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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/18819-8.txt b/18819-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9528bc9 --- /dev/null +++ b/18819-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,7178 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Hume, by T.H. Huxley + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Hume + (English Men of Letters Series) + +Author: T.H. Huxley + +Release Date: July 13, 2006 [EBook #18819] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HUME *** + + + + +Produced by Barbara Tozier, Bill Tozier, Martin Pettit and +the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at +http://www.pgdp.net + + + + + + +English Men of Letters + +EDITED BY JOHN MORLEY + + +HUME + +[Illustration: Publisher's logo] + +HUME + +BY + +PROFESSOR HUXLEY + + +London +MACMILLAN AND CO +1879 + +_The Right of Translation and Reproduction is Reserved_ + +LONDON: +R. CLAY, SONS, AND TAYLOR, +BREAD STREET HILL. + + + * * * * * + + + CONTENTS. + + + + _PART I.--HUME'S LIFE._ + + + CHAPTER I. + PAGE +EARLY LIFE: LITERARY AND POLITICAL WRITINGS 1 + + + CHAPTER II. + +LATER YEARS: THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND 26 + + + + _PART II.--HUME'S PHILOSOPHY._ + + + CHAPTER I. + +THE OBJECT AND SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY 48 + + + CHAPTER II. + +THE CONTENTS OF THE MIND 60 + + + CHAPTER III. + +THE ORIGIN OF THE IMPRESSIONS. 74 + + + CHAPTER IV. + +THE CLASSIFICATION AND THE NOMENCLATURE OF MENTAL +OPERATIONS 89 + + + CHAPTER V. + +THE MENTAL PHENOMENA OF ANIMALS 103 + + + CHAPTER VI. + +LANGUAGE--PROPOSITIONS CONCERNING NECESSARY TRUTHS 114 + + + CHAPTER VII. + +THE ORDER OF NATURE: MIRACLES 129 + + + CHAPTER VIII. + +THEISM: EVOLUTION OF THEOLOGY 140 + + + CHAPTER IX. + +THE SOUL: THE DOCTRINE OF IMMORTALITY 165 + + + CHAPTER X. + +VOLITION: LIBERTY AND NECESSITY 183 + + + CHAPTER XI. + +THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 197 + + + * * * * * + + +HUME. + + + + +PART I. + +_HUME'S LIFE._ + + + + +CHAPTER I. + +EARLY LIFE: LITERARY AND POLITICAL WRITINGS. + + +David Hume was born, in Edinburgh on the 26th of April (O.S.), 1711. His +parents were then residing in the parish of the Tron church, apparently +on a visit to the Scottish capital, as the small estate which his father +Joseph Hume, or Home, inherited, lay in Berwickshire, on the banks of +the Whitadder or Whitewater, a few miles from the border, and within +sight of English ground. The paternal mansion was little more than a +very modest farmhouse,[1] and the property derived its name of +Ninewells from a considerable spring, which breaks out on the slope in +front of the house, and falls into the Whitadder. + +Both mother and father came of good Scottish families--the paternal line +running back to Lord Home of Douglas, who went over to France with the +Douglas during the French wars of Henry V. and VI. and was killed at the +battle of Verneuil. Joseph Hume died when David was an infant, leaving +himself and two elder children, a brother and a sister, to the care of +their mother, who is described by David Hume in _My Own Life_ as "a +woman of singular merit, who though young and handsome devoted herself +entirely to the rearing and education of her children." Mr. Burton says: +"Her portrait, which I have seen, represents a thin but pleasing +countenance, expressive of great intellectual acuteness;" and as Hume +told Dr. Black that she had "precisely the same constitution with +himself" and died of the disorder which proved fatal to him, it is +probable that the qualities inherited from his mother had much to do +with the future philosopher's eminence. It is curious, however, that her +estimate of her son in her only recorded, and perhaps slightly +apocryphal utterance, is of a somewhat unexpected character. "Our +Davie's a fine goodnatured crater, but uncommon wake-minded." The first +part of the judgment was indeed verified by "Davie's" whole life; but +one might seek in vain for signs of what is commonly understood as +"weakness of mind" in a man who not only showed himself to be an +intellectual athlete, but who had an eminent share of practical wisdom +and tenacity of purpose. One would like to know, however, when it was +that Mrs. Hume committed herself to this not too flattering judgment of +her younger son. For as Hume reached the mature age of four and thirty, +before he obtained any employment of sufficient importance to convert +the meagre pittance of a middling laird's younger brother into a decent +maintenance, it is not improbable that a shrewd Scots wife may have +thought his devotion to philosophy and poverty to be due to mere +infirmity of purpose. But she lived till 1749, long enough to see more +than the dawn of her son's literary fame and official importance, and +probably changed her mind about "Davie's" force of character. + +David Hume appears to have owed little to schools or universities. There +is some evidence that he entered the Greek class in the University of +Edinburgh in 1723--when he was a boy of twelve years of age--but it is +not known how long his studies were continued, and he did not graduate. +In 1727, at any rate, he was living at Ninewells, and already possessed +by that love of learning and thirst for literary fame, which, as _My Own +Life_ tells us, was the ruling passion of his life and the chief source +of his enjoyments. A letter of this date, addressed to his friend +Michael Ramsay, is certainly a most singular production for a boy of +sixteen. After sundry quotations from Virgil the letter proceeds:-- + + "The perfectly wise man that outbraves fortune, is much greater + than the husbandman who slips by her; and, indeed, this pastoral + and saturnian happiness I have in a great measure come at just now. + I live like a king, pretty much by myself, neither full of action + nor perturbation--_molles somnos_. This state, however, I can + foresee is not to be relied on. My peace of mind is not + sufficiently confirmed by philosophy to withstand the blows of + fortune. This greatness and elevation of soul is to be found only + in study and contemplation. This alone can teach us to look down on + human accidents. You must allow [me] to talk thus like a + philosopher: 'tis a subject I think much on, and could talk all day + long of." + +If David talked in this strain to his mother her tongue probably gave +utterance to "Bless the bairn!" and, in her private soul, the epithet +"wake-minded" may then have recorded itself. But, though few lonely, +thoughtful, studious boys of sixteen give vent to their thoughts in such +stately periods, it is probable that the brooding over an ideal is +commoner at this age, than fathers and mothers, busy with the cares of +practical life, are apt to imagine. + +About a year later, Hume's family tried to launch him into the +profession of the law; but, as he tells us, "while they fancied I was +poring upon Voet and Vinnius, Cicero and Virgil were the authors which I +was secretly devouring," and the attempt seems to have come to an abrupt +termination. Nevertheless, as a very competent authority[2] wisely +remarks:-- + + "There appear to have been in Hume all the elements of which a good + lawyer is made: clearness of judgment, power of rapidly acquiring + knowledge, untiring industry, and dialectic skill: and if his mind + had not been preoccupied, he might have fallen into the gulf in + which many of the world's greatest geniuses lie + buried--professional eminence; and might have left behind him a + reputation limited to the traditional recollections of the + Parliament house, or associated with important decisions. He was + through life an able, clear-headed, man of business, and I have + seen several legal documents, written in his own hand and evidently + drawn by himself. They stand the test of general professional + observation; and their writer, by preparing documents of facts of + such a character on his own responsibility, showed that he had + considerable confidence in his ability to adhere to the forms + adequate for the occasion. He talked of it as 'an ancient prejudice + industriously propagated by the dunces in all countries, that _a + man of genius is unfit for business_,' and he showed, in his + general conduct through life, that he did not choose to come + voluntarily under this proscription." + +Six years longer Hume remained at Ninewells before he made another +attempt to embark in a practical career--this time commerce--and with a +like result. For a few months' trial proved that kind of life, also, to +be hopelessly against the grain. + +It was while in London, on his way to Bristol, where he proposed to +commence his mercantile life, that Hume addressed to some eminent London +physician (probably, as Mr. Burton suggests, Dr. George Cheyne) a +remarkable letter. Whether it was ever sent seems doubtful; but it shows +that philosophers as well as poets have their Werterian crises, and it +presents an interesting parallel to John Stuart Mill's record of the +corresponding period of his youth. The letter is too long to be given in +full, but a few quotations may suffice to indicate its importance to +those who desire to comprehend the man. + + "You must know then that from my earliest infancy I found always a + strong inclination to books and letters. As our college education + in Scotland, extending little further than the languages, ends + commonly when we are about fourteen or fifteen years of age, I was + after that left to my own choice in my reading, and found it + incline me almost equally to books of reasoning and philosophy, and + to poetry and the polite authors. Every one who is acquainted + either with the philosophers or critics, knows that there is + nothing yet established in either of these two sciences, and that + they contain little more than endless disputes, even in the most + fundamental articles. Upon examination of these, I found a certain + boldness of temper growing on me, which was not inclined to submit + to any authority in these subjects, but led me to seek out some new + medium, by which truth might be established. After much study and + reflection on this, at last, when I was about eighteen years of + age, there seemed to be opened up to me a new scene of thought, + which transported me beyond measure, and made me, with an ardour + natural to young men, throw up every other pleasure or business to + apply entirely to it. The law, which was the business I designed to + follow, appeared nauseous to me, and I could think of no other way + of pushing my fortune in the world, but that of a scholar and + philosopher. I was infinitely happy in this course of life for some + months; till at last, about the beginning of September, 1729, all + my ardour seemed in a moment to be extinguished, and I could no + longer raise my mind to that pitch, which formerly gave me such + excessive pleasure." + +This "decline of soul" Hume attributes, in part, to his being smitten +with the beautiful representations of virtue in the works of Cicero, +Seneca, and Plutarch, and being thereby led to discipline his temper and +his will along with his reason and understanding. + + "I was continually fortifying myself with reflections against + death, and poverty, and shame, and pain, and all the other + calamities of life." + +And he adds very characteristically:-- + + "These no doubt are exceeding useful when joined with an active + life, because the occasion being presented along with the + reflection, works it into the soul, and makes it take a deep + impression: but, in solitude, they serve to little other purpose + than to waste the spirits, the force of the mind meeting no + resistance, but wasting itself in the air, like our arm when it + misses its aim." + +Along with all this mental perturbation, symptoms of scurvy, a disease +now almost unknown among landsmen, but which, in the days of winter salt +meat, before root crops flourished in the Lothians, greatly plagued our +forefathers, made their appearance. And, indeed, it may be suspected +that physical conditions were, at first, at the bottom of the whole +business; for, in 1731, a ravenous appetite set in and, in six weeks +from being tall, lean, and raw-boned, Hume says he became sturdy and +robust, with a ruddy complexion and a cheerful countenance--eating, +sleeping, and feeling well, except that the capacity for intense mental +application seemed to be gone. He, therefore, determined to seek out a +more active life; and, though he could not and would not "quit his +pretensions to learning, but with his last breath," he resolved "to lay +them aside for some time, in order the more effectually to resume them." + +The careers open to a poor Scottish gentleman in those days were very +few; and, as Hume's option lay between a travelling tutorship and a +stool in a merchant's office, he chose the latter. + + "And having got recommendation to a considerable trader in Bristol, + I am just now hastening thither, with a resolution to forget + myself, and everything that is past, to engage myself, as far as is + possible, in that course of life, and to toss about the world from + one pole to the other, till I leave this distemper behind me."[3] + +But it was all of no use--Nature would have her way--and in the middle +of 1736, David Hume, aged twenty-three, without a profession or any +assured means of earning a guinea; and having doubtless, by his apparent +vacillation, but real tenacity of purpose, once more earned the title of +"wake-minded" at home; betook himself to a foreign country. + + "I went over to France, with a view of prosecuting my studies in a + country retreat: and there I laid that plan of life which I have + steadily and successfully pursued. I resolved to make a very rigid + frugality supply my deficiency of fortune, to maintain unimpaired + my independency, and to regard every object as contemptible except + the improvement of my talents in literature."[4] + +Hume passed through Paris on his way to Rheims, where he resided for +some time; though the greater part of his three years' stay was spent at +La Flêche, in frequent intercourse with the Jesuits of the famous +college in which Descartes was educated. Here he composed his first +work, the _Treatise of Human Nature_; though it would appear from the +following passage in the letter to Cheyne, that he had been accumulating +materials to that end for some years before he left Scotland. + + "I found that the moral philosophy transmitted to us by antiquity + laboured under the same inconvenience that has been found in their + natural philosophy, of being entirely hypothetical, and depending + more upon invention than experience: every one consulted his fancy + in erecting schemes of virtue and happiness, without regarding + human nature, upon which every moral conclusion must depend." + +This is the key-note of the _Treatise_; of which Hume himself says +apologetically, in one of his letters, that it was planned before he was +twenty-one and composed before he had reached the age of twenty-five.[5] + +Under these circumstances, it is probably the most remarkable +philosophical work, both intrinsically and in its effects upon the +course of thought, that has ever been written. Berkeley, indeed, +published the _Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision_, the _Treatise +Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge_, and the _Three +Dialogues_, between the ages of twenty-four and twenty-eight; and thus +comes very near to Hume, both in precocity and in influence; but his +investigations are more limited in their scope than those of his +Scottish contemporary. + +The first and second volumes of the _Treatise_, containing Book I., "Of +the Understanding," and Book II., "Of the Passions," were published in +January, 1739.[6] The publisher gave fifty pounds for the copyright; +which is probably more than an unknown writer of twenty-seven years of +age would get for a similar work, at the present time. But, in other +respects, its success fell far short of Hume's expectations. In a letter +dated the 1st of June, 1739, he writes,-- + + "I am not much in the humour of such compositions at present, + having received news from London of the success of my _Philosophy_, + which is but indifferent, if I may judge by the sale of the book, + and if I may believe my bookseller." + +This, however, indicates a very different reception from that which +Hume, looking through the inverted telescope of old age, ascribes to the +_Treatise_ in _My Own Life_. + + "Never literary attempt was more unfortunate than my _Treatise of + Human Nature_. It fell _deadborn from the press_ without reaching + such a distinction as even to excite a murmur among the zealots." + +As a matter of fact, it was fully, and, on the whole, respectfully and +appreciatively, reviewed in the _History of the Works of the Learned_ +for November, 1739.[7] Whoever the reviewer may have been, he was a man +of discernment, for he says that the work bears "incontestable marks of +a great capacity, of a soaring genius, but young, and not yet thoroughly +practised;" and he adds, that we shall probably have reason to consider +"this, compared with the later productions, in the same light as we view +the juvenile works of a Milton, or the first manner of a Raphael or +other celebrated painter." In a letter to Hutcheson, Hume merely speaks +of this article as "somewhat abusive;" so that his vanity, being young +and callow, seems to have been correspondingly wide-mouthed and hard to +satiate. + +It must be confessed that, on this occasion, no less than on that of his +other publications, Hume exhibits no small share of the craving after +mere notoriety and vulgar success, as distinct from the pardonable, if +not honourable, ambition for solid and enduring fame, which would have +harmonised better with his philosophy. Indeed, it appears to be by no +means improbable that this peculiarity of Hume's moral constitution was +the cause of his gradually forsaking philosophical studies, after the +publication of the third part (_On Morals_) of the _Treatise_, in 1740, +and turning to those political and historical topics which were likely +to yield, and did in fact yield, a much better return of that sort of +success which his soul loved. The _Philosophical Essays Concerning the +Human Understanding_, which afterwards became the _Inquiry_, is not much +more than an abridgment and recast, for popular use, of parts of the +_Treatise_, with the addition of the essays on Miracles and on +Necessity. In style, it exhibits a great improvement on the _Treatise_; +but the substance, if not deteriorated, is certainly not improved. Hume +does not really bring his mature powers to bear upon his early +speculations, in the later work. The crude fruits have not been ripened, +but they have been ruthlessly pruned away, along with the branches which +bore them. The result is a pretty shrub enough; but not the tree of +knowledge, with its roots firmly fixed in fact, its branches perennially +budding forth into new truths, which Hume might have reared. Perhaps, +after all, worthy Mrs. Hume was, in the highest sense, right. Davie was +"wake-minded," not to see that the world of philosophy was his to +overrun and subdue, if he would but persevere in the work he had begun. +But no--he must needs turn aside for "success": and verily he had his +reward; but not the crown he might have won. + +In 1740, Hume seems to have made an acquaintance which rapidly ripened +into a life long friendship. Adam Smith was, at that time, a boy student +of seventeen at the University of Glasgow; and Hume sends a copy of the +_Treatise_ to "Mr. Smith," apparently on the recommendation of the +well-known Hutcheson, Professor of Moral Philosophy in the university. +It is a remarkable evidence of Adam Smith's early intellectual +development, that a youth of his age should be thought worthy of such a +present. + +In 1741 Hume published anonymously, at Edinburgh, the first volume of +_Essays Moral and Political_, which was followed in 1742 by the second +volume. + +These pieces are written in an admirable style and, though arranged +without apparent method, a system of political philosophy may be +gathered from their contents. Thus the third essay, _That Politics may +be reduced to a Science_, defends that thesis, and dwells on the +importance of forms of government. + + "So great is the force of laws and of particular forms of + government, and so little dependence have they on the humours and + tempers of men, that consequences almost as general and certain may + sometimes be deduced from them as any which the mathematical + sciences afford us."--(III. 15.) (_See_ p. 45.) + +Hume proceeds to exemplify the evils which inevitably flow from +universal suffrage, from aristocratic privilege, and from elective +monarchy, by historical examples, and concludes:-- + + "That an hereditary prince, a nobility without vassals, and a + people voting by their representatives, form the best monarchy, + aristocracy, and democracy."--(III. 18.) + +If we reflect that the following passage of the same essay was written +nearly a century and a half ago, it would seem that whatever other +changes may have taken place, political warfare remains _in statu +quo_:-- + + "Those who either attack or defend a minister in such a government + as ours, where the utmost liberty is allowed, always carry matters + to an extreme, and exaggerate his merit or demerit with regard to + the public. His enemies are sure to charge him with the greatest + enormities, both in domestic and foreign management; and there is + no meanness or crime, of which, in their judgment, he is not + capable. Unnecessary wars, scandalous treaties, profusion of public + treasure, oppressive taxes, every kind of maladministration is + ascribed to him. To aggravate the charge, his pernicious conduct, + it is said, will extend its baneful influence even to posterity, by + undermining the best constitution in the world, and disordering + that wise system of laws, institutions, and customs, by which our + ancestors, during so many centuries, have been so happily governed. + He is not only a wicked minister in himself, but has removed every + security provided against wicked ministers for the future. + + "On the other hand, the partisans of the minister make his + panegyric rise as high as the accusation against him, and celebrate + his wise, steady, and moderate conduct in every part of his + administration. The honour and interest of the nation supported + abroad, public credit maintained at home, persecution restrained, + faction subdued: the merit of all these blessings is ascribed + solely to the minister. At the same time, he crowns all his other + merits by a religious care of the best government in the world, + which he has preserved in all its parts, and has transmitted + entire, to be the happiness and security of the latest + posterity."--(III. 26.) + +Hume sagely remarks that the panegyric and the accusation cannot both be +true; and, that what truth there may be in either, rather tends to show +that our much-vaunted constitution does not fulfil its chief object, +which is to provide a remedy against maladministration. And if it does +not-- + + "we are rather beholden to any minister who undermines it and + affords us the opportunity of erecting a better in its + place."--III. 28. + +The fifth Essay discusses the _Origin of Government_:-- + + "Man, born in a family, is compelled to maintain society from + necessity, from natural inclination, and from habit. The same + creature, in his farther progress, is engaged to establish + political society, in order to administer justice, without which + there can be no peace among them, nor safety, nor mutual + intercourse. We are therefore to look upon all the vast apparatus + of our government, as having ultimately no other object or purpose + but the distribution of justice, or, in other words, the support of + the twelve judges. Kings and parliaments, fleets and armies, + officers of the court and revenue, ambassadors, ministers and privy + councillors, are all subordinate in the end to this part of + administration. Even the clergy, as their duty leads them to + inculcate morality, may justly be thought, so far as regards this + world, to have no other useful object of their institution."--(III. + 37.) + +The police theory of government has never been stated more tersely: +and, if there were only one state in the world; and if we could be +certain by intuition, or by the aid of revelation, that it is wrong for +society, as a corporate body, to do anything for the improvement of its +members and, thereby, indirectly support the twelve judges, no objection +could be raised to it. + +Unfortunately the existence of rival or inimical nations furnishes +"kings and parliaments, fleets and armies," with a good deal of +occupation beyond the support of the twelve judges; and, though the +proposition that the State has no business to meddle with anything but +the administration of justice, seems sometimes to be regarded as an +axiom, it can hardly be said to be intuitively certain, inasmuch as a +great many people absolutely repudiate it; while, as yet, the attempt to +give it the authority of a revelation has not been made. + +As Hume says with profound truth in the fourth essay, _On the First +Principles of Government_:-- + + "As force is always on the side of the governed, the governors have + nothing to support them but opinion. It is, therefore, on opinion + only that government is founded; and this maxim extends to the most + despotic and most military governments, as well as to the most free + and the most popular."--(III. 31.) + +But if the whole fabric of social organisation rests on opinion, it may +surely be fairly argued that, in the interests of self-preservation, if +for no better reason, society has a right to see that the means of +forming just opinions are placed within the reach of every one of its +members; and, therefore, that due provision for education, at any rate, +is a right and, indeed, a duty, of the state. + +The three opinions upon which all government, or the authority of the +few over the many, is founded, says Hume, are public interest, right to +power, and right to property. No government can permanently exist, +unless the majority of the citizens, who are the ultimate depositary of +Force, are convinced that it serves the general interest, that it has +lawful authority, and that it respects individual rights:-- + + "A government may endure for several ages, though the balance of + power and the balance of property do not coincide.... But where the + original constitution allows any share of power, though small, to + an order of men who possess a large share of property, it is easy + for them gradually to stretch their authority, and bring the + balance of power to coincide with that of property. This has been + the case with the House of Commons in England."--(III. 34.) + +Hume then points out that, in his time, the authority of the Commons was +by no means equivalent to the property and power it represented, and +proceeds:-- + + "Were the members obliged to receive instructions from their + constituents, like the Dutch deputies, this would entirely alter + the case; and if such immense power and riches as those of all the + Commons of Great Britain, were brought into the scale, it is not + easy to conceive that the crown could either influence that + multitude of people, or withstand that balance of property. It is + true, the crown has great influence over the collective body in the + elections of members; but were this influence, which at present is + only exerted once in seven years, to be employed in bringing over + the people to every vote, it would soon be wasted, and no skill, + popularity, or revenue could support it. I must, therefore, be of + opinion that an alteration in this particular would introduce a + total alteration in our government, would soon reduce it to a pure + republic; and, perhaps, to a republic of no inconvenient + form."--(III. 35.) + +Viewed by the light of subsequent events, this is surely a very +remarkable example of political sagacity. The members of the House of +Commons are not yet delegates; but, with the widening of the suffrage +and the rapidly increasing tendency to drill and organise the +electorate, and to exact definite pledges from candidates, they are +rapidly becoming, if not delegates, at least attorneys for committees of +electors. The same causes are constantly tending to exclude men, who +combine a keen sense of self-respect with large intellectual capacity, +from a position in which the one is as constantly offended, as the other +is neutralised. Notwithstanding the attempt of George the Third to +resuscitate the royal authority, Hume's foresight has been so completely +justified that no one now dreams of the crown exerting the slightest +influence upon elections. + +In the seventh essay, Hume raises a very interesting discussion as to +the probable ultimate result of the forces which were at work in the +British Constitution in the first part of the eighteenth century:-- + + "There has been a sudden and sensible change in the opinions of + men, within these last fifty years, by the progress of learning and + of liberty. Most people in this island have divested themselves of + all superstitious reverence to names and authority; the clergy have + much lost their credit; their pretensions and doctrines have been + much ridiculed; and even religion can scarcely support itself in + the world. The mere name of _king_ commands little respect; and to + talk of a king as God's vicegerent on earth, or to give him any of + those magnificent titles which formerly dazzled mankind, would but + excite laughter in every one."--(III. 54.) + +In fact, at the present day, the danger to monarchy in Britain would +appear to lie, not in increasing love for equality, for which, except as +regards the law, Englishmen have never cared, but rather entertain an +aversion; nor in any abstract democratic theories, upon which the mass +of Englishmen pour the contempt with which they view theories in +general; but in the constantly increasing tendency of monarchy to become +slightly absurd, from the ever-widening discrepancy between modern +political ideas and the theory of kingship. As Hume observes, even in +his time, people had left off making believe that a king was a different +species of man from, other men; and, since his day, more and more such +make-believes have become impossible; until the maintenance of kingship +in coming generations seems likely to depend, entirely, upon whether it +is the general opinion, that a hereditary president of our virtual +republic will serve the general interest better than an elective one or +not. The tendency of public feeling in this direction is patent, but it +does not follow that a republic is to be the final stage of our +government. In fact, Hume thinks not:-- + + "It is well known, that every government must come to a period, and + that death is unavoidable to the political, as well as to the + animal body. But, as one kind of death may be preferable to + another, it may be inquired, whether it be more desirable for the + British constitution to terminate in a popular government, or in an + absolute monarchy? Here, I would frankly declare, that though + liberty be preferable to slavery, in almost every case; yet I + should rather wish to see an absolute monarch than a republic in + this island. For let us consider what kind of republic we have + reason to expect. The question is not concerning any fine imaginary + republic of which a man forms a plan in his closet. There is no + doubt but a popular government may be imagined more perfect than + an absolute monarchy, or even than our present constitution. But + what reason have we to expect that any such government will ever be + established in Great Britain, upon the dissolution of our monarchy? + If any single person acquire power enough to take our constitution + to pieces, and put it up anew, he is really an absolute monarch; + and we have already had an instance of this kind, sufficient to + convince us, that such a person will never resign his power, or + establish any free government. Matters, therefore, must be trusted + to their natural progress and operation; and the House of Commons, + according to its present constitution, must be the only legislature + in such a popular government. The inconveniences attending such a + situation of affairs present themselves by thousands. If the House + of Commons, in such a case, ever dissolve itself, which is not to + be expected, we may look for a civil war every election. If it + continue itself, we shall suffer all the tyranny of a faction + subdivided into new factions. And, as such a violent government + cannot long subsist, we shall at last, after many convulsions and + civil wars, find repose in absolute monarchy, which it would have + been happier for us to have established peaceably from the + beginning. Absolute monarchy, therefore, is the easiest death, the + true _Euthanasia_ of the British constitution. + + "Thus if we have more reason to be jealous of monarchy, because the + danger is more imminent from that quarter; we have also reason to + be more jealous of popular government, because that danger is more + terrible. This may teach us a lesson of moderation in all our + political controversies."--(III. 55.) + +One may admire the sagacity of these speculations, and the force and +clearness with which they are expressed, without altogether agreeing +with them. That an analogy between the social and bodily organism +exists, and is, in many respects, clear and full of instructive +suggestion, is undeniable. Yet a state answers, not to an individual, +but to a generic type; and there is no reason, in the nature of things, +why any generic type should die out. The type of the pearly _Nautilus_, +highly organised as it is, has persisted with but little change from the +Silurian epoch till now; and, so long as terrestrial conditions remain +approximately similar to what they are at present, there is no more +reason why it should cease to exist in the next, than in the past, +hundred million years or so. The true ground for doubting the +possibility of the establishment of absolute monarchy in Britain is, +that opinion seems to have passed through, and left far behind, the +stage at which such a change would be possible; and the true reason for +doubting the permanency of a republic, if it is ever established, lies +in the fact, that a republic requires for its maintenance a far higher +standard of morality and of intelligence in the members of the state +than any other form of government. Samuel gave the Israelites a king +because they were not righteous enough to do without one, with a pretty +plain warning of what they were to expect from the gift. And, up to this +time, the progress of such republics as have been established in the +world has not been such, as to lead to any confident expectation that +their foundation is laid on a sufficiently secure subsoil of public +spirit, morality, and intelligence. On the contrary, they exhibit +examples of personal corruption and of political profligacy as fine as +any hotbed of despotism has ever produced; while they fail in the +primary duty of the administration of justice, as none but an effete +despotism has ever failed. + +Hume has been accused of departing, in his old age, from the liberal +principles of his youth; and, no doubt, he was careful, in the later +editions of the _Essays_, to expunge everything that savoured of +democratic tendencies. But the passage just quoted shows that this was +no recantation, but simply a confirmation, by his experience of one of +the most debased periods of English history, of those evil tendencies +attendant on popular government, of which, from the first, he was fully +aware. + +In the ninth essay, _On the Parties of Great Britain_, there occurs a +passage which, while it affords evidence of the marvellous change which +has taken place in the social condition of Scotland since 1741, contains +an assertion respecting the state of the Jacobite party at that time, +which at first seems surprising:-- + + "As violent things have not commonly so long a duration as + moderate, we actually find that the Jacobite party is almost + entirely vanished from among us, and that the distinction of + _Court_ and _Country_, which is but creeping in at London, is the + only one that is ever mentioned in this kingdom. Beside the + violence and openness of the Jacobite party, another reason has + perhaps contributed to produce so sudden and so visible an + alteration in this part of Britain. There are only two ranks of men + among us; gentlemen who have some fortune and education, and the + meanest slaving poor; without any considerable number of that + middling rank of men, which abound more in England, both in cities + and in the country, than in any other part of the world. The + slaving poor are incapable of any principles; gentlemen may be + converted to true principles, by time and experience. The middling + rank of men have curiosity and knowledge enough to form principles, + but not enough to form true ones, or correct any prejudices that + they may have imbibed. And it is among the middling rank of people + that Tory principles do at present prevail most in England."--(III. + 80, _note_.) + +Considering that the Jacobite rebellion of 1745 broke out only four +years after this essay was published, the assertion that the Jacobite +party had "almost entirely vanished in 1741" sounds strange enough: and +the passage which contains it is omitted in the third edition of the +_Essays_, published in 1748. Nevertheless, Hume was probably right, as +the outbreak of '45 was little better than a Highland raid, and the +Pretender obtained no important following in the Lowlands. + +No less curious, in comparison with what would be said nowadays, is +Hume's remark in the Essay on the _Rise of the Arts and Sciences_ that-- + + "The English are become sensible of the scandalous licentiousness + of their stage from the example of the French decency and + morals."--(III. 135.) + +And it is perhaps as surprising to be told, by a man of Hume's literary +power, that the first polite prose in the English language was written +by Swift. Locke and Temple (with whom Sprat is astoundingly conjoined) +"knew too little of the rules of art to be esteemed elegant writers," +and the prose of Bacon, Harrington, and Milton is "altogether stiff and +pedantic." Hobbes, who whether he should be called a "polite" writer or +not, is a master of vigorous English; Clarendon, Addison, and Steele +(the last two, surely, were "polite" writers in all conscience) are not +mentioned. + +On the subject of _National Character_, about which more nonsense, and +often very mischievous nonsense, has been and is talked than upon any +other topic, Hume's observations are full of sense and shrewdness. He +distinguishes between the _moral_ and the _physical_ causes of national +character, enumerating under the former-- + + "The nature of the government, the revolutions of public affairs, + the plenty or penury in which people live, the situation of the + nation with regard to its neighbours, and such like + circumstances."--(III. 225.) + +and under the latter:-- + + "Those qualities of the air and climate, which are supposed to work + insensibly on the temper, by altering the tone and habit of the + body, and giving a particular complexion, which, though reflexion + and reason may sometimes overcome it, will yet prevail among the + generality of mankind, and have an influence on their + manners."--(III. 225.) + +While admitting and exemplifying the great influence of moral causes, +Hume remarks-- + + "As to physical causes, I am inclined to doubt altogether of their + operation in this particular; nor do I think that men owe anything + of their temper or genius to the air, food, or climate."--(III. + 227.) + +Hume certainly would not have accepted the "rice theory" in explanation +of the social state of the Hindoos; and, it may be safely assumed, that +he would not have had recourse to the circumambience of the "melancholy +main" to account for the troublous history of Ireland. He supports his +views by a variety of strong arguments, among which, at the present +conjuncture, it is worth noting that the following occurs-- + + "Where any accident, as a difference in language or religion, keeps + two nations, inhabiting the same country, from mixing with one + another, they will preserve during several centuries a distinct and + even opposite set of manners. The integrity, gravity, and bravery + of the Turks, form an exact contrast to the deceit, levity, and + cowardice of the modern Greeks."--(III. 233.) + +The question of the influence of race, which plays so great a part in +modern political speculations, was hardly broached in Hume's time, but +he had an inkling of its importance:-- + + "I am apt to suspect the Negroes to be naturally inferior to the + Whites. There scarcely ever was a civilised nation of that + complexion, nor even any individual, eminent either in action or + speculation.... Such a uniform and constant difference [between the + negroes and the whites] could not happen in so many countries and + ages, if nature had not made an original distinction between these + breeds of men.... In Jamaica, indeed, they talk of one Negro as a + man of parts and learning; but it is likely he is admired for + slender accomplishments, like a parrot who speaks a few words + plainly."--(III. 236.) + +The _Essays_ met with the success they deserved. Hume wrote to Henry +Home in June, 1742:-- + + "The Essays are all sold in London, as I am informed by two letters + from English gentlemen of my acquaintance. There is a demand for + them; and, as one of them tells me, Innys, the great bookseller in + Paul's Churchyard, wonders there is not a new edition, for he + cannot find copies for his customers. I am also told that Dr. + Butler has everywhere recommended them; so that I hope that they + will have some success." + +Hume had sent Butler a copy of the _Treatise_ and had called upon him, +in London, but he was out of town; and being shortly afterwards made +Bishop of Bristol, Hume seems to have thought that further advances on +his part might not be well received. + +Greatly comforted by this measure of success, Hume remained at +Ninewells, rubbing up his Greek, until 1745; when, at the mature age of +thirty-four, he made his entry into practical life, by becoming +bear-leader to the Marquis of Annandale, a young nobleman of feeble +body and feebler mind. As might have been predicted, this venture was +not more fortunate than his previous ones; and, after a year's +endurance, diversified latterly with pecuniary squabbles, in which +Hume's tenacity about a somewhat small claim is remarkable, the +engagement came to an end. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] A picture of the house, taken from Drummond's _History of Noble +British Families_, is to be seen in Chambers's _Book of Days_ (April +26th); and if, as Drummond says, "It is a favourable specimen of the +best Scotch lairds' houses," all that can be said is worst Scotch lairds +must have been poorly lodged indeed. + +[2] Mr. John Hill Burton, in his valuable _Life of Hume_, on which, I +need hardly say, I have drawn freely for the materials of the present +biographical sketch. + +[3] One cannot but be reminded of young Descartes' renunciation of study +for soldiering. + +[4] _My Own Life._ + +[5] Letter to Gilbert Elliot of Minto, 1751. "So vast an undertaking, +planned before I was one-and-twenty, and composed before twenty-five, +must necessarily be very defective. I have repented my haste a hundred +and a hundred times." + +[6] So says Mr. Burton, and that he is right is proved by a letter of +Hume's, dated February 13, 1739, in which he writes, "'Tis now a +fortnight since my book was published." But it is a curious illustration +of the value of testimony, that Hume, in _My Own Life_, states: "In the +end of 1738 I published my Treatise, and immediately went down to my +mother and my brother." + +[7] Burton, _Life_, vol. i. p. 109. + + + + +CHAPTER II. + +LATER YEARS: THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND. + + +In 1744, Hume's friends had endeavoured to procure his nomination to the +Chair of "Ethics and pneumatic philosophy"[8] in the University of +Edinburgh. About this matter he writes to his friend William Mure:-- + + "The accusation of heresy, deism, scepticism, atheism, &c., &c., + &c. was started against me; but never took, being bore down by the + contrary authority of all the good company in town." + +If the "good company in town" bore down the first three of these +charges, it is to be hoped, for the sake of their veracity, that they +knew their candidate chiefly as the very good company that he always +was; and had paid as little attention, as good company usually does, to +so solid a work as the _Treatise_. Hume expresses a naïve surprise, not +unmixed with indignation, that Hutcheson and Leechman, both clergymen +and sincere, though liberal, professors of orthodoxy, should have +expressed doubts as to his fitness for becoming a professedly +presbyterian teacher of presbyterian youth. The town council, however, +would not have him, and filled up the place with a safe nobody. + +In May, 1746, a new prospect opened. General St. Clair was appointed to +the command of an expedition to Canada, and he invited Hume, at a week's +notice, to be his secretary; to which office that of judge advocate was +afterwards added. + +Hume writes to a friend: "The office is very genteel, 10_s_. a day, +perquisites, and no expenses;" and, to another, he speculates on the +chance of procuring a company in an American regiment. "But this I build +not on, nor indeed am I very fond of it," he adds; and this was +fortunate, for the expedition, after dawdling away the summer in port, +was suddenly diverted to an attack on L'Orient, where it achieved a huge +failure and returned ignominiously to England. + +A letter to Henry Home, written when this unlucky expedition was +recalled, shows that Hume had already seriously turned his attention to +history. Referring to an invitation to go over to Flanders with the +General, he says: + + "Had I any fortune which would give me a prospect of leisure and + opportunity to prosecute my _historical projects_, nothing could be + more useful to me, and I should pick up more literary knowledge in + one campaign by being in the General's family, and being introduced + frequently to the Duke's, than most officers could do after many + years' service. But to what can all this serve? I am a philosopher, + and so I suppose must continue." + +But this vaticination was shortly to prove erroneous. Hume seems to +have made a very favourable impression on General St. Clair, as he did +upon every one with whom he came into personal contact; for, being +charged with a mission to the court of Turin, in 1748, the General +insisted upon the appointment of Hume as his secretary. He further made +him one of his aides-de-camp; so that the philosopher was obliged to +encase his more than portly, and by no means elegant, figure in a +military uniform. Lord Charlemont, who met him at Turin, says he was +"disguised in scarlet," and that he wore his uniform "like a grocer of +the train-bands." Hume, always ready for a joke at his own expense, +tells of the considerate kindness with which, at a reception at Vienna, +the Empress-dowager released him and his friends from the necessity of +walking backwards. "We esteemed ourselves very much obliged to her for +this attention, especially my companions, who were desperately afraid of +my falling on them and crushing them." + +Notwithstanding the many attractions of this appointment, Hume writes +that he leaves home "with infinite regret, where I had treasured up +stores of study and plans of thinking for many years;" and his only +consolation is that the opportunity of becoming conversant with state +affairs may be profitable:-- + + "I shall have an opportunity of seeing courts and camps: and if I + can afterward be so happy as to attain leisure and other + opportunities, this knowledge may even turn to account to me as a + man of letters, which I confess has always been the sole object of + my ambition. I have long had an intention, in my riper years, of + composing some history; and I question not but some greater + experience in the operations of the field and the intrigues of the + cabinet will be requisite, in order to enable me to speak with + judgment on these subjects." + +Hume returned to London in 1749, and, during his stay there, his mother +died, to his heartfelt sorrow. A curious story in connection with this +event is told by Dr. Carlyle, who knew Hume well, and whose authority is +perfectly trustworthy. + + "Mr. Boyle hearing of it, soon after went to his apartment, for + they lodged in the same house, where he found him in the deepest + affliction and in a flood of tears. After the usual topics and + condolences Mr. Boyle said to him, 'My friend, you owe this + uncommon grief to having thrown off the principles of religion: for + if you had not, you would have been consoled with the firm belief + that the good lady, who was not only the best of mothers, but the + most pious of Christians, was completely happy in the realms of the + just. To which David replied, 'Though I throw out my speculations + to entertain the learned and metaphysical world, yet in other + things I do not think so differently from the rest of the world as + you imagine.'" + +If Hume had told this story to Dr. Carlyle, the latter would have said +so; it must therefore have come from Mr. Boyle; and one would like to +have the opportunity of cross-examining that gentleman as to Hume's +exact words and their context, before implicitly accepting his version +of the conversation. Mr. Boyle's experience of mankind must have been +small, if he had not seen the firmest of believers overwhelmed with +grief by a like loss, and as completely inconsolable. Hume may have +thrown off Mr. Boyle's "principles of religion," but he was none the +less a very honest man, perfectly open and candid, and the last person +to use ambiguous phraseology, among his friends; unless, indeed, he saw +no other way of putting a stop to the intrusion of unmannerly twaddle +amongst the bitter-sweet memories stirred in his affectionate nature by +so heavy a blow. + +The _Philosophical Essays_ or _Inquiry_ was published in 1748, while +Hume was away with General St. Clair, and, on his return to England, he +had the mortification to find it overlooked in the hubbub caused by +Middleton's _Free Inquiry_, and its bold handling of the topic of the +_Essay on Miracles_, by which Hume doubtless expected the public to be +startled. + +Between 1749 and 1751, Hume resided at Ninewells, with his brother and +sister, and busied himself with the composition of his most finished, if +not his most important works, the _Dialogues on Natural Religion_, the +_Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals_, and the _Political +Discourses_. + +_The Dialogues on Natural Religion_ were touched and re-touched, at +intervals, for a quarter of a century, and were not published till after +Hume's death: but the _Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals_ +appeared in 1751, and the _Political Discourses_ in 1752. Full reference +will be made to the two former in the exposition of Hume's philosophical +views. The last has been well said to be the "cradle of political +economy: and much as that science has been investigated and expounded in +later times, these earliest, shortest, and simplest developments of its +principles are still read with delight even by those who are masters of +all the literature of this great subject."[9] + +The _Wealth of Nations_, the masterpiece of Hume's close friend, Adam +Smith, it must be remembered, did not appear before 1776, so that, in +political economy, no less than in philosophy, Hume was an original, a +daring, and a fertile innovator. + +The _Political Essays_ had a great and rapid success; translated into +French in 1753, and again in 1754, they conferred a European reputation +upon their author; and, what was more to the purpose, influenced the +later French school of economists of the eighteenth century. + +By this time, Hume had not only attained a high reputation in the world +of letters, but he considered himself a man of independent fortune. His +frugal habits had enabled him to accumulate £1,000, and he tells Michael +Ramsay in 1751:-- + + "While interest remains as at present, I have £50 a year, a hundred + pounds worth of books, great store of linens and fine clothes, and + near £100 in my pocket; along with order, frugality, a strong + spirit of independency, good health, a contented humour, and an + unabated love of study. In these circumstances I must esteem myself + one of the happy and fortunate; and so far from being willing to + draw my ticket over again in the lottery of life, there are very + few prizes with which I would make an exchange. After some + deliberation, I am resolved to settle in Edinburgh, and hope I + shall be able with these revenues to say with Horace:-- + + + 'Est bona librorum et provisæ frugis in annum + Copia.'" + + +It would be difficult to find a better example of the honourable +independence and cheerful self-reliance which should distinguish a man +of letters, and which characterised Hume throughout his career. By +honourable effort, the boy's noble ideal of life, became the man's +reality; and, at forty, Hume had the happiness of finding that he had +not wasted his youth in the pursuit of illusions, but that "the solid +certainty of waking bliss" lay before him, in the free play of his +powers in their appropriate sphere. + +In 1751, Hume removed to Edinburgh and took up his abode on a flat in +one of those prodigious houses in the Lawnmarket, which still excite the +admiration of tourists; afterwards moving to a house in the Canongate. +His sister joined him, adding £30 a year to the common stock; and, in +one of his charmingly playful letters to Dr. Clephane, he thus describes +his establishment, in 1753. + + "I shall exult and triumph to you a little that I have now at + last--being turned of forty, to my own honour, to that of learning, + and to that of the present age--arrived at the dignity of being a + householder. + + "About seven months ago, I got a house of my own, and completed a + regular family, consisting of a head, viz., myself, and two + inferior members, a maid and a cat. My sister has since joined me, + and keeps me company. With frugality, I can reach, I find, + cleanliness, warmth, light, plenty, and contentment. What would you + have more? Independence? I have it in a supreme degree. Honour? + That is not altogether wanting. Grace? That will come in time. A + wife? That is none of the indispensable requisites of life. Books? + That is one of them; and I have more than I can use. In short, I + cannot find any pleasure of consequence which I am not possessed of + in a greater or less degree; and, without any great effort of + philosophy, I may be easy and satisfied. + + "As there is no happiness without occupation, I have begun a work + which will occupy me several years, and which yields me much + satisfaction. 'Tis a History of Britain from the Union of the + Crowns to the present time. I have already finished the reign of + King James. My friends flatter me (by this I mean that they don't + flatter me) that I have succeeded." + +In 1752, the Faculty of Advocates elected Hume their librarian, an +office which, though it yielded little emolument--the salary was only +forty pounds a year--was valuable as it placed the resources of a large +library at his disposal. The proposal to give Hume even this paltry +place caused a great outcry, on the old score of infidelity. But as Hume +writes, in a jubilant letter to Clephane (February 4, 1752):-- + + "I carried the election by a considerable majority.... What is more + extraordinary, the cry of religion could not hinder the ladies from + being violently my partisans, and I owe my success in a great + measure to their solicitations. One has broke off all commerce with + her lover because he voted against me! And Mr. Lockhart, in a + speech to the Faculty, said there was no walking the streets, nor + even enjoying one's own fireside, on account of their importunate + zeal. The town says that even his bed was not safe for him, though + his wife was cousin-german to my antagonist. + + "'Twas vulgarly given out that the contest was between Deists and + Christians, and when the news of my success came to the playhouse, + the whisper rose that the Christians were defeated. Are you not + surprised that we could keep our popularity, notwithstanding this + imputation, which my friends could not deny to be well founded?" + +It would seem that the "good company" was less enterprising in its +asseverations in this canvass than in the last. + +The first volume of the _History of Great Britain, containing the reign +of James I. and Charles I._, was published in 1754. At first, the sale +was large, especially in Edinburgh, and if notoriety _per se_ was Hume's +object, he attained it. But he liked applause as well as fame and, to +his bitter disappointment, he says:-- + + "I was assailed by one cry of reproach, disapprobation, and even + detestation: English, Scotch, and Irish, Whig and Tory, Churchman + and Sectary, Freethinker and Religionist, Patriot and Courtier, + united in their rage against the man who had presumed to shed a + generous tear for the fate of Charles I. and the Earl of Strafford; + and after the first ebullitions of their fury were over, what was + still more mortifying, the book seemed to fall into oblivion. Mr. + Millar told me that in a twelvemonth he sold only forty-five copies + of it. I scarcely, indeed, heard of one man in the three kingdoms, + considerable for rank or letters, that could endure the book. I + must only except the primate of England, Dr. Herring, and the + primate of Ireland, Dr. Stone, which seem two odd exceptions. These + dignified prelates separately sent me messages not to be + discouraged." + +It certainly is odd to think of David Hume being comforted in his +affliction by the independent and spontaneous sympathy of a pair of +archbishops. But the instincts of the dignified prelates guided them +rightly; for, as the great painter of English history in Whig pigments +has been careful to point out,[10] Hume's historical picture, though a +great work, drawn by a master hand, has all the lights Tory, and all the +shades Whig. + +Hume's ecclesiastical enemies seem to have thought that their +opportunity had now arrived; and an attempt was made to get the General +Assembly of 1756 to appoint a committee to inquire into his writings. +But, after a keen debate, the proposal was rejected by fifty votes to +seventeen. Hume does not appear to have troubled himself about the +matter, and does not even think it worth mention in _My Own Life_. + +In 1756 he tells Clephane that he is worth £1,600 sterling, and +consequently master of an income which must have been wealth to a man of +his frugal habits. In the same year, he published the second volume of +the _History_, which met with a much better reception than the first; +and, in 1757, one of his most remarkable works, the _Natural History of +Religion_, appeared. In the same year, he resigned his office of +librarian to the Faculty of Advocates, and he projected removal to +London, probably to superintend the publication of the additional volume +of the _History_. + + "I shall certainly be in London next summer; and probably to remain + there during life: at least, if I can settle myself to my mind, + which I beg you to have an eye to. A room in a sober discreet + family, who would not be averse to admit a sober, discreet, + virtuous, regular, quiet, goodnatured man of a bad character--such + a room, I say, would suit me extremely."[11] + +The promised visit took place in the latter part of the year 1758, and +he remained in the metropolis for the greater part of 1759. The two +volumes of the _History of England under the House of Tudor_ were +published in London, shortly after Hume's return to Edinburgh; and, +according to his own account, they raised almost as great a clamour as +the first two had done. + +Busily occupied with the continuation of his historical labours, Hume +remained in Edinburgh until 1763; when, at the request of Lord Hertford, +who was going as ambassador to France, he was appointed to the embassy; +with the promise of the secretaryship, and, in the meanwhile, +performing the duties of that office. At first, Hume declined the offer; +but, as it was particularly honourable to so well abused a man, on +account of Lord Hertford's high reputation for virtue and piety,[12] and +no less advantageous by reason of the increase of fortune which it +secured to him, he eventually accepted it. + +In France, Hume's reputation stood far higher than in Britain; several +of his works had been translated; he had exchanged letters with +Montesquieu and with Helvetius; Rousseau had appealed to him; and the +charming Madame de Boufflers had drawn him into a correspondence, marked +by almost passionate enthusiasm on her part, and as fair an imitation of +enthusiasm as Hume was capable of, on his. In the extraordinary mixture +of learning, wit, humanity, frivolity, and profligacy which then +characterised the highest French society, a new sensation was worth +anything, and it mattered little whether the cause thereof was a +philosopher or a poodle; so Hume had a great success in the Parisian +world. Great nobles fêted him, and great ladies were not content unless +the "gros David" was to be seen at their receptions, and in their boxes +at the theatre. "At the opera his broad unmeaning face was usually to be +seen _entre deux jolis minois_," says Lord Charlemont.[13] Hume's cool +head was by no means turned; but he took the goods the gods provided +with much satisfaction; and everywhere won golden opinions by his +unaffected good sense and thorough kindness of heart. + +Over all this part of Hume's career, as over the surprising episode of +the quarrel with Rousseau, if that can be called quarrel which was +lunatic malignity on Rousseau's side and thorough generosity and +patience on Hume's, I may pass lightly. The story is admirably told by +Mr. Burton, to whose volumes I refer the reader. Nor need I dwell upon +Hume's short tenure of office in London, as Under-Secretary of State, +between 1767 and 1769. Success and wealth are rarely interesting, and +Hume's case is no exception to the rule. + +According to his own description the cares of official life were not +overwhelming. + + "My way of life here is very uniform and by no means disagreeable. + I have all the forenoon in the Secretary's house, from ten till + three, when there arrive from time to time messengers that bring me + all the secrets of the kingdom, and, indeed, of Europe, Asia, + Africa, and America. I am seldom hurried; but have leisure at + intervals to take up a book, or write a private letter, or converse + with a friend that may call for me; and from dinner to bed-time is + all my own. If you add to this that the person with whom I have the + chief, if not only, transactions, is the most reasonable, + equal-tempered, and gentleman-like man imaginable, and Lady + Aylesbury the same, you will certainly think I have no reason to + complain; and I am far from complaining. I only shall not regret + when my duty is over; because to me the situation can lead to + nothing, at least in all probability; and reading, and sauntering, + and lounging, and dozing, which I call thinking, is my supreme + happiness--I mean my full contentment." + +Hume's duty was soon over, and he returned to Edinburgh in 1769, "very +opulent" in the possession of £1,000 a year, and determined to take what +remained to him of life pleasantly and easily. In October, 1769, he +writes to Elliot:-- + + "I have been settled here two months, and am here body and soul, + without casting the least thought of regret to London, or even to + Paris.... I live still, and must for a twelvemonth, in my old house + in James's Court, which is very cheerful and even elegant, but too + small to display my great talent for cookery, the science to which + I intend to addict the remaining years of my life. I have just now + lying on the table before me a receipt for making _soupe à la + reine_, copied with my own hand; for beef and cabbage (a charming + dish) and old mutton and old claret nobody excels me. I make also + sheep's-head broth in a manner that Mr. Keith speaks of for eight + days after; and the Duc de Nivernois would bind himself apprentice + to my lass to learn it. I have already sent a challenge to David + Moncreiff: you will see that in a twelvemonth he will take to the + writing of history, the field I have deserted; for as to the giving + of dinners, he can now have no further pretensions. I should have + made a very bad use of my abode in Paris if I could not get the + better of a mere provincial like him. All my friends encourage me + in this ambition; as thinking it will redound very much to my + honour." + +In 1770, Hume built himself a house in the new town of Edinburgh, which +was then springing up. It was the first house in the street, and a +frolicsome young lady chalked upon the wall "St. David's Street." Hume's +servant complained to her master, who replied, "Never mind, lassie, many +a better man has been made a saint of before," and the street retains +its title to this day. + +In the following six years, the house in St. David's Street was the +centre of the accomplished and refined society which then distinguished +Edinburgh. Adam Smith, Blair, and Ferguson were within easy reach; and +what remains of Hume's correspondence with Sir Gilbert Elliot, Colonel +Edmonstone, and Mrs. Cockburn gives pleasant glimpses of his social +surroundings, and enables us to understand his contentment with his +absence from the more perturbed, if more brilliant, worlds of Paris and +London. + +Towards London, Londoners, and indeed Englishmen in general, Hume +entertained a dislike, mingled with contempt, which was as nearly +rancorous as any emotion of his could be. During his residence in Paris, +in 1764 and 1765, he writes to Blair:-- + + "The taste for literature is neither decayed nor depraved here, as + with the barbarians who inhabit the banks of the Thames." + +And he speaks of the "general regard paid to genius and learning" in +France as one of the points in which it most differs from England. Ten +years later, he cannot even thank Gibbon for his History without the +left-handed compliment, that he should never have expected such an +excellent work from the pen of an Englishman. Early in 1765, Hume writes +to Millar:-- + + "The rage and prejudice of parties frighten me, and above all, this + rage against the Scots, which is so dishonourable, and indeed so + infamous, to the English nation. We hear that it increases every + day without the least appearance of provocation on our part. It has + frequently made me resolve never in my life to set foot on English + ground. I dread, if I should undertake a more modern history, the + impertinence and ill-manners to which it would expose me; and I was + willing to know from you whether former prejudices had so far + subsided as to ensure me of a good reception." + +His fears were kindly appeased by Millar's assurance that the English +were not prejudiced against the Scots in general, but against the +particular Scot, Lord Bute, who was supposed to be the guide, +philosopher, and friend, of both Dowager Queen and King. + +To care nothing about literature, to dislike Scotchmen, and to be +insensible to the merits of David Hume, was a combination of iniquities +on the part of the English nation, which would have been amply +sufficient to ruffle the temper of the philosophic historian, who, +without being foolishly vain, had certainly no need of what has been +said to be the one form of prayer in which his countrymen, torn as they +are by theological differences, agree; "Lord! gie us a gude conceit o' +oursels." But when, to all this, these same Southrons added a passionate +admiration for Lord Chatham, who was in Hume's eyes a charlatan; and +filled up the cup of their abominations by cheering for "Wilkes and +Liberty," Hume's wrath knew no bounds, and, between 1768 and 1770, he +pours a perfect Jeremiad into the bosom of his friend Sir Gilbert +Elliot. + + "Oh! how I long to see America and the East Indies revolted, + totally and finally--the revenue reduced to half--public credit + fully discredited by bankruptcy--the third of London in ruins, and + the rascally mob subdued! I think I am not too old to despair of + being witness to all these blessings. + + "I am delighted to see the daily and hourly progress of madness and + folly and wickedness in England. The consummation of these + qualities are the true ingredients for making a fine narrative in + history, especially if followed by some signal and ruinous + convulsion--as I hope will soon be the case with that pernicious + people!" + +Even from the secure haven of James's Court, the maledictions continue +to pour forth:-- + + "Nothing but a rebellion and bloodshed will open the eyes of that + deluded people; though were they alone concerned, I think it is no + matter what becomes of them.... Our government has become a + chimera, and is too perfect, in point of liberty, for so rude a + beast as an Englishman; who is a man, a bad animal too, corrupted + by above a century of licentiousness. The misfortune is that this + liberty can scarcely be retrenched without danger of being entirely + lost; at least the fatal effects of licentiousness must first be + made palpable by some extreme mischief resulting from it. I may + wish that the catastrophe should rather fall on our posterity, but + it hastens on with such large strides as to leave little room for + hope. + + I am running over again the last edition of my History, in order to + correct it still further. I either soften or expunge many + villainous seditious Whig strokes which had crept into it. I wish + that my indignation at the present madness, encouraged by lies, + calumnies, imposture, and every infamous act usual among popular + leaders, may not throw me into the opposite extreme." + +A wise wish, indeed. Posterity respectfully concurs therein; and +subjects Hume's estimate of England and things English to such +modifications as it would probably have undergone had the wish been +fulfilled. + +In 1775, Hume's health began to fail; and, in the spring of the +following year, his disorder, which appears to have been hæmorrhage of +the bowels, attained such a height that he knew it must be fatal. So he +made his will, and wrote _My Own Life_, the conclusion of which is one +of the most cheerful, simple, and dignified leave-takings of life and +all its concerns, extant. + + "I now reckon upon a speedy dissolution. I have suffered very + little pain from my disorder; and what is more strange, have, + notwithstanding the great decline of my person, never suffered a + moment's abatement of spirits; insomuch that were I to name the + period of my life which I should most choose to pass over again, I + might be tempted to point to this later period. I possess the same + ardour as ever in study and the same gaiety in company; I consider, + besides, that a man of sixty-five, by dying, cuts off only a few + years of infirmities; and though I see many symptoms of my literary + reputation's breaking out at last with additional lustre, I know + that I could have but few years to enjoy it. It is difficult to be + more detached from life than I am at present. + + "To conclude historically with my own character, I am, or rather + was (for that is the style I must now use in speaking of myself, + which emboldens me the more to speak my sentiments); I was, I say, + a man of mild dispositions, of command of temper, of an open, + social, and cheerful humour, capable of attachment, but little + susceptible of enmity, and of great moderation in all my passions. + Even my love of literary fame, my ruling passion, never soured my + temper, notwithstanding my frequent disappointments. My company was + not unacceptable to the young and careless, as well as to the + studious and literary; and as I took a particular pleasure in the + company of modest women, I had no reason to be displeased with the + reception I met with from them. In a word, though most men any wise + eminent, have found reason to complain of calumny, I never was + touched or even attacked by her baleful tooth; and though I + wantonly exposed myself to the rage of both civil and religious + factions, they seemed to be disarmed in my behalf of their wonted + fury. My friends never had occasion to vindicate any one + circumstance of my character and conduct; not but that the zealots, + we may well suppose, would have been glad to invent and propagate + any story to my disadvantage, but they could never find any which + they thought would wear the face of probability. I cannot say there + is no vanity in making this funeral oration of myself, but I hope + it is not a misplaced one; and this is a matter of fact which is + easily cleared and ascertained." + +Hume died in Edinburgh on the 25th of August, 1776, and, a few days +later, his body, attended by a great concourse of people, who seem to +have anticipated for it the fate appropriate to the remains of wizards +and necromancers, was deposited in a spot selected by himself, in an old +burial-ground on the eastern slope of the Calton Hill. + +From the summit of this hill, there is a prospect unequalled by any to +be seen from the midst of a great city. Westward lies the Forth, and +beyond it, dimly blue, the far away Highland hills; eastward, rise the +bold contours of Arthur's Seat and the rugged crags of the Castle rock, +with the grey Old Town of Edinburgh; while, far below, from a maze of +crowded thoroughfares, the hoarse murmur of the toil of a polity of +energetic men is borne upon the ear. At times, a man may be as solitary +here as in a veritable wilderness; and may meditate undisturbedly upon +the epitome of nature and of man--the kingdoms of this world--spread out +before him. + +Surely, there is a fitness in the choice of this last resting-place by +the philosopher and historian, who saw so clearly that these two +kingdoms form but one realm, governed by uniform laws and alike based on +impenetrable darkness and eternal silence: and faithful to the last to +that profound veracity which was the secret of his philosophic +greatness, he ordered that the simple Roman tomb which marks his grave +should bear no inscription but + + + DAVID HUME + + BORN 1711. DIED 1776. + + _Leaving it to posterity to add the rest._ + + +It was by the desire and at the suggestion of my friend, the Editor of +this Series, that I undertook to attempt to help posterity in the +difficult business of knowing what to add to Hume's epitaph; and I +might, with justice, throw upon him the responsibility of my apparent +presumption in occupying a place among the men of letters, who are +engaged with him, in their proper function of writing about English Men +of Letters. + +That to which succeeding generations have made, are making, and will +make, continual additions, however, is Hume's fame as a philosopher; +and, though I know that my plea will add to my offence in some quarters, +I must plead, in extenuation of my audacity, that philosophy lies in the +province of science, and not in that of letters. + +In dealing with Hume's Life, I have endeavoured, as far as possible, to +make him speak for himself. If the extracts from his letters and essays +which I have given do not sufficiently show what manner of man he was, +I am sure that nothing I could say would make the case plainer. In the +exposition of Hume's philosophy which follows, I have pursued the same +plan, and I have applied myself to the task of selecting and arranging +in systematic order, the passages which appeared to me to contain the +clearest statements of Hume's opinions. + +I should have been glad to be able to confine myself to this duty, and +to limit my own comments to so much as was absolutely necessary to +connect my excerpts. Here and there, however, it must be confessed that +more is seen of my thread than of Hume's beads. My excuse must be an +ineradicable tendency to try to make things clear; while, I may further +hope, that there is nothing in what I may have said, which is +inconsistent with the logical development of Hume's principles. + +My authority for the facts of Hume's life is the admirable biography, +published in 1846, by Mr. John Hill Burton. The edition of Hume's works +from which all citations are made is that published by Black and Tait in +Edinburgh, in 1826. In this edition, the Essays are reprinted from the +edition of 1777, corrected by the author for the press a short time +before his death. It is well printed in four handy volumes; and as my +copy has long been in my possession, and bears marks of much reading, it +would have been troublesome for me to refer to any other. But, for the +convenience of those who possess some other edition, the following table +of the contents of the edition of 1826, with the paging of the four +volumes, is given:-- + + + VOLUME I. + + TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE. + + Book I. _Of the Understanding_, p. 5 to the end, p. 347. + + + VOLUME II. + + TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE. + + Book II. _Of the Passions_, p. 3-p. 215. + + Book III. _Of Morals_, p. 219-p. 415. + + DIALOGUES CONCERNING NATURAL RELIGION, p. 419-p. 548. + + APPENDIX TO THE TREATISE, p. 551-p. 560. + + + VOLUME III. + + ESSAYS, MORAL AND POLITICAL, p. 3-p. 282. + + POLITICAL DISCOURSES, p. 285-p. 579. + + + VOLUME IV. + + AN INQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, p. 3-p. 233. + + AN INQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS, p. 237-p. 431. + + THE NATURAL HISTORY OF RELIGION, p. 435-p. 513. + + ADDITIONAL ESSAYS, p. 517-p. 577. + + +As the volume and the page of the volume are given in my references, it +will be easy, by the help of this table, to learn where to look for any +passage cited, in differently arranged editions. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[8] "Pneumatic philosophy" must not be confounded with the theory of +elastic fluids; though, as Scottish chairs have, before now, combined +natural with civil history, the mistake would be pardonable. + +[9] Burton's _Life of David Hume_, i. p. 354. + +[10] Lord Macaulay, Article on History, _Edinburgh Review_, vol. lxvii. + +[11] Letter to Clephane, 3rd September, 1757. + +[12] "You must know that Lord Hertford has so high a character for +piety, that his taking me by the hand is a kind of regeneration to me, +and all past offences are now wiped off. But all these views are +trifling to one of my age and temper."--_Hume to Edmonstone_, 9th +January, 1764. Lord Hertford had procured him a pension of £200 a year +for life from the King, and the secretaryship was worth £1000 a year. + +[13] Madame d'Epinay gives a ludicrous account of Hume's performance +when pressed into a _tableau_, as a Sultan between two slaves, +personated for the occasion by two of the prettiest women in Paris:-- + +"Il les regarde attentivement, _il se frappe le ventre_ et les genoux à +plusieurs reprises et ne trouve jamais autre chose à leur dire que _Eh +bien! mes demoiselles.--Eh bien! vous voilà donc.... Eh bien! vous voilà +... vous voilà ici?_ Cette phrase dura un quart d'heure sans qu'il pût +en sortir. Une d'elles se leva d'impatience: Ah, dit-elle, je m'en étois +bien doutée, cet homme n'est bon qu'à manger du veau!"--Burton's _Life +of Hume_, vol. ii. p. 224. + + + + +PART II. + +_HUME'S PHILOSOPHY._ + + + + +CHAPTER I. + +THE OBJECT AND SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY. + + +Kant has said that the business of philosophy is to answer three +questions: What can I know? What ought I to do? and For what may I hope? +But it is pretty plain that these three resolve themselves, in the long +run, into the first. For rational expectation and moral action are alike +based upon beliefs; and a belief is void of justification, unless its +subject-matter lies within the boundaries of possible knowledge, and +unless its evidence satisfies the conditions which experience imposes as +the guarantee of credibility. + +Fundamentally, then, philosophy is the answer to the question, What can +I know? and it is by applying itself to this problem, that philosophy is +properly distinguished as a special department of scientific research. +What is commonly called science, whether mathematical, physical, or +biological, consists of the answers which mankind have been able to +give to the inquiry, What do I know? They furnish us with the results of +the mental operations which constitute thinking; while philosophy, in +the stricter sense of the term, inquires into the foundation of the +first principles which those operations assume or imply. + +But though, by reason of the special purpose of philosophy, its +distinctness from other branches of scientific investigation may be +properly vindicated, it is easy to see that, from the nature of its +subject-matter, it is intimately and, indeed, inseparably connected with +one branch of science. For it is obviously impossible to answer the +question, What can we know? unless, in the first place, there is a clear +understanding as to what is meant by knowledge; and, having settled this +point, the next step is to inquire how we come by that which we allow to +be knowledge; for, upon the reply, turns the answer to the further +question, whether, from the nature of the case, there are limits to the +knowable or not. While, finally, inasmuch as What can I know? not only +refers to knowledge of the past or of the present, but to the confident +expectation which we call knowledge of the future; it is necessary to +ask, further, what justification can be alleged for trusting to the +guidance of our expectations in practical conduct. + +It surely needs no argumentation to show, that the first problem cannot +be approached without the examination of the contents of the mind; and +the determination of how much of these contents may be called knowledge. +Nor can the second problem be dealt with in any other fashion; for it is +only by the observation of the growth of knowledge that we can +rationally hope to discover how knowledge grows. But the solution of +the third problem simply involves the discussion of the data obtained +by the investigation of the foregoing two. + +Thus, in order to answer three out of the four subordinate questions +into which What can I know? breaks up, we must have recourse to that +investigation of mental phenomena, the results of which are embodied in +the science of psychology. + +Psychology is a part of the science of life or biology, which differs +from the other branches of that science, merely in so far as it deals +with the psychical, instead of the physical, phenomena of life. + +As there is an anatomy of the body, so there is an anatomy of the mind; +the psychologist dissects mental phenomena into elementary states of +consciousness, as the anatomist resolves limbs into tissues, and tissues +into cells. The one traces the development of complex organs from simple +rudiments; the other follows the building up of complex conceptions out +of simpler constituents of thought. As the physiologist inquires into +the way in which the so-called "functions" of the body are performed, so +the psychologist studies the so-called "faculties" of the mind. Even a +cursory attention to the ways and works of the lower animals suggests a +comparative anatomy and physiology of the mind; and the doctrine of +evolution presses for application as much in the one field as in the +other. + +But there is more than a parallel, there is a close and intimate +connexion between psychology and physiology. No one doubts that, at any +rate, some mental states are dependent for their existence on the +performance of the functions of particular bodily organs. There is no +seeing without eyes, and no hearing without ears. If the origin of the +contents of the mind is truly a philosophical problem, then the +philosopher who attempts to deal with that problem, without acquainting +himself with the physiology of sensation, has no more intelligent +conception of his business than the physiologist, who thinks he can +discuss locomotion, without an acquaintance with the principles of +mechanics; or respiration, without some tincture of chemistry. + +On whatever ground we term physiology, science, psychology is entitled +to the same appellation; and the method of investigation which +elucidates the true relations of the one set of phenomena will discover +those of the other. Hence, as philosophy is, in great measure, the +exponent of the logical consequences of certain data established by +psychology; and as psychology itself differs from physical science only +in the nature of its subject-matter, and not in its method of +investigation, it would seem to be an obvious conclusion, that +philosophers are likely to be successful in their inquiries, in +proportion as they are familiar with the application of scientific +method to less abstruse subjects; just as it seems to require no +elaborate demonstration, that an astronomer, who wishes to comprehend +the solar system, would do well to acquire a preliminary acquaintance +with the elements of physics. And it is accordant with this presumption, +that the men who have made the most important positive additions to +philosophy, such as Descartes, Spinoza, and Kant, not to mention more +recent examples, have been deeply imbued with the spirit of physical +science; and, in some cases, such as those of Descartes and Kant, have +been largely acquainted with its details. On the other hand, the founder +of Positivism no less admirably illustrates the connexion of scientific +incapacity with philosophical incompetence. In truth, the laboratory is +the fore-court of the temple of philosophy; and whoso has not offered +sacrifices and undergone purification there, has little chance of +admission into the sanctuary. + +Obvious as these considerations may appear to be, it would be wrong to +ignore the fact that their force is by no means universally admitted. On +the contrary, the necessity for a proper psychological and physiological +training to the student of philosophy is denied, on the one hand, by the +"pure metaphysicians," who attempt to base the theory of knowing upon +supposed necessary and universal truths, and assert that scientific +observation is impossible unless such truths are already known or +implied: which, to those who are not "pure metaphysicians," seems very +much as if one should say that the fall of a stone cannot be observed, +unless the law of gravitation is already in the mind of the observer. + +On the other hand, the Positivists, so far as they accept the teachings +of their master, roundly assert, at any rate in words, that observation +of the mind is a thing inherently impossible in itself, and that +psychology is a chimera--a phantasm generated by the fermentation of the +dregs of theology. Nevertheless, if M. Comte had been asked what he +meant by "physiologic cérebrale," except that which other people call +"psychology;" and how he knew anything about the functions of the brain, +except by that very "observation intérieure," which he declares to be an +absurdity--it seems probable that he would have found it hard to escape +the admission, that, in vilipending psychology, he had been propounding +solemn nonsense. + +It is assuredly one of Hume's greatest merits that he clearly recognised +the fact that philosophy is based upon psychology; and that the inquiry +into the contents and the operations of the mind must be conducted upon +the same principles as a physical investigation, if what he calls the +"moral philosopher" would attain results of as firm and definite a +character as those which reward the "natural philosopher."[14] The title +of his first work, a "_Treatise of Human Nature, being an Attempt to +introduce the Experimental method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects_," +sufficiently indicates the point of view from which Hume regarded +philosophical problems; and he tells us in the preface, that his object +has been to promote the construction of a "science of man." + + "'Tis evident that all the sciences have a relation, greater or + less, to human nature; and that, however wide any of them may seem + to run from it, they still return back by one passage or another. + Even _Mathematics_, _Natural Philosophy_, and _Natural Religion_ + are in some measure dependent on the science of MAN; since they lie + under the cognizance of men, and are judged of by their powers and + qualities. 'Tis impossible to tell what changes and improvements we + might make in these sciences were we thoroughly acquainted with the + extent and force of human understanding, and could explain the + nature of the ideas we employ and of the operations we perform in + our reasonings.... To me it seems evident that the essence of mind + being equally unknown to us with that of external bodies, it must + be equally impossible to form any notion of its powers and + qualities otherwise than from careful and exact experiments, and + the observation of those particular effects which result from its + different circumstances and situations. And though we must + endeavour to render all our principles as universal as possible, by + tracing up our experiments to the utmost, and explaining all + effects from the simplest and fewest causes, 'tis still certain we + cannot go beyond experience; and any hypothesis that pretends to + discover the ultimate original qualities of human nature, ought at + first to be rejected as presumptuous and chimerical.... + + "But if this impossibility of explaining ultimate principles should + be esteemed a defect in the science of man, I will venture to + affirm, that it is a defect common to it with all the sciences, and + all the arts, in which we can employ ourselves, whether they be + such as are cultivated in the schools of the philosophers, or + practised in the shops of the meanest artisans. None of them can go + beyond experience, or establish any principles which are not + founded on that authority. Moral philosophy has, indeed, this + peculiar disadvantage, which is not found in natural, that in + collecting its experiments, it cannot make them purposely, with + premeditation, and after such a manner as to satisfy itself + concerning every particular difficulty which may arise. When I am + at a loss to know the effects of one body upon another in any + situation, I need only put them in that situation, and observe what + results from it. But should I endeavour to clear up in the same + manner any[15] doubt in moral philosophy, by placing myself in the + same case with that which I consider, 'tis evident this reflection + and premeditation would so disturb the operation of my natural + principles, as must render it impossible to form any just + conclusion from the phenomenon. We must, therefore, glean up our + experiments in this science from a cautious observation of human + life, and take them as they appear in the common course of the + world, by men's behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their + pleasures. Where experiments of this kind are judiciously collected + and compared, we may hope to establish on them a science which + will not be inferior in certainty, and will be much superior in + utility, to any other of human comprehension."--(I. pp. 7-11.) + +All science starts with hypotheses--in other words, with assumptions +that are unproved, while they may be, and often are, erroneous; but +which are better than nothing to the seeker after order in the maze of +phenomena. And the historical progress of every science depends on the +criticism of hypotheses--on the gradual stripping off, that is, of their +untrue or superfluous parts--until there remains only that exact verbal +expression of as much as we know of the fact, and no more, which +constitutes a perfect scientific theory. + +Philosophy has followed the same course as other branches of scientific +investigation. The memorable service rendered to the cause of sound +thinking by Descartes consisted in this: that he laid the foundation of +modern philosophical criticism by his inquiry into the nature of +certainty. It is a clear result of the investigation started by +Descartes, that there is one thing of which no doubt can be entertained, +for he who should pretend to doubt it would thereby prove its existence; +and that is the momentary consciousness we call a present thought or +feeling; that is safe, even if all other kinds of certainty are merely +more or less probable inferences. Berkeley and Locke, each in his way, +applied philosophical criticism in other directions; but they always, at +any rate professedly, followed the Cartesian maxim of admitting no +propositions to be true but such as are clear, distinct, and evident, +even while their arguments stripped off many a layer of hypothetical +assumption which their great predecessor had left untouched. No one has +more clearly stated the aims of the critical philosopher than Locke, in +a passage of the famous _Essay concerning Human Understanding_, which, +perhaps, I ought to assume to be well known to all English readers, but +which so probably is unknown to this full-crammed and much examined +generation that I venture to cite it: + + "If by this inquiry into the nature of the understanding I can + discover the powers thereof, how far they reach, to what things + they are in any degree proportionate, and where they fail us, I + suppose it may be of use to prevail with the busy mind of man to be + more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehension: + to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether; and to sit + down in quiet ignorance of those things which, upon examination, + are proved to be beyond the reach of our capacities. We should not + then, perhaps, be so forward, out of an affectation of universal + knowledge, to raise questions and perplex ourselves and others with + disputes about things to which our understandings are not suited, + and of which we cannot frame in our minds any clear and distinct + perception, or whereof (as it has, perhaps, too often happened) we + have not any notion at all.... Men may find matter sufficient to + busy their heads and employ their hands with variety, delight, and + satisfaction, if they will not boldly quarrel with their own + constitution and throw away the blessings their hands are filled + with because they are not big enough to grasp everything. We shall + not have much reason to complain of the narrowness of our minds, if + we will but employ them about what may be of use to us: for of that + they are very capable: and it will be an unpardonable, as well as a + childish peevishness, if we under-value the advantages of our + knowledge, and neglect to improve it to the ends for which it was + given us, because there are some things that are set out of the + reach of it. It will be no excuse to an idle and untoward servant + who would not attend to his business by candlelight, to plead that + he had not broad sunshine. The candle that is set up in us shines + bright enough for all our purposes.... Our business here is not to + know all things, but those which concern our conduct."[16] + +Hume develops the same fundamental conception in a somewhat different +way, and with a more definite indication of the practical benefits which +may be expected from a critical philosophy. The first and second parts +of the twelfth section of the _Inquiry_ are devoted to a condemnation of +excessive scepticism, or Pyrrhonism, with which Hume couples a +caricature of the Cartesian doubt; but, in the third part, a certain +"mitigated scepticism" is recommended and adopted, under the title of +"academical philosophy." After pointing out that a knowledge of the +infirmities of the human understanding, even in its most perfect state, +and when most accurate and cautious in its determinations, is the best +check upon the tendency to dogmatism, Hume continues:-- + + "Another species of _mitigated_ scepticism, which may be of + advantage to mankind, and which maybe the natural result of the + PYRRHONIAN doubts and scruples, is the limitation of our inquiries + to such subjects as are best adapted to the narrow capacity of + human understanding. The _imagination_ of man is naturally sublime, + delighted with whatever is remote and extraordinary, and running, + without control, into the most distant parts of space and time in + order to avoid the objects which custom has rendered too familiar + to it. A correct _judgment_ observes a contrary method, and, + avoiding all distant and high inquiries, confines itself to common + life, and to such subjects as fall under daily practice and + experience; leaving the more sublime topics to the embellishment of + poets and orators, or to the arts of priests and politicians. To + bring us to so salutary a determination, nothing can be more + serviceable than to be once thoroughly convinced of the force of + the PYRRHONIAN doubt, and of the impossibility that anything but + the strong power of natural instinct could free us from it. Those + who have a propensity to philosophy will still continue their + researches; because they reflect, that, besides the immediate + pleasure attending such an occupation, philosophical decisions are + nothing but the reflections of common life, methodised and + corrected. But they will never be tempted to go beyond common life, + so long as they consider the imperfection of those faculties which + they employ, their narrow reach, and their inaccurate operations. + While we cannot give a satisfactory reason why we believe, after a + thousand experiments, that a stone will fall or fire burn; can we + ever satisfy ourselves concerning any determination which we may + form with regard to the origin of worlds and the situation of + nature from and to eternity?"--(IV. pp. 189--90.) + +But further, it is the business of criticism not only to keep watch over +the vagaries of philosophy, but to do the duty of police in the whole +world of thought. Wherever it espies sophistry or superstition they are +to be bidden to stand; nay, they are to be followed to their very dens +and there apprehended and exterminated, as Othello smothered Desdemona, +"else she'll betray more men." + +Hume warms into eloquence as he sets forth the labours meet for the +strength and the courage of the Hercules of "mitigated scepticism." + + "Here, indeed, lies the justest and most plausible objection + against a considerable part of metaphysics, that they are not + properly a science, but arise either from the fruitless efforts of + human vanity, which would penetrate into subjects utterly + inaccessible to the understanding, or from the craft of popular + superstitions, which, being unable to defend themselves on fair + ground, raise these entangling brambles to cover and protect their + weakness. Chased from the open country, these robbers fly into the + forest, and lie in wait to break in upon every unguarded avenue of + the mind and overwhelm it with religious fears and prejudices. The + stoutest antagonist, if he remits his watch a moment, is oppressed; + and many, through cowardice and folly, open the gates to the + enemies, and willingly receive them with reverence and submission + as their legal sovereigns. + + "But is this a sufficient reason why philosophers should desist + from such researches and leave superstition still in possession of + her retreat? Is it not proper to draw an opposite conclusion, and + perceive the necessity of carrying the war into the most secret + recesses of the enemy?... The only method of freeing learning at + once from these abstruse questions, is to inquire seriously into + the nature of human understanding, and show, from an exact analysis + of its powers and capacity, that it is by no means fitted for such + remote and abstruse subjects. We must submit to this fatigue, in + order to live at ease ever after; and must cultivate true + metaphysics with some care, in order to destroy the false and + adulterated."--(IV. pp. 10, 11.) + +Near a century and a half has elapsed since these brave words were +shaped by David Hume's pen; and the business of carrying the war into +the enemy's camp has gone on but slowly. Like other campaigns, it long +languished for want of a good base of operations. But since physical +science, in the course of the last fifty years, has brought to the front +an inexhaustible supply of heavy artillery of a new pattern, warranted +to drive solid bolts of fact through the thickest skulls, things are +looking better; though hardly more than the first faint flutterings of +the dawn of the happy day, when superstition and false metaphysics shall +be no more and reasonable folks may "live at ease," are as yet +discernible by the _enfants perdus_ of the outposts. + +If, in thus conceiving the object and the limitations of philosophy, +Hume shows himself the spiritual child and continuator of the work of +Locke, he appears no less plainly as the parent of Kant and as the +protagonist of that more modern way of thinking, which has been called +"agnosticism," from its profession of an incapacity to discover the +indispensable conditions of either positive or negative knowledge, in +many propositions, respecting which, not only the vulgar, but +philosophers of the more sanguine sort, revel in the luxury of +unqualified assurance. + +The aim of the _Kritik der reinen Vernunft_ is essentially the same as +that of the _Treatise of Human Nature_, by which indeed Kant was led to +develop that "critical philosophy" with which his name and fame are +indissolubly bound up: and, if the details of Kant's criticism differ +from those of Hume, they coincide with them in their main result, which +is the limitation of all knowledge of reality to the world of phenomena +revealed to us by experience. + +The philosopher of Königsberg epitomises the philosopher of Ninewells +when he thus sums up the uses of philosophy:-- + + "The greatest and perhaps the sole use of all philosophy of pure + reason is, after all, merely negative, since it serves, not as an + organon for the enlargement [of knowledge], but as a discipline for + its delimitation; and instead of discovering truth, has only the + modest merit of preventing error."[17] + +FOOTNOTES: + +[14] In a letter to Hutcheson (September 17th, 1739) Hume +remarks:--"There are different ways of examining the mind as well as the +body. One may consider it either as an anatomist or as a painter: either +to discover its most secret springs and principles, or to describe the +grace and beauty of its actions;" and he proceeds to justify his own +mode of looking at the moral sentiments from the anatomist's point of +view. + +[15] The manner in which Hume constantly refers to the results of the +observation of the contents and the processes of his own mind clearly +shows that he has here inadvertently overstated the case. + +[16] Locke, _An Essay concerning Human Understanding_, Book I, chap. i, +§§ 4, 5, 6. + +[17] _Kritik der reinen Vernunft._ Ed. Hartenstein, p. 256. + + + + +CHAPTER II. + +THE CONTENTS OF THE MIND. + + +In the language of common life, the "mind" is spoken of as an entity, +independent of the body, though resident in and closely connected with +it, and endowed with numerous "faculties," such as sensibility, +understanding, memory, volition, which stand in the same relation to the +mind as the organs do to the body, and perform the functions of feeling, +reasoning, remembering, and willing. Of these functions, some, such as +sensation, are supposed to be merely passive--that is, they are called +into existence by impressions, made upon the sensitive faculty by a +material world of real objects, of which our sensations are supposed to +give us pictures; others, such as the memory and the reasoning faculty, +are considered to be partly passive and partly active; while volition is +held to be potentially, if not always actually, a spontaneous activity. + +The popular classification and terminology of the phenomena of +consciousness, however, are by no means the first crude conceptions +suggested by common sense, but rather a legacy, and, in many respects, a +sufficiently _damnosa hæreditas_, of ancient philosophy, more or less +leavened by theology; which has incorporated itself with the common +thought of later times, as the vices of the aristocracy of one age +become those of the mob in the next. Very little attention to what +passes in the mind is sufficient to show, that these conceptions involve +assumptions of an extremely hypothetical character. And the first +business of the student of psychology is to get rid of such +prepossessions; to form conceptions of mental phenomena as they are +given us by observation, without any hypothetical admixture, or with +only so much as is definitely recognised and held subject to +confirmation or otherwise; to classify these phenomena according to +their clearly recognisable characters; and to adopt a nomenclature which +suggests nothing beyond the results of observation. Thus chastened, +observation of the mind makes us acquainted with nothing but certain +events, facts, or phenomena (whichever name be preferred) which pass +over the inward field of view in rapid and, as it may appear on careless +inspection, in disorderly succession, like the shifting patterns of a +kaleidoscope. To all these mental phenomena, or states of our +consciousness,[18] Descartes gave the name of "thoughts,"[19] while +Locke and Berkeley termed them "ideas." Hume, regarding this as an +improper use of the word "idea," for which he proposes another +employment, gives the general name of "perceptions" to all states of +consciousness. Thus, whatever other signification we may see reason to +attach to the word "mind," it is certain that it is a name which is +employed to denote a series of perceptions; just as the word "tune," +whatever else it may mean, denotes, in the first place, a succession of +musical notes. Hume, indeed, goes further than others when he says +that-- + + "What we call a mind is nothing but a heap or collection of + different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and + supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with a perfect simplicity + and identity."--(I. p. 268.) + +With this "nothing but," however, he obviously falls into the primal and +perennial error of philosophical speculators--dogmatising from negative +arguments. He may be right or wrong; but the most he, or anybody else, +can prove in favour of his conclusion is, that we know nothing more of +the mind than that it is a series of perceptions. Whether there is +something in the mind that lies beyond the reach of observation; or +whether perceptions themselves are the products of something which can +be observed and which is not mind; are questions which can in nowise be +settled by direct observation. Elsewhere, the objectionable hypothetical +element of the definition of mind is less prominent:-- + + "The true idea of the human mind is to consider it as a system of + different perceptions, or different existences, which are linked + together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, + destroy, influence and modify each other.... In this respect I + cannot compare the soul more properly to anything than a republic + or commonwealth, in which the several members are united by the + reciprocal ties of government and subordination, and give rise to + other persons who propagate the same republic in the incessant + changes of its parts."--(I. p. 331). + +But, leaving the question of the proper definition of mind open for the +present, it is further a matter of direct observation, that, when we +take a general survey of all our perceptions or states of consciousness, +they naturally fall into sundry groups or classes. Of these classes, two +are distinguished by Hume as of primary importance. All "perceptions," +he says, are either "_Impressions_" or "_Ideas_." + +Under "impressions" he includes "all our more lively perceptions, when +we hear, see, feel, love, or will;" in other words, "all our sensations, +passions, and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul" +(I. p. 15). + +"Ideas," on the other hand, are the faint images of impressions in +thinking and reasoning, or of antecedent ideas. + +Both impressions and ideas may be either _simple_, when they are +incapable of further analysis, or _complex_, when they may be resolved +into simpler constituents. All simple ideas are exact copies of +impressions; but, in complex ideas, the arrangement of simple +constituents may be different from that of the impressions of which +those simple ideas are copies. + +Thus the colours red and blue and the odour of a rose, are simple +impressions; while the ideas of blue, of red, and of rose-odour are +simple copies of these impressions. But a red rose gives us a complex +impression, capable of resolution into the simple impressions of red +colour, rose-scent, and numerous others; and we may have a complex idea, +which is an accurate, though faint, copy of this complex impression. +Once in possession of the ideas of a red rose and of the colour blue, we +may, in imagination, substitute blue for red; and thus obtain a complex +idea of a blue rose, which is not an actual copy of any complex +impression, though all its elements are such copies. + +Hume has been criticised for making the distinction of impressions and +ideas to depend upon their relative strength or vivacity. Yet it would +be hard to point out any other character by which the things signified +can be distinguished. Any one who has paid attention to the curious +subject of what are called "subjective sensations" will be familiar with +examples of the extreme difficulty which sometimes attends the +discrimination of ideas of sensation from impressions of sensation, when +the ideas are very vivid, or the impressions are faint. Who has not +"fancied" he heard a noise; or has not explained inattention to a real +sound by saying, "I thought it was nothing but my fancy"? Even healthy +persons are much more liable to both visual and auditory spectra--that +is, ideas of vision and sound so vivid that they are taken for new +impressions--than is commonly supposed; and, in some diseased states, +ideas of sensible objects may assume all the vividness of reality. + +If ideas are nothing but copies of impressions, arranged, either in the +same order as that of the impressions from which they are derived, or in +a different order, it follows that the ultimate analysis of the contents +of the mind turns upon that of the impressions. According to Hume, +these are of two kinds: either they are impressions of sensation, or +they are impressions of reflection. The former are those afforded by the +five senses, together with pleasure and pain. The latter are the +passions or the emotions (which Hume employs as equivalent terms). Thus +the elementary states of consciousness, the raw materials of knowledge, +so to speak, are either sensations or emotions; and whatever we discover +in the mind, beyond these elementary states of consciousness, results +from the combinations and the metamorphoses which they undergo. + +It is not a little strange that a thinker of Hume's capacity should have +been satisfied with the results of a psychological analysis which +regards some obvious compounds as elements, while it omits altogether a +most important class of elementary states. + +With respect to the former point, Spinoza's masterly examination of the +Passions in the third part of the _Ethics_ should have been known to +Hume.[20] But, if he had been acquainted with that wonderful piece of +psychological anatomy, he would have learned that the emotions and +passions are all complex states, arising from the close association of +ideas of pleasure or pain with other ideas; and, indeed, without going +to Spinoza, his own acute discussion of the passions leads to the same +result,[21] and is wholly inconsistent with his classification of those +mental states among the primary uncompounded materials of consciousness. + +If Hume's "impressions of reflection" are excluded from among the +primary elements of consciousness, nothing is left but the impressions +afforded by the five senses, with pleasure and pain. Putting aside the +muscular sense, which had not come into view in Hume's time, the +questions arise whether these are all the simple undecomposable +materials of thought? or whether others exist of which Hume takes no +cognizance. + +Kant answered the latter question in the affirmative, in the _Kritik der +reinen Vernunft_, and thereby made one of the greatest advances ever +effected in philosophy; though it must be confessed that the German +philosopher's exposition of his views is so perplexed in style, so +burdened with the weight of a cumbrous and uncouth scholasticism, that +it is easy to confound the unessential parts of his system with those +which are of profound importance. His baggage train is bigger than his +army, and the student who attacks him is too often led to suspect he has +won a position when he has only captured a mob of useless +camp-followers. + +In his _Principles of Psychology_, Mr. Herbert Spencer appears to me to +have brought out the essential truth which underlies Kant's doctrine in +a far clearer manner than any one else; but, for the purpose of the +present summary view of Hume's philosophy, it must suffice if I state +the matter in my own way, giving the broad outlines, without entering +into the details of a large and difficult discussion. + +When a red light flashes across the field of vision, there arises in the +mind an "impression of sensation"--which we call red. It appears to me +that this sensation, red, is a something which may exist altogether +independently of any other impression, or idea, as an individual +existence. It is perfectly conceivable that a sentient being should have +no sense but vision, and that he should have spent his existence in +absolute darkness, with the exception of one solitary flash of red +light. That momentary illumination would suffice to give him the +impression under consideration; and the whole content of his +consciousness might be that impression; and, if he were endowed with +memory, its idea. + +Such being the state of affairs, suppose a second flash of red light to +follow the first. If there were no memory of the latter, the state of +the mind on the second occasion would simply be a repetition of that +which occurred before. There would be merely another impression. + +But suppose memory to exist, and that an idea of the first impression is +generated; then, if the supposed sentient being were like ourselves, +there might arise in his mind two altogether new impressions. The one is +the feeling of the _succession_ of the two impressions, the other is the +feeling of their _similarity_. + +Yet a third case is conceivable. Suppose two flashes of red light to +occur together, then a third feeling might arise which is neither +succession nor similarity, but that which we call _co-existence_. + +These feelings, or their contraries, are the foundation of everything +that we call a relation. They are no more capable of being described +than sensations are; and, as it appears to me, they are as little +susceptible of analysis into simpler elements. Like simple tastes and +smells, or feelings of pleasure and pain, they are ultimate irresolvable +facts of conscious experience; and, if we follow the principle of Hume's +nomenclature, they must be called _impressions of relation_. But it must +be remembered, that they differ from the other impressions, in requiring +the pre-existence of at least two of the latter. Though devoid of the +slightest resemblance to the other impressions, they are, in a manner, +generated by them. In fact, we may regard them as a kind of impressions +of impressions; or as the sensations of an inner sense, which takes +cognizance of the materials furnished to it by the outer senses. + +Hume failed as completely as his predecessors had done to recognise the +elementary character of impressions of relation; and, when he discusses +relations, he falls into a chaos of confusion and self-contradiction. + +In the _Treatise_, for example, (Book I., § iv.) resemblance, contiguity +in time and space, and cause and effect, are said to be the "uniting +principles among ideas," "the bond of union" or "associating quality by +which one idea naturally introduces another." Hume affirms that-- + + "These qualities produce an association among ideas, and upon the + appearance of one idea naturally introduce another." They are "the + principles of union or cohesion among our simple ideas, and, in + the imagination, supply the place of that inseparable connection by + which they are united in our memory. Here is a kind of + _attraction_, which, in the mental world, will be found to have as + extraordinary effects as in the natural, and to show itself in as + many and as various forms. Its effects are everywhere conspicuous; + but, as to its causes they are mostly unknown, and must be resolved + into _original_ qualities of human nature, which I pretend not to + explain."--(I. p. 29.) + +And at the end of this section Hume goes on to say-- + + "Amongst the effects of this union or association of ideas, there + are none more remarkable than those complex ideas which are the + common subjects of our thought and reasoning, and generally arise + from some principle of union among our simple ideas. These complex + ideas may be resolved into _relations_, _modes_, and + _substances_."--(_Ibid._) + +In the next section, which is devoted to _Relations_, they are spoken of +as qualities "by which two ideas are connected together in the +imagination," or "which make objects admit of comparison," and seven +kinds of relation are enumerated, namely, _resemblance_, _identity_, +_space and time_, _quantity or number_, _degrees of quality_, +_contrariety_, and _cause and effect_. + +To the reader of Hume, whose conceptions are usually so clear, definite, +and consistent, it is as unsatisfactory as it is surprising to meet with +so much questionable and obscure phraseology in a small space. One and +the same thing, for example, resemblance, is first called a "quality of +an idea," and secondly a "complex idea." Surely it cannot be both. Ideas +which have the qualities of "resemblance, contiguity, and cause and +effect," are said to "attract one another" (save the mark!), and so +become associated; though, in a subsequent part of the _Treatise_, +Hume's great effort is to prove that the relation of cause and effect is +a particular case of the process of association; that is to say, is a +result of the process of which it is supposed to be the cause. Moreover, +since, as Hume is never weary of reminding his readers, there is nothing +in ideas save copies of impressions, the qualities of resemblance, +contiguity, and so on, in the idea, must have existed in the impression +of which that idea is a copy; and therefore they must be either +sensations or emotions--from both of which classes they are excluded. + +In fact, in one place, Hume himself has an insight into the real nature +of relations. Speaking of equality, in the sense of a relation of +quantity, he says-- + + "Since equality is a relation, it is not, strictly speaking, a + property in the figures themselves, but arises merely from the + comparison which the mind makes between them."--(I. p. 70.) + +That is to say, when two impressions of equal figures are present, there +arises in the mind a _tertium quid_, which is the perception of +equality. On his own principles, Hume should therefore have placed this +"perception" among the ideas of reflection. However, as we have seen, he +expressly excludes everything but the emotions and the passions from +this group. + +It is necessary therefore to amend Hume's primary "geography of the +mind" by the excision of one territory and the addition of another; and +the elementary states of consciousness will stand thus:-- + + + A. IMPRESSIONS. + A. Sensations of + _a._ Smell. + _b._ Taste. + _c._ Hearing. + _d._ Sight. + _e._ Touch. + _f._ Resistance (the muscular sense). + B. Pleasure and Pain. + C. Relations. + _a._ Co-existence. + _b._ Succession. + _c._ Similarity and dissimilarity. + B. IDEAS. + Copies, or reproductions in memory, of the foregoing. + + +And now the question arises, whether any, and if so what, portion of +these contents of the mind are to be termed "knowledge." + +According to Locke, "Knowledge is the perception of the agreement or +disagreement of two ideas;" and Hume, though he does not say so in so +many words, tacitly accepts the definition. It follows, that neither +simple sensation, nor simple emotion, constitutes knowledge; but that, +when impressions of relation are added to these impressions, or their +ideas, knowledge arises; and that all knowledge is the knowledge of +likenesses and unlikenesses, co-existences and successions. + +It really matters very little in what sense terms are used, so long as +the same meaning is always rigidly attached to them; and, therefore, it +is hardly worth while to quarrel with this generally accepted, though +very arbitrary, limitation of the signification of "knowledge." But, on +the face of the matter, it is not obvious why the impression we call a +relation should have a better claim to the title of knowledge, than that +which we call a sensation or an emotion; and the restriction has this +unfortunate result, that it excludes all the most intense states of +consciousness from any claim to the title of "knowledge." + +For example, on this view, pain, so violent and absorbing as to exclude +all other forms of consciousness, is not knowledge; but becomes a part +of knowledge the moment we think of it in relation to another pain, or +to some other mental phenomenon. Surely this is somewhat inconvenient, +for there is only a verbal difference between having a sensation and +knowing one has it: they are simply two phrases for the same mental +state. + +But the "pure metaphysicians" make great capital out of the ambiguity. +For, starting with the assumption that all knowledge is the perception +of relations, and finding themselves, like mere common-sense folks, very +much disposed to call sensation knowledge, they at once gratify that +disposition and save their consistency, by declaring that even the +simplest act of sensation contains two terms and a relation--the +sensitive subject, the sensigenous object, and that masterful entity, +the Ego. From which great triad, as from a gnostic Trinity, emanates an +endless procession of other logical shadows and all the _Fata Morgana_ +of philosophical dreamland. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[18] "Consciousnesses" would be a better name, but it is awkward. I have +elsewhere proposed _psychoses_ as a substantive name for mental +phenomena. + +[19] As this has been denied, it may be as well to give Descartes's +words: "Par le mot de penser, j'entends tout ce que se fait dans nous de +telle sorte que nous l'apercevons immédiatement par nous-mêmes: c'est +pourquoi non-seulement entendre, vouloir, imaginer, mais aussi sentir, +c'est le même chose ici que penser."--_Principes de Philosophie_. Ed. +Cousin. 57. + +"Toutes les propriétés que nous trouvons en la chose qui pense ne sont +que des façons différentes de penser."--_Ibid._ 96. + +[20] On the whole, it is pleasant to find satisfactory evidence that +Hume knew nothing of the works of Spinoza; for the invariably abusive +manner in which he refers to that type of the philosophic hero is only +to be excused, if it is to be excused, by sheer ignorance of his life +and work. + +[21] For example, in discussing pride and humility, Hume says:-- + +"According as our idea of ourselves is more or less advantageous, we +feel either of these opposite affections, and are elated by pride or +dejected with humility ... when self enters not into the consideration +there is no room either for pride or humility." That is, pride is +pleasure, and humility is pain, associated with certain conceptions of +one's self; or, as Spinoza puts it:--"Superbia est de se præ amore sui +plus justo sentire" ("amor" being "lætitia concomitante idea causæ +externæ"); and "Humilitas est tristitia orta ex eo quod homo suam +impotentiam sive imbecillitatem contemplatur." + + + + +CHAPTER III. + +THE ORIGIN OF THE IMPRESSIONS. + + +Admitting that the sensations, the feelings of pleasure and pain, and +those of relation, are the primary irresolvable states of consciousness, +two further lines of investigation present themselves. The one leads us +to seek the origin of these "impressions;" the other, to inquire into +the nature of the steps by which they become metamorphosed into those +compound states of consciousness, which so largely enter into our +ordinary trains of thought. + +With respect to the origin of impressions of sensation, Hume is not +quite consistent with himself. In one place (I. p. 117) he says, that it +is impossible to decide "whether they arise immediately from the object, +or are produced by the creative power of the mind, or are derived from +the Author of our being," thereby implying that realism and idealism are +equally probable hypotheses. But, in fact, after the demonstration by +Descartes, that the immediate antecedents of sensations are changes in +the nervous system, with which our feelings have no sort of resemblance, +the hypothesis that sensations "arise immediately from the object" was +out of court; and that Hume fully admitted the Cartesian doctrine is +apparent when he says (I. p. 272):-- + + "All our perceptions are dependent on our organs and the + disposition of our nerves and animal spirits." + +And again, though in relation to another question, he observes:-- + + "There are three different kinds of impressions conveyed by the + senses. The first are those of the figure, bulk, motion, and + solidity of bodies. The second those of colours, tastes, smells, + sounds, heat, and cold. The third are the pains and pleasures that + arise from the application of objects to our bodies, as by the + cutting of our flesh with steel, and such like. Both philosophers + and the vulgar suppose the first of these to have a distinct + continued existence. The vulgar only regard the second as on the + same footing. Both philosophers and the vulgar again esteem the + third to be merely perceptions, and consequently interrupted and + dependent beings. + + "Now 'tis evident that, whatever may be our philosophical opinion, + colour, sounds, heat, and cold, as far as appears to the senses, + exist after the same manner with motion and solidity; and that the + difference we make between them, in this respect, arises not from + the mere perception. So strong is the prejudice for the distinct + continued existence of the former qualities, that when the contrary + opinion is advanced by modern philosophers, people imagine they can + almost refute it from their reason and experience, and that their + very senses contradict this philosophy. 'Tis also evident that + colours, sounds, &c., are originally on the same footing with the + pain that arises from steel, and pleasure that proceeds from a + fire; and that the difference betwixt them is founded neither on + perception nor reason, but on the imagination. For as they are + confessed to be, both of them, nothing but perceptions arising from + the particular configurations and motions of the parts of body, + wherein possibly can their difference consist? Upon the whole, + then, we may conclude that, as far as the senses are judges, all + perceptions are the same in the manner of their existence."--(I. p. + 250, 251.) + +The last words of this passage are as much Berkeley's as Hume's. But, +instead of following Berkeley in his deductions from the position thus +laid down, Hume, as the preceding citation shows, fully adopted the +conclusion to which all that we know of psychological physiology tends, +that the origin of the elements of consciousness, no less than that of +all its other states, is to be sought in bodily changes, the seat of +which can only be placed in the brain. And, as Locke had already done +with less effect, he states and refutes the arguments commonly brought +against the possibility of a causal connexion between the modes of +motion of the cerebral substance and states of consciousness, with great +clearness:-- + + "From these hypotheses concerning the _substance_ and _local + conjunction_ of our perceptions we may pass to another, which is + more intelligible than the former, and more important than the + latter, viz. concerning the _cause_ of our perceptions. Matter and + motion, 'tis commonly said in the schools, however varied, are + still matter and motion, and produce only a difference in the + position and situation of objects. Divide a body as often as you + please, 'tis still body. Place it in any figure, nothing ever + results but figure, or the relation of parts. Move it in any + manner, you still find motion or a change of relation. 'Tis absurd + to imagine that motion in a circle, for instance, should be nothing + but merely motion in a circle; while motion in another direction, + as in an ellipse, should also be a passion or moral reflection; + that the shocking of two globular particles should become a + sensation of pain, and that the meeting of the triangular ones + should afford a pleasure. Now as these different shocks and + variations and mixtures are the only changes of which matter is + susceptible, and as these never afford us any idea of thought or + perception, 'tis concluded to be impossible, that thought can ever + be caused by matter. + + "Few have been able to withstand the seeming evidence of this + argument; and yet nothing in the world is more easy than to refute + it. We need only reflect upon what has been proved at large, that + we are never sensible of any connexion between causes and effects, + and that 'tis only by our experience of their constant conjunction + we can arrive at any knowledge of this relation. Now, as all + objects which are not contrary are susceptible of a constant + conjunction, and as no real objects are contrary, I have inferred + from these principles (Part III. § 15) that, to consider the matter + _a priori_, anything may produce anything, and that we shall never + discover a reason why any object may or may not be the cause of any + other, however great, or however little, the resemblance may be + betwixt them. This evidently destroys the precedent reasoning, + concerning the cause of thought or perception. For though there + appear no manner of connection betwixt motion and thought, the case + is the same with all other causes and effects. Place one body of a + pound weight on one end of a lever, and another body of the same + weight on the other end; you will never find in these bodies any + principle of motion dependent on their distance from the centre, + more than of thought and perception. If you pretend, therefore, to + prove, _a priori_, that such a position of bodies can never cause + thought, because, turn it which way you will, it is nothing but a + position of bodies: you must, by the same course of reasoning, + conclude that it can never produce motion, since there is no more + apparent connection in the one than in the other. But, as this + latter conclusion is contrary to evident experience, and as 'tis + possible we may have a like experience in the operations of the + mind, and may perceive a constant conjunction of thought and + motion, you reason too hastily when, from the mere consideration of + the ideas, you conclude that 'tis impossible motion can ever + produce thought, or a different position of parts give rise to a + different passion or reflection. Nay, 'tis not only possible we may + have such an experience, but 'tis certain we have it; since every + one may perceive that the different dispositions of his body change + his thoughts and sentiments. And should it be said that this + depends on the union of soul and body, I would answer, that we must + separate the question concerning the substance of the mind from + that concerning the cause of its thought; and that, confining + ourselves to the latter question, we find, by the comparing their + ideas, that thought and motion are different from each other and by + experience, that they are constantly united; which, being all the + circumstances that enter into the idea of cause and effect, when + applied to the operations of matter, we may certainly conclude that + motion may be, and actually is, the cause of thought and + perception."--(I. pp. 314-316.) + +The upshot of all this is, that the "collection of perceptions," which +constitutes the mind, is really a system of effects, the causes of which +are to be sought in antecedent changes of the matter of the brain, just +as the "collection of motions," which we call flying, is a system of +effects, the causes of which are to be sought in the modes of motion of +the matter of the muscles of the wings. + +Hume, however, treats of this important topic only incidentally. He +seems to have had very little acquaintance even with such physiology as +was current in his time. At least, the only passage of his works, +bearing on this subject, with which I am acquainted, contains nothing +but a very odd version of the physiological views of Descartes:-- + + "When I received the relations of _resemblance_, _contiguity_, and + _causation_, as principles of union among ideas, without examining + into their causes, 'twas more in prosecution of my first maxim, + that we must in the end rest contented with experience, than for + want of something specious and plausible which I might have + displayed on that subject. 'Twould have been easy to have made an + imaginary dissection of the brain, and have shown why, upon our + conception of any idea, the animal spirits run into all the + contiguous traces and rouse up the other ideas that are related to + it. But though I have neglected any advantage which I might have + drawn from this topic in explaining the relations of ideas, I am + afraid I must here have recourse to it, in order to account for the + mistakes that arise from these relations. I shall therefore + observe, that as the mind is endowed with the power of exciting any + idea it pleases; whenever it despatches the spirits into that + region of the brain in which the idea is placed; these spirits + always excite the idea, when they run precisely into the proper + traces and rummage that cell which belongs to the idea. But as + their motion is seldom direct, and naturally turns a little to the + one side or to the other; for this reason the animal spirits, + falling into the contiguous traces, present other related ideas, in + lieu of that which the mind desired at first to survey. This change + we are not always sensible of; but continuing still the same train + of thought, make use of the related idea which is presented to us + and employ it in our reasonings, as if it were the same with what + we demanded. This is the cause of many mistakes and sophisms in + philosophy; as will naturally be imagined, and as it would be easy + to show, if there was occasion."--(I. p. 88.) + +Perhaps it is as well for Hume's fame that the occasion for further +physiological speculations of this sort did not arise. But, while +admitting the crudity of his notions and the strangeness of the language +in which they are couched, it must in justice be remembered, that what +are now known as the elements of the physiology of the nervous system +were hardly dreamed of in the first half of the eighteenth century; and, +as a further set off to Hume's credit, it must be noted that he grasped +the fundamental truth, that the key to the comprehension of mental +operations lies in the study of the molecular changes of the nervous +apparatus by which they are originated. + +Surely no one who is cognisant of the facts of the case, nowadays, +doubts that the roots of psychology lie in the physiology of the nervous +system. What we call the operations of the mind are functions of the +brain, and the materials of consciousness are products of cerebral +activity. Cabanis may have made use of crude and misleading phraseology +when he said that the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile; +but the conception which that much-abused phrase embodies is, +nevertheless, far more consistent with fact than the popular notion that +the mind is a metaphysical entity seated in the head, but as independent +of the brain as a telegraph operator is of his instrument. + +It is hardly necessary to point out that the doctrine just laid down is +what is commonly called materialism. In fact, I am not sure that the +adjective "crass," which appears to have a special charm for rhetorical +sciolists, would not be applied to it. But it is, nevertheless, true +that the doctrine contains nothing inconsistent with the purest +idealism. For, as Hume remarks (as indeed Descartes had observed long +before):-- + + "'Tis not our body we perceive when we regard our limbs and + members, but certain impressions which enter by the senses; so that + the ascribing a real and corporeal existence to these impressions, + or to their objects, is an act of the mind as difficult to explain + as that [the external existence of objects] which we examine at + present."--(I. p. 249.) + +Therefore, if we analyse the proposition that all mental phenomena are +the effects or products of material phenomena, all that it means amounts +to this; that whenever those states of consciousness which we call +sensation, or emotion, or thought, come into existence, complete +investigation will show good reason for the belief that they are +preceded by those other phenomena of consciousness to which we give the +names of matter and motion. All material changes appear, in the long +run, to be modes of motion; but our knowledge of motion is nothing but +that of a change in the place and order of our sensations; just as our +knowledge of matter is restricted to those feelings of which we assume +it to be the cause. + +It has already been pointed out, that Hume must have admitted, and in +fact does admit, the possibility that the mind is a Leibnitzian monad, +or a Fichtean world-generating Ego, the universe of things being merely +the picture produced by the evolution of the phenomena of consciousness. +For any demonstration that can be given to the contrary effect, the +"collection of perceptions" which makes up our consciousness may be an +orderly phantasmagoria generated by the Ego, unfolding its successive +scenes on the background of the abyss of nothingness; as a firework, +which is but cunningly arranged combustibles, grows from a spark into a +coruscation, and from a coruscation into figures, and words, and +cascades of devouring fire, and then vanishes into the darkness of the +night. + +On the other hand, it must no less readily be allowed that, for anything +that can be proved to the contrary, there may be a real something which +is the cause of all our impressions; that sensations, though not +likenesses, are symbols of that something; and that the part of that +something, which we call the nervous system, is an apparatus for +supplying us with a sort of algebra of fact, based on those symbols. A +brain may be the machinery by which the material universe becomes +conscious of itself. But it is important to notice that, even if this +conception of the universe and of the relation of consciousness to its +other components should be true, we should, nevertheless, be still bound +by the limits of thought, still unable to refute the arguments of pure +idealism. The more completely the materialistic position is admitted, +the easier is it to show that the idealistic position is unassailable, +if the idealist confines himself within the limits of positive +knowledge. + + +Hume deals with the questions whether all our ideas are derived from +experience, or whether, on the contrary, more or fewer of them are +innate, which so much exercised the mind of Locke, after a somewhat +summary fashion, in a note to the second section of the _Inquiry_:-- + + "It is probable that no more was meant by those who denied innate + ideas, than that all ideas were copies of our impressions; though + it must be confessed that the terms which they employed were not + chosen with such caution, nor so exactly defined, as to prevent all + mistakes about their doctrine. For what is meant by _innate_? If + innate be equivalent to natural, then all the perceptions and ideas + of the mind must be allowed to be innate or natural, in whatever + sense we take the latter word, whether in opposition to what is + uncommon, artificial, or miraculous. If by innate be meant + contemporary with our birth, the dispute seems to be frivolous; nor + is it worth while to inquire at what time thinking begins, whether + before, at, or after our birth. Again, the word _idea_ seems to be + commonly taken in a very loose sense by Locke and others, as + standing for any of our perceptions, our sensations and passions, + as well as thoughts. Now in this sense I should desire to know what + can be meant by asserting that self-love, or resentment of + injuries, or the passion between the sexes is not innate? + + "But admitting these terms, _impressions_ and _ideas_, in the + sense above explained, and understanding by _innate_ what is + original or copied from no precedent perception, then we may assert + that all our impressions are innate, and our ideas not innate." + +It would seem that Hume did not think it worth while to acquire a +comprehension of the real points at issue in the controversy which he +thus carelessly dismisses. + +Yet Descartes has defined what he means by innate ideas with so much +precision, that misconception ought to have been impossible. He says +that, when he speaks of an idea being "innate," he means that it exists +potentially in the mind, before it is actually called into existence by +whatever is its appropriate exciting cause. + + "I have never either thought or said," he writes, "that the mind + has any need of innate ideas [_idées naturelles_] which are + anything distinct from its faculty of thinking. But it is true that + observing that there are certain thoughts which arise neither from + external objects nor from the determination of my will, but only + from my faculty of thinking; in order to mark the difference + between the ideas or the notions which are the forms of these + thoughts, and to distinguish them from the others, which may be + called extraneous or voluntary, I have called them innate. But I + have used this term in the same sense as when we say that + generosity is innate in certain families; or that certain maladies, + such as gout or gravel, are innate in others; not that children + born in these families are troubled with such diseases in their + mother's womb; but because they are born with the disposition or + the faculty of contracting them."[22] + +His troublesome disciple, Regius, having asserted that all our ideas +come from observation or tradition, Descartes remarks:-- + + "So thoroughly erroneous is this assertion, that whoever has a + proper comprehension of the action of our senses, and understands + precisely the nature of that which is transmitted by them to our + thinking faculty, will rather affirm that no ideas of things, such + as are formed in thought, are brought to us by the senses, so that + there is nothing in our ideas which is other than innate in the + mind (_naturel à l'esprit_), or in the faculty of thinking, if only + certain circumstances are excepted, which belong only to + experience. For example, it is experience alone which causes us to + judge that such and such ideas, now present in our minds, are + related to certain things which are external to us; not in truth, + that they have been sent into our mind by these things, such as + they are, by the organs of the senses; but because these organs + have transmitted something which has occasioned the mind, in virtue + of its innate power, to form them at this time rather than at + another.... + + "Nothing passes from external objects to the soul except certain + motions of matter (_mouvemens corporels_), but neither these + motions, nor the figures which they produce, are conceived by us as + they exist in the sensory organs, as I have fully explained in my + "Dioptrics"; whence it follows that even the ideas of motion and of + figures are innate (_naturellement en nous_). And, _à fortiori_, + the ideas of pain, of colours, of sounds, and of all similar things + must be innate, in order that the mind may represent them to + itself, on the occasion of certain motions of matter with which + they have no resemblance." + +Whoever denies what is, in fact, an inconceivable proposition, that +sensations pass, as such, from the external world into the mind, must +admit the conclusion here laid down by Descartes, that, strictly +speaking, sensations, and _à fortiori_, all the other contents of the +mind, are innate. Or, to state the matter in accordance with the views +previously expounded, that they are products of the inherent properties +of the thinking organ, in which they lie potentially, before they are +called into existence by their appropriate causes. + +But if all the contents of the mind are innate, what is meant by +experience? + +It is the conversion, by unknown causes, of these innate potentialities +into actual existences. The organ of thought, prior to experience, may +be compared to an untouched piano, in which it may be properly said that +music is innate, inasmuch as its mechanism contains, potentially, so +many octaves of musical notes. The unknown cause of sensation which +Descartes calls the "je ne sais quoi dans les objets" or "choses telles +qu'elles sont," and Kant the "Noumenon" or "Ding an sich," is +represented by the musician; who, by touching the keys, converts the +potentiality of the mechanism into actual sounds. A note so produced is +the equivalent of a single experience. + +All the melodies and harmonies that proceed from the piano depend upon +the action of the musician upon the keys. There is no internal mechanism +which, when certain keys are struck, gives rise to an accompaniment of +which the musician is only indirectly the cause. According to Descartes, +however--and this is what is generally fixed upon as the essence of his +doctrine of innate ideas--the mind possesses such an internal mechanism, +by which certain classes of thoughts are generated, on the occasion of +certain experiences. Such thoughts are innate, just as sensations are +innate; they are not copies of sensations, any more than sensations are +copies of motions; they are invariably generated in the mind, when +certain experiences arise in it, just as sensations are invariably +generated when certain bodily motions take place; they are universal, +inasmuch as they arise under the same conditions in all men; they are +necessary, because their genesis under these conditions is invariable. +These innate thoughts are what Descartes terms "vérités" or truths: that +is beliefs--and his notions respecting them are plainly set forth in a +passage of the _Principes_. + + "Thus far I have discussed that which we know as things: it remains + that I should speak of that which we know as truths. For example, + when we think that it is impossible to make anything out of + nothing, we do not imagine that this proposition is a thing which + exists, or a property of something, but we take it for a certain + eternal truth, which has its seat in the mind (_pensée_), and is + called a common notion or an axiom. Similarly, when we affirm that + it is impossible that one and the same thing should exist and not + exist at the same time; that that which has been created should not + have been created; that he who thinks must exist while he thinks; + and a number of other like propositions; these are only truths, and + not things which exist outside our thoughts. And there is such a + number of these that it would be wearisome to enumerate them: nor + is it necessary to do so, because we cannot fail to know them when + the occasion of thinking about them presents itself, and we are not + blinded by any prejudices." + +It would appear that Locke was not more familiar with Descartes' +writings than Hume seems to have been; for, viewed in relation to the +passages just cited, the arguments adduced in his famous polemic against +innate ideas are totally irrelevant. + +It has been shown that Hume practically, if not in so many words, +admits the justice of Descartes' assertion that, strictly speaking, +sensations are innate; that is to say, that they are the product of the +reaction of the organ of the mind on the stimulus of an "unknown cause," +which is Descartes' "je ne sais quoi." Therefore, the difference between +Descartes' opinion and that of Hume resolves itself into this: Given +sensation-experiences, can all the contents of consciousness be derived +from the collocation and metamorphosis of these experiences? Or, are new +elements of consciousness, products of an innate potentiality distinct +from sensibility, added to these? Hume affirms the former position, +Descartes the latter. If the analysis of the phenomena of consciousness +given in the preceding pages is correct, Hume is in error; while the +father of modern philosophy had a truer insight, though he overstated +the case. For want of sufficiently searching psychological +investigations, Descartes was led to suppose that innumerable ideas, the +evolution of which in the course of experience can be demonstrated, were +direct or innate products of the thinking faculty. + +As has been already pointed out, it is the great merit of Kant that he +started afresh on the track indicated by Descartes, and steadily upheld +the doctrine of the existence of elements of consciousness, which are +neither sense-experiences nor any modifications of them. We may demur to +the expression that space and time are forms of sensory intuition; but +it imperfectly represents the great fact that co-existence and +succession are mental phenomena not given in the mere sense +experience.[23] + +FOOTNOTES: + +[22] Remarques de René Descartes sur un certain placard imprimé aux Pays +Bas vers la fin de l'année, 1647.--Descartes, _OEuvres_. Ed. Cousin, +x. p. 71. + +[23] "Wir können uns keinen Gegenstand denken, ohne durch Kategorien; +wir können keinen gedachten Gegenstand erkennen, ohne durch +Anschauungen, die jenen Begriffen entsprechen. Nun sind alle unsere +Anschauungen sinnlich, und diese Erkenntniss, so fern der Gegenstand +derselben gegeben ist, ist empirisch. Empirische Erkenntniss aber ist +Erfahrung. Folglich ist uns keine Erkenntniss _a priori_ möglich, als +lediglich von Gegenständen möglicher Erfahrung." + +"Aber diese Erkenntniss, die bloss auf Gegenstände der Erfahrung +eingeschränkt ist, ist darum nicht alle von der Erfahrung entlehnt, +sondern was sowohl die reinen Anschauungen, als die reinen +Verstandesbegriffe betrifft, so sind sie Elemente der Erkenntniss die in +uns _a priori_ angetroffen werden."--_Kritik der reinen Vernunft. +Elementarlehre_, p. 135. + +Without a glossary explanatory of Kant's terminology, this passage would +be hardly intelligible in a translation; but it may be paraphrased thus: +All knowledge is founded upon experiences of sensation, but it is not +all derived from those experiences; inasmuch as the impressions of +relation ("reine Anschauungen"; "reine Verstandesbegriffe") have a +potential or _à priori_ existence in us, and by their addition to +sense-experiences, constitute knowledge. + + + + +CHAPTER IV. + +THE CLASSIFICATION AND THE NOMENCLATURE OF MENTAL OPERATIONS. + + +If, as has been set forth in the preceding chapter, all mental states +are effects of physical causes, it follows that what are called mental +faculties and operations are, properly speaking, cerebral functions, +allotted to definite, though not yet precisely assignable, parts of the +brain. + +These functions appear to be reducible to three groups, namely: +Sensation, Correlation, and Ideation. + +The organs of the functions of sensation and correlation are those +portions of the cerebral substance, the molecular changes of which give +rise to impressions of sensation and impressions of relation. + +The changes in the nervous matter which bring about the effects which we +call its functions, follow upon some kind of stimulus, and rapidly +reaching their maximum, as rapidly die away. The effect of the +irritation of a nerve-fibre on the cerebral substance with which it is +connected may be compared to the pulling of a long bell-wire. The +impulse takes a little time to reach the bell; the bell rings and then +becomes quiescent, until another pull is given. So, in the brain, every +sensation is the ring of a cerebral particle, the effect of a momentary +impulse sent along a nerve-fibre. + +If there were a complete likeness between the two terms of this very +rough and ready comparison, it is obvious that there could be no such +thing as memory. A bell records no audible sign of having been rung five +minutes ago, and the activity of a sensigenous cerebral particle might +similarly leave no trace. Under these circumstances, again, it would +seem that the only impressions of relation which could arise would be +those of co-existence and of similarity. For succession implies memory +of an antecedent state.[24] + +But the special peculiarity of the cerebral apparatus is, that any given +function which has once been performed is very easily set a-going again, +by causes more or less different from those to which it owed its origin. +Of the mechanism of this generation of images of impressions or ideas +(in Hume's sense), which may be termed _Ideation_, we know nothing at +present, though the fact and its results are familiar enough. + +During our waking, and many of our sleeping, hours, in fact, the +function of ideation is in continual, if not continuous, activity. +Trains of thought, as we call them, succeed one another without +intermission, even when the starting of new trains by fresh +sense-impressions is as far as possible prevented. The rapidity and the +intensity of this ideational process are obviously dependent upon +physiological conditions. The widest differences in these respects are +constitutional in men of different temperaments; and are observable in +oneself, under varying conditions of hunger and repletion, fatigue and +freshness, calmness and emotional excitement. The influence of diet on +dreams; of stimulants upon the fulness and the velocity of the stream of +thought; the delirious phantasms generated by disease, by hashish, or by +alcohol; will occur to every one as examples of the marvellous +sensitiveness of the apparatus of ideation to purely physical +influences. + +The succession of mental states in ideation is not fortuitous, but +follows the law of association, which may be stated thus: that every +idea tends to be followed by some other idea which is associated with +the first, or its impression, by a relation of succession, of +contiguity, or of likeness. + +Thus the idea of the word horse just now presented itself to my mind, +and was followed in quick succession by the ideas of four legs, hoofs, +teeth, rider, saddle, racing, cheating; all of which ideas are connected +in my experience with the impression, or the idea, of a horse and with +one another, by the relations of contiguity and succession. No great +attention to what passes in the mind is needful to prove that our trains +of thought are neither to be arrested, nor even permanently controlled, +by our desires or emotions. Nevertheless they are largely influenced by +them. In the presence of a strong desire, or emotion, the stream of +thought no longer flows on in a straight course, but seems, as it were, +to eddy round the idea of that which is the object of the emotion. Every +one who has "eaten his bread in sorrow" knows how strangely the current +of ideas whirls about the conception of the object of regret or remorse +as a centre; every now and then, indeed, breaking away into the new +tracks suggested by passing associations, but still returning to the +central thought. Few can have been so happy as to have escaped the +social bore, whose pet notion is certain to crop up whatever topic is +started; while the fixed idea of the monomaniac is but the extreme form +of the same phenomenon. + +And as, on the one hand, it is so hard to drive away the thought we +would fain be rid of; so, upon the other, the pleasant imaginations +which we would so gladly retain are, sooner or later, jostled away by +the crowd of claimants for birth into the world of consciousness; which +hover as a sort of psychical possibilities, or inverse ghosts, the +bodily presentments of spiritual phenomena to be, in the limbo of the +brain. In that form of desire which is called "attention," the train of +thought, held fast, for a time, in the desired direction, seems ever +striving to get on to another line--and the junctions and sidings are so +multitudinous! + + +The constituents of trains of ideas may be grouped in various ways. + +Hume says:-- + + "We find, by experience, that when any impression has been present + in the mind, it again makes its appearance there as an idea, and + this it may do in two different ways: either when, on its new + appearance, it retains a considerable degree of its first vivacity, + and is somewhat intermediate between an impression and an idea; or + when it entirely loses that vivacity, and is a perfect idea. The + faculty by which we repeat our impressions in the first manner, is + called the _memory_, and the other the _imagination_."--(I. pp. 23, + 24.) + +And he considers that the only difference between ideas of imagination +and those of memory, except the superior vivacity of the latter, lies +in the fact that those of memory preserve the original order of the +impressions from which they are derived, while the imagination "is free +to transpose and change its ideas." + +The latter statement of the difference between memory and imagination is +less open to cavil than the former, though by no means unassailable. + +The special characteristic of a memory surely is not its vividness; but +that it is a complex idea, in which the idea of that which is remembered +is related by co-existence with other ideas, and by antecedence with +present impressions. + +If I say I remember A. B., the chance acquaintance of ten years ago, it +is not because my idea of A. B. is very vivid--on the contrary, it is +extremely faint--but because that idea is associated with ideas of +impressions co-existent with those which I call A. B.; and that all +these are at the end of the long series of ideas, which represent that +much past time. In truth I have a much more vivid idea of Mr. Pickwick, +or of Colonel Newcome, than I have of A. B.; but, associated with the +ideas of these persons, I have no idea of their having ever been derived +from the world of impressions; and so they are relegated to the world of +imagination. On the other hand, the characteristic of an imagination may +properly be said to lie not in its intensity, but in the fact that, as +Hume puts it, "the arrangement," or the relations, of the ideas are +different from those in which the impressions, whence these ideas are +derived, occurred; or in other words, that the thing imagined has not +happened. In popular usage, however, imagination is frequently employed +for simple memory--"In imagination I was back in the old times." + +It is a curious omission on Hume's part that, while thus dwelling on two +classes of ideas, _Memories_ and _Imaginations_, he has not, at the same +time, taken notice of a third group, of no small importance, which are +as different from imaginations as memories are; though, like the latter, +they are often confounded with pure imaginations in general speech. +These are the ideas of expectation, or as they may be called for the +sake of brevity, _Expectations_; which differ from simple imaginations +in being associated with the idea of the existence of corresponding +impressions, in the future, just as memories contain the idea of the +existence of the corresponding impressions in the past. + +The ideas belonging to two of the three groups enumerated: namely, +memories and expectations, present some features, of particular +interest. And first, with respect to memories. + +In Hume's words, all simple ideas are copies of simple impressions. The +idea of a single sensation is a faint, but accurate, image of that +sensation; the idea of a relation is a reproduction of the feeling of +co-existence, of succession, or of similarity. But, when complex +impressions or complex ideas are reproduced as memories, it is probable +that the copies never give all the details of the originals with perfect +accuracy, and it is certain that they rarely do so. No one possesses a +memory so good, that if he has only once observed a natural object, a +second inspection does not show him something that he has forgotten. +Almost all, if not all, our memories are therefore sketches, rather than +portraits, of the originals--the salient features are obvious, while the +subordinate characters are obscure or unrepresented. + +Now, when several complex impressions which are more or less different +from one another--let us say that out of ten impressions in each, six +are the same in all, and four are different from all the rest--are +successively presented to the mind, it is easy to see what must be the +nature of the result. The repetition of the six similar impressions will +strengthen the six corresponding elements of the complex idea, which +will therefore acquire greater vividness; while the four differing +impressions of each will not only acquire no greater strength than they +had at first, but, in accordance with the law of association, they will +all tend to appear at once, and will thus neutralise one another. + +This mental operation may be rendered comprehensible by considering what +takes place in the formation of compound photographs--when the images of +the faces of six sitters, for example, are each received on the same +photographic plate, for a sixth of the time requisite to take one +portrait. The final result is that all those points in which the six +faces agree are brought out strongly, while all those in which they +differ are left vague; and thus what may be termed a _generic_ portrait +of the six, in contradistinction to a _specific_ portrait of any one, is +produced. + +Thus our ideas of single complex impressions are incomplete in one way, +and those of numerous, more or less similar, complex impressions are +incomplete in another way; that is to say, they are _generic_, not +_specific_. And hence it follows, that our ideas of the impressions in +question are not, in the strict sense of the word, copies of those +impressions; while, at the same time, they may exist in the mind +independently of language. + +The generic ideas which are formed from several similar, but not +identical, complex experiences are what are commonly called _abstract_ +or _general_ ideas; and Berkeley endeavoured to prove that all general +ideas are nothing but particular ideas annexed to a certain term, which +gives them a more extensive signification, and makes them recall, upon +occasion, other individuals which are similar to them. Hume says that he +regards this as "one of the greatest and the most valuable discoveries +that has been made of late years in the republic of letters," and +endeavours to confirm it in such a manner that it shall be "put beyond +all doubt and controversy." + +I may venture to express a doubt whether he has succeeded in his object; +but the subject is an abstruse one; and I must content myself with the +remark, that though Berkeley's view appears to be largely applicable to +such general ideas as are formed after language has been acquired, and +to all the more abstract sort of conceptions, yet that general ideas of +sensible objects may nevertheless be produced in the way indicated, and +may exist independently of language. In dreams, one sees houses, trees +and other objects, which are perfectly recognisable as such, but which +remind one of the actual objects as seen "out of the corner of the eye," +or of the pictures thrown by a badly-focussed magic lantern. A man +addresses us who is like a figure seen by twilight; or we travel through +countries where every feature of the scenery is vague; the outlines of +the hills are ill-marked, and the rivers have no defined banks. They +are, in short, generic ideas of many past impressions of men, hills, and +rivers. An anatomist who occupies himself intently with the examination +of several specimens of some new kind of animal, in course of time +acquires so vivid a conception of its form and structure, that the idea +may take visible shape and become a sort of waking dream. But the figure +which thus presents itself is generic, not specific. It is no copy of +any one specimen, but, more or less, a mean of the series; and there +seems no reason to doubt that the minds of children before they learn to +speak, and of deaf mutes, are peopled with similarly generated generic +ideas of sensible objects. + + +It has been seen that a memory is a complex idea made up of at least two +constituents. In the first place there is the idea of an object; and +secondly, there is the idea of the relation of antecedence between that +object and some present objects. + +To say that one has a recollection of a given event and to express the +belief that it happened, are two ways of giving an account of one and +the same mental fact. But the former mode of stating the fact of memory +is preferable, at present, because it certainly does not presuppose the +existence of language in the mind of the rememberer; while it may be +said that the latter does. It is perfectly possible to have the idea of +an event A, and of the events B, C, D, which came between it and the +present state E, as mere mental pictures. It is hardly to be doubted +that children have very distinct memories long before they can speak; +and we believe that such is the case because they act upon their +memories. But, if they act upon their memories, they to all intents and +purposes believe their memories. In other words, though, being devoid of +language, the child cannot frame a proposition expressive of belief; +cannot say "sugar-plum was sweet;" yet the psychical operation of which +that proposition is merely the verbal expression, is perfectly +effected. The experience of the co-existence of sweetness with sugar has +produced a state of mind which bears the same relation to a verbal +proposition, as the natural disposition to produce a given idea, assumed +to exist by Descartes as an "innate idea" would bear to that idea put +into words. + +The fact that the beliefs of memory precede the use of language, and +therefore are originally purely instinctive, and independent of any +rational justification, should have been of great importance to Hume, +from its bearing upon his theory of causation; and it is curious that he +has not adverted to it, but always takes the trustworthiness of memories +for granted. It may be worth while briefly to make good the omission. + +That I was in pain, yesterday, is as certain to me as any matter of fact +can be; by no effort of the imagination is it possible for me really to +entertain the contrary belief. At the same time, I am bound to admit, +that the whole foundation for my belief is the fact, that the idea of +pain is indissolubly associated in my mind with the idea of that much +past time. Any one who will be at the trouble may provide himself with +hundreds of examples to the same effect. + +This and similar observations are important under another aspect. They +prove that the idea of even a single strong impression may be so +powerfully associated with that of a certain time, as to originate a +belief of which the contrary is inconceivable, and which may therefore +be properly said to be necessary. A single weak, or moderately strong, +impression may not be represented by any memory. But this defect of weak +experiences may be compensated by their repetition; and what Hume means +by "custom" or "habit" is simply the repetition of experiences. + + "wherever the repetition of any particular act or operation + produces a propensity to renew the same act or operation, without + being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding, we + always say that this propensity is the effect of _Custom_. By + employing that word, we pretend not to have given the ultimate + reason of such a propensity. We only point out a principle of human + nature which is universally acknowledged, and which is well known + by its effects."--(IV. p. 52.) + +It has been shown that an expectation is a complex idea which, like a +memory, is made up of two constituents. The one is the idea of an +object, the other is the idea of a relation of sequence between that +object and some present object; and the reasoning which applied to +memories applies to expectations. To have an expectation[25] of a given +event, and to believe that it will happen, are only two modes of stating +the same fact. Again, just in the same way as we call a memory, put into +words, a belief, so we give the same name to an expectation in like +clothing. And the fact already cited, that a child before it can speak +acts upon its memories, is good evidence that it forms expectations. The +infant who knows the meaning neither of "sugar-plum" nor of "sweet," +nevertheless is in full possession of that complex idea, which, when he +has learned to employ language, will take the form of the verbal +proposition, "A sugar-plum will be sweet." + +Thus, beliefs of expectation, or at any rate their potentialities, are, +as much as those of memory, antecedent to speech, and are as incapable +of justification by any logical process. In fact, expectations are but +memories inverted. The association which is the foundation of +expectation must exist as a memory before it can play its part. As Hume +says,-- + + " ... it is certain we here advance a very intelligible proposition + at least, if not a true one, when we assert that after the constant + conjunction of two objects, heat and flame, for instance, weight + and solidity, we are determined by custom alone to expect the one + from the appearance of the other. This hypothesis seems even the + only one which explains the difficulty why we draw from a thousand + instances, an inference which we are not able to draw from one + instance, that is in no respect different from them."... + + "Custom, then, is the great guide of human life. It is that + principle alone which renders our experience useful to us, and + makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with + those which have appeared in the past."... + + "All belief of matter-of-fact or real existence is derived merely + from some object present to the memory or senses, and a customary + conjunction between that and some other object; or in other words, + having found, in many instances, that any two kinds of objects, + flame and heat, snow and cold, have always been conjoined together: + if flame or snow be presented anew to the senses, the mind is + carried by custom to expect heat or cold, and to _believe_ that + such a quality does exist, and will discover itself upon a nearer + approach. This belief is the necessary result of placing the mind + in such circumstances. It is an operation of the soul, when we are + so situated, as unavoidable as to feel the passion of love, when we + receive benefits, or hatred, when we meet with injuries. All these + operations are a species of natural instincts, which no reasoning + or process of the thought and understanding is able either to + produce or to prevent."--(IV. pp. 52-56.) + +The only comment that appears needful here is, that Hume has attached +somewhat too exclusive a weight to that repetition of experiences to +which alone the term "custom" can be properly applied. The proverb says +that "a burnt child dreads the fire"; and any one who will make the +experiment will find, that one burning is quite sufficient to establish +an indissoluble belief that contact with fire and pain go together. + +As a sort of inverted memory, expectation follows the same laws; hence, +while a belief of expectation is, in most cases, as Hume truly says, +established by custom, or the repetition of weak impressions, it may +quite well be based upon a single strong experience. In the absence of +language, a specific memory cannot be strengthened by repetition. It is +obvious that that which has happened cannot happen again, with the same +collateral associations of co-existence and succession. But, memories of +the co-existence and succession of impressions are capable of being +indefinitely strengthened by the recurrence of similar impressions, in +the same order, even though the collateral associations are totally +different; in fact, the ideas of these impressions become generic. + +If I recollect that a piece of ice was cold yesterday, nothing can +strengthen the recollection of that particular fact; on the contrary, it +may grow weaker, in the absence of any record of it. But if I touch ice +to-day and again find it cold, the association is repeated, and the +memory of it becomes stronger. And, by this very simple process of +repetition of experience, it has become utterly impossible for us to +think of having handled ice without thinking of its coldness. But, that +which is, under the one aspect, the strengthening of a memory, is, +under the other, the intensification of an expectation. Not only can we +not think of having touched ice, without feeling cold, but we cannot +think of touching ice, in the future, without expecting to feel cold. An +expectation so strong that it cannot be changed, or abolished, may thus +be generated out of repeated experiences. And it is important to note +that such expectations may be formed quite unconsciously. In my dressing +room, a certain can is usually kept full of water, and I am in the habit +of lifting it to pour out water for washing. Sometimes the servant has +forgotten to fill it, and then I find that, when I take hold of the +handle, the can goes up with a jerk. Long association has, in fact, led +me to expect the can to have a considerable weight; and, quite unawares, +my muscular effort is adjusted to the expectation. + +The process of strengthening generic memories of succession, and, at the +same time, intensifying expectations of succession, is what is commonly +called _verification_. The impression B has frequently been observed to +follow the impression A. The association thus produced is represented as +the memory, A -> B. When the impression A appears again, the idea of B +follows, associated with that of the immediate appearance of the +impression B. If the impression B does appear, the expectation is said +to be verified; while the memory A -> B is strengthened, and gives rise +in turn to a stronger expectation. And repeated verification may render +that expectation so strong that its non-verification is inconceivable. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[24] It is not worth while, for the present purpose, to consider +whether, as all nervous action occupies a sensible time, the duration of +one impression might not overlap that of the impression which follows +it, in the case supposed. + +[25] We give no name to faint memories; but expectations of like +character play so large a part in human affairs that they, together with +the associated emotions of pleasure and pain, are distinguished as +"hopes" or "fears." + + + + +CHAPTER V. + +THE MENTAL PHENOMENA OF ANIMALS. + + +In the course of the preceding chapters, attention has been more than +once called to the fact, that the elements of consciousness and the +operations of the mental faculties, under discussion, exist +independently of and antecedent to, the existence of language. + +If any weight is to be attached to arguments from analogy, there is +overwhelming evidence in favour of the belief that children, before they +can speak, and deaf mutes, possess the feelings to which those who have +acquired the faculty of speech apply the name of sensations; that they +have the feelings of relation; that trains of ideas pass through their +minds; that generic ideas are formed from specific ones; and, that among +these, ideas of memory and expectation occupy a most important place, +inasmuch as, in their quality of potential beliefs, they furnish the +grounds of action. This conclusion, in truth, is one of those which, +though they cannot be demonstrated, are never doubted; and, since it is +highly probable and cannot be disproved, we are quite safe in accepting +it, as, at any rate, a good working hypothesis. + +But, if we accept it, we must extend it to a much wider assemblage of +living beings. Whatever cogency is attached to the arguments in favour +of the occurrence of all the fundamental phenomena of mind in young +children and deaf mutes, an equal force must be allowed to appertain to +those which may be adduced to prove that the higher animals have minds. +We must admit that Hume does not express himself too strongly when he +says-- + + "no truth appears to me more evident, than that the beasts are + endowed with thought and reason as well as men. The arguments are + in this case so obvious, that they never escape the most stupid and + ignorant."--(I. p. 232.) + +In fact, this is one of the few cases in which the conviction which +forces itself upon the stupid and the ignorant, is fortified by the +reasonings of the intelligent, and has its foundation deepened by every +increase of knowledge. It is not merely that the observation of the +actions of animals almost irresistibly suggests the attribution to them +of mental states, such as those which accompany corresponding actions in +men. The minute comparison which has been instituted by anatomists and +physiologists between the organs which we know to constitute the +apparatus of thought in man, and the corresponding organs in brutes, has +demonstrated the existence of the closest similarity between the two, +not only in structure, as far as the microscope will carry us, but in +function, as far as functions are determinable by experiment. There is +no question in the mind of any one acquainted with the facts that, so +far as observation and experiment can take us, the structure and the +functions of the nervous system are fundamentally the same in an ape, or +in a dog, and in a man. And the suggestion that we must stop at the +exact point at which direct proof fails us; and refuse to believe that +the similarity which extends so far stretches yet further, is no better +than a quibble. Robinson Crusoe did not feel bound to conclude, from the +single human footprint which he saw in the sand, that the maker of the +impression had only one leg. + +Structure for structure, down to the minutest microscopical details, the +eye, the ear, the olfactory organs, the nerves, the spinal cord, the +brain of an ape, or of a dog, correspond with the same organs in the +human subject. Cut a nerve, and the evidence of paralysis, or of +insensibility, is the same in the two cases; apply pressure to the +brain, or administer a narcotic, and the signs of intelligence disappear +in the one as in the other. Whatever reason we have for believing that +the changes which take place in the normal cerebral substance of man +give rise to states of consciousness, the same reason exists for the +belief that the modes of motion of the cerebral substance of an ape, or +of a dog, produce like effects. + +A dog acts as if he had all the different kinds of impressions of +sensation of which each of us is cognisant. Moreover, he governs his +movements exactly as if he had the feelings of distance, form, +succession, likeness, and unlikeness, with which we are familiar, or as +if the impressions of relation were generated in his mind as they are in +our own. Sleeping dogs frequently appear to dream. If they do, it must +be admitted that ideation goes on in them while they are asleep; and, in +that case, there is no reason to doubt that they are conscious of trains +of ideas in their waking state. Further, that dogs, if they possess +ideas at all, have memories and expectations, and those potential +beliefs of which these states are the foundation, can hardly be doubted +by any one who is conversant with their ways. Finally, there would +appear to be no valid argument against the supposition that dogs form +generic ideas of sensible objects. One of the most curious peculiarities +of the dog mind is its inherent snobbishness, shown by the regard paid +to external respectability. The dog who barks furiously at a beggar will +let a well-dressed man pass him without opposition. Has he not then a +"generic idea" of rags and dirt associated with the idea of aversion, +and that of sleek broadcloth associated with the idea of liking? + +In short, it seems hard to assign any good reason for denying to the +higher animals any mental state, or process, in which the employment of +the vocal or visual symbols of which language is composed is not +involved; and comparative psychology confirms the position in relation +to the rest of the animal world assigned to man by comparative anatomy. +As comparative anatomy is easily able to show that, physically, man is +but the last term of a long series of forms, which lead, by slow +gradations, from the highest mammal to the almost formless speck of +living protoplasm, which lies on the shadowy boundary between animal and +vegetable life; so, comparative psychology, though but a young science, +and far short of her elder sister's growth, points to the same +conclusion. + +In the absence of a distinct nervous system, we have no right to look +for its product, consciousness; and, even in those forms of animal life +in which the nervous apparatus has reached no higher degree of +development, than that exhibited by the system of the spinal cord and +the foundation of the brain in ourselves, the argument from analogy +leaves the assumption of the existence of any form of consciousness +unsupported. With the super-addition of a nervous apparatus +corresponding with the cerebrum in ourselves, it is allowable to suppose +the appearance of the simplest states of consciousness, or the +sensations; and it is conceivable that these may at first exist, without +any power of reproducing them, as memories; and, consequently, without +ideation. Still higher, an apparatus of correlation may be superadded, +until, as all these organs become more developed, the condition of the +highest speechless animals is attained. + +It is a remarkable example of Hume's sagacity that he perceived the +importance of a branch of science which, even now, can hardly be said to +exist; and that, in a remarkable passage, he sketches in bold outlines +the chief features of comparative psychology. + + " ... any theory, by which we explain the operations of the + understanding, or the origin and connexion of the passions in man, + will acquire additional authority if we find that the same theory + is requisite to explain the same phenomena in all other animals. We + shall make trial of this with regard to the hypothesis by which we + have, in the foregoing discourse, endeavoured to account for all + experimental reasonings; and it is hoped that this new point of + view will serve to confirm all our former observations. + + "_First_, it seems evident that animals, as well as men, learn many + things from experience, and infer that the same events will always + follow from the same causes. By this principle they become + acquainted with the more obvious properties of external objects, + and gradually, from their birth, treasure up a knowledge of the + nature of fire, water, earth, stones, heights, depths, &c., and of + the effects which result from their operation. The ignorance and + inexperience of the young are here plainly distinguishable from the + cunning and sagacity of the old, who have learned, by long + observation, to avoid what hurt them, and pursue what gave ease or + pleasure. A horse that has been accustomed to the field, becomes + acquainted with the proper height which he can leap, and will never + attempt what exceeds his force and ability. An old greyhound will + trust the more fatiguing part of the chase to the younger, and will + place himself so as to meet the hare in her doubles; nor are the + conjectures which he forms on this occasion founded on anything but + his observation and experience. + + "This is still more evident from the effects of discipline and + education on animals, who, by the proper application of rewards and + punishments, may be taught any course of action, the most contrary + to their natural instincts and propensities. Is it not experience + which renders a dog apprehensive of pain when you menace him, or + lift up the whip to beat him? Is it not even experience which makes + him answer to his name, and infer from such an arbitrary sound that + you mean him rather than any of his fellows, and intend to call + him, when you pronounce it in a certain manner and with a certain + tone and accent? + + "In all these cases we may observe that the animal infers some fact + beyond what immediately strikes his senses; and that this inference + is altogether founded on past experience, while the creature + expects from the present object the same consequences which it has + always found in its observation to result from similar objects. + + "_Secondly_, it is impossible that this inference of the animal can + be founded on any process of argument or reasoning, by which he + concludes that like events must follow like objects, and that the + course of nature will always be regular in its operations. For if + there be in reality any arguments of this nature they surely lie + too abstruse for the observation of such imperfect understandings; + since it may well employ the utmost care and attention of a + philosophic genius to discover and observe them. Animals therefore + are not guided in these inferences by reasoning; neither are + children; neither are the generality of mankind in their ordinary + actions and conclusions; neither are philosophers themselves, who, + in all the active parts of life, are in the main the same as the + vulgar, and are governed by the same maxims. Nature must have + provided some other principle, of more ready and more general use + and application; nor can an operation of such immense consequence + in life as that of inferring effects from causes, be trusted to the + uncertain process of reasoning and argumentation. Were this + doubtful with regard to men, it seems to admit of no question with + regard to the brute creation; and the conclusion being once firmly + established in the one, we have a strong presumption, from all the + rules of analogy, that it ought to be universally admitted, without + any exception or reserve. It is custom alone which engages animals, + from every object that strikes their senses, to infer its usual + attendant, and carries their imagination from the appearance of the + one to conceive the other, in that particular manner which we + denominate _belief_. No other explication can be given of this + operation in all the higher as well as lower classes of sensitive + beings which fall under our notice and observation."--(IV. pp. + 122-4.) + +It will be observed that Hume appears to contrast the "inference of the +animal" with the "process of argument or reasoning in man." But it would +be a complete misapprehension of his intention, if we were to suppose, +that he thereby means to imply that there is any real difference between +the two processes. The "inference of the animal" is a potential belief +of expectation; the process of argument, or reasoning, in man is based +upon potential beliefs of expectation, which are formed in the man +exactly in the same way as in the animal. But, in men endowed with +speech, the mental state which constitutes the potential belief is +represented by a verbal proposition, and thus becomes what all the world +recognises as a belief. The fallacy which Hume combats is, that the +proposition, or verbal representative of a belief, has come to be +regarded as a reality, instead of as the mere symbol which it really is; +and that reasoning, or logic, which deals with nothing but propositions, +is supposed to be necessary in order to validate the natural fact +symbolised by those propositions. It is a fallacy similar to that of +supposing that money is the foundation of wealth, whereas it is only the +wholly unessential symbol of property. + +In the passage which immediately follows that just quoted, Hume makes +admissions which might be turned to serious account against some of his +own doctrines. + + "But though animals learn many parts of their knowledge from + observation, there are also many parts of it which they derive from + the original hand of Nature, which much exceed the share of + capacity they possess on ordinary occasions, and in which they + improve, little or nothing, by the longest practice and experience. + These we denominate INSTINCTS, and are so apt to admire as + something very extraordinary and inexplicable by all the + disquisitions of human understanding. But our wonder will perhaps + cease or diminish when we consider that the experimental reasoning + itself, which we possess in common with beasts, and on which the + whole conduct of life depends, is nothing but a species of instinct + or mechanical power, that acts in us unknown to ourselves, and in + its chief operations is not directed by any such relations or + comparison of ideas as are the proper objects of our intellectual + faculties. + + "Though the instinct be different, yet still it is an instinct + which teaches a man to avoid the fire, as much as that which + teaches a bird, with such exactness, the art of incubation and the + whole economy and order of its nursery."--(IV. pp. 125, 126.) + +The parallel here drawn between the "avoidance of a fire" by a man and +the incubatory instinct of a bird is inexact. The man avoids fire when +he has had experience of the pain produced by burning; but the bird +incubates the first time it lays eggs, and therefore before it has had +any experience of incubation. For the comparison to be admissible, it +would be necessary that a man should avoid fire the first time he saw +it, which is notoriously not the case. + +The term "instinct" is very vague and ill-defined. It is commonly +employed to denote any action, or even feeling, which is not dictated by +conscious reasoning, whether it is, or is not, the result of previous +experience. It is "instinct" which leads a chicken just hatched to pick +up a grain of corn; parental love is said to be "instinctive"; the +drowning man who catches at a straw does it "instinctively"; and the +hand that accidentally touches something hot is drawn back by +"instinct." Thus "instinct" is made to cover everything from a simple +reflex movement, in which the organ of consciousness need not be at all +implicated, up to a complex combination of acts directed towards a +definite end and accompanied by intense consciousness. + +But this loose employment of the term "instinct" really accords with the +nature of the thing; for it is wholly impossible to draw any line of +demarcation between reflex actions and instincts. If a frog, on the +flank of which a little drop of acid has been placed, rubs it off with +the foot of the same side; and, if that foot be held, performs the same +operation, at the cost of much effort, with the other foot, it certainly +displays a curious instinct. But it is no less true that the whole +operation is a reflex operation of the spinal cord, which can be +performed quite as well when the brain is destroyed; and between which +and simple reflex actions there is a complete series of gradations. In +like manner, when an infant takes the breast, it is impossible to say +whether the action should be rather termed instinctive or reflex. + +What are usually called the instincts of animals are, however, acts of +such a nature that, if they were performed by men, they would involve +the generation of a series of ideas and of inferences from them; and it +is a curious, and apparently an insoluble, problem whether they are, or +are not, accompanied by cerebral changes of the same nature as those +which give rise to ideas and inferences in ourselves. When a chicken +picks up a grain, for example, are there, firstly, certain sensations, +accompanied by the feeling of relation between the grain and its own +body; secondly, a desire of the grain; thirdly, a volition to seize it? +Or, are only the sensational terms of the series actually represented in +consciousness? + +The latter seems the more probable opinion, though it must be admitted +that the other alternative is possible. But, in this case, the series of +mental states which occurs is such as would be represented in language +by a series of propositions, and would afford proof positive of the +existence of innate ideas, in the Cartesian sense. Indeed, a +metaphysical fowl, brooding over the mental operations of his +fully-fledged consciousness, might appeal to the fact as proof that, in +the very first action of his life, he assumed the existence of the Ego +and the non-Ego, and of a relation between the two. + +In all seriousness, if the existence of instincts be granted, the +possibility of the existence of innate ideas, in the most extended sense +ever imagined by Descartes, must also be admitted. In fact, Descartes, +as we have soon, illustrates what he means by an innate idea, by the +analogy of hereditary diseases or hereditary mental peculiarities, such +as generosity. On the other hand, hereditary mental tendencies may +justly be termed instincts; and still more appropriately might those +special proclivities, which constitute what we call genius, come into +the same category. + +The child who is impelled to draw as soon as it can hold a pencil; the +Mozart who breaks out into music as early; the boy Bidder who worked out +the most complicated sums without learning arithmetic; the boy Pascal +who evolved Euclid out of his own consciousness: all these may be said +to have been impelled by instinct, as much as are the beaver and the +bee. And the man of genius, is distinct in kind from the man of +cleverness, by reason of the working within him of strong innate +tendencies--which cultivation may improve, but which it can no more +create, than horticulture can make thistles bear figs. The analogy +between a musical instrument and the mind holds good here also. Art and +industry may get much music, of a sort, out of a penny whistle; but, +when all is done, it has no chance against an organ. The innate musical +potentialities of the two are infinitely different. + + + + +CHAPTER VI. + +LANGUAGE--PROPOSITIONS CONCERNING NECESSARY TRUTHS. + + +Though we may accept Hume's conclusion that speechless animals think, +believe, and reason; yet, it must be borne in mind, that there is an +important difference between the signification of the terms when applied +to them and when applied to those animals which possess language. The +thoughts of the former are trains of mere feelings; those of the latter +are, in addition, trains of the ideas of the signs which represent +feelings, and which are called "words." + +A word, in fact, is a spoken or written sign, the idea of which is, by +repetition, so closely associated with the idea of the simple or complex +feeling which it represents, that the association becomes indissoluble. +No Englishman, for example, can think of the word "dog" without +immediately having the idea of the group of impressions to which that +name is given; and conversely, the group of impressions immediately +calls up the idea of the word "dog." + +The association of words with impressions and ideas is the process of +naming; and language approaches perfection, in proportion as the shades +of difference between various ideas and impressions are represented by +differences in their names. + +The names of simple impressions and ideas, or of groups of co-existent +or successive complex impressions and ideas, considered _per se_, are +substantives; as redness, dog, silver, mouth; while the names of +impressions or ideas considered as parts or attributes of a complex +whole, are adjectives. Thus redness, considered as part of the complex +idea of a rose, becomes the adjective red; flesh-eater, as part of the +idea of a dog, is represented by carnivorous; whiteness, as part of the +idea of silver, is white; and so on. + +The linguistic machinery for the expression of belief is called +_predication_; and, as all beliefs express ideas of relation, we may say +that the sign of predication is the verbal symbol of a feeling of +relation. The words which serve to indicate predication are verbs. If I +say "silver" and then "white," I merely utter two names; but if I +interpose between them the verb "is," I express a belief in the +co-existence of the feeling of whiteness with the other feelings which +constitute the totality of the complex idea of silver; in other words, I +predicate "whiteness" of silver. + +In such a case as this, the verb expresses predication and nothing else, +and is called a copula. But, in the great majority of verbs, the word is +the sign of a complex idea, and the predication is expressed only by its +form. Thus in "silver shines," the verb "to shine" is the sign for the +feeling of brightness, and the mark of predication lies in the form +"shine-_s_." + +Another result is brought about by the forms of verbs. By slight +modifications they are made to indicate that a belief, or predication, +is a memory, or is an expectation. Thus "silver _shone_" expresses a +memory; "silver _will_ shine" an expectation. + +The form of words which expresses a predication is a proposition. +Hence, every predication is the verbal equivalent of a belief; and, as +every belief is either an immediate consciousness, a memory, or an +expectation, and as every expectation is traceable to a memory, it +follows that, in the long run, all propositions express either immediate +states of consciousness, or memories. The proposition which predicates A +of X must mean either, that the fact is testified by my present +consciousness, as when I say that two colours, visible at this moment, +resemble one another; or that A is indissolubly associated with X in +memory; or that A is indissolubly associated with X in expectation. But +it has already been shown that expectation is only an expression of +memory. + +Hume does not discuss the nature of language, but so much of what +remains to be said, concerning his philosophical tenets, turns upon the +value and the origin of verbal propositions, that this summary sketch of +the relations of language to the thinking process will probably not be +deemed superfluous. + +So large an extent of the field of thought is traversed by Hume, in his +discussion of the verbal propositions in which mankind enshrine their +beliefs, that it would be impossible to follow him throughout all the +windings of his long journey, within the limits of this essay. I +purpose, therefore, to limit myself to those propositions which +concern--1. Necessary Truths; 2. The Order of Nature; 3. The Soul; 4. +Theism; 5. The Passions and Volition; 6. The Principle of Morals. + + +Hume's views respecting necessary truths, and more particularly +concerning causation, have, more than any other part of his teaching, +contributed to give him a prominent place in the history of philosophy. + + "All the objects of human reason and inquiry may naturally be + divided into two kinds, to wit, _relations of ideas_ and _matters + of fact_. Of the first kind are the sciences of geometry, algebra, + and arithmetic, and, in short, every affirmation which is either + intuitively or demonstratively certain. _That the square of the + hypothenuse is equal to the square of the two sides_, is a + proposition which expresses a relation between these two figures. + _That three times five is equal to the half of thirty_, expresses a + relation between these numbers. Propositions of this kind are + discoverable by the mere operation of thought without dependence on + whatever is anywhere existent in the universe. Though there never + were a circle or a triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by + Euclid would for ever retain their certainty and evidence. + + "Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are + not ascertained in the same manner, nor is an evidence of their + truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The + contrary of every matter of fact is still possible, because it can + never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the + same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to + reality. _That the sun will not rise to-morrow_, is no less + intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction, than + the affirmation, _that it will rise_. We should in vain, therefore, + attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively + false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be + distinctly conceived by the mind."--(IV. pp. 32, 33.) + +The distinction here drawn between the truths of geometry and other +kinds of truth is far less sharply indicated in the _Treatise_, but as +Hume expressly disowns any opinions on these matters but such as are +expressed in the _Inquiry_, we may confine ourselves to the latter; and +it is needful to look narrowly into the propositions here laid down, as +much stress has been laid upon Hume's admission that the truths of +mathematics are intuitively and demonstratively certain; in other +words, that they are necessary and, in that respect, differ from all +other kinds of belief. + +What is meant by the assertion that "propositions of this kind are +discoverable by the mere operation of thought without dependence on what +is anywhere existent in the universe"? + +Suppose that there were no such things as impressions of sight and touch +anywhere in the universe, what idea could we have even of a straight +line, much less of a triangle and of the relations between its sides? +The fundamental proposition of all Hume's philosophy is that ideas are +copied from impressions; and, therefore, if there were no impressions of +straight lines and triangles there could be no ideas of straight lines +and triangles. But what we mean by the universe is the sum of our actual +and possible impressions. + +So, again, whether our conception of number is derived from relations of +impressions in space or in time, the impressions must exist in nature, +that is, in experience, before their relations can be perceived. Form +and number are mere names for certain relations between matters of fact; +unless a man had seen or felt the difference between a straight line and +a crooked one, straight and crooked would have no more meaning to him, +than red and blue to the blind. + +The axiom, that things which are equal to the same are equal to one +another, is only a particular case of the predication of similarity; if +there were no impressions, it is obvious that there could be no +predicates. But what is an existence in the universe but an impression? + +If what are called necessary truths are rigidly analysed, they will be +found to be of two kinds. Either they depend on the convention which +underlies the possibility of intelligible speech, that terms shall +always have the same meaning; or they are propositions the negation of +which implies the dissolution of some association in memory or +expectation, which is in fact indissoluble; or the denial of some fact +of immediate consciousness. + +The "necessary truth" A = A means that the perception which is called A +shall always be called A. The "necessary truth" that "two straight lines +cannot inclose a space," means that we have no memory, and can form no +expectation of their so doing. The denial of the "necessary truth" that +the thought now in my mind exists, involves the denial of consciousness. + +To the assertion that the evidence of matter of fact, is not so strong +as that of relations of ideas, it may be justly replied, that a great +number of matters of fact are nothing but relations of ideas. If I say +that red is unlike blue, I make an assertion concerning a relation of +ideas; but it is also matter of fact, and the contrary proposition is +inconceivable. If I remember[26] something that happened five minutes +ago, that is matter of fact; and, at the same time, it expresses a +relation between the event remembered and the present time. It is wholly +inconceivable to me that the event did not happen, so that my assurance +respecting it is as strong as that which I have respecting any other +necessary truth. In fact, the man is either very wise or very virtuous, +or very lucky, perhaps all three, who has gone through life without +accumulating a store of such necessary beliefs which he would give a +good deal to be able to disbelieve. + +It would be beside the mark to discuss the matter further on the present +occasion. It is sufficient to point out that, whatever may be the +differences, between mathematical and other truths, they do not justify +Hume's statement. And it is, at any rate, impossible to prove, that the +cogency of mathematical first principles is due to anything more than +these circumstances; that the experiences with which they are concerned +are among the first which arise in the mind; that they are so +incessantly repeated as to justify us, according to the ordinary laws of +ideation, in expecting that the associations which they form will be of +extreme tenacity; while the fact, that the expectations based upon them +are always verified, finishes the process of welding them together. + +Thus, if the axioms of mathematics are innate, nature would seem to have +taken unnecessary trouble; since the ordinary process of association +appears to be amply sufficient to confer upon them all the universality +and necessity which they actually possess. + + +Whatever needless admissions Hume may have made respecting other +necessary truths he is quite clear about the axiom of causation, "That +whatever event has a beginning must have a cause;" whether and in what +sense it is a necessary truth; and, that question being decided, whence +it is derived. + +With respect to the first question, Hume denies that it is a necessary +truth, in the sense that we are unable to conceive the contrary. The +evidence by which he supports this conclusion in the _Inquiry_, however, +is not strictly relevant to the issue. + + "No object ever discovers, by the qualities which appear to the + senses, either the cause which produced it, or the effects which + will arise from it; nor can our reason, unassisted by experience, + ever draw any inference concerning real existence and matter of + fact."--(IV. p. 35.) + +Abundant illustrations are given of this assertion, which indeed cannot +be seriously doubted; but it does not follow that, because we are +totally unable to say what cause preceded, or what effect will succeed, +any event, we do not necessarily suppose that the event had a cause and +will be succeeded by an effect. The scientific investigator who notes a +new phenomenon may be utterly ignorant of its cause, but he will, +without hesitation, seek for that cause. If you ask him why he does so, +he will probably say that it must have had a cause; and thereby imply +that his belief in causation is a necessary belief. + +In the _Treatise_ Hume indeed takes the bull by the horns: + + " ... as all distinct ideas are separable from each other, and as + the ideas of cause and effect are evidently distinct, 'twill be + easy for us to conceive any object to be non-existent this moment + find existent the next, without conjoining to it the distinct idea + of a cause or productive principle."--(I. p. 111.) + +If Hume had been content to state what he believed to be matter of fact, +and had abstained from giving superfluous reasons for that which is +susceptible of being proved or disproved only by personal experience, +his position would have been stronger. For it seems clear that, on the +ground of observation, he is quite right. Any man who lets his fancy run +riot in a waking dream, may experience the existence at one moment, and +the non-existence at the next, of phenomena which suggest no connexion +of cause and effect. Not only so, but it is notorious that, to the +unthinking mass of mankind, nine-tenths of the facts of life do not +suggest the relation of cause and effect; and they practically deny the +existence of any such relation by attributing them to chance. Few +gamblers but would stare if they were told that the falling of a die on +a particular face is as much the effect of a definite cause as the fact +of its falling; it is a proverb that "the wind bloweth where it +listeth;" and even thoughtful men usually receive with surprise the +suggestion, that the form of the crest of every wave that breaks, +wind-driven, on the sea-shore, and the direction of every particle of +foam that flies before the gale, are the exact effects of definite +causes; and, as such, must be capable of being determined, deductively, +from the laws of motion and the properties of air and water. So again, +there are large numbers of highly intelligent persons who rather pride +themselves on their fixed belief that our volitions have no cause; or +that the will causes itself, which is either the same thing, or a +contradiction in terms. + +Hume's argument in support of what appears to be a true proposition, +however, is of the circular sort, for the major premiss, that all +distinct ideas are separable in thought, assumes the question at issue. + +But the question whether the idea of causation is necessary, or not, is +really of very little importance. For, to say that an idea is necessary +is simply to affirm that we cannot conceive the contrary; and the fact +that we cannot conceive the contrary of any belief may be a presumption, +but is certainly no proof, of its truth. + +In the well-known experiment of touching a single round object, such as +a marble, with crossed fingers, it is utterly impossible to conceive +that we have not two round objects under them; and, though light is +undoubtedly a mere sensation arising in the brain, it is utterly +impossible to conceive that it is not outside the retina. In the same +way, he who touches anything with a rod, not only is irresistibly led to +believe that the sensation of contact is at the end of the rod, but is +utterly incapable of conceiving that this sensation is really in his +head. Yet that which is inconceivable is manifestly true in all these +cases. The beliefs and the unbeliefs are alike necessary, and alike +erroneous. + +It is commonly urged that the axiom of causation cannot be derived from +experience, because experience only proves that many things have causes, +whereas the axiom declares that all things have causes. The syllogism, +"many things which come into existence have causes, A has come into +existence: therefore A had a cause," is obviously fallacious, if A is +not previously shown to be one of the "many things." And this objection +is perfectly sound so far as it goes. The axiom of causation cannot +possibly be deduced from any general proposition which simply embodies +experience. But it does not follow that the belief, or expectation, +expressed by the axiom, is not a product of experience, generated +antecedently to, and altogether independently of, the logically +unjustifiable language in which we express it. + +In fact, the axiom of causation resembles all other beliefs of +expectation in being the verbal symbol of a purely automatic act of the +mind, which is altogether extra-logical, and would be illogical, if it +were not constantly verified by experience. Experience, as we have seen, +stores up memories; memories generate expectations or beliefs--why they +do so may be explained hereafter by proper investigation of cerebral +physiology. But, to seek for the reason of the facts in the verbal +symbols by which they are expressed, and to be astonished that it is not +to be found there, is surely singular; and what Hume did was to turn +attention from the verbal proposition to the psychical fact of which it +is the symbol. + + "When any natural object or event is presented, it is impossible + for us, by any sagacity or penetration, to discover, or even + conjecture, without experience, what event will result from it, or + to carry our foresight beyond that object, which is immediately + present to the memory and senses. Even after one instance or + experiment, where we have observed a particular event to follow + upon another, we are not entitled to form a general rule, or + foretell what will happen in like cases; it being justly esteemed + an unpardonable temerity to judge of the whole course of nature + from one single experiment, however accurate or certain. But when + one particular species of events has always, in all instances, been + conjoined with another, we make no longer any scruple of + foretelling one upon the appearance of the other, and of employing + that reasoning which can alone assure us of any matter of fact or + existence. We then call the one object _Cause_, the other _Effect_. + We suppose that there is some connexion between them: some power in + the one, by which it infallibly produces the other, and operates + with the greatest certainty and strongest necessity.... But there + is nothing in a number of instances, different from every single + instance, which is supposed to be exactly similar; except only, + that after a repetition of similar instances, the mind is carried + by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual + attendant, and to believe that it will exist.... The first time a + man saw the communication of motion by impulse, as by the shock of + two billiard balls, he could not pronounce that the one event was + _connected_, but only that it was _conjoined_, with the other. + After he has observed several instances of this nature, he then + pronounces them to be _connected_. What alteration has happened to + give rise to this new idea of _connexion_? Nothing but that he now + _feels_ those events to be _connected_ in his imagination, and can + readily foresee the existence of the one from the appearance of the + other. When we say, therefore, that one object is connected with + another we mean only that they have acquired a connexion in our + thought, and give rise to this inference, by which they become + proofs of each other's existence; a conclusion which is somewhat + extraordinary, but which seems founded on sufficient + evidence."--(IV. pp. 87-89.) + +In the fifteenth section of the third part of the _Treatise_, under the +head of the _Rules by which to Judge of Causes and Effects_, Hume gives +a sketch of the method of allocating effects to their causes, upon +which, so far as I am aware, no improvement was made down to the time of +the publication of Mill's _Logic_. Of Mill's four methods, that of +_agreement_ is indicated in the following passage:-- + + " ... where several different objects produce the same effect, it + must be by means of some quality which we discover to be common + amongst them. For as like effects imply like causes, we must always + ascribe the causation to the circumstance wherein we discover the + resemblance."--(I. p. 229.) + +Next, the foundation of the _method of difference_ is stated:-- + + "The difference in the effects of two resembling objects must + proceed from that particular in which they differ. For, as like + causes always produce like effects, when in any instance we find + our expectation to be disappointed, we must conclude that this + irregularity proceeds from some difference in the causes."--(I. p. + 230.) + +In the succeeding paragraph the _method of concomitant variations_ is +foreshadowed. + + "When any object increases or diminishes with the increase or + diminution of the cause, 'tis to be regarded as a compounded + effect, derived from the union of the several different effects + which arise from the several different parts of the cause. The + absence or presence of one part of the cause is here supposed to be + always attended with the absence or presence of a proportionable + part of the effect. This constant conjunction sufficiently proves + that the one part is the cause of the other. We must, however, + beware not to draw such a conclusion from a few experiments."--(I. + p. 230.) + +Lastly, the following rule, though awkwardly stated, contains a +suggestion of the _method of residues_:-- + + " ... an object which exists for any time in its full perfection + without any effect, is not the sole cause of that effect, but + requires to be assisted by some other principle, which may forward + its influence and operation. For as like effects necessarily follow + from like causes, and in a contiguous time and place, their + separation for a moment shows that these causes are not complete + ones."--(I. p. 230.) + +In addition to the bare notion of necessary connexion between the cause +and its effect, we undoubtedly find in our minds the idea of something +resident in the cause which, as we say, produces the effect, and we call +this something Force, Power, or Energy. Hume explains Force and Power as +the results of the association with inanimate causes of the feelings of +endeavour or resistance which we experience, when our bodies give rise +to, or resist, motion. + +If I throw a ball, I have a sense of effort which ends when the ball +leaves my hand; and if I catch a ball, I have a sense of resistance +which comes to an end with the quiescence of the ball. In the former +case, there is a strong suggestion of something having gone from myself +into the ball; in the latter, of something having been received from the +ball. Let any one hold a piece of iron near a strong magnet, and the +feeling that the magnet endeavours to pull the iron one way in the same +manner as he endeavours to pull it in the opposite direction, is very +strong. + +As Hume says:-- + + "No animal can put external bodies in motion without the sentiment + of a _nisus_, or endeavour; and every animal has a sentiment or + feeling from the stroke or blow of an external object that is in + motion. These sensations, which are merely animal, and from which + we can, _a priori_, draw no inference, we are apt to transfer to + inanimate objects, and to suppose that they have some such feelings + whenever they transfer or receive motion."--(IV. p. 91, _note_.) + +It is obviously, however, an absurdity not less gross than that of +supposing the sensation of warmth to exist in a fire, to imagine that +the subjective sensation of effort or resistance in ourselves can be +present in external objects, when they stand in the relation of causes +to other objects. + +To the argument, that we have a right to suppose the relation of cause +and effect to contain something more than invariable succession, +because, when we ourselves act as causes, or in volition, we are +conscious of exerting power; Hume replies, that we know nothing of the +feeling we call power except as effort or resistance; and that we have +not the slightest means of knowing whether it has anything to do with +the production of bodily motion or mental changes. And he points out, as +Descartes and Spinoza had done before him, that when voluntary motion +takes place, that which we will is not the immediate consequence of the +act of volition, but something which is separated from it by a long +chain of causes and effects. If the will is the cause of the movement of +a limb, it can be so only in the sense that the guard who gives the +order to go on, is the cause of the transport of a train from one +station to another. + + "We learn from anatomy, that the immediate object of power in + voluntary motion is not the member itself which is moved, but + certain muscles and nerves and animal spirits, and perhaps + something still more minute and unknown, through which the motion + is successively propagated, ere it reach the member itself, whose + motion is the immediate object of volition. Can there be a more + certain proof that the power by which the whole operation is + performed, so far from being directly and fully known by an inward + sentiment or consciousness, is to the last degree mysterious and + unintelligible? Here the mind wills a certain event: Immediately + another event, unknown to ourselves, and totally different from the + one intended, is produced: This event produces another equally + unknown: Till at last, through a long succession, the desired event + is produced."--(IV. p. 78.) + +A still stronger argument against ascribing an objective existence to +force or power, on the strength of our supposed direct intuition of +power in voluntary acts, may be urged from the unquestionable fact, that +we do not know, and cannot know, that volition does cause corporeal +motion; while there is a great deal to be said in favour of the view +that it is no cause, but merely a concomitant of that motion. But the +nature of volition will be more fitly considered hereafter. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[26] Hume, however, expressly includes the "records of our memory" among +his matters of fact.--(IV. p. 33.) + + + + +CHAPTER VII. + +THE ORDER OF NATURE: MIRACLES. + + +If our beliefs of expectation are based on our beliefs of memory, and +anticipation is only inverted recollection, it necessarily follows that +every belief of expectation implies the belief that the future will have +a certain resemblance to the past. From the first hour of experience, +onwards, this belief is constantly being verified, until old age is +inclined to suspect that experience has nothing new to offer. And when +the experience of generation after generation is recorded, and a single +book tells us more than Methuselah could have learned, had he spent +every waking hour of his thousand years in learning; when apparent +disorders are found to be only the recurrent pulses of a slow working +order, and the wonder of a year becomes the commonplace of a century; +when repeated and minute examination never reveals a break in the chain +of causes and effects; and the whole edifice of practical life is built +upon our faith in its continuity; the belief that that chain has never +been broken and will never be broken, becomes one of the strongest and +most justifiable of human convictions. And it must be admitted to be a +reasonable request, if we ask those who would have us put faith in the +actual occurrence of interruptions of that order, to produce evidence +in favour of their view, not only equal, but superior, in weight to that +which leads us to adopt ours. + +This is the essential argument of Hume's famous disquisition upon +miracles; and it may safely be declared to be irrefragable. But it must +be admitted that Hume has surrounded the kernel of his essay with a +shell of very doubtful value. + +The first step in this, as in all other discussions, is to come to a +clear understanding as to the meaning of the terms employed. +Argumentation whether miracles are possible, and, if possible, credible, +is mere beating the air until the arguers have agreed what they mean by +the word "miracles." + +Hume, with less than his usual perspicuity, but in accordance with a +common practice of believers in the miraculous, defines a miracle as a +"violation of the laws of nature," or as "a transgression of a law of +nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of +some invisible agent." + +There must, he says,-- + + "be an uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise + the event would not merit that appellation. And as an uniform + experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full + proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any + miracle; nor can such a proof be destroyed or the miracle rendered + credible but by an opposite proof which is superior."--(IV. p. + 134.) + +Every one of these dicta appears to be open to serious objection. + +The word "miracle"--_miraculum_,--in its primitive and legitimate sense, +simply means something wonderful. + +Cicero applies it as readily to the fancies of philosophers, "Portenta +et miracula philosophorum somniantium," as we do to the prodigies of +priests. And the source of the wonder which a miracle excites is the +belief, on the part of those who witness it, that it transcends or +contradicts ordinary experience. + +The definition of a miracle as a "violation of the laws of nature" is, +in reality, an employment of language which, on the face of the matter, +cannot be justified. For "nature" means neither more nor less than that +which is; the sum of phenomena presented to our experience; the totality +of events past, present, and to come. Every event must be taken to be a +part of nature, until proof to the contrary is supplied. And such proof +is, from the nature of the case, impossible. + +Hume asks:-- + + "Why is it more than probable that all men must die: that lead + cannot of itself remain suspended in the air: that fire consumes + wood and is extinguished by water; unless it be that these events + are found agreeable to the laws of nature, and there is required a + violation of those laws, or in other words, a miracle, to prevent + them?"--(IV. p. 133.) + +But the reply is obvious; not one of these events is "more than +probable"; though the probability may reach such a very high degree +that, in ordinary language, we are justified in saying that the opposite +events are impossible. Calling our often verified experience a "law of +nature" adds nothing to its value, nor in the slightest degree increases +any probability that it will be verified again, which may arise out of +the fact of its frequent verification. + +If a piece of lead were to remain suspended of itself, in the air, the +occurrence would be a "miracle," in the sense of a wonderful event, +indeed; but no one trained in the methods of science would imagine that +any law of nature was really violated thereby. He would simply set to +work to investigate the conditions under which so highly unexpected an +occurrence took place, and thereby enlarge his experience and modify his +hitherto unduly narrow conception of the laws of nature. + +The alternative definition, that a miracle is "a transgression of a law +of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition +of some invisible agent," (IV. p. 134, _note_) is still less defensible. +For a vast number of miracles have professedly been worked, neither by +the Deity, nor by any invisible agent; but by Beelzebub and his +compeers, or by very visible men. + +Moreover, not to repeat what has been said respecting the absurdity of +supposing that something which occurs is a transgression of laws, our +only knowledge of which is derived from the observation of that which +occurs; upon what sort of evidence can we be justified in concluding +that a given event is the effect of a particular volition of the Deity, +or of the interposition of some invisible (that is unperceivable) agent? +It may be so, but how is the assertion, that it is so, to be tested? If +it be said that the event exceeds the power of natural causes, what can +justify such a saying? The day-fly has better grounds for calling a +thunderstorm supernatural, than has man, with his experience of an +infinitesimal fraction of duration, to say that the most astonishing +event that can be imagined is beyond the scope of natural causes. + + "Whatever is intelligible and can be distinctly conceived, implies + no contradiction, and can never be proved false by any + demonstration, argument, or abstract reasoning _a priori_."--(IV. + p. 44.) + +So wrote Hume, with perfect justice, in his _Sceptical Doubts_. But a +miracle, in the sense of a sudden and complete change in the customary +order of nature, is intelligible, can be distinctly conceived, implies +no contradiction; and, therefore, according to Hume's own showing, +cannot be proved false by any demonstrative argument. + +Nevertheless, in diametrical contradiction to his own principles, Hume +says elsewhere:-- + + "It is a miracle that a dead man should come to life: because that + has never been observed in any age or country."--(IV. p. 134.) + +That is to say, there is an uniform experience against such an event, +and therefore, if it occurs, it is a violation of the laws of nature. +Or, to put the argument in its naked absurdity, that which never has +happened never can happen, without a violation of the laws of nature. In +truth, if a dead man did come to life, the fact would be evidence, not +that any law of nature had been violated, but that those laws, even when +they express the results of a very long and uniform experience, are +necessarily based on incomplete knowledge, and are to be held only as +grounds of more or less justifiable expectation. + +To sum up, the definition of a miracle as a suspension or a +contravention of the order of Nature is self-contradictory, because all +we know of the order of nature is derived from our observation of the +course of events of which the so-called miracle is a part. On the other +hand, no event is too extraordinary to be impossible; and, therefore, if +by the term miracles we mean only "extremely wonderful events," there +can be no just ground for denying the possibility of their occurrence. + + +But when we turn from the question of the possibility of miracles, +however they may be defined, in the abstract, to that respecting the +grounds upon which we are justified in believing any particular miracle, +Hume's arguments have a very different value, for they resolve +themselves into a simple statement of the dictates of common +sense--which may be expressed in this canon: the more a statement of +fact conflicts with previous experience, the more complete must be the +evidence which is to justify us in believing it. It is upon this +principle that every one carries on the business of common life. If a +man tells me he saw a piebald horse in Piccadilly, I believe him without +hesitation. The thing itself is likely enough, and there is no +imaginable motive for his deceiving me. But if the same person tells me +he observed a zebra there, I might hesitate a little about accepting his +testimony, unless I were well satisfied, not only as to his previous +acquaintance with zebras, but as to his powers and opportunities of +observation in the present case. If, however, my informant assured me +that he beheld a centaur trotting down that famous thoroughfare, I +should emphatically decline to credit his statement; and this even if he +were the most saintly of men and ready to suffer martyrdom in support of +his belief. In such a case, I could, of course, entertain no doubt of +the good faith of the witness; it would be only his competency, which +unfortunately has very little to do with good faith or intensity of +conviction, which I should presume to call in question. + +Indeed, I hardly know what testimony would satisfy me of the existence +of a live centaur. To put an extreme case, suppose the late Johannes +Müller, of Berlin, the greatest anatomist and physiologist among my +contemporaries, had barely affirmed he had seen a live centaur, I should +certainly have been staggered by the weight of an assertion coming from +such an authority. But I could have got no further than a suspension of +judgment. For, on the whole, it would have been more probable that even +he had fallen into some error of interpretation of the facts which came +under his observation, than that such an animal as a centaur really +existed. And nothing short of a careful monograph, by a highly competent +investigator, accompanied by figures and measurements of all the most +important parts of a centaur, put forth under circumstances which could +leave no doubt that falsification or misinterpretation would meet with +immediate exposure, could possibly enable a man of science to feel that +he acted conscientiously, in expressing his belief in the existence of a +centaur on the evidence of testimony. + +This hesitation about admitting the existence of such an animal as a +centaur, be it observed, does not deserve reproach, as scepticism, but +moderate praise, as mere scientific good faith. It need not imply, and +it does not, so far as I am concerned, any _a priori_ hypothesis that a +centaur is an impossible animal; or, that his existence, if he did +exist, would violate the laws of nature. Indubitably, the organisation +of a centaur presents a variety of practical difficulties to an +anatomist and physiologist; and a good many of those generalisations of +our present experience, which we are pleased to call laws of nature, +would be upset by the appearance of such an animal, so that we should +have to frame new laws to cover our extended experience. Every wise man +will admit that the possibilities of nature are infinite, and include +centaurs; but he will not the less feel it his duty to hold fast, for +the present, by the dictum of Lucretius, "Nam certe ex vivo Centauri non +fit imago," and to cast the entire burthen of proof, that centaurs +exist, on the shoulders of those who ask him to believe the statement. + +Judged by the canons either of common sense, or of science, which are +indeed one and the same, all "miracles" are centaurs, or they would not +be miracles; and men of sense and science will deal with them on the +same principles. No one who wishes to keep well within the limits of +that which he has a right to assert will affirm that it is impossible +that the sun and moon should ever have been made to appear to stand +still in the valley of Ajalon; or that the walls of a city should have +fallen down at a trumpet blast; or that water was turned into wine; +because such events are contrary to uniform experience and violate laws +of nature. For aught he can prove to the contrary, such events may +appear in the order of nature to-morrow. But common sense and common +honesty alike oblige him to demand from those who would have him believe +in the actual occurrence of such events, evidence of a cogency +proportionate to their departure from probability; evidence at least as +strong as that, which the man who says he has seen a centaur is bound to +produce, unless he is content to be thought either more than credulous +or less than honest. + +But are there any miracles on record, the evidence for which fulfils the +plain and simple requirements alike of elementary logic and of +elementary morality? + +Hume answers this question without the smallest hesitation, and with all +the authority of a historical specialist:-- + + "There is not to be found, in all history, any miracle attested by + a sufficient number of men, of such unquestioned goodness, + education, and learning, as to secure us against all delusion in + themselves; of such undoubted integrity, as to place them beyond + all suspicion of any design to deceive others; of such credit and + reputation in the eyes of mankind, as to have a great deal to lose + in case of their being detected in any falsehood; and at the same + time attesting facts, performed in such a public manner, and in so + celebrated a part of the world, as to render the detection + unavoidable: All which circumstances are requisite to give us a + full assurance of the testimony of men."--(IV. p. 135.) + +These are grave assertions, but they are least likely to be challenged +by those who have made it their business to weigh evidence and to give +their decision under a due sense of the moral responsibility which they +incur in so doing. + +It is probable that few persons who proclaim their belief in miracles +have considered what would be necessary to justify that belief in the +case of a professed modern miracle-worker. Suppose, for example, it is +affirmed that A.B. died and that C.D. brought him to life again. Let it +be granted that A.B. and C.D. are persons of unimpeachable honour and +veracity; that C.D. is the next heir to A.B.'s estate, and therefore had +a strong motive for not bringing him to life again; and that all A.B.'s +relations, respectable persons who bore him a strong affection, or had +otherwise an interest in his being alive, declared that they saw him +die. Furthermore, let A.B. be seen after his recovery by all his friends +and neighbours, and let his and their depositions, that he is now alive, +be taken down before a magistrate of known integrity and acuteness: +would all this constitute even presumptive evidence that C.D. had worked +a miracle? Unquestionably not. For the most important link in the whole +chain of evidence is wanting, and that is the proof that A.B. was really +dead. The evidence of ordinary observers on such a point as this is +absolutely worthless. And, even medical evidence, unless the physician +is a person of unusual knowledge and skill, may have little more value. +Unless careful thermometric observation proves that the temperature has +sunk below a certain point; unless the cadaveric stiffening of the +muscles has become well established; all the ordinary signs of death may +be fallacious, and the intervention of C.D. may have had no more to do +with A.B.'s restoration to life than any other fortuitously coincident +event. + +It may be said that such a coincidence would be more wonderful than the +miracle itself. Nevertheless history acquaints us with coincidences as +marvellous. + +On the 19th of February, 1842, Sir Robert Sale held Jellalabad with a +small English force and, daily expecting attack from an overwhelming +force of Afghans, had spent three months in incessantly labouring to +improve the fortifications of the town. Akbar Khan had approached within +a few miles, and an onslaught of his army was supposed to be imminent. +That morning an earthquake-- + + "nearly destroyed the town, threw down the greater part of the + parapets, the central gate with the adjoining bastions, and a part + of the new bastion which flanked it. Three other bastions were also + nearly destroyed, whilst several large breaches were made in the + curtains, and the Peshawur side, eighty feet long, was quite + practicable, the ditch being filled, and the descent easy. Thus in + one moment the labours of three months were in a great measure + destroyed."[27] + +If Akbar Khan had happened to give orders for an assault in the early +morning of the 19th of February, what good follower of the Prophet could +have doubted that Allah had lent his aid? As it chanced, however, +Mahometan faith in the miraculous took another turn; for the energetic +defenders of the post had repaired the damage by the end of the month; +and the enemy, finding no signs of the earthquake when they invested the +place, ascribed the supposed immunity of Jellalabad to English +witchcraft. + + +But the conditions of belief do not vary with time or place; and, if it +is undeniable that evidence of so complete and weighty a character is +needed, at the present time, for the establishment of the occurrence of +such a wonder as that supposed, it has always been needful. Those who +study the extant records of miracles with due attention will judge for +themselves how far it has ever been supplied. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[27] Report of Captain Broadfoot, garrison engineer, quoted in Kaye's +_Afghanistan_. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII. + +THEISM; EVOLUTION OF THEOLOGY. + + +Hume seems to have had but two hearty dislikes: the one to the English +nation, and the other to all the professors of dogmatic theology. The +one aversion he vented only privately to his friends; but, if he is ever +bitter in his public utterances, it is against priests[28] in general +and theological enthusiasts and fanatics in particular; if he ever seems +insincere, it is when he wishes to insult theologians by a parade of +sarcastic respect. One need go no further than the peroration of the +_Essay on Miracles_ for a characteristic illustration. + + "I am the better pleased with the method of reasoning here + delivered, as I think it may serve to confound those dangerous + friends and disguised enemies to the _Christian religion_ who have + undertaken to defend it by the principles of human reason. Our + most holy religion is founded on _Faith_, not on reason, and it is + a sure method of exposing it to put it to such a trial as it is by + no means fitted to endure. ... the Christian religion not only was + at first attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be + believed by any reasonable person without one. Mere reason is + insufficient to convince us of its veracity: And whoever is moved + by _Faith_ to assent to it, is conscious of a continual miracle in + his own person, which subverts all the principles of his + understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is + most contrary to custom and experience."--(IV. pp. 153, 154.) + +It is obvious that, here and elsewhere, Hume, adopting a popular +confusion of ideas, uses religion as the equivalent of dogmatic +theology; and, therefore, he says, with perfect justice, that "religion +is nothing but a species of philosophy" (iv. p. 171). Here no doubt lies +the root of his antagonism. The quarrels of theologians and philosophers +have not been about religion, but about philosophy; and philosophers not +unfrequently seem to entertain the same feeling towards theologians that +sportsmen cherish towards poachers. "There cannot be two passions more +nearly resembling each other than hunting and philosophy," says Hume. +And philosophic hunters are given to think, that, while they pursue +truth for its own sake, out of pure love for the chase (perhaps mingled +with a little human weakness to be thought good shots), and by open and +legitimate methods; their theological competitors too often care merely +to supply the market of establishments; and disdain neither the aid of +the snares of superstition, nor the cover of the darkness of ignorance. + +Unless some foundation was given for this impression by the theological +writers whose works had fallen in Hume's way, it is difficult to account +for the depth of feeling which so good natured a man manifests on the +subject. + +Thus he writes in the _Natural History of Religion_, with quite unusual +acerbity:-- + + "The chief objection to it [the ancient heathen mythology] with + regard to this planet is, that it is not ascertained by any just + reason or authority. The ancient tradition insisted on by heathen + priests and theologers is but a weak foundation: and transmitted + also such a number of contradictory reports, supported all of them + by equal authority, that it became absolutely impossible to fix a + preference among them. A few volumes, therefore, must contain all + the polemical writings of pagan priests: And their whole theology + must consist more of traditional stories and superstitious + practices than of philosophical argument and controversy. + + "But where theism forms the fundamental principle of any popular + religion, that tenet is so conformable to sound reason, that + philosophy is apt to incorporate itself with such a system of + theology. And if the other dogmas of that system be contained in a + sacred book, such as the Alcoran, or be determined by any visible + authority, like that of the Roman pontiff, speculative reasoners + naturally carry on their assent, and embrace a theory, which has + been instilled into them by their earliest education, and which + also possesses some degree of consistence and uniformity. But as + these appearances are sure, all of them, to prove deceitful, + philosophy will very soon find herself very unequally yoked with + her new associate; and instead of regulating each principle, as + they advance together, she is at every turn perverted to serve the + purposes of superstition. For besides the unavoidable incoherences, + which must be reconciled and adjusted, one may safely affirm, that + all popular theology, especially the scholastic, has a kind of + appetite for absurdity and contradiction. If that theology went not + beyond reason and common sense, her doctrines would appear too easy + and familiar. Amazement must of necessity be raised: Mystery + affected: Darkness and obscurity sought after: And a foundation of + merit afforded to the devout votaries, who desire an opportunity + of subduing their rebellious reason by the belief of the most + unintelligible sophisms. + + "Ecclesiastical history sufficiently confirms these reflections. + When a controversy is started, some people always pretend with + certainty to foretell the issue. Whichever opinion, say they, is + most contrary to plain reason is sure to prevail; even when the + general interest of the system requires not that decision. Though + the reproach of heresy may, for some time, be bandied about among + the disputants, it always rests at last on the side of reason. Any + one, it is pretended, that has but learning enough of this kind to + know the definition of _Arian_, _Pelagian_, _Erastian_, _Socinian_, + _Sabellian_, _Eutychian_, _Nestorian_, _Monothelite_, &c., not to + mention _Protestant_, whose fate is yet uncertain, will be + convinced of the truth of this observation. It is thus a system + becomes absurd in the end, merely from its being reasonable and + philosophical in the beginning. + + "To oppose the torrent of scholastic religion by such feeble maxims + as these, that _it is impossible for the same thing to be and not + to be_, that _the whole is greater than a part_, that _two and + three make five_, is pretending to stop the ocean with a bulrush. + Will you set up profane reason against sacred mystery? No + punishment is great enough for your impiety. And the same fires + which were kindled for heretics will serve also for the destruction + of philosophers."--(IV. pp. 481-3.) + +Holding these opinions respecting the recognised systems of theology and +their professors, Hume, nevertheless, seems to have had a theology of +his own; that is to say, he seems to have thought (though, as will +appear, it is needful for an expositor of his opinions to speak very +guardedly on this point) that the problem of theism is susceptible of +scientific treatment, with something more than a negative result. His +opinions are to be gathered from the eleventh section of the _Inquiry_ +(1748); from the _Dialogues concerning Natural Religion_, which were +written at least as early as 1751, though not published till after his +death; and from the _Natural History of Religion_, published in 1757. + +In the first two pieces, the reader is left to judge for himself which +interlocutor in the dialogue represents the thoughts of the author; but, +for the views put forward in the last, Hume accepts the responsibility. +Unfortunately, this essay deals almost wholly with the historical +development of theological ideas; and, on the question of the +philosophical foundation of theology, does little more than express the +writer's contentment with the argument from design. + + "The whole frame of nature bespeaks an Intelligent Author; and no + rational inquirer can, after serious reflection, suspend his belief + a moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine Theism + and Religion.--(IV. p. 435.) + + "Were men led into the apprehension of invisible, intelligent + power, by a contemplation of the works of nature, they could never + possibly entertain any conception but of one single being, who + bestowed existence and order on this vast machine, and adjusted all + its parts according to one regular plan or connected system. For + though, to persons of a certain turn of mind, it may not appear + altogether absurd, that several independent beings, endowed with + superior wisdom, might conspire in the contrivance and execution of + one regular plan, yet is this a merely arbitrary supposition, + which, even if allowed possible, must be confessed neither to be + supported by probability nor necessity. All things in the universe + are evidently of a piece. Everything is adjusted to everything. One + design prevails throughout the whole. And this uniformity leads the + mind to acknowledge one author; because the conception of different + authors, without any distinction of attributes or operations, + serves only to give perplexity to the imagination, without + bestowing any satisfaction on the understanding."--(IV. p. 442.) + +Thus Hume appears to have sincerely accepted the two fundamental +conclusions of the argument from design; firstly, that a Deity exists; +and, secondly, that He possesses attributes more or less allied to those +of human intelligence. But, at this embryonic stage of theology, Hume's +progress is arrested; and, after a survey of the development of dogma, +his "general corollary" is, that-- + + "The whole is a riddle, an enigma, an inexplicable mystery. Doubt, + uncertainty, suspense of judgment, appear the only result of our + most accurate scrutiny concerning this subject. But such is the + frailty of human reason, and such the irresistible contagion of + opinion, that even this deliberate doubt could scarcely be upheld; + did we not enlarge our view, and opposing one species of + superstition to another, set them a quarrelling; while we + ourselves, during their fury and contention, happily make our + escape into the calm, though obscure, regions of philosophy."--(IV. + p. 513.) + +Thus it may be fairly presumed that Hume expresses his own sentiments in +the words of the speech with which Philo concludes the _Dialogues_. + + "If the whole of natural theology, as some people seem to maintain, + resolves itself into one simple, though somewhat ambiguous, at + least undefined proposition, _That the cause or causes of order in + the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human + intelligence_: If this proposition be not capable of extension, + variation, or more particular explication: If it affords no + inference that affects human life or can be the source of any + action or forbearance: And if the analogy, imperfect as it is, can + be carried no further than to the human intelligence, and cannot be + transferred, with any appearance of probability, to the other + qualities of the mind; if this really be the case, what can the + most inquisitive, contemplative, and religious man do more than + give a plain, philosophical assent to the proposition, as often as + it occurs, and believe that the arguments on which it is + established exceed the objections which lie against it? Some + astonishment indeed will naturally arise from the greatness of the + object; some melancholy from its obscurity; some contempt of human + reason, that it can give no solution more satisfactory with regard + to so extraordinary and magnificent a question. But believe me, + Cleanthes, the most natural sentiment which a well-disposed mind + will feel on this occasion, is a longing desire and expectation + that Heaven would be pleased to dissipate, at least alleviate, this + profound ignorance, by affording some more particular revelation to + mankind, and making discoveries of the nature, attributes, and + operations of the Divine object of our faith."[29]--(II. pp. + 547-8.) + +Such being the sum total of Hume's conclusions, it cannot be said that +his theological burden is a heavy one. But, if we turn from the _Natural +History of Religion_, to the _Treatise_, the _Inquiry_, and the +_Dialogues_, the story of what happened to the ass laden with salt, who +took to the water, irresistibly suggests itself. Hume's theism, such as +it is, dissolves away in the dialectic river, until nothing is left but +the verbal sack in which it was contained. + +Of the two theistic propositions to which Hume is committed, the first +is the affirmation of the existence of a God, supported by the argument +from the nature of causation. In the _Dialogues_, Philo, while pushing +scepticism to its utmost limit, is nevertheless made to say that-- + + " ... where reasonable men treat these subjects, the question can + never be concerning the _Being_, but only the _Nature_, of the + Deity. The former truth, as you will observe, is unquestionable and + self-evident. Nothing exists without a cause, and the original + cause of this universe (whatever it be) we call God, and piously + ascribe to him every species of perfection."--(II. p. 439.) + +The expositor of Hume, who wishes to do his work thoroughly, as far as +it goes, cannot but fall into perplexity[30] when he contrasts this +language with that of the sections of the third part of the _Treatise_, +entitled, _Why a Cause is Always Necessary_, and _Of the Idea of +Necessary Connexion_. + +It is there shown, at large, that "every demonstration which has been +produced for the necessity of a cause is fallacious and sophistical" (I. +p. 111); it is affirmed, that "there is no absolute nor metaphysical +necessity that every beginning of existence should be attended with such +an object" [as a cause] (I. p. 227); and it is roundly asserted, that it +is "easy for us to conceive any object to be non-existent this moment +and existent the next, without conjoining to it the distinct idea of a +cause or productive principle" (I. p. 111). So far from the axiom, that +whatever begins to exist must have a cause of existence, being +"self-evident," as Philo calls it, Hume spends the greatest care in +showing that it is nothing but the product of custom, or experience. + +And the doubt thus forced upon one, whether Philo ought to be taken as +even, so far, Hume's mouth-piece, is increased when we reflect that we +are dealing with an acute reasoner; and that there is no difficulty in +drawing the deduction from Hume's own definition of a cause, that the +very phrase, a "first cause," involves a contradiction in terms. He lays +down that,-- + + "'Tis an established axiom both in natural and moral philosophy, + that an object, which exists for any time in its full perfection + without producing another, is not its sole cause; but is assisted + by some other principle which pushes it from its state of + inactivity, and makes it exert that energy, of which it was + secretly possessed."--(I. p. 106.) + +Now the "first cause" is assumed to have existed from all eternity, up +to the moment at which the universe came into existence. Hence it cannot +be the sole cause of the universe; in fact, it was no cause at all until +it was "assisted by some other principle"; consequently the so-called +"first cause," so far as it produces the universe, is in reality an +effect of that other principle. Moreover, though, in the person of +Philo, Hume assumes the axiom "that whatever begins to exist must have a +cause," which he denies in the _Treatise_, he must have seen, for a +child may see, that the assumption is of no real service. + +Suppose Y to be the imagined first cause and Z to be its effect. Let the +letters of the alphabet, _a_, _b_, _c_, _d_, _e_, _f_, _g_, in their +order, represent successive moments of time, and let _g_ represent the +particular moment at which the effect Z makes its appearance. It follows +that the cause Y could not have existed "in its full perfection" during +the time _a_--_e_, for if it had, then the effect Z would have come into +existence during that time, which, by the hypothesis, it did not do. The +cause Y, therefore, must have come into existence at _f_, and if +"everything that comes into existence has a cause," Y must have had a +cause X operating at _e_; X, a cause W operating at _d_; and, so on, _ad +infinitum_.[31] + +If the only demonstrative argument for the existence of a Deity, which +Hume advances, thus, literally, "goes to water" in the solvent of his +philosophy, the reasoning from the evidence of design does not fare much +better. If Hume really knew of any valid reply to Philo's arguments in +the following passages of the _Dialogues_, he has dealt unfairly by the +leader in concealing it:-- + + "But because I know you are not much swayed by names and + authorities, I shall endeavour to show you, a little more + distinctly, the inconveniences of that Anthropomorphism, which you + have embraced; and shall prove, that there is no ground to suppose + a plan of the world to be formed in the Divine mind, consisting of + distinct ideas, differently arranged, in the same manner as an + architect forms in his head the plan of a house which he intends to + execute. + + "It is not easy, I own, to see what is gained by this supposition, + whether we judge the matter by _Reason_ or by _Experience_. We are + still obliged to mount higher, in order to find the cause of this + cause, which you had assigned as satisfactory and conclusive. + + "If _Reason_ (I mean abstract reason, derived from inquiries _a + priori_) be not alike mute with regard to all questions concerning + cause and effect, this sentence at least it will venture to + pronounce: That a mental world, or universe of ideas, requires a + cause as much as does a material world, or universe of objects; + and, if similar in its arrangement, must require a similar cause. + For what is there in this subject, which should occasion a + different conclusion or inference? In an abstract view, they are + entirely alike; and no difficulty attends the one supposition, + which is not common to both of them. + + "Again, when we will needs force _Experience_ to pronounce some + sentence, even on those subjects which lie beyond her sphere, + neither can she perceive any material difference in this + particular, between these two kinds of worlds; but finds them to be + governed by similar principles, and to depend upon an equal variety + of causes in their operations. We have specimens in miniature of + both of them. Our own mind resembles the one; a vegetable or animal + body the other. Let experience, therefore, judge from these + samples. Nothing seems more delicate, with regard to its causes, + than thought: and as these causes never operate in two persons + after the same manner, so we never find two persons who think + exactly alike. Nor indeed does the same person think exactly alike + at any two different periods of time. A difference of age, of the + disposition of his body, of weather, of food, of company, of books, + of passions; any of these particulars, or others more minute, are + sufficient to alter the curious machinery of thought, and + communicate to it very different movements and operations. As far + as we can judge, vegetables and animal bodies are not more delicate + in their motions, nor depend upon a greater variety or more curious + adjustment of springs and principles. + + "How, therefore, shall we satisfy ourselves concerning the cause of + that Being whom you suppose the Author of Nature, or, according to + your system of anthropomorphism, the ideal world in which you trace + the material? Have we not the same reason to trace the ideal world + into another ideal world, or new intelligent principle? But if we + stop and go no farther; why go so far? Why not stop at the material + world? How can we satisfy ourselves without going on _in + infinitum_? And after all, what satisfaction is there in that + infinite progression? Let us remember the story of the Indian + philosopher and his elephant. It was never more applicable than to + the present subject. If the material world rests upon a similar + ideal world, this ideal world must rest upon some other; and so on + without end. It were better, therefore, never to look beyond the + present material world. By supposing it to contain the principle of + its order within itself, we really assert it to be God; and the + sooner we arrive at that Divine Being, so much the better. When you + go one step beyond the mundane system you only excite an + inquisitive humour, which it is impossible ever to satisfy. + + "To say, that the different ideas which compose the reason of the + Supreme Being, fall into order of themselves and by their own + natures, is really to talk without any precise meaning. If it has a + meaning, I would fain know why it is not as good sense to say, + that the parts of the material world fall into order of themselves, + and by their own nature. Can the one opinion be intelligible while + the other is not so?"--(II. pp. 461-4.) + +Cleanthes, in replying to Philo's discourse, says that it is very easy +to answer his arguments; but, as not unfrequently happens with +controversialists, he mistakes a reply for an answer, when he declares +that-- + + "The order and arrangement of nature, the curious adjustment of + final causes, the plain use and intention of every part and organ; + all these bespeak in the clearest language one intelligent cause or + author. The heavens and the earth join in the same testimony. The + whole chorus of nature raises one hymn to the praises of its + Creator."--(II. p. 465.) + +Though the rhetoric of Cleanthes may be admired, its irrelevancy to the +point at issue must be admitted. Wandering still further into the region +of declamation, he works himself into a passion: + + "You alone, or almost alone, disturb this general harmony. You + start abstruse doubts, cavils, and objections: You ask me what is + the cause of this cause? I know not: I care not: that concerns not + me. I have found a Deity; and here I stop my inquiry. Let those go + further who are wiser or more enterprising."--(II. p. 466.) + +In other words, O Cleanthes, reasoning having taken you as far as you +want to go, you decline to advance any further; even though you fully +admit that the very same reasoning forbids you to stop where you are +pleased to cry halt! But this is simply forcing your reason to abdicate +in favour of your caprice. It is impossible to imagine that Hume, of all +men in the world, could have rested satisfied with such an act of +high-treason against the sovereignty of philosophy. We may rather +conclude that the last word of the discussion, which he gives to Philo, +is also his own. + + "If I am still to remain in utter ignorance of causes, and can + absolutely give an explication of nothing, I shall never esteem it + any advantage to shove off for a moment a difficulty, which, you + acknowledge, must immediately, in its full force, recur upon me. + Naturalists[32] indeed very justly explain particular effects by + more general causes, though these general causes should remain in + the end totally inexplicable; but they never surely thought it + satisfactory to explain a particular effect by a particular cause, + which was no more to be accounted for than the effect itself. An + ideal system, arranged of itself, without a precedent design, is + not a whit more explicable than a material one, which attains its + order in a like manner; nor is there any more difficulty in the + latter supposition than in the former."--(II. p. 466.) + +It is obvious that, if Hume had been pushed, he must have admitted that +his opinion concerning the existence of a God, and of a certain remote +resemblance of his intellectual nature to that of man, was an hypothesis +which might possess more or less probability, but was incapable on his +own principles of any approach to demonstration. And to all attempts to +make any practical use of his theism; or to prove the existence of the +attributes of infinite wisdom, benevolence, justice, and the like, which +are usually ascribed to the Deity, by reason, he opposes a searching +critical negation.[33] + +The object of the speech of the imaginary Epicurean in the eleventh +section of the _Inquiry_, entitled _Of a Particular Providence and of a +Future State_, is to invert the argument of Bishop Butler's _Analogy_. + +That famous defence of theology against the _a priori_ scepticism of +Freethinkers of the eighteenth century, who based their arguments on the +inconsistency of the revealed scheme of salvation with the attributes of +the Deity, consists, essentially, in conclusively proving that, from a +moral point of view, Nature is at least as reprehensible as orthodoxy. +If you tell me, says Butler, in effect, that any part of revealed +religion must be false because it is inconsistent with the divine +attributes of justice and mercy; I beg leave to point out to you, that +there are undeniable natural facts which are fully open to the same +objection. Since you admit that nature is the work of God, you are +forced to allow that such facts are consistent with his attributes. +Therefore, you must also admit, that the parallel facts in the scheme of +orthodoxy are also consistent with them, and all your arguments to the +contrary fall to the ground. Q.E.D. In fact, the solid sense of Butler +left the Deism of the Freethinkers not a leg to stand upon. Perhaps, +however, he did not remember the wise saying that "A man seemeth right +in his own cause, but another cometh after and judgeth him." Hume's +Epicurean philosopher adopts the main arguments of the _Analogy_, but +unfortunately drives them home to a conclusion of which the good Bishop +would hardly have approved. + + "I deny a Providence, you say, and supreme governor of the world, + who guides the course of events, and punishes the vicious with + infamy and disappointment, and rewards the virtuous with honour and + success in all their undertakings. But surely I deny not the course + itself of events, which lies open to every one's inquiry and + examination. I acknowledge that, in the present order of things, + virtue is attended with more peace of mind than vice, and meets + with a more favourable reception from the world. I am sensible + that, according to the past experience of mankind, friendship is + the chief joy of human life, and moderation the only source of + tranquillity and happiness. I never balance between the virtuous + and the vicious course of life; but am sensible that, to a + well-disposed mind, every advantage is on the side of the former. + And what can you say more, allowing all your suppositions and + reasonings? You tell me, indeed, that this disposition of things + proceeds from intelligence and design. But, whatever it proceeds + from, the disposition itself, on which depends our happiness and + misery, and consequently our conduct and deportment in life, is + still the same. It is still open for me, as well as you, to + regulate my behaviour by my experience of past events. And if you + affirm that, while a divine providence is allowed, and a supreme + distributive justice in the universe, I ought to expect some more + particular reward of the good, and punishment of the bad, beyond + the ordinary course of events, I here find the same fallacy which I + have before endeavoured to detect. You persist in imagining, that + if we grant that divine existence for which you so earnestly + contend, you may safely infer consequences from it, and add + something to the experienced order of nature, by arguing from the + attributes which you ascribe to your gods. You seem not to remember + that all your reasonings on this subject can only be drawn from + effects to causes; and that every argument, deduced from causes to + effects, must of necessity be a gross sophism, since it is + impossible for you to know anything of the cause, but what you have + antecedently not inferred, but discovered to the full, in the + effect. + + "But what must a philosopher think of those vain reasoners who, + instead of regarding the present scene of things as the sole object + of their contemplation, so far reverse the whole course of nature, + as to render this life merely a passage to something further; a + porch, which leads to a greater and vastly different building; a + prologue which serves only to introduce the piece, and give it more + grace and propriety? Whence, do you think, can such philosophers + derive their idea of the gods? From their own conceit and + imagination surely. For if they derive it from the present + phenomena, it would never point to anything further, but must be + exactly adjusted to them. That the divinity may _possibly_ be + endowed with attributes which we have never seen exerted; may be + governed by principles of action which we cannot discover to be + satisfied; all this will freely be allowed. But still this is mere + _possibility_ and hypothesis. We never can have reason to _infer_ + any attributes or any principles of action in him, but so far as we + know them to have been exerted and satisfied. + + "_Are there any marks of a distributive justice in the world?_ If + you answer in the affirmative, I conclude that, since justice here + exerts itself, it is satisfied. If you reply in the negative, I + conclude that you have then no reason to ascribe justice, in our + sense of it, to the gods. If you hold a medium between affirmation + and negation, by saying that the justice of the gods at present + exerts itself in part, but not in its full extent, I answer that + you have no reason to give it any particular extent, but only so + far as you see it, _at present_, exert itself."--(IV. pp. 164-6.) + +Thus, the Freethinkers said, the attributes of the Deity being what they +are, the scheme of orthodoxy is inconsistent with them; whereupon Butler +gave the crushing reply: Agreeing with you as to the attributes of the +Deity, nature, by its existence, proves that the things to which you +object are quite consistent with them. To whom enters Hume's Epicurean +with the remark: Then, as nature is our only measure of the attributes +of the Deity in their practical manifestation, what warranty is there +for supposing that such measure is anywhere transcended? That the "other +side" of nature, if there be one, is governed on different principles +from this side? + +Truly on this topic silence is golden; while speech reaches not even +the dignity of sounding brass or tinkling cymbal, and is but the weary +clatter of an endless logomachy. One can but suspect that Hume also had +reached this conviction; and that his shadowy and inconsistent theism +was the expression of his desire to rest in a state of mind, which +distinctly excluded negation, while it included as little as possible of +affirmation, respecting a problem which he felt to be hopelessly +insoluble. + +But, whatever might be the views of the philosopher as to the arguments +for theism, the historian could have no doubt respecting its many-shaped +existence, and the great part which it has played in the world. Here, +then, was a body of natural facts to be investigated scientifically, and +the result of Hume's inquiries is embodied in the remarkable essay on +the _Natural History of Religion_. Hume anticipated the results of +modern investigation in declaring fetishism and polytheism to be the +form in which savage and ignorant men naturally clothe their ideas of +the unknown influences which govern their destiny; and they are +polytheists rather than monotheists because,-- + + " ... the first ideas of religion arose, not from a contemplation + of the works of nature, but from a concern with regard to the + events of life, and from the incessant hopes and fears which + actuate the human mind ... in order to carry men's attention beyond + the present course of things, or lead them into any inference + concerning invisible intelligent power, they must be actuated by + some passion which prompts their thought and reflection, some + motive which urges their first inquiry. But what passion shall we + have recourse to, for explaining an effect of such mighty + consequence? Not speculative curiosity merely, or the pure love of + truth. That motive is too refined for such gross apprehensions, + and would lead men into inquiries concerning the frame of nature, a + subject too large and comprehensive for their narrow capacities. No + passions, therefore, can be supposed to work on such barbarians, + but the ordinary affections of human life; the anxious concern for + happiness, the dread of future misery, the terror of death, the + thirst of revenge, the appetite for food and other necessaries. + Agitated by hopes and fears of this nature, especially the latter, + men scrutinize, with a trembling curiosity, the course of future + causes, and examine the various and contrary events of human life. + And in this disordered scene, with eyes still more disordered and + astonished, they see the first obscure traces of divinity."--(IV. + pp. 443, 4.) + +The shape assumed by these first traces of divinity is that of the +shadows of men's own minds, projected out of themselves by their +imaginations:-- + + "There is an universal tendency among mankind to conceive all + beings like themselves, and to transfer to every object those + qualities with which they are familiarly acquainted, and of which + they are intimately conscious.... The _unknown causes_ which + continually employ their thought, appearing always in the same + aspect, are all apprehended to be of the same kind or species. Nor + is it long before we ascribe to them thought, and reason, and + passion, and sometimes even the limbs and figures of men, in order + to bring them nearer to a resemblance with ourselves."--(IV. pp. + 446-7.) + +Hume asks whether polytheism really deserves the name of theism. + + "Our ancestors in Europe, before the revival of letters, believed + as we do at present, that there was one supreme God, the author of + nature, whose power, though in itself uncontrollable, was yet often + exerted by the interposition of his angels and subordinate + ministers, who executed his sacred purposes. But they also + believed, that all nature was full of other invisible powers: + fairies, goblins, elves, sprights; beings stronger and mightier + than men, but much inferior to the celestial natures who surround + the throne of God. Now, suppose that any one, in these ages, had + denied the existence of God and of his angels, would not his + impiety justly have deserved the appellation of atheism, even + though he had still allowed, by some odd capricious reasoning, that + the popular stories of elves and fairies were just and well + grounded? The difference, on the one hand, between such a person + and a genuine theist, is infinitely greater than that, on the + other, between him and one that absolutely excludes all invisible + intelligent power. And it is a fallacy, merely from the casual + resemblance of names, without any conformity of meaning, to rank + such opposite opinions under the same denomination. + + "To any one who considers justly of the matter, it will appear that + the gods of the polytheists are no better than the elves and + fairies of our ancestors, and merit as little as any pious worship + and veneration. These pretended religionists are really a kind of + superstitious atheists, and acknowledge no being that corresponds + to our idea of a Deity. No first principle of mind or thought; no + supreme government and administration; no divine contrivance or + intention in the fabric of the world."--(IV. pp. 450-51.) + +The doctrine that you may call an atheist anybody whose ideas about the +Deity do not correspond with your own, is so largely acted upon by +persons who are certainly not of Hume's way of thinking and, probably, +so far from having read him, would shudder to open any book bearing his +name, except the _History of England_, that it is surprising to trace +the theory of their practice to such a source. + +But on thinking the matter over, this theory seems so consonant with +reason, that one feels ashamed of having suspected many excellent +persons of being moved by mere malice and viciousness of temper to call +other folks atheists, when, after all, they have been obeying a purely +intellectual sense of fitness. As Hume says, truly enough, it is a mere +fallacy, because two people use the same names for things, the ideas of +which are mutually exclusive, to rank such opposite opinions under the +same denomination. If the Jew says, that the Deity is absolute unity, +and that it is sheer blasphemy to say that He ever became incarnate in +the person of a man; and, if the Trinitarian says, that the Deity is +numerically three as well as numerically one, and that it is sheer +blasphemy to say that He did not so become incarnate, it is obvious +enough that each must be logically held to deny the existence of the +other's Deity. Therefore; that each has a scientific right to call the +other an atheist; and that, if he refrains, it is only on the ground of +decency and good manners, which should restrain an honourable man from +employing even scientifically justifiable language, if custom has given +it an abusive connotation. While one must agree with Hume, then, it is, +nevertheless, to be wished that he had not set the bad example of +calling polytheists "superstitious atheists." It probably did not occur +to him that, by a parity of reasoning, the Unitarians might justify the +application of the same language to the Ultramontanes, and _vice versâ_. +But, to return from a digression which may not be wholly unprofitable, +Hume proceeds to show in what manner polytheism incorporated physical +and moral allegories, and naturally accepted hero-worship; and he sums +up his views of the first stages of the evolution of theology as +follows:-- + + "These then are the general principles of polytheism, founded in + human nature, and little or nothing dependent on caprice or + accident. As the _causes_ which bestow happiness or misery, are in + general very little known and very uncertain, our anxious concern + endeavours to attain a determinate idea of them: and finds no + better expedient than to represent them as intelligent, voluntary + agents, like ourselves, only somewhat superior in power and wisdom. + The limited influence of these agents, and their proximity to human + weakness, introduce the various distribution and division of their + authority, and thereby give rise to allegory. The same principles + naturally deify mortals, superior in power, courage, or + understanding, and produce hero-worship; together with fabulous + history and mythological tradition, in all its wild and + unaccountable forms. And as an invisible spiritual intelligence is + an object too refined for vulgar apprehension, men naturally affix + it to some sensible representation; such as either the more + conspicuous parts of nature, or the statues, images, and pictures, + which a more refined age forms of its divinities."--(IV. p. 461.) + +How did the further stage of theology, monotheism, arise out of +polytheism? Hume replies, certainly not by reasonings from first causes +or any sort of fine-drawn logic:-- + + "Even at this day, and in Europe, ask any of the vulgar why he + believes in an Omnipotent Creator of the world, he will never + mention the beauty of final causes, of which he is wholly ignorant: + He will not hold out his hand and bid you contemplate the + suppleness and variety of joints in his fingers, their bending all + one way, the counterpoise which they receive from the thumb, the + softness and fleshy parts of the inside of the hand, with all the + other circumstances which render that member fit for the use to + which it was destined. To these he has been long accustomed; and he + beholds them with listlessness and unconcern. He will tell you of + the sudden and unexpected death of such-a-one; the fall and bruise + of such another; the excessive drought of this season; the cold and + rains of another. These he ascribes to the immediate operation of + Providence: And such events as, with good reasoners, are the chief + difficulties in admitting a Supreme Intelligence, are with him the + sole arguments for it.... + + "We may conclude therefore, upon the whole, that since the vulgar, + in nations which have embraced the doctrine of theism, still build + it upon irrational and superstitious grounds, they are never led + into that opinion by any process of argument, but by a certain + train of thinking, more suitable to their genius and capacity. + + "It may readily happen, in an idolatrous nation, that though men + admit the existence of several limited deities, yet there is some + one God, whom, in a particular manner, they make the object of + their worship and adoration. They may either suppose, that, in the + distribution of power and territory among the Gods, their nation + was subjected to the jurisdiction of that particular deity; or, + reducing heavenly objects to the model of things below, they may + represent one god as the prince or supreme magistrate of the rest, + who, though of the same nature, rules them with an authority like + that which an earthly sovereign exerts over his subjects and + vassals. Whether this god, therefore, be considered as their + peculiar patron, or as the general sovereign of heaven, his + votaries will endeavour, by every art, to insinuate themselves into + his favour; and supposing him to be pleased, like themselves, with + praise and flattery, there is no eulogy or exaggeration which will + be spared in their addresses to him. In proportion as men's fears + or distresses become more urgent, they still invent new strains of + adulation; and even he who outdoes his predecessor in swelling the + titles of his divinity, is sure to be outdone by his successor in + newer and more pompous epithets of praise. Thus they proceed, till + at last they arrive at infinity itself, beyond which there is no + further progress; And it is well if, in striving to get further, + and to represent a magnificent simplicity, they run not into + inexplicable mystery, and destroy the intelligent nature of their + deity, on which alone any rational worship or adoration can be + founded. While they confine themselves to the notion of a perfect + being, the Creator of the world, they coincide, by chance, with the + principles of reason and true philosophy; though they are guided to + that notion, not by reason, of which they are in a great measure + incapable, but by the adulation and fears of the most vulgar + superstition."--(IV. pp. 463-6.) + + "Nay, if we should suppose, what never happens, that a popular + religion were found, in which it was expressly declared, that + nothing but morality could gain the divine favour; if an order of + priests were instituted to inculcate this opinion, in daily + sermons, and with all the arts of persuasion; yet so inveterate are + the people's prejudices, that, for want of some other superstition, + they would make the very attendance on these sermons the essentials + of religion, rather than place them in virtue and good morals. The + sublime prologue of Zaleucus' laws inspired not the Locrians, so + far as we can learn, with any sounder notions of the measures of + acceptance with the deity, than were familiar to the other + Greeks."--(IV. p. 505.) + +It has been remarked that Hume's writings are singularly devoid of local +colour; of allusions to the scenes with which, he was familiar, and to +the people from whom he sprang. Yet, surely, the Lowlands of Scotland +were more in his thoughts than the Zephyrean promontory, and the hard +visage of John Knox peered from behind the mask of Zaleucus, when this +passage left his pen. Nay, might not an acute German critic discern +therein a reminiscence of that eminently Scottish institution, a "Holy +Fair"? where as Hume's young contemporary sings:-- + + + "... opens out his cauld harangues + On practice and on morals; + An' aff the godly pour in thrangs + To gie the jars and barrels + A lift that day. + + "What signifies his barren shine + Of moral powers and reason? + His English style and gesture line + Are a' clean out of season. + Like Socrates or Antonine, + Or some auld pagan heathen, + The moral man he does define, + But ne'er a word o' faith in + That's right that day."[34] + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[28] In a note to the Essay on Superstition and Enthusiasm, Hume is +careful to define what he means by this term. "By priests I understand +only the pretenders to power and dominion, and to a superior sanctity of +character, distinct from virtue and good morals. These are very +different from _clergymen_, who are set apart to the care of sacred +matters, and the conducting our public devotions with greater decency +and order. There is no rank of men more to be respected than the +latter."--(III. p. 83.) + +[29] It is needless to quote the rest of the passage, though I cannot +refrain from observing that the recommendation which it contains, that a +"man of letters" should become a philosophical sceptic as "the first and +most essential step towards being a sound believing Christian," though +adopted and largely acted upon by many a champion of orthodoxy in these +days, is questionable in taste, if it be meant as a jest, and more than +questionable in morality, if it is to be taken in earnest. To pretend +that you believe any doctrine for no better reason than that you doubt +everything else, would be dishonest, if it were not preposterous. + +[30] A perplexity which is increased rather than diminished by some +passages in a letter to Gilbert Elliot of Minto (March 10, 1751). Hume +says, "You would perceive by the sample I have given you that I make +Cleanthes the hero of the dialogue; whatever you can think of, to +strengthen that side of the argument, will be most acceptable to me. Any +propensity you imagine I have to the other side crept in upon me against +my will; and 'tis not long ago that I burned an old manuscript book, +wrote before I was twenty, which contained, page after page, the gradual +progress of my thoughts on this head. It began with an anxious scent +after arguments to confirm the common opinion; doubts stole in, +dissipated, returned; were again dissipated, returned again; and it was +a perpetual struggle of a restless imagination against +inclination--perhaps against reason.... I could wish Cleanthes' argument +could be so analysed as to be rendered quite formal and regular. The +propensity of the mind towards it--unless that propensity were as strong +and universal as that to believe in our senses and experience--will +still, I am afraid, be esteemed a suspicious foundation. 'Tis here I +wish for your assistance. We must endeavour to prove that this +propensity is somewhat different from our inclination to find our own +figures in the clouds, our faces in the moon, our passions and +sentiments even in inanimate matter. Such an inclination may and ought +to be controlled, and can never be a legitimate ground of assent." +(Burton, _Life_, I. pp. 331-3.) The picture of Hume here drawn +unconsciously by his own hand, is unlike enough to the popular +conception of him as a careless sceptic loving doubt for doubt's sake. + +[31] Kant employs substantially the same argument:--"Würde das höchste +Wesen in dieser Kette der Bedingungen stehen, so würde es selbst ein +Glied der Reihe derselben sein, und eben so wie die niederen Glieder, +denen es vorgesetzt ist, noch fernere Untersuchungen wegen seines noch +höheren Grundes erfahren."--_Kritik._ Ed. Hartenstein, p. 422. + +[32] _I.e._ Natural philosophers. + +[33] Hume's letter to Mure of Caldwell, containing a criticism of +Leechman's sermon (Burton, I. p. 163), bears strongly on this point. + +[34] Burns published the _Holy Fair_ only ten years after Hume's death. + + + + +CHAPTER IX. + +THE SOUL: THE DOCTRINE OF IMMORTALITY. + + +Descartes taught that an absolute difference of kind separates matter, +as that which possesses extension, from spirit, as that which thinks. +They not only have no character in common, but it is inconceivable that +they should have any. On the assumption, that the attributes of the two +were wholly different, it appeared to be a necessary consequence that +the hypothetical causes of these attributes--their respective +substances--must be totally different. Notably, in the matter of +divisibility, since that which has no extension cannot be divisible, it +seemed that the _chose pensante_, the soul, must be an indivisible +entity. + +Later philosophers, accepting this notion of the soul, were naturally +much perplexed to understand how, if matter and spirit had nothing in +common, they could act and react on one another. All the changes of +matter being modes of motion, the difficulty of understanding how a +moving extended material body was to affect a thinking thing which had +no dimension, was as great as that involved in solving the problem of +how to hit a nominative case with a stick. Hence, the successors of +Descartes either found themselves obliged, with the Occasionalists, to +call in the aid of the Deity, who was supposed to be a sort of +go-between betwixt matter and spirit; or they had recourse, with +Leibnitz, to the doctrine of pre-established harmony, which denied any +influence of the body on the soul, or _vice versâ_, and compared matter +and spirit to two clocks so accurately regulated to keep time with one +another, that the one struck when ever the other pointed to the hour; +or, with Berkeley, they abolished the "substance" of matter altogether, +as a superfluity, though they failed to see that the same arguments +equally justified the abolition of soul as another superfluity, and the +reduction of the universe to a series of events or phenomena; or, +finally, with Spinoza, to whom Berkeley makes a perilously close +approach, they asserted the existence of only one substance, with two +chief attributes, the one, thought, and the other, extension. + +There remained only one possible position, which, had it been taken up +earlier, might have saved an immensity of trouble; and that was to +affirm that we do not, and cannot, know anything about the "substance" +either of the thinking thing, or of the extended thing. And Hume's sound +common sense led him to defend this thesis, which Locke had already +foreshadowed, with respect to the question of the substance of the soul. +Hume enunciates two opinions. The first is that the question itself is +unintelligible, and therefore cannot receive any answer; the second is +that the popular doctrine respecting the immateriality, simplicity, and +indivisibility of a thinking substance is a "true atheism, and will +serve to justify all those sentiments for which Spinoza is so +universally infamous." + +In support of the first opinion, Hume points out that it is impossible +to attach any definite meaning to the word "substance" when employed for +the hypothetical substratum of soul and matter. For if we define +substance as that which may exist by itself, the definition does not +distinguish the soul from perceptions. It is perfectly easy to conceive +that states of consciousness are self-subsistent. And, if the substance +of the soul is defined as that in which perceptions inhere, what is +meant by the inherence? Is such inherence conceivable? If conceivable, +what evidence is there of it? And what is the use of a substratum to +things which, for anything we know to the contrary, are capable of +existing by themselves? + +Moreover, it may be added, supposing the soul has a substance, how do we +know that it is different from the substance, which, on like grounds, +must be supposed to underlie the qualities of matter? + +Again, if it be said that our personal identity requires the assumption +of a substance which remains the same while the accidents of perception +shift and change, the question arises what is meant by personal +identity? + + "For my part," says Hume, "when I enter most intimately into what I + call _myself_, I always stumble on some particular perception or + other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or + pleasure. I never can catch _myself_ at any time without a + perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. When + my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep, so long + am I insensible of _myself_, and may be truly said not to exist. + And were all my perceptions removed by death, and I could neither + think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate, after the dissolution + of my body, I should be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive + what is further requisite to make me a perfect nonentity. If any + one, upon serious and unprejudiced reflection, thinks he has a + different notion of _himself_, I must confess I can reason no + longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the + right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this + particular. He may perhaps perceive something simple and continued + which he calls _himself_, though I am certain there is no such + principle in me. + + "But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture + to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a + bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed one + another with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux + and movement.... The mind is a kind of theatre, where several + perceptions successively make their appearance, pass, repass, glide + away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. + There is properly no _simplicity_ in it at one time, nor _identity_ + in different, whatever natural propension we may have to imagine + that simplicity and identity. The comparison of the theatre must + not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only that + constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant notion of the + place where these scenes are represented, or of the materials of + which it is composed. + + "What then gives so great a propension to ascribe an identity to + these successive perceptions, and to suppose ourselves possessed of + an invariable and uninterrupted existence through the whole course + of our lives? In order to answer this question, we must distinguish + between personal identity as it regards our thought and + imagination, and as it regards our passions, or the concern we take + in ourselves. The first is our present subject; and to explain it + perfectly we must take the matter pretty deep, and account for that + identity which we attribute to plants and animals; there being a + great analogy betwixt it and the identity of a self or + person."--(I. pp. 321, 322.) + +Perfect identity is exhibited by an object which remains unchanged +throughout a certain time; perfect diversity is seen in two or more +objects which are separated by intervals of space and periods of time. +But, in both these cases, there is no sharp line of demarcation between +identity and diversity, and it is impossible to say when an object +ceases to be one and becomes two. + +When a sea-anemone multiplies by division, there is a time during which +it is said to be one animal partially divided; but, after a while, it +becomes two animals adherent together, and the limit between these +conditions is purely arbitrary. So in mineralogy, a crystal of a +definite chemical composition may have its substance replaced, particle +by particle, by another chemical compound. When does it lose its +primitive identity and become a new thing? + +Again, a plant or an animal, in the course of its existence, from the +condition of an egg or seed to the end of life, remains the same neither +in form, nor in structure, nor in the matter of which it is composed: +every attribute it possesses is constantly changing, and yet we say that +it is always one and the same individual. And if, in this case, we +attribute identity without supposing an indivisible immaterial something +to underlie and condition that identity, why should we need the +supposition in the case of that succession of changeful phenomena we +call the mind? + +In fact, we ascribe identity to an individual plant or animal, simply +because there has been no moment of time at which we could observe any +division of it into parts separated by time or space. Every experience +we have of it is as one thing and not as two; and we sum up our +experiences in the ascription of identity, although we know quite well +that, strictly speaking, it has not been the same for any two moments. + +So with the mind. Our perceptions flow in even succession; the +impressions of the present moment are inextricably mixed up with the +memories of yesterday and the expectations of to-morrow, and all are +connected by the links of cause and effect. + + " ... as the same individual republic may not only change its + members, but also its laws and constitutions; in like manner the + same person may vary his character and disposition, as well as his + impressions and ideas, without losing his identity. Whatever + changes he endures, his several parts are still connected by the + relation of causation. And in this view our identity with regard to + the passions serves to corroborate that with regard to the + imagination, by the making our distant perceptions influence each + other, and by giving us a present concern for our past or future + pains or pleasures. + + "As memory alone acquaints us with the continuance and extent of + this succession of perceptions, 'tis to be considered, upon that + account chiefly, as the source of personal identity. Had we no + memory we never should have any notion of causation, nor + consequently of that chain of causes and effects which constitute + our self or person. But having once acquired this notion of + causation from the memory, we can extend the same chain of causes, + and consequently the identity of our persons, beyond our memory, + and can comprehend times, and circumstances, and actions, which we + have entirely forgot, but suppose in general to have existed. For + how few of our past actions are there of which we have any memory? + Who can tell me, for instance, what were his thoughts and actions + on the first of January, 1715, the eleventh of March, 1719, and the + third of August, 1733? Or will he affirm, because he has entirely + forgot the incidents of those days, that the present self is not + the same person with the self of that time, and by that means + overturn all the most established notions of personal identity? In + this view, therefore, memory does not so much _produce_ as + _discover_ personal identity, by showing us the relation of cause + and effect among our different perceptions. 'Twill be incumbent on + those who affirm that memory produces entirely our personal + identity, to give a reason why we can thus extend our identity + beyond our memory. + + "The whole of this doctrine leads us to a conclusion which is of + great importance in the present affair, viz. that all the nice and + subtle questions concerning personal identity can never possibly be + decided, and are to be regarded rather as grammatical than as + philosophical difficulties. Identity depends on the relations of + ideas, and these relations produce identity by means of that easy + transition they occasion. But as the relations, and the easiness of + the transition may diminish by insensible degrees, we have no just + standard by which we can decide any dispute concerning the time + when they acquire or lose a title to the name of identity. All the + disputes concerning the identity of connected objects are merely + verbal, except so far as the relation of parts gives rise to some + fiction or imaginary principle of union, as we have already + observed. + + "What I have said concerning the first origin and uncertainty of + our notion of identity, as applied to the human mind may be + extended, with little or no variation, to that of _simplicity_. An + object, whose different co-existent parts are bound together by a + close relation, operates upon the imagination after much the same + manner as one perfectly simple and undivisible, and requires not a + much greater stretch of thought in order to its conception. From + this similarity of operation we attribute a simplicity to it, and + feign a principle of union as the support of this simplicity, and + the centre of all the different parts and qualities of the + object."--(I. pp. 331-3.) + +The final result of Hume's reasoning comes to this: As we use the name +of body for the sum of the phenomena which make up our corporeal +existence, so we employ the name of soul for the sum of the phenomena +which constitute our mental existence; and we have no more reason, in +the latter case, than in the former, to suppose that there is anything +beyond the phenomena which answers to the name. In the case of the soul, +as in that of the body, the idea of substance is a mere fiction of the +imagination. This conclusion is nothing but a rigorous application of +Berkeley's reasoning concerning matter to mind, and it is fully adopted +by Kant.[35] + +Having arrived at the conclusion that the conception of a soul, as a +substantive thing, is a mere figment of the imagination; and that, +whether it exists or not, we can by no possibility know anything about +it, the inquiry as to the durability of the soul may seem superfluous. + +Nevertheless, there is still a sense in which, even under these +conditions, such an inquiry is justifiable. Leaving aside the problem of +the substance of the soul, and taking the word "soul" simply as a name +for the series of mental phenomena which make up an individual mind; it +remains open to us to ask, whether that series commenced with, or +before, the series of phenomena which constitute the corresponding +individual body; and whether it terminates with the end of the corporeal +series, or goes on after the existence of the body has ended. And, in +both cases, there arises the further question, whether the excess of +duration of the mental series over that of the body, is finite or +infinite. + +Hume has discussed some of these questions in the remarkable essay _On +the Immortality of the Soul_, which was not published till after his +death, and which seems long to have remained but little known. +Nevertheless, indeed, possibly, for that reason, its influence has been +manifested in unexpected quarters, and its main arguments have been +adduced by archiepiscopal and episcopal authority in evidence of the +value of revelation. Dr. Whately,[36] sometime Archbishop of Dublin, +paraphrases Hume, though he forgets to cite him; and Bishop Courtenay's +elaborate work,[37] dedicated to the Archbishop, is a development of +that prelate's version of Hume's essay. + +This little paper occupies only some ten pages, but it is not wonderful +that it attracted an acute logician like Whately, for it is a model of +clear and vigorous statement. The argument hardly admits of +condensation, so that I must let Hume speak for himself:-- + + "By the mere light of reason it seems difficult to prove the + immortality of the soul: the arguments for it are commonly derived + either from metaphysical topics, or moral, or physical. But in + reality it is the gospel, and the gospel alone, that has brought + _life and immortality_ to light.[38] + + "1. Metaphysical topics suppose that the soul is immaterial, and + that 'tis impossible for thought to belong to a material + substance.[39] But just metaphysics teach us that the notion of + substance is wholly confused and imperfect; and that we have no + other idea of any substance, than as an aggregate of particular + qualities inhering in an unknown something. Matter, therefore, and + spirit, are at bottom equally unknown, and we cannot determine what + qualities inhere in the one or in the other.[40] They likewise + teach us, that nothing can be decided _a priori_ concerning any + cause or effect; and that experience, being the only source of our + judgments of this nature, we cannot know from any other principle, + whether matter, by its structure or arrangement, may not be the + cause of thought. Abstract reasonings cannot decide any question of + fact or existence. But admitting a spiritual substance to be + dispersed throughout the universe, like the ethereal fire of the + Stoics, and to be the only inherent subject of thought, we have + reason to conclude from _analogy_, that nature uses it after the + manner she does the other substance, _matter_. She employs it as a + kind of paste or clay; modifies it into a variety of forms or + existences; dissolves after a time each modification, and from its + substance erects a new form. As the same material substance may + successively compose the bodies of all animals, the same spiritual + substance may compose their minds: Their consciousness, or that + system of thought which they formed during life, may be continually + dissolved by death, and nothing interests them in the new + modification. The most positive assertors of the mortality of the + soul never denied the immortality of its substance; and that an + immaterial substance, as well as a material, may lose its memory + or consciousness, appears in part from experience, if the soul be + immaterial. Seasoning from the common course of nature, and without + supposing any new interposition of the Supreme Cause, which ought + always to be excluded from philosophy, _what is incorruptible must + also be ingenerable_. The soul, therefore, if immortal, existed + before our birth, and if the former existence noways concerned us, + neither will the latter. Animals undoubtedly feel, think, love, + hate, will, and even reason, though in a more imperfect manner than + men: Are their souls also immaterial and immortal?"[41] + +Hume next proceeds to consider the moral arguments, and chiefly + + " ... those derived from the justice of God, which is supposed to + be further interested in the future punishment of the vicious and + reward of the virtuous." + +But if by the justice of God we moan the same attribute which we call +justice in ourselves, then why should either reward or punishment be +extended beyond this life?[42] Our sole means of knowing anything is +the reasoning faculty which God has given us; and that reasoning +faculty not only denies us any conception of a future state, but fails +to furnish a single valid argument in favour of the belief that the mind +will endure after the dissolution of the body. + + " ... If any purpose of nature be clear, we may affirm that the + whole scope and intention of man's creation, so far as we can judge + by natural reason, is limited to the present life." + +To the argument that the powers of man are so much greater than the +needs of this life require, that they suggest a future scene in which +they can be employed, Hume replies:-- + + "If the reason of man gives him great superiority above other + animals, his necessities are proportionably multiplied upon him; + his whole time, his whole capacity, activity, courage, and passion, + find sufficient employment in fencing against the miseries of his + present condition; and frequently, nay, almost always, are too + slender for the business assigned them. A pair of shoes, perhaps, + was never yet wrought to the highest degree of perfection that + commodity is capable of attaining; yet it is necessary, at least + very useful, that there should be some politicians and moralists, + even some geometers, poets and philosophers, among mankind. The + powers of men are no more superior to their wants, considered + merely in this life, than those of foxes and hares are, compared to + _their_ wants and to their period of existence. The inference from + parity of reason is therefore obvious." + +In short, Hume argues that, if the faculties with which we are endowed +are unable to discover a future state, and if the most attentive +consideration of their nature serves to show that they are adapted to +this life and nothing more, it is surely inconsistent with any +conception of justice that we should be dealt with, as if we had all +along had a clear knowledge of the fact thus carefully concealed from +us. What should we think of the justice of a father, who gave his son +every reason to suppose that a trivial fault would only be visited by a +box on the ear; and then, years afterwards, put him on the rack for a +week for the same fault? + +Again, the suggestion arises, if God is the cause of all things, he is +responsible for evil as well as for good; and it appears utterly +irreconcilable with our notions of justice that he should punish another +for that which he has, in fact, done himself. Moreover, just punishment +bears a proportion to the offence, while suffering which is infinite is +_ipso facto_ disproportionate to any finite deed. + + "Why then eternal punishment for the temporary offences of so frail + a creature as man? Can any one approve of Alexander's rage, who + intended to exterminate a whole nation because they had seized his + favourite horse Bucephalus? + + "Heaven and hell suppose two distinct species of men, the good and + the bad; but the greatest part of mankind float betwixt vice and + virtue. Were one to go round the world with the intention of giving + a good supper to the righteous and a sound drubbing to the wicked, + he would frequently be embarrassed in his choice, and would find + the merits and demerits of most men and women scarcely amount to + the value of either."[43] + +One can but admire the broad humanity and the insight into the springs +of action manifest in this passage. _Comprendre est à moitié pardonner_. +The more one knows of the real conditions which determine men's acts the +less one finds either to praise or blame. For kindly David Hume, "the +damnation of one man is an infinitely greater evil in the universe than +the subversion of a thousand million of kingdoms." And he would have +felt with his countryman Burns, that even "auld Nickie Ben" should "hae +a chance." + +As against those who reason for the necessity of a future state, in +order that the justice of the Deity may be satisfied, Hume's +argumentation appears unanswerable. For if the justice of God resembles +what we mean by justice, the bestowal of infinite happiness for finite +well-doing and infinite misery for finite ill-doing, it is in no sense +just. And, if the justice of God does not resemble what we mean by +justice, it is an abuse of language to employ the name of justice for +the attribute described by it. But, as against those who choose to argue +that there is nothing in what is known to us of the attributes of the +Deity inconsistent with a future state of rewards and punishments, +Hume's pleadings have no force. Bishop Butler's argument that, inasmuch +as the visitation of our acts by rewards and punishments takes place in +this life, rewards and punishments must be consistent with the +attributes of the Deity, and therefore may go on as long as the mind +endures, is unanswerable. Whatever exists is, by the hypothesis, +existent by the will of God; and, therefore, the pains and pleasures +which exist now may go on existing for all eternity, either increasing, +diminishing, or being endlessly varied in their intensity, as they are +now. + +It is remarkable that Hume does not refer to the sentimental arguments +for the immortality of the soul which are so much in vogue at the +present day; and which are based upon our desire for a longer conscious +existence than that which nature appears to have allotted to us. Perhaps +he did not think them worth notice. For indeed it is not a little +strange, that our strong desire that a certain occurrence should happen +should be put forward as evidence that it will happen. If my intense +desire to see the friend, from whom I have parted, does not bring him +from the other side of the world, or take me thither; if the mother's +agonised prayer that her child should live has not prevented him from +dying; experience certainly affords no presumption that the strong +desire to be alive after death, which we call the aspiration after +immortality, is any more likely to be gratified. As Hume truly says, +"All doctrines are to be suspected which are favoured by our passions;" +and the doctrine, that we are immortal because we should extremely like +to be so, contains the quintessence of suspiciousness. + +In respect of the existence and attributes of the soul, as of those of +the Deity, then, logic is powerless and reason silent. At the most we +can get no further than the conclusion of Kant:-- + + "After we have satisfied ourselves of the vanity of all the + ambitious attempts of reason to fly beyond the bounds of + experience, enough remains of practical value to content us. It is + true that no one may boast that he _knows_ that God and a future + life exist; for, if he possesses such knowledge, he is just the + man for whom I have long been seeking. All knowledge (touching an + object of mere reason) can be communicated, and therefore I might + hope to see my own knowledge increased to this prodigious extent, + by his instruction. No; our conviction in these matters is not + _logical_, but _moral_ certainty; and, inasmuch as it rests upon + subjective grounds, (of moral disposition) I must not even say: _it + is_ morally certain that there is a God, and so on; but, _I am_ + morally certain, and so on. That is to say: the belief in a God and + in another world is so interwoven with my moral nature, that the + former can no more vanish, than the latter can ever be torn from + me. + + "The only point to be remarked here is that this act of faith of + the intellect (_Vernunftglaube_) assumes the existence of moral + dispositions. If we leave them aside, and suppose a mind quite + indifferent to moral laws, the inquiry started by reason becomes + merely a subject for speculation; and [the conclusion attained] may + then indeed be supported by strong arguments from analogy, but not + by such as are competent to overcome persistent scepticism. + + "There is no one, however, who can fail to be interested in these + questions. For, although he may be excluded from moral influences + by the want of a good disposition, yet, even in this case, enough + remains to lead him to fear a divine existence and a future state. + To this end, no more is necessary than that he can at least have no + certainty that there is no such being, and no future life; for, to + make this conclusion demonstratively certain, he must be able to + prove the impossibility of both; and this assuredly no rational man + can undertake to do. This negative belief, indeed, cannot produce + either morality or good dispositions, but can operate in an + analogous fashion, by powerfully repressing the outbreak of evil + tendencies. + + "But it will be said, is this all that Pure Reason can do when it + gazes out beyond the bounds of experience? Nothing more than two + articles of faith? Common sense could achieve as much without + calling the philosophers to its counsels! + + "I will not here speak of the service which philosophy has rendered + to human reason by the laborious efforts of its criticism, granting + that the outcome proves to be merely negative: about that matter + something is to be said in the following section. But do you then + ask, that the knowledge which interests all men shall transcend the + common understanding and be discovered for you only by + philosophers? The very thing which you make a reproach, is the best + confirmation of the justice of the previous conclusions, since it + shows that which could not, at first, have been anticipated: + namely, that in those matters which concern all men alike, nature + is not guilty of distributing her gifts with partiality; and that + the highest philosophy, in dealing with the most important concerns + of humanity, is able to take us no further than the guidance which + she affords to the commonest understanding."[44] + +In short, nothing can be proved or disproved, respecting either the +distinct existence, the substance, or the durability of the soul. So +far, Kant is at one with Hume. But Kant adds, as you cannot disprove the +immortality of the soul, and as the belief therein is very useful for +moral purposes, you may assume it. To which, had Hume lived half a +century later, he would probably have replied, that, if morality has no +better foundation than an assumption, it is not likely to bear much +strain; and, if it has a better foundation, the assumption rather +weakens than strengthens it. + +As has been already said, Hume is not content with denying that we know +anything about the existence or the nature of the soul; but he carries +the war into the enemy's camp, and accuses those who affirm the +immateriality, simplicity, and indivisibility of the thinking substance, +of atheism and Spinozism, which are assumed to be convertible terms. + +The method of attack is ingenious. Observation appears to acquaint us +with two different systems of beings, and both Spinoza and orthodox +philosophers agree, that the necessary substratum of each of these is a +substance, in which the phenomena adhere, or of which they are +attributes or modes. + + "I observe first the universe of objects or of body; the sun, moon, + and stars; the earth, seas, plants, animals, men, ships, houses, + and other productions either of art or of nature. Here Spinoza + appears, and tells me that these are only modifications and that + the subject in which they inhere is simple, uncompounded, and + indivisible. After this I consider the other system of beings, viz. + the universe of thought, or my impressions and ideas. Then I + observe another sun, moon, and stars; an earth and seas, covered + and inhabited by plants and animals, towns, houses, mountains, + rivers; and, in short, everything I can discover or conceive in the + first system. Upon my inquiring concerning these, theologians + present themselves, and tell me that these also are modifications, + and modifications of one simple, uncompounded, and indivisible + substance. Immediately upon which I am deafened with the noise of a + hundred voices, that treat the first hypothesis with detestation + and scorn, and the second with applause and veneration. I turn my + attention to these hypotheses to see what may be the reason of so + great a partiality; and find that they have the same fault of being + unintelligible, and that, as far as we can understand them, they + are so much alike, that 'tis impossible to discover any absurdity + in one, which is not common to both of them."--(I. p. 309.) + +For the manner in which Hume makes his case good, I must refer to the +original. Plain people may rest satisfied that both hypotheses are +unintelligible, without plunging any further among syllogisms, the +premisses of which convey no meaning, while the conclusions carry no +conviction. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[35] "Our internal intuition shows no permanent existence, for the Ego +is only the consciousness of my thinking." "There is no means whatever +by which we can learn anything respecting the constitution of the soul, +so far as regards the possibility of its separate existence."--_Kritik +von den Paralogismen der reinen Vernunft_. + +[36] _Essays on Some of the Peculiarities of the Christian Religion_, +(Essay I. Revelation of a Future State), by Richard Whately, D.D., +Archbishop of Dublin. Fifth Edition, revised, 1846. + +[37] _The Future States: their Evidences and Nature; considered on +Principles Physical, Moral, and Scriptural, with the Design of showing +the Value of the Gospel Revelation_ by the Right Rev. Reginald +Courtenay, D.D., Lord Bishop of Kingston (Jamaica), 1857. + +[38] "Now that 'Jesus Christ brought life and immortality to light +through the Gospel,' and that in the most literal sense, which implies +that the revelation of the doctrine is _peculiar_ to His Gospel, seems +to be at least the most obvious meaning of the Scriptures of the New +Testament."--Whately, _l.c._ p. 27. + +[39] Compare, _Of the Immateriality of the Soul_, Section V. of Part +IV., Book I., of the _Treatise_, in which Hume concludes (I. p. 319) +that, whether it be material or immaterial, "in both cases the +metaphysical arguments for the immortality of the soul are equally +inconclusive; and in both cases the moral arguments and those derived +from the analogy of nature are equally strong and convincing." + +[40] "The question again respecting the materiality of the soul is one +which I am at a loss to understand clearly, till it shall have been +clearly determined _what matter is_. We know nothing of it, any more +than of mind, except its attributes."--Whately, _l.c._ p. 66. + +[41] "None of those who contend for the natural immortality of the soul +... have been able to extricate themselves from one difficulty, viz. +that all their arguments apply, with exactly the same force, to prove an +immortality, not only of _brutes_, but even of _plants_; though in such +a conclusion as this they are never willing to acquiesce."--Whately, +_l.c._ p. 67. + +[42] "Nor are we therefore authorised to infer _à priori_, independent +of Revelation, a future state of retribution, from the irregularities +prevailing in the present life, since that future state does not account +fully for these irregularities. It may explain, indeed, how present evil +may be conducive to future good, but not why the good could not be +attained without the evil; it may reconcile with our notions of the +divine justice the present prosperity of the wicked, but it does not +account for the existence of the wicked."--Whately, _l.c._ pp. 69, 70. + +[43] "So reason also shows, that for man to expect to earn for himself +by the practice of virtue, and claim, as his just right, an immortality +of exalted happiness, is a most extravagant and groundless +pretension."--Whately, _l.c._ p. 101. On the other hand, however, the +Archbishop sees no unreasonableness in a man's earning for himself an +immortality of intense unhappiness by the practice of vice. So that life +is, naturally, a venture in which you may lose all, but can earn +nothing. It may be thought somewhat hard upon mankind if they are pushed +into a speculation of this sort, willy-nilly. + +[44] _Kritik der reinen Vernunft_. Ed. Hartenstein, p. 547. + + + + +CHAPTER X. + +VOLITION: LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. + + +In the opening paragraphs of the third part of the second book of the +_Treatise_, Hume gives a description of the will. + + "Of all the immediate effects of pain and pleasure there is none + more remarkable than the _will_; and though, properly speaking, it + be not comprehended among the passions, yet as the full + understanding of its nature and properties is necessary to the + explanation of them, we shall here make it the subject of our + inquiry. I desire it may be observed, that, by the _will_, I mean + nothing but _the internal impression we feel, and are conscious of, + when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new + perception of our mind_. This impression, like the preceding ones + of pride and humility, love and hatred, 'tis impossible to define, + and needless to describe any further."--(II. p. 150.) + +This description of volition may be criticised on various grounds. More +especially does it seem defective in restricting the term "will" to that +feeling which arises when we act, or appear to act, as causes: for one +may will to strike, without striking; or to think of something which we +have forgotten. + +Every volition is a complex idea composed of two elements: the one is +the idea of an action; the other is a desire for the occurrence of that +action. If I will to strike, I have an idea of a certain movement, and a +desire that that movement should take place; if I will to think of any +subject, or, in other words, to attend to that subject, I have an idea +of the subject and a strong desire that it should remain present to my +consciousness. And so far as I can discover, this combination of an idea +of an object with an emotion, is everything that can be directly +observed in an act of volition. So that Hume's definition may be amended +thus: Volition is the impression which arises when the idea of a bodily +or mental action is accompanied by the desire that the action should be +accomplished. It differs from other desires simply in the fact, that we +regard ourselves as possible causes of the action desired. + +Two questions arise, in connexion with the observation of the phenomenon +of volition, as they arise out of the contemplation of all other natural +phenomena. Firstly, has it a cause; and, if so, what is its cause? +Secondly, is it followed by any effect, and if so, what effect does it +produce? + +Hume points out, that the nature of the phenomena we consider can have +nothing to do with the origin of the conception that they are connected +by the relation of cause and effect. For that relation is nothing but an +order of succession, which, so far as our experience goes, is +invariable; and it is obvious that the nature of phenomena has nothing +to do with their order. Whatever it is that leads us to seek for a cause +for every event, in the case of the phenomena of the external world, +compels us, with equal cogency, to seek it in that of the mind. + +The only meaning of the law of causation, in the physical world, is, +that it generalises universal experience of the order of that world; +and, if experience shows a similar order to obtain among states of +consciousness, the law of causation will properly express that order. + +That such an order exists, however, is acknowledged by every sane man: + + "Our idea, therefore, of necessity and causation, arises entirely + from the uniformity observable in the operations of nature, where + similar objects are constantly conjoined together, and the mind is + determined by custom to infer the one from the appearance of the + other. These two circumstances form the whole of that necessity + which we ascribe to matter. Beyond the constant _conjunction_ of + similar objects and the consequent _inference_ from one to the + other, we have no notion of any necessity of connexion. + + "If it appear, therefore, what all mankind have ever allowed, + without any doubt or hesitation, that these two circumstances take + place in the voluntary actions of men, and in the operations of + mind, it must follow that all mankind have ever agreed in the + doctrine of necessity, and that they have hitherto disputed merely + from not understanding each other."--(IV. p. 97.) + +But is this constant conjunction observable in human actions? A student +of history could give but one answer to this question: + + "Ambition, avarice, self-love, vanity, friendship, generosity, + public spirit: these passions, mixed in various degrees, and + distributed through society, have been, from the beginning of the + world, and still are, the source of all the actions and enterprizes + which have ever been observed among mankind. Would you know the + sentiments, inclinations, and course of life of the Greeks and + Romans? Study well the temper and actions of the French and + English. You cannot be much mistaken in transferring to the former + _most_ of the observations which you have made with regard to the + latter. Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that + history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular. + Its chief use is only to discover the constant and universal + principles of human nature, by showing men in all varieties of + circumstances and situations, and furnishing us with materials from + which we may form our observations, and become acquainted with the + regular springs of human action and behaviour. These records of + wars, intrigues, factions, and revolutions are so many collections + of experiments, by which the politician or moral philosopher fixes + the principles of his science, in the same manner as the physician + or natural philosopher becomes acquainted with the nature of + plants, minerals, and other external objects, by the experiments + which he forms concerning them. Nor are the earth, air, water, and + other elements examined by Aristotle and Hippocrates more like to + those which at present lie under our observation, than the men + described by Polybius and Tacitus are to those who now govern the + world."--(IV. pp. 97-8.) + +Hume proceeds to point out that the value set upon experience in the +conduct of affairs, whether of business or of politics, involves the +acknowledgment that we base our expectation of what men will do, upon +our observation of what they have done; and, that we are as firmly +convinced of the fixed order of thoughts as we are of that of things. +And, if it be urged that human actions not unfrequently appear +unaccountable and capricious, his reply is prompt:-- + + "I grant it possible to find some actions which seem to have no + regular connexion with any known motives, and are exceptions to all + the measures of conduct which have ever been established for the + government of men. But if one could willingly know what judgment + should be formed of such irregular and extraordinary actions, we + may consider the sentiments commonly entertained with regard to + those irregular events which appear in the course of nature, and + the operations of external objects. All causes are not conjoined to + their usual effects with like uniformity. An artificer, who handles + only dead matter, may be disappointed in his aim, as well as the + politician who directs the conduct of sensible and intelligent + agents. + + "The vulgar, who take things according to their first appearance, + attribute the uncertainty of events to such an uncertainty in the + causes as make the latter often fail of their usual influence, + though they meet with no impediment to their operation. But + philosophers, observing that, almost in every part of nature, there + is contained a vast variety of springs and principles, which are + hid, by reason of their minuteness or remoteness, find that it is + at least possible the contrariety of events may not proceed from + any contingency in the cause, but from the secret operation of + contrary causes. This possibility is converted into certainty by + further observation, when they remark that, upon an exact scrutiny, + a contrariety of effects always betrays a contrariety of causes, + and proceeds from their mutual opposition. A peasant can give no + better reason for the stopping of any clock or watch, than to say + that it does not commonly go right. But an artist easily perceives + that the same force in the spring or pendulum has always the same + influence on the wheels; but fails of its usual effect, perhaps by + reason of a grain of dust, which puts a stop to the whole movement. + From the observation of several parallel instances, philosophers + form a maxim, that the connexion between all causes and effects is + equally necessary, and that its seeming uncertainty in some + instances proceeds from the secret opposition of contrary + causes."--(IV. pp. 101-2.) + +So with regard to human actions:-- + + "The internal principles and motives may operate in a uniform + manner, notwithstanding these seeming irregularities; in the same + manner as the winds, rains, clouds, and other variations of the + weather are supposed to be governed by steady principles; though + not easily discoverable by human sagacity and inquiry."--(IV. p. + 103.) + +Meteorology, as a science, was not in existence in Hume's time, or he +would have left out the "supposed to be." In practice, again, what +difference does any one make between natural and moral evidence? + + "A prisoner who has neither money nor interest, discovers the + impossibility of his escape, as well when he considers the + obstinacy of the gaoler, as the walls and bars with which he is + surrounded; and, in all attempts for his freedom, chooses rather to + work upon the stone and iron of the one, than upon the inflexible + nature of the other. The same prisoner, when conducted to the + scaffold, foresees his death as certainly from the constancy and + fidelity of his guards, as from the operation of the axe or wheel. + His mind runs along a certain train of ideas: The refusal of the + soldiers to consent to his escape; the action of the executioner; + the separation of the head and body; bleeding, convulsive motions, + and death. Here is a connected chain of natural causes and + voluntary actions; but the mind feels no difference between them, + in passing from one link to another, nor is less certain of the + future event, than if it were connected with the objects presented + to the memory or senses, by a train of causes cemented together by + what we are pleased to call a _physical_ necessity. The same + experienced union has the same effect on the mind, whether the + united objects be motives, volition, and actions; or figure and + motion. We may change the names of things, but their nature and + their operation on the understanding never change."--(IV. pp. + 105-6.) + +But, if the necessary connexion of our acts with our ideas has always +been acknowledged in practice, why the proclivity of mankind to deny it +words? + + "If we examine the operations of body, and the production of + effects from their causes, we shall find that all our faculties can + never carry us further in our knowledge of this relation, than + barely to observe, that particular objects are _constantly + conjoined_ together, and that the mind is carried, by a _customary + transition_, from the appearance of the one to the belief of the + other. But though this conclusion concerning human ignorance be the + result of the strictest scrutiny of this subject, men still + entertain a strong propensity to believe, that they penetrate + further into the province of nature, and perceive something like a + necessary connexion between cause and effect. When, again, they + turn their reflections towards the operations of their own minds, + and _feel_ no such connexion between the motive and the action; + they are thence apt to suppose, that there is a difference between + the effects which result from material force, and those which arise + from thought and intelligence. But, being once convinced, that we + know nothing of causation of any kind, than merely the _constant + conjunction_ of objects, and the consequent _inference_ of the mind + from one to another, and finding that these two circumstances are + universally allowed to have place in voluntary actions; we may be + more easily led to own the same necessity common to all + causes."--(IV. pp. 107, 8.) + +The last asylum of the hard-pressed advocate of the doctrine of uncaused +volition is usually, that, argue as you like, he has a profound and +ineradicable consciousness of what he calls the freedom of his will. But +Hume follows him even here, though only in a note, as if he thought the +extinction of so transparent a sophism hardly worthy of the dignity of +his text. + + "The prevalence of the doctrine of liberty may be accounted for + from another cause, viz. a false sensation, or seeming experience, + which we have, or may have, of liberty or indifference in many of + our actions. The necessity of any action, whether of matter or of + mind, is not, properly speaking, a quality in the agent, but in any + thinking or intelligent being who may consider the action; and it + consists chiefly in the determination of his thoughts to infer the + existence of that action from some preceding objects; as liberty, + when opposed to necessity, is nothing but the want of that + determination, and a certain looseness or indifference which we + feel, in passing or not passing, from the idea of any object to the + idea of any succeeding one. Now we may observe that though, in + _reflecting_ on human actions, we seldom feel such looseness or + indifference, but are commonly able to infer them with considerable + certainty from their motives, and from the dispositions of the + agent; yet it frequently happens, that in _performing_ the actions + themselves, we are sensible of something like it: And as all + resembling objects are taken for each other, this has been employed + as demonstrative and even intuitive proof of human liberty. We feel + that our actions are subject to our will on most occasions; and + imagine we feel, that the will itself is subject to nothing, + because, when by a denial of it we are provoked to try, we feel + that it moves easily every way, and produces an image of itself (or + a _Velleity_ as it is called in the schools), even on that side on + which it did not settle. This image or faint notion, we persuade + ourselves, could at that time have been completed into the thing + itself; because, should that be denied, we find upon a second trial + that at present it can. We consider not that the fantastical desire + of showing liberty is here the motive of our actions."--(IV. p. + 110, _note_.) + +Moreover, the moment the attempt is made to give a definite meaning to +the words, the supposed opposition between free will and necessity turns +out to be a mere verbal dispute. + + "For what is meant by liberty, when applied to voluntary actions? + We cannot surely mean, that actions have so little connexion with + motive, inclinations, and circumstances, that one does not follow + with a certain degree of uniformity from the other, and that one + affords no inference by which we can conclude the existence of the + other. For these are plain and acknowledged matters of fact. By + liberty, then, we can only mean _a power of acting or not acting + according to the determinations of the will_; that is, if we choose + to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may. Now + this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every + one who is not a prisoner and in chains. Here then is no subject of + dispute."--(IV. p. 111.) + +Half the controversies about the freedom of the will would have had no +existence, if this pithy paragraph had been well pondered by those who +oppose the doctrine of necessity. For they rest upon the absurd +presumption that the proposition, "I can do as I like," is contradictory +to the doctrine of necessity. The answer is; nobody doubts that, at any +rate within certain limits, you can do as you like. But what determines +your likings and dislikings? Did you make your own constitution? Is it +your contrivance that one thing is pleasant and another is painful? And +even if it were, why did you prefer to make it after the one fashion +rather than the other? The passionate assertion of the consciousness of +their freedom, which is the favourite refuge of the opponents of the +doctrine of necessity, is mere futility, for nobody denies it. What they +really have to do, if they would upset the necessarian argument, is to +prove that they are free to associate any emotion whatever with any idea +whatever; to like pain as much as pleasure; vice as much as virtue; in +short, to prove, that, whatever may be the fixity of order of the +universe of things, that of thought is given over to chance. + +In the second part of this remarkable essay, Hume considers the real, or +supposed, immoral consequences of the doctrine of necessity, premising +the weighty observation that + + "When any opinion leads to absurdity, it is certainly false; but it + is not certain that an opinion is false because it is of dangerous + consequence."--(IV. p. 112.) + +And, therefore, that the attempt to refute an opinion by a picture of +its dangerous consequences to religion and morality, is as illogical as +it is reprehensible. + +It is said, in the first place, that necessity destroys responsibility; +that, as it is usually put, we have no right to praise or blame actions +that cannot be helped. Hume's reply amounts to this, that the very idea +of responsibility implies the belief in the necessary connexion of +certain actions with certain states of the mind. A person is held +responsible only for those acts which are preceded by a certain +intention; and, as we cannot see, or hear, or feel, an intention, we can +only reason out its existence on the principle that like effects have +like causes. + +If a man is found by the police busy with "jemmy" and dark lantern at a +jeweller's shop door over night, the magistrate before whom he is +brought the next morning, reasons from those effects to their causes in +the fellow's "burglarious" ideas and volitions, with perfect confidence, +and punishes him accordingly. And it is quite clear that such a +proceeding would be grossly unjust, if the links of the logical process +were other than necessarily connected together. The advocate who should +attempt to get the man off on the plea that his client need not +necessarily have had a felonious intent, would hardly waste his time +more, if he tried to prove that the sum of all the angles of a triangle +is not two right angles, but three. + +A man's moral responsibility for his acts has, in fact, nothing to do +with the causation of these acts, but depends on the frame of mind which +accompanies them. Common language tells us this, when it uses +"well-disposed" as the equivalent of "good," and "evil-minded" as that +of "wicked." If A does something which puts B in a violent passion, it +is quite possible to admit that B's passion is the necessary consequence +of A's act, and yet to believe that B's fury is morally wrong, or that +he ought to control it. In fact, a calm bystander would reason with both +on the assumption of moral necessity. He would say to A, "You were wrong +in doing a thing which you knew (that is, of the necessity of which you +were convinced) would irritate B." And he would say to B, "You are wrong +to give way to passion, for you know its evil effects"--that is the +necessary connection between yielding to passion and evil. + +So far, therefore, from necessity destroying moral responsibility, it is +the foundation of all praise and blame; and moral admiration reaches its +climax in the ascription of necessary goodness to the Deity. + +To the statement of another consequence of the necessarian doctrine, +that, if there be a God, he must be the cause of all evil as well as of +all good, Hume gives no real reply--probably because none is possible. +But then, if this conclusion is distinctly and unquestionably deducible +from the doctrine of necessity, it is no less unquestionably a direct +consequence of every known form of monotheism. If God is the cause of +all things, he must be the cause of evil among the rest; if he is +omniscient, he must have the fore-knowledge of evil; if he is almighty, +he must possess the power of preventing, or of extinguishing evil. And +to say that an all-knowing and all-powerful being is not responsible for +what happens, because he only permits it, is, under its intellectual +aspect, a piece of childish sophistry; while, as to the moral look of +it, one has only to ask any decently honourable man, whether, under like +circumstances, he would try to get rid of his responsibility by such a +plea. + +Hume's _Inquiry_ appeared in 1748. He does not refer to Anthony Collins' +essay on Liberty, published thirty-three years before, in which the same +question is treated to the same effect, with singular force and +lucidity. It may be said, perhaps, that it is not wonderful that the two +freethinkers should follow the same line of reasoning; but no such +theory will account for the fact that in 1754, the famous Calvinistic +divine, Jonathan Edwards, President of the College of New Jersey, +produced, in the interests of the straitest orthodoxy, a demonstration +of the necessarian thesis, which has never been equalled in power, and +certainly has never been refuted. + +In the ninth section of the fourth part of Edwards' _Inquiry_, he has to +deal with the Arminian objection to the Calvinistic doctrine that "it +makes God the author of sin"; and it is curious to watch the struggle +between the theological controversialist, striving to ward off an +admission which he knows will be employed to damage his side, and the +acute logician, conscious that, in some shape or other, the admission +must be made. Beginning with a _tu quoque_, that the Arminian doctrine +involves consequences as bad as the Calvinistic view, he proceeds to +object to the term "author of sin," though he ends by admitting that, in +a certain sense, it is applicable; he proves from Scripture, that God is +the disposer and orderer of sin; and then, by an elaborate false analogy +with the darkness resulting from the absence of the sun, endeavours to +suggest that he is only the author of it in a negative sense; and, +finally, he takes refuge in the conclusion that, though God is the +orderer and disposer of those deeds which, considered in relation to +their agents, are morally evil, yet, inasmuch as His purpose has all +along been infinitely good, they are not evil relatively to him. + +And this, of course, may be perfectly true; but if true, it is +inconsistent with the attribute of omnipotence. It is conceivable that +there should be no evil in the world; that which is conceivable is +certainly possible; if it were possible for evil to be non-existent, the +maker of the world, who, though foreknowing the existence of evil in +that world, did not prevent it, either did not really desire it should +not exist, or could not prevent its existence. It might be well for +those who inveigh against the logical consequences of necessarianism to +bethink them of the logical consequences of theism; which are not only +the same, when the attribute of Omniscience is ascribed to the Deity, +but which bring out, from the existence of moral evil, a hopeless +conflict between the attributes of Infinite Benevolence and Infinite +Power, which, with no less assurance, are affirmed to appertain to the +Divine Being. + +Kant's mode of dealing with the doctrine of necessity is very singular. +That the phenomena of the mind follow fixed relations of cause and +effect is, to him, as unquestionable as it is to Hume. But then there is +the _Ding an sich_, the _Noumenon_, or Kantian equivalent for the +substance of the soul. This, being out of the phenomenal world, is +subject to none of the laws of phenomena, and is consequently as +absolutely free, and as completely powerless, as a mathematical point, +_in vacua_, would be. Hence volition is uncaused, so far as it belongs +to the noumenon; but, necessary, so far as it takes effect in the +phenomenal world. + +Since Kant is never weary of telling us that we know nothing whatever, +and can know nothing, about the noumenon, except as the hypothetical +subject of any number of negative predicates; the information that it is +free, in the sense of being out of reach of the law of causation, is +about as valuable as the assertion that it is neither grey, nor blue, +nor square. For practical purposes, it must be admitted that the inward +possession of such a noumenal libertine does not amount to much for +people whose actual existence is made up of nothing but definitely +regulated phenomena. When the good and evil angels fought for the dead +body of Moses, its presence must have been of about the same value to +either of the contending parties, as that of Kant's noumenon, in the +battle of impulses which rages in the breast of man. Metaphysicians, as +a rule, are sadly deficient in the sense of humour; or they would surely +abstain from advancing propositions which, when stripped of the verbiage +in which they are disguised, appear to the profane eye to be bare shams, +naked but not ashamed. + + + + +CHAPTER XI. + +THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS. + + +In his autobiography, Hume writes:-- + + "In the same year [1752] was published at London my _Inquiry + Concerning the Principles of Morals_; which in my own opinion (who + ought not to judge on that subject) is of all my writings, + historical, philosophical, and literary, incomparably the best. It + came unnoticed and unobserved into the world." + +It may commonly be noticed that the relative value which an author +ascribes to his own works rarely agrees with the estimate formed of them +by his readers; who criticise the products, without either the power or +the wish to take into account the pains which they may have cost the +producer. Moreover, the clear and dispassionate common sense of the +_Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals_ may have tasted flat after +the highly-seasoned _Inquiry concerning the Human Understanding_. +Whether the public like to be deceived, or not, may be open to question; +but it is beyond a doubt that they love to be shocked in a pleasant and +mannerly way. Now Hume's speculations on moral questions are not so +remote from those of respectable professors, like Hutcheson, or saintly +prelates, such as Butler, as to present any striking novelty. And they +support the cause of righteousness in a cool, reasonable, indeed +slightly patronising fashion, eminently in harmony with the mind of the +eighteenth century; which admired virtue very much, if she would only +avoid the rigour which the age called fanaticism, and the fervour which +it called enthusiasm. + +Having applied the ordinary methods of scientific inquiry to the +intellectual phenomena of the mind, it was natural that Hume should +extend the same mode of investigation to its moral phenomena; and, in +the true spirit of a natural philosopher, he commences by selecting a +group of those states of consciousness with which every one's personal +experience must have made him familiar: in the expectation that the +discovery of the sources of moral approbation and disapprobation, in +this comparatively easy case, may furnish the means of detecting them +where they are more recondite. + + "We shall analyse that complication of mental qualities which form + what, in common life, we call PERSONAL MERIT: We shall consider + every attribute of the mind, which renders a man an object either + of esteem and affection, or of hatred and contempt; every habit or + sentiment or faculty, which if ascribed to any person, implies + either praise or blame, and may enter into any panegyric or satire + of his character and manners. The quick sensibility which, on this + head, is so universal among mankind, gives a philosopher sufficient + assurance that he can never be considerably mistaken in framing the + catalogue, or incurs any danger of misplacing the objects of his + contemplation: He needs only enter into his own breast for a + moment, and consider whether he should or should not desire to have + this or that quality assigned to him, and whether such or such an + imputation would proceed from a friend or an enemy. The very nature + of language guides us almost infallibly in forming a judgment of + this nature; and as every tongue possesses one set of words which + are taken in a good sense, and another in the opposite, the least + acquaintance with the idiom suffices, without any reasoning, to + direct us in collecting and arranging the estimable or blamable + qualities of men. The only object of reasoning is to discover the + circumstances on both sides, which are common to these qualities; + to observe that particular in which the estimable qualities agree + on the one hand, and the blamable on the other, and thence to reach + the foundation of ethics, and find their universal principles, from + which all censure or approbation is ultimately derived. As this is + a question of fact, not of abstract science, we can only expect + success by following the experimental method, and deducing general + maxims from a comparison of particular instances. The other + scientifical method, where a general abstract principle is first + established, and is afterwards branched out into a variety of + inferences and conclusions, may be more perfect in itself, but + suits less the imperfection of human nature, and is a common source + of illusion and mistake, in this as well as in other subjects. Men + are now cured of their passion for hypotheses and systems in + natural philosophy, and will hearken to no arguments but those + which are derived from experience. It is full time they should + attempt a like reformation in all moral disquisitions; and reject + every system of ethics, however subtile or ingenious, which is not + founded on fact and observation."--(IV. pp. 242-4.) + +No qualities give a man a greater claim to personal merit than +benevolence and justice; but if we inquire why benevolence deserves so +much praise, the answer will certainly contain a large reference to the +utility of that virtue to society; and as for justice, the very +existence of the virtue implies that of society; public utility is its +sole origin; and the measure of its usefulness is also the standard of +its merit. If every man possessed everything he wanted, and no one had +the power to interfere with such possession; or if no man desired that +which could damage his fellow-man, justice would have no part to play +in the universe. But as Hume observes:-- + + "In the present disposition of the human heart, it would perhaps be + difficult to find complete instances of such enlarged affections; + but still we may observe that the case of families approaches + towards it; and the stronger the mutual benevolence is among the + individuals, the nearer it approaches, till all distinction of + property be in a great measure lost and confounded among them. + Between married persons, the cement of friendship is by the laws + supposed so strong, as to abolish all division of possessions, and + has often, in reality, the force assigned to it.[45] And it is + observable that, during the ardour of new enthusiasms, when every + principle is inflamed into extravagance, the community of goods has + frequently been attempted; and nothing but experience of its + inconveniences, from the returning or disguised selfishness of men, + could make the imprudent fanatics adopt anew the ideas of justice + and separate property. So true is it that this virtue derives its + existence entirely from its necessary _use_ to the intercourse and + social state of mankind."--(IV. p. 256.) + + "Were the human species so framed by nature as that each individual + possessed within himself every faculty requisite both for his own + preservation and for the propagation of his kind: Were all society + and intercourse cut off between man and man by the primary + intention of the Supreme Creator: It seems evident that so solitary + a being would be as much incapable of justice as of social + discourse and conversation. Where mutual regard and forbearance + serve to no manner of purpose, they would never direct the conduct + of any reasonable man. The headlong course of the passions would be + checked by no reflection on future consequences. And as each man + is here supposed to love himself alone, and to depend only on + himself and his own activity for safety and happiness, he would, on + every occasion, to the utmost of his power, challenge the + preference above every other being, to none of which he is bound by + any ties, either of nature or of interest. + + "But suppose the conjunction of the sexes to be established in + nature, a family immediately arises; and particular rules being + found requisite for its subsistence, these are immediately + embraced, though without comprehending the rest of mankind within + their prescriptions. Suppose that several families unite together + in one society, which is totally disjoined from all others, the + rules which preserve peace and order enlarge themselves to the + utmost extent of that society; but becoming then entirely useless, + lose their force when carried one step further. But again, suppose + that several distinct societies maintain a kind of intercourse for + mutual convenience and advantage, the boundaries of justice still + grow larger, in proportion to the largeness of men's views and the + force of their mutual connexion. History, experience, reason, + sufficiently instruct us in this natural progress of human + sentiments, and in the gradual enlargement of our regard to justice + in proportion as we become acquainted with the extensive utility of + that virtue."--(IV. pp. 262-4.) + +The moral obligation of justice and the rights of property are by no +means diminished by this exposure of the purely utilitarian basis on +which they rest:-- + + "For what stronger foundation can be desired or conceived for any + duty, than to observe that human society, or even human nature, + could not subsist without the establishment of it, and will still + arrive at greater degrees of happiness and perfection, the more + inviolable the regard is which is paid to that duty? + + "The dilemma seems obvious: As justice evidently tends to promote + public utility, and to support civil society, the sentiment of + justice is either derived from our reflecting on that tendency, or, + like hunger, thirst, and other appetites, resentment, love of life, + attachment to offspring, and other passions, arises from a simple + original instinct in the human heart, which nature has implanted + for like salutary purposes. If the latter be the case, it follows + that property, which is the object of justice, is also + distinguished by a simple original instinct, and is not ascertained + by any argument or reflection. But who is there that ever heard of + such an instinct? Or is this a subject in which new discoveries can + be made? We may as well expect to discover in the body new senses + which had before escaped the observation of all mankind."--(IV. pp. + 273, 4.) + +The restriction of the object of justice to property, in this passage, +is singular. Pleasure and pain can hardly be included under the term +property, and yet justice surely deals largely with the withholding of +the former, or the infliction of the latter, by men on one another. If a +man bars another from a pleasure which he would otherwise enjoy, or +actively hurts him without good reason, the latter is said to be injured +as much as if his property had been interfered with. Here, indeed, it +may be readily shown, that it is as much the interest of society that +men should not interfere with one another's freedom, or mutually inflict +positive or negative pain, as that they should not meddle with one +another's property; and hence the obligation of justice in such matters +may be deduced. But, if a man merely thinks ill of another, or feels +maliciously towards him without due cause, he is properly said to be +unjust. In this case it would be hard to prove that any injury is done +to society by the evil thought; but there is no question that it will be +stigmatised as an injustice; and the offender himself, in another frame +of mind, is often ready enough to admit that he has failed to be just +towards his neighbour. However, it may plausibly be said, that so slight +a barrier lies between thought and speech, that any moral quality +attached to the latter is easily transferred to the former; and that, +since open slander is obviously opposed to the interests of society, +injustice of thought, which is silent slander, must become inextricably +associated with the same blame. + +But, granting the utility to society of all kinds of benevolence and +justice, why should the quality of those virtues involve the sense of +moral obligation? + +Hume answers this question in the fifth section, entitled, _Why Utility +Pleases_. He repudiates the deduction of moral approbation from +self-love, and utterly denies that we approve of benevolent or just +actions because we think of the benefits which they are likely to confer +indirectly on ourselves. The source of the approbation with which we +view an act useful to society must be sought elsewhere; and, in fact, is +to be found in that feeling which is called sympathy. + + "No man is absolutely indifferent to the happiness and misery of + others. The first has a natural tendency to give pleasure, the + second pain. This every one may find in himself. It is not probable + that these principles can be resolved into principles more simple + and universal, whatever attempts may have been made for that + purpose."--(IV. p. 294, _Note_.) + +Other men's joys and sorrows are not spectacles at which we remain +unmoved:-- + + " ... The view of the former, whether in its causes or effects, + like sunshine, or the prospect of well-cultivated plains (to carry + our pretensions no higher) communicates a secret joy and + satisfaction; the appearance of the latter, like a lowering cloud + or barren landscape, throws a melancholy damp over the imagination. + And this concession being once made, the difficulty is over; and a + natural unforced interpretation of the phenomena of human life will + afterwards, we hope, prevail among all speculative + inquirers."--(IV. p. 320.) + +The moral approbation, therefore, with which we regard acts of justice +or benevolence rests upon their utility to society, because the +perception of that utility or, in other words, of the pleasure which +they give to other men, arouses a feeling of sympathetic pleasure in +ourselves. The feeling of obligation to be just, or of the duty of +justice, arises out of that association of moral approbation or +disapprobation with one's own actions, which is what we call conscience. +To fail in justice, or in benevolence, is to be displeased with oneself. +But happiness is impossible without inward self-approval; and, hence, +every man who has any regard to his own happiness and welfare, will find +his best reward in the practice of every moral duty. On this topic Hume +expends much eloquence. + + "But what philosophical truths can be more advantageous to society + than these here delivered, which represent virtue in all her + genuine and most engaging charms, and make us approach her with + ease, familiarity, and affection? The dismal dress falls off, with + which many divines and some philosophers have covered her; and + nothing appears but gentleness, humanity, beneficence, affability; + nay, even at proper intervals, play, frolic, and gaiety. She talks + not of useless austerities and rigours, suffering and self-denial. + She declares that her sole purpose is to make her votaries, and all + mankind, during every period of their existence, if possible, + cheerful and happy; nor does she ever willingly part with any + pleasure but in hopes of ample compensation in some other period of + their lives. The sole trouble which she demands is that of just + calculation, and a steady preference of the greater happiness. And + if any austere pretenders approach her, enemies to joy and + pleasure, she either rejects them as hypocrites and deceivers, or + if she admit them in her train, they are ranked, however, among the + least favoured of her votaries. + + "And, indeed, to drop all figurative expression, what hopes can we + ever have of engaging mankind to a practice which we confess full + of austerity and rigour? Or what theory of morals can ever serve + any useful purpose, unless it can show, by a particular detail, + that all the duties which it recommends are also the true interest + of each individual? The peculiar advantage of the foregoing system + seem to be, that it furnishes proper mediums for that + purpose."--(IV. p. 360.) + +In this pæan to virtue, there is more of the dance measure than will +sound appropriate in the ears of most of the pilgrims who toil +painfully, not without many a stumble and many a bruise, along the rough +and steep roads which lead to the higher life. + +Virtue is undoubtedly beneficent; but the man is to be envied to whom +her ways seem in anywise playful. And, though she may not talk much +about suffering and self-denial, her silence on that topic may be +accounted for on the principle _ça va sans dire_. The calculation of the +greatest happiness is not performed quite so easily as a rule of three +sum; while, in the hour of temptation, the question will crop up, +whether, as something has to be sacrificed, a bird in the hand is not +worth two in the bush; whether it may not be as well to give up the +problematical greater happiness in the future, for a certain great +happiness in the present, and + + + "Buy the merry madness of one hour + With the long irksomeness of following time."[46] + + +If mankind cannot be engaged in practices "full of austerity and +rigour," by the love of righteousness and the fear of evil, without +seeking for other compensation than that which flows from the +gratification of such love and the consciousness of escape from +debasement, they are in a bad case. For they will assuredly find that +virtue presents no very close likeness to the sportive leader of the +joyous hours in Hume's rosy picture; but that she is an awful Goddess, +whose ministers are the Furies, and whose highest reward is peace. + +It is not improbable that Hume would have qualified all this as +enthusiasm or fanaticism, or both; but he virtually admits it:-- + + "Now, as virtue is an end, and is desirable on its own account, + without fee or reward, merely for the immediate satisfaction which + it conveys, it is requisite that there should be some sentiment + which it touches; some internal taste or feeling, or whatever you + please to call it, which distinguishes moral good and evil, and + which embraces the one and rejects the other. + + "Thus the distinct boundaries and offices of _reason_ and of + _taste_ are easily ascertained. The former conveys the knowledge of + truth and falsehood: The latter gives the sentiment of beauty and + deformity, vice and virtue. The one discovers objects as they + really stand in nature, without addition or diminution: The other + has a productive faculty, and gilding and staining all natural + objects with the colours borrowed from internal sentiment, raises + in a manner a new creation. Reason being cool and disengaged, is no + motive to action, and directs only the impulse received from + appetite or inclination, by showing us the means of attaining + happiness or avoiding misery. Taste, as it gives pleasure or pain, + and thereby constitutes happiness or misery, becomes a motive to + action, and is the first spring or impulse to desire and volition. + From circumstances and relations known or supposed, the former + leads us to the discovery of the concealed and unknown. After all + circumstances and relations are laid before us, the latter makes us + feel from the whole a new sentiment of blame or approbation. The + standard of the one, being founded on the nature of things, is + external and inflexible, even by the will of the Supreme Being: The + standard of the other, arising from the internal frame and + constitution of animals, is ultimately derived from the Supreme + Will, which bestowed on each being its peculiar nature, and + arranged the several classes and orders of existence."--(IV. pp. + 376-7.) + +Hume has not discussed the theological theory of the obligations of +morality, but it is obviously in accordance with his view of the nature +of those obligations. Under its theological aspect, morality is +obedience to the will of God; and the ground for such obedience is +two-fold; either we ought to obey God because He will punish us if we +disobey Him, which is an argument based on the utility of obedience; or +our obedience ought to flow from our love towards God, which is an +argument based on pure feeling and for which no reason can be given. +For, if any man should say that he takes no pleasure in the +contemplation of the ideal of perfect holiness, or, in other words, that +he does not love God, the attempt to argue him into acquiring that +pleasure would be as hopeless as the endeavour to persuade Peter Bell of +the "witchery of the soft blue sky." + +In whichever way we look at the matter, morality is based on feeling, +not on reason; though reason alone is competent to trace out the effects +of our actions and thereby dictate conduct. Justice is founded on the +love of one's neighbour; and goodness is a kind of beauty. The moral +law, like the laws of physical nature, rests in the long run upon +instinctive intuitions, and is neither more nor less "innate" and +"necessary" than they are. Some people cannot by any means be got to +understand the first book of Euclid; but the truths of mathematics are +no less necessary and binding on the great mass of mankind. Some there +are who cannot feel the difference between the _Sonata Appassionata_, +and _Cherry Ripe_; or between a gravestone-cutter's cherub and the +Apollo Belvidere; but the canons of art are none the less acknowledged. +While some there may be, who, devoid of sympathy are incapable of a +sense of duty; but neither does their existence affect the foundations +of morality. Such pathological deviations from true manhood are merely +the halt, the lame, and the blind of the world of consciousness; and the +anatomist of the mind leaves them aside, as the anatomist of the body +would ignore abnormal specimens. + +And as there are Pascals and Mozarts, Newtons and Raffaelles, in whom +the innate faculty for science or art seems to need but a touch to +spring into full vigour, and through whom the human race obtains new +possibilities of knowledge and new conceptions of beauty: so there have +been men of moral genius, to whom we owe ideals of duty and visions of +moral perfection, which ordinary mankind could never have attained; +though, happily for them, they can feel the beauty of a vision, which +lay beyond the reach of their dull imaginations, and count life well +spent in shaping some faint image of it in the actual world. + +THE END + +LONDON: R. CLAY, SONS, AND TAYLOR, BREAD STREET HILL. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[45] Family affection in the eighteenth century may have been stronger +than in the nineteenth; but Hume's bachelor inexperience can surely +alone explain his strange account of the suppositions of the marriage +law of that day, and their effects. The law certainly abolished all +division of possessions, but it did so by making the husband sole +proprietor. + +[46] Ben Jonson's _Cynthia's Revels_, act i. + + + + +ADVERTISEMENTS + + +ENGLISH MEN OF LETTERS. + +EDITED BY JOHN MORLEY. + + +_These Short Books are addressed to the general public with a view both +to stirring and satisfying an interest in literature and its great +topics in the minds of those who have to run as they read. An immense +class is growing up, and must every year increase, whose education will +have made them alive to the importance of the masters of our literature, +and capable of intelligent curiosity as to their performances. 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Huxley + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Hume + (English Men of Letters Series) + +Author: T.H. Huxley + +Release Date: July 13, 2006 [EBook #18819] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HUME *** + + + + +Produced by Barbara Tozier, Bill Tozier, Martin Pettit and +the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at +http://www.pgdp.net + + + + + + +</pre> + + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_i" id="Page_i">[Pg i]</a></span></p> +<h2>English Men of Letters</h2> + +<h3>EDITED BY JOHN MORLEY</h3> + +<p class='tbrk'> </p> + +<h1>HUME</h1> + +<p class="center"><img src="images/001.png" width='200' height='65' alt="Publisher's logo" /></p> + +<p class='tbrk'> </p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_iii" id="Page_iii">[Pg iii]</a></span></p> + +<h1>HUME</h1> + +<p class='tbrk'> </p> + +<h3>BY</h3> + +<h2>PROFESSOR HUXLEY</h2> + +<p class='tbrk'> </p> + +<h4>London<br />MACMILLAN AND CO<br />1879</h4> + +<h5><i>The Right of Translation and Reproduction is Reserved</i></h5> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_iv" id="Page_iv">[Pg iv]</a></span></p> + +<p class='tbrk'> </p> + +<h4>LONDON:<br />R. CLAY, SONS, AND TAYLOR,<br />BREAD STREET HILL.</h4> + +<p class='tbrk'> </p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_v" id="Page_v">[Pg v]</a></span></p> + +<h2>CONTENTS.</h2> + +<div class="index"> +<ul> +<li><a href="#PART_I"><i>PART I.—HUME'S LIFE.</i></a></li> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_AI">CHAPTER I.</a> +<ul> + <li class="subitem">EARLY LIFE: LITERARY AND POLITICAL WRITINGS</li> +</ul></li> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_AII">CHAPTER II.</a> +<ul> + <li class="subitem">LATER YEARS: THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND</li> +</ul></li> +<li><a href="#PART_II"><i>PART II.—HUME'S PHILOSOPHY.</i></a></li> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_I">CHAPTER I.</a> +<ul> + <li class="subitem">THE OBJECT AND SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY</li> +</ul></li> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_II">CHAPTER II.</a> +<ul> + <li class="subitem">THE CONTENTS OF THE MIND</li> +</ul></li> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_III">CHAPTER III.</a> +<ul> + <li class="subitem">THE ORIGIN OF THE IMPRESSIONS</li> +</ul></li> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_IV">CHAPTER IV.</a> +<ul> + <li class="subitem">THE CLASSIFICATION AND THE NOMENCLATURE OF MENTAL OPERATIONS</li> +</ul></li> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_V">CHAPTER V.</a> +<ul> + <li class="subitem">THE MENTAL PHENOMENA OF ANIMALS</li> +</ul></li> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_VI">CHAPTER VI.</a> +<ul> + <li class="subitem">LANGUAGE—PROPOSITIONS CONCERNING NECESSARY TRUTHS</li> +</ul></li> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_VII">CHAPTER VII.</a> +<ul> + <li class="subitem">THE ORDER OF NATURE: MIRACLES</li> +</ul></li> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_VIII">CHAPTER VIII.</a> +<ul> + <li class="subitem">THEISM: EVOLUTION OF THEOLOGY</li> +</ul></li> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_IX">CHAPTER IX.</a> +<ul> + <li class="subitem">THE SOUL: THE DOCTRINE OF IMMORTALITY</li> +</ul></li> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_X">CHAPTER X.</a> +<ul> + <li class="subitem">VOLITION: LIBERTY AND NECESSITY</li> +</ul></li> +<li><a href="#CHAPTER_XI">CHAPTER XI.</a> +<ul> + <li class="subitem">THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS</li> +</ul></li> +<li><a href="#ADVERTISEMENTS">ADVERTISEMENTS.</a></li> +</ul> +</div> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[Pg 1]</a></span></p> + +<h1>HUME.</h1> + +<h2><a name="PART_I" id="PART_I"></a>PART I.</h2> + +<h3><i>HUME'S LIFE.</i></h3> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_AI" id="CHAPTER_AI"></a>CHAPTER I.</h2> + +<h3>EARLY LIFE: LITERARY AND POLITICAL WRITINGS.</h3> + +<p>David Hume was born, in Edinburgh on the 26th of April (O.S.), 1711. His +parents were then residing in the parish of the Tron church, apparently +on a visit to the Scottish capital, as the small estate which his father +Joseph Hume, or Home, inherited, lay in Berwickshire, on the banks of +the Whitadder or Whitewater, a few miles from the border, and within +sight of English ground. The paternal mansion was little more than a +very modest farmhouse,<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> and the property derived its name<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[Pg 2]</a></span> of +Ninewells from a considerable spring, which breaks out on the slope in +front of the house, and falls into the Whitadder.</p> + +<p>Both mother and father came of good Scottish families—the paternal line +running back to Lord Home of Douglas, who went over to France with the +Douglas during the French wars of Henry V. and VI. and was killed at the +battle of Verneuil. Joseph Hume died when David was an infant, leaving +himself and two elder children, a brother and a sister, to the care of +their mother, who is described by David Hume in <i>My Own Life</i> as "a +woman of singular merit, who though young and handsome devoted herself +entirely to the rearing and education of her children." Mr. Burton says: +"Her portrait, which I have seen, represents a thin but pleasing +countenance, expressive of great intellectual acuteness;" and as Hume +told Dr. Black that she had "precisely the same constitution with +himself" and died of the disorder which proved fatal to him, it is +probable that the qualities inherited from his mother had much to do +with the future philosopher's eminence. It is curious, however, that her +estimate of her son in her only recorded, and perhaps slightly +apocryphal utterance, is of a somewhat unexpected character. "Our +Davie's a fine goodnatured crater, but uncommon wake-minded." The first +part of the judgment was indeed verified by "Davie's" whole life; but +one might seek in vain for signs of what is commonly understood as +"weakness of mind" in a man who not only showed himself to be an +intellectual athlete, but who had an eminent share of practical wisdom +and tenacity of purpose. One would like to know, however, when it was +that Mrs. Hume committed<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</a></span> herself to this not too flattering judgment of +her younger son. For as Hume reached the mature age of four and thirty, +before he obtained any employment of sufficient importance to convert +the meagre pittance of a middling laird's younger brother into a decent +maintenance, it is not improbable that a shrewd Scots wife may have +thought his devotion to philosophy and poverty to be due to mere +infirmity of purpose. But she lived till 1749, long enough to see more +than the dawn of her son's literary fame and official importance, and +probably changed her mind about "Davie's" force of character.</p> + +<p>David Hume appears to have owed little to schools or universities. There +is some evidence that he entered the Greek class in the University of +Edinburgh in 1723—when he was a boy of twelve years of age—but it is +not known how long his studies were continued, and he did not graduate. +In 1727, at any rate, he was living at Ninewells, and already possessed +by that love of learning and thirst for literary fame, which, as <i>My Own +Life</i> tells us, was the ruling passion of his life and the chief source +of his enjoyments. A letter of this date, addressed to his friend +Michael Ramsay, is certainly a most singular production for a boy of +sixteen. After sundry quotations from Virgil the letter proceeds:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"The perfectly wise man that outbraves fortune, is much greater +than the husbandman who slips by her; and, indeed, this pastoral +and saturnian happiness I have in a great measure come at just now. +I live like a king, pretty much by myself, neither full of action +nor perturbation—<i>molles somnos</i>. This state, however, I can +foresee is not to be relied on. My peace of mind is not +sufficiently confirmed<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</a></span> by philosophy to withstand the blows of +fortune. This greatness and elevation of soul is to be found only +in study and contemplation. This alone can teach us to look down on +human accidents. You must allow [me] to talk thus like a +philosopher: 'tis a subject I think much on, and could talk all day +long of."</p></blockquote> + +<p>If David talked in this strain to his mother her tongue probably gave +utterance to "Bless the bairn!" and, in her private soul, the epithet +"wake-minded" may then have recorded itself. But, though few lonely, +thoughtful, studious boys of sixteen give vent to their thoughts in such +stately periods, it is probable that the brooding over an ideal is +commoner at this age, than fathers and mothers, busy with the cares of +practical life, are apt to imagine.</p> + +<p>About a year later, Hume's family tried to launch him into the +profession of the law; but, as he tells us, "while they fancied I was +poring upon Voet and Vinnius, Cicero and Virgil were the authors which I +was secretly devouring," and the attempt seems to have come to an abrupt +termination. Nevertheless, as a very competent authority<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> wisely +remarks:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"There appear to have been in Hume all the elements of which a good +lawyer is made: clearness of judgment, power of rapidly acquiring +knowledge, untiring industry, and dialectic skill: and if his mind +had not been preoccupied, he might have fallen into the gulf in +which many of the world's greatest geniuses lie +buried—professional eminence; and might have left behind him a +reputation limited to the traditional<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</a></span> recollections of the +Parliament house, or associated with important decisions. He was +through life an able, clear-headed, man of business, and I have +seen several legal documents, written in his own hand and evidently +drawn by himself. They stand the test of general professional +observation; and their writer, by preparing documents of facts of +such a character on his own responsibility, showed that he had +considerable confidence in his ability to adhere to the forms +adequate for the occasion. He talked of it as 'an ancient prejudice +industriously propagated by the dunces in all countries, that <i>a +man of genius is unfit for business</i>,' and he showed, in his +general conduct through life, that he did not choose to come +voluntarily under this proscription."</p></blockquote> + +<p>Six years longer Hume remained at Ninewells before he made another +attempt to embark in a practical career—this time commerce—and with a +like result. For a few months' trial proved that kind of life, also, to +be hopelessly against the grain.</p> + +<p>It was while in London, on his way to Bristol, where he proposed to +commence his mercantile life, that Hume addressed to some eminent London +physician (probably, as Mr. Burton suggests, Dr. George Cheyne) a +remarkable letter. Whether it was ever sent seems doubtful; but it shows +that philosophers as well as poets have their Werterian crises, and it +presents an interesting parallel to John Stuart Mill's record of the +corresponding period of his youth. The letter is too long to be given in +full, but a few quotations may suffice to indicate its importance to +those who desire to comprehend the man.</p> + +<blockquote><p>"You must know then that from my earliest infancy I found always a +strong inclination to books and letters. As our college education +in Scotland, extending little further<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</a></span> than the languages, ends +commonly when we are about fourteen or fifteen years of age, I was +after that left to my own choice in my reading, and found it +incline me almost equally to books of reasoning and philosophy, and +to poetry and the polite authors. Every one who is acquainted +either with the philosophers or critics, knows that there is +nothing yet established in either of these two sciences, and that +they contain little more than endless disputes, even in the most +fundamental articles. Upon examination of these, I found a certain +boldness of temper growing on me, which was not inclined to submit +to any authority in these subjects, but led me to seek out some new +medium, by which truth might be established. After much study and +reflection on this, at last, when I was about eighteen years of +age, there seemed to be opened up to me a new scene of thought, +which transported me beyond measure, and made me, with an ardour +natural to young men, throw up every other pleasure or business to +apply entirely to it. The law, which was the business I designed to +follow, appeared nauseous to me, and I could think of no other way +of pushing my fortune in the world, but that of a scholar and +philosopher. I was infinitely happy in this course of life for some +months; till at last, about the beginning of September, 1729, all +my ardour seemed in a moment to be extinguished, and I could no +longer raise my mind to that pitch, which formerly gave me such +excessive pleasure."</p></blockquote> + +<p>This "decline of soul" Hume attributes, in part, to his being smitten +with the beautiful representations of virtue in the works of Cicero, +Seneca, and Plutarch, and being thereby led to discipline his temper and +his will along with his reason and understanding.</p> + +<blockquote><p>"I was continually fortifying myself with reflections against +death, and poverty, and shame, and pain, and all the other +calamities of life."</p></blockquote> + +<p>And he adds very characteristically:<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span>—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"These no doubt are exceeding useful when joined with an active +life, because the occasion being presented along with the +reflection, works it into the soul, and makes it take a deep +impression: but, in solitude, they serve to little other purpose +than to waste the spirits, the force of the mind meeting no +resistance, but wasting itself in the air, like our arm when it +misses its aim."</p></blockquote> + +<p>Along with all this mental perturbation, symptoms of scurvy, a disease +now almost unknown among landsmen, but which, in the days of winter salt +meat, before root crops flourished in the Lothians, greatly plagued our +forefathers, made their appearance. And, indeed, it may be suspected +that physical conditions were, at first, at the bottom of the whole +business; for, in 1731, a ravenous appetite set in and, in six weeks +from being tall, lean, and raw-boned, Hume says he became sturdy and +robust, with a ruddy complexion and a cheerful countenance—eating, +sleeping, and feeling well, except that the capacity for intense mental +application seemed to be gone. He, therefore, determined to seek out a +more active life; and, though he could not and would not "quit his +pretensions to learning, but with his last breath," he resolved "to lay +them aside for some time, in order the more effectually to resume them."</p> + +<p>The careers open to a poor Scottish gentleman in those days were very +few; and, as Hume's option lay between a travelling tutorship and a +stool in a merchant's office, he chose the latter.</p> + +<blockquote><p>"And having got recommendation to a considerable trader in Bristol, +I am just now hastening thither, with a resolution to forget +myself, and everything that is past, to engage myself, as far as is +possible, in that course of life, and to toss<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</a></span> about the world from +one pole to the other, till I leave this distemper behind me."<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a></p></blockquote> + +<p>But it was all of no use—Nature would have her way—and in the middle +of 1736, David Hume, aged twenty-three, without a profession or any +assured means of earning a guinea; and having doubtless, by his apparent +vacillation, but real tenacity of purpose, once more earned the title of +"wake-minded" at home; betook himself to a foreign country.</p> + +<blockquote><p>"I went over to France, with a view of prosecuting my studies in a +country retreat: and there I laid that plan of life which I have +steadily and successfully pursued. I resolved to make a very rigid +frugality supply my deficiency of fortune, to maintain unimpaired +my independency, and to regard every object as contemptible except +the improvement of my talents in literature."<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a></p></blockquote> + +<p>Hume passed through Paris on his way to Rheims, where he resided for +some time; though the greater part of his three years' stay was spent at +La Flêche, in frequent intercourse with the Jesuits of the famous +college in which Descartes was educated. Here he composed his first +work, the <i>Treatise of Human Nature</i>; though it would appear from the +following passage in the letter to Cheyne, that he had been accumulating +materials to that end for some years before he left Scotland.</p> + +<blockquote><p>"I found that the moral philosophy transmitted to us by antiquity +laboured under the same inconvenience that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span> has been found in their +natural philosophy, of being entirely hypothetical, and depending +more upon invention than experience: every one consulted his fancy +in erecting schemes of virtue and happiness, without regarding +human nature, upon which every moral conclusion must depend."</p></blockquote> + +<p>This is the key-note of the <i>Treatise</i>; of which Hume himself says +apologetically, in one of his letters, that it was planned before he was +twenty-one and composed before he had reached the age of twenty-five.<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a></p> + +<p>Under these circumstances, it is probably the most remarkable +philosophical work, both intrinsically and in its effects upon the +course of thought, that has ever been written. Berkeley, indeed, +published the <i>Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision</i>, the <i>Treatise +Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge</i>, and the <i>Three +Dialogues</i>, between the ages of twenty-four and twenty-eight; and thus +comes very near to Hume, both in precocity and in influence; but his +investigations are more limited in their scope than those of his +Scottish contemporary.</p> + +<p>The first and second volumes of the <i>Treatise</i>, containing Book I., "Of +the Understanding," and Book II., "Of the Passions," were published in +January, 1739.<a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> The<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span> publisher gave fifty pounds for the copyright; +which is probably more than an unknown writer of twenty-seven years of +age would get for a similar work, at the present time. But, in other +respects, its success fell far short of Hume's expectations. In a letter +dated the 1st of June, 1739, he writes,—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"I am not much in the humour of such compositions at present, +having received news from London of the success of my <i>Philosophy</i>, +which is but indifferent, if I may judge by the sale of the book, +and if I may believe my bookseller."</p></blockquote> + +<p>This, however, indicates a very different reception from that which +Hume, looking through the inverted telescope of old age, ascribes to the +<i>Treatise</i> in <i>My Own Life</i>.</p> + +<blockquote><p>"Never literary attempt was more unfortunate than my <i>Treatise of +Human Nature</i>. It fell <i>deadborn from the press</i> without reaching +such a distinction as even to excite a murmur among the zealots."</p></blockquote> + +<p>As a matter of fact, it was fully, and, on the whole, respectfully and +appreciatively, reviewed in the <i>History of the Works of the Learned</i> +for November, 1739.<a name="FNanchor_7_7" id="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> Whoever the reviewer may have been, he was a man +of discernment, for he says that the work bears "incontestable marks of +a great capacity, of a soaring genius, but young, and not yet thoroughly +practised;" and he adds, that we shall probably have reason to consider +"this, compared with the later productions, in the same light as we view +the juvenile works of a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span> Milton, or the first manner of a Raphael or +other celebrated painter." In a letter to Hutcheson, Hume merely speaks +of this article as "somewhat abusive;" so that his vanity, being young +and callow, seems to have been correspondingly wide-mouthed and hard to +satiate.</p> + +<p>It must be confessed that, on this occasion, no less than on that of his +other publications, Hume exhibits no small share of the craving after +mere notoriety and vulgar success, as distinct from the pardonable, if +not honourable, ambition for solid and enduring fame, which would have +harmonised better with his philosophy. Indeed, it appears to be by no +means improbable that this peculiarity of Hume's moral constitution was +the cause of his gradually forsaking philosophical studies, after the +publication of the third part (<i>On Morals</i>) of the <i>Treatise</i>, in 1740, +and turning to those political and historical topics which were likely +to yield, and did in fact yield, a much better return of that sort of +success which his soul loved. The <i>Philosophical Essays Concerning the +Human Understanding</i>, which afterwards became the <i>Inquiry</i>, is not much +more than an abridgment and recast, for popular use, of parts of the +<i>Treatise</i>, with the addition of the essays on Miracles and on +Necessity. In style, it exhibits a great improvement on the <i>Treatise</i>; +but the substance, if not deteriorated, is certainly not improved. Hume +does not really bring his mature powers to bear upon his early +speculations, in the later work. The crude fruits have not been ripened, +but they have been ruthlessly pruned away, along with the branches which +bore them. The result is a pretty shrub enough; but not the tree of +knowledge, with its roots firmly fixed in fact, its branches perennially +budding forth into new<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span> truths, which Hume might have reared. Perhaps, +after all, worthy Mrs. Hume was, in the highest sense, right. Davie was +"wake-minded," not to see that the world of philosophy was his to +overrun and subdue, if he would but persevere in the work he had begun. +But no—he must needs turn aside for "success": and verily he had his +reward; but not the crown he might have won.</p> + +<p>In 1740, Hume seems to have made an acquaintance which rapidly ripened +into a life long friendship. Adam Smith was, at that time, a boy student +of seventeen at the University of Glasgow; and Hume sends a copy of the +<i>Treatise</i> to "Mr. Smith," apparently on the recommendation of the +well-known Hutcheson, Professor of Moral Philosophy in the university. +It is a remarkable evidence of Adam Smith's early intellectual +development, that a youth of his age should be thought worthy of such a +present.</p> + +<p>In 1741 Hume published anonymously, at Edinburgh, the first volume of +<i>Essays Moral and Political</i>, which was followed in 1742 by the second +volume.</p> + +<p>These pieces are written in an admirable style and, though arranged +without apparent method, a system of political philosophy may be +gathered from their contents. Thus the third essay, <i>That Politics may +be reduced to a Science</i>, defends that thesis, and dwells on the +importance of forms of government.</p> + +<blockquote><p>"So great is the force of laws and of particular forms of +government, and so little dependence have they on the humours and +tempers of men, that consequences almost as general and certain may +sometimes be deduced from them as any which the mathematical +sciences afford us."—(III. 15.) (<i>See</i> <a href="#Page_45">p. 45.</a>)</p></blockquote> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span>Hume proceeds to exemplify the evils which inevitably flow from +universal suffrage, from aristocratic privilege, and from elective +monarchy, by historical examples, and concludes:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"That an hereditary prince, a nobility without vassals, and a +people voting by their representatives, form the best monarchy, +aristocracy, and democracy."—(III. 18.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>If we reflect that the following passage of the same essay was written +nearly a century and a half ago, it would seem that whatever other +changes may have taken place, political warfare remains <i>in statu +quo</i>:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"Those who either attack or defend a minister in such a government +as ours, where the utmost liberty is allowed, always carry matters +to an extreme, and exaggerate his merit or demerit with regard to +the public. His enemies are sure to charge him with the greatest +enormities, both in domestic and foreign management; and there is +no meanness or crime, of which, in their judgment, he is not +capable. Unnecessary wars, scandalous treaties, profusion of public +treasure, oppressive taxes, every kind of maladministration is +ascribed to him. To aggravate the charge, his pernicious conduct, +it is said, will extend its baneful influence even to posterity, by +undermining the best constitution in the world, and disordering +that wise system of laws, institutions, and customs, by which our +ancestors, during so many centuries, have been so happily governed. +He is not only a wicked minister in himself, but has removed every +security provided against wicked ministers for the future.</p> + +<p>"On the other hand, the partisans of the minister make his +panegyric rise as high as the accusation against him, and celebrate +his wise, steady, and moderate conduct in every part of his +administration. The honour and interest of the nation<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span> supported +abroad, public credit maintained at home, persecution restrained, +faction subdued: the merit of all these blessings is ascribed +solely to the minister. At the same time, he crowns all his other +merits by a religious care of the best government in the world, +which he has preserved in all its parts, and has transmitted +entire, to be the happiness and security of the latest +posterity."—(III. 26.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>Hume sagely remarks that the panegyric and the accusation cannot both be +true; and, that what truth there may be in either, rather tends to show +that our much-vaunted constitution does not fulfil its chief object, +which is to provide a remedy against maladministration. And if it does +not—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"we are rather beholden to any minister who undermines it and +affords us the opportunity of erecting a better in its +place."—III. 28.</p></blockquote> + +<p>The fifth Essay discusses the <i>Origin of Government</i>:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"Man, born in a family, is compelled to maintain society from +necessity, from natural inclination, and from habit. The same +creature, in his farther progress, is engaged to establish +political society, in order to administer justice, without which +there can be no peace among them, nor safety, nor mutual +intercourse. We are therefore to look upon all the vast apparatus +of our government, as having ultimately no other object or purpose +but the distribution of justice, or, in other words, the support of +the twelve judges. Kings and parliaments, fleets and armies, +officers of the court and revenue, ambassadors, ministers and privy +councillors, are all subordinate in the end to this part of +administration. Even the clergy, as their duty leads them to +inculcate morality, may justly be thought, so far as regards this +world, to have no other useful object of their institution."—(III. +37.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>The police theory of government has never been stated<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span> more tersely: +and, if there were only one state in the world; and if we could be +certain by intuition, or by the aid of revelation, that it is wrong for +society, as a corporate body, to do anything for the improvement of its +members and, thereby, indirectly support the twelve judges, no objection +could be raised to it.</p> + +<p>Unfortunately the existence of rival or inimical nations furnishes +"kings and parliaments, fleets and armies," with a good deal of +occupation beyond the support of the twelve judges; and, though the +proposition that the State has no business to meddle with anything but +the administration of justice, seems sometimes to be regarded as an +axiom, it can hardly be said to be intuitively certain, inasmuch as a +great many people absolutely repudiate it; while, as yet, the attempt to +give it the authority of a revelation has not been made.</p> + +<p>As Hume says with profound truth in the fourth essay, <i>On the First +Principles of Government</i>:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"As force is always on the side of the governed, the governors have +nothing to support them but opinion. It is, therefore, on opinion +only that government is founded; and this maxim extends to the most +despotic and most military governments, as well as to the most free +and the most popular."—(III. 31.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>But if the whole fabric of social organisation rests on opinion, it may +surely be fairly argued that, in the interests of self-preservation, if +for no better reason, society has a right to see that the means of +forming just opinions are placed within the reach of every one of its +members; and, therefore, that due provision for<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span> education, at any rate, +is a right and, indeed, a duty, of the state.</p> + +<p>The three opinions upon which all government, or the authority of the +few over the many, is founded, says Hume, are public interest, right to +power, and right to property. No government can permanently exist, +unless the majority of the citizens, who are the ultimate depositary of +Force, are convinced that it serves the general interest, that it has +lawful authority, and that it respects individual rights:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"A government may endure for several ages, though the balance of +power and the balance of property do not coincide.... But where the +original constitution allows any share of power, though small, to +an order of men who possess a large share of property, it is easy +for them gradually to stretch their authority, and bring the +balance of power to coincide with that of property. This has been +the case with the House of Commons in England."—(III. 34.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>Hume then points out that, in his time, the authority of the Commons was +by no means equivalent to the property and power it represented, and +proceeds:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"Were the members obliged to receive instructions from their +constituents, like the Dutch deputies, this would entirely alter +the case; and if such immense power and riches as those of all the +Commons of Great Britain, were brought into the scale, it is not +easy to conceive that the crown could either influence that +multitude of people, or withstand that balance of property. It is +true, the crown has great influence over the collective body in the +elections of members; but were this influence, which at present is +only exerted once in seven years, to be employed in bringing over +the people to every vote, it would soon be wasted, and no skill, +popularity, or revenue could support it. I must, therefore, be of +opinion that an alteration in this particular would introduce a +total alteration in our<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span> government, would soon reduce it to a pure +republic; and, perhaps, to a republic of no inconvenient +form."—(III. 35.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>Viewed by the light of subsequent events, this is surely a very +remarkable example of political sagacity. The members of the House of +Commons are not yet delegates; but, with the widening of the suffrage +and the rapidly increasing tendency to drill and organise the +electorate, and to exact definite pledges from candidates, they are +rapidly becoming, if not delegates, at least attorneys for committees of +electors. The same causes are constantly tending to exclude men, who +combine a keen sense of self-respect with large intellectual capacity, +from a position in which the one is as constantly offended, as the other +is neutralised. Notwithstanding the attempt of George the Third to +resuscitate the royal authority, Hume's foresight has been so completely +justified that no one now dreams of the crown exerting the slightest +influence upon elections.</p> + +<p>In the seventh essay, Hume raises a very interesting discussion as to +the probable ultimate result of the forces which were at work in the +British Constitution in the first part of the eighteenth century:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"There has been a sudden and sensible change in the opinions of +men, within these last fifty years, by the progress of learning and +of liberty. Most people in this island have divested themselves of +all superstitious reverence to names and authority; the clergy have +much lost their credit; their pretensions and doctrines have been +much ridiculed; and even religion can scarcely support itself in +the world. The mere name of <i>king</i> commands little respect; and to +talk of a king as God's vicegerent on earth, or to give him any of +those magnificent titles which formerly dazzled mankind, would but +excite laughter in every one."—(III. 54.)</p></blockquote><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span></p> + +<p>In fact, at the present day, the danger to monarchy in Britain would +appear to lie, not in increasing love for equality, for which, except as +regards the law, Englishmen have never cared, but rather entertain an +aversion; nor in any abstract democratic theories, upon which the mass +of Englishmen pour the contempt with which they view theories in +general; but in the constantly increasing tendency of monarchy to become +slightly absurd, from the ever-widening discrepancy between modern +political ideas and the theory of kingship. As Hume observes, even in +his time, people had left off making believe that a king was a different +species of man from, other men; and, since his day, more and more such +make-believes have become impossible; until the maintenance of kingship +in coming generations seems likely to depend, entirely, upon whether it +is the general opinion, that a hereditary president of our virtual +republic will serve the general interest better than an elective one or +not. The tendency of public feeling in this direction is patent, but it +does not follow that a republic is to be the final stage of our +government. In fact, Hume thinks not:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"It is well known, that every government must come to a period, and +that death is unavoidable to the political, as well as to the +animal body. But, as one kind of death may be preferable to +another, it may be inquired, whether it be more desirable for the +British constitution to terminate in a popular government, or in an +absolute monarchy? Here, I would frankly declare, that though +liberty be preferable to slavery, in almost every case; yet I +should rather wish to see an absolute monarch than a republic in +this island. For let us consider what kind of republic we have +reason to expect. The question is not concerning any fine imaginary +republic of which a man forms a plan in his closet. There is no +doubt<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span> but a popular government may be imagined more perfect than +an absolute monarchy, or even than our present constitution. But +what reason have we to expect that any such government will ever be +established in Great Britain, upon the dissolution of our monarchy? +If any single person acquire power enough to take our constitution +to pieces, and put it up anew, he is really an absolute monarch; +and we have already had an instance of this kind, sufficient to +convince us, that such a person will never resign his power, or +establish any free government. Matters, therefore, must be trusted +to their natural progress and operation; and the House of Commons, +according to its present constitution, must be the only legislature +in such a popular government. The inconveniences attending such a +situation of affairs present themselves by thousands. If the House +of Commons, in such a case, ever dissolve itself, which is not to +be expected, we may look for a civil war every election. If it +continue itself, we shall suffer all the tyranny of a faction +subdivided into new factions. And, as such a violent government +cannot long subsist, we shall at last, after many convulsions and +civil wars, find repose in absolute monarchy, which it would have +been happier for us to have established peaceably from the +beginning. Absolute monarchy, therefore, is the easiest death, the +true <i>Euthanasia</i> of the British constitution.</p> + +<p>"Thus if we have more reason to be jealous of monarchy, because the +danger is more imminent from that quarter; we have also reason to +be more jealous of popular government, because that danger is more +terrible. This may teach us a lesson of moderation in all our +political controversies."—(III. 55.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>One may admire the sagacity of these speculations, and the force and +clearness with which they are expressed, without altogether agreeing +with them. That an analogy between the social and bodily organism +exists, and is, in many respects, clear and full of instructive +suggestion, is undeniable. Yet a state answers, not to an individual, +but to a generic type; and there is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a></span> no reason, in the nature of things, +why any generic type should die out. The type of the pearly <i>Nautilus</i>, +highly organised as it is, has persisted with but little change from the +Silurian epoch till now; and, so long as terrestrial conditions remain +approximately similar to what they are at present, there is no more +reason why it should cease to exist in the next, than in the past, +hundred million years or so. The true ground for doubting the +possibility of the establishment of absolute monarchy in Britain is, +that opinion seems to have passed through, and left far behind, the +stage at which such a change would be possible; and the true reason for +doubting the permanency of a republic, if it is ever established, lies +in the fact, that a republic requires for its maintenance a far higher +standard of morality and of intelligence in the members of the state +than any other form of government. Samuel gave the Israelites a king +because they were not righteous enough to do without one, with a pretty +plain warning of what they were to expect from the gift. And, up to this +time, the progress of such republics as have been established in the +world has not been such, as to lead to any confident expectation that +their foundation is laid on a sufficiently secure subsoil of public +spirit, morality, and intelligence. On the contrary, they exhibit +examples of personal corruption and of political profligacy as fine as +any hotbed of despotism has ever produced; while they fail in the +primary duty of the administration of justice, as none but an effete +despotism has ever failed.</p> + +<p>Hume has been accused of departing, in his old age, from the liberal +principles of his youth; and, no doubt, he was careful, in the later +editions of the <i>Essays</i>, to expunge everything that savoured of +democratic tendencies. But<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span> the passage just quoted shows that this was +no recantation, but simply a confirmation, by his experience of one of +the most debased periods of English history, of those evil tendencies +attendant on popular government, of which, from the first, he was fully +aware.</p> + +<p>In the ninth essay, <i>On the Parties of Great Britain</i>, there occurs a +passage which, while it affords evidence of the marvellous change which +has taken place in the social condition of Scotland since 1741, contains +an assertion respecting the state of the Jacobite party at that time, +which at first seems surprising:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"As violent things have not commonly so long a duration as +moderate, we actually find that the Jacobite party is almost +entirely vanished from among us, and that the distinction of +<i>Court</i> and <i>Country</i>, which is but creeping in at London, is the +only one that is ever mentioned in this kingdom. Beside the +violence and openness of the Jacobite party, another reason has +perhaps contributed to produce so sudden and so visible an +alteration in this part of Britain. There are only two ranks of men +among us; gentlemen who have some fortune and education, and the +meanest slaving poor; without any considerable number of that +middling rank of men, which abound more in England, both in cities +and in the country, than in any other part of the world. The +slaving poor are incapable of any principles; gentlemen may be +converted to true principles, by time and experience. The middling +rank of men have curiosity and knowledge enough to form principles, +but not enough to form true ones, or correct any prejudices that +they may have imbibed. And it is among the middling rank of people +that Tory principles do at present prevail most in England."—(III. +80, <i>note</i>.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>Considering that the Jacobite rebellion of 1745 broke out only four +years after this essay was published, the assertion that the Jacobite +party had "almost entirely<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span> vanished in 1741" sounds strange enough: and +the passage which contains it is omitted in the third edition of the +<i>Essays</i>, published in 1748. Nevertheless, Hume was probably right, as +the outbreak of '45 was little better than a Highland raid, and the +Pretender obtained no important following in the Lowlands.</p> + +<p>No less curious, in comparison with what would be said nowadays, is +Hume's remark in the Essay on the <i>Rise of the Arts and Sciences</i> that—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"The English are become sensible of the scandalous licentiousness +of their stage from the example of the French decency and +morals."—(III. 135.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>And it is perhaps as surprising to be told, by a man of Hume's literary +power, that the first polite prose in the English language was written +by Swift. Locke and Temple (with whom Sprat is astoundingly conjoined) +"knew too little of the rules of art to be esteemed elegant writers," +and the prose of Bacon, Harrington, and Milton is "altogether stiff and +pedantic." Hobbes, who whether he should be called a "polite" writer or +not, is a master of vigorous English; Clarendon, Addison, and Steele +(the last two, surely, were "polite" writers in all conscience) are not +mentioned.</p> + +<p>On the subject of <i>National Character</i>, about which more nonsense, and +often very mischievous nonsense, has been and is talked than upon any +other topic, Hume's observations are full of sense and shrewdness. He +distinguishes between the <i>moral</i> and the <i>physical</i> causes of national +character, enumerating under the former—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"The nature of the government, the revolutions of public affairs, +the plenty or penury in which people live, the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span> situation of the +nation with regard to its neighbours, and such like +circumstances."—(III. 225.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>and under the latter:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"Those qualities of the air and climate, which are supposed to work +insensibly on the temper, by altering the tone and habit of the +body, and giving a particular complexion, which, though reflexion +and reason may sometimes overcome it, will yet prevail among the +generality of mankind, and have an influence on their +manners."—(III. 225.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>While admitting and exemplifying the great influence of moral causes, +Hume remarks—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"As to physical causes, I am inclined to doubt altogether of their +operation in this particular; nor do I think that men owe anything +of their temper or genius to the air, food, or climate."—(III. +227.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>Hume certainly would not have accepted the "rice theory" in explanation +of the social state of the Hindoos; and, it may be safely assumed, that +he would not have had recourse to the circumambience of the "melancholy +main" to account for the troublous history of Ireland. He supports his +views by a variety of strong arguments, among which, at the present +conjuncture, it is worth noting that the following occurs—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"Where any accident, as a difference in language or religion, keeps +two nations, inhabiting the same country, from mixing with one +another, they will preserve during several centuries a distinct and +even opposite set of manners. The integrity, gravity, and bravery +of the Turks, form an exact contrast to the deceit, levity, and +cowardice of the modern Greeks."—(III. 233.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>The question of the influence of race, which plays so<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span> great a part in +modern political speculations, was hardly broached in Hume's time, but +he had an inkling of its importance:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"I am apt to suspect the Negroes to be naturally inferior to the +Whites. There scarcely ever was a civilised nation of that +complexion, nor even any individual, eminent either in action or +speculation.... Such a uniform and constant difference [between the +negroes and the whites] could not happen in so many countries and +ages, if nature had not made an original distinction between these +breeds of men.... In Jamaica, indeed, they talk of one Negro as a +man of parts and learning; but it is likely he is admired for +slender accomplishments, like a parrot who speaks a few words +plainly."—(III. 236.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>The <i>Essays</i> met with the success they deserved. Hume wrote to Henry +Home in June, 1742:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"The Essays are all sold in London, as I am informed by two letters +from English gentlemen of my acquaintance. There is a demand for +them; and, as one of them tells me, Innys, the great bookseller in +Paul's Churchyard, wonders there is not a new edition, for he +cannot find copies for his customers. I am also told that Dr. +Butler has everywhere recommended them; so that I hope that they +will have some success."</p></blockquote> + +<p>Hume had sent Butler a copy of the <i>Treatise</i> and had called upon him, +in London, but he was out of town; and being shortly afterwards made +Bishop of Bristol, Hume seems to have thought that further advances on +his part might not be well received.</p> + +<p>Greatly comforted by this measure of success, Hume remained at +Ninewells, rubbing up his Greek, until 1745; when, at the mature age of +thirty-four, he made his entry into practical life, by becoming +bear-leader to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span> the Marquis of Annandale, a young nobleman of feeble +body and feebler mind. As might have been predicted, this venture was +not more fortunate than his previous ones; and, after a year's +endurance, diversified latterly with pecuniary squabbles, in which +Hume's tenacity about a somewhat small claim is remarkable, the +engagement came to an end.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> A picture of the house, taken from Drummond's <i>History of +Noble British Families</i>, is to be seen in Chambers's <i>Book of Days</i> +(April 26th); and if, as Drummond says, "It is a favourable specimen of +the best Scotch lairds' houses," all that can be said is worst Scotch +lairds must have been poorly lodged indeed.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Mr. John Hill Burton, in his valuable <i>Life of Hume</i>, on +which, I need hardly say, I have drawn freely for the materials of the +present biographical sketch.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> One cannot but be reminded of young Descartes' renunciation +of study for soldiering.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> <i>My Own Life.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> Letter to Gilbert Elliot of Minto, 1751. "So vast an +undertaking, planned before I was one-and-twenty, and composed before +twenty-five, must necessarily be very defective. I have repented my +haste a hundred and a hundred times."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_6_6" id="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> So says Mr. Burton, and that he is right is proved by a +letter of Hume's, dated February 13, 1739, in which he writes, "'Tis now +a fortnight since my book was published." But it is a curious +illustration of the value of testimony, that Hume, in <i>My Own Life</i>, +states: "In the end of 1738 I published my Treatise, and immediately +went down to my mother and my brother."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_7_7" id="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> Burton, <i>Life</i>, vol. i. p. 109.</p></div> +</div> + +<hr /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span></p> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_AII" id="CHAPTER_AII"></a>CHAPTER II.</h2> + +<h3>LATER YEARS: THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND.</h3> + +<p>In 1744, Hume's friends had endeavoured to procure his nomination to the +Chair of "Ethics and pneumatic philosophy"<a name="FNanchor_8_8" id="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> in the University of +Edinburgh. About this matter he writes to his friend William Mure:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"The accusation of heresy, deism, scepticism, atheism, &c., &c., +&c. was started against me; but never took, being bore down by the +contrary authority of all the good company in town."</p></blockquote> + +<p>If the "good company in town" bore down the first three of these +charges, it is to be hoped, for the sake of their veracity, that they +knew their candidate chiefly as the very good company that he always +was; and had paid as little attention, as good company usually does, to +so solid a work as the <i>Treatise</i>. Hume expresses a naïve surprise, not +unmixed with indignation, that Hutcheson and Leechman, both clergymen +and sincere,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span> though liberal, professors of orthodoxy, should have +expressed doubts as to his fitness for becoming a professedly +presbyterian teacher of presbyterian youth. The town council, however, +would not have him, and filled up the place with a safe nobody.</p> + +<p>In May, 1746, a new prospect opened. General St. Clair was appointed to +the command of an expedition to Canada, and he invited Hume, at a week's +notice, to be his secretary; to which office that of judge advocate was +afterwards added.</p> + +<p>Hume writes to a friend: "The office is very genteel, 10<i>s</i>. a day, +perquisites, and no expenses;" and, to another, he speculates on the +chance of procuring a company in an American regiment. "But this I build +not on, nor indeed am I very fond of it," he adds; and this was +fortunate, for the expedition, after dawdling away the summer in port, +was suddenly diverted to an attack on L'Orient, where it achieved a huge +failure and returned ignominiously to England.</p> + +<p>A letter to Henry Home, written when this unlucky expedition was +recalled, shows that Hume had already seriously turned his attention to +history. Referring to an invitation to go over to Flanders with the +General, he says:</p> + +<blockquote><p>"Had I any fortune which would give me a prospect of leisure and +opportunity to prosecute my <i>historical projects</i>, nothing could be +more useful to me, and I should pick up more literary knowledge in +one campaign by being in the General's family, and being introduced +frequently to the Duke's, than most officers could do after many +years' service. But to what can all this serve? I am a philosopher, +and so I suppose must continue."</p></blockquote> + +<p>But this vaticination was shortly to prove erroneous.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span> Hume seems to +have made a very favourable impression on General St. Clair, as he did +upon every one with whom he came into personal contact; for, being +charged with a mission to the court of Turin, in 1748, the General +insisted upon the appointment of Hume as his secretary. He further made +him one of his aides-de-camp; so that the philosopher was obliged to +encase his more than portly, and by no means elegant, figure in a +military uniform. Lord Charlemont, who met him at Turin, says he was +"disguised in scarlet," and that he wore his uniform "like a grocer of +the train-bands." Hume, always ready for a joke at his own expense, +tells of the considerate kindness with which, at a reception at Vienna, +the Empress-dowager released him and his friends from the necessity of +walking backwards. "We esteemed ourselves very much obliged to her for +this attention, especially my companions, who were desperately afraid of +my falling on them and crushing them."</p> + +<p>Notwithstanding the many attractions of this appointment, Hume writes +that he leaves home "with infinite regret, where I had treasured up +stores of study and plans of thinking for many years;" and his only +consolation is that the opportunity of becoming conversant with state +affairs may be profitable:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"I shall have an opportunity of seeing courts and camps: and if I +can afterward be so happy as to attain leisure and other +opportunities, this knowledge may even turn to account to me as a +man of letters, which I confess has always been the sole object of +my ambition. I have long had an intention, in my riper years, of +composing some history; and I question not but some greater +experience in the operations of the field and the intrigues of the +cabinet will be requisite, in order to enable me to speak with +judgment on these subjects."</p></blockquote> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span>Hume returned to London in 1749, and, during his stay there, his mother +died, to his heartfelt sorrow. A curious story in connection with this +event is told by Dr. Carlyle, who knew Hume well, and whose authority is +perfectly trustworthy.</p> + +<blockquote><p>"Mr. Boyle hearing of it, soon after went to his apartment, for +they lodged in the same house, where he found him in the deepest +affliction and in a flood of tears. After the usual topics and +condolences Mr. Boyle said to him, 'My friend, you owe this +uncommon grief to having thrown off the principles of religion: for +if you had not, you would have been consoled with the firm belief +that the good lady, who was not only the best of mothers, but the +most pious of Christians, was completely happy in the realms of the +just. To which David replied, 'Though I throw out my speculations +to entertain the learned and metaphysical world, yet in other +things I do not think so differently from the rest of the world as +you imagine.'"</p></blockquote> + +<p>If Hume had told this story to Dr. Carlyle, the latter would have said +so; it must therefore have come from Mr. Boyle; and one would like to +have the opportunity of cross-examining that gentleman as to Hume's +exact words and their context, before implicitly accepting his version +of the conversation. Mr. Boyle's experience of mankind must have been +small, if he had not seen the firmest of believers overwhelmed with +grief by a like loss, and as completely inconsolable. Hume may have +thrown off Mr. Boyle's "principles of religion," but he was none the +less a very honest man, perfectly open and candid, and the last person +to use ambiguous phraseology, among his friends; unless, indeed, he saw +no other way of putting a stop to the intrusion of unmannerly twaddle +amongst the bitter-sweet<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span> memories stirred in his affectionate nature by +so heavy a blow.</p> + +<p>The <i>Philosophical Essays</i> or <i>Inquiry</i> was published in 1748, while +Hume was away with General St. Clair, and, on his return to England, he +had the mortification to find it overlooked in the hubbub caused by +Middleton's <i>Free Inquiry</i>, and its bold handling of the topic of the +<i>Essay on Miracles</i>, by which Hume doubtless expected the public to be +startled.</p> + +<p>Between 1749 and 1751, Hume resided at Ninewells, with his brother and +sister, and busied himself with the composition of his most finished, if +not his most important works, the <i>Dialogues on Natural Religion</i>, the +<i>Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals</i>, and the <i>Political +Discourses</i>.</p> + +<p><i>The Dialogues on Natural Religion</i> were touched and re-touched, at +intervals, for a quarter of a century, and were not published till after +Hume's death: but the <i>Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals</i> +appeared in 1751, and the <i>Political Discourses</i> in 1752. Full reference +will be made to the two former in the exposition of Hume's philosophical +views. The last has been well said to be the "cradle of political +economy: and much as that science has been investigated and expounded in +later times, these earliest, shortest, and simplest developments of its +principles are still read with delight even by those who are masters of +all the literature of this great subject."<a name="FNanchor_9_9" id="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a></p> + +<p>The <i>Wealth of Nations</i>, the masterpiece of Hume's close friend, Adam +Smith, it must be remembered, did not appear before 1776, so that, in +political economy,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span> no less than in philosophy, Hume was an original, a +daring, and a fertile innovator.</p> + +<p>The <i>Political Essays</i> had a great and rapid success; translated into +French in 1753, and again in 1754, they conferred a European reputation +upon their author; and, what was more to the purpose, influenced the +later French school of economists of the eighteenth century.</p> + +<p>By this time, Hume had not only attained a high reputation in the world +of letters, but he considered himself a man of independent fortune. His +frugal habits had enabled him to accumulate £1,000, and he tells Michael +Ramsay in 1751:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"While interest remains as at present, I have £50 a year, a hundred +pounds worth of books, great store of linens and fine clothes, and +near £100 in my pocket; along with order, frugality, a strong +spirit of independency, good health, a contented humour, and an +unabated love of study. In these circumstances I must esteem myself +one of the happy and fortunate; and so far from being willing to +draw my ticket over again in the lottery of life, there are very +few prizes with which I would make an exchange. After some +deliberation, I am resolved to settle in Edinburgh, and hope I +shall be able with these revenues to say with Horace:—</p> + +<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> +<div>'Est bona librorum et provisæ frugis in annum</div> +<div>Copia.'"</div> +</div></div></blockquote> + +<p>It would be difficult to find a better example of the honourable +independence and cheerful self-reliance which should distinguish a man +of letters, and which characterised Hume throughout his career. By +honourable effort, the boy's noble ideal of life, became the man's +reality; and, at forty, Hume had the happiness of finding that he had +not wasted his youth in the pursuit of illusions, but that "the solid +certainty of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span> waking bliss" lay before him, in the free play of his +powers in their appropriate sphere.</p> + +<p>In 1751, Hume removed to Edinburgh and took up his abode on a flat in +one of those prodigious houses in the Lawnmarket, which still excite the +admiration of tourists; afterwards moving to a house in the Canongate. +His sister joined him, adding £30 a year to the common stock; and, in +one of his charmingly playful letters to Dr. Clephane, he thus describes +his establishment, in 1753.</p> + +<blockquote><p>"I shall exult and triumph to you a little that I have now at +last—being turned of forty, to my own honour, to that of learning, +and to that of the present age—arrived at the dignity of being a +householder.</p> + +<p>"About seven months ago, I got a house of my own, and completed a +regular family, consisting of a head, viz., myself, and two +inferior members, a maid and a cat. My sister has since joined me, +and keeps me company. With frugality, I can reach, I find, +cleanliness, warmth, light, plenty, and contentment. What would you +have more? Independence? I have it in a supreme degree. Honour? +That is not altogether wanting. Grace? That will come in time. A +wife? That is none of the indispensable requisites of life. Books? +That is one of them; and I have more than I can use. In short, I +cannot find any pleasure of consequence which I am not possessed of +in a greater or less degree; and, without any great effort of +philosophy, I may be easy and satisfied.</p> + +<p>"As there is no happiness without occupation, I have begun a work +which will occupy me several years, and which yields me much +satisfaction. 'Tis a History of Britain from the Union of the +Crowns to the present time. I have already finished the reign of +King James. My friends flatter me (by this I mean that they don't +flatter me) that I have succeeded."</p></blockquote> + +<p>In 1752, the Faculty of Advocates elected Hume their<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span> librarian, an +office which, though it yielded little emolument—the salary was only +forty pounds a year—was valuable as it placed the resources of a large +library at his disposal. The proposal to give Hume even this paltry +place caused a great outcry, on the old score of infidelity. But as Hume +writes, in a jubilant letter to Clephane (February 4, 1752):—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"I carried the election by a considerable majority.... What is more +extraordinary, the cry of religion could not hinder the ladies from +being violently my partisans, and I owe my success in a great +measure to their solicitations. One has broke off all commerce with +her lover because he voted against me! And Mr. Lockhart, in a +speech to the Faculty, said there was no walking the streets, nor +even enjoying one's own fireside, on account of their importunate +zeal. The town says that even his bed was not safe for him, though +his wife was cousin-german to my antagonist.</p> + +<p>"'Twas vulgarly given out that the contest was between Deists and +Christians, and when the news of my success came to the playhouse, +the whisper rose that the Christians were defeated. Are you not +surprised that we could keep our popularity, notwithstanding this +imputation, which my friends could not deny to be well founded?"</p></blockquote> + +<p>It would seem that the "good company" was less enterprising in its +asseverations in this canvass than in the last.</p> + +<p>The first volume of the <i>History of Great Britain, containing the reign +of James I. and Charles I.</i>, was published in 1754. At first, the sale +was large, especially in Edinburgh, and if notoriety <i>per se</i> was Hume's +object, he attained it. But he liked applause as well as fame and, to +his bitter disappointment, he says:<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span>—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"I was assailed by one cry of reproach, disapprobation, and even +detestation: English, Scotch, and Irish, Whig and Tory, Churchman +and Sectary, Freethinker and Religionist, Patriot and Courtier, +united in their rage against the man who had presumed to shed a +generous tear for the fate of Charles I. and the Earl of Strafford; +and after the first ebullitions of their fury were over, what was +still more mortifying, the book seemed to fall into oblivion. Mr. +Millar told me that in a twelvemonth he sold only forty-five copies +of it. I scarcely, indeed, heard of one man in the three kingdoms, +considerable for rank or letters, that could endure the book. I +must only except the primate of England, Dr. Herring, and the +primate of Ireland, Dr. Stone, which seem two odd exceptions. These +dignified prelates separately sent me messages not to be +discouraged."</p></blockquote> + +<p>It certainly is odd to think of David Hume being comforted in his +affliction by the independent and spontaneous sympathy of a pair of +archbishops. But the instincts of the dignified prelates guided them +rightly; for, as the great painter of English history in Whig pigments +has been careful to point out,<a name="FNanchor_10_10" id="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> Hume's historical picture, though a +great work, drawn by a master hand, has all the lights Tory, and all the +shades Whig.</p> + +<p>Hume's ecclesiastical enemies seem to have thought that their +opportunity had now arrived; and an attempt was made to get the General +Assembly of 1756 to appoint a committee to inquire into his writings. +But, after a keen debate, the proposal was rejected by fifty votes to +seventeen. Hume does not appear to have troubled himself about the +matter, and does not even think it worth mention in <i>My Own Life</i>.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span></p> + +<p>In 1756 he tells Clephane that he is worth £1,600 sterling, and +consequently master of an income which must have been wealth to a man of +his frugal habits. In the same year, he published the second volume of +the <i>History</i>, which met with a much better reception than the first; +and, in 1757, one of his most remarkable works, the <i>Natural History of +Religion</i>, appeared. In the same year, he resigned his office of +librarian to the Faculty of Advocates, and he projected removal to +London, probably to superintend the publication of the additional volume +of the <i>History</i>.</p> + +<blockquote><p>"I shall certainly be in London next summer; and probably to remain +there during life: at least, if I can settle myself to my mind, +which I beg you to have an eye to. A room in a sober discreet +family, who would not be averse to admit a sober, discreet, +virtuous, regular, quiet, goodnatured man of a bad character—such +a room, I say, would suit me extremely."<a name="FNanchor_11_11" id="FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a></p></blockquote> + +<p>The promised visit took place in the latter part of the year 1758, and +he remained in the metropolis for the greater part of 1759. The two +volumes of the <i>History of England under the House of Tudor</i> were +published in London, shortly after Hume's return to Edinburgh; and, +according to his own account, they raised almost as great a clamour as +the first two had done.</p> + +<p>Busily occupied with the continuation of his historical labours, Hume +remained in Edinburgh until 1763; when, at the request of Lord Hertford, +who was going as ambassador to France, he was appointed to the embassy; +with the promise of the secretaryship, and, in the mean<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span>while, +performing the duties of that office. At first, Hume declined the offer; +but, as it was particularly honourable to so well abused a man, on +account of Lord Hertford's high reputation for virtue and piety,<a name="FNanchor_12_12" id="FNanchor_12_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> and +no less advantageous by reason of the increase of fortune which it +secured to him, he eventually accepted it.</p> + +<p>In France, Hume's reputation stood far higher than in Britain; several +of his works had been translated; he had exchanged letters with +Montesquieu and with Helvetius; Rousseau had appealed to him; and the +charming Madame de Boufflers had drawn him into a correspondence, marked +by almost passionate enthusiasm on her part, and as fair an imitation of +enthusiasm as Hume was capable of, on his. In the extraordinary mixture +of learning, wit, humanity, frivolity, and profligacy which then +characterised the highest French society, a new sensation was worth +anything, and it mattered little whether the cause thereof was a +philosopher or a poodle; so Hume had a great success in the Parisian +world. Great nobles fêted him, and great ladies were not content unless +the "gros David" was to be seen at their receptions, and in their boxes +at the theatre. "At the opera his broad unmeaning face was usually to be +seen <i>entre deux jolis minois</i>," says Lord Charlemont.<a name="FNanchor_13_13" id="FNanchor_13_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span>Hume's cool +head was by no means turned; but he took the goods the gods provided +with much satisfaction; and everywhere won golden opinions by his +unaffected good sense and thorough kindness of heart.</p> + +<p>Over all this part of Hume's career, as over the surprising episode of +the quarrel with Rousseau, if that can be called quarrel which was +lunatic malignity on Rousseau's side and thorough generosity and +patience on Hume's, I may pass lightly. The story is admirably told by +Mr. Burton, to whose volumes I refer the reader. Nor need I dwell upon +Hume's short tenure of office in London, as Under-Secretary of State, +between 1767 and 1769. Success and wealth are rarely interesting, and +Hume's case is no exception to the rule.</p> + +<p>According to his own description the cares of official life were not +overwhelming.</p> + +<blockquote><p>"My way of life here is very uniform and by no means disagreeable. +I have all the forenoon in the Secretary's house, from ten till +three, when there arrive from time to time messengers that bring me +all the secrets of the kingdom, and, indeed, of Europe, Asia, +Africa, and America. I am seldom hurried; but have leisure at +intervals to take up a book, or write a private letter, or converse +with a friend that may call for me; and from dinner to bed-time is +all my own. If you add to this that the person with whom I have the +chief, if not only, transactions, is the most reasonable,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span> +equal-tempered, and gentleman-like man imaginable, and Lady +Aylesbury the same, you will certainly think I have no reason to +complain; and I am far from complaining. I only shall not regret +when my duty is over; because to me the situation can lead to +nothing, at least in all probability; and reading, and sauntering, +and lounging, and dozing, which I call thinking, is my supreme +happiness—I mean my full contentment."</p></blockquote> + +<p>Hume's duty was soon over, and he returned to Edinburgh in 1769, "very +opulent" in the possession of £1,000 a year, and determined to take what +remained to him of life pleasantly and easily. In October, 1769, he +writes to Elliot:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"I have been settled here two months, and am here body and soul, +without casting the least thought of regret to London, or even to +Paris.... I live still, and must for a twelvemonth, in my old house +in James's Court, which is very cheerful and even elegant, but too +small to display my great talent for cookery, the science to which +I intend to addict the remaining years of my life. I have just now +lying on the table before me a receipt for making <i>soupe à la +reine</i>, copied with my own hand; for beef and cabbage (a charming +dish) and old mutton and old claret nobody excels me. I make also +sheep's-head broth in a manner that Mr. Keith speaks of for eight +days after; and the Duc de Nivernois would bind himself apprentice +to my lass to learn it. I have already sent a challenge to David +Moncreiff: you will see that in a twelvemonth he will take to the +writing of history, the field I have deserted; for as to the giving +of dinners, he can now have no further pretensions. I should have +made a very bad use of my abode in Paris if I could not get the +better of a mere provincial like him. All my friends encourage me +in this ambition; as thinking it will redound very much to my +honour."</p></blockquote> + +<p>In 1770, Hume built himself a house in the new town<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span> of Edinburgh, which +was then springing up. It was the first house in the street, and a +frolicsome young lady chalked upon the wall "St. David's Street." Hume's +servant complained to her master, who replied, "Never mind, lassie, many +a better man has been made a saint of before," and the street retains +its title to this day.</p> + +<p>In the following six years, the house in St. David's Street was the +centre of the accomplished and refined society which then distinguished +Edinburgh. Adam Smith, Blair, and Ferguson were within easy reach; and +what remains of Hume's correspondence with Sir Gilbert Elliot, Colonel +Edmonstone, and Mrs. Cockburn gives pleasant glimpses of his social +surroundings, and enables us to understand his contentment with his +absence from the more perturbed, if more brilliant, worlds of Paris and +London.</p> + +<p>Towards London, Londoners, and indeed Englishmen in general, Hume +entertained a dislike, mingled with contempt, which was as nearly +rancorous as any emotion of his could be. During his residence in Paris, +in 1764 and 1765, he writes to Blair:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"The taste for literature is neither decayed nor depraved here, as +with the barbarians who inhabit the banks of the Thames."</p></blockquote> + +<p>And he speaks of the "general regard paid to genius and learning" in +France as one of the points in which it most differs from England. Ten +years later, he cannot even thank Gibbon for his History without the +left-handed compliment, that he should never have expected such an +excellent work from the pen of an Englishman. Early in 1765, Hume writes +to Millar:<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span>—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"The rage and prejudice of parties frighten me, and above all, this +rage against the Scots, which is so dishonourable, and indeed so +infamous, to the English nation. We hear that it increases every +day without the least appearance of provocation on our part. It has +frequently made me resolve never in my life to set foot on English +ground. I dread, if I should undertake a more modern history, the +impertinence and ill-manners to which it would expose me; and I was +willing to know from you whether former prejudices had so far +subsided as to ensure me of a good reception."</p></blockquote> + +<p>His fears were kindly appeased by Millar's assurance that the English +were not prejudiced against the Scots in general, but against the +particular Scot, Lord Bute, who was supposed to be the guide, +philosopher, and friend, of both Dowager Queen and King.</p> + +<p>To care nothing about literature, to dislike Scotchmen, and to be +insensible to the merits of David Hume, was a combination of iniquities +on the part of the English nation, which would have been amply +sufficient to ruffle the temper of the philosophic historian, who, +without being foolishly vain, had certainly no need of what has been +said to be the one form of prayer in which his countrymen, torn as they +are by theological differences, agree; "Lord! gie us a gude conceit o' +oursels." But when, to all this, these same Southrons added a passionate +admiration for Lord Chatham, who was in Hume's eyes a charlatan; and +filled up the cup of their abominations by cheering for "Wilkes and +Liberty," Hume's wrath knew no bounds, and, between 1768 and 1770, he +pours a perfect Jeremiad into the bosom of his friend Sir Gilbert +Elliot.</p> + +<blockquote><p>"Oh! how I long to see America and the East Indies revolted, +totally and finally—the revenue reduced to half<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span>—public credit +fully discredited by bankruptcy—the third of London in ruins, and +the rascally mob subdued! I think I am not too old to despair of +being witness to all these blessings.</p> + +<p>"I am delighted to see the daily and hourly progress of madness and +folly and wickedness in England. The consummation of these +qualities are the true ingredients for making a fine narrative in +history, especially if followed by some signal and ruinous +convulsion—as I hope will soon be the case with that pernicious +people!"</p></blockquote> + +<p>Even from the secure haven of James's Court, the maledictions continue +to pour forth:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"Nothing but a rebellion and bloodshed will open the eyes of that +deluded people; though were they alone concerned, I think it is no +matter what becomes of them.... Our government has become a +chimera, and is too perfect, in point of liberty, for so rude a +beast as an Englishman; who is a man, a bad animal too, corrupted +by above a century of licentiousness. The misfortune is that this +liberty can scarcely be retrenched without danger of being entirely +lost; at least the fatal effects of licentiousness must first be +made palpable by some extreme mischief resulting from it. I may +wish that the catastrophe should rather fall on our posterity, but +it hastens on with such large strides as to leave little room for +hope.</p> + +<p>I am running over again the last edition of my History, in order to +correct it still further. I either soften or expunge many +villainous seditious Whig strokes which had crept into it. I wish +that my indignation at the present madness, encouraged by lies, +calumnies, imposture, and every infamous act usual among popular +leaders, may not throw me into the opposite extreme."</p></blockquote> + +<p>A wise wish, indeed. Posterity respectfully concurs therein; and +subjects Hume's estimate of England and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span> things English to such +modifications as it would probably have undergone had the wish been +fulfilled.</p> + +<p>In 1775, Hume's health began to fail; and, in the spring of the +following year, his disorder, which appears to have been hæmorrhage of +the bowels, attained such a height that he knew it must be fatal. So he +made his will, and wrote <i>My Own Life</i>, the conclusion of which is one +of the most cheerful, simple, and dignified leave-takings of life and +all its concerns, extant.</p> + +<blockquote><p>"I now reckon upon a speedy dissolution. I have suffered very +little pain from my disorder; and what is more strange, have, +notwithstanding the great decline of my person, never suffered a +moment's abatement of spirits; insomuch that were I to name the +period of my life which I should most choose to pass over again, I +might be tempted to point to this later period. I possess the same +ardour as ever in study and the same gaiety in company; I consider, +besides, that a man of sixty-five, by dying, cuts off only a few +years of infirmities; and though I see many symptoms of my literary +reputation's breaking out at last with additional lustre, I know +that I could have but few years to enjoy it. It is difficult to be +more detached from life than I am at present.</p> + +<p>"To conclude historically with my own character, I am, or rather +was (for that is the style I must now use in speaking of myself, +which emboldens me the more to speak my sentiments); I was, I say, +a man of mild dispositions, of command of temper, of an open, +social, and cheerful humour, capable of attachment, but little +susceptible of enmity, and of great moderation in all my passions. +Even my love of literary fame, my ruling passion, never soured my +temper, notwithstanding my frequent disappointments. My company was +not unacceptable to the young and careless, as well as to the +studious and literary; and as I took a particular pleasure in the +company of modest women, I had no reason to be displeased<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span> with the +reception I met with from them. In a word, though most men any wise +eminent, have found reason to complain of calumny, I never was +touched or even attacked by her baleful tooth; and though I +wantonly exposed myself to the rage of both civil and religious +factions, they seemed to be disarmed in my behalf of their wonted +fury. My friends never had occasion to vindicate any one +circumstance of my character and conduct; not but that the zealots, +we may well suppose, would have been glad to invent and propagate +any story to my disadvantage, but they could never find any which +they thought would wear the face of probability. I cannot say there +is no vanity in making this funeral oration of myself, but I hope +it is not a misplaced one; and this is a matter of fact which is +easily cleared and ascertained."</p></blockquote> + +<p>Hume died in Edinburgh on the 25th of August, 1776, and, a few days +later, his body, attended by a great concourse of people, who seem to +have anticipated for it the fate appropriate to the remains of wizards +and necromancers, was deposited in a spot selected by himself, in an old +burial-ground on the eastern slope of the Calton Hill.</p> + +<p>From the summit of this hill, there is a prospect unequalled by any to +be seen from the midst of a great city. Westward lies the Forth, and +beyond it, dimly blue, the far away Highland hills; eastward, rise the +bold contours of Arthur's Seat and the rugged crags of the Castle rock, +with the grey Old Town of Edinburgh; while, far below, from a maze of +crowded thoroughfares, the hoarse murmur of the toil of a polity of +energetic men is borne upon the ear. At times, a man may be as solitary +here as in a veritable wilderness; and may meditate undisturbedly upon +the epitome of nature and of man—the kingdoms of this world—spread out +before him.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span></p> + +<p>Surely, there is a fitness in the choice of this last resting-place by +the philosopher and historian, who saw so clearly that these two +kingdoms form but one realm, governed by uniform laws and alike based on +impenetrable darkness and eternal silence: and faithful to the last to +that profound veracity which was the secret of his philosophic +greatness, he ordered that the simple Roman tomb which marks his grave +should bear no inscription but</p> + +<p class='center'>DAVID HUME<br /><br /> +<span class="smcap">Born</span> 1711. <span class="smcap">Died</span> 1776.<br /><br /> +<i>Leaving it to posterity to add the rest.</i></p> + +<p>It was by the desire and at the suggestion of my friend, the Editor of +this Series, that I undertook to attempt to help posterity in the +difficult business of knowing what to add to Hume's epitaph; and I +might, with justice, throw upon him the responsibility of my apparent +presumption in occupying a place among the men of letters, who are +engaged with him, in their proper function of writing about English Men +of Letters.</p> + +<p>That to which succeeding generations have made, are making, and will +make, continual additions, however, is Hume's fame as a philosopher; +and, though I know that my plea will add to my offence in some quarters, +I must plead, in extenuation of my audacity, that philosophy lies in the +province of science, and not in that of letters.</p> + +<p>In dealing with Hume's Life, I have endeavoured, as far as possible, to +make him speak for himself. If the extracts from his letters and essays +which I have given<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span> do not sufficiently show what manner of man he was, +I am sure that nothing I could say would make the case plainer. In the +exposition of Hume's philosophy which follows, I have pursued the same +plan, and I have applied myself to the task of selecting and arranging +in systematic order, the passages which appeared to me to contain the +clearest statements of Hume's opinions.</p> + +<p>I should have been glad to be able to confine myself to this duty, and +to limit my own comments to so much as was absolutely necessary to +connect my excerpts. Here and there, however, it must be confessed that +more is seen of my thread than of Hume's beads. My excuse must be an +ineradicable tendency to try to make things clear; while, I may further +hope, that there is nothing in what I may have said, which is +inconsistent with the logical development of Hume's principles.</p> + +<p>My authority for the facts of Hume's life is the admirable biography, +published in 1846, by Mr. John Hill Burton. The edition of Hume's works +from which all citations are made is that published by Black and Tait in +Edinburgh, in 1826. In this edition, the Essays are reprinted from the +edition of 1777, corrected by the author for the press a short time +before his death. It is well printed in four handy volumes; and as my +copy has long been in my possession, and bears marks of much reading, it +would have been troublesome for me to refer to any other. But, for the +convenience of those who possess some other edition, the following table +of the contents of the edition of 1826, with the paging of the four +volumes, is given:<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span>—</p> + +<p class='center'>VOLUME I.<br /><br /> +<span class="smcap">Treatise of Human Nature</span>.<br /><br /> +Book I. <i>Of the Understanding</i>, p. 5 to the end, p. 347.</p> + +<p class='center'><br />VOLUME II.<br /><br /> +<span class="smcap">Treatise of Human Nature</span>.<br /><br /> +Book II. <i>Of the Passions</i>, p. 3—p. 215.<br /> +Book III. <i>Of Morals</i>, p. 219—p. 415.<br /> +<span class="smcap">Dialogues concerning Natural Religion</span>, p. 419—p. 548.<br /> +<span class="smcap">Appendix to the Treatise</span>, p. 551—p. 560.</p> + +<p class='center'><br />VOLUME III.<br /><br /> +<span class="smcap">Essays, Moral and Political</span>, p. 3—p. 282.<br /> +<span class="smcap">Political Discourses</span>, p. 285—p. 579.</p> + +<p class='center'><br />VOLUME IV.<br /><br /> +<span class="smcap">An Inquiry concerning Human Understanding</span>, p. 3—p. 233.<br /> +<span class="smcap">An Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals</span>, p. 237—p. 431.<br /> +<span class="smcap">The Natural History of Religion</span>, p. 435—p. 513.<br /> +<span class="smcap">Additional Essays</span>, p. 517—p. 577.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span>As the volume and the page of the volume are given in my references, it +will be easy, by the help of this table, to learn where to look for any +passage cited, in differently arranged editions.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_8_8" id="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> "Pneumatic philosophy" must not be confounded with the +theory of elastic fluids; though, as Scottish chairs have, before now, +combined natural with civil history, the mistake would be pardonable.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_9_9" id="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> Burton's <i>Life of David Hume</i>, i. p. 354.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_10_10" id="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> Lord Macaulay, Article on History, <i>Edinburgh Review</i>, +vol. lxvii.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_11_11" id="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_11"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> Letter to Clephane, 3rd September, 1757.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_12_12" id="Footnote_12_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_12"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> "You must know that Lord Hertford has so high a character +for piety, that his taking me by the hand is a kind of regeneration to +me, and all past offences are now wiped off. But all these views are +trifling to one of my age and temper."—<i>Hume to Edmonstone</i>, 9th +January, 1764. Lord Hertford had procured him a pension of £200 a year +for life from the King, and the secretaryship was worth £1000 a year.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_13_13" id="Footnote_13_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_13"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> Madame d'Epinay gives a ludicrous account of Hume's +performance when pressed into a <i>tableau</i>, as a Sultan between two +slaves, personated for the occasion by two of the prettiest women in +Paris:— +</p><p> +"Il les regarde attentivement, <i>il se frappe le ventre</i> et les genoux à +plusieurs reprises et ne trouve jamais autre chose à leur dire que <i>Eh +bien! mes demoiselles.—Eh bien! vous voilà donc.... Eh bien! vous voilà +... vous voilà ici?</i> Cette phrase dura un quart d'heure sans qu'il pût +en sortir. Une d'elles se leva d'impatience: Ah, dit-elle, je m'en étois +bien doutée, cet homme n'est bon qu'à manger du veau!"—Burton's <i>Life +of Hume</i>, vol. ii. p. 224.</p></div> +</div> + +<hr /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span></p> +<h2><a name="PART_II" id="PART_II"></a>PART II.</h2> + +<h3><i>HUME'S PHILOSOPHY.</i></h3> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_I" id="CHAPTER_I"></a>CHAPTER I.</h2> + +<h3>THE OBJECT AND SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY.</h3> + +<p>Kant has said that the business of philosophy is to answer three +questions: What can I know? What ought I to do? and For what may I hope? +But it is pretty plain that these three resolve themselves, in the long +run, into the first. For rational expectation and moral action are alike +based upon beliefs; and a belief is void of justification, unless its +subject-matter lies within the boundaries of possible knowledge, and +unless its evidence satisfies the conditions which experience imposes as +the guarantee of credibility.</p> + +<p>Fundamentally, then, philosophy is the answer to the question, What can +I know? and it is by applying itself to this problem, that philosophy is +properly distinguished as a special department of scientific research. +What is commonly called science, whether mathematical, physical, or +biological, consists of the answers which mankind<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span> have been able to +give to the inquiry, What do I know? They furnish us with the results of +the mental operations which constitute thinking; while philosophy, in +the stricter sense of the term, inquires into the foundation of the +first principles which those operations assume or imply.</p> + +<p>But though, by reason of the special purpose of philosophy, its +distinctness from other branches of scientific investigation may be +properly vindicated, it is easy to see that, from the nature of its +subject-matter, it is intimately and, indeed, inseparably connected with +one branch of science. For it is obviously impossible to answer the +question, What can we know? unless, in the first place, there is a clear +understanding as to what is meant by knowledge; and, having settled this +point, the next step is to inquire how we come by that which we allow to +be knowledge; for, upon the reply, turns the answer to the further +question, whether, from the nature of the case, there are limits to the +knowable or not. While, finally, inasmuch as What can I know? not only +refers to knowledge of the past or of the present, but to the confident +expectation which we call knowledge of the future; it is necessary to +ask, further, what justification can be alleged for trusting to the +guidance of our expectations in practical conduct.</p> + +<p>It surely needs no argumentation to show, that the first problem cannot +be approached without the examination of the contents of the mind; and +the determination of how much of these contents may be called knowledge. +Nor can the second problem be dealt with in any other fashion; for it is +only by the observation of the growth of knowledge that we can +rationally hope to discover how knowledge grows. But the solution of +the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span> third problem simply involves the discussion of the data obtained +by the investigation of the foregoing two.</p> + +<p>Thus, in order to answer three out of the four subordinate questions +into which What can I know? breaks up, we must have recourse to that +investigation of mental phenomena, the results of which are embodied in +the science of psychology.</p> + +<p>Psychology is a part of the science of life or biology, which differs +from the other branches of that science, merely in so far as it deals +with the psychical, instead of the physical, phenomena of life.</p> + +<p>As there is an anatomy of the body, so there is an anatomy of the mind; +the psychologist dissects mental phenomena into elementary states of +consciousness, as the anatomist resolves limbs into tissues, and tissues +into cells. The one traces the development of complex organs from simple +rudiments; the other follows the building up of complex conceptions out +of simpler constituents of thought. As the physiologist inquires into +the way in which the so-called "functions" of the body are performed, so +the psychologist studies the so-called "faculties" of the mind. Even a +cursory attention to the ways and works of the lower animals suggests a +comparative anatomy and physiology of the mind; and the doctrine of +evolution presses for application as much in the one field as in the +other.</p> + +<p>But there is more than a parallel, there is a close and intimate +connexion between psychology and physiology. No one doubts that, at any +rate, some mental states are dependent for their existence on the +performance of the functions of particular bodily organs. There is no +seeing without eyes, and no hearing without ears. If the origin of the +contents of the mind is truly a philosophical<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span> problem, then the +philosopher who attempts to deal with that problem, without acquainting +himself with the physiology of sensation, has no more intelligent +conception of his business than the physiologist, who thinks he can +discuss locomotion, without an acquaintance with the principles of +mechanics; or respiration, without some tincture of chemistry.</p> + +<p>On whatever ground we term physiology, science, psychology is entitled +to the same appellation; and the method of investigation which +elucidates the true relations of the one set of phenomena will discover +those of the other. Hence, as philosophy is, in great measure, the +exponent of the logical consequences of certain data established by +psychology; and as psychology itself differs from physical science only +in the nature of its subject-matter, and not in its method of +investigation, it would seem to be an obvious conclusion, that +philosophers are likely to be successful in their inquiries, in +proportion as they are familiar with the application of scientific +method to less abstruse subjects; just as it seems to require no +elaborate demonstration, that an astronomer, who wishes to comprehend +the solar system, would do well to acquire a preliminary acquaintance +with the elements of physics. And it is accordant with this presumption, +that the men who have made the most important positive additions to +philosophy, such as Descartes, Spinoza, and Kant, not to mention more +recent examples, have been deeply imbued with the spirit of physical +science; and, in some cases, such as those of Descartes and Kant, have +been largely acquainted with its details. On the other hand, the founder +of Positivism no less admirably illustrates the connexion of scientific +incapacity with philosophical incompetence. In truth,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span> the laboratory is +the fore-court of the temple of philosophy; and whoso has not offered +sacrifices and undergone purification there, has little chance of +admission into the sanctuary.</p> + +<p>Obvious as these considerations may appear to be, it would be wrong to +ignore the fact that their force is by no means universally admitted. On +the contrary, the necessity for a proper psychological and physiological +training to the student of philosophy is denied, on the one hand, by the +"pure metaphysicians," who attempt to base the theory of knowing upon +supposed necessary and universal truths, and assert that scientific +observation is impossible unless such truths are already known or +implied: which, to those who are not "pure metaphysicians," seems very +much as if one should say that the fall of a stone cannot be observed, +unless the law of gravitation is already in the mind of the observer.</p> + +<p>On the other hand, the Positivists, so far as they accept the teachings +of their master, roundly assert, at any rate in words, that observation +of the mind is a thing inherently impossible in itself, and that +psychology is a chimera—a phantasm generated by the fermentation of the +dregs of theology. Nevertheless, if M. Comte had been asked what he +meant by "physiologic cérebrale," except that which other people call +"psychology;" and how he knew anything about the functions of the brain, +except by that very "observation intérieure," which he declares to be an +absurdity—it seems probable that he would have found it hard to escape +the admission, that, in vilipending psychology, he had been propounding +solemn nonsense.</p> + +<p>It is assuredly one of Hume's greatest merits that he clearly recognised +the fact that philosophy is based upon<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span> psychology; and that the inquiry +into the contents and the operations of the mind must be conducted upon +the same principles as a physical investigation, if what he calls the +"moral philosopher" would attain results of as firm and definite a +character as those which reward the "natural philosopher."<a name="FNanchor_14_14" id="FNanchor_14_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> The title +of his first work, a "<i>Treatise of Human Nature, being an Attempt to +introduce the Experimental method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects</i>," +sufficiently indicates the point of view from which Hume regarded +philosophical problems; and he tells us in the preface, that his object +has been to promote the construction of a "science of man."</p> + +<blockquote><p>"'Tis evident that all the sciences have a relation, greater or +less, to human nature; and that, however wide any of them may seem +to run from it, they still return back by one passage or another. +Even <i>Mathematics</i>, <i>Natural Philosophy</i>, and <i>Natural Religion</i> +are in some measure dependent on the science of <span class="smcap">Man</span>; since they lie +under the cognizance of men, and are judged of by their powers and +qualities. 'Tis impossible to tell what changes and improvements we +might make in these sciences were we thoroughly acquainted with the +extent and force of human understanding, and could explain the +nature of the ideas we employ and of the operations we perform in +our reasonings.... To me it seems evident that the essence of mind +being equally unknown to us with that of external bodies, it must +be equally impossible to form any notion of its powers and +qualities otherwise than from careful and exact experiments, and +the observation<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span> of those particular effects which result from its +different circumstances and situations. And though we must +endeavour to render all our principles as universal as possible, by +tracing up our experiments to the utmost, and explaining all +effects from the simplest and fewest causes, 'tis still certain we +cannot go beyond experience; and any hypothesis that pretends to +discover the ultimate original qualities of human nature, ought at +first to be rejected as presumptuous and chimerical....</p> + +<p>"But if this impossibility of explaining ultimate principles should +be esteemed a defect in the science of man, I will venture to +affirm, that it is a defect common to it with all the sciences, and +all the arts, in which we can employ ourselves, whether they be +such as are cultivated in the schools of the philosophers, or +practised in the shops of the meanest artisans. None of them can go +beyond experience, or establish any principles which are not +founded on that authority. Moral philosophy has, indeed, this +peculiar disadvantage, which is not found in natural, that in +collecting its experiments, it cannot make them purposely, with +premeditation, and after such a manner as to satisfy itself +concerning every particular difficulty which may arise. When I am +at a loss to know the effects of one body upon another in any +situation, I need only put them in that situation, and observe what +results from it. But should I endeavour to clear up in the same +manner any<a name="FNanchor_15_15" id="FNanchor_15_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> doubt in moral philosophy, by placing myself in the +same case with that which I consider, 'tis evident this reflection +and premeditation would so disturb the operation of my natural +principles, as must render it impossible to form any just +conclusion from the phenomenon. We must, therefore, glean up our +experiments in this science from a cautious observation of human +life, and take them as they appear in the common course of the +world, by men's behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their +pleasures. Where experiments of this kind are judiciously collected +and compared, we may<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span> hope to establish on them a science which +will not be inferior in certainty, and will be much superior in +utility, to any other of human comprehension."—(I. pp. 7-11.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>All science starts with hypotheses—in other words, with assumptions +that are unproved, while they may be, and often are, erroneous; but +which are better than nothing to the seeker after order in the maze of +phenomena. And the historical progress of every science depends on the +criticism of hypotheses—on the gradual stripping off, that is, of their +untrue or superfluous parts—until there remains only that exact verbal +expression of as much as we know of the fact, and no more, which +constitutes a perfect scientific theory.</p> + +<p>Philosophy has followed the same course as other branches of scientific +investigation. The memorable service rendered to the cause of sound +thinking by Descartes consisted in this: that he laid the foundation of +modern philosophical criticism by his inquiry into the nature of +certainty. It is a clear result of the investigation started by +Descartes, that there is one thing of which no doubt can be entertained, +for he who should pretend to doubt it would thereby prove its existence; +and that is the momentary consciousness we call a present thought or +feeling; that is safe, even if all other kinds of certainty are merely +more or less probable inferences. Berkeley and Locke, each in his way, +applied philosophical criticism in other directions; but they always, at +any rate professedly, followed the Cartesian maxim of admitting no +propositions to be true but such as are clear, distinct, and evident, +even while their arguments stripped off many a layer of hypothetical +assumption which their great predecessor had left untouched.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span> No one has +more clearly stated the aims of the critical philosopher than Locke, in +a passage of the famous <i>Essay concerning Human Understanding</i>, which, +perhaps, I ought to assume to be well known to all English readers, but +which so probably is unknown to this full-crammed and much examined +generation that I venture to cite it:</p> + +<blockquote><p>"If by this inquiry into the nature of the understanding I can +discover the powers thereof, how far they reach, to what things +they are in any degree proportionate, and where they fail us, I +suppose it may be of use to prevail with the busy mind of man to be +more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehension: +to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether; and to sit +down in quiet ignorance of those things which, upon examination, +are proved to be beyond the reach of our capacities. We should not +then, perhaps, be so forward, out of an affectation of universal +knowledge, to raise questions and perplex ourselves and others with +disputes about things to which our understandings are not suited, +and of which we cannot frame in our minds any clear and distinct +perception, or whereof (as it has, perhaps, too often happened) we +have not any notion at all.... Men may find matter sufficient to +busy their heads and employ their hands with variety, delight, and +satisfaction, if they will not boldly quarrel with their own +constitution and throw away the blessings their hands are filled +with because they are not big enough to grasp everything. We shall +not have much reason to complain of the narrowness of our minds, if +we will but employ them about what may be of use to us: for of that +they are very capable: and it will be an unpardonable, as well as a +childish peevishness, if we under-value the advantages of our +knowledge, and neglect to improve it to the ends for which it was +given us, because there are some things that are set out of the +reach of it. It will be no excuse to an idle and untoward servant +who would not attend to his business by candlelight, to plead that +he had not broad sunshine. The candle that is set up in us shines +bright<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span> enough for all our purposes.... Our business here is not to +know all things, but those which concern our conduct."<a name="FNanchor_16_16" id="FNanchor_16_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a></p></blockquote> + +<p>Hume develops the same fundamental conception in a somewhat different +way, and with a more definite indication of the practical benefits which +may be expected from a critical philosophy. The first and second parts +of the twelfth section of the <i>Inquiry</i> are devoted to a condemnation of +excessive scepticism, or Pyrrhonism, with which Hume couples a +caricature of the Cartesian doubt; but, in the third part, a certain +"mitigated scepticism" is recommended and adopted, under the title of +"academical philosophy." After pointing out that a knowledge of the +infirmities of the human understanding, even in its most perfect state, +and when most accurate and cautious in its determinations, is the best +check upon the tendency to dogmatism, Hume continues:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"Another species of <i>mitigated</i> scepticism, which may be of +advantage to mankind, and which maybe the natural result of the +<span class="smcap">Pyrrhonian</span> doubts and scruples, is the limitation of our inquiries +to such subjects as are best adapted to the narrow capacity of +human understanding. The <i>imagination</i> of man is naturally sublime, +delighted with whatever is remote and extraordinary, and running, +without control, into the most distant parts of space and time in +order to avoid the objects which custom has rendered too familiar +to it. A correct <i>judgment</i> observes a contrary method, and, +avoiding all distant and high inquiries, confines itself to common +life, and to such subjects as fall under daily practice and +experience; leaving the more sublime topics to the embellishment of +poets and orators, or to the arts of priests and politicians. To +bring us to so salutary a determination, nothing can be more<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span> +serviceable than to be once thoroughly convinced of the force of +the <span class="smcap">Pyrrhonian</span> doubt, and of the impossibility that anything but +the strong power of natural instinct could free us from it. Those +who have a propensity to philosophy will still continue their +researches; because they reflect, that, besides the immediate +pleasure attending such an occupation, philosophical decisions are +nothing but the reflections of common life, methodised and +corrected. But they will never be tempted to go beyond common life, +so long as they consider the imperfection of those faculties which +they employ, their narrow reach, and their inaccurate operations. +While we cannot give a satisfactory reason why we believe, after a +thousand experiments, that a stone will fall or fire burn; can we +ever satisfy ourselves concerning any determination which we may +form with regard to the origin of worlds and the situation of +nature from and to eternity?"—(IV. pp. 189—90.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>But further, it is the business of criticism not only to keep watch over +the vagaries of philosophy, but to do the duty of police in the whole +world of thought. Wherever it espies sophistry or superstition they are +to be bidden to stand; nay, they are to be followed to their very dens +and there apprehended and exterminated, as Othello smothered Desdemona, +"else she'll betray more men."</p> + +<p>Hume warms into eloquence as he sets forth the labours meet for the +strength and the courage of the Hercules of "mitigated scepticism."</p> + +<blockquote><p>"Here, indeed, lies the justest and most plausible objection +against a considerable part of metaphysics, that they are not +properly a science, but arise either from the fruitless efforts of +human vanity, which would penetrate into subjects utterly +inaccessible to the understanding, or from the craft of popular +superstitions, which, being unable to defend themselves on fair +ground, raise these entangling brambles to cover and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span> protect their +weakness. Chased from the open country, these robbers fly into the +forest, and lie in wait to break in upon every unguarded avenue of +the mind and overwhelm it with religious fears and prejudices. The +stoutest antagonist, if he remits his watch a moment, is oppressed; +and many, through cowardice and folly, open the gates to the +enemies, and willingly receive them with reverence and submission +as their legal sovereigns.</p> + +<p>"But is this a sufficient reason why philosophers should desist +from such researches and leave superstition still in possession of +her retreat? Is it not proper to draw an opposite conclusion, and +perceive the necessity of carrying the war into the most secret +recesses of the enemy?... The only method of freeing learning at +once from these abstruse questions, is to inquire seriously into +the nature of human understanding, and show, from an exact analysis +of its powers and capacity, that it is by no means fitted for such +remote and abstruse subjects. We must submit to this fatigue, in +order to live at ease ever after; and must cultivate true +metaphysics with some care, in order to destroy the false and +adulterated."—(IV. pp. 10, 11.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>Near a century and a half has elapsed since these brave words were +shaped by David Hume's pen; and the business of carrying the war into +the enemy's camp has gone on but slowly. Like other campaigns, it long +languished for want of a good base of operations. But since physical +science, in the course of the last fifty years, has brought to the front +an inexhaustible supply of heavy artillery of a new pattern, warranted +to drive solid bolts of fact through the thickest skulls, things are +looking better; though hardly more than the first faint flutterings of +the dawn of the happy day, when superstition and false metaphysics shall +be no more and reasonable folks may "live at ease," are as yet +discernible by the <i>enfants perdus</i> of the outposts.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span></p> + +<p>If, in thus conceiving the object and the limitations of philosophy, +Hume shows himself the spiritual child and continuator of the work of +Locke, he appears no less plainly as the parent of Kant and as the +protagonist of that more modern way of thinking, which has been called +"agnosticism," from its profession of an incapacity to discover the +indispensable conditions of either positive or negative knowledge, in +many propositions, respecting which, not only the vulgar, but +philosophers of the more sanguine sort, revel in the luxury of +unqualified assurance.</p> + +<p>The aim of the <i>Kritik der reinen Vernunft</i> is essentially the same as +that of the <i>Treatise of Human Nature</i>, by which indeed Kant was led to +develop that "critical philosophy" with which his name and fame are +indissolubly bound up: and, if the details of Kant's criticism differ +from those of Hume, they coincide with them in their main result, which +is the limitation of all knowledge of reality to the world of phenomena +revealed to us by experience.</p> + +<p>The philosopher of Königsberg epitomises the philosopher of Ninewells +when he thus sums up the uses of philosophy:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"The greatest and perhaps the sole use of all philosophy of pure +reason is, after all, merely negative, since it serves, not as an +organon for the enlargement [of knowledge], but as a discipline for +its delimitation; and instead of discovering truth, has only the +modest merit of preventing error."<a name="FNanchor_17_17" id="FNanchor_17_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a></p></blockquote> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_14_14" id="Footnote_14_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_14"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> In a letter to Hutcheson (September 17th, 1739) Hume +remarks:—"There are different ways of examining the mind as well as the +body. One may consider it either as an anatomist or as a painter: either +to discover its most secret springs and principles, or to describe the +grace and beauty of its actions;" and he proceeds to justify his own +mode of looking at the moral sentiments from the anatomist's point of +view.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_15_15" id="Footnote_15_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_15"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> The manner in which Hume constantly refers to the results +of the observation of the contents and the processes of his own mind +clearly shows that he has here inadvertently overstated the case.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_16_16" id="Footnote_16_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_16"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> Locke, <i>An Essay concerning Human Understanding</i>, Book I, +chap. i, §§ 4, 5, 6.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_17_17" id="Footnote_17_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_17"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> <i>Kritik der reinen Vernunft.</i> Ed. Hartenstein, p. 256.</p></div> +</div> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_II" id="CHAPTER_II"></a>CHAPTER II.</h2> + +<h3>THE CONTENTS OF THE MIND.</h3> + +<p>In the language of common life, the "mind" is spoken of as an entity, +independent of the body, though resident in and closely connected with +it, and endowed with numerous "faculties," such as sensibility, +understanding, memory, volition, which stand in the same relation to the +mind as the organs do to the body, and perform the functions of feeling, +reasoning, remembering, and willing. Of these functions, some, such as +sensation, are supposed to be merely passive—that is, they are called +into existence by impressions, made upon the sensitive faculty by a +material world of real objects, of which our sensations are supposed to +give us pictures; others, such as the memory and the reasoning faculty, +are considered to be partly passive and partly active; while volition is +held to be potentially, if not always actually, a spontaneous activity.</p> + +<p>The popular classification and terminology of the phenomena of +consciousness, however, are by no means the first crude conceptions +suggested by common sense, but rather a legacy, and, in many respects, a +sufficiently <i>damnosa hæreditas</i>, of ancient philosophy, more or less<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span> +leavened by theology; which has incorporated itself with the common +thought of later times, as the vices of the aristocracy of one age +become those of the mob in the next. Very little attention to what +passes in the mind is sufficient to show, that these conceptions involve +assumptions of an extremely hypothetical character. And the first +business of the student of psychology is to get rid of such +prepossessions; to form conceptions of mental phenomena as they are +given us by observation, without any hypothetical admixture, or with +only so much as is definitely recognised and held subject to +confirmation or otherwise; to classify these phenomena according to +their clearly recognisable characters; and to adopt a nomenclature which +suggests nothing beyond the results of observation. Thus chastened, +observation of the mind makes us acquainted with nothing but certain +events, facts, or phenomena (whichever name be preferred) which pass +over the inward field of view in rapid and, as it may appear on careless +inspection, in disorderly succession, like the shifting patterns of a +kaleidoscope. To all these mental phenomena, or states of our +consciousness,<a name="FNanchor_18_18" id="FNanchor_18_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_18" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> Descartes gave the name of "thoughts,"<a name="FNanchor_19_19" id="FNanchor_19_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> while +Locke<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a></span> and Berkeley termed them "ideas." Hume, regarding this as an +improper use of the word "idea," for which he proposes another +employment, gives the general name of "perceptions" to all states of +consciousness. Thus, whatever other signification we may see reason to +attach to the word "mind," it is certain that it is a name which is +employed to denote a series of perceptions; just as the word "tune," +whatever else it may mean, denotes, in the first place, a succession of +musical notes. Hume, indeed, goes further than others when he says +that—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"What we call a mind is nothing but a heap or collection of +different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and +supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with a perfect simplicity +and identity."—(I. p. 268.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>With this "nothing but," however, he obviously falls into the primal and +perennial error of philosophical speculators—dogmatising from negative +arguments. He may be right or wrong; but the most he, or anybody else, +can prove in favour of his conclusion is, that we know nothing more of +the mind than that it is a series of perceptions. Whether there is +something in the mind that lies beyond the reach of observation; or +whether perceptions themselves are the products of something which can +be observed and which is not mind; are questions which can in nowise be +settled by direct observation. Elsewhere, the objectionable hypothetical +element of the definition of mind is less prominent:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"The true idea of the human mind is to consider it as a system of +different perceptions, or different existences, which<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></span> are linked +together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, +destroy, influence and modify each other.... In this respect I +cannot compare the soul more properly to anything than a republic +or commonwealth, in which the several members are united by the +reciprocal ties of government and subordination, and give rise to +other persons who propagate the same republic in the incessant +changes of its parts."—(I. p. 331).</p></blockquote> + +<p>But, leaving the question of the proper definition of mind open for the +present, it is further a matter of direct observation, that, when we +take a general survey of all our perceptions or states of consciousness, +they naturally fall into sundry groups or classes. Of these classes, two +are distinguished by Hume as of primary importance. All "perceptions," +he says, are either "<i>Impressions</i>" or "<i>Ideas</i>."</p> + +<p>Under "impressions" he includes "all our more lively perceptions, when +we hear, see, feel, love, or will;" in other words, "all our sensations, +passions, and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul" +(I. p. 15).</p> + +<p>"Ideas," on the other hand, are the faint images of impressions in +thinking and reasoning, or of antecedent ideas.</p> + +<p>Both impressions and ideas may be either <i>simple</i>, when they are +incapable of further analysis, or <i>complex</i>, when they may be resolved +into simpler constituents. All simple ideas are exact copies of +impressions; but, in complex ideas, the arrangement of simple +constituents may be different from that of the impressions of which +those simple ideas are copies.</p> + +<p>Thus the colours red and blue and the odour of a rose, are simple +impressions; while the ideas of blue, of red,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span> and of rose-odour are +simple copies of these impressions. But a red rose gives us a complex +impression, capable of resolution into the simple impressions of red +colour, rose-scent, and numerous others; and we may have a complex idea, +which is an accurate, though faint, copy of this complex impression. +Once in possession of the ideas of a red rose and of the colour blue, we +may, in imagination, substitute blue for red; and thus obtain a complex +idea of a blue rose, which is not an actual copy of any complex +impression, though all its elements are such copies.</p> + +<p>Hume has been criticised for making the distinction of impressions and +ideas to depend upon their relative strength or vivacity. Yet it would +be hard to point out any other character by which the things signified +can be distinguished. Any one who has paid attention to the curious +subject of what are called "subjective sensations" will be familiar with +examples of the extreme difficulty which sometimes attends the +discrimination of ideas of sensation from impressions of sensation, when +the ideas are very vivid, or the impressions are faint. Who has not +"fancied" he heard a noise; or has not explained inattention to a real +sound by saying, "I thought it was nothing but my fancy"? Even healthy +persons are much more liable to both visual and auditory spectra—that +is, ideas of vision and sound so vivid that they are taken for new +impressions—than is commonly supposed; and, in some diseased states, +ideas of sensible objects may assume all the vividness of reality.</p> + +<p>If ideas are nothing but copies of impressions, arranged, either in the +same order as that of the impressions from which they are derived, or in +a different order, it follows that the ultimate analysis of the contents +of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span> the mind turns upon that of the impressions. According to Hume, +these are of two kinds: either they are impressions of sensation, or +they are impressions of reflection. The former are those afforded by the +five senses, together with pleasure and pain. The latter are the +passions or the emotions (which Hume employs as equivalent terms). Thus +the elementary states of consciousness, the raw materials of knowledge, +so to speak, are either sensations or emotions; and whatever we discover +in the mind, beyond these elementary states of consciousness, results +from the combinations and the metamorphoses which they undergo.</p> + +<p>It is not a little strange that a thinker of Hume's capacity should have +been satisfied with the results of a psychological analysis which +regards some obvious compounds as elements, while it omits altogether a +most important class of elementary states.</p> + +<p>With respect to the former point, Spinoza's masterly examination of the +Passions in the third part of the <i>Ethics</i> should have been known to +Hume.<a name="FNanchor_20_20" id="FNanchor_20_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> But, if he had been acquainted with that wonderful piece of +psychological anatomy, he would have learned that the emotions and +passions are all complex states, arising from the close association of +ideas of pleasure or pain with other ideas; and, indeed, without going +to Spinoza, his own acute discussion of the passions leads to the same +result,<a name="FNanchor_21_21" id="FNanchor_21_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_21" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> and is wholly inconsistent with his classi<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span>fication of those +mental states among the primary uncompounded materials of consciousness.</p> + +<p>If Hume's "impressions of reflection" are excluded from among the +primary elements of consciousness, nothing is left but the impressions +afforded by the five senses, with pleasure and pain. Putting aside the +muscular sense, which had not come into view in Hume's time, the +questions arise whether these are all the simple undecomposable +materials of thought? or whether others exist of which Hume takes no +cognizance.</p> + +<p>Kant answered the latter question in the affirmative, in the <i>Kritik der +reinen Vernunft</i>, and thereby made one of the greatest advances ever +effected in philosophy; though it must be confessed that the German +philosopher's exposition of his views is so perplexed in style, so +burdened with the weight of a cumbrous and uncouth scholasticism, that +it is easy to confound the unessential parts of his system with those +which are of profound importance. His baggage train is bigger than his +army, and the student who attacks him is too often led to suspect he has +won a position when he has only captured a mob of useless +camp-followers.</p> + +<p>In his <i>Principles of Psychology</i>, Mr. Herbert Spencer appears to me to +have brought out the essential truth<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span> which underlies Kant's doctrine in +a far clearer manner than any one else; but, for the purpose of the +present summary view of Hume's philosophy, it must suffice if I state +the matter in my own way, giving the broad outlines, without entering +into the details of a large and difficult discussion.</p> + +<p>When a red light flashes across the field of vision, there arises in the +mind an "impression of sensation"—which we call red. It appears to me +that this sensation, red, is a something which may exist altogether +independently of any other impression, or idea, as an individual +existence. It is perfectly conceivable that a sentient being should have +no sense but vision, and that he should have spent his existence in +absolute darkness, with the exception of one solitary flash of red +light. That momentary illumination would suffice to give him the +impression under consideration; and the whole content of his +consciousness might be that impression; and, if he were endowed with +memory, its idea.</p> + +<p>Such being the state of affairs, suppose a second flash of red light to +follow the first. If there were no memory of the latter, the state of +the mind on the second occasion would simply be a repetition of that +which occurred before. There would be merely another impression.</p> + +<p>But suppose memory to exist, and that an idea of the first impression is +generated; then, if the supposed sentient being were like ourselves, +there might arise in his mind two altogether new impressions. The one is +the feeling of the <i>succession</i> of the two impressions, the other is the +feeling of their <i>similarity</i>.</p> + +<p>Yet a third case is conceivable. Suppose two flashes<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span> of red light to +occur together, then a third feeling might arise which is neither +succession nor similarity, but that which we call <i>co-existence</i>.</p> + +<p>These feelings, or their contraries, are the foundation of everything +that we call a relation. They are no more capable of being described +than sensations are; and, as it appears to me, they are as little +susceptible of analysis into simpler elements. Like simple tastes and +smells, or feelings of pleasure and pain, they are ultimate irresolvable +facts of conscious experience; and, if we follow the principle of Hume's +nomenclature, they must be called <i>impressions of relation</i>. But it must +be remembered, that they differ from the other impressions, in requiring +the pre-existence of at least two of the latter. Though devoid of the +slightest resemblance to the other impressions, they are, in a manner, +generated by them. In fact, we may regard them as a kind of impressions +of impressions; or as the sensations of an inner sense, which takes +cognizance of the materials furnished to it by the outer senses.</p> + +<p>Hume failed as completely as his predecessors had done to recognise the +elementary character of impressions of relation; and, when he discusses +relations, he falls into a chaos of confusion and self-contradiction.</p> + +<p>In the <i>Treatise</i>, for example, (Book I., § iv.) resemblance, contiguity +in time and space, and cause and effect, are said to be the "uniting +principles among ideas," "the bond of union" or "associating quality by +which one idea naturally introduces another." Hume affirms that—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"These qualities produce an association among ideas, and upon the +appearance of one idea naturally introduce another." They are "the +principles of union or cohesion among our<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></span> simple ideas, and, in +the imagination, supply the place of that inseparable connection by +which they are united in our memory. Here is a kind of +<i>attraction</i>, which, in the mental world, will be found to have as +extraordinary effects as in the natural, and to show itself in as +many and as various forms. Its effects are everywhere conspicuous; +but, as to its causes they are mostly unknown, and must be resolved +into <i>original</i> qualities of human nature, which I pretend not to +explain."—(I. p. 29.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>And at the end of this section Hume goes on to say—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"Amongst the effects of this union or association of ideas, there +are none more remarkable than those complex ideas which are the +common subjects of our thought and reasoning, and generally arise +from some principle of union among our simple ideas. These complex +ideas may be resolved into <i>relations</i>, <i>modes</i>, and +<i>substances</i>."—(<i>Ibid.</i>)</p></blockquote> + +<p>In the next section, which is devoted to <i>Relations</i>, they are spoken of +as qualities "by which two ideas are connected together in the +imagination," or "which make objects admit of comparison," and seven +kinds of relation are enumerated, namely, <i>resemblance</i>, <i>identity</i>, +<i>space and time</i>, <i>quantity or number</i>, <i>degrees of quality</i>, +<i>contrariety</i>, and <i>cause and effect</i>.</p> + +<p>To the reader of Hume, whose conceptions are usually so clear, definite, +and consistent, it is as unsatisfactory as it is surprising to meet with +so much questionable and obscure phraseology in a small space. One and +the same thing, for example, resemblance, is first called a "quality of +an idea," and secondly a "complex idea." Surely it cannot be both. Ideas +which have the qualities of "resemblance, contiguity, and cause and +effect," are said to "attract one another" (save the mark!), and so +become<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></span> associated; though, in a subsequent part of the <i>Treatise</i>, +Hume's great effort is to prove that the relation of cause and effect is +a particular case of the process of association; that is to say, is a +result of the process of which it is supposed to be the cause. Moreover, +since, as Hume is never weary of reminding his readers, there is nothing +in ideas save copies of impressions, the qualities of resemblance, +contiguity, and so on, in the idea, must have existed in the impression +of which that idea is a copy; and therefore they must be either +sensations or emotions—from both of which classes they are excluded.</p> + +<p>In fact, in one place, Hume himself has an insight into the real nature +of relations. Speaking of equality, in the sense of a relation of +quantity, he says—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"Since equality is a relation, it is not, strictly speaking, a +property in the figures themselves, but arises merely from the +comparison which the mind makes between them."—(I. p. 70.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>That is to say, when two impressions of equal figures are present, there +arises in the mind a <i>tertium quid</i>, which is the perception of +equality. On his own principles, Hume should therefore have placed this +"perception" among the ideas of reflection. However, as we have seen, he +expressly excludes everything but the emotions and the passions from +this group.</p> + +<p>It is necessary therefore to amend Hume's primary "geography of the +mind" by the excision of one territory and the addition of another; and +the elementary states of consciousness will stand thus:—</p> + +<div class="poem"> +<div class='stanza'><div>A. <span class="smcap">Impressions</span>.</div> +<div class='i1'><span class="smcap">a</span>. Sensations of</div> +<div class='i2'><i>a.</i> Smell.</div> +<div class='i2'><i>b.</i> Taste.</div> +<div class='i2'><i>c.</i> Hearing.</div> +<div class='i2'><i>d.</i> Sight.</div> +<div class='i2'><i>e.</i> Touch.</div> +<div class='i2'><i>f.</i> Resistance (the muscular sense).</div> +<div class='i1'><span class="smcap">b</span>. Pleasure and Pain.</div> +<div class='i1'><span class="smcap">c</span>. Relations.</div> +<div class='i2'><i>a.</i> Co-existence.</div> +<div class='i2'><i>b.</i> Succession.</div> +<div class='i2'><i>c.</i> Similarity and dissimilarity.</div> +<div>B. <span class="smcap">Ideas</span>.</div> +<div>Copies, or reproductions in memory, of the foregoing.</div></div> +</div> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></span>And now the question arises, whether any, and if so what, portion of +these contents of the mind are to be termed "knowledge."</p> + +<p>According to Locke, "Knowledge is the perception of the agreement or +disagreement of two ideas;" and Hume, though he does not say so in so +many words, tacitly accepts the definition. It follows, that neither +simple sensation, nor simple emotion, constitutes knowledge; but that, +when impressions of relation are added to these impressions, or their +ideas, knowledge arises; and that all knowledge is the knowledge of +likenesses and unlikenesses, co-existences and successions.</p> + +<p>It really matters very little in what sense terms are used, so long as +the same meaning is always rigidly attached to them; and, therefore, it +is hardly worth while to quarrel with this generally accepted, though +very arbitrary, limitation of the signification of "knowledge." But, on +the face of the matter, it is not obvious why the impression we call a +relation should have a better claim to the title of knowledge, than that +which we call a sensation or an emotion; and the restriction has this<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span> +unfortunate result, that it excludes all the most intense states of +consciousness from any claim to the title of "knowledge."</p> + +<p>For example, on this view, pain, so violent and absorbing as to exclude +all other forms of consciousness, is not knowledge; but becomes a part +of knowledge the moment we think of it in relation to another pain, or +to some other mental phenomenon. Surely this is somewhat inconvenient, +for there is only a verbal difference between having a sensation and +knowing one has it: they are simply two phrases for the same mental +state.</p> + +<p>But the "pure metaphysicians" make great capital out of the ambiguity. +For, starting with the assumption that all knowledge is the perception +of relations, and finding themselves, like mere common-sense folks, very +much disposed to call sensation knowledge, they at once gratify that +disposition and save their consistency, by declaring that even the +simplest act of sensation contains two terms and a relation—the +sensitive subject, the sensigenous object, and that masterful entity, +the Ego. From which great triad, as from a gnostic Trinity, emanates an +endless procession of other logical shadows and all the <i>Fata Morgana</i> +of philosophical dreamland.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_18_18" id="Footnote_18_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_18"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> "Consciousnesses" would be a better name, but it is +awkward. I have elsewhere proposed <i>psychoses</i> as a substantive name for +mental phenomena.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_19_19" id="Footnote_19_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_19"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> As this has been denied, it may be as well to give +Descartes's words: "Par le mot de penser, j'entends tout ce que se fait +dans nous de telle sorte que nous l'apercevons immédiatement par +nous-mêmes: c'est pourquoi non-seulement entendre, vouloir, imaginer, +mais aussi sentir, c'est le même chose ici que penser."—<i>Principes de +Philosophie</i>. Ed. Cousin. 57. +</p><p> +"Toutes les propriétés que nous trouvons en la chose qui pense ne sont +que des façons différentes de penser."—<i>Ibid.</i> 96.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_20_20" id="Footnote_20_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_20"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> On the whole, it is pleasant to find satisfactory evidence +that Hume knew nothing of the works of Spinoza; for the invariably +abusive manner in which he refers to that type of the philosophic hero +is only to be excused, if it is to be excused, by sheer ignorance of his +life and work.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_21_21" id="Footnote_21_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_21"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> For example, in discussing pride and humility, Hume +says:— +</p><p> +"According as our idea of ourselves is more or less advantageous, we +feel either of these opposite affections, and are elated by pride or +dejected with humility ... when self enters not into the consideration +there is no room either for pride or humility." That is, pride is +pleasure, and humility is pain, associated with certain conceptions of +one's self; or, as Spinoza puts it:—"Superbia est de se præ amore sui +plus justo sentire" ("amor" being "lætitia concomitante idea causæ +externæ"); and "Humilitas est tristitia orta ex eo quod homo suam +impotentiam sive imbecillitatem contemplatur."</p></div> +</div> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_III" id="CHAPTER_III"></a>CHAPTER III.</h2> + +<h3>THE ORIGIN OF THE IMPRESSIONS.</h3> + +<p>Admitting that the sensations, the feelings of pleasure and pain, and +those of relation, are the primary irresolvable states of consciousness, +two further lines of investigation present themselves. The one leads us +to seek the origin of these "impressions;" the other, to inquire into +the nature of the steps by which they become metamorphosed into those +compound states of consciousness, which so largely enter into our +ordinary trains of thought.</p> + +<p>With respect to the origin of impressions of sensation, Hume is not +quite consistent with himself. In one place (I. p. 117) he says, that it +is impossible to decide "whether they arise immediately from the object, +or are produced by the creative power of the mind, or are derived from +the Author of our being," thereby implying that realism and idealism are +equally probable hypotheses. But, in fact, after the demonstration by +Descartes, that the immediate antecedents of sensations are changes in +the nervous system, with which our feelings have no sort of resemblance, +the hypothesis that sensations "arise immediately from the object" was +out of court;<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span> and that Hume fully admitted the Cartesian doctrine is +apparent when he says (I. p. 272):—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"All our perceptions are dependent on our organs and the +disposition of our nerves and animal spirits."</p></blockquote> + +<p>And again, though in relation to another question, he observes:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"There are three different kinds of impressions conveyed by the +senses. The first are those of the figure, bulk, motion, and +solidity of bodies. The second those of colours, tastes, smells, +sounds, heat, and cold. The third are the pains and pleasures that +arise from the application of objects to our bodies, as by the +cutting of our flesh with steel, and such like. Both philosophers +and the vulgar suppose the first of these to have a distinct +continued existence. The vulgar only regard the second as on the +same footing. Both philosophers and the vulgar again esteem the +third to be merely perceptions, and consequently interrupted and +dependent beings.</p> + +<p>"Now 'tis evident that, whatever may be our philosophical opinion, +colour, sounds, heat, and cold, as far as appears to the senses, +exist after the same manner with motion and solidity; and that the +difference we make between them, in this respect, arises not from +the mere perception. So strong is the prejudice for the distinct +continued existence of the former qualities, that when the contrary +opinion is advanced by modern philosophers, people imagine they can +almost refute it from their reason and experience, and that their +very senses contradict this philosophy. 'Tis also evident that +colours, sounds, &c., are originally on the same footing with the +pain that arises from steel, and pleasure that proceeds from a +fire; and that the difference betwixt them is founded neither on +perception nor reason, but on the imagination. For as they are +confessed to be, both of them, nothing but perceptions arising from +the particular configurations and motions of the parts of body, +wherein possibly can their difference consist? Upon the whole, +then, we may conclude that, as far as<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span> the senses are judges, all +perceptions are the same in the manner of their existence."—(I. p. +250, 251.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>The last words of this passage are as much Berkeley's as Hume's. But, +instead of following Berkeley in his deductions from the position thus +laid down, Hume, as the preceding citation shows, fully adopted the +conclusion to which all that we know of psychological physiology tends, +that the origin of the elements of consciousness, no less than that of +all its other states, is to be sought in bodily changes, the seat of +which can only be placed in the brain. And, as Locke had already done +with less effect, he states and refutes the arguments commonly brought +against the possibility of a causal connexion between the modes of +motion of the cerebral substance and states of consciousness, with great +clearness:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"From these hypotheses concerning the <i>substance</i> and <i>local +conjunction</i> of our perceptions we may pass to another, which is +more intelligible than the former, and more important than the +latter, viz. concerning the <i>cause</i> of our perceptions. Matter and +motion, 'tis commonly said in the schools, however varied, are +still matter and motion, and produce only a difference in the +position and situation of objects. Divide a body as often as you +please, 'tis still body. Place it in any figure, nothing ever +results but figure, or the relation of parts. Move it in any +manner, you still find motion or a change of relation. 'Tis absurd +to imagine that motion in a circle, for instance, should be nothing +but merely motion in a circle; while motion in another direction, +as in an ellipse, should also be a passion or moral reflection; +that the shocking of two globular particles should become a +sensation of pain, and that the meeting of the triangular ones +should afford a pleasure. Now as these different shocks and +variations and mixtures are the only changes of which matter is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span> +susceptible, and as these never afford us any idea of thought or +perception, 'tis concluded to be impossible, that thought can ever +be caused by matter.</p> + +<p>"Few have been able to withstand the seeming evidence of this +argument; and yet nothing in the world is more easy than to refute +it. We need only reflect upon what has been proved at large, that +we are never sensible of any connexion between causes and effects, +and that 'tis only by our experience of their constant conjunction +we can arrive at any knowledge of this relation. Now, as all +objects which are not contrary are susceptible of a constant +conjunction, and as no real objects are contrary, I have inferred +from these principles (Part III. § 15) that, to consider the matter +<i>a priori</i>, anything may produce anything, and that we shall never +discover a reason why any object may or may not be the cause of any +other, however great, or however little, the resemblance may be +betwixt them. This evidently destroys the precedent reasoning, +concerning the cause of thought or perception. For though there +appear no manner of connection betwixt motion and thought, the case +is the same with all other causes and effects. Place one body of a +pound weight on one end of a lever, and another body of the same +weight on the other end; you will never find in these bodies any +principle of motion dependent on their distance from the centre, +more than of thought and perception. If you pretend, therefore, to +prove, <i>a priori</i>, that such a position of bodies can never cause +thought, because, turn it which way you will, it is nothing but a +position of bodies: you must, by the same course of reasoning, +conclude that it can never produce motion, since there is no more +apparent connection in the one than in the other. But, as this +latter conclusion is contrary to evident experience, and as 'tis +possible we may have a like experience in the operations of the +mind, and may perceive a constant conjunction of thought and +motion, you reason too hastily when, from the mere consideration of +the ideas, you conclude that 'tis impossible motion can ever +produce thought, or a different position of parts give rise to a +different passion or reflection. Nay, 'tis not only possible we may +have such<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span> an experience, but 'tis certain we have it; since every +one may perceive that the different dispositions of his body change +his thoughts and sentiments. And should it be said that this +depends on the union of soul and body, I would answer, that we must +separate the question concerning the substance of the mind from +that concerning the cause of its thought; and that, confining +ourselves to the latter question, we find, by the comparing their +ideas, that thought and motion are different from each other and by +experience, that they are constantly united; which, being all the +circumstances that enter into the idea of cause and effect, when +applied to the operations of matter, we may certainly conclude that +motion may be, and actually is, the cause of thought and +perception."—(I. pp. 314-316.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>The upshot of all this is, that the "collection of perceptions," which +constitutes the mind, is really a system of effects, the causes of which +are to be sought in antecedent changes of the matter of the brain, just +as the "collection of motions," which we call flying, is a system of +effects, the causes of which are to be sought in the modes of motion of +the matter of the muscles of the wings.</p> + +<p>Hume, however, treats of this important topic only incidentally. He +seems to have had very little acquaintance even with such physiology as +was current in his time. At least, the only passage of his works, +bearing on this subject, with which I am acquainted, contains nothing +but a very odd version of the physiological views of Descartes:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"When I received the relations of <i>resemblance</i>, <i>contiguity</i>, and +<i>causation</i>, as principles of union among ideas, without examining +into their causes, 'twas more in prosecution of my first maxim, +that we must in the end rest contented with experience, than for +want of something specious and plausible which I might have +displayed on that subject. 'Twould<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span> have been easy to have made an +imaginary dissection of the brain, and have shown why, upon our +conception of any idea, the animal spirits run into all the +contiguous traces and rouse up the other ideas that are related to +it. But though I have neglected any advantage which I might have +drawn from this topic in explaining the relations of ideas, I am +afraid I must here have recourse to it, in order to account for the +mistakes that arise from these relations. I shall therefore +observe, that as the mind is endowed with the power of exciting any +idea it pleases; whenever it despatches the spirits into that +region of the brain in which the idea is placed; these spirits +always excite the idea, when they run precisely into the proper +traces and rummage that cell which belongs to the idea. But as +their motion is seldom direct, and naturally turns a little to the +one side or to the other; for this reason the animal spirits, +falling into the contiguous traces, present other related ideas, in +lieu of that which the mind desired at first to survey. This change +we are not always sensible of; but continuing still the same train +of thought, make use of the related idea which is presented to us +and employ it in our reasonings, as if it were the same with what +we demanded. This is the cause of many mistakes and sophisms in +philosophy; as will naturally be imagined, and as it would be easy +to show, if there was occasion."—(I. p. 88.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>Perhaps it is as well for Hume's fame that the occasion for further +physiological speculations of this sort did not arise. But, while +admitting the crudity of his notions and the strangeness of the language +in which they are couched, it must in justice be remembered, that what +are now known as the elements of the physiology of the nervous system +were hardly dreamed of in the first half of the eighteenth century; and, +as a further set off to Hume's credit, it must be noted that he grasped +the fundamental truth, that the key to the comprehension of mental +operations lies in the study of the molecular changes of the nervous +apparatus by which they are originated.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span></p> + +<p>Surely no one who is cognisant of the facts of the case, nowadays, +doubts that the roots of psychology lie in the physiology of the nervous +system. What we call the operations of the mind are functions of the +brain, and the materials of consciousness are products of cerebral +activity. Cabanis may have made use of crude and misleading phraseology +when he said that the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile; +but the conception which that much-abused phrase embodies is, +nevertheless, far more consistent with fact than the popular notion that +the mind is a metaphysical entity seated in the head, but as independent +of the brain as a telegraph operator is of his instrument.</p> + +<p>It is hardly necessary to point out that the doctrine just laid down is +what is commonly called materialism. In fact, I am not sure that the +adjective "crass," which appears to have a special charm for rhetorical +sciolists, would not be applied to it. But it is, nevertheless, true +that the doctrine contains nothing inconsistent with the purest +idealism. For, as Hume remarks (as indeed Descartes had observed long +before):—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"'Tis not our body we perceive when we regard our limbs and +members, but certain impressions which enter by the senses; so that +the ascribing a real and corporeal existence to these impressions, +or to their objects, is an act of the mind as difficult to explain +as that [the external existence of objects] which we examine at +present."—(I. p. 249.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>Therefore, if we analyse the proposition that all mental phenomena are +the effects or products of material phenomena, all that it means amounts +to this; that whenever those states of consciousness which we call +sensation, or emotion, or thought, come into existence,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span> complete +investigation will show good reason for the belief that they are +preceded by those other phenomena of consciousness to which we give the +names of matter and motion. All material changes appear, in the long +run, to be modes of motion; but our knowledge of motion is nothing but +that of a change in the place and order of our sensations; just as our +knowledge of matter is restricted to those feelings of which we assume +it to be the cause.</p> + +<p>It has already been pointed out, that Hume must have admitted, and in +fact does admit, the possibility that the mind is a Leibnitzian monad, +or a Fichtean world-generating Ego, the universe of things being merely +the picture produced by the evolution of the phenomena of consciousness. +For any demonstration that can be given to the contrary effect, the +"collection of perceptions" which makes up our consciousness may be an +orderly phantasmagoria generated by the Ego, unfolding its successive +scenes on the background of the abyss of nothingness; as a firework, +which is but cunningly arranged combustibles, grows from a spark into a +coruscation, and from a coruscation into figures, and words, and +cascades of devouring fire, and then vanishes into the darkness of the +night.</p> + +<p>On the other hand, it must no less readily be allowed that, for anything +that can be proved to the contrary, there may be a real something which +is the cause of all our impressions; that sensations, though not +likenesses, are symbols of that something; and that the part of that +something, which we call the nervous system, is an apparatus for +supplying us with a sort of algebra of fact, based on those symbols. A +brain may be the machinery by which the material universe<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span> becomes +conscious of itself. But it is important to notice that, even if this +conception of the universe and of the relation of consciousness to its +other components should be true, we should, nevertheless, be still bound +by the limits of thought, still unable to refute the arguments of pure +idealism. The more completely the materialistic position is admitted, +the easier is it to show that the idealistic position is unassailable, +if the idealist confines himself within the limits of positive +knowledge.</p> + +<p class='tbrk'> </p> + +<p>Hume deals with the questions whether all our ideas are derived from +experience, or whether, on the contrary, more or fewer of them are +innate, which so much exercised the mind of Locke, after a somewhat +summary fashion, in a note to the second section of the <i>Inquiry</i>:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"It is probable that no more was meant by those who denied innate +ideas, than that all ideas were copies of our impressions; though +it must be confessed that the terms which they employed were not +chosen with such caution, nor so exactly defined, as to prevent all +mistakes about their doctrine. For what is meant by <i>innate</i>? If +innate be equivalent to natural, then all the perceptions and ideas +of the mind must be allowed to be innate or natural, in whatever +sense we take the latter word, whether in opposition to what is +uncommon, artificial, or miraculous. If by innate be meant +contemporary with our birth, the dispute seems to be frivolous; nor +is it worth while to inquire at what time thinking begins, whether +before, at, or after our birth. Again, the word <i>idea</i> seems to be +commonly taken in a very loose sense by Locke and others, as +standing for any of our perceptions, our sensations and passions, +as well as thoughts. Now in this sense I should desire to know what +can be meant by asserting that self-love, or resentment of +injuries, or the passion between the sexes is not innate?</p> + +<p>"But admitting these terms, <i>impressions</i> and <i>ideas</i>, in the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span> +sense above explained, and understanding by <i>innate</i> what is +original or copied from no precedent perception, then we may assert +that all our impressions are innate, and our ideas not innate."</p></blockquote> + +<p>It would seem that Hume did not think it worth while to acquire a +comprehension of the real points at issue in the controversy which he +thus carelessly dismisses.</p> + +<p>Yet Descartes has defined what he means by innate ideas with so much +precision, that misconception ought to have been impossible. He says +that, when he speaks of an idea being "innate," he means that it exists +potentially in the mind, before it is actually called into existence by +whatever is its appropriate exciting cause.</p> + +<blockquote><p>"I have never either thought or said," he writes, "that the mind +has any need of innate ideas [<i>idées naturelles</i>] which are +anything distinct from its faculty of thinking. But it is true that +observing that there are certain thoughts which arise neither from +external objects nor from the determination of my will, but only +from my faculty of thinking; in order to mark the difference +between the ideas or the notions which are the forms of these +thoughts, and to distinguish them from the others, which may be +called extraneous or voluntary, I have called them innate. But I +have used this term in the same sense as when we say that +generosity is innate in certain families; or that certain maladies, +such as gout or gravel, are innate in others; not that children +born in these families are troubled with such diseases in their +mother's womb; but because they are born with the disposition or +the faculty of contracting them."<a name="FNanchor_22_22" id="FNanchor_22_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a></p></blockquote> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span>His troublesome disciple, Regius, having asserted that all our ideas +come from observation or tradition, Descartes remarks:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"So thoroughly erroneous is this assertion, that whoever has a +proper comprehension of the action of our senses, and understands +precisely the nature of that which is transmitted by them to our +thinking faculty, will rather affirm that no ideas of things, such +as are formed in thought, are brought to us by the senses, so that +there is nothing in our ideas which is other than innate in the +mind (<i>naturel à l'esprit</i>), or in the faculty of thinking, if only +certain circumstances are excepted, which belong only to +experience. For example, it is experience alone which causes us to +judge that such and such ideas, now present in our minds, are +related to certain things which are external to us; not in truth, +that they have been sent into our mind by these things, such as +they are, by the organs of the senses; but because these organs +have transmitted something which has occasioned the mind, in virtue +of its innate power, to form them at this time rather than at +another....</p> + +<p>"Nothing passes from external objects to the soul except certain +motions of matter (<i>mouvemens corporels</i>), but neither these +motions, nor the figures which they produce, are conceived by us as +they exist in the sensory organs, as I have fully explained in my +"Dioptrics"; whence it follows that even the ideas of motion and of +figures are innate (<i>naturellement en nous</i>). And, <i>à fortiori</i>, +the ideas of pain, of colours, of sounds, and of all similar things +must be innate, in order that the mind may represent them to +itself, on the occasion of certain motions of matter with which +they have no resemblance."</p></blockquote> + +<p>Whoever denies what is, in fact, an inconceivable proposition, that +sensations pass, as such, from the external world into the mind, must +admit the conclusion here laid down by Descartes, that, strictly +speaking, sensations,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span> and <i>à fortiori</i>, all the other contents of the +mind, are innate. Or, to state the matter in accordance with the views +previously expounded, that they are products of the inherent properties +of the thinking organ, in which they lie potentially, before they are +called into existence by their appropriate causes.</p> + +<p>But if all the contents of the mind are innate, what is meant by +experience?</p> + +<p>It is the conversion, by unknown causes, of these innate potentialities +into actual existences. The organ of thought, prior to experience, may +be compared to an untouched piano, in which it may be properly said that +music is innate, inasmuch as its mechanism contains, potentially, so +many octaves of musical notes. The unknown cause of sensation which +Descartes calls the "je ne sais quoi dans les objets" or "choses telles +qu'elles sont," and Kant the "Noumenon" or "Ding an sich," is +represented by the musician; who, by touching the keys, converts the +potentiality of the mechanism into actual sounds. A note so produced is +the equivalent of a single experience.</p> + +<p>All the melodies and harmonies that proceed from the piano depend upon +the action of the musician upon the keys. There is no internal mechanism +which, when certain keys are struck, gives rise to an accompaniment of +which the musician is only indirectly the cause. According to Descartes, +however—and this is what is generally fixed upon as the essence of his +doctrine of innate ideas—the mind possesses such an internal mechanism, +by which certain classes of thoughts are generated, on the occasion of +certain experiences. Such thoughts are innate, just as sensations are +innate; they are not copies of sensations, any more than sensations<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span> are +copies of motions; they are invariably generated in the mind, when +certain experiences arise in it, just as sensations are invariably +generated when certain bodily motions take place; they are universal, +inasmuch as they arise under the same conditions in all men; they are +necessary, because their genesis under these conditions is invariable. +These innate thoughts are what Descartes terms "vérités" or truths: that +is beliefs—and his notions respecting them are plainly set forth in a +passage of the <i>Principes</i>.</p> + +<blockquote><p>"Thus far I have discussed that which we know as things: it remains +that I should speak of that which we know as truths. For example, +when we think that it is impossible to make anything out of +nothing, we do not imagine that this proposition is a thing which +exists, or a property of something, but we take it for a certain +eternal truth, which has its seat in the mind (<i>pensée</i>), and is +called a common notion or an axiom. Similarly, when we affirm that +it is impossible that one and the same thing should exist and not +exist at the same time; that that which has been created should not +have been created; that he who thinks must exist while he thinks; +and a number of other like propositions; these are only truths, and +not things which exist outside our thoughts. And there is such a +number of these that it would be wearisome to enumerate them: nor +is it necessary to do so, because we cannot fail to know them when +the occasion of thinking about them presents itself, and we are not +blinded by any prejudices."</p></blockquote> + +<p>It would appear that Locke was not more familiar with Descartes' +writings than Hume seems to have been; for, viewed in relation to the +passages just cited, the arguments adduced in his famous polemic against +innate ideas are totally irrelevant.</p> + +<p>It has been shown that Hume practically, if not in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a></span> so many words, +admits the justice of Descartes' assertion that, strictly speaking, +sensations are innate; that is to say, that they are the product of the +reaction of the organ of the mind on the stimulus of an "unknown cause," +which is Descartes' "je ne sais quoi." Therefore, the difference between +Descartes' opinion and that of Hume resolves itself into this: Given +sensation-experiences, can all the contents of consciousness be derived +from the collocation and metamorphosis of these experiences? Or, are new +elements of consciousness, products of an innate potentiality distinct +from sensibility, added to these? Hume affirms the former position, +Descartes the latter. If the analysis of the phenomena of consciousness +given in the preceding pages is correct, Hume is in error; while the +father of modern philosophy had a truer insight, though he overstated +the case. For want of sufficiently searching psychological +investigations, Descartes was led to suppose that innumerable ideas, the +evolution of which in the course of experience can be demonstrated, were +direct or innate products of the thinking faculty.</p> + +<p>As has been already pointed out, it is the great merit of Kant that he +started afresh on the track indicated by Descartes, and steadily upheld +the doctrine of the existence of elements of consciousness, which are +neither sense-experiences nor any modifications of them. We may demur to +the expression that space and time are forms of sensory intuition; but +it imperfectly represents the great fact that co-existence and +succession are mental phenomena not given in the mere sense +experience.<a name="FNanchor_23_23" id="FNanchor_23_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_23" class="fnanchor">[23]</a></p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_22_22" id="Footnote_22_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_22"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> Remarques de René Descartes sur un certain placard imprimé +aux Pays Bas vers la fin de l'année, 1647.—Descartes, <i>Œuvres</i>. Ed. +Cousin, x. p. 71.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_23_23" id="Footnote_23_23"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_23"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> "Wir können uns keinen Gegenstand denken, ohne durch +Kategorien; wir können keinen gedachten Gegenstand erkennen, ohne durch +Anschauungen, die jenen Begriffen entsprechen. Nun sind alle unsere +Anschauungen sinnlich, und diese Erkenntniss, so fern der Gegenstand +derselben gegeben ist, ist empirisch. Empirische Erkenntniss aber ist +Erfahrung. Folglich ist uns keine Erkenntniss <i>a priori</i> möglich, als +lediglich von Gegenständen möglicher Erfahrung." +</p><p> +"Aber diese Erkenntniss, die bloss auf Gegenstände der Erfahrung +eingeschränkt ist, ist darum nicht alle von der Erfahrung entlehnt, +sondern was sowohl die reinen Anschauungen, als die reinen +Verstandesbegriffe betrifft, so sind sie Elemente der Erkenntniss die in +uns <i>a priori</i> angetroffen werden."—<i>Kritik der reinen Vernunft. +Elementarlehre</i>, p. 135. +</p><p> +Without a glossary explanatory of Kant's terminology, this passage would +be hardly intelligible in a translation; but it may be paraphrased thus: +All knowledge is founded upon experiences of sensation, but it is not +all derived from those experiences; inasmuch as the impressions of +relation ("reine Anschauungen"; "reine Verstandesbegriffe") have a +potential or <i>à priori</i> existence in us, and by their addition to +sense-experiences, constitute knowledge.</p></div> +</div> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IV" id="CHAPTER_IV"></a>CHAPTER IV.</h2> + +<h3>THE CLASSIFICATION AND THE NOMENCLATURE OF MENTAL OPERATIONS.</h3> + +<p>If, as has been set forth in the preceding chapter, all mental states +are effects of physical causes, it follows that what are called mental +faculties and operations are, properly speaking, cerebral functions, +allotted to definite, though not yet precisely assignable, parts of the +brain.</p> + +<p>These functions appear to be reducible to three groups, namely: +Sensation, Correlation, and Ideation.</p> + +<p>The organs of the functions of sensation and correlation are those +portions of the cerebral substance, the molecular changes of which give +rise to impressions of sensation and impressions of relation.</p> + +<p>The changes in the nervous matter which bring about the effects which we +call its functions, follow upon some kind of stimulus, and rapidly +reaching their maximum, as rapidly die away. The effect of the +irritation of a nerve-fibre on the cerebral substance with which it is +connected may be compared to the pulling of a long bell-wire. The +impulse takes a little time to reach the bell; the bell rings and then +becomes quiescent, until<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span> another pull is given. So, in the brain, every +sensation is the ring of a cerebral particle, the effect of a momentary +impulse sent along a nerve-fibre.</p> + +<p>If there were a complete likeness between the two terms of this very +rough and ready comparison, it is obvious that there could be no such +thing as memory. A bell records no audible sign of having been rung five +minutes ago, and the activity of a sensigenous cerebral particle might +similarly leave no trace. Under these circumstances, again, it would +seem that the only impressions of relation which could arise would be +those of co-existence and of similarity. For succession implies memory +of an antecedent state.<a name="FNanchor_24_24" id="FNanchor_24_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_24" class="fnanchor">[24]</a></p> + +<p>But the special peculiarity of the cerebral apparatus is, that any given +function which has once been performed is very easily set a-going again, +by causes more or less different from those to which it owed its origin. +Of the mechanism of this generation of images of impressions or ideas +(in Hume's sense), which may be termed <i>Ideation</i>, we know nothing at +present, though the fact and its results are familiar enough.</p> + +<p>During our waking, and many of our sleeping, hours, in fact, the +function of ideation is in continual, if not continuous, activity. +Trains of thought, as we call them, succeed one another without +intermission, even when the starting of new trains by fresh +sense-impressions is as far as possible prevented. The rapidity and the +intensity of this ideational process are obviously dependent upon +physiological conditions. The widest<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span> differences in these respects are +constitutional in men of different temperaments; and are observable in +oneself, under varying conditions of hunger and repletion, fatigue and +freshness, calmness and emotional excitement. The influence of diet on +dreams; of stimulants upon the fulness and the velocity of the stream of +thought; the delirious phantasms generated by disease, by hashish, or by +alcohol; will occur to every one as examples of the marvellous +sensitiveness of the apparatus of ideation to purely physical +influences.</p> + +<p>The succession of mental states in ideation is not fortuitous, but +follows the law of association, which may be stated thus: that every +idea tends to be followed by some other idea which is associated with +the first, or its impression, by a relation of succession, of +contiguity, or of likeness.</p> + +<p>Thus the idea of the word horse just now presented itself to my mind, +and was followed in quick succession by the ideas of four legs, hoofs, +teeth, rider, saddle, racing, cheating; all of which ideas are connected +in my experience with the impression, or the idea, of a horse and with +one another, by the relations of contiguity and succession. No great +attention to what passes in the mind is needful to prove that our trains +of thought are neither to be arrested, nor even permanently controlled, +by our desires or emotions. Nevertheless they are largely influenced by +them. In the presence of a strong desire, or emotion, the stream of +thought no longer flows on in a straight course, but seems, as it were, +to eddy round the idea of that which is the object of the emotion. Every +one who has "eaten his bread in sorrow" knows how strangely the current +of ideas whirls about the conception of the object of regret or<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span> remorse +as a centre; every now and then, indeed, breaking away into the new +tracks suggested by passing associations, but still returning to the +central thought. Few can have been so happy as to have escaped the +social bore, whose pet notion is certain to crop up whatever topic is +started; while the fixed idea of the monomaniac is but the extreme form +of the same phenomenon.</p> + +<p>And as, on the one hand, it is so hard to drive away the thought we +would fain be rid of; so, upon the other, the pleasant imaginations +which we would so gladly retain are, sooner or later, jostled away by +the crowd of claimants for birth into the world of consciousness; which +hover as a sort of psychical possibilities, or inverse ghosts, the +bodily presentments of spiritual phenomena to be, in the limbo of the +brain. In that form of desire which is called "attention," the train of +thought, held fast, for a time, in the desired direction, seems ever +striving to get on to another line—and the junctions and sidings are so +multitudinous!</p> + +<p class='tbrk'> </p> + +<p>The constituents of trains of ideas may be grouped in various ways.</p> + +<p>Hume says:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"We find, by experience, that when any impression has been present +in the mind, it again makes its appearance there as an idea, and +this it may do in two different ways: either when, on its new +appearance, it retains a considerable degree of its first vivacity, +and is somewhat intermediate between an impression and an idea; or +when it entirely loses that vivacity, and is a perfect idea. The +faculty by which we repeat our impressions in the first manner, is +called the <i>memory</i>, and the other the <i>imagination</i>."—(I. pp. 23, +24.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>And he considers that the only difference between ideas of imagination +and those of memory, except the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span> superior vivacity of the latter, lies +in the fact that those of memory preserve the original order of the +impressions from which they are derived, while the imagination "is free +to transpose and change its ideas."</p> + +<p>The latter statement of the difference between memory and imagination is +less open to cavil than the former, though by no means unassailable.</p> + +<p>The special characteristic of a memory surely is not its vividness; but +that it is a complex idea, in which the idea of that which is remembered +is related by co-existence with other ideas, and by antecedence with +present impressions.</p> + +<p>If I say I remember A. B., the chance acquaintance of ten years ago, it +is not because my idea of A. B. is very vivid—on the contrary, it is +extremely faint—but because that idea is associated with ideas of +impressions co-existent with those which I call A. B.; and that all +these are at the end of the long series of ideas, which represent that +much past time. In truth I have a much more vivid idea of Mr. Pickwick, +or of Colonel Newcome, than I have of A. B.; but, associated with the +ideas of these persons, I have no idea of their having ever been derived +from the world of impressions; and so they are relegated to the world of +imagination. On the other hand, the characteristic of an imagination may +properly be said to lie not in its intensity, but in the fact that, as +Hume puts it, "the arrangement," or the relations, of the ideas are +different from those in which the impressions, whence these ideas are +derived, occurred; or in other words, that the thing imagined has not +happened. In popular usage, however, imagination is frequently employed +for simple memory—"In imagination I was back in the old times."<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span></p> + +<p>It is a curious omission on Hume's part that, while thus dwelling on two +classes of ideas, <i>Memories</i> and <i>Imaginations</i>, he has not, at the same +time, taken notice of a third group, of no small importance, which are +as different from imaginations as memories are; though, like the latter, +they are often confounded with pure imaginations in general speech. +These are the ideas of expectation, or as they may be called for the +sake of brevity, <i>Expectations</i>; which differ from simple imaginations +in being associated with the idea of the existence of corresponding +impressions, in the future, just as memories contain the idea of the +existence of the corresponding impressions in the past.</p> + +<p>The ideas belonging to two of the three groups enumerated: namely, +memories and expectations, present some features, of particular +interest. And first, with respect to memories.</p> + +<p>In Hume's words, all simple ideas are copies of simple impressions. The +idea of a single sensation is a faint, but accurate, image of that +sensation; the idea of a relation is a reproduction of the feeling of +co-existence, of succession, or of similarity. But, when complex +impressions or complex ideas are reproduced as memories, it is probable +that the copies never give all the details of the originals with perfect +accuracy, and it is certain that they rarely do so. No one possesses a +memory so good, that if he has only once observed a natural object, a +second inspection does not show him something that he has forgotten. +Almost all, if not all, our memories are therefore sketches, rather than +portraits, of the originals—the salient features are obvious, while the +subordinate characters are obscure or unrepresented.</p> + +<p>Now, when several complex impressions which are<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</a></span> more or less different +from one another—let us say that out of ten impressions in each, six +are the same in all, and four are different from all the rest—are +successively presented to the mind, it is easy to see what must be the +nature of the result. The repetition of the six similar impressions will +strengthen the six corresponding elements of the complex idea, which +will therefore acquire greater vividness; while the four differing +impressions of each will not only acquire no greater strength than they +had at first, but, in accordance with the law of association, they will +all tend to appear at once, and will thus neutralise one another.</p> + +<p>This mental operation may be rendered comprehensible by considering what +takes place in the formation of compound photographs—when the images of +the faces of six sitters, for example, are each received on the same +photographic plate, for a sixth of the time requisite to take one +portrait. The final result is that all those points in which the six +faces agree are brought out strongly, while all those in which they +differ are left vague; and thus what may be termed a <i>generic</i> portrait +of the six, in contradistinction to a <i>specific</i> portrait of any one, is +produced.</p> + +<p>Thus our ideas of single complex impressions are incomplete in one way, +and those of numerous, more or less similar, complex impressions are +incomplete in another way; that is to say, they are <i>generic</i>, not +<i>specific</i>. And hence it follows, that our ideas of the impressions in +question are not, in the strict sense of the word, copies of those +impressions; while, at the same time, they may exist in the mind +independently of language.</p> + +<p>The generic ideas which are formed from several similar, but not +identical, complex experiences are what<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</a></span> are commonly called <i>abstract</i> +or <i>general</i> ideas; and Berkeley endeavoured to prove that all general +ideas are nothing but particular ideas annexed to a certain term, which +gives them a more extensive signification, and makes them recall, upon +occasion, other individuals which are similar to them. Hume says that he +regards this as "one of the greatest and the most valuable discoveries +that has been made of late years in the republic of letters," and +endeavours to confirm it in such a manner that it shall be "put beyond +all doubt and controversy."</p> + +<p>I may venture to express a doubt whether he has succeeded in his object; +but the subject is an abstruse one; and I must content myself with the +remark, that though Berkeley's view appears to be largely applicable to +such general ideas as are formed after language has been acquired, and +to all the more abstract sort of conceptions, yet that general ideas of +sensible objects may nevertheless be produced in the way indicated, and +may exist independently of language. In dreams, one sees houses, trees +and other objects, which are perfectly recognisable as such, but which +remind one of the actual objects as seen "out of the corner of the eye," +or of the pictures thrown by a badly-focussed magic lantern. A man +addresses us who is like a figure seen by twilight; or we travel through +countries where every feature of the scenery is vague; the outlines of +the hills are ill-marked, and the rivers have no defined banks. They +are, in short, generic ideas of many past impressions of men, hills, and +rivers. An anatomist who occupies himself intently with the examination +of several specimens of some new kind of animal, in course of time +acquires so vivid a conception of its form and structure, that the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</a></span> idea +may take visible shape and become a sort of waking dream. But the figure +which thus presents itself is generic, not specific. It is no copy of +any one specimen, but, more or less, a mean of the series; and there +seems no reason to doubt that the minds of children before they learn to +speak, and of deaf mutes, are peopled with similarly generated generic +ideas of sensible objects.</p> + +<p class='tbrk'> </p> + +<p>It has been seen that a memory is a complex idea made up of at least two +constituents. In the first place there is the idea of an object; and +secondly, there is the idea of the relation of antecedence between that +object and some present objects.</p> + +<p>To say that one has a recollection of a given event and to express the +belief that it happened, are two ways of giving an account of one and +the same mental fact. But the former mode of stating the fact of memory +is preferable, at present, because it certainly does not presuppose the +existence of language in the mind of the rememberer; while it may be +said that the latter does. It is perfectly possible to have the idea of +an event A, and of the events B, C, D, which came between it and the +present state E, as mere mental pictures. It is hardly to be doubted +that children have very distinct memories long before they can speak; +and we believe that such is the case because they act upon their +memories. But, if they act upon their memories, they to all intents and +purposes believe their memories. In other words, though, being devoid of +language, the child cannot frame a proposition expressive of belief; +cannot say "sugar-plum was sweet;" yet the psychical operation of which +that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</a></span> proposition is merely the verbal expression, is perfectly +effected. The experience of the co-existence of sweetness with sugar has +produced a state of mind which bears the same relation to a verbal +proposition, as the natural disposition to produce a given idea, assumed +to exist by Descartes as an "innate idea" would bear to that idea put +into words.</p> + +<p>The fact that the beliefs of memory precede the use of language, and +therefore are originally purely instinctive, and independent of any +rational justification, should have been of great importance to Hume, +from its bearing upon his theory of causation; and it is curious that he +has not adverted to it, but always takes the trustworthiness of memories +for granted. It may be worth while briefly to make good the omission.</p> + +<p>That I was in pain, yesterday, is as certain to me as any matter of fact +can be; by no effort of the imagination is it possible for me really to +entertain the contrary belief. At the same time, I am bound to admit, +that the whole foundation for my belief is the fact, that the idea of +pain is indissolubly associated in my mind with the idea of that much +past time. Any one who will be at the trouble may provide himself with +hundreds of examples to the same effect.</p> + +<p>This and similar observations are important under another aspect. They +prove that the idea of even a single strong impression may be so +powerfully associated with that of a certain time, as to originate a +belief of which the contrary is inconceivable, and which may therefore +be properly said to be necessary. A single weak, or moderately strong, +impression may not be represented by any memory. But this defect of weak +experiences may be compensated by their repeti<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</a></span>tion; and what Hume means +by "custom" or "habit" is simply the repetition of experiences.</p> + +<blockquote><p>"wherever the repetition of any particular act or operation +produces a propensity to renew the same act or operation, without +being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding, we +always say that this propensity is the effect of <i>Custom</i>. By +employing that word, we pretend not to have given the ultimate +reason of such a propensity. We only point out a principle of human +nature which is universally acknowledged, and which is well known +by its effects."—(IV. p. 52.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>It has been shown that an expectation is a complex idea which, like a +memory, is made up of two constituents. The one is the idea of an +object, the other is the idea of a relation of sequence between that +object and some present object; and the reasoning which applied to +memories applies to expectations. To have an expectation<a name="FNanchor_25_25" id="FNanchor_25_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_25" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> of a given +event, and to believe that it will happen, are only two modes of stating +the same fact. Again, just in the same way as we call a memory, put into +words, a belief, so we give the same name to an expectation in like +clothing. And the fact already cited, that a child before it can speak +acts upon its memories, is good evidence that it forms expectations. The +infant who knows the meaning neither of "sugar-plum" nor of "sweet," +nevertheless is in full possession of that complex idea, which, when he +has learned to employ language, will take the form of the verbal +proposition, "A sugar-plum will be sweet."</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</a></span>Thus, beliefs of expectation, or at any rate their potentialities, are, +as much as those of memory, antecedent to speech, and are as incapable +of justification by any logical process. In fact, expectations are but +memories inverted. The association which is the foundation of +expectation must exist as a memory before it can play its part. As Hume +says,—</p> + +<blockquote><p>" ... it is certain we here advance a very intelligible proposition +at least, if not a true one, when we assert that after the constant +conjunction of two objects, heat and flame, for instance, weight +and solidity, we are determined by custom alone to expect the one +from the appearance of the other. This hypothesis seems even the +only one which explains the difficulty why we draw from a thousand +instances, an inference which we are not able to draw from one +instance, that is in no respect different from them." ...</p> + +<p>"Custom, then, is the great guide of human life. It is that +principle alone which renders our experience useful to us, and +makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with +those which have appeared in the past." ...</p> + +<p>"All belief of matter-of-fact or real existence is derived merely +from some object present to the memory or senses, and a customary +conjunction between that and some other object; or in other words, +having found, in many instances, that any two kinds of objects, +flame and heat, snow and cold, have always been conjoined together: +if flame or snow be presented anew to the senses, the mind is +carried by custom to expect heat or cold, and to <i>believe</i> that +such a quality does exist, and will discover itself upon a nearer +approach. This belief is the necessary result of placing the mind +in such circumstances. It is an operation of the soul, when we are +so situated, as unavoidable as to feel the passion of love, when we +receive benefits, or hatred, when we meet with injuries. All these +operations are a species of natural instincts, which no reasoning +or process of the thought and understanding is able either to +produce or to prevent."—(IV. pp. 52-56.)</p></blockquote> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</a></span>The only comment that appears needful here is, that Hume has attached +somewhat too exclusive a weight to that repetition of experiences to +which alone the term "custom" can be properly applied. The proverb says +that "a burnt child dreads the fire"; and any one who will make the +experiment will find, that one burning is quite sufficient to establish +an indissoluble belief that contact with fire and pain go together.</p> + +<p>As a sort of inverted memory, expectation follows the same laws; hence, +while a belief of expectation is, in most cases, as Hume truly says, +established by custom, or the repetition of weak impressions, it may +quite well be based upon a single strong experience. In the absence of +language, a specific memory cannot be strengthened by repetition. It is +obvious that that which has happened cannot happen again, with the same +collateral associations of co-existence and succession. But, memories of +the co-existence and succession of impressions are capable of being +indefinitely strengthened by the recurrence of similar impressions, in +the same order, even though the collateral associations are totally +different; in fact, the ideas of these impressions become generic.</p> + +<p>If I recollect that a piece of ice was cold yesterday, nothing can +strengthen the recollection of that particular fact; on the contrary, it +may grow weaker, in the absence of any record of it. But if I touch ice +to-day and again find it cold, the association is repeated, and the +memory of it becomes stronger. And, by this very simple process of +repetition of experience, it has become utterly impossible for us to +think of having handled ice without thinking of its coldness. But, that +which is, under the one aspect, the strengthening of a memory, is,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</a></span> +under the other, the intensification of an expectation. Not only can we +not think of having touched ice, without feeling cold, but we cannot +think of touching ice, in the future, without expecting to feel cold. An +expectation so strong that it cannot be changed, or abolished, may thus +be generated out of repeated experiences. And it is important to note +that such expectations may be formed quite unconsciously. In my dressing +room, a certain can is usually kept full of water, and I am in the habit +of lifting it to pour out water for washing. Sometimes the servant has +forgotten to fill it, and then I find that, when I take hold of the +handle, the can goes up with a jerk. Long association has, in fact, led +me to expect the can to have a considerable weight; and, quite unawares, +my muscular effort is adjusted to the expectation.</p> + +<p>The process of strengthening generic memories of succession, and, at the +same time, intensifying expectations of succession, is what is commonly +called <i>verification</i>. The impression B has frequently been observed to +follow the impression A. The association thus produced is represented as +the memory, A → B. When the impression A appears again, +the idea of B follows, associated with that of the immediate appearance +of the impression B. If the impression B does appear, the expectation is +said to be verified; while the memory A → B is +strengthened, and gives rise in turn to a stronger expectation. And +repeated verification may render that expectation so strong that its +non-verification is inconceivable.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_24_24" id="Footnote_24_24"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_24"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> It is not worth while, for the present purpose, to +consider whether, as all nervous action occupies a sensible time, the +duration of one impression might not overlap that of the impression +which follows it, in the case supposed.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_25_25" id="Footnote_25_25"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_25"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> We give no name to faint memories; but expectations of +like character play so large a part in human affairs that they, together +with the associated emotions of pleasure and pain, are distinguished as +"hopes" or "fears."</p></div> +</div> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_V" id="CHAPTER_V"></a>CHAPTER V.</h2> + +<h3>THE MENTAL PHENOMENA OF ANIMALS.</h3> + +<p>In the course of the preceding chapters, attention has been more than +once called to the fact, that the elements of consciousness and the +operations of the mental faculties, under discussion, exist +independently of and antecedent to, the existence of language.</p> + +<p>If any weight is to be attached to arguments from analogy, there is +overwhelming evidence in favour of the belief that children, before they +can speak, and deaf mutes, possess the feelings to which those who have +acquired the faculty of speech apply the name of sensations; that they +have the feelings of relation; that trains of ideas pass through their +minds; that generic ideas are formed from specific ones; and, that among +these, ideas of memory and expectation occupy a most important place, +inasmuch as, in their quality of potential beliefs, they furnish the +grounds of action. This conclusion, in truth, is one of those which, +though they cannot be demonstrated, are never doubted; and, since it is +highly probable and cannot be disproved, we are quite safe in accepting +it, as, at any rate, a good working hypothesis.</p> + +<p>But, if we accept it, we must extend it to a much<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</a></span> wider assemblage of +living beings. Whatever cogency is attached to the arguments in favour +of the occurrence of all the fundamental phenomena of mind in young +children and deaf mutes, an equal force must be allowed to appertain to +those which may be adduced to prove that the higher animals have minds. +We must admit that Hume does not express himself too strongly when he +says—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"no truth appears to me more evident, than that the beasts are +endowed with thought and reason as well as men. The arguments are +in this case so obvious, that they never escape the most stupid and +ignorant."—(I. p. 232.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>In fact, this is one of the few cases in which the conviction which +forces itself upon the stupid and the ignorant, is fortified by the +reasonings of the intelligent, and has its foundation deepened by every +increase of knowledge. It is not merely that the observation of the +actions of animals almost irresistibly suggests the attribution to them +of mental states, such as those which accompany corresponding actions in +men. The minute comparison which has been instituted by anatomists and +physiologists between the organs which we know to constitute the +apparatus of thought in man, and the corresponding organs in brutes, has +demonstrated the existence of the closest similarity between the two, +not only in structure, as far as the microscope will carry us, but in +function, as far as functions are determinable by experiment. There is +no question in the mind of any one acquainted with the facts that, so +far as observation and experiment can take us, the structure and the +functions of the nervous system are fundamentally the same in an ape, or +in a dog, and in a man. And the sug<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</a></span>gestion that we must stop at the +exact point at which direct proof fails us; and refuse to believe that +the similarity which extends so far stretches yet further, is no better +than a quibble. Robinson Crusoe did not feel bound to conclude, from the +single human footprint which he saw in the sand, that the maker of the +impression had only one leg.</p> + +<p>Structure for structure, down to the minutest microscopical details, the +eye, the ear, the olfactory organs, the nerves, the spinal cord, the +brain of an ape, or of a dog, correspond with the same organs in the +human subject. Cut a nerve, and the evidence of paralysis, or of +insensibility, is the same in the two cases; apply pressure to the +brain, or administer a narcotic, and the signs of intelligence disappear +in the one as in the other. Whatever reason we have for believing that +the changes which take place in the normal cerebral substance of man +give rise to states of consciousness, the same reason exists for the +belief that the modes of motion of the cerebral substance of an ape, or +of a dog, produce like effects.</p> + +<p>A dog acts as if he had all the different kinds of impressions of +sensation of which each of us is cognisant. Moreover, he governs his +movements exactly as if he had the feelings of distance, form, +succession, likeness, and unlikeness, with which we are familiar, or as +if the impressions of relation were generated in his mind as they are in +our own. Sleeping dogs frequently appear to dream. If they do, it must +be admitted that ideation goes on in them while they are asleep; and, in +that case, there is no reason to doubt that they are conscious of trains +of ideas in their waking state. Further, that dogs, if they possess +ideas at all, have<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</a></span> memories and expectations, and those potential +beliefs of which these states are the foundation, can hardly be doubted +by any one who is conversant with their ways. Finally, there would +appear to be no valid argument against the supposition that dogs form +generic ideas of sensible objects. One of the most curious peculiarities +of the dog mind is its inherent snobbishness, shown by the regard paid +to external respectability. The dog who barks furiously at a beggar will +let a well-dressed man pass him without opposition. Has he not then a +"generic idea" of rags and dirt associated with the idea of aversion, +and that of sleek broadcloth associated with the idea of liking?</p> + +<p>In short, it seems hard to assign any good reason for denying to the +higher animals any mental state, or process, in which the employment of +the vocal or visual symbols of which language is composed is not +involved; and comparative psychology confirms the position in relation +to the rest of the animal world assigned to man by comparative anatomy. +As comparative anatomy is easily able to show that, physically, man is +but the last term of a long series of forms, which lead, by slow +gradations, from the highest mammal to the almost formless speck of +living protoplasm, which lies on the shadowy boundary between animal and +vegetable life; so, comparative psychology, though but a young science, +and far short of her elder sister's growth, points to the same +conclusion.</p> + +<p>In the absence of a distinct nervous system, we have no right to look +for its product, consciousness; and, even in those forms of animal life +in which the nervous apparatus has reached no higher degree of +development, than that exhibited by the system of the spinal cord<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</a></span> and +the foundation of the brain in ourselves, the argument from analogy +leaves the assumption of the existence of any form of consciousness +unsupported. With the super-addition of a nervous apparatus +corresponding with the cerebrum in ourselves, it is allowable to suppose +the appearance of the simplest states of consciousness, or the +sensations; and it is conceivable that these may at first exist, without +any power of reproducing them, as memories; and, consequently, without +ideation. Still higher, an apparatus of correlation may be superadded, +until, as all these organs become more developed, the condition of the +highest speechless animals is attained.</p> + +<p>It is a remarkable example of Hume's sagacity that he perceived the +importance of a branch of science which, even now, can hardly be said to +exist; and that, in a remarkable passage, he sketches in bold outlines +the chief features of comparative psychology.</p> + +<blockquote><p>" ... any theory, by which we explain the operations of the +understanding, or the origin and connexion of the passions in man, +will acquire additional authority if we find that the same theory +is requisite to explain the same phenomena in all other animals. We +shall make trial of this with regard to the hypothesis by which we +have, in the foregoing discourse, endeavoured to account for all +experimental reasonings; and it is hoped that this new point of +view will serve to confirm all our former observations.</p> + +<p>"<i>First</i>, it seems evident that animals, as well as men, learn many +things from experience, and infer that the same events will always +follow from the same causes. By this principle they become +acquainted with the more obvious properties of external objects, +and gradually, from their birth, treasure up a knowledge of the +nature of fire, water, earth, stones, heights, depths, &c., and of +the effects which result from their<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</a></span> operation. The ignorance and +inexperience of the young are here plainly distinguishable from the +cunning and sagacity of the old, who have learned, by long +observation, to avoid what hurt them, and pursue what gave ease or +pleasure. A horse that has been accustomed to the field, becomes +acquainted with the proper height which he can leap, and will never +attempt what exceeds his force and ability. An old greyhound will +trust the more fatiguing part of the chase to the younger, and will +place himself so as to meet the hare in her doubles; nor are the +conjectures which he forms on this occasion founded on anything but +his observation and experience.</p> + +<p>"This is still more evident from the effects of discipline and +education on animals, who, by the proper application of rewards and +punishments, may be taught any course of action, the most contrary +to their natural instincts and propensities. Is it not experience +which renders a dog apprehensive of pain when you menace him, or +lift up the whip to beat him? Is it not even experience which makes +him answer to his name, and infer from such an arbitrary sound that +you mean him rather than any of his fellows, and intend to call +him, when you pronounce it in a certain manner and with a certain +tone and accent?</p> + +<p>"In all these cases we may observe that the animal infers some fact +beyond what immediately strikes his senses; and that this inference +is altogether founded on past experience, while the creature +expects from the present object the same consequences which it has +always found in its observation to result from similar objects.</p> + +<p>"<i>Secondly</i>, it is impossible that this inference of the animal can +be founded on any process of argument or reasoning, by which he +concludes that like events must follow like objects, and that the +course of nature will always be regular in its operations. For if +there be in reality any arguments of this nature they surely lie +too abstruse for the observation of such imperfect understandings; +since it may well employ the utmost care and attention of a +philosophic genius to discover and observe them. Animals therefore +are not guided in these inferences by reasoning; neither are +children; neither are<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</a></span> the generality of mankind in their ordinary +actions and conclusions; neither are philosophers themselves, who, +in all the active parts of life, are in the main the same as the +vulgar, and are governed by the same maxims. Nature must have +provided some other principle, of more ready and more general use +and application; nor can an operation of such immense consequence +in life as that of inferring effects from causes, be trusted to the +uncertain process of reasoning and argumentation. Were this +doubtful with regard to men, it seems to admit of no question with +regard to the brute creation; and the conclusion being once firmly +established in the one, we have a strong presumption, from all the +rules of analogy, that it ought to be universally admitted, without +any exception or reserve. It is custom alone which engages animals, +from every object that strikes their senses, to infer its usual +attendant, and carries their imagination from the appearance of the +one to conceive the other, in that particular manner which we +denominate <i>belief</i>. No other explication can be given of this +operation in all the higher as well as lower classes of sensitive +beings which fall under our notice and observation."—(IV. pp. +122-4.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>It will be observed that Hume appears to contrast the "inference of the +animal" with the "process of argument or reasoning in man." But it would +be a complete misapprehension of his intention, if we were to suppose, +that he thereby means to imply that there is any real difference between +the two processes. The "inference of the animal" is a potential belief +of expectation; the process of argument, or reasoning, in man is based +upon potential beliefs of expectation, which are formed in the man +exactly in the same way as in the animal. But, in men endowed with +speech, the mental state which constitutes the potential belief is +represented by a verbal proposition, and thus becomes what all the world +recognises as a belief. The fallacy<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</a></span> which Hume combats is, that the +proposition, or verbal representative of a belief, has come to be +regarded as a reality, instead of as the mere symbol which it really is; +and that reasoning, or logic, which deals with nothing but propositions, +is supposed to be necessary in order to validate the natural fact +symbolised by those propositions. It is a fallacy similar to that of +supposing that money is the foundation of wealth, whereas it is only the +wholly unessential symbol of property.</p> + +<p>In the passage which immediately follows that just quoted, Hume makes +admissions which might be turned to serious account against some of his +own doctrines.</p> + +<blockquote><p>"But though animals learn many parts of their knowledge from +observation, there are also many parts of it which they derive from +the original hand of Nature, which much exceed the share of +capacity they possess on ordinary occasions, and in which they +improve, little or nothing, by the longest practice and experience. +These we denominate <span class="smcap">Instincts</span>, and are so apt to admire as +something very extraordinary and inexplicable by all the +disquisitions of human understanding. But our wonder will perhaps +cease or diminish when we consider that the experimental reasoning +itself, which we possess in common with beasts, and on which the +whole conduct of life depends, is nothing but a species of instinct +or mechanical power, that acts in us unknown to ourselves, and in +its chief operations is not directed by any such relations or +comparison of ideas as are the proper objects of our intellectual +faculties.</p> + +<p>"Though the instinct be different, yet still it is an instinct +which teaches a man to avoid the fire, as much as that which +teaches a bird, with such exactness, the art of incubation and the +whole economy and order of its nursery."—(IV. pp. 125, 126.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>The parallel here drawn between the "avoidance of a fire" by a man and +the incubatory instinct of a bird<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</a></span> is inexact. The man avoids fire when +he has had experience of the pain produced by burning; but the bird +incubates the first time it lays eggs, and therefore before it has had +any experience of incubation. For the comparison to be admissible, it +would be necessary that a man should avoid fire the first time he saw +it, which is notoriously not the case.</p> + +<p>The term "instinct" is very vague and ill-defined. It is commonly +employed to denote any action, or even feeling, which is not dictated by +conscious reasoning, whether it is, or is not, the result of previous +experience. It is "instinct" which leads a chicken just hatched to pick +up a grain of corn; parental love is said to be "instinctive"; the +drowning man who catches at a straw does it "instinctively"; and the +hand that accidentally touches something hot is drawn back by +"instinct." Thus "instinct" is made to cover everything from a simple +reflex movement, in which the organ of consciousness need not be at all +implicated, up to a complex combination of acts directed towards a +definite end and accompanied by intense consciousness.</p> + +<p>But this loose employment of the term "instinct" really accords with the +nature of the thing; for it is wholly impossible to draw any line of +demarcation between reflex actions and instincts. If a frog, on the +flank of which a little drop of acid has been placed, rubs it off with +the foot of the same side; and, if that foot be held, performs the same +operation, at the cost of much effort, with the other foot, it certainly +displays a curious instinct. But it is no less true that the whole +operation is a reflex operation of the spinal cord, which can be +performed quite as well when the brain is destroyed; and between which +and simple reflex actions<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</a></span> there is a complete series of gradations. In +like manner, when an infant takes the breast, it is impossible to say +whether the action should be rather termed instinctive or reflex.</p> + +<p>What are usually called the instincts of animals are, however, acts of +such a nature that, if they were performed by men, they would involve +the generation of a series of ideas and of inferences from them; and it +is a curious, and apparently an insoluble, problem whether they are, or +are not, accompanied by cerebral changes of the same nature as those +which give rise to ideas and inferences in ourselves. When a chicken +picks up a grain, for example, are there, firstly, certain sensations, +accompanied by the feeling of relation between the grain and its own +body; secondly, a desire of the grain; thirdly, a volition to seize it? +Or, are only the sensational terms of the series actually represented in +consciousness?</p> + +<p>The latter seems the more probable opinion, though it must be admitted +that the other alternative is possible. But, in this case, the series of +mental states which occurs is such as would be represented in language +by a series of propositions, and would afford proof positive of the +existence of innate ideas, in the Cartesian sense. Indeed, a +metaphysical fowl, brooding over the mental operations of his +fully-fledged consciousness, might appeal to the fact as proof that, in +the very first action of his life, he assumed the existence of the Ego +and the non-Ego, and of a relation between the two.</p> + +<p>In all seriousness, if the existence of instincts be granted, the +possibility of the existence of innate ideas, in the most extended sense +ever imagined by Descartes, must also be admitted. In fact, Descartes, +as we have<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</a></span> soon, illustrates what he means by an innate idea, by the +analogy of hereditary diseases or hereditary mental peculiarities, such +as generosity. On the other hand, hereditary mental tendencies may +justly be termed instincts; and still more appropriately might those +special proclivities, which constitute what we call genius, come into +the same category.</p> + +<p>The child who is impelled to draw as soon as it can hold a pencil; the +Mozart who breaks out into music as early; the boy Bidder who worked out +the most complicated sums without learning arithmetic; the boy Pascal +who evolved Euclid out of his own consciousness: all these may be said +to have been impelled by instinct, as much as are the beaver and the +bee. And the man of genius, is distinct in kind from the man of +cleverness, by reason of the working within him of strong innate +tendencies—which cultivation may improve, but which it can no more +create, than horticulture can make thistles bear figs. The analogy +between a musical instrument and the mind holds good here also. Art and +industry may get much music, of a sort, out of a penny whistle; but, +when all is done, it has no chance against an organ. The innate musical +potentialities of the two are infinitely different.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VI" id="CHAPTER_VI"></a>CHAPTER VI.</h2> + +<h3>LANGUAGE—PROPOSITIONS CONCERNING NECESSARY TRUTHS.</h3> + +<p>Though we may accept Hume's conclusion that speechless animals think, +believe, and reason; yet, it must be borne in mind, that there is an +important difference between the signification of the terms when applied +to them and when applied to those animals which possess language. The +thoughts of the former are trains of mere feelings; those of the latter +are, in addition, trains of the ideas of the signs which represent +feelings, and which are called "words."</p> + +<p>A word, in fact, is a spoken or written sign, the idea of which is, by +repetition, so closely associated with the idea of the simple or complex +feeling which it represents, that the association becomes indissoluble. +No Englishman, for example, can think of the word "dog" without +immediately having the idea of the group of impressions to which that +name is given; and conversely, the group of impressions immediately +calls up the idea of the word "dog."</p> + +<p>The association of words with impressions and ideas is the process of +naming; and language approaches perfection, in proportion as the shades +of difference between various ideas and impressions are represented by +differences in their names.</p> + +<p>The names of simple impressions and ideas, or of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[Pg 115]</a></span> groups of co-existent +or successive complex impressions and ideas, considered <i>per se</i>, are +substantives; as redness, dog, silver, mouth; while the names of +impressions or ideas considered as parts or attributes of a complex +whole, are adjectives. Thus redness, considered as part of the complex +idea of a rose, becomes the adjective red; flesh-eater, as part of the +idea of a dog, is represented by carnivorous; whiteness, as part of the +idea of silver, is white; and so on.</p> + +<p>The linguistic machinery for the expression of belief is called +<i>predication</i>; and, as all beliefs express ideas of relation, we may say +that the sign of predication is the verbal symbol of a feeling of +relation. The words which serve to indicate predication are verbs. If I +say "silver" and then "white," I merely utter two names; but if I +interpose between them the verb "is," I express a belief in the +co-existence of the feeling of whiteness with the other feelings which +constitute the totality of the complex idea of silver; in other words, I +predicate "whiteness" of silver.</p> + +<p>In such a case as this, the verb expresses predication and nothing else, +and is called a copula. But, in the great majority of verbs, the word is +the sign of a complex idea, and the predication is expressed only by its +form. Thus in "silver shines," the verb "to shine" is the sign for the +feeling of brightness, and the mark of predication lies in the form +"shine-<i>s</i>."</p> + +<p>Another result is brought about by the forms of verbs. By slight +modifications they are made to indicate that a belief, or predication, +is a memory, or is an expectation. Thus "silver <i>shone</i>" expresses a +memory; "silver <i>will</i> shine" an expectation.</p> + +<p>The form of words which expresses a predication is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[Pg 116]</a></span> a proposition. +Hence, every predication is the verbal equivalent of a belief; and, as +every belief is either an immediate consciousness, a memory, or an +expectation, and as every expectation is traceable to a memory, it +follows that, in the long run, all propositions express either immediate +states of consciousness, or memories. The proposition which predicates A +of X must mean either, that the fact is testified by my present +consciousness, as when I say that two colours, visible at this moment, +resemble one another; or that A is indissolubly associated with X in +memory; or that A is indissolubly associated with X in expectation. But +it has already been shown that expectation is only an expression of +memory.</p> + +<p>Hume does not discuss the nature of language, but so much of what +remains to be said, concerning his philosophical tenets, turns upon the +value and the origin of verbal propositions, that this summary sketch of +the relations of language to the thinking process will probably not be +deemed superfluous.</p> + +<p>So large an extent of the field of thought is traversed by Hume, in his +discussion of the verbal propositions in which mankind enshrine their +beliefs, that it would be impossible to follow him throughout all the +windings of his long journey, within the limits of this essay. I +purpose, therefore, to limit myself to those propositions which +concern—1. Necessary Truths; 2. The Order of Nature; 3. The Soul; 4. +Theism; 5. The Passions and Volition; 6. The Principle of Morals.</p> + +<p class='tbrk'> </p> + +<p>Hume's views respecting necessary truths, and more particularly +concerning causation, have, more than any other part of his teaching, +contributed to give him a prominent place in the history of philosophy.</p> + +<blockquote><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[Pg 117]</a></span>"All the objects of human reason and inquiry may naturally be +divided into two kinds, to wit, <i>relations of ideas</i> and <i>matters +of fact</i>. Of the first kind are the sciences of geometry, algebra, +and arithmetic, and, in short, every affirmation which is either +intuitively or demonstratively certain. <i>That the square of the +hypothenuse is equal to the square of the two sides</i>, is a +proposition which expresses a relation between these two figures. +<i>That three times five is equal to the half of thirty</i>, expresses a +relation between these numbers. Propositions of this kind are +discoverable by the mere operation of thought without dependence on +whatever is anywhere existent in the universe. Though there never +were a circle or a triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by +Euclid would for ever retain their certainty and evidence.</p> + +<p>"Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are +not ascertained in the same manner, nor is an evidence of their +truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The +contrary of every matter of fact is still possible, because it can +never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the +same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to +reality. <i>That the sun will not rise to-morrow</i>, is no less +intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction, than +the affirmation, <i>that it will rise</i>. We should in vain, therefore, +attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively +false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be +distinctly conceived by the mind."—(IV. pp. 32, 33.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>The distinction here drawn between the truths of geometry and other +kinds of truth is far less sharply indicated in the <i>Treatise</i>, but as +Hume expressly disowns any opinions on these matters but such as are +expressed in the <i>Inquiry</i>, we may confine ourselves to the latter; and +it is needful to look narrowly into the propositions here laid down, as +much stress has been laid upon Hume's admission that the truths of +mathematics are intuitively and demonstratively certain; in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[Pg 118]</a></span> other +words, that they are necessary and, in that respect, differ from all +other kinds of belief.</p> + +<p>What is meant by the assertion that "propositions of this kind are +discoverable by the mere operation of thought without dependence on what +is anywhere existent in the universe"?</p> + +<p>Suppose that there were no such things as impressions of sight and touch +anywhere in the universe, what idea could we have even of a straight +line, much less of a triangle and of the relations between its sides? +The fundamental proposition of all Hume's philosophy is that ideas are +copied from impressions; and, therefore, if there were no impressions of +straight lines and triangles there could be no ideas of straight lines +and triangles. But what we mean by the universe is the sum of our actual +and possible impressions.</p> + +<p>So, again, whether our conception of number is derived from relations of +impressions in space or in time, the impressions must exist in nature, +that is, in experience, before their relations can be perceived. Form +and number are mere names for certain relations between matters of fact; +unless a man had seen or felt the difference between a straight line and +a crooked one, straight and crooked would have no more meaning to him, +than red and blue to the blind.</p> + +<p>The axiom, that things which are equal to the same are equal to one +another, is only a particular case of the predication of similarity; if +there were no impressions, it is obvious that there could be no +predicates. But what is an existence in the universe but an impression?</p> + +<p>If what are called necessary truths are rigidly analysed, they will be +found to be of two kinds. Either they depend on the convention which +underlies the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[Pg 119]</a></span> possibility of intelligible speech, that terms shall +always have the same meaning; or they are propositions the negation of +which implies the dissolution of some association in memory or +expectation, which is in fact indissoluble; or the denial of some fact +of immediate consciousness.</p> + +<p>The "necessary truth" A = A means that the perception which is called A +shall always be called A. The "necessary truth" that "two straight lines +cannot inclose a space," means that we have no memory, and can form no +expectation of their so doing. The denial of the "necessary truth" that +the thought now in my mind exists, involves the denial of consciousness.</p> + +<p>To the assertion that the evidence of matter of fact, is not so strong +as that of relations of ideas, it may be justly replied, that a great +number of matters of fact are nothing but relations of ideas. If I say +that red is unlike blue, I make an assertion concerning a relation of +ideas; but it is also matter of fact, and the contrary proposition is +inconceivable. If I remember<a name="FNanchor_26_26" id="FNanchor_26_26"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_26" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> something that happened five minutes +ago, that is matter of fact; and, at the same time, it expresses a +relation between the event remembered and the present time. It is wholly +inconceivable to me that the event did not happen, so that my assurance +respecting it is as strong as that which I have respecting any other +necessary truth. In fact, the man is either very wise or very virtuous, +or very lucky, perhaps all three, who has gone through life without +accumulating a store of such necessary beliefs which he would give a +good deal to be able to disbelieve.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[Pg 120]</a></span></p> + +<p>It would be beside the mark to discuss the matter further on the present +occasion. It is sufficient to point out that, whatever may be the +differences, between mathematical and other truths, they do not justify +Hume's statement. And it is, at any rate, impossible to prove, that the +cogency of mathematical first principles is due to anything more than +these circumstances; that the experiences with which they are concerned +are among the first which arise in the mind; that they are so +incessantly repeated as to justify us, according to the ordinary laws of +ideation, in expecting that the associations which they form will be of +extreme tenacity; while the fact, that the expectations based upon them +are always verified, finishes the process of welding them together.</p> + +<p>Thus, if the axioms of mathematics are innate, nature would seem to have +taken unnecessary trouble; since the ordinary process of association +appears to be amply sufficient to confer upon them all the universality +and necessity which they actually possess.</p> + +<p class='tbrk'> </p> + +<p>Whatever needless admissions Hume may have made respecting other +necessary truths he is quite clear about the axiom of causation, "That +whatever event has a beginning must have a cause;" whether and in what +sense it is a necessary truth; and, that question being decided, whence +it is derived.</p> + +<p>With respect to the first question, Hume denies that it is a necessary +truth, in the sense that we are unable to conceive the contrary. The +evidence by which he supports this conclusion in the <i>Inquiry</i>, however, +is not strictly relevant to the issue.</p> + +<blockquote><p>"No object ever discovers, by the qualities which appear to the +senses, either the cause which produced it, or the effects<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[Pg 121]</a></span> which +will arise from it; nor can our reason, unassisted by experience, +ever draw any inference concerning real existence and matter of +fact."—(IV. p. 35.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>Abundant illustrations are given of this assertion, which indeed cannot +be seriously doubted; but it does not follow that, because we are +totally unable to say what cause preceded, or what effect will succeed, +any event, we do not necessarily suppose that the event had a cause and +will be succeeded by an effect. The scientific investigator who notes a +new phenomenon may be utterly ignorant of its cause, but he will, +without hesitation, seek for that cause. If you ask him why he does so, +he will probably say that it must have had a cause; and thereby imply +that his belief in causation is a necessary belief.</p> + +<p>In the <i>Treatise</i> Hume indeed takes the bull by the horns:</p> + +<blockquote><p>" ... as all distinct ideas are separable from each other, and as +the ideas of cause and effect are evidently distinct, 'twill be +easy for us to conceive any object to be non-existent this moment +find existent the next, without conjoining to it the distinct idea +of a cause or productive principle."—(I. p. 111.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>If Hume had been content to state what he believed to be matter of fact, +and had abstained from giving superfluous reasons for that which is +susceptible of being proved or disproved only by personal experience, +his position would have been stronger. For it seems clear that, on the +ground of observation, he is quite right. Any man who lets his fancy run +riot in a waking dream, may experience the existence at one moment, and +the non-existence at the next, of phenomena which suggest no connexion +of cause and effect. Not only so, but it is notorious that, to the +unthinking mass of man<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[Pg 122]</a></span>kind, nine-tenths of the facts of life do not +suggest the relation of cause and effect; and they practically deny the +existence of any such relation by attributing them to chance. Few +gamblers but would stare if they were told that the falling of a die on +a particular face is as much the effect of a definite cause as the fact +of its falling; it is a proverb that "the wind bloweth where it +listeth;" and even thoughtful men usually receive with surprise the +suggestion, that the form of the crest of every wave that breaks, +wind-driven, on the sea-shore, and the direction of every particle of +foam that flies before the gale, are the exact effects of definite +causes; and, as such, must be capable of being determined, deductively, +from the laws of motion and the properties of air and water. So again, +there are large numbers of highly intelligent persons who rather pride +themselves on their fixed belief that our volitions have no cause; or +that the will causes itself, which is either the same thing, or a +contradiction in terms.</p> + +<p>Hume's argument in support of what appears to be a true proposition, +however, is of the circular sort, for the major premiss, that all +distinct ideas are separable in thought, assumes the question at issue.</p> + +<p>But the question whether the idea of causation is necessary, or not, is +really of very little importance. For, to say that an idea is necessary +is simply to affirm that we cannot conceive the contrary; and the fact +that we cannot conceive the contrary of any belief may be a presumption, +but is certainly no proof, of its truth.</p> + +<p>In the well-known experiment of touching a single round object, such as +a marble, with crossed fingers, it is utterly impossible to conceive +that we have not two round objects under them; and, though light is +un<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[Pg 123]</a></span>doubtedly a mere sensation arising in the brain, it is utterly +impossible to conceive that it is not outside the retina. In the same +way, he who touches anything with a rod, not only is irresistibly led to +believe that the sensation of contact is at the end of the rod, but is +utterly incapable of conceiving that this sensation is really in his +head. Yet that which is inconceivable is manifestly true in all these +cases. The beliefs and the unbeliefs are alike necessary, and alike +erroneous.</p> + +<p>It is commonly urged that the axiom of causation cannot be derived from +experience, because experience only proves that many things have causes, +whereas the axiom declares that all things have causes. The syllogism, +"many things which come into existence have causes, A has come into +existence: therefore A had a cause," is obviously fallacious, if A is +not previously shown to be one of the "many things." And this objection +is perfectly sound so far as it goes. The axiom of causation cannot +possibly be deduced from any general proposition which simply embodies +experience. But it does not follow that the belief, or expectation, +expressed by the axiom, is not a product of experience, generated +antecedently to, and altogether independently of, the logically +unjustifiable language in which we express it.</p> + +<p>In fact, the axiom of causation resembles all other beliefs of +expectation in being the verbal symbol of a purely automatic act of the +mind, which is altogether extra-logical, and would be illogical, if it +were not constantly verified by experience. Experience, as we have seen, +stores up memories; memories generate expectations or beliefs—why they +do so may be explained hereafter by proper investigation of cerebral +physiology. But, to seek for the reason of the facts in the verbal<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[Pg 124]</a></span> +symbols by which they are expressed, and to be astonished that it is not +to be found there, is surely singular; and what Hume did was to turn +attention from the verbal proposition to the psychical fact of which it +is the symbol.</p> + +<blockquote><p>"When any natural object or event is presented, it is impossible +for us, by any sagacity or penetration, to discover, or even +conjecture, without experience, what event will result from it, or +to carry our foresight beyond that object, which is immediately +present to the memory and senses. Even after one instance or +experiment, where we have observed a particular event to follow +upon another, we are not entitled to form a general rule, or +foretell what will happen in like cases; it being justly esteemed +an unpardonable temerity to judge of the whole course of nature +from one single experiment, however accurate or certain. But when +one particular species of events has always, in all instances, been +conjoined with another, we make no longer any scruple of +foretelling one upon the appearance of the other, and of employing +that reasoning which can alone assure us of any matter of fact or +existence. We then call the one object <i>Cause</i>, the other <i>Effect</i>. +We suppose that there is some connexion between them: some power in +the one, by which it infallibly produces the other, and operates +with the greatest certainty and strongest necessity.... But there +is nothing in a number of instances, different from every single +instance, which is supposed to be exactly similar; except only, +that after a repetition of similar instances, the mind is carried +by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual +attendant, and to believe that it will exist.... The first time a +man saw the communication of motion by impulse, as by the shock of +two billiard balls, he could not pronounce that the one event was +<i>connected</i>, but only that it was <i>conjoined</i>, with the other. +After he has observed several instances of this nature, he then +pronounces them to be <i>connected</i>. What alteration has happened to +give rise to this new idea of <i>connexion</i>? Nothing but that he now<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[Pg 125]</a></span> +<i>feels</i> those events to be <i>connected</i> in his imagination, and can +readily foresee the existence of the one from the appearance of the +other. When we say, therefore, that one object is connected with +another we mean only that they have acquired a connexion in our +thought, and give rise to this inference, by which they become +proofs of each other's existence; a conclusion which is somewhat +extraordinary, but which seems founded on sufficient +evidence."—(IV. pp. 87-89.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>In the fifteenth section of the third part of the <i>Treatise</i>, under the +head of the <i>Rules by which to Judge of Causes and Effects</i>, Hume gives +a sketch of the method of allocating effects to their causes, upon +which, so far as I am aware, no improvement was made down to the time of +the publication of Mill's <i>Logic</i>. Of Mill's four methods, that of +<i>agreement</i> is indicated in the following passage:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>" ... where several different objects produce the same effect, it +must be by means of some quality which we discover to be common +amongst them. For as like effects imply like causes, we must always +ascribe the causation to the circumstance wherein we discover the +resemblance."—(I. p. 229.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>Next, the foundation of the <i>method of difference</i> is stated:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"The difference in the effects of two resembling objects must +proceed from that particular in which they differ. For, as like +causes always produce like effects, when in any instance we find +our expectation to be disappointed, we must conclude that this +irregularity proceeds from some difference in the causes."—(I. p. +230.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>In the succeeding paragraph the <i>method of concomitant variations</i> is +foreshadowed.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[Pg 126]</a></span></p> + +<blockquote><p>"When any object increases or diminishes with the increase or +diminution of the cause, 'tis to be regarded as a compounded +effect, derived from the union of the several different effects +which arise from the several different parts of the cause. The +absence or presence of one part of the cause is here supposed to be +always attended with the absence or presence of a proportionable +part of the effect. This constant conjunction sufficiently proves +that the one part is the cause of the other. We must, however, +beware not to draw such a conclusion from a few experiments."—(I. +p. 230.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>Lastly, the following rule, though awkwardly stated, contains a +suggestion of the <i>method of residues</i>:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>" ... an object which exists for any time in its full perfection +without any effect, is not the sole cause of that effect, but +requires to be assisted by some other principle, which may forward +its influence and operation. For as like effects necessarily follow +from like causes, and in a contiguous time and place, their +separation for a moment shows that these causes are not complete +ones."—(I. p. 230.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>In addition to the bare notion of necessary connexion between the cause +and its effect, we undoubtedly find in our minds the idea of something +resident in the cause which, as we say, produces the effect, and we call +this something Force, Power, or Energy. Hume explains Force and Power as +the results of the association with inanimate causes of the feelings of +endeavour or resistance which we experience, when our bodies give rise +to, or resist, motion.</p> + +<p>If I throw a ball, I have a sense of effort which ends when the ball +leaves my hand; and if I catch a ball, I have a sense of resistance +which comes to an end with the quiescence of the ball. In the former +case, there is a strong suggestion of something having gone from<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[Pg 127]</a></span> myself +into the ball; in the latter, of something having been received from the +ball. Let any one hold a piece of iron near a strong magnet, and the +feeling that the magnet endeavours to pull the iron one way in the same +manner as he endeavours to pull it in the opposite direction, is very +strong.</p> + +<p>As Hume says:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"No animal can put external bodies in motion without the sentiment +of a <i>nisus</i>, or endeavour; and every animal has a sentiment or +feeling from the stroke or blow of an external object that is in +motion. These sensations, which are merely animal, and from which +we can, <i>a priori</i>, draw no inference, we are apt to transfer to +inanimate objects, and to suppose that they have some such feelings +whenever they transfer or receive motion."—(IV. p. 91, <i>note</i>.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>It is obviously, however, an absurdity not less gross than that of +supposing the sensation of warmth to exist in a fire, to imagine that +the subjective sensation of effort or resistance in ourselves can be +present in external objects, when they stand in the relation of causes +to other objects.</p> + +<p>To the argument, that we have a right to suppose the relation of cause +and effect to contain something more than invariable succession, +because, when we ourselves act as causes, or in volition, we are +conscious of exerting power; Hume replies, that we know nothing of the +feeling we call power except as effort or resistance; and that we have +not the slightest means of knowing whether it has anything to do with +the production of bodily motion or mental changes. And he points out, as +Descartes and Spinoza had done before him, that when voluntary motion +takes place, that which we will<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[Pg 128]</a></span> is not the immediate consequence of the +act of volition, but something which is separated from it by a long +chain of causes and effects. If the will is the cause of the movement of +a limb, it can be so only in the sense that the guard who gives the +order to go on, is the cause of the transport of a train from one +station to another.</p> + +<blockquote><p>"We learn from anatomy, that the immediate object of power in +voluntary motion is not the member itself which is moved, but +certain muscles and nerves and animal spirits, and perhaps +something still more minute and unknown, through which the motion +is successively propagated, ere it reach the member itself, whose +motion is the immediate object of volition. Can there be a more +certain proof that the power by which the whole operation is +performed, so far from being directly and fully known by an inward +sentiment or consciousness, is to the last degree mysterious and +unintelligible? Here the mind wills a certain event: Immediately +another event, unknown to ourselves, and totally different from the +one intended, is produced: This event produces another equally +unknown: Till at last, through a long succession, the desired event +is produced."—(IV. p. 78.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>A still stronger argument against ascribing an objective existence to +force or power, on the strength of our supposed direct intuition of +power in voluntary acts, may be urged from the unquestionable fact, that +we do not know, and cannot know, that volition does cause corporeal +motion; while there is a great deal to be said in favour of the view +that it is no cause, but merely a concomitant of that motion. But the +nature of volition will be more fitly considered hereafter.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_26_26" id="Footnote_26_26"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_26"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> Hume, however, expressly includes the "records of our +memory" among his matters of fact.—(IV. p. 33.)</p></div> +</div> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[Pg 129]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VII" id="CHAPTER_VII"></a>CHAPTER VII.</h2> + +<h3>THE ORDER OF NATURE: MIRACLES.</h3> + +<p>If our beliefs of expectation are based on our beliefs of memory, and +anticipation is only inverted recollection, it necessarily follows that +every belief of expectation implies the belief that the future will have +a certain resemblance to the past. From the first hour of experience, +onwards, this belief is constantly being verified, until old age is +inclined to suspect that experience has nothing new to offer. And when +the experience of generation after generation is recorded, and a single +book tells us more than Methuselah could have learned, had he spent +every waking hour of his thousand years in learning; when apparent +disorders are found to be only the recurrent pulses of a slow working +order, and the wonder of a year becomes the commonplace of a century; +when repeated and minute examination never reveals a break in the chain +of causes and effects; and the whole edifice of practical life is built +upon our faith in its continuity; the belief that that chain has never +been broken and will never be broken, becomes one of the strongest and +most justifiable of human convictions. And it must be admitted to be a +reasonable request, if we ask those who would have us put faith in the +actual occurrence of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[Pg 130]</a></span> interruptions of that order, to produce evidence +in favour of their view, not only equal, but superior, in weight to that +which leads us to adopt ours.</p> + +<p>This is the essential argument of Hume's famous disquisition upon +miracles; and it may safely be declared to be irrefragable. But it must +be admitted that Hume has surrounded the kernel of his essay with a +shell of very doubtful value.</p> + +<p>The first step in this, as in all other discussions, is to come to a +clear understanding as to the meaning of the terms employed. +Argumentation whether miracles are possible, and, if possible, credible, +is mere beating the air until the arguers have agreed what they mean by +the word "miracles."</p> + +<p>Hume, with less than his usual perspicuity, but in accordance with a +common practice of believers in the miraculous, defines a miracle as a +"violation of the laws of nature," or as "a transgression of a law of +nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of +some invisible agent."</p> + +<p>There must, he says,—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"be an uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise +the event would not merit that appellation. And as an uniform +experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full +proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any +miracle; nor can such a proof be destroyed or the miracle rendered +credible but by an opposite proof which is superior."—- (IV. p. +134.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>Every one of these dicta appears to be open to serious objection.</p> + +<p>The word "miracle"—<i>miraculum</i>,—in its primitive and legitimate sense, +simply means something wonderful.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[Pg 131]</a></span></p> + +<p>Cicero applies it as readily to the fancies of philosophers, "Portenta +et miracula philosophorum somniantium," as we do to the prodigies of +priests. And the source of the wonder which a miracle excites is the +belief, on the part of those who witness it, that it transcends or +contradicts ordinary experience.</p> + +<p>The definition of a miracle as a "violation of the laws of nature" is, +in reality, an employment of language which, on the face of the matter, +cannot be justified. For "nature" means neither more nor less than that +which is; the sum of phenomena presented to our experience; the totality +of events past, present, and to come. Every event must be taken to be a +part of nature, until proof to the contrary is supplied. And such proof +is, from the nature of the case, impossible.</p> + +<p>Hume asks:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"Why is it more than probable that all men must die: that lead +cannot of itself remain suspended in the air: that fire consumes +wood and is extinguished by water; unless it be that these events +are found agreeable to the laws of nature, and there is required a +violation of those laws, or in other words, a miracle, to prevent +them?"—(IV. p. 133.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>But the reply is obvious; not one of these events is "more than +probable"; though the probability may reach such a very high degree +that, in ordinary language, we are justified in saying that the opposite +events are impossible. Calling our often verified experience a "law of +nature" adds nothing to its value, nor in the slightest degree increases +any probability that it will be verified again, which may arise out of +the fact of its frequent verification.</p> + +<p>If a piece of lead were to remain suspended of itself, in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[Pg 132]</a></span> the air, the +occurrence would be a "miracle," in the sense of a wonderful event, +indeed; but no one trained in the methods of science would imagine that +any law of nature was really violated thereby. He would simply set to +work to investigate the conditions under which so highly unexpected an +occurrence took place, and thereby enlarge his experience and modify his +hitherto unduly narrow conception of the laws of nature.</p> + +<p>The alternative definition, that a miracle is "a transgression of a law +of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition +of some invisible agent," (IV. p. 134, <i>note</i>) is still less defensible. +For a vast number of miracles have professedly been worked, neither by +the Deity, nor by any invisible agent; but by Beelzebub and his +compeers, or by very visible men.</p> + +<p>Moreover, not to repeat what has been said respecting the absurdity of +supposing that something which occurs is a transgression of laws, our +only knowledge of which is derived from the observation of that which +occurs; upon what sort of evidence can we be justified in concluding +that a given event is the effect of a particular volition of the Deity, +or of the interposition of some invisible (that is unperceivable) agent? +It may be so, but how is the assertion, that it is so, to be tested? If +it be said that the event exceeds the power of natural causes, what can +justify such a saying? The day-fly has better grounds for calling a +thunderstorm supernatural, than has man, with his experience of an +infinitesimal fraction of duration, to say that the most astonishing +event that can be imagined is beyond the scope of natural causes.</p> + +<blockquote><p>"Whatever is intelligible and can be distinctly conceived, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[Pg 133]</a></span>implies +no contradiction, and can never be proved false by any +demonstration, argument, or abstract reasoning <i>a priori</i>."—(IV. +p. 44.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>So wrote Hume, with perfect justice, in his <i>Sceptical Doubts</i>. But a +miracle, in the sense of a sudden and complete change in the customary +order of nature, is intelligible, can be distinctly conceived, implies +no contradiction; and, therefore, according to Hume's own showing, +cannot be proved false by any demonstrative argument.</p> + +<p>Nevertheless, in diametrical contradiction to his own principles, Hume +says elsewhere:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"It is a miracle that a dead man should come to life: because that +has never been observed in any age or country."—(IV. p. 134.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>That is to say, there is an uniform experience against such an event, +and therefore, if it occurs, it is a violation of the laws of nature. +Or, to put the argument in its naked absurdity, that which never has +happened never can happen, without a violation of the laws of nature. In +truth, if a dead man did come to life, the fact would be evidence, not +that any law of nature had been violated, but that those laws, even when +they express the results of a very long and uniform experience, are +necessarily based on incomplete knowledge, and are to be held only as +grounds of more or less justifiable expectation.</p> + +<p>To sum up, the definition of a miracle as a suspension or a +contravention of the order of Nature is self-contradictory, because all +we know of the order of nature is derived from our observation of the +course of events of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[Pg 134]</a></span> which the so-called miracle is a part. On the other +hand, no event is too extraordinary to be impossible; and, therefore, if +by the term miracles we mean only "extremely wonderful events," there +can be no just ground for denying the possibility of their occurrence.</p> + +<p class='tbrk'> </p> + +<p>But when we turn from the question of the possibility of miracles, +however they may be defined, in the abstract, to that respecting the +grounds upon which we are justified in believing any particular miracle, +Hume's arguments have a very different value, for they resolve +themselves into a simple statement of the dictates of common +sense—which may be expressed in this canon: the more a statement of +fact conflicts with previous experience, the more complete must be the +evidence which is to justify us in believing it. It is upon this +principle that every one carries on the business of common life. If a +man tells me he saw a piebald horse in Piccadilly, I believe him without +hesitation. The thing itself is likely enough, and there is no +imaginable motive for his deceiving me. But if the same person tells me +he observed a zebra there, I might hesitate a little about accepting his +testimony, unless I were well satisfied, not only as to his previous +acquaintance with zebras, but as to his powers and opportunities of +observation in the present case. If, however, my informant assured me +that he beheld a centaur trotting down that famous thoroughfare, I +should emphatically decline to credit his statement; and this even if he +were the most saintly of men and ready to suffer martyrdom in support of +his belief. In such a case, I could, of course, entertain no doubt of +the good faith of the witness; it would be only his competency, which +unfortunately has very little<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[Pg 135]</a></span> to do with good faith or intensity of +conviction, which I should presume to call in question.</p> + +<p>Indeed, I hardly know what testimony would satisfy me of the existence +of a live centaur. To put an extreme case, suppose the late Johannes +Müller, of Berlin, the greatest anatomist and physiologist among my +contemporaries, had barely affirmed he had seen a live centaur, I should +certainly have been staggered by the weight of an assertion coming from +such an authority. But I could have got no further than a suspension of +judgment. For, on the whole, it would have been more probable that even +he had fallen into some error of interpretation of the facts which came +under his observation, than that such an animal as a centaur really +existed. And nothing short of a careful monograph, by a highly competent +investigator, accompanied by figures and measurements of all the most +important parts of a centaur, put forth under circumstances which could +leave no doubt that falsification or misinterpretation would meet with +immediate exposure, could possibly enable a man of science to feel that +he acted conscientiously, in expressing his belief in the existence of a +centaur on the evidence of testimony.</p> + +<p>This hesitation about admitting the existence of such an animal as a +centaur, be it observed, does not deserve reproach, as scepticism, but +moderate praise, as mere scientific good faith. It need not imply, and +it does not, so far as I am concerned, any <i>a priori</i> hypothesis that a +centaur is an impossible animal; or, that his existence, if he did +exist, would violate the laws of nature. Indubitably, the organisation +of a centaur presents a variety of practical difficulties to an +anatomist and physiologist; and a good many of those generalisations<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[Pg 136]</a></span> of +our present experience, which we are pleased to call laws of nature, +would be upset by the appearance of such an animal, so that we should +have to frame new laws to cover our extended experience. Every wise man +will admit that the possibilities of nature are infinite, and include +centaurs; but he will not the less feel it his duty to hold fast, for +the present, by the dictum of Lucretius, "Nam certe ex vivo Centauri non +fit imago," and to cast the entire burthen of proof, that centaurs +exist, on the shoulders of those who ask him to believe the statement.</p> + +<p>Judged by the canons either of common sense, or of science, which are +indeed one and the same, all "miracles" are centaurs, or they would not +be miracles; and men of sense and science will deal with them on the +same principles. No one who wishes to keep well within the limits of +that which he has a right to assert will affirm that it is impossible +that the sun and moon should ever have been made to appear to stand +still in the valley of Ajalon; or that the walls of a city should have +fallen down at a trumpet blast; or that water was turned into wine; +because such events are contrary to uniform experience and violate laws +of nature. For aught he can prove to the contrary, such events may +appear in the order of nature to-morrow. But common sense and common +honesty alike oblige him to demand from those who would have him believe +in the actual occurrence of such events, evidence of a cogency +proportionate to their departure from probability; evidence at least as +strong as that, which the man who says he has seen a centaur is bound to +produce, unless he is content to be thought either more than credulous +or less than honest.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[Pg 137]</a></span>But are there any miracles on record, the evidence for which fulfils the +plain and simple requirements alike of elementary logic and of +elementary morality?</p> + +<p>Hume answers this question without the smallest hesitation, and with all +the authority of a historical specialist:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"There is not to be found, in all history, any miracle attested by +a sufficient number of men, of such unquestioned goodness, +education, and learning, as to secure us against all delusion in +themselves; of such undoubted integrity, as to place them beyond +all suspicion of any design to deceive others; of such credit and +reputation in the eyes of mankind, as to have a great deal to lose +in case of their being detected in any falsehood; and at the same +time attesting facts, performed in such a public manner, and in so +celebrated a part of the world, as to render the detection +unavoidable: All which circumstances are requisite to give us a +full assurance of the testimony of men."—(IV. p. 135.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>These are grave assertions, but they are least likely to be challenged +by those who have made it their business to weigh evidence and to give +their decision under a due sense of the moral responsibility which they +incur in so doing.</p> + +<p>It is probable that few persons who proclaim their belief in miracles +have considered what would be necessary to justify that belief in the +case of a professed modern miracle-worker. Suppose, for example, it is +affirmed that A.B. died and that C.D. brought him to life again. Let it +be granted that A.B. and C.D. are persons of unimpeachable honour and +veracity; that C.D. is the next heir to A.B.'s estate, and therefore had +a strong motive for not bringing him to life again; and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[Pg 138]</a></span> that all A.B.'s +relations, respectable persons who bore him a strong affection, or had +otherwise an interest in his being alive, declared that they saw him +die. Furthermore, let A.B. be seen after his recovery by all his friends +and neighbours, and let his and their depositions, that he is now alive, +be taken down before a magistrate of known integrity and acuteness: +would all this constitute even presumptive evidence that C.D. had worked +a miracle? Unquestionably not. For the most important link in the whole +chain of evidence is wanting, and that is the proof that A.B. was really +dead. The evidence of ordinary observers on such a point as this is +absolutely worthless. And, even medical evidence, unless the physician +is a person of unusual knowledge and skill, may have little more value. +Unless careful thermometric observation proves that the temperature has +sunk below a certain point; unless the cadaveric stiffening of the +muscles has become well established; all the ordinary signs of death may +be fallacious, and the intervention of C.D. may have had no more to do +with A.B.'s restoration to life than any other fortuitously coincident +event.</p> + +<p>It may be said that such a coincidence would be more wonderful than the +miracle itself. Nevertheless history acquaints us with coincidences as +marvellous.</p> + +<p>On the 19th of February, 1842, Sir Robert Sale held Jellalabad with a +small English force and, daily expecting attack from an overwhelming +force of Afghans, had spent three months in incessantly labouring to +improve the fortifications of the town. Akbar Khan had approached within +a few miles, and an onslaught of his army was supposed to be imminent. +That morning an earthquake—</p> + +<blockquote><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[Pg 139]</a></span>"nearly destroyed the town, threw down the greater part of the +parapets, the central gate with the adjoining bastions, and a part +of the new bastion which flanked it. Three other bastions were also +nearly destroyed, whilst several large breaches were made in the +curtains, and the Peshawur side, eighty feet long, was quite +practicable, the ditch being filled, and the descent easy. Thus in +one moment the labours of three months were in a great measure +destroyed."<a name="FNanchor_27_27" id="FNanchor_27_27"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_27" class="fnanchor">[27]</a></p></blockquote> + +<p>If Akbar Khan had happened to give orders for an assault in the early +morning of the 19th of February, what good follower of the Prophet could +have doubted that Allah had lent his aid? As it chanced, however, +Mahometan faith in the miraculous took another turn; for the energetic +defenders of the post had repaired the damage by the end of the month; +and the enemy, finding no signs of the earthquake when they invested the +place, ascribed the supposed immunity of Jellalabad to English +witchcraft.</p> + +<p class='tbrk'> </p> + +<p>But the conditions of belief do not vary with time or place; and, if it +is undeniable that evidence of so complete and weighty a character is +needed, at the present time, for the establishment of the occurrence of +such a wonder as that supposed, it has always been needful. Those who +study the extant records of miracles with due attention will judge for +themselves how far it has ever been supplied.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_27_27" id="Footnote_27_27"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_27"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> Report of Captain Broadfoot, garrison engineer, quoted in +Kaye's <i>Afghanistan</i>.</p></div> +</div> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[Pg 140]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VIII" id="CHAPTER_VIII"></a>CHAPTER VIII.</h2> + +<h3>THEISM; EVOLUTION OF THEOLOGY.</h3> + +<p>Hume seems to have had but two hearty dislikes: the one to the English +nation, and the other to all the professors of dogmatic theology. The +one aversion he vented only privately to his friends; but, if he is ever +bitter in his public utterances, it is against priests<a name="FNanchor_28_28" id="FNanchor_28_28"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_28" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> in general +and theological enthusiasts and fanatics in particular; if he ever seems +insincere, it is when he wishes to insult theologians by a parade of +sarcastic respect. One need go no further than the peroration of the +<i>Essay on Miracles</i> for a characteristic illustration.</p> + +<blockquote><p>"I am the better pleased with the method of reasoning here +delivered, as I think it may serve to confound those dangerous +friends and disguised enemies to the <i>Christian religion</i> who have +undertaken to defend it by the principles<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[Pg 141]</a></span> of human reason. Our +most holy religion is founded on <i>Faith</i>, not on reason, and it is +a sure method of exposing it to put it to such a trial as it is by +no means fitted to endure. ... the Christian religion not only was +at first attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be +believed by any reasonable person without one. Mere reason is +insufficient to convince us of its veracity: And whoever is moved +by <i>Faith</i> to assent to it, is conscious of a continual miracle in +his own person, which subverts all the principles of his +understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is +most contrary to custom and experience."—(IV. pp. 153, 154.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>It is obvious that, here and elsewhere, Hume, adopting a popular +confusion of ideas, uses religion as the equivalent of dogmatic +theology; and, therefore, he says, with perfect justice, that "religion +is nothing but a species of philosophy" (iv. p. 171). Here no doubt lies +the root of his antagonism. The quarrels of theologians and philosophers +have not been about religion, but about philosophy; and philosophers not +unfrequently seem to entertain the same feeling towards theologians that +sportsmen cherish towards poachers. "There cannot be two passions more +nearly resembling each other than hunting and philosophy," says Hume. +And philosophic hunters are given to think, that, while they pursue +truth for its own sake, out of pure love for the chase (perhaps mingled +with a little human weakness to be thought good shots), and by open and +legitimate methods; their theological competitors too often care merely +to supply the market of establishments; and disdain neither the aid of +the snares of superstition, nor the cover of the darkness of ignorance.</p> + +<p>Unless some foundation was given for this impression by the theological +writers whose works had fallen in Hume's way, it is difficult to account +for the depth of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[Pg 142]</a></span> feeling which so good natured a man manifests on the +subject.</p> + +<p>Thus he writes in the <i>Natural History of Religion</i>, with quite unusual +acerbity:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"The chief objection to it [the ancient heathen mythology] with +regard to this planet is, that it is not ascertained by any just +reason or authority. The ancient tradition insisted on by heathen +priests and theologers is but a weak foundation: and transmitted +also such a number of contradictory reports, supported all of them +by equal authority, that it became absolutely impossible to fix a +preference among them. A few volumes, therefore, must contain all +the polemical writings of pagan priests: And their whole theology +must consist more of traditional stories and superstitious +practices than of philosophical argument and controversy.</p> + +<p>"But where theism forms the fundamental principle of any popular +religion, that tenet is so conformable to sound reason, that +philosophy is apt to incorporate itself with such a system of +theology. And if the other dogmas of that system be contained in a +sacred book, such as the Alcoran, or be determined by any visible +authority, like that of the Roman pontiff, speculative reasoners +naturally carry on their assent, and embrace a theory, which has +been instilled into them by their earliest education, and which +also possesses some degree of consistence and uniformity. But as +these appearances are sure, all of them, to prove deceitful, +philosophy will very soon find herself very unequally yoked with +her new associate; and instead of regulating each principle, as +they advance together, she is at every turn perverted to serve the +purposes of superstition. For besides the unavoidable incoherences, +which must be reconciled and adjusted, one may safely affirm, that +all popular theology, especially the scholastic, has a kind of +appetite for absurdity and contradiction. If that theology went not +beyond reason and common sense, her doctrines would appear too easy +and familiar. Amazement must of necessity be raised: Mystery +affected: Darkness and obscurity sought after: And a foundation of +merit afforded to the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[Pg 143]</a></span> devout votaries, who desire an opportunity +of subduing their rebellious reason by the belief of the most +unintelligible sophisms.</p> + +<p>"Ecclesiastical history sufficiently confirms these reflections. +When a controversy is started, some people always pretend with +certainty to foretell the issue. Whichever opinion, say they, is +most contrary to plain reason is sure to prevail; even when the +general interest of the system requires not that decision. Though +the reproach of heresy may, for some time, be bandied about among +the disputants, it always rests at last on the side of reason. Any +one, it is pretended, that has but learning enough of this kind to +know the definition of <i>Arian</i>, <i>Pelagian</i>, <i>Erastian</i>, <i>Socinian</i>, +<i>Sabellian</i>, <i>Eutychian</i>, <i>Nestorian</i>, <i>Monothelite</i>, &c., not to +mention <i>Protestant</i>, whose fate is yet uncertain, will be +convinced of the truth of this observation. It is thus a system +becomes absurd in the end, merely from its being reasonable and +philosophical in the beginning.</p> + +<p>"To oppose the torrent of scholastic religion by such feeble maxims +as these, that <i>it is impossible for the same thing to be and not +to be</i>, that <i>the whole is greater than a part</i>, that <i>two and +three make five</i>, is pretending to stop the ocean with a bulrush. +Will you set up profane reason against sacred mystery? No +punishment is great enough for your impiety. And the same fires +which were kindled for heretics will serve also for the destruction +of philosophers."—(IV. pp. 481-3.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>Holding these opinions respecting the recognised systems of theology and +their professors, Hume, nevertheless, seems to have had a theology of +his own; that is to say, he seems to have thought (though, as will +appear, it is needful for an expositor of his opinions to speak very +guardedly on this point) that the problem of theism is susceptible of +scientific treatment, with something more than a negative result. His +opinions are to be gathered from the eleventh section of the <i>Inquiry</i> +(1748); from the <i>Dialogues concerning Natural Religion</i>, which were +written at least as early as 1751, though not<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[Pg 144]</a></span> published till after his +death; and from the <i>Natural History of Religion</i>, published in 1757.</p> + +<p>In the first two pieces, the reader is left to judge for himself which +interlocutor in the dialogue represents the thoughts of the author; but, +for the views put forward in the last, Hume accepts the responsibility. +Unfortunately, this essay deals almost wholly with the historical +development of theological ideas; and, on the question of the +philosophical foundation of theology, does little more than express the +writer's contentment with the argument from design.</p> + +<blockquote><p>"The whole frame of nature bespeaks an Intelligent Author; and no +rational inquirer can, after serious reflection, suspend his belief +a moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine Theism +and Religion.—(IV. p. 435.)</p> + +<p>"Were men led into the apprehension of invisible, intelligent +power, by a contemplation of the works of nature, they could never +possibly entertain any conception but of one single being, who +bestowed existence and order on this vast machine, and adjusted all +its parts according to one regular plan or connected system. For +though, to persons of a certain turn of mind, it may not appear +altogether absurd, that several independent beings, endowed with +superior wisdom, might conspire in the contrivance and execution of +one regular plan, yet is this a merely arbitrary supposition, +which, even if allowed possible, must be confessed neither to be +supported by probability nor necessity. All things in the universe +are evidently of a piece. Everything is adjusted to everything. One +design prevails throughout the whole. And this uniformity leads the +mind to acknowledge one author; because the conception of different +authors, without any distinction of attributes or operations, +serves only to give perplexity to the imagination, without +bestowing any satisfaction on the understanding."—(IV. p. 442.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>Thus Hume appears to have sincerely accepted the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[Pg 145]</a></span> two fundamental +conclusions of the argument from design; firstly, that a Deity exists; +and, secondly, that He possesses attributes more or less allied to those +of human intelligence. But, at this embryonic stage of theology, Hume's +progress is arrested; and, after a survey of the development of dogma, +his "general corollary" is, that—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"The whole is a riddle, an enigma, an inexplicable mystery. Doubt, +uncertainty, suspense of judgment, appear the only result of our +most accurate scrutiny concerning this subject. But such is the +frailty of human reason, and such the irresistible contagion of +opinion, that even this deliberate doubt could scarcely be upheld; +did we not enlarge our view, and opposing one species of +superstition to another, set them a quarrelling; while we +ourselves, during their fury and contention, happily make our +escape into the calm, though obscure, regions of philosophy."—(IV. +p. 513.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>Thus it may be fairly presumed that Hume expresses his own sentiments in +the words of the speech with which Philo concludes the <i>Dialogues</i>.</p> + +<blockquote><p>"If the whole of natural theology, as some people seem to maintain, +resolves itself into one simple, though somewhat ambiguous, at +least undefined proposition, <i>That the cause or causes of order in +the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human +intelligence</i>: If this proposition be not capable of extension, +variation, or more particular explication: If it affords no +inference that affects human life or can be the source of any +action or forbearance: And if the analogy, imperfect as it is, can +be carried no further than to the human intelligence, and cannot be +transferred, with any appearance of probability, to the other +qualities of the mind; if this really be the case, what can the +most inquisitive, contemplative, and religious man do more than +give a plain, philosophical assent to the proposition, as often as +it occurs, and believe<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[Pg 146]</a></span> that the arguments on which it is +established exceed the objections which lie against it? Some +astonishment indeed will naturally arise from the greatness of the +object; some melancholy from its obscurity; some contempt of human +reason, that it can give no solution more satisfactory with regard +to so extraordinary and magnificent a question. But believe me, +Cleanthes, the most natural sentiment which a well-disposed mind +will feel on this occasion, is a longing desire and expectation +that Heaven would be pleased to dissipate, at least alleviate, this +profound ignorance, by affording some more particular revelation to +mankind, and making discoveries of the nature, attributes, and +operations of the Divine object of our faith."<a name="FNanchor_29_29" id="FNanchor_29_29"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_29" class="fnanchor">[29]</a>—(II. pp. +547-8.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>Such being the sum total of Hume's conclusions, it cannot be said that +his theological burden is a heavy one. But, if we turn from the <i>Natural +History of Religion</i>, to the <i>Treatise</i>, the <i>Inquiry</i>, and the +<i>Dialogues</i>, the story of what happened to the ass laden with salt, who +took to the water, irresistibly suggests itself. Hume's theism, such as +it is, dissolves away in the dialectic river, until nothing is left but +the verbal sack in which it was contained.</p> + +<p>Of the two theistic propositions to which Hume is committed, the first +is the affirmation of the existence of a God, supported by the argument +from the nature of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[Pg 147]</a></span> causation. In the <i>Dialogues</i>, Philo, while pushing +scepticism to its utmost limit, is nevertheless made to say that—</p> + +<blockquote><p>" ... where reasonable men treat these subjects, the question can +never be concerning the <i>Being</i>, but only the <i>Nature</i>, of the +Deity. The former truth, as you will observe, is unquestionable and +self-evident. Nothing exists without a cause, and the original +cause of this universe (whatever it be) we call God, and piously +ascribe to him every species of perfection."—(II. p. 439.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>The expositor of Hume, who wishes to do his work thoroughly, as far as +it goes, cannot but fall into perplexity<a name="FNanchor_30_30" id="FNanchor_30_30"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_30" class="fnanchor">[30]</a> when he contrasts this +language with that of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[Pg 148]</a></span> the sections of the third part of the <i>Treatise</i>, +entitled, <i>Why a Cause is Always Necessary</i>, and <i>Of the Idea of +Necessary Connexion</i>.</p> + +<p>It is there shown, at large, that "every demonstration which has been +produced for the necessity of a cause is fallacious and sophistical" (I. +p. 111); it is affirmed, that "there is no absolute nor metaphysical +necessity that every beginning of existence should be attended with such +an object" [as a cause] (I. p. 227); and it is roundly asserted, that it +is "easy for us to conceive any object to be non-existent this moment +and existent the next, without conjoining to it the distinct idea of a +cause or productive principle" (I. p. 111). So far from the axiom, that +whatever begins to exist must have a cause of existence, being +"self-evident," as Philo calls it, Hume spends the greatest care in +showing that it is nothing but the product of custom, or experience.</p> + +<p>And the doubt thus forced upon one, whether Philo ought to be taken as +even, so far, Hume's mouth-piece, is increased when we reflect that we +are dealing with an acute reasoner; and that there is no difficulty in +drawing the deduction from Hume's own definition of a cause, that the +very phrase, a "first cause," involves a contradiction in terms. He lays +down that,—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"'Tis an established axiom both in natural and moral philosophy, +that an object, which exists for any time in its full perfection +without producing another, is not its sole cause; but is assisted +by some other principle which pushes it from its state of +inactivity, and makes it exert that energy, of which it was +secretly possessed."—(I. p. 106.)</p></blockquote><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[Pg 149]</a></span></p> + +<p>Now the "first cause" is assumed to have existed from all eternity, up +to the moment at which the universe came into existence. Hence it cannot +be the sole cause of the universe; in fact, it was no cause at all until +it was "assisted by some other principle"; consequently the so-called +"first cause," so far as it produces the universe, is in reality an +effect of that other principle. Moreover, though, in the person of +Philo, Hume assumes the axiom "that whatever begins to exist must have a +cause," which he denies in the <i>Treatise</i>, he must have seen, for a +child may see, that the assumption is of no real service.</p> + +<p>Suppose Y to be the imagined first cause and Z to be its effect. Let the +letters of the alphabet, <i>a</i>, <i>b</i>, <i>c</i>, <i>d</i>, <i>e</i>, <i>f</i>, <i>g</i>, in their +order, represent successive moments of time, and let <i>g</i> represent the +particular moment at which the effect Z makes its appearance. It follows +that the cause Y could not have existed "in its full perfection" during +the time <i>a</i>—<i>e</i>, for if it had, then the effect Z would have come into +existence during that time, which, by the hypothesis, it did not do. The +cause Y, therefore, must have come into existence at <i>f</i>, and if +"everything that comes into existence has a cause," Y must have had a +cause X operating at <i>e</i>; X, a cause W operating at <i>d</i>; and, so on, <i>ad +infinitum</i>.<a name="FNanchor_31_31" id="FNanchor_31_31"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_31" class="fnanchor">[31]</a></p> + +<p>If the only demonstrative argument for the existence of a Deity, which +Hume advances, thus, literally, "goes<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[Pg 150]</a></span> to water" in the solvent of his +philosophy, the reasoning from the evidence of design does not fare much +better. If Hume really knew of any valid reply to Philo's arguments in +the following passages of the <i>Dialogues</i>, he has dealt unfairly by the +leader in concealing it:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"But because I know you are not much swayed by names and +authorities, I shall endeavour to show you, a little more +distinctly, the inconveniences of that Anthropomorphism, which you +have embraced; and shall prove, that there is no ground to suppose +a plan of the world to be formed in the Divine mind, consisting of +distinct ideas, differently arranged, in the same manner as an +architect forms in his head the plan of a house which he intends to +execute.</p> + +<p>"It is not easy, I own, to see what is gained by this supposition, +whether we judge the matter by <i>Reason</i> or by <i>Experience</i>. We are +still obliged to mount higher, in order to find the cause of this +cause, which you had assigned as satisfactory and conclusive.</p> + +<p>"If <i>Reason</i> (I mean abstract reason, derived from inquiries <i>a +priori</i>) be not alike mute with regard to all questions concerning +cause and effect, this sentence at least it will venture to +pronounce: That a mental world, or universe of ideas, requires a +cause as much as does a material world, or universe of objects; +and, if similar in its arrangement, must require a similar cause. +For what is there in this subject, which should occasion a +different conclusion or inference? In an abstract view, they are +entirely alike; and no difficulty attends the one supposition, +which is not common to both of them.</p> + +<p>"Again, when we will needs force <i>Experience</i> to pronounce some +sentence, even on those subjects which lie beyond her sphere, +neither can she perceive any material difference in this +particular, between these two kinds of worlds; but finds them to be +governed by similar principles, and to depend upon an equal variety +of causes in their operations. We have specimens in miniature of +both of them. Our own mind resembles the one; a vegetable or animal +body the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[Pg 151]</a></span> other. Let experience, therefore, judge from these +samples. Nothing seems more delicate, with regard to its causes, +than thought: and as these causes never operate in two persons +after the same manner, so we never find two persons who think +exactly alike. Nor indeed does the same person think exactly alike +at any two different periods of time. A difference of age, of the +disposition of his body, of weather, of food, of company, of books, +of passions; any of these particulars, or others more minute, are +sufficient to alter the curious machinery of thought, and +communicate to it very different movements and operations. As far +as we can judge, vegetables and animal bodies are not more delicate +in their motions, nor depend upon a greater variety or more curious +adjustment of springs and principles.</p> + +<p>"How, therefore, shall we satisfy ourselves concerning the cause of +that Being whom you suppose the Author of Nature, or, according to +your system of anthropomorphism, the ideal world in which you trace +the material? Have we not the same reason to trace the ideal world +into another ideal world, or new intelligent principle? But if we +stop and go no farther; why go so far? Why not stop at the material +world? How can we satisfy ourselves without going on <i>in +infinitum</i>? And after all, what satisfaction is there in that +infinite progression? Let us remember the story of the Indian +philosopher and his elephant. It was never more applicable than to +the present subject. If the material world rests upon a similar +ideal world, this ideal world must rest upon some other; and so on +without end. It were better, therefore, never to look beyond the +present material world. By supposing it to contain the principle of +its order within itself, we really assert it to be God; and the +sooner we arrive at that Divine Being, so much the better. When you +go one step beyond the mundane system you only excite an +inquisitive humour, which it is impossible ever to satisfy.</p> + +<p>"To say, that the different ideas which compose the reason of the +Supreme Being, fall into order of themselves and by their own +natures, is really to talk without any precise meaning. If it has a +meaning, I would fain know why it is not<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[Pg 152]</a></span> as good sense to say, +that the parts of the material world fall into order of themselves, +and by their own nature. Can the one opinion be intelligible while +the other is not so?"—(II. pp. 461-4.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>Cleanthes, in replying to Philo's discourse, says that it is very easy +to answer his arguments; but, as not unfrequently happens with +controversialists, he mistakes a reply for an answer, when he declares +that—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"The order and arrangement of nature, the curious adjustment of +final causes, the plain use and intention of every part and organ; +all these bespeak in the clearest language one intelligent cause or +author. The heavens and the earth join in the same testimony. The +whole chorus of nature raises one hymn to the praises of its +Creator."—(II. p. 465.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>Though the rhetoric of Cleanthes may be admired, its irrelevancy to the +point at issue must be admitted. Wandering still further into the region +of declamation, he works himself into a passion:</p> + +<blockquote><p>"You alone, or almost alone, disturb this general harmony. You +start abstruse doubts, cavils, and objections: You ask me what is +the cause of this cause? I know not: I care not: that concerns not +me. I have found a Deity; and here I stop my inquiry. Let those go +further who are wiser or more enterprising."—(II. p. 466.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>In other words, O Cleanthes, reasoning having taken you as far as you +want to go, you decline to advance any further; even though you fully +admit that the very same reasoning forbids you to stop where you are +pleased to cry halt! But this is simply forcing your reason to abdicate +in favour of your caprice. It is impossible to imagine that Hume, of all +men in the world, could have rested satisfied with such an act of +high-treason against<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[Pg 153]</a></span> the sovereignty of philosophy. We may rather +conclude that the last word of the discussion, which he gives to Philo, +is also his own.</p> + +<blockquote><p>"If I am still to remain in utter ignorance of causes, and can +absolutely give an explication of nothing, I shall never esteem it +any advantage to shove off for a moment a difficulty, which, you +acknowledge, must immediately, in its full force, recur upon me. +Naturalists<a name="FNanchor_32_32" id="FNanchor_32_32"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_32" class="fnanchor">[32]</a> indeed very justly explain particular effects by +more general causes, though these general causes should remain in +the end totally inexplicable; but they never surely thought it +satisfactory to explain a particular effect by a particular cause, +which was no more to be accounted for than the effect itself. An +ideal system, arranged of itself, without a precedent design, is +not a whit more explicable than a material one, which attains its +order in a like manner; nor is there any more difficulty in the +latter supposition than in the former."—(II. p. 466.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>It is obvious that, if Hume had been pushed, he must have admitted that +his opinion concerning the existence of a God, and of a certain remote +resemblance of his intellectual nature to that of man, was an hypothesis +which might possess more or less probability, but was incapable on his +own principles of any approach to demonstration. And to all attempts to +make any practical use of his theism; or to prove the existence of the +attributes of infinite wisdom, benevolence, justice, and the like, which +are usually ascribed to the Deity, by reason, he opposes a searching +critical negation.<a name="FNanchor_33_33" id="FNanchor_33_33"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_33" class="fnanchor">[33]</a></p> + +<p>The object of the speech of the imaginary Epicurean in the eleventh +section of the <i>Inquiry</i>, entitled <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[Pg 154]</a></span><i>Of a Particular Providence and of a +Future State</i>, is to invert the argument of Bishop Butler's <i>Analogy</i>.</p> + +<p>That famous defence of theology against the <i>a priori</i> scepticism of +Freethinkers of the eighteenth century, who based their arguments on the +inconsistency of the revealed scheme of salvation with the attributes of +the Deity, consists, essentially, in conclusively proving that, from a +moral point of view, Nature is at least as reprehensible as orthodoxy. +If you tell me, says Butler, in effect, that any part of revealed +religion must be false because it is inconsistent with the divine +attributes of justice and mercy; I beg leave to point out to you, that +there are undeniable natural facts which are fully open to the same +objection. Since you admit that nature is the work of God, you are +forced to allow that such facts are consistent with his attributes. +Therefore, you must also admit, that the parallel facts in the scheme of +orthodoxy are also consistent with them, and all your arguments to the +contrary fall to the ground. Q.E.D. In fact, the solid sense of Butler +left the Deism of the Freethinkers not a leg to stand upon. Perhaps, +however, he did not remember the wise saying that "A man seemeth right +in his own cause, but another cometh after and judgeth him." Hume's +Epicurean philosopher adopts the main arguments of the <i>Analogy</i>, but +unfortunately drives them home to a conclusion of which the good Bishop +would hardly have approved.</p> + +<blockquote><p>"I deny a Providence, you say, and supreme governor of the world, +who guides the course of events, and punishes the vicious with +infamy and disappointment, and rewards the virtuous with honour and +success in all their undertakings. But surely I deny not the course +itself of events, which lies open to every one's inquiry and +examination. I acknowledge<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[Pg 155]</a></span> that, in the present order of things, +virtue is attended with more peace of mind than vice, and meets +with a more favourable reception from the world. I am sensible +that, according to the past experience of mankind, friendship is +the chief joy of human life, and moderation the only source of +tranquillity and happiness. I never balance between the virtuous +and the vicious course of life; but am sensible that, to a +well-disposed mind, every advantage is on the side of the former. +And what can you say more, allowing all your suppositions and +reasonings? You tell me, indeed, that this disposition of things +proceeds from intelligence and design. But, whatever it proceeds +from, the disposition itself, on which depends our happiness and +misery, and consequently our conduct and deportment in life, is +still the same. It is still open for me, as well as you, to +regulate my behaviour by my experience of past events. And if you +affirm that, while a divine providence is allowed, and a supreme +distributive justice in the universe, I ought to expect some more +particular reward of the good, and punishment of the bad, beyond +the ordinary course of events, I here find the same fallacy which I +have before endeavoured to detect. You persist in imagining, that +if we grant that divine existence for which you so earnestly +contend, you may safely infer consequences from it, and add +something to the experienced order of nature, by arguing from the +attributes which you ascribe to your gods. You seem not to remember +that all your reasonings on this subject can only be drawn from +effects to causes; and that every argument, deduced from causes to +effects, must of necessity be a gross sophism, since it is +impossible for you to know anything of the cause, but what you have +antecedently not inferred, but discovered to the full, in the +effect.</p> + +<p>"But what must a philosopher think of those vain reasoners who, +instead of regarding the present scene of things as the sole object +of their contemplation, so far reverse the whole course of nature, +as to render this life merely a passage to something further; a +porch, which leads to a greater and vastly different building; a +prologue which serves only to introduce the piece, and give it more +grace and propriety?<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[Pg 156]</a></span> Whence, do you think, can such philosophers +derive their idea of the gods? From their own conceit and +imagination surely. For if they derive it from the present +phenomena, it would never point to anything further, but must be +exactly adjusted to them. That the divinity may <i>possibly</i> be +endowed with attributes which we have never seen exerted; may be +governed by principles of action which we cannot discover to be +satisfied; all this will freely be allowed. But still this is mere +<i>possibility</i> and hypothesis. We never can have reason to <i>infer</i> +any attributes or any principles of action in him, but so far as we +know them to have been exerted and satisfied.</p> + +<p>"<i>Are there any marks of a distributive justice in the world?</i> If +you answer in the affirmative, I conclude that, since justice here +exerts itself, it is satisfied. If you reply in the negative, I +conclude that you have then no reason to ascribe justice, in our +sense of it, to the gods. If you hold a medium between affirmation +and negation, by saying that the justice of the gods at present +exerts itself in part, but not in its full extent, I answer that +you have no reason to give it any particular extent, but only so +far as you see it, <i>at present</i>, exert itself."—(IV. pp. 164-6.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>Thus, the Freethinkers said, the attributes of the Deity being what they +are, the scheme of orthodoxy is inconsistent with them; whereupon Butler +gave the crushing reply: Agreeing with you as to the attributes of the +Deity, nature, by its existence, proves that the things to which you +object are quite consistent with them. To whom enters Hume's Epicurean +with the remark: Then, as nature is our only measure of the attributes +of the Deity in their practical manifestation, what warranty is there +for supposing that such measure is anywhere transcended? That the "other +side" of nature, if there be one, is governed on different principles +from this side?</p> + +<p>Truly on this topic silence is golden; while speech<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[Pg 157]</a></span> reaches not even +the dignity of sounding brass or tinkling cymbal, and is but the weary +clatter of an endless logomachy. One can but suspect that Hume also had +reached this conviction; and that his shadowy and inconsistent theism +was the expression of his desire to rest in a state of mind, which +distinctly excluded negation, while it included as little as possible of +affirmation, respecting a problem which he felt to be hopelessly +insoluble.</p> + +<p>But, whatever might be the views of the philosopher as to the arguments +for theism, the historian could have no doubt respecting its many-shaped +existence, and the great part which it has played in the world. Here, +then, was a body of natural facts to be investigated scientifically, and +the result of Hume's inquiries is embodied in the remarkable essay on +the <i>Natural History of Religion</i>. Hume anticipated the results of +modern investigation in declaring fetishism and polytheism to be the +form in which savage and ignorant men naturally clothe their ideas of +the unknown influences which govern their destiny; and they are +polytheists rather than monotheists because,—</p> + +<blockquote><p>" ... the first ideas of religion arose, not from a contemplation +of the works of nature, but from a concern with regard to the +events of life, and from the incessant hopes and fears which +actuate the human mind ... in order to carry men's attention beyond +the present course of things, or lead them into any inference +concerning invisible intelligent power, they must be actuated by +some passion which prompts their thought and reflection, some +motive which urges their first inquiry. But what passion shall we +have recourse to, for explaining an effect of such mighty +consequence? Not speculative curiosity merely, or the pure love of +truth. That motive is too refined for<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[Pg 158]</a></span> such gross apprehensions, +and would lead men into inquiries concerning the frame of nature, a +subject too large and comprehensive for their narrow capacities. No +passions, therefore, can be supposed to work on such barbarians, +but the ordinary affections of human life; the anxious concern for +happiness, the dread of future misery, the terror of death, the +thirst of revenge, the appetite for food and other necessaries. +Agitated by hopes and fears of this nature, especially the latter, +men scrutinize, with a trembling curiosity, the course of future +causes, and examine the various and contrary events of human life. +And in this disordered scene, with eyes still more disordered and +astonished, they see the first obscure traces of divinity."—(IV. +pp. 443, 4.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>The shape assumed by these first traces of divinity is that of the +shadows of men's own minds, projected out of themselves by their +imaginations:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"There is an universal tendency among mankind to conceive all +beings like themselves, and to transfer to every object those +qualities with which they are familiarly acquainted, and of which +they are intimately conscious.... The <i>unknown causes</i> which +continually employ their thought, appearing always in the same +aspect, are all apprehended to be of the same kind or species. Nor +is it long before we ascribe to them thought, and reason, and +passion, and sometimes even the limbs and figures of men, in order +to bring them nearer to a resemblance with ourselves."—(IV. pp. +446-7.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>Hume asks whether polytheism really deserves the name of theism.</p> + +<blockquote><p>"Our ancestors in Europe, before the revival of letters, believed +as we do at present, that there was one supreme God, the author of +nature, whose power, though in itself uncontrollable, was yet often +exerted by the interposition of his angels and subordinate +ministers, who executed his sacred purposes. But they also +believed, that all nature was full of other invisible powers: +fairies, goblins, elves, sprights;<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[Pg 159]</a></span> beings stronger and mightier +than men, but much inferior to the celestial natures who surround +the throne of God. Now, suppose that any one, in these ages, had +denied the existence of God and of his angels, would not his +impiety justly have deserved the appellation of atheism, even +though he had still allowed, by some odd capricious reasoning, that +the popular stories of elves and fairies were just and well +grounded? The difference, on the one hand, between such a person +and a genuine theist, is infinitely greater than that, on the +other, between him and one that absolutely excludes all invisible +intelligent power. And it is a fallacy, merely from the casual +resemblance of names, without any conformity of meaning, to rank +such opposite opinions under the same denomination.</p> + +<p>"To any one who considers justly of the matter, it will appear that +the gods of the polytheists are no better than the elves and +fairies of our ancestors, and merit as little as any pious worship +and veneration. These pretended religionists are really a kind of +superstitious atheists, and acknowledge no being that corresponds +to our idea of a Deity. No first principle of mind or thought; no +supreme government and administration; no divine contrivance or +intention in the fabric of the world."—(IV. pp. 450-51.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>The doctrine that you may call an atheist anybody whose ideas about the +Deity do not correspond with your own, is so largely acted upon by +persons who are certainly not of Hume's way of thinking and, probably, +so far from having read him, would shudder to open any book bearing his +name, except the <i>History of England</i>, that it is surprising to trace +the theory of their practice to such a source.</p> + +<p>But on thinking the matter over, this theory seems so consonant with +reason, that one feels ashamed of having suspected many excellent +persons of being moved by mere malice and viciousness of temper to call +other folks atheists, when, after all, they have been<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[Pg 160]</a></span> obeying a purely +intellectual sense of fitness. As Hume says, truly enough, it is a mere +fallacy, because two people use the same names for things, the ideas of +which are mutually exclusive, to rank such opposite opinions under the +same denomination. If the Jew says, that the Deity is absolute unity, +and that it is sheer blasphemy to say that He ever became incarnate in +the person of a man; and, if the Trinitarian says, that the Deity is +numerically three as well as numerically one, and that it is sheer +blasphemy to say that He did not so become incarnate, it is obvious +enough that each must be logically held to deny the existence of the +other's Deity. Therefore; that each has a scientific right to call the +other an atheist; and that, if he refrains, it is only on the ground of +decency and good manners, which should restrain an honourable man from +employing even scientifically justifiable language, if custom has given +it an abusive connotation. While one must agree with Hume, then, it is, +nevertheless, to be wished that he had not set the bad example of +calling polytheists "superstitious atheists." It probably did not occur +to him that, by a parity of reasoning, the Unitarians might justify the +application of the same language to the Ultramontanes, and <i>vice versâ</i>. +But, to return from a digression which may not be wholly unprofitable, +Hume proceeds to show in what manner polytheism incorporated physical +and moral allegories, and naturally accepted hero-worship; and he sums +up his views of the first stages of the evolution of theology as +follows:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"These then are the general principles of polytheism, founded in +human nature, and little or nothing dependent on caprice or +accident. As the <i>causes</i> which bestow happiness or misery, are in +general very little known and very uncertain,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[Pg 161]</a></span> our anxious concern +endeavours to attain a determinate idea of them: and finds no +better expedient than to represent them as intelligent, voluntary +agents, like ourselves, only somewhat superior in power and wisdom. +The limited influence of these agents, and their proximity to human +weakness, introduce the various distribution and division of their +authority, and thereby give rise to allegory. The same principles +naturally deify mortals, superior in power, courage, or +understanding, and produce hero-worship; together with fabulous +history and mythological tradition, in all its wild and +unaccountable forms. And as an invisible spiritual intelligence is +an object too refined for vulgar apprehension, men naturally affix +it to some sensible representation; such as either the more +conspicuous parts of nature, or the statues, images, and pictures, +which a more refined age forms of its divinities."—(IV. p. 461.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>How did the further stage of theology, monotheism, arise out of +polytheism? Hume replies, certainly not by reasonings from first causes +or any sort of fine-drawn logic:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"Even at this day, and in Europe, ask any of the vulgar why he +believes in an Omnipotent Creator of the world, he will never +mention the beauty of final causes, of which he is wholly ignorant: +He will not hold out his hand and bid you contemplate the +suppleness and variety of joints in his fingers, their bending all +one way, the counterpoise which they receive from the thumb, the +softness and fleshy parts of the inside of the hand, with all the +other circumstances which render that member fit for the use to +which it was destined. To these he has been long accustomed; and he +beholds them with listlessness and unconcern. He will tell you of +the sudden and unexpected death of such-a-one; the fall and bruise +of such another; the excessive drought of this season; the cold and +rains of another. These he ascribes to the immediate operation of +Providence: And such events as, with good reasoners, are the chief +difficulties in admitting a Supreme Intelligence, are with him the +sole arguments for it....<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[Pg 162]</a></span></p> + +<p>"We may conclude therefore, upon the whole, that since the vulgar, +in nations which have embraced the doctrine of theism, still build +it upon irrational and superstitious grounds, they are never led +into that opinion by any process of argument, but by a certain +train of thinking, more suitable to their genius and capacity.</p> + +<p>"It may readily happen, in an idolatrous nation, that though men +admit the existence of several limited deities, yet there is some +one God, whom, in a particular manner, they make the object of +their worship and adoration. They may either suppose, that, in the +distribution of power and territory among the Gods, their nation +was subjected to the jurisdiction of that particular deity; or, +reducing heavenly objects to the model of things below, they may +represent one god as the prince or supreme magistrate of the rest, +who, though of the same nature, rules them with an authority like +that which an earthly sovereign exerts over his subjects and +vassals. Whether this god, therefore, be considered as their +peculiar patron, or as the general sovereign of heaven, his +votaries will endeavour, by every art, to insinuate themselves into +his favour; and supposing him to be pleased, like themselves, with +praise and flattery, there is no eulogy or exaggeration which will +be spared in their addresses to him. In proportion as men's fears +or distresses become more urgent, they still invent new strains of +adulation; and even he who outdoes his predecessor in swelling the +titles of his divinity, is sure to be outdone by his successor in +newer and more pompous epithets of praise. Thus they proceed, till +at last they arrive at infinity itself, beyond which there is no +further progress; And it is well if, in striving to get further, +and to represent a magnificent simplicity, they run not into +inexplicable mystery, and destroy the intelligent nature of their +deity, on which alone any rational worship or adoration can be +founded. While they confine themselves to the notion of a perfect +being, the Creator of the world, they coincide, by chance, with the +principles of reason and true philosophy; though they are guided to +that notion, not by reason, of which they are in a great measure +incapable, but by the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[Pg 163]</a></span> adulation and fears of the most vulgar +superstition."—(IV. pp. 463-6.)</p> + +<p>"Nay, if we should suppose, what never happens, that a popular +religion were found, in which it was expressly declared, that +nothing but morality could gain the divine favour; if an order of +priests were instituted to inculcate this opinion, in daily +sermons, and with all the arts of persuasion; yet so inveterate are +the people's prejudices, that, for want of some other superstition, +they would make the very attendance on these sermons the essentials +of religion, rather than place them in virtue and good morals. The +sublime prologue of Zaleucus' laws inspired not the Locrians, so +far as we can learn, with any sounder notions of the measures of +acceptance with the deity, than were familiar to the other +Greeks."—(IV. p. 505.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>It has been remarked that Hume's writings are singularly devoid of local +colour; of allusions to the scenes with which, he was familiar, and to +the people from whom he sprang. Yet, surely, the Lowlands of Scotland +were more in his thoughts than the Zephyrean promontory, and the hard +visage of John Knox peered from behind the mask of Zaleucus, when this +passage left his pen. Nay, might not an acute German critic discern +therein a reminiscence of that eminently Scottish institution, a "Holy +Fair"? where as Hume's young contemporary sings:—<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[Pg 164]</a></span></p> + +<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> +<div>"... opens out his cauld harangues</div> +<div class="i1">On practice and on morals;</div> +<div>An' aff the godly pour in thrangs</div> +<div class="i1">To gie the jars and barrels</div> +<div class="i6">A lift that day.</div> +</div><div class="stanza"> +<div>"What signifies his barren shine</div> +<div class="i1">Of moral powers and reason?</div> +<div>His English style and gesture line</div> +<div class="i1">Are a' clean out of season.</div> +<div>Like Socrates or Antonine,</div> +<div class="i1">Or some auld pagan heathen,</div> +<div>The moral man he does define,</div> +<div class="i1">But ne'er a word o' faith in</div> +<div class="i6">That's right that day."<a name="FNanchor_34_34" id="FNanchor_34_34"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_34" class="fnanchor">[34]</a></div> +</div></div> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_28_28" id="Footnote_28_28"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_28"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> In a note to the Essay on Superstition and Enthusiasm, +Hume is careful to define what he means by this term. "By priests I +understand only the pretenders to power and dominion, and to a superior +sanctity of character, distinct from virtue and good morals. These are +very different from <i>clergymen</i>, who are set apart to the care of sacred +matters, and the conducting our public devotions with greater decency +and order. There is no rank of men more to be respected than the +latter."—(III. p. 83.)</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_29_29" id="Footnote_29_29"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_29"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> It is needless to quote the rest of the passage, though I +cannot refrain from observing that the recommendation which it contains, +that a "man of letters" should become a philosophical sceptic as "the +first and most essential step towards being a sound believing +Christian," though adopted and largely acted upon by many a champion of +orthodoxy in these days, is questionable in taste, if it be meant as a +jest, and more than questionable in morality, if it is to be taken in +earnest. To pretend that you believe any doctrine for no better reason +than that you doubt everything else, would be dishonest, if it were not +preposterous.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_30_30" id="Footnote_30_30"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_30"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> A perplexity which is increased rather than diminished by +some passages in a letter to Gilbert Elliot of Minto (March 10, 1751). +Hume says, "You would perceive by the sample I have given you that I +make Cleanthes the hero of the dialogue; whatever you can think of, to +strengthen that side of the argument, will be most acceptable to me. Any +propensity you imagine I have to the other side crept in upon me against +my will; and 'tis not long ago that I burned an old manuscript book, +wrote before I was twenty, which contained, page after page, the gradual +progress of my thoughts on this head. It began with an anxious scent +after arguments to confirm the common opinion; doubts stole in, +dissipated, returned; were again dissipated, returned again; and it was +a perpetual struggle of a restless imagination against +inclination—perhaps against reason.... I could wish Cleanthes' argument +could be so analysed as to be rendered quite formal and regular. The +propensity of the mind towards it—unless that propensity were as strong +and universal as that to believe in our senses and experience—will +still, I am afraid, be esteemed a suspicious foundation. 'Tis here I +wish for your assistance. We must endeavour to prove that this +propensity is somewhat different from our inclination to find our own +figures in the clouds, our faces in the moon, our passions and +sentiments even in inanimate matter. Such an inclination may and ought +to be controlled, and can never be a legitimate ground of assent." +(Burton, <i>Life</i>, I. pp. 331-3.) The picture of Hume here drawn +unconsciously by his own hand, is unlike enough to the popular +conception of him as a careless sceptic loving doubt for doubt's sake.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_31_31" id="Footnote_31_31"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_31"><span class="label">[31]</span></a> Kant employs substantially the same argument:—"Würde das +höchste Wesen in dieser Kette der Bedingungen stehen, so würde es selbst +ein Glied der Reihe derselben sein, und eben so wie die niederen +Glieder, denen es vorgesetzt ist, noch fernere Untersuchungen wegen +seines noch höheren Grundes erfahren."—<i>Kritik.</i> Ed. Hartenstein, p. +422.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_32_32" id="Footnote_32_32"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_32"><span class="label">[32]</span></a> <i>I.e.</i> Natural philosophers.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_33_33" id="Footnote_33_33"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_33"><span class="label">[33]</span></a> Hume's letter to Mure of Caldwell, containing a criticism +of Leechman's sermon (Burton, I. p. 163), bears strongly on this point.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_34_34" id="Footnote_34_34"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_34"><span class="label">[34]</span></a> Burns published the <i>Holy Fair</i> only ten years after +Hume's death.</p></div> +</div> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[Pg 165]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IX" id="CHAPTER_IX"></a>CHAPTER IX.</h2> + +<h3>THE SOUL: THE DOCTRINE OF IMMORTALITY.</h3> + +<p>Descartes taught that an absolute difference of kind separates matter, +as that which possesses extension, from spirit, as that which thinks. +They not only have no character in common, but it is inconceivable that +they should have any. On the assumption, that the attributes of the two +were wholly different, it appeared to be a necessary consequence that +the hypothetical causes of these attributes—their respective +substances—must be totally different. Notably, in the matter of +divisibility, since that which has no extension cannot be divisible, it +seemed that the <i>chose pensante</i>, the soul, must be an indivisible +entity.</p> + +<p>Later philosophers, accepting this notion of the soul, were naturally +much perplexed to understand how, if matter and spirit had nothing in +common, they could act and react on one another. All the changes of +matter being modes of motion, the difficulty of understanding how a +moving extended material body was to affect a thinking thing which had +no dimension, was as great as that involved in solving the problem of +how to hit a nominative case with a stick. Hence, the successors of +Descartes either found themselves obliged, with the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[Pg 166]</a></span> Occasionalists, to +call in the aid of the Deity, who was supposed to be a sort of +go-between betwixt matter and spirit; or they had recourse, with +Leibnitz, to the doctrine of pre-established harmony, which denied any +influence of the body on the soul, or <i>vice versâ</i>, and compared matter +and spirit to two clocks so accurately regulated to keep time with one +another, that the one struck when ever the other pointed to the hour; +or, with Berkeley, they abolished the "substance" of matter altogether, +as a superfluity, though they failed to see that the same arguments +equally justified the abolition of soul as another superfluity, and the +reduction of the universe to a series of events or phenomena; or, +finally, with Spinoza, to whom Berkeley makes a perilously close +approach, they asserted the existence of only one substance, with two +chief attributes, the one, thought, and the other, extension.</p> + +<p>There remained only one possible position, which, had it been taken up +earlier, might have saved an immensity of trouble; and that was to +affirm that we do not, and cannot, know anything about the "substance" +either of the thinking thing, or of the extended thing. And Hume's sound +common sense led him to defend this thesis, which Locke had already +foreshadowed, with respect to the question of the substance of the soul. +Hume enunciates two opinions. The first is that the question itself is +unintelligible, and therefore cannot receive any answer; the second is +that the popular doctrine respecting the immateriality, simplicity, and +indivisibility of a thinking substance is a "true atheism, and will +serve to justify all those sentiments for which Spinoza is so +universally infamous."</p> + +<p>In support of the first opinion, Hume points out that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[Pg 167]</a></span> it is impossible +to attach any definite meaning to the word "substance" when employed for +the hypothetical substratum of soul and matter. For if we define +substance as that which may exist by itself, the definition does not +distinguish the soul from perceptions. It is perfectly easy to conceive +that states of consciousness are self-subsistent. And, if the substance +of the soul is defined as that in which perceptions inhere, what is +meant by the inherence? Is such inherence conceivable? If conceivable, +what evidence is there of it? And what is the use of a substratum to +things which, for anything we know to the contrary, are capable of +existing by themselves?</p> + +<p>Moreover, it may be added, supposing the soul has a substance, how do we +know that it is different from the substance, which, on like grounds, +must be supposed to underlie the qualities of matter?</p> + +<p>Again, if it be said that our personal identity requires the assumption +of a substance which remains the same while the accidents of perception +shift and change, the question arises what is meant by personal +identity?</p> + +<blockquote><p>"For my part," says Hume, "when I enter most intimately into what I +call <i>myself</i>, I always stumble on some particular perception or +other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or +pleasure. I never can catch <i>myself</i> at any time without a +perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. When +my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep, so long +am I insensible of <i>myself</i>, and may be truly said not to exist. +And were all my perceptions removed by death, and I could neither +think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate, after the dissolution +of my body, I should be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive +what is further requisite to make me a perfect nonentity. If any +one, upon serious and unprejudiced reflection, thinks he has<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[Pg 168]</a></span> a +different notion of <i>himself</i>, I must confess I can reason no +longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the +right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this +particular. He may perhaps perceive something simple and continued +which he calls <i>himself</i>, though I am certain there is no such +principle in me.</p> + +<p>"But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture +to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a +bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed one +another with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux +and movement.... The mind is a kind of theatre, where several +perceptions successively make their appearance, pass, repass, glide +away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. +There is properly no <i>simplicity</i> in it at one time, nor <i>identity</i> +in different, whatever natural propension we may have to imagine +that simplicity and identity. The comparison of the theatre must +not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only that +constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant notion of the +place where these scenes are represented, or of the materials of +which it is composed.</p> + +<p>"What then gives so great a propension to ascribe an identity to +these successive perceptions, and to suppose ourselves possessed of +an invariable and uninterrupted existence through the whole course +of our lives? In order to answer this question, we must distinguish +between personal identity as it regards our thought and +imagination, and as it regards our passions, or the concern we take +in ourselves. The first is our present subject; and to explain it +perfectly we must take the matter pretty deep, and account for that +identity which we attribute to plants and animals; there being a +great analogy betwixt it and the identity of a self or +person."—(I. pp. 321, 322.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>Perfect identity is exhibited by an object which remains unchanged +throughout a certain time; perfect diversity is seen in two or more +objects which are separated by intervals of space and periods of time.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[Pg 169]</a></span> +But, in both these cases, there is no sharp line of demarcation between +identity and diversity, and it is impossible to say when an object +ceases to be one and becomes two.</p> + +<p>When a sea-anemone multiplies by division, there is a time during which +it is said to be one animal partially divided; but, after a while, it +becomes two animals adherent together, and the limit between these +conditions is purely arbitrary. So in mineralogy, a crystal of a +definite chemical composition may have its substance replaced, particle +by particle, by another chemical compound. When does it lose its +primitive identity and become a new thing?</p> + +<p>Again, a plant or an animal, in the course of its existence, from the +condition of an egg or seed to the end of life, remains the same neither +in form, nor in structure, nor in the matter of which it is composed: +every attribute it possesses is constantly changing, and yet we say that +it is always one and the same individual. And if, in this case, we +attribute identity without supposing an indivisible immaterial something +to underlie and condition that identity, why should we need the +supposition in the case of that succession of changeful phenomena we +call the mind?</p> + +<p>In fact, we ascribe identity to an individual plant or animal, simply +because there has been no moment of time at which we could observe any +division of it into parts separated by time or space. Every experience +we have of it is as one thing and not as two; and we sum up our +experiences in the ascription of identity, although we know quite well +that, strictly speaking, it has not been the same for any two moments.</p> + +<p>So with the mind. Our perceptions flow in even<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[Pg 170]</a></span> succession; the +impressions of the present moment are inextricably mixed up with the +memories of yesterday and the expectations of to-morrow, and all are +connected by the links of cause and effect.</p> + +<blockquote><p>" ... as the same individual republic may not only change its +members, but also its laws and constitutions; in like manner the +same person may vary his character and disposition, as well as his +impressions and ideas, without losing his identity. Whatever +changes he endures, his several parts are still connected by the +relation of causation. And in this view our identity with regard to +the passions serves to corroborate that with regard to the +imagination, by the making our distant perceptions influence each +other, and by giving us a present concern for our past or future +pains or pleasures.</p> + +<p>"As memory alone acquaints us with the continuance and extent of +this succession of perceptions, 'tis to be considered, upon that +account chiefly, as the source of personal identity. Had we no +memory we never should have any notion of causation, nor +consequently of that chain of causes and effects which constitute +our self or person. But having once acquired this notion of +causation from the memory, we can extend the same chain of causes, +and consequently the identity of our persons, beyond our memory, +and can comprehend times, and circumstances, and actions, which we +have entirely forgot, but suppose in general to have existed. For +how few of our past actions are there of which we have any memory? +Who can tell me, for instance, what were his thoughts and actions +on the first of January, 1715, the eleventh of March, 1719, and the +third of August, 1733? Or will he affirm, because he has entirely +forgot the incidents of those days, that the present self is not +the same person with the self of that time, and by that means +overturn all the most established notions of personal identity? In +this view, therefore, memory does not so much <i>produce</i> as +<i>discover</i> personal identity, by showing us the relation of cause +and effect among our different perceptions. 'Twill be incumbent on +those who affirm that memory produces entirely our personal +identity,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[Pg 171]</a></span> to give a reason why we can thus extend our identity +beyond our memory.</p> + +<p>"The whole of this doctrine leads us to a conclusion which is of +great importance in the present affair, viz. that all the nice and +subtle questions concerning personal identity can never possibly be +decided, and are to be regarded rather as grammatical than as +philosophical difficulties. Identity depends on the relations of +ideas, and these relations produce identity by means of that easy +transition they occasion. But as the relations, and the easiness of +the transition may diminish by insensible degrees, we have no just +standard by which we can decide any dispute concerning the time +when they acquire or lose a title to the name of identity. All the +disputes concerning the identity of connected objects are merely +verbal, except so far as the relation of parts gives rise to some +fiction or imaginary principle of union, as we have already +observed.</p> + +<p>"What I have said concerning the first origin and uncertainty of +our notion of identity, as applied to the human mind may be +extended, with little or no variation, to that of <i>simplicity</i>. An +object, whose different co-existent parts are bound together by a +close relation, operates upon the imagination after much the same +manner as one perfectly simple and undivisible, and requires not a +much greater stretch of thought in order to its conception. From +this similarity of operation we attribute a simplicity to it, and +feign a principle of union as the support of this simplicity, and +the centre of all the different parts and qualities of the +object."—(I. pp. 331-3.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>The final result of Hume's reasoning comes to this: As we use the name +of body for the sum of the phenomena which make up our corporeal +existence, so we employ the name of soul for the sum of the phenomena +which constitute our mental existence; and we have no more reason, in +the latter case, than in the former, to suppose that there is anything +beyond the phenomena which answers to the name. In the case of the soul, +as in that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">[Pg 172]</a></span> of the body, the idea of substance is a mere fiction of the +imagination. This conclusion is nothing but a rigorous application of +Berkeley's reasoning concerning matter to mind, and it is fully adopted +by Kant.<a name="FNanchor_35_35" id="FNanchor_35_35"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_35" class="fnanchor">[35]</a></p> + +<p>Having arrived at the conclusion that the conception of a soul, as a +substantive thing, is a mere figment of the imagination; and that, +whether it exists or not, we can by no possibility know anything about +it, the inquiry as to the durability of the soul may seem superfluous.</p> + +<p>Nevertheless, there is still a sense in which, even under these +conditions, such an inquiry is justifiable. Leaving aside the problem of +the substance of the soul, and taking the word "soul" simply as a name +for the series of mental phenomena which make up an individual mind; it +remains open to us to ask, whether that series commenced with, or +before, the series of phenomena which constitute the corresponding +individual body; and whether it terminates with the end of the corporeal +series, or goes on after the existence of the body has ended. And, in +both cases, there arises the further question, whether the excess of +duration of the mental series over that of the body, is finite or +infinite.</p> + +<p>Hume has discussed some of these questions in the remarkable essay <i>On +the Immortality of the Soul</i>, which was not published till after his +death, and which seems long to have remained but little known. +Nevertheless, indeed, possibly, for that reason, its influence has been<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">[Pg 173]</a></span> +manifested in unexpected quarters, and its main arguments have been +adduced by archiepiscopal and episcopal authority in evidence of the +value of revelation. Dr. Whately,<a name="FNanchor_36_36" id="FNanchor_36_36"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_36" class="fnanchor">[36]</a> sometime Archbishop of Dublin, +paraphrases Hume, though he forgets to cite him; and Bishop Courtenay's +elaborate work,<a name="FNanchor_37_37" id="FNanchor_37_37"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> dedicated to the Archbishop, is a development of +that prelate's version of Hume's essay.</p> + +<p>This little paper occupies only some ten pages, but it is not wonderful +that it attracted an acute logician like Whately, for it is a model of +clear and vigorous statement. The argument hardly admits of +condensation, so that I must let Hume speak for himself:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"By the mere light of reason it seems difficult to prove the +immortality of the soul: the arguments for it are commonly derived +either from metaphysical topics, or moral, or physical. But in +reality it is the gospel, and the gospel alone, that has brought +<i>life and immortality</i> to light.<a name="FNanchor_38_38" id="FNanchor_38_38"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_38" class="fnanchor">[38]</a></p> + +<p>"1. Metaphysical topics suppose that the soul is immaterial, and +that 'tis impossible for thought to belong to a material<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">[Pg 174]</a></span> +substance.<a name="FNanchor_39_39" id="FNanchor_39_39"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_39" class="fnanchor">[39]</a> But just metaphysics teach us that the notion of +substance is wholly confused and imperfect; and that we have no +other idea of any substance, than as an aggregate of particular +qualities inhering in an unknown something. Matter, therefore, and +spirit, are at bottom equally unknown, and we cannot determine what +qualities inhere in the one or in the other.<a name="FNanchor_40_40" id="FNanchor_40_40"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_40" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> They likewise +teach us, that nothing can be decided <i>a priori</i> concerning any +cause or effect; and that experience, being the only source of our +judgments of this nature, we cannot know from any other principle, +whether matter, by its structure or arrangement, may not be the +cause of thought. Abstract reasonings cannot decide any question of +fact or existence. But admitting a spiritual substance to be +dispersed throughout the universe, like the ethereal fire of the +Stoics, and to be the only inherent subject of thought, we have +reason to conclude from <i>analogy</i>, that nature uses it after the +manner she does the other substance, <i>matter</i>. She employs it as a +kind of paste or clay; modifies it into a variety of forms or +existences; dissolves after a time each modification, and from its +substance erects a new form. As the same material substance may +successively compose the bodies of all animals, the same spiritual +substance may compose their minds: Their consciousness, or that +system of thought which they formed during life, may be continually +dissolved by death, and nothing interests them in the new +modification. The most positive assertors of the mortality of the +soul never denied the immortality of its substance; and that an +immaterial<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">[Pg 175]</a></span> substance, as well as a material, may lose its memory +or consciousness, appears in part from experience, if the soul be +immaterial. Seasoning from the common course of nature, and without +supposing any new interposition of the Supreme Cause, which ought +always to be excluded from philosophy, <i>what is incorruptible must +also be ingenerable</i>. The soul, therefore, if immortal, existed +before our birth, and if the former existence noways concerned us, +neither will the latter. Animals undoubtedly feel, think, love, +hate, will, and even reason, though in a more imperfect manner than +men: Are their souls also immaterial and immortal?"<a name="FNanchor_41_41" id="FNanchor_41_41"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_41" class="fnanchor">[41]</a></p></blockquote> + +<p>Hume next proceeds to consider the moral arguments, and chiefly</p> + +<blockquote><p>" ... those derived from the justice of God, which is supposed to +be further interested in the future punishment of the vicious and +reward of the virtuous."</p></blockquote> + +<p>But if by the justice of God we moan the same attribute which we call +justice in ourselves, then why should either reward or punishment be +extended beyond this life?<a name="FNanchor_42_42" id="FNanchor_42_42"></a><a href="#Footnote_42_42" class="fnanchor">[42]</a> Our sole means of knowing anything is +the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">[Pg 176]</a></span> reasoning faculty which God has given us; and that reasoning +faculty not only denies us any conception of a future state, but fails +to furnish a single valid argument in favour of the belief that the mind +will endure after the dissolution of the body.</p> + +<blockquote><p>" ... If any purpose of nature be clear, we may affirm that the +whole scope and intention of man's creation, so far as we can judge +by natural reason, is limited to the present life."</p></blockquote> + +<p>To the argument that the powers of man are so much greater than the +needs of this life require, that they suggest a future scene in which +they can be employed, Hume replies:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"If the reason of man gives him great superiority above other +animals, his necessities are proportionably multiplied upon him; +his whole time, his whole capacity, activity, courage, and passion, +find sufficient employment in fencing against the miseries of his +present condition; and frequently, nay, almost always, are too +slender for the business assigned them. A pair of shoes, perhaps, +was never yet wrought to the highest degree of perfection that +commodity is capable of attaining; yet it is necessary, at least +very useful, that there should be some politicians and moralists, +even some geometers, poets and philosophers, among mankind. The +powers of men are no more superior to their wants, considered +merely in this life, than those of foxes and hares are, compared to +<i>their</i> wants and to their period of existence. The inference from +parity of reason is therefore obvious."</p></blockquote> + +<p>In short, Hume argues that, if the faculties with which we are endowed +are unable to discover a future state, and if the most attentive +consideration of their nature serves to show that they are adapted to +this life and nothing more, it is surely inconsistent with any<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">[Pg 177]</a></span> +conception of justice that we should be dealt with, as if we had all +along had a clear knowledge of the fact thus carefully concealed from +us. What should we think of the justice of a father, who gave his son +every reason to suppose that a trivial fault would only be visited by a +box on the ear; and then, years afterwards, put him on the rack for a +week for the same fault?</p> + +<p>Again, the suggestion arises, if God is the cause of all things, he is +responsible for evil as well as for good; and it appears utterly +irreconcilable with our notions of justice that he should punish another +for that which he has, in fact, done himself. Moreover, just punishment +bears a proportion to the offence, while suffering which is infinite is +<i>ipso facto</i> disproportionate to any finite deed.</p> + +<blockquote><p>"Why then eternal punishment for the temporary offences of so frail +a creature as man? Can any one approve of Alexander's rage, who +intended to exterminate a whole nation because they had seized his +favourite horse Bucephalus?</p> + +<p>"Heaven and hell suppose two distinct species of men, the good and +the bad; but the greatest part of mankind float betwixt vice and +virtue. Were one to go round the world with the intention of giving +a good supper to the righteous and a sound drubbing to the wicked, +he would frequently be embarrassed in his choice, and would find +the merits and demerits of most men and women scarcely amount to +the value of either."<a name="FNanchor_43_43" id="FNanchor_43_43"></a><a href="#Footnote_43_43" class="fnanchor">[43]</a></p></blockquote> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">[Pg 178]</a></span>One can but admire the broad humanity and the insight into the springs +of action manifest in this passage. <i>Comprendre est à moitié pardonner</i>. +The more one knows of the real conditions which determine men's acts the +less one finds either to praise or blame. For kindly David Hume, "the +damnation of one man is an infinitely greater evil in the universe than +the subversion of a thousand million of kingdoms." And he would have +felt with his countryman Burns, that even "auld Nickie Ben" should "hae +a chance."</p> + +<p>As against those who reason for the necessity of a future state, in +order that the justice of the Deity may be satisfied, Hume's +argumentation appears unanswerable. For if the justice of God resembles +what we mean by justice, the bestowal of infinite happiness for finite +well-doing and infinite misery for finite ill-doing, it is in no sense +just. And, if the justice of God does not resemble what we mean by +justice, it is an abuse of language to employ the name of justice for +the attribute described by it. But, as against those who choose to argue +that there is nothing in what is known to us of the attributes of the +Deity inconsistent with a future state of rewards and punishments, +Hume's pleadings have no force. Bishop Butler's argument that, inasmuch +as the visitation of our acts by rewards and punishments takes place in +this life, rewards and punishments must be consistent with the +attributes of the Deity, and therefore may go on as long as the mind +endures, is unanswerable. Whatever exists is, by the hypothesis, +existent by the will of God; and, therefore, the pains and pleasures +which<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">[Pg 179]</a></span> exist now may go on existing for all eternity, either increasing, +diminishing, or being endlessly varied in their intensity, as they are +now.</p> + +<p>It is remarkable that Hume does not refer to the sentimental arguments +for the immortality of the soul which are so much in vogue at the +present day; and which are based upon our desire for a longer conscious +existence than that which nature appears to have allotted to us. Perhaps +he did not think them worth notice. For indeed it is not a little +strange, that our strong desire that a certain occurrence should happen +should be put forward as evidence that it will happen. If my intense +desire to see the friend, from whom I have parted, does not bring him +from the other side of the world, or take me thither; if the mother's +agonised prayer that her child should live has not prevented him from +dying; experience certainly affords no presumption that the strong +desire to be alive after death, which we call the aspiration after +immortality, is any more likely to be gratified. As Hume truly says, +"All doctrines are to be suspected which are favoured by our passions;" +and the doctrine, that we are immortal because we should extremely like +to be so, contains the quintessence of suspiciousness.</p> + +<p>In respect of the existence and attributes of the soul, as of those of +the Deity, then, logic is powerless and reason silent. At the most we +can get no further than the conclusion of Kant:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"After we have satisfied ourselves of the vanity of all the +ambitious attempts of reason to fly beyond the bounds of +experience, enough remains of practical value to content us. It is +true that no one may boast that he <i>knows</i> that God and a future +life exist; for, if he possesses such know<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">[Pg 180]</a></span>ledge, he is just the +man for whom I have long been seeking. All knowledge (touching an +object of mere reason) can be communicated, and therefore I might +hope to see my own knowledge increased to this prodigious extent, +by his instruction. No; our conviction in these matters is not +<i>logical</i>, but <i>moral</i> certainty; and, inasmuch as it rests upon +subjective grounds, (of moral disposition) I must not even say: <i>it +is</i> morally certain that there is a God, and so on; but, <i>I am</i> +morally certain, and so on. That is to say: the belief in a God and +in another world is so interwoven with my moral nature, that the +former can no more vanish, than the latter can ever be torn from +me.</p> + +<p>"The only point to be remarked here is that this act of faith of +the intellect (<i>Vernunftglaube</i>) assumes the existence of moral +dispositions. If we leave them aside, and suppose a mind quite +indifferent to moral laws, the inquiry started by reason becomes +merely a subject for speculation; and [the conclusion attained] may +then indeed be supported by strong arguments from analogy, but not +by such as are competent to overcome persistent scepticism.</p> + +<p>"There is no one, however, who can fail to be interested in these +questions. For, although he may be excluded from moral influences +by the want of a good disposition, yet, even in this case, enough +remains to lead him to fear a divine existence and a future state. +To this end, no more is necessary than that he can at least have no +certainty that there is no such being, and no future life; for, to +make this conclusion demonstratively certain, he must be able to +prove the impossibility of both; and this assuredly no rational man +can undertake to do. This negative belief, indeed, cannot produce +either morality or good dispositions, but can operate in an +analogous fashion, by powerfully repressing the outbreak of evil +tendencies.</p> + +<p>"But it will be said, is this all that Pure Reason can do when it +gazes out beyond the bounds of experience? Nothing more than two +articles of faith? Common sense could achieve as much without +calling the philosophers to its counsels!</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">[Pg 181]</a></span>"I will not here speak of the service which philosophy has rendered +to human reason by the laborious efforts of its criticism, granting +that the outcome proves to be merely negative: about that matter +something is to be said in the following section. But do you then +ask, that the knowledge which interests all men shall transcend the +common understanding and be discovered for you only by +philosophers? The very thing which you make a reproach, is the best +confirmation of the justice of the previous conclusions, since it +shows that which could not, at first, have been anticipated: +namely, that in those matters which concern all men alike, nature +is not guilty of distributing her gifts with partiality; and that +the highest philosophy, in dealing with the most important concerns +of humanity, is able to take us no further than the guidance which +she affords to the commonest understanding."<a name="FNanchor_44_44" id="FNanchor_44_44"></a><a href="#Footnote_44_44" class="fnanchor">[44]</a></p></blockquote> + +<p>In short, nothing can be proved or disproved, respecting either the +distinct existence, the substance, or the durability of the soul. So +far, Kant is at one with Hume. But Kant adds, as you cannot disprove the +immortality of the soul, and as the belief therein is very useful for +moral purposes, you may assume it. To which, had Hume lived half a +century later, he would probably have replied, that, if morality has no +better foundation than an assumption, it is not likely to bear much +strain; and, if it has a better foundation, the assumption rather +weakens than strengthens it.</p> + +<p>As has been already said, Hume is not content with denying that we know +anything about the existence or the nature of the soul; but he carries +the war into the enemy's camp, and accuses those who affirm the +immateriality, simplicity, and indivisibility of the thinking substance, +of atheism and Spinozism, which are assumed to be convertible terms.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">[Pg 182]</a></span>The method of attack is ingenious. Observation appears to acquaint us +with two different systems of beings, and both Spinoza and orthodox +philosophers agree, that the necessary substratum of each of these is a +substance, in which the phenomena adhere, or of which they are +attributes or modes.</p> + +<blockquote><p>"I observe first the universe of objects or of body; the sun, moon, +and stars; the earth, seas, plants, animals, men, ships, houses, +and other productions either of art or of nature. Here Spinoza +appears, and tells me that these are only modifications and that +the subject in which they inhere is simple, uncompounded, and +indivisible. After this I consider the other system of beings, viz. +the universe of thought, or my impressions and ideas. Then I +observe another sun, moon, and stars; an earth and seas, covered +and inhabited by plants and animals, towns, houses, mountains, +rivers; and, in short, everything I can discover or conceive in the +first system. Upon my inquiring concerning these, theologians +present themselves, and tell me that these also are modifications, +and modifications of one simple, uncompounded, and indivisible +substance. Immediately upon which I am deafened with the noise of a +hundred voices, that treat the first hypothesis with detestation +and scorn, and the second with applause and veneration. I turn my +attention to these hypotheses to see what may be the reason of so +great a partiality; and find that they have the same fault of being +unintelligible, and that, as far as we can understand them, they +are so much alike, that 'tis impossible to discover any absurdity +in one, which is not common to both of them."—(I. p. 309.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>For the manner in which Hume makes his case good, I must refer to the +original. Plain people may rest satisfied that both hypotheses are +unintelligible, without plunging any further among syllogisms, the +premisses of which convey no meaning, while the conclusions carry no +conviction.</p> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_35_35" id="Footnote_35_35"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_35"><span class="label">[35]</span></a> "Our internal intuition shows no permanent existence, for +the Ego is only the consciousness of my thinking." "There is no means +whatever by which we can learn anything respecting the constitution of +the soul, so far as regards the possibility of its separate +existence."—<i>Kritik von den Paralogismen der reinen Vernunft</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_36_36" id="Footnote_36_36"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_36"><span class="label">[36]</span></a> <i>Essays on Some of the Peculiarities of the Christian +Religion</i>, (Essay I. Revelation of a Future State), by Richard Whately, +D.D., Archbishop of Dublin. Fifth Edition, revised, 1846.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_37_37" id="Footnote_37_37"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_37"><span class="label">[37]</span></a> <i>The Future States: their Evidences and Nature; considered +on Principles Physical, Moral, and Scriptural, with the Design of +showing the Value of the Gospel Revelation</i> by the Right Rev. Reginald +Courtenay, D.D., Lord Bishop of Kingston (Jamaica), 1857.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_38_38" id="Footnote_38_38"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_38"><span class="label">[38]</span></a> "Now that 'Jesus Christ brought life and immortality to +light through the Gospel,' and that in the most literal sense, which +implies that the revelation of the doctrine is <i>peculiar</i> to His Gospel, +seems to be at least the most obvious meaning of the Scriptures of the +New Testament."—Whately, <i>l.c.</i> p. 27.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_39_39" id="Footnote_39_39"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_39"><span class="label">[39]</span></a> Compare, <i>Of the Immateriality of the Soul</i>, Section V. of +Part IV., Book I., of the <i>Treatise</i>, in which Hume concludes (I. p. +319) that, whether it be material or immaterial, "in both cases the +metaphysical arguments for the immortality of the soul are equally +inconclusive; and in both cases the moral arguments and those derived +from the analogy of nature are equally strong and convincing."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_40_40" id="Footnote_40_40"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_40"><span class="label">[40]</span></a> "The question again respecting the materiality of the soul +is one which I am at a loss to understand clearly, till it shall have +been clearly determined <i>what matter is</i>. We know nothing of it, any +more than of mind, except its attributes."—Whately, <i>l.c.</i> p. 66.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_41_41" id="Footnote_41_41"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_41"><span class="label">[41]</span></a> "None of those who contend for the natural immortality of +the soul ... have been able to extricate themselves from one difficulty, +viz. that all their arguments apply, with exactly the same force, to +prove an immortality, not only of <i>brutes</i>, but even of <i>plants</i>; though +in such a conclusion as this they are never willing to +acquiesce."—Whately, <i>l.c.</i> p. 67.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_42_42" id="Footnote_42_42"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42_42"><span class="label">[42]</span></a> "Nor are we therefore authorised to infer <i>à priori</i>, +independent of Revelation, a future state of retribution, from the +irregularities prevailing in the present life, since that future state +does not account fully for these irregularities. It may explain, indeed, +how present evil may be conducive to future good, but not why the good +could not be attained without the evil; it may reconcile with our +notions of the divine justice the present prosperity of the wicked, but +it does not account for the existence of the wicked."—Whately, <i>l.c.</i> +pp. 69, 70.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_43_43" id="Footnote_43_43"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43_43"><span class="label">[43]</span></a> "So reason also shows, that for man to expect to earn for +himself by the practice of virtue, and claim, as his just right, an +immortality of exalted happiness, is a most extravagant and groundless +pretension."—Whately, <i>l.c.</i> p. 101. On the other hand, however, the +Archbishop sees no unreasonableness in a man's earning for himself an +immortality of intense unhappiness by the practice of vice. So that life +is, naturally, a venture in which you may lose all, but can earn +nothing. It may be thought somewhat hard upon mankind if they are pushed +into a speculation of this sort, willy-nilly.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_44_44" id="Footnote_44_44"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44_44"><span class="label">[44]</span></a> <i>Kritik der reinen Vernunft</i>. Ed. Hartenstein, p. 547.</p></div> +</div> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">[Pg 183]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_X" id="CHAPTER_X"></a>CHAPTER X.</h2> + +<h3>VOLITION: LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.</h3> + +<p>In the opening paragraphs of the third part of the second book of the +<i>Treatise</i>, Hume gives a description of the will.</p> + +<blockquote><p>"Of all the immediate effects of pain and pleasure there is none +more remarkable than the <i>will</i>; and though, properly speaking, it +be not comprehended among the passions, yet as the full +understanding of its nature and properties is necessary to the +explanation of them, we shall here make it the subject of our +inquiry. I desire it may be observed, that, by the <i>will</i>, I mean +nothing but <i>the internal impression we feel, and are conscious of, +when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new +perception of our mind</i>. This impression, like the preceding ones +of pride and humility, love and hatred, 'tis impossible to define, +and needless to describe any further."—(II. p. 150.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>This description of volition may be criticised on various grounds. More +especially does it seem defective in restricting the term "will" to that +feeling which arises when we act, or appear to act, as causes: for one +may will to strike, without striking; or to think of something which we +have forgotten.</p> + +<p>Every volition is a complex idea composed of two elements: the one is +the idea of an action; the other is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">[Pg 184]</a></span> a desire for the occurrence of that +action. If I will to strike, I have an idea of a certain movement, and a +desire that that movement should take place; if I will to think of any +subject, or, in other words, to attend to that subject, I have an idea +of the subject and a strong desire that it should remain present to my +consciousness. And so far as I can discover, this combination of an idea +of an object with an emotion, is everything that can be directly +observed in an act of volition. So that Hume's definition may be amended +thus: Volition is the impression which arises when the idea of a bodily +or mental action is accompanied by the desire that the action should be +accomplished. It differs from other desires simply in the fact, that we +regard ourselves as possible causes of the action desired.</p> + +<p>Two questions arise, in connexion with the observation of the phenomenon +of volition, as they arise out of the contemplation of all other natural +phenomena. Firstly, has it a cause; and, if so, what is its cause? +Secondly, is it followed by any effect, and if so, what effect does it +produce?</p> + +<p>Hume points out, that the nature of the phenomena we consider can have +nothing to do with the origin of the conception that they are connected +by the relation of cause and effect. For that relation is nothing but an +order of succession, which, so far as our experience goes, is +invariable; and it is obvious that the nature of phenomena has nothing +to do with their order. Whatever it is that leads us to seek for a cause +for every event, in the case of the phenomena of the external world, +compels us, with equal cogency, to seek it in that of the mind.</p> + +<p>The only meaning of the law of causation, in the physical world, is, +that it generalises universal experience<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">[Pg 185]</a></span> of the order of that world; +and, if experience shows a similar order to obtain among states of +consciousness, the law of causation will properly express that order.</p> + +<p>That such an order exists, however, is acknowledged by every sane man:</p> + +<blockquote><p>"Our idea, therefore, of necessity and causation, arises entirely +from the uniformity observable in the operations of nature, where +similar objects are constantly conjoined together, and the mind is +determined by custom to infer the one from the appearance of the +other. These two circumstances form the whole of that necessity +which we ascribe to matter. Beyond the constant <i>conjunction</i> of +similar objects and the consequent <i>inference</i> from one to the +other, we have no notion of any necessity of connexion.</p> + +<p>"If it appear, therefore, what all mankind have ever allowed, +without any doubt or hesitation, that these two circumstances take +place in the voluntary actions of men, and in the operations of +mind, it must follow that all mankind have ever agreed in the +doctrine of necessity, and that they have hitherto disputed merely +from not understanding each other."—(IV. p. 97.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>But is this constant conjunction observable in human actions? A student +of history could give but one answer to this question:</p> + +<blockquote><p>"Ambition, avarice, self-love, vanity, friendship, generosity, +public spirit: these passions, mixed in various degrees, and +distributed through society, have been, from the beginning of the +world, and still are, the source of all the actions and enterprizes +which have ever been observed among mankind. Would you know the +sentiments, inclinations, and course of life of the Greeks and +Romans? Study well the temper and actions of the French and +English. You cannot be much mistaken in transferring to the former +<i>most</i> of the observations which you have made with regard to the +latter. Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that +history<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">[Pg 186]</a></span> informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular. +Its chief use is only to discover the constant and universal +principles of human nature, by showing men in all varieties of +circumstances and situations, and furnishing us with materials from +which we may form our observations, and become acquainted with the +regular springs of human action and behaviour. These records of +wars, intrigues, factions, and revolutions are so many collections +of experiments, by which the politician or moral philosopher fixes +the principles of his science, in the same manner as the physician +or natural philosopher becomes acquainted with the nature of +plants, minerals, and other external objects, by the experiments +which he forms concerning them. Nor are the earth, air, water, and +other elements examined by Aristotle and Hippocrates more like to +those which at present lie under our observation, than the men +described by Polybius and Tacitus are to those who now govern the +world."—(IV. pp. 97-8.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>Hume proceeds to point out that the value set upon experience in the +conduct of affairs, whether of business or of politics, involves the +acknowledgment that we base our expectation of what men will do, upon +our observation of what they have done; and, that we are as firmly +convinced of the fixed order of thoughts as we are of that of things. +And, if it be urged that human actions not unfrequently appear +unaccountable and capricious, his reply is prompt:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"I grant it possible to find some actions which seem to have no +regular connexion with any known motives, and are exceptions to all +the measures of conduct which have ever been established for the +government of men. But if one could willingly know what judgment +should be formed of such irregular and extraordinary actions, we +may consider the sentiments commonly entertained with regard to +those irregular events which appear in the course of nature, and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">[Pg 187]</a></span> +the operations of external objects. All causes are not conjoined to +their usual effects with like uniformity. An artificer, who handles +only dead matter, may be disappointed in his aim, as well as the +politician who directs the conduct of sensible and intelligent +agents.</p> + +<p>"The vulgar, who take things according to their first appearance, +attribute the uncertainty of events to such an uncertainty in the +causes as make the latter often fail of their usual influence, +though they meet with no impediment to their operation. But +philosophers, observing that, almost in every part of nature, there +is contained a vast variety of springs and principles, which are +hid, by reason of their minuteness or remoteness, find that it is +at least possible the contrariety of events may not proceed from +any contingency in the cause, but from the secret operation of +contrary causes. This possibility is converted into certainty by +further observation, when they remark that, upon an exact scrutiny, +a contrariety of effects always betrays a contrariety of causes, +and proceeds from their mutual opposition. A peasant can give no +better reason for the stopping of any clock or watch, than to say +that it does not commonly go right. But an artist easily perceives +that the same force in the spring or pendulum has always the same +influence on the wheels; but fails of its usual effect, perhaps by +reason of a grain of dust, which puts a stop to the whole movement. +From the observation of several parallel instances, philosophers +form a maxim, that the connexion between all causes and effects is +equally necessary, and that its seeming uncertainty in some +instances proceeds from the secret opposition of contrary +causes."—(IV. pp. 101-2.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>So with regard to human actions:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"The internal principles and motives may operate in a uniform +manner, notwithstanding these seeming irregularities; in the same +manner as the winds, rains, clouds, and other variations of the +weather are supposed to be governed by steady principles; though +not easily discoverable by human sagacity and inquiry."—(IV. p. +103.)</p></blockquote> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">[Pg 188]</a></span>Meteorology, as a science, was not in existence in Hume's time, or he +would have left out the "supposed to be." In practice, again, what +difference does any one make between natural and moral evidence?</p> + +<blockquote><p>"A prisoner who has neither money nor interest, discovers the +impossibility of his escape, as well when he considers the +obstinacy of the gaoler, as the walls and bars with which he is +surrounded; and, in all attempts for his freedom, chooses rather to +work upon the stone and iron of the one, than upon the inflexible +nature of the other. The same prisoner, when conducted to the +scaffold, foresees his death as certainly from the constancy and +fidelity of his guards, as from the operation of the axe or wheel. +His mind runs along a certain train of ideas: The refusal of the +soldiers to consent to his escape; the action of the executioner; +the separation of the head and body; bleeding, convulsive motions, +and death. Here is a connected chain of natural causes and +voluntary actions; but the mind feels no difference between them, +in passing from one link to another, nor is less certain of the +future event, than if it were connected with the objects presented +to the memory or senses, by a train of causes cemented together by +what we are pleased to call a <i>physical</i> necessity. The same +experienced union has the same effect on the mind, whether the +united objects be motives, volition, and actions; or figure and +motion. We may change the names of things, but their nature and +their operation on the understanding never change."—(IV. pp. +105-6.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>But, if the necessary connexion of our acts with our ideas has always +been acknowledged in practice, why the proclivity of mankind to deny it +words?</p> + +<blockquote><p>"If we examine the operations of body, and the production of +effects from their causes, we shall find that all our faculties can +never carry us further in our knowledge of this relation, than +barely to observe, that particular objects are <i>constantly +conjoined</i> together, and that the mind is carried, by a <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">[Pg 189]</a></span><i>customary +transition</i>, from the appearance of the one to the belief of the +other. But though this conclusion concerning human ignorance be the +result of the strictest scrutiny of this subject, men still +entertain a strong propensity to believe, that they penetrate +further into the province of nature, and perceive something like a +necessary connexion between cause and effect. When, again, they +turn their reflections towards the operations of their own minds, +and <i>feel</i> no such connexion between the motive and the action; +they are thence apt to suppose, that there is a difference between +the effects which result from material force, and those which arise +from thought and intelligence. But, being once convinced, that we +know nothing of causation of any kind, than merely the <i>constant +conjunction</i> of objects, and the consequent <i>inference</i> of the mind +from one to another, and finding that these two circumstances are +universally allowed to have place in voluntary actions; we may be +more easily led to own the same necessity common to all +causes."—(IV. pp. 107, 8.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>The last asylum of the hard-pressed advocate of the doctrine of uncaused +volition is usually, that, argue as you like, he has a profound and +ineradicable consciousness of what he calls the freedom of his will. But +Hume follows him even here, though only in a note, as if he thought the +extinction of so transparent a sophism hardly worthy of the dignity of +his text.</p> + +<blockquote><p>"The prevalence of the doctrine of liberty may be accounted for +from another cause, viz. a false sensation, or seeming experience, +which we have, or may have, of liberty or indifference in many of +our actions. The necessity of any action, whether of matter or of +mind, is not, properly speaking, a quality in the agent, but in any +thinking or intelligent being who may consider the action; and it +consists chiefly in the determination of his thoughts to infer the +existence of that action from some preceding objects; as liberty, +when<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">[Pg 190]</a></span> opposed to necessity, is nothing but the want of that +determination, and a certain looseness or indifference which we +feel, in passing or not passing, from the idea of any object to the +idea of any succeeding one. Now we may observe that though, in +<i>reflecting</i> on human actions, we seldom feel such looseness or +indifference, but are commonly able to infer them with considerable +certainty from their motives, and from the dispositions of the +agent; yet it frequently happens, that in <i>performing</i> the actions +themselves, we are sensible of something like it: And as all +resembling objects are taken for each other, this has been employed +as demonstrative and even intuitive proof of human liberty. We feel +that our actions are subject to our will on most occasions; and +imagine we feel, that the will itself is subject to nothing, +because, when by a denial of it we are provoked to try, we feel +that it moves easily every way, and produces an image of itself (or +a <i>Velleity</i> as it is called in the schools), even on that side on +which it did not settle. This image or faint notion, we persuade +ourselves, could at that time have been completed into the thing +itself; because, should that be denied, we find upon a second trial +that at present it can. We consider not that the fantastical desire +of showing liberty is here the motive of our actions."—(IV. p. +110, <i>note</i>.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>Moreover, the moment the attempt is made to give a definite meaning to +the words, the supposed opposition between free will and necessity turns +out to be a mere verbal dispute.</p> + +<blockquote><p>"For what is meant by liberty, when applied to voluntary actions? +We cannot surely mean, that actions have so little connexion with +motive, inclinations, and circumstances, that one does not follow +with a certain degree of uniformity from the other, and that one +affords no inference by which we can conclude the existence of the +other. For these are plain and acknowledged matters of fact. By +liberty, then, we can only mean <i>a power of acting or not acting +according to the determinations of the will</i>; that is, if we choose +to remain at<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">[Pg 191]</a></span> rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may. Now +this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every +one who is not a prisoner and in chains. Here then is no subject of +dispute."—(IV. p. 111.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>Half the controversies about the freedom of the will would have had no +existence, if this pithy paragraph had been well pondered by those who +oppose the doctrine of necessity. For they rest upon the absurd +presumption that the proposition, "I can do as I like," is contradictory +to the doctrine of necessity. The answer is; nobody doubts that, at any +rate within certain limits, you can do as you like. But what determines +your likings and dislikings? Did you make your own constitution? Is it +your contrivance that one thing is pleasant and another is painful? And +even if it were, why did you prefer to make it after the one fashion +rather than the other? The passionate assertion of the consciousness of +their freedom, which is the favourite refuge of the opponents of the +doctrine of necessity, is mere futility, for nobody denies it. What they +really have to do, if they would upset the necessarian argument, is to +prove that they are free to associate any emotion whatever with any idea +whatever; to like pain as much as pleasure; vice as much as virtue; in +short, to prove, that, whatever may be the fixity of order of the +universe of things, that of thought is given over to chance.</p> + +<p>In the second part of this remarkable essay, Hume considers the real, or +supposed, immoral consequences of the doctrine of necessity, premising +the weighty observation that</p> + +<blockquote><p>"When any opinion leads to absurdity, it is certainly false; but it +is not certain that an opinion is false because it is of dangerous +consequence."—(IV. p. 112.)</p></blockquote> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">[Pg 192]</a></span>And, therefore, that the attempt to refute an opinion by a picture of +its dangerous consequences to religion and morality, is as illogical as +it is reprehensible.</p> + +<p>It is said, in the first place, that necessity destroys responsibility; +that, as it is usually put, we have no right to praise or blame actions +that cannot be helped. Hume's reply amounts to this, that the very idea +of responsibility implies the belief in the necessary connexion of +certain actions with certain states of the mind. A person is held +responsible only for those acts which are preceded by a certain +intention; and, as we cannot see, or hear, or feel, an intention, we can +only reason out its existence on the principle that like effects have +like causes.</p> + +<p>If a man is found by the police busy with "jemmy" and dark lantern at a +jeweller's shop door over night, the magistrate before whom he is +brought the next morning, reasons from those effects to their causes in +the fellow's "burglarious" ideas and volitions, with perfect confidence, +and punishes him accordingly. And it is quite clear that such a +proceeding would be grossly unjust, if the links of the logical process +were other than necessarily connected together. The advocate who should +attempt to get the man off on the plea that his client need not +necessarily have had a felonious intent, would hardly waste his time +more, if he tried to prove that the sum of all the angles of a triangle +is not two right angles, but three.</p> + +<p>A man's moral responsibility for his acts has, in fact, nothing to do +with the causation of these acts, but depends on the frame of mind which +accompanies them. Common language tells us this, when it uses +"well-disposed" as the equivalent of "good," and "evil-minded"<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">[Pg 193]</a></span> as that +of "wicked." If A does something which puts B in a violent passion, it +is quite possible to admit that B's passion is the necessary consequence +of A's act, and yet to believe that B's fury is morally wrong, or that +he ought to control it. In fact, a calm bystander would reason with both +on the assumption of moral necessity. He would say to A, "You were wrong +in doing a thing which you knew (that is, of the necessity of which you +were convinced) would irritate B." And he would say to B, "You are wrong +to give way to passion, for you know its evil effects"—that is the +necessary connection between yielding to passion and evil.</p> + +<p>So far, therefore, from necessity destroying moral responsibility, it is +the foundation of all praise and blame; and moral admiration reaches its +climax in the ascription of necessary goodness to the Deity.</p> + +<p>To the statement of another consequence of the necessarian doctrine, +that, if there be a God, he must be the cause of all evil as well as of +all good, Hume gives no real reply—probably because none is possible. +But then, if this conclusion is distinctly and unquestionably deducible +from the doctrine of necessity, it is no less unquestionably a direct +consequence of every known form of monotheism. If God is the cause of +all things, he must be the cause of evil among the rest; if he is +omniscient, he must have the fore-knowledge of evil; if he is almighty, +he must possess the power of preventing, or of extinguishing evil. And +to say that an all-knowing and all-powerful being is not responsible for +what happens, because he only permits it, is, under its intellectual +aspect, a piece of childish sophistry; while, as to the moral look of +it, one has only to ask any decently honourable man, whether, under like +cir<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">[Pg 194]</a></span>cumstances, he would try to get rid of his responsibility by such a +plea.</p> + +<p>Hume's <i>Inquiry</i> appeared in 1748. He does not refer to Anthony Collins' +essay on Liberty, published thirty-three years before, in which the same +question is treated to the same effect, with singular force and +lucidity. It may be said, perhaps, that it is not wonderful that the two +freethinkers should follow the same line of reasoning; but no such +theory will account for the fact that in 1754, the famous Calvinistic +divine, Jonathan Edwards, President of the College of New Jersey, +produced, in the interests of the straitest orthodoxy, a demonstration +of the necessarian thesis, which has never been equalled in power, and +certainly has never been refuted.</p> + +<p>In the ninth section of the fourth part of Edwards' <i>Inquiry</i>, he has to +deal with the Arminian objection to the Calvinistic doctrine that "it +makes God the author of sin"; and it is curious to watch the struggle +between the theological controversialist, striving to ward off an +admission which he knows will be employed to damage his side, and the +acute logician, conscious that, in some shape or other, the admission +must be made. Beginning with a <i>tu quoque</i>, that the Arminian doctrine +involves consequences as bad as the Calvinistic view, he proceeds to +object to the term "author of sin," though he ends by admitting that, in +a certain sense, it is applicable; he proves from Scripture, that God is +the disposer and orderer of sin; and then, by an elaborate false analogy +with the darkness resulting from the absence of the sun, endeavours to +suggest that he is only the author of it in a negative sense; and, +finally, he takes refuge in the conclusion that, though<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">[Pg 195]</a></span> God is the +orderer and disposer of those deeds which, considered in relation to +their agents, are morally evil, yet, inasmuch as His purpose has all +along been infinitely good, they are not evil relatively to him.</p> + +<p>And this, of course, may be perfectly true; but if true, it is +inconsistent with the attribute of omnipotence. It is conceivable that +there should be no evil in the world; that which is conceivable is +certainly possible; if it were possible for evil to be non-existent, the +maker of the world, who, though foreknowing the existence of evil in +that world, did not prevent it, either did not really desire it should +not exist, or could not prevent its existence. It might be well for +those who inveigh against the logical consequences of necessarianism to +bethink them of the logical consequences of theism; which are not only +the same, when the attribute of Omniscience is ascribed to the Deity, +but which bring out, from the existence of moral evil, a hopeless +conflict between the attributes of Infinite Benevolence and Infinite +Power, which, with no less assurance, are affirmed to appertain to the +Divine Being.</p> + +<p>Kant's mode of dealing with the doctrine of necessity is very singular. +That the phenomena of the mind follow fixed relations of cause and +effect is, to him, as unquestionable as it is to Hume. But then there is +the <i>Ding an sich</i>, the <i>Noumenon</i>, or Kantian equivalent for the +substance of the soul. This, being out of the phenomenal world, is +subject to none of the laws of phenomena, and is consequently as +absolutely free, and as completely powerless, as a mathematical point, +<i>in vacua</i>, would be. Hence volition is uncaused, so far as it belongs +to the noumenon; but, necessary, so far as it takes effect in the +phenomenal world.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">[Pg 196]</a></span></p> + +<p>Since Kant is never weary of telling us that we know nothing whatever, +and can know nothing, about the noumenon, except as the hypothetical +subject of any number of negative predicates; the information that it is +free, in the sense of being out of reach of the law of causation, is +about as valuable as the assertion that it is neither grey, nor blue, +nor square. For practical purposes, it must be admitted that the inward +possession of such a noumenal libertine does not amount to much for +people whose actual existence is made up of nothing but definitely +regulated phenomena. When the good and evil angels fought for the dead +body of Moses, its presence must have been of about the same value to +either of the contending parties, as that of Kant's noumenon, in the +battle of impulses which rages in the breast of man. Metaphysicians, as +a rule, are sadly deficient in the sense of humour; or they would surely +abstain from advancing propositions which, when stripped of the verbiage +in which they are disguised, appear to the profane eye to be bare shams, +naked but not ashamed.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">[Pg 197]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XI" id="CHAPTER_XI"></a>CHAPTER XI.</h2> + +<h3>THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS.</h3> + +<p>In his autobiography, Hume writes:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"In the same year [1752] was published at London my <i>Inquiry +Concerning the Principles of Morals</i>; which in my own opinion (who +ought not to judge on that subject) is of all my writings, +historical, philosophical, and literary, incomparably the best. It +came unnoticed and unobserved into the world."</p></blockquote> + +<p>It may commonly be noticed that the relative value which an author +ascribes to his own works rarely agrees with the estimate formed of them +by his readers; who criticise the products, without either the power or +the wish to take into account the pains which they may have cost the +producer. Moreover, the clear and dispassionate common sense of the +<i>Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals</i> may have tasted flat after +the highly-seasoned <i>Inquiry concerning the Human Understanding</i>. +Whether the public like to be deceived, or not, may be open to question; +but it is beyond a doubt that they love to be shocked in a pleasant and +mannerly way. Now Hume's speculations on moral questions are not so +remote from those of respectable professors, like Hutcheson, or saintly +prelates, such as Butler, as to present any striking<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">[Pg 198]</a></span> novelty. And they +support the cause of righteousness in a cool, reasonable, indeed +slightly patronising fashion, eminently in harmony with the mind of the +eighteenth century; which admired virtue very much, if she would only +avoid the rigour which the age called fanaticism, and the fervour which +it called enthusiasm.</p> + +<p>Having applied the ordinary methods of scientific inquiry to the +intellectual phenomena of the mind, it was natural that Hume should +extend the same mode of investigation to its moral phenomena; and, in +the true spirit of a natural philosopher, he commences by selecting a +group of those states of consciousness with which every one's personal +experience must have made him familiar: in the expectation that the +discovery of the sources of moral approbation and disapprobation, in +this comparatively easy case, may furnish the means of detecting them +where they are more recondite.</p> + +<blockquote><p>"We shall analyse that complication of mental qualities which form +what, in common life, we call <span class="smcap">personal merit</span>: We shall consider +every attribute of the mind, which renders a man an object either +of esteem and affection, or of hatred and contempt; every habit or +sentiment or faculty, which if ascribed to any person, implies +either praise or blame, and may enter into any panegyric or satire +of his character and manners. The quick sensibility which, on this +head, is so universal among mankind, gives a philosopher sufficient +assurance that he can never be considerably mistaken in framing the +catalogue, or incurs any danger of misplacing the objects of his +contemplation: He needs only enter into his own breast for a +moment, and consider whether he should or should not desire to have +this or that quality assigned to him, and whether such or such an +imputation would proceed from a friend or an enemy. The very nature +of language guides us almost infallibly in forming a judgment of +this nature; and as every tongue possesses one set of words which +are taken in a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">[Pg 199]</a></span> good sense, and another in the opposite, the least +acquaintance with the idiom suffices, without any reasoning, to +direct us in collecting and arranging the estimable or blamable +qualities of men. The only object of reasoning is to discover the +circumstances on both sides, which are common to these qualities; +to observe that particular in which the estimable qualities agree +on the one hand, and the blamable on the other, and thence to reach +the foundation of ethics, and find their universal principles, from +which all censure or approbation is ultimately derived. As this is +a question of fact, not of abstract science, we can only expect +success by following the experimental method, and deducing general +maxims from a comparison of particular instances. The other +scientifical method, where a general abstract principle is first +established, and is afterwards branched out into a variety of +inferences and conclusions, may be more perfect in itself, but +suits less the imperfection of human nature, and is a common source +of illusion and mistake, in this as well as in other subjects. Men +are now cured of their passion for hypotheses and systems in +natural philosophy, and will hearken to no arguments but those +which are derived from experience. It is full time they should +attempt a like reformation in all moral disquisitions; and reject +every system of ethics, however subtile or ingenious, which is not +founded on fact and observation."—(IV. pp. 242-4.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>No qualities give a man a greater claim to personal merit than +benevolence and justice; but if we inquire why benevolence deserves so +much praise, the answer will certainly contain a large reference to the +utility of that virtue to society; and as for justice, the very +existence of the virtue implies that of society; public utility is its +sole origin; and the measure of its usefulness is also the standard of +its merit. If every man possessed everything he wanted, and no one had +the power to interfere with such possession; or if no man desired that +which could damage his fellow-man, justice<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">[Pg 200]</a></span> would have no part to play +in the universe. But as Hume observes:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"In the present disposition of the human heart, it would perhaps be +difficult to find complete instances of such enlarged affections; +but still we may observe that the case of families approaches +towards it; and the stronger the mutual benevolence is among the +individuals, the nearer it approaches, till all distinction of +property be in a great measure lost and confounded among them. +Between married persons, the cement of friendship is by the laws +supposed so strong, as to abolish all division of possessions, and +has often, in reality, the force assigned to it.<a name="FNanchor_45_45" id="FNanchor_45_45"></a><a href="#Footnote_45_45" class="fnanchor">[45]</a> And it is +observable that, during the ardour of new enthusiasms, when every +principle is inflamed into extravagance, the community of goods has +frequently been attempted; and nothing but experience of its +inconveniences, from the returning or disguised selfishness of men, +could make the imprudent fanatics adopt anew the ideas of justice +and separate property. So true is it that this virtue derives its +existence entirely from its necessary <i>use</i> to the intercourse and +social state of mankind."—(IV. p. 256.)</p> + +<p>"Were the human species so framed by nature as that each individual +possessed within himself every faculty requisite both for his own +preservation and for the propagation of his kind: Were all society +and intercourse cut off between man and man by the primary +intention of the Supreme Creator: It seems evident that so solitary +a being would be as much incapable of justice as of social +discourse and conversation. Where mutual regard and forbearance +serve to no manner of purpose, they would never direct the conduct +of any reasonable man. The headlong course of the passions would be +checked by no reflection on future consequences. And as each<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">[Pg 201]</a></span> man +is here supposed to love himself alone, and to depend only on +himself and his own activity for safety and happiness, he would, on +every occasion, to the utmost of his power, challenge the +preference above every other being, to none of which he is bound by +any ties, either of nature or of interest.</p> + +<p>"But suppose the conjunction of the sexes to be established in +nature, a family immediately arises; and particular rules being +found requisite for its subsistence, these are immediately +embraced, though without comprehending the rest of mankind within +their prescriptions. Suppose that several families unite together +in one society, which is totally disjoined from all others, the +rules which preserve peace and order enlarge themselves to the +utmost extent of that society; but becoming then entirely useless, +lose their force when carried one step further. But again, suppose +that several distinct societies maintain a kind of intercourse for +mutual convenience and advantage, the boundaries of justice still +grow larger, in proportion to the largeness of men's views and the +force of their mutual connexion. History, experience, reason, +sufficiently instruct us in this natural progress of human +sentiments, and in the gradual enlargement of our regard to justice +in proportion as we become acquainted with the extensive utility of +that virtue."—(IV. pp. 262-4.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>The moral obligation of justice and the rights of property are by no +means diminished by this exposure of the purely utilitarian basis on +which they rest:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"For what stronger foundation can be desired or conceived for any +duty, than to observe that human society, or even human nature, +could not subsist without the establishment of it, and will still +arrive at greater degrees of happiness and perfection, the more +inviolable the regard is which is paid to that duty?</p> + +<p>"The dilemma seems obvious: As justice evidently tends to promote +public utility, and to support civil society, the sentiment of +justice is either derived from our reflecting on that tendency, or, +like hunger, thirst, and other appetites, resentment, love of life, +attachment to offspring, and other<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">[Pg 202]</a></span> passions, arises from a simple +original instinct in the human heart, which nature has implanted +for like salutary purposes. If the latter be the case, it follows +that property, which is the object of justice, is also +distinguished by a simple original instinct, and is not ascertained +by any argument or reflection. But who is there that ever heard of +such an instinct? Or is this a subject in which new discoveries can +be made? We may as well expect to discover in the body new senses +which had before escaped the observation of all mankind."—(IV. pp. +273, 4.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>The restriction of the object of justice to property, in this passage, +is singular. Pleasure and pain can hardly be included under the term +property, and yet justice surely deals largely with the withholding of +the former, or the infliction of the latter, by men on one another. If a +man bars another from a pleasure which he would otherwise enjoy, or +actively hurts him without good reason, the latter is said to be injured +as much as if his property had been interfered with. Here, indeed, it +may be readily shown, that it is as much the interest of society that +men should not interfere with one another's freedom, or mutually inflict +positive or negative pain, as that they should not meddle with one +another's property; and hence the obligation of justice in such matters +may be deduced. But, if a man merely thinks ill of another, or feels +maliciously towards him without due cause, he is properly said to be +unjust. In this case it would be hard to prove that any injury is done +to society by the evil thought; but there is no question that it will be +stigmatised as an injustice; and the offender himself, in another frame +of mind, is often ready enough to admit that he has failed to be just +towards his neighbour. However, it may plausibly be said, that so slight +a barrier lies between<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">[Pg 203]</a></span> thought and speech, that any moral quality +attached to the latter is easily transferred to the former; and that, +since open slander is obviously opposed to the interests of society, +injustice of thought, which is silent slander, must become inextricably +associated with the same blame.</p> + +<p>But, granting the utility to society of all kinds of benevolence and +justice, why should the quality of those virtues involve the sense of +moral obligation?</p> + +<p>Hume answers this question in the fifth section, entitled, <i>Why Utility +Pleases</i>. He repudiates the deduction of moral approbation from +self-love, and utterly denies that we approve of benevolent or just +actions because we think of the benefits which they are likely to confer +indirectly on ourselves. The source of the approbation with which we +view an act useful to society must be sought elsewhere; and, in fact, is +to be found in that feeling which is called sympathy.</p> + +<blockquote><p>"No man is absolutely indifferent to the happiness and misery of +others. The first has a natural tendency to give pleasure, the +second pain. This every one may find in himself. It is not probable +that these principles can be resolved into principles more simple +and universal, whatever attempts may have been made for that +purpose."—(IV. p. 294, <i>Note</i>.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>Other men's joys and sorrows are not spectacles at which we remain +unmoved:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>" ... The view of the former, whether in its causes or effects, +like sunshine, or the prospect of well-cultivated plains (to carry +our pretensions no higher) communicates a secret joy and +satisfaction; the appearance of the latter, like a lowering cloud +or barren landscape, throws a melancholy damp over the imagination. +And this concession being once made, the difficulty is over; and a +natural unforced interpretation of the phenomena of human life will +afterwards, we hope, prevail among all speculative +inquirers."—(IV. p. 320.)</p></blockquote> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">[Pg 204]</a></span>The moral approbation, therefore, with which we regard acts of justice +or benevolence rests upon their utility to society, because the +perception of that utility or, in other words, of the pleasure which +they give to other men, arouses a feeling of sympathetic pleasure in +ourselves. The feeling of obligation to be just, or of the duty of +justice, arises out of that association of moral approbation or +disapprobation with one's own actions, which is what we call conscience. +To fail in justice, or in benevolence, is to be displeased with oneself. +But happiness is impossible without inward self-approval; and, hence, +every man who has any regard to his own happiness and welfare, will find +his best reward in the practice of every moral duty. On this topic Hume +expends much eloquence.</p> + +<blockquote><p>"But what philosophical truths can be more advantageous to society +than these here delivered, which represent virtue in all her +genuine and most engaging charms, and make us approach her with +ease, familiarity, and affection? The dismal dress falls off, with +which many divines and some philosophers have covered her; and +nothing appears but gentleness, humanity, beneficence, affability; +nay, even at proper intervals, play, frolic, and gaiety. She talks +not of useless austerities and rigours, suffering and self-denial. +She declares that her sole purpose is to make her votaries, and all +mankind, during every period of their existence, if possible, +cheerful and happy; nor does she ever willingly part with any +pleasure but in hopes of ample compensation in some other period of +their lives. The sole trouble which she demands is that of just +calculation, and a steady preference of the greater happiness. And +if any austere pretenders approach her, enemies to joy and +pleasure, she either rejects them as hypocrites and deceivers, or +if she admit them in her train, they are ranked, however, among the +least favoured of her votaries.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">[Pg 205]</a></span>"And, indeed, to drop all figurative expression, what hopes can we +ever have of engaging mankind to a practice which we confess full +of austerity and rigour? Or what theory of morals can ever serve +any useful purpose, unless it can show, by a particular detail, +that all the duties which it recommends are also the true interest +of each individual? The peculiar advantage of the foregoing system +seem to be, that it furnishes proper mediums for that +purpose."—(IV. p. 360.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>In this pæan to virtue, there is more of the dance measure than will +sound appropriate in the ears of most of the pilgrims who toil +painfully, not without many a stumble and many a bruise, along the rough +and steep roads which lead to the higher life.</p> + +<p>Virtue is undoubtedly beneficent; but the man is to be envied to whom +her ways seem in anywise playful. And, though she may not talk much +about suffering and self-denial, her silence on that topic may be +accounted for on the principle <i>ça va sans dire</i>. The calculation of the +greatest happiness is not performed quite so easily as a rule of three +sum; while, in the hour of temptation, the question will crop up, +whether, as something has to be sacrificed, a bird in the hand is not +worth two in the bush; whether it may not be as well to give up the +problematical greater happiness in the future, for a certain great +happiness in the present, and</p> + +<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> +<div class="i4">"Buy the merry madness of one hour</div> +<div>With the long irksomeness of following time."<a name="FNanchor_46_46" id="FNanchor_46_46"></a><a href="#Footnote_46_46" class="fnanchor">[46]</a></div> +</div></div> + +<p>If mankind cannot be engaged in practices "full of austerity and +rigour," by the love of righteousness and the fear of evil, without +seeking for other compensation than that which flows from the +gratification of such love and the consciousness of escape from +debasement, they<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">[Pg 206]</a></span> are in a bad case. For they will assuredly find that +virtue presents no very close likeness to the sportive leader of the +joyous hours in Hume's rosy picture; but that she is an awful Goddess, +whose ministers are the Furies, and whose highest reward is peace.</p> + +<p>It is not improbable that Hume would have qualified all this as +enthusiasm or fanaticism, or both; but he virtually admits it:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>"Now, as virtue is an end, and is desirable on its own account, +without fee or reward, merely for the immediate satisfaction which +it conveys, it is requisite that there should be some sentiment +which it touches; some internal taste or feeling, or whatever you +please to call it, which distinguishes moral good and evil, and +which embraces the one and rejects the other.</p> + +<p>"Thus the distinct boundaries and offices of <i>reason</i> and of +<i>taste</i> are easily ascertained. The former conveys the knowledge of +truth and falsehood: The latter gives the sentiment of beauty and +deformity, vice and virtue. The one discovers objects as they +really stand in nature, without addition or diminution: The other +has a productive faculty, and gilding and staining all natural +objects with the colours borrowed from internal sentiment, raises +in a manner a new creation. Reason being cool and disengaged, is no +motive to action, and directs only the impulse received from +appetite or inclination, by showing us the means of attaining +happiness or avoiding misery. Taste, as it gives pleasure or pain, +and thereby constitutes happiness or misery, becomes a motive to +action, and is the first spring or impulse to desire and volition. +From circumstances and relations known or supposed, the former +leads us to the discovery of the concealed and unknown. After all +circumstances and relations are laid before us, the latter makes us +feel from the whole a new sentiment of blame or approbation. The +standard of the one, being founded on the nature of things, is +external and inflexible, even by the will of the Supreme Being: The +standard of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">[Pg 207]</a></span> the other, arising from the internal frame and +constitution of animals, is ultimately derived from the Supreme +Will, which bestowed on each being its peculiar nature, and +arranged the several classes and orders of existence."—(IV. pp. +376-7.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>Hume has not discussed the theological theory of the obligations of +morality, but it is obviously in accordance with his view of the nature +of those obligations. Under its theological aspect, morality is +obedience to the will of God; and the ground for such obedience is +two-fold; either we ought to obey God because He will punish us if we +disobey Him, which is an argument based on the utility of obedience; or +our obedience ought to flow from our love towards God, which is an +argument based on pure feeling and for which no reason can be given. +For, if any man should say that he takes no pleasure in the +contemplation of the ideal of perfect holiness, or, in other words, that +he does not love God, the attempt to argue him into acquiring that +pleasure would be as hopeless as the endeavour to persuade Peter Bell of +the "witchery of the soft blue sky."</p> + +<p>In whichever way we look at the matter, morality is based on feeling, +not on reason; though reason alone is competent to trace out the effects +of our actions and thereby dictate conduct. Justice is founded on the +love of one's neighbour; and goodness is a kind of beauty. The moral +law, like the laws of physical nature, rests in the long run upon +instinctive intuitions, and is neither more nor less "innate" and +"necessary" than they are. Some people cannot by any means be got to +understand the first book of Euclid; but the truths of mathematics are +no less necessary and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">[Pg 208]</a></span> binding on the great mass of mankind. Some there +are who cannot feel the difference between the <i>Sonata Appassionata</i>, +and <i>Cherry Ripe</i>; or between a gravestone-cutter's cherub and the +Apollo Belvidere; but the canons of art are none the less acknowledged. +While some there may be, who, devoid of sympathy are incapable of a +sense of duty; but neither does their existence affect the foundations +of morality. Such pathological deviations from true manhood are merely +the halt, the lame, and the blind of the world of consciousness; and the +anatomist of the mind leaves them aside, as the anatomist of the body +would ignore abnormal specimens.</p> + +<p>And as there are Pascals and Mozarts, Newtons and Raffaelles, in whom +the innate faculty for science or art seems to need but a touch to +spring into full vigour, and through whom the human race obtains new +possibilities of knowledge and new conceptions of beauty: so there have +been men of moral genius, to whom we owe ideals of duty and visions of +moral perfection, which ordinary mankind could never have attained; +though, happily for them, they can feel the beauty of a vision, which +lay beyond the reach of their dull imaginations, and count life well +spent in shaping some faint image of it in the actual world.</p> + +<p class='tbrk'> </p> + +<h3>THE END</h3> + +<h4>LONDON: R. CLAY, SONS, AND TAYLOR, BREAD STREET HILL.</h4> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_45_45" id="Footnote_45_45"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45_45"><span class="label">[45]</span></a> Family affection in the eighteenth century may have been +stronger than in the nineteenth; but Hume's bachelor inexperience can +surely alone explain his strange account of the suppositions of the +marriage law of that day, and their effects. The law certainly abolished +all division of possessions, but it did so by making the husband sole +proprietor.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_46_46" id="Footnote_46_46"></a><a href="#FNanchor_46_46"><span class="label">[46]</span></a> Ben Jonson's <i>Cynthia's Revels</i>, act i.</p></div> +</div> + +<hr /> +<h2><a name="ADVERTISEMENTS" id="ADVERTISEMENTS"></a>ADVERTISEMENTS</h2> + +<hr class='smler' /> + +<h2>ENGLISH MEN OF LETTERS.</h2> + +<h3>EDITED BY JOHN MORLEY.</h3> + +<p><i>These Short Books are addressed to the general public with a view both +to stirring and satisfying an interest in literature and its great +topics in the minds of those who have to run as they read. An immense +class is growing up, and must every year increase, whose education will +have made them alive to the importance of the masters of our literature, +and capable of intelligent curiosity as to their performances. The +Series is intended to give the means of nourishing this curiosity, to an +extent that shall be copious enough to be profitable for knowledge and +life, and yet be brief enough to serve those whose leisure is scanty.</i></p> + +<p class='center'><i>The following are arranged for:</i>—</p> + +<table border='0' cellspacing='0' cellpadding='5' summary='English men of letters'> + <tr> + <td><i>SPENSER</i></td> + <td><i>The Dean of St. Paul's.</i></td> + <td></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><i>HUME</i></td> + <td><i>Professor Huxley.</i></td> + <td align="right"><i>[Ready.</i></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><i>BUNYAN</i></td> + <td><i>James Anthony Froude.</i></td> + <td align="right"></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><i>JOHNSON</i></td> + <td><i>Leslie Stephen.</i></td> + <td align="right"><i>[Ready.</i></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><i>GOLDSMITH</i></td> + <td><i>William Black.</i></td> + <td align="right"><i>[Ready.</i></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><i>MILTON</i></td> + <td><i>Mark Pattison.</i></td> + <td align="right"></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><i>WORDSWORTH</i></td> + <td><i>Goldwin Smith.</i></td> + <td align="right"></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><i>SWIFT</i></td> + <td><i>John Morley.</i></td> + <td align="right"></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><i>BURNS</i></td> + <td><i>Principal Shairp.</i></td> + <td align="right"><i>[Ready.</i></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td><i>SCOTT</i></td> + <td><i>Richard H. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Hume + (English Men of Letters Series) + +Author: T.H. Huxley + +Release Date: July 13, 2006 [EBook #18819] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HUME *** + + + + +Produced by Barbara Tozier, Bill Tozier, Martin Pettit and +the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at +http://www.pgdp.net + + + + + + +English Men of Letters + +EDITED BY JOHN MORLEY + + +HUME + +[Illustration: Publisher's logo] + +HUME + +BY + +PROFESSOR HUXLEY + + +London +MACMILLAN AND CO +1879 + +_The Right of Translation and Reproduction is Reserved_ + +LONDON: +R. CLAY, SONS, AND TAYLOR, +BREAD STREET HILL. + + + * * * * * + + + CONTENTS. + + + + _PART I.--HUME'S LIFE._ + + + CHAPTER I. + PAGE +EARLY LIFE: LITERARY AND POLITICAL WRITINGS 1 + + + CHAPTER II. + +LATER YEARS: THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND 26 + + + + _PART II.--HUME'S PHILOSOPHY._ + + + CHAPTER I. + +THE OBJECT AND SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY 48 + + + CHAPTER II. + +THE CONTENTS OF THE MIND 60 + + + CHAPTER III. + +THE ORIGIN OF THE IMPRESSIONS. 74 + + + CHAPTER IV. + +THE CLASSIFICATION AND THE NOMENCLATURE OF MENTAL +OPERATIONS 89 + + + CHAPTER V. + +THE MENTAL PHENOMENA OF ANIMALS 103 + + + CHAPTER VI. + +LANGUAGE--PROPOSITIONS CONCERNING NECESSARY TRUTHS 114 + + + CHAPTER VII. + +THE ORDER OF NATURE: MIRACLES 129 + + + CHAPTER VIII. + +THEISM: EVOLUTION OF THEOLOGY 140 + + + CHAPTER IX. + +THE SOUL: THE DOCTRINE OF IMMORTALITY 165 + + + CHAPTER X. + +VOLITION: LIBERTY AND NECESSITY 183 + + + CHAPTER XI. + +THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 197 + + + * * * * * + + +HUME. + + + + +PART I. + +_HUME'S LIFE._ + + + + +CHAPTER I. + +EARLY LIFE: LITERARY AND POLITICAL WRITINGS. + + +David Hume was born, in Edinburgh on the 26th of April (O.S.), 1711. His +parents were then residing in the parish of the Tron church, apparently +on a visit to the Scottish capital, as the small estate which his father +Joseph Hume, or Home, inherited, lay in Berwickshire, on the banks of +the Whitadder or Whitewater, a few miles from the border, and within +sight of English ground. The paternal mansion was little more than a +very modest farmhouse,[1] and the property derived its name of +Ninewells from a considerable spring, which breaks out on the slope in +front of the house, and falls into the Whitadder. + +Both mother and father came of good Scottish families--the paternal line +running back to Lord Home of Douglas, who went over to France with the +Douglas during the French wars of Henry V. and VI. and was killed at the +battle of Verneuil. Joseph Hume died when David was an infant, leaving +himself and two elder children, a brother and a sister, to the care of +their mother, who is described by David Hume in _My Own Life_ as "a +woman of singular merit, who though young and handsome devoted herself +entirely to the rearing and education of her children." Mr. Burton says: +"Her portrait, which I have seen, represents a thin but pleasing +countenance, expressive of great intellectual acuteness;" and as Hume +told Dr. Black that she had "precisely the same constitution with +himself" and died of the disorder which proved fatal to him, it is +probable that the qualities inherited from his mother had much to do +with the future philosopher's eminence. It is curious, however, that her +estimate of her son in her only recorded, and perhaps slightly +apocryphal utterance, is of a somewhat unexpected character. "Our +Davie's a fine goodnatured crater, but uncommon wake-minded." The first +part of the judgment was indeed verified by "Davie's" whole life; but +one might seek in vain for signs of what is commonly understood as +"weakness of mind" in a man who not only showed himself to be an +intellectual athlete, but who had an eminent share of practical wisdom +and tenacity of purpose. One would like to know, however, when it was +that Mrs. Hume committed herself to this not too flattering judgment of +her younger son. For as Hume reached the mature age of four and thirty, +before he obtained any employment of sufficient importance to convert +the meagre pittance of a middling laird's younger brother into a decent +maintenance, it is not improbable that a shrewd Scots wife may have +thought his devotion to philosophy and poverty to be due to mere +infirmity of purpose. But she lived till 1749, long enough to see more +than the dawn of her son's literary fame and official importance, and +probably changed her mind about "Davie's" force of character. + +David Hume appears to have owed little to schools or universities. There +is some evidence that he entered the Greek class in the University of +Edinburgh in 1723--when he was a boy of twelve years of age--but it is +not known how long his studies were continued, and he did not graduate. +In 1727, at any rate, he was living at Ninewells, and already possessed +by that love of learning and thirst for literary fame, which, as _My Own +Life_ tells us, was the ruling passion of his life and the chief source +of his enjoyments. A letter of this date, addressed to his friend +Michael Ramsay, is certainly a most singular production for a boy of +sixteen. After sundry quotations from Virgil the letter proceeds:-- + + "The perfectly wise man that outbraves fortune, is much greater + than the husbandman who slips by her; and, indeed, this pastoral + and saturnian happiness I have in a great measure come at just now. + I live like a king, pretty much by myself, neither full of action + nor perturbation--_molles somnos_. This state, however, I can + foresee is not to be relied on. My peace of mind is not + sufficiently confirmed by philosophy to withstand the blows of + fortune. This greatness and elevation of soul is to be found only + in study and contemplation. This alone can teach us to look down on + human accidents. You must allow [me] to talk thus like a + philosopher: 'tis a subject I think much on, and could talk all day + long of." + +If David talked in this strain to his mother her tongue probably gave +utterance to "Bless the bairn!" and, in her private soul, the epithet +"wake-minded" may then have recorded itself. But, though few lonely, +thoughtful, studious boys of sixteen give vent to their thoughts in such +stately periods, it is probable that the brooding over an ideal is +commoner at this age, than fathers and mothers, busy with the cares of +practical life, are apt to imagine. + +About a year later, Hume's family tried to launch him into the +profession of the law; but, as he tells us, "while they fancied I was +poring upon Voet and Vinnius, Cicero and Virgil were the authors which I +was secretly devouring," and the attempt seems to have come to an abrupt +termination. Nevertheless, as a very competent authority[2] wisely +remarks:-- + + "There appear to have been in Hume all the elements of which a good + lawyer is made: clearness of judgment, power of rapidly acquiring + knowledge, untiring industry, and dialectic skill: and if his mind + had not been preoccupied, he might have fallen into the gulf in + which many of the world's greatest geniuses lie + buried--professional eminence; and might have left behind him a + reputation limited to the traditional recollections of the + Parliament house, or associated with important decisions. He was + through life an able, clear-headed, man of business, and I have + seen several legal documents, written in his own hand and evidently + drawn by himself. They stand the test of general professional + observation; and their writer, by preparing documents of facts of + such a character on his own responsibility, showed that he had + considerable confidence in his ability to adhere to the forms + adequate for the occasion. He talked of it as 'an ancient prejudice + industriously propagated by the dunces in all countries, that _a + man of genius is unfit for business_,' and he showed, in his + general conduct through life, that he did not choose to come + voluntarily under this proscription." + +Six years longer Hume remained at Ninewells before he made another +attempt to embark in a practical career--this time commerce--and with a +like result. For a few months' trial proved that kind of life, also, to +be hopelessly against the grain. + +It was while in London, on his way to Bristol, where he proposed to +commence his mercantile life, that Hume addressed to some eminent London +physician (probably, as Mr. Burton suggests, Dr. George Cheyne) a +remarkable letter. Whether it was ever sent seems doubtful; but it shows +that philosophers as well as poets have their Werterian crises, and it +presents an interesting parallel to John Stuart Mill's record of the +corresponding period of his youth. The letter is too long to be given in +full, but a few quotations may suffice to indicate its importance to +those who desire to comprehend the man. + + "You must know then that from my earliest infancy I found always a + strong inclination to books and letters. As our college education + in Scotland, extending little further than the languages, ends + commonly when we are about fourteen or fifteen years of age, I was + after that left to my own choice in my reading, and found it + incline me almost equally to books of reasoning and philosophy, and + to poetry and the polite authors. Every one who is acquainted + either with the philosophers or critics, knows that there is + nothing yet established in either of these two sciences, and that + they contain little more than endless disputes, even in the most + fundamental articles. Upon examination of these, I found a certain + boldness of temper growing on me, which was not inclined to submit + to any authority in these subjects, but led me to seek out some new + medium, by which truth might be established. After much study and + reflection on this, at last, when I was about eighteen years of + age, there seemed to be opened up to me a new scene of thought, + which transported me beyond measure, and made me, with an ardour + natural to young men, throw up every other pleasure or business to + apply entirely to it. The law, which was the business I designed to + follow, appeared nauseous to me, and I could think of no other way + of pushing my fortune in the world, but that of a scholar and + philosopher. I was infinitely happy in this course of life for some + months; till at last, about the beginning of September, 1729, all + my ardour seemed in a moment to be extinguished, and I could no + longer raise my mind to that pitch, which formerly gave me such + excessive pleasure." + +This "decline of soul" Hume attributes, in part, to his being smitten +with the beautiful representations of virtue in the works of Cicero, +Seneca, and Plutarch, and being thereby led to discipline his temper and +his will along with his reason and understanding. + + "I was continually fortifying myself with reflections against + death, and poverty, and shame, and pain, and all the other + calamities of life." + +And he adds very characteristically:-- + + "These no doubt are exceeding useful when joined with an active + life, because the occasion being presented along with the + reflection, works it into the soul, and makes it take a deep + impression: but, in solitude, they serve to little other purpose + than to waste the spirits, the force of the mind meeting no + resistance, but wasting itself in the air, like our arm when it + misses its aim." + +Along with all this mental perturbation, symptoms of scurvy, a disease +now almost unknown among landsmen, but which, in the days of winter salt +meat, before root crops flourished in the Lothians, greatly plagued our +forefathers, made their appearance. And, indeed, it may be suspected +that physical conditions were, at first, at the bottom of the whole +business; for, in 1731, a ravenous appetite set in and, in six weeks +from being tall, lean, and raw-boned, Hume says he became sturdy and +robust, with a ruddy complexion and a cheerful countenance--eating, +sleeping, and feeling well, except that the capacity for intense mental +application seemed to be gone. He, therefore, determined to seek out a +more active life; and, though he could not and would not "quit his +pretensions to learning, but with his last breath," he resolved "to lay +them aside for some time, in order the more effectually to resume them." + +The careers open to a poor Scottish gentleman in those days were very +few; and, as Hume's option lay between a travelling tutorship and a +stool in a merchant's office, he chose the latter. + + "And having got recommendation to a considerable trader in Bristol, + I am just now hastening thither, with a resolution to forget + myself, and everything that is past, to engage myself, as far as is + possible, in that course of life, and to toss about the world from + one pole to the other, till I leave this distemper behind me."[3] + +But it was all of no use--Nature would have her way--and in the middle +of 1736, David Hume, aged twenty-three, without a profession or any +assured means of earning a guinea; and having doubtless, by his apparent +vacillation, but real tenacity of purpose, once more earned the title of +"wake-minded" at home; betook himself to a foreign country. + + "I went over to France, with a view of prosecuting my studies in a + country retreat: and there I laid that plan of life which I have + steadily and successfully pursued. I resolved to make a very rigid + frugality supply my deficiency of fortune, to maintain unimpaired + my independency, and to regard every object as contemptible except + the improvement of my talents in literature."[4] + +Hume passed through Paris on his way to Rheims, where he resided for +some time; though the greater part of his three years' stay was spent at +La Fleche, in frequent intercourse with the Jesuits of the famous +college in which Descartes was educated. Here he composed his first +work, the _Treatise of Human Nature_; though it would appear from the +following passage in the letter to Cheyne, that he had been accumulating +materials to that end for some years before he left Scotland. + + "I found that the moral philosophy transmitted to us by antiquity + laboured under the same inconvenience that has been found in their + natural philosophy, of being entirely hypothetical, and depending + more upon invention than experience: every one consulted his fancy + in erecting schemes of virtue and happiness, without regarding + human nature, upon which every moral conclusion must depend." + +This is the key-note of the _Treatise_; of which Hume himself says +apologetically, in one of his letters, that it was planned before he was +twenty-one and composed before he had reached the age of twenty-five.[5] + +Under these circumstances, it is probably the most remarkable +philosophical work, both intrinsically and in its effects upon the +course of thought, that has ever been written. Berkeley, indeed, +published the _Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision_, the _Treatise +Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge_, and the _Three +Dialogues_, between the ages of twenty-four and twenty-eight; and thus +comes very near to Hume, both in precocity and in influence; but his +investigations are more limited in their scope than those of his +Scottish contemporary. + +The first and second volumes of the _Treatise_, containing Book I., "Of +the Understanding," and Book II., "Of the Passions," were published in +January, 1739.[6] The publisher gave fifty pounds for the copyright; +which is probably more than an unknown writer of twenty-seven years of +age would get for a similar work, at the present time. But, in other +respects, its success fell far short of Hume's expectations. In a letter +dated the 1st of June, 1739, he writes,-- + + "I am not much in the humour of such compositions at present, + having received news from London of the success of my _Philosophy_, + which is but indifferent, if I may judge by the sale of the book, + and if I may believe my bookseller." + +This, however, indicates a very different reception from that which +Hume, looking through the inverted telescope of old age, ascribes to the +_Treatise_ in _My Own Life_. + + "Never literary attempt was more unfortunate than my _Treatise of + Human Nature_. It fell _deadborn from the press_ without reaching + such a distinction as even to excite a murmur among the zealots." + +As a matter of fact, it was fully, and, on the whole, respectfully and +appreciatively, reviewed in the _History of the Works of the Learned_ +for November, 1739.[7] Whoever the reviewer may have been, he was a man +of discernment, for he says that the work bears "incontestable marks of +a great capacity, of a soaring genius, but young, and not yet thoroughly +practised;" and he adds, that we shall probably have reason to consider +"this, compared with the later productions, in the same light as we view +the juvenile works of a Milton, or the first manner of a Raphael or +other celebrated painter." In a letter to Hutcheson, Hume merely speaks +of this article as "somewhat abusive;" so that his vanity, being young +and callow, seems to have been correspondingly wide-mouthed and hard to +satiate. + +It must be confessed that, on this occasion, no less than on that of his +other publications, Hume exhibits no small share of the craving after +mere notoriety and vulgar success, as distinct from the pardonable, if +not honourable, ambition for solid and enduring fame, which would have +harmonised better with his philosophy. Indeed, it appears to be by no +means improbable that this peculiarity of Hume's moral constitution was +the cause of his gradually forsaking philosophical studies, after the +publication of the third part (_On Morals_) of the _Treatise_, in 1740, +and turning to those political and historical topics which were likely +to yield, and did in fact yield, a much better return of that sort of +success which his soul loved. The _Philosophical Essays Concerning the +Human Understanding_, which afterwards became the _Inquiry_, is not much +more than an abridgment and recast, for popular use, of parts of the +_Treatise_, with the addition of the essays on Miracles and on +Necessity. In style, it exhibits a great improvement on the _Treatise_; +but the substance, if not deteriorated, is certainly not improved. Hume +does not really bring his mature powers to bear upon his early +speculations, in the later work. The crude fruits have not been ripened, +but they have been ruthlessly pruned away, along with the branches which +bore them. The result is a pretty shrub enough; but not the tree of +knowledge, with its roots firmly fixed in fact, its branches perennially +budding forth into new truths, which Hume might have reared. Perhaps, +after all, worthy Mrs. Hume was, in the highest sense, right. Davie was +"wake-minded," not to see that the world of philosophy was his to +overrun and subdue, if he would but persevere in the work he had begun. +But no--he must needs turn aside for "success": and verily he had his +reward; but not the crown he might have won. + +In 1740, Hume seems to have made an acquaintance which rapidly ripened +into a life long friendship. Adam Smith was, at that time, a boy student +of seventeen at the University of Glasgow; and Hume sends a copy of the +_Treatise_ to "Mr. Smith," apparently on the recommendation of the +well-known Hutcheson, Professor of Moral Philosophy in the university. +It is a remarkable evidence of Adam Smith's early intellectual +development, that a youth of his age should be thought worthy of such a +present. + +In 1741 Hume published anonymously, at Edinburgh, the first volume of +_Essays Moral and Political_, which was followed in 1742 by the second +volume. + +These pieces are written in an admirable style and, though arranged +without apparent method, a system of political philosophy may be +gathered from their contents. Thus the third essay, _That Politics may +be reduced to a Science_, defends that thesis, and dwells on the +importance of forms of government. + + "So great is the force of laws and of particular forms of + government, and so little dependence have they on the humours and + tempers of men, that consequences almost as general and certain may + sometimes be deduced from them as any which the mathematical + sciences afford us."--(III. 15.) (_See_ p. 45.) + +Hume proceeds to exemplify the evils which inevitably flow from +universal suffrage, from aristocratic privilege, and from elective +monarchy, by historical examples, and concludes:-- + + "That an hereditary prince, a nobility without vassals, and a + people voting by their representatives, form the best monarchy, + aristocracy, and democracy."--(III. 18.) + +If we reflect that the following passage of the same essay was written +nearly a century and a half ago, it would seem that whatever other +changes may have taken place, political warfare remains _in statu +quo_:-- + + "Those who either attack or defend a minister in such a government + as ours, where the utmost liberty is allowed, always carry matters + to an extreme, and exaggerate his merit or demerit with regard to + the public. His enemies are sure to charge him with the greatest + enormities, both in domestic and foreign management; and there is + no meanness or crime, of which, in their judgment, he is not + capable. Unnecessary wars, scandalous treaties, profusion of public + treasure, oppressive taxes, every kind of maladministration is + ascribed to him. To aggravate the charge, his pernicious conduct, + it is said, will extend its baneful influence even to posterity, by + undermining the best constitution in the world, and disordering + that wise system of laws, institutions, and customs, by which our + ancestors, during so many centuries, have been so happily governed. + He is not only a wicked minister in himself, but has removed every + security provided against wicked ministers for the future. + + "On the other hand, the partisans of the minister make his + panegyric rise as high as the accusation against him, and celebrate + his wise, steady, and moderate conduct in every part of his + administration. The honour and interest of the nation supported + abroad, public credit maintained at home, persecution restrained, + faction subdued: the merit of all these blessings is ascribed + solely to the minister. At the same time, he crowns all his other + merits by a religious care of the best government in the world, + which he has preserved in all its parts, and has transmitted + entire, to be the happiness and security of the latest + posterity."--(III. 26.) + +Hume sagely remarks that the panegyric and the accusation cannot both be +true; and, that what truth there may be in either, rather tends to show +that our much-vaunted constitution does not fulfil its chief object, +which is to provide a remedy against maladministration. And if it does +not-- + + "we are rather beholden to any minister who undermines it and + affords us the opportunity of erecting a better in its + place."--III. 28. + +The fifth Essay discusses the _Origin of Government_:-- + + "Man, born in a family, is compelled to maintain society from + necessity, from natural inclination, and from habit. The same + creature, in his farther progress, is engaged to establish + political society, in order to administer justice, without which + there can be no peace among them, nor safety, nor mutual + intercourse. We are therefore to look upon all the vast apparatus + of our government, as having ultimately no other object or purpose + but the distribution of justice, or, in other words, the support of + the twelve judges. Kings and parliaments, fleets and armies, + officers of the court and revenue, ambassadors, ministers and privy + councillors, are all subordinate in the end to this part of + administration. Even the clergy, as their duty leads them to + inculcate morality, may justly be thought, so far as regards this + world, to have no other useful object of their institution."--(III. + 37.) + +The police theory of government has never been stated more tersely: +and, if there were only one state in the world; and if we could be +certain by intuition, or by the aid of revelation, that it is wrong for +society, as a corporate body, to do anything for the improvement of its +members and, thereby, indirectly support the twelve judges, no objection +could be raised to it. + +Unfortunately the existence of rival or inimical nations furnishes +"kings and parliaments, fleets and armies," with a good deal of +occupation beyond the support of the twelve judges; and, though the +proposition that the State has no business to meddle with anything but +the administration of justice, seems sometimes to be regarded as an +axiom, it can hardly be said to be intuitively certain, inasmuch as a +great many people absolutely repudiate it; while, as yet, the attempt to +give it the authority of a revelation has not been made. + +As Hume says with profound truth in the fourth essay, _On the First +Principles of Government_:-- + + "As force is always on the side of the governed, the governors have + nothing to support them but opinion. It is, therefore, on opinion + only that government is founded; and this maxim extends to the most + despotic and most military governments, as well as to the most free + and the most popular."--(III. 31.) + +But if the whole fabric of social organisation rests on opinion, it may +surely be fairly argued that, in the interests of self-preservation, if +for no better reason, society has a right to see that the means of +forming just opinions are placed within the reach of every one of its +members; and, therefore, that due provision for education, at any rate, +is a right and, indeed, a duty, of the state. + +The three opinions upon which all government, or the authority of the +few over the many, is founded, says Hume, are public interest, right to +power, and right to property. No government can permanently exist, +unless the majority of the citizens, who are the ultimate depositary of +Force, are convinced that it serves the general interest, that it has +lawful authority, and that it respects individual rights:-- + + "A government may endure for several ages, though the balance of + power and the balance of property do not coincide.... But where the + original constitution allows any share of power, though small, to + an order of men who possess a large share of property, it is easy + for them gradually to stretch their authority, and bring the + balance of power to coincide with that of property. This has been + the case with the House of Commons in England."--(III. 34.) + +Hume then points out that, in his time, the authority of the Commons was +by no means equivalent to the property and power it represented, and +proceeds:-- + + "Were the members obliged to receive instructions from their + constituents, like the Dutch deputies, this would entirely alter + the case; and if such immense power and riches as those of all the + Commons of Great Britain, were brought into the scale, it is not + easy to conceive that the crown could either influence that + multitude of people, or withstand that balance of property. It is + true, the crown has great influence over the collective body in the + elections of members; but were this influence, which at present is + only exerted once in seven years, to be employed in bringing over + the people to every vote, it would soon be wasted, and no skill, + popularity, or revenue could support it. I must, therefore, be of + opinion that an alteration in this particular would introduce a + total alteration in our government, would soon reduce it to a pure + republic; and, perhaps, to a republic of no inconvenient + form."--(III. 35.) + +Viewed by the light of subsequent events, this is surely a very +remarkable example of political sagacity. The members of the House of +Commons are not yet delegates; but, with the widening of the suffrage +and the rapidly increasing tendency to drill and organise the +electorate, and to exact definite pledges from candidates, they are +rapidly becoming, if not delegates, at least attorneys for committees of +electors. The same causes are constantly tending to exclude men, who +combine a keen sense of self-respect with large intellectual capacity, +from a position in which the one is as constantly offended, as the other +is neutralised. Notwithstanding the attempt of George the Third to +resuscitate the royal authority, Hume's foresight has been so completely +justified that no one now dreams of the crown exerting the slightest +influence upon elections. + +In the seventh essay, Hume raises a very interesting discussion as to +the probable ultimate result of the forces which were at work in the +British Constitution in the first part of the eighteenth century:-- + + "There has been a sudden and sensible change in the opinions of + men, within these last fifty years, by the progress of learning and + of liberty. Most people in this island have divested themselves of + all superstitious reverence to names and authority; the clergy have + much lost their credit; their pretensions and doctrines have been + much ridiculed; and even religion can scarcely support itself in + the world. The mere name of _king_ commands little respect; and to + talk of a king as God's vicegerent on earth, or to give him any of + those magnificent titles which formerly dazzled mankind, would but + excite laughter in every one."--(III. 54.) + +In fact, at the present day, the danger to monarchy in Britain would +appear to lie, not in increasing love for equality, for which, except as +regards the law, Englishmen have never cared, but rather entertain an +aversion; nor in any abstract democratic theories, upon which the mass +of Englishmen pour the contempt with which they view theories in +general; but in the constantly increasing tendency of monarchy to become +slightly absurd, from the ever-widening discrepancy between modern +political ideas and the theory of kingship. As Hume observes, even in +his time, people had left off making believe that a king was a different +species of man from, other men; and, since his day, more and more such +make-believes have become impossible; until the maintenance of kingship +in coming generations seems likely to depend, entirely, upon whether it +is the general opinion, that a hereditary president of our virtual +republic will serve the general interest better than an elective one or +not. The tendency of public feeling in this direction is patent, but it +does not follow that a republic is to be the final stage of our +government. In fact, Hume thinks not:-- + + "It is well known, that every government must come to a period, and + that death is unavoidable to the political, as well as to the + animal body. But, as one kind of death may be preferable to + another, it may be inquired, whether it be more desirable for the + British constitution to terminate in a popular government, or in an + absolute monarchy? Here, I would frankly declare, that though + liberty be preferable to slavery, in almost every case; yet I + should rather wish to see an absolute monarch than a republic in + this island. For let us consider what kind of republic we have + reason to expect. The question is not concerning any fine imaginary + republic of which a man forms a plan in his closet. There is no + doubt but a popular government may be imagined more perfect than + an absolute monarchy, or even than our present constitution. But + what reason have we to expect that any such government will ever be + established in Great Britain, upon the dissolution of our monarchy? + If any single person acquire power enough to take our constitution + to pieces, and put it up anew, he is really an absolute monarch; + and we have already had an instance of this kind, sufficient to + convince us, that such a person will never resign his power, or + establish any free government. Matters, therefore, must be trusted + to their natural progress and operation; and the House of Commons, + according to its present constitution, must be the only legislature + in such a popular government. The inconveniences attending such a + situation of affairs present themselves by thousands. If the House + of Commons, in such a case, ever dissolve itself, which is not to + be expected, we may look for a civil war every election. If it + continue itself, we shall suffer all the tyranny of a faction + subdivided into new factions. And, as such a violent government + cannot long subsist, we shall at last, after many convulsions and + civil wars, find repose in absolute monarchy, which it would have + been happier for us to have established peaceably from the + beginning. Absolute monarchy, therefore, is the easiest death, the + true _Euthanasia_ of the British constitution. + + "Thus if we have more reason to be jealous of monarchy, because the + danger is more imminent from that quarter; we have also reason to + be more jealous of popular government, because that danger is more + terrible. This may teach us a lesson of moderation in all our + political controversies."--(III. 55.) + +One may admire the sagacity of these speculations, and the force and +clearness with which they are expressed, without altogether agreeing +with them. That an analogy between the social and bodily organism +exists, and is, in many respects, clear and full of instructive +suggestion, is undeniable. Yet a state answers, not to an individual, +but to a generic type; and there is no reason, in the nature of things, +why any generic type should die out. The type of the pearly _Nautilus_, +highly organised as it is, has persisted with but little change from the +Silurian epoch till now; and, so long as terrestrial conditions remain +approximately similar to what they are at present, there is no more +reason why it should cease to exist in the next, than in the past, +hundred million years or so. The true ground for doubting the +possibility of the establishment of absolute monarchy in Britain is, +that opinion seems to have passed through, and left far behind, the +stage at which such a change would be possible; and the true reason for +doubting the permanency of a republic, if it is ever established, lies +in the fact, that a republic requires for its maintenance a far higher +standard of morality and of intelligence in the members of the state +than any other form of government. Samuel gave the Israelites a king +because they were not righteous enough to do without one, with a pretty +plain warning of what they were to expect from the gift. And, up to this +time, the progress of such republics as have been established in the +world has not been such, as to lead to any confident expectation that +their foundation is laid on a sufficiently secure subsoil of public +spirit, morality, and intelligence. On the contrary, they exhibit +examples of personal corruption and of political profligacy as fine as +any hotbed of despotism has ever produced; while they fail in the +primary duty of the administration of justice, as none but an effete +despotism has ever failed. + +Hume has been accused of departing, in his old age, from the liberal +principles of his youth; and, no doubt, he was careful, in the later +editions of the _Essays_, to expunge everything that savoured of +democratic tendencies. But the passage just quoted shows that this was +no recantation, but simply a confirmation, by his experience of one of +the most debased periods of English history, of those evil tendencies +attendant on popular government, of which, from the first, he was fully +aware. + +In the ninth essay, _On the Parties of Great Britain_, there occurs a +passage which, while it affords evidence of the marvellous change which +has taken place in the social condition of Scotland since 1741, contains +an assertion respecting the state of the Jacobite party at that time, +which at first seems surprising:-- + + "As violent things have not commonly so long a duration as + moderate, we actually find that the Jacobite party is almost + entirely vanished from among us, and that the distinction of + _Court_ and _Country_, which is but creeping in at London, is the + only one that is ever mentioned in this kingdom. Beside the + violence and openness of the Jacobite party, another reason has + perhaps contributed to produce so sudden and so visible an + alteration in this part of Britain. There are only two ranks of men + among us; gentlemen who have some fortune and education, and the + meanest slaving poor; without any considerable number of that + middling rank of men, which abound more in England, both in cities + and in the country, than in any other part of the world. The + slaving poor are incapable of any principles; gentlemen may be + converted to true principles, by time and experience. The middling + rank of men have curiosity and knowledge enough to form principles, + but not enough to form true ones, or correct any prejudices that + they may have imbibed. And it is among the middling rank of people + that Tory principles do at present prevail most in England."--(III. + 80, _note_.) + +Considering that the Jacobite rebellion of 1745 broke out only four +years after this essay was published, the assertion that the Jacobite +party had "almost entirely vanished in 1741" sounds strange enough: and +the passage which contains it is omitted in the third edition of the +_Essays_, published in 1748. Nevertheless, Hume was probably right, as +the outbreak of '45 was little better than a Highland raid, and the +Pretender obtained no important following in the Lowlands. + +No less curious, in comparison with what would be said nowadays, is +Hume's remark in the Essay on the _Rise of the Arts and Sciences_ that-- + + "The English are become sensible of the scandalous licentiousness + of their stage from the example of the French decency and + morals."--(III. 135.) + +And it is perhaps as surprising to be told, by a man of Hume's literary +power, that the first polite prose in the English language was written +by Swift. Locke and Temple (with whom Sprat is astoundingly conjoined) +"knew too little of the rules of art to be esteemed elegant writers," +and the prose of Bacon, Harrington, and Milton is "altogether stiff and +pedantic." Hobbes, who whether he should be called a "polite" writer or +not, is a master of vigorous English; Clarendon, Addison, and Steele +(the last two, surely, were "polite" writers in all conscience) are not +mentioned. + +On the subject of _National Character_, about which more nonsense, and +often very mischievous nonsense, has been and is talked than upon any +other topic, Hume's observations are full of sense and shrewdness. He +distinguishes between the _moral_ and the _physical_ causes of national +character, enumerating under the former-- + + "The nature of the government, the revolutions of public affairs, + the plenty or penury in which people live, the situation of the + nation with regard to its neighbours, and such like + circumstances."--(III. 225.) + +and under the latter:-- + + "Those qualities of the air and climate, which are supposed to work + insensibly on the temper, by altering the tone and habit of the + body, and giving a particular complexion, which, though reflexion + and reason may sometimes overcome it, will yet prevail among the + generality of mankind, and have an influence on their + manners."--(III. 225.) + +While admitting and exemplifying the great influence of moral causes, +Hume remarks-- + + "As to physical causes, I am inclined to doubt altogether of their + operation in this particular; nor do I think that men owe anything + of their temper or genius to the air, food, or climate."--(III. + 227.) + +Hume certainly would not have accepted the "rice theory" in explanation +of the social state of the Hindoos; and, it may be safely assumed, that +he would not have had recourse to the circumambience of the "melancholy +main" to account for the troublous history of Ireland. He supports his +views by a variety of strong arguments, among which, at the present +conjuncture, it is worth noting that the following occurs-- + + "Where any accident, as a difference in language or religion, keeps + two nations, inhabiting the same country, from mixing with one + another, they will preserve during several centuries a distinct and + even opposite set of manners. The integrity, gravity, and bravery + of the Turks, form an exact contrast to the deceit, levity, and + cowardice of the modern Greeks."--(III. 233.) + +The question of the influence of race, which plays so great a part in +modern political speculations, was hardly broached in Hume's time, but +he had an inkling of its importance:-- + + "I am apt to suspect the Negroes to be naturally inferior to the + Whites. There scarcely ever was a civilised nation of that + complexion, nor even any individual, eminent either in action or + speculation.... Such a uniform and constant difference [between the + negroes and the whites] could not happen in so many countries and + ages, if nature had not made an original distinction between these + breeds of men.... In Jamaica, indeed, they talk of one Negro as a + man of parts and learning; but it is likely he is admired for + slender accomplishments, like a parrot who speaks a few words + plainly."--(III. 236.) + +The _Essays_ met with the success they deserved. Hume wrote to Henry +Home in June, 1742:-- + + "The Essays are all sold in London, as I am informed by two letters + from English gentlemen of my acquaintance. There is a demand for + them; and, as one of them tells me, Innys, the great bookseller in + Paul's Churchyard, wonders there is not a new edition, for he + cannot find copies for his customers. I am also told that Dr. + Butler has everywhere recommended them; so that I hope that they + will have some success." + +Hume had sent Butler a copy of the _Treatise_ and had called upon him, +in London, but he was out of town; and being shortly afterwards made +Bishop of Bristol, Hume seems to have thought that further advances on +his part might not be well received. + +Greatly comforted by this measure of success, Hume remained at +Ninewells, rubbing up his Greek, until 1745; when, at the mature age of +thirty-four, he made his entry into practical life, by becoming +bear-leader to the Marquis of Annandale, a young nobleman of feeble +body and feebler mind. As might have been predicted, this venture was +not more fortunate than his previous ones; and, after a year's +endurance, diversified latterly with pecuniary squabbles, in which +Hume's tenacity about a somewhat small claim is remarkable, the +engagement came to an end. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] A picture of the house, taken from Drummond's _History of Noble +British Families_, is to be seen in Chambers's _Book of Days_ (April +26th); and if, as Drummond says, "It is a favourable specimen of the +best Scotch lairds' houses," all that can be said is worst Scotch lairds +must have been poorly lodged indeed. + +[2] Mr. John Hill Burton, in his valuable _Life of Hume_, on which, I +need hardly say, I have drawn freely for the materials of the present +biographical sketch. + +[3] One cannot but be reminded of young Descartes' renunciation of study +for soldiering. + +[4] _My Own Life._ + +[5] Letter to Gilbert Elliot of Minto, 1751. "So vast an undertaking, +planned before I was one-and-twenty, and composed before twenty-five, +must necessarily be very defective. I have repented my haste a hundred +and a hundred times." + +[6] So says Mr. Burton, and that he is right is proved by a letter of +Hume's, dated February 13, 1739, in which he writes, "'Tis now a +fortnight since my book was published." But it is a curious illustration +of the value of testimony, that Hume, in _My Own Life_, states: "In the +end of 1738 I published my Treatise, and immediately went down to my +mother and my brother." + +[7] Burton, _Life_, vol. i. p. 109. + + + + +CHAPTER II. + +LATER YEARS: THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND. + + +In 1744, Hume's friends had endeavoured to procure his nomination to the +Chair of "Ethics and pneumatic philosophy"[8] in the University of +Edinburgh. About this matter he writes to his friend William Mure:-- + + "The accusation of heresy, deism, scepticism, atheism, &c., &c., + &c. was started against me; but never took, being bore down by the + contrary authority of all the good company in town." + +If the "good company in town" bore down the first three of these +charges, it is to be hoped, for the sake of their veracity, that they +knew their candidate chiefly as the very good company that he always +was; and had paid as little attention, as good company usually does, to +so solid a work as the _Treatise_. Hume expresses a naive surprise, not +unmixed with indignation, that Hutcheson and Leechman, both clergymen +and sincere, though liberal, professors of orthodoxy, should have +expressed doubts as to his fitness for becoming a professedly +presbyterian teacher of presbyterian youth. The town council, however, +would not have him, and filled up the place with a safe nobody. + +In May, 1746, a new prospect opened. General St. Clair was appointed to +the command of an expedition to Canada, and he invited Hume, at a week's +notice, to be his secretary; to which office that of judge advocate was +afterwards added. + +Hume writes to a friend: "The office is very genteel, 10_s_. a day, +perquisites, and no expenses;" and, to another, he speculates on the +chance of procuring a company in an American regiment. "But this I build +not on, nor indeed am I very fond of it," he adds; and this was +fortunate, for the expedition, after dawdling away the summer in port, +was suddenly diverted to an attack on L'Orient, where it achieved a huge +failure and returned ignominiously to England. + +A letter to Henry Home, written when this unlucky expedition was +recalled, shows that Hume had already seriously turned his attention to +history. Referring to an invitation to go over to Flanders with the +General, he says: + + "Had I any fortune which would give me a prospect of leisure and + opportunity to prosecute my _historical projects_, nothing could be + more useful to me, and I should pick up more literary knowledge in + one campaign by being in the General's family, and being introduced + frequently to the Duke's, than most officers could do after many + years' service. But to what can all this serve? I am a philosopher, + and so I suppose must continue." + +But this vaticination was shortly to prove erroneous. Hume seems to +have made a very favourable impression on General St. Clair, as he did +upon every one with whom he came into personal contact; for, being +charged with a mission to the court of Turin, in 1748, the General +insisted upon the appointment of Hume as his secretary. He further made +him one of his aides-de-camp; so that the philosopher was obliged to +encase his more than portly, and by no means elegant, figure in a +military uniform. Lord Charlemont, who met him at Turin, says he was +"disguised in scarlet," and that he wore his uniform "like a grocer of +the train-bands." Hume, always ready for a joke at his own expense, +tells of the considerate kindness with which, at a reception at Vienna, +the Empress-dowager released him and his friends from the necessity of +walking backwards. "We esteemed ourselves very much obliged to her for +this attention, especially my companions, who were desperately afraid of +my falling on them and crushing them." + +Notwithstanding the many attractions of this appointment, Hume writes +that he leaves home "with infinite regret, where I had treasured up +stores of study and plans of thinking for many years;" and his only +consolation is that the opportunity of becoming conversant with state +affairs may be profitable:-- + + "I shall have an opportunity of seeing courts and camps: and if I + can afterward be so happy as to attain leisure and other + opportunities, this knowledge may even turn to account to me as a + man of letters, which I confess has always been the sole object of + my ambition. I have long had an intention, in my riper years, of + composing some history; and I question not but some greater + experience in the operations of the field and the intrigues of the + cabinet will be requisite, in order to enable me to speak with + judgment on these subjects." + +Hume returned to London in 1749, and, during his stay there, his mother +died, to his heartfelt sorrow. A curious story in connection with this +event is told by Dr. Carlyle, who knew Hume well, and whose authority is +perfectly trustworthy. + + "Mr. Boyle hearing of it, soon after went to his apartment, for + they lodged in the same house, where he found him in the deepest + affliction and in a flood of tears. After the usual topics and + condolences Mr. Boyle said to him, 'My friend, you owe this + uncommon grief to having thrown off the principles of religion: for + if you had not, you would have been consoled with the firm belief + that the good lady, who was not only the best of mothers, but the + most pious of Christians, was completely happy in the realms of the + just. To which David replied, 'Though I throw out my speculations + to entertain the learned and metaphysical world, yet in other + things I do not think so differently from the rest of the world as + you imagine.'" + +If Hume had told this story to Dr. Carlyle, the latter would have said +so; it must therefore have come from Mr. Boyle; and one would like to +have the opportunity of cross-examining that gentleman as to Hume's +exact words and their context, before implicitly accepting his version +of the conversation. Mr. Boyle's experience of mankind must have been +small, if he had not seen the firmest of believers overwhelmed with +grief by a like loss, and as completely inconsolable. Hume may have +thrown off Mr. Boyle's "principles of religion," but he was none the +less a very honest man, perfectly open and candid, and the last person +to use ambiguous phraseology, among his friends; unless, indeed, he saw +no other way of putting a stop to the intrusion of unmannerly twaddle +amongst the bitter-sweet memories stirred in his affectionate nature by +so heavy a blow. + +The _Philosophical Essays_ or _Inquiry_ was published in 1748, while +Hume was away with General St. Clair, and, on his return to England, he +had the mortification to find it overlooked in the hubbub caused by +Middleton's _Free Inquiry_, and its bold handling of the topic of the +_Essay on Miracles_, by which Hume doubtless expected the public to be +startled. + +Between 1749 and 1751, Hume resided at Ninewells, with his brother and +sister, and busied himself with the composition of his most finished, if +not his most important works, the _Dialogues on Natural Religion_, the +_Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals_, and the _Political +Discourses_. + +_The Dialogues on Natural Religion_ were touched and re-touched, at +intervals, for a quarter of a century, and were not published till after +Hume's death: but the _Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals_ +appeared in 1751, and the _Political Discourses_ in 1752. Full reference +will be made to the two former in the exposition of Hume's philosophical +views. The last has been well said to be the "cradle of political +economy: and much as that science has been investigated and expounded in +later times, these earliest, shortest, and simplest developments of its +principles are still read with delight even by those who are masters of +all the literature of this great subject."[9] + +The _Wealth of Nations_, the masterpiece of Hume's close friend, Adam +Smith, it must be remembered, did not appear before 1776, so that, in +political economy, no less than in philosophy, Hume was an original, a +daring, and a fertile innovator. + +The _Political Essays_ had a great and rapid success; translated into +French in 1753, and again in 1754, they conferred a European reputation +upon their author; and, what was more to the purpose, influenced the +later French school of economists of the eighteenth century. + +By this time, Hume had not only attained a high reputation in the world +of letters, but he considered himself a man of independent fortune. His +frugal habits had enabled him to accumulate L1,000, and he tells Michael +Ramsay in 1751:-- + + "While interest remains as at present, I have L50 a year, a hundred + pounds worth of books, great store of linens and fine clothes, and + near L100 in my pocket; along with order, frugality, a strong + spirit of independency, good health, a contented humour, and an + unabated love of study. In these circumstances I must esteem myself + one of the happy and fortunate; and so far from being willing to + draw my ticket over again in the lottery of life, there are very + few prizes with which I would make an exchange. After some + deliberation, I am resolved to settle in Edinburgh, and hope I + shall be able with these revenues to say with Horace:-- + + + 'Est bona librorum et provisae frugis in annum + Copia.'" + + +It would be difficult to find a better example of the honourable +independence and cheerful self-reliance which should distinguish a man +of letters, and which characterised Hume throughout his career. By +honourable effort, the boy's noble ideal of life, became the man's +reality; and, at forty, Hume had the happiness of finding that he had +not wasted his youth in the pursuit of illusions, but that "the solid +certainty of waking bliss" lay before him, in the free play of his +powers in their appropriate sphere. + +In 1751, Hume removed to Edinburgh and took up his abode on a flat in +one of those prodigious houses in the Lawnmarket, which still excite the +admiration of tourists; afterwards moving to a house in the Canongate. +His sister joined him, adding L30 a year to the common stock; and, in +one of his charmingly playful letters to Dr. Clephane, he thus describes +his establishment, in 1753. + + "I shall exult and triumph to you a little that I have now at + last--being turned of forty, to my own honour, to that of learning, + and to that of the present age--arrived at the dignity of being a + householder. + + "About seven months ago, I got a house of my own, and completed a + regular family, consisting of a head, viz., myself, and two + inferior members, a maid and a cat. My sister has since joined me, + and keeps me company. With frugality, I can reach, I find, + cleanliness, warmth, light, plenty, and contentment. What would you + have more? Independence? I have it in a supreme degree. Honour? + That is not altogether wanting. Grace? That will come in time. A + wife? That is none of the indispensable requisites of life. Books? + That is one of them; and I have more than I can use. In short, I + cannot find any pleasure of consequence which I am not possessed of + in a greater or less degree; and, without any great effort of + philosophy, I may be easy and satisfied. + + "As there is no happiness without occupation, I have begun a work + which will occupy me several years, and which yields me much + satisfaction. 'Tis a History of Britain from the Union of the + Crowns to the present time. I have already finished the reign of + King James. My friends flatter me (by this I mean that they don't + flatter me) that I have succeeded." + +In 1752, the Faculty of Advocates elected Hume their librarian, an +office which, though it yielded little emolument--the salary was only +forty pounds a year--was valuable as it placed the resources of a large +library at his disposal. The proposal to give Hume even this paltry +place caused a great outcry, on the old score of infidelity. But as Hume +writes, in a jubilant letter to Clephane (February 4, 1752):-- + + "I carried the election by a considerable majority.... What is more + extraordinary, the cry of religion could not hinder the ladies from + being violently my partisans, and I owe my success in a great + measure to their solicitations. One has broke off all commerce with + her lover because he voted against me! And Mr. Lockhart, in a + speech to the Faculty, said there was no walking the streets, nor + even enjoying one's own fireside, on account of their importunate + zeal. The town says that even his bed was not safe for him, though + his wife was cousin-german to my antagonist. + + "'Twas vulgarly given out that the contest was between Deists and + Christians, and when the news of my success came to the playhouse, + the whisper rose that the Christians were defeated. Are you not + surprised that we could keep our popularity, notwithstanding this + imputation, which my friends could not deny to be well founded?" + +It would seem that the "good company" was less enterprising in its +asseverations in this canvass than in the last. + +The first volume of the _History of Great Britain, containing the reign +of James I. and Charles I._, was published in 1754. At first, the sale +was large, especially in Edinburgh, and if notoriety _per se_ was Hume's +object, he attained it. But he liked applause as well as fame and, to +his bitter disappointment, he says:-- + + "I was assailed by one cry of reproach, disapprobation, and even + detestation: English, Scotch, and Irish, Whig and Tory, Churchman + and Sectary, Freethinker and Religionist, Patriot and Courtier, + united in their rage against the man who had presumed to shed a + generous tear for the fate of Charles I. and the Earl of Strafford; + and after the first ebullitions of their fury were over, what was + still more mortifying, the book seemed to fall into oblivion. Mr. + Millar told me that in a twelvemonth he sold only forty-five copies + of it. I scarcely, indeed, heard of one man in the three kingdoms, + considerable for rank or letters, that could endure the book. I + must only except the primate of England, Dr. Herring, and the + primate of Ireland, Dr. Stone, which seem two odd exceptions. These + dignified prelates separately sent me messages not to be + discouraged." + +It certainly is odd to think of David Hume being comforted in his +affliction by the independent and spontaneous sympathy of a pair of +archbishops. But the instincts of the dignified prelates guided them +rightly; for, as the great painter of English history in Whig pigments +has been careful to point out,[10] Hume's historical picture, though a +great work, drawn by a master hand, has all the lights Tory, and all the +shades Whig. + +Hume's ecclesiastical enemies seem to have thought that their +opportunity had now arrived; and an attempt was made to get the General +Assembly of 1756 to appoint a committee to inquire into his writings. +But, after a keen debate, the proposal was rejected by fifty votes to +seventeen. Hume does not appear to have troubled himself about the +matter, and does not even think it worth mention in _My Own Life_. + +In 1756 he tells Clephane that he is worth L1,600 sterling, and +consequently master of an income which must have been wealth to a man of +his frugal habits. In the same year, he published the second volume of +the _History_, which met with a much better reception than the first; +and, in 1757, one of his most remarkable works, the _Natural History of +Religion_, appeared. In the same year, he resigned his office of +librarian to the Faculty of Advocates, and he projected removal to +London, probably to superintend the publication of the additional volume +of the _History_. + + "I shall certainly be in London next summer; and probably to remain + there during life: at least, if I can settle myself to my mind, + which I beg you to have an eye to. A room in a sober discreet + family, who would not be averse to admit a sober, discreet, + virtuous, regular, quiet, goodnatured man of a bad character--such + a room, I say, would suit me extremely."[11] + +The promised visit took place in the latter part of the year 1758, and +he remained in the metropolis for the greater part of 1759. The two +volumes of the _History of England under the House of Tudor_ were +published in London, shortly after Hume's return to Edinburgh; and, +according to his own account, they raised almost as great a clamour as +the first two had done. + +Busily occupied with the continuation of his historical labours, Hume +remained in Edinburgh until 1763; when, at the request of Lord Hertford, +who was going as ambassador to France, he was appointed to the embassy; +with the promise of the secretaryship, and, in the meanwhile, +performing the duties of that office. At first, Hume declined the offer; +but, as it was particularly honourable to so well abused a man, on +account of Lord Hertford's high reputation for virtue and piety,[12] and +no less advantageous by reason of the increase of fortune which it +secured to him, he eventually accepted it. + +In France, Hume's reputation stood far higher than in Britain; several +of his works had been translated; he had exchanged letters with +Montesquieu and with Helvetius; Rousseau had appealed to him; and the +charming Madame de Boufflers had drawn him into a correspondence, marked +by almost passionate enthusiasm on her part, and as fair an imitation of +enthusiasm as Hume was capable of, on his. In the extraordinary mixture +of learning, wit, humanity, frivolity, and profligacy which then +characterised the highest French society, a new sensation was worth +anything, and it mattered little whether the cause thereof was a +philosopher or a poodle; so Hume had a great success in the Parisian +world. Great nobles feted him, and great ladies were not content unless +the "gros David" was to be seen at their receptions, and in their boxes +at the theatre. "At the opera his broad unmeaning face was usually to be +seen _entre deux jolis minois_," says Lord Charlemont.[13] Hume's cool +head was by no means turned; but he took the goods the gods provided +with much satisfaction; and everywhere won golden opinions by his +unaffected good sense and thorough kindness of heart. + +Over all this part of Hume's career, as over the surprising episode of +the quarrel with Rousseau, if that can be called quarrel which was +lunatic malignity on Rousseau's side and thorough generosity and +patience on Hume's, I may pass lightly. The story is admirably told by +Mr. Burton, to whose volumes I refer the reader. Nor need I dwell upon +Hume's short tenure of office in London, as Under-Secretary of State, +between 1767 and 1769. Success and wealth are rarely interesting, and +Hume's case is no exception to the rule. + +According to his own description the cares of official life were not +overwhelming. + + "My way of life here is very uniform and by no means disagreeable. + I have all the forenoon in the Secretary's house, from ten till + three, when there arrive from time to time messengers that bring me + all the secrets of the kingdom, and, indeed, of Europe, Asia, + Africa, and America. I am seldom hurried; but have leisure at + intervals to take up a book, or write a private letter, or converse + with a friend that may call for me; and from dinner to bed-time is + all my own. If you add to this that the person with whom I have the + chief, if not only, transactions, is the most reasonable, + equal-tempered, and gentleman-like man imaginable, and Lady + Aylesbury the same, you will certainly think I have no reason to + complain; and I am far from complaining. I only shall not regret + when my duty is over; because to me the situation can lead to + nothing, at least in all probability; and reading, and sauntering, + and lounging, and dozing, which I call thinking, is my supreme + happiness--I mean my full contentment." + +Hume's duty was soon over, and he returned to Edinburgh in 1769, "very +opulent" in the possession of L1,000 a year, and determined to take what +remained to him of life pleasantly and easily. In October, 1769, he +writes to Elliot:-- + + "I have been settled here two months, and am here body and soul, + without casting the least thought of regret to London, or even to + Paris.... I live still, and must for a twelvemonth, in my old house + in James's Court, which is very cheerful and even elegant, but too + small to display my great talent for cookery, the science to which + I intend to addict the remaining years of my life. I have just now + lying on the table before me a receipt for making _soupe a la + reine_, copied with my own hand; for beef and cabbage (a charming + dish) and old mutton and old claret nobody excels me. I make also + sheep's-head broth in a manner that Mr. Keith speaks of for eight + days after; and the Duc de Nivernois would bind himself apprentice + to my lass to learn it. I have already sent a challenge to David + Moncreiff: you will see that in a twelvemonth he will take to the + writing of history, the field I have deserted; for as to the giving + of dinners, he can now have no further pretensions. I should have + made a very bad use of my abode in Paris if I could not get the + better of a mere provincial like him. All my friends encourage me + in this ambition; as thinking it will redound very much to my + honour." + +In 1770, Hume built himself a house in the new town of Edinburgh, which +was then springing up. It was the first house in the street, and a +frolicsome young lady chalked upon the wall "St. David's Street." Hume's +servant complained to her master, who replied, "Never mind, lassie, many +a better man has been made a saint of before," and the street retains +its title to this day. + +In the following six years, the house in St. David's Street was the +centre of the accomplished and refined society which then distinguished +Edinburgh. Adam Smith, Blair, and Ferguson were within easy reach; and +what remains of Hume's correspondence with Sir Gilbert Elliot, Colonel +Edmonstone, and Mrs. Cockburn gives pleasant glimpses of his social +surroundings, and enables us to understand his contentment with his +absence from the more perturbed, if more brilliant, worlds of Paris and +London. + +Towards London, Londoners, and indeed Englishmen in general, Hume +entertained a dislike, mingled with contempt, which was as nearly +rancorous as any emotion of his could be. During his residence in Paris, +in 1764 and 1765, he writes to Blair:-- + + "The taste for literature is neither decayed nor depraved here, as + with the barbarians who inhabit the banks of the Thames." + +And he speaks of the "general regard paid to genius and learning" in +France as one of the points in which it most differs from England. Ten +years later, he cannot even thank Gibbon for his History without the +left-handed compliment, that he should never have expected such an +excellent work from the pen of an Englishman. Early in 1765, Hume writes +to Millar:-- + + "The rage and prejudice of parties frighten me, and above all, this + rage against the Scots, which is so dishonourable, and indeed so + infamous, to the English nation. We hear that it increases every + day without the least appearance of provocation on our part. It has + frequently made me resolve never in my life to set foot on English + ground. I dread, if I should undertake a more modern history, the + impertinence and ill-manners to which it would expose me; and I was + willing to know from you whether former prejudices had so far + subsided as to ensure me of a good reception." + +His fears were kindly appeased by Millar's assurance that the English +were not prejudiced against the Scots in general, but against the +particular Scot, Lord Bute, who was supposed to be the guide, +philosopher, and friend, of both Dowager Queen and King. + +To care nothing about literature, to dislike Scotchmen, and to be +insensible to the merits of David Hume, was a combination of iniquities +on the part of the English nation, which would have been amply +sufficient to ruffle the temper of the philosophic historian, who, +without being foolishly vain, had certainly no need of what has been +said to be the one form of prayer in which his countrymen, torn as they +are by theological differences, agree; "Lord! gie us a gude conceit o' +oursels." But when, to all this, these same Southrons added a passionate +admiration for Lord Chatham, who was in Hume's eyes a charlatan; and +filled up the cup of their abominations by cheering for "Wilkes and +Liberty," Hume's wrath knew no bounds, and, between 1768 and 1770, he +pours a perfect Jeremiad into the bosom of his friend Sir Gilbert +Elliot. + + "Oh! how I long to see America and the East Indies revolted, + totally and finally--the revenue reduced to half--public credit + fully discredited by bankruptcy--the third of London in ruins, and + the rascally mob subdued! I think I am not too old to despair of + being witness to all these blessings. + + "I am delighted to see the daily and hourly progress of madness and + folly and wickedness in England. The consummation of these + qualities are the true ingredients for making a fine narrative in + history, especially if followed by some signal and ruinous + convulsion--as I hope will soon be the case with that pernicious + people!" + +Even from the secure haven of James's Court, the maledictions continue +to pour forth:-- + + "Nothing but a rebellion and bloodshed will open the eyes of that + deluded people; though were they alone concerned, I think it is no + matter what becomes of them.... Our government has become a + chimera, and is too perfect, in point of liberty, for so rude a + beast as an Englishman; who is a man, a bad animal too, corrupted + by above a century of licentiousness. The misfortune is that this + liberty can scarcely be retrenched without danger of being entirely + lost; at least the fatal effects of licentiousness must first be + made palpable by some extreme mischief resulting from it. I may + wish that the catastrophe should rather fall on our posterity, but + it hastens on with such large strides as to leave little room for + hope. + + I am running over again the last edition of my History, in order to + correct it still further. I either soften or expunge many + villainous seditious Whig strokes which had crept into it. I wish + that my indignation at the present madness, encouraged by lies, + calumnies, imposture, and every infamous act usual among popular + leaders, may not throw me into the opposite extreme." + +A wise wish, indeed. Posterity respectfully concurs therein; and +subjects Hume's estimate of England and things English to such +modifications as it would probably have undergone had the wish been +fulfilled. + +In 1775, Hume's health began to fail; and, in the spring of the +following year, his disorder, which appears to have been haemorrhage of +the bowels, attained such a height that he knew it must be fatal. So he +made his will, and wrote _My Own Life_, the conclusion of which is one +of the most cheerful, simple, and dignified leave-takings of life and +all its concerns, extant. + + "I now reckon upon a speedy dissolution. I have suffered very + little pain from my disorder; and what is more strange, have, + notwithstanding the great decline of my person, never suffered a + moment's abatement of spirits; insomuch that were I to name the + period of my life which I should most choose to pass over again, I + might be tempted to point to this later period. I possess the same + ardour as ever in study and the same gaiety in company; I consider, + besides, that a man of sixty-five, by dying, cuts off only a few + years of infirmities; and though I see many symptoms of my literary + reputation's breaking out at last with additional lustre, I know + that I could have but few years to enjoy it. It is difficult to be + more detached from life than I am at present. + + "To conclude historically with my own character, I am, or rather + was (for that is the style I must now use in speaking of myself, + which emboldens me the more to speak my sentiments); I was, I say, + a man of mild dispositions, of command of temper, of an open, + social, and cheerful humour, capable of attachment, but little + susceptible of enmity, and of great moderation in all my passions. + Even my love of literary fame, my ruling passion, never soured my + temper, notwithstanding my frequent disappointments. My company was + not unacceptable to the young and careless, as well as to the + studious and literary; and as I took a particular pleasure in the + company of modest women, I had no reason to be displeased with the + reception I met with from them. In a word, though most men any wise + eminent, have found reason to complain of calumny, I never was + touched or even attacked by her baleful tooth; and though I + wantonly exposed myself to the rage of both civil and religious + factions, they seemed to be disarmed in my behalf of their wonted + fury. My friends never had occasion to vindicate any one + circumstance of my character and conduct; not but that the zealots, + we may well suppose, would have been glad to invent and propagate + any story to my disadvantage, but they could never find any which + they thought would wear the face of probability. I cannot say there + is no vanity in making this funeral oration of myself, but I hope + it is not a misplaced one; and this is a matter of fact which is + easily cleared and ascertained." + +Hume died in Edinburgh on the 25th of August, 1776, and, a few days +later, his body, attended by a great concourse of people, who seem to +have anticipated for it the fate appropriate to the remains of wizards +and necromancers, was deposited in a spot selected by himself, in an old +burial-ground on the eastern slope of the Calton Hill. + +From the summit of this hill, there is a prospect unequalled by any to +be seen from the midst of a great city. Westward lies the Forth, and +beyond it, dimly blue, the far away Highland hills; eastward, rise the +bold contours of Arthur's Seat and the rugged crags of the Castle rock, +with the grey Old Town of Edinburgh; while, far below, from a maze of +crowded thoroughfares, the hoarse murmur of the toil of a polity of +energetic men is borne upon the ear. At times, a man may be as solitary +here as in a veritable wilderness; and may meditate undisturbedly upon +the epitome of nature and of man--the kingdoms of this world--spread out +before him. + +Surely, there is a fitness in the choice of this last resting-place by +the philosopher and historian, who saw so clearly that these two +kingdoms form but one realm, governed by uniform laws and alike based on +impenetrable darkness and eternal silence: and faithful to the last to +that profound veracity which was the secret of his philosophic +greatness, he ordered that the simple Roman tomb which marks his grave +should bear no inscription but + + + DAVID HUME + + BORN 1711. DIED 1776. + + _Leaving it to posterity to add the rest._ + + +It was by the desire and at the suggestion of my friend, the Editor of +this Series, that I undertook to attempt to help posterity in the +difficult business of knowing what to add to Hume's epitaph; and I +might, with justice, throw upon him the responsibility of my apparent +presumption in occupying a place among the men of letters, who are +engaged with him, in their proper function of writing about English Men +of Letters. + +That to which succeeding generations have made, are making, and will +make, continual additions, however, is Hume's fame as a philosopher; +and, though I know that my plea will add to my offence in some quarters, +I must plead, in extenuation of my audacity, that philosophy lies in the +province of science, and not in that of letters. + +In dealing with Hume's Life, I have endeavoured, as far as possible, to +make him speak for himself. If the extracts from his letters and essays +which I have given do not sufficiently show what manner of man he was, +I am sure that nothing I could say would make the case plainer. In the +exposition of Hume's philosophy which follows, I have pursued the same +plan, and I have applied myself to the task of selecting and arranging +in systematic order, the passages which appeared to me to contain the +clearest statements of Hume's opinions. + +I should have been glad to be able to confine myself to this duty, and +to limit my own comments to so much as was absolutely necessary to +connect my excerpts. Here and there, however, it must be confessed that +more is seen of my thread than of Hume's beads. My excuse must be an +ineradicable tendency to try to make things clear; while, I may further +hope, that there is nothing in what I may have said, which is +inconsistent with the logical development of Hume's principles. + +My authority for the facts of Hume's life is the admirable biography, +published in 1846, by Mr. John Hill Burton. The edition of Hume's works +from which all citations are made is that published by Black and Tait in +Edinburgh, in 1826. In this edition, the Essays are reprinted from the +edition of 1777, corrected by the author for the press a short time +before his death. It is well printed in four handy volumes; and as my +copy has long been in my possession, and bears marks of much reading, it +would have been troublesome for me to refer to any other. But, for the +convenience of those who possess some other edition, the following table +of the contents of the edition of 1826, with the paging of the four +volumes, is given:-- + + + VOLUME I. + + TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE. + + Book I. _Of the Understanding_, p. 5 to the end, p. 347. + + + VOLUME II. + + TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE. + + Book II. _Of the Passions_, p. 3-p. 215. + + Book III. _Of Morals_, p. 219-p. 415. + + DIALOGUES CONCERNING NATURAL RELIGION, p. 419-p. 548. + + APPENDIX TO THE TREATISE, p. 551-p. 560. + + + VOLUME III. + + ESSAYS, MORAL AND POLITICAL, p. 3-p. 282. + + POLITICAL DISCOURSES, p. 285-p. 579. + + + VOLUME IV. + + AN INQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, p. 3-p. 233. + + AN INQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS, p. 237-p. 431. + + THE NATURAL HISTORY OF RELIGION, p. 435-p. 513. + + ADDITIONAL ESSAYS, p. 517-p. 577. + + +As the volume and the page of the volume are given in my references, it +will be easy, by the help of this table, to learn where to look for any +passage cited, in differently arranged editions. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[8] "Pneumatic philosophy" must not be confounded with the theory of +elastic fluids; though, as Scottish chairs have, before now, combined +natural with civil history, the mistake would be pardonable. + +[9] Burton's _Life of David Hume_, i. p. 354. + +[10] Lord Macaulay, Article on History, _Edinburgh Review_, vol. lxvii. + +[11] Letter to Clephane, 3rd September, 1757. + +[12] "You must know that Lord Hertford has so high a character for +piety, that his taking me by the hand is a kind of regeneration to me, +and all past offences are now wiped off. But all these views are +trifling to one of my age and temper."--_Hume to Edmonstone_, 9th +January, 1764. Lord Hertford had procured him a pension of L200 a year +for life from the King, and the secretaryship was worth L1000 a year. + +[13] Madame d'Epinay gives a ludicrous account of Hume's performance +when pressed into a _tableau_, as a Sultan between two slaves, +personated for the occasion by two of the prettiest women in Paris:-- + +"Il les regarde attentivement, _il se frappe le ventre_ et les genoux a +plusieurs reprises et ne trouve jamais autre chose a leur dire que _Eh +bien! mes demoiselles.--Eh bien! vous voila donc.... Eh bien! vous voila +... vous voila ici?_ Cette phrase dura un quart d'heure sans qu'il put +en sortir. Une d'elles se leva d'impatience: Ah, dit-elle, je m'en etois +bien doutee, cet homme n'est bon qu'a manger du veau!"--Burton's _Life +of Hume_, vol. ii. p. 224. + + + + +PART II. + +_HUME'S PHILOSOPHY._ + + + + +CHAPTER I. + +THE OBJECT AND SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY. + + +Kant has said that the business of philosophy is to answer three +questions: What can I know? What ought I to do? and For what may I hope? +But it is pretty plain that these three resolve themselves, in the long +run, into the first. For rational expectation and moral action are alike +based upon beliefs; and a belief is void of justification, unless its +subject-matter lies within the boundaries of possible knowledge, and +unless its evidence satisfies the conditions which experience imposes as +the guarantee of credibility. + +Fundamentally, then, philosophy is the answer to the question, What can +I know? and it is by applying itself to this problem, that philosophy is +properly distinguished as a special department of scientific research. +What is commonly called science, whether mathematical, physical, or +biological, consists of the answers which mankind have been able to +give to the inquiry, What do I know? They furnish us with the results of +the mental operations which constitute thinking; while philosophy, in +the stricter sense of the term, inquires into the foundation of the +first principles which those operations assume or imply. + +But though, by reason of the special purpose of philosophy, its +distinctness from other branches of scientific investigation may be +properly vindicated, it is easy to see that, from the nature of its +subject-matter, it is intimately and, indeed, inseparably connected with +one branch of science. For it is obviously impossible to answer the +question, What can we know? unless, in the first place, there is a clear +understanding as to what is meant by knowledge; and, having settled this +point, the next step is to inquire how we come by that which we allow to +be knowledge; for, upon the reply, turns the answer to the further +question, whether, from the nature of the case, there are limits to the +knowable or not. While, finally, inasmuch as What can I know? not only +refers to knowledge of the past or of the present, but to the confident +expectation which we call knowledge of the future; it is necessary to +ask, further, what justification can be alleged for trusting to the +guidance of our expectations in practical conduct. + +It surely needs no argumentation to show, that the first problem cannot +be approached without the examination of the contents of the mind; and +the determination of how much of these contents may be called knowledge. +Nor can the second problem be dealt with in any other fashion; for it is +only by the observation of the growth of knowledge that we can +rationally hope to discover how knowledge grows. But the solution of +the third problem simply involves the discussion of the data obtained +by the investigation of the foregoing two. + +Thus, in order to answer three out of the four subordinate questions +into which What can I know? breaks up, we must have recourse to that +investigation of mental phenomena, the results of which are embodied in +the science of psychology. + +Psychology is a part of the science of life or biology, which differs +from the other branches of that science, merely in so far as it deals +with the psychical, instead of the physical, phenomena of life. + +As there is an anatomy of the body, so there is an anatomy of the mind; +the psychologist dissects mental phenomena into elementary states of +consciousness, as the anatomist resolves limbs into tissues, and tissues +into cells. The one traces the development of complex organs from simple +rudiments; the other follows the building up of complex conceptions out +of simpler constituents of thought. As the physiologist inquires into +the way in which the so-called "functions" of the body are performed, so +the psychologist studies the so-called "faculties" of the mind. Even a +cursory attention to the ways and works of the lower animals suggests a +comparative anatomy and physiology of the mind; and the doctrine of +evolution presses for application as much in the one field as in the +other. + +But there is more than a parallel, there is a close and intimate +connexion between psychology and physiology. No one doubts that, at any +rate, some mental states are dependent for their existence on the +performance of the functions of particular bodily organs. There is no +seeing without eyes, and no hearing without ears. If the origin of the +contents of the mind is truly a philosophical problem, then the +philosopher who attempts to deal with that problem, without acquainting +himself with the physiology of sensation, has no more intelligent +conception of his business than the physiologist, who thinks he can +discuss locomotion, without an acquaintance with the principles of +mechanics; or respiration, without some tincture of chemistry. + +On whatever ground we term physiology, science, psychology is entitled +to the same appellation; and the method of investigation which +elucidates the true relations of the one set of phenomena will discover +those of the other. Hence, as philosophy is, in great measure, the +exponent of the logical consequences of certain data established by +psychology; and as psychology itself differs from physical science only +in the nature of its subject-matter, and not in its method of +investigation, it would seem to be an obvious conclusion, that +philosophers are likely to be successful in their inquiries, in +proportion as they are familiar with the application of scientific +method to less abstruse subjects; just as it seems to require no +elaborate demonstration, that an astronomer, who wishes to comprehend +the solar system, would do well to acquire a preliminary acquaintance +with the elements of physics. And it is accordant with this presumption, +that the men who have made the most important positive additions to +philosophy, such as Descartes, Spinoza, and Kant, not to mention more +recent examples, have been deeply imbued with the spirit of physical +science; and, in some cases, such as those of Descartes and Kant, have +been largely acquainted with its details. On the other hand, the founder +of Positivism no less admirably illustrates the connexion of scientific +incapacity with philosophical incompetence. In truth, the laboratory is +the fore-court of the temple of philosophy; and whoso has not offered +sacrifices and undergone purification there, has little chance of +admission into the sanctuary. + +Obvious as these considerations may appear to be, it would be wrong to +ignore the fact that their force is by no means universally admitted. On +the contrary, the necessity for a proper psychological and physiological +training to the student of philosophy is denied, on the one hand, by the +"pure metaphysicians," who attempt to base the theory of knowing upon +supposed necessary and universal truths, and assert that scientific +observation is impossible unless such truths are already known or +implied: which, to those who are not "pure metaphysicians," seems very +much as if one should say that the fall of a stone cannot be observed, +unless the law of gravitation is already in the mind of the observer. + +On the other hand, the Positivists, so far as they accept the teachings +of their master, roundly assert, at any rate in words, that observation +of the mind is a thing inherently impossible in itself, and that +psychology is a chimera--a phantasm generated by the fermentation of the +dregs of theology. Nevertheless, if M. Comte had been asked what he +meant by "physiologic cerebrale," except that which other people call +"psychology;" and how he knew anything about the functions of the brain, +except by that very "observation interieure," which he declares to be an +absurdity--it seems probable that he would have found it hard to escape +the admission, that, in vilipending psychology, he had been propounding +solemn nonsense. + +It is assuredly one of Hume's greatest merits that he clearly recognised +the fact that philosophy is based upon psychology; and that the inquiry +into the contents and the operations of the mind must be conducted upon +the same principles as a physical investigation, if what he calls the +"moral philosopher" would attain results of as firm and definite a +character as those which reward the "natural philosopher."[14] The title +of his first work, a "_Treatise of Human Nature, being an Attempt to +introduce the Experimental method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects_," +sufficiently indicates the point of view from which Hume regarded +philosophical problems; and he tells us in the preface, that his object +has been to promote the construction of a "science of man." + + "'Tis evident that all the sciences have a relation, greater or + less, to human nature; and that, however wide any of them may seem + to run from it, they still return back by one passage or another. + Even _Mathematics_, _Natural Philosophy_, and _Natural Religion_ + are in some measure dependent on the science of MAN; since they lie + under the cognizance of men, and are judged of by their powers and + qualities. 'Tis impossible to tell what changes and improvements we + might make in these sciences were we thoroughly acquainted with the + extent and force of human understanding, and could explain the + nature of the ideas we employ and of the operations we perform in + our reasonings.... To me it seems evident that the essence of mind + being equally unknown to us with that of external bodies, it must + be equally impossible to form any notion of its powers and + qualities otherwise than from careful and exact experiments, and + the observation of those particular effects which result from its + different circumstances and situations. And though we must + endeavour to render all our principles as universal as possible, by + tracing up our experiments to the utmost, and explaining all + effects from the simplest and fewest causes, 'tis still certain we + cannot go beyond experience; and any hypothesis that pretends to + discover the ultimate original qualities of human nature, ought at + first to be rejected as presumptuous and chimerical.... + + "But if this impossibility of explaining ultimate principles should + be esteemed a defect in the science of man, I will venture to + affirm, that it is a defect common to it with all the sciences, and + all the arts, in which we can employ ourselves, whether they be + such as are cultivated in the schools of the philosophers, or + practised in the shops of the meanest artisans. None of them can go + beyond experience, or establish any principles which are not + founded on that authority. Moral philosophy has, indeed, this + peculiar disadvantage, which is not found in natural, that in + collecting its experiments, it cannot make them purposely, with + premeditation, and after such a manner as to satisfy itself + concerning every particular difficulty which may arise. When I am + at a loss to know the effects of one body upon another in any + situation, I need only put them in that situation, and observe what + results from it. But should I endeavour to clear up in the same + manner any[15] doubt in moral philosophy, by placing myself in the + same case with that which I consider, 'tis evident this reflection + and premeditation would so disturb the operation of my natural + principles, as must render it impossible to form any just + conclusion from the phenomenon. We must, therefore, glean up our + experiments in this science from a cautious observation of human + life, and take them as they appear in the common course of the + world, by men's behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their + pleasures. Where experiments of this kind are judiciously collected + and compared, we may hope to establish on them a science which + will not be inferior in certainty, and will be much superior in + utility, to any other of human comprehension."--(I. pp. 7-11.) + +All science starts with hypotheses--in other words, with assumptions +that are unproved, while they may be, and often are, erroneous; but +which are better than nothing to the seeker after order in the maze of +phenomena. And the historical progress of every science depends on the +criticism of hypotheses--on the gradual stripping off, that is, of their +untrue or superfluous parts--until there remains only that exact verbal +expression of as much as we know of the fact, and no more, which +constitutes a perfect scientific theory. + +Philosophy has followed the same course as other branches of scientific +investigation. The memorable service rendered to the cause of sound +thinking by Descartes consisted in this: that he laid the foundation of +modern philosophical criticism by his inquiry into the nature of +certainty. It is a clear result of the investigation started by +Descartes, that there is one thing of which no doubt can be entertained, +for he who should pretend to doubt it would thereby prove its existence; +and that is the momentary consciousness we call a present thought or +feeling; that is safe, even if all other kinds of certainty are merely +more or less probable inferences. Berkeley and Locke, each in his way, +applied philosophical criticism in other directions; but they always, at +any rate professedly, followed the Cartesian maxim of admitting no +propositions to be true but such as are clear, distinct, and evident, +even while their arguments stripped off many a layer of hypothetical +assumption which their great predecessor had left untouched. No one has +more clearly stated the aims of the critical philosopher than Locke, in +a passage of the famous _Essay concerning Human Understanding_, which, +perhaps, I ought to assume to be well known to all English readers, but +which so probably is unknown to this full-crammed and much examined +generation that I venture to cite it: + + "If by this inquiry into the nature of the understanding I can + discover the powers thereof, how far they reach, to what things + they are in any degree proportionate, and where they fail us, I + suppose it may be of use to prevail with the busy mind of man to be + more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehension: + to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether; and to sit + down in quiet ignorance of those things which, upon examination, + are proved to be beyond the reach of our capacities. We should not + then, perhaps, be so forward, out of an affectation of universal + knowledge, to raise questions and perplex ourselves and others with + disputes about things to which our understandings are not suited, + and of which we cannot frame in our minds any clear and distinct + perception, or whereof (as it has, perhaps, too often happened) we + have not any notion at all.... Men may find matter sufficient to + busy their heads and employ their hands with variety, delight, and + satisfaction, if they will not boldly quarrel with their own + constitution and throw away the blessings their hands are filled + with because they are not big enough to grasp everything. We shall + not have much reason to complain of the narrowness of our minds, if + we will but employ them about what may be of use to us: for of that + they are very capable: and it will be an unpardonable, as well as a + childish peevishness, if we under-value the advantages of our + knowledge, and neglect to improve it to the ends for which it was + given us, because there are some things that are set out of the + reach of it. It will be no excuse to an idle and untoward servant + who would not attend to his business by candlelight, to plead that + he had not broad sunshine. The candle that is set up in us shines + bright enough for all our purposes.... Our business here is not to + know all things, but those which concern our conduct."[16] + +Hume develops the same fundamental conception in a somewhat different +way, and with a more definite indication of the practical benefits which +may be expected from a critical philosophy. The first and second parts +of the twelfth section of the _Inquiry_ are devoted to a condemnation of +excessive scepticism, or Pyrrhonism, with which Hume couples a +caricature of the Cartesian doubt; but, in the third part, a certain +"mitigated scepticism" is recommended and adopted, under the title of +"academical philosophy." After pointing out that a knowledge of the +infirmities of the human understanding, even in its most perfect state, +and when most accurate and cautious in its determinations, is the best +check upon the tendency to dogmatism, Hume continues:-- + + "Another species of _mitigated_ scepticism, which may be of + advantage to mankind, and which maybe the natural result of the + PYRRHONIAN doubts and scruples, is the limitation of our inquiries + to such subjects as are best adapted to the narrow capacity of + human understanding. The _imagination_ of man is naturally sublime, + delighted with whatever is remote and extraordinary, and running, + without control, into the most distant parts of space and time in + order to avoid the objects which custom has rendered too familiar + to it. A correct _judgment_ observes a contrary method, and, + avoiding all distant and high inquiries, confines itself to common + life, and to such subjects as fall under daily practice and + experience; leaving the more sublime topics to the embellishment of + poets and orators, or to the arts of priests and politicians. To + bring us to so salutary a determination, nothing can be more + serviceable than to be once thoroughly convinced of the force of + the PYRRHONIAN doubt, and of the impossibility that anything but + the strong power of natural instinct could free us from it. Those + who have a propensity to philosophy will still continue their + researches; because they reflect, that, besides the immediate + pleasure attending such an occupation, philosophical decisions are + nothing but the reflections of common life, methodised and + corrected. But they will never be tempted to go beyond common life, + so long as they consider the imperfection of those faculties which + they employ, their narrow reach, and their inaccurate operations. + While we cannot give a satisfactory reason why we believe, after a + thousand experiments, that a stone will fall or fire burn; can we + ever satisfy ourselves concerning any determination which we may + form with regard to the origin of worlds and the situation of + nature from and to eternity?"--(IV. pp. 189--90.) + +But further, it is the business of criticism not only to keep watch over +the vagaries of philosophy, but to do the duty of police in the whole +world of thought. Wherever it espies sophistry or superstition they are +to be bidden to stand; nay, they are to be followed to their very dens +and there apprehended and exterminated, as Othello smothered Desdemona, +"else she'll betray more men." + +Hume warms into eloquence as he sets forth the labours meet for the +strength and the courage of the Hercules of "mitigated scepticism." + + "Here, indeed, lies the justest and most plausible objection + against a considerable part of metaphysics, that they are not + properly a science, but arise either from the fruitless efforts of + human vanity, which would penetrate into subjects utterly + inaccessible to the understanding, or from the craft of popular + superstitions, which, being unable to defend themselves on fair + ground, raise these entangling brambles to cover and protect their + weakness. Chased from the open country, these robbers fly into the + forest, and lie in wait to break in upon every unguarded avenue of + the mind and overwhelm it with religious fears and prejudices. The + stoutest antagonist, if he remits his watch a moment, is oppressed; + and many, through cowardice and folly, open the gates to the + enemies, and willingly receive them with reverence and submission + as their legal sovereigns. + + "But is this a sufficient reason why philosophers should desist + from such researches and leave superstition still in possession of + her retreat? Is it not proper to draw an opposite conclusion, and + perceive the necessity of carrying the war into the most secret + recesses of the enemy?... The only method of freeing learning at + once from these abstruse questions, is to inquire seriously into + the nature of human understanding, and show, from an exact analysis + of its powers and capacity, that it is by no means fitted for such + remote and abstruse subjects. We must submit to this fatigue, in + order to live at ease ever after; and must cultivate true + metaphysics with some care, in order to destroy the false and + adulterated."--(IV. pp. 10, 11.) + +Near a century and a half has elapsed since these brave words were +shaped by David Hume's pen; and the business of carrying the war into +the enemy's camp has gone on but slowly. Like other campaigns, it long +languished for want of a good base of operations. But since physical +science, in the course of the last fifty years, has brought to the front +an inexhaustible supply of heavy artillery of a new pattern, warranted +to drive solid bolts of fact through the thickest skulls, things are +looking better; though hardly more than the first faint flutterings of +the dawn of the happy day, when superstition and false metaphysics shall +be no more and reasonable folks may "live at ease," are as yet +discernible by the _enfants perdus_ of the outposts. + +If, in thus conceiving the object and the limitations of philosophy, +Hume shows himself the spiritual child and continuator of the work of +Locke, he appears no less plainly as the parent of Kant and as the +protagonist of that more modern way of thinking, which has been called +"agnosticism," from its profession of an incapacity to discover the +indispensable conditions of either positive or negative knowledge, in +many propositions, respecting which, not only the vulgar, but +philosophers of the more sanguine sort, revel in the luxury of +unqualified assurance. + +The aim of the _Kritik der reinen Vernunft_ is essentially the same as +that of the _Treatise of Human Nature_, by which indeed Kant was led to +develop that "critical philosophy" with which his name and fame are +indissolubly bound up: and, if the details of Kant's criticism differ +from those of Hume, they coincide with them in their main result, which +is the limitation of all knowledge of reality to the world of phenomena +revealed to us by experience. + +The philosopher of Koenigsberg epitomises the philosopher of Ninewells +when he thus sums up the uses of philosophy:-- + + "The greatest and perhaps the sole use of all philosophy of pure + reason is, after all, merely negative, since it serves, not as an + organon for the enlargement [of knowledge], but as a discipline for + its delimitation; and instead of discovering truth, has only the + modest merit of preventing error."[17] + +FOOTNOTES: + +[14] In a letter to Hutcheson (September 17th, 1739) Hume +remarks:--"There are different ways of examining the mind as well as the +body. One may consider it either as an anatomist or as a painter: either +to discover its most secret springs and principles, or to describe the +grace and beauty of its actions;" and he proceeds to justify his own +mode of looking at the moral sentiments from the anatomist's point of +view. + +[15] The manner in which Hume constantly refers to the results of the +observation of the contents and the processes of his own mind clearly +shows that he has here inadvertently overstated the case. + +[16] Locke, _An Essay concerning Human Understanding_, Book I, chap. i, +Sec.Sec. 4, 5, 6. + +[17] _Kritik der reinen Vernunft._ Ed. Hartenstein, p. 256. + + + + +CHAPTER II. + +THE CONTENTS OF THE MIND. + + +In the language of common life, the "mind" is spoken of as an entity, +independent of the body, though resident in and closely connected with +it, and endowed with numerous "faculties," such as sensibility, +understanding, memory, volition, which stand in the same relation to the +mind as the organs do to the body, and perform the functions of feeling, +reasoning, remembering, and willing. Of these functions, some, such as +sensation, are supposed to be merely passive--that is, they are called +into existence by impressions, made upon the sensitive faculty by a +material world of real objects, of which our sensations are supposed to +give us pictures; others, such as the memory and the reasoning faculty, +are considered to be partly passive and partly active; while volition is +held to be potentially, if not always actually, a spontaneous activity. + +The popular classification and terminology of the phenomena of +consciousness, however, are by no means the first crude conceptions +suggested by common sense, but rather a legacy, and, in many respects, a +sufficiently _damnosa haereditas_, of ancient philosophy, more or less +leavened by theology; which has incorporated itself with the common +thought of later times, as the vices of the aristocracy of one age +become those of the mob in the next. Very little attention to what +passes in the mind is sufficient to show, that these conceptions involve +assumptions of an extremely hypothetical character. And the first +business of the student of psychology is to get rid of such +prepossessions; to form conceptions of mental phenomena as they are +given us by observation, without any hypothetical admixture, or with +only so much as is definitely recognised and held subject to +confirmation or otherwise; to classify these phenomena according to +their clearly recognisable characters; and to adopt a nomenclature which +suggests nothing beyond the results of observation. Thus chastened, +observation of the mind makes us acquainted with nothing but certain +events, facts, or phenomena (whichever name be preferred) which pass +over the inward field of view in rapid and, as it may appear on careless +inspection, in disorderly succession, like the shifting patterns of a +kaleidoscope. To all these mental phenomena, or states of our +consciousness,[18] Descartes gave the name of "thoughts,"[19] while +Locke and Berkeley termed them "ideas." Hume, regarding this as an +improper use of the word "idea," for which he proposes another +employment, gives the general name of "perceptions" to all states of +consciousness. Thus, whatever other signification we may see reason to +attach to the word "mind," it is certain that it is a name which is +employed to denote a series of perceptions; just as the word "tune," +whatever else it may mean, denotes, in the first place, a succession of +musical notes. Hume, indeed, goes further than others when he says +that-- + + "What we call a mind is nothing but a heap or collection of + different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and + supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with a perfect simplicity + and identity."--(I. p. 268.) + +With this "nothing but," however, he obviously falls into the primal and +perennial error of philosophical speculators--dogmatising from negative +arguments. He may be right or wrong; but the most he, or anybody else, +can prove in favour of his conclusion is, that we know nothing more of +the mind than that it is a series of perceptions. Whether there is +something in the mind that lies beyond the reach of observation; or +whether perceptions themselves are the products of something which can +be observed and which is not mind; are questions which can in nowise be +settled by direct observation. Elsewhere, the objectionable hypothetical +element of the definition of mind is less prominent:-- + + "The true idea of the human mind is to consider it as a system of + different perceptions, or different existences, which are linked + together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, + destroy, influence and modify each other.... In this respect I + cannot compare the soul more properly to anything than a republic + or commonwealth, in which the several members are united by the + reciprocal ties of government and subordination, and give rise to + other persons who propagate the same republic in the incessant + changes of its parts."--(I. p. 331). + +But, leaving the question of the proper definition of mind open for the +present, it is further a matter of direct observation, that, when we +take a general survey of all our perceptions or states of consciousness, +they naturally fall into sundry groups or classes. Of these classes, two +are distinguished by Hume as of primary importance. All "perceptions," +he says, are either "_Impressions_" or "_Ideas_." + +Under "impressions" he includes "all our more lively perceptions, when +we hear, see, feel, love, or will;" in other words, "all our sensations, +passions, and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul" +(I. p. 15). + +"Ideas," on the other hand, are the faint images of impressions in +thinking and reasoning, or of antecedent ideas. + +Both impressions and ideas may be either _simple_, when they are +incapable of further analysis, or _complex_, when they may be resolved +into simpler constituents. All simple ideas are exact copies of +impressions; but, in complex ideas, the arrangement of simple +constituents may be different from that of the impressions of which +those simple ideas are copies. + +Thus the colours red and blue and the odour of a rose, are simple +impressions; while the ideas of blue, of red, and of rose-odour are +simple copies of these impressions. But a red rose gives us a complex +impression, capable of resolution into the simple impressions of red +colour, rose-scent, and numerous others; and we may have a complex idea, +which is an accurate, though faint, copy of this complex impression. +Once in possession of the ideas of a red rose and of the colour blue, we +may, in imagination, substitute blue for red; and thus obtain a complex +idea of a blue rose, which is not an actual copy of any complex +impression, though all its elements are such copies. + +Hume has been criticised for making the distinction of impressions and +ideas to depend upon their relative strength or vivacity. Yet it would +be hard to point out any other character by which the things signified +can be distinguished. Any one who has paid attention to the curious +subject of what are called "subjective sensations" will be familiar with +examples of the extreme difficulty which sometimes attends the +discrimination of ideas of sensation from impressions of sensation, when +the ideas are very vivid, or the impressions are faint. Who has not +"fancied" he heard a noise; or has not explained inattention to a real +sound by saying, "I thought it was nothing but my fancy"? Even healthy +persons are much more liable to both visual and auditory spectra--that +is, ideas of vision and sound so vivid that they are taken for new +impressions--than is commonly supposed; and, in some diseased states, +ideas of sensible objects may assume all the vividness of reality. + +If ideas are nothing but copies of impressions, arranged, either in the +same order as that of the impressions from which they are derived, or in +a different order, it follows that the ultimate analysis of the contents +of the mind turns upon that of the impressions. According to Hume, +these are of two kinds: either they are impressions of sensation, or +they are impressions of reflection. The former are those afforded by the +five senses, together with pleasure and pain. The latter are the +passions or the emotions (which Hume employs as equivalent terms). Thus +the elementary states of consciousness, the raw materials of knowledge, +so to speak, are either sensations or emotions; and whatever we discover +in the mind, beyond these elementary states of consciousness, results +from the combinations and the metamorphoses which they undergo. + +It is not a little strange that a thinker of Hume's capacity should have +been satisfied with the results of a psychological analysis which +regards some obvious compounds as elements, while it omits altogether a +most important class of elementary states. + +With respect to the former point, Spinoza's masterly examination of the +Passions in the third part of the _Ethics_ should have been known to +Hume.[20] But, if he had been acquainted with that wonderful piece of +psychological anatomy, he would have learned that the emotions and +passions are all complex states, arising from the close association of +ideas of pleasure or pain with other ideas; and, indeed, without going +to Spinoza, his own acute discussion of the passions leads to the same +result,[21] and is wholly inconsistent with his classification of those +mental states among the primary uncompounded materials of consciousness. + +If Hume's "impressions of reflection" are excluded from among the +primary elements of consciousness, nothing is left but the impressions +afforded by the five senses, with pleasure and pain. Putting aside the +muscular sense, which had not come into view in Hume's time, the +questions arise whether these are all the simple undecomposable +materials of thought? or whether others exist of which Hume takes no +cognizance. + +Kant answered the latter question in the affirmative, in the _Kritik der +reinen Vernunft_, and thereby made one of the greatest advances ever +effected in philosophy; though it must be confessed that the German +philosopher's exposition of his views is so perplexed in style, so +burdened with the weight of a cumbrous and uncouth scholasticism, that +it is easy to confound the unessential parts of his system with those +which are of profound importance. His baggage train is bigger than his +army, and the student who attacks him is too often led to suspect he has +won a position when he has only captured a mob of useless +camp-followers. + +In his _Principles of Psychology_, Mr. Herbert Spencer appears to me to +have brought out the essential truth which underlies Kant's doctrine in +a far clearer manner than any one else; but, for the purpose of the +present summary view of Hume's philosophy, it must suffice if I state +the matter in my own way, giving the broad outlines, without entering +into the details of a large and difficult discussion. + +When a red light flashes across the field of vision, there arises in the +mind an "impression of sensation"--which we call red. It appears to me +that this sensation, red, is a something which may exist altogether +independently of any other impression, or idea, as an individual +existence. It is perfectly conceivable that a sentient being should have +no sense but vision, and that he should have spent his existence in +absolute darkness, with the exception of one solitary flash of red +light. That momentary illumination would suffice to give him the +impression under consideration; and the whole content of his +consciousness might be that impression; and, if he were endowed with +memory, its idea. + +Such being the state of affairs, suppose a second flash of red light to +follow the first. If there were no memory of the latter, the state of +the mind on the second occasion would simply be a repetition of that +which occurred before. There would be merely another impression. + +But suppose memory to exist, and that an idea of the first impression is +generated; then, if the supposed sentient being were like ourselves, +there might arise in his mind two altogether new impressions. The one is +the feeling of the _succession_ of the two impressions, the other is the +feeling of their _similarity_. + +Yet a third case is conceivable. Suppose two flashes of red light to +occur together, then a third feeling might arise which is neither +succession nor similarity, but that which we call _co-existence_. + +These feelings, or their contraries, are the foundation of everything +that we call a relation. They are no more capable of being described +than sensations are; and, as it appears to me, they are as little +susceptible of analysis into simpler elements. Like simple tastes and +smells, or feelings of pleasure and pain, they are ultimate irresolvable +facts of conscious experience; and, if we follow the principle of Hume's +nomenclature, they must be called _impressions of relation_. But it must +be remembered, that they differ from the other impressions, in requiring +the pre-existence of at least two of the latter. Though devoid of the +slightest resemblance to the other impressions, they are, in a manner, +generated by them. In fact, we may regard them as a kind of impressions +of impressions; or as the sensations of an inner sense, which takes +cognizance of the materials furnished to it by the outer senses. + +Hume failed as completely as his predecessors had done to recognise the +elementary character of impressions of relation; and, when he discusses +relations, he falls into a chaos of confusion and self-contradiction. + +In the _Treatise_, for example, (Book I., Sec. iv.) resemblance, contiguity +in time and space, and cause and effect, are said to be the "uniting +principles among ideas," "the bond of union" or "associating quality by +which one idea naturally introduces another." Hume affirms that-- + + "These qualities produce an association among ideas, and upon the + appearance of one idea naturally introduce another." They are "the + principles of union or cohesion among our simple ideas, and, in + the imagination, supply the place of that inseparable connection by + which they are united in our memory. Here is a kind of + _attraction_, which, in the mental world, will be found to have as + extraordinary effects as in the natural, and to show itself in as + many and as various forms. Its effects are everywhere conspicuous; + but, as to its causes they are mostly unknown, and must be resolved + into _original_ qualities of human nature, which I pretend not to + explain."--(I. p. 29.) + +And at the end of this section Hume goes on to say-- + + "Amongst the effects of this union or association of ideas, there + are none more remarkable than those complex ideas which are the + common subjects of our thought and reasoning, and generally arise + from some principle of union among our simple ideas. These complex + ideas may be resolved into _relations_, _modes_, and + _substances_."--(_Ibid._) + +In the next section, which is devoted to _Relations_, they are spoken of +as qualities "by which two ideas are connected together in the +imagination," or "which make objects admit of comparison," and seven +kinds of relation are enumerated, namely, _resemblance_, _identity_, +_space and time_, _quantity or number_, _degrees of quality_, +_contrariety_, and _cause and effect_. + +To the reader of Hume, whose conceptions are usually so clear, definite, +and consistent, it is as unsatisfactory as it is surprising to meet with +so much questionable and obscure phraseology in a small space. One and +the same thing, for example, resemblance, is first called a "quality of +an idea," and secondly a "complex idea." Surely it cannot be both. Ideas +which have the qualities of "resemblance, contiguity, and cause and +effect," are said to "attract one another" (save the mark!), and so +become associated; though, in a subsequent part of the _Treatise_, +Hume's great effort is to prove that the relation of cause and effect is +a particular case of the process of association; that is to say, is a +result of the process of which it is supposed to be the cause. Moreover, +since, as Hume is never weary of reminding his readers, there is nothing +in ideas save copies of impressions, the qualities of resemblance, +contiguity, and so on, in the idea, must have existed in the impression +of which that idea is a copy; and therefore they must be either +sensations or emotions--from both of which classes they are excluded. + +In fact, in one place, Hume himself has an insight into the real nature +of relations. Speaking of equality, in the sense of a relation of +quantity, he says-- + + "Since equality is a relation, it is not, strictly speaking, a + property in the figures themselves, but arises merely from the + comparison which the mind makes between them."--(I. p. 70.) + +That is to say, when two impressions of equal figures are present, there +arises in the mind a _tertium quid_, which is the perception of +equality. On his own principles, Hume should therefore have placed this +"perception" among the ideas of reflection. However, as we have seen, he +expressly excludes everything but the emotions and the passions from +this group. + +It is necessary therefore to amend Hume's primary "geography of the +mind" by the excision of one territory and the addition of another; and +the elementary states of consciousness will stand thus:-- + + + A. IMPRESSIONS. + A. Sensations of + _a._ Smell. + _b._ Taste. + _c._ Hearing. + _d._ Sight. + _e._ Touch. + _f._ Resistance (the muscular sense). + B. Pleasure and Pain. + C. Relations. + _a._ Co-existence. + _b._ Succession. + _c._ Similarity and dissimilarity. + B. IDEAS. + Copies, or reproductions in memory, of the foregoing. + + +And now the question arises, whether any, and if so what, portion of +these contents of the mind are to be termed "knowledge." + +According to Locke, "Knowledge is the perception of the agreement or +disagreement of two ideas;" and Hume, though he does not say so in so +many words, tacitly accepts the definition. It follows, that neither +simple sensation, nor simple emotion, constitutes knowledge; but that, +when impressions of relation are added to these impressions, or their +ideas, knowledge arises; and that all knowledge is the knowledge of +likenesses and unlikenesses, co-existences and successions. + +It really matters very little in what sense terms are used, so long as +the same meaning is always rigidly attached to them; and, therefore, it +is hardly worth while to quarrel with this generally accepted, though +very arbitrary, limitation of the signification of "knowledge." But, on +the face of the matter, it is not obvious why the impression we call a +relation should have a better claim to the title of knowledge, than that +which we call a sensation or an emotion; and the restriction has this +unfortunate result, that it excludes all the most intense states of +consciousness from any claim to the title of "knowledge." + +For example, on this view, pain, so violent and absorbing as to exclude +all other forms of consciousness, is not knowledge; but becomes a part +of knowledge the moment we think of it in relation to another pain, or +to some other mental phenomenon. Surely this is somewhat inconvenient, +for there is only a verbal difference between having a sensation and +knowing one has it: they are simply two phrases for the same mental +state. + +But the "pure metaphysicians" make great capital out of the ambiguity. +For, starting with the assumption that all knowledge is the perception +of relations, and finding themselves, like mere common-sense folks, very +much disposed to call sensation knowledge, they at once gratify that +disposition and save their consistency, by declaring that even the +simplest act of sensation contains two terms and a relation--the +sensitive subject, the sensigenous object, and that masterful entity, +the Ego. From which great triad, as from a gnostic Trinity, emanates an +endless procession of other logical shadows and all the _Fata Morgana_ +of philosophical dreamland. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[18] "Consciousnesses" would be a better name, but it is awkward. I have +elsewhere proposed _psychoses_ as a substantive name for mental +phenomena. + +[19] As this has been denied, it may be as well to give Descartes's +words: "Par le mot de penser, j'entends tout ce que se fait dans nous de +telle sorte que nous l'apercevons immediatement par nous-memes: c'est +pourquoi non-seulement entendre, vouloir, imaginer, mais aussi sentir, +c'est le meme chose ici que penser."--_Principes de Philosophie_. Ed. +Cousin. 57. + +"Toutes les proprietes que nous trouvons en la chose qui pense ne sont +que des facons differentes de penser."--_Ibid._ 96. + +[20] On the whole, it is pleasant to find satisfactory evidence that +Hume knew nothing of the works of Spinoza; for the invariably abusive +manner in which he refers to that type of the philosophic hero is only +to be excused, if it is to be excused, by sheer ignorance of his life +and work. + +[21] For example, in discussing pride and humility, Hume says:-- + +"According as our idea of ourselves is more or less advantageous, we +feel either of these opposite affections, and are elated by pride or +dejected with humility ... when self enters not into the consideration +there is no room either for pride or humility." That is, pride is +pleasure, and humility is pain, associated with certain conceptions of +one's self; or, as Spinoza puts it:--"Superbia est de se prae amore sui +plus justo sentire" ("amor" being "laetitia concomitante idea causae +externae"); and "Humilitas est tristitia orta ex eo quod homo suam +impotentiam sive imbecillitatem contemplatur." + + + + +CHAPTER III. + +THE ORIGIN OF THE IMPRESSIONS. + + +Admitting that the sensations, the feelings of pleasure and pain, and +those of relation, are the primary irresolvable states of consciousness, +two further lines of investigation present themselves. The one leads us +to seek the origin of these "impressions;" the other, to inquire into +the nature of the steps by which they become metamorphosed into those +compound states of consciousness, which so largely enter into our +ordinary trains of thought. + +With respect to the origin of impressions of sensation, Hume is not +quite consistent with himself. In one place (I. p. 117) he says, that it +is impossible to decide "whether they arise immediately from the object, +or are produced by the creative power of the mind, or are derived from +the Author of our being," thereby implying that realism and idealism are +equally probable hypotheses. But, in fact, after the demonstration by +Descartes, that the immediate antecedents of sensations are changes in +the nervous system, with which our feelings have no sort of resemblance, +the hypothesis that sensations "arise immediately from the object" was +out of court; and that Hume fully admitted the Cartesian doctrine is +apparent when he says (I. p. 272):-- + + "All our perceptions are dependent on our organs and the + disposition of our nerves and animal spirits." + +And again, though in relation to another question, he observes:-- + + "There are three different kinds of impressions conveyed by the + senses. The first are those of the figure, bulk, motion, and + solidity of bodies. The second those of colours, tastes, smells, + sounds, heat, and cold. The third are the pains and pleasures that + arise from the application of objects to our bodies, as by the + cutting of our flesh with steel, and such like. Both philosophers + and the vulgar suppose the first of these to have a distinct + continued existence. The vulgar only regard the second as on the + same footing. Both philosophers and the vulgar again esteem the + third to be merely perceptions, and consequently interrupted and + dependent beings. + + "Now 'tis evident that, whatever may be our philosophical opinion, + colour, sounds, heat, and cold, as far as appears to the senses, + exist after the same manner with motion and solidity; and that the + difference we make between them, in this respect, arises not from + the mere perception. So strong is the prejudice for the distinct + continued existence of the former qualities, that when the contrary + opinion is advanced by modern philosophers, people imagine they can + almost refute it from their reason and experience, and that their + very senses contradict this philosophy. 'Tis also evident that + colours, sounds, &c., are originally on the same footing with the + pain that arises from steel, and pleasure that proceeds from a + fire; and that the difference betwixt them is founded neither on + perception nor reason, but on the imagination. For as they are + confessed to be, both of them, nothing but perceptions arising from + the particular configurations and motions of the parts of body, + wherein possibly can their difference consist? Upon the whole, + then, we may conclude that, as far as the senses are judges, all + perceptions are the same in the manner of their existence."--(I. p. + 250, 251.) + +The last words of this passage are as much Berkeley's as Hume's. But, +instead of following Berkeley in his deductions from the position thus +laid down, Hume, as the preceding citation shows, fully adopted the +conclusion to which all that we know of psychological physiology tends, +that the origin of the elements of consciousness, no less than that of +all its other states, is to be sought in bodily changes, the seat of +which can only be placed in the brain. And, as Locke had already done +with less effect, he states and refutes the arguments commonly brought +against the possibility of a causal connexion between the modes of +motion of the cerebral substance and states of consciousness, with great +clearness:-- + + "From these hypotheses concerning the _substance_ and _local + conjunction_ of our perceptions we may pass to another, which is + more intelligible than the former, and more important than the + latter, viz. concerning the _cause_ of our perceptions. Matter and + motion, 'tis commonly said in the schools, however varied, are + still matter and motion, and produce only a difference in the + position and situation of objects. Divide a body as often as you + please, 'tis still body. Place it in any figure, nothing ever + results but figure, or the relation of parts. Move it in any + manner, you still find motion or a change of relation. 'Tis absurd + to imagine that motion in a circle, for instance, should be nothing + but merely motion in a circle; while motion in another direction, + as in an ellipse, should also be a passion or moral reflection; + that the shocking of two globular particles should become a + sensation of pain, and that the meeting of the triangular ones + should afford a pleasure. Now as these different shocks and + variations and mixtures are the only changes of which matter is + susceptible, and as these never afford us any idea of thought or + perception, 'tis concluded to be impossible, that thought can ever + be caused by matter. + + "Few have been able to withstand the seeming evidence of this + argument; and yet nothing in the world is more easy than to refute + it. We need only reflect upon what has been proved at large, that + we are never sensible of any connexion between causes and effects, + and that 'tis only by our experience of their constant conjunction + we can arrive at any knowledge of this relation. Now, as all + objects which are not contrary are susceptible of a constant + conjunction, and as no real objects are contrary, I have inferred + from these principles (Part III. Sec. 15) that, to consider the matter + _a priori_, anything may produce anything, and that we shall never + discover a reason why any object may or may not be the cause of any + other, however great, or however little, the resemblance may be + betwixt them. This evidently destroys the precedent reasoning, + concerning the cause of thought or perception. For though there + appear no manner of connection betwixt motion and thought, the case + is the same with all other causes and effects. Place one body of a + pound weight on one end of a lever, and another body of the same + weight on the other end; you will never find in these bodies any + principle of motion dependent on their distance from the centre, + more than of thought and perception. If you pretend, therefore, to + prove, _a priori_, that such a position of bodies can never cause + thought, because, turn it which way you will, it is nothing but a + position of bodies: you must, by the same course of reasoning, + conclude that it can never produce motion, since there is no more + apparent connection in the one than in the other. But, as this + latter conclusion is contrary to evident experience, and as 'tis + possible we may have a like experience in the operations of the + mind, and may perceive a constant conjunction of thought and + motion, you reason too hastily when, from the mere consideration of + the ideas, you conclude that 'tis impossible motion can ever + produce thought, or a different position of parts give rise to a + different passion or reflection. Nay, 'tis not only possible we may + have such an experience, but 'tis certain we have it; since every + one may perceive that the different dispositions of his body change + his thoughts and sentiments. And should it be said that this + depends on the union of soul and body, I would answer, that we must + separate the question concerning the substance of the mind from + that concerning the cause of its thought; and that, confining + ourselves to the latter question, we find, by the comparing their + ideas, that thought and motion are different from each other and by + experience, that they are constantly united; which, being all the + circumstances that enter into the idea of cause and effect, when + applied to the operations of matter, we may certainly conclude that + motion may be, and actually is, the cause of thought and + perception."--(I. pp. 314-316.) + +The upshot of all this is, that the "collection of perceptions," which +constitutes the mind, is really a system of effects, the causes of which +are to be sought in antecedent changes of the matter of the brain, just +as the "collection of motions," which we call flying, is a system of +effects, the causes of which are to be sought in the modes of motion of +the matter of the muscles of the wings. + +Hume, however, treats of this important topic only incidentally. He +seems to have had very little acquaintance even with such physiology as +was current in his time. At least, the only passage of his works, +bearing on this subject, with which I am acquainted, contains nothing +but a very odd version of the physiological views of Descartes:-- + + "When I received the relations of _resemblance_, _contiguity_, and + _causation_, as principles of union among ideas, without examining + into their causes, 'twas more in prosecution of my first maxim, + that we must in the end rest contented with experience, than for + want of something specious and plausible which I might have + displayed on that subject. 'Twould have been easy to have made an + imaginary dissection of the brain, and have shown why, upon our + conception of any idea, the animal spirits run into all the + contiguous traces and rouse up the other ideas that are related to + it. But though I have neglected any advantage which I might have + drawn from this topic in explaining the relations of ideas, I am + afraid I must here have recourse to it, in order to account for the + mistakes that arise from these relations. I shall therefore + observe, that as the mind is endowed with the power of exciting any + idea it pleases; whenever it despatches the spirits into that + region of the brain in which the idea is placed; these spirits + always excite the idea, when they run precisely into the proper + traces and rummage that cell which belongs to the idea. But as + their motion is seldom direct, and naturally turns a little to the + one side or to the other; for this reason the animal spirits, + falling into the contiguous traces, present other related ideas, in + lieu of that which the mind desired at first to survey. This change + we are not always sensible of; but continuing still the same train + of thought, make use of the related idea which is presented to us + and employ it in our reasonings, as if it were the same with what + we demanded. This is the cause of many mistakes and sophisms in + philosophy; as will naturally be imagined, and as it would be easy + to show, if there was occasion."--(I. p. 88.) + +Perhaps it is as well for Hume's fame that the occasion for further +physiological speculations of this sort did not arise. But, while +admitting the crudity of his notions and the strangeness of the language +in which they are couched, it must in justice be remembered, that what +are now known as the elements of the physiology of the nervous system +were hardly dreamed of in the first half of the eighteenth century; and, +as a further set off to Hume's credit, it must be noted that he grasped +the fundamental truth, that the key to the comprehension of mental +operations lies in the study of the molecular changes of the nervous +apparatus by which they are originated. + +Surely no one who is cognisant of the facts of the case, nowadays, +doubts that the roots of psychology lie in the physiology of the nervous +system. What we call the operations of the mind are functions of the +brain, and the materials of consciousness are products of cerebral +activity. Cabanis may have made use of crude and misleading phraseology +when he said that the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile; +but the conception which that much-abused phrase embodies is, +nevertheless, far more consistent with fact than the popular notion that +the mind is a metaphysical entity seated in the head, but as independent +of the brain as a telegraph operator is of his instrument. + +It is hardly necessary to point out that the doctrine just laid down is +what is commonly called materialism. In fact, I am not sure that the +adjective "crass," which appears to have a special charm for rhetorical +sciolists, would not be applied to it. But it is, nevertheless, true +that the doctrine contains nothing inconsistent with the purest +idealism. For, as Hume remarks (as indeed Descartes had observed long +before):-- + + "'Tis not our body we perceive when we regard our limbs and + members, but certain impressions which enter by the senses; so that + the ascribing a real and corporeal existence to these impressions, + or to their objects, is an act of the mind as difficult to explain + as that [the external existence of objects] which we examine at + present."--(I. p. 249.) + +Therefore, if we analyse the proposition that all mental phenomena are +the effects or products of material phenomena, all that it means amounts +to this; that whenever those states of consciousness which we call +sensation, or emotion, or thought, come into existence, complete +investigation will show good reason for the belief that they are +preceded by those other phenomena of consciousness to which we give the +names of matter and motion. All material changes appear, in the long +run, to be modes of motion; but our knowledge of motion is nothing but +that of a change in the place and order of our sensations; just as our +knowledge of matter is restricted to those feelings of which we assume +it to be the cause. + +It has already been pointed out, that Hume must have admitted, and in +fact does admit, the possibility that the mind is a Leibnitzian monad, +or a Fichtean world-generating Ego, the universe of things being merely +the picture produced by the evolution of the phenomena of consciousness. +For any demonstration that can be given to the contrary effect, the +"collection of perceptions" which makes up our consciousness may be an +orderly phantasmagoria generated by the Ego, unfolding its successive +scenes on the background of the abyss of nothingness; as a firework, +which is but cunningly arranged combustibles, grows from a spark into a +coruscation, and from a coruscation into figures, and words, and +cascades of devouring fire, and then vanishes into the darkness of the +night. + +On the other hand, it must no less readily be allowed that, for anything +that can be proved to the contrary, there may be a real something which +is the cause of all our impressions; that sensations, though not +likenesses, are symbols of that something; and that the part of that +something, which we call the nervous system, is an apparatus for +supplying us with a sort of algebra of fact, based on those symbols. A +brain may be the machinery by which the material universe becomes +conscious of itself. But it is important to notice that, even if this +conception of the universe and of the relation of consciousness to its +other components should be true, we should, nevertheless, be still bound +by the limits of thought, still unable to refute the arguments of pure +idealism. The more completely the materialistic position is admitted, +the easier is it to show that the idealistic position is unassailable, +if the idealist confines himself within the limits of positive +knowledge. + + +Hume deals with the questions whether all our ideas are derived from +experience, or whether, on the contrary, more or fewer of them are +innate, which so much exercised the mind of Locke, after a somewhat +summary fashion, in a note to the second section of the _Inquiry_:-- + + "It is probable that no more was meant by those who denied innate + ideas, than that all ideas were copies of our impressions; though + it must be confessed that the terms which they employed were not + chosen with such caution, nor so exactly defined, as to prevent all + mistakes about their doctrine. For what is meant by _innate_? If + innate be equivalent to natural, then all the perceptions and ideas + of the mind must be allowed to be innate or natural, in whatever + sense we take the latter word, whether in opposition to what is + uncommon, artificial, or miraculous. If by innate be meant + contemporary with our birth, the dispute seems to be frivolous; nor + is it worth while to inquire at what time thinking begins, whether + before, at, or after our birth. Again, the word _idea_ seems to be + commonly taken in a very loose sense by Locke and others, as + standing for any of our perceptions, our sensations and passions, + as well as thoughts. Now in this sense I should desire to know what + can be meant by asserting that self-love, or resentment of + injuries, or the passion between the sexes is not innate? + + "But admitting these terms, _impressions_ and _ideas_, in the + sense above explained, and understanding by _innate_ what is + original or copied from no precedent perception, then we may assert + that all our impressions are innate, and our ideas not innate." + +It would seem that Hume did not think it worth while to acquire a +comprehension of the real points at issue in the controversy which he +thus carelessly dismisses. + +Yet Descartes has defined what he means by innate ideas with so much +precision, that misconception ought to have been impossible. He says +that, when he speaks of an idea being "innate," he means that it exists +potentially in the mind, before it is actually called into existence by +whatever is its appropriate exciting cause. + + "I have never either thought or said," he writes, "that the mind + has any need of innate ideas [_idees naturelles_] which are + anything distinct from its faculty of thinking. But it is true that + observing that there are certain thoughts which arise neither from + external objects nor from the determination of my will, but only + from my faculty of thinking; in order to mark the difference + between the ideas or the notions which are the forms of these + thoughts, and to distinguish them from the others, which may be + called extraneous or voluntary, I have called them innate. But I + have used this term in the same sense as when we say that + generosity is innate in certain families; or that certain maladies, + such as gout or gravel, are innate in others; not that children + born in these families are troubled with such diseases in their + mother's womb; but because they are born with the disposition or + the faculty of contracting them."[22] + +His troublesome disciple, Regius, having asserted that all our ideas +come from observation or tradition, Descartes remarks:-- + + "So thoroughly erroneous is this assertion, that whoever has a + proper comprehension of the action of our senses, and understands + precisely the nature of that which is transmitted by them to our + thinking faculty, will rather affirm that no ideas of things, such + as are formed in thought, are brought to us by the senses, so that + there is nothing in our ideas which is other than innate in the + mind (_naturel a l'esprit_), or in the faculty of thinking, if only + certain circumstances are excepted, which belong only to + experience. For example, it is experience alone which causes us to + judge that such and such ideas, now present in our minds, are + related to certain things which are external to us; not in truth, + that they have been sent into our mind by these things, such as + they are, by the organs of the senses; but because these organs + have transmitted something which has occasioned the mind, in virtue + of its innate power, to form them at this time rather than at + another.... + + "Nothing passes from external objects to the soul except certain + motions of matter (_mouvemens corporels_), but neither these + motions, nor the figures which they produce, are conceived by us as + they exist in the sensory organs, as I have fully explained in my + "Dioptrics"; whence it follows that even the ideas of motion and of + figures are innate (_naturellement en nous_). And, _a fortiori_, + the ideas of pain, of colours, of sounds, and of all similar things + must be innate, in order that the mind may represent them to + itself, on the occasion of certain motions of matter with which + they have no resemblance." + +Whoever denies what is, in fact, an inconceivable proposition, that +sensations pass, as such, from the external world into the mind, must +admit the conclusion here laid down by Descartes, that, strictly +speaking, sensations, and _a fortiori_, all the other contents of the +mind, are innate. Or, to state the matter in accordance with the views +previously expounded, that they are products of the inherent properties +of the thinking organ, in which they lie potentially, before they are +called into existence by their appropriate causes. + +But if all the contents of the mind are innate, what is meant by +experience? + +It is the conversion, by unknown causes, of these innate potentialities +into actual existences. The organ of thought, prior to experience, may +be compared to an untouched piano, in which it may be properly said that +music is innate, inasmuch as its mechanism contains, potentially, so +many octaves of musical notes. The unknown cause of sensation which +Descartes calls the "je ne sais quoi dans les objets" or "choses telles +qu'elles sont," and Kant the "Noumenon" or "Ding an sich," is +represented by the musician; who, by touching the keys, converts the +potentiality of the mechanism into actual sounds. A note so produced is +the equivalent of a single experience. + +All the melodies and harmonies that proceed from the piano depend upon +the action of the musician upon the keys. There is no internal mechanism +which, when certain keys are struck, gives rise to an accompaniment of +which the musician is only indirectly the cause. According to Descartes, +however--and this is what is generally fixed upon as the essence of his +doctrine of innate ideas--the mind possesses such an internal mechanism, +by which certain classes of thoughts are generated, on the occasion of +certain experiences. Such thoughts are innate, just as sensations are +innate; they are not copies of sensations, any more than sensations are +copies of motions; they are invariably generated in the mind, when +certain experiences arise in it, just as sensations are invariably +generated when certain bodily motions take place; they are universal, +inasmuch as they arise under the same conditions in all men; they are +necessary, because their genesis under these conditions is invariable. +These innate thoughts are what Descartes terms "verites" or truths: that +is beliefs--and his notions respecting them are plainly set forth in a +passage of the _Principes_. + + "Thus far I have discussed that which we know as things: it remains + that I should speak of that which we know as truths. For example, + when we think that it is impossible to make anything out of + nothing, we do not imagine that this proposition is a thing which + exists, or a property of something, but we take it for a certain + eternal truth, which has its seat in the mind (_pensee_), and is + called a common notion or an axiom. Similarly, when we affirm that + it is impossible that one and the same thing should exist and not + exist at the same time; that that which has been created should not + have been created; that he who thinks must exist while he thinks; + and a number of other like propositions; these are only truths, and + not things which exist outside our thoughts. And there is such a + number of these that it would be wearisome to enumerate them: nor + is it necessary to do so, because we cannot fail to know them when + the occasion of thinking about them presents itself, and we are not + blinded by any prejudices." + +It would appear that Locke was not more familiar with Descartes' +writings than Hume seems to have been; for, viewed in relation to the +passages just cited, the arguments adduced in his famous polemic against +innate ideas are totally irrelevant. + +It has been shown that Hume practically, if not in so many words, +admits the justice of Descartes' assertion that, strictly speaking, +sensations are innate; that is to say, that they are the product of the +reaction of the organ of the mind on the stimulus of an "unknown cause," +which is Descartes' "je ne sais quoi." Therefore, the difference between +Descartes' opinion and that of Hume resolves itself into this: Given +sensation-experiences, can all the contents of consciousness be derived +from the collocation and metamorphosis of these experiences? Or, are new +elements of consciousness, products of an innate potentiality distinct +from sensibility, added to these? Hume affirms the former position, +Descartes the latter. If the analysis of the phenomena of consciousness +given in the preceding pages is correct, Hume is in error; while the +father of modern philosophy had a truer insight, though he overstated +the case. For want of sufficiently searching psychological +investigations, Descartes was led to suppose that innumerable ideas, the +evolution of which in the course of experience can be demonstrated, were +direct or innate products of the thinking faculty. + +As has been already pointed out, it is the great merit of Kant that he +started afresh on the track indicated by Descartes, and steadily upheld +the doctrine of the existence of elements of consciousness, which are +neither sense-experiences nor any modifications of them. We may demur to +the expression that space and time are forms of sensory intuition; but +it imperfectly represents the great fact that co-existence and +succession are mental phenomena not given in the mere sense +experience.[23] + +FOOTNOTES: + +[22] Remarques de Rene Descartes sur un certain placard imprime aux Pays +Bas vers la fin de l'annee, 1647.--Descartes, _OEuvres_. Ed. Cousin, +x. p. 71. + +[23] "Wir koennen uns keinen Gegenstand denken, ohne durch Kategorien; +wir koennen keinen gedachten Gegenstand erkennen, ohne durch +Anschauungen, die jenen Begriffen entsprechen. Nun sind alle unsere +Anschauungen sinnlich, und diese Erkenntniss, so fern der Gegenstand +derselben gegeben ist, ist empirisch. Empirische Erkenntniss aber ist +Erfahrung. Folglich ist uns keine Erkenntniss _a priori_ moeglich, als +lediglich von Gegenstaenden moeglicher Erfahrung." + +"Aber diese Erkenntniss, die bloss auf Gegenstaende der Erfahrung +eingeschraenkt ist, ist darum nicht alle von der Erfahrung entlehnt, +sondern was sowohl die reinen Anschauungen, als die reinen +Verstandesbegriffe betrifft, so sind sie Elemente der Erkenntniss die in +uns _a priori_ angetroffen werden."--_Kritik der reinen Vernunft. +Elementarlehre_, p. 135. + +Without a glossary explanatory of Kant's terminology, this passage would +be hardly intelligible in a translation; but it may be paraphrased thus: +All knowledge is founded upon experiences of sensation, but it is not +all derived from those experiences; inasmuch as the impressions of +relation ("reine Anschauungen"; "reine Verstandesbegriffe") have a +potential or _a priori_ existence in us, and by their addition to +sense-experiences, constitute knowledge. + + + + +CHAPTER IV. + +THE CLASSIFICATION AND THE NOMENCLATURE OF MENTAL OPERATIONS. + + +If, as has been set forth in the preceding chapter, all mental states +are effects of physical causes, it follows that what are called mental +faculties and operations are, properly speaking, cerebral functions, +allotted to definite, though not yet precisely assignable, parts of the +brain. + +These functions appear to be reducible to three groups, namely: +Sensation, Correlation, and Ideation. + +The organs of the functions of sensation and correlation are those +portions of the cerebral substance, the molecular changes of which give +rise to impressions of sensation and impressions of relation. + +The changes in the nervous matter which bring about the effects which we +call its functions, follow upon some kind of stimulus, and rapidly +reaching their maximum, as rapidly die away. The effect of the +irritation of a nerve-fibre on the cerebral substance with which it is +connected may be compared to the pulling of a long bell-wire. The +impulse takes a little time to reach the bell; the bell rings and then +becomes quiescent, until another pull is given. So, in the brain, every +sensation is the ring of a cerebral particle, the effect of a momentary +impulse sent along a nerve-fibre. + +If there were a complete likeness between the two terms of this very +rough and ready comparison, it is obvious that there could be no such +thing as memory. A bell records no audible sign of having been rung five +minutes ago, and the activity of a sensigenous cerebral particle might +similarly leave no trace. Under these circumstances, again, it would +seem that the only impressions of relation which could arise would be +those of co-existence and of similarity. For succession implies memory +of an antecedent state.[24] + +But the special peculiarity of the cerebral apparatus is, that any given +function which has once been performed is very easily set a-going again, +by causes more or less different from those to which it owed its origin. +Of the mechanism of this generation of images of impressions or ideas +(in Hume's sense), which may be termed _Ideation_, we know nothing at +present, though the fact and its results are familiar enough. + +During our waking, and many of our sleeping, hours, in fact, the +function of ideation is in continual, if not continuous, activity. +Trains of thought, as we call them, succeed one another without +intermission, even when the starting of new trains by fresh +sense-impressions is as far as possible prevented. The rapidity and the +intensity of this ideational process are obviously dependent upon +physiological conditions. The widest differences in these respects are +constitutional in men of different temperaments; and are observable in +oneself, under varying conditions of hunger and repletion, fatigue and +freshness, calmness and emotional excitement. The influence of diet on +dreams; of stimulants upon the fulness and the velocity of the stream of +thought; the delirious phantasms generated by disease, by hashish, or by +alcohol; will occur to every one as examples of the marvellous +sensitiveness of the apparatus of ideation to purely physical +influences. + +The succession of mental states in ideation is not fortuitous, but +follows the law of association, which may be stated thus: that every +idea tends to be followed by some other idea which is associated with +the first, or its impression, by a relation of succession, of +contiguity, or of likeness. + +Thus the idea of the word horse just now presented itself to my mind, +and was followed in quick succession by the ideas of four legs, hoofs, +teeth, rider, saddle, racing, cheating; all of which ideas are connected +in my experience with the impression, or the idea, of a horse and with +one another, by the relations of contiguity and succession. No great +attention to what passes in the mind is needful to prove that our trains +of thought are neither to be arrested, nor even permanently controlled, +by our desires or emotions. Nevertheless they are largely influenced by +them. In the presence of a strong desire, or emotion, the stream of +thought no longer flows on in a straight course, but seems, as it were, +to eddy round the idea of that which is the object of the emotion. Every +one who has "eaten his bread in sorrow" knows how strangely the current +of ideas whirls about the conception of the object of regret or remorse +as a centre; every now and then, indeed, breaking away into the new +tracks suggested by passing associations, but still returning to the +central thought. Few can have been so happy as to have escaped the +social bore, whose pet notion is certain to crop up whatever topic is +started; while the fixed idea of the monomaniac is but the extreme form +of the same phenomenon. + +And as, on the one hand, it is so hard to drive away the thought we +would fain be rid of; so, upon the other, the pleasant imaginations +which we would so gladly retain are, sooner or later, jostled away by +the crowd of claimants for birth into the world of consciousness; which +hover as a sort of psychical possibilities, or inverse ghosts, the +bodily presentments of spiritual phenomena to be, in the limbo of the +brain. In that form of desire which is called "attention," the train of +thought, held fast, for a time, in the desired direction, seems ever +striving to get on to another line--and the junctions and sidings are so +multitudinous! + + +The constituents of trains of ideas may be grouped in various ways. + +Hume says:-- + + "We find, by experience, that when any impression has been present + in the mind, it again makes its appearance there as an idea, and + this it may do in two different ways: either when, on its new + appearance, it retains a considerable degree of its first vivacity, + and is somewhat intermediate between an impression and an idea; or + when it entirely loses that vivacity, and is a perfect idea. The + faculty by which we repeat our impressions in the first manner, is + called the _memory_, and the other the _imagination_."--(I. pp. 23, + 24.) + +And he considers that the only difference between ideas of imagination +and those of memory, except the superior vivacity of the latter, lies +in the fact that those of memory preserve the original order of the +impressions from which they are derived, while the imagination "is free +to transpose and change its ideas." + +The latter statement of the difference between memory and imagination is +less open to cavil than the former, though by no means unassailable. + +The special characteristic of a memory surely is not its vividness; but +that it is a complex idea, in which the idea of that which is remembered +is related by co-existence with other ideas, and by antecedence with +present impressions. + +If I say I remember A. B., the chance acquaintance of ten years ago, it +is not because my idea of A. B. is very vivid--on the contrary, it is +extremely faint--but because that idea is associated with ideas of +impressions co-existent with those which I call A. B.; and that all +these are at the end of the long series of ideas, which represent that +much past time. In truth I have a much more vivid idea of Mr. Pickwick, +or of Colonel Newcome, than I have of A. B.; but, associated with the +ideas of these persons, I have no idea of their having ever been derived +from the world of impressions; and so they are relegated to the world of +imagination. On the other hand, the characteristic of an imagination may +properly be said to lie not in its intensity, but in the fact that, as +Hume puts it, "the arrangement," or the relations, of the ideas are +different from those in which the impressions, whence these ideas are +derived, occurred; or in other words, that the thing imagined has not +happened. In popular usage, however, imagination is frequently employed +for simple memory--"In imagination I was back in the old times." + +It is a curious omission on Hume's part that, while thus dwelling on two +classes of ideas, _Memories_ and _Imaginations_, he has not, at the same +time, taken notice of a third group, of no small importance, which are +as different from imaginations as memories are; though, like the latter, +they are often confounded with pure imaginations in general speech. +These are the ideas of expectation, or as they may be called for the +sake of brevity, _Expectations_; which differ from simple imaginations +in being associated with the idea of the existence of corresponding +impressions, in the future, just as memories contain the idea of the +existence of the corresponding impressions in the past. + +The ideas belonging to two of the three groups enumerated: namely, +memories and expectations, present some features, of particular +interest. And first, with respect to memories. + +In Hume's words, all simple ideas are copies of simple impressions. The +idea of a single sensation is a faint, but accurate, image of that +sensation; the idea of a relation is a reproduction of the feeling of +co-existence, of succession, or of similarity. But, when complex +impressions or complex ideas are reproduced as memories, it is probable +that the copies never give all the details of the originals with perfect +accuracy, and it is certain that they rarely do so. No one possesses a +memory so good, that if he has only once observed a natural object, a +second inspection does not show him something that he has forgotten. +Almost all, if not all, our memories are therefore sketches, rather than +portraits, of the originals--the salient features are obvious, while the +subordinate characters are obscure or unrepresented. + +Now, when several complex impressions which are more or less different +from one another--let us say that out of ten impressions in each, six +are the same in all, and four are different from all the rest--are +successively presented to the mind, it is easy to see what must be the +nature of the result. The repetition of the six similar impressions will +strengthen the six corresponding elements of the complex idea, which +will therefore acquire greater vividness; while the four differing +impressions of each will not only acquire no greater strength than they +had at first, but, in accordance with the law of association, they will +all tend to appear at once, and will thus neutralise one another. + +This mental operation may be rendered comprehensible by considering what +takes place in the formation of compound photographs--when the images of +the faces of six sitters, for example, are each received on the same +photographic plate, for a sixth of the time requisite to take one +portrait. The final result is that all those points in which the six +faces agree are brought out strongly, while all those in which they +differ are left vague; and thus what may be termed a _generic_ portrait +of the six, in contradistinction to a _specific_ portrait of any one, is +produced. + +Thus our ideas of single complex impressions are incomplete in one way, +and those of numerous, more or less similar, complex impressions are +incomplete in another way; that is to say, they are _generic_, not +_specific_. And hence it follows, that our ideas of the impressions in +question are not, in the strict sense of the word, copies of those +impressions; while, at the same time, they may exist in the mind +independently of language. + +The generic ideas which are formed from several similar, but not +identical, complex experiences are what are commonly called _abstract_ +or _general_ ideas; and Berkeley endeavoured to prove that all general +ideas are nothing but particular ideas annexed to a certain term, which +gives them a more extensive signification, and makes them recall, upon +occasion, other individuals which are similar to them. Hume says that he +regards this as "one of the greatest and the most valuable discoveries +that has been made of late years in the republic of letters," and +endeavours to confirm it in such a manner that it shall be "put beyond +all doubt and controversy." + +I may venture to express a doubt whether he has succeeded in his object; +but the subject is an abstruse one; and I must content myself with the +remark, that though Berkeley's view appears to be largely applicable to +such general ideas as are formed after language has been acquired, and +to all the more abstract sort of conceptions, yet that general ideas of +sensible objects may nevertheless be produced in the way indicated, and +may exist independently of language. In dreams, one sees houses, trees +and other objects, which are perfectly recognisable as such, but which +remind one of the actual objects as seen "out of the corner of the eye," +or of the pictures thrown by a badly-focussed magic lantern. A man +addresses us who is like a figure seen by twilight; or we travel through +countries where every feature of the scenery is vague; the outlines of +the hills are ill-marked, and the rivers have no defined banks. They +are, in short, generic ideas of many past impressions of men, hills, and +rivers. An anatomist who occupies himself intently with the examination +of several specimens of some new kind of animal, in course of time +acquires so vivid a conception of its form and structure, that the idea +may take visible shape and become a sort of waking dream. But the figure +which thus presents itself is generic, not specific. It is no copy of +any one specimen, but, more or less, a mean of the series; and there +seems no reason to doubt that the minds of children before they learn to +speak, and of deaf mutes, are peopled with similarly generated generic +ideas of sensible objects. + + +It has been seen that a memory is a complex idea made up of at least two +constituents. In the first place there is the idea of an object; and +secondly, there is the idea of the relation of antecedence between that +object and some present objects. + +To say that one has a recollection of a given event and to express the +belief that it happened, are two ways of giving an account of one and +the same mental fact. But the former mode of stating the fact of memory +is preferable, at present, because it certainly does not presuppose the +existence of language in the mind of the rememberer; while it may be +said that the latter does. It is perfectly possible to have the idea of +an event A, and of the events B, C, D, which came between it and the +present state E, as mere mental pictures. It is hardly to be doubted +that children have very distinct memories long before they can speak; +and we believe that such is the case because they act upon their +memories. But, if they act upon their memories, they to all intents and +purposes believe their memories. In other words, though, being devoid of +language, the child cannot frame a proposition expressive of belief; +cannot say "sugar-plum was sweet;" yet the psychical operation of which +that proposition is merely the verbal expression, is perfectly +effected. The experience of the co-existence of sweetness with sugar has +produced a state of mind which bears the same relation to a verbal +proposition, as the natural disposition to produce a given idea, assumed +to exist by Descartes as an "innate idea" would bear to that idea put +into words. + +The fact that the beliefs of memory precede the use of language, and +therefore are originally purely instinctive, and independent of any +rational justification, should have been of great importance to Hume, +from its bearing upon his theory of causation; and it is curious that he +has not adverted to it, but always takes the trustworthiness of memories +for granted. It may be worth while briefly to make good the omission. + +That I was in pain, yesterday, is as certain to me as any matter of fact +can be; by no effort of the imagination is it possible for me really to +entertain the contrary belief. At the same time, I am bound to admit, +that the whole foundation for my belief is the fact, that the idea of +pain is indissolubly associated in my mind with the idea of that much +past time. Any one who will be at the trouble may provide himself with +hundreds of examples to the same effect. + +This and similar observations are important under another aspect. They +prove that the idea of even a single strong impression may be so +powerfully associated with that of a certain time, as to originate a +belief of which the contrary is inconceivable, and which may therefore +be properly said to be necessary. A single weak, or moderately strong, +impression may not be represented by any memory. But this defect of weak +experiences may be compensated by their repetition; and what Hume means +by "custom" or "habit" is simply the repetition of experiences. + + "wherever the repetition of any particular act or operation + produces a propensity to renew the same act or operation, without + being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding, we + always say that this propensity is the effect of _Custom_. By + employing that word, we pretend not to have given the ultimate + reason of such a propensity. We only point out a principle of human + nature which is universally acknowledged, and which is well known + by its effects."--(IV. p. 52.) + +It has been shown that an expectation is a complex idea which, like a +memory, is made up of two constituents. The one is the idea of an +object, the other is the idea of a relation of sequence between that +object and some present object; and the reasoning which applied to +memories applies to expectations. To have an expectation[25] of a given +event, and to believe that it will happen, are only two modes of stating +the same fact. Again, just in the same way as we call a memory, put into +words, a belief, so we give the same name to an expectation in like +clothing. And the fact already cited, that a child before it can speak +acts upon its memories, is good evidence that it forms expectations. The +infant who knows the meaning neither of "sugar-plum" nor of "sweet," +nevertheless is in full possession of that complex idea, which, when he +has learned to employ language, will take the form of the verbal +proposition, "A sugar-plum will be sweet." + +Thus, beliefs of expectation, or at any rate their potentialities, are, +as much as those of memory, antecedent to speech, and are as incapable +of justification by any logical process. In fact, expectations are but +memories inverted. The association which is the foundation of +expectation must exist as a memory before it can play its part. As Hume +says,-- + + " ... it is certain we here advance a very intelligible proposition + at least, if not a true one, when we assert that after the constant + conjunction of two objects, heat and flame, for instance, weight + and solidity, we are determined by custom alone to expect the one + from the appearance of the other. This hypothesis seems even the + only one which explains the difficulty why we draw from a thousand + instances, an inference which we are not able to draw from one + instance, that is in no respect different from them."... + + "Custom, then, is the great guide of human life. It is that + principle alone which renders our experience useful to us, and + makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with + those which have appeared in the past."... + + "All belief of matter-of-fact or real existence is derived merely + from some object present to the memory or senses, and a customary + conjunction between that and some other object; or in other words, + having found, in many instances, that any two kinds of objects, + flame and heat, snow and cold, have always been conjoined together: + if flame or snow be presented anew to the senses, the mind is + carried by custom to expect heat or cold, and to _believe_ that + such a quality does exist, and will discover itself upon a nearer + approach. This belief is the necessary result of placing the mind + in such circumstances. It is an operation of the soul, when we are + so situated, as unavoidable as to feel the passion of love, when we + receive benefits, or hatred, when we meet with injuries. All these + operations are a species of natural instincts, which no reasoning + or process of the thought and understanding is able either to + produce or to prevent."--(IV. pp. 52-56.) + +The only comment that appears needful here is, that Hume has attached +somewhat too exclusive a weight to that repetition of experiences to +which alone the term "custom" can be properly applied. The proverb says +that "a burnt child dreads the fire"; and any one who will make the +experiment will find, that one burning is quite sufficient to establish +an indissoluble belief that contact with fire and pain go together. + +As a sort of inverted memory, expectation follows the same laws; hence, +while a belief of expectation is, in most cases, as Hume truly says, +established by custom, or the repetition of weak impressions, it may +quite well be based upon a single strong experience. In the absence of +language, a specific memory cannot be strengthened by repetition. It is +obvious that that which has happened cannot happen again, with the same +collateral associations of co-existence and succession. But, memories of +the co-existence and succession of impressions are capable of being +indefinitely strengthened by the recurrence of similar impressions, in +the same order, even though the collateral associations are totally +different; in fact, the ideas of these impressions become generic. + +If I recollect that a piece of ice was cold yesterday, nothing can +strengthen the recollection of that particular fact; on the contrary, it +may grow weaker, in the absence of any record of it. But if I touch ice +to-day and again find it cold, the association is repeated, and the +memory of it becomes stronger. And, by this very simple process of +repetition of experience, it has become utterly impossible for us to +think of having handled ice without thinking of its coldness. But, that +which is, under the one aspect, the strengthening of a memory, is, +under the other, the intensification of an expectation. Not only can we +not think of having touched ice, without feeling cold, but we cannot +think of touching ice, in the future, without expecting to feel cold. An +expectation so strong that it cannot be changed, or abolished, may thus +be generated out of repeated experiences. And it is important to note +that such expectations may be formed quite unconsciously. In my dressing +room, a certain can is usually kept full of water, and I am in the habit +of lifting it to pour out water for washing. Sometimes the servant has +forgotten to fill it, and then I find that, when I take hold of the +handle, the can goes up with a jerk. Long association has, in fact, led +me to expect the can to have a considerable weight; and, quite unawares, +my muscular effort is adjusted to the expectation. + +The process of strengthening generic memories of succession, and, at the +same time, intensifying expectations of succession, is what is commonly +called _verification_. The impression B has frequently been observed to +follow the impression A. The association thus produced is represented as +the memory, A -> B. When the impression A appears again, the idea of B +follows, associated with that of the immediate appearance of the +impression B. If the impression B does appear, the expectation is said +to be verified; while the memory A -> B is strengthened, and gives rise +in turn to a stronger expectation. And repeated verification may render +that expectation so strong that its non-verification is inconceivable. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[24] It is not worth while, for the present purpose, to consider +whether, as all nervous action occupies a sensible time, the duration of +one impression might not overlap that of the impression which follows +it, in the case supposed. + +[25] We give no name to faint memories; but expectations of like +character play so large a part in human affairs that they, together with +the associated emotions of pleasure and pain, are distinguished as +"hopes" or "fears." + + + + +CHAPTER V. + +THE MENTAL PHENOMENA OF ANIMALS. + + +In the course of the preceding chapters, attention has been more than +once called to the fact, that the elements of consciousness and the +operations of the mental faculties, under discussion, exist +independently of and antecedent to, the existence of language. + +If any weight is to be attached to arguments from analogy, there is +overwhelming evidence in favour of the belief that children, before they +can speak, and deaf mutes, possess the feelings to which those who have +acquired the faculty of speech apply the name of sensations; that they +have the feelings of relation; that trains of ideas pass through their +minds; that generic ideas are formed from specific ones; and, that among +these, ideas of memory and expectation occupy a most important place, +inasmuch as, in their quality of potential beliefs, they furnish the +grounds of action. This conclusion, in truth, is one of those which, +though they cannot be demonstrated, are never doubted; and, since it is +highly probable and cannot be disproved, we are quite safe in accepting +it, as, at any rate, a good working hypothesis. + +But, if we accept it, we must extend it to a much wider assemblage of +living beings. Whatever cogency is attached to the arguments in favour +of the occurrence of all the fundamental phenomena of mind in young +children and deaf mutes, an equal force must be allowed to appertain to +those which may be adduced to prove that the higher animals have minds. +We must admit that Hume does not express himself too strongly when he +says-- + + "no truth appears to me more evident, than that the beasts are + endowed with thought and reason as well as men. The arguments are + in this case so obvious, that they never escape the most stupid and + ignorant."--(I. p. 232.) + +In fact, this is one of the few cases in which the conviction which +forces itself upon the stupid and the ignorant, is fortified by the +reasonings of the intelligent, and has its foundation deepened by every +increase of knowledge. It is not merely that the observation of the +actions of animals almost irresistibly suggests the attribution to them +of mental states, such as those which accompany corresponding actions in +men. The minute comparison which has been instituted by anatomists and +physiologists between the organs which we know to constitute the +apparatus of thought in man, and the corresponding organs in brutes, has +demonstrated the existence of the closest similarity between the two, +not only in structure, as far as the microscope will carry us, but in +function, as far as functions are determinable by experiment. There is +no question in the mind of any one acquainted with the facts that, so +far as observation and experiment can take us, the structure and the +functions of the nervous system are fundamentally the same in an ape, or +in a dog, and in a man. And the suggestion that we must stop at the +exact point at which direct proof fails us; and refuse to believe that +the similarity which extends so far stretches yet further, is no better +than a quibble. Robinson Crusoe did not feel bound to conclude, from the +single human footprint which he saw in the sand, that the maker of the +impression had only one leg. + +Structure for structure, down to the minutest microscopical details, the +eye, the ear, the olfactory organs, the nerves, the spinal cord, the +brain of an ape, or of a dog, correspond with the same organs in the +human subject. Cut a nerve, and the evidence of paralysis, or of +insensibility, is the same in the two cases; apply pressure to the +brain, or administer a narcotic, and the signs of intelligence disappear +in the one as in the other. Whatever reason we have for believing that +the changes which take place in the normal cerebral substance of man +give rise to states of consciousness, the same reason exists for the +belief that the modes of motion of the cerebral substance of an ape, or +of a dog, produce like effects. + +A dog acts as if he had all the different kinds of impressions of +sensation of which each of us is cognisant. Moreover, he governs his +movements exactly as if he had the feelings of distance, form, +succession, likeness, and unlikeness, with which we are familiar, or as +if the impressions of relation were generated in his mind as they are in +our own. Sleeping dogs frequently appear to dream. If they do, it must +be admitted that ideation goes on in them while they are asleep; and, in +that case, there is no reason to doubt that they are conscious of trains +of ideas in their waking state. Further, that dogs, if they possess +ideas at all, have memories and expectations, and those potential +beliefs of which these states are the foundation, can hardly be doubted +by any one who is conversant with their ways. Finally, there would +appear to be no valid argument against the supposition that dogs form +generic ideas of sensible objects. One of the most curious peculiarities +of the dog mind is its inherent snobbishness, shown by the regard paid +to external respectability. The dog who barks furiously at a beggar will +let a well-dressed man pass him without opposition. Has he not then a +"generic idea" of rags and dirt associated with the idea of aversion, +and that of sleek broadcloth associated with the idea of liking? + +In short, it seems hard to assign any good reason for denying to the +higher animals any mental state, or process, in which the employment of +the vocal or visual symbols of which language is composed is not +involved; and comparative psychology confirms the position in relation +to the rest of the animal world assigned to man by comparative anatomy. +As comparative anatomy is easily able to show that, physically, man is +but the last term of a long series of forms, which lead, by slow +gradations, from the highest mammal to the almost formless speck of +living protoplasm, which lies on the shadowy boundary between animal and +vegetable life; so, comparative psychology, though but a young science, +and far short of her elder sister's growth, points to the same +conclusion. + +In the absence of a distinct nervous system, we have no right to look +for its product, consciousness; and, even in those forms of animal life +in which the nervous apparatus has reached no higher degree of +development, than that exhibited by the system of the spinal cord and +the foundation of the brain in ourselves, the argument from analogy +leaves the assumption of the existence of any form of consciousness +unsupported. With the super-addition of a nervous apparatus +corresponding with the cerebrum in ourselves, it is allowable to suppose +the appearance of the simplest states of consciousness, or the +sensations; and it is conceivable that these may at first exist, without +any power of reproducing them, as memories; and, consequently, without +ideation. Still higher, an apparatus of correlation may be superadded, +until, as all these organs become more developed, the condition of the +highest speechless animals is attained. + +It is a remarkable example of Hume's sagacity that he perceived the +importance of a branch of science which, even now, can hardly be said to +exist; and that, in a remarkable passage, he sketches in bold outlines +the chief features of comparative psychology. + + " ... any theory, by which we explain the operations of the + understanding, or the origin and connexion of the passions in man, + will acquire additional authority if we find that the same theory + is requisite to explain the same phenomena in all other animals. We + shall make trial of this with regard to the hypothesis by which we + have, in the foregoing discourse, endeavoured to account for all + experimental reasonings; and it is hoped that this new point of + view will serve to confirm all our former observations. + + "_First_, it seems evident that animals, as well as men, learn many + things from experience, and infer that the same events will always + follow from the same causes. By this principle they become + acquainted with the more obvious properties of external objects, + and gradually, from their birth, treasure up a knowledge of the + nature of fire, water, earth, stones, heights, depths, &c., and of + the effects which result from their operation. The ignorance and + inexperience of the young are here plainly distinguishable from the + cunning and sagacity of the old, who have learned, by long + observation, to avoid what hurt them, and pursue what gave ease or + pleasure. A horse that has been accustomed to the field, becomes + acquainted with the proper height which he can leap, and will never + attempt what exceeds his force and ability. An old greyhound will + trust the more fatiguing part of the chase to the younger, and will + place himself so as to meet the hare in her doubles; nor are the + conjectures which he forms on this occasion founded on anything but + his observation and experience. + + "This is still more evident from the effects of discipline and + education on animals, who, by the proper application of rewards and + punishments, may be taught any course of action, the most contrary + to their natural instincts and propensities. Is it not experience + which renders a dog apprehensive of pain when you menace him, or + lift up the whip to beat him? Is it not even experience which makes + him answer to his name, and infer from such an arbitrary sound that + you mean him rather than any of his fellows, and intend to call + him, when you pronounce it in a certain manner and with a certain + tone and accent? + + "In all these cases we may observe that the animal infers some fact + beyond what immediately strikes his senses; and that this inference + is altogether founded on past experience, while the creature + expects from the present object the same consequences which it has + always found in its observation to result from similar objects. + + "_Secondly_, it is impossible that this inference of the animal can + be founded on any process of argument or reasoning, by which he + concludes that like events must follow like objects, and that the + course of nature will always be regular in its operations. For if + there be in reality any arguments of this nature they surely lie + too abstruse for the observation of such imperfect understandings; + since it may well employ the utmost care and attention of a + philosophic genius to discover and observe them. Animals therefore + are not guided in these inferences by reasoning; neither are + children; neither are the generality of mankind in their ordinary + actions and conclusions; neither are philosophers themselves, who, + in all the active parts of life, are in the main the same as the + vulgar, and are governed by the same maxims. Nature must have + provided some other principle, of more ready and more general use + and application; nor can an operation of such immense consequence + in life as that of inferring effects from causes, be trusted to the + uncertain process of reasoning and argumentation. Were this + doubtful with regard to men, it seems to admit of no question with + regard to the brute creation; and the conclusion being once firmly + established in the one, we have a strong presumption, from all the + rules of analogy, that it ought to be universally admitted, without + any exception or reserve. It is custom alone which engages animals, + from every object that strikes their senses, to infer its usual + attendant, and carries their imagination from the appearance of the + one to conceive the other, in that particular manner which we + denominate _belief_. No other explication can be given of this + operation in all the higher as well as lower classes of sensitive + beings which fall under our notice and observation."--(IV. pp. + 122-4.) + +It will be observed that Hume appears to contrast the "inference of the +animal" with the "process of argument or reasoning in man." But it would +be a complete misapprehension of his intention, if we were to suppose, +that he thereby means to imply that there is any real difference between +the two processes. The "inference of the animal" is a potential belief +of expectation; the process of argument, or reasoning, in man is based +upon potential beliefs of expectation, which are formed in the man +exactly in the same way as in the animal. But, in men endowed with +speech, the mental state which constitutes the potential belief is +represented by a verbal proposition, and thus becomes what all the world +recognises as a belief. The fallacy which Hume combats is, that the +proposition, or verbal representative of a belief, has come to be +regarded as a reality, instead of as the mere symbol which it really is; +and that reasoning, or logic, which deals with nothing but propositions, +is supposed to be necessary in order to validate the natural fact +symbolised by those propositions. It is a fallacy similar to that of +supposing that money is the foundation of wealth, whereas it is only the +wholly unessential symbol of property. + +In the passage which immediately follows that just quoted, Hume makes +admissions which might be turned to serious account against some of his +own doctrines. + + "But though animals learn many parts of their knowledge from + observation, there are also many parts of it which they derive from + the original hand of Nature, which much exceed the share of + capacity they possess on ordinary occasions, and in which they + improve, little or nothing, by the longest practice and experience. + These we denominate INSTINCTS, and are so apt to admire as + something very extraordinary and inexplicable by all the + disquisitions of human understanding. But our wonder will perhaps + cease or diminish when we consider that the experimental reasoning + itself, which we possess in common with beasts, and on which the + whole conduct of life depends, is nothing but a species of instinct + or mechanical power, that acts in us unknown to ourselves, and in + its chief operations is not directed by any such relations or + comparison of ideas as are the proper objects of our intellectual + faculties. + + "Though the instinct be different, yet still it is an instinct + which teaches a man to avoid the fire, as much as that which + teaches a bird, with such exactness, the art of incubation and the + whole economy and order of its nursery."--(IV. pp. 125, 126.) + +The parallel here drawn between the "avoidance of a fire" by a man and +the incubatory instinct of a bird is inexact. The man avoids fire when +he has had experience of the pain produced by burning; but the bird +incubates the first time it lays eggs, and therefore before it has had +any experience of incubation. For the comparison to be admissible, it +would be necessary that a man should avoid fire the first time he saw +it, which is notoriously not the case. + +The term "instinct" is very vague and ill-defined. It is commonly +employed to denote any action, or even feeling, which is not dictated by +conscious reasoning, whether it is, or is not, the result of previous +experience. It is "instinct" which leads a chicken just hatched to pick +up a grain of corn; parental love is said to be "instinctive"; the +drowning man who catches at a straw does it "instinctively"; and the +hand that accidentally touches something hot is drawn back by +"instinct." Thus "instinct" is made to cover everything from a simple +reflex movement, in which the organ of consciousness need not be at all +implicated, up to a complex combination of acts directed towards a +definite end and accompanied by intense consciousness. + +But this loose employment of the term "instinct" really accords with the +nature of the thing; for it is wholly impossible to draw any line of +demarcation between reflex actions and instincts. If a frog, on the +flank of which a little drop of acid has been placed, rubs it off with +the foot of the same side; and, if that foot be held, performs the same +operation, at the cost of much effort, with the other foot, it certainly +displays a curious instinct. But it is no less true that the whole +operation is a reflex operation of the spinal cord, which can be +performed quite as well when the brain is destroyed; and between which +and simple reflex actions there is a complete series of gradations. In +like manner, when an infant takes the breast, it is impossible to say +whether the action should be rather termed instinctive or reflex. + +What are usually called the instincts of animals are, however, acts of +such a nature that, if they were performed by men, they would involve +the generation of a series of ideas and of inferences from them; and it +is a curious, and apparently an insoluble, problem whether they are, or +are not, accompanied by cerebral changes of the same nature as those +which give rise to ideas and inferences in ourselves. When a chicken +picks up a grain, for example, are there, firstly, certain sensations, +accompanied by the feeling of relation between the grain and its own +body; secondly, a desire of the grain; thirdly, a volition to seize it? +Or, are only the sensational terms of the series actually represented in +consciousness? + +The latter seems the more probable opinion, though it must be admitted +that the other alternative is possible. But, in this case, the series of +mental states which occurs is such as would be represented in language +by a series of propositions, and would afford proof positive of the +existence of innate ideas, in the Cartesian sense. Indeed, a +metaphysical fowl, brooding over the mental operations of his +fully-fledged consciousness, might appeal to the fact as proof that, in +the very first action of his life, he assumed the existence of the Ego +and the non-Ego, and of a relation between the two. + +In all seriousness, if the existence of instincts be granted, the +possibility of the existence of innate ideas, in the most extended sense +ever imagined by Descartes, must also be admitted. In fact, Descartes, +as we have soon, illustrates what he means by an innate idea, by the +analogy of hereditary diseases or hereditary mental peculiarities, such +as generosity. On the other hand, hereditary mental tendencies may +justly be termed instincts; and still more appropriately might those +special proclivities, which constitute what we call genius, come into +the same category. + +The child who is impelled to draw as soon as it can hold a pencil; the +Mozart who breaks out into music as early; the boy Bidder who worked out +the most complicated sums without learning arithmetic; the boy Pascal +who evolved Euclid out of his own consciousness: all these may be said +to have been impelled by instinct, as much as are the beaver and the +bee. And the man of genius, is distinct in kind from the man of +cleverness, by reason of the working within him of strong innate +tendencies--which cultivation may improve, but which it can no more +create, than horticulture can make thistles bear figs. The analogy +between a musical instrument and the mind holds good here also. Art and +industry may get much music, of a sort, out of a penny whistle; but, +when all is done, it has no chance against an organ. The innate musical +potentialities of the two are infinitely different. + + + + +CHAPTER VI. + +LANGUAGE--PROPOSITIONS CONCERNING NECESSARY TRUTHS. + + +Though we may accept Hume's conclusion that speechless animals think, +believe, and reason; yet, it must be borne in mind, that there is an +important difference between the signification of the terms when applied +to them and when applied to those animals which possess language. The +thoughts of the former are trains of mere feelings; those of the latter +are, in addition, trains of the ideas of the signs which represent +feelings, and which are called "words." + +A word, in fact, is a spoken or written sign, the idea of which is, by +repetition, so closely associated with the idea of the simple or complex +feeling which it represents, that the association becomes indissoluble. +No Englishman, for example, can think of the word "dog" without +immediately having the idea of the group of impressions to which that +name is given; and conversely, the group of impressions immediately +calls up the idea of the word "dog." + +The association of words with impressions and ideas is the process of +naming; and language approaches perfection, in proportion as the shades +of difference between various ideas and impressions are represented by +differences in their names. + +The names of simple impressions and ideas, or of groups of co-existent +or successive complex impressions and ideas, considered _per se_, are +substantives; as redness, dog, silver, mouth; while the names of +impressions or ideas considered as parts or attributes of a complex +whole, are adjectives. Thus redness, considered as part of the complex +idea of a rose, becomes the adjective red; flesh-eater, as part of the +idea of a dog, is represented by carnivorous; whiteness, as part of the +idea of silver, is white; and so on. + +The linguistic machinery for the expression of belief is called +_predication_; and, as all beliefs express ideas of relation, we may say +that the sign of predication is the verbal symbol of a feeling of +relation. The words which serve to indicate predication are verbs. If I +say "silver" and then "white," I merely utter two names; but if I +interpose between them the verb "is," I express a belief in the +co-existence of the feeling of whiteness with the other feelings which +constitute the totality of the complex idea of silver; in other words, I +predicate "whiteness" of silver. + +In such a case as this, the verb expresses predication and nothing else, +and is called a copula. But, in the great majority of verbs, the word is +the sign of a complex idea, and the predication is expressed only by its +form. Thus in "silver shines," the verb "to shine" is the sign for the +feeling of brightness, and the mark of predication lies in the form +"shine-_s_." + +Another result is brought about by the forms of verbs. By slight +modifications they are made to indicate that a belief, or predication, +is a memory, or is an expectation. Thus "silver _shone_" expresses a +memory; "silver _will_ shine" an expectation. + +The form of words which expresses a predication is a proposition. +Hence, every predication is the verbal equivalent of a belief; and, as +every belief is either an immediate consciousness, a memory, or an +expectation, and as every expectation is traceable to a memory, it +follows that, in the long run, all propositions express either immediate +states of consciousness, or memories. The proposition which predicates A +of X must mean either, that the fact is testified by my present +consciousness, as when I say that two colours, visible at this moment, +resemble one another; or that A is indissolubly associated with X in +memory; or that A is indissolubly associated with X in expectation. But +it has already been shown that expectation is only an expression of +memory. + +Hume does not discuss the nature of language, but so much of what +remains to be said, concerning his philosophical tenets, turns upon the +value and the origin of verbal propositions, that this summary sketch of +the relations of language to the thinking process will probably not be +deemed superfluous. + +So large an extent of the field of thought is traversed by Hume, in his +discussion of the verbal propositions in which mankind enshrine their +beliefs, that it would be impossible to follow him throughout all the +windings of his long journey, within the limits of this essay. I +purpose, therefore, to limit myself to those propositions which +concern--1. Necessary Truths; 2. The Order of Nature; 3. The Soul; 4. +Theism; 5. The Passions and Volition; 6. The Principle of Morals. + + +Hume's views respecting necessary truths, and more particularly +concerning causation, have, more than any other part of his teaching, +contributed to give him a prominent place in the history of philosophy. + + "All the objects of human reason and inquiry may naturally be + divided into two kinds, to wit, _relations of ideas_ and _matters + of fact_. Of the first kind are the sciences of geometry, algebra, + and arithmetic, and, in short, every affirmation which is either + intuitively or demonstratively certain. _That the square of the + hypothenuse is equal to the square of the two sides_, is a + proposition which expresses a relation between these two figures. + _That three times five is equal to the half of thirty_, expresses a + relation between these numbers. Propositions of this kind are + discoverable by the mere operation of thought without dependence on + whatever is anywhere existent in the universe. Though there never + were a circle or a triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by + Euclid would for ever retain their certainty and evidence. + + "Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are + not ascertained in the same manner, nor is an evidence of their + truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The + contrary of every matter of fact is still possible, because it can + never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the + same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to + reality. _That the sun will not rise to-morrow_, is no less + intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction, than + the affirmation, _that it will rise_. We should in vain, therefore, + attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively + false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be + distinctly conceived by the mind."--(IV. pp. 32, 33.) + +The distinction here drawn between the truths of geometry and other +kinds of truth is far less sharply indicated in the _Treatise_, but as +Hume expressly disowns any opinions on these matters but such as are +expressed in the _Inquiry_, we may confine ourselves to the latter; and +it is needful to look narrowly into the propositions here laid down, as +much stress has been laid upon Hume's admission that the truths of +mathematics are intuitively and demonstratively certain; in other +words, that they are necessary and, in that respect, differ from all +other kinds of belief. + +What is meant by the assertion that "propositions of this kind are +discoverable by the mere operation of thought without dependence on what +is anywhere existent in the universe"? + +Suppose that there were no such things as impressions of sight and touch +anywhere in the universe, what idea could we have even of a straight +line, much less of a triangle and of the relations between its sides? +The fundamental proposition of all Hume's philosophy is that ideas are +copied from impressions; and, therefore, if there were no impressions of +straight lines and triangles there could be no ideas of straight lines +and triangles. But what we mean by the universe is the sum of our actual +and possible impressions. + +So, again, whether our conception of number is derived from relations of +impressions in space or in time, the impressions must exist in nature, +that is, in experience, before their relations can be perceived. Form +and number are mere names for certain relations between matters of fact; +unless a man had seen or felt the difference between a straight line and +a crooked one, straight and crooked would have no more meaning to him, +than red and blue to the blind. + +The axiom, that things which are equal to the same are equal to one +another, is only a particular case of the predication of similarity; if +there were no impressions, it is obvious that there could be no +predicates. But what is an existence in the universe but an impression? + +If what are called necessary truths are rigidly analysed, they will be +found to be of two kinds. Either they depend on the convention which +underlies the possibility of intelligible speech, that terms shall +always have the same meaning; or they are propositions the negation of +which implies the dissolution of some association in memory or +expectation, which is in fact indissoluble; or the denial of some fact +of immediate consciousness. + +The "necessary truth" A = A means that the perception which is called A +shall always be called A. The "necessary truth" that "two straight lines +cannot inclose a space," means that we have no memory, and can form no +expectation of their so doing. The denial of the "necessary truth" that +the thought now in my mind exists, involves the denial of consciousness. + +To the assertion that the evidence of matter of fact, is not so strong +as that of relations of ideas, it may be justly replied, that a great +number of matters of fact are nothing but relations of ideas. If I say +that red is unlike blue, I make an assertion concerning a relation of +ideas; but it is also matter of fact, and the contrary proposition is +inconceivable. If I remember[26] something that happened five minutes +ago, that is matter of fact; and, at the same time, it expresses a +relation between the event remembered and the present time. It is wholly +inconceivable to me that the event did not happen, so that my assurance +respecting it is as strong as that which I have respecting any other +necessary truth. In fact, the man is either very wise or very virtuous, +or very lucky, perhaps all three, who has gone through life without +accumulating a store of such necessary beliefs which he would give a +good deal to be able to disbelieve. + +It would be beside the mark to discuss the matter further on the present +occasion. It is sufficient to point out that, whatever may be the +differences, between mathematical and other truths, they do not justify +Hume's statement. And it is, at any rate, impossible to prove, that the +cogency of mathematical first principles is due to anything more than +these circumstances; that the experiences with which they are concerned +are among the first which arise in the mind; that they are so +incessantly repeated as to justify us, according to the ordinary laws of +ideation, in expecting that the associations which they form will be of +extreme tenacity; while the fact, that the expectations based upon them +are always verified, finishes the process of welding them together. + +Thus, if the axioms of mathematics are innate, nature would seem to have +taken unnecessary trouble; since the ordinary process of association +appears to be amply sufficient to confer upon them all the universality +and necessity which they actually possess. + + +Whatever needless admissions Hume may have made respecting other +necessary truths he is quite clear about the axiom of causation, "That +whatever event has a beginning must have a cause;" whether and in what +sense it is a necessary truth; and, that question being decided, whence +it is derived. + +With respect to the first question, Hume denies that it is a necessary +truth, in the sense that we are unable to conceive the contrary. The +evidence by which he supports this conclusion in the _Inquiry_, however, +is not strictly relevant to the issue. + + "No object ever discovers, by the qualities which appear to the + senses, either the cause which produced it, or the effects which + will arise from it; nor can our reason, unassisted by experience, + ever draw any inference concerning real existence and matter of + fact."--(IV. p. 35.) + +Abundant illustrations are given of this assertion, which indeed cannot +be seriously doubted; but it does not follow that, because we are +totally unable to say what cause preceded, or what effect will succeed, +any event, we do not necessarily suppose that the event had a cause and +will be succeeded by an effect. The scientific investigator who notes a +new phenomenon may be utterly ignorant of its cause, but he will, +without hesitation, seek for that cause. If you ask him why he does so, +he will probably say that it must have had a cause; and thereby imply +that his belief in causation is a necessary belief. + +In the _Treatise_ Hume indeed takes the bull by the horns: + + " ... as all distinct ideas are separable from each other, and as + the ideas of cause and effect are evidently distinct, 'twill be + easy for us to conceive any object to be non-existent this moment + find existent the next, without conjoining to it the distinct idea + of a cause or productive principle."--(I. p. 111.) + +If Hume had been content to state what he believed to be matter of fact, +and had abstained from giving superfluous reasons for that which is +susceptible of being proved or disproved only by personal experience, +his position would have been stronger. For it seems clear that, on the +ground of observation, he is quite right. Any man who lets his fancy run +riot in a waking dream, may experience the existence at one moment, and +the non-existence at the next, of phenomena which suggest no connexion +of cause and effect. Not only so, but it is notorious that, to the +unthinking mass of mankind, nine-tenths of the facts of life do not +suggest the relation of cause and effect; and they practically deny the +existence of any such relation by attributing them to chance. Few +gamblers but would stare if they were told that the falling of a die on +a particular face is as much the effect of a definite cause as the fact +of its falling; it is a proverb that "the wind bloweth where it +listeth;" and even thoughtful men usually receive with surprise the +suggestion, that the form of the crest of every wave that breaks, +wind-driven, on the sea-shore, and the direction of every particle of +foam that flies before the gale, are the exact effects of definite +causes; and, as such, must be capable of being determined, deductively, +from the laws of motion and the properties of air and water. So again, +there are large numbers of highly intelligent persons who rather pride +themselves on their fixed belief that our volitions have no cause; or +that the will causes itself, which is either the same thing, or a +contradiction in terms. + +Hume's argument in support of what appears to be a true proposition, +however, is of the circular sort, for the major premiss, that all +distinct ideas are separable in thought, assumes the question at issue. + +But the question whether the idea of causation is necessary, or not, is +really of very little importance. For, to say that an idea is necessary +is simply to affirm that we cannot conceive the contrary; and the fact +that we cannot conceive the contrary of any belief may be a presumption, +but is certainly no proof, of its truth. + +In the well-known experiment of touching a single round object, such as +a marble, with crossed fingers, it is utterly impossible to conceive +that we have not two round objects under them; and, though light is +undoubtedly a mere sensation arising in the brain, it is utterly +impossible to conceive that it is not outside the retina. In the same +way, he who touches anything with a rod, not only is irresistibly led to +believe that the sensation of contact is at the end of the rod, but is +utterly incapable of conceiving that this sensation is really in his +head. Yet that which is inconceivable is manifestly true in all these +cases. The beliefs and the unbeliefs are alike necessary, and alike +erroneous. + +It is commonly urged that the axiom of causation cannot be derived from +experience, because experience only proves that many things have causes, +whereas the axiom declares that all things have causes. The syllogism, +"many things which come into existence have causes, A has come into +existence: therefore A had a cause," is obviously fallacious, if A is +not previously shown to be one of the "many things." And this objection +is perfectly sound so far as it goes. The axiom of causation cannot +possibly be deduced from any general proposition which simply embodies +experience. But it does not follow that the belief, or expectation, +expressed by the axiom, is not a product of experience, generated +antecedently to, and altogether independently of, the logically +unjustifiable language in which we express it. + +In fact, the axiom of causation resembles all other beliefs of +expectation in being the verbal symbol of a purely automatic act of the +mind, which is altogether extra-logical, and would be illogical, if it +were not constantly verified by experience. Experience, as we have seen, +stores up memories; memories generate expectations or beliefs--why they +do so may be explained hereafter by proper investigation of cerebral +physiology. But, to seek for the reason of the facts in the verbal +symbols by which they are expressed, and to be astonished that it is not +to be found there, is surely singular; and what Hume did was to turn +attention from the verbal proposition to the psychical fact of which it +is the symbol. + + "When any natural object or event is presented, it is impossible + for us, by any sagacity or penetration, to discover, or even + conjecture, without experience, what event will result from it, or + to carry our foresight beyond that object, which is immediately + present to the memory and senses. Even after one instance or + experiment, where we have observed a particular event to follow + upon another, we are not entitled to form a general rule, or + foretell what will happen in like cases; it being justly esteemed + an unpardonable temerity to judge of the whole course of nature + from one single experiment, however accurate or certain. But when + one particular species of events has always, in all instances, been + conjoined with another, we make no longer any scruple of + foretelling one upon the appearance of the other, and of employing + that reasoning which can alone assure us of any matter of fact or + existence. We then call the one object _Cause_, the other _Effect_. + We suppose that there is some connexion between them: some power in + the one, by which it infallibly produces the other, and operates + with the greatest certainty and strongest necessity.... But there + is nothing in a number of instances, different from every single + instance, which is supposed to be exactly similar; except only, + that after a repetition of similar instances, the mind is carried + by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual + attendant, and to believe that it will exist.... The first time a + man saw the communication of motion by impulse, as by the shock of + two billiard balls, he could not pronounce that the one event was + _connected_, but only that it was _conjoined_, with the other. + After he has observed several instances of this nature, he then + pronounces them to be _connected_. What alteration has happened to + give rise to this new idea of _connexion_? Nothing but that he now + _feels_ those events to be _connected_ in his imagination, and can + readily foresee the existence of the one from the appearance of the + other. When we say, therefore, that one object is connected with + another we mean only that they have acquired a connexion in our + thought, and give rise to this inference, by which they become + proofs of each other's existence; a conclusion which is somewhat + extraordinary, but which seems founded on sufficient + evidence."--(IV. pp. 87-89.) + +In the fifteenth section of the third part of the _Treatise_, under the +head of the _Rules by which to Judge of Causes and Effects_, Hume gives +a sketch of the method of allocating effects to their causes, upon +which, so far as I am aware, no improvement was made down to the time of +the publication of Mill's _Logic_. Of Mill's four methods, that of +_agreement_ is indicated in the following passage:-- + + " ... where several different objects produce the same effect, it + must be by means of some quality which we discover to be common + amongst them. For as like effects imply like causes, we must always + ascribe the causation to the circumstance wherein we discover the + resemblance."--(I. p. 229.) + +Next, the foundation of the _method of difference_ is stated:-- + + "The difference in the effects of two resembling objects must + proceed from that particular in which they differ. For, as like + causes always produce like effects, when in any instance we find + our expectation to be disappointed, we must conclude that this + irregularity proceeds from some difference in the causes."--(I. p. + 230.) + +In the succeeding paragraph the _method of concomitant variations_ is +foreshadowed. + + "When any object increases or diminishes with the increase or + diminution of the cause, 'tis to be regarded as a compounded + effect, derived from the union of the several different effects + which arise from the several different parts of the cause. The + absence or presence of one part of the cause is here supposed to be + always attended with the absence or presence of a proportionable + part of the effect. This constant conjunction sufficiently proves + that the one part is the cause of the other. We must, however, + beware not to draw such a conclusion from a few experiments."--(I. + p. 230.) + +Lastly, the following rule, though awkwardly stated, contains a +suggestion of the _method of residues_:-- + + " ... an object which exists for any time in its full perfection + without any effect, is not the sole cause of that effect, but + requires to be assisted by some other principle, which may forward + its influence and operation. For as like effects necessarily follow + from like causes, and in a contiguous time and place, their + separation for a moment shows that these causes are not complete + ones."--(I. p. 230.) + +In addition to the bare notion of necessary connexion between the cause +and its effect, we undoubtedly find in our minds the idea of something +resident in the cause which, as we say, produces the effect, and we call +this something Force, Power, or Energy. Hume explains Force and Power as +the results of the association with inanimate causes of the feelings of +endeavour or resistance which we experience, when our bodies give rise +to, or resist, motion. + +If I throw a ball, I have a sense of effort which ends when the ball +leaves my hand; and if I catch a ball, I have a sense of resistance +which comes to an end with the quiescence of the ball. In the former +case, there is a strong suggestion of something having gone from myself +into the ball; in the latter, of something having been received from the +ball. Let any one hold a piece of iron near a strong magnet, and the +feeling that the magnet endeavours to pull the iron one way in the same +manner as he endeavours to pull it in the opposite direction, is very +strong. + +As Hume says:-- + + "No animal can put external bodies in motion without the sentiment + of a _nisus_, or endeavour; and every animal has a sentiment or + feeling from the stroke or blow of an external object that is in + motion. These sensations, which are merely animal, and from which + we can, _a priori_, draw no inference, we are apt to transfer to + inanimate objects, and to suppose that they have some such feelings + whenever they transfer or receive motion."--(IV. p. 91, _note_.) + +It is obviously, however, an absurdity not less gross than that of +supposing the sensation of warmth to exist in a fire, to imagine that +the subjective sensation of effort or resistance in ourselves can be +present in external objects, when they stand in the relation of causes +to other objects. + +To the argument, that we have a right to suppose the relation of cause +and effect to contain something more than invariable succession, +because, when we ourselves act as causes, or in volition, we are +conscious of exerting power; Hume replies, that we know nothing of the +feeling we call power except as effort or resistance; and that we have +not the slightest means of knowing whether it has anything to do with +the production of bodily motion or mental changes. And he points out, as +Descartes and Spinoza had done before him, that when voluntary motion +takes place, that which we will is not the immediate consequence of the +act of volition, but something which is separated from it by a long +chain of causes and effects. If the will is the cause of the movement of +a limb, it can be so only in the sense that the guard who gives the +order to go on, is the cause of the transport of a train from one +station to another. + + "We learn from anatomy, that the immediate object of power in + voluntary motion is not the member itself which is moved, but + certain muscles and nerves and animal spirits, and perhaps + something still more minute and unknown, through which the motion + is successively propagated, ere it reach the member itself, whose + motion is the immediate object of volition. Can there be a more + certain proof that the power by which the whole operation is + performed, so far from being directly and fully known by an inward + sentiment or consciousness, is to the last degree mysterious and + unintelligible? Here the mind wills a certain event: Immediately + another event, unknown to ourselves, and totally different from the + one intended, is produced: This event produces another equally + unknown: Till at last, through a long succession, the desired event + is produced."--(IV. p. 78.) + +A still stronger argument against ascribing an objective existence to +force or power, on the strength of our supposed direct intuition of +power in voluntary acts, may be urged from the unquestionable fact, that +we do not know, and cannot know, that volition does cause corporeal +motion; while there is a great deal to be said in favour of the view +that it is no cause, but merely a concomitant of that motion. But the +nature of volition will be more fitly considered hereafter. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[26] Hume, however, expressly includes the "records of our memory" among +his matters of fact.--(IV. p. 33.) + + + + +CHAPTER VII. + +THE ORDER OF NATURE: MIRACLES. + + +If our beliefs of expectation are based on our beliefs of memory, and +anticipation is only inverted recollection, it necessarily follows that +every belief of expectation implies the belief that the future will have +a certain resemblance to the past. From the first hour of experience, +onwards, this belief is constantly being verified, until old age is +inclined to suspect that experience has nothing new to offer. And when +the experience of generation after generation is recorded, and a single +book tells us more than Methuselah could have learned, had he spent +every waking hour of his thousand years in learning; when apparent +disorders are found to be only the recurrent pulses of a slow working +order, and the wonder of a year becomes the commonplace of a century; +when repeated and minute examination never reveals a break in the chain +of causes and effects; and the whole edifice of practical life is built +upon our faith in its continuity; the belief that that chain has never +been broken and will never be broken, becomes one of the strongest and +most justifiable of human convictions. And it must be admitted to be a +reasonable request, if we ask those who would have us put faith in the +actual occurrence of interruptions of that order, to produce evidence +in favour of their view, not only equal, but superior, in weight to that +which leads us to adopt ours. + +This is the essential argument of Hume's famous disquisition upon +miracles; and it may safely be declared to be irrefragable. But it must +be admitted that Hume has surrounded the kernel of his essay with a +shell of very doubtful value. + +The first step in this, as in all other discussions, is to come to a +clear understanding as to the meaning of the terms employed. +Argumentation whether miracles are possible, and, if possible, credible, +is mere beating the air until the arguers have agreed what they mean by +the word "miracles." + +Hume, with less than his usual perspicuity, but in accordance with a +common practice of believers in the miraculous, defines a miracle as a +"violation of the laws of nature," or as "a transgression of a law of +nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of +some invisible agent." + +There must, he says,-- + + "be an uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise + the event would not merit that appellation. And as an uniform + experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full + proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any + miracle; nor can such a proof be destroyed or the miracle rendered + credible but by an opposite proof which is superior."--(IV. p. + 134.) + +Every one of these dicta appears to be open to serious objection. + +The word "miracle"--_miraculum_,--in its primitive and legitimate sense, +simply means something wonderful. + +Cicero applies it as readily to the fancies of philosophers, "Portenta +et miracula philosophorum somniantium," as we do to the prodigies of +priests. And the source of the wonder which a miracle excites is the +belief, on the part of those who witness it, that it transcends or +contradicts ordinary experience. + +The definition of a miracle as a "violation of the laws of nature" is, +in reality, an employment of language which, on the face of the matter, +cannot be justified. For "nature" means neither more nor less than that +which is; the sum of phenomena presented to our experience; the totality +of events past, present, and to come. Every event must be taken to be a +part of nature, until proof to the contrary is supplied. And such proof +is, from the nature of the case, impossible. + +Hume asks:-- + + "Why is it more than probable that all men must die: that lead + cannot of itself remain suspended in the air: that fire consumes + wood and is extinguished by water; unless it be that these events + are found agreeable to the laws of nature, and there is required a + violation of those laws, or in other words, a miracle, to prevent + them?"--(IV. p. 133.) + +But the reply is obvious; not one of these events is "more than +probable"; though the probability may reach such a very high degree +that, in ordinary language, we are justified in saying that the opposite +events are impossible. Calling our often verified experience a "law of +nature" adds nothing to its value, nor in the slightest degree increases +any probability that it will be verified again, which may arise out of +the fact of its frequent verification. + +If a piece of lead were to remain suspended of itself, in the air, the +occurrence would be a "miracle," in the sense of a wonderful event, +indeed; but no one trained in the methods of science would imagine that +any law of nature was really violated thereby. He would simply set to +work to investigate the conditions under which so highly unexpected an +occurrence took place, and thereby enlarge his experience and modify his +hitherto unduly narrow conception of the laws of nature. + +The alternative definition, that a miracle is "a transgression of a law +of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition +of some invisible agent," (IV. p. 134, _note_) is still less defensible. +For a vast number of miracles have professedly been worked, neither by +the Deity, nor by any invisible agent; but by Beelzebub and his +compeers, or by very visible men. + +Moreover, not to repeat what has been said respecting the absurdity of +supposing that something which occurs is a transgression of laws, our +only knowledge of which is derived from the observation of that which +occurs; upon what sort of evidence can we be justified in concluding +that a given event is the effect of a particular volition of the Deity, +or of the interposition of some invisible (that is unperceivable) agent? +It may be so, but how is the assertion, that it is so, to be tested? If +it be said that the event exceeds the power of natural causes, what can +justify such a saying? The day-fly has better grounds for calling a +thunderstorm supernatural, than has man, with his experience of an +infinitesimal fraction of duration, to say that the most astonishing +event that can be imagined is beyond the scope of natural causes. + + "Whatever is intelligible and can be distinctly conceived, implies + no contradiction, and can never be proved false by any + demonstration, argument, or abstract reasoning _a priori_."--(IV. + p. 44.) + +So wrote Hume, with perfect justice, in his _Sceptical Doubts_. But a +miracle, in the sense of a sudden and complete change in the customary +order of nature, is intelligible, can be distinctly conceived, implies +no contradiction; and, therefore, according to Hume's own showing, +cannot be proved false by any demonstrative argument. + +Nevertheless, in diametrical contradiction to his own principles, Hume +says elsewhere:-- + + "It is a miracle that a dead man should come to life: because that + has never been observed in any age or country."--(IV. p. 134.) + +That is to say, there is an uniform experience against such an event, +and therefore, if it occurs, it is a violation of the laws of nature. +Or, to put the argument in its naked absurdity, that which never has +happened never can happen, without a violation of the laws of nature. In +truth, if a dead man did come to life, the fact would be evidence, not +that any law of nature had been violated, but that those laws, even when +they express the results of a very long and uniform experience, are +necessarily based on incomplete knowledge, and are to be held only as +grounds of more or less justifiable expectation. + +To sum up, the definition of a miracle as a suspension or a +contravention of the order of Nature is self-contradictory, because all +we know of the order of nature is derived from our observation of the +course of events of which the so-called miracle is a part. On the other +hand, no event is too extraordinary to be impossible; and, therefore, if +by the term miracles we mean only "extremely wonderful events," there +can be no just ground for denying the possibility of their occurrence. + + +But when we turn from the question of the possibility of miracles, +however they may be defined, in the abstract, to that respecting the +grounds upon which we are justified in believing any particular miracle, +Hume's arguments have a very different value, for they resolve +themselves into a simple statement of the dictates of common +sense--which may be expressed in this canon: the more a statement of +fact conflicts with previous experience, the more complete must be the +evidence which is to justify us in believing it. It is upon this +principle that every one carries on the business of common life. If a +man tells me he saw a piebald horse in Piccadilly, I believe him without +hesitation. The thing itself is likely enough, and there is no +imaginable motive for his deceiving me. But if the same person tells me +he observed a zebra there, I might hesitate a little about accepting his +testimony, unless I were well satisfied, not only as to his previous +acquaintance with zebras, but as to his powers and opportunities of +observation in the present case. If, however, my informant assured me +that he beheld a centaur trotting down that famous thoroughfare, I +should emphatically decline to credit his statement; and this even if he +were the most saintly of men and ready to suffer martyrdom in support of +his belief. In such a case, I could, of course, entertain no doubt of +the good faith of the witness; it would be only his competency, which +unfortunately has very little to do with good faith or intensity of +conviction, which I should presume to call in question. + +Indeed, I hardly know what testimony would satisfy me of the existence +of a live centaur. To put an extreme case, suppose the late Johannes +Mueller, of Berlin, the greatest anatomist and physiologist among my +contemporaries, had barely affirmed he had seen a live centaur, I should +certainly have been staggered by the weight of an assertion coming from +such an authority. But I could have got no further than a suspension of +judgment. For, on the whole, it would have been more probable that even +he had fallen into some error of interpretation of the facts which came +under his observation, than that such an animal as a centaur really +existed. And nothing short of a careful monograph, by a highly competent +investigator, accompanied by figures and measurements of all the most +important parts of a centaur, put forth under circumstances which could +leave no doubt that falsification or misinterpretation would meet with +immediate exposure, could possibly enable a man of science to feel that +he acted conscientiously, in expressing his belief in the existence of a +centaur on the evidence of testimony. + +This hesitation about admitting the existence of such an animal as a +centaur, be it observed, does not deserve reproach, as scepticism, but +moderate praise, as mere scientific good faith. It need not imply, and +it does not, so far as I am concerned, any _a priori_ hypothesis that a +centaur is an impossible animal; or, that his existence, if he did +exist, would violate the laws of nature. Indubitably, the organisation +of a centaur presents a variety of practical difficulties to an +anatomist and physiologist; and a good many of those generalisations of +our present experience, which we are pleased to call laws of nature, +would be upset by the appearance of such an animal, so that we should +have to frame new laws to cover our extended experience. Every wise man +will admit that the possibilities of nature are infinite, and include +centaurs; but he will not the less feel it his duty to hold fast, for +the present, by the dictum of Lucretius, "Nam certe ex vivo Centauri non +fit imago," and to cast the entire burthen of proof, that centaurs +exist, on the shoulders of those who ask him to believe the statement. + +Judged by the canons either of common sense, or of science, which are +indeed one and the same, all "miracles" are centaurs, or they would not +be miracles; and men of sense and science will deal with them on the +same principles. No one who wishes to keep well within the limits of +that which he has a right to assert will affirm that it is impossible +that the sun and moon should ever have been made to appear to stand +still in the valley of Ajalon; or that the walls of a city should have +fallen down at a trumpet blast; or that water was turned into wine; +because such events are contrary to uniform experience and violate laws +of nature. For aught he can prove to the contrary, such events may +appear in the order of nature to-morrow. But common sense and common +honesty alike oblige him to demand from those who would have him believe +in the actual occurrence of such events, evidence of a cogency +proportionate to their departure from probability; evidence at least as +strong as that, which the man who says he has seen a centaur is bound to +produce, unless he is content to be thought either more than credulous +or less than honest. + +But are there any miracles on record, the evidence for which fulfils the +plain and simple requirements alike of elementary logic and of +elementary morality? + +Hume answers this question without the smallest hesitation, and with all +the authority of a historical specialist:-- + + "There is not to be found, in all history, any miracle attested by + a sufficient number of men, of such unquestioned goodness, + education, and learning, as to secure us against all delusion in + themselves; of such undoubted integrity, as to place them beyond + all suspicion of any design to deceive others; of such credit and + reputation in the eyes of mankind, as to have a great deal to lose + in case of their being detected in any falsehood; and at the same + time attesting facts, performed in such a public manner, and in so + celebrated a part of the world, as to render the detection + unavoidable: All which circumstances are requisite to give us a + full assurance of the testimony of men."--(IV. p. 135.) + +These are grave assertions, but they are least likely to be challenged +by those who have made it their business to weigh evidence and to give +their decision under a due sense of the moral responsibility which they +incur in so doing. + +It is probable that few persons who proclaim their belief in miracles +have considered what would be necessary to justify that belief in the +case of a professed modern miracle-worker. Suppose, for example, it is +affirmed that A.B. died and that C.D. brought him to life again. Let it +be granted that A.B. and C.D. are persons of unimpeachable honour and +veracity; that C.D. is the next heir to A.B.'s estate, and therefore had +a strong motive for not bringing him to life again; and that all A.B.'s +relations, respectable persons who bore him a strong affection, or had +otherwise an interest in his being alive, declared that they saw him +die. Furthermore, let A.B. be seen after his recovery by all his friends +and neighbours, and let his and their depositions, that he is now alive, +be taken down before a magistrate of known integrity and acuteness: +would all this constitute even presumptive evidence that C.D. had worked +a miracle? Unquestionably not. For the most important link in the whole +chain of evidence is wanting, and that is the proof that A.B. was really +dead. The evidence of ordinary observers on such a point as this is +absolutely worthless. And, even medical evidence, unless the physician +is a person of unusual knowledge and skill, may have little more value. +Unless careful thermometric observation proves that the temperature has +sunk below a certain point; unless the cadaveric stiffening of the +muscles has become well established; all the ordinary signs of death may +be fallacious, and the intervention of C.D. may have had no more to do +with A.B.'s restoration to life than any other fortuitously coincident +event. + +It may be said that such a coincidence would be more wonderful than the +miracle itself. Nevertheless history acquaints us with coincidences as +marvellous. + +On the 19th of February, 1842, Sir Robert Sale held Jellalabad with a +small English force and, daily expecting attack from an overwhelming +force of Afghans, had spent three months in incessantly labouring to +improve the fortifications of the town. Akbar Khan had approached within +a few miles, and an onslaught of his army was supposed to be imminent. +That morning an earthquake-- + + "nearly destroyed the town, threw down the greater part of the + parapets, the central gate with the adjoining bastions, and a part + of the new bastion which flanked it. Three other bastions were also + nearly destroyed, whilst several large breaches were made in the + curtains, and the Peshawur side, eighty feet long, was quite + practicable, the ditch being filled, and the descent easy. Thus in + one moment the labours of three months were in a great measure + destroyed."[27] + +If Akbar Khan had happened to give orders for an assault in the early +morning of the 19th of February, what good follower of the Prophet could +have doubted that Allah had lent his aid? As it chanced, however, +Mahometan faith in the miraculous took another turn; for the energetic +defenders of the post had repaired the damage by the end of the month; +and the enemy, finding no signs of the earthquake when they invested the +place, ascribed the supposed immunity of Jellalabad to English +witchcraft. + + +But the conditions of belief do not vary with time or place; and, if it +is undeniable that evidence of so complete and weighty a character is +needed, at the present time, for the establishment of the occurrence of +such a wonder as that supposed, it has always been needful. Those who +study the extant records of miracles with due attention will judge for +themselves how far it has ever been supplied. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[27] Report of Captain Broadfoot, garrison engineer, quoted in Kaye's +_Afghanistan_. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII. + +THEISM; EVOLUTION OF THEOLOGY. + + +Hume seems to have had but two hearty dislikes: the one to the English +nation, and the other to all the professors of dogmatic theology. The +one aversion he vented only privately to his friends; but, if he is ever +bitter in his public utterances, it is against priests[28] in general +and theological enthusiasts and fanatics in particular; if he ever seems +insincere, it is when he wishes to insult theologians by a parade of +sarcastic respect. One need go no further than the peroration of the +_Essay on Miracles_ for a characteristic illustration. + + "I am the better pleased with the method of reasoning here + delivered, as I think it may serve to confound those dangerous + friends and disguised enemies to the _Christian religion_ who have + undertaken to defend it by the principles of human reason. Our + most holy religion is founded on _Faith_, not on reason, and it is + a sure method of exposing it to put it to such a trial as it is by + no means fitted to endure. ... the Christian religion not only was + at first attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be + believed by any reasonable person without one. Mere reason is + insufficient to convince us of its veracity: And whoever is moved + by _Faith_ to assent to it, is conscious of a continual miracle in + his own person, which subverts all the principles of his + understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is + most contrary to custom and experience."--(IV. pp. 153, 154.) + +It is obvious that, here and elsewhere, Hume, adopting a popular +confusion of ideas, uses religion as the equivalent of dogmatic +theology; and, therefore, he says, with perfect justice, that "religion +is nothing but a species of philosophy" (iv. p. 171). Here no doubt lies +the root of his antagonism. The quarrels of theologians and philosophers +have not been about religion, but about philosophy; and philosophers not +unfrequently seem to entertain the same feeling towards theologians that +sportsmen cherish towards poachers. "There cannot be two passions more +nearly resembling each other than hunting and philosophy," says Hume. +And philosophic hunters are given to think, that, while they pursue +truth for its own sake, out of pure love for the chase (perhaps mingled +with a little human weakness to be thought good shots), and by open and +legitimate methods; their theological competitors too often care merely +to supply the market of establishments; and disdain neither the aid of +the snares of superstition, nor the cover of the darkness of ignorance. + +Unless some foundation was given for this impression by the theological +writers whose works had fallen in Hume's way, it is difficult to account +for the depth of feeling which so good natured a man manifests on the +subject. + +Thus he writes in the _Natural History of Religion_, with quite unusual +acerbity:-- + + "The chief objection to it [the ancient heathen mythology] with + regard to this planet is, that it is not ascertained by any just + reason or authority. The ancient tradition insisted on by heathen + priests and theologers is but a weak foundation: and transmitted + also such a number of contradictory reports, supported all of them + by equal authority, that it became absolutely impossible to fix a + preference among them. A few volumes, therefore, must contain all + the polemical writings of pagan priests: And their whole theology + must consist more of traditional stories and superstitious + practices than of philosophical argument and controversy. + + "But where theism forms the fundamental principle of any popular + religion, that tenet is so conformable to sound reason, that + philosophy is apt to incorporate itself with such a system of + theology. And if the other dogmas of that system be contained in a + sacred book, such as the Alcoran, or be determined by any visible + authority, like that of the Roman pontiff, speculative reasoners + naturally carry on their assent, and embrace a theory, which has + been instilled into them by their earliest education, and which + also possesses some degree of consistence and uniformity. But as + these appearances are sure, all of them, to prove deceitful, + philosophy will very soon find herself very unequally yoked with + her new associate; and instead of regulating each principle, as + they advance together, she is at every turn perverted to serve the + purposes of superstition. For besides the unavoidable incoherences, + which must be reconciled and adjusted, one may safely affirm, that + all popular theology, especially the scholastic, has a kind of + appetite for absurdity and contradiction. If that theology went not + beyond reason and common sense, her doctrines would appear too easy + and familiar. Amazement must of necessity be raised: Mystery + affected: Darkness and obscurity sought after: And a foundation of + merit afforded to the devout votaries, who desire an opportunity + of subduing their rebellious reason by the belief of the most + unintelligible sophisms. + + "Ecclesiastical history sufficiently confirms these reflections. + When a controversy is started, some people always pretend with + certainty to foretell the issue. Whichever opinion, say they, is + most contrary to plain reason is sure to prevail; even when the + general interest of the system requires not that decision. Though + the reproach of heresy may, for some time, be bandied about among + the disputants, it always rests at last on the side of reason. Any + one, it is pretended, that has but learning enough of this kind to + know the definition of _Arian_, _Pelagian_, _Erastian_, _Socinian_, + _Sabellian_, _Eutychian_, _Nestorian_, _Monothelite_, &c., not to + mention _Protestant_, whose fate is yet uncertain, will be + convinced of the truth of this observation. It is thus a system + becomes absurd in the end, merely from its being reasonable and + philosophical in the beginning. + + "To oppose the torrent of scholastic religion by such feeble maxims + as these, that _it is impossible for the same thing to be and not + to be_, that _the whole is greater than a part_, that _two and + three make five_, is pretending to stop the ocean with a bulrush. + Will you set up profane reason against sacred mystery? No + punishment is great enough for your impiety. And the same fires + which were kindled for heretics will serve also for the destruction + of philosophers."--(IV. pp. 481-3.) + +Holding these opinions respecting the recognised systems of theology and +their professors, Hume, nevertheless, seems to have had a theology of +his own; that is to say, he seems to have thought (though, as will +appear, it is needful for an expositor of his opinions to speak very +guardedly on this point) that the problem of theism is susceptible of +scientific treatment, with something more than a negative result. His +opinions are to be gathered from the eleventh section of the _Inquiry_ +(1748); from the _Dialogues concerning Natural Religion_, which were +written at least as early as 1751, though not published till after his +death; and from the _Natural History of Religion_, published in 1757. + +In the first two pieces, the reader is left to judge for himself which +interlocutor in the dialogue represents the thoughts of the author; but, +for the views put forward in the last, Hume accepts the responsibility. +Unfortunately, this essay deals almost wholly with the historical +development of theological ideas; and, on the question of the +philosophical foundation of theology, does little more than express the +writer's contentment with the argument from design. + + "The whole frame of nature bespeaks an Intelligent Author; and no + rational inquirer can, after serious reflection, suspend his belief + a moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine Theism + and Religion.--(IV. p. 435.) + + "Were men led into the apprehension of invisible, intelligent + power, by a contemplation of the works of nature, they could never + possibly entertain any conception but of one single being, who + bestowed existence and order on this vast machine, and adjusted all + its parts according to one regular plan or connected system. For + though, to persons of a certain turn of mind, it may not appear + altogether absurd, that several independent beings, endowed with + superior wisdom, might conspire in the contrivance and execution of + one regular plan, yet is this a merely arbitrary supposition, + which, even if allowed possible, must be confessed neither to be + supported by probability nor necessity. All things in the universe + are evidently of a piece. Everything is adjusted to everything. One + design prevails throughout the whole. And this uniformity leads the + mind to acknowledge one author; because the conception of different + authors, without any distinction of attributes or operations, + serves only to give perplexity to the imagination, without + bestowing any satisfaction on the understanding."--(IV. p. 442.) + +Thus Hume appears to have sincerely accepted the two fundamental +conclusions of the argument from design; firstly, that a Deity exists; +and, secondly, that He possesses attributes more or less allied to those +of human intelligence. But, at this embryonic stage of theology, Hume's +progress is arrested; and, after a survey of the development of dogma, +his "general corollary" is, that-- + + "The whole is a riddle, an enigma, an inexplicable mystery. Doubt, + uncertainty, suspense of judgment, appear the only result of our + most accurate scrutiny concerning this subject. But such is the + frailty of human reason, and such the irresistible contagion of + opinion, that even this deliberate doubt could scarcely be upheld; + did we not enlarge our view, and opposing one species of + superstition to another, set them a quarrelling; while we + ourselves, during their fury and contention, happily make our + escape into the calm, though obscure, regions of philosophy."--(IV. + p. 513.) + +Thus it may be fairly presumed that Hume expresses his own sentiments in +the words of the speech with which Philo concludes the _Dialogues_. + + "If the whole of natural theology, as some people seem to maintain, + resolves itself into one simple, though somewhat ambiguous, at + least undefined proposition, _That the cause or causes of order in + the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human + intelligence_: If this proposition be not capable of extension, + variation, or more particular explication: If it affords no + inference that affects human life or can be the source of any + action or forbearance: And if the analogy, imperfect as it is, can + be carried no further than to the human intelligence, and cannot be + transferred, with any appearance of probability, to the other + qualities of the mind; if this really be the case, what can the + most inquisitive, contemplative, and religious man do more than + give a plain, philosophical assent to the proposition, as often as + it occurs, and believe that the arguments on which it is + established exceed the objections which lie against it? Some + astonishment indeed will naturally arise from the greatness of the + object; some melancholy from its obscurity; some contempt of human + reason, that it can give no solution more satisfactory with regard + to so extraordinary and magnificent a question. But believe me, + Cleanthes, the most natural sentiment which a well-disposed mind + will feel on this occasion, is a longing desire and expectation + that Heaven would be pleased to dissipate, at least alleviate, this + profound ignorance, by affording some more particular revelation to + mankind, and making discoveries of the nature, attributes, and + operations of the Divine object of our faith."[29]--(II. pp. + 547-8.) + +Such being the sum total of Hume's conclusions, it cannot be said that +his theological burden is a heavy one. But, if we turn from the _Natural +History of Religion_, to the _Treatise_, the _Inquiry_, and the +_Dialogues_, the story of what happened to the ass laden with salt, who +took to the water, irresistibly suggests itself. Hume's theism, such as +it is, dissolves away in the dialectic river, until nothing is left but +the verbal sack in which it was contained. + +Of the two theistic propositions to which Hume is committed, the first +is the affirmation of the existence of a God, supported by the argument +from the nature of causation. In the _Dialogues_, Philo, while pushing +scepticism to its utmost limit, is nevertheless made to say that-- + + " ... where reasonable men treat these subjects, the question can + never be concerning the _Being_, but only the _Nature_, of the + Deity. The former truth, as you will observe, is unquestionable and + self-evident. Nothing exists without a cause, and the original + cause of this universe (whatever it be) we call God, and piously + ascribe to him every species of perfection."--(II. p. 439.) + +The expositor of Hume, who wishes to do his work thoroughly, as far as +it goes, cannot but fall into perplexity[30] when he contrasts this +language with that of the sections of the third part of the _Treatise_, +entitled, _Why a Cause is Always Necessary_, and _Of the Idea of +Necessary Connexion_. + +It is there shown, at large, that "every demonstration which has been +produced for the necessity of a cause is fallacious and sophistical" (I. +p. 111); it is affirmed, that "there is no absolute nor metaphysical +necessity that every beginning of existence should be attended with such +an object" [as a cause] (I. p. 227); and it is roundly asserted, that it +is "easy for us to conceive any object to be non-existent this moment +and existent the next, without conjoining to it the distinct idea of a +cause or productive principle" (I. p. 111). So far from the axiom, that +whatever begins to exist must have a cause of existence, being +"self-evident," as Philo calls it, Hume spends the greatest care in +showing that it is nothing but the product of custom, or experience. + +And the doubt thus forced upon one, whether Philo ought to be taken as +even, so far, Hume's mouth-piece, is increased when we reflect that we +are dealing with an acute reasoner; and that there is no difficulty in +drawing the deduction from Hume's own definition of a cause, that the +very phrase, a "first cause," involves a contradiction in terms. He lays +down that,-- + + "'Tis an established axiom both in natural and moral philosophy, + that an object, which exists for any time in its full perfection + without producing another, is not its sole cause; but is assisted + by some other principle which pushes it from its state of + inactivity, and makes it exert that energy, of which it was + secretly possessed."--(I. p. 106.) + +Now the "first cause" is assumed to have existed from all eternity, up +to the moment at which the universe came into existence. Hence it cannot +be the sole cause of the universe; in fact, it was no cause at all until +it was "assisted by some other principle"; consequently the so-called +"first cause," so far as it produces the universe, is in reality an +effect of that other principle. Moreover, though, in the person of +Philo, Hume assumes the axiom "that whatever begins to exist must have a +cause," which he denies in the _Treatise_, he must have seen, for a +child may see, that the assumption is of no real service. + +Suppose Y to be the imagined first cause and Z to be its effect. Let the +letters of the alphabet, _a_, _b_, _c_, _d_, _e_, _f_, _g_, in their +order, represent successive moments of time, and let _g_ represent the +particular moment at which the effect Z makes its appearance. It follows +that the cause Y could not have existed "in its full perfection" during +the time _a_--_e_, for if it had, then the effect Z would have come into +existence during that time, which, by the hypothesis, it did not do. The +cause Y, therefore, must have come into existence at _f_, and if +"everything that comes into existence has a cause," Y must have had a +cause X operating at _e_; X, a cause W operating at _d_; and, so on, _ad +infinitum_.[31] + +If the only demonstrative argument for the existence of a Deity, which +Hume advances, thus, literally, "goes to water" in the solvent of his +philosophy, the reasoning from the evidence of design does not fare much +better. If Hume really knew of any valid reply to Philo's arguments in +the following passages of the _Dialogues_, he has dealt unfairly by the +leader in concealing it:-- + + "But because I know you are not much swayed by names and + authorities, I shall endeavour to show you, a little more + distinctly, the inconveniences of that Anthropomorphism, which you + have embraced; and shall prove, that there is no ground to suppose + a plan of the world to be formed in the Divine mind, consisting of + distinct ideas, differently arranged, in the same manner as an + architect forms in his head the plan of a house which he intends to + execute. + + "It is not easy, I own, to see what is gained by this supposition, + whether we judge the matter by _Reason_ or by _Experience_. We are + still obliged to mount higher, in order to find the cause of this + cause, which you had assigned as satisfactory and conclusive. + + "If _Reason_ (I mean abstract reason, derived from inquiries _a + priori_) be not alike mute with regard to all questions concerning + cause and effect, this sentence at least it will venture to + pronounce: That a mental world, or universe of ideas, requires a + cause as much as does a material world, or universe of objects; + and, if similar in its arrangement, must require a similar cause. + For what is there in this subject, which should occasion a + different conclusion or inference? In an abstract view, they are + entirely alike; and no difficulty attends the one supposition, + which is not common to both of them. + + "Again, when we will needs force _Experience_ to pronounce some + sentence, even on those subjects which lie beyond her sphere, + neither can she perceive any material difference in this + particular, between these two kinds of worlds; but finds them to be + governed by similar principles, and to depend upon an equal variety + of causes in their operations. We have specimens in miniature of + both of them. Our own mind resembles the one; a vegetable or animal + body the other. Let experience, therefore, judge from these + samples. Nothing seems more delicate, with regard to its causes, + than thought: and as these causes never operate in two persons + after the same manner, so we never find two persons who think + exactly alike. Nor indeed does the same person think exactly alike + at any two different periods of time. A difference of age, of the + disposition of his body, of weather, of food, of company, of books, + of passions; any of these particulars, or others more minute, are + sufficient to alter the curious machinery of thought, and + communicate to it very different movements and operations. As far + as we can judge, vegetables and animal bodies are not more delicate + in their motions, nor depend upon a greater variety or more curious + adjustment of springs and principles. + + "How, therefore, shall we satisfy ourselves concerning the cause of + that Being whom you suppose the Author of Nature, or, according to + your system of anthropomorphism, the ideal world in which you trace + the material? Have we not the same reason to trace the ideal world + into another ideal world, or new intelligent principle? But if we + stop and go no farther; why go so far? Why not stop at the material + world? How can we satisfy ourselves without going on _in + infinitum_? And after all, what satisfaction is there in that + infinite progression? Let us remember the story of the Indian + philosopher and his elephant. It was never more applicable than to + the present subject. If the material world rests upon a similar + ideal world, this ideal world must rest upon some other; and so on + without end. It were better, therefore, never to look beyond the + present material world. By supposing it to contain the principle of + its order within itself, we really assert it to be God; and the + sooner we arrive at that Divine Being, so much the better. When you + go one step beyond the mundane system you only excite an + inquisitive humour, which it is impossible ever to satisfy. + + "To say, that the different ideas which compose the reason of the + Supreme Being, fall into order of themselves and by their own + natures, is really to talk without any precise meaning. If it has a + meaning, I would fain know why it is not as good sense to say, + that the parts of the material world fall into order of themselves, + and by their own nature. Can the one opinion be intelligible while + the other is not so?"--(II. pp. 461-4.) + +Cleanthes, in replying to Philo's discourse, says that it is very easy +to answer his arguments; but, as not unfrequently happens with +controversialists, he mistakes a reply for an answer, when he declares +that-- + + "The order and arrangement of nature, the curious adjustment of + final causes, the plain use and intention of every part and organ; + all these bespeak in the clearest language one intelligent cause or + author. The heavens and the earth join in the same testimony. The + whole chorus of nature raises one hymn to the praises of its + Creator."--(II. p. 465.) + +Though the rhetoric of Cleanthes may be admired, its irrelevancy to the +point at issue must be admitted. Wandering still further into the region +of declamation, he works himself into a passion: + + "You alone, or almost alone, disturb this general harmony. You + start abstruse doubts, cavils, and objections: You ask me what is + the cause of this cause? I know not: I care not: that concerns not + me. I have found a Deity; and here I stop my inquiry. Let those go + further who are wiser or more enterprising."--(II. p. 466.) + +In other words, O Cleanthes, reasoning having taken you as far as you +want to go, you decline to advance any further; even though you fully +admit that the very same reasoning forbids you to stop where you are +pleased to cry halt! But this is simply forcing your reason to abdicate +in favour of your caprice. It is impossible to imagine that Hume, of all +men in the world, could have rested satisfied with such an act of +high-treason against the sovereignty of philosophy. We may rather +conclude that the last word of the discussion, which he gives to Philo, +is also his own. + + "If I am still to remain in utter ignorance of causes, and can + absolutely give an explication of nothing, I shall never esteem it + any advantage to shove off for a moment a difficulty, which, you + acknowledge, must immediately, in its full force, recur upon me. + Naturalists[32] indeed very justly explain particular effects by + more general causes, though these general causes should remain in + the end totally inexplicable; but they never surely thought it + satisfactory to explain a particular effect by a particular cause, + which was no more to be accounted for than the effect itself. An + ideal system, arranged of itself, without a precedent design, is + not a whit more explicable than a material one, which attains its + order in a like manner; nor is there any more difficulty in the + latter supposition than in the former."--(II. p. 466.) + +It is obvious that, if Hume had been pushed, he must have admitted that +his opinion concerning the existence of a God, and of a certain remote +resemblance of his intellectual nature to that of man, was an hypothesis +which might possess more or less probability, but was incapable on his +own principles of any approach to demonstration. And to all attempts to +make any practical use of his theism; or to prove the existence of the +attributes of infinite wisdom, benevolence, justice, and the like, which +are usually ascribed to the Deity, by reason, he opposes a searching +critical negation.[33] + +The object of the speech of the imaginary Epicurean in the eleventh +section of the _Inquiry_, entitled _Of a Particular Providence and of a +Future State_, is to invert the argument of Bishop Butler's _Analogy_. + +That famous defence of theology against the _a priori_ scepticism of +Freethinkers of the eighteenth century, who based their arguments on the +inconsistency of the revealed scheme of salvation with the attributes of +the Deity, consists, essentially, in conclusively proving that, from a +moral point of view, Nature is at least as reprehensible as orthodoxy. +If you tell me, says Butler, in effect, that any part of revealed +religion must be false because it is inconsistent with the divine +attributes of justice and mercy; I beg leave to point out to you, that +there are undeniable natural facts which are fully open to the same +objection. Since you admit that nature is the work of God, you are +forced to allow that such facts are consistent with his attributes. +Therefore, you must also admit, that the parallel facts in the scheme of +orthodoxy are also consistent with them, and all your arguments to the +contrary fall to the ground. Q.E.D. In fact, the solid sense of Butler +left the Deism of the Freethinkers not a leg to stand upon. Perhaps, +however, he did not remember the wise saying that "A man seemeth right +in his own cause, but another cometh after and judgeth him." Hume's +Epicurean philosopher adopts the main arguments of the _Analogy_, but +unfortunately drives them home to a conclusion of which the good Bishop +would hardly have approved. + + "I deny a Providence, you say, and supreme governor of the world, + who guides the course of events, and punishes the vicious with + infamy and disappointment, and rewards the virtuous with honour and + success in all their undertakings. But surely I deny not the course + itself of events, which lies open to every one's inquiry and + examination. I acknowledge that, in the present order of things, + virtue is attended with more peace of mind than vice, and meets + with a more favourable reception from the world. I am sensible + that, according to the past experience of mankind, friendship is + the chief joy of human life, and moderation the only source of + tranquillity and happiness. I never balance between the virtuous + and the vicious course of life; but am sensible that, to a + well-disposed mind, every advantage is on the side of the former. + And what can you say more, allowing all your suppositions and + reasonings? You tell me, indeed, that this disposition of things + proceeds from intelligence and design. But, whatever it proceeds + from, the disposition itself, on which depends our happiness and + misery, and consequently our conduct and deportment in life, is + still the same. It is still open for me, as well as you, to + regulate my behaviour by my experience of past events. And if you + affirm that, while a divine providence is allowed, and a supreme + distributive justice in the universe, I ought to expect some more + particular reward of the good, and punishment of the bad, beyond + the ordinary course of events, I here find the same fallacy which I + have before endeavoured to detect. You persist in imagining, that + if we grant that divine existence for which you so earnestly + contend, you may safely infer consequences from it, and add + something to the experienced order of nature, by arguing from the + attributes which you ascribe to your gods. You seem not to remember + that all your reasonings on this subject can only be drawn from + effects to causes; and that every argument, deduced from causes to + effects, must of necessity be a gross sophism, since it is + impossible for you to know anything of the cause, but what you have + antecedently not inferred, but discovered to the full, in the + effect. + + "But what must a philosopher think of those vain reasoners who, + instead of regarding the present scene of things as the sole object + of their contemplation, so far reverse the whole course of nature, + as to render this life merely a passage to something further; a + porch, which leads to a greater and vastly different building; a + prologue which serves only to introduce the piece, and give it more + grace and propriety? Whence, do you think, can such philosophers + derive their idea of the gods? From their own conceit and + imagination surely. For if they derive it from the present + phenomena, it would never point to anything further, but must be + exactly adjusted to them. That the divinity may _possibly_ be + endowed with attributes which we have never seen exerted; may be + governed by principles of action which we cannot discover to be + satisfied; all this will freely be allowed. But still this is mere + _possibility_ and hypothesis. We never can have reason to _infer_ + any attributes or any principles of action in him, but so far as we + know them to have been exerted and satisfied. + + "_Are there any marks of a distributive justice in the world?_ If + you answer in the affirmative, I conclude that, since justice here + exerts itself, it is satisfied. If you reply in the negative, I + conclude that you have then no reason to ascribe justice, in our + sense of it, to the gods. If you hold a medium between affirmation + and negation, by saying that the justice of the gods at present + exerts itself in part, but not in its full extent, I answer that + you have no reason to give it any particular extent, but only so + far as you see it, _at present_, exert itself."--(IV. pp. 164-6.) + +Thus, the Freethinkers said, the attributes of the Deity being what they +are, the scheme of orthodoxy is inconsistent with them; whereupon Butler +gave the crushing reply: Agreeing with you as to the attributes of the +Deity, nature, by its existence, proves that the things to which you +object are quite consistent with them. To whom enters Hume's Epicurean +with the remark: Then, as nature is our only measure of the attributes +of the Deity in their practical manifestation, what warranty is there +for supposing that such measure is anywhere transcended? That the "other +side" of nature, if there be one, is governed on different principles +from this side? + +Truly on this topic silence is golden; while speech reaches not even +the dignity of sounding brass or tinkling cymbal, and is but the weary +clatter of an endless logomachy. One can but suspect that Hume also had +reached this conviction; and that his shadowy and inconsistent theism +was the expression of his desire to rest in a state of mind, which +distinctly excluded negation, while it included as little as possible of +affirmation, respecting a problem which he felt to be hopelessly +insoluble. + +But, whatever might be the views of the philosopher as to the arguments +for theism, the historian could have no doubt respecting its many-shaped +existence, and the great part which it has played in the world. Here, +then, was a body of natural facts to be investigated scientifically, and +the result of Hume's inquiries is embodied in the remarkable essay on +the _Natural History of Religion_. Hume anticipated the results of +modern investigation in declaring fetishism and polytheism to be the +form in which savage and ignorant men naturally clothe their ideas of +the unknown influences which govern their destiny; and they are +polytheists rather than monotheists because,-- + + " ... the first ideas of religion arose, not from a contemplation + of the works of nature, but from a concern with regard to the + events of life, and from the incessant hopes and fears which + actuate the human mind ... in order to carry men's attention beyond + the present course of things, or lead them into any inference + concerning invisible intelligent power, they must be actuated by + some passion which prompts their thought and reflection, some + motive which urges their first inquiry. But what passion shall we + have recourse to, for explaining an effect of such mighty + consequence? Not speculative curiosity merely, or the pure love of + truth. That motive is too refined for such gross apprehensions, + and would lead men into inquiries concerning the frame of nature, a + subject too large and comprehensive for their narrow capacities. No + passions, therefore, can be supposed to work on such barbarians, + but the ordinary affections of human life; the anxious concern for + happiness, the dread of future misery, the terror of death, the + thirst of revenge, the appetite for food and other necessaries. + Agitated by hopes and fears of this nature, especially the latter, + men scrutinize, with a trembling curiosity, the course of future + causes, and examine the various and contrary events of human life. + And in this disordered scene, with eyes still more disordered and + astonished, they see the first obscure traces of divinity."--(IV. + pp. 443, 4.) + +The shape assumed by these first traces of divinity is that of the +shadows of men's own minds, projected out of themselves by their +imaginations:-- + + "There is an universal tendency among mankind to conceive all + beings like themselves, and to transfer to every object those + qualities with which they are familiarly acquainted, and of which + they are intimately conscious.... The _unknown causes_ which + continually employ their thought, appearing always in the same + aspect, are all apprehended to be of the same kind or species. Nor + is it long before we ascribe to them thought, and reason, and + passion, and sometimes even the limbs and figures of men, in order + to bring them nearer to a resemblance with ourselves."--(IV. pp. + 446-7.) + +Hume asks whether polytheism really deserves the name of theism. + + "Our ancestors in Europe, before the revival of letters, believed + as we do at present, that there was one supreme God, the author of + nature, whose power, though in itself uncontrollable, was yet often + exerted by the interposition of his angels and subordinate + ministers, who executed his sacred purposes. But they also + believed, that all nature was full of other invisible powers: + fairies, goblins, elves, sprights; beings stronger and mightier + than men, but much inferior to the celestial natures who surround + the throne of God. Now, suppose that any one, in these ages, had + denied the existence of God and of his angels, would not his + impiety justly have deserved the appellation of atheism, even + though he had still allowed, by some odd capricious reasoning, that + the popular stories of elves and fairies were just and well + grounded? The difference, on the one hand, between such a person + and a genuine theist, is infinitely greater than that, on the + other, between him and one that absolutely excludes all invisible + intelligent power. And it is a fallacy, merely from the casual + resemblance of names, without any conformity of meaning, to rank + such opposite opinions under the same denomination. + + "To any one who considers justly of the matter, it will appear that + the gods of the polytheists are no better than the elves and + fairies of our ancestors, and merit as little as any pious worship + and veneration. These pretended religionists are really a kind of + superstitious atheists, and acknowledge no being that corresponds + to our idea of a Deity. No first principle of mind or thought; no + supreme government and administration; no divine contrivance or + intention in the fabric of the world."--(IV. pp. 450-51.) + +The doctrine that you may call an atheist anybody whose ideas about the +Deity do not correspond with your own, is so largely acted upon by +persons who are certainly not of Hume's way of thinking and, probably, +so far from having read him, would shudder to open any book bearing his +name, except the _History of England_, that it is surprising to trace +the theory of their practice to such a source. + +But on thinking the matter over, this theory seems so consonant with +reason, that one feels ashamed of having suspected many excellent +persons of being moved by mere malice and viciousness of temper to call +other folks atheists, when, after all, they have been obeying a purely +intellectual sense of fitness. As Hume says, truly enough, it is a mere +fallacy, because two people use the same names for things, the ideas of +which are mutually exclusive, to rank such opposite opinions under the +same denomination. If the Jew says, that the Deity is absolute unity, +and that it is sheer blasphemy to say that He ever became incarnate in +the person of a man; and, if the Trinitarian says, that the Deity is +numerically three as well as numerically one, and that it is sheer +blasphemy to say that He did not so become incarnate, it is obvious +enough that each must be logically held to deny the existence of the +other's Deity. Therefore; that each has a scientific right to call the +other an atheist; and that, if he refrains, it is only on the ground of +decency and good manners, which should restrain an honourable man from +employing even scientifically justifiable language, if custom has given +it an abusive connotation. While one must agree with Hume, then, it is, +nevertheless, to be wished that he had not set the bad example of +calling polytheists "superstitious atheists." It probably did not occur +to him that, by a parity of reasoning, the Unitarians might justify the +application of the same language to the Ultramontanes, and _vice versa_. +But, to return from a digression which may not be wholly unprofitable, +Hume proceeds to show in what manner polytheism incorporated physical +and moral allegories, and naturally accepted hero-worship; and he sums +up his views of the first stages of the evolution of theology as +follows:-- + + "These then are the general principles of polytheism, founded in + human nature, and little or nothing dependent on caprice or + accident. As the _causes_ which bestow happiness or misery, are in + general very little known and very uncertain, our anxious concern + endeavours to attain a determinate idea of them: and finds no + better expedient than to represent them as intelligent, voluntary + agents, like ourselves, only somewhat superior in power and wisdom. + The limited influence of these agents, and their proximity to human + weakness, introduce the various distribution and division of their + authority, and thereby give rise to allegory. The same principles + naturally deify mortals, superior in power, courage, or + understanding, and produce hero-worship; together with fabulous + history and mythological tradition, in all its wild and + unaccountable forms. And as an invisible spiritual intelligence is + an object too refined for vulgar apprehension, men naturally affix + it to some sensible representation; such as either the more + conspicuous parts of nature, or the statues, images, and pictures, + which a more refined age forms of its divinities."--(IV. p. 461.) + +How did the further stage of theology, monotheism, arise out of +polytheism? Hume replies, certainly not by reasonings from first causes +or any sort of fine-drawn logic:-- + + "Even at this day, and in Europe, ask any of the vulgar why he + believes in an Omnipotent Creator of the world, he will never + mention the beauty of final causes, of which he is wholly ignorant: + He will not hold out his hand and bid you contemplate the + suppleness and variety of joints in his fingers, their bending all + one way, the counterpoise which they receive from the thumb, the + softness and fleshy parts of the inside of the hand, with all the + other circumstances which render that member fit for the use to + which it was destined. To these he has been long accustomed; and he + beholds them with listlessness and unconcern. He will tell you of + the sudden and unexpected death of such-a-one; the fall and bruise + of such another; the excessive drought of this season; the cold and + rains of another. These he ascribes to the immediate operation of + Providence: And such events as, with good reasoners, are the chief + difficulties in admitting a Supreme Intelligence, are with him the + sole arguments for it.... + + "We may conclude therefore, upon the whole, that since the vulgar, + in nations which have embraced the doctrine of theism, still build + it upon irrational and superstitious grounds, they are never led + into that opinion by any process of argument, but by a certain + train of thinking, more suitable to their genius and capacity. + + "It may readily happen, in an idolatrous nation, that though men + admit the existence of several limited deities, yet there is some + one God, whom, in a particular manner, they make the object of + their worship and adoration. They may either suppose, that, in the + distribution of power and territory among the Gods, their nation + was subjected to the jurisdiction of that particular deity; or, + reducing heavenly objects to the model of things below, they may + represent one god as the prince or supreme magistrate of the rest, + who, though of the same nature, rules them with an authority like + that which an earthly sovereign exerts over his subjects and + vassals. Whether this god, therefore, be considered as their + peculiar patron, or as the general sovereign of heaven, his + votaries will endeavour, by every art, to insinuate themselves into + his favour; and supposing him to be pleased, like themselves, with + praise and flattery, there is no eulogy or exaggeration which will + be spared in their addresses to him. In proportion as men's fears + or distresses become more urgent, they still invent new strains of + adulation; and even he who outdoes his predecessor in swelling the + titles of his divinity, is sure to be outdone by his successor in + newer and more pompous epithets of praise. Thus they proceed, till + at last they arrive at infinity itself, beyond which there is no + further progress; And it is well if, in striving to get further, + and to represent a magnificent simplicity, they run not into + inexplicable mystery, and destroy the intelligent nature of their + deity, on which alone any rational worship or adoration can be + founded. While they confine themselves to the notion of a perfect + being, the Creator of the world, they coincide, by chance, with the + principles of reason and true philosophy; though they are guided to + that notion, not by reason, of which they are in a great measure + incapable, but by the adulation and fears of the most vulgar + superstition."--(IV. pp. 463-6.) + + "Nay, if we should suppose, what never happens, that a popular + religion were found, in which it was expressly declared, that + nothing but morality could gain the divine favour; if an order of + priests were instituted to inculcate this opinion, in daily + sermons, and with all the arts of persuasion; yet so inveterate are + the people's prejudices, that, for want of some other superstition, + they would make the very attendance on these sermons the essentials + of religion, rather than place them in virtue and good morals. The + sublime prologue of Zaleucus' laws inspired not the Locrians, so + far as we can learn, with any sounder notions of the measures of + acceptance with the deity, than were familiar to the other + Greeks."--(IV. p. 505.) + +It has been remarked that Hume's writings are singularly devoid of local +colour; of allusions to the scenes with which, he was familiar, and to +the people from whom he sprang. Yet, surely, the Lowlands of Scotland +were more in his thoughts than the Zephyrean promontory, and the hard +visage of John Knox peered from behind the mask of Zaleucus, when this +passage left his pen. Nay, might not an acute German critic discern +therein a reminiscence of that eminently Scottish institution, a "Holy +Fair"? where as Hume's young contemporary sings:-- + + + "... opens out his cauld harangues + On practice and on morals; + An' aff the godly pour in thrangs + To gie the jars and barrels + A lift that day. + + "What signifies his barren shine + Of moral powers and reason? + His English style and gesture line + Are a' clean out of season. + Like Socrates or Antonine, + Or some auld pagan heathen, + The moral man he does define, + But ne'er a word o' faith in + That's right that day."[34] + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[28] In a note to the Essay on Superstition and Enthusiasm, Hume is +careful to define what he means by this term. "By priests I understand +only the pretenders to power and dominion, and to a superior sanctity of +character, distinct from virtue and good morals. These are very +different from _clergymen_, who are set apart to the care of sacred +matters, and the conducting our public devotions with greater decency +and order. There is no rank of men more to be respected than the +latter."--(III. p. 83.) + +[29] It is needless to quote the rest of the passage, though I cannot +refrain from observing that the recommendation which it contains, that a +"man of letters" should become a philosophical sceptic as "the first and +most essential step towards being a sound believing Christian," though +adopted and largely acted upon by many a champion of orthodoxy in these +days, is questionable in taste, if it be meant as a jest, and more than +questionable in morality, if it is to be taken in earnest. To pretend +that you believe any doctrine for no better reason than that you doubt +everything else, would be dishonest, if it were not preposterous. + +[30] A perplexity which is increased rather than diminished by some +passages in a letter to Gilbert Elliot of Minto (March 10, 1751). Hume +says, "You would perceive by the sample I have given you that I make +Cleanthes the hero of the dialogue; whatever you can think of, to +strengthen that side of the argument, will be most acceptable to me. Any +propensity you imagine I have to the other side crept in upon me against +my will; and 'tis not long ago that I burned an old manuscript book, +wrote before I was twenty, which contained, page after page, the gradual +progress of my thoughts on this head. It began with an anxious scent +after arguments to confirm the common opinion; doubts stole in, +dissipated, returned; were again dissipated, returned again; and it was +a perpetual struggle of a restless imagination against +inclination--perhaps against reason.... I could wish Cleanthes' argument +could be so analysed as to be rendered quite formal and regular. The +propensity of the mind towards it--unless that propensity were as strong +and universal as that to believe in our senses and experience--will +still, I am afraid, be esteemed a suspicious foundation. 'Tis here I +wish for your assistance. We must endeavour to prove that this +propensity is somewhat different from our inclination to find our own +figures in the clouds, our faces in the moon, our passions and +sentiments even in inanimate matter. Such an inclination may and ought +to be controlled, and can never be a legitimate ground of assent." +(Burton, _Life_, I. pp. 331-3.) The picture of Hume here drawn +unconsciously by his own hand, is unlike enough to the popular +conception of him as a careless sceptic loving doubt for doubt's sake. + +[31] Kant employs substantially the same argument:--"Wuerde das hoechste +Wesen in dieser Kette der Bedingungen stehen, so wuerde es selbst ein +Glied der Reihe derselben sein, und eben so wie die niederen Glieder, +denen es vorgesetzt ist, noch fernere Untersuchungen wegen seines noch +hoeheren Grundes erfahren."--_Kritik._ Ed. Hartenstein, p. 422. + +[32] _I.e._ Natural philosophers. + +[33] Hume's letter to Mure of Caldwell, containing a criticism of +Leechman's sermon (Burton, I. p. 163), bears strongly on this point. + +[34] Burns published the _Holy Fair_ only ten years after Hume's death. + + + + +CHAPTER IX. + +THE SOUL: THE DOCTRINE OF IMMORTALITY. + + +Descartes taught that an absolute difference of kind separates matter, +as that which possesses extension, from spirit, as that which thinks. +They not only have no character in common, but it is inconceivable that +they should have any. On the assumption, that the attributes of the two +were wholly different, it appeared to be a necessary consequence that +the hypothetical causes of these attributes--their respective +substances--must be totally different. Notably, in the matter of +divisibility, since that which has no extension cannot be divisible, it +seemed that the _chose pensante_, the soul, must be an indivisible +entity. + +Later philosophers, accepting this notion of the soul, were naturally +much perplexed to understand how, if matter and spirit had nothing in +common, they could act and react on one another. All the changes of +matter being modes of motion, the difficulty of understanding how a +moving extended material body was to affect a thinking thing which had +no dimension, was as great as that involved in solving the problem of +how to hit a nominative case with a stick. Hence, the successors of +Descartes either found themselves obliged, with the Occasionalists, to +call in the aid of the Deity, who was supposed to be a sort of +go-between betwixt matter and spirit; or they had recourse, with +Leibnitz, to the doctrine of pre-established harmony, which denied any +influence of the body on the soul, or _vice versa_, and compared matter +and spirit to two clocks so accurately regulated to keep time with one +another, that the one struck when ever the other pointed to the hour; +or, with Berkeley, they abolished the "substance" of matter altogether, +as a superfluity, though they failed to see that the same arguments +equally justified the abolition of soul as another superfluity, and the +reduction of the universe to a series of events or phenomena; or, +finally, with Spinoza, to whom Berkeley makes a perilously close +approach, they asserted the existence of only one substance, with two +chief attributes, the one, thought, and the other, extension. + +There remained only one possible position, which, had it been taken up +earlier, might have saved an immensity of trouble; and that was to +affirm that we do not, and cannot, know anything about the "substance" +either of the thinking thing, or of the extended thing. And Hume's sound +common sense led him to defend this thesis, which Locke had already +foreshadowed, with respect to the question of the substance of the soul. +Hume enunciates two opinions. The first is that the question itself is +unintelligible, and therefore cannot receive any answer; the second is +that the popular doctrine respecting the immateriality, simplicity, and +indivisibility of a thinking substance is a "true atheism, and will +serve to justify all those sentiments for which Spinoza is so +universally infamous." + +In support of the first opinion, Hume points out that it is impossible +to attach any definite meaning to the word "substance" when employed for +the hypothetical substratum of soul and matter. For if we define +substance as that which may exist by itself, the definition does not +distinguish the soul from perceptions. It is perfectly easy to conceive +that states of consciousness are self-subsistent. And, if the substance +of the soul is defined as that in which perceptions inhere, what is +meant by the inherence? Is such inherence conceivable? If conceivable, +what evidence is there of it? And what is the use of a substratum to +things which, for anything we know to the contrary, are capable of +existing by themselves? + +Moreover, it may be added, supposing the soul has a substance, how do we +know that it is different from the substance, which, on like grounds, +must be supposed to underlie the qualities of matter? + +Again, if it be said that our personal identity requires the assumption +of a substance which remains the same while the accidents of perception +shift and change, the question arises what is meant by personal +identity? + + "For my part," says Hume, "when I enter most intimately into what I + call _myself_, I always stumble on some particular perception or + other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or + pleasure. I never can catch _myself_ at any time without a + perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. When + my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep, so long + am I insensible of _myself_, and may be truly said not to exist. + And were all my perceptions removed by death, and I could neither + think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate, after the dissolution + of my body, I should be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive + what is further requisite to make me a perfect nonentity. If any + one, upon serious and unprejudiced reflection, thinks he has a + different notion of _himself_, I must confess I can reason no + longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the + right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this + particular. He may perhaps perceive something simple and continued + which he calls _himself_, though I am certain there is no such + principle in me. + + "But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture + to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a + bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed one + another with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux + and movement.... The mind is a kind of theatre, where several + perceptions successively make their appearance, pass, repass, glide + away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. + There is properly no _simplicity_ in it at one time, nor _identity_ + in different, whatever natural propension we may have to imagine + that simplicity and identity. The comparison of the theatre must + not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only that + constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant notion of the + place where these scenes are represented, or of the materials of + which it is composed. + + "What then gives so great a propension to ascribe an identity to + these successive perceptions, and to suppose ourselves possessed of + an invariable and uninterrupted existence through the whole course + of our lives? In order to answer this question, we must distinguish + between personal identity as it regards our thought and + imagination, and as it regards our passions, or the concern we take + in ourselves. The first is our present subject; and to explain it + perfectly we must take the matter pretty deep, and account for that + identity which we attribute to plants and animals; there being a + great analogy betwixt it and the identity of a self or + person."--(I. pp. 321, 322.) + +Perfect identity is exhibited by an object which remains unchanged +throughout a certain time; perfect diversity is seen in two or more +objects which are separated by intervals of space and periods of time. +But, in both these cases, there is no sharp line of demarcation between +identity and diversity, and it is impossible to say when an object +ceases to be one and becomes two. + +When a sea-anemone multiplies by division, there is a time during which +it is said to be one animal partially divided; but, after a while, it +becomes two animals adherent together, and the limit between these +conditions is purely arbitrary. So in mineralogy, a crystal of a +definite chemical composition may have its substance replaced, particle +by particle, by another chemical compound. When does it lose its +primitive identity and become a new thing? + +Again, a plant or an animal, in the course of its existence, from the +condition of an egg or seed to the end of life, remains the same neither +in form, nor in structure, nor in the matter of which it is composed: +every attribute it possesses is constantly changing, and yet we say that +it is always one and the same individual. And if, in this case, we +attribute identity without supposing an indivisible immaterial something +to underlie and condition that identity, why should we need the +supposition in the case of that succession of changeful phenomena we +call the mind? + +In fact, we ascribe identity to an individual plant or animal, simply +because there has been no moment of time at which we could observe any +division of it into parts separated by time or space. Every experience +we have of it is as one thing and not as two; and we sum up our +experiences in the ascription of identity, although we know quite well +that, strictly speaking, it has not been the same for any two moments. + +So with the mind. Our perceptions flow in even succession; the +impressions of the present moment are inextricably mixed up with the +memories of yesterday and the expectations of to-morrow, and all are +connected by the links of cause and effect. + + " ... as the same individual republic may not only change its + members, but also its laws and constitutions; in like manner the + same person may vary his character and disposition, as well as his + impressions and ideas, without losing his identity. Whatever + changes he endures, his several parts are still connected by the + relation of causation. And in this view our identity with regard to + the passions serves to corroborate that with regard to the + imagination, by the making our distant perceptions influence each + other, and by giving us a present concern for our past or future + pains or pleasures. + + "As memory alone acquaints us with the continuance and extent of + this succession of perceptions, 'tis to be considered, upon that + account chiefly, as the source of personal identity. Had we no + memory we never should have any notion of causation, nor + consequently of that chain of causes and effects which constitute + our self or person. But having once acquired this notion of + causation from the memory, we can extend the same chain of causes, + and consequently the identity of our persons, beyond our memory, + and can comprehend times, and circumstances, and actions, which we + have entirely forgot, but suppose in general to have existed. For + how few of our past actions are there of which we have any memory? + Who can tell me, for instance, what were his thoughts and actions + on the first of January, 1715, the eleventh of March, 1719, and the + third of August, 1733? Or will he affirm, because he has entirely + forgot the incidents of those days, that the present self is not + the same person with the self of that time, and by that means + overturn all the most established notions of personal identity? In + this view, therefore, memory does not so much _produce_ as + _discover_ personal identity, by showing us the relation of cause + and effect among our different perceptions. 'Twill be incumbent on + those who affirm that memory produces entirely our personal + identity, to give a reason why we can thus extend our identity + beyond our memory. + + "The whole of this doctrine leads us to a conclusion which is of + great importance in the present affair, viz. that all the nice and + subtle questions concerning personal identity can never possibly be + decided, and are to be regarded rather as grammatical than as + philosophical difficulties. Identity depends on the relations of + ideas, and these relations produce identity by means of that easy + transition they occasion. But as the relations, and the easiness of + the transition may diminish by insensible degrees, we have no just + standard by which we can decide any dispute concerning the time + when they acquire or lose a title to the name of identity. All the + disputes concerning the identity of connected objects are merely + verbal, except so far as the relation of parts gives rise to some + fiction or imaginary principle of union, as we have already + observed. + + "What I have said concerning the first origin and uncertainty of + our notion of identity, as applied to the human mind may be + extended, with little or no variation, to that of _simplicity_. An + object, whose different co-existent parts are bound together by a + close relation, operates upon the imagination after much the same + manner as one perfectly simple and undivisible, and requires not a + much greater stretch of thought in order to its conception. From + this similarity of operation we attribute a simplicity to it, and + feign a principle of union as the support of this simplicity, and + the centre of all the different parts and qualities of the + object."--(I. pp. 331-3.) + +The final result of Hume's reasoning comes to this: As we use the name +of body for the sum of the phenomena which make up our corporeal +existence, so we employ the name of soul for the sum of the phenomena +which constitute our mental existence; and we have no more reason, in +the latter case, than in the former, to suppose that there is anything +beyond the phenomena which answers to the name. In the case of the soul, +as in that of the body, the idea of substance is a mere fiction of the +imagination. This conclusion is nothing but a rigorous application of +Berkeley's reasoning concerning matter to mind, and it is fully adopted +by Kant.[35] + +Having arrived at the conclusion that the conception of a soul, as a +substantive thing, is a mere figment of the imagination; and that, +whether it exists or not, we can by no possibility know anything about +it, the inquiry as to the durability of the soul may seem superfluous. + +Nevertheless, there is still a sense in which, even under these +conditions, such an inquiry is justifiable. Leaving aside the problem of +the substance of the soul, and taking the word "soul" simply as a name +for the series of mental phenomena which make up an individual mind; it +remains open to us to ask, whether that series commenced with, or +before, the series of phenomena which constitute the corresponding +individual body; and whether it terminates with the end of the corporeal +series, or goes on after the existence of the body has ended. And, in +both cases, there arises the further question, whether the excess of +duration of the mental series over that of the body, is finite or +infinite. + +Hume has discussed some of these questions in the remarkable essay _On +the Immortality of the Soul_, which was not published till after his +death, and which seems long to have remained but little known. +Nevertheless, indeed, possibly, for that reason, its influence has been +manifested in unexpected quarters, and its main arguments have been +adduced by archiepiscopal and episcopal authority in evidence of the +value of revelation. Dr. Whately,[36] sometime Archbishop of Dublin, +paraphrases Hume, though he forgets to cite him; and Bishop Courtenay's +elaborate work,[37] dedicated to the Archbishop, is a development of +that prelate's version of Hume's essay. + +This little paper occupies only some ten pages, but it is not wonderful +that it attracted an acute logician like Whately, for it is a model of +clear and vigorous statement. The argument hardly admits of +condensation, so that I must let Hume speak for himself:-- + + "By the mere light of reason it seems difficult to prove the + immortality of the soul: the arguments for it are commonly derived + either from metaphysical topics, or moral, or physical. But in + reality it is the gospel, and the gospel alone, that has brought + _life and immortality_ to light.[38] + + "1. Metaphysical topics suppose that the soul is immaterial, and + that 'tis impossible for thought to belong to a material + substance.[39] But just metaphysics teach us that the notion of + substance is wholly confused and imperfect; and that we have no + other idea of any substance, than as an aggregate of particular + qualities inhering in an unknown something. Matter, therefore, and + spirit, are at bottom equally unknown, and we cannot determine what + qualities inhere in the one or in the other.[40] They likewise + teach us, that nothing can be decided _a priori_ concerning any + cause or effect; and that experience, being the only source of our + judgments of this nature, we cannot know from any other principle, + whether matter, by its structure or arrangement, may not be the + cause of thought. Abstract reasonings cannot decide any question of + fact or existence. But admitting a spiritual substance to be + dispersed throughout the universe, like the ethereal fire of the + Stoics, and to be the only inherent subject of thought, we have + reason to conclude from _analogy_, that nature uses it after the + manner she does the other substance, _matter_. She employs it as a + kind of paste or clay; modifies it into a variety of forms or + existences; dissolves after a time each modification, and from its + substance erects a new form. As the same material substance may + successively compose the bodies of all animals, the same spiritual + substance may compose their minds: Their consciousness, or that + system of thought which they formed during life, may be continually + dissolved by death, and nothing interests them in the new + modification. The most positive assertors of the mortality of the + soul never denied the immortality of its substance; and that an + immaterial substance, as well as a material, may lose its memory + or consciousness, appears in part from experience, if the soul be + immaterial. Seasoning from the common course of nature, and without + supposing any new interposition of the Supreme Cause, which ought + always to be excluded from philosophy, _what is incorruptible must + also be ingenerable_. The soul, therefore, if immortal, existed + before our birth, and if the former existence noways concerned us, + neither will the latter. Animals undoubtedly feel, think, love, + hate, will, and even reason, though in a more imperfect manner than + men: Are their souls also immaterial and immortal?"[41] + +Hume next proceeds to consider the moral arguments, and chiefly + + " ... those derived from the justice of God, which is supposed to + be further interested in the future punishment of the vicious and + reward of the virtuous." + +But if by the justice of God we moan the same attribute which we call +justice in ourselves, then why should either reward or punishment be +extended beyond this life?[42] Our sole means of knowing anything is +the reasoning faculty which God has given us; and that reasoning +faculty not only denies us any conception of a future state, but fails +to furnish a single valid argument in favour of the belief that the mind +will endure after the dissolution of the body. + + " ... If any purpose of nature be clear, we may affirm that the + whole scope and intention of man's creation, so far as we can judge + by natural reason, is limited to the present life." + +To the argument that the powers of man are so much greater than the +needs of this life require, that they suggest a future scene in which +they can be employed, Hume replies:-- + + "If the reason of man gives him great superiority above other + animals, his necessities are proportionably multiplied upon him; + his whole time, his whole capacity, activity, courage, and passion, + find sufficient employment in fencing against the miseries of his + present condition; and frequently, nay, almost always, are too + slender for the business assigned them. A pair of shoes, perhaps, + was never yet wrought to the highest degree of perfection that + commodity is capable of attaining; yet it is necessary, at least + very useful, that there should be some politicians and moralists, + even some geometers, poets and philosophers, among mankind. The + powers of men are no more superior to their wants, considered + merely in this life, than those of foxes and hares are, compared to + _their_ wants and to their period of existence. The inference from + parity of reason is therefore obvious." + +In short, Hume argues that, if the faculties with which we are endowed +are unable to discover a future state, and if the most attentive +consideration of their nature serves to show that they are adapted to +this life and nothing more, it is surely inconsistent with any +conception of justice that we should be dealt with, as if we had all +along had a clear knowledge of the fact thus carefully concealed from +us. What should we think of the justice of a father, who gave his son +every reason to suppose that a trivial fault would only be visited by a +box on the ear; and then, years afterwards, put him on the rack for a +week for the same fault? + +Again, the suggestion arises, if God is the cause of all things, he is +responsible for evil as well as for good; and it appears utterly +irreconcilable with our notions of justice that he should punish another +for that which he has, in fact, done himself. Moreover, just punishment +bears a proportion to the offence, while suffering which is infinite is +_ipso facto_ disproportionate to any finite deed. + + "Why then eternal punishment for the temporary offences of so frail + a creature as man? Can any one approve of Alexander's rage, who + intended to exterminate a whole nation because they had seized his + favourite horse Bucephalus? + + "Heaven and hell suppose two distinct species of men, the good and + the bad; but the greatest part of mankind float betwixt vice and + virtue. Were one to go round the world with the intention of giving + a good supper to the righteous and a sound drubbing to the wicked, + he would frequently be embarrassed in his choice, and would find + the merits and demerits of most men and women scarcely amount to + the value of either."[43] + +One can but admire the broad humanity and the insight into the springs +of action manifest in this passage. _Comprendre est a moitie pardonner_. +The more one knows of the real conditions which determine men's acts the +less one finds either to praise or blame. For kindly David Hume, "the +damnation of one man is an infinitely greater evil in the universe than +the subversion of a thousand million of kingdoms." And he would have +felt with his countryman Burns, that even "auld Nickie Ben" should "hae +a chance." + +As against those who reason for the necessity of a future state, in +order that the justice of the Deity may be satisfied, Hume's +argumentation appears unanswerable. For if the justice of God resembles +what we mean by justice, the bestowal of infinite happiness for finite +well-doing and infinite misery for finite ill-doing, it is in no sense +just. And, if the justice of God does not resemble what we mean by +justice, it is an abuse of language to employ the name of justice for +the attribute described by it. But, as against those who choose to argue +that there is nothing in what is known to us of the attributes of the +Deity inconsistent with a future state of rewards and punishments, +Hume's pleadings have no force. Bishop Butler's argument that, inasmuch +as the visitation of our acts by rewards and punishments takes place in +this life, rewards and punishments must be consistent with the +attributes of the Deity, and therefore may go on as long as the mind +endures, is unanswerable. Whatever exists is, by the hypothesis, +existent by the will of God; and, therefore, the pains and pleasures +which exist now may go on existing for all eternity, either increasing, +diminishing, or being endlessly varied in their intensity, as they are +now. + +It is remarkable that Hume does not refer to the sentimental arguments +for the immortality of the soul which are so much in vogue at the +present day; and which are based upon our desire for a longer conscious +existence than that which nature appears to have allotted to us. Perhaps +he did not think them worth notice. For indeed it is not a little +strange, that our strong desire that a certain occurrence should happen +should be put forward as evidence that it will happen. If my intense +desire to see the friend, from whom I have parted, does not bring him +from the other side of the world, or take me thither; if the mother's +agonised prayer that her child should live has not prevented him from +dying; experience certainly affords no presumption that the strong +desire to be alive after death, which we call the aspiration after +immortality, is any more likely to be gratified. As Hume truly says, +"All doctrines are to be suspected which are favoured by our passions;" +and the doctrine, that we are immortal because we should extremely like +to be so, contains the quintessence of suspiciousness. + +In respect of the existence and attributes of the soul, as of those of +the Deity, then, logic is powerless and reason silent. At the most we +can get no further than the conclusion of Kant:-- + + "After we have satisfied ourselves of the vanity of all the + ambitious attempts of reason to fly beyond the bounds of + experience, enough remains of practical value to content us. It is + true that no one may boast that he _knows_ that God and a future + life exist; for, if he possesses such knowledge, he is just the + man for whom I have long been seeking. All knowledge (touching an + object of mere reason) can be communicated, and therefore I might + hope to see my own knowledge increased to this prodigious extent, + by his instruction. No; our conviction in these matters is not + _logical_, but _moral_ certainty; and, inasmuch as it rests upon + subjective grounds, (of moral disposition) I must not even say: _it + is_ morally certain that there is a God, and so on; but, _I am_ + morally certain, and so on. That is to say: the belief in a God and + in another world is so interwoven with my moral nature, that the + former can no more vanish, than the latter can ever be torn from + me. + + "The only point to be remarked here is that this act of faith of + the intellect (_Vernunftglaube_) assumes the existence of moral + dispositions. If we leave them aside, and suppose a mind quite + indifferent to moral laws, the inquiry started by reason becomes + merely a subject for speculation; and [the conclusion attained] may + then indeed be supported by strong arguments from analogy, but not + by such as are competent to overcome persistent scepticism. + + "There is no one, however, who can fail to be interested in these + questions. For, although he may be excluded from moral influences + by the want of a good disposition, yet, even in this case, enough + remains to lead him to fear a divine existence and a future state. + To this end, no more is necessary than that he can at least have no + certainty that there is no such being, and no future life; for, to + make this conclusion demonstratively certain, he must be able to + prove the impossibility of both; and this assuredly no rational man + can undertake to do. This negative belief, indeed, cannot produce + either morality or good dispositions, but can operate in an + analogous fashion, by powerfully repressing the outbreak of evil + tendencies. + + "But it will be said, is this all that Pure Reason can do when it + gazes out beyond the bounds of experience? Nothing more than two + articles of faith? Common sense could achieve as much without + calling the philosophers to its counsels! + + "I will not here speak of the service which philosophy has rendered + to human reason by the laborious efforts of its criticism, granting + that the outcome proves to be merely negative: about that matter + something is to be said in the following section. But do you then + ask, that the knowledge which interests all men shall transcend the + common understanding and be discovered for you only by + philosophers? The very thing which you make a reproach, is the best + confirmation of the justice of the previous conclusions, since it + shows that which could not, at first, have been anticipated: + namely, that in those matters which concern all men alike, nature + is not guilty of distributing her gifts with partiality; and that + the highest philosophy, in dealing with the most important concerns + of humanity, is able to take us no further than the guidance which + she affords to the commonest understanding."[44] + +In short, nothing can be proved or disproved, respecting either the +distinct existence, the substance, or the durability of the soul. So +far, Kant is at one with Hume. But Kant adds, as you cannot disprove the +immortality of the soul, and as the belief therein is very useful for +moral purposes, you may assume it. To which, had Hume lived half a +century later, he would probably have replied, that, if morality has no +better foundation than an assumption, it is not likely to bear much +strain; and, if it has a better foundation, the assumption rather +weakens than strengthens it. + +As has been already said, Hume is not content with denying that we know +anything about the existence or the nature of the soul; but he carries +the war into the enemy's camp, and accuses those who affirm the +immateriality, simplicity, and indivisibility of the thinking substance, +of atheism and Spinozism, which are assumed to be convertible terms. + +The method of attack is ingenious. Observation appears to acquaint us +with two different systems of beings, and both Spinoza and orthodox +philosophers agree, that the necessary substratum of each of these is a +substance, in which the phenomena adhere, or of which they are +attributes or modes. + + "I observe first the universe of objects or of body; the sun, moon, + and stars; the earth, seas, plants, animals, men, ships, houses, + and other productions either of art or of nature. Here Spinoza + appears, and tells me that these are only modifications and that + the subject in which they inhere is simple, uncompounded, and + indivisible. After this I consider the other system of beings, viz. + the universe of thought, or my impressions and ideas. Then I + observe another sun, moon, and stars; an earth and seas, covered + and inhabited by plants and animals, towns, houses, mountains, + rivers; and, in short, everything I can discover or conceive in the + first system. Upon my inquiring concerning these, theologians + present themselves, and tell me that these also are modifications, + and modifications of one simple, uncompounded, and indivisible + substance. Immediately upon which I am deafened with the noise of a + hundred voices, that treat the first hypothesis with detestation + and scorn, and the second with applause and veneration. I turn my + attention to these hypotheses to see what may be the reason of so + great a partiality; and find that they have the same fault of being + unintelligible, and that, as far as we can understand them, they + are so much alike, that 'tis impossible to discover any absurdity + in one, which is not common to both of them."--(I. p. 309.) + +For the manner in which Hume makes his case good, I must refer to the +original. Plain people may rest satisfied that both hypotheses are +unintelligible, without plunging any further among syllogisms, the +premisses of which convey no meaning, while the conclusions carry no +conviction. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[35] "Our internal intuition shows no permanent existence, for the Ego +is only the consciousness of my thinking." "There is no means whatever +by which we can learn anything respecting the constitution of the soul, +so far as regards the possibility of its separate existence."--_Kritik +von den Paralogismen der reinen Vernunft_. + +[36] _Essays on Some of the Peculiarities of the Christian Religion_, +(Essay I. Revelation of a Future State), by Richard Whately, D.D., +Archbishop of Dublin. Fifth Edition, revised, 1846. + +[37] _The Future States: their Evidences and Nature; considered on +Principles Physical, Moral, and Scriptural, with the Design of showing +the Value of the Gospel Revelation_ by the Right Rev. Reginald +Courtenay, D.D., Lord Bishop of Kingston (Jamaica), 1857. + +[38] "Now that 'Jesus Christ brought life and immortality to light +through the Gospel,' and that in the most literal sense, which implies +that the revelation of the doctrine is _peculiar_ to His Gospel, seems +to be at least the most obvious meaning of the Scriptures of the New +Testament."--Whately, _l.c._ p. 27. + +[39] Compare, _Of the Immateriality of the Soul_, Section V. of Part +IV., Book I., of the _Treatise_, in which Hume concludes (I. p. 319) +that, whether it be material or immaterial, "in both cases the +metaphysical arguments for the immortality of the soul are equally +inconclusive; and in both cases the moral arguments and those derived +from the analogy of nature are equally strong and convincing." + +[40] "The question again respecting the materiality of the soul is one +which I am at a loss to understand clearly, till it shall have been +clearly determined _what matter is_. We know nothing of it, any more +than of mind, except its attributes."--Whately, _l.c._ p. 66. + +[41] "None of those who contend for the natural immortality of the soul +... have been able to extricate themselves from one difficulty, viz. +that all their arguments apply, with exactly the same force, to prove an +immortality, not only of _brutes_, but even of _plants_; though in such +a conclusion as this they are never willing to acquiesce."--Whately, +_l.c._ p. 67. + +[42] "Nor are we therefore authorised to infer _a priori_, independent +of Revelation, a future state of retribution, from the irregularities +prevailing in the present life, since that future state does not account +fully for these irregularities. It may explain, indeed, how present evil +may be conducive to future good, but not why the good could not be +attained without the evil; it may reconcile with our notions of the +divine justice the present prosperity of the wicked, but it does not +account for the existence of the wicked."--Whately, _l.c._ pp. 69, 70. + +[43] "So reason also shows, that for man to expect to earn for himself +by the practice of virtue, and claim, as his just right, an immortality +of exalted happiness, is a most extravagant and groundless +pretension."--Whately, _l.c._ p. 101. On the other hand, however, the +Archbishop sees no unreasonableness in a man's earning for himself an +immortality of intense unhappiness by the practice of vice. So that life +is, naturally, a venture in which you may lose all, but can earn +nothing. It may be thought somewhat hard upon mankind if they are pushed +into a speculation of this sort, willy-nilly. + +[44] _Kritik der reinen Vernunft_. Ed. Hartenstein, p. 547. + + + + +CHAPTER X. + +VOLITION: LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. + + +In the opening paragraphs of the third part of the second book of the +_Treatise_, Hume gives a description of the will. + + "Of all the immediate effects of pain and pleasure there is none + more remarkable than the _will_; and though, properly speaking, it + be not comprehended among the passions, yet as the full + understanding of its nature and properties is necessary to the + explanation of them, we shall here make it the subject of our + inquiry. I desire it may be observed, that, by the _will_, I mean + nothing but _the internal impression we feel, and are conscious of, + when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new + perception of our mind_. This impression, like the preceding ones + of pride and humility, love and hatred, 'tis impossible to define, + and needless to describe any further."--(II. p. 150.) + +This description of volition may be criticised on various grounds. More +especially does it seem defective in restricting the term "will" to that +feeling which arises when we act, or appear to act, as causes: for one +may will to strike, without striking; or to think of something which we +have forgotten. + +Every volition is a complex idea composed of two elements: the one is +the idea of an action; the other is a desire for the occurrence of that +action. If I will to strike, I have an idea of a certain movement, and a +desire that that movement should take place; if I will to think of any +subject, or, in other words, to attend to that subject, I have an idea +of the subject and a strong desire that it should remain present to my +consciousness. And so far as I can discover, this combination of an idea +of an object with an emotion, is everything that can be directly +observed in an act of volition. So that Hume's definition may be amended +thus: Volition is the impression which arises when the idea of a bodily +or mental action is accompanied by the desire that the action should be +accomplished. It differs from other desires simply in the fact, that we +regard ourselves as possible causes of the action desired. + +Two questions arise, in connexion with the observation of the phenomenon +of volition, as they arise out of the contemplation of all other natural +phenomena. Firstly, has it a cause; and, if so, what is its cause? +Secondly, is it followed by any effect, and if so, what effect does it +produce? + +Hume points out, that the nature of the phenomena we consider can have +nothing to do with the origin of the conception that they are connected +by the relation of cause and effect. For that relation is nothing but an +order of succession, which, so far as our experience goes, is +invariable; and it is obvious that the nature of phenomena has nothing +to do with their order. Whatever it is that leads us to seek for a cause +for every event, in the case of the phenomena of the external world, +compels us, with equal cogency, to seek it in that of the mind. + +The only meaning of the law of causation, in the physical world, is, +that it generalises universal experience of the order of that world; +and, if experience shows a similar order to obtain among states of +consciousness, the law of causation will properly express that order. + +That such an order exists, however, is acknowledged by every sane man: + + "Our idea, therefore, of necessity and causation, arises entirely + from the uniformity observable in the operations of nature, where + similar objects are constantly conjoined together, and the mind is + determined by custom to infer the one from the appearance of the + other. These two circumstances form the whole of that necessity + which we ascribe to matter. Beyond the constant _conjunction_ of + similar objects and the consequent _inference_ from one to the + other, we have no notion of any necessity of connexion. + + "If it appear, therefore, what all mankind have ever allowed, + without any doubt or hesitation, that these two circumstances take + place in the voluntary actions of men, and in the operations of + mind, it must follow that all mankind have ever agreed in the + doctrine of necessity, and that they have hitherto disputed merely + from not understanding each other."--(IV. p. 97.) + +But is this constant conjunction observable in human actions? A student +of history could give but one answer to this question: + + "Ambition, avarice, self-love, vanity, friendship, generosity, + public spirit: these passions, mixed in various degrees, and + distributed through society, have been, from the beginning of the + world, and still are, the source of all the actions and enterprizes + which have ever been observed among mankind. Would you know the + sentiments, inclinations, and course of life of the Greeks and + Romans? Study well the temper and actions of the French and + English. You cannot be much mistaken in transferring to the former + _most_ of the observations which you have made with regard to the + latter. Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that + history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular. + Its chief use is only to discover the constant and universal + principles of human nature, by showing men in all varieties of + circumstances and situations, and furnishing us with materials from + which we may form our observations, and become acquainted with the + regular springs of human action and behaviour. These records of + wars, intrigues, factions, and revolutions are so many collections + of experiments, by which the politician or moral philosopher fixes + the principles of his science, in the same manner as the physician + or natural philosopher becomes acquainted with the nature of + plants, minerals, and other external objects, by the experiments + which he forms concerning them. Nor are the earth, air, water, and + other elements examined by Aristotle and Hippocrates more like to + those which at present lie under our observation, than the men + described by Polybius and Tacitus are to those who now govern the + world."--(IV. pp. 97-8.) + +Hume proceeds to point out that the value set upon experience in the +conduct of affairs, whether of business or of politics, involves the +acknowledgment that we base our expectation of what men will do, upon +our observation of what they have done; and, that we are as firmly +convinced of the fixed order of thoughts as we are of that of things. +And, if it be urged that human actions not unfrequently appear +unaccountable and capricious, his reply is prompt:-- + + "I grant it possible to find some actions which seem to have no + regular connexion with any known motives, and are exceptions to all + the measures of conduct which have ever been established for the + government of men. But if one could willingly know what judgment + should be formed of such irregular and extraordinary actions, we + may consider the sentiments commonly entertained with regard to + those irregular events which appear in the course of nature, and + the operations of external objects. All causes are not conjoined to + their usual effects with like uniformity. An artificer, who handles + only dead matter, may be disappointed in his aim, as well as the + politician who directs the conduct of sensible and intelligent + agents. + + "The vulgar, who take things according to their first appearance, + attribute the uncertainty of events to such an uncertainty in the + causes as make the latter often fail of their usual influence, + though they meet with no impediment to their operation. But + philosophers, observing that, almost in every part of nature, there + is contained a vast variety of springs and principles, which are + hid, by reason of their minuteness or remoteness, find that it is + at least possible the contrariety of events may not proceed from + any contingency in the cause, but from the secret operation of + contrary causes. This possibility is converted into certainty by + further observation, when they remark that, upon an exact scrutiny, + a contrariety of effects always betrays a contrariety of causes, + and proceeds from their mutual opposition. A peasant can give no + better reason for the stopping of any clock or watch, than to say + that it does not commonly go right. But an artist easily perceives + that the same force in the spring or pendulum has always the same + influence on the wheels; but fails of its usual effect, perhaps by + reason of a grain of dust, which puts a stop to the whole movement. + From the observation of several parallel instances, philosophers + form a maxim, that the connexion between all causes and effects is + equally necessary, and that its seeming uncertainty in some + instances proceeds from the secret opposition of contrary + causes."--(IV. pp. 101-2.) + +So with regard to human actions:-- + + "The internal principles and motives may operate in a uniform + manner, notwithstanding these seeming irregularities; in the same + manner as the winds, rains, clouds, and other variations of the + weather are supposed to be governed by steady principles; though + not easily discoverable by human sagacity and inquiry."--(IV. p. + 103.) + +Meteorology, as a science, was not in existence in Hume's time, or he +would have left out the "supposed to be." In practice, again, what +difference does any one make between natural and moral evidence? + + "A prisoner who has neither money nor interest, discovers the + impossibility of his escape, as well when he considers the + obstinacy of the gaoler, as the walls and bars with which he is + surrounded; and, in all attempts for his freedom, chooses rather to + work upon the stone and iron of the one, than upon the inflexible + nature of the other. The same prisoner, when conducted to the + scaffold, foresees his death as certainly from the constancy and + fidelity of his guards, as from the operation of the axe or wheel. + His mind runs along a certain train of ideas: The refusal of the + soldiers to consent to his escape; the action of the executioner; + the separation of the head and body; bleeding, convulsive motions, + and death. Here is a connected chain of natural causes and + voluntary actions; but the mind feels no difference between them, + in passing from one link to another, nor is less certain of the + future event, than if it were connected with the objects presented + to the memory or senses, by a train of causes cemented together by + what we are pleased to call a _physical_ necessity. The same + experienced union has the same effect on the mind, whether the + united objects be motives, volition, and actions; or figure and + motion. We may change the names of things, but their nature and + their operation on the understanding never change."--(IV. pp. + 105-6.) + +But, if the necessary connexion of our acts with our ideas has always +been acknowledged in practice, why the proclivity of mankind to deny it +words? + + "If we examine the operations of body, and the production of + effects from their causes, we shall find that all our faculties can + never carry us further in our knowledge of this relation, than + barely to observe, that particular objects are _constantly + conjoined_ together, and that the mind is carried, by a _customary + transition_, from the appearance of the one to the belief of the + other. But though this conclusion concerning human ignorance be the + result of the strictest scrutiny of this subject, men still + entertain a strong propensity to believe, that they penetrate + further into the province of nature, and perceive something like a + necessary connexion between cause and effect. When, again, they + turn their reflections towards the operations of their own minds, + and _feel_ no such connexion between the motive and the action; + they are thence apt to suppose, that there is a difference between + the effects which result from material force, and those which arise + from thought and intelligence. But, being once convinced, that we + know nothing of causation of any kind, than merely the _constant + conjunction_ of objects, and the consequent _inference_ of the mind + from one to another, and finding that these two circumstances are + universally allowed to have place in voluntary actions; we may be + more easily led to own the same necessity common to all + causes."--(IV. pp. 107, 8.) + +The last asylum of the hard-pressed advocate of the doctrine of uncaused +volition is usually, that, argue as you like, he has a profound and +ineradicable consciousness of what he calls the freedom of his will. But +Hume follows him even here, though only in a note, as if he thought the +extinction of so transparent a sophism hardly worthy of the dignity of +his text. + + "The prevalence of the doctrine of liberty may be accounted for + from another cause, viz. a false sensation, or seeming experience, + which we have, or may have, of liberty or indifference in many of + our actions. The necessity of any action, whether of matter or of + mind, is not, properly speaking, a quality in the agent, but in any + thinking or intelligent being who may consider the action; and it + consists chiefly in the determination of his thoughts to infer the + existence of that action from some preceding objects; as liberty, + when opposed to necessity, is nothing but the want of that + determination, and a certain looseness or indifference which we + feel, in passing or not passing, from the idea of any object to the + idea of any succeeding one. Now we may observe that though, in + _reflecting_ on human actions, we seldom feel such looseness or + indifference, but are commonly able to infer them with considerable + certainty from their motives, and from the dispositions of the + agent; yet it frequently happens, that in _performing_ the actions + themselves, we are sensible of something like it: And as all + resembling objects are taken for each other, this has been employed + as demonstrative and even intuitive proof of human liberty. We feel + that our actions are subject to our will on most occasions; and + imagine we feel, that the will itself is subject to nothing, + because, when by a denial of it we are provoked to try, we feel + that it moves easily every way, and produces an image of itself (or + a _Velleity_ as it is called in the schools), even on that side on + which it did not settle. This image or faint notion, we persuade + ourselves, could at that time have been completed into the thing + itself; because, should that be denied, we find upon a second trial + that at present it can. We consider not that the fantastical desire + of showing liberty is here the motive of our actions."--(IV. p. + 110, _note_.) + +Moreover, the moment the attempt is made to give a definite meaning to +the words, the supposed opposition between free will and necessity turns +out to be a mere verbal dispute. + + "For what is meant by liberty, when applied to voluntary actions? + We cannot surely mean, that actions have so little connexion with + motive, inclinations, and circumstances, that one does not follow + with a certain degree of uniformity from the other, and that one + affords no inference by which we can conclude the existence of the + other. For these are plain and acknowledged matters of fact. By + liberty, then, we can only mean _a power of acting or not acting + according to the determinations of the will_; that is, if we choose + to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may. Now + this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every + one who is not a prisoner and in chains. Here then is no subject of + dispute."--(IV. p. 111.) + +Half the controversies about the freedom of the will would have had no +existence, if this pithy paragraph had been well pondered by those who +oppose the doctrine of necessity. For they rest upon the absurd +presumption that the proposition, "I can do as I like," is contradictory +to the doctrine of necessity. The answer is; nobody doubts that, at any +rate within certain limits, you can do as you like. But what determines +your likings and dislikings? Did you make your own constitution? Is it +your contrivance that one thing is pleasant and another is painful? And +even if it were, why did you prefer to make it after the one fashion +rather than the other? The passionate assertion of the consciousness of +their freedom, which is the favourite refuge of the opponents of the +doctrine of necessity, is mere futility, for nobody denies it. What they +really have to do, if they would upset the necessarian argument, is to +prove that they are free to associate any emotion whatever with any idea +whatever; to like pain as much as pleasure; vice as much as virtue; in +short, to prove, that, whatever may be the fixity of order of the +universe of things, that of thought is given over to chance. + +In the second part of this remarkable essay, Hume considers the real, or +supposed, immoral consequences of the doctrine of necessity, premising +the weighty observation that + + "When any opinion leads to absurdity, it is certainly false; but it + is not certain that an opinion is false because it is of dangerous + consequence."--(IV. p. 112.) + +And, therefore, that the attempt to refute an opinion by a picture of +its dangerous consequences to religion and morality, is as illogical as +it is reprehensible. + +It is said, in the first place, that necessity destroys responsibility; +that, as it is usually put, we have no right to praise or blame actions +that cannot be helped. Hume's reply amounts to this, that the very idea +of responsibility implies the belief in the necessary connexion of +certain actions with certain states of the mind. A person is held +responsible only for those acts which are preceded by a certain +intention; and, as we cannot see, or hear, or feel, an intention, we can +only reason out its existence on the principle that like effects have +like causes. + +If a man is found by the police busy with "jemmy" and dark lantern at a +jeweller's shop door over night, the magistrate before whom he is +brought the next morning, reasons from those effects to their causes in +the fellow's "burglarious" ideas and volitions, with perfect confidence, +and punishes him accordingly. And it is quite clear that such a +proceeding would be grossly unjust, if the links of the logical process +were other than necessarily connected together. The advocate who should +attempt to get the man off on the plea that his client need not +necessarily have had a felonious intent, would hardly waste his time +more, if he tried to prove that the sum of all the angles of a triangle +is not two right angles, but three. + +A man's moral responsibility for his acts has, in fact, nothing to do +with the causation of these acts, but depends on the frame of mind which +accompanies them. Common language tells us this, when it uses +"well-disposed" as the equivalent of "good," and "evil-minded" as that +of "wicked." If A does something which puts B in a violent passion, it +is quite possible to admit that B's passion is the necessary consequence +of A's act, and yet to believe that B's fury is morally wrong, or that +he ought to control it. In fact, a calm bystander would reason with both +on the assumption of moral necessity. He would say to A, "You were wrong +in doing a thing which you knew (that is, of the necessity of which you +were convinced) would irritate B." And he would say to B, "You are wrong +to give way to passion, for you know its evil effects"--that is the +necessary connection between yielding to passion and evil. + +So far, therefore, from necessity destroying moral responsibility, it is +the foundation of all praise and blame; and moral admiration reaches its +climax in the ascription of necessary goodness to the Deity. + +To the statement of another consequence of the necessarian doctrine, +that, if there be a God, he must be the cause of all evil as well as of +all good, Hume gives no real reply--probably because none is possible. +But then, if this conclusion is distinctly and unquestionably deducible +from the doctrine of necessity, it is no less unquestionably a direct +consequence of every known form of monotheism. If God is the cause of +all things, he must be the cause of evil among the rest; if he is +omniscient, he must have the fore-knowledge of evil; if he is almighty, +he must possess the power of preventing, or of extinguishing evil. And +to say that an all-knowing and all-powerful being is not responsible for +what happens, because he only permits it, is, under its intellectual +aspect, a piece of childish sophistry; while, as to the moral look of +it, one has only to ask any decently honourable man, whether, under like +circumstances, he would try to get rid of his responsibility by such a +plea. + +Hume's _Inquiry_ appeared in 1748. He does not refer to Anthony Collins' +essay on Liberty, published thirty-three years before, in which the same +question is treated to the same effect, with singular force and +lucidity. It may be said, perhaps, that it is not wonderful that the two +freethinkers should follow the same line of reasoning; but no such +theory will account for the fact that in 1754, the famous Calvinistic +divine, Jonathan Edwards, President of the College of New Jersey, +produced, in the interests of the straitest orthodoxy, a demonstration +of the necessarian thesis, which has never been equalled in power, and +certainly has never been refuted. + +In the ninth section of the fourth part of Edwards' _Inquiry_, he has to +deal with the Arminian objection to the Calvinistic doctrine that "it +makes God the author of sin"; and it is curious to watch the struggle +between the theological controversialist, striving to ward off an +admission which he knows will be employed to damage his side, and the +acute logician, conscious that, in some shape or other, the admission +must be made. Beginning with a _tu quoque_, that the Arminian doctrine +involves consequences as bad as the Calvinistic view, he proceeds to +object to the term "author of sin," though he ends by admitting that, in +a certain sense, it is applicable; he proves from Scripture, that God is +the disposer and orderer of sin; and then, by an elaborate false analogy +with the darkness resulting from the absence of the sun, endeavours to +suggest that he is only the author of it in a negative sense; and, +finally, he takes refuge in the conclusion that, though God is the +orderer and disposer of those deeds which, considered in relation to +their agents, are morally evil, yet, inasmuch as His purpose has all +along been infinitely good, they are not evil relatively to him. + +And this, of course, may be perfectly true; but if true, it is +inconsistent with the attribute of omnipotence. It is conceivable that +there should be no evil in the world; that which is conceivable is +certainly possible; if it were possible for evil to be non-existent, the +maker of the world, who, though foreknowing the existence of evil in +that world, did not prevent it, either did not really desire it should +not exist, or could not prevent its existence. It might be well for +those who inveigh against the logical consequences of necessarianism to +bethink them of the logical consequences of theism; which are not only +the same, when the attribute of Omniscience is ascribed to the Deity, +but which bring out, from the existence of moral evil, a hopeless +conflict between the attributes of Infinite Benevolence and Infinite +Power, which, with no less assurance, are affirmed to appertain to the +Divine Being. + +Kant's mode of dealing with the doctrine of necessity is very singular. +That the phenomena of the mind follow fixed relations of cause and +effect is, to him, as unquestionable as it is to Hume. But then there is +the _Ding an sich_, the _Noumenon_, or Kantian equivalent for the +substance of the soul. This, being out of the phenomenal world, is +subject to none of the laws of phenomena, and is consequently as +absolutely free, and as completely powerless, as a mathematical point, +_in vacua_, would be. Hence volition is uncaused, so far as it belongs +to the noumenon; but, necessary, so far as it takes effect in the +phenomenal world. + +Since Kant is never weary of telling us that we know nothing whatever, +and can know nothing, about the noumenon, except as the hypothetical +subject of any number of negative predicates; the information that it is +free, in the sense of being out of reach of the law of causation, is +about as valuable as the assertion that it is neither grey, nor blue, +nor square. For practical purposes, it must be admitted that the inward +possession of such a noumenal libertine does not amount to much for +people whose actual existence is made up of nothing but definitely +regulated phenomena. When the good and evil angels fought for the dead +body of Moses, its presence must have been of about the same value to +either of the contending parties, as that of Kant's noumenon, in the +battle of impulses which rages in the breast of man. Metaphysicians, as +a rule, are sadly deficient in the sense of humour; or they would surely +abstain from advancing propositions which, when stripped of the verbiage +in which they are disguised, appear to the profane eye to be bare shams, +naked but not ashamed. + + + + +CHAPTER XI. + +THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS. + + +In his autobiography, Hume writes:-- + + "In the same year [1752] was published at London my _Inquiry + Concerning the Principles of Morals_; which in my own opinion (who + ought not to judge on that subject) is of all my writings, + historical, philosophical, and literary, incomparably the best. It + came unnoticed and unobserved into the world." + +It may commonly be noticed that the relative value which an author +ascribes to his own works rarely agrees with the estimate formed of them +by his readers; who criticise the products, without either the power or +the wish to take into account the pains which they may have cost the +producer. Moreover, the clear and dispassionate common sense of the +_Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals_ may have tasted flat after +the highly-seasoned _Inquiry concerning the Human Understanding_. +Whether the public like to be deceived, or not, may be open to question; +but it is beyond a doubt that they love to be shocked in a pleasant and +mannerly way. Now Hume's speculations on moral questions are not so +remote from those of respectable professors, like Hutcheson, or saintly +prelates, such as Butler, as to present any striking novelty. And they +support the cause of righteousness in a cool, reasonable, indeed +slightly patronising fashion, eminently in harmony with the mind of the +eighteenth century; which admired virtue very much, if she would only +avoid the rigour which the age called fanaticism, and the fervour which +it called enthusiasm. + +Having applied the ordinary methods of scientific inquiry to the +intellectual phenomena of the mind, it was natural that Hume should +extend the same mode of investigation to its moral phenomena; and, in +the true spirit of a natural philosopher, he commences by selecting a +group of those states of consciousness with which every one's personal +experience must have made him familiar: in the expectation that the +discovery of the sources of moral approbation and disapprobation, in +this comparatively easy case, may furnish the means of detecting them +where they are more recondite. + + "We shall analyse that complication of mental qualities which form + what, in common life, we call PERSONAL MERIT: We shall consider + every attribute of the mind, which renders a man an object either + of esteem and affection, or of hatred and contempt; every habit or + sentiment or faculty, which if ascribed to any person, implies + either praise or blame, and may enter into any panegyric or satire + of his character and manners. The quick sensibility which, on this + head, is so universal among mankind, gives a philosopher sufficient + assurance that he can never be considerably mistaken in framing the + catalogue, or incurs any danger of misplacing the objects of his + contemplation: He needs only enter into his own breast for a + moment, and consider whether he should or should not desire to have + this or that quality assigned to him, and whether such or such an + imputation would proceed from a friend or an enemy. The very nature + of language guides us almost infallibly in forming a judgment of + this nature; and as every tongue possesses one set of words which + are taken in a good sense, and another in the opposite, the least + acquaintance with the idiom suffices, without any reasoning, to + direct us in collecting and arranging the estimable or blamable + qualities of men. The only object of reasoning is to discover the + circumstances on both sides, which are common to these qualities; + to observe that particular in which the estimable qualities agree + on the one hand, and the blamable on the other, and thence to reach + the foundation of ethics, and find their universal principles, from + which all censure or approbation is ultimately derived. As this is + a question of fact, not of abstract science, we can only expect + success by following the experimental method, and deducing general + maxims from a comparison of particular instances. The other + scientifical method, where a general abstract principle is first + established, and is afterwards branched out into a variety of + inferences and conclusions, may be more perfect in itself, but + suits less the imperfection of human nature, and is a common source + of illusion and mistake, in this as well as in other subjects. Men + are now cured of their passion for hypotheses and systems in + natural philosophy, and will hearken to no arguments but those + which are derived from experience. It is full time they should + attempt a like reformation in all moral disquisitions; and reject + every system of ethics, however subtile or ingenious, which is not + founded on fact and observation."--(IV. pp. 242-4.) + +No qualities give a man a greater claim to personal merit than +benevolence and justice; but if we inquire why benevolence deserves so +much praise, the answer will certainly contain a large reference to the +utility of that virtue to society; and as for justice, the very +existence of the virtue implies that of society; public utility is its +sole origin; and the measure of its usefulness is also the standard of +its merit. If every man possessed everything he wanted, and no one had +the power to interfere with such possession; or if no man desired that +which could damage his fellow-man, justice would have no part to play +in the universe. But as Hume observes:-- + + "In the present disposition of the human heart, it would perhaps be + difficult to find complete instances of such enlarged affections; + but still we may observe that the case of families approaches + towards it; and the stronger the mutual benevolence is among the + individuals, the nearer it approaches, till all distinction of + property be in a great measure lost and confounded among them. + Between married persons, the cement of friendship is by the laws + supposed so strong, as to abolish all division of possessions, and + has often, in reality, the force assigned to it.[45] And it is + observable that, during the ardour of new enthusiasms, when every + principle is inflamed into extravagance, the community of goods has + frequently been attempted; and nothing but experience of its + inconveniences, from the returning or disguised selfishness of men, + could make the imprudent fanatics adopt anew the ideas of justice + and separate property. So true is it that this virtue derives its + existence entirely from its necessary _use_ to the intercourse and + social state of mankind."--(IV. p. 256.) + + "Were the human species so framed by nature as that each individual + possessed within himself every faculty requisite both for his own + preservation and for the propagation of his kind: Were all society + and intercourse cut off between man and man by the primary + intention of the Supreme Creator: It seems evident that so solitary + a being would be as much incapable of justice as of social + discourse and conversation. Where mutual regard and forbearance + serve to no manner of purpose, they would never direct the conduct + of any reasonable man. The headlong course of the passions would be + checked by no reflection on future consequences. And as each man + is here supposed to love himself alone, and to depend only on + himself and his own activity for safety and happiness, he would, on + every occasion, to the utmost of his power, challenge the + preference above every other being, to none of which he is bound by + any ties, either of nature or of interest. + + "But suppose the conjunction of the sexes to be established in + nature, a family immediately arises; and particular rules being + found requisite for its subsistence, these are immediately + embraced, though without comprehending the rest of mankind within + their prescriptions. Suppose that several families unite together + in one society, which is totally disjoined from all others, the + rules which preserve peace and order enlarge themselves to the + utmost extent of that society; but becoming then entirely useless, + lose their force when carried one step further. But again, suppose + that several distinct societies maintain a kind of intercourse for + mutual convenience and advantage, the boundaries of justice still + grow larger, in proportion to the largeness of men's views and the + force of their mutual connexion. History, experience, reason, + sufficiently instruct us in this natural progress of human + sentiments, and in the gradual enlargement of our regard to justice + in proportion as we become acquainted with the extensive utility of + that virtue."--(IV. pp. 262-4.) + +The moral obligation of justice and the rights of property are by no +means diminished by this exposure of the purely utilitarian basis on +which they rest:-- + + "For what stronger foundation can be desired or conceived for any + duty, than to observe that human society, or even human nature, + could not subsist without the establishment of it, and will still + arrive at greater degrees of happiness and perfection, the more + inviolable the regard is which is paid to that duty? + + "The dilemma seems obvious: As justice evidently tends to promote + public utility, and to support civil society, the sentiment of + justice is either derived from our reflecting on that tendency, or, + like hunger, thirst, and other appetites, resentment, love of life, + attachment to offspring, and other passions, arises from a simple + original instinct in the human heart, which nature has implanted + for like salutary purposes. If the latter be the case, it follows + that property, which is the object of justice, is also + distinguished by a simple original instinct, and is not ascertained + by any argument or reflection. But who is there that ever heard of + such an instinct? Or is this a subject in which new discoveries can + be made? We may as well expect to discover in the body new senses + which had before escaped the observation of all mankind."--(IV. pp. + 273, 4.) + +The restriction of the object of justice to property, in this passage, +is singular. Pleasure and pain can hardly be included under the term +property, and yet justice surely deals largely with the withholding of +the former, or the infliction of the latter, by men on one another. If a +man bars another from a pleasure which he would otherwise enjoy, or +actively hurts him without good reason, the latter is said to be injured +as much as if his property had been interfered with. Here, indeed, it +may be readily shown, that it is as much the interest of society that +men should not interfere with one another's freedom, or mutually inflict +positive or negative pain, as that they should not meddle with one +another's property; and hence the obligation of justice in such matters +may be deduced. But, if a man merely thinks ill of another, or feels +maliciously towards him without due cause, he is properly said to be +unjust. In this case it would be hard to prove that any injury is done +to society by the evil thought; but there is no question that it will be +stigmatised as an injustice; and the offender himself, in another frame +of mind, is often ready enough to admit that he has failed to be just +towards his neighbour. However, it may plausibly be said, that so slight +a barrier lies between thought and speech, that any moral quality +attached to the latter is easily transferred to the former; and that, +since open slander is obviously opposed to the interests of society, +injustice of thought, which is silent slander, must become inextricably +associated with the same blame. + +But, granting the utility to society of all kinds of benevolence and +justice, why should the quality of those virtues involve the sense of +moral obligation? + +Hume answers this question in the fifth section, entitled, _Why Utility +Pleases_. He repudiates the deduction of moral approbation from +self-love, and utterly denies that we approve of benevolent or just +actions because we think of the benefits which they are likely to confer +indirectly on ourselves. The source of the approbation with which we +view an act useful to society must be sought elsewhere; and, in fact, is +to be found in that feeling which is called sympathy. + + "No man is absolutely indifferent to the happiness and misery of + others. The first has a natural tendency to give pleasure, the + second pain. This every one may find in himself. It is not probable + that these principles can be resolved into principles more simple + and universal, whatever attempts may have been made for that + purpose."--(IV. p. 294, _Note_.) + +Other men's joys and sorrows are not spectacles at which we remain +unmoved:-- + + " ... The view of the former, whether in its causes or effects, + like sunshine, or the prospect of well-cultivated plains (to carry + our pretensions no higher) communicates a secret joy and + satisfaction; the appearance of the latter, like a lowering cloud + or barren landscape, throws a melancholy damp over the imagination. + And this concession being once made, the difficulty is over; and a + natural unforced interpretation of the phenomena of human life will + afterwards, we hope, prevail among all speculative + inquirers."--(IV. p. 320.) + +The moral approbation, therefore, with which we regard acts of justice +or benevolence rests upon their utility to society, because the +perception of that utility or, in other words, of the pleasure which +they give to other men, arouses a feeling of sympathetic pleasure in +ourselves. The feeling of obligation to be just, or of the duty of +justice, arises out of that association of moral approbation or +disapprobation with one's own actions, which is what we call conscience. +To fail in justice, or in benevolence, is to be displeased with oneself. +But happiness is impossible without inward self-approval; and, hence, +every man who has any regard to his own happiness and welfare, will find +his best reward in the practice of every moral duty. On this topic Hume +expends much eloquence. + + "But what philosophical truths can be more advantageous to society + than these here delivered, which represent virtue in all her + genuine and most engaging charms, and make us approach her with + ease, familiarity, and affection? The dismal dress falls off, with + which many divines and some philosophers have covered her; and + nothing appears but gentleness, humanity, beneficence, affability; + nay, even at proper intervals, play, frolic, and gaiety. She talks + not of useless austerities and rigours, suffering and self-denial. + She declares that her sole purpose is to make her votaries, and all + mankind, during every period of their existence, if possible, + cheerful and happy; nor does she ever willingly part with any + pleasure but in hopes of ample compensation in some other period of + their lives. The sole trouble which she demands is that of just + calculation, and a steady preference of the greater happiness. And + if any austere pretenders approach her, enemies to joy and + pleasure, she either rejects them as hypocrites and deceivers, or + if she admit them in her train, they are ranked, however, among the + least favoured of her votaries. + + "And, indeed, to drop all figurative expression, what hopes can we + ever have of engaging mankind to a practice which we confess full + of austerity and rigour? Or what theory of morals can ever serve + any useful purpose, unless it can show, by a particular detail, + that all the duties which it recommends are also the true interest + of each individual? The peculiar advantage of the foregoing system + seem to be, that it furnishes proper mediums for that + purpose."--(IV. p. 360.) + +In this paean to virtue, there is more of the dance measure than will +sound appropriate in the ears of most of the pilgrims who toil +painfully, not without many a stumble and many a bruise, along the rough +and steep roads which lead to the higher life. + +Virtue is undoubtedly beneficent; but the man is to be envied to whom +her ways seem in anywise playful. And, though she may not talk much +about suffering and self-denial, her silence on that topic may be +accounted for on the principle _ca va sans dire_. The calculation of the +greatest happiness is not performed quite so easily as a rule of three +sum; while, in the hour of temptation, the question will crop up, +whether, as something has to be sacrificed, a bird in the hand is not +worth two in the bush; whether it may not be as well to give up the +problematical greater happiness in the future, for a certain great +happiness in the present, and + + + "Buy the merry madness of one hour + With the long irksomeness of following time."[46] + + +If mankind cannot be engaged in practices "full of austerity and +rigour," by the love of righteousness and the fear of evil, without +seeking for other compensation than that which flows from the +gratification of such love and the consciousness of escape from +debasement, they are in a bad case. For they will assuredly find that +virtue presents no very close likeness to the sportive leader of the +joyous hours in Hume's rosy picture; but that she is an awful Goddess, +whose ministers are the Furies, and whose highest reward is peace. + +It is not improbable that Hume would have qualified all this as +enthusiasm or fanaticism, or both; but he virtually admits it:-- + + "Now, as virtue is an end, and is desirable on its own account, + without fee or reward, merely for the immediate satisfaction which + it conveys, it is requisite that there should be some sentiment + which it touches; some internal taste or feeling, or whatever you + please to call it, which distinguishes moral good and evil, and + which embraces the one and rejects the other. + + "Thus the distinct boundaries and offices of _reason_ and of + _taste_ are easily ascertained. The former conveys the knowledge of + truth and falsehood: The latter gives the sentiment of beauty and + deformity, vice and virtue. The one discovers objects as they + really stand in nature, without addition or diminution: The other + has a productive faculty, and gilding and staining all natural + objects with the colours borrowed from internal sentiment, raises + in a manner a new creation. Reason being cool and disengaged, is no + motive to action, and directs only the impulse received from + appetite or inclination, by showing us the means of attaining + happiness or avoiding misery. Taste, as it gives pleasure or pain, + and thereby constitutes happiness or misery, becomes a motive to + action, and is the first spring or impulse to desire and volition. + From circumstances and relations known or supposed, the former + leads us to the discovery of the concealed and unknown. After all + circumstances and relations are laid before us, the latter makes us + feel from the whole a new sentiment of blame or approbation. The + standard of the one, being founded on the nature of things, is + external and inflexible, even by the will of the Supreme Being: The + standard of the other, arising from the internal frame and + constitution of animals, is ultimately derived from the Supreme + Will, which bestowed on each being its peculiar nature, and + arranged the several classes and orders of existence."--(IV. pp. + 376-7.) + +Hume has not discussed the theological theory of the obligations of +morality, but it is obviously in accordance with his view of the nature +of those obligations. Under its theological aspect, morality is +obedience to the will of God; and the ground for such obedience is +two-fold; either we ought to obey God because He will punish us if we +disobey Him, which is an argument based on the utility of obedience; or +our obedience ought to flow from our love towards God, which is an +argument based on pure feeling and for which no reason can be given. +For, if any man should say that he takes no pleasure in the +contemplation of the ideal of perfect holiness, or, in other words, that +he does not love God, the attempt to argue him into acquiring that +pleasure would be as hopeless as the endeavour to persuade Peter Bell of +the "witchery of the soft blue sky." + +In whichever way we look at the matter, morality is based on feeling, +not on reason; though reason alone is competent to trace out the effects +of our actions and thereby dictate conduct. Justice is founded on the +love of one's neighbour; and goodness is a kind of beauty. The moral +law, like the laws of physical nature, rests in the long run upon +instinctive intuitions, and is neither more nor less "innate" and +"necessary" than they are. Some people cannot by any means be got to +understand the first book of Euclid; but the truths of mathematics are +no less necessary and binding on the great mass of mankind. Some there +are who cannot feel the difference between the _Sonata Appassionata_, +and _Cherry Ripe_; or between a gravestone-cutter's cherub and the +Apollo Belvidere; but the canons of art are none the less acknowledged. +While some there may be, who, devoid of sympathy are incapable of a +sense of duty; but neither does their existence affect the foundations +of morality. Such pathological deviations from true manhood are merely +the halt, the lame, and the blind of the world of consciousness; and the +anatomist of the mind leaves them aside, as the anatomist of the body +would ignore abnormal specimens. + +And as there are Pascals and Mozarts, Newtons and Raffaelles, in whom +the innate faculty for science or art seems to need but a touch to +spring into full vigour, and through whom the human race obtains new +possibilities of knowledge and new conceptions of beauty: so there have +been men of moral genius, to whom we owe ideals of duty and visions of +moral perfection, which ordinary mankind could never have attained; +though, happily for them, they can feel the beauty of a vision, which +lay beyond the reach of their dull imaginations, and count life well +spent in shaping some faint image of it in the actual world. + +THE END + +LONDON: R. CLAY, SONS, AND TAYLOR, BREAD STREET HILL. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[45] Family affection in the eighteenth century may have been stronger +than in the nineteenth; but Hume's bachelor inexperience can surely +alone explain his strange account of the suppositions of the marriage +law of that day, and their effects. The law certainly abolished all +division of possessions, but it did so by making the husband sole +proprietor. + +[46] Ben Jonson's _Cynthia's Revels_, act i. + + + + +ADVERTISEMENTS + + +ENGLISH MEN OF LETTERS. + +EDITED BY JOHN MORLEY. + + +_These Short Books are addressed to the general public with a view both +to stirring and satisfying an interest in literature and its great +topics in the minds of those who have to run as they read. An immense +class is growing up, and must every year increase, whose education will +have made them alive to the importance of the masters of our literature, +and capable of intelligent curiosity as to their performances. 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