not intend to publish a proclamation, for the reason that Lane +desires to force him to do it. . . . + +"Went to Westport yesterday. Met several of the leading loyal +citizens; all agree that Genl. Ewing's order No. 11 is wise and +just--in fact a necessity. I have yet to find the first loyal man +in the border counties who condemns it. They are also warm in +their support of Genl. Ewing, and deprecate his removal. I am +satisfied he is acting wisely and efficiently. . . . + +"The radicals in Missouri condemn him (Ewing) as one of my friends; +the conservatives, because he is a Kansas man, and more especially +because of his order No. 11, and similar reasons and radical +measures. For a time this will weaken me very much, and possibly +may cause my overthrow. This risk I must take, because I am +satisfied I am doing the best for the public good, and acting +according to my instructions from the President. I seem in a fair +way to reach one of the positions referred to in the President's +letter of instructions, viz: That in which both factions will +abuse me. According to the President's standard, this is the only +evidence that I will ever have that I am right. It is hardly +possible that I will ever reach a point where both will commend +me. . . . + +"_Sept_. 8--Went to Independence yesterday, in company with Genl. +Ewing; . . . made a few remarks to quite a large assemblage of +people, which were well received; was followed by Genl. Ewing in +an appropriate speech, which produced a good effect. + +"Have determined to modify General Ewing's order, or rather he will +modify it at my suggestion, so that no property shall be destroyed. +I deem the destruction of property unnecessary and useless. The +chief evil has resulted from the aid given to guerillas in the way +of information conveyed by disloyal people, and by preparing their +food for them. This evil is now removed. Forage and grain cannot +be destroyed or carried away to such an extent as materially to +cripple them. I will as far as possible preserve the property of +all loyal people, with the view of permitting them to return as +soon as the guerillas shall be driven out. Property of known rebels +will be appropriated as far as possible to the use of the army and +loyal people who are made destitute. None will be destroyed. + +"Had a long interview this morning with Mayor Anthony of Leavenworth +and a number of influential citizens of that place. Anthony was +arrested and sent to this place yesterday by a detective in the +employ of Genl. Ewing. The arrest was without authority, and Genl. +Ewing promptly discharged the mayor. The object of the citizens +was to obtain a revocation of martial law in Leavenworth, and come +to a correct understanding as to the relation between the military +and civil authorities in that town, so as to prevent difficulty in +future. The whole matter was satisfactorily arranged. . . . + +"So far as can be learned, no people have gone from Leavenworth to +the Paola meeting, and it is probable the whole affair will amount +to nothing. Believing that the trouble here is substantially over, +I propose to start for St. Louis to-morrow morning." + + MUTINY IN THE STATE MILITIA + +A regiment of enrolled militia ordered to New Madrid to relieve +the 25th Missouri, in order that the latter might go to reinforce +General Steele in Arkansas, mutinied after they had gone on board +the steamer, brought the boat ashore, and went to their homes. +The provost guard of St. Louis was sent to arrest them. News having +come of the capture of Little Rock, the two enrolled militia +regiments in St. Louis were dismissed, except the mutineers, who +were kept at hard labor for some time, and the leaders tried for +mutiny. + +This mutiny was caused by the efforts of the radical papers and +politicians, who had for some time openly opposed the organization +of the provisional regiments, and encouraged the men to mutiny. + +I published an order enforcing martial law against all who should +incite mutiny among the troops, and through General Halleck obtained +the President's approval of this order, but did not find it necessary +to make that approval public until it was made known by the President +himself. + +In writing to General Halleck on September 20, I said: + +"I inclose herewith a copy of an order which I have found it +necessary to publish and enforce. The revolutionary faction which +has so long been striving to gain the ascendancy in Missouri, +particularly in St. Louis, to overthrow the present State government +and change the policy of the national administration, has at length +succeeded so far as to produce open mutiny of one of the militia +regiments and serious difficulties in others. + +"I inclose a number of slips from papers published in Missouri, to +show the extent to which this factious opposition to the government +has been carried. The effect already produced is but natural, and +the ultimate effect will be disastrous in the extreme, unless a +strong remedy be applied speedily. + +"Out of consideration for popular opinion and the well-known wishes +of the President relative to freedom of speech and of the press, +I have forborne until, in my belief, further forbearance would lead +to disastrous results. I am thoroughly convinced of the necessity +for prompt and decided measures to put down this revolutionary +scheme, and my sense of duty will not permit me to delay it longer. +It is barely possible that I may not have to enforce the order +against the public press. They may yield without the application +of force; but I do not expect it. The tone of some of their articles +since the publication of the order indicates a determination to +wage the war which they have begun to the bitter end. This +determination is based upon the belief that the President will not +sustain me in any such measures as those contemplated in the order. +A distinct approval by the President of my proposed action, and a +knowledge of the fact here, would end the whole matter at once. +I desire, if possible, to have such approval before taking action +in any individual case. Indeed, I believe such approval would +prevent the necessity for the use of force. It is difficult, I am +aware, for any one at a distance to believe that such measures can +be necessary against men and papers who claim to be 'radically +loyal.' The fact is, they are 'loyal' only to their 'radical' +theories, and are so 'radical' that they cannot possibly be 'loyal' +to the government. . . ." + + A REVOLUTIONARY PLOT + +These men were styled "revolutionists" not without sufficient cause. +It was currently reported that they had in 1861 conceived the +elevation of Fremont to a dictatorship. In 1862, and again in +1863, they invented a scheme for the violent overthrow of the +provisional State government and the existing national administration +in Missouri. The first act of the program was to seize and imprison +Governor Gamble and me. In 1862 some of them committed the +indiscretion of confiding their plans to General Frank P. Blair, +Jr., who at once warned me of it, but refused to give me the names +of his informers or of the leaders. He said he could not do so +without breach of confidence, but that he had informed them that +he should give me warning and expose the individuals if any further +steps were taken. Here the matter ended. + +In 1863 I received warning through the guard stationed at my +residence in the suburbs of the city, with which the revolutionists +had the folly to tamper in their efforts to spread disaffection +among my troops. This discovery, and the premature mutiny of the +regiment ordered to New Madrid, nipped the plot in the bud. I +refer to the circumstances now only to show that I was not unjust +in my denunciation of the "revolutionary faction" in Missouri. + +In General Halleck's letter of September 26, inclosing the President's +written approval of my general order, he said: + +". . . Neither faction in Missouri is really friendly to the +President and administration; but each is striving to destroy the +other, regardless of all other considerations. In their mutual +hatred they seem to have lost all sense of the perils of the country +and all sentiment of national patriotism. Every possible effort +should be made to allay this bitter party strife in that State." + +In reply, September 30, I expressed the following opinion: + +". . . I feel compelled to say that I believe you are not altogether +right in your information about the factions in Missouri. If the +so-called 'claybank' faction are not altogether friendly to the +President and administration, I have not been able to discover it. +The men who now sustain me are the same who rallied round Lyon and +sustained the government in the dark days of 1861, while the leaders +of the present 'charcoal' faction stood back until the danger was +past. I believe I have carried out my instructions as literally +as possible, yet I have received a reasonable support from one +faction and the most violent opposition from the other. I am +willing to pledge my official position that those who support me +now will support me in the execution of any policy the President +may order. They are the real friends of the government. It is +impossible for me to be blind to this fact, notwithstanding the +existence, to some extent, of the factional feeling to which you +allude." + +The improvement produced by the order was so decided that publication +of the President's approval was thought unnecessary. It only became +public through his letter of October 1, 1863, of which he gave a +copy to the radical delegation. + +In September the governor of Missouri placed all the militia of +the State, including those not in active service, under my command. +I published orders intended to control their action and prevent +interference with political meetings; also to secure freedom of +voting at the coming election in November. Several militia officers +guilty of such interference were dismissed, which produced a +wholesome effect. + +[( 1) The division of the Union party into radicals and conservatives, +or "charcoals" and "claybanks," originated during the administration +of General Fremont.] + + +CHAPTER VI +A Memorandum for Mr. Lincoln--The President's Instructions--His +Reply to the Radical Delegation--The Matter of Colored Enlistments +--Modification of the Order Respecting Elections Refused--A Letter +to the President on the Condition of Missouri--Former Confederates +in Union Militia Regiments--Summoned to Washington by Mr. Lincoln +--Offered the Command of the Army of the Ohio--Anecdote of General +Grant. + +On October 1, 1863, I furnished the following memorandum to the +Hon. James S. Rollins, M. C., for the information of the President. +It was doubtless seen by the President before the date of his letter +to the radical delegation, quoted further on. + +"The radicals urge as evidence of Genl. Schofield's misrule that +Missouri is in a worse condition than at any time since the rebellion; +that he has failed to use the troops at his disposal to put down +the rebellion. This charge is false, unless it be admitted that +the radicals are rebels. It is true that the State is in a bad +condition, and it is equally true that this condition is directly +brought about by professed Union men--radicals. + +"There has been no time since the beginning of the war when there +were so few armed rebels or guerillas in Missouri as at the present +time. The only trouble at all worth mentioning in comparison with +what the State has suffered heretofore is the lawless acts of +radicals in their efforts to exterminate or drive out all who differ +from them in political sentiment. This lawlessness is instigated, +encouraged, and applauded by the radical press and leaders. Every +effort to put down this lawlessness is denounced by the radicals +as persecution of loyal men. When Genl. Curtis relinquished command +he had in Missouri and Kansas 43,000 men; Genl. Schofield retained +in these States only 23,000. Of the remaining 20,000, he sent some +reinforcements to Genl. Rosecrans and a large force to Genl. Grant, +to assist in the capture of Vicksburg; and with the remainder and +a force equivalent to the one sent to Genl. Grant, returned by him +after the fall of Vicksburg, he has reclaimed all Arkansas and the +Indian Territory. + +"The radicals denounce Genl. Schofield because of his relations to +the State government. It is true that those relations have been +most cordial, but it is not true that his policy has been controlled +or materially influenced by Gov. Gamble. Gov. Gamble has not sought +to exercise any such control. He, without hesitation, placed all +the militia in active service under Genl. S.'s command, and yielded +to him the control of all military operations. As an example to +illustrate the truth of this statement: Genl. S. required the +militia to obey the 102d Article of War; although they were not in +the service of the United States, and although they constituted +the only force in the State capable of arresting fugitive slaves +with any certainty, no complaint was made by the State government. +No military force is used in this department for the return of +fugitives. All assertions to the contrary are false. On the +contrary, it has been invariably held by Genl. Schofield and Col. +Broadhead that free papers given under Genl. Curtis were to be held +valid, even though wrongfully given, the negroes having been the +slaves of loyal men. So also when the slaves of loyal men have, +by mistake or otherwise, been enlisted in colored regiments, Genl. +Schofield has invariably held that they have been made free by +their enlistment, and cannot be returned to their masters or +discharged from the service. + + A MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LINCOLN + +"It cannot be denied that Genl. Schofield's whole influence has +been in favor of emancipation. He did all in his power to secure +the passage of an ordinance of emancipation by the late State +Convention. The leaders of the present 'charcoal' faction, who +now war on Genl. Schofield, are not the men who sustained the +government at the beginning of the war. The men who now support +Genl. S. are the identical ones who stood around Lyon and sustained +the government in the dark days of 1861. They are the true friends +of the government; men who stand between the rebels on one side +and the radical revolutionists on the other; the men who maintain +the Constitution, uphold the laws, and advocate justice to all men. +If sustained by the President, they will rally to their standard +all the best men of the State, of both parties. + +"Secession is dead in Missouri. As a party the secessionists are +utterly without influence. The degree of support which they will +hereafter give to the government will depend upon its policy. If +the radicals triumph, the enemies of the government will be increased +both in numbers and bitterness. If a wise and just policy be +pursued, every respectable man in the State will soon be an active +supporter of the government, and Missouri will be the most loyal +State in the Union. + +"This, in fact, is the cause of the present fierce action of the +radicals. They know they must get the power at once, or there will +soon be an overwhelming loyal party opposed to them. The 'claybank' +leaders control all the conservative elements in the State, and +give to Genl. S., as the representative of the President, an honest +support. They will continue to support him in the execution of +any policy the President may order to be carried out. They sustain +him, and will sustain him in future, although they may not approve +all his acts, because it is their duty to the government." + +About the last of September a radical delegation of about one +hundred members from Missouri and Kansas went to Washington to urge +my removal from command in Missouri. The President sent me the +following instructions, and made a reply to the delegation, also +given below: + + "Executive Mansion, Washington, D. C., Oct. 1, 1863. +"General John M. Schofield. + +"Sir: There is no organized military force in avowed opposition +to the General Government now in Missouri; and if any such shall +reappear, your duty in regard to it will be too plain to require +any special instructions. Still, the condition of things both +there and elsewhere is such as to render it indispensable to maintain +for a time the United States military establishment in that State, +as well as to rely upon it for a fair contribution of support to +the establishment generally. Your immediate duty in regard to +Missouri now is to advance the efficiency of that establishment, +and to use it, as far as practicable, to compel the excited people +there to leave one another alone. + +"Under your recent order, which I have approved, you will only +arrest individuals, and suppress assemblies or newspapers, when +they may be working palpable injury to the military in your charge; +and in no other case will you interfere with the expression of +opinion in any form, or allow it to be interfered with violently +by others. In this you have a discretion to exercise with great +caution, calmness, and forbearance. + +"With the matters of removing the inhabitants of certain counties +_en masse_, and of removing certain individuals from time to time, +who are supposed to be mischievous, I am not now interfering, but +am leaving to your own discretion. + +"Nor am I interfering with what may still seem to you to be necessary +restrictions upon trade and intercourse. + +"I think proper, however, to enjoin upon you the following: Allow +no part of the military under your command to be engaged in either +returning fugitive slaves, or in forcing or enticing slaves from +their homes; and, so far as practicable, enforce the same forbearance +upon the people. + +"Report to me your opinion upon the availability for good of the +enrolled militia of the State. + +"Allow no one to enlist colored troops, except upon orders from +you, or from here through you. + +"Allow no one to assume the functions of confiscating property, +under the law of Congress or otherwise, except upon orders from +here. + +"At elections see that those, and only those, are allowed to vote +who are entitled to do so by the laws of Missouri, including, as +of those laws, the restriction laid by the Missouri Convention upon +those who may have participated in the rebellion. + +"So far as practicable, you will, by means of your military force, +expel guerillas, marauders, and murderers, and all who are known +to harbor, aid, or abet them. But, in like manner, you will repress +assumptions of unauthorized individuals to perform the same service, +because, under pretense of doing this, they become marauders and +murderers themselves. + +"To now restore peace, let the military obey orders, and those not +of the military leave each other alone, thus not breaking the peace +themselves. + +"In giving the above directions, it is not intended to restrain +you in other expedient and necessary matters not falling within +their range. + + "Your obt. servt., + "A. Lincoln." + + THE PRESIDENT'S INSTRUCTIONS + +I wrote in my journal, under date of October 2: + +"Colonel Du Bois, Captain Benham, and Captain Howard, who were sent +to inspect in Genl. Ewing's and Genl. Blunt's districts, have +returned. They report affairs in Blunt's district in a disgraceful +condition. I have determined to relieve Blunt, and propose to send +McNeil to Fort Smith. I telegraphed my intentions to Genl. Halleck +this morning, and asked for a general officer to command one of +the two districts. Soon after I received a despatch from the +President saying Genl. Halleck had shown him my despatch, and +adding: 'If possible, you better allow me to get through with a +certain matter here before adding to the difficulties of it. +Meantime supply me with the particulars of Maj.-Genl. Blunt's case.' + +"I replied: 'I will forward the papers in Genl. Blunt's case, and +defer action until I know your pleasure regarding it. I desire, +if possible, to diminish and not increase your difficulties. This +is one reason why I informed Genl. Halleck what I thought it +necessary to do.' Have since received a despatch from Genl. Halleck +saying that he had ordered Brig.-Genl. J. B. Sanborn from Vicksburg +to report to me for duty. + +"Have received a letter from Atty.-Genl. Bates, dated Sept. 29, +saying I need have no fear of the result of the efforts of the +radical delegation. + +"On Sept. 30 I received a despatch from the President transmitting +the false report from Leavenworth that Col. Moss, of the militia, +was driving out Union families from Platt and Union counties. +After full inquiry from Col. Guitar, Genl. Ewing, and Col. Williams +at St. Joseph, have replied to the President, informing him that +the report is false, and a base attempt of my enemies to influence +his action." + +Under date of October 4, I wrote in my journal: + +"The address presented to the President by the radical delegation +from Missouri was published in the 'Democrat' last evening. I +telegraphed the President last night that 'so much of it as relates +to me is not only untrue in spirit, but most of it is literally +false. If an answer or explanation is on any account desirable, +I shall be glad to make it.' To-day I received from the President +a despatch saying: 'Think you will not have just cause to complain +of my action. . . . '" + + THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY TO THE RADICAL DELEGATION + +The next day the President made this reply to the radical +delegation: + + "Executive Mansion, Washington, D. C., October 5, 1863. +"Hon. Charles D. Drake and Others, Committee. + +"Gentlemen: Your original address, presented on the 30th ultimo, +and the four supplementary ones, presented on the 3d inst., have +been carefully considered. I hope you will regard the other duties +claiming my attention, together with the great length and importance +of the documents, as constituting a sufficient apology for my not +having responded sooner. + +"These papers, framed for a common object, consist of the things +demanded, and the reasons for demanding them. + +"The things demanded are: + +"_First_. That General Schofield shall be relieved and General +Butler be appointed as commander of the Military Department of +Missouri. + +"_Second_. That the system of enrolled militia in Missouri may be +broken up, and national forces be substituted for it; and, + +"_Third_. That at elections persons may not be allowed to vote +who are not entitled by law to do so. + +"Among the reasons given, enough of suffering and wrong to Union +men is certainly, and I suppose truly, stated. Yet the whole case +as presented fails to convince me that General Schofield, or the +enrolled militia, is responsible for that suffering and wrong. +The whole can be explained on a more charitable and, as I think, +a more rational hypothesis. + +"We are in civil war. In such cases there always is a main question; +but in this case that question is a perplexing compound--Union and +slavery. It thus becomes a question not of two sides merely, but +of at least four sides, even among those who are for the Union, +saying nothing of those who are against it. Thus, those who are +for the Union _with_, but not _without_, slavery; those for it +_without_, but not _with_; those for it _with_ or _without_, but +prefer it _with_; and those for it _with_ or _without_, but prefer +it _without_. Among these again is a subdivision of those who are +for _gradual_, but not for _immediate_, and those who are for +_immediate_, but not for _gradual_, extinction of slavery. + +"It is easy to conceive that all these shades of opinion, and even +more, may be sincerely entertained by honest and truthful men; yet +all being for the Union, by reason of these differences each will +prefer a different way of sustaining the Union. At once sincerity +is questioned and motives are assailed; actual war coming, blood +grows hot and blood is spilled. Thought is forced from old channels +into confusion; deception breeds and thrives; confidence dies, and +universal suspicion reigns. Each man feels an impulse to kill his +neighbor, lest he be first killed by him. Revenge and retaliation +follow, and all this, as before said, may be among honest men only. +But this is not all. Every foul bird comes abroad, and every dirty +reptile rises up. These add crime to confusion. Strong measures +deemed indispensable, but harsh at best, such men make worse by +maladministration. Murders for old grudges and murders for pelf +proceed under any cloak that will best cover for the occasion. + +"These causes amply account for what has occurred in Missouri, +without ascribing it to the weakness or wickedness of any general. +The newspaper files--those chronicles of current events--will show +that evils now complained of were quite as prevalent under Fremont, +Hunter, Halleck, and Curtis as under Schofield. + +"If the former had greater force opposed to them, they had also +greater forces with which to meet it. When the organized rebel +army left the State, the main Federal force had to go also, leaving +the department commander at home relatively no stronger than before. + +"Without disparaging any, I affirm with confidence that no commander +of that department has, in proportion to his means, done better +than General Schofield. + +"The first specific charge against General Schofield is that the +enrolled militia was placed under his command, when it had not been +placed under the command of General Curtis. + +"That, I believe, is true; but you do not point out, nor can I +conceive, how that did or could injure loyal men or the Union cause. + +"You charge that upon General Curtis being superseded by General +Schofield, Franklin A. Dick was superseded by James O. Broadhead +as provost-marshal-general. No very specific showing is made as +to how this did or could injure the Union cause. It recalls, +however, the condition of things, as presented to me, which led to +a change of commanders for the department. + +"To restrain contraband intelligence and trade, a system of searches +seizures, permits, and passes had been introduced by General Fremont. +When General Halleck came, he found and continued the system, and +added an order, applicable to some parts of the State, to levy and +collect contributions from noted rebels to compensate losses and +relieve destitution caused by the rebellion. The action of General +Fremont and General Halleck, as stated, constituted a sort of system +which General Curtis found in full operation when he took command +of the department. That there was a necessity for something of +the sort was clear; but that it could only by justified by stern +necessity, and that it was liable to great abuse in administration, +was equally clear. Agents to execute it, contrary to the great prayer, +were led into temptation. Some might, while others would not, resist +that temptation. It was not possible to hold any to a very strict +accountability; and those yielding to the temptation would sell +permits and passes to those who would pay most, and most readily, +for them, and would seize property and collect levies in the aptest +way to fill their own pockets; money being the object, the man +having money, whether loyal or disloyal, would be a victim. This +practice doubtless existed to some extent, and it was a real +additional evil that it could be, and was, plausibly charged to +exist in greater extent than it did. + + THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY TO THE RADICAL DELEGATION + +"When General Curtis took command of the department, Mr. Dick, +against whom I never knew anything to allege, had general charge +of this system. A controversy in regard to it rapidly grew into +almost unmanageable proportions. One side ignored the necessity +and magnified the evils of the system, while the other ignored the +evils and magnified the necessity, and each bitterly assailed the +motives of the other. I could not fail to see that the controversy +enlarged in the same proportion as the professed Union men there +distinctly took sides in two opposing political parties. I exhausted +my wits, and very nearly my patience also, in efforts to convince +both that the evils they charged on each other were inherent in +the case, and could not be cured by giving either party a victory +over the other. + +"Plainly the irritating system was not to be perpetual, and it was +plausibly urged that it could be modified at once with advantage. +The case could scarcely be worse; and whether it could be made +better, could only be determined by a trial. In this view, and +not to ban or brand General Curtis, or to give a victory to any +party, I made the change of commander for the department. I now +learn that soon after this change Mr. Dick was removed, and that +Mr. Broadhead, a gentleman of no less good character, was put in +the place. The mere fact of this change is more distinctly complained +of than is any conduct of the new officer, or other consequences +of the change. + +"I gave the new commander no instructions as to the administration +of the system mentioned, beyond what is contained in the private +letter, afterward surreptitiously published,( 1) in which I directed +him to act solely for the public good, and independently of both +parties. Neither anything you have presented me, nor anything I +have otherwise learned, has convinced me that he has been unfaithful +to this charge. + +"Imbecility is urged as one cause for removing General Schofield; +and the late massacre at Lawrence, Kansas, is pressed as evidence +of that imbecility. To my mind that fact scarcely tends to prove +the proposition. That massacre is only an example of what Grierson, +John Morgan, and many others might have repeatedly done on their +respective raids, had they chosen to incur the personal hazard and +possessed the fiendish hearts to do it. + +"The charge is made that General Schofield, on purpose to protect +the Lawrence murderers, would not allow them to be pursued into +Missouri. While no punishment could be too sudden or too severe +for those murderers, I am well satisfied that the preventing of +the remedial raid into Missouri was the only safe way to avoid an +indiscriminate massacre there, including probably more innocent +than guilty. Instead of condemning, I therefore approve what I +understand General Schofield did in that respect. + +"The charges that General Schofield has purposely withheld protection +from loyal people, and purposely facilitated the objects of the +disloyal, are altogether beyond my power of belief. I do not +arraign the veracity of gentlemen as to the facts complained of, +but I do more than question the judgment which would infer that +those facts occurred in accordance with the _purposes_ of General +Schofield. + +"With my present views, I must decline to remove General Schofield. +In this I decide nothing against General Butler. I sincerely wish +it were convenient to assign him to a suitable command. + +"In order to meet some existing evils, I have addressed a letter +of instructions to General Schofield, a copy of which I inclose to +you. + +"As to the 'enrolled militia,' I shall endeavor to ascertain better +than I now know what is its exact value. Let me say now, however, +that your proposal to substitute national forces for the enrolled +militia implies that in your judgment the latter is doing something +which needs to be done, and if so, the proposition to throw that +force away, and supply its place by bringing other forces from the +field, where they are urgently needed, seems to me very extraordinary. +Whence shall they come? Shall they be withdrawn from Banks, or +Grant, or Steele, or Rosecrans? + +"Few things have been so grateful to my anxious feelings as when, +in June last, the local force in Missouri aided General Schofield +to so promptly send a large general force to the relief of General +Grant, then investing Vicksburg and menaced from without by General +Johnston. Was this all wrong? Should the enrolled militia then +have been broken up, and General Herron kept from Grant to police +Missouri? So far from finding cause to object, I confess to a +sympathy for whatever relieves our general force in Missouri, and +allows it to serve elsewhere. I, therefore, as at present advised, +cannot attempt the destruction of the enrolled militia of Missouri. +I may add that, the force being under the national military control, +it is also within the proclamation in regard to the _habeas corpus_. + +"I concur in the propriety of your request in regard to elections, +and have, as you see, directed General Schofield accordingly. I +do not feel justified to enter upon the broad field you present in +regard to the political differences between radicals and conservatives. +From time to time I have done and said what appeared to me proper +to do and say. The public knows it all. It obliges nobody to +follow me, and I trust it obliges me to follow nobody. The radicals +and conservatives each agree with me in some things and disagree +in others. I could wish both to agree with me in all things; for +then they would agree with each other, and would be too strong for +any foe from any quarter. They, however, choose to do otherwise, +and I do not question their right; I, too, shall do what seems to +be my duty. I hold whoever commands in Missouri, or elsewhere, +responsible to me, and not to either radicals or conservatives. +It is my duty to hear all; but at last, I must, within my sphere, +judge what to do and what to forbear. + + "Your obt. servt., + "A. Lincoln." + + THE MATTER OF COLORED ENLISTMENTS + +On October 13, I wrote in my journal: + +"The radical delegation has returned from Washington very much +crestfallen. It is generally conceded that they have accomplished +nothing. Nothing official is yet known on the subject. . . . + +"Lane spoke at Turner's Hall last evening; no disturbance; was +silent on the subject of the department commander. He informed me +yesterday, through Major Vaughan, that he had stopped the war upon +me, and intended hereafter not to oppose me unless circumstances +rendered it necessary. Said the President told him that whoever +made war on General Schofield, under the present state of affairs, +made war on him--the President. Said he never had made war on +General S., 'except incidentally.' + +"_Oct_. 14--Received yesterday an order from Genl. [Lorenzo] Thomas +appointing officers for the 1st Regt. Mo. Volunteers, of African +descent, and directing that they be detailed to raise the regiment. + +"Have telegraphed to the War Department for instructions as to the +mode of raising these troops, referring to a letter I wrote to Col. +Townsend on the subject on the 29th of September. In that letter +I explained the difficulty of raising such troops in Missouri, +unless it be done without regard to the claims of loyal slave- +owners. I also recommended that all able-bodied negroes be enlisted, +receipts given as a basis for payment to loyal owners, and suggested +that those of unquestioned loyalty might be paid at once from the +substitute fund. No answer has been received to that letter. + +"Some months ago I wrote to the Secretary of War, asking instructions +about the negro question. No answer. The Hon. Secretary seems +determined to make me deal with that question on my own responsibility. +It is very natural, but hardly just to me." + +I had issued an order respecting elections, in accordance with the +President's instructions. A personal request was made to me for +a modification of the order. The following letter was written in +reply to that request: + + "Headqrs., Department of the Missouri, + "St. Louis, Oct. 24th, 1863. +"Hon. C. Drake, St. Louis. + +"Sir: After full consideration of the subject of our conversation +this morning, I am of the opinion that no further orders upon the +subject of the election are necessary. The law which provides the +manner in which soldiers shall vote, and directs how the judges of +election shall be appointed, is as binding upon all persons to whom +it relates as any order would be. + +"Genl. Order No. 120 also alludes to the subject of soldiers voting, +I think, in sufficiently strong terms, although it is taken for +granted in that order that officers will do their duty in giving +their men an opportunity to vote. Moreover, any failure on their +part to do their whole duty in this regard would be a clear violation +of Genl. Order 101. I believe there is no ground for apprehension +that officers will neglect their duty regarding the election. If +anything is needed, it is that the troops be given full information +through the daily papers, which they all read, of their duties and +privileges under the laws. + +"From the short examination I have been able to give, I am of the +opinion that the Act of the General Assembly changing the mode of +voting does not apply to soldiers voting at the company polls; that +the ordinance of the convention remains unrepealed. + +"This, however, is a question which I will not presume to decide +or to refer to even in an order. + +"I return herewith the copy of Laws of Missouri which you were so +kind as to lend me. + + "Very respectfully your obt. servt., + "J. M. Schofield, Major-Genl." + + A LETTER ON THE CONDITION OF MISSOURI + +On October 25 I wrote to Mr. Lincoln in regard to a reorganization +of the militia of northwestern Missouri, which had been made for +the purpose of suppressing the lawlessness that had prevailed there +under the name of "loyalty," saying: + +"I take the liberty of sending you a letter which I have this day +received from Hon. Willard P. Hall, Lieut.-Governor of Missouri. + +"It may be of interest to you, as showing the good effect of the +stringent measures which I felt compelled to adopt in some portions +of Missouri, and of the firm support you have given me. + +"The immediate effect, as might have been expected, was a terrible +storm, but it has passed away, I hope never to return. + +"The State is now in far better condition than it has been at any +time during the war. + +"I have issued an election order in compliance with your instructions, +with which all parties express themselves well satisfied. It seems +I have at last succeeded in doing one thing which nobody can find +fault with. + +"Shelby's raid has terminated with a loss of about one half of the +men with which he entered the State, and _he received no recruits_ +except the robbers under Quantrill and Jackman. These left the +State with him. This fact is gratifying as showing that the rebel +power in Missouri is completely broken. + +"Whatever may be the secret feelings of the former secessionists +of Missouri, their influence now, so far as it is exerted at all, +is for peace and submission to the national authority. All that +is now necessary to secure peace to Missouri, with the possible +exception of occasional raids from Arkansas, is union among the +loyal people. I shall spare no effort to reconcile their differences +as far as possible, or at least to restrain their quarrel within +peaceable limits. The additional strength your support has given +me will enable me to do this far better then before. My radical +friends now exhibit some disposition to stop their war upon me, +and I shall certainly not give them any good reason for continuing +it. The honest enthusiasts on the subject of liberty, who compose +the respectable portion of this party, are already well disgusted +with their lawless brethren who have brought such odium upon them, +and now begin to realize the necessity of sustaining men in enforcing +the laws. + +"Whatever may be the result of the pending election, I believe the +most serious danger is already past. + +"I shall not fail to exercise great forbearance in enforcing +restrictions upon speech and the press. I have enforced my order +in only one case, and that so clear that the offender fully confessed +and asked pardon on any terms. It will not probably be necessary +for me to exercise any control over the press hereafter. + +"Your accurate appreciation of the real difficulty here, and the +strong and generous manner in which you have sustained me, will do +more good in Missouri than to have doubled the troops under my +command. This I hope soon to show you by sending additional forces +to the front." + +With the above letter to the President I inclosed the following: + + "St. Joseph, Mo., Oct. 21st, 1863. + +"General: It is with very great pleasure that I can inform you of +the satisfactory condition of things in this section of Missouri. +There is more security for men and property in northwestern Missouri +than there has been since the rebellion began. There is not a +spark of rebellious feeling left here, and all citizens seem to +be, and I believe are, ready to discharge all the duties of loyal +men. + +"The people are truly grateful to you for your efforts to protect +them, and you may rest assured will never fail you in any emergency. + + "Yours truly, + "Willard P. Hall +"Major-Genl. Schofield, etc." + + A LETTER ON THE CONDITION OF MISSOURI + +The following was written by me, November 1, 1863, to Mr. James L. +Thomas of St. Louis, in answer to what was understood to be an +attempt to obtain some expression of partizan preference as between +the "pestilent factions": + +"In reply to your letter of Oct. 30th, I will state that in some +important particulars you entirely misapprehend my remarks made +during our conversation on the 29th. I spoke of the lawless acts +committed in some portions of Missouri by men claiming to be radicals +and acting in the name of radicalism; and asserted that leading +men and papers of the party had failed to do their duty by disavowing +and frowning down this lawlessness; that in this course they had +been guilty of great folly, and had brought odium upon their party +in Missouri and throughout the country; that they had injured rather +than advanced the cause of emancipation. I made no remarks relative +to the radical party, nor to radicals as a party of class of +citizens. I spoke of those men and papers who by tolerating and +encouraging lawlessness in the name of radicalism had done so much +towards producing trouble in the State. + +"It is perhaps natural that any honest man should feel, as you +propose, to disown a party in which such abuses are tolerated, but +I cannot see the propriety of so doing. Would it not be much wiser +and more patriotic to endeavor to purify the party, to bring it +back to the high principles upon which it was founded, and to rid +it of the elements which have disgraced those principles? + +"Our conversation on the 29th was regarded by me as confidential, +and I still desire it to be so regarded by you, and also this +letter. No possible good can result from a public discussion by +me of such matters. + +"You are aware that as department commander I have nothing to do +with politics, nor with offenders as members of any party. I shall +unquestionably, upon proper proof, punish all who have been, or +may hereafter be, guilty of the crimes you mention, without regard +to the party they may belong to; but I do not propose to condemn +any party or class of men because of the guilt of one or any number +of its members. When I find men acting wrongfully or unwisely to +the prejudice of the Union cause, I endeavor, within my proper +sphere, to correct or restrain them by appropriate means according +to circumstances. Whether my influence thus exerted inures to the +benefit of one party or another is a question which I cannot take +into consideration. + +"My dealing is with individuals, not with parties. Officially I +know nothing of radicals or conservatives. The question with me +is simply what individuals obey the laws and what violate them; +who are for the government and who against it. The measures of +the President are my measures; his orders, my rule of action. +Whether a particular party gains strength or loses it by my action +must depend upon the party, and not upon me." + + FORMER CONFEDERATES IN UNION MILITIA REGIMENTS + +At this time occurred the following exchange of letters with the +President: + +"(Private and confidential.) + + "Executive Mansion, Washington, Oct. 28th, 1863. +"General John M. Schofield: There have recently reached the War +Department, and thence been laid before me, from Missouri, three +communications, all similar in import and identical in object. +One of them, addressed to nobody, and without place or date, but +having the signature of (apparently) the writer, is a letter of +eight closely written foolscap pages. The other two are written +by a different person at St. Joseph, Mo., and of the date, +respectively, October 12th and 13th, and each inclosing a large +number of affidavits. + +"The general statements of the whole are that the Federal and State +authorities are arming the disloyal and disarming the loyal, and +that the latter will all be killed or driven out of the State unless +there should be a change. + +"In particular, no loyal man who has been disarmed is named, but +the affidavits show, by name, forty-two persons as disloyal who +have been armed. They are as follows: [Names omitted.] + +"A majority of these are shown to have been in the rebel service. +I believe it could be shown that the government here has deliberately +armed more than ten times as many captured at Gettysburg, to say +nothing of similar operations in East Tennessee. These papers +contain altogether thirty-one manuscript pages, and one newspaper +in extenso; and yet I do not find it anywhere charged in them that +any loyal man has been harmed by reason of being disarmed, or that +any disloyal one has harmed anybody by reason of being armed by +the Federal or State government. + +"Of course I have not had time to carefully examine all; but I have +had most of them examined and briefed by others, and the result is +as stated. The remarkable fact that the actual evil is yet only +anticipated--inferred--induces me to suppose that I understand the +case. But I do not state my impression, because I might be mistaken, +and because your duty and mine is plain in any event. + +"The locality of nearly all this seems to be St. Joseph and Buchanan +County. I wish you to give special attention to this region, +particularly on Election day. Prevent violence, from whatever +quarter, and see that the soldiers themselves do no wrong. + + "Yours truly, + "A. Lincoln." + + "Hdqrs., Dept. of the Missouri. + "St. Louis, Nov. 9th, 1863. +"Mr. President: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of +your confidential letter dated Oct. 28th, and containing the names +of men enlisted in the militia of northwest Missouri who are said +to have been disloyal. + +"On my visit to Kansas and northwest Missouri during the troubles +there in September last, I examined personally into the difficulties +in Platte, Buchanan, and other western counties, and learned fully +their nature and origin. I at once ordered the reorganization of +the militia, which created so much commotion for a time, but which +has restored that portion of the State to a condition of profound +peace. + +"I have watched the progress of affairs there closely, and have +kept myself fully advised of all the facts. It is true that about +twice as many former rebels as were named by your informants are +in the militia organization, amounting to from five to ten per +cent. of the whole. It is also true that a very much larger number +of returned Missouri rebels have enlisted in the Kansas Volunteers, +and, so far as I know, are faithful, good soldiers. + +"The rule I established for the militia organization in northwest +Missouri was that the officers should be of undoubted loyalty, +original Union men, and that both officers and privates, as far as +possible, should be men of wealth and respectability, whose all +depended upon the preservation of peace. + +"The former sufferings of these men from the lawlessness which has +so long existed on the border made them willing to do military duty +to save from destruction or loss what property they had left. I +have yet to hear the first report of a murder, robbery, or arson +in that whole region since this new organization was made. The +late election was conducted in perfect peace and good order. There +is not the slightest pretense from any source of any interference +or other misconduct on the part of any of the troops. I have not +deemed it necessary to be very particular about the antecedents of +troops that are producing such good results. If I can make a +repentant rebel of more service to the government than a man who +never had any political sins to repent of, I see no reason for not +doing so. Indeed, I take no little satisfaction in making these +men guard the property of their more loyal neighbors, and in holding +their own property responsible for their fidelity. + +"I have the satisfaction of reporting to you that the late election +in all parts of the State passed off in perfect quiet and good +order. I have heard of no disturbance of any kind anywhere. The +aggregate vote, I think, shows that the purity of the ballot-box +was preserved in a remarkable degree. If the loyal people all +voted, few or no rebels did. + +"The prospects of future peace in this State are highly encouraging. + + "I am very respectfully your obt. servt., + "J. M. Schofield, Maj.-Genl. +"To the President." + +I had abundant reason to be satisfied with the result of this +controversy, so far as it concerned me, and with the condition of +the department when it terminated, near midwinter. Yet I was +satisfied some change was impending, and cared not how soon it +might come, now that my administration had been fully vindicated. +In fact, such a command was not at all to my taste, and I had always +longed for purely military service in the field, free from political +complications. It was therefore with sincere pleasure that I +received, in December, a summons from the President to come to +Washington. + + SUMMONED TO WASHINGTON BY MR. LINCOLN + +But before relating the circumstances of my visit to the President, +I must refer to an incident which occurred a short time before I +left St. Louis, and which I was afterward led to suspect was the +immediate cause of the President's desire to see me. + +The Missouri legislature was in session and balloting for a United +States senator. The legislature was divided into three parties-- +radicals, conservative Republicans, and Democrats, or "copperheads," +neither strong enough to elect without a fusion with one of the +others. A union of the radicals and the conservatives was, of +course, most desired by the administration; but their bitterness +had become so great that either would prefer a bargain with the +Democrats rather than with the other. The Hon. E. B. Washburne, +representative in Congress from Illinois, made an opportune visit +to St. Louis about this time, procured an interview with me at the +house of a common friend, and led me into a frank conversation +relative to this political question. I told him candidly that in +my opinion the desired union of radicals and conservatives was +impossible, for they were more bitterly opposed to each other then +either was to the Democrats. Mr. Washburne went to Washington, +and reported to the President that I was opposed to the much-desired +radical and conservative union in Missouri, and was using my +influence to prevent it. So opposite was this to the truth that +I had even written a letter to my friend Colonel J. O. Broadhead, +the conservative candidate, asking him to withdraw in favor of the +radical candidate, as a means of bringing about the harmony so much +desired by the President. This letter was not sent, because the +telegraphic reports from Jefferson City showed that it was too late +to do any good; but it was handed to Colonel Broadhead on his return +to show him my wishes in the matter. + +Upon my first visit to the President, he repeated to me this +Washburne story, without, however, intimating that he attached much +weight to it. I at once replied by giving him the simple facts +about my conversation with Washburne, and what my true position +was on that question. Mr. Lincoln promptly dismissed the subject +with the words: "I believe you, Schofield; those fellows have been +lying to me again." + +Mr. Lincoln undoubtedly referred here to a previous incident which +was related to me by the Hon. James S. Rollins, member of Congress +from Missouri, one of the truest and most truthful men in the world, +as having occurred in his presence. Some men from Missouri had +prevailed upon Mr. Rollins to introduce them to the President, to +whom they wished to represent the condition of affairs in Missouri +as viewed from their standpoint. After listening to their story, +the President opened the little right-hand drawer of his desk, took +out a letter from me, and read it to them. He then said: "_That_ +is the truth about the matter; you fellows are lying to me." + +Determined to leave no room for doubt in the President's mind, I +telegraphed to St. Louis and got the Broadhead letter; but by the +time it arrived I had become so satisfied of Mr. Lincoln's confidence +that I did not think it worth while to show it to him. + +I remained at the capital several weeks, and had full conversations +with the President on public affairs. The political situation was +a perplexing one. The state of parties in the West seemed that of +inextricable confusion, which Mr. Lincoln and his friends were +anxious to unravel, if possible, before the next Presidential +nomination. In Missouri the faction which had been friendly to me +was also a supporter of Mr. Lincoln, while the radicals were opposed +to him. In Kansas, on the contrary, the so-called Lane and Carney +factions, while vying with each other in professions of radicalism, +were divided in the opposite manner. The former supported the +President, but was bitterly hostile to me, while the latter was +friendly to me and opposed to Mr. Lincoln. I frankly told the +President that it was impossible for me to reconcile these differences +--indeed, that I did not believe any general in the army could, as +department commander, satisfy the Union people of both Kansas and +Missouri; neither the man nor the policy that would suit the one +would be at all satisfactory to the other. Mr. Lincoln had evidently +already arrived at much the same conclusion, and soon determined +to divide the old Department of the Missouri into three departments, +and try to assign to each a commander suited to its peculiarities. +But Mr. Lincoln declared decidedly to me, and to my friends in the +Senate, that he would make no change until the Senate united with +him in vindicating me by confirming my nomination as major-general, +then in the hands of the Military Committee of the Senate, and that +he would then give me a more important command. + + OFFERED THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY OF THE OHIO + +A large majority--indeed, all but some half-dozen--of the Senate +were known to be favorable to the confirmation; but this small +minority had control of the Military Committee, and were consequently +able to delay any report of the case to the Senate, and thus to +thwart the President's wishes. + +The matter stood thus for nearly a month, and seemed no nearer +solution than at first, when a despatch was received in Washington +from General Grant, then commanding the Military Division of the +Mississippi, saying it was necessary to relieve General Foster, on +account of ill-health, from the command of the Department and Army +of the Ohio, and to appoint a successor. Upon being asked whom he +wanted for that command, Grant replied: "Either McPherson or +Schofield." + +Among the changes then known in Washington to be in the near future +was Grant's elevation to the command of "all the armies," to be +naturally followed by Sherman's succession to that of the Division +of the Mississippi, and McPherson's to that of the Army of the +Tennessee. But Grant alone, perhaps, had no right to anticipate +those changes, hence he gave his just preference to my senior, +McPherson. + +Halleck handed me Grant's despatch, and asked me how I would like +that. I replied: "That is exactly what I want; nothing in the +world could be better." He then told me to take the despatch to +the President, which I immediately did, and in handing it to him +said: "If you want to give me that, I will gladly take all chances +for the future, whether in the Senate or elsewhere." Mr. Lincoln +replied in his characteristic way: "Why, Schofield, that cuts the +knot, don't it? Tell Halleck to come over here, and we will fix +it right away." I bade the President adieu, and started at once +for St. Louis, to turn over my command and proceed to my new field +of duty. + +I saw Mr. Lincoln only once after that time. That was when, just +a year later, I was passing through Washington with the Twenty- +third Corps, and called merely to pay my respects. The President +greeted me with the words: "Well, Schofield, I have n't heard +anything against you for a year." Apparently, the great trouble +to him with which I had been so closely connected, if not the cause, +was uppermost in his mind. + +With Mr. Lincoln I had no personal acquaintance, having met him +but once, previous to the visit above described. But in assigning +me to the command in Missouri he had, contrary to the usual custom, +written for me his own instructions, thus inviting my fullest +confidence. I had availed myself of this to tell him everything +without reserve, and he appeared never to doubt the exact truth of +my statements. + + ANECDOTE OF GENERAL GRANT + +My personal acquaintance with General Grant was equally limited-- +we having met but once, and for only a moment. He knew me only by +reputation. I never had any conversation or correspondence with +him on the subject, but presume he knew something about the trouble +I was in, had not forgotten the aid I sent him at Vicksburg, and +believed I would do what was right to the best of my ability. I +have had abundant reasons for believing that he never felt disappointed +in his trust and confidence. + +General Halleck knew me much better, having been my immediate +commander in Missouri in 1861 and 1862. Although on one or two +occasions he seemed a little harsh in respect to unimportant matters, +he was uniformly kind, considerate, and unwavering in his personal +and official support. + +The Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, expressed his confidence and +approval; said he was opposed to any change; that it was the +President's affair, with which he had nothing to do. I got the +impression that he regarded the whole scheme as a political one, +in which he took no interest, and with which he felt no sympathy. + +In St. Louis I met General Grant, who was then so soon to be assigned +to the command of "all the armies of the United States," and for +the first time really became acquainted with him. We were together +much of the time for several days and nights. The citizens of St. +Louis entertained the general in a most magnificent manner. At a +grand banquet given in his honor, at which I sat on his right, he +did not even touch one of the many glasses of wine placed by the +side of his plate. At length I ventured to remark that he had not +tasted his wine. He replied: "I dare not touch it. Sometimes I +can drink freely without any unpleasant effect; at others I cannot +take even a single glass of light wine." A strong man, indeed, +who could thus know and govern his own weakness! In reply to the +toast in his honor, he merely arose and bowed without saying a +word. Then turning to me, he said it was simply impossible for +him to utter a word when on his feet. As is well known, the great +general finally overcame his reserve. + +It was very difficult for me to comprehend the political necessity +which compelled Mr. Lincoln to give his official countenance to +such men as Lane and Blunt in Kansas, but such necessity was thought +to exist. I suppose that a great statesman should use in the best +way he can the worst materials as well as the best that are within +his reach, and, if possible, make them all subserve the great +purposes he has to accomplish. + +The old department was cut up, the Lane faction in Kansas was given +the man of its choice--General Curtis; Missouri was placed alone +under General Rosecrans--not Butler, as the radicals had asked; +Arkansas, having no voice in the matter, was left under the soldier, +General Steele, then in command there; and I left them all without +regret and with buoyant hopes of more satisfactory service in a +purely military field. + +[( 1) By a radical newspaper.] + + +CHAPTER VII +Condition of the Troops at Knoxville--Effect of the Promotion of +Grant and Sherman--Letter to Senator Henderson--A Visit from General +Sherman--United with his other Armies for the Atlanta Campaign-- +Comments on Sherman's "Memoirs"--Faulty Organization of Sherman's +Army--McPherson's Task at Resaca--McPherson's Character--Example of +the Working of a Faulty System. + +I arrived at Knoxville, Tennessee, on February 8, 1864, and the +next day relieved General John G. Foster. The troops then about +Knoxville were the Ninth Corps, two divisions of the Twenty-third, +and about one thousand cavalry and two divisions of the Fourth +Corps; the latter belonged to the Department of the Cumberland, +but had been left with General Burnside after the siege of Knoxville +was raised by General Sherman. + +The Ninth and Twenty-third Corps were reduced in effective strength +to mere skeletons, the former reporting present for duty equipped +only 2800 men, and the latter 3000 men; and these had for a long +time been living on half rations or less, and were generally far +less than half clad, many of them being entirely without shoes. +The remainder of these troops were disabled by wounds, sickness, +lack of food or clothing, or were employed in the care of the sick +or on extra duty. + +Many thousands of dead horses and mules were scattered round the +town, while the few remaining alive were reduced to skeletons. Of +about 30,000 animals with which General Burnside had gone into East +Tennessee, scarcely 1000 remained fit for service; while his army +of over 25,000 men had been reduced to not more than 7000 fit for +duty and effective for service in the field. Such was the result +of the siege of Knoxville, and such the Army of the Ohio when I +became its commander. + +But the splendid victory gained a short time before at Chattanooga +had raised the blockade upon our line of supply, and the railroad +to Chattanooga and Nashville was soon opened, so that our starving +and naked troops could begin to get supplies of food and clothing. +The movement of the first train of cars was reported by telegraph +from every station, and was eagerly awaited by the entire army. +When the locomotive whistle announced its approach, everybody turned +out to welcome it with shouts of joy. It proved to consist of ten +car-loads of horse and mule shoes for the dead animals which strewed +the plains! Fortunately the disgust produced by this disappointment +was not of long duration. The next train, which followed very +soon, contained coffee, sugar, and other articles to gladden the +hearts of hungry soldiers. + +The Confederate army under Longstreet still remained in East +Tennessee. A movement had recently been made by our troops, under +the immediate command of General John G. Parke (General Foster +being too lame to take the field in person), to drive Longstreet +out. But the movement had failed, the troops returning to Knoxville +with the loss of considerable material. In consequence of this, +much anxiety was felt in Washington regarding the situation in East +Tennessee. It was even apprehended that Knoxville might be in +danger; and an advance of Longstreet's force to Strawberry Plains, +where he laid a bridge over the Holston and crossed a part of his +troops, seemed to give some ground for such apprehensions. + + CONDITION OF THE TROOPS AT KNOXVILLE + +The miserable condition of our troops, the season of the year, the +almost total lack of means of transportation for supplies and of +a pontoon bridge to cross the river, rendered any considerable +movement on our part impossible. But to relieve the existing +apprehension, I determined to assume the offensive at once, and to +maintain it as far as possible. + +Early in February General Grant had proposed to give me 10,000 +additional troops from General Thomas's army at Chattanooga, and +to let me begin the campaign against Longstreet at once. But on +February 16 he informed me that the movement would have to be +delayed because of some operations in which General Thomas was to +engage. Nevertheless, I advanced on the 24th with what force I +had, at the same time sending a reconnaissance south of the French +Broad River to ascertain the nature of a hostile movement reported +in that direction. + +Upon our advance, Longstreet's troops withdrew across the Holston +and French Broad and retreated toward Morristown. His advance had +evidently been intended only to cover an attempted cavalry raid +upon our rear, which the high water in the Little Tennessee rendered +impracticable. + +We now occupied Strawberry Plains, rebuilt the railroad bridge, +pushed forward the construction of a bateau bridge which had been +commenced, in the meantime using the bateaux already constructed +to ferry the troops across the river. In this manner we were able +to advance as far as Morristown by February 29 with sufficient +force to reconnoiter Longstreet's position. This reconnaissance +demonstrated that the enemy held Bull's Gap, and that his entire +force was grouped about that strong position. The object of this +movement having been accomplished without loss, our troops retired +to New Market to await the arrival of the troops to be sent by +General Thomas, the completion of the railroad bridge, and other +necessary preparations for the expected campaign. + +On March 12 another reconnaissance was made as far as Bull's Gap, +which was found to be still occupied by the enemy, although reliable +information indicated that Longstreet was preparing for, and had +perhaps already begun, his movement toward Virginia. Although his +force, if concentrated, was much superior to mine, I determined to +endeavor to take advantage of his movement to attack his rear. My +advance held Morristown; all the troops were ordered forward to +that place, and preparations were made for an attack, when, on the +15th, orders came from General Grant to send the Ninth Corps to +the Army of the Potomac. + +Such a reduction of my command, instead of the expected reinforcement, +left me wholly unable to do more than observe Longstreet as he +leisurely withdrew from Tennessee and joined Lee in Virginia, and +prepare for the campaign of the coming summer, the nature of which +I could then only conjecture. + + EFFECT OF THE PROMOTION OF GRANT AND SHERMAN + +This entire change of program doubtless resulted from the promotion +of General Grant to lieutenant-general and commander-in-chief, and +General Sherman to his place in command of the Military Division +of the Mississippi, which occurred at that time. The change of +plans was undoubtedly wise. The Confederate government could not +afford to leave Longstreet's force in East Tennessee during the +summer. He must join Lee or Johnston before the opening of the +summer campaign. It was not worth while for us to expend time and +strength in driving him out, which ought to be devoted to preparations +for vastly more important work. I felt disappointed at the time +in not having an opportunity of doing something that would silence +my enemies in Washington, who were not slow to avail themselves of +any pretext for hostile action against me. It was not difficult +to manufacture one out of the public reports of what had been done, +or not done, in East Tennessee, and the Military Committee of the +Senate reported against the confirmation of my appointment as major- +general. Of this I was informed by my friend Senator J. B. Henderson, +in a letter urging me to "whip somebody anyhow." This information +and advice elicited a long reply, from which the following are +extracts, which expressed pretty fully my views and feelings on +the subject, and which, with events that soon followed, ended all +trouble I ever had with that august body, the United States Senate. + +I recollect in this connection a very pertinent remark made by +General Grant soon after he became President. My nomination as +major-general in the regular army, with those of Sherman and Sheridan +as general and lieutenant-general, had been sent to the Senate and +returned approved so promptly as to occasion comment. I remarked +that it had on one occasion taken me a year and a half to get +through the Senate. President Grant, as he handed me my commission, +replied: "Yes; and if your conduct then had been such as to avoid +that difficulty with the Senate, you would probably never have +received this commission at all." I have no doubt he was right. +To have pleased the radical politicians of that day would have been +enough to ruin any soldier. + + LETTER TO SENATOR HENDERSON + + "Headquarters, Army of the Ohio, + "Knoxville, Tenn., April 15, 1864. +"Dear Senator: I have just received your letter of the 7th informing +me that the Military Committee has reported against my nomination, +and urging me to 'whip somebody anyhow.' I am fully aware of the +importance to me personally of gaining a victory. No doubt I might +easily get up a little 'claptrap' on which to manufacture newspaper +notoriety, and convince the Senate of the United States that I had +won a great victory, and secure my confirmation by acclamation. +Such things have been done, alas! too frequently during this war. +But such is not my theory of a soldier's duties. I have an idea +that my military superiors are the proper judges of my character +and conduct, and that their testimony ought to be considered +satisfactory as to my _military qualities_. + +"I have the approval and support of the President, the Secretary +of War, General Halleck, General Grant, and General Sherman. I am +willing to abide the decision of any one or all of them, and I +would not give a copper for the weight of anybody's or everybody's +opinion in addition to, or in opposition to, theirs. + +"If the Senate is not satisfied with such testimony, I can't help +it. I never have and never will resort to 'buncombe' for the +purpose of securing my own advancement. If I cannot gain promotion +by legitimate means, I do not want it at all. . . . In all this +time I have yet to hear the first word of disapproval, from my +superior officer, of any one of my military operations (unless I +except Curtis, who disapproved of my pursuing Hindman so far into +Arkansas), and in general have received high commendation from my +superiors, both for my military operations and administration. I +would rather have this record without a major-general's commission, +then to gain the commission by adding to my reputation one grain +of falsehood. . . . + +"Grant was here in the winter, and Sherman only a few days ago. +They are fully acquainted with the condition of affairs. I have +been acting all the time under their instructions, and I believe +with their entire approval. They are generally understood to be +men whose opinions on military matters are entitled to respect. +I cannot do more or better than refer the Senate to them. + +"One thing is certain: I shall not be influenced one grain in the +discharge of my duty by any questions as to what action the Senate +may take on my nomination. . . . If the Senate is not satisfied as +to my past services, why not wait until they can know more? I am +tired enough of this suspense, but still am perfectly willing to +wait. In fact, I have become, in spite of myself, very indifferent +on the subject. I am pretty thoroughly convinced that a major- +general's commission is not worth half the trouble I and my friends +have had about mine, and I feel very little inclination to trouble +them, or even myself, any more about it. + +"The Senate has its duty to perform in this matter, as well as +myself and my superior officers. If senators are not willing to +act upon the concurrent testimony of all my superior officers as +to what services I have rendered, I shall not condescend to humbug +them into the belief that I have done something which I really have +not. + +"You ask me what are the prospects of putting down the rebellion. +I answer unhesitatingly that when the management of military matters +is left to military men, the rebellion will be put down very quickly, +and not before. I regard it as having been fully demonstrated that +neither the Senate, nor the House of Representatives, nor the +newspapers, nor the people of the United States, nor even all of +them together, can command an army. I rather think if you let +Grant alone, and let him have his own way, he will end the war this +year. At all events, the next ninety days will show whether he +will or not. + +"I find this letter is both too long and too ill-natured. I feel +too much as if I would like to 'whip somebody anyhow,' so I will +stop where I am. Let me hear from you again soon. + + "Yours very truly, + "J. M. Schofield. +"Hon. J. B. Henderson, + "U. S. Senate, Washington, D. C." + +Of course I knew the advice of my friend Senator Henderson was not +intended to be taken seriously, but only as expressing his view, +much the same as my own, of the then existing situation in the +Senate. But it gave me, all the same, the opportunity I wanted to +give his brother senators, through him, "a piece of my mind." + +General Sherman, on a visit to Knoxville about the end of March, +a few days before the date of the foregoing letter, disclosed to +me his general plans for the coming campaign, and the part I was +expected to take in it. + +It would be difficult to give an adequate conception of the feeling +of eager expectation and enthusiasm with which, having given my +final salutation to my "friends" in the Senate, I entered upon the +preparations for this campaign. Of its possible results to the +country there was room in my mind only for confidence. But for +myself, it was to decide my fate, and that speedily. My reputation +and rank as a soldier, so long held in the political balance, were +at length to be settled. The long-hoped-for opportunity had come, +and that under a general whose character and ability were already +established, and of the justice of whose judgment and action +regarding his subordinates there could be no reason for doubt in +my mind. My command was to be mostly of veteran troops, and not +too large for my experience. Its comparative smallness was a source +of satisfaction to me at that time, rather than anything like +jealousy of my senior brother commanders of the Cumberland and +Tennessee. + +My first care was to provide my men with all necessary equipments +for the campaign, and to fill up the ranks by calling in all +absentees. It was a refreshing sight to see the changed aspect +and feeling of the gallant little army as it marched with full +ranks and complete equipment, newly clad, from Knoxville toward +Dalton. + +My next thought was to win the respect and confidence of my men. +An opportunity to do this was speedily afforded in the delicate +operations in front of Dalton. The result may perhaps be fairly +expressed in the words of an old soldier who was overhead to say +as I passed his regiment that day under fire: "It is all right, +boys; I like the way the old man chaws his tobacco." From that +day forward I felt that the Twenty-third Corps confided in me as +I did in them. I never had any doubt they would do just what I +expected them to do, and would take it for granted that it was "all +right." + +It is with greatest pleasure that I record here the just tribute +paid to that splendid body of men by General Sherman about the +close of the Atlanta campaign: "The Twenty-third Corps never failed +to do all that was expected of it." + + COMMENTS ON SHERMAN'S "MEMOIRS" + +And it is with equal pleasure that I record the just and generous +treatment shown by General Sherman toward me from the beginning of +that campaign. Although much my senior in years, experience, and +reputation, he never showed that he was aware of it, but always +treated me as his peer. In his official reports and his memoirs +he has never been unkind or unjust, though it has never been his +habit to bestow much praise on individuals, or to think much of +the rewards due his subordinates, generally giving credit as justly +due to troops rather than to commanders. It would be impossible +for me not to cherish feelings of strong affection for my old +commander, as well as the profound respect due his character as a +man and solider, and his brilliant genius. + +If anything I may say in criticism of General Sherman's acts or +words shall seem unkind or be considered unjust, I can only disclaim +any such feeling, and freely admit that it would be wholly unworthy +of the relations that always existed between us. I write not for +the present, but for the future, and my only wish is to represent +the truth as it appears to me. If I fail to see it clearly, I do +but condemn myself. History will do impartial justice. Having +been in a subordinate position in the campaigns of 1864 in Georgia +and Tennessee, I shall not attempt to write a full account of those +campaigns, but shall limit myself to such comments as seem to me +to be called upon the already published histories of those +campaigns. + +In estimating the merits of Sherman's "Memoirs,"( 1) it should be +remembered that he does not, and does not claim to, occupy the +position of a disinterested, impartial historian. He writes, not +for the purpose of doing equal and exact justice to all actors in +a great historical drama, but for the purpose of elucidating his +own acts and motives, and vindicating himself against the harsh +criticism and censure which have followed some of his most important +transactions. However unconscious General Sherman himself may have +been of the influence of such motives, their existence was natural, +even inevitable, and they have manifestly given their coloring to +all of the memoirs. This should not occasion surprise, nor even +regret, much less be held to justify unkind criticism. It is +desirable for the future historian to have the view of the chief +actor in any portion of history taken from his own standpoint. It +is only by a critical, laborious and honest comparison of this view +with those of other actors and eye-witnesses that impartial history +may ultimately be written. + +My present purpose is simply to direct attention to some points in +the history of those campaigns of General Sherman in which I was +one of his principal subordinates, upon which the views of others +were at the time, or have since been, different from his own. In +what I have to say the motive of self-vindication can have little +or no influence; for, with some unimportant exceptions, General +Sherman does relatively full justice to me and to the little army +which I had the honor to command. I shall speak mainly of the acts +of others, especially the noble dead. + + FAULTY ORGANIZATION OF SHERMAN'S ARMY + +I must preface my remarks by observing that the organization of +Sherman's army during the Atlanta campaign was extremely faulty, +in that the three grand divisions were very unequal in strength, +the Army of the Cumberland having nearly _five times_ the infantry +strength of the Army of the Ohio, and more than twice that of the +Army of the Tennessee, even after the junction of Blair's corps. +The cavalry, of which two divisions belonged to the Army of the +Ohio, always acted either under the direct orders of General Sherman +or of the nearest army commander, according to the flank on which +it was operating. This inequality resulted from the fact that +Sherman's army was composed of three separate armies, or such +portions of them as could be spared from their several departments, +united for that campaign. General Thomas was, naturally enough, +disinclined to part with any of his troops, and the troops did not +wish to be separated from the old army in which they had won so +much honor, nor from the commander whom they revered. Besides, +General Thomas had had much greater experience in the command of +troops in the field than I, and General Sherman, if he thought of +it at all, may well have doubted the wisdom of diminishing the +command of the one to increase that of the other. I do not know +whether this matter was discussed at all before the opening of the +campaign, certainly not by me, who would have been restrained by +motives of delicacy, if by no other, from mentioning it. But in +fact my ambition was then limited to fighting well and successfully +with the single corps under my command. It was only after experience +had drawn attention more pointedly to the evils resulting from +faulty organization, and success had inspired legitimate confidence, +that this subject became matter of much thought and some discussion. + +But this faulty organization continued to the end of the Atlanta +campaign, and was, as I think will clearly appear, one of the causes +of many of the partial failures or imperfect successes that +characterized our operations. General Thomas's command often proved +unwieldy and slow from being larger than one man could handle in +a rough and in many places densely wooded country, while the others +were frequently too small for the work to be done. It was often +attempted to remedy this defect by ordering a division or corps of +the Army of the Cumberland to "co-operate with" or "support" one +of the others in making an attack; but military experience has +shown that "co-operate" and "support" mean, in general, to do +nothing effective. The corps commanders, generally, not being in +the habit of acting independently, and not being in direct +communication with the general-in-chief, and hence not familiar +with his plans and views, would not act with the necessary promptness +or vigor; and not regarding themselves as absolutely under the +orders of the general they were directed to support, they would +not obey his orders or requests unless they were in accord with +their own views; while one of these corps commanders, General +Sherman says, manifested an ambition to get one of the separate +armies under his command and win a victory on his "own hook." But +General Sherman fails to state that he encouraged all this by his +own now well-known erroneous opinion upon the question of the +relative rank of army and corps commanders; that this vital question +was evaded until its decision in a special case--that of Stanley +and Schofield--became absolutely necessary, and was then decided +erroneously, the error resulting in failure and great disappointment +to Sherman. Had this question been decided at an early day according +to the plain import of the law, as was afterward done by the War +Department, and orders given to corps commanders to obey instead +of "co-operate" or "support," much trouble would have been avoided. + +First among the most important events of the Atlanta campaign were +the operations about Dalton and Resaca. Here I have always thought +General Sherman committed the mistake, so common in war (and, as +I believe, not infrequently afterward committed by himself and +others in the Union armies), of assigning to too small a force the +main attack upon the vital point of an enemy's position. McPherson +had only about 22,000 infantry, while Sherman estimated Johnston's +force at about 60,000. Thomas's position in front of Rocky-face +Ridge was virtually as unassailable as that of Johnston behind it. +The only weak point of our position was that of two divisions of +the Twenty-third Corps on our left, north of Dalton. Had those +divisions been attacked, as Sherman apprehended, they might have +suffered severely, but would have drawn off force enough from the +enemy to increase largely the probabilities of success in the attack +in Johnston's rear. One half of Sherman's infantry was ample for +the demonstration in front of Dalton. At least one half should +have been sent through Snake Creek Gap to strike the enemy's rear. +There was no necessity to attack Resaca at all, and experience has +shown what terrible losses a small force in a strongly fortified +position may inflict upon a very large attacking force. Two or +three brigades could have invested Resaca, with the garrison it +then held, while a force large enough to hold its ground against +Johnston's whole army could have been put upon the railroad between +Resaca and Dalton. The result would then, in all probability, have +been what Sherman expected. Indeed, the fate of Johnston's army +might perhaps have been decided then and there. + + McPHERSON'S TASK AT RESACA + +Sherman certainly cannot be suspected of wishing to do injustice +to the memory of McPherson, for he loved and respected him most +highly, and mourned his death with evident sincerity. But I think +he is in error in saying that "at the critical moment McPherson +seems to have been a little timid." I believe the error was +Sherman's, not McPherson's; that McPherson was correct in his +judgment, which certainly was mine (after passing over the same +ground and fighting the battle of Resaca), that his force was +entirely too small for the work assigned it. I had not the same +opportunity General Sherman had of judging of McPherson's qualities +as a commander; but I knew him well and intimately, having sat upon +the same bench with him at West Point for four years, and been his +room-mate for a year and a half. His was the most completely +balanced mind and character with which I have ever been intimately +acquainted, although he did not possess in a very high degree the +power of invention or originality of thought. His personal courage +seemed to amount to unconsciousness of danger, while his care of +his troops cannot, I believe, be justly characterized otherwise +than as wise prudence. I consider this to be only a just tribute +to the memory of the nearest and dearest friend of my youth. + +If McPherson had commanded one third of the army, he might, with +a corps of Thomas's army in close support, have felt strong enough +to occupy and hold a position between Dalton and Resaca. As it +was, Thomas should have followed close upon his rear through Snake +Creek Gap, with two corps. The distance between the two wings of +the army would have been so short and the ground between them so +impassable to the enemy as to give us practically a continuous line +of battle, and Thomas's two corps in the valley of the Connasauga +near Tilton would have been in far better position to strike the +retreating enemy when he was compelled to let go of Dalton, than +they were in front of Rocky-face Ridge. Impartial history must, +I believe, hold Sherman himself mainly responsible for the failure +to realize his expectations in the first movement against Johnston. + + MCPHERSON'S TASK AT RESACA + +It seems at least probable that at the beginning of the movement +against Dalton, Sherman did not fully understand the character of +the enemy's position; for his plan clearly appears to have been to +make the main attack in front at the moment Johnston should be +compelled to let go from his stronghold by reason of McPherson's +operations in his rear; while McPherson, after breaking the railroad +and then falling back for security to the Gap, should strike Johnston +in flank during the confusion of retreat. + +The nature of the position rendered this plan impracticable for +producing any important result. Had McPherson broken the road ever +so "good" and then fallen back to the Gap as ordered, Johnston +could have moved his main army to Resaca that night, and at daylight +the next morning Sherman would have found in the enemy's trenches +at Dalton only a skirmish-line which would have leisurely retreated +before him to the new position at Resaca. The result would have +been essentially the same as that which was actually accomplished. + +Indeed, as it now seems clearly to appear to General Sherman, the +only possible mode of striking an effective blow at Dalton was to +capture Resaca or seize and hold a point on the road in rear of +Dalton, and _not_ to break the road and fall back as McPherson was +ordered to do. If Sherman had seen this clearly at the time, it +is inconceivable that he would have sent less than one fourth of +his army to execute the all-important part of the plan. And now +he judges McPherson as manifesting timidity ( 2) because he did +not at the critical moment attempt to accomplish, with his +comparatively small force, what Sherman should have ordered to be +done by a much larger force. + +A very bold, independent commander might have attempted, whether +successful or not, what Sherman thinks McPherson ought to have done +at Resaca; and, as Sherman says, such an opportunity does not occur +twice in the life of any man. But McPherson was a subordinate in +spirit as well as in fact, and cannot fairly be charged with timidity +for not attempting what he was not ordered to do, and what, in +fact, was no part of the plans of his superior so far as they were +indicated in his orders. + +If McPherson had assaulted Resaca, it is possible, but only possible, +that he might have succeeded. There were some cases during the +Civil War where intrenchments hastily constructed and imperfectly +defended were carried by assault; many more where the assault +failed; and, I believe, not one case where intrenchments carefully +prepared in advance, with obstructions in front, and defended by +a force commensurate with the extent of the line, like those at +Resaca, were successfully assaulted. + +It is true that McPherson's force was vastly superior to the single +brigade that held Resaca that day, but that practically amounts to +nothing. A single division would have been as good for such an +assault as two corps. Beyond a reasonable proportion, say of three +or four to one, numbers amount to nothing in making such an assault. +It would be physically possible for numbers to succeed in such a +case if their immediate commander was willing to sacrifice them +and they _were willing to be sacrificed_. But considering the +general unwillingness among commanders and men to sacrifice or to +be sacrificed beyond what seems to them a reasonable expenditure +of life for the object to be gained, success is _morally_ impossible, +or very nearly so, in an assault such as would have been required +to capture Resaca on May 9, 1864. Clearly, such an assault should +not be attempted except as the only chance of victory; and then +the subordinate officers and men should be clearly informed precisely +what they are expected to do, and made to understand the necessity +for so great and unusual a sacrifice. In that case, brave and true +men will make the sacrifice required, provided their pluck holds +out long enough; and that no man is wise enough to predict, even +of himself, much less of a large number of men. + + McPHERSON'S TASK AT RESACA + +The only chance of success was to invest Resaca on the west and +north, and put between the investing line and Dalton troops enough +to hold their ground against the main body of Johnston's army; and +this must have been done in a single day, starting from the debouche +of Snake Creek Gap, the troops moving by a single, common country +road. Johnston's whole army, except a small rear-guard, would by +the use of three roads have been in position to attack McPherson +at dawn of day the next morning, while the main body of Sherman's +army was far away on the other side of Rocky-face. Or if McPherson +had not held the entire natural position as far east as the Connasauga +River, Johnston could have passed round him in the night. It seems +to me certain that McPherson's force was too small to have taken +and held that position. Indeed it does not seem at all certain +that, however large his force might have been, he could have put +troops enough in position before night to accomplish the object of +cutting of Johnston's retreat. The case was analogous to that of +Hood's crossing Duck River in November of that year, and trying to +cut off our retreat at Spring Hill. There was simply not time +enough to do it in that one day, and if not done in one day it +could not be done at all. + +So that it does not seem at all certain that this, which was +"Thomas's plan" to throw the entire Army of the Cumberland on the +road in Johnston's rear and thus cut off his retreat, would have +succeeded any better than Sherman's, yet it gave greater promise +of success, and therefore ought to have been tried. It is at least +probable that Johnston's view of the case (see his "Narrative," +pages 15, 16, 17) is the correct one: That, with his thorough +knowledge of the ground, ample roads, and means of early information, +together with our ignorance of the ground and our extremely deficient +roads, he could have defeated any possible attempt to cut him off +from Resaca. + +To illustrate the faulty system of organization and command which +characterized the Atlanta campaign, I will now refer to an incident +of the operations about Dallas, it being next in order of date of +those I wish to consider. General Sherman does not allude to it +at all in his "Memoirs." + +Near the close of the operations about Dallas, the Twenty-third +Corps was moved to our left, under instructions from General Sherman +to endeavor to strike the enemy's right flank. A division of the +Army of the Cumberland was ordered to "support" the Twenty-third +Corps. There were no roads available, and the country was in the +main densely wooded. The head of the column was directed by the +compass toward a point where our maps, the general topography of +the country, and the enemy's known position indicated that his +right must probably rest. After a laborious march through dense +undergrowth, during which our skirmish-line was lost in the woods +and another deployed to replace it, we struck an intrenched line +strongly held, and a sharp action ensued. The Twenty-third Corps +was deployed as far to the left as possible, and the skirmishers +reported that they had reached the extremity of the enemy's intrenched +line, but could not overlap it. At this moment the division of +the Army of the Cumberland came up in splendid style, and _massed_ +immediately in the rear of our left, in "close supporting distance," +and under a pretty heavy fire. I first sent a staff officer and +then went myself to the division commander, explained the situation, +and asked him to put in a brigade on my left and turn the enemy's +flank so as to give us a footing beyond his parapet. He replied +that he was ordered by General Thomas only to "support" me, and +that he would do no more. The day was already far advanced, and +before I could bring troops from another part of my line darkness +came on, and the action ended for the day. By the next morning I +had brought another division of the Twenty-third Corps to the flank, +and General Sherman arrived on the ground. By his personal orders +this division was pushed straight through the woods to a point in +the enemy's rear, on the road leading from Dallas to Acworth, which +point it reached without any opposition, and there intrenched. +That night Johnston abandoned his lines. An inspection of the +enemy's intrenchments demonstrated that our skirmishers were right, +and that a single brigade on our left would have been ample to turn +the enemy's flank and open the way to victory. The above facts +were immediately reported to Sherman and Thomas. I do now know +what action, if any, was taken upon them. + + EXAMPLE OF THE WORKING OF A FAULTY SYSTEM + +I refer to this incident, not as especially affecting the military +reputation of any officer one way or the other, but to illustrate +the working of a faulty system. Under proper organization and +discipline, any division commander could hardly have failed with +that fine division to do all that was desired of him that day. I +believe that division commander's commission as major-general of +volunteers was anterior in date to mine, and he, no doubt, with +General Sherman and some others, thought he was not subject to my +orders. + +[( 1) The following was written in 1875, soon after the appearance +of the first edition.] + +[( 2) In the revised edition, Vol. II, p. 34, General Sherman +substitutes "cautious" for "timid."] + + +CHAPTER VIII +Sherman's Displeasure with Hooker growing out the Affair at Kolb's +Farm--Hooker's Despatch Evidently Misinterpreted--A Conversation +with James B. McPherson over the Question of Relative Rank-- +Encouraging John B. Hood to become a Soldier--Visit to the Camp of +Frank P. Blair, Jr.--Anecdote of Sherman and Hooker under Fire-- +The Assault on Kenesaw--Tendency of Veteran Troops--The Death of +McPherson before Atlanta--Sherman's error in a Question of Relative +Rank. + +In the affair at Kolb's Farm, on June 22, Hascall's division of +the Twenty-third Corps was abreast of and connecting with Hooker's +right, while his advance-guard was many yards in advance of the +line, when the enemy's attack at the Kolb House began. The first +attack fell upon this advance-guard, the 14th Kentucky Volunteers, +which gallantly held its ground until twice ordered to retire and +join the main line. In the meantime Hascall's line had been formed +in prolongation of Hooker's and covered with the usual hastily +constructed parapets, and three brigades of Cox's division had been +ordered forward to protect Hascall's right. The attack was repulsed +with ease, and there was no ground for apprehension about the safety +of my immediate flank, much less of Hooker's, after the arrival of +Cox's division, which occurred before the hour of Hooker's signal- +despatch to Sherman expressing anxiety about our extreme right. +On the following morning we reoccupied the ground held by the 14th +Kentucky at the opening of the engagement, and not only did I offer +to show General Sherman that the dead of my "advance division were +lying farther out than any of Hooker's," but he actually rode with +me over the ground, and saw the dead of the 14th Kentucky lying in +advance of Hooker's picket-line. + + SHERMAN'S DISPLEASURE WITH HOOKER + +My impression is that Hooker, in his signal-despatch of 5:30 P. M., +saying, "We have repulsed two heavy attacks, and feel confident, +our only apprehension being for our extreme right flank. Three +entire corps are in front of us,"( 1) meant by "our extreme right +flank" not his own right, but mine--that is, the _extreme_ right +of the entire line; for at the time of that despatch nearly my +whole corps was strongly posted on Hooker's right, and was well +"refused," forming a strong right flank. This General Hooker well +knew. But the Sandtown Road leading to our rear, on which Cox's +division had been posted until Johnston's attack made it necessary +to close him up on Hascall, was now less strongly guarded. I +believe that General Hooker had conceived the idea, as indicated +by his despatch to Sherman, that Johnston had drawn his main force +from around Kenesaw, and was about to strike our extreme right. +I recollect that I was all the time on the watch for such a blow, +but relied upon my cavalry to give me some warning of it, and made +it a rule to be always as well prepared for it as I could. Being +habitually on the flank, I had got used to that sort of thing, +while Hooker, having been habitually in the center with his flanks +well protected, was more nervous about having them exposed. At +all events, I did not regard the situation at the Kolb House as +anything unusual, and did not think of mentioning it in such a +light to General Sherman; while General Hooker, with a sort of +paternal feeling of seniority, may have thought it his duty to take +care of the whole right wing of the army, and to advise the general- +in-chief of the supposed danger to our "extreme right flank." + +There occurred on that occasion one of those little and seemingly +trifling incidents which never escape the memory, and are always +a source of pride, especially to those who are comparatively young. +When Sherman read Hooker's despatch, which he interpreted as meaning +that my corps was not in position to protect Hooker's flank, he +said in substance, if not literally, and with great emphasis: +"That is not true. I sent Schofield an order to be there. I know +he received the order, for his initials, in his own hand, are on +the envelop which the orderly brought back, and I know he is there. +Hooker's statement is false." What a delight it was to execute +the orders of a chief who manifested such confidence! + + HOOKER'S DESPATCH EVIDENTLY MISINTERPRETED + +I do not remember that I was "very angry" about Hooker's despatch, +as General Sherman says (Vol. II, page 59), though I think Sherman +was. Indeed, he had more reason to be angry than I; for the fact, +and evidence of it, were so plain that the Twenty-third Corps had +done its duty as ordered, that if Hooker's despatch was meant to +imply the contrary, which I doubt, that was a cause of anger to +the general-in-chief, whom he had unnecessarily alarmed, rather +than to me, who had no apprehension of being suspected by the +general-in-chief of having failed in my duty. + +In fact, I do not recollect having seen Hooker's despatch at all +until I saw it quoted in Sherman's "Memoirs." My recollection is +that Sherman told me, on his visiting us the next day, that he had +received during the battle a despatch from Hooker to the effect +that his flank was unprotected. In reply to this I explained to +General Sherman where my troops had been during the engagement, +and showed him the dead of the 14th Kentucky lying on the advanced +ground they had held while Hascall's division was forming. I +believe that if I had seen Hooker's despatch at the time, I should +have interpreted it then, as I do now, as referring, not to his +immediate right, but to the extreme right of the line. I do not +recollect any words, "pretty sharp" or otherwise, between General +Hooker and myself on that subject, and do not believe it was ever +mentioned between us. In short, I do not think I was present at +the interview in the "little church" described by General Sherman +(Sherman's "Memoirs," Vol. II, page 59). I have an impression that +General Hascall was there, and that it is to him General Sherman +refers. I believe the Kolb House difficulty was almost entirely +a misapprehension between General Sherman and General Hooker. Why +this mistake was not explained at the time or afterward I do not +know, unless it was that the feelings of those two gentlemen toward +each other were unfavorable to any such explanation. + +I will add that General Hooker and I were together both before and +after the opening of the Kolb House engagement. He knew perfectly +well where my troops were, and what they were doing, and it seems +to me utterly impossible that he can have meant by his despatch +what General Sherman understood it to mean. + +My despatches of that date to Sherman show that I had no special +apprehension even in respect to our extreme right flank, and that +I doubted the report that one whole corps was in our front. + +My orders on that day,( 2) show that Hascall was up with Hooker at +the intersection of the Marietta and Powder Spring roads, near the +Kolb House, as early as 3 P. M., and that Cox was ordered up with +three brigades at 4:15 P. M., _before the assault began_. Cox +arrived with the head of his column during the enemy's attack, and +was directed by me in person where and how to put his troops in +position. Hence I think I must be right in the inference that in +Hooker's despatch to Sherman of 5:30 P. M., the words "our extreme +right flank" must have been intended to refer to _my_ extreme right, +and not _his_. He was simply unduly apprehensive for the safety +of the extreme right flank of the army, not of his own corps in +particular. My report to General Sherman at 9 P. M. simply shows +that I did not share that apprehension; that, instead of believing +there were "three entire corps in front of us," I doubted whether +there was even all of Hood's corps. + +General Hooker's habit of swinging off from the rest of General +Thomas's army, and getting possession of roads designated for +McPherson or for me, was a common subject of remark between Sherman, +Thomas, McPherson, and myself; and his motive was understood to +be, as General Sherman states, to get command of one of the armies, +in the event of battle, by virtue of his senior commission. But +the subject was never mentioned between General Hooker and me, and +he never even approximated to giving me an order. No doubt he +entertained the opinion that he would have a right to give orders +to either General McPherson or myself under certain circumstances +likely to arise, for General Sherman entertained the same opinion. +What General Thomas thought on the question I never knew. My own +opinion and McPherson's were decidedly the contrary. + + CONVERSATION OVER THE QUESTION OF RELATIVE RANK + +In the final movement which resulted in the withdrawal of Johnston's +army from Kenesaw, the Army of the Tennessee passed by the right +flank of my infantry line along the famous Sandtown Road. While +this was going on, McPherson and I sat on our horses together a +long time, observing the movement and renewing the familiar +intercourse of our youth. We had a long and free conversation on +a great variety of subjects--a rare opportunity for commanders, +even in the same army, where their troops were generally from ten +to twenty miles apart in line of battle. One of the first subjects +that came up was that question of relative rank; for our troops +had "met" and were then "doing duty together," in the language of +the old article of war. But the subject was quickly dismissed with +the remark, made almost simultaneously by both, that such a question +could not possible cause any difficulty between us. McPherson had +the senior commission of major-general, and I the senior assignment +as army commander. Perhaps it would have puzzled even Halleck to +frame a satisfactory decision in that peculiar case. I had long +before determined what my decision would be if that question ever +became a practical one between McPherson and myself on the field +of battle. I would have said, in substance at least: "Mac, just +tell me what you want me to do." + +As we sat together that day, McPherson confided to me the secret +of his marriage engagement, for the purpose, as he stated, of +inquiring whether, in my opinion, he could before long find a chance +to go home and get married. I told him I thought that after the +capture of Atlanta operations would be suspended long enough for +that. But my dear and noble friend was killed in the next great +battle. After Atlanta had fallen I went home, as McPherson would +doubtless have done if he had lived; but our common friend and +classmate Hood cut the visit so short that there would have been +little time for marriage festivities. + +McPherson, among other high qualities, was one of the most generous +men I ever knew. He was remarkably skilful in topographical drawing, +etching, lettering, and all other uses of the pen. Although at +the head of the class and a most conscientious student whose time +was very valuable to himself, he would spend a very large part of +that precious time in "lettering" problems for classmates who needed +such help. For this reason and others he was, by common consent +of all the classes, the most popular man in the corps. I could +not compete with "Mac" at all in the lettering business, but I +tried to follow his good example, in my own way, by helping the +boys over knotty points in "math" and "phil." I had taught district +school one winter before going to West Point, and hence had acquired +the knack of explaining things. + +Hood was not well up in mathematics. The first part of the course +especially he found very hard--so much so that he became discouraged. +After the unauthorized festivities of Christmas, particularly, he +seemed much depressed. On the 26th he asked me which I would prefer +to be, "an officer of the army or a farmer in Kentucky?" I replied +in a way which aroused his ambition to accomplish what he had set +out to do in coming to West Point, without regard to preference +between farming and soldiering. He went to work in good earnest, +and passed the January examinations, though by a very narrow margin. +From that time on he did not seem to have so much difficulty. When +we were fighting each other so desperately fifteen years later, I +wondered whether Hood remembered the encouragement I had given him +to become a soldier, and came very near thinking once or twice that +perhaps I had made a mistake. But I do not believe that public +enmity ever diminished my personal regard for my old friend and +classmate. + + VISIT TO THE CAMP OF FRANK P. BLAIR, JR. + +In thinking of McPherson, I recall an interesting incident connected +with Frank P. Blair, Jr.'s arrival with his corps about June 9, +referred to by General Sherman (Vol. II, page 24). For some reason +we had an afternoon's rest the day after Blair arrived; so I rode +over to his camp--seven or eight miles, perhaps--to greet my old +friend. McPherson, to whose army Blair's corps belonged, and other +officers were there. To our immense surprise, Blair had brought +along great hogsheads of ice and numerous baskets of champagne, as +if to increase the warmth of our welcome. Of course we did not +disdain such an unusual treat in the enemy's country. About sunset +McPherson invited me to visit his camp, and we started off at a +full gallop, which we kept up all the way, yet it was some time +after dark when we reached the headquarters of the Army of the +Tennessee. A good camp supper was awaiting us, with jolly young +officers to make it merry. It was not until supper was ended that +I began to realize the necessity of a night's march to get back to +my own camp. As our infantry line was twenty miles long, and the +cavalry stretched it out on either flank as many more, my single +orderly was quite sufficient protection from any attack by the +enemy; but the Georgia bushes, brambles, and mud, combined with +the absence of any known road, constituted an enemy hard to overcome. +However, by the aid of the compass which I have always carried in +my head since I used to hunt in the wilds of the West, I got back +to camp, and went to bed, taking care not to observe the time of +night by my watch. + +As I have said, I was often much annoyed by General Hooker's corps +getting possession of roads which had been designated for mine to +advance upon, thus greatly delaying my movements. But it is but +just to say that this is susceptible of an explanation much more +creditable to General Hooker than that given by General Sherman. +General Thomas's army was so large that he could never get his +three corps into position as soon as expected by the use of the +roads designated for him. Hence, when Hooker was not in advance +he would "switch off" and hunt for another road to the right or +left, and thus sometimes strike in ahead of McPherson or me, and +leave us no road at all to move on. In fact, the army was so large +and the roads were so few that our movements were often painfully +slow and tedious, and General Hooker's motive may have been only +to get ahead and bring his corps into action or to the position +assigned to it in whatever way he could. + + ANECDOTE OF SHERMAN AND HOOKER UNDER FIRE + +The first time I ever saw General Sherman and General Hooker +together, or got even a suspicion that their personal relations +were other than the most satisfactory, was at Resaca. Cox's division +had gained possession of some portions of the enemy's outer works, +so that from a bald hill just in rear of our line some parts of +the main line of defense could be distinctly seen. Upon my informing +General Sherman of this, he soon appeared on the ground, accompanied +or closely followed by a large number of general and staff officers. +Besides Sherman, Thomas, Hooker, and Newton, a score of others were +there, all eager to see what they could of the now famous stronghold +which McPherson had refrained from assaulting. I led them to the +hill, on which a few dead trees were still standing, and from which +the much-desired view could be obtained. Of course all were on +foot, yet they were too numerous not to attract the attention of +the enemy. Very soon the sound of musketry in front, then not very +heavy, was varied by the sharp explosion of a shell overhead, and +fragments of branches of dead trees came falling all around. A +general "scatteration" occurred in all directions save one. Newton +and I, who were conversing at the time, quietly stepped aside a +few paces out of the line of fire, where we were much safer than +we would have been in full retreat, and then turned round to see +what had become of our companions. All save two had disappeared, +even Thomas having abandoned the field, probably for the first and +only time in his life. But still there, on the bald hill, in full +view of the hostile artillery, were the two already highly +distinguished generals, Sherman and Hooker, both alike famous for +supreme courage, striding round the ground, appearing to look at +nothing in particular and not conversing with each other, but +seeming at least a foot taller than usual, each waiting for the +other to lead off in retreat. After quite a long continuance of +this little drama, which greatly entertained Newton and me, the +two great soldiers, as if by some mysterious impulse,--for they +did not speak a word,--simultaneously and slowly strode to the +rear, where their horses were held. I cheerfully gave the "Johnny +Rebs" credit for the courtesy of not firing another shot after they +saw the effect of the first, which I doubt not was intended only +as a gentle hint that such impudence in Yankees was not to be +tolerated. Yet a single shell from the same direction,--probably +from the same battery,--when we were moving into action that morning, +exploded near my head, and killed the aide who was riding behind +me.( 3) My too numerous staff and escort had attracted attention. +I had at Dalton a few days before forbade the staff and escort to +follow me into action, unless specially ordered to do so; but they +had not so soon learned the lesson which the sad casualty at Resaca +taught them. It was then early in the campaign. Later, both +generals and orderlies had learned to restrain somewhat their +curiosity and their too thoughtless bravery. The perfect old +soldier has learned to economize the life and strength of men, +including his own, with somewhat the same care that he does those +of artillery horses and transportation mules. It is only the young +soldier who does not know the difference between husbanding the +national resources and showing cowardice in face of the enemy. + +At Wilson's Creek, where the brave Lyon was killed in August, 1861, +and where the gallant volunteers on both sides had fought with +almost unexampled courage, standing up to their work all the time, +until one third of their numbers were killed or wounded, and their +forty rounds of ammunition gone, the little companies of old, +regular Indian-fighters had been deployed as skirmishers in close +order, behind trees and bushes and hillocks, and had suffered +comparatively small losses. The following colloquy occurred between +one of them and a volunteer whose cartridge-box, as he was proud +to show, was empty. Volunteer: "How many shots did _you_ fire?" +Old soldier (looking into his cartridge-box): "I fired just +nineteen." Volunteer: "And how many rebs do you think you killed?" +Old soldier: "I guess I killed about nineteen." + +One beautiful, quiet Sunday afternoon, in front of Atlanta, when +even the pickets were respecting the Sabbath day, my headquarters +band, which had been playing selections of sacred music, easily +heard on the other side of the lines, struck up a favorite Southern +air of quite a different character. Quickly came a shell crashing +through the trees far over our heads. The band as quickly took +the hint and changed the tune. Such little "courtesies" from our +"friends the enemy" were not at all uncommon in the short intervals +of rest from deadly work. + + THE ASSAULT ON KENESAW + +General Sherman says in Vol. II, page 60, of his "Memoirs": + +"During the 24th and 25th of June, General Schofield extended his +right as far as prudent, so as to compel the enemy to thin out his +lines correspondingly, with the intention to make two strong assaults +at points where success would give us the greatest advantage. I +had consulted Generals Thomas, McPherson, and Schofield, and we +all agreed that we could not with prudence stretch out any more, +and therefore there was no alternative but to attack 'fortified +lines'--a thing carefully avoided up to that time." + +The first sentence literally means that I extended my right "with +the intention," _on my part_, "to make two strong assaults," etc. +But that is a mere verbal error. General Sherman, of course, meant +to say that the intention was his. + +The second sentence is, perhaps, ambiguous. At least it has been +construed to mean more than the truth. It is undoubtedly true that +"we all agreed that we could not with prudence stretch out any +more," but we did not agree in the conclusion "and therefore there +was no alternative," etc. + +Indeed, such conclusion was extremely illogical, as was demonstrated +a few days later, when one of the other "alternatives" was adopted +with success. This successful movement was essentially the same +as that which had been previously made to dislodge the enemy from +Dalton, and that by which Sherman's army had been transferred from +New Hope Church to the railroad in front of Allatoona, as well as +that by which Atlanta was afterward captured. Hence the existence +of this "alternative" could not have been unthought of by any of +us at the time of the assault on Kenesaw. + +But there was another alternative in this and similar cases, which +was much discussed at various times during the campaign. Its +practicability can be judged of only upon general principles, for +it was never tried. It was to detach two or three corps, nearly +half our army (which was about double the strength of the enemy), +make a detour wide enough to avoid his fortifications, and strike +directly at his flank and rear. Such a movement, it was urged, at +Dalton, Kenesaw, or Atlanta would have compelled Johnston to fight +a battle on equal terms with one half of Sherman's army, while he +had to hold his parapets against the other half. Whatever else +may be said of this proposed movement, it would undoubtedly have +been more hazardous and much more decisive, one way or the other, +than any of the plans actually adopted. It certainly promised +success proportionate to the cost, instead of a costly failure, +which the assault of fortified lines had almost invariably proved +to be. + +I did not see Thomas or McPherson for some days before the assault, +but I believe their judgment, like mine, was opposed to it. +Undoubtedly it was generally opposed, though deferentially as became +subordinates toward the commanding general. The responsibility +was entirely Sherman's, as he afterward frankly stated; and I +presume he did not mean to imply otherwise by the language used in +his "Memoirs" above quoted (Vol. II, page 60). General Sherman's +orders, issued on June 24 (Special Field Orders, No. 28), directed +each of the three armies to make an attack (under the word "assault" +for Thomas and "attack" for McPherson and me). I had made all +preparations to carry out the order on my part. Being visited by +General Sherman a day or two before the date named for the execution +of the order (June 27), I explained to him what I had done, and +how little hope there was of success, on account of the smallness +of my reserve to push the advantage even if we should break the +line, when he at once replied that it was not intended that I should +make an attack in front, but to make a strong demonstration in my +front, and gain what advantage I could on the enemy's flank. During +the day Cox's division forced the passage of Olley's Creek and +secured a position on the head of Nickajack, which was spoken of +by Sherman as the only success of the day. + + TENDENCY OF VETERAN TROOPS + +There were doubtless many occasions in the Atlanta campaign when +the enemy's intrenchments could have been assaulted with success. +These were when the position had been but recently occupied and +the fortifications were very slight. After several days' occupation, +as at the points attacked by Thomas and McPherson, the lines became +impregnable. Frequent efforts were made, and by none more earnestly +than by General Sherman, to press the troops to a vigorous assault +of the enemy's position under the favorable circumstances above +referred to. But the general feeling of the army, including not +only privates, but officers of nearly all grades, was undoubtedly +opposed to such attacks. The notion was very prevalent that there +was no necessity of fighting the enemy on unequal terms. When +attacked, either with or without cover, the troops would fight with +the most determined valor, and almost invariably with success. So +when attacking the enemy in open ground there was no lack of energy +or pluck. But we lose one of the most important lessons of the +war if we fail to remember and appreciate the fact that our veteran +troops are very loath to make an attack where they believe they +have not a fair chance of success. This feeling must be attributed, +not to a lack of high soldierly qualities, but to intelligence and +good sense. The veteran American soldier fights very much as he +has been accustomed to work his farm or run his sawmill: He wants +to see a fair prospect that it is "going to pay." His loyalty, +discipline, and pluck will not allow him under any circumstances +to retreat without orders, much less to run away; but if he encounters +a resistance which he thinks he cannot overcome, or which he thinks +it would "cost too much" to overcome, he will lie down, cover +himself with a little parapet, and hold his ground against any +force that may attempt to drive him back. This feeling of the +soldier is an element in the problem of war which cannot be ignored. +The general who, with such an army, would win the full measure of +success due to greatly superior numbers, must manoeuver so as to +compel the enemy to fight him on approximately equal terms, instead +of assaulting fortifications where, against modern weapons, numbers +are of little or no avail. In the days of the bayonet successful +tactics consisted in massing a superior force upon some vital point, +and breaking the enemy's line. Now it is the fire of the musket, +not the bayonet, that decides the battle. To mass troops against +the fire of a covered line is simply to devote them to destruction. +The greater the mass, the greater the loss--that is all. A large +mass has no more chance of success than a small one. That this is +absolutely true since the introduction of breech-loaders is probably +not doubted by any one; and it was very nearly true with the muzzle- +loading rifles used during our late war, as was abundantly demonstrated +on many occasions. + +I have always believed that the true tactics of our late war, +whenever our force was double that of the enemy (as it sometimes +was and always should have been at all points where decisive +movements were to be made), were to throw one half the force upon +the enemy's rear, so as to compel him to attack that force or else +retreat by side roads with loss of trains and artillery. This +would doubtless have been a bold departure from the ancient tactics, +which had not yet been proved obsolete. Yet I always thought it +strange that our leading generals were unwilling to attempt it. +Had Sherman divided his army in such a way, and struck at Hood's +rear, he might have found a chance to destroy that army as well as +the railroads in Georgia. + + THE DEATH OF McPHERSON BEFORE ATLANTA + +The death of McPherson, on July 22, was felt by all to be an +irreparable loss, and by none more so than by General Sherman, who +manifested deep feeling when the body was brought to the Howard +House, east of Atlanta. I recollect well his remark to the effect +that the whole of the Confederacy could not atone for the sacrifice +of one such life. + +My recollection of some of the incidents of that day differs in +some respects from that of General Sherman. As soon as it was +known that the Army of the Tennessee was heavily engaged I drew +out of line the larger part of my troops, leaving the picket-line +in position, with strong reserves behind the parapets, and massed +them near my left, ready to send reinforcements to the Army of the +Tennessee if necessary, or to form a temporary left flank if the +line on my left should be broken, as it was late in the day, as +described by General Sherman.( 4) + +When that break was made in the line immediately to the left of +mine, I had a rare opportunity of witnessing Sherman's splendid +conduct as a simple soldier, the occasion for which occurs so rarely +to the general-in-chief of a great army. Sherman at once sent to +me for _all my artillery_, which responded to his call at a full +gallop. He led the batteries in person to some high, open ground +_in front of our line_ near the Howard House, placed them in +position, and directed their fire, which from that advanced position +enfiladed the parapets from which our troops had been driven, and +which the enemy then occupied. With the aid of that terrible raking +fire, the division of Union troops very quickly regained the +intrenchments they had lost. General Sherman, on page 81, Vol. +II, gives me the credit due to himself for that soldierly conduct +as an artillery commander. I was occupied in forming my infantry +reserve to meet the enemy if Logan's troops did not drive them +back. Only my artillery was used in restoring this broken line, +because Logan's infantry proved sufficient without further aid. +This action of mine was taken with General Sherman's knowledge and +approval, and was the correct thing to do, for the reason that the +ground in my front was such as to make both my position and that +of the enemy practically unassailable. I had no apprehension of +an attack in my front, and there was no question of my attempting +to "make a lodgment in Atlanta" that day, as stated by Sherman in +Vol. II, page 80. + +It was proposed by me that my reserve and Thomas's should go the +assistance of the Army of the Tennessee, either directly or, better +still, by making a counter-attack in front of the right of that +army, which, if successful, would cut off the hostile force then +attacking in left. Sherman replied, as I recollect, that he had +asked Thomas to send some troops to the left, and the latter had +replied that he had none to spare. Without these the proposition +to make a counter-attack could not be entertained. But my memory +is only that of conversations with General Sherman during the day, +and he ought to be much better informed than I concerning what +passed between General Thomas and himself. I recollect that General +Sherman during the day expressed something like a wish to "let the +Army of the Tennessee fight its own battle," but in his statement +of motive for so doing I think he does that army injustice. My +impression was, and is, that they would have been very glad of +assistance, and that timely help would have increased the fraternal +feeling between the armies, instead of creating unworthy jealousy. + +I cannot but believe, as I then thought, that we were losing a +great opportunity that day. A large force of the enemy had made +a wide circuit from his defenses about Atlanta and attacked our +left several miles distant. We there had a chance to fight him on +equal terms. I thought, and still think, we ought to have concentrated +a large part of Thomas's force and mine near the Howard House, and +made a strong counter-attack upon this attacking column of the +enemy, with the hope of cutting it off from Atlanta. Instead of +this, Thomas spent the day in efforts to "make a lodgment in Atlanta" +over well-prepared fortifications which the Georgia militia could +hold against him about as well as the veteran Confederate troops. + +The movement of August 4 and 5 was designed to be substantially +what had been frequently suggested, but which I have heretofore +referred to as having never been tried, with the exception that +the attacking force was not to sever its connection with the main +body, and hence might not reach far enough to strike an exposed +flank of the enemy. But even with this modification I thought the +movement ought to have a fair chance of success. That movement +was not suggested by me in any way, and, so far as I know, not by +General Thomas. I believe it originated entirely with General +Sherman. I never heard of it until I received his orders. There +was no "argument" by me of the question of relative rank, as +suggested by General Sherman (Vol. II, page 99). + + SHERMAN'S ERROR IN A QUESTION OF RELATIVE RANK + +The positions of the troops when the order for the movement was +made rendered it convenient that the Twenty-third Corps be put in +first,--that is, next to the right of General Thomas's troops then +in position,--while the Fourteenth Corps, commanded by General John +M. Palmer, was relied upon to develop rapidly to our right and +endeavor to strike the enemy's flank before he could extend his +intrenched line far enough to meet and resist our attack. It was +not until some time after my orders for this movement had been +issued and should have been in progress of vigorous execution that +I received the first intimation that the question of rank had been +raised, as stated by General Sherman, and that my orders had simply +been transmitted to the division commanders of the Fourteenth Corps. + +It cannot for a moment be admitted that any share of the blame for +that failure attaches to the Fourteenth Corps, as such. Nor do I +believe with General Sherman that its slowness on that occasion +was due to anything "imbibed" from General Thomas. + + SHERMAN'S ERROR IN A QUESTION OF RELATIVE RANK + +My own view of military duty was different from that entertained +by the commander of the Fourteenth Corps, as was shown in my +subsequent action, hereinafter referred to, when I was ordered to +report to and act under the orders of General Stanley. But if the +distinguished statesman who then commanded the Fourteenth Corps +fell into error at that time, he has doubtless since regretted it +far more than any other man could possible do; and he has many +times atoned for that error by the great services to the country +which he has continued to render up to the present time. + +The primary and principal cause of this and all similar difficulties +during the Atlanta campaign was the grave error of opinion which +disregarded the special rank of army and department commanders +given them by the President's assignment under the law, and the +still graver error of judgment in leaving such an important question +open until the eve of battle, in the "hope that there would be no +necessity for making this decision." This error seems incomprehensible +when it is considered that it in effect nullified the President's +selection of army and department commanders at the most important +of all moments, the crisis of battle, by making these commanders +subject to the orders of any general of older commission whose +troops happened to be adjacent to theirs. + +In the midst of battle, when the orders of a common superior cannot +be obtained in time to meet an emergency, the highest commander +present must give the necessary orders and must be obeyed. This +is probably the gravest responsibility of war. Yet Sherman's +opinion and decision would have placed this responsibility, not +upon the army commander who had been selected by the President, +upon the advice of the general-in-chief, under an act of Congress +passed especially for the purpose, but upon some one who through +political influence or otherwise had got an earlier commission of +major-general. So many of the latter had proved to be unqualified +for responsible command that Congress had enacted a special law +authorizing the President to supersede such prior commissions and +assign commanders of armies or army corps in the field and in any +department whom he deemed competent.( 5) Palpable as this fallacy +seems, yet it was adhered to until overruled by the War Department. + +It is proper for me to add that I had at that time but a very slight +personal acquaintance with General Palmer. However, I knew him +well by reputation, and esteemed him highly. General Thomas, +especially, had given me a high estimate of his character and +abilities. If there was any cause of jealousy or ill-feeling +between us, I never suspected it. + +[( 1) War Records, Vol. XXXVIII, part iv, p. 558.] + +[( 2) War Records, Vol. XXXVIII, part iv, pp. 566 and 568.] + +[( 3) Captain A. H. Engle, who was killed at Resaca, was a most +charming and talented youth, only twenty years of age. That was +his first battle. He was caterer of the headquarters mess. That +morning, before leaving camp, Captain Engle made out all his accounts +and handed them, with the money for which he was responsible, to +another staff officer, saying that he was going to be killed that +day.] + +[( 4) Vol. II, pp. 80, 81.] + +[( 5) Reference is made here to the 122d Article of War, and the +resolution of Congress especially intended to modify it in respect +to command in any "field or department," approved April 4, 1862.] + + +CHAPTER IX +The Final Blow at Atlanta--Johnston's Untried Plan of Resistance-- +Hood's Faulty Move--Holding the Pivot of the Position--Anecdotes +of the Men in the Ranks--Deferring to General Stanley in a Question +of Relative Rank--The Failure at Jonesboro'--The Capture of Atlanta +--Absent from the Army--Hood's Operations in Sherman's Rear--Sent +Back to Thomas's Aid--Faulty Instructions to Oppose Hood at Pulaski +--At Columbia--Reason of the Delay in Exchanging Messages. + +When all our efforts to accomplish decisive results by partial +operations upon the flanks had failed, this question was much +discussed: What more decisive movement shall next be made for the +capture of Atlanta? There were practically but two propositions +to be considered: That of General Sherman, which was adopted with +success; and that heretofore referred to as having never been tried, +to detach two or more corps to make a lodgment on the railroad at +or below East Point, and then compel the enemy to come out of +Atlanta and endeavor to regain control of his only line of supply, +or abandon that city altogether. General Sherman thought it too +hazardous to detach two corps, though he was willing for me to +undertake it with one. In fact, this feeling marked General +Sherman's action throughout the campaign. He had no hesitation in +detaching a small force, the loss of which would still leave him +greatly superior in numbers to the enemy, or a very large force +under his own command, leaving the enemy to the care of the smaller +part, as in his march to Savannah. General Thomas, on the contrary, +thought the movement proposed by General Sherman "extra hazardous," +as Sherman says in his "Memoirs" (Vol. II, page 106). I did not +regard either of them as very hazardous, and upon consideration +rather preferred General Sherman's, because I thought it could not +fail to be decisive of the capture of Atlanta, while the other +might fail if not executed with promptness and vigor, and this, +experience had warned us, we could not be quite sure of. + + JOHNSTON'S UNTRIED PLAN OF RESISTANCE + +Some time after the war, that very able commander General Joseph +E. Johnston told me that in his judgment Sherman's operations in +Hood's rear ought not to have caused the evacuation of Atlanta; +that he (Johnston), when in command, had anticipated such a movement, +and had prepared, or intended to prepare, to oppose it by constructing +artillery redoubts at all suitable points in the rear of Atlanta, +as well as in front, which redoubts could be very speedily connected +by infantry intrenchments whenever necessary; that he aimed to keep +on longer than Sherman's army could subsist on the contents of +their wagons and haversacks; and that Sherman could not possibly +hold all the railroads leading into Atlanta _at the same time_, nor +destroy any one of them so thoroughly that it could not be repaired +in time to replenish Johnston's supplies in Atlanta. + +Here is presented a question well worthy of the candid study of +military critics. Whatever may be the final judgment upon that +question, it seems perfectly clear that Johnston's plan of defense +ought at least to have been tried by his successor. If Hood had +kept all his troops in compact order about Atlanta, he would have +been in the best possible condition to resist Sherman if the latter +turned back from Jonesboro' and attacked Atlanta from the rear, or +to strike Sherman's rear or flank in full force if he made any +other movement. The division of Hood's forces at that time, one +part holding on to Atlanta while the other went to _head off_ +Sherman, was the worst disposition that could have been made. + +As related to me personally by General Sheridan,--for I have not +yet studied the Virginia campaigns so thoroughly as to justify me +in speaking from the records,--it was a similar mistake on the part +of the Confederate cavalry commander J. E. B. Stuart, in trying to +get between Sheridan and Richmond, which gave Sheridan the advantage +and led to Stuart's defeat. Stuart had ridden hard all night, and +got between Sheridan and Richmond, his men and horses exhausted, +while Sheridan had been resting and feeding his own men and animals. +In the morning Sheridan "rode over" his exhausted antagonist. +These are among the many cases where exaggerated ideas of the +importance of places have led to the defeat of armies. I knew +Stuart well at West Point, he having been in the class next to +mine. He then gave promise of his future as a cavalry leader. + +The only specially hazardous part of Sherman's movement was that +which would fall to my lot--namely, to hold the "pivot" against a +possible attack of Hood's whole army while Thomas and Howard should +swing round it, and then draw out and join them after the swing +was made. Upon my reporting that I was perfectly willing to +undertake this task, and had no doubt of the ability of my corps +to accomplish it, all question about making the movement appeared +to be settled, and it was at once ordered. Hood did not avail +himself of his opportunity to attack me when alone, either in +position or in motion, hence my part of the movement proved easiest +of all. + +I had placed my corps in a completely inclosed field-work, large +enough to contain all my trains, and strong enough to resist any +attack from a greatly superior force until Sherman's movement could +be accomplished. + + ANECDOTES OF THE MEN IN THE RANKS + +I recollect even to this day a little incident of that time which +was, at least to me, both amusing and instructive. After receiving +Sherman's orders, which meant "suspend aggressive work and go to +fortifying," I was directing the laying out of the new work at the +most important part of the line, and the men had been ordered to +commence digging, when I heard an old volunteer, as he laid aside +his gun and put off his accoutrements with manifest reluctance, +say, _sotto voce:_ "Well, if digging is the way to put down the +rebellion, I guess we will have to do it." Our old soldiers had +a "mind of their own," and were not afraid to let their commanders +know it; yet they were essentially as thoroughly subordinate and +reliable as any troops any general ever had the honor to command. + +I now recall another incident which occurred a few days earlier, +in which a young Indiana volunteer was somewhat less respectful, +though he had no idea whom he was addressing, nor, probably, any +thought whatever about "relative rank." I had come out from my +tent, before sunrise in the morning, and was performing my morning +ablutions in the ordinary camp basin, preparatory to putting on my +outer clothing. None of my "people" were yet up, and the night +sentinel of my camp was a little way off. There came up a weary, +belated soldier who had, perhaps, been trudging along much of the +night, trying to overtake his regiment. I heard him ask in a loud +voice: "Where is the 128th Indiana?" Not supposing the question +was addressed to me, I did not look up. Then came in still louder +tones and in an amended form which left no room for doubt as to +whom it was addressed: "I mean you old fellow there with the red +shirt! Where is the 128th Indiana?" + +If from lapse of time my memory may not be exact as to the number +of the regiment, I am sure no apology is necessary to the gallant +128th. It was, anyhow, one of those very high-numbered new Indiana +regiments which had recently joined the army. The young soldier +was sent to the headquarters escort, given his breakfast, and +carried along until his regiment was overtaken. + +The Twenty-third Corps reached the railroad about the close of day +on August 31, having time to do no more than intrench our positions. +The orders that day and night were urgent to make the destruction +of the railroad thorough and extensive. This was evidently General +Sherman's primary object, showing a doubt in his mind whether the +effect of his movement would be the speedy abandonment of Atlanta, +or whether he would have to trust to his destruction of the railroad +to accomplish that object. + +Late in the night of the 31st, after General Stanley and I, who +were encamped near together, had gone to sleep, we received despatches +from General Sherman stating in effect that as we were too far from +the main body of the army to receive orders from him or General +Thomas, our two corps must act on the morrow under the orders of +the highest commander present, and that General Stanley, having +the older commission, was that highest commander. I was therefore +directed to report to General Stanley and act under his orders. +I replied to General Sherman that while I differed from him in +opinion upon the question of relative rank, I would for the present +cheerfully abide his decision and execute his orders. Early the +next morning, before I had time to report to General Stanley, he +appeared at my camp, evidently much disturbed by the orders he had +received. He said General Sherman was wrong; that he was not +entitled to the command and did not want it; and urged me to accept +the chief command, and let him act under my orders. I replied that +General Sherman's order was imperative, and I could not relieve +him (General Stanley) from the responsibility of executing it. It +was all wrong, but there was no present remedy, and he must do the +best he could. The position of his corps on the right made it +necessary that it should have the advance in the day's movement, +while I would follow close after and support him under all +circumstances. + + THE FAILURE AT JONESBORO' + +So we started early in the morning to execute Sherman's orders-- +thoroughly to destroy the railroad, and close down on Thomas toward +Jonesboro'. That morning, as Sherman says (Vol. II, page 107), +"Howard found an intrenched foe (Hardee's corps) covering Jonesboro'," +and "orders were sent to Generals Thomas and Schofield to turn +straight for Jonesboro', tearing up the railroad track as they +advanced." But of course, as General Sherman had anticipated, such +orders could not reach me in time to do any good. They were not +received until after the affair at Jonesboro' was ended. But +hearing the sound of battle in our front, I rode rapidly forward +to the head of Stanley's column, which was then not advancing, made +inquiries for that officer, and was informed that he was trying to +find General Thomas to get orders. I immediately brought my infantry +of the Twenty-third Corps out of the road occupied by Stanley's +corps, moved it to the front through woods and fields, and endeavored +to find a way by which I could reach the enemy's flank or rear, +riding so far ahead with a few staff officers and orderlies that +I escaped very narrowly being captured by the enemy. Finally, near +dark, General Stanley's troops began to deploy and attack the enemy; +and as there were more troops on the ground than could possibly be +used that day, I could do not more than stand and watch their +movements, as I did with intense interest until my medical director, +Dr. Hewit, one of the bravest and coolest men I ever knew, called +my attention to the fact that the place was much too hot for a +general and his staff who had nothing to do there. I believe if +General Sherman had been in our place he would have thought it +"more than a skirmish-line" (Vol. II, page 108) in Stanley's front +that gave us that fire both of musketry and artillery which my +staff officers have frequently spoken of as one of the ugliest they +ever experienced. General Stanley's fault was, not that he deployed +his troops, but that he did not put them in at once when he arrived +on the ground, instead of waiting for orders. But General Stanley, +whose gallantry was never questioned, was a subordinate in experience. +He had but recently risen to the command of a corps, and had been +little accustomed to act on his own responsibility. Feeling +overburdened with the responsibility wrongfully thrust upon him +that day, he naturally sought relief from it by reporting for orders +to General Thomas as soon as his corps was reunited to the main +army. + +The failure at Jonesboro', as at so many other places, was due to +that erroneous interpretation of the law that threw the supreme +responsibility at the crisis of battle upon untried and (in this +case) unwilling shoulders, or else left the lawful commander without +recognized authority, to beg in vain of others to "co-operate" with +him. + + THE CAPTURE OF ATLANTA + +During the night of August 31 others besides General Sherman were +too restless and impatient to sleep (Vol. II, page 108). The sounds +of explosion in Atlanta were distinctly heard, and the flashes of +light distinctly seen. With the compass for direction and the +watch for intervals of time between flash and sound, there was no +difficulty in locating their origin at Atlanta. An untutored farmer +may well have thought "these sounds were just like those of a +battle," but a practised ear could not have failed to note the +difference. First there would come an explosion louder and unlike +the report of one or several guns, and this would be followed by +numerous smaller, sharper, and perfectly distinct reports, quite +unlike that of musketry, which could not be mistaken for anything +but the explosion of shells. There could be no room for doubt that +these lights and sounds meant the destruction in Atlanta of magazines +or carloads of fixed ammunition, and hence that Hood was abandoning +that place. I reported my observations and conclusion to General +Sherman, but he "still remained in doubt." The doubt was to me +incomprehensible; but perhaps that was because I had no doubt from +the start, whether I was right or wrong, what the result would be. +My period of elation was when we got firm hold of the railroad at +Rough and Ready. Hood having failed to attack our exposed flank +during the movement, the fall of Atlanta was already an accomplished +fact with me when Sherman was still in doubt, as well as when Thomas +thought the news "too good to be true." But the above is worthy +of noting only as a necessary introduction to something far more +important. + +Hood's army was now divided and scattered over a distance of thirty +miles, one corps below Jonesboro' being just driven from its ground +with considerable loss and in retreat to Lovejoy's, the main body +leaving Atlanta and stretched along the road toward McDonough; +while Sherman's whole army, except Slocum's corps, was in compact +order about Jonesboro', nearly in a straight line between Atlanta +and Lovejoy's. This seemed exactly the opportunity to destroy +Hood's army, if that was the objective of the campaign. So anxious +was I that this be attempted that I offered to go with two corps, +or even with one, and intercept Hood's retreat on the McDonough +road, and hold him until Sherman could dispose of Hardee or interpose +his army between him and Hood. But more prudent counsels prevailed, +and we remained quietly in our camps for five days, while Hood +leisurely marched round us with all his baggage and Georgia militia, +and collected his scattered fragments at Lovejoy's. + +Atlanta had become, like Richmond, in popular estimation the real +objective of military operations. The public lost sight of the +fact that it was armies in the field, and not fortified places, +which gave strength to the rebellion; and apparently even prominent +generals, if they did not share the popular delusion, at least +recognized its value. The capture of Atlanta was enough to meet +the "political necessity," make "the election of Mr. Lincoln +certain," and win rejoicings and congratulations from all parts of +the North! It was not worth while to run any risk of trying to do +more at that time! It had to be left for two of Sherman's corps, +after the other four had gone on "the march to the sea," to fight +Hood at Columbia and Spring Hill, hurl him back from Franklin, and +then, with reinforcements not equal to half what Sherman had taken +away, to overwhelm him at Nashville. Why was not this done with +a much larger force under Sherman at Atlanta? This is one of the +questions for the future historian to discuss. + +During our rest near Lovejoy's, General Sherman requested me to +give him a statement in writing of my dissent from his decision +upon the question of relative rank, which I did. This he submitted +to the War Department for decision, as a "question of rank that +had arisen between Generals Schofield and Stanley." At this General +Stanley was very indignant, as well as at General Sherman's censure +of his conduct on September 1; for the reason that no question of +rank had been raised by us, and the command was thrust upon him in +opposition to his wish and in violation of the law as he understood +it. In due time came the decision of the War Department, written +by General Halleck, sustaining the view of the law Stanley and I +had taken, and reversing that of General Sherman; also kindly +commending my action in waiving the question during active +operations. + +It was by virtue of the above decision of the War Department that +I, instead of General Stanley, had command of the force that in +the following November, 1864, opposed Hood's advance from the +Tennessee River and repulsed his fierce assault at Franklin. + + ABSENT FROM THE ARMY + +As I was absent from the army on business connected with my department +during most of Hood's raid upon the railroad in the rear of Atlanta +(Sherman having announced his purpose to let his army rest during +that time), I have little to say in respect to the operations +resulting therefrom. But some things in Sherman's account seem to +require a little elucidation. + +Being informed by General Sherman of Hood's movement, I hurried to +the front and tried to reach the army by a special train with a +small guard from Cleveland, Tenn., but met, October 13, the head +of Hood's column at Dalton, where several trains of cars with +supplies and men without arms returning from furlough on their way +to Sherman had been stopped by the reported approach of Hood. I +ordered all back to Cleveland, and we barely had time to escape +capture by Hood's cavalry. On arriving at Cleveland, I reported +by telegraph to General Thomas, then at Nashville; and he desired +me to go to Chattanooga, take command of the troops there, and +prepare to defend that place, which it was thought Hood might +attempt to take by a _coup de main_, or to co-operate with Sherman. +As General Sherman says (Vol. II, page 156), "Hood had broken up +the telegraph, and thus had prevented quick communication"; but +through my own scouts and spies I was able to keep track of Hood's +movements. As soon as he turned westward I determined to move with +the troops, when no longer necessary to the defense of Chattanooga, +rapidly to Trenton and Valley Head, seize the passes through the +Lookout range, and prevent Hood's escape in that direction, presuming +that Sherman would intercept his retreat down the Chattanooga +valley. I sent a courier to General Sherman informing him of my +purpose, and informed General Thomas by telegraph. But the latter +disapproved my plan, and directed me to move to defend Caperton's +Ferry. This is what General Sherman refers to in his despatch of +October 16: "Your first move on Trenton and Valley Head was right; +the move to defend Caperton's Ferry is wrong. Notify General Thomas +of these, my views." But the difference between right and wrong +proved immaterial, since Hood was left free to escape down the +Chattanooga valley. Why this was done, or why Sherman did not want +to force the enemy east, by Spring Place, into the barren mountains, +where Johnston would have been compelled to go if McPherson's move +on Resaca in May had been successful, seems a mystery. The +explanation is probably to be found in Sherman's wish that Hood +would go where he would not be compelled to follow, and thus would +leave him (Sherman) a clear road for his march to the sea. Indeed +the conviction seems irresistible that Sherman and Hood could hardly +have acted in more perfect concert if they had been under the same +commander. The one did exactly what the other wanted, and the +other took care not to interfere with his movement. + +At the close of the Atlanta campaign, I promised General Sherman +that I would, as soon as I should be able to do so, write a full +critical history of that campaign as a text-book for military +students. I have not yet found time to fulfil that promise. The +foregoing pages were intended, when written, as only a very partial +fulfilment of that task, and that almost entirely of one side of +it--far the most difficult side. The other side is so easy, +comparatively, and is already so familiar to military students, +that further elucidation now seems hardly necessary. Yet I hope, +as a labor of love, if for no other reason, to present my impressions +of those grand tactical evolutions of a compact army of one hundred +thousand men, as I witnessed them with the intense interest of a +young commander and student of the great art which has so often in +the history of the world determined the destinies of nations. + + HOOD'S OPERATIONS IN SHERMAN'S REAR + +After the capture of Atlanta, in September, 1864, General Sherman +proposed to give his army rest for a month while he perfected his +plans and preparations for a change of base to some point on the +Atlantic or the gulf, in pursuance of the general plan outlined by +General Grant before the Atlanta campaign was opened in May. But +the Confederate commander took the initiative, about September 20, +by moving his army around Sherman's right, striking his railroad +about Allatoona and toward Chattanooga, doing some damage, and then +marching off westward with the design of transferring the theater +of war from Georgia to Alabama, Mississippi, or Tennessee. + +Sherman very promptly decided not to accept that challenge to meet +Hood upon a field chosen by the latter, but to continue substantially +the original plan for his own operations, having in view also new +ulterior plans opened to him by this erratic movement of his +adversary. An essential modification of the original plan, to meet +the unexpected movement of Hood, was to send back into Tennessee +force enough, in addition to the troops then there and others to +be assembled from the rear, to cope with Hood in the event of his +attempting the invasion of Tennessee and Kentucky, or to pursue +and occupy his attention if he should attempt to follow Sherman. +General George H. Thomas, commanding the Department of the Cumberland, +whose headquarters were at Nashville, was already at that place, +and was directed by General Sherman to assume command of all the +troops in the three departments under Sherman's command, except +those with the latter in Georgia, and to direct the operations +against Hood. + +Thomas had in his department at that time only the garrisons and +railroad guards which had been deemed essential during the preceding +operations in Georgia; and many of those were soon to be discharged +by expiration of their terms of enlistment, their places to be +supplied by new regiments coming from the rear. General A. J. +Smith's corps, then in Missouri, about ten thousand strong, was +ordered to Tennessee, and Sherman also ordered Stanley, with the +Fourth Corps, about twelve thousand men, to return from Georgia to +Tennessee and report to Thomas. Stanley had started by rail to +Tullahoma, and was to march, as he did, from the latter point to +Pulaski, Tennessee, which had been selected as the point of +concentration for Thomas's forces. This was the situation when I +returned to the army and reported in person to General Sherman. + +Under Sherman's promise of a month's rest for his army, I had gone +back to attend to the business of my department, as General Thomas +had also done, and hence was in the rear when Hood made his raid +upon Sherman's railroad. Upon reporting to General Sherman near +the end of October, I learned for the first time his purpose to +march to Savannah, and what troops he had provided for Thomas in +Tennessee. I told Sherman, with that perfect candor which he always +invited, that in my opinion Thomas's force was much too small; that +Hood evidently intended to invade Tennessee; and that he would not +be diverted from his purpose by Sherman's march in the opposite +direction, but would, on the contrary, be encouraged thereby to +pursue his own plan. Hence I requested Sherman to send me back +with the Twenty-third Corps to join Thomas. Sherman at first +appeared to understand my suggestions as a desire to be left in +Tennessee instead of Thomas, the latter to go with Sherman. But +I explained to him emphatically that such was not my thought. I +took it for granted that Thomas was to command the army in Tennessee, +and I wanted only to go back and help him because he would, in my +opinion, have to do the fighting while Sherman's march would be +unopposed. Sherman then replied that he must have three grand +divisions, under Slocum, Howard, and myself, to make his army +complete, and that he could not spare me; and he gave no indication +of concurrence in my opinion that he ought to send back more troops. + + SENT BACK TO THOMAS'S AID + +After leaving General Sherman that afternoon and returning to my +own camp, I wrote him a letter giving a special reason why my corps, +rather than any other, should be sent back to Tennessee in order +that it might be filled up my new regiments which had been ordered +from the North. No answer came to these suggestions until I had +made three days' march toward Atlanta, _en route_ for Savannah. +Then I received an order, October 30, to march to the nearest point +on the railroad, and report by telegraph to General Thomas for +orders. + +At first General Thomas ordered me to move by rail to Tullahoma, +and then march across to Pulaski, as Stanley was doing. But just +then Forrest with his cavalry appeared at Johnsonville, on the +Tennessee River west of Nashville, and destroyed a great quantity +of property, General Thomas not having sufficient force available +to oppose him; hence on November 3 Thomas ordered me to come at +once by rail to Nashville with my corps, where I reported to him +with the advance of my troops on November 5. He then ordered me +to go at once with some of my troops to Johnsonville and dispose +of the Confederate cavalry there, and then to return to Nashville +and proceed to Pulaski, to take command of all the troops in the +field, which would then include the Fourth Corps, my own Twenty- +third, except the detachment left at Johnsonville, and the cavalry +watching Hood toward Florence. My duty at Johnsonville, where I +left two brigades, was soon disposed of; and I then returned to +Nashville, and went at once by rail to Pulaski, arriving at that +place in the evening of November 13. + +Some so-called histories of the Tennessee campaign have been based +upon the theory that I was marching from Georgia to Tennessee, to +unite my corps with General Thomas's army at Nashville, when I +encountered Hood at Franklin, and after a sharp contest managed to +elude him and continue my march and unite with the Army of the +Cumberland at Nashville. Hence I wish to point out clearly that +I had been with the entire Twenty-third Corps to Nashville, with +a part of it to Johnsonville and back to Nashville, and thence to +Columbia and near Pulaski, all by rail; that all of the Army of +the Cumberland then in Tennessee was the Fourth Corps and the +cavalry at and near Pulaski; that General Thomas placed those troops +under my command, and that they remained so until after the battle +of Franklin, November 30, and the retreat to Nashville that night; +and that General Thomas did not have an army at Nashville until +December 1. I had united with Thomas's troops two weeks before +the battle of Franklin, and was commanding his army in the field +as well as my own during that time. If the historians had read +the records ( 1) they could not possibly have fallen into such a +mistake. + + FAULTY INSTRUCTIONS TO OPPOSE HOOD AT PULASKI + +Before reaching Pulaski I was furnished with an order from General +Thomas's headquarters assigning me to the command in the field, by +virtue of my rank as a department commander, and a copy of instructions +which had already been telegraphed to General Stanley at Pulaski. +I assumed command in the morning of November 14. The moment I met +Stanley at Pulaski, in the evening of November 13, he called my +attention to the faulty position of the troops and to an error in +General Thomas's instructions, about which I then knew nothing +because I was unacquainted with the geography of the surrounding +country. Upon Stanley's statement, I halted Cox's division of the +Twenty-third Corps a few miles north of Pulaski so that the troops +might be the more readily placed as the situation required when I +had time to consider it. No part of the Twenty-third Corps actually +went to Pulaski, although that was the place to which General Thomas +had ordered it. + +On the 19th General Thomas repeated to me the same orders he had +sent to General Stanley, in these words: "If the enemy advances +in force, as General Hatch believes, have everything in readiness +either to fight him at Pulaski if he advances on that place, or +cover the railroad and concentrate at Columbia, should he attempt +to turn your right flank. . . ."( 2) I then telegraphed General +Thomas, November 20, pointing out the faulty nature of the position +selected by him for the troops at Pulaski, and the danger that must +be incurred in attempting to carry out his instructions to fight +Hood at Pulaski if he should advance upon that place; also suggesting +what seemed to be the best way to avoid that difficulty. General +Thomas very promptly approved these suggestions, and thus ended +the embarrassment occasioned by the faulty instructions. But his +official report on that point has made it necessary for me to +comment upon it more fully later. + +The season of Hood's invasion of Tennessee was extremely unfavorable +for aggressive operations, and hence correspondingly favorable for +the defense. The ordinary country roads were almost impassable, +while the turnpikes were in good condition. As we held the crossing +of the Tennessee River at Decatur, Hood was compelled to cross at +the Shoals below, and to advance over those very bad roads; hence +we had ample time in which to make the necessary dispositions to +oppose him. + +Our cavalry gave us accurate information that the enemy was advancing +on the 21st, when Cox, with Wagner in support, was ordered to +interpose between the enemy's cavalry and Columbia; while Stanley, +with two divisions of the Fourth Corps, marched from Pulaski to +that place, and our cavalry moved on the enemy's right to cover +the turnpike and railroad. The whole army was in position at +Columbia, November 24, and began to intrench. Hood's infantry did +not appear in sight until the 26th. Cox had a brush with the +enemy's cavalry, which had driven in one of our cavalry brigades. +That action was magnified at the time, and afterward, into evidence +of a race between our troops and the enemy for the possession of +Columbia. In fact, Ruger's troops at Columbia were quite capable +of holding that place against Forrest, and Hood's infantry was not +within a day's march of either Cox or Stanley until after both had +reached Columbia. + +We held our intrenched position in front of Columbia until the +evening of November 27, inviting an attack, and hoping that Thomas +would arrive with, or send, reinforcements in time to assume the +offensive from Columbia; but reinforcements did not come, and the +enemy did not attack. It became evident that Hood's intention was +not to attack that position, but to turn it by crossing Duck River +above; hence the army was moved to the north bank of the river in +the night of the 27th. It was still hoped that the line of Duck +River might be held until reinforcements could arrive. General +Thomas was very urgent that this should be done, if possible, as +the arrival of General A. J. Smith's corps from Missouri had been +expected daily for some time, when General Thomas intended, as it +was understood, to come to the front in person with that corps and +all the other troops he could assemble in his department, take +command, and move against the enemy. + + REASON OF THE DELAY IN EXCHANGING MESSAGES + +About that time was disclosed one of those contrivances by which +the non-military agencies of government interfere with the operations +of armies. The War Department telegraph corps alone was intrusted +with the cipher in which General Thomas and I could communicate +with each other by telegraph. Neither he, nor I, nor any of our +staff officers were permitted to know the telegraph code. The work +was so badly done that from eight to forty-eight hours were occupied +in sending and delivering a despatch. Finally the cipher-operator +attached to my headquarters in the field deserted his post and went +to Franklin, so that the time required for a messenger to ride from +Franklin to my position in the field was added to the delay caused +by deciphering despatches. From all this it resulted that my +superior at Nashville was able to give me little assistance during +the critical days of that campaign. It has been generally supposed +that I was all that time acting under orders or instructions from +General Thomas, and his numerous despatches have been quoted in +"histories" as evidence in support of that supposition. The fact +is that I was not only without any appropriate orders or instructions +nearly all the time, but also without any timely information from +General Thomas to guide my action. + +This fact appears to have been fully recognized by General Thomas +in his official report, wherein he made no mention of any orders +or instructions given by him during the progress of those operations, +but referred only to "instructions already given" before I went to +Pulaski, and said: "My plans and wishes were fully explained to +General Schofield, and, as subsequent events will show, properly +appreciated and executed by him."( 3) + +[( 1) War Records, Vol. XLV.] + +[( 2) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, p. 944.] + +[( 3) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part I, p. 590.] + + +CHAPTER X +Hood Forces the Crossing of Duck River--Importance of Gaining Time +for Thomas to Concentrate Reinforcements at Nashville--The Affair +at Spring Hill--Incidents of the Night Retreat--Thomas's Reply to +the Request that a Bridge be Laid over the Harpeth--The Necessity +of Standing Ground at Franklin--Hood's Formidable Attack--Serious +Error of Two Brigades of the Rear-Guard--Brilliant Services of the +Reserve--Yellow Fever Averted--Hood's Assaults Repulsed--Johnston's +Criticism of Hood--The Advantage of Continuing the Retreat to +Nashville. + +In the afternoon of November 28 I received information that the +enemy's cavalry had forced the crossing of Duck River above Columbia, +and driven our cavalry back; and, about two o'clock that night, +that prisoners reported the enemy laying pontoon bridges, and that +Hood's infantry would begin to cross that morning. The army was +ready to march at a moment's notice. It could have retired to +Spring Hill or to Franklin without molestation or delay, but that +would have given the enemy the crossing of Duck River at Columbia +and the turnpike road for his advance with his artillery and trains. +There was no assurance that Thomas had assembled any of his expected +reinforcements at Nashville or elsewhere. It was known that orders +had been given some days before looking to concentration of some +of the troops in his department somewhere, but what had been +accomplished I was not informed. About A. J. Smith I was in a like +state of uncertainty. Only one thing was clear, and that was that +I must hold Hood back, if possible, until informed that Thomas had +concentrated his troops; for if I failed in that, Hood would not +only force me back upon Nashville before Thomas was ready to meet +him there, but would get possession of the Chattanooga Railroad, +and thus cut off the troops coming to Nashville from that direction. +After considering the matter some time in the night, I decided to +hold on at least until morning. Early in the morning a brigade of +infantry was sent up the river to reconnoiter and watch the enemy's +movements; at the same time Stanley was ordered, with two divisions +of his corps, back to Spring Hill, to occupy and intrench a position +there covering the roads and the trains, which were ordered to be +parked at that place, and General Thomas H. Ruger was ordered to +join him. + + IMPORTANCE OF GAINING TIME FOR THOMAS + +About 8 A. M. on the 29th came a despatch from Thomas, dated 8 P. M. +of the day before, conveying the information that Smith had not +arrived, and saying nothing about any other reinforcements, but +expressing the wish that the Duck River position be held until +Smith arrived; and another despatch designating Franklin, behind +the Harpeth River, as the place to which I would have to retire if +it became necessary to fall back from Duck River. I then decided +to hold on to the crossing of Duck River until the night of the +29th, thus gaining twenty-four hours more for Thomas to concentrate +his troops. I did not apprehend any serious danger at Spring Hill; +for Hood's infantry could not reach that place over a wretched +country road much before night, and Stanley, with one division and +our cavalry, could easily beat off Forrest. Hence I retained +Ruger's division and one of Stanley's, and disposed all the troops +to resist any attempt Hood might make, by marching directly from +his bridges upon my position on the north bank of Duck River, to +dislodge me from that position. That was his best chance of success, +but he did not try it. + +Stanley arrived at Spring Hill in time to beat off Forrest and +protect our trains. Then he intrenched a good position in which +to meet Hood's column when it should arrive, which it did late in +the afternoon. They had a hard fight which lasted until about +dark. Much bitter controversy arose between Hood and some of his +subordinates because of their failure to dislodge Stanley's division +and get possession of the turnpike at Spring Hill. While I have +no wish to take any part in that discussion, I must say that I +think the mistake was Hood's. I think he attempted a little longer +march, over a very bad road, than could be made in so short a time. +The 29th of November is a very short day, and the march of troops +across pontoon bridges and through deep mud is very slow. If Hood +had turned down the north bank of Duck River, across the fields, +which were no worse than his road, he could have got into a fight +about noon; but he thought, according to his own account in "Advance +and Retreat," that he was deceiving me by his thundering demonstrations +at Columbia, and that I did not know he was marching to Spring +Hill. He thought he was going to "catch me napping," after the +tactics of Stonewall Jackson, while in fact I was watching him all +day. Besides, Hood went to bed that night, while I was in the +saddle all night, directing in person all the important movements +of my troops. Perhaps that is enough to account for the difference +between success and failure, without censuring subordinate commanders. +Mine did all I could have asked anybody to do that night. + + THE AFFAIR AT SPRING HILL + +As soon as I was satisfied that Hood was gone to Spring Hill and +would not attack me on the bank of Duck River, I took the head of +my troops--Ruger's division--and marched rapidly to Spring Hill, +leaving staff officers to give orders to the other division commanders +to follow immediately in proper order as then formed in line. +These orders were somehow misunderstood. The order of march was +reversed, and the troops, except Ruger's, and Whitaker's brigade +of Kimball's division, did not move at once. But the delay did no +harm, and I did not know of the mistake until several days afterward. +If Hood had only known of that mistake, he might have troubled me +no little, perhaps, by pushing a column across from his camp, south +of Whitaker's right flank at Spring Hill, until it reached the +Columbia turnpike. But I had prepared even for that, as well as +I could, by sending a company of infantry to occupy the only cross- +road I could see near Spring Hill as we approached that place. I +ordered the captain of that company to hold that road at all hazards +until he was relieved by my orders! Some of Hood's troops "relieved" +him next morning! We have to do cruel things sometimes in war. +On arriving at Spring Hill, Whitaker's brigade was put in line on +the right of the troops then in position, so as to cover the turnpike +on which we were marching. This was about dark. In a few minutes +the Confederate camp-fires were lighted a few hundred yards in +front of that brigade. It was a very interesting sight, but I +don't think any of Whitaker's men cared to give the Confederates +a similar view of them. + +After stopping to see Stanley a few minutes, and learning that some +of Forrest's troopers had been seen at Thompson's Station, three +miles farther north, about dusk, I went with Ruger's division to +drive them off and clear the way to Franklin. To my great surprise, +I found only smouldering fires--no cavalry. This was where our +men passed so close to the "bivouac" that they "lighted their pipes +by the enemy's camp-fires"; and that is the way romance is woven +into history! But I took it for granted that the famous Forrest +must be on my road somewhere; for he was there in the afternoon, +and I had no cavalry anywhere near to drive him away. I could not +take time to go with or send infantry to find out where he was. +But I had with me my headquarters troop and as gallant an aide-- +Captain William J. Twining--as ever wore spur. Twining was the +same gallant and accomplished aide and officer of the corps of +engineers, now dead, who afterward made the famous ride of one +hundred and ten miles, through the enemy's country in North Carolina, +to carry a despatch from me to Sherman. He was a commissioner of +the District of Columbia at the time of his death. I ordered them +to go at full gallop down the pike to Franklin, and to ride over +whatever might be found in their way. I sat motionless on my horse +at Thompson's Station until the clatter of hoofs on that hard road +died out in the distance, and I knew the road was clear. I did +not tell the brave Twining the object of that ride, but simply to +report the situation to General Thomas by telegraph from Franklin, +and if any troops were at that place, as had been reported, to +order them forward at once. I had not yet determined whether I +could continue the retreat that night, or whether it might be +necessary to fight Hood at Spring Hill the next day. In either +case the troops at Franklin, if any were there, might be useful. + + INCIDENTS OF THE NIGHT RETREAT + +Upon returning to Spring Hill near midnight, I found my column from +Duck River there in compact order. As the road was clear and the +Confederates all sound asleep, while the Union forces were all wide +awake, there was no apparent reason for not continuing the march +that night. A column of artillery and wagons, and another of +infantry, moved side by side along the broad turnpike, so that if +the redoubtable Forrest should wake up and make his appearance +anywhere, he would be quickly brushed away. It was reported that +he did attack somewhere in the night, but I heard nothing of it at +the time, perhaps because I was sleeping quietly on my horse as we +marched along! + +I arrived at Franklin with the head of my column a short time before +the dawn of day, November 30; indicated to General J. D. Cox, +commanding the Twenty-third Corps, the line upon which the troops +were to be formed; and intrusted to him the formation, as the +several divisions of both corps should arrive, General Stanley +being in the rear directing the operations of the rear-guard. The +Twenty-third Corps occupied the center of the line crossing the +Columbia turnpike, and extended to the river on the left, while +the Fourth Corps was to extend the line to the river on the right. +Fortunately the natural position was such that Kimball's division +of the Fourth Corps was sufficient, leaving both Wood's and Wagner's +in reserve. I then gave my undivided attention to the means of +crossing the Harpeth River. + +Two days before I had telegraphed to General Thomas suggesting that +he have a pontoon bridge laid at Franklin, to which he replied: +"You can send some of the pontoons you used at Columbia to Franklin +to lay a bridge there."( 1) General Thomas or his staff should +have known that it was utterly impossible for me to use the pontoons +which I had at Columbia. Those pontoons were heavy wooden bateaux, +and there were no wagons to transport them, the train that brought +them there having been taken away, it is presumed by his order, +certainly not by mine. Hence I was compelled to burn that pontoon +bridge as well as the railroad bridge (partially) when my troops +retreated from Ducktown. But even if this were not all true, Thomas +knew the enemy was already crossing Duck River on my flank, and +that I must speedily take up a new position behind the Harpeth, +and that I desired him to provide the means for my army to cross +that river. It was a reasonable inference that I should not have +asked him to send another bridge if I already had one that I could +use. Besides, I was commanding General Thomas's army, operating +in his department, wherein I had no control of anything in rear of +the troops under my charge. It was his duty to foresee and provide +for all the necessities that might arise in the rear of the army +in the field. I telegraphed him again for a bridge at the Harpeth +on the 29th, when I found that retreat was inevitable, but he +apparently did not get that despatch. He nevertheless sent bridge +material by rail to Franklin, where it arrived on the morning of +November 30, too late for the pontoons to be used, though the +flooring was useful in covering the railroad bridge and the burned +wagon-bridge. I found also on the south side of the river a very +large park of wagons belonging to the Department of the Cumberland, +which, as well as my own trains and artillery, must be crossed over +before I could withdraw my troops to the north side. The troops +were very much fatigued by their long night march, rendering +considerable rest indispensable. Hence there could not be much +time in which to prepare defensive works with such obstructions as +to insure successful defense against a very heavy assault. But, +much more serious, Hood might cross the river above Franklin with +a considerable force of infantry, as well as with all his cavalry, +before I could get my materials over and troops enough to meet him +on the north side. The situation at Franklin had become vastly +more serious than that at Columbia or Spring Hill, and solely +because of the neglect of so simple a thing as to provide the bridge +I had asked for across the Harpeth. If that had been done, my +trains could have passed over at once, and the entire army could +have crossed before Hood reached Franklin. + + THE NECESSITY OF STANDING GROUND AT FRANKLIN + +To meet this greatest danger, Wood's division of the Fourth Corps +was crossed to the north side to support the cavalry in holding +the fords above, if that should become necessary; while Wagner's +division, which had acted as rear-guard from Spring Hill, was +ordered to remain far enough in front of the line to compel Hood +to disclose his intention to attack in front or to turn the position, +and was to retire and take its position in reserve at the proper +time, if the enemy formed for attack. Only one of those three +brigades--Opdycke's--came in at the proper time and took its +appropriate place; and that, it was asserted, and no doubt truly, +was by the brigade commander's own volition, he having been a +soldier enough to know his duty in such a case, without the necessity +for any orders. The other two brigades remained in their advanced +position until they were run over by the enemy. Much idle controversy +was indulged in among officers of the Fourth Corps and others in +respect to the action of those two brigades. The only proper way +to settle such a question was by a court-martial. As the corps +passed from my command the next morning, and had been under by +orders only a few days, I have never made any effort to fix, even +in my own mind, the responsibility for that blunder. + +By great exertion on the part of the engineers, the means of crossing +the river were at length provided. The supports of the burned +wagon-bridge were still standing at a level with the surface of +the water. They were timbered and planked over, and the railroad +bridge was also covered with planking, thus giving us two passable +bridges. The trains had all been crossed over, and a part of the +artillery. Orders had been issued for the troops to begin crossing +at dark, when Hood disclosed his purpose to attack. The artillery +was ordered back to its position in line, and General Stanley and +I, who were then together on the north side of the river, rode +rapidly to our posts, he to his corps on the south side, and I to +the high redoubt on the north bank, overlooking the entire field. + +There I witnessed the grandest display possible in war. Every +battalion and battery of the Union army in line was distinctly +seen. The corps of the Confederate army which were advancing or +forming for the attack could also be seen, though less clearly on +account of their greater distance, while the Confederate cavalry +could be dimly discerned moving to the fords of the river above +Franklin. Only a momentary view was permitted of this scene of +indescribable grandeur when it was changed into one of most tragic +interest and anxiety. The guns of the redoubt on the parapet of +which I stood with two or three staff officers had fired only a +few shots over the heads of our troops at the advancing enemy when +his heavy line overwhelmed Wagner's two brigades and rapidly followed +their fragments in a confused mass over our light intrenchments. +The charging ranks of the enemy, the flying remnants of our broken +troops, and the double ranks of our first line of defense, coming +back from the trenches together, produced the momentary impression +of an overwhelming mass of the enemy passing over our parapets. + + HOOD'S FORMIDABLE ATTACK + +It is hardly necessary to say that for a moment my "heart sank +within me." But instantly Opdycke's brigade and the 12th and 16th +Kentucky sprang forward, and steadily advanced to the breach. Up +to this moment there had been but little firing at that point, +because of our own troops and the enemy coming in pell-mell; hence +there was not much smoke, and the whole could be seen. But now +all became enveloped in a dense mass of smoke, and not a man was +visible except the fragments of the broken brigades and others, +afterward known to be prisoners, flocking to the rear. A few +seconds of suspense and intense anxiety followed, then the space +in the rear of our line became clear of fugitives, and the steady +roar of musketry and artillery and the dense volume of smoke rising +along the entire line told me that "the breach is restored, the +victory won"! That scene, and the emotion of that one moment, were +worth all the losses and dangers of a soldier's lifetime. + +It would hardly be possible to frame language that would do more +than justice to the magnificent conduct of Emerson Opdycke's brigade +and Laurence H. Rousseau's 12th Kentucky and John S. White's 16th +Kentucky, which were also in reserve, and their commanders, in that +battle. Their action was beyond all praise, and nothing that can +justly be said in respect to the battle can detract one iota from +their proud fame. Yet the light in which the part acted by Opdycke's +brigade (the others not being mentioned) is presented by some +"historians," to the prejudice, relatively, of other portions of +the army and of their commanders, is essentially false. It is +represented as something purely spontaneous, out of the ordinary +course, not contemplated in the dispositions made for battle, +unforseen and unexpected; in short, something more--yes, vastly +more--than the reasonable duty of the brigade; or, "beyond all +power of generalship to mold the battle or control its issue, the +simple charge of Opdycke's brigade stands in boldest relief." The +same might be said with equal truth of the action of any brigade +upon which devolves the assault of defense of the key of a military +position. The success or failure of "generalship to mold the battle +or control its issue" depends absolutely upon the action of such +brigades, their doing, or failure to do, the duty belonging to the +position to which they are assigned. Every soldier in the army +knew what his duty was in such a case--knew for what he had been +placed in that position. It would have been strange indeed if the +gallant commander of that brigade had waited for orders from some +higher officer to move "forward to the lines." As well might the +commander of a brigade in line wait for orders from the general-in- +chief before commencing to fire on the advancing enemy. + +The highest tribute that can be paid to Opdycke's brigade is the +just and true one, that it did exactly the duty assigned it in the +plan of battle, and did that duty nobly and with complete success. +That other brigades did the same is sufficiently shown by the fact +that twenty battle-flags were captured by a single brigade of the +Twenty-third Corps on the same part of the line, and that the 12th +and 16th Kentucky regiments relatively suffered equally heavy losses +in killed and wounded with those of Opdycke.( 2) + + SERIOUS ERROR OF TWO BRIGADES + +As before stated, the dispositions for defense contemplated the +whole of Wagner's division as the reserve to support the center, +that being the only part of the line upon which the enemy would +have time to make a heavy assault that day. This provision for an +ample reserve had been made after full consideration and before +Wood's division was ordered to the north side of the river, which +was after the day was well advanced and the enemy's cavalry had +begun to threaten the crossing above. The blunder respecting the +two brigades of Wagner's division came near being disastrous, and +the repulse of the assault in spite of that blunder makes it highly +probable that if the dispositions ordered had been properly made, +the repulse of the enemy would have been easy beyond reasonable +doubt. Yet it would be difficult to find a fairer chance of success +in a direct assault upon troops in position. Our intrenchments +were of the slightest kind, and without any considerable obstructions +in front to interfere seriously with the assault. The attack, no +less than the defense, was characterized by incomparable valor, +and the secret of its failure is to be found in one of the principles +taught by all military experience--the great superiority in strength +of a fresh body of troops in perfect order over another in the +state of disorder which necessarily results from even the most +successful assault. There was really no comparison, in effective +strength, between Opdycke's orderly and compact brigade and the +confused mass of Confederates that were crossing over our parapet. +The result was nothing extraordinary or at all unprecedented. It +was but one of the numerous proofs afforded by military history of +the value of that prudent maxim in the art of war which dictates +the placing of a suitable reserve in close support of that portion +of a defensive line which is liable to heavy assault. + +The surprising conduct of the commanders of the two brigades of +Wagner's division which were run over by the enemy, and of the +division commander himself, whatever may be true as to the conflicting +statements published in respect to their action, is one of the +strongest possible illustrations of the necessity of the higher +military education, and of the folly of intrusting high commands +to men without such education, which, fortunately for the country +and the army, is rarely learned by experience, but must be acquired +by laborious study of the rules and principles laid down by standard +authors as derived from the practice and teachings of the great +masters of the art of war in all ages. A well-educated officer, +either as brigade or division commander, would not have needed +orders from any source to tell him what to do in that emergency. +He would have known so surely what his duty was that he would have +retired at the proper time behind the main line, without ever +thinking whether or not he had orders to do so. As well might I +have waited for orders from General Thomas to retire across the +Harpeth after my duty on the south side of that river had been +accomplished. The cases are closely parallel. Any unofficial +discussion of the question of responsibility for the sacrifice of +those two brigades is idle. According to the established rules of +war, those three commanders ought to have been tried by court- +martial, and, if found guilty, shot or cashiered, for sacrificing +their own men and endangering the army. One example of such +punishment would do much to deter ignorant and incompetent men from +seeking high commands in the field. But the discipline of the +volunteer army of a republic must, it appears, inevitably be, +especially in respect to officers of high rank, quite imperfect, +although it may become in respect to the great mass of the troops, +as ours certainly did, exceedingly efficient. + +In the Atlanta campaign I sent a division commander to the rear in +permanent disgrace for sacrificing his men in a hopeless assault +upon a fortified line, contrary to the general orders and instructions +which General Sherman had published before the opening of the +campaign. But I never heard of another similar case of even +approximate justice to an officer of high rank. It is a striking +proof of the evil effect of war upon the minds and passions of men, +not only of those who are engaged in it, but even more upon those +who see it from a distance, that commanders are often severely +condemned for prudent care of the lives of men under their command, +who have no choice but to march blindly to death when ordered, +while the idiotic sacrifice of the bravest and noblest of patriotic +soldiers is loudly applauded as a grand exhibition of "gallantry" +in action. If George H. Thomas had had no other title to honor or +fame, he would have deserved the profound gratitude of the American +people, and a very high place among the country's patriots and +heroes, for the reason that while he never yielded ground to an +attacking foe, he never uselessly sacrificed the life of a soldier. + +It is a sin for a soldier to throw away his own life. It is not +his, but belongs to his country. How much greater sin and crime +in an officer the throw away the lives of a thousand men! If he +threw away a thousand dollars, he would be court-martialed and +cashiered. Are not the soldiers of a republic worth even a dollar +apiece! Patriotism and courage exist in great abundance in the +breasts of young Americans. All they need is instruction, discipline, +a little experience, such as our greatest soldier said he himself +needed at first, and, above all, intelligent leadership, which can +be acquired only by military education, to make them the best +soldiers the world has ever known. + + YELLOW FEVER AVERTED + +When I joined my company as second lieutenant in Florida in the +winter of 1853-4, I found the company had been reduced to one lance- +sergeant, two lance-corporals, and thirteen privates. Yellow fever +had done its deadly work. But that lesson was not lost. In later +years, upon the approach of that enemy, which could not be conquered +even by the highest science then known or practised, the troops +were marched a few miles into the pure air of the piney woods, +where the dreaded fever could not reach them. At the close of the +epidemic season which occurred when I had the honor to command the +army, I had the great satisfaction of reporting that not a single +soldier had been killed by that most dreaded of all enemies, and +the even greater satisfaction of reporting that those bravest of +the brave, the surgeons who volunteered to go into the very midst +of the camp of the enemy that does not respect even the red cross, +to minister to those who had been stricken down and to study the +nature of the disease for the future benefit of the army and of +mankind, had also been unharmed. As chief of those I do not hesitate +to name the present surgeon-general of the army, George M. Sternberg. +Yet how many of the noblest soldiers of humanity have given their +lives in that cause! + +Hood's assault at Franklin has been severely criticized. Even so +able a man as General J. E. Johnston characterizes it as a "useless +butchery." These criticisms are founded upon a misapprehension of +the facts, and are essentially erroneous. Hood must have been +fully aware of our relative weakness in numbers at Franklin, and +of the probable, if not certain, concentration of large reinforcements +at Nashville. He could not hope to have at any future time anything +like so great an advantage in that respect. The army at Franklin +and the troops at Nashville were within one night's march of each +other; Hood must therefore attack on November 30, or lose the +advantage of greatly superior numbers. It was impossible, after +the pursuit from Spring Hill, in a short day to turn our position +or make any other attack but a direct one in front. Besides, our +position, with a river in our rear, gave him the chance of vastly +greater results, if his assault were successful, than could be hoped +for by any attack he could make after we had crossed the Harpeth. +Still more, there was no unusual obstacle to a successful assault +at Franklin. The defenses were of the slightest character, and it +was not possible to make them formidable during the short time our +troops were in position, after the previous exhausting operations +of both day and night, which had rendered some rest on the 30th +absolutely necessary. + + HOOD'S ASSAULTS REPULSED + +The Confederate cause had reached a condition closely verging on +desperation, and Hood's commander-in-chief had called upon him to +undertake operations which he thought appropriate to such an +emergency. Franklin was the last opportunity he could expect to +have to reap the results hoped for in his aggressive movement. He +must strike there, as best he could, or give up his cause as lost. +I believe, therefore, that there can be no room for doubt that +Hood's assault was entirely justifiable. It may have been faulty +in execution, in not having been sufficiently supported by a powerful +reserve at the moment of first success. I have not the means of +knowing the actual facts in this regard; but the result seems to +render such a hypothesis at least probable, and the rapidity and +impetuosity of Hood's advance and assault add to that probability. + +It is interesting to consider what would probably have been the +march of events if we had retreated from Duck River in the night +of November 28, upon first learning that Hood had forced the crossing +of that river. We would have reached Franklin early on the 29th, +could have rebuilt the bridges and crossed the Harpeth that day +and night, and Hood could not have got up in time to make any +serious attack that day. So far as our little army was concerned, +for the moment all would have been well. But Hood would have been +in front of Franklin, with his whole army, artillery, and ammunition- +trains, by dawn of day on the 30th; he could have forced the crossing +of the Harpeth above Franklin early that day, compelled us to retire +to Nashville, and interposed his cavalry between Nashville and +Murfreesboro' that night or early on December 1. Thus Thomas's +remaining reinforcements from the south and east would have been +cut off, and he might have been attacked in Nashville, not later +than December 2, with several thousand fewer men than he finally +had there, a large part of his army--A. J. Smith's three divisions +--not fully ready for battle, and with fewer effective cavalry; +while Hood would have had his whole army, fresh and spirited, +without the losses and depression caused by its defeat at Franklin, +ready to attack an inferior force at Nashville or to cross the +Cumberland and invade Kentucky. In short, the day gained at Duck +River and Spring Hill was indispensable to Thomas's success. The +time gained by that "temerity" made success _possible_. The +additional time and relative strength gained by Hood's disastrous +repulse at Franklin made final success easy and certain. A retreat +at any time before nine o'clock A. M. on the 29th would have led +to substantially the same result as if begun at 2 A. M. + +If the plan adopted and ordered early in the morning of November +29 had been carried out, by which the line of Duck River would have +been abandoned in the middle of that day, the head of column from +Spring Hill would have arrived at Franklin about midnight, expecting +to cross the Harpeth without delay; but, under the conditions +actually found to exist at Franklin, not much progress toward +providing the means of crossing the Harpeth could have been made +before daylight in the morning; therefore our condition for battle +at Franklin would not have been materially different, in time or +otherwise, from what it actually was. Hood's artillery, as well +as his infantry, could have reached Spring Hill before daylight on +the 30th, and would have had practically a clear road to Franklin; +for the enemy's superior cavalry having been interposed between +our cavalry and infantry, it was necessary for our infantry, +artillery, and trains to retreat from Spring Hill to Franklin in +one compact column. A small force could not have been left at +Spring Hill, as had been suggested, to delay Hood's advance, because +of the imminent danger that it would be attacked in flank and rear +by the enemy's cavalry, and thus cut off and captured; hence Hood +could have made his attack at Franklin about noon, instead of at +4:30 P. M., and with a large force of artillery as well as of +infantry. Such an attack would, of course, have been far more +formidable than that which was actually made; whether it could have +been successfully resisted from noon until dark can only be +conjectured. It is sufficient here to note that the delay of Hood's +advance very greatly diminished the force of his attack at Franklin, +besides making his arrival before that place so late that he could +not turn that position that day by crossing the Harpeth above. +The tenacity with which the crossing of Duck River at Columbia was +held was well rewarded at Franklin. + + THE ADVANTAGE OF CONTINUING THE RETREAT + +The question has been raised whether we ought not to have held our +position in front of Franklin after having repulsed Hood's attack +and inflicted such heavy losses upon his troops. General Sherman +himself impliedly made this suggestion when he expressed the opinion +that Thomas ought to have turned on Hood after his repulse at +Franklin; and General Jacob D. Cox, who had been in the thickest +of the fight all the time, with high soldierly instinct sent me, +by one of my staff officers, the suggestion that we stay there and +finish the fight the next day. A fight to a finish, then and there, +might quite probably have given us the prize. But the reasons for +declining that tempting opportunity for complete victory will, I +believe, seem perfectly clear when fully stated. + +In anticipation of orders from General Thomas to fall back to +Nashville that night, the trains had been ordered to the rear before +the battle began, so as to clear the way for the march of our +troops, and to render impossible any interference by the enemy's +cavalry. Our ammunition had been well-nigh exhausted in the battle +at Franklin, as is shown by my telegram to General Thomas to send +a million rounds to Brentwood, thinking he might want me to hold +Hood there until he could get A. J. Smith's troops in position and +supplied with ammunition. If I had needed any such warning, that +given me by the general in his despatch,( 3) "But you must look +out that the enemy does not still persist," would have been sufficient +to deter me from fighting him the next day with my "back to the +river." Besides, it is not easy to estimate at midnight exactly +the results of a desperate battle then just terminated. But all +this is insignificant when compared with the controlling reason. +I had then fully accomplished the object (and I could not then know +how much more) for which the command in the field had for a time +been intrusted to me. My junction with reinforcements at Nashville +was assured, as also the future success of the army under my superior +in command. Why run any further risk? If it had been possible +for me, at that moment of supreme satisfaction, to have had any +thought of self, I might perhaps have considered the project of +turning upon my adversary at dawn the next morning, in hope of +routing his dispirited army. But if any man thinks such a thought +possible under such circumstances, he knows nothing about the +character of a patriotic soldier. If the troops I then had at +Franklin had been the sole reliance for ultimate success in the +campaign, nothing could have been clearer than my duty to turn and +strike with all my might at dawn the next day. + +(A copy of all the correspondence between General Thomas and myself, +with annotations showing the time of receipt of the several despatches +from General Thomas, thereby showing their influence upon my actions, +has been placed on file at the War Department. These copies of +despatches, with annotations, are intended mainly for the military +student who may care to make a close and critical study of such +military operations. The original records of such correspondence +are often worse than useless, for the reason that the exact time +of sending and receipt of a despatch is so often omitted. All sent +or received the same day are frequently printed in the records +indiscriminately, so that the last if as likely to come first as +otherwise; and, sometimes, historians have used despatches as if +they had been received at the time they were sent, though in fact +many hours or some days had elapsed. My annotations were made in +1882-3, at Black Point, San Francisco, California, with the assistance +of my ever faithful and efficient aide, Colonel William M. Wherry, +now lieutenant-colonel of the 2d United States Infantry, and were +attached to the copies of the records in 1886.) + +[( 1) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, p. 1108.] + +[( 2) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, pp. 241 and 413. The loss at +Franklin of Opdycke's six regiments was 205, while the 12th and +16th Kentucky regiments lost 106 men.] + +[( 3) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, p. 1171.] + + +CHAPTER XI +The Correspondence with General Thomas previous to the Battle of +Franklin--The Untenable Position at Pulaski--Available Troops which +were not Sent to the Front--Correspondence with General Thomas-- +Instructions Usually Received too Late--Advantage of Delaying the +Retreat from Duck River--No Serious Danger at Spring Hill--General +Thomas Hoping that Hood might be Delayed for Three Days at Franklin. + +I will now add to the foregoing sketch what seems to me necessary +to a full understanding of the operations preceding and immediately +following the battle of Franklin, referring briefly, as necessary +to an exact understanding of some things that occurred, to the +relation in which I stood to General Thomas. He was my senior by +thirteen years as a graduate of the Military Academy, where I had +known him well as my highly respected instructor. He had won high +distinction in Mexico, and had been twice brevetted for gallant +services in that war. He had seen far more service in the field +than I had, and in much larger commands, though almost always under +the immediate command of a superior--Buell, Rosecrans, and Sherman. +Even in the Atlanta campaign, then recently ended, his command was +nearly five times as large as mine. In 1864 he had already become +a brigadier-general in the regular army, having risen to that rank +by regular stages, while I was only a captain thirty-three years +of age. It will also be necessary for the reader to realize that +when I asked for and received orders to report with the Twenty- +third Corps to General Thomas in Tennessee, I felt in the fullest +degree all the deference and respect which were due to his seniority +in years and rank and services. + +When I went back to Tennessee my only anxiety respecting the +situation, so far as General Thomas's personality affected it, was +on account of his constitutional habit of very deliberate action. +I was apprehensive that, in some emergency created by the action +of the daring and reckless, though not over-talented, antagonist he +would have to meet, General Thomas might not be able to determine +and act quickly enough to save from defeat his army, then understood +to be so far inferior to the enemy in numerical strength. I had +far too high an opinion of his capacity as a general to doubt for +a moment that with sufficient time in which to mature his plans to +resist Hood's invasion and to execute those plans so far as was in +his power, he would do all that the wisest generalship could +suggest. + +I will also refer to the official returns of that period, which +show what troops General Thomas had elsewhere in his department +and available for service, as well as the effective strength of +the force then under my immediate command in the field, and that +of General A. J. Smith's three divisions, which had been ordered +from Missouri to join the forces of General Thomas. In his entire +department, excluding the Fourth and Twenty-third Corps in the +field, the infantry and artillery force, present for duty equipped, +officers and men, November 20, 1864, amounted to 29,332; the two +corps in the field, to 24,265; and A. J. Smith's corps, to about +10,000. The entire cavalry force, mounted and equipped, was about +4800; that unmounted, about 6700. + + THE CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL THOMAS + +It is necessary to exclude from this statement of troops available +for service in middle Tennessee those in Kentucky and East Tennessee, +belonging to the Department of the Ohio, for the reason that just +at that time unusual demand was made upon those troops for service +in East Tennessee, where some of the State forces had met with +disaster. This probably accounts in part for the discrepancies in +General Sherman's estimates referred to later. + +Hood's forces were then understood by General Thomas to consist of +from 40,000 to 45,000 infantry and artillery, and 10,000 to 12,000 +cavalry, including Forrest's command. I find from General Sherman's +despatch to Thomas, dated October 19, that his estimate of Hood's +strength, October 19, 1864, was about 40,000 men of all arms. + +I do not find in General Thomas's report or despatches any exact +statement of his own estimate; but the following language in his +official report of January 20, 1865, seems quite sufficiently +explicit on that point: "Two divisions of infantry, under Major- +General A. J. Smith, were reported on their way to join me from +Missouri, which, with several one-year regiments then arriving in +the department, and detachments collected from points of minor +importance, would swell my command, when concentrated, to an army +nearly as large as that of the enemy. Had the enemy delayed his +advance a week or ten days longer, I would have been ready to meet +him at some point south of Duck River. . . . " + +This must of course be accepted as General Thomas's own estimate +of the enemy's strength, on which his own action was based. And +it should be remembered that military operations must be based upon +the information then in possession of the commander, and just +criticism must also be based upon his action upon that information, +and not upon any afterward obtained. + +General Sherman estimated the force left with Thomas ( 1) at about +45,000 (exclusive of the Fourth and Twenty-third Corps, and Smith's +corps coming from Missouri), in which he included about 8000 or +10,000 new troops at Nashville, and the same number of civil +employees of the quartermaster's department. The Fourth and Twenty- +third corps he estimated at 27,000 men, and Smith's at 10,000, and +the cavalry in the field at 7700. All this was sufficiently accurate +if no account were taken of men unfit for duty or not equipped. +But the official returns show that the number of officers and men +present for duty equipped amounted to 49,322 in the department, +and in the two corps in the field to 24,265, and in the cavalry in +the field, to 4800. There were therefore the following discrepancies +in Sherman's estimate, due in part to the discharge of men whose +terms had expired, as well as to the usual number of men not equipped +for duty in the ranks: In the troops in the department, a discrepancy +of 8000; in the army corps in the field, 2735; in the cavalry in +the field, 2900 ( 2)--a total discrepancy of 13,635. That is to +say, Sherman's own estimate was in excess of Thomas's actual strength +by a force greater than either of the two army corps he sent back +to help Thomas. If he had sent back another large corps,--say the +Fourteenth, 13,000 strong, having besides the moral strength due +to the fact that it was Thomas's old corps,--the discrepancy in +his own estimate would doubtless have been sufficiently overcome, +and the line of Duck River at least, if not that of the Tennessee, +as Sherman had assured Grant, would have been securely held until +A. J. Smith arrived and Thomas could assume the offensive. + +Hood's force was ready to invade Tennessee in one compact army, +while Thomas then had in the field ready to oppose it a decidedly +inferior force, even admitting the lowest estimate made of that +hostile army. + + THE UNTENABLE POSITION AT PULASKI + +The superiority of the enemy's cavalry made it necessary that the +garrisons of all essential posts and the guards of important railroad +bridges should be strong enough to resist attack from a large force +of dismounted cavalry and light artillery, so long as Thomas was +compelled to remain on the defensive. The records of that time +indicate that Thomas then appreciated, what mature consideration +now confirms, that if Hood's advance had induced him (Thomas) to +draw off sufficient troops from garrisons and railroad guards to +enable him to give battle on equal terms to Hood at Pulaski or +Columbia, a raid by Hood's cavalry would probably have resulted in +the destruction or capture of nearly everything in the rear, not +only in Tennessee, but also in Kentucky, except perhaps Nashville +and Chattanooga. It was only wise forethought which suggested that +such might be the nature of Hood's plans, especially in view of +the season of the year and the condition of the roads, which made +aggressive operations of a large army, where all the hard roads +were held by the opposing forces, extremely difficult. The official +returns, now published in the War Records,( 3) show that the troops +were sufficient only for the purpose of garrisons and guards and +defensive action in the field until after the arrival of A. J. +Smith; and this is true even if Hood's cavalry force was no larger +than that which now appears from Forrest's report--5000; for Forrest +might easily have got a day or two the start of his pursuer at any +time, as had often been done on both sides during the war. + +It is true that Sherman's instructions to Thomas appear to have +contemplated the possibility, at least, that Thomas might be reduced +to the extreme necessity of holding Nashville, Chattanooga, and +Decatur defensively, even during a long siege, and of abandoning +all points of less importance than the three named, so that all +the garrisons of such minor points and all the railroad guards +might be concentrated with the garrisons of these three important +strategic points, for their defense during a siege. This must of +course have referred to the defensive period of the campaign only, +for the moment that Thomas's reinforcements should enable him to +assume the offensive all the necessities above referred to must +have disappeared. It must, I think, be admitted as beyond question +that, in view of his daily expectation of the arrival of A. J. +Smith's troops from Missouri, Thomas was perfectly right in not +acting upon Sherman's suggestion of extreme defensive action, and +thus abandoning his railroad to destruction. + +If, on the other hand, Thomas's reinforcements had arrived in time +to enable him to take the initiative by moving against Hood from +Pulaski or Columbia, then he might have drawn quite largely from +his garrisons in the rear to reinforce his army in the field, since +his "active offensive" operations would have fully occupied Hood's +cavalry, and thus have prevented a raid in Thomas's rear. But +until he was strong enough to advance, unless forced to the extreme +necessity of defending Nashville, Chattanooga, and Decatur, and +abandoning all else, Thomas could not prudently have reduced his +garrisons or guards. + +I knew nothing at that time of Sherman's instructions to Thomas, +and little about the actual strength of Thomas's garrisons and +railroad guards. But I was under the impression that some +reinforcements must be available from his own department, and felt +a little impatient about the long delay in their arrival, and hence +telegraphed General Thomas, November 24, suggesting the concentration +of R. S. Granger's troops and those along the railroad. The +despatches to me at that time, to be found in the War Records,( 4) +fully show the earnest determination of General Thomas to send +forward reinforcements as soon as possible, and even in detail, +and to fight Hood at or near Columbia. Indeed, those despatches +misled me somewhat as to what I might expect. + + AVAILABLE TROOPS NOT SENT TO THE FRONT + +Notwithstanding this earnest desire, General Thomas does not appear +to have realized the existence of a force available for the purpose +he had in view. The railroad guards from Atlanta to Chattanooga +or Dalton, withdrawn after Sherman started on his march, and +convalescents, men returning from furlough and others going to the +front, but failing to reach Sherman's army in time, all assembled +at Chattanooga, made a surplus force at that point of about 7000 +men.( 5) Some of these troops had been sent to East Tennessee, as +well as all the mounted troops available in Kentucky, for the +purpose of retrieving the disaster which had befallen the Tennessee +military governor's troops there, under Gillem. But all sent from +Chattanooga had been returned by November 21, about the time when +Hood's advance from Florence had become certainly known. Yet it +does not appear that General Thomas even inquired what force was +available at Chattanooga until November 25, when, in reply to a +telegram, he learned that Steedman could raise 5000 men (in fact, +7000), in addition to all necessary garrisons and guards, "to +threaten enemy in rear," in case he should "get on Chattanooga +railroad." It may then (November 25) have been too late to send +those 5000 or 7000 men to the line of Duck River, or perhaps even +to Franklin. They were sent to Nashville, reaching there after +the battle of Franklin. If they had been ordered to Columbia by +rail, via Nashville, as soon as Hood's advance was known to General +Thomas, they must have reached Duck River some time before Hood +attempted to cross that stream. This addition to the Fourth and +Twenty-third Corps would have raised the infantry in the field to +nearly an equality with that of Hood in fact, though not nearly to +what Hood's force was then supposed to be. That increased force +would doubtless have made it possible to prevent Hood from crossing +Duck River anywhere near Columbia for several days, and perhaps to +force him to select some other line of operations, or to content +himself with sending his cavalry on another raid. In any case, +the arrival of A. J. Smith a few days later would have enabled +Thomas to assume the aggressive before Hood could have struck a +serious blow at Thomas's army in the field. In view of the earnest +desire of General Thomas to reinforce the army in the field at +Columbia, there does not appear to be any rational explanation of +the fact that he did not send those 7000 men from Chattanooga to +Columbia. His own report states the fact about those "7000 men +belonging to his [General Sherman's] column," but does not give +any reason why they were not used in his "measures to act on the +defensive." As General Thomas says: "These men had been organized +into brigades, to be made available at such points as they might +be needed." At what other point could they possibly be so much +needed as that where the two corps were trying to oppose the advance +of the enemy long enough for Thomas to get up his other reinforcements? + + AVAILABLE TROOPS NOT SENT TO THE FRONT + +General Thomas appears to have been puzzled by doubt whether Hood +would aim for Nashville or some point on the Nashville and Chattanooga +Railroad, and not to have realized that his own plan should have +been to concentrate all his available force into one army, so as +to move against the enemy with the greatest possible force, no +matter what the enemy might do. With the exception of those 7000 +men belonging to Sherman's column, Thomas had for necessary garrisons +and railroad guards essentially the same number of men as had been +employed in that service all the preceding summer,--no more and no +less,--and the necessity for that service had not been very much +diminished, except at and about Decatur, Stevenson, and Tullahoma, +which Hood's advance from Florence had rendered of no further +consequence at that time. But the 7000 men available at Chattanooga +ought unquestionably to have been sent to Columbia, or at least +moved up to Nashville or Franklin, where they could "join the main +force," as suggested in my despatch of November 24 to Thomas,( 6) +instead of being left in Chattanooga "to threaten enemy in rear."( 7) +As suggested in my despatch of November 24, R. S. Granger's force +and others along the railroad south of Duck River, as well as +Steedman's, might have joined the main force at Columbia, if orders +had been given in time, thus increasing the army in the field by +fully 10,000 men. + +If R. S. Granger's force had been left at Decatur, it would have +drawn off from Hood's invading army at least an equal force to +guard his bridges at Florence, or else would have destroyed those +bridges and cut off his retreat after the battle of Nashville. +This was practically what had been suggested by Sherman in his +instructions to Thomas. But the withdrawal of Granger's troops +and their detention at Murfreesboro', instead of sending them to +"join the main force," served no good purpose at the time, and +prevented their use in the capture of Hood's defeated and retreating +troops. The failure to make this timely concentration was the one +great fault in Thomas's action, instead of his delay in attacking +at Nashville, for which he was so much criticized. But Hood's +repulse at Franklin had made this previous mistake a matter of past +history, and hence it was lost sight of in view of the imminent +danger afterward supposed to exist at Nashville, just as the +brilliant victory at Nashville was accepted as demonstrating the +wisdom of all that had gone before, even including Sherman's division +of his army between himself and Thomas before his march to the sea. +Such is the logic of contemporaneous military history! + +In my long conversations with General Grant on the steamer _Rhode +Island_ in January, 1865, I explained to him fully the error into +which he had been led in respect to Thomas's action or non-action +at Nashville in December, and he seemed to be perfectly satisfied +on that point. But he did not ask me anything about what had +occurred before the battle of Franklin, and hence I did not tell +him anything. + +In connection with the action of General Thomas previous to the +battle of Franklin, the following instructions from General Sherman +on October 31 are important: "You must unite all your men into +one army, and abandon all minor points, if you expect to defeat +Hood. General Schofield is marching to-day from here. . . . "( 8) +Again, on the same date, he telegraphed: "Bear in mind my instructions +as to concentration, and not let Hood catch you in detail."( 9) + +Sherman thus gave the most emphatic warning against the mistake +which Thomas nevertheless made by failing to concentrate all his +own available troops until it was too late to meet Hood's advance, +thus leaving two corps to bear the entire brunt of battle until +the crisis of the campaign was passed at Franklin. + + CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL THOMAS + +The following correspondence relating to the command of an army in +the field, to increasing the Fourth and Twenty-third corps, and to +the use to be made of R. S. Granger's troops, and the reason why +Thomas should assume the offensive as soon as possible, is also +important, especially as showing that Sherman expected the two +corps to be increased to 50,000 men, and that Thomas should command +in person: + + "Kingston, November 7, 1864, 10 A. M. +"Major-General Thomas: Despatch of 12:30 P. M. yesterday received. +General Schofield is entitled to the command [over Stanley] by +virtue of a recent decision of the War Department. I would advise +you to add to those corps new regiments until they number 25,000 +men each. If Beauregard advances from Corinth, it will be better +for you to command in person. Your presence alone will give +confidence. Granger should continue all the time to threaten the +rear, and as soon as possible some demonstration should be made +from the direction of Vicksburg against the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. +Also I want you to assume the offensive as quick as possible, as +I have reason to believe all of Beauregard's army is not there, +but that he has also divided his forces. + + "W. T. Sherman, Major-General."(10) +On the same day Thomas telegraphed to Sherman in reply to the above: + +"It is, and always has been, my intention to command the troops +with me in person. My object in giving the preference to General +Schofield [over Stanley] was merely that he should exercise command +should accidental circumstances prevent my presence."(11) + +Sherman and Thomas were equally right--Sherman in saying "It will +be better for you to command in person. Your presence alone will +give confidence"; and Thomas in replying, "It is, and always has +been, my intention to command the troops with me in person." The +proper place for a general-in-chief is with his army in the field, +where battles are to be fought, and not in the rear, where there +is little to do but to assemble reinforcements, which his chief of +staff could do as well as he. Thomas could have reached the army +at Columbia by rail in two hours, and at Franklin in one hour; yet +he left a subordinate to fight against a superior force, while he +remained in Nashville until he had collected there an army superior +to that of his adversary. But General Thomas must have had some +reason which seemed to him good and sufficient for his absence from +the field. He was the last man in the world to shrink from his +duty in battle. + +Before the above correspondence between General Sherman and General +Thomas was known to me I had written the following: "The relations +existing between General Thomas and me, and the confidence he had +shown in all his despatches, commencing with those received at +Pulaski, left little room for hesitation or doubt about doing, in +every emergency, what my own judgment dictated, as if I had been +in chief command, confident of the approval which he so fully +expressed after the events. Yet my experience then, as always, +led me to the opinion that it is better for the general-in-chief, +in all operations of a critical nature, to be present with the +troops in the field, if possible; he must be able to act with more +confidence than any subordinate can possibly feel. He was the sole +judge as to the necessity of his remaining in Nashville, and no +good reason could now be given for questioning the correctness of +his judgment. It is only intended as an expression of a general +rule for the consideration of military students." + + CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL THOMAS + +General Thomas's orders to General D. S. Stanley upon his being +sent to Pulaski, and his subsequent orders to me, dated November +19, to fight the enemy at Pulaski if he advanced against that place, +were, as shown in the following despatch from me, quite inapplicable +to the then existing situation: + + "Pulaski, November 20, 1864. +"Major-General Thomas: After full consideration I am of the opinion +that this is not the best position for the main body of our troops, +at least so long as we are inferior in strength to the enemy. If +Hood advances, whether his design be to strike this place or +Columbia, he must move via Lawrenceburg on account of the difficulty +of crossing Shoal Creek. Under cover of his cavalry, he can probably +reach Lawrenceburg without our knowledge, and move his forces a +day's march from that point toward Columbia before we could learn +his designs, and thus reach that point ahead of us; or he might +move upon this place, and while demonstrating against it throw his +forces on to the pike north of us, and thus cut us off from Columbia +and from our reinforcements. Lynnville would be free from these +objections as a point of concentration for our forces. On the +other hand, a force at this point covers the Nashville and Chattanooga +Railroad to the best advantage; but a brigade in the inclosed works +at this place could hold out against any force until relieved, +while the main force at Lynnville would be sure of concentrating +with the troops in the rear. I respectfully submit these views +for your consideration. + + "J. M. Schofield, Major-General." + +To this General Thomas replied at once: + + "Nashville, November 20, 1864. +"General Schofield: Your despatch of 2 P. M. this day just received. +Two other despatches of to-day were received previous to this one. +Do you mean that one brigade in the intrenchments at Pulaski could +hold out for a week? The reason I ask is, General Smith cannot +get here before next Friday. If one brigade can hold the fortifications +of Pulaski for a week or ten days, you are authorized to leave a +brigade or a division there, and concentrate the rest of your force +at Lynnville preparatory to support Hatch, or fall back on Columbia, +whichever may be necessary. Part of Ruger's troops will start for +Columbia to-night, the remainder at two o'clock to-morrow, and the +railroad superintendent says he will have them at Columbia by to- +morrow night. The very moment Smith's troops arrive I will start +them for Columbia. In any event, all surplus transportation should +be sent to Columbia. I have just received General Hatch's of this +P. M., and it seems from it that Hood is advancing. His movements +will indicate to you what disposition you should make--whether to +concentrate at Columbia or remain at Lynnville. If Hood's entire +army should advance, you must use your own discretion as to holding +the fortifications at Pulaski or withdrawing the troops. + + "Geo. H. Thomas, Major-General." + +General Thomas thus gave me the full freedom of action demanded by +the situation in which I was placed, in lieu of his previous +embarrassing orders about fighting the enemy at Pulaski. + +The following correspondence,(12) with the above, shows the situation +as reported by me to General Thomas, and his "plans and wishes" as +then explained to me immediately before and after Hood began his +advance: + + "Thomas to Schofield. + "November 24, 1864. +". . . Have the fords above Columbia as well guarded as you can, +and I think you will then have checked the advance of Hood, and we +shall have time to get up our reinforcements." + + "Schofield to Thomas. + "November 24, 1864, 1:39 P. M. +"Do you think it important to hold Columbia? My force is not large +enough to cover the town and railroad bridge. I can hold a shorter +line covering the railroad bridge, leaving the town and railroad +depot outside; but in any case the enemy can turn the position by +crossing above or below, and render my withdrawal to the north bank +very difficult. Please give me your views soon." + + "Thomas to Schofield. + "November 24, 1864. +"If you cannot hold Columbia, you had better withdraw to the north +bank of the river. From the description given I supposed the line +was sufficiently short to enable you and Stanley to hold it securely +and have a reserve. But it is better, of course, to substantially +check the enemy than to run the risk of defeat by risking too much. +Where is Stanley? Is he with you?" + + CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL THOMAS + + "Schofield to Thomas + "Columbia, November 24, 1864, 8:30 P. M. +"I have examined the ground and considered the situation carefully. +My troops are in position on the outer line, covering the railroad +depot and bridge, and pretty well intrenched. The line is too +long; yet if Hood wishes to fight me on it to-morrow, I am willing. +I think he will attack to-morrow, if at all. If he does not, I +must prepare to meet any attempt to cross Duck River above or below. +For this purpose I am preparing an interior line covering the +railroad bridge, which can be held by about seven thousand men, +which I propose to occupy, and put the rest of my troops and material +on the north bank of the river, ready to move as may be necessary. +With the fords guarded, as will then be practicable, I think Hood +cannot get the start of me. I think it best not to risk much now; +for a few days' delay, if we concentrate rapidly, will make us +strong enough to drive Hood back. My theory is that he will operate +against the Chattanooga Railroad, and I do not see how we can save +it from some damage at least. But if we concentrate Granger's +troops and those along the road promptly, so that they can join +the main force, there can be no doubt of the final result. Please +inform me whether my proposed arrangements meet with your approval." + + "Thomas to Schofield + "Nashville, November 24, 1864. +". . . Can you not cover the pontoon bridge with a bridge-head, +and hold it so as to preserve the bridge for crossing whenever we +get ready to advance? General Rousseau informed me that the +blockhouses protecting the railroad bridge cannot be reached by +the enemy's artillery; therefore the enemy could not get near enough +to the bridge to destroy it if the blockhouses are held. . . ." + +As stated in my official report, I did prepare and hold a bridge- +head covering both the railroad and the pontoon bridges over Duck +River at the same time, for which purpose I floated the pontoons +down the river to a point near the railroad bridge, having found +that the blockhouses referred to by General Rousseau could not be +made available for the protection of the pontoon bridge where it +before was--at the crossing of the turnpike. I abandoned that +bridge-head on the night of November 27, upon receipt of information +leading me to believe that Hood intended to cross Duck River above +Columbia. + +On November 25 General Thomas telegraphed me, in the following +terms, his approval of the dispositions I had made, and the +information that he had already ordered the concentration of troops +which I suggested in my despatch of the 24th: + +"Your cipher despatch of 8:30 P. M. is just received; some difficulty +in transmission the cause. Your arrangements are judicious and +approved. I gave orders two days ago to make the concentration +you suggest, and hope it will be nearly or quite completed to-day. +Will telegraph you further this morning." + +This despatch was more than twelve hours in transmission. + +Again, November 26, I reported the situation at Columbia, and my +action, as follows; also suggesting that infantry be sent forward +at once: + +"The enemy has kept up a strong demonstration with dismounted +cavalry since yesterday morning. He now shows a column of infantry +on the Mount Pleasant pike, about three miles distant. I cannot +yet tell how great the force. I have drawn my force in the interior +line, and will fight him there. If you have any infantry available, +I think it should be sent forward at once." + +Yet no infantry reinforcements were sent, although the "7000 men" +at Chattanooga could easily have reached Columbia before that time. + +At 8 A. M. the next day General Thomas replied as follows: + +"Your despatch of 10 A. M. yesterday received. I will send you +all the available infantry force I can raise. I expect some of +Smith's command here to-day, and will send it forward as rapidly +as possible. Sent you two regiments of cavalry day before yesterday, +two yesterday, and will send another to-day. If you can hold Hood +in check until I can get Smith up, we can whip him." + +Thus it appears that even as late as November 27 General Thomas +had not thought of sending the 7000 men at Chattanooga to "join +the main force," although so anxious that I should hold Hood in +check until he could get Smith up. He was still relying entirely +upon A. J. Smith, whose advance, so surely expected on the 25th, +was still expected on the 27th. It seems incredible that General +Thomas had not thought of sending Steedman's troops from Chattanooga, +instead of waiting for the uncertain arrival of A. J. Smith. + + DELAYING THE RETREAT FROM DUCK RIVER + +On November 27 I received an important despatch from General Thomas, +dated November 25. It was written under the apprehension that +Hood's design might be to move upon the Nashville and Chattanooga +Railroad, as I had suggested to Thomas on the 24th, and informed +me fully of his plans and instructions to meet such a movement, +requesting me to give him my views in reply. In that despatch +General Thomas said: + +"In case you have to move to the north bank of Duck River, I wish +you to keep some cavalry on the south side to observe and delay +Hood's advance on the Chattanooga Railroad as much as possible. +I hope to have five regiments of Granger's troops in Murfreesboro' +to-day. Have made arrangements for Milroy to fall back to +Murfreesboro' or this side of Duck River also, if the enemy advances. +The cavalry on the south side of Duck River should cover the +approaches to Shelbyville, and cross at that place, and hold the +bridge in case of an advance in force. I have asked General Steedman +how large a force he can raise to threaten the enemy's rear, should +he get on the Chattanooga road, and expect an answer soon. About +1000 of Hatch's cavalry have arrived here from Memphis, dismounted, +but they will be mounted here as soon as possible and sent to the +front; three regiments should start to-day, making about 1000 men. +I have not heard from any of Smith's troops yet; some of them will +surely be here to-day. If Hood moves on the Chattanooga road, I +will send Smith to Murfreesboro', as we shall be enabled thereby +to concentrate more rapidly. If you can hold Hood on the south +side of Duck River, I think we shall be able to drive him back +easily after concentrating. Answer, giving your views." + +Although that despatch of the 25th was not deciphered so as to be +read by me until the 27th, forty-eight hours after it was sent, +nevertheless it gave me timely information that Thomas had concentrated +all his available troops (except Steedman's, which he appears to +have overlooked until the 25th, and about which I had no knowledge) +at Murfreesboro', from which place they could "join the main force," +as I had suggested, in a few hours, either by rail or by wagon- +road, as circumstances might indicate. I was also led to infer +from Thomas's language on the 25th--"Some of them [A. J. Smith's +troops] will surely be here to-day"--that on the 27th Smith's corps +was already at Nashville, and that Thomas was only waiting for +information respecting the enemy's designs to select his point of +concentration and order all his available troops to join the army +in the field at that point. And it was still expected on the 27th +that this junction might be effected on the north bank of Duck +River, opposite Columbia. Hence I telegraphed General Thomas, +November 27, at 12:30 P. M.: + +"The enemy has made no real attack, and I am satisfied he does not +intend to attack. My information, though not very satisfactory, +leads me to believe that Hood intends to cross Duck River above +Columbia, and as near it as he can. I shall withdraw to the north +bank to-night and endeavor to prevent him from crossing. Wilson +is operating mainly on my left, with a portion of his command south +of the river. I have no late information from him. I have succeeded +in getting your cipher of the 25th translated. I believe your +dispositions are wise." + + DELAYING THE RETREAT FROM DUCK RIVER + +It appears from his despatch of November 25 that Thomas hoped we +might be able to hold the line of Duck River from Columbia as far +east as Shelbyville, as well as west to the Tennessee River. +Although this proved to be impracticable on account of the enemy's +superiority in cavalry at that time, the point (Murfreesboro') +which Thomas had selected for his concentration was far enough to +the rear of that line (Duck River) to make the concentration certain +if orders were given in due time. + +I learned in the afternoon of November 27, by General Thomas's +despatch of 8 A. M., already quoted, that A. J. Smith's troops were +not, as I had supposed, already in Nashville, but that some of them +were expected there that day, and would come forward to join me at +once. + +In the morning of November 28, at 8:45, I reported my withdrawal +to the north side of the river, saying: + +"My troops and material are all on the north side of Duck River. +The withdrawal was completed at daylight this morning without +serious difficulty. Cox holds the ford in front of Columbia, and +Ruger the railroad bridge, which I partially destroyed. Stanley +is going into position a short distance in rear of Cox. I think +I can now stop Hood's advance by any line near this, and meet in +time any distant movement to turn my position. I regret extremely +the necessity of withdrawing from Columbia, but believe it was +absolute. I will explain fully in time. Reinforcements will have +to march from Spring Hill or Thompson's Station. Supplies should +be sent to Thompson's Station." + +After withdrawing to the north bank of Duck River I telegraphed on +the morning of November 28: + +"I am in doubt whether it is advisable, with reference to future +operations, to hold this position or to retire to some point from +which we can move offensively. Of course we cannot recross the +river here. I could easily have held the bridge-head at the +railroad, but it would have been useless, as we could not possibly +advance from that point. Please give me your views and wishes." + +This was answered by General Thomas at "8 P. M.," the answer being +received by me next morning, November 29. + +It is thus seen that up to the morning of November 28 I was still +hoping for reinforcements on the line of Duck River, and thought +I could stop Hood's advance by any line near the Columbia and +Franklin pike, which I then held, as well as meet in good time any +distant movement to turn my position. Accordingly, at 9:10 A. M. +that day I telegraphed to General Thomas: + +"I have all the fords above and below this place well watched and +guarded as far as possible. Wilson is operating with his main +force on my left. The enemy does not appear to have moved in that +direction yet to any considerable distance. I will probably be +able to give you pretty full information this evening. Do you not +think the infantry at the distant crossings below here should now +be withdrawn and cavalry substituted? I do not think we can prevent +the crossing of even the enemy's cavalry, because the places are +so numerous. I think the best we can do is to hold the crossings +near us and watch the distant ones." + +But I learned soon after noon of the same day that our cavalry +found the fords so numerous that they could hardly watch them all, +much less guard any of them securely; and a little later I learned +that the enemy's cavalry had forced a crossing at some point only +a few miles above, between Huey's Mill and the Lewisburg-Franklin +pike. At 2:30 P. M. I telegraphed General Thomas: + +"The enemy was crossing in force a short distance this side of the +Lewisburg pike at noon to-day, and had driven our cavalry back +across the river on the pike at the same time. The force is reported +to be infantry, but I do not regard it as being probable. Wilson +has gone with his main force to learn the facts, and drive the +enemy back, if possible." + + DELAYING THE RETREAT FROM DUCK RIVER + +In the appendix to General Thomas's report the date of the above +despatch is given as "3:30 A. M." It was answered by General Thomas +at "10:30 P. M." and his answer was received by me November 29 (no +hour mentioned in the records). The Department of the Ohio records +say that I sent it at "2:30 P. M." The appendix to my report +mentions the date "November 29," but does not give the hour. My +official report, as published, also says this information was +received "about 2 A. M. on the 29th"; but this is evidently a +clerical error: Clearly the report should read, "about 2 P. M. on +the 28th." + +But our cavalry was unable to drive that of the enemy back, and +hence Hood was free to lay his pontoon bridge and cross his infantry +and artillery at any point above Columbia. We had not been able +to hold even the crossings near us. + +The same day, November 28, at 4 P. M., I telegraphed: + +"If Hood advances on the Lewisburg and Franklin pike, where do you +propose to fight him? I have all the force that is necessary here, +and General Smith's troops should be placed with reference to the +proposed point of concentration." + +And again, at 6 P. M.: + +"The enemy's cavalry in force has crossed the river on the Lewisburg +pike, and is now in possession of Rally Hill. + +"Wilson is trying to get on to the Franklin road ahead of them. +He thinks the enemy may swing around in behind him and me, and +strike Spring Hill, and wants Hammond's brigade to halt there. +Please give it orders if you know where it is. Also, I think it +would be well to send A. J. Smith's force to that place." + +In the night of November 28-9, about 2 A. M., I received the report +of the cavalry commander, conveying the information given him by +prisoners that the enemy had commenced to bridge the river near +Huey's Mill, and urging the necessity of immediate retreat to +Franklin.(13) The staff officer who handed me the despatch called +my attention especially to the words urging immediate action, and +I considered the subject quite a long time. But there did not seem +to me to be any necessity for such haste. The enemy could not +accomplish much before morning. It would then be early enough to +decide what must be done. Besides, it was not yet certain that +Hood was attempting to cross his infantry at Huey's Mill. The +vigorous action of his cavalry might be intended only to induce me +to fall back, and thus give him the use of the crossing at Columbia, +and of the turnpike from that place, for the movement of his +infantry, artillery, and trains. + +In the morning, November 29, I sent a brigade of infantry toward +Huey's Mill to reconnoiter and report the enemy's movements. At +the same time Stanley was ordered to Spring Hill, with two divisions +of his corps, to occupy and intrench a good position commanding +the roads at that place and protecting the trains and reserve +artillery which had been ordered to be parked there. Ruger's +division of the Twenty-third Corps, except one regiment, was ordered +to follow Stanley. The army was ready to occupy Spring Hill in +full force, and in ample time to meet any possible movement of the +enemy either on that place or, by the Lewisburg pike, on Franklin. + +In my orders to Ruger, dated 8 A. M., directing him to move at once +to Spring Hill, he was ordered to leave one regiment to guard the +river until dark and then join him at Spring Hill. It was then +intended, in any event, to hold Spring Hill until the morning of +November 30. At the same time Ruger was directed to order his +troops guarding the river below to march at once for Franklin. + + DELAYING THE RETREAT FROM DUCK RIVER + +But very soon after these orders were issued--that is, soon after +8 A. M.--a courier from Franklin brought me the two following +despatches from General Thomas: + + "Franklin, November 28, 1864. + "(By telegraph from Nashville, 9 P. M.) +"To Major-General Schofield: + +"If you are confident you can hold your present position, I wish +you to do so until I can get General Smith here. After his arrival +we can withdraw gradually and invite Hood across Duck River, and +fall upon him with our whole force, or wait until Wilson can organize +his entire cavalry force, and then withdraw from your present +position. Should Hood then cross river, we can surely ruin him. +You may have fords at Centreville, Bean's [Beard's] Ferry, Gordon's +Ferry, and Williamsport thoroughly obstructed by filling up all +the roads leading from them with trees, and then replace your +infantry by cavalry. Send an intelligent staff officer to see that +the work is properly done. As soon as relieved, concentrate your +infantry; the cavalry will be able to retard, if not prevent, Hood's +crossing, after the roads are thoroughly obstructed, if they do +their duty. The road leading from Centreville to Nashville should +be thoroughly obstructed. I am not sure but it would be a good +plan to invite Hood across Duck River if we can get him to move +toward Clarksville. Is there no convenience for unloading beyond +Thompson's Station? + + "Geo. H. Thomas, Major-General, Commanding."(14) + +The published records give this despatch as having been sent at "8 +P. M." The Department of the Cumberland records say that it was +telegraphed in cipher to Franklin at 9 P. M., and there deciphered +and sent by courier to my position near Columbia. The records do +not show the hour of receipt by me; but my reply to General Thomas +of 8:30 A. M., November 29, and my orders to Ruger of 8 and 8:45 +A. M., and to Stanley before and after 8 A. M., and my despatch to +Wilson of 8:15 A. M., fix the time of the receipt by me of this +despatch from General Thomas at a few minutes after 8 A. M., November +29. + +The other despatch was as follows: + + "(U. S. Military Telegraph.) + "Franklin, Tenn., November 28, 1864. + "(By telegraph from Nashville. 9:30 P. M.) +"To Major-General Schofield: + +"Your despatch of 3:30 [2:30] P. M. just received. If Wilson cannot +succeed in driving back the enemy, should it prove true that he +has crossed the river, you will necessarily have to make preparation +to take up a new position at Franklin, behind Harpeth, [while] +immediately, if it become necessary, to fall back. + + "(Signed) Geo. H. Thomas, Major-General, Commanding." + +The records of the Department of the Cumberland merely state that +this despatch was sent in "cipher." The appendix to my report +gives the hour "9:30 P. M." The appendix to General Thomas's report +fixes it at "10:30 P. M." The despatch from General Thomas to +General Halleck of 10 P. M., November 28, forwarding my despatch +of "8:45 A. M.," indicates that at 10 P. M. Thomas had not received +my report of "2:30 P. M." Hence "10:30 P. M.," as given by General +Thomas, must be the correct hour of the above despatch. It was +answered by me, together with the preceding telegram, at 8:30 A.M., +November 29; and was probably received by me at the same time +as the previous despatch,--very soon after 8 A. M.,--as indicated +by my despatch to Wilson of 8:15 A. M. + +I thus learned, a short time after eight o'clock on the morning of +the 29th, that A. J. Smith had not yet arrived at Nashville, and +that the position behind the Harpeth River at Franklin was that to +which I must retire when compelled to fall back. + + DELAYING THE RETREAT FROM DUCK RIVER + +(Another despatch from Thomas, dated November 28, 10 A. M., appears +in the records, in which he said: ". . . General Smith will certainly +be here in three days. . . ." But when that despatch reached my +headquarters in the field, the cipher-operator had left his post +and gone to Franklin. Hence the despatch could not be read by me +in time to be of any service. The records do not show when I +received it.) + +I was then confronted with the grave question, How long might it +be possible to hold Hood back, and thus gain time for Thomas to +get up his reinforcements? By holding on to the crossing of Duck +River at Columbia until dark that night, and thus preventing Hood +from using the turnpike for the movement of his artillery and trains +until the next day, we would practically gain twenty-four hours; +for he could not move them readily over his mud road from Huey's +Mill. To do this, I must not only head Hood off at Spring Hill, +but defeat any attempt he might make to dislodge me from the north +bank of Duck River. + +Early on November 29, I sent the following brief despatch in reply +to both of those which had been received a few minutes before from +General Thomas: + +"The enemy's cavalry has crossed in force on the Lewisburg pike, +and General Wilson reports the infantry crossing above Huey's Mill, +about five miles from this place. I have sent an infantry +reconnaissance to learn the facts. If it proves true, I will act +according to your instructions received this morning. Please send +orders to General Cooper,(15) via Johnsonville. It may be doubtful +whether my messenger from here will reach him." + +The appendix to General Thomas's report says that I sent this +despatch at "8:30 A. M." The appendix to my report says "8:20 A.M." +This despatch was evidently in answer to those from General +Thomas of 8 P. M. and 10:30 P. M., November 28, as indicated by my +orders to Stanley and Ruger, and my despatch of 8:15 A. M. to +Wilson. + +Soon after 10 A. M., November 29, the first report from the brigade +sent toward Huey's Mill showed that the enemy's infantry was crossing +the river at that place. That report is not found in the records, +and I do not recollect its words. But it did not produce the +impression upon my mind that Hood's movement was so rapid or +energetic as to prevent me from doing what seemed of such vital +importance. Therefore I decided not to yield my position unless +compelled by force to do so. While considering this question I +had detained one of Stanley's two divisions (Kimball's), and had +suspended the orders for Ruger's division to march to Spring Hill. +When the decision was reached, I put Kimball's and Wood's divisions +in position between Duck River and Rutherford's Creek, and Ruger's +north of that creek, to resist any attempt the enemy might make +upon our position. I then sent the following to Stanley at Spring +Hill: + + "Near Columbia, Tenn., November 29, 1864, 10:45 A. M. +"Major-General Stanley, Commanding Fourth Army Corps. + +"General: General Wood's reconnoissance shows a considerable force, +at least, on this side of the river. I have halted Kimball's +division this side of the creek and put it in position. I will +try to hold the enemy until dark, and then draw back. Select a +good position at Spring Hill, covering the approaches, and send +out parties to reconnoiter on all roads leading east and southeast. +Try to communicate with Wilson on the Lewisburg pike. Tell him to +cover Franklin and Spring Hill, and try not to let the enemy get +between us. + + "Very respectfully, + "J. M. Schofield, Major-General." + + NO SERIOUS DANGER AT SPRING HILL + +The situation early in the morning had been a very simple one, free +from any embarrassment or unusual danger. If the plan then decided +on and ordered had been carried out, three divisions of infantry +and nearly all the artillery of the army would have been in position +at Spring Hill and well intrenched long before the head of Hood's +infantry column, without any artillery, came in sight of that place +late in the afternoon. That position would have been secured beyond +doubt until the next morning. The other two divisions (Cox's and +Wood's) would have withdrawn from Duck River and marched to Spring +Hill early in the afternoon, before the enemy could seriously +interfere with them. Ruger's one regiment, without impedimenta, +was directed to march along the railway track to Spring Hill, and +thus avoid any interference from the enemy. The army would have +marched to Franklin early in the night of the 29th, instead of +after midnight as it actually did. That would have given the enemy +the afternoon and night in which to lay his pontoons and cross his +artillery and trains at Columbia. But that would not have been a +serious matter, in view of the situation as it was understood by +me up to about 8 A. M. of the 29th; for the information I had +received up to that hour justified the belief that both A. J. +Smith's troops and those concentrated at Murfreesboro' would meet +me at Franklin, or perhaps at Spring Hill, where we would be able +to give battle to the enemy on equal terms. + +But in view of the information received by me after eight o'clock +that morning, and the altered plan decided on soon after ten o'clock, +the situation became very materially different. Under this plan +the army must be ready to encounter a formidable enemy either in +the position then occupied on Duck River, or at some point on the +road between that place and Spring Hill. Hence I determined to +keep the main body of troops together, and trust to Stanley's one +division to hold Spring Hill until the army should reach that point. +That is to say, I decided to take the chances of a pitched battle +at any point the enemy might select between Duck River and Spring +Hill, as well as that of holding the latter place with one division +against any hostile force which might reach it before dark. + +There was no anxiety in my mind about what might happen at Spring +Hill after dark. The danger which actually developed there between +dark and midnight--of which I knew nothing until several days +afterward--resulted entirely from faulty execution of my orders. + +I arrived at Spring Hill at dusk with the head of the main column, +having ordered all the troops to follow in close order, and (except +Ruger's troops, which I took to Thompson's) to form line on the +right of Stanley's division at Spring Hill, covering the pike back +toward Columbia. Cox's division, being the last, was to form our +extreme right. In that contemplated position, if Hood had attacked +at any time in the night we would have had decidedly the advantage +of him. I had no anxiety on that point. When informed, about +midnight, that Cox had arrived, I understood that my orders had +been exactly executed, and then ordered Cox to take the lead and +the other divisions to follow, from the right by the rear, in the +march to Franklin. + +But it happened that only Whitaker's brigade of Kimball's division, +to which I gave the orders in person, followed Ruger's. Hence +that one brigade was the only force we had in line between Hood's +bivouac and the turnpike that night. If that fact had been known +to the enemy, the result would have been embarrassing, but not very +serious. If the enemy had got possession of a point on the pike, +the column from Duck River would have taken the country road a +short distance to the west of Spring Hill and Thompson's Station, +and marched on it to Franklin. The situation at Spring Hill in +the night was not by any means a desperate one. Veteran troops +are not so easily cut off in an open country. + + NO SERIOUS DANGER AT SPRING HILL + +The annotation upon the copy filed in the War Department of the +order actually given to the troops on November 29 explains how that +mistake occurred. In brief, the draft of an order prepared in +writing for another purpose, but not issued, was by some unexplained +blunder substituted for the oral orders actually dictated to a +staff officer. It was an example of how the improvised staff of +a volunteer army, like the "non-military agencies of government," +may interfere with military operations. + +The serious danger at Spring Hill ended at dark. The gallant action +of Stanley and his one division at that place in the afternoon of +November 29 cannot be over-estimated or too highly praised. If +the enemy had gained a position there in the afternoon which we +could not have passed round in the night, the situation would then +have become very serious. But, as I had calculated, the enemy did +not have time to do that before dark, against Stanley's stubborn +resistance. + +The following, from the official records, has been quoted as an +order from General Thomas to me, though I never received it, the +enemy's cavalry having got possession of the road between Franklin +and Spring Hill: + + "Nashville, November 29, 1864, 3:30 A. M. +"Major-General Schofield, near Columbia: + +"Your despatches of 6 P. M. and 9 P. M. yesterday are received. +I have directed General Hammond to halt his command at Spring Hill +and report to your for orders, if he cannot communicate with General +Wilson, and also instructing him to keep you well advised of the +enemy's movements. I desire you to fall back from Columbia and +take up your position at Franklin, leaving a sufficient force at +Spring Hill to contest the enemy's progress until you are securely +posted at Franklin. The troops at the fords below Williamsport, +etc., will be withdrawn and take up a position behind Franklin. +General A. J. Smith's command has not yet reached Nashville; as +soon as he arrives I will make immediate disposition of his troops +and notify you of the same. Please send me a report as to how +matters stand upon your receipt of this. + + "Geo. H. Thomas, + "Major-General U. S. Vols., Commanding."(16) + +This despatch does not appear upon any of the records as having +been received by me. If it was telegraphed in cipher to Franklin, +and there deciphered and sent by courier, this should have reached +me not long after noon. But the courier was probably driven back +or captured by the enemy's cavalry, who had possession of the direct +road, near Spring Hill, about noon. + +If any "orders" had been necessary in such a case, they had been +rendered unnecessary by Hood's movement to cross Duck River, of +which I had already learned at 2 A. M. of the same day (November +29). The only question in my mind that General Thomas could solve +--namely, to _what place_ I must retire--was settled by his despatch +of 10:30 P. M., November 28, above quoted, received by me about +8 A. M. of the 29th. But there still remained the question _when_ +I must do it; and that I must solve myself, for General Thomas was +much too far away, and communication was much too slow and uncertain, +for him to give me any help on that subject. + +I had received information of Hood's movement at 2 A. M., _six +hours earlier_, and I had ample time to get out of his way before +morning. After 8 A. M. it would, of course, not have been so easy. +Yet a retreat to Franklin that day (November 29), commencing at +eight or nine in the morning, and across the Harpeth that night, +would not have been at all difficult or dangerous. There would +have been some fighting with Hood's cavalry, but little or none +with his infantry. Hood would have had to lay a pontoon bridge at +Columbia, after my rear-guard had withdrawn, before his advance +from that point could begin; and, as events proved, he could not +reach Spring Hill by his mud road from Huey's Mill until late in +the afternoon. I had time to pass Spring Hill with my entire army +before Hood's infantry advance-guard could reach that place. Hence +I had ample time to consider the mathematical and physical questions +involved before deciding finally that I would not let Hood drive +me back from Duck River that day. But I did not at any time +contemplate a retreat that day farther back then Spring Hill, as +is shown by my direction to Ruger to have his regiment from Ducktown +join him there that night. + + NO SERIOUS DANGER AT SPRING HILL + +I am entirely willing to leave to intelligent military criticism +any question in respect to the accuracy of my calculations, also +the question whether I was justifiable, under the conditions then +existing or understood to exist respecting Thomas's preparations +in the rear to fight a decisive battle, in taking the risks, which +are always more or less unavoidable, of failure in the execution +of plans based upon so close an estimate of what could be done by +my adversary as well as by myself. I content myself with the simple +remark that, in my opinion, if my own orders had been carried out +as I gave them, and my reasonable suggestion to my superior in the +rear to bridge the Harpeth at Franklin had been promptly acted on, +there would have been far less risk of failure than must frequently +be incurred in war. + +If I had had satisfactory assurance of the timely arrival of +sufficient reinforcements on the line of Duck River, I would have +been justified in dividing my infantry into several detachments to +support the cavalry in opposing the crossing of Duck River at the +numerous places above Columbia. But, sooner or later, Hood could +have forced a crossing at some one of those places, and thus have +interposed a compact body of troops, larger than my entire army, +between my detachments. If that had occurred before my reinforcements +arrived, I would have been caught in the worst possible condition. +Hence, in the absence of certain information in respect to when +reinforcements would arrive, and their aggregate strength, a division +of my force was inadmissible. An inferior force should generally +be kept in one compact body, while a superior force may often be +divided to great advantage. + +I now direct attention to the correspondence between General Thomas +and myself, on November 30, before the battle of Franklin, showing +that he was not ready for battle at Nashville, and his desire that +I should, if possible, hold Hood back three days longer; and showing +that my estimate of the importance of time when I was at Columbia +was by no means exaggerated; also showing General Thomas's views +and mine of the military situation before the battle, and the action +then determined on and ordered and partially executed by the movement +of trains toward Nashville before the battle opened. The results +of the battle were not such, even if they had been fully known at +the time, as to have rendered admissible any change in those orders. + + "Nashville, [November] 30, [1864,] 4 A. M. +"Captain A. J. Twining, Franklin: + +"Your despatch of 1 A. M. to-day is received. Please inform General +Schofield that Major-General Smith's troops have just arrived at +the levee and are still on boats, and that it is impossible for +them to reach Franklin to-day. He must make strong efforts to +cover his wagon-train, protecting it against the enemy, as well as +to reach Franklin with his command and get into position there. +I will despatch him further in a few hours. + + "Geo. H. Thomas" + + HOPING TO DELAY HOOD FOR THREE DAYS AT FRANKLIN + +The next despatch from General Thomas was at 10:25 A. M. By that +time he had received two more despatches from me, as follows, I +having arrived at Franklin between 4 and 5 A. M.: + + "Franklin, November 30, 1864, 5 A. M. +"Have just seen your despatch to Captain Twining of 4 A. M. If +Smith is not needed for the immediate defense of Nashville, I think +he had better march for Franklin at once. He could at least cover +my wagon-train if I have to fall back from here." + + "Franklin, November 30, 1864, 5:30 A. M. +"I hope to get my troops and material safely across the Harpeth +this morning. We have suffered no material loss so far. I shall +try and get Wilson on my flank this morning. Forrest was all around +us yesterday, but we brushed him away in the evening and came +through. Hood attacked in the front and flank, but did not hurt +us." + +This last despatch was written before daylight, on my arrival at +Franklin, before I learned that there were no bridges across the +river. If pontoons had been laid or the wagon and railroad bridges +improved on the 29th, as was done by me after my arrival, all could +have crossed by noon of the 30th. + +General Thomas's reply of 10:25 A. M. was as follows: + +"Your despatches of 5:30 and 5:50, and Wilson's despatches, forwarded +by you, have been received. It will take Smith quite all day to +disembark; but if I find there is no immediate necessity to retain +him here, will send him to Franklin or Brentwood, according to +circumstances. If you can prevent Hood from turning your position +at Franklin, it should be held; but I do not wish you to risk too +much. I send you a map of the environs of Franklin." + +Again I telegraphed at 9:50 A. M.: + +"My trains are coming in all right, and half of the troops are here +and the other half about five miles out, coming on in good order, +with light skirmishing. I will have all across the river this +evening. Wilson is here, and has his cavalry on my flank. I do +not know where Forrest is. He may have gone east, but, no doubt, +will strike our flank and rear again soon. Wilson is entirely +unable to cope with him. Of course I cannot prevent Hood from +crossing the Harpeth whenever he may attempt it. Do you desire me +to hold on here until compelled to fall back?" + +And at 11 A. M. I telegraphed: "Troops and trains in all right." + +At noon I answered as follows General Thomas's last despatch: + +"Your despatch of 10:25 A. M. is received. I am satisfied that I +have heretofore run too much risk in trying to hold Hood in check +while so far inferior to him in both infantry and cavalry. The +slightest mistake on my part, or failure of a subordinate, during +the last three days might have proved disastrous. I don't want to +get into so tight a place again; yet I will cheerfully act in +accordance with your views of expediency, if you think it important +to hold Hood back as long as possible. When you get all your troops +together, and the cavalry in effective condition, we can easily +whip Hood, and, I believe, make the campaign a decisive one. Before +that, the most we can do is to husband our strength and increase +it as much as possible. I fear the troops which were stationed on +the river below Columbia will be lost. I will get my trains out +of the way as soon as possible, and watch Hood carefully. Possibly +I may be able to hold him here, but do not expect to be able to do +so long." + +This despatch shows not only my opinion at that time of the kind +of "place" I had been in, but my belief that the character of that +situation had been due largely to Thomas's action in leaving me +without the expected reinforcements, and in not providing the means +of crossing the Harpeth River. + + HOPING TO DELAY HOOD FOR THREE DAYS AT FRANKLIN + +The following seems to show that General Thomas did not even then +see the importance of prompt concentration of all his available +force in front of the enemy, but expected me, with two corps, to +fight the entire hostile force until he could complete his +concentration at Nashville. Even before the battle of Franklin he +seems to have thought he could take his time to concentrate, +reorganize his cavalry, and then "try Hood again." + + "Nashville, November 30, 1864. +"Major-General Schofield, Franklin: + +"General Smith reported to me this morning that one division of +his troops is still behind; we must therefore try to hold Hood +where he is now until those troops can get up, and the steamers +return. After that we will concentrate here, reorganize our cavalry, +and try Hood again. Do you think you can hold Hood at Franklin +for three days longer? Answer, giving your views; and I should +like to know what Wilson thinks he can do to aid you in holding +Hood. + + "Geo. H. Thomas, + "Major-General U. S. Vols, Commanding." + +Thereupon, in the following telegram, dated 3 P. M., I proposed +Brentwood as a point where A. J. Smith's and all the other troops +could surely unite with mine: + +"I have just received your despatch asking whether I can hold Hood +here three days. I do not believe I can. I can doubtless hold +him one day, but will hazard something in doing that. He now has +a large force, probably two corps, in my front, and seems preparing +to cross the river above and below. I think he can effect a crossing +to-morrow in spite of all my efforts, and probably to-night, if he +attempts it. A worse position than this for an inferior force +could hardly be found. I will refer your question to General Wilson +this evening. I think he can do very little. I have no doubt +Forrest will be in my rear to-morrow, or doing some greater mischief. +It appears to me that I ought to take position at Brentwood at +once. If A. J. Smith's division and the Murfreesboro' garrison +join me there, I ought to be able to hold Hood in check for some +time. I have just learned that the enemy's cavalry is already +crossing three miles above. I will have lively times with my trains +again." + +This despatch gives a very accurate estimate of the true situation +at that time, except perhaps that I did not then fully appreciate +how much our cavalry had gained in effective strength by the +reinforcements that had joined the corps in the field during the +retreat. I judged by the experience of the previous day (November +29). But the result was very different in the afternoon of the +30th, when our cavalry repulsed and drove back that of the enemy; +at the same time the infantry assault was repulsed at Franklin. +There was no apprehension of the result of an attack in front at +Franklin, but of a move of Hood to cross the river above and strike +for Nashville before I could effect a junction with the troops then +at that place. + +The following despatches must have been sent either during the +progress of the battle, or very soon afterward: + +"Please send A. J. Smith's division to Brentwood early to-morrow +morning. Also please send to Brentwood to-morrow morning 1,000,000 +rounds infantry ammunition, 2000 rounds 3-inch, and 1000 rounds +light twelve artillery." + +In reply to my advice, the following order to fall back to Nashville +was sent by Thomas _before_ the battle, but was received by me +_after_ the heavy fighting had ceased. Communication was interrupted +for a short time during the transfer of the telegraph station from +the town of Franklin to a place on the north side of the Harpeth, +rendered necessary by the battle. + + "Nashville, November 30, 1864. +"Your despatch of 3 P. M. is received. Send back your trains to +this place at once, and hold your troops in readiness to march to +Brentwood, and thence to this place, as soon as your trains are +fairly on the way, so disposing your force as to cover the wagon- +train. Have all railroad trains sent back immediately. Notify +General Wilson of my instructions. He will govern himself accordingly. +Relieve all garrisons in blockhouses and send back by railroad +trains last over the road. Acknowledge receipt. + + "Geo. H. Thomas, Major-General." + + HOPING TO DELAY HOOD FOR THREE DAYS AT FRANKLIN + +The following is my first report to General Thomas, sent immediately +after the battle: + +"The enemy made a heavy and persistent attack with about two corps, +commencing at 4 P. M. and lasting until after dark. He was repulsed +at all points with very heavy loss--probably five or six thousand +men. Our losses probably not more than one fourth that number.(17) +We have captured about one thousand men, including one brigadier- +general. Your despatch of this P. M. is received. I had already +given the orders you direct, and am now executing them." + +Before the battle, and in anticipation of the order from General +Thomas, the trains had been sent back and the preparations made +for the army to retire to Brentwood, the troops to commence +withdrawing from the line on the south side of the river immediately +after dark. In consequence of the battle, the movement of the +troops was suspended until midnight. General Thomas promptly +replied to my first report in these words: + +"Your telegram is just received. It is glorious news, and I +congratulate you and the brave men of your command; but you must +look out that the enemy does not still persist. The courier you +sent to General Cooper, at Widow Dean's, could not reach there, +and reports that he was chased by rebel cavalry on the whole route, +and finally came into this place. Major-General Steedman, with +five thousand men, should be here in the morning. When he arrives +I will start General A. J. Smith's command and General Steedman's +troops to your assistance at Brentwood." + +[( 1) See his "Memoirs," Vol. II, pp. 162, 163.] + +[( 2) It appears from General Thomas's report that he did have in +his department, by November 29, the mounted cavalry force stated +by General Sherman--viz., 7700; but only 4800 of that force joined +the army in the field before the enemy forced the crossing of Duck +River. The remaining 2900 were not available for service in the +field until after the crisis of the campaign was passed so far as +the cavalry could affect it.] + +[( 3) See. Vol. XLV, parts I and ii.] + +[( 4) See Vols. XXXIX and XLV.] + +[( 5) See General Thomas's report: War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, +p. 33.] + +[( 6) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, p. 1017.] + +[( 7) Thomas to Steedman, November 25: War Records, Vol. XLV, part +I, p. 1050.] + +[( 8) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part iii, p. 535.] + +[( 9) _Ibid_., p. 536.] + +[(10) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part iii, p. 685.] + +[(11) _Ibid_.] + +[(12) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I.] + +[(13) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, p. 1143.] + +[(14) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, p. 1108.] + +[(15) Cooper commanded the brigade guarding the river below +Columbia.] + +[(16) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, p. 1137.] + +[(17) At that time I did not know of our loss in prisoners, having +thought nearly all of Wagner's two brigades had come in with those +I had seen running to the rear.] + + +CHAPTER XII +After the Battle of Franklin--The Arrival at Nashville--General +Thomas's Greeting--A Refreshing Sleep--Services of the Cavalry +Corps and the Fourth Army Corps--Hood's Mistake after Crossing Duck +River--An Incident of the Atlanta Campaign Bearing on Hood's +Character--An Embarrassing Method of Transmitting Messages in Cipher +--The Aggressive Policy of the South. + +Early the next morning (December 1), after receiving at Brentwood +oral orders from General Thomas to continue the retreat to Nashville, +I lay on the ground until the main body of the troops had passed +and I had learned from the cavalry and from the infantry rear-guard +that nothing could occur in the rear which would require my attention. +I then rode forward and reported to General Thomas, whom I found +waiting for me at the place he had selected for the Twenty-third +Corps in the defensive line about Nashville. He greeted me in his +usual cordial but undemonstrative way, congratulated me, and said +I had done "well." I have often thought that I may not have shown +due appreciation of his kindness at that moment, for I did not then +feel very grateful to him; but he gave no indication that he +thought me unappreciative of his approbation. On the contrary, he +said in the kindest manner that I appeared "tired." To which I +replied, "Yes, I am very tired." That was about all the conversation +we had that day. + + AFTER THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN + +As soon as I saw that my troops were moving into the position he +had indicated to the division commanders before my arrival, I rode +to the hotel in Nashville, went to bed, and slept from about noon +of the 1st, without awakening to full consciousness, until about +sunset the next day. I only hope my weary soldiers enjoyed their +rest as much as I did mine, for they must have needed it even more. +When I awoke after that thoroughly refreshing sleep the annoyance +I had felt on account of the embarrassments experienced during the +retreat was replaced by reflections of a much more satisfactory +character. From that time forward my relations with General Thomas +were of the same cordial character as they always had been; and I +was much gratified by the flattering indorsement he placed on my +official report, of which I then knew the substance, if not the +exact words. + +The Fourth Army Corps and the cavalry corps of the Military Division +of the Mississippi having been under my command during only the +few days occupied in the operations between Pulaski and Nashville +(November 14 to December 1), no reports of the operations of those +two corps were ever made to me after the close of that brief period. +Hence it was not possible for me to give any full account of the +distinguished services of those two corps. The cavalry were never +seen by me. They were far in front or on the flank, doing all the +"seeing" for me, giving me information of vital importance in +respect to the enemy's movements. How important that information +was then regarded may be learned by a perusal of the despatches to +and from General Thomas during those days of anxious uncertainty +as to the enemy's plans. I believe no cavalry ever performed that +important service more efficiently. At no time in that short +campaign did I suffer any inconvenience from lack of information +that cavalry could possibly give. If it is true that the operations +of our cavalry were to some extent influenced by apprehension of +a cavalry raid on Nashville or other vital point in our rear, that +was only what General Thomas had been apprehending all the time, +and to meet with which he had assembled eight thousand troops in +Nashville, perhaps not informing the commander of his own cavalry +of that fact quite as early as he might have done.( 1) + +In fact, the redoubtable Forrest had become famous, and his troopers +were esteemed a very large factor in the problem then undergoing +solution--greater in some respects, as I have pointed out, than +the events justified. In my report of the battle of Franklin I +gave all the information in my possession of the gallant action of +our cavalry in driving that of the enemy back across the Harpeth +at the very time when his infantry assault was decisively repulsed. + +I have always regarded it as a very remarkable, and to me a very +fortunate, circumstance that the movements of my infantry columns +were at no time seriously interfered with by the enemy's more +numerous cavalry--not even at Spring Hill, where Stanley was attacked +by cavalry as well as infantry. Hence I have had no inclination +to make any investigation respecting the details of the action of +troops, only temporarily under my command, whose gallant conduct +and untiring vigilance contributed all that was needed to the +complete success of the military operations intrusted to my immediate +direction by our common superior, the department commander. I have +now, as always heretofore, only words of highest praise for the +services of the cavalry corps under my command. + +The Fourth Corps was under my own eye nearly all the time; and +sometimes, in emergencies, I even gave orders directly to the +subordinate commanders, without the formality of sending them +through the corps commander. Hence I have spoken of that corps +with the same freedom as of my own Twenty-third; and I hope I have +not failed to give, so far as the very restricted scope of my +account would permit, full justice to that noble corps of veteran +soldiers, as well as to its officers. As I have had special occasion +to say of the action of Opdycke's brigade and of the 12th and 16th +Kentucky of the Twenty-third Corps at Franklin, the conduct of +those troops was beyond all praise. + + HOOD'S MISTAKE AFTER CROSSING DUCK RIVER + +I believe little disputes always arise out of the honorable rivalry +which exists between bodies of troops acting together in a great +battle. Franklin was no exception to that general rule. For the +purpose of "pouring oil on the troubled waters" after Franklin, I +said that in my opinion there was glory enough won in that battle +to satisfy the reasonable ambition of everybody who was on the +field, and of some who were not there, but who were at first given +"the lion's share"; but if the disputants were not satisfied with +that, they might take whatever share of credit was supposed to be +due to me, and divide it among themselves. I was then, as I am +now, perfectly satisfied with the sense of triumph which filled my +soul when I saw my heroic comrades hurl back the hosts of rebellion +with slaughter which to some might seem dreadful, but which I +rejoiced in as being necessary to end that fratricidal war. It is +not worth while to conceal the fact that most earnest patriotism +sometimes arouses in the soldier's breast what might seem to be a +fiendish desire to witness the slaughter of his country's enemies. +Only a soldier of fortune or a hireling can be a stranger to such +feelings. Yet I aver that I had not the slightest feeling of +personal enmity toward my old friend and classmate General Hood, +or his comrades. It was the "accursed politicians" who had led +them into such a fratricidal strife who were the objects of our +maledictions. But even that feeling has been softened by time, +and by reflection upon the deeper and more remote causes of the +war, and that the glorious fruits of final victory have amply +repaid, and will continue to repay in all time, for all those +immense sacrifices and sufferings. + +Hood undoubtedly made a mistake in his plan of operations after he +crossed Duck River above Columbia on the night of November 28-9. +His march on Spring Hill would have been the best _if it had +succeeded_. But he failed to estimate accurately what he could +accomplish in a short winter day over a very bad road. In a long +day of summer, with that road in the usual summer condition, he +might have reached Spring Hill early in the afternoon, with force +enough to accomplish his purpose before night, if he had found a +single division, or even two divisions, there. But he failed simply +because he tried to do what was not possible. + +When Hood crossed the river he was not more than five miles (his +own journal says three) from the left flank of my position on the +north bank. The intervening space was open fields, not much, if +any, more difficult for the march of infantry than the dirt road +he actually used. If he had moved directly upon my flank, he could +have brought on a general engagement about noon, with a force at +least equal to mine. In anticipation of such a movement, I sent +a brigade toward Huey's Mill to watch Hood's movements, and formed +line of battle facing in that direction and covering the turnpike +to Spring Hill, for which purpose I detained one of the two divisions +of Stanley's corps which, at first, had been ordered to Spring +Hill. I was willing to fight Hood in that position, and expected +to do so. But I felt relieved when I found he had undertaken the +much more difficult task of marching to Spring Hill, where I believed +sufficient preparations had been made to oppose him until I could +reach that place by a broad macadamized road over which I could +march rapidly by day or by night. + +I now believe my judgment at that time was correct: That what I +had most to apprehend was not an attempt to get in my rear at Spring +Hill, but one to dislodge me from my position on Duck River by +defeating me in open battle. But I believed I could fight Hood, +even where I was, from noon until dark, and then retreat to Spring +Hill or Franklin in the night. At least I was willing to try it +rather than disappoint the expectation of General Thomas that I +would hold Hood in check until he could concentrate his reinforcements. +It seems to me clear that Hood's best chance at Duck River was to +force a general engagement as early in the day as possible, so as +to occupy the attention of all my infantry while his superior +cavalry was sent to occupy some point in my rear, and try to cut +off my retreat in the night. Perhaps Hood did not appreciate the +very great advantage a retreating army has in the exclusive use of +the best roads at night, especially when the nights are long and +the days correspondingly short--an advantage which cannot be overcome +by any superiority of numbers in the pursuing force, except by a +rapid circuitous march of a detachment. + + HOOD'S MISTAKE AFTER CROSSING DUCK RIVER + +As illustrating my accurate knowledge of Hood's character before +we ever met in battle, the following incident seems worthy of +mention. When Sherman's army, after crossing the Chattahoochee +River, was advancing on Atlanta,--my troops being in the center,-- +General Sherman was on the main road, a little in rear of me. My +advance-guard sent back to me an Atlanta paper containing an account +of the visit of President Davis, and the order relieving General +Johnston and assigning General Hood to the command of the army. +General Sherman erroneously says one of General Thomas's staff +officers brought him that paper. General Thomas was then off to +the right, on another road. I stopped until Sherman came up, and +handed him the paper. After reading it he said, in nearly, if not +exactly, the following words: "Schofield, do you know Hood? What +sort of a fellow is he?" I answered: "Yes, I know him well, and +I will tell you the sort of man he is. He'll hit you like h--l, +now, before you know it." Soon afterward, as well described by +Sherman, the sound of battle to our right gave indication of the +heavy attack Hood's troops made upon Thomas's advancing columns +that day, which failed of serious results, as I believe all now +admit, mainly if not entirely because Thomas himself was near the +head of the column which received the first blow. Soon after, a +still more heavy attack was made on the Army of the Tennessee, our +extreme left, which resulted in one of the severest and most closely +contested battles of the war, and in which the knightly McPherson +was killed. + + METHOD OF TRANSMITTING MESSAGES IN CIPHER + +Under the system enforced by the War Department in 1864-5, the +commanders of troops in the field were compelled to communicate +with each other either in plain language which the enemy could read +if a despatch fell into his hands, or else in a cipher which neither +of the commanders nor any of their staff officers could decipher. +They were made absolutely dependent upon the cipher-operators of +the telegraph corps. Of course all this cipher correspondence +between commanding generals was promptly transmitted to the War +Department, so that the Secretary could know what was going on as +well as anybody. Whatever may have been the object of this, perhaps +not difficult to conjecture, its effect was to make rapid correspondence +in cipher impossible when rapidity was most important and secrecy +most necessary. In previous years I and one at least of my staff +officers were always familiar with the cipher code, so that we +could together, as a rule, quickly unravel a knotty telegram. +Indeed, I once had to decipher a despatch to which I had no key, +except I knew from internal evidence that it must be under the War +Department code, though written in a different key. It was a +despatch from Grant, who was then besieging Vicksburg. It had been +sent to Memphis by steamer, and thence by telegraph to St. Louis, +the place from which Grant's army drew its supplies. A cipher +despatch sent under the circumstances from Grant to me, who was +not at that time under his command, must necessarily be of great +importance. My staff officer at once informed me that it was in +some key different from that we had in use. So I took the thing +in hand myself, and went to work by the simplest possible process, +but one sure to lead to the correct result in time--that is, to +make all possible arrangements of the words until one was found +that would convey a rational meaning. Commencing about 3 P. M., +I reached the desired result at three in the morning. Early that +day a steamer was on the way down the river with the supplies Grant +wanted. I never told the general how he came to get his supplies +so promptly, but I imagined I knew why he had telegraphed to me +rather than to the quartermaster whose duty it was to furnish +supplies for his army--and a most capable and efficient quartermaster +he was. I had only a short time before voluntarily sent General +Grant 5000 men, and I inferred that there was some connection +between the incidents. + +The immense change in the whole military situation which was produced +in a few minutes at Franklin (for the contest there was in fact +decided in that time, by the recovery of the breach in the line), +and that by a battle which had not been contemplated by either +General Thomas or myself (that is, on the south side of the Harpeth +River, with that stream in the rear of the army), nor yet by General +Hood until he saw the apparent opportunity to destroy his adversary; +and the fact that that dangerous situation had been produced and +the battle rendered necessary by slight accidents or mistakes which +might easily have been foreseen or avoided, cannot, it seems to +me, but produce in every thoughtful mind some reflection upon the +influence exercised by what is called "accident" or "chance" in +war. The "fortune of war" was, upon the whole, always in my favor, +in spite of adverse accidents; yet I have always acted upon the +principle that the highest duty of a commander is to anticipate +and provide for every possible contingency of war, so as to eliminate +what is called chance. + + THE AGGRESSIVE POLICY OF THE SOUTH + +Both Johnston and Hood refer in their narratives to the earnest +desire of their commander-in-chief, President Davis, that the army +they in succession commanded should undertake an aggressive campaign. +Johnston demonstrated that, under the circumstances existing while +he was in command, such an undertaking could not possibly have been +successful. Hood tried it under far more favorable circumstances, +and yet he failed, as had every former attempt of the Confederate +armies. The result in every case was costly failure, and in the +last overwhelming defeat. How much greater would have been the +military strength of the South if those losses had been avoided, +and how much greater would have been her moral strength if she had +maintained from the start a firm, consistent, and humane defensive +policy! How long would the conservative people of the North have +sustained the "invasion" of States where the people were fighting +only to "defend their homes and families." Did not the South throw +away a great moral advantage when it waged aggressive war upon the +North? No doubt it was necessary at first, from the secession +point of view, to "fire the Southern heart" by attacking Fort +Sumter. And, also from that point of view, that attack was fully +justifiable because that fort was in "Confederate" territory. The +invasions of Maryland and Pennsylvania were far different, and much +more so were the relentless guerrilla war waged in the border +States, attended with horrible massacres like that of Lawrence, +Kansas, which, though no one charges them to the government or +generals of the South, were unavoidable incidents of that species +of warfare; and the inhuman cruelties incidentally suffered by +Union prisoners. + +It is true that the slavery question was a very powerful factor in +our Civil War, and became more and more so as the war progressed. +But opinion on that question at the North was very far from unanimous +at the first, and it is a fair and important question how far the +growth of sentiment in the free States in favor of emancipation +was due to the slaveholders' method of carrying on the war. + +My desire here is to refer to these questions solely from the +military point of view, and for the consideration of military +students. The conditions upon which depends success or failure in +war are so many,--some of them being more or less obscure,--that +careful study of all such conditions is demanded of those who aspire +to become military leaders. + +[( 1) See Thomas's despatch of 8 P. M., November 29, to Colonel H. +C. Wharton, Wilson's staff officer: War Records, Vol. XLV, part +I, p. 1146.] + + +CHAPTER XIII +Grant Orders Thomas to Attack Hood or Relinquish the Command-- +Thomas's Corps Commanders Support Him in Delay--Grant's Intentions +in Sending Logan to Relieve Thomas--Change of Plan before the Battle +of Nashville--The Fighting of December 15--Expectation that Hood +would Retreat--Delay in Renewing the Attack on the 16th--Hopelessness +of Hood's Position--Letters to Grant and Sherman--Transferred to +the East--Financial Burden of the War--Thomas's Attitude toward +the War. + +The perilous character of the situation in Tennessee, in which it +was left by Sherman's premature start for the sea and Thomas's +tardy concentration of troops, wholly disappeared with the repulse +of Hood at Franklin. There was no further obstacle to the +concentration of Thomas's forces at Nashville, the organization +and equipment of his army, and the necessary preparations to assume +the offensive. Hood's army was too much shattered and crippled to +make any serious movement for some days, during which it was easy +for Thomas to prepare for battle all his troops except the cavalry, +of which latter, however, it required a longer time to complete +the remount. Indeed, Thomas could have given battle the second or +third day after Franklin with more than a fair prospect of success. + +Considering the feeling of nervous anxiety which prevailed in +Washington and throughout the country at the time, possibly he +ought to have assumed the offensive on the 2d or 3d of December. +But that state of anxiety was at first unknown at Nashville, even +to General Thomas, and was never fully appreciated or understood. +No one at Nashville, so far as I am aware, shared that feeling. +We knew, or thought we knew, that Hood could do nothing, unless it +were to retreat, before we would be prepared to meet him, and that +every day's delay strengthened us far more that it possibly could +him. His operations, which were closely watched every day, indicated +no intention to retreat; hence all at Nashville awaited with +confidence the period of complete preparation which was to give us +the decisive victory. + + THOMAS TO ATTACK HOOD OR RELINQUISH THE COMMAND + +The anxiety felt elsewhere, especially by General Grant, was probably +due to some doubt of the wisdom of Sherman's plan of going off with +his main army before disposing of Hood, contrary to Grant's first +advice; to the discovery of Sherman's error in supposing he had +left Thomas in complete condition to cope with Hood; to some +misapprehension as to the degree in which the situation in Tennessee +had been changed by the battle of Franklin; as well as to lack of +confidence in General Thomas on account of his well-known deliberation +of thought and action. + +Little was known of this state of anxiety by me, or, I believe, by +the corps commanders, until December 9, when General Thomas, calling +us together at his headquarters, informed us that he was ordered +to attack Hood at once or surrender his command (not saying to +whom), and asked our advice as to what he ought to do. One of the +officers present asked General Thomas to show us the order, which +he declined to do. This confirmed the belief which I had at first +formed that the successor named by General Grant could be no other +than myself--a belief formed from the fact that I was, next to +General Thomas, the highest officer in rank on the ground where +immediate action was demanded, and from my knowledge of General +Grant's confidence, which belief has since been fully justified by +the record. This, as I conceived, imposed upon me the duty of +responding at once to General Thomas's request for advice, without +waiting for the junior members of the council, according to the +usual military custom. Hence I immediately replied: "General +Thomas, I will sustain you in your determination not to fight until +you are fully ready." All the other commanders then promptly +expressed their concurrence. + +I do not know whether or not my declaration of purpose to sustain +General Thomas was made known to General Grant, or to any one in +Washington, either then or afterward. I have never made any inquiry +on that subject. Of course such information must have been conveyed +confidentially and indirectly, if at all, and hence would probably +not appear in the official records, though despatches and letters +marked "confidential" are sometimes published as official. I have +only conjectured that some knowledge of my opinion and decision +may, perhaps, have influenced General Grant's final determination +to go to Nashville himself. If some officer must go there to fight +a battle, Grant could get there about as soon as any other he could +well select. The records now published seem to verify the belief +then (December 9, 1864) existing in my mind, that I had only to +withhold my support from General Thomas in his determination to +delay, and the chief command would have fallen to my fortune, where +I believed brilliant victory was as nearly certain as anything in +war can be. But I never had the remotest idea of superseding +General Thomas. As I explained to General Sherman, I volunteered +to go back to Tennessee, not to supersede Thomas, but to help him. +I knew him and his subordinates well, as I did also the antagonist, +my West Point classmate, whom they would have to meet. I appreciated +Thomas's high qualities, his distinguished services, and, above +all, the profound affection and confidence of his troops--an element +of strength in a commander far greater than is generally understood, +even by military men, some of whom appear to be altogether ignorant +of its value as a factor in war. A doubt of our complete success +under his leadership, after our troops were united, never entered +my mind, much less a desire to diminish or dim the laurels he might +win. + + GRANT'S INTENTION IN SENDING LOGAN + +General Grant's great anxiety on account of the situation at +Nashville was manifested for several days by urgent despatches to +General Thomas to attack at once without waiting for further +preparations; then by an order to Thomas to turn over the chief +command to me, Thomas to become subordinate, which order was +suspended; and finally by starting for Nashville himself to direct +operations in person. In the meantime he ordered General John A. +Logan to go to Nashville to relieve Thomas in command of the Army +of the Cumberland, without thought, as he has said, of the question +whether Logan or myself should command the combined armies of the +Cumberland and of the Ohio. Grant had reached Washington from City +Point, and Logan had gone as far as Louisville, when the report of +Thomas's victory of December 15 made it unnecessary for either of +them to proceed farther. The following letters from Grant to Logan +are interesting as explaining the reasons and motives of his action +in sending Logan to Nashville, as well as his estimate of the +services I had rendered in the preceding operations: + + "New York, February 14, 1884. +"Hon. John A. Logan, U. S. Senate, Washington, D. C. + +"Dear Sir: In reply to your letter of the 11th, I have to say that +my response must be from memory entirely, having no data at hand +to refer to; but in regard to the order for you to go to Louisville +and Nashville for the purpose of relieving General Thomas, I never +thought of the question of who should command the combined armies +of the Cumberland and the Ohio. I was simply dissatisfied with +the slowness of General Thomas moving, and sent you out with orders +to relieve him. No doubt if the order had been carried out, the +question would immediately have arisen as to who was entitled to +the command, provided General Schofield was senior in rank to you, +which I do not know that he was. I know that his confirmation as +a major-general took place long after yours, but I do not know the +date of his commission. The question, in that case, of the command +of the whole would have been settled in a very few hours by the +use of the telegraph between Nashville and Washington. I was in +Washington when you arrived at Louisville and telegraphed me that +General Thomas had moved, and, as I remember the telegram, expressing +gratification that he had done so. I was then on my way to Nashville +myself, and remained over a day in Washington, hoping that Thomas +might still move. Of course I was gratified when I learned that +he had moved, because it was a very delicate and unpleasant matter +to remove a man of General Thomas's character and standing before +the country; but still I had urged him so long to move that I had +come to think it a duty. Of course in sending you to relieve +General Thomas, I meant no reflection whatever upon General Schofield, +who was commanding the Army of the Ohio, because I thought that he +had done very excellent service in punishing the entire force under +Hood a few days before, some twenty-five miles south of Nashville. +Very truly yours, + + "U. S. Grant + "(_per_ Frank F. Wood)." + + GRANT'S INTENTIONS IN SENDING LOGAN + + "New York, February 23, 1884. +"Gen. John A. Logan, U. S. Senate, Washington, D. C. + +"Dear General: Since I have been confined to my room I have +conducted all my correspondence through a secretary, who is a +stenographer, and he takes my dictation to the office and writes +the letters out there as dictated, and by my direction signs my +name. I intended that the letter which I wrote to you should be +brought back to me for my own signature, and I sign this myself to +show my entire responsibility for the one which you have just +received, and which I hope was satisfactory to you. + + "Very truly yours, + "U. S. Grant." + +The passion and prejudice begotten in the minds of Thomas's soldiers +and their friends by injustice, real or fancied, done or proposed +to be done to him by his superiors in rank, have rendered impossible +any calm discussion of questions touching his military career. +There is not yet, and probably will not be in our lifetime, a proper +audience for such discussion. But posterity will award justice to +all if their deeds have been such as to save their names from +oblivion. + +Time works legitimate "revenge," and makes all things even. When +I was a boy at West Point I was court-martialed for tolerating some +youthful "deviltry" of my classmates, in which I took no part +myself, and was sentenced to be dismissed. Thomas, then already +a veteran soldier, was a member of the court, and he and one other +were the only ones of thirteen members who declined to recommend +that the sentence be remitted. This I learned in 1868, when I was +Secretary of War. Only twelve years later I was able to repay this +then unknown stern denial of clemency to a youth by saving the +veteran soldier's army from disaster, and himself from the humiliation +of dismissal from command on the eve of victory. Five years later +still, I had the satisfaction, by intercession with the President, +of saving the same veteran general from assignment to an inferior +command, and of giving him the military division to which my +assignment had been ordered. When death had finally relieved him +from duty, and not till then, did I consent to be his successor. +In 1879 I had the satisfaction, after many months of patient +investigation, of rendering justice to the other of those two +unrelenting soldiers who, of all the thirteen, could not find it +in their hearts to recommend clemency to an erring youth; I was +president of the board which reversed the judgment of the court- +martial in the case of Fitz-John Porter. + +I believe it must now be fully known to all who are qualified to +judge and have had by personal association or by study of history +full opportunities to learn the truth, that General Thomas did not +possess in a high degree the activity of mind necessary to foresee +and provide for all the exigencies of military operations, nor the +mathematical talent required to estimate "the relations of time, +space, motion, and force" involved in great problems of war. His +well-known high qualities in other respects obscured these +imperfections from the great majority of those who surrounded him +during the war, and rendered the few educated soldiers who were +able to understand his true merits the more anxious to aid him and +save him from personal defeat. And no one, I am sure, of his +comrades in arms desires to detract from the great fame which is +justly his due; for, according to the best judgment of mankind, +moral qualities, more than intellectual, are the foundation of a +great and enduring fame. It was "Old Pap" Thomas, not General +Thomas, who was beloved by the Army of the Cumberland; and it is +the honest, conscientious patriot, the firm, unflinching old soldier, +not the general, whose name will be most respected in history. + + CHANGE OF PLAN BEFORE THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE + +Of the general details of the battle of Nashville I do not propose +to speak, but simply to notice a few of its most important points. +The plan of battle, as published, placed my command--the Twenty- +third Corps--in the left center of our line, where only a feint +was to be made. The Fourth Corps was to carry a salient advanced +line, while the main attack was to be made on the enemy's extreme +left by A. J. Smith's corps and the cavalry. After the order was +prepared I went to General Thomas with a map of the position showing +the exact length of the several parts of the enemy's line, and +explained to him that the force he had assigned to our left wing +was at least 10,000 men more than could be used to any advantage +unless for a real attack; and that, on the other hand, Smith's +force was not large enough for the real attack, considering the +extent of the ground occupied by the enemy on that flank. Hence +I suggested that my corps should support Smith instead of remaining +on the left of Wood. To this suggestion General Thomas readily +acceded, and orally authorized me to carry it into effect, but made +no change in his written order. The result of this change of plan +was that the close of the first day's engagement found the Twenty- +third Corps on the extreme right of our infantry line, in the most +advanced position captured from the enemy. Yet General Thomas, in +his official report, made no mention of this change of plan, but +said "the original plan of battle, with but few alterations, [was] +strictly adhered to."( 1) The "alterations" were certainly "few". +A change from 10,000 to 20,000 infantry in the main attacking force +may not properly be described as _many_ "alterations," but it looks +like one very _large_ one--sufficient, one would suppose, to +determine the difference between failure and success. + +The plan of battle issued December 14 had been matured and made +known to the principal subordinate commanders several days before, +when General Thomas intended to attack, but was prevented by the +storm. Hence there had been ample time for critical consideration +and discussion of the details of that plan, the result of which +was the modification made at the conference in the afternoon or +evening of December 14, which modification was not embodied in the +written order, but was orally directed to be carried out. If +General Thomas had caused that clerical work to be done in the +evening of December 14, his published orders and his battle of +December 15 would have been in complete harmony. There would not, +so far as I know, have been even a "few alterations." In this +connection, the difference between the "Special Field Order No. +342" of December 14, as recorded in General Thomas's order-book, +and the copy embodied in his official report, as explained in a +foot-note in the War Records, is not unimportant.( 2) In the order- +book he says: "Major-General Schofield _will mass_ the remainder +of his force in front of the works and co-operate with General +Wood, protecting the latter's left flank against an attack by the +enemy"; but in his report the words "_will move with_" are substituted +for "will mass." The latter, in military parlance, meant placing +my corps in reserve, with a view to "co-operate with General Wood," +etc., whenever such co-operation might be necessary; while the +words used in Thomas's final report meant active co-operation with +General Wood from the beginning of the engagement. In the body of +his report General Thomas spoke of the position of the Twenty-third +Corps as "in reserve," from which position it was ordered to the +right to join A. J. Smith's troops in the attack. Hence it would +seem that a position "in reserve" was what General Thomas had in +mind both when he prepared his order of battle and when he wrote +his report, and that the change to the words "will move with" was +simply a clerical error. + + EXPECTATION THAT HOOD WOULD RETREAT + +After darkness had ended the first day's battle (December 15), I +received an order in writing from General Thomas, which was in +substance to _pursue the retreating enemy_ early the next morning, +my corps to take the advance on the Granny White pike, and was +informed that the cavalry had been or would be ordered to start at +the same time by a road on the right, and cross the Harpeth below +Franklin. These orders seemed to be so utterly inapplicable to +the actual situation that I rode to the rear to where General +Thomas's headquarters were supposed to be, and there found that he +had gone back to his house in Nashville, to which place I followed +him. He appeared surprised at my suggestion that we would find +Hood in line of battle ready to receive us in the morning, or even +ready to strike our exposed right flank before we could renew the +attack, instead of in full retreat, as he had assumed. I told him +I knew Hood much better than he did, and I was sure he would not +retreat. Finally, after considerable discussion I obtained a +modification of the order so far as to direct the cavalry to remain +where it was until Hood's action should be known, and an order for +some of A. J. Smith's troops to support the right if necessary. +But no orders whatever were given, to my knowledge, looking to a +battle the next day--at least none for my troops or the cavalry. + +The next morning revealed the enemy in his new position, his left +remaining where it was the night before, in my immediate front, +but the rest of his line far back from the ground on which the +other portions of Thomas's army had passed the night. Some time +was of course required for the other corps to come up and get in +contact with the enemy, and the whole forenoon was passed by me in +impatient anxiety and fruitless efforts to get from General Thomas +some orders or authority that would enable us all to act together +--that is, the cavalry and the two infantry corps on the right. +At length the cavalry, without order from General Thomas, had worked +well round on the enemy's left so as to threaten his rear; I had +ordered Cox, commanding my right division, to advance his right in +conjunction with the movement of the cavalry, and at the proper +time to attack the left of the enemy's intrenchments covering the +Granny White pike, and that movement had commenced; while, having +been informed by General Darius N. Couch, commanding my left +division, that one of Smith's divisions was about to assault, I had +ordered Couch to support that division, which movement had also +commenced. Then General Thomas arrived near our right, where I +stood watching these movements. This, about four o'clock P. M., +was the first time I had seen or heard from General Thomas during +that day. He gave no order, nor was there time to give any. The +troops were already in motion, and we had hardly exchanged the +usual salutations when shouts to our left announced that McArthur's +division of Smith's corps had already carried the enemy's work in +its front, and our whole line advanced and swept all before it. + +In my judgment, General Thomas gave a little less than full credit +to McArthur's division, and considerably more than full justice to +the other troops, in his description of that assault, which was +distinctly seen by him and by me. + +The resistance along the whole left and center of Hood's line cannot +be said to have been strong or obstinate. Our total losses were +comparatively insignificant; and whatever may have been the appearance +to the troops under fire, to a cool observer out of the smoke the +enemy's fire seemed no more than that of an ordinary skirmish. +But with the exception of the comparatively feeble resistance of +the enemy, that splendid assault of McArthur's division, as I saw +it, was very accurately described by its gallant commander in his +official report, and also in that of General A. J. Smith. + + DELAY IN RENEWING THE ATTACK ON THE 16TH + +The fact is that Hood's left wing had been much weakened to strengthen +his right, which had been heavily pressed a short time before, as +fully described by General Thomas, and his army was already +substantially beaten. Its spirit seemed to be gone. What little +fight was left in it after November 30 had been greatly diminished +on December 15. Hood, almost alone of that army, was not whipped +until the 16th. He, the responsible leader of a desperate cause, +could not yield as long as there was a ray of hope. Under any +ordinary circumstances a commander even of the most moderate capacity +must have admitted his campaign a failure the morning after Franklin. +It would be absurd to compare the fighting of Hood's troops at +Nashville, especially on the second day, with the magnificent +assaults at Atlanta and Franklin. My own appreciation of the result +was expressed in the following despatch: + + "Headquarters, Army of the Ohio, + "December 16, 1864, 7:45 P. M. +"Major-General George H. Thomas, + "Commanding Department of the Cumberland. + +"General: I have the honor to report four pieces of artillery and +a considerable number of prisoners captured by General Cox's division +this afternoon. General Cox also reported four other pieces and +caissons captured in the valley between the hill carried by General +McArthur and that taken by General Cox. I learned, however, upon +inquiry, that General McArthur's troops claimed, and I have no +doubt justly, the honor of capturing the last four. My provost- +marshal reports seventy-four prisoners captured this P. M. I have +conversed with some of the officers captured, and am satisfied +Hood's army is more thoroughly beaten than any troops I have ever +seen. + +"I congratulate you most heartily upon the result of the two days' +operations. My messenger will wait for any orders you may have to +send me. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, + + "J. M. Schofield, Major-General." + +It now appears to be fully established by the records that Hood's +infantry force in the battle of Nashville was very far inferior to +that of Thomas, and he had sent a large part of his cavalry, with +some infantry, away to Murfreesboro'. This disparity must have +been perfectly well known to Hood, though not to Thomas. Hence it +would seem that Hood must have known that it was utterly impossible +for his army to resist the assaults which he must expect on December +16. Since all this has become known, it is impossible not to see +now that the comparatively feeble resistance offered by the +Confederate troops at Nashville was due not so much, perhaps, to +any lack of valor on the part of those troops, as to their +comparatively small numbers. I recall distinctly the conversation +I had with a Confederate field-officer a few minutes after he was +captured that day, and which I reported to General Thomas that +evening. In answer to my question as to when the Confederate troops +recognized the fact that they were beaten, he answered, "Not till +you routed us just now." I did not believe him then, for I thought +they must have recognized their defeat at Franklin, or at least on +the 15th, at Nashville. But now I think he probably told me the +exact truth. I doubt if any soldiers in the world ever needed so +much cumulative evidence to convince them that they were beaten. +"Brave boys were they!" If they had been fighting in a cause that +commanded the sympathy and support of the public conscience of the +world, they could never have been beaten; it is not necessary to +search for any other cause of the failure of the Confederate States. + + DELAY IN RENEWING THE ATTACK ON THE 16TH + +The most notable failure, on our side, of the battle of December +16 was the wasting of nearly the entire day, so that operations +ended with the successful assault at dark. What was left of Hood's +army had time to retreat across the Harpeth during the night and +destroy the bridges before the pursuit could be commenced. + +But the results of the two days' operations at Nashville were too +gratifying to admit of contemporaneous criticism. The battle has +been generally accepted as a perfect exemplification of the art of +war. It is certainly a good subject for the study of military +students, and it is partly for their benefit that I have pointed +out some of its prominent defects as I understood them. Its +commendable features are sufficiently evident; but in studying the +actions that have resulted in victory, we are apt to overlook the +errors without which the victory might have been far more complete, +or even to mistake those errors for real causes of success. + +The pursuit from Nashville was necessarily an imperfect one from +the start, simply because the successful assault having been made +at the close of day, the broken enemy had time to get across the +Harpeth and destroy the bridges before morning. The singular +blunder by which General Thomas's pontoon-train was sent toward +Murfreesboro' instead of Franklin added somewhat to the delay, but +probably did not essentially change the result. + +The state of all the roads except the one turnpike, the soft +condition of the fields everywhere, the bad weather,--rain, sleet, +and ice,--made the movements of troops which were necessary to an +effective pursuit extremely difficult, and often impossible. The +energy and determination of General Thomas and of all who could +take any active part in that pursuit were probably never surpassed +in military history, but the difficulties to be overcome were often +insurmountable. Under the conditions at that season of the year +and in that state of weather, the only possible chance of reaping +fruits commensurate with the brilliant victory at Nashville and +with the great preparations which had been made for pursuit was to +make the final assault at Nashville early enough in the day to +leave time before dark to prevent the enemy from crossing the +Harpeth and destroying the bridges. + +If Hood had retreated in the night of December 15, as Thomas presumed +he would, the result would doubtless have been even less serious +to the enemy; for he would not have suffered at Nashville the great +losses and demoralization which occurred to him on the 16th, and +would have been in better condition to make an effective retreat, +and even better able to cross the Harpeth in the night and destroy +the bridges. But this would have been difficult, if not impossible, +to prevent on the 15th, on account of the great extent and nature +of the movements necessarily required to open the battle on that +day. I now recall very distinctly the desire manifested by General +Thomas that those initial operations might, if possible, be expedited. +As we sat together on horseback just in rear of Wood's right and +of Smith's left, on ground overlooking nearly the entire field, +the general would frequently reach for my glasses, which he had +occasionally used before and said were the only field-glasses he +had ever found of much use to him, and try to peer through the +misty atmosphere far over the woods and field where his infantry +and cavalry were advancing against the enemy's left. After thus +looking long and earnestly, he would return the glasses to me, with +what seemed to be a sign of irritation or impatience, for he uttered +very few words in that long time, until late in the afternoon, +when, after using my field-glasses for the last time, he said to +me, with the energy which battle alone could arouse in his strong +nature: "Smith has not reached far enough to the right. Put in +your troops!" + +Occasionally, when a shell struck and exploded near where we were, +causing his horse to make a slight start, and only a slight one,-- +for the nature of the horse was much the same as that of the rider, +--the only change visible in the face or form of that stout-hearted +soldier was a slight motion of the bridle-hand to check the horse. +My own beautiful gray charger, "Frank Blair," though naturally more +nervous than the other, had become by that time hardly less fearless. +But I doubt if my great senior ever noticed that day what effect +the explosion of a shell produced on either the gray horse or his +rider. He had on his shoulders the responsibilities of a great +battle, while I then had better than ever before opportunity to +study the character of my chief. + + HOPELESSNESS OF HOOD'S POSITION + +A wiser commander than Hood might very probably have saved his army +from that terrible and useless sacrifice of December 16. But that +last and bravest champion of a desperate cause in the west appears +to have decided to remain and invite the total destruction of his +army. The position which the Confederates occupied in the morning +of the 16th was so close to that of more than half of the Union +troops that Hood's left could easily have been crushed by an infantry +assault and his rear reached by Thomas's cavalry before noon, and +nothing less than a miracle could have prevented the capture of +Hood's army. + +It is worthy of note as instructive comparison that on November +30 Hood advanced from Spring Hill to Franklin and made his famous +assault in just about the same length of time that it took our +troops to advance from the first to the second position at Nashville +and make the assault of December 16; and that the Fourth and Twenty- +third corps on November 29 and 30 fought two battles--Spring Hill +and Franklin--and marched forty miles, from Duck River to Nashville, +in thirty-six hours. Time is an element in military problems the +value of which cannot be too highly estimated, yet how seldom has +it been duly appreciated! + +The remnant of Hood's army having made its escape across the +Tennessee River, the pursuit terminated, and General Thomas issued +his remarkable General Orders No. 169, announcing that "the rear- +guard of the flying and dispirited enemy was driven across the +Tennessee River. . . ."( 3) + +Orders were then issued by General Thomas distributing his army +along the Tennessee River in winter quarters, and he commenced +planning a campaign for the ensuing spring, the general features +of which he telegraphed me, asking my opinion. His proposition +seemed to show so different an appreciation from my own of the +actual state of the war and of the demands of the country upon its +army at that momentous crisis, and views so different from mine in +respect to the strategic principles that should govern future +operations, that I wrote to General Grant and General Sherman, +giving them briefly my views upon the subject, and requesting an +order to join them on the Atlantic coast, to aid in terminating +the rebellion. My letter to General Grant was promptly followed +by a telegram to General Thomas directing him to send me east with +the Twenty-third Corps, which enabled me to participate in the +closing campaign of the war. + + LETTER TO GRANT + +The following are the letters, above referred to, to Grant and +Sherman, whose appreciation of the views therein expressed is +sufficiently shown by the published history of subsequent operations, +and the orders sent to Thomas by General Grant and the War Department +during that time: + + "(Unofficial.) + "Columbia, Tenn., December 27, 1864. +"Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant, Commanding U. S. Armies, City +Point, Va. + +"General: My corps was sent back to Tennessee by General Sherman, +instead of remaining with him on him march through Georgia, according +to his original design, for two reasons, viz.: First, because +General Thomas was not regarded strong enough after it became +evident that Hood designed to invade Tennessee; and, second, in +order that I might fill up my corps from the new troops then arriving +in Tennessee. These reasons now no longer exist. By uniting my +troops with Stanley's, we were able to hold Hood in check at Columbia +and Franklin until General Thomas could concentrate at Nashville, +and also to give Hood his death-blow at Franklin. Subsequent +operations have shown how little fight was then left in his army, +and have taken that little out of it. He now has not more than +fifteen thousand infantry, about ten thousand of whom only are +armed, and they greatly demoralized. With time to reorganize and +recruit, he could not probably raise his force to more than half +the strength he had at Franklin. + +"General Thomas has assigned several new regiments to my command, +and I hope soon to make them effective by distributing them in old +brigades. I will have from fifteen to eighteen thousand effective +men, two thirds of whom are the veterans of the campaigns of East +Tennessee and Georgia: A small force, it is true, yet one which +would at least be an appreciable addition to your army in Virginia +or elsewhere where decisive work is to be done. + +"It may not be practicable now for me to join General Sherman, but +it would not be difficult to transfer my command to Virginia. + +"I am aware that General Thomas contemplates a 'spring campaign' +into Alabama or Mississippi, with the Tennessee River as a base, +and believe he considers my command a necessary part of the operating +force. Without reference to the latter point, permit me to express +the opinion that such a campaign would not be an economical or +advantageous use of so many troops. + +"If aggressive operations are to be continued in the Gulf States, +it appears to me it would be much better to take Mobile and operate +from that point, thus striking vital points, if there are any such, +of rebel territory by much shorter lines. + +"But it appears to me that Lee's army is virtually all that is left +of the rebellion. If we can concentrate force enough to destroy +that, we will destroy with it the rebel government, and the occupation +of the whole South will then be but a matter of a few weeks' time. + +"Excuse, General, the liberty I have taken in expressing my views +thus freely and unsolicited. I have no other motive than a desire +for the nation's good, and a personal wish to serve where my little +command can do the most. + +"The change I suggest would of course deprive me of my department +command, but this would be a small loss to me or to the service. +The present arrangement is an unsatisfactory one at best. Nominally +I command both a department and an army in the field; but in fact +I do neither. I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient +servant, + + "J. M. Schofield, Major-General." + + LETTER TO SHERMAN + + "(Unofficial.) + "Columbia, Tenn., December 28, 1864. +"My dear General: Accept my hearty congratulations on the happy +termination of your 'pleasure excursion' through Georgia. You must +have had a merry Christmas. + +"As was predicted, you have had the fun, and we the hard work. +But altogether your plan has been a brilliant success. Hood didn't +follow _you_, . . . but he did _me_. I held him at Columbia several +days, and hurt him considerably. Finally he got across the Duck +River above, and made for Franklin via Spring Hill. I headed him +off at Spring Hill with a division, and concentrated at Franklin. +There he made the heaviest assaults I have ever seen, but was fairly +repulsed and terribly punished. In fact we pretty much knocked +all the fight out of him on that occasion, and he has shown very +little since. Now I reckon he has n't any left. + +"I barely succeeded in delaying Hood until Thomas could get A. J. +Smith and Steedman to Nashville, when he became abundantly strong, +and after getting Wilson's cavalry together moved out and gave Hood +a most thorough beating with all ease. The fact is, Hood's army +showed scarcely any fight at all. I have never seen anybody except +Jeff Thompson so easily beaten. + +"Stoneman has cleaned out Breckinridge and destroyed the salt-works +and everything else in southwest Virginia; so all together matters +are in pretty good shape in this part of the military division. + +"Thomas has given me nine new regiments, and promises three more. +These will make a pretty good division for new troops. + +"All this being true, I take it the objects for which I was left +in this part of the country have been accomplished, and I would +like very much to be with you again, to take part in the future +operations of the Grand Army. Cannot this be brought about? + +"Of course I can only conjecture what your operations will now be, +and can hardly judge of the practicability of my joining you, but +I hope I may be able to do so. I have written to General Grant on +this subject, and suggested that if I cannot reach you, I might +with propriety be sent to Virginia. I feel certain that I am no +longer needed here, for without me Thomas is much stronger than +Hood. + +"I have not talked with General Thomas on the subject, but intend +to do so as soon as I can see him.( 4) No doubt he will be opposed +to any reduction of his force, but I go for concentrating against +Lee. If we can whip him now, the rebellion will be virtually ended. + +"My corps is small, it is true, but it is 'powerful willing,' and +can help some anyhow. + +"Please present my kindest remembrances to my old comrades, and +favor me with an early reply. Yours very truly, + + "J. M. Schofield, Major-General. +"Major-General Sherman, Com'd'g, etc., Savannah, Ga." + +On my passage through Washington in January, 1865, Mr. Stanton, +the Secretary of War, confirmed the view I had taken of the situation, +and gave reasons for it before unknown to me, by telling me it was +regarded by the administration as an absolute financial necessity +that the war be ended in the campaign then about to begin. It is, +perhaps, not strange that General Thomas had not thought of this; +but it does seem remarkable that he had proposed to let a broken +and dispirited enemy have several months in which to recuperate +before annoying him any further. + +The expectation and instructions of General Grant and General +Sherman were that General Thomas should, as soon as he was ready +to take the offensive, pursue Hood into the Gulf States. General +Thomas appears to have forgotten that part of his instructions. +As soon as he had driven Hood across the river, he proposed to go +into winter quarters, and "hold the line of the Tennessee" till +some time the next spring. If General Sherman had confided to +General Thomas, as he did to General Grant, his ulterior purpose +to march from Savannah toward Richmond, for which reason he wanted +Hood kept out of his way, Thomas would have perceived the necessity +of pressing the pursuit of Hood into the Gulf States. But if Thomas +supposed, as he might naturally have done, that Sherman had only +shifted his base with a view to further operations in Georgia and +the Gulf States, under the plan of the last autumn, with which +Thomas was perfectly familiar, he may well have seen no necessity +for his pressing the pursuit beyond the Tennessee River in +midwinter. + +Some of our military operations in the Civil War remind me of the +spirit of "fair play" shown by our old doctors in the West in the +days of malarial fever. When the poison had fully developed its +power, and threatened the destruction of its victim, the good doctor +would come in and attack the enemy with heroic doses of quinine. +In a few days medical science would prevail. Then the fair-minded +physician would retire, and give the worsted malaria a chance to +recuperate and "come to time" for another attack; and so on +indefinitely until either the man or the malaria--often the man-- +finally got "knocked out." It was not until after much study and +some practice of the art of war that I conceived for myself the +idea of giving the enemy of my youth, which still clung to me, no +chance to recover after I once got him down. He has never got the +better of me since. + + THOMAS'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE WAR + +Had Thomas's plan been carried out, he would have been ready, with +a fine army splendidly equipped and supplied, to start from the +Tennessee River to invade the Gulf States, as had been done the +year before, just about the time the plans actually adopted resulted +in the surrender of all the Confederate armies. In Thomas's mind +war seems to have become the normal condition of the country. He +had apparently as yet no thought of its termination. The campaign +from the Tennessee River as a base had then become, like the "autumn +manoeuvers" of an European army, a regular operation to be commenced +at the proper time every year. In his general order of December +29, he said the enemy, "unless he is mad, must forever relinquish +all hope of bringing Tennessee again within the lines of the accursed +rebellion"; but the possible termination of that rebellion appeared +to be a contingency too remote to be taken into account in planning +future military operations. + +[( 1) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, p. 39.] + +[( 2) See Vol. XLV, part I, p. 37.] + +[( 3) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, p. 50.] + +[( 4) I did not see General Thomas after this letter was written.] + + +CHAPTER XIV +Hood's Motive in Attempting the Impossible at Nashville--Diversity +of Opinions Concerning that Battle--No Orders on Record for the +Battle of December 16--That Battle due to the Spontaneous Action +of Subordinate Commanders--Statements in the Reports of the Corps +Commanders--Explanation of the Absence of Orders--The Phraseology +of General Thomas's Report. + +The official records, Hood's statement, and Sherman's estimate, +made at the time, agree pretty closely in placing Hood's infantry +force at about 30,000 men when he crossed the Tennessee and began +his advance toward Nashville. He lost a considerable number at +Spring Hill on November 29, and over 6000, besides thirteen general +officers, at Franklin on November 30. Therefore 24,000 must be a +liberal estimate of his infantry strength after the battle of +Franklin. The infantry strength of the Fourth and Twenty-third +corps did not exceed 22,000 present for duty equipped, of which +one brigade (Cooper's) of the Twenty-third was sent by General +Thomas to guard the fords of Duck River below Columbia, and did +not rejoin the corps until after the battle of Franklin. Hence +Hood's infantry force at Columbia and Franklin was nearly one half +greater then mine. The disparity in cavalry was still greater at +first, but was reduced very considerably by the arrival of cavalry +sent from Nashville by General Thomas, especially Hammond's brigade, +which arrived in the field on the 29th, too late to assist in +holding the line of Duck River. + + HOOD'S MOTIVE AT NASHVILLE + +It follows that Hood had an opportunity to conduct operations +against an adversary of, at the most, only two thirds his own +strength in infantry and in cavalry--an opportunity such as had +never before been presented to any Confederate general. That he +thought his chance a very brilliant one is not remarkable. If he +could cut off my retreat or force me to a pitched battle, he had +full reason to hope for the most decisive results. This fact should +be given full weight in connection with the question why Hood did +not avoid intrenched positions and make a raid into Kentucky, which +he could easily have done at that time, because Thomas was not yet +ready to meet him in the open field. The moral effect of such a +raid would, of course, have been very great; but it must have proved +disastrous in the end, for the reason that Thomas would in a short +time have had in Hood's rear a far superior force to cut off his +retreat and force him to a decisive battle; whereas if Hood could +defeat and seriously cripple, if not destroy, the only organized +army in the field then opposed to him, he could afterward attend +to Thomas's scattered detachments in succession, or invade Kentucky, +as he might think expedient. As Hood was operating in the country +of his own friends, he did not lack full and accurate information +of the strength and movements of his adversary. Indeed, we were +also fully informed in due time of all of Hood's movements, but +overestimated his strength because we did not have friends residing +in his camps. + +But the defeat of Hood at Franklin, and Thomas's concentration of +troops at Nashville, completely reversed the situation. When Hood +recovered from the blow received at Franklin sufficiently to make +any further move, he found himself confronted no longer by an +inferior force, but by one of more than twice his own strength in +infantry, and not far, if at all, inferior to him in cavalry. The +artillery in the field is not specially considered in any of these +estimates, because it was ample in quantity and efficient in quality +on both sides, and need not be compared. This formidable army was +now in Hood's immediate front at Nashville, while the important +strategic points of Murfreesboro' and Chattanooga were strongly +garrisoned and fortified, and the railroads strongly guarded. It +had become too late for Hood to attempt a raid into Kentucky. +Thomas would have been close upon his rear with an army at least +twice as strong, with all the important points in Tennessee still +securely held. But successful operations against Nashville were +far less possible to Hood than an invasion of Kentucky. While no +commander could possibly think of destroying his own army by +assaulting a fortified place in which the garrison was more than +double his own strength, or indulge the hope of any valuable results +from a less than half investment of such a place, so bold a commander +as Hood might possibly attempt a raid into Kentucky, as the only +thing he could possibly do except retreat across the Tennessee +River, and thus abandon his cause as lost. It was this view of +the situation by General Grant and the authorities in Washington +that caused such intense anxiety on account of the delay of General +Thomas in attacking Hood at Nashville. It was perfectly evident +that Thomas could beat Hood whenever he chose to attack him, and +that Hood must be fully aware of that fact. Hence it was naturally +apprehended that Hood would either make a raid into Kentucky or +else retreat across the Tennessee River without suffering any +further damage. To those who were watching Hood closely at Nashville, +and especially to those who understood his character, there seemed +no ground for either apprehension. All his operations indicated +a serious attempt to besiege Nashville, though it was impossible +to imagine what he could hope to accomplish, unless it was to wait +in the most convenient place while his adversary, with all the +great resources of the country at his back, got ready to crush him. + + HOOD'S MOTIVE AT NASHVILLE + +As stated in his report, Thomas estimated Hood's strength as being +at least equal to his own, and with all the deliberation of his +nature, he insisted upon making the full preparations which he +considered essential to success not only in battle, but in pursuit +of a defeated enemy. From his point of view, Thomas was unquestionably +right in his action. How he came to make so great an overestimate +of the Confederate strength, in view of the means of information +in his possession and the estimate General Sherman had given him +before he started for Savannah, it is difficult to conjecture. +But the fact is now beyond question that Thomas made all those +elaborate preparations to attack an enemy of less than half his +own strength, under the belief that his adversary was at least +equal in strength to himself. That Hood then knew his own exact +strength is a matter of course, and that he did not underestimate +the strength of his adversary is almost equally certain. During +the two weeks in which his army lay in front of Nashville, if not +before, he must have ascertained very closely the strength of the +Union forces in his front. Hence Hood's "siege" of Nashville for +two weeks could not be regarded otherwise than as a stupendous +farce, were it not for the desperate bravery with which he thus +kept up the appearance of still fighting for a lost cause rather +than be the first to admit by his own action that it was indeed +lost. It is now well known that the feeling among the Southern +people and that of some of the highest officers of the Confederate +government made it impossible for any officer of their army to +admit in any public way the failure of the Confederacy until after +the enforced surrender of Lee's army in Virginia. Indeed, it +required much moral courage on the part of General Johnston +voluntarily to enter into a capitulation even after the capture of +Lee. + +This is unquestionably the explanation of Hood's desperate act in +waiting in front of Nashville and inviting the destruction or +capture of his army. The crushing blow he there received was like +a death-blow delivered by a giant full of strength and vigor upon +a gladiator already beaten and reduced in strength nearly to +exhaustion. Sherman was not very far wrong when he said that "the +battle of Nashville was fought at Franklin." The gladiator had +been reduced to less than one third of his former strength by a +long series of combats with a more powerful antagonist all the past +summer, and finally by his unexpected repulse at Franklin. It +required only one or two more blows from the powerful enemy at +Nashville to complete his destruction. Any estimate of the battle +of Nashville which fails to take into account the foregoing facts +must be essentially erroneous, and it is not doing any honor to +the great soldier who fought that battle to compare it with his +previous achievements when he heroically met and defeated superior +numbers of fresh and vigorous troops. + +A wide diversity of opinion has always existed among military men +in respect to the battle of Nashville, ranging all the way from +the view taken in historical accounts heretofore published to the +opinion expressed by General Sherman, in language intended of course +to be hyperbolical, namely that "the battle of Nashville was fought +at Franklin." The truth is to be found somewhere between these +two extremes. But the exact truth respecting that battle can +perhaps hardly yet be told. I will, however, state such facts of +my own knowledge and experience, and make such references to data +to be found in the voluminous records, as it seems to me may assist +the future historian, together with such comments as I deem +appropriate upon the information now available. As will be explained +hereafter, some important documents which originally formed part +of the records have disappeared therefrom. Their influence upon +historical opinion, if ever recovered, may now only be suggested. + + NO ORDERS FOR THE BATTLE OF DECEMBER 16 + +It must be observed as a very notable fact that the official records, +replete with orders and instructions issued every day, and almost +every hour, contain no record whatever of any written order or +instructions from General Thomas, given after the close of operations +on December 15, for the operations which actually took place the +next day. The only indications in the records, so far as I have +been able to discover, that any orders were given by General Thomas, +either orally or in writing, on the night of December 15, are the +following "orders of the day" for the Fourth Army Corps, issued by +General Wood after a personal interview with General Thomas that +night; the order in writing from General Thomas to General Wilson, +December 15; and the despatch from General Wilson to myself, dated +December 16, 10:10 A. M. They are as follows: + + "Headquarters Fourth Army Corps, + "Near Nashville, Tenn., December 15, 1864, 11:20 P. M. +"Orders of the day for the Fourth Army Corps for to-morrow, December +16, 1864: + +"If the enemy is in their front at daylight to-morrow morning, +division commanders will advance at that time, attack, and carry +whatever may be before them. If the enemy retreats to-night, we +will follow them. General Elliott, commanding Second Division, +will cross to the east of the Franklin pike, then move southward +parallel to it. He will deploy two regiments, connect with +skirmishers, and the rest of his division will move by flank. +General Kimball will follow, then General Beatty. The batteries +attached to each division to-day will accompany them to-morrow. +Ten ambulances and five ammunition-wagons will follow each division. + + "By the order of Brigadier-General Wood: + "J. S. Fullerton, + "Lieutenant-Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General." + + "Headquarters, Department of the Cumberland, + "Nashville, Tenn., December 15, 1864. +"Major-General J. H. Wilson, Commanding Cavalry Corps, Military +Division of the Mississippi. + +"General: I am directed by the major general commanding to say to +you that you will remain in your present position until it is +satisfactorily known whether the enemy will fight or retreat. In +case he retreats, you will move your command on the Hillsborough +pike across the Harpeth, and then take the most direct road or +roads to the Franklin pike, and endeavor to capture or destroy the +enemy's trains in their rear. + +"I have the honor to be, General, very respectfully your obedient +servant, + + "Robt. H. Ramsey, Assistant Adjutant-General." + +Both of these orders indicate a not unnatural state of doubt as to +whether the enemy would "fight or retreat." The former directs +what is to be done by the Fourth Corps in either case, while the +latter directs what shall be done in case the enemy retreats, but +says nothing about what shall be done if he does not retreat. + + "Hdqrs. Cavalry Corps, Mil. Div. of the Mississippi, + "In the Field, December 16, 1864, 10:10 A. M. +"Major-General Schofield, Commanding Twenty-third Army Corps. + +"General: The regiment sent to the Granny White pike reports it +strongly picketed toward us, with troops moving to our left. This +is probably Chalmers' division. I have heard nothing from Johnson +this morning; but, from what General Croxton reports, there is no +doubt that Chalmers crossed the Hardin pike, moving toward Brentwood. +The country on the left of the Hillsboro' pike, toward the enemy's +left, is too difficult for cavalry operations. It seems to me if +I was on the other flank of the army I might do more to annoy the +enemy, unless it is intended that I shall push out as directed last +night. + + "Very respectfully, + "J. H. Wilson, Brevet Major-General." + "(Indorsement.) +"Respectfully forwarded to Major-General Thomas. + + "J. M. Schofield, Major-General." + + NO ORDERS FOR THE BATTLE OF DECEMBER 16 + +This last, while showing that General Wilson had not received at +10:10 A. M. on the 16th any orders from General Thomas later than +that above quoted, appears to indicate that he had received some +previous order, referred to in the words "unless it is intended +that I shall push out as directed last night"; for the order above +quoted from the records did not indicate any intention that he +should "push out" unless the enemy was in retreat. + +An order in writing, as heretofore stated, was received by me very +soon after dark on the 15th. It has disappeared from the official +records, both those of General Thomas and mine. If any other orders +were issued by General Thomas, I have no personal knowledge of the +fact. + +In my judgment, whatever orders were issued by General Thomas on +the night of December 15 or in the morning of the 16th are essential +to truthful history; and I am sure they must have been more creditable +to General Thomas, though they may have been based upon erroneous +foresight of the enemy's action, which is necessarily very common +in war, than the absence from the records of any orders from him +to govern the operations of the army the next day, and the fact, +which appears from the records, that some of the troops at least +did not receive any orders from General Thomas, at any time, upon +which they could act on December 16. + +It seems at least strange that this absence of orders given in the +night of the 15th or morning of the 16th should have passed without +comment, especially in view of the very full orders issued on the +14th and in the night of the 16th. + +It will also be observed that General Thomas, in his official report +of the battle of Nashville, dated January 20, 1865, makes no mention +of any orders issued in the night of December 15 or morning of the +16th. He simply says in that regard: "The whole command bivouacked +in line of battle during the night on the ground occupied at dark, +whilst preparations were made to renew the battle at an early hour +on the morrow"; but does not say what those preparations were. +Then, after describing what had been done in the forenoon of the +16th, he says: "As soon as the above dispositions were completed, +and having visited the different commands, I gave directions that +the movement against the enemy's left flank should be continued"; +but no sub-report mentions the receipt of any such directions. +The report then proceeds to give a graphic and, I believe, nearly +accurate though brief description of what followed. + +It may also be observed that in my official report of the battle +of Nashville, dated December 31, 1864, the following appears: "In +the night of the 15th I waited upon the major-general commanding +at his headquarters, and received his orders for the pursuit of +the enemy on the following day." This report was, of course, before +General Thomas when he wrote his own, and had necessarily been read +by him and doubtless by some of his staff officers; yet no reference +was made in his report to the subject referred to in the words +above quoted from mine. These facts from the records may perhaps +be accepted as sufficient indication of the general purport of +whatever orders were issued in the night of the 15th, after the +close of that day's operations, and sufficient evidence that no +orders of a general character were given by General Thomas, either +oral or written, on the 16th until after he had "visited the +different commands." + + NO ORDERS FOR THE BATTLE OF DECEMBER 16 + +The report of General Steedman, dated January 27, 1865, says: +"December 16, at 6 A. M., in obedience to the orders of Major- +General Thomas, my command moved on the enemy's works." It is not +stated whether these orders were oral or written. No copy of them +appears in the records, nor any mention of a personal interview +with General Thomas or any of his staff. (Steedman was the man +who published a falsehood about an alleged telegram from me to +Grant about Thomas. See page 296.) + +General T. J. Wood's report, dated January 5, 1865, after describing +the operations of the morning of December 16, says: "After the +dispositions above recounted had been made, the commanding general +joined me near our most advanced position on the Franklin pike, +examined the positions of the troops, approved the same, and ordered +that the enemy should be vigorously pressed and unceasingly harassed +by our fire. He further directed that I should be constantly on +the alert for any opening for a more decisive effort, but for the +time to bide events. The general plan of the battle for the +preceding day--namely, to outflank and turn his left--was still to +be acted on. Before leaving me, the commanding general desired me +to confer with Major-General Steedman, whose command had moved out +that morning from Nashville by the Nolensville pike, and arrange +a military connection between his right and my left." This appears +from General Wood's report to have occurred a short time before +noon, and seems to have been the first information given to any of +the corps commanders of the general plan of operations for December +16. General Wood's report does not suggest that even he, who had +visited the commanding general the night before, had been given +any information about any such general plan; and that statement of +Wood's, "the general plan of the battle for the preceding day-- +namely, to outflank and turn his left--was still to be acted on," +was written many days after the battle, and then did not say that +General Thomas had at any time so ordered. + +In the report of General A. J. Smith, dated January 10, 1865, occurs +the following: "About 3 P. M. (December 10) General McArthur sent +word that he could carry the hill on his right by assault. Major- +General Thomas being present the matter was referred to him, and +I was requested to delay the movement until he could hear from +General Schofield, to whom he had sent. . . . General McArthur, +not receiving any reply, and fearing that if the attack should be +longer delayed the enemy would use the night to strengthen his +works, directed the first brigade (Colonel W. L. McMillen, 95th +Ohio Infantry, commanding) to storm the hill on which was the left +of the enemy's line," etc. This statement, which appears to be +nowhere dissented from, seems to show that very nearly the hour of +the day--not very long after 3 P. M.--when was initiated by General +McArthur the general attack which resulted in the brilliant and +final success of the day; that this initial movement was not made +in pursuance of any orders or directions from General Thomas, but, +on the contrary, during a period in which General Thomas had +requested General Smith to "delay the movement." + +General Wilson's report, dated December 21, says: "About 4:30 P. M. +the enemy, pressed in front, flank, and rear, broke in disorder. +Croxton's brigade, which had been held in reserve on the Hillsboro' +pike, as soon as the success of these dispositions had become +apparent was ordered to march rapidly across the country to the +Granny White pike, and beyond the right flank of Hammond's brigade; +but owing to the lateness of the hour and heaviness of the road +over which he was compelled to move, he secured but few prisoners." +This report also seems to be silent in respect to any order from +General Thomas. + +There was another good reason why the cavalry secured but few +prisoners at that time: There were very few left to secure behind +_that part_ of the line, the infantry having captured nearly all +of them. + + STATEMENTS IN THE REPORTS OF CORPS COMMANDERS + +My own official report, dated December 31, gave the following +account of the operations of December 16, to the accuracy of which +no exception was taken by General Thomas. The only order therein +mentioned as coming from General Thomas was that received in the +night of the 15th, "for the pursuit of the enemy on the following +day." + +"In the night of the 15th I waited upon the major-general commanding +at his headquarters, and received his orders for the pursuit of +the enemy on the following day. Our operations during the 15th +had swung the right and right center forward so that the general +direction of the line was nearly perpendicular to that before the +attack; only the right was in contact with the enemy, and was +therefore much exposed. Apprehensive that the enemy, instead of +retreating during the night, would mass and attack our right in +the morning, I requested that a division of infantry be sent to +reinforce the right, which was ordered accordingly from Major- +General Smith's command. In response to this order, General Smith +sent five regiments and a battery (about 1600 men), which were put +in reserve near the right. In the morning it was found that the +enemy still held his position in our front, of which the hill in +front of General Couch was the key, and had thrown up considerable +breastworks during the night. He had also increased the force on +his left during the night, and continued to mass troops there during +the early part of the day. During the morning, therefore, our +operations were limited to preparations for defense and co-operation +with the cavalry, which was operating to strike the Granny White +pike in rear of the enemy. About noon, the troops on my left +(Generals Smith and Wood) having advanced and come in contact with +the enemy in his new position, the enemy again withdrew from his +left a considerable force to strengthen his right and center, when +I ordered General Cox to advance in conjunction with the cavalry, +and endeavor to carry a high wooded hill beyond the flank of the +enemy's intrenched line, and overlooking the Granny White pike. +The hill was occupied by the enemy in considerable force, but was +not intrenched. My order was not executed with the promptness or +energy which I had expected, yet probably with as much as I had +reason to expect, considering the attenuated character of General +Cox's line and the great distance and rough ground over which the +attacking force had to move. The hill was, however, carried by +General Wilson's cavalry (dismounted), whose gallantry and energy +on that and other occasions which came under my observation cannot +be too greatly praised. + +"Almost simultaneously with this attack on the extreme right, the +salient hill in front of General Couch was attacked and carried by +General Smith's troops, supported by a brigade of General Couch's +division; and the fortified hill in front of General Cox, which +constituted the extreme flank of the enemy's intrenched line, was +attacked and carried by Colonel Doolittle's brigade of General +Cox's division, the latter capturing eight pieces of artillery and +200 to 300 prisoners. These several successes, gained almost +simultaneously, resulted in a complete rout of the enemy. The +cavalry had cut off his line of retreat by the Granny White pike, +and such of his troops as were not captured on the line could only +escape by climbing the Brentwood Hills. It is believed all of the +artillery along the left and center of the enemy's line fell into +our hands. Our troops continued the pursuit across the valley and +into the Brentwood Hills, when darkness compelled them to desist, +and they bivouacked for the night." + +In the histories of the battle of Nashville heretofore published, +it appears to have been assumed that the plan of battle issued to +the troops before the movement of December 15 was equally applicable +to the operations of the 16th, was so understood by the subordinate +commanders, and was the authoritative guide for their action during +the entire day of the 16th. Hence it has seemed to me necessary +to direct attention to the above extracts from the official records, +as well as to give my own personal recollections, for the benefit +of future historians. + + EXPLANATION OF THE ABSENCE OF ORDERS + +Unquestionably the _general plan_ of battle embraced in the orders +of December 14 for the attack on the 15th was well applicable to +the situation which actually existed in the morning of the 16th. +It was requisite only to direct in what manner the several corps +of the army should act in _concert_ in the _changed situation_ of +both armies, as had so clearly been done for the 15th, in the +_situation then existing_. But the detailed orders requisite for +such joint action given in the plan for the battle of the 15th, +were _absolutely inapplicable_ in most essential particulars to +the situation of the 16th, or to the battle actually fought on that +day. In view of the fact that much time had very wisely been spent +by General Thomas in remounting his cavalry and in making all other +preparations necessary to insure not only the defeat, but the +destruction or capture of the enemy, and of the further fact that +the operations of the 15th had so damaged the enemy that his retreat +that night was thought at least probable, if not certain, it hardly +seems possible that General Thomas could have been willing to +postpone a renewal of the attack until he could have time to visit +"the several commands" in person, and see for himself what the +situation actually was the next day, as if the operations he had +to determine on and order were the original plans of a battle yet +to be opened, instead of the final blow to be struck against an +enemy already substantially beaten and quite probably already in +full retreat. + +The only possible explanation of this very remarkable absence of +timely orders from General Thomas for the battle of December 16, +and of the long delay on that day, seems to be found in his well- +known constitutional habit, sometimes spoken of by his brother +officers who had long been familiarly acquainted with him. Unless +the opinions of those familiar acquaintances and friends were +substantially erroneous, General Thomas's habit of great deliberation +did not permit him to formulate in the night of December 15 the +comparatively simple orders requisite for the several corps to +_resume_, in the morning of the 16th, the movement "against the +enemy's left flank," which he says he "directed" to be "continued" +some time in _the afternoon_ of that day--so late, however, that +some of the troops, at least, becoming impatient at the long delay, +did not wait even for the orders they had asked for, but initiated +on their own responsibility the action which resulted in victory +before any directions whatever from General Thomas had reached +them. Or else, if General Thomas had clearly in his mind the +appropriate action of his several corps suggested by the condition +of the enemy _as he himself had seen it_ just before dark, or as +it might be modified during the night, he must, it would seem, have +felt so sure of Hood's retreat in the night that he did not think +it worth his while to give any orders except for pursuit. However +this may be, it seems to be clearly established by the records that +the movements which prepared the way for the final assault, and +that assault itself, were both made under the orders of subordinates, +and not in obedience to any orders or directions from General +Thomas, nor in accordance with any general plan which he had informed +them was to be the guide for their action that day. + +The battle of the 15th was fought in very close conformity to the +plan prepared, some time before the 14th, doubtless by General +Thomas himself, though spoken of by General Wood, in his confidential +letter of the 14th to Thomas, as "our plan," and modified at the +conference which was called that day upon the suggestion of Wood +in that confidential letter, and, as he said, "at the instance of +Schofield and Smith."( 1) But the battle of the 16th appears to +have been emphatically a battle of the troops themselves, acting +under the independent orders of their own subordinate commanders, +with such co-operation and support as they had arranged among +themselves, in the absence of any orders or instructions from their +common superior. + + THE PHRASEOLOGY OF GENERAL THOMAS'S REPORT + +It seems proper for me to say that I have never claimed for myself +any part of the credit due to subordinates that day (December 16). +Having failed in the night of December 15 to obtain any appropriate +orders for my action, or for the conjoint action of the corps on +my right and left, and also to obtain any such orders on the 16th, +the only orders I gave were those to support the movements on my +right and left initiated by the subordinate commanders there. For +this action General Thomas, in his report, gave the full credit +due to my troops, and, inferentially at least, more than was due +to me. I must also add, in order that there may be no misunderstanding +on the subject, that General Thomas also gave full credit to me +and to the Twenty-third Corps for the part we took in the battle +of December 15. + +The only special credit to which I have thought myself entitled in +respect to Nashville was for two incidental services which General +Thomas did not seem to think worthy even of mention. They were, +in fact, only such services as any efficient staff officer possessed +of unusual knowledge of the character and habits of the opposing +commander could have rendered to General Thomas as well as I could. +The two services referred to were the suggestion relative to the +change in the details of the plan of battle for December 15, by +which the infantry attacking force on our right was increased from +about ten thousand to nearly twenty thousand men; and the information +I gave to General Thomas, in the night of the 15th, that Hood would +not retreat without another fight, about which I had not the +slightest doubt, and which seemed to me more important than the +information I had given about the relative lengths of the several +parts of the enemy's line of defense and of his (General Thomas's) +line of attack, as proposed in his written orders. But these little +services, not worthy of mention in terms of special praise, seemed +to me worthy of record, especially the latter, since I had made a +long ride in a dark night, after having already been in the saddle +from daylight till dark, to carry the information to the commanding +general in person, and try to convince him of its correctness. + +A single word signifies sometimes much more than is imagined by +him who uses it. If General Thomas had said _resumed_ instead of +"continued," his statement of what he said he "directed" would have +corresponded very nearly with what was actually done after those +directions were given on December 16. But the continuation, at 3 +or 4 P. M. of one day, of action which had been suspended at +nightfall the preceding day, hardly accords with the rule of accuracy +which is demanded in maturely considered military reports. Indeed, +when a military movement is suspended at nightfall on account of +darkness, it is properly spoken of as _resumed_, not "continued," +even at daylight. The word "continued" was used to express what +was directed to be done at three or four o'clock in the afternoon +--"the movement against the enemy's left flank," which was not any +movement that had been going on that day and which could therefore +be continued, but the movement which, in fact, had ended the day +before in a very important success which had materially altered +the military situation under which the orders for the previous day +had been given. Hence the use of the word "continued" furnishes +food for thought. To have _resumed_, some time in the afternoon, +those operations of the preceding day would have been to state that +they had been suspended, not only during the night on account of +darkness, but during the greater part of the next day for no apparent +reason. That would have been manifestly inconsistent with the +theory that the operations of the second day were only a continuation +of those of the first, all in accordance with the plan of battle +published two days before, upon which theory the reports of General +Thomas and of some of the sub-commanders appear to have been based. +The logical conclusion of this reflection, in view of all the facts +now established by the records, seems to be that the plan of battle +for December 16 was matured and published to the army, as well as +to the world at large, some time after the event. + + THE PHRASEOLOGY OF GENERAL THOMAS'S REPORT + +It may be worthy of note that none of the officers whose reports +reveal their ignorance of that plan belonged to the Army of the +Cumberland, with which General Thomas had so long been identified. + +[( 1) War Records, Vol. XVL, part ii, p. 184.] + + +CHAPTER XV +General Thomas's Indorsement on the Report of the Battle of Franklin +--Courtesies to Him in Washington--Peculiarities of the Official +Records in Regard to Franklin and Nashville--Documents Which Have +Disappeared from the Records--Inconsistencies in General Thomas's +Report--False Representations Made to Him--Their Falsity Confirmed +by General Grant. + +After I parted from General Thomas in Tennessee, having at our last +meeting there congratulated him on his well-deserved promotion to +the highest permanent grade, that of major-general in the regular +army, I had no further official intercourse with him, and, so far +as I can recollect, did not see him until after June 1, 1868, when +I entered the War Department. During the intervening time--more +than three years--my attention had been absorbed by important +duties, including a mission to France in defense of the then violated +"Monroe doctrine," and command in Virginia during a part of the +period of "reconstruction." I had not even seen the official +reports of the campaign in Tennessee, they having been made public +while I was in Europe. + + GENERAL THOMAS'S INDORSEMENT + +Some time in 1868-9 a staff officer in the War Department brought +to my notice the indorsement made by General Thomas on my report +of the battle of Franklin, and of the preceding operations from +the time when, by his order, I assumed command of the army in the +field, as follows: + + "Headquarters, Department of the Cumberland, Nashville, Tenn., + December 7, 1864. +"Respectfully forwarded to the adjutant-general of the army, +cordially recommending the gallantry and skill of Major-General +Schofield to the commendation of the War Department. + + "Geo. H. Thomas, + "Major-General U. S. Volunteers, Commanding." + +Of course I was much gratified by this high commendation, of which +I had never before seen the text, though I had known the substance. +I was also shown the telegram from General Thomas to Secretary +Stanton recommending that I and Stanley be brevetted one grade in +the regular service for our conduct at Franklin. As I received, +a short time after that recommendation was made, the appointment +of brigadier-general in the regular service, I supposed that General +Thomas had based his recommendation for brevet upon his knowledge +or belief that I had been, or soon would be, appointed brigadier- +general. Hence I had the great satisfaction of believing that I +owed my brevet of major-general in the regular army, at least in +part, to General Thomas's recommendation. + +I cannot now recollect whether or not I saw at that time General +Thomas's report of the operations in Tennessee. If I did, there +was nothing in it to attract my special attention, as I was too +much occupied with the important affairs of the time to think or +care very much about anything that was already three years old. + +My relations with General Thomas during that time--the winter and +spring of 1868-9, when he was, by my selection, president of a very +important military court, with General Hancock and General Terry +as the other members, and General Holt as the judge-advocate--were +very cordial, at least on my part. He was my guest at a large +dinner given to the members of the President's cabinet and the +Diplomatic Corps, to which the only other gentlemen invited were +Generals Thomas and Hancock, as a special mark of distinction to +two of my brother officers in the army. When General Grant was +inaugurated President I went with General Sherman in person to ask +the President to give General Thomas command of the Division of +the Pacific, which I had before proposed for him, but which the +President had designated for me, under the impression that General +Thomas did not want it. + +A few days after that we went to our respective commands--General +Thomas to San Francisco, and I to Fort Leavenworth. From that time +we had no official or personal relations or correspondence during +the short remainder of his life. + +In respect to what was made public during that brief period, I long +since refused to believe that the superior officer whom I had always +so highly respected could possibly have been capable, in his own +mind and heart, of doing me the grievous wrong which I at one time +believed he had done. I now add, as the result of calm and +dispassionate judgment, that any criticism at that time, even under +great provocation, that could seem unkind, not to say unjust, to +that noble, patriotic, and brave soldier, from any source, not +excluding myself, was wholly unjustifiable and worthy only of +condemnation. His great services had entitled him to the kindest +possible consideration of any imperfections, either real or supposed, +in his military operations. + + PECULIARITIES OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS + +Now, in this winter of 1896-7, I have made a careful examination, +for the first time since the events, of all the published records +of the campaign of 1864 in Tennessee, for the purpose of doing +exact justice to the principal actors in that campaign, so far as +it is possible for me to do so. In this examination I have discovered +some things that have surprised me, but they have not altered my +deliberate judgment of the character of the great soldier under +whom I had the honor to serve in that campaign. I refer to them +only for the consideration of others. + +(1) In the report of General Thomas dated January 20, 1865, covering +the entire period of the campaign, including both the battles of +Franklin and Nashville, in his commendation of subordinates he made +no distinction between the corps commanders who had served immediately +under him and only in the battle of Nashville, and the army commander +who, besides the like service at Nashville, had commanded the army +in the field, in the absence therefrom of General Thomas, up to +and including the battle of Franklin, where signal victory had +prepared the way for the less difficult but brilliant success of +General Thomas at Nashville. + +(2) In the first letter from General Thomas recommending promotions +for service in the campaign, containing the names of a large number +of officers, no mention was made of my name or that of General +Stanley, who had been conspicuous for gallantry at Spring Hill and +at Franklin, where he was wounded. + +(3) In a telegram from the Secretary of War calling for recommendations +for promotion, General Thomas had been informed that while there +was no vacancy in the grade of major-general (the last having, in +fact, been given to General Thomas himself), there were then two +vacancies in that of brigadier-general; and it was after the receipt +of that information, and in view of all it might be understood to +imply, that General Thomas sent his telegram to the Secretary of +War recommending that Stanley and I be brevetted one grade in the +regular service, not, as he had said in his indorsement on my report +of the battle of Franklin, for "skill," but for "good conduct." +As General Thomas well knew, I was then only a captain in the +regular army. Hence he recommended me for the brevet of major-- +that is, of commander of a single battalion of four companies--for +my services in command of an army of thirty thousand men, including +artillery and cavalry. + +(4) The telegram from General Thomas to Secretary Stanton recommending +those brevets for Stanley and me was dated December 31, 1864, 5 P. M., +while my general report including that of the battle of Nashville +bears the same date without hour, but may have been, and probably +was, received by General Thomas before he sent his telegram +recommending my promotion. + +(5) Neither the report of General Thomas nor of any of his corps +commanders made any mention of order for "pursuit" in the morning +of December 16, and General Thomas himself in his report took no +notice whatever of the glaring discrepancy between my report and +some of the others, nor of any facts demonstrated or suggested by +the correspondence which was made a part of my report, nor made +any mention of the change in his plan of battle for December 15, +which was made the day before. + +(6) In the publication of my report in the War Records there is a +foot-note which says that the orders and correspondence referred +to are not found with the report filed in the War Department--a +fact similar to that which I had found in respect to my own retained +copies of orders and correspondence, which I understood had been +carefully locked up in a strong leather trunk ever since I left +Washington in March, 1869, but which had nevertheless mysteriously +disappeared. + +In that report of mine was a reference to the modification made in +General Thomas's published plan of battle for December 15, though +no intimation that it was made at my suggestion; also the statement +that I had, after the close of the battle of December 15, "waited +upon the commanding general and received his orders for the pursuit," +but no mention of the previous written orders to the same effect, +which had become obsolete by operation of the subsequent orders +received in person. There were attached to my report, and made a +part thereof, copies of all the orders and correspondence in my +possession relating to the battles of Franklin and Nashville, and +to the preceding operations of that campaign, including those about +the false position of the troops at Pulaski, those about the +concentration of the troops in Thomas's department, that about the +need of a pontoon bridge at Franklin, that about punishing the +telegraph-operator by whose desertion I was deprived of communication +with General Thomas during the most critical part of the campaign, +and, probably, the order in writing which I had received from +General Thomas after the battle of December 15. But of course +there were no copies of orders or despatches which I had _not_ +received; and the desertion of my telegraph-operator and the +operations of Forrest's cavalry in my rear had made it probable +that there must have been some such despatches sent but not received. +There were no annotations or other suggestions as to their significance +attached to any of those copies at that time. They were simply +included, without comment, as an essential part of the report. +The explanations found in this volume were made many years +afterward. + +In respect to the appendix to my report, I am now compelled to call +attention to the fact that it was an absolute necessity. I could +not possibly have made a truthful and rational report which would +have stood the test of a just criticism without reference to the +documents in that appendix; and it was far more respectful to +General Thomas simply to attach the documents, leaving him to make +any explanations he might think necessary, then to call attention +myself to the necessity for any such explanations. It would have +been impossible to give any rational explanation of the false +position occupied by the troops at Pulaski up to the very last +moment of safety except by reference to Thomas's orders to Stanley +and me, and the subsequent correspondence on that subject. Stanley, +with the blunt frankness justified by comradeship, had pointed it +out to me the moment we met at Pulaski, while I was governed by +the utmost delicacy in discussing the question with General Thomas, +so as to avoid suggesting to him that he had made a mistake. Yet +so evident was the mistake that I stopped the advance of the Twenty- +third Corps some miles north of Pulaski, and no part of that corps +actually went to that place. Cox was sent back to a point where +he could interpose between Hood and Columbia, and Ruger was stopped +at Columbia. + +The great tenacity with which I held on at Columbia and on the +north bank of Duck River could not have been justified except by +reference to the despatches showing Thomas's wishes and his assurance +of reinforcements at those points. If I had been free to do so, +nothing could have been plainer than my duty to have fallen back +behind the Harpeth when I found that Thomas could not or would not +reinforce me on the line of Duck River, and before Hood could +endanger my retreat. Hence I was compelled to include in the +history of that retreat the entire record of facts relating to it. + +Again, necessity was the only possible excuse for fighting the +battle of Franklin on the south side of the Harpeth, where defeat +would have been disastrous; and that necessity had arisen absolutely +and solely from the want of a bridge across that river, which I +had suggested that General Thomas place there. It was not possible +for me, without utter disregard for the truth of history as well +as for my own military reputation, to attempt to conceal those +facts. + + DOCUMENTS WHICH DISAPPEARED FROM THE RECORDS + +It must seem remarkable that in my report, dated December 7, of +operations from November 14 to December 1, 1864, including the +battle of Franklin, on which General Thomas placed his indorsement +commending my "skill," no mention whatever was made of any orders +or instructions from General Thomas. The simple fact was that I +could not have quoted the orders and instructions General Thomas +had given me for my guidance during those operations without implied +criticism of General Thomas; hence it was then thought best to omit +any reference to any such orders or instructions, and to limit the +report to a simple recital of the facts, thus making the report +strictly truthful so far as concerned my own action and that of +the troops under my command, without any reference whatever to my +superior at Nashville, under whose orders I was supposed to be +acting; and that report of December 7 appeared to be entirely +satisfactory to General Thomas in that respect as well as in all +others. But when the time came to make my final report of the +entire campaign, which must go upon the public records as my full +and exact contribution to the history of military operations in +which I had taken an important part, truth and justice to all +required me to make the records complete so far as lay in my power; +and if there was anything in the record, as submitted by me to +General Thomas, to which he took exception, it was as plainly his +duty to truth and justice to place those exceptions also on the +public records. So far from suggesting in my final report any +possible criticism of General Thomas, I put the best possible +construction upon all the despatches I had received from him, by +accepting them together as showing me that his object was "to hold +the enemy in check" until he (Thomas) could concentrate his +reinforcements, and not to fight Hood at Pulaski, as he (Thomas) +had at first ordered. I simply submitted to him the plain record, +with the best possible construction I could put upon it, and that +only so far as it was necessary for me to construe it to give the +general basis of my action. If any official duty remained to be +done in that regard, that duty devolved on General Thomas, not on +me. + +In my final report, dated December 31, 1864, I said, as above +indicated, that my instructions from the major-general commanding +were embraced in a telegram to General Stanley (dated November 8), +in which General Thomas said, "Should the enemy overpower them [the +cavalry] and march on Pulaski, you must hold that place," "a copy +of which was furnished with the order to assume command at Pulaski, +and subsequent despatches, explaining that the object was to hold +the enemy in check, should he advance, long enough to enable General +A. J. Smith's corps, then expected from Missouri, to reach Nashville, +other troops in the Department of the Cumberland to be concentrated, +and General Wilson's cavalry to be remounted and fitted for the +field. The reinforcements thus expected were about equal to the +force we then had in the field, and would make our entire force, +when concentrated, equal, or somewhat superior, to that of the +enemy. To effect this concentration was therefore of vital +importance, a consideration to which all others were secondary. +This required that the enemy's advance should be delayed as much +as possible, and at the same time a decisive battle avoided, unless +it could be fought on favorable terms." + +I refrained from quoting either of the despatches from General +Thomas,--that dated November 8 to Stanley, or that dated 19, +repeating in substance that of the 8th,--or my reply of November +20 pointing out the reasons by the position at Pulaski was a false +one to occupy under the circumstances; and I still think, as I then +thought, that that was done as delicately as possible so as to +avoid suggesting to General Thomas that I thought his order a +blunder. His reply of the same date shows that he so appreciated +it. This despatch last referred to from General Thomas, and all +the other correspondence after I reached Pulaski, fully justified +to me in the statement made in my report, above mentioned, as to +whence I derived my information of his plans. + + INCONSISTENCIES IN GENERAL THOMAS'S REPORT + +But in the report of General Thomas dated January 20, 1865, appears +the following: "Directions were then sent to General Schofield to +leave a sufficiently strong force for the defense of that point, +and with the balance of his command proceed to carry out the +instructions already given him, viz., to join the Fourth Corps at +Pulaski, and assume command of all the troops in the vicinity, +watch the movements of Hood, and retard his advance into Tennessee +as much as possible, without risking a general engagement, until +Maj.-Gen. A. J. Smith's command could arrive from Missouri, and +Maj.-Gen. J. H. Wilson could have time to remount the cavalry +regiments dismounted to furnish horses for Kilpatrick's division, +which was to accompany General Sherman in his march through Georgia. +. . . My plans and wishes were fully explained to General Schofield, +and, as subsequent events will show, properly appreciated and +executed by him." + +Thus, General Thomas, being fully satisfied with the operations of +the troops while under my immediate command in the field, asserted +that those operations were based upon his "plans and wishes," which +had been "fully explained" to me _before I went to Pulaski_, and +"properly appreciated," instead of upon what I had gathered from +General Thomas's orders to Stanley and subsequent orders to me +about fighting Hood at Pulaski, absolutely contradictory to that +stated in his report, "without risking a general engagement," and +his assent to my _radically different_ suggestions made _after I +assumed command at Pulaski_, as stated in my report. It is not +incumbent upon me to try to reconcile this statement in General +Thomas's report with the correspondence, above referred to, found +in the official records; and I see no reason for desiring any +further corroboration of the strict accuracy of the contrary +statement made by me in my report. I am entirely willing to leave +any discussion of that subject to others. + +In view of the fact that I was not one of General Thomas's corps +commanders, but an army commander, holding the same grade of command, +by special assignment of the President under the law, as General +Thomas himself, he might without military impropriety have left to +me in his report, as he had before done in fact, whether intentionally +or not, the entire responsibility of the operations of the army +under my immediate command from Pulaski to Nashville. The record +shows that, from the necessities of the case, I was compelled to +act, and did act, upon my own judgment from the beginning to the +end, not only without any timely orders, but generally without +timely or accurate information from General Thomas; and that he +approved, from time to time and finally, all that I had done. The +question as to why he afterward claimed that all had been done in +pursuance of his plans and wishes, fully explained to me _in +advance_, I must leave to others. He was certainly under no official +obligation to take upon himself any such responsibility. It may +be true, as General Sherman said and General Thomas admitted, that +it was his duty to take command in the field himself. But it was +not his duty, being in the rear, to hamper the actual army commander +in the field with embarrassing orders or instructions, nor to take +upon himself the responsibility of failure or success. If I had +failed in those hazardous operations, nobody could have held General +Thomas responsible, unless for neglect of duty in not commanding +himself in person, or in not sending me possible reinforcements. +No obedience to any erroneous orders or instructions of his, sent +from a distance whence the actual situation could not be seen as +clearly as at the front, could have justified me in case of failure. +The actual commander of an army in the field must act upon his own +judgment and responsibility, though with due deference to the plans +and wishes of his superior, so far as they are made known to him, +having in view the general object of a campaign. This sound military +principle appears to have been fully recognized by General Thomas +when he made his report. He only claimed that his "plans and wishes +were fully explained" and "properly appreciated and executed," not +that he had given any specific orders or instructions. Why, then, +did he assert, in contradiction of my statement previously made to +him, and in contradiction of the official record I had submitted +to him with that statement in my report, that those "plans and +wishes" of his had been "fully explained" to me _before_ instead +of _after_ I went to Pulaski? What possible difference could it +have made to General Thomas, personally or officially, whether the +records showed that his plans and wishes were made known to me +before or after I assumed command, provided they were received by +me in due time for my action? What possible motive could General +Thomas have had in putting on the public records what was in +substance a flat contradiction of an official statement I had made +to him with full documentary evidence to support it, and that in +the absence of any possible ground for his own contradictory +statement, except his own recollection of some conversation we may +have had more than two months before, in which he might have +explained to me his "plans and wishes"? I cannot believe that +General Thomas ever consciously did any such thing. That feature +of the report must have had some other author besides George H. +Thomas. It is true that the orders telegraphed to me by General +Thomas, November 19, "to fight him [Hood] at Pulaski, if he advances +against that place," were inconsistent with the statement in his +report that he had fully explained to me his plans and wishes as +specified in that report, and in plain disregard of the general +principle recognized in his report, as well as likely to lead to +disastrous results if obeyed. But those orders were on the records, +and could not be expunged, even if such a man as General Thomas +could possibly have wished to expunge anything from his official +record. Hence, I repeat, that feature of the report signed by +General Thomas could not have been his. + + INCONSISTENCIES IN GENERAL THOMAS'S REPORT + +In this connection it is to be observed that General Thomas had +not, at the time I went back to report to him in Tennessee, any +anxiety about his inability to cope with Hood after the arrival of +the Twenty-third Corps. He had assured General Sherman of his +entire confidence.( 1) He had ordered me to march, as Stanley had +done, from Tullahoma to Pulaski; but the action of Forrest at +Johnsonville about that time caused General Thomas to change his +orders and hurry me by rail to Nashville, and thence to Johnsonville, +with the advance of my troops, he wishing to see me in person as +I passed through Nashville.( 2) It would not be an unreasonable +presumption that the burden of conversation in that brief interview +was in respect to the alarming condition of Johnsonville at that +time, rather than in respect to some future defensive operations +against Hood, then hardly anticipated. Indeed, the entire +correspondence of that period, including that which occurred between +General Thomas and General Sherman, about which it is important to +note that I knew nothing at that time, shows that General Thomas +then expected to concentrate his troops at Columbia or Pulaski, or +both, in a very short time, take command in the field in person, +and begin aggressive operations against Hood. It seems extremely +probable that General Thomas had given very little thought at that +time to the subject of defensive action, except as against what +that troublesome cavalryman Forrest might do. It seems far more +probable from the record that General Thomas's "plans and wishes" +in respect to defensive action against Hood's advance into Tennessee, +which I had so "properly appreciated and executed," were, like the +plans of the battle of December 16 at Nashville, matured after the +event, or at least after Hood's advance into Tennessee had actually +begun, and after I had, in my telegram to General Thomas of November +20, pointed out to him the dangers of his previous plan, telegraphed +to me the day before. + +I do not think much importance is generally to be attached to what +any man may or may not recall to memory after the lapse of many +years, although the recollection of a recent event, repeated in +the memory, for good and sufficient reasons, very frequently during +a long time, may continue to be very accurate. However this may +be, perfect candor compels me to say here that I have never been +able to recall any conversation with General Thomas at any time in +respect to his plans or wishes in the event of Hood's advance from +the Tennessee before Thomas was ready to assume the offensive. I +now believe, as I always have done, that the only information I +ever received from General Thomas on that subject was that contained +in the telegraphic correspondence quoted in this volume. There is +now no doubt in my mind, and, so far as I can recall, never has +been any, that when I met General Thomas at Nashville, on my way +to Johnsonville, he expected A. J. Smith to arrive from Missouri +very soon, when he intended to concentrate all his available troops +at Columbia and Pulaski, take command in person, and move against +Hood; and that he considered his orders of November 8 to Stanley, +to fight Hood at Pulaski or Columbia, as Hood might elect, until +he (Thomas) could get there with reinforcements, all the orders +that could be necessary, even if Hood did get a little the start +of him. The records seem to show, still further, that even after +Hood's plans of aggression had developed so long in advance of +Thomas's preparations to meet him, Thomas did not then see the +great danger that might result from obedience to his orders of +November 8 to Stanley, and even went so far as to repeat those +orders to me on the 19th; but that he promptly corrected that +mistake when I pointed it out to him, and then authorized me to +act upon my own judgment. + +Now, at this late day, when I am so much older than General Thomas +was at the time of these events, I feel at liberty to discuss them +without reserve. I am not criticizing the acts of my official +superior. In my mature judgment, General Thomas was not justifiable, +in 1864-1865, in claiming the credit for what had been done by his +inferior in rank in actual command of the army in the field while +General Thomas himself was absent. + + INCONSISTENCIES IN GENERAL THOMAS'S REPORT + +So, in respect to the battle of Nashville, it would have been +utterly impossible to have given any rational explanation of the +action of my troops on December 15 under the published orders for +that battle. Hence I alluded, as lightly as possible, to the +modification in those orders which accounted for what I had done, +but gave no hint of the fact that I had suggested that modification. +I cannot now recollect whether I had any expectation at that time +in respect to what General Thomas would say on that subject in his +report; but, in my opinion, his well-known character would have +been fully justified the expectation that he would say in substance +that the foregoing plan of battle, which had been previously +prepared, was so far modified, upon the suggestion of General +Schofield and with the concurrence of other commanders, as to order +the Twenty-third Corps to a position in rear of our right, from +which it could reinforce the main attack on the enemy's left, +instead of to the reserve position on the left of the Fourth Corps. +It does not seem to me that a veteran general could have suffered +in his own estimation or in that of the world by such an act of +justice or generosity to a young subordinate. But the plain, +unavoidable truth is that General Thomas said in his report, besides +his statement about the "few alterations": "Finding General Smith +had not taken as much distance to the right as I expected he would +have done, I directed General Schofield to move his command (the +Twenty-third Corps) from the position in reserve to which it had +been assigned over to the right of General Smith . . ."--leaving +it necessarily to be inferred that "the position in reserve" referred +to was that to which it had been assigned in the published orders, +and that the Twenty-third Corps moved "over" from that position +"to the right of General Smith" after General Thomas gave directions +to that effect in the afternoon of December 15. Whereas, in fact, +that corps had moved over to the right at daylight in the morning, +so as to be ready for the action which General Thomas finally +ordered; otherwise it could not possibly have moved over to Smith's +right before dark. In fact, one of the divisions (Couch's) of the +Twenty-third Corps advanced with Smith's corps, "keeping within +supporting distance," as stated in my report, so that Couch was +able to take a very important part in the attack that day; while +Cox, though much nearer than General Thomas indicated, could not +reach the right till near the close of the day's operations, though +in time to take part in the final engagement in repelling the +enemy's attempt to regain lost ground. When it is remembered that +General Thomas was at the rear of our right, where all this could +be distinctly seen, no comment seems to be necessary on this feature +of his report. + +In respect to the statement in my report that I had in the night +of December 15 "waited upon the commanding general and received +his orders for the pursuit," that was simply a fact without which +there was possible no rational explanation of what occurred, or +did not occur, the next day. I must have taken it for granted that +General Thomas would make some frank and candid explanation of all +those matters in his own report, and I could not have imagined that +I might incur his displeasure by telling the simple truth. My +opinion of his character forbade the possibility of any supposition +that he would desire to conceal anything, even if concealment were +possible, of facts to which there were so many witnesses. Hence +my astonishment at the discovery of so much that I cannot even +attempt to explain. + +It was publicly stated, soon after the death of General Thomas, +that his mortal stroke occurred when he was trying to write something +in regard to the use made of the Twenty-third Corps in the battle +of Nashville. If he then saw, as it would seem he must have done, +the wrong into which he had been betrayed, his sudden death is +fully accounted for to the minds of all who knew his true and honest +and sensitive nature. He had been betrayed by some malign influence +into an outrage upon his own great reputation which it was not +possible to explain away, while the slight wrong he had done to +me, even if he had intended it, had already proved utterly harmless. +His own great record could not possibly suffer from my discussion +of the facts, unless those facts themselves proved damaging to him; +and he had been too much accustomed to such discussion to be +disturbed thereby. There seems no possible explanation of the +great shock General Thomas received but the discovery that he had +apparently done an irreparable injury to himself. But I do not +believe General Thomas himself was the author of those acts which +were so foreign to his nature. + + FALSE REPRESENTATIONS MADE TO GENERAL THOMAS + +At Nashville, in December, 1864, and afterward, General Thomas +appears to have been made the victim of a conspiracy to poison his +mind by false accusations against his senior subordinate. A press +report of a conversation said to have taken place in San Francisco +in the year 1869, between General Thomas and General Halleck, gave +some indication of the effect which had been produced on the mind +of General Thomas. From that time forward there appeared frequent +indications of the secret operations of that conspiracy; but no +public knowledge of its character or authors came to my knowledge +until 1881, when there appeared in the "New-York Times" of June 22 +an article, copied from the Toledo "Northern Ohio Democrat," which +disclosed the character of the false accusations which had been +made to General Thomas at Nashville, and the name of their principal, +if not sole, author. That publication gave me for the first time +the means of refuting a vile slander which had been doing its deadly +work in secret for nearly seventeen years. The following correspondence +with General Grant shows the character of that slander, and its +complete refutation: + + "London, England, July 12, 1881. +"General U. S. Grant, New York, U. S. A. + +"My dear General: For a long time I have been made aware of the +fact that a base falsehood was secretly circulated throughout the +country, to the effect that while General Thomas's army was at +Nashville in December, 1864, I endeavored in some way to influence +you or somebody in Washington to remove him from the command and +to place me in his stead. I have not heretofore been able to defend +myself against this slander because of its secrecy. But now, for +the first time within my knowledge, this falsehood has made its +appearance in public print, in the form of an article in the Toledo +"Northern Ohio Democrat," copied into the "New-York Times" of June +22, of which I send you a slip. + +"You, my dear General, are probably the only man now living who is +able to make an authoritative statement of the facts in respect to +this matter, such as must be accepted without question. + +"I hope, therefore, it is not asking too much to request you to +give me, in a form which I may use publicly, a full and explicit +statement of the facts in respect to this accusation. + +"Perhaps you may also be able to recall the substance of a conversation +between you and me, on the subject of the delay of Thomas to attack +Hood at Nashville, which occurred on the naval steamer on our way +from Hampton Roads to Cape Fear River, when we went down to see +Admiral Porter and General Terry while my troops were delayed by +the ice in the Potomac. + +"In that conversation I tried to justify Thomas's delay during the +storm at Nashville, and, I thought, perhaps succeeded in modifying +to some extent your opinion on the subject. If you are able to +recollect the substance of that conversation, a statement of it +would be an effective answer to the malicious charge that I was +not faithful to Thomas as my commanding officer. + +"Not knowing where you may be when this letter reaches the United +States, I send it to Colonel Wherry, to be sent you by mail or +handed you by one of my aides, as may be most convenient. Please +do me the great favor to send to Wherry, or the other officer who +may call upon you, an answer which he may use in public refutation +of the malicious charge which has been made against me. + +"He can then send it to me. The vipers are taking advantage of my +absence to publish falsehoods and given them a long start of the +truth which must be sent in pursuit. I am, dear General, as ever, +sincerely yours, + + "J. M. Schofield." + + THEIR FALSITY CONFIRMED BY GENERAL GRANT + + "New York, August 1, 1881. +"General J. M. Schofield. + +"Dear General: Your letter of the 12th of July has just been handed +me by Colonel Wherry of your staff. I have read it carefully, +together with the article from the Toledo "Democrat." The elapse +of time since the event spoken of in that article is so great that +I feel some hesitation in answering your letter and the article +from the "Democrat" as I might do if I had access to the archives +at Washington; but, writing from memory, I think I can say with +great positiveness there was never any despatch from you to me, or +from you to any one in Washington, disparaging General Thomas's +movements at Nashville. On the contrary, my recollection is that +when I met you on your way to Wilmington, N. C., subsequent to the +battle of Nashville, you explained the situation at Nashville prior +to General Thomas's movement against Hood, with a view of removing +the feeling that I had that Thomas had been slow. I was very +impatient at that time with what I thought was tardiness on the +part of General Thomas, and was very much afraid that while he was +lying there at Nashville and not moving his army, Hood might cross +the Tennessee River either above or below the city of Nashville, +and get between him and the Ohio River, and make a retrograde +movement of our army at Nashville a necessity, and very much +embarrass and delay future operations of the armies. Laboring +under this feeling and impression, I was telegraphing General Thomas +daily, and almost hourly, urging him to move out and attack Hood, +and finally became so impatient that I contemplated his removal +and the substitution of another officer in his place; but this +feeling on my part was not added to by any despatches from any +person from the scene of action, except those from General Thomas +himself. I have certainly no recollection of receiving any despatches +from Nashville, during the time spoken of in the article in the +"Democrat," from any person but General Thomas himself. I feel +very sure that if any despatches had been received from you, I +should now recollect it; and I am free to say that it would have +created a prejudice to your disadvantage if I had received any such +despatches. This much you are at liberty to use in any way you +may deem proper. The other reflections which the author of the +article alluded to [made] against you I of course am not called +upon to say anything in regard to. The fact is, your subsequent +promotions are proof positive that I entertained none of the views +set forth to your disadvantage in this article. Very truly yours, + + "U. S. Grant." + +The article above referred to asserted that "General Thomas knew +three days before the battle of Nashville that Schofield was playing +the part of Judas by telegraphing to General Grant, at Washington, +disparaging suggestions about the action of Thomas," and pretended +to quote the language of one of those despatches, as follows: "It +is the opinion of all our officers with whom I have conversed that +General Thomas is too tardy in moving against the enemy . . . " +It is also stated that "it was known to a number of our officers +that . . . Schofield was intriguing with Grant to get Thomas +relieved, in order that he might succeed to the command of our army +as the general next in rank to Thomas, . . . and he was watched +and exposed to Thomas." + +This boastful avowal by James B. Steedman of his own crime in making +reports which were false and slanderous to his commanding general +must doubtless be accepted as conclusive proof of his own guilt. +But a statement by such a witness cannot be regarded as proof that +any other officer was guilty of the same crime. So far as I know, +no other has ever made any avowal, public or private, of his own +guilt, or that of any one else. Nor has any other, so far as I +know, denied the truth of my statements, repeated in this volume, +of what occurred in the council held at Nashville on December 9, +1864. + +It does not seem probable that one such man as James B. Steedman +could have exerted such a powerful and baneful influence over +General George H. Thomas as that which now appears to have governed +his action. There must, it would seem, have been some others, as +Steedman asserted. If so, it is time for them, if living, to come +to the front and claim their share in the work of falsifying history, +of poisoning the mind and heart of their great and noble commander, +causing his untimely death, and endangering his great reputation +as a man of honor, truth, and justice. + + THEIR FALSITY CONDEMNED BY GENERAL GRANT + +The complete refutation by General Grant of the falsehood ended +the hostility which had been shown toward me during all that time, +and gradually led to a general recognition of the truth, which had +always been known and maintained by the most ardent friends of +General Thomas, like the late General J. S. Fullerton and General +H. V. Boynton, and the staff officers and the relatives of the +general himself. Finally, when it was proposed in Congress to +recognize my past services by promotion to the grade of lieutenant- +general on the eve of my retirement from active service, not a +voice in opposition was heard from the old Army of the Cumberland; +and when we met, for the first time in many years, by their cordial +invitation, on the historic fields of Chickamauga and Chattanooga, +to dedicate those grounds as sacred to the memory of the Army of +the Cumberland and its great commander, we met again as brother +soldiers, without any trace of the bitterness which malicious +slander had for so many years sunk deep into our hearts. + +For my part, I had for many years before refused to believe that +my old commander, whom I had so faithfully served and so highly +respected, could possibly have done me in his own mind and heart +the grievous wrong which he appeared to have done. Not long after +his death, and many years before the public refutation of the +slander which he was said to have accepted and believed, I put on +record my deliberate opinion that of General Thomas's character as +a man and a soldier his warmest eulogists had not spoken too highly. +And now, no matter what injustice General Thomas may have done me +under the malign influence which surrounded him, I refuse to alter +that deliberate judgment. He is to me in memory the same noble +old soldier and commander that he was when he intrusted to me the +command of his army in Tennessee, from Pulaski through Columbia, +Spring Hill, and Franklin to Nashville, and commended all I had +done in that command. + +Truthful military history cannot be written without some criticism. +"He who never made a mistake never made war." I am keenly sensible +of the delicacy of my personal relation to the history of General +Thomas, as well as of my obligation to contribute my share to that +history, which no other man could ever do if I neglected it. I +have written it with the greatest possible care. If I have fallen +into error in anything, there are men still living who can correct +my mistakes. It will be more just to the memory of General Thomas +to publish it now than to wait until all who could correct any +errors of mine are silent in death. Thus far none of the several +friends of General Thomas to whom I have applied have been able to +give me any explanation of the record referred to which modifies +that which I have stated. If any one can suggest a more satisfactory +explanation, he will earn my gratitude. + +[( 1) See Thomas to Sherman, November 12, 1864, 8:30 A. M.: "Your +despatch of 12 last night received. I have no fear that Beauregard +can do us any harm now; and if he attempts to follow you, I will +follow him as far as possible. If he does not follow you, I will +then thoroughly organize my troops, and I believe I shall have men +enough to ruin him unless he gets out of the way very rapidly. +The country through middle Alabama, I learn, is teeming with supplies +this year, which will be greatly to our advantage. + +"I have no additional news to report from the direction of Florence. +I am now convinced that the greater part of Beauregard's army is +near Florence and Tuscumbia, and that you will at least have a +clear road before you for several days, and that your success will +fully equal your expectations."] + +[( 2) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part iii, p. 624.] + + +CHAPTER XVI +Sherman's "March to the Sea"--The Military Theory On Which It Was +Based--Did It Involve War or Statesmanship?--The Correspondence +Between Grant and Sherman, and Sherman and Thomas--The Effect of +Jefferson Davis's Speech on Sherman--Rawlins's Reported Opposition +to the March, and Grant's Final Judgment On It. + +During the Atlanta campaign the principal commanders of the army +assumed, as a matter of course, that Atlanta would be ours in due +time, and hence there was much discussion of the question, What +next? It was evident the army could not go much farther and rely +upon its present line of supply, although General Thomas said, +immediately after the capture of Atlanta, that he had "a plan for +the capture of Macon" which he would like to execute. What the +plan was he did not divulge, General Sherman turning the conversation +in another direction. At that time it was presumed Hood would +oppose whatever move was attempted, and hence a new base, to be +provided in advance, if practicable, by the capture of some place +on the gulf or on the Atlantic, was evidently essential to further +operations in Georgia. This new base being provided, Sherman could +move out from Atlanta with twenty or thirty days' supplies in +wagons, and swing round Hood so as to place his rear toward the +new base and open communication therewith. Evidently the march to +the sea, as it was actually made, was impossible, and was not +thought of until Hood moved from Sherman's front and cleared the +way. + +In the popular judgment formed immediately after important events, +success or failure is the only criterion of wisdom; but the historian +must go deeper, and consider the merits of a general plan in view +of the greater or less probability of failure of any one of its +parts. What would have been the just judgment of mankind upon +Sherman's march to the sea if Thomas had failed, as Sherman with +a much larger force had done, to destroy or seriously cripple Hood's +army? Or what, if Hood had succeeded in his projected invasion of +Kentucky--an event much less improbable than many that have actually +occurred in war? If Hood had succeeded in overwhelming the smaller +force that opposed him at Columbia, Spring Hill, and Franklin, as +he came near doing, Nashville would have fallen an easy prey, for +it was not defensible by any force Thomas then had there. Thomas's +cavalry was not yet remounted, and Forrest, with his troopers, +would have had nearly a clear field of Kentucky while Hood marched +to the Ohio. What offset to this would have been the capture of +Savannah as a "Christmas gift" to the nation? + +The situation at that time was certainly a perplexing one to Sherman. +He could not permit Hood to put him, with his superior force, on +the defensive, nor even to appear to do so for a moment; and it +was not easy for him to consent that his enemy should entirely +nullify all his elaborately considered plans for future operations +in Georgia. What operations Sherman decided on in that unprecedented +case is well known. + + SHERMAN'S "MARCH TO THE SEA" + +When Sherman cut loose and started for Savannah on November 12, he +had not, as events proved, sufficient reason for assuming "Thomas's +strength and ability to meet Hood in the open field," or even to +hold Nashville against him, much less to hold "the line of the +Tennessee River firmly," which was the condition upon which Grant +at first consented that Sherman might make "the trip to the sea- +coast."( 1) + +Thomas's concurrence in Sherman's opinion, as shown in his despatch +of November 12, simply shows that they were both in the same error; +for A. J. Smith's troops did not begin to arrive at Nashville until +the day of the battle of Franklin (November 30), and they were a +very important part of the force relied upon in Sherman's plan. +The whole fate of the Tennessee campaign was decided by the delay +of Hood at Columbia and Spring Hill and his defeat in the desperate +battle of Franklin, and this by two of Sherman's six corps, without +the aid of any of the reinforcements upon which he counted so +largely, and about which he says so much. It is not too much to +say that the hazards of that retreat from Pulaski and of the defense +at Franklin were far greater than any portion of Sherman's army +had ever before encountered, and far greater than any army ever +ought to meet except in case of necessity--hazards which, at that +stage of the war, with our vastly superior armies in the field, it +would have been inexcusable voluntarily to incur. If it is asked +why such hazard was taken, the answer has heretofore been given. +By it alone could the time be gained which was necessary for Thomas's +reinforcements to reach Nashville. The time gained was barely +sufficient; one day less might have been fatal. + +The question that at once arises is, Why have taken even a chance +of error in a matter of so vital moment--an error that might have +led to disastrous consequences? Hood was already on the Tennessee +River, preparing to cross and begin his march to Nashville. Thomas +had ready to meet him only about two thirds Hood's strength in +infantry, and less than half in effective cavalry. A few days' +delay on Sherman's part in commencing his march would have disclosed +to him the impossibility of Smith's arrival in time, and have +enabled him to send another corps from his superabundant force to +assist Thomas. Such delay of only a few days could not have been +of serious consequence in respect to Sherman's plans. The near +approach of winter was the only reason why an early start was +important; and that was not considered any very serious obstacle +to the operations of Hood or Thomas in a more unfavorable country +for winter operations. + +The railroad was in running order to Atlanta, and the enemy's +cavalry were then known to be far from it. Sherman could have kept +his army supplied, and ready to start any day he pleased. Why not +have waited to see whether Thomas could get together troops enough +to cope with Hood, and then, when sufficient preparation had been +assured to fight the enemy, and only then, start off on a march +where there was no considerable enemy to fight? + +In the estimate of time, Sherman had no right to disregard even +Thomas's well-known "slowness of thought and action," but was bound +to take that into account. + +I have never yet been able to see the wisdom of taking any hazard +of defeat in Tennessee when we had ample force at command to secure +victory there, with enough remaining to march wherever its commander +pleased through the South, except where Hood's or Lee's army might +be. By this I mean to say that three, or even two, of Sherman's +corps could have gone to Savannah, or anywhere else, just as well +as four, and thus have left Thomas force enough to make the defeat +of Hood sure beyond contingency; or that Sherman should have delayed +his march to the sea until Thomas had concentrated troops enough +to defeat Hood. + + THE MILITARY THEORY ON WHICH IT WAS BASED + +The question which now presents itself for critical consideration +is, Upon what military theory was Sherman's "march to the sea" +based? + +Sherman himself explains it as a change of base, and he estimates +its value in comparison with that of his subsequent operations in +the ratio of one to ten. But why those subsequent operations, or +a change of base with a view to any such ulterior purpose? Grant +had not at that time even suggested the need of Sherman's aid +against Lee, and events proved that no such need existed. When +Sherman started for Savannah from Atlanta, the Confederate force +in the Gulf States was quite equal to Lee's army in Virginia, while +Grant's army was larger than Sherman's. Could Sherman have +contemplated at that time such a thing as going to Grant's assistance, +where he was not needed, and leaving Hood's army behind him? + +A change of base to Savannah or Mobile had been contemplated as a +probable necessity of future operations in Georgia or in the Gulf +States, upon the capture of Atlanta; but that of course upon the +supposition that there would still be a formidable army of the +Confederacy in those States against which operations were to be +conducted. When that Confederate army, under Hood, marched toward +the west, with the evident intention to carry the war into Tennessee +and Kentucky, why a change of base by Sherman in the opposite +direction, to Savannah? + +Sherman appears to have supposed at first that Hood would follow +him when he started on his march through Georgia, as Hood had +supposed that Sherman would follow him into Tennessee. Was there +any more reason for the one supposition than the other? Ought not +Sherman as well as Hood to have known his antagonist better than +such a supposition would imply? Was it not extremely unreasonable +to suppose that Hood, after he had marched hundreds of miles west +from Atlanta and reached the base of his projected operations in +Tennessee, would turn back and follow Sherman at such a distance +in his rear? It is perfectly evident that such a stern-chase by +Hood was contemplated only as a bare possibility, not by any means +as a probable result of Sherman's march. It could have had no +influence in forming Sherman's final determination to make that +march. In fact, the march does not appear to have been finally +decided on--certainly it was not commenced--until Hood had gone so +far in the opposite direction as to make his pursuit of Sherman +out of the question, and had fully disclosed his plan to invade +Tennessee. It was surely, therefore, an extraordinary spectacle +to see the main Union army marching where there was no considerable +hostile force to meet it, leaving a comparatively small detachment +to cope with the formidable enemy! + +Of course Sherman could not fall back into Tennessee, and thus let +Hood put him on the defensive, even for a short time. He could +afford only to send back a detachment large enough to enable Thomas, +with the other forces he could assemble, to hold Nashville and +prevent Hood from crossing the Cumberland. This is virtually but +little more than what Sherman did in that regard. + + THE MILITARY THEORY ON WHICH IT WAS BASED + +There then remained to Sherman practically only one line of action +at all consistent with the dictates of established principles in +the conduct of a military campaign: That was to strike with his +superior remaining force for Hood's rear, south of the Tennessee +River. Such a movement could have been commenced immediately upon +Hood's march in that direction. Supplies would have been drawn, +first from Chattanooga, and afterward from Stevenson, and then from +Decatur, Sherman's line of supply being thus very much shortened. +A small detachment at Atlanta could have destroyed the works of +military value in that place, and the railroad thence back to +Chattanooga, being completely covered in this work by Sherman's +army, without delaying its march a single day. Sherman could thus +have easily struck Hood south of the Tennessee before the latter +could have made his preparations for crossing that river. Indeed, +with Sherman marching in that direction, even so bold a man as Hood +could hardly have been so reckless as to have crossed the Tennessee; +and if he had, his destruction must have been sure. Hence the +least result would have been simply to transfer the theater of +operations from Georgia to Alabama, or perhaps to Mississippi, and +greatly to shorten Sherman's line of supply. And what possible +difference could it make in which part of the revolted States the +theater of war might be, so long as the Confederate army, to destroy +which was the only important object of a campaign, was there? To +avoid a transfer of the battlefield from Georgia to Alabama or +Mississippi, was it wise to run the risk of transferring it to +Kentucky or Ohio? Perhaps no movement which could have been +contemplated by the Confederate authorities would have been more +greatly to Sherman's advantage over Hood than the one they adopted. + +I cannot better show my own exact impression at the time respecting +the operations of Sherman and Hood in 1864, than by an illustration +that will be at once appreciated on every farm in America. When +two fighting-cocks meet for the first time, battle is joined without +delay, and is prosecuted with all possible vigor and skill. If +the result is decisive the victor's triumph is loudly proclaimed, +while the defeated combatant, with lowered crest, seeks safety in +flight. If, on the contrary, the result is a drawn battle, the +two antagonists, as if by common consent, slowly separate, carrying +their heads high, and sharply watching each other. When distance +has assured the close of that contest, they severally go to feeding, +as if nothing unusual had happened, or else march off to seek some +less formidable foe. Neither utters a note of defiance until he +is well beyond the other's reach. + +The correspondence between Grant and Sherman, especially the letters +from Grant of September 12, and from Sherman of September 20, both +carried by Grant's staff officer, Colonel Horace Porter, show a +complete understanding of the situation at that time, and perfect +accord in respect to the operations appropriate to that situation.( 2) +Savannah was to be captured, if practicable, by military and naval +forces from the east, and Sherman was so to manoeuver in respect +to Hood's army as to swing round the latter and thus place himself +in position to open communication with Savannah as his new base. +This was the simple, logical plan dictated by the situation, which +had for a long time been considered and worked out after weighing +all the advantages and disadvantages of other possible plans. + +But very soon after Sherman despatched his letter of September 20 +by Colonel Porter, Hood commenced his movement to Sherman's rear, +and then far to the west, which was designed to and did radically +change the military situation in view of which the carefully matured +plan described in Sherman's letter of September 20 had been formed. +Sherman, as clearly appears from his despatches later than September +20, considered long and apparently with great doubt what change +ought to be made in his own plans in consequence of the altered +situation due to the unexpected movements of his enterprising +adversary. That some very important change in Sherman's plans was +imperative was a matter of course. A general cannot well make his +own plans entirely upon his own theory as to what his enemy will +or ought to do, but must be governed in some measure by what the +other actually does. General Sherman evidently perceived quite +clearly what established rules of action required to be done, and +General Grant even more clearly, as was shown in his despatches of +October 11, 1864, and others. + + THE MILITARY THEORY ON WHICH IT WAS BASED + +It seems hardly possible to speak seriously of many of the reasons +given by Sherman for finally deciding to leave his old adversary +to the care of Thomas's inferior force. He said, for instance, in +his despatch to Grant of November 2: "If I could hope to overhaul +Hood, I would turn against him with my whole force. . . . No single +army can catch him."( 3) Sherman had been "catching" Hood with a +single army all summer, and without the slightest difficulty. What +reason had he to conclude that it would be impossible to do so +later? As my experience proved, it was as easy to "catch" him in +November, though with a smaller force, as it had been in July and +August with a much larger force, and Thomas had the same experience +in December. As Sherman knew from his own experience, as well as +I, whether the pursuing force was larger or smaller, Hood was about +the easiest man in the world to "catch," even by a "single" army. +But Sherman had under his command at that time, in Georgia and +Tennessee, as he said with great emphasis and confidence, two +armies, each larger than Hood's, even assuming the largest estimate +then made of the strength of Hood's army. It appears that Sherman +gave Hood credit at that time for only thirty thousand infantry, +besides cavalry.( 4) If that was his estimate, then he had at +least three or four armies (including the reinforcements he counted +on for Thomas in Tennessee), each equal in strength to Hood's. Is +it possible Sherman thought he could not catch Hood with three or +four armies? But another despatch from Sherman, dated November 2, +seems to show that his estimate of Hood's army was more than 50,000, +instead of 30,000; for in that despatch he said in substance that +unless he drew Slocum's corps back from Atlanta, and abandoned that +place, his army would be inferior to Hood's.( 5) Now Slocum's +corps numbered 10,000 men, and Sherman marched to the sea with +60,000 after stripping down to the best possible fighting condition. +Hence Sherman, after sending back the Fourth and Twenty-third corps +to Thomas, and leaving out Slocum's corps, had 50,000 men, and +therefore according to this reckoning Hood had _more_ than 50,000. +Forty thousand would have been a reasonable estimate for Sherman +to have made of Hood's strength, with his more accurate knowledge +than any of his subordinate commanders could have. But, somehow, +the estimate of Hood's force at that time accepted by Thomas and +his subordinates in Tennessee was 45,000, besides cavalry, which +as understood to be 10,000, or even 12,000 including Forrest's +separate command. But even this was less than half of Sherman's +two armies. + +Sherman made no attempt to "catch" Hood during his raid in Sherman's +rear in September, 1864, nor to interfere with his movement to the +west. In his "Memoirs,"( 6) Sherman says: "At first I thought of +interposing my whole army in the Chattooga Valley, so as to prevent +Hood's escape south. . . . He would be likely to retreat eastward +by Spring Place, which I did not want him to do." Even thus early +in the game Sherman saw the opportunity Hood was probably going to +give him to make his projected change of base to Savannah, and +hence he took care not to prevent Hood from completing his "co- +operative" movement. + +Sherman determined to destroy Atlanta and his railroad back to +Chattanooga, abandon entirely his former base of operations and +line of supply, and assume a new base of future operations on the +Atlantic or the gulf. In other words, Sherman decided that he +could not attempt to hold any part of the territory he had conquered +in the Atlanta campaign; that conquest was valuable only in the +opportunity it gave him to destroy everything of military importance +in that territory--that is, Atlanta and the railroads. The question +then arises, What possible difference could it make in which +direction he moved after having decided not to hold any part of +that territory, but to destroy it? Why would a move toward the +west any more than a move toward the east have the appearance of +losing all that had been gained, after he had destroyed it? The +simple fact is, the Confederate commander had abandoned Georgia to +its fate in the vain hope of putting Sherman on the defensive, not +realizing, apparently, that Sherman had ample force for defensive +purposes, besides an army superior to Hood's for aggressive +operations. The Southern army was thus placed where Sherman could +operate against it by a much shorter line, and hence with a much +larger force, if that was what he wished to do. He could at the +same time, if he thought it necessary or desirable, inflict upon +Georgia the destruction which the Confederate commander wanted to +prevent, but had in fact invited by abandoning that State, and that +without materially impairing the strength of his (Sherman's) main +army operating against the main force of the enemy. As suggested +by Grant, a cavalry raid through Georgia would have accomplished +that destruction as well as a march of 60,000 men. Hence, in the +light of all that appears in the records up to the time when Sherman +actually started on his march, no valid military reason had been +given why Sherman should not have sent a cavalry raid into Georgia, +as Grant suggested, to destroy everything there, and thus negative +Mr. Davis's promise of protection, while he (Sherman) pursued +relentlessly the strictly military plan Grant had prescribed for +him to break up Hood's army or capture it, which Sherman had yet +failed to accomplish. + +Manifestly some other motive besides the motives stated in Sherman's +telegraphic despatches must have decided him to carry out his plan +to make the march to the sea. + +The boastful assurance and threat of the Confederate commander-in- +chief,( 7) referred to by Sherman, gave at least some reason for +Sherman's defiant response by himself marching through Georgia +instead of sending a subordinate; and the partial execution of that +threat by Forrest's cavalry, referred to in Sherman's despatch of +November 1 to Grant, gave a strong reason for Sherman's eager +determination to march at once, without waiting for anything but +his own preparations. In his article, "The Grand Strategy of the +Last Year of the War,"( 8) Sherman reveals one of the reasons for +his haste in starting on his march. "How free and glorious I felt," +he says, "when the magic telegraph was cut, which prevented the +possibility of orders of any kind from the rear coming to delay or +hinder us!" A letter written by Sherman to Grant, November 6, on +the eve of his start for the sea, also gave reasons, other than +military, for his famous march. In Sherman's "Memoirs" no quotation +is made from this letter,( 9) and it is referred to very briefly +without giving any suggestion of its important contents. + +General Sherman thus stated his reasons for writing that letter: +"I have heretofore telegraphed and written you pretty fully, but +I still have some thoughts in my busy brain that should be confided +to you as a key to future developments." + + DID IT INVOLVE WAR OR STATESMANSHIP? + +Then Sherman explained, with the art of which he was master, clearly, +logically, and convincingly, the reasons for the operations of his +army from the fall of Atlanta down to the time of his writing, by +which he had completely defeated his adversary's designs, closing +with the following language: + +"Now, as to the second branch of my proposition, I admit that the +first object should be the destruction of that army; and if Beauregard +moves his infantry and artillery up into that pocket about Jackson +and Paris, I will feel strongly tempted to move Thomas directly +against him, and myself move rapidly by Decatur and Purdy to cut +off his retreat. . . . These are the reasons which have determined +my former movements." + +General Sherman then continues by explaining the reasons which +induced him not to carry out the movement above suggested. + +Now come the reasons for the future movements upon which Sherman +had then fully decided, after having obtained General Grant's +consent, and which he was about to begin. After stating what he +had done "in the last ten days" to prepare for his march, he said: + +"Then the question presents itself what shall be done? On the +supposition always that Thomas can hold the line of the Tennessee, +and very shortly be able to assume the offensive as against +Beauregard, I propose to act in such a manner against the material +resources of the South as utterly to negative Davis's boasted threat +and promises of protection. If we can march a well-appointed army +right through his territory, it is a demonstration to the world, +foreign and domestic, that we have a power which Davis cannot +resist. This may not be war, but rather statesmanship; nevertheless +it is overwhelming to my mind that there are thousands of people +abroad and in the South who will reason thus: If the North can +march an army right through the South, it is proof positive that +the North can prevail in this contest, leaving only open the question +of its willingness to use that power." + +It was, perhaps, not _war_, but rather _statesmanship_ upon which +Sherman was about to enter--not to defeat and destroy or capture +the Confederate armies, but to demonstrate in the most positive +manner that the "North can prevail in this contest," provided only +it is willing to use its power. And by what means was this +demonstration to be made? By marching a large army through the +South where there was and could be no Confederate army able to +oppose it, destroying everything of military value, including food, +and continuing this operation until the government and people of +the Southern States, and people abroad, should find the demonstration +convincing. Again I quote: + +"Now, Mr. Lincoln's election, which is assured, coupled with the +conclusion thus reached, makes a complete, logical whole. Even +without a battle, the result, operating upon the minds of sensible +men, would produce fruits more than compensating for the expense, +trouble, and risk." + +The election of Mr. Lincoln meant, of course, continued ascendancy +of the "war party" at the North, and that, coupled with the conclusion +above reached, made, as Sherman so forcibly stated it, "a complete, +logical whole." + +General Sherman then went on to give in his masterly way the +advantages and disadvantages of the several objectives open to him +as the goal of his march, reserving to himself finally the choice +between three,--Savannah, Mobile, and Pensacola,--trusting to +Richmond papers to keep Grant well advised of his movements and of +his final choice of the objective; and then, near the close of this +letter, in discussing the military aspects of his proposed march, +upon which he was about entering, he reverted to the old theory of +the line of the Tennessee--"on the supposition always that Thomas +can hold the line of the Tennessee, and very shortly be able to +assume the offensive as against Beauregard." + + DID IT INVOLVE WAR OR STATESMANSHIP? + +It is impossible not to admire the thoroughness with which Sherman +had considered all possible or even imaginary difficulties in his +way, nor to suppress a smile at the supreme confidence with which +he set out, with sixty thousand of the best soldiers in the world, +upon a march through a fine healthy country laden with abundance +of supplies for men and animals, at a time when only two armies in +the South were strong enough to offer him any serious opposition, +both of them farther from his line of march than he was from his +goal when he started, one besieged by Grant in Petersburg, and the +other already commencing an aggressive campaign against Thomas in +Tennessee! It is equally impossible to speak seriously of the +apprehension of some geographers and logisticians that Hood would +interfere in some way with Sherman's march through Georgia. Hood +could not have got within two hundred miles of Sherman before the +latter had destroyed as much of Georgia as he wished, and then +captured Savannah. Of course Sherman was not disturbed by any +apprehension that Hood might possibly oppose the march to Savannah. +He could have meant by what he said in his despatches on the subject +only that Hood would be compelled by "public clamor" to return to +Georgia to defend that State against Sherman's _further_ operations. +Hence his strong insistence that Thomas pursue Hood with energy, +and thus keep him out of his (Sherman's) way. + +It had never occurred to me, if the fact ever existed, that the +rebellion could not be suppressed by crushing or capturing the +Confederate armies, or that our vastly superior military strength +must necessarily be employed in crushing the Southern people, +however much they might deserve crushing, or else that we must give +up the contest. Yet while I never saw the necessity for what +Sherman called "statesmanship" rather than "war," I would never +have hesitated for a moment to say, what I now repeat, if it really +was necessary, in order to put down the rebellion and restore the +Union, to destroy all the property in the South, in the name of a +just and beneficent God, destroy it all! Hence my objection to +Sherman's plans was based upon my conviction that such plans were +not at that time, and never had been, necessary. Yet such plans +are legitimate and often necessary, and no man is wise enough to +tell in advance whether they may prove to be necessary or not. +The surest way to reach results is the way Sherman adopted. In +either a civil or foreign war, such methods may be very bad policy; +but very few men are cool-headed enough in civil war, even if wise +enough, to see what good policy dictates, and this is even more +true of men at a distance than of those at the front. Men who have +been fighting most of the time for three or four years generally +become pretty cool, while those in the rear seem to become hotter +and hotter as the end approaches, and even for some time after it +is reached. They must in some way work off the surplus passion +which the soldier has already exhausted in battle. Whatever may +be true as to Sherman's methods before Lee surrendered, the +destruction inflicted on the South after that time was solely the +work of passion, and not of reason. Of this last Sherman was +innocent. + +Sherman's destruction of military supplies and railroads did +undoubtedly render impossible any great prolongation of the war, +if that would otherwise have been possible; but it did not materially +hasten the actual collapse of the rebellion, which was due to +Grant's capture of Lee's army. Besides, if Grant had not captured +Lee, Sherman would. Lee could not possibly have escaped them both. +Hence Sherman's destruction of property in Georgia, South Carolina, +and North Carolina did not hasten the end of the rebellion. If +General Sherman was, at the time he planned his march to the sea, +informed of the nearly bankrupt condition of the United States +treasury, that fact went far toward justifying his action in leaving +as small a force as possible with Thomas, and even in starting on +his march before Thomas was fully ready to meet Hood. For to make +his demonstration early enough and as convincing as possible to +the people of the South and all the world, it was important to move +at once, and to show that his march was not a mere rapid _raid_, +but a deliberate march of a formidable army capable of crushing +anything that might get in its way, and that without waiting for +anything that might occur in its rear. Such a march of such an +army might well have been sufficient to convince everybody that +the United States had the military power to crush the rebellion, +and even destroy everything in the South, before the world should +find out that the resources of the government had been exhausted, +and that the United States had not the financial strength necessary +to make any further military use of the million of men they then +had on the muster- and pay-rolls. To have given the still more +convincing proof of the power of the Union, by destroying one of +the Confederate armies, would have taken a longer time. + + CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GRANT AND SHERMAN + +The following despatches fully show Sherman's first plan, assented +to by Grant, the essential feature of which was that Thomas should +be able to "hold the line of the Tennessee firmly," and the +corresponding information and instructions to Thomas: + + "Sherman to Grant + "Cartersville, Ga., October 10, 1864, 12 M. +". . . Hood is now crossing the Coosa, twelve miles below Rome, +bound west. If he passes over to the Mobile and Ohio road, had I +not better execute the plan of my letter sent by Colonel Porter, +and leave General Thomas with the troops now in Tennessee to defend +the State? He will have an ample force when the reinforcements +ordered reach Nashville." + + "Grant to Sherman + "City Point, Va., October 11, 1864, 11 A. M. +"Your despatch received. Does it not look as if Hood was going to +attempt the invasion of middle Tennessee? . . . If he does this, +he ought to be met and prevented from getting north of the Tennessee +River. If you were to cut loose, I do not believe you would meet +Hood's army. . . . Hood would probably strike for Nashville, thinking +by going north he could inflict greater damage upon us than we +could upon the rebels by going south. If there is any way of +getting at Hood's army, I would prefer that, but I must trust to +your own judgment. I find I shall not be able to send a force from +here to act with you on Savannah. Your movements, therefore, will +be independent of mine, at least until the fall of Richmond takes +place. I am afraid Thomas, with such lines of road as he has to +protect, could not prevent Hood going north. With Wilson turned +loose with all your cavalry, you will find the rebels put much more +on the defensive than heretofore." + + "Sherman to Grant. + "October 11, 1864, 10 A. M. +"Hood moved his army from Palmetto Station across by Dallas and +Cedartown, and is now on the Coosa River, south of Rome. He threw +one corps on my road at Acworth, and I was forced to follow. I +hold Atlanta with the Twentieth Corps, and have strong detachments +along my line. These reduce my active force to a comparatively +small army. We cannot remain now on the defensive. With 25,000 +men, and the bold cavalry he has, he can constantly break my road. +I would infinitely prefer to make a wreck of the road and of the +country from Chattanooga to Atlanta, including the latter city, +send back all my wounded and worthless, and, with my effective +army, move through Georgia, smashing things to the sea. Hood may +turn into Tennessee and Kentucky, but I believe he will be forced +to follow me. Instead of being on the defensive, I would be on +the offensive; instead of guessing at what he means to do, he would +have to guess at my plans. The difference in war is full 25 per +cent. I can make Savannah, Charleston, or the mouth of the +Chattahoochee. Answer quick, as I know we will not have the +telegraph long."(10) + + "Grant to Sherman. + "October 11, 1864, 11:30 P. M. +"Your despatch of to-day received. If you are satisfied the trip +to the sea-coast can be made, holding the line of the Tennessee +firmly, you may make it, destroying all the railroad south of Dalton +or Chattanooga, as you think best." + + + CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN SHERMAN AND THOMAS + + "Sherman to Thomas. + "October 20, 1864. +". . . I want all things bent to the following general plan of +action for the next three months. Out of the forces now here and +at Atlanta I propose to organize an efficient army of from 60,000 +to 65,000 men, with which I propose to destroy Macon, Augusta, and, +it may be, Savannah and Charleston, but I will always keep open +the alternatives of the mouth of Appalachicola and Mobile. By this +I propose to demonstrate the vulnerability of the South, and make +its inhabitants feel that war and individual ruin are synonymous +terms. To pursue Hood is folly, for he can twist and turn like a +fox and wear out any army in pursuit. To continue to occupy long +lines of railroads simply exposes our small detachments to be picked +up in detail, and forces me to make countermarches to protect lines +of communication. I know I am right in this, and shall proceed to +its maturity. As to detail, I propose to take General Howard and +his army, General Schofield and his, and two of your corps, viz., +Generals Davis and Slocum. . . . I will send General Stanley, with +the Fourth Corps, across by Will's Valley and Caperton's to Stevenson +to report to you. . . . I want you to retain command in Tennessee, +and before starting I will give you delegated authority over +Kentucky, Mississippi, Alabama, etc., whereby there will be unity +of action behind me. I will want you to hold Chattanooga and +Decatur in force, and on the occasion of my departure, of which +you shall have ample notice, to watch Hood close. I think he will +follow me, at least with his cavalry, in which event I want you to +push south from Decatur and the head of the Tennessee for Columbus, +Miss., and Selma, not absolutely to reach those points, but to +divert or pursue according to the state of facts. If, however, +Hood turns on you, you must act defensively on the line of the +Tennessee. . . . I do not fear that the Southern army will again +make a lodgment on the Mississippi. . . . The only hope of a Southern +success is in the remote regions difficult of access. We have now +a good entering wedge, and should drive it home. . . ." + + "Sherman to Grant. + "Gaylesville, Ala., October 22, 1864. +"I feel perfectly master of the situation here. I still hold +Atlanta and the road, with all bridges and vital points well guarded, +and I have in hand an army before which Hood has retreated +precipitately down the valley of the Coosa. It is hard to divine +his future plans; but by abandoning Georgia, and taking position +with his rear to Selma, he threatens the road from Chattanooga to +Atlanta, and may move to Tennessee by Decatur. He cannot cross +the Tennessee except at Muscle Shoals, for all other points are +patrolled by our gunboats. I am now perfecting arrangements to +put into Tennessee a force able to hold the line of the Tennessee +whilst I break up the railroad in front of Dalton, including the +city of Atlanta, and push into Georgia, and break up all its +railroads and depots, capture its horses and negroes, make desolation +everywhere, destroy the factories at Macon, Milledgeville, and +Augusta, and bring up with 60,000 men on the sea-shore about Savannah +or Charleston. I think this far better than defending a long line +of railroad. I will leave General George H. Thomas to command all +my division behind me, and take with me only the best fighting +material." + + CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GRANT AND SHERMAN + +But a few days later Sherman had made a radical change in his +previous plan. He telegraphed Grant, from Rome, Georgia, November +1, as follows: + +"As you foresaw, and as Jeff. Davis threatened, the enemy is now +in the full tide of execution of his grand plan to destroy my +communications and defeat this army. His infantry, about 30,000, +with Wheeler's and Roddey's cavalry, from 7000 to 10,000, are now +in the neighborhood of Tuscumbia and Florence, and, the water being +low, is able to cross at will. Forrest seems to be scattered from +Eastport to Jackson, Paris, and the lower Tennessee; and General +Thomas reports the capture by him of a gunboat and five transports. +General Thomas has near Athens and Pulaski Stanley's corps, about +15,000 strong, and Schofield's corps, 10,000, en route by rail, +and has at least 20,000 to 25,000 men, with new regiments and +conscripts arriving all the time; also Rosecrans promises the two +divisions of Smith and Mower, belonging to me, but I doubt if they +can reach Tennessee in less than ten days. If I were to let go +Atlanta and north Georgia and make for Hood, he would, as he did +here, retreat to the southwest, leaving his militia, now assembling +at Macon and Griffin, to occupy our conquests, and the work of last +summer would be lost. I have retained about 50,000 good troops, +and have sent back full 25,000; and having instructed General Thomas +to hold defensively Nashville, Chattanooga, and Decatur, all strongly +fortified and provisioned for a long siege, I will destroy all the +railroads of Georgia and do as much substantial damage as is +possible, reaching the sea-coast near one of the points hitherto +indicated, trusting that General Thomas, with his present troops +and the influx of new troops promised, will be able in a very few +days to assume the offensive. Hood's cavalry may do a good deal +of damage, and I have sent Wilson back with all dismounted cavalry, +retaining only about 4500. This is the best I can do, and shall, +therefore, when I get to Atlanta the necessary stores, move as soon +as possible." + +To that despatch General Grant replied, November 2: + +"Your despatch of 9 A. M. yesterday is just received. I despatched +you the same date, advising that Hood's army, now that it had worked +so far north, be looked upon more as the objective. With the force, +however, you have left with Thomas, he must be able to take care +of Hood and destroy him. I do not really see that you can withdraw +from where you are to follow Hood without giving up all we have +gained in territory. I say, then, go as you propose." + +Thus Grant gave his assent to Sherman's proposition that Nashville, +Chattanooga, and Decatur be held defensively, even during a long +siege if necessary, instead of the line of the Tennessee, as at +first insisted on by General Grant. Yet Grant's assent was given +in view of Sherman's trust that Thomas would be able _in a very +few days_ to assume the offensive. + +Sherman's despatch to Thomas of the same date (November 1) instructed +him as to the policy then determined on, in lieu of that which had +contemplated holding the line of the Tennessee firmly, as follows: + +"Despatch of last night received. The fact that Forrest is down +about Johnsonville, while Hood, with his infantry, is still about +Florence and Tuscumbia, gives you time for concentration. The +supplies about Chattanooga are immense, and I will soon be independent +of them; therefore I would not risk supplies coming in transitu +from Nashville to Chattanooga. In like manner, we have large +supplies in Nashville, and if they be well guarded, and Hood can't +get our supplies, he can't stay in Tennessee long. General Schofield +will go to you as rapidly as cars can take him. I have no doubt, +after the emergency is past, and the enemy has done us considerable +damage, reinforcements will pour to you more than can be provided +for or taken care of. In the meantime do your best. I will leave +here to-morrow for Kingston, and keep things moving toward the +south; therefore hold fast all new troops coming to you, excepting +such as are now at Chattanooga, to whom I will give orders." + +Yet in his letter to Grant, five days later, Sherman reverts to +the original plan: "On the supposition, always, that Thomas can +hold the line of the Tennessee." + +November 7, Sherman telegraphed Grant: ". . . On that day [November +10] or the following, if affairs should remain as now in Tennessee, +I propose to begin the movement which I have hitherto fully described +. . ." To which despatch General Grant replied: ". . . I see no +present reason for changing your plan. . . ." + +General Grant does not refer to the later despatches in his general +report, July 22, 1865, quoted in his "Memoirs," but uses the +following language: + +"With the troops thus left at his disposal, there was little doubt +that General Thomas could hold the line of the Tennessee, or, in +the event Hood should force it, would be able to concentrate and +beat him in battle. It was therefore readily consented to that +Sherman should start for the sea-coast." + + CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GRANT AND SHERMAN + +General Sherman also omits to make any reference in his "Memoirs" +to the despatches respecting a possible long siege of Nashville, +Chattanooga, and Decatur; but he says in a despatch of November 2 +to Grant, quoted in his "Memoirs": + +"If I turn back, the whole effect of my campaign will be lost. By +my movements I have thrown Beauregard [Hood] well to the west, and +Thomas will have ample time and sufficient troops to hold him until +the reinforcements from Missouri reach him. We have now ample +supplies at Chattanooga and Atlanta, and can stand a month's +interruption to our communications. I do not believe the Confederate +army can reach our railroad lines except by cavalry raids, and +Wilson will have cavalry enough to checkmate them. I am clearly +of opinion that the best results will follow my contemplated movement +through Georgia." + +The following language is found in a despatch dated November 11, +midnight, from Sherman to Thomas, which is especially important as +giving the last expression of his views of the situation, and of +what Thomas would be able to do after Sherman started for the sea: + +"I can hardly believe that Beauregard would attempt to work against +Nashville from Corinth as a base at this stage of the war, but all +information seems to point that way. If he does, you will whip +him out of his boots; but I rather think you will find commotion +in his camp in a day or two. Last night we burned Rome, and in +two or more days will burn Atlanta; and he must discover that I am +not retreating, but, on the contrary, fighting for the very heart +of Georgia. . . . These [some Confederate movements about Rome and +Atlanta] also seem to indicate that Beauregard expects me to retreat. +. . . To-morrow I begin the movement laid down in my Special Field +Orders, No. 115, and shall keep things moving thereafter. . . . By +using detachments of recruits and dismounted cavalry in your +fortifications, you will have Generals Schofield and Stanley and +General A. J. Smith, strengthened by eight or ten new regiments +and all of Wilson's cavalry. You could safely invite Beauregard +across the Tennessee River and prevent his ever returning. I still +believe, however, that public clamor will force him to turn and +follow me, in which event you should cross at Decatur and move +directly toward Selma as far as you can transport supplies. . . . +You may act . . . on the certainty that I sally from Atlanta on +the 16th instant with about 60,000 well provisioned, but expecting +to live chiefly on the country." + +The reason for this sudden and radical change of program is made +perfectly clear by Sherman's despatch of November 1 and others: +"The enemy is now in the full tide of execution of his grand plan +to destroy my communications and defeat this army." Sherman's +defiant spirit, thus aroused, brooked no delay. He would not wait +for anything but his own necessary preparations. Nashville, +Chattanooga, and Decatur could stand a long siege, and these alone +he regarded as of strategic importance. The enemy would doubtless +do "considerable damage," but afterward "reinforcements will pour +to you" (Thomas). He convinced himself that Thomas had troops +enough; but, "to make things sure," he might "call on the governors +of Indiana and Kentucky for some militia"! In the meantime, he +(Sherman) would "destroy all the railroads in Georgia and do as +much substantial damage as is possible." Thus recklessly challenged +by the Confederate chief, Sherman must not only accept that challenge, +but do it at once. Perhaps if Jefferson Davis had known William +T. Sherman as well as some of us did, he would not have uttered +that challenge. + + RAWLINS'S REPORTED OPPOSITION TO THE MARCH + +From Grant's "Memoirs"(11) it appears that General Grant not only +confirms Sherman's claim in respect to his independent authorship +of the plan, but says he (General Grant) was in favor of that plan +from the time it was first submitted to him, and credits his chief +of staff, General Rawlins, with having been "very bitterly opposed +to it," and with having appealed to the authorities at Washington +to stop it. + +This recollection of General Grant, after the lapse of so long a +time, and when he was suffering almost beyond endurance from a +fatal disease, may possibly, it seems to me, not express the views +he entertained in October, 1864, quite so fully or accurately as +his despatch of October 11, 1864, 11 A. M., to General Sherman, +heretofore quoted. + +That despatch was a literal prediction of what Hood actually did. +It was dictated by a clear military foresight, whether of Grant or +Rawlins. How far world-wide approval of Sherman's plans after +their brilliant success may have obscured the past can only be +conjectured. As distinctly stated by Grant himself soon afterward, +he clearly saw that somebody ought to be criticized; but, in view +of the results, he decided to let it pass. + +However all this may be, even my respect for the opinions of the +greatest of Union soldiers cannot alter the conclusion I have +reached after many years of study and mature consideration. I can +only say that the opinion ascribed to General Rawlins, as opposed +to General Grant's, was in my judgment the better of the two; and +that General Rawlins, though he had not the advantage of an early +military education, was a man of great natural ability, and had +learned much from more than three years' experience in war, after +which the differences in military judgment which had existed at +the beginning must have very largely, if not entirely, disappeared. +General Rawlins was my immediate successor in the War Department, +and would, I doubt not, have made a great reputation there if his +life had been prolonged. + +I believe Grant's own sound military judgment dictated his first +answer to Sherman, dissenting from the proposition to begin the +march to the sea before Hood's army was disposed of, or that result +assured. His great confidence in the genius of his brilliant +subordinate, and in Sherman's judgment that he had given Thomas +ample means to take care of Hood, no matter what that bold and +reckless adversary might do, dictated Grant's final assent to +Sherman's project. Their correspondence shows this so clearly and +fully that there would seem to be no need of my making any special +reference to it. I do so only because of the statement in General +Grant's "Memoirs." Very possibly General Grant may have meant, in +his "Memoirs," only that he approved the general project, under +the condition that sufficient force would be left "to take care of +Hood and destroy him," not caring to say anything about the +fulfillment or nonfulfillment of that condition. + +From about October 1 till the time Sherman started on his march-- +six weeks--he seems to have been so intent on the execution of that +project, and upon doing it with as large an army as possible, that +no question of military principle or of fact could be permitted to +stand in his way. He assumed and maintained throughout that the +only question was whether he should continue the aggressive, or +allow the enemy's movements to put him on the defensive, refusing +to consider any other possible plan of aggressive operations, except +for a moment in response to advice from Grant, and then brushing +it aside as impracticable.--"If I could hope to overhaul Hood," +etc. In like manner, he appears to have convinced himself that +his arrangements for direct operations against Hood by Thomas in +Tennessee were very materially more complete than they were in +fact, and he so represented the matter to General Grant. It seems +quite certain that Grant was laboring under a serious misapprehension +in respect to Thomas's condition to cope with Hood, and no doubt +Grant's subsequent impatience in respect to Thomas's action was +largely due to this fact. This point deserves close consideration. + + GRANT'S FINAL JUDGMENT ON IT + +Grant's first assent to Sherman's plan was made, October 11, on +the condition of "holding the line of the Tennessee firmly." On +October 22 Sherman telegraphed: "I am now perfecting arrangements +to put into Tennessee a force able to hold the line of the +Tennessee." + +Even as late as November 1, Grant again suggested to Sherman that +Hood ought to be his "objective," now that he "has gone so far +north." At an earlier hour the same day, in the despatch above +quoted, Sherman telegraphed, "trusting that General Thomas . . . +will be able in a very few days to assume the offensive." To this +Grant replied November 2: "With the force, however, you have left +with Thomas, he must be able to take care of Hood and destroy him." +In that despatch of November 1 Sherman had made a statement of the +troops Thomas would have, including A. J. Smith's from Missouri, +adding, "but I doubt if they can reach Tennessee in less than ten +days." Now Smith's troops did not reach Tennessee in less than +_thirty_ days instead of ten days, and after the crisis of the +campaign was passed; and the effective force in Tennessee before +Smith's arrival was 13,000 men less than Sherman had stated it. +So that the whole brunt of the fight with Hood fell upon the two +corps which Sherman had sent back, without any help from the +reinforcements upon which Sherman counted so largely. It was, in +fact, _six weeks_ instead of a "very few days" before Thomas was +able "to assume the offensive." It was not attempted to "hold the +line of the Tennessee" either "firmly" or at all. + +Having been absent from the army in the field during Hood's raid +in Sherman's rear, I knew little personally about those estimates +of the strength of the opposing forces. For the same reason, I +knew nothing of Sherman's plans or correspondence with Grant which +were considered or took place after the fall of Atlanta, though I +had been perfectly familiar with the plans discussed previous to +that time having in view a change of base to some point on the +Atlantic or on the gulf, with a view to further operations in +Georgia or the Gulf States, wherever there might be a hostile army +to operate against. Yet when I met Sherman at Gaylesburg I was +surprised to learn that he was going off to the sea with five sixths +of his army, leaving Thomas, with only one of his six corps, and +no other veteran troops then ready for field service, to take care +of Hood until he could get A. J. Smith from Missouri, incorporate +new regiments into the army and make them fit to meet the veteran +enemy, remount his cavalry, and concentrate his garrisons and +railroad guards in Tennessee! Of course I knew far less than +Sherman did about all that, for I had no responsibility and little +knowledge about Thomas's department. But I knew enough to feel +astonished when Sherman told me what he proposed to do. I plainly +told Sherman so, and urged him to send me back with my corps to +join Stanley and help Thomas.(12) + +Here arise several interesting questions which would be worthy of +consideration, although a satisfactory solution of them might not +be possible. Under Sherman's assurance as to what he had done for +Thomas in Tennessee, Grant appears to have been fully satisfied +that Thomas would be able to take care of Hood and destroy him, +thus eliminating that Confederate army from the future problem in +the Atlantic States. But could Sherman, with his more exact +knowledge of what he actually had done, have felt the same confidence? +In view of that knowledge and of the results of his own previous +operations against Hood, could he have expected any such result? +Is it not more probable that Sherman simply expected to take +advantage of Hood's temporary absence from Georgia to make his own +change of base to Savannah? Did Sherman not, in fact, really expect +Hood to follow him, even though at so great a distance, and be +prepared to resist his future operations from Savannah? Sherman +repeatedly said, in his despatches before he started, that he +believed Hood would follow him, being compelled to do so by public +clamor. What was Sherman's plan when he started for Savannah? +Was it simply to effect a change of base, or was it for well-defined +ulterior purposes? When did Sherman mature his plan to march to +Virginia, and when did that plan first dawn upon Sherman's mind? +In this connection, what significance is to be attached to the +dates of events in Tennessee, especially the battles of Franklin +and Nashville? + + GRANT'S FINAL JUDGMENT OF IT + +By the first mails which reached Sherman after he arrived on the +coast, December 14 and 15, containing letters from Grant dated +December 3 and 6, full information was received of the battle of +Franklin, which had occurred November 30. Thomas's official report +of the battle of Nashville was received by Sherman on December 24, +but rumors of that victory had reached him earlier. Sherman's +first letter to Grant, relative to future operations, written in +reply to those from Grant of December 3 and 6, was dated December +16. In that letter was mentioned Sherman's plan in the following +words: "Indeed, with my present command I had expected, upon +reducing Savannah, instantly to march to Columbia, South Carolina, +thence to Raleigh, and thence to report to you." Sherman's second +letter to Grant, on the same subject, written in reply to Grant's +letter of the 18th, was dated December 24, the day on which he +received Thomas's report of the battle of Nashville. In this letter +Sherman said: "I am also gratified that you have modified your +former orders. . . . I feel no doubt whatever as to our future +plans. I have thought them over so long and well that they appear +as clear as daylight." + +When Sherman first mentioned his future plan he knew that the +success of his past plan in Tennessee had been assured. Thomas +had succeeded in concentrating his forces at Nashville, and Hood +had suffered a severe defeat in attempting to prevent it. At the +time of Sherman's second letter, mentioning his very mature +consideration of his future plans and perfect confidence in respect +to them, he knew that Hood's army had been broken up, and had become +a small factor in the future problem. How long, and to what extent, +had Sherman anticipated these results in Tennessee, and matured +the plans of future operations, which were dependent upon those +results? I shall consider these several questions, which involve +so intimately the character of my old commander. + +[( 1) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part iii, p. 202.] + +[( 2) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part ii, pp. 364, 411.] + +[( 3) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part iii, p. 594.] + +[( 4) _ibid_., p. 576.] + +[( 5) _Ibid_., p. 594.] + +[( 6) Vol. II, p. 154.] + +[( 7) Mr. Jefferson Davis's speech. See General Sherman's "Memoirs," +Vol. II, p. 141.] + +[( 8) See the Century War Book, "Battles and Leaders of the Civil +War," Vol. IV, p. 257.] + +[( 9) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part iii, p. 658.] + +[(10) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part iii, p. 202.] + +[(11) Vol. II, pp. 374-6.] + +[(12) See my letter to General Sherman, December 28, 1864, p. 254.] + + +CHAPTER XVII +Sherman's Purpose in Marching to the Sea--His Expectations that +the Change of Base Would Be "Statesmanship," If Not "War"--The +Thousand-Mile March of Hood's Men to Surrender to Sherman--The +Credit Given by Grant to Sherman--"Master of the Situation"--The +Fame of Sherman's Grand Marches--His Great Ability as a Strategist. + +The actual result in Tennessee was more decisive than Sherman had +any good reason to expect. But he had good reason to expect, and +evidently did, that Thomas would be able, after he had concentrated +his troops, and after Hood had done considerable damage, to drive +the latter out of Tennessee and pursue him with such force and +energy as fully to occupy his attention and prevent him from +interfering in any manner with Sherman's own operations. Hence +Sherman as well as Grant had reason to assume that Hood's army +would be eliminated from the military problem in the Atlantic +States. Again, the general military situation as known to General +Sherman, or probably to anybody else, in October and November, +1864, did not indicate that Grant, with the force he then had in +Virginia, would be able to capture or destroy Lee's army. He might +undoubtedly capture Petersburg and Richmond, but Lee would probably +be able to withdraw his army toward the south, nearer to his sources +of supply, and by skilful manoeuvers prolong the contest until the +National Government might abandon it. Grant's letters at that time +confirm this view of the military situation. + +Some writers have attempted to explain and justify Sherman's action +in taking with him so large an army, while leaving Thomas one so +much smaller, on the ground that he might meet in his march to the +sea such opposition as possibly to require so large a force to +overcome it. But to any one familiar with the facts, and to no +one more than to Sherman, his army of 60,000 men was evidently all +out of proportion to any possible resistance it could meet in +Georgia. But when he should start northward from Savannah the case +would become vastly different. At any point in the Carolinas he +might possibly meet the whole of Lee's army. That is to say, +Sherman's ulterior plan could not be prudently undertaken at all +without an army as large as that with which he actually marched to +the sea, namely, 60,000 men. Indeed, as the records show, Sherman +considered a long time before he decided that he could spare the +Twenty-third Corps to go back and help Thomas. If any question +can possibly exist as to what was the essential part of Sherman's +plan in marching to Savannah, what other possible military reason +can be given for that march except to make the subsequent march to +Virginia with so large an army? Why change his base to Savannah? +What was he to operate against after he got there? + +Nothing could have been clearer to any military mind in the fall +of 1864, than that if either Lee's or Hood's army could be captured +or destroyed, the surrender of the other must necessarily follow +very quickly, and the rebellion be ended. No man could have been +more earnest than Sherman in his laudable desire to make the capture +of his own adversary the beginning of the end. Sherman's well- +known character leaves this beyond question. It is not possible +that he could have preferred a manifestation of the power of the +nation by destroying Southern property rather than by destroying +a Southern army. + + SHERMAN'S PURPOSE IN MARCHING TO THE SEA + +But there was one objection--absolutely overruling, apparently, in +Sherman's mind--to any further attempt by Sherman himself, with +the main body of his army then in Georgia, to prosecute the primary +military object of his campaign--the destruction or capture of +Hood's army. To have done so would have conceded a temporary +triumph to the chief of the Confederate armies, who had loudly +proclaimed his purpose to drive Sherman out of Georgia, and protect +that State from any further invasion. Such a concession, however +temporary, was manifestly intolerable to Sherman's mind.( 1) +Besides, Sherman had formed and announced, with Grant's cordial +concurrence, a well-matured plan of future operations. As "master +of the situation," he could afford to go on and substantially +execute that plan, or at least the primary part of it,--the change +of base,--treating almost with contempt the enemy's bold design to +thwart him. Although this must, at least for the time being, compel +him personally to forego and leave to a subordinate the primary +operations of a military campaign,--those directly against the +opposing army,--the joint action of Sherman and Grant, each with +a powerful army, directly against Lee's army in Virginia, was the +surest and probably the shortest possible way to end the war. +Hence Sherman's broad view of the entire national military situation, +including the moral aspect of it, which was then of very great +importance, gave rise to that grand conception of far-reaching +strategy which must ever stamp its author as a master of that great +art. + +Sherman having thus come to the conclusion that he personally must +abandon the attempt to "catch Hood," as he called it, his "busy +brain" did not fail to perceive every possible alternative plan of +operations. The abandonment of Georgia by Hood had completely +opened up two other alternatives, one of which was before not +possible, and the other only partly so. The one was a movement +upon Richmond or its communications to join with Grant in the +capture of Lee's army, and the other was to destroy the military +resources of the Southern Atlantic States. The first was too grand, +and perhaps might seem too visionary, to be talked about at first, +nor was any mention of it at that time necessary. Besides, events +might possibly render the march to Richmond unnecessary or +impracticable; or, possibly, Sherman might be compelled for some +reason to make his new base at Pensacola or Mobile, though he was +determined to make it at Savannah, if possible; and hence it was +necessary to have, in reserve as it were, a sufficient logical +reason for the preliminary operation, if that finally had to stand +alone. + +Again, that part of the original plan which contemplated the capture +of Savannah in advance could not be carried out. Grant could not +spare the troops from the east for that purpose. If that had been +done, Sherman could have marched to Augusta, there replenished his +supplies by the river from Savannah, and marched thence northward +by the upland route instead of through the swamps of South Carolina. +But, as it was, Sherman was, as he thought, compelled to go to +Savannah first, capture that place himself, and make that the base +for his northward march. Hence there was no need to say anything +to anybody about what further was to be done until after Savannah +was in Sherman's possession, and the time had arrived for him to +consult Grant about the future. Yet in Sherman's remarkable letter +to Grant, dated November 6, 1864,( 2) written after it was too late +to have any influence upon Grant's approval of Sherman's march, he +disclosed to Grant the ulterior object he had in view. In discussing +the reasons for selecting the route to Savannah rather than either +of the others, he said: "Incidentally I might destroy the enemy's +depots at Macon and Augusta, and reach the sea-shore at Charleston +or Savannah, from either of which points I could reinforce our +armies in Virginia." + + SHERMAN'S PURPOSE IN MARCHING TO THE SEA + +Of course Grant, no less than Sherman, must have perceived instantly +the full significance of Sherman's change of base to Savannah the +moment that move was suggested. The question in what manner that +concerted action between Grant and Sherman against Lee should be +arranged could well be considered later, after that march had been +made and a new base established at Savannah. The correspondence +between Grant and Sherman previous to Hood's march to the west, +including the letters of September 12 and 20, simply shows that +neither had at that time conceived the possibility of any movement +of Sherman toward Virginia. All their thoughts had reference to +continuing operations in the south, Sherman's most important object +being to get control of the Savannah River; or, as expressed, in +his last words: "If you can whip Lee, and I can march to the +Atlantic, I think Uncle Abe will give us a twenty days' leave of +absence to see the young folks." Their joint action against Lee +does not appear to have been suggested by either until Sherman's +letter of November 6, which was probably received by Grant after +Sherman started. + +The first thought suggested to Sherman by Hood's movement "leaving +open the road to Macon, as also to Augusta," as embodied in his +despatch to Halleck on September 25, related simply to the opportunity +thus offered to carry into effect without difficulty the original +plan of a change of base to Savannah. But when Hood's movement +had gone so far, and his designs were so fully disclosed, as +practically to eliminate his army from the problem in the Atlantic +States, Sherman determined to march as soon as possible, with the +ulterior purpose to "reinforce our armies in Virginia." He +telegraphed his determination to Grant on November 1, and on November +6 wrote him very fully, giving his reasons, including that to +reinforce Grant. Hence Sherman was well able to say at Savannah +on December 24: "I feel no doubt whatever as to our future plans. +I have thought them over so long and well that they appear clear +as daylight." + +It should be observed that Sherman's letter of November 6 to Grant +was strictly confidential. "I have still some thoughts . . . that +should be confided to you [that is, to Grant and to nobody else] +as a key to future developments." Neither Grant nor Sherman appears +to have made any use of that "key" for the public benefit. But it +now unlocks the store-house of Sherman's mind, and shows to the +world more of the real character of the great strategist than any +other public document he ever wrote. + +Then Grant was ready with his plan, first to seize and hold the +Southern railroads by which supplies could reach Lee, and second, +for Sherman and the most of his army to come to Virginia by sea, +to which Sherman responded with all the loyalty of his most loyal +nature, only mentioning incidentally his own plan. Thereupon, when +Grant gave him an invitation to speak freely, he replied as above +quoted, and explained in detail his plans for the northward march, +to "be on the Roanoke, either at Raleigh or Weldon, by the time +the spring fairly opens; and if you feel confident that you can +whip Lee outside of his intrenchments, I feel equally confident +that I can handle him in the open country." + +But Sherman's "busy brain" had provided in advance even for the +worst possible contingency--that after all his long march, however +long it might prove to be, that march might have to "stand alone" +--he might not actually take part in the capture of either of the +Confederate armies. Hence, before starting on his march, in his +letter of November 6 to Grant he explained that his march would be +"statesmanship" anyway, even if it was not "war." Sherman was not +a man to be "left out," no matter what might happen. + + SHERMAN'S PURPOSE IN MARCHING TO THE SEA + +But Sherman's good fortune was almost equal to his strategy and +his skill in marching an army. Although, as fate would have it, +he did not have a chance to assist in the capture of Lee, Thomas +had failed to obey his instructions to pursue Hood into the Gulf +states, whereby the fragments of that "broken and dispirited" army, +as Thomas well called it, were gathered together, under their old, +able commander, General Johnston, and appeared in Sherman's front +to oppose his northward march, and finally to capitulate to him at +"Bennett's House" in North Carolina. The remnant of that army +which Sherman had disdained to pursue into Alabama or Mississippi +had traveled a thousand miles to surrender to him! No story of +fiction could be more romantic than that fact of real war history. + +It was not necessary for Sherman to produce his letter of November +6, 1864; but I have quoted from it here very largely to show that +there was no possible contingency which his far-reaching mind had +not foreseen and provided for. + +Sherman's plan was so firmly fixed in his own mind, almost from +the very start, that he was determined to adhere to it in spite of +all possible opposition, even including the adverse opinions and +advice of General Grant. Hence, as was his habit in such cases, +he invented every imaginable reason, without regard to their logical +or illogical character, to convince others of the soundness of his +conclusion. But the logic of the real reasons which convinced his +own mind is, when the chaff is all winnowed away, as clear and +bright as the golden grain. + +In view of the great strategical project which Sherman had mapped +out for himself and which required a formidable army, and of his +responsibility for what might be the result of operations against +Hood in Tennessee, it was a difficult and delicate question to +decide what force he should take with him, and what send back. My +own belief always has been, and is now, that in view of his exact +knowledge of Thomas's character and habits of thought and action, +Sherman ought to have sent back another corps of veteran troops, +or else have waited to see that Thomas was actually prepared to +cope with Hood, preferably the latter, before going so far away +that he could not render him any assistance. Yet, as has heretofore +been shown, if Thomas had carried out Sherman's instructions by +promptly concentrating his troops, there would have been no risk +of serious results in Tennessee. + +In connection with Sherman's operations it is essential to bear in +mind the distinction between two radically different kinds of +strategy, one of which has for its object the conquest of territory +or the capture of places by defeating in battle or out-manoeuvering +the defending armies; while the other has for its object the +destruction or capture of those armies, resulting, of course, in +the conquest of all the enemy's territory. The first kind may be +all-sufficient, and hence best, in a foreign war having for its +object anything less than total conquest; but in the suppression +of a rebellion, as in a foreign conquest, the occupation of places +or territory ought to be entirely ignored except so far as this +contributes to the successful operation of armies against opposing +forces. This fundamental principle appears to have been duly +appreciated by the leading Union commanders near the close of the +Civil War, though not so fully in its earlier stages. Military +critics are apt to fall into error by not understanding the principle +itself, or by overlooking the change of policy above referred to. + + SHERMAN'S PURPOSE IN MARCHING TO THE SEA + +It is necessary not to confound the "march to the sea" as actually +conceived and executed by Sherman as a preliminary to the march +northward for the capture of Lee's army, with the previous far- +reaching strategic plans of Grant, of which Sherman and other chief +commanders were informed in the spring of 1864. + +Grant's plans had in view, as their great object, again to cut in +two the Confederate territory, as had been done by the opening of +the Mississippi River to the gulf. This next line of section might +be Chattanooga, Atlanta, and Savannah, or Chattanooga, Atlanta, +Montgomery, and Mobile. But with the disappearance of Hood's army +from that theater of operations, all reason for that plan of +"territorial" strategy had disappeared, and the occasion was then +presented, for the first time, for the wholly different strategical +plan of Sherman, of which Lee's army was the sole military objective. +Grant was perfectly just to himself as well as to Sherman in giving +the latter full credit for this last plan; and he modestly refrained +from any more than a brief mention of his own plans, which unforseen +events had made it unnecessary fully to execute. But history will +do justice to Grant's great strategical designs as well as to his +great achievements. I trust it may be my good fortune to contribute +something hereafter toward the payment of this debt of gratitude +which all Americans owe to the greatest soldier of the Union. + +The fact that Savannah was one of the points in both Grant's plans +and Sherman's was merely an incident, and a very unimportant one. +Indeed, after Hood got out of his way, Sherman might as well, and +I think better, have marched direct to Augusta, and thence northward, +wholly ignoring Savannah as well as Charleston, except that he +would have arrived in Virginia rather early in the season. Savannah +was a good place to go in order to spend the winter, besides +destroying Georgia en route. + +Of course it is much easier to see what might have been done than +to see in advance what can or ought to be done. But it can hardly +be believed that Sherman did not think of everything that was +possible, as well as many things that were not. At least, so simple +a proposition as the following could not have escaped his mind. + +Sherman was, as he so confidently said, absolute "master of the +situation" before he started for Savannah. Hood and Forrest had +utterly failed so to damage his communications that they could not +be put in order again in a few days. He was able, if he chose, to +remain in perfect security at Atlanta all winter, with two or three +corps, while he sent back to Thomas ample force to dispose of Hood. +Then, if the result of the operations of a larger force in Tennessee +had been as decisive as they actually were with the smaller one +Thomas had, Sherman could have recalled to Atlanta all of the troops +he had sent to Tennessee, and thus marched toward Virginia with +eighty-five or ninety or even one hundred thousand men, instead of +sixty thousand. All this could have surely been accomplished by +the middle of January, or before the time when Sherman actually +began his march from Savannah. From Atlanta to Columbia, South +Carolina, crossing the Savannah River above Augusta, is an easier +march than that from Savannah to Columbia. Or if Sherman had not +cared about paying a visit to Columbia en route, he could have +taken the much shorter "Piedmont route" to Charlotte, North Carolina, +and thence northward by whichever route he pleased. Instead of +retaining the dominant attitude of "master," Sherman lost it the +moment he started eastward with his main army, leaving an inferior +force to cope with his enemy; and the march through Georgia and +the capture of Savannah did not by any means restore that mastery +to Sherman. It was not restored until Hood was actually defeated +in Tennessee. + + THE FAME OF SHERMAN'S GRAND MARCHES + +I have referred to the possibilities of a direct march from Atlanta +via Columbia or Charlotte, with a much larger army, at exactly the +same time, for the purpose of showing that even Sherman's grand +strategic plan to assist in the capture of Lee's army did not +necessitate or justify his action in marching to Savannah and +quitting his own theater of operations before his adversary there +had been disposed of. The plan above suggested would have negatived +even more positively the boast and promise of the Confederate chief +that Sherman should be driven out of Georgia. The fact that Sherman +personally, with an army about as large as, or larger than, Hood's, +could and did remain quietly at Atlanta while one of his subordinates +disposed of Hood and his army, would have been the most emphatic +possible defeat of the Confederate plan to force him back by +operations in his rear. Only one part of Sherman's earnest desires +would have been unrealized--namely, to destroy Georgia. But even +that could have been, at least in a great measure, compensated for +by the more complete destruction of South Carolina, the cradle of +secession and rebellion. + +The more carefully Sherman's great operations are examined, the +more clearly it will appear that while his plans were magnificent, +their execution was not perfect. And this is the legitimate aim +of just military criticism, not to build up or pull down the +reputations of commanders, but to assist military students in their +efforts to perfect themselves in the art and science of war. + +Sherman's great marches, especially through the enemy's country +and over such obstacles as those found from Savannah to Goldsboro', +showed him to be a master of the auxiliary art of logistics no less +than of the great science of strategy. Even to those who have had +no means of duly appreciating the higher merits of Sherman's general +plans, his marches have seemed the wonder of the world. Yet, +strangely enough, the march through Georgia, which was in fact the +simplest thing possible, has been regarded as the great exploit, +while the vastly more difficult and important march through the +Carolinas appears to have been taken as a matter of course, perhaps +because of the conviction, which had by that time become general, +that Sherman could do anything he might undertake. + +In respect to Sherman's skill in grand tactics, I have only a few +words to say here. The part assigned him in Grant's general plan +of operations for all the armies, in 1864, in his "private and +confidential" letter of April 6, was as follows: "You I propose +to move against Johnston's army to break it up, and to get into +the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting +all the damage you can against their war resources." It is a +simple, plain matter of history that Sherman did not accomplish +the first and more important part of the task assigned him--"to +break it up"--in the four months of almost constant fighting with +Johnston's army. In the comments I have made upon the Atlanta +campaign, I believe I have shown clearly why Sherman did not +accomplish that result by the tactical operations to which he +limited himself. The manner in which that army, then under Hood +instead of Johnston, was finally broken up by Sherman's subordinates +in Tennessee, shows clearly enough what kind of modification of +Sherman's tactical methods was requisite to enable him to reach +the same result in Georgia. + + SHERMAN'S GREAT ABILITY AS A STRATEGIST + +Sherman's tactical operations during the entire Atlanta campaign +were marked by the highest degree of prudence and caution. Even +his one assault upon fortified lines at Kenesaw was no exception; +for the worst that could happen in that was what actually did +happen, namely, a fruitless loss of a considerable number of men, +yet a number quite insignificant in comparison with the total +strength of his army. Johnston displayed similar qualities in an +equal degree so long as he was in command; and his well-known +ability may have suggested to Sherman the wisdom of like prudence +in all his own operations. But Hood signalized his accession to +the command by the boldest kind of tactics, amounting even to +rashness in the commander of a force so inferior to that of his +adversary. Yet Sherman continued his own cautious methods to the +end. Even his last move, which resulted in the capture of Atlanta, +--the only one which had even the general appearance of boldness, +--was, in fact, marked by the greatest prudence throughout. The +Twentieth Corps occupied a strongly fortified bridge-head at the +Chattahoochee River, and the Twenty-third Corps another equally +strongly fortified "pivot" around which the grand wheel of the army +was made. That moving army was much larger than Hood's entire +force, and had all the advantage of the initiative, which completely +disconcerted the opposing commander, and caused him to commit a +blunder that ought to have proved fatal, namely, that of dividing +his inferior force and permitting his superior opponent to occupy +a position between the widely separated wings of his own army. +Yet Sherman refused to take any advantage of that blunder, and sat +still while Hood leisurely reunited his divided forces. + +Even if such extreme caution in handling a superior force against +such an antagonist as Johnston could be regarded as wise, it surely +could not against such an antagonist as Hood, whose character of +extreme audacity in the aggressive should have assured his destruction +by a more skilful adversary in command of a superior force. But +Sherman's own knowledge of his own impulsive nature made him unduly +distrustful of his own judgment when under great responsibility in +emergencies, and this in spite of his unusual intellectual activity +and his great confidence in his deliberately matured judgment. +This is the opinion of Sherman's character formed by me after the +closest possible observation and study. For this reason Sherman's +capacity as a tactician was not by any means equal to his ability +as a strategist. He lacked the element of confident boldness or +audacity in action which is necessary to gain the greatest results +by taking advantage of his adversary's blunders, and by tempting +or forcing his adversary into positions of which he might take +advantage. Yet Sherman was very far from lacking skill as a +tactician. Both he and Johnston might well be likened to masters +of the sword so skilful and so equally matched that neither could +give any material advantage over the other. In my opinion, their +duel of ten weeks' duration was never surpassed in the history of +the world for the masterly skill and execution with which the one +pressed the other back step by step, and the other disputed every +foot of the ground, neither giving nor attempting to make an +opportunity to strike a decisive blow. If the object of that +campaign was to capture Atlanta on the one side, and to defend it +on the other, the handling of those two splendid armies was simply +magnificent. It would be a great pity that an end was put to that +duel by the removal of Johnston, and the military world thus deprived +of a complete lesson, except for the fact that, whether or not the +contest finally resulted in the fall of Atlanta, the rebellion in +that part of the South would have been practically as far from an +end as it was the first of May! Johnston would have been there in +front of Sherman, all the same, and at least one more campaign +would have been required before the march to the sea could have +been made. + + SHERMAN'S GREAT ABILITY AS A STRATEGIST + +Although Sherman did not himself accomplish the first part of +Grant's plan in respect to Johnston's army,--namely, "to break it +up",--the second part, "to get into the interior of the enemy's +country, . . . inflicting all the damage you can against their war +resources,"( 3) was carried out as thoroughly as Grant or anybody +else could have wished. It is also true that Sherman claimed the +credit for the breaking up of Hood's army in Tennessee, while he +was marching to Savannah, as a legitimate and foreseen part of his +general plan, like his successful march and capture of Savannah. +But he appeared not to see that in such a claim he was condemning +himself for not having done with a superior force what Thomas +actually did with a smaller one. That result was, in fact, due +largely to an accident which, in the ordinary course of military +operations, ought not to have happened, and by which Hood was +tempted to make at Franklin one of those furious assaults upon +troops in position and ready to receive him which are almost always +disastrous. It was just the kind of temptation to Hood's army that +was necessary "to break it up," and it did so very effectually. +The old "Army of Tennessee," which had been so formidable, ceased +to be a formidable army on November 30. Its fighting days were +nearly over. After that it never did any fighting at all worthy +of its old record. And there was hardly a single day while Hood +was in command in the Atlanta campaign when a similar result might +not have been reached by a similar method, and that without any +risk of disaster to the Union army, because the force assaulted by +Hood might always have had a more powerful army near to hand to +support it if necessary. + +In his special field order of January 8, 1865, announcing to all +the troops of his military division the results of his great +campaign, General Sherman said: "Generals Thomas and Schofield, +commanding the departments to our rear, returned to their posts +and prepared to decoy General Hood into their meshes." If the +purpose that prompted Sherman to send me back to Tennessee was to +serve as a "decoy" to Hood, I must say that my part of the sport +would have been more enjoyable if it had taken place earlier in +the season, when Sherman was near by with his sixty thousand men +to help "bag the game." + +It has occurred to me as at least possible that Sherman's recollection +of the suggestions I had repeatedly made to him during the Atlanta +campaign may have been in his mind when he ordered me back to report +to Thomas, and when he wrote his special field order. If so, I +must protest my innocence of any intention to play the role of +"decoy" at Franklin when one of the great gunners was twenty miles +away, and the other several hundred! + +Yet, accepting even the most unfavorable view of Sherman's tactical +as well as of his strategical operations in connection with the +operations of all the other armies under Grant's general plans and +direction, there was nothing in them all that could possibly have +prevented their complete ultimate success in the capture of Lee's +army. If Grant had not captured that army, Sherman would. And +the surrender of Lee was necessarily followed by that of all the +other Confederate armies. Hence, whatever might have happened if +Sherman's great march had not been made, that march with so large +an army made the end of the rebellion in the spring of 1865 sure +beyond any possible doubt. In view of a public service so original +in its conception, so grand in its magnitude, and so brilliant in +its execution, any criticism respecting details cannot diminish +the fame of the general who planned and executed that grand campaign, +nor that of the general-in-chief, the success of whose far-reaching +plans had made the brilliant exploit of his subordinate possible. +Such criticisms are justifiable only in the interest of exact truth +and of exact military science, so that imperfections in the operations +of the greatest commanders may not be mistaken by the military +student as having been among the causes which led to success. + +[( 1) Sherman's "Memoirs," Vol. II, p. 141.] + +[( 2) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part iii, p. 658.] + +[( 3) War Records, Vol. XXXII, part iii, p. 245.] + + +CHAPTER XVIII +Transfer of the Twenty-Third Corps to North Carolina--Sherman's +Plan of Marching to the Rear of Lee--The Surrender of J. E. Johnston's +Army--Authorship of the Approved Terms of Surrender--Political +Reconstruction--Sherman's Genius--Contrast Between Grant and Sherman +--Halleck's Characteristics--His Attempt to Supplant Grant--Personal +Feeling in Battle--The Scars of War. + +Upon the termination of the campaign of 1864 in Tennessee, General +Grant ordered me, with the Twenty-third Corps, to the coast of +North Carolina, via Louisville, Cincinnati, Pittsburg, Washington, +and the sea. Under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of +War, Charles A. Dana, and the personal management of Colonel Lewis +B. Parsons of the quartermaster's department, that movement was +made without any necessity for the exercise of direction or control +on my part, in respect to routes or otherwise. I enjoyed very much +being a simple passenger on that comfortable journey, one of the +most remarkable in military history, and exceedingly creditable to +the officers of the War Department who directed and conducted it. +I did not know at the time anything about the details of the +arrangements made for transportation, nor who made them; but I have +always thought it an excellent illustration of the good results to +be obtained by a judicious distribution and division of duty, +authority, and responsibility in military operations on a large +scale. This being done under one common, competent head, to whom +all subordinates are alike responsible, the military system becomes +as nearly perfect as possible. + +While the transports were detained by an ice blockade in the Potomac, +I joined General Grant at Fort Monroe, and went with him on the +war-steamer _Rhode Island_ to Cape Fear River, where we met General +Terry and Admiral Porter, discussed the military situation, and +decided on the general plan of operations for the capture of the +defenses of Cape Fear River and the city of Wilmington, and subsequent +operations. On our return to Fort Monroe, I proceeded to Washington, +and sailed with the advance of the Twenty-third Corps, arriving at +the mouth of Cape Fear River on February 9, 1865, where we joined +General Terry, who with two divisions had already captured Fort +Fisher. I was then assigned to command the new department of North +Carolina. We turned the defenses of Cape Fear River by marching +round the swamps, and occupied Wilmington with little loss; then +we captured Kinston, after a pretty sharp fight of three days, and +occupied Goldsboro' on March 21, within one day of the time indicated +by Sherman, from Laurel Hill, N. C., March 8, for our junction at +Goldsboro'. General Sherman, who had been delayed by his battle +at Bentonville, did not reach Goldsboro' until the 23d, but the +sound of his guns on the 20th and 21st informed me that he was +near, and I put a bridge across the Neuse River, so as to go to +his assistance if necessary. After the junction at Goldsboro', I +commanded the "center," one of the three grand divisions of Sherman's +army. + +For the elucidation of some things in this campaign which have +seemed obscure, and some acts of General Sherman which have been +severely criticized, it is necessary to know the ruling ideas which +actuated him. As Sherman says, in his own estimate of the relative +importance of his march through Georgia and that through the +Carolinas, the former was only a change of base preparatory to the +latter, the great final campaign of the war, which had for its end +the defeat and capture of Lee's army. Sherman and his army expected +to share the glory of capturing Richmond and Lee's army, which had +baffled the Eastern troops for four years. This feeling in the +army was very general and very manifest at the time. + + SHERMAN'S PLAN OF MARCHING TO THE REAR OF LEE + +After the concentration at Goldsboro', Sherman's plan was to march +straight for Lee's rear at Petersburg, and he expected Johnston to +keep ahead of him and to unite with Lee for the final struggle at +or near Richmond. Grant's idea was quite different: He wanted +Sherman to keep between Lee and Johnston and prevent their union, +as well as to cut off Lee's retreat if he should escape before +Grant was ready to move, the latter alleging that he had ample +force to take care of Lee as soon as the necessary preparations +were made and the roads would permit him to move. It was this +important difference of plan that occasioned Sherman's visit to +City Point, where he hoped to gain Grant's acquiescence in his own +plans. The result was the movement ordered by Sherman on his return +to Goldsboro', which was substantially the same as that which Grant +had before proposed. Grant's immediate army proved to be, as he +predicted it would, amply sufficient for the capture of the whole +of Lee's army. Hence it is difficult to see in what respect +Sherman's campaign of the Carolinas was essential to this great +result, or proved to be more important than his march through +Georgia. Each was a great raid, inflicting immense damage upon +the enemy's country and resources, demoralizing to the people at +home and the army in Virginia, cutting off supplies necessary to +the support of the latter, possibly expediting somewhat the final +crisis at Richmond, and certainly making the subjugation more +complete of those of the Southern people who were thus made to +"feel the weight of war." Considered as to military results, +Sherman's march cannot be regarded as more than I have stated--a +grand raid. The defeat and practical destruction of Hood's army +in Tennessee was what paved the way to the speedy termination of +the war, which the capture of Lee by Grant fully accomplished; and +the result ought to have been essentially the same as to time if +Sherman's march had never been made. The capitulation of Johnston +was but the natural sequence of Lee's surrender; for Johnston's +army was not surrounded, and could not have been compelled to +surrender. Indeed Sherman could not have prevented that army from +marching back into the Gulf States and continuing the war for a +time. In military history Sherman's great march must rank only as +an auxiliary to the far more important operations of Grant and +Thomas. Sherman at the time saw clearly enough this view of the +case; hence his undeviating bent toward the final object of his +march, disregarding all minor ends--to take part in the capture of +Lee's army. + +During General Sherman's interviews with the President and General +Grant at City Point, his mind must have been absorbed with this +one idea which was the sole reason of his visit. Terms of surrender +and the policy to be pursued toward the conquered South must have +been referred to very casually, and nothing approximating instructions +on the subject can have been received or asked for by General +Sherman. Else how is it possible that the very pointed and emphatic +instructions of the President to General Grant, dated March 3, +1865,( 1) were not made known to him or the spirit of them conveyed +to him in conversation? + + THE SURRENDER OF J. E. JOHNSTON'S ARMY + +The question of the abstract wisdom of the terms of the Sherman- +Johnston "memorandum" has little to do with that of Sherman in +agreeing to it. Any person at all acquainted with the politics of +the dominant part at that time would have known that it was at +least unwise to introduce political questions at all. Besides, he +had the example of his superior, the general-in-chief, who had just +accepted the surrender of the principal Confederate army from the +Confederate generalissimo without any political conditions; and +the knowledge of President Lincoln's assassination, which must have +made the country unwilling to consent to more liberal terms than +had before been granted. Yet, however unwise Sherman's action may +have been, the uproar it created, and the attacks upon his honor +and integrity for which it was made the excuse, were utterly +inexcusable. They were probably unexampled as an exhibition of +the effect of great and unusual excitement upon the minds of men +unaccustomed to such moral and mental strain. + +The most charitable view of this matter seems also to be the most +just--namely, that the high officers of government were completely +unnerved and lost their heads under the terrible strain produced +by President Lincoln's assassination, increased somewhat, perhaps, +by a natural apprehension of what might come next. The contrast +between this state of excitement in Washington and the marked calm +that prevailed throughout the army was very instructive, and it +was difficult for any soldier to understand at that time the state +of mind in Washington. No part of the people could have felt more +deeply or with greater indignation the loss the country had suffered, +and the infamous crime by which it had been accomplished. Yet not +a ripple of excitement could be seen anywhere in the army. The +profound calm which pervades the atmosphere surrounding a great, +disciplined, self-confident army is one of the most sublime +exhibitions of human nature. + +That Sherman felt "outraged beyond measure" was natural and indeed +inevitable. He had committed an error of judgment arising from +political inexperience and a failure to appreciate the difference +between Mr. Lincoln's humane purposes toward individual Confederates +and his political policy. But the error was of the least possible +practical consequence, and there was not the slightest excuse for +making it public at the time, in violation of all rules of official +courtesy. All that it was necessary or right to do was to tell +Sherman to correct his error. + +While the effect of these ferocious bulletins received some time +later was such as General Sherman fully describes, the first effect +of the simple disapproval of the convention, both upon Sherman and +Johnston, not referred to by either in their published narratives, +may be interesting to readers of history. General Sherman was +manifestly much disappointed and mortified at the rejection of his +terms, although he had been prepared somewhat by expressions of +opinions from others in the interval, and both he and Johnston at +their last meeting seemed sad and dejected. + +To understand this, it must be remembered that Johnston's army was +not surrounded, and its surrender could not have been compelled. +Unless the terms of capitulation could be made such as the troops +themselves would be willing to accept, they would, it was apprehended, +break up into guerrilla bands of greater or less strength and carry +on the war in that way indefinitely. So strongly was I impressed +at the time with General Johnston's apprehension, that I was often +thereafter haunted in my dreams with the difficulties I was actually +encountering in the prosecution of military operations against +those remnants of the Confederate armies, in marshy and mountainous +countries, through summer heats and winter storms. It was several +years after the war that I became fully satisfied, at night, that +it was really over. + + AUTHORSHIP OF THE APPROVED TERMS OF SURRENDER + +At the time of Sherman's first interview with Johnston I hinted +that I would like to accompany him; but he desired me to remain in +immediate command, as I was next in rank, and we could not tell +what might happen. He took some others with him, but I believe +had no one present in the room to assist him in his discussion with +Johnston and Breckinridge. At his last interview I accompanied +him, by his special request. On meeting at Bennett's House, after +the usual salutations General Sherman and Johnston retired to the +conference room, and were there a long time with closed doors. At +length I was summoned to their presence, and informed in substance +that they were unable to arrange the terms of capitulation to their +satisfaction. They seemed discouraged at the failure of the +arrangement to which they had attached so much importance, apprehensive +that the terms of Grant and Lee, pure and simple, could not be +executed, and that if modified at all, they would meet with a second +disapproval. I listened to their statements of the difficulties +they had encountered, and then stated how I thought they could all +be arranged. General Johnston replied, in substance, "I think +General Schofield can fix it"; and General Sherman intimated to me +to write, pen and paper being on the table where I was sitting, +while the two great antagonists were nervously pacing the floor. +I at once wrote the "military convention" of April 26, handed it +to General Sherman, and he, after reading it, to General Johnston. +Having explained that I, as department commander, after General +Sherman was gone, could do all that might be necessary to remove +the difficulties which seemed to them so serious, the terms as +written by me were agreed to, as General Sherman says, "without +hesitation," and General Johnston, "without difficulty," and after +being copied _without alteration_ were signed by the two commanders. +Johnston's words, on handing the paper back to Sherman, were: "I +believe that is the best we can do." It was in pursuance of this +understanding that I made with General Johnston the "supplemental +terms," and gave his disbanded men the two hundred and fifty thousand +rations, with wagons to haul them, to prevent the troops from +robbing their own people, for which, in his "Narrative," he very +properly credits General Sherman. + +But I also gave to the troops from each State arms enough to arm +a guard to preserve order and protect citizens en route, the arms +so used to be turned over to United States officers after the troops +got home. This was one of the things most bitterly condemned in +Sherman's first agreement. Yet not a word was said when I did it! +It would be difficult for a soldier to imagine anything more +monstrous than the suggestion that he could not trust the officers +and men whom he had been fighting four years to go home and turn +in their arms after they had voluntarily surrendered and given +their parole of honor to do so. Yet there seem to be even in high +places some men who have no conception of the sense of honor which +exists among brave men. + +When that second "convention" was handed to General Grant the same +evening, he said that the only change he would have made would have +been to write General Sherman's name before General Johnston's. +So would I if I had thought about it; but I presume an unconscious +feeling of courtesy toward a fallen foe dictated the order in which +their names were written. + + AUTHORSHIP OF THE APPROVED TERMS OF SURRENDER + +It seems to me a little singular that neither General Sherman nor +General Johnston thought the circumstances above referred to worthy +of being preserved in memory, and I am not quite willing that +General Breckinridge shall carry off all the honor of assisting +the great commanders to make "memoranda" and "military conventions" +at "Bennett's House." But Sherman and Johnston were writing their +own defense, and it was natural that they should omit matter not +pertaining thereto. Besides, I was General Sherman's subordinate, +and owed him all the help I could give in every way. He may have +regarded my services, and perhaps justly, as little more than +clerical, after it was all over, even if he thought of the matter +at all.( 2) + +The Confederate troops were promptly furnished with all needed +supplies of food and transportation and sent in comfort to their +homes, freed from the necessity of taxing the slender resources of +the impoverished people on their routes. The surplus animals and +wagons remaining with the army were given to the people of North +Carolina in large numbers, and they were encouraged at once to +resume their industrial pursuits. In the meantime, all who were +in want were furnished with food. + +It may not be possible to judge how wise or unwise Sherman's first +"memorandum" might have proved if it had been ratified. It is +always difficult to tell how things that have not been tried would +have worked if they had been. We now know only this much--that +the imagination of man could hardly picture worse results than +those wrought out by the plan that was finally adopted--namely, to +destroy everything that existed in the way of government, and then +build from the bottom on the foundation of ignorance and rascality. + +The de facto State governments existing at the time of the surrender +would have been of infinite service in restoring order and material +prosperity, if they had been recognized by the military authority +of the United States and kept under military control similar to +that exercised by the district commissioners under the "reconstruction +acts." And such recognition would in no manner have interfered +with any action Congress might have thought it wise to take looking +to the organization of permanent governments and the admission of +senators and representatives in Congress. After two years of +"reconstruction" under President Johnson's "policy," the Southern +State governments were no better than those he had destroyed. Then +Congress took the matter in hand, and after years of labor brought +forth State governments far worse than either of those that had +been torn down. + +Party ambition on the one hand, and timidity on the other, were +the parents of these great follies. The presidential succession +was the mainspring of the first movement and of the opposition +thereto, while that and party majority in Congress were the motives +of the later "reconstruction." Both ingloriously failed, as they +deserved to do. How much stronger the Republican party would have +been if it had relied upon the loyal States which had sustained it +through the war, instead of timidly distrusting them and trying to +bolster itself up by the aid of the negro and "carpet-bag" governments +in the South! + +Political reconstruction ought not to have been thought of at the +close of the war. What was then needed was local civil government +under such military control as might be necessary, restoration of +order, industry, and material prosperity, leading to a gradual +reorganization of the society which had been completely broken up +by the war. After this had been done, and Congress had decided +upon the conditions of full restoration, it would have been time +enough to inaugurate political reconstruction. This was clear +enough at the time to those who had studied the subject and knew +by personal observation the real condition and feeling of the +Southern people. But the leading politicians of either party do +not appear to have had the wisdom and moral courage to advocate +such a policy. Both were impatient to see their party represented +on the floors of Congress by members from the South. + + POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION + +It was something of the kind above suggested which was aimed at by +Generals Sherman and Johnston, and which was deemed wise by the +leading generals both North and South. There were several conditions +in the memorandum that were clearly inadmissible, though easy of +correction without changing the essential features of the document. +This was to be expected from a hasty effort to solve a great +political problem by a man without political education or experience. +Sherman's failure was not unlike that of great politicians who +undertake to command armies. Their general ideas may be very good, +but they have no knowledge of details, and hence make mistakes +resulting in failure. + +As now seen, projected upon the dark background of the political +history of the Southern States during the twelve years from 1865 +to 1877, and compared with the plans of political doctrinaires in +1865, under the light of experience and reason, the Sherman-Johnston +memorandum and Sherman's letters of that period seem self-luminous +with political wisdom. Sherman needed only the aid of competent +military advisers in whom he had confidence to have made him one +of the greatest generals of any age, and he would have needed only +the aid of competent political advisers to have made him a great +statesman. But he looked almost with contempt upon a "staff," and +would doubtless have thought little better of a "cabinet." + +The efforts of political leaders to establish an absolutely impossible +popular government in the South seem to show the necessity of +general political education, no less than the military blunders of +the war show the necessity of general military education. If our +schools would drop from their course of studies some of the +comparatively unimportant "ologies," and substitute the qualifications +for good citizenship, the change would be greatly for the better. + +General Sherman was one of those rare actors in historic events +who require no eulogy. All his important acts were so unqualifiedly +his own, and so emphatically speak for themselves, that it is only +necessary to judge of the quality and merits of those acts. There +is no question of division of honors between him and any other +respecting any of his important operations. It is not meant by +this that he was disdainful of the advice or opinions of others. +On the contrary, although naturally impulsive and self-reliant, +his acquired habit was to study carefully and consult freely with +his subordinate commanders respecting all important movements. +Yet discussion resulted almost if not quite invariably in the +adoption of his own original plans. As to details, he was wont to +leave them very much to his subordinates, and, I think, did not +estimate very accurately the possibilities or probabilities of the +accomplishment of the details necessary to the success of his +general plans. It is certainly not too much to say that his +expectations in this regard were very frequently unrealized. But +of this it must be observed that the character of the theater of +war made the handling of a large army extremely difficult, precision +of movement impossible, and any accurate estimate of the time in +which projected operations could be accomplished by no means easy. +Criticism of General Sherman, or of his subordinates, based upon +military experience in other countries or upon the success of his +able antagonist General Johnston, to whom Sherman's difficulties +were corresponding advantages, is likely to be extremely unjust. +In short, Sherman's campaigns stand alone, without a parallel in +military history; alike unique in their conception, execution, and +final results; in most respects among the highest examples of the +art of war. Plans so general and original in conception and +successful in execution point unmistakably to a very high order of +military genius. + + SHERMAN'S GENIUS + +In the order of nature, comparison with those that follow as well +as those that precede is needed to establish the merits of any +individual. A commander may be a great captain compared with his +military predecessors, and yet some of his operations be regarded +as very faulty by more modern commanders. + +Some future historian, with the example before him of a later +chieftain who, on a similar field and under similar but improved +conditions, may have won more brilliant successes, may be able to +determine Sherman's rank among the commanders of past, present, +and future ages. + +Sufficient is not yet known in this country of the credit due any +one individual for the success achieved in the recent campaigns in +Europe to furnish the means of just comparison between the European +and American commanders of this generation. And even between Grant +and Sherman there are so few points of resemblance in military +character or methods, that they must be judged by contrasts rather +than by comparison. Hence it may always be difficult to determine +their exact relative merits as military leaders. Upon this point +I forbear, for the present, to express any opinion. + +In some other respects, Grant and Sherman were hardly less in +contrast than in their military characteristics. At the close of +the Atlanta campaign, in his letter of September 12, 1864, Grant +paid to Sherman the following generous and glowing tribute: "In +conclusion, it is hardly necessary for me to say that I feel you +have accomplished the most gigantic undertaking given to any general +in this war, and with a skill and ability that will be acknowledged +in history as unsurpassed, if not unequaled. It gives me as much +pleasure to record this in your favor as it would in favor of any +living man, myself included." + +To this Sherman replied, September 20: "In the meantime, know that +I admire your dogged perseverance and pluck more than ever." + +There has been much learned discussion of the relative merits of +McClellan's, Grant's, and other plans for the "capture of Richmond," +as if that was the object of the campaign. In fact, though the +capture of Richmond at any time during the war would have produced +some moral effect injurious to the rebellion and beneficial to the +Union in public opinion, it would have been a real injury to the +Union cause in a military sense, because it would have given us +one more important place to garrison, and have increased the length +of our line of supplies, always liable to be broken by the enemy's +cavalry. + +The worst form of operations in such a war is "territorial" strategy, +or that which aims at the capture and occupation of territory as +a primary object. The best is that which aims at the destruction +or capture of the opposing armies as the first and only important +object. Grant at Donelson, Vicksburg, and in Virginia best +illustrated this kind of strategy. + + HALLECK'S CHARACTERISTICS + +Halleck was probably the chief of the "territorial" strategists of +our Civil War period. In the winter of 1861-1862 the counties of +north Missouri bordering on the Missouri River were infested with +guerrillas. Halleck sent Pope, with a force of all arms amounting +to a considerable army, to "clear them out." Pope marched in +triumph from one end of that tier of counties to the other, and +Halleck then informed me with evident satisfaction that north +Missouri was cleared of rebels, and that the war was ended in that +part of the State! In fact, the guerrillas, "flushed" like a flock +of quail by Pope's advance-guard, had taken to the bush until the +rear-guard had passed out of sight, and then were found "feeding" +again on their old ground. + +I felt greatly complimented when Halleck, on his return from Corinth +to St. Louis, en route to Washington to take command of the army, +gave me a full explanation of his "siege of Corinth," including +his application of the standard European tactics of a former +generation, with its rule of 10,000 men to the mile in line and +regular approaches. + +I was many years younger than Halleck, Thomas, Sherman, Grant, and +the other chief commanders, and hence had much more to learn than +they. Perhaps I was also, on account of comparative youth, more +teachable. At any rate, the two lessons from Halleck above referred +to, and later experience, cause me to do "a world of thinking"; so +that I was amazed beyond expression when, in the winter of 1863- +64, just before Grant was made lieutenant-general, Halleck told me +that _his_ plan for the next campaign was to send west of the +Mississippi River force enough to finish the war in all that region +of country, and then return and clear up the States east of that +river! I said nothing, but could not help thinking that it was, +sure enough, time to have another general-in-chief of the army. +But accepting his strategic theory of operations in the American +Civil War,--territorial conquest,--his plans of campaign were +unquestionably sound. + +Halleck was, I believe, a man of great ability and of high military +education, though with little practical experience in war; yet his +peculiar views, and still more singular action, have seemed to me +very remarkable. He remained in Washington, practically inert, +while one of the great armies of which he was general-in-chief was +suffering sore reverses, almost in sight of the Capitol, and the +country's cause greatly imperiled for want of a competent commander +for that army. How could a soldier resist the impulse to "do or +die" at the head of that army? But General Halleck must have known +better than any one else at that time the limits of his own capacity. +He probably knew that even his great ability and education did not +suffice to qualify him for the command of an army in the field. +If so, his action afforded a patriotic example which some others +would have done well to imitate. + +As I have before stated, General Halleck was always kind and just +to me, so far as I ever knew, and I was much indebted to him for +support when it was needed. Now I find in the records the following +letter: + + "Richmond, Va., May 10, 1865, 10:30 A. M. +"Hon. Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War: + +"I beg leave to withdraw for the present my recommendation of +Schofield as military governor of North Carolina. It is represented +to me that he and General Blair were the principal advisers of +Sherman in his armistice with the rebel General Johnston. If so, +he is not a proper person to command in North Carolina. I therefore +suspend my recommendation for further developments. + + "H. W. Halleck, Major-General." + +The fact was that I had not been present when Sherman's memorandum +was agreed upon, had not been consulted about in any way, and knew +nothing of its character until after it had been sent to Washington. +All of this Halleck could have learned at once if he had inquired, +which he did not. So far as I know, he left on record, without +any subsequent explanation or correction, a report which was without +the slightest foundation in fact, and which he understood to be +very damaging to my reputation. Hence it seems necessary for me +to record the fact that there was no foundation for that report. +Beyond this I will only say that I think General Halleck, in this +slight matter, as in his far more serious conduct toward General +Sherman, was inexcusably thoughtless respecting the damage he might +do to the reputation of a brother soldier. The least a true man +can do is to make suitable public reparation if he has for any +reason done publicly a personal injustice. + + HALLECK'S ATTEMPT TO SUPPLANT GRANT + +I knew personally at the time the exact truth respecting the action +of General Halleck toward General Grant before the battle of Shiloh, +especially in ordering Grant to remain in the rear while General +C. F. Smith was sent with the advance of the army to Pittsburg +Landing, as described by General Grant in his "Memoirs." Halleck +hoped Smith might fight a battle and win a victory in Grant's +absence, which would naturally be followed by an order putting +Smith in command in place of Grant. But Halleck had not anticipated +Grant's soldierly action in applying to be relieved, and was not +prepared to face that emergency. As soon as Grant's application +reached St. Louis, Halleck abandoned that line of action, but he +did not abandon his purpose to supersede Grant in some way until +some time later. Whatever excuse there may have been at that time +for Halleck's opinion of Grant, nothing can be said in favor of +the method he adopted to accomplish his purpose to supersede him. + +The action of Grant in this case well foreshadowed that which +occurred when he was tendered the commission of lieutenant-general +and the command of all the armies. Grant would not hold any +commission or command without full authority to perform the duties +belonging to it. In his "Memoirs" he modestly refrains from relating +the most important part of that action, as he told it to me on the +war-steamer _Rhode Island_ the next January. Before accepting the +commission from President Lincoln, as Grant describes, he said in +substance that if it meant that he was to exercise actual command +of all the armies, without any interference from the War Department, +he was willing to accept it, otherwise he could not. To illustrate +what he meant, Grant said to me that when he was coming East to +accept that commission he determined that he would not be +"McClellanized." + +The personal observation, experience, and emotions of an individual +soldier may perhaps be interesting to the reader. I have never +been a lover of war or of strife, and have never been disposed to +seek a fight or quarrel. But when once engaged in or challenged +to battle all the combativeness in human nature is at once aroused. +It is then difficult, if not morally impossible, to decline the +challenge. At all events, that question is not even thought of at +times. One of the most difficult lessons a commander has to learn +is when to offer or accept battle, and when to refrain or decline +--that is, to be complete master of his own natural combativeness. +That courage which is the highest quality of a private or a +subordinate officer may become extremely dangerous in a commander, +unless dominated by that higher moral courage which is undisturbed +by excitement or passion. Grant probably possessed this higher +quality in a greater degree than any other commander of our time. +Sherman and Thomas also possessed it in a very high degree. In +Sherman it was the more remarkable because he was naturally impulsive, +and often manifested this trait, especially in minor matters. He +acquired the power of absolute self-command in battle. With Thomas +this quality appeared to be perfectly natural, as it did with Grant. + +Since I had to fight, I sometimes regretted that I could not have +a chance with a musket in the ranks (behind a good parapet and +"head-log," of course!), for I was a remarkably good shot in my +youth. But I never had a chance to fire a shot in battle except +once, and that was with my artillery at Fredericktown, Missouri, +where not an officer or man in the battery had any idea how to +point a field-piece and give it proper elevation according to the +distance. I quickly found the proper elevation by the means well +known to artillerists, and then directed the battery to go on firing +at that elevation, while I was called upon by the commanding officer +to devote myself to some men with muskets. I have seen this passion +so strong that a major-general commanding an army corps would +dismount and act the part of a gunner to a field-piece, apparently +oblivious to the battle raging all along the line of his corps. + + PERSONAL FEELING IN BATTLE + +Personal feeling in battle is sometimes remarkable, even to the +person himself. In my own experience, the degree of danger was +not often entirely unthought of; and in the comparatively few cases +where it was, the actual danger was much the greatest ever experienced +by me. That such should be the experience of a general in chief +command, under the responsibilities of a great battle, is natural +enough; but that the same should occur when there is little or no +responsibility seems worthy of remark in reference to its apparent +cause. In my first battle,--that of Wilson's Creek,--where I was +a staff officer under a soldier of great experience, ability, and +unsurpassed courage,--General Lyon,--I felt for a long time no +sense of responsibility whatever. I had only to convey his orders +to the troops. Yet the absorption of my mind in the discharge of +this simple duty, and in watching the progress of the battle, was +so complete that I absolutely had no thought whatever of self. +Even after Lyon had been twice wounded, both of our horses killed, +the troops on our left given way in disorder, leaving us standing +in the line, only a few feet to the left of Totten's battery, under +a murderous fire, it did not occur to me that I also might possibly +be hit. I had not even thought for a moment that the commanding +general ought not to be in such an exposed position, or that his +wounds ought to have surgical treatment! My absolute confidence +in my chief left no room in my mind for even such thoughts as those. +It was not until wounds had produced discouragement in the bravest +soul I ever knew that I was aroused to some sense of my own +responsibility as his senior staff officer, and spontaneously said: +"No, general, let us try it again." I was so much absorbed in the +battle itself at that time, and even after Lyon's death, that it +did not occur to me that wounds and death, even of the commanding +general himself, were of any consequence except as they might +influence the progress and final result of the battle. This is +the feeling that must dominate the action of every successful +commander. It is remarkable only because of its early development +in one not then under any such responsibility. + +It may not be a proper subject for criticism at this time, and +certainly is not for any that might seem harsh or unkind, yet it +is an instructive lesson which ought never to be forgotten, that +feeling and passion sometimes more than reason, sound military +principles, or wise statesmanship, dictated military as well as +political policy during and long after the Civil War. + +No doubt all are now ready to admit this in respect to the political +measures which wrought so much evil in the South during the so- +called reconstruction period. But those who are not familiar with +the facts will, I think, be amazed when they see the evidences of +this influence in military operations, and perhaps at no time more +strikingly than during the last period of the Civil War. It would +seem that the official correspondence of that period ought to be +a sufficient warning to deter any future generation from bringing +the country into a condition where even some of the most distinguished +citizens, statesmen, and soldiers seem to be governed more by +passion than by reason in the conduct of public affairs. The +inevitable horrors of war are bad enough in any case, but they are +vastly increased when the passions begotten of civil strife become +dominant. While all parts of the United States have reason for +pride in the manhood and valor of American soldiers, and in the +patriotic devotion of citizens to the cause which they believed to +be right, and profound gratitude for the restoration of the Union +of the States, the people of this entire country should bow their +heads in humiliation when they think of the general low state of +civilization which made such a war possible, and much of its conduct +the dictate of passion and hate rather than of reason or regard +for the public good. Even if it is true, as some soldier-statesmen +have said, but which I do not believe, that occasional wars are +necessary to the vitality of a nation,--necessary to keep up the +fires of patriotism and military ardor upon which the national life +depends,--let them be foreign and not civil wars. It is a great +mistake, though apparently a common one, to suppose that a country +benefits ultimately, in some mysterious way, by civil war, in spite +of all its losses during the war. That able scientist General M. +C. Meigs demonstrated years ago that this country had, in accordance +with a general law, suffered permanent national injury, irreparable +in all future time, by its Civil War, and showed very closely the +amount of that injury. + +It is, no doubt, true that the body politic, like the natural body, +may in extreme cases be so diseased either by inheritance or from +violation of natural laws, as to require the surgeon's knife to +remove the diseased part. But in such a case there is little cause +for pride except in the skill of the surgeon, and little cause for +rejoicing except in the fact that the operation was successful, +that neither the disease nor the surgeon's knife killed the patient. + +While the great Von Moltke and others were unquestionably right in +their views of the necessity for thorough preparation for war at +all times, I believe that indispensable preparation can be made in +a way vastly more satisfactory than by actual war. And this can +be done with only a trifling expenditure of treasure, and at no +cost whatever in blood or sorrow, nor in suspension of peaceful +pursuits, nor in burdensome debts, nor in enormous disbursements +for pensions. Let the schools of all kinds and all grades teach +patriotism, respect for law, obedience to authority, discipline, +courage, physical development, and the rudiments of practical +military manoeuvers; let the national and State military schools +be fostered and perfected, and the volunteer citizen soldiery given +material aid proportionate to their patriotic military zeal. Let +the fortifications of the sea-coasts and the fleets of battle-ships +and cruisers on the ocean be commensurate with the vast national +interests and honor intrusted to their protection and defense; let +the standing army be sufficient to discharge the duties which +require long and scientific education and training, and to serve +as models and instructors for the millions of young citizens: then +will the United States, by being always ready for war, insure to +themselves all the blessings of peace, and this at a cost utterly +insignificant in comparison with the cost of one great war. It is +a source of profound gratification to an old soldier who has long +worked toward this great end to know that his country has already, +in his short lifetime, come so near this perfect ideal of a peace- +loving yet military republic. Only a few more years of progress +in the direction already taken, and the usual prolongation of +natural life will yet enable me to witness the realization of this +one great object of my earthly ambition. + +[( 1) War Records, Vol. XLVI, part ii, p. 802.] + +[( 2) For the military convention of April 26, 1865, signed by +Sherman and Johnston, and the supplemental terms, signed by Johnston +and Schofield, see War Records, Vol. XLVII, part iii, pp. 313, 482.] + + +CHAPTER XIX +The Restoration of Civil Government in the Southern States--The +Course Pursued in North Carolina--An Order from General Grant in +Regard to Cotton and Produce--Suggestions for the Reorganization +of Civil Government--A Provisional Governor for North Carolina. + +Being in command in North Carolina at the close of the war, I was +connected for a short period with the very earliest consideration +of the vital question of the restoration of civil government in +the Southern States, in which I acted a more important part at a +later period. The moment the surrender of Johnston's army made it +evident that the end was near, the question arose, and was much +discussed among some of the prominent officers, as to the status +of the negroes in the South. The position was promptly taken by +me, as the responsible commander in North Carolina, that the question +at that time was solely one of fact. The President's proclamation +of emancipation was virtually a military order to the army to free +all the slaves in the insurgent States as rapidly as military +operations should bring them within its control. Whatever the +legal effect of the proclamation upon the status of slaves not +within the reach of the army when it was issued, there could be no +question of its binding obligation, as an order to the army, to be +executed and made practically effective as rapidly as it came within +the power of the army to execute it. Accordingly, the following +order was issued by me to give full practical effect to the +proclamation, and to maintain the freedom of all former slaves, so +long as the subject-matter should remain under military control. +This order, which was the first public official declaration on the +subject, was mentioned by one of the leading journals of New York +at the time as having at least the merit of "saving a world of +discussion." However this may be, little or no discussion followed, +and the freedom of all slaves in the States lately in insurrection +at once became an established fact. + + "(General Orders, No. 32.) + "Hdqrs. Dept. of North Carolina, Army of the Ohio, Raleigh, N. C., + April 27, 1865. +"To remove a doubt which seems to exist in the minds of some of +the people of North Carolina, it is hereby declared that by virtue +of the proclamation of the President of the United States dated +January 1, 1863, all persons in this State heretofore held as slaves +are now free, and that it is the duty of the army to maintain the +freedom of such persons. + +"It is recommended to the former owners of the freedmen to employ +them as hired servants at reasonable wages; and it is recommended +to the freedmen that, when allowed to do so, they remain with their +former masters, and labor fruitfully so long as they shall be +treated kindly and paid reasonable wages, or that they immediately +seek employment elsewhere in the kind of work to which they are +accustomed. It is not well for them to congregate about towns or +military camps. They will not be supported in idleness. + +"By command of Major-General Schofield: + "J. A. Campbell, Assistant Adjutant-General." + +On the same day I issued the following: + + "(General Orders, No. 31.) + "Hdqrs. Dept. of North Carolina, Army of the Ohio, Raleigh, N. C., + April 27, 1865. +"The commanding general has the great satisfaction of announcing +to the army and to the people of North Carolina that hostilities +within this State have definitively ceased; that for us the war is +ended; and it is hoped that peace will soon be restored throughout +our country. + +"It is now the duty of all to cultivate friendly relations with +the same zeal which has characterized our conduct of the war, that +the blessings of Union, peace, and material prosperity may be +speedily restored to the entire country. It is confidently believed +and expected that the troops of this army and the people of North +Carolina will cordially unite in honest endeavors to accomplish +this great end. + +"All good and peaceable citizens will be protected and treated with +kindness, while those who disturb the peace or violate the laws +will be punished with the severity of martial law. + +"The troops will be distributed so as best to secure the interests +of the United States government and protect the people until a +civil government can be established in harmony with the constitution +and laws of the United States. + +"The most perfect discipline and good conduct are enjoined upon +all officers and soldiers, and cordial support upon all good +citizens. + +"All who are peaceably disposed are invited to return to their +homes and resume their industrial pursuits. Such as have been +deprived of their animals and wagons by the hostile armies will be +temporarily supplied, as far as practicable, upon application to +the nearest provost-marshal, by loans of the captured property in +possession of the quartermaster's department. The needy will also +be supplied, for the time being, with subsistence stores from the +commissary department. . . . + +"By command of Major-General Schofield: + "J. A. Campbell, Assistant Adjutant-General." + +On May 4, I issued a circular to this effect: + +"Local commanders and provost-marshals will encourage all refugees, +white and colored, to return to their homes; and for this purpose +will furnish them the necessary railroad passes and subsistence. + +"Such persons must not be given passes to Raleigh or points on the +sea-coast, nor be permitted to congregate about towns or camps, +there to live in idleness." + +On May 5, I wrote to General Sherman: + +"When General Grant was here, as you doubtless recollect, he said +the lines had been extended to embrace this and other States south. +The order, it seems, has been modified so as to include only Virginia +and Tennessee. I think it would be an act of wisdom to open this +State to trade at once. I hope the government will make known its +policy as to organization of State governments without delay. +Affairs must necessarily be in a very unsettled state until that +is done. The people are now in a mood to accept almost anything +which promises a definite settlement. What is to be done with the +freedmen is the question of all, and it is the all-important +question. It requires prompt and wise action to prevent the negro +from becoming a huge elephant on our hands. + +"If I am to govern this State, it is important for me to know it +at once. If another is to be sent here, it cannot be done too +soon, for he will probably undo the most of what I shall have done. +I shall be most glad to hear from you fully when you have time to +write. . . ." + +Two days later I wrote to General Halleck: + +"I have received your despatch concerning slavery, the treatment +of freedmen, etc. I will send you my orders issued some days ago, +which agree perfectly with your views on this subject. I have not +recognized in any way any of the civil officers of the State--not +being willing to act in such matters in the absence of any indication +of the policy of the government, and taking it for granted that +instructions would be given soon. In this connection, I desire to +suggest that the sooner a military governor is appointed for this +State, and steps taken to organize a civil government, the better. +The people are now in a mood to accept anything in reason, and to +do what the government desires. If I am, by virtue of my command, +to perform the duties of military governor, I would like to know it. + +"If another is to be appointed, it ought to be done before I have +been compelled to do something which he may think it necessary to +undo. I think it would be eminently wise to retain in office +justices of the peace, sheriffs, and other inferior officers who +may prove to be loyal and worthy; but this should be done by the +military governor. I believe the administration need have no +anxiety about the question of slavery, or any other important +question, in this State. But the proper care of the freedmen should +be provided for by State legislation as soon as possible. I shall +be thankful for any information or instructions you may be able to +give me on these subjects." + +A week later more precise rules governing the freedmen were issued: + + "(General Orders, No. 46.) + "Hdqrs. Dept. of North Carolina, Army of the Ohio, Raleigh, N. C., + May 15, 1865. +"The following rules are published for the government of freedmen +in North Carolina until the restoration of civil government in the +State: + +"I. The common laws governing the domestic relations, such as +those giving parents authority and control over their children, and +guardians control over their wards, are in force. The parent's or +guardian's authority and obligations take the place of those of +the former master. + +"II. The former masters are constituted the guardians of minors +and of the aged and infirm, in the absence of parents or other +relatives capable of supporting them. + +"III. Young men and women under twenty-one years of age remain +under the control of their parents or guardians until they become +of age, thus aiding to support their parents and younger brothers +and sisters. + +"IV. The former masters of freedmen may not turn away the young +or the infirm, nor refuse to give them food and shelter; nor may +the able-bodied men or women go away from their homes, or live in +idleness, and leave their parents, children, or young brothers and +sisters to be supported by others. + +"V. Persons of age who are free from any of the obligations referred +to above are at liberty to find new homes wherever they can obtain +proper employment; but they will not be supported by the government, +nor by their former masters, unless they work. + +"VI. It will be left to the employer and servants to agree upon +the wages to be paid; but freedmen are advised that for the present +season they ought to expect only moderate wages, and where their +employers cannot pay them money, they ought to be contented with +a fair share in the crops to be raised. They have gained their +personal freedom. By industry and good conduct they may rise to +independence and even wealth. + +"VII. All officers, soldiers, and citizens are requested to give +publicity to these rules, and to instruct the freed people as to +their new rights and obligations. + +"VIII. All officers of the army and of the county police companies +are authorized and required to correct any violation of the above +rules within their jurisdictions. + +"IX. Each district commander will appoint a superintendent of +freedmen,--a commissioned officer,--with such number of assistants +--officers and non-commissioned officers--as may be necessary, +whose duty it will be to take charge of all the freed people in +his district who are without homes or proper employment. The +superintendents will send back to their homes all who have left +them in violation of the above rules, and will endeavor to find +homes and suitable employment for all others. They will provide +suitable camps or quarters for such as cannot be otherwise provided +for, and attend to their discipline, police, subsistence, etc. + +"X. The superintendents will hear all complaints of guardians or +wards, and report the facts to their district commanders, who are +authorized to dissolve the existing relations of guardian and ward +in any case which may seem to require it, and to direct the +superintendent to otherwise provide for the wards, in accordance +with the above rules. + + "By command of Major-General Schofield: + "J. A. Campbell, Assistant Adjutant-General." + +On May 29, General Grant, from Washington, ordered me to "give +every facility and encouragement to getting to market cotton and +other Southern products. Let there be no seizure of private property +or searching to look after Confederate cotton. The finances of +the country demand that all articles of export should be gotten to +the market as speedily as possible." I answered at once: + +"Your despatch concerning cotton and other products is received. +I some time ago removed all military restrictions upon trade, and +have given every facility for carrying cotton and other products +to market. The only obstacles in the way are the restrictions of +the Treasury Department. It would be a blessing to the country if +the whole system could be abolished. Now only one man in North +Carolina is authorized to buy cotton, and he does not pay money +for it. It is impossible for people to get their products to market +in this way." + +The imperative need of the Southern States at the close of the war +was temporary military government, and permission, under such full +military protection, to reorganize their civil governments. In +the following letter to General Grant, dated May 10, I submitted +by views concerning the policy that ought to be pursued: + +"I desire to submit to you my views concerning the policy that +ought to be pursued in North Carolina, leaving it to your judgment +whether or not to submit them to the President or Secretary of War. +I am now led to this mainly by a letter which I received on the +7th from Chief Justice Chase, giving some points of the policy +advocated by him, which, if adopted in this State, would in my +opinion lead to disastrous results. + +"The points I refer to are briefly as follows, viz.: + +"The organization of the State government to be left to the people +acting in their original sovereign capacity. + +"In determining the right of suffrage, the old Constitution, amended +in 1835, to be followed in preference to the new one which was in +force at the commencement of the rebellion--the object being to +give negroes the right to vote. + +"The first proposition is not, I think, open to serious objection. +With proper assistance from the military authorities, it can be +successfully carried out. + +"The second proposition is the one to which I refer as specially +objectionable, and this for two reasons. + +"First. The Constitution of the State as it existed immediately +prior to the rebellion is still the State Constitution, and there +is no power on earth but the people of the State that can alter it. + +"The operations of the war have freed the slaves in this and most +other States, and, doubtless, slavery will be constitutionally +abolished throughout the country. But the United States cannot +make a negro, nor even a white man, an elector in any State. That +is a power expressly reserved by the Constitution to the several +States. We cannot alter or amend the Constitution of North Carolina, +as it now exists, without either first altering or else violating +the Constitution of the United States. + +"If we hold that by the rebellion the States have lost their +existence as States, and have been reduced to unorganized Territories +under the absolute sovereign authority of the United States, then +undoubtedly we may declare that all inhabitants, white and black, +shall have equal political rights and an equal voice in the +organization of a State to be admitted into the Union. But I +understand President Johnson repudiates this doctrine; hence it +may be left out of the question. + +"It appears to me beyond question that the Constitution of North +Carolina is now valid and binding as the law of the State, and that +any measures for the reorganization of the State government must +be in accordance with the provisions of that instrument. This, I +am convinced, is the unanimous opinion of the leading Union men of +the State. + +"My second reason for objecting to the proposition is the absolute +unfitness of the negroes, as a class, for any such responsibility. +They can neither read nor write. They have no knowledge whatever +of law or government. They do not even know the meaning of the +freedom that has been given them, and are much astonished when +informed that it does not mean that they are to live in idleness +and be fed by the government. + +"It is true they are docile, obedient, and anxious to learn, but +we certainly ought to teach them something before we give them an +equal voice with ourselves in government. This view is so fully +recognized as correct by all who are familiar, by actual contact, +with the negro character and condition, that argument seems +superfluous. I have yet to see a single one among the many Union +men in North Carolina who would willingly submit for a moment to +the immediate elevation of the negro to political equality with +the white man. + +"They are all, or nearly all, content with the abolition of slavery. +Many of them are rejoiced that it is done. But to raise the negro, +in his present ignorant and degraded condition, to be their political +equals would be, in their opinion, to enslave them [the white +citizens]. If they did not rebel against it, it would only be +because rebellion would be hopeless. A government so organized +would in no sense be a popular government. + + THE REORGANIZATION OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT + +"After careful consideration of all the questions involved, I am +fully convinced as to the best policy to be adopted in this State, +which I will submit in outline: + +"A military governor to be appointed, who shall have command of +all the troops in the State; or the department commander be authorized +to assume, by virtue of his command, the function of military +governor, which naturally devolves upon him. + +"The military governor to declare the Constitution and laws of the +State in force immediately preceding the pretended Act of Secession +(so far as the same are not inconsistent with the Constitution and +laws of the United States and the war proclamations of the President) +to be still in force. + +"To make provisional appointments of justices of the peace, sheriffs, +and such other inferior officers as the State laws empower the +governor to appoint, to serve until the organization of a civil +government. + +"To order an enrolment of all electors who may take the President's +amnesty oath. + +"As soon as this enrolment shall be completed, to call an election +for delegates to a State convention. The qualifications of voters +and candidates to be those prescribed by the State laws, and that +they shall take the amnesty oath. All acts of the convention to +be submitted to the people, for their ratification or rejection, +at the same time with the election of governor and members of the +legislature, which would be ordered by the convention. + +"I would confidently expect a convention, so chosen, to repudiate +the doctrine of secession, abolish slavery, and fully restore the +State to its practical constitutional relations to the Government +of the United States. The people are now ripe for such action. +They only ask to know what the government desires them to do, and +how they are to do it. + +"If, however, they should fail to do this, I would regard them as +having violated their oaths, would dissolve the convention, and +hold the State under military government until the people should +come to their senses. I would have a lawful popular government or +a military government--the latter being a necessary substitute in +the absence of the former. + +"I am willing to discharge, to the best of my ability, any duty +which may properly devolve upon me. Yet if a policy so opposed to +my views as that proposed by Mr. Chase is to be adopted, I respectfully +suggest that I am not the proper person to carry it out. + +"If, however, after knowing my views fully, it be desired that I +execute the President's wishes, would it not be well for me to have +a personal interview with him, in order that I may fully understand +his plan and the principles upon which it is founded?" + +The fundamental principles of my suggestion were: + +First. The Constitution and laws as they were before secession, +modified to embrace the legitimate results of the war--namely, +national integrity and universal freedom. + +Second. Intelligent suffrage, to be regulated by the States +themselves; and + +Third. Military governments, in the absence of popular civil +governments, as being the only lawful substitute, under our system, +for a government by the people during their temporary inability, +from whatever cause, to govern themselves. + +But these constitutional methods were rejected. First came the +unauthorized system of "provisional" governors, civilians without +any shadow of lawful authority for their appointments, and their +abortive attempts at "reconstruction." + +Next the Fourteenth Amendment, disfranchising nearly all the trusted +leaders of the Southern people, and then the "iron-clad oath," +universal enfranchisement of the ignorant blacks, and "carpet-bag" +government, with all their offensive consequences. If wise +statesmanship instead of party passion had ruled the hour, how +easily could those twelve years of misrule in the South, and +consequent disappointment and shame among its authors in the North, +have been avoided! + + A PROVISIONAL GOVERNOR FOR NORTH CAROLINA + +A "provisional" governor (William W. Holden) having been appointed +for North Carolina, I relinquished command of the department in +June, 1865, to enter upon more important service in respect to the +then existing military intervention in Mexico by the Emperor of +the French. + + +CHAPTER XX +French Intervention in Mexico--A Plan to Compel the Withdrawal of +the French Army--Grant's Letter of Instructions to General Sheridan +--Secretary Seward Advocates Moral Suasion--A Mission to Paris With +That End in View--Speechmaking at the American Thanksgiving Dinner +--Napoleon's Method of Retreating with Dignity--A Presentation to +the Emperor and Empress. + +While the government of the United States was fully occupied with +the contest for the preservation of the Union, Napoleon III, Emperor +of the French, attempted to overthrow the republican government of +Mexico, and establish in its stead an empire under the Archduke +Maximilian of Austria. If the American conflict had resulted in +the triumph of secession, so also might Napoleon have succeeded in +re-establishing monarchical government on the American continent. +But from the moment when the Union of the States became reassured, +European interference in the political affairs of the American +republic became impossible. Upon this subject there appeared to +be no division of sentiment among the people of the United States. +Certainly there was none among the responsible American statesmen +of that time. It was their unanimous voice that the French +intervention in Mexico must be speedily terminated; but there was +naturally some division of opinion respecting the means by which +this should be effected. Some favored the most prompt and vigorous +military action, while others, not unmindful of the long-existing +friendship between the people of the United States and France, +preferred more peaceful measures. + + FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO + +As the first and necessary step in either line of policy, whether +for immediate active military operations or as conclusive evidence +of ultimate military purpose in aid of diplomacy, General Sheridan +was sent, with an army of about fifty thousand men, to the line of +the Rio Grande. But Sheridan's troops were Union volunteers who +had been enlisted especially for the Civil War, then terminated; +and the necessity was at once recognized of organizing a new army +for the express purpose of acting against the French army in Mexico, +in case of need. It was proposed that this new army should be +enlisted and organized under the republican government of Mexico, +the only government recognized by the United States in that country. +This course would avoid the necessity of any political action of +the government of the United States in the premises. Lieutenant- +General U. S. Grant, then commander-in-chief of the armies of the +United States, was requested to select an officer to organize and +command the proposed army. + +In June, 1865, at Raleigh, North Carolina, I received a message +from General Grant informing me of my selection, and desiring me, +if I was willing to consider the proposition, to come to Washington +for consultation on the subject. Upon my arrival in Washington, +I consulted freely with General Grant, Senor Romero (the Mexican +minister), President Johnson, Secretary of State Seward, and +Secretary of War Stanton, all of whom approved the general proposition +that I should assume the control and direction of the measures to +be adopted for the purpose of causing the French army to evacuate +Mexico. Not much was said between me and the President or either +of his secretaries at that time about the means to be employed; +but it appeared to be understood by all that force would probably +be necessary, and for some time no other means were considered. +The subject was fully discussed with General Grant and Senor Romero, +and I then consented to take charge of the matter, with the +understanding that I should have perfect freedom of action and +choice of means and of time, so far as circumstances would permit. +To enable me to do this, the War Department gave me leave of absence +for twelve months, with permission to go beyond the limits of the +United States and to take with me any officers of my staff whom I +might designate. It was proposed to organize in Mexican territory +an army corps under commissions from the government of Mexico, the +officers and soldiers to be taken from the Union and Confederate +forces, who were reported to be eager to enlist in such an +enterprise. + +The Mexican authorities proposed to furnish the means by which this +army should be paid and the expenses of military operations defrayed, +and to that end a loan was to be negotiated in the United States. +To facilitate the enlistment and equipment of the proposed army +corps, General Grant gave me a manuscript order, dated West Point, +July 25, 1865, addressed to General P. H. Sheridan, then commanding +the Military Division of the Gulf, with a large force near the +Mexican frontier. The following is a copy of General Grant's order: + + GRANT'S LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS TO SHERIDAN + +"Head Quarters Armies of the United States. + + "West Point, N. Y., July 25, 1865. +"Maj.-Gen. P. H. Sheridan, Com'd'g Mil. Div. of the Gulf. + +"General: Maj.-General J. M. Schofield goes to the Rio Grande on +an inspection tour, carrying with him a leave of absence for one +year, with authority to leave the United States. If he avails +himself of this leave he will explain to you the object more fully +than I could do in the limits of a letter, and much more fully than +I could do now, under any circumstances, because much that will +have to be learned to fix his determination, whether to go or not, +has yet to be found out in Washington whilst I shall be away. +This, however, I can say: Gen. Schofield's leave has been given +with the concurrence of the President, he having full knowledge of +the object. I have both written my views to the President and had +conversations with him on the subject. In all that relates to +Mexican affairs he agrees in the duty we owe to ourselves to maintain +the Monroe doctrine, both as a principle and as a security for our +future peace. + +"On the Rio Grande, or in Texas, convenient to get there, we must +have a large amount of surrendered ordnance and ordnance stores, +or such articles accumulating from discharging men who leave their +stores behind. Without special orders to do so, send none of these +articles back, but rather place them convenient to be permitted to +go into Mexico if they can be got into the hands of the defenders +of the only Government we recognize in that country. I hope Gen. +Schofield may go with orders direct to receive these articles; but +if he does not, I know it will meet with general approbation to +let him have them if contrary orders are not received. + +"It is a fixed determination on the part of the people of the United +States, and I think myself safe in saying on the part of the +President also, that an empire shall not be established on this +continent by the aid of foreign bayonets. A war on the part of +the United States is to be avoided, if possible; but it will be +better to go to war now, when but little aid given to the Mexicans +will settle the question, than to have in prospect a greater war, +sure to come if delayed until the empire is established. We want, +then, to aid the Mexican without giving cause of war between the +United States and France. Between the would-be empire of Maximilian +and the United States all difficulty can easily be settled by +observing the same sort of neutrality that has been observed toward +us for the last four years. + +"This is a little indefinite as a letter of instructions to be +governed by. I hope with this you may receive them--instructions +--in much more positive terms. With a knowledge of the fact before +you, however, that the greatest desire is felt to see the Liberal +Government restored in Mexico,--and no doubt exists of the strict +justice of our right to demand this, and enforce the demand with +the whole strength of the United States,--your own judgment gives +you a basis of action that will aid you. + +"I will recommend in a few days that you be directed to discharge +all the men you think can be spared from the Dept. of Texas, where +they are, giving transportation to their homes to all who desire +to return. You are aware that existing orders permit discharged +soldiers to retain their arms and accoutrements at low rates, fixed +in orders. + + "Very respectfully, your obt. svt., + "U. S. Grant, Lt.-Gen." + +In effect this order required General Sheridan to turn over to me +all of his volunteer troops who might wish to take part in the +Mexican enterprise, with their arms and equipments, and all +"surrendered ordnance and ordnance stores," etc., thus making it +easy for me to arm and equip at small cost the ex-Confederates and +others who would join my standard. Soon after the date of General +Grant's order to General Sheridan, and at the request of Secretary +Seward, conveyed to me by Mr. Stanton, I met Mr. Seward at Cape +May. He then proposed to me to go to France, under authority of +the State Department, to see if the French emperor could not be +made to understand the necessity of withdrawing his army from Mexico, +and thus save us the necessity of expelling it by force. Mr. Seward +expressed the belief that if Napoleon could be made to understand that +the people of the United States would never, under any circumstances, +consent to the existence in Mexico of a government established and +sustained by foreign power, he would withdraw his army from that +country. If this were done, the friendly relations between the +people of France and the United States would not be disturbed, +while the expulsion of a French army from Mexico by American +volunteers would engender great bitterness of feeling among the +French people, even if it did not lead to war between France and +the United States. + + SECRETARY SEWARD ADVOCATES MORAL SUASION + +This proposition from Mr. Seward seemed to put upon me the +responsibility of deciding the momentous question of future friendship +or enmity between my own country and our ancient ally and friend. +I had, on the one hand, full authority from the War Department and +the general-in-chief of the army, given with the knowledge and +consent of the President of the United States, to organize and +equip an army for the purpose of driving the French out of Mexico, +and on the other hand a request from the State Department to go to +France and try by peaceful means to accomplish the same end. + +As the negotiation of the Mexican loan had not made great progress, +the funds were not yet available for the support of an army. It +was expected that the actual beginning of operations on the Rio +Grande would stimulate subscriptions to the loan, yet the lack of +ready money was a sufficient cause for some delay in making the +proposed "inspection tour" to the Rio Grande; and this fact, added +to a natural love of peace rather then of war, and a due sense of +the dictates of patriotism as contrasted with mere military ambition, +determined the decision of that question. It is reason for profound +thankfulness that the peaceful course was adopted. + +In a letter dated August 4, 1865, I informed Mr. Seward of my +decision, "after mature reflection," "to undertake the mission" +which he had proposed. Mr. Seward acknowledged my letter on August +9, and on the 19th I received a telegram from the War Department +to "report at the State Department upon your [my] next visit to +Washington." This order was promptly obeyed. On August 23 the +Secretary of War sent a letter to the Secretary of State, accrediting +me as an officer of the army, in which capacity, and unofficially, +I was to be understood by the public as visiting Europe. A copy +of this letter, inclosed in one from the State Department, was sent +to Mr. Bigelow, United States minister at Paris; and similar letters +were sent to several other United States ministers in Europe. But +time passed until November 4, and thus more than two months elapsed +before the Secretary of State was ready for me to start to Europe. +Mr. Seward then gave me a confidential letter, dated November 4, +1865, addressed to Mr. Bigelow, and a letter of credit on the +Barings, and requested me to proceed on my mission. + +In his letter to Mr. Bigelow he said: "General Schofield proceeds +to Paris. He is, I believe, fully informed of the feelings and +sentiments, not only of this government, but of the American people. +I commend him to your confidence," etc. Mr. Seward explained to +me several times during this period of delay that correspondence +then going on with the French government rendered it advisable that +my visit be delayed until he should receive expected answers from +that government. The Atlantic cable did not then exist, and hence +correspondence across the ocean was necessarily slow. The expected +despatch--viz., that from the French Foreign Office to their minister +at Washington, dated October 18, 1865, and communicated to Mr. +Seward on the 29th of the same month--was no more satisfactory, +though in better tone, than those which had preceded. In effect +it demanded a recognition by the United States of the government +of Maximilian in Mexico as a condition precedent to the recall of +the French army. The time had evidently arrived when Napoleon must +be informed in language which could not be misunderstood what was +the real sentiment of the government and people of the United States +on the Mexican question. It was difficult, perhaps impossible, to +express that sentiment in official diplomatic language that an +emperor could afford to receive from a friendly power. It was +therefore desirable that the disagreeable information be conveyed +to Napoleon in a way which would command his full credence, and +which he yet need not regard as offensive. Mr. Seward's explanation +and instructions to me, after several long conversations on the +subject, were summed up in the words; "I want you to get your legs +under Napoleon's mahogany, and tell him he must get out of Mexico." + + A MISSION TO PARIS + +In my visit to Paris I was accompanied by two officers of my staff, +Brevet Brigadier-General William M. Wherry and Brevet Brigadier- +General G. W. Schofield, who had been given leave of absence for +the purpose of going with me to Mexico or elsewhere. We sailed +from New York, November 15, 1865, on the Cunard steamer _Java_, +and stayed a day in Liverpool and several days in London, where I +explained to Mr. Adams, United States minister, the purpose of my +visit. + +Mr. Adams expressed hearty sympathy with the object of my mission, +and gave cordial assent to my wish that I might feel at liberty to +consult him in regard to it at any time. + +Mr. Motley, United States minister at Vienna, whom I had the pleasure +of meeting at the residence of Mr. Adams, assured me that the +government of Austria was especially desirous of not being regarded +by the United States as responsible in any manner for the attempt +to establish an empire under the Austrian archduke in Mexico. Mr. +Motley thought a visit by me to Vienna while the Mexican question +was pending might produce undue excitement. Hence I limited my +tour in that direction to Italy. + +We proceeded to Paris on the 2d of December. Our arrival had been +preceded by vague rumors of an official mission more or less hostile +to the interests of France, which caused great excitement among +the French people and the American residents in Paris, and serious +depression of United States, Mexican, and French securities in the +financial markets of Europe. It was also understood that no little +anxiety was felt at the French court, then at Compiegne. It was +manifestly desirable to allay so far as possible this undue excitement +in the public mind. Hence I availed myself of an early opportunity, +given by the American Thanksgiving dinner at the Grand Hotel, to +intimate in unmistakable terms that my mission, if any, was one +entirely friendly to the people of France. + + SPEECHMAKING AT THE AMERICAN THANKSGIVING DINNER + +The following is a part of the account of that banquet given by +the Paris correspondent of the "New York Herald," under date of +December 8, 1865: + +"The American residents and transient sojourners in Paris celebrated +the national Thanksgiving by a grand dinner at the Grand Hotel, +which passed off in splendid style. . . . The next toast was the +long-looked-for-one of the evening, for it was known that it would +call up a distinguished guest from whom all were anxious to hear. +It was "The Army and Navy of the United States." When the band +had ceased playing "Yankee Doodle," Major-General Schofield rose +to reply to this toast, and was received with tremendous enthusiasm. +The ladies rose and waved their handkerchiefs, and gentlemen shouted +until they were hoarse. The general, after bowing his acknowledgments, +said: 'Fellow-countrymen--I want words to express to you the +satisfaction which will be felt in the heart of every soldier and +sailor when he learns the manner in which the names of the army +and navy have been received by you to-night. I will at this time +allude but briefly to one of the great lessons taught by the American +war--the grandest lesson of modern times. A great people who have +heretofore lived under a government so mild that they were scarcely +aware of its existence have found, in time of war, that government +to be one of the strongest in the world [cheers], raising and +maintaining armies and navies vaster than any ever before known +[cheers]. In point of character, in point of physical and moral +qualities, in point of discipline and of mobility in large masses, +the armies of the United States have never before been equaled +[loud cheers]. Yet this, great as it is, is not the greatest wonder +of the American war. This vast army, as soon as its work was done, +was quietly disbanded, and every man went to his home, as quietly +as the Christian goes back from church on Sabbath morning; and each +soldier re-entered upon the avocations of peace a better citizen +than he was before he became a soldier [renewed applause]. This +was the grandest lesson of the war. It shows that the power of a +nation to maintain its dignity and integrity does not result from +or depend upon its form of government; that the greatest national +strength--the power to mass the largest armies in time of war--is +entirely consistent with the broadest liberty of the citizen in +time of peace [enthusiasm]. Permit me, in conclusion, to propose +a toast which I know will be heartily responded to by every true +American--"The old friendship between France and the United States: +May it be strengthened and perpetuated!"' General Schofield's +toast was drunk with great enthusiasm, and upon his taking his seat +the applause which followed his remarks was deafening." + +The situation of Napoleon's government at that time was extremely +critical. The opposition was powerful and aggressive. The +intervention in Mexican affairs was very unpopular in France, and +yet the national pride of the people would not permit the Emperor +to yield to menace even from the United States, nor allow his army +to be driven by force from Mexico without a supreme effort to +maintain it there. Napoleon could not have submitted to such +humiliation without the loss of his throne. In short, forcible +intervention by the American people in the Mexican question, or +the public threat of such action, arousing the national pride of +France, must have led to a long and bloody war, resulting, doubtless, +in final success to America and probably in a revolution in France. + +Such a result would have been a just punishment to Napoleon for +his conduct toward the United States and Mexico during our Civil +War. But why involve the people of France and the people of the +United States in this punishment? Why make enemies of our ancient +friends? Our sister republic of Mexico must be relieved from +foreign domination, at whatever cost; but strife and lasting enmity +between the United States and France would be a fearful price to +pay for even so great a good as the freedom of Mexico. Manifestly +such extreme measures should not be resorted to until all peaceful +means had failed. Considerations of this nature determined my +course while in Paris. I had sufficient opportunity in two interviews +with Prince Napoleon, and in several conversations with officers +of high rank on the Emperor's staff, to make known to the Emperor +the views and purposes of the government and people of the United +States in respect to Mexican affairs. Our conversation was without +reserve on either side, and with the understanding that nothing +said by me would be withheld from the Emperor. + +The principal of these staff-officers was the distinguished Admiral +de la Graviere, who had commanded the French squadron in American +waters in the early part of our Civil War and in the capture of +Vera Cruz. This gallant and honest old sailor had reported to his +government the exact truth about the enterprise which Napoleon had +undertaken when he ordered the bombardment and capture of the +Mexican seaport for the alleged purpose of collecting a French +claim--namely, that he was no better able to collect that claim +after the city was in his possession then he had been before, and +that the conquest of Mexico by the operations of a large army would +be necessary before any financial return could be expected. This +unwelcome report led to the admiral's recall to France, and he was +sent to his home in disgrace. But in due time the Emperor learned +that while all others had deceived him, the admiral had told him +the truth, whereupon he was called to Paris, restored to the +confidence of his chief, and appointed aide-de-camp on the staff +of the Emperor. Admiral de la Graviere was a warm friend of America, +rejoiced in the triumph of the Union cause, understood and appreciated +the sentiments of the people of the United States, among whom he +had made many friends, and was a very willing medium of communication +to the Emperor of the exact attitude of the American people respecting +the Monroe doctrine, which the Emperor of the French had been +betrayed into violating through the influence of persons high in +his confidence, but governed by sordid motives. + + NAPOLEON'S METHOD OF RETREATING WITH DIGNITY + +Admiral Reno, Assistant Minister of Marine, was another of the high +French officials with whom free conversation was held. + +The fidelity with which Prince Napoleon and others reported to the +Emperor the character of the unofficial message which I had to +deliver rendered it quite unnecessary that it be delivered in +person, and quite impossible that the Emperor should be willing to +receive it in that way. Hence, though I received several intimations +that I would be invited to a private interview, no invitation came, +and none was sought. My letters from Paris to Mr. Seward, to +General Grant, and to Senor Romero, reported the progress made, +and the nature of the situation as it then appeared to me. + +On January 22 I was present at a dinner given by Prince Napoleon +in the Palais Royal. Every shade of political opinion in Paris +was represented among the guests. Political discussion seemed to +be entirely unrestrained, with one exception, when a remark which +savored of disloyalty to the empire was rebuked by the prince. + +In the Emperor's address to the French legislature on January 22, +his future policy in respect to Mexico had been hinted at in the +words: "[Our expedition] _touche a son terme_." The declared +purpose of speedily terminating the intervention in Mexico having +been applauded by all, the prince inquired pointedly of me whether, +in my opinion, the Emperor's declaration would be satisfactory to +the United States, and received the unreserved reply that it would, +as I believed, be accepted as satisfactory. + +In my report to Mr. Seward of January 24, I expressed the belief +that even his enemies in France would not be disposed to embarrass +the Emperor with respect to Mexico, "well satisfied to see him get +out of that country by any means, and thus avoid war with the United +States"; and I ventured the suggestion that "this course would also +seem wise on our part." In my letter of the same date to General +Grant I said: + +"You will get by this mail Napoleon's speech delivered at the +opening of the French legislative session. I was present and heard +the speech delivered. That part of it relating to Mexico and the +United States was received with very general tokens of approbation, +while most of the remainder met with a cold reception. I have +since heard it discussed very freely by many prominent men of all +shades of political opinion, among others the Prince Napoleon. +All seem to recognize the falsity of the Emperor's assumptions +where he says: 'In Mexico the government founded by the will of +the people is consolidating itself,' etc. Yet his statements are, +no doubt, believed by a large majority of the French people, and +therefore afford him a very good reason for yielding to the demand, +made in common by the people of France and the United States, that +his intervention in Mexico shall be brought to an end. This is +the logic of his position and the solution of his difficulty, viz.: +To assert that he has accomplished the object of his expedition to +Mexico, and hence to end it. While we laugh at the absurdity of +his premises, we can hardly find fault with his conclusion, and +hence it is not worth while to criticize any part of his argument. +Rather I think it well to let him make the most of his audacity in +the creation of convenient facts. The opinion seems to be universal +here that the Emperor is sincere in his declarations of intention +as to Mexico; indeed, that he has adopted the policy of making the +strongest possible bid for the friendship of the United States. +It is certainly easy to derive such an opinion from his speech, +and I am strongly inclined to believe it correct. Yet we cannot +forget the fact that in his speech of last year he used quite as +strong language as to the speedy termination of his Mexican +expedition. Hence I shall indulge in some doubt until I see the +actual development of his present plans. I have no idea that +Napoleon believes that Maximilian can remain long in Mexico after +the French troops are withdrawn; but it is very important for him, +in order to give some appearance of truth to his assumed grounds +of action, that Maximilian be allowed to stay there some time +without French aid. And for this reason he wants some assurance +of neutrality from the government of the United States. Prince +Napoleon and others with whom I have conversed express the decided +opinion that Maximilian will come away with Marshal Bazaine, in +spite of all the Emperor may say to induce him to try to stand +alone. This, I apprehend, will be the difficulty, and may cause +much delay, unless the United States kindly lend a helping hand. +Would it not be wise for us to abstain for a few months from all +interference, direct or indirect, and thus give Napoleon and +Maximilian time to carry out their farce? Mexico would thus be +rid of the French flag in the least possible time. If the French +troops come also, Juarez can easily dispose of Maximilian at any +time. If they succeed in getting the French troops to remain as +colonists, then the United States can easily find a good reason +for disposing of the whole matter, and Napoleon will not dare to +interfere. . . . An officer of the Emperor's household left here +about ten days ago with despatches for Mexico which, it is understood, +contained the Emperor's declaration to Maximilian of his intention +to recall his troops. This will give you some idea of the time +when the matter may be arranged if all works well." + + NAPOLEON'S METHOD OF RETREATING WITH DIGNITY + +My views relative to the purposes of the French government appear +to have been in accord with those of Mr. Bigelow at the time, as +shown in his official despatches afterward published, and adopted +by Mr. Seward in his subsequent correspondence with the French +minister at Washington. They were soon afterward confirmed by the +official announcement which the French minister was authorized to +make to the government of the United States. In fact, I was in +almost constant conference with Mr. Bigelow during that time, and +knew that my views, as communicated to Mr. Seward and General Grant, +were in close accord with his, although I could not know anything +of Mr. Bigelow's despatches to the State Department until they were +published. Mr. Bigelow's comprehension of the French view of the +Mexican question proved to be perfectly exact. While awaiting +further instructions in reply to my report of January 24, I occupied +my time in visits to the south of France, Italy, Switzerland, and +England. + +Among the personal incidents connected with my stay in Paris which +seem worthy of record were the following: + +Soon after my arrival in Paris, in company with Mr. Bigelow I called +upon Marshal Randon, Minister of War, who was the only minister of +the French government then in Paris. We were received with cold +and formal politeness. Some days later, the Emperor having returned +to Paris, and having apparently become satisfied that I was not +occupied with any designs hostile to France, I received a very +courteous letter from the Minister of War, dated December 13, and +addressed to Mr. Bigelow; and Captain Guzman, the officer therein +named, reported to me immediately. Under the guidance of this +accomplished officer I saw in the most agreeable manner all the +military establishments about Paris. These courtesies were +acknowledged in a letter dated February 25, 1866, addressed to Mr. +Bigelow. + + A PRESENTATION TO THE EMPEROR AND EMPRESS + +My presentation to the Emperor and Empress occurred at one of those +brilliant occasions at the Tuileries for which the second empire +was famous. In conversing with the Emperor, he desired to know +something of the operations of the American armies, and especially +their marvelous methods of supply at great distances from a base +of operations. + +It gives me great pleasure to record here, as I did in my correspondence +at the time, the great courtesy, the kindness, and the charming +hospitality shown me by Mr. Bigelow and his amiable family during +my stay in Paris. Mr. Adams, United States minister at London, +was also exceedingly kind, inviting a very distinguished company +to meet me at dinner, taking me to several charming entertainments, +and presenting me to the Prince of Wales, who then received in +place of the Queen. General King at Rome, and Mr. Marsh at Florence, +also entertained me very courteously during my short stay at those +places. The warmth of greeting by Americans everywhere, and the +courteous reception by all foreigners whom I met, lent a peculiar +charm to the first visit of a Union soldier among those who had +watched from a distance the great American conflict. + +I now have the satisfaction of knowing, in the light of subsequent +events, that whatever my mission to France contributed toward the +solution of the momentous question of that day was wisely directed +in the interest of peace at home, continued friendship with our +former allies, the people of France, and the relief of an American +republic from foreign domination; these great blessings were combined +in the final result. + +Too much cannot be said in praise of the able and patriotic +statesmanship displayed by Secretary Seward in his treatment of +the French violation of the Monroe doctrine. + +Early in May, 1866, I received from Mr. Seward his final reply to +my report of January 24, in which he said: "The object for which +you were detailed to visit Europe having been sufficiently +accomplished, there is considered to be no further occasion for +you to remain in that quarter in the service of this department." +Whereupon I returned to the United States, and reported at the +State Department on the 4th of June. + +The condition of the Franco-Mexican question at the time of my +return from Europe gave no further occasion for my offices in either +of the ways which had been contemplated in behalf of Mexico. +Subsequent events in Mexico included the sad fate of Maximilian +and the sadder fate of Carlotta. + + +CHAPTER XXI +Reconstruction in Virginia--The State Legislature Advised to Adopt +the Fourteenth Amendment--Congressional Reconstruction as a Result +of the Refusal--The Manner in Which the Acts of Congress Were +Executed--No Resort to Trial by Military Commission--The Obnoxious +Constitution Framed by the State Convention--How Its Worst Feature +Was Nullified--Appointed Secretary of War. + +In August, 1866, after my return from Europe, I was assigned to +command the Department of the Potomac, which included the State of +Virginia, then governed in part by the Freedmen's Bureau and in +part by the provisional government which had been organized at +Alexandria while the war was still in progress. The State had yet +to obtain from Congress a recognition of its government, which +recognition was understood to depend upon the ratification by the +State legislature of the then pending Fourteenth Amendment to the +Constitution of the United States. This subject was very fully +discussed between me and the leading members of the legislature. +I advised them to accept the proposed amendment as the only means +of saving the State from the more "radical" reconstruction under +act of Congress, which was then threatened. It was urged that +Virginia would not suffer much from the operation of the Fourteenth +Amendment, because of the general intelligence of her white population +and their superiority in numbers over the negroes--advantages which +some of the other Southern States did not enjoy; that if the Virginia +legislature would ratify the pending amendment, Congress could not +refuse to recognize the existing State government and make it +permanent; and that Virginia would thus be restored at once to her +full privileges as a State in the Union. I visited Washington, +and obtained from leading Republicans in Congress the assurance, +so far as it was in their power to give it, that such would be the +result. On my return to Richmond, it at first seemed that the +amendment would be speedily ratified. But other influences, +understood to come from some source in Washington (probably President +Johnson), finally prevailed; the amendment was rejected; and Virginia +was thus doomed to undergo "congressional reconstruction" in company +with her sister States. + + RECONSTRUCTION IN VIRGINIA + +The "policy" of President Johnson having resulted in an "irrepressible +conflict" between him and Congress, finally culminating in his +impeachment, the reconstruction of the States lately in insurrection +was undertaken by Congress. First an act dated March 2, 1867, was +passed for the military government of the "rebel States," and then +another act, dated March 23, 1867, prescribing the conditions of +organization of State governments preparatory to restoration to +the Union; the last-named act was supplemented by the act dated +July 19, 1867. All of these acts were passed over the President's +veto. They provided for the assignment of military commanders in +the several districts, with nearly absolute powers to govern those +States and direct the steps in the process of reconstruction. It +fell to my lot to command the First Military District, into which +Virginia was converted by the act of Congress. + +The terrible oppression of the Southern people embodied in those +acts of Congress has hardly been appreciated by even the most +enlightened and conservative people of the North. Only those who +actually suffered the baneful effects of the unrestrained working +of those laws can ever realize their full enormity. The radical +Congress was not content to impose upon the Southern States impartial +suffrage to whites and blacks alike. They were not content even +to disfranchise the leading rebels, according to the terms of the +Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Even those would not be +sufficient to put the Southern whites under the domination of their +former slaves and of adventurers from the North, and thus to secure +the radical supremacy in the reconstructed States. Hence another +and an enormous stride was taken, with the purpose of putting those +States under what became known as "carpet-bag" governments, so +offensive as to be nearly intolerable even to their authors. That +stride consisted in imposing the so-called "iron-clad oath" upon +all officers, of whatever grade or character, in all the former +Confederate States. That oath excluded from office not only all +who had in any way taken active part in the rebellion, but even +the most constant Union men of the South who had remained at home +during the war; for not one of them had escaped "giving aid or +comfort" in some way to those engaged in the rebellion. Even so +conspicuous a loyalist as Judge Rives, afterward United States +district judge, declared, after mature deliberation, that he could +not take that oath, although his constant fidelity to the Union +was known to all of Virginia. + +I asked this noted Union man to accept the office of chief justice +of the State, but he could not take the prescribed oath. He had +permitted his boy, about to join the Confederate army, to take +one of his horses rather than see him go afoot. Perhaps the judge +was too conscientious. But it was the evil effect of the law to +exclude the highly honorable and let the rascals in. Thus the +Union could not have the benefit of Judge Rives's eminent services +in the vital work of reconstruction, and some "carpet-bagger" had +to take his place. And thus, although the acts of Congress permitted +a majority of the whites to vote, their choice of officers was +restricted to negroes and "carpet-baggers"! To these latter, +therefore, was committed the entire work of organizing and +administering the Southern State governments, which required the +aid of the United States troops to support them, and which fell by +their own weight the moment that support was withdrawn. + + RECONSTRUCTION IN VIRGINIA + +The manner in which I executed those "reconstruction" acts of +Congress in Virginia, so as to save that State from the great evils +suffered by sister States, is perhaps an instructive part of the +history of that time. The following extracts from my orders and +correspondence clearly show the constitutional principles upon +which my administration was based. They also give the essential +points in the history of Virginia reconstruction up to the time +when the Convention had completed its work of framing a constitution. +My "General Orders, No. 1," dated Richmond, Va., March 13, 1867, +was as follows: + +"I. In compliance with the order of the President, the undersigned +hereby assumes command of the First District, State of Virginia, +under the act of Congress of March 2, 1867. + +"II. All officers under the existing provisional government of +the State of Virginia will continue to perform the duties of their +respective offices according to law, unless otherwise hereafter +ordered in individual cases, until their successors shall be duly +elected and qualified in accordance with the above-named act of +Congress. + +"III. It is desirable that the military power conferred by the +before-mentioned act be exercised only so far as may be necessary +to accomplish the objects for which that power was conferred, and +the undersigned appeals to the people of Virginia, and especially +to magistrates and other civil officers, to render the necessity +for the exercise of this power as slight as possible, by strict +obedience to the laws, and by impartial administration of justice +to all classes. . . ." + +On April 20 was issued "General Orders, No. 16": + +"I. Temporary appointments to fill vacancies which may occur in +county or city offices will, in general, be made upon the concurrent +recommendations of the County Court or City Council and of the +President of the Board of Registration ( 1) for the county or city. + +"II. The several County Courts and City Councils are requested to +confer with the Presidents of the Boards of Registration concerning +such appointments, and to agree upon a suitable person to fill any +vacancy that may occur. + +"III. The President of the Board of Registration will forward to +the assistant adjutant-general the recommendation of the court or +council, with his own indorsement thereon. + +"IV. When a County Court is not in session, a recommendation signed +by five justices, including the presiding justice, will be received +in lieu of the recommendation of the court. + +"V. County and corporation officers appointed by the commanding +general will be required to give the bonds required by law, and +will be subject to indictment for malfeasance, misfeasance, or +neglect of official duty, the same as if they had been elected by +the people." + +On May 28 was issued "General Orders, No. 31," in part as follows; + +". . . IV. The military commissioners [officers of the army] will +make a prompt report to these headquarters of each case of which +they may take jurisdiction, and the disposition made of such case. +Where parties are held for trial, either in confinement or under +bail, such full statement will be made of the facts in each case +as will enable the commanding general to decide whether the case +shall be tried by a military commission or be brought before a +civil court. + +"V. Trial by the civil court will be preferred in all cases where +there is satisfactory reason to believe that justice will be done. +But until the orders of the commanding general are made known in +any case, the paramount jurisdiction assumed by the military +commissioner will be exclusive. + +"VI. All persons, civil officers and others, are required to obey +and execute the lawful orders of the military commissioners to the +same extent as they are required by law to obey and execute writs +issued by civil magistrates. Any person who shall disobey or resist +the lawful orders or authority of a military commissioner shall be +tried by a military commission, and upon conviction shall be punished +by fine and imprisonment according to the nature and degree of the +offense. . . . + +"VII. This order will not be construed to excuse civil officers, +in any degree, from the faithful discharge of their duties. It is +intended to aid the civil authorities, and not to supersede them, +except in cases of necessity." + + NO RESORT TO TRIAL BY MILITARY COMMISSION + +No case arose in Virginia in which it was found necessary, in my +opinion, to supersede the civil authorities in the administration +of justice. Not a single citizen of that State was tried by military +commission. Yet some cases arose which well illustrate the +fascinations of absolute power to those who desire the benefit of +its exercise in its own interests. Some of the most prominent +citizens of Virginia, men who had earnestly opposed the general +policy of military government then in force, came to me to settle +their petty differences summarily. They seemed much disappointed +when I declined to adjudicate such cases, and informed them that +they must be content with the slow process of trial before their +own civil magistrates. Other orders were in part as follows: + + "Richmond, Va., July 26, 1867. +". . . III. The governor and other executive officers, the courts +of law, and councils of cities are invited to recommend suitable +persons for appointment to such offices as, under the existing laws +of Virginia, are usually filled by their appointment or upon their +nomination. . . ." + + "Richmond, Va., August 8, 1867. +". . . VI. Military commissioners are reminded that they are to +be 'governed in the discharge of their duties by the laws of +Virginia, so far as the same are not in conflict with the laws of +the United States, or orders issued from these headquarters,' and +that they are not to supersede the civil authorities, except in +cases of necessity. In such cases the action, or failure to act, +of the civil officers should be fully reported, in order that the +commanding general may hold them to a proper accountability for +any neglect of duty. . . ." + + THE OBNOXIOUS CONSTITUTION + +Upon the adjournment of the State Convention, I sent the following +letter to General Grant: + + "Richmond, Va., April 18, 1868. +"Dear General: In spite of every effort that could be made to +prevent it, the Virginia Convention has adhered to its proscriptive +measures, or rather to the most objectionable of them. + +"After every other means had failed, I even went so far as to visit +the Convention, and urge the repeal of the test oath. But what I +said seemed not to have the slightest influence. I inclose a +newspaper report, which is a pretty accurate one, of what I said, +and which will show that I have at least done my duty in that +regard, if not more. + +"The same baneful influence that secured the election of a majority +of ignorant blacks, and equally ignorant or unprincipled whites, +to the Convention, has proved sufficient to hold them firmly to +their original purpose. They could only hope to obtain office by +disqualifying everybody in the State who is capable of discharging +official duties, and all else to them was of comparatively slight +influence. Even the question whether their Constitution will be +ratified or rejected, the treat with indifference. Congress, they +say, will make it right anyway. . . . + +"Of course I may be mistaken, but my opinion is that the Constitution +must be adopted. This would not be a serious matter if it (the +Constitution) were a good one, and good officers could be elected +under it. But it seems hardly possible that the Union party can +organize upon a satisfactory basis for the election. The negroes +and their associates will doubtless insist upon unqualified +indorsement of the Constitution by their nominees. This the +respectable whites will not give. Hence the late Convention will +be reproduced in the legislature, a large majority being either +worthless radicals, white and black, or bitter opponents of +reconstruction upon the congressional plan. The danger is that we +will have on our hands, not only one big elephant in the Constitution, +but a host of little ones in the shape of officers-elect who are +not fit to be installed--a prospect not very encouraging, at least. + +"My impression is that the wisest course would be to let the thing +fall and die where it is--not submit it to the people at all. We +can then go on putting Union men in office and reorganizing the +provisional government upon a loyal basis, until the friends of +reconstruction get control of the State. Then a convention can be +called which will frame a Constitution fit to be ratified by the +people of the State and approved by Congress and the country at +large. + +"If Congress would give a little more latitude in the selection of +officers, by modifying the test oath, there would be no difficulty +in filling all the offices in the State with men who would aid +restoration. Without some such change, the work of reorganization +cannot be carried very far. The view of the question which I have +given above is, of course, the local one; but it seems to me the +national one leads to the same conclusion. I can't see how the +indorsement of such a Constitution as this one, by the Republican +party, can be otherwise than damaging to them in the North. Would +it not be wise for Congress to say at once, We reject, once and +for all, proscriptive constitutions? + +"I have written this letter merely to suggest points that occur to +me as worthy of very careful consideration. I suppose Congress +alone can determine what is to be done. + +"As explained in my official letter to-day, I feel bound to await +the action of Congress before ordering an election. The nominating +conventions of the two parties meet in Richmond on the 6th and 7th +of May. Perhaps it may be best for Congress to await their action +before determining the question. . . . " + +The newspaper clipping inclosed in the above letter to General +Grant was a report of the proceedings of the Convention which +appeared in the "Richmond Dispatch" of April 18, 1868. Several +other letters to General Grant, near the same time, explained the +situation in detail. + +As was to be expected, and in spite of any influence which the +military commander could properly exert, that proposed Constitution, +like those framed in the other States, perpetuated the worst features +of the acts of Congress. It disqualified all the respectable whites +from any active part in the government, leaving the negroes and +"carpet-baggers" full sway. So sweeping was this disqualification +that in many parts of the State not a native Virginian, white or +black, could be found who could read or write, and who would be +eligible for election or appointment to any office. In my great +anxiety to save the State from so great an evil, I went to the hall +of the Convention and explained the impossibility of organizing a +government under such a Constitution, and besought the Convention +to strike out the disqualifying clause. I was listened to with +cold respect, my advice was disregarded, and promptly after my +departure the Constitution was finally adopted, and the Convention +adjourned _sine die_. + +But the State was, nevertheless, saved from the impending disaster. +The act of Congress required that the Constitution be submitted to +the people for ratification or rejection; but Congress had failed +to appropriate money to pay the expenses of an election. If an +election was to be held, the money must be taken from the treasury +of the State, by the order of the district commander, or else +Congress must make a special appropriation for that purpose. I +declined to sanction the use of the people's money for any such +purpose, refused to order an election for ratification or rejection +of the obnoxious Constitution, and referred the matter to Congress, +with a recommendation that the people be authorized to vote separately +on the disqualifying clause--a privilege which the Convention had +denied. + + HOW ITS WORST FEATURE WAS NULLIFIED + +The radicals in Congress were so glad, apparently, of this mode of +escape from a result so obnoxious to the better sense of the Union +people at that time, that not a voice was raised in favor of the +"carpet-bag" Constitution or in disapprobation of my action in +regard to it. The instrument was permitted to rest quietly in the +pigeonhole of the district commander's desk until the next year. +Then an act was passed providing for submitting that Constitution +to the people of Virginia, with the privilege of voting separately +on the disfranchising clause, which clause they, of course, rejected. +Thus Virginia was saved from the vile government and spoilation +which cursed the other Southern States, and which the same radical +Congress and its successors sustained until the decent public +sentiment of the North would endure them no longer. + +It is, perhaps, not too much to say that if the other district +commanders had in like manner refused to make themselves parties +to the spoilation of the people placed under their charge, Congress +would have shrunk from the direct act of imposing upon them such +obnoxious governments, and the country might have been saved the +disgrace of the eight years of carpet-bag rule in the South. At +least it is certain that a large proportion of the more moderate +among the Republican majority in Congress at that time indulged +the hope that respectable governments might be organized under the +acts of Congress. But they made this difficult, if not impossible, +when they gave their assent to the amendment of those acts, prepared +by the extremest radicals, depriving the Southern whites of any +active part in the organization of their governments. Impartial +justice, as expressed in "impartial suffrage," might have led to +tolerable results even in those States where the blacks were in +the majority. But under a law which gave universal suffrage to +the blacks and disfranchised the influential whites, any tolerable +result was impossible unless under the administration of a man who +had the independence and courage to disarm such a law of its +poisonous sting. However this may be, it is certain that Virginia +owes its escape from the sad fate of her sister States to the action +of her district commander, who has abundant reason for the belief +that the good people of that State fully appreciated the fact. + + APPOINTED SECRETARY OF WAR + +With this service to the people of Virginia, my duty in that State +practically terminated. The impeachment trial of President Johnson +had reached its crisis. It had become evident to those who were +wise enough to discern the "signs of the times" that the Senate +would probably not sustain the articles of impeachment by the +necessary two-thirds majority. This would leave unsettled the +quarrel between the President and Congress over the War Department, +and that on the eve of an exciting Presidential election, in which +several of the newly reconstructed States were expected to take +part. In not one of these States was the new government able to +stand alone or to preserve the peace within its borders. A firm +and impartial administration of the War Department in the sole +interest of peace and order during the coming contest was the one +indispensable want of the country. Without that, a revival of +civil strife seemed inevitable. Under these circumstances, I was +urged to accept the office of Secretary of War, with the assurance +that in this way the contest which endangered the peace of the +country could be adjusted. I gave my consent, the nomination was +promptly sent to the Senate, and that body, in spite of its very +large majority in opposition to the President, confirmed the +appointment with almost entire unanimity. The impeachment was +dismissed, and that dangerous farce, which had come within one or +two votes of inflicting lasting disgrace upon the country, happily +came to an end. + +Upon the inauguration of the newly elected President in March, +1869, I laid down the war portfolio without having incurred censure +from either party for any of my official acts, and with the +approbation of all for impartial discharge of duty. But, apparently +lest such a thing might possibly happen again, Congress made haste +to pass a law prohibiting any army officer from thereafter holding +any civil office whatever! In 1895 that law was so modified as +not to apply to officers on the retired list! It is a singular +coincidence that I had just then been retired. + +[( 1) The presidents of Boards of Registration were army officers +detailed by me for that duty.] + + +CHAPTER XXII +Differences Between the Commanding General of the Army and the War +Department--General Grant's Special Powers--His Appointment as +Secretary of War _Ad interim_--The Impeachment of President Johnson +--Memorandum of Interviews with William M. Evarts and General Grant +in Regard to the Secretaryship of War--Failure of the Impeachment +Trial--Harmony in the War Department--A New Policy at Army +Headquarters. + +During nearly the entire history of the government of the United +States the relations between the general-in-chief, or nominal +commanding general of the army, and the War Department have been +the cause of discord, sometimes descending to bitter personal +controversy, and in a few instances leading to very serious results. + +The differences between General Scott and the Secretary became so +serious that the general removed his headquarters from Washington +to New York, and remained away from the capital several years, +until the time when civil war was imminent. General Sherman also +found it necessary to escape from an intolerable situation by +removing to St. Louis, and did not return to Washington until the +condition of the War Department led to the impeachment of the +Secretary of War. During their long absence from the capital +neither of these generals could exercise any appreciable influence +over either the administration or the command of the army. It is +thought to be worthy of note that during one of these periods of +absence of the general-in-chief the military resources of the +country were mostly placed within easy reach of those about to +engage in an effort to break up the Union, and that during the +other period corruption in the War Department led to impeachment. +It is no reflection upon the many eminent, patriotic citizens who +have held the war portfolio to say that the very few men who have +proved unworthy of that great trust would have been much less likely +to do serious harm to the public interests if they had been under +the watchful eye of a jealous old soldier, like Scott or Sherman, +who was not afraid of them. + + THE COMMANDING GENERAL AND THE WAR DEPARTMENT + +As hereafter explained, the controversy between General Grant and +the Secretary of War was the primary cause which finally led to +the impeachment of the President of the United States. The cause +of this trouble has seemed to be inherent in the form and character +of the government. An essential provision of the Constitution +makes the President commander-in-chief of the army and navy. It +is manifestly indispensable that the executive head of a government +be clothed with this authority. Yet the President is not, as a +rule, a man of military education or experience. The exigencies +of party politics also seem to require, in general, that the +Secretary of War be a party politician, equally lacking with the +President in qualifications for military command. + +The art of war has in all ages called forth the highest order of +genius and character, the great captains of the world having been +esteemed as among the greatest men. So, also, and in continually +increasing degree in modern times, the military art has called for +scientific education of the very highest character, supplemented +by practical experience. It cannot be questioned that the military +profession requires ability, education, and practical training no +less than the legal or any other profession. A Supreme Court of +the United States composed of merchants and bankers would be no +more of an anomaly than a body of general and staff officers of +like composition. The general policy of our government seems to +be based upon a recognition of this self-evident principle. We +have a national military academy and other military schools inferior +to none in the world, and well-organized staff departments which +are thoroughly efficient in war as well as in peace. The laws also +provide a due proportion of subordinate general officers for the +command of geographical departments in time of peace, or of divisions +and brigades in the field in time of war. But no provision is made +for an actual military commander of the entire army either in peace +or in war. During only a single year since the adoption of the +Constitution of the United States has this not been the fact. In +pursuance of a special act of Congress and the orders of President +Lincoln, General Grant in fact commanded "all the armies of the +United States" during the last year of the Civil War; but at no +other time has there been an actual military commander of the army +or armies whose authority as such was recognized by the War +Department. + +Why, it may be asked, this strange departure from the recognized +rule of organization in all governmental and business affairs? +Why provide educated and trained experts for all subordinate +positions, and none for the head or chief, vastly the most important +of all? + +In the first place, it is important to observe that the matter +rests absolutely in the hands of the President. Congress has no +power in the matter. To create by law a military head for the army +would be a violation of the essential provision of the Constitution +which makes the President commander-in-chief. + + GENERAL GRANT'S SPECIAL POWERS + +In the case of General Grant, Congress fully recognized this fact, +saying: "Under the direction and during the pleasure of the +President" he "may" command the armies of the United States. Even +this, if intended as conveying authority to the President, was +superfluous, and if intended as more than that would have been +unconstitutional. In fact, it was only a suggestion, intended to +be entirely within the limits of constitutional propriety, of what +was the general opinion of the people and of Congress, that after +three years of failure the President ought to select a soldier and +put him in actual command of all the armies. The President then +went far beyond the suggestion of Congress, and even to the extreme +limit of military abdication. He not only gave General Grant +absolute, independent command, placing at his disposal all the +military resources of the country, but he even denied to himself +any knowledge whatever of the general's plans. In this patriotic +act of extreme self-abnegation President Lincoln undoubtedly acted +in exact accord with what he believed to be the expressed popular +opinion, and probably in accord with his own judgment and inclination; +for no one could have been more painfully aware than he had by +that time become of the absolute necessity of having a military +man actually in control of all the armies, or more desirous than +he of relief from a responsibility to which he and his advisers +had proved so unequal. But it must be admitted that in this +President Lincoln went beyond the limit fixed by his constitutional +obligation as commander-in-chief. He would have more exactly +fulfilled that obligation if he had endeavored faithfully to +comprehend and adopt as his own all the plans proposed by his chosen +and trusted general-in-chief, guarding the latter against all +possible interference, theretofore so pernicious, from the War +Department or any other source. By such means the President could +have actually exercised the chief command imposed upon him by the +Constitution, sharing in due measure with his chief military officer +the responsibilities imposed by their high offices. In no other +way, it is believed, can the duties imposed upon a constitutional +commander-in-chief who is not possessed of military education and +experience be fully and conscientiously performed. Indeed, such +is the method pursued by great military sovereigns all over the +world, except in a few instances where the monarch believes himself, +either truly or falsely, superior in military ability to his chief +of staff. It is only in this country, where the chief of state +has generally no military training, and his war minister the same, +that a chief of staff of the army is supposed to be unnecessary. +While it is easy to understand the reasons which led to the action +of the government in the spring of 1864, it is much less easy to +understand why some reasonable approximation to that course, as +above suggested, and in accord with the practice of all military +nations, has never been adopted as a permanent system in this +country. Perhaps it may be like the case of that citizen of Arkansas +who did not mend the roof of his house when it was not raining +because it did not then need mending. But it would seem the part +of wisdom to perfect the military system so far as practicable in +time of peace rather then continue a fruitless controversy over +the exact location of an undefined and undefinable line supposed +to separate the military administration from the command in the +army, or the functions of the Secretary of War from those of the +commanding general. The experience of many years has shown that +the Secretary was sure to get on both sides of that line, no matter +where it was drawn. But it is encouraging to note that some +experiments made in more recent years, in the direction of the +generally recognized sound military system, have not proved by any +means unsatisfactory. + + GENERAL GRANT'S SPECIAL POWERS + +This chronic controversy between the military administration and +the command once gave rise to one of the most dangerous crises in +American history. The facts in respect to the origin of that crisis +soon became obscured by other events, and have never been correctly +published. + +The assassination of President Lincoln occurred a very short time +before the end of the Civil War. It appears that his successor in +the Presidential office did not withdraw any part of the supreme +authority which had been conferred upon General Grant by President +Lincoln a year before. Nevertheless, Secretary Stanton, who had +very reluctantly yielded to President Lincoln's order, began, soon +after the end of hostile operations, to resume the exercise of +those functions which had formerly been claimed as belonging to the +War Department, and which had been suspended by President Lincoln. +Stanton "boldly took command of the armies."( 1) By this General +Grant was deeply offended, and finally declared that the action of +the Secretary of War was intolerable; although he refers to it in +his "Memoirs" as "another little spat." The authority which Stanton +assumed was the constitutional authority of the commander-in-chief +of the army, a large part of which authority had been delegated by +the President to General Grant, not to Secretary Stanton. Hence +the Secretary's assumption was offensive alike to the general and +to the President. General Grant acted with great forbearance, and +endeavored to obtain from Secretary Stanton due recognition of his +rightful authority as general commanding the army, but with no +permanent effect.( 2) + +General Grant opposed the removal of Mr. Stanton by the exercise +of the President's prerogative alone, for the reason, with others, +that such action would be in violation of the Tenure-of-Office +Act.( 3) He also objected at first to either removal or suspension, +mainly for fear that an objectionable appointment might be made in +Stanton's place.( 4) But those two objections being removed by +Johnson's tender of the appointment to Grant himself, _vice_ Stanton +suspended instead of removed, General Grant gave his full countenance +and support to President Johnson in the _suspension_ of Mr. Stanton, +with a view on the part of the President to his ultimate removal, +either with the concurrence of the Senate or through a judicial +decision that the Tenure-of-Office Act was, as Johnson claimed, +unconstitutional.( 5) + +On August 12, 1867, Grant himself accepted the appointment of +Secretary of War _ad interim_, and informed Stanton that he had +done so. Stanton denied the right of the President to suspend him +without the consent of the Senate, but wrote to the President, and +to the same effect to General Grant: "But inasmuch as the general +commanding the armies of the United States has been appointed _ad +interim_, and has notified me that he has accepted the appointment, +I have no alternative but to submit, under protest, to superior +force." + +In 1866, 1867, and 1868 General Grant talked to me freely several +times of his differences with Secretary Stanton. His most emphatic +declaration on that subject, and of his own intended action in +consequence, appears from the records to have been made after +Stanton's return to the War Office in January, 1868, when his +conduct was even more offensive to Grant than it had been before +Stanton's suspension in August, 1867, and when Grant and Sherman +were trying to get Stanton out of the War Office.( 6) At the time +of General Grant's visit to Richmond, Va., as one of the Peabody +trustees, he said to me that the conduct of Mr. Stanton had become +intolerable to him, and, after asking my opinion, declared in +emphatic terms his intention to demand either the removal of Stanton +or the acceptance of his own resignation. But the bitter personal +controversy which immediately followed between Grant and Johnson, +the second attempt to remove Stanton in February, 1868, and the +consequent impeachment of the President, totally eclipsed the more +distant and lesser controversy between Grant and Stanton, and, +doubtless, prevented Grant from taking the action in respect to +Stanton's removal which he informed me in Richmond he intended to +take.( 7) + + GRANT AS SECRETARY OF WAR _AD INTERIM_ + +Of the impeachment and trial of President Johnson it is not my +province to write. My special knowledge relates only to its first +cause, above referred to, and its termination, both intimately +connected with the history of the War Department, the necessities +of which department, real or supposed, constituted the only vital +issue involved in the impeachment trial. The following memorandum, +made by me at the time, and now published with the consent of Mr. +Evarts, explains the circumstances under which I became Secretary +of War in 1868, and the connection of that event with the termination +of the impeachment trial: + + "Memorandum +"May, 1868 + +"In compliance with a written request from Mr. W. M. Evarts, dated +Tuesday, April 21, 1868, 2 P. M., I called upon that gentleman in +his room at Willard's Hotel, Washington, a few minutes before three +o'clock P. M. of the same day. + +"Mr. Evarts introduced conversation by saying something about the +approaching trial of Mr. Jefferson Davis, but quickly said that +was not what he wished to see me about. The business upon which +he wished to see me was of vastly greater importance, involving +the safety of the country and the maintenance of the Constitution. +Mr. Evarts then asked my consent that the President might at any +time before the close of the impeachment trial send my nomination +to the Senate as Secretary of War in place of Mr. Stanton. I asked +upon what ground, and for what reasons, the proposition was made, +which question was then answered in part, and in the evening of +the same day more fully, as hereafter related. It having been +announced that General Grant was waiting at the door for me, this +first interview was cut short with an agreement to renew it about +eight o'clock the same evening. Before separating I asked Mr. +Evarts whether I was at liberty to mention the subject to any other +person. Mr. Evarts replied: 'I suppose you mean General Grant.' +I said: 'Yes, my relations with General Grant, and his with the +President, are such that I do not wish to act in such a matter +without consulting him.' Mr. Evarts said he could not give consent +that any persons should be informed that such a proposition had +been made on behalf of the President, and suggested some objections +to consulting General Grant on the subject, for the reason of his +being a candidate for the Presidency, but finally intimated that +it might be well to talk to General Grant about it incidentally, +and thus learn his views. + + INTERVIEWS WITH EVARTS AND GRANT + +"While walking with General Grant after dinner the same day, I said +to him, in effect, that I had reason to believe that a proposition +like to one referred to above would probably be made to me, and +that upon the theory, as I understood, that the President would +not be convicted by the Senate, and I asked General Grant's opinion +in regard to it. General Grant replied that he had supposed there +was no reasonable doubt of the President's removal, but if that +was not the case, or if it were, he (General Grant) would be glad +to have me as Secretary of War during the remainder of the term; +that Mr. Wade would have some difficulty in making up a cabinet +for so short a portion of a term. + +"About eight o'clock P. M. of the same day (April 21) I again called +upon Mr. Evarts at the hotel, when a long conversation took place +upon the subject referred to in the morning. The substance of what +Mr. Evarts said was as follows: He was fully satisfied that the +President could not be convicted upon the evidence; if he was +removed, it would be done wholly from supposed party necessity; +that this was the opinion and feeling of a considerable number of +the ablest lawyers and statesmen among the Republican senators; +that it was his and their opinion that if the President was removed, +it would be not really from anything he had done, but for fear of +what he might do; that he (Mr. Evarts) did not believe the President +could possibly be convicted in any event, but that senators were +at a loss how to remove the apprehensions of the Republican party +as to what the President would do in case of acquittal, unless the +War Department was placed in a satisfactory condition in advance. +He said: 'A majority of Republicans in both houses of Congress +and throughout the country now regret the commencement of the +impeachment proceedings, since they find how slight is the evidence +of guilty intent. But now the serious question is, how to get out +of the scrape? A judgment of guilty and removal of the President +would be ruinous to the party, and cause the political death of +every senator who voted for it as soon as the country has time to +reflect upon the facts and appreciate the frivolous character of +the charges upon which the removal must be based. The precedent +of the impeachment and removal of the President for political +reasons would be exceedingly dangerous to the government and the +Constitution; in short, the emergency is one of great national +peril.' + +"He added that this was the view of the case entertained by several +among the most prominent Republican senators, and that from such +senators came the suggestion that my nomination as Secretary of +War be sent to the Senate, in order that the Senate might vote upon +the President's case in the light of that nomination. Mr. Evarts +believed that I was so named because my appointment would be +satisfactory to General Grant, and would give the Republican party +a sense of security as to the President's future action in reference +to the War Department and the military districts of the South; that +it was not with anybody a question of friendship or hostility toward +the President personally, for he really had no friends. That while +the Democrats in the Senate would of course vote for his acquittal, +and do their whole duty in the case, just so soon as he was removed +they would rejoice that it was done, feeling confident that it +would cause the overthrow of the Republican party and the defeat +of General Grant. Mr. Evarts was not at liberty to mention names +of senators holding these views and originating the proposition of +my nomination. + +"I suggested a number of objections, some personal as to myself, +and others of a public character, to giving my assent to the proposed +nomination, in reply to which objections many of the above statements +by Mr. Evarts were made. I then said I would again talk with +General Grant upon the subject, and give a definite reply the next +morning. About eleven o'clock the same night (April 21) I informed +General Grant at his house that the proposition above named had +been (or it would be) made to me; that it originated with Republican +senators; and I gave in substance the reasons above stated as what +I understood to be the grounds upon which the proposition was made. +I did not give any names of senators, nor the channel through which +my information or the proposition came. My remarks to General +Grant were prefaced by the statement that while I would be glad of +General Grant's advice if he felt at liberty to give it, I did not +wish to ask General Grant to commit himself in so delicate a matter +unless he desired to do so; but that the matter was one of so great +importance that I thought it my duty to tell him all about it, and +what I believed I ought to do, and leave General Grant to advise +me or not, as he thought best. I said that although the statement +of the views and wishes of senators above referred to came to me +indirectly, they came in such a way as not to permit me to doubt +their correctness, and I believed it my duty to yield to the request. +General Grant at once replied that under those circumstances he +did not see how I could do otherwise. General Grant said he did +not believe in any compromise of the impeachment question. The +President ought to be convicted or acquitted fairly and squarely +on the facts proved. That if he was acquitted, as soon as Congress +adjourned he would trample the laws under foot and do whatever he +pleased; that Congress would have to remain in session all summer +to protect the country from the lawless acts of the President; that +the only limit to his violation of law had been, and would be, his +courage, which had been very slight heretofore, but would be vastly +increased by his escape from punishment. General Grant said he +would not believe any pledge or promise Mr. Johnson might make in +regard to his future conduct. In his opinion, the only safe course, +and the most popular one, would be to remove the President. He +could understand the grounds of apprehension in the minds of some +leading Republicans, but he did not agree with them. He believed +the safest and wisest course was the bold and direct one. In this +General Grant was very emphatic; he said he would not advise me to +enter into any project to compromise the impeachment question, but +if the facts were as represented that I could not well do otherwise +than to acquiesce in the nomination. + + INTERVIEWS WITH EVARTS AND GRANT + +"The next morning (April 22), about ten o'clock, I called upon Mr. +Evarts at Willard's Hotel, and informed him that I had considered +the matter as carefully as I was able to do, and that there was +only one difficulty in my mind. That was as to what would be the +policy of the President during the remainder of his term, in the +event of his being acquitted. I mentioned some of the President's +recent acts, such as the creation of the Military Division of the +Atlantic, disregard of military usage in sending orders to army +officers out of the regular channels, etc.--acts for which no good +reason could be given, and which at least tended to create discord +and trouble. Mr. Evarts replied that he could not tell anything +about those matters, but presumed that such annoying irregularities +would disappear with the removal of their cause, namely, hostility +between the President and the Secretary of War. Mr. Evarts said +he did not see how I could satisfy myself of that subject without +a personal interview with the President, which would not be advisable +in the circumstances. I then said I did not expect any pledge from +the President, and did not expect to receive any communication from +him on the subject, either directly or indirectly; and that I was +not willing to converse with the President, nor with any other +person except Mr. Evarts, on the subject; but that I wished the +President to understand distinctly the conditions upon which I was +willing to accept the appointment, and desired Mr. Evarts to inform +the President of these conditions. If the nomination was then +made, I would take it for granted that the conditions were +satisfactory. I then said I had always been treated kindly by the +President, and felt kindly toward him; that I had always advised +him, whenever any excuse had been given for offering advice, to +avoid all causes of irritation with Congress, and try to act in +harmony with the legislative department; that I regarded the removal +of Mr. Stanton, in the way it was done, as wrong and unwise; that +I understood this proposition as coming originally from the Republican +side of the Senate, and as being accepted by the President in the +interest of peace, and for the purpose of securing harmony between +the legislative and executive departments of the government, and +a just and faithful administration of the laws, including the +reconstruction acts. I added: 'And the President knows from +General Schofield's acts what he means by this,--if, after these +conditions have been fully stated to the President, he sends my +name to the Senate, I will deem it my duty to say nothing on the +subject of accepting or declining the appointment until the Senate +has acted upon it.' + +"Mr. Evarts intimated that the above was satisfactory, and the +interview then ended." + +I returned to Richmond on Thursday, April 23, being then in command +in Virginia, executing the reconstruction acts. On the 24th the +President sent to the Senate my nomination as Secretary of War. +On the morning of the 26th I received from General Grant a confidential +letter, dated April 25, advising me under the circumstances to +decline the secretaryship in advance.( 8) + +To the above letter I sent the following letters in reply: + + "(Confidential.) + "Richmond, Va., April 26, 1868. +"Dear General: I regret exceedingly that your advice came too +late. I have already promised not to decline the nomination in +advance of any action of the Senate. + + "Yours very truly, + "J. M. Schofield, Bvt. Maj.-Gen. +"Gen'l Grant, Washington, D. C." + + "Richmond, Va., April 26, 1868. +"Dear General: I see from the papers that the President has +nominated me to the Senate as Secretary of War. You are aware that +I do not want that office; yet under existing circumstances, if +the Senate should wish me to serve I could not decline. I presume +my nomination will not be confirmed, but have no right to act upon +any such presumption. + + "Yours very truly, + "J. M. Schofield, Bvt. Maj.-Gen. +"Gen'l Grant, Washington, D. C." + + FAILURE OF THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL + +I have no means of knowing to what extent, if any, the Senate was +influenced by this nomination, but anxiety about the ultimate result +seemed to be soon allayed. About a month later a vote was taken +in the Senate, and the impeachment failed; my nomination was then +confirmed, as stated at the time, by a nearly unanimous vote of +the Senate. + +I entered upon the duties of the office as Secretary of War on the +first day of June, and continued to discharge them until a few days +after General Grant's inauguration in March. I was greeted very +cordially by the President, by all the members of his cabinet, by +General Grant, and by a large number of senators who called upon +me at the War Department. + +The duties devolved upon me were often of a very delicate character, +and it required at times no little tact to avoid serious trouble. +President Johnson's views were sometimes in direct conflict with +those which I felt compelled to maintain under the acts of Congress +affecting the States lately in rebellion; but it is due to the +memory of President Johnson to say that he did not at any time +require me to do anything contrary to my interpretation of the acts +of Congress, and the he in general acquiesced without objection in +all the measures I deemed necessary to preserve the peace and secure +a fair vote of the newly enfranchised citizens of the Southern +States in the Presidential election. The cordial assistance of +Mr. Evarts as Attorney-General was a great help to me in such +matters. When he was present I had little difficulty in respect +to the law involved in any question; but when he happened to be +absent, and I was compelled to stand alone against all the cabinet, +or all who chose to take any interest in the question, it was hard +work. But I always carried the day--at least, in act if not in +argument. The President never decided against me. He thus fulfilled +to the letter the implied promise made when he submitted my nomination +to the Senate. + +If there ever had been any real ground for the wide-spread apprehension +of criminal purpose on the part of President Johnson, certainly +all indication of any such purpose disappeared with the failure of +his impeachment and the settlement of the long-standing controversy +respecting the War Department. The so-called reconstruction laws, +which the President so emphatically condemned as being unconstitutional, +were carried out without any further objection from him; the +Presidential election in the Southern States was conducted with +perfect good order; a free ballot and a full count were secured +under the supervision and protection of the army--a thing supposed +to be so dangerous to the liberties of a free people. This and +many other examples in the history of this country, from the time +when Washington surrendered his commission to the Continental +Congress down to the present time, show that a "free people" have +nothing to fear from their army, whether regular, volunteer, or +militia; the soldiers are, in fact, among the most devoted and +loyal citizens of the republic, and thoroughly imbued with the +fundamental principle of subordination of the military to the civil +power. + + HARMONY IN THE WAR DEPARTMENT + +With General Grant my relations while in the War Department were +of the most satisfactory character. As a candidate for the +Presidency, and as President-elect, he naturally desired to be as +free as possible from the current duties of his office as general +of the army, and he was absent from Washington much of the time, +his chief of staff, General Rawlins, remaining there to promulgate +orders in his name. Thus it devolved upon me to exercise all the +functions of "commander-in-chief of the army"--functions which it +is usually attempted to divide among three,--the President, the +Secretary of War, and the general-in-chief,--without any legal +definition of the part which belongs to each. Of course "the +machine" ran very smoothly in the one case, though there had been +much friction in the other. + +In compliance with the wish of General Grant, I remained in office +under him for a few days, for the purpose of inaugurating the system +which he hoped would end the long-standing controversy between the +War Department and the headquarters of the army. The order which +was issued assigning General Sherman to command the entire army, +staff as well as line, was prepared by me under General Grant's +instructions, and the draft of the order was approved by him as +expressing the views he had maintained when he was general-in-chief. +As President he very soon yielded to the opposite views, and caused +the order to be amended accordingly. + +That General Sherman then entertained views of his authority which +were too broad, as General Grant had also done, is no doubt true; +but it ought not to have been very difficult to correct such errors. +It was easier to take away all administrative authority and all +command over the general staff of the army, and the latter course +was adopted. The ancient controversy was up to 1888 no nearer +settlement than it was in 1869, though in General Sheridan's time +some progress had been made in the persistent efforts to deprive +the general-in-chief of the little authority which had been left +to General Sherman. General Sheridan had, with his usual gallantry +and confidence, renewed the contest, but had been worsted in his +first encounter with the Secretary, and then gave up the struggle. + +Upon my assignment to the "command of the army" in 1888, I determined +to profit so far as possible by the unsatisfactory experience of +Generals Scott, Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan--at least so far as +to avoid further attempts to accomplish the impossible, which +attempts have usually the result of accomplishing little or nothing. +In fact, long study of the subject, at the instance of Generals +Grant and Sherman, earnest efforts to champion their views, and +knowledge of the causes of their failure, had led me to the conclusion +heretofore suggested, namely, that under the government of the +United States an actual military commander of the army is not +possible, unless in an extreme emergency like that which led to +the assignment of Lieutenant-General Grant in 1864; and that the +general-in-chief, or nominal commanding general, can at most be +only a "chief of staff,"--that or nothing,--whatever may be the +mere title under which he may be assigned to duty by the President. + + A NEW POLICY AT ARMY HEADQUARTERS + +As the first step in the experimental course decided upon, I sent +an order in writing to the adjutant-general, directing him never, +under any circumstances, to issue an order dictated by me, or in +my name, without first laying it before the Secretary of War; and +I made it known to all the staff that I disclaimed the right to +issue any order to the army without the knowledge of the President +or the Secretary. I also forbade the issuing of any order in my +name without my knowledge. The first rule was easy, the latter +very difficult, to enforce. I found, with no little surprise, that +the office of the "commanding general" usually learned for the +first time of routine orders issued in his name by seeing them +published in the New York papers the next day; and it was quite +difficult at first to make it distinctly understood that such a +practice could not be tolerated. In fact, it became necessary to +call attention to the question of veracity involved in such a use +of the general's name. Such was the condition the War Department +had reached. The adjutant-general had acquired the habit of issuing +nearly all his orders to the army without the knowledge of any one +of his superiors--the President, the Secretary of War, or the +general-in-chief. In fact, the adjutant-general had in practice +come very near being "commander-in-chief." + +Some time and much patience were required to bring about the +necessary change, but ere long the result became very apparent. +Perfect harmony was established between the War Department and the +headquarters of the army, and this continued, under the administrations +of Secretaries Proctor, Elkins, and Lamont, up to the time of my +retirement from active service. During all this period,--namely, +from 1889 to 1895, under the administrations of Presidents Harrison +and Cleveland,--the method I have indicated was exactly followed +by the President in all cases of such importance as to demand his +personal action, and some such cases occurred under both administrations. +The orders issued were actually the President's orders. No matter +by whom suggested or by whom formulated, they were in their final +form understandingly dictated by the President, and sent to the +army in his name by the commanding general, thus leaving no possible +ground for question as to the constitutional authority under which +they were issued, nor of the regularity of the methods, in conformity +with army regulations, by which they were communicated to the army. + +It is, I think, to be hoped that the system thus begun may be fully +developed and become permanent, as being the best practicable +solution of a long-standing and dangerous controversy, and as most +in accord with the fundamental principles of our constitutional +government, under which the President, whether a soldier or a +civilian, is in fact as well as in name the commander-in-chief of +the army and navy. + +[( 1) Grant's "Memoirs," Vol. II, p. 105.] + +[( 2) Grant's "Memoirs," Vol. II, pp. 104, 105; Sherman's "Memoirs," +second edition, Vol. II, pp. 446-450.] + +[( 3) See General Grant's letter to President Andrew Johnson, August +1, 1867, in McPherson's "History of Reconstruction," p. 307.] + +[( 4) See General Grant's letter to President Andrew Johnson, +February 3, 1868, in McPherson's "History of Reconstruction," p. +286.] + +[( 5) Sherman's "Memoirs," second edition, Vol. II, p. 241; and +McPherson's "History of Reconstruction," pp. 282-293.] + +[( 6) Sherman's "Memoirs," second edition, Vol. II, pp. 422-424.] + +[( 7) The records of the Peabody trustees show that their meeting +in Richmond, when General Grant was present, occurred January 21 +and 22, 1868.] + +[( 8) From all circumstances it is fair to assume that General +Grant's change of attitude was owing to his opinion as to the effect +the nomination would have upon the impeachment proceedings.] + + +CHAPTER XXIII +Assignment to the Department of the Missouri--A Cordial Reception +from Former Opponents in St. Louis--Origin of the Military School +at Fort Riley--Funeral of General George H. Thomas--Death of General +George G. Meade--Assigned to the Division of the Pacific--A Visit +to Hawaii--Military Men in the Exercise of Political Power--Trouble +with the Modoc Indians--The Canby Massacre. + +When I went into the War Office in 1868, the cordial greeting +extended from all quarters was exceedingly gratifying to me, and, +I thought, highly honorable to those gentlemen, especially in the +Senate, who had so long opposed me, only one of whom, I believe, +failed to call at the office and express a kindly welcome; and that +one was so great a man, in his own estimation, I flattered myself +that was the only reason he had not called to greet me. So when +I returned to St. Louis in March, 1869, the good citizens of that +place gave me a banquet and a most cordial welcome, in which all +participated, save one, of those who had seemed to be my most bitter +enemies in 1862 and 1863. It was especially noteworthy that the +Hon. Charles D. Drake, who had been chairman of the large delegation +which went to Washington, and one of the recognized leaders in the +movement, to obtain my removal from the command in Missouri, was +among the most cordial in his expressions of esteem and regard from +March, 1869, up to the time of his death, at which time I was in +command of the army. But his principal associate, the Hon. Henry +T. Blow, could not forgive me, for what thing especially I do not +know, unless for my offense in arresting a "loyal" editor, for +which he denounced me in a telegram to the President. That was, +no doubt, a very grave offense, but a natural one for a young +soldier. Indeed, old as I am now, and much sad experience as I +have had with the press, I would probably do the same thing again. +That "loyal" editor, professing the greatest zeal for the Union +cause and devotion to the National Government, had published, in +a city under martial law, a confidential letter from the President, +the commander-in-chief of the army, to the commanding general of +that department. The ever kind and indulgent President was only +too willing to overlook such an offense on the part of one who +professed to be a friend of the Union. But a soldier could not +overlook such an outrage as that upon his commander-in-chief, and +upon the cause he was sworn to defend. Though his respect for a +free press be profound, there are some kinds of freedom which must, +in time of war, be crushed, even though the soldier himself may +also be crushed. A soldier who is not ready to meet his fate in +that way, as well as in battle, is not fit to command. + + ASSIGNMENT TO THE DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI + +In President Grant's order of March, 1869, assigning the general +officers to commands, the Department of the Missouri again fell to +my lot. I relieved Lieutenant-General Sheridan, who took command +of the Division of the Missouri, and removed his headquarters from +St. Louis to Chicago, which then became for the first time the +principal military center of all the Western country. These +arrangements were intended to be as nearly permanent as practicable, +so that all might have a period of comparative rest after the eight +years of war and strife. I then reverted, for the first time in +those eight years, to the thoughts and ambitions of my youth and +young manhood, for I had grown much older in that time. First was +the ambition, inherited from my grandfather McAllister, to acquire +a farm big enough to keep all the neighbors at a respectful distance. +In company with my brother and another officer, I bought in Colorado +a ranch about ten miles square, and projected some farming and +stock-raising on a large scale. My dream was to prepare a place +where I could, ere long, retire from public life and pass the +remainder of my days in peace and in the enjoyment of all those +out-of-door sports which were always so congenial to me. But events +"over which I had no control" soon defeated that scheme. That, +like all the other plans of my own invention, came to naught. The +ranch was sold, and I got out of it, as I always tried to do, about +as much as I had put in. + +Upon a suggestion from General Henry J. Hunt, the famous chief of +artillery, when I was in the War Department, I ordered a light- +artillery school to be established at Fort Riley, Kansas. Also, +upon his suggestion, I directed that the four batteries which were +to compose that school should be supplied with carbines, so that +they might serve as cavalry when necessary to protect the neighboring +settlements against Indian raids, and thus overcome any objection +which might be urged on the ground that the barracks at Fort Riley +were needed for cavalry. The school was organized, under Colonel +John Hamilton; the batteries did good service as cavalry in the +summers of 1869 and 1870; and all was working, as I thought, in a +highly satisfactory manner so long as I remained in command of that +department. But after I went to California, for some inscrutable +reason the school was broken up and the batteries again scattered +to separate posts. + + ORIGIN OF THE MILITARY SCHOOL AT FORT RILEY + +When that department again came under by command, as part of the +Division of the Missouri, and General Sheridan was in command of +the army, a move was made by somebody to get possession of that +splendid military reservation of Fort Riley for some other purpose. +Hence it became necessary to manifest in some more striking way +the importance of that place for military uses. The occasion had +again come for carrying out that scheme which Hunt and I had devised +for doing what was so much needed for the artillery. Fortunately, +General Sheridan wanted also to do something beneficial for the +cavalry, in which he felt much the same special interest that I +did in the artillery. So a sort of alliance, offensive and defensive, +was formed, which included as its most active and influential member +Senator Plumb of Kansas, to obtain the necessary funds and build +a suitable post and establish at Fort Riley a school of cavalry +and light artillery. The result finally attained, when I was in +command of the army, is well known, and is an honor to the country. + +The department headquarters were removed to St. Louis during the +winter of 1869-70 to make room at Fort Leavenworth for the cavalry +who had been on the plains during the summer. I then had the +pleasure of renewing the intimate friendships which had been formed +between 1860 and 1863 in that most hospitable city. Even those +ties which had been so rudely severed by war in the spring of 1861 +were restored and became as strong as ever. I found that the memory +of a little humanity displayed in mitigating somewhat the horrors +of war had sufficed to obliterate in those few years the recollection +of a bitter sectional enmity; while, on the other hand, a record +of some faithful service far enough from their eyes to enable them +to see it without the aid of a microscope, and the cooler judgment +of a few years of peace, had so far obscured the partizan contests +of a period of war that none were more cordial friends in 1869 than +those who had seemed bitterest enemies six years before. Human +nature is not half so bad as it sometimes pretends to be. As a +rule, it would be pretty good all the time if men could only keep +cool. Among all the enjoyments of that season in St. Louis, that +which left the deepest impression on my memory, as has always been +the case with me, was the sport at Hat Island, under the management +of that most genial of companions, Ben Stickney. We hunted with +hounds before breakfast every morning, and shot water-fowl from +breakfast till supper. What was done after supper has never been +told. What conclusive evidence of the "reversionary" tendency in +civilized man to a humbler state! He never feels so happy as when +he throws off a large part of his civilization and reverts to the +life of a semi-savage. The only thing that saves him from total +relapse is the fact that he takes with him those little comforts, +both liquid and solid, which cannot be found in the woods. He thus +keeps up the taste that finally draws him back again to a civilized, +or, more accurately, semi-civilized life. If any sportsman knows +any better reason than that for not living like a savage when in +his hunting-camp, I would like him to give that reason to me! + +We returned to Fort Leavenworth in the spring, and expected to make +that our permanent home. Some necessary improvements had been made +in the quarters during the winter, and no one could have desired +a more comfortable residence, more congenial companionship, or more +agreeable occupation than that of guarding and protecting the infant +settlements of industrious but unarmed and confiding people rapidly +spreading far out upon the plains. With my cavalry and carbined +artillery encamped in front, I wanted no other occupation in life +than to ward off the savage and kill off his food until there should +no longer be an Indian frontier in our beautiful country. + + FUNERAL OF GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS + +But soon after my pickets were put out on the plains, there came +the sad news of the sudden death, in San Francisco, of my old +commander, General George H. Thomas. His body was brought east to +Troy, New York, for interment. All his old companions, including +President Grant, assembled to pay the last tribute of respect and +honor to that noble old soldier, whose untimely death was deeply +mourned by all. It was a most impressive scene, All the high +commanders of the vast army which had been disbanded five years +before assembled around the grave of one of their number. The hero +was buried, as he had lived, honored by all who knew him, and +mourned by the nation he had so faithfully served. + +Immediately after the funeral of General Thomas there was, if I +recollect rightly, a large assembly, in Philadelphia, of the Society +of the Army of the Potomac. General Grant and General Sherman were +there, and we met at an early dinner at the house of General Meade, +who had been designated by General Sherman to succeed General Thomas +in command of the Division of the Pacific. After dinner General +Meade took me to drive through Fairmount Park, in which he was +greatly interested as president of the commission having it in +charge. He explained to me the great sacrifice he would make in +giving up command of the Division of the Atlantic, and his congenial +occupation and pleasant home in Philadelphia, where he was best +known and most highly respected, and where, as I could see in +driving along, almost everybody recognized and saluted him. I +thought he had indeed better reason to feel satisfied with his home +than any other man I had known. But he, too, great and brave +soldier, was given but little longer to enjoy the high honors he +had so nobly won in command of the Army of the Potomac. When I +had so far recovered from a severe attack of pneumonia as to be +permitted to look for the first time at a morning paper, one of +the first things that attracted by attention was the death of +General Meade, from the same disease, the day before. + +Of course the President did not hesitate to accede to General +Meade's desire, for he had given him, only a year before, the +division of his choice. As is well known, the relations between +General Meade and General Hancock were not at that time quite +satisfactory. As I knew the exact truth at the time, I think it +my duty to state that General Grant believed that General Hancock +had not at one time shown that degree of subordination which a +soldier ought always to feel. But to the honor of both be it said +that their difference was ere long removed, and General Hancock +was assigned to command the Division of the Atlantic, according to +his rank. In the meantime, it fell my lot to take the Division of +the Pacific, which I had a year before gladly relinquished in favor +of General Thomas. + +Soon after my arrival in San Francisco, General Sherman met me +there, and we went together, by sea, to Oregon, where we met General +Canby, then commanding the Department of the Columbia. We ascended +the Columbia River to Umatilla, and rode by stage from that place +to Kelton, on the Central Pacific Railroad, seven hundred and fifty +miles. After a visit to Salt Lake City, we returned to St. Louis, +where I had some work to complete as president of a board on tactics +and small arms, upon the completion of which I returned to San +Francisco. + +In the summer of 1871, after the great earthquake of that year, I +made a trip across the Sierra to Camp Independence, which had been +destroyed, to consider the question of rebuilding that post. Of +the buildings, brick or adobe, not one remained in condition to be +occupied. Very fortunately, all in the garrison had received timely +warning from the first shock, so that none were injured by the +second and third shocks, which tumbled everything to the ground. +Some thirty people living in small adobe houses in Owens River +valley were killed. Sounds like heavy artillery in the distance +were still heard at intervals after our arrival. For many miles +along the length of the valley a great crevasse had been formed by +the upheaval, which must have been many feet in height. In the +subsidence one side had fallen several feet lower than the other, +and at a place where the crack crossed the wagon-tracks a horizontal +motion of several feet had taken place, the road marking its +permanent effect. + + ASSIGNED TO THE DIVISION OF THE PACIFIC + +We ascended Owens River valley to the source of that stream, +recrossed the mountains by the "bloody" canon, and descended through +the great Yosemite valley, which from the higher altitude looked +like a little "hole in the ground." That was the least interesting +of all my four visits to that wonderful work of nature. Our round +trip occupied about seven weeks. + +At our last camp, in Tuolumne meadows, some time in August, after +the temperature had been above eighty degrees in the daytime, it +fell below thirty at night. I contracted a cold which developed +into pneumonia, from which I did not recover for many months. It +was during my convalescence that I went with Colonel B. S. Alexander +to the Hawaiian Islands, under an arrangement previously made with +the War Department. + +It was the year 1872 when I and Colonel Alexander, the senior +engineer officer on the Pacific coast, who had applied to the War +Department and obtained an order to visit the Hawaiian Islands for +the purpose of reporting to the War Department, confidentially, +the value of those islands to the United States for military and +naval purposes, went to Hawaii with Rear-Admiral Pennock on the +flag-ship _California_, and returned, three months later, on the +war-steamer _Benicia_. During our stay we visited the largest +island of the group,--Hawaii,--and its principal seaport,--Hilo,-- +and the great crater of Kilauea. We made a careful examination of +the famous harbor of Pearl River, in the island of Oahu, a few +miles from Honolulu, including a survey of the entrance to that +harbor and an estimate of the cost of cutting a deep ship-channel +through the coral reef at the extremity of that entrance toward +the sea. + +At that time the young king Lunalilo had just ascended the throne +made vacant by the death of the last of the ancient reigning house +of Hawaii. The policy of the preceding king had been annexation +to the United States; but the new sovereign and his advisers were +opposed to that policy, although very friendly to Americans, and +largely controlled by their influence in governmental affairs. It +was manifest that the question of annexation ought not to be +discussed at that time, but that action ought to be taken at once +to secure to the United States the exclusive right to the use of +Pearl River harbor for naval purposes, and to prepare the way to +make annexation to the United States sure in due time. This could +readily be done by making such concessions in favor of the products +of Hawaiian industries as would develop the resources of the islands +and increase their wealth, all of which would be to the ultimate +benefit of the United States when the islands should become a part +of this country. + + A VISIT TO HAWAII + +The continuous and rapid decay of all the ancient families of +chiefs, from which alone would the people ever think of electing +a king or a queen, and the notorious corruption in blood and +character of the few remaining half-castes nominally belonging to +those ancient families, made it plain to all that the monarchical +government must soon die a natural death, or become so intolerably +corrupt as to make its overthrow inevitable. Americans by birth +or descent were then, and had been for a long time, the controlling +element in the government. While perfectly faithful to that +government, they had lost none of their love for their native +country, and looked forward with confidence to the time when the +islands, like ripe fruit, should fall into the lap of their beloved +mother. These American Hawaiians were men of very high character, +and much above the average of intelligence even in this country. +They had no desire to force the ripening of the fruit, but were +perfectly content to bide the course of nature, which must of +necessity produce the result in no long time. + +It seems to me a very narrow view of the intelligence of the people +of this country which suggests any serious difficulty in the +government of outlying possessions which are essentially military +and naval outposts simply because their heterogeneous populations +are not yet capable of self-government, or fit for admission to +the Union as a State. If the Territorial system to which the +country is accustomed is not appropriate in any special case, and +the prejudice against a military government is regarded as +insurmountable, we have an example in the present government of +the District of Columbia,--one of the best and most economical in +the world,--which would require very slight modification to make +it perfectly applicable to any of the islands of the Atlantic, the +Pacific, or the gulf which may be acquired by this country. I do +not believe any man worthy of the title of statesman will admit +for a moment that the United States cannot govern, and govern well, +any national outposts or other possessions which the interests of +the country may require it to hold. In fact, it seems an almost +self-evident proposition that a government, under exclusive national +authority, exercised over comparatively small districts of country +and small population, under the constant observation of the people +and public press of the entire country, is more likely to be just +and pure than any other. Responsibility to a local constituency +undoubtedly has great advantages, but responsibility to the government +and entire people of the United States has vastly greater. + +When it was proposed to me in Virginia, in 1867, that I become a +candidate for the United States Senate under the State government +which I was trying to "reconstruct," I replied that in my opinion +the highest qualification I possessed for that difficult duty I +was then required to perform resided in the fact that there was +"nothing in the gift of Virginia which I could afford to accept." +I believe now that the highest external incentive to honorable +conduct anywhere in the world is that of responsibility to the +government and the whole people of the United States. There need +be no apprehension that any American who has a national reputation +at stake will be guilty of any of the crimes which are said to +stain the administration of viceroys in some parts of the world. +The prejudice which still exists in this country in respect to +military government is due solely to the fact that the people do +not yet appreciate the legitimate influence which they themselves +exercise over their public servants, military no less than civil. +Indeed, there is perhaps no other class of citizens so sensitive +to public criticism as those in the military service, certainly +none who value more highly their reputation for faithful and +honorable conduct in the public service. I do not hesitate to give +it as my deliberate judgment, based upon the experience of half a +century, that the best and most satisfactory government any island +of the West Indies can have in the next hundred years will be a +military government under an officer of the United States army. + +It is only an incident of despotic governments, past or present, +that soldiers have been employed to execute despotic orders. The +common inference that military government is essentially despotic +is absolutely false. On the contrary, military men are, as a rule, +the most humane. This has been most notably so in the history of +this country. Almost without exception, the soldiers of all grades +in the Union army desired to treat the conquered South with all +possible kindness and humanity, while the men who inflicted upon +the Southern people the worst form of cruelty were men who had +never fought a battle. There have been some cruel soldiers in the +world, many more cruel men who were not soldiers except perhaps in +name. Men of that character generally avoid danger. What mankind +has most to dread is the placing of military power in the hands of +men who are not real soldiers. They are quite sure to abuse it in +one way or the others, by cruelty to their own men, or else to +others. The same disregard for human life which induces an ignorant +man to take command of troops and send them to useless slaughter +may well manifest itself in barbarity toward prisoners of war or +non-combatants; but a real soldier is never guilty of either of +those crimes, which seem to me alike among the greatest in military +experience. + + TROUBLE WITH THE MODOC INDIANS + +The Modoc Indians were a brave people, and had always been friends +of the whites; but their old home in southern Oregon was rich +grazing-land, and was much coveted by the ranchmen of that region. +Hence the Modocs were induced in some way to leave their homes and +go upon the Klamath reservation. There they were starved and +generally abused until they could stand it no longer. They went +back to their old place, and declared they would die rather than +go to live with the Klamaths again. Repeated requests were made +by the Indian Bureau to the War Department to force the Modocs to +go back to the Klamaths; but this was firmly opposed by General +Canby, commanding the department; by me, who then commanded the +Division of the Pacific; and by General Sherman, commanding the +army. No such order could be obtained in the regular way. Resort +was had to an innocent old army regulation which directed department +commanders to render such military assistance as might be necessary +to enable the Indian superintendents to carry out their orders from +Washington. Without the knowledge of the President, or the Secretary +of War, or the general of the army, an order was sent from the +Indian Bureau in Washington to send the Modocs back to the Klamath +reservation, and to call on the department commander for troops to +enforce the order. General Canby, honorable and simple-hearted +man that he was, never imagined that such an order could come from +Washington, after all that had been said about it, unless with the +sanction of the highest authority and the knowledge of the War +Department. He did not even think it necessary to report to the +division commander the requisition which had been made upon him +for troops, but loyally obeyed the old regulation. The first +information that came to me was that the troops had been beaten +with heavy loss, and that many of the surrounding settlers had been +killed by the Indians. A long and bloody war ensued, with some +results which were deplorable in the extreme. General Canby's +confiding nature had led him into a terrible mistake. He had +executed an unwise regulation which placed military power in unworthy +hands, without waiting to inquire whether that power was not, in +fact, about to be unlawfully abused, and thus had become a party +to the sacrifice of many innocent lives. The brave and noble- +hearted Canby strove in every possible way to make peace with the +Modocs without further shedding of innocent blood. But the savage +red man, who had never been guilty of breaking faith with a civilized +white man, would no longer trust any one of the "treacherous race." +He paid them back "in their own coin," according to his traditional +method. Though warned of the danger, Canby went calmly into the +trap they had laid for him, in the hope that his confidence might +inspire their respect; but he was the very man whose troops had +been ordered to drive them out from their happy homes, and they +treacherously killed him. And I doubt not, if more blood must be +shed, he preferred to be the first to die. This is the true history +of the "Canby massacre." + + THE CANBY MASSACRE + +After a long contest, costing many lives, the Modocs were subdued +and made prisoners. Those Indians who had been engaged in the +massacre were tried and justly executed according to the laws of +civilized war, while those white men who, in no less flagrant +disregard of the laws of civilization, brought on the war were not +called to any account for their crime. But President Grant, when +I called his attention to the abuse of that old regulation, promptly +abolished it. Since that time, as I understand it, no man but the +head of the nation can order the army to kill unless necessary in +defense, nor determine for what purposes the army may be employed. +The people of the United States are advancing, though slowly, in +civilization. Their fundamental law has very wisely always provided +that Congress alone should have power to "declare war"; but for +many years any Indian agent, or any bloodthirsty white man on the +frontier, who chose to kill an Indian in cold blood, could inaugurate +a war without waiting to declare it, and that without the slightest +danger of punishment. A little military justice, in the absence +of any possible civil government, in what was so long called the +"Indian country" would have saved many hundreds of millions of +dollars and many thousands of lives. But the inherited prejudice +against "military despotism" has hardly yet been eradicated from +the minds of the millions of freemen who inhabit this country--as +if seventy or fifty, or even thirty, millions of people could not +defend their liberties against a little standing army! A white +murderer was long regarded as so much better than an honest Indian +that the murderer must go free because there was no judge or jury +to try him, while the Indian must be shot by the soldiers, without +trial, for trying to protect himself from murder. If the innocent +could be separated from the guilty, "plague, pestilence, and famine" +would not be an unjust punishment for the crimes committed in this +country against the original occupants of the soil. And it should +be remembered that when retribution comes, though we may not +understand why, the innocent often share the fate of the guilty. +The law under which nations suffer for their crimes does not seem +to differ much from the law of retribution which governs the savage +Indian. + +No possible plea of the demands of civilization, or of the interests +of a superior race, can be held to justify such a policy as that +long pursued by the people of this country. The natural law of +the "survival of the fittest" may doubtless be pleaded in explanation +of all that has happened; but that is not a law of Christianity, +nor of civilization, nor of wisdom. It is the law of greed and +cruelty, which generally works in the end the destruction of its +devotees. In their greedy and blind pursuit of their own prey, +they lose sight of the shark that is waiting to devour them. It +is still the "fittest" that survives. It were wiser to remember +that the shark is always well armed, and if you would survive him +you must be fitter than he. If the benign law of civilization +could be relied upon always to govern, then all would be well. +But as long as sharks still live, the cruel law of nature cannot +be ignored. The highest principles and the highest wisdom, combined, +would seem to suggest the higher law as the rule of action toward +the weaker, and the natural law as the rule for defense against +the stronger. This country has, happily, already made some progress +in both directions. If that is continued a few more years, then +all, strong as well as weak, will be glad to "arbitrate" if we ask +them to. + + +CHAPTER XXIV +Superintendent at West Point--General Sherman's Ulterior Reasons +for the Appointment--Origin of the "Department of West Point"--Case +of the Colored Cadet Whittaker--A Proposed Removal for Political +Effect--General Terry's Friendly Attitude--A Muddle of New Commands +--Waiting Orders, and a Visit to Europe--Again in Command in the +West--The Establishment of Fort Sheridan at Chicago. + +In the centennial year, 1876, I committed the mistake of my life +by consenting, in deference to the opinions and wishes of my +superiors and in opposition to my own judgment and interests, to +give up the command of a military division appropriate to my rank +of major-general, and accept a position which by law and custom +was appropriate to the rank of colonel. The following extracts +from correspondence will sufficiently explain the reasons for this +extraordinary action, and the assurances which induced it: + + "(Telegram.) + "Washington, D. C., March 28, 1876. +"General John M. Schofield, San Francisco, California: + +"Will you accept the superintendency of the military academy at +West Point? I advise it. Your rank and history will elevate it +and solve all trouble. Admiral Porter's example at Annapolis is +suggested as precedent. The President, Secretary Taft, and I are +unanimous on the wisdom and propriety of it. Advise me of your +decision as early as you can--certainly this week. You will be +subject to no supervision except by the usual board of visitors +and the general commanding the army. + + "W. T. Sherman, General." + + "(Telegram.) + "San Francisco, Cal., March 29, 1876. +"General Sherman, Washington, D. C.: + +"I appreciate the importance of the superintendency of the academy, +and the compliment paid me by the President, Secretary of War, and +yourself in desiring me to accept it. Under the circumstances I +cannot decline. . . . + + "J. M. Schofield, Major-General." + + "(Telegram.) + "Headquarters of the Army, + "Washington, D. C., March 30, 1876. +"General J. M. Schofield, San Francisco, California. + +"Despatch received, and am much pleased; think you could add new +luster to the old academy. It has always needed a head with rank +and experience, and now I am sure that the whole country will be +satisfied. . . . I am not yet resolved on my own course of action, +but will be governed by events to occur in this week. + + "W. T. Sherman, General." + + SUPERINTENDENT AT WEST POINT + + "Headquarters Mil. Div. of the Pacific, + "San Francisco, Cal., March 30, 1876. +"General Sherman, etc., Washington, D. C. + +"My dear General: I was not taken entirely by surprise by your +despatch relative to the West Point superintendency. General Grant +mentioned the subject to me soon after the war, and army officers +since that time have spoken of it often enough to keep me in mind +of the fact that I might some time be called upon to assume that +responsibility. Yet it is with a strong feeling of reluctance that +I have brought myself to regard it as a thing to be done. This +feeling results from several causes, which I desire to explain to +you, while I know you will give me credit for a desire to do what +appears best for the public service, and satisfactory to all +concerned, without too much concern for my own personal preference. + +"In the first place, I have no little doubt of the possession of +any special fitness for that position, and have pretty strong +appreciation of its difficulties and importance. I do not feel at +all confident that the flattering expectations of my friends will +be realized from my management of the academy. + +"I have been there enough to know pretty well how difficult a post +that of superintendent is, and how varied the good qualities a man +ought to possess to fit him in all respects for it. + +"Rank and reputation will of course be of some assistance, but +their good effect will be greatly impaired without the dignity of +command belonging to them. To transfer an officer of rank from a +high command and post of great responsibility and trust to one +heretofore regarded as appropriate to an inferior grade, may be +regarded as elevating the dignity of the new command, but looks +much more like degrading the officer, and to that extent impairs +the good effect desired to be produced. Besides, it is impossible +for any officer not to _feel_ that in taking such inferior command, +although it is even for the avowed purpose of raising its dignity, +that he is stooping to do so. Especially must both these effects +be produced when the assignment is only an executive act. If it +was done in pursuance of law, the case would be materially different. +. . . + +"We were all delighted at the news of your return to Washington +and the prospect of your restoration to the proper duties and +authority of general of the army; and I sincerely hope the events +to occur this week, alluded to in your telegram to-day, may be such +as to justify you in taking the course universally desired by the +army. We want our general where he can best look after all the +interests of the military service, with power to command the army +in fact as well as in name. + +"I have read with the greatest pleasure your capital speech to the +Knights of St. Patrick. + +"Please present my respectful compliments to the Secretary of War, +and my kindest regards to the President. + + "I am, dear General, as ever, truly yours, + "J. M. Schofield." + +During the Civil War the demand for the services in the field of +the most capable officers had, as was generally understood, been +prejudicial to the interests of the military academy; and this +continued some time after the close of the war, in consequence of +the unusual increase in rank of those officers who were known to +be fitted in all respects for the head of that institution. This +difficulty was increased by the very unreasonable notion that +because the law had opened the academy to the line of the army, +the superintendent must necessarily be taken from the line, and +not from the corps of engineers, although the latter contained many +officers of appropriate rank who had then added to their high +scientific ability and attainments distinguished services in the +field. Even in the line, officers were not wanting of appropriate +rank, character, ability, education, and experience to qualify them +for the duties of superintendent. For example, my immediate +predecessor, Major-General Thomas H. Ruger, then a colonel of +infantry, was in all respects highly qualified for that office; +and when I relived him I found the academy in about the same state +of efficiency which had characterized it before the war. There +was, in fact, at that time little, if any, foundation for the +assumption that the interests of the military academy required the +assignment of any officer of higher rank than colonel to duty as +superintendent of the academy. Of course I did not know this before +I went there, and it was a matter for the judgment of my superiors, +whose duty, and not mine, it was to know the facts. + + ULTERIOR REASONS FOR THE APPOINTMENT + +But General Sherman had other reasons, some of them very cogent in +his own estimation at least, for desiring my presence somewhere in +the Eastern States; and the West Point "detail" was the only way +in which that could be readily brought about. He had just been +restored, or was about to be, to the actual command of the army, +after having been practically suspended from command a long time +because of his differences with the Secretary of War. He desired +especially to bring the military academy under his command, and +appears to have been assured of President Grant's support in that +regard. General Sherman also wished me to revise the army regulations, +so as to incorporate the theory of relation between the administration +and the command which he and General Grant had maintained as the +true one, but which had generally, if not always, been opposed by +the Secretaries of War and by the chiefs of staff departments. +These were doubtless the principal reasons for General Sherman's +anxiety to have me accept the assignment to West Point. But very +soon after my arrival in the East I found that I was also expected +to preside over a board of review in the case of General Fitz-John +Porter and in that of Surgeon-General William A. Hammond; and that +my junior in rank, Major-General Irvin McDowell, could not be given +a command appropriate to his rank unless it was the division which +I had consented to vacate. Of course I could not but feel complimented +by this indication that my superiors thought me capable of doing +well so many things at once, nor yet could I fail to see that, +after all, my care of West Point had not been considered of so +vital importance, since it would not interfere with the all-important +revision of the army regulations, and the retrial of Porter and +Hammond. + +But I had given my consent, though under erroneous impressions as +to reasons and necessity, to what my superiors desired, and hence +determined to keep my thoughts to myself so long as the promises +made by General Sherman were fulfilled. But I had hardly got +settled in the academic chair before I received a great affront +from the Secretary of War, through the adjutant-general of the +army, in direct violation of General Sherman's promise that I should +"be subject to no supervision except by the usual board of visitors +and the general commanding the army." This offensive action arose +not simply from ignorance of General Sherman's promise, of which +the adjutant-general and the Secretary of War had evidently not +been informed, but from culpable ignorance of the academic regulations +on the part of the adjutant-general, and still more culpable +disregard of the invariable rule of courtesy enjoined by military +law among military men. With no little difficulty I restrained my +indignation so far as to write a calm and respectful letter to the +Secretary of War, inclosing a copy of my correspondence with General +Sherman respecting my command at West Point, and pointing out the +regulation which he or the adjutant-general had ignored, and +requesting him to submit the whole matter to the President. It is +due to the Honorable Secretary, and is a pleasure to me, to say +that he did not wait the slow course of the mail, but telegraphed +me at once that it was all a mistake, and that he made all the +amend that a gentleman could make under the circumstances. He as +well as I had been made the victim of the ignorance and discourtesy +of a staff officer, in a matter about which the Secretary of War +could of necessity know nothing unless the staff officer informed +him. But I was determined to guard against any such outrage in +the future, and hence insisted that West Point be erected into a +military department. By this means I would become entitled to the +effective intervention and protection of the general of the army. +This is the origin of that anomaly which must have puzzled many +military men, namely, the "Department of West Point." + +But I discovered in time that even this safeguard was by no means +sufficient. I had some apprehension on this subject at the start, +and telegraphed General Sherman about it; but his answer of May 25 +was accepted as sufficiently reassuring. Indeed it could hardly +have been imagined that a President of the United States would +disregard an honorable obligation incurred by his predecessor; but +before I got through with that matter I was enlightened on that +point. + + CASE OF THE COLORED CADET WHITTAKER + +In the spring of 1880 there arose great public excitement over the +case of the one colored cadet then at West Point. This cadet, +whose name was Whittaker, had twice been found deficient in studies, +and recommended by the academic board for dismissal; but had been +saved therefrom by me, in my perhaps too strong desire to give the +young colored man all possible chance of ultimate success, however +unwise his appointment to the military academy might have been. +As was stated by me at the time, in my report of the case to the +War Department, that second and unusual indulgence was based upon +the fact that he was the only representative of his race then at +the academy. Being again, for the third time, in danger of dismissal, +that colored cadet, either by his own hands, or by others with his +consent (of which he was finally convicted by a general court- +martial), was bound hand and foot and mutilated in such manner as, +while doing him no material injury, to create a suspicion of foul +play on the part of other cadets. An official investigation by +the commandant, Colonel Henry M. Lazelle, led him to the conclusion +that the other cadets had no knowledge whatever of the outrage, +and that the colored cadet himself was guilty. Not being fully +satisfied with that conclusion, I appointed a court of inquiry to +investigate the matter more thoroughly. The result of that +investigation fully sustained the finding of Colonel Lazelle, that +the colored cadet himself was the guilty person. + +But those judicial conclusions did not suffice to allay the public +clamor for protection to the recently emancipated negroes in the +enjoyment of the privileges in the national institutions for which +they had not become either mentally or morally fitted. A presidential +election was pending, and the colored vote and that in sympathy +with it demanded assurance of the hearty and effective support of +the national administration. Nothing less than a radical change +at West Point would satisfy that demand, and who could be a more +appropriate victim to offer as a sacrifice to that Moloch than one +who had already gone beyond the limits of duty, of justice, and of +wisdom in his kind treatment of the colored cadet. It was decided +in Washington that he, the over-kind superintendent himself, should +be sacrificed to that partizan clamor before the coming election. +Some rumor of this purpose had reached me, though it had been +concealed from General Sherman, who assured me that no such purpose +existed. + + GENERAL TERRY'S FRIENDLY ATTITUDE + +In General Sherman's absence, General Alfred H. Terry was chosen +to succeed me. He came to West Point, August 14, for the purpose +of learning from me in person the truth as to the assertion made +to him that the proposition to relieve me from duty at West Point +was in accord with my own wishes. When informed, as he had suspected, +that I could not possibly have expressed any such wish under the +circumstances then existing, he positively refused, like the +honorable man that he was, to be made a party to any such act of +wrong. There was not the slightest foundation in fact for the +assumption that my relief from command could be based upon my own +request, and no such reason could have been given in an order +relieving me. That assumption could have had no other apparent +motive than to induce my warm friend General Terry to accept the +appointment. As soon as he learned the truth from me, General +Terry went to Washington and exposed the falsehood of which he and +I together were the intended victims. This action of a true friend, +and the correspondence which had passed between General Sherman +and me, sufficed to prevent the consummation of the wrong which +had been contemplated. + +After the presidential election was over, and partizan passion had +subsided, I made a formal application, November 12, 1880, to be +relieved from duty at West Point on or before the first of May +following, and to be permitted to await orders until an appropriate +command became vacant. I repeatedly expressed my desire that none +of my brother officers should be disturbed in their commands on my +account, and that no new command should be created for me. I was +entirely content to await the ordinary course of events, in view +of pending legislation relative to retirements for age, and of +retirements which might be made under the laws then existing. + +My relief from West Point was effected earlier than General Sherman +or I had anticipated. Before the end of 1880 the following +correspondence passed between me and the general of the army: + + "(Confidential.) + "Headquarters, Army of the United States, Washington, D. C., + December 13, 1880. +"General J. M. Schofield, West Point, New York. + +"Dear General: General Drum has just shown me the memorandum for +orders. The President has worked out this scheme himself, without +asking my help, and I am glad of it, for I would not like to burden +my conscience with such a bungle. + +"He creates a new department out of Louisiana, Arkansas, and the +Indian Territory, to be commanded by the senior officer present. +. . . + +"You are to command the Department of Texas and this new department, +called a division, of what name I don't know. + +"Howard is to replace you at West Point. I suppose the order will +issue at once. + + "Yours truly, + "W. T. Sherman." + + "West Point, N. Y., December 14, 1880. +"General Sherman, Washington, D. C. + +"My dear General: I have received your confidential letter of +yesterday, informing me of the bungling scheme which has been worked +out without your help. I presume it would be fruitless to attempt +any opposition to the species of mania which manifests itself in +such action. It may be best to let it run its course during the +short time which must yet elapse until a reign of reason is again +inaugurated with the incoming administration. But it occurs to me +that you may be able to save the useless expense to the government +and the great inconvenience and expense to staff officers which +would necessarily result from the organization of a division which +could only last for a few months. To me personally it is a matter +of little moment; but not so with the staff officers and the military +appropriations. I am not willing to have such a thing done, even +apparently, on my account. Please advise what official action, if +any, should be taken by me in this matter. Personally I am perfectly +ready to obey the President's order, without a word of protest; +but I am not willing to be the occasion of manifest injury to the +public service, and of useless inconvenience and expense to the +officers of the general staff who must be assigned to the headquarters +of the new division. + + "Very truly yours, + "J. M. Schofield." + + A MUDDLE OF NEW COMMANDS + +But the public interests, and my desire to make my own entirely +subservient thereto, were alike disregarded. A new division was +carved out of three old ones, in violation of the plainest dictates +of military principles. The government was subjected to a worse +than useless expense of many thousands of dollars, and a number of +staff officers to like useless expense and trouble. For all this +there was no other apparent motive but to make it appear that there +were appropriate commands for all the major-generals then in active +service, and hence no reason for placing any one of them on the +retired list. As a part of that scheme, one of the most active +brigadier-generals, younger than one of the major-generals, was +selected instead of the latter to make way for an aspirant having +greater "influence." The correspondence of that period shows the +indignation felt in the army at such disregard of the just claims +of officers and of the interests of the military service. Neither +General Sherman nor any of the several higher officers at that time +could hope to derive any advantage from the passage of the act of +Congress, then pending, to retire all officers at a fixed age. On +the contrary, such a law would most probably cut them off when in +the full prime of activity and usefulness. But all were more than +willing to accept that rather than still be in a position to be +arbitrarily cut off to make place for some over-ambitious aspirant +possessed of greater influence, of whatever kind. I know perfectly +well that General Sherman was governed by a generous desire to give +General Sheridan command of the army for a number of years, while +the latter was still in the prime of life. But that he could have +done, and had announced his intention to do, by requesting to be +relieved from the command and permitted to await the President's +orders, performing such duties, from time to time, as the President +might desire of him. Such a status of high officers of great +experience, whose inspections, observations, and advice might be +of great value to the President and to the War Department, would +manifestly have been far better for the country than that of total +retirement, which deprives the President of any right to call upon +them for any service whatever, even in an emergency. This was one +of the subjects of correspondence between General Sherman and me +while I was in Europe in 1881-2. But it was finally agreed by all +concerned that it would be best to favor the uniform application +of the rule of retirement for age, so that all might be assured, +as far as possible, of a time, to which they might look forward +with certainty, when they would be relieved from further apprehension +of treatment which no soldier can justly characterize without +apparent disrespect to his official superior. + +Such treatment is indeed uncommon. The conduct of the commander- +in-chief of the army toward his subordinates has been generally +kind and considerate in this country. But the few opposite examples +have been quite enough to cloud the life of every officer of high +rank with the constant apprehension of an insult which he could +neither submit to nor resent. + +Soon after the inauguration of President Garfield, the "Division +of the Gulf" was broken up, and I was permitted to visit Europe, +as I had requested in the preceding November, until the President +should be pleased to assign me to a command according to my rank. + + "(Telegram.) + "Washington, D. C., May 3, 1861. +"General J. M. Schofield, Commanding Division, New Orleans, La.: + +"In case the President will repeal the orders creating the new +division and department, and agree to give you the Division of the +Pacific in a year, will you be willing to take your leave to go +abroad meantime? Telegraph me fully and frankly for use. + + "W. T. Sherman, General." + + WAITING ORDERS, AND A VISIT TO EUROPE + + "Headqrs. Mil. Div. Gulf, + "New Orleans, La., May 3, 1881. +"General W. T. Sherman, Washington, D. C.: + +"Your telegram of this date just received. I am debarred, by a +promise made to General McDowell about two years and a half ago, +from making any condition affecting his command of the Division of +the Pacific. If I am to displace him, it must be without regard +to any wish of mine. If it is the purpose of the President to +assign me to that command in a year, I would like to go abroad in +the meantime, as it would not be convenient to go afterward, though +I would prefer to go next year rather than this. But I cannot +afford to go on leave with reduced pay. If it is not found +practicable to give me a command according to my rank, and so +organized as to benefit rather than injure the military service, +I am willing to await orders for a year without reduction of pay. + +"This is substantially the proposition I made in my application to +be relieved from duty at West Point; and I am still willing to +abide by it, although my wishes were then disregarded, if it will +relieve the present administration from embarrassment. But I would +much prefer to have a proper command. . . . + + "J. M. Schofield, Maj.-Gen." + + "(Telegram.) + "Washington, D. C., May 5, 1881. +"General J. M. Schofield, Commanding Division, New Orleans, La.: + +"Your despatch of the third was duly received, and a copy thereof +laid before the Secretary of War, who has received the orders of +the President to repeal all parts of General Orders, No. 84, of +December 18, 1880, which refer to the Division of the Gulf and +Department of Arkansas, restoring the _status quo_ before that +order was made. You will be placed on waiting orders, with full +pay, till further orders of the President. You may take action +accordingly. + + "W. T. Sherman, General." + +My stay in Europe--from May, 1881, to May, 1882--was marked by only +one incident of special military interest. Under orders of the +War Department, upon invitation from the government of France, I +witnessed the autumn manoeuvers of the Twelfth Corps of the French +army at and about Limoges. A few other officers of our army, and +many from other countries, enjoyed the same privilege. The +operations, which were interesting and instructive, culminated in +an assault upon and the capture of Limoges. The next day the corps +was reviewed in the streets of the city. The general-in-chief and +his staff and suite rode along the line at full speed. The head +of the cavalcade, consisting of the French and American generals, +and a few other officers of high rank, came out in good order. +The others were much disordered, and so covered with dust that the +uniforms of all nations looked very much alike. The ceremony was +terminated at the public square, where the cavalry was formed along +one side, and the opposite was occupied by high officials and +prominent citizens of the town. The charge of the squadrons across +the square, halting at command within a few feet of the reviewing +general, was a fine exhibition of discipline and perfect control. + +After the review the general-in-chief made a long address to his +assembled officers, explaining in much detail the important lessors +taught by the manoeuvers. He closed with a feeling allusion to +his own mental and physical strength and vigor, which had been so +fully displayed in the last few days, and which were still at the +service of his beloved France. But the gallant old soldier was +retired, all the same, at the end of the year. Republics seem to +have much the same way of doing things on both sides of the ocean! + +A pleasing incident occurred at one time during the manoeuvers. +At the hour of halt for the midday rest a delicious repast was +served at the beautiful home of the prefect of the department, +between the two opposing lines. The tables were spread in lovely +arbors loaded with grapes. When the dejeuner was ended, speeches +were made by the distinguished prefect and the gallant general-in- +chief, to which, as senior of the visiting officers from foreign +countries, I was called upon to respond. Thus suddenly summoned +to an unwonted task, I was much too prudent to address the guests +in a language which they all understood. But by a free use of the +words and phrases which are so common in the military language of +France and of this country, linked together by as little Anglo- +Saxon as possible, I made a speech which was warmly received, and +which, after careful revision with the aid of a highly accomplished +French officer who had been educated in England as well as in +France, was made to appear pretty well when printed in both +languages. + +The charming hospitality of the general-in-chief of the Twelfth +Army Corps and of the prefect of Limoges, with all the other +incidents of the autumn manoeuvers of 1881, are an ever fresh and +pleasant memory, with the many other recollections of beautiful +France under the empire and under the republic. + + AGAIN IN COMMAND IN THE WEST + +According to the understanding expressed in my correspondence with +General Sherman of May 3, 1881, I returned from Europe at the end +of a year, and reported for duty. But in the meantime President +Garfield had been assassinated, and the bill then pending in Congress +providing for the retirement of officers at a fixed age was amended +so as to make that age sixty-four years instead of sixty-two. +Hence I continued to wait without protest until the retirement of +my junior in rank, the next autumn, for the fulfilment of General +Sherman's assurance conveyed in his despatch of May 25, 1876: "If +any hitch occurs at any future time, you can resume your present +or some command due your rank." Although this long suspension from +command was very annoying, I had the satisfaction of knowing that +none of my brother officers had been disturbed on my account. + +In the fall of 1882, I was again assigned to the command of the +Division of the Pacific, awaiting the time of General Sherman's +retirement under the law and the succession of General Sheridan to +the command of the army. Nothing of special interest occurred in +that interval. In 1883 I succeeded to the command of the Division +of the Missouri, with my headquarters in Chicago. One of the first +and most important subjects which impressed themselves upon my +attention after the generous reception and banquet given by the +citizens of that hospitable city, was the necessity for a military +post near that place. The location of Chicago makes it the most +important strategical center of the entire northern frontier. It +is also the most important center of interstate commerce and +transportation anywhere in the country. Yet in 1883 there were no +troops nearer than St. Paul, Omaha, and Leavenworth. At the time +of the railroad strikes in 1877, troops had been brought there in +time to render the necessary service, but no thought appears to +have been given to the necessity of better provision for the future. + + THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FORT SHERIDAN AT CHICAGO + +There had been in early times a military reservation at the mouth +of the Chicago River, on which old Fort Dearborn was located. But +that had become far too valuable to be retained for military use, +and no longer suitable for a military post, being in the heart of +a great city. Hence it had passed out of the hands of the government. +Upon consultation with Senator Logan and a few others, it was not +thought possible to obtain from Congress the large sum of money +necessary to buy ground for a post near Chicago; but that if the +United States owned the ground, the appropriations to build a post +could readily be obtained. Hence the subject was mentioned to a +few prominent citizens, with the suggestion that a site be purchased +by subscription and presented to the United States. I was soon +invited to meet the Commercial club at one of their monthly dinners, +where the matter was fully discussed. At another meeting, some +time later, it was made the special subject for consideration, and +this resulted in the organization of the plan to raise the money +and purchase the ground. All the eligible sites were examined, +the prices obtained, and the purchase-money pledged. Then the +proposition was submitted to the War Department and approved. +General Sheridan was sent out to select the best of the sites +offered, and his choice fell on that which all, I believe, had +esteemed the best, though the most expensive--a beautiful tract of +land of about six hundred acres, situated on the shore of Lake +Michigan twenty-five miles north of Chicago. The cost was nothing +to the broad-minded and far-sighted men of that city. The munificent +gift was accepted by Congress, and appropriations were made for +the finest military post in the country. It was appropriately +named Fort Sheridan, not only in recognition of the great services +the general had rendered to the country, but as a special and +graceful recognition of the services he had rendered Chicago in +the time of her sorest need. + +During my brief service--two years and some months--in the Division +of the Missouri, I traveled many thousands of miles, and visited +nearly all parts of that vast territory, from the Canadian line to +the Gulf of Mexico, some of which was then new to me, attending to +the ordinary routine duties of a time of comparative peace. Nothing +else occurred at all comparable in importance, in my judgment, to +the establishment of the post of Fort Sheridan. + + +CHAPTER XXV +The Death of General Hancock--Assigned to the Division of the +Atlantic--Measures for Improving the Sea-Coast Defense--General +Fitz-John Porter's Restoration to the Army--President of the Board +Appointed to Review the Action of the Court Martial--General Grant's +Opinion--Senator Logan's Explanation of His Hostile Attitude Toward +General Porter. + +In the spring of 1886 we were again called to meet around the grave +of one of the bravest and best of our companions. The almost +incomparably gallant Hancock, the idol of his soldiers and of a +very large part of the people, so perfectly stainless in life and +character that even political contest could not fan the breath of +slander, had suddenly passed away. We buried him with all honor +at his home in Pennsylvania. Again it fell to my lot--the lot so +common to the soldier--to step into the place in the ranks where +my comrade had suddenly fallen. + + ASSIGNED TO THE DIVISION OF THE ATLANTIC + +The Division of the Missouri was then larger in territory and much +larger in number of troops than that of the Atlantic, and had been +far more important. But Indian wars were, as we hoped, approaching +an end, while we also hoped that the country might soon be aroused +to the necessities of the national defense. The Division of the +Atlantic, including also the greater part of the Gulf States and +those of the northeastern frontier, would then resume its rightful +place as by far the most important of the grand military divisions +of the country. Hence I accepted without hesitation the command +of that division. My natural tastes and favorite studies had led +me largely in the direction of these modern sciences which have in +a few years imparted such enormous strides to the development of +the mechanical means of attack and defense, changing in a corresponding +degree the great problems of war. The valor of great masses of +men, and even the genius of great commanders in the field, have +been compelled to yield the first place in importance to the +scientific skill and wisdom in finance which are able and willing +to prepare in advance the most powerful engines of war. Nations, +especially those so happily situated as the United States, may now +surely defend their own territory against invasion or damage, and +the national honor and the rights of their citizens throughout the +world, by the wise scientific use of surplus revenue, derived from +high import duties if the people so please, instead of by the former +uncivilized method of sacrificing the lives of hundreds of thousands +of brave men. Far more, such sacrifice of the brave can no longer +avail. As well might it be attempted to return to hand- or ox- +power, freight-wagons and country roads, in place of the present +steam-locomotives, trains of cars, and steel tracks, for the enormous +transportation of the present day, as to rely upon the bravery of +troops for the defense of a city. + +Science has wrought no greater revolution in any of the arts of +peace than it has in the art of war. Indeed, the vast national +interests involved all over the world have employed the greatest +efforts of genius in developing the most powerful means of attack +and defense. + +Such were the thoughts with which I entered upon my duties in the +Division of the Atlantic, and such guided my action there and in +the subsequent command of the army. That not very much was +accomplished is too painfully true. Yet a beginning was at once +made, and progress, though slow, continued until the hope now seems +justified that our country may be ready before it is too late to +"command the peace" in a voice which all must heed. + +I was ably and zealously assisted in all this work by Major Joseph +P. Sanger, one of my aides until his well-merited promotion to +inspector-general. Then Captain Tasker H. Bliss took Major Sanger's +place, and helped me to carry forward the work with his well-known +ability, devotion, and industry. The army owes much to those +faithful officers, without whose help little could have been done +by me. I quote here from a memorandum, prepared at my request by +Major Sanger, showing in detail the measures taken to perfect, so +far as possible in advance, the instruction of the artillery of +the army in the service of the modern high-power armament, so that +every new gun and mortar should have, the moment it was finished +and placed in position, thoroughly qualified officers and men to +use it: + +"Major-General J. M. Schofield assumed command of the Division of +the Atlantic and Department of the East April 13, 1886; and during +the remaining months of that year, as opportunity afforded, gave +much attention to the condition of the sea-coast forts and their +garrison from the Canadian line to the Gulf of Mexico. + +"There were at this time sixty-six posts in the division, of which +twenty-seven were garrisoned and thirty-five ungarrisoned; of the +total number, fifty-one were sea-coast forts and the balance +barracks, properly speaking. Of the garrisoned forts, fifteen had +no armaments, and the armaments of all the others were the old +muzzle-loading types of low power. The efficiency of the artillery +personnel was far from satisfactory, from lack of proper instruction, +due in turn to lack of facilities. Artillery target practice, +except at Forts Monroe, Hamilton, and Wadsworth, had practically +ceased in the division; and of the forty-five companies of artillery, +comprising seventy-five per cent. of the entire artillery troops +of the army, only two batteries continually at Fort Monroe had had +annual artillery target practice during the preceding ten years, +and some of the batteries had not fired a shot. + + MEASURES FOR IMPROVING THE SEA-COAST DEFENSE + +"To remedy these defects, and at the same time provide a system of +fire control applicable to the defense of all our harbors, orders +were issued in 1887 for mapping the harbors, establishing base +lines, and arranging the extremities for the use of angle-measuring +instruments, and graduating traverse circles in azimuth. Systematic +artillery instruction and target practice were ordered, and a system +of reports suited to the preservation and utilization of all data +resulting from the firing. + +"Thus, for the first time in the history of the country, an effort +was made to establish and develop a system of artillery fire control +adapted to our fortifications and armament. In 1888 General +Schofield succeeded General Sheridan in command of the army, and +in December issued 'General Orders, No. 108' from the headquarters +of the army. This order extended to all the artillery troops of +the army the system of artillery instruction and target practice +which had been established in the Division of the Atlantic. As it +had not been found practicable to equip all the artillery posts +with the necessary appliances for carrying out the provisions of +the order, the eleven principal posts on the Eastern, Western, and +Southern coasts were designated as artillery posts of instruction, +and provided with all the guns, implements, and instruments necessary +for the instruction and target practice of such of the neighboring +garrisons as were unprovided with proper facilities. + +"To insure the proper execution of the order, there was appropriated +March 2, 1889, twenty thousand dollars to be expended under the +direct supervision of the Board of Ordnance and Fortifications, +which had been created by the Fortification Appropriation Act of +September 22, 1888, and of which General Schofield was the president. +The Army Regulations of 1889 were published on February 9, and +paragraph 382 authorized the commanding general of each geographical +division within which were the headquarters of one or more artillery +regiments to designate, with the approval of the general commanding +the army, a division inspector of artillery target practice, whose +duty it was to make inspections with a view to insuring uniform, +thorough, and systematic artillery instruction. + +"On June 11, 1889, 'General Orders, No. 49' was issued from the +headquarters of the army, in anticipation of the more complete +equipment of the artillery posts with the apparatus necessary for +the proper conduct of artillery instruction and target practice. +The course of instruction covered the use of plane tables, telescopic +and other sights, electrical firing-machines, chronographs, +velocimeters, anemometers, and other meteorological instruments, +stop-watches, signaling, telegraphy, vessel tracking, judging +distance, and, in short, everything essential to the scientific +use of the guns. By 'General Orders, No. 62, Headquarters of the +Army,' July 2, 1889, Lieutenant T. H. Bliss, Fort Artillery, Aide- +de-Camp to General Schofield commanding, was announced as inspector +of small arms and artillery practice. As an inducement to greater +application on the part of the student officers of the Artillery +School and of the Infantry and Cavalry School, the distinction of +'honor graduate' was conferred on all officers who had graduated, +or should graduate, either first or second from the Artillery +School, or first, second, or third from the Infantry and Cavalry +School: the same to appear with their names in the Army Register +as long as such graduates should continue on the active or retired +list of the army. . . ." + + FITZ-JOHN PORTER'S RESTORATION TO THE ARMY + +In August, 1886, after the passage of a bill by Congress, General +Fitz-John Porter was restored to the army, as colonel, by President +Cleveland. When I was in the War Department in 1868, General Porter +had come to me with a request that I would present his case to the +President, and recommend that he be given a rehearing. I declined +to do so, on the ground that, in my opinion, an impartial investigation +and disposition of his case, whatever were its merits, could not +be made until the passions and prejudices begotten by the war had +subsided much further than they had done at that time. In the +course of conversation I told him that while I never permitted +myself to form an opinion of any case without much more knowledge +of it than I had of his, I presumed, from the finding of the court- +martial, that he had at least been guilty of acting upon what he +supposed to be his own better judgment under the circumstances he +found to exist, instead of in strict obedience to General Pope's +orders. He said that was not the case; that he had not even +literally disobeyed orders; that in so far as he had acted upon +his own judgment, he had loyally done all that could be done to +carry out General Pope's wishes; and that all he wanted was an +opportunity to prove such to be the facts. I replied that if he +could prove what he stated beyond question, he would of course have +a case worthy of consideration--not otherwise. Nothing was said +in respect to the facts or the evidence in contravention of the +judgment of the court-martial which tried him. Hence, beyond that +above stated, I had no knowledge of his case when the board of +review, of which I was president, met in 1878 to hear the new +evidence; and I believe neither of the other members of the board +--Generals A. H. Terry and George W. Getty--was any better informed. + +The duty of the board was very different from that of a court- +martial appointed to try an original case. The accused had already +been tried and convicted. He was not to have a new trial. He +could not have any benefit whatever of any doubt that might exist +after all the evidence, old and new, had been fully considered. +He must prove his innocence positively, by absolutely convincing +evidence, or else the original judgment of the court-martial must +stand. This view of the issue was fully accepted by General Porter +and his counsel. This caused a new and peculiar duty to devolve +upon the board--at least it was so to me; that is, to find, if +possible, some view of all the evidence, or of all the facts +established by the evidence, that could be regarded as consistent +with the theory or supposition that Porter was guilty. + +When the evidence was all in, the members of the board separated +for several weeks to let each examine all the evidence and reach +his own conclusion, to be presented in form at the next meeting of +the board. I believe I devoted more earnest work to the examination +and analysis than I had ever done to any one thing before in my +life. I tried in succession every possible explanation of the +established facts, in the effort to find some one consistent with +the theory that Porter had been guilty of disobedience, as charged, +or of any other military offense. But I could not find one, except +the very patent one that he had sent despatches to Burnside which +were by no means respectful to Pope; and the board expressed an +opinion in condemnation of that, which Porter's counsel very frankly +admitted to be just. + +In the course of that long and earnest effort to find Porter guilty, +--for that is what the effort was in effect,--the whole story of +his conduct and of the operations of the two opposing armies and +the actions of other prominent officers became so clear, and his +honorable and soldierly conduct so absolutely demonstrated, that +it was exceedingly difficult, in view of all the wrong he had +suffered, to write a cold judicial statement of the facts. The +first draft was toned down in many particulars in the effort to +bring it within the strictest rules of judicial decisions. I have +sometimes thought since that if the report of the board could have +been much colder, it might have been better at first for Porter, +though less just. But I do not think he or any of his companions +and friends will ever feel like finding fault because the board +could not entirely suppress the feelings produced by their discovery +of the magnitude of the wrong that had been done to a gallant fellow- +soldier. + + GENERAL GRANT'S OPINION + +The first time I met General Grant after the decision of the board +was published was very soon after he had published in 1882 the +result of his own investigation of the case. He at once introduced +the subject, and talked about it for a long time in the most earnest +manner that I ever heard him speak on any subject. He would not +permit me to utter a single sentence until he had gone all over +the case and showed me that he understood all its essential features +as thoroughly as I did, and that his judgment was precisely the +same as that which the board had reached. He intimated very +decidedly that no impartial and intelligent military man could, in +his opinion, possibly reach any other conclusion. The general +evidently desired to make it perfectly clear that he had not adopted +the opinion of a board of which I was a member, nor that of any +one else; but that he had thoroughly mastered the case for himself, +and formed his own judgment in regard to it. I take pleasure in +recording the fact that he unquestionably had done it, and I never +knew a man who could form more positive opinions, or one who could +express them more convincingly, than General Grant. + +The board was not called upon the express any opinion respecting +the action of the court-martial upon the evidence before it, and +it would have been manifestly improper to do so. Speaking for +myself, and not for any other member of the board, I do not now +hesitate to say that the finding and sentence of the general court- +martial which tried General Fitz-John Porter were not justified by +the evidence before that court. In my judgment, formed from long +observation and much experience, the passions of warfare often +render the administration of justice impossible. A suggestion once +made to me by a man in very high military authority, that a finding +and sentence of court-martial rendered in time of war should be +regarded as _res adjudicata_, produced in my mind the painful +impression that a very great man did not find the word "justice" +anywhere in his vocabulary; and I watched for many years the +conversation and writings and public speeches of that man without +finding that he ever made use of that word, or ever gave as a reason +for doing or not doing anything that it would be just or unjust. +In his mind, whatever might have happened to any person was simply +a matter of good or bad fortune which did not concern him. He +refused even to consider the question whether injustice had or had +not been done, or whether the operation of a law was not relatively +unjust to some as compared to others. When to such natural character +and habits of thought are added the stern necessities of war as +viewed by a commander and many other officers, what possible chance +of justice can be left to an _unfortunate_ man? + +It is true that even if the life of an innocent man may have been +sacrificed under the stern necessities of discipline, that is no +more than thousands of his fellow-soldiers have suffered because +of the crimes and follies of politicians who brought on the war. +But that is no reason why his memory as well as those of his comrades +should not be finally honored, if it can be proved that, after all, +he also was innocent and brave. + +In my opinion, no government can be regarded as just to its army +unless it provides, under appropriate conditions, for the rehearing +of cases that may be tried by court-martial in time of war. Perhaps +it may most wisely be left for the President and Congress to +institute appropriate action in each individual case. That is a +matter for mature consideration. My only desire is to suggest the +necessity for some such action, whenever reasonable grounds for it +may be presented. I have no respect for the suggestions sometimes +urged that labor and expense are sufficient grounds for failure to +secure justice to every citizen or soldier of the republic, whether +at home or abroad. + + SENATOR LOGAN'S EXPLANATION + +Soon after General Logan's last election to the Senate, I had a +very interesting and unreserved conversation with him, at his house +in Chicago, in respect to his action in the Porter case. He spoke +of it with evident candor, acknowledged that his view of the case +was probably wrong, and as if to excuse his mistake, volunteered +an explanation as to how he came to take that view of it. He told +me that when he found that the case might probably come before +Congress, he wanted to prepare himself in advance as far as possible +to deal with it justly, and to defend the right effectively. Hence +he went to General Grant to obtain the best possible view of the +military questions involved. General Grant gave him the theory of +the military situation and of the operations of the opposing armies, +as well as that of Porter's own conduct, which had been presented +to, and evidently accepted by, the court-martial, as presenting +the true merits of the case. General Logan accepted that theory +as unquestionably correct, and bent all his energies to the +construction of unanswerable arguments in support of Porter's +condemnation. + +At that time neither General Grant nor General Logan knew anything +of the new evidence which was afterward submitted to the board of +review. Logan's powerful arguments in the Senate were based upon +the preconceived idea of the case, supported by such part of the +new evidence, as well as of the old, as could be made to support +that view. In reply to my statement that he had unquestionably +been led astray, he said that that was quite probable, but that +Grant was responsible, and that it was then too late to change. +I do not think that anybody will now hesitate to say that General +Grant's view of his duty in respect to this last point was the more +to be commended. But the fact I wish to record is that of Logan's +sincerity in the great efforts he had made to convict Porter on +the floor of the Senate, and his explanation of the way in which +he had been led into the greatest possible error. It suggests the +reflection that even a senator of the United States might better +form his own opinions rather than adopt those even of the highest +authority, when the only question involved is one of justice, and +not one of public policy, in which latter case differences of +opinion must of necessity be reconciled for the purpose of securing +unity of action. + +As an illustration of the necessity for an absolutely impartial +review of cases which have involved the passions of war, reference +must be made to the action of one member of the Porter court-martial +who made it generally understood that his individual opinion +supported the finding of that court. He went so far as to make +inquiries whether precedents could be found in American or English +history to sustain a member of a court-martial in publicly defending +the finding of that court, notwithstanding the oath of secrecy +imposed by law upon every member. And this same member of the +court was furnished by a very able lawyer with an argument in +support of the findings of the court, based upon a review of the +evidence submitted to the subsequent board, as if that member of +the court might make public use of that argument as his own. + + +CHAPTER XXVI +The Death of General Sheridan--His Successor in Command of the Army +--Deplorable Condition of the War Department at the Time--A Better +Understanding Between the Department and the Army Commander--General +Sheridan's Humiliating Experience--The Granting of Medals--The +Secretary's Call-Bell--The Relations of Secretary and General-- +Views Submitted to President Cleveland--The Law Fixing Retirement +for Age--An Anecdote of General Grant. + +Again, in 1888, only two years after Hancock's death, another of +our most gallant companions, the matchless Sheridan, was suddenly +stricken down, and soon passed away, before the expiration of half +the term allotted for his command of the army. As next in rank, +upon the request of the general's family and upon the order of the +Secretary of War it became my duty to arrange and conduct the +military ceremonies at the funeral. + +We buried our companion in beautiful Arlington, the choicest spot +in America for the last resting-place of a soldier. It was a bright +summer's day, and the funeral ceremonies, both religious and +military, were the most impressive I have ever seen. As a special +tribute of respect to my brother soldier, a staff officer in uniform +was sent to meet and escort the archbishop who came to celebrate +the funeral mass. + +The death of General Sheridan placed me in a position which I had +never anticipated--that of senior officer on the active list of +the army. The President had known little of me either officially +or personally, and I had some grave differences with the Secretary +of War upon subjects of great importance in my estimation, though +doubtless less in his. I had defended as well as I could, and with +some persistence, what I then believed and now know was the right, +but had been worsted, as a matter of course. It is due to the +Honorable Secretary to say that he disclaimed, many months later, +ever having knowingly given his sanction to the document announcing +one of the military doctrines which I had so persistently but +ineffectually combated. But I did not know that in August, 1888, +and he did not then know that he had been thus betrayed. Hence I +thought it quite improbable that a general holding opinions so +radically opposed to those of the Secretary of War would be called +to the command of the army. But I quietly waited in Washington +for the President's orders, neither seeking nor receiving any +opportunity for explanation of the supposed irreconcilable difference +with the Secretary of War. What occurred in that secret council- +chamber of the commander-in-chief, where the fate of so many anxious +soldiers has been sealed, I have never known or inquired; but in +no great length of time came the President's order assigning me to +the command of the army,--six or seven hours, as I afterward learned, +after it was received in the War Department and given to the press. + + DEPLORABLE CONDITION OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT + +It is not too much to say that the condition of the War Department +at that time was deplorable. It was the culmination of the +controversy respecting the relations between the administration +and the command which had lasted, with slight intermissions, for +forty years. It is not my purpose to go into the history of that +long controversy, but only to state briefly its final result, part +of which was perhaps due to General Sheridan's extreme illness for +some time before his death, and his retention in nominal command +and in the nominal administration of military justice long after +it had become impossible for him to discharge such duties intelligently. +But that result had been practically reached a long time before +General Sheridan became seriously ill. He had long ceased, as +General Sherman and General Scott had before him, not only to +command, but to exercise any appreciable influence in respect to +either the command or the administration. The only difference was +that General Scott went to New York and General Sherman to St. +Louis, while General Sheridan stayed in Washington. + +I have always understood, but do not know the fact, that in former +times the Secretary of War had exercised some intelligent control +over military affairs, so that there was at least unity in the +exercise of military authority. But in 1888 even that had ceased, +and it had been boldly announced some time before that each +departmental chief of staff, in his own sphere, was clothed with +all the authority of the Secretary of War. All that a major-general +as well as an officer of lower grade had to do was to execute such +orders as he might receive from the brigadiers at the head of the +several bureaus in Washington. It was not even necessary for those +mighty chiefs to say that their mandates had the sanction of any +higher authority. Their own fiat was all-sufficient for a mere +soldier of the line or for his commanding general, of whatever +grade of rank or of command. It is not strange that the Secretary +was finally unable to admit that he, great lawyer as he was, could +possibly have given his sanction to such an interpretation of the +law as that; but the decision was given by his order, and it governed +the army for a long time. Of course the adjutant-general became +by far the chiefest of those many chiefs; for it is his function +to issue to the army all the orders of both the Secretary of War +and the commanding general. Be it said to his credit that he did +not assume to issue orders in his own name, after the manner of +other chiefs. Like a sensible man, he was content with the actual +exercise of power, without caring to let the army know that he did +it. He had only to use the name of the Secretary or the general, +as he pleased; either would answer with the army. Of course I knew +something of this before I went to Washington, for the evidence of +it was sometimes too plain to be ignored. Yet it did seem to me +passing strange to sit in my office about noon, where I had been +all the day before, and learn from the New York papers what orders +I had issued on that previous day! Upon inquiry I was told that +that was only a matter of routine, and a rule of long standing. +But I mildly indicated that such a practice did not meet my approval, +and that I wished it changed, which was finally done, as explained +in a previous chapter. But even then I had no means of knowing +whether an order sent to me in the name of the Secretary of War +had ever been seen by him, or whether it was the work of the adjutant- +general, or the product of some joint operations of two or more of +the several chiefs, each of whom had the Secretary's authority to +do such things. At length the Secretary, though with evidently +serious misgivings respecting some deep ulterior purpose of mine, +consented that I might have an officer of the adjutant-general's +department, whom I knew, in my own office, to keep me informed of +what I was to do, and, if possible, what orders I might actually +receive from the Secretary himself, and what from the several other +heads of that hydra called the War Department. + + A BETTER UNDERSTANDING + +After that change things went on much better; but it was at best +only an armed truce, with everybody on guard, until the end of that +administration, and then it came very near culminating in a pitched +battle at the very beginning of the next. By what seemed at the +time a very sharp trick, but which may possibly have been only the +natural working of the vicious system, I was made to appear to the +new Secretary of War as having failed promptly to give effect to +an order authorized by his predecessor, but on which no authentic +marks of _his_ authority appeared, only such as might indicate that +it came from another source. But if it was a trick, it signally +failed. A few candid words from one soldier to another, even if +that other had not been a solider all his life, were quite sufficient +to dissipate that little cloud which at first had threatened a +storm. Then sunlight began to appear; and when, in due time, by +the operation of some natural laws, and some others happily enacted +by Congress, certain necessary changes came about, the sky over +the War Department became almost cloudless, and I trust it may +never again be darkened as it had been nearly all the time for +forty years. + +General Sheridan had entered upon his duties with all the soldierly +courage and confidence of his nature, declaring his purpose to +regain the ground lost by General Sherman when, to use Sheridan's +own expressive words, "Sherman threw up the sponge." He announced +his interpretation of the President's order assigning him to the +"command of the army" as necessarily including _all_ the army, not +excepting the chiefs of the staff departments; and he soon gave +evidence of his faith by ordering one of those chiefs on an inspecting +tour, or something of that kind, without the knowledge of the +Secretary of War. Thus the Secretary found the chief of one of +the bureaus of his department gone without his authority, he knew +not where. It was not difficult for the Secretary to point out to +the general, as he did in writing, in a firm, though kind and +confidential way, that such could not possibly be the true meaning +of the President's order. No attempt appears to have been made to +discuss the subject further, or to find any ground broad enough +for both Secretary and general to stand upon. Nothing further +appears to have been said or done on that subject during that +administration. But upon the inauguration of the next, the Secretary +of War sent out to all the commanding generals of the army copies +of that letter of his predecessor, in which the general-in-chief +had been so mildly and respectfully, yet so thoroughly, beaten. +The army was thus given to understand on that occasion that their +senior in command had not even been given a chance to "throw up +the sponge," as his predecessor had done, but had been "knocked +out" by the first blow. + + GENERAL SHERIDAN'S HUMILIATING EXPERIENCE + +As if that was not humiliation enough for a great soldier to bear, +whenever the Secretary went away one of the same chiefs of bureaus +that the general thought he had a right to command acted as Secretary +of War, to dominate over him! But the loyal, subordinate soldier +who had commanded great armies and achieved magnificent victories +in the field while those bureau chiefs were purveying powder and +balls, or pork and beans, submitted even to that without a murmur, +for a great lawyer had told him that such was the law, and how +could he know any better? It was only when the adjutant-general, +his own staff-officer, so made by the regulations which the general +knew, was thus appointed over him, that his soldierly spirit +rebelled. The humblest soldier of a republic could not endure +that. All this was based upon the theory that the general of the +army was not an officer of the War Department, and hence could not +be appointed acting Secretary of War. What other great department +of the government could recognize the standing army as belonging +to it, if not the Department of War? Surely the little army had +a hard time while it was thus turned out into the cold, not even +its chief recognized as belonging to any department of the government +of the country which they were all sworn to serve, but subject to +the orders of any bureau officer who happened to be the senior in +Washington in hot summer weather, when nearly all had gone to the +mountains or the sea? + +That same great lawyer announced in my hearing, very soon after +his accession to power, in response to a suggestion that war service +was entitled to weight in appointments and promotions, that in his +judgment "that book was closed." Could any one of the million of +soldiers still living, and the many more millions of patriots who +are always alive in our country, be expected to support such a +policy as that? In my opinion, that one short speech cost the +national administration more than a million of votes. Soldiers +don't say much through the press, but they quietly talk things over +around their campfires. And I hope many generations will pass away +before they and their sons will cause thus to keep alive the fires +of patriotism kindled by the great struggle for American Union. + +Thank God, that "law" did not last many years. There was great +rejoicing throughout the little army when it was again recognized +as belonging to the Department of War. But that cause of rejoicing +was soon beclouded. By another of those inscrutable dispensations +of Providence, another superior, under the title of Assistant +Secretary of War, was interposed between the commander-in-chief of +the army and the general appointed to assist him in the command. +It had been thought, and so stated in writing, that the major- +general commanding, and the ten heads of staff departments and +bureaus, with their many assistants, all educated men of long +experience in the several departments of military affairs, and some +of them tried in war, might give the Secretary all the assistance +he needed, if they were permitted to do it. But no; it appears to +have been thought that some other, who had had no education or +experience in the affairs of the War Department, could better assist +a Secretary who to similar acquired qualifications for his office +added far greater natural endowments and the just confidence of +his country. Thus the major-general was treated as much worse than +the lieutenant-general had been, as he was inferior to him in rank. +But I also submitted without a word, because it was this time +unquestionably the law as well as the will of my lawful superiors +in office. I waited as patiently as I could, as the lieutenant- +general had done, the time when by operation of law, human or +divine, welcome relief from a burdensome duty would come, upon the +official declaration that I had done, as best I could, all the duty +that God and my country required of me. + + THE GRANTING OF MEDALS + +One illustration will suffice to show the working of this new +invention by which the general-in-chief was still further removed +from the commander-in-chief, whose chief military adviser he was +supposed to be. An act of Congress authorized the President to +confer medals of honor upon soldiers of all grades who might be +most distinguished for bravery in action. It is the most highly +prized of all military rewards because given to the _soldier_, +without regard to rank, for that service which every true soldier +regards as of the greatest merit. The standard of merit deserving +that reward is essentially the same in all the armies of the +civilized world, and the medal is made of iron or bronze, instead +of anything more glittering or precious, to indicate the character +of the deed it commemorates. That standard of merit is the most +heroic devotion in the discharge of _soldierly duty_ in the face +of the enemy, that conduct which brings victory, honor, and glory +to the country for which a brave man has devoted his life in +obedience to the orders which have come down to him from the head +of the nation, which spirit of obedience and devotion creates armies +and saves nations from defeat, disaster, or domestic convulsion. +These highest tokens of a nation's honor had for many years been +given with the greatest care, after most rigid scrutiny of the +official records and all other evidence presented, laboriously +reviewed by the general-in-chief in person, recommended by him +under the universal rule of civilized nations, and approved by the +Secretary of War, whose approval is considered equivalent to the +order of the President, by which alone, under the law, a medal of +honor can be granted. But at length these carefully considered +recommendations were disapproved by the Assistant Secretary of War, +on the ground that the soldier had only done his duty! He had only +done, or heroically tried to do until stricken down by the enemy's +fire, what his commander had ordered! Some other standard of +soldierly honor was set up, not involving obedience to orders nor +discharge of duty, but instead of that some act of each soldier's +own volition, as if what a nation most highly honored was independent +action of each one of its million of soldiers, without any special +regard to the orders of the commander-in-chief or any of his +subordinate commanders! Thus the most dearly bought honor of a +citizen of this great republic, intrusted by Congress to the +commander-in-chief of the army, to be duly awarded to his subordinates, +passed into the hands of an Assistant Secretary of War, to be +awarded by him under his own newly invented theory of soldierly +merit! After a laborious but vain attempt to obtain recognition +of the time-honored standard of soldierly honor and merit, the +general-in-chief was forced to admit that the new standard set up +by the Assistant Secretary of War did not afford him any intelligible +guide by which he could be governed in making his recommendations, +and hence he requested to be relieved _by the Secretary of War_ +from consideration of such cases in future, presuming that the +vital question would thus, as a matter of course, receive the +_personal_ consideration of the _Secretary_. The formal action of +the "Secretary of War," relieving the general from that important +duty involving the honor of those under his command, was very +promptly made known to him. But now there is very good reason for +the belief that the honorable and very worthy Secretary knew nothing +at all of the whole transaction! + +It was my good fortune to have had, by close personal association, +exact knowledge of the difficulties which my predecessors had +encountered, as well as, perhaps, a more modest ambition, and hence +to avoid some of those difficulties. Yet in view of the past +experience of all commanders of the army, from that of George +Washington with the Continental Congress down to the present time, +I advise all my young brother soldiers to limit their ambition to +the command of the Division of the Atlantic or Department of the +East. But since some of them must in all probability be required +to discharge the duties of the higher position, I trust the varied +experiences of their predecessors may serve as some help to them +in the discharge of those duties, which are vastly more difficult +and far less agreeable than any other duties of an American soldier. +They are the duties which most closely concern the subordinate +relation of the military to the civil power in a republic. In that +relation I had the great good fortune to enjoy most cordial and +considerate personal treatment on the part of my distinguished +associates representing the civil power. Hence my advice to my +young military friends may be fairly regarded as based upon the +most favorable view of what any of them may reasonably expect. It +is the one position of all in the army which most severely tries +the spirit of subordination which is so indispensable in a soldier +of a republic. I have not thought it surprising that none of my +great predecessors were quite able to endure the trial. + + THE SECRETARY'S CALL-BELL + +It is there where the polished surfaces of military etiquette and +modern methods come in contact with the rough cast-iron of those +which often prevail in civil administration, and the former get +badly scratched. Military rules are invariable, with rare exceptions +understood and observed by all, while civil practice varies according +to the character and habits of the chief in authority, from those +of the illustrious Stanton, now well known in history,( 1) to the +opposite extreme of refined courtesy. Long observation and experience +have led to the belief that such rasping of feelings, too sensitive +perhaps, even more than substantial difference, has often been the +cause of discord. A single example may suffice to illustrate what +is meant. In the arrangements of the room especially designed for +the office of the Secretary of War in the splendid new State, War, +and Navy Departments building, was a great table-desk on which was +a complete system of electric buttons connected with wires leading +to bells in all the principal offices in the department, the buttons +bearing the titles of the officers at the head of the several +bureaus, etc., so that the Secretary could "ring up" any colonel, +brigadier-general, or major-general whom he wished to see, just as +a gentleman in private life does his coachman, butler, or valet. +To an army officer who had for many years, in lower grades, been +accustomed to the invariable formula, delivered by a well-dressed +soldier standing at "attention" and respectfully saluting, "The +commanding officer sends his compliments to Captain B---, and wishes +to see the captain at headquarters," the tinkling of that soft +little bell must have sounded harsh indeed after he had attained +the rank of brigadier-general. Twice only, I believe, my own old +soldier messenger who attended in the room where the telephone and +bells were located, came to my room, with an indescribable expression +on his face, and said, "The bell from the Secretary's office is +ringing!" I replied, "Indeed? Go up and inquire what it means." +Presently the Secretary's own messenger appeared, and delivered a +message in courteous terms--whether the same the Secretary had +given to him I did not know, but had reason to doubt, for I had +seen and heard the Secretary violently ring a certain bell several +times, and then say with great emphasis to his messenger, "Go and +tell ---- to come here," not even using the high military title by +which "----" was habitually addressed in the War Department. But +those uncivil methods of an imperfect civilization are gradually +passing away, and the more refined courtesies, taught, I believe, +in all our great schools as well as in the military and naval +service, are taking their place. It is now a long time since that +reform was practically complete in the War Department. + + THE RELATIONS OF SECRETARY AND GENERAL + +Thus it appeared, when I went into the office in 1888, that of my +predecessors in command of the army, Scott and Sherman had given +up the contest, Sheridan had been put quickly _hors de combat_, +while Grant alone had won the fight, and that after a long contest, +involving several issues, in which a Secretary of War was finally +removed from office with the consent of his own personal and +political friends, a President was impeached and escaped removal +from office by only one vote, and the country was brought to the +verge of another civil war. As I had helped Evarts, Seward, and +some others whose names I never knew, to "pour oil on the troubled +waters" in the time of Grant and Stanton, and to get everybody into +the humor to respond heartily to that great aspiration, "Let us +have peace," I thought perhaps I might do something in the same +direction in later years. Be that as it might, I had no desire to +try again what so many others had failed to accomplish, but thought +it better to make an experiment with a less ambitious plan of my +own, which I had worked out while trying to champion the ideas +entertained by all my predecessors. At the request of General +Grant and General Sherman, when the one was President and the other +general of the army, I studied the subject as thoroughly as I was +capable of doing, and formulated a regulation intended to define +the relations between the Secretary of War, the general of the +army, and the staff departments. I still think that plan of my +great superiors, only formulated by me, would have worked quite +satisfactorily if it could have had general and cordial support. +Yet I do not think it was based upon the soundest view of the +constitutional obligations of the President as commander-in-chief +of the army, nor at all consistent with the practice in this country +of giving the command of the army to the officer happening to be +senior in rank, without regard to the "special trust and confidence" +reposed in him by the President for the time being. It was based +too much upon the special conditions then existing, wherein the +general of the army, no less than the Secretary of War, enjoyed +the confidence of the President in the highest degree. The plan +proposed to give far too great authority to the general, if he did +not, for whatever reason, enjoy the full confidence of the President. +It also trusted too much to the ability and disinterested fidelity +of the several chiefs of the staff departments. In short, it was +based upon a supposed higher degree of administrative virtue than +always exists even in this country. + +However all this may be, the proposed regulation did not meet with +cordial support, so far as I know, from any but General Grant, +General Sherman, and General M. C. Meigs, then quartermaster-general. +The other bureau chiefs earnestly opposed it. It was near the end +of General Grant's second term, and no effort was made, so far as +I know, to adopt any regulation on the subject in the next or any +succeeding administration. The personal controversy between General +Scott and the Secretary of War many years before had resulted in +the repeal, through revision, of the old and quite satisfactory +regulation on the subject, and no other worthy of the name has ever +been adopted in its place. + +Soon after I was assigned to the command of the army I submitted, +in writing, to President Cleveland my own mature views on the +subject. They received some favorable consideration, but no formal +action, in view of the near approach of the end of his first term. +From that time till near the present the paper was in the personal +custody of the Secretary of War. What consideration, if any, it +ever received, I was never informed. But it was the guide of my +own action, at least, while I was in command of the army. It is +now on file in the War Department. It is to be hoped that some +future military and administrative geniuses, superior to any of +the last hundred years, may be able to solve that difficult problem. +I can only say that my own plan worked well enough so long as I +helped to work it. How it may be with anybody else, either under +my plan or some other, only the future can determine. I so far +succeeded that the most intelligent staff officers used to say, +"For the first time the general actually does command the army." +They saw only the results, without exactly perceiving the nature +of the motive-power. + +The way to success in rendering efficient public service does not +lie through any assumption of the authority which the nation may +have given to another, even if not most wisely, but rather in +zealous, faithful, and subordinate efforts to assist that other in +doing what the country has imposed upon him. + + THE LAW FIXING RETIREMENT FOR AGE + +A soldier may honorably crave, as the dearest object of his life, +recognition of his _past services_ by promotion to a higher grade. +That is his one reward for all he may have done. But the desire +for higher command, greater power, and more unrestrained authority +exhibits ambition inconsistent with due military subordination and +good citizenship. It is a dangerous ambition in a republic. The +highest examples of patriotism ever shown in this country have been +in the voluntary surrender of power into the hands of the people +or of their chosen representatives, not in efforts to increase or +prolong that power. Following those highest examples, in the year +1882 all the senior officers of the army, including Sherman, +Sheridan, and Hancock, united in advocating the measure then pending +in Congress, to fix a limit of age when every officer should +relinquish command and return to the ranks of private citizenship. +In doing so, nearly all of those seniors, especially Hancock, +relinquished forever all hope of rising to the command of the army. +My case was not so strong as that of Hancock, because I was younger. +But Sheridan was only six months older than I, and his "expectation +of life" was far beyond the time when I should become sixty-four +years old. Hence I cheerfully relinquished in 1882 any reasonable +ambition I may ever have had to command the army. My ultimate +succession to that command in 1888 was, like all other important +events in my personal career, unsought and unexpected. Hence +whatever I did from 1888 to 1895 was only a little "extra duty," +and I have had no reason to find fault on account of the "extra- +duty pay" which I received, though none of it was in money. I am +inclined to think it a pretty good rule for a soldier to wait until +he is "detailed," and not to try to put himself "on guard." I do +not know any case in American history where the opposite course +has not resulted in irretrievable injury to him who adopted it. +Temporary success in gaining high position, before education and +experience have given the necessary qualifications, necessarily +results finally in failure; while slower advancement, giving full +opportunities for education and experience in the duties of each +grade, insures full qualification for the next higher. American +history is full of such examples, as it is--alas! too truly--of +those cases where the highest qualifications and most becoming +modesty have not met with any appropriate advancement or other +recognition. + + AN ANECDOTE OF GENERAL GRANT + +In the official intercourse of a soldier with the great departments +of government, he often finds useful those maxims which have served +him as commander of an army in the field. The most important of +these is, not to enter a combat where he is sure to be beaten, as, +for instance, where his opponent is the judge who is to decide the +issue. As in war, so in administration, battle once joined, +questions of right become obscured. The most powerful guns and +battalions are sure to win. It is much wiser to seek an ally who +carries a heavier armament. Some subordinates of mine--clerks and +messengers, I believe--were once required to refund some money +which had been paid them on my interpretation of the law and +regulations. My careful explanation of the ground of my action +was promptly disapproved. I then requested that the money be +charged to me and the whole matter referred to Congress, in reply +to which request I was informed that the accounts had been settled. +In another case I requested that my appeal from adverse action be +submitted to President Grant, who had had occasion to know something +about me. I was requested by telegraph, in cipher, to withdraw +that appeal, as it was liable to cause trouble. Being a lover of +peace rather than war, I complied. In that perhaps I made a mistake. +If I had adhered to my appeal, it might have saved a public +impeachment. Again, I was called upon by one of the Treasury +bureaus to refund some money which had been paid me for mileage by +the Secretary of War, on the alleged ground that the Secretary +could not lawfully give me such an order. I referred the matter +to the Secretary, as one that did not concern me personally, but +which involved the dignity of the head of the War Department as +compared with that of a subordinate bureau of another department. +The Treasury official soon notified me that the account had been +allowed. To illustrate the application of the same principle under +opposite conditions, I must relate the story told of President +Grant. When informed by a Treasury officer that he could not find +any law to justify what the President had desired to be done, he +replied, "Then I will see if I can find a Treasury officer who can +find that law." Of course no change in the incumbent of that office +proved to be necessary. I have thought in several cases in later +years that Grant's military method might have been tried to +advantage. + +"Be ye wise as a serpent and harmless as a dove" is the only rule +of action I have ever heard of that can steer a soldier clear of +trouble with the civil powers of this great republic. Yet he must +sometimes, when his honor or the rights of his subordinates are +involved, make the fight, though he knows he must be beaten. A +soldier must then stand by his guns as long as he can, and it has +happened that such a fight, apparently hopeless at the time, has +given victory to a future generation. + +[( 1) Sherman's "Memoirs," second edition, Vol. II, p. 422.] + + +CHAPTER XXVII +President of the New Board of Ordnance and Fortifications--Usefulness +of the Board--Troubles with the Sioux Indians in 1890-1891--Success +of the Plan to Employ Indians as Soldiers--Marriage to Miss +Kilbourne--The Difficulty with Chili in 1892. + +Even as late as the year 1882, very high military authority in +this country advocated with great earnestness the proposition that +our old brick and stone forts, with their smooth-bore guns, could +make a successful defense against a modern iron-clad fleet! At +the same time, and even much later, high naval authority maintained +that the United States navy should be relied upon for the defense +of our many thousands of miles of sea-coast! In view of such +counsel, it does not seem strange that Congress, after all the old +ships had nearly all rotted away, began to give some attention to +a new navy, but thought little or nothing of land defenses. The +old brick and stone parapets and the cast-iron guns were still +there; none of them had become rotten, though the wooden carriages +had gone to decay, and the guns were lying on the ground! Yet, +after a long dream of security, the Great National Council announced +the decision that _something_ ought probably to be done for sea- +coast defense. Provision was made by law for a very high board, +with the Secretary of War presiding, to report to Congress what +was required--a thing which, if Congress had only known it, the +Engineer Bureau of the War Department could have reported just as +well in far less time. But a length a very able report was submitted, +which inspired the confidence of Congress. + + BOARD OF ORDNANCE AND FORTIFICATION + +In the meantime there had arisen a condition which can best be +expressed as "want of confidence" in the chief of the Ordnance +Department of the army on the part of committees of Congress. From +this it resulted that no appropriations were made for several years +for any new armament, and hence none for fortifications. Thus by +a trifle were the wheels of a great government blocked for a long +time! Yet that government still survives! Finally, in the year +1888 an act was passed creating a Board of Ordnance and Fortifications, +of which the commanding general of the army should be president, +and appropriating quite a large sum of money to be expended, under +the direct supervision of that board, to commence the work of +fortification and armament of the sea-coast. After a very careful +examination and full consideration and discussion, the board adopted +the plans prepared by the Bureaus of Engineering and Ordnance, and +the work was began and carried forward substantially the same as +if the expenditure of the appropriation had been intrusted to the +two bureaus concerned and the Secretary of War. + +The board did perform, and still continues to perform, a very +important and essential duty, and one which cannot be satisfactorily +intrusted to any one man, namely, that of deciding the delicate +and difficult questions constantly arising in respect to the +practical utility and economy of new inventions having reference +to works of defense or of attack. But these questions had no +immediate bearing whatever upon the all-important problem of the +day--to place the sea-coasts of the United States in a satisfactory +state of defense according to the best scientific methods then +known to the world. And that problem had already been solved, in +all respects save one, namely, how to get out of Congress the +necessary money to do the work? Genius will never cease to invent +something better. If we are to wait for the best, the next war +will be over long before we shall begin to prepare for it. All +great military nations had been engaged for many years in elaborate +and costly experiments, to develop the best possible means of attack +and defense, and our Engineer and Ordnance departments had not +failed to profit thereby to the fullest extent. They were ready, +without any such costly experiments, to make our defenses as good +as any in the world. Yet that work of so vital importance must be +delayed until American genius could also be assured of a chance, +at government expense, of developing something better than anybody +else in the world had done! An end was finally, in 1888, put to +that dangerous delay by the device, so happily invented by somebody +in Congress, of a Board of Ordnance and Fortification. + + USEFULNESS OF THE BOARD + +The board has also served, and will doubtless continue to serve, +another very important purpose. It brings together, in close +consideration and discussion of all details of the system of national +defense, representative officers of the engineers, the ordnance, +and the artillery, together with a representative civilian who has +become, by service in Congress, far better able than any other +member to insure that perfect understanding between the board and +the committees of Congress which is essential to harmonious action. +Above all, it has given to the commanding general an opportunity +to become perfectly familiar with all the details of the coast +defenses, and to exert a legitimate influence in making preparations +for war, which must be of vital importance to him and to the country +when he has to bear the great responsibility of command. I used +to say that it would not be just to me to deprive me of such +opportunities for education, and I doubt not all my successors will +share that feeling. Thus, what may prove to be of the greatest +benefit to the military service has finally come out of that evil +of "want of confidence" in an ordnance chief. + +When in command of the Division of the Atlantic in 1886-7, I made +a careful estimate of the aggregate strength of the war garrisons +required for the fortifications and armament recommended by the +Endicott board, and of the peace garrisons which would be absolutely +required for the care of the new works and for the instruction of +the militia artillery reserves. It was found that the addition of +two regiments to the present artillery strength of the army would +provide the requisite force. Hence a measure was formulated and +submitted to Congress to convert the present five regiments into +seven, with some proportionate reduction in the number of officers, +intended to promote efficiency and economy. That measure has +appeared to meet with the approval of nearly all concerned, but is +still pending in Congress. It is probably the most important +military measure now awaiting favorable action. The measure which +accompanies it for the reorganization of the infantry, though not +of so pressing necessity, is based upon sound military principles, +and is worthy of prompt and favorable action. + +The first introduction of the policy of confining the warlike tribes +of Indians upon very restricted reservations necessarily caused +great discontent, especially among the younger men, who where thus +cut off from the sports of the chase and the still greater sport +of occasional forays into frontier settlements, which were the only +means known in Indian custom by which a young warrior could gain +a name and a position of honor in his tribe. Either through too +limited appropriations or bad management, the provisions furnished +for the support of the Indians, in lieu of those to which they had +been accustomed, proved inadequate. This caused the spirit of +discontent to increase and to become general among all ages. The +natural result was such a threat of war from the great Sioux nation +in the winter of 1890-91 as to necessitate the concentration of +quite a large army to meet the danger of a general outbreak. In +the course of military operations, accidents rather than design on +either side occasioned some serious collisions between the troops +and the Indians, especially at Wounded Knee, resulting in desperate +conflict and much loss of life. But by very careful management on +the part of the commanding general in the field, Major-General +Miles, a general conflict was averted, and the Sioux made their +submission. They had had no general intention to go to war, if +they could avoid it without starvation. After a large sum of money +had been expended by the War Department in this way, the deficiencies +in food were supplied at about the same cost as would, if made in +advance, have removed the cause of war. The Indians gained their +point of getting as much food as they needed, and the War Department +paid the extra bills, but out of the same public treasury which +has so often been bled in that way. + + TROUBLES WITH THE SIOUX INDIANS IN 1890-91 + +It was quite beyond the power of the War Department to guard against +a recurrence of that greatest danger of Indian wars--starvation of +the Indians. But long experience and accurate knowledge of Indian +character had suggested a method by which the other cause of +discontent among the young Indian warriors might be, at least in +a great measure, removed. That was by providing a legitimate method +by which their irrepressible love of military life and exploits +might be largely gratified, and, at the same time, those ambitious +young men transferred from the ranks of more or less probable savage +enemies to the ranks of friends and practically civilized allies. +Fortunately, the strongest trait of the Indian character, namely, +fidelity to the war chief, lent itself to this project. Long +experience had shown the existence of this Indian trait. In only +one solitary instance had the Indian scouts so long employed by +the army ever proved unfaithful, though often employed in hostilities +against their own tribes. Hence, if the ardent young warriors +could be induced to enlist for three years in the army, they would, +at least for that time, be converted from enemies into allies, even +against such of their own tribes as might refuse to enlist. Of +course the army must suffer somewhat, in its effective strength +for all purposes, during this experiment; for it is evident that +a company or troop of Indians would not be quite as valuable for +general service as the same number of white men. Yet the transfer +of a few hundred of the best Sioux warriors from the Sioux side to +our side would much more than compensate for the loss of the same +number of white troops. The result of that experiment seemed to +be entirely satisfactory. At all events, there has been no great +Indian war, nor any threat of one, since that experiment was begun. +It has served to tide over the time during which the young men, +who had from earliest childhood listened to stories of the Custer +massacre and other great Indian achievements, were undergoing +transformation from the life and character of savage warriors to +those of civilized husbandmen, under the system of allotments in +severalty. When the short warlike part of the life of one generation +is past, the danger will no longer exist. + +In June, 1891, at Keokuk, Iowa, I married Miss Georgia Kilbourne, +daughter of Mrs. George E. Kilbourne of that city. Then a host of +old soldiers of the Union army reassembled to greet their comrade. + +In 1892 this country seemed to be on the verge of war with the +little republic of Chile. So confident were some officials of the +administration that war was inevitable, that I was asked to make +an estimate of the military force which would be necessary to occupy +and hold a vital point in Chilean territory until the demands of +the United States were complied with. It was assumed, of course, +that the navy could easily do all the rest. Pending the consideration +of this subject, so disagreeable to me, I had a dream which I +repeated at the time to a few intimate friends. I saw in the public +street a man holding a mangy-looking dog by the neck, and beating +him with a great club, while a crowd of people assembled to witness +the "sport." Some one asked the man why he was beating the poor +dog. He replied: "Oh, just to make him yelp." But the dog did +not "yelp." He bore his cruel punishment without a whine. Then +he was transformed into a splendid animal, one of the noblest of +his species, and the entire crowd of bystanders, with one accord, +rushing in and compelled the man to desist from beating him. + + +CHAPTER XXVIII +Services of the Army During the Labor Strikes of 1894--Military +Control of the Pacific Railways--United States Troops in the City +of Chicago--Orders Sent to General Miles, and his Reports--The +Proclamation of the President--Instructions to Govern the Troops +in Dealing with a Mob--The Duties of the Military Misunderstood-- +Orders of the President in Regard to the Pacific Railways. + +In 1894 the vast development of railroad communication between the +Mississippi valley and the Pacific Ocean, and the similar building +of new cities and founding of industrial enterprises in the region +between the Rocky Mountains and the Pacific, both in anticipation +of the future development of the country rather then in response +to any demand then existing, having been substantially completed, +or suspended for an indefinite time, a large amount of capital so +invested was found for the time unproductive, and a great number +of laborers were left in the Pacific States without any possible +employment. The great majority of these laborers were, as usual, +without any accumulated means to pay their transportation to any +other part of the country, and hence were left to drift as they +might toward the East, subsisting by whatever means they could find +during their long tramp of many hundreds of miles. Similar and +other causes had produced at the same time industrial depression +throughout the country, so that the unfortunate laborers drifting +eastward were only an additional burden upon communities already +overloaded with unemployed labor. Thus the borrowing of foreign +capital to put into unprofitable investments, and the employment +of great numbers of laborers in making premature developments, met +with the consequences which are sure to follow disregard of natural +laws. The management of the Pacific railroads did not appear to +appreciate the wisdom of mitigating, so far as was in their power, +the evil which had resulted from their own policy, by giving free +transportation to the laborers who had been stranded on the Pacific +coast. Hence all the transcontinental roads were soon blocked by +lawless seizures of trains, and suffered losses far greater than +they saved in transportation. Indeed, the requisite transportation +of destitute laborers eastward would have cost the roads practically +nothing, while their losses resulting from not providing it were +very great. Every possible effort was made for a long time to deal +effectively with this evil by the ordinary course of judicial +proceedings; but such methods proved entirely inadequate. The +government was finally compelled, in consequence of the almost +total interruption of interstate commerce and of the transportation +of the United States mails and troops, to assume military control +along the lines of all the Pacific roads, and direct the department +commanders to restore and maintain, by military force, traffic and +transportation over those roads. + + MILITARY CONTROL OF THE PACIFIC RAILWAYS + +For some time those lawless acts did not seem to result from any +general organization. But they gradually developed into the +formidable character of a wide-spread conspiracy and combination, +with recognized general leaders, to obstruct and prevent the due +execution of the laws of the United States respecting transportation +and interstate commerce. The principal center of this conspiracy, +and by far the most formidable combination, was in Chicago, where +the greatest material interests, both public and private, were at +stake, though many other important railroad centers and many thousand +miles of road were involved. There the insurrection was so great +in numbers and so violent in its acts as to require the most prompt +and energetic action of a very large force to suppress disorder, +protect public property, and execute the laws. The city police +were utterly powerless in such an emergency, and deputy United +States marshals, though employed without limit as to numbers, were +no more effective. The State militia were not called out in time +to meet the emergency. Hence nothing remained but for the National +Government to exercise the military power conferred upon it by the +Constitution and laws, so far as the same were applicable.( 1) +Fortunately, the acts of Congress passed in pursuance of the +Constitution, although never before made effective in a similar +case, were found to give ample authority for the action then +required. Fortunately, also, the wise foresight of the government +in establishing a large military post at Fort Sheridan, near Chicago, +made a regiment of infantry, a squadron of cavalry, and a battery +of artillery immediately available for service in that city. But, +unfortunately, the commanding general of that department was absent +from his command, where superior military capacity was so much +needed at that time. Although the troops west of the Mississippi +had been engaged for a long time, under the President's orders, in +overcoming the unlawful obstruction of railroad traffic above +referred to, the general appears not to have anticipated any +emergency which would in his judgment require or justify such use +of troops in his own department, and hence remained in the Eastern +States, where he had gone some time before. From this it resulted +that when the troops at Fort Sheridan were ordered into Chicago, +the execution of the order devolved upon subordinate officers, and +the troops were so dispersed as to be unable to act with the +necessary effect. + +It having become apparent that the services of troops would probably +be required in the city of Chicago, and in anticipation of orders +from the President, instructions were telegraphed on July 2 to the +commanding general of the Department of the Missouri to make +preparations to move the garrison of Fort Sheridan to the Lake +Front Park in the city. The reply of his staff-officer, Colonel +Martin, showed that the department commander, Major-General Miles, +was not in Chicago, and the adjutant-general of the army did not +know where he was, but, after several inquiries by telegraph, +learned that the general had started that afternoon from Long Island +for Washington instead of Chicago. The next day (July 3), in the +President's room at the Executive Mansion, in reply to my suggestion +that his presence was needed with his command, General Miles said +he was subject to orders, but that in his opinion the United States +troops ought not to be employed in the city of Chicago at that +time. No reply was made by the President or the Secretary of War, +who was also present, to that expression of opinion, but the +President approved my further suggestion that General Miles should +return at once to his command. The general started by the first +train, but could not reach Chicago in time to meet the emergency. +It became necessary in the judgment of the President to order the +Fort Sheridan garrison into the city in the afternoon of the same +day (July 3). + + UNITED STATES TROOPS IN THE CITY OF CHICAGO + +The instructions given the day before about moving the troops to +Lake Front Park were not complied with. From that point they could +most readily have protected the sub-treasury, custom-house, post- +office, and other United States property, and also have acted in +a formidable body at any other point where their service might +properly have been required. But instead of that, the troops were +so dispersed that they could not act with much effect anywhere, +and could give no protection whatever to the vast amount of United +States property exposed to destruction. This error appears to have +resulted in some measure from the too great deference paid by +commanding officers to the advice or wisdom of civil officers to +whom they were referred to for information, and much more from lack +of knowledge of the lawful relations existing between the national +troops and the civil authorities in this country, although those +relations had been plainly defined in an order dated May 25, quoted +below. Like ignorance in respect to the proper tactical methods +of dealing with insurrection against the authority of the United +States caused halting and ineffective action of the troops. To +correct this error and make known to all the rules which must govern +United States troops in like emergencies, the subjoined order, +dated July 9, was issued. The extracts from correspondence quoted +below, indicate the nature of the errors above referred to, and +their correction some time after the arrival of General Miles in +Chicago. + +The garrison of Fort Sheridan proved sufficient, notwithstanding +the first faulty disposition and action of troops, to hold the mob +in check until reinforcements arrived from distant stations and +the State troops were brought into effective action. Finally, the +proclamation of the President of the United States, quoted below, +which was issued at the moment when ample military forces had been +placed in position to enforce his constitutional mandates, very +quickly terminated all forcible resistance to the execution of the +laws of the United States. The same result, though perhaps with +greater destruction of life and far less destruction of property, +would probably have been accomplished in a single day by the Fort +Sheridan garrison alone, acting in one compact body, according to +the tactics prescribed for such service. If a like occasion ever +again occurs, the action of the troops will doubtless be governed +by such tactics. Delay is too dangerous in such cases. + + "(Telegram.) + "Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C., July 2, 1894. +"To the Commanding General, Department of the Missouri, Chicago, + Illinois. + +"You will please make all necessary arrangements, confidentially, +for the transportation of the entire garrison of Fort Sheridan-- +infantry, cavalry, and artillery--to the Lake Front Park in the +city of Chicago. To avoid possible interruption of the movement +by rail and by marching through a part of the city, it may be +advisable to bring them by steamboat. Please consider this matter, +and have the arrangements perfected without delay. You may expect +orders at any time for the movement. Acknowledge receipt, and +report in what manner the movement is to be made. + + "J. M. Schofield, Major-General Commanding." + + "(Telegram.) + "Chicago, Illinois, July 2, 1894. +"Adjutant-General U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.: + +"Confidential despatch this date received at three-thirty P. M. +Arrangements can be made to bring troops from Sheridan to Lake +Front Park by steamer, but there would be difficulty in disembarking +them there, as the Van Buren street viaduct has been torn down; +and, besides, transportation from barracks to pier at Sheridan +would necessarily be slow. They can be brought from Sheridan to +Lake Front direct by rail, and disembark on grounds, thus avoiding +marching through city. Suggest the latter plan as best, especially +as rail transportation is now at the post sufficient to bring the +whole command--infantry, artillery, and cavalry--as soon as they +can be loaded on cars at that point. + + "Martin, Asst. Adjt.-Genl. + "(in absence of Major-Genl. Comdg.)." + + UNITED STATES TROOPS IN THE CITY OF CHICAGO + + "(Telegram.) + "Washington, D. C., July 3, 1894, four o'clock P. M. +"To Martin, Adjutant-General, Hdqrs. Dept. of the Missouri, Chicago, + Ills. + +"It having become impracticable, in the judgment of the President, +to enforce, by ordinary course of judicial proceedings, the laws +of the United States, you will direct Colonel Crofton to move his +entire command at once to the city of Chicago, leaving the necessary +guard at Fort Sheridan, there to execute the orders and processes +of the United States court, to prevent the obstruction of the United +States mails, and generally to enforce the faithful execution of +the laws of the United States. He will confer with the United +States marshal, the United States district attorney, and Edwin +Walker, special counsel. Acknowledge receipt, and report action +promptly. + +"By order of the President: + "J. M. Schofield, Major-General." + + "(Telegram.) + "Chicago, Ills, July 4, 1894. +"Adjutant-General U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.: + +"At ten-fifteen this morning Colonel Crofton reports his command +in the city; located, infantry at Blue Island and Grand Crossing, +cavalry and artillery at stock-yards; cannot learn that anything +definite has been accomplished, but there has been no active trouble. +People appear to feel easier since arrival of troops. General +Miles is expected to arrive in city within an hour or at twelve. + + "Martin, Asst. Adjt.-Genl." + + "(Telegram.) + "Chicago, Ills., July 4, 1894. +"Adjt. Genl. U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.: + +"Returned at eleven-thirty this morning. + + "Miles, Maj.-Genl. Commanding." + + "(Telegram.) + "Chicago, Ills., July 4, 1894. +"Adjutant-General U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.: + +"Cavalry and artillery moving to the stock-yards were delayed by +obstructions placed upon the track, also cars being overturned on +track and the threatening mob in the vicinity. A report is received +that a mob of about two thousand men has gathered near Blue Island +and threatened to take that place at four o'clock this afternoon. +It is occupied by four companies of infantry. At the request of +U. S. Marshal Arnold, troops had been located at Blue Island, the +stock-yards, and the crossing at Forty-seventh street of the Lake +Shore and Rock Island railroads before my arrival, and others are +desired at South Chicago. I have directed all commanding officers +not to allow crowds or mobs to congregate about the commands in a +menacing or threatening manner, and to keep out pickets and guards; +and, after due warning, if the mobs approach the commands in a +threatening manner, they must be dispersed, even if firearms have +to be used. A large number of men in the city are wearing white +ribbon, the color ordered by Debs to indicate their allegiance to +his orders. Owing to the feeling of feverish excitement in the +city, and the large number of unoccupied, the condition of to-day +is more critical than at any other time. Most of the roads are +moving mail and passenger trains. All of the roads will attempt +to move their trains to-morrow morning. Sufficient number of men +are available and anxious to work to take the place of all the +strikers, provided proper protection can be given them. Seven +roads have moved a few cars of perishable freight. All the troops +from Sheridan are occupied, and I renew my recommendation that the +garrison be very largely increased at once to meet any emergency +that may arise. The effect of moving troops through the country, +especially from Kansas to Chicago, at this time would be desirable. + + "Nelson A. Miles, Major-General Commanding." + +Additional troops were concentrated in Chicago as rapidly as they +could be transported, until the force there aggregated about two +thousand men. More were in readiness to move if necessary. + + ORDERS SENT TO GENERAL MILES, AND HIS REPORTS + + "(Telegram.) + "Chicago, Ills., July 5, 1894. +"Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington, D. C.: + +"Owing to the excellent discipline and great forbearance of officers +and men, serious hostilities were avoided yesterday; several small +fights and affrays occurred. Matters look more favorable to-day, +although interference exists on five roads. All railroads are +endeavoring to move freight and mail trains. + + "Miles, Major-General Commanding." + + "(Telegram.) + "Chicago, Ills, July 5, 1894. +"Adjutant-General U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.: + +"The mob of several thousand are moving east along Rock Island +nearer center of city, overturning cars, burning station-houses, +and destroying property. There is a report that the mob intend +sacking some of the principal building near Rookery Building to- +night. The riot will soon embrace all the criminals of the city +and vicinity. Unless very positive measures are taken, the riot +will be beyond the control of any small force. Has the government +any additional instructions? + + "Nelson A. Miles, Major-General Commanding." + + "(Telegram--Confidential.) + "Chicago, Ills, July 5, 1894. +"Adjutant-General, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.: + +"While most of the roads are moving passenger and mail trains, +nearly all the freight trains are interfered with, and but very +few are moving. This morning a mob of over two thousand men gathered +at the stock-yards, crowded among the troops, obstructed the movement +of trains, knocked down a railroad official, and overturned some +twenty freight-cars on the track, which obstructs all freight and +passenger traffic in the vicinity of the stock-yards, and thereby +the transit of meat-trains to different parts of the country, as +well as the passenger traffic of the Rock Island Railroad. The +mob also derailed a passenger-train coming into the city on the +Pittsburg, Fort Wayne, and Chicago Railroad, and burned switches, +which destroys track. The injunction of the United States Court +is openly defied, and unless the mobs are dispersed by the action +of the police, or they are fired upon by United States troops, more +serious trouble may be expected, as the mob is increasing and +becoming more defiant. Shall I give the order for troops to fire +on mob obstructing trains? + + "Miles, Major-General Commanding." + +The following extracts from correspondence and orders, and the +proclamation of the President, with the foregoing explanation, +sufficiently indicate the methods by which the unlawful combination +in Chicago was suppressed: + + "(Telegram.) + "Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C., July 5, 1894, 10:15 + P. M. +"To Major-General Miles, Headquarters Department of the Missouri, + United States Army, Chicago, Illinois. + +"In view of the situation in Chicago, as reported in your despatches +to the adjutant-general this evening, it is your duty to concentrate +your troops so as to enable them to act effectively either in +execution of the orders heretofore given, or in protecting the +property of the United States, as in your judgment may be necessary. +In any event, the troops should not be scattered or divided into +small detachments, nor should they attempt to do service in several +places at the same time, which their numbers will not enable them +to do effectively. + +"The mere preservation of peace and good order in the city is, of +course, the province of the city and State authorities. + + "J. M. Schofield, Major-General Commanding." + + ORDERS SENT TO GENERAL MILES, AND HIS REPORTS + + "(Telegram.) + "Chicago, Ills., July 6, 1894. +"Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington, D. C.: + +"In accordance with the orders of the War Department, the troops +were sent to Blue Island, stock-yards, Grand Crossing, and Forty- +ninth street, at the request of the U. S. marshal. This disposition +was made before my arrival yesterday. The roads were obstructed +in several places by mobs; the largest and most violent gathered +near the stock-yards at noon, and gradually moved east along the +line of the Rock Island road, overturning cars, burning station- +house, roundhouse, and other property. The mob was estimated at +ten thousand men, three miles long and half a mile wide; it moved +steadily north until after dark, destroying property and setting +fires, and the cry of the mob was "To hell with the government!" +It reached Eighteenth street after dark, and then dispersed. While +this threatening movement was in action I withdrew some of the +troops on the outskirts of the city, and in the evening the battery +and one troop of cavalry, to the Lake Front Park, for the purpose +of attacking the mob should it reach the vicinity of the government +building between Adams and Jackson sts. During the afternoon, +night, and this morning I have concentrated nine (9) companies +infantry, troop cavalry, and the battery of artillery on the Lake +Front Park. This includes troops from Leavenworth and Brady. +During last night a proclamation was issued by the mayor directing +the police to disperse mobs and prevent the lawless from interfering +with railroads. If this order is executed there will be no further +trouble. One engineer has been stoned to death. During the night +a dozen fires were started in different places, but destroying very +little property, except the principal buildings of the World's Fair +and more than a hundred cars; this morning a mob has gathered near +the stock-yards in as large numbers as yesterday at this time; they +threatened to hang U. S. marshals and policemen. The law-breakers +constitute a very small percentage of the people. The mass of the +people desire the maintenance of law and order. The action of the +Chief Executive has given universal satisfaction. + + "Miles, Major-General Commanding." + + THE PROCLAMATION OF THE PRESIDENT + +"By the President of the United States of America. +"A Proclamation. + +"_Whereas_, by reason of unlawful obstructions, combinations, and +assemblages of persons, it has become impracticable, in the judgment +of the President, to enforce, by the ordinary course of judicial +proceedings, the laws of the United States within the State of +Illinois, and especially in the city of Chicago, within said State: + +"_And whereas_, for the purpose of enforcing the faithful execution +of the laws of the United States and protecting its property and +removing obstructions to the United States mails, in the State and +city aforesaid, the President has employed a part of the military +forces of the United States: + +"_Now, therefore_, I, Grover Cleveland, President of the United +States, do hereby admonish all good citizens and all persons who +may be, or may come, within the city and State aforesaid, against +aiding, countenancing, encouraging, or taking any part in such +unlawful obstructions, combinations, and assemblages; and I hereby +warn all persons engaged in, or in any way connected with, such +unlawful obstructions, combinations, and assemblages, to disperse +and retire peaceably to their respective abodes on or before twelve +o'clock noon on the ninth day of July instant. + +"Those who disregard this warning and persist in taking part with +a riotous mob in forcibly resisting and obstructing the execution +of the laws of the United States, or interfering with the functions +of the government, or destroying or attempting to destroy the +property belonging to the United States or under its protection, +cannot be regarded otherwise than as public enemies. + +"Troops employed against such a riotous mob will act with all the +moderation and forbearance consistent with the accomplishment of +the desired end; but the stern necessities that confront them will +not with certainly permit discrimination between guilty participants +and those who are mingled with them from curiosity and without +criminal intent. They only safe course, therefore, for those not +actually unlawfully participating is to abide at their homes, or +at least not to be found in the neighborhood of riotous assemblages. + +"While there will be no hesitation or vacillation in the decisive +treatment of the guilty, this warning is especially intended to +protect and save the innocent. + +"_In testimony whereof_, I have hereunto set my hand and caused +the seal of the United States to be hereto affixed. + +"Done at the city of Washington, this eighth day of July, in the +year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-four, and +of the independence of the United States the one hundred and +nineteenth. + + "Grover Cleveland. +"By the President: + "W. Q. Gresham, Secretary of State." + + "(General Orders, No. 6). + "Headquarters Department of the Missouri, Chicago, Illinois, July + 9, 1894. +"To all United States troops serving in the Department of the + Missouri. + +"The acts of violence committed during the past few days in +obstructing the mail-trains and post-roads; the blocking of the +interstate commerce; the open defiance and violation of the injunction +of the United States Court; the assaults upon the Federal forces +in the lawful discharge of their duties; the destruction, pillage, +and looting of the inland commerce property belonging to citizens +of the different States, and other acts of rebellion and lawlessness, +have been of such a serious character that the duties of the military +authorities are now clearly defined. + +"The proclamation of the President, the commander-in-chief of the +land and navy forces and the State militia when called into service, +is understood by the military to be in the interests of humanity +and to avoid the useless waste of life, if possible. _It is an +executive order for all law-abiding citizens to separate themselves +from the law-breakers and those in actual hostility to the action +of the United States Court and the laws of the National Government._ +He has defined the attitude of these law-breakers to be that of +enemies of the government, and hence it is the duty of the military +forces to aid the United States marshals to disperse, capture, or +destroy all bodies of men obstructing the mail-routes and in actual +hostility to the injunction of the United States Court and the laws +of the United States. + +"This does not change the relations of the Federal officials with +those of the local authority, as it is expected that the State and +municipal governments will maintain peace and good order within +the territory of their jurisdiction. Should they fail or be +overpowered, the military forces will assist them, but not to the +extent of leaving unprotected property belonging to or under the +protection of the United States. + +"The officer in the immediate command of troops must be the judge +as to what use to make of the forces of his command in executing +his orders, and in case serious action be required and there be +time, he will communicate with his next superior for his +instructions. + +"The earnest efforts of the law-abiding citizens have done much to +improve the condition of affairs during the last few days, and I +earnestly request all law-abiding citizens to do whatever is possible +to assist in maintaining the civil government and the authority of +the municipal, State, and Federal governments in preserving peace +and good order. + +"By command of Major-General Miles: + "J. P. Martin, Assistant Adjutant-General." + + "(General Orders, No. 23) + "Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, + July 9, 1864. +"The following instructions are published for the government of +the army: + +"A mob forcibly resisting or obstructing the execution of the laws +of the United States, or attempting to destroy property belonging +to or under the protection of the United States, is a public enemy. + +"Troops called into action against such a mob are governed by the +general regulations of the army and military tactics in respect to +the manner in which they shall act to accomplish the desired end. +It is purely a tactical question in what manner they shall use the +weapons with which they are armed--whether by the fire of musketry +and artillery, or by the use of the bayonet and saber, or by both, +and at what stage of the operations each or either mode of attack +shall be employed. + +"This tactical question must necessarily be decided by the immediate +commander of the troops, according to his best judgment of the +situation and the authorized drill regulations. + +"In the first stage of an insurrection lawless mobs are frequently +commingled with great crowds of comparatively innocent people drawn +there by curiosity and excitement, and ignorant of the great danger +to which they are exposed. Under such circumstances the commanding +officer should withhold the fire of his troops, if possible, until +timely warning has been given to the innocent to separate themselves +from the guilty. + +"Under no circumstances are the troops to fire into a crowd without +the order of the commanding officer, except that single sharp- +shooters, selected by the commanding officer, may shoot down +individual rioters who have fired upon or thrown missiles at the +troops. + +"As a general rule, the bayonet alone should be used against mixed +crowds in the first stages of a revolt. But as soon as sufficient +warning has been given to enable the innocent to separate themselves +from the guilty, the action of the troops should be governed solely +by the tactical considerations involved in the duty they are ordered +to perform. They are not called upon to consider how great may be +the losses inflicted upon the public enemy, except to make their +blows so effective as to promptly suppress all resistance to lawful +authority, and to stop the destruction of life the moment lawless +resistance has ceased. Punishment belongs not to the troops, but +to the courts of justice. + +"By command of Major-General Schofield: + "Geo. D. Ruggles, Adjutant-General." + + INSTRUCTIONS IN DEALING WITH A MOB + + "(General Orders, No. 15) + "Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, + May 25, 1894. +"The following instructions are issued for the government of +department commanders: + +"Whenever the troops may be lawfully employed, under the order of +the President, to suppress 'insurrection in any State against the +government thereof,' as provided in section 5297 of the Revised +Statutes; or to 'enforce the execution of the laws of the United +States' when 'by reason of unlawful obstructions, combinations, or +assemblages of persons' it has 'become impracticable, in the judgment +of the President, to enforce, by the ordinary course of judicial +proceedings, the laws of the United States,' as provided in section +5298 of the Revised Statutes, the troops are employed as a part of +the military power of the United States, and act under the orders +of the President, as commander-in-chief, and his military subordinates. +They cannot be directed to act under the orders of any civil officer. +The commanding officers of the troops so employed are directly +responsible to their military superiors. Any unlawful or unauthorized +act on their part would not be excusable on the ground of any order +or request received by them from a marshal or any other civil +officer. + +"By command of Major-General Schofield: + "Geo. D. Ruggles, Adjutant-General." + +It appears to have been thought in Chicago that "the request of +the United States marshal," with whom the commanding officer of +the troops had been directed to "confer," was equivalent to "orders +of the War Department," notwithstanding the order of May 25, above +quoted, strictly prohibiting any such use of the troops. Hence +the faulty disposition of the troops which was corrected when the +mob was approaching the heart of the city. Then "some of the troops +on the outskirts of the city" were withdrawn, and "in the evening +the battery and one troop of cavalry" were moved "to the Lake Front +Park, for the purpose of attacking the mob should it reach the +vicinity of the government building between Adams and Jackson sts." +And during the afternoon and night of the 5th and morning of the +6th an effective force was concentrated on the Lake Front Park, +forty-eight hours after the time when the orders from Washington +indicated that the Fort Sheridan garrison should be at that place. + + THE DUTIES OF THE MILITARY MISUNDERSTOOD + +On July 9, the day after the President had issued his proclamation, +it appeared in Chicago that "the duties of the military authorities +are now clearly defined." The President's proclamation was +"understood by the military to be in the interests of humanity," +and to concern, in some way, "the State militia," as if they had +been "called into the service" of the United States. It was "the +duty of the military forces to aid the United States marshals." +Again, "it is expected the State and municipal governments will +maintain peace and good order . . . . Should they fail or be +overpowered, the military force will assist them . . "--and this +notwithstanding the well-known law on that subject to which allusion +was made in the despatch of July 5 from the headquarters of the +army. + +The President's proclamation was strictly limited to "the purpose +of enforcing the faithful execution of the laws of the United +States, and protecting its property, and removing obstructions to +the United States mails," for which purpose the proclamation stated +"the President has employed a part of the military forces of the +United States"--not _is about to employ_, but _has employed_, under +specific orders, which were telegraphed to Colonel Martin on July +3, to do certain things which were precisely the things specified +in the proclamation of July 8, and not "to aid the United States +marshals" in doing those things or any others. Yet it was not +until July 9, six days after the order to Colonel Martin, that +those duties became "clearly defined," and then they were misunderstood +in the very essential particulars above specified. + +The lawless interruption of traffic on the Pacific roads had +continued from the latter part of April till early in July,--two +months and a half,--in spite of all the efforts to enforce the +laws, in each special case, by the ordinary course of judicial +proceedings. Yet as soon as full discretionary authority was given +to the several department commanders to act promptly as each +emergency might require, all obstruction to the operations of the +Pacific railroads rapidly disappeared. + +The ordinary course of judicial proceedings is generally far too +slow to produce satisfactory results when military force is required. +Fortunately the Constitution and laws of the United States do not +require such ineffective mixture of civil and military methods. +When the civil power ceases to be effective and the President is +required to exercise his authority as commander-in-chief of the +army, his acts become purely military, untrammeled by any civil +authority whatever. This is perhaps one of the strongest and most +valuable provisions of the Constitution and laws--one which, if +generally known, is most likely to deter the lawless from any +attempt to act in defiance of the judicial authority of the United +States. The General Order No. 15, issued at the time herein referred +to (May 25, 1894), was based upon the foregoing interpretation of +the Constitution and laws. + +Under the Constitution and existing statutes of the United States +it is not proper to use the troops, either in large or small numbers, +to "aid the United States marshals." When the civil officers, with +their civil posse, are no longer able to enforce the laws, they +stand aside, and the military power, under the orders of the +commander-in-chief, steps in and overcomes the lawless resistance +to authority. Then the civil officers resume their functions, to +make arrests of individuals, hold them in custody, and deliver them +to the courts for trial. It is not the duty of the troops in such +cases to guard prisoners who are in the custody of civil officers; +but it is the duty of the troops, if necessary, to repel by force +of arms any unlawful attempt to rescue such prisoners. This +distinction should be clearly understood by all army officers, and +it is of universal application. The duty of the army is, when so +ordered by the President, to overcome and suppress lawless resistance +to civil authority. There military duty ends, and civil officers +resume their functions. + + THE DUTIES OF THE MILITARY MISUNDERSTOOD + +The distinction between the authority of the United States and that +of the several States is so clearly defined that there can be no +possible excuse for ignorance on that subject on the part of any +officer of the army. But the relation between the civil and the +military authorities of the United States had not been clearly +defined, after the passage of the "Posse Comitatus Act," until the +order of May 25, 1894, was issued. But that can hardly excuse +continued ignorance of the law a month or more after that order +was issued; and it is worthy of note that at least one department +commander showed himself familiar with the law before the order +was issued, by correcting the mistake of a subordinate, which called +attention to the necessity of issuing some such order. + +Of course that order had the sanction of the President, after +consideration and approval by the Attorney-General, before it was +issued. + +The acts of Congress creating the Pacific railroads and making them +military roads justify and require that the government give them +military protection whenever, in the judgment of the President, +such protection is needed. It is not incumbent on the commander- +in-chief of the army of the United States to call on civil courts +and marshals to protect the military roads over which he proposes +to move his troops, whether on foot or on horseback or in cars. +It appears to have been almost forgotten that the transcontinental +railroads were built, at great expense to the national treasury, +_mainly as a military bond_ between the Atlantic States and the +Pacific States, and that this is by far their most important service, +and this explains the meaning of the language employed by the acts +of Congress creating them. + +At the time of the massacre of Chinese laborers at Rock Springs, +Wyoming, during President Cleveland's first administration, I was +ordered by the President to go to that place from Chicago and +suppress that violation of the treaty obligations between this +country and China. On my arrival at Omaha, I was informed by the +press reporters that a grand conclave at Denver that night was to +consider a proposition to order out all the train-men on the Union +Pacific Railroad the next morning, for the purpose, as I understood, +of preventing the passage of my train. I told the reporters they +might telegraph those people in Denver, but not for publication, +that I was traveling over a military road, on military duty, under +orders from the commander-in-chief of the army; that interference +with that journey would be regarded by me as an act of war, and +would be so treated. I heard no more on that subject. That +interpretation of the Pacific Railroad acts was suggested several +times, but never officially accepted until 1894. + + ORDERS OF THE PRESIDENT + +The following are in substance the orders sent on July 6 and 7, by +the President's direction, to all the department commanders in the +country traversed by the Pacific railroads, and the President's +proclamation which followed two days later, under the operation of +which traffic was resumed throughout all that vast region of country +as rapidly as trains carrying troops could be moved. No serious +opposition or resistance was offered anywhere. + + "(Telegram.) + "Headquarters of the Army, Washington, July 7, 1894. +"Brigadier-General Otis, Commanding Department of the Columbia, + Vancouver Barracks, Washington: + +"In view of the fact, as substantiated by communications received +from the Department of Justice, from military official reports, +and from other reliable sources, that by reason of unlawful +obstructions, and combinations or assemblages of persons, it has +become impracticable, in the judgment of the President, to enforce, +by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, the laws of the +United States, and to prevent obstructions of the United States +mails, and interruptions to commerce between the States, on the +line of the Northern Pacific Railroad, and to secure to the United +States the right guaranteed by section II of the act approved July +2, 1864, constituting the Northern Pacific Railroad 'a post route +and military road subject to the use of the United States for +postal, military, naval, and all other government service,' you +are directed by the President to employ the military force under +your command to remove obstructions to the mails, and to execute +any orders of the United States courts for the protection of property +in the hands of receivers appointed by such courts, and for preventing +interruption of interstate commerce, and to give such protection +to said railroad as will prevent any unlawful and forcible obstruction +to the regular and orderly operation of said road 'for postal, +military, naval, and all other government service.' + + "J. M. Schofield, Major-General Commanding." + + "(Telegram) + "Headquarters of the Army, Washington, July 7, 1894. +"Brigadier-General Otis, Commanding Department of the Columbia, + Vancouver Barracks, Washington: + +"The order of the President sent you this morning by telegraph is +the same in substance as one sent last night to General Merritt, +the purpose being to extend military protection over the entire +line of the Northern Pacific Railroad from St. Paul to Puget Sound. +In the movement of the troop-trains along the line of the road in +the execution of this order, the Department of Justice will furnish +a sufficient force of marshals to make arrests and hold prisoners +subject to the orders of the United States courts. You will please +concert with General Merritt by direct correspondence the necessary +exchanges of guards upon moving trains at the military posts in +your department and in his, nearest to each other, so that the +troops may return to their proper stations without unnecessary +delay. + + "J. M. Schofield, Major-General Commanding." + +"By the President of the United States of America. +"A Proclamation. + +"_Whereas_, by reason of unlawful obstruction, combinations, and +assemblages of persons, is has become impracticable, in the judgment +of the President, to enforce, by the ordinary course of judicial +proceedings, the laws of the United States at certain points and +places within the States of North Dakota, Montana, Idaho, Washington, +Wyoming, Colorado, and California, and the Territories of Utah and +New Mexico, and especially along the lines of such railways traversing +said States and Territories as are military roads and post routes, +and are engaged in interstate commerce and in carrying United States +mails: + +"_And whereas_, for the purpose of enforcing the faithful execution +of the laws of the United States, and protecting property belonging +to the United States or under its protection, and of preventing +obstructions of the United States mails and of commerce between +the States and Territories, and of securing to the United States +the right guaranteed by law to the use of such roads for the postal, +military, naval, and other government service, the President has +employed a part of the military forces of the United States: + +"_Now, therefore_, I, Grover Cleveland, President of the United +States, do hereby command all persons engaged in, or in any way +connected with, such unlawful obstructions, combinations, and +assemblages, to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective +abodes on or before three o'clock in the afternoon on the tenth +day of July instant. + +"_In witness whereof_, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the +seal of the United states to he hereto affixed. + +"Done at the city of Washington, this ninth day of July, in the +year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-four, and +in the independence of the United States the one hundred and +nineteenth. + + "Grover Cleveland. +"By the President: + "W. Q. Gresham, Secretary of State." + +[( 1) See the report of Attorney-General Olney, December 1, 1894, +p. 31.] + + +CHAPTER XXIX +Lessons of the Civil War--Weakness of the Military Policy at the +Outbreak of the Rebellion--A Poor Use of the Educated Soldiers of +the Army--Military Wisdom Shown by the Confederate Authorities-- +Territorial Strategy--General Military Education Indispensable to +Good Citizenship--Organization of the National Guard--General Grant +Without Military Books--Measures Necessary to the National Defense. + +In my opinion, the most important of all the lessons taught by the +Civil War is the necessity of using in the most effective manner +the means at the disposal of the government when war breaks out. +The necessity for adequate preparation is a different question, +which has been much discussed, and in regard to which some progress +has been made toward a satisfactory solution. Whatever the outcome +may be in respect to preparation for war, certainly the government +and the people ought to adopt such a policy as will lead to the +best practicable use of the preparations which have actually been +made. + +In this respect the policy adopted by the National Government in +1861 was about as weak as possible, while that of the Confederates +was comparatively strong. It is said that this weak policy was +due largely to General Scott, and grew out of his distrust of +volunteer troops; he having thought it necessary to have a considerable +body of regular troops to give steadiness and confidence to the +volunteers or militia. This is a very good theory, no doubt, +providing the regulars could be provided in advance in such numbers +as to produce the desired effect. But if that theory had been +relied upon in 1861, the "Confederate States" would have established +their independence long before the regular army could be organized +and made effective. What was demanded by the necessities of the +country in 1861 was the best large army that could be made in the +shortest possible time, not a better small army to be made in a +much longer time. + +The United States government actually had in hand the means of +creating in a very short time a far larger efficient army than the +South could possibly have raised in the same time. This means had +been provided, with great care and at great expense, through a long +term of years, by the education of young men at the Military Academy, +and their practical training in the small regular army in all kinds +of actual service, including one foreign war and almost constant +campaigns against the Indians. Nowhere in the world could have +been found a better corps of officers to organize, instruct, and +discipline new troops. Yet those officers were hardly employed at +all in that service at first, when it was of supreme importance. +Some time later, when the necessity was not so great, a few officers +of the army were permitted to accept commands in the volunteers. +Even then it often required great "influence" to secure such +"indulgences." Scores of young officers, qualified in every way +to do such service in the first six months of the war, sought in +vain for opportunities to render the valuable services for which +the government had educated them, and were compelled to drag along +four years in the discharge of duties several grades below their +qualifications. + + WEAKNESS OF THE MILITARY POLICY + +In the regular army in 1861 there were, exclusive of those who went +South, at least 600 officers who, after graduating at West Point, +had served several years with their regiments, and were well +qualified to drill a regiment and command it in battle. A large +proportion of them were fitted to command brigades, and some of +them divisions, and even army corps. The three years' volunteers +first called out could have been fully supplied with brigade, +division, and corps commanders from graduates of West Point who +were thoroughly qualified by theoretical education and established +character, and many of them by practical experience in the Mexican +war and Indian campaigns, for the instruction, discipline, and +command of troops, still leaving a sufficient number with the +regulars for efficient service. The old sergeants of the army in +1861 were relatively competent company commanders. One commissioned +officer to four companies of these veteran Indian-fighters made as +reliable a battalion as any general could wish for in the conditions +then existing. + +Experience demonstrated that a volunteer regiment could in a very +few weeks be converted into an efficient and thoroughly reliable +force in battle by a single young officer of the regular army. In +other words, by a judicious use of the small body of officers whom +the country had educated at so great an expense, a fine army of +500,000 men, or more, could have been called into service, organizied, +disciplined, and put into the field by August 1, 1861; and that +without interfering in any way with the three months' militia called +out to meet the first emergency, which militia ought, of course, +to have acted strictly on the defensive until the more permanent +force could take the field. In a few months more, certainly by +the spring of 1862, the instruction, discipline, and field experience +of the first levy would have given good officers enough to organize +and command a million more men. It required, in short, only a wise +use of the national resources to overwhelm the South before the +spring of 1863. + +The supply of arms, it is true, was deplorably deficient in 1861. +But the South was only a little better off than the North in that +regard. Besides, the National Government had command of all the +markets of the world, and of the means of ocean transportation. +It could have bought at once all the available arms everywhere, +and thus fully equipped its own troops, while preventing the South +from doing the same. Hence the excuse given at the time--namely, +want of muskets--was no excuse whatever for delay in the organization +of armies. + +The rebellion made some progress at first, and offered effective +resistance for a long time, simply because the Southern authorities +manifested greater military wisdom than the Northern. The difference +in preparations and in military training in advance was quite +insignificant. The North had many more educated and competent +military men than the South. The difference was that the South +used the few they had to the best advantage, while the North so +used only a very few of their many. + +The lesson next in importance taught by our experience is the +necessity of general military education in a country having popular +government. No man can be fully qualified for the duties of a +statesman until he has made a thorough study of the science of war +in its broadest sense. He need not go to a military school, much +less serve in the army or in the militia. But unless he makes +himself thoroughly acquainted with the methods and conditions +requisite to success in war, he is liable to do almost infinite +damage to his country. For instance, the very first success of +the Union armies--the capture of Fort Donelson--was quickly followed +by a proclamation of thanksgiving and an order to stop recruiting. +That one act of "statesmanship" cost the country untold millions +of dollars and many thousands of lives. It was necessary only to +take the ordinary military advantage of the popular enthusiasm +throughout the country after Grant's first victory to have made +the Union armies absolutely irresistible by any force the South +could raise and arm at that time. + + A POOR USE OF THE EDUCATED SOLDIERS OF THE ARMY + +There has been much irrelevant discussion about the ability or +inability of commanders in the North and South. The fact is that +political instead of military ideas controlled in a very large +degree the selection of commanders in the Union armies; while for +three whole years the authorities in Washington could not see the +necessity of unity of action in all the armies under one military +leader. It required three years of costly experience to teach the +government that simple lesson, taught in the military text-books! +As experience finally proved, there was no lack of men capable of +leading even large armies to victory; but, with few exceptions, +they were not put in command until many others had been tried. +Information as to military fitness was not sought from military +sources. If a lawyer is wanted for the supreme bench, or an engineer +to construct a great bridge, information is sought from the best +men of the profession concerned; but the opinions of politicians +were thought sufficient in determining the selection of major- +generals! + +Again, the policy of the government required the capture and +occupation of all the important seaports and other places in the +South, and the permanent occupation and protection of all the +territory gained in military operations. Until near the close of +the war, neither the public nor the government seemed to have the +remotest conception of the fundamental fact that Confederate armies, +wherever they might go, instead of places and States, were the only +real objectives. Even some of the best Union generals were +constrained to act upon this popular heresy, contrary to their own +sound military judgment and education. Yet while this erroneous +"territorial" strategy was insisted on, no adequate conception was +formed of the vastly greater force required to hold all the territory +gained, and to push aggressive operations still further into the +heart of the South. Very rarely indeed were the Union armies large +enough, until near the end of the war, to assure success. The end +finally came through a long succession of desperate battles between +forces so nearly equal that decisive victory was impossible until +the weaker side finally became exhausted. Thus the aggregate loss +in men as well as in money was vastly greater than it would have +been if the Union had put forth its full strength and ended the +rebellion in two years instead of four. + +It is true that some of the worst of these "blind guides" were men +supposed to have a very high military education. But if sound +military education had been at all general in the country, statesmen +would have known by what standard to judge of any one man's fitness +for high command. + +It is true that no amount of military education can supply the +place of military genius or create a great commander. It may +possibly happen at any time that there may not be among all the +living graduates of West Point one Grant or Sherman or Sheridan, +or one Lee or Johnston or Jackson. So much greater the need of a +well-educated staff and a well-disciplined army. Nobody is wise +enough to predict who will prove best able to command a great army. +But it is the easiest thing in the world to tell who can best create +such an army and command its subdivisions, and this is the work to +be done instantly upon the outbreak of war. The selection of +commanders for the several armies, and, above all, of a general-in- +chief, must of course be the most difficult; for it is not probable +that any man young enough will have had any experience in such +commands in this country. But even this difficulty will disappear +in a very great measure if statesmen will make the study of the +art and science of war, instead of far less important subjects, a +part of their pastime. They will thus acquire the ability to judge, +from personal acquaintance with military men and conversation with +other best informed, of the relative fitness of officers for the +highest commands. + + GENERAL MILITARY EDUCATION INDISPENSABLE + +There is no possible remedy for such evils as this country has +suffered except general military education. In my opinion, no man +is fit for a seat in Congress unless he has had such an education. +The first thing he ought to learn is the old and trite military +maxim that the only was to carry on war economically is to make it +"short, sharp, and decisive." To dole out military appropriations +in driblets is to invite disaster and ultimate bankruptcy. So it +is in respect to the necessary preparations for war in time of +peace. No man is wise enough to tell when war will come. Preparations +are made upon the theory that it may come at any time. If a hundred +millions are necessary for adequate preparation for defense, and +you have spent only fifty when war comes, you might as well have +thrown your fifty millions into the sea. There is no such thing +as partial defense in modern war. If there are weak points in your +defense, your enemy is sure to find them. Indeed, he knows about +them all the time, and will strike them at once. Then your whole +costly system will be worthless. + +What would be thought of the business capacity of a man who would +not insure his house or his store or his stock of goods against +fire because he did not happen to have money enough in bank to pay +the premium, but would have to borrow it at three per cent.? Or +of a man who would wait until he had realized the expected profit +on a commercial venture before insuring the goods? If preparation +for defense is the policy of a country, it would be little short +of blindness to delay it on account of a temporary deficiency in +the current revenue. + +All now admit that universal education is an indispensable requisite +to fitness for universal suffrage. The most serious questions upon +which a free people can be called to vote are: A question of war, +a question of preparation for war, and a question of approval and +support, or disapproval and condemnation, of an administration on +account of the mode in which war has been conducted. Can this +highest duty of the citizen be intelligently performed without +military education? A sovereign _individual_ regards this as +demanding the highest education and the ablest counsel he can +possibly obtain. Can sovereign _millions_ do it wisely without +any education whatever? I believe no proposition could possibly +be plainer than that general military education is indispensable +to good citizenship in this country, and especially to all who may +be intrusted with high responsibilities in the legislative and +executive departments of the National Government. What would be +thought of a general of the army who tried to shield himself from +censure or punishment behind his ignorance of the law? Can a +legislator be excused because he knows nothing of the art and +science of war? If there is any one offense in this country which +ought never, under any circumstances, to be pardoned, it is ignorance +in those who are trusted by the people to manage the affairs of +their government. As in the military, so in the civil departments +of government, there a few greater crimes than that of seeking and +assuming the responsibilities of an office for which the man himself +knows he is not fit. It is nearly as great as that committed by +the appointing power under similar circumstances. + + GENERAL MILITARY EDUCATION INDISPENSABLE + +A system of general military education should of course include +elementary training in all the schools, public and private, so that +every boy, before he is sixteen years old, would know how to use +the rifled musket in ranks, and be familiar with the simple evolutions +of a company and battalion. Young men never forget such training +received when they are boys. The country would have in a few years +several millions of fairly well-trained young soldiers, requiring +only competent officers and a few days drill in regimental tactics +to make a reliable army for any service this country will probably +ever require of her volunteer soldiery. If it were a question of +the invasion of a foreign country against a modern veteran army, +the case would be different. But for defense against any possible +landing of a hostile army on our shores, our available force ought +to be so overwhelming in numbers as to far more than compensate +for lack of experience. Yet it must not be forgotten that some +training is _indispensable_. No possible advantage in numbers can +overcome the disadvantage resulting from total ignorance of tactics +and of the use of the modern long-range rifle. Good parents who +apprehend evil effects from giving their boys military training +ought to reflect that the boys will go, all the same, whether +trained or not, when the country is threatened with invasion. +Then, if ignorant, the will simply be doomed to fall the victims +of skilled marksmen to whose shots they know not how to reply. +Possibly the most cruel fate which American parents could prepare +for their sons would be to keep them in ignorance of the highest +duty their country may call upon them to perform, so that, unable +to offer and effective resistance to invasion, they could only die +in a hopeless effort to do their duty as citizen soldiers and +patriots--or, worse, live only to be driven in disgrace from a +field which a little education would have enabled them gloriously +to win. + +There should be, under State authority, a general enrolment and +organization of all the young men who have received military +training, and places of rendezvous fixed at convenient centers at +or near railway-stations. Officers of all grades up to that of +colonel should be appointed in advance, and occasional musters held +under State laws, even if military exercises were not attempted. + +Our colleges and high schools, besides the military academies of +the country, are even now educating a fair percentage of young men +to be officers of such an organization of enrolled regiments as +that here suggested. This percentage could easily be increased in +accordance with the demand. Besides, the retired men of the +regiments of the National Guard in the several States might furnish +some officers for the enrolled militia. But those well-trained +and fully equipped regiments would be required to move with full +ranks at once to the place of danger. Hence their active members +would not be available in the great expansion of the army in the +first period of war. The organization of the first reserve must, +for this reason, be entirely independent of the National Guard. + +A great and very important advance has already been made in bringing +the regular army into close relations with the National Guard of +the several States, and in the employment of regular officers in +disseminating military education, both theoretical and practical, +throughout the country. These are among the most valuable services +the regular army can render in time of peace, and they should be +extended, if practicable, still further. Especially in the State +artillery, which must soon be organized for war service in the new +fortifications, instruction by regular officers will be indispensable, +and this can best be given in conjunction with the regular garrisons, +the same as in war service. It would also be well to perfect an +arrangement by which the new infantry regiments, when first taking +the field upon the breaking out of war, might be accompanied by +small bodies of regulars, to lead the way and indicate by example +what is to be done. Experience has shown that under such example +the rawest volunteers will be almost as stanch in battle as the +regulars themselves. The beneficial effect upon new troops of the +example of men who have before been in battle is very great. Hence +it is that old regiments should always be kept full by the addition +of recruits, rather than that the casualties of service be replaced +by new regiments. + + ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD + +What constitutes valuable education, military no less than civil, +is often greatly misunderstood. Elementary education and practical +training are indispensable to everybody, while higher education +may be rather injurious than beneficial, unless it is so regulated +as to elevate the reasoning faculties and independence of thought, +rather than mere acquisition of knowledge. Some notable examples +of this have appeared in the military annals of this country, and +no doubt in the civil also. Men who had become famous military +scholars were total failures in war, not only as commanders in the +field, for which no amount of theoretical education alone can +qualify a man, but also as military advisers. This was apparently +because their elaborate studies had made them mere imitators or +copyists. Whatever originality of thought or power of invention +they ever possessed had ceased to exist from disuse. They could +plan and direct a campaign with absolute accuracy, according to +the teachings of the great masters, for the well-defined purpose +upon which those teachings had been based. But when a wholly new +problem was presented to them, they had no conception of the right +mode of solving it. The plan of one great campaign was based +absolutely upon the best-approved method of capturing a certain +place, without any reference to what damage might or might not be +done to the opposing army in that operation. The plan of another +great campaign had for its sole object the conquest and permanent +occupation of a great territory, and was so conducted as to avoid +the possibility of seriously hurting the enemy in that operation. +Yet the theory upon which this last plan was based, as well as the +first, governed the policy of the government more than two years. + + GENERAL GRANT WITHOUT MILITARY BOOKS + +It was not until Grant took command of "all the armies" that the +true strategic principle governed the general military policy. In +this connection, the story told by Grant himself about his military +studies is very instructive. When asked by the representative of +some friends who wished to present him a library for his new house +in Washington, what military books he then had, so that they might +not duplicate them, he replied that he did not have any military +books, and never had any, except the West-Point text-books. No +doubt Grant might have profited from some additional study, but +none at all was far better than so much as to have dwarfed his mind +into that of an imitator of former commanders. + +The development of great military ability in Grant, as the result +of his own experience and independent thought,--that is, the +independent development of his own native military genius,--is by +far the most interesting part of his history. + +In short, the great lesson taught by our own experience is that +elementary military training should be universal, because every +young man may be called upon the perform the duties of a soldier; +that general military reading, and habits of independent thought +upon all great military subjects, should be cultivated by all who +aspire to any high place in life, because they may be called upon +to discharge the highest possible duties of good citizens in peace +or in war, namely, those connected with the national defense; that +due preparation for defense ought to be made without delay, and +the requisite means kept always ready; and, above all, that the +best method of making the quickest possible effective use of those +means ought to be fully matured and understood by all who may be +called upon to execute the orders of the government. + +It now seems to me amazing that the affairs of an enlightened nation +could have been so badly managed as to leave the secession issue +in doubt almost to the last moment of a four years' contest, as it +is now well known it was. Probably the one saving fact in all +those years was that the young soldiers of the republic--and they +were nearly all young then--knew little and cared less about the +wrangling of self-seeking politicians and visionary doctrinaires +in the rear, but fought steadily on to the end, never doubting for +a moment the final triumph. I have never been able to recall a +single instance of doubt manifested by any soldier in the field, +though I did know a very few cases of officers of considerable +rank, who thought they ought to have had more rank, who went to +the rear and said something about failure in the field. + +I believe now that it required only some _real_ emergency, such, +for instance, as the capture of Washington in July, 1863, to call +forth the power of the North and crush the rebellion in six months. +If any man thinks a great disaster would have disheartened the +North, he knows nothing of the people of our country. It was the +slow waste of enormous resources and of latent military strength +that at length made many even of the stoutest hearts begin to feel +despondent. I do not believe there was any time when the people +would not have responded with unanimity and enthusiasm to an appeal +to put forth all their strength and end the rebellion at a single +blow. + +The one lesson of reason and experience that I would impress upon +my countrymen in every possible way is, when war or insurrection +comes or is threatened, do not trifle with it. Do not invoke +judicial proceedings, or call for 75,000 men; but call for _men_, +and let them come as many as will! If some of them do not get +there in time, before it is all over, it will not cost much to send +them home again! The services of the Pennsylvania reserve, though +ready for the field, were actually, positively refused until after +the disaster of Bull Run! The greatest wonder in the history of +this wonderful republic is that the government actually survived +such a military policy as that! + +In this connection, it ought to be distinctly understood that the +great object of education at West Point and other military schools +in not to make high commanders, but to make thorough soldiers, men +capable of creating effective armies in the shortest possible time, +and of commanding comparatively small bodies of men. If great +commanders are ever again required in this country, they will come +to the front in due time. They cannot be selected in advance of +the actual trial in war. Even West Point, though one of the best +schools in the world, can at the most only lay the foundation of +a military education. Each individual must build for himself upon +that foundation the superstructure which is to mark his place in +the world. If he does not build, his monument will hardly appear +above the surface of the ground, and will soon be covered out of +sight. + +It is of vital importance that the necessity of providing for +calling into active service a very large army in the shortest +possible time be fully understood. It is assumed that every +important seaport will in time be so fortified as to be safe against +any _unsupported_ naval attack. Modern science has rendered this +easy and certain. Hence a naval attack must necessarily be supported +by the landing of a military force upon the open coast, to attack +the land defenses in reverse; and such defenses are now far more +vulnerable to attack in rear than those of former times. + + MEASURES NECESSARY TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE + +The sea-coasts of the United States are many thousand miles in +extent, and an attack may be made at any one or several of the many +important seaports in these long lines of coast. No one can +anticipate where the blow or blows may fall. Hence it is necessary +to be prepared to resist an attempt to land at any one of those +many points which are of such importance as to tempt an enemy to +attack them. The railroad facilities of the country are such that +the necessary armies can be moved to all exposed points in time to +meet any emergency. But the armies must be ready to move almost +at a moment's notice. There will be no time to organize, much less +to drill, new troops. Before that could be done, any one or two +or three of our largest seaport cities could be captured and +destroyed, and the invading forces get back again on their transports, +and under the protection of the guns of their own fleet. And even +if we had a navy more powerful than that of our enemy, it alone +could give us no adequate protection; for the enemy would be sure +to select a point of attack where our navy was not at the time, +and which it could not reach until too late. Indispensable as a +navy is to this country, it cannot act any very important part in +the defense of so extended a sea-coast unless it is many times more +powerful than any fleet which an enemy may send to attack us. The +enemy being free to choose his point of attack, we would required +at or near every one of the exposed points a fleet at least as +large as his, or in the aggregate at least five times as large. +No one, it is presumed, contemplates the creation of any such navy +as that in this country. + +Indeed, it would be the height of folly to require the navy to take +part in the defense. In a country having the situation of the +United States, the navy is the _aggressive_ arm of the national +military power. Its function is to punish an enemy until he is +willing to submit to the national demands. For this purpose entire +freedom of action is essential; also secure depots where supplies +may be drawn and where necessary repairs may be made, and harbors +where cruisers or other vessels may seek safety if temporarily +overpowered. Hence arises one of the most important functions of +the land defense: To give the aggressive arm secure bases of +operation at all the great seaports where navy-yards or depots are +located. It may be that in special cases military forces may be +needed to act in support of naval operations, or to hold for a time +important points in a foreign country; but such service must be +only auxiliary, not a primary object. Foreign conquest and permanent +occupation are not a part of the policy of this country. There is +no division of opinion among standard naval and military authorities +on this great subject; such standard authors as Rear-Admiral Walker +and Captain Mahan have clearly set forth the relative functions of +the army and navy in enforcing the military policy of the United +States. The military problem which this country must solve is to +provide such means of aggressive and defensive action as to be able +to enforce a due observance of American public law on this continent, +and, while doing this, to defend itself against insult and spoilation. +The land defenses, including torpedoes and in a few cases floating +batteries, should be entirely independent of the active navy, so +that the latter may be free to act in one compact mass against any +enemy which may anywhere oppose it. + +There will be another important necessity for very large forces of +infantry and light artillery,--that is, large in the aggregate,-- +in the event of war with even a second- or third-class naval power: +To protect our long lines of open coast and small unfortified +harbors from destruction from the guns and landing-parties of the +enemy's light-draft cruisers. This would require a "picket-line" +with considerable "reserves," several thousand miles in length. +The national pride, if not the material interests involved, would +not permit the government to submit to such destruction or spoilation +without making every possible effort to prevent it. In short, +unless the government and the people of the United States are +willing to prepare in advance for putting into the field at a +moment's notice a very large and effective army, as well as to +fortify all important seaports, they may as well make up their +minds to submit, at least for a time, to whatever indignity any +considerable naval power may see fit to inflict upon them. No half- +way measures will do any good. Fortifications without an army +would be worth no more, against any country having a considerable +army and navy, than an army without fortifications. + + +CHAPTER XXX +The Financial Lesson of the Civil War--Approaching Bankruptcy of +the Government near the Close of the War--The Legal-Tender Notes +an Injury to the Public Credit--A Vicious Clause in the Constitution +--No Prejudice in the Army Against Officers Not Educated at West +Point--The Need of a Law Reforming the Relations Between the +President and the Commander of the Army--Devotion to the Chosen +Leader in Times of Public Peril. + +Another great lesson taught by our Civil War, perhaps even more +important than any other, is the financial lesson. An established +government which has a place to maintain among the commercial +nations of the world must maintain its credit. It must purchase +its supplies and munitions of war and pay its troops in _money_. +In a great and prolonged war it is not possible for the people to +contribute all the means required at the time. The amount of +taxation would be greater than any people could bear. Hence the +government must borrow the necessary money. This cannot be done +without national credit. If credit declines, rates of interest +and discount on securities increase until the national debt reaches +its limit and no more money can be borrowed. In short, the nation +becomes bankrupt. This was the condition of the United States +before the close of the late Civil War. With a million of men on +the muster- and pay-rolls, including several great armies of veteran +troops in the field, while the Confederate army was reduced to a +very small fraction of that number, the Union cause was on the very +verge of failure, because the government could no longer raise +money to pay its troops, purchase supplies, or make any further +use of its magnificent armies. This astounding fact was confided +to the generals of the army in the winter of 1864-5 by the Secretary +of War, who then said the rebellion must be suppressed in the coming +spring campaign, or the effort abandoned, because the resources of +the treasury were exhausted. In corroboration of my recollection +of this subject, I now find the following in a private letter +written by me at that time: + + "Washington, February 3, 1865. +"There is much excitement here over the peace rumors, and it would +seem there must be good foundation for it. The President has +actually gone to Fort Monroe to meet the rebel commissioners. I +do not, however, indulge much faith in the result of these +negotiations. We will probably have to beat Lee's army before we +can have peace. There is much commotion among politicians, and +there will be a storm of some kind on the political sea if peace +is made now. On the other hand, if the war continues long, the +treasury will most likely become bankrupt. It has got far behind +already. There is no money to pay the army, and no one can tell +where it is to come from. I have succeeded in getting enough to +pay my troops, which was obtained by special arrangement with the +treasury, and as a special reward for their distinguished services. +No other troops in the country have been paid for five months, and +there is no money to pay them." + +The reasons for the deplorable condition of the United States +treasury are understood by all financiers. Yet a very large +proportion of the voting population do not appear to understand +it, or do not know the fact. People engaged in an effort to throw +off their dependency or political connection, and establish their +own independence, or a country defending itself against a powerful +adversary, may be compelled to resort to forced loans, in the +absence of national credit, to carry on the war. But in a great +country with unlimited resources, like the United States, resort +to forced loans would seem to be entirely unnecessary. However +this may be, and whatever may be the necessity in any case, a forced +loan, _without interest_, is simple robbery to the extent of unpaid +interest, even if the principal is paid. And a robber cannot expect +to have much credit left after his character becomes known to the +world. + + THE FINANCIAL LESSON OF THE CIVIL WAR + +The issue of legal-tender notes during the Civil War was of this +character. The country received a deadly blow to its financial +credit when that policy was adopted. Nations or peoples cannot, +any more than individuals, violate the established rules of honest +dealing without suffering the just penalty. If money is needed +beyond current revenues, there is no other honest way to get it +but by borrowing it at such rate of interest and upon such security +as can be agreed upon. Besides, to leave any room for doubt or +cavil about the conditions of a loan, or about the standard of +money in which principal and interest are to be paid, necessarily +arouses suspicion of bad faith, and hence destroys or seriously +injures national credit. It is now perfectly well known to all +who have taken the pains to study the subject that this false and +practically dishonest policy, however innocently it may have been +conceived, cost the United States many hundreds of millions of +dollars, and came very near bringing disaster upon the Union cause. +One of the most astounding spectacles ever presented in the history +of the world was that presented by this country. It went into the +war practically free from debt, and come out of it with a debt +which seemed very large, to be sure, and was in fact nearly twice +as large as it ought to have been, yet so small in comparison with +the country's resources that it could be paid off in a few years. +It went into the war practically without an army, and came out of +the war with its military strength not even yet fully developed. +It had more than a million of men, nearly all veterans, in the +ranks, and could have raised a million more, if necessary, without +seriously interfering with the industries of the country. Yet in +four short years a false financial policy destroyed the national +credit, brought its treasury to bankruptcy, and thus reduced a +great people to a condition in which they could no longer make any +use of their enormous military strength! This lesson ought to be +taught in every school-house in the United States, until every +child is made to understand that there is no such thing in the +world as paper money; that the only real money in the world is +standard gold and silver; that paper can be used in the place of +money only when it represents the real gold or silver in which it +can at any time be redeemed; that even gold and silver can be used +together as standard money only under the real intrinsic values as +recognized by all the world; that any attempt to force either gold +or silver into unlimited circulation, under any arbitrary ratio +different from their real ratio, is not honest; and that dishonesty +is the worst of all financial policies, as well as the most unworthy +of a civilized people. + +The laws of finance, like the laws of military strategy, were never +invented by anybody, any more than the law of gravitation or the +law of electrical attraction and repulsion. They have all been +learned by the experience and study of mankind since the dawn of +civilization. All alike are parts of the great laws of nature. +They should be carefully and diligently studied and taught in all +the schools, until the rising generation understand that all the +affairs of mankind are governed by the uniform laws established by +the great Creator and Ruler of the universe; and that self-appointed +"leaders of the people" who would entice them to follow their own +inventions cannot save them from the penalties which naturally +follow the violation of any of the laws of the universe. In short, +education,--wisely directed education,--both in science and in +morals, is the one indispensable foundation of good popular +government. The relative importance to be attached to the many +branches of popular education demands the careful consideration of +all educators, and still more the _purity_ of the doctrines taught +in all the schools. There is good reason for believe that this +last duty has been much neglected, especially in respect to financial +theories. + + A VICIOUS CLAUSE IN THE CONSTITUTION + +In this connection, it is worthy of serious consideration whether +one of the teachings of a corrupt age has not found its way into +that almost sacred writing, the Constitution of the United States. +What right has Congress, or any other department of government, or +any government on earth, to "regulate the value" of money, any more +than that of wheat or corn? Is not the real value of money, like +that of everything else, regulated by the general law of supply +and demand throughout the world? Ought not the value of money, +and what shall constitute money, be left, without governmental +interference, to be determined by the common consent of mankind? +Must not commercial intercourse among all the countries of the +world necessarily regulate all this, in spite of the decrees of +government? Ought not the function of government in this regard +to be limited to the coining of money and stamping on its face its +real value--that is, in effect, the amount of gold or silver it +actually contains? In short, is not the attempt of government to +make a certain weight of one thing equal to a certain weight of +another thing a plain violation of a natural law, and hence +necessarily vicious? Is not all our serious monetary controversy +in this country the result of vicious teaching to be found in our +own Constitution, inherited from a corrupt age, when the fiat of +a prince was thought sufficient to make a coin worth more than it +was in fact? Where did so many of the people of the United States +learn the heretical doctrine of fiat money? Is it not taught in +the Constitution of the United States? It so seems to me, and +hence it seems to me that the people should at once strike at the +very root of the evil, and eradicate from their fundamental law +the theory that the value of anything can be regulated by arbitrary +fiat, in violation of natural law. Let the people restore to +themselves their inalienable right to liberty of trade, so that +they can deal with each other in gold, or in silver, or in cotton, +or in corn, as they please, and pay in what they have agreed to +pay in, without impertinent interference from legislators or anybody +else. Then, and only then, can the monetary system of this country +be placed on a sound foundation, and all the gold or silver of our +mines, as well as all the other products of human industry, and +the people who produce or own them, become truly free. + +Another important lesson taught by our experience since the Civil +War, no less than at the commencement of that period, is that prompt +and vigorous action, in accordance with established military methods, +whenever military force must be employed, necessarily presupposes +such knowledge of the laws on the part of department and army +commanders as will justify the President in intrusting them with +discretionary authority to act without specific orders in each +case. Such emergencies as that of 1894, for example, give striking +proof of the necessity for the higher education to fit men for high +command in the army. It is not mainly a question of _military_ +education. Early deficiencies in that respect may soon be overcome +by the constant practice afforded by active service. The indispensable +necessity is for _education in general_, and especially in those +things which army officers are not habitually required to know, +but which are of vital importance to those who must, in great +emergencies, by intrusted with great responsibilities and with +discretionary authority. That very emergency of 1894 gave examples +of officers, not educated at West Point nor at any other military +school, distinguished for gallant and efficient military service +in the field, who proved to be perfectly familiar with the principles +of constitutional and military law which ought to govern the action +of troops under circumstances like those of 1894; while others, +distinguished as commanders in the field, seemed strangely ignorant +of both constitutional and military laws. It is also worthy of +remark that such necessary legal education did not appear to be +universal among the West Point graduates at that time. Some men +who are not graduates of West Point are much better qualified for +high command than some who are. + + OFFICERS NOT EDUCATED AT WEST POINT + +Much has been said about a supposed prejudice in the army against +officers who have not enjoyed the advantages of education at the +military academy. I aver, emphatically that I have never seen any +evidence of any such feeling, and I do not believe it has ever +existed to any appreciable extent. On the contrary, the general +feeling has been that of just and generous consideration for officers +who were at first laboring under that disadvantage. Some of the +most popular men in the army have been among those appointed from +civil life or from the volunteers. General Alfred H. Terry was a +fair example of this. He was a ripe scholar, a thorough lawyer, +a very laborious student of the art and science of war,--more so +than most West Point graduates,--and so modest that he hesitated +to accept the appointment of brigadier-general in the regular army, +although it had been given for so distinguished a service as the +capture of Fort Fisher, on the ground that older officers who had +devoted their whole lives to the military service were better +entitled to it. + +The general feeling in the army has no special reference to West +Point. It is a feeling, and a very strong one, in favor of +_education_, of qualification in all respects for the service which +may be required, and of that dignified self-respect and becoming +modesty which prevent an officer from desiring a position for +which he is not fully qualified, and, above all, that manly delicacy +which makes it impossible for an officer to _seek_ a position which +ought to be left to _seek him_. As well might a maiden ask a man +to marry her, or get some one else to do it for her, as a soldier +to seek in the same way a position on the staff of a general or of +the President. + +This is especially true in respect to the position of the "commanding +general," or general-in-chief, of the army. The President being, +by the Constitution, commander-in-chief of the army and navy, no +law of Congress, even with his own consent, could relieve him from +that responsibility. There is no law, and there could not +constitutionally be any law passed, establishing any such office +as that of commanding general of the army, and defining the duties +and authority attached to it. Such a law would be a clear encroachment +upon the constitutional prerogatives of the President. The only +constitutional relation in which the so-called "commanding general," +or "general-in-chief," of the army can occupy is that usually called +"chief of staff"--the chief military adviser and executive officer +of the commander-in-chief. He cannot exercise any command whatever +independently of the President, and the latter must of necessity +define and limit his duties. No other authority can possibly do +it. In this regard the President's power and discretion are limited +only by his constitutional obligation to exercise the chief command +himself. He can give his general-in-chief as much authority as he +pleases consistently with that obligation. Hence it is entirely +in the discretion of the President to define and fix the relations +which should exist between the general and the Secretary of War-- +a very difficult thing to do, no doubt,--at least one which seems +never to have been satisfactorily done by any President. The +Secretary and the general appear to have been left to arrange that +as best they could, or to leave it unarranged. However this may +be, the relations of the general to the President are, or ought to +be, of the most confidential character, no less so than those of +any member of the cabinet. And the necessity of that confidential +relation is far more important than in the case of any cabinet +officer, for the reason that it is brought into prominence in times +of great emergency, when questions of peace and war are involved, +and when the President is required to act upon momentous military +operations about which he cannot, in general, have much knowledge, +and hence must trust to the ability, judgment, discretion, and +scientific military knowledge of the general-in-chief. In such +cases the general becomes, as it were, the "keeper of the President's +conscience" in respect to the most momentous questions he can ever +have to decide. + + THE PRESIDENT AND THE COMMANDER OF THE ARMY + +It is necessarily extremely embarrassing to the President to be +compelled to place or retain in that close, confidential, and +important relation to himself an officer in whom he has not entire +confidence in all respects; or else, as the only alternative, by +selecting another, to cast a reflection upon the senior in rank, +whose soldierly character and services may have entitled him to +the highest distinction. The situation is no less embarrassing, +under the existing law and custom, to the officer who may at any +time happen to be the senior in commission. He may be compelled +to submit to the humiliation of being superseded by some junior in +rank, or else to occupy a confidential position of great importance +in the absence of that confidence which is necessary to make such +a position even tolerable to himself or to the army, which must +inevitably be deprived of his legitimate influence for good if he +does not enjoy the confidence of the President and the Secretary +of War. There can be no relief from this dilemma, so embarrassing +to both the President and the general, except by appropriate +legislation. + +The most important military reform now required in this country is +a law authorizing the President, "by and with the advice and consent +of the Senate," to appoint, not a commander of the army, but a +"general-in-chief," or "chief of staff," to aid him (the commander- +in-chief) in the discharge of his military duties. The President +ought to have the power to retire such officer at any time, with +due regard for his rank and service, and to appoint another in the +same manner. The title "commanding general of the army" is +inappropriate and misleading. There never has been any such office +in this country, except that created especially for General Grant +in 1864. The old title of "general-in-chief," given to the officer +at the head of the army before the Civil War, is the appropriate +title in this country. That officer is, in fact, the chief general, +but does not command the army. + +If it be considered the best policy to reserve the two highest +military grades,--those of general and lieutenant-general,--to be +conferred only by special act of Congress for distinguished services, +appropriate distinction may be given to the officer at the head of +the army at any time by the title of general-in-chief, with such +additional compensation as is necessary to defray his living expenses +in Washington. Neither the rank nor the pay of an officer in a +subordinate position can possibly be regarded as appropriate to +one in a higher grade of duty. Every grade of public service should +have an officer of appropriate rank and compensation, certainly +the highest in any department even more than any other. The +government of this country has not been duly regardful even of its +own dignity and self-respect, in denying to its chief military +officer appropriate rank, and in requiring him to expend all the +savings of a lifetime to maintain his official position for a few +years at the seat of government. + + THE PRESIDENT AND THE COMMANDER OF THE ARMY + +Not by any means the least benefit to be expected from a law +authorizing each President to select his chief general, would be +the education thus given to officers of the army in respect to the +relation in which they stand to the commander-in-chief, and in +respect to the reasonable limits of military ambition in a republic +where the President is and must be commander-in-chief, whether he +is a man of military education and experience or not. + +So strongly were those views impressed upon my mind by my studies +of the subject, made at the request of General Grant and General +Sherman many years ago, that when I became the senior officer of +the army I refrained scrupulously from suggesting to the President +or the Secretary of War or anybody else that I had any expectation +of being assigned to the command, or regarded myself as having any +claim to it. It seemed to me solely a question for the President +himself to decide whether or not he wanted me as his chief military +adviser and assistant, and it would have been impossible for me to +consent that anybody should try to influence his decision in my +favor. + +The duties of patriotic citizenship in time of war have not always +been duly appreciated, even by those most zealous in their loyalty +to the government. I would not detract one iota from the honor +and fame of the wise, brave, and patriotic statesmen who upheld +the hands of the great Lincoln in his struggle against the avowed +foes of the Union, and his still harder struggle with professed +patriots who wielded national influence only for evil, though under +the guise of friends of the Union. But if many thousands of those +zealous and "truly loyal Union men," many of whom I knew, could +have managed in some way to get into the ranks and get killed in +battle in the first year, I firmly believe the Union would have +been restored much sooner than it was. + +When the people have chosen their chief to lead them through the +fierce storms of civil war, he alone must guide the ship, or else +all must perish. After the storm has burst upon them it is too +late to select another pilot. Then partizan opposition, impairing +the popular strength and confidence of the leader and embarrassing +his military operations or public policy, becomes treason, and a +far more dangerous treason than any which the open sympathizers +with the public enemy could possibly commit. Those powerful leaders +of public opinion who hounded Lincoln on to measures which his far +greater wisdom and his supreme sense of responsibility told him +were unwise, deserved to be hanged, or at least to be imprisoned +until the war was over. That some of them died in shame and disgrace +upon the failure of their own selfish schemes for personal or +political aggrandizement, was only a mild measure of righteous +retribution. + +In the calm atmosphere of these later years I still think that the +course of the young soldier who had not learned any of the arts or +of the ambitions of partizan leaders, but whose only motto was "the +President's policy is my policy; his orders my rule of action," +was much more in accord with the plain duty of every citizen of +the republic. I can find in my mind or heart only contempt for +that theory of patriotic duty which sends one citizen to the front, +freely to give his life, without question, to enforce the orders +of the chosen leader of the nation, and permits another to stay at +home and bend all his efforts toward forcing the substitution of +his own egotistical views upon the country, in lieu of those which +the great leader has decided to be most wise. + +Let the names of the great war governors, and of the statesmen in +Congress and cabinet who gave all of their strength to the support +of the measures of Lincoln, stand by the side of the foremost +commanders of armies on the roll of national honor. Let the others +be covered by the mantle of charity, and quietly pass into oblivion. + + +CHAPTER XXXI +General Sherman's Friendship--His Death--General Grant's Recognition +of Services--His Great Trait, Moral and Intellectual Honesty--His +Confidence in Himself--Grant, Like Lincoln, a Typical American--On +the Retired List of the Army--Conclusion. + +General Sherman never failed to manifest his generous appreciation +of my services as one of his trusted lieutenants, from the time we +met in the field until he retired from command of the army. Our +long-standing friendship increased till the time of his death. +While I was in command of the army, General Sherman never came to +Washington without coming very promptly to see me at headquarters, +not waiting for a first visit from his junior in rank. Of course +this great and cordial courtesy was very promptly returned. Upon +the occasions of these visits at the office, the general would sit +a long time, talking in his inimitably charming manner with me and +the staff officers who came in with their morning business. Then +he would insist upon my going with him to call upon the President, +a formality which was demanded by his high sense of the respect +due from him and me together, as past and present commanding +generals, to the commander-in-chief. This high regard for military +courtesy which was a characteristic of General Sherman, though he +seemed comparatively indifferent to any lack of it toward himself, +well merits the imitation of all military men. + +The last of those visits occurred a very short time before the +general's death. He was then well aware of the weakness which so +soon proved fatal to him, and submitted like a child while I wrapped +him up before going over to the White House. Upon my suggestion +of the necessity of caution, he said "Yes," and gripping his hand +near his chest, added "It will catch me like that some time, and +I will be gone." Yet General Sherman preferred the life in New +York which was so congenial to him, rather than seek to prolong +his days in a milder climate. + +We laid him by the side of his wife, that highest type of the +Christian woman, wife, and mother. Who can ever forget that touching +scene by the grave in St. Louis? The brave young priest, the very +image in character, even more than in face, of his great father, +standing alone, without another of the priests of his church, and +daring, without ecclesiastical sanction or support, to perform the +service for the dead prescribed by his church for those who "die +in the Lord." "Worthy son of a noble sire!" What man dares to +pass judgment upon him who so mightily helped to save his country +from ruin, and to strike the shackles from millions of slaves, or +to say that he was not worthy to be numbered among those to whom +the Divine Master has said, "Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one +of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me"? + +The subject of this volume being limited to events of which I have +had personal knowledge, and it never having been my good fortune +to serve in the field with General Grant, it would be inappropriate +to make herein any general comments about his military operations. +But I cannot close this account of events so closely connected with +my own official life without making acknowledgment of my obligations +to that great-hearted man for the justice, kindness, and generosity +which he invariably manifested toward me whenever occasion offered. + + GENERAL GRANT'S RECOGNITION OF SERVICES + +It was General Grant whose voluntary application, in the winter of +1863-4, relieved me from the disagreeable controversy with partizan +politicians in Missouri, and gave me command of an army in the +field. It was upon his recommendation that my services in that +command were recognized by promotion from the grade of captain to +that of brigadier-general in the regular army and brevet major- +general for services in the battle of Franklin. It was Grant who, +upon my suggestion, ordered me, with the Twenty-third Corps, from +Tennessee to North Carolina, to take part in the closing operations +of the war, instead of leaving me where nothing important remained +to be done. It was he who paid me the high compliment of selecting +me to conduct the operations which might be necessary to enforce +the Monroe doctrine against the French army which had invaded +Mexico. It was he who firmly sustained me in saving the people of +Virginia from the worst effects of the congressional reconstruction +laws. It was he who greeted me most cordially as Secretary of War +in 1868, and expressed a desire that I might hold that office under +his own administration. And, finally, it was he who promoted me +to the rank of major-general in the regular army, the next day +after his inauguration as President. + +It was a great disappointment to me to find only casual mention of +my name in General Grant's "Memoirs." But I was not only consoled, +but moved to deep emotion when told by his worthy son, Colonel +Frederick Dent Grant, that his father had not ceased up to the last +day of his life to cherish the same kind feeling he had always +manifested toward me, and that one of his last fruitless efforts, +when he could no longer speak, was to put on paper some legible +words mentioning my name. + +General Sherman wrote that he could not understand Grant, and +doubted if Grant understood himself. A very distinguished statesman, +whose name I need not mention, said to me that, in his opinion, +there was nothing special in Grant to understand. Others have +varied widely in their estimates of that extraordinary character. +Yet I believe its most extraordinary quality was its extreme +simplicity--so extreme that many have entirely overlooked it in +their search for some deeply hidden secret to account for so great +a character, unmindful of the general fact that simplicity is one +of the most prominent attributes of greatness. + +The greatest of all the traits of Grant's character was that which +lay always on the surface, visible to all who had eyes to see it. +That was his moral and intellectual integrity, sincerity, veracity, +and justice. He was incapable of any attempt to deceive anybody, +except for a legitimate purpose, as in military strategy; and, +above all, he was incapable of deceiving himself. He possessed +that rarest of all human faculties, the power of a perfectly accurate +estimate of himself, uninfluenced by pride, ambition, flattery, or +self-interest. Grant was very far from being a modest man, as the +word modest is generally understood. His just self-esteem was as +far above modesty as it was above flattery. The highest encomiums +were accepted for what he believed them to be worth. They did not +disturb his equilibrium in the slightest degree. + + GRANT'S CONFIDENCE IN HIMSELF + +While Grant knew his own merits as well as anybody did, he also +knew his own imperfections, and estimated them at their real value. +For example, his inability to speak in public, which produced the +impression of extreme modesty or diffidence, he accepted simply as +a fact in his nature which was of little or no consequence, and +which he did not even care to conceal. He would not for many years +even take the trouble to jot down a few words in advance, so as to +be able to say something when called upon. Indeed, I believed he +would have regarded it as an unworthy attempt to appear in a false +light if he had made preparations in advance for an "extemporaneous" +speech. Even when he did in later years write some notes on the +back of a dinner-card, he would take care to let everybody see that +he had done so by holding the card in plain view while he read his +little speech. After telling a story in which the facts had been +modified somewhat to give the greater effect, which no one could +enjoy more than he did, Grant would take care to explain exactly +in what respects he had altered the facts for the purpose of +increasing the interest in his story, so that he might not leave +any wrong impression. + +When Grant's attention was called to any mistake he had committed, +he would see and admit it as quickly and unreservedly as if it had +been made by anybody else, and with a smile which expressed the +exact opposite of that feeling which most men are apt to show under +like circumstances. His love of truth and justice was so far above +all personal considerations that he showed unmistakable evidence +of gratification when any error into which he might have fallen +was corrected. The fact that he had made a mistake and that is +was plainly pointed out to him did not produce the slightest +unpleasant impression, while the further fact that no harm had +resulted from his mistake gave him real pleasure. In Grant's +judgment, no case in which any wrong had been done could possibly +be regarded as finally settled until that wrong was righted; and +if he himself had been, in any sense, a party to that wrong, he +was the more earnest in his desire to see justice done. While he +thus showed a total absence of any false pride of opinion or of +knowledge, no man could be firmer than he in adherence to his mature +judgment, or more earnest in his determination, on proper occasions, +to make it understood that his opinion was his own, and not borrowed +from anybody else. His pride in his own mature opinion was very +great; in that he was as far as possible from being a modest man. +This absolute confidence in his own judgment upon any subject which +he had mastered, and the moral courage to take upon himself alone +the highest responsibility, and to demand full authority and freedom +to act according to his own judgment, without interference from +anybody, added to his accurate estimate of his own ability and his +clear perception of the necessity for undivided authority and +responsibility in the conduct of military operations, and in all +that concerns the efficiency of armies in time of war, constituted +the foundation of that very great character. + +When summoned to Washington to take command of all the armies, with +the rank of lieutenant-general, he determined, before he reached +the capital, that he would not accept the command under any other +conditions than those above stated. His sense of honor and of +loyalty to the country would not permit him to consent to be placed +in a false position,--one in which he could not perform the service +which the country had been led to expect from him,--and he had the +courage to say so in unqualified terms. + +These are the traits of character which made Grant a very great +man--the only man of our time, so far as can be known, who possessed +both the character and the military ability which were, under the +circumstances, indispensable in the commander of the armies which +were to suppress the great rebellion. + +It has been said that Grant, like Lincoln, was a typical American, +and for that reason was most beloved and respected by the people. +That is true of the statesman and of the soldier, as well as of +the people, if it is meant that they were the highest type, that +ideal which commands the respect and admiration of the highest and +best in a man's nature, however far he may know it to be above +himself. The soldiers and the people saw in Grant or in Lincoln, +not one of themselves, not a plain man of the people, nor yet some +superior being whom they could not understand, but the personification +of their highest ideal of a citizen, soldier, or statesman, a man +whose greatness they could see and understand as plainly as anything +else under the sun. And there was no more mystery about it all in +fact than there was in the popular mind. + +Matchless courage and composure in the midst of the most trying +events of battle, magnanimity in the hour of victory, and moral +courage to compel all others to respect his plighted faith toward +those who had surrendered to him, were the crowning glories of +Grant's great and noble character. + + CONCLUSION + +On September 29, 1895, came the hour when I had done, however +imperfectly, all the duty my country required of me, and I was +placed on the retired list of the army. Having been, at appropriate +periods in my official career, by the unsolicited action of my +official superiors, justly and generously rewarded for all my public +services, and having been at the head of the army several years, +near the close of the period fixed by law for active military +service I was made the grateful recipient of the highest honor +which the government of my country can confer upon a soldier, +namely, that of appointment to a higher grade under a special act +of Congress. My public life was, in the main, a stormy one, as +this volume has, perhaps too fully, shown. Many times I felt keenly +the injustice of those who did not appreciate the sincerity of my +purpose to do, to the best of my ability, what the government +desired of me, with little or no regard for my own personal opinions +or ambitions. But I can now concede to nearly all those who so +bitterly opposed me the same patriotic motives which I know inspired +my own conduct; and I would be unworthy of my birthright as an +American citizen if I did not feel grateful to my countrymen and +to our government for all the kindness they have shown me. + + +THE END. + + +INDEX [omitted] + + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's Forty-Six Years in the Army, by John M. 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