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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/1738-h.zip b/1738-h.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..3ac52c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/1738-h.zip diff --git a/1738-h/1738-h.htm b/1738-h/1738-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..613710f --- /dev/null +++ b/1738-h/1738-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,6077 @@ +<?xml version="1.0" encoding="us-ascii"?> + +<!DOCTYPE html + PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd" > + +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" lang="en"> + <head> + <title> + Statesman, by Plato + </title> + <style type="text/css" xml:space="preserve"> + + body { margin:5%; background:#faebd0; text-align:justify} + P { text-indent: 1em; margin-top: .25em; margin-bottom: .25em; } + H1,H2,H3,H4,H5,H6 { text-align: center; margin-left: 15%; margin-right: 15%; } + hr { width: 50%; text-align: center;} + .foot { margin-left: 20%; margin-right: 20%; text-align: justify; text-indent: -3em; font-size: 90%; } + blockquote {font-size: 97%; font-style: italic; margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%;} + .mynote {background-color: #DDE; color: #000; padding: .5em; margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 95%;} + .toc { margin-left: 10%; margin-bottom: .75em;} + .toc2 { margin-left: 20%;} + div.fig { display:block; margin:0 auto; text-align:center; } + div.middle { margin-left: 20%; margin-right: 20%; text-align: justify; } + .figleft {float: left; margin-left: 0%; margin-right: 1%;} + .figright {float: right; margin-right: 0%; margin-left: 1%;} + .pagenum {display:inline; font-size: 70%; font-style:normal; + margin: 0; padding: 0; position: absolute; right: 1%; + text-align: right;} + pre { font-style: italic; font-size: 90%; margin-left: 10%;} + +</style> + </head> + <body> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Statesman, by Plato + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Statesman + +Author: Plato + +Translator: Benjamin Jowett + +Release Date: November 7, 2008 [EBook #1738] +Last Updated: January 15, 2013 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK STATESMAN *** + + + + +Produced by Sue Asscher, and David Widger + + + + + +</pre> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <h1> + STATESMAN + </h1> + <p> + <br /> + </p> + <h2> + By Plato + </h2> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <h3> + Translated by Benjamin Jowett + </h3> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <h3> + Contents + </h3> + <table summary="" style="margin-right: auto; margin-left: auto"> + <tr> + <td> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_INTR"> INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0002"> STATESMAN </a> + </p> + </td> + </tr> + </table> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <br /> <br /> <a name="link2H_INTR" id="link2H_INTR"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <h2> + INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS. + </h2> + <p> + In the Phaedrus, the Republic, the Philebus, the Parmenides, and the + Sophist, we may observe the tendency of Plato to combine two or more + subjects or different aspects of the same subject in a single dialogue. In + the Sophist and Statesman especially we note that the discussion is partly + regarded as an illustration of method, and that analogies are brought from + afar which throw light on the main subject. And in his later writings + generally we further remark a decline of style, and of dramatic power; the + characters excite little or no interest, and the digressions are apt to + overlay the main thesis; there is not the 'callida junctura' of an + artistic whole. Both the serious discussions and the jests are sometimes + out of place. The invincible Socrates is withdrawn from view; and new foes + begin to appear under old names. Plato is now chiefly concerned, not with + the original Sophist, but with the sophistry of the schools of philosophy, + which are making reasoning impossible; and is driven by them out of the + regions of transcendental speculation back into the path of common sense. + A logical or psychological phase takes the place of the doctrine of Ideas + in his mind. He is constantly dwelling on the importance of regular + classification, and of not putting words in the place of things. He has + banished the poets, and is beginning to use a technical language. He is + bitter and satirical, and seems to be sadly conscious of the realities of + human life. Yet the ideal glory of the Platonic philosophy is not + extinguished. He is still looking for a city in which kings are either + philosophers or gods (compare Laws). + </p> + <p> + The Statesman has lost the grace and beauty of the earlier dialogues. The + mind of the writer seems to be so overpowered in the effort of thought as + to impair his style; at least his gift of expression does not keep up with + the increasing difficulty of his theme. The idea of the king or statesman + and the illustration of method are connected, not like the love and + rhetoric of the Phaedrus, by 'little invisible pegs,' but in a confused + and inartistic manner, which fails to produce any impression of a whole on + the mind of the reader. Plato apologizes for his tediousness, and + acknowledges that the improvement of his audience has been his only aim in + some of his digressions. His own image may be used as a motto of his + style: like an inexpert statuary he has made the figure or outline too + large, and is unable to give the proper colours or proportions to his + work. He makes mistakes only to correct them—this seems to be his + way of drawing attention to common dialectical errors. The Eleatic + stranger, here, as in the Sophist, has no appropriate character, and + appears only as the expositor of a political ideal, in the delineation of + which he is frequently interrupted by purely logical illustrations. The + younger Socrates resembles his namesake in nothing but a name. The + dramatic character is so completely forgotten, that a special reference is + twice made to discussions in the Sophist; and this, perhaps, is the + strongest ground which can be urged for doubting the genuineness of the + work. But, when we remember that a similar allusion is made in the Laws to + the Republic, we see that the entire disregard of dramatic propriety is + not always a sufficient reason for doubting the genuineness of a Platonic + writing. + </p> + <p> + The search after the Statesman, which is carried on, like that for the + Sophist, by the method of dichotomy, gives an opportunity for many + humorous and satirical remarks. Several of the jests are mannered and + laboured: for example, the turn of words with which the dialogue opens; or + the clumsy joke about man being an animal, who has a power of two-feet—both + which are suggested by the presence of Theodorus, the geometrician. There + is political as well as logical insight in refusing to admit the division + of mankind into Hellenes and Barbarians: 'if a crane could speak, he would + in like manner oppose men and all other animals to cranes.' The pride of + the Hellene is further humbled, by being compared to a Phrygian or Lydian. + Plato glories in this impartiality of the dialectical method, which places + birds in juxtaposition with men, and the king side by side with the + bird-catcher; king or vermin-destroyer are objects of equal interest to + science (compare Parmen.). There are other passages which show that the + irony of Socrates was a lesson which Plato was not slow in learning—as, + for example, the passing remark, that 'the kings and statesmen of our day + are in their breeding and education very like their subjects;' or the + anticipation that the rivals of the king will be found in the class of + servants; or the imposing attitude of the priests, who are the established + interpreters of the will of heaven, authorized by law. Nothing is more + bitter in all his writings than his comparison of the contemporary + politicians to lions, centaurs, satyrs, and other animals of a feebler + sort, who are ever changing their forms and natures. But, as in the later + dialogues generally, the play of humour and the charm of poetry have + departed, never to return. + </p> + <p> + Still the Politicus contains a higher and more ideal conception of + politics than any other of Plato's writings. The city of which there is a + pattern in heaven (Republic), is here described as a Paradisiacal state of + human society. In the truest sense of all, the ruler is not man but God; + and such a government existed in a former cycle of human history, and may + again exist when the gods resume their care of mankind. In a secondary + sense, the true form of government is that which has scientific rulers, + who are irresponsible to their subjects. Not power but knowledge is the + characteristic of a king or royal person. And the rule of a man is better + and higher than law, because he is more able to deal with the infinite + complexity of human affairs. But mankind, in despair of finding a true + ruler, are willing to acquiesce in any law or custom which will save them + from the caprice of individuals. They are ready to accept any of the six + forms of government which prevail in the world. To the Greek, nomos was a + sacred word, but the political idealism of Plato soars into a region + beyond; for the laws he would substitute the intelligent will of the + legislator. Education is originally to implant in men's minds a sense of + truth and justice, which is the divine bond of states, and the legislator + is to contrive human bonds, by which dissimilar natures may be united in + marriage and supply the deficiencies of one another. As in the Republic, + the government of philosophers, the causes of the perversion of states, + the regulation of marriages, are still the political problems with which + Plato's mind is occupied. He treats them more slightly, partly because the + dialogue is shorter, and also because the discussion of them is + perpetually crossed by the other interest of dialectic, which has begun to + absorb him. + </p> + <p> + The plan of the Politicus or Statesman may be briefly sketched as follows: + (1) By a process of division and subdivision we discover the true herdsman + or king of men. But before we can rightly distinguish him from his rivals, + we must view him, (2) as he is presented to us in a famous ancient tale: + the tale will also enable us to distinguish the divine from the human + herdsman or shepherd: (3) and besides our fable, we must have an example; + for our example we will select the art of weaving, which will have to be + distinguished from the kindred arts; and then, following this pattern, we + will separate the king from his subordinates or competitors. (4) But are + we not exceeding all due limits; and is there not a measure of all arts + and sciences, to which the art of discourse must conform? There is; but + before we can apply this measure, we must know what is the aim of + discourse: and our discourse only aims at the dialectical improvement of + ourselves and others.—Having made our apology, we return once more + to the king or statesman, and proceed to contrast him with pretenders in + the same line with him, under their various forms of government. (5) His + characteristic is, that he alone has science, which is superior to law and + written enactments; these do but spring out of the necessities of mankind, + when they are in despair of finding the true king. (6) The sciences which + are most akin to the royal are the sciences of the general, the judge, the + orator, which minister to him, but even these are subordinate to him. (7) + Fixed principles are implanted by education, and the king or statesman + completes the political web by marrying together dissimilar natures, the + courageous and the temperate, the bold and the gentle, who are the warp + and the woof of society. + </p> + <p> + The outline may be filled up as follows:— + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I have reason to thank you, Theodorus, for the acquaintance of + Theaetetus and the Stranger. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: And you will have three times as much reason to thank me when + they have delineated the Statesman and Philosopher, as well as the + Sophist. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Does the great geometrician apply the same measure to all three? + Are they not divided by an interval which no geometrical ratio can + express? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: By the god Ammon, Socrates, you are right; and I am glad to see + that you have not forgotten your geometry. But before I retaliate on you, + I must request the Stranger to finish the argument... + </p> + <p> + The Stranger suggests that Theaetetus shall be allowed to rest, and that + Socrates the younger shall respond in his place; Theodorus agrees to the + suggestion, and Socrates remarks that the name of the one and the face of + the other give him a right to claim relationship with both of them. They + propose to take the Statesman after the Sophist; his path they must + determine, and part off all other ways, stamping upon them a single + negative form (compare Soph.). + </p> + <p> + The Stranger begins the enquiry by making a division of the arts and + sciences into theoretical and practical—the one kind concerned with + knowledge exclusively, and the other with action; arithmetic and the + mathematical sciences are examples of the former, and carpentering and + handicraft arts of the latter (compare Philebus). Under which of the two + shall we place the Statesman? Or rather, shall we not first ask, whether + the king, statesman, master, householder, practise one art or many? As the + adviser of a physician may be said to have medical science and to be a + physician, so the adviser of a king has royal science and is a king. And + the master of a large household may be compared to the ruler of a small + state. Hence we conclude that the science of the king, statesman, and + householder is one and the same. And this science is akin to knowledge + rather than to action. For a king rules with his mind, and not with his + hands. + </p> + <p> + But theoretical science may be a science either of judging, like + arithmetic, or of ruling and superintending, like that of the architect or + master-builder. And the science of the king is of the latter nature; but + the power which he exercises is underived and uncontrolled,—a + characteristic which distinguishes him from heralds, prophets, and other + inferior officers. He is the wholesale dealer in command, and the herald, + or other officer, retails his commands to others. Again, a ruler is + concerned with the production of some object, and objects may be divided + into living and lifeless, and rulers into the rulers of living and + lifeless objects. And the king is not like the master-builder, concerned + with lifeless matter, but has the task of managing living animals. And the + tending of living animals may be either a tending of individuals, or a + managing of herds. And the Statesman is not a groom, but a herdsman, and + his art may be called either the art of managing a herd, or the art of + collective management:—Which do you prefer? 'No matter.' Very good, + Socrates, and if you are not too particular about words you will be all + the richer some day in true wisdom. But how would you subdivide the + herdsman's art? 'I should say, that there is one management of men, and + another of beasts.' Very good, but you are in too great a hurry to get to + man. All divisions which are rightly made should cut through the middle; + if you attend to this rule, you will be more likely to arrive at classes. + 'I do not understand the nature of my mistake.' Your division was like a + division of the human race into Hellenes and Barbarians, or into Lydians + or Phrygians and all other nations, instead of into male and female; or + like a division of number into ten thousand and all other numbers, instead + of into odd and even. And I should like you to observe further, that + though I maintain a class to be a part, there is no similar necessity for + a part to be a class. But to return to your division, you spoke of men and + other animals as two classes—the second of which you comprehended + under the general name of beasts. This is the sort of division which an + intelligent crane would make: he would put cranes into a class by + themselves for their special glory, and jumble together all others, + including man, in the class of beasts. An error of this kind can only be + avoided by a more regular subdivision. Just now we divided the whole class + of animals into gregarious and non-gregarious, omitting the previous + division into tame and wild. We forgot this in our hurry to arrive at man, + and found by experience, as the proverb says, that 'the more haste the + worse speed.' + </p> + <p> + And now let us begin again at the art of managing herds. You have probably + heard of the fish-preserves in the Nile and in the ponds of the Great + King, and of the nurseries of geese and cranes in Thessaly. These suggest + a new division into the rearing or management of land-herds and of + water-herds:—I need not say with which the king is concerned. And + land-herds may be divided into walking and flying; and every idiot knows + that the political animal is a pedestrian. At this point we may take a + longer or a shorter road, and as we are already near the end, I see no + harm in taking the longer, which is the way of mesotomy, and accords with + the principle which we were laying down. The tame, walking, herding + animal, may be divided into two classes—the horned and the hornless, + and the king is concerned with the hornless; and these again may be + subdivided into animals having or not having cloven feet, or mixing or not + mixing the breed; and the king or statesman has the care of animals which + have not cloven feet, and which do not mix the breed. And now, if we omit + dogs, who can hardly be said to herd, I think that we have only two + species left which remain undivided: and how are we to distinguish them? + To geometricians, like you and Theaetetus, I can have no difficulty in + explaining that man is a diameter, having a power of two feet; and the + power of four-legged creatures, being the double of two feet, is the + diameter of our diameter. There is another excellent jest which I spy in + the two remaining species. Men and birds are both bipeds, and human beings + are running a race with the airiest and freest of creation, in which they + are far behind their competitors;—this is a great joke, and there is + a still better in the juxtaposition of the bird-taker and the king, who + may be seen scampering after them. For, as we remarked in discussing the + Sophist, the dialectical method is no respecter of persons. But we might + have proceeded, as I was saying, by another and a shorter road. In that + case we should have begun by dividing land animals into bipeds and + quadrupeds, and bipeds into winged and wingless; we should than have taken + the Statesman and set him over the 'bipes implume,' and put the reins of + government into his hands. + </p> + <p> + Here let us sum up:—The science of pure knowledge had a part which + was the science of command, and this had a part which was a science of + wholesale command; and this was divided into the management of animals, + and was again parted off into the management of herds of animals, and + again of land animals, and these into hornless, and these into bipeds; and + so at last we arrived at man, and found the political and royal science. + And yet we have not clearly distinguished the political shepherd from his + rivals. No one would think of usurping the prerogatives of the ordinary + shepherd, who on all hands is admitted to be the trainer, matchmaker, + doctor, musician of his flock. But the royal shepherd has numberless + competitors, from whom he must be distinguished; there are merchants, + husbandmen, physicians, who will all dispute his right to manage the + flock. I think that we can best distinguish him by having recourse to a + famous old tradition, which may amuse as well as instruct us; the + narrative is perfectly true, although the scepticism of mankind is prone + to doubt the tales of old. You have heard what happened in the quarrel of + Atreus and Thyestes? 'You mean about the golden lamb?' No, not that; but + another part of the story, which tells how the sun and stars once arose in + the west and set in the east, and that the god reversed their motion, as a + witness to the right of Atreus. 'There is such a story.' And no doubt you + have heard of the empire of Cronos, and of the earthborn men? The origin + of these and the like stories is to be found in the tale which I am about + to narrate. + </p> + <p> + There was a time when God directed the revolutions of the world, but at + the completion of a certain cycle he let go; and the world, by a necessity + of its nature, turned back, and went round the other way. For divine + things alone are unchangeable; but the earth and heavens, although endowed + with many glories, have a body, and are therefore liable to perturbation. + In the case of the world, the perturbation is very slight, and amounts + only to a reversal of motion. For the lord of moving things is alone + self-moved; neither can piety allow that he goes at one time in one + direction and at another time in another; or that God has given the + universe opposite motions; or that there are two gods, one turning it in + one direction, another in another. But the truth is, that there are two + cycles of the world, and in one of them it is governed by an immediate + Providence, and receives life and immortality, and in the other is let go + again, and has a reverse action during infinite ages. This new action is + spontaneous, and is due to exquisite perfection of balance, to the vast + size of the universe, and to the smallness of the pivot upon which it + turns. All changes in the heaven affect the animal world, and this being + the greatest of them, is most destructive to men and animals. At the + beginning of the cycle before our own very few of them had survived; and + on these a mighty change passed. For their life was reversed like the + motion of the world, and first of all coming to a stand then quickly + returned to youth and beauty. The white locks of the aged became black; + the cheeks of the bearded man were restored to their youth and fineness; + the young men grew softer and smaller, and, being reduced to the condition + of children in mind as well as body, began to vanish away; and the bodies + of those who had died by violence, in a few moments underwent a parallel + change and disappeared. In that cycle of existence there was no such thing + as the procreation of animals from one another, but they were born of the + earth, and of this our ancestors, who came into being immediately after + the end of the last cycle and at the beginning of this, have preserved the + recollection. Such traditions are often now unduly discredited, and yet + they may be proved by internal evidence. For observe how consistent the + narrative is; as the old returned to youth, so the dead returned to life; + the wheel of their existence having been reversed, they rose again from + the earth: a few only were reserved by God for another destiny. Such was + the origin of the earthborn men. + </p> + <p> + 'And is this cycle, of which you are speaking, the reign of Cronos, or our + present state of existence?' No, Socrates, that blessed and spontaneous + life belongs not to this, but to the previous state, in which God was the + governor of the whole world, and other gods subject to him ruled over + parts of the world, as is still the case in certain places. They were + shepherds of men and animals, each of them sufficing for those of whom he + had the care. And there was no violence among them, or war, or devouring + of one another. Their life was spontaneous, because in those days God + ruled over man; and he was to man what man is now to the animals. Under + his government there were no estates, or private possessions, or families; + but the earth produced a sufficiency of all things, and men were born out + of the earth, having no traditions of the past; and as the temperature of + the seasons was mild, they took no thought for raiment, and had no beds, + but lived and dwelt in the open air. + </p> + <p> + Such was the age of Cronos, and the age of Zeus is our own. Tell me, which + is the happier of the two? Or rather, shall I tell you that the happiness + of these children of Cronos must have depended on how they used their + time? If having boundless leisure, and the power of discoursing not only + with one another but with the animals, they had employed these advantages + with a view to philosophy, gathering from every nature some addition to + their store of knowledge;—or again, if they had merely eaten and + drunk, and told stories to one another, and to the beasts;—in either + case, I say, there would be no difficulty in answering the question. But + as nobody knows which they did, the question must remain unanswered. And + here is the point of my tale. In the fulness of time, when the earthborn + men had all passed away, the ruler of the universe let go the helm, and + became a spectator; and destiny and natural impulse swayed the world. At + the same instant all the inferior deities gave up their hold; the whole + universe rebounded, and there was a great earthquake, and utter ruin of + all manner of animals. After a while the tumult ceased, and the universal + creature settled down in his accustomed course, having authority over all + other creatures, and following the instructions of his God and Father, at + first more precisely, afterwards with less exactness. The reason of the + falling off was the disengagement of a former chaos; 'a muddy vesture of + decay' was a part of his original nature, out of which he was brought by + his Creator, under whose immediate guidance, while he remained in that + former cycle, the evil was minimized and the good increased to the utmost. + And in the beginning of the new cycle all was well enough, but as time + went on, discord entered in; at length the good was minimized and the evil + everywhere diffused, and there was a danger of universal ruin. Then the + Creator, seeing the world in great straits, and fearing that chaos and + infinity would come again, in his tender care again placed himself at the + helm and restored order, and made the world immortal and imperishable. + Once more the cycle of life and generation was reversed; the infants grew + into young men, and the young men became greyheaded; no longer did the + animals spring out of the earth; as the whole world was now lord of its + own progress, so the parts were to be self-created and self-nourished. At + first the case of men was very helpless and pitiable; for they were alone + among the wild beasts, and had to carry on the struggle for existence + without arts or knowledge, and had no food, and did not know how to get + any. That was the time when Prometheus brought them fire, Hephaestus and + Athene taught them arts, and other gods gave them seeds and plants. Out of + these human life was framed; for mankind were left to themselves, and + ordered their own ways, living, like the universe, in one cycle after one + manner, and in another cycle after another manner. + </p> + <p> + Enough of the myth, which may show us two errors of which we were guilty + in our account of the king. The first and grand error was in choosing for + our king a god, who belongs to the other cycle, instead of a man from our + own; there was a lesser error also in our failure to define the nature of + the royal functions. The myth gave us only the image of a divine shepherd, + whereas the statesmen and kings of our own day very much resemble their + subjects in education and breeding. On retracing our steps we find that we + gave too narrow a designation to the art which was concerned with + command-for-self over living creatures, when we called it the 'feeding' of + animals in flocks. This would apply to all shepherds, with the exception + of the Statesman; but if we say 'managing' or 'tending' animals, the term + would include him as well. Having remodelled the name, we may subdivide as + before, first separating the human from the divine shepherd or manager. + Then we may subdivide the human art of governing into the government of + willing and unwilling subjects—royalty and tyranny—which are + the extreme opposites of one another, although we in our simplicity have + hitherto confounded them. + </p> + <p> + And yet the figure of the king is still defective. We have taken up a lump + of fable, and have used more than we needed. Like statuaries, we have made + some of the features out of proportion, and shall lose time in reducing + them. Or our mythus may be compared to a picture, which is well drawn in + outline, but is not yet enlivened by colour. And to intelligent persons + language is, or ought to be, a better instrument of description than any + picture. 'But what, Stranger, is the deficiency of which you speak?' No + higher truth can be made clear without an example; every man seems to know + all things in a dream, and to know nothing when he is awake. And the + nature of example can only be illustrated by an example. Children are + taught to read by being made to compare cases in which they do not know a + certain letter with cases in which they know it, until they learn to + recognize it in all its combinations. Example comes into use when we + identify something unknown with that which is known, and form a common + notion of both of them. Like the child who is learning his letters, the + soul recognizes some of the first elements of things; and then again is at + fault and unable to recognize them when they are translated into the + difficult language of facts. Let us, then, take an example, which will + illustrate the nature of example, and will also assist us in + characterizing the political science, and in separating the true king from + his rivals. + </p> + <p> + I will select the example of weaving, or, more precisely, weaving of wool. + In the first place, all possessions are either productive or preventive; + of the preventive sort are spells and antidotes, divine and human, and + also defences, and defences are either arms or screens, and screens are + veils and also shields against heat and cold, and shields against heat and + cold are shelters and coverings, and coverings are blankets or garments, + and garments are in one piece or have many parts; and of these latter, + some are stitched and others are fastened, and of these again some are + made of fibres of plants and some of hair, and of these some are cemented + with water and earth, and some are fastened with their own material; the + latter are called clothes, and are made by the art of clothing, from which + the art of weaving differs only in name, as the political differs from the + royal science. Thus we have drawn several distinctions, but as yet have + not distinguished the weaving of garments from the kindred and + co-operative arts. For the first process to which the material is + subjected is the opposite of weaving—I mean carding. And the art of + carding, and the whole art of the fuller and the mender, are concerned + with the treatment and production of clothes, as well as the art of + weaving. Again, there are the arts which make the weaver's tools. And if + we say that the weaver's art is the greatest and noblest of those which + have to do with woollen garments,—this, although true, is not + sufficiently distinct; because these other arts require to be first + cleared away. Let us proceed, then, by regular steps:—There are + causal or principal, and co-operative or subordinate arts. To the causal + class belong the arts of washing and mending, of carding and spinning the + threads, and the other arts of working in wool; these are chiefly of two + kinds, falling under the two great categories of composition and division. + Carding is of the latter sort. But our concern is chiefly with that part + of the art of wool-working which composes, and of which one kind twists + and the other interlaces the threads, whether the firmer texture of the + warp or the looser texture of the woof. These are adapted to each other, + and the orderly composition of them forms a woollen garment. And the art + which presides over these operations is the art of weaving. + </p> + <p> + But why did we go through this circuitous process, instead of saying at + once that weaving is the art of entwining the warp and the woof? In order + that our labour may not seem to be lost, I must explain the whole nature + of excess and defect. There are two arts of measuring—one is + concerned with relative size, and the other has reference to a mean or + standard of what is meet. The difference between good and evil is the + difference between a mean or measure and excess or defect. All things + require to be compared, not only with one another, but with the mean, + without which there would be no beauty and no art, whether the art of the + statesman or the art of weaving or any other; for all the arts guard + against excess or defect, which are real evils. This we must endeavour to + show, if the arts are to exist; and the proof of this will be a harder + piece of work than the demonstration of the existence of not-being which + we proved in our discussion about the Sophist. At present I am content + with the indirect proof that the existence of such a standard is necessary + to the existence of the arts. The standard or measure, which we are now + only applying to the arts, may be some day required with a view to the + demonstration of absolute truth. + </p> + <p> + We may now divide this art of measurement into two parts; placing in the + one part all the arts which measure the relative size or number of + objects, and in the other all those which depend upon a mean or standard. + Many accomplished men say that the art of measurement has to do with all + things, but these persons, although in this notion of theirs they may very + likely be right, are apt to fail in seeing the differences of classes—they + jumble together in one the 'more' and the 'too much,' which are very + different things. Whereas the right way is to find the differences of + classes, and to comprehend the things which have any affinity under the + same class. + </p> + <p> + I will make one more observation by the way. When a pupil at a school is + asked the letters which make up a particular word, is he not asked with a + view to his knowing the same letters in all words? And our enquiry about + the Statesman in like manner is intended not only to improve our knowledge + of politics, but our reasoning powers generally. Still less would any one + analyze the nature of weaving for its own sake. There is no difficulty in + exhibiting sensible images, but the greatest and noblest truths have no + outward form adapted to the eye of sense, and are only revealed in + thought. And all that we are now saying is said for the sake of them. I + make these remarks, because I want you to get rid of any impression that + our discussion about weaving and about the reversal of the universe, and + the other discussion about the Sophist and not-being, were tedious and + irrelevant. Please to observe that they can only be fairly judged when + compared with what is meet; and yet not with what is meet for producing + pleasure, nor even meet for making discoveries, but for the great end of + developing the dialectical method and sharpening the wits of the auditors. + He who censures us, should prove that, if our words had been fewer, they + would have been better calculated to make men dialecticians. + </p> + <p> + And now let us return to our king or statesman, and transfer to him the + example of weaving. The royal art has been separated from that of other + herdsmen, but not from the causal and co-operative arts which exist in + states; these do not admit of dichotomy, and therefore they must be carved + neatly, like the limbs of a victim, not into more parts than are + necessary. And first (1) we have the large class of instruments, which + includes almost everything in the world; from these may be parted off (2) + vessels which are framed for the preservation of things, moist or dry, + prepared in the fire or out of the fire. The royal or political art has + nothing to do with either of these, any more than with the arts of making + (3) vehicles, or (4) defences, whether dresses, or arms, or walls, or (5) + with the art of making ornaments, whether pictures or other playthings, as + they may be fitly called, for they have no serious use. Then (6) there are + the arts which furnish gold, silver, wood, bark, and other materials, + which should have been put first; these, again, have no concern with the + kingly science; any more than the arts (7) which provide food and + nourishment for the human body, and which furnish occupation to the + husbandman, huntsman, doctor, cook, and the like, but not to the king or + statesman. Further, there are small things, such as coins, seals, stamps, + which may with a little violence be comprehended in one of the + above-mentioned classes. Thus they will embrace every species of property + with the exception of animals,—but these have been already included + in the art of tending herds. There remains only the class of slaves or + ministers, among whom I expect that the real rivals of the king will be + discovered. I am not speaking of the veritable slave bought with money, + nor of the hireling who lets himself out for service, nor of the trader or + merchant, who at best can only lay claim to economical and not to royal + science. Nor am I referring to government officials, such as heralds and + scribes, for these are only the servants of the rulers, and not the rulers + themselves. I admit that there may be something strange in any servants + pretending to be masters, but I hardly think that I could have been wrong + in supposing that the principal claimants to the throne will be of this + class. Let us try once more: There are diviners and priests, who are full + of pride and prerogative; these, as the law declares, know how to give + acceptable gifts to the gods, and in many parts of Hellas the duty of + performing solemn sacrifices is assigned to the chief magistrate, as at + Athens to the King Archon. At last, then, we have found a trace of those + whom we were seeking. But still they are only servants and ministers. + </p> + <p> + And who are these who next come into view in various forms of men and + animals and other monsters appearing—lions and centaurs and satyrs—who + are these? I did not know them at first, for every one looks strange when + he is unexpected. But now I recognize the politician and his troop, the + chief of Sophists, the prince of charlatans, the most accomplished of + wizards, who must be carefully distinguished from the true king or + statesman. And here I will interpose a question: What are the true forms + of government? Are they not three—monarchy, oligarchy, and + democracy? and the distinctions of freedom and compulsion, law and no law, + poverty and riches expand these three into six. Monarchy may be divided + into royalty and tyranny; oligarchy into aristocracy and plutocracy; and + democracy may observe the law or may not observe it. But are any of these + governments worthy of the name? Is not government a science, and are we to + suppose that scientific government is secured by the rulers being many or + few, rich or poor, or by the rule being compulsory or voluntary? Can the + many attain to science? In no Hellenic city are there fifty good draught + players, and certainly there are not as many kings, for by kings we mean + all those who are possessed of the political science. A true government + must therefore be the government of one, or of a few. And they may govern + us either with or without law, and whether they are poor or rich, and + however they govern, provided they govern on some scientific principle,—it + makes no difference. And as the physician may cure us with our will, or + against our will, and by any mode of treatment, burning, bleeding, + lowering, fattening, if he only proceeds scientifically: so the true + governor may reduce or fatten or bleed the body corporate, while he acts + according to the rules of his art, and with a view to the good of the + state, whether according to law or without law. + </p> + <p> + 'I do not like the notion, that there can be good government without law.' + </p> + <p> + I must explain: Law-making certainly is the business of a king; and yet + the best thing of all is, not that the law should rule, but that the king + should rule, for the varieties of circumstances are endless, and no simple + or universal rule can suit them all, or last for ever. The law is just an + ignorant brute of a tyrant, who insists always on his commands being + fulfilled under all circumstances. 'Then why have we laws at all?' I will + answer that question by asking you whether the training master gives a + different discipline to each of his pupils, or whether he has a general + rule of diet and exercise which is suited to the constitutions of the + majority? 'The latter.' The legislator, too, is obliged to lay down + general laws, and cannot enact what is precisely suitable to each + particular case. He cannot be sitting at every man's side all his life, + and prescribe for him the minute particulars of his duty, and therefore he + is compelled to impose on himself and others the restriction of a written + law. Let me suppose now, that a physician or trainer, having left + directions for his patients or pupils, goes into a far country, and comes + back sooner than he intended; owing to some unexpected change in the + weather, the patient or pupil seems to require a different mode of + treatment: Would he persist in his old commands, under the idea that all + others are noxious and heterodox? Viewed in the light of science, would + not the continuance of such regulations be ridiculous? And if the + legislator, or another like him, comes back from a far country, is he to + be prohibited from altering his own laws? The common people say: Let a man + persuade the city first, and then let him impose new laws. But is a + physician only to cure his patients by persuasion, and not by force? Is he + a worse physician who uses a little gentle violence in effecting the cure? + Or shall we say, that the violence is just, if exercised by a rich man, + and unjust, if by a poor man? May not any man, rich or poor, with or + without law, and whether the citizens like or not, do what is for their + good? The pilot saves the lives of the crew, not by laying down rules, but + by making his art a law, and, like him, the true governor has a strength + of art which is superior to the law. This is scientific government, and + all others are imitations only. Yet no great number of persons can attain + to this science. And hence follows an important result. The true political + principle is to assert the inviolability of the law, which, though not the + best thing possible, is best for the imperfect condition of man. + </p> + <p> + I will explain my meaning by an illustration:—Suppose that mankind, + indignant at the rogueries and caprices of physicians and pilots, call + together an assembly, in which all who like may speak, the skilled as well + as the unskilled, and that in their assembly they make decrees for + regulating the practice of navigation and medicine which are to be binding + on these professions for all time. Suppose that they elect annually by + vote or lot those to whom authority in either department is to be + delegated. And let us further imagine, that when the term of their + magistracy has expired, the magistrates appointed by them are summoned + before an ignorant and unprofessional court, and may be condemned and + punished for breaking the regulations. They even go a step further, and + enact, that he who is found enquiring into the truth of navigation and + medicine, and is seeking to be wise above what is written, shall be called + not an artist, but a dreamer, a prating Sophist and a corruptor of youth; + and if he try to persuade others to investigate those sciences in a manner + contrary to the law, he shall be punished with the utmost severity. And + like rules might be extended to any art or science. But what would be the + consequence? + </p> + <p> + 'The arts would utterly perish, and human life, which is bad enough + already, would become intolerable.' + </p> + <p> + But suppose, once more, that we were to appoint some one as the guardian + of the law, who was both ignorant and interested, and who perverted the + law: would not this be a still worse evil than the other? 'Certainly.' For + the laws are based on some experience and wisdom. Hence the wiser course + is, that they should be observed, although this is not the best thing of + all, but only the second best. And whoever, having skill, should try to + improve them, would act in the spirit of the law-giver. But then, as we + have seen, no great number of men, whether poor or rich, can be makers of + laws. And so, the nearest approach to true government is, when men do + nothing contrary to their own written laws and national customs. When the + rich preserve their customs and maintain the law, this is called + aristocracy, or if they neglect the law, oligarchy. When an individual + rules according to law, whether by the help of science or opinion, this is + called monarchy; and when he has royal science he is a king, whether he be + so in fact or not; but when he rules in spite of law, and is blind with + ignorance and passion, he is called a tyrant. These forms of government + exist, because men despair of the true king ever appearing among them; if + he were to appear, they would joyfully hand over to him the reins of + government. But, as there is no natural ruler of the hive, they meet + together and make laws. And do we wonder, when the foundation of politics + is in the letter only, at the miseries of states? Ought we not rather to + admire the strength of the political bond? For cities have endured the + worst of evils time out of mind; many cities have been shipwrecked, and + some are like ships foundering, because their pilots are absolutely + ignorant of the science which they profess. + </p> + <p> + Let us next ask, which of these untrue forms of government is the least + bad, and which of them is the worst? I said at the beginning, that each of + the three forms of government, royalty, aristocracy, and democracy, might + be divided into two, so that the whole number of them, including the best, + will be seven. Under monarchy we have already distinguished royalty and + tyranny; of oligarchy there were two kinds, aristocracy and plutocracy; + and democracy may also be divided, for there is a democracy which + observes, and a democracy which neglects, the laws. The government of one + is the best and the worst—the government of a few is less bad and + less good—the government of the many is the least bad and least good + of them all, being the best of all lawless governments, and the worst of + all lawful ones. But the rulers of all these states, unless they have + knowledge, are maintainers of idols, and themselves idols—wizards, + and also Sophists; for, after many windings, the term 'Sophist' comes home + to them. + </p> + <p> + And now enough of centaurs and satyrs: the play is ended, and they may + quit the political stage. Still there remain some other and better + elements, which adhere to the royal science, and must be drawn off in the + refiner's fire before the gold can become quite pure. The arts of the + general, the judge, and the orator, will have to be separated from the + royal art; when the separation has been made, the nature of the king will + be unalloyed. Now there are inferior sciences, such as music and others; + and there is a superior science, which determines whether music is to be + learnt or not, and this is different from them, and the governor of them. + The science which determines whether we are to use persuasion, or not, is + higher than the art of persuasion; the science which determines whether we + are to go to war, is higher than the art of the general. The science which + makes the laws, is higher than that which only administers them. And the + science which has this authority over the rest, is the science of the king + or statesman. + </p> + <p> + Once more we will endeavour to view this royal science by the light of our + example. We may compare the state to a web, and I will show you how the + different threads are drawn into one. You would admit—would you not?—that + there are parts of virtue (although this position is sometimes assailed by + Eristics), and one part of virtue is temperance, and another courage. + These are two principles which are in a manner antagonistic to one + another; and they pervade all nature; the whole class of the good and + beautiful is included under them. The beautiful may be subdivided into two + lesser classes: one of these is described by us in terms expressive of + motion or energy, and the other in terms expressive of rest and quietness. + We say, how manly! how vigorous! how ready! and we say also, how calm! how + temperate! how dignified! This opposition of terms is extended by us to + all actions, to the tones of the voice, the notes of music, the workings + of the mind, the characters of men. The two classes both have their + exaggerations; and the exaggerations of the one are termed 'hardness,' + 'violence,' 'madness;' of the other 'cowardliness,' or 'sluggishness.' And + if we pursue the enquiry, we find that these opposite characters are + naturally at variance, and can hardly be reconciled. In lesser matters the + antagonism between them is ludicrous, but in the State may be the occasion + of grave disorders, and may disturb the whole course of human life. For + the orderly class are always wanting to be at peace, and hence they pass + imperceptibly into the condition of slaves; and the courageous sort are + always wanting to go to war, even when the odds are against them, and are + soon destroyed by their enemies. But the true art of government, first + preparing the material by education, weaves the two elements into one, + maintaining authority over the carders of the wool, and selecting the + proper subsidiary arts which are necessary for making the web. The royal + science is queen of educators, and begins by choosing the natures which + she is to train, punishing with death and exterminating those who are + violently carried away to atheism and injustice, and enslaving those who + are wallowing in the mire of ignorance. The rest of the citizens she + blends into one, combining the stronger element of courage, which we may + call the warp, with the softer element of temperance, which we may imagine + to be the woof. These she binds together, first taking the eternal + elements of the honourable, the good, and the just, and fastening them + with a divine cord in a heaven-born nature, and then fastening the animal + elements with a human cord. The good legislator can implant by education + the higher principles; and where they exist there is no difficulty in + inserting the lesser human bonds, by which the State is held together; + these are the laws of intermarriage, and of union for the sake of + offspring. Most persons in their marriages seek after wealth or power; or + they are clannish, and choose those who are like themselves,—the + temperate marrying the temperate, and the courageous the courageous. The + two classes thrive and flourish at first, but they soon degenerate; the + one become mad, and the other feeble and useless. This would not have been + the case, if they had both originally held the same notions about the + honourable and the good; for then they never would have allowed the + temperate natures to be separated from the courageous, but they would have + bound them together by common honours and reputations, by intermarriages, + and by the choice of rulers who combine both qualities. The temperate are + careful and just, but are wanting in the power of action; the courageous + fall short of them in justice, but in action are superior to them: and no + state can prosper in which either of these qualities is wanting. The + noblest and best of all webs or states is that which the royal science + weaves, combining the two sorts of natures in a single texture, and in + this enfolding freeman and slave and every other social element, and + presiding over them all. + </p> + <p> + 'Your picture, Stranger, of the king and statesman, no less than of the + Sophist, is quite perfect.' + </p> + <p> + ... + </p> + <p> + The principal subjects in the Statesman may be conveniently embraced under + six or seven heads:—(1) the myth; (2) the dialectical interest; (3) + the political aspects of the dialogue; (4) the satirical and paradoxical + vein; (5) the necessary imperfection of law; (6) the relation of the work + to the other writings of Plato; lastly (7), we may briefly consider the + genuineness of the Sophist and Statesman, which can hardly be assumed + without proof, since the two dialogues have been questioned by three such + eminent Platonic scholars as Socher, Schaarschmidt, and Ueberweg. + </p> + <p> + I. The hand of the master is clearly visible in the myth. First in the + connection with mythology;—he wins a kind of verisimilitude for this + as for his other myths, by adopting received traditions, of which he + pretends to find an explanation in his own larger conception (compare + Introduction to Critias). The young Socrates has heard of the sun rising + in the west and setting in the east, and of the earth-born men; but he has + never heard the origin of these remarkable phenomena. Nor is Plato, here + or elsewhere, wanting in denunciations of the incredulity of 'this latter + age,' on which the lovers of the marvellous have always delighted to + enlarge. And he is not without express testimony to the truth of his + narrative;—such testimony as, in the Timaeus, the first men gave of + the names of the gods ('They must surely have known their own ancestors'). + For the first generation of the new cycle, who lived near the time, are + supposed to have preserved a recollection of a previous one. He also + appeals to internal evidence, viz. the perfect coherence of the tale, + though he is very well aware, as he says in the Cratylus, that there may + be consistency in error as well as in truth. The gravity and minuteness + with which some particulars are related also lend an artful aid. The + profound interest and ready assent of the young Socrates, who is not too + old to be amused 'with a tale which a child would love to hear,' are a + further assistance. To those who were naturally inclined to believe that + the fortunes of mankind are influenced by the stars, or who maintained + that some one principle, like the principle of the Same and the Other in + the Timaeus, pervades all things in the world, the reversal of the motion + of the heavens seemed necessarily to produce a reversal of the order of + human life. The spheres of knowledge, which to us appear wide asunder as + the poles, astronomy and medicine, were naturally connected in the minds + of early thinkers, because there was little or nothing in the space + between them. Thus there is a basis of philosophy, on which the + improbabilities of the tale may be said to rest. These are some of the + devices by which Plato, like a modern novelist, seeks to familiarize the + marvellous. + </p> + <p> + The myth, like that of the Timaeus and Critias, is rather historical than + poetical, in this respect corresponding to the general change in the later + writings of Plato, when compared with the earlier ones. It is hardly a + myth in the sense in which the term might be applied to the myth of the + Phaedrus, the Republic, the Phaedo, or the Gorgias, but may be more aptly + compared with the didactic tale in which Protagoras describes the fortunes + of primitive man, or with the description of the gradual rise of a new + society in the Third Book of the Laws. Some discrepancies may be observed + between the mythology of the Statesman and the Timaeus, and between the + Timaeus and the Republic. But there is no reason to expect that all + Plato's visions of a former, any more than of a future, state of + existence, should conform exactly to the same pattern. We do not find + perfect consistency in his philosophy; and still less have we any right to + demand this of him in his use of mythology and figures of speech. And we + observe that while employing all the resources of a writer of fiction to + give credibility to his tales, he is not disposed to insist upon their + literal truth. Rather, as in the Phaedo, he says, 'Something of the kind + is true;' or, as in the Gorgias, 'This you will think to be an old wife's + tale, but you can think of nothing truer;' or, as in the Statesman, he + describes his work as a 'mass of mythology,' which was introduced in order + to teach certain lessons; or, as in the Phaedrus, he secretly laughs at + such stories while refusing to disturb the popular belief in them. + </p> + <p> + The greater interest of the myth consists in the philosophical lessons + which Plato presents to us in this veiled form. Here, as in the tale of + Er, the son of Armenius, he touches upon the question of freedom and + necessity, both in relation to God and nature. For at first the universe + is governed by the immediate providence of God,—this is the golden + age,—but after a while the wheel is reversed, and man is left to + himself. Like other theologians and philosophers, Plato relegates his + explanation of the problem to a transcendental world; he speaks of what in + modern language might be termed 'impossibilities in the nature of things,' + hindering God from continuing immanent in the world. But there is some + inconsistency; for the 'letting go' is spoken of as a divine act, and is + at the same time attributed to the necessary imperfection of matter; there + is also a numerical necessity for the successive births of souls. At + first, man and the world retain their divine instincts, but gradually + degenerate. As in the Book of Genesis, the first fall of man is succeeded + by a second; the misery and wickedness of the world increase continually. + The reason of this further decline is supposed to be the disorganisation + of matter: the latent seeds of a former chaos are disengaged, and envelope + all things. The condition of man becomes more and more miserable; he is + perpetually waging an unequal warfare with the beasts. At length he + obtains such a measure of education and help as is necessary for his + existence. Though deprived of God's help, he is not left wholly destitute; + he has received from Athene and Hephaestus a knowledge of the arts; other + gods give him seeds and plants; and out of these human life is + reconstructed. He now eats bread in the sweat of his brow, and has + dominion over the animals, subjected to the conditions of his nature, and + yet able to cope with them by divine help. Thus Plato may be said to + represent in a figure—(1) the state of innocence; (2) the fall of + man; (3) the still deeper decline into barbarism; (4) the restoration of + man by the partial interference of God, and the natural growth of the arts + and of civilised society. Two lesser features of this description should + not pass unnoticed:—(1) the primitive men are supposed to be created + out of the earth, and not after the ordinary manner of human generation—half + the causes of moral evil are in this way removed; (2) the arts are + attributed to a divine revelation: and so the greatest difficulty in the + history of pre-historic man is solved. Though no one knew better than + Plato that the introduction of the gods is not a reason, but an excuse for + not giving a reason (Cratylus), yet, considering that more than two + thousand years later mankind are still discussing these problems, we may + be satisfied to find in Plato a statement of the difficulties which arise + in conceiving the relation of man to God and nature, without expecting to + obtain from him a solution of them. In such a tale, as in the Phaedrus, + various aspects of the Ideas were doubtless indicated to Plato's own mind, + as the corresponding theological problems are to us. The immanence of + things in the Ideas, or the partial separation of them, and the + self-motion of the supreme Idea, are probably the forms in which he would + have interpreted his own parable. + </p> + <p> + He touches upon another question of great interest—the consciousness + of evil—what in the Jewish Scriptures is called 'eating of the tree + of the knowledge of good and evil.' At the end of the narrative, the + Eleatic asks his companion whether this life of innocence, or that which + men live at present, is the better of the two. He wants to distinguish + between the mere animal life of innocence, the 'city of pigs,' as it is + comically termed by Glaucon in the Republic, and the higher life of reason + and philosophy. But as no one can determine the state of man in the world + before the Fall, 'the question must remain unanswered.' Similar questions + have occupied the minds of theologians in later ages; but they can hardly + be said to have found an answer. Professor Campbell well observes, that + the general spirit of the myth may be summed up in the words of the Lysis: + 'If evil were to perish, should we hunger any more, or thirst any more, or + have any similar sensations? Yet perhaps the question what will or will + not be is a foolish one, for who can tell?' As in the Theaetetus, evil is + supposed to continue,—here, as the consequence of a former state of + the world, a sort of mephitic vapour exhaling from some ancient chaos,—there, + as involved in the possibility of good, and incident to the mixed state of + man. + </p> + <p> + Once more—and this is the point of connexion with the rest of the + dialogue—the myth is intended to bring out the difference between + the ideal and the actual state of man. In all ages of the world men have + dreamed of a state of perfection, which has been, and is to be, but never + is, and seems to disappear under the necessary conditions of human + society. The uselessness, the danger, the true value of such political + ideals have often been discussed; youth is too ready to believe in them; + age to disparage them. Plato's 'prudens quaestio' respecting the + comparative happiness of men in this and in a former cycle of existence is + intended to elicit this contrast between the golden age and 'the life + under Zeus' which is our own. To confuse the divine and human, or hastily + apply one to the other, is a 'tremendous error.' Of the ideal or divine + government of the world we can form no true or adequate conception; and + this our mixed state of life, in which we are partly left to ourselves, + but not wholly deserted by the gods, may contain some higher elements of + good and knowledge than could have existed in the days of innocence under + the rule of Cronos. So we may venture slightly to enlarge a Platonic + thought which admits of a further application to Christian theology. Here + are suggested also the distinctions between God causing and permitting + evil, and between his more and less immediate government of the world. + </p> + <p> + II. The dialectical interest of the Statesman seems to contend in Plato's + mind with the political; the dialogue might have been designated by two + equally descriptive titles—either the 'Statesman,' or 'Concerning + Method.' Dialectic, which in the earlier writings of Plato is a revival of + the Socratic question and answer applied to definition, is now occupied + with classification; there is nothing in which he takes greater delight + than in processes of division (compare Phaedr.); he pursues them to a + length out of proportion to his main subject, and appears to value them as + a dialectical exercise, and for their own sake. A poetical vision of some + order or hierarchy of ideas or sciences has already been floating before + us in the Symposium and the Republic. And in the Phaedrus this aspect of + dialectic is further sketched out, and the art of rhetoric is based on the + division of the characters of mankind into their several classes. The same + love of divisions is apparent in the Gorgias. But in a well-known passage + of the Philebus occurs the first criticism on the nature of + classification. There we are exhorted not to fall into the common error of + passing from unity to infinity, but to find the intermediate classes; and + we are reminded that in any process of generalization, there may be more + than one class to which individuals may be referred, and that we must + carry on the process of division until we have arrived at the infima + species. + </p> + <p> + These precepts are not forgotten, either in the Sophist or in the + Statesman. The Sophist contains four examples of division, carried on by + regular steps, until in four different lines of descent we detect the + Sophist. In the Statesman the king or statesman is discovered by a similar + process; and we have a summary, probably made for the first time, of + possessions appropriated by the labour of man, which are distributed into + seven classes. We are warned against preferring the shorter to the longer + method;—if we divide in the middle, we are most likely to light upon + species; at the same time, the important remark is made, that 'a part is + not to be confounded with a class.' Having discovered the genus under + which the king falls, we proceed to distinguish him from the collateral + species. To assist our imagination in making this separation, we require + an example. The higher ideas, of which we have a dreamy knowledge, can + only be represented by images taken from the external world. But, first of + all, the nature of example is explained by an example. The child is taught + to read by comparing the letters in words which he knows with the same + letters in unknown combinations; and this is the sort of process which we + are about to attempt. As a parallel to the king we select the worker in + wool, and compare the art of weaving with the royal science, trying to + separate either of them from the inferior classes to which they are akin. + This has the incidental advantage, that weaving and the web furnish us + with a figure of speech, which we can afterwards transfer to the State. + </p> + <p> + There are two uses of examples or images—in the first place, they + suggest thoughts—secondly, they give them a distinct form. In the + infancy of philosophy, as in childhood, the language of pictures is + natural to man: truth in the abstract is hardly won, and only by use + familiarized to the mind. Examples are akin to analogies, and have a + reflex influence on thought; they people the vacant mind, and may often + originate new directions of enquiry. Plato seems to be conscious of the + suggestiveness of imagery; the general analogy of the arts is constantly + employed by him as well as the comparison of particular arts—weaving, + the refining of gold, the learning to read, music, statuary, painting, + medicine, the art of the pilot—all of which occur in this dialogue + alone: though he is also aware that 'comparisons are slippery things,' and + may often give a false clearness to ideas. We shall find, in the Philebus, + a division of sciences into practical and speculative, and into more or + less speculative: here we have the idea of master-arts, or sciences which + control inferior ones. Besides the supreme science of dialectic, 'which + will forget us, if we forget her,' another master-science for the first + time appears in view—the science of government, which fixes the + limits of all the rest. This conception of the political or royal science + as, from another point of view, the science of sciences, which holds sway + over the rest, is not originally found in Aristotle, but in Plato. + </p> + <p> + The doctrine that virtue and art are in a mean, which is familiarized to + us by the study of the Nicomachean Ethics, is also first distinctly + asserted in the Statesman of Plato. The too much and the too little are in + restless motion: they must be fixed by a mean, which is also a standard + external to them. The art of measuring or finding a mean between excess + and defect, like the principle of division in the Phaedrus, receives a + particular application to the art of discourse. The excessive length of a + discourse may be blamed; but who can say what is excess, unless he is + furnished with a measure or standard? Measure is the life of the arts, and + may some day be discovered to be the single ultimate principle in which + all the sciences are contained. Other forms of thought may be noted—the + distinction between causal and co-operative arts, which may be compared + with the distinction between primary and co-operative causes in the + Timaeus; or between cause and condition in the Phaedo; the passing mention + of economical science; the opposition of rest and motion, which is found + in all nature; the general conception of two great arts of composition and + division, in which are contained weaving, politics, dialectic; and in + connexion with the conception of a mean, the two arts of measuring. + </p> + <p> + In the Theaetetus, Plato remarks that precision in the use of terms, + though sometimes pedantic, is sometimes necessary. Here he makes the + opposite reflection, that there may be a philosophical disregard of words. + The evil of mere verbal oppositions, the requirement of an impossible + accuracy in the use of terms, the error of supposing that philosophy was + to be found in language, the danger of word-catching, have frequently been + discussed by him in the previous dialogues, but nowhere has the spirit of + modern inductive philosophy been more happily indicated than in the words + of the Statesman:—'If you think more about things, and less about + words, you will be richer in wisdom as you grow older.' A similar spirit + is discernible in the remarkable expressions, 'the long and difficult + language of facts;' and 'the interrogation of every nature, in order to + obtain the particular contribution of each to the store of knowledge.' Who + has described 'the feeble intelligence of all things; given by metaphysics + better than the Eleatic Stranger in the words—'The higher ideas can + hardly be set forth except through the medium of examples; every man seems + to know all things in a kind of dream, and then again nothing when he is + awake?' Or where is the value of metaphysical pursuits more truly + expressed than in the words,—'The greatest and noblest things have + no outward image of themselves visible to man: therefore we should learn + to give a rational account of them?' + </p> + <p> + III. The political aspects of the dialogue are closely connected with the + dialectical. As in the Cratylus, the legislator has 'the dialectician + standing on his right hand;' so in the Statesman, the king or statesman is + the dialectician, who, although he may be in a private station, is still a + king. Whether he has the power or not, is a mere accident; or rather he + has the power, for what ought to be is ('Was ist vernunftig, das ist + wirklich'); and he ought to be and is the true governor of mankind. There + is a reflection in this idealism of the Socratic 'Virtue is knowledge;' + and, without idealism, we may remark that knowledge is a great part of + power. Plato does not trouble himself to construct a machinery by which + 'philosophers shall be made kings,' as in the Republic: he merely holds up + the ideal, and affirms that in some sense science is really supreme over + human life. + </p> + <p> + He is struck by the observation 'quam parva sapientia regitur mundus,' and + is touched with a feeling of the ills which afflict states. The condition + of Megara before and during the Peloponnesian War, of Athens under the + Thirty and afterwards, of Syracuse and the other Sicilian cities in their + alternations of democratic excess and tyranny, might naturally suggest + such reflections. Some states he sees already shipwrecked, others + foundering for want of a pilot; and he wonders not at their destruction, + but at their endurance. For they ought to have perished long ago, if they + had depended on the wisdom of their rulers. The mingled pathos and satire + of this remark is characteristic of Plato's later style. + </p> + <p> + The king is the personification of political science. And yet he is + something more than this,—the perfectly good and wise tyrant of the + Laws, whose will is better than any law. He is the special providence who + is always interfering with and regulating all things. Such a conception + has sometimes been entertained by modern theologians, and by Plato + himself, of the Supreme Being. But whether applied to Divine or to human + governors the conception is faulty for two reasons, neither of which are + noticed by Plato:—first, because all good government supposes a + degree of co-operation in the ruler and his subjects,—an 'education + in politics' as well as in moral virtue; secondly, because government, + whether Divine or human, implies that the subject has a previous knowledge + of the rules under which he is living. There is a fallacy, too, in + comparing unchangeable laws with a personal governor. For the law need not + necessarily be an 'ignorant and brutal tyrant,' but gentle and humane, + capable of being altered in the spirit of the legislator, and of being + administered so as to meet the cases of individuals. Not only in fact, but + in idea, both elements must remain—the fixed law and the living + will; the written word and the spirit; the principles of obligation and of + freedom; and their applications whether made by law or equity in + particular cases. + </p> + <p> + There are two sides from which positive laws may be attacked:—either + from the side of nature, which rises up and rebels against them in the + spirit of Callicles in the Gorgias; or from the side of idealism, which + attempts to soar above them,—and this is the spirit of Plato in the + Statesman. But he soon falls, like Icarus, and is content to walk instead + of flying; that is, to accommodate himself to the actual state of human + things. Mankind have long been in despair of finding the true ruler; and + therefore are ready to acquiesce in any of the five or six received forms + of government as better than none. And the best thing which they can do + (though only the second best in reality), is to reduce the ideal state to + the conditions of actual life. Thus in the Statesman, as in the Laws, we + have three forms of government, which we may venture to term, (1) the + ideal, (2) the practical, (3) the sophistical—what ought to be, what + might be, what is. And thus Plato seems to stumble, almost by accident, on + the notion of a constitutional monarchy, or of a monarchy ruling by laws. + </p> + <p> + The divine foundations of a State are to be laid deep in education + (Republic), and at the same time some little violence may be used in + exterminating natures which are incapable of education (compare Laws). + Plato is strongly of opinion that the legislator, like the physician, may + do men good against their will (compare Gorgias). The human bonds of + states are formed by the inter-marriage of dispositions adapted to supply + the defects of each other. As in the Republic, Plato has observed that + there are opposite natures in the world, the strong and the gentle, the + courageous and the temperate, which, borrowing an expression derived from + the image of weaving, he calls the warp and the woof of human society. To + interlace these is the crowning achievement of political science. In the + Protagoras, Socrates was maintaining that there was only one virtue, and + not many: now Plato is inclined to think that there are not only parallel, + but opposite virtues, and seems to see a similar opposition pervading all + art and nature. But he is satisfied with laying down the principle, and + does not inform us by what further steps the union of opposites is to be + effected. + </p> + <p> + In the loose framework of a single dialogue Plato has thus combined two + distinct subjects—politics and method. Yet they are not so far apart + as they appear: in his own mind there was a secret link of connexion + between them. For the philosopher or dialectician is also the only true + king or statesman. In the execution of his plan Plato has invented or + distinguished several important forms of thought, and made incidentally + many valuable remarks. Questions of interest both in ancient and modern + politics also arise in the course of the dialogue, which may with + advantage be further considered by us:— + </p> + <p> + a. The imaginary ruler, whether God or man, is above the law, and is a law + to himself and to others. Among the Greeks as among the Jews, law was a + sacred name, the gift of God, the bond of states. But in the Statesman of + Plato, as in the New Testament, the word has also become the symbol of an + imperfect good, which is almost an evil. The law sacrifices the individual + to the universal, and is the tyranny of the many over the few (compare + Republic). It has fixed rules which are the props of order, and will not + swerve or bend in extreme cases. It is the beginning of political society, + but there is something higher—an intelligent ruler, whether God or + man, who is able to adapt himself to the endless varieties of + circumstances. Plato is fond of picturing the advantages which would + result from the union of the tyrant who has power with the legislator who + has wisdom: he regards this as the best and speediest way of reforming + mankind. But institutions cannot thus be artificially created, nor can the + external authority of a ruler impose laws for which a nation is + unprepared. The greatest power, the highest wisdom, can only proceed one + or two steps in advance of public opinion. In all stages of civilization + human nature, after all our efforts, remains intractable,—not like + clay in the hands of the potter, or marble under the chisel of the + sculptor. Great changes occur in the history of nations, but they are + brought about slowly, like the changes in the frame of nature, upon which + the puny arm of man hardly makes an impression. And, speaking generally, + the slowest growths, both in nature and in politics, are the most + permanent. + </p> + <p> + b. Whether the best form of the ideal is a person or a law may fairly be + doubted. The former is more akin to us: it clothes itself in poetry and + art, and appeals to reason more in the form of feeling: in the latter + there is less danger of allowing ourselves to be deluded by a figure of + speech. The ideal of the Greek state found an expression in the + deification of law: the ancient Stoic spoke of a wise man perfect in + virtue, who was fancifully said to be a king; but neither they nor Plato + had arrived at the conception of a person who was also a law. Nor is it + easy for the Christian to think of God as wisdom, truth, holiness, and + also as the wise, true, and holy one. He is always wanting to break + through the abstraction and interrupt the law, in order that he may + present to himself the more familiar image of a divine friend. While the + impersonal has too slender a hold upon the affections to be made the basis + of religion, the conception of a person on the other hand tends to + degenerate into a new kind of idolatry. Neither criticism nor experience + allows us to suppose that there are interferences with the laws of nature; + the idea is inconceivable to us and at variance with facts. The + philosopher or theologian who could realize to mankind that a person is a + law, that the higher rule has no exception, that goodness, like knowledge, + is also power, would breathe a new religious life into the world. + </p> + <p> + c. Besides the imaginary rule of a philosopher or a God, the actual forms + of government have to be considered. In the infancy of political science, + men naturally ask whether the rule of the many or of the few is to be + preferred. If by 'the few' we mean 'the good' and by 'the many,' 'the + bad,' there can be but one reply: 'The rule of one good man is better than + the rule of all the rest, if they are bad.' For, as Heracleitus says, 'One + is ten thousand if he be the best.' If, however, we mean by the rule of + the few the rule of a class neither better nor worse than other classes, + not devoid of a feeling of right, but guided mostly by a sense of their + own interests, and by the rule of the many the rule of all classes, + similarly under the influence of mixed motives, no one would hesitate to + answer—'The rule of all rather than one, because all classes are + more likely to take care of all than one of another; and the government + has greater power and stability when resting on a wider basis.' Both in + ancient and modern times the best balanced form of government has been + held to be the best; and yet it should not be so nicely balanced as to + make action and movement impossible. + </p> + <p> + The statesman who builds his hope upon the aristocracy, upon the middle + classes, upon the people, will probably, if he have sufficient experience + of them, conclude that all classes are much alike, and that one is as good + as another, and that the liberties of no class are safe in the hands of + the rest. The higher ranks have the advantage in education and manners, + the middle and lower in industry and self-denial; in every class, to a + certain extent, a natural sense of right prevails, sometimes communicated + from the lower to the higher, sometimes from the higher to the lower, + which is too strong for class interests. There have been crises in the + history of nations, as at the time of the Crusades or the Reformation, or + the French Revolution, when the same inspiration has taken hold of whole + peoples, and permanently raised the sense of freedom and justice among + mankind. + </p> + <p> + But even supposing the different classes of a nation, when viewed + impartially, to be on a level with each other in moral virtue, there + remain two considerations of opposite kinds which enter into the problem + of government. Admitting of course that the upper and lower classes are + equal in the eye of God and of the law, yet the one may be by nature + fitted to govern and the other to be governed. A ruling caste does not + soon altogether lose the governing qualities, nor a subject class easily + acquire them. Hence the phenomenon so often observed in the old Greek + revolutions, and not without parallel in modern times, that the leaders of + the democracy have been themselves of aristocratic origin. The people are + expecting to be governed by representatives of their own, but the true man + of the people either never appears, or is quickly altered by + circumstances. Their real wishes hardly make themselves felt, although + their lower interests and prejudices may sometimes be flattered and + yielded to for the sake of ulterior objects by those who have political + power. They will often learn by experience that the democracy has become a + plutocracy. The influence of wealth, though not the enjoyment of it, has + become diffused among the poor as well as among the rich; and society, + instead of being safer, is more at the mercy of the tyrant, who, when + things are at the worst, obtains a guard—that is, an army—and + announces himself as the saviour. + </p> + <p> + The other consideration is of an opposite kind. Admitting that a few wise + men are likely to be better governors than the unwise many, yet it is not + in their power to fashion an entire people according to their behest. When + with the best intentions the benevolent despot begins his regime, he finds + the world hard to move. A succession of good kings has at the end of a + century left the people an inert and unchanged mass. The Roman world was + not permanently improved by the hundred years of Hadrian and the + Antonines. The kings of Spain during the last century were at least equal + to any contemporary sovereigns in virtue and ability. In certain states of + the world the means are wanting to render a benevolent power effectual. + These means are not a mere external organisation of posts or telegraphs, + hardly the introduction of new laws or modes of industry. A change must be + made in the spirit of a people as well as in their externals. The ancient + legislator did not really take a blank tablet and inscribe upon it the + rules which reflection and experience had taught him to be for a nation's + interest; no one would have obeyed him if he had. But he took the customs + which he found already existing in a half-civilised state of society: + these he reduced to form and inscribed on pillars; he defined what had + before been undefined, and gave certainty to what was uncertain. No + legislation ever sprang, like Athene, in full power out of the head either + of God or man. + </p> + <p> + Plato and Aristotle are sensible of the difficulty of combining the wisdom + of the few with the power of the many. According to Plato, he is a + physician who has the knowledge of a physician, and he is a king who has + the knowledge of a king. But how the king, one or more, is to obtain the + required power, is hardly at all considered by him. He presents the idea + of a perfect government, but except the regulation for mixing different + tempers in marriage, he never makes any provision for the attainment of + it. Aristotle, casting aside ideals, would place the government in a + middle class of citizens, sufficiently numerous for stability, without + admitting the populace; and such appears to have been the constitution + which actually prevailed for a short time at Athens—the rule of the + Five Thousand—characterized by Thucydides as the best government of + Athens which he had known. It may however be doubted how far, either in a + Greek or modern state, such a limitation is practicable or desirable; for + those who are left outside the pale will always be dangerous to those who + are within, while on the other hand the leaven of the mob can hardly + affect the representation of a great country. There is reason for the + argument in favour of a property qualification; there is reason also in + the arguments of those who would include all and so exhaust the political + situation. + </p> + <p> + The true answer to the question is relative to the circumstances of + nations. How can we get the greatest intelligence combined with the + greatest power? The ancient legislator would have found this question more + easy than we do. For he would have required that all persons who had a + share of government should have received their education from the state + and have borne her burdens, and should have served in her fleets and + armies. But though we sometimes hear the cry that we must 'educate the + masses, for they are our masters,' who would listen to a proposal that the + franchise should be confined to the educated or to those who fulfil + political duties? Then again, we know that the masses are not our masters, + and that they are more likely to become so if we educate them. In modern + politics so many interests have to be consulted that we are compelled to + do, not what is best, but what is possible. + </p> + <p> + d. Law is the first principle of society, but it cannot supply all the + wants of society, and may easily cause more evils than it cures. Plato is + aware of the imperfection of law in failing to meet the varieties of + circumstances: he is also aware that human life would be intolerable if + every detail of it were placed under legal regulation. It may be a great + evil that physicians should kill their patients or captains cast away + their ships, but it would be a far greater evil if each particular in the + practice of medicine or seamanship were regulated by law. Much has been + said in modern times about the duty of leaving men to themselves, which is + supposed to be the best way of taking care of them. The question is often + asked, What are the limits of legislation in relation to morals? And the + answer is to the same effect, that morals must take care of themselves. + There is a one-sided truth in these answers, if they are regarded as + condemnations of the interference with commerce in the last century or of + clerical persecution in the Middle Ages. But 'laissez-faire' is not the + best but only the second best. What the best is, Plato does not attempt to + determine; he only contrasts the imperfection of law with the wisdom of + the perfect ruler. + </p> + <p> + Laws should be just, but they must also be certain, and we are obliged to + sacrifice something of their justice to their certainty. Suppose a wise + and good judge, who paying little or no regard to the law, attempted to + decide with perfect justice the cases that were brought before him. To the + uneducated person he would appear to be the ideal of a judge. Such justice + has been often exercised in primitive times, or at the present day among + eastern rulers. But in the first place it depends entirely on the personal + character of the judge. He may be honest, but there is no check upon his + dishonesty, and his opinion can only be overruled, not by any principle of + law, but by the opinion of another judging like himself without law. In + the second place, even if he be ever so honest, his mode of deciding + questions would introduce an element of uncertainty into human life; no + one would know beforehand what would happen to him, or would seek to + conform in his conduct to any rule of law. For the compact which the law + makes with men, that they shall be protected if they observe the law in + their dealings with one another, would have to be substituted another + principle of a more general character, that they shall be protected by the + law if they act rightly in their dealings with one another. The complexity + of human actions and also the uncertainty of their effects would be + increased tenfold. For one of the principal advantages of law is not + merely that it enforces honesty, but that it makes men act in the same + way, and requires them to produce the same evidence of their acts. Too + many laws may be the sign of a corrupt and overcivilized state of society, + too few are the sign of an uncivilized one; as soon as commerce begins to + grow, men make themselves customs which have the validity of laws. Even + equity, which is the exception to the law, conforms to fixed rules and + lies for the most part within the limits of previous decisions. + </p> + <p> + IV. The bitterness of the Statesman is characteristic of Plato's later + style, in which the thoughts of youth and love have fled away, and we are + no longer tended by the Muses or the Graces. We do not venture to say that + Plato was soured by old age, but certainly the kindliness and courtesy of + the earlier dialogues have disappeared. He sees the world under a harder + and grimmer aspect: he is dealing with the reality of things, not with + visions or pictures of them: he is seeking by the aid of dialectic only, + to arrive at truth. He is deeply impressed with the importance of + classification: in this alone he finds the true measure of human things; + and very often in the process of division curious results are obtained. + For the dialectical art is no respecter of persons: king and vermin-taker + are all alike to the philosopher. There may have been a time when the king + was a god, but he now is pretty much on a level with his subjects in + breeding and education. Man should be well advised that he is only one of + the animals, and the Hellene in particular should be aware that he himself + was the author of the distinction between Hellene and Barbarian, and that + the Phrygian would equally divide mankind into Phrygians and Barbarians, + and that some intelligent animal, like a crane, might go a step further, + and divide the animal world into cranes and all other animals. Plato + cannot help laughing (compare Theaet.) when he thinks of the king running + after his subjects, like the pig-driver or the bird-taker. He would + seriously have him consider how many competitors there are to his throne, + chiefly among the class of serving-men. A good deal of meaning is lurking + in the expression—'There is no art of feeding mankind worthy the + name.' There is a similar depth in the remark,—'The wonder about + states is not that they are short-lived, but that they last so long in + spite of the badness of their rulers.' + </p> + <p> + V. There is also a paradoxical element in the Statesman which delights in + reversing the accustomed use of words. The law which to the Greek was the + highest object of reverence is an ignorant and brutal tyrant—the + tyrant is converted into a beneficent king. The sophist too is no longer, + as in the earlier dialogues, the rival of the statesman, but assumes his + form. Plato sees that the ideal of the state in his own day is more and + more severed from the actual. From such ideals as he had once formed, he + turns away to contemplate the decline of the Greek cities which were far + worse now in his old age than they had been in his youth, and were to + become worse and worse in the ages which followed. He cannot contain his + disgust at the contemporary statesmen, sophists who had turned + politicians, in various forms of men and animals, appearing, some like + lions and centaurs, others like satyrs and monkeys. In this new disguise + the Sophists make their last appearance on the scene: in the Laws Plato + appears to have forgotten them, or at any rate makes only a slight + allusion to them in a single passage (Laws). + </p> + <p> + VI. The Statesman is naturally connected with the Sophist. At first sight + we are surprised to find that the Eleatic Stranger discourses to us, not + only concerning the nature of Being and Not-being, but concerning the king + and statesman. We perceive, however, that there is no inappropriateness in + his maintaining the character of chief speaker, when we remember the close + connexion which is assumed by Plato to exist between politics and + dialectic. In both dialogues the Proteus Sophist is exhibited, first, in + the disguise of an Eristic, secondly, of a false statesman. There are + several lesser features which the two dialogues have in common. The styles + and the situations of the speakers are very similar; there is the same + love of division, and in both of them the mind of the writer is greatly + occupied about method, to which he had probably intended to return in the + projected 'Philosopher.' + </p> + <p> + The Statesman stands midway between the Republic and the Laws, and is also + related to the Timaeus. The mythical or cosmical element reminds us of the + Timaeus, the ideal of the Republic. A previous chaos in which the elements + as yet were not, is hinted at both in the Timaeus and Statesman. The same + ingenious arts of giving verisimilitude to a fiction are practised in both + dialogues, and in both, as well as in the myth at the end of the Republic, + Plato touches on the subject of necessity and free-will. The words in + which he describes the miseries of states seem to be an amplification of + the 'Cities will never cease from ill' of the Republic. The point of view + in both is the same; and the differences not really important, e.g. in the + myth, or in the account of the different kinds of states. But the + treatment of the subject in the Statesman is fragmentary, and the shorter + and later work, as might be expected, is less finished, and less worked + out in detail. The idea of measure and the arrangement of the sciences + supply connecting links both with the Republic and the Philebus. + </p> + <p> + More than any of the preceding dialogues, the Statesman seems to + approximate in thought and language to the Laws. There is the same decline + and tendency to monotony in style, the same self-consciousness, + awkwardness, and over-civility; and in the Laws is contained the pattern + of that second best form of government, which, after all, is admitted to + be the only attainable one in this world. The 'gentle violence,' the + marriage of dissimilar natures, the figure of the warp and the woof, are + also found in the Laws. Both expressly recognize the conception of a first + or ideal state, which has receded into an invisible heaven. Nor does the + account of the origin and growth of society really differ in them, if we + make allowance for the mythic character of the narrative in the Statesman. + The virtuous tyrant is common to both of them; and the Eleatic Stranger + takes up a position similar to that of the Athenian Stranger in the Laws. + </p> + <p> + VII. There would have been little disposition to doubt the genuineness of + the Sophist and Statesman, if they had been compared with the Laws rather + than with the Republic, and the Laws had been received, as they ought to + be, on the authority of Aristotle and on the ground of their intrinsic + excellence, as an undoubted work of Plato. The detailed consideration of + the genuineness and order of the Platonic dialogues has been reserved for + another place: a few of the reasons for defending the Sophist and + Statesman may be given here. + </p> + <p> + 1. The excellence, importance, and metaphysical originality of the two + dialogues: no works at once so good and of such length are known to have + proceeded from the hands of a forger. + </p> + <p> + 2. The resemblances in them to other dialogues of Plato are such as might + be expected to be found in works of the same author, and not in those of + an imitator, being too subtle and minute to have been invented by another. + The similar passages and turns of thought are generally inferior to the + parallel passages in his earlier writings; and we might a priori have + expected that, if altered, they would have been improved. But the + comparison of the Laws proves that this repetition of his own thoughts and + words in an inferior form is characteristic of Plato's later style. + </p> + <p> + 3. The close connexion of them with the Theaetetus, Parmenides, and + Philebus, involves the fate of these dialogues, as well as of the two + suspected ones. + </p> + <p> + 4. The suspicion of them seems mainly to rest on a presumption that in + Plato's writings we may expect to find an uniform type of doctrine and + opinion. But however we arrange the order, or narrow the circle of the + dialogues, we must admit that they exhibit a growth and progress in the + mind of Plato. And the appearance of change or progress is not to be + regarded as impugning the genuineness of any particular writings, but may + be even an argument in their favour. If we suppose the Sophist and + Politicus to stand halfway between the Republic and the Laws, and in near + connexion with the Theaetetus, the Parmenides, the Philebus, the arguments + against them derived from differences of thought and style disappear or + may be said without paradox in some degree to confirm their genuineness. + There is no such interval between the Republic or Phaedrus and the two + suspected dialogues, as that which separates all the earlier writings of + Plato from the Laws. And the Theaetetus, Parmenides, and Philebus, supply + links, by which, however different from them, they may be reunited with + the great body of the Platonic writings. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0002" id="link2H_4_0002"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + STATESMAN + </h2> + <p> + PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Theodorus, Socrates, The Eleatic Stranger, The + Younger Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I owe you many thanks, indeed, Theodorus, for the acquaintance + both of Theaetetus and of the Stranger. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: And in a little while, Socrates, you will owe me three times as + many, when they have completed for you the delineation of the Statesman + and of the Philosopher, as well as of the Sophist. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Sophist, statesman, philosopher! O my dear Theodorus, do my ears + truly witness that this is the estimate formed of them by the great + calculator and geometrician? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: What do you mean, Socrates? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I mean that you rate them all at the same value, whereas they + are really separated by an interval, which no geometrical ratio can + express. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: By Ammon, the god of Cyrene, Socrates, that is a very fair hit; + and shows that you have not forgotten your geometry. I will retaliate on + you at some other time, but I must now ask the Stranger, who will not, I + hope, tire of his goodness to us, to proceed either with the Statesman or + with the Philosopher, whichever he prefers. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: That is my duty, Theodorus; having begun I must go on, and not + leave the work unfinished. But what shall be done with Theaetetus? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: In what respect? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Shall we relieve him, and take his companion, the Young + Socrates, instead of him? What do you advise? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Yes, give the other a turn, as you propose. The young always do + better when they have intervals of rest. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I think, Stranger, that both of them may be said to be in some + way related to me; for the one, as you affirm, has the cut of my ugly face + (compare Theaet.), the other is called by my name. And we should always be + on the look-out to recognize a kinsman by the style of his conversation. I + myself was discoursing with Theaetetus yesterday, and I have just been + listening to his answers; my namesake I have not yet examined, but I must. + Another time will do for me; to-day let him answer you. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Very good. Young Socrates, do you hear what the elder Socrates + is proposing? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: I do. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And do you agree to his proposal? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: As you do not object, still less can I. After the Sophist, then, + I think that the Statesman naturally follows next in the order of enquiry. + And please to say, whether he, too, should be ranked among those who have + science. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Then the sciences must be divided as before? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: I dare say. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: But yet the division will not be the same? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: How then? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: They will be divided at some other point. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Where shall we discover the path of the Statesman? We must find + and separate off, and set our seal upon this, and we will set the mark of + another class upon all diverging paths. Thus the soul will conceive of all + kinds of knowledge under two classes. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: To find the path is your business, Stranger, and not mine. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Yes, Socrates, but the discovery, when once made, must be yours + as well as mine. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Well, and are not arithmetic and certain other kindred arts, + merely abstract knowledge, wholly separated from action? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: But in the art of carpentering and all other handicrafts, the + knowledge of the workman is merged in his work; he not only knows, but he + also makes things which previously did not exist. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Then let us divide sciences in general into those which are + practical and those which are purely intellectual. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Let us assume these two divisions of science, which is one + whole. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And are 'statesman,' 'king,' 'master,' or 'householder,' one and + the same; or is there a science or art answering to each of these names? + Or rather, allow me to put the matter in another way. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Let me hear. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: If any one who is in a private station has the skill to advise + one of the public physicians, must not he also be called a physician? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And if any one who is in a private station is able to advise the + ruler of a country, may not he be said to have the knowledge which the + ruler himself ought to have? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: But surely the science of a true king is royal science? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And will not he who possesses this knowledge, whether he happens + to be a ruler or a private man, when regarded only in reference to his + art, be truly called 'royal'? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: He certainly ought to be. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And the householder and master are the same? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Of course. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Again, a large household may be compared to a small state:—will + they differ at all, as far as government is concerned? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: They will not. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Then, returning to the point which we were just now discussing, + do we not clearly see that there is one science of all of them; and this + science may be called either royal or political or economical; we will not + quarrel with any one about the name. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: This too, is evident, that the king cannot do much with his + hands, or with his whole body, towards the maintenance of his empire, + compared with what he does by the intelligence and strength of his mind. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly not. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Then, shall we say that the king has a greater affinity to + knowledge than to manual arts and to practical life in general? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly he has. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Then we may put all together as one and the same—statesmanship + and the statesman—the kingly science and the king. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And now we shall only be proceeding in due order if we go on to + divide the sphere of knowledge? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Think whether you can find any joint or parting in knowledge. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Tell me of what sort. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Such as this: You may remember that we made an art of + calculation? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Which was, unmistakeably, one of the arts of knowledge? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And to this art of calculation which discerns the differences of + numbers shall we assign any other function except to pass judgment on + their differences? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: How could we? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: You know that the master-builder does not work himself, but is + the ruler of workmen? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: He contributes knowledge, not manual labour? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And may therefore be justly said to share in theoretical + science? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: But he ought not, like the calculator, to regard his functions + as at an end when he has formed a judgment;—he must assign to the + individual workmen their appropriate task until they have completed the + work. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Are not all such sciences, no less than arithmetic and the like, + subjects of pure knowledge; and is not the difference between the two + classes, that the one sort has the power of judging only, and the other of + ruling as well? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: That is evident. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: May we not very properly say, that of all knowledge, there are + two divisions—one which rules, and the other which judges? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: I should think so. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And when men have anything to do in common, that they should be + of one mind is surely a desirable thing? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Then while we are at unity among ourselves, we need not mind + about the fancies of others? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And now, in which of these divisions shall we place the king?—Is + he a judge and a kind of spectator? Or shall we assign to him the art of + command—for he is a ruler? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: The latter, clearly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Then we must see whether there is any mark of division in the + art of command too. I am inclined to think that there is a distinction + similar to that of manufacturer and retail dealer, which parts off the + king from the herald. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: How is this? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Why, does not the retailer receive and sell over again the + productions of others, which have been sold before? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly he does. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And is not the herald under command, and does he not receive + orders, and in his turn give them to others? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Then shall we mingle the kingly art in the same class with the + art of the herald, the interpreter, the boatswain, the prophet, and the + numerous kindred arts which exercise command; or, as in the preceding + comparison we spoke of manufacturers, or sellers for themselves, and of + retailers,—seeing, too, that the class of supreme rulers, or rulers + for themselves, is almost nameless—shall we make a word following + the same analogy, and refer kings to a supreme or ruling-for-self science, + leaving the rest to receive a name from some one else? For we are seeking + the ruler; and our enquiry is not concerned with him who is not a ruler. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Thus a very fair distinction has been attained between the man + who gives his own commands, and him who gives another's. And now let us + see if the supreme power allows of any further division. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: By all means. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: I think that it does; and please to assist me in making the + division. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: At what point? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: May not all rulers be supposed to command for the sake of + producing something? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Nor is there any difficulty in dividing the things produced into + two classes. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: How would you divide them? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Of the whole class, some have life and some are without life. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And by the help of this distinction we may make, if we please, a + subdivision of the section of knowledge which commands. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: At what point? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: One part may be set over the production of lifeless, the other + of living objects; and in this way the whole will be divided. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: That division, then, is complete; and now we may leave one half, + and take up the other; which may also be divided into two. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Which of the two halves do you mean? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Of course that which exercises command about animals. For, + surely, the royal science is not like that of a master-workman, a science + presiding over lifeless objects;—the king has a nobler function, + which is the management and control of living beings. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And the breeding and tending of living beings may be observed to + be sometimes a tending of the individual; in other cases, a common care of + creatures in flocks? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: But the statesman is not a tender of individuals—not like + the driver or groom of a single ox or horse; he is rather to be compared + with the keeper of a drove of horses or oxen. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, I see, thanks to you. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Shall we call this art of tending many animals together, the art + of managing a herd, or the art of collective management? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: No matter;—whichever suggests itself to us in the + course of conversation. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Very good, Socrates; and, if you continue to be not too + particular about names, you will be all the richer in wisdom when you are + an old man. And now, as you say, leaving the discussion of the name,—can + you see a way in which a person, by showing the art of herding to be of + two kinds, may cause that which is now sought amongst twice the number of + things, to be then sought amongst half that number? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: I will try;—there appears to me to be one management + of men and another of beasts. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: You have certainly divided them in a most straightforward and + manly style; but you have fallen into an error which hereafter I think + that we had better avoid. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What is the error? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: I think that we had better not cut off a single small portion + which is not a species, from many larger portions; the part should be a + species. To separate off at once the subject of investigation, is a most + excellent plan, if only the separation be rightly made; and you were under + the impression that you were right, because you saw that you would come to + man; and this led you to hasten the steps. But you should not chip off too + small a piece, my friend; the safer way is to cut through the middle; + which is also the more likely way of finding classes. Attention to this + principle makes all the difference in a process of enquiry. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean, Stranger? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: I will endeavour to speak more plainly out of love to your good + parts, Socrates; and, although I cannot at present entirely explain + myself, I will try, as we proceed, to make my meaning a little clearer. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What was the error of which, as you say, we were guilty in + our recent division? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: The error was just as if some one who wanted to divide the human + race, were to divide them after the fashion which prevails in this part of + the world; here they cut off the Hellenes as one species, and all the + other species of mankind, which are innumerable, and have no ties or + common language, they include under the single name of 'barbarians,' and + because they have one name they are supposed to be of one species also. Or + suppose that in dividing numbers you were to cut off ten thousand from all + the rest, and make of it one species, comprehending the rest under another + separate name, you might say that here too was a single class, because you + had given it a single name. Whereas you would make a much better and more + equal and logical classification of numbers, if you divided them into odd + and even; or of the human species, if you divided them into male and + female; and only separated off Lydians or Phrygians, or any other tribe, + and arrayed them against the rest of the world, when you could no longer + make a division into parts which were also classes. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true; but I wish that this distinction between a part + and a class could still be made somewhat plainer. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: O Socrates, best of men, you are imposing upon me a very + difficult task. We have already digressed further from our original + intention than we ought, and you would have us wander still further away. + But we must now return to our subject; and hereafter, when there is a + leisure hour, we will follow up the other track; at the same time, I wish + you to guard against imagining that you ever heard me declare— + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: That a class and a part are distinct. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What did I hear, then? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: That a class is necessarily a part, but there is no similar + necessity that a part should be a class; that is the view which I should + always wish you to attribute to me, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: So be it. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: There is another thing which I should like to know. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: The point at which we digressed; for, if I am not mistaken, the + exact place was at the question, Where you would divide the management of + herds. To this you appeared rather too ready to answer that there were two + species of animals; man being one, and all brutes making up the other. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: I thought that in taking away a part, you imagined that the + remainder formed a class, because you were able to call them by the common + name of brutes. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: That again is true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Suppose now, O most courageous of dialecticians, that some wise + and understanding creature, such as a crane is reputed to be, were, in + imitation of you, to make a similar division, and set up cranes against + all other animals to their own special glorification, at the same time + jumbling together all the others, including man, under the appellation of + brutes,—here would be the sort of error which we must try to avoid. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: How can we be safe? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: If we do not divide the whole class of animals, we shall be less + likely to fall into that error. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: We had better not take the whole? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Yes, there lay the source of error in our former division. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: How? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: You remember how that part of the art of knowledge which was + concerned with command, had to do with the rearing of living creatures,—I + mean, with animals in herds? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: In that case, there was already implied a division of all + animals into tame and wild; those whose nature can be tamed are called + tame, and those which cannot be tamed are called wild. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And the political science of which we are in search, is and ever + was concerned with tame animals, and is also confined to gregarious + animals. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: But then we ought not to divide, as we did, taking the whole + class at once. Neither let us be in too great haste to arrive quickly at + the political science; for this mistake has already brought upon us the + misfortune of which the proverb speaks. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What misfortune? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: The misfortune of too much haste, which is too little speed. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: And all the better, Stranger;—we got what we + deserved. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Very well: Let us then begin again, and endeavour to divide the + collective rearing of animals; for probably the completion of the argument + will best show what you are so anxious to know. Tell me, then— + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Have you ever heard, as you very likely may—for I do not + suppose that you ever actually visited them—of the preserves of + fishes in the Nile, and in the ponds of the Great King; or you may have + seen similar preserves in wells at home? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, to be sure, I have seen them, and I have often heard + the others described. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And you may have heard also, and may have been assured by + report, although you have not travelled in those regions, of nurseries of + geese and cranes in the plains of Thessaly? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: I asked you, because here is a new division of the management of + herds, into the management of land and of water herds. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: There is. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And do you agree that we ought to divide the collective rearing + of herds into two corresponding parts, the one the rearing of water, and + the other the rearing of land herds? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: There is surely no need to ask which of these two contains the + royal art, for it is evident to everybody. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Any one can divide the herds which feed on dry land? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: How would you divide them? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: I should distinguish between those which fly and those which + walk. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Most true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And where shall we look for the political animal? Might not an + idiot, so to speak, know that he is a pedestrian? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: The art of managing the walking animal has to be further + divided, just as you might halve an even number. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Let me note that here appear in view two ways to that part or + class which the argument aims at reaching,—the one a speedier way, + which cuts off a small portion and leaves a large; the other agrees better + with the principle which we were laying down, that as far as we can we + should divide in the middle; but it is longer. We can take either of them, + whichever we please. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Cannot we have both ways? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Together? What a thing to ask! but, if you take them in turn, + you clearly may. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Then I should like to have them in turn. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: There will be no difficulty, as we are near the end; if we had + been at the beginning, or in the middle, I should have demurred to your + request; but now, in accordance with your desire, let us begin with the + longer way; while we are fresh, we shall get on better. And now attend to + the division. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Let me hear. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: The tame walking herding animals are distributed by nature into + two classes. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Upon what principle? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: The one grows horns; and the other is without horns. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Suppose that you divide the science which manages pedestrian + animals into two corresponding parts, and define them; for if you try to + invent names for them, you will find the intricacy too great. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: How must I speak of them, then? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: In this way: let the science of managing pedestrian animals be + divided into two parts, and one part assigned to the horned herd, and the + other to the herd that has no horns. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: All that you say has been abundantly proved, and may + therefore be assumed. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: The king is clearly the shepherd of a polled herd, who have no + horns. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: That is evident. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Shall we break up this hornless herd into sections, and + endeavour to assign to him what is his? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: By all means. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Shall we distinguish them by their having or not having cloven + feet, or by their mixing or not mixing the breed? You know what I mean. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: I mean that horses and asses naturally breed from one another. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: But the remainder of the hornless herd of tame animals will not + mix the breed. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And of which has the Statesman charge,—of the mixed or of + the unmixed race? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly of the unmixed. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: I suppose that we must divide this again as before. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: We must. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Every tame and herding animal has now been split up, with the + exception of two species; for I hardly think that dogs should be reckoned + among gregarious animals. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not; but how shall we divide the two remaining + species? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: There is a measure of difference which may be appropriately + employed by you and Theaetetus, who are students of geometry. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What is that? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: The diameter; and, again, the diameter of a diameter. (Compare + Meno.) + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: How does man walk, but as a diameter whose power is two feet? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Just so. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And the power of the remaining kind, being the power of twice + two feet, may be said to be the diameter of our diameter. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly; and now I think that I pretty nearly understand + you. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: In these divisions, Socrates, I descry what would make another + famous jest. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Human beings have come out in the same class with the freest and + airiest of creation, and have been running a race with them. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: I remark that very singular coincidence. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And would you not expect the slowest to arrive last? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Indeed I should. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And there is a still more ridiculous consequence, that the king + is found running about with the herd and in close competition with the + bird-catcher, who of all mankind is most of an adept at the airy life. + (Plato is here introducing a new subdivision, i.e. that of bipeds into men + and birds. Others however refer the passage to the division into + quadrupeds and bipeds, making pigs compete with human beings and the + pig-driver with the king. According to this explanation we must translate + the words above, 'freest and airiest of creation,' 'worthiest and laziest + of creation.') + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Then here, Socrates, is still clearer evidence of the truth of + what was said in the enquiry about the Sophist? (Compare Sophist.) + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: That the dialectical method is no respecter of persons, and does + not set the great above the small, but always arrives in her own way at + the truest result. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And now, I will not wait for you to ask, but will of my own + accord take you by the shorter road to the definition of a king. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: By all means. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: I say that we should have begun at first by dividing land + animals into biped and quadruped; and since the winged herd, and that + alone, comes out in the same class with man, we should divide bipeds into + those which have feathers and those which have not, and when they have + been divided, and the art of the management of mankind is brought to + light, the time will have come to produce our Statesman and ruler, and set + him like a charioteer in his place, and hand over to him the reins of + state, for that too is a vocation which belongs to him. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good; you have paid me the debt,—I mean, that + you have completed the argument, and I suppose that you added the + digression by way of interest. (Compare Republic.) + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Then now, let us go back to the beginning, and join the links, + which together make the definition of the name of the Statesman's art. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: By all means. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: The science of pure knowledge had, as we said originally, a part + which was the science of rule or command, and from this was derived + another part, which was called command-for-self, on the analogy of + selling-for-self; an important section of this was the management of + living animals, and this again was further limited to the management of + them in herds; and again in herds of pedestrian animals. The chief + division of the latter was the art of managing pedestrian animals which + are without horns; this again has a part which can only be comprehended + under one term by joining together three names—shepherding pure-bred + animals. The only further subdivision is the art of man-herding,—this + has to do with bipeds, and is what we were seeking after, and have now + found, being at once the royal and political. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: To be sure. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And do you think, Socrates, that we really have done as you say? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Do you think, I mean, that we have really fulfilled our + intention?—There has been a sort of discussion, and yet the + investigation seems to me not to be perfectly worked out: this is where + the enquiry fails. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: I do not understand. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: I will try to make the thought, which is at this moment present + in my mind, clearer to us both. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Let me hear. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: There were many arts of shepherding, and one of them was the + political, which had the charge of one particular herd? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And this the argument defined to be the art of rearing, not + horses or other brutes, but the art of rearing man collectively? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Note, however, a difference which distinguishes the king from + all other shepherds. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: To what do you refer? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: I want to ask, whether any one of the other herdsmen has a rival + who professes and claims to share with him in the management of the herd? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: I mean to say that merchants, husbandmen, providers of food, and + also training-masters and physicians, will all contend with the herdsmen + of humanity, whom we call Statesmen, declaring that they themselves have + the care of rearing or managing mankind, and that they rear not only the + common herd, but also the rulers themselves. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Are they not right in saying so? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Very likely they may be, and we will consider their claim. But + we are certain of this,—that no one will raise a similar claim as + against the herdsman, who is allowed on all hands to be the sole and only + feeder and physician of his herd; he is also their match-maker and + accoucheur; no one else knows that department of science. And he is their + merry-maker and musician, as far as their nature is susceptible of such + influences, and no one can console and soothe his own herd better than he + can, either with the natural tones of his voice or with instruments. And + the same may be said of tenders of animals in general. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: But if this is as you say, can our argument about the king be + true and unimpeachable? Were we right in selecting him out of ten thousand + other claimants to be the shepherd and rearer of the human flock? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Surely not. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Had we not reason just to now to apprehend, that although we may + have described a sort of royal form, we have not as yet accurately worked + out the true image of the Statesman? and that we cannot reveal him as he + truly is in his own nature, until we have disengaged and separated him + from those who hang about him and claim to share in his prerogatives? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And that, Socrates, is what we must do, if we do not mean to + bring disgrace upon the argument at its close. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: We must certainly avoid that. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Then let us make a new beginning, and travel by a different + road. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What road? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: I think that we may have a little amusement; there is a famous + tale, of which a good portion may with advantage be interwoven, and then + we may resume our series of divisions, and proceed in the old path until + we arrive at the desired summit. Shall we do as I say? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: By all means. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Listen, then, to a tale which a child would love to hear; and + you are not too old for childish amusement. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Let me hear. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: There did really happen, and will again happen, like many other + events of which ancient tradition has preserved the record, the portent + which is traditionally said to have occurred in the quarrel of Atreus and + Thyestes. You have heard, no doubt, and remember what they say happened at + that time? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: I suppose you to mean the token of the birth of the golden + lamb. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: No, not that; but another part of the story, which tells how the + sun and the stars once rose in the west, and set in the east, and that the + god reversed their motion, and gave them that which they now have as a + testimony to the right of Atreus. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes; there is that legend also. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Again, we have been often told of the reign of Cronos. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, very often. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Did you ever hear that the men of former times were earth-born, + and not begotten of one another? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, that is another old tradition. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: All these stories, and ten thousand others which are still more + wonderful, have a common origin; many of them have been lost in the lapse + of ages, or are repeated only in a disconnected form; but the origin of + them is what no one has told, and may as well be told now; for the tale is + suited to throw light on the nature of the king. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good; and I hope that you will give the whole story, + and leave out nothing. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Listen, then. There is a time when God himself guides and helps + to roll the world in its course; and there is a time, on the completion of + a certain cycle, when he lets go, and the world being a living creature, + and having originally received intelligence from its author and creator, + turns about and by an inherent necessity revolves in the opposite + direction. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Why is that? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Why, because only the most divine things of all remain ever + unchanged and the same, and body is not included in this class. Heaven and + the universe, as we have termed them, although they have been endowed by + the Creator with many glories, partake of a bodily nature, and therefore + cannot be entirely free from perturbation. But their motion is, as far as + possible, single and in the same place, and of the same kind; and is + therefore only subject to a reversal, which is the least alteration + possible. For the lord of all moving things is alone able to move of + himself; and to think that he moves them at one time in one direction and + at another time in another is blasphemy. Hence we must not say that the + world is either self-moved always, or all made to go round by God in two + opposite courses; or that two Gods, having opposite purposes, make it move + round. But as I have already said (and this is the only remaining + alternative) the world is guided at one time by an external power which is + divine and receives fresh life and immortality from the renewing hand of + the Creator, and again, when let go, moves spontaneously, being set free + at such a time as to have, during infinite cycles of years, a reverse + movement: this is due to its perfect balance, to its vast size, and to the + fact that it turns on the smallest pivot. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Your account of the world seems to be very reasonable + indeed. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Let us now reflect and try to gather from what has been said the + nature of the phenomenon which we affirmed to be the cause of all these + wonders. It is this. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: The reversal which takes place from time to time of the motion + of the universe. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: How is that the cause? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Of all changes of the heavenly motions, we may consider this to + be the greatest and most complete. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: I should imagine so. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And it may be supposed to result in the greatest changes to the + human beings who are the inhabitants of the world at the time. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Such changes would naturally occur. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And animals, as we know, survive with difficulty great and + serious changes of many different kinds when they come upon them at once. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Hence there necessarily occurs a great destruction of them, + which extends also to the life of man; few survivors of the race are left, + and those who remain become the subjects of several novel and remarkable + phenomena, and of one in particular, which takes place at the time when + the transition is made to the cycle opposite to that in which we are now + living. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: The life of all animals first came to a standstill, and the + mortal nature ceased to be or look older, and was then reversed and grew + young and delicate; the white locks of the aged darkened again, and the + cheeks the bearded man became smooth, and recovered their former bloom; + the bodies of youths in their prime grew softer and smaller, continually + by day and night returning and becoming assimilated to the nature of a + newly-born child in mind as well as body; in the succeeding stage they + wasted away and wholly disappeared. And the bodies of those who died by + violence at that time quickly passed through the like changes, and in a + few days were no more seen. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Then how, Stranger, were the animals created in those + days; and in what way were they begotten of one another? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: It is evident, Socrates, that there was no such thing in the + then order of nature as the procreation of animals from one another; the + earth-born race, of which we hear in story, was the one which existed in + those days—they rose again from the ground; and of this tradition, + which is now-a-days often unduly discredited, our ancestors, who were + nearest in point of time to the end of the last period and came into being + at the beginning of this, are to us the heralds. And mark how consistent + the sequel of the tale is; after the return of age to youth, follows the + return of the dead, who are lying in the earth, to life; simultaneously + with the reversal of the world the wheel of their generation has been + turned back, and they are put together and rise and live in the opposite + order, unless God has carried any of them away to some other lot. + According to this tradition they of necessity sprang from the earth and + have the name of earth-born, and so the above legend clings to them. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly that is quite consistent with what has preceded; + but tell me, was the life which you said existed in the reign of Cronos in + that cycle of the world, or in this? For the change in the course of the + stars and the sun must have occurred in both. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: I see that you enter into my meaning;—no, that blessed and + spontaneous life does not belong to the present cycle of the world, but to + the previous one, in which God superintended the whole revolution of the + universe; and the several parts the universe were distributed under the + rule of certain inferior deities, as is the way in some places still. + There were demigods, who were the shepherds of the various species and + herds of animals, and each one was in all respects sufficient for those of + whom he was the shepherd; neither was there any violence, or devouring of + one another, or war or quarrel among them; and I might tell of ten + thousand other blessings, which belonged to that dispensation. The reason + why the life of man was, as tradition says, spontaneous, is as follows: In + those days God himself was their shepherd, and ruled over them, just as + man, who is by comparison a divine being, still rules over the lower + animals. Under him there were no forms of government or separate + possession of women and children; for all men rose again from the earth, + having no memory of the past. And although they had nothing of this sort, + the earth gave them fruits in abundance, which grew on trees and shrubs + unbidden, and were not planted by the hand of man. And they dwelt naked, + and mostly in the open air, for the temperature of their seasons was mild; + and they had no beds, but lay on soft couches of grass, which grew + plentifully out of the earth. Such was the life of man in the days of + Cronos, Socrates; the character of our present life, which is said to be + under Zeus, you know from your own experience. Can you, and will you, + determine which of them you deem the happier? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Impossible. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Then shall I determine for you as well as I can? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: By all means. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Suppose that the nurslings of Cronos, having this boundless + leisure, and the power of holding intercourse, not only with men, but with + the brute creation, had used all these advantages with a view to + philosophy, conversing with the brutes as well as with one another, and + learning of every nature which was gifted with any special power, and was + able to contribute some special experience to the store of wisdom, there + would be no difficulty in deciding that they would be a thousand times + happier than the men of our own day. Or, again, if they had merely eaten + and drunk until they were full, and told stories to one another and to the + animals—such stories as are now attributed to them—in this + case also, as I should imagine, the answer would be easy. But until some + satisfactory witness can be found of the love of that age for knowledge + and discussion, we had better let the matter drop, and give the reason why + we have unearthed this tale, and then we shall be able to get on. In the + fulness of time, when the change was to take place, and the earth-born + race had all perished, and every soul had completed its proper cycle of + births and been sown in the earth her appointed number of times, the pilot + of the universe let the helm go, and retired to his place of view; and + then Fate and innate desire reversed the motion of the world. Then also + all the inferior deities who share the rule of the supreme power, being + informed of what was happening, let go the parts of the world which were + under their control. And the world turning round with a sudden shock, + being impelled in an opposite direction from beginning to end, was shaken + by a mighty earthquake, which wrought a new destruction of all manner of + animals. Afterwards, when sufficient time had elapsed, the tumult and + confusion and earthquake ceased, and the universal creature, once more at + peace, attained to a calm, and settled down into his own orderly and + accustomed course, having the charge and rule of himself and of all the + creatures which are contained in him, and executing, as far as he + remembered them, the instructions of his Father and Creator, more + precisely at first, but afterwords with less exactness. The reason of the + falling off was the admixture of matter in him; this was inherent in the + primal nature, which was full of disorder, until attaining to the present + order. From God, the constructor, the world received all that is good in + him, but from a previous state came elements of evil and unrighteousness, + which, thence derived, first of all passed into the world, and were then + transmitted to the animals. While the world was aided by the pilot in + nurturing the animals, the evil was small, and great the good which he + produced, but after the separation, when the world was let go, at first + all proceeded well enough; but, as time went on, there was more and more + forgetting, and the old discord again held sway and burst forth in full + glory; and at last small was the good, and great was the admixture of + evil, and there was a danger of universal ruin to the world, and to the + things contained in him. Wherefore God, the orderer of all, in his tender + care, seeing that the world was in great straits, and fearing that all + might be dissolved in the storm and disappear in infinite chaos, again + seated himself at the helm; and bringing back the elements which had + fallen into dissolution and disorder to the motion which had prevailed + under his dispensation, he set them in order and restored them, and made + the world imperishable and immortal. And this is the whole tale, of which + the first part will suffice to illustrate the nature of the king. For when + the world turned towards the present cycle of generation, the age of man + again stood still, and a change opposite to the previous one was the + result. The small creatures which had almost disappeared grew in and + stature, and the newly-born children of the earth became grey and died and + sank into the earth again. All things changed, imitating and following the + condition of the universe, and of necessity agreeing with that in their + mode of conception and generation and nurture; for no animal was any + longer allowed to come into being in the earth through the agency of other + creative beings, but as the world was ordained to be the lord of his own + progress, in like manner the parts were ordained to grow and generate and + give nourishment, as far as they could, of themselves, impelled by a + similar movement. And so we have arrived at the real end of this + discourse; for although there might be much to tell of the lower animals, + and of the condition out of which they changed and of the causes of the + change, about men there is not much, and that little is more to the + purpose. Deprived of the care of God, who had possessed and tended them, + they were left helpless and defenceless, and were torn in pieces by the + beasts, who were naturally fierce and had now grown wild. And in the first + ages they were still without skill or resource; the food which once grew + spontaneously had failed, and as yet they knew not how to procure it, + because they had never felt the pressure of necessity. For all these + reasons they were in a great strait; wherefore also the gifts spoken of in + the old tradition were imparted to man by the gods, together with so much + teaching and education as was indispensable; fire was given to them by + Prometheus, the arts by Hephaestus and his fellow-worker, Athene, seeds + and plants by others. From these is derived all that has helped to frame + human life; since the care of the Gods, as I was saying, had now failed + men, and they had to order their course of life for themselves, and were + their own masters, just like the universal creature whom they imitate and + follow, ever changing, as he changes, and ever living and growing, at one + time in one manner, and at another time in another. Enough of the story, + which may be of use in showing us how greatly we erred in the delineation + of the king and the statesman in our previous discourse. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What was this great error of which you speak? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: There were two; the first a lesser one, the other was an error + on a much larger and grander scale. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: I mean to say that when we were asked about a king and statesman + of the present cycle and generation, we told of a shepherd of a human + flock who belonged to the other cycle, and of one who was a god when he + ought to have been a man; and this a great error. Again, we declared him + to be the ruler of the entire State, without explaining how: this was not + the whole truth, nor very intelligible; but still it was true, and + therefore the second error was not so great as the first. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Before we can expect to have a perfect description of the + statesman we must define the nature of his office. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And the myth was introduced in order to show, not only that all + others are rivals of the true shepherd who is the object of our search, + but in order that we might have a clearer view of him who is alone worthy + to receive this appellation, because he alone of shepherds and herdsmen, + according to the image which we have employed, has the care of human + beings. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And I cannot help thinking, Socrates, that the form of the + divine shepherd is even higher than that of a king; whereas the statesmen + who are now on earth seem to be much more like their subjects in + character, and much more nearly to partake of their breeding and + education. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Still they must be investigated all the same, to see whether, + like the divine shepherd, they are above their subjects or on a level with + them. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Of course. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: To resume:—Do you remember that we spoke of a + command-for-self exercised over animals, not singly but collectively, + which we called the art of rearing a herd? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, I remember. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: There, somewhere, lay our error; for we never included or + mentioned the Statesman; and we did not observe that he had no place in + our nomenclature. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: How was that? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: All other herdsmen 'rear' their herds, but this is not a + suitable term to apply to the Statesman; we should use a name which is + common to them all. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: True, if there be such a name. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Why, is not 'care' of herds applicable to all? For this implies + no feeding, or any special duty; if we say either 'tending' the herds, or + 'managing' the herds, or 'having the care' of them, the same word will + include all, and then we may wrap up the Statesman with the rest, as the + argument seems to require. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite right; but how shall we take the next step in the + division? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: As before we divided the art of 'rearing' herds accordingly as + they were land or water herds, winged and wingless, mixing or not mixing + the breed, horned and hornless, so we may divide by these same differences + the 'tending' of herds, comprehending in our definition the kingship of + to-day and the rule of Cronos. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: That is clear; but I still ask, what is to follow. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: If the word had been 'managing' herds, instead of feeding or + rearing them, no one would have argued that there was no care of men in + the case of the politician, although it was justly contended, that there + was no human art of feeding them which was worthy of the name, or at + least, if there were, many a man had a prior and greater right to share in + such an art than any king. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: But no other art or science will have a prior or better right + than the royal science to care for human society and to rule over men in + general. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: In the next place, Socrates, we must surely notice that a great + error was committed at the end of our analysis. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What was it? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Why, supposing we were ever so sure that there is such an art as + the art of rearing or feeding bipeds, there was no reason why we should + call this the royal or political art, as though there were no more to be + said. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Our first duty, as we were saying, was to remodel the name, so + as to have the notion of care rather than of feeding, and then to divide, + for there may be still considerable divisions. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: How can they be made? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: First, by separating the divine shepherd from the human guardian + or manager. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And the art of management which is assigned to man would again + have to be subdivided. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: On what principle? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: On the principle of voluntary and compulsory. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Why? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Because, if I am not mistaken, there has been an error here; for + our simplicity led us to rank king and tyrant together, whereas they are + utterly distinct, like their modes of government. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Then, now, as I said, let us make the correction and divide + human care into two parts, on the principle of voluntary and compulsory. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And if we call the management of violent rulers tyranny, and the + voluntary management of herds of voluntary bipeds politics, may we not + further assert that he who has this latter art of management is the true + king and statesman? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: I think, Stranger, that we have now completed the account + of the Statesman. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Would that we had, Socrates, but I have to satisfy myself as + well as you; and in my judgment the figure of the king is not yet + perfected; like statuaries who, in their too great haste, having overdone + the several parts of their work, lose time in cutting them down, so too + we, partly out of haste, partly out of a magnanimous desire to expose our + former error, and also because we imagined that a king required grand + illustrations, have taken up a marvellous lump of fable, and have been + obliged to use more than was necessary. This made us discourse at large, + and, nevertheless, the story never came to an end. And our discussion + might be compared to a picture of some living being which had been fairly + drawn in outline, but had not yet attained the life and clearness which is + given by the blending of colours. Now to intelligent persons a living + being had better be delineated by language and discourse than by any + painting or work of art: to the duller sort by works of art. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true; but what is the imperfection which still + remains? I wish that you would tell me. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: The higher ideas, my dear friend, can hardly be set forth except + through the medium of examples; every man seems to know all things in a + dreamy sort of way, and then again to wake up and to know nothing. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: I fear that I have been unfortunate in raising a question about + our experience of knowledge. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Why so? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Why, because my 'example' requires the assistance of another + example. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Proceed; you need not fear that I shall tire. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: I will proceed, finding, as I do, such a ready listener in you: + when children are beginning to know their letters— + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What are you going to say? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: That they distinguish the several letters well enough in very + short and easy syllables, and are able to tell them correctly. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Whereas in other syllables they do not recognize them, and think + and speak falsely of them. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Will not the best and easiest way of bringing them to a + knowledge of what they do not as yet know be— + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Be what? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: To refer them first of all to cases in which they judge + correctly about the letters in question, and then to compare these with + the cases in which they do not as yet know, and to show them that the + letters are the same, and have the same character in both combinations, + until all cases in which they are right have been placed side by side with + all cases in which they are wrong. In this way they have examples, and are + made to learn that each letter in every combination is always the same and + not another, and is always called by the same name. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Are not examples formed in this manner? We take a thing and + compare it with another distinct instance of the same thing, of which we + have a right conception, and out of the comparison there arises one true + notion, which includes both of them. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Exactly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Can we wonder, then, that the soul has the same uncertainty + about the alphabet of things, and sometimes and in some cases is firmly + fixed by the truth in each particular, and then, again, in other cases is + altogether at sea; having somehow or other a correct notion of + combinations; but when the elements are transferred into the long and + difficult language (syllables) of facts, is again ignorant of them? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: There is nothing wonderful in that. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Could any one, my friend, who began with false opinion ever + expect to arrive even at a small portion of truth and to attain wisdom? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Hardly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Then you and I will not be far wrong in trying to see the nature + of example in general in a small and particular instance; afterwards from + lesser things we intend to pass to the royal class, which is the highest + form of the same nature, and endeavour to discover by rules of art what + the management of cities is; and then the dream will become a reality to + us. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Then, once more, let us resume the previous argument, and as + there were innumerable rivals of the royal race who claim to have the care + of states, let us part them all off, and leave him alone; and, as I was + saying, a model or example of this process has first to be framed. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Exactly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: What model is there which is small, and yet has any analogy with + the political occupation? Suppose, Socrates, that if we have no other + example at hand, we choose weaving, or, more precisely, weaving of wool—this + will be quite enough, without taking the whole of weaving, to illustrate + our meaning? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Why should we not apply to weaving the same processes of + division and subdivision which we have already applied to other classes; + going once more as rapidly as we can through all the steps until we come + to that which is needed for our purpose? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: How do you mean? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: I shall reply by actually performing the process. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: All things which we make or acquire are either creative or + preventive; of the preventive class are antidotes, divine and human, and + also defences; and defences are either military weapons or protections; + and protections are veils, and also shields against heat and cold, and + shields against heat and cold are shelters and coverings; and coverings + are blankets and garments; and garments are some of them in one piece, and + others of them are made in several parts; and of these latter some are + stitched, others are fastened and not stitched; and of the not stitched, + some are made of the sinews of plants, and some of hair; and of these, + again, some are cemented with water and earth, and others are fastened + together by themselves. And these last defences and coverings which are + fastened together by themselves are called clothes, and the art which + superintends them we may call, from the nature of the operation, the art + of clothing, just as before the art of the Statesman was derived from the + State; and may we not say that the art of weaving, at least that largest + portion of it which was concerned with the making of clothes, differs only + in name from this art of clothing, in the same way that, in the previous + case, the royal science differed from the political? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Most true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: In the next place, let us make the reflection, that the art of + weaving clothes, which an incompetent person might fancy to have been + sufficiently described, has been separated off from several others which + are of the same family, but not from the co-operative arts. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: And which are the kindred arts? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: I see that I have not taken you with me. So I think that we had + better go backwards, starting from the end. We just now parted off from + the weaving of clothes, the making of blankets, which differ from each + other in that one is put under and the other is put around: and these are + what I termed kindred arts. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: I understand. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And we have subtracted the manufacture of all articles made of + flax and cords, and all that we just now metaphorically termed the sinews + of plants, and we have also separated off the process of felting and the + putting together of materials by stitching and sewing, of which the most + important part is the cobbler's art. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Precisely. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Then we separated off the currier's art, which prepared + coverings in entire pieces, and the art of sheltering, and subtracted the + various arts of making water-tight which are employed in building, and in + general in carpentering, and in other crafts, and all such arts as furnish + impediments to thieving and acts of violence, and are concerned with + making the lids of boxes and the fixing of doors, being divisions of the + art of joining; and we also cut off the manufacture of arms, which is a + section of the great and manifold art of making defences; and we + originally began by parting off the whole of the magic art which is + concerned with antidotes, and have left, as would appear, the very art of + which we were in search, the art of protection against winter cold, which + fabricates woollen defences, and has the name of weaving. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Yes, my boy, but that is not all; for the first process to which + the material is subjected is the opposite of weaving. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: How so? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Weaving is a sort of uniting? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: But the first process is a separation of the clotted and matted + fibres? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: I mean the work of the carder's art; for we cannot say that + carding is weaving, or that the carder is a weaver. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Again, if a person were to say that the art of making the warp + and the woof was the art of weaving, he would say what was paradoxical and + false. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: To be sure. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Shall we say that the whole art of the fuller or of the mender + has nothing to do with the care and treatment of clothes, or are we to + regard all these as arts of weaving? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And yet surely all these arts will maintain that they are + concerned with the treatment and production of clothes; they will dispute + the exclusive prerogative of weaving, and though assigning a larger sphere + to that, will still reserve a considerable field for themselves. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Besides these, there are the arts which make tools and + instruments of weaving, and which will claim at least to be co-operative + causes in every work of the weaver. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Most true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Well, then, suppose that we define weaving, or rather that part + of it which has been selected by us, to be the greatest and noblest of + arts which are concerned with woollen garments—shall we be right? Is + not the definition, although true, wanting in clearness and completeness; + for do not all those other arts require to be first cleared away? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Then the next thing will be to separate them, in order that the + argument may proceed in a regular manner? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: By all means. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Let us consider, in the first place, that there are two kinds of + arts entering into everything which we do. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What are they? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: The one kind is the conditional or co-operative, the other the + principal cause. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: The arts which do not manufacture the actual thing, but which + furnish the necessary tools for the manufacture, without which the several + arts could not fulfil their appointed work, are co-operative; but those + which make the things themselves are causal. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: A very reasonable distinction. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Thus the arts which make spindles, combs, and other instruments + of the production of clothes, may be called co-operative, and those which + treat and fabricate the things themselves, causal. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: The arts of washing and mending, and the other preparatory arts + which belong to the causal class, and form a division of the great art of + adornment, may be all comprehended under what we call the fuller's art. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Carding and spinning threads and all the parts of the process + which are concerned with the actual manufacture of a woollen garment form + a single art, which is one of those universally acknowledged,—the + art of working in wool. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: To be sure. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Of working in wool, again, there are two divisions, and both + these are parts of two arts at once. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: How is that? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Carding and one half of the use of the comb, and the other + processes of wool-working which separate the composite, may be classed + together as belonging both to the art of wool-working, and also to one of + the two great arts which are of universal application—the art of + composition and the art of division. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: To the latter belong carding and the other processes of which I + was just now speaking; the art of discernment or division in wool and + yarn, which is effected in one manner with the comb and in another with + the hands, is variously described under all the names which I just now + mentioned. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Again, let us take some process of wool-working which is also a + portion of the art of composition, and, dismissing the elements of + division which we found there, make two halves, one on the principle of + composition, and the other on the principle of division. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Let that be done. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And once more, Socrates, we must divide the part which belongs + at once both to wool-working and composition, if we are ever to discover + satisfactorily the aforesaid art of weaving. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: We must. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Yes, certainly, and let us call one part of the art the art of + twisting threads, the other the art of combining them. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Do I understand you, in speaking of twisting, to be + referring to manufacture of the warp? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Yes, and of the woof too; how, if not by twisting, is the woof + made? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: There is no other way. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Then suppose that you define the warp and the woof, for I think + that the definition will be of use to you. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: How shall I define them? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: As thus: A piece of carded wool which is drawn out lengthwise + and breadthwise is said to be pulled out. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And the wool thus prepared, when twisted by the spindle, and + made into a firm thread, is called the warp, and the art which regulates + these operations the art of spinning the warp. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And the threads which are more loosely spun, having a softness + proportioned to the intertexture of the warp and to the degree of force + used in dressing the cloth,—the threads which are thus spun are + called the woof, and the art which is set over them may be called the art + of spinning the woof. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And, now, there can be no mistake about the nature of the part + of weaving which we have undertaken to define. For when that part of the + art of composition which is employed in the working of wool forms a web by + the regular intertexture of warp and woof, the entire woven substance is + called by us a woollen garment, and the art which presides over this is + the art of weaving. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: But why did we not say at once that weaving is the art of + entwining warp and woof, instead of making a long and useless circuit? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: I thought, Stranger, that there was nothing useless in + what was said. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Very likely, but you may not always think so, my sweet friend; + and in case any feeling of dissatisfaction should hereafter arise in your + mind, as it very well may, let me lay down a principle which will apply to + arguments in general. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Proceed. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Let us begin by considering the whole nature of excess and + defect, and then we shall have a rational ground on which we may praise or + blame too much length or too much shortness in discussions of this kind. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Let us do so. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: The points on which I think that we ought to dwell are the + following:— + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Length and shortness, excess and defect; with all of these the + art of measurement is conversant. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And the art of measurement has to be divided into two parts, + with a view to our present purpose. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Where would you make the division? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: As thus: I would make two parts, one having regard to the + relativity of greatness and smallness to each other; and there is another, + without which the existence of production would be impossible. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Do you not think that it is only natural for the greater to be + called greater with reference to the less alone, and the less less with + reference to the greater alone? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Well, but is there not also something exceeding and exceeded by + the principle of the mean, both in speech and action, and is not this a + reality, and the chief mark of difference between good and bad men? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Plainly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Then we must suppose that the great and small exist and are + discerned in both these ways, and not, as we were saying before, only + relatively to one another, but there must also be another comparison of + them with the mean or ideal standard; would you like to hear the reason + why? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: If we assume the greater to exist only in relation to the less, + there will never be any comparison of either with the mean. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And would not this doctrine be the ruin of all the arts and + their creations; would not the art of the Statesman and the aforesaid art + of weaving disappear? For all these arts are on the watch against excess + and defect, not as unrealities, but as real evils, which occasion a + difficulty in action; and the excellence or beauty of every work of art is + due to this observance of measure. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: But if the science of the Statesman disappears, the search for + the royal science will be impossible. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Well, then, as in the case of the Sophist we extorted the + inference that not-being had an existence, because here was the point at + which the argument eluded our grasp, so in this we must endeavour to show + that the greater and less are not only to be measured with one another, + but also have to do with the production of the mean; for if this is not + admitted, neither a statesman nor any other man of action can be an + undisputed master of his science. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, we must certainly do again what we did then. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: But this, Socrates, is a greater work than the other, of which + we only too well remember the length. I think, however, that we may fairly + assume something of this sort— + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: That we shall some day require this notion of a mean with a view + to the demonstration of absolute truth; meanwhile, the argument that the + very existence of the arts must be held to depend on the possibility of + measuring more or less, not only with one another, but also with a view to + the attainment of the mean, seems to afford a grand support and + satisfactory proof of the doctrine which we are maintaining; for if there + are arts, there is a standard of measure, and if there is a standard of + measure, there are arts; but if either is wanting, there is neither. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: True; and what is the next step? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: The next step clearly is to divide the art of measurement into + two parts, as we have said already, and to place in the one part all the + arts which measure number, length, depth, breadth, swiftness with their + opposites; and to have another part in which they are measured with the + mean, and the fit, and the opportune, and the due, and with all those + words, in short, which denote a mean or standard removed from the + extremes. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Here are two vast divisions, embracing two very different + spheres. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: There are many accomplished men, Socrates, who say, believing + themselves to speak wisely, that the art of measurement is universal, and + has to do with all things. And this means what we are now saying; for all + things which come within the province of art do certainly in some sense + partake of measure. But these persons, because they are not accustomed to + distinguish classes according to real forms, jumble together two widely + different things, relation to one another, and to a standard, under the + idea that they are the same, and also fall into the converse error of + dividing other things not according to their real parts. Whereas the right + way is, if a man has first seen the unity of things, to go on with the + enquiry and not desist until he has found all the differences contained in + it which form distinct classes; nor again should he be able to rest + contented with the manifold diversities which are seen in a multitude of + things until he has comprehended all of them that have any affinity within + the bounds of one similarity and embraced them within the reality of a + single kind. But we have said enough on this head, and also of excess and + defect; we have only to bear in mind that two divisions of the art of + measurement have been discovered which are concerned with them, and not + forget what they are. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: We will not forget. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And now that this discussion is completed, let us go on to + consider another question, which concerns not this argument only but the + conduct of such arguments in general. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What is this new question? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Take the case of a child who is engaged in learning his letters: + when he is asked what letters make up a word, should we say that the + question is intended to improve his grammatical knowledge of that + particular word, or of all words? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly, in order that he may have a better knowledge of + all words. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And is our enquiry about the Statesman intended only to improve + our knowledge of politics, or our power of reasoning generally? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly, as in the former example, the purpose is general. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Still less would any rational man seek to analyse the notion of + weaving for its own sake. But people seem to forget that some things have + sensible images, which are readily known, and can be easily pointed out + when any one desires to answer an enquirer without any trouble or + argument; whereas the greatest and highest truths have no outward image of + themselves visible to man, which he who wishes to satisfy the soul of the + enquirer can adapt to the eye of sense (compare Phaedr.), and therefore we + ought to train ourselves to give and accept a rational account of them; + for immaterial things, which are the noblest and greatest, are shown only + in thought and idea, and in no other way, and all that we are now saying + is said for the sake of them. Moreover, there is always less difficulty in + fixing the mind on small matters than on great. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Let us call to mind the bearing of all this. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: I wanted to get rid of any impression of tediousness which we + may have experienced in the discussion about weaving, and the reversal of + the universe, and in the discussion concerning the Sophist and the being + of not-being. I know that they were felt to be too long, and I reproached + myself with this, fearing that they might be not only tedious but + irrelevant; and all that I have now said is only designed to prevent the + recurrence of any such disagreeables for the future. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good. Will you proceed? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Then I would like to observe that you and I, remembering what + has been said, should praise or blame the length or shortness of + discussions, not by comparing them with one another, but with what is + fitting, having regard to the part of measurement, which, as we said, was + to be borne in mind. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And yet, not everything is to be judged even with a view to what + is fitting; for we should only want such a length as is suited to give + pleasure, if at all, as a secondary matter; and reason tells us, that we + should be contented to make the ease or rapidity of an enquiry, not our + first, but our second object; the first and highest of all being to assert + the great method of division according to species—whether the + discourse be shorter or longer is not to the point. No offence should be + taken at length, but the longer and shorter are to be employed + indifferently, according as either of them is better calculated to sharpen + the wits of the auditors. Reason would also say to him who censures the + length of discourses on such occasions and cannot away with their + circumlocution, that he should not be in such a hurry to have done with + them, when he can only complain that they are tedious, but he should prove + that if they had been shorter they would have made those who took part in + them better dialecticians, and more capable of expressing the truth of + things; about any other praise and blame, he need not trouble himself—he + should pretend not to hear them. But we have had enough of this, as you + will probably agree with me in thinking. Let us return to our Statesman, + and apply to his case the aforesaid example of weaving. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good;—let us do as you say. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: The art of the king has been separated from the similar arts of + shepherds, and, indeed, from all those which have to do with herds at all. + There still remain, however, of the causal and co-operative arts those + which are immediately concerned with States, and which must first be + distinguished from one another. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: You know that these arts cannot easily be divided into two + halves; the reason will be very evident as we proceed. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Then we had better do so. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: We must carve them like a victim into members or limbs, since we + cannot bisect them. (Compare Phaedr.) For we certainly should divide + everything into as few parts as possible. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What is to be done in this case? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: What we did in the example of weaving—all those arts which + furnish the tools were regarded by us as co-operative. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: So now, and with still more reason, all arts which make any + implement in a State, whether great or small, may be regarded by us as + co-operative, for without them neither State nor Statesmanship would be + possible; and yet we are not inclined to say that any of them is a product + of the kingly art. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: No, indeed. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: The task of separating this class from others is not an easy + one; for there is plausibility in saying that anything in the world is the + instrument of doing something. But there is another class of possessions + in a city, of which I have a word to say. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What class do you mean? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: A class which may be described as not having this power; that is + to say, not like an instrument, framed for production, but designed for + the preservation of that which is produced. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: To what do you refer? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: To the class of vessels, as they are comprehensively termed, + which are constructed for the preservation of things moist and dry, of + things prepared in the fire or out of the fire; this is a very large + class, and has, if I am not mistaken, literally nothing to do with the + royal art of which we are in search. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: There is also a third class of possessions to be noted, + different from these and very extensive, moving or resting on land or + water, honourable and also dishonourable. The whole of this class has one + name, because it is intended to be sat upon, being always a seat for + something. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: A vehicle, which is certainly not the work of the Statesman, but + of the carpenter, potter, and coppersmith. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: I understand. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And is there not a fourth class which is again different, and in + which most of the things formerly mentioned are contained,—every + kind of dress, most sorts of arms, walls and enclosures, whether of earth + or stone, and ten thousand other things? all of which being made for the + sake of defence, may be truly called defences, and are for the most part + to be regarded as the work of the builder or of the weaver, rather than of + the Statesman. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Shall we add a fifth class, of ornamentation and drawing, and of + the imitations produced by drawing and music, which are designed for + amusement only, and may be fairly comprehended under one name? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Plaything is the name. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: That one name may be fitly predicated of all of them, for none + of these things have a serious purpose—amusement is their sole aim. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: That again I understand. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Then there is a class which provides materials for all these, + out of which and in which the arts already mentioned fabricate their + works;—this manifold class, I say, which is the creation and + offspring of many other arts, may I not rank sixth? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: I am referring to gold, silver, and other metals, and all that + wood-cutting and shearing of every sort provides for the art of carpentry + and plaiting; and there is the process of barking and stripping the + cuticle of plants, and the currier's art, which strips off the skins of + animals, and other similar arts which manufacture corks and papyri and + cords, and provide for the manufacture of composite species out of simple + kinds—the whole class may be termed the primitive and simple + possession of man, and with this the kingly science has no concern at all. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: The provision of food and of all other things which mingle their + particles with the particles of the human body, and minister to the body, + will form a seventh class, which may be called by the general term of + nourishment, unless you have any better name to offer. This, however, + appertains rather to the husbandman, huntsman, trainer, doctor, cook, and + is not to be assigned to the Statesman's art. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: These seven classes include nearly every description of + property, with the exception of tame animals. Consider;—there was + the original material, which ought to have been placed first; next come + instruments, vessels, vehicles, defences, playthings, nourishment; small + things, which may be included under one of these—as for example, + coins, seals and stamps, are omitted, for they have not in them the + character of any larger kind which includes them; but some of them may, + with a little forcing, be placed among ornaments, and others may be made + to harmonize with the class of implements. The art of herding, which has + been already divided into parts, will include all property in tame + animals, except slaves. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: The class of slaves and ministers only remains, and I suspect + that in this the real aspirants for the throne, who are the rivals of the + king in the formation of the political web, will be discovered; just as + spinners, carders, and the rest of them, were the rivals of the weaver. + All the others, who were termed co-operators, have been got rid of among + the occupations already mentioned, and separated from the royal and + political science. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: I agree. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Let us go a little nearer, in order that we may be more certain + of the complexion of this remaining class. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Let us do so. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: We shall find from our present point of view that the greatest + servants are in a case and condition which is the reverse of what we + anticipated. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Who are they? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Those who have been purchased, and have so become possessions; + these are unmistakably slaves, and certainly do not claim royal science. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Again, freemen who of their own accord become the servants of + the other classes in a State, and who exchange and equalise the products + of husbandry and the other arts, some sitting in the market-place, others + going from city to city by land or sea, and giving money in exchange for + money or for other productions—the money-changer, the merchant, the + ship-owner, the retailer, will not put in any claim to statecraft or + politics? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: No; unless, indeed, to the politics of commerce. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: But surely men whom we see acting as hirelings and serfs, and + too happy to turn their hand to anything, will not profess to share in + royal science? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: But what would you say of some other serviceable officials? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Who are they, and what services do they perform? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: There are heralds, and scribes perfected by practice, and divers + others who have great skill in various sorts of business connected with + the government of states—what shall we call them? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: They are the officials, and servants of the rulers, as you + just now called them, but not themselves rulers. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: There may be something strange in any servant pretending to be a + ruler, and yet I do not think that I could have been dreaming when I + imagined that the principal claimants to political science would be found + somewhere in this neighbourhood. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Well, let us draw nearer, and try the claims of some who have + not yet been tested: in the first place, there are diviners, who have a + portion of servile or ministerial science, and are thought to be the + interpreters of the gods to men. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: There is also the priestly class, who, as the law declares, know + how to give the gods gifts from men in the form of sacrifices which are + acceptable to them, and to ask on our behalf blessings in return from + them. Now both these are branches of the servile or ministerial art. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, clearly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And here I think that we seem to be getting on the right track; + for the priest and the diviner are swollen with pride and prerogative, and + they create an awful impression of themselves by the magnitude of their + enterprises; in Egypt, the king himself is not allowed to reign, unless he + have priestly powers, and if he should be of another class and has thrust + himself in, he must get enrolled in the priesthood. In many parts of + Hellas, the duty of offering the most solemn propitiatory sacrifices is + assigned to the highest magistracies, and here, at Athens, the most solemn + and national of the ancient sacrifices are supposed to be celebrated by + him who has been chosen by lot to be the King Archon. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Precisely. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: But who are these other kings and priests elected by lot who now + come into view followed by their retainers and a vast throng, as the + former class disappears and the scene changes? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Whom can you mean? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: They are a strange crew. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Why strange? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: A minute ago I thought that they were animals of every tribe; + for many of them are like lions and centaurs, and many more like satyrs + and such weak and shifty creatures;—Protean shapes quickly changing + into one another's forms and natures; and now, Socrates, I begin to see + who they are. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Who are they? You seem to be gazing on some strange + vision. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Yes; every one looks strange when you do not know him; and just + now I myself fell into this mistake—at first sight, coming suddenly + upon him, I did not recognize the politician and his troop. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Who is he? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: The chief of Sophists and most accomplished of wizards, who must + at any cost be separated from the true king or Statesman, if we are ever + to see daylight in the present enquiry. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: That is a hope not lightly to be renounced. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Never, if I can help it; and, first, let me ask you a question. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Is not monarchy a recognized form of government? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And, after monarchy, next in order comes the government of the + few? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Of course. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Is not the third form of government the rule of the multitude, + which is called by the name of democracy? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And do not these three expand in a manner into five, producing + out of themselves two other names? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What are they? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What are they? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: There is a criterion of voluntary and involuntary, poverty and + riches, law and the absence of law, which men now-a-days apply to them; + the two first they subdivide accordingly, and ascribe to monarchy two + forms and two corresponding names, royalty and tyranny. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And the government of the few they distinguish by the names of + aristocracy and oligarchy. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Democracy alone, whether rigidly observing the laws or not, and + whether the multitude rule over the men of property with their consent or + against their consent, always in ordinary language has the same name. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: But do you suppose that any form of government which is defined + by these characteristics of the one, the few, or the many, of poverty or + wealth, of voluntary or compulsory submission, of written law or the + absence of law, can be a right one? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Why not? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Reflect; and follow me. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: In what direction? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Shall we abide by what we said at first, or shall we retract our + words? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: To what do you refer? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: If I am not mistaken, we said that royal power was a science? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And a science of a peculiar kind, which was selected out of the + rest as having a character which is at once judicial and authoritative? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And there was one kind of authority over lifeless things and + another other living animals; and so we proceeded in the division step by + step up to this point, not losing the idea of science, but unable as yet + to determine the nature of the particular science? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Hence we are led to observe that the distinguishing principle of + the State cannot be the few or many, the voluntary or involuntary, poverty + or riches; but some notion of science must enter into it, if we are to be + consistent with what has preceded. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: And we must be consistent. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Well, then, in which of these various forms of States may the + science of government, which is among the greatest of all sciences and + most difficult to acquire, be supposed to reside? That we must discover, + and then we shall see who are the false politicians who pretend to be + politicians but are not, although they persuade many, and shall separate + them from the wise king. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: That, as the argument has already intimated, will be our + duty. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Do you think that the multitude in a State can attain political + science? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Impossible. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: But, perhaps, in a city of a thousand men, there would be a + hundred, or say fifty, who could? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: In that case political science would certainly be the + easiest of all sciences; there could not be found in a city of that number + as many really first-rate draught-players, if judged by the standard of + the rest of Hellas, and there would certainly not be as many kings. For + kings we may truly call those who possess royal science, whether they rule + or not, as was shown in the previous argument. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Thank you for reminding me; and the consequence is that any true + form of government can only be supposed to be the government of one, two, + or, at any rate, of a few. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And these, whether they rule with the will, or against the will, + of their subjects, with written laws or without written laws, and whether + they are poor or rich, and whatever be the nature of their rule, must be + supposed, according to our present view, to rule on some scientific + principle; just as the physician, whether he cures us against our will or + with our will, and whatever be his mode of treatment,—incision, + burning, or the infliction of some other pain,—whether he practises + out of a book or not out of a book, and whether he be rich or poor, + whether he purges or reduces in some other way, or even fattens his + patients, is a physician all the same, so long as he exercises authority + over them according to rules of art, if he only does them good and heals + and saves them. And this we lay down to be the only proper test of the art + of medicine, or of any other art of command. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Then that can be the only true form of government in which the + governors are really found to possess science, and are not mere + pretenders, whether they rule according to law or without law, over + willing or unwilling subjects, and are rich or poor themselves—none + of these things can with any propriety be included in the notion of the + ruler. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And whether with a view to the public good they purge the State + by killing some, or exiling some; whether they reduce the size of the body + corporate by sending out from the hive swarms of citizens, or, by + introducing persons from without, increase it; while they act according to + the rules of wisdom and justice, and use their power with a view to the + general security and improvement, the city over which they rule, and which + has these characteristics, may be described as the only true State. All + other governments are not genuine or real; but only imitations of this, + and some of them are better and some of them are worse; the better are + said to be well governed, but they are mere imitations like the others. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: I agree, Stranger, in the greater part of what you say; + but as to their ruling without laws—the expression has a harsh + sound. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: You have been too quick for me, Socrates; I was just going to + ask you whether you objected to any of my statements. And now I see that + we shall have to consider this notion of there being good government + without laws. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: There can be no doubt that legislation is in a manner the + business of a king, and yet the best thing of all is not that the law + should rule, but that a man should rule supposing him to have wisdom and + royal power. Do you see why this is? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Why? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Because the law does not perfectly comprehend what is noblest + and most just for all and therefore cannot enforce what is best. The + differences of men and actions, and the endless irregular movements of + human things, do not admit of any universal and simple rule. And no art + whatsoever can lay down a rule which will last for all time. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Of course not. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: But the law is always striving to make one;—like an + obstinate and ignorant tyrant, who will not allow anything to be done + contrary to his appointment, or any question to be asked—not even in + sudden changes of circumstances, when something happens to be better than + what he commanded for some one. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly; the law treats us all precisely in the manner + which you describe. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: A perfectly simple principle can never be applied to a state of + things which is the reverse of simple. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Then if the law is not the perfection of right, why are we + compelled to make laws at all? The reason of this has next to be + investigated. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Let me ask, whether you have not meetings for gymnastic contests + in your city, such as there are in other cities, at which men compete in + running, wrestling, and the like? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes; they are very common among us. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And what are the rules which are enforced on their pupils by + professional trainers or by others having similar authority? Can you + remember? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: To what do you refer? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: The training-masters do not issue minute rules for individuals, + or give every individual what is exactly suited to his constitution; they + think that they ought to go more roughly to work, and to prescribe + generally the regimen which will benefit the majority. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And therefore they assign equal amounts of exercise to them all; + they send them forth together, and let them rest together from their + running, wrestling, or whatever the form of bodily exercise may be. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And now observe that the legislator who has to preside over the + herd, and to enforce justice in their dealings with one another, will not + be able, in enacting for the general good, to provide exactly what is + suitable for each particular case. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: He cannot be expected to do so. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: He will lay down laws in a general form for the majority, + roughly meeting the cases of individuals; and some of them he will deliver + in writing, and others will be unwritten; and these last will be + traditional customs of the country. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: He will be right. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Yes, quite right; for how can he sit at every man's side all + through his life, prescribing for him the exact particulars of his duty? + Who, Socrates, would be equal to such a task? No one who really had the + royal science, if he had been able to do this, would have imposed upon + himself the restriction of a written law. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: So I should infer from what has now been said. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Or rather, my good friend, from what is going to be said. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: And what is that? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Let us put to ourselves the case of a physician, or trainer, who + is about to go into a far country, and is expecting to be a long time away + from his patients—thinking that his instructions will not be + remembered unless they are written down, he will leave notes of them for + the use of his pupils or patients. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: But what would you say, if he came back sooner than he had + intended, and, owing to an unexpected change of the winds or other + celestial influences, something else happened to be better for them,—would + he not venture to suggest this new remedy, although not contemplated in + his former prescription? Would he persist in observing the original law, + neither himself giving any new commandments, nor the patient daring to do + otherwise than was prescribed, under the idea that this course only was + healthy and medicinal, all others noxious and heterodox? Viewed in the + light of science and true art, would not all such enactments be utterly + ridiculous? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Utterly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And if he who gave laws, written or unwritten, determining what + was good or bad, honourable or dishonourable, just or unjust, to the + tribes of men who flock together in their several cities, and are governed + in accordance with them; if, I say, the wise legislator were suddenly to + come again, or another like to him, is he to be prohibited from changing + them?—would not this prohibition be in reality quite as ridiculous + as the other? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Do you know a plausible saying of the common people which is in + point? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: I do not recall what you mean at the moment. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: They say that if any one knows how the ancient laws may be + improved, he must first persuade his own State of the improvement, and + then he may legislate, but not otherwise. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: And are they not right? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: I dare say. But supposing that he does use some gentle violence + for their good, what is this violence to be called? Or rather, before you + answer, let me ask the same question in reference to our previous + instances. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Suppose that a skilful physician has a patient, of whatever sex + or age, whom he compels against his will to do something for his good + which is contrary to the written rules; what is this compulsion to be + called? Would you ever dream of calling it a violation of the art, or a + breach of the laws of health? Nothing could be more unjust than for the + patient to whom such violence is applied, to charge the physician who + practises the violence with wanting skill or aggravating his disease. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Most true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: In the political art error is not called disease, but evil, or + disgrace, or injustice. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And when the citizen, contrary to law and custom, is compelled + to do what is juster and better and nobler than he did before, the last + and most absurd thing which he could say about such violence is that he + has incurred disgrace or evil or injustice at the hands of those who + compelled him. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And shall we say that the violence, if exercised by a rich man, + is just, and if by a poor man, unjust? May not any man, rich or poor, with + or without laws, with the will of the citizens or against the will of the + citizens, do what is for their interest? Is not this the true principle of + government, according to which the wise and good man will order the + affairs of his subjects? As the pilot, by watching continually over the + interests of the ship and of the crew,—not by laying down rules, but + by making his art a law,—preserves the lives of his fellow-sailors, + even so, and in the self-same way, may there not be a true form of polity + created by those who are able to govern in a similar spirit, and who show + a strength of art which is superior to the law? Nor can wise rulers ever + err while they observing the one great rule of distributing justice to the + citizens with intelligence and skill, are able to preserve them, and, as + far as may be, to make them better from being worse. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: No one can deny what has been now said. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Neither, if you consider, can any one deny the other statement. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What was it? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: We said that no great number of persons, whoever they may be, + can attain political knowledge, or order a State wisely, but that the true + government is to be found in a small body, or in an individual, and that + other States are but imitations of this, as we said a little while ago, + some for the better and some for the worse. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean? I cannot have understood your previous + remark about imitations. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And yet the mere suggestion which I hastily threw out is highly + important, even if we leave the question where it is, and do not seek by + the discussion of it to expose the error which prevails in this matter. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: The idea which has to be grasped by us is not easy or familiar; + but we may attempt to express it thus:—Supposing the government of + which I have been speaking to be the only true model, then the others must + use the written laws of this—in no other way can they be saved; they + will have to do what is now generally approved, although not the best + thing in the world. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What is this? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: No citizen should do anything contrary to the laws, and any + infringement of them should be punished with death and the most extreme + penalties; and this is very right and good when regarded as the second + best thing, if you set aside the first, of which I was just now speaking. + Shall I explain the nature of what I call the second best? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: By all means. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: I must again have recourse to my favourite images; through them, + and them alone, can I describe kings and rulers. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What images? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: The noble pilot and the wise physician, who 'is worth many + another man'—in the similitude of these let us endeavour to discover + some image of the king. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What sort of an image? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Well, such as this:—Every man will reflect that he suffers + strange things at the hands of both of them; the physician saves any whom + he wishes to save, and any whom he wishes to maltreat he maltreats—cutting + or burning them; and at the same time requiring them to bring him + payments, which are a sort of tribute, of which little or nothing is spent + upon the sick man, and the greater part is consumed by him and his + domestics; and the finale is that he receives money from the relations of + the sick man or from some enemy of his, and puts him out of the way. And + the pilots of ships are guilty of numberless evil deeds of the same kind; + they intentionally play false and leave you ashore when the hour of + sailing arrives; or they cause mishaps at sea and cast away their freight; + and are guilty of other rogueries. Now suppose that we, bearing all this + in mind, were to determine, after consideration, that neither of these + arts shall any longer be allowed to exercise absolute control either over + freemen or over slaves, but that we will summon an assembly either of all + the people, or of the rich only, that anybody who likes, whatever may be + his calling, or even if he have no calling, may offer an opinion either + about seamanship or about diseases—whether as to the manner in which + physic or surgical instruments are to be applied to the patient, or again + about the vessels and the nautical implements which are required in + navigation, and how to meet the dangers of winds and waves which are + incidental to the voyage, how to behave when encountering pirates, and + what is to be done with the old-fashioned galleys, if they have to fight + with others of a similar build—and that, whatever shall be decreed + by the multitude on these points, upon the advice of persons skilled or + unskilled, shall be written down on triangular tablets and columns, or + enacted although unwritten to be national customs; and that in all future + time vessels shall be navigated and remedies administered to the patient + after this fashion. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What a strange notion! + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Suppose further, that the pilots and physicians are appointed + annually, either out of the rich, or out of the whole people, and that + they are elected by lot; and that after their election they navigate + vessels and heal the sick according to the written rules. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Worse and worse. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: But hear what follows:—When the year of office has + expired, the pilot or physician has to come before a court of review, in + which the judges are either selected from the wealthy classes or chosen by + lot out of the whole people; and anybody who pleases may be their accuser, + and may lay to their charge, that during the past year they have not + navigated their vessels or healed their patients according to the letter + of the law and the ancient customs of their ancestors; and if either of + them is condemned, some of the judges must fix what he is to suffer or + pay. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: He who is willing to take a command under such conditions, + deserves to suffer any penalty. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Yet once more, we shall have to enact that if any one is + detected enquiring into piloting and navigation, or into health and the + true nature of medicine, or about the winds, or other conditions of the + atmosphere, contrary to the written rules, and has any ingenious notions + about such matters, he is not to be called a pilot or physician, but a + cloudy prating sophist;—further, on the ground that he is a + corrupter of the young, who would persuade them to follow the art of + medicine or piloting in an unlawful manner, and to exercise an arbitrary + rule over their patients or ships, any one who is qualified by law may + inform against him, and indict him in some court, and then if he is found + to be persuading any, whether young or old, to act contrary to the written + law, he is to be punished with the utmost rigour; for no one should + presume to be wiser than the laws; and as touching healing and health and + piloting and navigation, the nature of them is known to all, for anybody + may learn the written laws and the national customs. If such were the mode + of procedure, Socrates, about these sciences and about generalship, and + any branch of hunting, or about painting or imitation in general, or + carpentry, or any sort of handicraft, or husbandry, or planting, or if we + were to see an art of rearing horses, or tending herds, or divination, or + any ministerial service, or draught-playing, or any science conversant + with number, whether simple or square or cube, or comprising motion,—I + say, if all these things were done in this way according to written + regulations, and not according to art, what would be the result? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: All the arts would utterly perish, and could never be + recovered, because enquiry would be unlawful. And human life, which is bad + enough already, would then become utterly unendurable. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: But what, if while compelling all these operations to be + regulated by written law, we were to appoint as the guardian of the laws + some one elected by a show of hands, or by lot, and he caring nothing + about the laws, were to act contrary to them from motives of interest or + favour, and without knowledge,—would not this be a still worse evil + than the former? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: To go against the laws, which are based upon long experience, + and the wisdom of counsellors who have graciously recommended them and + persuaded the multitude to pass them, would be a far greater and more + ruinous error than any adherence to written law? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Therefore, as there is a danger of this, the next best thing in + legislating is not to allow either the individual or the multitude to + break the law in any respect whatever. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: The laws would be copies of the true particulars of action as + far as they admit of being written down from the lips of those who have + knowledge? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly they would. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And, as we were saying, he who has knowledge and is a true + Statesman, will do many things within his own sphere of action by his art + without regard to the laws, when he is of opinion that something other + than that which he has written down and enjoined to be observed during his + absence would be better. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, we said so. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And any individual or any number of men, having fixed laws, in + acting contrary to them with a view to something better, would only be + acting, as far as they are able, like the true Statesman? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: If they had no knowledge of what they were doing, they would + imitate the truth, and they would always imitate ill; but if they had + knowledge, the imitation would be the perfect truth, and an imitation no + longer. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And the principle that no great number of men are able to + acquire a knowledge of any art has been already admitted by us. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, it has. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Then the royal or political art, if there be such an art, will + never be attained either by the wealthy or by the other mob. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Impossible. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Then the nearest approach which these lower forms of government + can ever make to the true government of the one scientific ruler, is to do + nothing contrary to their own written laws and national customs. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: When the rich imitate the true form, such a government is called + aristocracy; and when they are regardless of the laws, oligarchy. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Or again, when an individual rules according to law in imitation + of him who knows, we call him a king; and if he rules according to law, we + give him the same name, whether he rules with opinion or with knowledge. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: To be sure. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And when an individual truly possessing knowledge rules, his + name will surely be the same—he will be called a king; and thus the + five names of governments, as they are now reckoned, become one. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: That is true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And when an individual ruler governs neither by law nor by + custom, but following in the steps of the true man of science pretends + that he can only act for the best by violating the laws, while in reality + appetite and ignorance are the motives of the imitation, may not such an + one be called a tyrant? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And this we believe to be the origin of the tyrant and the king, + of oligarchies, and aristocracies, and democracies,—because men are + offended at the one monarch, and can never be made to believe that any one + can be worthy of such authority, or is able and willing in the spirit of + virtue and knowledge to act justly and holily to all; they fancy that he + will be a despot who will wrong and harm and slay whom he pleases of us; + for if there could be such a despot as we describe, they would acknowledge + that we ought to be too glad to have him, and that he alone would be the + happy ruler of a true and perfect State. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: To be sure. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: But then, as the State is not like a beehive, and has no natural + head who is at once recognized to be the superior both in body and in + mind, mankind are obliged to meet and make laws, and endeavour to approach + as nearly as they can to the true form of government. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And when the foundation of politics is in the letter only and in + custom, and knowledge is divorced from action, can we wonder, Socrates, at + the miseries which there are, and always will be, in States? Any other + art, built on such a foundation and thus conducted, would ruin all that it + touched. Ought we not rather to wonder at the natural strength of the + political bond? For States have endured all this, time out of mind, and + yet some of them still remain and are not overthrown, though many of them, + like ships at sea, founder from time to time, and perish and have perished + and will hereafter perish, through the badness of their pilots and crews, + who have the worst sort of ignorance of the highest truths—I mean to + say, that they are wholly unaquainted with politics, of which, above all + other sciences, they believe themselves to have acquired the most perfect + knowledge. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Then the question arises:—which of these untrue forms of + government is the least oppressive to their subjects, though they are all + oppressive; and which is the worst of them? Here is a consideration which + is beside our present purpose, and yet having regard to the whole it seems + to influence all our actions: we must examine it. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, we must. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: You may say that of the three forms, the same is at once the + hardest and the easiest. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: I am speaking of the three forms of government, which I + mentioned at the beginning of this discussion—monarchy, the rule of + the few, and the rule of the many. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: If we divide each of these we shall have six, from which the + true one may be distinguished as a seventh. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: How would you make the division? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Monarchy divides into royalty and tyranny; the rule of the few + into aristocracy, which has an auspicious name, and oligarchy; and + democracy or the rule of the many, which before was one, must now be + divided. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: On what principle of division? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: On the same principle as before, although the name is now + discovered to have a twofold meaning. For the distinction of ruling with + law or without law, applies to this as well as to the rest. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: The division made no difference when we were looking for the + perfect State, as we showed before. But now that this has been separated + off, and, as we said, the others alone are left for us, the principle of + law and the absence of law will bisect them all. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: That would seem to follow, from what has been said. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Then monarchy, when bound by good prescriptions or laws, is the + best of all the six, and when lawless is the most bitter and oppressive to + the subject. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: The government of the few, which is intermediate between that of + the one and many, is also intermediate in good and evil; but the + government of the many is in every respect weak and unable to do either + any great good or any great evil, when compared with the others, because + the offices are too minutely subdivided and too many hold them. And this + therefore is the worst of all lawful governments, and the best of all + lawless ones. If they are all without the restraints of law, democracy is + the form in which to live is best; if they are well ordered, then this is + the last which you should choose, as royalty, the first form, is the best, + with the exception of the seventh, for that excels them all, and is among + States what God is among men. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: You are quite right, and we should choose that above all. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: The members of all these States, with the exception of the one + which has knowledge, may be set aside as being not Statesmen but + partisans,—upholders of the most monstrous idols, and themselves + idols; and, being the greatest imitators and magicians, they are also the + greatest of Sophists. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: The name of Sophist after many windings in the argument + appears to have been most justly fixed upon the politicians, as they are + termed. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And so our satyric drama has been played out; and the troop of + Centaurs and Satyrs, however unwilling to leave the stage, have at last + been separated from the political science. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: So I perceive. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: There remain, however, natures still more troublesome, because + they are more nearly akin to the king, and more difficult to discern; the + examination of them may be compared to the process of refining gold. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What is your meaning? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: The workmen begin by sifting away the earth and stones and the + like; there remain in a confused mass the valuable elements akin to gold, + which can only be separated by fire,—copper, silver, and other + precious metal; these are at last refined away by the use of tests, until + the gold is left quite pure. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, that is the way in which these things are said to be + done. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: In like manner, all alien and uncongenial matter has been + separated from political science, and what is precious and of a kindred + nature has been left; there remain the nobler arts of the general and the + judge, and the higher sort of oratory which is an ally of the royal art, + and persuades men to do justice, and assists in guiding the helm of + States:—How can we best clear away all these, leaving him whom we + seek alone and unalloyed? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: That is obviously what has in some way to be attempted. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: If the attempt is all that is wanting, he shall certainly be + brought to light; and I think that the illustration of music may assist in + exhibiting him. Please to answer me a question. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What question? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: There is such a thing as learning music or handicraft arts in + general? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: There is. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And is there any higher art or science, having power to decide + which of these arts are and are not to be learned;—what do you say? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: I should answer that there is. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And do we acknowledge this science to be different from the + others? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And ought the other sciences to be superior to this, or no + single science to any other? Or ought this science to be the overseer and + governor of all the others? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: The latter. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: You mean to say that the science which judges whether we ought + to learn or not, must be superior to the science which is learned or which + teaches? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Far superior. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And the science which determines whether we ought to persuade or + not, must be superior to the science which is able to persuade? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Of course. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Very good; and to what science do we assign the power of + persuading a multitude by a pleasing tale and not by teaching? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: That power, I think, must clearly be assigned to rhetoric. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And to what science do we give the power of determining whether + we are to employ persuasion or force towards any one, or to refrain + altogether? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: To that science which governs the arts of speech and + persuasion. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Which, if I am not mistaken, will be politics? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Rhetoric seems to be quickly distinguished from politics, being + a different species, yet ministering to it. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: But what would you think of another sort of power or science? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What science? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: The science which has to do with military operations against our + enemies—is that to be regarded as a science or not? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: How can generalship and military tactics be regarded as + other than a science? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And is the art which is able and knows how to advise when we are + to go to war, or to make peace, the same as this or different? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: If we are to be consistent, we must say different. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And we must also suppose that this rules the other, if we are + not to give up our former notion? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And, considering how great and terrible the whole art of war is, + can we imagine any which is superior to it but the truly royal? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: No other. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: The art of the general is only ministerial, and therefore not + political? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Exactly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Once more let us consider the nature of the righteous judge. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Does he do anything but decide the dealings of men with one + another to be just or unjust in accordance with the standard which he + receives from the king and legislator,—showing his own peculiar + virtue only in this, that he is not perverted by gifts, or fears, or pity, + or by any sort of favour or enmity, into deciding the suits of men with + one another contrary to the appointment of the legislator? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: No; his office is such as you describe. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Then the inference is that the power of the judge is not royal, + but only the power of a guardian of the law which ministers to the royal + power? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: The review of all these sciences shows that none of them is + political or royal. For the truly royal ought not itself to act, but to + rule over those who are able to act; the king ought to know what is and + what is not a fitting opportunity for taking the initiative in matters of + the greatest importance, whilst others should execute his orders. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And, therefore, the arts which we have described, as they have + no authority over themselves or one another, but are each of them + concerned with some special action of their own, have, as they ought to + have, special names corresponding to their several actions. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: I agree. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And the science which is over them all, and has charge of the + laws, and of all matters affecting the State, and truly weaves them all + into one, if we would describe under a name characteristic of their common + nature, most truly we may call politics. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Exactly so. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Then, now that we have discovered the various classes in a + State, shall I analyse politics after the pattern which weaving supplied? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: I greatly wish that you would. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Then I must describe the nature of the royal web, and show how + the various threads are woven into one piece. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: A task has to be accomplished, which, although difficult, + appears to be necessary. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly the attempt must be made. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: To assume that one part of virtue differs in kind from another, + is a position easily assailable by contentious disputants, who appeal to + popular opinion. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: I do not understand. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Let me put the matter in another way: I suppose that you would + consider courage to be a part of virtue? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly I should. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And you would think temperance to be different from courage; and + likewise to be a part of virtue? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: I shall venture to put forward a strange theory about them. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: That they are two principles which thoroughly hate one another + and are antagonistic throughout a great part of nature. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: How singular! + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Yes, very—for all the parts of virtue are commonly said to + be friendly to one another. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Then let us carefully investigate whether this is universally + true, or whether there are not parts of virtue which are at war with their + kindred in some respect. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Tell me how we shall consider that question. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: We must extend our enquiry to all those things which we consider + beautiful and at the same time place in two opposite classes. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Explain; what are they? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Acuteness and quickness, whether in body or soul or in the + movement of sound, and the imitations of them which painting and music + supply, you must have praised yourself before now, or been present when + others praised them. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And do you remember the terms in which they are praised? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: I do not. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: I wonder whether I can explain to you in words the thought which + is passing in my mind. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Why not? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: You fancy that this is all so easy: Well, let us consider these + notions with reference to the opposite classes of action under which they + fall. When we praise quickness and energy and acuteness, whether of mind + or body or sound, we express our praise of the quality which we admire by + one word, and that one word is manliness or courage. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: How? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: We speak of an action as energetic and brave, quick and manly, + and vigorous too; and when we apply the name of which I speak as the + common attribute of all these natures, we certainly praise them. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And do we not often praise the quiet strain of action also? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: To be sure. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And do we not then say the opposite of what we said of the + other? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: How do you mean? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: We exclaim How calm! How temperate! in admiration of the slow + and quiet working of the intellect, and of steadiness and gentleness in + action, of smoothness and depth of voice, and of all rhythmical movement + and of music in general, when these have a proper solemnity. Of all such + actions we predicate not courage, but a name indicative of order. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: But when, on the other hand, either of these is out of place, + the names of either are changed into terms of censure. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: How so? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Too great sharpness or quickness or hardness is termed violence + or madness; too great slowness or gentleness is called cowardice or + sluggishness; and we may observe, that for the most part these qualities, + and the temperance and manliness of the opposite characters, are arrayed + as enemies on opposite sides, and do not mingle with one another in their + respective actions; and if we pursue the enquiry, we shall find that men + who have these different qualities of mind differ from one another. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: In what respect? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: In respect of all the qualities which I mentioned, and very + likely of many others. According to their respective affinities to either + class of actions they distribute praise and blame,—praise to the + actions which are akin to their own, blame to those of the opposite party—and + out of this many quarrels and occasions of quarrel arise among them. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: The difference between the two classes is often a trivial + concern; but in a state, and when affecting really important matters, + becomes of all disorders the most hateful. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: To what do you refer? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: To nothing short of the whole regulation of human life. For the + orderly class are always ready to lead a peaceful life, quietly doing + their own business; this is their manner of behaving with all men at home, + and they are equally ready to find some way of keeping the peace with + foreign States. And on account of this fondness of theirs for peace, which + is often out of season where their influence prevails, they become by + degrees unwarlike, and bring up their young men to be like themselves; + they are at the mercy of their enemies; whence in a few years they and + their children and the whole city often pass imperceptibly from the + condition of freemen into that of slaves. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What a cruel fate! + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And now think of what happens with the more courageous natures. + Are they not always inciting their country to go to war, owing to their + excessive love of the military life? they raise up enemies against + themselves many and mighty, and either utterly ruin their native-land or + enslave and subject it to its foes? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: That, again, is true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Must we not admit, then, that where these two classes exist, + they always feel the greatest antipathy and antagonism towards one + another? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: We cannot deny it. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And returning to the enquiry with which we began, have we not + found that considerable portions of virtue are at variance with one + another, and give rise to a similar opposition in the characters who are + endowed with them? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Let us consider a further point. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: I want to know, whether any constructive art will make any, even + the most trivial thing, out of bad and good materials indifferently, if + this can be helped? does not all art rather reject the bad as far as + possible, and accept the good and fit materials, and from these elements, + whether like or unlike, gathering them all into one, work out some nature + or idea? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: To, be sure. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Then the true and natural art of statesmanship will never allow + any State to be formed by a combination of good and bad men, if this can + be avoided; but will begin by testing human natures in play, and after + testing them, will entrust them to proper teachers who are the ministers + of her purposes—she will herself give orders, and maintain + authority; just as the art of weaving continually gives orders and + maintains authority over the carders and all the others who prepare the + material for the work, commanding the subsidiary arts to execute the works + which she deems necessary for making the web. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: In like manner, the royal science appears to me to be the + mistress of all lawful educators and instructors, and having this queenly + power, will not permit them to train men in what will produce characters + unsuited to the political constitution which she desires to create, but + only in what will produce such as are suitable. Those which have no share + of manliness and temperance, or any other virtuous inclination, and, from + the necessity of an evil nature, are violently carried away to godlessness + and insolence and injustice, she gets rid of by death and exile, and + punishes them with the greatest of disgraces. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: That is commonly said. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: But those who are wallowing in ignorance and baseness she bows + under the yoke of slavery. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite right. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: The rest of the citizens, out of whom, if they have education, + something noble may be made, and who are capable of being united by the + statesman, the kingly art blends and weaves together; taking on the one + hand those whose natures tend rather to courage, which is the stronger + element and may be regarded as the warp, and on the other hand those which + incline to order and gentleness, and which are represented in the figure + as spun thick and soft, after the manner of the woof—these, which + are naturally opposed, she seeks to bind and weave together in the + following manner: + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: In what manner? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: First of all, she takes the eternal element of the soul and + binds it with a divine cord, to which it is akin, and then the animal + nature, and binds that with human cords. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: I do not understand what you mean. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: The meaning is, that the opinion about the honourable and the + just and good and their opposites, which is true and confirmed by reason, + is a divine principle, and when implanted in the soul, is implanted, as I + maintain, in a nature of heavenly birth. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes; what else should it be? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Only the Statesman and the good legislator, having the + inspiration of the royal muse, can implant this opinion, and he, only in + the rightly educated, whom we were just now describing. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Likely enough. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: But him who cannot, we will not designate by any of the names + which are the subject of the present enquiry. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very right. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: The courageous soul when attaining this truth becomes civilized, + and rendered more capable of partaking of justice; but when not partaking, + is inclined to brutality. Is not that true? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And again, the peaceful and orderly nature, if sharing in these + opinions, becomes temperate and wise, as far as this may be in a State, + but if not, deservedly obtains the ignominious name of silliness. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Can we say that such a connexion as this will lastingly unite + the evil with one another or with the good, or that any science would + seriously think of using a bond of this kind to join such materials? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Impossible. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: But in those who were originally of a noble nature, and who have + been nurtured in noble ways, and in those only, may we not say that union + is implanted by law, and that this is the medicine which art prescribes + for them, and of all the bonds which unite the dissimilar and contrary + parts of virtue is not this, as I was saying, the divinest? + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Where this divine bond exists there is no difficulty in + imagining, or when you have imagined, in creating the other bonds, which + are human only. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: How is that, and what bonds do you mean? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Rights of intermarriage, and ties which are formed between + States by giving and taking children in marriage, or between individuals + by private betrothals and espousals. For most persons form marriage + connexions without due regard to what is best for the procreation of + children. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: In what way? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: They seek after wealth and power, which in matrimony are objects + not worthy even of a serious censure. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: There is no need to consider them at all. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: More reason is there to consider the practice of those who make + family their chief aim, and to indicate their error. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: They act on no true principle at all; they seek their ease and + receive with open arms those who are like themselves, and hate those who + are unlike them, being too much influenced by feelings of dislike. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: How so? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: The quiet orderly class seek for natures like their own, and as + far as they can they marry and give in marriage exclusively in this class, + and the courageous do the same; they seek natures like their own, whereas + they should both do precisely the opposite. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: How and why is that? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Because courage, when untempered by the gentler nature during + many generations, may at first bloom and strengthen, but at last bursts + forth into downright madness. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Like enough. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: And then, again, the soul which is over-full of modesty and has + no element of courage in many successive generations, is apt to grow too + indolent, and at last to become utterly paralyzed and useless. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: That, again, is quite likely. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: It was of these bonds I said that there would be no difficulty + in creating them, if only both classes originally held the same opinion + about the honourable and good;—indeed, in this single work, the + whole process of royal weaving is comprised—never to allow temperate + natures to be separated from the brave, but to weave them together, like + the warp and the woof, by common sentiments and honours and reputation, + and by the giving of pledges to one another; and out of them forming one + smooth and even web, to entrust to them the offices of State. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: How do you mean? + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: Where one officer only is needed, you must choose a ruler who + has both these qualities—when many, you must mingle some of each, + for the temperate ruler is very careful and just and safe, but is wanting + in thoroughness and go. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly, that is very true. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: The character of the courageous, on the other hand, falls short + of the former in justice and caution, but has the power of action in a + remarkable degree, and where either of these two qualities is wanting, + there cities cannot altogether prosper either in their public or private + life. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly they cannot. + </p> + <p> + STRANGER: This then we declare to be the completion of the web of + political action, which is created by a direct intertexture of the brave + and temperate natures, whenever the royal science has drawn the two minds + into communion with one another by unanimity and friendship, and having + perfected the noblest and best of all the webs which political life + admits, and enfolding therein all other inhabitants of cities, whether + slaves or freemen, binds them in one fabric and governs and presides over + them, and, in so far as to be happy is vouchsafed to a city, in no + particular fails to secure their happiness. + </p> + <p> + YOUNG SOCRATES: Your picture, Stranger, of the king and statesman, no less + than of the Sophist, is quite perfect. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Statesman, by Plato + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK STATESMAN *** + +***** This file should be named 1738-h.htm or 1738-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/1/7/3/1738/ + +Produced by Sue Asscher, and David Widger + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Statesman + +Author: Plato + +Translator: Benjamin Jowett + +Posting Date: November 7, 2008 [EBook #1738] +Release Date: May, 1999 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK STATESMAN *** + + + + +Produced by Sue Asscher + + + + + +STATESMAN + +By Plato + + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + + + +INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS. + +In the Phaedrus, the Republic, the Philebus, the Parmenides, and the +Sophist, we may observe the tendency of Plato to combine two or more +subjects or different aspects of the same subject in a single dialogue. +In the Sophist and Statesman especially we note that the discussion is +partly regarded as an illustration of method, and that analogies are +brought from afar which throw light on the main subject. And in his +later writings generally we further remark a decline of style, and of +dramatic power; the characters excite little or no interest, and +the digressions are apt to overlay the main thesis; there is not the +'callida junctura' of an artistic whole. Both the serious discussions +and the jests are sometimes out of place. The invincible Socrates is +withdrawn from view; and new foes begin to appear under old names. Plato +is now chiefly concerned, not with the original Sophist, but with the +sophistry of the schools of philosophy, which are making reasoning +impossible; and is driven by them out of the regions of transcendental +speculation back into the path of common sense. A logical or +psychological phase takes the place of the doctrine of Ideas in +his mind. He is constantly dwelling on the importance of regular +classification, and of not putting words in the place of things. He has +banished the poets, and is beginning to use a technical language. He is +bitter and satirical, and seems to be sadly conscious of the realities +of human life. Yet the ideal glory of the Platonic philosophy is not +extinguished. He is still looking for a city in which kings are either +philosophers or gods (compare Laws). + +The Statesman has lost the grace and beauty of the earlier dialogues. +The mind of the writer seems to be so overpowered in the effort of +thought as to impair his style; at least his gift of expression does +not keep up with the increasing difficulty of his theme. The idea of the +king or statesman and the illustration of method are connected, not like +the love and rhetoric of the Phaedrus, by 'little invisible pegs,' +but in a confused and inartistic manner, which fails to produce any +impression of a whole on the mind of the reader. Plato apologizes for +his tediousness, and acknowledges that the improvement of his audience +has been his only aim in some of his digressions. His own image may be +used as a motto of his style: like an inexpert statuary he has made the +figure or outline too large, and is unable to give the proper colours +or proportions to his work. He makes mistakes only to correct them--this +seems to be his way of drawing attention to common dialectical errors. +The Eleatic stranger, here, as in the Sophist, has no appropriate +character, and appears only as the expositor of a political ideal, in +the delineation of which he is frequently interrupted by purely logical +illustrations. The younger Socrates resembles his namesake in nothing +but a name. The dramatic character is so completely forgotten, that a +special reference is twice made to discussions in the Sophist; and this, +perhaps, is the strongest ground which can be urged for doubting the +genuineness of the work. But, when we remember that a similar allusion +is made in the Laws to the Republic, we see that the entire disregard +of dramatic propriety is not always a sufficient reason for doubting the +genuineness of a Platonic writing. + +The search after the Statesman, which is carried on, like that for +the Sophist, by the method of dichotomy, gives an opportunity for many +humorous and satirical remarks. Several of the jests are mannered and +laboured: for example, the turn of words with which the dialogue +opens; or the clumsy joke about man being an animal, who has a power +of two-feet--both which are suggested by the presence of Theodorus, the +geometrician. There is political as well as logical insight in refusing +to admit the division of mankind into Hellenes and Barbarians: 'if a +crane could speak, he would in like manner oppose men and all other +animals to cranes.' The pride of the Hellene is further humbled, +by being compared to a Phrygian or Lydian. Plato glories in this +impartiality of the dialectical method, which places birds in +juxtaposition with men, and the king side by side with the bird-catcher; +king or vermin-destroyer are objects of equal interest to science +(compare Parmen.). There are other passages which show that the irony +of Socrates was a lesson which Plato was not slow in learning--as, for +example, the passing remark, that 'the kings and statesmen of our day +are in their breeding and education very like their subjects;' or the +anticipation that the rivals of the king will be found in the class +of servants; or the imposing attitude of the priests, who are the +established interpreters of the will of heaven, authorized by law. +Nothing is more bitter in all his writings than his comparison of the +contemporary politicians to lions, centaurs, satyrs, and other animals +of a feebler sort, who are ever changing their forms and natures. But, +as in the later dialogues generally, the play of humour and the charm of +poetry have departed, never to return. + +Still the Politicus contains a higher and more ideal conception of +politics than any other of Plato's writings. The city of which there +is a pattern in heaven (Republic), is here described as a Paradisiacal +state of human society. In the truest sense of all, the ruler is not +man but God; and such a government existed in a former cycle of human +history, and may again exist when the gods resume their care of mankind. +In a secondary sense, the true form of government is that which has +scientific rulers, who are irresponsible to their subjects. Not power +but knowledge is the characteristic of a king or royal person. And the +rule of a man is better and higher than law, because he is more able +to deal with the infinite complexity of human affairs. But mankind, in +despair of finding a true ruler, are willing to acquiesce in any law or +custom which will save them from the caprice of individuals. They are +ready to accept any of the six forms of government which prevail in the +world. To the Greek, nomos was a sacred word, but the political idealism +of Plato soars into a region beyond; for the laws he would substitute +the intelligent will of the legislator. Education is originally to +implant in men's minds a sense of truth and justice, which is the divine +bond of states, and the legislator is to contrive human bonds, by which +dissimilar natures may be united in marriage and supply the deficiencies +of one another. As in the Republic, the government of philosophers, the +causes of the perversion of states, the regulation of marriages, are +still the political problems with which Plato's mind is occupied. He +treats them more slightly, partly because the dialogue is shorter, and +also because the discussion of them is perpetually crossed by the other +interest of dialectic, which has begun to absorb him. + +The plan of the Politicus or Statesman may be briefly sketched as +follows: (1) By a process of division and subdivision we discover the +true herdsman or king of men. But before we can rightly distinguish him +from his rivals, we must view him, (2) as he is presented to us in a +famous ancient tale: the tale will also enable us to distinguish the +divine from the human herdsman or shepherd: (3) and besides our fable, +we must have an example; for our example we will select the art of +weaving, which will have to be distinguished from the kindred arts; +and then, following this pattern, we will separate the king from his +subordinates or competitors. (4) But are we not exceeding all due +limits; and is there not a measure of all arts and sciences, to which +the art of discourse must conform? There is; but before we can apply +this measure, we must know what is the aim of discourse: and our +discourse only aims at the dialectical improvement of ourselves and +others.--Having made our apology, we return once more to the king or +statesman, and proceed to contrast him with pretenders in the same +line with him, under their various forms of government. (5) His +characteristic is, that he alone has science, which is superior to law +and written enactments; these do but spring out of the necessities of +mankind, when they are in despair of finding the true king. (6) The +sciences which are most akin to the royal are the sciences of the +general, the judge, the orator, which minister to him, but even these +are subordinate to him. (7) Fixed principles are implanted by education, +and the king or statesman completes the political web by marrying +together dissimilar natures, the courageous and the temperate, the bold +and the gentle, who are the warp and the woof of society. + +The outline may be filled up as follows:-- + +SOCRATES: I have reason to thank you, Theodorus, for the acquaintance of +Theaetetus and the Stranger. + +THEODORUS: And you will have three times as much reason to thank me +when they have delineated the Statesman and Philosopher, as well as the +Sophist. + +SOCRATES: Does the great geometrician apply the same measure to all +three? Are they not divided by an interval which no geometrical ratio +can express? + +THEODORUS: By the god Ammon, Socrates, you are right; and I am glad to +see that you have not forgotten your geometry. But before I retaliate on +you, I must request the Stranger to finish the argument... + +The Stranger suggests that Theaetetus shall be allowed to rest, and that +Socrates the younger shall respond in his place; Theodorus agrees to the +suggestion, and Socrates remarks that the name of the one and the face +of the other give him a right to claim relationship with both of them. +They propose to take the Statesman after the Sophist; his path they +must determine, and part off all other ways, stamping upon them a single +negative form (compare Soph.). + +The Stranger begins the enquiry by making a division of the arts and +sciences into theoretical and practical--the one kind concerned with +knowledge exclusively, and the other with action; arithmetic and the +mathematical sciences are examples of the former, and carpentering and +handicraft arts of the latter (compare Philebus). Under which of the two +shall we place the Statesman? Or rather, shall we not first ask, whether +the king, statesman, master, householder, practise one art or many? As +the adviser of a physician may be said to have medical science and to be +a physician, so the adviser of a king has royal science and is a king. +And the master of a large household may be compared to the ruler of a +small state. Hence we conclude that the science of the king, statesman, +and householder is one and the same. And this science is akin to +knowledge rather than to action. For a king rules with his mind, and not +with his hands. + +But theoretical science may be a science either of judging, like +arithmetic, or of ruling and superintending, like that of the architect +or master-builder. And the science of the king is of the latter nature; +but the power which he exercises is underived and uncontrolled,--a +characteristic which distinguishes him from heralds, prophets, and +other inferior officers. He is the wholesale dealer in command, and the +herald, or other officer, retails his commands to others. Again, a ruler +is concerned with the production of some object, and objects may be +divided into living and lifeless, and rulers into the rulers of living +and lifeless objects. And the king is not like the master-builder, +concerned with lifeless matter, but has the task of managing living +animals. And the tending of living animals may be either a tending of +individuals, or a managing of herds. And the Statesman is not a groom, +but a herdsman, and his art may be called either the art of managing +a herd, or the art of collective management:--Which do you prefer? 'No +matter.' Very good, Socrates, and if you are not too particular about +words you will be all the richer some day in true wisdom. But how would +you subdivide the herdsman's art? 'I should say, that there is one +management of men, and another of beasts.' Very good, but you are in too +great a hurry to get to man. All divisions which are rightly made should +cut through the middle; if you attend to this rule, you will be more +likely to arrive at classes. 'I do not understand the nature of my +mistake.' Your division was like a division of the human race into +Hellenes and Barbarians, or into Lydians or Phrygians and all other +nations, instead of into male and female; or like a division of number +into ten thousand and all other numbers, instead of into odd and even. +And I should like you to observe further, that though I maintain a class +to be a part, there is no similar necessity for a part to be a class. +But to return to your division, you spoke of men and other animals as +two classes--the second of which you comprehended under the general name +of beasts. This is the sort of division which an intelligent crane would +make: he would put cranes into a class by themselves for their special +glory, and jumble together all others, including man, in the class of +beasts. An error of this kind can only be avoided by a more regular +subdivision. Just now we divided the whole class of animals into +gregarious and non-gregarious, omitting the previous division into tame +and wild. We forgot this in our hurry to arrive at man, and found by +experience, as the proverb says, that 'the more haste the worse speed.' + +And now let us begin again at the art of managing herds. You have +probably heard of the fish-preserves in the Nile and in the ponds of the +Great King, and of the nurseries of geese and cranes in Thessaly. These +suggest a new division into the rearing or management of land-herds and +of water-herds:--I need not say with which the king is concerned. And +land-herds may be divided into walking and flying; and every idiot knows +that the political animal is a pedestrian. At this point we may take a +longer or a shorter road, and as we are already near the end, I see no +harm in taking the longer, which is the way of mesotomy, and accords +with the principle which we were laying down. The tame, walking, herding +animal, may be divided into two classes--the horned and the hornless, +and the king is concerned with the hornless; and these again may be +subdivided into animals having or not having cloven feet, or mixing or +not mixing the breed; and the king or statesman has the care of animals +which have not cloven feet, and which do not mix the breed. And now, if +we omit dogs, who can hardly be said to herd, I think that we have only +two species left which remain undivided: and how are we to distinguish +them? To geometricians, like you and Theaetetus, I can have no +difficulty in explaining that man is a diameter, having a power of two +feet; and the power of four-legged creatures, being the double of two +feet, is the diameter of our diameter. There is another excellent jest +which I spy in the two remaining species. Men and birds are both bipeds, +and human beings are running a race with the airiest and freest of +creation, in which they are far behind their competitors;--this is a +great joke, and there is a still better in the juxtaposition of the +bird-taker and the king, who may be seen scampering after them. For, +as we remarked in discussing the Sophist, the dialectical method is no +respecter of persons. But we might have proceeded, as I was saying, +by another and a shorter road. In that case we should have begun by +dividing land animals into bipeds and quadrupeds, and bipeds into winged +and wingless; we should than have taken the Statesman and set him over +the 'bipes implume,' and put the reins of government into his hands. + +Here let us sum up:--The science of pure knowledge had a part which +was the science of command, and this had a part which was a science of +wholesale command; and this was divided into the management of animals, +and was again parted off into the management of herds of animals, and +again of land animals, and these into hornless, and these into bipeds; +and so at last we arrived at man, and found the political and royal +science. And yet we have not clearly distinguished the political +shepherd from his rivals. No one would think of usurping the +prerogatives of the ordinary shepherd, who on all hands is admitted to +be the trainer, matchmaker, doctor, musician of his flock. But the royal +shepherd has numberless competitors, from whom he must be distinguished; +there are merchants, husbandmen, physicians, who will all dispute his +right to manage the flock. I think that we can best distinguish him by +having recourse to a famous old tradition, which may amuse as well as +instruct us; the narrative is perfectly true, although the scepticism of +mankind is prone to doubt the tales of old. You have heard what happened +in the quarrel of Atreus and Thyestes? 'You mean about the golden lamb?' +No, not that; but another part of the story, which tells how the sun +and stars once arose in the west and set in the east, and that the god +reversed their motion, as a witness to the right of Atreus. 'There is +such a story.' And no doubt you have heard of the empire of Cronos, and +of the earthborn men? The origin of these and the like stories is to be +found in the tale which I am about to narrate. + +There was a time when God directed the revolutions of the world, but +at the completion of a certain cycle he let go; and the world, by a +necessity of its nature, turned back, and went round the other way. +For divine things alone are unchangeable; but the earth and heavens, +although endowed with many glories, have a body, and are therefore +liable to perturbation. In the case of the world, the perturbation is +very slight, and amounts only to a reversal of motion. For the lord of +moving things is alone self-moved; neither can piety allow that he goes +at one time in one direction and at another time in another; or that God +has given the universe opposite motions; or that there are two gods, one +turning it in one direction, another in another. But the truth is, that +there are two cycles of the world, and in one of them it is governed by +an immediate Providence, and receives life and immortality, and in the +other is let go again, and has a reverse action during infinite ages. +This new action is spontaneous, and is due to exquisite perfection of +balance, to the vast size of the universe, and to the smallness of the +pivot upon which it turns. All changes in the heaven affect the animal +world, and this being the greatest of them, is most destructive to men +and animals. At the beginning of the cycle before our own very few of +them had survived; and on these a mighty change passed. For their life +was reversed like the motion of the world, and first of all coming to a +stand then quickly returned to youth and beauty. The white locks of the +aged became black; the cheeks of the bearded man were restored to their +youth and fineness; the young men grew softer and smaller, and, being +reduced to the condition of children in mind as well as body, began to +vanish away; and the bodies of those who had died by violence, in a few +moments underwent a parallel change and disappeared. In that cycle of +existence there was no such thing as the procreation of animals from one +another, but they were born of the earth, and of this our ancestors, who +came into being immediately after the end of the last cycle and at the +beginning of this, have preserved the recollection. Such traditions are +often now unduly discredited, and yet they may be proved by internal +evidence. For observe how consistent the narrative is; as the old +returned to youth, so the dead returned to life; the wheel of their +existence having been reversed, they rose again from the earth: a few +only were reserved by God for another destiny. Such was the origin of +the earthborn men. + +'And is this cycle, of which you are speaking, the reign of Cronos, +or our present state of existence?' No, Socrates, that blessed and +spontaneous life belongs not to this, but to the previous state, in +which God was the governor of the whole world, and other gods subject +to him ruled over parts of the world, as is still the case in certain +places. They were shepherds of men and animals, each of them sufficing +for those of whom he had the care. And there was no violence among them, +or war, or devouring of one another. Their life was spontaneous, because +in those days God ruled over man; and he was to man what man is now +to the animals. Under his government there were no estates, or private +possessions, or families; but the earth produced a sufficiency of all +things, and men were born out of the earth, having no traditions of +the past; and as the temperature of the seasons was mild, they took no +thought for raiment, and had no beds, but lived and dwelt in the open +air. + +Such was the age of Cronos, and the age of Zeus is our own. Tell me, +which is the happier of the two? Or rather, shall I tell you that the +happiness of these children of Cronos must have depended on how +they used their time? If having boundless leisure, and the power of +discoursing not only with one another but with the animals, they had +employed these advantages with a view to philosophy, gathering from +every nature some addition to their store of knowledge;--or again, if +they had merely eaten and drunk, and told stories to one another, and +to the beasts;--in either case, I say, there would be no difficulty in +answering the question. But as nobody knows which they did, the question +must remain unanswered. And here is the point of my tale. In the fulness +of time, when the earthborn men had all passed away, the ruler of +the universe let go the helm, and became a spectator; and destiny and +natural impulse swayed the world. At the same instant all the inferior +deities gave up their hold; the whole universe rebounded, and there was +a great earthquake, and utter ruin of all manner of animals. After a +while the tumult ceased, and the universal creature settled down in +his accustomed course, having authority over all other creatures, +and following the instructions of his God and Father, at first more +precisely, afterwards with less exactness. The reason of the falling off +was the disengagement of a former chaos; 'a muddy vesture of decay' +was a part of his original nature, out of which he was brought by his +Creator, under whose immediate guidance, while he remained in that +former cycle, the evil was minimized and the good increased to the +utmost. And in the beginning of the new cycle all was well enough, but +as time went on, discord entered in; at length the good was minimized +and the evil everywhere diffused, and there was a danger of universal +ruin. Then the Creator, seeing the world in great straits, and fearing +that chaos and infinity would come again, in his tender care again +placed himself at the helm and restored order, and made the world +immortal and imperishable. Once more the cycle of life and generation +was reversed; the infants grew into young men, and the young men became +greyheaded; no longer did the animals spring out of the earth; as the +whole world was now lord of its own progress, so the parts were to +be self-created and self-nourished. At first the case of men was very +helpless and pitiable; for they were alone among the wild beasts, and +had to carry on the struggle for existence without arts or knowledge, +and had no food, and did not know how to get any. That was the time when +Prometheus brought them fire, Hephaestus and Athene taught them arts, +and other gods gave them seeds and plants. Out of these human life was +framed; for mankind were left to themselves, and ordered their own ways, +living, like the universe, in one cycle after one manner, and in another +cycle after another manner. + +Enough of the myth, which may show us two errors of which we were guilty +in our account of the king. The first and grand error was in choosing +for our king a god, who belongs to the other cycle, instead of a man +from our own; there was a lesser error also in our failure to define +the nature of the royal functions. The myth gave us only the image of +a divine shepherd, whereas the statesmen and kings of our own day very +much resemble their subjects in education and breeding. On retracing our +steps we find that we gave too narrow a designation to the art which was +concerned with command-for-self over living creatures, when we called it +the 'feeding' of animals in flocks. This would apply to all shepherds, +with the exception of the Statesman; but if we say 'managing' or +'tending' animals, the term would include him as well. Having remodelled +the name, we may subdivide as before, first separating the human from +the divine shepherd or manager. Then we may subdivide the human art of +governing into the government of willing and unwilling subjects--royalty +and tyranny--which are the extreme opposites of one another, although we +in our simplicity have hitherto confounded them. + +And yet the figure of the king is still defective. We have taken up a +lump of fable, and have used more than we needed. Like statuaries, we +have made some of the features out of proportion, and shall lose time in +reducing them. Or our mythus may be compared to a picture, which is well +drawn in outline, but is not yet enlivened by colour. And to intelligent +persons language is, or ought to be, a better instrument of description +than any picture. 'But what, Stranger, is the deficiency of which you +speak?' No higher truth can be made clear without an example; every +man seems to know all things in a dream, and to know nothing when he is +awake. And the nature of example can only be illustrated by an example. +Children are taught to read by being made to compare cases in which they +do not know a certain letter with cases in which they know it, until +they learn to recognize it in all its combinations. Example comes into +use when we identify something unknown with that which is known, and +form a common notion of both of them. Like the child who is learning his +letters, the soul recognizes some of the first elements of things; +and then again is at fault and unable to recognize them when they are +translated into the difficult language of facts. Let us, then, take +an example, which will illustrate the nature of example, and will also +assist us in characterizing the political science, and in separating the +true king from his rivals. + +I will select the example of weaving, or, more precisely, weaving of +wool. In the first place, all possessions are either productive or +preventive; of the preventive sort are spells and antidotes, divine and +human, and also defences, and defences are either arms or screens, and +screens are veils and also shields against heat and cold, and shields +against heat and cold are shelters and coverings, and coverings are +blankets or garments, and garments are in one piece or have many parts; +and of these latter, some are stitched and others are fastened, and of +these again some are made of fibres of plants and some of hair, and of +these some are cemented with water and earth, and some are fastened with +their own material; the latter are called clothes, and are made by the +art of clothing, from which the art of weaving differs only in name, as +the political differs from the royal science. Thus we have drawn several +distinctions, but as yet have not distinguished the weaving of garments +from the kindred and co-operative arts. For the first process to which +the material is subjected is the opposite of weaving--I mean carding. +And the art of carding, and the whole art of the fuller and the mender, +are concerned with the treatment and production of clothes, as well as +the art of weaving. Again, there are the arts which make the weaver's +tools. And if we say that the weaver's art is the greatest and noblest +of those which have to do with woollen garments,--this, although true, +is not sufficiently distinct; because these other arts require to be +first cleared away. Let us proceed, then, by regular steps:--There are +causal or principal, and co-operative or subordinate arts. To the causal +class belong the arts of washing and mending, of carding and spinning +the threads, and the other arts of working in wool; these are chiefly +of two kinds, falling under the two great categories of composition and +division. Carding is of the latter sort. But our concern is chiefly with +that part of the art of wool-working which composes, and of which one +kind twists and the other interlaces the threads, whether the firmer +texture of the warp or the looser texture of the woof. These are adapted +to each other, and the orderly composition of them forms a woollen +garment. And the art which presides over these operations is the art of +weaving. + +But why did we go through this circuitous process, instead of saying +at once that weaving is the art of entwining the warp and the woof? In +order that our labour may not seem to be lost, I must explain the whole +nature of excess and defect. There are two arts of measuring--one is +concerned with relative size, and the other has reference to a mean or +standard of what is meet. The difference between good and evil is the +difference between a mean or measure and excess or defect. All things +require to be compared, not only with one another, but with the mean, +without which there would be no beauty and no art, whether the art of +the statesman or the art of weaving or any other; for all the arts guard +against excess or defect, which are real evils. This we must endeavour +to show, if the arts are to exist; and the proof of this will be +a harder piece of work than the demonstration of the existence of +not-being which we proved in our discussion about the Sophist. At +present I am content with the indirect proof that the existence of such +a standard is necessary to the existence of the arts. The standard or +measure, which we are now only applying to the arts, may be some day +required with a view to the demonstration of absolute truth. + +We may now divide this art of measurement into two parts; placing in +the one part all the arts which measure the relative size or number +of objects, and in the other all those which depend upon a mean or +standard. Many accomplished men say that the art of measurement has to +do with all things, but these persons, although in this notion of theirs +they may very likely be right, are apt to fail in seeing the differences +of classes--they jumble together in one the 'more' and the 'too much,' +which are very different things. Whereas the right way is to find the +differences of classes, and to comprehend the things which have any +affinity under the same class. + +I will make one more observation by the way. When a pupil at a school is +asked the letters which make up a particular word, is he not asked with +a view to his knowing the same letters in all words? And our enquiry +about the Statesman in like manner is intended not only to improve our +knowledge of politics, but our reasoning powers generally. Still less +would any one analyze the nature of weaving for its own sake. There +is no difficulty in exhibiting sensible images, but the greatest and +noblest truths have no outward form adapted to the eye of sense, and are +only revealed in thought. And all that we are now saying is said for the +sake of them. I make these remarks, because I want you to get rid of any +impression that our discussion about weaving and about the reversal of +the universe, and the other discussion about the Sophist and not-being, +were tedious and irrelevant. Please to observe that they can only be +fairly judged when compared with what is meet; and yet not with what is +meet for producing pleasure, nor even meet for making discoveries, but +for the great end of developing the dialectical method and sharpening +the wits of the auditors. He who censures us, should prove that, if our +words had been fewer, they would have been better calculated to make men +dialecticians. + +And now let us return to our king or statesman, and transfer to him the +example of weaving. The royal art has been separated from that of other +herdsmen, but not from the causal and co-operative arts which exist +in states; these do not admit of dichotomy, and therefore they must be +carved neatly, like the limbs of a victim, not into more parts than are +necessary. And first (1) we have the large class of instruments, which +includes almost everything in the world; from these may be parted off +(2) vessels which are framed for the preservation of things, moist or +dry, prepared in the fire or out of the fire. The royal or political art +has nothing to do with either of these, any more than with the arts +of making (3) vehicles, or (4) defences, whether dresses, or arms, or +walls, or (5) with the art of making ornaments, whether pictures or +other playthings, as they may be fitly called, for they have no serious +use. Then (6) there are the arts which furnish gold, silver, wood, bark, +and other materials, which should have been put first; these, again, +have no concern with the kingly science; any more than the arts (7) +which provide food and nourishment for the human body, and which furnish +occupation to the husbandman, huntsman, doctor, cook, and the like, but +not to the king or statesman. Further, there are small things, such as +coins, seals, stamps, which may with a little violence be comprehended +in one of the above-mentioned classes. Thus they will embrace every +species of property with the exception of animals,--but these have been +already included in the art of tending herds. There remains only the +class of slaves or ministers, among whom I expect that the real rivals +of the king will be discovered. I am not speaking of the veritable slave +bought with money, nor of the hireling who lets himself out for service, +nor of the trader or merchant, who at best can only lay claim to +economical and not to royal science. Nor am I referring to government +officials, such as heralds and scribes, for these are only the servants +of the rulers, and not the rulers themselves. I admit that there may be +something strange in any servants pretending to be masters, but I hardly +think that I could have been wrong in supposing that the principal +claimants to the throne will be of this class. Let us try once more: +There are diviners and priests, who are full of pride and prerogative; +these, as the law declares, know how to give acceptable gifts to +the gods, and in many parts of Hellas the duty of performing solemn +sacrifices is assigned to the chief magistrate, as at Athens to the +King Archon. At last, then, we have found a trace of those whom we were +seeking. But still they are only servants and ministers. + +And who are these who next come into view in various forms of men and +animals and other monsters appearing--lions and centaurs and satyrs--who +are these? I did not know them at first, for every one looks strange +when he is unexpected. But now I recognize the politician and his troop, +the chief of Sophists, the prince of charlatans, the most accomplished +of wizards, who must be carefully distinguished from the true king or +statesman. And here I will interpose a question: What are the true forms +of government? Are they not three--monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy? +and the distinctions of freedom and compulsion, law and no law, poverty +and riches expand these three into six. Monarchy may be divided into +royalty and tyranny; oligarchy into aristocracy and plutocracy; and +democracy may observe the law or may not observe it. But are any of +these governments worthy of the name? Is not government a science, and +are we to suppose that scientific government is secured by the rulers +being many or few, rich or poor, or by the rule being compulsory or +voluntary? Can the many attain to science? In no Hellenic city are there +fifty good draught players, and certainly there are not as many kings, +for by kings we mean all those who are possessed of the political +science. A true government must therefore be the government of one, or +of a few. And they may govern us either with or without law, and whether +they are poor or rich, and however they govern, provided they govern on +some scientific principle,--it makes no difference. And as the physician +may cure us with our will, or against our will, and by any mode of +treatment, burning, bleeding, lowering, fattening, if he only proceeds +scientifically: so the true governor may reduce or fatten or bleed the +body corporate, while he acts according to the rules of his art, and +with a view to the good of the state, whether according to law or +without law. + +'I do not like the notion, that there can be good government without +law.' + +I must explain: Law-making certainly is the business of a king; and yet +the best thing of all is, not that the law should rule, but that the +king should rule, for the varieties of circumstances are endless, and no +simple or universal rule can suit them all, or last for ever. The law is +just an ignorant brute of a tyrant, who insists always on his commands +being fulfilled under all circumstances. 'Then why have we laws at all?' +I will answer that question by asking you whether the training master +gives a different discipline to each of his pupils, or whether he has a +general rule of diet and exercise which is suited to the constitutions +of the majority? 'The latter.' The legislator, too, is obliged to lay +down general laws, and cannot enact what is precisely suitable to each +particular case. He cannot be sitting at every man's side all his life, +and prescribe for him the minute particulars of his duty, and therefore +he is compelled to impose on himself and others the restriction of a +written law. Let me suppose now, that a physician or trainer, having +left directions for his patients or pupils, goes into a far country, and +comes back sooner than he intended; owing to some unexpected change in +the weather, the patient or pupil seems to require a different mode of +treatment: Would he persist in his old commands, under the idea that all +others are noxious and heterodox? Viewed in the light of science, +would not the continuance of such regulations be ridiculous? And if the +legislator, or another like him, comes back from a far country, is he to +be prohibited from altering his own laws? The common people say: Let a +man persuade the city first, and then let him impose new laws. But is a +physician only to cure his patients by persuasion, and not by force? Is +he a worse physician who uses a little gentle violence in effecting the +cure? Or shall we say, that the violence is just, if exercised by a rich +man, and unjust, if by a poor man? May not any man, rich or poor, with +or without law, and whether the citizens like or not, do what is for +their good? The pilot saves the lives of the crew, not by laying down +rules, but by making his art a law, and, like him, the true governor +has a strength of art which is superior to the law. This is scientific +government, and all others are imitations only. Yet no great number +of persons can attain to this science. And hence follows an important +result. The true political principle is to assert the inviolability +of the law, which, though not the best thing possible, is best for the +imperfect condition of man. + +I will explain my meaning by an illustration:--Suppose that mankind, +indignant at the rogueries and caprices of physicians and pilots, call +together an assembly, in which all who like may speak, the skilled as +well as the unskilled, and that in their assembly they make decrees +for regulating the practice of navigation and medicine which are to +be binding on these professions for all time. Suppose that they elect +annually by vote or lot those to whom authority in either department is +to be delegated. And let us further imagine, that when the term of their +magistracy has expired, the magistrates appointed by them are summoned +before an ignorant and unprofessional court, and may be condemned and +punished for breaking the regulations. They even go a step further, and +enact, that he who is found enquiring into the truth of navigation and +medicine, and is seeking to be wise above what is written, shall be +called not an artist, but a dreamer, a prating Sophist and a corruptor +of youth; and if he try to persuade others to investigate those sciences +in a manner contrary to the law, he shall be punished with the utmost +severity. And like rules might be extended to any art or science. But +what would be the consequence? + +'The arts would utterly perish, and human life, which is bad enough +already, would become intolerable.' + +But suppose, once more, that we were to appoint some one as the guardian +of the law, who was both ignorant and interested, and who perverted the +law: would not this be a still worse evil than the other? 'Certainly.' +For the laws are based on some experience and wisdom. Hence the wiser +course is, that they should be observed, although this is not the best +thing of all, but only the second best. And whoever, having skill, +should try to improve them, would act in the spirit of the law-giver. +But then, as we have seen, no great number of men, whether poor or rich, +can be makers of laws. And so, the nearest approach to true government +is, when men do nothing contrary to their own written laws and national +customs. When the rich preserve their customs and maintain the law, this +is called aristocracy, or if they neglect the law, oligarchy. When an +individual rules according to law, whether by the help of science or +opinion, this is called monarchy; and when he has royal science he is +a king, whether he be so in fact or not; but when he rules in spite of +law, and is blind with ignorance and passion, he is called a tyrant. +These forms of government exist, because men despair of the true king +ever appearing among them; if he were to appear, they would joyfully +hand over to him the reins of government. But, as there is no natural +ruler of the hive, they meet together and make laws. And do we wonder, +when the foundation of politics is in the letter only, at the miseries +of states? Ought we not rather to admire the strength of the political +bond? For cities have endured the worst of evils time out of mind; +many cities have been shipwrecked, and some are like ships foundering, +because their pilots are absolutely ignorant of the science which they +profess. + +Let us next ask, which of these untrue forms of government is the least +bad, and which of them is the worst? I said at the beginning, that each +of the three forms of government, royalty, aristocracy, and democracy, +might be divided into two, so that the whole number of them, including +the best, will be seven. Under monarchy we have already distinguished +royalty and tyranny; of oligarchy there were two kinds, aristocracy and +plutocracy; and democracy may also be divided, for there is a democracy +which observes, and a democracy which neglects, the laws. The government +of one is the best and the worst--the government of a few is less bad +and less good--the government of the many is the least bad and least +good of them all, being the best of all lawless governments, and the +worst of all lawful ones. But the rulers of all these states, +unless they have knowledge, are maintainers of idols, and themselves +idols--wizards, and also Sophists; for, after many windings, the term +'Sophist' comes home to them. + +And now enough of centaurs and satyrs: the play is ended, and they +may quit the political stage. Still there remain some other and better +elements, which adhere to the royal science, and must be drawn off in +the refiner's fire before the gold can become quite pure. The arts of +the general, the judge, and the orator, will have to be separated from +the royal art; when the separation has been made, the nature of the king +will be unalloyed. Now there are inferior sciences, such as music and +others; and there is a superior science, which determines whether +music is to be learnt or not, and this is different from them, and the +governor of them. The science which determines whether we are to use +persuasion, or not, is higher than the art of persuasion; the science +which determines whether we are to go to war, is higher than the art of +the general. The science which makes the laws, is higher than that which +only administers them. And the science which has this authority over the +rest, is the science of the king or statesman. + +Once more we will endeavour to view this royal science by the light of +our example. We may compare the state to a web, and I will show you how +the different threads are drawn into one. You would admit--would +you not?--that there are parts of virtue (although this position is +sometimes assailed by Eristics), and one part of virtue is temperance, +and another courage. These are two principles which are in a manner +antagonistic to one another; and they pervade all nature; the whole +class of the good and beautiful is included under them. The beautiful +may be subdivided into two lesser classes: one of these is described +by us in terms expressive of motion or energy, and the other in terms +expressive of rest and quietness. We say, how manly! how vigorous! how +ready! and we say also, how calm! how temperate! how dignified! This +opposition of terms is extended by us to all actions, to the tones of +the voice, the notes of music, the workings of the mind, the characters +of men. The two classes both have their exaggerations; and the +exaggerations of the one are termed 'hardness,' 'violence,' 'madness;' +of the other 'cowardliness,' or 'sluggishness.' And if we pursue +the enquiry, we find that these opposite characters are naturally at +variance, and can hardly be reconciled. In lesser matters the antagonism +between them is ludicrous, but in the State may be the occasion of +grave disorders, and may disturb the whole course of human life. For +the orderly class are always wanting to be at peace, and hence they pass +imperceptibly into the condition of slaves; and the courageous sort are +always wanting to go to war, even when the odds are against them, and +are soon destroyed by their enemies. But the true art of government, +first preparing the material by education, weaves the two elements into +one, maintaining authority over the carders of the wool, and selecting +the proper subsidiary arts which are necessary for making the web. The +royal science is queen of educators, and begins by choosing the natures +which she is to train, punishing with death and exterminating those who +are violently carried away to atheism and injustice, and enslaving those +who are wallowing in the mire of ignorance. The rest of the citizens she +blends into one, combining the stronger element of courage, which we +may call the warp, with the softer element of temperance, which we +may imagine to be the woof. These she binds together, first taking +the eternal elements of the honourable, the good, and the just, and +fastening them with a divine cord in a heaven-born nature, and then +fastening the animal elements with a human cord. The good legislator can +implant by education the higher principles; and where they exist there +is no difficulty in inserting the lesser human bonds, by which the State +is held together; these are the laws of intermarriage, and of union for +the sake of offspring. Most persons in their marriages seek after +wealth or power; or they are clannish, and choose those who are like +themselves,--the temperate marrying the temperate, and the courageous +the courageous. The two classes thrive and flourish at first, but they +soon degenerate; the one become mad, and the other feeble and useless. +This would not have been the case, if they had both originally held +the same notions about the honourable and the good; for then they +never would have allowed the temperate natures to be separated from the +courageous, but they would have bound them together by common honours +and reputations, by intermarriages, and by the choice of rulers who +combine both qualities. The temperate are careful and just, but are +wanting in the power of action; the courageous fall short of them in +justice, but in action are superior to them: and no state can prosper in +which either of these qualities is wanting. The noblest and best of all +webs or states is that which the royal science weaves, combining the two +sorts of natures in a single texture, and in this enfolding freeman and +slave and every other social element, and presiding over them all. + +'Your picture, Stranger, of the king and statesman, no less than of the +Sophist, is quite perfect.' + +... + +The principal subjects in the Statesman may be conveniently embraced +under six or seven heads:--(1) the myth; (2) the dialectical interest; +(3) the political aspects of the dialogue; (4) the satirical and +paradoxical vein; (5) the necessary imperfection of law; (6) the +relation of the work to the other writings of Plato; lastly (7), we may +briefly consider the genuineness of the Sophist and Statesman, which +can hardly be assumed without proof, since the two dialogues have +been questioned by three such eminent Platonic scholars as Socher, +Schaarschmidt, and Ueberweg. + +I. The hand of the master is clearly visible in the myth. First in the +connection with mythology;--he wins a kind of verisimilitude for this +as for his other myths, by adopting received traditions, of which he +pretends to find an explanation in his own larger conception (compare +Introduction to Critias). The young Socrates has heard of the sun rising +in the west and setting in the east, and of the earth-born men; but he +has never heard the origin of these remarkable phenomena. Nor is Plato, +here or elsewhere, wanting in denunciations of the incredulity of 'this +latter age,' on which the lovers of the marvellous have always delighted +to enlarge. And he is not without express testimony to the truth of his +narrative;--such testimony as, in the Timaeus, the first men gave of the +names of the gods ('They must surely have known their own ancestors'). +For the first generation of the new cycle, who lived near the time, are +supposed to have preserved a recollection of a previous one. He also +appeals to internal evidence, viz. the perfect coherence of the tale, +though he is very well aware, as he says in the Cratylus, that there may +be consistency in error as well as in truth. The gravity and minuteness +with which some particulars are related also lend an artful aid. The +profound interest and ready assent of the young Socrates, who is not too +old to be amused 'with a tale which a child would love to hear,' are a +further assistance. To those who were naturally inclined to believe that +the fortunes of mankind are influenced by the stars, or who maintained +that some one principle, like the principle of the Same and the Other +in the Timaeus, pervades all things in the world, the reversal of the +motion of the heavens seemed necessarily to produce a reversal of the +order of human life. The spheres of knowledge, which to us appear wide +asunder as the poles, astronomy and medicine, were naturally connected +in the minds of early thinkers, because there was little or nothing in +the space between them. Thus there is a basis of philosophy, on which +the improbabilities of the tale may be said to rest. These are some of +the devices by which Plato, like a modern novelist, seeks to familiarize +the marvellous. + +The myth, like that of the Timaeus and Critias, is rather historical +than poetical, in this respect corresponding to the general change in +the later writings of Plato, when compared with the earlier ones. It +is hardly a myth in the sense in which the term might be applied to the +myth of the Phaedrus, the Republic, the Phaedo, or the Gorgias, but +may be more aptly compared with the didactic tale in which Protagoras +describes the fortunes of primitive man, or with the description of +the gradual rise of a new society in the Third Book of the Laws. Some +discrepancies may be observed between the mythology of the Statesman and +the Timaeus, and between the Timaeus and the Republic. But there is no +reason to expect that all Plato's visions of a former, any more than +of a future, state of existence, should conform exactly to the same +pattern. We do not find perfect consistency in his philosophy; and still +less have we any right to demand this of him in his use of mythology and +figures of speech. And we observe that while employing all the resources +of a writer of fiction to give credibility to his tales, he is not +disposed to insist upon their literal truth. Rather, as in the Phaedo, +he says, 'Something of the kind is true;' or, as in the Gorgias, 'This +you will think to be an old wife's tale, but you can think of nothing +truer;' or, as in the Statesman, he describes his work as a 'mass of +mythology,' which was introduced in order to teach certain lessons; or, +as in the Phaedrus, he secretly laughs at such stories while refusing to +disturb the popular belief in them. + +The greater interest of the myth consists in the philosophical lessons +which Plato presents to us in this veiled form. Here, as in the tale +of Er, the son of Armenius, he touches upon the question of freedom and +necessity, both in relation to God and nature. For at first the universe +is governed by the immediate providence of God,--this is the golden +age,--but after a while the wheel is reversed, and man is left to +himself. Like other theologians and philosophers, Plato relegates his +explanation of the problem to a transcendental world; he speaks of what +in modern language might be termed 'impossibilities in the nature of +things,' hindering God from continuing immanent in the world. But there +is some inconsistency; for the 'letting go' is spoken of as a divine +act, and is at the same time attributed to the necessary imperfection of +matter; there is also a numerical necessity for the successive births +of souls. At first, man and the world retain their divine instincts, but +gradually degenerate. As in the Book of Genesis, the first fall of +man is succeeded by a second; the misery and wickedness of the world +increase continually. The reason of this further decline is supposed to +be the disorganisation of matter: the latent seeds of a former chaos are +disengaged, and envelope all things. The condition of man becomes more +and more miserable; he is perpetually waging an unequal warfare with the +beasts. At length he obtains such a measure of education and help as is +necessary for his existence. Though deprived of God's help, he is not +left wholly destitute; he has received from Athene and Hephaestus a +knowledge of the arts; other gods give him seeds and plants; and out of +these human life is reconstructed. He now eats bread in the sweat of his +brow, and has dominion over the animals, subjected to the conditions of +his nature, and yet able to cope with them by divine help. Thus Plato +may be said to represent in a figure--(1) the state of innocence; (2) +the fall of man; (3) the still deeper decline into barbarism; (4) the +restoration of man by the partial interference of God, and the natural +growth of the arts and of civilised society. Two lesser features of +this description should not pass unnoticed:--(1) the primitive men are +supposed to be created out of the earth, and not after the ordinary +manner of human generation--half the causes of moral evil are in this +way removed; (2) the arts are attributed to a divine revelation: and so +the greatest difficulty in the history of pre-historic man is solved. +Though no one knew better than Plato that the introduction of the gods +is not a reason, but an excuse for not giving a reason (Cratylus), yet, +considering that more than two thousand years later mankind are still +discussing these problems, we may be satisfied to find in Plato a +statement of the difficulties which arise in conceiving the relation of +man to God and nature, without expecting to obtain from him a solution +of them. In such a tale, as in the Phaedrus, various aspects of the +Ideas were doubtless indicated to Plato's own mind, as the corresponding +theological problems are to us. The immanence of things in the Ideas, or +the partial separation of them, and the self-motion of the supreme +Idea, are probably the forms in which he would have interpreted his own +parable. + +He touches upon another question of great interest--the consciousness of +evil--what in the Jewish Scriptures is called 'eating of the tree of the +knowledge of good and evil.' At the end of the narrative, the Eleatic +asks his companion whether this life of innocence, or that which men +live at present, is the better of the two. He wants to distinguish +between the mere animal life of innocence, the 'city of pigs,' as it +is comically termed by Glaucon in the Republic, and the higher life of +reason and philosophy. But as no one can determine the state of man +in the world before the Fall, 'the question must remain unanswered.' +Similar questions have occupied the minds of theologians in later ages; +but they can hardly be said to have found an answer. Professor Campbell +well observes, that the general spirit of the myth may be summed up in +the words of the Lysis: 'If evil were to perish, should we hunger any +more, or thirst any more, or have any similar sensations? Yet perhaps +the question what will or will not be is a foolish one, for who can +tell?' As in the Theaetetus, evil is supposed to continue,--here, as the +consequence of a former state of the world, a sort of mephitic vapour +exhaling from some ancient chaos,--there, as involved in the possibility +of good, and incident to the mixed state of man. + +Once more--and this is the point of connexion with the rest of the +dialogue--the myth is intended to bring out the difference between the +ideal and the actual state of man. In all ages of the world men have +dreamed of a state of perfection, which has been, and is to be, but +never is, and seems to disappear under the necessary conditions of human +society. The uselessness, the danger, the true value of such political +ideals have often been discussed; youth is too ready to believe in +them; age to disparage them. Plato's 'prudens quaestio' respecting the +comparative happiness of men in this and in a former cycle of existence +is intended to elicit this contrast between the golden age and 'the +life under Zeus' which is our own. To confuse the divine and human, or +hastily apply one to the other, is a 'tremendous error.' Of the ideal +or divine government of the world we can form no true or adequate +conception; and this our mixed state of life, in which we are partly +left to ourselves, but not wholly deserted by the gods, may contain some +higher elements of good and knowledge than could have existed in the +days of innocence under the rule of Cronos. So we may venture slightly +to enlarge a Platonic thought which admits of a further application to +Christian theology. Here are suggested also the distinctions between +God causing and permitting evil, and between his more and less immediate +government of the world. + +II. The dialectical interest of the Statesman seems to contend in +Plato's mind with the political; the dialogue might have been +designated by two equally descriptive titles--either the 'Statesman,' or +'Concerning Method.' Dialectic, which in the earlier writings of Plato +is a revival of the Socratic question and answer applied to definition, +is now occupied with classification; there is nothing in which he takes +greater delight than in processes of division (compare Phaedr.); he +pursues them to a length out of proportion to his main subject, and +appears to value them as a dialectical exercise, and for their own sake. +A poetical vision of some order or hierarchy of ideas or sciences has +already been floating before us in the Symposium and the Republic. And +in the Phaedrus this aspect of dialectic is further sketched out, +and the art of rhetoric is based on the division of the characters +of mankind into their several classes. The same love of divisions is +apparent in the Gorgias. But in a well-known passage of the Philebus +occurs the first criticism on the nature of classification. There we +are exhorted not to fall into the common error of passing from unity to +infinity, but to find the intermediate classes; and we are reminded that +in any process of generalization, there may be more than one class to +which individuals may be referred, and that we must carry on the process +of division until we have arrived at the infima species. + +These precepts are not forgotten, either in the Sophist or in the +Statesman. The Sophist contains four examples of division, carried on +by regular steps, until in four different lines of descent we detect +the Sophist. In the Statesman the king or statesman is discovered by +a similar process; and we have a summary, probably made for the first +time, of possessions appropriated by the labour of man, which are +distributed into seven classes. We are warned against preferring the +shorter to the longer method;--if we divide in the middle, we are most +likely to light upon species; at the same time, the important remark +is made, that 'a part is not to be confounded with a class.' Having +discovered the genus under which the king falls, we proceed to +distinguish him from the collateral species. To assist our imagination +in making this separation, we require an example. The higher ideas, +of which we have a dreamy knowledge, can only be represented by images +taken from the external world. But, first of all, the nature of example +is explained by an example. The child is taught to read by comparing +the letters in words which he knows with the same letters in unknown +combinations; and this is the sort of process which we are about to +attempt. As a parallel to the king we select the worker in wool, and +compare the art of weaving with the royal science, trying to separate +either of them from the inferior classes to which they are akin. This +has the incidental advantage, that weaving and the web furnish us with a +figure of speech, which we can afterwards transfer to the State. + +There are two uses of examples or images--in the first place, they +suggest thoughts--secondly, they give them a distinct form. In the +infancy of philosophy, as in childhood, the language of pictures is +natural to man: truth in the abstract is hardly won, and only by use +familiarized to the mind. Examples are akin to analogies, and have a +reflex influence on thought; they people the vacant mind, and may often +originate new directions of enquiry. Plato seems to be conscious of the +suggestiveness of imagery; the general analogy of the arts is constantly +employed by him as well as the comparison of particular arts--weaving, +the refining of gold, the learning to read, music, statuary, painting, +medicine, the art of the pilot--all of which occur in this dialogue +alone: though he is also aware that 'comparisons are slippery things,' +and may often give a false clearness to ideas. We shall find, in the +Philebus, a division of sciences into practical and speculative, and +into more or less speculative: here we have the idea of master-arts, +or sciences which control inferior ones. Besides the supreme science +of dialectic, 'which will forget us, if we forget her,' another +master-science for the first time appears in view--the science of +government, which fixes the limits of all the rest. This conception +of the political or royal science as, from another point of view, the +science of sciences, which holds sway over the rest, is not originally +found in Aristotle, but in Plato. + +The doctrine that virtue and art are in a mean, which is familiarized +to us by the study of the Nicomachean Ethics, is also first distinctly +asserted in the Statesman of Plato. The too much and the too little +are in restless motion: they must be fixed by a mean, which is also +a standard external to them. The art of measuring or finding a mean +between excess and defect, like the principle of division in the +Phaedrus, receives a particular application to the art of discourse. The +excessive length of a discourse may be blamed; but who can say what is +excess, unless he is furnished with a measure or standard? Measure is +the life of the arts, and may some day be discovered to be the single +ultimate principle in which all the sciences are contained. Other forms +of thought may be noted--the distinction between causal and co-operative +arts, which may be compared with the distinction between primary and +co-operative causes in the Timaeus; or between cause and condition in +the Phaedo; the passing mention of economical science; the opposition of +rest and motion, which is found in all nature; the general conception +of two great arts of composition and division, in which are contained +weaving, politics, dialectic; and in connexion with the conception of a +mean, the two arts of measuring. + +In the Theaetetus, Plato remarks that precision in the use of terms, +though sometimes pedantic, is sometimes necessary. Here he makes the +opposite reflection, that there may be a philosophical disregard of +words. The evil of mere verbal oppositions, the requirement of an +impossible accuracy in the use of terms, the error of supposing that +philosophy was to be found in language, the danger of word-catching, +have frequently been discussed by him in the previous dialogues, but +nowhere has the spirit of modern inductive philosophy been more happily +indicated than in the words of the Statesman:--'If you think more about +things, and less about words, you will be richer in wisdom as you grow +older.' A similar spirit is discernible in the remarkable expressions, +'the long and difficult language of facts;' and 'the interrogation of +every nature, in order to obtain the particular contribution of each to +the store of knowledge.' Who has described 'the feeble intelligence of +all things; given by metaphysics better than the Eleatic Stranger in +the words--'The higher ideas can hardly be set forth except through +the medium of examples; every man seems to know all things in a kind of +dream, and then again nothing when he is awake?' Or where is the value +of metaphysical pursuits more truly expressed than in the words,--'The +greatest and noblest things have no outward image of themselves visible +to man: therefore we should learn to give a rational account of them?' + +III. The political aspects of the dialogue are closely connected +with the dialectical. As in the Cratylus, the legislator has 'the +dialectician standing on his right hand;' so in the Statesman, the king +or statesman is the dialectician, who, although he may be in a private +station, is still a king. Whether he has the power or not, is a mere +accident; or rather he has the power, for what ought to be is ('Was +ist vernunftig, das ist wirklich'); and he ought to be and is the true +governor of mankind. There is a reflection in this idealism of the +Socratic 'Virtue is knowledge;' and, without idealism, we may remark +that knowledge is a great part of power. Plato does not trouble himself +to construct a machinery by which 'philosophers shall be made kings,' as +in the Republic: he merely holds up the ideal, and affirms that in some +sense science is really supreme over human life. + +He is struck by the observation 'quam parva sapientia regitur mundus,' +and is touched with a feeling of the ills which afflict states. The +condition of Megara before and during the Peloponnesian War, of Athens +under the Thirty and afterwards, of Syracuse and the other Sicilian +cities in their alternations of democratic excess and tyranny, might +naturally suggest such reflections. Some states he sees already +shipwrecked, others foundering for want of a pilot; and he wonders not +at their destruction, but at their endurance. For they ought to have +perished long ago, if they had depended on the wisdom of their rulers. +The mingled pathos and satire of this remark is characteristic of +Plato's later style. + +The king is the personification of political science. And yet he is +something more than this,--the perfectly good and wise tyrant of the +Laws, whose will is better than any law. He is the special providence +who is always interfering with and regulating all things. Such a +conception has sometimes been entertained by modern theologians, and by +Plato himself, of the Supreme Being. But whether applied to Divine or +to human governors the conception is faulty for two reasons, neither of +which are noticed by Plato:--first, because all good government supposes +a degree of co-operation in the ruler and his subjects,--an 'education +in politics' as well as in moral virtue; secondly, because government, +whether Divine or human, implies that the subject has a previous +knowledge of the rules under which he is living. There is a fallacy, +too, in comparing unchangeable laws with a personal governor. For the +law need not necessarily be an 'ignorant and brutal tyrant,' but gentle +and humane, capable of being altered in the spirit of the legislator, +and of being administered so as to meet the cases of individuals. Not +only in fact, but in idea, both elements must remain--the fixed law +and the living will; the written word and the spirit; the principles of +obligation and of freedom; and their applications whether made by law or +equity in particular cases. + +There are two sides from which positive laws may be attacked:--either +from the side of nature, which rises up and rebels against them in the +spirit of Callicles in the Gorgias; or from the side of idealism, which +attempts to soar above them,--and this is the spirit of Plato in the +Statesman. But he soon falls, like Icarus, and is content to walk +instead of flying; that is, to accommodate himself to the actual state +of human things. Mankind have long been in despair of finding the true +ruler; and therefore are ready to acquiesce in any of the five or six +received forms of government as better than none. And the best thing +which they can do (though only the second best in reality), is to reduce +the ideal state to the conditions of actual life. Thus in the Statesman, +as in the Laws, we have three forms of government, which we may venture +to term, (1) the ideal, (2) the practical, (3) the sophistical--what +ought to be, what might be, what is. And thus Plato seems to stumble, +almost by accident, on the notion of a constitutional monarchy, or of a +monarchy ruling by laws. + +The divine foundations of a State are to be laid deep in education +(Republic), and at the same time some little violence may be used in +exterminating natures which are incapable of education (compare Laws). +Plato is strongly of opinion that the legislator, like the physician, +may do men good against their will (compare Gorgias). The human bonds +of states are formed by the inter-marriage of dispositions adapted to +supply the defects of each other. As in the Republic, Plato has observed +that there are opposite natures in the world, the strong and the gentle, +the courageous and the temperate, which, borrowing an expression derived +from the image of weaving, he calls the warp and the woof of human +society. To interlace these is the crowning achievement of political +science. In the Protagoras, Socrates was maintaining that there was only +one virtue, and not many: now Plato is inclined to think that there +are not only parallel, but opposite virtues, and seems to see a similar +opposition pervading all art and nature. But he is satisfied with laying +down the principle, and does not inform us by what further steps the +union of opposites is to be effected. + +In the loose framework of a single dialogue Plato has thus combined two +distinct subjects--politics and method. Yet they are not so far apart +as they appear: in his own mind there was a secret link of connexion +between them. For the philosopher or dialectician is also the only true +king or statesman. In the execution of his plan Plato has invented or +distinguished several important forms of thought, and made incidentally +many valuable remarks. Questions of interest both in ancient and modern +politics also arise in the course of the dialogue, which may with +advantage be further considered by us:-- + +a. The imaginary ruler, whether God or man, is above the law, and is a +law to himself and to others. Among the Greeks as among the Jews, law +was a sacred name, the gift of God, the bond of states. But in the +Statesman of Plato, as in the New Testament, the word has also become +the symbol of an imperfect good, which is almost an evil. The law +sacrifices the individual to the universal, and is the tyranny of the +many over the few (compare Republic). It has fixed rules which are the +props of order, and will not swerve or bend in extreme cases. It is +the beginning of political society, but there is something higher--an +intelligent ruler, whether God or man, who is able to adapt himself to +the endless varieties of circumstances. Plato is fond of picturing the +advantages which would result from the union of the tyrant who has power +with the legislator who has wisdom: he regards this as the best and +speediest way of reforming mankind. But institutions cannot thus be +artificially created, nor can the external authority of a ruler impose +laws for which a nation is unprepared. The greatest power, the highest +wisdom, can only proceed one or two steps in advance of public opinion. +In all stages of civilization human nature, after all our efforts, +remains intractable,--not like clay in the hands of the potter, or +marble under the chisel of the sculptor. Great changes occur in the +history of nations, but they are brought about slowly, like the changes +in the frame of nature, upon which the puny arm of man hardly makes an +impression. And, speaking generally, the slowest growths, both in nature +and in politics, are the most permanent. + +b. Whether the best form of the ideal is a person or a law may fairly be +doubted. The former is more akin to us: it clothes itself in poetry and +art, and appeals to reason more in the form of feeling: in the latter +there is less danger of allowing ourselves to be deluded by a figure +of speech. The ideal of the Greek state found an expression in the +deification of law: the ancient Stoic spoke of a wise man perfect in +virtue, who was fancifully said to be a king; but neither they nor Plato +had arrived at the conception of a person who was also a law. Nor is it +easy for the Christian to think of God as wisdom, truth, holiness, and +also as the wise, true, and holy one. He is always wanting to break +through the abstraction and interrupt the law, in order that he may +present to himself the more familiar image of a divine friend. While +the impersonal has too slender a hold upon the affections to be made the +basis of religion, the conception of a person on the other hand tends to +degenerate into a new kind of idolatry. Neither criticism nor experience +allows us to suppose that there are interferences with the laws of +nature; the idea is inconceivable to us and at variance with facts. The +philosopher or theologian who could realize to mankind that a person +is a law, that the higher rule has no exception, that goodness, like +knowledge, is also power, would breathe a new religious life into the +world. + +c. Besides the imaginary rule of a philosopher or a God, the actual +forms of government have to be considered. In the infancy of political +science, men naturally ask whether the rule of the many or of the few is +to be preferred. If by 'the few' we mean 'the good' and by 'the many,' +'the bad,' there can be but one reply: 'The rule of one good man +is better than the rule of all the rest, if they are bad.' For, as +Heracleitus says, 'One is ten thousand if he be the best.' If, however, +we mean by the rule of the few the rule of a class neither better nor +worse than other classes, not devoid of a feeling of right, but guided +mostly by a sense of their own interests, and by the rule of the many +the rule of all classes, similarly under the influence of mixed motives, +no one would hesitate to answer--'The rule of all rather than one, +because all classes are more likely to take care of all than one of +another; and the government has greater power and stability when resting +on a wider basis.' Both in ancient and modern times the best balanced +form of government has been held to be the best; and yet it should not +be so nicely balanced as to make action and movement impossible. + +The statesman who builds his hope upon the aristocracy, upon the +middle classes, upon the people, will probably, if he have sufficient +experience of them, conclude that all classes are much alike, and that +one is as good as another, and that the liberties of no class are +safe in the hands of the rest. The higher ranks have the advantage in +education and manners, the middle and lower in industry and self-denial; +in every class, to a certain extent, a natural sense of right prevails, +sometimes communicated from the lower to the higher, sometimes from the +higher to the lower, which is too strong for class interests. There have +been crises in the history of nations, as at the time of the Crusades or +the Reformation, or the French Revolution, when the same inspiration has +taken hold of whole peoples, and permanently raised the sense of freedom +and justice among mankind. + +But even supposing the different classes of a nation, when viewed +impartially, to be on a level with each other in moral virtue, there +remain two considerations of opposite kinds which enter into the problem +of government. Admitting of course that the upper and lower classes are +equal in the eye of God and of the law, yet the one may be by nature +fitted to govern and the other to be governed. A ruling caste does not +soon altogether lose the governing qualities, nor a subject class easily +acquire them. Hence the phenomenon so often observed in the old Greek +revolutions, and not without parallel in modern times, that the leaders +of the democracy have been themselves of aristocratic origin. The people +are expecting to be governed by representatives of their own, but the +true man of the people either never appears, or is quickly altered by +circumstances. Their real wishes hardly make themselves felt, although +their lower interests and prejudices may sometimes be flattered and +yielded to for the sake of ulterior objects by those who have political +power. They will often learn by experience that the democracy has become +a plutocracy. The influence of wealth, though not the enjoyment of +it, has become diffused among the poor as well as among the rich; and +society, instead of being safer, is more at the mercy of the tyrant, +who, when things are at the worst, obtains a guard--that is, an +army--and announces himself as the saviour. + +The other consideration is of an opposite kind. Admitting that a few +wise men are likely to be better governors than the unwise many, yet +it is not in their power to fashion an entire people according to their +behest. When with the best intentions the benevolent despot begins his +regime, he finds the world hard to move. A succession of good kings has +at the end of a century left the people an inert and unchanged mass. The +Roman world was not permanently improved by the hundred years of Hadrian +and the Antonines. The kings of Spain during the last century were at +least equal to any contemporary sovereigns in virtue and ability. In +certain states of the world the means are wanting to render a benevolent +power effectual. These means are not a mere external organisation of +posts or telegraphs, hardly the introduction of new laws or modes of +industry. A change must be made in the spirit of a people as well as +in their externals. The ancient legislator did not really take a blank +tablet and inscribe upon it the rules which reflection and experience +had taught him to be for a nation's interest; no one would have obeyed +him if he had. But he took the customs which he found already existing +in a half-civilised state of society: these he reduced to form and +inscribed on pillars; he defined what had before been undefined, and +gave certainty to what was uncertain. No legislation ever sprang, like +Athene, in full power out of the head either of God or man. + +Plato and Aristotle are sensible of the difficulty of combining the +wisdom of the few with the power of the many. According to Plato, he is +a physician who has the knowledge of a physician, and he is a king who +has the knowledge of a king. But how the king, one or more, is to obtain +the required power, is hardly at all considered by him. He presents +the idea of a perfect government, but except the regulation for mixing +different tempers in marriage, he never makes any provision for the +attainment of it. Aristotle, casting aside ideals, would place the +government in a middle class of citizens, sufficiently numerous for +stability, without admitting the populace; and such appears to have +been the constitution which actually prevailed for a short time at +Athens--the rule of the Five Thousand--characterized by Thucydides as +the best government of Athens which he had known. It may however be +doubted how far, either in a Greek or modern state, such a limitation is +practicable or desirable; for those who are left outside the pale will +always be dangerous to those who are within, while on the other hand +the leaven of the mob can hardly affect the representation of a great +country. There is reason for the argument in favour of a property +qualification; there is reason also in the arguments of those who would +include all and so exhaust the political situation. + +The true answer to the question is relative to the circumstances of +nations. How can we get the greatest intelligence combined with the +greatest power? The ancient legislator would have found this question +more easy than we do. For he would have required that all persons who +had a share of government should have received their education from the +state and have borne her burdens, and should have served in her fleets +and armies. But though we sometimes hear the cry that we must 'educate +the masses, for they are our masters,' who would listen to a proposal +that the franchise should be confined to the educated or to those who +fulfil political duties? Then again, we know that the masses are not our +masters, and that they are more likely to become so if we educate them. +In modern politics so many interests have to be consulted that we are +compelled to do, not what is best, but what is possible. + +d. Law is the first principle of society, but it cannot supply all the +wants of society, and may easily cause more evils than it cures. Plato +is aware of the imperfection of law in failing to meet the varieties of +circumstances: he is also aware that human life would be intolerable if +every detail of it were placed under legal regulation. It may be a great +evil that physicians should kill their patients or captains cast away +their ships, but it would be a far greater evil if each particular in +the practice of medicine or seamanship were regulated by law. Much has +been said in modern times about the duty of leaving men to themselves, +which is supposed to be the best way of taking care of them. The +question is often asked, What are the limits of legislation in relation +to morals? And the answer is to the same effect, that morals must take +care of themselves. There is a one-sided truth in these answers, if they +are regarded as condemnations of the interference with commerce in +the last century or of clerical persecution in the Middle Ages. But +'laissez-faire' is not the best but only the second best. What the +best is, Plato does not attempt to determine; he only contrasts the +imperfection of law with the wisdom of the perfect ruler. + +Laws should be just, but they must also be certain, and we are obliged +to sacrifice something of their justice to their certainty. Suppose +a wise and good judge, who paying little or no regard to the law, +attempted to decide with perfect justice the cases that were brought +before him. To the uneducated person he would appear to be the ideal of +a judge. Such justice has been often exercised in primitive times, or at +the present day among eastern rulers. But in the first place it depends +entirely on the personal character of the judge. He may be honest, +but there is no check upon his dishonesty, and his opinion can only be +overruled, not by any principle of law, but by the opinion of another +judging like himself without law. In the second place, even if he +be ever so honest, his mode of deciding questions would introduce an +element of uncertainty into human life; no one would know beforehand +what would happen to him, or would seek to conform in his conduct to +any rule of law. For the compact which the law makes with men, that they +shall be protected if they observe the law in their dealings with +one another, would have to be substituted another principle of a more +general character, that they shall be protected by the law if they act +rightly in their dealings with one another. The complexity of human +actions and also the uncertainty of their effects would be increased +tenfold. For one of the principal advantages of law is not merely that +it enforces honesty, but that it makes men act in the same way, and +requires them to produce the same evidence of their acts. Too many laws +may be the sign of a corrupt and overcivilized state of society, too few +are the sign of an uncivilized one; as soon as commerce begins to +grow, men make themselves customs which have the validity of laws. Even +equity, which is the exception to the law, conforms to fixed rules and +lies for the most part within the limits of previous decisions. + +IV. The bitterness of the Statesman is characteristic of Plato's later +style, in which the thoughts of youth and love have fled away, and we +are no longer tended by the Muses or the Graces. We do not venture to +say that Plato was soured by old age, but certainly the kindliness and +courtesy of the earlier dialogues have disappeared. He sees the world +under a harder and grimmer aspect: he is dealing with the reality of +things, not with visions or pictures of them: he is seeking by the aid +of dialectic only, to arrive at truth. He is deeply impressed with the +importance of classification: in this alone he finds the true measure of +human things; and very often in the process of division curious results +are obtained. For the dialectical art is no respecter of persons: king +and vermin-taker are all alike to the philosopher. There may have been a +time when the king was a god, but he now is pretty much on a level with +his subjects in breeding and education. Man should be well advised that +he is only one of the animals, and the Hellene in particular should be +aware that he himself was the author of the distinction between Hellene +and Barbarian, and that the Phrygian would equally divide mankind into +Phrygians and Barbarians, and that some intelligent animal, like a +crane, might go a step further, and divide the animal world into cranes +and all other animals. Plato cannot help laughing (compare Theaet.) when +he thinks of the king running after his subjects, like the pig-driver +or the bird-taker. He would seriously have him consider how many +competitors there are to his throne, chiefly among the class of +serving-men. A good deal of meaning is lurking in the expression--'There +is no art of feeding mankind worthy the name.' There is a similar +depth in the remark,--'The wonder about states is not that they are +short-lived, but that they last so long in spite of the badness of their +rulers.' + +V. There is also a paradoxical element in the Statesman which delights +in reversing the accustomed use of words. The law which to the Greek was +the highest object of reverence is an ignorant and brutal tyrant--the +tyrant is converted into a beneficent king. The sophist too is no +longer, as in the earlier dialogues, the rival of the statesman, but +assumes his form. Plato sees that the ideal of the state in his own day +is more and more severed from the actual. From such ideals as he had +once formed, he turns away to contemplate the decline of the Greek +cities which were far worse now in his old age than they had been in his +youth, and were to become worse and worse in the ages which followed. He +cannot contain his disgust at the contemporary statesmen, sophists who +had turned politicians, in various forms of men and animals, appearing, +some like lions and centaurs, others like satyrs and monkeys. In this +new disguise the Sophists make their last appearance on the scene: in +the Laws Plato appears to have forgotten them, or at any rate makes only +a slight allusion to them in a single passage (Laws). + +VI. The Statesman is naturally connected with the Sophist. At first +sight we are surprised to find that the Eleatic Stranger discourses +to us, not only concerning the nature of Being and Not-being, but +concerning the king and statesman. We perceive, however, that there is +no inappropriateness in his maintaining the character of chief speaker, +when we remember the close connexion which is assumed by Plato to exist +between politics and dialectic. In both dialogues the Proteus Sophist +is exhibited, first, in the disguise of an Eristic, secondly, of a false +statesman. There are several lesser features which the two dialogues +have in common. The styles and the situations of the speakers are very +similar; there is the same love of division, and in both of them the +mind of the writer is greatly occupied about method, to which he had +probably intended to return in the projected 'Philosopher.' + +The Statesman stands midway between the Republic and the Laws, and is +also related to the Timaeus. The mythical or cosmical element reminds us +of the Timaeus, the ideal of the Republic. A previous chaos in which +the elements as yet were not, is hinted at both in the Timaeus and +Statesman. The same ingenious arts of giving verisimilitude to a fiction +are practised in both dialogues, and in both, as well as in the myth at +the end of the Republic, Plato touches on the subject of necessity and +free-will. The words in which he describes the miseries of states seem +to be an amplification of the 'Cities will never cease from ill' of the +Republic. The point of view in both is the same; and the differences not +really important, e.g. in the myth, or in the account of the different +kinds of states. But the treatment of the subject in the Statesman is +fragmentary, and the shorter and later work, as might be expected, is +less finished, and less worked out in detail. The idea of measure and +the arrangement of the sciences supply connecting links both with the +Republic and the Philebus. + +More than any of the preceding dialogues, the Statesman seems to +approximate in thought and language to the Laws. There is the same +decline and tendency to monotony in style, the same self-consciousness, +awkwardness, and over-civility; and in the Laws is contained the pattern +of that second best form of government, which, after all, is admitted +to be the only attainable one in this world. The 'gentle violence,' the +marriage of dissimilar natures, the figure of the warp and the woof, +are also found in the Laws. Both expressly recognize the conception of +a first or ideal state, which has receded into an invisible heaven. Nor +does the account of the origin and growth of society really differ in +them, if we make allowance for the mythic character of the narrative in +the Statesman. The virtuous tyrant is common to both of them; and the +Eleatic Stranger takes up a position similar to that of the Athenian +Stranger in the Laws. + +VII. There would have been little disposition to doubt the genuineness +of the Sophist and Statesman, if they had been compared with the Laws +rather than with the Republic, and the Laws had been received, as they +ought to be, on the authority of Aristotle and on the ground of their +intrinsic excellence, as an undoubted work of Plato. The detailed +consideration of the genuineness and order of the Platonic dialogues has +been reserved for another place: a few of the reasons for defending the +Sophist and Statesman may be given here. + +1. The excellence, importance, and metaphysical originality of the two +dialogues: no works at once so good and of such length are known to have +proceeded from the hands of a forger. + +2. The resemblances in them to other dialogues of Plato are such as +might be expected to be found in works of the same author, and not in +those of an imitator, being too subtle and minute to have been invented +by another. The similar passages and turns of thought are generally +inferior to the parallel passages in his earlier writings; and we might +a priori have expected that, if altered, they would have been improved. +But the comparison of the Laws proves that this repetition of his own +thoughts and words in an inferior form is characteristic of Plato's +later style. + +3. The close connexion of them with the Theaetetus, Parmenides, and +Philebus, involves the fate of these dialogues, as well as of the two +suspected ones. + +4. The suspicion of them seems mainly to rest on a presumption that in +Plato's writings we may expect to find an uniform type of doctrine and +opinion. But however we arrange the order, or narrow the circle of the +dialogues, we must admit that they exhibit a growth and progress in the +mind of Plato. And the appearance of change or progress is not to be +regarded as impugning the genuineness of any particular writings, but +may be even an argument in their favour. If we suppose the Sophist and +Politicus to stand halfway between the Republic and the Laws, and in +near connexion with the Theaetetus, the Parmenides, the Philebus, the +arguments against them derived from differences of thought and style +disappear or may be said without paradox in some degree to confirm their +genuineness. There is no such interval between the Republic or Phaedrus +and the two suspected dialogues, as that which separates all the earlier +writings of Plato from the Laws. And the Theaetetus, Parmenides, and +Philebus, supply links, by which, however different from them, they may +be reunited with the great body of the Platonic writings. + + + + +STATESMAN + + +PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Theodorus, Socrates, The Eleatic Stranger, The +Younger Socrates. + + +SOCRATES: I owe you many thanks, indeed, Theodorus, for the acquaintance +both of Theaetetus and of the Stranger. + +THEODORUS: And in a little while, Socrates, you will owe me three +times as many, when they have completed for you the delineation of the +Statesman and of the Philosopher, as well as of the Sophist. + +SOCRATES: Sophist, statesman, philosopher! O my dear Theodorus, do my +ears truly witness that this is the estimate formed of them by the great +calculator and geometrician? + +THEODORUS: What do you mean, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: I mean that you rate them all at the same value, whereas they +are really separated by an interval, which no geometrical ratio can +express. + +THEODORUS: By Ammon, the god of Cyrene, Socrates, that is a very +fair hit; and shows that you have not forgotten your geometry. I will +retaliate on you at some other time, but I must now ask the Stranger, +who will not, I hope, tire of his goodness to us, to proceed either with +the Statesman or with the Philosopher, whichever he prefers. + +STRANGER: That is my duty, Theodorus; having begun I must go on, and not +leave the work unfinished. But what shall be done with Theaetetus? + +THEODORUS: In what respect? + +STRANGER: Shall we relieve him, and take his companion, the Young +Socrates, instead of him? What do you advise? + +THEODORUS: Yes, give the other a turn, as you propose. The young always +do better when they have intervals of rest. + +SOCRATES: I think, Stranger, that both of them may be said to be in some +way related to me; for the one, as you affirm, has the cut of my ugly +face (compare Theaet.), the other is called by my name. And we should +always be on the look-out to recognize a kinsman by the style of his +conversation. I myself was discoursing with Theaetetus yesterday, and +I have just been listening to his answers; my namesake I have not yet +examined, but I must. Another time will do for me; to-day let him answer +you. + +STRANGER: Very good. Young Socrates, do you hear what the elder Socrates +is proposing? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I do. + +STRANGER: And do you agree to his proposal? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: As you do not object, still less can I. After the Sophist, +then, I think that the Statesman naturally follows next in the order +of enquiry. And please to say, whether he, too, should be ranked among +those who have science. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: Then the sciences must be divided as before? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I dare say. + +STRANGER: But yet the division will not be the same? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How then? + +STRANGER: They will be divided at some other point. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: Where shall we discover the path of the Statesman? We must +find and separate off, and set our seal upon this, and we will set +the mark of another class upon all diverging paths. Thus the soul will +conceive of all kinds of knowledge under two classes. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: To find the path is your business, Stranger, and not +mine. + +STRANGER: Yes, Socrates, but the discovery, when once made, must be +yours as well as mine. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good. + +STRANGER: Well, and are not arithmetic and certain other kindred arts, +merely abstract knowledge, wholly separated from action? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: But in the art of carpentering and all other handicrafts, the +knowledge of the workman is merged in his work; he not only knows, but +he also makes things which previously did not exist. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: Then let us divide sciences in general into those which are +practical and those which are purely intellectual. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Let us assume these two divisions of science, which is +one whole. + +STRANGER: And are 'statesman,' 'king,' 'master,' or 'householder,' one +and the same; or is there a science or art answering to each of these +names? Or rather, allow me to put the matter in another way. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Let me hear. + +STRANGER: If any one who is in a private station has the skill to advise +one of the public physicians, must not he also be called a physician? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: And if any one who is in a private station is able to advise +the ruler of a country, may not he be said to have the knowledge which +the ruler himself ought to have? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: But surely the science of a true king is royal science? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: And will not he who possesses this knowledge, whether he +happens to be a ruler or a private man, when regarded only in reference +to his art, be truly called 'royal'? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: He certainly ought to be. + +STRANGER: And the householder and master are the same? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Of course. + +STRANGER: Again, a large household may be compared to a small +state:--will they differ at all, as far as government is concerned? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: They will not. + +STRANGER: Then, returning to the point which we were just now +discussing, do we not clearly see that there is one science of all +of them; and this science may be called either royal or political or +economical; we will not quarrel with any one about the name. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not. + +STRANGER: This too, is evident, that the king cannot do much with his +hands, or with his whole body, towards the maintenance of his empire, +compared with what he does by the intelligence and strength of his mind. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly not. + +STRANGER: Then, shall we say that the king has a greater affinity to +knowledge than to manual arts and to practical life in general? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly he has. + +STRANGER: Then we may put all together as one and the +same--statesmanship and the statesman--the kingly science and the king. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly. + +STRANGER: And now we shall only be proceeding in due order if we go on +to divide the sphere of knowledge? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good. + +STRANGER: Think whether you can find any joint or parting in knowledge. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Tell me of what sort. + +STRANGER: Such as this: You may remember that we made an art of +calculation? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: Which was, unmistakeably, one of the arts of knowledge? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: And to this art of calculation which discerns the differences +of numbers shall we assign any other function except to pass judgment on +their differences? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How could we? + +STRANGER: You know that the master-builder does not work himself, but is +the ruler of workmen? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: He contributes knowledge, not manual labour? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: And may therefore be justly said to share in theoretical +science? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite true. + +STRANGER: But he ought not, like the calculator, to regard his functions +as at an end when he has formed a judgment;--he must assign to the +individual workmen their appropriate task until they have completed the +work. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: Are not all such sciences, no less than arithmetic and the +like, subjects of pure knowledge; and is not the difference between the +two classes, that the one sort has the power of judging only, and the +other of ruling as well? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: That is evident. + +STRANGER: May we not very properly say, that of all knowledge, there are +two divisions--one which rules, and the other which judges? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I should think so. + +STRANGER: And when men have anything to do in common, that they should +be of one mind is surely a desirable thing? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: Then while we are at unity among ourselves, we need not mind +about the fancies of others? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not. + +STRANGER: And now, in which of these divisions shall we place the +king?--Is he a judge and a kind of spectator? Or shall we assign to him +the art of command--for he is a ruler? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: The latter, clearly. + +STRANGER: Then we must see whether there is any mark of division in the +art of command too. I am inclined to think that there is a distinction +similar to that of manufacturer and retail dealer, which parts off the +king from the herald. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How is this? + +STRANGER: Why, does not the retailer receive and sell over again the +productions of others, which have been sold before? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly he does. + +STRANGER: And is not the herald under command, and does he not receive +orders, and in his turn give them to others? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: Then shall we mingle the kingly art in the same class with the +art of the herald, the interpreter, the boatswain, the prophet, and the +numerous kindred arts which exercise command; or, as in the preceding +comparison we spoke of manufacturers, or sellers for themselves, and of +retailers,--seeing, too, that the class of supreme rulers, or rulers for +themselves, is almost nameless--shall we make a word following the +same analogy, and refer kings to a supreme or ruling-for-self science, +leaving the rest to receive a name from some one else? For we are +seeking the ruler; and our enquiry is not concerned with him who is not +a ruler. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good. + +STRANGER: Thus a very fair distinction has been attained between the man +who gives his own commands, and him who gives another's. And now let us +see if the supreme power allows of any further division. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: By all means. + +STRANGER: I think that it does; and please to assist me in making the +division. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: At what point? + +STRANGER: May not all rulers be supposed to command for the sake of +producing something? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: Nor is there any difficulty in dividing the things produced +into two classes. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How would you divide them? + +STRANGER: Of the whole class, some have life and some are without life. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: And by the help of this distinction we may make, if we please, +a subdivision of the section of knowledge which commands. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: At what point? + +STRANGER: One part may be set over the production of lifeless, the other +of living objects; and in this way the whole will be divided. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: That division, then, is complete; and now we may leave one +half, and take up the other; which may also be divided into two. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Which of the two halves do you mean? + +STRANGER: Of course that which exercises command about animals. For, +surely, the royal science is not like that of a master-workman, +a science presiding over lifeless objects;--the king has a nobler +function, which is the management and control of living beings. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: And the breeding and tending of living beings may be observed +to be sometimes a tending of the individual; in other cases, a common +care of creatures in flocks? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: But the statesman is not a tender of individuals--not like +the driver or groom of a single ox or horse; he is rather to be compared +with the keeper of a drove of horses or oxen. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, I see, thanks to you. + +STRANGER: Shall we call this art of tending many animals together, the +art of managing a herd, or the art of collective management? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: No matter;--whichever suggests itself to us in the +course of conversation. + +STRANGER: Very good, Socrates; and, if you continue to be not too +particular about names, you will be all the richer in wisdom when you +are an old man. And now, as you say, leaving the discussion of the +name,--can you see a way in which a person, by showing the art of +herding to be of two kinds, may cause that which is now sought amongst +twice the number of things, to be then sought amongst half that number? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I will try;--there appears to me to be one management of +men and another of beasts. + +STRANGER: You have certainly divided them in a most straightforward and +manly style; but you have fallen into an error which hereafter I think +that we had better avoid. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What is the error? + +STRANGER: I think that we had better not cut off a single small portion +which is not a species, from many larger portions; the part should be a +species. To separate off at once the subject of investigation, is a most +excellent plan, if only the separation be rightly made; and you were +under the impression that you were right, because you saw that you would +come to man; and this led you to hasten the steps. But you should not +chip off too small a piece, my friend; the safer way is to cut through +the middle; which is also the more likely way of finding classes. +Attention to this principle makes all the difference in a process of +enquiry. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean, Stranger? + +STRANGER: I will endeavour to speak more plainly out of love to your +good parts, Socrates; and, although I cannot at present entirely explain +myself, I will try, as we proceed, to make my meaning a little clearer. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What was the error of which, as you say, we were guilty +in our recent division? + +STRANGER: The error was just as if some one who wanted to divide the +human race, were to divide them after the fashion which prevails in this +part of the world; here they cut off the Hellenes as one species, and +all the other species of mankind, which are innumerable, and have +no ties or common language, they include under the single name of +'barbarians,' and because they have one name they are supposed to be of +one species also. Or suppose that in dividing numbers you were to +cut off ten thousand from all the rest, and make of it one species, +comprehending the rest under another separate name, you might say that +here too was a single class, because you had given it a single name. +Whereas you would make a much better and more equal and logical +classification of numbers, if you divided them into odd and even; or of +the human species, if you divided them into male and female; and only +separated off Lydians or Phrygians, or any other tribe, and arrayed them +against the rest of the world, when you could no longer make a division +into parts which were also classes. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true; but I wish that this distinction between a +part and a class could still be made somewhat plainer. + +STRANGER: O Socrates, best of men, you are imposing upon me a very +difficult task. We have already digressed further from our original +intention than we ought, and you would have us wander still further +away. But we must now return to our subject; and hereafter, when there +is a leisure hour, we will follow up the other track; at the same time, +I wish you to guard against imagining that you ever heard me declare-- + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What? + +STRANGER: That a class and a part are distinct. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What did I hear, then? + +STRANGER: That a class is necessarily a part, but there is no similar +necessity that a part should be a class; that is the view which I should +always wish you to attribute to me, Socrates. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: So be it. + +STRANGER: There is another thing which I should like to know. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it? + +STRANGER: The point at which we digressed; for, if I am not mistaken, +the exact place was at the question, Where you would divide the +management of herds. To this you appeared rather too ready to answer +that there were two species of animals; man being one, and all brutes +making up the other. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: I thought that in taking away a part, you imagined that the +remainder formed a class, because you were able to call them by the +common name of brutes. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: That again is true. + +STRANGER: Suppose now, O most courageous of dialecticians, that some +wise and understanding creature, such as a crane is reputed to be, +were, in imitation of you, to make a similar division, and set up cranes +against all other animals to their own special glorification, at the +same time jumbling together all the others, including man, under the +appellation of brutes,--here would be the sort of error which we must +try to avoid. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How can we be safe? + +STRANGER: If we do not divide the whole class of animals, we shall be +less likely to fall into that error. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: We had better not take the whole? + +STRANGER: Yes, there lay the source of error in our former division. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How? + +STRANGER: You remember how that part of the art of knowledge which +was concerned with command, had to do with the rearing of living +creatures,--I mean, with animals in herds? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: In that case, there was already implied a division of all +animals into tame and wild; those whose nature can be tamed are called +tame, and those which cannot be tamed are called wild. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: And the political science of which we are in search, is and +ever was concerned with tame animals, and is also confined to gregarious +animals. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: But then we ought not to divide, as we did, taking the whole +class at once. Neither let us be in too great haste to arrive quickly at +the political science; for this mistake has already brought upon us the +misfortune of which the proverb speaks. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What misfortune? + +STRANGER: The misfortune of too much haste, which is too little speed. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: And all the better, Stranger;--we got what we deserved. + +STRANGER: Very well: Let us then begin again, and endeavour to divide +the collective rearing of animals; for probably the completion of the +argument will best show what you are so anxious to know. Tell me, then-- + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What? + +STRANGER: Have you ever heard, as you very likely may--for I do not +suppose that you ever actually visited them--of the preserves of fishes +in the Nile, and in the ponds of the Great King; or you may have seen +similar preserves in wells at home? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, to be sure, I have seen them, and I have often +heard the others described. + +STRANGER: And you may have heard also, and may have been assured by +report, although you have not travelled in those regions, of nurseries +of geese and cranes in the plains of Thessaly? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: I asked you, because here is a new division of the management +of herds, into the management of land and of water herds. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: There is. + +STRANGER: And do you agree that we ought to divide the collective +rearing of herds into two corresponding parts, the one the rearing of +water, and the other the rearing of land herds? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: There is surely no need to ask which of these two contains the +royal art, for it is evident to everybody. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: Any one can divide the herds which feed on dry land? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How would you divide them? + +STRANGER: I should distinguish between those which fly and those which +walk. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Most true. + +STRANGER: And where shall we look for the political animal? Might not an +idiot, so to speak, know that he is a pedestrian? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: The art of managing the walking animal has to be further +divided, just as you might halve an even number. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly. + +STRANGER: Let me note that here appear in view two ways to that part +or class which the argument aims at reaching,--the one a speedier way, +which cuts off a small portion and leaves a large; the other agrees +better with the principle which we were laying down, that as far as we +can we should divide in the middle; but it is longer. We can take either +of them, whichever we please. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Cannot we have both ways? + +STRANGER: Together? What a thing to ask! but, if you take them in turn, +you clearly may. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Then I should like to have them in turn. + +STRANGER: There will be no difficulty, as we are near the end; if we had +been at the beginning, or in the middle, I should have demurred to your +request; but now, in accordance with your desire, let us begin with the +longer way; while we are fresh, we shall get on better. And now attend +to the division. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Let me hear. + +STRANGER: The tame walking herding animals are distributed by nature +into two classes. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Upon what principle? + +STRANGER: The one grows horns; and the other is without horns. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly. + +STRANGER: Suppose that you divide the science which manages pedestrian +animals into two corresponding parts, and define them; for if you try to +invent names for them, you will find the intricacy too great. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How must I speak of them, then? + +STRANGER: In this way: let the science of managing pedestrian animals +be divided into two parts, and one part assigned to the horned herd, and +the other to the herd that has no horns. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: All that you say has been abundantly proved, and may +therefore be assumed. + +STRANGER: The king is clearly the shepherd of a polled herd, who have no +horns. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: That is evident. + +STRANGER: Shall we break up this hornless herd into sections, and +endeavour to assign to him what is his? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: By all means. + +STRANGER: Shall we distinguish them by their having or not having cloven +feet, or by their mixing or not mixing the breed? You know what I mean. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What? + +STRANGER: I mean that horses and asses naturally breed from one another. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: But the remainder of the hornless herd of tame animals will +not mix the breed. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: And of which has the Statesman charge,--of the mixed or of the +unmixed race? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly of the unmixed. + +STRANGER: I suppose that we must divide this again as before. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: We must. + +STRANGER: Every tame and herding animal has now been split up, with +the exception of two species; for I hardly think that dogs should be +reckoned among gregarious animals. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not; but how shall we divide the two remaining +species? + +STRANGER: There is a measure of difference which may be appropriately +employed by you and Theaetetus, who are students of geometry. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What is that? + +STRANGER: The diameter; and, again, the diameter of a diameter. (Compare +Meno.) + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean? + +STRANGER: How does man walk, but as a diameter whose power is two feet? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Just so. + +STRANGER: And the power of the remaining kind, being the power of twice +two feet, may be said to be the diameter of our diameter. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly; and now I think that I pretty nearly +understand you. + +STRANGER: In these divisions, Socrates, I descry what would make another +famous jest. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it? + +STRANGER: Human beings have come out in the same class with the freest +and airiest of creation, and have been running a race with them. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I remark that very singular coincidence. + +STRANGER: And would you not expect the slowest to arrive last? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Indeed I should. + +STRANGER: And there is a still more ridiculous consequence, that the +king is found running about with the herd and in close competition with +the bird-catcher, who of all mankind is most of an adept at the airy +life. (Plato is here introducing a new subdivision, i.e. that of bipeds +into men and birds. Others however refer the passage to the division +into quadrupeds and bipeds, making pigs compete with human beings and +the pig-driver with the king. According to this explanation we must +translate the words above, 'freest and airiest of creation,' 'worthiest +and laziest of creation.') + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: Then here, Socrates, is still clearer evidence of the truth of +what was said in the enquiry about the Sophist? (Compare Sophist.) + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What? + +STRANGER: That the dialectical method is no respecter of persons, and +does not set the great above the small, but always arrives in her own +way at the truest result. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly. + +STRANGER: And now, I will not wait for you to ask, but will of my +own accord take you by the shorter road to the definition of a king. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: By all means. + +STRANGER: I say that we should have begun at first by dividing land +animals into biped and quadruped; and since the winged herd, and that +alone, comes out in the same class with man, we should divide bipeds +into those which have feathers and those which have not, and when they +have been divided, and the art of the management of mankind is brought +to light, the time will have come to produce our Statesman and ruler, +and set him like a charioteer in his place, and hand over to him the +reins of state, for that too is a vocation which belongs to him. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good; you have paid me the debt,--I mean, that you +have completed the argument, and I suppose that you added the digression +by way of interest. (Compare Republic.) + +STRANGER: Then now, let us go back to the beginning, and join the links, +which together make the definition of the name of the Statesman's art. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: By all means. + +STRANGER: The science of pure knowledge had, as we said originally, a +part which was the science of rule or command, and from this was derived +another part, which was called command-for-self, on the analogy of +selling-for-self; an important section of this was the management of +living animals, and this again was further limited to the management +of them in herds; and again in herds of pedestrian animals. The chief +division of the latter was the art of managing pedestrian animals which +are without horns; this again has a part which can only be comprehended +under one term by joining together three names--shepherding pure-bred +animals. The only further subdivision is the art of man-herding,--this +has to do with bipeds, and is what we were seeking after, and have now +found, being at once the royal and political. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: To be sure. + +STRANGER: And do you think, Socrates, that we really have done as you +say? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What? + +STRANGER: Do you think, I mean, that we have really fulfilled +our intention?--There has been a sort of discussion, and yet the +investigation seems to me not to be perfectly worked out: this is where +the enquiry fails. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I do not understand. + +STRANGER: I will try to make the thought, which is at this moment +present in my mind, clearer to us both. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Let me hear. + +STRANGER: There were many arts of shepherding, and one of them was the +political, which had the charge of one particular herd? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: And this the argument defined to be the art of rearing, not +horses or other brutes, but the art of rearing man collectively? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: Note, however, a difference which distinguishes the king from +all other shepherds. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: To what do you refer? + +STRANGER: I want to ask, whether any one of the other herdsmen has a +rival who professes and claims to share with him in the management of +the herd? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean? + +STRANGER: I mean to say that merchants, husbandmen, providers of food, +and also training-masters and physicians, will all contend with the +herdsmen of humanity, whom we call Statesmen, declaring that they +themselves have the care of rearing or managing mankind, and that they +rear not only the common herd, but also the rulers themselves. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Are they not right in saying so? + +STRANGER: Very likely they may be, and we will consider their claim. +But we are certain of this,--that no one will raise a similar claim as +against the herdsman, who is allowed on all hands to be the sole and +only feeder and physician of his herd; he is also their match-maker +and accoucheur; no one else knows that department of science. And he is +their merry-maker and musician, as far as their nature is susceptible of +such influences, and no one can console and soothe his own herd +better than he can, either with the natural tones of his voice or with +instruments. And the same may be said of tenders of animals in general. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: But if this is as you say, can our argument about the king +be true and unimpeachable? Were we right in selecting him out of ten +thousand other claimants to be the shepherd and rearer of the human +flock? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Surely not. + +STRANGER: Had we not reason just to now to apprehend, that although we +may have described a sort of royal form, we have not as yet accurately +worked out the true image of the Statesman? and that we cannot reveal +him as he truly is in his own nature, until we have disengaged and +separated him from those who hang about him and claim to share in his +prerogatives? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: And that, Socrates, is what we must do, if we do not mean to +bring disgrace upon the argument at its close. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: We must certainly avoid that. + +STRANGER: Then let us make a new beginning, and travel by a different +road. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What road? + +STRANGER: I think that we may have a little amusement; there is a famous +tale, of which a good portion may with advantage be interwoven, and then +we may resume our series of divisions, and proceed in the old path until +we arrive at the desired summit. Shall we do as I say? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: By all means. + +STRANGER: Listen, then, to a tale which a child would love to hear; and +you are not too old for childish amusement. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Let me hear. + +STRANGER: There did really happen, and will again happen, like many +other events of which ancient tradition has preserved the record, the +portent which is traditionally said to have occurred in the quarrel of +Atreus and Thyestes. You have heard, no doubt, and remember what they +say happened at that time? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I suppose you to mean the token of the birth of the +golden lamb. + +STRANGER: No, not that; but another part of the story, which tells how +the sun and the stars once rose in the west, and set in the east, and +that the god reversed their motion, and gave them that which they now +have as a testimony to the right of Atreus. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes; there is that legend also. + +STRANGER: Again, we have been often told of the reign of Cronos. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, very often. + +STRANGER: Did you ever hear that the men of former times were +earth-born, and not begotten of one another? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, that is another old tradition. + +STRANGER: All these stories, and ten thousand others which are still +more wonderful, have a common origin; many of them have been lost in +the lapse of ages, or are repeated only in a disconnected form; but the +origin of them is what no one has told, and may as well be told now; for +the tale is suited to throw light on the nature of the king. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good; and I hope that you will give the whole +story, and leave out nothing. + +STRANGER: Listen, then. There is a time when God himself guides and +helps to roll the world in its course; and there is a time, on the +completion of a certain cycle, when he lets go, and the world being a +living creature, and having originally received intelligence from its +author and creator, turns about and by an inherent necessity revolves in +the opposite direction. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Why is that? + +STRANGER: Why, because only the most divine things of all remain ever +unchanged and the same, and body is not included in this class. Heaven +and the universe, as we have termed them, although they have been +endowed by the Creator with many glories, partake of a bodily nature, +and therefore cannot be entirely free from perturbation. But their +motion is, as far as possible, single and in the same place, and of the +same kind; and is therefore only subject to a reversal, which is the +least alteration possible. For the lord of all moving things is alone +able to move of himself; and to think that he moves them at one time in +one direction and at another time in another is blasphemy. Hence we must +not say that the world is either self-moved always, or all made to go +round by God in two opposite courses; or that two Gods, having opposite +purposes, make it move round. But as I have already said (and this is +the only remaining alternative) the world is guided at one time by an +external power which is divine and receives fresh life and immortality +from the renewing hand of the Creator, and again, when let go, moves +spontaneously, being set free at such a time as to have, during infinite +cycles of years, a reverse movement: this is due to its perfect balance, +to its vast size, and to the fact that it turns on the smallest pivot. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Your account of the world seems to be very reasonable +indeed. + +STRANGER: Let us now reflect and try to gather from what has been said +the nature of the phenomenon which we affirmed to be the cause of all +these wonders. It is this. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What? + +STRANGER: The reversal which takes place from time to time of the motion +of the universe. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How is that the cause? + +STRANGER: Of all changes of the heavenly motions, we may consider this +to be the greatest and most complete. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I should imagine so. + +STRANGER: And it may be supposed to result in the greatest changes to +the human beings who are the inhabitants of the world at the time. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Such changes would naturally occur. + +STRANGER: And animals, as we know, survive with difficulty great and +serious changes of many different kinds when they come upon them at +once. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: Hence there necessarily occurs a great destruction of them, +which extends also to the life of man; few survivors of the race are +left, and those who remain become the subjects of several novel and +remarkable phenomena, and of one in particular, which takes place at the +time when the transition is made to the cycle opposite to that in which +we are now living. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it? + +STRANGER: The life of all animals first came to a standstill, and the +mortal nature ceased to be or look older, and was then reversed and grew +young and delicate; the white locks of the aged darkened again, and the +cheeks the bearded man became smooth, and recovered their former bloom; +the bodies of youths in their prime grew softer and smaller, continually +by day and night returning and becoming assimilated to the nature of a +newly-born child in mind as well as body; in the succeeding stage they +wasted away and wholly disappeared. And the bodies of those who died by +violence at that time quickly passed through the like changes, and in a +few days were no more seen. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Then how, Stranger, were the animals created in those +days; and in what way were they begotten of one another? + +STRANGER: It is evident, Socrates, that there was no such thing in the +then order of nature as the procreation of animals from one another; the +earth-born race, of which we hear in story, was the one which existed +in those days--they rose again from the ground; and of this tradition, +which is now-a-days often unduly discredited, our ancestors, who were +nearest in point of time to the end of the last period and came into +being at the beginning of this, are to us the heralds. And mark how +consistent the sequel of the tale is; after the return of age to youth, +follows the return of the dead, who are lying in the earth, to life; +simultaneously with the reversal of the world the wheel of their +generation has been turned back, and they are put together and rise and +live in the opposite order, unless God has carried any of them away to +some other lot. According to this tradition they of necessity sprang +from the earth and have the name of earth-born, and so the above legend +clings to them. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly that is quite consistent with what has +preceded; but tell me, was the life which you said existed in the reign +of Cronos in that cycle of the world, or in this? For the change in the +course of the stars and the sun must have occurred in both. + +STRANGER: I see that you enter into my meaning;--no, that blessed and +spontaneous life does not belong to the present cycle of the world, but +to the previous one, in which God superintended the whole revolution of +the universe; and the several parts the universe were distributed under +the rule of certain inferior deities, as is the way in some places +still. There were demigods, who were the shepherds of the various +species and herds of animals, and each one was in all respects +sufficient for those of whom he was the shepherd; neither was there any +violence, or devouring of one another, or war or quarrel among them; +and I might tell of ten thousand other blessings, which belonged to that +dispensation. The reason why the life of man was, as tradition says, +spontaneous, is as follows: In those days God himself was their +shepherd, and ruled over them, just as man, who is by comparison a +divine being, still rules over the lower animals. Under him there were +no forms of government or separate possession of women and children; +for all men rose again from the earth, having no memory of the past. And +although they had nothing of this sort, the earth gave them fruits in +abundance, which grew on trees and shrubs unbidden, and were not planted +by the hand of man. And they dwelt naked, and mostly in the open air, +for the temperature of their seasons was mild; and they had no beds, but +lay on soft couches of grass, which grew plentifully out of the earth. +Such was the life of man in the days of Cronos, Socrates; the character +of our present life, which is said to be under Zeus, you know from your +own experience. Can you, and will you, determine which of them you deem +the happier? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Impossible. + +STRANGER: Then shall I determine for you as well as I can? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: By all means. + +STRANGER: Suppose that the nurslings of Cronos, having this boundless +leisure, and the power of holding intercourse, not only with men, but +with the brute creation, had used all these advantages with a view to +philosophy, conversing with the brutes as well as with one another, and +learning of every nature which was gifted with any special power, and +was able to contribute some special experience to the store of wisdom, +there would be no difficulty in deciding that they would be a thousand +times happier than the men of our own day. Or, again, if they had merely +eaten and drunk until they were full, and told stories to one another +and to the animals--such stories as are now attributed to them--in this +case also, as I should imagine, the answer would be easy. But until some +satisfactory witness can be found of the love of that age for knowledge +and discussion, we had better let the matter drop, and give the reason +why we have unearthed this tale, and then we shall be able to get on. +In the fulness of time, when the change was to take place, and the +earth-born race had all perished, and every soul had completed its +proper cycle of births and been sown in the earth her appointed number +of times, the pilot of the universe let the helm go, and retired to his +place of view; and then Fate and innate desire reversed the motion of +the world. Then also all the inferior deities who share the rule of the +supreme power, being informed of what was happening, let go the parts +of the world which were under their control. And the world turning +round with a sudden shock, being impelled in an opposite direction from +beginning to end, was shaken by a mighty earthquake, which wrought a new +destruction of all manner of animals. Afterwards, when sufficient time +had elapsed, the tumult and confusion and earthquake ceased, and the +universal creature, once more at peace, attained to a calm, and settled +down into his own orderly and accustomed course, having the charge and +rule of himself and of all the creatures which are contained in him, and +executing, as far as he remembered them, the instructions of his +Father and Creator, more precisely at first, but afterwords with less +exactness. The reason of the falling off was the admixture of matter in +him; this was inherent in the primal nature, which was full of disorder, +until attaining to the present order. From God, the constructor, the +world received all that is good in him, but from a previous state came +elements of evil and unrighteousness, which, thence derived, first of +all passed into the world, and were then transmitted to the animals. +While the world was aided by the pilot in nurturing the animals, the +evil was small, and great the good which he produced, but after the +separation, when the world was let go, at first all proceeded well +enough; but, as time went on, there was more and more forgetting, and +the old discord again held sway and burst forth in full glory; and at +last small was the good, and great was the admixture of evil, and there +was a danger of universal ruin to the world, and to the things contained +in him. Wherefore God, the orderer of all, in his tender care, seeing +that the world was in great straits, and fearing that all might be +dissolved in the storm and disappear in infinite chaos, again seated +himself at the helm; and bringing back the elements which had fallen +into dissolution and disorder to the motion which had prevailed under +his dispensation, he set them in order and restored them, and made the +world imperishable and immortal. And this is the whole tale, of which +the first part will suffice to illustrate the nature of the king. For +when the world turned towards the present cycle of generation, the age +of man again stood still, and a change opposite to the previous one was +the result. The small creatures which had almost disappeared grew in and +stature, and the newly-born children of the earth became grey and +died and sank into the earth again. All things changed, imitating and +following the condition of the universe, and of necessity agreeing with +that in their mode of conception and generation and nurture; for no +animal was any longer allowed to come into being in the earth through +the agency of other creative beings, but as the world was ordained to be +the lord of his own progress, in like manner the parts were ordained +to grow and generate and give nourishment, as far as they could, of +themselves, impelled by a similar movement. And so we have arrived at +the real end of this discourse; for although there might be much to tell +of the lower animals, and of the condition out of which they changed +and of the causes of the change, about men there is not much, and that +little is more to the purpose. Deprived of the care of God, who had +possessed and tended them, they were left helpless and defenceless, and +were torn in pieces by the beasts, who were naturally fierce and had +now grown wild. And in the first ages they were still without skill or +resource; the food which once grew spontaneously had failed, and as +yet they knew not how to procure it, because they had never felt the +pressure of necessity. For all these reasons they were in a great +strait; wherefore also the gifts spoken of in the old tradition +were imparted to man by the gods, together with so much teaching and +education as was indispensable; fire was given to them by Prometheus, +the arts by Hephaestus and his fellow-worker, Athene, seeds and plants +by others. From these is derived all that has helped to frame human +life; since the care of the Gods, as I was saying, had now failed men, +and they had to order their course of life for themselves, and were +their own masters, just like the universal creature whom they imitate +and follow, ever changing, as he changes, and ever living and growing, +at one time in one manner, and at another time in another. Enough of +the story, which may be of use in showing us how greatly we erred in the +delineation of the king and the statesman in our previous discourse. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What was this great error of which you speak? + +STRANGER: There were two; the first a lesser one, the other was an error +on a much larger and grander scale. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean? + +STRANGER: I mean to say that when we were asked about a king and +statesman of the present cycle and generation, we told of a shepherd of +a human flock who belonged to the other cycle, and of one who was a +god when he ought to have been a man; and this a great error. Again, +we declared him to be the ruler of the entire State, without explaining +how: this was not the whole truth, nor very intelligible; but still it +was true, and therefore the second error was not so great as the first. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good. + +STRANGER: Before we can expect to have a perfect description of the +statesman we must define the nature of his office. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: And the myth was introduced in order to show, not only that +all others are rivals of the true shepherd who is the object of our +search, but in order that we might have a clearer view of him who is +alone worthy to receive this appellation, because he alone of shepherds +and herdsmen, according to the image which we have employed, has the +care of human beings. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: And I cannot help thinking, Socrates, that the form of +the divine shepherd is even higher than that of a king; whereas the +statesmen who are now on earth seem to be much more like their subjects +in character, and much more nearly to partake of their breeding and +education. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: Still they must be investigated all the same, to see whether, +like the divine shepherd, they are above their subjects or on a level +with them. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Of course. + +STRANGER: To resume:--Do you remember that we spoke of a +command-for-self exercised over animals, not singly but collectively, +which we called the art of rearing a herd? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, I remember. + +STRANGER: There, somewhere, lay our error; for we never included or +mentioned the Statesman; and we did not observe that he had no place in +our nomenclature. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How was that? + +STRANGER: All other herdsmen 'rear' their herds, but this is not a +suitable term to apply to the Statesman; we should use a name which is +common to them all. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True, if there be such a name. + +STRANGER: Why, is not 'care' of herds applicable to all? For this +implies no feeding, or any special duty; if we say either 'tending' the +herds, or 'managing' the herds, or 'having the care' of them, the same +word will include all, and then we may wrap up the Statesman with the +rest, as the argument seems to require. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite right; but how shall we take the next step in the +division? + +STRANGER: As before we divided the art of 'rearing' herds accordingly as +they were land or water herds, winged and wingless, mixing or not +mixing the breed, horned and hornless, so we may divide by these same +differences the 'tending' of herds, comprehending in our definition the +kingship of to-day and the rule of Cronos. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: That is clear; but I still ask, what is to follow. + +STRANGER: If the word had been 'managing' herds, instead of feeding or +rearing them, no one would have argued that there was no care of men in +the case of the politician, although it was justly contended, that there +was no human art of feeding them which was worthy of the name, or at +least, if there were, many a man had a prior and greater right to share +in such an art than any king. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: But no other art or science will have a prior or better right +than the royal science to care for human society and to rule over men in +general. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite true. + +STRANGER: In the next place, Socrates, we must surely notice that a +great error was committed at the end of our analysis. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What was it? + +STRANGER: Why, supposing we were ever so sure that there is such an +art as the art of rearing or feeding bipeds, there was no reason why +we should call this the royal or political art, as though there were no +more to be said. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not. + +STRANGER: Our first duty, as we were saying, was to remodel the name, +so as to have the notion of care rather than of feeding, and then to +divide, for there may be still considerable divisions. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How can they be made? + +STRANGER: First, by separating the divine shepherd from the human +guardian or manager. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: And the art of management which is assigned to man would again +have to be subdivided. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: On what principle? + +STRANGER: On the principle of voluntary and compulsory. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Why? + +STRANGER: Because, if I am not mistaken, there has been an error here; +for our simplicity led us to rank king and tyrant together, whereas they +are utterly distinct, like their modes of government. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: Then, now, as I said, let us make the correction and divide +human care into two parts, on the principle of voluntary and compulsory. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: And if we call the management of violent rulers tyranny, and +the voluntary management of herds of voluntary bipeds politics, may we +not further assert that he who has this latter art of management is the +true king and statesman? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I think, Stranger, that we have now completed the +account of the Statesman. + +STRANGER: Would that we had, Socrates, but I have to satisfy myself +as well as you; and in my judgment the figure of the king is not +yet perfected; like statuaries who, in their too great haste, having +overdone the several parts of their work, lose time in cutting them +down, so too we, partly out of haste, partly out of a magnanimous desire +to expose our former error, and also because we imagined that a king +required grand illustrations, have taken up a marvellous lump of fable, +and have been obliged to use more than was necessary. This made us +discourse at large, and, nevertheless, the story never came to an end. +And our discussion might be compared to a picture of some living being +which had been fairly drawn in outline, but had not yet attained the +life and clearness which is given by the blending of colours. Now to +intelligent persons a living being had better be delineated by language +and discourse than by any painting or work of art: to the duller sort by +works of art. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true; but what is the imperfection which still +remains? I wish that you would tell me. + +STRANGER: The higher ideas, my dear friend, can hardly be set forth +except through the medium of examples; every man seems to know all +things in a dreamy sort of way, and then again to wake up and to know +nothing. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean? + +STRANGER: I fear that I have been unfortunate in raising a question +about our experience of knowledge. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Why so? + +STRANGER: Why, because my 'example' requires the assistance of another +example. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Proceed; you need not fear that I shall tire. + +STRANGER: I will proceed, finding, as I do, such a ready listener in +you: when children are beginning to know their letters-- + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What are you going to say? + +STRANGER: That they distinguish the several letters well enough in very +short and easy syllables, and are able to tell them correctly. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: Whereas in other syllables they do not recognize them, and +think and speak falsely of them. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: Will not the best and easiest way of bringing them to a +knowledge of what they do not as yet know be-- + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Be what? + +STRANGER: To refer them first of all to cases in which they judge +correctly about the letters in question, and then to compare these with +the cases in which they do not as yet know, and to show them that the +letters are the same, and have the same character in both combinations, +until all cases in which they are right have been placed side by side +with all cases in which they are wrong. In this way they have examples, +and are made to learn that each letter in every combination is always +the same and not another, and is always called by the same name. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: Are not examples formed in this manner? We take a thing and +compare it with another distinct instance of the same thing, of which we +have a right conception, and out of the comparison there arises one true +notion, which includes both of them. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Exactly. + +STRANGER: Can we wonder, then, that the soul has the same uncertainty +about the alphabet of things, and sometimes and in some cases is firmly +fixed by the truth in each particular, and then, again, in other cases +is altogether at sea; having somehow or other a correct notion of +combinations; but when the elements are transferred into the long and +difficult language (syllables) of facts, is again ignorant of them? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: There is nothing wonderful in that. + +STRANGER: Could any one, my friend, who began with false opinion ever +expect to arrive even at a small portion of truth and to attain wisdom? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Hardly. + +STRANGER: Then you and I will not be far wrong in trying to see the +nature of example in general in a small and particular instance; +afterwards from lesser things we intend to pass to the royal class, +which is the highest form of the same nature, and endeavour to discover +by rules of art what the management of cities is; and then the dream +will become a reality to us. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: Then, once more, let us resume the previous argument, and as +there were innumerable rivals of the royal race who claim to have the +care of states, let us part them all off, and leave him alone; and, as I +was saying, a model or example of this process has first to be framed. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Exactly. + +STRANGER: What model is there which is small, and yet has any analogy +with the political occupation? Suppose, Socrates, that if we have no +other example at hand, we choose weaving, or, more precisely, weaving of +wool--this will be quite enough, without taking the whole of weaving, to +illustrate our meaning? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: Why should we not apply to weaving the same processes of +division and subdivision which we have already applied to other classes; +going once more as rapidly as we can through all the steps until we come +to that which is needed for our purpose? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How do you mean? + +STRANGER: I shall reply by actually performing the process. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good. + +STRANGER: All things which we make or acquire are either creative or +preventive; of the preventive class are antidotes, divine and human, and +also defences; and defences are either military weapons or protections; +and protections are veils, and also shields against heat and cold, and +shields against heat and cold are shelters and coverings; and coverings +are blankets and garments; and garments are some of them in one piece, +and others of them are made in several parts; and of these latter some +are stitched, others are fastened and not stitched; and of the not +stitched, some are made of the sinews of plants, and some of hair; and +of these, again, some are cemented with water and earth, and others are +fastened together by themselves. And these last defences and coverings +which are fastened together by themselves are called clothes, and +the art which superintends them we may call, from the nature of the +operation, the art of clothing, just as before the art of the Statesman +was derived from the State; and may we not say that the art of weaving, +at least that largest portion of it which was concerned with the making +of clothes, differs only in name from this art of clothing, in the same +way that, in the previous case, the royal science differed from the +political? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Most true. + +STRANGER: In the next place, let us make the reflection, that the art +of weaving clothes, which an incompetent person might fancy to have been +sufficiently described, has been separated off from several others which +are of the same family, but not from the co-operative arts. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: And which are the kindred arts? + +STRANGER: I see that I have not taken you with me. So I think that we +had better go backwards, starting from the end. We just now parted off +from the weaving of clothes, the making of blankets, which differ from +each other in that one is put under and the other is put around: and +these are what I termed kindred arts. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I understand. + +STRANGER: And we have subtracted the manufacture of all articles made +of flax and cords, and all that we just now metaphorically termed the +sinews of plants, and we have also separated off the process of felting +and the putting together of materials by stitching and sewing, of which +the most important part is the cobbler's art. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Precisely. + +STRANGER: Then we separated off the currier's art, which prepared +coverings in entire pieces, and the art of sheltering, and subtracted +the various arts of making water-tight which are employed in building, +and in general in carpentering, and in other crafts, and all such +arts as furnish impediments to thieving and acts of violence, and are +concerned with making the lids of boxes and the fixing of doors, being +divisions of the art of joining; and we also cut off the manufacture +of arms, which is a section of the great and manifold art of making +defences; and we originally began by parting off the whole of the magic +art which is concerned with antidotes, and have left, as would appear, +the very art of which we were in search, the art of protection against +winter cold, which fabricates woollen defences, and has the name of +weaving. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: Yes, my boy, but that is not all; for the first process to +which the material is subjected is the opposite of weaving. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How so? + +STRANGER: Weaving is a sort of uniting? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: But the first process is a separation of the clotted and +matted fibres? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean? + +STRANGER: I mean the work of the carder's art; for we cannot say that +carding is weaving, or that the carder is a weaver. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not. + +STRANGER: Again, if a person were to say that the art of making the warp +and the woof was the art of weaving, he would say what was paradoxical +and false. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: To be sure. + +STRANGER: Shall we say that the whole art of the fuller or of the mender +has nothing to do with the care and treatment of clothes, or are we to +regard all these as arts of weaving? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not. + +STRANGER: And yet surely all these arts will maintain that they are +concerned with the treatment and production of clothes; they will +dispute the exclusive prerogative of weaving, and though assigning +a larger sphere to that, will still reserve a considerable field for +themselves. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: Besides these, there are the arts which make tools and +instruments of weaving, and which will claim at least to be co-operative +causes in every work of the weaver. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Most true. + +STRANGER: Well, then, suppose that we define weaving, or rather that +part of it which has been selected by us, to be the greatest and noblest +of arts which are concerned with woollen garments--shall we be right? +Is not the definition, although true, wanting in clearness and +completeness; for do not all those other arts require to be first +cleared away? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: Then the next thing will be to separate them, in order that +the argument may proceed in a regular manner? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: By all means. + +STRANGER: Let us consider, in the first place, that there are two kinds +of arts entering into everything which we do. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What are they? + +STRANGER: The one kind is the conditional or co-operative, the other the +principal cause. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean? + +STRANGER: The arts which do not manufacture the actual thing, but which +furnish the necessary tools for the manufacture, without which the +several arts could not fulfil their appointed work, are co-operative; +but those which make the things themselves are causal. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: A very reasonable distinction. + +STRANGER: Thus the arts which make spindles, combs, and other +instruments of the production of clothes, may be called co-operative, +and those which treat and fabricate the things themselves, causal. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: The arts of washing and mending, and the other preparatory +arts which belong to the causal class, and form a division of the +great art of adornment, may be all comprehended under what we call the +fuller's art. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good. + +STRANGER: Carding and spinning threads and all the parts of the process +which are concerned with the actual manufacture of a woollen garment +form a single art, which is one of those universally acknowledged,--the +art of working in wool. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: To be sure. + +STRANGER: Of working in wool, again, there are two divisions, and both +these are parts of two arts at once. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How is that? + +STRANGER: Carding and one half of the use of the comb, and the other +processes of wool-working which separate the composite, may be classed +together as belonging both to the art of wool-working, and also to one +of the two great arts which are of universal application--the art of +composition and the art of division. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: To the latter belong carding and the other processes of which +I was just now speaking; the art of discernment or division in wool and +yarn, which is effected in one manner with the comb and in another with +the hands, is variously described under all the names which I just now +mentioned. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: Again, let us take some process of wool-working which is also +a portion of the art of composition, and, dismissing the elements of +division which we found there, make two halves, one on the principle of +composition, and the other on the principle of division. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Let that be done. + +STRANGER: And once more, Socrates, we must divide the part which belongs +at once both to wool-working and composition, if we are ever to discover +satisfactorily the aforesaid art of weaving. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: We must. + +STRANGER: Yes, certainly, and let us call one part of the art the art of +twisting threads, the other the art of combining them. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Do I understand you, in speaking of twisting, to be +referring to manufacture of the warp? + +STRANGER: Yes, and of the woof too; how, if not by twisting, is the woof +made? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: There is no other way. + +STRANGER: Then suppose that you define the warp and the woof, for I +think that the definition will be of use to you. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How shall I define them? + +STRANGER: As thus: A piece of carded wool which is drawn out lengthwise +and breadthwise is said to be pulled out. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: And the wool thus prepared, when twisted by the spindle, and +made into a firm thread, is called the warp, and the art which regulates +these operations the art of spinning the warp. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: And the threads which are more loosely spun, having a softness +proportioned to the intertexture of the warp and to the degree of force +used in dressing the cloth,--the threads which are thus spun are called +the woof, and the art which is set over them may be called the art of +spinning the woof. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: And, now, there can be no mistake about the nature of the part +of weaving which we have undertaken to define. For when that part of the +art of composition which is employed in the working of wool forms a web +by the regular intertexture of warp and woof, the entire woven substance +is called by us a woollen garment, and the art which presides over this +is the art of weaving. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: But why did we not say at once that weaving is the art of +entwining warp and woof, instead of making a long and useless circuit? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I thought, Stranger, that there was nothing useless in +what was said. + +STRANGER: Very likely, but you may not always think so, my sweet friend; +and in case any feeling of dissatisfaction should hereafter arise in +your mind, as it very well may, let me lay down a principle which will +apply to arguments in general. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Proceed. + +STRANGER: Let us begin by considering the whole nature of excess and +defect, and then we shall have a rational ground on which we may praise +or blame too much length or too much shortness in discussions of this +kind. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Let us do so. + +STRANGER: The points on which I think that we ought to dwell are the +following:-- + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What? + +STRANGER: Length and shortness, excess and defect; with all of these the +art of measurement is conversant. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: And the art of measurement has to be divided into two parts, +with a view to our present purpose. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Where would you make the division? + +STRANGER: As thus: I would make two parts, one having regard to the +relativity of greatness and smallness to each other; and there is +another, without which the existence of production would be impossible. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean? + +STRANGER: Do you not think that it is only natural for the greater to be +called greater with reference to the less alone, and the less less with +reference to the greater alone? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: Well, but is there not also something exceeding and exceeded +by the principle of the mean, both in speech and action, and is not this +a reality, and the chief mark of difference between good and bad men? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Plainly. + +STRANGER: Then we must suppose that the great and small exist and are +discerned in both these ways, and not, as we were saying before, only +relatively to one another, but there must also be another comparison of +them with the mean or ideal standard; would you like to hear the reason +why? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: If we assume the greater to exist only in relation to the +less, there will never be any comparison of either with the mean. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: And would not this doctrine be the ruin of all the arts and +their creations; would not the art of the Statesman and the aforesaid +art of weaving disappear? For all these arts are on the watch against +excess and defect, not as unrealities, but as real evils, which occasion +a difficulty in action; and the excellence or beauty of every work of +art is due to this observance of measure. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: But if the science of the Statesman disappears, the search for +the royal science will be impossible. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: Well, then, as in the case of the Sophist we extorted the +inference that not-being had an existence, because here was the point +at which the argument eluded our grasp, so in this we must endeavour +to show that the greater and less are not only to be measured with one +another, but also have to do with the production of the mean; for if +this is not admitted, neither a statesman nor any other man of action +can be an undisputed master of his science. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, we must certainly do again what we did then. + +STRANGER: But this, Socrates, is a greater work than the other, of which +we only too well remember the length. I think, however, that we may +fairly assume something of this sort-- + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What? + +STRANGER: That we shall some day require this notion of a mean with a +view to the demonstration of absolute truth; meanwhile, the argument +that the very existence of the arts must be held to depend on the +possibility of measuring more or less, not only with one another, but +also with a view to the attainment of the mean, seems to afford a grand +support and satisfactory proof of the doctrine which we are maintaining; +for if there are arts, there is a standard of measure, and if there is a +standard of measure, there are arts; but if either is wanting, there is +neither. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True; and what is the next step? + +STRANGER: The next step clearly is to divide the art of measurement into +two parts, as we have said already, and to place in the one part all the +arts which measure number, length, depth, breadth, swiftness with their +opposites; and to have another part in which they are measured with the +mean, and the fit, and the opportune, and the due, and with all those +words, in short, which denote a mean or standard removed from the +extremes. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Here are two vast divisions, embracing two very +different spheres. + +STRANGER: There are many accomplished men, Socrates, who say, believing +themselves to speak wisely, that the art of measurement is universal, +and has to do with all things. And this means what we are now saying; +for all things which come within the province of art do certainly in +some sense partake of measure. But these persons, because they are +not accustomed to distinguish classes according to real forms, jumble +together two widely different things, relation to one another, and to a +standard, under the idea that they are the same, and also fall into +the converse error of dividing other things not according to their real +parts. Whereas the right way is, if a man has first seen the unity of +things, to go on with the enquiry and not desist until he has found all +the differences contained in it which form distinct classes; nor again +should he be able to rest contented with the manifold diversities which +are seen in a multitude of things until he has comprehended all of them +that have any affinity within the bounds of one similarity and embraced +them within the reality of a single kind. But we have said enough on +this head, and also of excess and defect; we have only to bear in mind +that two divisions of the art of measurement have been discovered which +are concerned with them, and not forget what they are. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: We will not forget. + +STRANGER: And now that this discussion is completed, let us go on to +consider another question, which concerns not this argument only but the +conduct of such arguments in general. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What is this new question? + +STRANGER: Take the case of a child who is engaged in learning his +letters: when he is asked what letters make up a word, should we say +that the question is intended to improve his grammatical knowledge of +that particular word, or of all words? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly, in order that he may have a better knowledge of +all words. + +STRANGER: And is our enquiry about the Statesman intended only to +improve our knowledge of politics, or our power of reasoning generally? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly, as in the former example, the purpose is +general. + +STRANGER: Still less would any rational man seek to analyse the notion +of weaving for its own sake. But people seem to forget that some things +have sensible images, which are readily known, and can be easily pointed +out when any one desires to answer an enquirer without any trouble or +argument; whereas the greatest and highest truths have no outward image +of themselves visible to man, which he who wishes to satisfy the soul +of the enquirer can adapt to the eye of sense (compare Phaedr.), and +therefore we ought to train ourselves to give and accept a rational +account of them; for immaterial things, which are the noblest and +greatest, are shown only in thought and idea, and in no other way, and +all that we are now saying is said for the sake of them. Moreover, there +is always less difficulty in fixing the mind on small matters than on +great. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good. + +STRANGER: Let us call to mind the bearing of all this. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it? + +STRANGER: I wanted to get rid of any impression of tediousness which we +may have experienced in the discussion about weaving, and the reversal +of the universe, and in the discussion concerning the Sophist and the +being of not-being. I know that they were felt to be too long, and I +reproached myself with this, fearing that they might be not only tedious +but irrelevant; and all that I have now said is only designed to prevent +the recurrence of any such disagreeables for the future. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good. Will you proceed? + +STRANGER: Then I would like to observe that you and I, remembering +what has been said, should praise or blame the length or shortness of +discussions, not by comparing them with one another, but with what is +fitting, having regard to the part of measurement, which, as we said, +was to be borne in mind. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: And yet, not everything is to be judged even with a view to +what is fitting; for we should only want such a length as is suited to +give pleasure, if at all, as a secondary matter; and reason tells us, +that we should be contented to make the ease or rapidity of an enquiry, +not our first, but our second object; the first and highest of all being +to assert the great method of division according to species--whether the +discourse be shorter or longer is not to the point. No offence should +be taken at length, but the longer and shorter are to be employed +indifferently, according as either of them is better calculated to +sharpen the wits of the auditors. Reason would also say to him who +censures the length of discourses on such occasions and cannot away with +their circumlocution, that he should not be in such a hurry to have +done with them, when he can only complain that they are tedious, but he +should prove that if they had been shorter they would have made +those who took part in them better dialecticians, and more capable of +expressing the truth of things; about any other praise and blame, he +need not trouble himself--he should pretend not to hear them. But we +have had enough of this, as you will probably agree with me in thinking. +Let us return to our Statesman, and apply to his case the aforesaid +example of weaving. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good;--let us do as you say. + +STRANGER: The art of the king has been separated from the similar arts +of shepherds, and, indeed, from all those which have to do with herds +at all. There still remain, however, of the causal and co-operative arts +those which are immediately concerned with States, and which must first +be distinguished from one another. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good. + +STRANGER: You know that these arts cannot easily be divided into two +halves; the reason will be very evident as we proceed. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Then we had better do so. + +STRANGER: We must carve them like a victim into members or limbs, since +we cannot bisect them. (Compare Phaedr.) For we certainly should divide +everything into as few parts as possible. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What is to be done in this case? + +STRANGER: What we did in the example of weaving--all those arts which +furnish the tools were regarded by us as co-operative. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: So now, and with still more reason, all arts which make any +implement in a State, whether great or small, may be regarded by us as +co-operative, for without them neither State nor Statesmanship would +be possible; and yet we are not inclined to say that any of them is a +product of the kingly art. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: No, indeed. + +STRANGER: The task of separating this class from others is not an easy +one; for there is plausibility in saying that anything in the world +is the instrument of doing something. But there is another class of +possessions in a city, of which I have a word to say. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What class do you mean? + +STRANGER: A class which may be described as not having this power; that +is to say, not like an instrument, framed for production, but designed +for the preservation of that which is produced. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: To what do you refer? + +STRANGER: To the class of vessels, as they are comprehensively termed, +which are constructed for the preservation of things moist and dry, of +things prepared in the fire or out of the fire; this is a very large +class, and has, if I am not mistaken, literally nothing to do with the +royal art of which we are in search. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not. + +STRANGER: There is also a third class of possessions to be noted, +different from these and very extensive, moving or resting on land or +water, honourable and also dishonourable. The whole of this class has +one name, because it is intended to be sat upon, being always a seat for +something. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it? + +STRANGER: A vehicle, which is certainly not the work of the Statesman, +but of the carpenter, potter, and coppersmith. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I understand. + +STRANGER: And is there not a fourth class which is again different, and +in which most of the things formerly mentioned are contained,--every +kind of dress, most sorts of arms, walls and enclosures, whether of +earth or stone, and ten thousand other things? all of which being made +for the sake of defence, may be truly called defences, and are for the +most part to be regarded as the work of the builder or of the weaver, +rather than of the Statesman. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: Shall we add a fifth class, of ornamentation and drawing, and +of the imitations produced by drawing and music, which are designed for +amusement only, and may be fairly comprehended under one name? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it? + +STRANGER: Plaything is the name. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: That one name may be fitly predicated of all of them, for none +of these things have a serious purpose--amusement is their sole aim. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: That again I understand. + +STRANGER: Then there is a class which provides materials for all these, +out of which and in which the arts already mentioned fabricate their +works;--this manifold class, I say, which is the creation and offspring +of many other arts, may I not rank sixth? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean? + +STRANGER: I am referring to gold, silver, and other metals, and all +that wood-cutting and shearing of every sort provides for the art +of carpentry and plaiting; and there is the process of barking and +stripping the cuticle of plants, and the currier's art, which strips off +the skins of animals, and other similar arts which manufacture corks and +papyri and cords, and provide for the manufacture of composite species +out of simple kinds--the whole class may be termed the primitive and +simple possession of man, and with this the kingly science has no +concern at all. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: The provision of food and of all other things which mingle +their particles with the particles of the human body, and minister to +the body, will form a seventh class, which may be called by the general +term of nourishment, unless you have any better name to offer. This, +however, appertains rather to the husbandman, huntsman, trainer, doctor, +cook, and is not to be assigned to the Statesman's art. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not. + +STRANGER: These seven classes include nearly every description of +property, with the exception of tame animals. Consider;--there was the +original material, which ought to have been placed first; next come +instruments, vessels, vehicles, defences, playthings, nourishment; small +things, which may be included under one of these--as for example, coins, +seals and stamps, are omitted, for they have not in them the character +of any larger kind which includes them; but some of them may, with a +little forcing, be placed among ornaments, and others may be made to +harmonize with the class of implements. The art of herding, which has +been already divided into parts, will include all property in tame +animals, except slaves. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: The class of slaves and ministers only remains, and I suspect +that in this the real aspirants for the throne, who are the rivals of +the king in the formation of the political web, will be discovered; +just as spinners, carders, and the rest of them, were the rivals of the +weaver. All the others, who were termed co-operators, have been got rid +of among the occupations already mentioned, and separated from the royal +and political science. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I agree. + +STRANGER: Let us go a little nearer, in order that we may be more +certain of the complexion of this remaining class. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Let us do so. + +STRANGER: We shall find from our present point of view that the greatest +servants are in a case and condition which is the reverse of what we +anticipated. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Who are they? + +STRANGER: Those who have been purchased, and have so become possessions; +these are unmistakably slaves, and certainly do not claim royal science. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not. + +STRANGER: Again, freemen who of their own accord become the servants of +the other classes in a State, and who exchange and equalise the products +of husbandry and the other arts, some sitting in the market-place, +others going from city to city by land or sea, and giving money in +exchange for money or for other productions--the money-changer, the +merchant, the ship-owner, the retailer, will not put in any claim to +statecraft or politics? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: No; unless, indeed, to the politics of commerce. + +STRANGER: But surely men whom we see acting as hirelings and serfs, and +too happy to turn their hand to anything, will not profess to share in +royal science? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not. + +STRANGER: But what would you say of some other serviceable officials? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Who are they, and what services do they perform? + +STRANGER: There are heralds, and scribes perfected by practice, +and divers others who have great skill in various sorts of business +connected with the government of states--what shall we call them? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: They are the officials, and servants of the rulers, as +you just now called them, but not themselves rulers. + +STRANGER: There may be something strange in any servant pretending to be +a ruler, and yet I do not think that I could have been dreaming when +I imagined that the principal claimants to political science would be +found somewhere in this neighbourhood. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: Well, let us draw nearer, and try the claims of some who have +not yet been tested: in the first place, there are diviners, who have +a portion of servile or ministerial science, and are thought to be the +interpreters of the gods to men. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: There is also the priestly class, who, as the law declares, +know how to give the gods gifts from men in the form of sacrifices which +are acceptable to them, and to ask on our behalf blessings in return +from them. Now both these are branches of the servile or ministerial +art. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, clearly. + +STRANGER: And here I think that we seem to be getting on the right +track; for the priest and the diviner are swollen with pride and +prerogative, and they create an awful impression of themselves by +the magnitude of their enterprises; in Egypt, the king himself is not +allowed to reign, unless he have priestly powers, and if he should be +of another class and has thrust himself in, he must get enrolled in +the priesthood. In many parts of Hellas, the duty of offering the most +solemn propitiatory sacrifices is assigned to the highest magistracies, +and here, at Athens, the most solemn and national of the ancient +sacrifices are supposed to be celebrated by him who has been chosen by +lot to be the King Archon. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Precisely. + +STRANGER: But who are these other kings and priests elected by lot who +now come into view followed by their retainers and a vast throng, as the +former class disappears and the scene changes? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Whom can you mean? + +STRANGER: They are a strange crew. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Why strange? + +STRANGER: A minute ago I thought that they were animals of every tribe; +for many of them are like lions and centaurs, and many more like satyrs +and such weak and shifty creatures;--Protean shapes quickly changing +into one another's forms and natures; and now, Socrates, I begin to see +who they are. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Who are they? You seem to be gazing on some strange +vision. + +STRANGER: Yes; every one looks strange when you do not know him; +and just now I myself fell into this mistake--at first sight, coming +suddenly upon him, I did not recognize the politician and his troop. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Who is he? + +STRANGER: The chief of Sophists and most accomplished of wizards, who +must at any cost be separated from the true king or Statesman, if we are +ever to see daylight in the present enquiry. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: That is a hope not lightly to be renounced. + +STRANGER: Never, if I can help it; and, first, let me ask you a +question. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What? + +STRANGER: Is not monarchy a recognized form of government? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: And, after monarchy, next in order comes the government of the +few? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Of course. + +STRANGER: Is not the third form of government the rule of the multitude, +which is called by the name of democracy? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: And do not these three expand in a manner into five, producing +out of themselves two other names? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What are they? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What are they? + +STRANGER: There is a criterion of voluntary and involuntary, poverty and +riches, law and the absence of law, which men now-a-days apply to them; +the two first they subdivide accordingly, and ascribe to monarchy two +forms and two corresponding names, royalty and tyranny. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: And the government of the few they distinguish by the names of +aristocracy and oligarchy. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: Democracy alone, whether rigidly observing the laws or not, +and whether the multitude rule over the men of property with their +consent or against their consent, always in ordinary language has the +same name. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: But do you suppose that any form of government which is +defined by these characteristics of the one, the few, or the many, of +poverty or wealth, of voluntary or compulsory submission, of written law +or the absence of law, can be a right one? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Why not? + +STRANGER: Reflect; and follow me. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: In what direction? + +STRANGER: Shall we abide by what we said at first, or shall we retract +our words? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: To what do you refer? + +STRANGER: If I am not mistaken, we said that royal power was a science? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: And a science of a peculiar kind, which was selected out +of the rest as having a character which is at once judicial and +authoritative? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: And there was one kind of authority over lifeless things and +another other living animals; and so we proceeded in the division step +by step up to this point, not losing the idea of science, but unable as +yet to determine the nature of the particular science? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: Hence we are led to observe that the distinguishing principle +of the State cannot be the few or many, the voluntary or involuntary, +poverty or riches; but some notion of science must enter into it, if we +are to be consistent with what has preceded. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: And we must be consistent. + +STRANGER: Well, then, in which of these various forms of States may the +science of government, which is among the greatest of all sciences and +most difficult to acquire, be supposed to reside? That we must discover, +and then we shall see who are the false politicians who pretend to be +politicians but are not, although they persuade many, and shall separate +them from the wise king. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: That, as the argument has already intimated, will be our +duty. + +STRANGER: Do you think that the multitude in a State can attain +political science? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Impossible. + +STRANGER: But, perhaps, in a city of a thousand men, there would be a +hundred, or say fifty, who could? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: In that case political science would certainly be the +easiest of all sciences; there could not be found in a city of that +number as many really first-rate draught-players, if judged by the +standard of the rest of Hellas, and there would certainly not be as +many kings. For kings we may truly call those who possess royal science, +whether they rule or not, as was shown in the previous argument. + +STRANGER: Thank you for reminding me; and the consequence is that any +true form of government can only be supposed to be the government of +one, two, or, at any rate, of a few. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: And these, whether they rule with the will, or against the +will, of their subjects, with written laws or without written laws, and +whether they are poor or rich, and whatever be the nature of their +rule, must be supposed, according to our present view, to rule on some +scientific principle; just as the physician, whether he cures us +against our will or with our will, and whatever be his mode of +treatment,--incision, burning, or the infliction of some other +pain,--whether he practises out of a book or not out of a book, and +whether he be rich or poor, whether he purges or reduces in some other +way, or even fattens his patients, is a physician all the same, so long +as he exercises authority over them according to rules of art, if he +only does them good and heals and saves them. And this we lay down to +be the only proper test of the art of medicine, or of any other art of +command. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite true. + +STRANGER: Then that can be the only true form of government in which +the governors are really found to possess science, and are not mere +pretenders, whether they rule according to law or without law, over +willing or unwilling subjects, and are rich or poor themselves--none +of these things can with any propriety be included in the notion of the +ruler. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: And whether with a view to the public good they purge the +State by killing some, or exiling some; whether they reduce the size of +the body corporate by sending out from the hive swarms of citizens, +or, by introducing persons from without, increase it; while they act +according to the rules of wisdom and justice, and use their power with +a view to the general security and improvement, the city over which they +rule, and which has these characteristics, may be described as the only +true State. All other governments are not genuine or real; but only +imitations of this, and some of them are better and some of them are +worse; the better are said to be well governed, but they are mere +imitations like the others. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I agree, Stranger, in the greater part of what you say; +but as to their ruling without laws--the expression has a harsh sound. + +STRANGER: You have been too quick for me, Socrates; I was just going to +ask you whether you objected to any of my statements. And now I see that +we shall have to consider this notion of there being good government +without laws. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: There can be no doubt that legislation is in a manner the +business of a king, and yet the best thing of all is not that the law +should rule, but that a man should rule supposing him to have wisdom and +royal power. Do you see why this is? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Why? + +STRANGER: Because the law does not perfectly comprehend what is noblest +and most just for all and therefore cannot enforce what is best. The +differences of men and actions, and the endless irregular movements of +human things, do not admit of any universal and simple rule. And no art +whatsoever can lay down a rule which will last for all time. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Of course not. + +STRANGER: But the law is always striving to make one;--like an obstinate +and ignorant tyrant, who will not allow anything to be done contrary to +his appointment, or any question to be asked--not even in sudden changes +of circumstances, when something happens to be better than what he +commanded for some one. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly; the law treats us all precisely in the manner +which you describe. + +STRANGER: A perfectly simple principle can never be applied to a state +of things which is the reverse of simple. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: Then if the law is not the perfection of right, why are +we compelled to make laws at all? The reason of this has next to be +investigated. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: Let me ask, whether you have not meetings for gymnastic +contests in your city, such as there are in other cities, at which men +compete in running, wrestling, and the like? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes; they are very common among us. + +STRANGER: And what are the rules which are enforced on their pupils by +professional trainers or by others having similar authority? Can you +remember? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: To what do you refer? + +STRANGER: The training-masters do not issue minute rules for +individuals, or give every individual what is exactly suited to his +constitution; they think that they ought to go more roughly to work, and +to prescribe generally the regimen which will benefit the majority. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: And therefore they assign equal amounts of exercise to them +all; they send them forth together, and let them rest together from +their running, wrestling, or whatever the form of bodily exercise may +be. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: And now observe that the legislator who has to preside over +the herd, and to enforce justice in their dealings with one another, +will not be able, in enacting for the general good, to provide exactly +what is suitable for each particular case. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: He cannot be expected to do so. + +STRANGER: He will lay down laws in a general form for the majority, +roughly meeting the cases of individuals; and some of them he will +deliver in writing, and others will be unwritten; and these last will be +traditional customs of the country. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: He will be right. + +STRANGER: Yes, quite right; for how can he sit at every man's side all +through his life, prescribing for him the exact particulars of his duty? +Who, Socrates, would be equal to such a task? No one who really had the +royal science, if he had been able to do this, would have imposed upon +himself the restriction of a written law. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: So I should infer from what has now been said. + +STRANGER: Or rather, my good friend, from what is going to be said. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: And what is that? + +STRANGER: Let us put to ourselves the case of a physician, or trainer, +who is about to go into a far country, and is expecting to be a long +time away from his patients--thinking that his instructions will not be +remembered unless they are written down, he will leave notes of them for +the use of his pupils or patients. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: But what would you say, if he came back sooner than he had +intended, and, owing to an unexpected change of the winds or other +celestial influences, something else happened to be better for +them,--would he not venture to suggest this new remedy, although not +contemplated in his former prescription? Would he persist in observing +the original law, neither himself giving any new commandments, nor the +patient daring to do otherwise than was prescribed, under the idea +that this course only was healthy and medicinal, all others noxious and +heterodox? Viewed in the light of science and true art, would not all +such enactments be utterly ridiculous? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Utterly. + +STRANGER: And if he who gave laws, written or unwritten, determining +what was good or bad, honourable or dishonourable, just or unjust, to +the tribes of men who flock together in their several cities, and are +governed in accordance with them; if, I say, the wise legislator were +suddenly to come again, or another like to him, is he to be prohibited +from changing them?--would not this prohibition be in reality quite as +ridiculous as the other? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: Do you know a plausible saying of the common people which is +in point? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I do not recall what you mean at the moment. + +STRANGER: They say that if any one knows how the ancient laws may be +improved, he must first persuade his own State of the improvement, and +then he may legislate, but not otherwise. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: And are they not right? + +STRANGER: I dare say. But supposing that he does use some gentle +violence for their good, what is this violence to be called? Or rather, +before you answer, let me ask the same question in reference to our +previous instances. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean? + +STRANGER: Suppose that a skilful physician has a patient, of whatever +sex or age, whom he compels against his will to do something for his +good which is contrary to the written rules; what is this compulsion to +be called? Would you ever dream of calling it a violation of the art, +or a breach of the laws of health? Nothing could be more unjust than for +the patient to whom such violence is applied, to charge the physician +who practises the violence with wanting skill or aggravating his +disease. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Most true. + +STRANGER: In the political art error is not called disease, but evil, or +disgrace, or injustice. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite true. + +STRANGER: And when the citizen, contrary to law and custom, is compelled +to do what is juster and better and nobler than he did before, the last +and most absurd thing which he could say about such violence is that +he has incurred disgrace or evil or injustice at the hands of those who +compelled him. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: And shall we say that the violence, if exercised by a rich +man, is just, and if by a poor man, unjust? May not any man, rich or +poor, with or without laws, with the will of the citizens or against +the will of the citizens, do what is for their interest? Is not this the +true principle of government, according to which the wise and good +man will order the affairs of his subjects? As the pilot, by watching +continually over the interests of the ship and of the crew,--not by +laying down rules, but by making his art a law,--preserves the lives of +his fellow-sailors, even so, and in the self-same way, may there not +be a true form of polity created by those who are able to govern in a +similar spirit, and who show a strength of art which is superior to the +law? Nor can wise rulers ever err while they observing the one great +rule of distributing justice to the citizens with intelligence and +skill, are able to preserve them, and, as far as may be, to make them +better from being worse. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: No one can deny what has been now said. + +STRANGER: Neither, if you consider, can any one deny the other +statement. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What was it? + +STRANGER: We said that no great number of persons, whoever they may be, +can attain political knowledge, or order a State wisely, but that the +true government is to be found in a small body, or in an individual, and +that other States are but imitations of this, as we said a little while +ago, some for the better and some for the worse. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean? I cannot have understood your previous +remark about imitations. + +STRANGER: And yet the mere suggestion which I hastily threw out is +highly important, even if we leave the question where it is, and do not +seek by the discussion of it to expose the error which prevails in this +matter. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean? + +STRANGER: The idea which has to be grasped by us is not easy or +familiar; but we may attempt to express it thus:--Supposing the +government of which I have been speaking to be the only true model, then +the others must use the written laws of this--in no other way can they +be saved; they will have to do what is now generally approved, although +not the best thing in the world. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What is this? + +STRANGER: No citizen should do anything contrary to the laws, and any +infringement of them should be punished with death and the most extreme +penalties; and this is very right and good when regarded as the +second best thing, if you set aside the first, of which I was just now +speaking. Shall I explain the nature of what I call the second best? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: By all means. + +STRANGER: I must again have recourse to my favourite images; through +them, and them alone, can I describe kings and rulers. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What images? + +STRANGER: The noble pilot and the wise physician, who 'is worth many +another man'--in the similitude of these let us endeavour to discover +some image of the king. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What sort of an image? + +STRANGER: Well, such as this:--Every man will reflect that he suffers +strange things at the hands of both of them; the physician saves +any whom he wishes to save, and any whom he wishes to maltreat he +maltreats--cutting or burning them; and at the same time requiring them +to bring him payments, which are a sort of tribute, of which little or +nothing is spent upon the sick man, and the greater part is consumed by +him and his domestics; and the finale is that he receives money from the +relations of the sick man or from some enemy of his, and puts him out of +the way. And the pilots of ships are guilty of numberless evil deeds of +the same kind; they intentionally play false and leave you ashore when +the hour of sailing arrives; or they cause mishaps at sea and cast away +their freight; and are guilty of other rogueries. Now suppose that we, +bearing all this in mind, were to determine, after consideration, that +neither of these arts shall any longer be allowed to exercise absolute +control either over freemen or over slaves, but that we will summon an +assembly either of all the people, or of the rich only, that anybody who +likes, whatever may be his calling, or even if he have no calling, may +offer an opinion either about seamanship or about diseases--whether as +to the manner in which physic or surgical instruments are to be applied +to the patient, or again about the vessels and the nautical implements +which are required in navigation, and how to meet the dangers of +winds and waves which are incidental to the voyage, how to behave when +encountering pirates, and what is to be done with the old-fashioned +galleys, if they have to fight with others of a similar build--and that, +whatever shall be decreed by the multitude on these points, upon +the advice of persons skilled or unskilled, shall be written down on +triangular tablets and columns, or enacted although unwritten to be +national customs; and that in all future time vessels shall be navigated +and remedies administered to the patient after this fashion. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What a strange notion! + +STRANGER: Suppose further, that the pilots and physicians are appointed +annually, either out of the rich, or out of the whole people, and that +they are elected by lot; and that after their election they navigate +vessels and heal the sick according to the written rules. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Worse and worse. + +STRANGER: But hear what follows:--When the year of office has expired, +the pilot or physician has to come before a court of review, in which +the judges are either selected from the wealthy classes or chosen by lot +out of the whole people; and anybody who pleases may be their accuser, +and may lay to their charge, that during the past year they have not +navigated their vessels or healed their patients according to the letter +of the law and the ancient customs of their ancestors; and if either of +them is condemned, some of the judges must fix what he is to suffer or +pay. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: He who is willing to take a command under such +conditions, deserves to suffer any penalty. + +STRANGER: Yet once more, we shall have to enact that if any one is +detected enquiring into piloting and navigation, or into health and the +true nature of medicine, or about the winds, or other conditions of the +atmosphere, contrary to the written rules, and has any ingenious notions +about such matters, he is not to be called a pilot or physician, but a +cloudy prating sophist;--further, on the ground that he is a corrupter +of the young, who would persuade them to follow the art of medicine or +piloting in an unlawful manner, and to exercise an arbitrary rule over +their patients or ships, any one who is qualified by law may inform +against him, and indict him in some court, and then if he is found to +be persuading any, whether young or old, to act contrary to the written +law, he is to be punished with the utmost rigour; for no one should +presume to be wiser than the laws; and as touching healing and health +and piloting and navigation, the nature of them is known to all, for +anybody may learn the written laws and the national customs. If such +were the mode of procedure, Socrates, about these sciences and about +generalship, and any branch of hunting, or about painting or imitation +in general, or carpentry, or any sort of handicraft, or husbandry, or +planting, or if we were to see an art of rearing horses, or tending +herds, or divination, or any ministerial service, or draught-playing, or +any science conversant with number, whether simple or square or cube, +or comprising motion,--I say, if all these things were done in this way +according to written regulations, and not according to art, what would +be the result? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: All the arts would utterly perish, and could never be +recovered, because enquiry would be unlawful. And human life, which is +bad enough already, would then become utterly unendurable. + +STRANGER: But what, if while compelling all these operations to be +regulated by written law, we were to appoint as the guardian of the laws +some one elected by a show of hands, or by lot, and he caring nothing +about the laws, were to act contrary to them from motives of interest +or favour, and without knowledge,--would not this be a still worse evil +than the former? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: To go against the laws, which are based upon long experience, +and the wisdom of counsellors who have graciously recommended them and +persuaded the multitude to pass them, would be a far greater and more +ruinous error than any adherence to written law? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: Therefore, as there is a danger of this, the next best thing +in legislating is not to allow either the individual or the multitude to +break the law in any respect whatever. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: The laws would be copies of the true particulars of action as +far as they admit of being written down from the lips of those who have +knowledge? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly they would. + +STRANGER: And, as we were saying, he who has knowledge and is a true +Statesman, will do many things within his own sphere of action by his +art without regard to the laws, when he is of opinion that something +other than that which he has written down and enjoined to be observed +during his absence would be better. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, we said so. + +STRANGER: And any individual or any number of men, having fixed laws, in +acting contrary to them with a view to something better, would only be +acting, as far as they are able, like the true Statesman? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: If they had no knowledge of what they were doing, they would +imitate the truth, and they would always imitate ill; but if they had +knowledge, the imitation would be the perfect truth, and an imitation no +longer. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite true. + +STRANGER: And the principle that no great number of men are able to +acquire a knowledge of any art has been already admitted by us. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, it has. + +STRANGER: Then the royal or political art, if there be such an art, will +never be attained either by the wealthy or by the other mob. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Impossible. + +STRANGER: Then the nearest approach which these lower forms of +government can ever make to the true government of the one scientific +ruler, is to do nothing contrary to their own written laws and national +customs. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good. + +STRANGER: When the rich imitate the true form, such a government is +called aristocracy; and when they are regardless of the laws, oligarchy. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: Or again, when an individual rules according to law in +imitation of him who knows, we call him a king; and if he rules +according to law, we give him the same name, whether he rules with +opinion or with knowledge. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: To be sure. + +STRANGER: And when an individual truly possessing knowledge rules, his +name will surely be the same--he will be called a king; and thus the +five names of governments, as they are now reckoned, become one. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: That is true. + +STRANGER: And when an individual ruler governs neither by law nor by +custom, but following in the steps of the true man of science pretends +that he can only act for the best by violating the laws, while in +reality appetite and ignorance are the motives of the imitation, may not +such an one be called a tyrant? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: And this we believe to be the origin of the tyrant and the +king, of oligarchies, and aristocracies, and democracies,--because men +are offended at the one monarch, and can never be made to believe that +any one can be worthy of such authority, or is able and willing in the +spirit of virtue and knowledge to act justly and holily to all; they +fancy that he will be a despot who will wrong and harm and slay whom he +pleases of us; for if there could be such a despot as we describe, they +would acknowledge that we ought to be too glad to have him, and that he +alone would be the happy ruler of a true and perfect State. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: To be sure. + +STRANGER: But then, as the State is not like a beehive, and has no +natural head who is at once recognized to be the superior both in body +and in mind, mankind are obliged to meet and make laws, and endeavour to +approach as nearly as they can to the true form of government. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: And when the foundation of politics is in the letter only +and in custom, and knowledge is divorced from action, can we wonder, +Socrates, at the miseries which there are, and always will be, in +States? Any other art, built on such a foundation and thus conducted, +would ruin all that it touched. Ought we not rather to wonder at the +natural strength of the political bond? For States have endured all +this, time out of mind, and yet some of them still remain and are not +overthrown, though many of them, like ships at sea, founder from time +to time, and perish and have perished and will hereafter perish, through +the badness of their pilots and crews, who have the worst sort of +ignorance of the highest truths--I mean to say, that they are wholly +unaquainted with politics, of which, above all other sciences, they +believe themselves to have acquired the most perfect knowledge. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: Then the question arises:--which of these untrue forms of +government is the least oppressive to their subjects, though they are +all oppressive; and which is the worst of them? Here is a consideration +which is beside our present purpose, and yet having regard to the whole +it seems to influence all our actions: we must examine it. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, we must. + +STRANGER: You may say that of the three forms, the same is at once the +hardest and the easiest. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean? + +STRANGER: I am speaking of the three forms of government, which I +mentioned at the beginning of this discussion--monarchy, the rule of the +few, and the rule of the many. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: If we divide each of these we shall have six, from which the +true one may be distinguished as a seventh. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How would you make the division? + +STRANGER: Monarchy divides into royalty and tyranny; the rule of the +few into aristocracy, which has an auspicious name, and oligarchy; and +democracy or the rule of the many, which before was one, must now be +divided. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: On what principle of division? + +STRANGER: On the same principle as before, although the name is now +discovered to have a twofold meaning. For the distinction of ruling with +law or without law, applies to this as well as to the rest. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: The division made no difference when we were looking for the +perfect State, as we showed before. But now that this has been separated +off, and, as we said, the others alone are left for us, the principle of +law and the absence of law will bisect them all. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: That would seem to follow, from what has been said. + +STRANGER: Then monarchy, when bound by good prescriptions or laws, +is the best of all the six, and when lawless is the most bitter and +oppressive to the subject. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: The government of the few, which is intermediate between that +of the one and many, is also intermediate in good and evil; but the +government of the many is in every respect weak and unable to do either +any great good or any great evil, when compared with the others, because +the offices are too minutely subdivided and too many hold them. And this +therefore is the worst of all lawful governments, and the best of all +lawless ones. If they are all without the restraints of law, democracy +is the form in which to live is best; if they are well ordered, then +this is the last which you should choose, as royalty, the first form, is +the best, with the exception of the seventh, for that excels them all, +and is among States what God is among men. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: You are quite right, and we should choose that above +all. + +STRANGER: The members of all these States, with the exception of the +one which has knowledge, may be set aside as being not Statesmen but +partisans,--upholders of the most monstrous idols, and themselves idols; +and, being the greatest imitators and magicians, they are also the +greatest of Sophists. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: The name of Sophist after many windings in the argument +appears to have been most justly fixed upon the politicians, as they are +termed. + +STRANGER: And so our satyric drama has been played out; and the troop of +Centaurs and Satyrs, however unwilling to leave the stage, have at last +been separated from the political science. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: So I perceive. + +STRANGER: There remain, however, natures still more troublesome, because +they are more nearly akin to the king, and more difficult to discern; +the examination of them may be compared to the process of refining gold. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What is your meaning? + +STRANGER: The workmen begin by sifting away the earth and stones and +the like; there remain in a confused mass the valuable elements akin to +gold, which can only be separated by fire,--copper, silver, and other +precious metal; these are at last refined away by the use of tests, +until the gold is left quite pure. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, that is the way in which these things are said to +be done. + +STRANGER: In like manner, all alien and uncongenial matter has been +separated from political science, and what is precious and of a kindred +nature has been left; there remain the nobler arts of the general and +the judge, and the higher sort of oratory which is an ally of the royal +art, and persuades men to do justice, and assists in guiding the helm of +States:--How can we best clear away all these, leaving him whom we seek +alone and unalloyed? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: That is obviously what has in some way to be attempted. + +STRANGER: If the attempt is all that is wanting, he shall certainly be +brought to light; and I think that the illustration of music may assist +in exhibiting him. Please to answer me a question. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What question? + +STRANGER: There is such a thing as learning music or handicraft arts in +general? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: There is. + +STRANGER: And is there any higher art or science, having power to decide +which of these arts are and are not to be learned;--what do you say? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I should answer that there is. + +STRANGER: And do we acknowledge this science to be different from the +others? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: And ought the other sciences to be superior to this, or no +single science to any other? Or ought this science to be the overseer +and governor of all the others? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: The latter. + +STRANGER: You mean to say that the science which judges whether we ought +to learn or not, must be superior to the science which is learned or +which teaches? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Far superior. + +STRANGER: And the science which determines whether we ought to persuade +or not, must be superior to the science which is able to persuade? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Of course. + +STRANGER: Very good; and to what science do we assign the power of +persuading a multitude by a pleasing tale and not by teaching? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: That power, I think, must clearly be assigned to +rhetoric. + +STRANGER: And to what science do we give the power of determining +whether we are to employ persuasion or force towards any one, or to +refrain altogether? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: To that science which governs the arts of speech and +persuasion. + +STRANGER: Which, if I am not mistaken, will be politics? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good. + +STRANGER: Rhetoric seems to be quickly distinguished from politics, +being a different species, yet ministering to it. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: But what would you think of another sort of power or science? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What science? + +STRANGER: The science which has to do with military operations against +our enemies--is that to be regarded as a science or not? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How can generalship and military tactics be regarded as +other than a science? + +STRANGER: And is the art which is able and knows how to advise when we +are to go to war, or to make peace, the same as this or different? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: If we are to be consistent, we must say different. + +STRANGER: And we must also suppose that this rules the other, if we are +not to give up our former notion? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: And, considering how great and terrible the whole art of war +is, can we imagine any which is superior to it but the truly royal? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: No other. + +STRANGER: The art of the general is only ministerial, and therefore not +political? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Exactly. + +STRANGER: Once more let us consider the nature of the righteous judge. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good. + +STRANGER: Does he do anything but decide the dealings of men with one +another to be just or unjust in accordance with the standard which he +receives from the king and legislator,--showing his own peculiar virtue +only in this, that he is not perverted by gifts, or fears, or pity, or +by any sort of favour or enmity, into deciding the suits of men with one +another contrary to the appointment of the legislator? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: No; his office is such as you describe. + +STRANGER: Then the inference is that the power of the judge is not +royal, but only the power of a guardian of the law which ministers to +the royal power? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: The review of all these sciences shows that none of them is +political or royal. For the truly royal ought not itself to act, but to +rule over those who are able to act; the king ought to know what is and +what is not a fitting opportunity for taking the initiative in matters +of the greatest importance, whilst others should execute his orders. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: And, therefore, the arts which we have described, as they +have no authority over themselves or one another, but are each of them +concerned with some special action of their own, have, as they ought to +have, special names corresponding to their several actions. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I agree. + +STRANGER: And the science which is over them all, and has charge of the +laws, and of all matters affecting the State, and truly weaves them +all into one, if we would describe under a name characteristic of their +common nature, most truly we may call politics. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Exactly so. + +STRANGER: Then, now that we have discovered the various classes in +a State, shall I analyse politics after the pattern which weaving +supplied? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I greatly wish that you would. + +STRANGER: Then I must describe the nature of the royal web, and show how +the various threads are woven into one piece. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly. + +STRANGER: A task has to be accomplished, which, although difficult, +appears to be necessary. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly the attempt must be made. + +STRANGER: To assume that one part of virtue differs in kind from +another, is a position easily assailable by contentious disputants, who +appeal to popular opinion. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I do not understand. + +STRANGER: Let me put the matter in another way: I suppose that you would +consider courage to be a part of virtue? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly I should. + +STRANGER: And you would think temperance to be different from courage; +and likewise to be a part of virtue? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: I shall venture to put forward a strange theory about them. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it? + +STRANGER: That they are two principles which thoroughly hate one another +and are antagonistic throughout a great part of nature. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How singular! + +STRANGER: Yes, very--for all the parts of virtue are commonly said to be +friendly to one another. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: Then let us carefully investigate whether this is universally +true, or whether there are not parts of virtue which are at war with +their kindred in some respect. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Tell me how we shall consider that question. + +STRANGER: We must extend our enquiry to all those things which we +consider beautiful and at the same time place in two opposite classes. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Explain; what are they? + +STRANGER: Acuteness and quickness, whether in body or soul or in the +movement of sound, and the imitations of them which painting and music +supply, you must have praised yourself before now, or been present when +others praised them. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: And do you remember the terms in which they are praised? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I do not. + +STRANGER: I wonder whether I can explain to you in words the thought +which is passing in my mind. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Why not? + +STRANGER: You fancy that this is all so easy: Well, let us consider +these notions with reference to the opposite classes of action under +which they fall. When we praise quickness and energy and acuteness, +whether of mind or body or sound, we express our praise of the quality +which we admire by one word, and that one word is manliness or courage. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How? + +STRANGER: We speak of an action as energetic and brave, quick and manly, +and vigorous too; and when we apply the name of which I speak as the +common attribute of all these natures, we certainly praise them. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: And do we not often praise the quiet strain of action also? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: To be sure. + +STRANGER: And do we not then say the opposite of what we said of the +other? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How do you mean? + +STRANGER: We exclaim How calm! How temperate! in admiration of the slow +and quiet working of the intellect, and of steadiness and gentleness in +action, of smoothness and depth of voice, and of all rhythmical movement +and of music in general, when these have a proper solemnity. Of all such +actions we predicate not courage, but a name indicative of order. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: But when, on the other hand, either of these is out of place, +the names of either are changed into terms of censure. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How so? + +STRANGER: Too great sharpness or quickness or hardness is termed +violence or madness; too great slowness or gentleness is called +cowardice or sluggishness; and we may observe, that for the most part +these qualities, and the temperance and manliness of the opposite +characters, are arrayed as enemies on opposite sides, and do not mingle +with one another in their respective actions; and if we pursue the +enquiry, we shall find that men who have these different qualities of +mind differ from one another. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: In what respect? + +STRANGER: In respect of all the qualities which I mentioned, and very +likely of many others. According to their respective affinities to +either class of actions they distribute praise and blame,--praise to +the actions which are akin to their own, blame to those of the opposite +party--and out of this many quarrels and occasions of quarrel arise +among them. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: The difference between the two classes is often a trivial +concern; but in a state, and when affecting really important matters, +becomes of all disorders the most hateful. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: To what do you refer? + +STRANGER: To nothing short of the whole regulation of human life. For +the orderly class are always ready to lead a peaceful life, quietly +doing their own business; this is their manner of behaving with all +men at home, and they are equally ready to find some way of keeping the +peace with foreign States. And on account of this fondness of theirs for +peace, which is often out of season where their influence prevails, they +become by degrees unwarlike, and bring up their young men to be like +themselves; they are at the mercy of their enemies; whence in a +few years they and their children and the whole city often pass +imperceptibly from the condition of freemen into that of slaves. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What a cruel fate! + +STRANGER: And now think of what happens with the more courageous +natures. Are they not always inciting their country to go to war, owing +to their excessive love of the military life? they raise up enemies +against themselves many and mighty, and either utterly ruin their +native-land or enslave and subject it to its foes? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: That, again, is true. + +STRANGER: Must we not admit, then, that where these two classes exist, +they always feel the greatest antipathy and antagonism towards one +another? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: We cannot deny it. + +STRANGER: And returning to the enquiry with which we began, have we +not found that considerable portions of virtue are at variance with one +another, and give rise to a similar opposition in the characters who are +endowed with them? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: Let us consider a further point. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it? + +STRANGER: I want to know, whether any constructive art will make +any, even the most trivial thing, out of bad and good materials +indifferently, if this can be helped? does not all art rather reject the +bad as far as possible, and accept the good and fit materials, and from +these elements, whether like or unlike, gathering them all into one, +work out some nature or idea? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: To, be sure. + +STRANGER: Then the true and natural art of statesmanship will never +allow any State to be formed by a combination of good and bad men, if +this can be avoided; but will begin by testing human natures in play, +and after testing them, will entrust them to proper teachers who are the +ministers of her purposes--she will herself give orders, and maintain +authority; just as the art of weaving continually gives orders and +maintains authority over the carders and all the others who prepare the +material for the work, commanding the subsidiary arts to execute the +works which she deems necessary for making the web. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite true. + +STRANGER: In like manner, the royal science appears to me to be the +mistress of all lawful educators and instructors, and having this +queenly power, will not permit them to train men in what will produce +characters unsuited to the political constitution which she desires to +create, but only in what will produce such as are suitable. Those +which have no share of manliness and temperance, or any other virtuous +inclination, and, from the necessity of an evil nature, are violently +carried away to godlessness and insolence and injustice, she gets rid of +by death and exile, and punishes them with the greatest of disgraces. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: That is commonly said. + +STRANGER: But those who are wallowing in ignorance and baseness she bows +under the yoke of slavery. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite right. + +STRANGER: The rest of the citizens, out of whom, if they have education, +something noble may be made, and who are capable of being united by the +statesman, the kingly art blends and weaves together; taking on the one +hand those whose natures tend rather to courage, which is the stronger +element and may be regarded as the warp, and on the other hand those +which incline to order and gentleness, and which are represented in +the figure as spun thick and soft, after the manner of the woof--these, +which are naturally opposed, she seeks to bind and weave together in the +following manner: + +YOUNG SOCRATES: In what manner? + +STRANGER: First of all, she takes the eternal element of the soul and +binds it with a divine cord, to which it is akin, and then the animal +nature, and binds that with human cords. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I do not understand what you mean. + +STRANGER: The meaning is, that the opinion about the honourable and +the just and good and their opposites, which is true and confirmed +by reason, is a divine principle, and when implanted in the soul, is +implanted, as I maintain, in a nature of heavenly birth. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes; what else should it be? + +STRANGER: Only the Statesman and the good legislator, having the +inspiration of the royal muse, can implant this opinion, and he, only in +the rightly educated, whom we were just now describing. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Likely enough. + +STRANGER: But him who cannot, we will not designate by any of the names +which are the subject of the present enquiry. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very right. + +STRANGER: The courageous soul when attaining this truth becomes +civilized, and rendered more capable of partaking of justice; but when +not partaking, is inclined to brutality. Is not that true? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: And again, the peaceful and orderly nature, if sharing in +these opinions, becomes temperate and wise, as far as this may be in a +State, but if not, deservedly obtains the ignominious name of silliness. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite true. + +STRANGER: Can we say that such a connexion as this will lastingly unite +the evil with one another or with the good, or that any science would +seriously think of using a bond of this kind to join such materials? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Impossible. + +STRANGER: But in those who were originally of a noble nature, and who +have been nurtured in noble ways, and in those only, may we not say +that union is implanted by law, and that this is the medicine which art +prescribes for them, and of all the bonds which unite the dissimilar and +contrary parts of virtue is not this, as I was saying, the divinest? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: Where this divine bond exists there is no difficulty in +imagining, or when you have imagined, in creating the other bonds, which +are human only. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How is that, and what bonds do you mean? + +STRANGER: Rights of intermarriage, and ties which are formed between +States by giving and taking children in marriage, or between individuals +by private betrothals and espousals. For most persons form marriage +connexions without due regard to what is best for the procreation of +children. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: In what way? + +STRANGER: They seek after wealth and power, which in matrimony are +objects not worthy even of a serious censure. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: There is no need to consider them at all. + +STRANGER: More reason is there to consider the practice of those who +make family their chief aim, and to indicate their error. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite true. + +STRANGER: They act on no true principle at all; they seek their ease and +receive with open arms those who are like themselves, and hate those who +are unlike them, being too much influenced by feelings of dislike. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How so? + +STRANGER: The quiet orderly class seek for natures like their own, and +as far as they can they marry and give in marriage exclusively in this +class, and the courageous do the same; they seek natures like their own, +whereas they should both do precisely the opposite. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How and why is that? + +STRANGER: Because courage, when untempered by the gentler nature during +many generations, may at first bloom and strengthen, but at last bursts +forth into downright madness. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Like enough. + +STRANGER: And then, again, the soul which is over-full of modesty and +has no element of courage in many successive generations, is apt to grow +too indolent, and at last to become utterly paralyzed and useless. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: That, again, is quite likely. + +STRANGER: It was of these bonds I said that there would be no difficulty +in creating them, if only both classes originally held the same opinion +about the honourable and good;--indeed, in this single work, the whole +process of royal weaving is comprised--never to allow temperate natures +to be separated from the brave, but to weave them together, like the +warp and the woof, by common sentiments and honours and reputation, and +by the giving of pledges to one another; and out of them forming one +smooth and even web, to entrust to them the offices of State. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How do you mean? + +STRANGER: Where one officer only is needed, you must choose a ruler who +has both these qualities--when many, you must mingle some of each, for +the temperate ruler is very careful and just and safe, but is wanting in +thoroughness and go. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly, that is very true. + +STRANGER: The character of the courageous, on the other hand, falls +short of the former in justice and caution, but has the power of action +in a remarkable degree, and where either of these two qualities is +wanting, there cities cannot altogether prosper either in their public +or private life. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly they cannot. + +STRANGER: This then we declare to be the completion of the web of +political action, which is created by a direct intertexture of the brave +and temperate natures, whenever the royal science has drawn the two +minds into communion with one another by unanimity and friendship, and +having perfected the noblest and best of all the webs which political +life admits, and enfolding therein all other inhabitants of cities, +whether slaves or freemen, binds them in one fabric and governs and +presides over them, and, in so far as to be happy is vouchsafed to a +city, in no particular fails to secure their happiness. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Your picture, Stranger, of the king and statesman, no +less than of the Sophist, is quite perfect. + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Statesman, by Plato + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK STATESMAN *** + +***** This file should be named 1738.txt or 1738.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/1/7/3/1738/ + +Produced by Sue Asscher + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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FOR PUBLIC DOMAIN ETEXTS*Ver.04.29.93*END* + + + + + +This etext was prepared by Sue Asscher <asschers@aia.net.au> + + + + + +STATESMAN + +by + +Plato + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + +INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS. + +In the Phaedrus, the Republic, the Philebus, the Parmenides, and the +Sophist, we may observe the tendency of Plato to combine two or more +subjects or different aspects of the same subject in a single dialogue. In +the Sophist and Statesman especially we note that the discussion is partly +regarded as an illustration of method, and that analogies are brought from +afar which throw light on the main subject. And in his later writings +generally we further remark a decline of style, and of dramatic power; the +characters excite little or no interest, and the digressions are apt to +overlay the main thesis; there is not the 'callida junctura' of an artistic +whole. Both the serious discussions and the jests are sometimes out of +place. The invincible Socrates is withdrawn from view; and new foes begin +to appear under old names. Plato is now chiefly concerned, not with the +original Sophist, but with the sophistry of the schools of philosophy, +which are making reasoning impossible; and is driven by them out of the +regions of transcendental speculation back into the path of common sense. +A logical or psychological phase takes the place of the doctrine of Ideas +in his mind. He is constantly dwelling on the importance of regular +classification, and of not putting words in the place of things. He has +banished the poets, and is beginning to use a technical language. He is +bitter and satirical, and seems to be sadly conscious of the realities of +human life. Yet the ideal glory of the Platonic philosophy is not +extinguished. He is still looking for a city in which kings are either +philosophers or gods (compare Laws). + +The Statesman has lost the grace and beauty of the earlier dialogues. The +mind of the writer seems to be so overpowered in the effort of thought as +to impair his style; at least his gift of expression does not keep up with +the increasing difficulty of his theme. The idea of the king or statesman +and the illustration of method are connected, not like the love and +rhetoric of the Phaedrus, by 'little invisible pegs,' but in a confused and +inartistic manner, which fails to produce any impression of a whole on the +mind of the reader. Plato apologizes for his tediousness, and acknowledges +that the improvement of his audience has been his only aim in some of his +digressions. His own image may be used as a motto of his style: like an +inexpert statuary he has made the figure or outline too large, and is +unable to give the proper colours or proportions to his work. He makes +mistakes only to correct them--this seems to be his way of drawing +attention to common dialectical errors. The Eleatic stranger, here, as in +the Sophist, has no appropriate character, and appears only as the +expositor of a political ideal, in the delineation of which he is +frequently interrupted by purely logical illustrations. The younger +Socrates resembles his namesake in nothing but a name. The dramatic +character is so completely forgotten, that a special reference is twice +made to discussions in the Sophist; and this, perhaps, is the strongest +ground which can be urged for doubting the genuineness of the work. But, +when we remember that a similar allusion is made in the Laws to the +Republic, we see that the entire disregard of dramatic propriety is not +always a sufficient reason for doubting the genuineness of a Platonic +writing. + +The search after the Statesman, which is carried on, like that for the +Sophist, by the method of dichotomy, gives an opportunity for many humorous +and satirical remarks. Several of the jests are mannered and laboured: +for example, the turn of words with which the dialogue opens; or the clumsy +joke about man being an animal, who has a power of two-feet--both which are +suggested by the presence of Theodorus, the geometrician. There is +political as well as logical insight in refusing to admit the division of +mankind into Hellenes and Barbarians: 'if a crane could speak, he would in +like manner oppose men and all other animals to cranes.' The pride of the +Hellene is further humbled, by being compared to a Phrygian or Lydian. +Plato glories in this impartiality of the dialectical method, which places +birds in juxtaposition with men, and the king side by side with the bird- +catcher; king or vermin-destroyer are objects of equal interest to science +(compare Parmen.). There are other passages which show that the irony of +Socrates was a lesson which Plato was not slow in learning--as, for +example, the passing remark, that 'the kings and statesmen of our day are +in their breeding and education very like their subjects;' or the +anticipation that the rivals of the king will be found in the class of +servants; or the imposing attitude of the priests, who are the established +interpreters of the will of heaven, authorized by law. Nothing is more +bitter in all his writings than his comparison of the contemporary +politicians to lions, centaurs, satyrs, and other animals of a feebler +sort, who are ever changing their forms and natures. But, as in the later +dialogues generally, the play of humour and the charm of poetry have +departed, never to return. + +Still the Politicus contains a higher and more ideal conception of politics +than any other of Plato's writings. The city of which there is a pattern +in heaven (Republic), is here described as a Paradisiacal state of human +society. In the truest sense of all, the ruler is not man but God; and +such a government existed in a former cycle of human history, and may again +exist when the gods resume their care of mankind. In a secondary sense, +the true form of government is that which has scientific rulers, who are +irresponsible to their subjects. Not power but knowledge is the +characteristic of a king or royal person. And the rule of a man is better +and higher than law, because he is more able to deal with the infinite +complexity of human affairs. But mankind, in despair of finding a true +ruler, are willing to acquiesce in any law or custom which will save them +from the caprice of individuals. They are ready to accept any of the six +forms of government which prevail in the world. To the Greek, nomos was a +sacred word, but the political idealism of Plato soars into a region +beyond; for the laws he would substitute the intelligent will of the +legislator. Education is originally to implant in men's minds a sense of +truth and justice, which is the divine bond of states, and the legislator +is to contrive human bonds, by which dissimilar natures may be united in +marriage and supply the deficiencies of one another. As in the Republic, +the government of philosophers, the causes of the perversion of states, the +regulation of marriages, are still the political problems with which +Plato's mind is occupied. He treats them more slightly, partly because the +dialogue is shorter, and also because the discussion of them is perpetually +crossed by the other interest of dialectic, which has begun to absorb him. + +The plan of the Politicus or Statesman may be briefly sketched as follows: +(1) By a process of division and subdivision we discover the true herdsman +or king of men. But before we can rightly distinguish him from his rivals, +we must view him, (2) as he is presented to us in a famous ancient tale: +the tale will also enable us to distinguish the divine from the human +herdsman or shepherd: (3) and besides our fable, we must have an example; +for our example we will select the art of weaving, which will have to be +distinguished from the kindred arts; and then, following this pattern, we +will separate the king from his subordinates or competitors. (4) But are +we not exceeding all due limits; and is there not a measure of all arts and +sciences, to which the art of discourse must conform? There is; but before +we can apply this measure, we must know what is the aim of discourse: and +our discourse only aims at the dialectical improvement of ourselves and +others.--Having made our apology, we return once more to the king or +statesman, and proceed to contrast him with pretenders in the same line +with him, under their various forms of government. (5) His characteristic +is, that he alone has science, which is superior to law and written +enactments; these do but spring out of the necessities of mankind, when +they are in despair of finding the true king. (6) The sciences which are +most akin to the royal are the sciences of the general, the judge, the +orator, which minister to him, but even these are subordinate to him. (7) +Fixed principles are implanted by education, and the king or statesman +completes the political web by marrying together dissimilar natures, the +courageous and the temperate, the bold and the gentle, who are the warp and +the woof of society. + +The outline may be filled up as follows:-- + +SOCRATES: I have reason to thank you, Theodorus, for the acquaintance of +Theaetetus and the Stranger. + +THEODORUS: And you will have three times as much reason to thank me when +they have delineated the Statesman and Philosopher, as well as the Sophist. + +SOCRATES: Does the great geometrician apply the same measure to all three? +Are they not divided by an interval which no geometrical ratio can express? + +THEODORUS: By the god Ammon, Socrates, you are right; and I am glad to see +that you have not forgotten your geometry. But before I retaliate on you, +I must request the Stranger to finish the argument... + +The Stranger suggests that Theaetetus shall be allowed to rest, and that +Socrates the younger shall respond in his place; Theodorus agrees to the +suggestion, and Socrates remarks that the name of the one and the face of +the other give him a right to claim relationship with both of them. They +propose to take the Statesman after the Sophist; his path they must +determine, and part off all other ways, stamping upon them a single +negative form (compare Soph.). + +The Stranger begins the enquiry by making a division of the arts and +sciences into theoretical and practical--the one kind concerned with +knowledge exclusively, and the other with action; arithmetic and the +mathematical sciences are examples of the former, and carpentering and +handicraft arts of the latter (compare Philebus). Under which of the two +shall we place the Statesman? Or rather, shall we not first ask, whether +the king, statesman, master, householder, practise one art or many? As the +adviser of a physician may be said to have medical science and to be a +physician, so the adviser of a king has royal science and is a king. And +the master of a large household may be compared to the ruler of a small +state. Hence we conclude that the science of the king, statesman, and +householder is one and the same. And this science is akin to knowledge +rather than to action. For a king rules with his mind, and not with his +hands. + +But theoretical science may be a science either of judging, like +arithmetic, or of ruling and superintending, like that of the architect or +master-builder. And the science of the king is of the latter nature; but +the power which he exercises is underived and uncontrolled,--a +characteristic which distinguishes him from heralds, prophets, and other +inferior officers. He is the wholesale dealer in command, and the herald, +or other officer, retails his commands to others. Again, a ruler is +concerned with the production of some object, and objects may be divided +into living and lifeless, and rulers into the rulers of living and lifeless +objects. And the king is not like the master-builder, concerned with +lifeless matter, but has the task of managing living animals. And the +tending of living animals may be either a tending of individuals, or a +managing of herds. And the Statesman is not a groom, but a herdsman, and +his art may be called either the art of managing a herd, or the art of +collective management:--Which do you prefer? 'No matter.' Very good, +Socrates, and if you are not too particular about words you will be all the +richer some day in true wisdom. But how would you subdivide the herdsman's +art? 'I should say, that there is one management of men, and another of +beasts.' Very good, but you are in too great a hurry to get to man. All +divisions which are rightly made should cut through the middle; if you +attend to this rule, you will be more likely to arrive at classes. 'I do +not understand the nature of my mistake.' Your division was like a +division of the human race into Hellenes and Barbarians, or into Lydians or +Phrygians and all other nations, instead of into male and female; or like a +division of number into ten thousand and all other numbers, instead of into +odd and even. And I should like you to observe further, that though I +maintain a class to be a part, there is no similar necessity for a part to +be a class. But to return to your division, you spoke of men and other +animals as two classes--the second of which you comprehended under the +general name of beasts. This is the sort of division which an intelligent +crane would make: he would put cranes into a class by themselves for their +special glory, and jumble together all others, including man, in the class +of beasts. An error of this kind can only be avoided by a more regular +subdivision. Just now we divided the whole class of animals into +gregarious and non-gregarious, omitting the previous division into tame and +wild. We forgot this in our hurry to arrive at man, and found by +experience, as the proverb says, that 'the more haste the worse speed.' + +And now let us begin again at the art of managing herds. You have probably +heard of the fish-preserves in the Nile and in the ponds of the Great King, +and of the nurseries of geese and cranes in Thessaly. These suggest a new +division into the rearing or management of land-herds and of water-herds:-- +I need not say with which the king is concerned. And land-herds may be +divided into walking and flying; and every idiot knows that the political +animal is a pedestrian. At this point we may take a longer or a shorter +road, and as we are already near the end, I see no harm in taking the +longer, which is the way of mesotomy, and accords with the principle which +we were laying down. The tame, walking, herding animal, may be divided +into two classes--the horned and the hornless, and the king is concerned +with the hornless; and these again may be subdivided into animals having or +not having cloven feet, or mixing or not mixing the breed; and the king or +statesman has the care of animals which have not cloven feet, and which do +not mix the breed. And now, if we omit dogs, who can hardly be said to +herd, I think that we have only two species left which remain undivided: +and how are we to distinguish them? To geometricians, like you and +Theaetetus, I can have no difficulty in explaining that man is a diameter, +having a power of two feet; and the power of four-legged creatures, being +the double of two feet, is the diameter of our diameter. There is another +excellent jest which I spy in the two remaining species. Men and birds are +both bipeds, and human beings are running a race with the airiest and +freest of creation, in which they are far behind their competitors;--this +is a great joke, and there is a still better in the juxtaposition of the +bird-taker and the king, who may be seen scampering after them. For, as we +remarked in discussing the Sophist, the dialectical method is no respecter +of persons. But we might have proceeded, as I was saying, by another and a +shorter road. In that case we should have begun by dividing land animals +into bipeds and quadrupeds, and bipeds into winged and wingless; we should +than have taken the Statesman and set him over the 'bipes implume,' and put +the reins of government into his hands. + +Here let us sum up:--The science of pure knowledge had a part which was the +science of command, and this had a part which was a science of wholesale +command; and this was divided into the management of animals, and was again +parted off into the management of herds of animals, and again of land +animals, and these into hornless, and these into bipeds; and so at last we +arrived at man, and found the political and royal science. And yet we have +not clearly distinguished the political shepherd from his rivals. No one +would think of usurping the prerogatives of the ordinary shepherd, who on +all hands is admitted to be the trainer, matchmaker, doctor, musician of +his flock. But the royal shepherd has numberless competitors, from whom he +must be distinguished; there are merchants, husbandmen, physicians, who +will all dispute his right to manage the flock. I think that we can best +distinguish him by having recourse to a famous old tradition, which may +amuse as well as instruct us; the narrative is perfectly true, although the +scepticism of mankind is prone to doubt the tales of old. You have heard +what happened in the quarrel of Atreus and Thyestes? 'You mean about the +golden lamb?' No, not that; but another part of the story, which tells how +the sun and stars once arose in the west and set in the east, and that the +god reversed their motion, as a witness to the right of Atreus. 'There is +such a story.' And no doubt you have heard of the empire of Cronos, and of +the earthborn men? The origin of these and the like stories is to be found +in the tale which I am about to narrate. + +There was a time when God directed the revolutions of the world, but at the +completion of a certain cycle he let go; and the world, by a necessity of +its nature, turned back, and went round the other way. For divine things +alone are unchangeable; but the earth and heavens, although endowed with +many glories, have a body, and are therefore liable to perturbation. In +the case of the world, the perturbation is very slight, and amounts only to +a reversal of motion. For the lord of moving things is alone self-moved; +neither can piety allow that he goes at one time in one direction and at +another time in another; or that God has given the universe opposite +motions; or that there are two gods, one turning it in one direction, +another in another. But the truth is, that there are two cycles of the +world, and in one of them it is governed by an immediate Providence, and +receives life and immortality, and in the other is let go again, and has a +reverse action during infinite ages. This new action is spontaneous, and +is due to exquisite perfection of balance, to the vast size of the +universe, and to the smallness of the pivot upon which it turns. All +changes in the heaven affect the animal world, and this being the greatest +of them, is most destructive to men and animals. At the beginning of the +cycle before our own very few of them had survived; and on these a mighty +change passed. For their life was reversed like the motion of the world, +and first of all coming to a stand then quickly returned to youth and +beauty. The white locks of the aged became black; the cheeks of the +bearded man were restored to their youth and fineness; the young men grew +softer and smaller, and, being reduced to the condition of children in mind +as well as body, began to vanish away; and the bodies of those who had died +by violence, in a few moments underwent a parallel change and disappeared. +In that cycle of existence there was no such thing as the procreation of +animals from one another, but they were born of the earth, and of this our +ancestors, who came into being immediately after the end of the last cycle +and at the beginning of this, have preserved the recollection. Such +traditions are often now unduly discredited, and yet they may be proved by +internal evidence. For observe how consistent the narrative is; as the old +returned to youth, so the dead returned to life; the wheel of their +existence having been reversed, they rose again from the earth: a few only +were reserved by God for another destiny. Such was the origin of the +earthborn men. + +'And is this cycle, of which you are speaking, the reign of Cronos, or our +present state of existence?' No, Socrates, that blessed and spontaneous +life belongs not to this, but to the previous state, in which God was the +governor of the whole world, and other gods subject to him ruled over parts +of the world, as is still the case in certain places. They were shepherds +of men and animals, each of them sufficing for those of whom he had the +care. And there was no violence among them, or war, or devouring of one +another. Their life was spontaneous, because in those days God ruled over +man; and he was to man what man is now to the animals. Under his +government there were no estates, or private possessions, or families; but +the earth produced a sufficiency of all things, and men were born out of +the earth, having no traditions of the past; and as the temperature of the +seasons was mild, they took no thought for raiment, and had no beds, but +lived and dwelt in the open air. + +Such was the age of Cronos, and the age of Zeus is our own. Tell me, which +is the happier of the two? Or rather, shall I tell you that the happiness +of these children of Cronos must have depended on how they used their time? +If having boundless leisure, and the power of discoursing not only with one +another but with the animals, they had employed these advantages with a +view to philosophy, gathering from every nature some addition to their +store of knowledge;--or again, if they had merely eaten and drunk, and told +stories to one another, and to the beasts;--in either case, I say, there +would be no difficulty in answering the question. But as nobody knows +which they did, the question must remain unanswered. And here is the point +of my tale. In the fulness of time, when the earthborn men had all passed +away, the ruler of the universe let go the helm, and became a spectator; +and destiny and natural impulse swayed the world. At the same instant all +the inferior deities gave up their hold; the whole universe rebounded, and +there was a great earthquake, and utter ruin of all manner of animals. +After a while the tumult ceased, and the universal creature settled down in +his accustomed course, having authority over all other creatures, and +following the instructions of his God and Father, at first more precisely, +afterwards with less exactness. The reason of the falling off was the +disengagement of a former chaos; 'a muddy vesture of decay' was a part of +his original nature, out of which he was brought by his Creator, under +whose immediate guidance, while he remained in that former cycle, the evil +was minimized and the good increased to the utmost. And in the beginning +of the new cycle all was well enough, but as time went on, discord entered +in; at length the good was minimized and the evil everywhere diffused, and +there was a danger of universal ruin. Then the Creator, seeing the world +in great straits, and fearing that chaos and infinity would come again, in +his tender care again placed himself at the helm and restored order, and +made the world immortal and imperishable. Once more the cycle of life and +generation was reversed; the infants grew into young men, and the young men +became greyheaded; no longer did the animals spring out of the earth; as +the whole world was now lord of its own progress, so the parts were to be +self-created and self-nourished. At first the case of men was very +helpless and pitiable; for they were alone among the wild beasts, and had +to carry on the struggle for existence without arts or knowledge, and had +no food, and did not know how to get any. That was the time when +Prometheus brought them fire, Hephaestus and Athene taught them arts, and +other gods gave them seeds and plants. Out of these human life was framed; +for mankind were left to themselves, and ordered their own ways, living, +like the universe, in one cycle after one manner, and in another cycle +after another manner. + +Enough of the myth, which may show us two errors of which we were guilty in +our account of the king. The first and grand error was in choosing for our +king a god, who belongs to the other cycle, instead of a man from our own; +there was a lesser error also in our failure to define the nature of the +royal functions. The myth gave us only the image of a divine shepherd, +whereas the statesmen and kings of our own day very much resemble their +subjects in education and breeding. On retracing our steps we find that we +gave too narrow a designation to the art which was concerned with command- +for-self over living creatures, when we called it the 'feeding' of animals +in flocks. This would apply to all shepherds, with the exception of the +Statesman; but if we say 'managing' or 'tending' animals, the term would +include him as well. Having remodelled the name, we may subdivide as +before, first separating the human from the divine shepherd or manager. +Then we may subdivide the human art of governing into the government of +willing and unwilling subjects--royalty and tyranny--which are the extreme +opposites of one another, although we in our simplicity have hitherto +confounded them. + +And yet the figure of the king is still defective. We have taken up a lump +of fable, and have used more than we needed. Like statuaries, we have made +some of the features out of proportion, and shall lose time in reducing +them. Or our mythus may be compared to a picture, which is well drawn in +outline, but is not yet enlivened by colour. And to intelligent persons +language is, or ought to be, a better instrument of description than any +picture. 'But what, Stranger, is the deficiency of which you speak?' No +higher truth can be made clear without an example; every man seems to know +all things in a dream, and to know nothing when he is awake. And the +nature of example can only be illustrated by an example. Children are +taught to read by being made to compare cases in which they do not know a +certain letter with cases in which they know it, until they learn to +recognize it in all its combinations. Example comes into use when we +identify something unknown with that which is known, and form a common +notion of both of them. Like the child who is learning his letters, the +soul recognizes some of the first elements of things; and then again is at +fault and unable to recognize them when they are translated into the +difficult language of facts. Let us, then, take an example, which will +illustrate the nature of example, and will also assist us in characterizing +the political science, and in separating the true king from his rivals. + +I will select the example of weaving, or, more precisely, weaving of wool. +In the first place, all possessions are either productive or preventive; of +the preventive sort are spells and antidotes, divine and human, and also +defences, and defences are either arms or screens, and screens are veils +and also shields against heat and cold, and shields against heat and cold +are shelters and coverings, and coverings are blankets or garments, and +garments are in one piece or have many parts; and of these latter, some are +stitched and others are fastened, and of these again some are made of +fibres of plants and some of hair, and of these some are cemented with +water and earth, and some are fastened with their own material; the latter +are called clothes, and are made by the art of clothing, from which the art +of weaving differs only in name, as the political differs from the royal +science. Thus we have drawn several distinctions, but as yet have not +distinguished the weaving of garments from the kindred and co-operative +arts. For the first process to which the material is subjected is the +opposite of weaving--I mean carding. And the art of carding, and the whole +art of the fuller and the mender, are concerned with the treatment and +production of clothes, as well as the art of weaving. Again, there are the +arts which make the weaver's tools. And if we say that the weaver's art is +the greatest and noblest of those which have to do with woollen garments,-- +this, although true, is not sufficiently distinct; because these other arts +require to be first cleared away. Let us proceed, then, by regular steps: +--There are causal or principal, and co-operative or subordinate arts. To +the causal class belong the arts of washing and mending, of carding and +spinning the threads, and the other arts of working in wool; these are +chiefly of two kinds, falling under the two great categories of composition +and division. Carding is of the latter sort. But our concern is chiefly +with that part of the art of wool-working which composes, and of which one +kind twists and the other interlaces the threads, whether the firmer +texture of the warp or the looser texture of the woof. These are adapted +to each other, and the orderly composition of them forms a woollen garment. +And the art which presides over these operations is the art of weaving. + +But why did we go through this circuitous process, instead of saying at +once that weaving is the art of entwining the warp and the woof? In order +that our labour may not seem to be lost, I must explain the whole nature of +excess and defect. There are two arts of measuring--one is concerned with +relative size, and the other has reference to a mean or standard of what is +meet. The difference between good and evil is the difference between a +mean or measure and excess or defect. All things require to be compared, +not only with one another, but with the mean, without which there would be +no beauty and no art, whether the art of the statesman or the art of +weaving or any other; for all the arts guard against excess or defect, +which are real evils. This we must endeavour to show, if the arts are to +exist; and the proof of this will be a harder piece of work than the +demonstration of the existence of not-being which we proved in our +discussion about the Sophist. At present I am content with the indirect +proof that the existence of such a standard is necessary to the existence +of the arts. The standard or measure, which we are now only applying to +the arts, may be some day required with a view to the demonstration of +absolute truth. + +We may now divide this art of measurement into two parts; placing in the +one part all the arts which measure the relative size or number of objects, +and in the other all those which depend upon a mean or standard. Many +accomplished men say that the art of measurement has to do with all things, +but these persons, although in this notion of theirs they may very likely +be right, are apt to fail in seeing the differences of classes--they jumble +together in one the 'more' and the 'too much,' which are very different +things. Whereas the right way is to find the differences of classes, and +to comprehend the things which have any affinity under the same class. + +I will make one more observation by the way. When a pupil at a school is +asked the letters which make up a particular word, is he not asked with a +view to his knowing the same letters in all words? And our enquiry about +the Statesman in like manner is intended not only to improve our knowledge +of politics, but our reasoning powers generally. Still less would any one +analyze the nature of weaving for its own sake. There is no difficulty in +exhibiting sensible images, but the greatest and noblest truths have no +outward form adapted to the eye of sense, and are only revealed in thought. +And all that we are now saying is said for the sake of them. I make these +remarks, because I want you to get rid of any impression that our +discussion about weaving and about the reversal of the universe, and the +other discussion about the Sophist and not-being, were tedious and +irrelevant. Please to observe that they can only be fairly judged when +compared with what is meet; and yet not with what is meet for producing +pleasure, nor even meet for making discoveries, but for the great end of +developing the dialectical method and sharpening the wits of the auditors. +He who censures us, should prove that, if our words had been fewer, they +would have been better calculated to make men dialecticians. + +And now let us return to our king or statesman, and transfer to him the +example of weaving. The royal art has been separated from that of other +herdsmen, but not from the causal and co-operative arts which exist in +states; these do not admit of dichotomy, and therefore they must be carved +neatly, like the limbs of a victim, not into more parts than are necessary. +And first (1) we have the large class of instruments, which includes almost +everything in the world; from these may be parted off (2) vessels which are +framed for the preservation of things, moist or dry, prepared in the fire +or out of the fire. The royal or political art has nothing to do with +either of these, any more than with the arts of making (3) vehicles, or (4) +defences, whether dresses, or arms, or walls, or (5) with the art of making +ornaments, whether pictures or other playthings, as they may be fitly +called, for they have no serious use. Then (6) there are the arts which +furnish gold, silver, wood, bark, and other materials, which should have +been put first; these, again, have no concern with the kingly science; any +more than the arts (7) which provide food and nourishment for the human +body, and which furnish occupation to the husbandman, huntsman, doctor, +cook, and the like, but not to the king or statesman. Further, there are +small things, such as coins, seals, stamps, which may with a little +violence be comprehended in one of the above-mentioned classes. Thus they +will embrace every species of property with the exception of animals,--but +these have been already included in the art of tending herds. There +remains only the class of slaves or ministers, among whom I expect that the +real rivals of the king will be discovered. I am not speaking of the +veritable slave bought with money, nor of the hireling who lets himself out +for service, nor of the trader or merchant, who at best can only lay claim +to economical and not to royal science. Nor am I referring to government +officials, such as heralds and scribes, for these are only the servants of +the rulers, and not the rulers themselves. I admit that there may be +something strange in any servants pretending to be masters, but I hardly +think that I could have been wrong in supposing that the principal +claimants to the throne will be of this class. Let us try once more: +There are diviners and priests, who are full of pride and prerogative; +these, as the law declares, know how to give acceptable gifts to the gods, +and in many parts of Hellas the duty of performing solemn sacrifices is +assigned to the chief magistrate, as at Athens to the King Archon. At +last, then, we have found a trace of those whom we were seeking. But still +they are only servants and ministers. + +And who are these who next come into view in various forms of men and +animals and other monsters appearing--lions and centaurs and satyrs--who +are these? I did not know them at first, for every one looks strange when +he is unexpected. But now I recognize the politician and his troop, the +chief of Sophists, the prince of charlatans, the most accomplished of +wizards, who must be carefully distinguished from the true king or +statesman. And here I will interpose a question: What are the true forms +of government? Are they not three--monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy? and +the distinctions of freedom and compulsion, law and no law, poverty and +riches expand these three into six. Monarchy may be divided into royalty +and tyranny; oligarchy into aristocracy and plutocracy; and democracy may +observe the law or may not observe it. But are any of these governments +worthy of the name? Is not government a science, and are we to suppose +that scientific government is secured by the rulers being many or few, rich +or poor, or by the rule being compulsory or voluntary? Can the many attain +to science? In no Hellenic city are there fifty good draught players, and +certainly there are not as many kings, for by kings we mean all those who +are possessed of the political science. A true government must therefore +be the government of one, or of a few. And they may govern us either with +or without law, and whether they are poor or rich, and however they govern, +provided they govern on some scientific principle,--it makes no difference. +And as the physician may cure us with our will, or against our will, and by +any mode of treatment, burning, bleeding, lowering, fattening, if he only +proceeds scientifically: so the true governor may reduce or fatten or +bleed the body corporate, while he acts according to the rules of his art, +and with a view to the good of the state, whether according to law or +without law. + +'I do not like the notion, that there can be good government without law.' + +I must explain: Law-making certainly is the business of a king; and yet +the best thing of all is, not that the law should rule, but that the king +should rule, for the varieties of circumstances are endless, and no simple +or universal rule can suit them all, or last for ever. The law is just an +ignorant brute of a tyrant, who insists always on his commands being +fulfilled under all circumstances. 'Then why have we laws at all?' I will +answer that question by asking you whether the training master gives a +different discipline to each of his pupils, or whether he has a general +rule of diet and exercise which is suited to the constitutions of the +majority? 'The latter.' The legislator, too, is obliged to lay down +general laws, and cannot enact what is precisely suitable to each +particular case. He cannot be sitting at every man's side all his life, +and prescribe for him the minute particulars of his duty, and therefore he +is compelled to impose on himself and others the restriction of a written +law. Let me suppose now, that a physician or trainer, having left +directions for his patients or pupils, goes into a far country, and comes +back sooner than he intended; owing to some unexpected change in the +weather, the patient or pupil seems to require a different mode of +treatment: Would he persist in his old commands, under the idea that all +others are noxious and heterodox? Viewed in the light of science, would +not the continuance of such regulations be ridiculous? And if the +legislator, or another like him, comes back from a far country, is he to be +prohibited from altering his own laws? The common people say: Let a man +persuade the city first, and then let him impose new laws. But is a +physician only to cure his patients by persuasion, and not by force? Is he +a worse physician who uses a little gentle violence in effecting the cure? +Or shall we say, that the violence is just, if exercised by a rich man, and +unjust, if by a poor man? May not any man, rich or poor, with or without +law, and whether the citizens like or not, do what is for their good? The +pilot saves the lives of the crew, not by laying down rules, but by making +his art a law, and, like him, the true governor has a strength of art which +is superior to the law. This is scientific government, and all others are +imitations only. Yet no great number of persons can attain to this +science. And hence follows an important result. The true political +principle is to assert the inviolability of the law, which, though not the +best thing possible, is best for the imperfect condition of man. + +I will explain my meaning by an illustration:--Suppose that mankind, +indignant at the rogueries and caprices of physicians and pilots, call +together an assembly, in which all who like may speak, the skilled as well +as the unskilled, and that in their assembly they make decrees for +regulating the practice of navigation and medicine which are to be binding +on these professions for all time. Suppose that they elect annually by +vote or lot those to whom authority in either department is to be +delegated. And let us further imagine, that when the term of their +magistracy has expired, the magistrates appointed by them are summoned +before an ignorant and unprofessional court, and may be condemned and +punished for breaking the regulations. They even go a step further, and +enact, that he who is found enquiring into the truth of navigation and +medicine, and is seeking to be wise above what is written, shall be called +not an artist, but a dreamer, a prating Sophist and a corruptor of youth; +and if he try to persuade others to investigate those sciences in a manner +contrary to the law, he shall be punished with the utmost severity. And +like rules might be extended to any art or science. But what would be the +consequence? + +'The arts would utterly perish, and human life, which is bad enough +already, would become intolerable.' + +But suppose, once more, that we were to appoint some one as the guardian of +the law, who was both ignorant and interested, and who perverted the law: +would not this be a still worse evil than the other? 'Certainly.' For the +laws are based on some experience and wisdom. Hence the wiser course is, +that they should be observed, although this is not the best thing of all, +but only the second best. And whoever, having skill, should try to improve +them, would act in the spirit of the law-giver. But then, as we have seen, +no great number of men, whether poor or rich, can be makers of laws. And +so, the nearest approach to true government is, when men do nothing +contrary to their own written laws and national customs. When the rich +preserve their customs and maintain the law, this is called aristocracy, or +if they neglect the law, oligarchy. When an individual rules according to +law, whether by the help of science or opinion, this is called monarchy; +and when he has royal science he is a king, whether he be so in fact or +not; but when he rules in spite of law, and is blind with ignorance and +passion, he is called a tyrant. These forms of government exist, because +men despair of the true king ever appearing among them; if he were to +appear, they would joyfully hand over to him the reins of government. But, +as there is no natural ruler of the hive, they meet together and make laws. +And do we wonder, when the foundation of politics is in the letter only, at +the miseries of states? Ought we not rather to admire the strength of the +political bond? For cities have endured the worst of evils time out of +mind; many cities have been shipwrecked, and some are like ships +foundering, because their pilots are absolutely ignorant of the science +which they profess. + +Let us next ask, which of these untrue forms of government is the least +bad, and which of them is the worst? I said at the beginning, that each of +the three forms of government, royalty, aristocracy, and democracy, might +be divided into two, so that the whole number of them, including the best, +will be seven. Under monarchy we have already distinguished royalty and +tyranny; of oligarchy there were two kinds, aristocracy and plutocracy; and +democracy may also be divided, for there is a democracy which observes, and +a democracy which neglects, the laws. The government of one is the best +and the worst--the government of a few is less bad and less good--the +government of the many is the least bad and least good of them all, being +the best of all lawless governments, and the worst of all lawful ones. But +the rulers of all these states, unless they have knowledge, are maintainers +of idols, and themselves idols--wizards, and also Sophists; for, after many +windings, the term 'Sophist' comes home to them. + +And now enough of centaurs and satyrs: the play is ended, and they may +quit the political stage. Still there remain some other and better +elements, which adhere to the royal science, and must be drawn off in the +refiner's fire before the gold can become quite pure. The arts of the +general, the judge, and the orator, will have to be separated from the +royal art; when the separation has been made, the nature of the king will +be unalloyed. Now there are inferior sciences, such as music and others; +and there is a superior science, which determines whether music is to be +learnt or not, and this is different from them, and the governor of them. +The science which determines whether we are to use persuasion, or not, is +higher than the art of persuasion; the science which determines whether we +are to go to war, is higher than the art of the general. The science which +makes the laws, is higher than that which only administers them. And the +science which has this authority over the rest, is the science of the king +or statesman. + +Once more we will endeavour to view this royal science by the light of our +example. We may compare the state to a web, and I will show you how the +different threads are drawn into one. You would admit--would you not?-- +that there are parts of virtue (although this position is sometimes +assailed by Eristics), and one part of virtue is temperance, and another +courage. These are two principles which are in a manner antagonistic to +one another; and they pervade all nature; the whole class of the good and +beautiful is included under them. The beautiful may be subdivided into two +lesser classes: one of these is described by us in terms expressive of +motion or energy, and the other in terms expressive of rest and quietness. +We say, how manly! how vigorous! how ready! and we say also, how calm! how +temperate! how dignified! This opposition of terms is extended by us to +all actions, to the tones of the voice, the notes of music, the workings of +the mind, the characters of men. The two classes both have their +exaggerations; and the exaggerations of the one are termed 'hardness,' +'violence,' 'madness;' of the other 'cowardliness,' or 'sluggishness.' And +if we pursue the enquiry, we find that these opposite characters are +naturally at variance, and can hardly be reconciled. In lesser matters the +antagonism between them is ludicrous, but in the State may be the occasion +of grave disorders, and may disturb the whole course of human life. For +the orderly class are always wanting to be at peace, and hence they pass +imperceptibly into the condition of slaves; and the courageous sort are +always wanting to go to war, even when the odds are against them, and are +soon destroyed by their enemies. But the true art of government, first +preparing the material by education, weaves the two elements into one, +maintaining authority over the carders of the wool, and selecting the +proper subsidiary arts which are necessary for making the web. The royal +science is queen of educators, and begins by choosing the natures which she +is to train, punishing with death and exterminating those who are violently +carried away to atheism and injustice, and enslaving those who are +wallowing in the mire of ignorance. The rest of the citizens she blends +into one, combining the stronger element of courage, which we may call the +warp, with the softer element of temperance, which we may imagine to be the +woof. These she binds together, first taking the eternal elements of the +honourable, the good, and the just, and fastening them with a divine cord +in a heaven-born nature, and then fastening the animal elements with a +human cord. The good legislator can implant by education the higher +principles; and where they exist there is no difficulty in inserting the +lesser human bonds, by which the State is held together; these are the laws +of intermarriage, and of union for the sake of offspring. Most persons in +their marriages seek after wealth or power; or they are clannish, and +choose those who are like themselves,--the temperate marrying the +temperate, and the courageous the courageous. The two classes thrive and +flourish at first, but they soon degenerate; the one become mad, and the +other feeble and useless. This would not have been the case, if they had +both originally held the same notions about the honourable and the good; +for then they never would have allowed the temperate natures to be +separated from the courageous, but they would have bound them together by +common honours and reputations, by intermarriages, and by the choice of +rulers who combine both qualities. The temperate are careful and just, but +are wanting in the power of action; the courageous fall short of them in +justice, but in action are superior to them: and no state can prosper in +which either of these qualities is wanting. The noblest and best of all +webs or states is that which the royal science weaves, combining the two +sorts of natures in a single texture, and in this enfolding freeman and +slave and every other social element, and presiding over them all. + +'Your picture, Stranger, of the king and statesman, no less than of the +Sophist, is quite perfect.' + +... + +The principal subjects in the Statesman may be conveniently embraced under +six or seven heads:--(1) the myth; (2) the dialectical interest; (3) the +political aspects of the dialogue; (4) the satirical and paradoxical vein; +(5) the necessary imperfection of law; (6) the relation of the work to the +other writings of Plato; lastly (7), we may briefly consider the +genuineness of the Sophist and Statesman, which can hardly be assumed +without proof, since the two dialogues have been questioned by three such +eminent Platonic scholars as Socher, Schaarschmidt, and Ueberweg. + +I. The hand of the master is clearly visible in the myth. First in the +connection with mythology;--he wins a kind of verisimilitude for this as +for his other myths, by adopting received traditions, of which he pretends +to find an explanation in his own larger conception (compare Introduction +to Critias). The young Socrates has heard of the sun rising in the west +and setting in the east, and of the earth-born men; but he has never heard +the origin of these remarkable phenomena. Nor is Plato, here or elsewhere, +wanting in denunciations of the incredulity of 'this latter age,' on which +the lovers of the marvellous have always delighted to enlarge. And he is +not without express testimony to the truth of his narrative;--such +testimony as, in the Timaeus, the first men gave of the names of the gods +('They must surely have known their own ancestors'). For the first +generation of the new cycle, who lived near the time, are supposed to have +preserved a recollection of a previous one. He also appeals to internal +evidence, viz. the perfect coherence of the tale, though he is very well +aware, as he says in the Cratylus, that there may be consistency in error +as well as in truth. The gravity and minuteness with which some +particulars are related also lend an artful aid. The profound interest and +ready assent of the young Socrates, who is not too old to be amused 'with a +tale which a child would love to hear,' are a further assistance. To those +who were naturally inclined to believe that the fortunes of mankind are +influenced by the stars, or who maintained that some one principle, like +the principle of the Same and the Other in the Timaeus, pervades all things +in the world, the reversal of the motion of the heavens seemed necessarily +to produce a reversal of the order of human life. The spheres of +knowledge, which to us appear wide asunder as the poles, astronomy and +medicine, were naturally connected in the minds of early thinkers, because +there was little or nothing in the space between them. Thus there is a +basis of philosophy, on which the improbabilities of the tale may be said +to rest. These are some of the devices by which Plato, like a modern +novelist, seeks to familiarize the marvellous. + +The myth, like that of the Timaeus and Critias, is rather historical than +poetical, in this respect corresponding to the general change in the later +writings of Plato, when compared with the earlier ones. It is hardly a +myth in the sense in which the term might be applied to the myth of the +Phaedrus, the Republic, the Phaedo, or the Gorgias, but may be more aptly +compared with the didactic tale in which Protagoras describes the fortunes +of primitive man, or with the description of the gradual rise of a new +society in the Third Book of the Laws. Some discrepancies may be observed +between the mythology of the Statesman and the Timaeus, and between the +Timaeus and the Republic. But there is no reason to expect that all +Plato's visions of a former, any more than of a future, state of existence, +should conform exactly to the same pattern. We do not find perfect +consistency in his philosophy; and still less have we any right to demand +this of him in his use of mythology and figures of speech. And we observe +that while employing all the resources of a writer of fiction to give +credibility to his tales, he is not disposed to insist upon their literal +truth. Rather, as in the Phaedo, he says, 'Something of the kind is true;' +or, as in the Gorgias, 'This you will think to be an old wife's tale, but +you can think of nothing truer;' or, as in the Statesman, he describes his +work as a 'mass of mythology,' which was introduced in order to teach +certain lessons; or, as in the Phaedrus, he secretly laughs at such stories +while refusing to disturb the popular belief in them. + +The greater interest of the myth consists in the philosophical lessons +which Plato presents to us in this veiled form. Here, as in the tale of +Er, the son of Armenius, he touches upon the question of freedom and +necessity, both in relation to God and nature. For at first the universe +is governed by the immediate providence of God,--this is the golden age,-- +but after a while the wheel is reversed, and man is left to himself. Like +other theologians and philosophers, Plato relegates his explanation of the +problem to a transcendental world; he speaks of what in modern language +might be termed 'impossibilities in the nature of things,' hindering God +from continuing immanent in the world. But there is some inconsistency; +for the 'letting go' is spoken of as a divine act, and is at the same time +attributed to the necessary imperfection of matter; there is also a +numerical necessity for the successive births of souls. At first, man and +the world retain their divine instincts, but gradually degenerate. As in +the Book of Genesis, the first fall of man is succeeded by a second; the +misery and wickedness of the world increase continually. The reason of +this further decline is supposed to be the disorganisation of matter: the +latent seeds of a former chaos are disengaged, and envelope all things. +The condition of man becomes more and more miserable; he is perpetually +waging an unequal warfare with the beasts. At length he obtains such a +measure of education and help as is necessary for his existence. Though +deprived of God's help, he is not left wholly destitute; he has received +from Athene and Hephaestus a knowledge of the arts; other gods give him +seeds and plants; and out of these human life is reconstructed. He now +eats bread in the sweat of his brow, and has dominion over the animals, +subjected to the conditions of his nature, and yet able to cope with them +by divine help. Thus Plato may be said to represent in a figure--(1) the +state of innocence; (2) the fall of man; (3) the still deeper decline into +barbarism; (4) the restoration of man by the partial interference of God, +and the natural growth of the arts and of civilised society. Two lesser +features of this description should not pass unnoticed:--(1) the primitive +men are supposed to be created out of the earth, and not after the ordinary +manner of human generation--half the causes of moral evil are in this way +removed; (2) the arts are attributed to a divine revelation: and so the +greatest difficulty in the history of pre-historic man is solved. Though +no one knew better than Plato that the introduction of the gods is not a +reason, but an excuse for not giving a reason (Cratylus), yet, considering +that more than two thousand years later mankind are still discussing these +problems, we may be satisfied to find in Plato a statement of the +difficulties which arise in conceiving the relation of man to God and +nature, without expecting to obtain from him a solution of them. In such a +tale, as in the Phaedrus, various aspects of the Ideas were doubtless +indicated to Plato's own mind, as the corresponding theological problems +are to us. The immanence of things in the Ideas, or the partial separation +of them, and the self-motion of the supreme Idea, are probably the forms in +which he would have interpreted his own parable. + +He touches upon another question of great interest--the consciousness of +evil--what in the Jewish Scriptures is called 'eating of the tree of the +knowledge of good and evil.' At the end of the narrative, the Eleatic asks +his companion whether this life of innocence, or that which men live at +present, is the better of the two. He wants to distinguish between the +mere animal life of innocence, the 'city of pigs,' as it is comically +termed by Glaucon in the Republic, and the higher life of reason and +philosophy. But as no one can determine the state of man in the world +before the Fall, 'the question must remain unanswered.' Similar questions +have occupied the minds of theologians in later ages; but they can hardly +be said to have found an answer. Professor Campbell well observes, that +the general spirit of the myth may be summed up in the words of the Lysis: +'If evil were to perish, should we hunger any more, or thirst any more, or +have any similar sensations? Yet perhaps the question what will or will +not be is a foolish one, for who can tell?' As in the Theaetetus, evil is +supposed to continue,--here, as the consequence of a former state of the +world, a sort of mephitic vapour exhaling from some ancient chaos,--there, +as involved in the possibility of good, and incident to the mixed state of +man. + +Once more--and this is the point of connexion with the rest of the +dialogue--the myth is intended to bring out the difference between the +ideal and the actual state of man. In all ages of the world men have +dreamed of a state of perfection, which has been, and is to be, but never +is, and seems to disappear under the necessary conditions of human society. +The uselessness, the danger, the true value of such political ideals have +often been discussed; youth is too ready to believe in them; age to +disparage them. Plato's 'prudens quaestio' respecting the comparative +happiness of men in this and in a former cycle of existence is intended to +elicit this contrast between the golden age and 'the life under Zeus' which +is our own. To confuse the divine and human, or hastily apply one to the +other, is a 'tremendous error.' Of the ideal or divine government of the +world we can form no true or adequate conception; and this our mixed state +of life, in which we are partly left to ourselves, but not wholly deserted +by the gods, may contain some higher elements of good and knowledge than +could have existed in the days of innocence under the rule of Cronos. So +we may venture slightly to enlarge a Platonic thought which admits of a +further application to Christian theology. Here are suggested also the +distinctions between God causing and permitting evil, and between his more +and less immediate government of the world. + +II. The dialectical interest of the Statesman seems to contend in Plato's +mind with the political; the dialogue might have been designated by two +equally descriptive titles--either the 'Statesman,' or 'Concerning Method.' +Dialectic, which in the earlier writings of Plato is a revival of the +Socratic question and answer applied to definition, is now occupied with +classification; there is nothing in which he takes greater delight than in +processes of division (compare Phaedr.); he pursues them to a length out of +proportion to his main subject, and appears to value them as a dialectical +exercise, and for their own sake. A poetical vision of some order or +hierarchy of ideas or sciences has already been floating before us in the +Symposium and the Republic. And in the Phaedrus this aspect of dialectic +is further sketched out, and the art of rhetoric is based on the division +of the characters of mankind into their several classes. The same love of +divisions is apparent in the Gorgias. But in a well-known passage of the +Philebus occurs the first criticism on the nature of classification. There +we are exhorted not to fall into the common error of passing from unity to +infinity, but to find the intermediate classes; and we are reminded that in +any process of generalization, there may be more than one class to which +individuals may be referred, and that we must carry on the process of +division until we have arrived at the infima species. + +These precepts are not forgotten, either in the Sophist or in the +Statesman. The Sophist contains four examples of division, carried on by +regular steps, until in four different lines of descent we detect the +Sophist. In the Statesman the king or statesman is discovered by a similar +process; and we have a summary, probably made for the first time, of +possessions appropriated by the labour of man, which are distributed into +seven classes. We are warned against preferring the shorter to the longer +method;--if we divide in the middle, we are most likely to light upon +species; at the same time, the important remark is made, that 'a part is +not to be confounded with a class.' Having discovered the genus under +which the king falls, we proceed to distinguish him from the collateral +species. To assist our imagination in making this separation, we require +an example. The higher ideas, of which we have a dreamy knowledge, can +only be represented by images taken from the external world. But, first of +all, the nature of example is explained by an example. The child is taught +to read by comparing the letters in words which he knows with the same +letters in unknown combinations; and this is the sort of process which we +are about to attempt. As a parallel to the king we select the worker in +wool, and compare the art of weaving with the royal science, trying to +separate either of them from the inferior classes to which they are akin. +This has the incidental advantage, that weaving and the web furnish us with +a figure of speech, which we can afterwards transfer to the State. + +There are two uses of examples or images--in the first place, they suggest +thoughts--secondly, they give them a distinct form. In the infancy of +philosophy, as in childhood, the language of pictures is natural to man: +truth in the abstract is hardly won, and only by use familiarized to the +mind. Examples are akin to analogies, and have a reflex influence on +thought; they people the vacant mind, and may often originate new +directions of enquiry. Plato seems to be conscious of the suggestiveness +of imagery; the general analogy of the arts is constantly employed by him +as well as the comparison of particular arts--weaving, the refining of +gold, the learning to read, music, statuary, painting, medicine, the art of +the pilot--all of which occur in this dialogue alone: though he is also +aware that 'comparisons are slippery things,' and may often give a false +clearness to ideas. We shall find, in the Philebus, a division of sciences +into practical and speculative, and into more or less speculative: here we +have the idea of master-arts, or sciences which control inferior ones. +Besides the supreme science of dialectic, 'which will forget us, if we +forget her,' another master-science for the first time appears in view--the +science of government, which fixes the limits of all the rest. This +conception of the political or royal science as, from another point of +view, the science of sciences, which holds sway over the rest, is not +originally found in Aristotle, but in Plato. + +The doctrine that virtue and art are in a mean, which is familiarized to us +by the study of the Nicomachean Ethics, is also first distinctly asserted +in the Statesman of Plato. The too much and the too little are in restless +motion: they must be fixed by a mean, which is also a standard external to +them. The art of measuring or finding a mean between excess and defect, +like the principle of division in the Phaedrus, receives a particular +application to the art of discourse. The excessive length of a discourse +may be blamed; but who can say what is excess, unless he is furnished with +a measure or standard? Measure is the life of the arts, and may some day +be discovered to be the single ultimate principle in which all the sciences +are contained. Other forms of thought may be noted--the distinction +between causal and co-operative arts, which may be compared with the +distinction between primary and co-operative causes in the Timaeus; or +between cause and condition in the Phaedo; the passing mention of +economical science; the opposition of rest and motion, which is found in +all nature; the general conception of two great arts of composition and +division, in which are contained weaving, politics, dialectic; and in +connexion with the conception of a mean, the two arts of measuring. + +In the Theaetetus, Plato remarks that precision in the use of terms, though +sometimes pedantic, is sometimes necessary. Here he makes the opposite +reflection, that there may be a philosophical disregard of words. The evil +of mere verbal oppositions, the requirement of an impossible accuracy in +the use of terms, the error of supposing that philosophy was to be found in +language, the danger of word-catching, have frequently been discussed by +him in the previous dialogues, but nowhere has the spirit of modern +inductive philosophy been more happily indicated than in the words of the +Statesman:--'If you think more about things, and less about words, you will +be richer in wisdom as you grow older.' A similar spirit is discernible in +the remarkable expressions, 'the long and difficult language of facts;' and +'the interrogation of every nature, in order to obtain the particular +contribution of each to the store of knowledge.' Who has described 'the +feeble intelligence of all things; given by metaphysics better than the +Eleatic Stranger in the words--'The higher ideas can hardly be set forth +except through the medium of examples; every man seems to know all things +in a kind of dream, and then again nothing when he is awake?' Or where is +the value of metaphysical pursuits more truly expressed than in the words, +--'The greatest and noblest things have no outward image of themselves +visible to man: therefore we should learn to give a rational account of +them?' + +III. The political aspects of the dialogue are closely connected with the +dialectical. As in the Cratylus, the legislator has 'the dialectician +standing on his right hand;' so in the Statesman, the king or statesman is +the dialectician, who, although he may be in a private station, is still a +king. Whether he has the power or not, is a mere accident; or rather he +has the power, for what ought to be is ('Was ist vernunftig, das ist +wirklich'); and he ought to be and is the true governor of mankind. There +is a reflection in this idealism of the Socratic 'Virtue is knowledge;' +and, without idealism, we may remark that knowledge is a great part of +power. Plato does not trouble himself to construct a machinery by which +'philosophers shall be made kings,' as in the Republic: he merely holds up +the ideal, and affirms that in some sense science is really supreme over +human life. + +He is struck by the observation 'quam parva sapientia regitur mundus,' and +is touched with a feeling of the ills which afflict states. The condition +of Megara before and during the Peloponnesian War, of Athens under the +Thirty and afterwards, of Syracuse and the other Sicilian cities in their +alternations of democratic excess and tyranny, might naturally suggest such +reflections. Some states he sees already shipwrecked, others foundering +for want of a pilot; and he wonders not at their destruction, but at their +endurance. For they ought to have perished long ago, if they had depended +on the wisdom of their rulers. The mingled pathos and satire of this +remark is characteristic of Plato's later style. + +The king is the personification of political science. And yet he is +something more than this,--the perfectly good and wise tyrant of the Laws, +whose will is better than any law. He is the special providence who is +always interfering with and regulating all things. Such a conception has +sometimes been entertained by modern theologians, and by Plato himself, of +the Supreme Being. But whether applied to Divine or to human governors the +conception is faulty for two reasons, neither of which are noticed by +Plato:--first, because all good government supposes a degree of co- +operation in the ruler and his subjects,--an 'education in politics' as +well as in moral virtue; secondly, because government, whether Divine or +human, implies that the subject has a previous knowledge of the rules under +which he is living. There is a fallacy, too, in comparing unchangeable +laws with a personal governor. For the law need not necessarily be an +'ignorant and brutal tyrant,' but gentle and humane, capable of being +altered in the spirit of the legislator, and of being administered so as to +meet the cases of individuals. Not only in fact, but in idea, both +elements must remain--the fixed law and the living will; the written word +and the spirit; the principles of obligation and of freedom; and their +applications whether made by law or equity in particular cases. + +There are two sides from which positive laws may be attacked:--either from +the side of nature, which rises up and rebels against them in the spirit of +Callicles in the Gorgias; or from the side of idealism, which attempts to +soar above them,--and this is the spirit of Plato in the Statesman. But he +soon falls, like Icarus, and is content to walk instead of flying; that is, +to accommodate himself to the actual state of human things. Mankind have +long been in despair of finding the true ruler; and therefore are ready to +acquiesce in any of the five or six received forms of government as better +than none. And the best thing which they can do (though only the second +best in reality), is to reduce the ideal state to the conditions of actual +life. Thus in the Statesman, as in the Laws, we have three forms of +government, which we may venture to term, (1) the ideal, (2) the practical, +(3) the sophistical--what ought to be, what might be, what is. And thus +Plato seems to stumble, almost by accident, on the notion of a +constitutional monarchy, or of a monarchy ruling by laws. + +The divine foundations of a State are to be laid deep in education +(Republic), and at the same time some little violence may be used in +exterminating natures which are incapable of education (compare Laws). +Plato is strongly of opinion that the legislator, like the physician, may +do men good against their will (compare Gorgias). The human bonds of +states are formed by the inter-marriage of dispositions adapted to supply +the defects of each other. As in the Republic, Plato has observed that +there are opposite natures in the world, the strong and the gentle, the +courageous and the temperate, which, borrowing an expression derived from +the image of weaving, he calls the warp and the woof of human society. To +interlace these is the crowning achievement of political science. In the +Protagoras, Socrates was maintaining that there was only one virtue, and +not many: now Plato is inclined to think that there are not only parallel, +but opposite virtues, and seems to see a similar opposition pervading all +art and nature. But he is satisfied with laying down the principle, and +does not inform us by what further steps the union of opposites is to be +effected. + +In the loose framework of a single dialogue Plato has thus combined two +distinct subjects--politics and method. Yet they are not so far apart as +they appear: in his own mind there was a secret link of connexion between +them. For the philosopher or dialectician is also the only true king or +statesman. In the execution of his plan Plato has invented or +distinguished several important forms of thought, and made incidentally +many valuable remarks. Questions of interest both in ancient and modern +politics also arise in the course of the dialogue, which may with advantage +be further considered by us:-- + +a. The imaginary ruler, whether God or man, is above the law, and is a law +to himself and to others. Among the Greeks as among the Jews, law was a +sacred name, the gift of God, the bond of states. But in the Statesman of +Plato, as in the New Testament, the word has also become the symbol of an +imperfect good, which is almost an evil. The law sacrifices the individual +to the universal, and is the tyranny of the many over the few (compare +Republic). It has fixed rules which are the props of order, and will not +swerve or bend in extreme cases. It is the beginning of political society, +but there is something higher--an intelligent ruler, whether God or man, +who is able to adapt himself to the endless varieties of circumstances. +Plato is fond of picturing the advantages which would result from the union +of the tyrant who has power with the legislator who has wisdom: he regards +this as the best and speediest way of reforming mankind. But institutions +cannot thus be artificially created, nor can the external authority of a +ruler impose laws for which a nation is unprepared. The greatest power, +the highest wisdom, can only proceed one or two steps in advance of public +opinion. In all stages of civilization human nature, after all our +efforts, remains intractable,--not like clay in the hands of the potter, or +marble under the chisel of the sculptor. Great changes occur in the +history of nations, but they are brought about slowly, like the changes in +the frame of nature, upon which the puny arm of man hardly makes an +impression. And, speaking generally, the slowest growths, both in nature +and in politics, are the most permanent. + +b. Whether the best form of the ideal is a person or a law may fairly be +doubted. The former is more akin to us: it clothes itself in poetry and +art, and appeals to reason more in the form of feeling: in the latter +there is less danger of allowing ourselves to be deluded by a figure of +speech. The ideal of the Greek state found an expression in the +deification of law: the ancient Stoic spoke of a wise man perfect in +virtue, who was fancifully said to be a king; but neither they nor Plato +had arrived at the conception of a person who was also a law. Nor is it +easy for the Christian to think of God as wisdom, truth, holiness, and also +as the wise, true, and holy one. He is always wanting to break through the +abstraction and interrupt the law, in order that he may present to himself +the more familiar image of a divine friend. While the impersonal has too +slender a hold upon the affections to be made the basis of religion, the +conception of a person on the other hand tends to degenerate into a new +kind of idolatry. Neither criticism nor experience allows us to suppose +that there are interferences with the laws of nature; the idea is +inconceivable to us and at variance with facts. The philosopher or +theologian who could realize to mankind that a person is a law, that the +higher rule has no exception, that goodness, like knowledge, is also power, +would breathe a new religious life into the world. + +c. Besides the imaginary rule of a philosopher or a God, the actual forms +of government have to be considered. In the infancy of political science, +men naturally ask whether the rule of the many or of the few is to be +preferred. If by 'the few' we mean 'the good' and by 'the many,' 'the +bad,' there can be but one reply: 'The rule of one good man is better than +the rule of all the rest, if they are bad.' For, as Heracleitus says, 'One +is ten thousand if he be the best.' If, however, we mean by the rule of +the few the rule of a class neither better nor worse than other classes, +not devoid of a feeling of right, but guided mostly by a sense of their own +interests, and by the rule of the many the rule of all classes, similarly +under the influence of mixed motives, no one would hesitate to answer--'The +rule of all rather than one, because all classes are more likely to take +care of all than one of another; and the government has greater power and +stability when resting on a wider basis.' Both in ancient and modern times +the best balanced form of government has been held to be the best; and yet +it should not be so nicely balanced as to make action and movement +impossible. + +The statesman who builds his hope upon the aristocracy, upon the middle +classes, upon the people, will probably, if he have sufficient experience +of them, conclude that all classes are much alike, and that one is as good +as another, and that the liberties of no class are safe in the hands of the +rest. The higher ranks have the advantage in education and manners, the +middle and lower in industry and self-denial; in every class, to a certain +extent, a natural sense of right prevails, sometimes communicated from the +lower to the higher, sometimes from the higher to the lower, which is too +strong for class interests. There have been crises in the history of +nations, as at the time of the Crusades or the Reformation, or the French +Revolution, when the same inspiration has taken hold of whole peoples, and +permanently raised the sense of freedom and justice among mankind. + +But even supposing the different classes of a nation, when viewed +impartially, to be on a level with each other in moral virtue, there remain +two considerations of opposite kinds which enter into the problem of +government. Admitting of course that the upper and lower classes are equal +in the eye of God and of the law, yet the one may be by nature fitted to +govern and the other to be governed. A ruling caste does not soon +altogether lose the governing qualities, nor a subject class easily acquire +them. Hence the phenomenon so often observed in the old Greek revolutions, +and not without parallel in modern times, that the leaders of the democracy +have been themselves of aristocratic origin. The people are expecting to +be governed by representatives of their own, but the true man of the people +either never appears, or is quickly altered by circumstances. Their real +wishes hardly make themselves felt, although their lower interests and +prejudices may sometimes be flattered and yielded to for the sake of +ulterior objects by those who have political power. They will often learn +by experience that the democracy has become a plutocracy. The influence of +wealth, though not the enjoyment of it, has become diffused among the poor +as well as among the rich; and society, instead of being safer, is more at +the mercy of the tyrant, who, when things are at the worst, obtains a +guard--that is, an army--and announces himself as the saviour. + +The other consideration is of an opposite kind. Admitting that a few wise +men are likely to be better governors than the unwise many, yet it is not +in their power to fashion an entire people according to their behest. When +with the best intentions the benevolent despot begins his regime, he finds +the world hard to move. A succession of good kings has at the end of a +century left the people an inert and unchanged mass. The Roman world was +not permanently improved by the hundred years of Hadrian and the Antonines. +The kings of Spain during the last century were at least equal to any +contemporary sovereigns in virtue and ability. In certain states of the +world the means are wanting to render a benevolent power effectual. These +means are not a mere external organisation of posts or telegraphs, hardly +the introduction of new laws or modes of industry. A change must be made +in the spirit of a people as well as in their externals. The ancient +legislator did not really take a blank tablet and inscribe upon it the +rules which reflection and experience had taught him to be for a nation's +interest; no one would have obeyed him if he had. But he took the customs +which he found already existing in a half-civilised state of society: +these he reduced to form and inscribed on pillars; he defined what had +before been undefined, and gave certainty to what was uncertain. No +legislation ever sprang, like Athene, in full power out of the head either +of God or man. + +Plato and Aristotle are sensible of the difficulty of combining the wisdom +of the few with the power of the many. According to Plato, he is a +physician who has the knowledge of a physician, and he is a king who has +the knowledge of a king. But how the king, one or more, is to obtain the +required power, is hardly at all considered by him. He presents the idea +of a perfect government, but except the regulation for mixing different +tempers in marriage, he never makes any provision for the attainment of it. +Aristotle, casting aside ideals, would place the government in a middle +class of citizens, sufficiently numerous for stability, without admitting +the populace; and such appears to have been the constitution which actually +prevailed for a short time at Athens--the rule of the Five Thousand-- +characterized by Thucydides as the best government of Athens which he had +known. It may however be doubted how far, either in a Greek or modern +state, such a limitation is practicable or desirable; for those who are +left outside the pale will always be dangerous to those who are within, +while on the other hand the leaven of the mob can hardly affect the +representation of a great country. There is reason for the argument in +favour of a property qualification; there is reason also in the arguments +of those who would include all and so exhaust the political situation. + +The true answer to the question is relative to the circumstances of +nations. How can we get the greatest intelligence combined with the +greatest power? The ancient legislator would have found this question more +easy than we do. For he would have required that all persons who had a +share of government should have received their education from the state and +have borne her burdens, and should have served in her fleets and armies. +But though we sometimes hear the cry that we must 'educate the masses, for +they are our masters,' who would listen to a proposal that the franchise +should be confined to the educated or to those who fulfil political duties? +Then again, we know that the masses are not our masters, and that they are +more likely to become so if we educate them. In modern politics so many +interests have to be consulted that we are compelled to do, not what is +best, but what is possible. + +d. Law is the first principle of society, but it cannot supply all the +wants of society, and may easily cause more evils than it cures. Plato is +aware of the imperfection of law in failing to meet the varieties of +circumstances: he is also aware that human life would be intolerable if +every detail of it were placed under legal regulation. It may be a great +evil that physicians should kill their patients or captains cast away their +ships, but it would be a far greater evil if each particular in the +practice of medicine or seamanship were regulated by law. Much has been +said in modern times about the duty of leaving men to themselves, which is +supposed to be the best way of taking care of them. The question is often +asked, What are the limits of legislation in relation to morals? And the +answer is to the same effect, that morals must take care of themselves. +There is a one-sided truth in these answers, if they are regarded as +condemnations of the interference with commerce in the last century or of +clerical persecution in the Middle Ages. But 'laissez-faire' is not the +best but only the second best. What the best is, Plato does not attempt to +determine; he only contrasts the imperfection of law with the wisdom of the +perfect ruler. + +Laws should be just, but they must also be certain, and we are obliged to +sacrifice something of their justice to their certainty. Suppose a wise +and good judge, who paying little or no regard to the law, attempted to +decide with perfect justice the cases that were brought before him. To the +uneducated person he would appear to be the ideal of a judge. Such justice +has been often exercised in primitive times, or at the present day among +eastern rulers. But in the first place it depends entirely on the personal +character of the judge. He may be honest, but there is no check upon his +dishonesty, and his opinion can only be overruled, not by any principle of +law, but by the opinion of another judging like himself without law. In +the second place, even if he be ever so honest, his mode of deciding +questions would introduce an element of uncertainty into human life; no one +would know beforehand what would happen to him, or would seek to conform in +his conduct to any rule of law. For the compact which the law makes with +men, that they shall be protected if they observe the law in their dealings +with one another, would have to be substituted another principle of a more +general character, that they shall be protected by the law if they act +rightly in their dealings with one another. The complexity of human +actions and also the uncertainty of their effects would be increased +tenfold. For one of the principal advantages of law is not merely that it +enforces honesty, but that it makes men act in the same way, and requires +them to produce the same evidence of their acts. Too many laws may be the +sign of a corrupt and overcivilized state of society, too few are the sign +of an uncivilized one; as soon as commerce begins to grow, men make +themselves customs which have the validity of laws. Even equity, which is +the exception to the law, conforms to fixed rules and lies for the most +part within the limits of previous decisions. + +IV. The bitterness of the Statesman is characteristic of Plato's later +style, in which the thoughts of youth and love have fled away, and we are +no longer tended by the Muses or the Graces. We do not venture to say that +Plato was soured by old age, but certainly the kindliness and courtesy of +the earlier dialogues have disappeared. He sees the world under a harder +and grimmer aspect: he is dealing with the reality of things, not with +visions or pictures of them: he is seeking by the aid of dialectic only, +to arrive at truth. He is deeply impressed with the importance of +classification: in this alone he finds the true measure of human things; +and very often in the process of division curious results are obtained. +For the dialectical art is no respecter of persons: king and vermin-taker +are all alike to the philosopher. There may have been a time when the king +was a god, but he now is pretty much on a level with his subjects in +breeding and education. Man should be well advised that he is only one of +the animals, and the Hellene in particular should be aware that he himself +was the author of the distinction between Hellene and Barbarian, and that +the Phrygian would equally divide mankind into Phrygians and Barbarians, +and that some intelligent animal, like a crane, might go a step further, +and divide the animal world into cranes and all other animals. Plato +cannot help laughing (compare Theaet.) when he thinks of the king running +after his subjects, like the pig-driver or the bird-taker. He would +seriously have him consider how many competitors there are to his throne, +chiefly among the class of serving-men. A good deal of meaning is lurking +in the expression--'There is no art of feeding mankind worthy the name.' +There is a similar depth in the remark,--'The wonder about states is not +that they are short-lived, but that they last so long in spite of the +badness of their rulers.' + +V. There is also a paradoxical element in the Statesman which delights in +reversing the accustomed use of words. The law which to the Greek was the +highest object of reverence is an ignorant and brutal tyrant--the tyrant is +converted into a beneficent king. The sophist too is no longer, as in the +earlier dialogues, the rival of the statesman, but assumes his form. Plato +sees that the ideal of the state in his own day is more and more severed +from the actual. From such ideals as he had once formed, he turns away to +contemplate the decline of the Greek cities which were far worse now in his +old age than they had been in his youth, and were to become worse and worse +in the ages which followed. He cannot contain his disgust at the +contemporary statesmen, sophists who had turned politicians, in various +forms of men and animals, appearing, some like lions and centaurs, others +like satyrs and monkeys. In this new disguise the Sophists make their last +appearance on the scene: in the Laws Plato appears to have forgotten them, +or at any rate makes only a slight allusion to them in a single passage +(Laws). + +VI. The Statesman is naturally connected with the Sophist. At first sight +we are surprised to find that the Eleatic Stranger discourses to us, not +only concerning the nature of Being and Not-being, but concerning the king +and statesman. We perceive, however, that there is no inappropriateness in +his maintaining the character of chief speaker, when we remember the close +connexion which is assumed by Plato to exist between politics and +dialectic. In both dialogues the Proteus Sophist is exhibited, first, in +the disguise of an Eristic, secondly, of a false statesman. There are +several lesser features which the two dialogues have in common. The styles +and the situations of the speakers are very similar; there is the same love +of division, and in both of them the mind of the writer is greatly occupied +about method, to which he had probably intended to return in the projected +'Philosopher.' + +The Statesman stands midway between the Republic and the Laws, and is also +related to the Timaeus. The mythical or cosmical element reminds us of the +Timaeus, the ideal of the Republic. A previous chaos in which the elements +as yet were not, is hinted at both in the Timaeus and Statesman. The same +ingenious arts of giving verisimilitude to a fiction are practised in both +dialogues, and in both, as well as in the myth at the end of the Republic, +Plato touches on the subject of necessity and free-will. The words in +which he describes the miseries of states seem to be an amplification of +the 'Cities will never cease from ill' of the Republic. The point of view +in both is the same; and the differences not really important, e.g. in the +myth, or in the account of the different kinds of states. But the +treatment of the subject in the Statesman is fragmentary, and the shorter +and later work, as might be expected, is less finished, and less worked out +in detail. The idea of measure and the arrangement of the sciences supply +connecting links both with the Republic and the Philebus. + +More than any of the preceding dialogues, the Statesman seems to +approximate in thought and language to the Laws. There is the same decline +and tendency to monotony in style, the same self-consciousness, +awkwardness, and over-civility; and in the Laws is contained the pattern of +that second best form of government, which, after all, is admitted to be +the only attainable one in this world. The 'gentle violence,' the marriage +of dissimilar natures, the figure of the warp and the woof, are also found +in the Laws. Both expressly recognize the conception of a first or ideal +state, which has receded into an invisible heaven. Nor does the account of +the origin and growth of society really differ in them, if we make +allowance for the mythic character of the narrative in the Statesman. The +virtuous tyrant is common to both of them; and the Eleatic Stranger takes +up a position similar to that of the Athenian Stranger in the Laws. + +VII. There would have been little disposition to doubt the genuineness of +the Sophist and Statesman, if they had been compared with the Laws rather +than with the Republic, and the Laws had been received, as they ought to +be, on the authority of Aristotle and on the ground of their intrinsic +excellence, as an undoubted work of Plato. The detailed consideration of +the genuineness and order of the Platonic dialogues has been reserved for +another place: a few of the reasons for defending the Sophist and +Statesman may be given here. + +1. The excellence, importance, and metaphysical originality of the two +dialogues: no works at once so good and of such length are known to have +proceeded from the hands of a forger. + +2. The resemblances in them to other dialogues of Plato are such as might +be expected to be found in works of the same author, and not in those of an +imitator, being too subtle and minute to have been invented by another. +The similar passages and turns of thought are generally inferior to the +parallel passages in his earlier writings; and we might a priori have +expected that, if altered, they would have been improved. But the +comparison of the Laws proves that this repetition of his own thoughts and +words in an inferior form is characteristic of Plato's later style. + +3. The close connexion of them with the Theaetetus, Parmenides, and +Philebus, involves the fate of these dialogues, as well as of the two +suspected ones. + +4. The suspicion of them seems mainly to rest on a presumption that in +Plato's writings we may expect to find an uniform type of doctrine and +opinion. But however we arrange the order, or narrow the circle of the +dialogues, we must admit that they exhibit a growth and progress in the +mind of Plato. And the appearance of change or progress is not to be +regarded as impugning the genuineness of any particular writings, but may +be even an argument in their favour. If we suppose the Sophist and +Politicus to stand halfway between the Republic and the Laws, and in near +connexion with the Theaetetus, the Parmenides, the Philebus, the arguments +against them derived from differences of thought and style disappear or may +be said without paradox in some degree to confirm their genuineness. There +is no such interval between the Republic or Phaedrus and the two suspected +dialogues, as that which separates all the earlier writings of Plato from +the Laws. And the Theaetetus, Parmenides, and Philebus, supply links, by +which, however different from them, they may be reunited with the great +body of the Platonic writings. + + + +STATESMAN + +by + +Plato + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + +PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: +Theodorus, Socrates, The Eleatic Stranger, The Younger Socrates. + + +SOCRATES: I owe you many thanks, indeed, Theodorus, for the acquaintance +both of Theaetetus and of the Stranger. + +THEODORUS: And in a little while, Socrates, you will owe me three times as +many, when they have completed for you the delineation of the Statesman and +of the Philosopher, as well as of the Sophist. + +SOCRATES: Sophist, statesman, philosopher! O my dear Theodorus, do my +ears truly witness that this is the estimate formed of them by the great +calculator and geometrician? + +THEODORUS: What do you mean, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: I mean that you rate them all at the same value, whereas they +are really separated by an interval, which no geometrical ratio can +express. + +THEODORUS: By Ammon, the god of Cyrene, Socrates, that is a very fair hit; +and shows that you have not forgotten your geometry. I will retaliate on +you at some other time, but I must now ask the Stranger, who will not, I +hope, tire of his goodness to us, to proceed either with the Statesman or +with the Philosopher, whichever he prefers. + +STRANGER: That is my duty, Theodorus; having begun I must go on, and not +leave the work unfinished. But what shall be done with Theaetetus? + +THEODORUS: In what respect? + +STRANGER: Shall we relieve him, and take his companion, the Young +Socrates, instead of him? What do you advise? + +THEODORUS: Yes, give the other a turn, as you propose. The young always +do better when they have intervals of rest. + +SOCRATES: I think, Stranger, that both of them may be said to be in some +way related to me; for the one, as you affirm, has the cut of my ugly face +(compare Theaet.), the other is called by my name. And we should always be +on the look-out to recognize a kinsman by the style of his conversation. I +myself was discoursing with Theaetetus yesterday, and I have just been +listening to his answers; my namesake I have not yet examined, but I must. +Another time will do for me; to-day let him answer you. + +STRANGER: Very good. Young Socrates, do you hear what the elder Socrates +is proposing? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I do. + +STRANGER: And do you agree to his proposal? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: As you do not object, still less can I. After the Sophist, +then, I think that the Statesman naturally follows next in the order of +enquiry. And please to say, whether he, too, should be ranked among those +who have science. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: Then the sciences must be divided as before? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I dare say. + +STRANGER: But yet the division will not be the same? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How then? + +STRANGER: They will be divided at some other point. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: Where shall we discover the path of the Statesman? We must find +and separate off, and set our seal upon this, and we will set the mark of +another class upon all diverging paths. Thus the soul will conceive of all +kinds of knowledge under two classes. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: To find the path is your business, Stranger, and not mine. + +STRANGER: Yes, Socrates, but the discovery, when once made, must be yours +as well as mine. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good. + +STRANGER: Well, and are not arithmetic and certain other kindred arts, +merely abstract knowledge, wholly separated from action? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: But in the art of carpentering and all other handicrafts, the +knowledge of the workman is merged in his work; he not only knows, but he +also makes things which previously did not exist. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: Then let us divide sciences in general into those which are +practical and those which are purely intellectual. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Let us assume these two divisions of science, which is one +whole. + +STRANGER: And are 'statesman,' 'king,' 'master,' or 'householder,' one and +the same; or is there a science or art answering to each of these names? +Or rather, allow me to put the matter in another way. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Let me hear. + +STRANGER: If any one who is in a private station has the skill to advise +one of the public physicians, must not he also be called a physician? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: And if any one who is in a private station is able to advise the +ruler of a country, may not he be said to have the knowledge which the +ruler himself ought to have? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: But surely the science of a true king is royal science? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: And will not he who possesses this knowledge, whether he happens +to be a ruler or a private man, when regarded only in reference to his art, +be truly called 'royal'? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: He certainly ought to be. + +STRANGER: And the householder and master are the same? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Of course. + +STRANGER: Again, a large household may be compared to a small state:--will +they differ at all, as far as government is concerned? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: They will not. + +STRANGER: Then, returning to the point which we were just now discussing, +do we not clearly see that there is one science of all of them; and this +science may be called either royal or political or economical; we will not +quarrel with any one about the name. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not. + +STRANGER: This too, is evident, that the king cannot do much with his +hands, or with his whole body, towards the maintenance of his empire, +compared with what he does by the intelligence and strength of his mind. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly not. + +STRANGER: Then, shall we say that the king has a greater affinity to +knowledge than to manual arts and to practical life in general? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly he has. + +STRANGER: Then we may put all together as one and the same--statesmanship +and the statesman--the kingly science and the king. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly. + +STRANGER: And now we shall only be proceeding in due order if we go on to +divide the sphere of knowledge? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good. + +STRANGER: Think whether you can find any joint or parting in knowledge. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Tell me of what sort. + +STRANGER: Such as this: You may remember that we made an art of +calculation? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: Which was, unmistakeably, one of the arts of knowledge? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: And to this art of calculation which discerns the differences of +numbers shall we assign any other function except to pass judgment on their +differences? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How could we? + +STRANGER: You know that the master-builder does not work himself, but is +the ruler of workmen? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: He contributes knowledge, not manual labour? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: And may therefore be justly said to share in theoretical +science? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite true. + +STRANGER: But he ought not, like the calculator, to regard his functions +as at an end when he has formed a judgment;--he must assign to the +individual workmen their appropriate task until they have completed the +work. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: Are not all such sciences, no less than arithmetic and the like, +subjects of pure knowledge; and is not the difference between the two +classes, that the one sort has the power of judging only, and the other of +ruling as well? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: That is evident. + +STRANGER: May we not very properly say, that of all knowledge, there are +two divisions--one which rules, and the other which judges? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I should think so. + +STRANGER: And when men have anything to do in common, that they should be +of one mind is surely a desirable thing? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: Then while we are at unity among ourselves, we need not mind +about the fancies of others? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not. + +STRANGER: And now, in which of these divisions shall we place the king?-- +Is he a judge and a kind of spectator? Or shall we assign to him the art +of command--for he is a ruler? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: The latter, clearly. + +STRANGER: Then we must see whether there is any mark of division in the +art of command too. I am inclined to think that there is a distinction +similar to that of manufacturer and retail dealer, which parts off the king +from the herald. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How is this? + +STRANGER: Why, does not the retailer receive and sell over again the +productions of others, which have been sold before? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly he does. + +STRANGER: And is not the herald under command, and does he not receive +orders, and in his turn give them to others? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: Then shall we mingle the kingly art in the same class with the +art of the herald, the interpreter, the boatswain, the prophet, and the +numerous kindred arts which exercise command; or, as in the preceding +comparison we spoke of manufacturers, or sellers for themselves, and of +retailers,--seeing, too, that the class of supreme rulers, or rulers for +themselves, is almost nameless--shall we make a word following the same +analogy, and refer kings to a supreme or ruling-for-self science, leaving +the rest to receive a name from some one else? For we are seeking the +ruler; and our enquiry is not concerned with him who is not a ruler. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good. + +STRANGER: Thus a very fair distinction has been attained between the man +who gives his own commands, and him who gives another's. And now let us +see if the supreme power allows of any further division. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: By all means. + +STRANGER: I think that it does; and please to assist me in making the +division. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: At what point? + +STRANGER: May not all rulers be supposed to command for the sake of +producing something? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: Nor is there any difficulty in dividing the things produced into +two classes. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How would you divide them? + +STRANGER: Of the whole class, some have life and some are without life. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: And by the help of this distinction we may make, if we please, a +subdivision of the section of knowledge which commands. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: At what point? + +STRANGER: One part may be set over the production of lifeless, the other +of living objects; and in this way the whole will be divided. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: That division, then, is complete; and now we may leave one half, +and take up the other; which may also be divided into two. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Which of the two halves do you mean? + +STRANGER: Of course that which exercises command about animals. For, +surely, the royal science is not like that of a master-workman, a science +presiding over lifeless objects;--the king has a nobler function, which is +the management and control of living beings. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: And the breeding and tending of living beings may be observed to +be sometimes a tending of the individual; in other cases, a common care of +creatures in flocks? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: But the statesman is not a tender of individuals--not like the +driver or groom of a single ox or horse; he is rather to be compared with +the keeper of a drove of horses or oxen. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, I see, thanks to you. + +STRANGER: Shall we call this art of tending many animals together, the art +of managing a herd, or the art of collective management? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: No matter;--whichever suggests itself to us in the course +of conversation. + +STRANGER: Very good, Socrates; and, if you continue to be not too +particular about names, you will be all the richer in wisdom when you are +an old man. And now, as you say, leaving the discussion of the name,--can +you see a way in which a person, by showing the art of herding to be of two +kinds, may cause that which is now sought amongst twice the number of +things, to be then sought amongst half that number? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I will try;--there appears to me to be one management of +men and another of beasts. + +STRANGER: You have certainly divided them in a most straightforward and +manly style; but you have fallen into an error which hereafter I think that +we had better avoid. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What is the error? + +STRANGER: I think that we had better not cut off a single small portion +which is not a species, from many larger portions; the part should be a +species. To separate off at once the subject of investigation, is a most +excellent plan, if only the separation be rightly made; and you were under +the impression that you were right, because you saw that you would come to +man; and this led you to hasten the steps. But you should not chip off too +small a piece, my friend; the safer way is to cut through the middle; which +is also the more likely way of finding classes. Attention to this +principle makes all the difference in a process of enquiry. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean, Stranger? + +STRANGER: I will endeavour to speak more plainly out of love to your good +parts, Socrates; and, although I cannot at present entirely explain myself, +I will try, as we proceed, to make my meaning a little clearer. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What was the error of which, as you say, we were guilty in +our recent division? + +STRANGER: The error was just as if some one who wanted to divide the human +race, were to divide them after the fashion which prevails in this part of +the world; here they cut off the Hellenes as one species, and all the other +species of mankind, which are innumerable, and have no ties or common +language, they include under the single name of 'barbarians,' and because +they have one name they are supposed to be of one species also. Or suppose +that in dividing numbers you were to cut off ten thousand from all the +rest, and make of it one species, comprehending the rest under another +separate name, you might say that here too was a single class, because you +had given it a single name. Whereas you would make a much better and more +equal and logical classification of numbers, if you divided them into odd +and even; or of the human species, if you divided them into male and +female; and only separated off Lydians or Phrygians, or any other tribe, +and arrayed them against the rest of the world, when you could no longer +make a division into parts which were also classes. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true; but I wish that this distinction between a part +and a class could still be made somewhat plainer. + +STRANGER: O Socrates, best of men, you are imposing upon me a very +difficult task. We have already digressed further from our original +intention than we ought, and you would have us wander still further away. +But we must now return to our subject; and hereafter, when there is a +leisure hour, we will follow up the other track; at the same time, I wish +you to guard against imagining that you ever heard me declare-- + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What? + +STRANGER: That a class and a part are distinct. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What did I hear, then? + +STRANGER: That a class is necessarily a part, but there is no similar +necessity that a part should be a class; that is the view which I should +always wish you to attribute to me, Socrates. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: So be it. + +STRANGER: There is another thing which I should like to know. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it? + +STRANGER: The point at which we digressed; for, if I am not mistaken, the +exact place was at the question, Where you would divide the management of +herds. To this you appeared rather too ready to answer that there were two +species of animals; man being one, and all brutes making up the other. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: I thought that in taking away a part, you imagined that the +remainder formed a class, because you were able to call them by the common +name of brutes. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: That again is true. + +STRANGER: Suppose now, O most courageous of dialecticians, that some wise +and understanding creature, such as a crane is reputed to be, were, in +imitation of you, to make a similar division, and set up cranes against all +other animals to their own special glorification, at the same time jumbling +together all the others, including man, under the appellation of brutes,-- +here would be the sort of error which we must try to avoid. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How can we be safe? + +STRANGER: If we do not divide the whole class of animals, we shall be less +likely to fall into that error. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: We had better not take the whole? + +STRANGER: Yes, there lay the source of error in our former division. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How? + +STRANGER: You remember how that part of the art of knowledge which was +concerned with command, had to do with the rearing of living creatures,--I +mean, with animals in herds? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: In that case, there was already implied a division of all +animals into tame and wild; those whose nature can be tamed are called +tame, and those which cannot be tamed are called wild. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: And the political science of which we are in search, is and ever +was concerned with tame animals, and is also confined to gregarious +animals. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: But then we ought not to divide, as we did, taking the whole +class at once. Neither let us be in too great haste to arrive quickly at +the political science; for this mistake has already brought upon us the +misfortune of which the proverb speaks. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What misfortune? + +STRANGER: The misfortune of too much haste, which is too little speed. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: And all the better, Stranger;--we got what we deserved. + +STRANGER: Very well: Let us then begin again, and endeavour to divide the +collective rearing of animals; for probably the completion of the argument +will best show what you are so anxious to know. Tell me, then-- + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What? + +STRANGER: Have you ever heard, as you very likely may--for I do not +suppose that you ever actually visited them--of the preserves of fishes in +the Nile, and in the ponds of the Great King; or you may have seen similar +preserves in wells at home? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, to be sure, I have seen them, and I have often heard +the others described. + +STRANGER: And you may have heard also, and may have been assured by +report, although you have not travelled in those regions, of nurseries of +geese and cranes in the plains of Thessaly? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: I asked you, because here is a new division of the management of +herds, into the management of land and of water herds. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: There is. + +STRANGER: And do you agree that we ought to divide the collective rearing +of herds into two corresponding parts, the one the rearing of water, and +the other the rearing of land herds? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: There is surely no need to ask which of these two contains the +royal art, for it is evident to everybody. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: Any one can divide the herds which feed on dry land? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How would you divide them? + +STRANGER: I should distinguish between those which fly and those which +walk. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Most true. + +STRANGER: And where shall we look for the political animal? Might not an +idiot, so to speak, know that he is a pedestrian? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: The art of managing the walking animal has to be further +divided, just as you might halve an even number. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly. + +STRANGER: Let me note that here appear in view two ways to that part or +class which the argument aims at reaching,--the one a speedier way, which +cuts off a small portion and leaves a large; the other agrees better with +the principle which we were laying down, that as far as we can we should +divide in the middle; but it is longer. We can take either of them, +whichever we please. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Cannot we have both ways? + +STRANGER: Together? What a thing to ask! but, if you take them in turn, +you clearly may. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Then I should like to have them in turn. + +STRANGER: There will be no difficulty, as we are near the end; if we had +been at the beginning, or in the middle, I should have demurred to your +request; but now, in accordance with your desire, let us begin with the +longer way; while we are fresh, we shall get on better. And now attend to +the division. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Let me hear. + +STRANGER: The tame walking herding animals are distributed by nature into +two classes. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Upon what principle? + +STRANGER: The one grows horns; and the other is without horns. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly. + +STRANGER: Suppose that you divide the science which manages pedestrian +animals into two corresponding parts, and define them; for if you try to +invent names for them, you will find the intricacy too great. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How must I speak of them, then? + +STRANGER: In this way: let the science of managing pedestrian animals be +divided into two parts, and one part assigned to the horned herd, and the +other to the herd that has no horns. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: All that you say has been abundantly proved, and may +therefore be assumed. + +STRANGER: The king is clearly the shepherd of a polled herd, who have no +horns. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: That is evident. + +STRANGER: Shall we break up this hornless herd into sections, and +endeavour to assign to him what is his? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: By all means. + +STRANGER: Shall we distinguish them by their having or not having cloven +feet, or by their mixing or not mixing the breed? You know what I mean. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What? + +STRANGER: I mean that horses and asses naturally breed from one another. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: But the remainder of the hornless herd of tame animals will not +mix the breed. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: And of which has the Statesman charge,--of the mixed or of the +unmixed race? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly of the unmixed. + +STRANGER: I suppose that we must divide this again as before. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: We must. + +STRANGER: Every tame and herding animal has now been split up, with the +exception of two species; for I hardly think that dogs should be reckoned +among gregarious animals. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not; but how shall we divide the two remaining +species? + +STRANGER: There is a measure of difference which may be appropriately +employed by you and Theaetetus, who are students of geometry. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What is that? + +STRANGER: The diameter; and, again, the diameter of a diameter. (Compare +Meno.) + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean? + +STRANGER: How does man walk, but as a diameter whose power is two feet? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Just so. + +STRANGER: And the power of the remaining kind, being the power of twice +two feet, may be said to be the diameter of our diameter. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly; and now I think that I pretty nearly understand +you. + +STRANGER: In these divisions, Socrates, I descry what would make another +famous jest. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it? + +STRANGER: Human beings have come out in the same class with the freest and +airiest of creation, and have been running a race with them. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I remark that very singular coincidence. + +STRANGER: And would you not expect the slowest to arrive last? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Indeed I should. + +STRANGER: And there is a still more ridiculous consequence, that the king +is found running about with the herd and in close competition with the +bird-catcher, who of all mankind is most of an adept at the airy life. +(Plato is here introducing a new suddivision, i.e. that of bipeds into men +and birds. Others however refer the passage to the division into +quadrupeds and bipeds, making pigs compete with human beings and the pig- +driver with the king. According to this explanation we must translate the +words above, 'freest and airiest of creation,' 'worthiest and laziest of +creation.') + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: Then here, Socrates, is still clearer evidence of the truth of +what was said in the enquiry about the Sophist? (Compare Sophist.) + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What? + +STRANGER: That the dialectical method is no respecter of persons, and does +not set the great above the small, but always arrives in her own way at the +truest result. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly. + +STRANGER: And now, I will not wait for you to ask the, but will of my own +accord take you by the shorter road to the definition of a king. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: By all means. + +STRANGER: I say that we should have begun at first by dividing land +animals into biped and quadruped; and since the winged herd, and that +alone, comes out in the same class with man, we should divide bipeds into +those which have feathers and those which have not, and when they have been +divided, and the art of the management of mankind is brought to light, the +time will have come to produce our Statesman and ruler, and set him like a +charioteer in his place, and hand over to him the reins of state, for that +too is a vocation which belongs to him. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good; you have paid me the debt,--I mean, that you +have completed the argument, and I suppose that you added the digression by +way of interest. (Compare Republic.) + +STRANGER: Then now, let us go back to the beginning, and join the links, +which together make the definition of the name of the Statesman's art. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: By all means. + +STRANGER: The science of pure knowledge had, as we said originally, a part +which was the science of rule or command, and from this was derived another +part, which was called command-for-self, on the analogy of selling-for- +self; an important section of this was the management of living animals, +and this again was further limited to the management of them in herds; and +again in herds of pedestrian animals. The chief division of the latter was +the art of managing pedestrian animals which are without horns; this again +has a part which can only be comprehended under one term by joining +together three names--shepherding pure-bred animals. The only further +subdivision is the art of man-herding,--this has to do with bipeds, and is +what we were seeking after, and have now found, being at once the royal and +political. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: To be sure. + +STRANGER: And do you think, Socrates, that we really have done as you say? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What? + +STRANGER: Do you think, I mean, that we have really fulfilled our +intention?--There has been a sort of discussion, and yet the investigation +seems to me not to be perfectly worked out: this is where the enquiry +fails. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I do not understand. + +STRANGER: I will try to make the thought, which is at this moment present +in my mind, clearer to us both. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Let me hear. + +STRANGER: There were many arts of shepherding, and one of them was the +political, which had the charge of one particular herd? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: And this the argument defined to be the art of rearing, not +horses or other brutes, but the art of rearing man collectively? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: Note, however, a difference which distinguishes the king from +all other shepherds. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: To what do you refer? + +STRANGER: I want to ask, whether any one of the other herdsmen has a rival +who professes and claims to share with him in the management of the herd? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean? + +STRANGER: I mean to say that merchants, husbandmen, providers of food, and +also training-masters and physicians, will all contend with the herdsmen of +humanity, whom we call Statesmen, declaring that they themselves have the +care of rearing or managing mankind, and that they rear not only the common +herd, but also the rulers themselves. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Are they not right in saying so? + +STRANGER: Very likely they may be, and we will consider their claim. But +we are certain of this,--that no one will raise a similar claim as against +the herdsman, who is allowed on all hands to be the sole and only feeder +and physician of his herd; he is also their match-maker and accoucheur; no +one else knows that department of science. And he is their merry-maker and +musician, as far as their nature is susceptible of such influences, and no +one can console and soothe his own herd better than he can, either with the +natural tones of his voice or with instruments. And the same may be said +of tenders of animals in general. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: But if this is as you say, can our argument about the king be +true and unimpeachable? Were we right in selecting him out of ten thousand +other claimants to be the shepherd and rearer of the human flock? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Surely not. + +STRANGER: Had we not reason just to now to apprehend, that although we may +have described a sort of royal form, we have not as yet accurately worked +out the true image of the Statesman? and that we cannot reveal him as he +truly is in his own nature, until we have disengaged and separated him from +those who hang about him and claim to share in his prerogatives? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: And that, Socrates, is what we must do, if we do not mean to +bring disgrace upon the argument at its close. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: We must certainly avoid that. + +STRANGER: Then let us make a new beginning, and travel by a different +road. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What road? + +STRANGER: I think that we may have a little amusement; there is a famous +tale, of which a good portion may with advantage be interwoven, and then we +may resume our series of divisions, and proceed in the old path until we +arrive at the desired summit. Shall we do as I say? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: By all means. + +STRANGER: Listen, then, to a tale which a child would love to hear; and +you are not too old for childish amusement. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Let me hear. + +STRANGER: There did really happen, and will again happen, like many other +events of which ancient tradition has preserved the record, the portent +which is traditionally said to have occurred in the quarrel of Atreus and +Thyestes. You have heard, no doubt, and remember what they say happened at +that time? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I suppose you to mean the token of the birth of the golden +lamb. + +STRANGER: No, not that; but another part of the story, which tells how the +sun and the stars once rose in the west, and set in the east, and that the +god reversed their motion, and gave them that which they now have as a +testimony to the right of Atreus. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes; there is that legend also. + +STRANGER: Again, we have been often told of the reign of Cronos. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, very often. + +STRANGER: Did you ever hear that the men of former times were earth-born, +and not begotten of one another? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, that is another old tradition. + +STRANGER: All these stories, and ten thousand others which are still more +wonderful, have a common origin; many of them have been lost in the lapse +of ages, or are repeated only in a disconnected form; but the origin of +them is what no one has told, and may as well be told now; for the tale is +suited to throw light on the nature of the king. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good; and I hope that you will give the whole story, +and leave out nothing. + +STRANGER: Listen, then. There is a time when God himself guides and helps +to roll the world in its course; and there is a time, on the completion of +a certain cycle, when he lets go, and the world being a living creature, +and having originally received intelligence from its author and creator, +turns about and by an inherent necessity revolves in the opposite +direction. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Why is that? + +STRANGER: Why, because only the most divine things of all remain ever +unchanged and the same, and body is not included in this class. Heaven and +the universe, as we have termed them, although they have been endowed by +the Creator with many glories, partake of a bodily nature, and therefore +cannot be entirely free from perturbation. But their motion is, as far as +possible, single and in the same place, and of the same kind; and is +therefore only subject to a reversal, which is the least alteration +possible. For the lord of all moving things is alone able to move of +himself; and to think that he moves them at one time in one direction and +at another time in another is blasphemy. Hence we must not say that the +world is either self-moved always, or all made to go round by God in two +opposite courses; or that two Gods, having opposite purposes, make it move +round. But as I have already said (and this is the only remaining +alternative) the world is guided at one time by an external power which is +divine and receives fresh life and immortality from the renewing hand of +the Creator, and again, when let go, moves spontaneously, being set free at +such a time as to have, during infinite cycles of years, a reverse +movement: this is due to its perfect balance, to its vast size, and to the +fact that it turns on the smallest pivot. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Your account of the world seems to be very reasonable +indeed. + +STRANGER: Let us now reflect and try to gather from what has been said the +nature of the phenomenon which we affirmed to be the cause of all these +wonders. It is this. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What? + +STRANGER: The reversal which takes place from time to time of the motion +of the universe. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How is that the cause? + +STRANGER: Of all changes of the heavenly motions, we may consider this to +be the greatest and most complete. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I should imagine so. + +STRANGER: And it may be supposed to result in the greatest changes to the +human beings who are the inhabitants of the world at the time. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Such changes would naturally occur. + +STRANGER: And animals, as we know, survive with difficulty great and +serious changes of many different kinds when they come upon them at once. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: Hence there necessarily occurs a great destruction of them, +which extends also to the life of man; few survivors of the race are left, +and those who remain become the subjects of several novel and remarkable +phenomena, and of one in particular, which takes place at the time when the +transition is made to the cycle opposite to that in which we are now +living. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it? + +STRANGER: The life of all animals first came to a standstill, and the +mortal nature ceased to be or look older, and was then reversed and grew +young and delicate; the white locks of the aged darkened again, and the +cheeks the bearded man became smooth, and recovered their former bloom; the +bodies of youths in their prime grew softer and smaller, continually by day +and night returning and becoming assimilated to the nature of a newly-born +child in mind as well as body; in the succeeding stage they wasted away and +wholly disappeared. And the bodies of those who died by violence at that +time quickly passed through the like changes, and in a few days were no +more seen. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Then how, Stranger, were the animals created in those +days; and in what way were they begotten of one another? + +STRANGER: It is evident, Socrates, that there was no such thing in the +then order of nature as the procreation of animals from one another; the +earth-born race, of which we hear in story, was the one which existed in +those days--they rose again from the ground; and of this tradition, which +is now-a-days often unduly discredited, our ancestors, who were nearest in +point of time to the end of the last period and came into being at the +beginning of this, are to us the heralds. And mark how consistent the +sequel of the tale is; after the return of age to youth, follows the return +of the dead, who are lying in the earth, to life; simultaneously with the +reversal of the world the wheel of their generation has been turned back, +and they are put together and rise and live in the opposite order, unless +God has carried any of them away to some other lot. According to this +tradition they of necessity sprang from the earth and have the name of +earth-born, and so the above legend clings to them. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly that is quite consistent with what has preceded; +but tell me, was the life which you said existed in the reign of Cronos in +that cycle of the world, or in this? For the change in the course of the +stars and the sun must have occurred in both. + +STRANGER: I see that you enter into my meaning;--no, that blessed and +spontaneous life does not belong to the present cycle of the world, but to +the previous one, in which God superintended the whole revolution of the +universe; and the several parts the universe were distributed under the +rule of certain inferior deities, as is the way in some places still. +There were demigods, who were the shepherds of the various species and +herds of animals, and each one was in all respects sufficient for those of +whom he was the shepherd; neither was there any violence, or devouring of +one another, or war or quarrel among them; and I might tell of ten thousand +other blessings, which belonged to that dispensation. The reason why the +life of man was, as tradition says, spontaneous, is as follows: In those +days God himself was their shepherd, and ruled over them, just as man, who +is by comparison a divine being, still rules over the lower animals. Under +him there were no forms of government or separate possession of women and +children; for all men rose again from the earth, having no memory of the +past. And although they had nothing of this sort, the earth gave them +fruits in abundance, which grew on trees and shrubs unbidden, and were not +planted by the hand of man. And they dwelt naked, and mostly in the open +air, for the temperature of their seasons was mild; and they had no beds, +but lay on soft couches of grass, which grew plentifully out of the earth. +Such was the life of man in the days of Cronos, Socrates; the character of +our present life, which is said to be under Zeus, you know from your own +experience. Can you, and will you, determine which of them you deem the +happier? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Impossible. + +STRANGER: Then shall I determine for you as well as I can? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: By all means. + +STRANGER: Suppose that the nurslings of Cronos, having this boundless +leisure, and the power of holding intercourse, not only with men, but with +the brute creation, had used all these advantages with a view to +philosophy, conversing with the brutes as well as with one another, and +learning of every nature which was gifted with any special power, and was +able to contribute some special experience to the store of wisdom, there +would be no difficulty in deciding that they would be a thousand times +happier than the men of our own day. Or, again, if they had merely eaten +and drunk until they were full, and told stories to one another and to the +animals--such stories as are now attributed to them--in this case also, as +I should imagine, the answer would be easy. But until some satisfactory +witness can be found of the love of that age for knowledge and discussion, +we had better let the matter drop, and give the reason why we have +unearthed this tale, and then we shall be able to get on. In the fulness +of time, when the change was to take place, and the earth-born race had all +perished, and every soul had completed its proper cycle of births and been +sown in the earth her appointed number of times, the pilot of the universe +let the helm go, and retired to his place of view; and then Fate and innate +desire reversed the motion of the world. Then also all the inferior +deities who share the rule of the supreme power, being informed of what was +happening, let go the parts of the world which were under their control. +And the world turning round with a sudden shock, being impelled in an +opposite direction from beginning to end, was shaken by a mighty +earthquake, which wrought a new destruction of all manner of animals. +Afterwards, when sufficient time had elapsed, the tumult and confusion and +earthquake ceased, and the universal creature, once more at peace, attained +to a calm, and settled down into his own orderly and accustomed course, +having the charge and rule of himself and of all the creatures which are +contained in him, and executing, as far as he remembered them, the +instructions of his Father and Creator, more precisely at first, but +afterwords with less exactness. The reason of the falling off was the +admixture of matter in him; this was inherent in the primal nature, which +was full of disorder, until attaining to the present order. From God, the +constructor, the world received all that is good in him, but from a +previous state came elements of evil and unrighteousness, which, thence +derived, first of all passed into the world, and were then transmitted to +the animals. While the world was aided by the pilot in nurturing the +animals, the evil was small, and great the good which he produced, but +after the separation, when the world was let go, at first all proceeded +well enough; but, as time went on, there was more and more forgetting, and +the old discord again held sway and burst forth in full glory; and at last +small was the good, and great was the admixture of evil, and there was a +danger of universal ruin to the world, and to the things contained in him. +Wherefore God, the orderer of all, in his tender care, seeing that the +world was in great straits, and fearing that all might be dissolved in the +storm and disappear in infinite chaos, again seated himself at the helm; +and bringing back the elements which had fallen into dissolution and +disorder to the motion which had prevailed under his dispensation, he set +them in order and restored them, and made the world imperishable and +immortal. And this is the whole tale, of which the first part will suffice +to illustrate the nature of the king. For when the world turned towards +the present cycle of generation, the age of man again stood still, and a +change opposite to the previous one was the result. The small creatures +which had almost disappeared grew in and stature, and the newly-born +children of the earth became grey and died and sank into the earth again. +All things changed, imitating and following the condition of the universe, +and of necessity agreeing with that in their mode of conception and +generation and nurture; for no animal was any longer allowed to come into +being in the earth through the agency of other creative beings, but as the +world was ordained to be the lord of his own progress, in like manner the +parts were ordained to grow and generate and give nourishment, as far as +they could, of themselves, impelled by a similar movement. And so we have +arrived at the real end of this discourse; for although there might be much +to tell of the lower animals, and of the condition out of which they +changed and of the causes of the change, about men there is not much, and +that little is more to the purpose. Deprived of the care of God, who had +possessed and tended them, they were left helpless and defenceless, and +were torn in pieces by the beasts, who were naturally fierce and had now +grown wild. And in the first ages they were still without skill or +resource; the food which once grew spontaneously had failed, and as yet +they knew not how to procure it, because they had never felt the pressure +of necessity. For all these reasons they were in a great strait; wherefore +also the gifts spoken of in the old tradition were imparted to man by the +gods, together with so much teaching and education as was indispensable; +fire was given to them by Prometheus, the arts by Hephaestus and his +fellow-worker, Athene, seeds and plants by others. From these is derived +all that has helped to frame human life; since the care of the Gods, as I +was saying, had now failed men, and they had to order their course of life +for themselves, and were their own masters, just like the universal +creature whom they imitate and follow, ever changing, as he changes, and +ever living and growing, at one time in one manner, and at another time in +another. Enough of the story, which may be of use in showing us how +greatly we erred in the delineation of the king and the statesman in our +previous discourse. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What was this great error of which you speak? + +STRANGER: There were two; the first a lesser one, the other was an error +on a much larger and grander scale. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean? + +STRANGER: I mean to say that when we were asked about a king and statesman +of the present cycle and generation, we told of a shepherd of a human flock +who belonged to the other cycle, and of one who was a god when he ought to +have been a man; and this a great error. Again, we declared him to be the +ruler of the entire State, without explaining how: this was not the whole +truth, nor very intelligible; but still it was true, and therefore the +second error was not so great as the first. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good. + +STRANGER: Before we can expect to have a perfect description of the +statesman we must define the nature of his office. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: And the myth was introduced in order to show, not only that all +others are rivals of the true shepherd who is the object of our search, but +in order that we might have a clearer view of him who is alone worthy to +receive this appellation, because he alone of shepherds and herdsmen, +according to the image which we have employed, has the care of human +beings. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: And I cannot help thinking, Socrates, that the form of the +divine shepherd is even higher than that of a king; whereas the statesmen +who are now on earth seem to be much more like their subjects in character, +and much more nearly to partake of their breeding and education. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: Still they must be investigated all the same, to see whether, +like the divine shepherd, they are above their subjects or on a level with +them. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Of course. + +STRANGER: To resume:--Do you remember that we spoke of a command-for-self +exercised over animals, not singly but collectively, which we called the +art of rearing a herd? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, I remember. + +STRANGER: There, somewhere, lay our error; for we never included or +mentioned the Statesman; and we did not observe that he had no place in our +nomenclature. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How was that? + +STRANGER: All other herdsmen 'rear' their herds, but this is not a +suitable term to apply to the Statesman; we should use a name which is +common to them all. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True, if there be such a name. + +STRANGER: Why, is not 'care' of herds applicable to all? For this implies +no feeding, or any special duty; if we say either 'tending' the herds, or +'managing' the herds, or 'having the care' of them, the same word will +include all, and then we may wrap up the Statesman with the rest, as the +argument seems to require. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite right; but how shall we take the next step in the +division? + +STRANGER: As before we divided the art of 'rearing' herds accordingly as +they were land or water herds, winged and wingless, mixing or not mixing +the breed, horned and hornless, so we may divide by these same differences +the 'tending' of herds, comprehending in our definition the kingship of to- +day and the rule of Cronos. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: That is clear; but I still ask, what is to follow. + +STRANGER: If the word had been 'managing' herds, instead of feeding or +rearing them, no one would have argued that there was no care of men in the +case of the politician, although it was justly contended, that there was no +human art of feeding them which was worthy of the name, or at least, if +there were, many a man had a prior and greater right to share in such an +art than any king. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: But no other art or science will have a prior or better right +than the royal science to care for human society and to rule over men in +general. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite true. + +STRANGER: In the next place, Socrates, we must surely notice that a great +error was committed at the end of our analysis. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What was it? + +STRANGER: Why, supposing we were ever so sure that there is such an art as +the art of rearing or feeding bipeds, there was no reason why we should +call this the royal or political art, as though there were no more to be +said. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not. + +STRANGER: Our first duty, as we were saying, was to remodel the name, so +as to have the notion of care rather than of feeding, and then to divide, +for there may be still considerable divisions. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How can they be made? + +STRANGER: First, by separating the divine shepherd from the human guardian +or manager. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: And the art of management which is assigned to man would again +have to be subdivided. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: On what principle? + +STRANGER: On the principle of voluntary and compulsory. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Why? + +STRANGER: Because, if I am not mistaken, there has been an error here; for +our simplicity led us to rank king and tyrant together, whereas they are +utterly distinct, like their modes of government. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: Then, now, as I said, let us make the correction and divide +human care into two parts, on the principle of voluntary and compulsory. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: And if we call the management of violent rulers tyranny, and the +voluntary management of herds of voluntary bipeds politics, may we not +further assert that he who has this latter art of management is the true +king and statesman? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I think, Stranger, that we have now completed the account +of the Statesman. + +STRANGER: Would that we had, Socrates, but I have to satisfy myself as +well as you; and in my judgment the figure of the king is not yet +perfected; like statuaries who, in their too great haste, having overdone +the several parts of their work, lose time in cutting them down, so too we, +partly out of haste, partly out of a magnanimous desire to expose our +former error, and also because we imagined that a king required grand +illustrations, have taken up a marvellous lump of fable, and have been +obliged to use more than was necessary. This made us discourse at large, +and, nevertheless, the story never came to an end. And our discussion +might be compared to a picture of some living being which had been fairly +drawn in outline, but had not yet attained the life and clearness which is +given by the blending of colours. Now to intelligent persons a living +being had better be delineated by language and discourse than by any +painting or work of art: to the duller sort by works of art. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true; but what is the imperfection which still +remains? I wish that you would tell me. + +STRANGER: The higher ideas, my dear friend, can hardly be set forth except +through the medium of examples; every man seems to know all things in a +dreamy sort of way, and then again to wake up and to know nothing. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean? + +STRANGER: I fear that I have been unfortunate in raising a question about +our experience of knowledge. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Why so? + +STRANGER: Why, because my 'example' requires the assistance of another +example. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Proceed; you need not fear that I shall tire. + +STRANGER: I will proceed, finding, as I do, such a ready listener in you: +when children are beginning to know their letters-- + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What are you going to say? + +STRANGER: That they distinguish the several letters well enough in very +short and easy syllables, and are able to tell them correctly. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: Whereas in other syllables they do not recognize them, and think +and speak falsely of them. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: Will not the best and easiest way of bringing them to a +knowledge of what they do not as yet know be-- + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Be what? + +STRANGER: To refer them first of all to cases in which they judge +correctly about the letters in question, and then to compare these with the +cases in which they do not as yet know, and to show them that the letters +are the same, and have the same character in both combinations, until all +cases in which they are right have been placed side by side with all cases +in which they are wrong. In this way they have examples, and are made to +learn that each letter in every combination is always the same and not +another, and is always called by the same name. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: Are not examples formed in this manner? We take a thing and +compare it with another distinct instance of the same thing, of which we +have a right conception, and out of the comparison there arises one true +notion, which includes both of them. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Exactly. + +STRANGER: Can we wonder, then, that the soul has the same uncertainty +about the alphabet of things, and sometimes and in some cases is firmly +fixed by the truth in each particular, and then, again, in other cases is +altogether at sea; having somehow or other a correct notion of +combinations; but when the elements are transferred into the long and +difficult language (syllables) of facts, is again ignorant of them? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: There is nothing wonderful in that. + +STRANGER: Could any one, my friend, who began with false opinion ever +expect to arrive even at a small portion of truth and to attain wisdom? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Hardly. + +STRANGER: Then you and I will not be far wrong in trying to see the nature +of example in general in a small and particular instance; afterwards from +lesser things we intend to pass to the royal class, which is the highest +form of the same nature, and endeavour to discover by rules of art what the +management of cities is; and then the dream will become a reality to us. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: Then, once more, let us resume the previous argument, and as +there were innumerable rivals of the royal race who claim to have the care +of states, let us part them all off, and leave him alone; and, as I was +saying, a model or example of this process has first to be framed. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Exactly. + +STRANGER: What model is there which is small, and yet has any analogy with +the political occupation? Suppose, Socrates, that if we have no other +example at hand, we choose weaving, or, more precisely, weaving of wool-- +this will be quite enough, without taking the whole of weaving, to +illustrate our meaning? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: Why should we not apply to weaving the same processes of +division and subdivision which we have already applied to other classes; +going once more as rapidly as we can through all the steps until we come to +that which is needed for our purpose? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How do you mean? + +STRANGER: I shall reply by actually performing the process. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good. + +STRANGER: All things which we make or acquire are either creative or +preventive; of the preventive class are antidotes, divine and human, and +also defences; and defences are either military weapons or protections; and +protections are veils, and also shields against heat and cold, and shields +against heat and cold are shelters and coverings; and coverings are +blankets and garments; and garments are some of them in one piece, and +others of them are made in several parts; and of these latter some are +stitched, others are fastened and not stitched; and of the not stitched, +some are made of the sinews of plants, and some of hair; and of these, +again, some are cemented with water and earth, and others are fastened +together by themselves. And these last defences and coverings which are +fastened together by themselves are called clothes, and the art which +superintends them we may call, from the nature of the operation, the art of +clothing, just as before the art of the Statesman was derived from the +State; and may we not say that the art of weaving, at least that largest +portion of it which was concerned with the making of clothes, differs only +in name from this art of clothing, in the same way that, in the previous +case, the royal science differed from the political? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Most true. + +STRANGER: In the next place, let us make the reflection, that the art of +weaving clothes, which an incompetent person might fancy to have been +sufficiently described, has been separated off from several others which +are of the same family, but not from the co-operative arts. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: And which are the kindred arts? + +STRANGER: I see that I have not taken you with me. So I think that we had +better go backwards, starting from the end. We just now parted off from +the weaving of clothes, the making of blankets, which differ from each +other in that one is put under and the other is put around: and these are +what I termed kindred arts. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I understand. + +STRANGER: And we have subtracted the manufacture of all articles made of +flax and cords, and all that we just now metaphorically termed the sinews +of plants, and we have also separated off the process of felting and the +putting together of materials by stitching and sewing, of which the most +important part is the cobbler's art. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Precisely. + +STRANGER: Then we separated off the currier's art, which prepared +coverings in entire pieces, and the art of sheltering, and subtracted the +various arts of making water-tight which are employed in building, and in +general in carpentering, and in other crafts, and all such arts as furnish +impediments to thieving and acts of violence, and are concerned with making +the lids of boxes and the fixing of doors, being divisions of the art of +joining; and we also cut off the manufacture of arms, which is a section of +the great and manifold art of making defences; and we originally began by +parting off the whole of the magic art which is concerned with antidotes, +and have left, as would appear, the very art of which we were in search, +the art of protection against winter cold, which fabricates woollen +defences, and has the name of weaving. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: Yes, my boy, but that is not all; for the first process to which +the material is subjected is the opposite of weaving. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How so? + +STRANGER: Weaving is a sort of uniting? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: But the first process is a separation of the clotted and matted +fibres? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean? + +STRANGER: I mean the work of the carder's art; for we cannot say that +carding is weaving, or that the carder is a weaver. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not. + +STRANGER: Again, if a person were to say that the art of making the warp +and the woof was the art of weaving, he would say what was paradoxical and +false. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: To be sure. + +STRANGER: Shall we say that the whole art of the fuller or of the mender +has nothing to do with the care and treatment of clothes, or are we to +regard all these as arts of weaving? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not. + +STRANGER: And yet surely all these arts will maintain that they are +concerned with the treatment and production of clothes; they will dispute +the exclusive prerogative of weaving, and though assigning a larger sphere +to that, will still reserve a considerable field for themselves. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: Besides these, there are the arts which make tools and +instruments of weaving, and which will claim at least to be co-operative +causes in every work of the weaver. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Most true. + +STRANGER: Well, then, suppose that we define weaving, or rather that part +of it which has been selected by us, to be the greatest and noblest of arts +which are concerned with woollen garments--shall we be right? Is not the +definition, although true, wanting in clearness and completeness; for do +not all those other arts require to be first cleared away? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: Then the next thing will be to separate them, in order that the +argument may proceed in a regular manner? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: By all means. + +STRANGER: Let us consider, in the first place, that there are two kinds of +arts entering into everything which we do. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What are they? + +STRANGER: The one kind is the conditional or co-operative, the other the +principal cause. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean? + +STRANGER: The arts which do not manufacture the actual thing, but which +furnish the necessary tools for the manufacture, without which the several +arts could not fulfil their appointed work, are co-operative; but those +which make the things themselves are causal. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: A very reasonable distinction. + +STRANGER: Thus the arts which make spindles, combs, and other instruments +of the production of clothes, may be called co-operative, and those which +treat and fabricate the things themselves, causal. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: The arts of washing and mending, and the other preparatory arts +which belong to the causal class, and form a division of the great art of +adornment, may be all comprehended under what we call the fuller's art. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good. + +STRANGER: Carding and spinning threads and all the parts of the process +which are concerned with the actual manufacture of a woollen garment form a +single art, which is one of those universally acknowledged,--the art of +working in wool. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: To be sure. + +STRANGER: Of working in wool, again, there are two divisions, and both +these are parts of two arts at once. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How is that? + +STRANGER: Carding and one half of the use of the comb, and the other +processes of wool-working which separate the composite, may be classed +together as belonging both to the art of wool-working, and also to one of +the two great arts which are of universal application--the art of +composition and the art of division. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: To the latter belong carding and the other processes of which I +was just now speaking; the art of discernment or division in wool and yarn, +which is effected in one manner with the comb and in another with the +hands, is variously described under all the names which I just now +mentioned. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: Again, let us take some process of wool-working which is also a +portion of the art of composition, and, dismissing the elements of division +which we found there, make two halves, one on the principle of composition, +and the other on the principle of division. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Let that be done. + +STRANGER: And once more, Socrates, we must divide the part which belongs +at once both to wool-working and composition, if we are ever to discover +satisfactorily the aforesaid art of weaving. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: We must. + +STRANGER: Yes, certainly, and let us call one part of the art the art of +twisting threads, the other the art of combining them. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Do I understand you, in speaking of twisting, to be +referring to manufacture of the warp? + +STRANGER: Yes, and of the woof too; how, if not by twisting, is the woof +made? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: There is no other way. + +STRANGER: Then suppose that you define the warp and the woof, for I think +that the definition will be of use to you. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How shall I define them? + +STRANGER: As thus: A piece of carded wool which is drawn out lengthwise +and breadthwise is said to be pulled out. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: And the wool thus prepared, when twisted by the spindle, and +made into a firm thread, is called the warp, and the art which regulates +these operations the art of spinning the warp. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: And the threads which are more loosely spun, having a softness +proportioned to the intertexture of the warp and to the degree of force +used in dressing the cloth,--the threads which are thus spun are called the +woof, and the art which is set over them may be called the art of spinning +the woof. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: And, now, there can be no mistake about the nature of the part +of weaving which we have undertaken to define. For when that part of the +art of composition which is employed in the working of wool forms a web by +the regular intertexture of warp and woof, the entire woven substance is +called by us a woollen garment, and the art which presides over this is the +art of weaving. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: But why did we not say at once that weaving is the art of +entwining warp and woof, instead of making a long and useless circuit? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I thought, Stranger, that there was nothing useless in +what was said. + +STRANGER: Very likely, but you may not always think so, my sweet friend; +and in case any feeling of dissatisfaction should hereafter arise in your +mind, as it very well may, let me lay down a principle which will apply to +arguments in general. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Proceed. + +STRANGER: Let us begin by considering the whole nature of excess and +defect, and then we shall have a rational ground on which we may praise or +blame too much length or too much shortness in discussions of this kind. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Let us do so. + +STRANGER: The points on which I think that we ought to dwell are the +following:-- + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What? + +STRANGER: Length and shortness, excess and defect; with all of these the +art of measurement is conversant. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: And the art of measurement has to be divided into two parts, +with a view to our present purpose. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Where would you make the division? + +STRANGER: As thus: I would make two parts, one having regard to the +relativity of greatness and smallness to each other; and there is another, +without which the existence of production would be impossible. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean? + +STRANGER: Do you not think that it is only natural for the greater to be +called greater with reference to the less alone, and the less less with +reference to the greater alone? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: Well, but is there not also something exceeding and exceeded by +the principle of the mean, both in speech and action, and is not this a +reality, and the chief mark of difference between good and bad men? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Plainly. + +STRANGER: Then we must suppose that the great and small exist and are +discerned in both these ways, and not, as we were saying before, only +relatively to one another, but there must also be another comparison of +them with the mean or ideal standard; would you like to hear the reason +why? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: If we assume the greater to exist only in relation to the less, +there will never be any comparison of either with the mean. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: And would not this doctrine be the ruin of all the arts and +their creations; would not the art of the Statesman and the aforesaid art +of weaving disappear? For all these arts are on the watch against excess +and defect, not as unrealities, but as real evils, which occasion a +difficulty in action; and the excellence or beauty of every work of art is +due to this observance of measure. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: But if the science of the Statesman disappears, the search for +the royal science will be impossible. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: Well, then, as in the case of the Sophist we extorted the +inference that not-being had an existence, because here was the point at +which the argument eluded our grasp, so in this we must endeavour to show +that the greater and less are not only to be measured with one another, but +also have to do with the production of the mean; for if this is not +admitted, neither a statesman nor any other man of action can be an +undisputed master of his science. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, we must certainly do again what we did then. + +STRANGER: But this, Socrates, is a greater work than the other, of which +we only too well remember the length. I think, however, that we may fairly +assume something of this sort-- + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What? + +STRANGER: That we shall some day require this notion of a mean with a view +to the demonstration of absolute truth; meanwhile, the argument that the +very existence of the arts must be held to depend on the possibility of +measuring more or less, not only with one another, but also with a view to +the attainment of the mean, seems to afford a grand support and +satisfactory proof of the doctrine which we are maintaining; for if there +are arts, there is a standard of measure, and if there is a standard of +measure, there are arts; but if either is wanting, there is neither. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True; and what is the next step? + +STRANGER: The next step clearly is to divide the art of measurement into +two parts, as we have said already, and to place in the one part all the +arts which measure number, length, depth, breadth, swiftness with their +opposites; and to have another part in which they are measured with the +mean, and the fit, and the opportune, and the due, and with all those +words, in short, which denote a mean or standard removed from the extremes. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Here are two vast divisions, embracing two very different +spheres. + +STRANGER: There are many accomplished men, Socrates, who say, believing +themselves to speak wisely, that the art of measurement is universal, and +has to do with all things. And this means what we are now saying; for all +things which come within the province of art do certainly in some sense +partake of measure. But these persons, because they are not accustomed to +distinguish classes according to real forms, jumble together two widely +different things, relation to one another, and to a standard, under the +idea that they are the same, and also fall into the converse error of +dividing other things not according to their real parts. Whereas the right +way is, if a man has first seen the unity of things, to go on with the +enquiry and not desist until he has found all the differences contained in +it which form distinct classes; nor again should he be able to rest +contented with the manifold diversities which are seen in a multitude of +things until he has comprehended all of them that have any affinity within +the bounds of one similarity and embraced them within the reality of a +single kind. But we have said enough on this head, and also of excess and +defect; we have only to bear in mind that two divisions of the art of +measurement have been discovered which are concerned with them, and not +forget what they are. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: We will not forget. + +STRANGER: And now that this discussion is completed, let us go on to +consider another question, which concerns not this argument only but the +conduct of such arguments in general. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What is this new question? + +STRANGER: Take the case of a child who is engaged in learning his letters: +when he is asked what letters make up a word, should we say that the +question is intended to improve his grammatical knowledge of that +particular word, or of all words? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly, in order that he may have a better knowledge of +all words. + +STRANGER: And is our enquiry about the Statesman intended only to improve +our knowledge of politics, or our power of reasoning generally? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly, as in the former example, the purpose is general. + +STRANGER: Still less would any rational man seek to analyse the notion of +weaving for its own sake. But people seem to forget that some things have +sensible images, which are readily known, and can be easily pointed out +when any one desires to answer an enquirer without any trouble or argument; +whereas the greatest and highest truths have no outward image of themselves +visible to man, which he who wishes to satisfy the soul of the enquirer can +adapt to the eye of sense (compare Phaedr.), and therefore we ought to +train ourselves to give and accept a rational account of them; for +immaterial things, which are the noblest and greatest, are shown only in +thought and idea, and in no other way, and all that we are now saying is +said for the sake of them. Moreover, there is always less difficulty in +fixing the mind on small matters than on great. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good. + +STRANGER: Let us call to mind the bearing of all this. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it? + +STRANGER: I wanted to get rid of any impression of tediousness which we +may have experienced in the discussion about weaving, and the reversal of +the universe, and in the discussion concerning the Sophist and the being of +not-being. I know that they were felt to be too long, and I reproached +myself with this, fearing that they might be not only tedious but +irrelevant; and all that I have now said is only designed to prevent the +recurrence of any such disagreeables for the future. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good. Will you proceed? + +STRANGER: Then I would like to observe that you and I, remembering what +has been said, should praise or blame the length or shortness of +discussions, not by comparing them with one another, but with what is +fitting, having regard to the part of measurement, which, as we said, was +to be borne in mind. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: And yet, not everything is to be judged even with a view to what +is fitting; for we should only want such a length as is suited to give +pleasure, if at all, as a secondary matter; and reason tells us, that we +should be contented to make the ease or rapidity of an enquiry, not our +first, but our second object; the first and highest of all being to assert +the great method of division according to species--whether the discourse be +shorter or longer is not to the point. No offence should be taken at +length, but the longer and shorter are to be employed indifferently, +according as either of them is better calculated to sharpen the wits of the +auditors. Reason would also say to him who censures the length of +discourses on such occasions and cannot away with their circumlocution, +that he should not be in such a hurry to have done with them, when he can +only complain that they are tedious, but he should prove that if they had +been shorter they would have made those who took part in them better +dialecticians, and more capable of expressing the truth of things; about +any other praise and blame, he need not trouble himself--he should pretend +not to hear them. But we have had enough of this, as you will probably +agree with me in thinking. Let us return to our Statesman, and apply to +his case the aforesaid example of weaving. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good;--let us do as you say. + +STRANGER: The art of the king has been separated from the similar arts of +shepherds, and, indeed, from all those which have to do with herds at all. +There still remain, however, of the causal and co-operative arts those +which are immediately concerned with States, and which must first be +distinguished from one another. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good. + +STRANGER: You know that these arts cannot easily be divided into two +halves; the reason will be very evident as we proceed. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Then we had better do so. + +STRANGER: We must carve them like a victim into members or limbs, since we +cannot bisect them. (Compare Phaedr.) For we certainly should divide +everything into as few parts as possible. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What is to be done in this case? + +STRANGER: What we did in the example of weaving--all those arts which +furnish the tools were regarded by us as co-operative. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: So now, and with still more reason, all arts which make any +implement in a State, whether great or small, may be regarded by us as co- +operative, for without them neither State nor Statesmanship would be +possible; and yet we are not inclined to say that any of them is a product +of the kingly art. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: No, indeed. + +STRANGER: The task of separating this class from others is not an easy +one; for there is plausibility in saying that anything in the world is the +instrument of doing something. But there is another class of possessions +in a city, of which I have a word to say. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What class do you mean? + +STRANGER: A class which may be described as not having this power; that is +to say, not like an instrument, framed for production, but designed for the +preservation of that which is produced. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: To what do you refer? + +STRANGER: To the class of vessels, as they are comprehensively termed, +which are constructed for the preservation of things moist and dry, of +things prepared in the fire or out of the fire; this is a very large class, +and has, if I am not mistaken, literally nothing to do with the royal art +of which we are in search. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not. + +STRANGER: There is also a third class of possessions to be noted, +different from these and very extensive, moving or resting on land or +water, honourable and also dishonourable. The whole of this class has one +name, because it is intended to be sat upon, being always a seat for +something. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it? + +STRANGER: A vehicle, which is certainly not the work of the Statesman, but +of the carpenter, potter, and coppersmith. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I understand. + +STRANGER: And is there not a fourth class which is again different, and in +which most of the things formerly mentioned are contained,--every kind of +dress, most sorts of arms, walls and enclosures, whether of earth or stone, +and ten thousand other things? all of which being made for the sake of +defence, may be truly called defences, and are for the most part to be +regarded as the work of the builder or of the weaver, rather than of the +Statesman. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: Shall we add a fifth class, of ornamentation and drawing, and of +the imitations produced by drawing and music, which are designed for +amusement only, and may be fairly comprehended under one name? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it? + +STRANGER: Plaything is the name. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: That one name may be fitly predicated of all of them, for none +of these things have a serious purpose--amusement is their sole aim. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: That again I understand. + +STRANGER: Then there is a class which provides materials for all these, +out of which and in which the arts already mentioned fabricate their +works;--this manifold class, I say, which is the creation and offspring of +many other arts, may I not rank sixth? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean? + +STRANGER: I am referring to gold, silver, and other metals, and all that +wood-cutting and shearing of every sort provides for the art of carpentry +and plaiting; and there is the process of barking and stripping the cuticle +of plants, and the currier's art, which strips off the skins of animals, +and other similar arts which manufacture corks and papyri and cords, and +provide for the manufacture of composite species out of simple kinds--the +whole class may be termed the primitive and simple possession of man, and +with this the kingly science has no concern at all. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: The provision of food and of all other things which mingle their +particles with the particles of the human body, and minister to the body, +will form a seventh class, which may be called by the general term of +nourishment, unless you have any better name to offer. This, however, +appertains rather to the husbandman, huntsman, trainer, doctor, cook, and +is not to be assigned to the Statesman's art. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not. + +STRANGER: These seven classes include nearly every description of +property, with the exception of tame animals. Consider;--there was the +original material, which ought to have been placed first; next come +instruments, vessels, vehicles, defences, playthings, nourishment; small +things, which may be included under one of these--as for example, coins, +seals and stamps, are omitted, for they have not in them the character of +any larger kind which includes them; but some of them may, with a little +forcing, be placed among ornaments, and others may be made to harmonize +with the class of implements. The art of herding, which has been already +divided into parts, will include all property in tame animals, except +slaves. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: The class of slaves and ministers only remains, and I suspect +that in this the real aspirants for the throne, who are the rivals of the +king in the formation of the political web, will be discovered; just as +spinners, carders, and the rest of them, were the rivals of the weaver. +All the others, who were termed co-operators, have been got rid of among +the occupations already mentioned, and separated from the royal and +political science. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I agree. + +STRANGER: Let us go a little nearer, in order that we may be more certain +of the complexion of this remaining class. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Let us do so. + +STRANGER: We shall find from our present point of view that the greatest +servants are in a case and condition which is the reverse of what we +anticipated. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Who are they? + +STRANGER: Those who have been purchased, and have so become possessions; +these are unmistakably slaves, and certainly do not claim royal science. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not. + +STRANGER: Again, freemen who of their own accord become the servants of +the other classes in a State, and who exchange and equalise the products of +husbandry and the other arts, some sitting in the market-place, others +going from city to city by land or sea, and giving money in exchange for +money or for other productions--the money-changer, the merchant, the ship- +owner, the retailer, will not put in any claim to statecraft or politics? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: No; unless, indeed, to the politics of commerce. + +STRANGER: But surely men whom we see acting as hirelings and serfs, and +too happy to turn their hand to anything, will not profess to share in +royal science? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly not. + +STRANGER: But what would you say of some other serviceable officials? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Who are they, and what services do they perform? + +STRANGER: There are heralds, and scribes perfected by practice, and divers +others who have great skill in various sorts of business connected with the +government of states--what shall we call them? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: They are the officials, and servants of the rulers, as you +just now called them, but not themselves rulers. + +STRANGER: There may be something strange in any servant pretending to be a +ruler, and yet I do not think that I could have been dreaming when I +imagined that the principal claimants to political science would be found +somewhere in this neighbourhood. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: Well, let us draw nearer, and try the claims of some who have +not yet been tested: in the first place, there are diviners, who have a +portion of servile or ministerial science, and are thought to be the +interpreters of the gods to men. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: There is also the priestly class, who, as the law declares, know +how to give the gods gifts from men in the form of sacrifices which are +acceptable to them, and to ask on our behalf blessings in return from them. +Now both these are branches of the servile or ministerial art. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, clearly. + +STRANGER: And here I think that we seem to be getting on the right track; +for the priest and the diviner are swollen with pride and prerogative, and +they create an awful impression of themselves by the magnitude of their +enterprises; in Egypt, the king himself is not allowed to reign, unless he +have priestly powers, and if he should be of another class and has thrust +himself in, he must get enrolled in the priesthood. In many parts of +Hellas, the duty of offering the most solemn propitiatory sacrifices is +assigned to the highest magistracies, and here, at Athens, the most solemn +and national of the ancient sacrifices are supposed to be celebrated by him +who has been chosen by lot to be the King Archon. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Precisely. + +STRANGER: But who are these other kings and priests elected by lot who now +come into view followed by their retainers and a vast throng, as the former +class disappears and the scene changes? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Whom can you mean? + +STRANGER: They are a strange crew. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Why strange? + +STRANGER: A minute ago I thought that they were animals of every tribe; +for many of them are like lions and centaurs, and many more like satyrs and +such weak and shifty creatures;--Protean shapes quickly changing into one +another's forms and natures; and now, Socrates, I begin to see who they +are. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Who are they? You seem to be gazing on some strange +vision. + +STRANGER: Yes; every one looks strange when you do not know him; and just +now I myself fell into this mistake--at first sight, coming suddenly upon +him, I did not recognize the politician and his troop. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Who is he? + +STRANGER: The chief of Sophists and most accomplished of wizards, who must +at any cost be separated from the true king or Statesman, if we are ever to +see daylight in the present enquiry. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: That is a hope not lightly to be renounced. + +STRANGER: Never, if I can help it; and, first, let me ask you a question. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What? + +STRANGER: Is not monarchy a recognized form of government? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: And, after monarchy, next in order comes the government of the +few? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Of course. + +STRANGER: Is not the third form of government the rule of the multitude, +which is called by the name of democracy? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: And do not these three expand in a manner into five, producing +out of themselves two other names? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What are they? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What are they? + +STRANGER: There is a criterion of voluntary and involuntary, poverty and +riches, law and the absence of law, which men now-a-days apply to them; the +two first they subdivide accordingly, and ascribe to monarchy two forms and +two corresponding names, royalty and tyranny. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: And the government of the few they distinguish by the names of +aristocracy and oligarchy. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: Democracy alone, whether rigidly observing the laws or not, and +whether the multitude rule over the men of property with their consent or +against their consent, always in ordinary language has the same name. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: But do you suppose that any form of government which is defined +by these characteristics of the one, the few, or the many, of poverty or +wealth, of voluntary or compulsory submission, of written law or the +absence of law, can be a right one? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Why not? + +STRANGER: Reflect; and follow me. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: In what direction? + +STRANGER: Shall we abide by what we said at first, or shall we retract our +words? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: To what do you refer? + +STRANGER: If I am not mistaken, we said that royal power was a science? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: And a science of a peculiar kind, which was selected out of the +rest as having a character which is at once judicial and authoritative? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: And there was one kind of authority over lifeless things and +another other living animals; and so we proceeded in the division step by +step up to this point, not losing the idea of science, but unable as yet to +determine the nature of the particular science? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: Hence we are led to observe that the distinguishing principle of +the State cannot be the few or many, the voluntary or involuntary, poverty +or riches; but some notion of science must enter into it, if we are to be +consistent with what has preceded. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: And we must be consistent. + +STRANGER: Well, then, in which of these various forms of States may the +science of government, which is among the greatest of all sciences and most +difficult to acquire, be supposed to reside? That we must discover, and +then we shall see who are the false politicians who pretend to be +politicians but are not, although they persuade many, and shall separate +them from the wise king. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: That, as the argument has already intimated, will be our +duty. + +STRANGER: Do you think that the multitude in a State can attain political +science? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Impossible. + +STRANGER: But, perhaps, in a city of a thousand men, there would be a +hundred, or say fifty, who could? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: In that case political science would certainly be the +easiest of all sciences; there could not be found in a city of that number +as many really first-rate draught-players, if judged by the standard of the +rest of Hellas, and there would certainly not be as many kings. For kings +we may truly call those who possess royal science, whether they rule or +not, as was shown in the previous argument. + +STRANGER: Thank you for reminding me; and the consequence is that any true +form of government can only be supposed to be the government of one, two, +or, at any rate, of a few. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: And these, whether they rule with the will, or against the will, +of their subjects, with written laws or without written laws, and whether +they are poor or rich, and whatever be the nature of their rule, must be +supposed, according to our present view, to rule on some scientific +principle; just as the physician, whether he cures us against our will or +with our will, and whatever be his mode of treatment,--incision, burning, +or the infliction of some other pain,--whether he practises out of a book +or not out of a book, and whether he be rich or poor, whether he purges or +reduces in some other way, or even fattens his patients, is a physician all +the same, so long as he exercises authority over them according to rules of +art, if he only does them good and heals and saves them. And this we lay +down to be the only proper test of the art of medicine, or of any other art +of command. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite true. + +STRANGER: Then that can be the only true form of government in which the +governors are really found to possess science, and are not mere pretenders, +whether they rule according to law or without law, over willing or +unwilling subjects, and are rich or poor themselves--none of these things +can with any propriety be included in the notion of the ruler. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: And whether with a view to the public good they purge the State +by killing some, or exiling some; whether they reduce the size of the body +corporate by sending out from the hive swarms of citizens, or, by +introducing persons from without, increase it; while they act according to +the rules of wisdom and justice, and use their power with a view to the +general security and improvement, the city over which they rule, and which +has these characteristics, may be described as the only true State. All +other governments are not genuine or real; but only imitations of this, and +some of them are better and some of them are worse; the better are said to +be well governed, but they are mere imitations like the others. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I agree, Stranger, in the greater part of what you say; +but as to their ruling without laws--the expression has a harsh sound. + +STRANGER: You have been too quick for me, Socrates; I was just going to +ask you whether you objected to any of my statements. And now I see that +we shall have to consider this notion of there being good government +without laws. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: There can be no doubt that legislation is in a manner the +business of a king, and yet the best thing of all is not that the law +should rule, but that a man should rule supposing him to have wisdom and +royal power. Do you see why this is? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Why? + +STRANGER: Because the law does not perfectly comprehend what is noblest +and most just for all and therefore cannot enforce what is best. The +differences of men and actions, and the endless irregular movements of +human things, do not admit of any universal and simple rule. And no art +whatsoever can lay down a rule which will last for all time. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Of course not. + +STRANGER: But the law is always striving to make one;--like an obstinate +and ignorant tyrant, who will not allow anything to be done contrary to his +appointment, or any question to be asked--not even in sudden changes of +circumstances, when something happens to be better than what he commanded +for some one. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly; the law treats us all precisely in the manner +which you describe. + +STRANGER: A perfectly simple principle can never be applied to a state of +things which is the reverse of simple. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: Then if the law is not the perfection of right, why are we +compelled to make laws at all? The reason of this has next to be +investigated. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: Let me ask, whether you have not meetings for gymnastic contests +in your city, such as there are in other cities, at which men compete in +running, wrestling, and the like? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes; they are very common among us. + +STRANGER: And what are the rules which are enforced on their pupils by +professional trainers or by others having similar authority? Can you +remember? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: To what do you refer? + +STRANGER: The training-masters do not issue minute rules for individuals, +or give every individual what is exactly suited to his constitution; they +think that they ought to go more roughly to work, and to prescribe +generally the regimen which will benefit the majority. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: And therefore they assign equal amounts of exercise to them all; +they send them forth together, and let them rest together from their +running, wrestling, or whatever the form of bodily exercise may be. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: And now observe that the legislator who has to preside over the +herd, and to enforce justice in their dealings with one another, will not +be able, in enacting for the general good, to provide exactly what is +suitable for each particular case. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: He cannot be expected to do so. + +STRANGER: He will lay down laws in a general form for the majority, +roughly meeting the cases of individuals; and some of them he will deliver +in writing, and others will be unwritten; and these last will be +traditional customs of the country. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: He will be right. + +STRANGER: Yes, quite right; for how can he sit at every man's side all +through his life, prescribing for him the exact particulars of his duty? +Who, Socrates, would be equal to such a task? No one who really had the +royal science, if he had been able to do this, would have imposed upon +himself the restriction of a written law. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: So I should infer from what has now been said. + +STRANGER: Or rather, my good friend, from what is going to be said. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: And what is that? + +STRANGER: Let us put to ourselves the case of a physician, or trainer, who +is about to go into a far country, and is expecting to be a long time away +from his patients--thinking that his instructions will not be remembered +unless they are written down, he will leave notes of them for the use of +his pupils or patients. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: But what would you say, if he came back sooner than he had +intended, and, owing to an unexpected change of the winds or other +celestial influences, something else happened to be better for them,--would +he not venture to suggest this new remedy, although not contemplated in his +former prescription? Would he persist in observing the original law, +neither himself giving any new commandments, nor the patient daring to do +otherwise than was prescribed, under the idea that this course only was +healthy and medicinal, all others noxious and heterodox? Viewed in the +light of science and true art, would not all such enactments be utterly +ridiculous? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Utterly. + +STRANGER: And if he who gave laws, written or unwritten, determining what +was good or bad, honourable or dishonourable, just or unjust, to the tribes +of men who flock together in their several cities, and are governed in +accordance with them; if, I say, the wise legislator were suddenly to come +again, or another like to him, is he to be prohibited from changing them?-- +would not this prohibition be in reality quite as ridiculous as the other? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: Do you know a plausible saying of the common people which is in +point? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I do not recall what you mean at the moment. + +STRANGER: They say that if any one knows how the ancient laws may be +improved, he must first persuade his own State of the improvement, and then +he may legislate, but not otherwise. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: And are they not right? + +STRANGER: I dare say. But supposing that he does use some gentle violence +for their good, what is this violence to be called? Or rather, before you +answer, let me ask the same question in reference to our previous +instances. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean? + +STRANGER: Suppose that a skilful physician has a patient, of whatever sex +or age, whom he compels against his will to do something for his good which +is contrary to the written rules; what is this compulsion to be called? +Would you ever dream of calling it a violation of the art, or a breach of +the laws of health? Nothing could be more unjust than for the patient to +whom such violence is applied, to charge the physician who practises the +violence with wanting skill or aggravating his disease. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Most true. + +STRANGER: In the political art error is not called disease, but evil, or +disgrace, or injustice. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite true. + +STRANGER: And when the citizen, contrary to law and custom, is compelled +to do what is juster and better and nobler than he did before, the last and +most absurd thing which he could say about such violence is that he has +incurred disgrace or evil or injustice at the hands of those who compelled +him. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: And shall we say that the violence, if exercised by a rich man, +is just, and if by a poor man, unjust? May not any man, rich or poor, with +or without laws, with the will of the citizens or against the will of the +citizens, do what is for their interest? Is not this the true principle of +government, according to which the wise and good man will order the affairs +of his subjects? As the pilot, by watching continually over the interests +of the ship and of the crew,--not by laying down rules, but by making his +art a law,--preserves the lives of his fellow-sailors, even so, and in the +self-same way, may there not be a true form of polity created by those who +are able to govern in a similar spirit, and who show a strength of art +which is superior to the law? Nor can wise rulers ever err while they +observing the one great rule of distributing justice to the citizens with +intelligence and skill, are able to preserve them, and, as far as may be, +to make them better from being worse. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: No one can deny what has been now said. + +STRANGER: Neither, if you consider, can any one deny the other statement. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What was it? + +STRANGER: We said that no great number of persons, whoever they may be, +can attain political knowledge, or order a State wisely, but that the true +government is to be found in a small body, or in an individual, and that +other States are but imitations of this, as we said a little while ago, +some for the better and some for the worse. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean? I cannot have understood your previous +remark about imitations. + +STRANGER: And yet the mere suggestion which I hastily threw out is highly +important, even if we leave the question where it is, and do not seek by +the discussion of it to expose the error which prevails in this matter. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean? + +STRANGER: The idea which has to be grasped by us is not easy or familiar; +but we may attempt to express it thus:--Supposing the government of which I +have been speaking to be the only true model, then the others must use the +written laws of this--in no other way can they be saved; they will have to +do what is now generally approved, although not the best thing in the +world. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What is this? + +STRANGER: No citizen should do anything contrary to the laws, and any +infringement of them should be punished with death and the most extreme +penalties; and this is very right and good when regarded as the second best +thing, if you set aside the first, of which I was just now speaking. Shall +I explain the nature of what I call the second best? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: By all means. + +STRANGER: I must again have recourse to my favourite images; through them, +and them alone, can I describe kings and rulers. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What images? + +STRANGER: The noble pilot and the wise physician, who 'is worth many +another man'--in the similitude of these let us endeavour to discover some +image of the king. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What sort of an image? + +STRANGER: Well, such as this:--Every man will reflect that he suffers +strange things at the hands of both of them; the physician saves any whom +he wishes to save, and any whom he wishes to maltreat he maltreats--cutting +or burning them; and at the same time requiring them to bring him payments, +which are a sort of tribute, of which little or nothing is spent upon the +sick man, and the greater part is consumed by him and his domestics; and +the finale is that he receives money from the relations of the sick man or +from some enemy of his, and puts him out of the way. And the pilots of +ships are guilty of numberless evil deeds of the same kind; they +intentionally play false and leave you ashore when the hour of sailing +arrives; or they cause mishaps at sea and cast away their freight; and are +guilty of other rogueries. Now suppose that we, bearing all this in mind, +were to determine, after consideration, that neither of these arts shall +any longer be allowed to exercise absolute control either over freemen or +over slaves, but that we will summon an assembly either of all the people, +or of the rich only, that anybody who likes, whatever may be his calling, +or even if he have no calling, may offer an opinion either about seamanship +or about diseases--whether as to the manner in which physic or surgical +instruments are to be applied to the patient, or again about the vessels +and the nautical implements which are required in navigation, and how to +meet the dangers of winds and waves which are incidental to the voyage, how +to behave when encountering pirates, and what is to be done with the old- +fashioned galleys, if they have to fight with others of a similar build-- +and that, whatever shall be decreed by the multitude on these points, upon +the advice of persons skilled or unskilled, shall be written down on +triangular tablets and columns, or enacted although unwritten to be +national customs; and that in all future time vessels shall be navigated +and remedies administered to the patient after this fashion. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What a strange notion! + +STRANGER: Suppose further, that the pilots and physicians are appointed +annually, either out of the rich, or out of the whole people, and that they +are elected by lot; and that after their election they navigate vessels and +heal the sick according to the written rules. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Worse and worse. + +STRANGER: But hear what follows:--When the year of office has expired, the +pilot or physician has to come before a court of review, in which the +judges are either selected from the wealthy classes or chosen by lot out of +the whole people; and anybody who pleases may be their accuser, and may lay +to their charge, that during the past year they have not navigated their +vessels or healed their patients according to the letter of the law and the +ancient customs of their ancestors; and if either of them is condemned, +some of the judges must fix what he is to suffer or pay. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: He who is willing to take a command under such conditions, +deserves to suffer any penalty. + +STRANGER: Yet once more, we shall have to enact that if any one is +detected enquiring into piloting and navigation, or into health and the +true nature of medicine, or about the winds, or other conditions of the +atmosphere, contrary to the written rules, and has any ingenious notions +about such matters, he is not to be called a pilot or physician, but a +cloudy prating sophist;--further, on the ground that he is a corrupter of +the young, who would persuade them to follow the art of medicine or +piloting in an unlawful manner, and to exercise an arbitrary rule over +their patients or ships, any one who is qualified by law may inform against +him, and indict him in some court, and then if he is found to be persuading +any, whether young or old, to act contrary to the written law, he is to be +punished with the utmost rigour; for no one should presume to be wiser than +the laws; and as touching healing and health and piloting and navigation, +the nature of them is known to all, for anybody may learn the written laws +and the national customs. If such were the mode of procedure, Socrates, +about these sciences and about generalship, and any branch of hunting, or +about painting or imitation in general, or carpentry, or any sort of +handicraft, or husbandry, or planting, or if we were to see an art of +rearing horses, or tending herds, or divination, or any ministerial +service, or draught-playing, or any science conversant with number, whether +simple or square or cube, or comprising motion,--I say, if all these things +were done in this way according to written regulations, and not according +to art, what would be the result? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: All the arts would utterly perish, and could never be +recovered, because enquiry would be unlawful. And human life, which is bad +enough already, would then become utterly unendurable. + +STRANGER: But what, if while compelling all these operations to be +regulated by written law, we were to appoint as the guardian of the laws +some one elected by a show of hands, or by lot, and he caring nothing about +the laws, were to act contrary to them from motives of interest or favour, +and without knowledge,--would not this be a still worse evil than the +former? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: To go against the laws, which are based upon long experience, +and the wisdom of counsellors who have graciously recommended them and +persuaded the multitude to pass them, would be a far greater and more +ruinous error than any adherence to written law? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: Therefore, as there is a danger of this, the next best thing in +legislating is not to allow either the individual or the multitude to break +the law in any respect whatever. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: The laws would be copies of the true particulars of action as +far as they admit of being written down from the lips of those who have +knowledge? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly they would. + +STRANGER: And, as we were saying, he who has knowledge and is a true +Statesman, will do many things within his own sphere of action by his art +without regard to the laws, when he is of opinion that something other than +that which he has written down and enjoined to be observed during his +absence would be better. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, we said so. + +STRANGER: And any individual or any number of men, having fixed laws, in +acting contrary to them with a view to something better, would only be +acting, as far as they are able, like the true Statesman? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: If they had no knowledge of what they were doing, they would +imitate the truth, and they would always imitate ill; but if they had +knowledge, the imitation would be the perfect truth, and an imitation no +longer. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite true. + +STRANGER: And the principle that no great number of men are able to +acquire a knowledge of any art has been already admitted by us. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, it has. + +STRANGER: Then the royal or political art, if there be such an art, will +never be attained either by the wealthy or by the other mob. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Impossible. + +STRANGER: Then the nearest approach which these lower forms of government +can ever make to the true government of the one scientific ruler, is to do +nothing contrary to their own written laws and national customs. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good. + +STRANGER: When the rich imitate the true form, such a government is called +aristocracy; and when they are regardless of the laws, oligarchy. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: Or again, when an individual rules according to law in imitation +of him who knows, we call him a king; and if he rules according to law, we +give him the same name, whether he rules with opinion or with knowledge. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: To be sure. + +STRANGER: And when an individual truly possessing knowledge rules, his +name will surely be the same--he will be called a king; and thus the five +names of governments, as they are now reckoned, become one. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: That is true. + +STRANGER: And when an individual ruler governs neither by law nor by +custom, but following in the steps of the true man of science pretends that +he can only act for the best by violating the laws, while in reality +appetite and ignorance are the motives of the imitation, may not such an +one be called a tyrant? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: And this we believe to be the origin of the tyrant and the king, +of oligarchies, and aristocracies, and democracies,--because men are +offended at the one monarch, and can never be made to believe that any one +can be worthy of such authority, or is able and willing in the spirit of +virtue and knowledge to act justly and holily to all; they fancy that he +will be a despot who will wrong and harm and slay whom he pleases of us; +for if there could be such a despot as we describe, they would acknowledge +that we ought to be too glad to have him, and that he alone would be the +happy ruler of a true and perfect State. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: To be sure. + +STRANGER: But then, as the State is not like a beehive, and has no natural +head who is at once recognized to be the superior both in body and in mind, +mankind are obliged to meet and make laws, and endeavour to approach as +nearly as they can to the true form of government. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: And when the foundation of politics is in the letter only and in +custom, and knowledge is divorced from action, can we wonder, Socrates, at +the miseries which there are, and always will be, in States? Any other +art, built on such a foundation and thus conducted, would ruin all that it +touched. Ought we not rather to wonder at the natural strength of the +political bond? For States have endured all this, time out of mind, and +yet some of them still remain and are not overthrown, though many of them, +like ships at sea, founder from time to time, and perish and have perished +and will hereafter perish, through the badness of their pilots and crews, +who have the worst sort of ignorance of the highest truths--I mean to say, +that they are wholly unaquainted with politics, of which, above all other +sciences, they believe themselves to have acquired the most perfect +knowledge. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: Then the question arises:--which of these untrue forms of +government is the least oppressive to their subjects, though they are all +oppressive; and which is the worst of them? Here is a consideration which +is beside our present purpose, and yet having regard to the whole it seems +to influence all our actions: we must examine it. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, we must. + +STRANGER: You may say that of the three forms, the same is at once the +hardest and the easiest. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean? + +STRANGER: I am speaking of the three forms of government, which I +mentioned at the beginning of this discussion--monarchy, the rule of the +few, and the rule of the many. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: If we divide each of these we shall have six, from which the +true one may be distinguished as a seventh. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How would you make the division? + +STRANGER: Monarchy divides into royalty and tyranny; the rule of the few +into aristocracy, which has an auspicious name, and oligarchy; and +democracy or the rule of the many, which before was one, must now be +divided. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: On what principle of division? + +STRANGER: On the same principle as before, although the name is now +discovered to have a twofold meaning. For the distinction of ruling with +law or without law, applies to this as well as to the rest. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: The division made no difference when we were looking for the +perfect State, as we showed before. But now that this has been separated +off, and, as we said, the others alone are left for us, the principle of +law and the absence of law will bisect them all. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: That would seem to follow, from what has been said. + +STRANGER: Then monarchy, when bound by good prescriptions or laws, is the +best of all the six, and when lawless is the most bitter and oppressive to +the subject. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: The government of the few, which is intermediate between that of +the one and many, is also intermediate in good and evil; but the government +of the many is in every respect weak and unable to do either any great good +or any great evil, when compared with the others, because the offices are +too minutely subdivided and too many hold them. And this therefore is the +worst of all lawful governments, and the best of all lawless ones. If they +are all without the restraints of law, democracy is the form in which to +live is best; if they are well ordered, then this is the last which you +should choose, as royalty, the first form, is the best, with the exception +of the seventh, for that excels them all, and is among States what God is +among men. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: You are quite right, and we should choose that above all. + +STRANGER: The members of all these States, with the exception of the one +which has knowledge, may be set aside as being not Statesmen but partisans, +--upholders of the most monstrous idols, and themselves idols; and, being +the greatest imitators and magicians, they are also the greatest of +Sophists. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: The name of Sophist after many windings in the argument +appears to have been most justly fixed upon the politicians, as they are +termed. + +STRANGER: And so our satyric drama has been played out; and the troop of +Centaurs and Satyrs, however unwilling to leave the stage, have at last +been separated from the political science. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: So I perceive. + +STRANGER: There remain, however, natures still more troublesome, because +they are more nearly akin to the king, and more difficult to discern; the +examination of them may be compared to the process of refining gold. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What is your meaning? + +STRANGER: The workmen begin by sifting away the earth and stones and the +like; there remain in a confused mass the valuable elements akin to gold, +which can only be separated by fire,--copper, silver, and other precious +metal; these are at last refined away by the use of tests, until the gold +is left quite pure. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, that is the way in which these things are said to be +done. + +STRANGER: In like manner, all alien and uncongenial matter has been +separated from political science, and what is precious and of a kindred +nature has been left; there remain the nobler arts of the general and the +judge, and the higher sort of oratory which is an ally of the royal art, +and persuades men to do justice, and assists in guiding the helm of +States:--How can we best clear away all these, leaving him whom we seek +alone and unalloyed? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: That is obviously what has in some way to be attempted. + +STRANGER: If the attempt is all that is wanting, he shall certainly be +brought to light; and I think that the illustration of music may assist in +exhibiting him. Please to answer me a question. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What question? + +STRANGER: There is such a thing as learning music or handicraft arts in +general? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: There is. + +STRANGER: And is there any higher art or science, having power to decide +which of these arts are and are not to be learned;--what do you say? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I should answer that there is. + +STRANGER: And do we acknowledge this science to be different from the +others? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: And ought the other sciences to be superior to this, or no +single science to any other? Or ought this science to be the overseer and +governor of all the others? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: The latter. + +STRANGER: You mean to say that the science which judges whether we ought +to learn or not, must be superior to the science which is learned or which +teaches? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Far superior. + +STRANGER: And the science which determines whether we ought to persuade or +not, must be superior to the science which is able to persuade? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Of course. + +STRANGER: Very good; and to what science do we assign the power of +persuading a multitude by a pleasing tale and not by teaching? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: That power, I think, must clearly be assigned to rhetoric. + +STRANGER: And to what science do we give the power of determining whether +we are to employ persuasion or force towards any one, or to refrain +altogether? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: To that science which governs the arts of speech and +persuasion. + +STRANGER: Which, if I am not mistaken, will be politics? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good. + +STRANGER: Rhetoric seems to be quickly distinguished from politics, being +a different species, yet ministering to it. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: But what would you think of another sort of power or science? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What science? + +STRANGER: The science which has to do with military operations against our +enemies--is that to be regarded as a science or not? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How can generalship and military tactics be regarded as +other than a science? + +STRANGER: And is the art which is able and knows how to advise when we are +to go to war, or to make peace, the same as this or different? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: If we are to be consistent, we must say different. + +STRANGER: And we must also suppose that this rules the other, if we are +not to give up our former notion? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: And, considering how great and terrible the whole art of war is, +can we imagine any which is superior to it but the truly royal? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: No other. + +STRANGER: The art of the general is only ministerial, and therefore not +political? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Exactly. + +STRANGER: Once more let us consider the nature of the righteous judge. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very good. + +STRANGER: Does he do anything but decide the dealings of men with one +another to be just or unjust in accordance with the standard which he +receives from the king and legislator,--showing his own peculiar virtue +only in this, that he is not perverted by gifts, or fears, or pity, or by +any sort of favour or enmity, into deciding the suits of men with one +another contrary to the appointment of the legislator? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: No; his office is such as you describe. + +STRANGER: Then the inference is that the power of the judge is not royal, +but only the power of a guardian of the law which ministers to the royal +power? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: The review of all these sciences shows that none of them is +political or royal. For the truly royal ought not itself to act, but to +rule over those who are able to act; the king ought to know what is and +what is not a fitting opportunity for taking the initiative in matters of +the greatest importance, whilst others should execute his orders. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: And, therefore, the arts which we have described, as they have +no authority over themselves or one another, but are each of them concerned +with some special action of their own, have, as they ought to have, special +names corresponding to their several actions. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I agree. + +STRANGER: And the science which is over them all, and has charge of the +laws, and of all matters affecting the State, and truly weaves them all +into one, if we would describe under a name characteristic of their common +nature, most truly we may call politics. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Exactly so. + +STRANGER: Then, now that we have discovered the various classes in a +State, shall I analyse politics after the pattern which weaving supplied? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I greatly wish that you would. + +STRANGER: Then I must describe the nature of the royal web, and show how +the various threads are woven into one piece. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly. + +STRANGER: A task has to be accomplished, which, although difficult, +appears to be necessary. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly the attempt must be made. + +STRANGER: To assume that one part of virtue differs in kind from another, +is a position easily assailable by contentious disputants, who appeal to +popular opinion. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I do not understand. + +STRANGER: Let me put the matter in another way: I suppose that you would +consider courage to be a part of virtue? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly I should. + +STRANGER: And you would think temperance to be different from courage; +and likewise to be a part of virtue? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: I shall venture to put forward a strange theory about them. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it? + +STRANGER: That they are two principles which thoroughly hate one another +and are antagonistic throughout a great part of nature. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How singular! + +STRANGER: Yes, very--for all the parts of virtue are commonly said to be +friendly to one another. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes. + +STRANGER: Then let us carefully investigate whether this is universally +true, or whether there are not parts of virtue which are at war with their +kindred in some respect. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Tell me how we shall consider that question. + +STRANGER: We must extend our enquiry to all those things which we consider +beautiful and at the same time place in two opposite classes. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Explain; what are they? + +STRANGER: Acuteness and quickness, whether in body or soul or in the +movement of sound, and the imitations of them which painting and music +supply, you must have praised yourself before now, or been present when +others praised them. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: And do you remember the terms in which they are praised? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I do not. + +STRANGER: I wonder whether I can explain to you in words the thought which +is passing in my mind. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Why not? + +STRANGER: You fancy that this is all so easy: Well, let us consider these +notions with reference to the opposite classes of action under which they +fall. When we praise quickness and energy and acuteness, whether of mind +or body or sound, we express our praise of the quality which we admire by +one word, and that one word is manliness or courage. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How? + +STRANGER: We speak of an action as energetic and brave, quick and manly, +and vigorous too; and when we apply the name of which I speak as the common +attribute of all these natures, we certainly praise them. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: And do we not often praise the quiet strain of action also? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: To be sure. + +STRANGER: And do we not then say the opposite of what we said of the +other? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How do you mean? + +STRANGER: We exclaim How calm! How temperate! in admiration of the slow +and quiet working of the intellect, and of steadiness and gentleness in +action, of smoothness and depth of voice, and of all rhythmical movement +and of music in general, when these have a proper solemnity. Of all such +actions we predicate not courage, but a name indicative of order. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: But when, on the other hand, either of these is out of place, +the names of either are changed into terms of censure. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How so? + +STRANGER: Too great sharpness or quickness or hardness is termed violence +or madness; too great slowness or gentleness is called cowardice or +sluggishness; and we may observe, that for the most part these qualities, +and the temperance and manliness of the opposite characters, are arrayed as +enemies on opposite sides, and do not mingle with one another in their +respective actions; and if we pursue the enquiry, we shall find that men +who have these different qualities of mind differ from one another. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: In what respect? + +STRANGER: In respect of all the qualities which I mentioned, and very +likely of many others. According to their respective affinities to either +class of actions they distribute praise and blame,--praise to the actions +which are akin to their own, blame to those of the opposite party--and out +of this many quarrels and occasions of quarrel arise among them. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: The difference between the two classes is often a trivial +concern; but in a state, and when affecting really important matters, +becomes of all disorders the most hateful. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: To what do you refer? + +STRANGER: To nothing short of the whole regulation of human life. For the +orderly class are always ready to lead a peaceful life, quietly doing their +own business; this is their manner of behaving with all men at home, and +they are equally ready to find some way of keeping the peace with foreign +States. And on account of this fondness of theirs for peace, which is +often out of season where their influence prevails, they become by degrees +unwarlike, and bring up their young men to be like themselves; they are at +the mercy of their enemies; whence in a few years they and their children +and the whole city often pass imperceptibly from the condition of freemen +into that of slaves. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What a cruel fate! + +STRANGER: And now think of what happens with the more courageous natures. +Are they not always inciting their country to go to war, owing to their +excessive love of the military life? they raise up enemies against +themselves many and mighty, and either utterly ruin their native-land or +enslave and subject it to its foes? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: That, again, is true. + +STRANGER: Must we not admit, then, that where these two classes exist, +they always feel the greatest antipathy and antagonism towards one +another? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: We cannot deny it. + +STRANGER: And returning to the enquiry with which we began, have we not +found that considerable portions of virtue are at variance with one +another, and give rise to a similar opposition in the characters who are +endowed with them? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: True. + +STRANGER: Let us consider a further point. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: What is it? + +STRANGER: I want to know, whether any constructive art will make any, even +the most trivial thing, out of bad and good materials indifferently, if +this can be helped? does not all art rather reject the bad as far as +possible, and accept the good and fit materials, and from these elements, +whether like or unlike, gathering them all into one, work out some nature +or idea? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: To, be sure. + +STRANGER: Then the true and natural art of statesmanship will never allow +any State to be formed by a combination of good and bad men, if this can be +avoided; but will begin by testing human natures in play, and after testing +them, will entrust them to proper teachers who are the ministers of her +purposes--she will herself give orders, and maintain authority; just as the +art of weaving continually gives orders and maintains authority over the +carders and all the others who prepare the material for the work, +commanding the subsidiary arts to execute the works which she deems +necessary for making the web. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite true. + +STRANGER: In like manner, the royal science appears to me to be the +mistress of all lawful educators and instructors, and having this queenly +power, will not permit them to train men in what will produce characters +unsuited to the political constitution which she desires to create, but +only in what will produce such as are suitable. Those which have no share +of manliness and temperance, or any other virtuous inclination, and, from +the necessity of an evil nature, are violently carried away to godlessness +and insolence and injustice, she gets rid of by death and exile, and +punishes them with the greatest of disgraces. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: That is commonly said. + +STRANGER: But those who are wallowing in ignorance and baseness she bows +under the yoke of slavery. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite right. + +STRANGER: The rest of the citizens, out of whom, if they have education, +something noble may be made, and who are capable of being united by the +statesman, the kingly art blends and weaves together; taking on the one +hand those whose natures tend rather to courage, which is the stronger +element and may be regarded as the warp, and on the other hand those which +incline to order and gentleness, and which are represented in the figure as +spun thick and soft, after the manner of the woof--these, which are +naturally opposed, she seeks to bind and weave together in the following +manner: + +YOUNG SOCRATES: In what manner? + +STRANGER: First of all, she takes the eternal element of the soul and +binds it with a divine cord, to which it is akin, and then the animal +nature, and binds that with human cords. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: I do not understand what you mean. + +STRANGER: The meaning is, that the opinion about the honourable and the +just and good and their opposites, which is true and confirmed by reason, +is a divine principle, and when implanted in the soul, is implanted, as I +maintain, in a nature of heavenly birth. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes; what else should it be? + +STRANGER: Only the Statesman and the good legislator, having the +inspiration of the royal muse, can implant this opinion, and he, only in +the rightly educated, whom we were just now describing. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Likely enough. + +STRANGER: But him who cannot, we will not designate by any of the names +which are the subject of the present enquiry. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very right. + +STRANGER: The courageous soul when attaining this truth becomes civilized, +and rendered more capable of partaking of justice; but when not partaking, +is inclined to brutality. Is not that true? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly. + +STRANGER: And again, the peaceful and orderly nature, if sharing in these +opinions, becomes temperate and wise, as far as this may be in a State, but +if not, deservedly obtains the ignominious name of silliness. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite true. + +STRANGER: Can we say that such a connexion as this will lastingly unite +the evil with one another or with the good, or that any science would +seriously think of using a bond of this kind to join such materials? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Impossible. + +STRANGER: But in those who were originally of a noble nature, and who have +been nurtured in noble ways, and in those only, may we not say that union +is implanted by law, and that this is the medicine which art prescribes for +them, and of all the bonds which unite the dissimilar and contrary parts of +virtue is not this, as I was saying, the divinest? + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Very true. + +STRANGER: Where this divine bond exists there is no difficulty in +imagining, or when you have imagined, in creating the other bonds, which +are human only. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How is that, and what bonds do you mean? + +STRANGER: Rights of intermarriage, and ties which are formed between +States by giving and taking children in marriage, or between individuals by +private betrothals and espousals. For most persons form marriage +connexions without due regard to what is best for the procreation of +children. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: In what way? + +STRANGER: They seek after wealth and power, which in matrimony are objects +not worthy even of a serious censure. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: There is no need to consider them at all. + +STRANGER: More reason is there to consider the practice of those who make +family their chief aim, and to indicate their error. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite true. + +STRANGER: They act on no true principle at all; they seek their ease and +receive with open arms those who are like themselves, and hate those who +are unlike them, being too much influenced by feelings of dislike. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How so? + +STRANGER: The quiet orderly class seek for natures like their own, and as +far as they can they marry and give in marriage exclusively in this class, +and the courageous do the same; they seek natures like their own, whereas +they should both do precisely the opposite. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How and why is that? + +STRANGER: Because courage, when untempered by the gentler nature during +many generations, may at first bloom and strengthen, but at last bursts +forth into downright madness. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Like enough. + +STRANGER: And then, again, the soul which is over-full of modesty and has +no element of courage in many successive generations, is apt to grow too +indolent, and at last to become utterly paralyzed and useless. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: That, again, is quite likely. + +STRANGER: It was of these bonds I said that there would be no difficulty +in creating them, if only both classes originally held the same opinion +about the honourable and good;--indeed, in this single work, the whole +process of royal weaving is comprised--never to allow temperate natures to +be separated from the brave, but to weave them together, like the warp and +the woof, by common sentiments and honours and reputation, and by the +giving of pledges to one another; and out of them forming one smooth and +even web, to entrust to them the offices of State. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: How do you mean? + +STRANGER: Where one officer only is needed, you must choose a ruler who +has both these qualities--when many, you must mingle some of each, for the +temperate ruler is very careful and just and safe, but is wanting in +thoroughness and go. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly, that is very true. + +STRANGER: The character of the courageous, on the other hand, falls short +of the former in justice and caution, but has the power of action in a +remarkable degree, and where either of these two qualities is wanting, +there cities cannot altogether prosper either in their public or private +life. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly they cannot. + +STRANGER: This then we declare to be the completion of the web of +political action, which is created by a direct intertexture of the brave +and temperate natures, whenever the royal science has drawn the two minds +into communion with one another by unanimity and friendship, and having +perfected the noblest and best of all the webs which political life admits, +and enfolding therein all other inhabitants of cities, whether slaves or +freemen, binds them in one fabric and governs and presides over them, and, +in so far as to be happy is vouchsafed to a city, in no particular fails to +secure their happiness. + +YOUNG SOCRATES: Your picture, Stranger, of the king and statesman, no less +than of the Sophist, is quite perfect. + + + + + +End of this Project Gutenberg Etext of Statesman by Plato + diff --git a/old/sttsm10.zip b/old/sttsm10.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..cbf7320 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/sttsm10.zip |