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+The Project Gutenberg eBook, Bolshevism, by John Spargo
+
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+
+
+
+Title: Bolshevism
+       The Enemy of Political and Industrial Democracy
+
+
+Author: John Spargo
+
+
+
+Release Date: August 28, 2005  [eBook #16613]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+
+***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK BOLSHEVISM***
+
+
+E-text prepared by Rick Niles, Josephine Paolucci, and the Project
+Gutenberg Online Distributed Proofreading Team (https://www.pgdp.net/)
+
+
+
+Transcriber's note: Minor typographical errors in the original text
+                    have been corrected and footnotes moved to the
+                    end of the book.
+
+
+
+
+
+BOLSHEVISM
+
+The Enemy of Political and Industrial Democracy
+
+by
+
+JOHN SPARGO
+
+Author of
+"Social Democracy Explained" "Socialism, a Summary and Interpretation of
+Socialist Principles" "Applied Socialism" etc.
+
+Harper & Brothers Publishers
+New York and London
+
+1919
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+     *     *     *     *     *     *     *
+
+      BOOKS BY
+
+      JOHN SPARGO
+
+      BOLSHEVISM
+      AMERICANISM AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY
+      SOCIAL DEMOCRACY EXPLAINED
+
+
+      HARPER & BROTHERS, NEW YORK
+
+      ESTABLISHED 1817
+
+
+     *     *     *     *     *     *     *
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+        PREFACE
+
+     I. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
+
+    II. FROM REVOLUTION TO REVOLUTION
+
+   III. THE WAR AND THE PEOPLE
+
+    IV. THE SECOND REVOLUTION
+
+     V. FROM BOURGEOISIE TO BOLSHEVIKI
+
+    VI. THE BOLSHEVIK WAR AGAINST DEMOCRACY
+
+   VII. BOLSHEVIST THEORY AND PRACTICE
+
+        POSTSCRIPTUM: A PERSONAL STATEMENT
+
+
+APPENDICES:
+
+     I. AN APPEAL TO THE PROLETARIAT BY THE PETROGRAD WORKMEN'S AND
+        SOLDIERS' COUNCIL
+
+    II. HOW THE RUSSIAN PEASANTS FOUGHT FOR A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY
+
+   III. FORMER SOCIALIST PREMIER OF FINLAND ON BOLSHEVISM
+
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+
+In the following pages I have tried to make a plain and easily
+understandable outline of the origin, history, and meaning of Bolshevism. I
+have attempted to provide the average American reader with a fair and
+reliable statement of the philosophy, program, and policies of the Russian
+Bolsheviki. In order to avoid confusion, and to keep the matter as simple
+and clear as possible, I have not tried to deal with the numerous
+manifestations of Bolshevism in other lands, but have confined myself
+strictly to the Russian example. With some detail--too much, some of my
+readers may think!--I have sketched the historical background in order that
+the Bolsheviki may be seen in proper perspective and fairly judged in
+connection with the whole revolutionary movement in Russia.
+
+Whoever turns to these pages in the expectation of finding a sensational
+"exposure" of Bolshevism and the Bolsheviki will be disappointed. It has
+been my aim to make a deliberate and scientific study, not an _ex-parte_
+indictment. A great many lurid and sensational stories about the Bolsheviki
+have been published, the net result of which is to make the leaders of this
+phase of the great universal war of the classes appear as brutal and
+depraved monsters of iniquity. There is not a crime known to mankind,
+apparently, of which they have not been loudly declared to be guilty. My
+long experience in the Socialist movement has furnished me with too much
+understanding of the manner and extent to which working-class movements are
+abused and slandered to permit me to accept these stories as gospel truth.
+That experience has forced me to assume that most of the terrible stories
+told about the Bolsheviki are either untrue and without any foundation in
+fact or greatly exaggerated. The "rumor factories" in Geneva, Stockholm,
+Copenhagen, The Hague, and other European capitals, which were so busy
+during the war fabricating and exploiting for profit stories of massacres,
+victories, assassinations, revolutions, peace treaties, and other momentous
+events, which subsequent information proved never to have happened at all,
+seem now to have turned their attention to the Bolsheviki.
+
+However little of a cynic one may be, it is almost impossible to refrain
+from wondering at the fact that so many writers and journals that in the
+quite recent past maintained absolute silence when the czar and his minions
+were committing their infamous outrages against the working-people and
+their leaders, and that were never known to protest against the many crimes
+committed by our own industrial czars against our working-people and their
+leaders--that these writers and journals are now so violently denouncing
+the Bolsheviki for alleged inhumanities. When the same journals that
+defended or apologized for the brutal lynchings of I.W.W. agitators and the
+savage assaults committed upon other peaceful citizens whose only crime was
+exercising their lawful and moral right to organize and strike for better
+wages, denounce the Bolsheviki for their "brutality" and their
+"lawlessness" and cry for vengeance upon them, honest and sincere men
+become bitter and scornful.
+
+I am not a Bolshevik or a defender of the Bolsheviki. As a Social Democrat
+and Internationalist of many years' standing--and therefore loyal to
+America and American ideals--I am absolutely opposed to the principles and
+practices of the Bolsheviki, which, from the very first, I have regarded
+and denounced as an inverted form of Czarism. It is quite clear to my mind,
+however, that there can be no good result from wild abuse or from
+misrepresentation of facts and motives. I am convinced that the stupid
+campaign of calumny which has been waged against the Bolsheviki has won for
+them the sympathy of many intelligent Americans who love fairness and hate
+injustice. In this way lying and abuse react against those who indulge in
+them.
+
+In this study I have completely ignored the flood of newspaper stories of
+Bolshevist "outrages" and "crimes" which has poured forth during the past
+year. I have ignored, too, the remarkable collection of documents edited
+and annotated by Mr. Sisson and published by the United States Committee on
+Public Information. I do not doubt that there is much that is true in that
+collection of documents--indeed, there is some corroboration of some of
+them--but the means of determining what is true and what false are not yet
+available to the student. So much doubt and suspicion is reasonably and
+properly attached to some of the documents that the value of the whole mass
+is greatly impaired. To rely upon these documents to make a case against
+the Bolsheviki, unless and until they have been more fully investigated and
+authenticated than they appear to have been as yet, and corroborated, would
+be like relying upon the testimony of an unreliable witness to convict a
+man serious crime.
+
+That the Bolsheviki have been guilty of many crimes is certain. Ample
+evidence of that fact will be found in the following pages. They have
+committed many crimes against men and women whose splendid service to the
+Russian revolutionary movement serves only to accentuate the crimes in
+question. But their worst crimes have been against political and social
+democracy, which they have shamefully betrayed and opposed with as little
+scruple, and as much brutal injustice, as was ever manifested by the
+Romanovs. This is a terrible charge, I know, but I believe that the most
+sympathetic toward the Bolsheviki among my readers will, if they are
+candid, admit that it is amply sustained by the evidence.
+
+Concerning that evidence it is perhaps necessary to say that I have
+confined myself to the following: official documents issued by the
+Bolshevist government; the writings and addresses of accredited Bolshevik
+leaders and officials--in the form in which they have been published by the
+Bolsheviki themselves; the declarations of Russian Socialist organizations
+of long and honorable standing in the international Socialist movement; the
+statements of equally well-known and trusted Russian Socialists, and of
+responsible Russian Socialist journals.
+
+While I have indicated the sources of most of the evidence against the
+Bolsheviki, either in the text itself or in the foot-notes and references,
+I have not thought it advisable to burden my pages with such foot-notes and
+references concerning matters of general knowledge. To have given
+references and authorities for all the facts summarized in the historical
+outlines, for example, would have been simply a show of pedantry and served
+only to frighten away the ordinary reader.
+
+I have been deeply indebted to the works of other writers, among which I
+may mention the following: Peter Kropotkin's _Memoirs of a Revolutionist_
+and _Ideals and Realities of Russian Literature_; S. Stepniak's
+_Underground Russia_; Leo Deutsch's _Sixteen Years in Siberia_; Alexander
+Ular's _Russia from Within_; William English Walling's _Russia's Message_;
+Zinovy N. Preev's _The Russian Riddle_; Maxim Litvinov's _The Bolshevik
+Revolution: Its Rise and Meaning_; M.J. Olgin's _The Soul of the Russian
+Revolution_; A.J. Sack's _The Birth of Russian Democracy_; E.A. Ross's
+_Russia in Upheaval_; Isaac Don Levine's _The Russian Revolution_; Bessie
+Beatty's _The Red Heart of Russia_; Louise Bryant's _Six Red Months in
+Russia_; Leon Trotzky's _Our Revolution_ and _The Bolsheviki and World
+Peace_; Gabriel Domergue's _La Russe Rouge_; Nikolai Lenine's _The Soviets
+at Work_; Zinoviev and Lenine's _Sozialismus und Krieg_; Emile
+Vandervelde's _Trois Aspects de la Révolution Russe_; P.G. Chesnais's _La
+Révolution et la Paix_ and _Les Bolsheviks_. I have also freely availed
+myself of the many admirable translations of official Bolshevist documents
+published in _The Class Struggle_, of New York, a pro-Bolshevist magazine;
+the collection of documents published by _The Nation_, of New York, a
+journal exceedingly generous in its treatment of Bolshevism and the
+Bolsheviki; and of the mass of material published in its excellent
+"International Notes" by _Justice_, of London, the oldest Socialist
+newspaper in the English language, I believe, and one of the most ably
+edited.
+
+Grateful acknowledgment is hereby made of friendly service rendered and
+valuable information given by Mr. Alexander Kerensky, former Premier of
+Russia; Mr. Henry L. Slobodin, of New York; Mr. A.J. Sack, Director of the
+Russian Information Bureau in the United States; Dr. Boris Takavenko,
+editor of _La Russia Nuova_, Rome, Italy; Mr. William English Walling, New
+York; and my friend, Father Cahill, of Bennington.
+
+Among the Appendices at the end of the volume will be found some important
+documents containing some contemporary Russian Socialist judgments of
+Bolshevism. These documents are, I venture to suggest, of the utmost
+possible value and importance to the student and general reader.
+
+    JOHN SPARGO,
+
+    "NESTLEDOWN,"
+      OLD BENNNIGTON, VERMONT,
+        _End of January, 1919_.
+
+
+
+
+BOLSHEVISM
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
+
+
+I
+
+For almost a full century Russia has been the theater of a great
+revolutionary movement. In the light of Russian history we read with
+cynical amusement that in 1848, when all Europe was in a revolutionary
+ferment, a German economist confidently predicted that revolutionary
+agitation could not live in the peculiar soil of Russian civilization.
+August Franz von Haxthausen was in many respects a competent and even a
+profound student of Russian politics, but he was wrong in his belief that
+the amount of rural communism existing in Russia, particularly the _mir_,
+would make it impossible for storms of revolutionary agitation to arise and
+stir the national life.
+
+As a matter of historical fact, the ferment of revolution had appeared in
+the land of the Czars long before the German economist made his remarkably
+ill-judged forecast. At the end of the Napoleonic wars many young officers
+of the Russian army returned to their native land full of revolutionary
+ideas and ideals acquired in France, Italy, and Germany, and intent upon
+action. At first their intention was simply to make an appeal to Alexander
+I to grant self-government to Russia, which at one time he had seemed
+disposed to do. Soon they found themselves engaged in a secret conspiratory
+movement having for its object the overthrow of Czarism. The story of the
+failure of these romanticists, the manner in which the abortive attempt at
+revolution in December, 1825, was suppressed, and how the leaders were
+punished by Nicholas I--these things are well known to most students of
+Russian history. The Decembrists, as they came to be called, failed, as
+they were bound to do, but it would be a mistake to suppose that their
+efforts were altogether vain. On the contrary, their inspiration was felt
+throughout the next thirty years and was reflected in the literature of the
+period. During that period Russian literature was tinged with the faith in
+social regeneration held by most of the cultured intellectual classes. The
+Decembrists were the spiritual progenitors of the Russian revolutionary
+movement of our time. In the writings of Pushkin--himself a
+Decembrist--Lermontoff, Gogol, Turgeniev, Dostoyevsky, and many others less
+well known, the influence of the Decembrist movement is clearly manifested.
+
+If we are to select a single figure as the founder of the modern social
+revolutionary movement in Russia, that title can be applied to Alexander
+Herzen with greater fitness than to any other. His influence upon the
+movement during many years was enormous. Herzen was half-German, his mother
+being German. He was born at Moscow in 1812, shortly before the French
+occupation of the city. His parents were very rich and he enjoyed the
+advantages of a splendid education, as well as great luxury. At twenty-two
+years of age he was banished to a small town in the Urals, where he spent
+six years, returning to Moscow in 1840. It is noteworthy that the offense
+for which he had been sent into exile was the singing of songs in praise of
+the Decembrist martyrs. This occurred at a meeting of one of the "Students'
+Circles" founded by Herzen for the dissemination of revolutionary Socialist
+ideals among the students.
+
+Upon his return to Moscow in 1840 Herzen, together with Bakunin and other
+friends, again engaged in revolutionary propaganda and in 1842 he was again
+exiled. In 1847, through the influence of powerful friends, he received
+permission to leave Russia for travel abroad. He never again saw his native
+land, all the remaining years of life being spent in exile. After a tour of
+Italy, Herzen arrived in Paris on the eve of the Revolution of 1848,
+joining there his friends, Bakunin and Turgeniev, and many other
+revolutionary leaders. It was impossible for him to participate actively in
+the 1848 uprising, owing to the activity of the Paris police, but he
+watched the Revolution with the profoundest sympathy. And when it failed
+and was followed by the terrible reaction his distress was almost
+unbounded. For a brief period he was the victim of the most appalling
+pessimism, but after a time his faith returned and he joined with Proudhon
+in issuing a radical revolutionary paper, _L'Ami du Peuple_, of which,
+Kropotkin tells us in his admirable study of Russian literature, "almost
+every number was confiscated by the police of Napoleon the Third." The
+paper had a very brief life, and Herzen himself was soon expelled from
+France, going to Switzerland, of which country he became a citizen.
+
+In 1857 Herzen settled in London, where he published for some years a
+remarkable paper, called _Kolokol (The Bell)_, in which he exposed the
+iniquities and shortcomings of Czarism and inspired the youth of Russia
+with his revolutionary ideals. The paper had to be smuggled into Russia, of
+course, and the manner in which the smuggling was done is one of the most
+absorbing stories in all the tragic history of the vast land of the Czars.
+Herzen was a charming writer and a keen thinker, and it is impossible to
+exaggerate the extent of his influence. But when the freedom of the serfs,
+for which he so vigorously contended, was promulgated by Alexander II, and
+other extensive reforms were granted, his influence waned. He died in 1870
+in Switzerland.
+
+
+II
+
+Alexander II was not alone in hoping that the Act of Liberation would usher
+in a new era of prosperity and tranquillity for Russia. Many of the most
+radical of the Intelligentsia, followers of Herzen, believed that Russia
+was destined to outstrip the older nations of western Europe in its
+democracy and its culture. It was not long before disillusionment came: the
+serfs were set free, but the manner in which the land question had been
+dealt with made their freedom almost a mockery. As a result there were
+numerous uprisings of peasants--riots which the government suppressed in
+the most sanguinary manner. From that time until the present the land
+question has been the core of the Russian problem. Every revolutionary
+movement has been essentially concerned with giving the land to the
+peasants.
+
+Within a few months after the liberation of the serfs the revolutionary
+unrest was so wide-spread that the government became alarmed and instituted
+a policy of vigorous repression. Progressive papers, which had sprung up as
+a result of the liberal tendencies characterizing the reign of Alexander
+II thus far, were suppressed and many of the leading writers were
+imprisoned and exiled. Among those thus punished was that brilliant writer,
+Tchernyshevsky, to whom the Russian movement owes so much. His
+_Contemporary Review_ was, during the four critical years 1858-62 the
+principal forum for the discussion of the problems most vital to the life
+of Russia. In it the greatest leaders of Russian thought discussed the land
+question, co-operation, communism, popular education, and similar subjects.
+This served a twofold purpose: in the first place, it brought to the study
+of the pressing problems of the time the ablest and best minds of the
+country; secondly, it provided these Intellectuals with a bond of union and
+stimulus to serve the poor and the oppressed. That Alexander II had been
+influenced to sign the Emancipation Act by Tchernyshevsky and his friends
+did not cause the authorities to spare Tchernyshevsky when, in 1863, he
+engaged in active Socialist propaganda. He was arrested and imprisoned in a
+fortress, where he wrote the novel which has so profoundly influenced two
+generations of discontented and protesting Russians--_What is to Be Done?_
+In form a novel of thrilling interest, this work was really an elaborate
+treatise upon Russian social conditions. It dealt with the vexed problems
+of marriage and divorce, the land question, co-operative production, and
+other similar matters, and the solutions it suggested for these problems
+became widely accepted as the program of revolutionary Russia. Few books in
+any literature have ever produced such a profound impression, or exerted as
+much influence upon the life of a nation. In the following year, 1864,
+Tchernyshevsky was exiled to hard labor in Siberia, remaining there until
+1883, when he returned to Russia. He lived only six years longer, dying in
+1889.
+
+The attempt made by a young student to assassinate Alexander II, on April
+4, 1866, was seized upon by the Czar and his advisers as an excuse for
+instituting a policy of terrible reaction. The most repressive measures
+were taken against the Intelligentsia and all the liberal reforms which had
+been introduced were practically destroyed. It was impossible to restore
+serfdom, of course, but the condition of the peasants without land was even
+worse than if they had remained serfs. Excessive taxation, heavy redemption
+charges, famine, crop failures, and other ills drove the people to
+desperation. Large numbers of students espoused the cause of the peasants
+and a new popular literature appeared in which the sufferings of the people
+were portrayed with fervor and passion. In 1868-69 there were numerous
+demonstrations and riots by way of protest against the reactionary policy
+of the government.
+
+It was at this time that Michael Bakunin, from his exile in Switzerland,
+conspired with Nechaiev to bring about a great uprising of the peasants,
+through the Society for the Liberation of the People. Bakunin advised the
+students to leave the universities and to go among the people to teach them
+and, at the same time, arouse them to revolt. It was at this time, too,
+that Nicholas Tchaykovsky and his friends, the famous Circle of
+Tchaykovsky, began to distribute among students in all parts of the Empire
+books dealing with the condition of the peasants and proposing remedies
+therefor. This work greatly influenced the young Intelligentsia, but the
+immediate results among the peasants were not very encouraging. Even the
+return from Switzerland, by order of the government, of hundreds of
+students who were disciples of Bakunin and Peter Lavrov did not produce any
+great success.
+
+Very soon a new organization appeared. The remnant of the Circle
+Tchaykovsky, together with some followers of Bakunin, formed a society
+called the Land and Freedom Society. This society, which was destined to
+exert a marked influence upon revolutionary Russia, was the most ambitious
+revolutionary effort Russia had known. The society had a constitution and a
+carefully worked out program. It had one special group to carry on
+propaganda among students; another to agitate among the peasants; and a
+third to employ armed force against the government and against those guilty
+of treachery toward the society. The basis of the society was the
+conviction that Russia needed an economic revolution; that only an economic
+revolution, starting with the producers, could overthrow Czarism and
+establish the ideal state of society.
+
+The members of this Land and Freedom Society divided their work into four
+main divisions: (1) Agitation--passive and active. Passive agitation
+included strikes, petitions for reforms, refusal to pay taxes, and so on.
+Active agitation meant riots and uprisings. (2) Organization--the formation
+of a fighting force prepared to bring about a general uprising. (3)
+Education--the spreading of revolutionary knowledge and ideas, a
+continuation of the work of the Tchaykovsky Circle. (4) Secularization--the
+carrying on of systematic work against the Orthodox Church through special
+channels. One of the early leaders of this society was George Plechanov,
+who later founded the Russian Social Democracy and gave to the Russian
+revolutionary movement its Marxian character, inspiring such men as Nikolai
+Lenine and Leon Trotzky, among many others. The society did not attain any
+very great amount of success in its efforts to reach the peasants, and it
+was that fact more than any other which determined Plechanov's future
+course.
+
+
+III
+
+When the failure of the Land and Freedom methods became evident, and the
+government became more and more oppressive, desperate individuals and
+groups resorted to acts of terrorism. It was thus that Vera Zasulich
+attempted the assassination of the infamous Chief of Police Trepov. The
+movement to temper Czarism by assassination systematically pursued was
+beginning. In 1879 the Land and Freedom Society held a conference for the
+purpose of discussing its program. A majority favored resorting to
+terroristic tactics; Plechanov and a few other well-known revolutionists
+were opposed--favoring the old methods. The society split, the majority
+becoming known as the Will of the People and adopting a terroristic
+program. This organization sentenced Czar Alexander II to death and several
+unsuccessful attempts were made to carry out the sentence. The leaders
+believed that the assassination of the Czar would give rise to a general
+revolution throughout the whole of Russia. In February, 1880, occurred the
+famous attempt to blow up the Winter Palace. For a time it seemed that the
+Czar had learned the lesson the Will of the People sought to teach him, and
+that he would institute far-reaching reforms. Pursuing a policy of
+vacillation and fear, however, Alexander II soon fell back into the old
+attitude. On March 1, 1881, a group of revolutionists, among them Sophia
+Perovskaya, made another attempt upon his life, succeeding, at first, only
+in damaging the bottom of the Czar's carriage and wounding a number of
+Cossack soldiers. "Thank God, I am untouched," said the Czar, in response
+to the inquiry of an officer of his guard. "It's too soon to thank God!"
+cried N.I. Grinevitsky, hurling a bomb at the Czar. Within a short time
+Alexander II and his assailant were both dead.
+
+The assassination of Alexander II was a tragic event for Russia. On the
+very morning of his death the ill-fated monarch had approved a plan for
+extensive reforms presented by the liberal Minister, Loris-Melikoff. It had
+been decided to call a conference three days later and to invite a number
+of well-known public men to co-operate in introducing the reforms. These
+reforms would not have been far-reaching enough to satisfy the
+revolutionists, but they would certainly have improved the situation and
+given Russia a new hope. That hope died with Alexander II. His son,
+Alexander III, had always been a pronounced reactionary and had advised his
+father against making any concessions to the agitators. It was not
+surprising, therefore, that he permitted himself to be advised against the
+liberals by the most reactionary bureaucrats in the Empire, and to adopt
+the most oppressive policies.
+
+The new Czar was greatly influenced by his former tutor, the reactionary
+bureaucrat Pobiedonostzev. At first it was believed that out of respect for
+his father's memory Alexander III would carry out the program of reforms
+formulated by Loris-Melikoff, as his father had promised to do. In a
+Manifesto issued on the 29th of April, 1881, Alexander III promised to do
+this, but in the same document there were passages which could only be
+interpreted as meaning that all demands for constitutional reform would be
+resisted and Absolutism upheld at all cost. Doubtless it was due to the
+influence of Pobiedonostzev, Procurator of the Holy Synod, that Alexander
+III soon abandoned all intention of carrying out his father's wishes in the
+matter of reform and instituted such reactionary policies that the peasants
+feared that serfdom was to be restored. A terrible persecution of the Jews
+was begun, lasting for several years. The Poles, too, felt the oppressive
+hand of Pobiedonostzev. The latter was mastered by the Slavophil philosophy
+that the revolutionary unrest in Russia was traceable to the diversity of
+races, languages, and religions. He believed that Nihilism, Anarchism, and
+Socialism flourished because the people were cosmopolitan rather than
+nationalistic in experience and feeling, and that peace and stability could
+come only from the persistent and vigorous development of the three
+principles of Nationality, Orthodoxy, and Autocracy as the basis of the
+state.
+
+In this doctrine we have the whole explanation of the reactionary policy of
+Alexander III. In the Manifesto of April 29th was announced the Czar's
+determination to strengthen and uphold autocracy. That was the foundation
+stone. To uphold orthodoxy was the next logical necessity, for autocracy
+and orthodoxy were, in Russia, closely related. Hence the non-orthodox
+sects--such as the Finnish Protestants, German Lutherans, Polish Roman
+Catholics, the Jews, and the Mohammedans--were increasingly restricted in
+the observance of their religion. They might not build new places of
+worship; their children could not be educated in the faith of their
+parents. In many cases children were taken away from their parents in order
+to be sent to schools where they would be inculcated with the orthodox
+faith. In a similar way, every attempt was made to suppress the use of
+languages other than Russian.
+
+Along with this attempt to force the whole population into a single mold
+went a determined resistance to liberalism in all its forms. All this was
+accompanied by a degree of efficiency in the police service quite unusual
+in Russia, with the result that the terroristic tactics of the Will of the
+People party were unavailing, except in the cases of a few minor officials.
+Plots to assassinate the Czar were laid, but they were generally betrayed
+to the police. The most serious of these plots, in March, 1887, led to the
+arrest of all the conspirators.
+
+In the mean time there had appeared the first definite Marxian Social
+Democratic group in Russia. Plechanov, Vera Zasulich, Leo Deutsch, and
+other Russian revolutionists in Switzerland formed the organization known
+as the Group for the Emancipation of Labor. This organization was based
+upon the principles and tactics of Marxian Socialism and sought to create a
+purely proletarian movement. As we have seen, when revolutionary terrorism
+was at its height Plechanov and his disciples had proclaimed its futility
+and pinned their faith to the nascent class of industrial wage-workers. In
+the early 'eighties this class was so small in Russia that it seemed to
+many of the best and clearest minds of the revolutionary movement quite
+hopeless to rely upon it. Plechanov was derided as a mere theorist and
+closet philosopher, but he never wavered in his conviction that Socialism
+must come in Russia as the natural outcome of capitalist development. By
+means of a number of scholarly polemics against the principles and tactics
+of the Will of the People party, Plechanov gathered to his side of the
+controversy a group of very brilliant and able disciples, and so laid the
+basis for the Social Democratic Labor party. With the relatively rapid
+expansion of capitalism, beginning with the year 1888, and the inevitable
+increase of the city proletariat, the Marxian movement made great progress.
+A strong labor-union movement and a strong political Socialist movement
+were thus developed side by side.
+
+At the same time there was a revival of terrorism, the one available reply
+of the oppressed to brutal autocracy. While the Marxian movement made
+headway among the industrial workers, the older terroristic movement made
+headway among the peasants. Various groups appeared in different parts of
+the country. When Alexander III died, at the end of 1894, both movements
+had developed considerable strength. Working in secret and subject to
+terrible measures of repression, their leaders being constantly imprisoned
+and exiled, these two wings of the Russian revolutionary movement were
+gathering strength in preparation for an uprising more extensive and
+serious than anything that had hitherto been attempted.
+
+Whenever a new Czar ascended the throne in Russia it was the fashion to
+hope for some measure of reform and for a degree of liberality. Frequently,
+as in the case of Alexander III, all such hopes were speedily killed, but
+repeated experiences of the kind did not prevent the birth of new hopes
+with the death of successive Czars. When, therefore, Alexander III was
+succeeded by his son, Nicholas II, liberal Russia expectantly awaited the
+promulgation of constitutional reforms. In this they were doomed to
+disappointment, just as they had been on the occasion of the accession of
+the new Czar's immediate predecessor. Nicholas II was evidently going to be
+quite as reactionary as his father was. This was made manifest in a number
+of ways. When a deputation from one of the zemstvos, which congratulated
+him upon his ascension to the throne, expressed the hope that he would
+listen to "the voice of the people and the expression of its desires," the
+reply of the new Czar was a grim warning of what was to come. Nicholas II
+told the zemstvos that he intended to follow the example of his father and
+uphold the principles of Absolutism, and that any thought of participation
+by the zemstvos or other organizations of the people in state affairs was a
+senseless dream. More significant still, perhaps, was the fact that the
+hated Pobiedonostzev was retained in power.
+
+The revolutionists were roused as they had not been for a decade or more.
+Some of the leaders believed that the new reign of reaction would prove to
+be the occasion and the opportunity for bringing about a union of all the
+revolutionary forces, Anarchists and Socialists alike, peasants and
+industrial workers. This hope was destined to fail, but there was an
+unmistakable revolutionary awakening. In the latter part of January, 1895,
+an open letter to Nicholas II was smuggled into the country from
+Switzerland and widely distributed. It informed the Czar that the
+Socialists would fight to the bitter end the hateful order of things which
+he was responsible for creating, and menacingly said, "It will not be long
+before you find yourself entangled by it."
+
+
+IV
+
+In one respect Nicholas II differed from Alexander III--he was by nature
+more humane and sentimental. Like his father, he was thoroughly dominated
+by Pobiedonostzev's theory that Russia, in order to be secure and stable,
+must be based upon Nationality, Orthodoxy, and Autocracy. He wanted to see
+Holy Russia homogeneous and free from revolutionary disturbances. But his
+sensitive nature shrank from the systematic persecution of the non-orthodox
+sects and the Jews, and he quietly intimated to the officials that he would
+not approve its continuance. At the same time, he was not willing to face
+the issue squarely and openly announce a change of policy or restore
+religious freedom. That would have meant the overthrow of Pobiedonostzev
+and the Czar's emancipation from his sinister influence, and for that
+Nicholas II lacked the necessary courage and stamina. Cowardice and
+weakness of the will characterized his reign from the very beginning.
+
+When the officials, in obedience to their ruler's wishes, relaxed the
+severity which had marked the treatment of the Jews and the non-orthodox
+Christian sects, the change was soon noted by the victims and once more
+there was a revival of hope. But the efforts of the Finns to secure a
+modification of the Russification policy were quite fruitless. When a
+deputation was sent from Finland to represent to the Czar that the rights
+and privileges solemnly reserved to them at the time of the annexation were
+being denied to the people of Finland, Nicholas II refused to grant the
+deputation an audience. Instead of getting relief, the people of Finland
+soon found that the oppression steadily increased. It was evident that
+Finnish nationality was to be crushed out, if possible, in the interest of
+Russian homogeneity.
+
+It soon became apparent, moreover, that Pobiedonostzev was to enjoy even
+more power than he had under Alexander III. In proportion as the character
+of Nicholas II was weaker than that of his father, the power of the
+Procurator of the Holy Synod was greater. And there was a superstitious
+element in the mentality of the new Czar which Pobiedonostzev played upon
+with infinite cunning. He ruled the weak-willed Czar and filled the
+ministries with men who shared his views and upon whom he could rely.
+Notwithstanding the Czar's expressed wishes, he soon found ways and means
+to add to the persecutions of the Jews and the various non-orthodox
+Christian sects. In his determination to hammer the varied racial groups
+into a homogeneous nation, he adopted terrible measures and so roused the
+hatred of the Finns, Armenians, Georgians, and other subject peoples,
+stirring among them passionate resentment and desire for revolutionary
+action. It is impossible to conceive of a policy more dangerous to the
+dynasty than was conceived and followed by this fanatical Russophil. The
+Poles were persecuted and forced, in sheer despair, and by self-interest,
+into the revolutionary movement. Armenians were persecuted and their church
+lands and church funds confiscated; so they, too, were forced into the
+revolutionary current.
+
+Worse than all else was the cruel persecution of the Jews. Not only were
+they compelled to live within the Pale of Settlement, but this was so
+reduced that abominable congestion and poverty resulted. Intolerable
+restrictions were placed upon the facilities for education in the secondary
+schools, the gymnasia, and in the universities. It was hoped in this way to
+destroy the intellectual leadership of the Jews. Pogroms were instigated,
+stirring the civilized world to protest at the horrible outrages. The
+Minister of the Interior, Von Plehve, proclaimed his intention to "drown
+the Revolution in Jewish blood," while Pobiedonostzev's ambition was "to
+force one-third of the Jews to conversion, another third to emigrate"--to
+escape persecution. The other third he expected to die of hunger and
+misery. When Leo Tolstoy challenged these infamies, and called upon the
+civilized world on behalf of the victims, the Holy Synod denounced Tolstoy
+and his followers as a sect "especially dangerous for the Orthodox Church
+and the state." Later, in 1900, the Holy Synod excommunicated Tolstoy from
+the Orthodox Church.
+
+The fatal logic of fanatical fury led to attacks upon the zemstvos. These
+local organizations had been instituted in 1864, by Alexander II, in the
+liberal years of his reign. Elected mainly by the landlords and the
+peasants, they were a vital part of the life of the nation. Possessing no
+political powers or functions, having nothing to do with legislation, they
+were important agencies of local government. The representatives of each
+county constituted a county-zemstvo and the representatives elected by all
+the county-zemstvos in a province constituted a province-zemstvo. Both
+types concerned themselves with much the same range of activities. They
+built roads and telegraph stations; they maintained model farms and
+agricultural experiment stations similar to those maintained by our state
+governments. They maintained schools, bookstores, and libraries:
+co-operative stores; hospitals and banks. They provided the peasants with
+cheap credit, good seeds, fertilizers, agricultural implements, and so
+forth. In many cases they provided for free medical aid to the peasants. In
+some instances they published newspapers and magazines.
+
+It must be remembered that the zemstvos were the only representative public
+bodies elected by any large part of the people. While the suffrage was
+quite undemocratic, being so arranged that the landlords were assured a
+majority over the peasants at all times, nevertheless they did perform a
+great democratic service. But for them, life would have been well-nigh
+impossible for the peasant. In addition to the services already enumerated,
+these civic bodies were the relief agencies of the Empire, and when crop
+failures brought famine to the peasants it was always the zemstvos which
+undertook the work of relief. Hampered at every point, denied the right to
+control the schools they created and maintained, inhibited by law from
+discussing political questions, the zemstvos, nevertheless, became the
+natural channels for the spreading of discontent and opposition to the
+régime through private communication and discussion.
+
+To bureaucrats of the type of Pobiedonostzev and Von Plehve, with their
+fanatical belief in autocracy, these organizations of the people were so
+many plague spots. Not daring to suppress them altogether, they determined
+to restrict them at every opportunity. Some of the zemstvos were suspended
+and disbanded for certain periods of time. Individual members were exiled
+for utterances which Von Plehve regarded as dangerous. The power of the
+zemstvos themselves was lessened by taking from them such important
+functions as the provisioning of famine-stricken districts and by limiting
+in the most arbitrary manner the amount of the budget permitted to each
+zemstvo. Since every decision of the zemstvos was subject to veto by the
+governors of the respective provinces, the government had at all times a
+formidable weapon at hand to use in its fight against the zemstvos. This
+weapon Von Plehve used with great effect; the most reasonable actions of
+the zemstvos were vetoed for no other reason than hatred of any sort of
+representative government.
+
+
+V
+
+The result of all this was to drive the zemstvos toward the revolutionary
+movements of the peasants and the city workers. That the zemstvos were not
+naturally inclined to radicalism and revolution needs no demonstration.
+Economic interest, tradition, and environment all conspired to keep these
+popular bodies conservative. Landowners were always in the majority and in
+general the zemstvos reflected the ideas and ideals of the enlightened
+wealthy and cultivated classes. The peasant representatives in the zemstvos
+were generally peasants of the most successful and prosperous type, hating
+the revolutionists and all their works. By means of a policy incredibly
+insane these conservatively inclined elements of the population were goaded
+to revolt. The newspapers and magazines of the zemstvos became more and
+more critical of the government, more and more outspoken in denunciation of
+existing conditions. Presently, the leaders of the zemstvos followed the
+example of the revolutionists and held a secret convention at which a
+program for common action was agreed upon. Thus they were resorting to
+illegal methods, exactly as the Socialists had done. Finally, many of the
+liberal zemstvo leaders formed themselves into a political party--the Union
+of Liberation--with a special organ of its own, called _Emancipation_. This
+organ, edited by the brilliant and courageous Peter Struve, was published
+in Stuttgart, Germany, and, since its circulation in Russia was forbidden,
+it had to be smuggled into the country and secretly circulated, just as the
+revolutionary Socialist journals were. Thus another bond was established
+between two very different movements.
+
+As was inevitable, revolutionary terrorism enormously increased. In the
+cities the working-men were drawn mainly into the Social Democratic
+Working-men's party, founded by Plechanov and others in 1898, but the
+peasants, in so far as they were aroused at all, rallied around the
+standard of the Socialist-Revolutionists, successors to the Will of the
+People party. This party was peculiarly a party of the peasants, just as
+the party of Plechanov was peculiarly a party of industrial workers. It
+emphasized the land question above all else. It naturally scorned the view,
+largely held by the Marxists in the other party, that Russia must wait
+until her industrial development was perfected before attempting to realize
+Socialism. It scorned the slow, legalistic methods and resolutely answered
+the terrorism of Czarism by a terrorism of the people. It maintained a
+special department for carrying on this grim work. Its Central Committee
+passed sentences of death upon certain officials, and its decrees were
+carried out by the members of its Fighting Organization. To this
+organization within the party belonged many of the ablest and most
+consecrated men and women in Russia.
+
+A few illustrations will suffice to make clear the nature of this
+terroristic retaliation: In March, 1902, Sypiagin, the Minister of the
+Interior, was shot down as he entered his office by a member of the
+Fighting Organization, Stephen Balmashev, who was disguised as an officer.
+Sypiagin had been duly sentenced to death by the Central Committee. He had
+been responsible for upward of sixty thousand political arrests and for the
+suffering of many exiles. Balmashev went to his death with heroic
+fortitude. In May, 1903, Gregory Gershuni and two associates executed the
+reactionary Governor of Ufa. Early in June, 1904, Borikov, Governor-General
+of Finland, was assassinated by a revolutionist. A month later, July 15th,
+the infamous Von Plehve, who had been judged by the Central Committee and
+held responsible for the Kishinev pogrom, was killed by a bomb thrown under
+the wheels of his carriage by Sazanov, a member of the Fighting Force. The
+death of this cruel tyrant thrilled the world. In February, 1905, Ivan
+Kaliaiev executed the death sentence which had been passed upon the
+ruthless Governor-General of Moscow, the Grand-Duke Serghei Alexandrovich.
+
+There was war in Russia--war between two systems of organized terrorism.
+Sometimes the Czar and his Ministers weakened and promised concessions, but
+always there was speedy reaction and, usually, an increased vigor of
+oppression. The assassination of Von Plehve, however, for the first time
+really weakened the government. Czarism was, in fact, already toppling. The
+new Minister of the Interior, Von Plehve's successor, Prince
+Svyatpolk-Mirski, sought to meet the situation by a policy of compromise.
+While he maintained Von Plehve's methods of suppressing the radical
+organizations and their press, and using provocative agents to entrap
+revolutionary leaders, he granted a certain degree of freedom to the
+moderate press and adopted a relatively liberal attitude toward the
+zemstvos. By this means he hoped to avert the impending revolution.
+
+Taking advantage of the new conditions, the leaders of the zemstvos
+organized a national convention. This the government forbade, but it had
+lost much of its power and the leaders of the movement ignored the order
+and proceeded to hold the convention. At this convention, held at St.
+Petersburg, November 6, 1904, attended by many of the ablest lawyers,
+doctors, professors, scientists, and publicists in Russia, a resolution was
+adopted demanding that the government at once call representatives of the
+people together for the purpose of setting up a constitutional government
+in Russia. It was a revolutionary act, a challenge to the autocracy, which
+the latter dared not accept. On the contrary, in December the Czar issued
+an ambiguous ukase in which a number of concessions and reforms were
+promised, but carefully avoiding the fundamental issues at stake.
+
+
+VI
+
+Meanwhile the war with Japan, unpopular from the first, had proved to be an
+unbroken series of military defeats and disasters for Russia. From the
+opening of the war in February to the end of the year the press had been
+permitted to publish very little real news concerning it, but it was not
+possible to hide for long the bitter truth. Taxes mounted higher and
+higher, prices rose, and there was intense suffering, while the loss of
+life was enormous. News of the utter failure and incompetence of the army
+and the navy seeped through. Here was Russia with a population three times
+as large as that of Japan, and with an annual budget of two billions as
+against Japan's paltry sixty millions, defeated at every turn. What did
+this failure signify? In the first place, it signified the weakness and
+utter incompetence of the régime. It meant that imperialist expansion, with
+a corresponding strengthening of the old régime, was out of the question.
+Most intelligent Russians, with no lack of real patriotism, rejoiced at the
+succession of defeats because it proved to the masses the unfitness of the
+bureaucracy.
+
+It signified something else, also. There were many who remembered the
+scandals of the Turkish War, in 1877, when Bessarabia was recovered. At
+that time there was a perfect riot of graft, corruption, and treachery,
+much of which came under the observation of the zemstvos of the border.
+High military officials trafficked in munitions and food-supplies. Food
+intended for the army was stolen and sold--sometimes, it was said, to the
+enemy. Materials were paid for, but never delivered to the army at all. The
+army was demoralized and the Turks repulsed the Russians again and again.
+Now similar stories began to be circulated. Returning victims told stories
+of brutal treatment of the troops by officers; of wounded and dying men
+neglected; of lack of hospital care and medical attention. They told worse
+stories, too, of open treachery by military officials and others; of army
+supplies stolen; of shells ordered which would fit no guns the Russian army
+ever had, and so on. It was suggested, and widely believed, that Germany
+had connived at the systematic corruption of the Russian bureaucracy and
+the Russian army, to serve its own imperialistic and economic ends.
+
+Such was the state of Russia at the end of the year 1904. Then came the
+tragic events of January, 1905, which marked the opening of the Revolution.
+In order to counteract the agitation of the Social Democrats among the city
+workers, and the formation by them of trades-unions, the government had
+caused to be formed "legal" unions--that is, organizations of workmen
+approved by the government. In order to give these organizations some
+semblance to real labor-unions, and thereby the better to deceive the
+workers, strikes were actually inspired by agents of the government from
+time to time. On more than one occasion strikes thus instigated by the
+government spread beyond control and caused great alarm. The Czar and his
+agents were playing with fire.
+
+Among such unions was the Gathering of Industrial Working-men of St.
+Petersburg, which had for its program such innocent and non-revolutionary
+objects as "sober and reasonable pastimes, aimed at physical, intellectual,
+and moral improvement; strengthening of Russian national ideas; development
+of sensible views concerning the rights and duties of working-men and
+improvement of labor conditions and mutual assistance." It was founded by
+Father Gapon, who was opposed to the revolutionary movement, and was
+regarded by the Socialists as a Czarist tool.
+
+On January 3d--Russian calendar--several thousand men belonging to the
+Gathering of Industrial Workin-gmen of St. Petersburg went out on strike.
+By the 6th the strike had assumed the dimensions of a general strike. It
+was estimated that on the latter date fully one hundred and forty thousand
+men were out on strike, practically paralyzing the industrial life of the
+city. At meetings of the strikers speeches were made which had as much to
+do with the political demands for constitutional government as with the
+original grievances of the strikers. The strike was fast becoming a
+revolution. On the 9th Father Gapon led the hosts to the Winter Palace, to
+present a petition to the Czar asking for reforms. The text of the petition
+was widely circulated beforehand. It begged the Czar to order immediately
+"that representatives of all the Russian land, of all classes and groups,
+convene." It outlined a moderate program which had the support of almost
+the entire nation with the exception of the bureaucracy:
+
+    Let every one be equal and free in the right of election; order to
+    this end that election for the Constituent Assembly be based on
+    general, equal, direct, and secret suffrage. This is our main
+    request; in it and upon it everything is founded; this is the only
+    ointment for our painful wounds; and in the absence of this our
+    blood will continue to flow constantly, carrying us swiftly toward
+    death.
+
+    But this measure alone cannot remedy all our wounds. Many others
+    are necessary, and we tell them to you, Sire, directly and openly,
+    as to our Father. We need:
+
+    _I. Measures to counteract the ignorance and legal oppression of
+    the Russian people_:
+
+    (1) Personal freedom and inviolability, freedom of speech and the
+    press, freedom of assemblage, freedom in religious affairs;
+
+    (2) General and compulsory public education at the expense of the
+    state;
+
+    (3) Responsibility of the Ministers to the people, and guaranties
+    of lawfulness in administration;
+
+    (4) Equality before the law for all without exemption;
+
+    (5) Immediate rehabilitation of those punished for their
+    convictions.
+
+    (6) Separation of the Church from the state.
+
+    _II. Measures against the poverty of the people_:
+
+    (1) Abolition of indirect taxes and introduction of direct income
+    taxes on a progressive scale;
+
+    (2) Abolition of the redemption payments, cheap credit, and
+    gradual transferring of the land to the people;
+
+    (3) The orders for the naval and military Ministers should be
+    filled in Russia and not abroad;
+
+    (4) The cessation of the war by the will of the people.
+
+    _III. Measures against oppression of labor by capital_:
+
+    (1) Protection of labor by legislation;
+
+    (2) Freedom of consumers' and producers' leagues and
+    trades-unions;
+
+    (3) An eight-hour workday and a regulation of overtime;
+
+    (4) Freedom of struggle against capital (freedom of labor
+    strikes);
+
+    (5) Participation of labor representatives in the framing of a
+    bill concerning state insurance of working-men;
+
+    (6) Normal wages.
+
+    Those are, Sire, the principal wants with which we have come to
+    you. Let your decree be known, swear that you will satisfy them,
+    and you will make Russia happy and glorious, and your name will be
+    branded in our hearts and in the hearts of our posterity for ever
+    and ever. If, however, you will not reply to our prayer, we shall
+    die here, on the place before your palace. We have no other refuge
+    and no other means. We have two roads before us, one to freedom
+    and happiness, the other to the grave. Tell us, Sire, which, and
+    we will follow obediently, and if it be the road of death, let our
+    lives be a sacrifice for suffering-wearied Russia. We do not
+    regret the sacrifice; we bring it willingly.
+
+Led on by the strange, hypnotic power of the mystical Father Gapon, who was
+clad in the robes of his office, tens of thousands of working-people
+marched that day to the Winter Palace, confident that the Czar would see
+them, receive their petitions, and harken to their prayers. It was not a
+revolutionary demonstration in the accepted sense of that term; the
+marchers did not carry red flags nor sing Socialist songs of revolt.
+Instead, they bore pictures of the Czar and other members of the royal
+family and sang "God Save the Czar" and other well-known religious hymns.
+No attempt was made to prevent the procession from reaching the square in
+front of the Winter Palace. Suddenly, without a word of warning, troops
+appeared from the courtyards, where they were hidden, and fired into the
+crowded mass of human beings, killing more than five hundred and wounding
+nearly three thousand. All who were able to do so turned and fled, among
+them Father Gapon.
+
+Bloody Sunday, as the day is known in Russian annals, is generally regarded
+as the beginning of the First Revolution. Immediately people began to talk
+of armed resistance. On the evening of the day of the tragedy there was a
+meeting of more than seven hundred Intellectuals at which the means for
+carrying on revolution was the topic discussed. This was the first of many
+similar gatherings which took place all over Russia. Soon the Intellectuals
+began to organize unions, ostensibly for the protection of their
+professional interests, but in reality for political purposes. There were
+unions of doctors, writers, lawyers, engineers, professors, editors, and so
+on. Quietly, and almost without design, there was being effected another
+and more important union, namely, the union of all classes against
+autocracy and despotism.
+
+The Czar gave from his private purse fifty thousand rubles for the relief
+of the families of the victims of Bloody Sunday. On the 19th of January he
+received a deputation of carefully selected "loyal" working-men and
+delivered to them a characteristic homily, which infuriated the masses by
+its stupid perversion of the facts connected with the wanton massacre of
+Bloody Sunday. Then, at the end of the month, he proclaimed the appointment
+of a commission to "investigate the causes of labor unrest in St.
+Petersburg and its suburbs and to find means of avoiding them in the
+future." This commission was to consist of representatives of capital and
+labor. The working-men thereupon made the following demands:
+
+(1) That labor be given an equal number of members in the commission with
+capital;
+
+(2) That the working-men be permitted to freely elect their own
+representatives;
+
+(3) That the sessions of the commission be open to the public;
+
+(4) That there be complete freedom of speech for the representatives of
+labor in the commission;
+
+(5) That all the working-people arrested on January 9th be released.
+
+These demands of the working-men's organizations were rejected by the
+government, whereupon the workers agreed to boycott the commission and
+refuse to have anything to do with it. At last it became evident to the
+government that, in the circumstances, the commission could not accomplish
+any good, and it was therefore abandoned. The Czar and his advisers were
+desperate and vacillating. One day they would adopt a conciliatory attitude
+toward the workers, and the next day follow it up with fresh measures of
+repression and punishment.
+
+Little heeding the stupid charge by the Holy Synod that the revolutionary
+leaders were in the pay of the Japanese, the workers went on organizing and
+striking. All over Russia there were strikes, the movement had spread far
+beyond the bounds of St. Petersburg. General strikes took place in many of
+the large cities, such as Riga, Vilna, Libau, Warsaw, Lodz, Batum, Minsk,
+Tiflis, and many others. Conflicts between strikers and soldiers and police
+were common. Russia was aflame with revolution. The movement spread to the
+peasants in a most surprising manner. Numerous extensive and serious
+revolts of peasants occurred in different parts of Russia, the peasants
+looting the mansions of the landowners, and indulging in savage outbreaks
+of rioting.
+
+While this was going on the army was being completely demoralized. The
+terrible defeat of the Russian forces by the Japanese--the foe that had
+been so lightly regarded--at Mukden was a crushing blow which greatly
+impaired the morale of the troops, both those at home and those at the
+front. Disaster followed upon disaster. May saw the destruction of the
+great Russian fleet. In June rebellion broke out in the navy, and the crew
+of the battle-ship _Potyamkin_, which was on the Black Sea, mutinied and
+hoisted the red flag. After making prisoners of their officers, the sailors
+hastened to lend armed assistance to striking working-men at Odessa who
+were in conflict with soldiers and police.
+
+
+VII
+
+It was a time of turbulent unrest and apparent utter confusion. It was not
+easy to discern the underlying significance and purpose of some of the most
+important events. On every hand there were strikes and uprisings, many of
+them without any sort of leadership or plan. Strikes which began over
+questions of wages and hours became political demonstrations in favor of a
+Constituent Assembly. On the other hand, political demonstrations became
+transformed, without any conscious effort on the part of anybody, into
+strikes for immediate economic betterment. There was an intense class
+conflict going on in Russia, as the large number of strikes for increased
+wages and shorter hours proved, yet the larger political struggle dwarfed
+and obscured the class struggle. For the awakened proletariat of the
+cities the struggle in which they were engaged was economic as well as
+political. They wisely regarded the political struggle as part of the class
+struggle, as Plechanov and his friends declared it to be. Yet the fact
+remained that the capitalist class against which the proletariat was
+fighting on the economic field was, for the most part, fighting against
+autocracy, for the overthrow of Czarism and the establishment of political
+democracy, as earnestly, if less violently, than the proletariat was. The
+reason for this was the recognition by the leading capitalists of Russia of
+the fact that industrial progress was retarded by the old régime, and that
+capitalist development requires popular education, a relatively high
+standard of living, political freedom, and stability and order in
+government. It was perfectly natural, therefore, for the great associations
+of manufacturers and merchants to unite in urging the government to grant
+extensive political reforms so long as the class conflict was merely
+incidental.
+
+What had begun mainly as a class war had become the war of all classes
+against autocracy. Of course, in such a merging of classes there
+necessarily appeared many shadings and degrees of interest. Not all the
+social groups and classes were as radical in their demands as the organized
+peasants and city workers, who were the soul of the revolutionary movement.
+There were, broadly speaking, two great divisions of social life with which
+the Revolution was concerned--the political and the economic. With regard
+to the first there was practical unanimity; he would be a blind slave to
+theoretical formulć who sought to maintain the thesis that class interests
+divided masses and classes here. All classes, with the exception of the
+bureaucracy, wanted the abolition of Czarism and Absolutism and the
+establishment of a constitutional government, elected by the people on a
+basis of universal suffrage, and directly responsible to the electorate.
+
+Upon the economic issue there was less agreement, though all parties and
+classes recognized the need of extensive change. It was universally
+recognized that some solution of the land question must be found. There can
+never be social peace or political stability in Russia until that problem
+is settled. Now, it was easy for the Socialist groups, on the one hand, and
+the moderate groups, upon the other, to unite in demanding that the large
+estates be divided among the peasants. But while the Socialist
+groups--those of the peasants as well as those of city workers--demanded
+that the land be taken without compensation, the bourgeois elements,
+especially the leaders of the zemstvos, insisted that the state should pay
+compensation for the land taken. Judgment upon this vital question has long
+been embittered by the experience of the peasants with the "redemption
+payments" which were established when serfdom was abolished. During the
+period of greatest intensity, the summer of 1905, a federation of the
+various revolutionary peasants' organizations was formed and based its
+policy upon the middle ground of favoring the payment of compensation _in
+some cases_.
+
+All through this trying period the Czar and his advisers were temporizing
+and attempting to obtain peace by means of petty concessions. A greater
+degree of religious liberty was granted, and a new representative body, the
+Imperial Duma, was provided for. This body was not to be a parliament in
+any real sense, but a debating society. It could _discuss_ proposed
+legislation, but it had no powers to _enact_ legislation of any kind.
+Absolutism was dying hard, clinging to its powers with remarkable tenacity.
+Of course, the concessions did not satisfy the revolutionists, not even
+the most moderate sections, and the net result was to intensify rather than
+to diminish the flame.
+
+On the 2d of August--10th, according to the old Russian calendar--the war
+with Japan came to an end with the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth.
+Russia had experienced humiliating and disastrous defeat at the hands of a
+nation far inferior in population and wealth, but infinitely superior in
+military capacity and morale. The news of the conditions of peace
+intensified the ardor and determination of the revolting Russian people
+and, on the other hand, added to the already great weakness of the
+government. September witnessed a great revival of revolutionary agitation,
+and by the end of the month a fresh epidemic of strikes had broken out in
+various parts of the country. By the middle of October the whole life of
+Russia, civil, industrial, and commercial, was a chaos. In some of the
+cities the greater part of the population had placed themselves in a state
+of siege, under revolutionary leadership.
+
+On the 17th of October--Russian style--the Czar issued the famous Manifesto
+which acknowledged the victory of the people and the death of Absolutism.
+After the usual amount of pietistic verbiage by way of introduction the
+Manifesto said:
+
+    We make it the duty of the government to execute our firm will:
+
+    (1) To grant the people the unshakable foundations of civic
+    freedom on the basis of real personal inviolability, freedom of
+    conscience, of speech, of assemblage of unions.
+
+    (2) To admit now to participation in the Imperial Duma, without
+    stopping the pending elections and in so far as it is feasible in
+    the short time remaining before the convening of the Duma, all the
+    classes of the population, _leaving the farther development of the
+    principle of universal suffrage to the new legislative order._
+
+    (3) _To establish as an unshakable rule that no law can become
+    binding without the consent of the Imperial Duma, and that the
+    representatives of the people must be guaranteed a real
+    participation in the control over the lawfulness of the
+    authorities appointed by us_.
+
+    We call upon all faithful sons of Russia to remember their duty to
+    their fatherland, to aid in putting an end to the unprecedented
+    disturbances, and to exert with us all their power to restore
+    quiet and peace in our native land.
+
+
+VIII
+
+The Czar's Manifesto rang through the civilized world. In all lands it was
+hailed as the end of despotism and the triumph of democracy and freedom.
+The joy of the Russian people was unbounded. At last, after fourscore years
+of heroic struggle and sacrifice by countless heroes, named and nameless,
+the goal of freedom was attained. Men, women, and children sang in the
+streets to express their joy. Red flags were displayed everywhere and
+solemnly saluted by the officers and men of the Czar's army. But the
+rejoicing was premature, as the events of a few hours clearly proved. With
+that fatal vacillation which characterized his whole life, Nicholas II had
+no sooner issued his Manifesto than he surrendered once more to the evil
+forces by which he was surrounded and harked back to the old ways. The day
+following the issuance of the Manifesto, while the people were still
+rejoicing, there began a series of terrible pogroms. The cry went forth,
+"Kill the Intellectuals and the Jews!"
+
+There had been organized in support of the government, and by its agents,
+bodies of so-called "patriots." These were, in the main, recruited from the
+underworld, a very large number of them being criminals who were released
+from the prison for the purpose. Officially known as the Association of
+the Russian People and the Association to Combat the Revolution, these
+organizations were popularly nicknamed the Black Hundreds. Most of the
+members were paid directly by the government for their services, while
+others were rewarded with petty official positions. The Czar himself
+accepted membership in these infamous organizations of hired assassins.
+Within three weeks after the issuance of the Manifesto more than a hundred
+organized pogroms took place, the number of killed amounting to nearly four
+thousand; the wounded to more than ten thousand, according to the most
+competent authorities. In Odessa alone more than one thousand persons were
+killed and many thousands wounded in a four-days' massacre. In all the
+bloody pages of the history of the Romanovs there is nothing comparable to
+the frightful terror of this period.
+
+Naturally, this brutal vengeance and the deception which Nicholas II and
+his advisers had practised upon the people had the immediate effect of
+increasing the relative strength and prestige of the Socialists in the
+revolutionary movement as against the less radical elements. To meet such
+brutality and force only the most extreme measures were deemed adequate.
+The Council of Workmen's Deputies, which had been organized by the
+proletariat of St. Petersburg a few days before the Czar issued his
+Manifesto, now became a great power, the central guiding power of the
+Revolution. Similar bodies were organized in other great cities. The
+example set by the city workers was followed by the peasants in many places
+and Councils of Peasants' Deputies were organized. In a few cases large
+numbers of soldiers, making common cause with these bodies representing the
+working class, formed Councils of Soldiers' Deputies. Here, then, was a new
+phenomenon; betrayed by the state, weary of the struggle to democratize
+and liberalize the political state, the workers had established a sort of
+revolutionary self-government of a new kind, entirely independent of the
+state. We shall never comprehend the later developments in Russia,
+especially the phenomenon of Bolshevism, unless we have a sympathetic
+understanding of these Soviets--autonomous, non-political units of
+working-class self-government, composed of delegates elected directly by
+the workers.
+
+As the revolutionary resistance to the Black Hundreds increased, and the
+rapidly growing Soviets of workmen's, peasants' and soldiers' delegates
+asserted a constantly increasing indifference to the existing political
+state, the government again tried to stem the tide by making concessions.
+On November 3d--new style--in a vain attempt to appease the incessant
+demand for the release of the thousands of political prisoners, and to put
+an end to the forcible release of such prisoners by infuriated mobs, a
+partial amnesty was declared. On the 16th a sop was thrown to the peasants
+in the shape of a decree abolishing all the remaining land-redemption
+payments. Had this reform come sooner it might have had the effect of
+stemming the tide of revolt among the peasants, but in the circumstances it
+was of no avail. Early in December the press censorship was abolished by
+decree, but that was of very little importance, for the radical press had
+thrown off all its restraints, simply ignoring the censorship. The
+government of Nicholas II was quite as helpless as it was tyrannical,
+corrupt, and inefficient. The army and navy, demoralized by the defeat
+suffered at the hands of Japan, and especially by knowledge of the
+corruption in high places which made that defeat inevitable, were no longer
+dependable. Tens of thousands of soldiers and marines had joined with the
+workmen in the cities in open rebellion. Many more indulged themselves in
+purposeless rioting.
+
+The organization of the various councils of delegates representing
+factory-workers and peasants, inevitable as it seemed to be, had one
+disastrous effect, the seriousness of which cannot be overstated. As we
+have seen, the cruel, blundering policy of the government had united all
+classes against it in a revolutionary movement of unexampled magnitude.
+Given the conditions prevailing in Russia, and especially the lack of
+industrial development and the corresponding numerical weakness of the
+industrial proletariat, it was evident that the only chance of success in
+the Revolution lay in the united effort of all classes against the old
+régime. Nothing could have better served the autocracy, and therefore
+injured the revolutionary cause, than the creation of a division in the
+ranks of the revolutionists.
+
+This was exactly what the separate organizations of the working class
+accomplished. All the provocative agents of the Czar could not have
+contrived anything so serviceable to the reaction. _Divide et impera_ has
+been the guiding principle of cunning despots in all ages, and the astutest
+advisers of Nicholas II must have grinned with Satanic glee when they
+realized how seriously the forces they were contending against were
+dividing. Stupid oppression had driven into one united force the
+wage-earning and wage-paying classes. Working-men and manufacturers made
+common cause against that stupid oppression. Now, however, as the
+inevitable result of the organization of the Soviets, and the predominance
+of these in the Revolution, purely economic issues came to the front. In
+proportion as the class struggle between employers and employed was
+accentuated the common struggle against autocracy was minimized and
+obscured. Numerous strikes for increased wages occurred, forcing the
+employers to organize resistance. Workers in one city--St. Petersburg, for
+example--demanded the immediate introduction of an eight-hour workday, and
+proclaimed it to be in force, quite regardless of the fact that longer
+hours prevailed elsewhere and that, given the competitive system, their
+employers were bound to resist a demand that would be a handicap favoring
+their competitors.
+
+As might have been foreseen, the employers were forced to rely upon the
+government, the very government they had denounced and conspired to
+overthrow. The president of the Council of Workmen's Deputies of St.
+Petersburg, Chrustalev-Nosar, in his _History of the Council of Workmen's
+Deputies_, quotes the order adopted by acclamation on November 11th--new
+style--introducing, from November 13th, an eight-hour workday in all shops
+and factories "in a revolutionary way." By way of commentary, he quotes a
+further order, adopted November 25, repealing the former order and
+declaring:
+
+    The government, headed by Count Witte, _in its endeavor to break
+    the vigor of the revolutionary proletariat, came to the support of
+    capital_, thus turning the question of an eight-hour workday in
+    St. Petersburg into a national problem. The consequence has been
+    that the working-men of St. Petersburg are unable now, apart from
+    the working-men of the entire country, to realize the decree of
+    the Council. The Council of Workmen's Deputies, therefore, deems
+    it necessary to _stop temporarily the immediate and general
+    establishment of an eight-hour workday by force_.
+
+The Councils inaugurated general strike after general strike. At first
+these strikes were successful from a revolutionary point of view. Soon,
+however, it became apparent that the general strike is a weapon which can
+only be used effectively on rare occasions. It is impossible to rekindle
+frequently and at will the sacrificial passion necessary to make a
+successful general strike. This the leaders of the proletariat of Russia
+overlooked. They overlooked, also, the fact that the masses of the workers
+were exhausted by the long series of strikes in which they had engaged and
+were on the verge of starvation. The consequence was that most of the later
+strikes failed to accomplish anything like the ends sought.
+
+Naturally, the government was recovering its confidence and its courage in
+proportion to the class divisions and antagonisms of the opposition. It
+once more suppressed the revolutionary press and prohibited meetings. Once
+more it proclaimed martial law in many cities. With all its old-time
+assurance it caused the arrest of the leaders of the unions of workmen and
+peasants, broke up the organizations and imprisoned their officers. It
+issued a decree which made it a crime to participate in strikes. With the
+full sanction of the government, as was shown by the publication of
+documentary evidence of unquestioned authenticity, the Black Hundreds
+renewed their brutality. The strong Council of Workmen's Deputies of St.
+Petersburg, with which Witte had dealt as though it were part of the
+government itself, was broken up and suppressed. Witte wanted
+constitutional government on the basis of the October Manifesto, but he
+wanted the orderly development of Russian capitalism. In this attitude he
+was supported, of course, by the capitalist organizations. The very men who
+in the summer of 1905 had demanded that the government grant the demands of
+the workers and so end the strikes, and who worked in unison with the
+workers to secure the much-desired political freedom, six months later were
+demanding that the government suppress the strikes and exert its force to
+end disorder.
+
+Recognition of these facts need not imply any lack of sympathy with the
+proletariat in their demands. The class struggle in modern industrial
+society is a fact, and there is abundant justification--the justification
+of necessity and of achievement--for aggressive class consciousness and
+class warfare. But it is quite obvious that there are times when class
+interests and class warfare must be set aside in favor of larger social
+interests. It is obviously dangerous and reactionary--and therefore
+wrong--to insist upon strikes or other forms of class warfare in moments of
+great calamity, as, for example, during disasters like the Johnstown flood
+and the Messina earthquake, or amid the ravages of a pestilential plague.
+Marx, to whom we owe the formulation of the theory of class struggle which
+has guided the Socialist movement, would never have questioned this
+important truth; he would never have supported class separatism under
+conditions such as those prevailing in Russia at the end of 1905. Only
+doctrinaires, slaves to formulć, but blind to reality, could have
+sanctioned such separatism. But doctrinaires always abound in times of
+revolution.
+
+By December the government was stronger than it had been at any time since
+the Revolution began. The zemstvos were no longer an active part of the
+revolutionary movement. Indeed, there had come over these bodies a great
+change, and most of them were now dominated by relatively reactionary
+landowners who, hitherto apathetic and indifferent, had been stirred to
+defensive action by the aggressive class warfare of the workers.
+Practically all the bourgeois moderates had been driven to the more or less
+open support of the government. December witnessed a new outburst in St.
+Petersburg, Moscow, and other cities. Barricades were raised in the streets
+in many places. In Moscow, where the most bitter and sanguinary struggles
+took place, more than a thousand persons were killed. The government was
+better prepared than the workers; the army had recovered no little of its
+lost morale and did not refuse to shoot down the workers as it had done on
+previous occasions. The strikes and insurrections were put down in bloody
+vengeance and there followed a reign of brutal repression indescribably
+horrible and savage. By way of protest and retaliation, there were
+individual acts of terrorism, such as the execution of the Governor of
+Tambov by Marie Spiridonova, but these were of little or no avail. The
+First Revolution was drowned in blood and tears.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+FROM REVOLUTION TO REVOLUTION
+
+
+I
+
+No struggle for human freedom was ever wholly vain. No matter how vast and
+seemingly complete the failure, there is always something of enduring good
+achieved. That is the law of progress, universal and immutable. The First
+Russian Revolution conformed to the law; it had failed and died in a tragic
+way, yet its failure was relative and it left something of substantial
+achievement as the foundation for fresh hope, courage, and effort. Czarism
+had gathered all its mighty black forces and seemed, at the beginning of
+1906, to be stronger than at any time in fifty years. The souls of Russia's
+noblest and best sons and daughters were steeped in bitter pessimism. And
+yet there was reason for hope and rejoicing; out of the ruin and despair
+two great and supremely vital facts stood in bold, challenging relief.
+
+The first of these facts was the new aspect of Czarism, its changed status.
+Absolutism as a legal institution was dead. Nothing that Nicholas II and
+his advisers were able to do could undo the constitutional changes effected
+when the imperial edict made it part of the fundamental law of the nation
+that "no law can become binding without the consent of the Imperial Duma,"
+and that the Duma, elected by the people, had the right to control the
+actions of the officials of the government, even when such officials were
+appointed by the Czar himself. Absolutism was illegal now. Attempts might
+be made to reintroduce it, and, indeed, that was the real significance of
+the policy pursued by the government, but Absolutism could no longer
+possess the moral strength that inheres in the sanctity of law. In fighting
+it the Russian people now had that strength upon their side.
+
+The second vital and hopeful fact was likewise a moral force. Absolutism
+with all its assumed divine prerogatives, in the person of the Czar, had
+declared its firm will "to grant the people the unshakable foundations of
+civic freedom on the basis of real personal inviolability, freedom of
+conscience, of speech, of assemblage and of unions." This civic freedom
+Absolutism had sanctioned. By that act it gave the prestige of legality to
+such assemblages, discussions, and publications as had always hitherto been
+forced to accept risks and disabilities inseparable from illegal conduct.
+Civic freedom had long been outlawed, a thing associated with lawlessness
+and crime, and so long as that condition remained many who believed in
+civic freedom itself, who wanted a free press, freedom of public assemblage
+and of conscience in matters pertaining to religion, were kept from
+participation in the struggle. Respect for law, as law, is deeply rooted in
+civilized mankind--a fact which, while it makes the task of the
+revolutionist hard, and at times impedes progress, is, nevertheless, of
+immense value to human society.
+
+Civic freedom was not yet a fact. It seemed, as a reality, to be as far
+away as ever. Meetings were forbidden by officials and broken up by
+soldiers and police; newspapers were suppressed, as of old; labor-unions,
+and even the unions of the Intellectuals, were ruthlessly persecuted and
+treated as conspiracies against the state. All this and more was true and
+discouraging. Yet there was substantial gain: civic freedom as a practical
+fact did not exist, but civic freedom as a lawful right lived in the minds
+of millions of people--the greatest fact in Russia. The terms of the
+Manifesto of October 17th--Absolutism's solemn covenant with the
+nation--had not been repealed, and the nation knew that the government did
+not dare to repeal it. Not all the Czar's armies and Black Hundreds could
+destroy that consciousness of the lawful right to civic freedom. Nothing
+could restore the old condition. Whereas in the past the government, in
+suppressing the press and popular assemblages, could say to the people, "We
+uphold the law!" now when the government attempted these things, the people
+defiantly cried out, "You break the law!" Absolutism was no longer a thing
+of law.
+
+Nicholas II and all his bureaucrats could not return the chicken to the egg
+from which it had been hatched. They could not unsay the fateful words
+which called into being the Imperial Duma. The Revolution had put into
+their souls a terrible fear of the wrath of the people. The Czar and his
+government had to permit the election of the Duma to proceed, and yet,
+conscious of the fact that the success of the Duma inevitably meant the end
+of the old régime, they were bound, in self-protection, to attempt to kill
+the Duma in the hope that thereby they would kill, or at least paralyze,
+the Revolution itself. Thus it was, while not daring to forbid the
+elections for the Duma to proceed, the government adopted a Machiavellian
+policy.
+
+The essentials of that policy were these: on the one hand, the Duma was not
+to be seriously considered at all, when it should assemble. It would be
+ignored, if possible, and no attention paid to any of its deliberations or
+attempts to legislate. A certain amount of latitude would be given to it
+as a debating society, a sort of safety-valve, but that was all. If this
+policy could not be carried out in its entirety, if, for example, it should
+prove impossible to completely ignore the Duma, it would be easy enough to
+devise a mass of hampering restrictions and regulations which would render
+it impotent, and yet necessitate no formal repudiation of the October
+Manifesto. On the other hand, there was the possibility that the Duma might
+be captured and made a safe ally. The suffrage upon which the elections
+were to be based was most undemocratic and unjust, giving to the landlords
+and the prosperous peasants, together with the wealthy classes in the
+cities, an enormous preponderance in the electorate. By using the Black
+Hundreds to work among the electors--bribing, cajoling, threatening, and
+coercing, as the occasion might require--it might be possible to bring
+about the election of a Duma which would be a pliant and ready tool of the
+government.
+
+One of the favorite devices of the Black Hundreds was to send agents among
+the workers in the cities and among the peasants to discredit the Duma in
+advance, and to spread the idea that it would only represent the
+bourgeoisie. Many of the most influential Socialist leaders unfortunately
+preached the same doctrine. This was the natural and logical outcome of the
+separate action of the classes in the Revolution, and of the manner in
+which the proletariat had forced the economic struggle to the front during
+the political struggle. In the vanguard of the fight for the Duma were the
+Constitutional Democrats, led by Miliukov, Prince Lvov, and many prominent
+leaders of the zemstvos. The divorce between the classes represented by
+these men and the proletariat represented by the Social Democrats was
+absolute. It was not surprising that the leaders of the Social Democratic
+party should be suspicious and distrustful of the Constitutional Democrats
+and refuse to co-operate with them.
+
+But many of the Social Democrats went much farther than this, and, in the
+name of Socialism and proletarian class consciousness, adopted the same
+attitude toward the Duma itself as that which the agents of the Black
+Hundreds were urging upon the people. Among the Socialist leaders who took
+this position was Vladimir Ulyanov, the great propagandist whom the world
+knows to-day as Nikolai Lenine, Bolshevik Prime Minister and Dictator.
+Lenine urged the workers to boycott the Duma and to refuse to participate
+in the elections in any manner whatever. At a time when only a united
+effort by all classes could be expected to accomplish anything, and when
+such a victory of the people over the autocratic régime as might have been
+secured by united action would have meant the triumph of the Revolution,
+Lenine preached separatism. Unfortunately, his influence, even at that
+time, was very great and his counsels prevailed with a great many Socialist
+groups over the wiser counsels of Plechanov and others.
+
+It may be said, in explanation and extenuation of Lenine's course, that the
+boycotting of the elections was the logical outcome of the class antagonism
+and separatism, and that the bourgeois leaders were just as much
+responsible for the separatism as the leaders of the proletariat were. All
+this is true. It is quite true to say that wiser leadership of the
+manufacturing class in the critical days of 1905 would have made
+concessions and granted many of the demands of the striking workmen. By so
+doing they might have maintained unity in the political struggle. But, even
+if so much be granted, it is poor justification and defense of a Socialist
+policy to say that it was neither better nor worse, neither more stupid nor
+more wise, than that of the bourgeoisie! In the circumstances, Lenine's
+policy was most disastrous for Russia. It is not necessary to believe the
+charge that was made at the time and afterward that Lenine was in the pay
+of the government and a tool of the Black Hundreds. Subsequent incidents
+served to fasten grave suspicion upon him, but no one ever offered proof of
+corruption. In all probability, he was then, and throughout the later
+years, honest and sincere--a fanatic, often playing a dangerous game,
+unmoral rather than immoral, believing that the end he sought justified any
+means.
+
+
+II
+
+When the elections for the Duma were held, in March, 1906, the failure of
+the government's attempt to capture the body was complete. It was
+overwhelmingly a progressive parliament that had been elected. The
+Constitutional Democrats, upon a radical program, had elected the largest
+number of members, 178. Next came the representatives of the peasants'
+organizations, with a program of moderate Socialism, numbering 116. This
+group became known in the Duma as the Labor Group. A third group consisted
+of 63 representatives of border provinces, mostly advanced Liberals, called
+Autonomists, on account of their special interest in questions concerning
+local autonomy. There were only 28 avowed supporters of the government.
+Finally, despite the Socialist boycott of the elections, there were almost
+as many Socialists elected as there were supporters of the government.
+
+Once more Russia had spoken for democracy in no uncertain voice. And once
+more Czarism committed the incredible folly of attempting to stem the tide
+of democracy by erecting further measures of autocracy as a dam. Shortly
+before the time came for the assembling of the newly elected Duma, the
+Czar's government announced new fundamental laws which limited the powers
+of the Duma and practically reduced it to a farce. In the first place, the
+Imperial Council was to be reconstituted and set over the Duma as an upper
+chamber, or Senate, having equal rights with the Duma. Half of the members
+of the Imperial Council were to be appointed by the Czar and the other half
+elected from universities, zemstvos, bourses, and by the clergy and the
+nobility. In other words, over the Duma was to be set a body which could
+always be so manipulated as to insure the defeat of any measure displeasing
+to the old régime. And the Czar reserved to himself the power to summon or
+dissolve the Duma at will, as well as the power to declare war and to make
+peace and to enter into treaties with other nations. What a farce was this
+considered as a fulfilment of the solemn assurances given in October, 1905!
+
+But the reactionary madness went even farther; believing the revolutionary
+movement to have been crushed to such a degree that it might act with
+impunity, autocracy took other measures. Three days before the assembling
+of the Duma the Czar replaced his old Ministry by one still more
+reactionary. At the head of the Cabinet, as Prime Minister, he appointed
+the notorious reactionary bureaucrat, Goremykin. With full regard for the
+bloody traditions of the office, the infamous Stolypin, former Governor of
+Saratov, was made Minister of the Interior. At the head of the Department
+of Agriculture, which was charged with responsibility for dealing with
+agrarian problems, was placed Stishinsky, a large landowner, bitterly
+hostile to, and hated by, the peasants. The composition of the new Ministry
+was a defiance of the popular will and sentiment, and was so interpreted.
+
+The Duma opened on April 27th, at the Taurida Palace. St. Petersburg was a
+vast armed camp that day. Tens of thousands of soldiers, fully armed, were
+massed at different points in readiness to suppress any demonstrations by
+the populace. It was said that provocateurs moved among the people, trying
+to stir an uprising which would afford a pretext for action by the
+soldiers. The members of the Duma were first received by the Czar at the
+Winter Palace and addressed by him in a pompous speech which carefully
+avoided all the vital questions in which the Russian people were so keenly
+interested. It was a speech which might as well have been made by the first
+Czar Nicholas. But there was no need of words to tell what was in the mind
+of Nicholas II; that had been made quite evident by the new laws and the
+new Ministry. Before the Duma lay the heavy task of continuing the
+Revolution, despite the fact that the revolutionary army had been scattered
+as chaff is scattered before the winds.
+
+The first formal act of the Duma, after the opening ceremonies were
+finished, was to demand amnesty for all the political prisoners. The
+members of the Duma had come to the Taurida Palace that day through streets
+crowded with people who chanted in monotonous chorus the word "Amnesty."
+The oldest man in the assembly, I.I. Petrunkevitch, was cheered again and
+again as he voiced the popular demand on behalf of "those who have
+sacrificed their freedom to free our dear fatherland." There were some
+seventy-five thousand political prisoners in Russia at that time, the
+flower of Russian manhood and womanhood, treated as common criminals and,
+in many instances, subject to terrible torture. Well might Petrunkevitch
+proclaim: "All the prisons of our country are full. Thousands of hands are
+being stretched out to us in hope and supplication, and I think that the
+duty of our conscience compels us to use all the influence our position
+gives us to see that the freedom that Russia has won costs no more
+sacrifices ... I think, gentlemen ... we cannot refrain just now from
+expressing our deepest feelings, the cry of our heart--that free Russia
+demands the liberation of all prisoners." At the end of the eloquent appeal
+there was an answering cry of: "Amnesty!" "Amnesty!" The chorus of the
+streets was echoed in the Duma itself.
+
+There was no lack of courage in the Duma. One of its first acts was the
+adoption of an address in response to the speech delivered by the Czar to
+the members at the reception at the Winter Palace. The address was in
+reality a statement of the objects and needs of the Russian people, their
+program. It was a radical document, but moderately couched. It demanded
+full political freedom; amnesty for all who had been imprisoned for
+political reasons or for violations of laws in restriction of religious
+liberty; the abolition of martial law and other extraordinary measures;
+abolition of capital punishment; the abolition of the Imperial Council and
+democratization of the laws governing elections to the Duma; autonomy for
+Finland and Poland; the expropriation of state and private lands in the
+interest of the peasants; a comprehensive body of social legislation
+designed to protect the industrial workers. In a word, the program of the
+Duma was a broad and comprehensive program of political and social
+democracy, which, if enacted, would have placed Russia among the foremost
+democracies of the world.
+
+The boldness of the Duma program was a direct challenge to the government
+and was so interpreted by the Czar and his Ministers. By the reactionary
+press it was denounced as a conspiracy to hand the nation over to the
+Socialists. That it should have passed the Duma almost unanimously was an
+indication of the extent to which the liberal bourgeoisie represented by
+the Constitutional Democrats was prepared to go in order to destroy
+autocracy. No wonder that some of the most trusted Marxian Socialists in
+Russia were urging that it was the duty of the Socialists to co-operate
+with the Duma! Yet there was a section of the Marxists engaged in a
+constant agitation against the Duma, preaching the doctrine of the class
+struggle, but blind to the actual fact that the dominant issue was in the
+conflict between the democracy of the Duma and the autocracy of Czarism.
+
+The class consciousness of the old régime was much clearer and more
+intelligent. The Czar refused to receive the committee of the Duma,
+appointed to make formal presentation of the address. Then, on May 12th,
+Goremykin, the Prime Minister, addressed the Duma, making answer to its
+demands. On behalf of the government he rebuked the Duma for its
+unpatriotic conduct in a speech full of studied insult and contemptuous
+defiance. He made it quite clear that the government was not going to grant
+any reforms worthy of mention. More than that, he made it plain to the
+entire nation that Nicholas II and his bureaucracy would never recognize
+the Duma as an independent parliamentary body. Thus the old régime answered
+the challenge of the Duma.
+
+For seventy-two days the Duma worked and fought, seventy-two days of
+parliamentary history for which there is no parallel in the annals of
+parliamentary government. For the sake of the larger aims before it, the
+Duma carried out the demands of the government that it approve certain
+petty measures placed before it for the formality of its approval. On the
+other hand, it formulated and passed numerous measures upon its own
+initiative and demanded that they be recognized as laws of the land. Among
+the measures thus adopted were laws guaranteeing freedom of assemblage;
+equality of all citizens before the law; the right of labor organizations
+to exist and to conduct strikes; reform of judicial procedure in the
+courts; state aid for peasants suffering from crop failure and other
+agrarian reforms; the abolition of capital punishment. In addition to
+pursuing its legislative program, the Duma members voiced the country's
+protest against the shortcomings of the government, subjecting the various
+Ministers to searching interpellation, day after day.
+
+Not a single one of the measures adopted by the Duma received the support
+of the Imperial Council. This body was effectively performing the task for
+which it had been created. To the interpellations of the Duma the Czar's
+Ministers made the most insulting replies, when they happened to take any
+notice of them at all. All the old iniquities were resorted to by the
+government, supported, as always, by the reactionary press. The homes of
+members of the Duma were entered and searched by the police and every
+parliamentary right and privilege was flouted. Even the publication of the
+speeches delivered in the Duma was forbidden.
+
+The Duma had from the first maintained a vigorous protest against "the
+infamy of executions without trial, pogroms, bombardment, and
+imprisonment." Again and again it had been charged that pogroms were
+carried out under the protection of the government, in accordance with the
+old policy of killing the Jews and the Intellectuals. The answer of the
+government was--another pogrom of merciless savagery. On June 1st, at
+Byalostock, upward of eighty men, women, and children were killed, many
+more wounded, and scores of women, young and old, brutally outraged. The
+Duma promptly sent a commission to Byalostock to investigate and report
+upon the facts, and presently the commission made a report which proved
+beyond question the responsibility of the government for the whole brutal
+and bloody business. It was shown that the inflammatory manifestos calling
+upon the "loyal" citizens to make the attack were printed in the office of
+the Police Department; that soldiers in the garrison had been told days in
+advance when the pogrom would take place; and that in the looting and
+sacking of houses and shops, which occurred upon a large scale, officers of
+the garrison had participated. These revelations made a profound impression
+in Russia and throughout Europe.
+
+
+III
+
+The Duma finally brought upon itself the whole weight of Czarism when it
+addressed a special appeal to the peasants of the country in which it dealt
+with candor and sincerity with the great agrarian problems which bore upon
+the peasants so heavily. The appeal outlined the various measures which the
+Duma had tried to enact for the relief of the peasants, and the attitude of
+the Czar's Ministers. The many strong peasants' organizations, and their
+numerous representatives in the Duma, made the circulation of this appeal
+an easy matter. The government could not close these channels of
+communication, nor prevent the Duma's strong plea for lawful rights and
+against lawlessness by government officials from reaching the peasants.
+Only one method of defense remained to the Czar and his Ministers: On July
+9th, like a thunderbolt from the sky, came a new Manifesto from the Czar,
+dissolving the Duma. In the Manifesto all the old arrogance of Absolutism
+reappeared. A more striking contrast to the Manifesto of the previous
+October could not be readily imagined. The Duma was accused of having
+exceeded its rights by "investigating the actions of local authorities
+appointed by the Emperor," notwithstanding the fact that in the October
+Manifesto it had been solemnly covenanted "that the representatives of the
+people must be guaranteed a real participation in the control over the
+lawfulness of the authorities appointed by us." The Duma was condemned for
+"finding imperfections in the fundamental laws which can be altered only by
+the monarch's will" and for its "overtly lawless act of appealing to the
+people." The Manifesto charged that the growing unrest and lawlessness of
+the peasants were due to the failure of the Duma to ameliorate their
+conditions--and this in spite of the record!
+
+When the members of the Duma arrived at the Taurida Palace next day they
+found the place filled with troops who prevented their entrance. They were
+powerless. Some two hundred-odd members adjourned to Viborg, whence they
+issued an appeal to the people to defend their rights. These men were not
+Socialists, most of them belonging to the party of the Constitutional
+Democrats, but they issued an appeal to the people to meet the dissolution
+of the Imperial Duma by a firm refusal to pay taxes, furnish recruits for
+the army, or sanction the legality of any loans to the government. This was
+practically identical with the policy set forth in the Manifesto of the
+Executive Committee of the St. Petersburg Council of Workmen's Deputies at
+the beginning of the previous December, before the elections to the Duma.
+Now, however, the Socialists in the Duma--both the Social Democrats and the
+Socialist-Revolutionists--together with the semi-Socialist Labor Group,
+decided that it was not enough to appeal for passive resistance; that only
+an armed uprising could accomplish anything. They therefore appealed to
+the city proletariat, the peasants, the army, and the navy to rise in armed
+strength against the tyrannical régime.
+
+Neither appeal produced any noteworthy result. The response to the Viborg
+appeal was far less than that which followed the similar appeal of the St.
+Petersburg workmen in December. The signers of the appeal were arrested,
+sentenced to three months' imprisonment, and deprived of their electoral
+rights. To the appeal of the Duma Socialists there was likewise very little
+response, either from city workers, peasants, soldiers, or marines. Russia
+was struggle-weary. The appeals fell upon the ears of a cowed and beaten
+populace. The two documents served only to emphasize one fact, namely, that
+capacity and daring to attempt active and violent resistance was still
+largely confined to the working-class representatives. In appealing to the
+workers to meet the attacks of the government with armed resistance, the
+leaders of the peasants and the city proletariat were ready to take their
+places in the vanguard of the fight. On the other hand, the signers of the
+Viborg appeal for passive resistance manifested no such determination or
+desire, though they must have known that passive resistance could only be a
+temporary phase, that any concerted action by the people to resist the
+collection of taxes and recruiting for the army would have led to attack
+and counter-attack-to a violent revolution.
+
+Feeling perfectly secure, the government, while promising the election of
+another Duma, carried on a policy of vigorous repression of all radical and
+revolutionary agitation and organization. Executions without trial were
+almost daily commonplaces. Prisoners were mercilessly tortured, and, in
+many cases, flogged to death. Hundreds of persons, of both sexes, many of
+them simple bourgeois-liberals and not revolutionists in any sense of the
+word, were exiled to Siberia. The revolutionary organizations of the
+workers were filled with spies and provocateurs, an old and effective
+method of destroying their morale. In all the provinces of Russia field
+court martial was proclaimed. Field court martial is more drastic than
+ordinary court martial and practically amounts to condemnation without
+trial, for trials under it are simply farcical, since neither defense nor
+appeal is granted. Nearly five hundred revolutionists were put to death
+under this system, many of them without even the pretense of a trial.
+
+The Black Hundreds were more active than ever, goaded on by the Holy Synod.
+Goremykin resigned as Premier and his place was taken by the unspeakably
+cruel and bloodthirsty Stolypin, whose "hemp neckties," as the grim jest of
+the masses went, circled the necks of scores of revolutionists swinging
+from as many gallows. There were many resorts to terrorism on the part of
+the revolutionists during the summer of 1906, many officials paying for the
+infamies of the government with their lives. How many of these "executions"
+were genuine revolutionary protests, and how many simple murders instigated
+or committed by provocative agents for the purpose of discrediting the
+revolutionists and affording the government excuses for fresh infamies,
+will perhaps never be known. Certainly, in many cases, there was no
+authorization by any revolutionary body.
+
+In February, 1907, the elections for the Second Duma were held under a
+reign of terror. The bureaucracy was determined to have a "safe and sane"
+body this time, and resorted to every possible nefarious device to attain
+that end. Whole masses of electors whose right to vote had been established
+at the previous election were arbitrarily disfranchised. While every
+facility was given to candidates openly favoring the government, including
+the Octobrists, every possible obstacle was placed in the way of radical
+candidates, especially Socialists. The meetings of the latter were, in
+hundreds of cases, prohibited; in other hundreds of cases they were broken
+up by the Black Hundreds and the police. Many of the most popular
+candidates were arrested and imprisoned without trial, as were members of
+their campaign committees. Yet, notwithstanding all these things, the
+Second Duma was, from the standpoint of the government, worse than the
+first. The Socialists, adopting the tactics of Plechanov, against the
+advice of Lenine, his former pupil and disciple, had decided not to boycott
+the elections this time, but to participate in them. When the returns were
+published it was found that the Social Democrats and the
+Socialist-Revolutionists had each elected over sixty deputies, the total
+being nearly a third of the membership--455. In addition there were some
+ninety members in the peasants' Labor Group, which were semi-Socialist.
+There were 117 Constitutional Democrats. The government supporters,
+including the Octobrists, numbered less than one hundred.
+
+From the first the attitude of the government toward the new Duma was one
+of contemptuous arrogance. "The Czar's Hangman," Stolypin, lectured the
+members as though they were naughty children, forbidding them to invite
+experts to aid them in framing measures, or to communicate with any of the
+zemstvos or municipal councils upon any questions whatsoever. "The Duma was
+not granted the right to express disapproval, reproach, or mistrust of the
+government," he thundered. To the Duma there was left about as much real
+power as is enjoyed by the "governments" of our "juvenile republics."
+
+As a natural consequence of these things, the Second Duma paid less
+attention to legislation than the First Duma had done, and gave its time
+largely to interpellations and protests. Partly because of the absence of
+some of the most able leaders they had had in the First Duma, and partly to
+the aggressive radicalism of the Socialists, which they could only
+half-heartedly approve at best, the Constitutional Democrats were less
+influential than in the former parliament. They occupied a middle
+ground--always a difficult position. The real fight was between the
+Socialists and the reactionaries, supporters of the government. Among the
+latter were perhaps a score of members belonging to the Black Hundreds,
+constituting the extreme right wing of the reactionary group. Between these
+and the Socialists of the extreme left the assembly was kept at fever
+pitch. The Black Hundreds, for the most part, indulged in violent tirades
+of abuse, often in the most disgusting profanity. The Socialists replied
+with proletarian passion and vigor, and riotous scenes were common. The
+Second Duma was hardly a deliberative assembly!
+
+On June 1st Stolypin threw a bombshell into the Duma by accusing the Social
+Democrats of having conspired to form a military plot for the overthrow of
+the government of Nicholas II. Evidence to this effect had been furnished
+to the Police Department by the spy and provocative agent, Azev. Of course
+there was no secret about the fact that the Social Democrats were always
+trying to bring about revolt in the army and the navy. They had openly
+proclaimed this, time and again. In the appeal issued at the time of the
+dissolution of the First Duma they had called upon the army and navy to
+rise in armed revolt. But the betrayal of their plans was a matter of some
+consequence. Azev himself had been loudest and most persistent in urging
+the work on. Stolypin demanded that all the Social Democrats be excluded
+permanently from the Duma and that sixteen of them be handed over to the
+government for imprisonment. The demand was a challenge to the whole Duma,
+since it called into question the right of the Duma to determine its own
+membership. Obviously, if members of parliament are to be dismissed
+whenever an autocratic government orders it, there is an end of
+parliamentary government. The demand created a tremendous sensation and
+gave rise to a long and exciting debate. Before it was ended, however,
+Nicholas II ordered the Duma dissolved. On June 3d the Second Duma met the
+fate of its predecessor, having lasted one hundred days.
+
+
+IV
+
+As on the former occasion, arrangements were at once begun to bring about
+the election of another and more subservient Duma. It is significant that
+throughout Nicholas II and his Cabinet recognized the imperative necessity
+of maintaining the institution in form. They dared not abolish it, greatly
+as they would have liked to do so. On the day that the Duma was dissolved
+the Czar, asserting his divine right to enact and repeal laws at will,
+disregarding again the solemn assurances of the October Manifesto, by edict
+changed the electoral laws, consulting neither the Duma nor the Imperial
+Council. This new law greatly decreased the representation of the city
+workers and the peasants in the Duma and correspondingly increased the
+representation of the rich landowners and capitalists. A docile and "loyal"
+Duma was thus made certain, and no one was very much surprised when the
+elections, held in September, resulted in an immense reactionary majority.
+When the Third Duma met on December 14, 1907, the reactionaries were as
+strong as the Socialist and Labor groups had been in the previous Duma,
+and of the reactionaries the group of members of the Black Hundreds was a
+majority.
+
+In the mean time there had been the familiar rule of brutal reaction. Most
+of the Social Democratic members of the Second Duma were arrested and
+condemned for high treason, being sent to prison and to Siberia. New laws
+and regulations restricting the press were proclaimed and enforced with
+increasing severity. By comparison with the next two years, the period from
+1905 to 1907 was a period of freedom. After the election of the Third Duma
+the bureaucracy grew ever bolder. Books and leaflets which had been
+circulated openly and with perfect freedom during 1905 and 1906 were
+forbidden, and, moreover, their authors were arrested and sentenced to long
+terms of imprisonment. While the law still granted freedom of assemblage
+and the right to organize meetings, these rights did not exist as
+realities. Everywhere the Black Hundreds held sway, patronized by the Czar,
+who wore their emblem and refused to permit the punishment of any of their
+members, even though they might be found guilty by the courts.
+
+It is not necessary to dwell upon the work of the Third Duma. This is not a
+history of Russia, and a detailed study of the servile parliament of
+Nicholas II and Stolypin would take us too far afield from our special
+study--the revolutionary movement. Suffice it, therefore, to say that some
+very useful legislation, necessary to the economic development of Russia,
+was enacted, and that, despite the overwhelming preponderance of
+reactionaries, it was not an absolutely docile body. On several occasions
+the Third Duma exercised the right of criticism quite vigorously, and on
+two or three occasions acted in more or less open defiance of the wishes of
+the government. A notable instance of this was the legislation of 1909,
+considerably extending freedom of religious organization and worship, which
+was, however, greatly curtailed later by the Imperial Council--and then
+nullified by the government.
+
+The period 1906-14 was full of despair for sensitive and aspiring souls.
+The steady and rapid rise in the suicide-rate bore grim and eloquent
+testimony to the character of those years of dark repression. The number of
+suicides in St. Petersburg increased during the period 1905-08 more than
+400 per cent.; in Moscow about 800 per cent.! In the latter city two-fifths
+of the suicides in 1908 were of persons less than twenty years old! And
+yet, withal, there was room for hope, the soul of progress was not dead. In
+various directions there was a hopeful and promising growth. First among
+these hopeful and promising facts was the marvelous growth of the
+Consumers' Co-operatives. After 1905 began the astonishing increase in the
+number of these important organizations, which continued, year after year,
+right up to the Revolution of 1917. In 1905 there were 4,479 such
+co-operatives in Russia; in 1911 there were 19,253. Another hopeful sign
+was the steadily increasing literacy of the masses. Statistics upon this
+point are almost worthless. Russian official statistics are notoriously
+defective and the figures relating to literacy are peculiarly so, but the
+leaders of Russian Socialism have attested to the fact. In this connection
+it is worthy of note that, according to the most authentic official
+records, the number of persons subscribing to the public press grew in a
+single year, from 1908 to 1909, fully 25 per cent. Education and
+organization were going on, hand in hand.
+
+Nor was agitation dead. In the Duma the Socialist and Labor parties and
+groups, knowing that they had no chance to enact their program, made the
+Duma a rostrum from which to address the masses throughout the nation.
+Sometimes, indeed, the newspapers were forbidden to print their speeches,
+but as a rule they were published, at least by the liberal papers, and so
+disseminated among the masses. In these speeches the Social Democrats,
+Socialist-Revolutionaries, Laborites, and more daring of the Constitutional
+Democrats mercilessly exposed the bureaucracy, so keeping the fires of
+discontent alive.
+
+
+V
+
+Of vast significance to mankind was the controversy that was being waged
+within the Socialist movement of Russia during these years, for this was
+the period in which Bolshevism was shaping itself and becoming articulate.
+The words "Bolsheviki" and "Bolshevism" first made their appearance in
+1903, but it was not until 1905 that they began to acquire their present
+meaning. At the second convention of the Social Democratic party, held in
+1903, the party split in two factions. The majority faction, headed by
+Lenine, adopted the name Bolsheviki, a word derived from the Russian word
+"bolshinstvo," meaning "majority." The minority faction, which followed
+Plechanov, though he did not formally join it, was called, in
+contradistinction, the "Mensheviki"--that is, the minority. No question of
+principle was involved in the split, the question at issue being simply
+whether there should be more or less centralization in the organization.
+There was no thought on either side of leaving the Social Democratic party.
+It was simply a factional division in the party itself and did not prevent
+loyal co-operation. Both the Bolsheviki and the Mensheviki remained Social
+Democrats--that is, Socialists of the school of Marx.
+
+During the revolutionary struggle of 1905-06 the breach between the two
+factions was greatly widened. The two groups held utterly irreconcilable
+conceptions of Socialist policy, if not of Socialism as an ideal. The
+psychology of the two groups was radically different. By this time the
+Lenine faction was no longer the majority, being, in fact, a rather small
+minority in the party. The Plechanov faction was greatly in the majority.
+But the old names continued to be used. Although a minority, the Lenine
+faction was still called the Bolsheviki, and the Plechanov faction called
+the Mensheviki, despite the fact that it was the majority. Thus Bolshevism
+no longer connoted the principles and tactics of the majority. It came to
+be used interchangeably with Leninism, as a synonym. The followers of
+Vladimir Ulyanov continued to regard themselves as part of the Social
+Democratic party, its radical left wing, and it was not until after the
+Second Revolution, in 1917, that they manifested any desire to be
+differentiated from the Social Democrats.
+
+Vladimir Ulyanov was born in 1870, at Simbirsk, in central Russia. There is
+no mystery about his use of the alias, Nikolai Lenine, which he has made
+world-famous and by which he chooses to be known. Almost every Russian
+revolutionist has had to adopt various aliases for self-protection and for
+the protection of other Russian Socialists. Ulyanov has followed the rule
+and lived and worked under several aliases, and his writings under the name
+"Nikolai Lenine" made him a great power in the Russian Socialist movement.
+
+Lenine's father was a governmental official employed in the Department of
+Public Instruction. It is one of the many anomalies of the life of the
+Russian Dictator that he himself belongs by birth, training, culture, and
+experience to the bourgeoisie against which he fulminates so furiously.
+Even his habits and tastes are of bourgeois and not proletarian origin. He
+is an Intellectual of the Intellectuals and has never had the slightest
+proletarian experience. As a youth still in his teens he entered the
+University of St. Petersburg, but his stay there was exceedingly brief,
+owing to a tragedy which greatly embittered his life and gave it its
+direction. An older brother, who was also a student in the university, was
+condemned to death, in a secret trial, for complicity in a terrorist plot
+to assassinate Alexander III. Shortly afterward he was put to death. Lenine
+himself was arrested at the same time as his brother, but released for lack
+of evidence connecting him with the affair. It is said, however, that the
+arrest caused his expulsion from the university. Lenine was not the only
+young man to be profoundly impressed by the execution of the youthful
+Alexander Ulyanov; another student, destined to play an important rôle in
+the great tragedy of revolutionary Russia, was stirred to bitter hatred of
+the system. That young student was Alexander Kerensky, whose father and the
+father of the Ulyanovs were close friends.
+
+Lenine's activities brought him into conflict with the authorities several
+times and forced him to spend a good deal of time in exile. As a youth of
+seventeen, at the time of the execution of his brother, he was dismissed
+from the Law School in St. Petersburg. A few years later he was sent to
+Siberia for a political "crime." Upon various occasions later he was
+compelled to flee from the country, living sometimes in Paris, sometimes in
+London, but more often in Switzerland. It was through his writings mainly
+that he acquired the influence he had in the Russian movement. There is
+nothing unusual or remarkable about this, for the Social Democratic party
+of Russia was practically directed from Geneva. Lenine was in London when
+the Revolution of 1905 broke out and caused him to hurry to St. Petersburg.
+
+As a young man Lenine, like most of the Intelligentsia of the period, gave
+up a good deal of his spare time to teaching small groups of uneducated
+working-men the somewhat abstract and intricate theories and doctrines of
+Socialism. To that excellent practice, no doubt, much of Lenine's skill as
+a lucid expositor and successful propagandist is due. He has written a
+number of important works, most of them being of a polemical nature and
+dealing with party disputations upon questions of theory and tactics. The
+work by which he was best known in Socialist circles prior to his
+sensational rise to the Premiership is a treatise on _The Development of
+Capitalism in Russia_. This work made its appearance in 1899, when the
+Marxian Socialist movement was still very weak. In it Lenine defended the
+position of the Marxians, Plechanov and his group, that Russia was not an
+exception to the general law of capitalist development, as was claimed by
+the leaders of the People's party, the _Narodniki_. The book gave Lenine an
+assured position among the intellectual leaders of the movement, and was
+regarded as a conclusive defense of the position of the Plechanov group, to
+which Lenine belonged. Since his overthrow of the Kerensky régime, and his
+attempt to establish a new kind of social state in Russia, Lenine has been
+frequently confronted by his own earlier reasoning by those who believe his
+position to be contrary to the true Marxian position.
+
+From 1903 to 1906 Lenine's views developed farther and farther away from
+those of his great teacher, George Plechanov. His position in the period of
+the First Duma can best be stated, perhaps, in opposition to the position
+of Plechanov and the Mensheviki. Accepting the Marxian theory of historical
+development, Plechanov and his followers believed that Russia must pass
+through a phase of capitalist development before there could be a
+social--as distinguished from a merely political--revolution. Certainly
+they believed, an intensive development of industry, bringing into
+existence a strong capitalist class, on the one hand, and a strong
+proletariat, on the other hand, must precede any attempt to create a Social
+Democratic state. They believed, furthermore, that a political revolution,
+creating a democratic constitutional system of government, must come before
+the social revolution could be achieved. They accepted the traditional
+Marxian view that the achievement of this political revolution must be
+mainly the task of the bourgeoisie, and that the proletariat, and
+especially the Socialists, should co-operate with the enlightened
+bourgeoisie in attaining that political revolution without which there
+could never be a Socialist commonwealth.
+
+Plechanov was not blind to the dangers of compromise which must be faced in
+basing the policy of a movement of the masses upon this reasoning. He
+argued, however, that there was no choice in the matter at all; that the
+iron law of historical inevitability and necessity determined the matter.
+He pointed out that the bourgeoisie, represented by the Constitutional
+Democrats in the political struggle, were compelled to wage relentless war
+upon Absolutism, the abolition of which was as absolutely essential to the
+realization of their class aims as it was to the realization of the class
+aims of the proletariat. Hence, in this struggle, the capitalist class, as
+yet too weak to accomplish the overthrow of autocracy and Czarism, and the
+proletariat, equally dependent for success upon the overthrow of autocracy
+and Czarism, and equally too weak to accomplish it unaided, had to face the
+fact that historical development had given the two classes which were
+destined to wage a long conflict an immediate unity of interest. Their
+imperative needs at the moment were not conflicting needs, but identical
+ones. To divide their forces, to refuse to co-operate with each other, was
+to play the game of the Czar and his associates, argued Plechanov.
+
+The Mensheviki favored participation in the Duma elections and co-operation
+with the liberal and radical bourgeoisie parties, in so far as might be
+necessary to overthrow the autocracy, and without sacrificing Socialist
+principles. They pointed out that this position was evidently feared by the
+bureaucracy far more than the position of the extremists among the Social
+Democrats and the Socialist-Revolutionists, who refused to consider such
+co-operation, and pointed to the fact that provocateurs in large numbers
+associated themselves with the latter in their organizations and preached
+the same doctrine of absolute isolation and exclusiveness.
+
+It will be seen that the position of the Mensheviki was one of practical
+political opportunism, an opportunism, however, that must be sharply
+distinguished from what Wilhelm Liebknecht used to call "political
+cow-trading." No man in the whole history of international Socialism ever
+more thoroughly despised this species of political opportunism than George
+Plechanov. To those who are familiar with the literature of international
+Socialism it will be unnecessary to say that Plechanov was not the man to
+deprecate the importance of sound theory as a guide to the formulation of
+party policies. For many years he was rightly regarded as one of the
+greatest theoreticians of the movement. Certainly there was only one other
+writer in the whole international movement who could be named as having an
+equal title to be considered the greatest Socialist theorist since
+Marx--Karl Kautsky.
+
+But Plechanov[1]--like Marx himself--set reality above dogma, and regarded
+movement as of infinitely greater importance than theory. The Mensheviki
+wanted to convene a great mass convention of representatives of the
+industrial proletariat during the summer of 1906. "It is a class movement,"
+they said, "not a little sectarian movement. How can there be a _class_
+movement unless the way is open to all the working class to participate?"
+Accordingly, they wanted a convention to which all the factory-workers
+would be invited to send representatives. There should be no doctrinal
+tests, the sole qualification being membership in the working class. It did
+not matter to the advocates of this policy whether a man belonged to the
+Social Democratic party or to any party; whether he called himself a
+revolutionist or anything else. It was, they said, a movement of the
+working class, not the movement of a sect within the working class.
+
+They knew, of course, that in such a great mass movement there would
+probably be some theoretical confusion, more or less muddled thinking. They
+recognized, too, that in the great mass convention they proposed some
+Social Democratic formulations might be rejected and some others adopted
+which did not accord with the Marxian doctrines. But, quoting Marx to the
+effect that "One step of real movement is worth a thousand programs," they
+contended that if there was anything at all in the Marxian theory of
+progress through class struggles, and the historic rule of the working
+class, it must follow that, while they might make mistakes and go
+temporarily astray, the workers could not go far wrong, their class
+interests being a surer guide than any amount of intellectualism could
+produce.
+
+Lenine and his friends, the Bolsheviki, bitterly opposed all this reasoning
+and took a diametrically opposite position upon every one of the questions
+involved. They absolutely opposed any sort of co-operation with bourgeois
+parties of any kind, for any purpose whatever. No matter how progressive a
+particular bourgeois party might be, nor how important the reform aimed at,
+they believed that Social Democrats should remain in "splendid isolation,"
+refusing to make any distinction between more liberal and less liberal,
+progressive and reactionary, groups in the bourgeoisie. Trotzky, who did
+not at first formally join the Bolsheviki, but was a true Bolshevik in his
+intellectual convictions and sympathies, fully shared this view.
+
+Now, Lenine and Trotzky were dogmatic Marxists, and as such they could not
+deny the contention that capitalism must attain a certain development
+before Socialism could be attained in Russia. Nor could they deny that
+Absolutism was an obstacle to the development both of capitalist industry
+and of Socialism. They contended, however, that the peculiar conditions in
+Russia, resulting from the retardation of her economic development for so
+long, made it both possible and necessary to create a revolutionary
+movement which would, at one and the same time, overthrow both autocracy
+and capitalism. Necessarily, therefore, their warfare must be directed
+equally against autocracy and all political parties of the landlord and
+capitalist classes. They were guided throughout by this fundamental
+conviction. The policy of absolute and unqualified isolation in the Duma,
+which they insisted the Social Democrats ought to pursue, was based upon
+that conviction.
+
+
+VI
+
+All this is quite clear and easily intelligible. Granted the premise, the
+logic is admirable. It is not so easy, however, to see why, even granting
+the soundness of their opposition to _co-operation_ with bourgeois parties
+and groups in the Duma, there should be no political _competition_ with
+them--which would seem to be logically implied in the boycott of the Duma
+elections. Non-participation in the elections, consistently pursued as a
+proletarian policy, would leave the proletariat unrepresented in the
+legislative body, without one representative to fight its battles on what
+the world universally regards as one of the most important battle-fields of
+civilization. And yet, here, too, they were entirely logical and
+consistent--they did not believe in parliamentary government. As yet, they
+were not disposed to emphasize this overmuch, not, apparently, because of
+any lack of candor and good faith, but rather because the substitute for
+parliamentary government had not sufficiently shaped itself in their minds.
+The desire not to be confused with the Anarchists was another reason.
+Because the Bolsheviki and the Anarchists both oppose parliamentary
+government and the political state, it has been concluded by many writers
+on the subject that Bolshevism is simply Anarchism in another guise. This
+is a mistake. Bolshevism is quite different from and opposed to Anarchism.
+It requires strongly centralized government, which Anarchism abhors.
+
+Parliamentary government cannot exist except upon the basis of the will of
+the majority. Whoever enters into the parliamentary struggle, therefore,
+must hope and aim to convert the majority. Back of that hope and aim must
+be faith in the intellectual and moral capacity of the majority. At the
+foundation of Bolshevist theory and practice lies the important fact that
+there is no such faith, and, consequently, neither the hope nor the aim to
+convert the majority and with its strength make the Revolution. Out of the
+adult population of Russia at that time approximately 85 per cent. were
+peasants and less than 5 per cent. belonged to the industrial proletariat.
+At that time something like 70 per cent. of the people were illiterate.
+Even in St. Petersburg--where the standard of literacy was higher than in
+any other city--not more than 55 per cent. of the people could sign their
+own names in 1905, according to the most authentic government reports. When
+we contemplate such facts as these can we wonder that impatient
+revolutionaries should shrink from attempting the task of converting a
+majority of the population to an intelligent acceptance of Socialism?
+
+There was another reason besides this, however. Lenine--and he personifies
+Bolshevism--was, and is, a doctrinaire Marxist of the most dogmatic type
+conceivable. As such he believed that the new social order must be the
+creation of that class which is the peculiar product of modern capitalism,
+the industrial proletariat. To that class alone he and his followers pinned
+all their faith and hope, and that class was a small minority of the
+population and bound to remain a minority for a very long period of years.
+Here, then, we have the key. It cannot be too strongly stressed that the
+Bolsheviki did not base their hope upon the working class of Russia, and
+did not trust it. The working class of Russia--if we are to use the term
+with an intelligent regard to realities--was and is mainly composed of
+peasants; the industrial proletariat was and is only a relatively small
+part of the great working class of the nation. _But it is upon that small
+section, as against the rest of the working class, that Bolshevism relies_.
+
+Lenine has always refused to include the peasants in his definition of the
+working class. With almost fanatical intensity he has insisted that the
+peasant, together with the petty manufacturer and trader, would soon
+disappear; that industrial concentration would have its counterpart in a
+great concentration of landownings and agriculture; that the small peasant
+holdings would be swallowed up by large, modern agricultural estates, with
+the result that there would be an immense mass of landless agricultural
+wage-workers. This class would, of course, be a genuinely proletarian
+class, and its interests would be identical with those of the industrial
+proletariat. Until that time came it would be dangerous to rely upon the
+peasants, he urged, because their instincts are bourgeois rather than
+proletarian. Naturally, he has looked askance at the peasant Socialist
+movements, denying that they were truly Socialist at all. They could not be
+Socialist movements in the true sense, he contended, because they lacked
+the essential quality of true Socialists, namely, proletarian class
+consciousness.
+
+Naturally, too, Lenine and his followers have always regarded movements
+which aimed to divide the land among the peasants, and so tend to give
+permanence to a class of petty agriculturists, as essentially reactionary.
+The exigencies of the struggle have forced them into some compromises, of
+course. For example, at first they were not willing to admit that the
+peasants could be admitted into their group at all, but later on they
+admitted some who belonged to the poorest class of peasants. Throughout,
+however, they have insisted that the peasant class as a whole was a class
+of petty bourgeoisie and that its instincts and interests would inevitably
+lead it to side with the bourgeoisie as against the proletariat. Of course,
+this is a very familiar phase of Socialist evolution in every country. It
+lasted in Germany many years. In Russia, however, the question assumed an
+importance it never had in any other country, owing to the vast
+preponderance of peasants in the population. Anything more un-Russian than
+this theorizing cannot be well conceived. It runs counter to every fact in
+Russian experience, to the very basis of her economic life at this stage of
+her history. Lenine is a Russian, but his dogmas are not Russian, but
+German. Bolshevism is the product of perverted German scholasticism.
+
+Even the industrial workers as a whole, in their present stage of
+development, were not to be trusted, according to the Bolshevist leaders.
+They frankly opposed the Mensheviki when the latter proposed to hold their
+great convention of industrial workers, giving as their reason the fear
+that the convention majority would not consist of class-conscious
+revolutionary Marxian Socialists. In other words, they feared that the
+majority would not be on their side, and they had not the time or the
+patience to convert them. There was no pretense of faith in the majority of
+the industrial proletariat, much less of faith in the entire working class
+of Russia. The industrial proletariat was a minority of the working class,
+and the Bolsheviki pinned their faith to a minority of that minority. They
+wanted to establish, not democracy, but dictatorship of Russia by a small,
+disciplined, intelligent, and determined minority of working-men.
+
+The lines of cleavage between the Mensheviki and the Bolsheviki were thus
+clearly drawn. The former, while ready to join in mass uprisings and armed
+insurrections by the masses, believed that the supreme necessity was
+education and organization of all the working-people. Still relying upon
+the industrial proletariat to lead the struggle, they nevertheless
+recognized that the peasants were indispensable. The Bolsheviki, on the
+other hand, relied exclusively upon armed insurrection, initiated and
+directed by desperate minorities. The Mensheviki contended that the time
+for secret, conspiratory action was past; that Russia had outgrown that
+earlier method. As far as possible, they carried the struggle openly into
+the political field. They organized unions, educational societies, and
+co-operatives, confident that through these agencies the workers would
+develop cohesion and strength, which, at the right time, they would use as
+their class interests dictated. The Bolsheviki, on the other hand, clung to
+the old conspiratory methods, always mastered by the idea that a sudden
+_coup_ must some day place the reins of power in the hands of a
+revolutionary minority of the workers and enable them to set up a
+dictatorship. That dictatorship, it must be understood, was not to be
+permanent; democracy, possibly even political democracy, would come later.
+
+As we have already noted, into the ranks of the terrorist
+Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Bolsheviki spies and provocative agents
+wormed their way in large numbers. It is the inevitable fate of secret,
+conspiratory movements that this should be so, and also that it should
+result in saturating the minds of all engaged in the movements with
+distrust and suspicion. More than once the charge of being a provocateur
+was leveled at Lenine and at Trotzky, but without justification,
+apparently. There was, indeed, one incident which placed Lenine in a bad
+light. It belongs to a somewhat later period than we have been discussing,
+but it serves admirably to illustrate conditions which obtained throughout
+the whole dark period between the two great revolutions. One of Lenine's
+close friends and disciples was Roman Malinovsky, a fiery speaker of
+considerable power, distinguished for his bitter attacks upon the bourgeois
+progressive parties and upon the Mensheviki. The tenor of his speeches was
+always the same--only the interest of the proletariat should be considered;
+all bourgeois political parties and groups were equally reactionary, and
+any co-operation with them, for any purpose, was a betrayal of Socialist
+principle.
+
+Malinovsky was trusted by the Bolsheviki. He was elected to the Fourth
+Duma, where he became the leader of the little group of thirteen Social
+Democrats. Like other members of the Bolshevik faction, he entered the
+Duma, despite his contempt for parliamentary action, simply because it
+afforded him a useful opportunity for agitation and demonstrations. In the
+Duma he assailed even a portion of the Social Democratic group as belonging
+to the bourgeoisie, succeeding in splitting it in two factions and becoming
+the leader of the Bolshevik faction, numbering six. This blatant demagogue,
+whom Lenine called "the Russian Bebel," was proposed for membership in the
+International Socialist Bureau, the supreme council of the International
+Socialist movement, and would have been sent as a delegate to that body as
+a representative of Russian Socialist movement but for the discovery of the
+fact that he was a secret agent of the Czar's government!
+
+It was proved that Malinovsky was a provocateur in the pay of the Police
+Department, and that many, if not all, of his speeches had been prepared
+for him in the Police Department by a former director named Beletzky. The
+exposure made a great sensation in Russian Socialist circles at the time,
+and the fact that it was Nikolai Lenine who had proposed that Malinovsky be
+chosen to sit in the International Socialist Bureau naturally caused a
+great deal of unfriendly comment. It cannot be denied that the incident
+placed Lenine in an unfavorable light, but it must be admitted that
+nothing developed to suggest that he was guilty of anything more serious
+than permitting himself to be outwitted and deceived by a cunning
+trickster. The incident serves to show, however, the ease with which the
+extreme fanaticism of the Bolsheviki played into the hands of the
+autocracy.
+
+
+VII
+
+While Bolsheviki and Mensheviki wrangled and disputed, great forces were at
+work among the Russian people. By 1910 the terrible pall of depression and
+despair which had settled upon the nation as a result of the failure of the
+First Revolution began to break. There was a new generation of college
+students, youthful and optimistic spirits who were undeterred by the
+failure of 1905-06, confident that they were wiser and certain to succeed.
+Also there had been an enormous growth of working-class organizations,
+large numbers of unions and co-operative societies having been formed in
+spite of the efforts of the government. The soul of Russia was once more
+stirring.
+
+The end of 1910 and the beginning of 1911 witnessed a new series of
+strikes, such as had not occurred since 1905. The first were students'
+strikes, inaugurated in support of their demand for the abolition of
+capital punishment. These were quickly followed by important strikes in the
+industrial centers for economic ends--better wages and shorter
+working-hours. As in the period immediately preceding the First Revolution,
+the industrial unrest soon manifested itself in political ways. Without any
+conscious leadership at all this would have been inevitable in the existing
+circumstances. But there was leadership. Social Democrats of both factions,
+and Socialists of other groups as well, moved among the workers, preaching
+the old, yet ever new, gospel of revolt. Political strikes followed the
+strikes for immediate economic ends. Throughout the latter part of 1911 and
+the whole of 1912 the revolutionary movement once more spread among the
+masses.
+
+The year 1913 was hardly well begun when revolutionary activities assumed
+formidable proportions. January 9th--Russian calendar--anniversary of
+Bloody Sunday, was celebrated all over the country by great demonstrations
+which were really demonstration-strikes. In St. Petersburg fifty-five
+thousand workers went out--and there were literally hundreds of other
+smaller "strikes" of a similar nature throughout the country. In April
+another anniversary of the martyrdom of revolting working-men was similarly
+celebrated in most of the industrial centers, hundreds of thousands of
+workers striking as a manifestation against the government. The 1st of May
+was celebrated as it had not been celebrated since 1905. In the various
+industrial cities hundreds of thousands of workmen left their work to march
+through the streets and hold mass meetings, and so formidable was the
+movement that the government was cowed and dared not attempt to suppress it
+by force. There was a defiant note of revolution in this great uprising of
+the workers. They demanded an eight-hour day and the right to organize
+unions and make collective bargains. In addition to these demands, they
+protested against the Balkan War and against militarism in general.
+
+Had the great war not intervened, a tragic interlude in Russia's long
+history of struggle, the year 1914 would have seen the greatest struggle
+for the overthrow of Czarism in all that history. Whether it would have
+been more successful than the effort of 1905 can never be known, but it is
+certain that the working-class revolutionary movement was far stronger
+than it was nine years before. On the other hand, there would not have been
+the same degree of support from the other classes, for in the intervening
+period class lines had been more sharply drawn and the class conflict
+greatly intensified. Surging through the masses like a mighty tide was the
+spirit of revolt, manifesting itself much as it had done nine years before.
+All through the early months of the year the revolutionary temper grew. The
+workers became openly defiant and the government, held in check, doubtless,
+by the delicate balance of the international situation, dared not resort to
+force with sufficient vigor to stamp out the agitation. Mass meetings were
+held in spite of all regulations to the contrary; political strikes
+occurred in all parts of the country. In St. Petersburg and Moscow
+barricades were thrown up in the streets as late as July. Then the war
+clouds burst. A greater passion than that of revolution swept over the
+nation and it turned to present a united front to the external foe.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+THE WAR AND THE PEOPLE
+
+
+I
+
+The war against Austria and Germany was not unpopular. Certainly there was
+never an occasion when a declaration of war by their rulers roused so
+little resentment among the Russian people. Wars are practically never
+popular with the great mass of the people in any country, and this is
+especially true of autocratically governed countries. The heavy burdens
+which all great wars impose upon the laboring class, as well as upon the
+petty bourgeoisie, cause even the most righteous wars to be regarded with
+dread and sorrow. The memory of the war with Japan was too fresh and too
+bitter to make it possible for the mass of the Russian people to welcome
+the thought of another war. It cannot, therefore, in truth be said that the
+war with the Central Empires was popular. But it can be said with sincerity
+and the fullest sanction that the war was not unpopular; that it was
+accepted by the greater part of the people as a just and, moreover, a
+necessary war. Opposition to the war was not greater in Russia than in
+England or France, or, later, in America. Of course, there were religious
+pacifists and Socialists who opposed the war and denounced it, as they
+would have denounced any other war, on general principles, no matter what
+the issues involved might be, but their number and their influence were
+small and quite unimportant.
+
+The one great outstanding fact was the manner in which the sense of peril
+to the fatherland rallied to its defense the different races, creeds,
+classes, and parties, the great tidal wave of genuine and sincere
+patriotism sweeping everything before it, even the mighty, passionate
+revolutionary agitation. It can hardly be questioned or doubted that if the
+war had been bitterly resented by the masses it would have precipitated
+revolution instead of retarding it. From this point of view the war was a
+deplorable disaster. That no serious attempt was made to bring about a
+revolution at that time is the best possible evidence that the declaration
+of war did not enrage the people. If not a popular and welcome event,
+therefore, the declaration of war by the Czar was not an unpopular one.
+Never before since his accession to the throne had Nicholas II had the
+support of the nation to anything like the same extent.
+
+Take the Jews, for example. Bitterly hated and persecuted as they had been,
+despised and humiliated beyond description; victims of the knout and the
+pogrom; tortured by Cossacks and Black Hundreds; robbed by official
+extortions; their women shamed and ravaged and their babies doomed to rot
+and die in the noisome Pale--the Jews owed no loyalty to the Czar or even
+to the nation. Had they sought revenge in the hour of Russia's crisis, in
+howsoever grim a manner, it would have been easy to understand their action
+and hard indeed to regard it with condemnation. It is almost unthinkable
+that the Czar could have thought of the Jews in his vast Empire in those
+days without grave apprehension and fear.
+
+Yet, as all the world knows, the Jews resolutely overcame whatever
+suggestion of revenge came to them and, with marvelous solidarity,
+responded to Russia's call without hesitation and without political
+intrigue or bargaining. As a whole, they were as loyal as any of the
+Czar's subjects. How shall we explain this phenomenon?
+
+The explanation is that the leaders of the Jewish people, and practically
+the whole body of Jewish Intellectuals, recognized from the first that the
+war was more than a war of conflicting dynasties; that it was a war of
+conflicting ideals. They recognized that the Entente, as a whole,
+notwithstanding that it included the autocracy of Russia, represented the
+generous, democratic ideals and principles vital to every Jew in that they
+must be securely established before the emancipation of the Jew could be
+realized. Their hatred of Czarism was not engulfed by any maudlin
+sentiment; they knew that they had no "fatherland" to defend. They were not
+swept on a tide of jingoism to forget their tragic history and proclaim
+their loyalty to the infamous oppressor. No. Their loyalty was to the
+Entente, not to the Czar. They were guided by enlightened self-interest, by
+an intelligent understanding of the meaning to them of the great struggle
+against Teutonic militarist-imperialism.
+
+Every intelligent and educated Jew in Russia knew that the real source of
+the brutal anti-Semitism which characterized the rule of the Romanovs was
+Prussian and not Russian. He knew that it had long been one of the main
+features of Germany's foreign policy to instigate and stimulate hatred and
+fear of the Jews by Russian officialdom. There could not be a more tragic
+mistake than to infer from the ruthless oppression of the Jews in Russia
+that anti-Semitism is characteristically Russian. Surely, the fact that the
+First Duma was practically unanimous in deciding to give equal rights to
+the Jews with all the rest of the population proves that the Russian people
+did not hate the Jews. The ill-treatment of the Jews was part of the policy
+by which Germany, for her own ends, cunningly contrived to weaken Russia
+and so prevent the development of her national solidarity. Racial animosity
+and conflict was an ideal instrument for attaining that result. Internal
+war and abortive revolutionary outbreaks which kept the country unsettled,
+and the energies of the government taxed to the uttermost, served the same
+end, and were, therefore, the object of Germany's intrigues in Russia,
+equally with hostility to the Jews, as we shall have occasion to note.
+
+German intrigue in Russia is an interesting study in economic determinism.
+Unless we comprehend it we shall strive in vain to understand Russia's part
+in the war and her rôle in the history of the past few decades. A brief
+study of the map of Europe by any person who possesses even an elementary
+knowledge of the salient principles of economics will reveal Germany's
+interest in Russia and make quite plain why German statesmen have so
+assiduously aimed to keep Russia in a backward economic condition. As a
+great industrial nation it was to Germany's interest to have Russia remain
+backward industrially, predominantly an agricultural country, quite as
+surely as it was to her interest as a military power to have weakness and
+inefficiency, instead of strength and efficiency, in Russia's military
+organization. As a highly developed industrial nation Russia would of
+necessity have been Germany's formidable rival--perhaps her most formidable
+rival--and by her geographical situation would have possessed an enormous
+advantage in the exploitation of the vast markets in the far East. As a
+feudal agricultural country, on the other hand, Russia would be a great
+market for German manufactured goods, and, at the same time, a most
+convenient supply-depot for raw materials and granary upon which Germany
+could rely for raw materials, wheat, rye, and other staple grains--a
+supply-depot and granary, moreover, accessible by overland transportation
+not subject to naval attack.
+
+For the Russian Jew the defeat of Germany was a vital necessity. The
+victory of Germany and her allies could only serve to strengthen Prussian
+influence in Russia and add to the misery and suffering of the Jewish
+population. That other factors entered into the determination of the
+attitude of the Jews, such as, for example, faith in England as the
+traditional friend of the Jew, and abhorrence at the cruel invasion of
+Belgium, is quite true. But the great determinant was the well-understood
+fact that Germany's rulers had long systematically manipulated Russian
+politics and the Russian bureaucracy to the serious injury of the Jewish
+race. Germany's militarist-imperialism was the soul and inspiration of the
+oppression which cursed every Jew in Russia.
+
+
+II
+
+The democratic elements in Russia were led to support the government by
+very similar reasoning. The same economic and dynastic motives which had
+led Germany to promote racial animosities and struggles in Russia led her
+to take every other possible means to uphold autocracy and prevent the
+establishment of democracy. This had been long recognized by all liberal
+Russians, no matter to what political school or party they might belong. It
+was as much part of the common knowledge as the fact that St. Petersburg
+was the national capital. It was part of the intellectual creed of
+practically every liberal Russian that there was a natural affinity between
+the great autocracies of Germany and Russia, and that a revolution in
+Russia which seriously endangered the existence of monarchical absolutism
+would be suppressed by Prussian guns and bayonets reinforcing those of
+loyal Russian troops. It was generally believed by Russian Socialists that
+in 1905 the Kaiser had promised to send troops into Russia to crush the
+Revolution if called upon for that aid. Many German Socialists, it may be
+added, shared that belief. Autocracies have a natural tendency to combine
+forces against revolutionary movements. It would have been no more strange
+for Wilhelm II to aid Nicholas II in quelling a revolution that menaced his
+throne than it was for Alexander I to aid in putting down revolution in
+Germany; or than it was for Nicholas I to crush the Hungarian Revolution in
+1849, in the interest of Francis Joseph; or than it was for Bismarck to
+rush to the aid of Alexander II in putting down the Polish insurrection in
+1863.
+
+The democrats of Russia knew, moreover, that, in addition to the natural
+affinity which served to bind the two autocracies, the Romanov and
+Hohenzollern dynasties had been closely knit together in a strong union by
+years and years of carefully planned and strongly wrought blood ties. As
+Isaac Don Lenine reminds us in his admirable study of the Russian
+Revolution, Nicholas II was more than seven-eighths German, less than
+one-eighth of his blood heritage being Romanov. Catherine the Great, wife
+of Peter III, was a Prussian by birth and heritage and thoroughly
+Prussianized her court. After her--from 1796 to 1917--six Czars reigned in
+Russia, five of whom married German wives. As was inevitable in such
+circumstances, the Russian court had long been notoriously subject to
+German influences and strongly pro-German in its sympathies--by no means a
+small matter in an autocratic country. Fully aware of their advantage, the
+Kaiser and his Ministers increased the German influence and power at the
+Russian court by encouraging German nobles to marry into Russian court
+circles. The closing decade of the reign of Nicholas II was marked by an
+extraordinary increase of Prussian influence in his court, an achievement
+in which the Kaiser was greatly assisted by the Czarina, who was, it will
+be remembered, a German princess.
+
+Naturally, the German composition and character of the Czar's court was
+reflected in the diplomatic service and in the most important departments
+of the Russian government, including the army. The Russian Secret Service
+was very largely in the hands of Germans and Russians who had married
+German wives. The same thing may be said of the Police Department. Many of
+the generals and other high officers in the Russian army were either of
+German parentage or connected with Germany by marriage ties. In brief, the
+whole Russian bureaucracy was honeycombed by German influence.
+
+Outside official circles, much the same condition existed among the great
+landowners. Those of the Baltic provinces were largely of Teutonic descent,
+of course. Many had married German wives. The result was that the nobility
+of these provinces, long peculiarly influential in the political life of
+Russia, was, to a very large degree, pro-German. In addition to these,
+there were numerous large landowners of German birth, while many, probably
+a big majority, of the superintendents of the large industrial
+establishments and landed estates were German citizens. It is notorious
+that the principal factories upon which Russia had to rely for guns and
+munitions were in charge of Germans, who had been introduced because of
+their high technical efficiency.
+
+In view of these facts, and a mass of similar facts which might be cited,
+it was natural for the democrats of Russia to identify Germany and German
+intrigue and influence with the hated bureaucracy. It was as natural as it
+was for the German influence to be used against the democratic movement in
+Russia, as it invariably was. Practically the entire mass of democratic
+opinion in Russia, including, of course, all the Socialist factions,
+regarded these royal, aristocratic, and bureaucratic German influences as a
+menace to Russia, a cancer that must be cut out. With the exception of a
+section of the Socialists, whose position we shall presently examine, the
+mass of liberal-thinking, progressive, democratic Russians saw in the war a
+welcome breaking of the German yoke. Believing that the victory of Germany
+would restore the yoke, and that her defeat by Russia would eliminate the
+power which had sustained Czarism, they welcomed the war and rallied with
+enthusiasm at the call to arms. They were loyal, but to Russia, not to the
+Czar. They felt that in warring against Prussian militarist-imperialism
+they were undermining Russian Absolutism.
+
+That the capitalists of Russia should want to see the power of Germany to
+hold Russia in chains completely destroyed is easy to understand. To all
+intents and purposes, from the purely economic point of view, Russia was
+virtually a German colony to be exploited for the benefit of Germany. The
+commercial treaties of 1905, which gave Germany such immense trade
+advantages, had become exceedingly unpopular. On the other hand, the
+immense French loan of 1905, the greater part of which had been used to
+develop the industrial life of Russia, had the effect of bringing Russian
+capitalists into closer relations with French capitalists. For further
+capital Russia could only look to France and England with any confident
+hope. Above all, the capitalists of Russia wanted freedom for economic
+development; they wanted stability and national unity, the very things
+Germany was preventing. They wanted efficient government and the
+elimination of the terrible corruption which infested the bureaucracy. The
+law of economic evolution was inexorable and inescapable; the capitalist
+system could not grow within the narrow confines of Absolutism.
+
+For the Russian capitalist class, therefore, it was of the most vital
+importance that Germany's power should not be increased, as it would of
+necessity be if the Entente submitted to her threats and permitted Serbia
+to be crushed by Austria, and the furtherance of the Pan-German
+_Mitteleuropa_ designs. It was vitally necessary to Russian capitalism that
+Germany's strangle-hold upon the inner life of Russia should be broken. The
+issue was not the competition of capitalism, as that is commonly
+understood; it was not the rivalry for markets like that which animates the
+capitalist classes of all lands. The Russian capitalist class was animated
+by no fear of German competition in the sense in which the nations of the
+world have understood that term. They had their own vast home market to
+develop. The industrialization of the country must transform a very large
+part of the peasantry into factory artisans living in cities, having new
+needs and relatively high wages, and, consequently, more money to spend.
+For many years to come their chief reliance must be the home market,
+constantly expanding as the relative importance of manufacturing increased
+and forced improved methods of agriculture upon the nation in the process,
+as it was bound to do.
+
+It was Germany as a persistent meddler in Russian government and politics
+that the capitalists of Russia resented. It was the unfair advantage that
+this underhand political manipulation gave her in their own home field that
+stirred up the leaders of the capitalist class of Russia. That, and the
+knowledge that German intrigue by promoting divisions in Russia was the
+mainstay of the autocracy, solidified the capitalist class of Russia in
+support of the war. There was a small section of this class that went much
+farther than this and entertained more ambitious hopes. They realized fully
+that Turkey had already fallen under the domination of Germany to such a
+degree that in the event of a German victory in the war, or, what really
+amounted to the same thing, the submission of the Entente to her will,
+Germany would become the ruler of the Dardanelles and European Turkey be in
+reality, and perhaps in form, part of the German Empire.
+
+Such a development could not fail, they believed, to have the most
+disastrous consequences for Russia. Inevitably, it would add to German
+prestige and power in the Russian Empire, and weld together the
+Hohenzollern, Habsburg, and Romanov autocracies in a solid, reactionary
+mass, which, under the efficient leadership of Germany, might easily
+dominate the entire world. Moreover, like many of the ablest Russians,
+including the foremost Marxian Socialist scholars, they believed that the
+normal economic development of Russia required a free outlet to the warm
+waters of the Mediterranean, which alone could give her free access to the
+great ocean highways. Therefore they hoped that one result of a victorious
+war by the Entente against the Central Empires, in which Russia would play
+an important part, would be the acquisition of Constantinople by Russia.
+Thus the old vision of the Czars had become the vision of an influential
+and rising class with a solid basis of economic interest.
+
+
+III
+
+As in every other country involved, the Socialist movement was sharply
+divided by the war. Paradoxical as it seems, in spite of the great revival
+of revolutionary hope and sentiment in the first half of the year, the
+Socialist parties and groups were not strong when the war broke out. They
+were, indeed, at a very low state. They had not yet recovered from the
+reaction. The manipulation of the electoral laws following the dissolution
+of the Second Duma, and the systematic oppression and repression of all
+radical organizations by the administration, had greatly reduced the
+Socialist parties in membership and influence. The masses were, for a long
+time, weary of struggle, despondent, and passive. The Socialist factions
+meanwhile were engaged in an apparently interminable controversy upon
+theoretical and tactical questions in which the masses of the
+working-people, when they began to stir at last, took no interest, and
+which they could hardly be supposed to understand. The Socialist parties
+and groups were subject to a very great disability in that their leaders
+were practically all in exile. Had a revolution broken out, as it would
+have done but for the war, Socialist leadership would have asserted itself.
+
+As in all other countries, the divisions of opinion created by the war
+among the Socialists cut across all previous existing lines of separation
+and made it impossible to say that this or that faction adopted a
+particular view. Just as in Germany, France, and England, some of the most
+revolutionary Socialists joined with the more moderate Socialists in
+upholding the war, while extremely moderate Socialists joined with
+Socialists of the opposite extreme in opposing it. It is possible, however,
+to set forth the principal features of the division with tolerable
+accuracy:
+
+A majority of the Socialist-Revolutionary party executive issued an
+anti-war Manifesto. There is no means of telling how far the views
+expressed represented the attitude of the peasant Socialists as a whole,
+owing to the disorganized state of the party and the difficulties of
+assembling the members. The Manifesto read:
+
+    There is no doubt that Austrian imperialism is responsible for the
+    war with Serbia. But is it not equally criminal on the part of
+    Serbs to refuse autonomy to Macedonia and to oppress smaller and
+    weaker nations?
+
+    It is the protection of this state that our government considers
+    its "sacred duty." What hypocrisy! Imagine the intervention of the
+    Czar on behalf of poor Serbia, whilst he martyrizes Poland,
+    Finland and the Jews, and behaves like a brigand toward Persia.
+
+    Whatever may be the course of events, the Russian workers and
+    peasants will continue their heroic fight to obtain for Russia a
+    place among civilized nations.
+
+This Manifesto was issued, as reported in the Socialist press, prior to the
+actual declaration of war. It was a threat of revolution made with a view
+to preventing the war, if possible, and belongs to the same category as the
+similar threats of revolution made by the German Socialists before the war
+to the same end. The mildness of manner which characterizes the Manifesto
+may be attributed to two causes--weakness of the movement and a resulting
+lack of assurance, together with a lack of conviction arising from the fact
+that many of the leaders, while they hated the Czar and all his works, and
+could not reconcile themselves to the idea of making any kind of truce with
+their great enemy, nevertheless were pro-Ally and anxious for the defeat of
+German imperialism. In other words, these leaders shared the national
+feeling against Germany, and, had they been free citizens of a
+democratically governed country, would have loyally supported the war.
+
+When the Duma met, on August 8th, for the purpose of voting the war
+credits, the Social Democrats of both factions, Bolsheviki and Mensheviki,
+fourteen in number,[2] united upon a policy of abstention from voting.
+Valentin Khaustov, on behalf of the two factions, read this statement:
+
+    A terrible and unprecedented calamity has broken upon the people
+    of the entire world. Millions of workers have been torn away from
+    their labor, ruined, and swept away by a bloody torrent. Millions
+    of families have been delivered over to famine.
+
+    War has already begun. While the governments of Europe were
+    preparing for it, the proletariat of the entire world, with the
+    German workers at the head, unanimously protested.
+
+    The hearts of the Russian workers are with the European
+    proletariat. This war is provoked by the policy of expansion for
+    which the ruling classes of all countries are responsible.
+
+    The proletariat will defend the civilization of the world against
+    this attack.
+
+    The conscious proletariat of the belligerent countries has not
+    been sufficiently powerful to prevent this war and the resulting
+    return of barbarism.
+
+    But we are convinced that the working class will find in the
+    international solidarity of the workers the means to force the
+    conclusion of peace at an early date. The terms of that peace will
+    be dictated by the people themselves, and not by the diplomats.
+
+    We are convinced that this war will finally open the eyes of the
+    great masses of Europe, and show them the real causes of all the
+    violence and oppression that they endure, and that therefore this
+    new explosion of barbarism will be the last.
+
+As soon as this declaration was read the fourteen members of the Social
+Democratic group left the chamber in silence. They were immediately
+followed by the Laborites and Socialist-Revolutionists representing the
+peasant Socialists, so that none of the Socialists in the Duma voted for
+the war credits. As we shall see later on, the Laborites and most of the
+Socialist-Revolutionists afterward supported the war. The declaration of
+the Social Democrats in the Duma was as weak and as lacking in definiteness
+of policy as the Manifesto of the Socialist-Revolutionists already quoted.
+We know now that it was a compromise. It was possible to get agreement upon
+a statement of general principles which were commonplaces of Socialist
+propaganda, and to vaguely expressed hopes that "the working class will
+find in the international solidarity of the workers the means to force the
+conclusion of peace at an early date." It was easy enough to do this, but
+it would have been impossible to unite upon a definite policy of resistance
+and opposition to the war. It was easy to agree not to vote for the war
+credits, since there was no danger that this would have any practical
+effect, the voting of the credits--largely a mere form--being quite
+certain. It would have been impossible to get all to agree to vote
+_against_ the credits.
+
+Under the strong leadership of Alexander Kerensky the Labor party soon took
+a decided stand in support of the war. In the name of the entire group of
+the party's representatives in the Duma, Kerensky read at an early session
+a statement which pledged the party to defend the fatherland. "We firmly
+believe," said Kerensky, "that the great flower of Russian democracy,
+together with all the other forces, will throw back the aggressive enemy
+and _will defend their native land_." The party had decided, he said, to
+support the war "in defense of the land of our birth and of our
+civilization created by the blood of our race.... We believe that through
+the agony of the battle-field the brotherhood of the Russian people will be
+strengthened and a common desire created to free the land from its terrible
+internal troubles." Kerensky declared that the workers would take no
+responsibility for the suicidal war into which the governments of Europe
+had plunged their peoples. He strongly criticized the government, but
+ended, nevertheless, in calling upon the peasants and industrial workers to
+support the war:
+
+"The Socialists of England, Belgium, France, and Germany have tried to
+protest against rushing into war. We Russian Socialists were not able at
+the last to raise our voices freely against the war. But, deeply convinced
+of the brotherhood of the workers of all lands, we send our brotherly
+greetings to all who protested against the preparations for this
+fratricidal conflict of peoples. Remember that Russian citizens have no
+enemies among the working classes of the belligerents! _Protect your
+country to the end against aggression by the states whose governments are
+hostile to us, but remember that there would not have been this terrible
+war had the great ideals of democracy, freedom, equality, and brotherhood
+been directing the activities of those who control the destinies of Russia
+and other lands!_ As it is, our authorities, even in this terrible moment,
+show no desire to forget internal strife, grant no amnesty to those who
+have fought for freedom and the country's happiness, show no desire for
+reconciliation with the non-Russian peoples of the Empire.
+
+"And, instead of relieving the condition of the laboring classes of the
+people, the government puts on them especially the heaviest load of the war
+expenses, by tightening the yoke of indirect taxes.
+
+"Peasants and workers, all who want the happiness and well-being of Russia
+in these great trials, harden your spirit! Gather all your strength and,
+having defended your land, free it; and to you, our brothers, who are
+shedding blood for the fatherland, a profound obeisance and fraternal
+greetings."
+
+Kerensky's statement was of tremendous significance. Made on behalf of the
+entire group of which he was leader, it reflected the sober second thought
+of the representatives of the peasant Socialists and socialistically
+inclined radicals. Their solemnly measured protest against the reactionary
+policy of the government was as significant as the announcement that they
+would support the war. It was a fact that at the very time when national
+unity was of the most vital importance the government was already goading
+the people into despairing revolt.
+
+That a section of the Bolsheviki began a secret agitation against the war,
+aiming at a revolt among the soldiers, regardless of the fact that it would
+mean Russia's defeat and Germany's triumph, is a certainty. The government
+soon learned of this movement and promptly took steps to crush it. Many
+Russian Socialists have charged that the policy of the Bolsheviki was
+inspired by provocateurs in the employ of the police, and by them betrayed.
+Others believe that the policy was instigated by German provocateurs, for
+very obvious purposes. It was not uncommon for German secret agents to worm
+their way into the Russian Socialist ranks, nor for the agents of the
+Russian police to keep the German secret service informed of what was going
+on in Russian Socialist circles. Whatever truth there may be in the
+suspicion that the anti-war Bolshevik faction of the Social Democrats were
+the victims of the Russian police espionage system, and were betrayed by
+one whom they had trusted, as the Socialist-Revolutionists had been
+betrayed by Azev, the fact remains that the government ordered the arrest
+of five of the Bolshevist Social Democratic members of the Duma, on
+November 17th. Never before had the government disregarded the principle of
+parliamentary immunity. When members of the First Duma, belonging to
+various parties, and members of the Second Duma, belonging to the Social
+Democratic party, were arrested it was only after the Duma had been
+formally dissolved. The arrest of the five Social Democrats while the Duma
+was still sitting evoked a strong protest, even from the conservatives.
+
+The government based its action upon the following allegations, which
+appear to have been substantially correct: in October arrangements were
+made to convoke a secret conference of delegates of the Social Democratic
+organization to plan for a revolutionary uprising. The police learned of
+the plan, and when at last, on November 17th, the conference was held at
+Viborg, eight miles from Petrograd--as the national capital was now
+called--a detachment of police found eleven persons assembled, including
+five members of the Imperial Duma, Messrs. Petrovsky, Badavev, Mouranov,
+Samoelov, and Chagov. The police arrested six persons, but did not arrest
+the Duma members, on account of their parliamentary position. An examining
+magistrate, however, indicted the whole eleven who attended the conference,
+under Article No. 102 of the Penal Code, and issued warrants for their
+arrest. Among those arrested was Kamanev, one of Lenine's closest friends,
+who behaved so badly at his trial, manifesting so much cowardice, that he
+was censured by his party.
+
+At this conference, according to the government, arrangements were made to
+circulate among the masses a Manifesto which declared that "from the
+viewpoint of the working class and of the laboring masses of all the
+nations of Russia, the defeat of the monarchy of the Czar and of its armies
+would be of extremely little consequence." The Manifesto urged the
+imperative necessity of _carrying on on all sides the propaganda of the
+social revolution among the army and at the theater of the war, and that
+weapons should be directed not against their brothers, the hired slaves of
+other countries, but against the reactionary bourgeois governments_. The
+Manifesto went on, according to the government, to favor the organization
+of a similar propaganda in all languages, among all the armies, with the
+aim of creating republics in Russia, Poland, Germany, Austria, and all
+other European countries, these to be federated into a republican United
+Stares of Europe.
+
+The declaration that the defeat of the Russian armies would be "of
+extremely little consequence" to the workers became the key-note of the
+anti-war agitation of the Bolsheviki. Lenine and Zinoviev, still in exile,
+adopted the view that the defeat of Russia was _actually desirable_ from
+the point of view of the Russian working class. "We are Russians, and for
+that very reason we want Czarism to be defeated," was the cry.[3] In his
+paper, the _Social Democrat_, published in Switzerland, Lenine advocated
+Russian defeat, to be brought about through treachery and revolt in the
+army, as the best means of furthering revolutionary progress. The majority
+of the Bolshevik faction made common cause with the extreme left-wing
+Socialists of the Socialist-Revolutionary party, who shared their views and
+became known as "Porazhentsi"--that is, advocates of defeat. Naturally, the
+charge was made that they were pro-German, and it was even charged that
+they were in the pay of Germany. Possibly some of them were, but it by no
+means follows that because they desired Russia's defeat they were therefore
+consciously pro-German. They were not pro-German, but anti-Czarists. They
+believed quite honestly, most of them, that Russia's defeat was the surest
+and quickest way of bringing about the Revolution in Russia which would
+overthrow Czarism. In many respects their position was quite like that of
+those Irish rebels who desired to see England defeated, even though it
+meant Germany's triumph, not because of any love for Germany, but because
+they hated England and believed that her defeat would be Ireland's
+opportunity. However short-sighted and stupid such a policy may be judged
+to be, it is quite comprehensible and should not be misrepresented. It is a
+remarkable fact that the Bolsheviki, while claiming to be the most radical
+and extreme internationalists, were in practice the most narrow
+nationalists. They were exactly as narrow in their nationalism as the
+Sinn-Feiners of Ireland. They were not blind to the terrible wrongs
+inflicted upon Belgium, or to the fact that Germany's victory over Russia
+would make it possible for her to crush the western democracies, France and
+England. But neither to save Belgium nor to prevent German militarism
+crushing French and English workers under its iron heel would they have the
+Russian workers make any sacrifice. They saw, and cared only for, what they
+believed to be _Russian_ interests.
+
+
+IV
+
+But during the first months of the war the Porazhentsi--including the
+Bolsheviki--were a very small minority. The great majority of the
+Socialist-Revolutionists rallied to the support of the Allied cause. Soon
+after the war began a Socialist Manifesto to the laboring masses of Russia
+was issued. It bore the signature of many of the best-known Russian
+Socialists, representing all the Socialist factions and groups except the
+Bolsheviki. Among the names were those of George Plechanov, Leo Deutsch,
+Gregory Alexinsky, N. Avksentiev, B. Vorovonov, I. Bunakov, and A.
+Bach--representing the best thought of the movement in practically all its
+phases. This document is of the greatest historical importance, not merely
+because it expressed the sentiments of Socialists of so many shades, but
+even more because of its carefully reasoned arguments why Socialists should
+support the war and why the defeat of Germany was essential to Russian and
+international social democracy. Despite its great length, the Manifesto is
+here given in its entirety:
+
+    We, the undersigned, belong to the different shades of Russian
+    Socialistic thought. We differ on many things, but we firmly agree
+    in that the defeat of Russia in her struggle with Germany would
+    mean her defeat in her struggle for freedom, and we think that,
+    guided by this conviction, our adherents in Russia must come
+    together for a common service to their people, in the hour of the
+    grave danger the country is now facing.
+
+    We address ourselves to the politically conscious working-men,
+    peasants, artisans, clerks--to all of those who earn their bread
+    in the sweat of their brow, and who, suffering from the lack of
+    means and want of political rights, are struggling for a better
+    future for themselves, for their children, and for their brethren.
+
+    We send them our hearty greeting, and persistently say to them:
+    Listen to us in this fatal time, when the enemy has conquered the
+    Western strongholds of Russia, has occupied an important part of
+    our territory and is menacing Kiev, Petrograd, and Moscow, these
+    most important centers of our social life.
+
+    Misinformed people may tell you that in defending yourselves from
+    German invasion you support our old political régime. These people
+    want to see Russia defeated because of their hatred of the Czar's
+    government. Like one of the heroes of our genius of satire,
+    Shchedrin, they mix fatherland with its temporary bosses. But
+    Russia belongs not to the Czar, but to the Russian working-people.
+    In defending Russia, the working-people defend themselves, defend
+    the road to their freedom. As we said before, the inevitable
+    consequences of German victory would be the strengthening of our
+    old régime.
+
+    The Russian reactionaries understand this very thoroughly. _In a
+    faint, half-hearted manner they are defending Russia from
+    Germany_. The Ministers who resigned recently, Maklakov and
+    Shcheglovitov, presented a secret report to the Czar, in November,
+    1914, in which they explained how advantageous it would be for the
+    Czar to make a separate peace with Germany. _They understand that
+    the defeat of Germany would be a defeat of the principles of
+    monarchism, so dear to all our European reactionaries_.
+
+    Our people will never forget _the failure of the Czar's government
+    to defend Russia_. But if the progressive, the politically
+    conscious people will not take part in the struggle against
+    Germany, the Czar's government will have an excuse for saying: "It
+    is not our fault that Germany defeats us; it is the fault of the
+    revolutionists who have betrayed their country," and this will
+    vindicate the government in the eyes of the people.
+
+    The political situation in Russia is such that only across the
+    bridge of national defense can we reach freedom. Remember, _we do
+    not tell you, first victory against the external enemy and then
+    revolution against the internal, the Czar's government_.
+
+    In the course of events the defeat of the Czar's government may
+    serve as a necessary preliminary condition for, and even as a
+    guaranty of, the elimination of the German danger. The French
+    revolutionists of the end of the eighteenth century would never
+    have been able to have overcome the enemy, attacking France on all
+    sides, had they not adopted such tactics only when the popular
+    movement against the old régime became mature enough to render
+    their efforts effective.
+
+    Furthermore, you must not be embarrassed by the arguments of those
+    who believe that every one who defends his country refuses thereby
+    to take part in the struggle of the classes. These persons do not
+    know what they are talking about. In the first place, in order
+    that the struggle of the classes in Russia should be successful,
+    certain social and political conditions must exist there. _These
+    conditions will not exist if Germany wins_.
+
+    In the second place, if the working-man of Russia cannot but
+    defend himself against the exploitation of the Russian landed
+    aristocrat and capitalist it seems incomprehensible that he should
+    remain inactive when the lasso of exploitation is being drawn
+    around his neck by the German landed aristocracy (the _Junker_)
+    and the German capitalist who are, unfortunately, at the present
+    time _supported by a considerable part of the German proletariat
+    that has turned traitor to its duty of solidarity with the
+    proletariat of other countries_.
+
+    By striving to the utmost to cut this lasso of German
+    imperialistic exploitation, the proletariat of Russia will
+    continue the struggle of the classes in that form which at the
+    present moment is most appropriate, fruitful, and effective.
+
+    It has been our country's fate once before to suffer from the
+    bloody horrors of a hostile invasion. But never before did it have
+    to defend itself against an enemy so well armed, so skilfully
+    organized, so carefully prepared for his plundering enterprise as
+    he is now.
+
+    The position of the country is dangerous to the highest degree;
+    therefore upon all of you, upon all the politically conscious
+    children of the working-people of Russia, lies an enormous
+    responsibility.
+
+    If you say to yourselves that it is immaterial to you and to your
+    less developed brothers as to who wins in this great international
+    collision going on now, and if you act accordingly, Russia will be
+    crushed by Germany. And when Russia will be crushed by Germany, it
+    will fare badly with the Allies. This does not need any
+    demonstration.
+
+    But if, on the contrary, you become convinced that the defeat of
+    Russia will reflect badly upon the interests of the working
+    population, and if you will help the self-defense of our country
+    with all your forces, our country and her allies will escape the
+    terrible danger menacing them.
+
+    Therefore, go deeply into the situation. You make a great mistake
+    if you imagine that it is not to the interests of the
+    working-people to defend our country. In reality, nobody's
+    interests suffer more terribly from the invasion of an enemy than
+    the interests of the working-population.
+
+    Take, for instance, the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. When the
+    Germans besieged Paris and the cost of all the necessaries of life
+    rose enormously, it was clear that the poor suffered much more
+    than the rich. In the same way, when Germany exacted five billions
+    of contribution from vanquished France, this same, in the final
+    count, was paid by the poor; for paying that contribution indirect
+    taxation was greatly raised, the burden of which nearly entirely
+    falls on the lower classes.
+
+    More than that. The most dangerous consequence to France, due to
+    her defeat in 1870-71, was the retardation of her economic
+    development. In other words, the defeat of France badly reflected
+    upon the contemporary interests of her people, and, even more,
+    upon her entire subsequent development.
+
+    The defeat of Russia by Germany will much more injure our people
+    than the defeat of France injured the French people. The war now
+    exacts incredibly large expenditures. It is more difficult for
+    Russia, a country economically backward, to bear that expenditure
+    than for the wealthy states of western Europe. Russia's back, even
+    before the war, was burdened with a heavy state loan. Now this
+    debt is growing by the hour, and vast regions of Russia are
+    subject to wholesale devastation.
+
+    If the Germans will win the final victory, they will demand from
+    us an enormous contribution, in comparison with which the streams
+    of gold that poured into victorious Germany from vanquished
+    France, after the war of 1871, will seem a mere trifle.
+
+    But that will not be all. The most consequent and outspoken
+    heralds of German imperialism are even now saying that it is
+    necessary to exact from Russia the cession of important territory,
+    which should be cleared from the present population for the
+    greater convenience of German settlers. Never before have
+    plunderers, dreaming of despoiling a conquered people, displayed
+    such cynical heartlessness!
+
+    But for our vanquishers it will not be enough to exact an
+    unheard-of enormous contribution and to tear up our western
+    borderlands. Already, in 1904, Russia, being in a difficult
+    situation, was obliged to conclude a commercial treaty with
+    Germany, very disadvantageous to herself. The treaty hindered, at
+    the same time, the development of our agriculture and the progress
+    of our industries. It affected, with equal disadvantage, the
+    interests of the farmers as well as of those engaged in industry.
+    It is easy to imagine what kind of a treaty victorious German
+    imperialism would impose upon us. In economic matters, Russia
+    would become a German colony. Russia's further economic
+    development would be greatly hindered if not altogether stopped.
+    Degeneration and deprivation would be the result of German victory
+    for an important part of the Russian working-people.
+
+    What will German victory bring to western Europe? After all we
+    have already said, it is needless to expatiate on how many of the
+    unmerited economic calamities it will bring to the people of the
+    western countries allied to Russia. We wish to draw your attention
+    to the following: England, France, even Belgium and Italy, are, in
+    a political sense, far ahead of the German Empire, which has not
+    as yet grown up to a parliamentary régime. German victory over
+    these countries would be the victory of the old over the new, and
+    if the democratic ideal is dear to you, you must wish success to
+    our Western Allies.
+
+    Indifference to the result of this war would be, for us, equal to
+    political suicide. The most important, the most vital interests of
+    the proletariat and of the laboring peasantry demand of you an
+    active participation in the defense of the country. Your watchword
+    must be victory over the foreign enemy. In an active movement
+    toward such victory, the live forces of the people will become
+    free and strong.
+
+    Obedient to this watchword, you must be as wise as serpents.
+    Although in your hearts may burn the flame of noble indignation,
+    in your heads must reign, invariably, cold political reckoning.
+    You must know that zeal without reason is sometimes worse than
+    complete indifference. Every act of agitation in the rear of the
+    army, fighting against the enemy, would be equivalent to high
+    treason, as it would be a service to the foreign enemy.
+
+    The thunders of the war certainly cannot make the Russian
+    manufacturers and merchants more idealistic than they were in time
+    of peace. In the filling of the numerous orders, inevitable during
+    the mobilization of industry for war needs, the capitalists will,
+    as they are accustomed to, take great care of the interests of
+    capital, and will not take care of the interests of hired labor.
+    You will be entirely right if you wax indignant at their conduct.
+    But in all cases, whenever you desire to answer by a strike, you
+    must first think whether such action would not be detrimental to
+    the cause of the defense of Russia.
+
+    The private must be subject to the general. The workmen of every
+    factory must remember that they would commit, without any doubt,
+    the gravest mistake if, considering only their own interests, they
+    forget how severely the interests of the entire Russian
+    proletariat and peasantry would suffer from German victory.
+
+    The tactics which can be defined by the motto, "All or nothing,"
+    are the tactics of anarchy, fully unworthy of the conscious
+    representatives of the proletariat and peasantry. The General
+    Staff of the German Army would greet with pleasure the news that
+    we had adopted such tactics. _Believe us that this Staff is ready
+    to help all those who would like to preach it in our country_.
+    They want trouble in Russia, they want strikes in England, they
+    want everything that would facilitate the achievement of their
+    conquering schemes.
+
+    But you will not make them rejoice. You will not forget the words
+    of our great fabulist: "What the enemy advises is surely bad." You
+    must insist that all your representatives take the most active
+    part in all organizations created now, under the pressure of
+    public opinion, for the struggle with the foe. Your
+    representatives must, if possible, take part not only in the work
+    of the special technical organizations, such as the War-Industrial
+    Committees which have been created for the needs of the army, but
+    also in all other organizations of social and political character.
+
+    The situation is such that we cannot come to freedom in any other
+    way than by the war of national defense.
+
+That the foregoing Manifesto expressed the position of the vast majority of
+Russian Socialists there can be no doubt whatever. Between this position
+and that of the Porazhentsi with their doctrine that Russia's defeat by
+Germany was desirable, there was a middle ground, which was taken by a not
+inconsiderable number of Socialists, including such able leaders as Paul
+Axelrod. Those who took up this intermediate position were both
+anti-Czarists and anti-German-imperialists. They were pro-Ally in the large
+sense, and desired to see the Allies win over the Central Empires, if not a
+"crushing" victory, a very definite and conclusive one. But they regarded
+the alliance of Czarism with the Allies as an unnatural marriage. They
+believed that autocratic Russia's natural alliance was with autocratic
+Germany and Austria. Their hatred of Czarism led them to wish for its
+defeat, even by Germany, provided the victory were not so great as to
+permit Germany to extend her domain over Russia or any large part of it.
+Their position became embodied in the phrase, "Victory by the Allies on the
+west and Russia's defeat on the east." This was, of course, utterly
+unpractical theorizing and bore no relation to reality.
+
+
+V
+
+Thanks in part to the vigorous propaganda of such leaders as Plechanov,
+Deutsch, Bourtzev, Tseretelli, Kerensky, and many others, and in part to
+the instinctive good sense of the masses, support of the war by Socialists
+of all shades and factions--except the extreme Bolsheviki and
+the so-called "Internationalist" sections of Mensheviki and
+Socialist-Revolutionists--became general. The anti-war minority was
+exceedingly small and had no hold upon the masses. Had the government been
+both wise and honestly desirous of presenting a united front to the foe,
+and to that end made intelligent and generous concessions to the democratic
+movement, it is most unlikely that Russia would have collapsed. As it was,
+the government adopted a policy which could not fail to weaken the military
+force of the nation--a policy admirably suited to German needs.
+
+Extremes meet. On the one hand there were the Porazhentsi Socialists,
+contending that the interests of progress would be best served by a German
+victory over Russia, and plotting to weaken and corrupt the morale of the
+Russian army and to stir up internal strife to that end. On the other hand,
+within the royal court, and throughout the bureaucracy, reactionary
+pro-German officials were animated by the belief that the victory of
+Germany was essential to the permanence of Absolutism and autocratic
+government. They, too, like the Socialist "defeatists," aimed to weaken
+and corrupt the morale of the army and to divide the nation.
+
+These Germanophiles in places of power realized that they had unconscious
+but exceedingly useful allies in the Socialist intransigents. Actuated by
+motives however high, the latter played into the hands of the most corrupt
+and reactionary force that ever infested the old régime. This force, the
+reactionary Germanophiles, had from the very first hoped and believed that
+Germany would win the war. They had exerted every ounce of pressure they
+could command to keep the Czar from maintaining the treaty with France and
+entering into the war on her side against Germany and Austria. When they
+failed in this, they bided their time, full of confidence that the superior
+efficiency of the German military machine would soon triumph. But when they
+witnessed the great victorious onward rush of the Russian army, which for a
+time manifested such a degree of efficiency as they had never believed to
+be possible, they began to bestir themselves. From this quarter came the
+suggestion, very early in the war, as Plechanov and his associates charged
+in their Manifesto, that the Czar ought to make an early peace with
+Germany.
+
+They went much farther than this. Through every conceivable channel they
+contrived to obstruct Russia's military effort. They conspired to
+disorganize the transportation system, the hospital service, the
+food-supply, the manufacture of munitions. They, too, in a most effective
+manner, were plotting to weaken and corrupt the morale of the army. There
+was universal uneasiness. In the Allied chancelleries there was fear of a
+treacherous separate peace between Russia and Germany. It was partly to
+avert that catastrophe by means of a heavy bribe that England undertook the
+forcing of the Dardanelles. All over Russia there was an awakening of the
+memories of the graft that ate like a canker-worm at the heart of the
+nation. Men told once more the story of the Russian general in Manchuria,
+in 1904, who, when asked why fifty thousand men were marching barefoot,
+answered that the boots were in the pocket of Grand-Duke Vladimir! They
+told again the story of the cases of "shells" for the Manchurian army which
+were intercepted in the nation's capital, _en route_ to Moscow, and found
+to contain--paving-stones! How General Kuropatkin managed to amass a
+fortune of over six million rubles during the war with Japan was
+remembered. Fear that the same kind of treason was being perpetrated grew
+almost to the panic point.
+
+So bad were conditions in the army, so completely had the Germanophile
+reactionaries sabotaged the organization, that the people themselves took
+the matter in hand. Municipalities all over the country formed a Union of
+Cities to furnish food, clothes, and other necessaries to the army. The
+National Union of Zemstvos did the same thing. More than three thousand
+institutions were established on the different Russian fronts by the
+National Union of Zemstvos. These institutions included hospitals,
+ambulance stations, feeding stations for troops on the march, dental
+stations, veterinary stations, factories for manufacturing supplies, motor
+transportation services, and so on through a long catalogue of things which
+the administration absolutely failed to provide. The same great
+organization furnished millions of tents and millions of pairs of boots and
+socks. Civil Russia was engaged in a great popular struggle to overcome
+incompetence, corruption, and sabotage in the bureaucracy. For this work
+the civilian agencies were not thanked by the government. Instead, they
+were oppressed and hindered. Against them was directed the hate of the
+dark forces of the "occult government" and at the same time the fierce
+opposition and scorn of men who called themselves Socialists and champions
+of proletarian freedom!
+
+There was treachery in the General Staff and throughout the War Department,
+at the very head of which was a corrupt traitor, Sukhomlinov. It was
+treachery in the General Staff which led to the tragic disasters in East
+Prussia. The great drive of the Austrian and German armies in 1915, which
+led to the loss of Poland, Lithuania, and large parts of Volhynia and
+Courland, and almost entirely eliminated Russia from the war, was
+unquestionably brought about by co-operation with the German General Staff
+on the part of the sinister "occult government," as the Germanophile
+reactionary conspiracy in the highest circles came to be known.
+
+No wonder that Plechanov and his friends in their Manifesto to the Russian
+workers declared that the reactionaries were defending Russia from
+subjugation by Germany in "a half-hearted way," and that "our people will
+never forget the failure of the Czar's government to defend Russia." They
+were only saying, in very moderate language, what millions were thinking;
+what, a few months later, many of the liberal spokesmen of the country were
+ready to say in harsher language. As early as January, 1915, the Duma met
+and cautiously expressed its alarm. In July it met again, many of the
+members coming directly from the front, in uniform. Only the fear that a
+revolution would make the continuance of the war impossible prevented a
+revolution at that time. The Duma was in a revolutionary mood. Miliukov,
+for example, thundered:
+
+" ... In January we came here with ... the feeling of patriotic alarm. We
+then kept this feeling to ourselves. Yet in closed sessions of committees
+we told the government all that filled the soul of the people. The answer
+we received did not calm us; it amounted to saying that the government
+could get along without us, without our co-operation. To-day we have
+convened in a grave moment of trial for our fatherland. The patriotic alarm
+of the people has proved to be well founded, to the misfortune of our
+country. Secret things have become open, and the assertions of half a year
+ago have turned out to be mere words. Yet the country cannot be satisfied
+with words. _The people wish to take affairs into their own hands and to
+correct what has been neglected. The people look upon us as legal executors
+of their will_."
+
+Kerensky spoke to the same general effect, adding, "_I appeal to the people
+themselves to take into their hands the salvation of the country and fight
+for a full right to govern the state_." The key-note of revolution was
+being sounded now. For the spirit of revolution breathed in the words, "The
+people wish to take affairs into their own hands," and in Kerensky's
+challenge, "I appeal to the people themselves to take into their hands the
+salvation of the country." The Duma was the logical center around which the
+democratic forces of the country could rally. Its moderate character
+determined this. Only its example was necessary to the development of a
+great national movement to overthrow the old régime with its manifold
+treachery, corruption, and incompetence. When, on August 22d, the
+Progressive Bloc was formed by a coalition of Constitutional Democrats,
+Progressives, Nationalists, and Octobrists--the last-named group having
+hitherto generally supported the government--there was a general chorus of
+approval throughout the country, If the program of the Bloc was not radical
+enough to satisfy the various Socialist groups, even the Laborites, led by
+Kerensky, it was, nevertheless, a program which they could support in the
+main, as far as it went.
+
+All over the country there was approval of the demand for a responsible
+government. The municipal councils of the large cities passed resolutions
+in support of it. The great associations of manufacturers supported it. All
+over the nation the demand for a responsible government was echoed. It was
+generally believed that the Czar and his advisers would accept the
+situation and accede to the popular demand. But once more the influence of
+the reactionaries triumphed, and on September 3d came the defiant answer of
+the government to the people. It was an order suspending the Duma
+indefinitely. The gods make mad those whom they would destroy.
+
+Things went from bad to worse. More and more oppressive grew the
+government; more and more stupidly brutal and reactionary in its dealings
+with the wide-spread popular unrest. Heavier and heavier grew the burden of
+unscientific and unjustly distributed taxation. Worse and worse became the
+condition of the soldiers at the front; ever more scandalous the neglect of
+the sick and wounded. Incompetence, corruption, and treason combined to
+hurry the nation onward to a disastrous collapse. The Germanophiles were
+still industriously at work in the most important and vital places,
+practising sabotage upon a scale never dreamed of before in the history of
+any nation. They played upon the fears of the miserable weakling who was
+the nominal ruler of the vast Russian Empire, and frightened him into
+sanctioning the most suicidal policy of devising new measures of oppression
+instead of making generous concessions.
+
+Russia possessed food in abundance, being far better off in this respect
+than any other belligerent on either side, yet Russia was in the grip of
+famine. There was a vast surplus of food grains and cereals over and above
+the requirements of the army and the civilian population, yet there was
+wide-spread hunger. Prices rose to impossible levels. The most astonishing
+anarchy and disorganization characterized the administration of the
+food-supply. It was possible to get fresh butter within an hour's journey
+from Moscow for twenty-five cents a pound, but in Moscow the price was two
+and a half dollars a pound. Here, as throughout the nation, incompetence
+was reinforced by corruption and pro-German treachery. Many writers have
+called attention to the fact that even in normal times the enormous
+exportation of food grains in Russia went on side by side with per capita
+underconsumption by the peasants whose labor produced the great harvests,
+amounting to not less than 30 per cent. Now, of course, conditions were far
+worse.
+
+When the government was urged to call a convention of national leaders to
+deal with the food situation it stubbornly refused. More than that, it made
+war upon the only organizations which were staving off famine and making it
+possible for the nation to endure. Every conceivable obstacle was placed in
+the way of the National Union of Zemstvos and the Union of Cities; the
+co-operative associations, which were rendering valuable service in meeting
+the distress of working-men's families, were obstructed and restricted in
+every possible way, their national offices being closed by the police. The
+officials of the labor-unions who were co-operating with employers in
+substituting arbitration in place of strikes, establishing soup-kitchens
+and relief funds, and doing other similar work to keep the nation alive,
+were singled out for arrest and imprisonment. The Black Hundreds were
+perniciously active in all this oppression and in the treacherous advocacy
+of a separate peace with Germany.
+
+In October, 1916, a conference of chairmen of province zemstvos adopted and
+published a resolution which declared:
+
+    The tormenting and horrifying suspicion, the sinister rumors of
+    perfidy and treason, of dark forces working in favor of Germany to
+    destroy the unity of the nation, to sow discord and thus prepare
+    conditions for an ignominious peace, have now reached the clear
+    certainty that the hand of the enemy secretly influences the
+    affairs of our state.
+
+
+VI
+
+An adequate comprehension of the things set forth in this terrible summary
+is of the highest importance to every one who would attempt the task of
+reaching an intelligent understanding of the mighty upheaval in Russia and
+its far-reaching consequences. The Russian Revolution of 1917 was not
+responsible for the disastrous separate peace with Germany. The foundations
+for that were laid by the reactionaries of the old régime. It was the
+logical outcome of their long-continued efforts. Lenine, Trotzky, and their
+Bolshevist associates were mere puppets, simple tools whose visions,
+ambitions, and schemes became the channels through which the conspiracy of
+the worst reactionaries in Russia realized one part of an iniquitous
+program.
+
+The Revolution itself was a genuine and sincere effort on the part of the
+Russian people to avert the disaster and shame of a separate peace; to
+serve the Allied cause with all the fidelity of which they were capable.
+There would have been a separate peace if the old régime had remained in
+power a few weeks longer and the Revolution been averted. It is most likely
+that it would have been a more shameful peace than was concluded at
+Brest-Litovsk, and that it would have resulted in an actual and active
+alliance of the Romanov dynasty with the dynasties of the Hohenzollerns and
+the Habsburgs. The Russian Revolution of 1917 had this great merit: it so
+delayed the separate peace between Russia and Germany that the Allies were
+able to prepare for it. It had the merit, also, that it forced the
+attainment of the separate peace to come in such a manner as to reduce
+Germany's military gain on the western front to a minimum.
+
+The manner in which the Bolsheviki in their wild, groping, and frenzied
+efforts to apply theoretical abstractions to the living world, torn as it
+was by the wolves of war, famine, treason, oppression, and despair, served
+the foes of freedom and progress must not be lost sight of. The Bolshevist,
+wherever he may present himself, is the foe of progress and the ally of
+reaction.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+THE SECOND REVOLUTION
+
+
+I
+
+When the Duma assembled On November 14, 1916--new style--the approaching
+doom of Czar Nicholas II was already manifest. Why the Revolution did not
+occur at that time is a puzzle not easy to solve. Perhaps the mere fact
+that the Duma was assembling served to postpone resort to drastic measures.
+The nation waited for the Duma to lead. It is probable, also, that fear
+lest revolution prove disastrous to the military forces exercised a
+restraining influence upon the people. Certain it is that it would have
+been easy enough to kindle the fires of revolution at that time. Never in
+the history of the nation, not even in 1905, were conditions riper for
+revolt, and never had there been a more solid array of the nation against
+the bureaucracy. Discontent and revolutionary temper were not confined to
+Socialists, nor to the lower classes. Landowners, capitalists, military
+officials, and Intellectuals were united with the peasants and artisans, to
+an even greater extent than in the early stages of the First Revolution.
+Conservatives and Moderates joined with Social Democrats and
+Socialist-Revolutionists in opposition to the corrupt and oppressive
+régime. Even the president of the Duma, Michael Rodzianko, a conservative
+landowner, assailed the government.
+
+One of the principal reasons for this unexampled unity against the
+government was the wide-spread conviction, based, as we have seen, upon the
+most damning evidence, that Premier Sturmer and his Cabinet were not loyal
+to the Allies and that they contemplated making a separate peace with
+Germany. All factions in the Duma were bitterly opposed to a separate
+peace. Rodzianko was loudly cheered when he denounced the intrigues against
+the Allies and declared: "Russia gave her word to fight in common with the
+Allies till complete and final victory is won. Russia will not betray her
+friends, and with contempt refuses any consideration of a separate peace.
+Russia will not be a traitor to those who are fighting side by side with
+her sons for a great and just cause." Notwithstanding the intensification
+of the class conflict naturally resulting from the great industrial
+development since 1906, patriotism temporarily overshadowed all class
+consciousness.
+
+The cheers that greeted Rodzianko's declaration, and the remarkable ovation
+to the Allied ambassadors, who were present, amply demonstrated that, in
+spite of the frightful suffering and sacrifice which the nation had
+endured, all classes were united in their determination to win the war.
+Only a corrupt section of the bureaucracy, at one end of the social scale,
+and a small section of extreme left-wing Socialists, at the other end of
+the social scale, were at that time anti-war. There was this difference
+between the Socialist pacifists and the bureaucratic advocates of peace
+with Germany: the former were not pro-German nor anti-Ally, but sincere
+internationalists, honest and brave--however mistaken--advocates of peace.
+Outside of the bureaucracy there was no hostility to the Allies in Russia.
+Except for the insignificant Socialist minority referred to, the masses of
+the Russian people realized that the defeat of the Hohenzollern dynasty
+was necessary to a realization of the ideal of a free Russia. The new and
+greater revolution was already beginning, and determination to defeat the
+Hohenzollern bulwark of the Romanov despotism was almost universal. The
+whole nation was pervaded by this spirit.
+
+Paul Miliukov, leader of the Constitutional Democrats, popularly known as
+the "Cadets," furiously lashed Premier Sturmer and quoted the irrefutable
+evidence of his pro-Germanism and of his corruption. Sturmer reeled under
+the smashing attack. In his rage he forbade the publication of Miliukov's
+speech, but hundreds of thousands of copies of it were secretly printed and
+distributed. Every one recognized that there was war between the Duma and
+the government, and notwithstanding the criticism of the Socialists, who
+naturally regarded it as a bourgeois body, the Duma represented Russia.
+
+Sturmer proposed to his Cabinet the dissolution of the Duma, but failed to
+obtain the support of a majority. Then he determined to get the Czar's
+signature to a decree of dissolution. But the Czar was at the General
+Headquarters of the army at the time and therefore surrounded by army
+officers, practically all of whom were with the Duma and inspired by a
+bitter resentment of the pro-German intrigues, especially the neglect of
+the army organization. The weak will of Nicholas II was thus beyond the
+reach of Sturmer's influence for the time being. Meanwhile, the Ministers
+of the Army and Navy had appeared before the Duma and declared themselves
+to be on the side of the people and their parliament. On his way to visit
+the Czar at General Headquarters, Premier Sturmer was met by one of the
+Czar's messengers and handed his dismissal from office. The Duma had won.
+
+The evil genius which inspired and controlled him led Nicholas II to
+appoint as Sturmer's successor the utterly reactionary bureaucrat,
+Alexander Trepov, and to retain in office as Minister of the Interior the
+infamous Protopopov, associate of the unsavory Rasputin. When Trepov made
+his first appearance as Premier in the Duma he was loudly hissed by the
+Socialists. Other factions, while not concealing their disappointment, were
+more tolerant and even became more hopeful when they realized that from the
+first Trepov was fighting to oust Protopopov. That meant, of course, a
+fight against Rasputin as well. Whatever Trepov's motives might be in
+fighting Protopopov and Rasputin he was helping the opposition. But Trepov
+was no match for such opponents. It soon became evident that as Premier he
+was a mere figurehead and that Rasputin and Protopopov held the government
+in their hands. Protopopov openly defied the Premier and the Duma.
+
+In December it began to be rumored in political circles that Sturmer, who
+was now attached in some not clearly defined capacity to the Foreign
+Office, was about to be sent to a neutral country as ambassador. The rumor
+created the utmost consternation in liberal circles in Russia and in the
+Allied embassies. If true, it could only have one meaning, namely, that
+arrangements were being made to negotiate a separate peace with
+Germany--and that meant that Russia was to become Germany's economic
+vassal.
+
+The Duma demanded a responsible Ministry, a Cabinet directly responsible
+to, and controlled by, the Duma as the people's representative. This demand
+had been constantly made since the First Revolution. Even the Imperial
+Council, upon which the Czar had always been able to rely for support
+against revolutionary movements, now joined forces with the Duma in making
+this demand. That traditionally reactionary, bureaucratic body, composed
+of former Premiers, Cabinet Ministers, and other high officials, formally
+demanded that the Czar take steps to make the government responsible to the
+popularly elected assemblage. This was a small revolution in itself. The
+fabric of Czarism had cracked.
+
+
+II
+
+There can be no doubt in the mind of any student of Russian affairs that
+the unity of the Imperial Council and the Duma, like the unity of classes,
+was due to the strong pro-Ally sentiment which at that time possessed
+practically the entire nation. On December 12th--new style--Germany offered
+Russia a separate peace, and three days later the Foreign Minister,
+Pokrovsky, visited the Duma and announced that Russia would reject the
+offer. The Duma immediately passed a resolution declaring that "the Duma
+unanimously favors a categorical refusal by the Allied governments to
+enter, under present conditions, into any peace negotiations whatever." On
+the 19th a similar resolution was adopted by the Imperial Council, which
+continued to follow the leadership of the Duma. Before adjourning for the
+Christmas holidays the Duma passed another resolution, aimed chiefly at
+Protopopov and Sturmer, protesting against the sinister activities which
+were undermining the war-making forces of the nation, and praising the work
+of the zemstvos and working-class organizations which had struggled bravely
+to sustain the army, feed the people, care for the sick and wounded, and
+avert utter chaos.
+
+On December 30th, in the early hours of the morning, the monk Rasputin was
+murdered and his body thrown into the Neva. The strangest and most evil of
+all the actors in the Russian drama was dead, but the system which made
+him what he was lived. Rasputin dead exercised upon the diseased mind of
+the Czarina--and, through her, upon the Czar--even a greater influence than
+when he was alive. Nicholas II was as powerless to resist the insane
+Czarina's influence as he had proved himself to be when he banished the
+Grand-Duke Nicholas for pointing out that the Czarina was the tool of evil
+and crafty intriguers. Heedless of the warning implied in the murder of
+Rasputin, and of the ever-growing opposition to the government and the
+throne, the Czar inaugurated, or permitted to be inaugurated, new measures
+of reaction and repression.
+
+Trepov was driven from the Premiership and replaced by Prince Golitizin, a
+bureaucrat of small brain and less conscience. The best Minister of
+Education Russia had ever had, Ignatyev, was replaced by one of the
+blackest of all reactionaries. The Czar celebrated the New-Year by issuing
+an edict retiring the progressive members of the Imperial Council, who had
+supported the Duma, and appointing in their stead the most reactionary men
+he could find in the Empire. At the head of the Council as president he
+placed the notorious Jew-hating Stcheglovitov. As always, hatred of the Jew
+sprang from fear of progress.
+
+As one reads the history of January, 1917, in Russia, as it was reported in
+the press day by day, and the numerous accounts of competent and
+trustworthy observers, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that
+Protopopov deliberately sought to precipitate a revolution. Mad as this
+hypothesis seems to be, it is nevertheless the only one which affords a
+rational explanation of the policy of the government. No sooner was
+Golitizin made Premier than it was announced that the opening of the Duma
+would be postponed till the end of January, in order that the Cabinet
+might be reorganized. Later it was announced that the Duma opening would be
+again postponed--this time till the end of February. In the reorganization
+of the Cabinet, Shuvaviev, the War Minister, who had loyally co-operated
+with the zemstvos and had supported the Duma in November, was dismissed.
+Pokrovsky, the Foreign Minister, who had announced to the Duma in December
+the rejection of the German peace offer, was reported to be "sick" and
+given "leave of absence." Other changes were made in the Cabinet, in every
+case to the advantage of the reactionaries. It was practically impossible
+for anyone in Russia to find out who the Ministers of the government were.
+
+Protopopov released Sukhomlinov, the former Minister of War who had been
+justly convicted of treason. This action, taken, it was said, at the
+direction of the Czarina, added to the already wide-spread belief that the
+government was animated by a desire to make peace with Germany. That the
+Czar himself was loyal to the Allies was generally believed, but there was
+no such belief in the loyalty of Protopopov, Sturmer, and their associates.
+The nation meantime was drifting into despair and anarchy. The railway
+system was deliberately permitted to become disorganized. Hunger reigned in
+the cities and the food reserves for the army were deliberately reduced to
+a two days' supply. The terror of hunger spread through the large cities
+and through the army at the front like prairie fire.
+
+It became evident that Protopopov was carrying out the plans of the
+Germanophiles, deliberately trying to disorganize the life of the nation
+and make successful warfare impossible. Socialists and labor leaders
+charged that his agents were encouraging the pacifist minority and opposing
+the patriotic majority among the workers. The work of the War Industries
+Committee which controlled organizations engaged in the manufacture of
+war-supplies which employed hundreds of thousands of workers was hampered
+in every way. It is the testimony of the best-known and most-trusted
+working-class leaders in Russia that the vast majority of the workers,
+while anxious for a general democratic peace, were opposed to a separate
+peace with Germany and favored the continuation of the war against
+Prussianism and the co-operation of all classes to that end. The pacifists
+and "defeatist" Socialists represented a minority. To the minority every
+possible assistance was given, while the leaders of the working class who
+were loyal to the war, and who sought to sustain the morale of the workers
+in support of the war, were opposed and thwarted in their efforts and, in
+many cases, cast into prison. The Black Hundreds were still at work.
+
+Socialist leaders of the working class issued numerous appeals to the
+workers, warning them that Protopopov's secret police agitators were trying
+to bring about strikes, and begging them not to lend themselves to such
+treacherous designs, which could only aid Germany at the expense of
+democracy in Russia and elsewhere. It became known, too, that large numbers
+of machine-guns were being distributed among the police in Petrograd and
+placed at strategic points throughout the city. It was said that Protopopov
+was mad, but it was the methodical madness of a desperate, reactionary,
+autocratic régime.
+
+
+III
+
+Protopopov and Sturmer and their associates recognized as clearly as the
+liberals did the natural kinship and interdependence of the three great
+autocracies, the Romanov, Habsburg, and Hohenzollern dynasties. They knew
+well that the crushing of autocracy in Austria-Hungary and Germany would
+make it impossible to maintain autocracy in Russia. They realized,
+furthermore, that while the nation was not willing to attempt revolution
+during the war, the end of the war would inevitably bring with it
+revolution upon a scale far vaster than had ever been attempted before,
+unless, indeed, the revolutionary leaders could be goaded into making a
+premature attempt to overthrow the monarchy. In that case, it might be
+possible to crush them. Given a rebellion in the cities, which could be
+crushed by the police amply provided with machine-guns, and by "loyal"
+troops, with a vast army unprovided with food and no means of supplying it,
+there would be abundant justification for making a separate peace with
+Germany. Thus the Revolution would be crushed and the whole system of
+autocracy, Russian, Austrian, and German, preserved.
+
+The morning of the 27th of February--new style--was tense with an ominous
+expectancy. In the Allied chancelleries anxious groups were gathered. They
+realized that the fate of the Allies hung in the balance. In Petrograd
+alone three hundred thousand workers went out on strike that day, and the
+police agents did their level best to provoke violence. The large bodies of
+troops massed at various points throughout the city, and the police with
+their machine-guns, testified to the thoroughness with which the government
+had prepared to crush any revolutionary manifestations. Thanks to the
+excellent discipline of the workers, and the fine wisdom of the leaders of
+the Social Democrats, the Socialist-Revolutionists, and the Labor Group,
+who constantly exhorted the workers not to fall into the trap set for them,
+there was no violence.
+
+At the opening session of the Duma, Kerensky, leader of the Labor Group,
+made a characteristic address in which he denounced the arrest of the Labor
+Group members of the War Industries Committee. He directed his attack
+against the "system," not against individuals:
+
+"We are living in a state of anarchy unprecedented in our history. In
+comparison with it the period of 1613 seems like child's play. Chaos has
+enveloped not only the political, but the economic life of the nation as
+well. It destroys the very foundations of the nation's social economic
+structure.
+
+"Things have come to such a pass that recently one of the Ministries,
+shipping coal from Petrograd to a neighboring city, had armed the train
+with a special guard so that other authorities should not confiscate the
+coal on the way! We have arrived already at the primitive stage when each
+person defends with all the resources at his command the material in his
+possession, ready to enter into mortal combat for it with his neighbor. We
+are witnessing the same scenes which France went through at the time of the
+Revolution. Then also the products shipped to Paris were accompanied by
+special detachments of troops to prevent their being seized by the
+provincial authorities....
+
+"Behold the Cabinet of Rittich-Protopopov-Golitizin dragging into the court
+the Labor Group of the War Industries Committee, charged with aiming at the
+creation of a Russian Social-Democratic republic! They did not even know
+that nobody aims at a 'Social-Democratic' republic. One aiming at a
+republic labors for popular government. But has the court anything to say
+about all these distinctions? We know beforehand what sentences are to be
+imposed upon the prisoners....
+
+"I have no desire to criticize the individual members of the Cabinet. The
+greatest mistake of all is to seek traitors, German agents, separate
+Sturmers. _We have a still greater enemy than the German influence, than
+the treachery and treason of individuals. And that enemy is the system--the
+system of a medieval form of government_."
+
+How far the conspiracy of the government of Russia against the war of
+Russia and her Allies extended is shown by the revelations made in the Duma
+on March 3d by one of the members, A. Konovalov. He reported that two days
+previously, March 1st, the only two members of the Labor Group of the War
+Industries Committee who were not in prison issued an appeal to the workers
+not to strike. These two members of the Labor Group of the War Industries
+Committee, Anosovsky and Ostapenko, took their exhortation to the bureau of
+the War Industries Committee for its approval. But, although approved by
+this great and important organization, the appeal was not passed by the
+government censor. When Guchkov, president of the War Industries Committee,
+attempted to get the appeal printed in the newspapers he was prevented by
+action emanating from the office of Protopopov.
+
+
+IV
+
+Through all the early days of March there was labor unrest in Petrograd, as
+well as in some other cities. Petrograd was, naturally, the storm center.
+There were small strikes, but, fortunately, not much rioting. The extreme
+radicals were agitating for the release of the imprisoned leaders of the
+Labor Group and urging drastic action by the workers. Much of this
+agitation was sincere and honest, but no little of it was due to the
+provocative agents. These, disguised as workmen, seized every opportunity
+to urge revolt. Any pretext sufficed them; they stimulated the honest
+agitation to revolt as a protest against the imprisonment of the Labor
+Group, and the desperate threat that unless food was forthcoming revolution
+would be resorted to for sinister purposes. And all the time the police and
+the troops were massed to crush the first rising.
+
+The next few days were destined to reveal the fact that the cunning and
+guile of Protopopov had overreached itself; that the soldiers could not be
+relied upon to crush any uprising of the people. There was some rioting in
+Petrograd on March 3d, and the next day the city was placed under martial
+law. On March 7th the textile workers went out on strike and were quickly
+followed by several thousand workers belonging to other trades. Next day
+there was a tremendous popular demonstration at which the workers demanded
+food. The strike spread during the next two or three days until there was a
+pretty general stoppage of industry. Students from the university joined
+with the striking workmen and there were numerous demonstrations, but
+little disposition to violence. When the Cossacks and mounted police were
+sent to break up the crowds, the Cossacks took great care not to hurt the
+people, fraternizing with them and being cheered by them. It was evident
+that the army would not let itself be used to crush the uprising of the
+people. The police remained "loyal," but they were not adequate in numbers.
+Protopopov had set in motion forces which no human agency could control.
+The Revolution was well under way.
+
+The Duma remained in constant session. Meantime the situation in the
+capital was becoming serious in the extreme. Looting of stores began, and
+there were many victims of the police efforts to disperse the crowds. In
+the midst of the crisis the Duma repudiated the government and broke off
+all relations with it. The resolution of the Duma declared that "The
+government which covered its hands with the blood of the people should no
+longer be admitted to the Duma. With such a government the Duma breaks all
+relations forever." The answer of Czar Nicholas was an order to dissolve
+the Duma, which order the Duma voted to ignore, remaining in session as
+before.
+
+On Sunday, March 11th, there was a great outpouring of people at a
+demonstration. Police established on the roofs of some public buildings
+attacked the closely packed throngs with machine-gun fire, killing and
+wounding hundreds. One of the famous regiments, the Volynski, revolted,
+killed its commander, and joined the people when ordered to fire into the
+crowds. Detachments of soldiers belonging to other regiments followed their
+example and refused to fire upon the people. One or two detachments of
+troops did obey orders and were immediately attacked by the revolutionary
+troops. There was civil war in Petrograd.
+
+While the fighting was still going on, the president of the Duma sent the
+following telegram to the Czar:
+
+    The situation is grave. Anarchy reigns in the capital. The
+    government is paralyzed. The transport of provisions and fuel is
+    completely disorganized. General dissatisfaction is growing.
+    Irregular rifle-firing is occurring in the streets. It is
+    necessary to charge immediately some person enjoying the
+    confidence of the people to form a new government. It is
+    impossible to linger. Any delay means death. Let us pray to God
+    that the responsibility in this hour will not fall upon a crowned
+    head.
+
+    RODZIANKO.
+
+The Duma waited in vain that night for an answer from the Czar. The
+bourgeois elements in the Duma were terrified. Only the leaders of the
+different Socialist groups appeared to possess any idea of providing the
+revolutionary movement with proper direction. While the leaders of the
+bourgeois groups were proclaiming their conviction that the Revolution
+would be crushed in a few hours by the tens of thousands of troops in
+Petrograd who had not yet rebelled, the Socialist leaders were busy
+preparing plans to carry on the struggle. Even those Social Democrats who
+for various reasons had most earnestly tried to avert the Revolution gave
+themselves with whole-hearted enthusiasm to the task of organizing the
+revolutionary forces. Following the example set in the 1905 Revolution,
+there had been formed a central committee of the working-class
+organizations to direct the movement. This body, composed of elected
+representatives of the unions and Socialist societies, was later known as
+the Council of Workmen's Deputies. It was this body which undertook the
+organization of the Revolution. This Revolution, unlike that of 1905, was
+initiated by the bourgeoisie, but its originators manifested little desire
+and less capacity to lead it.
+
+When Monday morning came there was no longer an unorganized, planless mass
+confusedly opposing a carefully organized force, but a compact,
+well-organized, and skilfully led movement. Processions were formed, each
+under responsible directors with very definite instructions. As on the
+previous day, the police stationed upon roofs of buildings, and at various
+strategic points, fired upon the people. As on the previous day, also, the
+soldiers joined the Revolution and refused to shoot the people. The famous
+Guards' Regiment, long the pet and pride of the Czar, was the first to
+rebel. The soldiers killed the officer who ordered them to fire, and then
+with cheers joined the rebels. When the military authorities sent out
+another regiment to suppress the rebel Guards' Regiment they saw the new
+force go over to the Revolution in a body. Other regiments deserted in the
+same manner. The flower of the Russian army had joined the people in
+revolting against the Czar and the system of Czarism.
+
+On the side of the revolutionists were now many thousands of well-trained
+soldiers, fully armed. Soon they took possession of the Arsenal, after
+killing the commander. The soldiers made organized and systematic warfare
+upon the police. Every policeman seen was shot down, police stations were
+set on fire, and prisons were broken open and the prisoners released. The
+numerous political prisoners were triumphantly liberated and took their
+places in the revolutionary ranks. In rapid succession the great bastiles
+fell! Peter and Paul Fortress, scene of infinite martyrdom, fell into the
+hands of the revolutionary forces, and the prisoners, many of them heroes
+and martyrs of other uprisings, were set free amid frenzied cheering. The
+great Schlüsselburg Fortress was likewise seized and emptied. With
+twenty-five thousand armed troops on their side, the revolutionists were
+practically masters of the capital. They attacked the headquarters of the
+hated Secret Service and made a vast, significantly symbolical bonfire of
+its archives.
+
+Once more Rodzianko appealed to the Czar. It is no reflection upon
+Rodzianko's honesty, or upon his loyalty to the people, to say that he was
+appalled by the development of the struggle. He sympathized with the people
+in their demand for political democracy and would wage war to the end upon
+Czarism, but he feared the effect of the Revolution upon the army and the
+Allied cause. Moreover, he was a landowner, and he feared Socialism. In
+1906 he had joined forces with the government when the Socialists led the
+masses--and now the Socialist leaders were again at the head of the masses.
+Perhaps the result would have been otherwise if the Duma had followed up
+its repudiation of the government by openly and unreservedly placing itself
+at the head of the uprising. In any other country than Russia that would
+have been done, in all probability, but the Russian bourgeoisie was weak.
+This was due, like so much else in Russia, to the backwardness of the
+industrial system. There was not a strong middle class and, therefore, the
+bourgeoisie left the fighting to the working class. Rodzianko's new appeal
+to the Czar was pathetic. When hundreds of dead and dying lay in the
+streets and in churches, hospitals, and other public buildings, he could
+still imagine that the Czar could save the situation: "The situation is
+growing worse. It is necessary to take measures immediately, for to-morrow
+it will be too late," he telegraphed. "The last hour has struck to decide
+the fate of the country and of the dynasty." Poor, short-sighted bourgeois!
+It was already "too late" for "measures" by the weak-minded Nicholas II to
+avail. The "fate of the country and of the dynasty" was already determined!
+It was just as well that the Czar did not make any reply to the message.
+
+The new ruler of Russia, King Demos, was speaking now. Workers and soldiers
+sent deputations to the Taurida Palace, where the Duma was sitting.
+Rodzianko read to them the message he had sent to the Czar, but that was
+small comfort. Thousands of revolutionists, civilian and military, stormed
+the Taurida Palace and clamored to hear what the Socialists in the Duma had
+to say. In response to this demand Tchcheidze, Kerensky, Skobelev, and
+other Socialists from various groups appeared and addressed the people.
+These men had a message to give; they understood the ferment and were part
+of it. They were of the Revolution--bone of its bone, flesh of its flesh,
+and so they were cheered again and again. And what a triumvirate they made,
+these leaders of the people! Tchcheidze, once a university professor, keen,
+cool, and as witty as George Bernard Shaw, listened to with the deference
+democracy always pays to intellect.
+
+Kerensky, lawyer by profession, matchless as an orator, obviously the
+prophet and inspirer rather than the executive type; Skobelev, blunt,
+direct, and practical, a man little given to romantic illusions. It was
+Skobelev who made the announcement to the crowd outside the Taurida Palace
+that the old system was ended forever and that the Duma would create a
+Provisional Committee. He begged the workers and the soldiers to keep
+order, to refrain from violence against individuals, and to observe strict
+discipline. "Freedom demands discipline and order," he said.
+
+That afternoon the Duma selected a temporary committee to restore order.
+The committee, called the Duma Committee of Safety, consisted of twelve
+members, representing all the parties and groups in the Duma. The hastily
+formed committee of the workers met and decided to call on the workmen to
+hold immediate elections for the Council of Workmen's Deputies--the first
+meeting of which was to be held that evening. That this was a perilous
+thing to do the history of the First Revolution clearly showed, but no
+other course seemed open to the workers, in view of the attitude of the
+bourgeoisie. On behalf of the Duma Committee, Rodzianko issued the
+following proclamation:
+
+    The Provisional Committee of the members of the Imperial Duma,
+    aware of the grave conditions of internal disorder created by the
+    measure of the old government, has found itself compelled to take
+    into its hands the re-establishment of political and civil order.
+    In full consciousness of the responsibility of its decision, the
+    Provisional Committee expresses its trust that the population and
+    the army will help it in the difficult task of creating a new
+    government which will comply with the wishes of the population,
+    and be able to enjoy its confidence.
+
+    MICHAIL RODZIANKO, _Speaker of the Imperial Duma_.
+    February 27, 1917.[4]
+
+That night the first formal session of the Council of Workmen's Deputies
+was held. Tchcheidze was elected president, Kerensky vice-president. The
+deputies had been elected by the working-men of many factories and by the
+members of Socialist organizations. It was not until the following day that
+soldiers' representatives were added and the words "and Soldiers" added to
+the title of the Council. At this first meeting the Council--a most
+moderate and capable body--called for a Constituent Assembly on the basis
+of equal, direct, and secret universal suffrage. This demand was contained
+in an address to the people which read, in part:
+
+    To finish the struggle successfully in the interests of democracy,
+    the people must create their own powerful organization.
+
+    The Council of the Workmen's Deputies, holding its session in the
+    Imperial Duma, makes it its supreme task to organize the people's
+    forces and their struggle for a final securing of political
+    freedom and popular government in Russia.
+
+    We appeal to the entire population of the capital to rally around
+    the Council, to form local committees in the various boroughs, and
+    to take over the management of local affairs.
+
+    All together, with united forces, we will struggle for a final
+    abolition of the old system and the calling of a Constituent
+    Assembly on the basis of universal, equal, direct, and secret
+    suffrage.
+
+This document is of the highest historical importance and merits close
+study. As already noted, Tchcheidze, leader of the Mensheviki, was
+president of the Council, and this appeal to the people shows how fully the
+moderate views of his group prevailed. Indeed, the manner in which the
+moderate counsels of the Mensheviki dominated the Council at a time of
+great excitement and passion, when extremists might have been expected to
+obtain the lead, is one of the most remarkable features of the whole story
+of the Second Russian Revolution. It appeared at this time that the
+Russian proletariat had fully learned the tragic lessons of 1905-06.
+
+It is evident from the text of the appeal that at the time the Council
+looked upon the Revolution as being primarily a political event, not as a
+movement to reconstruct the economic and social system. There is no
+reference to social democracy. Even the land question is not referred to.
+How limited their purpose was at the moment may be gathered from the
+statement, "The Council ... makes it its supreme task to organize the
+people's forces and their struggle for a final securing of political
+freedom and popular government." It is also clearly evident that,
+notwithstanding the fact that the Council itself was a working-class
+organization, a manifestation of the class consciousness of the workers,
+the leaders of the Council did not regard the Revolution as a proletarian
+event, nor doubt the necessity of co-operation on the part of all classes.
+Proletarian exclusiveness came later, but on March 13th the appeal of the
+Council was "to the entire population."
+
+March 14th saw the arrest of many of the leading reactionaries, including
+Protopopov and the traitor Sukhomlinov, and an approach to order. All that
+day the representatives of the Duma and the representatives of the Council
+of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, as it was now called, embryo of the
+first Soviet government, tried to reach an agreement concerning the future
+organization of Russia. The representatives of the Duma were pitifully
+lacking in comprehension of the situation. They wanted the Czar deposed,
+but the monarchy itself retained, subject to constitutional limitations
+analogous to those obtaining in England. They wanted the Romanov dynasty
+retained, their choice being the Czar's brother, Grand-Duke Michael. The
+representatives of the Soviet, on the other hand, would not tolerate the
+suggestion that the monarchy be continued. Standing, as yet, only for
+political democracy, they insisted that the monarchy must be abolished and
+that the new government be republican in form. The statesmanship and
+political skill of these representatives of the workers were immeasurably
+superior to those possessed by the bourgeois representatives of the Duma.
+
+
+V
+
+Thursday, March 15, 1917--new style--was one of the most fateful and
+momentous days in the history of mankind. It will always be remembered as
+the day on which Czarism ceased to exist in Russia. At three o'clock in the
+afternoon Miliukov, leader of the Constitutional Democrats, appeared in
+front of the Taurida Palace and announced to the waiting throngs that an
+agreement had been reached between the Duma and the Council of Workmen's
+and Soldiers' Deputies; that it had been decided to depose the Czar, to
+constitute immediately a Provisional Government composed of representatives
+of all parties and groups, and to proceed with arrangements for the holding
+of a Constituent Assembly at an early date to determine the form of a
+permanent democratic government for Russia.
+
+At the head of the Provisional Government, as Premier, had been placed
+Prince George E. Lvov, who as president of the Union of Zemstvos had proved
+himself to be a democrat of the most liberal school as well as an
+extraordinarily capable organizer. The position of Minister of Foreign
+Affairs was given to Miliukov, whose strong sympathy with the Allies was
+well known. The position of Minister of Justice was given to Alexander
+Kerensky, one of the most extraordinary men in Russia, a leader of the
+Group of Toil, a party of peasant Socialists, vice-president of the Council
+of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies. At the head of the War Department was
+placed Alexander Guchkov, a soldier-politician, leader of the Octobrist
+party, who had turned against the First Revolution in 1905, when it became
+an economic war of the classes, evoking thereby the hatred of the
+Socialists, but who as head of the War Industries Committee had achieved
+truly wonderful results in the present war in face of the opposition of the
+government. The pressing food problem was placed in the hands of Andrei
+Shingarev. As Minister of Agriculture Shingarev belonged to the radical
+left wing of the Cadets.
+
+It cannot be said that the composition of the Provisional Government was
+received with popular satisfaction. It was top-heavy with representatives
+of the bourgeoisie. There was only one Socialist, Kerensky. Miliukov's
+selection, inevitable though it was, and great as his gifts were, was
+condemned by the radical working-men because he was regarded as a dangerous
+"imperialist" on account of his advocacy of the annexation of
+Constantinople. Guchkov's inclusion was equally unpopular on account of his
+record at the time of the First Revolution. The most popular selection was
+undoubtedly Kerensky, because he represented more nearly than any of the
+others the aspirations of the masses. As a whole, it was the fact that the
+Provisional Government was too fully representative of the bourgeois
+parties and groups which gave the Bolsheviki and other radicals a chance to
+condemn it.
+
+The absence of the name of Tchcheidze from the list was a surprise and a
+disappointment to most of the moderate Socialists, for he had come to be
+regarded as one of the most capable and trustworthy leaders of the masses.
+The fact that he was not included in the new government could hardly fail
+to cause uneasy suspicion. It was said later that efforts had been made to
+induce him to join the new government, but that he declined to do so.
+Tchcheidze's position was a very difficult one. Thoroughly in sympathy with
+the plan to form a coalition Provisional Government, and supporting
+Kerensky in his position, Tchcheidze nevertheless declined to enter the new
+Cabinet himself. In this he was quite honest and not at all the tricky
+politician he has been represented as being.
+
+Tchcheidze knew that the Duma had been elected upon a most undemocratic
+suffrage and that it did not and could not represent the masses of the
+peasants and wage-workers. These classes were represented in the Council of
+Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, which continued to exist as a separate
+body, independent of the Duma, but co-operating with it as an equal. From a
+Socialist point of view it would have been a mistake to disband the
+Council, Tchcheidze believed. He saw Soviet government as the need of the
+critical moment, rather than as the permanent, distinctive type of Russian
+Social democracy as the critics of Kerensky have alleged.
+
+While the Provisional Government was being created, the Czar, at General
+Headquarters, was being forced to recognize the bitter fact that the
+Romanov dynasty could no longer live. When he could no more resist the
+pressure brought to bear upon him by the representatives of the Duma, he
+wrote and signed a formal instrument of abdication of the Russian throne,
+naming his brother, Grand-Duke Michael, as his successor. The latter dared
+not attempt to assume the imperial rôle. He recognized that the end of
+autocracy had been reached and declined to accept the throne unless chosen
+by a popular referendum vote. On March 16th, the day after the abdication
+of Nicholas II, Michael issued a statement in which he said:
+
+    This heavy responsibility has come to me at the voluntary request
+    of my brother, who has transferred the Imperial throne to me
+    during a time of warfare which is accompanied by unprecedented
+    popular disturbances.
+
+    Moved by the thought, which is in the minds of the entire people,
+    that the good of the country is paramount, I have adopted the firm
+    resolution to accept the supreme power only if this be the will of
+    our great people, who, by a plebiscite organized by their
+    representatives in a Constituent Assembly, shall establish a form
+    of government and new fundamental laws for the Russian state.
+
+    Consequently, invoking the benediction of our Lord, I urge all
+    citizens of Russia to submit to the Provisional Government,
+    established upon the initiative of the Duma and invested with full
+    plenary powers, until such time which will follow with as little
+    delay as possible, as the Constituent Assembly, on a basis of
+    universal, direct, equal, and secret suffrage, shall, by its
+    decision as to the new form of government, express the will of the
+    people.
+
+The hated Romanov dynasty was ended at last. It is not likely that
+Grand-Duke Michael entertained the faintest hope that he would ever be
+called to the throne, either by a Constituent Assembly or by a popular
+referendum. Not only was the Romanov dynasty ended, but equally so was
+monarchical Absolutism itself. No other dynasty would replace that of the
+Romanovs. Russia had thrown off the yoke of autocracy. The Second
+Revolution was an accomplished fact; its first phase was complete.
+Thoughtful men among the revolutionists recognized that the next phase
+would be far more perilous and difficult. "The bigger task is still before
+us," said Miliukov, in his address to the crowd that afternoon. A
+Constituent Assembly was to be held and that was bound to intensify the
+differences which had been temporarily composed during the struggle to
+overthrow the system of Absolutism. And the differences which existed
+between the capitalist class and the working class were not greater than
+those which existed within the latter.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+FROM BOURGEOISIE TO BOLSHEVIKI
+
+
+I
+
+It required no great gift of prophecy to foretell the failure of the
+Provisional Government established by the revolutionary coalition headed by
+Prince Lvov. From the very first day it was evident that the Cabinet could
+never satisfy the Russian people. It was an anomaly in that the Revolution
+had been a popular revolution, while the Provisional Government was
+overwhelmingly representative of the landowners, manufacturers, bankers,
+and merchants--the despised and distrusted bourgeoisie. The very meager
+representation given to the working class, through Kerensky, was, in the
+circumstances, remarkable for its stupid effrontery and its disregard of
+the most obvious realities. Much has been said and written of the
+doctrinaire attitude which has characterized the Bolsheviki in the later
+phases of the struggle, but if by doctrinairism is meant subservience to
+preconceived theories and disregard of realities, it must be said that the
+statesmen of the bourgeoisie were as completely its victims as the
+Bolsheviki later proved to be. They were subservient to dogma and
+indifferent to fact.
+
+The bourgeois leaders of Russia--and those Socialists who co-operated with
+them--attempted to ignore the biggest and most vital fact in the whole
+situation, namely, the fact that the Revolution was essentially a
+Socialist Revolution in the sense that the overwhelming mass of the people
+were bent upon the realization of a very comprehensive, though somewhat
+crudely conceived, program of socialization. It was not a mere political
+Revolution, and political changes which left the essential social structure
+unchanged, which did not tend to bring about equality of democratic
+opportunity, and which left the control of the nation in the hands of
+landowners and capitalists, could never satisfy the masses nor fail to
+invite their savage attack. Only the most hopeless and futile of
+doctrinaires could have argued themselves into believing anything else. It
+was quite idle to argue from the experience of other countries that Russia
+must follow the universal rule and establish and maintain bourgeois rule
+for a period more or less prolonged. True, that had been the experience of
+most nations, but it was foolish in the extreme to suppose that it must be
+the experience of Russia, whose conditions were so utterly unlike those
+which had obtained in any nation which had by revolution established
+constitutional government upon a democratic basis.
+
+To begin with, in every other country revolution by the bourgeoisie itself
+had been the main factor in the overthrow of autocracy. Feudalism and
+monarchical autocracy fell in western Europe before the might of a powerful
+rising class. That this class in every case drew to its side the masses and
+benefited by their co-operation must not be allowed to obscure the fact
+that in these other countries of all the classes in society the bourgeoisie
+was the most powerful. It was that fact which established its right to rule
+in place of the deposed rulers. The Russian middle class, however, lacked
+that historic right to rule. In consequence of the backwardness of the
+nation from the point of view of industrial development, the bourgeoisie
+was correspondingly backward and weak. Never in any country had a class so
+weak and uninfluential essayed the rôle of the ruling class. To believe
+that a class which at the most did not exceed six per cent. of the
+population could assert and maintain its rule over a nation of one hundred
+and eighty millions of people, when these had been stirred by years of
+revolutionary agitation, was at once pedantic and absurd.
+
+The industrial proletariat was as backward and as relatively weak as the
+bourgeoisie. Except by armed force and tyranny of the worst kind, this
+class could not rule Russia. Its fitness and right to rule are not
+appreciably greater than the fitness and right of the bourgeoisie. It
+cannot even be said on its behalf that it had waged the revolutionary
+struggle of the working class, for in truth its share in the Russian
+revolutionary movement had been relatively small, far less than that of the
+peasant organizations. With more than one hundred and thirty-five millions
+of peasants, from whose discontent and struggle the revolutionary movement
+had drawn its main strength, neither the bourgeoisie nor the
+class-conscious section of the industrial proletariat could set up its rule
+without angry protest and attacks which, soon or late, must overturn it.
+Every essential fact in the Russian situation, which was so unique, pointed
+to the need for a genuine and sincere co-operation by the intelligent
+leaders of all the opposition elements until stability was attained,
+together with freedom from the abnormal difficulties due to the war. In any
+event, the domination of the Provisional Government by a class so weak and
+so narrow in its outlook and aims was a disaster. As soon as time for
+reflection had been afforded the masses discontent and distrust were
+inevitable.
+
+
+II
+
+From the first days there were ominous murmurings. Yet it must be confessed
+that the Provisional Government manifested much greater enlightenment than
+might have been expected of it and hastened to enact a program--quite
+remarkable for its liberality and vision; a program which, had it come from
+a government more truly representative in its personnel of revolutionary
+Russia, might, with one important addition, have served as the foundation
+of an enduring structure. On March 18th the Provisional Government issued a
+statement of its program and an appeal to the citizens for support. This
+document, which is said to have been the joint work of P.I. Novgorodtzev,
+N.V. Nekrasov, and P.N. Miliukov, read as follows:
+
+    CITIZENS: The Executive Committee of the Duma, with the
+    aid and support of the garrison of the capital and its
+    inhabitants, has succeeded in triumphing over the obnoxious forces
+    of the old régime so that we can proceed to a more stable
+    organization of the executive power, with men whose past political
+    activity assures them the country's confidence.
+
+    The new Cabinet will base its policy upon the following
+    principles: _First_.--An immediate and general amnesty for all
+    political and religious offenses, including terrorist acts and
+    military and agrarian offenses.
+
+    _Second_.--Liberty of speech and of the press; freedom for
+    alliances, unions, and strikes, with the extension of these
+    liberties to military officials, within the limits admitted by
+    military requirements.
+
+    _Third_.--Abolition of all social, religious, and national
+    restrictions.
+
+    _Fourth_.--To proceed forthwith to the preparation and convocation
+    of a Constituent Assembly, based on universal suffrage. This
+    Assembly will establish a stable universal régime.
+
+    _Fifth_.--The substitution of the police by a national militia,
+    with chiefs to be elected and responsible to the municipalities.
+
+    _Sixth_.--Communal elections to be based on universal, direct,
+    equal, and secret suffrage.
+
+    _Seventh_.--The troops which participated in the revolutionary
+    movement will not be disarmed, but will remain in Petrograd.
+
+    _Eighth_.--While maintaining strict military discipline for troops
+    in active service, it is desirable to abrogate for soldiers all
+    restrictions in the enjoyment of civil rights accorded other
+    citizens.
+
+    The Provisional Government desires to add that it has no intention
+    of taking advantage of war conditions to delay the realization of
+    the measures of reform above mentioned.
+
+This address is worthy of especial attention. The generous liberalism of
+the program it outlines cannot be denied, but it is political liberalism
+only. It is not directly and definitely concerned with the great
+fundamental economic issues which so profoundly affect the life and
+well-being of the working class, peasants, and factory-workers alike. It is
+the program of men who saw in the Revolution only a great epochal political
+advance. In this it reflects its bourgeois origin. With the exception of
+the right to organize unions and strikes--which is a political measure--not
+one of the important economic demands peculiar to the working class is met
+in the program. The land question, which was the economic basis of the
+Revolution, and without which there could have been no Revolution, was not
+even mentioned. And the Manifesto which the Provisional Government
+addressed to the nation on March 20th was equally silent with regard to the
+land question and the socialization of industry.
+
+Evidently the Provisional Government desired to confine itself as closely
+as possible to political democracy, and to leave fundamental economic
+reform to be attended to by the Constituent Assembly. If that were its
+purpose, it would have helped matters to have had the purpose clearly
+stated and not merely left to inference. But whatever the shortcomings of
+its first official statements, the actual program of the Provisional
+Government during the first weeks was far more satisfactory and afforded
+room for great hope. On March 21st the constitution of Finland was
+restored. On the following day amnesty was granted to all political and
+religious offenders. Within a few days freedom and self-government were
+granted to Poland, subject to the ratification of the Constituent Assembly.
+At the same time all laws discriminating against the Jews were repealed by
+the following decree:
+
+All existing legal restrictions upon the rights of Russian citizens, based
+upon faith, religious teaching, or nationality, are revoked. In accordance
+with this, we hereby repeal all laws existing in Russia as a whole, as well
+as for separate localities, concerning:
+
+    1. Selection of place of residence and change of residence.
+
+    2. Acquiring rights of ownership and other material rights in all
+    kinds of movable property and real estate, and likewise in the
+    possession of, the use and managing of all property, or receiving
+    such for security.
+
+    3. Engaging in all kinds of trades, commerce, and industry, not
+    excepting mining; also equal participation in the bidding for
+    government contracts, deliveries, and in public auctions.
+
+    4. Participation in joint-stock and other commercial or industrial
+    companies and partnerships, and also employment in these companies
+    and partnerships in all kinds of positions, either by elections or
+    by employment.
+
+    5. Employment of servants, salesmen, foremen, laborers, and trade
+    apprentices.
+
+    6. Entering the government service, civil as well as military, and
+    the grade or condition of such service; participation in the
+    elections for the institutions for local self-government, and all
+    kinds of public institutions; serving in all kinds of positions of
+    government and public establishments, as well as the prosecution
+    of the duties connected with such positions.
+
+    7. Admission to all kinds of educational institutions, whether
+    private, government, or public, and the pursuing of the courses of
+    instruction of these institutions, and receiving scholarships.
+    Also the pursuance of teaching and other educational professions.
+
+    8. Performing the duties of guardians, trustees, or jurors.
+
+    9. The use of language and dialects, other than Russian, in the
+    proceedings of private societies, or in teaching in all kinds of
+    private educational institutions, and in commercial bookkeeping.
+
+Thus all the humiliating restrictions which had been imposed upon the
+Jewish people were swept away. Had the Provisional Government done nothing
+else than this, it would have justified itself at the bar of history. But
+it accomplished much more than this: before it had been in office a month,
+in addition to its liberation of Finns, Poles, and Jews, the Provisional
+Government abolished the death penalty; removed all the provincial
+governors and substituted for them the elected heads of the provincial
+county councils; _confiscated the large land holdings of the Imperial
+family and of the monasteries_; levied an excess war-profits tax on all war
+industries; and fixed the price of food at rates greatly lower than had
+prevailed before. The Provisional Government had gone farther, and, while
+declaring that these matters must be left to the Constituent Assembly for
+settlement, had declared itself in favor of woman suffrage and of _the
+distribution of all land among the peasants, the terms and conditions of
+expropriation and distribution to be determined by the Constituent
+Assembly_.
+
+The Provisional Government also established a War Cabinet which introduced
+various reforms into the army. All the old oppressive regulations were
+repealed and an attempt made to democratize the military system. Some of
+these reforms were of the utmost value; others were rather dangerous
+experiments. Much criticism has been leveled against the rules providing
+for the election of officers by the men in the ranks, for a conciliation
+board to act in disputes between men and officers over questions of
+discipline, and the abolition of the regulations requiring private soldiers
+to address officers by the title "Sir." It must be borne in mind, however,
+in discussing these things, that these rules represented a great, honest
+effort to restore the morale of an army that had been demoralized, and to
+infuse it with democratic faith and zeal in order that it might "carry on."
+It is not just to judge the rules without considering the conditions which
+called them forth.
+
+Certainly the Provisional Government--which the government of the United
+States formally recognized on March 22d, being followed in this by the
+other Allied governments next day--could not be accused fairly of being
+either slothful or unfaithful. Its accomplishments during those first weeks
+were most remarkable. Nevertheless, as the days went by it became evident
+that it could not hope to satisfy the masses and that, therefore, it could
+not last very long.
+
+
+III
+
+The Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates was pursuing its
+independent existence, under the leadership of Tchcheidze, Skobelev,
+Tseretelli, and other moderate Social Democrats. As yet the Bolsheviki were
+a very small and uninfluential faction, lacking capable leadership. There
+can be very little doubt that the Council represented the feelings of the
+great mass of the organized wage-earners far more satisfactorily than the
+Provisional Government did, or that it was trusted to a far greater degree,
+alike by the wage-earners of the cities and the peasants. A great
+psychological fact existed, a fact which the Provisional Government and the
+governments of the Allied nations might well have reckoned with: the
+Russian working-people, artisans and peasants alike, were aggressively
+class conscious and could trust fully only the leaders of their own class.
+
+The majority of the Social Democratic party was, at the beginning, so far
+from anything like Bolshevism, so thoroughly constructive and opportunistic
+in its policies, that its official organ, _Pravda_--not yet captured by the
+Bolsheviki--put forward a program which might easily have been made the
+basis for an effective coalition. It was in some respects disappointingly
+moderate: like the program of the Provisional Government, it left the land
+question untouched, except in so far as the clause demanding the
+confiscation of the property of the royal family and the Church bore upon
+it. The Social Democratic party, reflecting the interests of the city
+proletariat, had never been enthusiastic about the peasants' claim for
+distribution of the land, and there had been much controversy between its
+leaders and the leaders of the Socialist-Revolutionary party, the party of
+the peasants. The program as printed in Pravda read:
+
+    1. A biennial one-house parliament.
+
+    2. Wide extension of the principle of self-government.
+
+    3. Inviolability of person and dwelling.
+
+    4. Unlimited freedom of the press, of speech, and of assembly.
+
+    5. Freedom of movement in business.
+
+    6. Equal rights for all irrespective of sex, religion, and
+    nationality.
+
+    7. Abolition of class distinction.
+
+    8. Education in native language; native languages everywhere to
+    have equal rights with official language.
+
+    9. Every nationality in the state to have the right of
+    self-definition.
+
+    10. The right of all persons to prosecute officials before a jury.
+
+    11. Election of magistrates.
+
+    12. A citizen army instead of ordinary troops.
+
+    13. Separation of Church from state and school from Church.
+
+    14. Free compulsory education for both sexes to the age of
+    sixteen.
+
+    15. State feeding of poor children.
+
+    16. Confiscation of Church property, also that of the royal
+    family.
+
+    17. Progressive income tax.
+
+    18. An eight-hour day, with six hours for all under eighteen.
+
+    19. Prohibition of female labor where such is harmful to women.
+
+    20. A clear holiday once a week to consist of forty-two hours on
+    end.
+
+It would be a mistake to suppose that this very moderate program embraced
+all that the majority of the Social Democratic party aimed at. It was not
+intended to be more than an ameliorative program for immediate adoption by
+the Constituent Assembly, for the convocation of which the Social Democrats
+were most eager, and which they confidently believed would have a majority
+of Socialists of different factions.
+
+In a brilliant and caustic criticism of conditions as they existed in the
+pre-Bolshevist period, Trotzky denounced what he called "the farce of dual
+authority." In a characteristically clever and biting phrase, he described
+it as "The epoch of Dual Impotence, the government not able, and the Soviet
+not daring," and predicted its culmination in a "crisis of unheard-of
+severity."[5] There was more than a little truth in the scornful phrase. On
+the one hand, there was the Provisional Government, to which the Soviet had
+given its consent and its allegiance, trying to discharge the functions of
+government. On the other hand, there was the Soviet itself, claiming the
+right to control the course of the Provisional Government and indulging in
+systematic criticism of the latter's actions. It was inevitable that the
+Soviet should have been driven irresistibly to the point where it must
+either renounce its own existence or oppose the Provisional Government.
+
+The dominating spirit and thought of the Soviet was that of international
+social democracy. While most of the delegates believed that it was
+necessary to prosecute the war and to defeat the aggressions of the Central
+Empires, they were still Socialists, internationalists, fundamental
+democrats, and anti-imperialists. Not without good and sufficient reason,
+they mistrusted the bourgeois statesmen and believed that some of the most
+influential among them were imperialists, actuated by a desire for
+territorial expansion, especially the annexation of Constantinople, and
+that they were committed to various secret treaties entered into by the old
+régime with England, France, and Italy. In the meetings of the Soviet, and
+in other assemblages of workers, the ugly suspicion grew that the war was
+not simply a war for national defense, for which there was democratic
+sanction and justification, but a war of imperialism, and that the
+Provisional Government was pursuing the old ways of secret diplomacy.
+
+Strength was given to this feeling when Miliukov, the Foreign Minister, in
+an interview championed the annexation of Constantinople as a necessary
+safeguard for the outlet to the Mediterranean which Russian economic
+development needed. Immediately there was an outcry of protest from the
+Soviet, in which, it should be observed, the Bolsheviki were already
+gaining strength and confidence, thanks to the leadership of Kamenev,
+Lenine's colleague, who had returned from Siberian exile. It was not only
+the Bolsheviki, however, who protested against imperialistic tendencies.
+Practically the whole body of Socialists, Mensheviki and Bolsheviki alike,
+agreed in opposing imperialism and secret diplomacy. Socialists loyal to
+the national defense and Socialists who repudiated that policy and deemed
+it treason to the cause of Socialism were united in this one thing.
+
+The storm of protest which Miliukov's interview provoked was stilled
+temporarily when the Premier, Lvov, announced that the Foreign Minister's
+views concerning the annexation of Constantinople were purely personal and
+did not represent the policy of the Provisional Government. Assurances were
+given that the Provisional Government was in accord with the policy of the
+Soviet. On April 16th a national congress of the Councils of Workmen's and
+Soldiers' Delegates adopted a series of resolutions in which there was a
+distinct menace to the Provisional Government. An earlier proclamation by
+the Petrograd Soviet had taken the form of a letter addressed to
+"Proletarians and Working-people of all Countries," but being in fact an
+appeal to the German working class to rise and refuse to fight against
+democratic and free Russia.[6] It declared that the peoples must take the
+matter of deciding questions of war and peace into their own hands. The new
+declaration was addressed to the Russian people:
+
+    _First_.--The Provisional Government, which constituted itself
+    during the Revolution, in agreement with the Council of Workmen's
+    and Soldiers' Delegates of Petrograd, published a proclamation
+    announcing its program. This Congress records that this program
+    contains in principle political demands for Russian democracy, and
+    _recognizes that so far the Provisional Government has faithfully
+    carried out its promises_.
+
+    _Second_.--This Congress appeals to the whole revolutionary
+    democracy of Russia to rally to the support of the Council of
+    Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, which is the center of the
+    organized democratic forces that are capable, in unison with
+    other progressive forces, of counteracting any counter
+    revolutionary attempt and of consolidating the conquests of the
+    revolution.
+
+    _Third_.--The Congress recognizes the necessity of permanent
+    political control, the necessity of exercising an influence over
+    the Provisional Government which will keep it up to a more
+    energetic struggle against anti-revolutionary forces, and the
+    necessity of exercising an influence which will insure its
+    democratizing the whole Russian life and paving the way for a
+    common _peace without annexations or contributions_, but on a
+    basis of free national development of all peoples.
+
+    _Fourth_.--The Congress appeals to the democracy, while declining
+    responsibility for any of its acts, to support the Provisional
+    Government as long as it continues to consolidate and develop the
+    conquest of the Revolution, _and as long as the basis of its
+    foreign policy does not rest upon aspirations for territorial
+    expansion_.
+
+    _Fifth_.--The Congress calls upon the revolutionary democracy of
+    Russia, rallying around the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers'
+    Delegates, to be ready to _vigorously suppress any attempt by the
+    government to elude the control of democracy or to renounce the
+    carrying out of its pledges_.[7]
+
+On April 27th, acting under pressure from the Soviet, the Provisional
+Government published a Manifesto to the Russian people in which it
+announced a foreign policy which conformed to that which the Congress of
+Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates had adopted. On May 1st
+Miliukov, the Foreign Minister, transmitted this Manifesto to the Allied
+governments as a preliminary to an invitation to those governments to
+restate their war aims. Accompanying the Manifesto was a Note of
+explanation, which was interpreted by a great many of the Socialists as an
+intimation to the Allies that the Manifesto was intended merely for home
+consumption, and that the Provisional Government would be glad to have the
+Allies disregard it. It is difficult for any one outside of Russia, whose
+sympathies were with the Entente Allies, to gather such an impression from
+the text of the Note, which simply set forth that enemy attempts to spread
+the belief that Russia was about to make a separate peace with Germany made
+it necessary for the Provisional Government to state its "entire agreement"
+with the aims of the Allies as set forth by their statesmen, including
+President Wilson, and to affirm that "the Provisional Government, in
+safeguarding the right acquired for our country, will maintain a strict
+regard for its agreement with the allies of Russia."
+
+Although it was explained that the Note had been sent with the knowledge
+and approval of the Provisional Government, the storm of fury it produced
+was directed against Miliukov and, in less degree, Guchkov. Tremendous
+demonstrations of protest against "imperialism" were held. In the Soviet a
+vigorous demand for the overthrow of the Provisional Government was made by
+the steadily growing Bolshevik faction and by many anti-Bolsheviki
+Socialists. To avert the disaster of a vote of the Soviet against it, the
+Provisional Government made the following explanation of the so-called
+Miliukov Note:
+
+    The Note was subjected to long and detailed examination by the
+    Provisional Government, and was unanimously approved. This Note,
+    in speaking of a "decisive victory," had in view a solution of the
+    problems mentioned in the communication of April 9th, and which
+    was thus specified:
+
+    "The government deems it to be its right and duty to declare now
+    that free Russia does not aim at the domination of other nations,
+    or at depriving them of their national patrimony, or at occupying
+    by force foreign territories, but that its object is to establish
+    a durable peace on the basis of the rights of nations to decide
+    their own destiny.
+
+    "The Russian nation does not lust after the strengthening of its
+    power abroad at the expense of other nations. Its aim is not to
+    subjugate or humiliate any one. In the name of the higher
+    principles of equity, the Russian people have broken the chains
+    which fettered the Polish nation, but it will not suffer that its
+    own country shall emerge from the great struggle humiliated or
+    weakened in its vital forces.
+
+    "In referring to the 'penalties and guarantees' essential to a
+    durable peace, the Provisional Government had in view the
+    reduction of armaments, the establishment of international
+    tribunals, etc.
+
+    "This explanation will be communicated by the Minister of Foreign
+    Affairs to the Ambassadors of the Allied Powers."
+
+This assurance satisfied a majority of the delegates to the Soviet meeting
+held on the evening of May 4th, and a resolution of confidence in the
+Provisional Government was carried, after a very stormy debate. The
+majority, however, was a very small one, thirty-five in a total vote of
+about twenty-five hundred. It was clearly evident that the political
+government and the Soviet, which was increasingly inclined to assume the
+functions of government, were nearing a serious breach. With each day the
+Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, as the organized expression
+of the great mass of wage-workers in Petrograd, grew in power over the
+Provisional Government and its influence throughout the whole of Russia. On
+May 13th Guchkov resigned, and three days later Miliukov followed his
+example. The party of the Constitutional Democrats had come to be
+identified in the minds of the revolutionary proletariat with imperialism
+and secret diplomacy, and was utterly discredited. The crisis developed an
+intensification of the distrust of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat.
+
+
+IV
+
+The crisis was not due solely to the diplomacy of the Provisional
+Government. Indeed, that was a minor cause. Behind all the discussions and
+disputes over Miliukov's conduct of the affairs of the Foreign Office there
+was the far more serious issue created by the agitation of the Bolsheviki.
+Under the leadership of Kamenev, Lenine, and others less well known, who
+skillfully exploited the friction with the Provisional Government, the idea
+of overthrowing that bourgeois body and of asserting that the Councils of
+Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates would rule Russia in the interests of the
+working class made steady if not rapid progress.
+
+Late in April Lenine and several other active Bolshevik leaders returned to
+Petrograd from Switzerland, together with Martov and other Menshevik
+leaders, who, while differing from the Bolsheviki upon practically all
+other matters, agreed with them in their bitter and uncompromising
+opposition to the war and in demanding an immediate peace.[8] As is well
+known, they were granted special facilities by the German Government in
+order that they might reach Russia safely. Certain Swiss Socialist leaders,
+regarded as strongly pro-German, arranged with the German Government that
+the Russian revolutionists should be permitted to travel across Germany by
+rail, in closed carriages. Unusual courtesies were extended to the
+travelers by the German authorities, and it was quite natural that Lenine
+and his associates should have been suspected of being sympathizers with,
+if not the paid agents and tools of, the German Government. The manner in
+which their actions, when they arrived in Russia, served the ends sought
+by the German military authorities naturally strengthened the suspicion so
+that it became a strong conviction.
+
+Suspicious as the circumstances undoubtedly were, there is a very simple
+explanation of the conduct of Lenine and his companions. It is not at all
+necessary to conclude that they were German agents. Let us look at the
+facts with full candor: Lenine had long openly advocated the view that the
+defeat of Russia, even by Germany, would be good for the Russian
+revolutionary movement. But that was in the days before the overthrow of
+the Czar. Since that time his position had naturally shifted somewhat; he
+had opposed the continuation of the war and urged the Russian workers to
+withhold support from it. He had influenced the Soviets to demand a
+restatement of war aims by the Allies, and to incessantly agitate for
+immediate negotiations looking toward a general and democratic peace. Of
+course, the preaching of such a policy in Russia at that time by a leader
+so powerful and influential as Lenine, bound as it was to divide Russia and
+sow dissension among the Allies, fitted admirably into the German plans.
+That Germany would have been glad to pay for the performance of service so
+valuable can hardly be doubted.
+
+On his side, Lenine is far too astute a thinker to have failed to
+understand that the German Government had its own selfish interests in view
+when it arranged for his passage across Germany. But the fact that the
+Allies would suffer, and that the Central Empires would gain some
+advantage, was of no consequence to him. That was an unavoidable accident
+and was purely incidental. His own purpose, to lead the revolutionary
+movement into a new phase, in which he believed with fanatical
+thoroughness, was the only thing that mattered in the least. If the
+conditions had been reversed, and he could only have reached Russia by the
+co-operation of the Allies, whose cause would be served, however
+unintentionally, by his work, he would have felt exactly the same. On the
+other hand, it was of the essence of his faith that his policy would lead
+to the overthrow of all capitalist-imperialist governments, those of
+Germany and her allies no less than those ranged on the other side. Germany
+might reason that a revolutionary uprising led by Lenine would rid her of
+one of her enemies and enable her to hurl larger forces against the foe on
+the western front. At that reasoning Lenine would smile in derision,
+thoroughly believing that any uprising he might bring about in Russia would
+sweep westward and destroy the whole fabric of Austro-German
+capitalist-imperialism. Lenine knew that he was being used by Germany, but
+he believed that he, in turn, was using Germany. He was supremely confident
+that he could outplay the German statesmen and military leaders.
+
+It was a dangerous game that Lenine was playing, and he knew it, but the
+stakes were high and worth the great risk involved. It was not necessary
+for Germany to buy the service he could render to her; that service would
+be an unavoidable accompaniment of his mission. He argued that his work
+could, at the worst, give only temporary advantage to Germany. So far as
+there is any evidence to show, Lenine has been personally incorruptible.
+Holding lightly what he scornfully derides as "bourgeois morality," unmoral
+rather than immoral, willing to use any and all means to achieve ends which
+he sincerely believes to be the very highest and noblest that ever inspired
+mankind, he would, doubtless, take German money if he saw that it would
+help him to achieve his purposes. He would do so, however, without any
+thought of self-aggrandizement. It is probably safe and just to believe
+that if Lenine ever took money from the Germans, either at that time or
+subsequently, he did so in this spirit, believing that the net result of
+his efforts would be equally disastrous to all the capitalist governments
+concerned in the war. It must be remembered, moreover, that the
+distinctions drawn by most thoughtful men between autocratic governments
+like those which ruled Germany and Austria and the more democratic
+governments of France, England, and America, have very little meaning or
+value to men like Lenine. They regard the political form as relatively
+unimportant; what matters is the fundamental economic class interest
+represented by the governments. Capitalist governments are all equally
+undesirable.
+
+What Lenine's program was when he left Switzerland is easily learned. A few
+days before he left Switzerland he delivered a lecture on "The Russian
+Revolution," in which he made a careful statement of his position. It gives
+a very good idea of Lenine's mental processes. It shows him as a Marxist of
+the most dogmatic type--the type which caused Marx himself to rejoice that
+he was not a "Marxist":
+
+    As to the revolutionary organization and its task, the conquest of
+    the power of the state and militarism: From the praxis of the
+    French Commune of 1871, Marx shows that "the working class cannot
+    simply take over the governmental machinery as built by the
+    bourgeoisie, and use this machinery for its own purposes." The
+    proletariat must break down this machinery. And this has been
+    either concealed or denied by the opportunists.[9] But it is the
+    most valuable lesson of the Paris Commune of 1871 and the
+    Revolution in Russia in 1905. The difference between us and the
+    Anarchists is, that we admit the state is a necessity in the
+    development of our Revolution. The difference with the
+    opportunists and the Kautsky[10] disciples is that we claim that
+    we do not need the bourgeois state machinery as completed in the
+    "democratic" bourgeois republics, but _the direct power of armed
+    and organized workers_. Such was the character of the Commune of
+    1871 and of the Council of Workmen and Soldiers of 1905 and 1917.
+    On this basis we build.[11]
+
+Lenine went on to outline his program of action, which was to begin a new
+phase of the Revolution; to carry the revolt against Czarism onward against
+the bourgeoisie. Notwithstanding his scorn for democracy, he declared at
+that time that his policy included the establishment of a "democratic
+republic," confiscation of the landed estates of the nobility in favor of
+the peasants, and the opening up of immediate peace negotiations. But the
+latter he would take out of the hands of the government entirely. "Peace
+negotiations should not be carried on by and with bourgeois governments,
+but with the proletariat in each of the warring countries." In his
+criticism of Kerensky and Tchcheidze the Bolshevik leader was especially
+scornful and bitter.
+
+In a letter which he addressed to the Socialists of Switzerland immediately
+after his departure for Russia, Lenine gave a careful statement of his own
+position and that of his friends. It shows an opportunistic attitude of
+mind which differs from the opportunistic attitude of the moderate
+Socialists _in direction only_, not in the _quality of being
+opportunistic_:
+
+    Historic conditions have made the Russians, _perhaps for a short
+    period_, the leaders of the revolutionary world proletariat, _but
+    Socialism cannot now prevail in Russia_. We can expect only an
+    agrarian revolution, which will help to create more favorable
+    conditions for further development of the proletarian forces and
+    _may result in measures for the control of production and
+    distribution_.
+
+    The main results of the present Revolution will have to be _the
+    creation of more favorable conditions for further revolutionary
+    development_, and to influence the more highly developed European
+    countries into action.[12]
+
+The Bolsheviki at this period had as their program the following:
+
+(1) The Soviets of Workers, Soldiers, and Peasants to constitute themselves
+into the actual revolutionary government and establish the dictatorship of
+the proletariat; (2) immediate confiscation of landed estates without
+compensation, the seizure to be done by the peasants themselves, without
+waiting for legal forms or processes, the peasants to organize into
+Soviets; (3) measures for the control of production and distribution by the
+revolutionary government, nationalization of monopolies, repudiation of the
+national debt; (4) the workers to take possession of factories and operate
+them in co-operation with the technical staffs; (5) refusal by the Soviets
+to recognize any treaties made by the governments either of the Czar or the
+bourgeoisie, and the immediate publication of all such treaties; (6) the
+workers to propose at once and publicly an immediate truce and negotiations
+of peace, these to be carried on by the proletariat and not by and with the
+bourgeoisie; (7) bourgeois war debts to be paid exclusively by the
+capitalists.
+
+According to Litvinov, who is certainly not an unfriendly authority, as
+soon as Lenine arrived in Russia he submitted a new program to his party
+which was so novel, and so far a departure from accepted Socialist
+principles, that "Lenine's own closest friends shrank from it and refused
+to accept it."[13]
+
+This program involved the abandonment of the plans made for holding the
+Constituent Assembly, or, at any rate, such a radical change as to amount
+to the abandonment of the accepted plans. _He proposed that universal,
+equal, direct, and secret suffrage be frankly abandoned, and that only the
+industrial proletariat and the poorest section of the peasantry be
+permitted to vote at all!_ Against the traditional Socialist view that
+class distinctions must be wiped out and the class war ended by the
+victorious proletariat, Lenine proposed to make the class division more
+rigid and enduring. He proposed to give the sole control of Russia into the
+hands of not more than two hundred thousand workers in a land of one
+hundred and eighty millions of people, more than one hundred and
+thirty-five millions of whom were peasants!
+
+Of course, there could be no reconciliation between such views as these and
+the universally accepted Socialist principle of democratic government.
+Lenine did not hesitate to declare that democracy itself was a "bourgeois
+conception" which the revolutionary proletariat must overthrow, a
+declaration hard to reconcile with his demand for a "democratic republic."
+Russia must not become a democratic republic, he argued, for a democratic
+republic is a bourgeois republic. Again and again, during the time we are
+discussing and later, Lenine assailed the principle of democratic
+government. "Since March, 1917, the word 'democracy' is simply a shackle
+fastened upon the revolutionary nation," he declared in an article written
+after the Bolsheviki had overthrown Kerensky.[14]
+
+When democracy is abolished, parliamentary government goes with it. From
+the first days after his return to Russia Lenine advocated, instead of a
+parliamentary republic similar to that of France or the United States, what
+he called a Soviet republic, which would be formed upon these lines: local
+government would be carried on by local Soviets composed of delegates
+elected by "the working class and the poorest peasantry," to use a common
+Bolshevik phrase which bothers a great many people whose minds insist upon
+classifying peasants as "working-people" and part of the working class.
+What Lenine means when he uses the phrase, and what Litvinov means[15] is
+that the industrial wage-workers--to whom is applied the term "working
+class"--must be sharply distinguished from peasants and small farmers,
+though the very poorest peasants, not being conservative, as more
+prosperous peasants are, can be united with the wage-workers.
+
+These local Soviets functioning in local government would, in Lenine's
+Soviet republic, elect delegates to a central committee of all the Soviets
+in the country, and that central committee would be the state. Except in
+details of organization, this is not materially different from the
+fundamental idea of the I.W.W. with which we are familiar.[16] According to
+the latter, the labor-unions, organized on industrial lines and federated
+through a central council, will take the place of parliamentary government
+elected on territorial lines. According to the Bolshevik plan, Soviets
+would take the place held by the unions in the plan of the I.W.W. It is not
+to be wondered at that, in the words of Litvinov, Lenine's own closest
+friends shrank from his scheme and Lenine "was compelled to drop it for a
+time."
+
+
+V
+
+Bolshevism was greatly strengthened in its leadership by the return of Leon
+Trotzky, who arrived in Petrograd on May 17th. Trotzky was born in Moscow
+about forty-five years ago. Like Lenine, he is of bourgeois origin, his
+father being a wealthy Moscow merchant. He is a Jew and his real name is
+Bronstein. To live under an assumed name has always been a common practice
+among Russian revolutionists, for very good and cogent reasons. Certainly
+all who knew anything at all of the personnel of the Russian revolutionary
+movement during the past twenty years knew that Trotzky was Bronstein, and
+that he was a Jew. The idea, assiduously disseminated by a section of the
+American press, that there must be something discreditable or mysterious
+connected with his adoption of an alias is extremely absurd, and can only
+be explained by monumental ignorance of Russian revolutionary history.
+
+Trotzky has been a fighter in the ranks of the revolutionary army of Russia
+for twenty years. As early as 1900 his activities as a Socialist
+propagandist among students had landed him in prison in solitary
+confinement. In 1902 he was exiled to eastern Siberia, whence he managed to
+escape. During the next three years he lived abroad, except for brief
+intervals spent in Russia, devoting himself to Socialist journalism. His
+first pamphlet, published in Geneva in 1903, was an attempt to reconcile
+the two factions in the Social Democratic party, the Bolsheviki and the
+Mensheviki. He was an orthodox Marxist of the most extreme doctrinaire
+type, and naturally inclined to the Bolshevik view. Yet he never joined the
+Bolsheviki, preferring to remain aloof from both factions and steadfastly
+and earnestly striving to unite them.
+
+When the Revolution of 1905 broke out Trotzky had already attained
+considerable influence among the Socialists. He was regarded as one of the
+ablest of the younger Marxians, and men spoke of him as destined to occupy
+the place of Plechanov. He became one of the most influential leaders of
+the St. Petersburg Soviet, and was elected its president. In that capacity
+he labored with titanic energy and manifested great versatility, as
+organizer, writer, speaker, and arbiter of disputes among warring
+individuals and groups. When the end came he was arrested and thrown into
+prison, where he remained for twelve months. After that he was tried and
+sentenced to life-exile in northern Siberia. From this he managed to
+escape, however, and from 1907 until the outbreak of the war in 1914 he
+lived in Vienna.
+
+The first two years of the war he lived in France, doing editorial work for
+a radical Russian Socialist daily paper, the _Nashe Slovo_. His writing,
+together with his activity in the Zimmerwald movement of anti-war
+Socialists, caused his expulsion from France. The Swiss government having
+refused to permit him to enter Switzerland, he sought refuge in Spain,
+where he was once more arrested and imprisoned for a short time. Released
+through the intervention of Spanish Socialists, he set sail with his family
+for New York, where he arrived early in January, 1917. Soon after the news
+of the Russian Revolution thrilled the world Trotzky, like many other
+Russian exiles, made hasty preparations to return, sailing on March 27th
+on a Norwegian steamer. At Halifax he and his family, together with a
+number of other Russian revolutionists, were taken from the ship and
+interned in a camp for war prisoners, Trotzky resisting violently and
+having to be carried off the ship. The British authorities kept them
+interned for a month, but finally released them at the urgent demand of the
+Foreign Minister of the Russian Provisional Government, Miliukov.
+
+Such, in brief outline, is the history of the man Trotzky. It is a typical
+Russian history: the story of a persistent, courageous, and exceedingly
+able fighter for an ideal believed in with fanatical devotion. Lenine, in
+one of his many disputes with Trotzky, called him "a man who blinds himself
+with revolutionary phrases,"[17] and the description is very apt. He
+possesses all the usual characteristics of the revolutionary Jewish
+Socialists of Russia. To a high-strung, passionate, nervous temperament and
+an exceedingly active imagination he unites a keen intellect which finds
+its highest satisfaction in theoretical abstractions and subtleties, and
+which accepts, phrases as though they were realities.
+
+Understanding of Trotzky's attitude during the recent revolutionary and
+counter-revolutionary struggles is made easier by understanding the
+development of his thought in the First Revolution, 1905-06. He began as an
+extremely orthodox Marxist, and believed that any attempt to establish a
+Socialist order in Russia until a more or less protracted intensive
+economic development, exhausting the possibilities of capitalism, made
+change inevitable, must fail. He accepted the view that a powerful
+capitalist class must be developed and perform its indispensable historical
+rôle, to be challenged and overthrown in its turn by the proletariat. That
+was the essence of his pure and unadulterated faith. To it he clung with
+all the tenacity of his nature, deriding as "Utopians" and "dreamers" the
+peasant Socialists who refused to accept the Marxian theory of Socialism as
+the product of historic necessity as applicable to Russia.
+
+The great upheaval of 1905 changed his viewpoint. The manner in which
+revolutionary ideas spread among the masses created in Trotzky, as in many
+others, almost unbounded confidence and enthusiasm. In an essay written
+soon after the outbreak of the Revolution he wrote: "The Revolution has
+come. _One move of hers has lifted the people over scores of steps, up
+which in times of peace we would have had to drag ourselves with hardships
+and fatigue_." The idea that the Revolution had "lifted the people over
+scores of steps" possessed him and changed his whole conception of the
+manner in which Socialism was to come. Still calling himself a Marxist, and
+believing as strongly as ever in the fundamental Marxian doctrines, as he
+understood them, he naturally devoted his keen mind with its peculiar
+aptitude for Talmudic hair-splitting to a new interpretation of Marxism. He
+declared his belief that in Russia it was possible to change from
+Absolutism to Socialism immediately, without the necessity of a prolonged
+period of capitalist development. At the same time, he maintained a
+scornful attitude toward the "Utopianism" of the peasant Socialists, who
+had always made the same contention, because he believed they based their
+hopes and their policy upon a wrong conception of Socialism. He had small
+patience for their agrarian Socialism with its economic basis in
+peasant-proprietorship and voluntary co-operation.
+
+He argued that the Russian bourgeoisie was so thoroughly infected with the
+ills of the bureaucratic system that it was itself decadent; not virile
+and progressive as a class aiming to possess the future must be. Since it
+was thus corrupted and weakened, and therefore incapable of fulfilling any
+revolutionary historical rôle, that became the _immediate_ task of the
+proletariat. Here was an example of the manner in which lifting over
+revolutionary steps was accomplished. Of course, the peasantry was in a
+backward and even primitive state which unfitted it for the proletarian
+rôle. Nevertheless, it had a class consciousness of its own, and an
+irresistible hunger for land. Without this class supporting it, or, at
+least, acquiescing in its rule, the proletariat could never hope to seize
+and hold the power of government. It would be possible to solve the
+difficulty here presented, Trotzky contended, if the enactment of the
+peasant program were permitted during the Revolution and accepted by the
+proletariat as a _fait accompli_. This would satisfy the peasants and make
+them content to acquiesce in a proletarian dictatorship. Once firmly
+established in power, it would be possible for the proletariat to gradually
+apply the true Socialist solution to the agrarian problem and to convert
+the peasants. "Once in power, the proletariat will appear before the
+peasantry as its liberator," he wrote.
+
+His imagination fired by the manner in which the Soviet of which he was
+president held the loyalty of the masses during the revolutionary uprising,
+and the representative character it developed, Trotzky conceived the idea
+that it lent itself admirably to the scheme of proletarian dictatorship.
+Parliamentary government cannot be used to impose and maintain a
+dictatorship, whether of autocracy or oligarchy, bourgeoisie or
+proletariat. In the Soviet, as a result of six weeks' experience in
+abnormal times, during which it was never for a moment subjected to the
+test of maintaining the economic life of the nation, Trotzky saw the ideal
+proletarian government. He once described the Soviet as "a true,
+unadulterated democracy," but, unless we are to dismiss the description as
+idle and vain rhetoric, we must assume that the word "democracy" was used
+in an entirely new sense, utterly incompatible with its etymological and
+historical meaning. Democracy has always meant absence of class rule;
+proletarian dictatorship is class rule.
+
+In the foregoing analysis of the theoretical and tactical views which
+Trotzky held during and immediately after the First Revolution, it is easy
+to see the genesis of the policies of the Bolshevik government which came
+twelve years later. The intervening years served only to deepen his
+convictions. At the center of all his thinking during that period was his
+belief in the sufficiency of the Soviet, and in the need of proletarian
+dictatorship. Throwing aside the first cautious thought that these things
+arose from the peculiar conditions existing in Russia as a result of her
+retarded economic development, he had come to regard them as applicable to
+all nations and to all peoples, except, perhaps, the peoples still living
+in barbarism or savagery.
+
+
+VI
+
+After the crisis which resulted in the resignation of Miliukov and Guchkov,
+it was evident that the Lvov government could not long endure. The
+situation in the army, as well as in the country, was so bad that the
+complete reorganization of the Provisional Government, upon much more
+radical lines, was imperative. The question arose among the revolutionary
+working-class organizations whether they should consent to co-operation
+with the liberal bourgeoisie in a new coalition Cabinet or whether they
+should refuse such co-operation and fight exclusively on class lines. This,
+of course, opened the entire controversy between Bolsheviki and Mensheviki.
+
+In the mean time the war-weary nation was clamoring for peace. The army was
+demoralized and saturated with the defeatism preached by the Porazhentsi.
+To deal with this grave situation two important conventions were arranged
+for, as follows: the Convention of Soldiers' Delegates from the Front,
+which opened on May 10th and lasted for about a week, and the First
+All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Delegates, which opened on May 17th and
+lasted for about twelve days. Between the two gatherings there was also an
+important meeting of the Petrograd Council of Workmen's and Soldiers'
+Deputies, which dealt with the same grave situation. The dates here are of
+the greatest significance: the first convention was opened three days
+before Miliukov's resignation and was in session when that event occurred;
+the second convention was opened four days after the resignation of
+Miliukov and one day after that of Guchkov. It was Guchkov's unique
+experience to address the convention of Soldiers' Delegates from the Front
+as Minister of War and Marine, explaining and defending his policy with
+great ability, and then, some days later, to address the same assembly as a
+private citizen.
+
+Guchkov drew a terrible picture of the seriousness of the military
+situation. With truly amazing candor he described conditions and explained
+how they had been brought about. He begged the soldiers not to lay down
+their arms, but to fight with new courage. Kerensky followed with a long
+speech, noble and full of pathos. In some respects, it was the most
+powerful of all the appeals it fell to his lot to make to his people, who
+were staggering in the too strong sunlight of an unfamiliar freedom. He
+did not lack courage to speak plainly: "My heart and soul are uneasy. I am
+greatly worried and I must say so openly, no matter what ... the
+consequences will be. The process of resurrecting the country's creative
+forces for the purpose of establishing the new régime rests on the basis of
+liberty and personal responsibility.... A century of slavery has not only
+demoralized the government and transformed the old officials into a band of
+traitors, _but it has also destroyed in the people themselves the
+consciousness of their responsibility for their fate, their country's
+destiny_." It was in this address that he cried out in his anguish: "I
+regret that I did not die two months ago. I would have died happy with the
+dream that the flame of a new life has been kindled in Russia, hopeful of a
+time when we could respect one another's right without resorting to the
+knout."
+
+To the soldiers Kerensky brought this challenge: "You fired on the people
+when the government demanded. But now, when it comes to obeying your own
+revolutionary government, you can no longer endure further sacrifice! Does
+this mean that free Russia is a nation of rebellious slaves?" He closed
+with an eloquent peroration: "I came here because I believe in my right to
+tell the truth as I understand it. People who even under the old régime
+went about their work openly and without fear of death, those people, I
+say, will not be terrorized. The fate of our country is in our hands and
+the country is in great danger. We have sipped of the cup of liberty and we
+are somewhat intoxicated; we are in need of the greatest possible sobriety
+and discipline. We must go down in history meriting the epitaph on our
+tombstones, 'They died, but they were never slaves.'"
+
+From the Petrograd Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies came I.G.
+Tseretelli, who had just returned from ten years' Siberian exile. A native
+of Georgia, a prince, nearly half of his forty-two years had been spent
+either in Socialist service or in exile brought about by such service. A
+man of education, wise in leadership and a brilliant orator, his leadership
+of the Socialist Group in the Second Duma had marked him as one of the
+truly great men of Russia. To the Convention of Soldiers' Delegates from
+the Front Tseretelli brought the decisions of the Council of Workmen's and
+Soldiers' Deputies, in shaping which he had taken an important part with
+Tchcheidze, Skobelev, and others. The Council had decided "to send an
+appeal to the soldiers at the front, and to explain to them that _in order
+to bring about universal peace it is necessary to defend the Revolution and
+Russia by defending the front_." This action had been taken despite the
+opposition of the Bolsheviki, and showed that the moderate Socialists were
+still in control of the Soviet. An Appeal to the Army, drawn up by
+Tseretelli, was adopted by the vote of every member except the Bolsheviki,
+who refrained from voting. This Appeal to the Army Tseretelli presented to
+the Soldiers' Delegates from the Front:
+
+    Comrades, soldiers at the front, in the name of the Revolutionary
+    Democracy, we make a fervent appeal to you.
+
+    A hard task has fallen to your lot. You have paid a dear price,
+    you have paid with your blood, a dear price indeed, for the crimes
+    of the Czar who sent you to fight and left you without arms,
+    without ammunition, without bread!
+
+    Why, the privation you now suffer is the work of the Czar and his
+    coterie of self-seeking associates who brought the country to
+    ruin. And the Revolution will need the efforts of many to overcome
+    the disorganization left her as a heritage by these robbers and
+    executioners.
+
+    The working class did not need the war. The workers did not begin
+    it. It was started by the Czars and capitalists of all countries.
+    Each day of war is for the people only a day of unnecessary
+    suffering and misfortune. Having dethroned the Czar, the Russian
+    people have selected for their first problem the ending of the war
+    in the quickest possible manner.
+
+    The Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies has appealed to
+    all nations to end the butchery. We have appealed to the French
+    and the English, to the Germans and the Austrians.[18] Russia
+    wants an answer to this appeal. Remember, however, comrades and
+    soldiers, that our appeal will be of no value if the regiments of
+    Wilhelm overpower Revolutionary Russia before our brothers, the
+    workers and peasants of other countries, will be able to respond.
+    Our appeal will become "a scrap of paper" if the whole strength of
+    the revolutionary people does not stand behind it, if the triumph
+    of Wilhelm Hohenzollern will be established on the ruins of
+    Russian freedom. The ruin of free Russia will be a tremendous,
+    irreparable misfortune, not only for us, but for the toilers of
+    the whole world.
+
+
+    Comrades, soldiers, defend Revolutionary Russia with all your
+    might!
+
+    The workers and peasants of Russia desire peace with all their
+    soul. But this peace must be universal, a peace for all nations
+    based on the agreement of all.
+
+    What would happen if we should agree to a separate peace--a peace
+    for ourselves alone! What would happen if the Russian soldiers
+    were to stick their bayonets into the ground to-day and say that
+    they do not care to fight any longer, that it makes no difference
+    to them what happens to the whole world!
+
+    Here is what would happen. Having destroyed our allies in the
+    west, German Imperialism would rush in upon us with all the force
+    of its arms. Germany's imperialists, her landowners and
+    capitalists, would put an iron heel on our necks, would occupy our
+    cities, our villages, and our land, and would force us to pay
+    tribute to her. Was it to bow down at the feet of Wilhelm that we
+    overthrew Nicholas?
+
+    Comrades--soldiers! The Council of Workmen's and Soldiers'
+    Deputies leads you to peace by another route. We lead you to peace
+    by calling upon the workers and peasants of Serbia and Austria to
+    rise and revolt; we lead you to peace by calling an international
+    conference of Socialists for a universal and determined revolt
+    against war. There is a great necessity, comrades--soldiers, for
+    the peoples of the world to awaken. Time is needed in order that
+    they should rebel and with an iron hand force their Czars and
+    capitalists to peace. Time is needed so that the toilers of all
+    lands should join with us for a merciless war upon violators and
+    robbers.
+
+    _But remember, comrades--soldiers, this time will never come if
+    you do not stop the advance of the enemy at the front, if your
+    ranks are crushed and under the feet of Wilhelm falls the
+    breathless corpse of the Russian Revolution_.
+
+    Remember, comrades, that at the front, in the trenches, you are
+    now standing in defense of Russia's freedom. You defend the
+    Revolution, you defend your brothers, the workers and peasants.
+    Let this defense be worthy of the great cause and the great
+    sacrifices already made by you. _It is impossible to defend the
+    front if, as has been decided, the soldiers are not to leave the
+    trenches under any circumstances_.[19] At times only an attack can
+    repulse and prevent the advance of the enemy. At times awaiting an
+    attack means patiently waiting for death. Again, only the change
+    to an advance may save you or your brothers, on other sections of
+    the front, from destruction.
+
+
+    Remember this, comrades--soldiers! Having sworn to defend Russian
+    freedom, do not refuse to start the offensive the military
+    situation may require. The freedom and happiness of Russia are in
+    your hands.
+
+    In defending this freedom be on the lookout for betrayal and
+    trickery. The fraternization which is developing on the front can
+    easily turn into such a trap.
+
+    Revolutionary armies may fraternize, but with whom? With an army
+    also revolutionary, which has decided to die for peace and
+    freedom. At present, however, not only in the German army, but
+    even in the Austro-Hungarian army, in spite of the number of
+    individuals politically conscious and honest, there is no
+    revolution. In those countries the armies are still blindly
+    following Wilhelm and Charles, the landowners and capitalists, and
+    agree to annexation of foreign soil, to robberies and violence.
+    There the General Staff will make use not only of your credulity,
+    but also of the blind obedience of their soldiers. You go out to
+    fraternize with open hearts. And to meet you an officer of the
+    General Staff leaves the enemies' trenches, disguised as a common
+    soldier. You speak with the enemy without any trickery. At that
+    very time he photographs the surrounding territory. You stop the
+    shooting to fraternize, but behind the enemies' trenches artillery
+    is being moved, new positions built and troops transferred.
+
+    Comrades--soldiers, not by fraternization will you get peace, not
+    by separate agreements made at the front by single companies,
+    battalions, or regiments. Not in separate peace or in a separate
+    truce lies the salvation of the Russian Revolution, the triumph of
+    peace for the whole world.
+
+    The people who assure you that fraternizing is the road to peace
+    lead you to destruction. Do not believe them. The road to peace is
+    a different one. It has been pointed out to you already by the
+    Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies: tread it. Sweep aside
+    everything that weakens your fighting power, that brings into the
+    army disorganization and loss of spirit.
+
+    Your fighting power serves the cause of peace. The Council of
+    Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies is able to continue its
+    revolutionary work with all its might, to develop its struggle for
+    peace, only by depending on you, knowing that you will not allow
+    the military destruction of Russia.
+
+    Comrades--soldiers, the workers and peasants, not only of Russia,
+    but of the whole world, look to you with confidence and hope.
+
+    Soldiers of the Revolution, you will prove worthy of this faith,
+    for you know that your military tasks serve the cause of peace.
+
+    In the name of the happiness and freedom of Revolutionary Russia,
+    in the name of the coming brotherhood of nations, you will fulfil
+    your military duties with unconquerable strength.
+
+Again and again Tseretelli was interrupted with cheers as he read this
+Appeal to the Army. He was cheered, too, when he explained that the Soviet
+had decided to support the reconstructed Provisional Government and called
+upon the soldiers to do likewise. There was a storm of applause when he
+said: "We well realize the necessity of having a strong power in Russia;
+however, the strength of this power must rely upon its progressive and
+revolutionary policy. Our government must adopt the revolutionary slogans
+of democracy. It must grant the demands of the revolutionary people. It
+must turn over all land to the laboring peasantry. It must safeguard the
+interests of the working class, enacting improved social legislation for
+the protection of labor. It must lead Russia to a speedy and lasting peace
+worthy of a great people."
+
+When Plechanov was introduced to the convention as "the veteran of the
+Russian Revolution" he received an ovation such as few men have ever been
+accorded. The great Socialist theorist plunged into a keen and forceful
+attack upon the theories of the Bolsheviki. He was frequently interrupted
+by angry cries and by impatient questionings, which he answered with
+rapier-like sentences. He was asked what a "democratic" government should
+be, and replied:
+
+"I am asked, 'What should a democratic government be? My answer is: It
+should be a government enjoying the people's full confidence and
+sufficiently strong to prevent any possibility of anarchy. Under what
+condition, then, can such a strong, democratic government be established?
+In my opinion it is necessary, for this purpose, _that the government be
+composed of representatives of all those parts of the population that are
+not interested in the restoration of the old order. What is called a
+coalition Ministry is necessary_. Our comrades, the Socialists,
+acknowledging the necessity of entering the government, can and should set
+forth definite conditions, definite demands. _But there should be no
+demands that would be unacceptable to the representatives of other classes,
+to the spokesmen of other parts of the population_."
+
+"Would you have us Russian proletarians fight in this war for England's
+colonial interests?" was one of the questions hurled at Plechanov, and
+greeted by the jubilant applause of the Bolsheviki. Plechanov replied with
+great spirit, his reply evoking a storm of cheers: "The answer is clear to
+every one who accepts the principle of self-determination of nations," he
+said. "The colonies are not deserts, but populated localities, and their
+populations should also be given the right to determine freely their own
+destinies. It is clear that Russia cannot fight for the sake of any one's
+predatory aspirations. _But I am surprised that the question of annexations
+is raised in Russia, whose sixteen provinces are under the Prussian heel!_
+I do not understand this exclusive solicitude for Germany's interests."
+
+To those who advocated fraternization, who were engaged in spreading the
+idea that the German working class would refuse to fight against the
+Russian revolutionists, the great Socialist teacher, possessing one of the
+ripest minds in the whole international Socialist movement, and an intimate
+knowledge of the history of that movement, made vigorous reply and recited
+a significant page of Socialist history:
+
+"In the fall of 1906, when Wilhelm was planning to move his troops on the
+then revolutionary Russia, I asked my comrades, the German Social
+Democrats, 'What will you do in case Wilhelm declares war on Russia?' At
+the party convention in Mannheim, Bebel gave me an answer to this question.
+Bebel introduced a resolution in favor of the declaration of a general
+strike in the event of war being declared on Russia. But this resolution
+was not adopted; _members of the trade-unions voted against it_. This is a
+fact which you should not forget. Bebel had to beat a retreat and introduce
+another resolution. Kautsky and Rosa Luxemburg were dissatisfied with
+Bebel's conduct. I asked Kautsky whether there is a way to bring about a
+general strike against the workers' will. As there is no such way, there
+was nothing else that Bebel could do. _And if Wilhelm had sent his hordes
+to Russia in 1906, the German workers would not have done an earthly thing
+to prevent the butchery_. In September, 1914, the situation was still
+worse."
+
+The opposition to Plechanov on the part of some of the delegates was an
+evidence of the extent to which disaffection, defeatism, and the readiness
+to make peace at any price almost--a general peace preferably, but, if not,
+then a separate peace--had permeated even the most intelligent part of the
+Russian army. Bolshevism and its ally, defeatism, were far more influential
+in the ranks of the soldiers than in those of the workers in the factories.
+Yet the majority was with Kerensky, Tseretelli, and Plechanov, as the
+following resolutions adopted by the convention prove:
+
+    The first convention of the Delegates from the Front, having heard
+    reports on current problems from the representatives of the
+    Provisional Government, members of the Executive Committee of the
+    Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, and from
+    representatives of the Socialist parties, and having considered
+    the situation, hereby resolves:
+
+    (1) That the disorganization of the food-supply system and the
+    weakening of the army's fighting capacity, due to a distrust of a
+    majority of the military authorities, to lack of inner
+    organization, and to other temporary causes, have reached such a
+    degree that the freedom won by the Revolution is seriously
+    endangered.
+
+    (2) That the sole salvation lies in establishing a government
+    enjoying the full confidence of the toiling masses, in the
+    awakening of a creative revolutionary enthusiasm, and in concerted
+    self-sacrificing work on the part of all the elements of the
+    population.
+
+    The convention extends to the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers'
+    Delegates its warmest appreciation of the latter's
+    self-sacrificing and honest work for the strengthening of the new
+    order in Russia, in the interests of the Russian Democracy and at
+    the same time wishes to see, in the nearest possible future, the
+    above Council transformed into an All-Russian Council of Workmen's
+    and Soldiers' Delegates.
+
+    _The convention is of the opinion that the war is at present
+    conducted for purposes of conquest and against the interests of
+    the masses_, and it, therefore, urges the Council of Workmen's and
+    Soldiers' Delegates to take the most energetic and effective
+    measures for the purpose of ending this butchery, on the basis of
+    free self-determination of nations and of renunciation by all
+    belligerent countries of annexations and indemnities. Not a drop
+    of Russian blood shall be given for aims foreign to us.
+
+    Considering that the earliest possible achievement of this purpose
+    is contingent only upon a strong revolutionary army, which would
+    defend freedom and government, and be fully supported by the
+    organized Revolutionary Democracy, that is, by the Council of
+    Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, responsible for its acts to the
+    whole country, the convention welcomes the responsible decision of
+    the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates to take part in
+    the new Provisional Government.
+
+    The convention demands that the representatives of the Church give
+    up for the country's benefit the treasures and funds now in the
+    possession of churches and monasteries. The convention makes an
+    urgent appeal to all parts of the population.
+
+    1. To the comrade-soldiers in the rear: Comrades! Come to fill up
+    our thinning ranks in the trenches and rise shoulder to shoulder
+    with us for the country's defense!
+
+    2. Comrade-workers! Work energetically and unite your efforts, and
+    in this way help us in our last fight for universal peace for
+    nations! By strengthening the front you will strengthen freedom!
+
+    3. Fellow-citizens of the capitalist class! Follow the historic
+    example of Minin! Even as he, open your treasuries and quickly
+    bring your money to the aid of Russia!
+
+    4. To the peasants: Fathers and Brothers! Bring your last mite to
+    help the weakening front! Give us bread, and oats and hay to our
+    horses. Remember that the future Russia will be yours!
+
+    5. Comrades-Intellectuals! Come to us and bring the light of
+    knowledge into our dark trenches! Share with us the difficult work
+    of advancing Russia's freedom and prepare us for the citizenship
+    of new Russia!
+
+    6. To the Russian women: Support your husbands and sons in the
+    performing of their civil duty to the country! Replace them where
+    this is not beyond your strength! Let your scorn drive away all
+    those who are slackers in these difficult times!
+
+No one can read this declaration without a deep sense of the lofty and
+sincere citizenship of the brave men who adopted it as their expression.
+The fundamental loyalty of these leaders of the common soldiers, their
+spokesmen and delegates, is beyond question. Pardonably weary of a war in
+which they had been more shamefully betrayed and neglected than any other
+army in modern times, frankly suspicious of capitalist governments which
+had made covenants with the hated Romanov dynasty, they were still far from
+being ready to follow the leadership of Bolsheviki. They had, instead,
+adopted the sanely constructive policy of Tchcheidze, Tseretelli, Skobelev,
+Plechanov, and other Socialists who from the first had seen the great
+struggle in its true perspective. That they did not succeed in averting
+disaster is due in part to the fact that the Revolution itself had come too
+late to make military success possible, and in part to the failure of the
+governments allied with Russia to render intelligent aid.
+
+
+VII
+
+The Provisional Government was reorganized. Before we consider the actions
+of the All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Delegates, one of the most
+important gatherings of representatives of Russian workers ever held, the
+reorganization of the Provisional Government merits attention. On the 17th,
+at a special sitting of the Duma, Guchkov and Miliukov explained why they
+had resigned. Guchkov made it a matter of conscience. Anarchy had entered
+into the administration of the army and navy, he said: "In the way of
+reforms the new government has gone very far. Not even in the most
+democratic countries have the principles of self-government, freedom, and
+equality been so extensively applied in military life. We have gone
+somewhat farther than the danger limit, and the impetuous current drives us
+farther still.... I could not consent to this dangerous work; I could not
+sign my name to orders and laws which in my opinion would lead to a rapid
+deterioration of our military forces. A country, and especially an army,
+cannot be administered on the principles of meetings and conferences."
+
+Miliukov told his colleagues of the Duma that he had not resigned of his
+own free will, but under pressure: "I had to resign, yielding not to force,
+but to the wish of a considerable majority of my colleagues. With a clear
+conscience I can say that I did not leave on my own account, but was
+compelled to leave." Nevertheless, he said, the foreign policy he had
+pursued was the correct one. "You could see for yourselves that my activity
+in foreign politics was in accord with your ideas," he declared amid
+applause which eloquently testified to the approval with which the
+bourgeoisie regarded policies and tendencies which the proletariat
+condemned. He pointed out that the pacifist policies of Zimmerwald and
+Keinthal had permeated a large part of the Socialist movement, and that the
+Soviet, the Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, claiming to
+exercise control over the Provisional Government, were divided. He feared
+that the proposal to establish a Coalition Government would not lead to
+success, because of "discord in the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers'
+Delegates itself." Not all the members of the latter body were agreed upon
+entering into a Coalition Government, and "it is evident that those who do
+not enter the government will continue to criticize those who have entered,
+and it is possible that the Socialists who enter the Cabinet will find
+themselves confronted with the same storm of criticism as the government
+did before." Still, because it meant the creation of a stronger government
+at once, which was the most vital need, he, like Guchkov, favored a
+coalition which would ally the Constitutional Democratic party with the
+majority of the Socialists.
+
+The Soviet had decided at its meeting on May 14th to participate in a
+Coalition Ministry. The struggle upon that question between Bolsheviki and
+Mensheviki was long and bitter. The vote, which was forty-one in favor of
+participation to nineteen against, probably fairly represented the full
+strength of Bolshevism in its stronghold. After various conferences between
+Premier Lvov and the other Ministers, on the one side, and representatives
+of the Soviet, on the other side, a new Provisional Government was
+announced, with Prince Lvov again Prime Minister. In the new Cabinet there
+were seven Constitutional Democrats, six Socialists, and two Octobrists. As
+Minister of War and head of the army and navy Alexander Kerensky took the
+place of Guchkov, while P.N. Pereverzev, a clever member of the
+Socialist-Revolutionary party, succeeded Kerensky as Minister of Justice.
+In Miliukov's position at the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was
+placed M.I. Terestchenko, a wealthy sugar-manufacturer, member of the
+Constitutional-Democratic party, who had held the post of Minister of
+Finance, which was now given to A.I. Shingariev, a brilliant member of the
+same party, who had proved his worth and capacity as Minister of
+Agriculture. To the latter post was appointed V.M. Chernov, the leader of
+the Socialist-Revolutionists, one of the most capable Socialists in Russia,
+or, for that matter, the world. Other Socialists of distinction in the new
+Provisional Government were I.G. Tseretelli, as Minister of Posts and
+Telegraphs, and M.I. Skobelev, as Minister of Labor. As Minister of Supply
+an independent Socialist, A.V. Peshekhonov, was chosen.
+
+It was a remarkable Cabinet. So far as the Socialists were concerned, it
+would have been difficult to select worthier or abler representatives. As
+in the formation of the First Provisional Government, attempts had been
+made to induce Tchcheidze to accept a position in the Cabinet, but without
+success. He could not be induced to enter a Coalition Ministry, though he
+strongly and even enthusiastically supported in the Soviet the motion to
+participate in such a Ministry. Apart from the regret caused by
+Tchcheidze's decision, it was felt on every hand that the Socialists had
+sent into the Second Provisional Government their strongest and most
+capable representatives; men who possessed the qualities of statesmen and
+who would fill their posts with honorable distinction and full loyalty. On
+the side of the Constitutional Democrats and the Octobrists, too, there
+were men of sterling character, distinguished ability, and very liberal
+minds. The selection of Terestchenko as Minister of Foreign Affairs was by
+many Socialists looked upon with distrust, but, upon the whole, the
+Coalition Ministry met with warm approbation. If any coalition of the sort
+could succeed, the Cabinet headed by Prince Lvov might be expected to do
+so.
+
+On the 18th, the Petrograd Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates
+adopted a resolution, introduced by Tchcheidze, president of the Council,
+warmly approving the entrance of the Socialist Ministers into the Cabinet
+and accepting the declaration of the new Provisional Government as
+satisfactory. This resolution was bitterly opposed by the Bolsheviki, who
+were led in the fight by Trotzky. This was Trotzky's first speech in
+Petrograd since his arrival the previous day from America. His speech was a
+demagogic appeal against co-operation with any bourgeois elements.
+Participation in the Coalition Ministry by the Socialists was a dangerous
+policy, he argued, since it sacrificed the fundamental principle of class
+struggle. Elaborating his views further, he said: "I never believed that
+the emancipation of the working class will come from above. Division of
+power will not cease with the entrance of the Socialists into the Ministry.
+A strong revolutionary power is necessary. The Russian Revolution will not
+perish. But I believe only in a miracle from below. There are three
+commandments for the proletariat. They are: First, transmission of power to
+the revolutionary people; second, control over their own leaders; and
+third, confidence in their own revolutionary powers."
+
+This was the beginning of Trotzky's warfare upon the Coalition Government,
+a warfare which he afterward systematically waged with all his might.
+Tchcheidze and others effectively replied to the Bolshevik leader's
+criticisms and after long and strenuous debate the resolution of the
+Executive Committee presented by Tchcheidze was carried by a large
+majority, the opposition only mustering seven votes. The resolution read as
+follows:
+
+    Acknowledging that the declaration of the Provisional Government,
+    which has been reconstructed and fortified by the entrance of
+    representatives of the Revolutionary Democracy, conforms to the
+    idea and purpose of strengthening the achievements of the
+    Revolution and its further development, the Council of Workmen's
+    and Soldiers' Delegates has determined:
+
+    I. Representatives of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers'
+    Delegates must enter into the Provisional Government.
+
+    II. Those representatives of the Council of Workmen's and
+    Soldiers' Delegates who join the government must, until the
+    creation of an All-Russian organ of the Council of Workmen's and
+    Soldiers' Delegates, consider themselves responsible to the
+    Petrograd Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, and must
+    pledge themselves to give accounts of all their activities to that
+    Council.
+
+    III. The Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates expresses
+    its full confidence in the new Provisional Government, and urges
+    all friends of democracy to give this government active
+    assistance, which will insure it the full measure of power
+    necessary for the safety of the Revolution's gains and for its
+    further development.
+
+If there is any one thing which may be said with certainty concerning the
+state of working-class opinion in Russia at that time, two months after the
+overthrow of the old régime, it is that the overwhelming majority of the
+working-people, both city workers and peasants, supported the policy of the
+Mensheviki and the Socialist-Revolutionists--the policy of co-operating
+with liberal bourgeois elements to win the war and create a stable
+government--as against the policy of the Bolsheviki. The two votes of the
+Petrograd Soviet told where the city workers stood. That very section of
+the proletariat upon which the Bolsheviki leaders based their hopes had
+repudiated them in the most emphatic manner. The Delegates of the Soldiers
+at the Front had shown that they would not follow the advice of the leaders
+of the Bolsheviki. And at the first opportunity which presented itself the
+peasants placed themselves in definite opposition to Bolshevism.
+
+On the afternoon preceding the action of the Soviet in giving its
+indorsement to the new Provisional Government and instructing its
+representatives to enter the Coalition Cabinet, there assembled in the
+People's House, Petrograd, more than one thousand peasant delegates to the
+first All-Russian Congress of Peasants. Never before had so many peasant
+delegates been gathered together in Russia to consider their special
+problems. There were present delegates from every part of Russia, even from
+the extreme border provinces, and many from the front. On the platform were
+the members of the Organizing Committee, the Executive Committee of the
+Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, the Socialist-Revolutionary
+party, the Social Democratic party, and a number of prominent Socialist
+leaders. As might be expected in a peasants' Congress, members of the
+Socialist-Revolutionary party were in the majority, numbering 537. The next
+largest group was the Social Democratic party, including Bolsheviki and
+Mensheviki, numbering 103. There were 136 delegates described as
+non-partizan; 4 belonged to the group called the "People's Socialists" and
+6 to the Labor Group. It was the most representative body of peasant
+workers ever brought together.
+
+Among the first speakers to address the Congress was the venerable
+"Grandmother" of the Russian Revolution, Catherine Breshkovskaya, who spoke
+with the freedom accorded to her and to her alone. "Tell me," she demanded,
+"is there advantage to us in keeping our front on a war footing and in
+allowing the people to sit in trenches with their hands folded and to die
+from fever, scurvy, and all sorts of contagious diseases? If our army had a
+real desire to help the Allies, the war would be finished in one or two
+months, _but we are prolonging it by sitting with our hands folded_." V.M.
+Chernov, leader of the Socialist-Revolutionary party, the new Minister of
+Agriculture, made a notable address in which he traversed with great skill
+and courage the arguments of the Bolsheviki, making a superb defense of the
+policy of participation in the government.
+
+Kerensky, idol of the peasants, appearing for the first time as Minister of
+War and head of the army and navy, made a vigorous plea for unity, for
+self-discipline, and for enthusiastic support of the new Provisional
+Government. He did not mince matters: "I intend to establish an iron
+discipline in the army. I am certain that I shall succeed in my
+undertaking, because it will be a discipline based upon duty toward the
+country, the duty of honor.... By all means, we must see that the country
+becomes free and strong enough to elect the Constituent Assembly, the
+Assembly which, through its sovereign, absolute power, will give to the
+toiling Russian peasants that for which they have been yearning for
+centuries, the land.... We are afraid of no demagogues, whether they come
+from the right or from the left. We shall attend to our business, quietly
+and firmly." Kerensky begged the peasants to assert their will that there
+should be "no repetition of the sad events of 1905-06, when the entire
+country seemed already in our hands, but slipped out because it became
+involved in anarchy." The speech created a profound impression and it was
+voted to have it printed in millions of copies, at the expense of the
+Congress, and have them distributed throughout the army.
+
+A similar honor was accorded the speech of I.I. Bunakov, one of the best
+known and most popular of the leaders of the Socialist-Revolutionary party.
+With remorseless logic he traversed the arguments of the Bolsheviki and the
+Porazhentsi. Taking the cry that there must be "no annexations," for
+example, he declared that the peasants of Russia could only accept that in
+the sense that Poland be reunited and her independence be restored; that
+the people of Alsace and Lorraine be permitted to be reunited to France;
+that Armenia be taken from Turkey and made independent. The peasants could
+not accept the _status quo ante_ as a basis for peace. He assailed the
+treacherous propaganda for a separate peace with terrific scorn: "But such
+peace is unacceptable to us peasants. A separate peace would kill not only
+our Revolution, but the cause of social revolution the world over. A
+separate peace is dishonor for Russia and treason toward the Allies.... We
+must start an offensive. To remain in the trenches without moving is a
+separate truce, more shameful even than a separate peace. A separate truce
+demoralizes the army and ruins the people. This spring, according to our
+agreement with the Allies, we should have begun a general offensive, but
+instead of that we have concluded a separate truce. _The Allies saved the
+Russian Revolution, but they are becoming exhausted_.... When our Minister
+of War, Kerensky, speaks of starting an offensive, the Russian army must
+support him with all its strength, with all the means available.... From
+here we should send our delegates to the front and urge our army to wage an
+offensive. Let the army know that it must fight and die for Russia's
+freedom, for the peace of the whole world, and for the coming Socialist
+commonwealth."
+
+In the resolutions which were adopted the Congress confined itself to
+outlining a program for the Constituent Assembly, urging the abolition of
+private property in land, forests, water-power, mines, and mineral
+resources. It urged the Provisional Government to "issue an absolutely
+clear and unequivocal statement which would show that on this question the
+Provisional Government will allow nobody to oppose the people's will." It
+also issued a special appeal "to the peasants and the whole wage-earning
+population of Russia" to vote at the forthcoming elections for the
+Constituent Assembly, "only for those candidates who pledge themselves to
+advocate the nationalization of the land without reimbursement on
+principles of equality." In the election for an Executive Committee to
+carry on the work of the Congress and maintain the organization the
+delegates with Bolshevist tendencies were "snowed under." Those who were
+elected were, practically without exception, stalwart supporters of the
+policy of participation in and responsibility for the Provisional
+Government, and known to be ardent believers in the Constituent Assembly.
+Chernov, with 810 votes, led the poll; Breshkovskaya came next with 809;
+Kerensky came third with 804; Avksentiev had 799; Bunakov 790; Vera Finger
+776, and so on. Nineteenth on the list of thirty elected came the venerable
+Nicholas Tchaykovsky, well known in America. Once more a great
+representative body of Russian working-people had spoken and rejected the
+teachings and the advice of the Bolsheviki.
+
+
+VIII
+
+As we have seen, it was with the authority and mandate of the overwhelming
+majority of the organized workers that the Socialists entered the Coalition
+Ministry. It was with that mandate that Kerensky undertook the Herculean
+task of restoring the discipline and morale of the Russian army. In that
+work he was the agent and representative of the organized working class.
+For this reason, if for no other, Kerensky and his associates were entitled
+to expect and to receive the loyal support of all who professed loyalty to
+the working class. Instead of giving that support, however, the Bolsheviki
+devoted themselves to the task of defeating every effort of the Provisional
+Government to carry out its program, which, it must be borne in mind, had
+been approved by the great mass of the organized workers. They availed
+themselves of every means in their power to hamper Kerensky in his work and
+to hinder the organization of the economic resources of the nation to
+sustain the military forces.
+
+Kerensky had promised to organize preparations for a vigorous offensive
+against the Austro-German forces. That such offensive was needed was
+obvious and was denied by none except the ultra-pacifists and the
+Bolsheviki. The Congress of Soldiers' Delegates from the Front and the
+Petrograd Soviet had specifically urged the need of such an offensive, as
+had most of the well-known peasants' leaders. It was a working-class
+policy. But that fact did not prevent the Bolsheviki from throwing
+obstacles in the way of its fulfilment. They carried on an active
+propaganda among the men in the army and the navy, urging insubordination,
+fraternization, and refusal to fight. They encouraged sabotage as a means
+of insuring the failure of the efforts of the Provisional Government. So
+thoroughly did they play into the hands of the German military authorities,
+whether intentionally or otherwise, that the charge of being in the pay of
+Germany was made against them--not by prejudiced bourgeois politicians and
+journalists, but by the most responsible Socialists in Russia.
+
+The epic story of Kerensky's magnificently heroic fight to recreate the
+Russian army is too well known to need retelling here. Though it was vain
+and ended in failure, as it was foredoomed to do, it must forever be
+remembered with gratitude and admiration by all friends of freedom. The
+audacity and the courage with which Kerensky and a few loyal associates
+strove to maintain Russia in the struggle made the Allied nations, and all
+the civilized world, their debtors. Many mistakes were made, it is true,
+yet it is very doubtful if human beings could have achieved more or
+succeeded where they failed. It must be confessed, furthermore, that the
+governments of the nations with which they were allied made many grievous
+mistakes on their part.
+
+Perhaps the greatest blunder that a discriminating posterity will charge to
+Kerensky's account was the signing of the famous Declaration of Soldiers'
+Rights. This document, which was signed on May 27th, can only be regarded
+in the light of a surrender to overpowering forces. In his address to the
+All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Delegates, on May 18th, speaking for the
+first time in his capacity as Minister of War, Kerensky had declared, "I
+intend to establish an iron discipline in the army," yet the Declaration of
+Soldiers' Rights which he signed nine days later was certain to make any
+real discipline impossible. Was it because he was inconsistent,
+vacillating, and weak that Kerensky attached his name to such a document?
+
+Such a judgment would be gravely unjust to a great man. The fact is that
+Kerensky's responsibility was very small indeed. He and his Socialist
+associates in the Cabinet held their positions by authority of the Council
+of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, and they had agreed to be subject to
+its guidance and instruction. The Soviet was responsible for the
+Declaration of Soldiers' Rights. Kerensky was acting under its orders. The
+Soviet had already struck a fatal blow at military discipline by its famous
+Order Number One, which called on the soldiers not to execute the orders of
+their officers unless the orders were first approved by the revolutionary
+authorities--that is, by the Soviet or its accredited agents. That the
+order was prompted by an intense love for revolutionary ideals, or that it
+was justified by the amount of treachery which had been discovered among
+the officers of the army, may explain and even excuse it, but the fact
+remains that it was a deadly blow at military discipline. The fact that
+Kerensky's predecessor, Guchkov, had to appear at a convention of soldiers'
+delegates and explain and defend his policies showed that discipline was at
+a low ebb. It brought the army into the arena of politics and made
+questions of military strategy subject to political maneuvering.
+
+The Declaration of Soldiers' Rights was a further step along a road which
+inevitably led to disaster. That remarkable document provided that soldiers
+and officers of all ranks should enjoy full civic and political rights;
+that they should be free to speak or write upon any subject; that their
+correspondence should be uncensored; that while on duty they should be free
+to receive any printed matter, books, papers, and so on, which they
+desired. It provided for the abolition of the compulsory salute to
+officers; gave the private soldier the right to discard his uniform when
+not actually on service and to leave barracks freely during "off-duty"
+hours. Finally, it placed all matters pertaining to the management in the
+hands of elective committees in the composition of which the men were to
+have four-fifths of the elective power and the officers one-fifth.
+
+Of course, the Declaration of Soldiers' Rights represented a violent
+reaction. Under the old régime the army was a monstrously cruel machine;
+the soldiers were slaves. At the first opportunity they had revolted and,
+as invariably happens, the pendulum had swung too far. On May 28th the
+Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates issued a declaration in which
+it was said: "From now on the soldier-citizen is free from the slavery of
+saluting, and as an equal, free person will greet whomsoever he chooses....
+Discipline in the Revolutionary Army will exist, prompted by popular
+enthusiasm and the sense of duty toward the free country rather than by a
+slavish salute." If we are tempted to laugh at this naďve idealism, we
+Americans will do well to remember that it was an American
+statesman-idealist who believed that we could raise an army of a million
+men overnight, and that a shrewd American capitalist-idealist sent forth a
+"peace ship" with a motley crew of dreamers and disputers to end the
+greatest war in history.
+
+
+IX
+
+Throughout the first half of June, while arrangements for a big military
+offensive were being made, and were causing Kerensky and the other
+Socialist Ministers to strain every nerve, Lenine, Trotzky, Kamenev,
+Zinoviev, and other leaders of the Bolsheviki were as strenuously engaged
+in denouncing the offensive and trying to make it impossible. Whatever gift
+or genius these men possessed was devoted wholly to destruction and
+obstruction. The student will search in vain among the multitude of records
+of meetings, conventions, debates, votes, and resolutions for a single
+instance of participation in any constructive act, one positive service to
+the soldiers at the front or the workers' families in need, by any
+Bolshevik leader. But they never missed an opportunity to embarrass those
+who were engaged in such work, and by so doing add to the burden that was
+already too heavy.
+
+Lenine denounced the offensive against Germany as "an act of treason
+against the Socialist International" and poured out the vials of his wrath
+against Kerensky, who was, as we know, simply carrying out the decisions of
+the Soviet and other working-class organizations. Thus we had the
+astonishing and tragic spectacle of one Socialist leader working with
+titanic energy among the troops who had been betrayed and demoralized by
+the old régime, seeking to stir them into action against the greatest
+militarist system in the world, while another Socialist leader worked with
+might and main to defeat that attempt and to prevent the rehabilitation of
+the demoralized army. And all the while the German General Staff gloated at
+every success of the Bolsheviki. There was a regular system of
+communications between the irreconcilable revolutionists and the German
+General Staff. In proof of this statement only one illustration need be
+offered, though many such could be cited: At the All-Russian Congress of
+Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, on June 22d, Kerensky read, in the
+presence of Lenine, a long message, signed by the commander-in-chief of the
+German eastern front, sent by wireless in response to a declaration of
+certain delegates of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates.
+
+At this session Lenine bitterly assailed the proposed offensive. He said
+that it was impossible for either side to win a military victory, revamping
+all the defeatist arguments that were familiar in every country. He
+minimized the loss which Russia had suffered at Germany's hands, and the
+gains Germany had made in Belgium and northern France, pointing out that
+she had, on the other hand, lost her colonies, which England would be very
+unlikely to give back unless compelled to do so by other nations. Taunted
+with being in favor of a separate peace with Germany, Lenine indignantly
+denied the accusation. "It is a lie," he cried. "Down with a separate
+peace! _We Russian revolutionists will never consent to it._" He argued
+that there could be only one policy for Socialists in any country--namely,
+to seize the occasion of war to overthrow the capitalist-class rule in that
+country. No war entered into by a capitalist ruling class, regardless what
+its motives, should be supported by Socialists. He argued that the adoption
+of his policy by the Russian working class would stand ten times the chance
+of succeeding that the military policy would have. The German working class
+would compel their government and the General Staff to follow the example
+of Russia and make peace.
+
+Kerensky was called upon to reply to Lenine. At the time when the
+restoration of the army required all his attention and all his strength, it
+was necessary for Kerensky to attend innumerable and well-nigh interminable
+debates and discussions to maintain stout resistance to the Bolshevik
+offensive always being waged in the rear. That, of course, was part of the
+Bolshevist plan of campaign. So Kerensky, wearied by his tremendous efforts
+to perform the task assigned him by the workers, answered Lenine. His reply
+was a forensic masterpiece. He took the message of the commander-in-chief
+of the German eastern front and hurled it at Lenine's head, figuratively
+speaking, showing how Lenine's reasoning was paralleled in the German
+propaganda. With merciless logic and incisive phrase he showed how the
+Bolsheviki were using the formula, "the self-determination of
+nationalities," as the basis of a propaganda to bring about the
+dismemberment of Russia and its reduction to a chaotic medley of small,
+helpless states. To Lenine's statements about the readiness of the German
+working class to rebel, Kerensky made retort that Lenine should have
+remained in Germany while on his way to Russia and preached his ideas
+there.
+
+A few days earlier, at a session of the same Congress, Trotzky and Kamenev
+had made vigorous assault upon the Coalition Government and upon the
+Socialist policy with reference thereto. In view of what subsequently
+transpired, it is important to note that Trotzky made much of the delay in
+calling together the Constituent Assembly: "The policy of continual
+postponement _and the detailed preparations_ for calling the Constituent
+Assembly is a false policy. It may destroy even the very realization of the
+Constituent Assembly." This profession of concern for the Constituent
+Assembly was hypocritical, dishonest, and insincere. He did not in the
+least care about or believe in the Constituent Assembly, and had not done
+so at any time since the First Revolution of 1905-06. His whole thought
+rejected such a democratic instrument. However, he and his associates knew
+that the demand for a Constituent Assembly was almost universal, and that
+to resist that demand was impossible. Their very obvious policy in the
+circumstances was to try and force the holding of the Assembly prematurely,
+without adequate preparation, and without affording an opportunity for a
+nation-wide electoral campaign. A hastily gathered, badly organized
+Constituent Assembly would be a mob-gathering which could be easily
+stampeded or controlled by a determined minority.
+
+Trotzky assailed the Coalition Government with vitriolic passion. At the
+moment when it was obvious to everybody that unity of effort was the only
+possible condition for the survival of the Revolution, and that any
+division in the ranks of the revolutionists, no matter upon what it might
+be based, must imperil the whole movement, he and all his Bolshevik
+colleagues deliberately stirred up dissension. Even if their opposition to
+political union with non-proletarian parties was right as the basis of a
+sound policy, to insist upon it at the moment of dire peril was either
+treachery or madness. When a house is already on fire the only thing in
+order, the only thing that can have the sanction of wisdom and honor, is to
+work to extinguish the fire. It is obviously not the time to debate whether
+the house was properly built or whether mistakes were made. Russia was a
+house on fire; the Bolsheviki insisted upon endless debating.
+
+Kamenev followed Trotzky's lead in attacking the Coalition Government. In a
+subtle speech he supported the idea of splitting Russia up into a large
+number of petty states, insisting that the formula, "self-determination of
+peoples," applied to the separatist movement in the Ukraine. He insisted
+that for the Russian working-people it was a matter of indifference whether
+the Central Empires or the Entente nations won in the war. He argued that
+the only hope for the Russian Revolution must be the support of the
+revolutionary proletariat in the other European countries, particularly
+those adjacent to Russia: "If the revolutionary proletariat of Europe fails
+to support the Russian Revolution the latter will be ruined. As that
+support is the only guaranty of the safety of the Revolution, we cannot
+change our policy by discussing the question of how much fraternizing will
+stimulate the awakening of the proletariat of Europe." In other words,
+Kamenev was in the position of a desperate gambler who stakes his life and
+his all upon one throw of the dice or one spin of the wheel.
+
+It was in this manner that the Bolshevist leaders conspired to Russia's
+destruction. They were absorbing the time and energies of the men who were
+really trying to do something, compelling them to engage in numerous
+futile debates, to the neglect of their vitally important work, debates,
+moreover, which could have no other effect than to weaken the nation.
+Further, they were actively obstructing the work of the government. Thus
+Tseretelli, Kerensky, Skobelev, and many others whose efforts might have
+saved the Revolution, were thwarted by men wholly without a sense of
+responsibility. Lenine was shrieking for the arrest of capitalists because
+they were capitalists, when it was obvious that the services of those same
+capitalists were needed if the nation was to live. Later on, when
+confronted by the realities and responsibilities of government, he availed
+himself of the special powers and training of the despised capitalists. At
+this earlier period he was, as Tseretelli repeatedly reminded the workers,
+without any sense of responsibility for the practical results of his
+propaganda. And that was equally true of the Bolsheviki as a whole. They
+talked about sending "ultimatums" to the Allies, while the whole system of
+national defense was falling to pieces. Tseretelli made the only reply it
+was possible for a sane man to make:
+
+"It is proposed that we speak to the Allies with ultimatums, but did those
+who made this silly proposal think that this road might lead to the
+breaking of diplomatic relations with the Allies, and to that very separate
+peace which is condemned by all factions among us? Did Lenine think of the
+actual consequences of his proposal to arrest several dozen capitalists at
+this time? Can the Bolsheviki guarantee that their road will lead us to the
+correct solution of the crisis? No. If they guarantee this they do not know
+what they are doing and their guaranty is worthless. The Bolshevik road can
+lead us only to one end, civil war."
+
+Once more the good sense of the working class prevailed. By an
+overwhelming majority of votes the Congress decided to uphold the Coalition
+Government and rejected the Bolshevik proposals. The resolution adopted
+declared that "the passing over of all power to the bourgeoisie elements
+would deal a blow at the revolutionary cause," but that equally the
+transfer of all power to the Soviets would be disastrous to the Revolution,
+and "would greatly weaken her powers by prematurely driving away from her
+elements which are still capable of serving her, and would threaten the
+ruin of the Revolution." Therefore, having heard the explanations of the
+Socialist Ministers and having full confidence in them, the Congress
+insisted that the Socialist Ministers be solely responsible to the
+"plenipotentiary and representative organ of the whole organized
+Revolutionary Democracy of Russia, which organ must be composed of the
+representatives of the All-Russian Congress of Councils of Workmen's and
+Soldiers' Delegates, as well as of representatives of the All-Russian
+Congress of Peasants' Delegates."
+
+But in spite of the fact that the workers upon every opportunity repudiated
+their policies, the Bolsheviki continued their tactics. Lenine, Trotzky,
+Tshitsherin, Zinoviev, and others called upon the workers to stop working
+and to go out into the streets to demonstrate for peace. The All-Russian
+Congress of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates issued an appeal to the
+workers warning them not to heed the call of the Bolsheviki, which had been
+made at the "moment of supreme danger." The appeal said:
+
+    Comrades, in the name of millions of workers, peasants, and
+    soldiers, we tell you, "Do not do that which you are called upon
+    to do." At this dangerous moment you are called out into the
+    streets to demand the overthrow of the Provisional Government, to
+    whom the All-Russian Congress has just found it necessary to give
+    its support. And those who are calling you cannot but know that
+    out of your peaceful demonstrations bloodshed and chaos may
+    result.... You are being called to a demonstration in favor of the
+    Revolution, _but we know that counter-revolutionists want to take
+    advantage of your demonstration ... the counter-revolutionists are
+    eagerly awaiting the moment when strife will develop in the ranks
+    of the Revolutionary Democracy and enable them to crush the
+    Revolution_.
+
+
+X
+
+Not only in this way were the Bolsheviki recklessly attempting to thwart
+the efforts of the Socialist Ministers to carry out the mandates of the
+majority of the working class of Russia, but they were equally active in
+trying to secure the failure of the attempt to restore the army. All
+through June the Bolshevik papers denounced the military offensive. In the
+ranks of the army itself a persistent campaign against further fighting was
+carried on. The Duma had voted, on June 17th, for an immediate offensive,
+and it was approved by the Petrograd Soviet. The Provisional Government on
+that date published a Note to the Allied governments, requesting a
+conference with a view to making a restatement of their war aims. These
+actions were approved by the All-Russian Congress of Workmen's and
+Soldiers' Delegates, as was also the expulsion from Russia of the Swiss
+Socialist, Robert Grimm, who was a notorious agent of the German
+Government. Grimm, as is now well known, was acting under the orders of
+Hoffman, the Swiss Minister of Foreign Affairs, and was trying to bring
+about a separate peace between Russia and Germany. He was also intimately
+connected with the infamous "Parvus," the trusted Social Democrat who was a
+spy and tool of the German Government. As always, the great majority of the
+representatives of the actual working class of Russia took the sane
+course.
+
+But the Bolsheviki were meanwhile holding mass meetings among the troops,
+preaching defeatism and surrender and urging the soldiers not to obey the
+orders of "bourgeois" officers. The Provisional Government was not blind to
+the peril of this propaganda, but it dared not attempt to end it by force,
+conscious that any attempt to do so would provoke revolt which could not be
+stayed. The Bolsheviki, unable to control the Workmen's and Soldiers'
+Council, sought in every possible manner to weaken its influence and to
+discredit it. They conspired to overthrow the Provisional Government. Their
+plot was to bring about an armed revolt on the 24th of June, when the
+All-Russian Congress of Soviets would be in session. They planned to arrest
+the members of the Provisional Government and assume full power. _At the
+same time, all the soldiers at the front were to be called on to leave the
+trenches_. On the eve of the date when it was to be executed this plot was
+divulged. There was treachery within their own ranks. The Bolshevik leaders
+humbly apologized and promised to abandon their plans. Under other
+conditions the Provisional Government might have refused to be satisfied
+with apologies, might have adopted far sterner measures, but it was face to
+face with the bitter fact that the nation was drunk with the strong wine of
+freedom. The time had not yet arrived when the masses could be expected to
+recognize the distinction between liberty within the law and the license
+that leads always to tyranny. It takes time and experience of freedom to
+teach the stern lesson that, as Rousseau has it, freedom comes by way of
+self-imposed compulsions to be free.
+
+The offensive which Kerensky had urged and planned began on July 1st and
+its initial success was encouraging. It seemed as though the miracle of the
+restoration of the Russian army had been achieved, despite everything. Here
+was an army whose killed and dead already amounted to more than three
+million men,[20] an army which had suffered incredible hardships, again
+going into battle with songs. On the 1st of July more than thirty-six
+thousand prisoners were taken by the Russians on the southwestern front.
+Then came the tragic harvest of the Bolshevist propaganda. In northeastern
+Galicia the 607th Russian Regiment left the trenches and forced other units
+to do the same thing, opening a clear way for the German advance. Regiment
+after regiment refused to obey orders. Officers were brutally murdered by
+their men. Along a front of more than one hundred and fifty miles the
+Russians, greatly superior in numbers, retreated without attempting to
+fight, while the enemy steadily advanced. This was made possible by the
+agitation of the Bolsheviki, especially by the mutiny which they provoked
+among the troops in the garrison at Petrograd. On the 17th of July, at the
+very time when the separatist movement in the Ukraine, the resignation of
+the Constitutional Democrats from the government, and the revolt and
+treachery among the troops had produced a grave crisis, seizing the
+opportunity afforded by the general chaos, the Bolsheviki attempted to
+realize their aim of establishing what they called a "dictatorship of the
+proletariat," but which was in reality the dictatorship of a small part of
+the proletariat. There was no pretense that they represented a majority of
+the proletariat, even. It was a desperate effort to impose the dictatorship
+of a small minority of the proletariat upon the whole nation. For two days
+the revolt lasted, more than five hundred men, women, and children being
+killed in the streets of Petrograd.
+
+On the 20th Prince Lvov resigned as Premier. In the mean time the
+Bolshevist uprising had been put down by Cossack troops and the leaders
+were in hiding. Kerensky stepped into Lvov's position as Premier and
+continued to address himself to the task of bringing order out of the
+chaos. There could not have been any selfish ambition in this; no
+place-hunter would have attempted to bear the heavy burden Kerensky then
+assumed, especially with his knowledge of the seriousness of the situation.
+He knew that the undertaking was practically hopeless, yet he determined
+never to give up the struggle so long as there was a single thing to be
+done and his comrades desired him to do it.[21]
+
+There had been created a revolutionary body representing all the organized
+workers, called the United Executive Committee of the All-Russian Councils
+of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates, a body of more than three
+hundred elected representatives of the various Soviets. They represented
+the views of many millions. This body vigorously denounced the Bolsheviki
+and rallied to the support of Kerensky and his colleagues. In a Manifesto
+to the people the Bolsheviki were charged with responsibility for the blood
+of all who had been slain in the uprising. On July 21st a second Manifesto
+was issued by the Committee calling upon the workers to uphold the
+government so long as the authorized representatives of the working class
+determined that to be the proper course to follow. The charge that Lenine,
+Zinoviev, Trotzky, and others were acting under German instructions and
+receiving German money spread until it was upon almost every tongue in
+Petrograd. On July 24th Gregory Alexinsky, a well-known Socialist, in his
+paper, _Bez Lisnih Slov_, published a circumstantial story of German
+intrigue in the Ukraine, revealed by one Yermolenko, an ensign in the 16th
+Siberian Regiment, who had been sent to Russia by the German Government.
+This Yermolenko charged that Lenine had been instructed by the authorities
+in Berlin, just as he himself had been, and that Lenine had been furnished
+with almost unlimited funds by the German Government, the arrangement being
+that it was to be forwarded through one Svendson, at Stockholm.[22] By a
+vote of 300 to 11 the United Executive Committee of the All-Russian
+Councils of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates adopted the
+following resolution:
+
+    The whole Revolutionary Democracy desires that the Bolsheviki
+    group accused of having organized disorders, or inciting revolt,
+    or of having received money from German sources be tried publicly.
+    In consequence, the Executive Committee considers it absolutely
+    inadmissible that Lenine and Zinoviev should escape justice, and
+    demands that the Bolsheviki faction immediately and categorically
+    express its censure of the conduct of its leaders.
+
+Later on, under the "terror," there was some pretense of an "investigation"
+of the charge that Lenine and others had received German money, but there
+has never been a genuine investigation so far as is known. Groups of
+Russian Socialists belonging to various parties and groups have asked that
+a commission of well-known Socialists from the leading countries of Europe
+and from the United States, furnished with reliable interpreters, be sent
+to Russia to make a thorough investigation of the charge.
+
+The United Executive Committee of the workers' organizations adopted a
+resolution demanding that all members and all factions, and the members of
+all affiliated bodies, obey the mandate of the majority, and that all
+majority decisions be absolutely obeyed. They took the position--too late,
+alas!--that the will of the majority must be observed, since the only
+alternative was the rule of the majority by the aggressive minority.
+Repressive measures against the Bolsheviki were adopted by the Kerensky
+Cabinet with the full approval of the Committee. Some of the Bolshevik
+papers were suppressed and the death penalty, which had been abolished at
+the very beginning of the Revolution, was partially restored in that it was
+ordered that it should be applied to traitors and deserters at the front.
+Lenine and Zinoviev were in hiding, but Trotzky, Kamenev, Alexandra
+Kollontay, and many other noted Bolsheviki were imprisoned for a few days.
+
+It was Kerensky's hope that by arranging for an early conference by the
+Allies, at which the war aims would be restated in terms similar to those
+which President Wilson had employed, and by definitely fixing the date for
+the Constituent Assembly elections, September 30th, while sternly
+repressing the Bolsheviki, it might be possible to save Russia. But it was
+too late. Despite his almost superhuman efforts, and the loyal support of
+the great majority of the Soviets, he was defeated. Day after day
+conditions at the front grew worse. By the beginning of August practically
+the whole of Galicia was in the hands of the Germans. Russian soldiers in
+large numbers retreated before inferior numbers of Germans, refusing to
+strike a blow. Germans furnished them with immense quantities of spirits,
+and an orgy of drunkenness took place. The red flag was borne by debauched
+and drunken mobs. What a fate for the symbol of universal freedom and
+human brotherhood!
+
+It was a time of terrible strain and upheaval. Crisis followed upon crisis.
+Chernov resigned his position as Minister of Agriculture. Kerensky resigned
+as Premier, but the members of the Provisional Government by unanimous vote
+declined to accept the resignation. They called a joint meeting of all the
+Cabinet, of leaders of all political parties, of the Duma, of the Soviets
+of workers, peasants, and soldiers. At this meeting the whole critical
+situation was discussed and all present joined in demanding that Kerensky
+continue in office. The political parties represented were the Social
+Democrats, the Socialist-Revolutionists, the Democratic Radicals, the Labor
+Union party, the Popular Socialists, and the Constitutional Democrats. From
+these groups came an appeal which Kerensky could not deny. He said:
+
+"In view of the evident impossibility of establishing, by means of a
+compromise between the various political groups, Socialist as well as
+non-Socialist, a strong revolutionary government ... I was obliged to
+resign. Friday's conference, ... after a prolonged discussion, resulted in
+the parties represented at the conference deciding to intrust me with the
+task of reconstructing the government. Considering it impossible for me in
+the present circumstances, when defeat without and disintegration within
+are threatening the country, to withdraw from the heavy task which is now
+intrusted to me, I regard this task as an express order of the country to
+construct a strong revolutionary government in the shortest possible time
+and in spite of all the obstacles which might arise."
+
+For the second time Kerensky was Premier at the head of a Coalition
+Ministry. No other government was possible for Russia except a strong
+despotism. Theorists might debate the advisability of such coalition, but
+the stern reality was that nothing else was possible. The leader of the
+peasants, Chernov, returned to his old post as Minister of Agriculture and
+the Constitutional Democrats took their share of the burden. There were six
+parties and groups in the new Cabinet, four of them of various shades of
+Socialism and two of them liberal bourgeoisie. Never before, perhaps, and
+certainly only rarely, if ever, have men essayed a heavier or more
+difficult task than that which this new Provisional Government undertook.
+
+Heroically Kerensky sought to make successful the efforts of General
+Kornilov, as commander-in-chief, to restore order and discipline in the
+army, but it was too late. The disintegration had gone too far. The
+measures which the Revolutionary Democracy had introduced into the army, in
+the hope of realizing freedom, had reduced it to a wild mob. Officers were
+butchered by their men; regiment after regiment deserted its post and, in
+some instances, attempted to make a separate peace with the enemy, even
+offering to pay indemnities. Moreover, the industrial organization of the
+country had been utterly demoralized. The manufacture of army supplies had
+fallen off more than 60 per cent., with the result that the state of
+affairs was worse than in the most corrupt period of the old régime.
+
+
+XI
+
+It became evident to the Provisional Government that something big and
+dramatic must be done, without waiting for the results of the Constituent
+Assembly elections. Accordingly, it was decided to call together a great
+extraordinary council, representing all classes and all parties, to
+consider the situation and the best means of meeting it. The Extraordinary
+National Conference, as it was called, was opened in Moscow, on August
+26th, with more than fourteen hundred members in attendance. Some of these
+members--principally those from the Soviets--had been elected as delegates,
+but the others had been invited by the government and could not be said to
+speak as authorized representatives. There were about one hundred and
+ninety men who had been members of one or other of the Dumas; one hundred
+representatives of the peasants' Soviets and other peasant organizations;
+about two hundred and thirty representatives of the Soviets of industrial
+workers and of soldiers; more than three hundred from co-operatives; about
+one hundred and eighty from the trade-unions; about one hundred and fifty
+from municipalities; one hundred and fifty representatives of banks and
+industrial concerns, and about one hundred and twenty from the Union of
+Zemstvos and Towns. It was a Conference more thoroughly representative of
+Russia than any that had ever been held. There were, indeed, no
+representatives of the old régime, and there were few representatives of
+the Bolsheviki. The former had no place in the new Russia that was
+struggling for its existence; the repressive measures that had been found
+necessary accounted for the scant representation of the latter.
+
+It was to this Conference that President Wilson sent his famous message
+giving the assurance of "every material and moral assistance" to the people
+and government of Russia. For three days the great assembly debated and
+listened to speeches from men representing every section of the country,
+every class, and every party. Kerensky, Tseretelli, Tchcheidze, Boublikov,
+Plechanov, Kropotkin, Breshkovskaya, and others, spoke for the workers;
+General Kornilov and General Kaledine spoke for the military command;
+Miliukov, Nekrasov, Guchkov, Maklakov, and others spoke for the
+bourgeoisie. At times feeling ran high, as might have been expected, but
+throughout the great gathering there was displayed a remarkable unanimity
+of feeling and immediate purpose; a common resolve to support the
+Provisional Government, to re-establish discipline in the army and navy, to
+remain loyal to the Allies, and reject with scorn all offers of a separate
+peace, and to work for the success of the Constituent Assembly.
+
+But, notwithstanding the unity upon these immediately vital points, the
+Moscow Conference showed that there was still a great gulf between the
+classes, and that no matter how they might co-operate to meet and overcome
+the peril that hung over the nation like the sword of Damocles, there could
+be no unity in working out the great economic and social program which must
+be the basis for the Social Democratic commonwealth which the workers
+sought to establish, and which the bourgeois elements feared almost as much
+as they feared the triumph of Germany. In some respects the Conference
+intensified class feeling and added to, instead of lessening, the civil
+strife. The Bolsheviki were not slow to exploit this fact. They pointed to
+the Conference as evidence of a desire on the part of the Socialist
+Ministers, and of the officials of the Soviets, to compromise with the
+bourgeoisie. This propaganda had its effect and Bolshevism grew in
+consequence, especially in Petrograd.
+
+Then followed the disastrous military and political events which made it
+practically impossible for the Kerensky government to stand. At the front
+the soldiers were still revolting, deserting, and retreating. Kornilov was
+quite helpless. Germany began a new offensive, and on September 2d German
+armies crossed the Dvina near Riga. On September 3d Riga was surrendered to
+the Germans in the most shameful manner and panic reigned in Petrograd.
+Then on the 9th came the revolt of Kornilov against the Provisional
+Government and the vulgar quarrel between him and Kerensky. Kornilov
+charged that the Provisional Government, under pressure from the
+Bolsheviki, was playing into the hands of the German General Staff.
+Kerensky, backed by the rest of the Cabinet, ordered Kornilov's removal,
+while Kornilov despatched a division of troops, drawn from the front,
+against Petrograd.
+
+It was a most disastrous conflict for which no adequate explanation can be
+found except in the strained mental condition of all the principal parties
+concerned. In less strenuous times, and in a calmer atmosphere, the two
+leaders, equally patriotic, would have found no difficulty in removing
+misunderstandings. As things were, a mischievous intermediary, and two men
+suffering the effects of a prolonged and intense nervous strain, provided
+all the elements of a disaster. Kornilov's revolt was crushed without great
+trouble and with very little bloodshed, Kornilov himself being arrested.
+The Soviets stood by the Provisional Government, for they saw in the revolt
+the attempt to set up a personal dictatorship. Even the Bolsheviki were
+temporarily sobered by the sudden appearance of the "man on horseback."
+Kerensky, by direction of his colleagues, became commander-in-chief of the
+Russian armies. Always, it seemed, through every calamity, all parties
+except the Bolsheviki agreed that he was the one man strong enough to
+undertake the heaviest and hardest tasks.
+
+Toward the end of September what may be termed the Kerensky régime entered
+upon its last phase. For reasons which have been already set forth, the
+Bolsheviki kept up a bitter attack upon the Provisional Government, and
+upon the official leaders of the Soviets, on account of the Moscow
+Conference. They demanded that the United Executive Committee of the
+Soviets convoke a new Conference. They contended that the Moscow Conference
+had been convoked by the government, not by the Soviets, and that the
+United Executive Committee must act for the latter. The United Executive
+Committee complied and summoned a new National Democratic Conference, which
+assembled on September 27th. By this time, as a result of the exhaustion of
+the patience of many workers, many of the Soviets had ceased to exist,
+while others existed on paper only. According to the _Izvestya Soveta_,
+there had been more than eight hundred region organizations at one time,
+many scores of which had disappeared. According to the same authority, the
+peasants were drawing away from the Workers' and Soldiers' Soviets. The
+United Executive Committee, which had been elected in June, was, of course,
+dominated by anti-Bolsheviki--that is, by Menshevik Social Democrats and by
+Socialist-Revolutionists.
+
+The Democratic Conference was not confined to the Soviets. It embraced
+delegates from Soviets of peasants, soldiers, and industrial workers; from
+municipalities, from zemstvos, co-operatives, and other organizations. It
+differed from the Moscow Conference principally in that the delegates were
+elected and that it did not include so many representatives of the
+capitalist class. The petty bourgeoisie was represented, but not the great
+capitalists. There were more than a thousand members in attendance at this
+Democratic Conference, which was dominated by the most moderate section of
+the Social Democrats. The Socialist-Revolutionists were not very numerous.
+
+This Conference created another Coalition Cabinet, the last of the Kerensky
+régime. Kerensky continued as Premier and as commander-in-chief of the
+army. There were in the Cabinet five Social Democrats, two
+Socialist-Revolutionists, eight Constitutional Democrats, and two
+non-partisans. It was therefore as far as its predecessors from meeting the
+standards insisted upon by many radical Socialists, who, while not
+Bolsheviki, still believed that there should be at least an absolute
+Socialist predominance in the Provisional Government. Of course, the new
+Coalition Ministry infuriated the Bolsheviki. From his hiding-place Lenine
+issued a series of "Letters to the Comrades," which were published in the
+_Rabochiy Put_, in which he urged the necessity of an armed uprising like
+that of July, only upon a larger scale. In these letters he scoffed at the
+Constituent Assembly as a poor thing to satisfy hungry men. Meanwhile,
+Trotzky, out of prison again, and other Bolshevik leaders were agitating by
+speeches, proclamations, and newspaper articles for an uprising. The
+Provisional Government dared not try to suppress them. Its hold upon the
+people was now too weak.
+
+The Democratic Conference introduced one innovation. It created a
+Preliminary Parliament, as the new body came to be known, though its first
+official title was the Provisional Council of the Republic. This new body
+was to function as a parliament until the Constituent Assembly convened,
+when it would give place to whatever form of parliamentary body the
+Constituent Assembly might create. This Preliminary Parliament and its
+functions were thus described:
+
+    This Council, in which all classes of the population will be
+    represented, and in which the delegates elected to the Democratic
+    Conference will also participate, will be given the right of
+    addressing questions to the government and of securing replies to
+    them in a definite period of time, of working out legislative acts
+    and discussing all those questions which will be presented for
+    consideration by the Provisional Government, as well as those
+    which will arise on its own initiative. Resting on the
+    co-operation of such a Council, the government, preserving, in
+    accordance with its pledge, the unity of the governmental power
+    created by the Revolution, will regard it its duty to consider the
+    great public significance of such a Council in all its acts up to
+    the time when the Constituent Assembly gives full and complete
+    representation to all classes of the population of Russia.
+
+This Preliminary Parliament was really another Duma--that is, it was a very
+limited parliamentary body. Its life was short and quite uneventful. It
+assembled for the first time on October 8th and was dispersed by the
+Bolsheviki on November 7th. When it assembled there were 555 members--the
+number fixed by the decree of the Provisional Government. Of these, 53 were
+Bolsheviki, but these withdrew almost at the opening with three others,
+thus reducing the actual membership of the body to less than five hundred.
+Even with the Bolsheviki withdrawn, when Kerensky appeared before the
+Preliminary Parliament on November 6th and made his last appeal, a
+resolution expressing confidence in his government was carried only by a
+small majority. Only about three hundred members were in attendance on this
+occasion, and of these 123 voted the expression of confidence, while 102
+voted against it, and 26 declined to vote at all.
+
+The Bolsheviki had forced the United Executive Committee to convene a new
+All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and the date of its meeting had been fixed
+at November 7th. While the elections and arrangements for this Congress
+were proceeding, the Bolsheviki were actively and openly organizing an
+uprising. In their papers and at their meetings they announced that on
+November 7th there would be an armed uprising against the government. Their
+intentions were, therefore, thoroughly well known, and it was believed that
+the government had taken every necessary step to repress any attempt to
+carry those intentions into practice. It was said that of the delegates to
+the All-Russian Congress of Soviets-numbering 676 as against more than one
+thousand at the former Congress of peasant Soviets alone--a majority were
+Bolsheviki. It was charged that the Bolsheviki had intimidated many workers
+into voting for their candidates; that they had, in some instances, put
+forward their men as anti-Bolsheviki and secured their election by false
+pretenses; that they had practised fraud in many instances. It was quite
+certain that a great many Soviets had refused to send delegates, and that
+many thousands of workers, and these all anti-Bolsheviki, had simply grown
+weary and disgusted with the whole struggle. Whatever the explanation might
+be, the fact remained that of the 676 delegates 390 were generally rated as
+Bolsheviki, while 230 were Socialist-Revolutionists and Mensheviki. Not all
+of the Socialist-Revolutionists could be counted as anti-Bolsheviki,
+moreover. There were fifty-six delegates whose position was not quite
+clearly defined, but who were regarded as being, if not Bolsheviki, at
+least anti-government. For the first time in the whole struggle the
+Bolsheviki apparently had a majority of delegates in a working-class
+convention.
+
+On the night of the 6th, a few hours before the opening of the Congress of
+Soviets, the Bolsheviki struck the blow they had been so carefully
+planning. They were not met with the resistance they had expected--for
+reasons which have never been satisfactorily explained. Kerensky recognized
+that it was useless for him to attempt to carry on the fight. The
+Bolsheviki had organized their Red Guards, and these, directed by military
+leaders, occupied the principal government buildings, such as the central
+telephone and telegraph offices, the military-staff barracks, and so on.
+Part of the Petrograd garrison joined with the Bolsheviki, the other part
+simply refusing to do anything. On the morning of November 7th the members
+of the Provisional Government were arrested in the Winter Palace, but
+Kerensky managed to escape. The Bolshevik _coup d'état_ was thus
+accomplished practically without bloodshed. A new government was formed,
+called the Council of People's Commissaries, of which Nikolai Lenine was
+President and Leon Trotzky Commissioner for Foreign Affairs. The
+"dictatorship of the proletariat" was thus begun. Kerensky's attempt to
+rally forces enough to put an end to this dictatorship was a pathetic
+failure, as it was bound to be. It was like the last fitful flicker with
+which a great flame dies. The masses wanted peace--for that they would
+tolerate even a dictatorship.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+THE BOLSHEVIK WAR AGAINST DEMOCRACY
+
+
+I
+
+The defenders and supporters of the Bolsheviki have made much of the fact
+that there was very little bloodshed connected with the successful
+Bolshevik uprising in Petrograd. That ought not to be permitted, however,
+to obscure the fundamental fact that it was a military _coup d'état_, the
+triumph of brute force over the will of the vast majority of the people. It
+was a crime against democracy. That the people were passive, worn out, and
+distracted, content to wait for the Constituent Assembly, only makes the
+Bolshevik crime appear the greater. Let us consider the facts very briefly.
+Less than three weeks away was the date set for the Constituent Assembly
+elections. Campaigns for the election of representatives to that great
+democratic convention were already in progress. It was to be the most
+democratic constitutional convention that ever existed in any country, its
+members being elected by the entire population, every man and woman in
+Russia being entitled to vote. The suffrage was equal, direct, universal,
+and secret.
+
+Moreover, there was a great democratic reconstruction of the nation
+actually in progress at the time. The building up of autonomous democratic
+local governing bodies, in the shape of a new type of zemstvos, was rapidly
+progressing. The old-time zemstvos had been undemocratic and did not
+represent the working-people, but the new zemstvos were composed of
+representatives nominated and elected by universal suffrage, equal, secret,
+and direct. Instead of being very limited in their powers as the old
+zemstvos were, the new zemstvos were charged with all the ordinary
+functions of local government. The elections to these bodies served as an
+admirable practical education in democracy, making it more certain than
+would otherwise have been the case that the Russian people would know how
+to use their new political instrument so as to secure a Constituent
+Assembly fully representing their will and their desire.
+
+At the same time active preparations for holding the election of members to
+the Constituent Assembly were actually under way. The Socialist parties
+were making special efforts to educate the illiterate voters how to use
+their ballots correctly. The Provisional Government, on its part, was
+pushing the preparations for the elections as rapidly as possible. All over
+the country special courts were established, in central places, to train
+the necessary workers so that the elections might be properly conducted.
+Above all, the great problem of the socialization of the land which had
+been agitated for so many years had now reached the stage at which its
+solution might almost have been said to be complete. The National Soviet of
+Peasants, together with the Socialist Revolutionary party, had formulated a
+law on the subject which represented the aspiration and the best thought of
+the leaders of the peasants' movement. That law had been approved in the
+Council of Ministers and was ready for immediate promulgation. Peasant
+leaders like Chernov, Rakitnikov, Vikhiliaev, and Maslov had put an immense
+amount of work into the formulation of this law, which aimed to avoid
+anarchy, to see to it that instead of an individualistic scramble by the
+peasants for the land, in small and unorganized holdings, the problem
+should be scientifically dealt with, lands being justly distributed among
+the peasant communes, and among the peasants who had been despoiled, and
+large estates co-operatively organized and managed.
+
+All this the Bolsheviki knew, for it was common knowledge. There is no
+truth whatever in the claim set up by many of the apologists for the
+Bolsheviki that they became enraged and resorted to desperate tactics
+because nothing effective was being done to realize the aims of the
+Revolution, to translate its ideals into fact. Quite the contrary is true.
+_The Bolshevik insurrection was precipitated by its leaders precisely
+because they saw that the Provisional Government was loyally and
+intelligently carrying out the program of the Revolution, in co-operation
+with the majority of the working-class organizations and their leaders._
+
+The Bolsheviki did not want the ideals of the Revolution to be realized,
+for the very simple reason that they were opposed to those ideals. In all
+the long struggle from Herzen to Kerensky the revolutionary movement of
+Russia had stood for political democracy first of all. Now, at the moment
+when political democracy was being realized, the Bolsheviki sought to kill
+it and to set up something else--namely, a dictatorship of a small party of
+less than two hundred thousand over a nation of one hundred and eighty
+millions. There can be no dispute as to this aim; it has been stated by
+Lenine with great frankness. "_Just as one hundred and fifty thousand
+lordly landowners under Czarism dominated the one hundred and thirty
+millions of Russian peasants, so two hundred thousand members of the
+Bolshevik party are imposing their proletarian will on the mass, but this
+time in the interest of the latter._"[23]
+
+Lenine's figures probably exaggerate the Bolshevik numbers, but, assuming
+them to be accurate, can anybody in his right mind, knowing anything of the
+history of the Russian revolutionary movement, believe that the
+substitution of a ruling class of one hundred and fifty thousand by one of
+two hundred thousand, to govern a nation of one hundred and eighty
+millions, was the end to which so many lives were sacrificed? Can any sane
+and sincere person believe that the class domination described by the great
+arch-Bolshevik himself comes within measurable distance of being as much of
+a realization of the ideals of the Revolution as did the Constituent
+Assembly plan with its basis of political democracy, universal, equal,
+direct, secret, all-determining suffrage? We do not forget Lenine's
+statement that this new domination of the people by a ruling minority
+differs from the old régime in that the Bolsheviki are imposing their will
+upon the mass "_in the interest of the latter_." What ruling class ever
+failed to make that claim? Was it not the habit of the Czars, all of them,
+during the whole revolutionary epoch, to indulge in the pious cant of
+proclaiming that they were motived only by their solicitude for the
+interests and well-being of the peasants?
+
+It is a curious illustration of the superficial character of the Bolshevist
+mentality that a man so gifted intellectually as Lenine undoubtedly is
+should advance in justification of his policy a plea so repugnant to
+morality and intelligence, and that it should be quietly accepted by men
+and women calling themselves radical revolutionists. Some years ago a
+well-known American capitalist announced with great solemnity that he and
+men like himself were the agents of Providence, charged with managing
+industry "for the good of the people." Naturally, his naďve claim provoked
+the scornful laughter of every radical in the land. Yet, strange as it may
+seem, whenever I have pointed out to popular audiences that Lenine asserted
+the right of two hundred thousand proletarians to impose their rule upon
+Russia, always, without a single exception, some defender of the
+Bolsheviki--generally a Socialist or a member of the I.W.W.--has entered
+the plea, "Yes, but it is for the good of the people!"
+
+If the Bolsheviki had wanted to see the realization of the ideals of the
+Revolution, they would have found in the conditions existing immediately
+prior to their insurrection a challenge calling them to the service of the
+nation, in support of the Provisional Government and the Preliminary
+Parliament. They would have permitted nothing to imperil the success of the
+program that was so well advanced. As it was, determination to defeat that
+program was their impelling motive. Not only did they fear and oppose
+_political_ democracy; they were equally opposed to democracy in
+_industry_, to that democracy in the economic life of the nation which
+every Socialist movement in the world had at all times acknowledged to be
+its goal. As we shall see, they united to political dictatorship industrial
+dictatorship. They did not want democracy, but power; they did not want
+peace, even, as they wanted power.
+
+The most painstaking and sympathetic study of the Russian Revolution will
+not disclose any great ideal or principle, moral or political, underlying
+the distinctive Bolshevik agitation and program. Nothing could well be
+farther from the truth than the view taken by many amiable people who,
+while disavowing the actions of the Bolsheviki, seek to mitigate the
+judgment which mankind pronounces against them by the plea that, after
+all, they are extreme idealists, misguided, of course, but, nevertheless,
+inspired by a noble ideal; that they are trying, as John Brown and many
+others have tried, to realize a great ideal, but have been made incapable
+of seeing their ideal in its proper perspective, and, therefore, of making
+the compromises and adjustments which the transmutation of ideals to
+reality always requires.
+
+No sympathizer with Russia--certainly no Socialist--can fail to wish that
+this indulgent criticism were true. Its acceptance would lighten the
+darkest chapter in Russian history, and, at the same time, remove from the
+great international Socialist movement a shameful reproach. But the facts
+are incompatible with such a theory. Instead of being fanatical idealists,
+incapable of compromises and adjustments, the Bolsheviki have, from the
+very beginning, been loudly scornful of rigid and unbending idealism; have
+made numerous compromises, alliances, and "political deals," and have
+repeatedly shifted their ground in accordance with political expediency.
+They have been consistently loyal to no aim save one--the control of power.
+They have been opportunists of the most extreme type. There is not a single
+Socialist or democratic principle which they have not abandoned when it
+served, their political ends; not a single instrument, principle, or device
+of autocratic despotism which they have not used when by so doing they
+could gain power. For the motto of Bolshevism we might well paraphrase the
+well-known line of Horace, and make it read, "Get power, honestly, if you
+can, if not--somehow or other."
+
+Of course, this judgment applies only to Bolshevism as such: to the special
+and peculiar methods and ideas which distinguish the Bolsheviki from their
+fellow-Socialists. It is not to be questioned that as Socialists and
+revolutionists they have been inspired by some of the great ideals common
+to all Socialists everywhere. But they differed from the great mass of
+Russian Socialists so fundamentally that they separated themselves from
+them and became a separate and distinct party. _That which caused this
+separation is the essence of Bolshevism--not the ideals held in common_. No
+understanding of Bolshevism is possible unless this fundamental fact is
+first fully understood. Power, to be gained at any cost, and ruthlessly
+applied, by the proletarian minority, is the basic principle of Bolshevism
+as a distinct form of revolutionary movement. Of course, the Bolshevik
+leaders sought this power for no sordid, self-aggrandizing ends; they are
+not self-seeking adventurers, as many would have us believe. They are
+sincerely and profoundly convinced that the goal of social and economic
+freedom and justice can be more easily attained by their method than by the
+method of democratic Socialism. Still, the fact remains that what social
+ideals they hold are no part of Bolshevism. They are Socialist ideals.
+Bolshevism is a distinctive method and a program, and its essence is the
+relentless use of power by the proletariat against the rest of society in
+the same manner that the bourgeois and military rulers of nations have
+commonly used it against the proletariat. Bolshevism has simply inverted
+the old Czarist régime.
+
+The fairness and justice of this judgment are demonstrated by the
+Bolsheviki themselves. They denounced Kerensky's government for not holding
+the elections for the Constituent Assembly sooner, posing as the champions
+of the Constituante. When they had themselves assumed control of the
+government they delayed the meeting of the Constituent Assembly and then
+suppressed it by force of arms! They denounced Kerensky for having
+restored the death penalty in the army in cases of gross treachery,
+professing an intense horror of capital punishment as a form of "bourgeois
+savagery." When they came into power they instituted capital punishment for
+_civil_ and _political offenses_, establishing public hangings and
+floggings as a means of impressing the population![24] They had bitterly
+assailed Kerensky for his "militarism," for trying to build up the army and
+for urging men to fight. In less critical circumstances they themselves
+resorted to forced conscription. They condemned Kerensky and his colleagues
+for "interfering with freedom of speech and press." When they came into
+power they suppressed all non-Bolshevist papers and meetings in a manner
+differing not at all from that of the Czar's régime, forcing the other
+Socialist parties and groups to resort to the old pre-Revolution
+"underground" methods.
+
+The evidence of all these things, and things even worse than these, is
+conclusive and unimpeachable. It is contained in the records of the
+Bolshevik government, in its publications, and in the reports of the great
+Socialist parties of Russia, officially made to the International Socialist
+Bureau. Surely the evidence sustains the charge that, whatever else they
+may or may not be, the Bolsheviki are not unbending and uncompromising
+idealists of the type of John Brown and William Lloyd Garrison, as they are
+so often represented as being by well-meaning sentimentalists whose
+indulgence of the Bolsheviki is as unlimited as their ignorance concerning
+them.
+
+Some day, perhaps, a competent psychologist will attempt the task of
+explaining the psychology of our fellow-citizens who are so ready to defend
+the Bolsheviki for doing the very things they themselves hate and condemn.
+In any list of men and women in this country friendly to the Bolsheviki it
+will be found that they are practically all pacifists and
+anti-conscriptionists, while a great many are non-resistants and
+conscientious objectors to military service. Practically all of them are
+vigorous defenders of the freedom of the press, of the right of public
+assemblage and of free speech. With the exception of a few Anarchists, they
+are almost universally strong advocates of radical political democracy. How
+can high-minded and intelligent men and women--as many of them are--holding
+such beliefs as these give countenance to the Bolsheviki, who bitterly and
+resolutely oppose all of them? How can they denounce America's adoption of
+conscription and say that it means that "Democracy is dead in America"
+while, at the same time, hailing the birth of democracy in Russia, where
+conscription is enforced by the Bolsheviki? How, again, can they at one and
+the same time condemn American democracy for its imperfections, as in the
+matter of suffrage, while upholding and defending the very men who, in
+Russia, deliberately set out to destroy the universal equal suffrage
+already achieved? How can they demand freedom of the press and of
+assemblage, even in war-time, and denounce such restrictions as we have had
+to endure here in America, and at the same time uphold the men responsible
+for suppressing the press and public assemblages in Russia in a manner
+worse than was attempted by the Czar? Is there no logical sense in the
+average radical's mind? Or can it be that, after all, the people who make
+up the Bolshevist following, and who are so much given to engaging in
+protest demonstrations of various kinds, are simply restless, unanchored
+spirits, for whom the stimulant and excitation of revolt is a necessity?
+How many are simply victims of subtle neuroses occasioned by sex
+derangements, by religious chaos, and similar causes?
+
+
+II
+
+The Bolshevik rule began as a reign of terror. We must not make the mistake
+of supposing that it was imposed upon the rest of Russia as easily as it
+was imposed upon Petrograd, where conditions were exceptional. In the
+latter city, with the assistance of the Preobrajenski and Seminovsky
+regiments from the garrison, and of detachments of sailors from the Baltic
+fleet, to all of whom most extravagant promises were made, the _coup
+d'état_ was easily managed with little bloodshed. But in a great many other
+places the Bolshevist rule was effected in no such peaceful fashion, but by
+means of a bloody terror. Here, for example, is the account of the manner
+in which the counter-revolution of the Bolsheviki was accomplished at
+Saratov, as given by a competent eye-witness, a well-known Russian
+Socialist whose long and honorable service in the revolutionary movement
+entitles her to the honor of every friend of Free Russia--Inna
+Rakitnikov:[25]
+
+    Here ... is how the Bolshevist _coup d'état_ took place at
+    Saratov. I was witness to these facts myself. Saratov is a big
+    university and intellectual center, possessing a great number of
+    schools, libraries, and divers associations designed to elevate
+    the intellectual standard of the population. The Zemstvo of
+    Saratov was one of the best in Russia. The peasant population of
+    this province, among whom the revolutionary Socialist propaganda
+    was carried on for several years, by the Revolutionary Socialist
+    party, is wide awake and well organized. The Municipality and the
+    Agricultural Committees were composed of Socialists. The
+    population was actively preparing for the elections to the
+    Constituent Assembly; the people discussed the list of candidates,
+    studied the candidates' biographies, as well as the programs of
+    the different parties. On the night of October 28th [November
+    10th, European calendar], by reason of an order that had come from
+    Petrograd, the Bolshevik _coup d'état_ broke out at Saratov. The
+    following forces were its instruments: the garrison, which was a
+    stranger to the mass of the population, a weak party of workers,
+    and, in the capacity of leaders, some Intellectuals, who, up to
+    that time, had played no rôle in the public life of the town.
+
+    It was indeed a military _coup d'état. The city hall, where sat
+    the Socialists, who were elected by equal, direct, and secret
+    universal suffrage, was surrounded by soldiers; machine-guns were
+    placed in front and the bombardment began. This lasted a whole
+    night; some were wounded, some killed_. The municipal judges were
+    arrested. Soon after a Manifesto solemnly announced to the
+    population that the "enemies of the people," the
+    "counter-revolutionaries," were overthrown; that the power of
+    Saratov was going to pass into the hands of the Soviet
+    (Bolshevist) of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates.
+
+As soon as the overthrow of the existing authorities was effected and the
+Bolsheviki, through their Red Guards and other means, were in a position to
+exert their authority, they resorted to every method of oppression and
+repression known to the old autocratic régime. They suppressed the papers
+of the Socialist parties and groups opposed to them, and in some instances
+confiscated the plants, turned out the editors, and used the papers
+themselves. In one of his "Letters to the Comrades," published in the
+_Rabochiy Put_, a few days before the insurrection, Lenine had confessed
+that Kerensky had maintained freedom of the press and of assemblage. The
+passage is worth quoting, not only for the information it contains
+concerning the Kerensky régime, but also because it affords a standard by
+which to judge the Bolsheviki. Lenine wrote:
+
+    The Germans have only one Liebknecht, no newspapers, no freedom of
+    assemblage, no councils; they are working against the intense
+    hostility of all classes of the population, including the wealthy
+    peasants--with the imperialist bourgeoisie splendidly
+    organized--and yet the Germans are making some attempt at
+    agitation; _while we, with tens of papers, with freedom of
+    assemblage, with the majority of the Council with us, we, the best
+    situated of all the proletarian internationalists, can we refuse
+    to support the German revolutionists in organizing a revolt?_
+
+That it was not the "German revolutionists" who in November, 1917, wanted
+the Russians to revolt against the Kerensky government, but the Majority
+Socialists, upon whom Lenine had poured his contempt, on the one hand, and
+the German General Staff, on the other hand, is a mere detail. The
+important thing is that Lenine admitted that under the Kerensky government
+the Russian workers, including the Bolsheviki, were "the best situated of
+all the proletarian internationalists," and that they had "tens of papers,
+with freedom of assemblage." In the face of such statements by Lenine
+himself, written a few days before the Bolshevik counter-revolution, what
+becomes of the charge that the suppression of popular liberties under
+Kerensky was one of the main causes of the revolt of the Bolsheviki?
+
+Against the tolerance of Kerensky, the arbitrary and despotic methods of
+the Bolsheviki stand out in strong contrast. Many non-Bolshevist Socialist
+organs were suppressed; papers containing matter displeasing to the
+Bolshevik authorities were suspended, whole issues were confiscated, and
+editors were imprisoned, precisely as in the days of the Czar. It became
+necessary for the Socialist-Revolutionists to issue their paper with a
+different title, and from a different place, every day. Here is the
+testimony of Inna Rakitnikov again, contained in an official report to the
+International Socialist Bureau:
+
+    All the non-Bolshevik newspapers were confiscated or prosecuted
+    and deprived of every means of reaching the provinces; their
+    editors' offices and printing-establishments were looted. After
+    the creation of the "Revolutionary Tribunal" the authors of
+    articles that were not pleasing to the Bolsheviki, as well as the
+    directors of newspapers, were brought to judgment and condemned to
+    make amends or go to prison, etc.
+
+    The premises of numerous organizations were being constantly
+    pillaged. The Red Guard came there to search, destroying different
+    documents; frequently objects which were found on the premises
+    disappeared. Thus were looted the premises of the Central
+    Committee of the Revolutionary Socialist party (27 Galernaia
+    Street) and--several times--the office of the paper _Dielo Naroda_
+    (22 Liteinia Street) ... the office of the paper Volya Naroda,
+    etc.... But the Central Committee ... continued to issue a daily
+    paper, only changing its title, as in the time of Czarism, and
+    thus continued its propaganda....
+
+The _Yolya Naroda_, referred to by Inna Rakitnikov, was the official organ
+of the Socialist-Revolutionary party. It was raided on several occasions.
+For example, in January, 1918, the leaders of the party reported that a
+detachment of Bolshevik Red Guards had broken into the office of the paper,
+committed various depredations, and made several arrests.[26] Here is
+another Socialist witness: One of the ablest of the leaders of the Bohemian
+Socialists in the United States is Joseph Martinek, the brilliant and
+scholarly editor of the Bohemian Socialist weekly, the _Delnicke Listy_. He
+has always been identified with the radical section of the movement. A
+student of Russian history, speaking the language fluently, it was his good
+fortune to spend several weeks in Petrograd immediately before and after
+the Bolshevik counter-revolution. He testifies that the "freedom of the
+press established by Kerensky" was "terminated by the Bolsheviki."[27]
+This is not the testimony of "capitalist newspapers," but of Socialists of
+unquestionable authority and standing. The _Dielo Naroda_ was a Socialist
+paper, and the volunteer venders of it, who were brutally beaten and shot
+down by Red Guards, were Socialist working-men.[28] When Oskar Tokoi, the
+well-known revolutionary Finnish Socialist leader, former Prime Minister of
+Finland, declares that "freedom of assemblage, association, free speech,
+and free press is altogether destroyed,"[29] the Bolsheviki and their
+sympathizers cannot plead that they are the victims of "capitalist
+misrepresentation." The attitude of the Bolshevik leaders toward the
+freedom of the press has been frankly stated editorially in Pravda, their
+official organ, in the following words:
+
+    The press is a most dangerous weapon in the hands of our enemies.
+    We will tear it from them, we will reduce it to impotence. It is
+    the moment for us to prepare battle. We will be inflexible in our
+    defense of the rights of the exploited. The struggle will be
+    decisive. We are going to smite the journals with fines, to shut
+    them up, to arrest the editors, and hold them as hostages.[30]
+
+Is it any wonder that Paul Axelrod, who was one of the representatives of
+Russia on the International Socialist Bureau prior to the outbreak of the
+war, has been forced to declare that the Bolsheviki have "introduced into
+Russia a system worse than Czarism, suppressing the Constituent Assembly
+and the liberty of the press"?[31] Or that the beloved veteran of the
+Russian Revolution, Nicholas Tchaykovsky, should lament that "the
+Bolshevik usurpation is the continuation of the government by which Czarism
+held the country in an iron grip"?[32]
+
+
+III
+
+Lenine, Trotzky, Zinoviev, and other Bolshevik leaders early found
+themselves so much at variance with the accepted Socialist position that
+they decided to change their party name. They had been Social Democrats, a
+part of the Social Democratic party of Russia. Now ever since Bronterre
+O'Brien first used the terms "Social Democrat" and "Social Democracy," in
+1839, their meaning has been pretty well established. A Social Democrat is
+one who aims to base government and industry upon democracy. Certainly,
+this cannot be said to be an accurate description of the position of men
+who believe in the rule of a nation of one hundred and eighty millions by a
+small party of two hundred thousand or less--or even by an entire class
+representing not more than six per cent. of the population--and Lenine and
+his friends, recognizing the fact, decided to change the name of their
+group to the _Communist party_, by which name they are now known in Russia.
+Lenine frankly admits that it would be a mistake to speak of this party as
+a party of democracy. He says:
+
+    The word "democracy" cannot be scientifically applied to the
+    Communist party. Since March, 1917, the word democracy is simply a
+    shackle fastened upon the revolutionary nation and preventing it
+    from establishing boldly, freely, and regardless of all obstacles
+    a new form of power; the Council of Workmen's, Soldiers' and
+    Peasants' Deputies, harbinger of the abolition of every form of
+    authority.[33]
+
+The phrase "harbinger of the abolition of every form of authority" would
+seem to indicate that Lenine's ideal is that of the old Nihilists--or of
+Anarchists of the Bakuninist school. That is very far from the truth. The
+phrase in question is merely a rhetorical flourish. No man has more
+caustically criticized and ridiculed the Anarchists for their dream of
+organization without authority than Nikolai Lenine. Moreover, his
+conception of Soviet government provides for a very strong central
+authority. It is a new kind of state, but a state, nevertheless, and, as we
+shall discover, far more powerful than the political state with which we
+are familiar, exercising far greater control over the life of the
+individual. It is not to be a democratic state, but a very despotic one, a
+dictatorship by a small but powerful ruling class. It was not the word
+"democracy" which Lenine felt to be a "shackle upon the revolutionary
+nation," but democracy itself.
+
+The manner in which they betrayed the Constituent Assembly will prove the
+complete hostility of the Bolsheviki to democratic government. In order to
+excuse and justify the Bolsheviki's actions in this regard, their
+supporters in this country have assiduously circulated two statements. They
+are, first, that the Provisional Government purposely and with malicious
+intent delayed the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, hoping to stave
+it off altogether; second, that such a long time had elapsed between the
+elections and the convocation that when the latter date was reached the
+delegates no longer represented the true feeling of the electorate.
+
+With regard to the first of these statements, which is a repetition of a
+charge made by Trotzky before the Bolshevik revolt, it is to be noted that
+it is offered in justification of the Bolshevik _coup d'état_. If the
+charge made were true, instead of false, as it can easily be shown to be,
+it would only justify the counter-revolution if the counter-revolution
+itself were made the instrument for insuring the safety of the Constituent
+Assembly. But the Bolsheviki _suppressed the Constituent Assembly_. By what
+process of reasoning do we reach the result that because the Provisional
+Government delayed the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, which the
+people desired, a counter-revolutionary movement to _suppress it
+altogether_, by force of arms, was right and proper?
+
+With regard to the second statement, which is a repetition of an argument
+advanced in Russia, it should be sufficient to emphasize a few dates. The
+Bolsheviki seized the power of government on November 7th and the elections
+for the Constituent Assembly took place on November 25th--nearly three
+weeks later. The date set by the Kerensky government for the opening of the
+Constituent Assembly was December 12th and on that date some forty-odd
+members put in an appearance. Recognizing that they could not begin
+business until a quorum appeared, these decided to wait until at least a
+quorum should be present. They did not attempt to do any work. What
+happened is told in the following passages from a signed statement by 109
+members--all Socialist-Revolutionists.[34]
+
+    On the appointed day and hour of the opening of the session of the
+    Constituent Assembly ... the delegates to the Constituent Assembly
+    who had arrived in Petrograd gathered at the Tavrichesky Palace.
+    The elected representatives of the people beheld innumerable
+    banners and large crowds surrounding the palace. This was
+    Petrograd greeting the representatives of the people. At the doors
+    of the palace the picture changed. There stood armed guards and at
+    the orders of the usurpers, the Bolsheviki, they refused to let
+    the delegates pass into the Tavrichesky Palace. It appeared that,
+    in order to enter the building, the _delegates had first to pay
+    respects to the Commissaire, a satellite of Lenine and Trotzky,
+    and there receive special permission_. The delegates would not
+    submit to that; elected by the people and equipped with formal
+    authorization, they had the right to freely enter any public
+    building assigned for their meeting. The delegates decided to
+    enter the Tavrichesky Palace without asking the new authorities,
+    and they succeeded in doing so. On the first day the guards did
+    not dare to lift their arms against the people's elected
+    representatives and allowed them to enter the building without
+    molestation.
+
+    There was no struggle, no violence, no sacrifices; the delegates
+    demanded that the guards respect their rights; they demanded to be
+    admitted, and the guards yielded.
+
+    In the Tavrichesky Palace the delegates opened their meeting; V.M.
+    Chernov was elected chairman. There were, altogether, about forty
+    delegates present. They realized that there were not enough
+    present to start the work of the Constituent Assembly. _It was
+    decided that it would be advisable to await the arrival of the
+    other delegates and start the work of the Constituent Assembly
+    only when a sufficient number were present_. Those already there
+    decided to meet daily at the Tavrichesky Palace in order to count
+    all the delegates as they arrived, and on an appointed day to
+    publicly announce the day and hour of the beginning of the
+    activities of the Constituent Assembly.
+
+    When the delegates finished their session and adjourned, the old
+    guards had been dismissed for their submissive attitude toward the
+    delegates and replaced by armed civilian followers of Lenine and
+    Trotzky. The latter issued an order to disband the delegates, but
+    there were none to be disbanded.
+
+    The following day the government of the Bolsheviki dishonestly and
+    basely slandered the people's representatives in their official
+    announcement which appeared in Pravda. That lying newspaper wrote
+    that the representatives of the people had forced their way into
+    the palace, accompanied by Junkers and the White Guards of the
+    bourgeoisie, that the representatives wanted to take advantage of
+    their small numbers and had begun the work of the Constituent
+    Assembly. Every one knows that this is slanderous as regards the
+    representatives of the people. Such lies and slanders were
+    resorted to by the old régime.
+
+    The aim of the slanders and the lies is clear. _The usurpers do
+    not want the people's representatives to have the supreme power
+    and therefore are preparing to disband the Constituent Assembly_.
+    On the 28th of November, in the evening, _having begun to arrest
+    members of the Constitutional-Democratic party, the Bolsheviki
+    violated the inviolability of the Constituent Assembly. On
+    December 3d a delegate to the Constituent Assembly, the
+    Socialist-Revolutionist, Filippovsky, who was elected by the army
+    on the southwestern front, was arrested_.
+
+    In accordance with their decision reached on November 28th, the
+    delegates gathered at the Tavrichesky Palace on November 29th and
+    30th. As on the first day, armed soldiers stood guard at the
+    entrance of the palace and would not let any one pass. The
+    delegates, however, insisted and were finally allowed to enter.
+
+    On the third day, scenes of brutal violence toward the people's
+    representatives took place at the palace. Peasants were the
+    unfortunate victims of this violence.
+
+    When the delegates had ended their session and all that remained
+    was the affixing of the signatures to the minutes, sailors forced
+    their way into the hall; these were headed by a Bolshevik officer,
+    _a former commander of the Fortress of St. Peter and St. Paul_.
+    The commander demanded that the delegates disband. In reply it was
+    stated that the delegates would disband after they had finished
+    their business. Then at the order of the commander the sailors
+    took the delegate Ilyan, elected by the peasants of the Province
+    of Tambov, by the arm and dragged him to the exit. After Ilyan,
+    the sailors dragged out the peasant delegate from the Province of
+    Moscow, Bikov; then the sailors approached Maltzev, a peasant
+    delegate from the Province of Kostroma. He, however, shouted out
+    that he would rather be shot than to submit to such violence. His
+    courage appealed to the sailors and they stopped.
+
+    Now all the halls in the Tavrichesky Palace are locked and it is
+    impossible to meet there. The delegates who come to the
+    Tavrichesky Palace cannot even gather in the lobby, for as soon
+    as a group gathers, the armed hirelings of Lenine and Trotzky
+    disperse them. Thus, in former times, behaved the servants of the
+    Czar and the enemies of the people, policemen and gendarmes.
+
+This is not the testimony of correspondents of bourgeois journals; it is
+from a statement prepared at the time and signed by more than a hundred
+Socialists, members of the oldest and largest Socialist party in Russia,
+many of them men whose long and honorable service has endeared them to
+their comrades in all lands. It is not testimony that can be impeached or
+controverted. It forms part of the report of these well-known and trusted
+Socialists to their comrades in Russia and elsewhere. The claim that the
+elections to the Constituent Assembly were held on the basis of an obsolete
+register, before the people had a chance to become acquainted with the
+Bolshevist program, and that so long a time had elapsed since the elections
+that the delegates could not be regarded as true representatives of the
+people, was first put forward by the Bolsheviki when the Constituent
+Assembly was finally convened, on January 18th. It was an absurd claim for
+the Bolsheviki to make, for one of the very earliest acts of the Bolshevik
+government, after the overthrow of Kerensky, was to issue a decree ordering
+that the elections be held as arranged. By that act they assumed
+responsibility for the elections, and could not fairly and honorably enter
+the plea, later on, that the elections were not valid.
+
+Here is the story of the struggle for the Constituent Assembly, briefly
+summarized. The first Provisional Government issued a Manifesto on March
+20, 1917, promising to convoke the Constituent Assembly "as soon as
+possible." This promise was repeated by the Provisional Government when it
+was reorganized after the resignation of Miliukov and Guchkov in the
+middle of May. That the promise was sincere there can be no reasonable
+doubt, for the Provisional Government at once set about creating a
+commission to work out the necessary machinery and was for the election by
+popular vote of delegates to the Constituent Assembly. Russia was not like
+a country which had ample electoral machinery already existing; new
+machinery had to be devised for the purpose. This commission was opened on
+June 7, 1917; its work was undertaken with great earnestness, and completed
+in a remarkably short time, with the result that on July 22d the
+Provisional Government--Kerensky at its head--announced that the elections
+to the Constituent Assembly would be held on September 30th, and the
+convocation of the Assembly itself on the 12th of December. It was soon
+found, however, that it would be physically impossible for the local
+authorities all to be prepared to hold the election on the date set--it was
+necessary, among other things, to first elect the local authorities which
+were to arrange for the election of the delegates to the Constituent
+Assembly--and so, on August 22d, Kerensky signed the following decree,
+making _the one and only postponement_ of the Constituent Assembly, so far
+as the Provisional Government was concerned:
+
+    Desiring to assure the convocation of the Constituent Assembly as
+    soon as possible, the Provisional Government designated the 30th
+    of September as election-day, in which case the whole burden of
+    making up the election lists must fall on the municipalities and
+    the newly elected zemstvos. _The enormous labor of holding the
+    elections for the local institution has taken time_. At present,
+    in view of the date of establishment of the local institutions, on
+    the basis decreed by the government--direct, general, equal, and
+    secret suffrage--the Provisional Government has decided:
+
+    To set aside as the day for the elections to the Constituent
+    Assembly the 25th of November, of the year 1917, and as the date
+    for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly the 12th of
+    December, of the year 1917.
+
+Notwithstanding this clear and honorable record, we find Trotzky, at a
+Conference of Northern Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, on
+October 25th, when he well knew that arrangements for holding the
+Constituent Assembly elections were in full swing, charging that Kerensky
+was engaged in preventing the convocation of the Constituent Assembly! He
+demanded at that time that all power should be taken from the Provisional
+Government and transferred to the Soviets. These, he said, would convoke
+the Assembly on the date that had been assigned, December 12th.
+
+The Bolshevik _coup d'état_ took place, as already noted, less than three
+weeks before the date set for the elections, for which every preparation
+had been made by the government and the local authorities. It was at the
+beginning of the campaign, and the Bolsheviki had their own candidates in
+the field in many places. It was a foregone conclusion that the Constituent
+Assembly brought into being by the universal suffrage would be dominated by
+Socialists. There was never the slightest fear that it would be dominated
+by the bourgeois parties. What followed is best told in the exact language
+of a protest to the International Socialist Bureau by Inna Rakitnikov,
+representative of the Revolutionary Socialist party, which was, be it
+remembered, the largest and the oldest of the Russian Socialist parties:
+
+    The _coup d'état_ was followed by various other manifestations of
+    Bolshevist activity--arrests, searches, confiscation of
+    newspapers, ban on meetings. Bands of soldiers looted the country
+    houses in the suburbs of the city; a school for the children of
+    the people and the buildings of the Children's Holiday Settlement
+    were also pillaged. Bands of soldiers were forthwith sent into the
+    country to cause trouble there.... The bands of soldiers who were
+    sent into the country used not only persuasion, but also violence,
+    _trying to force the peasants to give their votes for the
+    Bolshevik candidates at the time of the elections to the
+    Constituent Assembly; they tore up the bulletins of the
+    Socialist-Revolutionists, overturned the ballot-boxes, etc_....
+    The inhabitants of the country proved themselves in all that
+    concerned the elections wide awake to the highest degree. There
+    were hardly any abstentions; _90 per cent. of the population took
+    part in the voting_. The day of the voting was kept as a solemn
+    feast; the priest said mass; the peasants dressed in their best
+    clothes; they believed that the Constituent Assembly would give
+    them order, laws, the land. In the Government of Saratov, out of
+    fourteen deputies elected, there were twelve
+    Socialist-Revolutionists. There were others (such as the
+    Government of Pensa, for example) that elected only
+    Socialist-Revolutionists. The Bolsheviki had the majority only in
+    Petrograd and Moscow and in certain units of the army. To violence
+    and conquest of power by force of arms the population answered by
+    the elections to the Constituent Assembly, the people sent to this
+    Assembly, not the Bolsheviki, but, by an overwhelming majority,
+    Socialist-Revolutionists.
+
+Of course, this is the testimony of one who is confessedly anti-Bolshevist,
+one who has suffered deep injury at the hands of the Bolsheviki of whom she
+writes. For all that, her testimony cannot be ignored or laughed aside. It
+has been indorsed by E. Roubanovitch, a member of the International
+Socialist Bureau, and a man of the highest integrity, in the following
+words: "I affirm that her sincere and matured testimony cannot be suspected
+of partizanship or of dogmatic partiality against the Bolsheviki." What is
+more important, however, is that the subsequent conduct of the Bolsheviki
+in all matters relating to the Constituent Assembly was such as to confirm
+belief in her statements.
+
+No Bolshevik spokesman has ever yet challenged the accuracy of the
+statement that an overwhelming majority of the deputies elected to the
+Constituent Assembly were representatives of the Revolutionary Socialist
+party. As a matter of fact, the Bolsheviki elected less than one-third of
+the deputies. In the announcement of their withdrawal from the Constituent
+Assembly when it assembled in January the Bolshevik members admitted that
+the Socialist-Revolutionists had "obtained a majority of the Constituent
+Assembly."
+
+The attitude of the Bolsheviki toward the Constituent Assembly changed as
+their electoral prospects changed. At first, believing that, as a result of
+their successful _coup_, they would have the support of the great mass of
+the peasants and city workers, they were vigorous in their support of the
+Assembly. In the first of their "decrees" after the overthrow of the
+Kerensky Cabinet, the Bolshevik "Commissaries of the People" announced that
+they were to exercise complete power "until the meeting of the Constituent
+Assembly," which was nothing less than a pledge that they would regard the
+latter body as the supreme, ultimate authority. Three days after the revolt
+Lenine, as president of the People's Commissaries, published this decree:
+
+    In the name of the Government of the Republic, elected by the
+    All-Russian Congress of Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers'
+    Delegates, with the participation of the Peasants' Delegates, the
+    Council of the People's Commissaries decrees:
+
+    1. That the elections to the Constituent Assembly shall be held on
+    November 25th, the day set aside for this purpose.
+
+    2. All electoral committees, all local organizations, the Councils
+    of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates and the soldiers'
+    organizations at the front are to bend every effort toward
+    safeguarding the freedom of the voters and fair play at the
+    elections to the Constituent Assembly, which will be held on the
+    appointed date.
+
+If this attitude had been maintained throughout, and had the Bolsheviki
+loyally accepted the verdict of the electorate when it was given, there
+could have been no complaint. But the evidence shows that their early
+attitude was not maintained. Later on, as reports received from the
+interior of the country showed that the masses were not flocking to their
+banners, they began to assume a critical attitude toward the Constituent
+Assembly. The leaders of the Socialist-Revolutionary party were warning
+their followers that the Bolsheviki would try to wreck the Constituent
+Assembly, for which they were bitterly denounced in organs like _Pravda_
+and _Izvestya_. Very soon, however, these Bolshevist organs began to
+discuss the Constituent Assembly in a very critical spirit. It was
+possible, they pointed out, that it would have a bourgeois majority,
+treating the Socialist-Revolutionists and the Cadets as being on the same
+level, equally servants of the bourgeoisie. Then appeared editorials to
+show that it would not be possible to place the destinies of Russia in the
+hands of such people, even though they were elected by the "unthinking
+masses." Finally, when it was clear that the Socialist-Revolutionary party
+had elected a majority of the members, _Pravda_ and _Izvestya_ took the
+position that _the victorious people did not need a Constituent Assembly_;
+that a new instrument had been created which made the old democratic method
+obsolete.[35] The "new instrument" was, of course, the Bolshevist Soviet.
+
+
+IV
+
+For the moment we are not concerned with the merits or the failings of the
+Soviet considered as an instrument of government. We are concerned only
+with democracy and the relation of the Bolshevist method to democracy. From
+this point of view, then, let us consider the facts. The Soviet was not
+something new, as so many of our American drawing-room champions of
+Bolshevism seem to think. The Soviet was the type of organization common to
+Russia. There were Soviets of peasants, of soldiers, of teachers, of
+industrial workers, of officers, of professional men, and so on. Every
+class and every group in the classes had its own Soviet. The Soviet in its
+simplest form is a delegate body consisting of representatives of a
+particular group--a peasants' Soviet, for example. Another type, more
+important, roughly corresponds to the Central Labor Union in an American
+city, in that it is composed of representatives of workers of all kinds.
+These delegates are, in the main, chosen by the workers in the shops and
+factories and in the meetings of the unions. The anti-Bolshevist
+Socialists, such as the Mensheviki and the Socialist-Revolutionists, were
+not opposed to Soviets as working-class organizations. On the contrary,
+they approved of them, supported them, and, generally, belonged to them.
+
+They were opposed only to the theory that these Soviets, recruited in a
+more or less haphazard manner, as such organizations must necessarily be,
+were better adapted to the governing of a great country like Russia than a
+legal body which received its mandate in elections based upon universal,
+equal, direct, and secret suffrage. No one ever pretended that the Soviets
+represented all the workers of Russia--including peasants in that term--or
+even a majority of them. No one ever pretended that the Soviet, as such,
+was a stable and constant factor. New Soviets were always springing up and
+others dying out. Many existed only in name, on paper. _There never has
+been an accurate list of the Soviets existing in Russia_. Many lists have
+been made, but always by the time they could be tabulated and published
+there have been many changes. For these and other reasons which will
+suggest themselves to the mind of any thoughtful reader, many of the
+leaders of the revolutionary movement in Russia have doubted the value of
+the Soviet as a _unit of government, while highly valuing it as a unit of
+working-class organization and struggle_.
+
+Back of all the strife between the Bolsheviki centered around the Soviets
+and the Socialist-Revolutionists and Mensheviki, centered around the
+Constituent Assembly, was a greater fact than any we have been discussing,
+however. The Bolsheviki with their doctrinaire Marxism had carried the
+doctrine of the class struggle to such extreme lengths that they virtually
+placed the great mass of the peasants with the bourgeoisie. The Revolution
+must be controlled by the proletariat, they argued. The control of the
+government and of industry by the people, which was the slogan of the old
+democracy, will not do, for the term "the people" includes bourgeois
+elements. Even if it is narrowed by excluding the great capitalists and
+landowners, still it embraces the lesser capitalists, small landowners,
+shopkeepers, and the petty bourgeoisie in general. These elements weaken
+the militancy of the proletariat. What is needed is the dictatorship of the
+proletariat. Now, only a very small part of the peasantry, the very poor
+peasants, can be safely linked to the proletariat--and even these must be
+carefully watched. It was a phase of the old and familiar conflict between
+agrarian and industrial groups in the Socialist movement. It is not very
+many years since the Socialist party of America was convulsed by a similar
+discussion. Could the farmer ever be a genuine and sincere and trustworthy
+Socialist? The question was asked in the party papers in all seriousness,
+and in one or two state organizations measures were taken to limit the
+number of farmers entering the party, so that at all times there might be
+the certainty of a preponderance of proletarian over farmer votes.
+
+Similar distrust, only upon a much bigger scale, explains the fight for and
+against the Constituent Assembly. Lenine and his followers distrusted the
+peasants as a class whose interests were akin to the class of small
+property-owners. He would only unite with the poor, propertyless peasants.
+The leaders of the peasantry, on the other hand, supported by the more
+liberal Marxians, would expand the meaning of the term "working class" and
+embrace within its meaning all the peasants as well as all city workers,
+most of the professional classes, and so on. We can get some idea of this
+strife from a criticism which Lenine directs against the Mensheviki:
+
+    In its class composition this party is not Socialist at all. It
+    does not represent the toiling masses. It represents fairly
+    prosperous peasants and working-men, petty traders, many small and
+    some even fairly large capitalists, and a certain number of real
+    but gullible proletarians who have been caught in the bourgeois
+    net.[36]
+
+It is clear from this criticism that Lenine does not believe that a genuine
+Socialist party--and, presumably, therefore, the same must apply to a
+Socialist government--can represent "fairly prosperous peasants and
+working-men." We now know how to appraise the Soviet government. The
+constitution of Russia under the rule of the Bolsheviki is required by law
+to be posted in all public places in Russia. In Article II, Chapter V,
+paragraph 9, of this document it is set forth that "the Constitution of the
+Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic involves, in view of the
+present transition period, the establishment of a dictatorship of the urban
+and rural proletariat and the poorest peasantry in the form of a powerful
+All-Russian Soviet authority." Attention is called to this passage here,
+not for the sake of pointing out the obvious need for some exact definition
+of the loose expression, "the poorest peasantry," nor for the sake of any
+captious criticism, but solely to point out the important fact that Lenine
+only admits a part of the peasantry--the poorest--to share in the
+dictatorship of the proletariat.
+
+Turning to another part of the same important document--Article III,
+Chapter VI, Section A, paragraph 25--we find the basis of representation in
+the All-Russian Congress of Soviets stated. There are representatives of
+town Soviets and representatives of provincial congresses of Soviets. The
+former represent the industrial workers; the latter represent the peasants
+almost exclusively. It is important, therefore, to note that there is one
+delegate for every twenty-five thousand city voters and one for every one
+hundred and twenty-five thousand peasant voters! In Section B of the same
+Article, Chapter X, paragraph 53, we find the same discrimination: it takes
+five peasants' votes to equal the vote of one city voter; it was this
+general attitude of the Bolsheviki toward the peasants, dividing them into
+classes and treating the great majority of them as petty, rural
+bourgeoisie, which roused the resentment of the peasants' leaders. They
+naturally insisted that the peasants constituted a distinct class,
+co-operating with the proletariat, not to be ruled by it. Even Marie
+Spiridonova, who at first joined with the Bolsheviki, was compelled, later
+on, to assert this point of view.
+
+It is easy to understand the distrust of the Bolsheviki by the Socialist
+parties and groups which represented the peasants. The latter class
+constituted more than 85 per cent. of the population. Moreover, it had
+furnished the great majority of the fighters in the revolutionary movement.
+Its leaders and spokesmen resented the idea that they were to be dictated
+to and controlled by a minority, which was, as Lenine himself admitted, not
+materially more numerous than the old ruling class of landowners had been.
+They wanted a democratic governmental system, free from class rule, while
+the Bolsheviki wanted class rule. Generalizations are proverbially
+perilous, and should be very cautiously made and applied to great currents
+of thought and of life. But in a broad sense we may fairly say that the
+Socialism of the Socialist-Revolutionists and the Mensheviki, the Socialism
+of Kerensky and the men who were the majority of the Constituent Assembly,
+was the product of Russian life and Russian economic development, while the
+Socialism that the Bolsheviki tried by force of arms to impose upon Russia
+was as un-Russian as it could be. The Bolshevist conception of Socialism
+had its origin in Marxian theory. Both Marx and Engels freely predicted the
+setting up of "a dictatorship of the proletariat"--the phrase which the
+Bolsheviki have made their own.
+
+Yet, the Bolsheviki are not Marxians. Their Socialism is as little Marxian
+as Russian. When Marx and Engels forecasted the establishment of
+proletarian dictatorship it was part of their theorem that economic
+evolution would have reduced practically all the masses to a proletarian
+state; that industrial and commercial concentration would have reached such
+a stage of development that there would be on the one side a small class
+of owners, and, on the other side, the proletariat. There would be, they
+believed, no middle class. The disappearance of the middle class was, for
+them and for their followers, a development absolutely certain to take
+place. They saw the same process going on with the same result in
+agriculture. It might be less rapid in its progress, but not one whit less
+certain. It was only as the inevitable climax to this evolution that they
+believed the "dictatorship of the proletariat" would be achieved. In other
+words, the proletariat would be composed of the overwhelming majority of
+the body politic and social. That is very different from the Bolshevist
+attempt to set up the dictatorship of the proletariat in a land where more
+than 85 per cent, of the people are peasants; where industrial development
+is behind the rest of the world, and where dictatorship of the proletariat
+means the domination of more than one hundred and eighty millions of people
+by two hundred thousand "proletarians and the poorest peasants," according
+to Lenine's statement, or by six per cent. of the population _if we assume
+the entire proletariat to be united in the dictatorship!_
+
+
+V
+
+At the time of the disturbances which took place in Petrograd in December,
+over the delay in holding the Constituent Assembly, the Bolshevik
+government announced that the Constituante would be permitted to convene on
+January 18th, provided that not less than four hundred delegates were in
+attendance. Accordingly, the defenders of the Constituent Assembly arranged
+for a great demonstration to take place on that day in honor of the event.
+It was also intended to be a warning to the Bolsheviki not to try to
+further interfere with the Constituante. An earnest but entirely peaceful
+mass of people paraded with flags and banners and signs containing such
+inscriptions as "Proletarians of All Countries, Unite!" "Land and Liberty,"
+"Long Live the Constituent Assembly," and many others. They set out from
+different parts of the city to unite at the Field of Mars and march to the
+Taurida Palace to protest against any interference with the Constituent
+Assembly. As they neared the Taurida Palace they were confronted by Red
+Guards, who, without any preliminary warning or any effort at persuasion,
+fired into the crowd. Among the first victims was a member of the Executive
+Committee of the Soviet of Peasants' Delegates, the Siberian peasant
+Logvinov, part of whose head was shot away by an explosive bullet. Another
+victim was the militant Socialist-Revolutionist Gorbatchevskaia. Several
+students and a number of workmen were also killed. Similar massacres
+occurred at the same time in other parts of the city. Other processions
+wending their way toward the meeting-place were fired into. Altogether one
+hundred persons were either killed or very seriously wounded by the Red
+Guards, who said that they had received orders "not to spare the
+cartridges." Similar demonstrations were held in Moscow and other cities
+and were similarly treated by the Red Guards. In Moscow especially the loss
+of life was great. Yet the Bolshevist organs passed these tragic events
+over in complete silence. They did not mention the massacres, nor did they
+mention the great demonstration at the funeral of the victims, four days
+later.
+
+When the Constituent Assembly was formally opened, on January 18th, it was
+well known on every hand that the Bolshevik government would use force to
+destroy it if the deputies refused to do exactly as they were told. The
+corridors were filled with armed soldiers and sailors, ready for action.
+
+The Lenine-Trotzky Ministry had summoned an extraordinary Congress of
+Soviets to meet in Petrograd at the same time, and it was well understood
+that they were determined to erect this Soviet Congress into the supreme
+legislative power. If the Constituent Assembly would consent to this, so
+much the better, of course. In that case there would be a valuable legal
+sanction, the sanction of a democratically elected body expressly charged
+with the task of determining the form and manner of government for Free
+Russia. Should the Constituent Assembly not be willing, there was an
+opportunity for another _coup d'état_.
+
+In precisely the same way as the Ministry during the last years of Czarism
+would lay before the Duma certain documents and demand that they be
+approved, so the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets--the Bolshevik
+power--demanded that the Constituent Assembly meekly assent to a document
+prepared for it in advance. It was at once a test and a challenge; if the
+Assembly was willing to accept orders from the Soviet authority and content
+itself with rubber-stamping the decrees of the latter, as ordered, it could
+be permitted to go on--at least for a time. At the head of the Constituent
+Assembly, as president, the deputies elected Victor Chernov, who had been
+Minister of Agriculture under Kerensky. At the head of the Bolshevik
+faction was Sverdlov, chairman of the Executive Committee of the Soviets.
+He it was who opened the fight, demanding that the following declaration be
+adopted by the Constituante as the basis of a Constitution for Russia:
+
+    DECLARATION OF THE RIGHT'S OF THE TOILING AND EXPLOITED
+    PEOPLE
+
+    I
+
+    1. Russia is to be declared a republic of the workers', soldiers'
+    and peasants' Soviets. All power in the cities and in the country
+    belongs to the Soviets.
+
+    2. The Russian Soviet Republic is based on the free federation of
+    free peoples, on the federation of national Soviet republics.
+
+    II
+
+    Assuming as its duty the destruction of all exploitation of the
+    workers, the complete abolition of the class system of society,
+    and the placing of society upon a socialistic basis, and the
+    ultimate bringing about of victory for Socialism in every country,
+    the Constituent Assembly further decides:
+
+    1. That the socialization of land be realized, private ownership
+    of land be abolished, all the land be proclaimed common property
+    of the people and turned over to the toiling masses without
+    compensation on the basis of equal right to the use of land.
+
+    All forests, mines, and waters which are of social importance, as
+    well as all living and other forms of property, and all
+    agricultural enterprises, are declared national property.
+
+    2. To confirm the decree of the Soviets concerning the inspection
+    of working conditions, the highest department of national economy,
+    which is the first step in achieving the ownership by the Soviets
+    of the factories, mines, railroads, and means of production and
+    transportation.
+
+    3. To confirm the decree of the Soviets transferring all banks to
+    the ownership of the Soviet Republic, as one of the steps in the
+    freeing of the toiling masses from the yoke of capitalism.
+
+    4. To enforce general compulsory labor, in order to destroy the
+    class of parasites, and to reorganize the economic life. In order
+    to make the power of the toiling masses secure and to prevent the
+    restoration of the rule of the exploiters, the toiling masses will
+    be armed and a Red Guard composed of workers and peasants formed,
+    and the exploiting classes shall be disarmed.
+
+    III
+
+    1. Declaring its firm determination to make society free from the
+    chaos of capitalism and imperialism, which has drenched the
+    country in blood in this most criminal war of all wars, the
+    Constituent Assembly accepts completely the policy of the Soviets,
+    whose duty it is to publish all secret treaties, to organize the
+    most extensive fraternization between the workers and peasants of
+    warring armies, and by revolutionary methods to bring about a
+    democratic peace among the belligerent nations without annexations
+    and indemnities, on the basis of the free self-determination of
+    nations--at any price.
+
+    2. For this purpose the Constituent Assembly declares its complete
+    separation from the brutal policy of the bourgeoisie, which
+    furthers the well-being of the exploiters in a few selected
+    nations by enslaving hundreds of millions of the toiling peoples
+    of the colonies and the small nations generally.
+
+    The Constituent Assembly accepts the policy of the Council of
+    People's Commissars in giving complete independence to Finland, in
+    beginning the withdrawal of troops from Persia, and in declaring
+    for Armenia the right of self-determination.
+
+    A blow at international financial capital is the Soviet decree
+    which annuls foreign loans made by the governments of the Czar,
+    the landowners and the bourgeoisie. The Soviet government is to
+    continue firmly on this road until the final victory from the yoke
+    of capitalism is won through international workers' revolt.
+
+    As the Constituent Assembly was elected on the basis of lists of
+    candidates nominated before the November Revolution, when the
+    people as a whole could not yet rise against their exploiters, and
+    did not know how powerful would be the strength of the exploiters
+    in defending their privileges, and had not yet begun to create a
+    Socialist society, the Constituent Assembly considers it, even
+    from a formal point of view, unjust to oppose the Soviet power.
+    The Constituent Assembly is of the opinion that at this moment, in
+    the decisive hour of the struggle of the people against their
+    exploiters, the exploiters must not have a seat in any government
+    organization or institution. The power completely and without
+    exception belongs to the people and its authorized
+    representatives--the workers', soldiers' and peasants' Soviets.
+
+    Supporting the Soviet rule and accepting the orders of the Council
+    of People's Commissars, the Constituent Assembly acknowledges its
+    duty to outline a form for the reorganization of society.
+
+    Striving at the same time to organize a free and voluntary, and
+    thereby also a complete and strong, union among the toiling
+    classes of all the Russian nations, the Constituent Assembly
+    limits itself to outlining the basis of the federation of Russian
+    Soviet Republics, leaving to the people, to the workers and
+    soldiers, to decide for themselves, in their own Soviet meetings,
+    if they are willing, and on what conditions they prefer, to join
+    the federated government and other federations of Soviet
+    enterprise. These general principles are to be published without
+    delay, and the official representatives of the Soviets are
+    required to read them at the opening of the Constituent Assembly.
+
+The demand for the adoption of this declaration gave rise to a long and
+stormy debate. The leaders of the Socialist-Revolutionists and the
+Mensheviki stoutly contended that the adoption of the declaration would be
+virtually an abdication of the task for which the Constituent Assembly had
+been elected by the people, and, therefore, a betrayal of trust. They could
+not admit the impudent claim that an election held in November, based upon
+universal suffrage, on lists made up as recently as September, could in
+January be set aside as being "obsolete" and "unrepresentative." That a
+majority of the Bolshevik candidates put forward had been defeated,
+nullified, they argued, the claim of the Bolsheviki that the fact that the
+candidates had all been nominated before the November insurrection should
+be regarded as reason for acknowledging the Bolshevik Soviet as superior to
+the Constituent Assembly. They insisted upon the point, which the Bolshevik
+spokesmen did not attempt to controvert, that the Constituent Assembly
+represented the votes of many millions of men and women,[37] while the
+total actual membership represented by the Soviet power did not at the time
+number one hundred thousand!
+
+As might have been expected, the proposal to adopt the declaration
+submitted to the Constituent Assembly in this arrogant fashion was rejected
+by an enormous majority. The Bolshevik members, who had tried to make the
+session a farce, thereupon withdrew after submitting a statement in which
+they charged the Constituent Assembly with being a counter-revolutionary
+body, and the Revolutionary-Socialist party with being a traitorous party
+"directing the fight of the bourgeoisie against the workers' revolution."
+The statement said that the Bolshevik members withdrew "in order to permit
+the Soviet power to determine what relations it would hold with the
+counter-revolutionary section of the Constituent Assembly"--a threat which
+needed no interpretation.
+
+After the withdrawal of the Bolshevik members, the majority very quickly
+adopted a declaration which had been carefully prepared by the
+Socialist-Revolutionists during the weeks which had elapsed since the
+elections in the preliminary conferences which had been held for that
+purpose. The declaration read as follows:
+
+
+    RUSSIA'S FORM OF GOVERNMENT
+
+    In the name of the peoples who compose the Russian state, the
+    All-Russian Constituent Assembly proclaims the Russian State to be
+    the Russian Democratic Federated Republic, uniting indissolubly
+    into one whole the peoples and territories which are sovereign
+    within the limits prescribed by the Federal Constitution.
+
+    LAWS REGARDING LAND OWNERSHIP
+
+    1. _The right to privately own land within the boundaries of the
+    Russian Republic is hereby abolished forever._
+
+    2. All land within the boundaries of the Russian Republic, with
+    all mines, forests, and waters, is hereby declared the property of
+    the nation.
+
+    3. The republic has the right to control all land, with all the
+    mines, forests, and waters thereof, through the central and local
+    administration, in accordance with the regulation provided by the
+    present law.
+
+    4. The autonomous provinces of the Russian Republic have title to
+    land on the basis of the present law and in accordance with the
+    Federal Constitution.
+
+    5. The tasks of the central and local governments as regards the
+    use of lands, mines, forests, and waters are:
+
+    a. The creation of conditions conducive to the best possible
+    utilization of the country's natural resources and the highest
+    possible development of its productive forces.
+
+    b. The fair distribution of all natural wealth among the people.
+
+    6. The rights of individuals and institutions to land, mines,
+    forests, and waters are restricted merely to utilization by said
+    individuals and institutions.
+
+    7. The use of all mines, forests, land, and waters is free to all
+    citizens of the Russian Republic, regardless of nationality or
+    creed. This includes all unions of citizens, also governmental and
+    public institutions.
+
+    8. The right to use the land is to be acquired and discontinued on
+    the basis prescribed by this fundamental law.
+
+    9. _All titles to land at present held by the individuals,
+    associations, and institutions are abolished in so far as they
+    contradict this law._
+
+    10. All land, mines, forests, waters, at present owned by and
+    otherwise in the possession of individuals, associations, and
+    institutions, _are confiscated without compensation for the loss
+    incurred._
+
+    DEMOCRATIC PEACE
+
+    In the name of the peoples of the Russian Republic, the
+    All-Russian Constituent Assembly expresses the firm will of the
+    people to _immediately discontinue the war_ and conclude a just
+    and general peace, appeals to the Allied countries proposing to
+    define jointly the exact terms of the democratic peace acceptable
+    to all the belligerent nations, in order to present these terms,
+    in behalf of the Allies, to the governments fighting against the
+    Russian Republic and her allies.
+
+    The Constituent Assembly firmly believes that the attempts of the
+    peoples of Russia to end the disastrous war will meet with a
+    unanimous response on the part of the peoples and the governments
+    of the Allied countries, and that by common efforts a speedy peace
+    will be attained, which will safeguard the well-being and dignity
+    of all the belligerent countries.
+
+    The Constituent Assembly resolves to elect from its midst an
+    authorized delegation which will carry on negotiations with the
+    representatives of the Allied countries and which will present the
+    appeal to jointly formulate terms upon which a speedy termination
+    of the war will be possible, as well as for the purpose of
+    carrying out the decisions of the Constituent Assembly regarding
+    the question of peace negotiations with the countries fighting
+    against us.
+
+    This delegation, which is to be under the guidance of the
+    Constituent Assembly, is to immediately start fulfilling the
+    duties imposed upon it.
+
+    Expressing, in the name of the peoples of Russia, its regret that
+    the negotiations with Germany, which were started without
+    preliminary agreement with the Allied countries, have assumed the
+    character of negotiations for a separate peace, the Constituent
+    Assembly, in the name of the peoples of the Federated Republic,
+    _while continuing the armistice, accepts the further carrying on
+    of the negotiations with the countries warring against us_ in
+    order to work toward a general democratic peace which shall be in
+    accordance "with the people's will and protect Russia's
+    interests."
+
+
+VI
+
+Immediately following the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly a body of
+Red Guards shot the two Constitutional Democrats, Kokoshkin and Shingariev,
+who were at the time confined as prisoners who were ill in the Naval
+Hospital. The reason for the brutal murder of these men was that they were
+bourgeoisie and, therefore, enemies of the working class! It is only just
+to add that the foul deed was immediately condemned by the Bolshevik
+government and by the Soviet of Petrograd. "The working class will never
+approve of any outrages upon our prisoners, whatever may have been their
+political offense against the people and their Revolution," the latter body
+declared, in a resolution on the subject of the assassinations. Two days
+after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly twenty-three
+Socialist-Revolutionist members of that body, assembled at the office of
+their party, were arrested, and the premises occupied by Red Guards, the
+procedure being exactly as it used to be in the old days under the Czar.
+
+There is a relentless logic of life and action from which there can be no
+escape. Czarism was a product of that inexorable process. All its
+oppression and brutality proceeded by an inevitable and irresistible
+sequence from the first determination and effort to realize the principle
+of autocracy. Any dictatorship, whether of a single man, a group or class,
+must rest ultimately upon oppressive and coercive force. Believing that the
+means would be justified by the end, Lenine and Trotzky and their
+associates had suppressed the Constituent Assembly, claiming that
+parliamentary government, based upon the equal and free suffrage of all
+classes, was, during the transition period, dangerous to the proletariat;
+that in its stead a new type of government must be established--government
+by associations of wage-earners, soldiers, and peasants, called Soviets.
+
+But what if among these there should develop a purpose contrary to the
+purpose of the Bolsheviki? Would men who, starting out with a belief in the
+Constituante, and as its champions, used force to destroy and suppress it
+the moment it became evident that its purpose was not their purpose,
+hesitate to suppress and destroy any Soviet movement which adopted
+policies contrary to their own? What assurance could there be, once their
+point of view, their initial principle, was granted, that the freedom
+denied to the Constituante would be assured to the Soviets? In the very
+nature of the case there could be no such assurance. However honest and
+sincere the Bolsheviki themselves might be in their belief that there would
+be such assurance, there could in fact be none, for the logic of life is
+stronger than any human will.
+
+As was inevitable, the Bolsheviki soon found themselves in the position of
+suppressing Soviets which they could not control as freely and in the same
+manner as they had suppressed the Constituent Assembly. When, for example,
+the soldiers of the Preobrajenski Regiment--the very men who helped the
+Bolsheviki into power--became dissatisfied and organized, publishing their
+own organ, _The Soldier's Cloak_, the paper was confiscated and the
+organization suppressed.[38] The forcible suppression of Soviets was
+common. The Central Executive Committee of the National Soviet of Peasants'
+Delegates, together with the old Central Executive Committee of the Soviets
+of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates (who had never acknowledged the
+October elections), convoked an extraordinary assembly of Soviets on
+January 8th, the same date as that on which the Bolshevik Congress of
+Soviets was convoked. Circumstances compelled the opening to be deferred
+until two days later, the 10th. This conference, called the Third
+All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Soviets, was suppressed by force, many of
+the 359 delegates and all the members of the Executive Committee being
+arrested. The following extract from a declaration of protest addressed by
+the outraged peasants to the Congress of Soviets of Workmen, Soldiers, and
+Peasants convoked by the Bolshevik government tells the story:
+
+    As soon as the Congress was opened, sailors and Red Guards, armed
+    with guns and hand-grenades, broke into the premises (11
+    Kirillovskaia Street), surrounded the house, poured into the
+    corridors and the session hall, and ordered all persons to leave.
+
+    "In whose name do you order us, who are Delegates to the Peasants'
+    Congress of All-Russia, to disperse?" asked the peasants.
+
+    "In the name of the Baltic fleet," the sailor's replied.
+
+    The peasants refused; cries of protest were raised. One by one the
+    peasants ascended the tribune to stigmatize the Bolsheviki in
+    speeches full of indignation, and to express the hopes that they
+    placed in the Constituent Assembly....
+
+    This session of the Congress presented a strange spectacle:
+    disturbed by men who confessed that they did not know why they
+    were there, the peasants sang revolutionary songs; the sailors,
+    armed with guns and grenades, joined them. Then the peasants knelt
+    down to sing a funeral hymn to the memory of Logvinov, whose
+    coffin was even yesterday within the room. The soldiers, lowering
+    their guns, knelt down also.
+
+    The Bolshevik authorities became excited; they did not expect such
+    a turn of events. "Enough said," declared the chiefs; "we have
+    come not to speak, but to act. If they do not want to go to
+    Smolny, let them get out of here." And they set themselves to the
+    task.
+
+    In groups of five the peasants were conducted down-stairs,
+    trampled upon, and, on their refusal to go to Smolny, pushed out
+    of doors during the night in the midst of the enormous city of
+    which they knew nothing.
+
+    Members of the Executive Committee were arrested,[39] the premises
+    occupied by sailors and Red Guards, the objects found therein
+    stolen.
+
+
+    The peasants found shelter in the homes of the inhabitants of
+    Petrograd, who, indignant, offered them hospitality. A certain
+    number were lodged in the barracks of the Preobrajenski Regiment.
+    The sailors, who but a few minutes before had sung a funeral hymn
+    to Logvinov, and wept when they saw that they had understood
+    nothing, now became the docile executioners of the orders of the
+    Bolsheviki. And when they were asked, "Why do you do this?" they
+    answered, as in the time, still recent, of Czarism: "It is the
+    order. No need to talk."[40]
+
+We do not need to rely upon the testimony of witnesses belonging to the
+Revolutionary Socialist party, the Mensheviki, or other factions unfriendly
+to the Bolsheviki. However trustworthy such testimony may be, and however
+well corroborated, we cannot expect it to be convincing to those who pin
+their faith to the Bolsheviki. Such people will believe only what the
+Bolsheviki themselves say about Bolshevism. It is well, therefore, that we
+can supplement the testimony already given by equally definite and direct
+testimony from official Bolshevist sources to the same effect. From the
+official organs of the Bolsheviki it can be shown that the Bolshevik
+authorities suppressed Soviet after Soviet; that when they found that
+Soviets were controlled by Socialists who belonged to other factions they
+dissolved them and ordered new elections, refusing to permit the free
+choice of the members to be expressed in selecting their officers.
+
+The Bolsheviki did this, it should be remembered, not merely in cases where
+Mensheviki or Socialist-Revolutionists were in the majority, but
+also in cases where the majority consisted of members of the
+Socialist-Revolutionary party of the Left--the faction which had united
+with the Bolsheviki in suppressing the Constituante. Their union with the
+Bolsheviki was from the first a compromise, based upon the political
+opportunism of both sides. The Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left did not
+believe in the Bolshevik theories or program, but they wanted the political
+assistance of the Bolsheviki. The latter did not believe in the theories or
+program of the Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left, but they wanted their
+political support. The union could not long endure; the differences were
+too deeply rooted. Before very long the Bolsheviki were fighting their
+former allies and the Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left, like Marie
+Spiridonova, for example, were fighting the Bolsheviki. At Kazan, where
+Lenine went to school, the Soviet was dissolved because it was controlled
+by Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left, former allies, now hostile to the
+Bolsheviki. Here are two paragraphs from _Izvestya_, one of the Bolshevist
+official organs:
+
+    KAZAN, _July 26th. As the important offices in the Soviet
+    were occupied by Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left, the
+    Extraordinary Commission has dissolved the Provisional Soviet. The
+    governmental power is now represented by a Revolutionary
+    Committee. (Izvestya, July 28, 1918.)_
+
+    KAZAN, _August 1_. The state of mind of the workmen is
+    revolutionary. _If the Mensheviki dare to carry on their
+    propaganda, death menaces them. (Idem, August 3.)_
+
+And here is confirmation from another official organ of the Bolsheviki,
+_Pravda_:
+
+    KAZAN, _August 4th_. The Provisional Congress of the
+    Soviets of the Peasants has been dissolved because of the absence
+    from it of poor peasants and _because its state of mind is
+    obviously counter-revolutionary. (Pravda, August 6, 1918.)_
+
+As early as April, 1918, the Soviet at Jaroslav was dissolved by the
+Bolshevik authorities and new elections ordered.[41] In these elections
+the Mensheviki and the Socialist-Revolutionists everywhere gained an
+absolute majority.[42] The population here wanted the Constituent Assembly
+and they wanted Russia to fight on with the Allies. Attempts to suppress
+this majority led to insurrection, which the Bolsheviki crushed in the most
+brutal manner, and when the people, overpowered and helpless, sought to
+make peace, the Bolsheviki only _increased the artillery fire_! Here is an
+"Official Bulletin," published in _Izvestya_, July 21, 1918:
+
+    At Jaroslav the adversary, gripped in the iron ring of our troops,
+    has tried to enter into negotiations. _The reply has been given
+    under the form of redoubled artillery fire._
+
+_Izvestya_ published, on July 25th, a Bolshevist military proclamation
+addressed to the inhabitants of Jaroslav concerning the insurrection which
+originally arose from the suppression of the Soviet and other popular
+assemblages:
+
+    The General Staff notifies to the population of Jaroslav that all
+    those who desire to live are invited to abandon the town in the
+    course of twenty-four hours and to meet near the America Bridge.
+    Those who remain will be treated as insurgents, _and no quarter
+    will be given to any one_. Heavy artillery fire and gas-bombs will
+    be used against them. _All those who remain will perish In the
+    ruins of the town with the insurrectionists, the traitors, and the
+    enemies of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolution._
+
+Next day, July 26th, _Izvestya_ published the information that "after
+minute questionings and full inquiry" a special commission appointed to
+inquire into the events relating to the insurrection at Jaroslav had listed
+350 persons as having "taken an active part in the insurrection and had
+relations with the Czecho-Slovaks," and that by order of the commissioners
+the whole band of 350 had been shot!
+
+It is needless to multiply the illustrations of brutal oppression--of men
+and women arrested and imprisoned for no other crime than that of engaging
+in propaganda in favor of government by universal suffrage; of newspapers
+confiscated and suppressed; of meetings banned and Soviets dissolved
+because the members' "state of mind" did not please the Bolsheviki. Maxim
+Gorky declared in his _Novya Zhizn_ that there had been "ten thousand
+lynchings." Upon what authority Gorky--who was inclined to sympathize with
+the Bolsheviki, and who even accepted office under them--based that
+statement is not known. Probably it is an exaggeration. One thing, however,
+is quite certain, namely, that a reign of terror surpassing the worst days
+of the old régime was inflicted upon unhappy Russia by the Bolsheviki. At
+the very beginning of the Bolshevik régime Trotzky laughed to scorn all the
+protests against violence, threatening that resort would be had to the
+guillotine. Speaking to the opponents of the Bolshevik policy in the
+Petrograd Soviet, he said:
+
+"You are perturbed by the mild terror we are applying against our class
+enemies, but know that not later than a month hence this terror will take a
+more terrible form on the model of the terror of the great revolutionaries
+of France. Not a fortress, but the guillotine will be for our enemies."
+
+That threat was not literally carried out, but there was a near approach to
+it when public hangings for civil offenses were established. For
+reintroducing the death penalty into the army as a means of putting an end
+to treason and the brutal murder of officers by rebellious soldiers, the
+Bolsheviki excoriated Kerensky. _Yet they themselves introduced hanging and
+flogging in public for petty civil crimes!_ The death penalty was never
+inflicted for civil crimes under the late Czar. It was never inflicted for
+political offenses. Only rarely was it inflicted for murder. It remained
+for a so-called "Socialist" government to resort to such savagery as we
+find described in the following extract from the recognized official organ
+of the Bolshevik government:
+
+Two village robbers were condemned to death. All the people of Semenovskaia
+and the surrounding communes were invited to the ceremony. On July 6th, at
+midday, a great crowd of interested spectators arrived at the village of
+Loupia. The organizers of the execution gave to each of the bystanders the
+opportunity of flogging the condemned to obtain from them supplementary
+confessions. The number of blows was unlimited. Then a vote of the
+spectators was taken as to the method of execution. The majority was for
+hanging. In order that the spectacle could be easily seen, the spectators
+were ranged in three ranks--the first row sat down, the second rested on
+the knee, and the third stood up.[43]
+
+The Bolshevik government created an All-Russian Extraordinary Commission,
+which in turn created Provincial and District Extraordinary Commissions.
+These bodies--the local not less than the national--were empowered to make
+arrests and even decree and carry out capital sentences. There was no
+appeal from their decisions; they were simply required to _report
+afterward_! Only members of the Bolshevik party were immune from this
+terror. Alminsky, a Bolshevist writer of note, felt called upon to protest
+against this hideous travesty of democratic justice, and wrote in
+_Pravda_:
+
+The absence of the necessary restraint makes one feel appalled at the
+"instruction" issued by the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission to "All
+Provincial Extraordinary Commissions," which says: "The All-Russian
+Extraordinary Commission is perfectly independent in its work, carrying out
+house searches, arrests, executions, of which it _afterward_ reports to the
+Council of the People's Commissaries and to the Central Executive Council."
+Further, the Provincial and District Extraordinary Commissions "are
+independent in their activities, and when called upon by the local
+Executive Council present a report of their work." In so far as house
+searches and arrests are concerned, a report made _afterward_ may result in
+putting right irregularities committed owing to lack of restraint. The same
+cannot be said of executions.... It can also be seen from the "instruction"
+that personal safety is to a certain extent guaranteed only to members of
+the government, of the Central Council, and of the local Executive
+Committees. With the exception of these few persons all members of the
+local committees of the [Bolshevik] Party, of the Control Committees, and
+of the Executive Committee of the party may be shot at any time by the
+decision of any Extraordinary Commission of a small district town if they
+happen to be on its territory, and a report of that made _afterward._[44]
+
+
+VII
+
+While in some respects, such as this terrible savagery, Bolshevism has
+out-Heroded Herod and surpassed the régime of the Romanovs in cruel
+oppression, upon the whole its methods have been very like that of the
+latter. There is really not much to choose between the ways of Stolypin and
+Von Plehve and those of the Lenine-Trotzky rule. The methods employed have
+been very similar and in not a few instances the same men who acted as the
+agents of espionage and tyranny for the Czar have served the Bolsheviki in
+the same capacity. Just as under Czarism there was alliance with the Black
+Hundreds and with all sorts of corrupt and vicious criminal agents, so we
+find the same phenomenon recurring under the Bolsheviki. The time has not
+yet arrived for the compilation of the full record of Bolshevism in this
+particular, but enough is known to justify the charge here made. That
+agents-provocateurs, spies, informers, police agents, and pogrom-makers
+formerly in the service of the Czar have been given positions of trust and
+honor by Lenine and Trotzky unfortunately admits of no doubt whatever.
+
+It was stated at a meeting of Russians held in Paris in the summer of 1917
+that one of the first Russian regiments which refused to obey orders to
+advance "contained 120 former political or civil police agents out of 181
+refractory soldiers." During the Kerensky régime, at the time when Lenine
+was carrying on his propaganda through _Pravda_,[45] Vladimir Bourtzev
+exposed three notorious agents of the old police terror, provocateurs, who
+were working on the paper. In August, 1917, the Jewish Conjoint Committee
+in London published a long telegram from the representative of the Jewish
+Committee in Petrograd, calling attention to the fact that Lenine's party
+was working in tacit agreement with the Black Hundreds. The telegram is
+here given in full:
+
+    Extreme Russian reactionaries have allied themselves closely with
+    extreme revolutionaries, and Black Hundreds have entered into
+    tacit coalition with the Lenine party. In the army the former
+    agents and detectives of the political police carry on ardent
+    campaign for defeat, and in the rear the former
+    agents-provocateurs prepare and direct endless troubles.
+
+    The motives of this policy on the part of the reactionaries are
+    clear. It is the direct road to a counter-revolution. The
+    troubles, the insurrections, and shocking disorders which follow
+    provoke disgust at the Revolution, while the military defeats
+    prepare the ground for an intervention of the old friend of the
+    Russian Black Hundreds, William II, the counter-revolutionaries
+    work systematically for the defeat of the Russian armies,
+    sometimes openly, cynically.
+
+    Thus in their press and proclamations they go so far as to throw
+    the whole responsibility for the war and for the obstacles placed
+    in the way of a peace with Germany on the Jews. It is these
+    "diabolical Jews," they say, who prevent the conclusion of peace
+    and insist on the continuation of the war, because they desire to
+    ruin Russia. Proclamations in this sense have been found, together
+    with a voluminous anti-Semitic literature, in the offices of the
+    party of Lenine Bolsheviki (Maximalists), and particularly at the
+    headquarters of the extreme revolutionaries, Château
+    Knheshinskaja. Salutations. BLANK.
+
+That the leaders of the Bolsheviki, particularly Lenine and Trotzky, ever
+entered into any "agreement" with the Black Hundreds, or took any part in
+the anti-Semitic campaign referred to, is highly improbable. Unless and
+until it is supported by ample evidence of a competent nature, we shall be
+justified in refusing to believe anything of the sort. It is, however,
+quite probable that provocateurs worming their way into Lenine's and
+Trotzky's good graces tried to use the Bolshevik agitation as a cover for
+their own nefarious work. As we have seen already, Lenine had previously
+been imposed upon by a notorious secret police agent, Malinovsky. But the
+open association of the Bolsheviki with men who played a despicable rôle
+under the old régime is not to be denied. The simple-minded reader of
+Bolshevist literature who believes that the Bolshevik government, whatever
+its failings, has the merit of being a government by real working-men and
+working-women, needs to be enlightened. Not only are Lenine and Trotzky not
+of the proletariat themselves, but they have associated with themselves
+men whose lives have been spent, not as workers, not even as simple
+bourgeoisie, but as servants of the terror-system of the Czar. They have
+associated with themselves, too, some of the most corrupt criminals in
+Russia. Here are a few of them:
+
+Professor Kobozev, of Riga, joined the Bolsheviki and was active as a
+delegate to the Municipal Council of Petrograd. According to the
+information possessed by the Russian revolutionary leaders, this Professor
+Kobozev used to be a police spy, his special job being to make reports to
+the police concerning the political opinions and actions of students and
+faculty members. One of the very first men released from prison by the
+Bolsheviki was one Doctor Doubrovine, who had been a leader of the Black
+Hundreds, an organizer of many pogroms. He became an active Bolshevik.
+Kamenev, the Bolshevik leader, friend of Lenine, is a journalist. He was
+formerly a member of the old Social Democratic party. Soon after the war
+broke out he was arrested and behaved so badly that he was censured by his
+party. Early in the Revolution of 1917 he was accused of serving the secret
+police at Kiev. Bonno Brouevitch, Military Councilor to the Bolshevik
+government, was a well-known anti-Semite who had been dismissed from his
+military office on two occasions, once by the Czar's government and once by
+the Provisional Government. General Komisarov, another of Lenine's trusted
+military officials and advisers, was formerly a chief official of the
+Czar's secret police, known for his terrible persecution of the
+revolutionists. Accused of high treason by the Provisional Government, he
+fled, but returned and joined the Lenine-Trotzky forces. Prince Andronikov,
+associate of Rasputin; (Lenine's "My friend, the Prince"); Orlov, police
+agent and "denouncer" and secretary of the infamous Protopopov; Postnikov,
+convicted and imprisoned as a German spy in 1910; Lepinsky, formerly in the
+Czar's secret police; and Gualkine, friend of the unspeakable Rasputin, are
+some of the other men who have been closely identified with the
+"proletarian régime" of the Bolsheviki.[46] The man they released from
+prison and placed in the important position of Military Commander of
+Petrograd was Muraviev, who had been chief of the Czar's police and was
+regarded by even the moderate members of the Provisional Government, both
+under Lvov and Kerensky, as a dangerous reactionary.[47] Karl Radek, the
+Bohemian, a notorious leader of the Russian Bolsheviki, who undertook to
+stir up the German workers and direct the Spartacide revolt, was, according
+to _Justice_, expelled from the German Social Democratic party before the
+war as a thief and a police spy.[48] How shall we justify men calling
+themselves Socialists and proletarian revolutionists, who ally themselves
+with such men as these, but imprison, harry, and abuse such men and women
+as Bourtzev, Kropotkin, Plechanov, Breshkovskaya, Tchaykovsky, Spiridonova,
+Agounov, Larokine, Avksentiev, and many other Socialists like them?
+
+In surveying the fight of the Bolsheviki to establish their rule it is
+impossible to fail to observe that their chief animus has been directed
+against other Socialists, rather than against members of the reactionary
+parties. That this has been the fact they do not themselves deny. For
+example, the "People's Commissary of Justice," G.I. Oppokov, better known
+as "Lomov," declared in an interview in January, 1918: "Our chief enemies
+are not the Cadets. Our most irreconcilable opponents are the Moderate
+Socialists. This explains the arrests of Socialists and the closing down of
+Socialist newspapers. Such measures of repression are, however, only
+temporary."[49] And in the Soviet at Petrograd, July 30, 1918,
+according to _Pravda_, Lachevitch, one of the delegates, said: "The
+Socialist-Revolutionists of the Right and the Mensheviki are more dangerous
+for the government of the Soviets than the bourgeoisie. But these enemies
+are not yet exterminated and can move about freely. The proletariat
+must act. We ought, once for all, to rid ourselves of the
+Socialist-Revolutionists of the Right and of the Mensheviki."
+
+In this summary of the Bolsheviki war against democracy, it will be
+observed, no attempt has been made to gather all the lurid and fantastic
+stories which have been published by sensational journalists. The testimony
+comes from Socialist sources of the utmost reliability, much of it from
+official Bolshevist sources. The system of oppression it describes is twin
+brother to that which existed under the Romanovs, to end which hundreds of
+thousands of the noblest and best of our humankind gave up their lives.
+Under the banner of Social Democracy a tyranny has been established as
+infamous as anything in the annals of autocracy.
+
+    "_O Liberty, what monstrous crimes are committed in thy great
+    name!_"
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+BOLSHEVIST THEORY AND PRACTICE
+
+
+I
+
+Utopia-making is among the easiest and most fascinating of all intellectual
+occupations. Few employments which can be called intellectual are easier
+than that of devising panaceas for the ills of society, of demonstrating on
+paper how the rough places of life may be made plain and its crooked ones
+made straight. And it is not a vain and fruitless waste of effort and of
+time, as things so easy of achievement often are. Many of the noblest minds
+of all lands and all ages have found pleasure and satisfaction in the
+imagining of ideal commonwealths and by so doing have rendered great
+service to mankind, enriching literature and, what is more important,
+stimulating the urge and passion for improvement and the faith of men in
+their power to climb to the farthest heights of their dreams. But the
+material of life is hard and lacks the plastic quality of inspired
+imagination. Though there is probably no single evil which exists for which
+a solution has not been devised in the wonderful laboratory of visioning,
+the perversity of the subtle and mysterious thing called life is such that
+many great and grave evils continue to challenge, perplex, and harass our
+humankind.
+
+Yet, notwithstanding the plain lesson of history and experience, the
+reminder impressed on every page of humanity's record, that between the
+glow and the glamour of the vision and its actual realization stretches a
+long, long road, there are many simple-minded souls to whom the vision
+gleamed is as the goal attained. They do not distinguish between schemes on
+paper and ideals crystallized into living realities. This type of mind is
+far more common than is generally recognized; that is why so many people
+quite seriously believe that the Bolsheviki have really established in
+Russia a society which conforms to the generous ideals of social democracy.
+They have read the rhetorical "decrees" and "proclamations" in which the
+shibboleths of freedom and democracy abound, and are satisfied. Yet it
+ought to be plainly evident to any intelligent person that, even if the
+decrees and proclamations were as sound as they are in fact unsound, and as
+definite as they are in fact vague, they would afford no real basis for
+judging Bolshevism as an actual experiment in social polity. There is, in
+ultimate analysis, only one test to apply to Bolshevism--namely, the test
+of reality. We must ask what the Bolsheviki did, not what they professed;
+what was the performance, not what was the promise.
+
+Of course, this does not mean that we are to judge result wholly without
+regard to aim. Admirable intention is still admirable as intention, even
+when untoward circumstance defeats it and brings deplorable results.
+Bolshevism is not merely a body of belief and speculation. When the
+Bolsheviki seized the government of Russia and began to attempt to carry
+out their ideas, Bolshevism became a living movement in a world of reality
+and subject to the acid test of pragmatic criteria. It must be judged by
+such a matter-of-fact standard as the extent to which it has enlarged or
+diminished the happiness, health, comfort, freedom, well-being,
+satisfaction, and efficiency of the greatest number of individuals. Unless
+the test shows that it has increased the sum of good available for the
+mass, Bolshevism cannot be regarded as a gain. If, on the contrary, the
+test shows that it has resulted in sensibly diminishing the sum of good
+available to the greatest number of people, Bolshevism must be counted as a
+move in the wrong direction, as so much effort lost. Nothing that can be
+urged on philosophical or moral grounds for or against the moral or
+intellectual impulses that prompted it can fundamentally change the
+verdict. Yet, for all that, it is well to examine the theory which inspires
+the practice; well to know the manner and method of thinking, and the view
+of life, from which Bolshevism as a movement of masses of men and women
+proceeds.
+
+Theoretically, Bolshevism, as such, has no necessary connection with the
+philosophy or the program of Socialism. Certain persons have established a
+working relation between Socialism, a program, and Bolshevism, a method.
+The connection is not inherently logical, but, on the contrary, wholly
+adventitious. As a matter of fact, Bolshevism can only be linked to the
+program of Socialism by violently and disastrously weakening the latter and
+destroying its fundamental character. We shall do well to remember this; to
+remember that the method of action, and, back of the method, the philosophy
+on which it rests and from which it springs, are separate and distinct from
+Socialism. They are incalculably older and they have been associated with
+vastly different programs. All that is new in Bolshevism is that a very old
+method of action, and a very old philosophy of action, have been seized
+upon by a new class which attempts to unite them to a new program.
+
+That is all that is implied in the "dictatorship of the proletariat."
+Dictatorship by small minorities is not a new political phenomenon. All
+that is new when the minority attempting to establish its dictatorship is
+composed of poor, propertyless people, is the fact of their economic
+condition and status. That is the only difference between the dictatorship
+of Russia by the Romanov dynasty and the dictatorship of Russia by a small
+minority of determined, class-conscious working-people. It is not only the
+precise forms of oppressive power used by them that are identically
+characteristic of Czarism and Bolshevism, but their underlying philosophy.
+Both forms of dictatorship rest upon the philosophy of might as the only
+valid right. Militarism, especially as it was developed under Prussian
+leadership, has exactly the same philosophy and aims at the same general
+result, namely, to establish the domination and control of society by a
+minority class. The Bolsheviki have simply inverted Czarism and Militarism.
+
+What really shocks the majority of people is not, after all, the methods or
+the philosophy of Bolshevism, but the fact that the Bolsheviki, belonging
+to a subject class, have seized upon the methods and philosophy of the most
+powerful ruling classes and turned them to their own account. There is a
+class morality and a class psychology the subtle influences of which few
+perceive as a matter of habit, which, however, to a great extent shape our
+judgments, our sympathies, and our antipathies. Men who never were shocked
+when a Czar, speaking the language of piety and religion, indulged in the
+most infamous methods and deeds of terror and oppression, are shocked
+beyond all power of adequate expression when former subjects of that same
+Czar, speaking the language of the religion of democracy and freedom,
+resort to the same infamous methods of terror and oppression.
+
+
+II
+
+The idea that a revolting proletarian minority might by force impose its
+rule upon society runs through the history of the modern working class, a
+note of impatient, desperate, menacing despair. The Bolsheviki say that
+they are Marxian Socialists; that Marx believed in and advocated the
+setting up, during the transitory period of social revolution, of the
+"dictatorship of the proletariat." They are not quite honest in this claim,
+however; they are indulging in verbal tricks. It is true that Marx taught
+that the proletarian dominion of society, as a preliminary to the abolition
+of all class rule of every kind, must be regarded as certain and
+inevitable. But it is not honest to claim the sanction of his teaching for
+the seizure of political power by a small class, consisting of about 6 per
+cent. of the population, and the imposition by force of its rule upon the
+majority of the population that is either unwilling or passive. That is the
+negation of Marxian Socialism. _It is the essence of Marx's teaching that
+the social revolution must come as a historical necessity when the
+proletariat itself comprises an overwhelming majority of the people_.
+
+Let us summarize the theory as it appears in the _Communist Manifesto_:
+Marx begins by setting forth the fact that class conflict is as old as
+civilization itself, that history is very largely the record of conflicts
+between contending social classes. In our epoch, he argues, class conflict
+is greatly simplified; there is really only one division, that which
+divides the bourgeoisie and the proletariat: "Society as a whole is more
+and more splitting up into great hostile camps, into two great classes
+directly facing each other, bourgeoisie and proletariat." ... "With the
+development of industry the proletariat not only increases in numbers; it
+becomes concentrated in great masses, its strength grows, and it feels that
+strength more." ... "The proletarian movement is the _self-conscious,
+independent movement of the immense majority in the interests of the
+immense majority_." It is this "immense majority" that is to establish its
+dominion. Marx expressly points out that "all previous historical movements
+were movements of minorities, or in the interest of minorities." It is the
+great merit of the movement of the proletariat, as he conceives it, that it
+is the "movement of the immense majority, in the interests of the immense
+majority."
+
+Clearly, when Lenine and his followers say that they take their doctrine of
+the "dictatorship of the proletariat" from Marx, they pervert the truth;
+they take from Marx only the phrase, not their fundamental policy. It is
+not to be denied that there were times when Marx himself momentarily lapsed
+into the error of Blanqui and the older school of Utopian, conspiratory
+Socialists who believed that they could find a short cut to social
+democracy; that by a surprise stroke, carefully prepared and daringly
+executed, a small and desperate minority could overthrow the existing
+social order and bring about Socialism. As Jaurčs has pointed out,[50] the
+mind of Marx sometimes harked back to the dramatic side of the French
+Revolution, and was captivated by such episodes as the conspiracy of Babeuf
+and his friends, who in their day, while the proletariat was a small
+minority, even as it is in Russia now, sought to establish its dominion.
+But it is well known that after the failure of the Paris Commune, in 1871,
+Marx once and for all abandoned all belief in this form of the
+"dictatorship of the proletariat," and in the possibility of securing
+Socialism through the conspiratory action of minorities. He was even rather
+unwilling that the _Manifesto_ should be republished after that, except as
+a purely historical document. It was in that spirit of reaction that he and
+Engels wrote in 1872 that passage--to which Lenine has given such an
+unwarranted interpretation--in which they say that the Commune had shown
+that "the working classes cannot simply take possession of the ready-made
+state machine and set it in motion for their own aims."
+
+It was no less an interpreter of Marx than his great collaborator and
+friend, Frederick Engels, who, in 1895, stated the reasons for abandoning
+all belief in the possibility of accomplishing anything through political
+surprises and through the action of small conscious and determined
+minorities at the head of unconscious masses:
+
+    History proved that we were wrong--we and those who like us, in
+    1848, awaited the speedy success of the proletariat. It became
+    perfectly clear _that economic conditions all over the Continent
+    were by no means as yet sufficiently matured for superseding the
+    capitalist organization of production_. This was proved by the
+    economic revolution which commenced on the continent of Europe
+    after 1848 and developed in France, Austria-Hungary, Poland, and,
+    recently, also in Russia, and made Germany into an industrial
+    state of the first rank--all on a capitalist basis, _which shows
+    that in 1848 the prevailing conditions were still capable of
+    expansion_. And to-day we have a huge international army of
+    Socialists.... If this mighty proletarian army has not yet reached
+    its goal, if it is destined to gain its ends only in a long drawn
+    out struggle, making headway but slowly, step by step, this only
+    proves how impossible it was in 1848 to change social conditions
+    by forcible means ... the time for small minorities to place
+    themselves at the head of the ignorant masses and resort to force
+    in order to bring about revolutions, is gone. _A complete change
+    in the organization of society can be brought about only by the
+    conscious co-operation of the masses_; they must be alive to the
+    aim in view; they must know what they want. The history of the
+    last fifty years has taught us that.[51]
+
+What Engels had in mind when he stressed the fact that history showed that
+in 1848 "the prevailing conditions were still capable of expansion" is the
+central Marxian doctrine of historical inevitability. It is surely less
+than honest to claim the prestige and authority of Marx's teachings upon
+the slender basis of a distorted version of his early thought, while
+completely ignoring the matured body of his doctrines. It may not matter
+much to the world to-day what Marx thought, or how far Lenine follows his
+teachings, but it is of importance that the claim set up by Lenine and
+Trotzky and many of their followers that they are guided by the principles
+of Marxian Socialism is itself demonstrably an evidence of moral or
+intellectual obliquity, which makes them very dangerous guides to follow.
+It is of importance, too, that the claim they make allures many Socialists
+of trusting and uncritical minds to follow them.
+
+Many times in his long life Marx, together with Engels, found himself
+engaged in a fierce war against the very things Lenine and Trotzky and
+their associates have been trying to do. He thundered against Weitling, who
+wanted to have a "daring minority" seize the power of the state and
+establish its dictatorship by a _coup d'état_. He was denounced as a
+"reactionary" by Willich and Kinkel because, in 1850, he rejected with
+scorn the idea of a sudden seizure of political power through conspiratory
+action, and had the courage to say that it would take fifty years for the
+workers "to fit themselves for political power." He opposed Lassalle's idea
+of an armed insurrection in 1862, because he was certain that the economic
+development had not yet reached the stage which alone could make a social
+change possible. He fought with all the fierce impetuousness of his nature
+every attempt of Bakunin to lead the workers to attempt the seizure of
+political power and forcibly establish their rule while still a
+minority.[52] He fought all these men because he had become profoundly
+convinced that "_no social order ever disappears before all the productive
+forces for which there is room in it have been developed; and new and
+higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions
+of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society_."[53] No
+"dictatorship of the proletariat," no action by any minority, however well
+armed or however desperate, can overcome that great law.
+
+The "dictatorship of the proletariat" in the sense in which that term is
+used by the Russian Bolshevik leaders, and by those who in other countries
+are urging that their example be followed, is not a policy of Marxian
+Socialism. It is not a product of modern conditions. Rather it harks back
+to the earlier conspiratory Socialism of Blanqui, with its traditions
+inherited from Robespierre and Babeuf. So far as its advocates are
+concerned, Marx and the whole modern Socialist movement might as well never
+have existed at all. They take us back three-quarters of a century, to the
+era before Marx, to that past so remote in intellectual and moral
+character, though recent in point of time, when the working class of no
+country in Europe possessed the right to vote--when the workers were
+indeed proletarians and not citizens; not only propertyless, but also
+"without a fatherland."
+
+In truth, it is not difficult to understand how this theory has found
+acceptance in Russia. It was not difficult to understand why Marx's
+doctrine of economic evolution was for many years rejected by most Russian
+Socialists; why the latter took the view that Socialism must be more
+quickly attained, that capitalism was not a necessary precursor of
+Socialism in Russia, but that an intelligent leadership of passive masses
+would successfully establish Socialism on the basis of the old Russian
+communal institutions. It was quite easy to understand the change that came
+with Russia's industrial awakening, how the development of factory
+production gave an impetus to the Marxian theories. And, though it presents
+a strange paradox, in that it comes at a time when, despite everything,
+Russian capitalism continues to develop, it is really not difficult to
+understand how and why pre-Marxian conceptions reappear in that great land
+of paradoxes. Politically and intellectually the position of the
+proletariat of Russia before the recent Revolution was that of the
+proletariat of France in 1848.
+
+But that which baffles the mind of the serious investigator is the
+readiness of so many presumably intelligent people living in countries
+where--as in America--wholly different conditions prevail to ignore the
+differences and be ready to abandon all the democratic advance made by the
+workers. There is nothing more certain in the whole range of social and
+political life than the fact that the doctrine that the power of the state
+must be seized and used by the proletariat against the non-proletarian
+classes, even for a relatively brief period, _can only be carried out by
+destroying all the democracy thus far achieved_.
+
+
+III
+
+The validity of the foregoing contention can scarcely be questioned, except
+by those to whom phrases are of more consequence than facts, who place
+theories above realities. The moment the Bolsheviki tried to translate
+their rhetorical propaganda for the dictatorship of the proletariat into
+the concrete terms of political reality they found that they were compelled
+to direct their main opposition, not against the bourgeoisie, or even
+against capitalism, but against the newly created democracy. In the
+movement to create a democratic government resting upon the basis of
+universal, direct, equal, and secret suffrage they saw a peril to their
+scheme far more formidable than militarism or capitalism. It was for this
+reason that they set themselves to the task of suppressing the Constituent
+Assembly. Only political simpletons will seriously regard the Bolshevik
+attempt to camouflage their motive by pretending that they determined to
+crush the Constituent Assembly because its members were elected on a
+register that was "obsolete" and therefore no longer truly represented the
+people.
+
+The German Spartacides, who were acting in full accord with the Russian
+Bolsheviki, had not that miserable excuse. Yet they set out by force of
+arms to _prevent any election being held_. In this they were quite
+consistent; they wanted to set up a dictatorship, and they knew that the
+overwhelming mass of the people wanted something very different. At a
+dinner of the Inter-Collegiate Socialist Society in New York, in December,
+1918, a spokesman for the German variety of Bolshevism blandly explained
+that "Karl Liebknecht and his comrades know that they cannot hope to get a
+majority, therefore they are determined that no elections shall be held.
+They will prevent this by force. After some time, perhaps, when a
+proletarian régime has existed long enough, and people have become
+convinced of the superiority of the Socialist way, or at least grown used
+to it, _and it is safe to do so_, popular elections may be permitted."
+Incredible as it seems, this declaration was received with cheers by an
+audience which only a few minutes before had cheered with equal fervor
+denunciations of "encroachments upon American democracy."
+
+Curiously enough, the precise manner in which the Bolsheviki have acted
+against democracy was set forth, as far back as 1850, by a German, Johann
+von Miquel, in a letter to Karl Marx. Miquel was born in Hanover, but his
+ancestors were of French origin. He studied at Heidelberg and Göttingen,
+and became associated with the Socialist movement of the period. He settled
+down to the practice of law, however, and when Hanover was annexed by
+Prussia he entered the Prussian parliament. After the "dismissal of the
+pilot," Bismarck, he became Prussian Minister of Finance, holding that
+position for ten years. Liebknecht referred to him as "my former _comrade
+in communismo_ and present Chancellor _in re_." This Miquel, while he was
+still a Socialist, in 1850 wrote to Marx as follows:
+
+    The workers' party may succeed against the upper middle class and
+    what remains of the feudal element, _but it will be attacked on
+    its flank by the democracy_. We can perhaps give an anti-bourgeois
+    tone to the Revolution for a little while, _we can destroy the
+    essential conditions of bourgeois production_; but we cannot
+    possibly put down the small tradesmen and shopkeeping class, the
+    petty bourgeoisie. My motto is to secure all we can get. We should
+    prevent the lower and middle class from _forming any organizations
+    for as long a time as possible_ after the first victory, and
+    especially oppose ourselves in serried ranks to the plan of
+    calling a Constitutional Assembly. Partial terrorism, local
+    anarchy, must replace for us what we lack in bulk.
+
+What a remarkable anticipation of the Bolshevist methods of 1917-18 is thus
+outlined in this letter, written sixty-seven years before the Bolshevik
+_coup d'état!_ How literally Lenine, Trotzky and Co. have followed Herr von
+Miquel! They have desperately tried to "give an anti-bourgeois tone to the
+Revolution," denouncing as bourgeois reactionaries the men and women whose
+labors and sacrifices have made the Russian Socialist movement. They have
+destroyed "the essential conditions" of bourgeois and of any other than the
+most primitive production. They have set themselves in serried ranks in
+opposition to "the plan of calling a Constitutional Assembly." They have
+suppressed not only the organizations of the "lower and middle class," but
+also those of a great part of the working class, thus going beyond Miquel.
+Finally, to replace what they lack in bulk, they have resorted to "partial
+terrorism and local anarchy."
+
+And it is in the name of revolutionary progress, of ultra-radicalism, that
+we are called upon to revert to the tactics of desperation born of the
+discouraging conditions of nearly seventy years ago. A new philosophy has
+taken possession of the easily possessed minds of Greenwich Village
+philosophers and parlor revolutionists--a new philosophy of progress,
+according to which revolutionary progress consists in the unraveling by
+feverish fingers of the fabric woven through years of sacrifice; in
+abandoning high levels attained for the lower levels from which the
+struggles of the past raised us; in harking back to the thoughts and the
+tactics of men who shouted their despairing, defiant cries into the gloom
+of the blackest period of the nineteenth century!
+
+Universal, secret, equal, and direct suffrage was a fact in Russia, the
+first great achievement of the Revolution. Upon that foundation, and upon
+no other, it was possible to build an enduring, comprehensive social
+democracy. Against that foundation the Bolsheviki hurled their destructive
+power, creating a discriminating class suffrage, disfranchising a great
+part of the Russian people--not merely the bourgeoisie, but a considerable
+part of the working class itself. Chapter XIII of Article 4 of the
+Constitution of the "Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic" sets
+forth the qualifications for voting, as follows:
+
+    THE RIGHT TO VOTE
+
+    CHAPTER THIRTEEN
+
+
+    64. The right to vote and to be elected to the Soviets is enjoyed
+    by the following citizens, irrespective of religion, nationality,
+    domicile, etc., of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet
+    Republic, of both sexes, who shall have completed their eighteenth
+    year by the day of election:
+
+    a. All who have acquired the means of living through labor that is
+    productive and useful to society, and also persons engaged in
+    housekeeping which enables the former to do productive work--i.e.,
+    laborers and employees of all classes who are employed in
+    industry, trade, agriculture, etc.; and peasants and Cossack
+    agricultural laborers who employ no help for the purpose of making
+    profits.
+
+    b. Soldiers of the army and navy of the Soviets.
+
+    c. Citizens of the two preceding categories who have to any degree
+    lost their capacity to work.
+
+    Note 1: Local Soviets may, upon approval of the central power,
+    lower the age standard mentioned herein.
+
+    Note 2: Non-citizens mentioned in Paragraph 20 (Article 2, Chapter
+    Five) have the right to vote.
+
+    65. The following persons enjoy neither the right to vote nor the
+    right to be voted for, even though they belong to one of the
+    categories enumerated above, namely:
+
+    a. Persons who employ hired labor in order to obtain from it an
+    increase in profits.
+
+    b. Persons who have an income without doing any work, such as
+    interest from capital, receipts from property, etc.
+
+    c. Private merchants, trade, and commercial brokers.
+
+    d. Monks and clergy of all denominations.
+
+    e. Employees and agents of the former police, the gendarme corps,
+    and the Okhrana (Czar's secret service), also members of the
+    former reigning dynasty.
+
+    f. Persons who have in legal form been declared demented or
+    mentally deficient, and also persons under guardianship.
+
+    g. Persons who have been deprived by a Soviet of their rights of
+    citizenship because of selfish or dishonorable offenses, for the
+    period fixed by the sentence.
+
+Apparently the Constitution does not provide any standard for determining
+what labor is "useful and productive to society," and leaves the way open
+for a degree of arbitrariness on the part of some authority or other that
+is wholly incompatible with any generally accepted ideal of freedom and
+democracy. It is apparent from the text of paragraph 64, subdivision "a" of
+the foregoing chapter that housekeeping as such is not included in the
+category of "labor that is productive and useful to society," for a
+separate category is made of it. The language used is that "The right to
+vote and to be elected to the Soviets is enjoyed by.... All who have
+acquired the means of living through labor that is productive and useful to
+society, _and also_ persons engaged in housekeeping, which enables the
+former to do productive work--_i.e._, laborers and employees of all classes
+who are employed in industry, trade, agriculture, etc."
+
+This _seems_ to mean that persons engaged in housekeeping can only vote if
+and when they are so engaged in order to enable other persons than
+themselves to do "productive work." It appears that housekeeping for
+persons not engaged in such productive work--for children, for
+example--would not confer the right to vote. It is not possible to tell
+with certainty what it _does_ mean, however, for there is probably not a
+single person in Russia or in the world who can tell exactly what this
+precious instrument actually means. What standard is to be established to
+determine what labor is "productive" and "useful"? Is the journalist, for
+instance, engaged in useful and productive labor? Is the novelist? is the
+agitator? Presumably the journalist employed in defending the Soviet
+Republic against attacks by unfriendly critics would be doing useful work
+and be entitled to vote, but what about the journalist employed in making
+the criticisms? Would the wife of the latter, no matter how much she might
+disagree with her husband's views, be barred from voting, simply because
+she was "engaged in housekeeping" for one whose labors were not regarded
+"productive and useful to society"? If the language used means anything at
+all, apparently she would be so disfranchised.
+
+Upon what ground is it decided that the "private merchant" may not vote?
+Certainly it is not because his labor is of necessity neither productive
+nor useful, for paragraph 65 says that even though belonging to one of the
+categories of persons otherwise qualified to vote, the private merchant may
+"enjoy neither the right to vote nor to be voted for." The keeper of a
+little grocery store, even though his income is not greater than that of a
+mechanic, and despite the fact that his store meets a local need and makes
+his services, therefore, "useful" in the highest degree, cannot enjoy civic
+rights, simply because he is a "merchant"! The clergy of all denominations
+are excluded from the franchise. It does not matter, according to this
+constitution, that a minister belongs to a church independent of any
+connection with the state, that he is elected by people who desire his
+services and is paid by them, that he satisfies them and is therefore
+doing a "useful service"--if utility means the satisfying of needs--because
+he is so employed he cannot vote.
+
+It is clearly provided that "peasants and Cossack agricultural laborers who
+employ no help for the purpose of making profits" can vote and be voted
+for. But no persons "who employ hired labor in order to obtain from it an
+increase in profits" may vote or be elected to office, _even though the
+work they do is productive and useful to society._ A peasant who hires no
+assistance may vote, but if he decides that by employing a boy to help him
+he will be able to give better attention to certain crops and make more
+money, even though he pays the boy every penny that the service is worth,
+judged by any standard whatever, he loses his vote and his civic status
+because, forsooth, he has gained in his net income as a result of his
+enterprise. And this is seriously put forward as the basis of government in
+a nation needing an intense and universal stimulation of its economic
+production.
+
+A militant suffragist friend of mine, whose passion for universal suffrage
+in America is so great that it leads her to join in all sorts of
+demonstrations protesting against the failure of the United States Senate
+to pass the Susan B. Anthony amendment--even leading her to join in the
+public burning of President Wilson's speeches, a queer emulation of the
+ancient ecclesiastical bigotry of burning heretical books!--manages to
+unite to her passion for equal and unrestricted suffrage an equally
+passionate admiration for the Bolsheviki, arch-enemies of equal and
+unrestricted suffrage. Her case is not exceptional: it is rather typical of
+the Bolshevik following in England and in America. Such minds are not
+governed and directed by rational processes, but by emotional impulses,
+generally of pathological origin.
+
+What the Bolshevik constitution would mean if practically applied to
+American life to-day can be briefly indicated. The following classes would
+certainly be entitled to vote and to be elected to office:
+
+1. All wage-earners engaged in the production of goods and utilities
+regarded by some designated authority as "productive and useful to
+society."
+
+2. Teachers and educators engaged in the public service.
+
+3. All farmers owning and working their own farms without hired help of any
+kind.
+
+4. All wage-earners engaged in the public service as employees of the
+state, subdivisions of the state, or public service corporations-such as
+postal clerks, street-railway workers, electricians, and so on.
+
+5. Wives and others engaged in keeping the homes of the foregoing, so as to
+enable them to work.
+
+6. The "soldiers of the army and navy"--whether all officers are included
+is not clear from the text.
+
+Now let us see what classes would be as certainly excluded from the right
+to vote and to be voted for.
+
+1. Every merchant from the keeper of a corner grocery store to the owner of
+a great mercantile establishment.
+
+2. Every banker, every commission agent, every broker, every insurance
+agent, every real-estate dealer.
+
+3. Every farmer who hires help of any kind--even a single "hand."
+
+4. Every petty contractor, garage-keeper, or other person employing any
+hired help whatever, including the professional writer who hires a
+stenographer, the doctor who hires a chauffeur, and the dentist who hires a
+mechanic assistant.
+
+5. Every clergyman and minister of the Gospel.
+
+6. Every person whose income is derived from inherited wealth or from
+invested earnings, including all who live upon annuities provided by gift
+or bequest.
+
+7. Every person engaged in housekeeping for persons included in any of the
+foregoing six categories--including the wives of such disqualified persons.
+
+There are many occupational groups whose civic status is not so easily
+defined. The worker engaged in making articles of luxury, enjoyed only by
+the privileged few, could hardly have a better claim to a vote than the
+housekeeper of a man whose income was derived from foreign investments, or
+than the chauffeur of a man whose income was derived from government bonds.
+All three represent, presumably, types of that parasitic labor which
+subjects those engaged in it to disfranchisement. Apparently, though not
+certainly, then, the following would also be disfranchised:
+
+1. All lawyers except those engaged by the public authorities for the
+public service.
+
+2. All teachers and educators other than those engaged in the public
+service.
+
+3. All bankers, managers of industries, commercial travelers, experts, and
+accountants except those employed in the public service, or whose labor is
+judged by a competent tribunal to be necessary and useful.
+
+4. All editors, journalists, authors of books and plays, except as special
+provision might be provided for individuals.
+
+5. All persons engaged in occupations which a competent tribunal decided to
+classify as non-essential or non-productive.
+
+Any serious attempt to introduce such restrictions and limitations of the
+right of suffrage in America would provoke irresistible revolt. It would be
+justly and properly regarded as an attempt to arrest the forward march of
+the nation and to turn its energies in a backward direction. It would be
+just as reactionary in the political world as it would be in the industrial
+world to revert back to hand-tool production; to substitute the ox-team for
+the railway system, the hand-loom for the power-loom, the flail for the
+threshing-machine, the sickle for the modern harvesting-machine, the human
+courier for the electric telegraph.
+
+Yet we find a radical like Mr. Max Eastman giving his benediction and
+approval to precisely such a program in Russia as a substitute for
+universal suffrage. We find him quoting with apparent approval an article
+setting forth Lenine's plan, hardly disguised, to disfranchise every farmer
+who employs even a single hired helper.[54]
+
+Lenine's position is quite clear. "Only the proletariat leading on the
+poorest peasants (the semi-proletariat as they are called in our program)
+... may undertake the steps toward Socialism that have become absolutely
+unavoidable and non-postponable.... The peasants want to retain their small
+holdings and to arrive at some place of equal distribution.... So be it. No
+sensible Socialist will quarrel with a pauper peasant on this ground. If
+the lands are confiscated, _so long as the proletarians rule in the great
+centers, and all political power is handed over to the proletariat_, the
+rest will take care of itself."[55] Yet, in spite of Lenine's insistence
+that all political power be "handed over to the proletariat," in spite of a
+score of similar utterances which might be quoted, and, finally, in spite
+of the Soviet Constitution which so obviously excludes from the right to
+vote a large part of the adult population, an American Bolshevist
+pamphleteer has the effrontery to insult the intelligence of his readers
+by the stupidly and palpably false statement that "even at the present time
+95 per cent. in Russia can vote, while in the United States only about 65
+per cent. can vote."[56]
+
+Of course it is only as a temporary measure that this dictatorship of a
+class is to be maintained. It is designed only for the period of transition
+and adjustment. In time the adjustment will be made, all forms of social
+parasitism and economic exploitation will disappear, and then it will be
+both possible and natural to revert to democratic government. Too simple
+and naďve to be trusted alone in a world so full of trickery and tricksters
+as ours are they who find any asurance in this promise. They are surely
+among the most gullible of our humankind!
+
+Of course, the answer to the claim is a very simple one: it is that no
+class gaining privilege and power ever surrenders it until it is compelled
+to do so. Every one who has read the pre-Marxian literature dealing with
+the dictatorship of the proletariat knows how insistent is the demand that
+the period of dictatorship must be _prolonged as much as possible_. Even
+Marx himself insisted, on one occasion at least, that it must be maintained
+as long as possible,[57] and in the letter of Johann von Miquel, already
+quoted, we find the same thought expressed in the same terms, "as long as
+possible." But even if we put aside these warnings of human experience and
+of recorded history, and persuade ourselves that in Russia we have a wholly
+new phenomenon, a class possessing powers of dictatorship animated by a
+burning passion to relinquish those powers as quickly as possible, is it
+not still evident that the social adjustments that must be made to reach
+the stage where, according to the Bolshevik standards, political democracy
+can be introduced, must, under the most favorable circumstances
+conceivable, take many, many years? Even Lenine admits that "a sound
+solution of the problem of increasing the productivity of labor" (which
+lies at the very heart of the problem we are now discussing) "requires at
+least (especially after a most distressing and destructive war) several
+years."[58]
+
+From the point of view of social democracy the basis of the Bolshevik state
+is reactionary and unsound. The true Socialist policy is that set forth by
+Wilhelm Liebknecht in the following words: "The political power which the
+Social Democracy aims at and which it will win, no matter what its enemies
+may do, _has not for its object the establishment of the dictatorship of
+the proletariat, but the suppression of the dictatorship of the
+bourgeoisie_."[59]
+
+
+IV
+
+
+Democracy in government and in industry must characterize any system of
+society which can be justly called Socialist. Thirteen years ago I wrote,
+"Socialism without democracy is as impossible as a shadow without
+light."[60] That seemed to me then, as it seems to-day, axiomatic. And so
+the greatest Socialist thinkers and leaders always regarded it. "We have
+perceived that Socialism and democracy are inseparable," declared William
+Liebknecht, the well-beloved, in 1899.[61] Thirty years earlier, in 1869,
+he had given lucid expression to the same conviction in these words:
+"Socialism and democracy are not the same, but they are only different
+expressions of the same fundamental idea. They belong to each other, round
+out each other, and can never stand in contradiction to each other.
+Socialism without democracy is pseudo-Socialism, just as democracy without
+Socialism is pseudo-democracy."[62] Democracy in industry is, as I have
+insisted in my writing with unfailing consistency, as inseparable from
+Socialism as democracy in government.[63] Unless industry is brought within
+the control of democracy and made responsive to the common will, Socialism
+is not attained.
+
+Everywhere the organized working class aspires to attain that industrial
+democracy which is the counterpart of political democracy. Syndicalism,
+with all its vagaries, its crude reversal to outworn ideas and methods, is,
+nevertheless, fundamentally an expression of that yearning. It is the same
+passion that lies back of the Shop Stewards' movement in England, and that
+inspires the much more patiently and carefully developed theories and plans
+of the advocates of "Guild Socialism." Motived by the same desire, our
+American labor-unions are demanding, and steadily gaining, an increasing
+share in the actual direction of industry. Joint control by boards composed
+of representatives of employers, employees, and the general public is, to
+an ever-increasing extent, determining the conditions of employment, wage
+standards, work standards, hours of labor, choice and conduct of foremen,
+and many other matters of vital importance to the wage-earners. That we
+are still a long way from anything like industrial democracy is all too
+painfully true and obvious, but it is equally obvious that we are
+struggling toward the goal, and that there is a serious purpose and
+intention to realize the ideal.
+
+Impelled by the inexorable logic of its own existence as a dictatorship,
+the Bolshevik government has had to set itself against any and every
+manifestation of democracy in industry with the same relentless force as it
+opposed democracy in government. True, owing to the fact that, following
+the line of industrial evolution, the trade-union movement was not strongly
+enough developed to even attempt any organization for the expression of
+industrial democracy comparable to the Constituent Assembly. It is equally
+true, however, that had such an organization existed the necessity to
+suppress it, as the political organization was suppressed, would have
+proceeded inevitably and irresistibly from the creation of a dictatorship.
+_There cannot be, in any country, as co-existent forces, political
+dictatorship and industrial democracy._ It is also true that such
+democratic agencies as there were existing the Bolsheviki neglected.
+
+That the Bolsheviki did not establish industrial democracy in its fullest
+sense is not to be charged to their discredit. Had Bolshevism never
+appeared, and had the Constituent Assembly been permitted to function
+unmolested and free, it would have taken many years to realize anything
+like a well-rounded industrial democracy, for which a highly developed
+industrial system is absolutely essential. The leaders of the Bolshevik
+movement recognized from the first that the time had not yet arrived for
+even attempting to set up a Socialist commonwealth based on the social
+ownership and democratic control of industry. Lenine frankly declared that
+"Socialism cannot now prevail in Russia,"[64] and Trotzky said, a month
+after the _coup d'état_: "We are not ready yet to take over all
+industry.... For the present, we expect of the earnings of a factory to pay
+the owner 5 or 6 per cent. yearly on his actual investment. What we aim at
+now is _control_ rather than _ownership_."[65] He did not tell Professor
+Ross, who records this statement, on what grounds the owner of the property
+thus controlled by the Soviet government, and who thus becomes a partner of
+the government, is to be excluded from the exercise of the franchise. But
+let that pass.
+
+When the Bolsheviki seized the power of the state, they found themselves
+confronted by a terrific task. Russia was utterly demoralized. An
+undeveloped nation industrially, war and internal strife had wrought havoc
+with the industrial life she had. Her railways were neglected and the whole
+transportation system, entirely inadequate even for peace needs, had, under
+the strain of the war, fallen into chaos. After the March Revolution, as a
+natural consequence of the intoxication of the new freedom, such
+disciplines as had existed were broken down. Production fell off in a most
+alarming manner. During the Kerensky régime Skobelev, as Minister of Labor,
+repeatedly begged the workers to prove their loyalty to the Revolution by
+increased exertion and faithfulness in the workshops and factories. The
+Bolsheviki, on their part, as a means of fighting the Provisional
+Government, preached the opposite doctrine, that of sabotage. In every
+manner possible they encouraged the workers to limit production, to waste
+time and materials, strike for trivial reasons, and, in short, do all that
+was possible to defeat the effort to place industry upon a sound basis.
+
+When they found themselves in possession of the powers of government the
+Bolshevik leaders soon had to face the stern realities of the conditions
+essential to the life of a great nation. They could not escape the
+necessity of intensifying production. They had not only promised peace, but
+bread, and bread comes only from labor. Every serious student of the
+problem has realized that the first great task of any Socialist society
+must be _to increase the productivity of labor_. It is all very well for a
+popular propaganda among the masses to promise a great reduction in the
+hours of labor and, at the same time, a great improvement in the standards
+of living. The translation of such promises into actual achievements must
+prove to be an enormous task. To build the better homes, make the better
+and more abundant clothing, shoes, furniture, and other things required to
+fulfil the promise, will require a great deal of labor, and such an
+organization of industry upon a basis of efficiency as no nation has yet
+developed. If the working class of this or any other country should take
+possession of the existing organization of production, there would not be
+enough in the fund now going to the capitalist class to satisfy the
+requirements of the workers, _even if not a penny of compensation were paid
+to the expropriated owners_. Kautsky, among others, has courageously faced
+this fact and insisted that "it will be one of the imperative tasks of the
+Social Revolution not simply to continue, but to increase production; the
+victorious proletariat must extend production rapidly if it is to be able
+to satisfy the enormous demands that will be made upon the new régime."[66]
+ From the first
+this problem had to be faced by the Bolshevik government. We find Lenine
+insisting that the workers must be inspired with "idealism, self-sacrifice,
+and persistence" to turn out as large a product as possible; that the
+productivity of labor must be raised and a high level of industrial
+performance as the duty of every worker be rigorously insisted upon. It is
+not enough to have destroyed feudalism and the monarchy:
+
+    In every Socialist revolution, however, the main task of the
+    proletariat, and of the poorest peasantry led by it--and, hence,
+    also in the Socialist revolution in Russia inaugurated by us on
+    November 7, 1917, consists in the positive and constructive work
+    of establishing an extremely complex and delicate net of newly
+    organized relationships covering the systematic production and
+    distribution of products which are necessary for the existence of
+    tens of millions of people. The successful realization of such a
+    revolution depends on the original historical creative work of the
+    majority of the population, and first of all of the majority of
+    the toilers. _The victory of the Socialist revolution will not be
+    assured unless the proletariat and the poorest peasantry manifest
+    sufficient consciousness, idealism, self-sacrifice, and
+    persistence._ With the creation of a new--the Soviet--type of
+    state, offering to the oppressed toiling masses the opportunity to
+    participate actively in the free construction of a new society, we
+    have solved only a small part of the difficult task. _The main
+    difficulty is in the economic domain; to raise the productivity of
+    labor, to establish strict and universal accounting and control of
+    production and distribution, and actually to socialize
+    production._[67]
+
+Lenine recognizes, as every thoughtful person must, that this task of
+organizing production and distribution cannot be undertaken by "the
+proletariat and the poorest peasants." It requires a vast amount of highly
+developed technical knowledge and skill, the result of long training and
+superior education. This kind of service is so highly paid, in comparison
+with the wages paid to the manual workers, that it lifts those who perform
+the service and receive the high salaries into the ranks of the
+bourgeoisie. Certainly, even though they are engaged in performing work of
+the highest value and the most vital consequence, the specialists, experts,
+and directing managers of industry are not of the "working class," as that
+term is commonly employed. And no matter how we may speculate upon the
+possible attainment of approximate equality of income in some future near
+or remote, the fact is that the labor of such men can only be secured by
+paying much more than is paid to the manual workers.
+
+Quite wisely, the Bolshevik government decided that it must have such
+services, no matter that they must be highly paid for; that they could only
+be rendered by the hated bourgeoisie and that, in consequence, certain
+compromises and relations with the bourgeoisie became necessary the moment
+the services were engaged. The Bolshevik government recognized the
+imperative necessity of the service which only highly paid specialists
+could give and wisely decided that no prejudice or theory must be permitted
+to block the necessary steps for Russia's reconstruction. In a spirit of
+intelligent opportunism, therefore, they subordinated shibboleths,
+prejudices, dogmas, and theories to Russia's necessity. The sanity of this
+opportunistic attitude is altogether admirable, but it contrasts strangely
+with the refusal to co-operate with the bourgeoisie in establishing a
+stable democratic government--no less necessary for Russia's reconstruction
+and for Socialism. As a matter of fact, the very promptitude and sanity of
+their opportunism when faced by responsibility, serves to demonstrate the
+truth of the contention made in these pages, that in refusing to co-operate
+with others in building up a permanently secure democratic government,
+they were actuated by no high moral principle, but simply by a desire to
+gain power. The position of Russia to-day would have been vastly different
+if the wisdom manifested in the following paragraphs had governed Lenine
+and his associates in the days when Kerensky was trying to save Russian
+democracy:
+
+    _Without the direction of specialists of different branches of
+    knowledge, technique, and experience, the transformation toward
+    Socialism is impossible_, for Socialism demands a conscious mass
+    movement toward a higher productivity of labor in comparison with
+    capitalism and on the basis which had been attained by capitalism.
+    Socialism must accomplish this movement forward in its own way, by
+    its own methods--to make it more definite, by Soviet methods. But
+    the specialists are inevitably bourgeois on account of the whole
+    environment of social life which made them specialists.... In view
+    of the considerable delay in accounting and control in general,
+    although we have succeeded in defeating sabotage, we have _not
+    yet_ created an environment which would put at our disposal the
+    bourgeois specialists. Many sabotagers are coming into our
+    service, but the best organizers and the biggest specialists can
+    be used by the state either in the old bourgeois way (that is, for
+    a higher salary) or in the new proletarian way (that is, by
+    creating such an environment of universal accounting and control
+    which would inevitably and naturally attract and gain the
+    submission of specialists). We were forced now to make use of the
+    old bourgeois method and agree to a very high remuneration for the
+    services of the biggest of the bourgeois specialists. All those
+    who are acquainted with the facts understand this, but not all
+    give sufficient thought to the significance of such a measure on
+    the part of the proletarian state. _It is clear that the measure
+    is a compromise, that it is a defection from the principles of the
+    Paris Commune and of any proletarian rule, which demand the
+    reduction of salaries to the standard of remuneration of the
+    average workers_--principles which demand that "career hunting" be
+    fought by deeds, not words.
+
+    Furthermore, it is clear that such a measure is not merely a halt
+    in a certain part and to a certain degree of the offensive against
+    capitalism (for capitalism is not a quantity of money, but a
+    definite social relationship), _but also a step backward by our
+    Socialist Soviet state_, which has from the very beginning
+    proclaimed and carried on a policy of reducing high salaries to
+    the standard of wages of the average worker.
+
+    ... The corrupting influence of high salaries is beyond
+    question--both on the Soviets ... and on the mass of the workers.
+    But all thinking and honest workers and peasants will agree with
+    us and will admit that we are unable to get rid at once of the
+    evil heritage of capitalism.... The sooner we ourselves, workers
+    and peasants, learn better labor discipline and a higher technique
+    of toil, making use of the bourgeois specialists for this purpose,
+    the sooner we will get rid of the need of paying tribute to these
+    specialists.[68]
+
+We find the same readiness to compromise and to follow the line of least
+resistance in dealing with the co-operatives. From 1906 onward there had
+been an enormous growth of co-operatives in Russia. They were of various
+kinds and animated by varied degrees of social consciousness. They did not
+differ materially from the co-operatives of England, Belgium, Denmark,
+Italy, or Germany except in the one important particular that they relied
+upon bourgeois Intellectuals for leadership and direction to a greater
+extent than do the co-operatives in the countries named. They were
+admirably fitted to be the nuclei of a socialized system of distribution.
+Out of office the Bolsheviki had sneered at these working-class
+organizations and denounced them as "bourgeois corruptions of the militant
+proletariat." Necessity and responsibility soon forced the adoption of a
+new attitude toward them. The Bolshevik government had to accept the
+despised co-operatives, and even compromise Bolshevist principles as the
+price of securing their services:
+
+    A Socialist state can come into existence only as a net of
+    production and consumption communes, which keep conscientious
+    accounts of their production and consumption, economize labor,
+    steadily increasing its productivity and thus making it possible
+    to lower the workday to seven, six, or even less hours. Anything
+    less than rigorous, universal, thorough accounting and control of
+    grain and of the production of grain, and later also of all other
+    necessary products, will not do. We have inherited from capitalism
+    mass organizations which can facilitate the transition to mass
+    accounting and control of distribution--the consumers'
+    co-operatives. They are developed in Russia less than in the more
+    advanced countries, but they comprise more than 10,000,000
+    members. The decree on consumers' associations which was recently
+    issued is extremely significant, showing clearly the peculiarity
+    of the position and of the problem of the Socialist Soviet
+    Republic at the present time.
+
+    The decree is an agreement with the bourgeois co-operatives and
+    with the workmen's co-operatives adhering to the bourgeois
+    standpoint. The agreement or compromise consists, firstly, in the
+    fact that the representatives of these institutions not only
+    participated in the deliberations on this decree, but had
+    practically received a determining voice, for parts of the decree
+    which met determined opposition from these institutions were
+    rejected. Secondly and essentially, the compromise consists in the
+    rejection by the Soviet authority of the principle of free
+    admission to the co-operatives (the only consistent principle from
+    the proletarian standpoint), and that the whole population of a
+    given locality should be _united in a single co-operative_. The
+    defection from this, the only Socialist principle, which is in
+    accord with the problem of doing away with classes, allows the
+    existence of working-class co-operatives (which in this case call
+    themselves working-class co-operatives only because they submit to
+    the class interests of the bourgeoisie). Lastly, the proposition
+    of the Soviet government completely to exclude the bourgeoisie
+    from the administration of the co-operatives was also considerably
+    weakened, and only owners of capitalistic commercial and
+    industrial enterprises are excluded from the administration.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+    If the proletariat, acting through the Soviets, should
+    successfully establish accounting and control on a national scale,
+    there would be no need for such compromise. Through the Food
+    Departments of the Soviets, through their organs of supply, we
+    would unite the population in one co-operative directed by the
+    proletariat, without the assistance from bourgeois co-operatives,
+    without concessions to the purely bourgeois principle which
+    compels the labor co-operatives to remain side by side with the
+    bourgeois co-operatives instead of wholly subjecting these
+    bourgeois co-operatives, fusing both?[69]
+
+
+V
+
+It is no mood of captious, unfriendly criticism that attention is specially
+directed to these compromises. Only political charlatans, ineffective
+quacks, and irresponsible soap-box orators see crime against the
+revolutionary program of the masses in a wise and honest opportunism.
+History will not condemn the Bolsheviki for the give-and-take,
+compromise-where-necessary policy outlined in the foregoing paragraphs. Its
+condemnation will be directed rather against their failure to act in that
+spirit from the moment the first Provisional Government arose. Had they
+joined with the other Socialists and established a strong Coalition
+Government, predominantly Socialist, but including representatives of the
+most liberal and democratic elements of the bourgeoisie, it would have been
+possible to bring the problems of labor organization and labor discipline
+under democratic direction. It would not have been possible to establish
+complete industrial democracy, fully developed Socialism, nor will it be
+possible to do this for many years to come.
+
+But it would have been easy and natural for the state to secure to the
+workers a degree of economic assurance and protection not otherwise
+possible. It would have been possible, too, for the workers'
+organizations, recognized by and co-operating with the state, to have
+undertaken, in a large degree, the control of the conditions of their own
+employment which labor organizations everywhere are demanding and gradually
+gaining. The best features of "Guild Socialism" could nowhere have been so
+easily adopted.[70] But instead of effort in these directions, we find the
+Bolsheviki resorting to the _Taylor System of Scientific Management
+enforced by an individual dictator whose word is final and absolute, to
+disobey whom is treason_! There is not a nation in the world with a
+working-class movement of any strength where it would be possible to
+introduce the industrial servitude here described:
+
+    The most conscious vanguard of the Russian proletariat has already
+    turned to the problem of increasing labor discipline. For
+    instance, the central committee of the Metallurgical Union and the
+    Central Council of the Trades Unions have begun work on respective
+    measures and drafts of decrees. This work should be supported and
+    advanced by all means. _We should immediately introduce piece work
+    and try it out in practice. We should try out every scientific and
+    progressive suggestion of the Taylor System_; we should compare
+    the earnings with the general total of production, or the
+    exploitation results of railroad and water transportation, and so
+    on.
+
+    The Russian is a poor worker in comparison with the workers of the
+    advanced nations, and this could not be otherwise under the régime
+    of the Czar and other remnants of feudalism. The last word of
+    capitalism in this respect, the Taylor System--as well as all
+    progressive measures of capitalism--combine the refined cruelty of
+    bourgeois exploitation and a number of most valuable scientific
+    attainments in the analysis of mechanical motions during work, in
+    dismissing superfluous and useless motions, in determining the
+    most correct methods of the work, the best systems of accounting
+    and control, etc. The Soviet Republic must adopt valuable and
+    scientific and technical advance in this field. _The possibility
+    of Socialism will be determined by our success in combining the
+    Soviet rule and the Soviet organization of management with the
+    latest progressive measures of capitalism. We must introduce in
+    Russia the study and the teaching of the Taylor System and its
+    systematic trial and adaptation_. While working to increase the
+    productivity of labor, we must at the same time take into account
+    the peculiarities of the transition period from capitalism to
+    Socialism, which require, on one hand, that we lay the foundation
+    for the Socialist organization of emulation, and, on the other
+    hand, _require the use of compulsion so that the slogan of the
+    dictatorship of the proletariat should not be weakened by the
+    practice of a too mild proletarian government_.
+
+    The resolution of the last (Moscow) Congress of the Soviets
+    advocates, as the most important problem at present, the creation
+    of "efficient organization" and higher discipline. Such
+    resolutions are now readily supported by everybody. But that their
+    realization requires compulsion, and _compulsion in the form of a
+    dictatorship_, is ordinarily not comprehended. And yet, it would
+    be the greatest stupidity and the most absurd opportunism to
+    suppose that the transition from capitalism to Socialism is
+    possible without compulsion and dictatorship. The Marxian theory
+    has long ago criticized beyond misunderstanding this petty
+    bourgeois-democratic and anarchistic nonsense. And Russia of
+    1917-18 confirms in this respect the Marxian theory so clearly,
+    palpably, and convincingly that only those who are hopelessly
+    stupid or who have firmly determined to ignore the truth can still
+    err in this respect. Either a Kornilov dictatorship (if Kornilov
+    be taken as Russian type of a bourgeois Cavaignac) or a
+    dictatorship of the proletariat--no other alternative is possible
+    for a country which is passing through an unusually swift
+    development with unusually difficult transitions and which suffers
+    from desperate disorganization created by the most horrible
+    war.[71]
+
+This dictatorship is to be no light affair, no purely nominal force, but a
+relentless iron-hand rule. Lenine is afraid that the proletariat is too
+soft-hearted and lenient. He says:
+
+    But "dictatorship" is a great word. And great words must not be
+    used in vain. A dictatorship is an iron rule, with revolutionary
+    daring and swift and merciless in the suppression of the
+    exploiters as well as of the thugs (hooligans). And our rule is
+    too mild, quite frequently resembling jam rather than iron.[72]
+
+And so the dictatorship of the proletariat becomes the _dictatorship of a
+single person_, a super-boss and industrial autocrat: We must learn to
+combine the stormy, energetic breaking of all restraint on the part of the
+toiling masses _with iron discipline during work, with absolute submission
+to the will of one person, the Soviet director, during work_.[73]
+
+As I copy these words from Lenine's book my memory recalls the days, more
+than twenty years ago, when as a workman in England and as shop steward of
+my union I joined with my comrades in breaking down the very things Lenine
+here proposes to set up in the name of Socialism. "Absolute submission to
+the will of one person" is not a state toward which free men will strive.
+Not willingly will men who enjoy the degree of personal freedom existing in
+democratic nations turn to this:
+
+    With respect to ... the significance of individual dictatorial
+    power from the standpoint of the specific problems of the present
+    period, we must say that every large machine industry--which is
+    the material productive source and basis of Socialism--requires an
+    absolute and strict unity of the will which directs the joint work
+    of hundreds, thousands, and tens of thousands of people. This
+    necessity is obvious from the technical, economical, and
+    historical standpoint, and has always been recognized by all those
+    who had given any thought to Socialism, as its prerequisite. But
+    how can we secure a strict unity of will? _By subjecting the will
+    of thousands_ to the will of one.
+
+    This subjection, _if the participants in the common work are
+    ideally conscious and disciplined_, may resemble the mild leading
+    of an orchestra conductor; but may take the acute form of a
+    dictatorship--if there is no ideal discipline and consciousness.
+    But at any rate, _complete submission to a single will is
+    absolutely necessary for the success of the processes of work
+    which is organized on the type of large machine industry_. This is
+    doubly true of the railways. And just this transition from one
+    political problem to another, which in appearance has no
+    resemblance to the first, constitutes the peculiarity of the
+    present period. The Revolution has just broken the oldest, the
+    strongest, and the heaviest chains to which the masses were
+    compelled to submit. So it was yesterday. And to-day, the same
+    Revolution (and indeed in the interest of Socialism) demands the
+    _absolute submission_ of the masses to the _single will_ of those
+    who direct the labor process. It is self-evident that it can be
+    realized only after great upheavals, crises, returns to the old;
+    only through the greatest strain of the energy of the proletarian
+    vanguard which is leading the people to the new order....
+
+    To the extent to which the principal problem of the Soviet rule
+    changes from military suppression to administration, suppression
+    and compulsion will, _as a rule, be manifested in trials, and not
+    in shooting on the spot_. And in this respect the revolutionary
+    masses have taken, after November 7, 1918, the right road and have
+    proved the vitality of the Revolution, when they started to
+    organize their own workmen's and peasants' tribunals, before any
+    decrees were issued dismissing the bourgeois-democratic judicial
+    apparatus. _But our revolutionary and popular tribunals are
+    excessively and incredibly weak. It is apparent that the popular
+    view of the courts--which was inherited from the régime of the
+    landowners and the bourgeoisie--as not their own, has not yet been
+    completely destroyed_. It is not sufficiently appreciated that the
+    courts serve to attract all the poor to administration (for
+    judicial activity is one of the functions of state
+    administration); that the court is _an organ of the rule of the
+    proletariat and of the poorest peasantry; that the court is a
+    means of training in discipline_. There is a lack of appreciation
+    of the simple and obvious fact that, if the chief misfortunes of
+    Russia are famine and unemployment, these misfortunes cannot be
+    overcome by any outbursts of enthusiasm, but only by thorough and
+    universal organization and discipline, in order to increase the
+    production of bread for men and fuel for industry, to transport it
+    in time, and to distribute it in the right way. That therefore
+    _responsibility_ for the pangs of famine and unemployment falls on
+    _every one who violates the labor discipline in any enterprise and
+    in any business_. That those who are responsible should be
+    discovered, tried, and _punished without mercy_. The petty
+    bourgeois environment, which we will have to combat persistently
+    now, shows particularly in the lack of comprehension of the
+    economic and political connection between famine and unemployment
+    and the _prevailing dissoluteness in organization and
+    discipline_--in the firm hold of the view of the small proprietor
+    that "nothing matters, if only I gain as much as possible."
+
+    A characteristic struggle occurred on this basis in connection
+    with the last decree on railway management, the decree which
+    granted dictatorial (or "unlimited") power to individual
+    directors. The conscious (and mostly, probably, unconscious)
+    representatives of petty bourgeois dissoluteness contended that
+    the granting of "unlimited" (_i.e._, dictatorial) power to
+    individuals was a defection from the principle of board
+    administration, from the democratic and other principles of the
+    Soviet rule. Some of the Socialist-Revolutionists of the left wing
+    carried on a plainly demagogic agitation against the decree on
+    dictatorship, appealing to the evil instincts and to the petty
+    bourgeois desire for personal gain. The question thus presented is
+    of really great significance; firstly, the question of principle
+    is, in general, the appointment of individuals endowed with
+    unlimited power, the appointment of dictators, in accord with the
+    fundamental principles of the Soviet rule; secondly, in what
+    relation is this case--this precedent, if you wish--to the special
+    problems of the Soviet rule during the present concrete period?
+    Both questions deserve serious consideration.[74]
+
+With characteristic ingenuity Lenine attempts to provide this dictatorship
+with a theoretical basis which will pass muster as Marxian Socialism. He
+uses the term "Soviet democracy" as a synonym for democratic Socialism and
+says there is "absolutely no contradiction in principle" between it and
+"the use of dictatorial power of individuals." By what violence to reason
+and to language is the word _democracy_ applied to the system described by
+Lenine? To use words with such scant respect to their meanings, established
+by etymology, history, and universal agreement in usage, is to invite and
+indeed compel the contempt of minds disciplined by reason's practices. As
+for the claim that there is no contradiction in principle between
+democratic Socialism and the exercise of dictatorial power by individuals,
+before it can be accepted every Socialist teacher and leader of any
+standing anywhere, the programs of all the Socialist parties, and their
+practice, must be denied and set aside. Whether democratic Socialism be
+wise or unwise, a practical possibility or an unrealizable idea, at least
+it has nothing in common with such reactionary views as are expressed in
+the following:
+
+    That the dictatorship of individuals has very frequently in the
+    history of revolutionary movements served as an expression and
+    means of realization of the dictatorship of the revolutionary
+    classes is confirmed by the undisputed experience of history. With
+    bourgeois democratic principles, the dictatorship of individuals
+    has undoubtedly been compatible. But this point is always treated
+    adroitly by the bourgeois critics of the Soviet rule and by their
+    petty bourgeois aides. On one hand, they declared the Soviet rule
+    simply something absurd and anarchically wild, carefully avoiding
+    all our historical comparisons and theoretical proofs that the
+    Soviets are a higher form of democracy; nay, more, the beginning
+    of a _Socialist_ form of democracy. On the other hand, they demand
+    of us a higher democracy than the bourgeois and argue: with your
+    Bolshevist (_i.e._, Socialist, not bourgeois) democratic
+    principles, with the Soviet democratic principles, individual
+    dictatorship is absolutely incompatible.
+
+    Extremely poor arguments, these. If we are not Anarchists, we must
+    admit the necessity of a state--that is, of _compulsion_, for the
+    transition from capitalism to Socialism. The form of compulsion is
+    determined by the degree of development of the particular
+    revolutionary class, then by such special circumstances as, for
+    instance, the heritage of a long and reactionary war, and then by
+    the forms of resistance of the bourgeoisie and the petty
+    bourgeoisie. _There is therefore absolutely no contradiction in
+    principle between the Soviet (Socialist) democracy and the use of
+    dictatorial power of individuals_. The distinction between a
+    proletarian and a bourgeois dictatorship consists in this: that
+    the first directs its attacks against the exploiting minority in
+    the interests of the exploited majority; and, further, in this,
+    that the first is accomplished (also through individuals) not only
+    by the masses of the exploited toilers, but also by the
+    organizations which are so constructed that they arouse these
+    masses to historical creative work (the Soviets belong to this
+    kind of organization).[75]
+
+This, then, is Bolshevism, not as it is seen and described by unfriendly
+"bourgeois" writers, but as it is seen and described by the acknowledged
+intellectual and political leader of the Bolsheviki, Nikolai Lenine. I have
+not taken any non-Bolshevist authority; I have not even restated his views
+in a summary of my own, lest into the summary might be injected some
+reflexes of my own critical thought. Bolshevism is revealed in all its
+reactionary repulsiveness as something between which and absolute,
+individual dictatorial power there is "absolutely no contradiction in
+principle." It will not avail for our American followers and admirers of
+the Bolsheviki to plead that these things are temporary, compromises with
+the ideal due to the extraordinary circumstances prevailing in Russia, and
+to beg a mitigation of the severity of our judgment on that account.
+
+The answer to the plea is twofold: in the first place, they who offer it
+must, if they are sincere, abandon the savagely critical attitude they have
+seen fit to adopt toward our own government and nation because with
+"extraordinary conditions prevailing" we have had introduced conscription,
+unusual restrictions of movement and of utterance, and so forth. How else,
+indeed, can their sincerity be demonstrated? If the fact that extraordinary
+conditions justified Lenine and his associates in instituting a régime so
+tyrannical, what rule of reason or of morals must be invoked to refuse to
+count the extraordinary conditions produced in our own nation by the war as
+justification for the special measures of military service and discipline
+here introduced?
+
+But there is a second answer to the claim which is more direct and
+conclusive. It is not open to argument at all. It is found in the words of
+Lenine himself, in his claim that there is absolutely no contradiction
+between the principle of individual dictatorship, ruling with iron hand,
+and the principle upon which Soviet government rests. There has been no
+compromise here, for if there is no contradiction in principle no
+compromise could have been required. Lenine is not afraid to make or to
+admit making compromises; he admits that compromises have been made. It was
+a compromise to employ highly salaried specialists from the bourgeoisie, "a
+defection from the principles of the Paris Commune and of any proletarian
+rule," as he says. It was a compromise, another "defection from the only
+Socialist principle," to admit the right of the co-operatives to determine
+their own conditions of membership. Having made these declarations quite
+candidly, he takes pains to assure us that there was no such defection from
+principle in establishing the absolute rule of an individual dictator,
+that there was absolutely no contradiction in principle in this.[76]
+
+Moreover, there is no reason for regarding this dictatorship as a temporary
+thing, if Lenine himself is to be accepted as an authoritative spokesman.
+Obviously, if there is nothing in the principle of an absolute individual
+dictatorship which is in contradiction to the Bolshevik ideal, there can be
+no Bolshevik principle which necessarily requires for its realization the
+ending of such dictatorship. Why, therefore, may it not be continued
+indefinitely? Certainly, if the dictatorship is abolished it will not
+be--if Lenine is to be seriously considered--on account of its
+incompatibility with Bolshevik principles.
+
+
+VI
+
+The Bolshevik government of Russia is credited by many of its admirers in
+this country with having solved the great land problem and with having
+satisfied the land-hunger of the peasants. It is charged, moreover, that
+the bitter opposition to the Bolsheviki is mainly due to agitation by the
+bourgeoisie, led by the expropriated landowners, who want to defeat the
+Revolution and to have their former titles to the land restored. Of course,
+it is true that, so far as they dare to do so, the former landowners
+actively oppose the Bolsheviki. No expropriated class ever acted otherwise,
+and it would be foolish to expect anything else. But any person who
+believes that the opposition of the great peasant Socialist organizations,
+and especially of the Socialist-Revolutionists, is due to the confiscation
+of the land, either consciously or unconsciously, is capable of believing
+anything and quite immune from rationality.
+
+The facts in the case are, briefly, as follows: First, as Professor Ross
+has pointed out,[77] the land policy of the Bolshevik government was a
+compromise of the principles long advocated by its leaders, a compromise
+made for political reasons only. Second, as Marie Spiridonova abundantly
+demonstrated at an All-Russian Soviet Conference in July, 1918, the
+Bolshevik government did not honorably live up to its agreement with the
+Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left. Third, so far as the land problem was
+concerned there was not the slightest need or justification for the
+Bolshevik _coup d'état_, for the reason that the problem had already been
+solved on the precise lines afterward followed in the Soviet decree and the
+leaders of the peasants were satisfied. We have the authority of no less
+competent a witness than Litvinov, Bolshevist Minister to England, that
+"the land measure had been 'lifted' bodily from the program of the
+Socialist-Revolutionists."[78] Each of these statements is amply sustained
+by evidence which cannot be disputed or overcome.
+
+That the "land decree" which the Bolshevik government promulgated was a
+compromise with their long-cherished principles admits of no doubt
+whatever. Every one who has kept informed concerning Russian revolutionary
+movements during the past twenty or twenty-five years knows that during all
+that time one of the principal subjects of controversy among Socialists was
+the land question and the proper method of solving it. The "Narodniki," or
+peasant Socialists, later organized into the Socialist-Revolutionary party,
+wanted distribution of the land belonging to the big estates among the
+peasant communes, to be co-operatively owned and managed. They did not want
+land nationalization, which was the program of the Marxists--the Social
+Democrats. This latter program meant that, instead of the land being
+divided among the peasants' communal organizations, it should be owned,
+used, and managed by the state, the principles of large-scale production
+and wage labor being applied to agriculture in the same manner as to
+industry.
+
+The attitude of the Social Democratic party toward the peasant Socialists
+and their program was characterized by that same certainty that small
+agricultural holdings were to pass away, and by the same contemptuous
+attitude toward the peasant life and peasant aspirations that we find in
+the writings of Marx, Engels, Liebknecht, and many other Marxists.[79]
+Lenine himself had always adopted this attitude. He never trusted the
+peasants and was opposed to any program which would give the land to them
+as they desired. Mr. Walling, who spent nearly three years in Russia,
+including the whole period of the Revolution of 1905-06, writes of Lenine's
+position at that time:
+
+    Like Alexinsky, Lenine awaits the agrarian movement ... and hopes
+    that a railway strike with the destruction of the lines of
+    communication and _the support of the peasantry_ may some day put
+    the government of Russia into the people's hands. However, I was
+    shocked to find that this important leader also, though he expects
+    a full co-operation with the peasants on equal terms, _during the
+    Revolution_, feels toward them a very _deep distrust_, thinking
+    them to a large extent bigoted and blindly patriotic, and fearing
+    that they may some day shoot down the working-men as the French
+    peasants did during the Paris Commune.
+
+    The chief basis for this distrust is, of course, the prejudiced
+    feeling that the peasants are not likely to become good
+    Socialists. _It is on this account that Lenine and all the Social
+    Democratic leaders place their hopes on a future development of
+    large agricultural estates in Russia and the increase of the
+    landless agricultural working class, which alone they believe
+    would prove truly Socialist_.[80]
+
+The Russian Social Democratic Labor party, to which Lenine belonged, and of
+which he was an influential leader, adopted in 1906 the following program
+with regard to land ownership:
+
+    1. Confiscation of Church, Monastery, Appanage, Cabinet,[81] and
+    private estate lands, _except small holdings_, and turning them
+    over, together with the state lands, to the great organs of local
+    administration, which have been democratically elected. Land,
+    however, which is necessary as a basis for future colonization,
+    together with the forests and bodies of water, which are of
+    national importance, are to pass into the control of the
+    democratic state.
+
+    2. Wherever conditions are unfavorable for this transformation,
+    the party declares itself in favor of a division among the
+    peasants of such of the private estates as already have the petty
+    farming conditions, or which may be necessary to round out a
+    reasonable holding.
+
+This program was at the time regarded as a compromise. It did not wholly
+suit anybody. The peasant leaders feared the amount of state ownership and
+management involved. On the other hand, the extreme left wing of the Social
+Democrats--Lenine and his friends--wanted the party to proclaim itself in
+favor of _the complete nationalization of all privately owned land, even
+that of the small peasant owners_, but were willing, provided the principle
+were this stated, to accept, as a temporary expedient, division of the land
+in certain exceptional instances. On the other hand, the
+Socialist-Revolutionists wanted, not the distribution of lands among a
+multitude of private owners, as is very generally supposed, but its
+socialization. Their program provided for "the socialization of all
+privately owned lands--that is, the taking of them out of the private
+ownership of persons into the public ownership and _their management by
+democratically organized leagues of communities with the purpose of an
+equitable utilization_." They wanted to avoid the creation of a great army
+of what they described as "wage-slaves of the state" and, on the other
+hand, they wanted to build upon the basis of Russian communism and, as far
+as possible, prevent the extension of capitalist methods--and therefore of
+the class struggle--into the agrarian life of Russia.
+
+When the Bolsheviki came into power they sought first of all to split the
+peasant Socialist movement and gain the support of its extreme left wing.
+For this reason they agreed to adopt the program of the Revolutionary
+Socialist party. It was Marie Spiridonova who made that arrangement
+possible. It was, in fact, a political deal. Lenine and Trotzky, on behalf
+of the Bolshevik government, agreed to accept the land policy of the
+Socialist-Revolutionists, and in return Spiridonova and her friends agreed
+to support the Bolsheviki. There is abundant evidence of the truth of the
+following account of Professor Ross:
+
+    Among the first acts of the Bolsheviki in power was to square
+    their debt to the left wing of the Social Revolutionists, their
+    ally in the _coup d'état_. The latter would accept only one kind
+    of currency--the expropriation of the private landowners without
+    compensation and the transfer of all land into the hands of the
+    peasant communes. The Bolsheviki themselves, as good Marxists,
+    took no stock in the peasants' commune. As such, pending the
+    introduction of Socialism, they should, perhaps, have nationalized
+    the land and rented it to the highest bidder, regardless of
+    whether it was to be tilled in small parcels without hired labor
+    or in large blocks on the capitalistic plan. The land edict of
+    November does, indeed, decree land nationalism; however, the vital
+    proviso is added that "the use of the land must be equalized--that
+    is, according to local conditions and according to the ability to
+    work and the needs of each individual," and further that "the
+    hiring of labor is not permitted." The administrative machinery is
+    thus described: "All the confiscated land becomes the land capital
+    of the nation. Its distribution among the working-people is to be
+    in charge of the local and central authorities, beginning with the
+    organized rural and urban communities and ending with the
+    provincial central organs." Such is the irony of fate. _Those who
+    had charged the rural land commune with being the most serious
+    brake upon Russia's progress, and who had stigmatized the
+    People-ists as reactionaries and Utopians, now came to enact into
+    law most of their tenets--the equalization of the use of land, the
+    prohibition of the hiring of labor, and everything else!_[82]
+
+The much-praised land policy of the Bolsheviki is, in fact, not a Bolshevik
+policy at all, but one which they have accepted as a compromise for
+temporary political advantage. "Claim everything in sight," said a noted
+American politician on one occasion to his followers. Our followers of the
+Bolsheviki, taught by a very clever propaganda, seem to be acting upon that
+maxim. They claim for the Bolsheviki everything which can in the slightest
+manner win favor with the American public, notwithstanding that it involves
+claiming for the Bolsheviki credit to which they are not entitled. As early
+as May 18, 1917, it was announced by the Provisional Government that the
+"question of the transfer of the land to the toilers" was to be left to the
+Constituent Assembly, and there was never a doubt in the mind of any
+Russian Socialist how that body would settle it; never a moment when it was
+doubted that the Constituent Assembly would be controlled by the
+Socialist-Revolutionary party. When Kerensky became Prime Minister one of
+the first acts of his Cabinet was to create a special committee for the
+purpose of preparing the law for the socialization of the land and the
+necessary machinery for carrying the law into effect. The All-Russian
+Peasants' Congress had, as early as May, five months before the Bolshevik
+counter-revolution, adopted the land policy for which the Bolsheviki now
+are being praised by their admirers in this country. That policy had been
+crystallized into a carefully prepared law which had been approved by the
+Council of Ministers. The Bolsheviki did no more than to issue a crudely
+conceived "decree" which they have never at any time had the power to
+enforce in more than about a fourth of Russia--in place of a law which
+would have embraced all Russia and have been secure and permanent.
+
+On July 16, 1918, Marie Spiridonova, in an address delivered in Petrograd,
+protested vehemently against the manner in which the Bolshevik government
+was departing from the policy it had agreed to maintain with regard to the
+land, and going back to the old Social Democratic ideas. She declared that
+she had been responsible for the decree of February, which provided for the
+socialization of the land. That measure provided for the abolition of
+private property in land, and placed all land in the hands of and under the
+direction of the peasant communes. It was the old Socialist-Revolutionist
+program. But the Bolshevik government had not carried out the law of
+February. Instead, it had resorted to the Social Democratic method of
+nationalization. In the western governments, she said, "great estates were
+being taken over by government departments and were being managed by
+officials, on the ground that state control would yield better results than
+communal ownership. Under this system the peasants were being reduced to
+the state of slaves paid wages by the state. Yet the law provided that
+these estates should be divided among the peasant communes to be tilled by
+the peasants on a co-operative system."[83] Spiridonova protested against
+the attitude of the Bolsheviki toward the peasants, against dividing them
+into classes and placing the greater part of them with the bourgeoisie. She
+insisted that the peasants be regarded as a single class, co-operating with
+the industrial proletariat, yet distinct from it and from the bourgeoisie.
+For our present purpose, it does not matter whether the leaders of the
+Bolsheviki were right or wrong in their decision that state operation was
+better than operation by village co-operatives. Our sole concern here and
+now is the fact that they did not keep faith with the section of the
+peasants they had won over to their side, and the fact that, as this
+incident shows, we cannot regard the formal decrees of the Soviet Republic
+as descriptions of realities.
+
+The Bolsheviki remain to-day, as at the beginning, a counter-revolutionary
+power imposing its rule upon the great mass of the Russian people by armed
+force. There can be little doubt that if a free election could be had
+immediately upon the same basis as that on which the Constituent Assembly
+was elected--namely, universal, secret, equal, direct suffrage, the
+Bolsheviki would be overwhelmingly beaten. There can be little doubt that
+the great mass of the peasantry would support, as before, the candidates of
+the Socialist-Revolutionary party. It is quite true that some of the
+leaders of that party have consented to work with the Bolshevik government.
+Compromises have been effected; the Bolsheviki have conciliated the
+peasants somewhat, and the latter have, in many cases, sought to make the
+best of a bad situation. Many have adopted a passive attitude. But there
+can be no greater mistake than to believe that the Bolsheviki have solved
+the land question to the satisfaction of the peasants and so won their
+allegiance.
+
+
+VII
+
+This survey of the theories and practices of the Bolsheviki would invite
+criticism and distrust if the peace program which culminated in the
+shameful surrender to Germany, the "indecent peace" as the Russians call
+it, were passed over without mention. And yet there is no need to tell here
+a story with which every one is familiar. By that humiliating peace Russia
+lost 780,000 square kilometers of territory, occupied by 56,000,000
+inhabitants. She lost one-third of her total mileage of railways, amounting
+to more than 13,000 miles. She lost, also, 73 per cent. of her iron
+production; 89 per cent. of her coal production, and many thousands of
+factories of various kinds. These latter included 268 sugar-refineries, 918
+textile-factories, 574 breweries, 133 tobacco-factories, 1,685
+distilleries, 244 chemical-factories, 615 paper-mills, and 1,073
+machine-factories.[84] Moreover, it was not an enduring peace and war
+against Germany had to be resumed.
+
+In judging the manner in which the Bolsheviki concluded peace with Germany,
+it is necessary to be on guard against prejudice engendered by the war and
+its passions. The tragi-comedy of Brest-Litovsk, and the pitiable rôle of
+Trotzky, have naturally been linked together with the manner in which
+Lenine and his companions reached Russia with the aid of the German
+Government, the way in which all the well-known leaders of the Bolsheviki
+had deliberately weakened the morale of the troops at the front, and their
+persistent opposition to all the efforts of Kerensky to restore the
+fighting spirit of the army--all these things combined have convinced many
+thoughtful and close observers that the Bolsheviki were in league with the
+Germans against the Allies. Perhaps the time is not yet ripe for passing
+final judgment upon this matter. Certainly there were ugly-looking
+incidents which appeared to indicate a close co-operation with the Germans.
+
+There was, for example, the acknowledged fact that the Bolsheviki on
+seizing the power of government immediately entered into negotiations with
+the notorious "Parvus," whose rôle as an agent of the German Government is
+now thoroughly established. "Parvus" is the pseudonym of one of the most
+sinister figures in the history of the Socialist movement, Dr. Alexander
+Helfandt. Born at Odessa, of German-Jewish descent, he studied in Germany
+and in the early eighteen-nineties attained prominence as a prolific and
+brilliant contributor to the German Socialist review, _Die Neue Zeit_. He
+was early "exiled" from Russia, but it was suspected by a great many
+Socialists that in reality his "exile" was simply a device to cover
+employment in the Russian Secret Service as a spy and informer, for which
+the prestige he had gained in Socialist circles was a valuable aid. When
+the Revolution of 1905 broke out Helfandt returned to Russia under the
+terms of the amnesty declared at that time. He at once joined the Leninist
+section of the Social Democratic party, the Bolsheviki. A scandal occurred
+some time later, when the connection of "Parvus" with the Russian
+Government was freely charged against him. Among those who attacked him and
+accused him of being an agent-provocateur were Tseretelli, the
+Socialist-Revolutionist, and Miliukov, the leader of the Cadets.
+
+Some years later, at the time of the uprisings in connection with the Young
+Turk movement, "Parvus" turned up in Constantinople, where he was
+presumably engaged in work for the German Government. This was commonly
+believed in European political circles, though denied at the time by
+"Parvus" himself. One thing is certain, namely, that although he was
+notoriously poor when he went there--his financial condition was well known
+to his Socialist associates--he returned at the beginning of 1915 a very
+rich man. He explained his riches by saying that he had, while at
+Constantinople, Bucharest, and Sofia, successfully speculated in war wheat.
+He wrote this explanation in the German Socialist paper, _Die Glocke_, and
+drew from Hugo Hasse the following observation: "I blame nobody for being
+wealthy; I only ask if it is the rôle of a Social Democrat to become a
+profiteer of the war."[85] Very soon we find this precious gentleman
+settled in Copenhagen, where he established a "Society for Studying the
+Social Consequences of the War," which was, of course, entirely pro-German.
+This society is said to have exercised considerable influence among the
+Russians in Copenhagen and to have greatly influenced many Danish
+Socialists to take Germany's side. According to _Pravda_, the Bolshevik
+organ, the German Government, through the intermediary of German Social
+Democrats, established a working relation with Danish trade-unions and the
+Danish Social Democratic party, whereby the Danish unions got the coal
+needed in Copenhagen at a figure below the market price. Then the Danish
+party sent its leader, Borgdjerg, to Petrograd as an emissary to place
+before the Petrograd Soviet the terms of peace of the German Majority
+Socialists, which were, of course, the terms of the German Government. We
+find "Parvus" at the same time, as he is engaged in this sort of intrigue,
+associated with one Furstenberg in shipping drugs into Russia and food from
+Russia into Germany.[86] According to Grumbach,[87] he sought to induce
+prominent Norwegian Socialists to act as intermediaries to inform certain
+Norwegian syndicates that Germany would grant them a monopoly of coal
+consignments if the Norwegian Social Democratic press would adopt a more
+friendly attitude toward Germany and the Social Democratic members in the
+Norwegian parliament would urge the stoppage or the limitation of fish
+exports to England.
+
+During this period "Parvus" was bitterly denounced by Plechanov, by
+Alexinsky and other Russian Socialists as an agent of the Central Powers.
+He was denounced also by Lenine and Trotzky and by _Pravda_. Lenine
+described him as "the vilest of bandits and betrayers." It was therefore
+somewhat astonishing for those familiar with these facts to read the
+following communication, which appeared in the German Socialist press on
+November 30, 1917, and, later, in the British Socialist organ, _Justice_:
+
+    STOCKHOLM, November 20.--The Foreign Relations Committee
+    of the Bolsheviki makes the following communication: "The German
+    comrade, 'Parvus,' has brought to the Bolshevik Committee at
+    Stockholm the congratulations of the _Parteivorstand_ of the
+    Majority Social Democrats, who declare their solidarity with the
+    struggles of the Russian proletariat and with its request to begin
+    pourparlers immediately on the basis of a democratic peace without
+    annexations and indemnities. The Foreign Relations Committee of
+    the Bolsheviki has transmitted these declarations to the Central
+    Committee at Petrograd, as well as to the Soviets."
+
+When Hugo Hasse questioned Philipp Scheidemann about the negotiations which
+were going on through "Parvus," Scheidemann replied that it was the
+Bolsheviki themselves who had invited "Parvus" to come to Stockholm for the
+purpose of opening up negotiations. This statement was denounced as a lie
+by Karl Radek in _Pravda_. Some day, doubtless, the truth will be known;
+for the present it is enough to note the fact that as early as November the
+Bolsheviki were negotiating through such a discredited agent of the Central
+Powers as Dr. Alexander Helfandt, otherwise "Parvus," the well-known
+Marxist! Such facts as this, added to those previously noticed, tended
+inevitably to strengthen the conviction that Lenine and Trotsky were the
+pliant and conscious tools of Germany all the time, and that the protests
+of Trotzky at Brest-Litovsk were simply stage-play.
+
+But for all that, unless and until official, documentary evidence is
+forthcoming which proves them to have been in such relations with the
+German Government and military authorities, they ought not to be condemned
+upon the chain of suspicious circumstances, strong as that chain apparently
+is. The fact is that they had to make peace, and make it quickly. Kerensky,
+had he been permitted to hold on, would equally have had to make a separate
+peace, and make it quickly. Only one thing could have delayed that for
+long--namely, the arrival of an adequate force of Allied troops on the
+Russian front to stiffen the morale and to take the burden of fighting off
+from the Russians. Of that there was no sign and no promise or likelihood.
+Kerensky knew that he would have had to make peace, at almost any cost and
+on almost any terms, if he remained in power. If the Bolsheviki appear in
+the light of traitors to the Allies, it should be remembered that pressure
+of circumstances would have forced even such a loyal friend of the Allies
+as Kerensky certainly proved himself to be to make a separate peace,
+practically on Germany's terms, in a very little while. It was not a matter
+of months, but of weeks at most, probably of days.
+
+Russia had to have peace. The nation was war-weary and exhausted. The
+Allies had not understood the situation--indeed, they never have understood
+Russia, even to this day--and had bungled right along. What made it
+possible for the Bolsheviki to assert their rule so easily was the fact
+that they promised immediate peace, and the great mass of the Russian
+workers wanted immediate peace above everything else. They were so eager
+for peace that so long as they could get it they cared at the time for
+nothing. Literally nothing else mattered. As we have seen, the Bolshevik
+leaders had strenuously denied wanting to make a "separate peace." There is
+little reason for doubting that they were sincere in this in the sense that
+what they wanted was a _general_ peace, if that could be possibly obtained.
+Peace they had to have, as quickly as possible. If they could not persuade
+their Allies to join with them in making such a general peace, they were
+willing to make a _separate_ peace. That is quite different from _wanting_
+a separate peace from the first. There was, indeed, in the demand made at
+the beginning of December upon the Allies to restate their war aims within
+a period of seven days an arrogant and provocative tone which invited the
+suspicion that the ultimatum--for such it was--had not been conceived in
+good faith; that it was deliberately framed in such a manner as to prevent
+compliance by the Allies. And it may well be the fact that Lenine and
+Trotzky counted upon the inevitable refusal to convince the Russian people,
+and especially the Russian army, that the Allied nations were fighting for
+imperialistic ends, just as the Bolsheviki had always charged. The
+Machiavellian cunning of such a policy is entirely characteristic of the
+conspirator type.
+
+On December 14th the armistice was signed at Brest-Litovsk, to last for a
+period of twenty-eight days. On December 5th, the Bolsheviki had published
+the terms upon which they desired to effect the armistice. These terms,
+which the Germans scornfully rejected, provided that the German forces
+which had been occupied on the Russian front should not be sent to other
+fronts to fight against the Allies, and that the German troops should
+retire from the Russian islands held by them. In the armistice as it was
+finally signed at Brest-Litovsk there was a clause which, upon its face,
+seemed to prove that Trotzky had kept faith with the Allies. The clause
+provided that there should be no transfer of troops by either side, for the
+purpose of military operations, during the armistice, from the front
+between the Baltic and the Black Sea. This, however, was, from the German
+point of view, merely a _pro forma_ arrangement, a "scrap of paper."
+Grumbach wrote to _L'Humanité_ that on December 20th Berlin was full of
+German soldiers from the Russian front en route to the western front. He
+said that he had excellent authority for saying that this had been called
+to the attention of Lenine and Trotzky by the Independent Social Democrats,
+but that, "nevertheless, they diplomatically shut their eyes."[88] It is
+more than probable that, in the circumstances, neither Lenine nor Trotzky
+cared much if at all for such a breach of the terms of the armistice, but,
+had their attitude been otherwise, what could they have done? They were as
+helpless as ever men were in the world, as subsequent events proved.
+
+As one reads the numerous declamatory utterances of Trotzky in those
+critical days of early December, 1917, the justice of Lenine's scornful
+description of his associate as a "man who blinds himself with
+revolutionary phrases" becomes manifest. It is easy to understand the
+strained relations that existed between the two men. His "neither war nor
+peace" gesture--it was no more!--his dramatic refusal to sign the stiffened
+peace terms, his desire to call all Russia to arms again to fight the
+Germans, his determination to create a vast "Red Army" to renew the war
+against Germany, and his professed willingness to "accept the services of
+American officers in training that army," all indicated a mind given to
+illusions and stone blind to realities. Lenine at least knew that the game
+was up. He knew that the game into which he had so coolly entered when he
+left Switzerland, and which he had played with all his skill and cunning,
+was at an end and that the Germans had won. The Germans behaved with a
+perfidy that is unmatched in modern history, disregarded the armistice they
+had signed, and savagely hurled their forces against the defenseless,
+partially demobilized and trusting Russians. There was nothing left for the
+Bolsheviki to do. They had delivered Russia to the Germans. In March the
+"indecent peace" was signed, with what result we know. Bolshevism had been
+the ally of Prussian militarism. Consciously or unconsciously, willingly or
+unwillingly, Lenine, Trotzky, and the other Bolshevik leaders had done all
+that men could do to make the German military lords masters of the world.
+Had there been a similar movement in France, England, the United States, or
+even Italy, to-day the Hohenzollerns and Habsburgs would be upon their
+thrones, realizing the fulfilment of the Pan-German vision.
+
+
+VIII
+
+In view of the fact that so many of our American pacifists have glorified
+the Bolsheviki, it may be well to remind them, if they have forgotten, or
+to inform them, if they do not know it, that their admiration is by no
+means reciprocated. Both Lenine and Trotzky have spoken and written in
+terms of utter disdain of pacifist movements in general and of the
+pacifists of England and America in particular. They have insisted that,
+_in present society_, disarmament is really a reactionary proposal. The
+inclusion in the Constitution, which they have forced upon Russia by armed
+might, of _permanent universal compulsory military service_ is not by
+accident. They believe that only when all nations have become Socialist
+nations will it be a proper policy for Socialists to favor disarmament. It
+would be interesting to know how our American admirers and defenders of
+Bolshevism, who are all anti-conscriptionists and ultra-pacifists, so far
+as can be discovered, reconcile their position with that of the Bolsheviki
+who base their state, not as a temporary expedient, _but as a matter of
+principle_, upon universal, compulsory military service! What, one wonders,
+do these American Bolsheviki worshipers think of the teaching of these
+paragraphs from an article by Lenine?[89]
+
+    Disarmament is a Socialistic ideal. In Socialist society there
+    will be no more wars, which means that disarmament will have been
+    realized. But he is not a Socialist who expects the realization of
+    Socialism _without_ the social revolution and the dictatorship of
+    the proletariat. Dictatorship is a government power, depending
+    directly upon force, and, in the twentieth century, force means,
+    not fists and clubs, but armies. To insert "disarmament" into our
+    program is equivalent to saying, we are opposed to the use of
+    arms. But such a statement would contain not a grain of Marxism,
+    any more than would the equivalent statement, we are opposed to
+    the use of force.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+    _A suppressed class which has no desire to learn the use of arms,
+    and to bear arms, deserves nothing else than to be treated as
+    slaves_. We cannot, unless we wish to transform ourselves into
+    mere bourgeois pacifists, forget that we are living in a society
+    based on classes, and that there is no escape from such a society,
+    except by the class struggle and the overthrow of the power of the
+    ruling class.
+
+    In every class society, whether it be based on slavery, serfdom,
+    or, as at the present moment, on wage-labor, the class of the
+    oppressors is an armed class. Not only the standing army of the
+    present day, but also the present-day popular militia--even in the
+    most democratic bourgeois republics, as in Switzerland--means an
+    armament of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat....
+
+    How can you, in the face of this fact, ask the revolutionary
+    Social Democracy to set up the "demand" of "disarmament"? _To ask
+    this is to renounce completely the standpoint of the class
+    struggle, to give up the very thought of revolution_. Our
+    watchword must be: to arm the proletariat so that it may defeat,
+    expropriate, and disarm the bourgeoisie. This is the only possible
+    policy of the revolutionary class, a policy arising directly from
+    the _actual evolution_ of capitalistic militarism, in fact,
+    dictated by the evolution. Only after having disarmed the
+    bourgeoisie can the proletariat, without betraying its historic
+    mission, cast all weapons to the scrap-heap; and there is no doubt
+    that the proletariat will do this, but only then, and not by any
+    possibility before then.
+
+How is it possible for our extreme pacifists, with their relentless
+opposition to military force in all its forms to conscription, to universal
+military service, to armaments of all kinds, even for defensive purposes,
+and to voluntarily enlisted armies even, to embrace Bolshevism with
+enthusiasm, resting as it does upon the basis of the philosophy so frankly
+stated by Lenine, is a question for which no answer seems wholly adequate.
+Of course, what Lenine advocates is class armament within the nation, for
+civil war--the war of the classes. But he is not opposed to national
+armaments, as such, nor willing to support disarmament as a national policy
+_until the time comes when an entirely socialized humanity finds itself
+freed from the necessity of arming against anybody_. There is probably not
+a militarist in America to-day who, however bitterly opposed to disarmament
+as a present policy, would not agree that if, in some future time, mankind
+reaches the happy condition of universal Socialism, disarmament will then
+become practicable and logical. It would not be difficult for General Wood
+to subscribe to that doctrine, I think. It would not have been difficult
+for Mr. Roosevelt to subscribe to it.
+
+Not only is Lenine willing to support national armaments, and even to fight
+for the defense of national rights, whenever an attack on these is also an
+attack on proletarian rights--which he believes to be the case in the
+continued war against Germany, he goes much farther than this _and provides
+a theoretical justification for a Socialist policy of passive acceptance of
+ever-increasing militarism_. He draws a strangely forced parallel between
+the Socialist attitude toward the trusts and the attitude which ought to be
+taken toward armaments. We know, he argues, that trusts bring great evils.
+Against the evils we struggle, but how? Not by trying to do away with the
+trusts, for we regard the trusts as steps in progress. We must go onward,
+through the trust system to Socialism. In a similar way we should not
+deplore "the militarization of the populations." If the bourgeoisie
+militarizes all the men, and all the boys, nay, even all the women, why--so
+much the better! "Never will the women of an oppressed class that is really
+revolutionary be content" to demand disarmament. On the contrary, they will
+encourage their sons to bear the arms and "learn well the business of war."
+Of course, this knowledge they will use, "not in order that they may shoot
+at their brothers, the workers of other countries, as they are doing in the
+present war ... but in order that they may struggle against the bourgeoisie
+in their own country, in order that they may put an end to exploitation,
+poverty, and war, not by the path of good-natured wishes, but by the path
+of victory over the bourgeoisie and of disarmament of the bourgeoisie."[90]
+ Universally the working class has taken a position the
+very opposite of this. Universally we find the organized working class
+favoring disarmament, peace agreements, and covenants in general opposing
+extensions of what Lenine describes as "the militarization of populations."
+For this universality of attitude and action there can only be one adequate
+explanation--namely, the instinctive class consciousness of the workers.
+But, according to Lenine, this instinctive class consciousness is all
+wrong; somehow or other it expresses itself in a "bourgeois" policy. The
+workers ought to welcome the efforts of the ruling class to militarize and
+train in the arts of war not only the men of the nations, but the boys and
+even the women as well. Some day, if this course be followed, there will be
+two great armed classes in every nation and between these will occur the
+decisive war which shall establish the supremacy of the most numerous and
+powerful class. Socialism is thus to be won, not by the conquests of reason
+and of conscience, but by brute force.
+
+Obviously, there is no point of sympathy between this brutal and arrogant
+gospel of force and the striving of modern democracy for the peaceful
+organization of the world, for disarmament, a league of nations, and, in
+general, the supplanting of force of arms by the force of reason and
+morality. There is a Prussian quality in Lenine's philosophy. He is the
+Treitschke of social revolt, brutal, relentless, and unscrupulous, glorying
+in might, which is, for him, the only right. And that is what characterizes
+the whole Bolshevik movement: it is the infusion into the class strife and
+struggles of the world the same brutality and the same faith that might is
+right which made Prussian militarism the menace it was to civilization.
+
+And just as the world of civilized mankind recognized Prussian militarism
+as its deadly enemy, to be overcome at all costs, so, too, Bolshevism must
+be overcome. And that can best be done, not by attempting to drown it in
+blood, but by courageously and consistently setting ourselves to the task
+of removing the social oppression, the poverty, and the servitude which
+produce the desperation of soul that drives men to Bolshevism. The remedy
+for Bolshevism is a sane and far-reaching program of constructive social
+democracy.
+
+
+
+
+POSTSCRIPTUM: A PERSONAL STATEMENT
+
+
+This book is the fulfilment of a promise to a friend. Soon after my return
+from Europe, in November, I spent part of a day in New York discussing
+Bolshevism with two friends. One of these is a Russian Socialist, who has
+lived many years in America, a citizen of the United States, and a man
+whose erudition and fidelity to the working-class movement during many
+years have long commanded my admiration and reverence. The other friend is
+a native American, also a Socialist. A sincere Christian, he has identified
+his faith in the religion of Jesus and his faith in democratic Socialism.
+The two are not conflicting forces, or even separate ones, but merely
+different and complementary aspects of the same faith. He is a man who is
+universally loved and honored for his nobility of character and his
+generous idealism. While in Europe I had spent much time consulting with
+Russian friends in Paris, Rome, and other cities, and had collected a
+considerable amount of authentic material relating to Bolshevism and the
+Bolsheviki. I had not the slightest intention of using this material to
+make a book; in fact, my plans contemplated a very different employment of
+my time. But, in the course of the discussion, my American Socialist friend
+asked me to "jot down" for him some of the things I had said, and,
+especially, to write, in a letter, what I believed to be the psychology of
+Bolshevism. This, in an unguarded moment, I undertook to do.
+
+When I set out, a few days later, to redeem my promise, I found that, in
+order to make things intelligible, it was absolutely necessary to explain
+the historical backgrounds of the Russian revolutionary movement, to
+describe the point of view of various persons and groups with some detail,
+and to quote quite extensively from the documentary material I had
+gathered. Naturally, the limits of a letter were quickly outgrown and I
+found that my response to my friend's innocent request approached the
+length of a small volume. Even so, it was quite unsatisfactory. It left
+many things unexplained and much of my own thought obscure. I decided then
+to rewrite the whole thing and make a book of it, thus making available for
+what I hope will be a large number of readers what I had at first intended
+only for a dear friend.
+
+I am very conscious of the imperfections of the book as it stands. It has
+been written under conditions far from favorable, crowded into a very busy
+life. My keenest critics will, I am sure, be less conscious of its defects
+than I am. It is, however, an earnest contribution to a very important
+discussion, and, I venture to hope, with all its demerits, a useful one. If
+it aids a single person to a clearer comprehension of the inherent
+wrongfulness of the Bolshevist philosophy and method, I shall be rewarded.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+_So here, my dear Will, is the fulfilment of my promise._
+
+
+
+
+APPENDICES
+
+
+I. AN APPEAL TO THE PROLETARIAT BY THE PETROGRAD WORKMEN'S AND
+SOLDIERS' COUNCIL
+
+II. HOW THE RUSSIAN PEASANTS FOUGHT FOR A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY--A
+REPORT TO THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST BUREAU
+
+III. FORMER SOCIALIST PREMIER OF FINLAND ON BOLSHEVISM
+
+
+
+
+APPENDIX I
+
+AN APPEAL TO THE PROLETARIAT BY THE PETROGRAD WORKMEN'S AND SOLDIERS'
+COUNCIL
+
+
+COMRADES:
+
+_Proletarians and Working-people of all Countries_:
+
+We, Russian workers and soldiers, united in the Petrograd Workmen's and
+Soldiers' Delegate Council, send you our warmest greetings and the news of
+great events. The democracy of Russia has overthrown the century-old
+despotism of the Czars and enters your ranks as a rightful member and as a
+powerful force in the battle for our common liberation. Our victory is a
+great victory for the freedom and democracy of the world. The principal
+supporter of reaction in the world, the "gendarme of Europe," no longer
+exists. May the earth over his grave become a heavy stone! Long live
+liberty, long live the international solidarity of the proletariat and its
+battle for the final victory!
+
+Our cause is not yet entirely won. Not all the shadows of the old régime
+have been scattered and not a few enemies are gathering their forces
+together against the Russian Revolution. Nevertheless, our conquests are
+great. The peoples of Russia will express their will in the Constitutional
+convention which is to be called within a short time upon the basis of
+universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage. And now it may already be
+said with certainty in advance that the democratic republic will triumph in
+Russia. The Russian people is in possession of complete political liberty.
+Now it can say an authoritative word about the internal self-government of
+the country and about its foreign policy. And in addressing ourselves to
+all the peoples who are being destroyed and ruined in this terrible war, we
+declare that the time has come in which the decisive struggle against the
+attempts at conquest by the governments of all the nations must be begun.
+The time has come in which the peoples must take the matter of deciding the
+questions of war and peace into their own hands.
+
+Conscious of its own revolutionary strength, the democracy of Russia
+declares that it will fight with all means against the policy of conquest
+of its ruling classes, and it summons the peoples of Europe to united,
+decisive action for peace. We appeal to our brothers, to the
+German-Austrian coalition, and above all to the German proletariat. The
+first day of the war you were made to believe that in raising your weapons
+against absolutist Russia you were defending European civilization against
+Asiatic despotism. In this many of you found the justification of the
+support that was accorded to the war. Now also this justification has
+vanished. Democratic Russia cannot menace freedom and civilization.
+
+We shall firmly defend our own liberty against all reactionary threats,
+whether they come from without or within. The Russian Revolution will not
+retreat before the bayonets of conquerors, and it will not allow itself to
+be trampled to pieces by outside military force. We call upon you to throw
+off the yoke of your absolutist régime, as the Russian people has shaken
+off the autocracy of the Czars. Refuse to serve as the tools of conquest
+and power in the hands of the kings, Junkers, and bankers, and we shall,
+with common efforts, put an end to the fearful butchery that dishonors
+humanity and darkens the great days of the birth of Russian liberty.
+
+Working-men of all countries! In fraternally stretching out our hands to
+you across the mountains of our brothers' bodies, across the sea of
+innocent blood and tears, across the smoking ruins of cities and villages,
+across the destroyed gifts of civilization, we summon you to the work of
+renewing and solidifying international unity. In that lies the guaranty of
+our future triumph and of the complete liberation of humanity.
+
+Working-men of all countries, unite!
+
+    TCHCHEIDZE, _the President_.
+    PETROGRAD, _April, 1917_.
+
+
+
+
+APPENDIX II
+
+HOW THE RUSSIAN PEASANTS FOUGHT FOR A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY[91]
+
+
+A report to the International Socialist Bureau by Inna Rakitnikov,
+Vice-President of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Delegates,
+placing themselves upon the grounds of the defense of the Constituent
+Assembly.
+
+With a letter-preface by the citizen, E. Roubanovitch, member of the
+International Socialist Bureau.
+
+    _To the Executive Committee of the International Socialist
+    Bureau_:
+
+    DEAR COMRADES,--The citizen Inna Rakitnikov has lately
+    come from Petrograd to Paris for personal reasons that are
+    peculiarly tragic. At the time of her departure the Executive
+    Committee of the Second Soviet of Peasant Delegates of All-Russia,
+    of which she is one of the vice-presidents, requested her to make
+    to the International Socialist Bureau a detailed report of the
+    fights that this organization had to make against the Bolsheviki
+    in order to realize the convocation of the Constituent Assembly.
+
+    This is the report under the title of a document that I present
+    here, without commentary, asking you to communicate it without
+    delay to all the sections of the International. Two words of
+    explanation, only: First, I wish to draw your attention to the
+    fact that this is the second time that the Executive Committee of
+    the Soviet of the Peasants of All-Russia addresses itself publicly
+    to the International.
+
+    At the time of my journey to Stockholm in the month of September,
+    1917, I made, at a session of the Holland, Scandinavian committee,
+    presided over by Branting, a communication in the name of the
+    Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasants. I handed over on
+    this occasion to our secretary, Camille Huysmans, an appeal to the
+    democrats of the entire world, in which the Executive Committee
+    indicated clearly its position in the questions of the world war
+    and of agrarian reform, and vindicated its place in the Workers'
+    and Socialist International family.
+
+    I must also present to you the author of this report. The citizen
+    Rakitnikov, a member of the Russian Revolutionary Socialist party,
+    has worked for a long time in the ranks of this party as a
+    publicist and organizer and propagandist, especially among the
+    peasants. She has known long years of prison, of Siberia, of
+    exile. Before and during the war until the beginning of the
+    Revolution she lived as a political fugitive in Paris. While being
+    a partizan convinced of the necessity of national defense of
+    invaded countries against the imperialistic aggression of German
+    militarism--in which she is in perfect accord with the members of
+    our party such as Stepan Sletof, Iakovlef, and many other
+    voluntary Russian republicans, all dead facing the enemy in the
+    ranks of the French army--the citizen Rakitnikov belonged to the
+    international group. I affirm that her sincere and matured
+    testimony cannot be suspected of partizanship or of dogmatic
+    partiality against the Bolsheviki, who, as you know, tried to
+    cover their follies and their abominable crimes against the plan
+    of the Russian people, and against all the other Socialist
+    parties, under the lying pretext of internationalist ideas, ideas
+    which they have, in reality, trampled under foot and betrayed.
+
+    Yours fraternally,
+    E. ROUBANOVITCH,
+    _June 28, 1918._
+    _Member of the B.S.I._
+
+"The Bolsheviki who promised liberty, equality, peace, etc., have not been
+ashamed to follow in the footsteps of Czarism. It is not liberty; it is
+tyranny." (Extract from a letter of a young Russian Socialist, an
+enthusiast of liberty who died all too soon.)
+
+
+I
+
+_Organization of the Peasants after the Revolution in Soviets of Peasant
+Delegates_
+
+
+A short time after the Revolution of February the Russian peasants grouped
+themselves in a National Soviet of Peasant Delegates at the First Congress
+of the Peasants of All-Russia, which took place at Petrograd. The Executive
+Committee of this Soviet was elected. It was composed of well-known leaders
+of the Revolutionary Socialist party and of peasant delegates sent from the
+country. Without adhering officially to the Revolutionary Socialist party,
+the Soviet of Peasant Delegates adopted the line of conduct of this party.
+While co-ordinating its tactics with the party's, it nevertheless remained
+an organization completely independent. The Bolsheviki, who at this
+Congress attempted to subject the peasants to their influence, had not at
+the time any success. The speeches of Lenine and the other members of this
+party did not meet with any sympathy, but on the contrary provoked lively
+protest. The Executive Committee had as its organ the paper _Izvestya of
+the National Soviet of Peasant Delegates_. Thousands of copies of this were
+scattered throughout the country. Besides the central national Soviet there
+existed local organizations, the Soviets, the government districts who were
+in constant communication with the Executive Committee staying at
+Petrograd.
+
+From its foundation the Executive Committee exercised great energy in the
+work of the union and the organization of the peasant masses, and in the
+development of the Socialist conscience in their breasts. Its members
+spread thousands and hundreds of thousands of copies of pamphlets of the
+Revolutionary Socialist party, exposing in simple form the essence of
+Socialism and the history of the International explaining the sense and the
+importance of the Revolution in Russia, the history of the fight that
+preceded it, showing the significance of the liberties acquired. They
+insisted, above all, on the importance of the socialization of the soil and
+the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. A close and living tie was
+created between the members of the Executive Committee staying at Petrograd
+and the members in the provinces. The Executive Committee was truly the
+expression of the will of the mass of the Russian peasants.
+
+The Minister of Agriculture and the principal agrarian committee were at
+this time occupied in preparing the groundwork of the realization of
+socialization of the soil; the Revolutionary Socialist party did not cease
+to press the government to act in this sense. Agrarian committees were
+formed at once to fight against the disorganized recovery of lands by the
+peasants, and to take under their control large properties where
+exploitation based on the co-operative principle was in progress of
+organization; agricultural improvements highly perfected would thus be
+preserved against destruction and pillage. At the same time agrarian
+committees attended to a just distribution among the peasants of the lands
+of which they had been despoiled.
+
+The peasants, taken in a body, and in spite of the agrarian troubles which
+occurred here and there, awaited the reform with patience, understanding
+all the difficulties which its realization required and all the
+impossibilities of perfecting the thing hastily. The Executive Committee of
+the Soviet of Peasants' Delegates played in this respect an important rôle.
+It did all it could to explain to the peasants the complexity of the
+problem in order to prevent them from attempting anything anarchistic, or
+to attempt a disorganized recovery of lands which could end only with the
+further enrichment of peasants who were already rich.
+
+Such was, in its general aspect, the action of the National Soviet of
+Peasants' Delegates, which, in the month of August, 1917, addressed,
+through the intermediary of the International Socialist Bureau, an appeal
+to the democracies of the world. In order to better understand the events
+which followed, we must consider for a moment the general conditions which
+at that time existed in Russia, and in the midst of which the action of
+this organization was taking place.
+
+
+II
+
+_The Difficulties of the Beginning of the Revolution_
+
+
+The honeymoon of the Revolution had passed rapidly. Joy gave place to cares
+and alarms. Autocracy had bequeathed to the country an unwieldy heritage:
+the army and the whole mechanism of the state were disorganized. Taking
+advantage of the listlessness of the army, the Bolshevist propaganda
+developed and at the same time increased the desire of the soldiers to
+fight no more. The disorganization was felt more and more at the front; at
+the same time anarchy increased in the interior of the country; production
+diminished; the productiveness of labor was lowered, and an eight-hour day
+became in fact a five or six-hour day. The strained relations between the
+workers and the administration were such that certain factories preferred
+to close. The central power suffered frequent crises; the Cadets, fearing
+the responsibilities, preferred to remain out of power.
+
+All this created a state of unrest and hastened the preparations for the
+election of the Constituent Assembly, toward which the eyes of the whole
+country were turned. Nevertheless, the country was far from chaos and from
+the anarchy into which further events plunged it. Young Russia, not
+accustomed to liberty, without experience in political life and autonomous
+action, was far from that hopeless state to which the Bolsheviki reduced it
+some months later. The people had confidence in the Socialists, in the
+Revolutionary Socialist party, which then held sway everywhere, in the
+municipalities, the zemstvos, and in the Soviets; they had confidence in
+the Constituent Assembly which would restore order and work out the laws.
+All that was necessary was to combat certain characteristics and certain
+peculiarities of the existence of the Russian people, which impelled them
+toward anarchy, instead of encouraging them, as did the Bolsheviki, who, in
+this respect, followed the line of least resistance.
+
+The Bolshevist propaganda did all within its power to weaken the
+Provisional Government, to discredit it in the eyes of the people, to
+increase the licentiousness at the front and disorganization in the
+interior of the country. They proclaimed that the "Imperialists" sent the
+soldiers to be massacred, but what they did not say is that under actual
+conditions it was necessary for a revolutionary people to have a
+revolutionary army to defend its liberty. They spoke loudly for a
+counter-revolution and for counter-revolutionaries who await but the
+propitious moment to take hold of the government, while in reality the
+complete failure of the insurrection of Kornilov showed that the
+counter-revolution could rest on nothing, that there was no place for it
+then in the life of Russia.
+
+In fine, the situation of the country was difficult, but not critical. The
+united efforts of the people and all the thousands of forces of the country
+would have permitted it to come to the end of its difficulties and to find
+a solution of the situation.
+
+
+III
+
+_The Insurrection of Kornilov_
+
+
+But now the insurrection of Kornilov broke out. It was entirely unexpected
+by all the Socialist parties, by their central committees, and, of course,
+by the Socialist Ministers. Petrograd was in no way prepared for an attack
+of this kind. In the course of the evening of the fatal day when Kornilov
+approached Petrograd, the central committee of the Revolutionary Socialist
+party received by telephone, from the Palace of Hiver, the news of the
+approach of Kornilovien troops. This news revolutionized everybody. A
+meeting of all the organizations took place at Smolny; the members of the
+party alarmed by the news, and other persons wishing to know the truth
+about the events, or to receive indications as to what should be done, came
+there to a reunion. It was a strange picture that Smolny presented that
+night. The human torrent rushed along its corridors, committees and
+commissions sat in its side apartments. They asked one another what was
+happening, what was to be done. News succeeded news. One thing was certain.
+Petrograd was not prepared for the fight. It was not protected by anything,
+and the Cossacks who followed Kornilov could easily take it.
+
+The National Soviet of Peasants' Delegates in the session that it held that
+same night at No. 6 Fontaka Street adopted a resolution calling all the
+peasants to armed resistance against Kornilov. The Central Executive
+Committee with the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates established
+a special organization which was to defend Petrograd and to fight against
+the insurrection. Detachments of volunteers and of soldiers were directed
+toward the locality where Kornilov was, to get information and to organize
+a propaganda among the troops that followed the General, and in case of
+failure to fight hand to hand. As they quit in the morning they did not
+know how things would turn; they were rather pessimistic with regard to the
+issue of the insurrection for the Socialists.
+
+The end of this conspiracy is known. The troops that followed Kornilov left
+him as soon as they found out the truth. In this respect, everything ended
+well, but this event had profound and regrettable circumstances.
+
+The acute deplorable crisis of the central power became chronic. The
+Cadets, compromised by their participation in the Kornilov conspiracy,
+preferred to remain apart. The Socialist-Revolutionists did not see clearly
+what there was at the bottom of the whole affair. _It was as much as any
+one knew at the moment_. Kerensky, in presence of the menace of the
+counter-revolution on the right and of the growing anarchy on the extreme
+left, would have called to Petrograd a part of the troops from the front to
+stem the tide. Such was the rôle of different persons in this story. It is
+only later, when all the documents will be shown, that the story can be
+verified, but at all events it is beyond doubt that the Revolutionary
+Socialist party was in no wise mixed in this conspiracy. The conspiracy of
+Kornilov completely freed the hands of the Bolsheviki. In the Pravda, and
+in other Bolshevist newspapers, complaints were read of the danger of a new
+counter-revolution which was developing with the complicity of Kerensky
+acting in accord or in agreement with the traitor Cadets. The public was
+excited against the Socialist-Revolutionists, who were accused of having
+secretly helped this counter-revolution. The Bolsheviki alone, said its
+organs, had saved the Revolution; to them alone was due the failure of the
+Kornilov insurrection.
+
+The Bolsheviki agitation assumed large proportions. Copies of the _Pravda_,
+spread lavishly here and there, were poisoned with calumny, campaigns
+against the other parties, boasting gross flatteries addressed to the
+soldiers and appeals to trouble. Bolsheviki meetings permeated with the
+same spirit were organized at Petrograd, Moscow, and other cities.
+Bolshevist agitators set out for the front at the same time with copies of
+the _Pravda_ and other papers, and the Bolsheviki enjoyed, during this
+time--as Lenine himself admits--complete liberty. Their chiefs, compromised
+in the insurrection of June 3d, had been given their freedom.
+
+Their principal watchword was "Down with the war!" "Kerensky and the other
+conciliators," they cried, "want war and do not want peace. Kerensky will
+give you neither peace, nor land, nor bread, nor Constituent Assembly. Down
+with the traitor and the counter-revolutionists! They want to smother the
+Revolution. We demand peace. We will give you peace, land to the peasants,
+factories and work to the workmen!" Under this simple form the agitation
+was followed up among the masses and found a propitious ground, first among
+the soldiers who were tired of war and athirst for peace. In the Soviet of
+the Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates of Petrograd the Bolshevist party
+soon found itself strengthened and fortified. Its influence was also
+considerable among the sailors of the Baltic fleet. Cronstadt was entirely
+in their hands. New elections of the Central Executive Committee of the
+Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates soon became necessary; they
+gave a big majority to the Bolsheviki. The old bureau, Tchcheidze at its
+head, had to leave; the Bolsheviki triumphed clamorously.
+
+To fight against the Bolsheviki the Executive Committee of the National
+Soviet of Peasants' Delegates decided at the beginning of December to call
+a Second General Peasants' Congress. This was to decide if the peasants
+would defend the Constituent Assembly or if they would follow the
+Bolsheviki. This Congress had, in effect, a decisive importance. It showed
+what was the portion of the peasant class that upheld the Bolsheviki. It
+was principally the peasants in soldiers' dress, the "déclassé soldiers,"
+men taken from the country life by the war, from their natural
+surroundings, and desiring but one thing, the end of the war. The peasants
+who had come from the country had, on the contrary, received the mandate to
+uphold the Constituent Assembly. They firmly maintained their point of view
+and resisted all the attempts of the Bolsheviki and the
+"Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left" (who followed them blindly) to make
+their influence prevail. The speech of Lenine was received with hostility;
+as for Trotzky, who, some time before, had publicly threatened with the
+guillotine all the "enemies of the Revolution," they prevented him from
+speaking, crying out: "Down with the tyrant! Guillotineur! Assassin!" To
+give his speech Trotzky, accompanied by his faithful "capotes," was obliged
+to repair to another hall.
+
+The Second Peasants' Congress was thus distinctly split into two parties.
+The Bolsheviki tried by every means to elude a straight answer to the
+question, "Does the Congress wish to uphold the Constituent Assembly?" They
+prolonged the discussion, driving the peasants to extremities by every kind
+of paltry discussion on foolish questions, hoping to tire them out and thus
+cause a certain number of them to return home. The tiresome discussions
+carried on for ten days, with the effect that a part of the peasants,
+seeing nothing come from it, returned home. But the peasants had, in spite
+of all, the upper hand; by a roll-call vote 359 against 314 pronounced
+themselves for the defense without reserve of the Constituent Assembly.
+
+Any work in common for the future was impossible. The fraction of the
+peasants that pronounced itself for the Constituent Assembly continued to
+sit apart, named its Executive Committee, and decided to continue the fight
+resolutely. The Bolsheviki, on their part, took their partizans to the
+Smolny, declared to be usurpers of the Soviet of Peasants' Delegates who
+pronounced themselves for the defense of the Constituante, and, with the
+aid of soldiers, ejected the former Executive Committee from their premises
+and took possession of their goods, the library, etc.
+
+The new Executive Committee, which did not have at its disposition Red
+Guards, was obliged to look for another place, to collect the money
+necessary for this purpose, etc. Its members were able, with much
+difficulty, to place everything upon its feet and to assure the
+publication of an organ (the _Izvestya_ of the National Soviet of Peasants'
+Delegates determined to defend the Constituent Assembly), to send delegates
+into different regions, and to establish relations with the provinces, etc.
+
+Together with the peasants, workmen and Socialist parties and numerous
+democratic organizations prepared themselves for the defense of the
+Constituent Assembly: The Union of Postal Employees, a part of the Union of
+Railway Workers, the Bank Employees, the City Employees, the food
+distributors' organizations, the teachers' associations, the zemstvos, the
+co-operatives. These organizations believed that the _coup d'état_ of
+October 25th was neither legal nor just; they demanded a convocation with
+brief delay of the Constituent Assembly and the restoration of the
+liberties that were trampled under foot by the Bolsheviki.
+
+These treated them as _saboteurs_, "enemies of the people," deprived them
+of their salaries, and expelled them from their lodgings. They ordered
+those who opposed them to be deprived of their food-cards. They published
+lists of strikers, thus running the risk of having them lynched by the
+crowds. At Saratov, for example, the strike of postal workers and
+telegraphers lasted a month and a half. The institutions whose strike would
+have entailed for the population not only disorganization, but an arrest of
+all life (such as the railroads, the organizations of food distributers),
+abstained from striking, only asking the Bolsheviki not to meddle with
+their work. Sometimes, however, the gross interference of the Bolsheviki in
+work of which they understood nothing obliged those opposed to them, in
+spite of everything, to strike. It is to be noted also that the professors
+of secondary schools were obliged to join the strike movements (the
+superior schools had already ceased to function at this time) as well as
+the theatrical artistes: a talented artist, Silotti, was arrested; he
+declared that even in the time of Czarism nobody was ever uneasy on
+account of his political opinions.
+
+
+IV
+
+_The Bolsheviki and the Constituent Assembly_
+
+
+At the time of the accomplishment of their _coup d'état_, the Bolsheviki
+cried aloud that the ministry of Kerensky put off a long time the
+convocation of the Constituante (which was a patent lie), that they would
+never call the Assembly, and that they alone, the Bolsheviki, would do it.
+But according as the results of the elections became known their opinions
+changed.
+
+In the beginning they boasted of their electoral victories at Petrograd and
+Moscow. Then they kept silent, as if the elections had no existence
+whatever. But the _Pravda_ and the _Izvestya_ of the Soviet of Workmen's
+and Soldiers' Delegates continued to treat as caluminators those who
+exposed the danger that was threatening the Constituent Assembly at the
+hands of the Bolsheviki. They did not yet dare to assert themselves openly.
+They had to gain time to strengthen their power. They hastily followed up
+peace pourparlers, to place Russia and the Constituent Assembly, if this
+met, before an accomplished fact.
+
+They hastened to attract the peasants to themselves. That was the reason
+which motived the "decree" of Lenine on the socialization of the soil,
+which decree appeared immediately after the _coup d'état_. This decree was
+simply a reproduction of a Revolutionary Socialists' resolution adopted at
+a Peasants' Congress. What could the socialization of the soil be to Lenine
+and all the Bolsheviki in general? They had been, but a short time before,
+profoundly indifferent with regard to this Socialist-Revolutionist
+"Utopia." It had been for them an object of raillery. But they knew that
+without this "Utopia" they would have no peasants. And they threw them
+this mouthful, this "decree," which astonished the peasants. "Is it a law?
+Is it not a law? Nobody knows," they said.
+
+It is the same desire to have, cost what it may, the sympathy of the
+peasants that explains the union of the Bolsheviki with those who are
+called the "Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left" (for the name
+Socialist-Revolutionist spoke to the heart of the peasant), who played the
+stupid and shameful rôle of followers of the Bolsheviki, with a blind
+weapon between their hands.
+
+A part of the "peasants in uniform" followed the Bolsheviki to Smolny. The
+Germans honored the Bolsheviki by continuing with them the pourparlers for
+peace. The Bolshevist government had at its disposal the Red Guards, well
+paid, created suddenly in the presence of the crumbling of the army for
+fear of remaining without the help of bayonets. These Red Guards, who later
+fled in shameful fashion before the German patrols, advanced into the
+interior of the country and gained victories over the unarmed populace. The
+Bolsheviki felt the ground firm under their feet and threw off the mask. A
+campaign against the Constituent Assembly commenced. At first in _Pravda_
+and in _Izvestya_ were only questions. What will this Constituent Assembly
+be? Of whom will it be composed? It is possible that it will have a
+majority of servants of the bourgeoisie--Cadets Socialist-Revolutionists.
+_Can we confide to such a Constituent Assembly the destinies of the Russian
+Revolution? Will it recognize the power of the Soviets?_ Then came certain
+hypocritical "ifs." "If," yes, "if" the personnel of the Constituent
+Assembly is favorable to us; "if" it will recognize the power of the
+Soviets, it can count on their support. _If not--it condemns itself to
+death_.
+
+The Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left in their organ, _The Flag of
+Labor_, repeated in the wake of the Bolsheviki, "We will uphold the
+Constituent Assembly in _the measure we_--"
+
+Afterward we see no longer questions or prudent "ifs," but distinct
+answers. "The majority of the Constituent Assembly is formed," said the
+Bolsheviki, "of Socialist-Revolutionists and Cadets--that is to say,
+enemies of the people. This composition assures it of a
+counter-revolutionary spirit. Its destiny is therefore clear. Historic
+examples come to its aid. _The victorious people has no need of a
+Constituent Assembly. It is above the Constituante_. It has gone beyond
+it." The Russian people, half illiterate, were made to believe that in a
+few weeks they had outgrown the end for which millions of Russians had
+fought for almost a century; that they no longer had need of the most
+perfect form of popular representation, such as did not exist even in the
+most cultivated countries of western Europe. To the Constituent Assembly,
+legislative organ due to equal, direct, and secret universal suffrage, they
+opposed the Soviets, with their recruiting done by hazard and their
+elections to two or three degrees,[92] the Soviets which were the
+revolutionary organs and not the legislative organs, and whose rôle besides
+none of those who fought for the Constituent Assembly sought to diminish.
+
+
+V
+
+_The Fight Concentrates Around the Constituent Assembly_
+
+
+This was a maneuver whose object appeared clearly. The defenders of the
+Constituent Assembly had evidence of what was being prepared. The peasants
+who waited with impatience the opening of the Constituent Assembly sent
+delegates to Petrograd to find out the cause of the delay of the
+convocation. These delegates betook themselves to the Executive Committee
+of the Soviet of Peasants' Delegates (11 Kirillovskaia Street), and to the
+Socialist-Revolutionist fraction of the members of the Constituante (2
+Bolotnai Street). This last fraction worked actively at its proper
+organization. A bureau of organization was elected, commissions charged to
+elaborate projects of law for the Constituante. The fraction issued
+bulletins explaining to the population the program which the
+Socialist-Revolutionists were going to defend at the Constituante. Active
+relations were undertaken with the provinces. At the same time the members
+of the fraction, among whom were many peasants and workmen, followed up an
+active agitation in the workshops and factories of Petrograd, and among the
+soldiers of the Preobrajenski Regiment and some others. The members of the
+Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasants' Delegates worked in concert
+with them. It was precisely the opinion of the peasants and of the workmen
+which had most importance in the fight against the Bolsheviki. They, the
+true representatives of the people, were listened to everywhere; people
+were obliged to reckon with them.
+
+It was under these conditions that the Democratic Conference met. Called by
+the Provisional Government, it comprised representatives of the Soviets, of
+parties, of organizations of the army, peasant organizations,
+co-operatives, zemstvos, agricultural committees, etc. Its object was to
+solve the question of power until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly.
+
+At this conference the Bolsheviki formed only a small minority; but they
+acted as masters of the situation, calling, in a provocative manner,
+all those who were not in accord with them, "Kornilovist,
+counter-revolutionaries, traitors!" Because of this attitude the
+conference, which ought to have had the character of an assembly deciding
+affairs of state, took on the character of a boisterous meeting, which
+lasted several days of unending twaddle. What the Bolsheviki wanted was a
+verbal victory--to have shouted more loudly than their opponents. The same
+speeches were repeated every day. Some upheld a power exclusively
+Socialist, others--the majority composed of delegates from different
+corners of the country--sanctioned an agreement with all the democratic
+elements.
+
+The provincial delegates, having come with a view to serious work, returned
+to their homes, carrying with them a painful impression of lost
+opportunities, of useless debates.
+
+There remained but a few weeks before the convocation of the Constituent
+Assembly. Those who voted against a government exclusively Socialist did
+not think that, under the troublesome conditions of the time, they could
+expose the country to the risk of a dispersion of strength; they feared the
+possible isolation of the government in face of certain elements whose help
+could not be relied on. But they did not take into account a fact which had
+resulted from the Kornilovist insurrection: the natural distrust of the
+working masses in presence of all the non-Socialists, of those who--not
+being in immediate contact with them--placed themselves, were it ever so
+little, more on the right.
+
+The Democratic conference resulted in the formation of a Pre-Parliament.
+There the relations, between the forces in presence of each other, were
+about the same. Besides the Bolsheviki soon abandoned the Pre-Parliament,
+for they were already preparing their insurrection which curtailed the
+dissolution of that institution.
+
+"We are on the eve of a Bolshevik insurrection"--such was, at this time,
+the opinion of all those who took part in political life. "We are rushing
+to it with dizzy rapidity. The catastrophe is inevitable." But what is very
+characteristic is this, that, while preparing their insurrection, the
+Bolsheviki, in their press, did not hesitate to treat as liars and
+calumniators all those who spoke of the danger of this insurrection, and
+that on the eve of a conquest of power (with arms ready) premeditated and
+well prepared in advance.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+During the whole period that preceded the Bolshevik insurrection a great
+creative work was being carried on in the country in spite of the
+undesirable phenomena of which we have spoken above.
+
+1. With great difficulty there were established organs of a local,
+autonomous administration, volost and district zemstvos, which were to
+furnish a basis of organization to the government zemstvos. The zemstvo of
+former times was made up of only class representatives; _the elections to
+the new zemstvos were effected by universal suffrage, equal, direct, and
+secret_. These elections were a kind of schooling for the population,
+showing it the practical significance of universal suffrage, and preparing
+it for the elections to the Constituent Assembly. At the same time they
+laid the foundation of a local autonomous administration.
+
+2. Preparations for the election to the Constituent Assembly were made; an
+agitation, an intense propaganda followed; preparations of a technical
+order were made. This was a difficult task because of the great number of
+electors, the dispersion of the population, the great number of illiterate,
+etc. Everywhere special courts had been established, in view of the
+elections, to train agitators and instructors, who afterward were sent in
+great numbers into the country.
+
+3. _At the same time the ground was hurriedly prepared for the law
+concerning the socialization of the soil._ The abandonment of his post by
+Tchernov, Minister of Agriculture, did not stop this work. The principal
+agricultural committee and the Minister of Agriculture, directed by
+Rakitnikov and Vikhiliaev, hastened to finish this work before the
+convocation of the Constituent Assembly. The Revolutionary Socialist party
+decided to keep for itself the post of Minister of Agriculture; for the
+position they named S. Maslov, who had to exact from the government an
+immediate vote on the law concerning the socialization of the soil. _The
+study of this law in the Council of Ministers was finished. Nothing more
+remained to be done but to adopt and promulgate it. Because of the
+excitement of the people in the country, it was decided to do this at once,
+without waiting for the Constituent Assembly_. Finally, to better realize
+the conditions of the time, it must be added that the whole country awaited
+anxiously the elections to the Constituent Assembly. All believed that this
+was going to settle the life of Russia.
+
+
+VI
+
+_The Bolshevist Insurrection_
+
+
+It was under these conditions that the Bolshevist _coup d'état_ happened.
+In the capitals as well as in the provinces, it was accomplished by armed
+force; at Petrograd, with the help of the sailors of the Baltic fleet, of
+the soldiers of the Preobrajenski, Semenovski, and other regiments, in
+other towns with the aid of the local garrisons. Here, for example, is how
+the Bolshevist _coup d'état_ took place at Saratov. I was a witness to
+these facts myself. Saratov is a big university and intellectual center,
+possessing a great number of schools, libraries, and divers associations
+designed to elevate the intellectual standard of the population. The
+zemstvo of Saratov was one of the best in Russia. The peasant population of
+this province, among whom the Revolutionary Socialist propaganda was
+carried on for several years by the Revolutionary Socialist Party, is wide
+awake and well organized. The municipality and the agricultural committees
+were composed of Socialists. The population was actively preparing for the
+elections to the Constituent Assembly; the people discussed the list of
+candidates, studied the candidates' biographies, as well as the programs of
+the different parties.
+
+On the night of October 28th, by reason of an order that had come from
+Petrograd, the Bolshevik _coup d'état_ broke out at Saratov. The following
+forces were its instruments: the garrison which was a stranger to the
+masses of the population, a weak party of workers, and, in the capacity of
+leaders, some Intellectuals who, up to that time, had played no rôle in the
+public life of the town.
+
+It was indeed a military _coup d'état_. The city hall, where sat the
+Socialists, who were elected by equal, direct, and secret universal
+suffrage, was surrounded by the soldiers; machine-guns were placed in front
+and the bombardment began. This lasted a whole night; some were wounded,
+some killed. The municipal judges were arrested. Soon after a Manifesto
+solemnly announced to the population that the "enemies of the people," the
+"counter-revolutionaries," were overthrown; that the power at Saratov was
+going to pass into the hands of the Soviet (Bolshevist) of the Workmen's
+and Soldiers' Delegates.
+
+The population was perplexed; the people thought that they had sent to the
+Town Hall Socialists, men of their choice. Now these men were declared
+"enemies of the people," were shot down or arrested by other Socialists.
+What did all this mean? And the inhabitant of Saratov felt a fear stealing
+into his soul at the sight of this violence; he began to doubt the value of
+the Socialist idea in general. The faith of former times gave place to
+doubt, disappointment, and discouragement. The _coup d'état_ was followed
+by divers other manifestations of Bolshevist activity--arrests, searches,
+confiscation of newspapers, ban on meetings. Bands of soldiers looted the
+country houses in the suburbs of the city; a school for the children of the
+people and the buildings of the children's holiday settlement were also
+pillaged. Bands of soldiers were forthwith sent into the country to cause
+trouble there.
+
+_The sensible part of the population of Saratov severely condemned these
+acts_ in a series of Manifestos signed by the Printers' Union, the mill
+workers, the City Employees' Union, Postal and Telegraph Employees,
+students' organizations, and many other democratic associations and
+organizations.
+
+The peasants received the _coup d'état_ with distinct hostility. Meetings
+and reunions were soon organized in the villages. Resolutions were voted
+censuring the _coup d'état_ of violence, deciding to organize to resist the
+Bolsheviki, and demanding the removal of the Bolshevist soldier members
+from the rural communes. The bands of soldiers, who were sent into the
+country, used not only persuasion, but also violence, trying to force the
+peasants to give their votes for the Bolshevik candidates at the time of
+the elections to the Constituent Assembly; they tore up the bulletins of
+the Socialist-Revolutionists, overturned the ballot-boxes, etc.
+
+But the Bolshevik soldiers were not able to disturb the confidence of the
+peasants in the Constituent Assembly, and in the Revolutionary Socialist
+party, whose program they had long since adopted, and whose leaders and
+ways of acting they knew, the inhabitants of the country proved themselves
+in all that concerned the elections wide awake to the highest degree. There
+were hardly any abstentions, _90 per cent. of the population took part in
+the voting_. The day of the voting was kept as a solemn feast; the priest
+said mass; the peasants dressed in their Sunday clothes; they believed that
+the Constituent Assembly would give them order, laws, the land. In the
+government of Saratov, out of fourteen deputies elected, there were twelve
+Socialist-Revolutionists; there were others (such as the government of
+Pensa, for example) that elected _only_ Socialist-Revolutionists. The
+Bolsheviki had the majority only in Petrograd and Moscow and in certain
+units of the army. The elections to the Constituent Assembly were a
+decisive victory for the Revolutionary Socialist party.
+
+Such was the response of Russia to the Bolshevik _coup d'état_. To violence
+and conquest of power by force of arms, the population answered by the
+elections to the Constituent Assembly; the people sent to this
+assembly, not the Bolsheviki, but, by an overwhelming majority,
+Socialist-Revolutionists.
+
+
+VII
+
+_The Fight Against the Bolsheviki_
+
+
+But the final result of the elections was not established forthwith. In
+many places the elections had to be postponed. The Bolshevik _coup d'état_
+had disorganized life, had upset postal and telegraphic communications, and
+had even destroyed, in certain localities, the electoral mechanism itself
+by the arrest of the active workers. The elections which began in the
+middle of November were not concluded till toward the month of January.
+
+In the mean time, in the country a fierce battle was raging against the
+Bolsheviki. It was not, on the part of their adversaries, a fight for
+power. If the Socialist-Revolutionists had wished they could have seized
+the power; to do that they had only to follow the example of those who were
+called "the Revolutionary Socialists of the Left." Not only did they not
+follow their example, but they also excluded them from their midst. A short
+time after the Bolshevik insurrection, when the part taken in this
+insurrection by certain Revolutionary Socialists of the Left was found out,
+the Central Committee of the Revolutionary Socialist party voted to exclude
+them from the party for having violated the party discipline and having
+adopted tactics contrary to its principles. This exclusion was confirmed
+afterward by the Fourth Congress of the party, which took place in
+December, 1917.
+
+Soon after the _coup d'état_ of October the question was among all parties
+and all organizations: "What is to be done? How will the situation be
+remedied?" The remedy included three points. First, creation of a power
+composed of the representatives of all Socialist organizations, with the
+"Populist-Socialists" on the extreme right, and with the express condition
+that the principal actors in the Bolshevik _coup d'état_ would not have
+part in the Ministry. Second, immediate establishment of the democratic
+liberties, which were trampled under foot by the Bolsheviki, without which
+any form of Socialism is inconceivable. Third, convocation without delay of
+the Constituent Assembly.
+
+Such were the conditions proposed to the Bolsheviki in the name of several
+Socialist parties (the Revolutionary Socialist party, the Mensheviki, the
+Populist-Socialists, etc.), and of several democratic organizations
+(Railroad Workers' Union, Postal and Telegraphic Employees' Union, etc.).
+The Bolsheviki, at this time, were not sure of being able to hold their
+position; certain Commissaries of the People, soon after they were
+installed in power, handed in their resignation, being terrified by the
+torrents of blood that were shed at Moscow and by the cruelties which
+accompanied the _coup d'état_. The Bolsheviki pretended to accept the
+pourparlers, but kept them dragging along so as to gain time. In the mean
+time they tried to strengthen themselves in the provinces, where they
+gained victories such as that of Saratov; they actively rushed the
+pourparlers for peace; they had to do it at all cost, even if, in doing it,
+they had to accept the assistance of the traitor and spy, by name Schneur,
+for they had promised peace to the soldiers.
+
+For this it sufficed them to have gained some victories in the provinces,
+and that the Germans accepted the proposition of pourparlers of peace ("the
+German generals came to meet us in gala attire, wearing their ribbons and
+decorations," with triumph announced in their appeal to the Russian people
+the representatives of this "Socialist" government Schneur & Co.), for this
+the Bolsheviki henceforth refused every compromise and all conference with
+the other parties. For the other parties--those who did not recognize the
+Bolshevik _coup d'état_ and did not approve of the violence that was
+perpetrated--there was only one alternative, the fight.
+
+It was the Revolutionary Socialist party and the National Soviet of
+Peasants' Delegates that had to bear the brunt of this fight, which was
+carried on under extremely difficult conditions. All the non-Bolshevik
+newspapers were confiscated or prosecuted and deprived of every means of
+reaching the provinces; their editors' offices and printing establishments
+were looted. After the creation of the "Revolutionary Tribunal," the
+authors of articles that were not pleasing to the Bolsheviki, as well as
+the directors of the newspapers, were brought to judgment and condemned to
+make amends or go to prison, etc.
+
+The premises of numerous organizations were being constantly pillaged; the
+Red Guard came there to search, destroying different documents; frequently
+objects which were found on the premises disappeared. Thus were looted the
+premises of the Central Committee of the Revolutionary Socialist party (27
+Galernaia Street), and, several times, the offices of the paper _Dielo
+Narvda_ (22 Litcinaia Street), as well as the office of the "League for the
+Defense of the Constituent Assembly," the premises of the committees of
+divers sections of the Revolutionary Socialist party, the office of the
+paper _Volia Naroda_, etc.
+
+Leaders of the different parties were arrested. The arrest of the whole
+Central Committee of the Revolutionary Socialist party was to be carried
+out as well as the arrest of all the Socialist-Revolutionists, and of all
+the Mensheviki in sight. The Bolshevist press became infuriated, exclaiming
+against the "counter-revolution," against their "complicity" with Kornilov
+and Kalodine.
+
+All those who did not adhere to the Bolsheviki were indignant at the sight
+of the crimes committed, and wished to defend the Constituent Assembly.
+Knowingly, and in a premeditated manner, the Bolshevist press excited the
+soldiers and the workmen against all other parties. And then when the
+unthinking masses, drunk with flattery and hatred, committed acts of
+lynching, the Bolshevist leaders expressed sham regrets! Thus it was after
+the death of Doukhonine, who was cut to pieces by the sailors; and thus it
+was after the dastardly assassination of the Cadets, Shingariev and
+Kokochkine, after the shootings _en masse_ and the drowning of the
+officers.
+
+It was under these conditions that the fight was carried on; and the brunt
+of it, as I have already stated, was sustained by the Revolutionary
+Socialist party and the National Soviet of Peasants' Delegates, and it was
+against these two that the Bolsheviki were particularly infuriated. "Now it
+is not the Cadets who are dangerous to us," said they, "but the
+Socialist-Revolutionists--these traitors, these enemies of the people." The
+most sacred names of the Revolution were publicly trampled under foot by
+them. Their cynicism went so far as to accuse Breshkovskaya, "the
+Grandmother of the Russian Revolution," of having sold out to the
+Americans. Personally I had the opportunity to hear a Bolshevist orator, a
+member of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers'
+Delegates, express this infamous calumny at a meeting organized by the
+Preobrajenski Regiment. The Bolsheviki tried, by every means, to crush the
+party, to reduce it to a clandestine existence. But the Central Committee
+declared that it would continue to fight against violence--and that in an
+open manner; it continued to issue a daily paper, only changing its title,
+as in the time of Czarism, and thus continued its propaganda in the
+factories, and helped to form public opinion, etc.
+
+At the Fourth Congress of the party, which took place in December, the
+delegates from the provinces, where the despotism of the Bolsheviki was
+particularly violent, raised the question of introducing terrorist methods
+in the fight against the Bolsheviki. "From the time that the party is
+placed in a fight under conditions which differ nothing from those of
+Czarism, ancient methods are to be resumed; violence must be opposed to
+violence," they said. But the Congress spurned this means; the
+Revolutionary Socialist party did not adopt the methods of terrorism; it
+could not do it, because the Bolsheviki were, after all, followed by the
+masses--unthinking, it is true, but the masses, nevertheless. It is by
+educating them, and not by the use of violence, that they are to be fought
+against. Terrorist acts could bring nothing but a bloody suppression.
+
+
+VIII
+
+_The Second Peasant Congress_
+
+
+In the space of a month a great amount of work was accomplished. A breach
+was made in the general misunderstanding. Moral help was assured to the
+Constituent Assembly on the part of the workmen and part of the soldiers of
+Petrograd. There was no longer any confidence placed in the Bolsheviki.
+Besides, the agitation was not the only cause of this change. The workers
+soon came to understand that the Bolshevik tactics could only irritate and
+disgust the great mass of the population, that the Bolsheviki were not the
+representatives of the workers, that their promises of land, of peace, and
+other earthly goods were only a snare. The industrial production diminished
+more and more; numerous factories and shops closed their doors and
+thousands of workmen found themselves on the streets. The population of
+Petrograd, which, at first, received a quarter of a pound of bread per day
+(a black bread made with straw), had now but one-eighth of a pound, while
+in the time of Kerensky the ration was half a pound. The other products
+(oatmeal, butter, eggs, milk) were entirely lacking or cost extremely high
+prices. One ruble fifty copecks for a pound of potatoes, six rubles a
+pound of meat, etc. The transportation of products to Petrograd had almost
+ceased. The city was on the eve of famine.
+
+The workers were irritated by the violence and the arbitrary manner of the
+Bolsheviki, and by the exploits of the Red Guard, well paid, enjoying all
+the privileges, well nourished, well clothed, and well shod in the midst of
+a Petrograd starving and in rags.
+
+Discontent manifested itself also among the soldiers of the Preobrajenski
+and Litovsky regiments, and others. In this manner in the day of the
+meeting of the Constituent Assembly they were no longer very numerous. What
+loud cries, nevertheless, they had sent forth lately when Kerensky wished
+to send the Preobrajenski and Seminovski regiments from Petrograd! "What?
+Send the revolutionary regiments from Petrograd? To make easier the
+surrender of the capital to the counter-revolution?" The soldiers of the
+Preobrajenski Regiment organized in their barracks frequent meetings, where
+the acts of the Bolsheviki were sharply criticized; they started a paper,
+_The Soldiers' Cloak_, which was confiscated.
+
+On the other hand, here is one of the resolutions voted by the workers of
+the Putilov factory:
+
+    The Constituent Assembly is the only organ expressing the will of
+    the entire people. It alone is able to reconstitute the unity of
+    the country.
+
+The majority of the deputies to the Constituent Assembly who had for some
+time been elected had arrived in Petrograd, and the Bolsheviki always
+retarded the opening. The Socialist-Revolutionist fraction started
+conferences with the other fractions on the necessity for fixing a day for
+the opening of the Constituante, without waiting the good pleasure of the
+Commissaries of the People. They chose the date, December 27th, but the
+opening could not take place on that day, the Ukrainian fraction having
+suddenly abandoned the majority to join themselves to the Bolsheviki and
+the Revolutionary Socialists of the Left. Finally, the government fixed the
+opening of the Constituent Assembly for the 5th (18th) of January.
+
+Here is a document which relates this fight for the date of the opening of
+the Constituante:
+
+    _Bulletin of Members of the Constituent Assembly Belonging to the
+    Socialist-Revolutionist Fraction. No. 5, Dec. 31, 1917._
+
+    _To All the Citizens_:
+
+    The Socialist-Revolutionist fraction of the Constituent Assembly
+    addresses the whole people the present exposé of the reasons for
+    which the Constituent Assembly has not been opened until this day:
+    it warns them, at the same time, of the danger which threatens the
+    sovereign rights of the people.
+
+    Let it be thus placed in clear daylight, the true character of
+    those who, under pretext of following the well-being of the
+    workers, forge new chains for liberated Russia, those who attempt
+    to assassinate the Constituent Assembly, which alone is able to
+    save Russia from the foreign yoke and from the despotism which has
+    been born within.
+
+    Let all the citizens know that the hour is near when they must be
+    ready to rise like one man for the defense of their liberty and
+    their Constituent Assembly.
+
+    For, citizens, your salvation is solely in your own hands.
+
+    Citizens! you know that on the day assigned for the opening of the
+    Constituent Assembly, November 28th, all the
+    Socialist-Revolutionist deputies who were elected had come to
+    Petrograd. You know that neither violence of a usurping power nor
+    arrests of our comrades, by force of arms which were opposed to us
+    at the Taurida Palace, could prevent us from assembling and
+    fulfilling our duty.
+
+    But the civil war which has spread throughout the country retarded
+    the election to the Constituent Assembly and the number of
+    deputies elected was insufficient.
+
+    It was necessary to postpone the opening of the Constituent
+    Assembly.
+
+    Our fraction utilized this forced delay by an intensive
+    preparatory work. We elaborated, in several commissions, projects
+    of law concerning all the fundamental questions that the
+    Constituante would have to solve. We adopted the project of our
+    fundamental law on the question of the land; we elaborated the
+    measures which the Constituante would have to take from the very
+    first day in order to arrive at a truly democratic peace, so
+    necessary to our country; we discussed the principles which should
+    direct the friendly dwelling together of all the nationalities
+    which people Russia and assure each people a national point of
+    view, the free disposition of itself, thus putting an end to the
+    fratricidal war.
+
+    Our fraction would have been all ready for the day of the opening
+    of the Constituante, in order to commence, from the first, a
+    creative work and give to the impoverished country peace, bread,
+    land, and liberty.
+
+    At the same time, we did our utmost to accelerate the arrival of
+    the deputies and the opening of the Assembly.
+
+    During this time events became more and more menacing every day,
+    the Bolshevik power was more rapidly leading our country to its
+    fall. From before the time when the Germans had presented their
+    conditions of peace the Bolsheviki had destroyed the army,
+    suppressed its provisioning, and stripped the front, while at the
+    same time by civil war and the looting of the savings of the
+    people they achieved the economic ruin of the country. Actually,
+    they recognized themselves that the German conditions were
+    unacceptable and invited the reconstruction of the army. In spite
+    of this, these criminals do not retire; they will achieve their
+    criminal work.
+
+    Russia suffers in the midst of famine, of civil war, and enemy
+    invasion which threatens to reach even the heart of the country.
+
+    No delay is permissible.
+
+    Our fraction fixed on the 27th of December the last delay for the
+    opening of the Constituante; on this day more than half of the
+    deputies could have arrived in Petrograd. We entered into
+    conference with the other fractions. The Ukrainians, some other
+    national fractions, and the Menshevik Social Democrats adhered to
+    our resolution. The Revolutionary Socialists of the Left
+    hypocritically declared themselves partizans of an early opening
+    of the Constituante. But behold, the Council of the so-called
+    "Commissaries of the People" fixed the opening for the 5th of
+    January. _At the same time they called for the 8th of January a
+    Congress of the Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates,
+    thus hoping to be able to trick and to cover with the name of this
+    Congress their criminal acts_. The object of this postponement is
+    clear; they did not even hide it and threatened to dissolve the
+    Constituent Assembly in case that it did not submit to the
+    Bolshevik Congress of Soviets. The same threat was repeated by
+    those who are called Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left.
+
+    The delegation of the Ukrainian Revolutionary Socialists abandoned
+    us also and submitted to the order for the convocation on January
+    5th, considering that the fight of the Bolshevik power against the
+    Constituent Assembly is an internal question, which interests only
+    Greater Russia.
+
+    Citizens! We shall be there, too, on January 5th, so that the
+    least particle of responsibility for the sabotage of the
+    Constituent Assembly may not fall upon us.
+
+    But we do not think that we can suspend our activity with regard
+    to the speediest possible opening of the Constituent Assembly.
+
+    We address an energetic appeal to all the deputies; in the name of
+    the fatherland, in the name of the Revolution, in the name of the
+    duty which devolves upon you by reason of your election, come,
+    all, to Petrograd! On the 1st of January all the deputies present
+    will decide on the day for the opening of the Constituent
+    Assembly.
+
+    We appeal to you, citizens! Remind your elected representatives of
+    their duty.
+
+    And remember that your salvation is solely in your own hands, a
+    mortal danger threatens the Constituent Assembly; be all ready to
+    rise in its defense!
+
+    THE REVOLUTIONARY SOCIALIST FRACTION OF THE CONSTITUENT
+    ASSEMBLY.
+
+On the 3d of January the League for the Defense of the Constituent Assembly
+held a meeting at which were present 210 delegates, representing the
+Socialist parties as well as various democratic organizations and many
+factories--that of Putilov, that of Oboukhov, and still others from the
+outskirts of Narva, from the districts of Viborg, Spassky, and
+Petrogradsky, from the Isle Vassily. It was decided to organize for January
+5th a peaceful display in honor of the opening of the Constituent
+Assembly.
+
+The Bolsheviki answered this by furious articles in the _Pravda_, urging
+the people not to spare the counter-revolutionaries, these bourgeoisie who
+intend, by means of their Constituante, to combat the revolutionary people.
+They advised the people of Petrograd not to go out on the streets that day.
+"We shall act without reserve," they added.
+
+Sailors were called from Cronstadt; cruisers and torpedo-boats came. An
+order was issued to the sailors and to the Red Guards who patrolled all the
+works of the Taurida, to make use of their arms if any one attempted to
+enter the palace. For that day unlimited powers were accorded to the
+military authorities. At the same time an assembly of the representatives
+of the garrison at Petrograd, fixed for that day, was proscribed, and the
+newspaper, _The Soldiers' Cloak_, was suppressed.
+
+A Congress of Soviets was called for the 8th of January. They prepared the
+dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and they wanted to place the
+Congress before the accomplished fact. The Executive Committee of the
+Soviet of Peasants' Delegates, and the Central Executive Committee of the
+Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates chosen at the first elections
+answered by the two following appeals:
+
+    Peasant Comrades!
+
+    The Bolsheviki have fixed the 5th of January for the opening of
+    the Constituent Assembly; for the 8th of January they call the III
+    Congress of the Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, and
+    for the 13th the Peasant Congress.
+
+    The peasants are, by design, relegated to the background.
+
+    An outrage against the Constituent Assembly is being prepared.
+
+    In this historic moment the peasants cannot remain aloof.
+
+    The Provisional Executive Committee of the National Soviet of
+    Peasants' Delegates, which goes on duty as a guard to the
+    Constituent Assembly, has decided to call, on the 8th of January,
+    also, the Third National Congress of the Soviets of Peasants'
+    Delegates. The representation remains the same as before. Send
+    your delegates at once to Petrograd, Grand Bolotnai, 2A.
+
+    The fate of the Constituent Assembly is the fate of Russia, the
+    fate of the Revolution.
+
+    All up for the defense of the Constituent Assembly, for the
+    defense of the Revolution--not by word alone, but by acts!
+
+    [Signed] _The Provisional Executive Committee of the National
+    Soviet of Peasants' Delegates, upholding the principle of the
+    defense of the Constituent Assembly_.
+
+    APPEAL OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE SOVIETS OF
+    WORKMEN'S AND SOLDIERS' DELEGATES, CHOSEN AT THE FIRST
+    ELECTIONS
+
+    To all the Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, to all
+    the Committees of the Army and of the Navy, to all the
+    organizations associated with the Soviets and Committees, to all
+    the members of the Socialist-Revolutionist and Menshevist Social
+    Democratic fractions who left the Second Congress of Soviets:
+
+    Comrades, workmen, and soldiers! Our cry of alarm is addressed to
+    all those to whom the work of the Soviets is dear. Know that a
+    traitorous blow threatens the revolutionary fatherland, the
+    Constituent Assembly, and even the work of the Soviets. Your duty
+    is to prepare yourselves for their defense.
+
+    The Central Executive Committee, nominated at the October
+    Congress, calls together for the 8th of January a Congress of
+    Soviets, destined to bungle the Constituent Assembly.
+
+    Comrades! The Second Congress of Soviets assembled at the end of
+    October, under conditions particularly unfavorable, at the time
+    that the Bolshevik party, won over by its leaders to a policy of
+    adventure, a plot unbecoming a class organization, executed at
+    Petrograd a _coup d'état_ which gave it power; at a time when
+    certain groups with the same viewpoint disorganized even the
+    method of convocation of the Second Congress, thus openly aspiring
+    to falsify the results; at this same Congress the regular
+    representatives of the army were lacking (only two armies being
+    represented), and the Soviets of the provinces were very
+    insufficiently represented (only about 120 out of 900). Under
+    these conditions it is but natural that the Central Executive
+    Committee of the Soviets chosen at the first election would not
+    recognize the right of this Congress to decide the politics of the
+    Soviets.
+
+    However, in spite of the protestations, and even of the departure
+    of a great number of delegates (those of the Revolutionary
+    Socialist fraction, Mensheviki, and Populist-Socialists), a new
+    Executive Committee of the Soviets was elected. To consider this
+    last as the central director of all the Soviets of the country was
+    absolutely impossible. The delegates who remained in the Congress
+    formed only an assembly of a group with a little fraction of the
+    Revolutionary Socialists of the Left, who had given their adhesion
+    to them. Thus the Central Committee named by their Conference
+    could not be considered except as representatives of these two
+    groups only.
+
+    Bringing to the organization of Soviets an unheard-of disorder,
+    establishing by their shameful methods of fighting its domination
+    over the Soviets, some of which were taken by surprise, the others
+    terrorized and broken in their personnel, deceiving the working
+    class and the army by its short-sighted policy of adventure, the
+    new Executive Committee during the two months that have since
+    passed has attempted to subject all the Soviets of Russia to its
+    influence. It succeeded in part in this, in the measure in which
+    the confidence of the groups which constituted it in the policy
+    was not yet exhausted. But a considerable portion of the Soviets,
+    as well as fractions of other Soviets, fractions composed of the
+    most devoted and experienced fighters, continued to follow the
+    only true revolutionary road; to develop the class organization of
+    the working masses, to direct their intellectual and political
+    life, to develop the political and social aspects of the
+    Revolution, to exert, by all the power of the working class
+    organized into Soviets, the necessary pressure to attain the end
+    that it proposed. The questions of peace and of war, that of the
+    organization of production and of food-supply, and that of the
+    fight for the Constituent Assembly are in the first place. The
+    policy of adventure of the groups which seized the power is on the
+    eve of failure. Peace could not be realized by a rupture with the
+    Allies and an entente with the imperialistic orb of the Central
+    Powers. By reason of this failure of the policy of the
+    Commissaires of the People, of the disorganization of production
+    (which, among other things, has had as a result the creation of
+    hundreds of thousands of unemployed), by reason of the civil war
+    kindled in the country and the absence of a power recognized by
+    the whole people, the Central Powers tend to take hold in the most
+    cynical fashion of a whole series of western provinces (Poland,
+    Lithuania, Courland), and to subject the whole country to their
+    complete economic, if not political, domination.
+
+    The question of provisioning has taken on an unheard-of acuteness;
+    the gross interference in the functioning of organs already
+    created for this object, and the civil war kindled everywhere
+    throughout the country, have completely demoralized the
+    provisioning of wheat in regions where they had none, the north
+    and the army are found on the eve of famine.
+
+    Industry is dying. Hundreds of factories and workshops are
+    stopped. The short-sighted policy of the Commissaries has caused
+    hundreds of workmen to be thrown on the streets and become
+    unemployed. The will of the entire people is threatened with being
+    violated. The usurpers who in October got hold of the power by
+    launching the word of order for a swift convocation of the
+    Constituent Assembly strive hard, now that the elections are over,
+    to retain the power in their hands by arresting the deputies and
+    dissolving the Constituante itself.
+
+    _All that which the country holds of life, and in the first place
+    all the working class and all the army, ought to rise with arms in
+    their hands to defend the popular power represented by the
+    Constituante, which must bring peace to the people and consolidate
+    by legislative means the revolutionary conquests of the working
+    class._
+
+    In bringing this to your knowledge, the Central Committee chosen
+    at the first elections invites you, Comrades, to place yourself
+    immediately in agreement with it.
+
+    Considering the Congress of October as incompetent, the Central
+    Committee chosen at the first elections has decided to begin a
+    preparatory work in view of the convocation of a new Congress of
+    the Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates.
+
+    In the near future, while the Commissaires of the People, in the
+    persons of Lenine and Trotzky, are going to fight against the
+    sovereign power of the Constituent Assembly, we shall have to
+    intervene with all our energy in the conflict artificially encited
+    by the adventurers, between that Assembly and the Soviets. _It
+    will be our task to aid the Soviets in taking consciousness of
+    their rôle, in defining their political lines, and in determining
+    their functions and those of the Constituante._
+
+    Comrades! The convocation of the Congress for the 8th of January
+    is dictated by the desire to provoke a conflict between the
+    Soviets and the Constituante, and thus botch this last. Anxious
+    for the fate of the country, the Executive Committee chosen at the
+    first elections decides to convoke at Petrograd for the 8th of
+    January an extraordinary assembly of _all the Soviets, all the
+    Committees of the Army and the Navy, all the fractions of the
+    Soviets and military committees, all the organizations that
+    cluster around the Soviets and the Committees that are standing
+    upon the ground of the defense of the Constituante._ The following
+    are the Orders of the Day:
+
+    1. The power of the Constituent Assembly.
+    2. The fight for the general democratic peace and the re-establishment
+    of the International.
+    3. The immediate problems of the policy of the Soviets.
+
+    Comrades! Assure for this extraordinary assembly of Soviets the
+    most complete representation of all the organizations of workmen
+    and soldiers. Establish at once election centers. We have a fight
+    to uphold.
+
+    In the name of the Revolution, all the reason and all the energy
+    ought to be thrown into the balance.
+
+    THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF SOVIETS OF WORKMEN'S AND
+    SOLDIERS' DELEGATES CHOSEN AT THE FIRST ELECTIONS.
+
+    _25 December, 1917._
+
+
+IX
+
+_The Manifestation of January 5th at Petrograd_
+
+
+From eleven o'clock in the morning cortčges, composed principally of
+working-men bearing red flags and placards with inscriptions such as
+"Proletarians of All Countries, Unite!" "Land and Liberty!" "Long Live the
+Constituent Assembly!" etc., set out from different parts of the city. The
+members of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasants' Delegates
+had agreed to meet at the Field, of Mars where a procession coming from the
+Petrogradsky quarter was due to arrive. It was soon learned that a part of
+the participants, coming from the Viborg quarter, had been assailed at the
+Liteiny bridge by gunfire from the Red Guards and were obliged to turn
+back. But that did not check the other parades. The peasant participants,
+united with the workers from Petrogradsky quarter, came to the Field of
+Mars; after having lowered their flags before the tombs of the Revolution
+of February and sung a funeral hymn to their memory, they installed
+themselves on Liteinaia Street. New manifestants came to join them and the
+street was crowded with people. At the corner of Fourstatskaia Street (one
+of the Streets leading to the Taurida Palace) they found themselves all at
+once assailed by shots from the Red Guards.
+
+The Red Guard fired _without warning_, something that never before
+happened, even in the time of Czarism. The police always began by inviting
+the participators to disperse. Among the first victims was a member of the
+Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasants' Delegates, the Siberian
+peasant, Logvinov. An explosive bullet shot away half of his head (a
+photograph of his body was taken; it was added to the documents which were
+transferred to the Commission of Inquiry). Several workmen and students and
+one militant of the Revolutionary Socialist party, Gorbatchevskaia, were
+killed at the same time. Other processions of participants on their way to
+the Taurida Palace were fired into at the same time. On all the streets
+leading to the palace, groups of Red Guards had been established; they
+received the order "Not to spare the cartridges." On that day at Petrograd
+there were one hundred killed and wounded.
+
+It must be noted that when, at a session of the Constituent Assembly, in
+the Taurida Palace, they learned of this shooting, M. Steinberg,
+Commissioner of Justice, declared in the corridor that it was a lie, that
+he himself had visited the streets of Petrograd and had found everywhere
+that "all was quiet." Exactly as the Ministers of Nicholas Romanov after
+the suppressions said "Lie. Lie," so cried the Bolsheviki and the
+Revolutionary Socialists of the Left, in response to the question formally
+put on the subject of the shooting by a member of the Constituent Assembly.
+
+The following day the Bolshevik organs and those of the Revolutionary
+Socialists of the Left passed over these facts in silence. This silence
+they kept also on the 9th of January, the day on which literally all
+Petrograd assembled at the funeral of the victims. Public indignation,
+however, obliged them in the end to admit that there had been some small
+groups of participants and to name a Commission of Inquiry concerning the
+street disorders which had taken place on January 5th. This Commission was
+very dilatory in the performance of its duty and it is very doubtful if
+they ever came to any decision.
+
+Analogous manifestations took place at Moscow, at Saratov and other cities;
+everywhere they were accompanied by shootings. The number of victims was
+particularly considerable at Moscow.
+
+
+X
+
+_At the Taurida Palace on the Day of the Opening of the Constituent
+Assembly_
+
+
+The Taurida Palace on that day presented a strange aspect. At every door,
+in the corridors, in the halls, everywhere soldiers and sailors and Red
+Guards armed with guns and hand-grenades, who at every turn demanded your
+pass. It was no easy matter to get into the palace. Nearly all the places
+reserved for the public were occupied by the Bolsheviki and their friends.
+The appearance of the Taurida Palace was not that of a place where the
+free representatives of a free people were going to assemble.
+
+The Bolsheviki delayed as much as possible the opening of the session. It
+was only at four o'clock instead of at midday that they deigned to make up
+their minds. They and the Revolutionary Socialists of the Left occupied
+seats of the extreme left; then came the Revolutionary Socialists, the
+Mensheviki, and the other Socialist fractions. The seats on the right
+remained vacant. The few Cadets that had been chosen preferred not to come.
+In this manner the Constituent Assembly was composed at this first and last
+session solely of Socialists. This, however, did not prevent the presence
+in the corridors and the session hail of a crowd of sailors and Red Guards
+armed, as if it were a question of an assembly of conspirators, enemies of
+the Revolution.
+
+From the beginning a fight was started by the election of president. The
+majority nominated for the office of president Chernov; the Bolsheviki and
+the Revolutionary Socialists of the Left voted against him. The Bolsheviki
+did not propose any candidate of their own, and placed before the members
+the candidacy of a Revolutionary Socialist of the Left, Marie Spiridonova,
+who was totally incapable of fulfilling this rôle. Afterward several
+declarations were read--that of the Bolsheviki, that of the
+Socialist-Revolutionists (read by Chernov), that of the Mensheviki (read by
+Tseretelli). The partizans of each fraction greeted the reading of their
+own declaration with deafening applause (for the audience was one of
+"comrades" and did not hesitate to take part in the debates); cat-calls and
+shouts greeted the orators of the opposing fractions. Each word of the
+declarations of the Socialist-Revolutionists and of the Mensheviki
+(declarations which every Socialist could sign) was received with a round
+of hisses, shouts, deafening cries, exclamations of contempt for the
+Bolsheviki, the sailors, and the soldiers. The speech of Chernov--president
+and member of a detested party--had above all the honor of such a
+greeting. As for Tseretelli, he was at first greeted by an inconceivable
+din, but was able afterward--his speech was so full of profound sense--to
+capture the attention of the Bolsheviki themselves.
+
+A general impression that was extremely distressing came from this historic
+session. The attitude of the Bolsheviki was grossly unbecoming and
+provocative of disdain. It indicated clearly that the dissolution of the
+Constituante was, for them, already decided. Lenine, who continually kept
+contemptuous silence, wound up by stretching himself upon his bench and
+pretending to sleep. Lunotcharsky from his ministerial bench pointed
+contemptuously with his finger toward the white hair of a veteran of the
+Revolutionary Socialist party. The sailors leveled the muzzles of their
+revolvers at the Socialist-Revolutionists. The audience laughed, whistled,
+and shouted.
+
+The Bolsheviki finally left the Assembly, followed, as might be understood,
+by their servants, the Revolutionary Socialists of the Left. The fractions
+which remained voted the law proposed by the Socialist-Revolutionists on
+the transfer of the lands to common ownership (socialization of the soil).
+The sailors and Red Guards attempted several times to interrupt the
+session. At five o'clock in the morning they finally demanded with a loud
+voice that everybody leave.
+
+"We were obliged to go," said, later, the members of the Constituent
+Assembly at a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasants'
+Delegates in recounting these tragic moments, "not that we were afraid of
+being shot; we were prepared for that, and each one of us expected it, but
+fear of something else which is far worse: for fear of insults and gross
+violence. We were only a handful; what was that beside those great big
+fellows full of malice toward the Constituante and of defiance for the
+'enemies of the people,' the 'servants of the bourgeoisie,' which we were
+in their eyes, thanks to the lies and the calumnies of the Bolsheviki?
+Careful of our dignity, and out of respect for the place where we were, we
+could not permit ourselves to be cuffed, nor that they throw us out of the
+Taurida Palace by force--and that is what would have inevitably happened."
+
+It was thus that the Constituent Assembly ended. The
+Socialist-Revolutionist fraction maintained an attitude of surprising calm
+and respectful bearing, not allowing itself to be disturbed by any
+provocation. The correspondents of foreign newspapers congratulated the
+members and said to them that in this session to which the Bolsheviki had
+wished to give the character of "any-old-kind-of-a-meeting" all the
+fractions maintained a truly parliamentary attitude.
+
+The Bolshevik terror became rife. _All the newspapers that tried to open
+the eyes of the people as to what was happening were confiscated_. Every
+attempt to circulate the _Dielo Naroda_ or other newspapers of the
+opposition was severely punished. The volunteer venders of these papers
+were arrested, cruelly struck down by rifle butts, and sometimes even shot.
+The population, indignant, gathered in groups on the streets, but the Red
+Guards dispersed all assemblages.
+
+
+XI
+
+_The Dissolution of the Third All-Russian Peasants' Congress_
+
+
+This is the course of the events which followed the dissolution of the
+Constituante. On the 8th of January the members of the Constituante
+assembled at Bolotnaia; two were arrested; the premises of the fraction
+were occupied by the Red Guards. On the 9th of January took place the
+funeral of the victims, in which all Petrograd took part. The Bolsheviki
+this time did not dare to shoot into the magnificent procession preceded by
+a long line of coffins. The 10th of January they dispersed the Third
+All-Russian Congress of Peasants which had placed itself on the side of the
+Constituent Assembly. The Congress had been at first arranged for the 8th
+of January (the same day as the Bolshevik Congress of the Soviets), but,
+because of the events, it was postponed to the 10th. The peasants who had
+come to this Congress knew perfectly well that they would have a fight to
+uphold, perhaps even to give their lives. Their neighbors, their
+co-villagers, wept when they saw them set out, as if it were a question of
+men condemned to death. That alone suffices to show to what degree were
+conscious these peasants who had come from all corners of the country to
+prepare themselves for the defense of the Constituent Assembly.
+
+As soon as the Congress was opened sailors and Red Guards, armed with guns
+and hand-grenades, broke into the premises (11 Kirillovskaia Street),
+surrounded the house, poured into the corridors and the session hall, and
+ordered all persons to leave.
+
+"In whose name do you order us, who are Delegates to the Peasants' Congress
+of All-Russia, to disperse?" asked the peasants.
+
+"In the name of the Baltic fleet," the soldiers replied.
+
+The peasants refused; cries of protest were raised. One by one the peasant
+delegates ascended the tribune to stigmatize the Bolsheviki in speeches
+full of indignation, and to express the hopes that they placed in the
+Constituent Assembly.
+
+The sailors listened. They had come to disperse a counter-revolutionary
+Congress, and these speeches troubled them. One sailor, not able to stand
+it any longer, burst into tears.
+
+"Let me speak!" he shouted to the president. "I hear your speeches, peasant
+comrades, and I no longer understand anything.... What is going on? We are
+peasants, and you, too, are peasants. But we are of this side, and you are
+of the other.... Why? Who has separated us? For we are brothers.... But it
+is as if a barrier had been placed between us." He wept and, seizing his
+revolver, he exclaimed, "No, I would rather kill myself!"
+
+This session of the Congress presented a strange spectacle, disturbed by
+men who confessed that they did not know why they were there; the peasants
+sang revolutionary songs; the sailors, armed with guns and grenades, joined
+them. Then the peasants knelt down to sing a funeral hymn to the memory of
+Logvinov, whose coffin was even yesterday within the room. The soldiers,
+lowering their guns, knelt down also.
+
+The Bolshevik authorities became excited; they did not expect such a turn
+to events. "Enough said," declared the chief; "we have come not to speak,
+but to act. If they do not want to go to Smolny, let them get out of here."
+And they set themselves to the task.
+
+In groups of five the peasants were conducted down-stairs, trampled on,
+and, on their refusal to go to Smolny, pushed out of doors during the night
+in the midst of the enormous city of which they knew nothing.
+
+Members of the Executive Committee were arrested, the premises occupied by
+sailors and Red Guards, the objects found therein stolen.
+
+The peasants found shelter in the homes of the inhabitants of Petrograd,
+who, indignant, offered them hospitality; a certain number were lodged in
+the barracks of the Preobrajenski Regiment. The sailors, who but a few
+minutes before had sung a funeral hymn to Logvinov, and wept when they saw
+that they understood nothing, now became the docile executors of the orders
+of the Bolsheviki. And when they were asked, "Why do you do this?" they
+answered as in the time, still recent, of Czarism: "It is the order. No
+need to talk."
+
+It was thus there was manifested the habit of servile obedience, of
+arbitrary power and violence, which had been taking root for several
+centuries; under a thin veneer of revolution one finds the servile and
+violent man of yesterday.
+
+In the midst of these exceptional circumstances the peasants gave proof of
+that obstinacy and energy in the pursuit of their rights for which they are
+noted. Thrown out in the middle of the night, robbed, insulted, they
+decided, nevertheless, to continue their Congress. "How, otherwise, can we
+go home?" said they. "We must come to an understanding as to what is to be
+done."
+
+The members of the Executive Committee who were still free succeeded in
+finding new premises (let it be noted that among others the workmen of the
+big Oboukhovsky factory offered them hospitality), and during three days
+the peasants could assemble secretly by hiding themselves from the eyes of
+the Red Guard, and the spies in various quarters of Petrograd, until such
+time as the decisions were given on all great questions. _A procčs-verbal
+was prepared concerning all that had taken place on Kirillovskaia Street. A
+declaration was made protesting against the acts of the Bolshevik
+government_. This declaration was to be read at the Taurida Palace when the
+Soviets were in congress by delegates designated for that purpose. The
+Bolsheviki, however, would not permit the delegates to enter the Taurida
+Palace.
+
+Here are the texts of the declaration and of the procčs-verbal:
+
+    At the Third National Congress of Soviets of Peasants' Delegates
+    grouped around the principle of the defense of the Constituent
+    Assembly, this declaration was sent to the Congress of Workmen's,
+    Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates called together by the
+    Bolshevist government at the Taurida Palace:
+
+    At the Second National Peasants' Congress the 359 delegates who
+    had come together for the defense of the Constituent Assembly
+    continued the work of the Congress and elected a provisional
+    Executive Committee, independently of the 354 delegates who had
+    opposed the power of the Constituent Assembly and adhered to the
+    Bolsheviki.
+
+    We, peasant delegates, having come to Petrograd, more than 300 in
+    number, to participate in a Congress called by the Provisional
+    Executive Committee, which is that of those of the Soviets which
+    acknowledge the principle of the defense of the Constituent
+    Assembly, declare to our electors, to the millions of the peasant
+    population, and to the whole country, that the actual government
+    which is called "The Government of the Peasants and Workmen" has
+    established in their integrity the violence, the arbitrariness,
+    and all the horrors of the autocratic régime which was overthrown
+    by the great Revolution of February. All the liberties attained by
+    that Revolution and won by innumerable sacrifices during several
+    generations are scouted and trodden under foot. Liberty of opinion
+    does not exist; men who under the government of the Czar had paid
+    by years of prison and exile for their devotedness to the
+    revolutionary cause are now again thrown into the dungeons of
+    fortresses without any accusation whatever, of anything of which
+    they might be guilty, being made to them. Again spies and
+    informers are in action. Again capital punishment is
+    re-established in its most horrible forms; shooting on the streets
+    and assassinations without judgment or examination. _Peaceful
+    processions, on their way to salute the Constituent Assembly, are
+    greeted by a fusillade of shots upon the orders of the autocrats
+    of Smolny. The liberty of the press does not exist; the papers
+    which displease the Bolsheviki are suppressed, their printing
+    plants and offices looted, their editors arrested._
+
+    The organizations which, during the preceding months, were
+    established with great difficulty--zemstvos, municipalities,
+    agricultural and food committees--are foolishly destroyed in an
+    excess of savage fanaticism.
+
+    The Bolsheviki even try to kill the supreme representation, the
+    only one legitimately established, of the popular will--the
+    Constituent Assembly.
+
+    To justify this violence and this tyranny they try to allege the
+    well-being of the people, but we, peasant workers, we see well
+    that their policy will only tighten the cord around the workers'
+    necks, while the possibility of a democratic peace becomes more
+    remote every day; matters have come to the point where the
+    Bolsheviki proclaim a further mobilization--of salaried
+    volunteers, it is true--to renew the hostilities. They strive to
+    represent the war with Ukraine and with the Cossacks under the
+    aspect of a war of classes; it is not, however, the bourgeoisie,
+    but the representatives of the working classes who are killed on
+    one side and on the other. They promised the Socialist régime, and
+    they have only destroyed the production of the factories so as to
+    leave the population without product and throw the workers into an
+    army of unemployed; the horrible specter of famine occupies the
+    void left by the broken organizations of food-supply; millions of
+    the money of the people are squandered in maintaining a Red
+    Guard--or sent to Germany to keep up the agitation there, while
+    the wives and the widows of our soldiers no longer receive an
+    allowance, there being no money in the Treasury, and are obliged
+    to live on charity.
+
+    The Russian country is threatened with ruin. Death knocks at the
+    doors of the hovels of the workmen.
+
+    By what forces have the Bolsheviki thus killed our country? Twelve
+    days before the organization of the autonomous administration was
+    achieved and the elections to the Constituent Assembly begun, at
+    the time when there had been organized all the autonomous
+    administrations of volosts, districts, governments, and cities,
+    chosen by equal, direct, and secret universal suffrage, thus
+    assuring the realization of the will of the people and justifying
+    the confidence of the population--even then they seized the power
+    and established a régime which subjects all the institutions of
+    the country to the unlicensed power of the Commissaries of the
+    People. _And these Commissaries rely upon the Soviets, which were
+    chosen at elections that were carried out according to rank, with
+    open balloting and inequality of vote, for therein the peasants
+    count only as many representatives as the workmen of the cities,
+    although in Russia their number is sixty times greater_.
+
+    Absence of control permits every abuse of power; absence of secret
+    voting permits that into these Soviets at these suspicious
+    elections some enter who are attracted by the political rôle of
+    these institutions; the defeat of inequality in the suffrage
+    restrains the expression of the will of the peasants, and,
+    accordingly, these cannot have confidence in this system of
+    government. The tyranny that presided at these elections was such
+    that the Bolsheviki themselves pay no attention to the results,
+    and declare that the Soviets that are opposed to themselves are
+    bourgeoisie and capitalists. We, representing the peasant workers,
+    must declare in the name of our constituents: if anything can save
+    Russia, it can only be the re-establishment of the organs of
+    local autonomous administration, chosen by equal, direct, and
+    secret universal suffrage and the resumption, without delay, of
+    the work of the Constituent Assembly.
+
+    The Constituent Assembly alone can express the exact will of the
+    working-people, for the system of election which governs it
+    includes every measure of precaution against violence, corruption,
+    and other abuses, and assures the election of deputies chosen by
+    the majority; now, in the country, the majority is composed of the
+    working class.
+
+    Millions of peasants delegated us to defend the Constituante, but
+    this was dissolved as soon as it began to work for the good of the
+    people. The work of the Constituante was interrupted at the time
+    that it was discussing the law concerning land, when a new
+    agricultural régime was being elaborated for the country. For this
+    reason, and for this alone, the Constituante adopted only the
+    first articles of this law, articles which established the
+    definite transfer of all the land to the hands of the workers,
+    without any ransom. The other articles of this law, which
+    concerned the order of the apportionment of lots, its forms, its
+    methods of possession, etc., could not be adopted, although they
+    were completely elaborated in the commission and nothing remained
+    but to sanction them.
+
+    We, peasants assembled in Congress, we, too, have been the object
+    of violence and outrages, unheard of even under the Czarist
+    régime. Red Guards and sailors, armed, invaded our premises. We
+    were searched in the rudest manner. Our goods and the provisions
+    which we had brought from home were stolen. Several of our
+    comrade-delegates and all the members of the Committee were
+    arrested and taken to Peter and Paul Fortress. We ourselves were,
+    late at night, put out of doors in a city which we did not know,
+    deprived of shelter under which to sleep. All that, to oblige us
+    either to go to Smolny, where the Bolshevist government called
+    another Congress, or to return to our homes without having
+    attained any result. But violence could not stop us; secretly, as
+    in the time of Czarist autocracy, we found a place to assemble and
+    to continue our work.
+
+    In making known these facts to the country and the numerous
+    millions of the peasant population, we call upon them to
+    stigmatize the revolting policy practised by the Bolshevik
+    government with regard to all those who are not in accord with it.
+    Returned to our villages, dispersed in every corner of immense
+    Russia, we shall use all our powers to make known to the mass of
+    peasants and to the entire country the truth concerning this
+    government of violence; to make known in every corner of the
+    fatherland that the actual government, which has the hardihood to
+    call itself "Government of the Workmen and Peasants," in reality
+    shoots down workmen and peasants and shamelessly scoffs at the
+    country. We shall use all our strength to induce the population of
+    peasant workers to demand an account from this government of
+    violence, as well as from their prodigal children, their sons and
+    brothers, who in the army and navy give aid to these autocrats in
+    the commission of violence.
+
+    In the name of millions of peasants, by whom we were delegated, we
+    demand that they no longer obstruct the work of the Constituent
+    Assembly. We were not allowed to finish the work for which we had
+    come; at home we shall continue this work. We shall employ all our
+    strength to effect, as soon as possible, the convocation of a new
+    National Congress of Peasants' Delegates united on the principle
+    of the defense of the Constituante, and that in a place where we
+    need not fear a new dissolution. Lately we fought against
+    autocracy and Czarist violence; we shall fight with no less energy
+    against the new autocrats who practise violence, whoever they may
+    be, and whatever may be the shibboleths by which they cover their
+    criminal acts. We shall fight for the Constituent Assembly,
+    because it is in that alone that we see the salvation of our
+    country, that of the Revolution, and that of Land and Liberty.
+
+    Charged by our constituents to defend the Constituent Assembly, we
+    cannot participate in a Congress called by those who have
+    dissolved it; who have profaned the idea which to the people is
+    something sacred; who have shot down the defenders of true
+    democracy; who have shed the sacred blood of our Logvinov, member
+    of the Executive Committee of peasant deputies, who on the 5th of
+    January was killed by an explosive bullet during a peaceful
+    manifestation, bearing the flag "Land and Liberty."
+    Comrade-peasants who have come by chance to this Congress declare
+    to these violators that the only Executive Committee that upholds
+    the idea of the defense of the Constituante forms a center around
+    which are grouped all the peasant workers. We call the entire mass
+    of peasants to the work that is common to all--the fight for "Land
+    and Liberty," for the true government of the people. "We all come
+    from the people, children of the same family of workers," and we
+    all have to follow a route that leads to happiness and liberty.
+    Now this road, which leads to "Land and Liberty," goes through the
+    Constituent Assembly alone. The Constituent Assembly was
+    dissolved, but it was chosen by the entire people, and it ought to
+    live.
+
+    _Long live the Constituent Assembly!_
+    _Down with violence and tyranny!_
+    _All power to the people, through the agency of the_
+    _Constituent Assembly!_
+
+    [Signed] The Third National Congress of Soviets of Peasant
+    Delegates, United on the Principle of the Defense of the
+    Constituent Assembly.
+
+
+PROCČS-VERBAL OF THE SESSION OF THE III NATIONAL CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OF
+PEASANTS' DELEGATES, UNITED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF THE DEFENSE OF THE
+CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY
+
+The Provisional Executive Committee of Soviets of Peasants' Delegates
+nominated by the fraction of the Second National Congress of these Soviets,
+which, to the number of 359 delegates, was organized on the basis of the
+principle of the defense of the Constituent Assembly, had addressed to all
+the Soviets an appeal inviting those who believe in the defense of the
+Constituante to send representatives to the Third Congress, fixed by the
+Committee for the 8th of January, and destined to offset the Congress
+called for the 12th of January by the Committee of that fraction of the
+Congress which, to the number of 314 votes, took sides against the power of
+the Constituent Assembly and joined the Bolsheviki.
+
+The Peasants' Congress, meeting by districts and by governments, as well as
+the local executive committees of Soviets which have chosen us, knew well
+to which Congress they delegated us and had given us precise mandates,
+expressing their confidence in the Constituent Assembly and their blame of
+the Soviets and the Bolshevik organs that impede the work of the
+Constituante and call the peasants to the Congress of January 12th. These
+congresses and these committees have charged us to use all our efforts to
+defend the Constituent Assembly, binding themselves, on their part, in case
+our efforts were insufficient, to rise in a body for its defense.
+
+By reason of the disorganization of postal and telegraphic communications,
+and because in different localities the calls of the Committee were held up
+by the Bolshevist organizations, the instructions concerning the Congress
+fixed for the 8th of January were not received in many provinces until
+after considerable delay.
+
+Some minutes before the opening of the Conference, which was to take place
+on the premises of the Committee (11 Kirillovskaia Street), where the
+delegates on hand had lodged, there arrived a detachment of sailors and Red
+Guards armed with guns and bombs, who surrounded the house, guarding all
+the entrances, and occupied all the apartments. The Executive Committee,
+performing its duty toward the peasant workers, which duty was to hold
+their flag with a firm hand, not fearing any violence, and not allowing
+themselves to be intimidated by the bayonets and the bombs of the enemies
+of the peasant workers, opened the session at the hour indicated.
+
+The Bolshevist pretorians, however, violating the freedom of assembly,
+broke into the hall and surrounded the office and members of the Conference
+with bayonets drawn. Their leader, Kornilov, staff-commandant of the Red
+Guards of the Rojdestvensky quarter, made a speech to the delegates, in
+which he said that they were to go to the Smolny Institute, to the
+Bolshevist Congress, assuring them that they had come to this Congress by
+mistake; at the end he read a document ordering him to make a search of the
+premises, to confiscate all papers, and to arrest all who would offer
+resistance. In reply to this speech the delegates and the members of the
+Executive Committee spoke in turn; they stigmatized vehemently the criminal
+policy of the Bolshevist government, which dissolved the Constituent
+Assembly, the true representation of the popular will, without having given
+it the time to register a vote on the agricultural law; which shot down
+workers participating in peaceful negotiations; which deprived the people
+of the right of assembly to discuss their needs; which destroyed freedom of
+speech and assembly and trampled in the dust the whole Russian Revolution.
+The delegates, one after another, tried to explain to the Red Guards that
+it was not the delegates that were deceived in coming to this conference,
+but those who were going to Smolny to the Bolshevist Congress, those who,
+by order of the Bolsheviki, kill the peasants' representatives and dissolve
+their Congress.
+
+In the midst of these speeches Kornilov declared the Congress dissolved; to
+this Comrade Ovtchinnikov, president of the Conference, replied that the
+Congress would not be dissolved except by force, and, besides, that the
+document read by Kornilov did not authorize him to pronounce its
+dissolution. Members of the Congress having entered into arguments with the
+sailors and the Red Guards, concerning the violence inflicted on the
+peasant delegates, the sound of the rattling of guns was heard and the
+leader of the pretorians declared that if the Congress would not submit to
+his orders he would stop at nothing. All the members of the Congress were
+forthwith searched and thrown out of doors in groups of five, with the idea
+that, having come from the provinces, and not knowing Petrograd, they would
+find themselves dispersed in such a way as not to be able to assemble again
+anywhere, and would be obliged either to betake themselves to the railway
+and return home or to direct their steps toward Smolny, the address of
+which was given to each one at the exit. At the same time, without reason,
+the following were arrested: Minor, a deputy to the Constituent Assembly;
+Rakitnikov, Ovtchinnikov, Roussine, Sorokine, and Tchernobaiev, members of
+the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasant Delegates; and Chmelev, a
+soldier. The premises of the Committee, on which were various documents and
+papers which were to be sent into the country, were occupied by Red Guards,
+and machine-guns were placed at the entrance. The search ended about nine
+o'clock in the evening. Some late delegates alone were authorized to spend
+the night on the premises under the supervision of Red Guards.
+
+An inquiry held among the comrades, who had come for this Third National
+Peasants' Congress, established that, at the time when the premises of the
+Executive Committee were seized, January 10, 1918, there were, among the
+sailors and Red Guards of the detachment that did the work, _German and
+Austrian prisoners dressed in Russian uniforms_; it also established the
+fact that many objects had disappeared in the course of the search. The
+Congress decided: first, to consider as a law the socialization of the soil
+voted by the Constituent Assembly and to apply the same in the country;
+second, to consider that the Constituent Assembly, dispersed by brutal
+force, was nevertheless elected by the whole people and ought to exist and
+to assemble again as soon as that would be possible; third, to fight
+everywhere in the provinces in the defense of the organs of autonomous
+administration, which the Bolsheviki dispersed by armed force. During these
+few days when the peasants were obliged to assemble in secret and to
+station patrols to protect their meetings, they followed those methods of
+conspiracy that the Russian Socialists had been obliged to employ when they
+fought against the tyranny of autocracy. Returning to their villages, the
+peasants bore with them the greatest hate for the Bolsheviki, whom they
+considered the personification of tyranny and violence. And they took with
+them also a firm resolution to fight against this violence.
+
+The Executive Committee, whose powers were confirmed by the Third Congress,
+found itself thus, for the second time, deprived of all its goods, its
+premises, and its pecuniary resources; it found itself obliged to lead a
+half-clandestine existence, to organize secret assemblies, etc. Miss
+Spiridonova, who, in this fight against the peasants that rose to the
+defense of the Constituent Assembly, gave proof of intolerance and peculiar
+fanaticism, found herself at the head of the "peasants in uniform," sitting
+at Smolny, _adopting a decree whereby all the moneys that came by post to
+the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasant Delegates defending the
+Constituent Assembly were to be confiscated._
+
+The action of the Executive Committee was thus rendered very difficult. But
+it continued to fight, to publish an organ, to commission delegates, to
+entertain continued relations with the provinces and the country.
+
+
+XII
+
+_Conclusion_
+
+
+_Morally, Bolshevism was killed in the eyes of the workers in the course of
+these days_ when a peaceful demonstration was fired upon, the Constituent
+Assembly dissolved, the Peasant Congress (and, very soon, the Congress of
+the Agricultural Committees) dispersed. The Central Committee of the
+Revolutionary Socialist party issued an order for new elections to the
+Soviets, thinking thus to eliminate automatically the Bolsheviki. And, in
+truth, when at Petrograd and in the provinces, these elections began, the
+Revolutionary Socialists and the Mensheviki received the majority and the
+Bolsheviki were snowed under. But these new elections were thwarted by many
+circumstances: first, because of the lessening of production the workmen
+were discharged in a body and quit the factories; second, the Bolsheviki
+put obstacles in the way of the elections and sometimes openly prohibited
+them. Nevertheless, wherever they could be held, the results were
+unfavorable to the Bolsheviki.
+
+Finally, when the working classes clearly saw the shameful rôle played by
+the Bolsheviki in the matter of peace, when they saw the Bolsheviki humbly
+beg for peace at any price from the Germans, they understood that it was
+impossible to continue to tolerate such a government. _The Central
+Committee of the Revolutionary Socialist party published a Manifesto
+appealing to an armed fight against the Bolshevik government and the German
+gangs_ that were overrunning the country.
+
+The frightful results of this "peace," so extolled by the Bolsheviki,
+rendered even the name of the Bolshevist government odious in the eyes of
+every conscientious and honest man.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+But Bolshevism still endures, for it is based on the armed force of the Red
+Guard, on the supineness of the masses deprived of a political education,
+and not accustomed to fight or to act, and from ancient habit of submitting
+to force.
+
+The causes which produced Bolshevism are: first, the accumulation of all
+the conditions of the historic past of the Russian people; second, their
+psychic character and their habits; third, the conditions of the present
+time; and fourth, the general situation of the world--that is to say, the
+war.
+
+We also note the vague and hesitating policy of the Provisional Government;
+the lack of political education among the people, ready to follow him who
+promises the most; small development of civic sentiment; the want of any
+attachment whatever to the state--that of the Romanov having never given
+anything to the people and having taken all from them. Czarism took from
+the miserable peasant his last penny under form of taxes; it took his
+children from him for war; for the least act of disobedience to authority
+he was whipped. He wallowed in misery and in ignorance, deprived of every
+right, human or legal. How could he, this wretched and oppressed peasant
+develop civic sentiments, a consciousness of his personal dignity? On the
+other hand, we must take into account the immense weariness caused by the
+war and by the disorganization which it brought into the whole cycle of
+existence (to an incomparably greater degree than in western Europe). Such
+were the causes which had established a favorable scope for Bolshevik
+propaganda; to introduce their domination they knew how to make use of the
+shortcomings of the people and the defects of Russian life.
+
+In fine, what is Bolshevism in its essence? _It is an experiment, that is
+either criminal or that proceeds from a terrible thoughtlessness, tried,
+without their consent, on the living body of the Russian people_. Thus some
+attempt to apply their theories, others wish to measure the height of their
+personal influence, while still others (and they are found in every
+movement) seek to profit by the circumstances.
+
+Bolshevism is a phenomenon brought about by force; it is not a natural
+consequence of the progress of the Russian Revolution. Taken all in all,
+Bolshevism is not Socialism. The Bolshevist _coup d'état_ was accomplished
+contrary to the wish of the majority of the people, who were preparing for
+the Constituent Assembly.
+
+_It was accomplished with the help of armed force, and it is because of
+this that the Bolshevist régime holds out._
+
+_It has against it the whole conscious portion of the peasant and working
+population and all the Intellectuals._
+
+_It has crushed and trampled under foot the liberty that was won by the
+Russian people._
+
+The Bolsheviki pretend to act in the name of the people. Why, then, have
+they dissolved the Constituent Assembly elected by the people?
+
+They pretend to have the majority of the people with them. Why, then, this
+governmental terror that is being used in a manner more cruel even than in
+the time of Czarism?
+
+They say that, to fight against the bourgeoisie, the use of violence is
+necessary. But their principal thrusts are directed not against the
+bourgeoisie, but against the Socialist parties that do not agree with them.
+And they dare give this caricature the name of Dictatorship of the
+Proletariat!
+
+Socialism must necessarily be founded on democratic principles. If not, "it
+cuts off the branch of the tree on which it rests," according to the
+expression of Kautsky.
+
+Socialism needs constructive elements. It does not limit itself to the
+destruction of ancient forms of existence; it creates new ones. But
+Bolshevism has only destructive elements. It does nothing but destroy,
+always destroy, with a blind hatred, a savage fanaticism.
+
+What has it established? Its "decrees" are only verbal solutions without
+sense, skeletons of ideas, or simply a revolutionary phraseology containing
+nothing real (as for example the famous shibboleth, "neither peace nor
+war").
+
+During the few months of its reign Bolshevism has succeeded in destroying
+many things; nearly everything that the effort of the Russian people had
+established. Life, disorganized almost to its foundations, has become
+almost impossible in Russia. The railroads do not function, or function
+only with great difficulty; the postal and telegraphic communications are
+interrupted in several places. The zemstvos--bases of the life of the
+country--are suppressed (they are "bourgeois" institutions); the schools
+and hospitals, whose existence is impossible without the zemstvos, are
+closed. The most complete chaos exists in the food-supply. The
+Intellectuals, who, in Russia, had suffered so much from the Czarist
+tyranny and oppression, are declared "enemies of the people" and compelled
+to lead a clandestine existence; they are dying of hunger. It is the
+Intellectuals and not the bourgeois (who are hiding) that suffer most from
+the Bolshevist régime.
+
+The Soviets alone remain. But the Soviets are not only revolutionary
+organs, they are "guardians of the Revolution," but in no way legislative
+and administrative organs.
+
+Bolshevism is an experiment tried on the Russian people. The people are
+going to pay dearly for it. At least let not this experiment be lost, on
+them, as well as on other peoples! Let the Socialists of western Europe be
+not unduly elated by words or by far-fetched judgments. Let them look the
+cruel reality in the face and examine facts to find out the truth.
+
+A tyranny which is supported by bayonets is always repugnant, wherever it
+comes from, and under whatever name it may strut. It can have nothing in
+common with Socialism, which is not only a doctrine of economic necessity,
+but also a doctrine of superior justice and truth.
+
+"All the societies or individuals adhering to the Internationale will know
+what must be the basis of their conduct toward all men: Truth, Justice,
+Morality, without Distinction of Color, Creed, or Nationality," said the
+statutes that were drawn up by the prime founders of our Internationale.
+
+_The Executive Committee of the National Soviet of Peasant Delegates
+Placing themselves on the Grounds of the Defense of the Constituent
+Assembly, having had to examine, in its session of February 8, 1918, the
+violence committed by the Bolsheviki, and to pass in review the
+persecutions that this organization had to suffer from that party and from
+the government of the Commissaries of the People, decided to bring the
+violence committed by the Bolsheviki in the name of Socialism to the
+knowledge of the Socialists of western Europe and of the International
+Socialist Bureau through the citizen, E. Roubanovitch, representative of
+the Revolutionary Socialist party at the International Socialist Bureau and
+intrusted with International relations by the Executive Committee of the
+First Soviet of Peasants.
+
+The Executive Committee demands the expulsion, from the Socialist family,
+of the Bolshevist leaders, as well as of those of the Revolutionary
+Socialists of the Left, who seized the power by force, held it by violence
+and compromised Socialism in the eyes of the popular masses.
+
+Let our brothers of western Europe be judges between the Socialist peasants
+who rose in the defense of the Constituent Assembly and the Bolsheviki, who
+dispersed them by armed force, thus trampling under foot the will of the
+Russian people._
+
+INNA RAKITNIKOV,
+
+_Vice-President of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasant
+Delegates, who stand in Defense of the Constituent Assembly._
+
+_May 30, 1918._
+
+
+
+
+APPENDIX III
+
+FORMER SOCIALIST PREMIER OF FINLAND ON BOLSHEVISM
+
+
+The following letter was addressed to Mr. Santeri Nuorteva, who, it will be
+remembered, was appointed Minister to America by the Revolutionary
+Government of Finland. The author of the letter, Oskar Tokoi, was the first
+Socialist Prime Minister in the world. He is a Socialist of long standing,
+who has always been identified with the radical section of the movement.
+Mr. Nuorteva, it should be added, is himself a strong supporter of the
+Bolsheviki, and is their accredited American representative.
+
+    ARCHANGEL, _September 10, 1918._
+
+    SANTERI NUORTEVA,
+
+    _Fitchburg, Mass._:
+
+    DEAR COMRADE,--I deem it my duty to appeal to you and to
+    other comrades in America in order to be able to make clear to you
+    the trend of events here.
+
+    The situation here has become particularly critical. We, the
+    Finnish refugees, who, after the unfortunate revolution, had to
+    flee from Finland to Russia, find ourselves to-day in a very
+    tragic situation. A part of the former Red Guardists who fled here
+    have joined the Red Army formed by the Russian Soviet Government;
+    another part has formed itself as a special Finnish legion, allied
+    with the army of the Allied countries; and a third part, which has
+    gone as far as to Siberia, is prowling about there, diffused over
+    many sections of the country, and there have been reports that a
+    part of those Finns have joined the ranks of the Czecho-Slovaks.
+    The Finnish masses, thus divided, may therefore at any time get
+    into fighting each other, which indeed would be the greatest of
+    all misfortunes. It is therefore necessary to take a clear
+    position, and to induce all the Finns to support it, and we hope
+    that you as well, over in America, will support it as much as is
+    in your power.
+
+    During these my wanderings I have happened to traverse Russia from
+    one end to another, and I have become deeply convinced that Russia
+    is not able to rise from this state of chaos and confusion by her
+    own strength and of her own accord. The magnificent economic
+    revolution, which the Bolsheviki in Russia are trying now to bring
+    about, is doomed in Russia to complete failure. The economic
+    conditions in Russia have not even approximately reached a stage
+    to make an economic revolution possible, and the low grade of
+    education, as well as the unsteady character of the Russian
+    people, makes it still more impossible.
+
+    It is true that magnificent theories and plans have been laid
+    here, but their putting into practice is altogether impossible,
+    principally because of the following reasons: The whole propertied
+    class--which here in Russia, where small property ownership mainly
+    prevails, is very numerous--is opposing and obstructing;
+    technically trained people and specialists necessary in the
+    industries are obstructing; local committees and sub-organs make
+    all systematic action impossible, as they in their respective
+    fields determine things quite autocratically and make everything
+    unsuccessful which should be based on a strong, coherent, and in
+    every respect minutely conceived system as a social production
+    should be based. But even if all these, in themselves
+    unsurmountable obstacles, could be made away with, there remains
+    still the worst one--and that is the workers themselves.
+
+    It is already clear that in the face of such economic conditions
+    the whole social order has been upset. Naturally only a small part
+    of the people will remain backing such an order. The whole
+    propertied class belongs to the opponents of the government,
+    including the petty bourgeoisie, the craftsmen, the small
+    merchants, the profiteers. The whole Intellectual class and a
+    great part of the workers are also opposing the government. In
+    comparison with the entire population only a small minority
+    supports the government, and, what is worse to the supporters of
+    the government, are rallying all the hooligans, robbers, and
+    others to whom this period of confusion promises a good chance of
+    individual action. It is also clear that such a régime cannot stay
+    but with the help of a stern terror. But, on the other hand, the
+    longer the terror continues the more disagreeable and hated it
+    becomes. Even a great part of those who from the beginning could
+    stay with the government and who still are sincere Social
+    Democrats, having seen all this chaos, begin to step aside, or to
+    ally themselves with those openly opposing the government.
+    Naturally, as time goes by, there remains only the worst and the
+    most demoralized element. Terror, arbitrary rule, and open
+    brigandage become more and more usual, and the government is not
+    able at all to prevent it. And the outcome is clearly to be
+    foreseen--the unavoidable failure of all this magnificently
+    planned system.
+
+    And what will be the outcome of that? My conviction is that as
+    soon as possible we should turn toward the other road--the road of
+    united action. I have seen, and I am convinced that the majority
+    of the Russian people is fundamentally democratic and
+    whole-heartedly detests a reinstitution of autocracy, and that
+    therefore all such elements must, without delay, be made to unite.
+    But it is also clear that at first they, even united, will not be
+    able to bring about order in this country on their own accord. I
+    do not believe that at this time there is in Russia any social
+    force which would be able to organize the conditions in the
+    country. For that reason, to my mind, we should, to begin with,
+    frankly and honestly rely on the help of the Allied Powers. Help
+    from Germany cannot be considered, as Germany, because of her own
+    interests, is compelled to support the Bolshevik rule as long as
+    possible, as Germany from the Bolshevik rule is pressing more and
+    more political and economic advantages, to such an extent even
+    that all of Russia is becoming practically a colony of Germany.
+    Russia thus would serve to compensate Germany for the colonies
+    lost in South Africa.
+
+    A question presents itself at once whether the Allied Powers are
+    better. And it must be answered instantly that neither would they
+    establish in Russia any Socialist society. Yet the democratic
+    traditions of these countries are some surety that the social
+    order established by them will be a democratic one. It is clear as
+    day that the policy of the Allied Powers is also imperialistic,
+    but the geographical and economic position of these countries is
+    such that even their own interests demand that Russia should be
+    able to develop somewhat freely. The problem has finally evolved
+    into such a state of affairs where Russia must rely on the help
+    either of the Allies or Germany; we must choose, as the saying
+    goes, "between two evils," and, things being as badly mixed as
+    they are, the lesser evil must be chosen frankly and openly. It
+    does not seem possible to get anywhere by dodging the issue.
+    Russia perhaps would have saved herself some time ago from this
+    unfortunate situation if she had understood immediately after the
+    February Revolution the necessity of a union between the more
+    democratic elements. Bolshevism undoubtedly has brought Russia a
+    big step toward her misfortune, from which she cannot extricate
+    herself on her own accord.
+
+    Thus there exists no more any purely Socialist army, and all the
+    fighting forces and all those who have taken to arms are fighting
+    for the interests of the one or the other group of the Great
+    Powers. The question therefore finally is only this--in the
+    interests of which group one wants to fight. The revolutionary
+    struggles in Russia and in Finland, to my mind, have clearly
+    established that a Socialist society cannot be brought about by
+    the force of arms and cannot be supported by the force of arms,
+    but that a Socialist order must be founded on a conscious and
+    living will by an overwhelming majority of the nations, which is
+    able to realize its will without the help of arms.
+
+    But now that the nations of the world have actually been thrown
+    into an armed conflict, and the war, which in itself is the
+    greatest crime of the world, still is raging, we must stand it. We
+    must, however, destroy the originator and the cause of the war,
+    the militarism, by its own arms, and on its ruins we must build,
+    in harmony and in peace--not by force, as the Russian Bolsheviki
+    want--a new and a better social order under the guardianship of
+    which the people may develop peacefully and securely.
+
+    I have been explaining to you my ideas, expecting that you will
+    publish them. You over in America are not able to imagine how
+    horrible the life in Russia at the present time is. The period
+    after the French Revolution surely must have been as a life in a
+    paradise compared with this. Hunger, brigandage, arrests, and
+    murders are such every-day events that nobody pays any attention
+    to them. Freedom of assemblage, association, free speech, and free
+    press is a far-away ideal which is altogether destroyed at the
+    present time. Arbitrary rule and terror are raging everywhere,
+    and, what is worst of all, not only the terror proclaimed by the
+    government, but individual terror as well.
+
+    My greetings to all friends and comrades.
+
+    OSKAR TOKOI.
+
+THE END
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[1] Plechanov never formally joined the Menshevik faction, I believe, but
+his writings showed that he favored that faction and the Mensheviki
+acknowledged his intellectual leadership.
+
+[2] They had gained one member since the election.
+
+[3] Quoted by Litvinov, _The Bolshevik Revolution: Its Rise and Meaning_,
+p. 22. Litvinov, it must be remembered, was the Bolshevik Minister to Great
+Britain. His authority to speak for the Bolsheviki is not to be questioned.
+
+[4] The date is Russian style--March 12th, our style.
+
+[5] _The State in Russia--Old and New_, by Leon Trotzky; _The Class
+Struggle_, Vol. II, No. 2, pp. 213-221.
+
+[6] This document is printed in full at the end of the volume as Appendix.
+I
+
+[7] The author of the present study is responsible for the use of italics
+in this document.
+
+[8] Litvinov, _The Bolshevik Revolution: Its Rise and Meaning_, p. 30.
+
+[9] Lenine is not quite accurate in his statement of Marx's views nor quite
+fair in stating the position of the "opportunists." The argument of Marx in
+_The Civil War in France_ is not that the proletariat must "break down" the
+governmental machinery, but that it must _modify_ it and _adapt_ it to the
+class needs. This is something quite different, of course. Moreover, it is
+the basis of the policy of the "opportunists." The Mensheviki and other
+moderate Socialists in Russia were trying to _modify_ and _adapt_ the
+political state.
+
+[10] The reference is to Karl Kautsky, the great German exponent of Marxian
+theory.
+
+[11] _The New International_ (American Bolshevik organ), June 30, 1917.
+
+[12] _The New International_, July 23, 1917.
+
+[13] Litvinov, _op. cit._, p. 31.
+
+[14] _The New International_, April, 1918.
+
+[15] See, _e.g._, the article by Lenine, _New International_, April, 1918,
+and Litvinov, _op. cit._
+
+[16] See my _Syndicalism, Industrial Unionism, and Socialism_ for the
+I.W.W. philosophy.
+
+[17] Bryant, _Six Months in Red Russia_, p. 141.
+
+[18] This appeal is published as Appendix I at the end of this volume.
+
+[19] Certain Soviets of Soldiers at the Front had decided that they would
+stay in their trenches for defensive purposes, but would obey no commands
+to go forward, no matter what the military situation.
+
+[20] Figures supplied by the Russian Information Bureau.
+
+[21] "It was with a deep and awful sense of the terrible failure before us
+that I consented to become Premier at that time," Kerensky told the present
+writer.
+
+[22] The story was reproduced in _New Europe_ (London), September, 1917.
+
+[23] _The New International_, April, 1918.
+
+[24] See p. 254.
+
+[25] See the letter of E. Roubanovitch, Appendix II, p. 331.
+
+[26] _Justice_, London, January 31, 1918.
+
+[27] _Justice_, London, May 16, 1918.
+
+[28] _Vide_ Special Memorandum to the International Socialist Bureau on
+behalf of the Revolutionary Socialist party of Russia.
+
+[29] See Appendix III.
+
+[30] _Pravda_, July 5, 1918.
+
+[31] February, 1918, Protest Against Recognition of Bolshevik
+Representative by British Labor Party Conference.
+
+[32] Proclamation to People of the Northern Province, etc., December, 1918
+
+[33] _The New International_, April, 1918.
+
+[34] The dates given are according to the Russian calendar.
+
+[35] See the Rakitnikov Memorandum--Appendix.
+
+[36] _The New International_, April, 1918.
+
+[37] The number of votes was over 36,000,000.
+
+[38] _Vide_ Rakitnikov report.
+
+[39] Twenty-three members of the Executive Committee were arrested and,
+without any trial, thrown into the Fortress of Peter and Paul.
+
+[40] From a Declaration of Protest by the Executive Committee of the Third
+National Congress of Peasants' Delegates (anti-Bolshevist), sent to the
+Bolshevik Congress of Soviets of Workmen, Soldiers, and Peasants, but not
+permitted to be read to that assembly.
+
+[41] _L'Ouorier Russe_, May, 1918.
+
+[42] _Idem_.
+
+[43] _Izvestya_, July 28, 1918.
+
+[44] _Pravda_, October 8, 1918 (No. 216).
+
+[45] "Agents-Provocateurs and the Russian Revolution," article in
+_Justice,_, August 16, 1916, by J. Tchernoff.
+
+[46] Most of the information in this paragraph is based upon an article in
+the Swiss newspaper _Lausanne Gazette_ by the well-known Russian
+journalist, Serge Persky, carefully checked up by Russian Socialist exiles
+in Paris.
+
+[47] Joseph Martinek, in the _Cleveland Press_.
+
+[48] _Justice_ (London), January 23, 1919.
+
+[49] _Justice_, London, January 31, 1918.
+
+[50] Jean Jaurčs, _Studies in Socialism_.
+
+[51] F. Engels, 1895, Preface to Marx's _Civil War in France_.
+
+[52] The reader is referred to my _Sidelights on Contemporary Socialism_
+and my _Karl Marx: His Life and Works_ for a fuller account of these
+struggles.
+
+[53] Marx, _A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy_, p. 12.
+
+[54] Editorial entitled "Bolshevik Problems," in _The Liberator_, April,
+1918.
+
+[55] The article by Lenine quoted by Mr. Eastman appeared in _The New
+International_, February, 1918.
+
+[56] _The Bolsheviks and the Soviets_, by Albert Rhys Williams, p. 6.
+
+[57] _Ansprache der Centralbehorde an den Bund, vom Marz, 1850_: Anhang IX
+der Enthullerngen über den Kommunisten-process Zu Koln, p. 79.
+
+[58] Lenine, _The Soviets at Work_.
+
+[59] Wilhelm Liebknecht, _No Compromise, No Political Trading_, p. 30.
+
+[60] _Socialism: a Summary and Interpretation of Socialist Principles_, by
+John Spargo, p. 215 (1st edition Macmillan, 1916).
+
+[61] Liebknecht, _No Compromise, No Political Trading_, p. 16.
+
+[62] Liebknecht, _No Compromise, No Political Trading_, p. 28.
+
+[63] This subject is treated in the following, among others, of my books:
+
+_Socialism: a Summary and Interpretation of Socialist Principles_; _Applied
+Socialism_; _Syndicalism, Industrial Unionism, and Socialism_; _Elements of
+Socialism_ (Spargo and Arner), and _Social Democracy Explained_.
+
+[64] _The New International_, July 23, 1917.
+
+[65] Conversation with Trotzky reported by E.A. Ross, _Russia in Upheaval_,
+p. 208.
+
+[66] Kautsky, _The Social Revolution_, p. 137.
+
+[67] Lenine, _The Soviets at Work_.
+
+[68] Lenine, _op. cit._
+
+[69] Lenine, _op. cit._
+
+[70] The best expositions of Guild Socialism are _Self-Government in
+Industry_, by G.D.H. Cole, and _National Guilds_, by S.G. Hobson, edited by
+A.R. Orage.
+
+[71] Lenine, _op. cit._
+
+[72] Lenine, _op. cit._
+
+[73] Lenine, _op. cit._
+
+[74] Lenine, _op. cit._
+
+[75] Lenine, _op. cit._
+
+[76] Of course, Trotzky's statement to Professor Ross about paying the
+capitalists "5 or 6 per cent. a year" was frankly a compromise.
+
+[77] E.A. Ross, _Russia in Upheaval_, pp. 206-207.
+
+[78] Litvinov, _The Bolshevik Revolution: Its Rise and Meaning_, p. 39.
+
+[79] Marx and Engels speak of the "idiocy of rural life" from which
+capitalism, through the concentration of agriculture and the abolition of
+small holdings, would rescue the peasant proprietors (_Communist
+Manifesto_). In _Capital_ Marx speaks of the manner in which modern
+industry "annihilates the peasant, _the bulwark of the old society_" (Vol.
+I, p. 513). Liebknecht says that in 1848 it was the _city_ which overthrew
+the corrupt citizen king and the _country_ which overthrew the new
+republic, chose Louis Bonaparte and prepared the way for the Empire. "The
+French peasantry created an empire through their blind fear of proletarian
+Socialism" (_Die Grund und Bodenfrage_). Kautsky wrote, "Peasants who feel
+that they are not proletarians, but true peasants, are not only not to be
+won over to our cause, _but belong to our most dangerous adversaries_"
+(_Dat Erfurter Programm und die Land-agitation_). It would be easy to
+compile a volume of such utterances.
+
+[80] Walling, _Russia's Message_, p. 118. The italics are mine.
+
+[81] "Cabinet lands" are the crown lands, property of the Czar and royal
+family.
+
+[82] Ross, _op. cit._, pp. 206-207.
+
+[83] _Justice_, London, August 1, 1917.
+
+[84] The figures given are quoted by Sack, in _The Birth of Russian
+Democracy_, and were originally published by the Bolshevist Commissaire of
+Commerce.
+
+[85] _Parvus et le Parti Socialiste Danois_, by P.G. La Chesnais.
+
+[86] La Chesnais, _op. cit._
+
+[87] In "_L'Humanité_," article condensed in _Justice_, January 31, 1918.
+
+[88] International Notes, _Justice_, January 3, 1918.
+
+[89] _The Disarmament Cry_, by N. Lenine, in _The Class Struggle_,
+May-June, 1918.
+
+[90] _The "Disarmament" Cry_, by N. Lenine, _The Class Struggle_, May-June,
+1918.
+
+[91] Most, if not all, dates in this document are given as in the Russian
+calendar, which is thirteen days behind ours.
+
+[92] This refers, doubtless, to the different basis for voting applied to
+the peasants and the industrial workers, as provided in the Soviet
+Constitution.
+
+
+
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+<h1>The Project Gutenberg eBook, Bolshevism, by John Spargo</h1>
+<pre>
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at <a href = "https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a></pre>
+<p>Title: Bolshevism</p>
+<p>       The Enemy of Political and Industrial Democracy</p>
+<p>Author: John Spargo</p>
+<p>Release Date: August 28, 2005  [eBook #16613]</p>
+<p>Language: English</p>
+<p>Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1</p>
+<p>***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK BOLSHEVISM***</p>
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+<h3>E-text prepared by Rick Niles, Josephine Paolucci,<br />
+    and the Project Gutenberg Online Distributed Proofreading Team<br />
+    (https://www.pgdp.net/)</h3>
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+<table border="0" style="background-color: #dddddd;" cellpadding="10">
+  <tr>
+    <td valign="top">
+      Transcriber's note:<br />
+      <br />
+      Minor typographical errors in the original text
+	  have been corrected and footnotes moved to the
+	  end of the book.
+	</td>
+  </tr>
+</table>
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+<hr class="full" />
+
+<p><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2"></a></p>
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+<h1>BOLSHEVISM</h1>
+
+<h2><i>The Enemy of Political and Industrial Democracy</i></h2>
+
+
+<h3>BY</h3>
+
+<h2>JOHN SPARGO</h2>
+
+<h4><i>Author of</i></h4>
+
+<h4>"SOCIAL DEMOCRACY EXPLAINED" "SOCIALISM, A SUMMARY AND INTERPRETATION OF
+SOCIALIST PRINCIPLES" "APPLIED SOCIALISM" ETC.</h4>
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+
+<h6>HARPER &amp; BROTHERS PUBLISHERS<br />
+NEW YORK AND LONDON</h6>
+<h4>1919</h4>
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+<hr />
+<p><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3"></a>BOOKS BY</p>
+
+<p>JOHN SPARGO</p>
+
+<p>
+BOLSHEVISM<br />
+AMERICANISM AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY<br />
+SOCIAL DEMOCRACY EXPLAINED<br />
+</p>
+
+
+<p>HARPER &amp; BROTHERS, NEW YORK</p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">Established</span> 1817</p>
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<h2><a name="CONTENTS" id="CONTENTS"></a>CONTENTS</h2>
+
+
+<div class='center'>
+<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary="">
+<tr><td align='left'>Preface</td><td align='left'><a href="#PREFACE"><b>v</b></a></td></tr>
+<tr><td align='left'>I. The Historical Background</td><td align='left'><a href="#CHAPTER_I"><b>1</b></a></td></tr>
+<tr><td align='left'>II. From Revolution To Revolution</td><td align='left'><a href="#CHAPTER_II"><b>39</b></a></td></tr>
+<tr><td align='left'>III. The War And The People</td><td align='left'><a href="#CHAPTER_III"><b>76</b></a></td></tr>
+<tr><td align='left'>IV. The Second Revolution</td><td align='left'><a href="#CHAPTER_IV"><b>110</b></a></td></tr>
+<tr><td align='left'>V. From Bourgeoisie To Bolsheviki</td><td align='left'><a href="#CHAPTER_V"><b>134</b></a></td></tr>
+<tr><td align='left'>VI. The Bolshevik War Against Democracy</td><td align='left'><a href="#CHAPTER_VI"><b>209</b></a></td></tr>
+<tr><td align='left'>VII. Bolshevist Theory And Practice</td><td align='left'><a href="#CHAPTER_VII"><b>262</b></a></td></tr>
+<tr><td align='left'>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Postscriptum: A Personal Statement</td><td align='left'><a href="#POSTSCRIPTUM_A_PERSONAL_STATEMENT"><b>324</b></a></td></tr>
+<tr><td align='left'>APPENDICES:</td></tr>
+<tr><td align='left'>I. An Appeal To The Proletariat By The Petrograd Workmen's And Soldiers' Council</td><td align='left'><a href="#APPENDIX_I"><b>329</b></a></td></tr>
+<tr><td align='left'>II. How The Russian Peasants Fought For A Constituent Assembly</td><td align='left'><a href="#APPENDIX_II"><b>331</b></a></td></tr>
+<tr><td align='left'>III. Former Socialist Premier Of Finland On Bolshevism</td><td align='left'><a href="#APPENDIX_III"><b>385</b></a></td></tr>
+</table></div>
+
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6"></a></p>
+<h2><a name="PREFACE" id="PREFACE"></a>PREFACE</h2>
+
+
+<p>In the following pages I have tried to make a plain and easily
+understandable outline of the origin, history, and meaning of Bolshevism. I
+have attempted to provide the average American reader with a fair and
+reliable statement of the philosophy, program, and policies of the Russian
+Bolsheviki. In order to avoid confusion, and to keep the matter as simple
+and clear as possible, I have not tried to deal with the numerous
+manifestations of Bolshevism in other lands, but have confined myself
+strictly to the Russian example. With some detail&mdash;too much, some of my
+readers may think!&mdash;I have sketched the historical background in order that
+the Bolsheviki may be seen in proper perspective and fairly judged in
+connection with the whole revolutionary movement in Russia.</p>
+
+<p>Whoever turns to these pages in the expectation of finding a sensational
+"exposure" of Bolshevism and the Bolsheviki will be disappointed. It has
+been my aim to make a deliberate and scientific study, not an <i>ex-parte</i>
+indictment. A great many lurid and sensational stories about the Bolsheviki
+have been published, the net result of which is to make the leaders of this
+phase of the great universal war of the classes appear as brutal and
+depraved monsters of iniquity. There is not a crime known to mankind,
+apparently, of which they have not been loudly declared to be guilty. My
+long experience in the Socialist <a name="Page_7" id="Page_7"></a>movement has furnished me with too much
+understanding of the manner and extent to which working-class movements are
+abused and slandered to permit me to accept these stories as gospel truth.
+That experience has forced me to assume that most of the terrible stories
+told about the Bolsheviki are either untrue and without any foundation in
+fact or greatly exaggerated. The "rumor factories" in Geneva, Stockholm,
+Copenhagen, The Hague, and other European capitals, which were so busy
+during the war fabricating and exploiting for profit stories of massacres,
+victories, assassinations, revolutions, peace treaties, and other momentous
+events, which subsequent information proved never to have happened at all,
+seem now to have turned their attention to the Bolsheviki.</p>
+
+<p>However little of a cynic one may be, it is almost impossible to refrain
+from wondering at the fact that so many writers and journals that in the
+quite recent past maintained absolute silence when the czar and his minions
+were committing their infamous outrages against the working-people and
+their leaders, and that were never known to protest against the many crimes
+committed by our own industrial czars against our working-people and their
+leaders&mdash;that these writers and journals are now so violently denouncing
+the Bolsheviki for alleged inhumanities. When the same journals that
+defended or apologized for the brutal lynchings of I.W.W. agitators and the
+savage assaults committed upon other peaceful citizens whose only crime was
+exercising their lawful and moral right to organize and strike for better
+wages, denounce the Bolsheviki for their "brutality" and their
+"lawlessness" and cry for vengeance upon them, honest and sincere men
+become bitter and scornful.</p>
+
+<p>I am not a Bolshevik or a defender of the Bolsheviki.<a name="Page_8" id="Page_8"></a> As a Social Democrat
+and Internationalist of many years' standing&mdash;and therefore loyal to
+America and American ideals&mdash;I am absolutely opposed to the principles and
+practices of the Bolsheviki, which, from the very first, I have regarded
+and denounced as an inverted form of Czarism. It is quite clear to my mind,
+however, that there can be no good result from wild abuse or from
+misrepresentation of facts and motives. I am convinced that the stupid
+campaign of calumny which has been waged against the Bolsheviki has won for
+them the sympathy of many intelligent Americans who love fairness and hate
+injustice. In this way lying and abuse react against those who indulge in
+them.</p>
+
+<p>In this study I have completely ignored the flood of newspaper stories of
+Bolshevist "outrages" and "crimes" which has poured forth during the past
+year. I have ignored, too, the remarkable collection of documents edited
+and annotated by Mr. Sisson and published by the United States Committee on
+Public Information. I do not doubt that there is much that is true in that
+collection of documents&mdash;indeed, there is some corroboration of some of
+them&mdash;but the means of determining what is true and what false are not yet
+available to the student. So much doubt and suspicion is reasonably and
+properly attached to some of the documents that the value of the whole mass
+is greatly impaired. To rely upon these documents to make a case against
+the Bolsheviki, unless and until they have been more fully investigated and
+authenticated than they appear to have been as yet, and corroborated, would
+be like relying upon the testimony of an unreliable witness to convict a
+man serious crime.</p>
+
+<p>That the Bolsheviki have been guilty of many crimes <a name="Page_9" id="Page_9"></a>is certain. Ample
+evidence of that fact will be found in the following pages. They have
+committed many crimes against men and women whose splendid service to the
+Russian revolutionary movement serves only to accentuate the crimes in
+question. But their worst crimes have been against political and social
+democracy, which they have shamefully betrayed and opposed with as little
+scruple, and as much brutal injustice, as was ever manifested by the
+Romanovs. This is a terrible charge, I know, but I believe that the most
+sympathetic toward the Bolsheviki among my readers will, if they are
+candid, admit that it is amply sustained by the evidence.</p>
+
+<p>Concerning that evidence it is perhaps necessary to say that I have
+confined myself to the following: official documents issued by the
+Bolshevist government; the writings and addresses of accredited Bolshevik
+leaders and officials&mdash;in the form in which they have been published by the
+Bolsheviki themselves; the declarations of Russian Socialist organizations
+of long and honorable standing in the international Socialist movement; the
+statements of equally well-known and trusted Russian Socialists, and of
+responsible Russian Socialist journals.</p>
+
+<p>While I have indicated the sources of most of the evidence against the
+Bolsheviki, either in the text itself or in the foot-notes and references,
+I have not thought it advisable to burden my pages with such foot-notes and
+references concerning matters of general knowledge. To have given
+references and authorities for all the facts summarized in the historical
+outlines, for example, would have been simply a show of pedantry and served
+only to frighten away the ordinary reader.</p>
+
+<p>I have been deeply indebted to the works of other writers, among which I
+may mention the following: Peter<a name="Page_10" id="Page_10"></a> Kropotkin's <i>Memoirs of a Revolutionist</i>
+and <i>Ideals and Realities of Russian Literature</i>; S. Stepniak's
+<i>Underground Russia</i>; Leo Deutsch's <i>Sixteen Years in Siberia</i>; Alexander
+Ular's <i>Russia from Within</i>; William English Walling's <i>Russia's Message</i>;
+Zinovy N. Preev's <i>The Russian Riddle</i>; Maxim Litvinov's <i>The Bolshevik
+Revolution: Its Rise and Meaning</i>; M.J. Olgin's <i>The Soul of the Russian
+Revolution</i>; A.J. Sack's <i>The Birth of Russian Democracy</i>; E.A. Ross's
+<i>Russia in Upheaval</i>; Isaac Don Levine's <i>The Russian Revolution</i>; Bessie
+Beatty's <i>The Red Heart of Russia</i>; Louise Bryant's <i>Six Red Months in
+Russia</i>; Leon Trotzky's <i>Our Revolution</i> and <i>The Bolsheviki and World
+Peace</i>; Gabriel Domergue's <i>La Russe Rouge</i>; Nikolai Lenine's <i>The Soviets
+at Work</i>; Zinoviev and Lenine's <i>Sozialismus und Krieg</i>; Emile
+Vandervelde's <i>Trois Aspects de la R&eacute;volution Russe</i>; P.G. Chesnais's <i>La
+R&eacute;volution et la Paix</i> and <i>Les Bolsheviks</i>. I have also freely availed
+myself of the many admirable translations of official Bolshevist documents
+published in <i>The Class Struggle</i>, of New York, a pro-Bolshevist magazine;
+the collection of documents published by <i>The Nation</i>, of New York, a
+journal exceedingly generous in its treatment of Bolshevism and the
+Bolsheviki; and of the mass of material published in its excellent
+"International Notes" by <i>Justice</i>, of London, the oldest Socialist
+newspaper in the English language, I believe, and one of the most ably
+edited.</p>
+
+<p>Grateful acknowledgment is hereby made of friendly service rendered and
+valuable information given by Mr. Alexander Kerensky, former Premier of
+Russia; Mr. Henry L. Slobodin, of New York; Mr. A.J. Sack, Director of the
+Russian Information Bureau in the United States; Dr. Boris Takavenko,
+editor of <i>La Russia Nuova</i>, Rome, Italy; Mr. William English Walling, New
+York; and my friend, Father Cahill, of Bennington.</p>
+
+<p><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11"></a>Among the Appendices at the end of the volume will be found some important
+documents containing some contemporary Russian Socialist judgments of
+Bolshevism. These documents are, I venture to suggest, of the utmost
+possible value and importance to the student and general reader.</p>
+
+<p>
+<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><span class="smcap">John Spargo,</span></span><br />
+<br />
+<span style="margin-left: 2em;">"<span class="smcap">Nestledown</span>,"</span><br />
+<span style="margin-left: 3em;"><span class="smcap">Old Bennnigton, Vermont</span>,</span><br />
+<span style="margin-left: 4em;"><i>End of January, 1919</i>.</span><br />
+</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12"></a></p>
+<h2><a name="BOLSHEVISM" id="BOLSHEVISM"></a>BOLSHEVISM</h2>
+
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_I" id="CHAPTER_I"></a>CHAPTER I</h2>
+
+<h3>THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND</h3>
+
+
+<h4>I</h4>
+
+<p>For almost a full century Russia has been the theater of a great
+revolutionary movement. In the light of Russian history we read with
+cynical amusement that in 1848, when all Europe was in a revolutionary
+ferment, a German economist confidently predicted that revolutionary
+agitation could not live in the peculiar soil of Russian civilization.
+August Franz von Haxthausen was in many respects a competent and even a
+profound student of Russian politics, but he was wrong in his belief that
+the amount of rural communism existing in Russia, particularly the <i>mir</i>,
+would make it impossible for storms of revolutionary agitation to arise and
+stir the national life.</p>
+
+<p>As a matter of historical fact, the ferment of revolution had appeared in
+the land of the Czars long before the German economist made his remarkably
+ill-judged forecast. At the end of the Napoleonic wars many young officers
+of the Russian army returned to their native land full of revolutionary
+ideas and ideals acquired in France, Italy, <a name="Page_13" id="Page_13"></a>and Germany, and intent upon
+action. At first their intention was simply to make an appeal to Alexander
+I to grant self-government to Russia, which at one time he had seemed
+disposed to do. Soon they found themselves engaged in a secret conspiratory
+movement having for its object the overthrow of Czarism. The story of the
+failure of these romanticists, the manner in which the abortive attempt at
+revolution in December, 1825, was suppressed, and how the leaders were
+punished by Nicholas I&mdash;these things are well known to most students of
+Russian history. The Decembrists, as they came to be called, failed, as
+they were bound to do, but it would be a mistake to suppose that their
+efforts were altogether vain. On the contrary, their inspiration was felt
+throughout the next thirty years and was reflected in the literature of the
+period. During that period Russian literature was tinged with the faith in
+social regeneration held by most of the cultured intellectual classes. The
+Decembrists were the spiritual progenitors of the Russian revolutionary
+movement of our time. In the writings of Pushkin&mdash;himself a
+Decembrist&mdash;Lermontoff, Gogol, Turgeniev, Dostoyevsky, and many others less
+well known, the influence of the Decembrist movement is clearly manifested.</p>
+
+<p>If we are to select a single figure as the founder of the modern social
+revolutionary movement in Russia, that title can be applied to Alexander
+Herzen with greater fitness than to any other. His influence upon the
+movement during many years was enormous. Herzen was half-German, his mother
+being German. He was born at Moscow in 1812, shortly before the French
+occupation of the city. His parents were very rich and he enjoyed the
+advantages of a splendid education, as well as great luxury. At twenty-two
+years of age he was banished to <a name="Page_14" id="Page_14"></a>a small town in the Urals, where he spent
+six years, returning to Moscow in 1840. It is noteworthy that the offense
+for which he had been sent into exile was the singing of songs in praise of
+the Decembrist martyrs. This occurred at a meeting of one of the "Students'
+Circles" founded by Herzen for the dissemination of revolutionary Socialist
+ideals among the students.</p>
+
+<p>Upon his return to Moscow in 1840 Herzen, together with Bakunin and other
+friends, again engaged in revolutionary propaganda and in 1842 he was again
+exiled. In 1847, through the influence of powerful friends, he received
+permission to leave Russia for travel abroad. He never again saw his native
+land, all the remaining years of life being spent in exile. After a tour of
+Italy, Herzen arrived in Paris on the eve of the Revolution of 1848,
+joining there his friends, Bakunin and Turgeniev, and many other
+revolutionary leaders. It was impossible for him to participate actively in
+the 1848 uprising, owing to the activity of the Paris police, but he
+watched the Revolution with the profoundest sympathy. And when it failed
+and was followed by the terrible reaction his distress was almost
+unbounded. For a brief period he was the victim of the most appalling
+pessimism, but after a time his faith returned and he joined with Proudhon
+in issuing a radical revolutionary paper, <i>L'Ami du Peuple</i>, of which,
+Kropotkin tells us in his admirable study of Russian literature, "almost
+every number was confiscated by the police of Napoleon the Third." The
+paper had a very brief life, and Herzen himself was soon expelled from
+France, going to Switzerland, of which country he became a citizen.</p>
+
+<p>In 1857 Herzen settled in London, where he published for some years a
+remarkable paper, called <i>Kolokol (The Bell)</i>, in which he exposed the
+iniquities and shortcomings <a name="Page_15" id="Page_15"></a>of Czarism and inspired the youth of Russia
+with his revolutionary ideals. The paper had to be smuggled into Russia, of
+course, and the manner in which the smuggling was done is one of the most
+absorbing stories in all the tragic history of the vast land of the Czars.
+Herzen was a charming writer and a keen thinker, and it is impossible to
+exaggerate the extent of his influence. But when the freedom of the serfs,
+for which he so vigorously contended, was promulgated by Alexander II, and
+other extensive reforms were granted, his influence waned. He died in 1870
+in Switzerland.</p>
+
+
+<h4>II</h4>
+
+<p>Alexander II was not alone in hoping that the Act of Liberation would usher
+in a new era of prosperity and tranquillity for Russia. Many of the most
+radical of the Intelligentsia, followers of Herzen, believed that Russia
+was destined to outstrip the older nations of western Europe in its
+democracy and its culture. It was not long before disillusionment came: the
+serfs were set free, but the manner in which the land question had been
+dealt with made their freedom almost a mockery. As a result there were
+numerous uprisings of peasants&mdash;riots which the government suppressed in
+the most sanguinary manner. From that time until the present the land
+question has been the core of the Russian problem. Every revolutionary
+movement has been essentially concerned with giving the land to the
+peasants.</p>
+
+<p>Within a few months after the liberation of the serfs the revolutionary
+unrest was so wide-spread that the government became alarmed and instituted
+a policy of vigorous repression. Progressive papers, which had sprung up as
+a result of the liberal tendencies characterizing <a name="Page_16" id="Page_16"></a>the reign of Alexander
+II thus far, were suppressed and many of the leading writers were
+imprisoned and exiled. Among those thus punished was that brilliant writer,
+Tchernyshevsky, to whom the Russian movement owes so much. His
+<i>Contemporary Review</i> was, during the four critical years 1858-62 the
+principal forum for the discussion of the problems most vital to the life
+of Russia. In it the greatest leaders of Russian thought discussed the land
+question, co-operation, communism, popular education, and similar subjects.
+This served a twofold purpose: in the first place, it brought to the study
+of the pressing problems of the time the ablest and best minds of the
+country; secondly, it provided these Intellectuals with a bond of union and
+stimulus to serve the poor and the oppressed. That Alexander II had been
+influenced to sign the Emancipation Act by Tchernyshevsky and his friends
+did not cause the authorities to spare Tchernyshevsky when, in 1863, he
+engaged in active Socialist propaganda. He was arrested and imprisoned in a
+fortress, where he wrote the novel which has so profoundly influenced two
+generations of discontented and protesting Russians&mdash;<i>What is to Be Done?</i>
+In form a novel of thrilling interest, this work was really an elaborate
+treatise upon Russian social conditions. It dealt with the vexed problems
+of marriage and divorce, the land question, co-operative production, and
+other similar matters, and the solutions it suggested for these problems
+became widely accepted as the program of revolutionary Russia. Few books in
+any literature have ever produced such a profound impression, or exerted as
+much influence upon the life of a nation. In the following year, 1864,
+Tchernyshevsky was exiled to hard labor in Siberia, remaining there until
+1883, when he returned to Russia. He lived only six years longer, dying in
+1889.</p><p><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17"></a></p>
+
+<p>The attempt made by a young student to assassinate Alexander II, on April
+4, 1866, was seized upon by the Czar and his advisers as an excuse for
+instituting a policy of terrible reaction. The most repressive measures
+were taken against the Intelligentsia and all the liberal reforms which had
+been introduced were practically destroyed. It was impossible to restore
+serfdom, of course, but the condition of the peasants without land was even
+worse than if they had remained serfs. Excessive taxation, heavy redemption
+charges, famine, crop failures, and other ills drove the people to
+desperation. Large numbers of students espoused the cause of the peasants
+and a new popular literature appeared in which the sufferings of the people
+were portrayed with fervor and passion. In 1868-69 there were numerous
+demonstrations and riots by way of protest against the reactionary policy
+of the government.</p>
+
+<p>It was at this time that Michael Bakunin, from his exile in Switzerland,
+conspired with Nechaiev to bring about a great uprising of the peasants,
+through the Society for the Liberation of the People. Bakunin advised the
+students to leave the universities and to go among the people to teach them
+and, at the same time, arouse them to revolt. It was at this time, too,
+that Nicholas Tchaykovsky and his friends, the famous Circle of
+Tchaykovsky, began to distribute among students in all parts of the Empire
+books dealing with the condition of the peasants and proposing remedies
+therefor. This work greatly influenced the young Intelligentsia, but the
+immediate results among the peasants were not very encouraging. Even the
+return from Switzerland, by order of the government, of hundreds of
+students who were disciples of Bakunin and Peter Lavrov did not produce any
+great success.</p><p><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18"></a></p>
+
+<p>Very soon a new organization appeared. The remnant of the Circle
+Tchaykovsky, together with some followers of Bakunin, formed a society
+called the Land and Freedom Society. This society, which was destined to
+exert a marked influence upon revolutionary Russia, was the most ambitious
+revolutionary effort Russia had known. The society had a constitution and a
+carefully worked out program. It had one special group to carry on
+propaganda among students; another to agitate among the peasants; and a
+third to employ armed force against the government and against those guilty
+of treachery toward the society. The basis of the society was the
+conviction that Russia needed an economic revolution; that only an economic
+revolution, starting with the producers, could overthrow Czarism and
+establish the ideal state of society.</p>
+
+<p>The members of this Land and Freedom Society divided their work into four
+main divisions: (1) Agitation&mdash;passive and active. Passive agitation
+included strikes, petitions for reforms, refusal to pay taxes, and so on.
+Active agitation meant riots and uprisings. (2) Organization&mdash;the formation
+of a fighting force prepared to bring about a general uprising. (3)
+Education&mdash;the spreading of revolutionary knowledge and ideas, a
+continuation of the work of the Tchaykovsky Circle. (4) Secularization&mdash;the
+carrying on of systematic work against the Orthodox Church through special
+channels. One of the early leaders of this society was George Plechanov,
+who later founded the Russian Social Democracy and gave to the Russian
+revolutionary movement its Marxian character, inspiring such men as Nikolai
+Lenine and Leon Trotzky, among many others. The society did not attain any
+very great amount of success in its efforts to reach the peasants, and it
+was <a name="Page_19" id="Page_19"></a>that fact more than any other which determined Plechanov's future
+course.</p>
+
+
+<h4>III</h4>
+
+<p>When the failure of the Land and Freedom methods became evident, and the
+government became more and more oppressive, desperate individuals and
+groups resorted to acts of terrorism. It was thus that Vera Zasulich
+attempted the assassination of the infamous Chief of Police Trepov. The
+movement to temper Czarism by assassination systematically pursued was
+beginning. In 1879 the Land and Freedom Society held a conference for the
+purpose of discussing its program. A majority favored resorting to
+terroristic tactics; Plechanov and a few other well-known revolutionists
+were opposed&mdash;favoring the old methods. The society split, the majority
+becoming known as the Will of the People and adopting a terroristic
+program. This organization sentenced Czar Alexander II to death and several
+unsuccessful attempts were made to carry out the sentence. The leaders
+believed that the assassination of the Czar would give rise to a general
+revolution throughout the whole of Russia. In February, 1880, occurred the
+famous attempt to blow up the Winter Palace. For a time it seemed that the
+Czar had learned the lesson the Will of the People sought to teach him, and
+that he would institute far-reaching reforms. Pursuing a policy of
+vacillation and fear, however, Alexander II soon fell back into the old
+attitude. On March 1, 1881, a group of revolutionists, among them Sophia
+Perovskaya, made another attempt upon his life, succeeding, at first, only
+in damaging the bottom of the Czar's carriage and wounding a number of
+Cossack soldiers. "Thank God, I am untouched," said the Czar, in response
+to the inquiry of an officer of his guard. "It's too soon to thank God!"<a name="Page_20" id="Page_20"></a>
+cried N.I. Grinevitsky, hurling a bomb at the Czar. Within a short time
+Alexander II and his assailant were both dead.</p>
+
+<p>The assassination of Alexander II was a tragic event for Russia. On the
+very morning of his death the ill-fated monarch had approved a plan for
+extensive reforms presented by the liberal Minister, Loris-Melikoff. It had
+been decided to call a conference three days later and to invite a number
+of well-known public men to co-operate in introducing the reforms. These
+reforms would not have been far-reaching enough to satisfy the
+revolutionists, but they would certainly have improved the situation and
+given Russia a new hope. That hope died with Alexander II. His son,
+Alexander III, had always been a pronounced reactionary and had advised his
+father against making any concessions to the agitators. It was not
+surprising, therefore, that he permitted himself to be advised against the
+liberals by the most reactionary bureaucrats in the Empire, and to adopt
+the most oppressive policies.</p>
+
+<p>The new Czar was greatly influenced by his former tutor, the reactionary
+bureaucrat Pobiedonostzev. At first it was believed that out of respect for
+his father's memory Alexander III would carry out the program of reforms
+formulated by Loris-Melikoff, as his father had promised to do. In a
+Manifesto issued on the 29th of April, 1881, Alexander III promised to do
+this, but in the same document there were passages which could only be
+interpreted as meaning that all demands for constitutional reform would be
+resisted and Absolutism upheld at all cost. Doubtless it was due to the
+influence of Pobiedonostzev, Procurator of the Holy Synod, that Alexander
+III soon abandoned all intention of carrying out his father's wishes in the
+matter of reform and instituted such reactionary policies that the peasants
+feared that serfdom <a name="Page_21" id="Page_21"></a>was to be restored. A terrible persecution of the Jews
+was begun, lasting for several years. The Poles, too, felt the oppressive
+hand of Pobiedonostzev. The latter was mastered by the Slavophil philosophy
+that the revolutionary unrest in Russia was traceable to the diversity of
+races, languages, and religions. He believed that Nihilism, Anarchism, and
+Socialism flourished because the people were cosmopolitan rather than
+nationalistic in experience and feeling, and that peace and stability could
+come only from the persistent and vigorous development of the three
+principles of Nationality, Orthodoxy, and Autocracy as the basis of the
+state.</p>
+
+<p>In this doctrine we have the whole explanation of the reactionary policy of
+Alexander III. In the Manifesto of April 29th was announced the Czar's
+determination to strengthen and uphold autocracy. That was the foundation
+stone. To uphold orthodoxy was the next logical necessity, for autocracy
+and orthodoxy were, in Russia, closely related. Hence the non-orthodox
+sects&mdash;such as the Finnish Protestants, German Lutherans, Polish Roman
+Catholics, the Jews, and the Mohammedans&mdash;were increasingly restricted in
+the observance of their religion. They might not build new places of
+worship; their children could not be educated in the faith of their
+parents. In many cases children were taken away from their parents in order
+to be sent to schools where they would be inculcated with the orthodox
+faith. In a similar way, every attempt was made to suppress the use of
+languages other than Russian.</p>
+
+<p>Along with this attempt to force the whole population into a single mold
+went a determined resistance to liberalism in all its forms. All this was
+accompanied by a degree of efficiency in the police service quite unusual
+in Russia, with the result that the terroristic tactics of the<a name="Page_22" id="Page_22"></a> Will of the
+People party were unavailing, except in the cases of a few minor officials.
+Plots to assassinate the Czar were laid, but they were generally betrayed
+to the police. The most serious of these plots, in March, 1887, led to the
+arrest of all the conspirators.</p>
+
+<p>In the mean time there had appeared the first definite Marxian Social
+Democratic group in Russia. Plechanov, Vera Zasulich, Leo Deutsch, and
+other Russian revolutionists in Switzerland formed the organization known
+as the Group for the Emancipation of Labor. This organization was based
+upon the principles and tactics of Marxian Socialism and sought to create a
+purely proletarian movement. As we have seen, when revolutionary terrorism
+was at its height Plechanov and his disciples had proclaimed its futility
+and pinned their faith to the nascent class of industrial wage-workers. In
+the early 'eighties this class was so small in Russia that it seemed to
+many of the best and clearest minds of the revolutionary movement quite
+hopeless to rely upon it. Plechanov was derided as a mere theorist and
+closet philosopher, but he never wavered in his conviction that Socialism
+must come in Russia as the natural outcome of capitalist development. By
+means of a number of scholarly polemics against the principles and tactics
+of the Will of the People party, Plechanov gathered to his side of the
+controversy a group of very brilliant and able disciples, and so laid the
+basis for the Social Democratic Labor party. With the relatively rapid
+expansion of capitalism, beginning with the year 1888, and the inevitable
+increase of the city proletariat, the Marxian movement made great progress.
+A strong labor-union movement and a strong political Socialist movement
+were thus developed side by side.</p>
+
+<p>At the same time there was a revival of terrorism, the <a name="Page_23" id="Page_23"></a>one available reply
+of the oppressed to brutal autocracy. While the Marxian movement made
+headway among the industrial workers, the older terroristic movement made
+headway among the peasants. Various groups appeared in different parts of
+the country. When Alexander III died, at the end of 1894, both movements
+had developed considerable strength. Working in secret and subject to
+terrible measures of repression, their leaders being constantly imprisoned
+and exiled, these two wings of the Russian revolutionary movement were
+gathering strength in preparation for an uprising more extensive and
+serious than anything that had hitherto been attempted.</p>
+
+<p>Whenever a new Czar ascended the throne in Russia it was the fashion to
+hope for some measure of reform and for a degree of liberality. Frequently,
+as in the case of Alexander III, all such hopes were speedily killed, but
+repeated experiences of the kind did not prevent the birth of new hopes
+with the death of successive Czars. When, therefore, Alexander III was
+succeeded by his son, Nicholas II, liberal Russia expectantly awaited the
+promulgation of constitutional reforms. In this they were doomed to
+disappointment, just as they had been on the occasion of the accession of
+the new Czar's immediate predecessor. Nicholas II was evidently going to be
+quite as reactionary as his father was. This was made manifest in a number
+of ways. When a deputation from one of the zemstvos, which congratulated
+him upon his ascension to the throne, expressed the hope that he would
+listen to "the voice of the people and the expression of its desires," the
+reply of the new Czar was a grim warning of what was to come. Nicholas II
+told the zemstvos that he intended to follow the example of his father and
+uphold the principles of Absolutism, and that any thought <a name="Page_24" id="Page_24"></a>of participation
+by the zemstvos or other organizations of the people in state affairs was a
+senseless dream. More significant still, perhaps, was the fact that the
+hated Pobiedonostzev was retained in power.</p>
+
+<p>The revolutionists were roused as they had not been for a decade or more.
+Some of the leaders believed that the new reign of reaction would prove to
+be the occasion and the opportunity for bringing about a union of all the
+revolutionary forces, Anarchists and Socialists alike, peasants and
+industrial workers. This hope was destined to fail, but there was an
+unmistakable revolutionary awakening. In the latter part of January, 1895,
+an open letter to Nicholas II was smuggled into the country from
+Switzerland and widely distributed. It informed the Czar that the
+Socialists would fight to the bitter end the hateful order of things which
+he was responsible for creating, and menacingly said, "It will not be long
+before you find yourself entangled by it."</p>
+
+
+<h4>IV</h4>
+
+<p>In one respect Nicholas II differed from Alexander III&mdash;he was by nature
+more humane and sentimental. Like his father, he was thoroughly dominated
+by Pobiedonostzev's theory that Russia, in order to be secure and stable,
+must be based upon Nationality, Orthodoxy, and Autocracy. He wanted to see
+Holy Russia homogeneous and free from revolutionary disturbances. But his
+sensitive nature shrank from the systematic persecution of the non-orthodox
+sects and the Jews, and he quietly intimated to the officials that he would
+not approve its continuance. At the same time, he was not willing to face
+the issue squarely and openly announce a change of policy or restore
+religious freedom. That would have meant the <a name="Page_25" id="Page_25"></a>overthrow of Pobiedonostzev
+and the Czar's emancipation from his sinister influence, and for that
+Nicholas II lacked the necessary courage and stamina. Cowardice and
+weakness of the will characterized his reign from the very beginning.</p>
+
+<p>When the officials, in obedience to their ruler's wishes, relaxed the
+severity which had marked the treatment of the Jews and the non-orthodox
+Christian sects, the change was soon noted by the victims and once more
+there was a revival of hope. But the efforts of the Finns to secure a
+modification of the Russification policy were quite fruitless. When a
+deputation was sent from Finland to represent to the Czar that the rights
+and privileges solemnly reserved to them at the time of the annexation were
+being denied to the people of Finland, Nicholas II refused to grant the
+deputation an audience. Instead of getting relief, the people of Finland
+soon found that the oppression steadily increased. It was evident that
+Finnish nationality was to be crushed out, if possible, in the interest of
+Russian homogeneity.</p>
+
+<p>It soon became apparent, moreover, that Pobiedonostzev was to enjoy even
+more power than he had under Alexander III. In proportion as the character
+of Nicholas II was weaker than that of his father, the power of the
+Procurator of the Holy Synod was greater. And there was a superstitious
+element in the mentality of the new Czar which Pobiedonostzev played upon
+with infinite cunning. He ruled the weak-willed Czar and filled the
+ministries with men who shared his views and upon whom he could rely.
+Notwithstanding the Czar's expressed wishes, he soon found ways and means
+to add to the persecutions of the Jews and the various non-orthodox
+Christian sects. In his determination to hammer the varied racial groups
+into a homogeneous nation, he <a name="Page_26" id="Page_26"></a>adopted terrible measures and so roused the
+hatred of the Finns, Armenians, Georgians, and other subject peoples,
+stirring among them passionate resentment and desire for revolutionary
+action. It is impossible to conceive of a policy more dangerous to the
+dynasty than was conceived and followed by this fanatical Russophil. The
+Poles were persecuted and forced, in sheer despair, and by self-interest,
+into the revolutionary movement. Armenians were persecuted and their church
+lands and church funds confiscated; so they, too, were forced into the
+revolutionary current.</p>
+
+<p>Worse than all else was the cruel persecution of the Jews. Not only were
+they compelled to live within the Pale of Settlement, but this was so
+reduced that abominable congestion and poverty resulted. Intolerable
+restrictions were placed upon the facilities for education in the secondary
+schools, the gymnasia, and in the universities. It was hoped in this way to
+destroy the intellectual leadership of the Jews. Pogroms were instigated,
+stirring the civilized world to protest at the horrible outrages. The
+Minister of the Interior, Von Plehve, proclaimed his intention to "drown
+the Revolution in Jewish blood," while Pobiedonostzev's ambition was "to
+force one-third of the Jews to conversion, another third to emigrate"&mdash;to
+escape persecution. The other third he expected to die of hunger and
+misery. When Leo Tolstoy challenged these infamies, and called upon the
+civilized world on behalf of the victims, the Holy Synod denounced Tolstoy
+and his followers as a sect "especially dangerous for the Orthodox Church
+and the state." Later, in 1900, the Holy Synod excommunicated Tolstoy from
+the Orthodox Church.</p>
+
+<p>The fatal logic of fanatical fury led to attacks upon the zemstvos. These
+local organizations had been instituted <a name="Page_27" id="Page_27"></a>in 1864, by Alexander II, in the
+liberal years of his reign. Elected mainly by the landlords and the
+peasants, they were a vital part of the life of the nation. Possessing no
+political powers or functions, having nothing to do with legislation, they
+were important agencies of local government. The representatives of each
+county constituted a county-zemstvo and the representatives elected by all
+the county-zemstvos in a province constituted a province-zemstvo. Both
+types concerned themselves with much the same range of activities. They
+built roads and telegraph stations; they maintained model farms and
+agricultural experiment stations similar to those maintained by our state
+governments. They maintained schools, bookstores, and libraries:
+co-operative stores; hospitals and banks. They provided the peasants with
+cheap credit, good seeds, fertilizers, agricultural implements, and so
+forth. In many cases they provided for free medical aid to the peasants. In
+some instances they published newspapers and magazines.</p>
+
+<p>It must be remembered that the zemstvos were the only representative public
+bodies elected by any large part of the people. While the suffrage was
+quite undemocratic, being so arranged that the landlords were assured a
+majority over the peasants at all times, nevertheless they did perform a
+great democratic service. But for them, life would have been well-nigh
+impossible for the peasant. In addition to the services already enumerated,
+these civic bodies were the relief agencies of the Empire, and when crop
+failures brought famine to the peasants it was always the zemstvos which
+undertook the work of relief. Hampered at every point, denied the right to
+control the schools they created and maintained, inhibited by law from
+discussing political questions, the zemstvos, nevertheless, became the
+natural channels for <a name="Page_28" id="Page_28"></a>the spreading of discontent and opposition to the
+r&eacute;gime through private communication and discussion.</p>
+
+<p>To bureaucrats of the type of Pobiedonostzev and Von Plehve, with their
+fanatical belief in autocracy, these organizations of the people were so
+many plague spots. Not daring to suppress them altogether, they determined
+to restrict them at every opportunity. Some of the zemstvos were suspended
+and disbanded for certain periods of time. Individual members were exiled
+for utterances which Von Plehve regarded as dangerous. The power of the
+zemstvos themselves was lessened by taking from them such important
+functions as the provisioning of famine-stricken districts and by limiting
+in the most arbitrary manner the amount of the budget permitted to each
+zemstvo. Since every decision of the zemstvos was subject to veto by the
+governors of the respective provinces, the government had at all times a
+formidable weapon at hand to use in its fight against the zemstvos. This
+weapon Von Plehve used with great effect; the most reasonable actions of
+the zemstvos were vetoed for no other reason than hatred of any sort of
+representative government.</p>
+
+
+<h4>V</h4>
+
+<p>The result of all this was to drive the zemstvos toward the revolutionary
+movements of the peasants and the city workers. That the zemstvos were not
+naturally inclined to radicalism and revolution needs no demonstration.
+Economic interest, tradition, and environment all conspired to keep these
+popular bodies conservative. Landowners were always in the majority and in
+general the zemstvos reflected the ideas and ideals of the enlightened
+wealthy and cultivated classes. The peasant representatives in the zemstvos
+were generally peasants of the <a name="Page_29" id="Page_29"></a>most successful and prosperous type, hating
+the revolutionists and all their works. By means of a policy incredibly
+insane these conservatively inclined elements of the population were goaded
+to revolt. The newspapers and magazines of the zemstvos became more and
+more critical of the government, more and more outspoken in denunciation of
+existing conditions. Presently, the leaders of the zemstvos followed the
+example of the revolutionists and held a secret convention at which a
+program for common action was agreed upon. Thus they were resorting to
+illegal methods, exactly as the Socialists had done. Finally, many of the
+liberal zemstvo leaders formed themselves into a political party&mdash;the Union
+of Liberation&mdash;with a special organ of its own, called <i>Emancipation</i>. This
+organ, edited by the brilliant and courageous Peter Struve, was published
+in Stuttgart, Germany, and, since its circulation in Russia was forbidden,
+it had to be smuggled into the country and secretly circulated, just as the
+revolutionary Socialist journals were. Thus another bond was established
+between two very different movements.</p>
+
+<p>As was inevitable, revolutionary terrorism enormously increased. In the
+cities the working-men were drawn mainly into the Social Democratic
+Working-men's party, founded by Plechanov and others in 1898, but the
+peasants, in so far as they were aroused at all, rallied around the
+standard of the Socialist-Revolutionists, successors to the Will of the
+People party. This party was peculiarly a party of the peasants, just as
+the party of Plechanov was peculiarly a party of industrial workers. It
+emphasized the land question above all else. It naturally scorned the view,
+largely held by the Marxists in the other party, that Russia must wait
+until her industrial development was perfected before attempting to realize
+Socialism.<a name="Page_30" id="Page_30"></a> It scorned the slow, legalistic methods and resolutely answered
+the terrorism of Czarism by a terrorism of the people. It maintained a
+special department for carrying on this grim work. Its Central Committee
+passed sentences of death upon certain officials, and its decrees were
+carried out by the members of its Fighting Organization. To this
+organization within the party belonged many of the ablest and most
+consecrated men and women in Russia.</p>
+
+<p>A few illustrations will suffice to make clear the nature of this
+terroristic retaliation: In March, 1902, Sypiagin, the Minister of the
+Interior, was shot down as he entered his office by a member of the
+Fighting Organization, Stephen Balmashev, who was disguised as an officer.
+Sypiagin had been duly sentenced to death by the Central Committee. He had
+been responsible for upward of sixty thousand political arrests and for the
+suffering of many exiles. Balmashev went to his death with heroic
+fortitude. In May, 1903, Gregory Gershuni and two associates executed the
+reactionary Governor of Ufa. Early in June, 1904, Borikov, Governor-General
+of Finland, was assassinated by a revolutionist. A month later, July 15th,
+the infamous Von Plehve, who had been judged by the Central Committee and
+held responsible for the Kishinev pogrom, was killed by a bomb thrown under
+the wheels of his carriage by Sazanov, a member of the Fighting Force. The
+death of this cruel tyrant thrilled the world. In February, 1905, Ivan
+Kaliaiev executed the death sentence which had been passed upon the
+ruthless Governor-General of Moscow, the Grand-Duke Serghei Alexandrovich.</p>
+
+<p>There was war in Russia&mdash;war between two systems of organized terrorism.
+Sometimes the Czar and his Ministers weakened and promised concessions, but
+always there was speedy reaction and, usually, an increased vigor of
+<a name="Page_31" id="Page_31"></a>oppression. The assassination of Von Plehve, however, for the first time
+really weakened the government. Czarism was, in fact, already toppling. The
+new Minister of the Interior, Von Plehve's successor, Prince
+Svyatpolk-Mirski, sought to meet the situation by a policy of compromise.
+While he maintained Von Plehve's methods of suppressing the radical
+organizations and their press, and using provocative agents to entrap
+revolutionary leaders, he granted a certain degree of freedom to the
+moderate press and adopted a relatively liberal attitude toward the
+zemstvos. By this means he hoped to avert the impending revolution.</p>
+
+<p>Taking advantage of the new conditions, the leaders of the zemstvos
+organized a national convention. This the government forbade, but it had
+lost much of its power and the leaders of the movement ignored the order
+and proceeded to hold the convention. At this convention, held at St.
+Petersburg, November 6, 1904, attended by many of the ablest lawyers,
+doctors, professors, scientists, and publicists in Russia, a resolution was
+adopted demanding that the government at once call representatives of the
+people together for the purpose of setting up a constitutional government
+in Russia. It was a revolutionary act, a challenge to the autocracy, which
+the latter dared not accept. On the contrary, in December the Czar issued
+an ambiguous ukase in which a number of concessions and reforms were
+promised, but carefully avoiding the fundamental issues at stake.</p>
+
+
+<h4>VI</h4>
+
+<p>Meanwhile the war with Japan, unpopular from the first, had proved to be an
+unbroken series of military defeats and disasters for Russia. From the
+opening of the war in February to the end of the year the press had <a name="Page_32" id="Page_32"></a>been
+permitted to publish very little real news concerning it, but it was not
+possible to hide for long the bitter truth. Taxes mounted higher and
+higher, prices rose, and there was intense suffering, while the loss of
+life was enormous. News of the utter failure and incompetence of the army
+and the navy seeped through. Here was Russia with a population three times
+as large as that of Japan, and with an annual budget of two billions as
+against Japan's paltry sixty millions, defeated at every turn. What did
+this failure signify? In the first place, it signified the weakness and
+utter incompetence of the r&eacute;gime. It meant that imperialist expansion, with
+a corresponding strengthening of the old r&eacute;gime, was out of the question.
+Most intelligent Russians, with no lack of real patriotism, rejoiced at the
+succession of defeats because it proved to the masses the unfitness of the
+bureaucracy.</p>
+
+<p>It signified something else, also. There were many who remembered the
+scandals of the Turkish War, in 1877, when Bessarabia was recovered. At
+that time there was a perfect riot of graft, corruption, and treachery,
+much of which came under the observation of the zemstvos of the border.
+High military officials trafficked in munitions and food-supplies. Food
+intended for the army was stolen and sold&mdash;sometimes, it was said, to the
+enemy. Materials were paid for, but never delivered to the army at all. The
+army was demoralized and the Turks repulsed the Russians again and again.
+Now similar stories began to be circulated. Returning victims told stories
+of brutal treatment of the troops by officers; of wounded and dying men
+neglected; of lack of hospital care and medical attention. They told worse
+stories, too, of open treachery by military officials and others; of army
+supplies stolen; of shells ordered which would fit no guns the Russian army
+ever had, and so on. It was suggested, and widely believed, <a name="Page_33" id="Page_33"></a>that Germany
+had connived at the systematic corruption of the Russian bureaucracy and
+the Russian army, to serve its own imperialistic and economic ends.</p>
+
+<p>Such was the state of Russia at the end of the year 1904. Then came the
+tragic events of January, 1905, which marked the opening of the Revolution.
+In order to counteract the agitation of the Social Democrats among the city
+workers, and the formation by them of trades-unions, the government had
+caused to be formed "legal" unions&mdash;that is, organizations of workmen
+approved by the government. In order to give these organizations some
+semblance to real labor-unions, and thereby the better to deceive the
+workers, strikes were actually inspired by agents of the government from
+time to time. On more than one occasion strikes thus instigated by the
+government spread beyond control and caused great alarm. The Czar and his
+agents were playing with fire.</p>
+
+<p>Among such unions was the Gathering of Industrial Working-men of St.
+Petersburg, which had for its program such innocent and non-revolutionary
+objects as "sober and reasonable pastimes, aimed at physical, intellectual,
+and moral improvement; strengthening of Russian national ideas; development
+of sensible views concerning the rights and duties of working-men and
+improvement of labor conditions and mutual assistance." It was founded by
+Father Gapon, who was opposed to the revolutionary movement, and was
+regarded by the Socialists as a Czarist tool.</p>
+
+<p>On January 3d&mdash;Russian calendar&mdash;several thousand men belonging to the
+Gathering of Industrial Workin-gmen of St. Petersburg went out on strike.
+By the 6th the strike had assumed the dimensions of a general strike. It
+was estimated that on the latter date fully one hundred and forty thousand
+men were out on strike, <a name="Page_34" id="Page_34"></a>practically paralyzing the industrial life of the
+city. At meetings of the strikers speeches were made which had as much to
+do with the political demands for constitutional government as with the
+original grievances of the strikers. The strike was fast becoming a
+revolution. On the 9th Father Gapon led the hosts to the Winter Palace, to
+present a petition to the Czar asking for reforms. The text of the petition
+was widely circulated beforehand. It begged the Czar to order immediately
+"that representatives of all the Russian land, of all classes and groups,
+convene." It outlined a moderate program which had the support of almost
+the entire nation with the exception of the bureaucracy:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>Let every one be equal and free in the right of election; order to
+this end that election for the Constituent Assembly be based on
+general, equal, direct, and secret suffrage. This is our main
+request; in it and upon it everything is founded; this is the only
+ointment for our painful wounds; and in the absence of this our
+blood will continue to flow constantly, carrying us swiftly toward
+death.</p>
+
+<p>But this measure alone cannot remedy all our wounds. Many others
+are necessary, and we tell them to you, Sire, directly and openly,
+as to our Father. We need:</p>
+
+<p><i>I. Measures to counteract the ignorance and legal oppression of
+the Russian people</i>:</p>
+
+<p>(1) Personal freedom and inviolability, freedom of speech and the
+press, freedom of assemblage, freedom in religious affairs;</p>
+
+<p>(2) General and compulsory public education at the expense of the
+state;</p>
+
+<p>(3) Responsibility of the Ministers to the people, and guaranties
+of lawfulness in administration;</p>
+
+<p>(4) Equality before the law for all without exemption;</p>
+
+<p>(5) Immediate rehabilitation of those punished for their
+convictions.</p>
+
+<p>(6) Separation of the Church from the state.</p><p><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35"></a></p>
+
+<p><i>II. Measures against the poverty of the people</i>:</p>
+
+<p>(1) Abolition of indirect taxes and introduction of direct income
+taxes on a progressive scale;</p>
+
+<p>(2) Abolition of the redemption payments, cheap credit, and
+gradual transferring of the land to the people;</p>
+
+<p>(3) The orders for the naval and military Ministers should be
+filled in Russia and not abroad;</p>
+
+<p>(4) The cessation of the war by the will of the people.</p>
+
+<p><i>III. Measures against oppression of labor by capital</i>:</p>
+
+<p>(1) Protection of labor by legislation;</p>
+
+<p>(2) Freedom of consumers' and producers' leagues and
+trades-unions;</p>
+
+<p>(3) An eight-hour workday and a regulation of overtime;</p>
+
+<p>(4) Freedom of struggle against capital (freedom of labor
+strikes);</p>
+
+<p>(5) Participation of labor representatives in the framing of a
+bill concerning state insurance of working-men;</p>
+
+<p>(6) Normal wages.</p>
+
+<p>Those are, Sire, the principal wants with which we have come to
+you. Let your decree be known, swear that you will satisfy them,
+and you will make Russia happy and glorious, and your name will be
+branded in our hearts and in the hearts of our posterity for ever
+and ever. If, however, you will not reply to our prayer, we shall
+die here, on the place before your palace. We have no other refuge
+and no other means. We have two roads before us, one to freedom
+and happiness, the other to the grave. Tell us, Sire, which, and
+we will follow obediently, and if it be the road of death, let our
+lives be a sacrifice for suffering-wearied Russia. We do not
+regret the sacrifice; we bring it willingly.</p></div>
+
+<p>Led on by the strange, hypnotic power of the mystical Father Gapon, who was
+clad in the robes of his office, tens of thousands of working-people
+marched that day to the Winter Palace, confident that the Czar would see
+them, receive their petitions, and harken to their prayers. It was not a
+revolutionary demonstration in the accepted sense of that term; the
+marchers did not carry red flags nor sing Socialist songs of revolt.
+Instead, they bore <a name="Page_36" id="Page_36"></a>pictures of the Czar and other members of the royal
+family and sang "God Save the Czar" and other well-known religious hymns.
+No attempt was made to prevent the procession from reaching the square in
+front of the Winter Palace. Suddenly, without a word of warning, troops
+appeared from the courtyards, where they were hidden, and fired into the
+crowded mass of human beings, killing more than five hundred and wounding
+nearly three thousand. All who were able to do so turned and fled, among
+them Father Gapon.</p>
+
+<p>Bloody Sunday, as the day is known in Russian annals, is generally regarded
+as the beginning of the First Revolution. Immediately people began to talk
+of armed resistance. On the evening of the day of the tragedy there was a
+meeting of more than seven hundred Intellectuals at which the means for
+carrying on revolution was the topic discussed. This was the first of many
+similar gatherings which took place all over Russia. Soon the Intellectuals
+began to organize unions, ostensibly for the protection of their
+professional interests, but in reality for political purposes. There were
+unions of doctors, writers, lawyers, engineers, professors, editors, and so
+on. Quietly, and almost without design, there was being effected another
+and more important union, namely, the union of all classes against
+autocracy and despotism.</p>
+
+<p>The Czar gave from his private purse fifty thousand rubles for the relief
+of the families of the victims of Bloody Sunday. On the 19th of January he
+received a deputation of carefully selected "loyal" working-men and
+delivered to them a characteristic homily, which infuriated the masses by
+its stupid perversion of the facts connected with the wanton massacre of
+Bloody Sunday. Then, at the end of the month, he proclaimed the appointment
+of a commission to "investigate the causes of labor <a name="Page_37" id="Page_37"></a>unrest in St.
+Petersburg and its suburbs and to find means of avoiding them in the
+future." This commission was to consist of representatives of capital and
+labor. The working-men thereupon made the following demands:</p>
+
+<p>(1) That labor be given an equal number of members in the commission with
+capital;</p>
+
+<p>(2) That the working-men be permitted to freely elect their own
+representatives;</p>
+
+<p>(3) That the sessions of the commission be open to the public;</p>
+
+<p>(4) That there be complete freedom of speech for the representatives of
+labor in the commission;</p>
+
+<p>(5) That all the working-people arrested on January 9th be released.</p>
+
+<p>These demands of the working-men's organizations were rejected by the
+government, whereupon the workers agreed to boycott the commission and
+refuse to have anything to do with it. At last it became evident to the
+government that, in the circumstances, the commission could not accomplish
+any good, and it was therefore abandoned. The Czar and his advisers were
+desperate and vacillating. One day they would adopt a conciliatory attitude
+toward the workers, and the next day follow it up with fresh measures of
+repression and punishment.</p>
+
+<p>Little heeding the stupid charge by the Holy Synod that the revolutionary
+leaders were in the pay of the Japanese, the workers went on organizing and
+striking. All over Russia there were strikes, the movement had spread far
+beyond the bounds of St. Petersburg. General strikes took place in many of
+the large cities, such as Riga, Vilna, Libau, Warsaw, Lodz, Batum, Minsk,
+Tiflis, and many others. Conflicts between strikers and soldiers and police
+were common. Russia was aflame with revolution. The movement spread to the
+peasants <a name="Page_38" id="Page_38"></a>in a most surprising manner. Numerous extensive and serious
+revolts of peasants occurred in different parts of Russia, the peasants
+looting the mansions of the landowners, and indulging in savage outbreaks
+of rioting.</p>
+
+<p>While this was going on the army was being completely demoralized. The
+terrible defeat of the Russian forces by the Japanese&mdash;the foe that had
+been so lightly regarded&mdash;at Mukden was a crushing blow which greatly
+impaired the morale of the troops, both those at home and those at the
+front. Disaster followed upon disaster. May saw the destruction of the
+great Russian fleet. In June rebellion broke out in the navy, and the crew
+of the battle-ship <i>Potyamkin</i>, which was on the Black Sea, mutinied and
+hoisted the red flag. After making prisoners of their officers, the sailors
+hastened to lend armed assistance to striking working-men at Odessa who
+were in conflict with soldiers and police.</p>
+
+
+<h4>VII</h4>
+
+<p>It was a time of turbulent unrest and apparent utter confusion. It was not
+easy to discern the underlying significance and purpose of some of the most
+important events. On every hand there were strikes and uprisings, many of
+them without any sort of leadership or plan. Strikes which began over
+questions of wages and hours became political demonstrations in favor of a
+Constituent Assembly. On the other hand, political demonstrations became
+transformed, without any conscious effort on the part of anybody, into
+strikes for immediate economic betterment. There was an intense class
+conflict going on in Russia, as the large number of strikes for increased
+wages and shorter hours proved, yet the larger political struggle dwarfed
+and obscured the class struggle. For <a name="Page_39" id="Page_39"></a>the awakened proletariat of the
+cities the struggle in which they were engaged was economic as well as
+political. They wisely regarded the political struggle as part of the class
+struggle, as Plechanov and his friends declared it to be. Yet the fact
+remained that the capitalist class against which the proletariat was
+fighting on the economic field was, for the most part, fighting against
+autocracy, for the overthrow of Czarism and the establishment of political
+democracy, as earnestly, if less violently, than the proletariat was. The
+reason for this was the recognition by the leading capitalists of Russia of
+the fact that industrial progress was retarded by the old r&eacute;gime, and that
+capitalist development requires popular education, a relatively high
+standard of living, political freedom, and stability and order in
+government. It was perfectly natural, therefore, for the great associations
+of manufacturers and merchants to unite in urging the government to grant
+extensive political reforms so long as the class conflict was merely
+incidental.</p>
+
+<p>What had begun mainly as a class war had become the war of all classes
+against autocracy. Of course, in such a merging of classes there
+necessarily appeared many shadings and degrees of interest. Not all the
+social groups and classes were as radical in their demands as the organized
+peasants and city workers, who were the soul of the revolutionary movement.
+There were, broadly speaking, two great divisions of social life with which
+the Revolution was concerned&mdash;the political and the economic. With regard
+to the first there was practical unanimity; he would be a blind slave to
+theoretical formul&aelig; who sought to maintain the thesis that class interests
+divided masses and classes here. All classes, with the exception of the
+bureaucracy, wanted the abolition of Czarism and Absolutism and the
+establishment of a constitutional government, <a name="Page_40" id="Page_40"></a>elected by the people on a
+basis of universal suffrage, and directly responsible to the electorate.</p>
+
+<p>Upon the economic issue there was less agreement, though all parties and
+classes recognized the need of extensive change. It was universally
+recognized that some solution of the land question must be found. There can
+never be social peace or political stability in Russia until that problem
+is settled. Now, it was easy for the Socialist groups, on the one hand, and
+the moderate groups, upon the other, to unite in demanding that the large
+estates be divided among the peasants. But while the Socialist
+groups&mdash;those of the peasants as well as those of city workers&mdash;demanded
+that the land be taken without compensation, the bourgeois elements,
+especially the leaders of the zemstvos, insisted that the state should pay
+compensation for the land taken. Judgment upon this vital question has long
+been embittered by the experience of the peasants with the "redemption
+payments" which were established when serfdom was abolished. During the
+period of greatest intensity, the summer of 1905, a federation of the
+various revolutionary peasants' organizations was formed and based its
+policy upon the middle ground of favoring the payment of compensation <i>in
+some cases</i>.</p>
+
+<p>All through this trying period the Czar and his advisers were temporizing
+and attempting to obtain peace by means of petty concessions. A greater
+degree of religious liberty was granted, and a new representative body, the
+Imperial Duma, was provided for. This body was not to be a parliament in
+any real sense, but a debating society. It could <i>discuss</i> proposed
+legislation, but it had no powers to <i>enact</i> legislation of any kind.
+Absolutism was dying hard, clinging to its powers with remarkable tenacity.
+Of course, the concessions did not satisfy the revolutionists, <a name="Page_41" id="Page_41"></a>not even
+the most moderate sections, and the net result was to intensify rather than
+to diminish the flame.</p>
+
+<p>On the 2d of August&mdash;10th, according to the old Russian calendar&mdash;the war
+with Japan came to an end with the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth.
+Russia had experienced humiliating and disastrous defeat at the hands of a
+nation far inferior in population and wealth, but infinitely superior in
+military capacity and morale. The news of the conditions of peace
+intensified the ardor and determination of the revolting Russian people
+and, on the other hand, added to the already great weakness of the
+government. September witnessed a great revival of revolutionary agitation,
+and by the end of the month a fresh epidemic of strikes had broken out in
+various parts of the country. By the middle of October the whole life of
+Russia, civil, industrial, and commercial, was a chaos. In some of the
+cities the greater part of the population had placed themselves in a state
+of siege, under revolutionary leadership.</p>
+
+<p>On the 17th of October&mdash;Russian style&mdash;the Czar issued the famous Manifesto
+which acknowledged the victory of the people and the death of Absolutism.
+After the usual amount of pietistic verbiage by way of introduction the
+Manifesto said:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>We make it the duty of the government to execute our firm will:</p>
+
+<p>(1) To grant the people the unshakable foundations of civic
+freedom on the basis of real personal inviolability, freedom of
+conscience, of speech, of assemblage of unions.</p>
+
+<p>(2) To admit now to participation in the Imperial Duma, without
+stopping the pending elections and in so far as it is feasible in
+the short time remaining before the convening of the Duma, all the
+classes of the population, <i>leaving the farther development of the
+principle of universal suffrage to the new legislative order.</i></p><p><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42"></a></p>
+
+<p>(3) <i>To establish as an unshakable rule that no law can become
+binding without the consent of the Imperial Duma, and that the
+representatives of the people must be guaranteed a real
+participation in the control over the lawfulness of the
+authorities appointed by us</i>.</p>
+
+<p>We call upon all faithful sons of Russia to remember their duty to
+their fatherland, to aid in putting an end to the unprecedented
+disturbances, and to exert with us all their power to restore
+quiet and peace in our native land.</p></div>
+
+
+<h4>VIII</h4>
+
+<p>The Czar's Manifesto rang through the civilized world. In all lands it was
+hailed as the end of despotism and the triumph of democracy and freedom.
+The joy of the Russian people was unbounded. At last, after fourscore years
+of heroic struggle and sacrifice by countless heroes, named and nameless,
+the goal of freedom was attained. Men, women, and children sang in the
+streets to express their joy. Red flags were displayed everywhere and
+solemnly saluted by the officers and men of the Czar's army. But the
+rejoicing was premature, as the events of a few hours clearly proved. With
+that fatal vacillation which characterized his whole life, Nicholas II had
+no sooner issued his Manifesto than he surrendered once more to the evil
+forces by which he was surrounded and harked back to the old ways. The day
+following the issuance of the Manifesto, while the people were still
+rejoicing, there began a series of terrible pogroms. The cry went forth,
+"Kill the Intellectuals and the Jews!"</p>
+
+<p>There had been organized in support of the government, and by its agents,
+bodies of so-called "patriots." These were, in the main, recruited from the
+underworld, a very large number of them being criminals who were released
+from the prison for the purpose. Officially known as the<a name="Page_43" id="Page_43"></a> Association of
+the Russian People and the Association to Combat the Revolution, these
+organizations were popularly nicknamed the Black Hundreds. Most of the
+members were paid directly by the government for their services, while
+others were rewarded with petty official positions. The Czar himself
+accepted membership in these infamous organizations of hired assassins.
+Within three weeks after the issuance of the Manifesto more than a hundred
+organized pogroms took place, the number of killed amounting to nearly four
+thousand; the wounded to more than ten thousand, according to the most
+competent authorities. In Odessa alone more than one thousand persons were
+killed and many thousands wounded in a four-days' massacre. In all the
+bloody pages of the history of the Romanovs there is nothing comparable to
+the frightful terror of this period.</p>
+
+<p>Naturally, this brutal vengeance and the deception which Nicholas II and
+his advisers had practised upon the people had the immediate effect of
+increasing the relative strength and prestige of the Socialists in the
+revolutionary movement as against the less radical elements. To meet such
+brutality and force only the most extreme measures were deemed adequate.
+The Council of Workmen's Deputies, which had been organized by the
+proletariat of St. Petersburg a few days before the Czar issued his
+Manifesto, now became a great power, the central guiding power of the
+Revolution. Similar bodies were organized in other great cities. The
+example set by the city workers was followed by the peasants in many places
+and Councils of Peasants' Deputies were organized. In a few cases large
+numbers of soldiers, making common cause with these bodies representing the
+working class, formed Councils of Soldiers' Deputies. Here, then, was a new
+phenomenon; betrayed by the state, weary of the <a name="Page_44" id="Page_44"></a>struggle to democratize
+and liberalize the political state, the workers had established a sort of
+revolutionary self-government of a new kind, entirely independent of the
+state. We shall never comprehend the later developments in Russia,
+especially the phenomenon of Bolshevism, unless we have a sympathetic
+understanding of these Soviets&mdash;autonomous, non-political units of
+working-class self-government, composed of delegates elected directly by
+the workers.</p>
+
+<p>As the revolutionary resistance to the Black Hundreds increased, and the
+rapidly growing Soviets of workmen's, peasants' and soldiers' delegates
+asserted a constantly increasing indifference to the existing political
+state, the government again tried to stem the tide by making concessions.
+On November 3d&mdash;new style&mdash;in a vain attempt to appease the incessant
+demand for the release of the thousands of political prisoners, and to put
+an end to the forcible release of such prisoners by infuriated mobs, a
+partial amnesty was declared. On the 16th a sop was thrown to the peasants
+in the shape of a decree abolishing all the remaining land-redemption
+payments. Had this reform come sooner it might have had the effect of
+stemming the tide of revolt among the peasants, but in the circumstances it
+was of no avail. Early in December the press censorship was abolished by
+decree, but that was of very little importance, for the radical press had
+thrown off all its restraints, simply ignoring the censorship. The
+government of Nicholas II was quite as helpless as it was tyrannical,
+corrupt, and inefficient. The army and navy, demoralized by the defeat
+suffered at the hands of Japan, and especially by knowledge of the
+corruption in high places which made that defeat inevitable, were no longer
+dependable. Tens of thousands of soldiers and marines had joined with the
+workmen in the <a name="Page_45" id="Page_45"></a>cities in open rebellion. Many more indulged themselves in
+purposeless rioting.</p>
+
+<p>The organization of the various councils of delegates representing
+factory-workers and peasants, inevitable as it seemed to be, had one
+disastrous effect, the seriousness of which cannot be overstated. As we
+have seen, the cruel, blundering policy of the government had united all
+classes against it in a revolutionary movement of unexampled magnitude.
+Given the conditions prevailing in Russia, and especially the lack of
+industrial development and the corresponding numerical weakness of the
+industrial proletariat, it was evident that the only chance of success in
+the Revolution lay in the united effort of all classes against the old
+r&eacute;gime. Nothing could have better served the autocracy, and therefore
+injured the revolutionary cause, than the creation of a division in the
+ranks of the revolutionists.</p>
+
+<p>This was exactly what the separate organizations of the working class
+accomplished. All the provocative agents of the Czar could not have
+contrived anything so serviceable to the reaction. <i>Divide et impera</i> has
+been the guiding principle of cunning despots in all ages, and the astutest
+advisers of Nicholas II must have grinned with Satanic glee when they
+realized how seriously the forces they were contending against were
+dividing. Stupid oppression had driven into one united force the
+wage-earning and wage-paying classes. Working-men and manufacturers made
+common cause against that stupid oppression. Now, however, as the
+inevitable result of the organization of the Soviets, and the predominance
+of these in the Revolution, purely economic issues came to the front. In
+proportion as the class struggle between employers and employed was
+accentuated the common struggle against autocracy was minimized and
+obscured. Numerous strikes <a name="Page_46" id="Page_46"></a>for increased wages occurred, forcing the
+employers to organize resistance. Workers in one city&mdash;St. Petersburg, for
+example&mdash;demanded the immediate introduction of an eight-hour workday, and
+proclaimed it to be in force, quite regardless of the fact that longer
+hours prevailed elsewhere and that, given the competitive system, their
+employers were bound to resist a demand that would be a handicap favoring
+their competitors.</p>
+
+<p>As might have been foreseen, the employers were forced to rely upon the
+government, the very government they had denounced and conspired to
+overthrow. The president of the Council of Workmen's Deputies of St.
+Petersburg, Chrustalev-Nosar, in his <i>History of the Council of Workmen's
+Deputies</i>, quotes the order adopted by acclamation on November 11th&mdash;new
+style&mdash;introducing, from November 13th, an eight-hour workday in all shops
+and factories "in a revolutionary way." By way of commentary, he quotes a
+further order, adopted November 25, repealing the former order and
+declaring:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>The government, headed by Count Witte, <i>in its endeavor to break
+the vigor of the revolutionary proletariat, came to the support of
+capital</i>, thus turning the question of an eight-hour workday in
+St. Petersburg into a national problem. The consequence has been
+that the working-men of St. Petersburg are unable now, apart from
+the working-men of the entire country, to realize the decree of
+the Council. The Council of Workmen's Deputies, therefore, deems
+it necessary to <i>stop temporarily the immediate and general
+establishment of an eight-hour workday by force</i>.</p></div>
+
+<p>The Councils inaugurated general strike after general strike. At first
+these strikes were successful from a revolutionary point of view. Soon,
+however, it became apparent that the general strike is a weapon which can
+only be used effectively on rare occasions. It is impossible to rekindle
+frequently and at will the sacrificial passion necessary <a name="Page_47" id="Page_47"></a>to make a
+successful general strike. This the leaders of the proletariat of Russia
+overlooked. They overlooked, also, the fact that the masses of the workers
+were exhausted by the long series of strikes in which they had engaged and
+were on the verge of starvation. The consequence was that most of the later
+strikes failed to accomplish anything like the ends sought.</p>
+
+<p>Naturally, the government was recovering its confidence and its courage in
+proportion to the class divisions and antagonisms of the opposition. It
+once more suppressed the revolutionary press and prohibited meetings. Once
+more it proclaimed martial law in many cities. With all its old-time
+assurance it caused the arrest of the leaders of the unions of workmen and
+peasants, broke up the organizations and imprisoned their officers. It
+issued a decree which made it a crime to participate in strikes. With the
+full sanction of the government, as was shown by the publication of
+documentary evidence of unquestioned authenticity, the Black Hundreds
+renewed their brutality. The strong Council of Workmen's Deputies of St.
+Petersburg, with which Witte had dealt as though it were part of the
+government itself, was broken up and suppressed. Witte wanted
+constitutional government on the basis of the October Manifesto, but he
+wanted the orderly development of Russian capitalism. In this attitude he
+was supported, of course, by the capitalist organizations. The very men who
+in the summer of 1905 had demanded that the government grant the demands of
+the workers and so end the strikes, and who worked in unison with the
+workers to secure the much-desired political freedom, six months later were
+demanding that the government suppress the strikes and exert its force to
+end disorder.</p>
+
+<p>Recognition of these facts need not imply any lack of sympathy with the
+proletariat in their demands. The <a name="Page_48" id="Page_48"></a>class struggle in modern industrial
+society is a fact, and there is abundant justification&mdash;the justification
+of necessity and of achievement&mdash;for aggressive class consciousness and
+class warfare. But it is quite obvious that there are times when class
+interests and class warfare must be set aside in favor of larger social
+interests. It is obviously dangerous and reactionary&mdash;and therefore
+wrong&mdash;to insist upon strikes or other forms of class warfare in moments of
+great calamity, as, for example, during disasters like the Johnstown flood
+and the Messina earthquake, or amid the ravages of a pestilential plague.
+Marx, to whom we owe the formulation of the theory of class struggle which
+has guided the Socialist movement, would never have questioned this
+important truth; he would never have supported class separatism under
+conditions such as those prevailing in Russia at the end of 1905. Only
+doctrinaires, slaves to formul&aelig;, but blind to reality, could have
+sanctioned such separatism. But doctrinaires always abound in times of
+revolution.</p>
+
+<p>By December the government was stronger than it had been at any time since
+the Revolution began. The zemstvos were no longer an active part of the
+revolutionary movement. Indeed, there had come over these bodies a great
+change, and most of them were now dominated by relatively reactionary
+landowners who, hitherto apathetic and indifferent, had been stirred to
+defensive action by the aggressive class warfare of the workers.
+Practically all the bourgeois moderates had been driven to the more or less
+open support of the government. December witnessed a new outburst in St.
+Petersburg, Moscow, and other cities. Barricades were raised in the streets
+in many places. In Moscow, where the most bitter and sanguinary struggles
+took place, more than a thousand persons were killed. The government was
+better prepared than the workers; <a name="Page_49" id="Page_49"></a>the army had recovered no little of its
+lost morale and did not refuse to shoot down the workers as it had done on
+previous occasions. The strikes and insurrections were put down in bloody
+vengeance and there followed a reign of brutal repression indescribably
+horrible and savage. By way of protest and retaliation, there were
+individual acts of terrorism, such as the execution of the Governor of
+Tambov by Marie Spiridonova, but these were of little or no avail. The
+First Revolution was drowned in blood and tears.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50"></a></p>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_II" id="CHAPTER_II"></a>CHAPTER II</h2>
+
+<h3>FROM REVOLUTION TO REVOLUTION</h3>
+
+
+<h4>I</h4>
+
+<p>No struggle for human freedom was ever wholly vain. No matter how vast and
+seemingly complete the failure, there is always something of enduring good
+achieved. That is the law of progress, universal and immutable. The First
+Russian Revolution conformed to the law; it had failed and died in a tragic
+way, yet its failure was relative and it left something of substantial
+achievement as the foundation for fresh hope, courage, and effort. Czarism
+had gathered all its mighty black forces and seemed, at the beginning of
+1906, to be stronger than at any time in fifty years. The souls of Russia's
+noblest and best sons and daughters were steeped in bitter pessimism. And
+yet there was reason for hope and rejoicing; out of the ruin and despair
+two great and supremely vital facts stood in bold, challenging relief.</p>
+
+<p>The first of these facts was the new aspect of Czarism, its changed status.
+Absolutism as a legal institution was dead. Nothing that Nicholas II and
+his advisers were able to do could undo the constitutional changes effected
+when the imperial edict made it part of the fundamental law of the nation
+that "no law can become binding without the consent of the Imperial Duma,"
+and that the Duma, elected by the people, had the right to control the
+actions of the officials of the government, even when <a name="Page_51" id="Page_51"></a>such officials were
+appointed by the Czar himself. Absolutism was illegal now. Attempts might
+be made to reintroduce it, and, indeed, that was the real significance of
+the policy pursued by the government, but Absolutism could no longer
+possess the moral strength that inheres in the sanctity of law. In fighting
+it the Russian people now had that strength upon their side.</p>
+
+<p>The second vital and hopeful fact was likewise a moral force. Absolutism
+with all its assumed divine prerogatives, in the person of the Czar, had
+declared its firm will "to grant the people the unshakable foundations of
+civic freedom on the basis of real personal inviolability, freedom of
+conscience, of speech, of assemblage and of unions." This civic freedom
+Absolutism had sanctioned. By that act it gave the prestige of legality to
+such assemblages, discussions, and publications as had always hitherto been
+forced to accept risks and disabilities inseparable from illegal conduct.
+Civic freedom had long been outlawed, a thing associated with lawlessness
+and crime, and so long as that condition remained many who believed in
+civic freedom itself, who wanted a free press, freedom of public assemblage
+and of conscience in matters pertaining to religion, were kept from
+participation in the struggle. Respect for law, as law, is deeply rooted in
+civilized mankind&mdash;a fact which, while it makes the task of the
+revolutionist hard, and at times impedes progress, is, nevertheless, of
+immense value to human society.</p>
+
+<p>Civic freedom was not yet a fact. It seemed, as a reality, to be as far
+away as ever. Meetings were forbidden by officials and broken up by
+soldiers and police; newspapers were suppressed, as of old; labor-unions,
+and even the unions of the Intellectuals, were ruthlessly persecuted and
+treated as conspiracies against the state. All this and more was true and
+discouraging. Yet there <a name="Page_52" id="Page_52"></a>was substantial gain: civic freedom as a practical
+fact did not exist, but civic freedom as a lawful right lived in the minds
+of millions of people&mdash;the greatest fact in Russia. The terms of the
+Manifesto of October 17th&mdash;Absolutism's solemn covenant with the
+nation&mdash;had not been repealed, and the nation knew that the government did
+not dare to repeal it. Not all the Czar's armies and Black Hundreds could
+destroy that consciousness of the lawful right to civic freedom. Nothing
+could restore the old condition. Whereas in the past the government, in
+suppressing the press and popular assemblages, could say to the people, "We
+uphold the law!" now when the government attempted these things, the people
+defiantly cried out, "You break the law!" Absolutism was no longer a thing
+of law.</p>
+
+<p>Nicholas II and all his bureaucrats could not return the chicken to the egg
+from which it had been hatched. They could not unsay the fateful words
+which called into being the Imperial Duma. The Revolution had put into
+their souls a terrible fear of the wrath of the people. The Czar and his
+government had to permit the election of the Duma to proceed, and yet,
+conscious of the fact that the success of the Duma inevitably meant the end
+of the old r&eacute;gime, they were bound, in self-protection, to attempt to kill
+the Duma in the hope that thereby they would kill, or at least paralyze,
+the Revolution itself. Thus it was, while not daring to forbid the
+elections for the Duma to proceed, the government adopted a Machiavellian
+policy.</p>
+
+<p>The essentials of that policy were these: on the one hand, the Duma was not
+to be seriously considered at all, when it should assemble. It would be
+ignored, if possible, and no attention paid to any of its deliberations or
+attempts to legislate. A certain amount of latitude would <a name="Page_53" id="Page_53"></a>be given to it
+as a debating society, a sort of safety-valve, but that was all. If this
+policy could not be carried out in its entirety, if, for example, it should
+prove impossible to completely ignore the Duma, it would be easy enough to
+devise a mass of hampering restrictions and regulations which would render
+it impotent, and yet necessitate no formal repudiation of the October
+Manifesto. On the other hand, there was the possibility that the Duma might
+be captured and made a safe ally. The suffrage upon which the elections
+were to be based was most undemocratic and unjust, giving to the landlords
+and the prosperous peasants, together with the wealthy classes in the
+cities, an enormous preponderance in the electorate. By using the Black
+Hundreds to work among the electors&mdash;bribing, cajoling, threatening, and
+coercing, as the occasion might require&mdash;it might be possible to bring
+about the election of a Duma which would be a pliant and ready tool of the
+government.</p>
+
+<p>One of the favorite devices of the Black Hundreds was to send agents among
+the workers in the cities and among the peasants to discredit the Duma in
+advance, and to spread the idea that it would only represent the
+bourgeoisie. Many of the most influential Socialist leaders unfortunately
+preached the same doctrine. This was the natural and logical outcome of the
+separate action of the classes in the Revolution, and of the manner in
+which the proletariat had forced the economic struggle to the front during
+the political struggle. In the vanguard of the fight for the Duma were the
+Constitutional Democrats, led by Miliukov, Prince Lvov, and many prominent
+leaders of the zemstvos. The divorce between the classes represented by
+these men and the proletariat represented by the Social Democrats was
+absolute. It was not surprising that the leaders of the Social Democratic
+party should be suspicious <a name="Page_54" id="Page_54"></a>and distrustful of the Constitutional Democrats
+and refuse to co-operate with them.</p>
+
+<p>But many of the Social Democrats went much farther than this, and, in the
+name of Socialism and proletarian class consciousness, adopted the same
+attitude toward the Duma itself as that which the agents of the Black
+Hundreds were urging upon the people. Among the Socialist leaders who took
+this position was Vladimir Ulyanov, the great propagandist whom the world
+knows to-day as Nikolai Lenine, Bolshevik Prime Minister and Dictator.
+Lenine urged the workers to boycott the Duma and to refuse to participate
+in the elections in any manner whatever. At a time when only a united
+effort by all classes could be expected to accomplish anything, and when
+such a victory of the people over the autocratic r&eacute;gime as might have been
+secured by united action would have meant the triumph of the Revolution,
+Lenine preached separatism. Unfortunately, his influence, even at that
+time, was very great and his counsels prevailed with a great many Socialist
+groups over the wiser counsels of Plechanov and others.</p>
+
+<p>It may be said, in explanation and extenuation of Lenine's course, that the
+boycotting of the elections was the logical outcome of the class antagonism
+and separatism, and that the bourgeois leaders were just as much
+responsible for the separatism as the leaders of the proletariat were. All
+this is true. It is quite true to say that wiser leadership of the
+manufacturing class in the critical days of 1905 would have made
+concessions and granted many of the demands of the striking workmen. By so
+doing they might have maintained unity in the political struggle. But, even
+if so much be granted, it is poor justification and defense of a Socialist
+policy to say that it was neither better nor worse, neither more stupid nor
+more <a name="Page_55" id="Page_55"></a>wise, than that of the bourgeoisie! In the circumstances, Lenine's
+policy was most disastrous for Russia. It is not necessary to believe the
+charge that was made at the time and afterward that Lenine was in the pay
+of the government and a tool of the Black Hundreds. Subsequent incidents
+served to fasten grave suspicion upon him, but no one ever offered proof of
+corruption. In all probability, he was then, and throughout the later
+years, honest and sincere&mdash;a fanatic, often playing a dangerous game,
+unmoral rather than immoral, believing that the end he sought justified any
+means.</p>
+
+
+<h4>II</h4>
+
+<p>When the elections for the Duma were held, in March, 1906, the failure of
+the government's attempt to capture the body was complete. It was
+overwhelmingly a progressive parliament that had been elected. The
+Constitutional Democrats, upon a radical program, had elected the largest
+number of members, 178. Next came the representatives of the peasants'
+organizations, with a program of moderate Socialism, numbering 116. This
+group became known in the Duma as the Labor Group. A third group consisted
+of 63 representatives of border provinces, mostly advanced Liberals, called
+Autonomists, on account of their special interest in questions concerning
+local autonomy. There were only 28 avowed supporters of the government.
+Finally, despite the Socialist boycott of the elections, there were almost
+as many Socialists elected as there were supporters of the government.</p>
+
+<p>Once more Russia had spoken for democracy in no uncertain voice. And once
+more Czarism committed the incredible folly of attempting to stem the tide
+of democracy by erecting further measures of autocracy as a dam. Shortly
+before the time came for the assembling of the <a name="Page_56" id="Page_56"></a>newly elected Duma, the
+Czar's government announced new fundamental laws which limited the powers
+of the Duma and practically reduced it to a farce. In the first place, the
+Imperial Council was to be reconstituted and set over the Duma as an upper
+chamber, or Senate, having equal rights with the Duma. Half of the members
+of the Imperial Council were to be appointed by the Czar and the other half
+elected from universities, zemstvos, bourses, and by the clergy and the
+nobility. In other words, over the Duma was to be set a body which could
+always be so manipulated as to insure the defeat of any measure displeasing
+to the old r&eacute;gime. And the Czar reserved to himself the power to summon or
+dissolve the Duma at will, as well as the power to declare war and to make
+peace and to enter into treaties with other nations. What a farce was this
+considered as a fulfilment of the solemn assurances given in October, 1905!</p>
+
+<p>But the reactionary madness went even farther; believing the revolutionary
+movement to have been crushed to such a degree that it might act with
+impunity, autocracy took other measures. Three days before the assembling
+of the Duma the Czar replaced his old Ministry by one still more
+reactionary. At the head of the Cabinet, as Prime Minister, he appointed
+the notorious reactionary bureaucrat, Goremykin. With full regard for the
+bloody traditions of the office, the infamous Stolypin, former Governor of
+Saratov, was made Minister of the Interior. At the head of the Department
+of Agriculture, which was charged with responsibility for dealing with
+agrarian problems, was placed Stishinsky, a large landowner, bitterly
+hostile to, and hated by, the peasants. The composition of the new Ministry
+was a defiance of the popular will and sentiment, and was so interpreted.</p>
+
+<p>The Duma opened on April 27th, at the Taurida Palace.<a name="Page_57" id="Page_57"></a> St. Petersburg was a
+vast armed camp that day. Tens of thousands of soldiers, fully armed, were
+massed at different points in readiness to suppress any demonstrations by
+the populace. It was said that provocateurs moved among the people, trying
+to stir an uprising which would afford a pretext for action by the
+soldiers. The members of the Duma were first received by the Czar at the
+Winter Palace and addressed by him in a pompous speech which carefully
+avoided all the vital questions in which the Russian people were so keenly
+interested. It was a speech which might as well have been made by the first
+Czar Nicholas. But there was no need of words to tell what was in the mind
+of Nicholas II; that had been made quite evident by the new laws and the
+new Ministry. Before the Duma lay the heavy task of continuing the
+Revolution, despite the fact that the revolutionary army had been scattered
+as chaff is scattered before the winds.</p>
+
+<p>The first formal act of the Duma, after the opening ceremonies were
+finished, was to demand amnesty for all the political prisoners. The
+members of the Duma had come to the Taurida Palace that day through streets
+crowded with people who chanted in monotonous chorus the word "Amnesty."
+The oldest man in the assembly, I.I. Petrunkevitch, was cheered again and
+again as he voiced the popular demand on behalf of "those who have
+sacrificed their freedom to free our dear fatherland." There were some
+seventy-five thousand political prisoners in Russia at that time, the
+flower of Russian manhood and womanhood, treated as common criminals and,
+in many instances, subject to terrible torture. Well might Petrunkevitch
+proclaim: "All the prisons of our country are full. Thousands of hands are
+being stretched out to us in hope and supplication, and I think that the
+duty of our conscience compels us to use all the influence our <a name="Page_58" id="Page_58"></a>position
+gives us to see that the freedom that Russia has won costs no more
+sacrifices ... I think, gentlemen ... we cannot refrain just now from
+expressing our deepest feelings, the cry of our heart&mdash;that free Russia
+demands the liberation of all prisoners." At the end of the eloquent appeal
+there was an answering cry of: "Amnesty!" "Amnesty!" The chorus of the
+streets was echoed in the Duma itself.</p>
+
+<p>There was no lack of courage in the Duma. One of its first acts was the
+adoption of an address in response to the speech delivered by the Czar to
+the members at the reception at the Winter Palace. The address was in
+reality a statement of the objects and needs of the Russian people, their
+program. It was a radical document, but moderately couched. It demanded
+full political freedom; amnesty for all who had been imprisoned for
+political reasons or for violations of laws in restriction of religious
+liberty; the abolition of martial law and other extraordinary measures;
+abolition of capital punishment; the abolition of the Imperial Council and
+democratization of the laws governing elections to the Duma; autonomy for
+Finland and Poland; the expropriation of state and private lands in the
+interest of the peasants; a comprehensive body of social legislation
+designed to protect the industrial workers. In a word, the program of the
+Duma was a broad and comprehensive program of political and social
+democracy, which, if enacted, would have placed Russia among the foremost
+democracies of the world.</p>
+
+<p>The boldness of the Duma program was a direct challenge to the government
+and was so interpreted by the Czar and his Ministers. By the reactionary
+press it was denounced as a conspiracy to hand the nation over to the
+Socialists. That it should have passed the Duma almost unanimously was an
+indication of the extent to which the <a name="Page_59" id="Page_59"></a>liberal bourgeoisie represented by
+the Constitutional Democrats was prepared to go in order to destroy
+autocracy. No wonder that some of the most trusted Marxian Socialists in
+Russia were urging that it was the duty of the Socialists to co-operate
+with the Duma! Yet there was a section of the Marxists engaged in a
+constant agitation against the Duma, preaching the doctrine of the class
+struggle, but blind to the actual fact that the dominant issue was in the
+conflict between the democracy of the Duma and the autocracy of Czarism.</p>
+
+<p>The class consciousness of the old r&eacute;gime was much clearer and more
+intelligent. The Czar refused to receive the committee of the Duma,
+appointed to make formal presentation of the address. Then, on May 12th,
+Goremykin, the Prime Minister, addressed the Duma, making answer to its
+demands. On behalf of the government he rebuked the Duma for its
+unpatriotic conduct in a speech full of studied insult and contemptuous
+defiance. He made it quite clear that the government was not going to grant
+any reforms worthy of mention. More than that, he made it plain to the
+entire nation that Nicholas II and his bureaucracy would never recognize
+the Duma as an independent parliamentary body. Thus the old r&eacute;gime answered
+the challenge of the Duma.</p>
+
+<p>For seventy-two days the Duma worked and fought, seventy-two days of
+parliamentary history for which there is no parallel in the annals of
+parliamentary government. For the sake of the larger aims before it, the
+Duma carried out the demands of the government that it approve certain
+petty measures placed before it for the formality of its approval. On the
+other hand, it formulated and passed numerous measures upon its own
+initiative and demanded that they be recognized as laws of the land. Among
+the measures thus adopted were laws guaranteeing <a name="Page_60" id="Page_60"></a>freedom of assemblage;
+equality of all citizens before the law; the right of labor organizations
+to exist and to conduct strikes; reform of judicial procedure in the
+courts; state aid for peasants suffering from crop failure and other
+agrarian reforms; the abolition of capital punishment. In addition to
+pursuing its legislative program, the Duma members voiced the country's
+protest against the shortcomings of the government, subjecting the various
+Ministers to searching interpellation, day after day.</p>
+
+<p>Not a single one of the measures adopted by the Duma received the support
+of the Imperial Council. This body was effectively performing the task for
+which it had been created. To the interpellations of the Duma the Czar's
+Ministers made the most insulting replies, when they happened to take any
+notice of them at all. All the old iniquities were resorted to by the
+government, supported, as always, by the reactionary press. The homes of
+members of the Duma were entered and searched by the police and every
+parliamentary right and privilege was flouted. Even the publication of the
+speeches delivered in the Duma was forbidden.</p>
+
+<p>The Duma had from the first maintained a vigorous protest against "the
+infamy of executions without trial, pogroms, bombardment, and
+imprisonment." Again and again it had been charged that pogroms were
+carried out under the protection of the government, in accordance with the
+old policy of killing the Jews and the Intellectuals. The answer of the
+government was&mdash;another pogrom of merciless savagery. On June 1st, at
+Byalostock, upward of eighty men, women, and children were killed, many
+more wounded, and scores of women, young and old, brutally outraged. The
+Duma promptly sent a commission to Byalostock to investigate <a name="Page_61" id="Page_61"></a>and report
+upon the facts, and presently the commission made a report which proved
+beyond question the responsibility of the government for the whole brutal
+and bloody business. It was shown that the inflammatory manifestos calling
+upon the "loyal" citizens to make the attack were printed in the office of
+the Police Department; that soldiers in the garrison had been told days in
+advance when the pogrom would take place; and that in the looting and
+sacking of houses and shops, which occurred upon a large scale, officers of
+the garrison had participated. These revelations made a profound impression
+in Russia and throughout Europe.</p>
+
+
+<h4>III</h4>
+
+<p>The Duma finally brought upon itself the whole weight of Czarism when it
+addressed a special appeal to the peasants of the country in which it dealt
+with candor and sincerity with the great agrarian problems which bore upon
+the peasants so heavily. The appeal outlined the various measures which the
+Duma had tried to enact for the relief of the peasants, and the attitude of
+the Czar's Ministers. The many strong peasants' organizations, and their
+numerous representatives in the Duma, made the circulation of this appeal
+an easy matter. The government could not close these channels of
+communication, nor prevent the Duma's strong plea for lawful rights and
+against lawlessness by government officials from reaching the peasants.
+Only one method of defense remained to the Czar and his Ministers: On July
+9th, like a thunderbolt from the sky, came a new Manifesto from the Czar,
+dissolving the Duma. In the Manifesto all the old arrogance of Absolutism
+reappeared. A more striking contrast to the Manifesto of the previous
+October <a name="Page_62" id="Page_62"></a>could not be readily imagined. The Duma was accused of having
+exceeded its rights by "investigating the actions of local authorities
+appointed by the Emperor," notwithstanding the fact that in the October
+Manifesto it had been solemnly covenanted "that the representatives of the
+people must be guaranteed a real participation in the control over the
+lawfulness of the authorities appointed by us." The Duma was condemned for
+"finding imperfections in the fundamental laws which can be altered only by
+the monarch's will" and for its "overtly lawless act of appealing to the
+people." The Manifesto charged that the growing unrest and lawlessness of
+the peasants were due to the failure of the Duma to ameliorate their
+conditions&mdash;and this in spite of the record!</p>
+
+<p>When the members of the Duma arrived at the Taurida Palace next day they
+found the place filled with troops who prevented their entrance. They were
+powerless. Some two hundred-odd members adjourned to Viborg, whence they
+issued an appeal to the people to defend their rights. These men were not
+Socialists, most of them belonging to the party of the Constitutional
+Democrats, but they issued an appeal to the people to meet the dissolution
+of the Imperial Duma by a firm refusal to pay taxes, furnish recruits for
+the army, or sanction the legality of any loans to the government. This was
+practically identical with the policy set forth in the Manifesto of the
+Executive Committee of the St. Petersburg Council of Workmen's Deputies at
+the beginning of the previous December, before the elections to the Duma.
+Now, however, the Socialists in the Duma&mdash;both the Social Democrats and the
+Socialist-Revolutionists&mdash;together with the semi-Socialist Labor Group,
+decided that it was not enough to appeal for passive resistance; that only
+an armed uprising could accomplish anything. They therefore <a name="Page_63" id="Page_63"></a>appealed to
+the city proletariat, the peasants, the army, and the navy to rise in armed
+strength against the tyrannical r&eacute;gime.</p>
+
+<p>Neither appeal produced any noteworthy result. The response to the Viborg
+appeal was far less than that which followed the similar appeal of the St.
+Petersburg workmen in December. The signers of the appeal were arrested,
+sentenced to three months' imprisonment, and deprived of their electoral
+rights. To the appeal of the Duma Socialists there was likewise very little
+response, either from city workers, peasants, soldiers, or marines. Russia
+was struggle-weary. The appeals fell upon the ears of a cowed and beaten
+populace. The two documents served only to emphasize one fact, namely, that
+capacity and daring to attempt active and violent resistance was still
+largely confined to the working-class representatives. In appealing to the
+workers to meet the attacks of the government with armed resistance, the
+leaders of the peasants and the city proletariat were ready to take their
+places in the vanguard of the fight. On the other hand, the signers of the
+Viborg appeal for passive resistance manifested no such determination or
+desire, though they must have known that passive resistance could only be a
+temporary phase, that any concerted action by the people to resist the
+collection of taxes and recruiting for the army would have led to attack
+and counter-attack-to a violent revolution.</p>
+
+<p>Feeling perfectly secure, the government, while promising the election of
+another Duma, carried on a policy of vigorous repression of all radical and
+revolutionary agitation and organization. Executions without trial were
+almost daily commonplaces. Prisoners were mercilessly tortured, and, in
+many cases, flogged to death. Hundreds of persons, of both sexes, many of
+them simple bourgeois-liberals <a name="Page_64" id="Page_64"></a>and not revolutionists in any sense of the
+word, were exiled to Siberia. The revolutionary organizations of the
+workers were filled with spies and provocateurs, an old and effective
+method of destroying their morale. In all the provinces of Russia field
+court martial was proclaimed. Field court martial is more drastic than
+ordinary court martial and practically amounts to condemnation without
+trial, for trials under it are simply farcical, since neither defense nor
+appeal is granted. Nearly five hundred revolutionists were put to death
+under this system, many of them without even the pretense of a trial.</p>
+
+<p>The Black Hundreds were more active than ever, goaded on by the Holy Synod.
+Goremykin resigned as Premier and his place was taken by the unspeakably
+cruel and bloodthirsty Stolypin, whose "hemp neckties," as the grim jest of
+the masses went, circled the necks of scores of revolutionists swinging
+from as many gallows. There were many resorts to terrorism on the part of
+the revolutionists during the summer of 1906, many officials paying for the
+infamies of the government with their lives. How many of these "executions"
+were genuine revolutionary protests, and how many simple murders instigated
+or committed by provocative agents for the purpose of discrediting the
+revolutionists and affording the government excuses for fresh infamies,
+will perhaps never be known. Certainly, in many cases, there was no
+authorization by any revolutionary body.</p>
+
+<p>In February, 1907, the elections for the Second Duma were held under a
+reign of terror. The bureaucracy was determined to have a "safe and sane"
+body this time, and resorted to every possible nefarious device to attain
+that end. Whole masses of electors whose right to vote had been established
+at the previous election were arbitrarily <a name="Page_65" id="Page_65"></a>disfranchised. While every
+facility was given to candidates openly favoring the government, including
+the Octobrists, every possible obstacle was placed in the way of radical
+candidates, especially Socialists. The meetings of the latter were, in
+hundreds of cases, prohibited; in other hundreds of cases they were broken
+up by the Black Hundreds and the police. Many of the most popular
+candidates were arrested and imprisoned without trial, as were members of
+their campaign committees. Yet, notwithstanding all these things, the
+Second Duma was, from the standpoint of the government, worse than the
+first. The Socialists, adopting the tactics of Plechanov, against the
+advice of Lenine, his former pupil and disciple, had decided not to boycott
+the elections this time, but to participate in them. When the returns were
+published it was found that the Social Democrats and the
+Socialist-Revolutionists had each elected over sixty deputies, the total
+being nearly a third of the membership&mdash;455. In addition there were some
+ninety members in the peasants' Labor Group, which were semi-Socialist.
+There were 117 Constitutional Democrats. The government supporters,
+including the Octobrists, numbered less than one hundred.</p>
+
+<p>From the first the attitude of the government toward the new Duma was one
+of contemptuous arrogance. "The Czar's Hangman," Stolypin, lectured the
+members as though they were naughty children, forbidding them to invite
+experts to aid them in framing measures, or to communicate with any of the
+zemstvos or municipal councils upon any questions whatsoever. "The Duma was
+not granted the right to express disapproval, reproach, or mistrust of the
+government," he thundered. To the Duma there was left about as much real
+power as is enjoyed by the "governments" of our "juvenile republics."</p>
+
+<p>As a natural consequence of these things, the Second<a name="Page_66" id="Page_66"></a> Duma paid less
+attention to legislation than the First Duma had done, and gave its time
+largely to interpellations and protests. Partly because of the absence of
+some of the most able leaders they had had in the First Duma, and partly to
+the aggressive radicalism of the Socialists, which they could only
+half-heartedly approve at best, the Constitutional Democrats were less
+influential than in the former parliament. They occupied a middle
+ground&mdash;always a difficult position. The real fight was between the
+Socialists and the reactionaries, supporters of the government. Among the
+latter were perhaps a score of members belonging to the Black Hundreds,
+constituting the extreme right wing of the reactionary group. Between these
+and the Socialists of the extreme left the assembly was kept at fever
+pitch. The Black Hundreds, for the most part, indulged in violent tirades
+of abuse, often in the most disgusting profanity. The Socialists replied
+with proletarian passion and vigor, and riotous scenes were common. The
+Second Duma was hardly a deliberative assembly!</p>
+
+<p>On June 1st Stolypin threw a bombshell into the Duma by accusing the Social
+Democrats of having conspired to form a military plot for the overthrow of
+the government of Nicholas II. Evidence to this effect had been furnished
+to the Police Department by the spy and provocative agent, Azev. Of course
+there was no secret about the fact that the Social Democrats were always
+trying to bring about revolt in the army and the navy. They had openly
+proclaimed this, time and again. In the appeal issued at the time of the
+dissolution of the First Duma they had called upon the army and navy to
+rise in armed revolt. But the betrayal of their plans was a matter of some
+consequence. Azev himself had been loudest and most persistent in urging
+the work on. Stolypin demanded that all the Social<a name="Page_67" id="Page_67"></a> Democrats be excluded
+permanently from the Duma and that sixteen of them be handed over to the
+government for imprisonment. The demand was a challenge to the whole Duma,
+since it called into question the right of the Duma to determine its own
+membership. Obviously, if members of parliament are to be dismissed
+whenever an autocratic government orders it, there is an end of
+parliamentary government. The demand created a tremendous sensation and
+gave rise to a long and exciting debate. Before it was ended, however,
+Nicholas II ordered the Duma dissolved. On June 3d the Second Duma met the
+fate of its predecessor, having lasted one hundred days.</p>
+
+
+<h4>IV</h4>
+
+<p>As on the former occasion, arrangements were at once begun to bring about
+the election of another and more subservient Duma. It is significant that
+throughout Nicholas II and his Cabinet recognized the imperative necessity
+of maintaining the institution in form. They dared not abolish it, greatly
+as they would have liked to do so. On the day that the Duma was dissolved
+the Czar, asserting his divine right to enact and repeal laws at will,
+disregarding again the solemn assurances of the October Manifesto, by edict
+changed the electoral laws, consulting neither the Duma nor the Imperial
+Council. This new law greatly decreased the representation of the city
+workers and the peasants in the Duma and correspondingly increased the
+representation of the rich landowners and capitalists. A docile and "loyal"
+Duma was thus made certain, and no one was very much surprised when the
+elections, held in September, resulted in an immense reactionary majority.
+When the Third Duma met on December 14, 1907, the reactionaries were as
+strong as the<a name="Page_68" id="Page_68"></a> Socialist and Labor groups had been in the previous Duma,
+and of the reactionaries the group of members of the Black Hundreds was a
+majority.</p>
+
+<p>In the mean time there had been the familiar rule of brutal reaction. Most
+of the Social Democratic members of the Second Duma were arrested and
+condemned for high treason, being sent to prison and to Siberia. New laws
+and regulations restricting the press were proclaimed and enforced with
+increasing severity. By comparison with the next two years, the period from
+1905 to 1907 was a period of freedom. After the election of the Third Duma
+the bureaucracy grew ever bolder. Books and leaflets which had been
+circulated openly and with perfect freedom during 1905 and 1906 were
+forbidden, and, moreover, their authors were arrested and sentenced to long
+terms of imprisonment. While the law still granted freedom of assemblage
+and the right to organize meetings, these rights did not exist as
+realities. Everywhere the Black Hundreds held sway, patronized by the Czar,
+who wore their emblem and refused to permit the punishment of any of their
+members, even though they might be found guilty by the courts.</p>
+
+<p>It is not necessary to dwell upon the work of the Third Duma. This is not a
+history of Russia, and a detailed study of the servile parliament of
+Nicholas II and Stolypin would take us too far afield from our special
+study&mdash;the revolutionary movement. Suffice it, therefore, to say that some
+very useful legislation, necessary to the economic development of Russia,
+was enacted, and that, despite the overwhelming preponderance of
+reactionaries, it was not an absolutely docile body. On several occasions
+the Third Duma exercised the right of criticism quite vigorously, and on
+two or three occasions acted in more or less open defiance of the wishes of
+the government. A <a name="Page_69" id="Page_69"></a>notable instance of this was the legislation of 1909,
+considerably extending freedom of religious organization and worship, which
+was, however, greatly curtailed later by the Imperial Council&mdash;and then
+nullified by the government.</p>
+
+<p>The period 1906-14 was full of despair for sensitive and aspiring souls.
+The steady and rapid rise in the suicide-rate bore grim and eloquent
+testimony to the character of those years of dark repression. The number of
+suicides in St. Petersburg increased during the period 1905-08 more than
+400 per cent.; in Moscow about 800 per cent.! In the latter city two-fifths
+of the suicides in 1908 were of persons less than twenty years old! And
+yet, withal, there was room for hope, the soul of progress was not dead. In
+various directions there was a hopeful and promising growth. First among
+these hopeful and promising facts was the marvelous growth of the
+Consumers' Co-operatives. After 1905 began the astonishing increase in the
+number of these important organizations, which continued, year after year,
+right up to the Revolution of 1917. In 1905 there were 4,479 such
+co-operatives in Russia; in 1911 there were 19,253. Another hopeful sign
+was the steadily increasing literacy of the masses. Statistics upon this
+point are almost worthless. Russian official statistics are notoriously
+defective and the figures relating to literacy are peculiarly so, but the
+leaders of Russian Socialism have attested to the fact. In this connection
+it is worthy of note that, according to the most authentic official
+records, the number of persons subscribing to the public press grew in a
+single year, from 1908 to 1909, fully 25 per cent. Education and
+organization were going on, hand in hand.</p>
+
+<p>Nor was agitation dead. In the Duma the Socialist and Labor parties and
+groups, knowing that they had no chance to enact their program, made the
+Duma a rostrum <a name="Page_70" id="Page_70"></a>from which to address the masses throughout the nation.
+Sometimes, indeed, the newspapers were forbidden to print their speeches,
+but as a rule they were published, at least by the liberal papers, and so
+disseminated among the masses. In these speeches the Social Democrats,
+Socialist-Revolutionaries, Laborites, and more daring of the Constitutional
+Democrats mercilessly exposed the bureaucracy, so keeping the fires of
+discontent alive.</p>
+
+
+<h4>V</h4>
+
+<p>Of vast significance to mankind was the controversy that was being waged
+within the Socialist movement of Russia during these years, for this was
+the period in which Bolshevism was shaping itself and becoming articulate.
+The words "Bolsheviki" and "Bolshevism" first made their appearance in
+1903, but it was not until 1905 that they began to acquire their present
+meaning. At the second convention of the Social Democratic party, held in
+1903, the party split in two factions. The majority faction, headed by
+Lenine, adopted the name Bolsheviki, a word derived from the Russian word
+"bolshinstvo," meaning "majority." The minority faction, which followed
+Plechanov, though he did not formally join it, was called, in
+contradistinction, the "Mensheviki"&mdash;that is, the minority. No question of
+principle was involved in the split, the question at issue being simply
+whether there should be more or less centralization in the organization.
+There was no thought on either side of leaving the Social Democratic party.
+It was simply a factional division in the party itself and did not prevent
+loyal co-operation. Both the Bolsheviki and the Mensheviki remained Social
+Democrats&mdash;that is, Socialists of the school of Marx.</p><p><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71"></a></p>
+
+<p>During the revolutionary struggle of 1905-06 the breach between the two
+factions was greatly widened. The two groups held utterly irreconcilable
+conceptions of Socialist policy, if not of Socialism as an ideal. The
+psychology of the two groups was radically different. By this time the
+Lenine faction was no longer the majority, being, in fact, a rather small
+minority in the party. The Plechanov faction was greatly in the majority.
+But the old names continued to be used. Although a minority, the Lenine
+faction was still called the Bolsheviki, and the Plechanov faction called
+the Mensheviki, despite the fact that it was the majority. Thus Bolshevism
+no longer connoted the principles and tactics of the majority. It came to
+be used interchangeably with Leninism, as a synonym. The followers of
+Vladimir Ulyanov continued to regard themselves as part of the Social
+Democratic party, its radical left wing, and it was not until after the
+Second Revolution, in 1917, that they manifested any desire to be
+differentiated from the Social Democrats.</p>
+
+<p>Vladimir Ulyanov was born in 1870, at Simbirsk, in central Russia. There is
+no mystery about his use of the alias, Nikolai Lenine, which he has made
+world-famous and by which he chooses to be known. Almost every Russian
+revolutionist has had to adopt various aliases for self-protection and for
+the protection of other Russian Socialists. Ulyanov has followed the rule
+and lived and worked under several aliases, and his writings under the name
+"Nikolai Lenine" made him a great power in the Russian Socialist movement.</p>
+
+<p>Lenine's father was a governmental official employed in the Department of
+Public Instruction. It is one of the many anomalies of the life of the
+Russian Dictator that he himself belongs by birth, training, culture, and
+experience to the bourgeoisie against which he fulminates so furiously.<a name="Page_72" id="Page_72"></a>
+Even his habits and tastes are of bourgeois and not proletarian origin. He
+is an Intellectual of the Intellectuals and has never had the slightest
+proletarian experience. As a youth still in his teens he entered the
+University of St. Petersburg, but his stay there was exceedingly brief,
+owing to a tragedy which greatly embittered his life and gave it its
+direction. An older brother, who was also a student in the university, was
+condemned to death, in a secret trial, for complicity in a terrorist plot
+to assassinate Alexander III. Shortly afterward he was put to death. Lenine
+himself was arrested at the same time as his brother, but released for lack
+of evidence connecting him with the affair. It is said, however, that the
+arrest caused his expulsion from the university. Lenine was not the only
+young man to be profoundly impressed by the execution of the youthful
+Alexander Ulyanov; another student, destined to play an important r&ocirc;le in
+the great tragedy of revolutionary Russia, was stirred to bitter hatred of
+the system. That young student was Alexander Kerensky, whose father and the
+father of the Ulyanovs were close friends.</p>
+
+<p>Lenine's activities brought him into conflict with the authorities several
+times and forced him to spend a good deal of time in exile. As a youth of
+seventeen, at the time of the execution of his brother, he was dismissed
+from the Law School in St. Petersburg. A few years later he was sent to
+Siberia for a political "crime." Upon various occasions later he was
+compelled to flee from the country, living sometimes in Paris, sometimes in
+London, but more often in Switzerland. It was through his writings mainly
+that he acquired the influence he had in the Russian movement. There is
+nothing unusual or remarkable about this, for the Social Democratic party
+of Russia was practically directed from Geneva. Lenine was in London <a name="Page_73" id="Page_73"></a>when
+the Revolution of 1905 broke out and caused him to hurry to St. Petersburg.</p>
+
+<p>As a young man Lenine, like most of the Intelligentsia of the period, gave
+up a good deal of his spare time to teaching small groups of uneducated
+working-men the somewhat abstract and intricate theories and doctrines of
+Socialism. To that excellent practice, no doubt, much of Lenine's skill as
+a lucid expositor and successful propagandist is due. He has written a
+number of important works, most of them being of a polemical nature and
+dealing with party disputations upon questions of theory and tactics. The
+work by which he was best known in Socialist circles prior to his
+sensational rise to the Premiership is a treatise on <i>The Development of
+Capitalism in Russia</i>. This work made its appearance in 1899, when the
+Marxian Socialist movement was still very weak. In it Lenine defended the
+position of the Marxians, Plechanov and his group, that Russia was not an
+exception to the general law of capitalist development, as was claimed by
+the leaders of the People's party, the <i>Narodniki</i>. The book gave Lenine an
+assured position among the intellectual leaders of the movement, and was
+regarded as a conclusive defense of the position of the Plechanov group, to
+which Lenine belonged. Since his overthrow of the Kerensky r&eacute;gime, and his
+attempt to establish a new kind of social state in Russia, Lenine has been
+frequently confronted by his own earlier reasoning by those who believe his
+position to be contrary to the true Marxian position.</p>
+
+<p>From 1903 to 1906 Lenine's views developed farther and farther away from
+those of his great teacher, George Plechanov. His position in the period of
+the First Duma can best be stated, perhaps, in opposition to the position
+of Plechanov and the Mensheviki. Accepting the Marxian theory of historical
+development, Plechanov and his <a name="Page_74" id="Page_74"></a>followers believed that Russia must pass
+through a phase of capitalist development before there could be a
+social&mdash;as distinguished from a merely political&mdash;revolution. Certainly
+they believed, an intensive development of industry, bringing into
+existence a strong capitalist class, on the one hand, and a strong
+proletariat, on the other hand, must precede any attempt to create a Social
+Democratic state. They believed, furthermore, that a political revolution,
+creating a democratic constitutional system of government, must come before
+the social revolution could be achieved. They accepted the traditional
+Marxian view that the achievement of this political revolution must be
+mainly the task of the bourgeoisie, and that the proletariat, and
+especially the Socialists, should co-operate with the enlightened
+bourgeoisie in attaining that political revolution without which there
+could never be a Socialist commonwealth.</p>
+
+<p>Plechanov was not blind to the dangers of compromise which must be faced in
+basing the policy of a movement of the masses upon this reasoning. He
+argued, however, that there was no choice in the matter at all; that the
+iron law of historical inevitability and necessity determined the matter.
+He pointed out that the bourgeoisie, represented by the Constitutional
+Democrats in the political struggle, were compelled to wage relentless war
+upon Absolutism, the abolition of which was as absolutely essential to the
+realization of their class aims as it was to the realization of the class
+aims of the proletariat. Hence, in this struggle, the capitalist class, as
+yet too weak to accomplish the overthrow of autocracy and Czarism, and the
+proletariat, equally dependent for success upon the overthrow of autocracy
+and Czarism, and equally too weak to accomplish it unaided, had to face the
+fact that historical development had given the two classes <a name="Page_75" id="Page_75"></a>which were
+destined to wage a long conflict an immediate unity of interest. Their
+imperative needs at the moment were not conflicting needs, but identical
+ones. To divide their forces, to refuse to co-operate with each other, was
+to play the game of the Czar and his associates, argued Plechanov.</p>
+
+<p>The Mensheviki favored participation in the Duma elections and co-operation
+with the liberal and radical bourgeoisie parties, in so far as might be
+necessary to overthrow the autocracy, and without sacrificing Socialist
+principles. They pointed out that this position was evidently feared by the
+bureaucracy far more than the position of the extremists among the Social
+Democrats and the Socialist-Revolutionists, who refused to consider such
+co-operation, and pointed to the fact that provocateurs in large numbers
+associated themselves with the latter in their organizations and preached
+the same doctrine of absolute isolation and exclusiveness.</p>
+
+<p>It will be seen that the position of the Mensheviki was one of practical
+political opportunism, an opportunism, however, that must be sharply
+distinguished from what Wilhelm Liebknecht used to call "political
+cow-trading." No man in the whole history of international Socialism ever
+more thoroughly despised this species of political opportunism than George
+Plechanov. To those who are familiar with the literature of international
+Socialism it will be unnecessary to say that Plechanov was not the man to
+deprecate the importance of sound theory as a guide to the formulation of
+party policies. For many years he was rightly regarded as one of the
+greatest theoreticians of the movement. Certainly there was only one other
+writer in the whole international movement who could be named as having an
+equal title to be considered the greatest Socialist theorist since
+Marx&mdash;Karl Kautsky.</p><p><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76"></a></p>
+
+<p>But Plechanov<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>&mdash;like Marx himself&mdash;set reality above dogma, and regarded
+movement as of infinitely greater importance than theory. The Mensheviki
+wanted to convene a great mass convention of representatives of the
+industrial proletariat during the summer of 1906. "It is a class movement,"
+they said, "not a little sectarian movement. How can there be a <i>class</i>
+movement unless the way is open to all the working class to participate?"
+Accordingly, they wanted a convention to which all the factory-workers
+would be invited to send representatives. There should be no doctrinal
+tests, the sole qualification being membership in the working class. It did
+not matter to the advocates of this policy whether a man belonged to the
+Social Democratic party or to any party; whether he called himself a
+revolutionist or anything else. It was, they said, a movement of the
+working class, not the movement of a sect within the working class.</p>
+
+<p>They knew, of course, that in such a great mass movement there would
+probably be some theoretical confusion, more or less muddled thinking. They
+recognized, too, that in the great mass convention they proposed some
+Social Democratic formulations might be rejected and some others adopted
+which did not accord with the Marxian doctrines. But, quoting Marx to the
+effect that "One step of real movement is worth a thousand programs," they
+contended that if there was anything at all in the Marxian theory of
+progress through class struggles, and the historic rule of the working
+class, it must follow that, while they might make mistakes and go
+temporarily astray, the workers could not go far <a name="Page_77" id="Page_77"></a>wrong, their class
+interests being a surer guide than any amount of intellectualism could
+produce.</p>
+
+<p>Lenine and his friends, the Bolsheviki, bitterly opposed all this reasoning
+and took a diametrically opposite position upon every one of the questions
+involved. They absolutely opposed any sort of co-operation with bourgeois
+parties of any kind, for any purpose whatever. No matter how progressive a
+particular bourgeois party might be, nor how important the reform aimed at,
+they believed that Social Democrats should remain in "splendid isolation,"
+refusing to make any distinction between more liberal and less liberal,
+progressive and reactionary, groups in the bourgeoisie. Trotzky, who did
+not at first formally join the Bolsheviki, but was a true Bolshevik in his
+intellectual convictions and sympathies, fully shared this view.</p>
+
+<p>Now, Lenine and Trotzky were dogmatic Marxists, and as such they could not
+deny the contention that capitalism must attain a certain development
+before Socialism could be attained in Russia. Nor could they deny that
+Absolutism was an obstacle to the development both of capitalist industry
+and of Socialism. They contended, however, that the peculiar conditions in
+Russia, resulting from the retardation of her economic development for so
+long, made it both possible and necessary to create a revolutionary
+movement which would, at one and the same time, overthrow both autocracy
+and capitalism. Necessarily, therefore, their warfare must be directed
+equally against autocracy and all political parties of the landlord and
+capitalist classes. They were guided throughout by this fundamental
+conviction. The policy of absolute and unqualified isolation in the Duma,
+which they insisted the Social Democrats ought to pursue, was based upon
+that conviction.</p><p><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78"></a></p>
+
+
+<h4>VI</h4>
+
+<p>All this is quite clear and easily intelligible. Granted the premise, the
+logic is admirable. It is not so easy, however, to see why, even granting
+the soundness of their opposition to <i>co-operation</i> with bourgeois parties
+and groups in the Duma, there should be no political <i>competition</i> with
+them&mdash;which would seem to be logically implied in the boycott of the Duma
+elections. Non-participation in the elections, consistently pursued as a
+proletarian policy, would leave the proletariat unrepresented in the
+legislative body, without one representative to fight its battles on what
+the world universally regards as one of the most important battle-fields of
+civilization. And yet, here, too, they were entirely logical and
+consistent&mdash;they did not believe in parliamentary government. As yet, they
+were not disposed to emphasize this overmuch, not, apparently, because of
+any lack of candor and good faith, but rather because the substitute for
+parliamentary government had not sufficiently shaped itself in their minds.
+The desire not to be confused with the Anarchists was another reason.
+Because the Bolsheviki and the Anarchists both oppose parliamentary
+government and the political state, it has been concluded by many writers
+on the subject that Bolshevism is simply Anarchism in another guise. This
+is a mistake. Bolshevism is quite different from and opposed to Anarchism.
+It requires strongly centralized government, which Anarchism abhors.</p>
+
+<p>Parliamentary government cannot exist except upon the basis of the will of
+the majority. Whoever enters into the parliamentary struggle, therefore,
+must hope and aim to convert the majority. Back of that hope and aim must
+be faith in the intellectual and moral capacity of the majority. At the
+foundation of Bolshevist theory and practice lies <a name="Page_79" id="Page_79"></a>the important fact that
+there is no such faith, and, consequently, neither the hope nor the aim to
+convert the majority and with its strength make the Revolution. Out of the
+adult population of Russia at that time approximately 85 per cent. were
+peasants and less than 5 per cent. belonged to the industrial proletariat.
+At that time something like 70 per cent. of the people were illiterate.
+Even in St. Petersburg&mdash;where the standard of literacy was higher than in
+any other city&mdash;not more than 55 per cent. of the people could sign their
+own names in 1905, according to the most authentic government reports. When
+we contemplate such facts as these can we wonder that impatient
+revolutionaries should shrink from attempting the task of converting a
+majority of the population to an intelligent acceptance of Socialism?</p>
+
+<p>There was another reason besides this, however. Lenine&mdash;and he personifies
+Bolshevism&mdash;was, and is, a doctrinaire Marxist of the most dogmatic type
+conceivable. As such he believed that the new social order must be the
+creation of that class which is the peculiar product of modern capitalism,
+the industrial proletariat. To that class alone he and his followers pinned
+all their faith and hope, and that class was a small minority of the
+population and bound to remain a minority for a very long period of years.
+Here, then, we have the key. It cannot be too strongly stressed that the
+Bolsheviki did not base their hope upon the working class of Russia, and
+did not trust it. The working class of Russia&mdash;if we are to use the term
+with an intelligent regard to realities&mdash;was and is mainly composed of
+peasants; the industrial proletariat was and is only a relatively small
+part of the great working class of the nation. <i>But it is upon that small
+section, as against the rest of the working class, that Bolshevism relies</i>.</p>
+
+<p>Lenine has always refused to include the peasants in <a name="Page_80" id="Page_80"></a>his definition of the
+working class. With almost fanatical intensity he has insisted that the
+peasant, together with the petty manufacturer and trader, would soon
+disappear; that industrial concentration would have its counterpart in a
+great concentration of landownings and agriculture; that the small peasant
+holdings would be swallowed up by large, modern agricultural estates, with
+the result that there would be an immense mass of landless agricultural
+wage-workers. This class would, of course, be a genuinely proletarian
+class, and its interests would be identical with those of the industrial
+proletariat. Until that time came it would be dangerous to rely upon the
+peasants, he urged, because their instincts are bourgeois rather than
+proletarian. Naturally, he has looked askance at the peasant Socialist
+movements, denying that they were truly Socialist at all. They could not be
+Socialist movements in the true sense, he contended, because they lacked
+the essential quality of true Socialists, namely, proletarian class
+consciousness.</p>
+
+<p>Naturally, too, Lenine and his followers have always regarded movements
+which aimed to divide the land among the peasants, and so tend to give
+permanence to a class of petty agriculturists, as essentially reactionary.
+The exigencies of the struggle have forced them into some compromises, of
+course. For example, at first they were not willing to admit that the
+peasants could be admitted into their group at all, but later on they
+admitted some who belonged to the poorest class of peasants. Throughout,
+however, they have insisted that the peasant class as a whole was a class
+of petty bourgeoisie and that its instincts and interests would inevitably
+lead it to side with the bourgeoisie as against the proletariat. Of course,
+this is a very familiar phase of Socialist evolution in every country. It
+lasted in Germany many years.<a name="Page_81" id="Page_81"></a> In Russia, however, the question assumed an
+importance it never had in any other country, owing to the vast
+preponderance of peasants in the population. Anything more un-Russian than
+this theorizing cannot be well conceived. It runs counter to every fact in
+Russian experience, to the very basis of her economic life at this stage of
+her history. Lenine is a Russian, but his dogmas are not Russian, but
+German. Bolshevism is the product of perverted German scholasticism.</p>
+
+<p>Even the industrial workers as a whole, in their present stage of
+development, were not to be trusted, according to the Bolshevist leaders.
+They frankly opposed the Mensheviki when the latter proposed to hold their
+great convention of industrial workers, giving as their reason the fear
+that the convention majority would not consist of class-conscious
+revolutionary Marxian Socialists. In other words, they feared that the
+majority would not be on their side, and they had not the time or the
+patience to convert them. There was no pretense of faith in the majority of
+the industrial proletariat, much less of faith in the entire working class
+of Russia. The industrial proletariat was a minority of the working class,
+and the Bolsheviki pinned their faith to a minority of that minority. They
+wanted to establish, not democracy, but dictatorship of Russia by a small,
+disciplined, intelligent, and determined minority of working-men.</p>
+
+<p>The lines of cleavage between the Mensheviki and the Bolsheviki were thus
+clearly drawn. The former, while ready to join in mass uprisings and armed
+insurrections by the masses, believed that the supreme necessity was
+education and organization of all the working-people. Still relying upon
+the industrial proletariat to lead the struggle, they nevertheless
+recognized that the peasants were indispensable. The Bolsheviki, on the
+other hand, <a name="Page_82" id="Page_82"></a>relied exclusively upon armed insurrection, initiated and
+directed by desperate minorities. The Mensheviki contended that the time
+for secret, conspiratory action was past; that Russia had outgrown that
+earlier method. As far as possible, they carried the struggle openly into
+the political field. They organized unions, educational societies, and
+co-operatives, confident that through these agencies the workers would
+develop cohesion and strength, which, at the right time, they would use as
+their class interests dictated. The Bolsheviki, on the other hand, clung to
+the old conspiratory methods, always mastered by the idea that a sudden
+<i>coup</i> must some day place the reins of power in the hands of a
+revolutionary minority of the workers and enable them to set up a
+dictatorship. That dictatorship, it must be understood, was not to be
+permanent; democracy, possibly even political democracy, would come later.</p>
+
+<p>As we have already noted, into the ranks of the terrorist
+Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Bolsheviki spies and provocative agents
+wormed their way in large numbers. It is the inevitable fate of secret,
+conspiratory movements that this should be so, and also that it should
+result in saturating the minds of all engaged in the movements with
+distrust and suspicion. More than once the charge of being a provocateur
+was leveled at Lenine and at Trotzky, but without justification,
+apparently. There was, indeed, one incident which placed Lenine in a bad
+light. It belongs to a somewhat later period than we have been discussing,
+but it serves admirably to illustrate conditions which obtained throughout
+the whole dark period between the two great revolutions. One of Lenine's
+close friends and disciples was Roman Malinovsky, a fiery speaker of
+considerable power, distinguished for his bitter attacks upon the bourgeois
+progressive parties <a name="Page_83" id="Page_83"></a>and upon the Mensheviki. The tenor of his speeches was
+always the same&mdash;only the interest of the proletariat should be considered;
+all bourgeois political parties and groups were equally reactionary, and
+any co-operation with them, for any purpose, was a betrayal of Socialist
+principle.</p>
+
+<p>Malinovsky was trusted by the Bolsheviki. He was elected to the Fourth
+Duma, where he became the leader of the little group of thirteen Social
+Democrats. Like other members of the Bolshevik faction, he entered the
+Duma, despite his contempt for parliamentary action, simply because it
+afforded him a useful opportunity for agitation and demonstrations. In the
+Duma he assailed even a portion of the Social Democratic group as belonging
+to the bourgeoisie, succeeding in splitting it in two factions and becoming
+the leader of the Bolshevik faction, numbering six. This blatant demagogue,
+whom Lenine called "the Russian Bebel," was proposed for membership in the
+International Socialist Bureau, the supreme council of the International
+Socialist movement, and would have been sent as a delegate to that body as
+a representative of Russian Socialist movement but for the discovery of the
+fact that he was a secret agent of the Czar's government!</p>
+
+<p>It was proved that Malinovsky was a provocateur in the pay of the Police
+Department, and that many, if not all, of his speeches had been prepared
+for him in the Police Department by a former director named Beletzky. The
+exposure made a great sensation in Russian Socialist circles at the time,
+and the fact that it was Nikolai Lenine who had proposed that Malinovsky be
+chosen to sit in the International Socialist Bureau naturally caused a
+great deal of unfriendly comment. It cannot be denied that the incident
+placed Lenine in an unfavorable light, <a name="Page_84" id="Page_84"></a>but it must be admitted that
+nothing developed to suggest that he was guilty of anything more serious
+than permitting himself to be outwitted and deceived by a cunning
+trickster. The incident serves to show, however, the ease with which the
+extreme fanaticism of the Bolsheviki played into the hands of the
+autocracy.</p>
+
+
+<h4>VII</h4>
+
+<p>While Bolsheviki and Mensheviki wrangled and disputed, great forces were at
+work among the Russian people. By 1910 the terrible pall of depression and
+despair which had settled upon the nation as a result of the failure of the
+First Revolution began to break. There was a new generation of college
+students, youthful and optimistic spirits who were undeterred by the
+failure of 1905-06, confident that they were wiser and certain to succeed.
+Also there had been an enormous growth of working-class organizations,
+large numbers of unions and co-operative societies having been formed in
+spite of the efforts of the government. The soul of Russia was once more
+stirring.</p>
+
+<p>The end of 1910 and the beginning of 1911 witnessed a new series of
+strikes, such as had not occurred since 1905. The first were students'
+strikes, inaugurated in support of their demand for the abolition of
+capital punishment. These were quickly followed by important strikes in the
+industrial centers for economic ends&mdash;better wages and shorter
+working-hours. As in the period immediately preceding the First Revolution,
+the industrial unrest soon manifested itself in political ways. Without any
+conscious leadership at all this would have been inevitable in the existing
+circumstances. But there was leadership. Social Democrats of both factions,
+and Socialists of other groups <a name="Page_85" id="Page_85"></a>as well, moved among the workers, preaching
+the old, yet ever new, gospel of revolt. Political strikes followed the
+strikes for immediate economic ends. Throughout the latter part of 1911 and
+the whole of 1912 the revolutionary movement once more spread among the
+masses.</p>
+
+<p>The year 1913 was hardly well begun when revolutionary activities assumed
+formidable proportions. January 9th&mdash;Russian calendar&mdash;anniversary of
+Bloody Sunday, was celebrated all over the country by great demonstrations
+which were really demonstration-strikes. In St. Petersburg fifty-five
+thousand workers went out&mdash;and there were literally hundreds of other
+smaller "strikes" of a similar nature throughout the country. In April
+another anniversary of the martyrdom of revolting working-men was similarly
+celebrated in most of the industrial centers, hundreds of thousands of
+workers striking as a manifestation against the government. The 1st of May
+was celebrated as it had not been celebrated since 1905. In the various
+industrial cities hundreds of thousands of workmen left their work to march
+through the streets and hold mass meetings, and so formidable was the
+movement that the government was cowed and dared not attempt to suppress it
+by force. There was a defiant note of revolution in this great uprising of
+the workers. They demanded an eight-hour day and the right to organize
+unions and make collective bargains. In addition to these demands, they
+protested against the Balkan War and against militarism in general.</p>
+
+<p>Had the great war not intervened, a tragic interlude in Russia's long
+history of struggle, the year 1914 would have seen the greatest struggle
+for the overthrow of Czarism in all that history. Whether it would have
+been more successful than the effort of 1905 can never be known, but it is
+certain that the working-class revolutionary <a name="Page_86" id="Page_86"></a>movement was far stronger
+than it was nine years before. On the other hand, there would not have been
+the same degree of support from the other classes, for in the intervening
+period class lines had been more sharply drawn and the class conflict
+greatly intensified. Surging through the masses like a mighty tide was the
+spirit of revolt, manifesting itself much as it had done nine years before.
+All through the early months of the year the revolutionary temper grew. The
+workers became openly defiant and the government, held in check, doubtless,
+by the delicate balance of the international situation, dared not resort to
+force with sufficient vigor to stamp out the agitation. Mass meetings were
+held in spite of all regulations to the contrary; political strikes
+occurred in all parts of the country. In St. Petersburg and Moscow
+barricades were thrown up in the streets as late as July. Then the war
+clouds burst. A greater passion than that of revolution swept over the
+nation and it turned to present a united front to the external foe.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87"></a></p>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_III" id="CHAPTER_III"></a>CHAPTER III</h2>
+
+<h3>THE WAR AND THE PEOPLE</h3>
+
+
+<h4>I</h4>
+
+<p>The war against Austria and Germany was not unpopular. Certainly there was
+never an occasion when a declaration of war by their rulers roused so
+little resentment among the Russian people. Wars are practically never
+popular with the great mass of the people in any country, and this is
+especially true of autocratically governed countries. The heavy burdens
+which all great wars impose upon the laboring class, as well as upon the
+petty bourgeoisie, cause even the most righteous wars to be regarded with
+dread and sorrow. The memory of the war with Japan was too fresh and too
+bitter to make it possible for the mass of the Russian people to welcome
+the thought of another war. It cannot, therefore, in truth be said that the
+war with the Central Empires was popular. But it can be said with sincerity
+and the fullest sanction that the war was not unpopular; that it was
+accepted by the greater part of the people as a just and, moreover, a
+necessary war. Opposition to the war was not greater in Russia than in
+England or France, or, later, in America. Of course, there were religious
+pacifists and Socialists who opposed the war and denounced it, as they
+would have denounced any other war, on general principles, no matter what
+the issues involved might be, but their number and their influence were
+small and quite unimportant.</p><p><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88"></a></p>
+
+<p>The one great outstanding fact was the manner in which the sense of peril
+to the fatherland rallied to its defense the different races, creeds,
+classes, and parties, the great tidal wave of genuine and sincere
+patriotism sweeping everything before it, even the mighty, passionate
+revolutionary agitation. It can hardly be questioned or doubted that if the
+war had been bitterly resented by the masses it would have precipitated
+revolution instead of retarding it. From this point of view the war was a
+deplorable disaster. That no serious attempt was made to bring about a
+revolution at that time is the best possible evidence that the declaration
+of war did not enrage the people. If not a popular and welcome event,
+therefore, the declaration of war by the Czar was not an unpopular one.
+Never before since his accession to the throne had Nicholas II had the
+support of the nation to anything like the same extent.</p>
+
+<p>Take the Jews, for example. Bitterly hated and persecuted as they had been,
+despised and humiliated beyond description; victims of the knout and the
+pogrom; tortured by Cossacks and Black Hundreds; robbed by official
+extortions; their women shamed and ravaged and their babies doomed to rot
+and die in the noisome Pale&mdash;the Jews owed no loyalty to the Czar or even
+to the nation. Had they sought revenge in the hour of Russia's crisis, in
+howsoever grim a manner, it would have been easy to understand their action
+and hard indeed to regard it with condemnation. It is almost unthinkable
+that the Czar could have thought of the Jews in his vast Empire in those
+days without grave apprehension and fear.</p>
+
+<p>Yet, as all the world knows, the Jews resolutely overcame whatever
+suggestion of revenge came to them and, with marvelous solidarity,
+responded to Russia's call without hesitation and without political
+intrigue or bargaining.<a name="Page_89" id="Page_89"></a> As a whole, they were as loyal as any of the
+Czar's subjects. How shall we explain this phenomenon?</p>
+
+<p>The explanation is that the leaders of the Jewish people, and practically
+the whole body of Jewish Intellectuals, recognized from the first that the
+war was more than a war of conflicting dynasties; that it was a war of
+conflicting ideals. They recognized that the Entente, as a whole,
+notwithstanding that it included the autocracy of Russia, represented the
+generous, democratic ideals and principles vital to every Jew in that they
+must be securely established before the emancipation of the Jew could be
+realized. Their hatred of Czarism was not engulfed by any maudlin
+sentiment; they knew that they had no "fatherland" to defend. They were not
+swept on a tide of jingoism to forget their tragic history and proclaim
+their loyalty to the infamous oppressor. No. Their loyalty was to the
+Entente, not to the Czar. They were guided by enlightened self-interest, by
+an intelligent understanding of the meaning to them of the great struggle
+against Teutonic militarist-imperialism.</p>
+
+<p>Every intelligent and educated Jew in Russia knew that the real source of
+the brutal anti-Semitism which characterized the rule of the Romanovs was
+Prussian and not Russian. He knew that it had long been one of the main
+features of Germany's foreign policy to instigate and stimulate hatred and
+fear of the Jews by Russian officialdom. There could not be a more tragic
+mistake than to infer from the ruthless oppression of the Jews in Russia
+that anti-Semitism is characteristically Russian. Surely, the fact that the
+First Duma was practically unanimous in deciding to give equal rights to
+the Jews with all the rest of the population proves that the Russian people
+did not hate the Jews. The ill-treatment of the Jews was part of the policy
+by which Germany, for her <a name="Page_90" id="Page_90"></a>own ends, cunningly contrived to weaken Russia
+and so prevent the development of her national solidarity. Racial animosity
+and conflict was an ideal instrument for attaining that result. Internal
+war and abortive revolutionary outbreaks which kept the country unsettled,
+and the energies of the government taxed to the uttermost, served the same
+end, and were, therefore, the object of Germany's intrigues in Russia,
+equally with hostility to the Jews, as we shall have occasion to note.</p>
+
+<p>German intrigue in Russia is an interesting study in economic determinism.
+Unless we comprehend it we shall strive in vain to understand Russia's part
+in the war and her r&ocirc;le in the history of the past few decades. A brief
+study of the map of Europe by any person who possesses even an elementary
+knowledge of the salient principles of economics will reveal Germany's
+interest in Russia and make quite plain why German statesmen have so
+assiduously aimed to keep Russia in a backward economic condition. As a
+great industrial nation it was to Germany's interest to have Russia remain
+backward industrially, predominantly an agricultural country, quite as
+surely as it was to her interest as a military power to have weakness and
+inefficiency, instead of strength and efficiency, in Russia's military
+organization. As a highly developed industrial nation Russia would of
+necessity have been Germany's formidable rival&mdash;perhaps her most formidable
+rival&mdash;and by her geographical situation would have possessed an enormous
+advantage in the exploitation of the vast markets in the far East. As a
+feudal agricultural country, on the other hand, Russia would be a great
+market for German manufactured goods, and, at the same time, a most
+convenient supply-depot for raw materials and granary upon which Germany
+could rely for raw materials, wheat, rye, and other staple grains&mdash;a
+<a name="Page_91" id="Page_91"></a>supply-depot and granary, moreover, accessible by overland transportation
+not subject to naval attack.</p>
+
+<p>For the Russian Jew the defeat of Germany was a vital necessity. The
+victory of Germany and her allies could only serve to strengthen Prussian
+influence in Russia and add to the misery and suffering of the Jewish
+population. That other factors entered into the determination of the
+attitude of the Jews, such as, for example, faith in England as the
+traditional friend of the Jew, and abhorrence at the cruel invasion of
+Belgium, is quite true. But the great determinant was the well-understood
+fact that Germany's rulers had long systematically manipulated Russian
+politics and the Russian bureaucracy to the serious injury of the Jewish
+race. Germany's militarist-imperialism was the soul and inspiration of the
+oppression which cursed every Jew in Russia.</p>
+
+
+<h4>II</h4>
+
+<p>The democratic elements in Russia were led to support the government by
+very similar reasoning. The same economic and dynastic motives which had
+led Germany to promote racial animosities and struggles in Russia led her
+to take every other possible means to uphold autocracy and prevent the
+establishment of democracy. This had been long recognized by all liberal
+Russians, no matter to what political school or party they might belong. It
+was as much part of the common knowledge as the fact that St. Petersburg
+was the national capital. It was part of the intellectual creed of
+practically every liberal Russian that there was a natural affinity between
+the great autocracies of Germany and Russia, and that a revolution in
+Russia which seriously endangered the existence of monarchical absolutism
+would be suppressed by Prussian <a name="Page_92" id="Page_92"></a>guns and bayonets reinforcing those of
+loyal Russian troops. It was generally believed by Russian Socialists that
+in 1905 the Kaiser had promised to send troops into Russia to crush the
+Revolution if called upon for that aid. Many German Socialists, it may be
+added, shared that belief. Autocracies have a natural tendency to combine
+forces against revolutionary movements. It would have been no more strange
+for Wilhelm II to aid Nicholas II in quelling a revolution that menaced his
+throne than it was for Alexander I to aid in putting down revolution in
+Germany; or than it was for Nicholas I to crush the Hungarian Revolution in
+1849, in the interest of Francis Joseph; or than it was for Bismarck to
+rush to the aid of Alexander II in putting down the Polish insurrection in
+1863.</p>
+
+<p>The democrats of Russia knew, moreover, that, in addition to the natural
+affinity which served to bind the two autocracies, the Romanov and
+Hohenzollern dynasties had been closely knit together in a strong union by
+years and years of carefully planned and strongly wrought blood ties. As
+Isaac Don Lenine reminds us in his admirable study of the Russian
+Revolution, Nicholas II was more than seven-eighths German, less than
+one-eighth of his blood heritage being Romanov. Catherine the Great, wife
+of Peter III, was a Prussian by birth and heritage and thoroughly
+Prussianized her court. After her&mdash;from 1796 to 1917&mdash;six Czars reigned in
+Russia, five of whom married German wives. As was inevitable in such
+circumstances, the Russian court had long been notoriously subject to
+German influences and strongly pro-German in its sympathies&mdash;by no means a
+small matter in an autocratic country. Fully aware of their advantage, the
+Kaiser and his Ministers increased the German influence and power at the
+Russian court by encouraging German <a name="Page_93" id="Page_93"></a>nobles to marry into Russian court
+circles. The closing decade of the reign of Nicholas II was marked by an
+extraordinary increase of Prussian influence in his court, an achievement
+in which the Kaiser was greatly assisted by the Czarina, who was, it will
+be remembered, a German princess.</p>
+
+<p>Naturally, the German composition and character of the Czar's court was
+reflected in the diplomatic service and in the most important departments
+of the Russian government, including the army. The Russian Secret Service
+was very largely in the hands of Germans and Russians who had married
+German wives. The same thing may be said of the Police Department. Many of
+the generals and other high officers in the Russian army were either of
+German parentage or connected with Germany by marriage ties. In brief, the
+whole Russian bureaucracy was honeycombed by German influence.</p>
+
+<p>Outside official circles, much the same condition existed among the great
+landowners. Those of the Baltic provinces were largely of Teutonic descent,
+of course. Many had married German wives. The result was that the nobility
+of these provinces, long peculiarly influential in the political life of
+Russia, was, to a very large degree, pro-German. In addition to these,
+there were numerous large landowners of German birth, while many, probably
+a big majority, of the superintendents of the large industrial
+establishments and landed estates were German citizens. It is notorious
+that the principal factories upon which Russia had to rely for guns and
+munitions were in charge of Germans, who had been introduced because of
+their high technical efficiency.</p>
+
+<p>In view of these facts, and a mass of similar facts which might be cited,
+it was natural for the democrats of Russia to identify Germany and German
+intrigue and <a name="Page_94" id="Page_94"></a>influence with the hated bureaucracy. It was as natural as it
+was for the German influence to be used against the democratic movement in
+Russia, as it invariably was. Practically the entire mass of democratic
+opinion in Russia, including, of course, all the Socialist factions,
+regarded these royal, aristocratic, and bureaucratic German influences as a
+menace to Russia, a cancer that must be cut out. With the exception of a
+section of the Socialists, whose position we shall presently examine, the
+mass of liberal-thinking, progressive, democratic Russians saw in the war a
+welcome breaking of the German yoke. Believing that the victory of Germany
+would restore the yoke, and that her defeat by Russia would eliminate the
+power which had sustained Czarism, they welcomed the war and rallied with
+enthusiasm at the call to arms. They were loyal, but to Russia, not to the
+Czar. They felt that in warring against Prussian militarist-imperialism
+they were undermining Russian Absolutism.</p>
+
+<p>That the capitalists of Russia should want to see the power of Germany to
+hold Russia in chains completely destroyed is easy to understand. To all
+intents and purposes, from the purely economic point of view, Russia was
+virtually a German colony to be exploited for the benefit of Germany. The
+commercial treaties of 1905, which gave Germany such immense trade
+advantages, had become exceedingly unpopular. On the other hand, the
+immense French loan of 1905, the greater part of which had been used to
+develop the industrial life of Russia, had the effect of bringing Russian
+capitalists into closer relations with French capitalists. For further
+capital Russia could only look to France and England with any confident
+hope. Above all, the capitalists of Russia wanted freedom for economic
+development; they wanted stability and national unity, the very things
+Germany <a name="Page_95" id="Page_95"></a>was preventing. They wanted efficient government and the
+elimination of the terrible corruption which infested the bureaucracy. The
+law of economic evolution was inexorable and inescapable; the capitalist
+system could not grow within the narrow confines of Absolutism.</p>
+
+<p>For the Russian capitalist class, therefore, it was of the most vital
+importance that Germany's power should not be increased, as it would of
+necessity be if the Entente submitted to her threats and permitted Serbia
+to be crushed by Austria, and the furtherance of the Pan-German
+<i>Mitteleuropa</i> designs. It was vitally necessary to Russian capitalism that
+Germany's strangle-hold upon the inner life of Russia should be broken. The
+issue was not the competition of capitalism, as that is commonly
+understood; it was not the rivalry for markets like that which animates the
+capitalist classes of all lands. The Russian capitalist class was animated
+by no fear of German competition in the sense in which the nations of the
+world have understood that term. They had their own vast home market to
+develop. The industrialization of the country must transform a very large
+part of the peasantry into factory artisans living in cities, having new
+needs and relatively high wages, and, consequently, more money to spend.
+For many years to come their chief reliance must be the home market,
+constantly expanding as the relative importance of manufacturing increased
+and forced improved methods of agriculture upon the nation in the process,
+as it was bound to do.</p>
+
+<p>It was Germany as a persistent meddler in Russian government and politics
+that the capitalists of Russia resented. It was the unfair advantage that
+this underhand political manipulation gave her in their own home field that
+stirred up the leaders of the capitalist class of Russia. That, and the
+knowledge that German intrigue by promoting <a name="Page_96" id="Page_96"></a>divisions in Russia was the
+mainstay of the autocracy, solidified the capitalist class of Russia in
+support of the war. There was a small section of this class that went much
+farther than this and entertained more ambitious hopes. They realized fully
+that Turkey had already fallen under the domination of Germany to such a
+degree that in the event of a German victory in the war, or, what really
+amounted to the same thing, the submission of the Entente to her will,
+Germany would become the ruler of the Dardanelles and European Turkey be in
+reality, and perhaps in form, part of the German Empire.</p>
+
+<p>Such a development could not fail, they believed, to have the most
+disastrous consequences for Russia. Inevitably, it would add to German
+prestige and power in the Russian Empire, and weld together the
+Hohenzollern, Habsburg, and Romanov autocracies in a solid, reactionary
+mass, which, under the efficient leadership of Germany, might easily
+dominate the entire world. Moreover, like many of the ablest Russians,
+including the foremost Marxian Socialist scholars, they believed that the
+normal economic development of Russia required a free outlet to the warm
+waters of the Mediterranean, which alone could give her free access to the
+great ocean highways. Therefore they hoped that one result of a victorious
+war by the Entente against the Central Empires, in which Russia would play
+an important part, would be the acquisition of Constantinople by Russia.
+Thus the old vision of the Czars had become the vision of an influential
+and rising class with a solid basis of economic interest.</p>
+
+
+<h4>III</h4>
+
+<p>As in every other country involved, the Socialist movement was sharply
+divided by the war. Paradoxical as it <a name="Page_97" id="Page_97"></a>seems, in spite of the great revival
+of revolutionary hope and sentiment in the first half of the year, the
+Socialist parties and groups were not strong when the war broke out. They
+were, indeed, at a very low state. They had not yet recovered from the
+reaction. The manipulation of the electoral laws following the dissolution
+of the Second Duma, and the systematic oppression and repression of all
+radical organizations by the administration, had greatly reduced the
+Socialist parties in membership and influence. The masses were, for a long
+time, weary of struggle, despondent, and passive. The Socialist factions
+meanwhile were engaged in an apparently interminable controversy upon
+theoretical and tactical questions in which the masses of the
+working-people, when they began to stir at last, took no interest, and
+which they could hardly be supposed to understand. The Socialist parties
+and groups were subject to a very great disability in that their leaders
+were practically all in exile. Had a revolution broken out, as it would
+have done but for the war, Socialist leadership would have asserted itself.</p>
+
+<p>As in all other countries, the divisions of opinion created by the war
+among the Socialists cut across all previous existing lines of separation
+and made it impossible to say that this or that faction adopted a
+particular view. Just as in Germany, France, and England, some of the most
+revolutionary Socialists joined with the more moderate Socialists in
+upholding the war, while extremely moderate Socialists joined with
+Socialists of the opposite extreme in opposing it. It is possible, however,
+to set forth the principal features of the division with tolerable
+accuracy:</p>
+
+<p>A majority of the Socialist-Revolutionary party executive issued an
+anti-war Manifesto. There is no means of telling how far the views
+expressed represented the attitude of the peasant Socialists as a whole,
+owing to the <a name="Page_98" id="Page_98"></a>disorganized state of the party and the difficulties of
+assembling the members. The Manifesto read:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>There is no doubt that Austrian imperialism is responsible for the
+war with Serbia. But is it not equally criminal on the part of
+Serbs to refuse autonomy to Macedonia and to oppress smaller and
+weaker nations?</p>
+
+<p>It is the protection of this state that our government considers
+its "sacred duty." What hypocrisy! Imagine the intervention of the
+Czar on behalf of poor Serbia, whilst he martyrizes Poland,
+Finland and the Jews, and behaves like a brigand toward Persia.</p>
+
+<p>Whatever may be the course of events, the Russian workers and
+peasants will continue their heroic fight to obtain for Russia a
+place among civilized nations.</p></div>
+
+<p>This Manifesto was issued, as reported in the Socialist press, prior to the
+actual declaration of war. It was a threat of revolution made with a view
+to preventing the war, if possible, and belongs to the same category as the
+similar threats of revolution made by the German Socialists before the war
+to the same end. The mildness of manner which characterizes the Manifesto
+may be attributed to two causes&mdash;weakness of the movement and a resulting
+lack of assurance, together with a lack of conviction arising from the fact
+that many of the leaders, while they hated the Czar and all his works, and
+could not reconcile themselves to the idea of making any kind of truce with
+their great enemy, nevertheless were pro-Ally and anxious for the defeat of
+German imperialism. In other words, these leaders shared the national
+feeling against Germany, and, had they been free citizens of a
+democratically governed country, would have loyally supported the war.</p>
+
+<p>When the Duma met, on August 8th, for the purpose of voting the war
+credits, the Social Democrats of both factions,<a name="Page_99" id="Page_99"></a> Bolsheviki and Mensheviki,
+fourteen in number,<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> united upon a policy of abstention from voting.
+Valentin Khaustov, on behalf of the two factions, read this statement:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>A terrible and unprecedented calamity has broken upon the people
+of the entire world. Millions of workers have been torn away from
+their labor, ruined, and swept away by a bloody torrent. Millions
+of families have been delivered over to famine.</p>
+
+<p>War has already begun. While the governments of Europe were
+preparing for it, the proletariat of the entire world, with the
+German workers at the head, unanimously protested.</p>
+
+<p>The hearts of the Russian workers are with the European
+proletariat. This war is provoked by the policy of expansion for
+which the ruling classes of all countries are responsible.</p>
+
+<p>The proletariat will defend the civilization of the world against
+this attack.</p>
+
+<p>The conscious proletariat of the belligerent countries has not
+been sufficiently powerful to prevent this war and the resulting
+return of barbarism.</p>
+
+<p>But we are convinced that the working class will find in the
+international solidarity of the workers the means to force the
+conclusion of peace at an early date. The terms of that peace will
+be dictated by the people themselves, and not by the diplomats.</p>
+
+<p>We are convinced that this war will finally open the eyes of the
+great masses of Europe, and show them the real causes of all the
+violence and oppression that they endure, and that therefore this
+new explosion of barbarism will be the last.</p></div>
+
+<p>As soon as this declaration was read the fourteen members of the Social
+Democratic group left the chamber in silence. They were immediately
+followed by the Laborites and Socialist-Revolutionists representing the
+peasant Socialists, so that none of the Socialists in the Duma voted for
+the war credits. As we shall see later on, the Laborites <a name="Page_100" id="Page_100"></a>and most of the
+Socialist-Revolutionists afterward supported the war. The declaration of
+the Social Democrats in the Duma was as weak and as lacking in definiteness
+of policy as the Manifesto of the Socialist-Revolutionists already quoted.
+We know now that it was a compromise. It was possible to get agreement upon
+a statement of general principles which were commonplaces of Socialist
+propaganda, and to vaguely expressed hopes that "the working class will
+find in the international solidarity of the workers the means to force the
+conclusion of peace at an early date." It was easy enough to do this, but
+it would have been impossible to unite upon a definite policy of resistance
+and opposition to the war. It was easy to agree not to vote for the war
+credits, since there was no danger that this would have any practical
+effect, the voting of the credits&mdash;largely a mere form&mdash;being quite
+certain. It would have been impossible to get all to agree to vote
+<i>against</i> the credits.</p>
+
+<p>Under the strong leadership of Alexander Kerensky the Labor party soon took
+a decided stand in support of the war. In the name of the entire group of
+the party's representatives in the Duma, Kerensky read at an early session
+a statement which pledged the party to defend the fatherland. "We firmly
+believe," said Kerensky, "that the great flower of Russian democracy,
+together with all the other forces, will throw back the aggressive enemy
+and <i>will defend their native land</i>." The party had decided, he said, to
+support the war "in defense of the land of our birth and of our
+civilization created by the blood of our race.... We believe that through
+the agony of the battle-field the brotherhood of the Russian people will be
+strengthened and a common desire created to free the land from its terrible
+internal troubles." Kerensky declared that the workers would take no
+responsibility for <a name="Page_101" id="Page_101"></a>the suicidal war into which the governments of Europe
+had plunged their peoples. He strongly criticized the government, but
+ended, nevertheless, in calling upon the peasants and industrial workers to
+support the war:</p>
+
+<p>"The Socialists of England, Belgium, France, and Germany have tried to
+protest against rushing into war. We Russian Socialists were not able at
+the last to raise our voices freely against the war. But, deeply convinced
+of the brotherhood of the workers of all lands, we send our brotherly
+greetings to all who protested against the preparations for this
+fratricidal conflict of peoples. Remember that Russian citizens have no
+enemies among the working classes of the belligerents! <i>Protect your
+country to the end against aggression by the states whose governments are
+hostile to us, but remember that there would not have been this terrible
+war had the great ideals of democracy, freedom, equality, and brotherhood
+been directing the activities of those who control the destinies of Russia
+and other lands!</i> As it is, our authorities, even in this terrible moment,
+show no desire to forget internal strife, grant no amnesty to those who
+have fought for freedom and the country's happiness, show no desire for
+reconciliation with the non-Russian peoples of the Empire.</p>
+
+<p>"And, instead of relieving the condition of the laboring classes of the
+people, the government puts on them especially the heaviest load of the war
+expenses, by tightening the yoke of indirect taxes.</p>
+
+<p>"Peasants and workers, all who want the happiness and well-being of Russia
+in these great trials, harden your spirit! Gather all your strength and,
+having defended your land, free it; and to you, our brothers, who are
+shedding blood for the fatherland, a profound obeisance and fraternal
+greetings."</p>
+
+<p>Kerensky's statement was of tremendous significance.<a name="Page_102" id="Page_102"></a> Made on behalf of the
+entire group of which he was leader, it reflected the sober second thought
+of the representatives of the peasant Socialists and socialistically
+inclined radicals. Their solemnly measured protest against the reactionary
+policy of the government was as significant as the announcement that they
+would support the war. It was a fact that at the very time when national
+unity was of the most vital importance the government was already goading
+the people into despairing revolt.</p>
+
+<p>That a section of the Bolsheviki began a secret agitation against the war,
+aiming at a revolt among the soldiers, regardless of the fact that it would
+mean Russia's defeat and Germany's triumph, is a certainty. The government
+soon learned of this movement and promptly took steps to crush it. Many
+Russian Socialists have charged that the policy of the Bolsheviki was
+inspired by provocateurs in the employ of the police, and by them betrayed.
+Others believe that the policy was instigated by German provocateurs, for
+very obvious purposes. It was not uncommon for German secret agents to worm
+their way into the Russian Socialist ranks, nor for the agents of the
+Russian police to keep the German secret service informed of what was going
+on in Russian Socialist circles. Whatever truth there may be in the
+suspicion that the anti-war Bolshevik faction of the Social Democrats were
+the victims of the Russian police espionage system, and were betrayed by
+one whom they had trusted, as the Socialist-Revolutionists had been
+betrayed by Azev, the fact remains that the government ordered the arrest
+of five of the Bolshevist Social Democratic members of the Duma, on
+November 17th. Never before had the government disregarded the principle of
+parliamentary immunity. When members of the First Duma, belonging to
+various parties, and members of the Second Duma, <a name="Page_103" id="Page_103"></a>belonging to the Social
+Democratic party, were arrested it was only after the Duma had been
+formally dissolved. The arrest of the five Social Democrats while the Duma
+was still sitting evoked a strong protest, even from the conservatives.</p>
+
+<p>The government based its action upon the following allegations, which
+appear to have been substantially correct: in October arrangements were
+made to convoke a secret conference of delegates of the Social Democratic
+organization to plan for a revolutionary uprising. The police learned of
+the plan, and when at last, on November 17th, the conference was held at
+Viborg, eight miles from Petrograd&mdash;as the national capital was now
+called&mdash;a detachment of police found eleven persons assembled, including
+five members of the Imperial Duma, Messrs. Petrovsky, Badavev, Mouranov,
+Samoelov, and Chagov. The police arrested six persons, but did not arrest
+the Duma members, on account of their parliamentary position. An examining
+magistrate, however, indicted the whole eleven who attended the conference,
+under Article No. 102 of the Penal Code, and issued warrants for their
+arrest. Among those arrested was Kamanev, one of Lenine's closest friends,
+who behaved so badly at his trial, manifesting so much cowardice, that he
+was censured by his party.</p>
+
+<p>At this conference, according to the government, arrangements were made to
+circulate among the masses a Manifesto which declared that "from the
+viewpoint of the working class and of the laboring masses of all the
+nations of Russia, the defeat of the monarchy of the Czar and of its armies
+would be of extremely little consequence." The Manifesto urged the
+imperative necessity of <i>carrying on on all sides the propaganda of the
+social revolution among the army and at the theater of the war, and that
+weapons should be directed not against their brothers, the <a name="Page_104" id="Page_104"></a>hired slaves of
+other countries, but against the reactionary bourgeois governments</i>. The
+Manifesto went on, according to the government, to favor the organization
+of a similar propaganda in all languages, among all the armies, with the
+aim of creating republics in Russia, Poland, Germany, Austria, and all
+other European countries, these to be federated into a republican United
+Stares of Europe.</p>
+
+<p>The declaration that the defeat of the Russian armies would be "of
+extremely little consequence" to the workers became the key-note of the
+anti-war agitation of the Bolsheviki. Lenine and Zinoviev, still in exile,
+adopted the view that the defeat of Russia was <i>actually desirable</i> from
+the point of view of the Russian working class. "We are Russians, and for
+that very reason we want Czarism to be defeated," was the cry.<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> In his
+paper, the <i>Social Democrat</i>, published in Switzerland, Lenine advocated
+Russian defeat, to be brought about through treachery and revolt in the
+army, as the best means of furthering revolutionary progress. The majority
+of the Bolshevik faction made common cause with the extreme left-wing
+Socialists of the Socialist-Revolutionary party, who shared their views and
+became known as "Porazhentsi"&mdash;that is, advocates of defeat. Naturally, the
+charge was made that they were pro-German, and it was even charged that
+they were in the pay of Germany. Possibly some of them were, but it by no
+means follows that because they desired Russia's defeat they were therefore
+consciously pro-German. They were not pro-German, but anti-Czarists. They
+believed quite honestly, most of them, that Russia's defeat was the surest
+and quickest <a name="Page_105" id="Page_105"></a>way of bringing about the Revolution in Russia which would
+overthrow Czarism. In many respects their position was quite like that of
+those Irish rebels who desired to see England defeated, even though it
+meant Germany's triumph, not because of any love for Germany, but because
+they hated England and believed that her defeat would be Ireland's
+opportunity. However short-sighted and stupid such a policy may be judged
+to be, it is quite comprehensible and should not be misrepresented. It is a
+remarkable fact that the Bolsheviki, while claiming to be the most radical
+and extreme internationalists, were in practice the most narrow
+nationalists. They were exactly as narrow in their nationalism as the
+Sinn-Feiners of Ireland. They were not blind to the terrible wrongs
+inflicted upon Belgium, or to the fact that Germany's victory over Russia
+would make it possible for her to crush the western democracies, France and
+England. But neither to save Belgium nor to prevent German militarism
+crushing French and English workers under its iron heel would they have the
+Russian workers make any sacrifice. They saw, and cared only for, what they
+believed to be <i>Russian</i> interests.</p>
+
+
+<h4>IV</h4>
+
+<p>But during the first months of the war the Porazhentsi&mdash;including the
+Bolsheviki&mdash;were a very small minority. The great majority of the
+Socialist-Revolutionists rallied to the support of the Allied cause. Soon
+after the war began a Socialist Manifesto to the laboring masses of Russia
+was issued. It bore the signature of many of the best-known Russian
+Socialists, representing all the Socialist factions and groups except the
+Bolsheviki. Among the names were those of George Plechanov, Leo Deutsch,
+Gregory Alexinsky, N. Avksentiev, B. Vorovonov, I.<a name="Page_106" id="Page_106"></a> Bunakov, and A.
+Bach&mdash;representing the best thought of the movement in practically all its
+phases. This document is of the greatest historical importance, not merely
+because it expressed the sentiments of Socialists of so many shades, but
+even more because of its carefully reasoned arguments why Socialists should
+support the war and why the defeat of Germany was essential to Russian and
+international social democracy. Despite its great length, the Manifesto is
+here given in its entirety:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>We, the undersigned, belong to the different shades of Russian
+Socialistic thought. We differ on many things, but we firmly agree
+in that the defeat of Russia in her struggle with Germany would
+mean her defeat in her struggle for freedom, and we think that,
+guided by this conviction, our adherents in Russia must come
+together for a common service to their people, in the hour of the
+grave danger the country is now facing.</p>
+
+<p>We address ourselves to the politically conscious working-men,
+peasants, artisans, clerks&mdash;to all of those who earn their bread
+in the sweat of their brow, and who, suffering from the lack of
+means and want of political rights, are struggling for a better
+future for themselves, for their children, and for their brethren.</p>
+
+<p>We send them our hearty greeting, and persistently say to them:
+Listen to us in this fatal time, when the enemy has conquered the
+Western strongholds of Russia, has occupied an important part of
+our territory and is menacing Kiev, Petrograd, and Moscow, these
+most important centers of our social life.</p>
+
+<p>Misinformed people may tell you that in defending yourselves from
+German invasion you support our old political r&eacute;gime. These people
+want to see Russia defeated because of their hatred of the Czar's
+government. Like one of the heroes of our genius of satire,
+Shchedrin, they mix fatherland with its temporary bosses. But
+Russia belongs not to the Czar, but to the Russian working-people.
+In defending Russia, the working-people defend themselves, defend
+the road to their freedom. As we said before, the inevitable
+consequences of German victory would be the strengthening of our
+old r&eacute;gime.</p><p><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107"></a></p>
+
+<p>The Russian reactionaries understand this very thoroughly. <i>In a
+faint, half-hearted manner they are defending Russia from
+Germany</i>. The Ministers who resigned recently, Maklakov and
+Shcheglovitov, presented a secret report to the Czar, in November,
+1914, in which they explained how advantageous it would be for the
+Czar to make a separate peace with Germany. <i>They understand that
+the defeat of Germany would be a defeat of the principles of
+monarchism, so dear to all our European reactionaries</i>.</p>
+
+<p>Our people will never forget <i>the failure of the Czar's government
+to defend Russia</i>. But if the progressive, the politically
+conscious people will not take part in the struggle against
+Germany, the Czar's government will have an excuse for saying: "It
+is not our fault that Germany defeats us; it is the fault of the
+revolutionists who have betrayed their country," and this will
+vindicate the government in the eyes of the people.</p>
+
+<p>The political situation in Russia is such that only across the
+bridge of national defense can we reach freedom. Remember, <i>we do
+not tell you, first victory against the external enemy and then
+revolution against the internal, the Czar's government</i>.</p>
+
+<p>In the course of events the defeat of the Czar's government may
+serve as a necessary preliminary condition for, and even as a
+guaranty of, the elimination of the German danger. The French
+revolutionists of the end of the eighteenth century would never
+have been able to have overcome the enemy, attacking France on all
+sides, had they not adopted such tactics only when the popular
+movement against the old r&eacute;gime became mature enough to render
+their efforts effective.</p>
+
+<p>Furthermore, you must not be embarrassed by the arguments of those
+who believe that every one who defends his country refuses thereby
+to take part in the struggle of the classes. These persons do not
+know what they are talking about. In the first place, in order
+that the struggle of the classes in Russia should be successful,
+certain social and political conditions must exist there. <i>These
+conditions will not exist if Germany wins</i>.</p>
+
+<p>In the second place, if the working-man of Russia cannot but
+defend himself against the exploitation of the Russian landed
+aristocrat and capitalist it seems incomprehensible that he should
+remain inactive when the lasso of exploitation is being drawn
+around his neck by the German landed aristocracy (the <i>Junker</i>)
+and the German capitalist who are, unfortunately, at the present
+<a name="Page_108" id="Page_108"></a>time <i>supported by a considerable part of the German proletariat
+that has turned traitor to its duty of solidarity with the
+proletariat of other countries</i>.</p>
+
+<p>By striving to the utmost to cut this lasso of German
+imperialistic exploitation, the proletariat of Russia will
+continue the struggle of the classes in that form which at the
+present moment is most appropriate, fruitful, and effective.</p>
+
+<p>It has been our country's fate once before to suffer from the
+bloody horrors of a hostile invasion. But never before did it have
+to defend itself against an enemy so well armed, so skilfully
+organized, so carefully prepared for his plundering enterprise as
+he is now.</p>
+
+<p>The position of the country is dangerous to the highest degree;
+therefore upon all of you, upon all the politically conscious
+children of the working-people of Russia, lies an enormous
+responsibility.</p>
+
+<p>If you say to yourselves that it is immaterial to you and to your
+less developed brothers as to who wins in this great international
+collision going on now, and if you act accordingly, Russia will be
+crushed by Germany. And when Russia will be crushed by Germany, it
+will fare badly with the Allies. This does not need any
+demonstration.</p>
+
+<p>But if, on the contrary, you become convinced that the defeat of
+Russia will reflect badly upon the interests of the working
+population, and if you will help the self-defense of our country
+with all your forces, our country and her allies will escape the
+terrible danger menacing them.</p>
+
+<p>Therefore, go deeply into the situation. You make a great mistake
+if you imagine that it is not to the interests of the
+working-people to defend our country. In reality, nobody's
+interests suffer more terribly from the invasion of an enemy than
+the interests of the working-population.</p>
+
+<p>Take, for instance, the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. When the
+Germans besieged Paris and the cost of all the necessaries of life
+rose enormously, it was clear that the poor suffered much more
+than the rich. In the same way, when Germany exacted five billions
+of contribution from vanquished France, this same, in the final
+count, was paid by the poor; for paying that contribution indirect
+taxation was greatly raised, the burden of which nearly entirely
+falls on the lower classes.</p>
+
+<p>More than that. The most dangerous consequence to France, <a name="Page_109" id="Page_109"></a>due to
+her defeat in 1870-71, was the retardation of her economic
+development. In other words, the defeat of France badly reflected
+upon the contemporary interests of her people, and, even more,
+upon her entire subsequent development.</p>
+
+<p>The defeat of Russia by Germany will much more injure our people
+than the defeat of France injured the French people. The war now
+exacts incredibly large expenditures. It is more difficult for
+Russia, a country economically backward, to bear that expenditure
+than for the wealthy states of western Europe. Russia's back, even
+before the war, was burdened with a heavy state loan. Now this
+debt is growing by the hour, and vast regions of Russia are
+subject to wholesale devastation.</p>
+
+<p>If the Germans will win the final victory, they will demand from
+us an enormous contribution, in comparison with which the streams
+of gold that poured into victorious Germany from vanquished
+France, after the war of 1871, will seem a mere trifle.</p>
+
+<p>But that will not be all. The most consequent and outspoken
+heralds of German imperialism are even now saying that it is
+necessary to exact from Russia the cession of important territory,
+which should be cleared from the present population for the
+greater convenience of German settlers. Never before have
+plunderers, dreaming of despoiling a conquered people, displayed
+such cynical heartlessness!</p>
+
+<p>But for our vanquishers it will not be enough to exact an
+unheard-of enormous contribution and to tear up our western
+borderlands. Already, in 1904, Russia, being in a difficult
+situation, was obliged to conclude a commercial treaty with
+Germany, very disadvantageous to herself. The treaty hindered, at
+the same time, the development of our agriculture and the progress
+of our industries. It affected, with equal disadvantage, the
+interests of the farmers as well as of those engaged in industry.
+It is easy to imagine what kind of a treaty victorious German
+imperialism would impose upon us. In economic matters, Russia
+would become a German colony. Russia's further economic
+development would be greatly hindered if not altogether stopped.
+Degeneration and deprivation would be the result of German victory
+for an important part of the Russian working-people.</p>
+
+<p>What will German victory bring to western Europe? After all we
+have already said, it is needless to expatiate on how many <a name="Page_110" id="Page_110"></a>of the
+unmerited economic calamities it will bring to the people of the
+western countries allied to Russia. We wish to draw your attention
+to the following: England, France, even Belgium and Italy, are, in
+a political sense, far ahead of the German Empire, which has not
+as yet grown up to a parliamentary r&eacute;gime. German victory over
+these countries would be the victory of the old over the new, and
+if the democratic ideal is dear to you, you must wish success to
+our Western Allies.</p>
+
+<p>Indifference to the result of this war would be, for us, equal to
+political suicide. The most important, the most vital interests of
+the proletariat and of the laboring peasantry demand of you an
+active participation in the defense of the country. Your watchword
+must be victory over the foreign enemy. In an active movement
+toward such victory, the live forces of the people will become
+free and strong.</p>
+
+<p>Obedient to this watchword, you must be as wise as serpents.
+Although in your hearts may burn the flame of noble indignation,
+in your heads must reign, invariably, cold political reckoning.
+You must know that zeal without reason is sometimes worse than
+complete indifference. Every act of agitation in the rear of the
+army, fighting against the enemy, would be equivalent to high
+treason, as it would be a service to the foreign enemy.</p>
+
+<p>The thunders of the war certainly cannot make the Russian
+manufacturers and merchants more idealistic than they were in time
+of peace. In the filling of the numerous orders, inevitable during
+the mobilization of industry for war needs, the capitalists will,
+as they are accustomed to, take great care of the interests of
+capital, and will not take care of the interests of hired labor.
+You will be entirely right if you wax indignant at their conduct.
+But in all cases, whenever you desire to answer by a strike, you
+must first think whether such action would not be detrimental to
+the cause of the defense of Russia.</p>
+
+<p>The private must be subject to the general. The workmen of every
+factory must remember that they would commit, without any doubt,
+the gravest mistake if, considering only their own interests, they
+forget how severely the interests of the entire Russian
+proletariat and peasantry would suffer from German victory.</p>
+
+<p>The tactics which can be defined by the motto, "All or nothing,"
+are the tactics of anarchy, fully unworthy of the conscious
+<a name="Page_111" id="Page_111"></a>representatives of the proletariat and peasantry. The General
+Staff of the German Army would greet with pleasure the news that
+we had adopted such tactics. <i>Believe us that this Staff is ready
+to help all those who would like to preach it in our country</i>.
+They want trouble in Russia, they want strikes in England, they
+want everything that would facilitate the achievement of their
+conquering schemes.</p>
+
+<p>But you will not make them rejoice. You will not forget the words
+of our great fabulist: "What the enemy advises is surely bad." You
+must insist that all your representatives take the most active
+part in all organizations created now, under the pressure of
+public opinion, for the struggle with the foe. Your
+representatives must, if possible, take part not only in the work
+of the special technical organizations, such as the War-Industrial
+Committees which have been created for the needs of the army, but
+also in all other organizations of social and political character.</p>
+
+<p>The situation is such that we cannot come to freedom in any other
+way than by the war of national defense.</p></div>
+
+<p>That the foregoing Manifesto expressed the position of the vast majority of
+Russian Socialists there can be no doubt whatever. Between this position
+and that of the Porazhentsi with their doctrine that Russia's defeat by
+Germany was desirable, there was a middle ground, which was taken by a not
+inconsiderable number of Socialists, including such able leaders as Paul
+Axelrod. Those who took up this intermediate position were both
+anti-Czarists and anti-German-imperialists. They were pro-Ally in the large
+sense, and desired to see the Allies win over the Central Empires, if not a
+"crushing" victory, a very definite and conclusive one. But they regarded
+the alliance of Czarism with the Allies as an unnatural marriage. They
+believed that autocratic Russia's natural alliance was with autocratic
+Germany and Austria. Their hatred of Czarism led them to wish for its
+defeat, even by Germany, provided the victory were not so great as <a name="Page_112" id="Page_112"></a>to
+permit Germany to extend her domain over Russia or any large part of it.
+Their position became embodied in the phrase, "Victory by the Allies on the
+west and Russia's defeat on the east." This was, of course, utterly
+unpractical theorizing and bore no relation to reality.</p>
+
+
+<h4>V</h4>
+
+<p>Thanks in part to the vigorous propaganda of such leaders as Plechanov,
+Deutsch, Bourtzev, Tseretelli, Kerensky, and many others, and in part to
+the instinctive good sense of the masses, support of the war by Socialists
+of all shades and factions&mdash;except the extreme Bolsheviki and the so-called
+"Internationalist" sections of Mensheviki and
+Socialist-Revolutionists&mdash;became general. The anti-war minority was
+exceedingly small and had no hold upon the masses. Had the government been
+both wise and honestly desirous of presenting a united front to the foe,
+and to that end made intelligent and generous concessions to the democratic
+movement, it is most unlikely that Russia would have collapsed. As it was,
+the government adopted a policy which could not fail to weaken the military
+force of the nation&mdash;a policy admirably suited to German needs.</p>
+
+<p>Extremes meet. On the one hand there were the Porazhentsi Socialists,
+contending that the interests of progress would be best served by a German
+victory over Russia, and plotting to weaken and corrupt the morale of the
+Russian army and to stir up internal strife to that end. On the other hand,
+within the royal court, and throughout the bureaucracy, reactionary
+pro-German officials were animated by the belief that the victory of
+Germany was essential to the permanence of Absolutism and autocratic
+government. They, too, like the Socialist<a name="Page_113" id="Page_113"></a> "defeatists," aimed to weaken
+and corrupt the morale of the army and to divide the nation.</p>
+
+<p>These Germanophiles in places of power realized that they had unconscious
+but exceedingly useful allies in the Socialist intransigents. Actuated by
+motives however high, the latter played into the hands of the most corrupt
+and reactionary force that ever infested the old r&eacute;gime. This force, the
+reactionary Germanophiles, had from the very first hoped and believed that
+Germany would win the war. They had exerted every ounce of pressure they
+could command to keep the Czar from maintaining the treaty with France and
+entering into the war on her side against Germany and Austria. When they
+failed in this, they bided their time, full of confidence that the superior
+efficiency of the German military machine would soon triumph. But when they
+witnessed the great victorious onward rush of the Russian army, which for a
+time manifested such a degree of efficiency as they had never believed to
+be possible, they began to bestir themselves. From this quarter came the
+suggestion, very early in the war, as Plechanov and his associates charged
+in their Manifesto, that the Czar ought to make an early peace with
+Germany.</p>
+
+<p>They went much farther than this. Through every conceivable channel they
+contrived to obstruct Russia's military effort. They conspired to
+disorganize the transportation system, the hospital service, the
+food-supply, the manufacture of munitions. They, too, in a most effective
+manner, were plotting to weaken and corrupt the morale of the army. There
+was universal uneasiness. In the Allied chancelleries there was fear of a
+treacherous separate peace between Russia and Germany. It was partly to
+avert that catastrophe by means of a heavy bribe that England undertook the
+forcing of the Dardanelles. All <a name="Page_114" id="Page_114"></a>over Russia there was an awakening of the
+memories of the graft that ate like a canker-worm at the heart of the
+nation. Men told once more the story of the Russian general in Manchuria,
+in 1904, who, when asked why fifty thousand men were marching barefoot,
+answered that the boots were in the pocket of Grand-Duke Vladimir! They
+told again the story of the cases of "shells" for the Manchurian army which
+were intercepted in the nation's capital, <i>en route</i> to Moscow, and found
+to contain&mdash;paving-stones! How General Kuropatkin managed to amass a
+fortune of over six million rubles during the war with Japan was
+remembered. Fear that the same kind of treason was being perpetrated grew
+almost to the panic point.</p>
+
+<p>So bad were conditions in the army, so completely had the Germanophile
+reactionaries sabotaged the organization, that the people themselves took
+the matter in hand. Municipalities all over the country formed a Union of
+Cities to furnish food, clothes, and other necessaries to the army. The
+National Union of Zemstvos did the same thing. More than three thousand
+institutions were established on the different Russian fronts by the
+National Union of Zemstvos. These institutions included hospitals,
+ambulance stations, feeding stations for troops on the march, dental
+stations, veterinary stations, factories for manufacturing supplies, motor
+transportation services, and so on through a long catalogue of things which
+the administration absolutely failed to provide. The same great
+organization furnished millions of tents and millions of pairs of boots and
+socks. Civil Russia was engaged in a great popular struggle to overcome
+incompetence, corruption, and sabotage in the bureaucracy. For this work
+the civilian agencies were not thanked by the government. Instead, they
+were oppressed and hindered. Against them <a name="Page_115" id="Page_115"></a>was directed the hate of the
+dark forces of the "occult government" and at the same time the fierce
+opposition and scorn of men who called themselves Socialists and champions
+of proletarian freedom!</p>
+
+<p>There was treachery in the General Staff and throughout the War Department,
+at the very head of which was a corrupt traitor, Sukhomlinov. It was
+treachery in the General Staff which led to the tragic disasters in East
+Prussia. The great drive of the Austrian and German armies in 1915, which
+led to the loss of Poland, Lithuania, and large parts of Volhynia and
+Courland, and almost entirely eliminated Russia from the war, was
+unquestionably brought about by co-operation with the German General Staff
+on the part of the sinister "occult government," as the Germanophile
+reactionary conspiracy in the highest circles came to be known.</p>
+
+<p>No wonder that Plechanov and his friends in their Manifesto to the Russian
+workers declared that the reactionaries were defending Russia from
+subjugation by Germany in "a half-hearted way," and that "our people will
+never forget the failure of the Czar's government to defend Russia." They
+were only saying, in very moderate language, what millions were thinking;
+what, a few months later, many of the liberal spokesmen of the country were
+ready to say in harsher language. As early as January, 1915, the Duma met
+and cautiously expressed its alarm. In July it met again, many of the
+members coming directly from the front, in uniform. Only the fear that a
+revolution would make the continuance of the war impossible prevented a
+revolution at that time. The Duma was in a revolutionary mood. Miliukov,
+for example, thundered:</p>
+
+<p>" ... In January we came here with ... the feeling of patriotic alarm. We
+then kept this feeling to ourselves.<a name="Page_116" id="Page_116"></a> Yet in closed sessions of committees
+we told the government all that filled the soul of the people. The answer
+we received did not calm us; it amounted to saying that the government
+could get along without us, without our co-operation. To-day we have
+convened in a grave moment of trial for our fatherland. The patriotic alarm
+of the people has proved to be well founded, to the misfortune of our
+country. Secret things have become open, and the assertions of half a year
+ago have turned out to be mere words. Yet the country cannot be satisfied
+with words. <i>The people wish to take affairs into their own hands and to
+correct what has been neglected. The people look upon us as legal executors
+of their will</i>."</p>
+
+<p>Kerensky spoke to the same general effect, adding, "<i>I appeal to the people
+themselves to take into their hands the salvation of the country and fight
+for a full right to govern the state</i>." The key-note of revolution was
+being sounded now. For the spirit of revolution breathed in the words, "The
+people wish to take affairs into their own hands," and in Kerensky's
+challenge, "I appeal to the people themselves to take into their hands the
+salvation of the country." The Duma was the logical center around which the
+democratic forces of the country could rally. Its moderate character
+determined this. Only its example was necessary to the development of a
+great national movement to overthrow the old r&eacute;gime with its manifold
+treachery, corruption, and incompetence. When, on August 22d, the
+Progressive Bloc was formed by a coalition of Constitutional Democrats,
+Progressives, Nationalists, and Octobrists&mdash;the last-named group having
+hitherto generally supported the government&mdash;there was a general chorus of
+approval throughout the country, If the program of the Bloc was not radical
+enough to satisfy the various Socialist groups, even the Laborites, led by
+Kerensky, <a name="Page_117" id="Page_117"></a>it was, nevertheless, a program which they could support in the
+main, as far as it went.</p>
+
+<p>All over the country there was approval of the demand for a responsible
+government. The municipal councils of the large cities passed resolutions
+in support of it. The great associations of manufacturers supported it. All
+over the nation the demand for a responsible government was echoed. It was
+generally believed that the Czar and his advisers would accept the
+situation and accede to the popular demand. But once more the influence of
+the reactionaries triumphed, and on September 3d came the defiant answer of
+the government to the people. It was an order suspending the Duma
+indefinitely. The gods make mad those whom they would destroy.</p>
+
+<p>Things went from bad to worse. More and more oppressive grew the
+government; more and more stupidly brutal and reactionary in its dealings
+with the wide-spread popular unrest. Heavier and heavier grew the burden of
+unscientific and unjustly distributed taxation. Worse and worse became the
+condition of the soldiers at the front; ever more scandalous the neglect of
+the sick and wounded. Incompetence, corruption, and treason combined to
+hurry the nation onward to a disastrous collapse. The Germanophiles were
+still industriously at work in the most important and vital places,
+practising sabotage upon a scale never dreamed of before in the history of
+any nation. They played upon the fears of the miserable weakling who was
+the nominal ruler of the vast Russian Empire, and frightened him into
+sanctioning the most suicidal policy of devising new measures of oppression
+instead of making generous concessions.</p>
+
+<p>Russia possessed food in abundance, being far better off in this respect
+than any other belligerent on either side, yet Russia was in the grip of
+famine. There was a vast <a name="Page_118" id="Page_118"></a>surplus of food grains and cereals over and above
+the requirements of the army and the civilian population, yet there was
+wide-spread hunger. Prices rose to impossible levels. The most astonishing
+anarchy and disorganization characterized the administration of the
+food-supply. It was possible to get fresh butter within an hour's journey
+from Moscow for twenty-five cents a pound, but in Moscow the price was two
+and a half dollars a pound. Here, as throughout the nation, incompetence
+was reinforced by corruption and pro-German treachery. Many writers have
+called attention to the fact that even in normal times the enormous
+exportation of food grains in Russia went on side by side with per capita
+underconsumption by the peasants whose labor produced the great harvests,
+amounting to not less than 30 per cent. Now, of course, conditions were far
+worse.</p>
+
+<p>When the government was urged to call a convention of national leaders to
+deal with the food situation it stubbornly refused. More than that, it made
+war upon the only organizations which were staving off famine and making it
+possible for the nation to endure. Every conceivable obstacle was placed in
+the way of the National Union of Zemstvos and the Union of Cities; the
+co-operative associations, which were rendering valuable service in meeting
+the distress of working-men's families, were obstructed and restricted in
+every possible way, their national offices being closed by the police. The
+officials of the labor-unions who were co-operating with employers in
+substituting arbitration in place of strikes, establishing soup-kitchens
+and relief funds, and doing other similar work to keep the nation alive,
+were singled out for arrest and imprisonment. The Black Hundreds were
+perniciously active in all this oppression and in the treacherous advocacy
+of a separate peace with Germany.</p><p><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119"></a></p>
+
+<p>In October, 1916, a conference of chairmen of province zemstvos adopted and
+published a resolution which declared:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>The tormenting and horrifying suspicion, the sinister rumors of
+perfidy and treason, of dark forces working in favor of Germany to
+destroy the unity of the nation, to sow discord and thus prepare
+conditions for an ignominious peace, have now reached the clear
+certainty that the hand of the enemy secretly influences the
+affairs of our state.</p></div>
+
+
+<h4>VI</h4>
+
+<p>An adequate comprehension of the things set forth in this terrible summary
+is of the highest importance to every one who would attempt the task of
+reaching an intelligent understanding of the mighty upheaval in Russia and
+its far-reaching consequences. The Russian Revolution of 1917 was not
+responsible for the disastrous separate peace with Germany. The foundations
+for that were laid by the reactionaries of the old r&eacute;gime. It was the
+logical outcome of their long-continued efforts. Lenine, Trotzky, and their
+Bolshevist associates were mere puppets, simple tools whose visions,
+ambitions, and schemes became the channels through which the conspiracy of
+the worst reactionaries in Russia realized one part of an iniquitous
+program.</p>
+
+<p>The Revolution itself was a genuine and sincere effort on the part of the
+Russian people to avert the disaster and shame of a separate peace; to
+serve the Allied cause with all the fidelity of which they were capable.
+There would have been a separate peace if the old r&eacute;gime had remained in
+power a few weeks longer and the Revolution been averted. It is most likely
+that it would have been a more shameful peace than was concluded at
+Brest-Litovsk, <a name="Page_120" id="Page_120"></a>and that it would have resulted in an actual and active
+alliance of the Romanov dynasty with the dynasties of the Hohenzollerns and
+the Habsburgs. The Russian Revolution of 1917 had this great merit: it so
+delayed the separate peace between Russia and Germany that the Allies were
+able to prepare for it. It had the merit, also, that it forced the
+attainment of the separate peace to come in such a manner as to reduce
+Germany's military gain on the western front to a minimum.</p>
+
+<p>The manner in which the Bolsheviki in their wild, groping, and frenzied
+efforts to apply theoretical abstractions to the living world, torn as it
+was by the wolves of war, famine, treason, oppression, and despair, served
+the foes of freedom and progress must not be lost sight of. The Bolshevist,
+wherever he may present himself, is the foe of progress and the ally of
+reaction.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121"></a></p>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IV" id="CHAPTER_IV"></a>CHAPTER IV</h2>
+
+<h3>THE SECOND REVOLUTION</h3>
+
+
+<h4>I</h4>
+
+<p>When the Duma assembled On November 14, 1916&mdash;new style&mdash;the approaching
+doom of Czar Nicholas II was already manifest. Why the Revolution did not
+occur at that time is a puzzle not easy to solve. Perhaps the mere fact
+that the Duma was assembling served to postpone resort to drastic measures.
+The nation waited for the Duma to lead. It is probable, also, that fear
+lest revolution prove disastrous to the military forces exercised a
+restraining influence upon the people. Certain it is that it would have
+been easy enough to kindle the fires of revolution at that time. Never in
+the history of the nation, not even in 1905, were conditions riper for
+revolt, and never had there been a more solid array of the nation against
+the bureaucracy. Discontent and revolutionary temper were not confined to
+Socialists, nor to the lower classes. Landowners, capitalists, military
+officials, and Intellectuals were united with the peasants and artisans, to
+an even greater extent than in the early stages of the First Revolution.
+Conservatives and Moderates joined with Social Democrats and
+Socialist-Revolutionists in opposition to the corrupt and oppressive
+r&eacute;gime. Even the president of the Duma, Michael Rodzianko, a conservative
+landowner, assailed the government.</p>
+
+<p>One of the principal reasons for this unexampled unity <a name="Page_122" id="Page_122"></a>against the
+government was the wide-spread conviction, based, as we have seen, upon the
+most damning evidence, that Premier Sturmer and his Cabinet were not loyal
+to the Allies and that they contemplated making a separate peace with
+Germany. All factions in the Duma were bitterly opposed to a separate
+peace. Rodzianko was loudly cheered when he denounced the intrigues against
+the Allies and declared: "Russia gave her word to fight in common with the
+Allies till complete and final victory is won. Russia will not betray her
+friends, and with contempt refuses any consideration of a separate peace.
+Russia will not be a traitor to those who are fighting side by side with
+her sons for a great and just cause." Notwithstanding the intensification
+of the class conflict naturally resulting from the great industrial
+development since 1906, patriotism temporarily overshadowed all class
+consciousness.</p>
+
+<p>The cheers that greeted Rodzianko's declaration, and the remarkable ovation
+to the Allied ambassadors, who were present, amply demonstrated that, in
+spite of the frightful suffering and sacrifice which the nation had
+endured, all classes were united in their determination to win the war.
+Only a corrupt section of the bureaucracy, at one end of the social scale,
+and a small section of extreme left-wing Socialists, at the other end of
+the social scale, were at that time anti-war. There was this difference
+between the Socialist pacifists and the bureaucratic advocates of peace
+with Germany: the former were not pro-German nor anti-Ally, but sincere
+internationalists, honest and brave&mdash;however mistaken&mdash;advocates of peace.
+Outside of the bureaucracy there was no hostility to the Allies in Russia.
+Except for the insignificant Socialist minority referred to, the masses of
+the Russian people realized that the defeat of the Hohenzollern dynasty
+<a name="Page_123" id="Page_123"></a>was necessary to a realization of the ideal of a free Russia. The new and
+greater revolution was already beginning, and determination to defeat the
+Hohenzollern bulwark of the Romanov despotism was almost universal. The
+whole nation was pervaded by this spirit.</p>
+
+<p>Paul Miliukov, leader of the Constitutional Democrats, popularly known as
+the "Cadets," furiously lashed Premier Sturmer and quoted the irrefutable
+evidence of his pro-Germanism and of his corruption. Sturmer reeled under
+the smashing attack. In his rage he forbade the publication of Miliukov's
+speech, but hundreds of thousands of copies of it were secretly printed and
+distributed. Every one recognized that there was war between the Duma and
+the government, and notwithstanding the criticism of the Socialists, who
+naturally regarded it as a bourgeois body, the Duma represented Russia.</p>
+
+<p>Sturmer proposed to his Cabinet the dissolution of the Duma, but failed to
+obtain the support of a majority. Then he determined to get the Czar's
+signature to a decree of dissolution. But the Czar was at the General
+Headquarters of the army at the time and therefore surrounded by army
+officers, practically all of whom were with the Duma and inspired by a
+bitter resentment of the pro-German intrigues, especially the neglect of
+the army organization. The weak will of Nicholas II was thus beyond the
+reach of Sturmer's influence for the time being. Meanwhile, the Ministers
+of the Army and Navy had appeared before the Duma and declared themselves
+to be on the side of the people and their parliament. On his way to visit
+the Czar at General Headquarters, Premier Sturmer was met by one of the
+Czar's messengers and handed his dismissal from office. The Duma had won.</p>
+
+<p>The evil genius which inspired and controlled him led Nicholas II to
+appoint as Sturmer's successor the utterly <a name="Page_124" id="Page_124"></a>reactionary bureaucrat,
+Alexander Trepov, and to retain in office as Minister of the Interior the
+infamous Protopopov, associate of the unsavory Rasputin. When Trepov made
+his first appearance as Premier in the Duma he was loudly hissed by the
+Socialists. Other factions, while not concealing their disappointment, were
+more tolerant and even became more hopeful when they realized that from the
+first Trepov was fighting to oust Protopopov. That meant, of course, a
+fight against Rasputin as well. Whatever Trepov's motives might be in
+fighting Protopopov and Rasputin he was helping the opposition. But Trepov
+was no match for such opponents. It soon became evident that as Premier he
+was a mere figurehead and that Rasputin and Protopopov held the government
+in their hands. Protopopov openly defied the Premier and the Duma.</p>
+
+<p>In December it began to be rumored in political circles that Sturmer, who
+was now attached in some not clearly defined capacity to the Foreign
+Office, was about to be sent to a neutral country as ambassador. The rumor
+created the utmost consternation in liberal circles in Russia and in the
+Allied embassies. If true, it could only have one meaning, namely, that
+arrangements were being made to negotiate a separate peace with
+Germany&mdash;and that meant that Russia was to become Germany's economic
+vassal.</p>
+
+<p>The Duma demanded a responsible Ministry, a Cabinet directly responsible
+to, and controlled by, the Duma as the people's representative. This demand
+had been constantly made since the First Revolution. Even the Imperial
+Council, upon which the Czar had always been able to rely for support
+against revolutionary movements, now joined forces with the Duma in making
+this demand. That traditionally reactionary, bureaucratic body, composed
+<a name="Page_125" id="Page_125"></a>of former Premiers, Cabinet Ministers, and other high officials, formally
+demanded that the Czar take steps to make the government responsible to the
+popularly elected assemblage. This was a small revolution in itself. The
+fabric of Czarism had cracked.</p>
+
+
+<h4>II</h4>
+
+<p>There can be no doubt in the mind of any student of Russian affairs that
+the unity of the Imperial Council and the Duma, like the unity of classes,
+was due to the strong pro-Ally sentiment which at that time possessed
+practically the entire nation. On December 12th&mdash;new style&mdash;Germany offered
+Russia a separate peace, and three days later the Foreign Minister,
+Pokrovsky, visited the Duma and announced that Russia would reject the
+offer. The Duma immediately passed a resolution declaring that "the Duma
+unanimously favors a categorical refusal by the Allied governments to
+enter, under present conditions, into any peace negotiations whatever." On
+the 19th a similar resolution was adopted by the Imperial Council, which
+continued to follow the leadership of the Duma. Before adjourning for the
+Christmas holidays the Duma passed another resolution, aimed chiefly at
+Protopopov and Sturmer, protesting against the sinister activities which
+were undermining the war-making forces of the nation, and praising the work
+of the zemstvos and working-class organizations which had struggled bravely
+to sustain the army, feed the people, care for the sick and wounded, and
+avert utter chaos.</p>
+
+<p>On December 30th, in the early hours of the morning, the monk Rasputin was
+murdered and his body thrown into the Neva. The strangest and most evil of
+all the actors in the Russian drama was dead, but the system <a name="Page_126" id="Page_126"></a>which made
+him what he was lived. Rasputin dead exercised upon the diseased mind of
+the Czarina&mdash;and, through her, upon the Czar&mdash;even a greater influence than
+when he was alive. Nicholas II was as powerless to resist the insane
+Czarina's influence as he had proved himself to be when he banished the
+Grand-Duke Nicholas for pointing out that the Czarina was the tool of evil
+and crafty intriguers. Heedless of the warning implied in the murder of
+Rasputin, and of the ever-growing opposition to the government and the
+throne, the Czar inaugurated, or permitted to be inaugurated, new measures
+of reaction and repression.</p>
+
+<p>Trepov was driven from the Premiership and replaced by Prince Golitizin, a
+bureaucrat of small brain and less conscience. The best Minister of
+Education Russia had ever had, Ignatyev, was replaced by one of the
+blackest of all reactionaries. The Czar celebrated the New-Year by issuing
+an edict retiring the progressive members of the Imperial Council, who had
+supported the Duma, and appointing in their stead the most reactionary men
+he could find in the Empire. At the head of the Council as president he
+placed the notorious Jew-hating Stcheglovitov. As always, hatred of the Jew
+sprang from fear of progress.</p>
+
+<p>As one reads the history of January, 1917, in Russia, as it was reported in
+the press day by day, and the numerous accounts of competent and
+trustworthy observers, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that
+Protopopov deliberately sought to precipitate a revolution. Mad as this
+hypothesis seems to be, it is nevertheless the only one which affords a
+rational explanation of the policy of the government. No sooner was
+Golitizin made Premier than it was announced that the opening of the Duma
+would be postponed till the end of January, in order that the<a name="Page_127" id="Page_127"></a> Cabinet
+might be reorganized. Later it was announced that the Duma opening would be
+again postponed&mdash;this time till the end of February. In the reorganization
+of the Cabinet, Shuvaviev, the War Minister, who had loyally co-operated
+with the zemstvos and had supported the Duma in November, was dismissed.
+Pokrovsky, the Foreign Minister, who had announced to the Duma in December
+the rejection of the German peace offer, was reported to be "sick" and
+given "leave of absence." Other changes were made in the Cabinet, in every
+case to the advantage of the reactionaries. It was practically impossible
+for anyone in Russia to find out who the Ministers of the government were.</p>
+
+<p>Protopopov released Sukhomlinov, the former Minister of War who had been
+justly convicted of treason. This action, taken, it was said, at the
+direction of the Czarina, added to the already wide-spread belief that the
+government was animated by a desire to make peace with Germany. That the
+Czar himself was loyal to the Allies was generally believed, but there was
+no such belief in the loyalty of Protopopov, Sturmer, and their associates.
+The nation meantime was drifting into despair and anarchy. The railway
+system was deliberately permitted to become disorganized. Hunger reigned in
+the cities and the food reserves for the army were deliberately reduced to
+a two days' supply. The terror of hunger spread through the large cities
+and through the army at the front like prairie fire.</p>
+
+<p>It became evident that Protopopov was carrying out the plans of the
+Germanophiles, deliberately trying to disorganize the life of the nation
+and make successful warfare impossible. Socialists and labor leaders
+charged that his agents were encouraging the pacifist minority and opposing
+the patriotic majority among the workers.<a name="Page_128" id="Page_128"></a> The work of the War Industries
+Committee which controlled organizations engaged in the manufacture of
+war-supplies which employed hundreds of thousands of workers was hampered
+in every way. It is the testimony of the best-known and most-trusted
+working-class leaders in Russia that the vast majority of the workers,
+while anxious for a general democratic peace, were opposed to a separate
+peace with Germany and favored the continuation of the war against
+Prussianism and the co-operation of all classes to that end. The pacifists
+and "defeatist" Socialists represented a minority. To the minority every
+possible assistance was given, while the leaders of the working class who
+were loyal to the war, and who sought to sustain the morale of the workers
+in support of the war, were opposed and thwarted in their efforts and, in
+many cases, cast into prison. The Black Hundreds were still at work.</p>
+
+<p>Socialist leaders of the working class issued numerous appeals to the
+workers, warning them that Protopopov's secret police agitators were trying
+to bring about strikes, and begging them not to lend themselves to such
+treacherous designs, which could only aid Germany at the expense of
+democracy in Russia and elsewhere. It became known, too, that large numbers
+of machine-guns were being distributed among the police in Petrograd and
+placed at strategic points throughout the city. It was said that Protopopov
+was mad, but it was the methodical madness of a desperate, reactionary,
+autocratic r&eacute;gime.</p>
+
+
+<h4>III</h4>
+
+<p>Protopopov and Sturmer and their associates recognized as clearly as the
+liberals did the natural kinship and interdependence of the three great
+autocracies, the Romanov,<a name="Page_129" id="Page_129"></a> Habsburg, and Hohenzollern dynasties. They knew
+well that the crushing of autocracy in Austria-Hungary and Germany would
+make it impossible to maintain autocracy in Russia. They realized,
+furthermore, that while the nation was not willing to attempt revolution
+during the war, the end of the war would inevitably bring with it
+revolution upon a scale far vaster than had ever been attempted before,
+unless, indeed, the revolutionary leaders could be goaded into making a
+premature attempt to overthrow the monarchy. In that case, it might be
+possible to crush them. Given a rebellion in the cities, which could be
+crushed by the police amply provided with machine-guns, and by "loyal"
+troops, with a vast army unprovided with food and no means of supplying it,
+there would be abundant justification for making a separate peace with
+Germany. Thus the Revolution would be crushed and the whole system of
+autocracy, Russian, Austrian, and German, preserved.</p>
+
+<p>The morning of the 27th of February&mdash;new style&mdash;was tense with an ominous
+expectancy. In the Allied chancelleries anxious groups were gathered. They
+realized that the fate of the Allies hung in the balance. In Petrograd
+alone three hundred thousand workers went out on strike that day, and the
+police agents did their level best to provoke violence. The large bodies of
+troops massed at various points throughout the city, and the police with
+their machine-guns, testified to the thoroughness with which the government
+had prepared to crush any revolutionary manifestations. Thanks to the
+excellent discipline of the workers, and the fine wisdom of the leaders of
+the Social Democrats, the Socialist-Revolutionists, and the Labor Group,
+who constantly exhorted the workers not to fall into the trap set for them,
+there was no violence.</p>
+
+<p>At the opening session of the Duma, Kerensky, leader <a name="Page_130" id="Page_130"></a>of the Labor Group,
+made a characteristic address in which he denounced the arrest of the Labor
+Group members of the War Industries Committee. He directed his attack
+against the "system," not against individuals:</p>
+
+<p>"We are living in a state of anarchy unprecedented in our history. In
+comparison with it the period of 1613 seems like child's play. Chaos has
+enveloped not only the political, but the economic life of the nation as
+well. It destroys the very foundations of the nation's social economic
+structure.</p>
+
+<p>"Things have come to such a pass that recently one of the Ministries,
+shipping coal from Petrograd to a neighboring city, had armed the train
+with a special guard so that other authorities should not confiscate the
+coal on the way! We have arrived already at the primitive stage when each
+person defends with all the resources at his command the material in his
+possession, ready to enter into mortal combat for it with his neighbor. We
+are witnessing the same scenes which France went through at the time of the
+Revolution. Then also the products shipped to Paris were accompanied by
+special detachments of troops to prevent their being seized by the
+provincial authorities....</p>
+
+<p>"Behold the Cabinet of Rittich-Protopopov-Golitizin dragging into the court
+the Labor Group of the War Industries Committee, charged with aiming at the
+creation of a Russian Social-Democratic republic! They did not even know
+that nobody aims at a 'Social-Democratic' republic. One aiming at a
+republic labors for popular government. But has the court anything to say
+about all these distinctions? We know beforehand what sentences are to be
+imposed upon the prisoners....</p>
+
+<p>"I have no desire to criticize the individual members of the Cabinet. The
+greatest mistake of all is to seek <a name="Page_131" id="Page_131"></a>traitors, German agents, separate
+Sturmers. <i>We have a still greater enemy than the German influence, than
+the treachery and treason of individuals. And that enemy is the system&mdash;the
+system of a medieval form of government</i>."</p>
+
+<p>How far the conspiracy of the government of Russia against the war of
+Russia and her Allies extended is shown by the revelations made in the Duma
+on March 3d by one of the members, A. Konovalov. He reported that two days
+previously, March 1st, the only two members of the Labor Group of the War
+Industries Committee who were not in prison issued an appeal to the workers
+not to strike. These two members of the Labor Group of the War Industries
+Committee, Anosovsky and Ostapenko, took their exhortation to the bureau of
+the War Industries Committee for its approval. But, although approved by
+this great and important organization, the appeal was not passed by the
+government censor. When Guchkov, president of the War Industries Committee,
+attempted to get the appeal printed in the newspapers he was prevented by
+action emanating from the office of Protopopov.</p>
+
+
+<h4>IV</h4>
+
+<p>Through all the early days of March there was labor unrest in Petrograd, as
+well as in some other cities. Petrograd was, naturally, the storm center.
+There were small strikes, but, fortunately, not much rioting. The extreme
+radicals were agitating for the release of the imprisoned leaders of the
+Labor Group and urging drastic action by the workers. Much of this
+agitation was sincere and honest, but no little of it was due to the
+provocative agents. These, disguised as workmen, seized every opportunity
+to urge revolt. Any pretext sufficed them; they stimulated the honest
+agitation to revolt as a protest against the imprisonment <a name="Page_132" id="Page_132"></a>of the Labor
+Group, and the desperate threat that unless food was forthcoming revolution
+would be resorted to for sinister purposes. And all the time the police and
+the troops were massed to crush the first rising.</p>
+
+<p>The next few days were destined to reveal the fact that the cunning and
+guile of Protopopov had overreached itself; that the soldiers could not be
+relied upon to crush any uprising of the people. There was some rioting in
+Petrograd on March 3d, and the next day the city was placed under martial
+law. On March 7th the textile workers went out on strike and were quickly
+followed by several thousand workers belonging to other trades. Next day
+there was a tremendous popular demonstration at which the workers demanded
+food. The strike spread during the next two or three days until there was a
+pretty general stoppage of industry. Students from the university joined
+with the striking workmen and there were numerous demonstrations, but
+little disposition to violence. When the Cossacks and mounted police were
+sent to break up the crowds, the Cossacks took great care not to hurt the
+people, fraternizing with them and being cheered by them. It was evident
+that the army would not let itself be used to crush the uprising of the
+people. The police remained "loyal," but they were not adequate in numbers.
+Protopopov had set in motion forces which no human agency could control.
+The Revolution was well under way.</p>
+
+<p>The Duma remained in constant session. Meantime the situation in the
+capital was becoming serious in the extreme. Looting of stores began, and
+there were many victims of the police efforts to disperse the crowds. In
+the midst of the crisis the Duma repudiated the government and broke off
+all relations with it. The resolution of the Duma declared that "The
+government which covered its hands with the blood of the people should no
+longer <a name="Page_133" id="Page_133"></a>be admitted to the Duma. With such a government the Duma breaks all
+relations forever." The answer of Czar Nicholas was an order to dissolve
+the Duma, which order the Duma voted to ignore, remaining in session as
+before.</p>
+
+<p>On Sunday, March 11th, there was a great outpouring of people at a
+demonstration. Police established on the roofs of some public buildings
+attacked the closely packed throngs with machine-gun fire, killing and
+wounding hundreds. One of the famous regiments, the Volynski, revolted,
+killed its commander, and joined the people when ordered to fire into the
+crowds. Detachments of soldiers belonging to other regiments followed their
+example and refused to fire upon the people. One or two detachments of
+troops did obey orders and were immediately attacked by the revolutionary
+troops. There was civil war in Petrograd.</p>
+
+<p>While the fighting was still going on, the president of the Duma sent the
+following telegram to the Czar:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>The situation is grave. Anarchy reigns in the capital. The
+government is paralyzed. The transport of provisions and fuel is
+completely disorganized. General dissatisfaction is growing.
+Irregular rifle-firing is occurring in the streets. It is
+necessary to charge immediately some person enjoying the
+confidence of the people to form a new government. It is
+impossible to linger. Any delay means death. Let us pray to God
+that the responsibility in this hour will not fall upon a crowned
+head.</p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">Rodzianko</span>.</p></div>
+
+<p>The Duma waited in vain that night for an answer from the Czar. The
+bourgeois elements in the Duma were terrified. Only the leaders of the
+different Socialist groups appeared to possess any idea of providing the
+revolutionary movement with proper direction. While the leaders of the
+bourgeois groups were proclaiming their conviction that the Revolution
+would be crushed in a few <a name="Page_134" id="Page_134"></a>hours by the tens of thousands of troops in
+Petrograd who had not yet rebelled, the Socialist leaders were busy
+preparing plans to carry on the struggle. Even those Social Democrats who
+for various reasons had most earnestly tried to avert the Revolution gave
+themselves with whole-hearted enthusiasm to the task of organizing the
+revolutionary forces. Following the example set in the 1905 Revolution,
+there had been formed a central committee of the working-class
+organizations to direct the movement. This body, composed of elected
+representatives of the unions and Socialist societies, was later known as
+the Council of Workmen's Deputies. It was this body which undertook the
+organization of the Revolution. This Revolution, unlike that of 1905, was
+initiated by the bourgeoisie, but its originators manifested little desire
+and less capacity to lead it.</p>
+
+<p>When Monday morning came there was no longer an unorganized, planless mass
+confusedly opposing a carefully organized force, but a compact,
+well-organized, and skilfully led movement. Processions were formed, each
+under responsible directors with very definite instructions. As on the
+previous day, the police stationed upon roofs of buildings, and at various
+strategic points, fired upon the people. As on the previous day, also, the
+soldiers joined the Revolution and refused to shoot the people. The famous
+Guards' Regiment, long the pet and pride of the Czar, was the first to
+rebel. The soldiers killed the officer who ordered them to fire, and then
+with cheers joined the rebels. When the military authorities sent out
+another regiment to suppress the rebel Guards' Regiment they saw the new
+force go over to the Revolution in a body. Other regiments deserted in the
+same manner. The flower of the Russian army had joined the people in
+revolting against the Czar and the system of Czarism.</p><p><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135"></a></p>
+
+<p>On the side of the revolutionists were now many thousands of well-trained
+soldiers, fully armed. Soon they took possession of the Arsenal, after
+killing the commander. The soldiers made organized and systematic warfare
+upon the police. Every policeman seen was shot down, police stations were
+set on fire, and prisons were broken open and the prisoners released. The
+numerous political prisoners were triumphantly liberated and took their
+places in the revolutionary ranks. In rapid succession the great bastiles
+fell! Peter and Paul Fortress, scene of infinite martyrdom, fell into the
+hands of the revolutionary forces, and the prisoners, many of them heroes
+and martyrs of other uprisings, were set free amid frenzied cheering. The
+great Schl&uuml;sselburg Fortress was likewise seized and emptied. With
+twenty-five thousand armed troops on their side, the revolutionists were
+practically masters of the capital. They attacked the headquarters of the
+hated Secret Service and made a vast, significantly symbolical bonfire of
+its archives.</p>
+
+<p>Once more Rodzianko appealed to the Czar. It is no reflection upon
+Rodzianko's honesty, or upon his loyalty to the people, to say that he was
+appalled by the development of the struggle. He sympathized with the people
+in their demand for political democracy and would wage war to the end upon
+Czarism, but he feared the effect of the Revolution upon the army and the
+Allied cause. Moreover, he was a landowner, and he feared Socialism. In
+1906 he had joined forces with the government when the Socialists led the
+masses&mdash;and now the Socialist leaders were again at the head of the masses.
+Perhaps the result would have been otherwise if the Duma had followed up
+its repudiation of the government by openly and unreservedly placing itself
+at the head of the uprising. In any other country than Russia that would
+have been <a name="Page_136" id="Page_136"></a>done, in all probability, but the Russian bourgeoisie was weak.
+This was due, like so much else in Russia, to the backwardness of the
+industrial system. There was not a strong middle class and, therefore, the
+bourgeoisie left the fighting to the working class. Rodzianko's new appeal
+to the Czar was pathetic. When hundreds of dead and dying lay in the
+streets and in churches, hospitals, and other public buildings, he could
+still imagine that the Czar could save the situation: "The situation is
+growing worse. It is necessary to take measures immediately, for to-morrow
+it will be too late," he telegraphed. "The last hour has struck to decide
+the fate of the country and of the dynasty." Poor, short-sighted bourgeois!
+It was already "too late" for "measures" by the weak-minded Nicholas II to
+avail. The "fate of the country and of the dynasty" was already determined!
+It was just as well that the Czar did not make any reply to the message.</p>
+
+<p>The new ruler of Russia, King Demos, was speaking now. Workers and soldiers
+sent deputations to the Taurida Palace, where the Duma was sitting.
+Rodzianko read to them the message he had sent to the Czar, but that was
+small comfort. Thousands of revolutionists, civilian and military, stormed
+the Taurida Palace and clamored to hear what the Socialists in the Duma had
+to say. In response to this demand Tchcheidze, Kerensky, Skobelev, and
+other Socialists from various groups appeared and addressed the people.
+These men had a message to give; they understood the ferment and were part
+of it. They were of the Revolution&mdash;bone of its bone, flesh of its flesh,
+and so they were cheered again and again. And what a triumvirate they made,
+these leaders of the people! Tchcheidze, once a university professor, keen,
+cool, and as witty as George Bernard Shaw, listened to with the deference
+democracy always pays to intellect.</p><p><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137"></a></p>
+
+<p>Kerensky, lawyer by profession, matchless as an orator, obviously the
+prophet and inspirer rather than the executive type; Skobelev, blunt,
+direct, and practical, a man little given to romantic illusions. It was
+Skobelev who made the announcement to the crowd outside the Taurida Palace
+that the old system was ended forever and that the Duma would create a
+Provisional Committee. He begged the workers and the soldiers to keep
+order, to refrain from violence against individuals, and to observe strict
+discipline. "Freedom demands discipline and order," he said.</p>
+
+<p>That afternoon the Duma selected a temporary committee to restore order.
+The committee, called the Duma Committee of Safety, consisted of twelve
+members, representing all the parties and groups in the Duma. The hastily
+formed committee of the workers met and decided to call on the workmen to
+hold immediate elections for the Council of Workmen's Deputies&mdash;the first
+meeting of which was to be held that evening. That this was a perilous
+thing to do the history of the First Revolution clearly showed, but no
+other course seemed open to the workers, in view of the attitude of the
+bourgeoisie. On behalf of the Duma Committee, Rodzianko issued the
+following proclamation:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>The Provisional Committee of the members of the Imperial Duma,
+aware of the grave conditions of internal disorder created by the
+measure of the old government, has found itself compelled to take
+into its hands the re-establishment of political and civil order.
+In full consciousness of the responsibility of its decision, the
+Provisional Committee expresses its trust that the population and
+the army will help it in the difficult task of creating a new
+government which will comply with the wishes of the population,
+and be able to enjoy its confidence.</p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">Michail Rodzianko</span>, <i>Speaker of the Imperial Duma</i>.
+February 27, 1917.<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a></p></div>
+<p><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138"></a></p>
+<p>That night the first formal session of the Council of Workmen's Deputies
+was held. Tchcheidze was elected president, Kerensky vice-president. The
+deputies had been elected by the working-men of many factories and by the
+members of Socialist organizations. It was not until the following day that
+soldiers' representatives were added and the words "and Soldiers" added to
+the title of the Council. At this first meeting the Council&mdash;a most
+moderate and capable body&mdash;called for a Constituent Assembly on the basis
+of equal, direct, and secret universal suffrage. This demand was contained
+in an address to the people which read, in part:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>To finish the struggle successfully in the interests of democracy,
+the people must create their own powerful organization.</p>
+
+<p>The Council of the Workmen's Deputies, holding its session in the
+Imperial Duma, makes it its supreme task to organize the people's
+forces and their struggle for a final securing of political
+freedom and popular government in Russia.</p>
+
+<p>We appeal to the entire population of the capital to rally around
+the Council, to form local committees in the various boroughs, and
+to take over the management of local affairs.</p>
+
+<p>All together, with united forces, we will struggle for a final
+abolition of the old system and the calling of a Constituent
+Assembly on the basis of universal, equal, direct, and secret
+suffrage.</p></div>
+
+<p>This document is of the highest historical importance and merits close
+study. As already noted, Tchcheidze, leader of the Mensheviki, was
+president of the Council, and this appeal to the people shows how fully the
+moderate views of his group prevailed. Indeed, the manner in which the
+moderate counsels of the Mensheviki dominated the Council at a time of
+great excitement and passion, when extremists might have been expected to
+obtain the lead, is one of the most remarkable features of the whole story
+of the Second Russian Revolution. It appeared at <a name="Page_139" id="Page_139"></a>this time that the
+Russian proletariat had fully learned the tragic lessons of 1905-06.</p>
+
+<p>It is evident from the text of the appeal that at the time the Council
+looked upon the Revolution as being primarily a political event, not as a
+movement to reconstruct the economic and social system. There is no
+reference to social democracy. Even the land question is not referred to.
+How limited their purpose was at the moment may be gathered from the
+statement, "The Council ... makes it its supreme task to organize the
+people's forces and their struggle for a final securing of political
+freedom and popular government." It is also clearly evident that,
+notwithstanding the fact that the Council itself was a working-class
+organization, a manifestation of the class consciousness of the workers,
+the leaders of the Council did not regard the Revolution as a proletarian
+event, nor doubt the necessity of co-operation on the part of all classes.
+Proletarian exclusiveness came later, but on March 13th the appeal of the
+Council was "to the entire population."</p>
+
+<p>March 14th saw the arrest of many of the leading reactionaries, including
+Protopopov and the traitor Sukhomlinov, and an approach to order. All that
+day the representatives of the Duma and the representatives of the Council
+of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, as it was now called, embryo of the
+first Soviet government, tried to reach an agreement concerning the future
+organization of Russia. The representatives of the Duma were pitifully
+lacking in comprehension of the situation. They wanted the Czar deposed,
+but the monarchy itself retained, subject to constitutional limitations
+analogous to those obtaining in England. They wanted the Romanov dynasty
+retained, their choice being the Czar's brother, Grand-Duke Michael. The
+representatives of the Soviet, <a name="Page_140" id="Page_140"></a>on the other hand, would not tolerate the
+suggestion that the monarchy be continued. Standing, as yet, only for
+political democracy, they insisted that the monarchy must be abolished and
+that the new government be republican in form. The statesmanship and
+political skill of these representatives of the workers were immeasurably
+superior to those possessed by the bourgeois representatives of the Duma.</p>
+
+
+<h4>V</h4>
+
+<p>Thursday, March 15, 1917&mdash;new style&mdash;was one of the most fateful and
+momentous days in the history of mankind. It will always be remembered as
+the day on which Czarism ceased to exist in Russia. At three o'clock in the
+afternoon Miliukov, leader of the Constitutional Democrats, appeared in
+front of the Taurida Palace and announced to the waiting throngs that an
+agreement had been reached between the Duma and the Council of Workmen's
+and Soldiers' Deputies; that it had been decided to depose the Czar, to
+constitute immediately a Provisional Government composed of representatives
+of all parties and groups, and to proceed with arrangements for the holding
+of a Constituent Assembly at an early date to determine the form of a
+permanent democratic government for Russia.</p>
+
+<p>At the head of the Provisional Government, as Premier, had been placed
+Prince George E. Lvov, who as president of the Union of Zemstvos had proved
+himself to be a democrat of the most liberal school as well as an
+extraordinarily capable organizer. The position of Minister of Foreign
+Affairs was given to Miliukov, whose strong sympathy with the Allies was
+well known. The position of Minister of Justice was given to Alexander
+Kerensky, one of the most extraordinary men in Russia, a leader of the<a name="Page_141" id="Page_141"></a>
+Group of Toil, a party of peasant Socialists, vice-president of the Council
+of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies. At the head of the War Department was
+placed Alexander Guchkov, a soldier-politician, leader of the Octobrist
+party, who had turned against the First Revolution in 1905, when it became
+an economic war of the classes, evoking thereby the hatred of the
+Socialists, but who as head of the War Industries Committee had achieved
+truly wonderful results in the present war in face of the opposition of the
+government. The pressing food problem was placed in the hands of Andrei
+Shingarev. As Minister of Agriculture Shingarev belonged to the radical
+left wing of the Cadets.</p>
+
+<p>It cannot be said that the composition of the Provisional Government was
+received with popular satisfaction. It was top-heavy with representatives
+of the bourgeoisie. There was only one Socialist, Kerensky. Miliukov's
+selection, inevitable though it was, and great as his gifts were, was
+condemned by the radical working-men because he was regarded as a dangerous
+"imperialist" on account of his advocacy of the annexation of
+Constantinople. Guchkov's inclusion was equally unpopular on account of his
+record at the time of the First Revolution. The most popular selection was
+undoubtedly Kerensky, because he represented more nearly than any of the
+others the aspirations of the masses. As a whole, it was the fact that the
+Provisional Government was too fully representative of the bourgeois
+parties and groups which gave the Bolsheviki and other radicals a chance to
+condemn it.</p>
+
+<p>The absence of the name of Tchcheidze from the list was a surprise and a
+disappointment to most of the moderate Socialists, for he had come to be
+regarded as one of the most capable and trustworthy leaders of the <a name="Page_142" id="Page_142"></a>masses.
+The fact that he was not included in the new government could hardly fail
+to cause uneasy suspicion. It was said later that efforts had been made to
+induce him to join the new government, but that he declined to do so.
+Tchcheidze's position was a very difficult one. Thoroughly in sympathy with
+the plan to form a coalition Provisional Government, and supporting
+Kerensky in his position, Tchcheidze nevertheless declined to enter the new
+Cabinet himself. In this he was quite honest and not at all the tricky
+politician he has been represented as being.</p>
+
+<p>Tchcheidze knew that the Duma had been elected upon a most undemocratic
+suffrage and that it did not and could not represent the masses of the
+peasants and wage-workers. These classes were represented in the Council of
+Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, which continued to exist as a separate
+body, independent of the Duma, but co-operating with it as an equal. From a
+Socialist point of view it would have been a mistake to disband the
+Council, Tchcheidze believed. He saw Soviet government as the need of the
+critical moment, rather than as the permanent, distinctive type of Russian
+Social democracy as the critics of Kerensky have alleged.</p>
+
+<p>While the Provisional Government was being created, the Czar, at General
+Headquarters, was being forced to recognize the bitter fact that the
+Romanov dynasty could no longer live. When he could no more resist the
+pressure brought to bear upon him by the representatives of the Duma, he
+wrote and signed a formal instrument of abdication of the Russian throne,
+naming his brother, Grand-Duke Michael, as his successor. The latter dared
+not attempt to assume the imperial r&ocirc;le. He recognized that the end of
+autocracy had been reached and declined to accept the throne unless chosen
+by a popular referendum <a name="Page_143" id="Page_143"></a>vote. On March 16th, the day after the abdication
+of Nicholas II, Michael issued a statement in which he said:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>This heavy responsibility has come to me at the voluntary request
+of my brother, who has transferred the Imperial throne to me
+during a time of warfare which is accompanied by unprecedented
+popular disturbances.</p>
+
+<p>Moved by the thought, which is in the minds of the entire people,
+that the good of the country is paramount, I have adopted the firm
+resolution to accept the supreme power only if this be the will of
+our great people, who, by a plebiscite organized by their
+representatives in a Constituent Assembly, shall establish a form
+of government and new fundamental laws for the Russian state.</p>
+
+<p>Consequently, invoking the benediction of our Lord, I urge all
+citizens of Russia to submit to the Provisional Government,
+established upon the initiative of the Duma and invested with full
+plenary powers, until such time which will follow with as little
+delay as possible, as the Constituent Assembly, on a basis of
+universal, direct, equal, and secret suffrage, shall, by its
+decision as to the new form of government, express the will of the
+people.</p></div>
+
+<p>The hated Romanov dynasty was ended at last. It is not likely that
+Grand-Duke Michael entertained the faintest hope that he would ever be
+called to the throne, either by a Constituent Assembly or by a popular
+referendum. Not only was the Romanov dynasty ended, but equally so was
+monarchical Absolutism itself. No other dynasty would replace that of the
+Romanovs. Russia had thrown off the yoke of autocracy. The Second
+Revolution was an accomplished fact; its first phase was complete.
+Thoughtful men among the revolutionists recognized that the next phase
+would be far more perilous and difficult. "The bigger task is still before
+us," said Miliukov, in his address to the crowd that afternoon. A
+Constituent Assembly was to be held and that was bound <a name="Page_144" id="Page_144"></a>to intensify the
+differences which had been temporarily composed during the struggle to
+overthrow the system of Absolutism. And the differences which existed
+between the capitalist class and the working class were not greater than
+those which existed within the latter.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145"></a></p>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_V" id="CHAPTER_V"></a>CHAPTER V</h2>
+
+<h3>FROM BOURGEOISIE TO BOLSHEVIKI</h3>
+
+
+<h4>I</h4>
+
+<p>It required no great gift of prophecy to foretell the failure of the
+Provisional Government established by the revolutionary coalition headed by
+Prince Lvov. From the very first day it was evident that the Cabinet could
+never satisfy the Russian people. It was an anomaly in that the Revolution
+had been a popular revolution, while the Provisional Government was
+overwhelmingly representative of the landowners, manufacturers, bankers,
+and merchants&mdash;the despised and distrusted bourgeoisie. The very meager
+representation given to the working class, through Kerensky, was, in the
+circumstances, remarkable for its stupid effrontery and its disregard of
+the most obvious realities. Much has been said and written of the
+doctrinaire attitude which has characterized the Bolsheviki in the later
+phases of the struggle, but if by doctrinairism is meant subservience to
+preconceived theories and disregard of realities, it must be said that the
+statesmen of the bourgeoisie were as completely its victims as the
+Bolsheviki later proved to be. They were subservient to dogma and
+indifferent to fact.</p>
+
+<p>The bourgeois leaders of Russia&mdash;and those Socialists who co-operated with
+them&mdash;attempted to ignore the biggest and most vital fact in the whole
+situation, namely, <a name="Page_146" id="Page_146"></a>the fact that the Revolution was essentially a
+Socialist Revolution in the sense that the overwhelming mass of the people
+were bent upon the realization of a very comprehensive, though somewhat
+crudely conceived, program of socialization. It was not a mere political
+Revolution, and political changes which left the essential social structure
+unchanged, which did not tend to bring about equality of democratic
+opportunity, and which left the control of the nation in the hands of
+landowners and capitalists, could never satisfy the masses nor fail to
+invite their savage attack. Only the most hopeless and futile of
+doctrinaires could have argued themselves into believing anything else. It
+was quite idle to argue from the experience of other countries that Russia
+must follow the universal rule and establish and maintain bourgeois rule
+for a period more or less prolonged. True, that had been the experience of
+most nations, but it was foolish in the extreme to suppose that it must be
+the experience of Russia, whose conditions were so utterly unlike those
+which had obtained in any nation which had by revolution established
+constitutional government upon a democratic basis.</p>
+
+<p>To begin with, in every other country revolution by the bourgeoisie itself
+had been the main factor in the overthrow of autocracy. Feudalism and
+monarchical autocracy fell in western Europe before the might of a powerful
+rising class. That this class in every case drew to its side the masses and
+benefited by their co-operation must not be allowed to obscure the fact
+that in these other countries of all the classes in society the bourgeoisie
+was the most powerful. It was that fact which established its right to rule
+in place of the deposed rulers. The Russian middle class, however, lacked
+that historic right to rule. In consequence of the backwardness of the
+nation from <a name="Page_147" id="Page_147"></a>the point of view of industrial development, the bourgeoisie
+was correspondingly backward and weak. Never in any country had a class so
+weak and uninfluential essayed the r&ocirc;le of the ruling class. To believe
+that a class which at the most did not exceed six per cent. of the
+population could assert and maintain its rule over a nation of one hundred
+and eighty millions of people, when these had been stirred by years of
+revolutionary agitation, was at once pedantic and absurd.</p>
+
+<p>The industrial proletariat was as backward and as relatively weak as the
+bourgeoisie. Except by armed force and tyranny of the worst kind, this
+class could not rule Russia. Its fitness and right to rule are not
+appreciably greater than the fitness and right of the bourgeoisie. It
+cannot even be said on its behalf that it had waged the revolutionary
+struggle of the working class, for in truth its share in the Russian
+revolutionary movement had been relatively small, far less than that of the
+peasant organizations. With more than one hundred and thirty-five millions
+of peasants, from whose discontent and struggle the revolutionary movement
+had drawn its main strength, neither the bourgeoisie nor the
+class-conscious section of the industrial proletariat could set up its rule
+without angry protest and attacks which, soon or late, must overturn it.
+Every essential fact in the Russian situation, which was so unique, pointed
+to the need for a genuine and sincere co-operation by the intelligent
+leaders of all the opposition elements until stability was attained,
+together with freedom from the abnormal difficulties due to the war. In any
+event, the domination of the Provisional Government by a class so weak and
+so narrow in its outlook and aims was a disaster. As soon as time for
+reflection had been afforded the masses discontent and distrust were
+inevitable.</p><p><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148"></a></p>
+
+
+<h4>II</h4>
+
+<p>From the first days there were ominous murmurings. Yet it must be confessed
+that the Provisional Government manifested much greater enlightenment than
+might have been expected of it and hastened to enact a program&mdash;quite
+remarkable for its liberality and vision; a program which, had it come from
+a government more truly representative in its personnel of revolutionary
+Russia, might, with one important addition, have served as the foundation
+of an enduring structure. On March 18th the Provisional Government issued a
+statement of its program and an appeal to the citizens for support. This
+document, which is said to have been the joint work of P.I. Novgorodtzev,
+N.V. Nekrasov, and P.N. Miliukov, read as follows:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p><span class="smcap">Citizens</span>: The Executive Committee of the Duma, with the
+aid and support of the garrison of the capital and its
+inhabitants, has succeeded in triumphing over the obnoxious forces
+of the old r&eacute;gime so that we can proceed to a more stable
+organization of the executive power, with men whose past political
+activity assures them the country's confidence.</p>
+
+<p>The new Cabinet will base its policy upon the following
+principles: <i>First</i>.&mdash;An immediate and general amnesty for all
+political and religious offenses, including terrorist acts and
+military and agrarian offenses.</p>
+
+<p><i>Second</i>.&mdash;Liberty of speech and of the press; freedom for
+alliances, unions, and strikes, with the extension of these
+liberties to military officials, within the limits admitted by
+military requirements.</p>
+
+<p><i>Third</i>.&mdash;Abolition of all social, religious, and national
+restrictions.</p>
+
+<p><i>Fourth</i>.&mdash;To proceed forthwith to the preparation and convocation
+of a Constituent Assembly, based on universal suffrage. This
+Assembly will establish a stable universal r&eacute;gime.</p>
+
+<p><i>Fifth</i>.&mdash;The substitution of the police by a national militia,
+with chiefs to be elected and responsible to the municipalities.</p><p><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149"></a></p>
+
+<p><i>Sixth</i>.&mdash;Communal elections to be based on universal, direct,
+equal, and secret suffrage.</p>
+
+<p><i>Seventh</i>.&mdash;The troops which participated in the revolutionary
+movement will not be disarmed, but will remain in Petrograd.</p>
+
+<p><i>Eighth</i>.&mdash;While maintaining strict military discipline for troops
+in active service, it is desirable to abrogate for soldiers all
+restrictions in the enjoyment of civil rights accorded other
+citizens.</p>
+
+<p>The Provisional Government desires to add that it has no intention
+of taking advantage of war conditions to delay the realization of
+the measures of reform above mentioned.</p></div>
+
+<p>This address is worthy of especial attention. The generous liberalism of
+the program it outlines cannot be denied, but it is political liberalism
+only. It is not directly and definitely concerned with the great
+fundamental economic issues which so profoundly affect the life and
+well-being of the working class, peasants, and factory-workers alike. It is
+the program of men who saw in the Revolution only a great epochal political
+advance. In this it reflects its bourgeois origin. With the exception of
+the right to organize unions and strikes&mdash;which is a political measure&mdash;not
+one of the important economic demands peculiar to the working class is met
+in the program. The land question, which was the economic basis of the
+Revolution, and without which there could have been no Revolution, was not
+even mentioned. And the Manifesto which the Provisional Government
+addressed to the nation on March 20th was equally silent with regard to the
+land question and the socialization of industry.</p>
+
+<p>Evidently the Provisional Government desired to confine itself as closely
+as possible to political democracy, and to leave fundamental economic
+reform to be attended to by the Constituent Assembly. If that were its
+purpose, it would have helped matters to have had the purpose clearly
+stated and not merely left to inference. But whatever the shortcomings of
+its first official statements, <a name="Page_150" id="Page_150"></a>the actual program of the Provisional
+Government during the first weeks was far more satisfactory and afforded
+room for great hope. On March 21st the constitution of Finland was
+restored. On the following day amnesty was granted to all political and
+religious offenders. Within a few days freedom and self-government were
+granted to Poland, subject to the ratification of the Constituent Assembly.
+At the same time all laws discriminating against the Jews were repealed by
+the following decree:</p>
+
+<p>All existing legal restrictions upon the rights of Russian citizens, based
+upon faith, religious teaching, or nationality, are revoked. In accordance
+with this, we hereby repeal all laws existing in Russia as a whole, as well
+as for separate localities, concerning:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>1. Selection of place of residence and change of residence.</p>
+
+<p>2. Acquiring rights of ownership and other material rights in all
+kinds of movable property and real estate, and likewise in the
+possession of, the use and managing of all property, or receiving
+such for security.</p>
+
+<p>3. Engaging in all kinds of trades, commerce, and industry, not
+excepting mining; also equal participation in the bidding for
+government contracts, deliveries, and in public auctions.</p>
+
+<p>4. Participation in joint-stock and other commercial or industrial
+companies and partnerships, and also employment in these companies
+and partnerships in all kinds of positions, either by elections or
+by employment.</p>
+
+<p>5. Employment of servants, salesmen, foremen, laborers, and trade
+apprentices.</p>
+
+<p>6. Entering the government service, civil as well as military, and
+the grade or condition of such service; participation in the
+elections for the institutions for local self-government, and all
+kinds of public institutions; serving in all kinds of positions of
+government and public establishments, as well as the prosecution
+of the duties connected with such positions.</p>
+
+<p>7. Admission to all kinds of educational institutions, whether
+private, government, or public, and the pursuing of the courses of
+instruction of these institutions, and receiving scholarships.
+Also the pursuance of teaching and other educational professions.</p><p><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151"></a></p>
+
+<p>8. Performing the duties of guardians, trustees, or jurors.</p>
+
+<p>9. The use of language and dialects, other than Russian, in the
+proceedings of private societies, or in teaching in all kinds of
+private educational institutions, and in commercial bookkeeping.</p></div>
+
+<p>Thus all the humiliating restrictions which had been imposed upon the
+Jewish people were swept away. Had the Provisional Government done nothing
+else than this, it would have justified itself at the bar of history. But
+it accomplished much more than this: before it had been in office a month,
+in addition to its liberation of Finns, Poles, and Jews, the Provisional
+Government abolished the death penalty; removed all the provincial
+governors and substituted for them the elected heads of the provincial
+county councils; <i>confiscated the large land holdings of the Imperial
+family and of the monasteries</i>; levied an excess war-profits tax on all war
+industries; and fixed the price of food at rates greatly lower than had
+prevailed before. The Provisional Government had gone farther, and, while
+declaring that these matters must be left to the Constituent Assembly for
+settlement, had declared itself in favor of woman suffrage and of <i>the
+distribution of all land among the peasants, the terms and conditions of
+expropriation and distribution to be determined by the Constituent
+Assembly</i>.</p>
+
+<p>The Provisional Government also established a War Cabinet which introduced
+various reforms into the army. All the old oppressive regulations were
+repealed and an attempt made to democratize the military system. Some of
+these reforms were of the utmost value; others were rather dangerous
+experiments. Much criticism has been leveled against the rules providing
+for the election of officers by the men in the ranks, for a conciliation
+board to act in disputes between men and officers over questions <a name="Page_152" id="Page_152"></a>of
+discipline, and the abolition of the regulations requiring private soldiers
+to address officers by the title "Sir." It must be borne in mind, however,
+in discussing these things, that these rules represented a great, honest
+effort to restore the morale of an army that had been demoralized, and to
+infuse it with democratic faith and zeal in order that it might "carry on."
+It is not just to judge the rules without considering the conditions which
+called them forth.</p>
+
+<p>Certainly the Provisional Government&mdash;which the government of the United
+States formally recognized on March 22d, being followed in this by the
+other Allied governments next day&mdash;could not be accused fairly of being
+either slothful or unfaithful. Its accomplishments during those first weeks
+were most remarkable. Nevertheless, as the days went by it became evident
+that it could not hope to satisfy the masses and that, therefore, it could
+not last very long.</p>
+
+
+<h4>III</h4>
+
+<p>The Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates was pursuing its
+independent existence, under the leadership of Tchcheidze, Skobelev,
+Tseretelli, and other moderate Social Democrats. As yet the Bolsheviki were
+a very small and uninfluential faction, lacking capable leadership. There
+can be very little doubt that the Council represented the feelings of the
+great mass of the organized wage-earners far more satisfactorily than the
+Provisional Government did, or that it was trusted to a far greater degree,
+alike by the wage-earners of the cities and the peasants. A great
+psychological fact existed, a fact which the Provisional Government and the
+governments of the Allied nations might well have reckoned with: the<a name="Page_153" id="Page_153"></a>
+Russian working-people, artisans and peasants alike, were aggressively
+class conscious and could trust fully only the leaders of their own class.</p>
+
+<p>The majority of the Social Democratic party was, at the beginning, so far
+from anything like Bolshevism, so thoroughly constructive and opportunistic
+in its policies, that its official organ, <i>Pravda</i>&mdash;not yet captured by the
+Bolsheviki&mdash;put forward a program which might easily have been made the
+basis for an effective coalition. It was in some respects disappointingly
+moderate: like the program of the Provisional Government, it left the land
+question untouched, except in so far as the clause demanding the
+confiscation of the property of the royal family and the Church bore upon
+it. The Social Democratic party, reflecting the interests of the city
+proletariat, had never been enthusiastic about the peasants' claim for
+distribution of the land, and there had been much controversy between its
+leaders and the leaders of the Socialist-Revolutionary party, the party of
+the peasants. The program as printed in Pravda read:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>1. A biennial one-house parliament.</p>
+
+<p>2. Wide extension of the principle of self-government.</p>
+
+<p>3. Inviolability of person and dwelling.</p>
+
+<p>4. Unlimited freedom of the press, of speech, and of assembly.</p>
+
+<p>5. Freedom of movement in business.</p>
+
+<p>6. Equal rights for all irrespective of sex, religion, and
+nationality.</p>
+
+<p>7. Abolition of class distinction.</p>
+
+<p>8. Education in native language; native languages everywhere to
+have equal rights with official language.</p>
+
+<p>9. Every nationality in the state to have the right of
+self-definition.</p>
+
+<p>10. The right of all persons to prosecute officials before a jury.</p>
+
+<p>11. Election of magistrates.</p>
+
+<p>12. A citizen army instead of ordinary troops.</p>
+
+<p>13. Separation of Church from state and school from Church.</p><p><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154"></a></p>
+
+<p>14. Free compulsory education for both sexes to the age of
+sixteen.</p>
+
+<p>15. State feeding of poor children.</p>
+
+<p>16. Confiscation of Church property, also that of the royal
+family.</p>
+
+<p>17. Progressive income tax.</p>
+
+<p>18. An eight-hour day, with six hours for all under eighteen.</p>
+
+<p>19. Prohibition of female labor where such is harmful to women.</p>
+
+<p>20. A clear holiday once a week to consist of forty-two hours on
+end.</p></div>
+
+<p>It would be a mistake to suppose that this very moderate program embraced
+all that the majority of the Social Democratic party aimed at. It was not
+intended to be more than an ameliorative program for immediate adoption by
+the Constituent Assembly, for the convocation of which the Social Democrats
+were most eager, and which they confidently believed would have a majority
+of Socialists of different factions.</p>
+
+<p>In a brilliant and caustic criticism of conditions as they existed in the
+pre-Bolshevist period, Trotzky denounced what he called "the farce of dual
+authority." In a characteristically clever and biting phrase, he described
+it as "The epoch of Dual Impotence, the government not able, and the Soviet
+not daring," and predicted its culmination in a "crisis of unheard-of
+severity."<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> There was more than a little truth in the scornful phrase. On
+the one hand, there was the Provisional Government, to which the Soviet had
+given its consent and its allegiance, trying to discharge the functions of
+government. On the other hand, there was the Soviet itself, claiming the
+right to control the course of the Provisional Government and indulging in
+systematic criticism of the latter's actions. It was inevitable that the
+Soviet should have been driven <a name="Page_155" id="Page_155"></a>irresistibly to the point where it must
+either renounce its own existence or oppose the Provisional Government.</p>
+
+<p>The dominating spirit and thought of the Soviet was that of international
+social democracy. While most of the delegates believed that it was
+necessary to prosecute the war and to defeat the aggressions of the Central
+Empires, they were still Socialists, internationalists, fundamental
+democrats, and anti-imperialists. Not without good and sufficient reason,
+they mistrusted the bourgeois statesmen and believed that some of the most
+influential among them were imperialists, actuated by a desire for
+territorial expansion, especially the annexation of Constantinople, and
+that they were committed to various secret treaties entered into by the old
+r&eacute;gime with England, France, and Italy. In the meetings of the Soviet, and
+in other assemblages of workers, the ugly suspicion grew that the war was
+not simply a war for national defense, for which there was democratic
+sanction and justification, but a war of imperialism, and that the
+Provisional Government was pursuing the old ways of secret diplomacy.</p>
+
+<p>Strength was given to this feeling when Miliukov, the Foreign Minister, in
+an interview championed the annexation of Constantinople as a necessary
+safeguard for the outlet to the Mediterranean which Russian economic
+development needed. Immediately there was an outcry of protest from the
+Soviet, in which, it should be observed, the Bolsheviki were already
+gaining strength and confidence, thanks to the leadership of Kamenev,
+Lenine's colleague, who had returned from Siberian exile. It was not only
+the Bolsheviki, however, who protested against imperialistic tendencies.
+Practically the whole body of Socialists, Mensheviki and Bolsheviki alike,
+agreed in opposing imperialism and secret diplomacy. Socialists <a name="Page_156" id="Page_156"></a>loyal to
+the national defense and Socialists who repudiated that policy and deemed
+it treason to the cause of Socialism were united in this one thing.</p>
+
+<p>The storm of protest which Miliukov's interview provoked was stilled
+temporarily when the Premier, Lvov, announced that the Foreign Minister's
+views concerning the annexation of Constantinople were purely personal and
+did not represent the policy of the Provisional Government. Assurances were
+given that the Provisional Government was in accord with the policy of the
+Soviet. On April 16th a national congress of the Councils of Workmen's and
+Soldiers' Delegates adopted a series of resolutions in which there was a
+distinct menace to the Provisional Government. An earlier proclamation by
+the Petrograd Soviet had taken the form of a letter addressed to
+"Proletarians and Working-people of all Countries," but being in fact an
+appeal to the German working class to rise and refuse to fight against
+democratic and free Russia.<a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> It declared that the peoples must take the
+matter of deciding questions of war and peace into their own hands. The new
+declaration was addressed to the Russian people:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p><i>First</i>.&mdash;The Provisional Government, which constituted itself
+during the Revolution, in agreement with the Council of Workmen's
+and Soldiers' Delegates of Petrograd, published a proclamation
+announcing its program. This Congress records that this program
+contains in principle political demands for Russian democracy, and
+<i>recognizes that so far the Provisional Government has faithfully
+carried out its promises</i>.</p>
+
+<p><i>Second</i>.&mdash;This Congress appeals to the whole revolutionary
+democracy of Russia to rally to the support of the Council of
+Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, which is the center of the
+<a name="Page_157" id="Page_157"></a>organized democratic forces that are capable, in unison with
+other progressive forces, of counteracting any counter
+revolutionary attempt and of consolidating the conquests of the
+revolution.</p>
+
+<p><i>Third</i>.&mdash;The Congress recognizes the necessity of permanent
+political control, the necessity of exercising an influence over
+the Provisional Government which will keep it up to a more
+energetic struggle against anti-revolutionary forces, and the
+necessity of exercising an influence which will insure its
+democratizing the whole Russian life and paving the way for a
+common <i>peace without annexations or contributions</i>, but on a
+basis of free national development of all peoples.</p>
+
+<p><i>Fourth</i>.&mdash;The Congress appeals to the democracy, while declining
+responsibility for any of its acts, to support the Provisional
+Government as long as it continues to consolidate and develop the
+conquest of the Revolution, <i>and as long as the basis of its
+foreign policy does not rest upon aspirations for territorial
+expansion</i>.</p>
+
+<p><i>Fifth</i>.&mdash;The Congress calls upon the revolutionary democracy of
+Russia, rallying around the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers'
+Delegates, to be ready to <i>vigorously suppress any attempt by the
+government to elude the control of democracy or to renounce the
+carrying out of its pledges</i>.<a name="FNanchor_7_7" id="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>On April 27th, acting under pressure from the Soviet, the Provisional
+Government published a Manifesto to the Russian people in which it
+announced a foreign policy which conformed to that which the Congress of
+Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates had adopted. On May 1st
+Miliukov, the Foreign Minister, transmitted this Manifesto to the Allied
+governments as a preliminary to an invitation to those governments to
+restate their war aims. Accompanying the Manifesto was a Note of
+explanation, which was interpreted by a great many of the Socialists as an
+intimation to the Allies that the Manifesto <a name="Page_158" id="Page_158"></a>was intended merely for home
+consumption, and that the Provisional Government would be glad to have the
+Allies disregard it. It is difficult for any one outside of Russia, whose
+sympathies were with the Entente Allies, to gather such an impression from
+the text of the Note, which simply set forth that enemy attempts to spread
+the belief that Russia was about to make a separate peace with Germany made
+it necessary for the Provisional Government to state its "entire agreement"
+with the aims of the Allies as set forth by their statesmen, including
+President Wilson, and to affirm that "the Provisional Government, in
+safeguarding the right acquired for our country, will maintain a strict
+regard for its agreement with the allies of Russia."</p>
+
+<p>Although it was explained that the Note had been sent with the knowledge
+and approval of the Provisional Government, the storm of fury it produced
+was directed against Miliukov and, in less degree, Guchkov. Tremendous
+demonstrations of protest against "imperialism" were held. In the Soviet a
+vigorous demand for the overthrow of the Provisional Government was made by
+the steadily growing Bolshevik faction and by many anti-Bolsheviki
+Socialists. To avert the disaster of a vote of the Soviet against it, the
+Provisional Government made the following explanation of the so-called
+Miliukov Note:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>The Note was subjected to long and detailed examination by the
+Provisional Government, and was unanimously approved. This Note,
+in speaking of a "decisive victory," had in view a solution of the
+problems mentioned in the communication of April 9th, and which
+was thus specified:</p>
+
+<p>"The government deems it to be its right and duty to declare now
+that free Russia does not aim at the domination of other nations,
+or at depriving them of their national patrimony, or at occupying
+by force foreign territories, but that its object <a name="Page_159" id="Page_159"></a>is to establish
+a durable peace on the basis of the rights of nations to decide
+their own destiny.</p>
+
+<p>"The Russian nation does not lust after the strengthening of its
+power abroad at the expense of other nations. Its aim is not to
+subjugate or humiliate any one. In the name of the higher
+principles of equity, the Russian people have broken the chains
+which fettered the Polish nation, but it will not suffer that its
+own country shall emerge from the great struggle humiliated or
+weakened in its vital forces.</p>
+
+<p>"In referring to the 'penalties and guarantees' essential to a
+durable peace, the Provisional Government had in view the
+reduction of armaments, the establishment of international
+tribunals, etc.</p>
+
+<p>"This explanation will be communicated by the Minister of Foreign
+Affairs to the Ambassadors of the Allied Powers."</p></div>
+
+<p>This assurance satisfied a majority of the delegates to the Soviet meeting
+held on the evening of May 4th, and a resolution of confidence in the
+Provisional Government was carried, after a very stormy debate. The
+majority, however, was a very small one, thirty-five in a total vote of
+about twenty-five hundred. It was clearly evident that the political
+government and the Soviet, which was increasingly inclined to assume the
+functions of government, were nearing a serious breach. With each day the
+Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, as the organized expression
+of the great mass of wage-workers in Petrograd, grew in power over the
+Provisional Government and its influence throughout the whole of Russia. On
+May 13th Guchkov resigned, and three days later Miliukov followed his
+example. The party of the Constitutional Democrats had come to be
+identified in the minds of the revolutionary proletariat with imperialism
+and secret diplomacy, and was utterly discredited. The crisis developed an
+intensification of the distrust of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat.</p><p><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160"></a></p>
+
+
+<h4>IV</h4>
+
+<p>The crisis was not due solely to the diplomacy of the Provisional
+Government. Indeed, that was a minor cause. Behind all the discussions and
+disputes over Miliukov's conduct of the affairs of the Foreign Office there
+was the far more serious issue created by the agitation of the Bolsheviki.
+Under the leadership of Kamenev, Lenine, and others less well known, who
+skillfully exploited the friction with the Provisional Government, the idea
+of overthrowing that bourgeois body and of asserting that the Councils of
+Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates would rule Russia in the interests of the
+working class made steady if not rapid progress.</p>
+
+<p>Late in April Lenine and several other active Bolshevik leaders returned to
+Petrograd from Switzerland, together with Martov and other Menshevik
+leaders, who, while differing from the Bolsheviki upon practically all
+other matters, agreed with them in their bitter and uncompromising
+opposition to the war and in demanding an immediate peace.<a name="FNanchor_8_8" id="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> As is well
+known, they were granted special facilities by the German Government in
+order that they might reach Russia safely. Certain Swiss Socialist leaders,
+regarded as strongly pro-German, arranged with the German Government that
+the Russian revolutionists should be permitted to travel across Germany by
+rail, in closed carriages. Unusual courtesies were extended to the
+travelers by the German authorities, and it was quite natural that Lenine
+and his associates should have been suspected of being sympathizers with,
+if not the paid agents and tools of, the German Government. The manner in
+which their actions, when they arrived in Russia, <a name="Page_161" id="Page_161"></a>served the ends sought
+by the German military authorities naturally strengthened the suspicion so
+that it became a strong conviction.</p>
+
+<p>Suspicious as the circumstances undoubtedly were, there is a very simple
+explanation of the conduct of Lenine and his companions. It is not at all
+necessary to conclude that they were German agents. Let us look at the
+facts with full candor: Lenine had long openly advocated the view that the
+defeat of Russia, even by Germany, would be good for the Russian
+revolutionary movement. But that was in the days before the overthrow of
+the Czar. Since that time his position had naturally shifted somewhat; he
+had opposed the continuation of the war and urged the Russian workers to
+withhold support from it. He had influenced the Soviets to demand a
+restatement of war aims by the Allies, and to incessantly agitate for
+immediate negotiations looking toward a general and democratic peace. Of
+course, the preaching of such a policy in Russia at that time by a leader
+so powerful and influential as Lenine, bound as it was to divide Russia and
+sow dissension among the Allies, fitted admirably into the German plans.
+That Germany would have been glad to pay for the performance of service so
+valuable can hardly be doubted.</p>
+
+<p>On his side, Lenine is far too astute a thinker to have failed to
+understand that the German Government had its own selfish interests in view
+when it arranged for his passage across Germany. But the fact that the
+Allies would suffer, and that the Central Empires would gain some
+advantage, was of no consequence to him. That was an unavoidable accident
+and was purely incidental. His own purpose, to lead the revolutionary
+movement into a new phase, in which he believed with fanatical
+thoroughness, was the only thing that mattered in the least. If <a name="Page_162" id="Page_162"></a>the
+conditions had been reversed, and he could only have reached Russia by the
+co-operation of the Allies, whose cause would be served, however
+unintentionally, by his work, he would have felt exactly the same. On the
+other hand, it was of the essence of his faith that his policy would lead
+to the overthrow of all capitalist-imperialist governments, those of
+Germany and her allies no less than those ranged on the other side. Germany
+might reason that a revolutionary uprising led by Lenine would rid her of
+one of her enemies and enable her to hurl larger forces against the foe on
+the western front. At that reasoning Lenine would smile in derision,
+thoroughly believing that any uprising he might bring about in Russia would
+sweep westward and destroy the whole fabric of Austro-German
+capitalist-imperialism. Lenine knew that he was being used by Germany, but
+he believed that he, in turn, was using Germany. He was supremely confident
+that he could outplay the German statesmen and military leaders.</p>
+
+<p>It was a dangerous game that Lenine was playing, and he knew it, but the
+stakes were high and worth the great risk involved. It was not necessary
+for Germany to buy the service he could render to her; that service would
+be an unavoidable accompaniment of his mission. He argued that his work
+could, at the worst, give only temporary advantage to Germany. So far as
+there is any evidence to show, Lenine has been personally incorruptible.
+Holding lightly what he scornfully derides as "bourgeois morality," unmoral
+rather than immoral, willing to use any and all means to achieve ends which
+he sincerely believes to be the very highest and noblest that ever inspired
+mankind, he would, doubtless, take German money if he saw that it would
+help him to achieve his purposes. He would do so, however, without any
+thought of self-aggrandizement. It is probably safe and <a name="Page_163" id="Page_163"></a>just to believe
+that if Lenine ever took money from the Germans, either at that time or
+subsequently, he did so in this spirit, believing that the net result of
+his efforts would be equally disastrous to all the capitalist governments
+concerned in the war. It must be remembered, moreover, that the
+distinctions drawn by most thoughtful men between autocratic governments
+like those which ruled Germany and Austria and the more democratic
+governments of France, England, and America, have very little meaning or
+value to men like Lenine. They regard the political form as relatively
+unimportant; what matters is the fundamental economic class interest
+represented by the governments. Capitalist governments are all equally
+undesirable.</p>
+
+<p>What Lenine's program was when he left Switzerland is easily learned. A few
+days before he left Switzerland he delivered a lecture on "The Russian
+Revolution," in which he made a careful statement of his position. It gives
+a very good idea of Lenine's mental processes. It shows him as a Marxist of
+the most dogmatic type&mdash;the type which caused Marx himself to rejoice that
+he was not a "Marxist":</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>As to the revolutionary organization and its task, the conquest of
+the power of the state and militarism: From the praxis of the
+French Commune of 1871, Marx shows that "the working class cannot
+simply take over the governmental machinery as built by the
+bourgeoisie, and use this machinery for its own purposes." The
+proletariat must break down this machinery. And this has been
+either concealed or denied by the opportunists.<a name="FNanchor_9_9" id="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164"></a> But it is the
+most valuable lesson of the Paris Commune of 1871 and the
+Revolution in Russia in 1905. The difference between us and the
+Anarchists is, that we admit the state is a necessity in the
+development of our Revolution. The difference with the
+opportunists and the Kautsky<a name="FNanchor_10_10" id="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> disciples is that we claim that
+we do not need the bourgeois state machinery as completed in the
+"democratic" bourgeois republics, but <i>the direct power of armed
+and organized workers</i>. Such was the character of the Commune of
+1871 and of the Council of Workmen and Soldiers of 1905 and 1917.
+On this basis we build.<a name="FNanchor_11_11" id="FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>Lenine went on to outline his program of action, which was to begin a new
+phase of the Revolution; to carry the revolt against Czarism onward against
+the bourgeoisie. Notwithstanding his scorn for democracy, he declared at
+that time that his policy included the establishment of a "democratic
+republic," confiscation of the landed estates of the nobility in favor of
+the peasants, and the opening up of immediate peace negotiations. But the
+latter he would take out of the hands of the government entirely. "Peace
+negotiations should not be carried on by and with bourgeois governments,
+but with the proletariat in each of the warring countries." In his
+criticism of Kerensky and Tchcheidze the Bolshevik leader was especially
+scornful and bitter.</p>
+
+<p>In a letter which he addressed to the Socialists of Switzerland immediately
+after his departure for Russia, Lenine gave a careful statement of his own
+position and that of his friends. It shows an opportunistic attitude of
+mind which differs from the opportunistic attitude of the moderate
+Socialists <i>in direction only</i>, not in the <i>quality of being
+opportunistic</i>:</p><p><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165"></a></p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>Historic conditions have made the Russians, <i>perhaps for a short
+period</i>, the leaders of the revolutionary world proletariat, <i>but
+Socialism cannot now prevail in Russia</i>. We can expect only an
+agrarian revolution, which will help to create more favorable
+conditions for further development of the proletarian forces and
+<i>may result in measures for the control of production and
+distribution</i>.</p>
+
+<p>The main results of the present Revolution will have to be <i>the
+creation of more favorable conditions for further revolutionary
+development</i>, and to influence the more highly developed European
+countries into action.<a name="FNanchor_12_12" id="FNanchor_12_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>The Bolsheviki at this period had as their program the following:</p>
+
+<p>(1) The Soviets of Workers, Soldiers, and Peasants to constitute themselves
+into the actual revolutionary government and establish the dictatorship of
+the proletariat; (2) immediate confiscation of landed estates without
+compensation, the seizure to be done by the peasants themselves, without
+waiting for legal forms or processes, the peasants to organize into
+Soviets; (3) measures for the control of production and distribution by the
+revolutionary government, nationalization of monopolies, repudiation of the
+national debt; (4) the workers to take possession of factories and operate
+them in co-operation with the technical staffs; (5) refusal by the Soviets
+to recognize any treaties made by the governments either of the Czar or the
+bourgeoisie, and the immediate publication of all such treaties; (6) the
+workers to propose at once and publicly an immediate truce and negotiations
+of peace, these to be carried on by the proletariat and not by and with the
+bourgeoisie; (7) bourgeois war debts to be paid exclusively by the
+capitalists.</p>
+
+<p>According to Litvinov, who is certainly not an unfriendly <a name="Page_166" id="Page_166"></a>authority, as
+soon as Lenine arrived in Russia he submitted a new program to his party
+which was so novel, and so far a departure from accepted Socialist
+principles, that "Lenine's own closest friends shrank from it and refused
+to accept it."<a name="FNanchor_13_13" id="FNanchor_13_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a></p>
+
+<p>This program involved the abandonment of the plans made for holding the
+Constituent Assembly, or, at any rate, such a radical change as to amount
+to the abandonment of the accepted plans. <i>He proposed that universal,
+equal, direct, and secret suffrage be frankly abandoned, and that only the
+industrial proletariat and the poorest section of the peasantry be
+permitted to vote at all!</i> Against the traditional Socialist view that
+class distinctions must be wiped out and the class war ended by the
+victorious proletariat, Lenine proposed to make the class division more
+rigid and enduring. He proposed to give the sole control of Russia into the
+hands of not more than two hundred thousand workers in a land of one
+hundred and eighty millions of people, more than one hundred and
+thirty-five millions of whom were peasants!</p>
+
+<p>Of course, there could be no reconciliation between such views as these and
+the universally accepted Socialist principle of democratic government.
+Lenine did not hesitate to declare that democracy itself was a "bourgeois
+conception" which the revolutionary proletariat must overthrow, a
+declaration hard to reconcile with his demand for a "democratic republic."
+Russia must not become a democratic republic, he argued, for a democratic
+republic is a bourgeois republic. Again and again, during the time we are
+discussing and later, Lenine assailed the principle of democratic
+government. "Since March, 1917, the word 'democracy' is simply a shackle
+fastened upon the <a name="Page_167" id="Page_167"></a>revolutionary nation," he declared in an article written
+after the Bolsheviki had overthrown Kerensky.<a name="FNanchor_14_14" id="FNanchor_14_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a></p>
+
+<p>When democracy is abolished, parliamentary government goes with it. From
+the first days after his return to Russia Lenine advocated, instead of a
+parliamentary republic similar to that of France or the United States, what
+he called a Soviet republic, which would be formed upon these lines: local
+government would be carried on by local Soviets composed of delegates
+elected by "the working class and the poorest peasantry," to use a common
+Bolshevik phrase which bothers a great many people whose minds insist upon
+classifying peasants as "working-people" and part of the working class.
+What Lenine means when he uses the phrase, and what Litvinov means<a name="FNanchor_15_15" id="FNanchor_15_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> is
+that the industrial wage-workers&mdash;to whom is applied the term "working
+class"&mdash;must be sharply distinguished from peasants and small farmers,
+though the very poorest peasants, not being conservative, as more
+prosperous peasants are, can be united with the wage-workers.</p>
+
+<p>These local Soviets functioning in local government would, in Lenine's
+Soviet republic, elect delegates to a central committee of all the Soviets
+in the country, and that central committee would be the state. Except in
+details of organization, this is not materially different from the
+fundamental idea of the I.W.W. with which we are familiar.<a name="FNanchor_16_16" id="FNanchor_16_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> According to
+the latter, the labor-unions, organized on industrial lines and federated
+through a central council, will take the place of parliamentary government
+elected on territorial lines. According to the<a name="Page_168" id="Page_168"></a> Bolshevik plan, Soviets
+would take the place held by the unions in the plan of the I.W.W. It is not
+to be wondered at that, in the words of Litvinov, Lenine's own closest
+friends shrank from his scheme and Lenine "was compelled to drop it for a
+time."</p>
+
+
+<h4>V</h4>
+
+<p>Bolshevism was greatly strengthened in its leadership by the return of Leon
+Trotzky, who arrived in Petrograd on May 17th. Trotzky was born in Moscow
+about forty-five years ago. Like Lenine, he is of bourgeois origin, his
+father being a wealthy Moscow merchant. He is a Jew and his real name is
+Bronstein. To live under an assumed name has always been a common practice
+among Russian revolutionists, for very good and cogent reasons. Certainly
+all who knew anything at all of the personnel of the Russian revolutionary
+movement during the past twenty years knew that Trotzky was Bronstein, and
+that he was a Jew. The idea, assiduously disseminated by a section of the
+American press, that there must be something discreditable or mysterious
+connected with his adoption of an alias is extremely absurd, and can only
+be explained by monumental ignorance of Russian revolutionary history.</p>
+
+<p>Trotzky has been a fighter in the ranks of the revolutionary army of Russia
+for twenty years. As early as 1900 his activities as a Socialist
+propagandist among students had landed him in prison in solitary
+confinement. In 1902 he was exiled to eastern Siberia, whence he managed to
+escape. During the next three years he lived abroad, except for brief
+intervals spent in Russia, devoting himself to Socialist journalism. His
+first pamphlet, published in Geneva in 1903, was an attempt to reconcile
+<a name="Page_169" id="Page_169"></a>the two factions in the Social Democratic party, the Bolsheviki and the
+Mensheviki. He was an orthodox Marxist of the most extreme doctrinaire
+type, and naturally inclined to the Bolshevik view. Yet he never joined the
+Bolsheviki, preferring to remain aloof from both factions and steadfastly
+and earnestly striving to unite them.</p>
+
+<p>When the Revolution of 1905 broke out Trotzky had already attained
+considerable influence among the Socialists. He was regarded as one of the
+ablest of the younger Marxians, and men spoke of him as destined to occupy
+the place of Plechanov. He became one of the most influential leaders of
+the St. Petersburg Soviet, and was elected its president. In that capacity
+he labored with titanic energy and manifested great versatility, as
+organizer, writer, speaker, and arbiter of disputes among warring
+individuals and groups. When the end came he was arrested and thrown into
+prison, where he remained for twelve months. After that he was tried and
+sentenced to life-exile in northern Siberia. From this he managed to
+escape, however, and from 1907 until the outbreak of the war in 1914 he
+lived in Vienna.</p>
+
+<p>The first two years of the war he lived in France, doing editorial work for
+a radical Russian Socialist daily paper, the <i>Nashe Slovo</i>. His writing,
+together with his activity in the Zimmerwald movement of anti-war
+Socialists, caused his expulsion from France. The Swiss government having
+refused to permit him to enter Switzerland, he sought refuge in Spain,
+where he was once more arrested and imprisoned for a short time. Released
+through the intervention of Spanish Socialists, he set sail with his family
+for New York, where he arrived early in January, 1917. Soon after the news
+of the Russian Revolution thrilled the world Trotzky, like many other
+Russian exiles, made hasty preparations to return, sailing on<a name="Page_170" id="Page_170"></a> March 27th
+on a Norwegian steamer. At Halifax he and his family, together with a
+number of other Russian revolutionists, were taken from the ship and
+interned in a camp for war prisoners, Trotzky resisting violently and
+having to be carried off the ship. The British authorities kept them
+interned for a month, but finally released them at the urgent demand of the
+Foreign Minister of the Russian Provisional Government, Miliukov.</p>
+
+<p>Such, in brief outline, is the history of the man Trotzky. It is a typical
+Russian history: the story of a persistent, courageous, and exceedingly
+able fighter for an ideal believed in with fanatical devotion. Lenine, in
+one of his many disputes with Trotzky, called him "a man who blinds himself
+with revolutionary phrases,"<a name="FNanchor_17_17" id="FNanchor_17_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> and the description is very apt. He
+possesses all the usual characteristics of the revolutionary Jewish
+Socialists of Russia. To a high-strung, passionate, nervous temperament and
+an exceedingly active imagination he unites a keen intellect which finds
+its highest satisfaction in theoretical abstractions and subtleties, and
+which accepts, phrases as though they were realities.</p>
+
+<p>Understanding of Trotzky's attitude during the recent revolutionary and
+counter-revolutionary struggles is made easier by understanding the
+development of his thought in the First Revolution, 1905-06. He began as an
+extremely orthodox Marxist, and believed that any attempt to establish a
+Socialist order in Russia until a more or less protracted intensive
+economic development, exhausting the possibilities of capitalism, made
+change inevitable, must fail. He accepted the view that a powerful
+capitalist class must be developed and perform its indispensable historical
+r&ocirc;le, to be challenged and overthrown in its turn <a name="Page_171" id="Page_171"></a>by the proletariat. That
+was the essence of his pure and unadulterated faith. To it he clung with
+all the tenacity of his nature, deriding as "Utopians" and "dreamers" the
+peasant Socialists who refused to accept the Marxian theory of Socialism as
+the product of historic necessity as applicable to Russia.</p>
+
+<p>The great upheaval of 1905 changed his viewpoint. The manner in which
+revolutionary ideas spread among the masses created in Trotzky, as in many
+others, almost unbounded confidence and enthusiasm. In an essay written
+soon after the outbreak of the Revolution he wrote: "The Revolution has
+come. <i>One move of hers has lifted the people over scores of steps, up
+which in times of peace we would have had to drag ourselves with hardships
+and fatigue</i>." The idea that the Revolution had "lifted the people over
+scores of steps" possessed him and changed his whole conception of the
+manner in which Socialism was to come. Still calling himself a Marxist, and
+believing as strongly as ever in the fundamental Marxian doctrines, as he
+understood them, he naturally devoted his keen mind with its peculiar
+aptitude for Talmudic hair-splitting to a new interpretation of Marxism. He
+declared his belief that in Russia it was possible to change from
+Absolutism to Socialism immediately, without the necessity of a prolonged
+period of capitalist development. At the same time, he maintained a
+scornful attitude toward the "Utopianism" of the peasant Socialists, who
+had always made the same contention, because he believed they based their
+hopes and their policy upon a wrong conception of Socialism. He had small
+patience for their agrarian Socialism with its economic basis in
+peasant-proprietorship and voluntary co-operation.</p>
+
+<p>He argued that the Russian bourgeoisie was so thoroughly infected with the
+ills of the bureaucratic system that <a name="Page_172" id="Page_172"></a>it was itself decadent; not virile
+and progressive as a class aiming to possess the future must be. Since it
+was thus corrupted and weakened, and therefore incapable of fulfilling any
+revolutionary historical r&ocirc;le, that became the <i>immediate</i> task of the
+proletariat. Here was an example of the manner in which lifting over
+revolutionary steps was accomplished. Of course, the peasantry was in a
+backward and even primitive state which unfitted it for the proletarian
+r&ocirc;le. Nevertheless, it had a class consciousness of its own, and an
+irresistible hunger for land. Without this class supporting it, or, at
+least, acquiescing in its rule, the proletariat could never hope to seize
+and hold the power of government. It would be possible to solve the
+difficulty here presented, Trotzky contended, if the enactment of the
+peasant program were permitted during the Revolution and accepted by the
+proletariat as a <i>fait accompli</i>. This would satisfy the peasants and make
+them content to acquiesce in a proletarian dictatorship. Once firmly
+established in power, it would be possible for the proletariat to gradually
+apply the true Socialist solution to the agrarian problem and to convert
+the peasants. "Once in power, the proletariat will appear before the
+peasantry as its liberator," he wrote.</p>
+
+<p>His imagination fired by the manner in which the Soviet of which he was
+president held the loyalty of the masses during the revolutionary uprising,
+and the representative character it developed, Trotzky conceived the idea
+that it lent itself admirably to the scheme of proletarian dictatorship.
+Parliamentary government cannot be used to impose and maintain a
+dictatorship, whether of autocracy or oligarchy, bourgeoisie or
+proletariat. In the Soviet, as a result of six weeks' experience in
+abnormal times, during which it was never for a moment subjected <a name="Page_173" id="Page_173"></a>to the
+test of maintaining the economic life of the nation, Trotzky saw the ideal
+proletarian government. He once described the Soviet as "a true,
+unadulterated democracy," but, unless we are to dismiss the description as
+idle and vain rhetoric, we must assume that the word "democracy" was used
+in an entirely new sense, utterly incompatible with its etymological and
+historical meaning. Democracy has always meant absence of class rule;
+proletarian dictatorship is class rule.</p>
+
+<p>In the foregoing analysis of the theoretical and tactical views which
+Trotzky held during and immediately after the First Revolution, it is easy
+to see the genesis of the policies of the Bolshevik government which came
+twelve years later. The intervening years served only to deepen his
+convictions. At the center of all his thinking during that period was his
+belief in the sufficiency of the Soviet, and in the need of proletarian
+dictatorship. Throwing aside the first cautious thought that these things
+arose from the peculiar conditions existing in Russia as a result of her
+retarded economic development, he had come to regard them as applicable to
+all nations and to all peoples, except, perhaps, the peoples still living
+in barbarism or savagery.</p>
+
+
+<h4>VI</h4>
+
+<p>After the crisis which resulted in the resignation of Miliukov and Guchkov,
+it was evident that the Lvov government could not long endure. The
+situation in the army, as well as in the country, was so bad that the
+complete reorganization of the Provisional Government, upon much more
+radical lines, was imperative. The question arose among the revolutionary
+working-class organizations whether they should consent to co-operation
+with the liberal bourgeoisie in a new coalition Cabinet or <a name="Page_174" id="Page_174"></a>whether they
+should refuse such co-operation and fight exclusively on class lines. This,
+of course, opened the entire controversy between Bolsheviki and Mensheviki.</p>
+
+<p>In the mean time the war-weary nation was clamoring for peace. The army was
+demoralized and saturated with the defeatism preached by the Porazhentsi.
+To deal with this grave situation two important conventions were arranged
+for, as follows: the Convention of Soldiers' Delegates from the Front,
+which opened on May 10th and lasted for about a week, and the First
+All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Delegates, which opened on May 17th and
+lasted for about twelve days. Between the two gatherings there was also an
+important meeting of the Petrograd Council of Workmen's and Soldiers'
+Deputies, which dealt with the same grave situation. The dates here are of
+the greatest significance: the first convention was opened three days
+before Miliukov's resignation and was in session when that event occurred;
+the second convention was opened four days after the resignation of
+Miliukov and one day after that of Guchkov. It was Guchkov's unique
+experience to address the convention of Soldiers' Delegates from the Front
+as Minister of War and Marine, explaining and defending his policy with
+great ability, and then, some days later, to address the same assembly as a
+private citizen.</p>
+
+<p>Guchkov drew a terrible picture of the seriousness of the military
+situation. With truly amazing candor he described conditions and explained
+how they had been brought about. He begged the soldiers not to lay down
+their arms, but to fight with new courage. Kerensky followed with a long
+speech, noble and full of pathos. In some respects, it was the most
+powerful of all the appeals it fell to his lot to make to his people, who
+were staggering in the too strong sunlight of an unfamiliar <a name="Page_175" id="Page_175"></a>freedom. He
+did not lack courage to speak plainly: "My heart and soul are uneasy. I am
+greatly worried and I must say so openly, no matter what ... the
+consequences will be. The process of resurrecting the country's creative
+forces for the purpose of establishing the new r&eacute;gime rests on the basis of
+liberty and personal responsibility.... A century of slavery has not only
+demoralized the government and transformed the old officials into a band of
+traitors, <i>but it has also destroyed in the people themselves the
+consciousness of their responsibility for their fate, their country's
+destiny</i>." It was in this address that he cried out in his anguish: "I
+regret that I did not die two months ago. I would have died happy with the
+dream that the flame of a new life has been kindled in Russia, hopeful of a
+time when we could respect one another's right without resorting to the
+knout."</p>
+
+<p>To the soldiers Kerensky brought this challenge: "You fired on the people
+when the government demanded. But now, when it comes to obeying your own
+revolutionary government, you can no longer endure further sacrifice! Does
+this mean that free Russia is a nation of rebellious slaves?" He closed
+with an eloquent peroration: "I came here because I believe in my right to
+tell the truth as I understand it. People who even under the old r&eacute;gime
+went about their work openly and without fear of death, those people, I
+say, will not be terrorized. The fate of our country is in our hands and
+the country is in great danger. We have sipped of the cup of liberty and we
+are somewhat intoxicated; we are in need of the greatest possible sobriety
+and discipline. We must go down in history meriting the epitaph on our
+tombstones, 'They died, but they were never slaves.'"</p>
+
+<p>From the Petrograd Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies came I.G.
+Tseretelli, who had just returned from <a name="Page_176" id="Page_176"></a>ten years' Siberian exile. A native
+of Georgia, a prince, nearly half of his forty-two years had been spent
+either in Socialist service or in exile brought about by such service. A
+man of education, wise in leadership and a brilliant orator, his leadership
+of the Socialist Group in the Second Duma had marked him as one of the
+truly great men of Russia. To the Convention of Soldiers' Delegates from
+the Front Tseretelli brought the decisions of the Council of Workmen's and
+Soldiers' Deputies, in shaping which he had taken an important part with
+Tchcheidze, Skobelev, and others. The Council had decided "to send an
+appeal to the soldiers at the front, and to explain to them that <i>in order
+to bring about universal peace it is necessary to defend the Revolution and
+Russia by defending the front</i>." This action had been taken despite the
+opposition of the Bolsheviki, and showed that the moderate Socialists were
+still in control of the Soviet. An Appeal to the Army, drawn up by
+Tseretelli, was adopted by the vote of every member except the Bolsheviki,
+who refrained from voting. This Appeal to the Army Tseretelli presented to
+the Soldiers' Delegates from the Front:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>Comrades, soldiers at the front, in the name of the Revolutionary
+Democracy, we make a fervent appeal to you.</p>
+
+<p>A hard task has fallen to your lot. You have paid a dear price,
+you have paid with your blood, a dear price indeed, for the crimes
+of the Czar who sent you to fight and left you without arms,
+without ammunition, without bread!</p>
+
+<p>Why, the privation you now suffer is the work of the Czar and his
+coterie of self-seeking associates who brought the country to
+ruin. And the Revolution will need the efforts of many to overcome
+the disorganization left her as a heritage by these robbers and
+executioners.</p>
+
+<p>The working class did not need the war. The workers did not begin
+it. It was started by the Czars and capitalists of all countries.
+Each day of war is for the people only a day of unnecessary
+suffering and misfortune. Having dethroned the<a name="Page_177" id="Page_177"></a> Czar, the Russian
+people have selected for their first problem the ending of the war
+in the quickest possible manner.</p>
+
+<p>The Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies has appealed to
+all nations to end the butchery. We have appealed to the French
+and the English, to the Germans and the Austrians.<a name="FNanchor_18_18" id="FNanchor_18_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_18" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> Russia
+wants an answer to this appeal. Remember, however, comrades and
+soldiers, that our appeal will be of no value if the regiments of
+Wilhelm overpower Revolutionary Russia before our brothers, the
+workers and peasants of other countries, will be able to respond.
+Our appeal will become "a scrap of paper" if the whole strength of
+the revolutionary people does not stand behind it, if the triumph
+of Wilhelm Hohenzollern will be established on the ruins of
+Russian freedom. The ruin of free Russia will be a tremendous,
+irreparable misfortune, not only for us, but for the toilers of
+the whole world.</p>
+
+
+<p>Comrades, soldiers, defend Revolutionary Russia with all your
+might!</p>
+
+<p>The workers and peasants of Russia desire peace with all their
+soul. But this peace must be universal, a peace for all nations
+based on the agreement of all.</p>
+
+<p>What would happen if we should agree to a separate peace&mdash;a peace
+for ourselves alone! What would happen if the Russian soldiers
+were to stick their bayonets into the ground to-day and say that
+they do not care to fight any longer, that it makes no difference
+to them what happens to the whole world!</p>
+
+<p>Here is what would happen. Having destroyed our allies in the
+west, German Imperialism would rush in upon us with all the force
+of its arms. Germany's imperialists, her landowners and
+capitalists, would put an iron heel on our necks, would occupy our
+cities, our villages, and our land, and would force us to pay
+tribute to her. Was it to bow down at the feet of Wilhelm that we
+overthrew Nicholas?</p>
+
+<p>Comrades&mdash;soldiers! The Council of Workmen's and Soldiers'
+Deputies leads you to peace by another route. We lead you to peace
+by calling upon the workers and peasants of Serbia and Austria to
+rise and revolt; we lead you to peace by calling an international
+conference of Socialists for a universal and determined revolt
+against war. There is a great necessity, comrades&mdash;soldiers, for
+the peoples of the world to awaken. Time <a name="Page_178" id="Page_178"></a>is needed in order that
+they should rebel and with an iron hand force their Czars and
+capitalists to peace. Time is needed so that the toilers of all
+lands should join with us for a merciless war upon violators and
+robbers.</p>
+
+<p><i>But remember, comrades&mdash;soldiers, this time will never come if
+you do not stop the advance of the enemy at the front, if your
+ranks are crushed and under the feet of Wilhelm falls the
+breathless corpse of the Russian Revolution</i>.</p>
+
+<p>Remember, comrades, that at the front, in the trenches, you are
+now standing in defense of Russia's freedom. You defend the
+Revolution, you defend your brothers, the workers and peasants.
+Let this defense be worthy of the great cause and the great
+sacrifices already made by you. <i>It is impossible to defend the
+front if, as has been decided, the soldiers are not to leave the
+trenches under any circumstances</i>.<a name="FNanchor_19_19" id="FNanchor_19_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> At times only an attack can
+repulse and prevent the advance of the enemy. At times awaiting an
+attack means patiently waiting for death. Again, only the change
+to an advance may save you or your brothers, on other sections of
+the front, from destruction.</p>
+
+
+<p>Remember this, comrades&mdash;soldiers! Having sworn to defend Russian
+freedom, do not refuse to start the offensive the military
+situation may require. The freedom and happiness of Russia are in
+your hands.</p>
+
+<p>In defending this freedom be on the lookout for betrayal and
+trickery. The fraternization which is developing on the front can
+easily turn into such a trap.</p>
+
+<p>Revolutionary armies may fraternize, but with whom? With an army
+also revolutionary, which has decided to die for peace and
+freedom. At present, however, not only in the German army, but
+even in the Austro-Hungarian army, in spite of the number of
+individuals politically conscious and honest, there is no
+revolution. In those countries the armies are still blindly
+following Wilhelm and Charles, the landowners and capitalists, and
+agree to annexation of foreign soil, to robberies and violence.
+There the General Staff will make use not only of your credulity,
+but also of the blind obedience of their soldiers. You go out to
+fraternize with open hearts. And to meet you <a name="Page_179" id="Page_179"></a>an officer of the
+General Staff leaves the enemies' trenches, disguised as a common
+soldier. You speak with the enemy without any trickery. At that
+very time he photographs the surrounding territory. You stop the
+shooting to fraternize, but behind the enemies' trenches artillery
+is being moved, new positions built and troops transferred.</p>
+
+<p>Comrades&mdash;soldiers, not by fraternization will you get peace, not
+by separate agreements made at the front by single companies,
+battalions, or regiments. Not in separate peace or in a separate
+truce lies the salvation of the Russian Revolution, the triumph of
+peace for the whole world.</p>
+
+<p>The people who assure you that fraternizing is the road to peace
+lead you to destruction. Do not believe them. The road to peace is
+a different one. It has been pointed out to you already by the
+Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies: tread it. Sweep aside
+everything that weakens your fighting power, that brings into the
+army disorganization and loss of spirit.</p>
+
+<p>Your fighting power serves the cause of peace. The Council of
+Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies is able to continue its
+revolutionary work with all its might, to develop its struggle for
+peace, only by depending on you, knowing that you will not allow
+the military destruction of Russia.</p>
+
+<p>Comrades&mdash;soldiers, the workers and peasants, not only of Russia,
+but of the whole world, look to you with confidence and hope.</p>
+
+<p>Soldiers of the Revolution, you will prove worthy of this faith,
+for you know that your military tasks serve the cause of peace.</p>
+
+<p>In the name of the happiness and freedom of Revolutionary Russia,
+in the name of the coming brotherhood of nations, you will fulfil
+your military duties with unconquerable strength.</p></div>
+
+<p>Again and again Tseretelli was interrupted with cheers as he read this
+Appeal to the Army. He was cheered, too, when he explained that the Soviet
+had decided to support the reconstructed Provisional Government and called
+upon the soldiers to do likewise. There was a storm of applause when he
+said: "We well realize the necessity of having a strong power in Russia;
+however, the strength <a name="Page_180" id="Page_180"></a>of this power must rely upon its progressive and
+revolutionary policy. Our government must adopt the revolutionary slogans
+of democracy. It must grant the demands of the revolutionary people. It
+must turn over all land to the laboring peasantry. It must safeguard the
+interests of the working class, enacting improved social legislation for
+the protection of labor. It must lead Russia to a speedy and lasting peace
+worthy of a great people."</p>
+
+<p>When Plechanov was introduced to the convention as "the veteran of the
+Russian Revolution" he received an ovation such as few men have ever been
+accorded. The great Socialist theorist plunged into a keen and forceful
+attack upon the theories of the Bolsheviki. He was frequently interrupted
+by angry cries and by impatient questionings, which he answered with
+rapier-like sentences. He was asked what a "democratic" government should
+be, and replied:</p>
+
+<p>"I am asked, 'What should a democratic government be? My answer is: It
+should be a government enjoying the people's full confidence and
+sufficiently strong to prevent any possibility of anarchy. Under what
+condition, then, can such a strong, democratic government be established?
+In my opinion it is necessary, for this purpose, <i>that the government be
+composed of representatives of all those parts of the population that are
+not interested in the restoration of the old order. What is called a
+coalition Ministry is necessary</i>. Our comrades, the Socialists,
+acknowledging the necessity of entering the government, can and should set
+forth definite conditions, definite demands. <i>But there should be no
+demands that would be unacceptable to the representatives of other classes,
+to the spokesmen of other parts of the population</i>."</p>
+
+<p>"Would you have us Russian proletarians fight in this <a name="Page_181" id="Page_181"></a>war for England's
+colonial interests?" was one of the questions hurled at Plechanov, and
+greeted by the jubilant applause of the Bolsheviki. Plechanov replied with
+great spirit, his reply evoking a storm of cheers: "The answer is clear to
+every one who accepts the principle of self-determination of nations," he
+said. "The colonies are not deserts, but populated localities, and their
+populations should also be given the right to determine freely their own
+destinies. It is clear that Russia cannot fight for the sake of any one's
+predatory aspirations. <i>But I am surprised that the question of annexations
+is raised in Russia, whose sixteen provinces are under the Prussian heel!</i>
+I do not understand this exclusive solicitude for Germany's interests."</p>
+
+<p>To those who advocated fraternization, who were engaged in spreading the
+idea that the German working class would refuse to fight against the
+Russian revolutionists, the great Socialist teacher, possessing one of the
+ripest minds in the whole international Socialist movement, and an intimate
+knowledge of the history of that movement, made vigorous reply and recited
+a significant page of Socialist history:</p>
+
+<p>"In the fall of 1906, when Wilhelm was planning to move his troops on the
+then revolutionary Russia, I asked my comrades, the German Social
+Democrats, 'What will you do in case Wilhelm declares war on Russia?' At
+the party convention in Mannheim, Bebel gave me an answer to this question.
+Bebel introduced a resolution in favor of the declaration of a general
+strike in the event of war being declared on Russia. But this resolution
+was not adopted; <i>members of the trade-unions voted against it</i>. This is a
+fact which you should not forget. Bebel had to beat a retreat and introduce
+another resolution. Kautsky and Rosa Luxemburg were dissatisfied <a name="Page_182" id="Page_182"></a>with
+Bebel's conduct. I asked Kautsky whether there is a way to bring about a
+general strike against the workers' will. As there is no such way, there
+was nothing else that Bebel could do. <i>And if Wilhelm had sent his hordes
+to Russia in 1906, the German workers would not have done an earthly thing
+to prevent the butchery</i>. In September, 1914, the situation was still
+worse."</p>
+
+<p>The opposition to Plechanov on the part of some of the delegates was an
+evidence of the extent to which disaffection, defeatism, and the readiness
+to make peace at any price almost&mdash;a general peace preferably, but, if not,
+then a separate peace&mdash;had permeated even the most intelligent part of the
+Russian army. Bolshevism and its ally, defeatism, were far more influential
+in the ranks of the soldiers than in those of the workers in the factories.
+Yet the majority was with Kerensky, Tseretelli, and Plechanov, as the
+following resolutions adopted by the convention prove:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>The first convention of the Delegates from the Front, having heard
+reports on current problems from the representatives of the
+Provisional Government, members of the Executive Committee of the
+Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, and from
+representatives of the Socialist parties, and having considered
+the situation, hereby resolves:</p>
+
+<p>(1) That the disorganization of the food-supply system and the
+weakening of the army's fighting capacity, due to a distrust of a
+majority of the military authorities, to lack of inner
+organization, and to other temporary causes, have reached such a
+degree that the freedom won by the Revolution is seriously
+endangered.</p>
+
+<p>(2) That the sole salvation lies in establishing a government
+enjoying the full confidence of the toiling masses, in the
+awakening of a creative revolutionary enthusiasm, and in concerted
+self-sacrificing work on the part of all the elements of the
+population.</p>
+
+<p>The convention extends to the Council of Workmen's and<a name="Page_183" id="Page_183"></a> Soldiers'
+Delegates its warmest appreciation of the latter's
+self-sacrificing and honest work for the strengthening of the new
+order in Russia, in the interests of the Russian Democracy and at
+the same time wishes to see, in the nearest possible future, the
+above Council transformed into an All-Russian Council of Workmen's
+and Soldiers' Delegates.</p>
+
+<p><i>The convention is of the opinion that the war is at present
+conducted for purposes of conquest and against the interests of
+the masses</i>, and it, therefore, urges the Council of Workmen's and
+Soldiers' Delegates to take the most energetic and effective
+measures for the purpose of ending this butchery, on the basis of
+free self-determination of nations and of renunciation by all
+belligerent countries of annexations and indemnities. Not a drop
+of Russian blood shall be given for aims foreign to us.</p>
+
+<p>Considering that the earliest possible achievement of this purpose
+is contingent only upon a strong revolutionary army, which would
+defend freedom and government, and be fully supported by the
+organized Revolutionary Democracy, that is, by the Council of
+Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, responsible for its acts to the
+whole country, the convention welcomes the responsible decision of
+the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates to take part in
+the new Provisional Government.</p>
+
+<p>The convention demands that the representatives of the Church give
+up for the country's benefit the treasures and funds now in the
+possession of churches and monasteries. The convention makes an
+urgent appeal to all parts of the population.</p>
+
+<p>1. To the comrade-soldiers in the rear: Comrades! Come to fill up
+our thinning ranks in the trenches and rise shoulder to shoulder
+with us for the country's defense!</p>
+
+<p>2. Comrade-workers! Work energetically and unite your efforts, and
+in this way help us in our last fight for universal peace for
+nations! By strengthening the front you will strengthen freedom!</p>
+
+<p>3. Fellow-citizens of the capitalist class! Follow the historic
+example of Minin! Even as he, open your treasuries and quickly
+bring your money to the aid of Russia!</p>
+
+<p>4. To the peasants: Fathers and Brothers! Bring your last mite to
+help the weakening front! Give us bread, and oats and hay to our
+horses. Remember that the future Russia will be yours!</p><p><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184"></a></p>
+
+<p>5. Comrades-Intellectuals! Come to us and bring the light of
+knowledge into our dark trenches! Share with us the difficult work
+of advancing Russia's freedom and prepare us for the citizenship
+of new Russia!</p>
+
+<p>6. To the Russian women: Support your husbands and sons in the
+performing of their civil duty to the country! Replace them where
+this is not beyond your strength! Let your scorn drive away all
+those who are slackers in these difficult times!</p></div>
+
+<p>No one can read this declaration without a deep sense of the lofty and
+sincere citizenship of the brave men who adopted it as their expression.
+The fundamental loyalty of these leaders of the common soldiers, their
+spokesmen and delegates, is beyond question. Pardonably weary of a war in
+which they had been more shamefully betrayed and neglected than any other
+army in modern times, frankly suspicious of capitalist governments which
+had made covenants with the hated Romanov dynasty, they were still far from
+being ready to follow the leadership of Bolsheviki. They had, instead,
+adopted the sanely constructive policy of Tchcheidze, Tseretelli, Skobelev,
+Plechanov, and other Socialists who from the first had seen the great
+struggle in its true perspective. That they did not succeed in averting
+disaster is due in part to the fact that the Revolution itself had come too
+late to make military success possible, and in part to the failure of the
+governments allied with Russia to render intelligent aid.</p>
+
+
+<h4>VII</h4>
+
+<p>The Provisional Government was reorganized. Before we consider the actions
+of the All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Delegates, one of the most
+important gatherings of representatives of Russian workers ever held, the
+reorganization of the Provisional Government merits attention. On the 17th,
+at a special sitting of the Duma,<a name="Page_185" id="Page_185"></a> Guchkov and Miliukov explained why they
+had resigned. Guchkov made it a matter of conscience. Anarchy had entered
+into the administration of the army and navy, he said: "In the way of
+reforms the new government has gone very far. Not even in the most
+democratic countries have the principles of self-government, freedom, and
+equality been so extensively applied in military life. We have gone
+somewhat farther than the danger limit, and the impetuous current drives us
+farther still.... I could not consent to this dangerous work; I could not
+sign my name to orders and laws which in my opinion would lead to a rapid
+deterioration of our military forces. A country, and especially an army,
+cannot be administered on the principles of meetings and conferences."</p>
+
+<p>Miliukov told his colleagues of the Duma that he had not resigned of his
+own free will, but under pressure: "I had to resign, yielding not to force,
+but to the wish of a considerable majority of my colleagues. With a clear
+conscience I can say that I did not leave on my own account, but was
+compelled to leave." Nevertheless, he said, the foreign policy he had
+pursued was the correct one. "You could see for yourselves that my activity
+in foreign politics was in accord with your ideas," he declared amid
+applause which eloquently testified to the approval with which the
+bourgeoisie regarded policies and tendencies which the proletariat
+condemned. He pointed out that the pacifist policies of Zimmerwald and
+Keinthal had permeated a large part of the Socialist movement, and that the
+Soviet, the Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, claiming to
+exercise control over the Provisional Government, were divided. He feared
+that the proposal to establish a Coalition Government would not lead to
+success, because of "discord in the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers'
+Delegates itself." Not all the <a name="Page_186" id="Page_186"></a>members of the latter body were agreed upon
+entering into a Coalition Government, and "it is evident that those who do
+not enter the government will continue to criticize those who have entered,
+and it is possible that the Socialists who enter the Cabinet will find
+themselves confronted with the same storm of criticism as the government
+did before." Still, because it meant the creation of a stronger government
+at once, which was the most vital need, he, like Guchkov, favored a
+coalition which would ally the Constitutional Democratic party with the
+majority of the Socialists.</p>
+
+<p>The Soviet had decided at its meeting on May 14th to participate in a
+Coalition Ministry. The struggle upon that question between Bolsheviki and
+Mensheviki was long and bitter. The vote, which was forty-one in favor of
+participation to nineteen against, probably fairly represented the full
+strength of Bolshevism in its stronghold. After various conferences between
+Premier Lvov and the other Ministers, on the one side, and representatives
+of the Soviet, on the other side, a new Provisional Government was
+announced, with Prince Lvov again Prime Minister. In the new Cabinet there
+were seven Constitutional Democrats, six Socialists, and two Octobrists. As
+Minister of War and head of the army and navy Alexander Kerensky took the
+place of Guchkov, while P.N. Pereverzev, a clever member of the
+Socialist-Revolutionary party, succeeded Kerensky as Minister of Justice.
+In Miliukov's position at the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was
+placed M.I. Terestchenko, a wealthy sugar-manufacturer, member of the
+Constitutional-Democratic party, who had held the post of Minister of
+Finance, which was now given to A.I. Shingariev, a brilliant member of the
+same party, who had proved his worth and capacity as Minister of
+Agriculture.<a name="Page_187" id="Page_187"></a> To the latter post was appointed V.M. Chernov, the leader of
+the Socialist-Revolutionists, one of the most capable Socialists in Russia,
+or, for that matter, the world. Other Socialists of distinction in the new
+Provisional Government were I.G. Tseretelli, as Minister of Posts and
+Telegraphs, and M.I. Skobelev, as Minister of Labor. As Minister of Supply
+an independent Socialist, A.V. Peshekhonov, was chosen.</p>
+
+<p>It was a remarkable Cabinet. So far as the Socialists were concerned, it
+would have been difficult to select worthier or abler representatives. As
+in the formation of the First Provisional Government, attempts had been
+made to induce Tchcheidze to accept a position in the Cabinet, but without
+success. He could not be induced to enter a Coalition Ministry, though he
+strongly and even enthusiastically supported in the Soviet the motion to
+participate in such a Ministry. Apart from the regret caused by
+Tchcheidze's decision, it was felt on every hand that the Socialists had
+sent into the Second Provisional Government their strongest and most
+capable representatives; men who possessed the qualities of statesmen and
+who would fill their posts with honorable distinction and full loyalty. On
+the side of the Constitutional Democrats and the Octobrists, too, there
+were men of sterling character, distinguished ability, and very liberal
+minds. The selection of Terestchenko as Minister of Foreign Affairs was by
+many Socialists looked upon with distrust, but, upon the whole, the
+Coalition Ministry met with warm approbation. If any coalition of the sort
+could succeed, the Cabinet headed by Prince Lvov might be expected to do
+so.</p>
+
+<p>On the 18th, the Petrograd Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates
+adopted a resolution, introduced by Tchcheidze, president of the Council,
+warmly approving <a name="Page_188" id="Page_188"></a>the entrance of the Socialist Ministers into the Cabinet
+and accepting the declaration of the new Provisional Government as
+satisfactory. This resolution was bitterly opposed by the Bolsheviki, who
+were led in the fight by Trotzky. This was Trotzky's first speech in
+Petrograd since his arrival the previous day from America. His speech was a
+demagogic appeal against co-operation with any bourgeois elements.
+Participation in the Coalition Ministry by the Socialists was a dangerous
+policy, he argued, since it sacrificed the fundamental principle of class
+struggle. Elaborating his views further, he said: "I never believed that
+the emancipation of the working class will come from above. Division of
+power will not cease with the entrance of the Socialists into the Ministry.
+A strong revolutionary power is necessary. The Russian Revolution will not
+perish. But I believe only in a miracle from below. There are three
+commandments for the proletariat. They are: First, transmission of power to
+the revolutionary people; second, control over their own leaders; and
+third, confidence in their own revolutionary powers."</p>
+
+<p>This was the beginning of Trotzky's warfare upon the Coalition Government,
+a warfare which he afterward systematically waged with all his might.
+Tchcheidze and others effectively replied to the Bolshevik leader's
+criticisms and after long and strenuous debate the resolution of the
+Executive Committee presented by Tchcheidze was carried by a large
+majority, the opposition only mustering seven votes. The resolution read as
+follows:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>Acknowledging that the declaration of the Provisional Government,
+which has been reconstructed and fortified by the entrance of
+representatives of the Revolutionary Democracy, conforms to the
+idea and purpose of strengthening the achievements <a name="Page_189" id="Page_189"></a>of the
+Revolution and its further development, the Council of Workmen's
+and Soldiers' Delegates has determined:</p>
+
+<p>I. Representatives of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers'
+Delegates must enter into the Provisional Government.</p>
+
+<p>II. Those representatives of the Council of Workmen's and
+Soldiers' Delegates who join the government must, until the
+creation of an All-Russian organ of the Council of Workmen's and
+Soldiers' Delegates, consider themselves responsible to the
+Petrograd Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, and must
+pledge themselves to give accounts of all their activities to that
+Council.</p>
+
+<p>III. The Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates expresses
+its full confidence in the new Provisional Government, and urges
+all friends of democracy to give this government active
+assistance, which will insure it the full measure of power
+necessary for the safety of the Revolution's gains and for its
+further development.</p></div>
+
+<p>If there is any one thing which may be said with certainty concerning the
+state of working-class opinion in Russia at that time, two months after the
+overthrow of the old r&eacute;gime, it is that the overwhelming majority of the
+working-people, both city workers and peasants, supported the policy of the
+Mensheviki and the Socialist-Revolutionists&mdash;the policy of co-operating
+with liberal bourgeois elements to win the war and create a stable
+government&mdash;as against the policy of the Bolsheviki. The two votes of the
+Petrograd Soviet told where the city workers stood. That very section of
+the proletariat upon which the Bolsheviki leaders based their hopes had
+repudiated them in the most emphatic manner. The Delegates of the Soldiers
+at the Front had shown that they would not follow the advice of the leaders
+of the Bolsheviki. And at the first opportunity which presented itself the
+peasants placed themselves in definite opposition to Bolshevism.</p>
+
+<p>On the afternoon preceding the action of the Soviet in <a name="Page_190" id="Page_190"></a>giving its
+indorsement to the new Provisional Government and instructing its
+representatives to enter the Coalition Cabinet, there assembled in the
+People's House, Petrograd, more than one thousand peasant delegates to the
+first All-Russian Congress of Peasants. Never before had so many peasant
+delegates been gathered together in Russia to consider their special
+problems. There were present delegates from every part of Russia, even from
+the extreme border provinces, and many from the front. On the platform were
+the members of the Organizing Committee, the Executive Committee of the
+Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, the Socialist-Revolutionary
+party, the Social Democratic party, and a number of prominent Socialist
+leaders. As might be expected in a peasants' Congress, members of the
+Socialist-Revolutionary party were in the majority, numbering 537. The next
+largest group was the Social Democratic party, including Bolsheviki and
+Mensheviki, numbering 103. There were 136 delegates described as
+non-partizan; 4 belonged to the group called the "People's Socialists" and
+6 to the Labor Group. It was the most representative body of peasant
+workers ever brought together.</p>
+
+<p>Among the first speakers to address the Congress was the venerable
+"Grandmother" of the Russian Revolution, Catherine Breshkovskaya, who spoke
+with the freedom accorded to her and to her alone. "Tell me," she demanded,
+"is there advantage to us in keeping our front on a war footing and in
+allowing the people to sit in trenches with their hands folded and to die
+from fever, scurvy, and all sorts of contagious diseases? If our army had a
+real desire to help the Allies, the war would be finished in one or two
+months, <i>but we are prolonging it by sitting with our hands folded</i>." V.M.
+Chernov, leader <a name="Page_191" id="Page_191"></a>of the Socialist-Revolutionary party, the new Minister of
+Agriculture, made a notable address in which he traversed with great skill
+and courage the arguments of the Bolsheviki, making a superb defense of the
+policy of participation in the government.</p>
+
+<p>Kerensky, idol of the peasants, appearing for the first time as Minister of
+War and head of the army and navy, made a vigorous plea for unity, for
+self-discipline, and for enthusiastic support of the new Provisional
+Government. He did not mince matters: "I intend to establish an iron
+discipline in the army. I am certain that I shall succeed in my
+undertaking, because it will be a discipline based upon duty toward the
+country, the duty of honor.... By all means, we must see that the country
+becomes free and strong enough to elect the Constituent Assembly, the
+Assembly which, through its sovereign, absolute power, will give to the
+toiling Russian peasants that for which they have been yearning for
+centuries, the land.... We are afraid of no demagogues, whether they come
+from the right or from the left. We shall attend to our business, quietly
+and firmly." Kerensky begged the peasants to assert their will that there
+should be "no repetition of the sad events of 1905-06, when the entire
+country seemed already in our hands, but slipped out because it became
+involved in anarchy." The speech created a profound impression and it was
+voted to have it printed in millions of copies, at the expense of the
+Congress, and have them distributed throughout the army.</p>
+
+<p>A similar honor was accorded the speech of I.I. Bunakov, one of the best
+known and most popular of the leaders of the Socialist-Revolutionary party.
+With remorseless logic he traversed the arguments of the Bolsheviki and the
+Porazhentsi. Taking the cry that there must be "no annexations," for
+example, he declared that <a name="Page_192" id="Page_192"></a>the peasants of Russia could only accept that in
+the sense that Poland be reunited and her independence be restored; that
+the people of Alsace and Lorraine be permitted to be reunited to France;
+that Armenia be taken from Turkey and made independent. The peasants could
+not accept the <i>status quo ante</i> as a basis for peace. He assailed the
+treacherous propaganda for a separate peace with terrific scorn: "But such
+peace is unacceptable to us peasants. A separate peace would kill not only
+our Revolution, but the cause of social revolution the world over. A
+separate peace is dishonor for Russia and treason toward the Allies.... We
+must start an offensive. To remain in the trenches without moving is a
+separate truce, more shameful even than a separate peace. A separate truce
+demoralizes the army and ruins the people. This spring, according to our
+agreement with the Allies, we should have begun a general offensive, but
+instead of that we have concluded a separate truce. <i>The Allies saved the
+Russian Revolution, but they are becoming exhausted</i>.... When our Minister
+of War, Kerensky, speaks of starting an offensive, the Russian army must
+support him with all its strength, with all the means available.... From
+here we should send our delegates to the front and urge our army to wage an
+offensive. Let the army know that it must fight and die for Russia's
+freedom, for the peace of the whole world, and for the coming Socialist
+commonwealth."</p>
+
+<p>In the resolutions which were adopted the Congress confined itself to
+outlining a program for the Constituent Assembly, urging the abolition of
+private property in land, forests, water-power, mines, and mineral
+resources. It urged the Provisional Government to "issue an absolutely
+clear and unequivocal statement which would show that on this question the
+Provisional Government will <a name="Page_193" id="Page_193"></a>allow nobody to oppose the people's will." It
+also issued a special appeal "to the peasants and the whole wage-earning
+population of Russia" to vote at the forthcoming elections for the
+Constituent Assembly, "only for those candidates who pledge themselves to
+advocate the nationalization of the land without reimbursement on
+principles of equality." In the election for an Executive Committee to
+carry on the work of the Congress and maintain the organization the
+delegates with Bolshevist tendencies were "snowed under." Those who were
+elected were, practically without exception, stalwart supporters of the
+policy of participation in and responsibility for the Provisional
+Government, and known to be ardent believers in the Constituent Assembly.
+Chernov, with 810 votes, led the poll; Breshkovskaya came next with 809;
+Kerensky came third with 804; Avksentiev had 799; Bunakov 790; Vera Finger
+776, and so on. Nineteenth on the list of thirty elected came the venerable
+Nicholas Tchaykovsky, well known in America. Once more a great
+representative body of Russian working-people had spoken and rejected the
+teachings and the advice of the Bolsheviki.</p>
+
+
+<h4>VIII</h4>
+
+<p>As we have seen, it was with the authority and mandate of the overwhelming
+majority of the organized workers that the Socialists entered the Coalition
+Ministry. It was with that mandate that Kerensky undertook the Herculean
+task of restoring the discipline and morale of the Russian army. In that
+work he was the agent and representative of the organized working class.
+For this reason, if for no other, Kerensky and his associates were entitled
+to expect and to receive the loyal support of all who professed loyalty to
+the working class. Instead of <a name="Page_194" id="Page_194"></a>giving that support, however, the Bolsheviki
+devoted themselves to the task of defeating every effort of the Provisional
+Government to carry out its program, which, it must be borne in mind, had
+been approved by the great mass of the organized workers. They availed
+themselves of every means in their power to hamper Kerensky in his work and
+to hinder the organization of the economic resources of the nation to
+sustain the military forces.</p>
+
+<p>Kerensky had promised to organize preparations for a vigorous offensive
+against the Austro-German forces. That such offensive was needed was
+obvious and was denied by none except the ultra-pacifists and the
+Bolsheviki. The Congress of Soldiers' Delegates from the Front and the
+Petrograd Soviet had specifically urged the need of such an offensive, as
+had most of the well-known peasants' leaders. It was a working-class
+policy. But that fact did not prevent the Bolsheviki from throwing
+obstacles in the way of its fulfilment. They carried on an active
+propaganda among the men in the army and the navy, urging insubordination,
+fraternization, and refusal to fight. They encouraged sabotage as a means
+of insuring the failure of the efforts of the Provisional Government. So
+thoroughly did they play into the hands of the German military authorities,
+whether intentionally or otherwise, that the charge of being in the pay of
+Germany was made against them&mdash;not by prejudiced bourgeois politicians and
+journalists, but by the most responsible Socialists in Russia.</p>
+
+<p>The epic story of Kerensky's magnificently heroic fight to recreate the
+Russian army is too well known to need retelling here. Though it was vain
+and ended in failure, as it was foredoomed to do, it must forever be
+remembered with gratitude and admiration by all friends of freedom. The
+audacity and the courage with which<a name="Page_195" id="Page_195"></a> Kerensky and a few loyal associates
+strove to maintain Russia in the struggle made the Allied nations, and all
+the civilized world, their debtors. Many mistakes were made, it is true,
+yet it is very doubtful if human beings could have achieved more or
+succeeded where they failed. It must be confessed, furthermore, that the
+governments of the nations with which they were allied made many grievous
+mistakes on their part.</p>
+
+<p>Perhaps the greatest blunder that a discriminating posterity will charge to
+Kerensky's account was the signing of the famous Declaration of Soldiers'
+Rights. This document, which was signed on May 27th, can only be regarded
+in the light of a surrender to overpowering forces. In his address to the
+All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Delegates, on May 18th, speaking for the
+first time in his capacity as Minister of War, Kerensky had declared, "I
+intend to establish an iron discipline in the army," yet the Declaration of
+Soldiers' Rights which he signed nine days later was certain to make any
+real discipline impossible. Was it because he was inconsistent,
+vacillating, and weak that Kerensky attached his name to such a document?</p>
+
+<p>Such a judgment would be gravely unjust to a great man. The fact is that
+Kerensky's responsibility was very small indeed. He and his Socialist
+associates in the Cabinet held their positions by authority of the Council
+of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, and they had agreed to be subject to
+its guidance and instruction. The Soviet was responsible for the
+Declaration of Soldiers' Rights. Kerensky was acting under its orders. The
+Soviet had already struck a fatal blow at military discipline by its famous
+Order Number One, which called on the soldiers not to execute the orders of
+their officers unless the orders were first approved by the revolutionary
+authorities&mdash;that <a name="Page_196" id="Page_196"></a>is, by the Soviet or its accredited agents. That the
+order was prompted by an intense love for revolutionary ideals, or that it
+was justified by the amount of treachery which had been discovered among
+the officers of the army, may explain and even excuse it, but the fact
+remains that it was a deadly blow at military discipline. The fact that
+Kerensky's predecessor, Guchkov, had to appear at a convention of soldiers'
+delegates and explain and defend his policies showed that discipline was at
+a low ebb. It brought the army into the arena of politics and made
+questions of military strategy subject to political maneuvering.</p>
+
+<p>The Declaration of Soldiers' Rights was a further step along a road which
+inevitably led to disaster. That remarkable document provided that soldiers
+and officers of all ranks should enjoy full civic and political rights;
+that they should be free to speak or write upon any subject; that their
+correspondence should be uncensored; that while on duty they should be free
+to receive any printed matter, books, papers, and so on, which they
+desired. It provided for the abolition of the compulsory salute to
+officers; gave the private soldier the right to discard his uniform when
+not actually on service and to leave barracks freely during "off-duty"
+hours. Finally, it placed all matters pertaining to the management in the
+hands of elective committees in the composition of which the men were to
+have four-fifths of the elective power and the officers one-fifth.</p>
+
+<p>Of course, the Declaration of Soldiers' Rights represented a violent
+reaction. Under the old r&eacute;gime the army was a monstrously cruel machine;
+the soldiers were slaves. At the first opportunity they had revolted and,
+as invariably happens, the pendulum had swung too far. On May 28th the
+Council of Workmen's and Soldiers'<a name="Page_197" id="Page_197"></a> Delegates issued a declaration in which
+it was said: "From now on the soldier-citizen is free from the slavery of
+saluting, and as an equal, free person will greet whomsoever he chooses....
+Discipline in the Revolutionary Army will exist, prompted by popular
+enthusiasm and the sense of duty toward the free country rather than by a
+slavish salute." If we are tempted to laugh at this na&iuml;ve idealism, we
+Americans will do well to remember that it was an American
+statesman-idealist who believed that we could raise an army of a million
+men overnight, and that a shrewd American capitalist-idealist sent forth a
+"peace ship" with a motley crew of dreamers and disputers to end the
+greatest war in history.</p>
+
+
+<h4>IX</h4>
+
+<p>Throughout the first half of June, while arrangements for a big military
+offensive were being made, and were causing Kerensky and the other
+Socialist Ministers to strain every nerve, Lenine, Trotzky, Kamenev,
+Zinoviev, and other leaders of the Bolsheviki were as strenuously engaged
+in denouncing the offensive and trying to make it impossible. Whatever gift
+or genius these men possessed was devoted wholly to destruction and
+obstruction. The student will search in vain among the multitude of records
+of meetings, conventions, debates, votes, and resolutions for a single
+instance of participation in any constructive act, one positive service to
+the soldiers at the front or the workers' families in need, by any
+Bolshevik leader. But they never missed an opportunity to embarrass those
+who were engaged in such work, and by so doing add to the burden that was
+already too heavy.</p>
+
+<p>Lenine denounced the offensive against Germany as<a name="Page_198" id="Page_198"></a> "an act of treason
+against the Socialist International" and poured out the vials of his wrath
+against Kerensky, who was, as we know, simply carrying out the decisions of
+the Soviet and other working-class organizations. Thus we had the
+astonishing and tragic spectacle of one Socialist leader working with
+titanic energy among the troops who had been betrayed and demoralized by
+the old r&eacute;gime, seeking to stir them into action against the greatest
+militarist system in the world, while another Socialist leader worked with
+might and main to defeat that attempt and to prevent the rehabilitation of
+the demoralized army. And all the while the German General Staff gloated at
+every success of the Bolsheviki. There was a regular system of
+communications between the irreconcilable revolutionists and the German
+General Staff. In proof of this statement only one illustration need be
+offered, though many such could be cited: At the All-Russian Congress of
+Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, on June 22d, Kerensky read, in the
+presence of Lenine, a long message, signed by the commander-in-chief of the
+German eastern front, sent by wireless in response to a declaration of
+certain delegates of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates.</p>
+
+<p>At this session Lenine bitterly assailed the proposed offensive. He said
+that it was impossible for either side to win a military victory, revamping
+all the defeatist arguments that were familiar in every country. He
+minimized the loss which Russia had suffered at Germany's hands, and the
+gains Germany had made in Belgium and northern France, pointing out that
+she had, on the other hand, lost her colonies, which England would be very
+unlikely to give back unless compelled to do so by other nations. Taunted
+with being in favor of a separate peace with Germany, Lenine indignantly
+denied the accusation.<a name="Page_199" id="Page_199"></a> "It is a lie," he cried. "Down with a separate
+peace! <i>We Russian revolutionists will never consent to it.</i>" He argued
+that there could be only one policy for Socialists in any country&mdash;namely,
+to seize the occasion of war to overthrow the capitalist-class rule in that
+country. No war entered into by a capitalist ruling class, regardless what
+its motives, should be supported by Socialists. He argued that the adoption
+of his policy by the Russian working class would stand ten times the chance
+of succeeding that the military policy would have. The German working class
+would compel their government and the General Staff to follow the example
+of Russia and make peace.</p>
+
+<p>Kerensky was called upon to reply to Lenine. At the time when the
+restoration of the army required all his attention and all his strength, it
+was necessary for Kerensky to attend innumerable and well-nigh interminable
+debates and discussions to maintain stout resistance to the Bolshevik
+offensive always being waged in the rear. That, of course, was part of the
+Bolshevist plan of campaign. So Kerensky, wearied by his tremendous efforts
+to perform the task assigned him by the workers, answered Lenine. His reply
+was a forensic masterpiece. He took the message of the commander-in-chief
+of the German eastern front and hurled it at Lenine's head, figuratively
+speaking, showing how Lenine's reasoning was paralleled in the German
+propaganda. With merciless logic and incisive phrase he showed how the
+Bolsheviki were using the formula, "the self-determination of
+nationalities," as the basis of a propaganda to bring about the
+dismemberment of Russia and its reduction to a chaotic medley of small,
+helpless states. To Lenine's statements about the readiness of the German
+working class to rebel, Kerensky made retort that Lenine should <a name="Page_200" id="Page_200"></a>have
+remained in Germany while on his way to Russia and preached his ideas
+there.</p>
+
+<p>A few days earlier, at a session of the same Congress, Trotzky and Kamenev
+had made vigorous assault upon the Coalition Government and upon the
+Socialist policy with reference thereto. In view of what subsequently
+transpired, it is important to note that Trotzky made much of the delay in
+calling together the Constituent Assembly: "The policy of continual
+postponement <i>and the detailed preparations</i> for calling the Constituent
+Assembly is a false policy. It may destroy even the very realization of the
+Constituent Assembly." This profession of concern for the Constituent
+Assembly was hypocritical, dishonest, and insincere. He did not in the
+least care about or believe in the Constituent Assembly, and had not done
+so at any time since the First Revolution of 1905-06. His whole thought
+rejected such a democratic instrument. However, he and his associates knew
+that the demand for a Constituent Assembly was almost universal, and that
+to resist that demand was impossible. Their very obvious policy in the
+circumstances was to try and force the holding of the Assembly prematurely,
+without adequate preparation, and without affording an opportunity for a
+nation-wide electoral campaign. A hastily gathered, badly organized
+Constituent Assembly would be a mob-gathering which could be easily
+stampeded or controlled by a determined minority.</p>
+
+<p>Trotzky assailed the Coalition Government with vitriolic passion. At the
+moment when it was obvious to everybody that unity of effort was the only
+possible condition for the survival of the Revolution, and that any
+division in the ranks of the revolutionists, no matter upon what it might
+be based, must imperil the whole movement, he and all his Bolshevik
+colleagues deliberately <a name="Page_201" id="Page_201"></a>stirred up dissension. Even if their opposition to
+political union with non-proletarian parties was right as the basis of a
+sound policy, to insist upon it at the moment of dire peril was either
+treachery or madness. When a house is already on fire the only thing in
+order, the only thing that can have the sanction of wisdom and honor, is to
+work to extinguish the fire. It is obviously not the time to debate whether
+the house was properly built or whether mistakes were made. Russia was a
+house on fire; the Bolsheviki insisted upon endless debating.</p>
+
+<p>Kamenev followed Trotzky's lead in attacking the Coalition Government. In a
+subtle speech he supported the idea of splitting Russia up into a large
+number of petty states, insisting that the formula, "self-determination of
+peoples," applied to the separatist movement in the Ukraine. He insisted
+that for the Russian working-people it was a matter of indifference whether
+the Central Empires or the Entente nations won in the war. He argued that
+the only hope for the Russian Revolution must be the support of the
+revolutionary proletariat in the other European countries, particularly
+those adjacent to Russia: "If the revolutionary proletariat of Europe fails
+to support the Russian Revolution the latter will be ruined. As that
+support is the only guaranty of the safety of the Revolution, we cannot
+change our policy by discussing the question of how much fraternizing will
+stimulate the awakening of the proletariat of Europe." In other words,
+Kamenev was in the position of a desperate gambler who stakes his life and
+his all upon one throw of the dice or one spin of the wheel.</p>
+
+<p>It was in this manner that the Bolshevist leaders conspired to Russia's
+destruction. They were absorbing the time and energies of the men who were
+really trying to do something, compelling them to engage in numerous
+<a name="Page_202" id="Page_202"></a>futile debates, to the neglect of their vitally important work, debates,
+moreover, which could have no other effect than to weaken the nation.
+Further, they were actively obstructing the work of the government. Thus
+Tseretelli, Kerensky, Skobelev, and many others whose efforts might have
+saved the Revolution, were thwarted by men wholly without a sense of
+responsibility. Lenine was shrieking for the arrest of capitalists because
+they were capitalists, when it was obvious that the services of those same
+capitalists were needed if the nation was to live. Later on, when
+confronted by the realities and responsibilities of government, he availed
+himself of the special powers and training of the despised capitalists. At
+this earlier period he was, as Tseretelli repeatedly reminded the workers,
+without any sense of responsibility for the practical results of his
+propaganda. And that was equally true of the Bolsheviki as a whole. They
+talked about sending "ultimatums" to the Allies, while the whole system of
+national defense was falling to pieces. Tseretelli made the only reply it
+was possible for a sane man to make:</p>
+
+<p>"It is proposed that we speak to the Allies with ultimatums, but did those
+who made this silly proposal think that this road might lead to the
+breaking of diplomatic relations with the Allies, and to that very separate
+peace which is condemned by all factions among us? Did Lenine think of the
+actual consequences of his proposal to arrest several dozen capitalists at
+this time? Can the Bolsheviki guarantee that their road will lead us to the
+correct solution of the crisis? No. If they guarantee this they do not know
+what they are doing and their guaranty is worthless. The Bolshevik road can
+lead us only to one end, civil war."</p>
+
+<p>Once more the good sense of the working class prevailed.<a name="Page_203" id="Page_203"></a> By an
+overwhelming majority of votes the Congress decided to uphold the Coalition
+Government and rejected the Bolshevik proposals. The resolution adopted
+declared that "the passing over of all power to the bourgeoisie elements
+would deal a blow at the revolutionary cause," but that equally the
+transfer of all power to the Soviets would be disastrous to the Revolution,
+and "would greatly weaken her powers by prematurely driving away from her
+elements which are still capable of serving her, and would threaten the
+ruin of the Revolution." Therefore, having heard the explanations of the
+Socialist Ministers and having full confidence in them, the Congress
+insisted that the Socialist Ministers be solely responsible to the
+"plenipotentiary and representative organ of the whole organized
+Revolutionary Democracy of Russia, which organ must be composed of the
+representatives of the All-Russian Congress of Councils of Workmen's and
+Soldiers' Delegates, as well as of representatives of the All-Russian
+Congress of Peasants' Delegates."</p>
+
+<p>But in spite of the fact that the workers upon every opportunity repudiated
+their policies, the Bolsheviki continued their tactics. Lenine, Trotzky,
+Tshitsherin, Zinoviev, and others called upon the workers to stop working
+and to go out into the streets to demonstrate for peace. The All-Russian
+Congress of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates issued an appeal to the
+workers warning them not to heed the call of the Bolsheviki, which had been
+made at the "moment of supreme danger." The appeal said:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>Comrades, in the name of millions of workers, peasants, and
+soldiers, we tell you, "Do not do that which you are called upon
+to do." At this dangerous moment you are called out into the
+streets to demand the overthrow of the Provisional Government, <a name="Page_204" id="Page_204"></a>to
+whom the All-Russian Congress has just found it necessary to give
+its support. And those who are calling you cannot but know that
+out of your peaceful demonstrations bloodshed and chaos may
+result.... You are being called to a demonstration in favor of the
+Revolution, <i>but we know that counter-revolutionists want to take
+advantage of your demonstration ... the counter-revolutionists are
+eagerly awaiting the moment when strife will develop in the ranks
+of the Revolutionary Democracy and enable them to crush the
+Revolution</i>.</p></div>
+
+
+<h4>X</h4>
+
+<p>Not only in this way were the Bolsheviki recklessly attempting to thwart
+the efforts of the Socialist Ministers to carry out the mandates of the
+majority of the working class of Russia, but they were equally active in
+trying to secure the failure of the attempt to restore the army. All
+through June the Bolshevik papers denounced the military offensive. In the
+ranks of the army itself a persistent campaign against further fighting was
+carried on. The Duma had voted, on June 17th, for an immediate offensive,
+and it was approved by the Petrograd Soviet. The Provisional Government on
+that date published a Note to the Allied governments, requesting a
+conference with a view to making a restatement of their war aims. These
+actions were approved by the All-Russian Congress of Workmen's and
+Soldiers' Delegates, as was also the expulsion from Russia of the Swiss
+Socialist, Robert Grimm, who was a notorious agent of the German
+Government. Grimm, as is now well known, was acting under the orders of
+Hoffman, the Swiss Minister of Foreign Affairs, and was trying to bring
+about a separate peace between Russia and Germany. He was also intimately
+connected with the infamous "Parvus," the trusted Social Democrat who was a
+spy and tool of the German Government. As always, the great majority of the
+representatives <a name="Page_205" id="Page_205"></a>of the actual working class of Russia took the sane
+course.</p>
+
+<p>But the Bolsheviki were meanwhile holding mass meetings among the troops,
+preaching defeatism and surrender and urging the soldiers not to obey the
+orders of "bourgeois" officers. The Provisional Government was not blind to
+the peril of this propaganda, but it dared not attempt to end it by force,
+conscious that any attempt to do so would provoke revolt which could not be
+stayed. The Bolsheviki, unable to control the Workmen's and Soldiers'
+Council, sought in every possible manner to weaken its influence and to
+discredit it. They conspired to overthrow the Provisional Government. Their
+plot was to bring about an armed revolt on the 24th of June, when the
+All-Russian Congress of Soviets would be in session. They planned to arrest
+the members of the Provisional Government and assume full power. <i>At the
+same time, all the soldiers at the front were to be called on to leave the
+trenches</i>. On the eve of the date when it was to be executed this plot was
+divulged. There was treachery within their own ranks. The Bolshevik leaders
+humbly apologized and promised to abandon their plans. Under other
+conditions the Provisional Government might have refused to be satisfied
+with apologies, might have adopted far sterner measures, but it was face to
+face with the bitter fact that the nation was drunk with the strong wine of
+freedom. The time had not yet arrived when the masses could be expected to
+recognize the distinction between liberty within the law and the license
+that leads always to tyranny. It takes time and experience of freedom to
+teach the stern lesson that, as Rousseau has it, freedom comes by way of
+self-imposed compulsions to be free.</p>
+
+<p>The offensive which Kerensky had urged and planned <a name="Page_206" id="Page_206"></a>began on July 1st and
+its initial success was encouraging. It seemed as though the miracle of the
+restoration of the Russian army had been achieved, despite everything. Here
+was an army whose killed and dead already amounted to more than three
+million men,<a name="FNanchor_20_20" id="FNanchor_20_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> an army which had suffered incredible hardships, again
+going into battle with songs. On the 1st of July more than thirty-six
+thousand prisoners were taken by the Russians on the southwestern front.
+Then came the tragic harvest of the Bolshevist propaganda. In northeastern
+Galicia the 607th Russian Regiment left the trenches and forced other units
+to do the same thing, opening a clear way for the German advance. Regiment
+after regiment refused to obey orders. Officers were brutally murdered by
+their men. Along a front of more than one hundred and fifty miles the
+Russians, greatly superior in numbers, retreated without attempting to
+fight, while the enemy steadily advanced. This was made possible by the
+agitation of the Bolsheviki, especially by the mutiny which they provoked
+among the troops in the garrison at Petrograd. On the 17th of July, at the
+very time when the separatist movement in the Ukraine, the resignation of
+the Constitutional Democrats from the government, and the revolt and
+treachery among the troops had produced a grave crisis, seizing the
+opportunity afforded by the general chaos, the Bolsheviki attempted to
+realize their aim of establishing what they called a "dictatorship of the
+proletariat," but which was in reality the dictatorship of a small part of
+the proletariat. There was no pretense that they represented a majority of
+the proletariat, even. It was a desperate effort to impose the dictatorship
+of a small minority of the proletariat upon the whole nation. For two days
+the revolt lasted, <a name="Page_207" id="Page_207"></a>more than five hundred men, women, and children being
+killed in the streets of Petrograd.</p>
+
+<p>On the 20th Prince Lvov resigned as Premier. In the mean time the
+Bolshevist uprising had been put down by Cossack troops and the leaders
+were in hiding. Kerensky stepped into Lvov's position as Premier and
+continued to address himself to the task of bringing order out of the
+chaos. There could not have been any selfish ambition in this; no
+place-hunter would have attempted to bear the heavy burden Kerensky then
+assumed, especially with his knowledge of the seriousness of the situation.
+He knew that the undertaking was practically hopeless, yet he determined
+never to give up the struggle so long as there was a single thing to be
+done and his comrades desired him to do it.<a name="FNanchor_21_21" id="FNanchor_21_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_21" class="fnanchor">[21]</a></p>
+
+<p>There had been created a revolutionary body representing all the organized
+workers, called the United Executive Committee of the All-Russian Councils
+of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates, a body of more than three
+hundred elected representatives of the various Soviets. They represented
+the views of many millions. This body vigorously denounced the Bolsheviki
+and rallied to the support of Kerensky and his colleagues. In a Manifesto
+to the people the Bolsheviki were charged with responsibility for the blood
+of all who had been slain in the uprising. On July 21st a second Manifesto
+was issued by the Committee calling upon the workers to uphold the
+government so long as the authorized representatives of the working class
+determined that to be the proper course to follow. The charge that Lenine,
+Zinoviev, Trotzky, and others were acting under German instructions <a name="Page_208" id="Page_208"></a>and
+receiving German money spread until it was upon almost every tongue in
+Petrograd. On July 24th Gregory Alexinsky, a well-known Socialist, in his
+paper, <i>Bez Lisnih Slov</i>, published a circumstantial story of German
+intrigue in the Ukraine, revealed by one Yermolenko, an ensign in the 16th
+Siberian Regiment, who had been sent to Russia by the German Government.
+This Yermolenko charged that Lenine had been instructed by the authorities
+in Berlin, just as he himself had been, and that Lenine had been furnished
+with almost unlimited funds by the German Government, the arrangement being
+that it was to be forwarded through one Svendson, at Stockholm.<a name="FNanchor_22_22" id="FNanchor_22_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> By a
+vote of 300 to 11 the United Executive Committee of the All-Russian
+Councils of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates adopted the
+following resolution:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>The whole Revolutionary Democracy desires that the Bolsheviki
+group accused of having organized disorders, or inciting revolt,
+or of having received money from German sources be tried publicly.
+In consequence, the Executive Committee considers it absolutely
+inadmissible that Lenine and Zinoviev should escape justice, and
+demands that the Bolsheviki faction immediately and categorically
+express its censure of the conduct of its leaders.</p></div>
+
+<p>Later on, under the "terror," there was some pretense of an "investigation"
+of the charge that Lenine and others had received German money, but there
+has never been a genuine investigation so far as is known. Groups of
+Russian Socialists belonging to various parties and groups have asked that
+a commission of well-known Socialists from the leading countries of Europe
+and from the United States, furnished with reliable interpreters, be sent
+to Russia to make a thorough investigation of the charge.</p><p><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209"></a></p>
+
+<p>The United Executive Committee of the workers' organizations adopted a
+resolution demanding that all members and all factions, and the members of
+all affiliated bodies, obey the mandate of the majority, and that all
+majority decisions be absolutely obeyed. They took the position&mdash;too late,
+alas!&mdash;that the will of the majority must be observed, since the only
+alternative was the rule of the majority by the aggressive minority.
+Repressive measures against the Bolsheviki were adopted by the Kerensky
+Cabinet with the full approval of the Committee. Some of the Bolshevik
+papers were suppressed and the death penalty, which had been abolished at
+the very beginning of the Revolution, was partially restored in that it was
+ordered that it should be applied to traitors and deserters at the front.
+Lenine and Zinoviev were in hiding, but Trotzky, Kamenev, Alexandra
+Kollontay, and many other noted Bolsheviki were imprisoned for a few days.</p>
+
+<p>It was Kerensky's hope that by arranging for an early conference by the
+Allies, at which the war aims would be restated in terms similar to those
+which President Wilson had employed, and by definitely fixing the date for
+the Constituent Assembly elections, September 30th, while sternly
+repressing the Bolsheviki, it might be possible to save Russia. But it was
+too late. Despite his almost superhuman efforts, and the loyal support of
+the great majority of the Soviets, he was defeated. Day after day
+conditions at the front grew worse. By the beginning of August practically
+the whole of Galicia was in the hands of the Germans. Russian soldiers in
+large numbers retreated before inferior numbers of Germans, refusing to
+strike a blow. Germans furnished them with immense quantities of spirits,
+and an orgy of drunkenness took place. The red flag was borne by debauched
+and <a name="Page_210" id="Page_210"></a>drunken mobs. What a fate for the symbol of universal freedom and
+human brotherhood!</p>
+
+<p>It was a time of terrible strain and upheaval. Crisis followed upon crisis.
+Chernov resigned his position as Minister of Agriculture. Kerensky resigned
+as Premier, but the members of the Provisional Government by unanimous vote
+declined to accept the resignation. They called a joint meeting of all the
+Cabinet, of leaders of all political parties, of the Duma, of the Soviets
+of workers, peasants, and soldiers. At this meeting the whole critical
+situation was discussed and all present joined in demanding that Kerensky
+continue in office. The political parties represented were the Social
+Democrats, the Socialist-Revolutionists, the Democratic Radicals, the Labor
+Union party, the Popular Socialists, and the Constitutional Democrats. From
+these groups came an appeal which Kerensky could not deny. He said:</p>
+
+<p>"In view of the evident impossibility of establishing, by means of a
+compromise between the various political groups, Socialist as well as
+non-Socialist, a strong revolutionary government ... I was obliged to
+resign. Friday's conference, ... after a prolonged discussion, resulted in
+the parties represented at the conference deciding to intrust me with the
+task of reconstructing the government. Considering it impossible for me in
+the present circumstances, when defeat without and disintegration within
+are threatening the country, to withdraw from the heavy task which is now
+intrusted to me, I regard this task as an express order of the country to
+construct a strong revolutionary government in the shortest possible time
+and in spite of all the obstacles which might arise."</p>
+
+<p>For the second time Kerensky was Premier at the head of a Coalition
+Ministry. No other government was possible <a name="Page_211" id="Page_211"></a>for Russia except a strong
+despotism. Theorists might debate the advisability of such coalition, but
+the stern reality was that nothing else was possible. The leader of the
+peasants, Chernov, returned to his old post as Minister of Agriculture and
+the Constitutional Democrats took their share of the burden. There were six
+parties and groups in the new Cabinet, four of them of various shades of
+Socialism and two of them liberal bourgeoisie. Never before, perhaps, and
+certainly only rarely, if ever, have men essayed a heavier or more
+difficult task than that which this new Provisional Government undertook.</p>
+
+<p>Heroically Kerensky sought to make successful the efforts of General
+Kornilov, as commander-in-chief, to restore order and discipline in the
+army, but it was too late. The disintegration had gone too far. The
+measures which the Revolutionary Democracy had introduced into the army, in
+the hope of realizing freedom, had reduced it to a wild mob. Officers were
+butchered by their men; regiment after regiment deserted its post and, in
+some instances, attempted to make a separate peace with the enemy, even
+offering to pay indemnities. Moreover, the industrial organization of the
+country had been utterly demoralized. The manufacture of army supplies had
+fallen off more than 60 per cent., with the result that the state of
+affairs was worse than in the most corrupt period of the old r&eacute;gime.</p>
+
+
+<h4>XI</h4>
+
+<p>It became evident to the Provisional Government that something big and
+dramatic must be done, without waiting for the results of the Constituent
+Assembly elections. Accordingly, it was decided to call together a great
+extraordinary council, representing all classes and all parties, <a name="Page_212" id="Page_212"></a>to
+consider the situation and the best means of meeting it. The Extraordinary
+National Conference, as it was called, was opened in Moscow, on August
+26th, with more than fourteen hundred members in attendance. Some of these
+members&mdash;principally those from the Soviets&mdash;had been elected as delegates,
+but the others had been invited by the government and could not be said to
+speak as authorized representatives. There were about one hundred and
+ninety men who had been members of one or other of the Dumas; one hundred
+representatives of the peasants' Soviets and other peasant organizations;
+about two hundred and thirty representatives of the Soviets of industrial
+workers and of soldiers; more than three hundred from co-operatives; about
+one hundred and eighty from the trade-unions; about one hundred and fifty
+from municipalities; one hundred and fifty representatives of banks and
+industrial concerns, and about one hundred and twenty from the Union of
+Zemstvos and Towns. It was a Conference more thoroughly representative of
+Russia than any that had ever been held. There were, indeed, no
+representatives of the old r&eacute;gime, and there were few representatives of
+the Bolsheviki. The former had no place in the new Russia that was
+struggling for its existence; the repressive measures that had been found
+necessary accounted for the scant representation of the latter.</p>
+
+<p>It was to this Conference that President Wilson sent his famous message
+giving the assurance of "every material and moral assistance" to the people
+and government of Russia. For three days the great assembly debated and
+listened to speeches from men representing every section of the country,
+every class, and every party. Kerensky, Tseretelli, Tchcheidze, Boublikov,
+Plechanov, Kropotkin, Breshkovskaya, and others, spoke for the workers;
+General<a name="Page_213" id="Page_213"></a> Kornilov and General Kaledine spoke for the military command;
+Miliukov, Nekrasov, Guchkov, Maklakov, and others spoke for the
+bourgeoisie. At times feeling ran high, as might have been expected, but
+throughout the great gathering there was displayed a remarkable unanimity
+of feeling and immediate purpose; a common resolve to support the
+Provisional Government, to re-establish discipline in the army and navy, to
+remain loyal to the Allies, and reject with scorn all offers of a separate
+peace, and to work for the success of the Constituent Assembly.</p>
+
+<p>But, notwithstanding the unity upon these immediately vital points, the
+Moscow Conference showed that there was still a great gulf between the
+classes, and that no matter how they might co-operate to meet and overcome
+the peril that hung over the nation like the sword of Damocles, there could
+be no unity in working out the great economic and social program which must
+be the basis for the Social Democratic commonwealth which the workers
+sought to establish, and which the bourgeois elements feared almost as much
+as they feared the triumph of Germany. In some respects the Conference
+intensified class feeling and added to, instead of lessening, the civil
+strife. The Bolsheviki were not slow to exploit this fact. They pointed to
+the Conference as evidence of a desire on the part of the Socialist
+Ministers, and of the officials of the Soviets, to compromise with the
+bourgeoisie. This propaganda had its effect and Bolshevism grew in
+consequence, especially in Petrograd.</p>
+
+<p>Then followed the disastrous military and political events which made it
+practically impossible for the Kerensky government to stand. At the front
+the soldiers were still revolting, deserting, and retreating. Kornilov was
+quite helpless. Germany began a new offensive, <a name="Page_214" id="Page_214"></a>and on September 2d German
+armies crossed the Dvina near Riga. On September 3d Riga was surrendered to
+the Germans in the most shameful manner and panic reigned in Petrograd.
+Then on the 9th came the revolt of Kornilov against the Provisional
+Government and the vulgar quarrel between him and Kerensky. Kornilov
+charged that the Provisional Government, under pressure from the
+Bolsheviki, was playing into the hands of the German General Staff.
+Kerensky, backed by the rest of the Cabinet, ordered Kornilov's removal,
+while Kornilov despatched a division of troops, drawn from the front,
+against Petrograd.</p>
+
+<p>It was a most disastrous conflict for which no adequate explanation can be
+found except in the strained mental condition of all the principal parties
+concerned. In less strenuous times, and in a calmer atmosphere, the two
+leaders, equally patriotic, would have found no difficulty in removing
+misunderstandings. As things were, a mischievous intermediary, and two men
+suffering the effects of a prolonged and intense nervous strain, provided
+all the elements of a disaster. Kornilov's revolt was crushed without great
+trouble and with very little bloodshed, Kornilov himself being arrested.
+The Soviets stood by the Provisional Government, for they saw in the revolt
+the attempt to set up a personal dictatorship. Even the Bolsheviki were
+temporarily sobered by the sudden appearance of the "man on horseback."
+Kerensky, by direction of his colleagues, became commander-in-chief of the
+Russian armies. Always, it seemed, through every calamity, all parties
+except the Bolsheviki agreed that he was the one man strong enough to
+undertake the heaviest and hardest tasks.</p>
+
+<p>Toward the end of September what may be termed the Kerensky r&eacute;gime entered
+upon its last phase. For reasons <a name="Page_215" id="Page_215"></a>which have been already set forth, the
+Bolsheviki kept up a bitter attack upon the Provisional Government, and
+upon the official leaders of the Soviets, on account of the Moscow
+Conference. They demanded that the United Executive Committee of the
+Soviets convoke a new Conference. They contended that the Moscow Conference
+had been convoked by the government, not by the Soviets, and that the
+United Executive Committee must act for the latter. The United Executive
+Committee complied and summoned a new National Democratic Conference, which
+assembled on September 27th. By this time, as a result of the exhaustion of
+the patience of many workers, many of the Soviets had ceased to exist,
+while others existed on paper only. According to the <i>Izvestya Soveta</i>,
+there had been more than eight hundred region organizations at one time,
+many scores of which had disappeared. According to the same authority, the
+peasants were drawing away from the Workers' and Soldiers' Soviets. The
+United Executive Committee, which had been elected in June, was, of course,
+dominated by anti-Bolsheviki&mdash;that is, by Menshevik Social Democrats and by
+Socialist-Revolutionists.</p>
+
+<p>The Democratic Conference was not confined to the Soviets. It embraced
+delegates from Soviets of peasants, soldiers, and industrial workers; from
+municipalities, from zemstvos, co-operatives, and other organizations. It
+differed from the Moscow Conference principally in that the delegates were
+elected and that it did not include so many representatives of the
+capitalist class. The petty bourgeoisie was represented, but not the great
+capitalists. There were more than a thousand members in attendance at this
+Democratic Conference, which was dominated by the most moderate section of
+the Social Democrats. The Socialist-Revolutionists were not very numerous.</p><p><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216"></a></p>
+
+<p>This Conference created another Coalition Cabinet, the last of the Kerensky
+r&eacute;gime. Kerensky continued as Premier and as commander-in-chief of the
+army. There were in the Cabinet five Social Democrats, two
+Socialist-Revolutionists, eight Constitutional Democrats, and two
+non-partisans. It was therefore as far as its predecessors from meeting the
+standards insisted upon by many radical Socialists, who, while not
+Bolsheviki, still believed that there should be at least an absolute
+Socialist predominance in the Provisional Government. Of course, the new
+Coalition Ministry infuriated the Bolsheviki. From his hiding-place Lenine
+issued a series of "Letters to the Comrades," which were published in the
+<i>Rabochiy Put</i>, in which he urged the necessity of an armed uprising like
+that of July, only upon a larger scale. In these letters he scoffed at the
+Constituent Assembly as a poor thing to satisfy hungry men. Meanwhile,
+Trotzky, out of prison again, and other Bolshevik leaders were agitating by
+speeches, proclamations, and newspaper articles for an uprising. The
+Provisional Government dared not try to suppress them. Its hold upon the
+people was now too weak.</p>
+
+<p>The Democratic Conference introduced one innovation. It created a
+Preliminary Parliament, as the new body came to be known, though its first
+official title was the Provisional Council of the Republic. This new body
+was to function as a parliament until the Constituent Assembly convened,
+when it would give place to whatever form of parliamentary body the
+Constituent Assembly might create. This Preliminary Parliament and its
+functions were thus described:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>This Council, in which all classes of the population will be
+represented, and in which the delegates elected to the Democratic
+Conference will also participate, will be given the right <a name="Page_217" id="Page_217"></a>of
+addressing questions to the government and of securing replies to
+them in a definite period of time, of working out legislative acts
+and discussing all those questions which will be presented for
+consideration by the Provisional Government, as well as those
+which will arise on its own initiative. Resting on the
+co-operation of such a Council, the government, preserving, in
+accordance with its pledge, the unity of the governmental power
+created by the Revolution, will regard it its duty to consider the
+great public significance of such a Council in all its acts up to
+the time when the Constituent Assembly gives full and complete
+representation to all classes of the population of Russia.</p></div>
+
+<p>This Preliminary Parliament was really another Duma&mdash;that is, it was a very
+limited parliamentary body. Its life was short and quite uneventful. It
+assembled for the first time on October 8th and was dispersed by the
+Bolsheviki on November 7th. When it assembled there were 555 members&mdash;the
+number fixed by the decree of the Provisional Government. Of these, 53 were
+Bolsheviki, but these withdrew almost at the opening with three others,
+thus reducing the actual membership of the body to less than five hundred.
+Even with the Bolsheviki withdrawn, when Kerensky appeared before the
+Preliminary Parliament on November 6th and made his last appeal, a
+resolution expressing confidence in his government was carried only by a
+small majority. Only about three hundred members were in attendance on this
+occasion, and of these 123 voted the expression of confidence, while 102
+voted against it, and 26 declined to vote at all.</p>
+
+<p>The Bolsheviki had forced the United Executive Committee to convene a new
+All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and the date of its meeting had been fixed
+at November 7th. While the elections and arrangements for this Congress
+were proceeding, the Bolsheviki were actively and <a name="Page_218" id="Page_218"></a>openly organizing an
+uprising. In their papers and at their meetings they announced that on
+November 7th there would be an armed uprising against the government. Their
+intentions were, therefore, thoroughly well known, and it was believed that
+the government had taken every necessary step to repress any attempt to
+carry those intentions into practice. It was said that of the delegates to
+the All-Russian Congress of Soviets-numbering 676 as against more than one
+thousand at the former Congress of peasant Soviets alone&mdash;a majority were
+Bolsheviki. It was charged that the Bolsheviki had intimidated many workers
+into voting for their candidates; that they had, in some instances, put
+forward their men as anti-Bolsheviki and secured their election by false
+pretenses; that they had practised fraud in many instances. It was quite
+certain that a great many Soviets had refused to send delegates, and that
+many thousands of workers, and these all anti-Bolsheviki, had simply grown
+weary and disgusted with the whole struggle. Whatever the explanation might
+be, the fact remained that of the 676 delegates 390 were generally rated as
+Bolsheviki, while 230 were Socialist-Revolutionists and Mensheviki. Not all
+of the Socialist-Revolutionists could be counted as anti-Bolsheviki,
+moreover. There were fifty-six delegates whose position was not quite
+clearly defined, but who were regarded as being, if not Bolsheviki, at
+least anti-government. For the first time in the whole struggle the
+Bolsheviki apparently had a majority of delegates in a working-class
+convention.</p>
+
+<p>On the night of the 6th, a few hours before the opening of the Congress of
+Soviets, the Bolsheviki struck the blow they had been so carefully
+planning. They were not met with the resistance they had expected&mdash;for
+reasons which have never been satisfactorily explained. Kerensky recognized
+that it was useless for him to attempt to carry on <a name="Page_219" id="Page_219"></a>the fight. The
+Bolsheviki had organized their Red Guards, and these, directed by military
+leaders, occupied the principal government buildings, such as the central
+telephone and telegraph offices, the military-staff barracks, and so on.
+Part of the Petrograd garrison joined with the Bolsheviki, the other part
+simply refusing to do anything. On the morning of November 7th the members
+of the Provisional Government were arrested in the Winter Palace, but
+Kerensky managed to escape. The Bolshevik <i>coup d'&eacute;tat</i> was thus
+accomplished practically without bloodshed. A new government was formed,
+called the Council of People's Commissaries, of which Nikolai Lenine was
+President and Leon Trotzky Commissioner for Foreign Affairs. The
+"dictatorship of the proletariat" was thus begun. Kerensky's attempt to
+rally forces enough to put an end to this dictatorship was a pathetic
+failure, as it was bound to be. It was like the last fitful flicker with
+which a great flame dies. The masses wanted peace&mdash;for that they would
+tolerate even a dictatorship.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220"></a></p>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VI" id="CHAPTER_VI"></a>CHAPTER VI</h2>
+
+<h3>THE BOLSHEVIK WAR AGAINST DEMOCRACY</h3>
+
+
+<h4>I</h4>
+
+<p>The defenders and supporters of the Bolsheviki have made much of the fact
+that there was very little bloodshed connected with the successful
+Bolshevik uprising in Petrograd. That ought not to be permitted, however,
+to obscure the fundamental fact that it was a military <i>coup d'&eacute;tat</i>, the
+triumph of brute force over the will of the vast majority of the people. It
+was a crime against democracy. That the people were passive, worn out, and
+distracted, content to wait for the Constituent Assembly, only makes the
+Bolshevik crime appear the greater. Let us consider the facts very briefly.
+Less than three weeks away was the date set for the Constituent Assembly
+elections. Campaigns for the election of representatives to that great
+democratic convention were already in progress. It was to be the most
+democratic constitutional convention that ever existed in any country, its
+members being elected by the entire population, every man and woman in
+Russia being entitled to vote. The suffrage was equal, direct, universal,
+and secret.</p>
+
+<p>Moreover, there was a great democratic reconstruction of the nation
+actually in progress at the time. The building up of autonomous democratic
+local governing bodies, in the shape of a new type of zemstvos, was rapidly
+progressing.<a name="Page_221" id="Page_221"></a> The old-time zemstvos had been undemocratic and did not
+represent the working-people, but the new zemstvos were composed of
+representatives nominated and elected by universal suffrage, equal, secret,
+and direct. Instead of being very limited in their powers as the old
+zemstvos were, the new zemstvos were charged with all the ordinary
+functions of local government. The elections to these bodies served as an
+admirable practical education in democracy, making it more certain than
+would otherwise have been the case that the Russian people would know how
+to use their new political instrument so as to secure a Constituent
+Assembly fully representing their will and their desire.</p>
+
+<p>At the same time active preparations for holding the election of members to
+the Constituent Assembly were actually under way. The Socialist parties
+were making special efforts to educate the illiterate voters how to use
+their ballots correctly. The Provisional Government, on its part, was
+pushing the preparations for the elections as rapidly as possible. All over
+the country special courts were established, in central places, to train
+the necessary workers so that the elections might be properly conducted.
+Above all, the great problem of the socialization of the land which had
+been agitated for so many years had now reached the stage at which its
+solution might almost have been said to be complete. The National Soviet of
+Peasants, together with the Socialist Revolutionary party, had formulated a
+law on the subject which represented the aspiration and the best thought of
+the leaders of the peasants' movement. That law had been approved in the
+Council of Ministers and was ready for immediate promulgation. Peasant
+leaders like Chernov, Rakitnikov, Vikhiliaev, and Maslov had put an immense
+amount of work into the formulation of this law, which <a name="Page_222" id="Page_222"></a>aimed to avoid
+anarchy, to see to it that instead of an individualistic scramble by the
+peasants for the land, in small and unorganized holdings, the problem
+should be scientifically dealt with, lands being justly distributed among
+the peasant communes, and among the peasants who had been despoiled, and
+large estates co-operatively organized and managed.</p>
+
+<p>All this the Bolsheviki knew, for it was common knowledge. There is no
+truth whatever in the claim set up by many of the apologists for the
+Bolsheviki that they became enraged and resorted to desperate tactics
+because nothing effective was being done to realize the aims of the
+Revolution, to translate its ideals into fact. Quite the contrary is true.
+<i>The Bolshevik insurrection was precipitated by its leaders precisely
+because they saw that the Provisional Government was loyally and
+intelligently carrying out the program of the Revolution, in co-operation
+with the majority of the working-class organizations and their leaders.</i></p>
+
+<p>The Bolsheviki did not want the ideals of the Revolution to be realized,
+for the very simple reason that they were opposed to those ideals. In all
+the long struggle from Herzen to Kerensky the revolutionary movement of
+Russia had stood for political democracy first of all. Now, at the moment
+when political democracy was being realized, the Bolsheviki sought to kill
+it and to set up something else&mdash;namely, a dictatorship of a small party of
+less than two hundred thousand over a nation of one hundred and eighty
+millions. There can be no dispute as to this aim; it has been stated by
+Lenine with great frankness. "<i>Just as one hundred and fifty thousand
+lordly landowners under Czarism dominated the one hundred and thirty
+millions of Russian peasants, so two hundred thousand members of the
+Bolshevik party are imposing their proletarian <a name="Page_223" id="Page_223"></a>will on the mass, but this
+time in the interest of the latter.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_23_23" id="FNanchor_23_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_23" class="fnanchor">[23]</a></p>
+
+<p>Lenine's figures probably exaggerate the Bolshevik numbers, but, assuming
+them to be accurate, can anybody in his right mind, knowing anything of the
+history of the Russian revolutionary movement, believe that the
+substitution of a ruling class of one hundred and fifty thousand by one of
+two hundred thousand, to govern a nation of one hundred and eighty
+millions, was the end to which so many lives were sacrificed? Can any sane
+and sincere person believe that the class domination described by the great
+arch-Bolshevik himself comes within measurable distance of being as much of
+a realization of the ideals of the Revolution as did the Constituent
+Assembly plan with its basis of political democracy, universal, equal,
+direct, secret, all-determining suffrage? We do not forget Lenine's
+statement that this new domination of the people by a ruling minority
+differs from the old r&eacute;gime in that the Bolsheviki are imposing their will
+upon the mass "<i>in the interest of the latter</i>." What ruling class ever
+failed to make that claim? Was it not the habit of the Czars, all of them,
+during the whole revolutionary epoch, to indulge in the pious cant of
+proclaiming that they were motived only by their solicitude for the
+interests and well-being of the peasants?</p>
+
+<p>It is a curious illustration of the superficial character of the Bolshevist
+mentality that a man so gifted intellectually as Lenine undoubtedly is
+should advance in justification of his policy a plea so repugnant to
+morality and intelligence, and that it should be quietly accepted by men
+and women calling themselves radical revolutionists. Some years ago a
+well-known American capitalist announced with great solemnity that he and
+men like <a name="Page_224" id="Page_224"></a>himself were the agents of Providence, charged with managing
+industry "for the good of the people." Naturally, his na&iuml;ve claim provoked
+the scornful laughter of every radical in the land. Yet, strange as it may
+seem, whenever I have pointed out to popular audiences that Lenine asserted
+the right of two hundred thousand proletarians to impose their rule upon
+Russia, always, without a single exception, some defender of the
+Bolsheviki&mdash;generally a Socialist or a member of the I.W.W.&mdash;has entered
+the plea, "Yes, but it is for the good of the people!"</p>
+
+<p>If the Bolsheviki had wanted to see the realization of the ideals of the
+Revolution, they would have found in the conditions existing immediately
+prior to their insurrection a challenge calling them to the service of the
+nation, in support of the Provisional Government and the Preliminary
+Parliament. They would have permitted nothing to imperil the success of the
+program that was so well advanced. As it was, determination to defeat that
+program was their impelling motive. Not only did they fear and oppose
+<i>political</i> democracy; they were equally opposed to democracy in
+<i>industry</i>, to that democracy in the economic life of the nation which
+every Socialist movement in the world had at all times acknowledged to be
+its goal. As we shall see, they united to political dictatorship industrial
+dictatorship. They did not want democracy, but power; they did not want
+peace, even, as they wanted power.</p>
+
+<p>The most painstaking and sympathetic study of the Russian Revolution will
+not disclose any great ideal or principle, moral or political, underlying
+the distinctive Bolshevik agitation and program. Nothing could well be
+farther from the truth than the view taken by many amiable people who,
+while disavowing the actions of the Bolsheviki, seek to mitigate the
+judgment which mankind <a name="Page_225" id="Page_225"></a>pronounces against them by the plea that, after
+all, they are extreme idealists, misguided, of course, but, nevertheless,
+inspired by a noble ideal; that they are trying, as John Brown and many
+others have tried, to realize a great ideal, but have been made incapable
+of seeing their ideal in its proper perspective, and, therefore, of making
+the compromises and adjustments which the transmutation of ideals to
+reality always requires.</p>
+
+<p>No sympathizer with Russia&mdash;certainly no Socialist&mdash;can fail to wish that
+this indulgent criticism were true. Its acceptance would lighten the
+darkest chapter in Russian history, and, at the same time, remove from the
+great international Socialist movement a shameful reproach. But the facts
+are incompatible with such a theory. Instead of being fanatical idealists,
+incapable of compromises and adjustments, the Bolsheviki have, from the
+very beginning, been loudly scornful of rigid and unbending idealism; have
+made numerous compromises, alliances, and "political deals," and have
+repeatedly shifted their ground in accordance with political expediency.
+They have been consistently loyal to no aim save one&mdash;the control of power.
+They have been opportunists of the most extreme type. There is not a single
+Socialist or democratic principle which they have not abandoned when it
+served, their political ends; not a single instrument, principle, or device
+of autocratic despotism which they have not used when by so doing they
+could gain power. For the motto of Bolshevism we might well paraphrase the
+well-known line of Horace, and make it read, "Get power, honestly, if you
+can, if not&mdash;somehow or other."</p>
+
+<p>Of course, this judgment applies only to Bolshevism as such: to the special
+and peculiar methods and ideas which distinguish the Bolsheviki from their
+fellow-Socialists.<a name="Page_226" id="Page_226"></a> It is not to be questioned that as Socialists and
+revolutionists they have been inspired by some of the great ideals common
+to all Socialists everywhere. But they differed from the great mass of
+Russian Socialists so fundamentally that they separated themselves from
+them and became a separate and distinct party. <i>That which caused this
+separation is the essence of Bolshevism&mdash;not the ideals held in common</i>. No
+understanding of Bolshevism is possible unless this fundamental fact is
+first fully understood. Power, to be gained at any cost, and ruthlessly
+applied, by the proletarian minority, is the basic principle of Bolshevism
+as a distinct form of revolutionary movement. Of course, the Bolshevik
+leaders sought this power for no sordid, self-aggrandizing ends; they are
+not self-seeking adventurers, as many would have us believe. They are
+sincerely and profoundly convinced that the goal of social and economic
+freedom and justice can be more easily attained by their method than by the
+method of democratic Socialism. Still, the fact remains that what social
+ideals they hold are no part of Bolshevism. They are Socialist ideals.
+Bolshevism is a distinctive method and a program, and its essence is the
+relentless use of power by the proletariat against the rest of society in
+the same manner that the bourgeois and military rulers of nations have
+commonly used it against the proletariat. Bolshevism has simply inverted
+the old Czarist r&eacute;gime.</p>
+
+<p>The fairness and justice of this judgment are demonstrated by the
+Bolsheviki themselves. They denounced Kerensky's government for not holding
+the elections for the Constituent Assembly sooner, posing as the champions
+of the Constituante. When they had themselves assumed control of the
+government they delayed the meeting of the Constituent Assembly and then
+suppressed <a name="Page_227" id="Page_227"></a>it by force of arms! They denounced Kerensky for having
+restored the death penalty in the army in cases of gross treachery,
+professing an intense horror of capital punishment as a form of "bourgeois
+savagery." When they came into power they instituted capital punishment for
+<i>civil</i> and <i>political offenses</i>, establishing public hangings and
+floggings as a means of impressing the population!<a name="FNanchor_24_24" id="FNanchor_24_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_24" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> They had bitterly
+assailed Kerensky for his "militarism," for trying to build up the army and
+for urging men to fight. In less critical circumstances they themselves
+resorted to forced conscription. They condemned Kerensky and his colleagues
+for "interfering with freedom of speech and press." When they came into
+power they suppressed all non-Bolshevist papers and meetings in a manner
+differing not at all from that of the Czar's r&eacute;gime, forcing the other
+Socialist parties and groups to resort to the old pre-Revolution
+"underground" methods.</p>
+
+<p>The evidence of all these things, and things even worse than these, is
+conclusive and unimpeachable. It is contained in the records of the
+Bolshevik government, in its publications, and in the reports of the great
+Socialist parties of Russia, officially made to the International Socialist
+Bureau. Surely the evidence sustains the charge that, whatever else they
+may or may not be, the Bolsheviki are not unbending and uncompromising
+idealists of the type of John Brown and William Lloyd Garrison, as they are
+so often represented as being by well-meaning sentimentalists whose
+indulgence of the Bolsheviki is as unlimited as their ignorance concerning
+them.</p>
+
+<p>Some day, perhaps, a competent psychologist will attempt the task of
+explaining the psychology of our fellow-citizens who are so ready to defend
+the Bolsheviki for <a name="Page_228" id="Page_228"></a>doing the very things they themselves hate and condemn.
+In any list of men and women in this country friendly to the Bolsheviki it
+will be found that they are practically all pacifists and
+anti-conscriptionists, while a great many are non-resistants and
+conscientious objectors to military service. Practically all of them are
+vigorous defenders of the freedom of the press, of the right of public
+assemblage and of free speech. With the exception of a few Anarchists, they
+are almost universally strong advocates of radical political democracy. How
+can high-minded and intelligent men and women&mdash;as many of them are&mdash;holding
+such beliefs as these give countenance to the Bolsheviki, who bitterly and
+resolutely oppose all of them? How can they denounce America's adoption of
+conscription and say that it means that "Democracy is dead in America"
+while, at the same time, hailing the birth of democracy in Russia, where
+conscription is enforced by the Bolsheviki? How, again, can they at one and
+the same time condemn American democracy for its imperfections, as in the
+matter of suffrage, while upholding and defending the very men who, in
+Russia, deliberately set out to destroy the universal equal suffrage
+already achieved? How can they demand freedom of the press and of
+assemblage, even in war-time, and denounce such restrictions as we have had
+to endure here in America, and at the same time uphold the men responsible
+for suppressing the press and public assemblages in Russia in a manner
+worse than was attempted by the Czar? Is there no logical sense in the
+average radical's mind? Or can it be that, after all, the people who make
+up the Bolshevist following, and who are so much given to engaging in
+protest demonstrations of various kinds, are simply restless, unanchored
+spirits, for whom the stimulant and excitation of revolt is a necessity?
+How many are simply victims <a name="Page_229" id="Page_229"></a>of subtle neuroses occasioned by sex
+derangements, by religious chaos, and similar causes?</p>
+
+
+<h4>II</h4>
+
+<p>The Bolshevik rule began as a reign of terror. We must not make the mistake
+of supposing that it was imposed upon the rest of Russia as easily as it
+was imposed upon Petrograd, where conditions were exceptional. In the
+latter city, with the assistance of the Preobrajenski and Seminovsky
+regiments from the garrison, and of detachments of sailors from the Baltic
+fleet, to all of whom most extravagant promises were made, the <i>coup
+d'&eacute;tat</i> was easily managed with little bloodshed. But in a great many other
+places the Bolshevist rule was effected in no such peaceful fashion, but by
+means of a bloody terror. Here, for example, is the account of the manner
+in which the counter-revolution of the Bolsheviki was accomplished at
+Saratov, as given by a competent eye-witness, a well-known Russian
+Socialist whose long and honorable service in the revolutionary movement
+entitles her to the honor of every friend of Free Russia&mdash;Inna
+Rakitnikov:<a name="FNanchor_25_25" id="FNanchor_25_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_25" class="fnanchor">[25]</a></p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>Here ... is how the Bolshevist <i>coup d'&eacute;tat</i> took place at
+Saratov. I was witness to these facts myself. Saratov is a big
+university and intellectual center, possessing a great number of
+schools, libraries, and divers associations designed to elevate
+the intellectual standard of the population. The Zemstvo of
+Saratov was one of the best in Russia. The peasant population of
+this province, among whom the revolutionary Socialist propaganda
+was carried on for several years, by the Revolutionary Socialist
+party, is wide awake and well organized. The Municipality and the
+Agricultural Committees were composed of Socialists.<a name="Page_230" id="Page_230"></a> The
+population was actively preparing for the elections to the
+Constituent Assembly; the people discussed the list of candidates,
+studied the candidates' biographies, as well as the programs of
+the different parties. On the night of October 28th [November
+10th, European calendar], by reason of an order that had come from
+Petrograd, the Bolshevik <i>coup d'&eacute;tat</i> broke out at Saratov. The
+following forces were its instruments: the garrison, which was a
+stranger to the mass of the population, a weak party of workers,
+and, in the capacity of leaders, some Intellectuals, who, up to
+that time, had played no r&ocirc;le in the public life of the town.</p>
+
+<p>It was indeed a military <i>coup d'&eacute;tat. The city hall, where sat
+the Socialists, who were elected by equal, direct, and secret
+universal suffrage, was surrounded by soldiers; machine-guns were
+placed in front and the bombardment began. This lasted a whole
+night; some were wounded, some killed</i>. The municipal judges were
+arrested. Soon after a Manifesto solemnly announced to the
+population that the "enemies of the people," the
+"counter-revolutionaries," were overthrown; that the power of
+Saratov was going to pass into the hands of the Soviet
+(Bolshevist) of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates.</p></div>
+
+<p>As soon as the overthrow of the existing authorities was effected and the
+Bolsheviki, through their Red Guards and other means, were in a position to
+exert their authority, they resorted to every method of oppression and
+repression known to the old autocratic r&eacute;gime. They suppressed the papers
+of the Socialist parties and groups opposed to them, and in some instances
+confiscated the plants, turned out the editors, and used the papers
+themselves. In one of his "Letters to the Comrades," published in the
+<i>Rabochiy Put</i>, a few days before the insurrection, Lenine had confessed
+that Kerensky had maintained freedom of the press and of assemblage. The
+passage is worth quoting, not only for the information it contains
+concerning the Kerensky r&eacute;gime, but also because it affords a standard by
+which to judge the Bolsheviki. Lenine wrote:</p><p><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231"></a></p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>The Germans have only one Liebknecht, no newspapers, no freedom of
+assemblage, no councils; they are working against the intense
+hostility of all classes of the population, including the wealthy
+peasants&mdash;with the imperialist bourgeoisie splendidly
+organized&mdash;and yet the Germans are making some attempt at
+agitation; <i>while we, with tens of papers, with freedom of
+assemblage, with the majority of the Council with us, we, the best
+situated of all the proletarian internationalists, can we refuse
+to support the German revolutionists in organizing a revolt?</i></p></div>
+
+<p>That it was not the "German revolutionists" who in November, 1917, wanted
+the Russians to revolt against the Kerensky government, but the Majority
+Socialists, upon whom Lenine had poured his contempt, on the one hand, and
+the German General Staff, on the other hand, is a mere detail. The
+important thing is that Lenine admitted that under the Kerensky government
+the Russian workers, including the Bolsheviki, were "the best situated of
+all the proletarian internationalists," and that they had "tens of papers,
+with freedom of assemblage." In the face of such statements by Lenine
+himself, written a few days before the Bolshevik counter-revolution, what
+becomes of the charge that the suppression of popular liberties under
+Kerensky was one of the main causes of the revolt of the Bolsheviki?</p>
+
+<p>Against the tolerance of Kerensky, the arbitrary and despotic methods of
+the Bolsheviki stand out in strong contrast. Many non-Bolshevist Socialist
+organs were suppressed; papers containing matter displeasing to the
+Bolshevik authorities were suspended, whole issues were confiscated, and
+editors were imprisoned, precisely as in the days of the Czar. It became
+necessary for the Socialist-Revolutionists to issue their paper with a
+different title, and from a different place, every day. Here is the
+testimony of Inna Rakitnikov again, contained in an official report to the
+International Socialist Bureau:</p><p><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232"></a></p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>All the non-Bolshevik newspapers were confiscated or prosecuted
+and deprived of every means of reaching the provinces; their
+editors' offices and printing-establishments were looted. After
+the creation of the "Revolutionary Tribunal" the authors of
+articles that were not pleasing to the Bolsheviki, as well as the
+directors of newspapers, were brought to judgment and condemned to
+make amends or go to prison, etc.</p>
+
+<p>The premises of numerous organizations were being constantly
+pillaged. The Red Guard came there to search, destroying different
+documents; frequently objects which were found on the premises
+disappeared. Thus were looted the premises of the Central
+Committee of the Revolutionary Socialist party (27 Galernaia
+Street) and&mdash;several times&mdash;the office of the paper <i>Dielo Naroda</i>
+(22 Liteinia Street) ... the office of the paper Volya Naroda,
+etc.... But the Central Committee ... continued to issue a daily
+paper, only changing its title, as in the time of Czarism, and
+thus continued its propaganda....</p></div>
+
+<p>The <i>Yolya Naroda</i>, referred to by Inna Rakitnikov, was the official organ
+of the Socialist-Revolutionary party. It was raided on several occasions.
+For example, in January, 1918, the leaders of the party reported that a
+detachment of Bolshevik Red Guards had broken into the office of the paper,
+committed various depredations, and made several arrests.<a name="FNanchor_26_26" id="FNanchor_26_26"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_26" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> Here is
+another Socialist witness: One of the ablest of the leaders of the Bohemian
+Socialists in the United States is Joseph Martinek, the brilliant and
+scholarly editor of the Bohemian Socialist weekly, the <i>Delnicke Listy</i>. He
+has always been identified with the radical section of the movement. A
+student of Russian history, speaking the language fluently, it was his good
+fortune to spend several weeks in Petrograd immediately before and after
+the Bolshevik counter-revolution. He testifies that the "freedom of the
+press established by Kerensky" was "terminated by the<a name="Page_233" id="Page_233"></a> Bolsheviki."<a name="FNanchor_27_27" id="FNanchor_27_27"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_27" class="fnanchor">[27]</a>
+This is not the testimony of "capitalist newspapers," but of Socialists of
+unquestionable authority and standing. The <i>Dielo Naroda</i> was a Socialist
+paper, and the volunteer venders of it, who were brutally beaten and shot
+down by Red Guards, were Socialist working-men.<a name="FNanchor_28_28" id="FNanchor_28_28"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_28" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> When Oskar Tokoi, the
+well-known revolutionary Finnish Socialist leader, former Prime Minister of
+Finland, declares that "freedom of assemblage, association, free speech,
+and free press is altogether destroyed,"<a name="FNanchor_29_29" id="FNanchor_29_29"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_29" class="fnanchor">[29]</a> the Bolsheviki and their
+sympathizers cannot plead that they are the victims of "capitalist
+misrepresentation." The attitude of the Bolshevik leaders toward the
+freedom of the press has been frankly stated editorially in Pravda, their
+official organ, in the following words:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>The press is a most dangerous weapon in the hands of our enemies.
+We will tear it from them, we will reduce it to impotence. It is
+the moment for us to prepare battle. We will be inflexible in our
+defense of the rights of the exploited. The struggle will be
+decisive. We are going to smite the journals with fines, to shut
+them up, to arrest the editors, and hold them as hostages.<a name="FNanchor_30_30" id="FNanchor_30_30"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_30" class="fnanchor">[30]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>Is it any wonder that Paul Axelrod, who was one of the representatives of
+Russia on the International Socialist Bureau prior to the outbreak of the
+war, has been forced to declare that the Bolsheviki have "introduced into
+Russia a system worse than Czarism, suppressing the Constituent Assembly
+and the liberty of the press"?<a name="FNanchor_31_31" id="FNanchor_31_31"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_31" class="fnanchor">[31]</a> Or that the beloved veteran of the
+Russian Revolution,<a name="Page_234" id="Page_234"></a> Nicholas Tchaykovsky, should lament that "the
+Bolshevik usurpation is the continuation of the government by which Czarism
+held the country in an iron grip"?<a name="FNanchor_32_32" id="FNanchor_32_32"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_32" class="fnanchor">[32]</a></p>
+
+
+<h4>III</h4>
+
+<p>Lenine, Trotzky, Zinoviev, and other Bolshevik leaders early found
+themselves so much at variance with the accepted Socialist position that
+they decided to change their party name. They had been Social Democrats, a
+part of the Social Democratic party of Russia. Now ever since Bronterre
+O'Brien first used the terms "Social Democrat" and "Social Democracy," in
+1839, their meaning has been pretty well established. A Social Democrat is
+one who aims to base government and industry upon democracy. Certainly,
+this cannot be said to be an accurate description of the position of men
+who believe in the rule of a nation of one hundred and eighty millions by a
+small party of two hundred thousand or less&mdash;or even by an entire class
+representing not more than six per cent. of the population&mdash;and Lenine and
+his friends, recognizing the fact, decided to change the name of their
+group to the <i>Communist party</i>, by which name they are now known in Russia.
+Lenine frankly admits that it would be a mistake to speak of this party as
+a party of democracy. He says:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>The word "democracy" cannot be scientifically applied to the
+Communist party. Since March, 1917, the word democracy is simply a
+shackle fastened upon the revolutionary nation and preventing it
+from establishing boldly, freely, and regardless of all obstacles
+a new form of power; the Council of Workmen's,<a name="Page_235" id="Page_235"></a> Soldiers' and
+Peasants' Deputies, harbinger of the abolition of every form of
+authority.<a name="FNanchor_33_33" id="FNanchor_33_33"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_33" class="fnanchor">[33]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>The phrase "harbinger of the abolition of every form of authority" would
+seem to indicate that Lenine's ideal is that of the old Nihilists&mdash;or of
+Anarchists of the Bakuninist school. That is very far from the truth. The
+phrase in question is merely a rhetorical flourish. No man has more
+caustically criticized and ridiculed the Anarchists for their dream of
+organization without authority than Nikolai Lenine. Moreover, his
+conception of Soviet government provides for a very strong central
+authority. It is a new kind of state, but a state, nevertheless, and, as we
+shall discover, far more powerful than the political state with which we
+are familiar, exercising far greater control over the life of the
+individual. It is not to be a democratic state, but a very despotic one, a
+dictatorship by a small but powerful ruling class. It was not the word
+"democracy" which Lenine felt to be a "shackle upon the revolutionary
+nation," but democracy itself.</p>
+
+<p>The manner in which they betrayed the Constituent Assembly will prove the
+complete hostility of the Bolsheviki to democratic government. In order to
+excuse and justify the Bolsheviki's actions in this regard, their
+supporters in this country have assiduously circulated two statements. They
+are, first, that the Provisional Government purposely and with malicious
+intent delayed the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, hoping to stave
+it off altogether; second, that such a long time had elapsed between the
+elections and the convocation that when the latter date was reached the
+delegates no longer represented the true feeling of the electorate.</p><p><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236"></a></p>
+
+<p>With regard to the first of these statements, which is a repetition of a
+charge made by Trotzky before the Bolshevik revolt, it is to be noted that
+it is offered in justification of the Bolshevik <i>coup d'&eacute;tat</i>. If the
+charge made were true, instead of false, as it can easily be shown to be,
+it would only justify the counter-revolution if the counter-revolution
+itself were made the instrument for insuring the safety of the Constituent
+Assembly. But the Bolsheviki <i>suppressed the Constituent Assembly</i>. By what
+process of reasoning do we reach the result that because the Provisional
+Government delayed the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, which the
+people desired, a counter-revolutionary movement to <i>suppress it
+altogether</i>, by force of arms, was right and proper?</p>
+
+<p>With regard to the second statement, which is a repetition of an argument
+advanced in Russia, it should be sufficient to emphasize a few dates. The
+Bolsheviki seized the power of government on November 7th and the elections
+for the Constituent Assembly took place on November 25th&mdash;nearly three
+weeks later. The date set by the Kerensky government for the opening of the
+Constituent Assembly was December 12th and on that date some forty-odd
+members put in an appearance. Recognizing that they could not begin
+business until a quorum appeared, these decided to wait until at least a
+quorum should be present. They did not attempt to do any work. What
+happened is told in the following passages from a signed statement by 109
+members&mdash;all Socialist-Revolutionists.<a name="FNanchor_34_34" id="FNanchor_34_34"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_34" class="fnanchor">[34]</a></p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>On the appointed day and hour of the opening of the session of the
+Constituent Assembly ... the delegates to the Constituent Assembly
+who had arrived in Petrograd gathered at the Tavrichesky<a name="Page_237" id="Page_237"></a> Palace.
+The elected representatives of the people beheld innumerable
+banners and large crowds surrounding the palace. This was
+Petrograd greeting the representatives of the people. At the doors
+of the palace the picture changed. There stood armed guards and at
+the orders of the usurpers, the Bolsheviki, they refused to let
+the delegates pass into the Tavrichesky Palace. It appeared that,
+in order to enter the building, the <i>delegates had first to pay
+respects to the Commissaire, a satellite of Lenine and Trotzky,
+and there receive special permission</i>. The delegates would not
+submit to that; elected by the people and equipped with formal
+authorization, they had the right to freely enter any public
+building assigned for their meeting. The delegates decided to
+enter the Tavrichesky Palace without asking the new authorities,
+and they succeeded in doing so. On the first day the guards did
+not dare to lift their arms against the people's elected
+representatives and allowed them to enter the building without
+molestation.</p>
+
+<p>There was no struggle, no violence, no sacrifices; the delegates
+demanded that the guards respect their rights; they demanded to be
+admitted, and the guards yielded.</p>
+
+<p>In the Tavrichesky Palace the delegates opened their meeting; V.M.
+Chernov was elected chairman. There were, altogether, about forty
+delegates present. They realized that there were not enough
+present to start the work of the Constituent Assembly. <i>It was
+decided that it would be advisable to await the arrival of the
+other delegates and start the work of the Constituent Assembly
+only when a sufficient number were present</i>. Those already there
+decided to meet daily at the Tavrichesky Palace in order to count
+all the delegates as they arrived, and on an appointed day to
+publicly announce the day and hour of the beginning of the
+activities of the Constituent Assembly.</p>
+
+<p>When the delegates finished their session and adjourned, the old
+guards had been dismissed for their submissive attitude toward the
+delegates and replaced by armed civilian followers of Lenine and
+Trotzky. The latter issued an order to disband the delegates, but
+there were none to be disbanded.</p>
+
+<p>The following day the government of the Bolsheviki dishonestly and
+basely slandered the people's representatives in their official
+announcement which appeared in Pravda. That lying newspaper wrote
+that the representatives of the people had forced their way into
+the palace, accompanied by Junkers and <a name="Page_238" id="Page_238"></a>the White Guards of the
+bourgeoisie, that the representatives wanted to take advantage of
+their small numbers and had begun the work of the Constituent
+Assembly. Every one knows that this is slanderous as regards the
+representatives of the people. Such lies and slanders were
+resorted to by the old r&eacute;gime.</p>
+
+<p>The aim of the slanders and the lies is clear. <i>The usurpers do
+not want the people's representatives to have the supreme power
+and therefore are preparing to disband the Constituent Assembly</i>.
+On the 28th of November, in the evening, <i>having begun to arrest
+members of the Constitutional-Democratic party, the Bolsheviki
+violated the inviolability of the Constituent Assembly. On
+December 3d a delegate to the Constituent Assembly, the
+Socialist-Revolutionist, Filippovsky, who was elected by the army
+on the southwestern front, was arrested</i>.</p>
+
+<p>In accordance with their decision reached on November 28th, the
+delegates gathered at the Tavrichesky Palace on November 29th and
+30th. As on the first day, armed soldiers stood guard at the
+entrance of the palace and would not let any one pass. The
+delegates, however, insisted and were finally allowed to enter.</p>
+
+<p>On the third day, scenes of brutal violence toward the people's
+representatives took place at the palace. Peasants were the
+unfortunate victims of this violence.</p>
+
+<p>When the delegates had ended their session and all that remained
+was the affixing of the signatures to the minutes, sailors forced
+their way into the hall; these were headed by a Bolshevik officer,
+<i>a former commander of the Fortress of St. Peter and St. Paul</i>.
+The commander demanded that the delegates disband. In reply it was
+stated that the delegates would disband after they had finished
+their business. Then at the order of the commander the sailors
+took the delegate Ilyan, elected by the peasants of the Province
+of Tambov, by the arm and dragged him to the exit. After Ilyan,
+the sailors dragged out the peasant delegate from the Province of
+Moscow, Bikov; then the sailors approached Maltzev, a peasant
+delegate from the Province of Kostroma. He, however, shouted out
+that he would rather be shot than to submit to such violence. His
+courage appealed to the sailors and they stopped.</p>
+
+<p>Now all the halls in the Tavrichesky Palace are locked and it is
+impossible to meet there. The delegates who come to the
+Tavrichesky Palace cannot even gather in the lobby, for as soon
+<a name="Page_239" id="Page_239"></a>as a group gathers, the armed hirelings of Lenine and Trotzky
+disperse them. Thus, in former times, behaved the servants of the
+Czar and the enemies of the people, policemen and gendarmes.</p></div>
+
+<p>This is not the testimony of correspondents of bourgeois journals; it is
+from a statement prepared at the time and signed by more than a hundred
+Socialists, members of the oldest and largest Socialist party in Russia,
+many of them men whose long and honorable service has endeared them to
+their comrades in all lands. It is not testimony that can be impeached or
+controverted. It forms part of the report of these well-known and trusted
+Socialists to their comrades in Russia and elsewhere. The claim that the
+elections to the Constituent Assembly were held on the basis of an obsolete
+register, before the people had a chance to become acquainted with the
+Bolshevist program, and that so long a time had elapsed since the elections
+that the delegates could not be regarded as true representatives of the
+people, was first put forward by the Bolsheviki when the Constituent
+Assembly was finally convened, on January 18th. It was an absurd claim for
+the Bolsheviki to make, for one of the very earliest acts of the Bolshevik
+government, after the overthrow of Kerensky, was to issue a decree ordering
+that the elections be held as arranged. By that act they assumed
+responsibility for the elections, and could not fairly and honorably enter
+the plea, later on, that the elections were not valid.</p>
+
+<p>Here is the story of the struggle for the Constituent Assembly, briefly
+summarized. The first Provisional Government issued a Manifesto on March
+20, 1917, promising to convoke the Constituent Assembly "as soon as
+possible." This promise was repeated by the Provisional Government when it
+was reorganized after the <a name="Page_240" id="Page_240"></a>resignation of Miliukov and Guchkov in the
+middle of May. That the promise was sincere there can be no reasonable
+doubt, for the Provisional Government at once set about creating a
+commission to work out the necessary machinery and was for the election by
+popular vote of delegates to the Constituent Assembly. Russia was not like
+a country which had ample electoral machinery already existing; new
+machinery had to be devised for the purpose. This commission was opened on
+June 7, 1917; its work was undertaken with great earnestness, and completed
+in a remarkably short time, with the result that on July 22d the
+Provisional Government&mdash;Kerensky at its head&mdash;announced that the elections
+to the Constituent Assembly would be held on September 30th, and the
+convocation of the Assembly itself on the 12th of December. It was soon
+found, however, that it would be physically impossible for the local
+authorities all to be prepared to hold the election on the date set&mdash;it was
+necessary, among other things, to first elect the local authorities which
+were to arrange for the election of the delegates to the Constituent
+Assembly&mdash;and so, on August 22d, Kerensky signed the following decree,
+making <i>the one and only postponement</i> of the Constituent Assembly, so far
+as the Provisional Government was concerned:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>Desiring to assure the convocation of the Constituent Assembly as
+soon as possible, the Provisional Government designated the 30th
+of September as election-day, in which case the whole burden of
+making up the election lists must fall on the municipalities and
+the newly elected zemstvos. <i>The enormous labor of holding the
+elections for the local institution has taken time</i>. At present,
+in view of the date of establishment of the local institutions, on
+the basis decreed by the government&mdash;direct, general, equal, and
+secret suffrage&mdash;the Provisional Government has decided:</p><p><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241"></a></p>
+
+<p>To set aside as the day for the elections to the Constituent
+Assembly the 25th of November, of the year 1917, and as the date
+for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly the 12th of
+December, of the year 1917.</p></div>
+
+<p>Notwithstanding this clear and honorable record, we find Trotzky, at a
+Conference of Northern Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, on
+October 25th, when he well knew that arrangements for holding the
+Constituent Assembly elections were in full swing, charging that Kerensky
+was engaged in preventing the convocation of the Constituent Assembly! He
+demanded at that time that all power should be taken from the Provisional
+Government and transferred to the Soviets. These, he said, would convoke
+the Assembly on the date that had been assigned, December 12th.</p>
+
+<p>The Bolshevik <i>coup d'&eacute;tat</i> took place, as already noted, less than three
+weeks before the date set for the elections, for which every preparation
+had been made by the government and the local authorities. It was at the
+beginning of the campaign, and the Bolsheviki had their own candidates in
+the field in many places. It was a foregone conclusion that the Constituent
+Assembly brought into being by the universal suffrage would be dominated by
+Socialists. There was never the slightest fear that it would be dominated
+by the bourgeois parties. What followed is best told in the exact language
+of a protest to the International Socialist Bureau by Inna Rakitnikov,
+representative of the Revolutionary Socialist party, which was, be it
+remembered, the largest and the oldest of the Russian Socialist parties:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>The <i>coup d'&eacute;tat</i> was followed by various other manifestations of
+Bolshevist activity&mdash;arrests, searches, confiscation of
+newspapers, ban on meetings. Bands of soldiers looted the country
+houses in the suburbs of the city; a school for the children of
+<a name="Page_242" id="Page_242"></a>the people and the buildings of the Children's Holiday Settlement
+were also pillaged. Bands of soldiers were forthwith sent into the
+country to cause trouble there.... The bands of soldiers who were
+sent into the country used not only persuasion, but also violence,
+<i>trying to force the peasants to give their votes for the
+Bolshevik candidates at the time of the elections to the
+Constituent Assembly; they tore up the bulletins of the
+Socialist-Revolutionists, overturned the ballot-boxes, etc</i>....
+The inhabitants of the country proved themselves in all that
+concerned the elections wide awake to the highest degree. There
+were hardly any abstentions; <i>90 per cent. of the population took
+part in the voting</i>. The day of the voting was kept as a solemn
+feast; the priest said mass; the peasants dressed in their best
+clothes; they believed that the Constituent Assembly would give
+them order, laws, the land. In the Government of Saratov, out of
+fourteen deputies elected, there were twelve
+Socialist-Revolutionists. There were others (such as the
+Government of Pensa, for example) that elected only
+Socialist-Revolutionists. The Bolsheviki had the majority only in
+Petrograd and Moscow and in certain units of the army. To violence
+and conquest of power by force of arms the population answered by
+the elections to the Constituent Assembly, the people sent to this
+Assembly, not the Bolsheviki, but, by an overwhelming majority,
+Socialist-Revolutionists.</p></div>
+
+<p>Of course, this is the testimony of one who is confessedly anti-Bolshevist,
+one who has suffered deep injury at the hands of the Bolsheviki of whom she
+writes. For all that, her testimony cannot be ignored or laughed aside. It
+has been indorsed by E. Roubanovitch, a member of the International
+Socialist Bureau, and a man of the highest integrity, in the following
+words: "I affirm that her sincere and matured testimony cannot be suspected
+of partizanship or of dogmatic partiality against the Bolsheviki." What is
+more important, however, is that the subsequent conduct of the Bolsheviki
+in all matters relating to the Constituent Assembly was such as to confirm
+belief in her statements.</p>
+
+<p>No Bolshevik spokesman has ever yet challenged the <a name="Page_243" id="Page_243"></a>accuracy of the
+statement that an overwhelming majority of the deputies elected to the
+Constituent Assembly were representatives of the Revolutionary Socialist
+party. As a matter of fact, the Bolsheviki elected less than one-third of
+the deputies. In the announcement of their withdrawal from the Constituent
+Assembly when it assembled in January the Bolshevik members admitted that
+the Socialist-Revolutionists had "obtained a majority of the Constituent
+Assembly."</p>
+
+<p>The attitude of the Bolsheviki toward the Constituent Assembly changed as
+their electoral prospects changed. At first, believing that, as a result of
+their successful <i>coup</i>, they would have the support of the great mass of
+the peasants and city workers, they were vigorous in their support of the
+Assembly. In the first of their "decrees" after the overthrow of the
+Kerensky Cabinet, the Bolshevik "Commissaries of the People" announced that
+they were to exercise complete power "until the meeting of the Constituent
+Assembly," which was nothing less than a pledge that they would regard the
+latter body as the supreme, ultimate authority. Three days after the revolt
+Lenine, as president of the People's Commissaries, published this decree:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>In the name of the Government of the Republic, elected by the
+All-Russian Congress of Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers'
+Delegates, with the participation of the Peasants' Delegates, the
+Council of the People's Commissaries decrees:</p>
+
+<p>1. That the elections to the Constituent Assembly shall be held on
+November 25th, the day set aside for this purpose.</p>
+
+<p>2. All electoral committees, all local organizations, the Councils
+of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates and the soldiers'
+organizations at the front are to bend every effort toward
+safeguarding the freedom of the voters and fair play at the
+elections to the Constituent Assembly, which will be held on the
+appointed date.</p></div><p><a name="Page_244" id="Page_244"></a></p>
+
+<p>If this attitude had been maintained throughout, and had the Bolsheviki
+loyally accepted the verdict of the electorate when it was given, there
+could have been no complaint. But the evidence shows that their early
+attitude was not maintained. Later on, as reports received from the
+interior of the country showed that the masses were not flocking to their
+banners, they began to assume a critical attitude toward the Constituent
+Assembly. The leaders of the Socialist-Revolutionary party were warning
+their followers that the Bolsheviki would try to wreck the Constituent
+Assembly, for which they were bitterly denounced in organs like <i>Pravda</i>
+and <i>Izvestya</i>. Very soon, however, these Bolshevist organs began to
+discuss the Constituent Assembly in a very critical spirit. It was
+possible, they pointed out, that it would have a bourgeois majority,
+treating the Socialist-Revolutionists and the Cadets as being on the same
+level, equally servants of the bourgeoisie. Then appeared editorials to
+show that it would not be possible to place the destinies of Russia in the
+hands of such people, even though they were elected by the "unthinking
+masses." Finally, when it was clear that the Socialist-Revolutionary party
+had elected a majority of the members, <i>Pravda</i> and <i>Izvestya</i> took the
+position that <i>the victorious people did not need a Constituent Assembly</i>;
+that a new instrument had been created which made the old democratic method
+obsolete.<a name="FNanchor_35_35" id="FNanchor_35_35"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_35" class="fnanchor">[35]</a> The "new instrument" was, of course, the Bolshevist Soviet.</p>
+
+
+<h4>IV</h4>
+
+<p>For the moment we are not concerned with the merits or the failings of the
+Soviet considered as an instrument <a name="Page_245" id="Page_245"></a>of government. We are concerned only
+with democracy and the relation of the Bolshevist method to democracy. From
+this point of view, then, let us consider the facts. The Soviet was not
+something new, as so many of our American drawing-room champions of
+Bolshevism seem to think. The Soviet was the type of organization common to
+Russia. There were Soviets of peasants, of soldiers, of teachers, of
+industrial workers, of officers, of professional men, and so on. Every
+class and every group in the classes had its own Soviet. The Soviet in its
+simplest form is a delegate body consisting of representatives of a
+particular group&mdash;a peasants' Soviet, for example. Another type, more
+important, roughly corresponds to the Central Labor Union in an American
+city, in that it is composed of representatives of workers of all kinds.
+These delegates are, in the main, chosen by the workers in the shops and
+factories and in the meetings of the unions. The anti-Bolshevist
+Socialists, such as the Mensheviki and the Socialist-Revolutionists, were
+not opposed to Soviets as working-class organizations. On the contrary,
+they approved of them, supported them, and, generally, belonged to them.</p>
+
+<p>They were opposed only to the theory that these Soviets, recruited in a
+more or less haphazard manner, as such organizations must necessarily be,
+were better adapted to the governing of a great country like Russia than a
+legal body which received its mandate in elections based upon universal,
+equal, direct, and secret suffrage. No one ever pretended that the Soviets
+represented all the workers of Russia&mdash;including peasants in that term&mdash;or
+even a majority of them. No one ever pretended that the Soviet, as such,
+was a stable and constant factor. New Soviets were always springing up and
+others dying out. Many existed only in name, on paper. <i>There never <a name="Page_246" id="Page_246"></a>has
+been an accurate list of the Soviets existing in Russia</i>. Many lists have
+been made, but always by the time they could be tabulated and published
+there have been many changes. For these and other reasons which will
+suggest themselves to the mind of any thoughtful reader, many of the
+leaders of the revolutionary movement in Russia have doubted the value of
+the Soviet as a <i>unit of government, while highly valuing it as a unit of
+working-class organization and struggle</i>.</p>
+
+<p>Back of all the strife between the Bolsheviki centered around the Soviets
+and the Socialist-Revolutionists and Mensheviki, centered around the
+Constituent Assembly, was a greater fact than any we have been discussing,
+however. The Bolsheviki with their doctrinaire Marxism had carried the
+doctrine of the class struggle to such extreme lengths that they virtually
+placed the great mass of the peasants with the bourgeoisie. The Revolution
+must be controlled by the proletariat, they argued. The control of the
+government and of industry by the people, which was the slogan of the old
+democracy, will not do, for the term "the people" includes bourgeois
+elements. Even if it is narrowed by excluding the great capitalists and
+landowners, still it embraces the lesser capitalists, small landowners,
+shopkeepers, and the petty bourgeoisie in general. These elements weaken
+the militancy of the proletariat. What is needed is the dictatorship of the
+proletariat. Now, only a very small part of the peasantry, the very poor
+peasants, can be safely linked to the proletariat&mdash;and even these must be
+carefully watched. It was a phase of the old and familiar conflict between
+agrarian and industrial groups in the Socialist movement. It is not very
+many years since the Socialist party of America was convulsed by a similar
+discussion. Could the farmer ever be a genuine and sincere and trustworthy<a name="Page_247" id="Page_247"></a>
+Socialist? The question was asked in the party papers in all seriousness,
+and in one or two state organizations measures were taken to limit the
+number of farmers entering the party, so that at all times there might be
+the certainty of a preponderance of proletarian over farmer votes.</p>
+
+<p>Similar distrust, only upon a much bigger scale, explains the fight for and
+against the Constituent Assembly. Lenine and his followers distrusted the
+peasants as a class whose interests were akin to the class of small
+property-owners. He would only unite with the poor, propertyless peasants.
+The leaders of the peasantry, on the other hand, supported by the more
+liberal Marxians, would expand the meaning of the term "working class" and
+embrace within its meaning all the peasants as well as all city workers,
+most of the professional classes, and so on. We can get some idea of this
+strife from a criticism which Lenine directs against the Mensheviki:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>In its class composition this party is not Socialist at all. It
+does not represent the toiling masses. It represents fairly
+prosperous peasants and working-men, petty traders, many small and
+some even fairly large capitalists, and a certain number of real
+but gullible proletarians who have been caught in the bourgeois
+net.<a name="FNanchor_36_36" id="FNanchor_36_36"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_36" class="fnanchor">[36]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>It is clear from this criticism that Lenine does not believe that a genuine
+Socialist party&mdash;and, presumably, therefore, the same must apply to a
+Socialist government&mdash;can represent "fairly prosperous peasants and
+working-men." We now know how to appraise the Soviet government. The
+constitution of Russia under the rule of the Bolsheviki is required by law
+to be posted in all public <a name="Page_248" id="Page_248"></a>places in Russia. In Article II, Chapter V,
+paragraph 9, of this document it is set forth that "the Constitution of the
+Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic involves, in view of the
+present transition period, the establishment of a dictatorship of the urban
+and rural proletariat and the poorest peasantry in the form of a powerful
+All-Russian Soviet authority." Attention is called to this passage here,
+not for the sake of pointing out the obvious need for some exact definition
+of the loose expression, "the poorest peasantry," nor for the sake of any
+captious criticism, but solely to point out the important fact that Lenine
+only admits a part of the peasantry&mdash;the poorest&mdash;to share in the
+dictatorship of the proletariat.</p>
+
+<p>Turning to another part of the same important document&mdash;Article III,
+Chapter VI, Section A, paragraph 25&mdash;we find the basis of representation in
+the All-Russian Congress of Soviets stated. There are representatives of
+town Soviets and representatives of provincial congresses of Soviets. The
+former represent the industrial workers; the latter represent the peasants
+almost exclusively. It is important, therefore, to note that there is one
+delegate for every twenty-five thousand city voters and one for every one
+hundred and twenty-five thousand peasant voters! In Section B of the same
+Article, Chapter X, paragraph 53, we find the same discrimination: it takes
+five peasants' votes to equal the vote of one city voter; it was this
+general attitude of the Bolsheviki toward the peasants, dividing them into
+classes and treating the great majority of them as petty, rural
+bourgeoisie, which roused the resentment of the peasants' leaders. They
+naturally insisted that the peasants constituted a distinct class,
+co-operating with the proletariat, not to be ruled by it. Even Marie
+Spiridonova, who at first joined <a name="Page_249" id="Page_249"></a>with the Bolsheviki, was compelled, later
+on, to assert this point of view.</p>
+
+<p>It is easy to understand the distrust of the Bolsheviki by the Socialist
+parties and groups which represented the peasants. The latter class
+constituted more than 85 per cent. of the population. Moreover, it had
+furnished the great majority of the fighters in the revolutionary movement.
+Its leaders and spokesmen resented the idea that they were to be dictated
+to and controlled by a minority, which was, as Lenine himself admitted, not
+materially more numerous than the old ruling class of landowners had been.
+They wanted a democratic governmental system, free from class rule, while
+the Bolsheviki wanted class rule. Generalizations are proverbially
+perilous, and should be very cautiously made and applied to great currents
+of thought and of life. But in a broad sense we may fairly say that the
+Socialism of the Socialist-Revolutionists and the Mensheviki, the Socialism
+of Kerensky and the men who were the majority of the Constituent Assembly,
+was the product of Russian life and Russian economic development, while the
+Socialism that the Bolsheviki tried by force of arms to impose upon Russia
+was as un-Russian as it could be. The Bolshevist conception of Socialism
+had its origin in Marxian theory. Both Marx and Engels freely predicted the
+setting up of "a dictatorship of the proletariat"&mdash;the phrase which the
+Bolsheviki have made their own.</p>
+
+<p>Yet, the Bolsheviki are not Marxians. Their Socialism is as little Marxian
+as Russian. When Marx and Engels forecasted the establishment of
+proletarian dictatorship it was part of their theorem that economic
+evolution would have reduced practically all the masses to a proletarian
+state; that industrial and commercial concentration would have reached such
+a stage of development that <a name="Page_250" id="Page_250"></a>there would be on the one side a small class
+of owners, and, on the other side, the proletariat. There would be, they
+believed, no middle class. The disappearance of the middle class was, for
+them and for their followers, a development absolutely certain to take
+place. They saw the same process going on with the same result in
+agriculture. It might be less rapid in its progress, but not one whit less
+certain. It was only as the inevitable climax to this evolution that they
+believed the "dictatorship of the proletariat" would be achieved. In other
+words, the proletariat would be composed of the overwhelming majority of
+the body politic and social. That is very different from the Bolshevist
+attempt to set up the dictatorship of the proletariat in a land where more
+than 85 per cent, of the people are peasants; where industrial development
+is behind the rest of the world, and where dictatorship of the proletariat
+means the domination of more than one hundred and eighty millions of people
+by two hundred thousand "proletarians and the poorest peasants," according
+to Lenine's statement, or by six per cent. of the population <i>if we assume
+the entire proletariat to be united in the dictatorship!</i></p>
+
+
+<h4>V</h4>
+
+<p>At the time of the disturbances which took place in Petrograd in December,
+over the delay in holding the Constituent Assembly, the Bolshevik
+government announced that the Constituante would be permitted to convene on
+January 18th, provided that not less than four hundred delegates were in
+attendance. Accordingly, the defenders of the Constituent Assembly arranged
+for a great demonstration to take place on that day in honor of the event.
+It was also intended to be a warning to <a name="Page_251" id="Page_251"></a>the Bolsheviki not to try to
+further interfere with the Constituante. An earnest but entirely peaceful
+mass of people paraded with flags and banners and signs containing such
+inscriptions as "Proletarians of All Countries, Unite!" "Land and Liberty,"
+"Long Live the Constituent Assembly," and many others. They set out from
+different parts of the city to unite at the Field of Mars and march to the
+Taurida Palace to protest against any interference with the Constituent
+Assembly. As they neared the Taurida Palace they were confronted by Red
+Guards, who, without any preliminary warning or any effort at persuasion,
+fired into the crowd. Among the first victims was a member of the Executive
+Committee of the Soviet of Peasants' Delegates, the Siberian peasant
+Logvinov, part of whose head was shot away by an explosive bullet. Another
+victim was the militant Socialist-Revolutionist Gorbatchevskaia. Several
+students and a number of workmen were also killed. Similar massacres
+occurred at the same time in other parts of the city. Other processions
+wending their way toward the meeting-place were fired into. Altogether one
+hundred persons were either killed or very seriously wounded by the Red
+Guards, who said that they had received orders "not to spare the
+cartridges." Similar demonstrations were held in Moscow and other cities
+and were similarly treated by the Red Guards. In Moscow especially the loss
+of life was great. Yet the Bolshevist organs passed these tragic events
+over in complete silence. They did not mention the massacres, nor did they
+mention the great demonstration at the funeral of the victims, four days
+later.</p>
+
+<p>When the Constituent Assembly was formally opened, on January 18th, it was
+well known on every hand that the Bolshevik government would use force to
+destroy it <a name="Page_252" id="Page_252"></a>if the deputies refused to do exactly as they were told. The
+corridors were filled with armed soldiers and sailors, ready for action.</p>
+
+<p>The Lenine-Trotzky Ministry had summoned an extraordinary Congress of
+Soviets to meet in Petrograd at the same time, and it was well understood
+that they were determined to erect this Soviet Congress into the supreme
+legislative power. If the Constituent Assembly would consent to this, so
+much the better, of course. In that case there would be a valuable legal
+sanction, the sanction of a democratically elected body expressly charged
+with the task of determining the form and manner of government for Free
+Russia. Should the Constituent Assembly not be willing, there was an
+opportunity for another <i>coup d'&eacute;tat</i>.</p>
+
+<p>In precisely the same way as the Ministry during the last years of Czarism
+would lay before the Duma certain documents and demand that they be
+approved, so the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets&mdash;the Bolshevik
+power&mdash;demanded that the Constituent Assembly meekly assent to a document
+prepared for it in advance. It was at once a test and a challenge; if the
+Assembly was willing to accept orders from the Soviet authority and content
+itself with rubber-stamping the decrees of the latter, as ordered, it could
+be permitted to go on&mdash;at least for a time. At the head of the Constituent
+Assembly, as president, the deputies elected Victor Chernov, who had been
+Minister of Agriculture under Kerensky. At the head of the Bolshevik
+faction was Sverdlov, chairman of the Executive Committee of the Soviets.
+He it was who opened the fight, demanding that the following declaration be
+adopted by the Constituante as the basis of a Constitution for Russia:</p><p><a name="Page_253" id="Page_253"></a></p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><h4><span class="smcap">Declaration Of The Right's Of The Toiling And Exploited
+People</span></h4>
+
+<p>I</p>
+
+<p>1. Russia is to be declared a republic of the workers', soldiers'
+and peasants' Soviets. All power in the cities and in the country
+belongs to the Soviets.</p>
+
+<p>2. The Russian Soviet Republic is based on the free federation of
+free peoples, on the federation of national Soviet republics.</p>
+
+<p>II</p>
+
+<p>Assuming as its duty the destruction of all exploitation of the
+workers, the complete abolition of the class system of society,
+and the placing of society upon a socialistic basis, and the
+ultimate bringing about of victory for Socialism in every country,
+the Constituent Assembly further decides:</p>
+
+<p>1. That the socialization of land be realized, private ownership
+of land be abolished, all the land be proclaimed common property
+of the people and turned over to the toiling masses without
+compensation on the basis of equal right to the use of land.</p>
+
+<p>All forests, mines, and waters which are of social importance, as
+well as all living and other forms of property, and all
+agricultural enterprises, are declared national property.</p>
+
+<p>2. To confirm the decree of the Soviets concerning the inspection
+of working conditions, the highest department of national economy,
+which is the first step in achieving the ownership by the Soviets
+of the factories, mines, railroads, and means of production and
+transportation.</p>
+
+<p>3. To confirm the decree of the Soviets transferring all banks to
+the ownership of the Soviet Republic, as one of the steps in the
+freeing of the toiling masses from the yoke of capitalism.</p>
+
+<p>4. To enforce general compulsory labor, in order to destroy the
+class of parasites, and to reorganize the economic life. In order
+to make the power of the toiling masses secure and to prevent the
+restoration of the rule of the exploiters, the toiling masses will
+be armed and a Red Guard composed of workers and peasants formed,
+and the exploiting classes shall be disarmed.</p><p><a name="Page_254" id="Page_254"></a></p>
+
+<p>III</p>
+
+<p>1. Declaring its firm determination to make society free from the
+chaos of capitalism and imperialism, which has drenched the
+country in blood in this most criminal war of all wars, the
+Constituent Assembly accepts completely the policy of the Soviets,
+whose duty it is to publish all secret treaties, to organize the
+most extensive fraternization between the workers and peasants of
+warring armies, and by revolutionary methods to bring about a
+democratic peace among the belligerent nations without annexations
+and indemnities, on the basis of the free self-determination of
+nations&mdash;at any price.</p>
+
+<p>2. For this purpose the Constituent Assembly declares its complete
+separation from the brutal policy of the bourgeoisie, which
+furthers the well-being of the exploiters in a few selected
+nations by enslaving hundreds of millions of the toiling peoples
+of the colonies and the small nations generally.</p>
+
+<p>The Constituent Assembly accepts the policy of the Council of
+People's Commissars in giving complete independence to Finland, in
+beginning the withdrawal of troops from Persia, and in declaring
+for Armenia the right of self-determination.</p>
+
+<p>A blow at international financial capital is the Soviet decree
+which annuls foreign loans made by the governments of the Czar,
+the landowners and the bourgeoisie. The Soviet government is to
+continue firmly on this road until the final victory from the yoke
+of capitalism is won through international workers' revolt.</p>
+
+<p>As the Constituent Assembly was elected on the basis of lists of
+candidates nominated before the November Revolution, when the
+people as a whole could not yet rise against their exploiters, and
+did not know how powerful would be the strength of the exploiters
+in defending their privileges, and had not yet begun to create a
+Socialist society, the Constituent Assembly considers it, even
+from a formal point of view, unjust to oppose the Soviet power.
+The Constituent Assembly is of the opinion that at this moment, in
+the decisive hour of the struggle of the people against their
+exploiters, the exploiters must not have a seat in any government
+organization or institution. The power completely and without
+exception belongs to the people and its authorized
+representatives&mdash;the workers', soldiers' and peasants' Soviets.</p><p><a name="Page_255" id="Page_255"></a></p>
+
+<p>Supporting the Soviet rule and accepting the orders of the Council
+of People's Commissars, the Constituent Assembly acknowledges its
+duty to outline a form for the reorganization of society.</p>
+
+<p>Striving at the same time to organize a free and voluntary, and
+thereby also a complete and strong, union among the toiling
+classes of all the Russian nations, the Constituent Assembly
+limits itself to outlining the basis of the federation of Russian
+Soviet Republics, leaving to the people, to the workers and
+soldiers, to decide for themselves, in their own Soviet meetings,
+if they are willing, and on what conditions they prefer, to join
+the federated government and other federations of Soviet
+enterprise. These general principles are to be published without
+delay, and the official representatives of the Soviets are
+required to read them at the opening of the Constituent Assembly.</p></div>
+
+<p>The demand for the adoption of this declaration gave rise to a long and
+stormy debate. The leaders of the Socialist-Revolutionists and the
+Mensheviki stoutly contended that the adoption of the declaration would be
+virtually an abdication of the task for which the Constituent Assembly had
+been elected by the people, and, therefore, a betrayal of trust. They could
+not admit the impudent claim that an election held in November, based upon
+universal suffrage, on lists made up as recently as September, could in
+January be set aside as being "obsolete" and "unrepresentative." That a
+majority of the Bolshevik candidates put forward had been defeated,
+nullified, they argued, the claim of the Bolsheviki that the fact that the
+candidates had all been nominated before the November insurrection should
+be regarded as reason for acknowledging the Bolshevik Soviet as superior to
+the Constituent Assembly. They insisted upon the point, which the Bolshevik
+spokesmen did not attempt to controvert, that the Constituent Assembly
+represented the votes of many millions of men and women,<a name="FNanchor_37_37" id="FNanchor_37_37"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a><a name="Page_256" id="Page_256"></a> while the
+total actual membership represented by the Soviet power did not at the time
+number one hundred thousand!</p>
+
+<p>As might have been expected, the proposal to adopt the declaration
+submitted to the Constituent Assembly in this arrogant fashion was rejected
+by an enormous majority. The Bolshevik members, who had tried to make the
+session a farce, thereupon withdrew after submitting a statement in which
+they charged the Constituent Assembly with being a counter-revolutionary
+body, and the Revolutionary-Socialist party with being a traitorous party
+"directing the fight of the bourgeoisie against the workers' revolution."
+The statement said that the Bolshevik members withdrew "in order to permit
+the Soviet power to determine what relations it would hold with the
+counter-revolutionary section of the Constituent Assembly"&mdash;a threat which
+needed no interpretation.</p>
+
+<p>After the withdrawal of the Bolshevik members, the majority very quickly
+adopted a declaration which had been carefully prepared by the
+Socialist-Revolutionists during the weeks which had elapsed since the
+elections in the preliminary conferences which had been held for that
+purpose. The declaration read as follows:</p>
+
+
+<div class="blockquot"><h4><span class="smcap">Russia's Form Of Government</span></h4>
+
+<p>In the name of the peoples who compose the Russian state, the
+All-Russian Constituent Assembly proclaims the Russian State to be
+the Russian Democratic Federated Republic, uniting indissolubly
+into one whole the peoples and territories which are sovereign
+within the limits prescribed by the Federal Constitution.</p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">Laws Regarding Land Ownership</span></p>
+
+<p>1. <i>The right to privately own land within the boundaries of the
+Russian Republic is hereby abolished forever.</i></p><p><a name="Page_257" id="Page_257"></a></p>
+
+<p>2. All land within the boundaries of the Russian Republic, with
+all mines, forests, and waters, is hereby declared the property of
+the nation.</p>
+
+<p>3. The republic has the right to control all land, with all the
+mines, forests, and waters thereof, through the central and local
+administration, in accordance with the regulation provided by the
+present law.</p>
+
+<p>4. The autonomous provinces of the Russian Republic have title to
+land on the basis of the present law and in accordance with the
+Federal Constitution.</p>
+
+<p>5. The tasks of the central and local governments as regards the
+use of lands, mines, forests, and waters are:</p>
+
+<p>a. The creation of conditions conducive to the best possible
+utilization of the country's natural resources and the highest
+possible development of its productive forces.</p>
+
+<p>b. The fair distribution of all natural wealth among the people.</p>
+
+<p>6. The rights of individuals and institutions to land, mines,
+forests, and waters are restricted merely to utilization by said
+individuals and institutions.</p>
+
+<p>7. The use of all mines, forests, land, and waters is free to all
+citizens of the Russian Republic, regardless of nationality or
+creed. This includes all unions of citizens, also governmental and
+public institutions.</p>
+
+<p>8. The right to use the land is to be acquired and discontinued on
+the basis prescribed by this fundamental law.</p>
+
+<p>9. <i>All titles to land at present held by the individuals,
+associations, and institutions are abolished in so far as they
+contradict this law.</i></p>
+
+<p>10. All land, mines, forests, waters, at present owned by and
+otherwise in the possession of individuals, associations, and
+institutions, <i>are confiscated without compensation for the loss
+incurred.</i></p>
+
+<h4><span class="smcap">Democratic Peace</span></h4>
+
+<p>In the name of the peoples of the Russian Republic, the
+All-Russian Constituent Assembly expresses the firm will of the
+people to <i>immediately discontinue the war</i> and conclude a just
+and general peace, appeals to the Allied countries proposing to
+define jointly the exact terms of the democratic peace acceptable
+<a name="Page_258" id="Page_258"></a>to all the belligerent nations, in order to present these terms,
+in behalf of the Allies, to the governments fighting against the
+Russian Republic and her allies.</p>
+
+<p>The Constituent Assembly firmly believes that the attempts of the
+peoples of Russia to end the disastrous war will meet with a
+unanimous response on the part of the peoples and the governments
+of the Allied countries, and that by common efforts a speedy peace
+will be attained, which will safeguard the well-being and dignity
+of all the belligerent countries.</p>
+
+<p>The Constituent Assembly resolves to elect from its midst an
+authorized delegation which will carry on negotiations with the
+representatives of the Allied countries and which will present the
+appeal to jointly formulate terms upon which a speedy termination
+of the war will be possible, as well as for the purpose of
+carrying out the decisions of the Constituent Assembly regarding
+the question of peace negotiations with the countries fighting
+against us.</p>
+
+<p>This delegation, which is to be under the guidance of the
+Constituent Assembly, is to immediately start fulfilling the
+duties imposed upon it.</p>
+
+<p>Expressing, in the name of the peoples of Russia, its regret that
+the negotiations with Germany, which were started without
+preliminary agreement with the Allied countries, have assumed the
+character of negotiations for a separate peace, the Constituent
+Assembly, in the name of the peoples of the Federated Republic,
+<i>while continuing the armistice, accepts the further carrying on
+of the negotiations with the countries warring against us</i> in
+order to work toward a general democratic peace which shall be in
+accordance "with the people's will and protect Russia's
+interests."</p></div>
+
+
+<h4>VI</h4>
+
+<p>Immediately following the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly a body of
+Red Guards shot the two Constitutional Democrats, Kokoshkin and Shingariev,
+who were at the time confined as prisoners who were ill in the Naval
+Hospital. The reason for the brutal murder of these men was that they were
+bourgeoisie and, therefore, enemies of the working class! It is only just
+to add <a name="Page_259" id="Page_259"></a>that the foul deed was immediately condemned by the Bolshevik
+government and by the Soviet of Petrograd. "The working class will never
+approve of any outrages upon our prisoners, whatever may have been their
+political offense against the people and their Revolution," the latter body
+declared, in a resolution on the subject of the assassinations. Two days
+after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly twenty-three
+Socialist-Revolutionist members of that body, assembled at the office of
+their party, were arrested, and the premises occupied by Red Guards, the
+procedure being exactly as it used to be in the old days under the Czar.</p>
+
+<p>There is a relentless logic of life and action from which there can be no
+escape. Czarism was a product of that inexorable process. All its
+oppression and brutality proceeded by an inevitable and irresistible
+sequence from the first determination and effort to realize the principle
+of autocracy. Any dictatorship, whether of a single man, a group or class,
+must rest ultimately upon oppressive and coercive force. Believing that the
+means would be justified by the end, Lenine and Trotzky and their
+associates had suppressed the Constituent Assembly, claiming that
+parliamentary government, based upon the equal and free suffrage of all
+classes, was, during the transition period, dangerous to the proletariat;
+that in its stead a new type of government must be established&mdash;government
+by associations of wage-earners, soldiers, and peasants, called Soviets.</p>
+
+<p>But what if among these there should develop a purpose contrary to the
+purpose of the Bolsheviki? Would men who, starting out with a belief in the
+Constituante, and as its champions, used force to destroy and suppress it
+the moment it became evident that its purpose was not their purpose,
+hesitate to suppress and destroy any<a name="Page_260" id="Page_260"></a> Soviet movement which adopted
+policies contrary to their own? What assurance could there be, once their
+point of view, their initial principle, was granted, that the freedom
+denied to the Constituante would be assured to the Soviets? In the very
+nature of the case there could be no such assurance. However honest and
+sincere the Bolsheviki themselves might be in their belief that there would
+be such assurance, there could in fact be none, for the logic of life is
+stronger than any human will.</p>
+
+<p>As was inevitable, the Bolsheviki soon found themselves in the position of
+suppressing Soviets which they could not control as freely and in the same
+manner as they had suppressed the Constituent Assembly. When, for example,
+the soldiers of the Preobrajenski Regiment&mdash;the very men who helped the
+Bolsheviki into power&mdash;became dissatisfied and organized, publishing their
+own organ, <i>The Soldier's Cloak</i>, the paper was confiscated and the
+organization suppressed.<a name="FNanchor_38_38" id="FNanchor_38_38"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_38" class="fnanchor">[38]</a> The forcible suppression of Soviets was
+common. The Central Executive Committee of the National Soviet of Peasants'
+Delegates, together with the old Central Executive Committee of the Soviets
+of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates (who had never acknowledged the
+October elections), convoked an extraordinary assembly of Soviets on
+January 8th, the same date as that on which the Bolshevik Congress of
+Soviets was convoked. Circumstances compelled the opening to be deferred
+until two days later, the 10th. This conference, called the Third
+All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Soviets, was suppressed by force, many of
+the 359 delegates and all the members of the Executive Committee being
+arrested. The following extract from a declaration <a name="Page_261" id="Page_261"></a>of protest addressed by
+the outraged peasants to the Congress of Soviets of Workmen, Soldiers, and
+Peasants convoked by the Bolshevik government tells the story:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>As soon as the Congress was opened, sailors and Red Guards, armed
+with guns and hand-grenades, broke into the premises (11
+Kirillovskaia Street), surrounded the house, poured into the
+corridors and the session hall, and ordered all persons to leave.</p>
+
+<p>"In whose name do you order us, who are Delegates to the Peasants'
+Congress of All-Russia, to disperse?" asked the peasants.</p>
+
+<p>"In the name of the Baltic fleet," the sailor's replied.</p>
+
+<p>The peasants refused; cries of protest were raised. One by one the
+peasants ascended the tribune to stigmatize the Bolsheviki in
+speeches full of indignation, and to express the hopes that they
+placed in the Constituent Assembly....</p>
+
+<p>This session of the Congress presented a strange spectacle:
+disturbed by men who confessed that they did not know why they
+were there, the peasants sang revolutionary songs; the sailors,
+armed with guns and grenades, joined them. Then the peasants knelt
+down to sing a funeral hymn to the memory of Logvinov, whose
+coffin was even yesterday within the room. The soldiers, lowering
+their guns, knelt down also.</p>
+
+<p>The Bolshevik authorities became excited; they did not expect such
+a turn of events. "Enough said," declared the chiefs; "we have
+come not to speak, but to act. If they do not want to go to
+Smolny, let them get out of here." And they set themselves to the
+task.</p>
+
+<p>In groups of five the peasants were conducted down-stairs,
+trampled upon, and, on their refusal to go to Smolny, pushed out
+of doors during the night in the midst of the enormous city of
+which they knew nothing.</p>
+
+<p>Members of the Executive Committee were arrested,<a name="FNanchor_39_39" id="FNanchor_39_39"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_39" class="fnanchor">[39]</a> the premises
+occupied by sailors and Red Guards, the objects found therein
+stolen.</p>
+
+
+<p>The peasants found shelter in the homes of the inhabitants of
+Petrograd, who, indignant, offered them hospitality. A certain
+<a name="Page_262" id="Page_262"></a>number were lodged in the barracks of the Preobrajenski Regiment.
+The sailors, who but a few minutes before had sung a funeral hymn
+to Logvinov, and wept when they saw that they had understood
+nothing, now became the docile executioners of the orders of the
+Bolsheviki. And when they were asked, "Why do you do this?" they
+answered, as in the time, still recent, of Czarism: "It is the
+order. No need to talk."<a name="FNanchor_40_40" id="FNanchor_40_40"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_40" class="fnanchor">[40]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>We do not need to rely upon the testimony of witnesses belonging to the
+Revolutionary Socialist party, the Mensheviki, or other factions unfriendly
+to the Bolsheviki. However trustworthy such testimony may be, and however
+well corroborated, we cannot expect it to be convincing to those who pin
+their faith to the Bolsheviki. Such people will believe only what the
+Bolsheviki themselves say about Bolshevism. It is well, therefore, that we
+can supplement the testimony already given by equally definite and direct
+testimony from official Bolshevist sources to the same effect. From the
+official organs of the Bolsheviki it can be shown that the Bolshevik
+authorities suppressed Soviet after Soviet; that when they found that
+Soviets were controlled by Socialists who belonged to other factions they
+dissolved them and ordered new elections, refusing to permit the free
+choice of the members to be expressed in selecting their officers.</p>
+
+<p>The Bolsheviki did this, it should be remembered, not merely in cases where
+Mensheviki or Socialist-Revolutionists were in the majority, but also in
+cases where the majority consisted of members of the
+Socialist-Revolutionary party of the Left&mdash;the faction which had united
+with the Bolsheviki in suppressing the Constituante.<a name="Page_263" id="Page_263"></a> Their union with the
+Bolsheviki was from the first a compromise, based upon the political
+opportunism of both sides. The Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left did not
+believe in the Bolshevik theories or program, but they wanted the political
+assistance of the Bolsheviki. The latter did not believe in the theories or
+program of the Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left, but they wanted their
+political support. The union could not long endure; the differences were
+too deeply rooted. Before very long the Bolsheviki were fighting their
+former allies and the Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left, like Marie
+Spiridonova, for example, were fighting the Bolsheviki. At Kazan, where
+Lenine went to school, the Soviet was dissolved because it was controlled
+by Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left, former allies, now hostile to the
+Bolsheviki. Here are two paragraphs from <i>Izvestya</i>, one of the Bolshevist
+official organs:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p><span class="smcap">Kazan</span>, <i>July 26th. As the important offices in the Soviet
+were occupied by Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left, the
+Extraordinary Commission has dissolved the Provisional Soviet. The
+governmental power is now represented by a Revolutionary
+Committee. (Izvestya, July 28, 1918.)</i></p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">Kazan</span>, <i>August 1</i>. The state of mind of the workmen is
+revolutionary. <i>If the Mensheviki dare to carry on their
+propaganda, death menaces them. (Idem, August 3.)</i></p></div>
+
+<p>And here is confirmation from another official organ of the Bolsheviki,
+<i>Pravda</i>:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p><span class="smcap">Kazan</span>, <i>August 4th</i>. The Provisional Congress of the
+Soviets of the Peasants has been dissolved because of the absence
+from it of poor peasants and <i>because its state of mind is
+obviously counter-revolutionary. (Pravda, August 6, 1918.)</i></p></div>
+
+<p>As early as April, 1918, the Soviet at Jaroslav was dissolved by the
+Bolshevik authorities and new elections <a name="Page_264" id="Page_264"></a>ordered.<a name="FNanchor_41_41" id="FNanchor_41_41"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_41" class="fnanchor">[41]</a> In these elections
+the Mensheviki and the Socialist-Revolutionists everywhere gained an
+absolute majority.<a name="FNanchor_42_42" id="FNanchor_42_42"></a><a href="#Footnote_42_42" class="fnanchor">[42]</a> The population here wanted the Constituent Assembly
+and they wanted Russia to fight on with the Allies. Attempts to suppress
+this majority led to insurrection, which the Bolsheviki crushed in the most
+brutal manner, and when the people, overpowered and helpless, sought to
+make peace, the Bolsheviki only <i>increased the artillery fire</i>! Here is an
+"Official Bulletin," published in <i>Izvestya</i>, July 21, 1918:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>At Jaroslav the adversary, gripped in the iron ring of our troops,
+has tried to enter into negotiations. <i>The reply has been given
+under the form of redoubled artillery fire.</i></p></div>
+
+<p><i>Izvestya</i> published, on July 25th, a Bolshevist military proclamation
+addressed to the inhabitants of Jaroslav concerning the insurrection which
+originally arose from the suppression of the Soviet and other popular
+assemblages:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>The General Staff notifies to the population of Jaroslav that all
+those who desire to live are invited to abandon the town in the
+course of twenty-four hours and to meet near the America Bridge.
+Those who remain will be treated as insurgents, <i>and no quarter
+will be given to any one</i>. Heavy artillery fire and gas-bombs will
+be used against them. <i>All those who remain will perish In the
+ruins of the town with the insurrectionists, the traitors, and the
+enemies of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolution.</i></p></div>
+
+<p>Next day, July 26th, <i>Izvestya</i> published the information that "after
+minute questionings and full inquiry" a special commission appointed to
+inquire into the events relating to the insurrection at Jaroslav had listed
+350 persons as having "taken an active part in the insurrection <a name="Page_265" id="Page_265"></a>and had
+relations with the Czecho-Slovaks," and that by order of the commissioners
+the whole band of 350 had been shot!</p>
+
+<p>It is needless to multiply the illustrations of brutal oppression&mdash;of men
+and women arrested and imprisoned for no other crime than that of engaging
+in propaganda in favor of government by universal suffrage; of newspapers
+confiscated and suppressed; of meetings banned and Soviets dissolved
+because the members' "state of mind" did not please the Bolsheviki. Maxim
+Gorky declared in his <i>Novya Zhizn</i> that there had been "ten thousand
+lynchings." Upon what authority Gorky&mdash;who was inclined to sympathize with
+the Bolsheviki, and who even accepted office under them&mdash;based that
+statement is not known. Probably it is an exaggeration. One thing, however,
+is quite certain, namely, that a reign of terror surpassing the worst days
+of the old r&eacute;gime was inflicted upon unhappy Russia by the Bolsheviki. At
+the very beginning of the Bolshevik r&eacute;gime Trotzky laughed to scorn all the
+protests against violence, threatening that resort would be had to the
+guillotine. Speaking to the opponents of the Bolshevik policy in the
+Petrograd Soviet, he said:</p>
+
+<p>"You are perturbed by the mild terror we are applying against our class
+enemies, but know that not later than a month hence this terror will take a
+more terrible form on the model of the terror of the great revolutionaries
+of France. Not a fortress, but the guillotine will be for our enemies."</p>
+
+<p>That threat was not literally carried out, but there was a near approach to
+it when public hangings for civil offenses were established. For
+reintroducing the death penalty into the army as a means of putting an end
+to treason and the brutal murder of officers by rebellious <a name="Page_266" id="Page_266"></a>soldiers, the
+Bolsheviki excoriated Kerensky. <i>Yet they themselves introduced hanging and
+flogging in public for petty civil crimes!</i> The death penalty was never
+inflicted for civil crimes under the late Czar. It was never inflicted for
+political offenses. Only rarely was it inflicted for murder. It remained
+for a so-called "Socialist" government to resort to such savagery as we
+find described in the following extract from the recognized official organ
+of the Bolshevik government:</p>
+
+<p>Two village robbers were condemned to death. All the people of Semenovskaia
+and the surrounding communes were invited to the ceremony. On July 6th, at
+midday, a great crowd of interested spectators arrived at the village of
+Loupia. The organizers of the execution gave to each of the bystanders the
+opportunity of flogging the condemned to obtain from them supplementary
+confessions. The number of blows was unlimited. Then a vote of the
+spectators was taken as to the method of execution. The majority was for
+hanging. In order that the spectacle could be easily seen, the spectators
+were ranged in three ranks&mdash;the first row sat down, the second rested on
+the knee, and the third stood up.<a name="FNanchor_43_43" id="FNanchor_43_43"></a><a href="#Footnote_43_43" class="fnanchor">[43]</a></p>
+
+<p>The Bolshevik government created an All-Russian Extraordinary Commission,
+which in turn created Provincial and District Extraordinary Commissions.
+These bodies&mdash;the local not less than the national&mdash;were empowered to make
+arrests and even decree and carry out capital sentences. There was no
+appeal from their decisions; they were simply required to <i>report
+afterward</i>! Only members of the Bolshevik party were immune from this
+terror. Alminsky, a Bolshevist writer of note, felt called upon to protest
+against this hideous travesty of democratic justice, and wrote in
+<i>Pravda</i>:</p><p><a name="Page_267" id="Page_267"></a></p>
+
+<p>The absence of the necessary restraint makes one feel appalled at the
+"instruction" issued by the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission to "All
+Provincial Extraordinary Commissions," which says: "The All-Russian
+Extraordinary Commission is perfectly independent in its work, carrying out
+house searches, arrests, executions, of which it <i>afterward</i> reports to the
+Council of the People's Commissaries and to the Central Executive Council."
+Further, the Provincial and District Extraordinary Commissions "are
+independent in their activities, and when called upon by the local
+Executive Council present a report of their work." In so far as house
+searches and arrests are concerned, a report made <i>afterward</i> may result in
+putting right irregularities committed owing to lack of restraint. The same
+cannot be said of executions.... It can also be seen from the "instruction"
+that personal safety is to a certain extent guaranteed only to members of
+the government, of the Central Council, and of the local Executive
+Committees. With the exception of these few persons all members of the
+local committees of the [Bolshevik] Party, of the Control Committees, and
+of the Executive Committee of the party may be shot at any time by the
+decision of any Extraordinary Commission of a small district town if they
+happen to be on its territory, and a report of that made <i>afterward.</i><a name="FNanchor_44_44" id="FNanchor_44_44"></a><a href="#Footnote_44_44" class="fnanchor">[44]</a></p>
+
+
+<h4>VII</h4>
+
+<p>While in some respects, such as this terrible savagery, Bolshevism has
+out-Heroded Herod and surpassed the r&eacute;gime of the Romanovs in cruel
+oppression, upon the whole its methods have been very like that of the
+latter. There is really not much to choose between the ways of Stolypin and
+Von Plehve and those of the Lenine-Trotzky rule. The methods employed have
+been very similar and in not a few instances the same men who acted as the
+agents of espionage and tyranny for the Czar have served the Bolsheviki in
+the same capacity. Just as <a name="Page_268" id="Page_268"></a>under Czarism there was alliance with the Black
+Hundreds and with all sorts of corrupt and vicious criminal agents, so we
+find the same phenomenon recurring under the Bolsheviki. The time has not
+yet arrived for the compilation of the full record of Bolshevism in this
+particular, but enough is known to justify the charge here made. That
+agents-provocateurs, spies, informers, police agents, and pogrom-makers
+formerly in the service of the Czar have been given positions of trust and
+honor by Lenine and Trotzky unfortunately admits of no doubt whatever.</p>
+
+<p>It was stated at a meeting of Russians held in Paris in the summer of 1917
+that one of the first Russian regiments which refused to obey orders to
+advance "contained 120 former political or civil police agents out of 181
+refractory soldiers." During the Kerensky r&eacute;gime, at the time when Lenine
+was carrying on his propaganda through <i>Pravda</i>,<a name="FNanchor_45_45" id="FNanchor_45_45"></a><a href="#Footnote_45_45" class="fnanchor">[45]</a> Vladimir Bourtzev
+exposed three notorious agents of the old police terror, provocateurs, who
+were working on the paper. In August, 1917, the Jewish Conjoint Committee
+in London published a long telegram from the representative of the Jewish
+Committee in Petrograd, calling attention to the fact that Lenine's party
+was working in tacit agreement with the Black Hundreds. The telegram is
+here given in full:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>Extreme Russian reactionaries have allied themselves closely with
+extreme revolutionaries, and Black Hundreds have entered into
+tacit coalition with the Lenine party. In the army the former
+agents and detectives of the political police carry on ardent
+campaign for defeat, and in the rear the former
+agents-provocateurs prepare and direct endless troubles.</p>
+
+<p>The motives of this policy on the part of the reactionaries <a name="Page_269" id="Page_269"></a>are
+clear. It is the direct road to a counter-revolution. The
+troubles, the insurrections, and shocking disorders which follow
+provoke disgust at the Revolution, while the military defeats
+prepare the ground for an intervention of the old friend of the
+Russian Black Hundreds, William II, the counter-revolutionaries
+work systematically for the defeat of the Russian armies,
+sometimes openly, cynically.</p>
+
+<p>Thus in their press and proclamations they go so far as to throw
+the whole responsibility for the war and for the obstacles placed
+in the way of a peace with Germany on the Jews. It is these
+"diabolical Jews," they say, who prevent the conclusion of peace
+and insist on the continuation of the war, because they desire to
+ruin Russia. Proclamations in this sense have been found, together
+with a voluminous anti-Semitic literature, in the offices of the
+party of Lenine Bolsheviki (Maximalists), and particularly at the
+headquarters of the extreme revolutionaries, Ch&acirc;teau
+Knheshinskaja. Salutations. <span class="smcap">Blank</span>.</p></div>
+
+<p>That the leaders of the Bolsheviki, particularly Lenine and Trotzky, ever
+entered into any "agreement" with the Black Hundreds, or took any part in
+the anti-Semitic campaign referred to, is highly improbable. Unless and
+until it is supported by ample evidence of a competent nature, we shall be
+justified in refusing to believe anything of the sort. It is, however,
+quite probable that provocateurs worming their way into Lenine's and
+Trotzky's good graces tried to use the Bolshevik agitation as a cover for
+their own nefarious work. As we have seen already, Lenine had previously
+been imposed upon by a notorious secret police agent, Malinovsky. But the
+open association of the Bolsheviki with men who played a despicable r&ocirc;le
+under the old r&eacute;gime is not to be denied. The simple-minded reader of
+Bolshevist literature who believes that the Bolshevik government, whatever
+its failings, has the merit of being a government by real working-men and
+working-women, needs to be enlightened. Not only are Lenine and Trotzky not
+of the proletariat <a name="Page_270" id="Page_270"></a>themselves, but they have associated with themselves
+men whose lives have been spent, not as workers, not even as simple
+bourgeoisie, but as servants of the terror-system of the Czar. They have
+associated with themselves, too, some of the most corrupt criminals in
+Russia. Here are a few of them:</p>
+
+<p>Professor Kobozev, of Riga, joined the Bolsheviki and was active as a
+delegate to the Municipal Council of Petrograd. According to the
+information possessed by the Russian revolutionary leaders, this Professor
+Kobozev used to be a police spy, his special job being to make reports to
+the police concerning the political opinions and actions of students and
+faculty members. One of the very first men released from prison by the
+Bolsheviki was one Doctor Doubrovine, who had been a leader of the Black
+Hundreds, an organizer of many pogroms. He became an active Bolshevik.
+Kamenev, the Bolshevik leader, friend of Lenine, is a journalist. He was
+formerly a member of the old Social Democratic party. Soon after the war
+broke out he was arrested and behaved so badly that he was censured by his
+party. Early in the Revolution of 1917 he was accused of serving the secret
+police at Kiev. Bonno Brouevitch, Military Councilor to the Bolshevik
+government, was a well-known anti-Semite who had been dismissed from his
+military office on two occasions, once by the Czar's government and once by
+the Provisional Government. General Komisarov, another of Lenine's trusted
+military officials and advisers, was formerly a chief official of the
+Czar's secret police, known for his terrible persecution of the
+revolutionists. Accused of high treason by the Provisional Government, he
+fled, but returned and joined the Lenine-Trotzky forces. Prince Andronikov,
+associate of Rasputin; (Lenine's "My friend, the Prince"); Orlov, police
+<a name="Page_271" id="Page_271"></a>agent and "denouncer" and secretary of the infamous Protopopov; Postnikov,
+convicted and imprisoned as a German spy in 1910; Lepinsky, formerly in the
+Czar's secret police; and Gualkine, friend of the unspeakable Rasputin, are
+some of the other men who have been closely identified with the
+"proletarian r&eacute;gime" of the Bolsheviki.<a name="FNanchor_46_46" id="FNanchor_46_46"></a><a href="#Footnote_46_46" class="fnanchor">[46]</a> The man they released from
+prison and placed in the important position of Military Commander of
+Petrograd was Muraviev, who had been chief of the Czar's police and was
+regarded by even the moderate members of the Provisional Government, both
+under Lvov and Kerensky, as a dangerous reactionary.<a name="FNanchor_47_47" id="FNanchor_47_47"></a><a href="#Footnote_47_47" class="fnanchor">[47]</a> Karl Radek, the
+Bohemian, a notorious leader of the Russian Bolsheviki, who undertook to
+stir up the German workers and direct the Spartacide revolt, was, according
+to <i>Justice</i>, expelled from the German Social Democratic party before the
+war as a thief and a police spy.<a name="FNanchor_48_48" id="FNanchor_48_48"></a><a href="#Footnote_48_48" class="fnanchor">[48]</a> How shall we justify men calling
+themselves Socialists and proletarian revolutionists, who ally themselves
+with such men as these, but imprison, harry, and abuse such men and women
+as Bourtzev, Kropotkin, Plechanov, Breshkovskaya, Tchaykovsky, Spiridonova,
+Agounov, Larokine, Avksentiev, and many other Socialists like them?</p>
+
+<p>In surveying the fight of the Bolsheviki to establish their rule it is
+impossible to fail to observe that their chief animus has been directed
+against other Socialists, rather than against members of the reactionary
+parties. That this has been the fact they do not themselves deny.<a name="Page_272" id="Page_272"></a> For
+example, the "People's Commissary of Justice," G.I. Oppokov, better known
+as "Lomov," declared in an interview in January, 1918: "Our chief enemies
+are not the Cadets. Our most irreconcilable opponents are the Moderate
+Socialists. This explains the arrests of Socialists and the closing down of
+Socialist newspapers. Such measures of repression are, however, only
+temporary."<a name="FNanchor_49_49" id="FNanchor_49_49"></a><a href="#Footnote_49_49" class="fnanchor">[49]</a> And in the Soviet at Petrograd, July 30, 1918, according to
+<i>Pravda</i>, Lachevitch, one of the delegates, said: "The
+Socialist-Revolutionists of the Right and the Mensheviki are more dangerous
+for the government of the Soviets than the bourgeoisie. But these enemies
+are not yet exterminated and can move about freely. The proletariat must
+act. We ought, once for all, to rid ourselves of the
+Socialist-Revolutionists of the Right and of the Mensheviki."</p>
+
+<p>In this summary of the Bolsheviki war against democracy, it will be
+observed, no attempt has been made to gather all the lurid and fantastic
+stories which have been published by sensational journalists. The testimony
+comes from Socialist sources of the utmost reliability, much of it from
+official Bolshevist sources. The system of oppression it describes is twin
+brother to that which existed under the Romanovs, to end which hundreds of
+thousands of the noblest and best of our humankind gave up their lives.
+Under the banner of Social Democracy a tyranny has been established as
+infamous as anything in the annals of autocracy.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>"<i>O Liberty, what monstrous crimes are committed in thy great
+name!</i>"</p></div><p><a name="Page_273" id="Page_273"></a></p>
+
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VII" id="CHAPTER_VII"></a>CHAPTER VII</h2>
+
+<h3>BOLSHEVIST THEORY AND PRACTICE</h3>
+
+
+<h4>I</h4>
+
+<p>Utopia-making is among the easiest and most fascinating of all intellectual
+occupations. Few employments which can be called intellectual are easier
+than that of devising panaceas for the ills of society, of demonstrating on
+paper how the rough places of life may be made plain and its crooked ones
+made straight. And it is not a vain and fruitless waste of effort and of
+time, as things so easy of achievement often are. Many of the noblest minds
+of all lands and all ages have found pleasure and satisfaction in the
+imagining of ideal commonwealths and by so doing have rendered great
+service to mankind, enriching literature and, what is more important,
+stimulating the urge and passion for improvement and the faith of men in
+their power to climb to the farthest heights of their dreams. But the
+material of life is hard and lacks the plastic quality of inspired
+imagination. Though there is probably no single evil which exists for which
+a solution has not been devised in the wonderful laboratory of visioning,
+the perversity of the subtle and mysterious thing called life is such that
+many great and grave evils continue to challenge, perplex, and harass our
+humankind.</p>
+
+<p>Yet, notwithstanding the plain lesson of history and <a name="Page_274" id="Page_274"></a>experience, the
+reminder impressed on every page of humanity's record, that between the
+glow and the glamour of the vision and its actual realization stretches a
+long, long road, there are many simple-minded souls to whom the vision
+gleamed is as the goal attained. They do not distinguish between schemes on
+paper and ideals crystallized into living realities. This type of mind is
+far more common than is generally recognized; that is why so many people
+quite seriously believe that the Bolsheviki have really established in
+Russia a society which conforms to the generous ideals of social democracy.
+They have read the rhetorical "decrees" and "proclamations" in which the
+shibboleths of freedom and democracy abound, and are satisfied. Yet it
+ought to be plainly evident to any intelligent person that, even if the
+decrees and proclamations were as sound as they are in fact unsound, and as
+definite as they are in fact vague, they would afford no real basis for
+judging Bolshevism as an actual experiment in social polity. There is, in
+ultimate analysis, only one test to apply to Bolshevism&mdash;namely, the test
+of reality. We must ask what the Bolsheviki did, not what they professed;
+what was the performance, not what was the promise.</p>
+
+<p>Of course, this does not mean that we are to judge result wholly without
+regard to aim. Admirable intention is still admirable as intention, even
+when untoward circumstance defeats it and brings deplorable results.
+Bolshevism is not merely a body of belief and speculation. When the
+Bolsheviki seized the government of Russia and began to attempt to carry
+out their ideas, Bolshevism became a living movement in a world of reality
+and subject to the acid test of pragmatic criteria. It must be judged by
+such a matter-of-fact standard as the extent to which it has enlarged or
+diminished the happiness, <a name="Page_275" id="Page_275"></a>health, comfort, freedom, well-being,
+satisfaction, and efficiency of the greatest number of individuals. Unless
+the test shows that it has increased the sum of good available for the
+mass, Bolshevism cannot be regarded as a gain. If, on the contrary, the
+test shows that it has resulted in sensibly diminishing the sum of good
+available to the greatest number of people, Bolshevism must be counted as a
+move in the wrong direction, as so much effort lost. Nothing that can be
+urged on philosophical or moral grounds for or against the moral or
+intellectual impulses that prompted it can fundamentally change the
+verdict. Yet, for all that, it is well to examine the theory which inspires
+the practice; well to know the manner and method of thinking, and the view
+of life, from which Bolshevism as a movement of masses of men and women
+proceeds.</p>
+
+<p>Theoretically, Bolshevism, as such, has no necessary connection with the
+philosophy or the program of Socialism. Certain persons have established a
+working relation between Socialism, a program, and Bolshevism, a method.
+The connection is not inherently logical, but, on the contrary, wholly
+adventitious. As a matter of fact, Bolshevism can only be linked to the
+program of Socialism by violently and disastrously weakening the latter and
+destroying its fundamental character. We shall do well to remember this; to
+remember that the method of action, and, back of the method, the philosophy
+on which it rests and from which it springs, are separate and distinct from
+Socialism. They are incalculably older and they have been associated with
+vastly different programs. All that is new in Bolshevism is that a very old
+method of action, and a very old philosophy of action, have been seized
+upon by a new class which attempts to unite them to a new program.</p><p><a name="Page_276" id="Page_276"></a></p>
+
+<p>That is all that is implied in the "dictatorship of the proletariat."
+Dictatorship by small minorities is not a new political phenomenon. All
+that is new when the minority attempting to establish its dictatorship is
+composed of poor, propertyless people, is the fact of their economic
+condition and status. That is the only difference between the dictatorship
+of Russia by the Romanov dynasty and the dictatorship of Russia by a small
+minority of determined, class-conscious working-people. It is not only the
+precise forms of oppressive power used by them that are identically
+characteristic of Czarism and Bolshevism, but their underlying philosophy.
+Both forms of dictatorship rest upon the philosophy of might as the only
+valid right. Militarism, especially as it was developed under Prussian
+leadership, has exactly the same philosophy and aims at the same general
+result, namely, to establish the domination and control of society by a
+minority class. The Bolsheviki have simply inverted Czarism and Militarism.</p>
+
+<p>What really shocks the majority of people is not, after all, the methods or
+the philosophy of Bolshevism, but the fact that the Bolsheviki, belonging
+to a subject class, have seized upon the methods and philosophy of the most
+powerful ruling classes and turned them to their own account. There is a
+class morality and a class psychology the subtle influences of which few
+perceive as a matter of habit, which, however, to a great extent shape our
+judgments, our sympathies, and our antipathies. Men who never were shocked
+when a Czar, speaking the language of piety and religion, indulged in the
+most infamous methods and deeds of terror and oppression, are shocked
+beyond all power of adequate expression when former subjects of that same
+Czar, speaking the language of the religion <a name="Page_277" id="Page_277"></a>of democracy and freedom,
+resort to the same infamous methods of terror and oppression.</p>
+
+
+<h4>II</h4>
+
+<p>The idea that a revolting proletarian minority might by force impose its
+rule upon society runs through the history of the modern working class, a
+note of impatient, desperate, menacing despair. The Bolsheviki say that
+they are Marxian Socialists; that Marx believed in and advocated the
+setting up, during the transitory period of social revolution, of the
+"dictatorship of the proletariat." They are not quite honest in this claim,
+however; they are indulging in verbal tricks. It is true that Marx taught
+that the proletarian dominion of society, as a preliminary to the abolition
+of all class rule of every kind, must be regarded as certain and
+inevitable. But it is not honest to claim the sanction of his teaching for
+the seizure of political power by a small class, consisting of about 6 per
+cent. of the population, and the imposition by force of its rule upon the
+majority of the population that is either unwilling or passive. That is the
+negation of Marxian Socialism. <i>It is the essence of Marx's teaching that
+the social revolution must come as a historical necessity when the
+proletariat itself comprises an overwhelming majority of the people</i>.</p>
+
+<p>Let us summarize the theory as it appears in the <i>Communist Manifesto</i>:
+Marx begins by setting forth the fact that class conflict is as old as
+civilization itself, that history is very largely the record of conflicts
+between contending social classes. In our epoch, he argues, class conflict
+is greatly simplified; there is really only one division, that which
+divides the bourgeoisie and the proletariat: "Society as a whole is more
+and more splitting <a name="Page_278" id="Page_278"></a>up into great hostile camps, into two great classes
+directly facing each other, bourgeoisie and proletariat." ... "With the
+development of industry the proletariat not only increases in numbers; it
+becomes concentrated in great masses, its strength grows, and it feels that
+strength more." ... "The proletarian movement is the <i>self-conscious,
+independent movement of the immense majority in the interests of the
+immense majority</i>." It is this "immense majority" that is to establish its
+dominion. Marx expressly points out that "all previous historical movements
+were movements of minorities, or in the interest of minorities." It is the
+great merit of the movement of the proletariat, as he conceives it, that it
+is the "movement of the immense majority, in the interests of the immense
+majority."</p>
+
+<p>Clearly, when Lenine and his followers say that they take their doctrine of
+the "dictatorship of the proletariat" from Marx, they pervert the truth;
+they take from Marx only the phrase, not their fundamental policy. It is
+not to be denied that there were times when Marx himself momentarily lapsed
+into the error of Blanqui and the older school of Utopian, conspiratory
+Socialists who believed that they could find a short cut to social
+democracy; that by a surprise stroke, carefully prepared and daringly
+executed, a small and desperate minority could overthrow the existing
+social order and bring about Socialism. As Jaur&egrave;s has pointed out,<a name="FNanchor_50_50" id="FNanchor_50_50"></a><a href="#Footnote_50_50" class="fnanchor">[50]</a> the
+mind of Marx sometimes harked back to the dramatic side of the French
+Revolution, and was captivated by such episodes as the conspiracy of Babeuf
+and his friends, who in their day, while the proletariat was a small
+minority, even as it is in Russia now, sought to establish its dominion.
+But <a name="Page_279" id="Page_279"></a>it is well known that after the failure of the Paris Commune, in 1871,
+Marx once and for all abandoned all belief in this form of the
+"dictatorship of the proletariat," and in the possibility of securing
+Socialism through the conspiratory action of minorities. He was even rather
+unwilling that the <i>Manifesto</i> should be republished after that, except as
+a purely historical document. It was in that spirit of reaction that he and
+Engels wrote in 1872 that passage&mdash;to which Lenine has given such an
+unwarranted interpretation&mdash;in which they say that the Commune had shown
+that "the working classes cannot simply take possession of the ready-made
+state machine and set it in motion for their own aims."</p>
+
+<p>It was no less an interpreter of Marx than his great collaborator and
+friend, Frederick Engels, who, in 1895, stated the reasons for abandoning
+all belief in the possibility of accomplishing anything through political
+surprises and through the action of small conscious and determined
+minorities at the head of unconscious masses:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>History proved that we were wrong&mdash;we and those who like us, in
+1848, awaited the speedy success of the proletariat. It became
+perfectly clear <i>that economic conditions all over the Continent
+were by no means as yet sufficiently matured for superseding the
+capitalist organization of production</i>. This was proved by the
+economic revolution which commenced on the continent of Europe
+after 1848 and developed in France, Austria-Hungary, Poland, and,
+recently, also in Russia, and made Germany into an industrial
+state of the first rank&mdash;all on a capitalist basis, <i>which shows
+that in 1848 the prevailing conditions were still capable of
+expansion</i>. And to-day we have a huge international army of
+Socialists.... If this mighty proletarian army has not yet reached
+its goal, if it is destined to gain its ends only in a long drawn
+out struggle, making headway but slowly, step by step, this only
+proves how impossible it was in 1848 to change social conditions
+by forcible means ... the time for small minorities to place
+themselves at the head of the ignorant masses <a name="Page_280" id="Page_280"></a>and resort to force
+in order to bring about revolutions, is gone. <i>A complete change
+in the organization of society can be brought about only by the
+conscious co-operation of the masses</i>; they must be alive to the
+aim in view; they must know what they want. The history of the
+last fifty years has taught us that.<a name="FNanchor_51_51" id="FNanchor_51_51"></a><a href="#Footnote_51_51" class="fnanchor">[51]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>What Engels had in mind when he stressed the fact that history showed that
+in 1848 "the prevailing conditions were still capable of expansion" is the
+central Marxian doctrine of historical inevitability. It is surely less
+than honest to claim the prestige and authority of Marx's teachings upon
+the slender basis of a distorted version of his early thought, while
+completely ignoring the matured body of his doctrines. It may not matter
+much to the world to-day what Marx thought, or how far Lenine follows his
+teachings, but it is of importance that the claim set up by Lenine and
+Trotzky and many of their followers that they are guided by the principles
+of Marxian Socialism is itself demonstrably an evidence of moral or
+intellectual obliquity, which makes them very dangerous guides to follow.
+It is of importance, too, that the claim they make allures many Socialists
+of trusting and uncritical minds to follow them.</p>
+
+<p>Many times in his long life Marx, together with Engels, found himself
+engaged in a fierce war against the very things Lenine and Trotzky and
+their associates have been trying to do. He thundered against Weitling, who
+wanted to have a "daring minority" seize the power of the state and
+establish its dictatorship by a <i>coup d'&eacute;tat</i>. He was denounced as a
+"reactionary" by Willich and Kinkel because, in 1850, he rejected with
+scorn the idea of a sudden seizure of political power through conspiratory
+action, and had the courage to say that it would <a name="Page_281" id="Page_281"></a>take fifty years for the
+workers "to fit themselves for political power." He opposed Lassalle's idea
+of an armed insurrection in 1862, because he was certain that the economic
+development had not yet reached the stage which alone could make a social
+change possible. He fought with all the fierce impetuousness of his nature
+every attempt of Bakunin to lead the workers to attempt the seizure of
+political power and forcibly establish their rule while still a
+minority.<a name="FNanchor_52_52" id="FNanchor_52_52"></a><a href="#Footnote_52_52" class="fnanchor">[52]</a> He fought all these men because he had become profoundly
+convinced that "<i>no social order ever disappears before all the productive
+forces for which there is room in it have been developed; and new and
+higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions
+of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society</i>."<a name="FNanchor_53_53" id="FNanchor_53_53"></a><a href="#Footnote_53_53" class="fnanchor">[53]</a> No
+"dictatorship of the proletariat," no action by any minority, however well
+armed or however desperate, can overcome that great law.</p>
+
+<p>The "dictatorship of the proletariat" in the sense in which that term is
+used by the Russian Bolshevik leaders, and by those who in other countries
+are urging that their example be followed, is not a policy of Marxian
+Socialism. It is not a product of modern conditions. Rather it harks back
+to the earlier conspiratory Socialism of Blanqui, with its traditions
+inherited from Robespierre and Babeuf. So far as its advocates are
+concerned, Marx and the whole modern Socialist movement might as well never
+have existed at all. They take us back three-quarters of a century, to the
+era before Marx, to that past so remote in intellectual and moral
+character, though recent in point of time, when the working class of no
+<a name="Page_282" id="Page_282"></a>country in Europe possessed the right to vote&mdash;when the workers were
+indeed proletarians and not citizens; not only propertyless, but also
+"without a fatherland."</p>
+
+<p>In truth, it is not difficult to understand how this theory has found
+acceptance in Russia. It was not difficult to understand why Marx's
+doctrine of economic evolution was for many years rejected by most Russian
+Socialists; why the latter took the view that Socialism must be more
+quickly attained, that capitalism was not a necessary precursor of
+Socialism in Russia, but that an intelligent leadership of passive masses
+would successfully establish Socialism on the basis of the old Russian
+communal institutions. It was quite easy to understand the change that came
+with Russia's industrial awakening, how the development of factory
+production gave an impetus to the Marxian theories. And, though it presents
+a strange paradox, in that it comes at a time when, despite everything,
+Russian capitalism continues to develop, it is really not difficult to
+understand how and why pre-Marxian conceptions reappear in that great land
+of paradoxes. Politically and intellectually the position of the
+proletariat of Russia before the recent Revolution was that of the
+proletariat of France in 1848.</p>
+
+<p>But that which baffles the mind of the serious investigator is the
+readiness of so many presumably intelligent people living in countries
+where&mdash;as in America&mdash;wholly different conditions prevail to ignore the
+differences and be ready to abandon all the democratic advance made by the
+workers. There is nothing more certain in the whole range of social and
+political life than the fact that the doctrine that the power of the state
+must be seized and used by the proletariat against the non-proletarian
+classes, even for a relatively brief period, <i>can only be carried out by
+destroying all the democracy thus far achieved</i>.</p><p><a name="Page_283" id="Page_283"></a></p>
+
+
+<h4>III</h4>
+
+<p>The validity of the foregoing contention can scarcely be questioned, except
+by those to whom phrases are of more consequence than facts, who place
+theories above realities. The moment the Bolsheviki tried to translate
+their rhetorical propaganda for the dictatorship of the proletariat into
+the concrete terms of political reality they found that they were compelled
+to direct their main opposition, not against the bourgeoisie, or even
+against capitalism, but against the newly created democracy. In the
+movement to create a democratic government resting upon the basis of
+universal, direct, equal, and secret suffrage they saw a peril to their
+scheme far more formidable than militarism or capitalism. It was for this
+reason that they set themselves to the task of suppressing the Constituent
+Assembly. Only political simpletons will seriously regard the Bolshevik
+attempt to camouflage their motive by pretending that they determined to
+crush the Constituent Assembly because its members were elected on a
+register that was "obsolete" and therefore no longer truly represented the
+people.</p>
+
+<p>The German Spartacides, who were acting in full accord with the Russian
+Bolsheviki, had not that miserable excuse. Yet they set out by force of
+arms to <i>prevent any election being held</i>. In this they were quite
+consistent; they wanted to set up a dictatorship, and they knew that the
+overwhelming mass of the people wanted something very different. At a
+dinner of the Inter-Collegiate Socialist Society in New York, in December,
+1918, a spokesman for the German variety of Bolshevism blandly explained
+that "Karl Liebknecht and his comrades know that they cannot hope to get a
+majority, therefore they are determined that no elections shall be held.
+They will prevent this by <a name="Page_284" id="Page_284"></a>force. After some time, perhaps, when a
+proletarian r&eacute;gime has existed long enough, and people have become
+convinced of the superiority of the Socialist way, or at least grown used
+to it, <i>and it is safe to do so</i>, popular elections may be permitted."
+Incredible as it seems, this declaration was received with cheers by an
+audience which only a few minutes before had cheered with equal fervor
+denunciations of "encroachments upon American democracy."</p>
+
+<p>Curiously enough, the precise manner in which the Bolsheviki have acted
+against democracy was set forth, as far back as 1850, by a German, Johann
+von Miquel, in a letter to Karl Marx. Miquel was born in Hanover, but his
+ancestors were of French origin. He studied at Heidelberg and G&ouml;ttingen,
+and became associated with the Socialist movement of the period. He settled
+down to the practice of law, however, and when Hanover was annexed by
+Prussia he entered the Prussian parliament. After the "dismissal of the
+pilot," Bismarck, he became Prussian Minister of Finance, holding that
+position for ten years. Liebknecht referred to him as "my former <i>comrade
+in communismo</i> and present Chancellor <i>in re</i>." This Miquel, while he was
+still a Socialist, in 1850 wrote to Marx as follows:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>The workers' party may succeed against the upper middle class and
+what remains of the feudal element, <i>but it will be attacked on
+its flank by the democracy</i>. We can perhaps give an anti-bourgeois
+tone to the Revolution for a little while, <i>we can destroy the
+essential conditions of bourgeois production</i>; but we cannot
+possibly put down the small tradesmen and shopkeeping class, the
+petty bourgeoisie. My motto is to secure all we can get. We should
+prevent the lower and middle class from <i>forming any organizations
+for as long a time as possible</i> after the first victory, and
+especially oppose ourselves in serried ranks to the plan of
+calling a Constitutional Assembly. Partial terrorism, local
+anarchy, must replace for us what we lack in bulk.</p></div><p><a name="Page_285" id="Page_285"></a></p>
+
+<p>What a remarkable anticipation of the Bolshevist methods of 1917-18 is thus
+outlined in this letter, written sixty-seven years before the Bolshevik
+<i>coup d'&eacute;tat!</i> How literally Lenine, Trotzky and Co. have followed Herr von
+Miquel! They have desperately tried to "give an anti-bourgeois tone to the
+Revolution," denouncing as bourgeois reactionaries the men and women whose
+labors and sacrifices have made the Russian Socialist movement. They have
+destroyed "the essential conditions" of bourgeois and of any other than the
+most primitive production. They have set themselves in serried ranks in
+opposition to "the plan of calling a Constitutional Assembly." They have
+suppressed not only the organizations of the "lower and middle class," but
+also those of a great part of the working class, thus going beyond Miquel.
+Finally, to replace what they lack in bulk, they have resorted to "partial
+terrorism and local anarchy."</p>
+
+<p>And it is in the name of revolutionary progress, of ultra-radicalism, that
+we are called upon to revert to the tactics of desperation born of the
+discouraging conditions of nearly seventy years ago. A new philosophy has
+taken possession of the easily possessed minds of Greenwich Village
+philosophers and parlor revolutionists&mdash;a new philosophy of progress,
+according to which revolutionary progress consists in the unraveling by
+feverish fingers of the fabric woven through years of sacrifice; in
+abandoning high levels attained for the lower levels from which the
+struggles of the past raised us; in harking back to the thoughts and the
+tactics of men who shouted their despairing, defiant cries into the gloom
+of the blackest period of the nineteenth century!</p>
+
+<p>Universal, secret, equal, and direct suffrage was a fact in Russia, the
+first great achievement of the Revolution. Upon that foundation, and upon
+no other, it was possible <a name="Page_286" id="Page_286"></a>to build an enduring, comprehensive social
+democracy. Against that foundation the Bolsheviki hurled their destructive
+power, creating a discriminating class suffrage, disfranchising a great
+part of the Russian people&mdash;not merely the bourgeoisie, but a considerable
+part of the working class itself. Chapter XIII of Article 4 of the
+Constitution of the "Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic" sets
+forth the qualifications for voting, as follows:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><h4>THE RIGHT TO VOTE</h4>
+
+<h4><span class="smcap">Chapter Thirteen</span></h4>
+
+
+<p>64. The right to vote and to be elected to the Soviets is enjoyed
+by the following citizens, irrespective of religion, nationality,
+domicile, etc., of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet
+Republic, of both sexes, who shall have completed their eighteenth
+year by the day of election:</p>
+
+<p>a. All who have acquired the means of living through labor that is
+productive and useful to society, and also persons engaged in
+housekeeping which enables the former to do productive work&mdash;i.e.,
+laborers and employees of all classes who are employed in
+industry, trade, agriculture, etc.; and peasants and Cossack
+agricultural laborers who employ no help for the purpose of making
+profits.</p>
+
+<p>b. Soldiers of the army and navy of the Soviets.</p>
+
+<p>c. Citizens of the two preceding categories who have to any degree
+lost their capacity to work.</p>
+
+<p>Note 1: Local Soviets may, upon approval of the central power,
+lower the age standard mentioned herein.</p>
+
+<p>Note 2: Non-citizens mentioned in Paragraph 20 (Article 2, Chapter
+Five) have the right to vote.</p>
+
+<p>65. The following persons enjoy neither the right to vote nor the
+right to be voted for, even though they belong to one of the
+categories enumerated above, namely:</p>
+
+<p>a. Persons who employ hired labor in order to obtain from it an
+increase in profits.</p>
+
+<p>b. Persons who have an income without doing any work, such as
+interest from capital, receipts from property, etc.</p><p><a name="Page_287" id="Page_287"></a></p>
+
+<p>c. Private merchants, trade, and commercial brokers.</p>
+
+<p>d. Monks and clergy of all denominations.</p>
+
+<p>e. Employees and agents of the former police, the gendarme corps,
+and the Okhrana (Czar's secret service), also members of the
+former reigning dynasty.</p>
+
+<p>f. Persons who have in legal form been declared demented or
+mentally deficient, and also persons under guardianship.</p>
+
+<p>g. Persons who have been deprived by a Soviet of their rights of
+citizenship because of selfish or dishonorable offenses, for the
+period fixed by the sentence.</p></div>
+
+<p>Apparently the Constitution does not provide any standard for determining
+what labor is "useful and productive to society," and leaves the way open
+for a degree of arbitrariness on the part of some authority or other that
+is wholly incompatible with any generally accepted ideal of freedom and
+democracy. It is apparent from the text of paragraph 64, subdivision "a" of
+the foregoing chapter that housekeeping as such is not included in the
+category of "labor that is productive and useful to society," for a
+separate category is made of it. The language used is that "The right to
+vote and to be elected to the Soviets is enjoyed by.... All who have
+acquired the means of living through labor that is productive and useful to
+society, <i>and also</i> persons engaged in housekeeping, which enables the
+former to do productive work&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, laborers and employees of all classes
+who are employed in industry, trade, agriculture, etc."</p>
+
+<p>This <i>seems</i> to mean that persons engaged in housekeeping can only vote if
+and when they are so engaged in order to enable other persons than
+themselves to do "productive work." It appears that housekeeping for
+persons not engaged in such productive work&mdash;for children, for
+example&mdash;would not confer the right to vote. It is not possible to tell
+with certainty what it <i>does</i> mean, <a name="Page_288" id="Page_288"></a>however, for there is probably not a
+single person in Russia or in the world who can tell exactly what this
+precious instrument actually means. What standard is to be established to
+determine what labor is "productive" and "useful"? Is the journalist, for
+instance, engaged in useful and productive labor? Is the novelist? is the
+agitator? Presumably the journalist employed in defending the Soviet
+Republic against attacks by unfriendly critics would be doing useful work
+and be entitled to vote, but what about the journalist employed in making
+the criticisms? Would the wife of the latter, no matter how much she might
+disagree with her husband's views, be barred from voting, simply because
+she was "engaged in housekeeping" for one whose labors were not regarded
+"productive and useful to society"? If the language used means anything at
+all, apparently she would be so disfranchised.</p>
+
+<p>Upon what ground is it decided that the "private merchant" may not vote?
+Certainly it is not because his labor is of necessity neither productive
+nor useful, for paragraph 65 says that even though belonging to one of the
+categories of persons otherwise qualified to vote, the private merchant may
+"enjoy neither the right to vote nor to be voted for." The keeper of a
+little grocery store, even though his income is not greater than that of a
+mechanic, and despite the fact that his store meets a local need and makes
+his services, therefore, "useful" in the highest degree, cannot enjoy civic
+rights, simply because he is a "merchant"! The clergy of all denominations
+are excluded from the franchise. It does not matter, according to this
+constitution, that a minister belongs to a church independent of any
+connection with the state, that he is elected by people who desire his
+services and is paid by them, that he satisfies them and is <a name="Page_289" id="Page_289"></a>therefore
+doing a "useful service"&mdash;if utility means the satisfying of needs&mdash;because
+he is so employed he cannot vote.</p>
+
+<p>It is clearly provided that "peasants and Cossack agricultural laborers who
+employ no help for the purpose of making profits" can vote and be voted
+for. But no persons "who employ hired labor in order to obtain from it an
+increase in profits" may vote or be elected to office, <i>even though the
+work they do is productive and useful to society.</i> A peasant who hires no
+assistance may vote, but if he decides that by employing a boy to help him
+he will be able to give better attention to certain crops and make more
+money, even though he pays the boy every penny that the service is worth,
+judged by any standard whatever, he loses his vote and his civic status
+because, forsooth, he has gained in his net income as a result of his
+enterprise. And this is seriously put forward as the basis of government in
+a nation needing an intense and universal stimulation of its economic
+production.</p>
+
+<p>A militant suffragist friend of mine, whose passion for universal suffrage
+in America is so great that it leads her to join in all sorts of
+demonstrations protesting against the failure of the United States Senate
+to pass the Susan B. Anthony amendment&mdash;even leading her to join in the
+public burning of President Wilson's speeches, a queer emulation of the
+ancient ecclesiastical bigotry of burning heretical books!&mdash;manages to
+unite to her passion for equal and unrestricted suffrage an equally
+passionate admiration for the Bolsheviki, arch-enemies of equal and
+unrestricted suffrage. Her case is not exceptional: it is rather typical of
+the Bolshevik following in England and in America. Such minds are not
+governed and directed by rational processes, but by emotional impulses,
+generally of pathological origin.</p><p><a name="Page_290" id="Page_290"></a></p>
+
+<p>What the Bolshevik constitution would mean if practically applied to
+American life to-day can be briefly indicated. The following classes would
+certainly be entitled to vote and to be elected to office:</p>
+
+<p>1. All wage-earners engaged in the production of goods and utilities
+regarded by some designated authority as "productive and useful to
+society."</p>
+
+<p>2. Teachers and educators engaged in the public service.</p>
+
+<p>3. All farmers owning and working their own farms without hired help of any
+kind.</p>
+
+<p>4. All wage-earners engaged in the public service as employees of the
+state, subdivisions of the state, or public service corporations-such as
+postal clerks, street-railway workers, electricians, and so on.</p>
+
+<p>5. Wives and others engaged in keeping the homes of the foregoing, so as to
+enable them to work.</p>
+
+<p>6. The "soldiers of the army and navy"&mdash;whether all officers are included
+is not clear from the text.</p>
+
+<p>Now let us see what classes would be as certainly excluded from the right
+to vote and to be voted for.</p>
+
+<p>1. Every merchant from the keeper of a corner grocery store to the owner of
+a great mercantile establishment.</p>
+
+<p>2. Every banker, every commission agent, every broker, every insurance
+agent, every real-estate dealer.</p>
+
+<p>3. Every farmer who hires help of any kind&mdash;even a single "hand."</p>
+
+<p>4. Every petty contractor, garage-keeper, or other person employing any
+hired help whatever, including the professional writer who hires a
+stenographer, the doctor who hires a chauffeur, and the dentist who hires a
+mechanic assistant.</p>
+
+<p>5. Every clergyman and minister of the Gospel.</p>
+
+<p>6. Every person whose income is derived from inherited <a name="Page_291" id="Page_291"></a>wealth or from
+invested earnings, including all who live upon annuities provided by gift
+or bequest.</p>
+
+<p>7. Every person engaged in housekeeping for persons included in any of the
+foregoing six categories&mdash;including the wives of such disqualified persons.</p>
+
+<p>There are many occupational groups whose civic status is not so easily
+defined. The worker engaged in making articles of luxury, enjoyed only by
+the privileged few, could hardly have a better claim to a vote than the
+housekeeper of a man whose income was derived from foreign investments, or
+than the chauffeur of a man whose income was derived from government bonds.
+All three represent, presumably, types of that parasitic labor which
+subjects those engaged in it to disfranchisement. Apparently, though not
+certainly, then, the following would also be disfranchised:</p>
+
+<p>1. All lawyers except those engaged by the public authorities for the
+public service.</p>
+
+<p>2. All teachers and educators other than those engaged in the public
+service.</p>
+
+<p>3. All bankers, managers of industries, commercial travelers, experts, and
+accountants except those employed in the public service, or whose labor is
+judged by a competent tribunal to be necessary and useful.</p>
+
+<p>4. All editors, journalists, authors of books and plays, except as special
+provision might be provided for individuals.</p>
+
+<p>5. All persons engaged in occupations which a competent tribunal decided to
+classify as non-essential or non-productive.</p>
+
+<p>Any serious attempt to introduce such restrictions and limitations of the
+right of suffrage in America would provoke irresistible revolt. It would be
+justly and properly regarded as an attempt to arrest the forward march of
+<a name="Page_292" id="Page_292"></a>the nation and to turn its energies in a backward direction. It would be
+just as reactionary in the political world as it would be in the industrial
+world to revert back to hand-tool production; to substitute the ox-team for
+the railway system, the hand-loom for the power-loom, the flail for the
+threshing-machine, the sickle for the modern harvesting-machine, the human
+courier for the electric telegraph.</p>
+
+<p>Yet we find a radical like Mr. Max Eastman giving his benediction and
+approval to precisely such a program in Russia as a substitute for
+universal suffrage. We find him quoting with apparent approval an article
+setting forth Lenine's plan, hardly disguised, to disfranchise every farmer
+who employs even a single hired helper.<a name="FNanchor_54_54" id="FNanchor_54_54"></a><a href="#Footnote_54_54" class="fnanchor">[54]</a></p>
+
+<p>Lenine's position is quite clear. "Only the proletariat leading on the
+poorest peasants (the semi-proletariat as they are called in our program)
+... may undertake the steps toward Socialism that have become absolutely
+unavoidable and non-postponable.... The peasants want to retain their small
+holdings and to arrive at some place of equal distribution.... So be it. No
+sensible Socialist will quarrel with a pauper peasant on this ground. If
+the lands are confiscated, <i>so long as the proletarians rule in the great
+centers, and all political power is handed over to the proletariat</i>, the
+rest will take care of itself."<a name="FNanchor_55_55" id="FNanchor_55_55"></a><a href="#Footnote_55_55" class="fnanchor">[55]</a> Yet, in spite of Lenine's insistence
+that all political power be "handed over to the proletariat," in spite of a
+score of similar utterances which might be quoted, and, finally, in spite
+of the Soviet Constitution which so obviously excludes from the right to
+vote a large part of the adult population, an American Bolshevist
+pamphleteer has the <a name="Page_293" id="Page_293"></a>effrontery to insult the intelligence of his readers
+by the stupidly and palpably false statement that "even at the present time
+95 per cent. in Russia can vote, while in the United States only about 65
+per cent. can vote."<a name="FNanchor_56_56" id="FNanchor_56_56"></a><a href="#Footnote_56_56" class="fnanchor">[56]</a></p>
+
+<p>Of course it is only as a temporary measure that this dictatorship of a
+class is to be maintained. It is designed only for the period of transition
+and adjustment. In time the adjustment will be made, all forms of social
+parasitism and economic exploitation will disappear, and then it will be
+both possible and natural to revert to democratic government. Too simple
+and na&iuml;ve to be trusted alone in a world so full of trickery and tricksters
+as ours are they who find any asurance in this promise. They are surely
+among the most gullible of our humankind!</p>
+
+<p>Of course, the answer to the claim is a very simple one: it is that no
+class gaining privilege and power ever surrenders it until it is compelled
+to do so. Every one who has read the pre-Marxian literature dealing with
+the dictatorship of the proletariat knows how insistent is the demand that
+the period of dictatorship must be <i>prolonged as much as possible</i>. Even
+Marx himself insisted, on one occasion at least, that it must be maintained
+as long as possible,<a name="FNanchor_57_57" id="FNanchor_57_57"></a><a href="#Footnote_57_57" class="fnanchor">[57]</a> and in the letter of Johann von Miquel, already
+quoted, we find the same thought expressed in the same terms, "as long as
+possible." But even if we put aside these warnings of human experience and
+of recorded history, and persuade ourselves that in Russia we have a wholly
+new phenomenon, a class possessing powers of dictatorship animated by a
+burning passion to relinquish those powers as quickly as possible, is it
+not still evident that the social adjustments that must be made to reach
+<a name="Page_294" id="Page_294"></a>the stage where, according to the Bolshevik standards, political democracy
+can be introduced, must, under the most favorable circumstances
+conceivable, take many, many years? Even Lenine admits that "a sound
+solution of the problem of increasing the productivity of labor" (which
+lies at the very heart of the problem we are now discussing) "requires at
+least (especially after a most distressing and destructive war) several
+years."<a name="FNanchor_58_58" id="FNanchor_58_58"></a><a href="#Footnote_58_58" class="fnanchor">[58]</a></p>
+
+<p>From the point of view of social democracy the basis of the Bolshevik state
+is reactionary and unsound. The true Socialist policy is that set forth by
+Wilhelm Liebknecht in the following words: "The political power which the
+Social Democracy aims at and which it will win, no matter what its enemies
+may do, <i>has not for its object the establishment of the dictatorship of
+the proletariat, but the suppression of the dictatorship of the
+bourgeoisie</i>."<a name="FNanchor_59_59" id="FNanchor_59_59"></a><a href="#Footnote_59_59" class="fnanchor">[59]</a></p>
+
+
+<h4>IV</h4>
+
+
+<p>Democracy in government and in industry must characterize any system of
+society which can be justly called Socialist. Thirteen years ago I wrote,
+"Socialism without democracy is as impossible as a shadow without
+light."<a name="FNanchor_60_60" id="FNanchor_60_60"></a><a href="#Footnote_60_60" class="fnanchor">[60]</a> That seemed to me then, as it seems to-day, axiomatic. And so
+the greatest Socialist thinkers and leaders always regarded it. "We have
+perceived that Socialism and democracy are inseparable," declared William
+Liebknecht, the well-beloved, in 1899.<a name="FNanchor_61_61" id="FNanchor_61_61"></a><a href="#Footnote_61_61" class="fnanchor">[61]</a> Thirty years earlier, in 1869,
+he had given lucid expression to the<a name="Page_295" id="Page_295"></a> same conviction in these words:
+"Socialism and democracy are not the same, but they are only different
+expressions of the same fundamental idea. They belong to each other, round
+out each other, and can never stand in contradiction to each other.
+Socialism without democracy is pseudo-Socialism, just as democracy without
+Socialism is pseudo-democracy."<a name="FNanchor_62_62" id="FNanchor_62_62"></a><a href="#Footnote_62_62" class="fnanchor">[62]</a> Democracy in industry is, as I have
+insisted in my writing with unfailing consistency, as inseparable from
+Socialism as democracy in government.<a name="FNanchor_63_63" id="FNanchor_63_63"></a><a href="#Footnote_63_63" class="fnanchor">[63]</a> Unless industry is brought within
+the control of democracy and made responsive to the common will, Socialism
+is not attained.</p>
+
+<p>Everywhere the organized working class aspires to attain that industrial
+democracy which is the counterpart of political democracy. Syndicalism,
+with all its vagaries, its crude reversal to outworn ideas and methods, is,
+nevertheless, fundamentally an expression of that yearning. It is the same
+passion that lies back of the Shop Stewards' movement in England, and that
+inspires the much more patiently and carefully developed theories and plans
+of the advocates of "Guild Socialism." Motived by the same desire, our
+American labor-unions are demanding, and steadily gaining, an increasing
+share in the actual direction of industry. Joint control by boards composed
+of representatives of employers, employees, and the general public is, to
+an ever-increasing extent, determining the conditions of employment, wage
+standards, work standards, hours of labor, choice and conduct of foremen,
+and many other matters of vital importance to the <a name="Page_296" id="Page_296"></a>wage-earners. That we
+are still a long way from anything like industrial democracy is all too
+painfully true and obvious, but it is equally obvious that we are
+struggling toward the goal, and that there is a serious purpose and
+intention to realize the ideal.</p>
+
+<p>Impelled by the inexorable logic of its own existence as a dictatorship,
+the Bolshevik government has had to set itself against any and every
+manifestation of democracy in industry with the same relentless force as it
+opposed democracy in government. True, owing to the fact that, following
+the line of industrial evolution, the trade-union movement was not strongly
+enough developed to even attempt any organization for the expression of
+industrial democracy comparable to the Constituent Assembly. It is equally
+true, however, that had such an organization existed the necessity to
+suppress it, as the political organization was suppressed, would have
+proceeded inevitably and irresistibly from the creation of a dictatorship.
+<i>There cannot be, in any country, as co-existent forces, political
+dictatorship and industrial democracy.</i> It is also true that such
+democratic agencies as there were existing the Bolsheviki neglected.</p>
+
+<p>That the Bolsheviki did not establish industrial democracy in its fullest
+sense is not to be charged to their discredit. Had Bolshevism never
+appeared, and had the Constituent Assembly been permitted to function
+unmolested and free, it would have taken many years to realize anything
+like a well-rounded industrial democracy, for which a highly developed
+industrial system is absolutely essential. The leaders of the Bolshevik
+movement recognized from the first that the time had not yet arrived for
+even attempting to set up a Socialist commonwealth based on the social
+ownership and democratic control of industry. Lenine frankly declared that
+"Socialism <a name="Page_297" id="Page_297"></a>cannot now prevail in Russia,"<a name="FNanchor_64_64" id="FNanchor_64_64"></a><a href="#Footnote_64_64" class="fnanchor">[64]</a> and Trotzky said, a month
+after the <i>coup d'&eacute;tat</i>: "We are not ready yet to take over all
+industry.... For the present, we expect of the earnings of a factory to pay
+the owner 5 or 6 per cent. yearly on his actual investment. What we aim at
+now is <i>control</i> rather than <i>ownership</i>."<a name="FNanchor_65_65" id="FNanchor_65_65"></a><a href="#Footnote_65_65" class="fnanchor">[65]</a> He did not tell Professor
+Ross, who records this statement, on what grounds the owner of the property
+thus controlled by the Soviet government, and who thus becomes a partner of
+the government, is to be excluded from the exercise of the franchise. But
+let that pass.</p>
+
+<p>When the Bolsheviki seized the power of the state, they found themselves
+confronted by a terrific task. Russia was utterly demoralized. An
+undeveloped nation industrially, war and internal strife had wrought havoc
+with the industrial life she had. Her railways were neglected and the whole
+transportation system, entirely inadequate even for peace needs, had, under
+the strain of the war, fallen into chaos. After the March Revolution, as a
+natural consequence of the intoxication of the new freedom, such
+disciplines as had existed were broken down. Production fell off in a most
+alarming manner. During the Kerensky r&eacute;gime Skobelev, as Minister of Labor,
+repeatedly begged the workers to prove their loyalty to the Revolution by
+increased exertion and faithfulness in the workshops and factories. The
+Bolsheviki, on their part, as a means of fighting the Provisional
+Government, preached the opposite doctrine, that of sabotage. In every
+manner possible they encouraged the workers to limit production, to waste
+time and materials, strike for trivial reasons, and, in short, do all <a name="Page_298" id="Page_298"></a>that
+was possible to defeat the effort to place industry upon a sound basis.</p>
+
+<p>When they found themselves in possession of the powers of government the
+Bolshevik leaders soon had to face the stern realities of the conditions
+essential to the life of a great nation. They could not escape the
+necessity of intensifying production. They had not only promised peace, but
+bread, and bread comes only from labor. Every serious student of the
+problem has realized that the first great task of any Socialist society
+must be <i>to increase the productivity of labor</i>. It is all very well for a
+popular propaganda among the masses to promise a great reduction in the
+hours of labor and, at the same time, a great improvement in the standards
+of living. The translation of such promises into actual achievements must
+prove to be an enormous task. To build the better homes, make the better
+and more abundant clothing, shoes, furniture, and other things required to
+fulfil the promise, will require a great deal of labor, and such an
+organization of industry upon a basis of efficiency as no nation has yet
+developed. If the working class of this or any other country should take
+possession of the existing organization of production, there would not be
+enough in the fund now going to the capitalist class to satisfy the
+requirements of the workers, <i>even if not a penny of compensation were paid
+to the expropriated owners</i>. Kautsky, among others, has courageously faced
+this fact and insisted that "it will be one of the imperative tasks of the
+Social Revolution not simply to continue, but to increase production; the
+victorious proletariat must extend production rapidly if it is to be able
+to satisfy the enormous demands that will be made upon the new r&eacute;gime."<a name="FNanchor_66_66" id="FNanchor_66_66"></a><a href="#Footnote_66_66" class="fnanchor">[66]</a><br />
+<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">From the first</span><a name="Page_299" id="Page_299"></a><br />
+this problem had to be faced by the Bolshevik government. We find Lenine
+insisting that the workers must be inspired with "idealism, self-sacrifice,
+and persistence" to turn out as large a product as possible; that the
+productivity of labor must be raised and a high level of industrial
+performance as the duty of every worker be rigorously insisted upon. It is
+not enough to have destroyed feudalism and the monarchy:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>In every Socialist revolution, however, the main task of the
+proletariat, and of the poorest peasantry led by it&mdash;and, hence,
+also in the Socialist revolution in Russia inaugurated by us on
+November 7, 1917, consists in the positive and constructive work
+of establishing an extremely complex and delicate net of newly
+organized relationships covering the systematic production and
+distribution of products which are necessary for the existence of
+tens of millions of people. The successful realization of such a
+revolution depends on the original historical creative work of the
+majority of the population, and first of all of the majority of
+the toilers. <i>The victory of the Socialist revolution will not be
+assured unless the proletariat and the poorest peasantry manifest
+sufficient consciousness, idealism, self-sacrifice, and
+persistence.</i> With the creation of a new&mdash;the Soviet&mdash;type of
+state, offering to the oppressed toiling masses the opportunity to
+participate actively in the free construction of a new society, we
+have solved only a small part of the difficult task. <i>The main
+difficulty is in the economic domain; to raise the productivity of
+labor, to establish strict and universal accounting and control of
+production and distribution, and actually to socialize
+production.</i><a name="FNanchor_67_67" id="FNanchor_67_67"></a><a href="#Footnote_67_67" class="fnanchor">[67]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>Lenine recognizes, as every thoughtful person must, that this task of
+organizing production and distribution cannot be undertaken by "the
+proletariat and the poorest peasants." It requires a vast amount of highly
+developed technical knowledge and skill, the result of long training and
+superior education. This kind of service is <a name="Page_300" id="Page_300"></a>so highly paid, in comparison
+with the wages paid to the manual workers, that it lifts those who perform
+the service and receive the high salaries into the ranks of the
+bourgeoisie. Certainly, even though they are engaged in performing work of
+the highest value and the most vital consequence, the specialists, experts,
+and directing managers of industry are not of the "working class," as that
+term is commonly employed. And no matter how we may speculate upon the
+possible attainment of approximate equality of income in some future near
+or remote, the fact is that the labor of such men can only be secured by
+paying much more than is paid to the manual workers.</p>
+
+<p>Quite wisely, the Bolshevik government decided that it must have such
+services, no matter that they must be highly paid for; that they could only
+be rendered by the hated bourgeoisie and that, in consequence, certain
+compromises and relations with the bourgeoisie became necessary the moment
+the services were engaged. The Bolshevik government recognized the
+imperative necessity of the service which only highly paid specialists
+could give and wisely decided that no prejudice or theory must be permitted
+to block the necessary steps for Russia's reconstruction. In a spirit of
+intelligent opportunism, therefore, they subordinated shibboleths,
+prejudices, dogmas, and theories to Russia's necessity. The sanity of this
+opportunistic attitude is altogether admirable, but it contrasts strangely
+with the refusal to co-operate with the bourgeoisie in establishing a
+stable democratic government&mdash;no less necessary for Russia's reconstruction
+and for Socialism. As a matter of fact, the very promptitude and sanity of
+their opportunism when faced by responsibility, serves to demonstrate the
+truth of the contention made in these pages, that in refusing to co-operate
+with others in building up a permanently secure democratic <a name="Page_301" id="Page_301"></a>government,
+they were actuated by no high moral principle, but simply by a desire to
+gain power. The position of Russia to-day would have been vastly different
+if the wisdom manifested in the following paragraphs had governed Lenine
+and his associates in the days when Kerensky was trying to save Russian
+democracy:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p><i>Without the direction of specialists of different branches of
+knowledge, technique, and experience, the transformation toward
+Socialism is impossible</i>, for Socialism demands a conscious mass
+movement toward a higher productivity of labor in comparison with
+capitalism and on the basis which had been attained by capitalism.
+Socialism must accomplish this movement forward in its own way, by
+its own methods&mdash;to make it more definite, by Soviet methods. But
+the specialists are inevitably bourgeois on account of the whole
+environment of social life which made them specialists.... In view
+of the considerable delay in accounting and control in general,
+although we have succeeded in defeating sabotage, we have <i>not
+yet</i> created an environment which would put at our disposal the
+bourgeois specialists. Many sabotagers are coming into our
+service, but the best organizers and the biggest specialists can
+be used by the state either in the old bourgeois way (that is, for
+a higher salary) or in the new proletarian way (that is, by
+creating such an environment of universal accounting and control
+which would inevitably and naturally attract and gain the
+submission of specialists). We were forced now to make use of the
+old bourgeois method and agree to a very high remuneration for the
+services of the biggest of the bourgeois specialists. All those
+who are acquainted with the facts understand this, but not all
+give sufficient thought to the significance of such a measure on
+the part of the proletarian state. <i>It is clear that the measure
+is a compromise, that it is a defection from the principles of the
+Paris Commune and of any proletarian rule, which demand the
+reduction of salaries to the standard of remuneration of the
+average workers</i>&mdash;principles which demand that "career hunting" be
+fought by deeds, not words.</p>
+
+<p>Furthermore, it is clear that such a measure is not merely a halt
+in a certain part and to a certain degree of the offensive against
+capitalism (for capitalism is not a quantity of money, <a name="Page_302" id="Page_302"></a>but a
+definite social relationship), <i>but also a step backward by our
+Socialist Soviet state</i>, which has from the very beginning
+proclaimed and carried on a policy of reducing high salaries to
+the standard of wages of the average worker.</p>
+
+<p>... The corrupting influence of high salaries is beyond
+question&mdash;both on the Soviets ... and on the mass of the workers.
+But all thinking and honest workers and peasants will agree with
+us and will admit that we are unable to get rid at once of the
+evil heritage of capitalism.... The sooner we ourselves, workers
+and peasants, learn better labor discipline and a higher technique
+of toil, making use of the bourgeois specialists for this purpose,
+the sooner we will get rid of the need of paying tribute to these
+specialists.<a name="FNanchor_68_68" id="FNanchor_68_68"></a><a href="#Footnote_68_68" class="fnanchor">[68]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>We find the same readiness to compromise and to follow the line of least
+resistance in dealing with the co-operatives. From 1906 onward there had
+been an enormous growth of co-operatives in Russia. They were of various
+kinds and animated by varied degrees of social consciousness. They did not
+differ materially from the co-operatives of England, Belgium, Denmark,
+Italy, or Germany except in the one important particular that they relied
+upon bourgeois Intellectuals for leadership and direction to a greater
+extent than do the co-operatives in the countries named. They were
+admirably fitted to be the nuclei of a socialized system of distribution.
+Out of office the Bolsheviki had sneered at these working-class
+organizations and denounced them as "bourgeois corruptions of the militant
+proletariat." Necessity and responsibility soon forced the adoption of a
+new attitude toward them. The Bolshevik government had to accept the
+despised co-operatives, and even compromise Bolshevist principles as the
+price of securing their services:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>A Socialist state can come into existence only as a net of
+production and consumption communes, which keep conscientious
+<a name="Page_303" id="Page_303"></a>accounts of their production and consumption, economize labor,
+steadily increasing its productivity and thus making it possible
+to lower the workday to seven, six, or even less hours. Anything
+less than rigorous, universal, thorough accounting and control of
+grain and of the production of grain, and later also of all other
+necessary products, will not do. We have inherited from capitalism
+mass organizations which can facilitate the transition to mass
+accounting and control of distribution&mdash;the consumers'
+co-operatives. They are developed in Russia less than in the more
+advanced countries, but they comprise more than 10,000,000
+members. The decree on consumers' associations which was recently
+issued is extremely significant, showing clearly the peculiarity
+of the position and of the problem of the Socialist Soviet
+Republic at the present time.</p>
+
+<p>The decree is an agreement with the bourgeois co-operatives and
+with the workmen's co-operatives adhering to the bourgeois
+standpoint. The agreement or compromise consists, firstly, in the
+fact that the representatives of these institutions not only
+participated in the deliberations on this decree, but had
+practically received a determining voice, for parts of the decree
+which met determined opposition from these institutions were
+rejected. Secondly and essentially, the compromise consists in the
+rejection by the Soviet authority of the principle of free
+admission to the co-operatives (the only consistent principle from
+the proletarian standpoint), and that the whole population of a
+given locality should be <i>united in a single co-operative</i>. The
+defection from this, the only Socialist principle, which is in
+accord with the problem of doing away with classes, allows the
+existence of working-class co-operatives (which in this case call
+themselves working-class co-operatives only because they submit to
+the class interests of the bourgeoisie). Lastly, the proposition
+of the Soviet government completely to exclude the bourgeoisie
+from the administration of the co-operatives was also considerably
+weakened, and only owners of capitalistic commercial and
+industrial enterprises are excluded from the administration.</p>
+
+<hr style='width: 45%;' />
+
+<p>If the proletariat, acting through the Soviets, should
+successfully establish accounting and control on a national scale,
+there <a name="Page_304" id="Page_304"></a>would be no need for such compromise. Through the Food
+Departments of the Soviets, through their organs of supply, we
+would unite the population in one co-operative directed by the
+proletariat, without the assistance from bourgeois co-operatives,
+without concessions to the purely bourgeois principle which
+compels the labor co-operatives to remain side by side with the
+bourgeois co-operatives instead of wholly subjecting these
+bourgeois co-operatives, fusing both?<a name="FNanchor_69_69" id="FNanchor_69_69"></a><a href="#Footnote_69_69" class="fnanchor">[69]</a></p></div>
+
+
+<h4>V</h4>
+
+<p>It is no mood of captious, unfriendly criticism that attention is specially
+directed to these compromises. Only political charlatans, ineffective
+quacks, and irresponsible soap-box orators see crime against the
+revolutionary program of the masses in a wise and honest opportunism.
+History will not condemn the Bolsheviki for the give-and-take,
+compromise-where-necessary policy outlined in the foregoing paragraphs. Its
+condemnation will be directed rather against their failure to act in that
+spirit from the moment the first Provisional Government arose. Had they
+joined with the other Socialists and established a strong Coalition
+Government, predominantly Socialist, but including representatives of the
+most liberal and democratic elements of the bourgeoisie, it would have been
+possible to bring the problems of labor organization and labor discipline
+under democratic direction. It would not have been possible to establish
+complete industrial democracy, fully developed Socialism, nor will it be
+possible to do this for many years to come.</p>
+
+<p>But it would have been easy and natural for the state to secure to the
+workers a degree of economic assurance and protection not otherwise
+possible. It would have <a name="Page_305" id="Page_305"></a>been possible, too, for the workers'
+organizations, recognized by and co-operating with the state, to have
+undertaken, in a large degree, the control of the conditions of their own
+employment which labor organizations everywhere are demanding and gradually
+gaining. The best features of "Guild Socialism" could nowhere have been so
+easily adopted.<a name="FNanchor_70_70" id="FNanchor_70_70"></a><a href="#Footnote_70_70" class="fnanchor">[70]</a> But instead of effort in these directions, we find the
+Bolsheviki resorting to the <i>Taylor System of Scientific Management
+enforced by an individual dictator whose word is final and absolute, to
+disobey whom is treason</i>! There is not a nation in the world with a
+working-class movement of any strength where it would be possible to
+introduce the industrial servitude here described:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>The most conscious vanguard of the Russian proletariat has already
+turned to the problem of increasing labor discipline. For
+instance, the central committee of the Metallurgical Union and the
+Central Council of the Trades Unions have begun work on respective
+measures and drafts of decrees. This work should be supported and
+advanced by all means. <i>We should immediately introduce piece work
+and try it out in practice. We should try out every scientific and
+progressive suggestion of the Taylor System</i>; we should compare
+the earnings with the general total of production, or the
+exploitation results of railroad and water transportation, and so
+on.</p>
+
+<p>The Russian is a poor worker in comparison with the workers of the
+advanced nations, and this could not be otherwise under the r&eacute;gime
+of the Czar and other remnants of feudalism. The last word of
+capitalism in this respect, the Taylor System&mdash;as well as all
+progressive measures of capitalism&mdash;combine the refined cruelty of
+bourgeois exploitation and a number of most valuable scientific
+attainments in the analysis of mechanical motions during work, in
+dismissing superfluous and useless motions, in determining the
+most correct methods of the work, <a name="Page_306" id="Page_306"></a>the best systems of accounting
+and control, etc. The Soviet Republic must adopt valuable and
+scientific and technical advance in this field. <i>The possibility
+of Socialism will be determined by our success in combining the
+Soviet rule and the Soviet organization of management with the
+latest progressive measures of capitalism. We must introduce in
+Russia the study and the teaching of the Taylor System and its
+systematic trial and adaptation</i>. While working to increase the
+productivity of labor, we must at the same time take into account
+the peculiarities of the transition period from capitalism to
+Socialism, which require, on one hand, that we lay the foundation
+for the Socialist organization of emulation, and, on the other
+hand, <i>require the use of compulsion so that the slogan of the
+dictatorship of the proletariat should not be weakened by the
+practice of a too mild proletarian government</i>.</p>
+
+<p>The resolution of the last (Moscow) Congress of the Soviets
+advocates, as the most important problem at present, the creation
+of "efficient organization" and higher discipline. Such
+resolutions are now readily supported by everybody. But that their
+realization requires compulsion, and <i>compulsion in the form of a
+dictatorship</i>, is ordinarily not comprehended. And yet, it would
+be the greatest stupidity and the most absurd opportunism to
+suppose that the transition from capitalism to Socialism is
+possible without compulsion and dictatorship. The Marxian theory
+has long ago criticized beyond misunderstanding this petty
+bourgeois-democratic and anarchistic nonsense. And Russia of
+1917-18 confirms in this respect the Marxian theory so clearly,
+palpably, and convincingly that only those who are hopelessly
+stupid or who have firmly determined to ignore the truth can still
+err in this respect. Either a Kornilov dictatorship (if Kornilov
+be taken as Russian type of a bourgeois Cavaignac) or a
+dictatorship of the proletariat&mdash;no other alternative is possible
+for a country which is passing through an unusually swift
+development with unusually difficult transitions and which suffers
+from desperate disorganization created by the most horrible
+war.<a name="FNanchor_71_71" id="FNanchor_71_71"></a><a href="#Footnote_71_71" class="fnanchor">[71]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>This dictatorship is to be no light affair, no purely nominal force, but a
+relentless iron-hand rule. Lenine is <a name="Page_307" id="Page_307"></a>afraid that the proletariat is too
+soft-hearted and lenient. He says:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>But "dictatorship" is a great word. And great words must not be
+used in vain. A dictatorship is an iron rule, with revolutionary
+daring and swift and merciless in the suppression of the
+exploiters as well as of the thugs (hooligans). And our rule is
+too mild, quite frequently resembling jam rather than iron.<a name="FNanchor_72_72" id="FNanchor_72_72"></a><a href="#Footnote_72_72" class="fnanchor">[72]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>And so the dictatorship of the proletariat becomes the <i>dictatorship of a
+single person</i>, a super-boss and industrial autocrat: We must learn to
+combine the stormy, energetic breaking of all restraint on the part of the
+toiling masses <i>with iron discipline during work, with absolute submission
+to the will of one person, the Soviet director, during work</i>.<a name="FNanchor_73_73" id="FNanchor_73_73"></a><a href="#Footnote_73_73" class="fnanchor">[73]</a></p>
+
+<p>As I copy these words from Lenine's book my memory recalls the days, more
+than twenty years ago, when as a workman in England and as shop steward of
+my union I joined with my comrades in breaking down the very things Lenine
+here proposes to set up in the name of Socialism. "Absolute submission to
+the will of one person" is not a state toward which free men will strive.
+Not willingly will men who enjoy the degree of personal freedom existing in
+democratic nations turn to this:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>With respect to ... the significance of individual dictatorial
+power from the standpoint of the specific problems of the present
+period, we must say that every large machine industry&mdash;which is
+the material productive source and basis of Socialism&mdash;requires an
+absolute and strict unity of the will which directs the joint work
+of hundreds, thousands, and tens of thousands of people. This
+necessity is obvious from the technical, economical, and
+historical standpoint, and has always been recognized by all those
+who had given any thought to Socialism, as its prerequisite.<a name="Page_308" id="Page_308"></a> But
+how can we secure a strict unity of will? <i>By subjecting the will
+of thousands</i> to the will of one.</p>
+
+<p>This subjection, <i>if the participants in the common work are
+ideally conscious and disciplined</i>, may resemble the mild leading
+of an orchestra conductor; but may take the acute form of a
+dictatorship&mdash;if there is no ideal discipline and consciousness.
+But at any rate, <i>complete submission to a single will is
+absolutely necessary for the success of the processes of work
+which is organized on the type of large machine industry</i>. This is
+doubly true of the railways. And just this transition from one
+political problem to another, which in appearance has no
+resemblance to the first, constitutes the peculiarity of the
+present period. The Revolution has just broken the oldest, the
+strongest, and the heaviest chains to which the masses were
+compelled to submit. So it was yesterday. And to-day, the same
+Revolution (and indeed in the interest of Socialism) demands the
+<i>absolute submission</i> of the masses to the <i>single will</i> of those
+who direct the labor process. It is self-evident that it can be
+realized only after great upheavals, crises, returns to the old;
+only through the greatest strain of the energy of the proletarian
+vanguard which is leading the people to the new order....</p>
+
+<p>To the extent to which the principal problem of the Soviet rule
+changes from military suppression to administration, suppression
+and compulsion will, <i>as a rule, be manifested in trials, and not
+in shooting on the spot</i>. And in this respect the revolutionary
+masses have taken, after November 7, 1918, the right road and have
+proved the vitality of the Revolution, when they started to
+organize their own workmen's and peasants' tribunals, before any
+decrees were issued dismissing the bourgeois-democratic judicial
+apparatus. <i>But our revolutionary and popular tribunals are
+excessively and incredibly weak. It is apparent that the popular
+view of the courts&mdash;which was inherited from the r&eacute;gime of the
+landowners and the bourgeoisie&mdash;as not their own, has not yet been
+completely destroyed</i>. It is not sufficiently appreciated that the
+courts serve to attract all the poor to administration (for
+judicial activity is one of the functions of state
+administration); that the court is <i>an organ of the rule of the
+proletariat and of the poorest peasantry; that the court is a
+means of training in discipline</i>. There is a lack of appreciation
+of the simple and obvious fact that, if the chief misfortunes of
+Russia are famine and unemployment, these misfortunes cannot be
+overcome by <a name="Page_309" id="Page_309"></a>any outbursts of enthusiasm, but only by thorough and
+universal organization and discipline, in order to increase the
+production of bread for men and fuel for industry, to transport it
+in time, and to distribute it in the right way. That therefore
+<i>responsibility</i> for the pangs of famine and unemployment falls on
+<i>every one who violates the labor discipline in any enterprise and
+in any business</i>. That those who are responsible should be
+discovered, tried, and <i>punished without mercy</i>. The petty
+bourgeois environment, which we will have to combat persistently
+now, shows particularly in the lack of comprehension of the
+economic and political connection between famine and unemployment
+and the <i>prevailing dissoluteness in organization and
+discipline</i>&mdash;in the firm hold of the view of the small proprietor
+that "nothing matters, if only I gain as much as possible."</p>
+
+<p>A characteristic struggle occurred on this basis in connection
+with the last decree on railway management, the decree which
+granted dictatorial (or "unlimited") power to individual
+directors. The conscious (and mostly, probably, unconscious)
+representatives of petty bourgeois dissoluteness contended that
+the granting of "unlimited" (<i>i.e.</i>, dictatorial) power to
+individuals was a defection from the principle of board
+administration, from the democratic and other principles of the
+Soviet rule. Some of the Socialist-Revolutionists of the left wing
+carried on a plainly demagogic agitation against the decree on
+dictatorship, appealing to the evil instincts and to the petty
+bourgeois desire for personal gain. The question thus presented is
+of really great significance; firstly, the question of principle
+is, in general, the appointment of individuals endowed with
+unlimited power, the appointment of dictators, in accord with the
+fundamental principles of the Soviet rule; secondly, in what
+relation is this case&mdash;this precedent, if you wish&mdash;to the special
+problems of the Soviet rule during the present concrete period?
+Both questions deserve serious consideration.<a name="FNanchor_74_74" id="FNanchor_74_74"></a><a href="#Footnote_74_74" class="fnanchor">[74]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>With characteristic ingenuity Lenine attempts to provide this dictatorship
+with a theoretical basis which will pass muster as Marxian Socialism. He
+uses the term<a name="Page_310" id="Page_310"></a> "Soviet democracy" as a synonym for democratic Socialism and
+says there is "absolutely no contradiction in principle" between it and
+"the use of dictatorial power of individuals." By what violence to reason
+and to language is the word <i>democracy</i> applied to the system described by
+Lenine? To use words with such scant respect to their meanings, established
+by etymology, history, and universal agreement in usage, is to invite and
+indeed compel the contempt of minds disciplined by reason's practices. As
+for the claim that there is no contradiction in principle between
+democratic Socialism and the exercise of dictatorial power by individuals,
+before it can be accepted every Socialist teacher and leader of any
+standing anywhere, the programs of all the Socialist parties, and their
+practice, must be denied and set aside. Whether democratic Socialism be
+wise or unwise, a practical possibility or an unrealizable idea, at least
+it has nothing in common with such reactionary views as are expressed in
+the following:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>That the dictatorship of individuals has very frequently in the
+history of revolutionary movements served as an expression and
+means of realization of the dictatorship of the revolutionary
+classes is confirmed by the undisputed experience of history. With
+bourgeois democratic principles, the dictatorship of individuals
+has undoubtedly been compatible. But this point is always treated
+adroitly by the bourgeois critics of the Soviet rule and by their
+petty bourgeois aides. On one hand, they declared the Soviet rule
+simply something absurd and anarchically wild, carefully avoiding
+all our historical comparisons and theoretical proofs that the
+Soviets are a higher form of democracy; nay, more, the beginning
+of a <i>Socialist</i> form of democracy. On the other hand, they demand
+of us a higher democracy than the bourgeois and argue: with your
+Bolshevist (<i>i.e.</i>, Socialist, not bourgeois) democratic
+principles, with the Soviet democratic principles, individual
+dictatorship is absolutely incompatible.</p><p><a name="Page_311" id="Page_311"></a></p>
+
+<p>Extremely poor arguments, these. If we are not Anarchists, we must
+admit the necessity of a state&mdash;that is, of <i>compulsion</i>, for the
+transition from capitalism to Socialism. The form of compulsion is
+determined by the degree of development of the particular
+revolutionary class, then by such special circumstances as, for
+instance, the heritage of a long and reactionary war, and then by
+the forms of resistance of the bourgeoisie and the petty
+bourgeoisie. <i>There is therefore absolutely no contradiction in
+principle between the Soviet (Socialist) democracy and the use of
+dictatorial power of individuals</i>. The distinction between a
+proletarian and a bourgeois dictatorship consists in this: that
+the first directs its attacks against the exploiting minority in
+the interests of the exploited majority; and, further, in this,
+that the first is accomplished (also through individuals) not only
+by the masses of the exploited toilers, but also by the
+organizations which are so constructed that they arouse these
+masses to historical creative work (the Soviets belong to this
+kind of organization).<a name="FNanchor_75_75" id="FNanchor_75_75"></a><a href="#Footnote_75_75" class="fnanchor">[75]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>This, then, is Bolshevism, not as it is seen and described by unfriendly
+"bourgeois" writers, but as it is seen and described by the acknowledged
+intellectual and political leader of the Bolsheviki, Nikolai Lenine. I have
+not taken any non-Bolshevist authority; I have not even restated his views
+in a summary of my own, lest into the summary might be injected some
+reflexes of my own critical thought. Bolshevism is revealed in all its
+reactionary repulsiveness as something between which and absolute,
+individual dictatorial power there is "absolutely no contradiction in
+principle." It will not avail for our American followers and admirers of
+the Bolsheviki to plead that these things are temporary, compromises with
+the ideal due to the extraordinary circumstances prevailing in Russia, and
+to beg a mitigation of the severity of our judgment on that account.</p><p><a name="Page_312" id="Page_312"></a></p>
+
+<p>The answer to the plea is twofold: in the first place, they who offer it
+must, if they are sincere, abandon the savagely critical attitude they have
+seen fit to adopt toward our own government and nation because with
+"extraordinary conditions prevailing" we have had introduced conscription,
+unusual restrictions of movement and of utterance, and so forth. How else,
+indeed, can their sincerity be demonstrated? If the fact that extraordinary
+conditions justified Lenine and his associates in instituting a r&eacute;gime so
+tyrannical, what rule of reason or of morals must be invoked to refuse to
+count the extraordinary conditions produced in our own nation by the war as
+justification for the special measures of military service and discipline
+here introduced?</p>
+
+<p>But there is a second answer to the claim which is more direct and
+conclusive. It is not open to argument at all. It is found in the words of
+Lenine himself, in his claim that there is absolutely no contradiction
+between the principle of individual dictatorship, ruling with iron hand,
+and the principle upon which Soviet government rests. There has been no
+compromise here, for if there is no contradiction in principle no
+compromise could have been required. Lenine is not afraid to make or to
+admit making compromises; he admits that compromises have been made. It was
+a compromise to employ highly salaried specialists from the bourgeoisie, "a
+defection from the principles of the Paris Commune and of any proletarian
+rule," as he says. It was a compromise, another "defection from the only
+Socialist principle," to admit the right of the co-operatives to determine
+their own conditions of membership. Having made these declarations quite
+candidly, he takes pains to assure us that there was no such defection from
+principle in establishing the absolute rule of an individual <a name="Page_313" id="Page_313"></a>dictator,
+that there was absolutely no contradiction in principle in this.<a name="FNanchor_76_76" id="FNanchor_76_76"></a><a href="#Footnote_76_76" class="fnanchor">[76]</a></p>
+
+<p>Moreover, there is no reason for regarding this dictatorship as a temporary
+thing, if Lenine himself is to be accepted as an authoritative spokesman.
+Obviously, if there is nothing in the principle of an absolute individual
+dictatorship which is in contradiction to the Bolshevik ideal, there can be
+no Bolshevik principle which necessarily requires for its realization the
+ending of such dictatorship. Why, therefore, may it not be continued
+indefinitely? Certainly, if the dictatorship is abolished it will not
+be&mdash;if Lenine is to be seriously considered&mdash;on account of its
+incompatibility with Bolshevik principles.</p>
+
+
+<h4>VI</h4>
+
+<p>The Bolshevik government of Russia is credited by many of its admirers in
+this country with having solved the great land problem and with having
+satisfied the land-hunger of the peasants. It is charged, moreover, that
+the bitter opposition to the Bolsheviki is mainly due to agitation by the
+bourgeoisie, led by the expropriated landowners, who want to defeat the
+Revolution and to have their former titles to the land restored. Of course,
+it is true that, so far as they dare to do so, the former landowners
+actively oppose the Bolsheviki. No expropriated class ever acted otherwise,
+and it would be foolish to expect anything else. But any person who
+believes that the opposition of the great peasant Socialist organizations,
+and especially of the Socialist-Revolutionists, is due to the confiscation
+of the land, either consciously <a name="Page_314" id="Page_314"></a>or unconsciously, is capable of believing
+anything and quite immune from rationality.</p>
+
+<p>The facts in the case are, briefly, as follows: First, as Professor Ross
+has pointed out,<a name="FNanchor_77_77" id="FNanchor_77_77"></a><a href="#Footnote_77_77" class="fnanchor">[77]</a> the land policy of the Bolshevik government was a
+compromise of the principles long advocated by its leaders, a compromise
+made for political reasons only. Second, as Marie Spiridonova abundantly
+demonstrated at an All-Russian Soviet Conference in July, 1918, the
+Bolshevik government did not honorably live up to its agreement with the
+Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left. Third, so far as the land problem was
+concerned there was not the slightest need or justification for the
+Bolshevik <i>coup d'&eacute;tat</i>, for the reason that the problem had already been
+solved on the precise lines afterward followed in the Soviet decree and the
+leaders of the peasants were satisfied. We have the authority of no less
+competent a witness than Litvinov, Bolshevist Minister to England, that
+"the land measure had been 'lifted' bodily from the program of the
+Socialist-Revolutionists."<a name="FNanchor_78_78" id="FNanchor_78_78"></a><a href="#Footnote_78_78" class="fnanchor">[78]</a> Each of these statements is amply sustained
+by evidence which cannot be disputed or overcome.</p>
+
+<p>That the "land decree" which the Bolshevik government promulgated was a
+compromise with their long-cherished principles admits of no doubt
+whatever. Every one who has kept informed concerning Russian revolutionary
+movements during the past twenty or twenty-five years knows that during all
+that time one of the principal subjects of controversy among Socialists was
+the land question and the proper method of solving it. The "Narodniki," or
+peasant Socialists, later organized into the Socialist-Revolutionary party,
+wanted distribution <a name="Page_315" id="Page_315"></a>of the land belonging to the big estates among the
+peasant communes, to be co-operatively owned and managed. They did not want
+land nationalization, which was the program of the Marxists&mdash;the Social
+Democrats. This latter program meant that, instead of the land being
+divided among the peasants' communal organizations, it should be owned,
+used, and managed by the state, the principles of large-scale production
+and wage labor being applied to agriculture in the same manner as to
+industry.</p>
+
+<p>The attitude of the Social Democratic party toward the peasant Socialists
+and their program was characterized by that same certainty that small
+agricultural holdings were to pass away, and by the same contemptuous
+attitude toward the peasant life and peasant aspirations that we find in
+the writings of Marx, Engels, Liebknecht, and many other Marxists.<a name="FNanchor_79_79" id="FNanchor_79_79"></a><a href="#Footnote_79_79" class="fnanchor">[79]</a>
+Lenine himself had always adopted this attitude. He never trusted the
+peasants and was opposed to any program which would give the land to them
+as they desired. Mr. Walling, who spent nearly three years in Russia,
+including the whole period of the Revolution of 1905-06, writes of Lenine's
+position at that time:</p>
+<p><a name="Page_316" id="Page_316"></a></p>
+<div class="blockquot"><p>Like Alexinsky, Lenine awaits the agrarian movement ... and hopes
+that a railway strike with the destruction of the lines of
+communication and <i>the support of the peasantry</i> may some day put
+the government of Russia into the people's hands. However, I was
+shocked to find that this important leader also, though he expects
+a full co-operation with the peasants on equal terms, <i>during the
+Revolution</i>, feels toward them a very <i>deep distrust</i>, thinking
+them to a large extent bigoted and blindly patriotic, and fearing
+that they may some day shoot down the working-men as the French
+peasants did during the Paris Commune.</p>
+
+<p>The chief basis for this distrust is, of course, the prejudiced
+feeling that the peasants are not likely to become good
+Socialists. <i>It is on this account that Lenine and all the Social
+Democratic leaders place their hopes on a future development of
+large agricultural estates in Russia and the increase of the
+landless agricultural working class, which alone they believe
+would prove truly Socialist</i>.<a name="FNanchor_80_80" id="FNanchor_80_80"></a><a href="#Footnote_80_80" class="fnanchor">[80]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>The Russian Social Democratic Labor party, to which Lenine belonged, and of
+which he was an influential leader, adopted in 1906 the following program
+with regard to land ownership:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>1. Confiscation of Church, Monastery, Appanage, Cabinet,<a name="FNanchor_81_81" id="FNanchor_81_81"></a><a href="#Footnote_81_81" class="fnanchor">[81]</a> and
+private estate lands, <i>except small holdings</i>, and turning them
+over, together with the state lands, to the great organs of local
+administration, which have been democratically elected. Land,
+however, which is necessary as a basis for future colonization,
+together with the forests and bodies of water, which are of
+national importance, are to pass into the control of the
+democratic state.</p>
+
+<p>2. Wherever conditions are unfavorable for this transformation,
+the party declares itself in favor of a division among the
+peasants of such of the private estates as already have the petty
+farming conditions, or which may be necessary to round out a
+reasonable holding.</p></div>
+<p><a name="Page_317" id="Page_317"></a></p>
+<p>This program was at the time regarded as a compromise. It did not wholly
+suit anybody. The peasant leaders feared the amount of state ownership and
+management involved. On the other hand, the extreme left wing of the Social
+Democrats&mdash;Lenine and his friends&mdash;wanted the party to proclaim itself in
+favor of <i>the complete nationalization of all privately owned land, even
+that of the small peasant owners</i>, but were willing, provided the principle
+were this stated, to accept, as a temporary expedient, division of the land
+in certain exceptional instances. On the other hand, the
+Socialist-Revolutionists wanted, not the distribution of lands among a
+multitude of private owners, as is very generally supposed, but its
+socialization. Their program provided for "the socialization of all
+privately owned lands&mdash;that is, the taking of them out of the private
+ownership of persons into the public ownership and <i>their management by
+democratically organized leagues of communities with the purpose of an
+equitable utilization</i>." They wanted to avoid the creation of a great army
+of what they described as "wage-slaves of the state" and, on the other
+hand, they wanted to build upon the basis of Russian communism and, as far
+as possible, prevent the extension of capitalist methods&mdash;and therefore of
+the class struggle&mdash;into the agrarian life of Russia.</p>
+
+<p>When the Bolsheviki came into power they sought first of all to split the
+peasant Socialist movement and gain the support of its extreme left wing.
+For this reason they agreed to adopt the program of the Revolutionary
+Socialist party. It was Marie Spiridonova who made that arrangement
+possible. It was, in fact, a political deal. Lenine and Trotzky, on behalf
+of the Bolshevik government, agreed to accept the land policy of the
+Socialist-Revolutionists, and in return Spiridonova and <a name="Page_318" id="Page_318"></a>her friends agreed
+to support the Bolsheviki. There is abundant evidence of the truth of the
+following account of Professor Ross:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>Among the first acts of the Bolsheviki in power was to square
+their debt to the left wing of the Social Revolutionists, their
+ally in the <i>coup d'&eacute;tat</i>. The latter would accept only one kind
+of currency&mdash;the expropriation of the private landowners without
+compensation and the transfer of all land into the hands of the
+peasant communes. The Bolsheviki themselves, as good Marxists,
+took no stock in the peasants' commune. As such, pending the
+introduction of Socialism, they should, perhaps, have nationalized
+the land and rented it to the highest bidder, regardless of
+whether it was to be tilled in small parcels without hired labor
+or in large blocks on the capitalistic plan. The land edict of
+November does, indeed, decree land nationalism; however, the vital
+proviso is added that "the use of the land must be equalized&mdash;that
+is, according to local conditions and according to the ability to
+work and the needs of each individual," and further that "the
+hiring of labor is not permitted." The administrative machinery is
+thus described: "All the confiscated land becomes the land capital
+of the nation. Its distribution among the working-people is to be
+in charge of the local and central authorities, beginning with the
+organized rural and urban communities and ending with the
+provincial central organs." Such is the irony of fate. <i>Those who
+had charged the rural land commune with being the most serious
+brake upon Russia's progress, and who had stigmatized the
+People-ists as reactionaries and Utopians, now came to enact into
+law most of their tenets&mdash;the equalization of the use of land, the
+prohibition of the hiring of labor, and everything else!</i><a name="FNanchor_82_82" id="FNanchor_82_82"></a><a href="#Footnote_82_82" class="fnanchor">[82]</a></p></div>
+
+<p>The much-praised land policy of the Bolsheviki is, in fact, not a Bolshevik
+policy at all, but one which they have accepted as a compromise for
+temporary political advantage. "Claim everything in sight," said a noted
+American politician on one occasion to his followers.<a name="Page_319" id="Page_319"></a> Our followers of the
+Bolsheviki, taught by a very clever propaganda, seem to be acting upon that
+maxim. They claim for the Bolsheviki everything which can in the slightest
+manner win favor with the American public, notwithstanding that it involves
+claiming for the Bolsheviki credit to which they are not entitled. As early
+as May 18, 1917, it was announced by the Provisional Government that the
+"question of the transfer of the land to the toilers" was to be left to the
+Constituent Assembly, and there was never a doubt in the mind of any
+Russian Socialist how that body would settle it; never a moment when it was
+doubted that the Constituent Assembly would be controlled by the
+Socialist-Revolutionary party. When Kerensky became Prime Minister one of
+the first acts of his Cabinet was to create a special committee for the
+purpose of preparing the law for the socialization of the land and the
+necessary machinery for carrying the law into effect. The All-Russian
+Peasants' Congress had, as early as May, five months before the Bolshevik
+counter-revolution, adopted the land policy for which the Bolsheviki now
+are being praised by their admirers in this country. That policy had been
+crystallized into a carefully prepared law which had been approved by the
+Council of Ministers. The Bolsheviki did no more than to issue a crudely
+conceived "decree" which they have never at any time had the power to
+enforce in more than about a fourth of Russia&mdash;in place of a law which
+would have embraced all Russia and have been secure and permanent.</p>
+
+<p>On July 16, 1918, Marie Spiridonova, in an address delivered in Petrograd,
+protested vehemently against the manner in which the Bolshevik government
+was departing from the policy it had agreed to maintain with regard to the
+land, and going back to the old Social Democratic <a name="Page_320" id="Page_320"></a>ideas. She declared that
+she had been responsible for the decree of February, which provided for the
+socialization of the land. That measure provided for the abolition of
+private property in land, and placed all land in the hands of and under the
+direction of the peasant communes. It was the old Socialist-Revolutionist
+program. But the Bolshevik government had not carried out the law of
+February. Instead, it had resorted to the Social Democratic method of
+nationalization. In the western governments, she said, "great estates were
+being taken over by government departments and were being managed by
+officials, on the ground that state control would yield better results than
+communal ownership. Under this system the peasants were being reduced to
+the state of slaves paid wages by the state. Yet the law provided that
+these estates should be divided among the peasant communes to be tilled by
+the peasants on a co-operative system."<a name="FNanchor_83_83" id="FNanchor_83_83"></a><a href="#Footnote_83_83" class="fnanchor">[83]</a> Spiridonova protested against
+the attitude of the Bolsheviki toward the peasants, against dividing them
+into classes and placing the greater part of them with the bourgeoisie. She
+insisted that the peasants be regarded as a single class, co-operating with
+the industrial proletariat, yet distinct from it and from the bourgeoisie.
+For our present purpose, it does not matter whether the leaders of the
+Bolsheviki were right or wrong in their decision that state operation was
+better than operation by village co-operatives. Our sole concern here and
+now is the fact that they did not keep faith with the section of the
+peasants they had won over to their side, and the fact that, as this
+incident shows, we cannot regard the formal decrees of the Soviet Republic
+as descriptions of realities.</p>
+<p><a name="Page_321" id="Page_321"></a></p>
+<p>The Bolsheviki remain to-day, as at the beginning, a counter-revolutionary
+power imposing its rule upon the great mass of the Russian people by armed
+force. There can be little doubt that if a free election could be had
+immediately upon the same basis as that on which the Constituent Assembly
+was elected&mdash;namely, universal, secret, equal, direct suffrage, the
+Bolsheviki would be overwhelmingly beaten. There can be little doubt that
+the great mass of the peasantry would support, as before, the candidates of
+the Socialist-Revolutionary party. It is quite true that some of the
+leaders of that party have consented to work with the Bolshevik government.
+Compromises have been effected; the Bolsheviki have conciliated the
+peasants somewhat, and the latter have, in many cases, sought to make the
+best of a bad situation. Many have adopted a passive attitude. But there
+can be no greater mistake than to believe that the Bolsheviki have solved
+the land question to the satisfaction of the peasants and so won their
+allegiance.</p>
+
+
+<h4>VII</h4>
+
+<p>This survey of the theories and practices of the Bolsheviki would invite
+criticism and distrust if the peace program which culminated in the
+shameful surrender to Germany, the "indecent peace" as the Russians call
+it, were passed over without mention. And yet there is no need to tell here
+a story with which every one is familiar. By that humiliating peace Russia
+lost 780,000 square kilometers of territory, occupied by 56,000,000
+inhabitants. She lost one-third of her total mileage of railways, amounting
+to more than 13,000 miles. She lost, also, 73 per cent. of her iron
+production; 89 per cent. of her <a name="Page_322" id="Page_322"></a>coal production, and many thousands of
+factories of various kinds. These latter included 268 sugar-refineries, 918
+textile-factories, 574 breweries, 133 tobacco-factories, 1,685
+distilleries, 244 chemical-factories, 615 paper-mills, and 1,073
+machine-factories.<a name="FNanchor_84_84" id="FNanchor_84_84"></a><a href="#Footnote_84_84" class="fnanchor">[84]</a> Moreover, it was not an enduring peace and war
+against Germany had to be resumed.</p>
+
+<p>In judging the manner in which the Bolsheviki concluded peace with Germany,
+it is necessary to be on guard against prejudice engendered by the war and
+its passions. The tragi-comedy of Brest-Litovsk, and the pitiable r&ocirc;le of
+Trotzky, have naturally been linked together with the manner in which
+Lenine and his companions reached Russia with the aid of the German
+Government, the way in which all the well-known leaders of the Bolsheviki
+had deliberately weakened the morale of the troops at the front, and their
+persistent opposition to all the efforts of Kerensky to restore the
+fighting spirit of the army&mdash;all these things combined have convinced many
+thoughtful and close observers that the Bolsheviki were in league with the
+Germans against the Allies. Perhaps the time is not yet ripe for passing
+final judgment upon this matter. Certainly there were ugly-looking
+incidents which appeared to indicate a close co-operation with the Germans.</p>
+
+<p>There was, for example, the acknowledged fact that the Bolsheviki on
+seizing the power of government immediately entered into negotiations with
+the notorious "Parvus," whose r&ocirc;le as an agent of the German Government is
+now thoroughly established. "Parvus" is the pseudonym of one of the most
+sinister figures in the history <a name="Page_323" id="Page_323"></a>of the Socialist movement, Dr. Alexander
+Helfandt. Born at Odessa, of German-Jewish descent, he studied in Germany
+and in the early eighteen-nineties attained prominence as a prolific and
+brilliant contributor to the German Socialist review, <i>Die Neue Zeit</i>. He
+was early "exiled" from Russia, but it was suspected by a great many
+Socialists that in reality his "exile" was simply a device to cover
+employment in the Russian Secret Service as a spy and informer, for which
+the prestige he had gained in Socialist circles was a valuable aid. When
+the Revolution of 1905 broke out Helfandt returned to Russia under the
+terms of the amnesty declared at that time. He at once joined the Leninist
+section of the Social Democratic party, the Bolsheviki. A scandal occurred
+some time later, when the connection of "Parvus" with the Russian
+Government was freely charged against him. Among those who attacked him and
+accused him of being an agent-provocateur were Tseretelli, the
+Socialist-Revolutionist, and Miliukov, the leader of the Cadets.</p>
+
+<p>Some years later, at the time of the uprisings in connection with the Young
+Turk movement, "Parvus" turned up in Constantinople, where he was
+presumably engaged in work for the German Government. This was commonly
+believed in European political circles, though denied at the time by
+"Parvus" himself. One thing is certain, namely, that although he was
+notoriously poor when he went there&mdash;his financial condition was well known
+to his Socialist associates&mdash;he returned at the beginning of 1915 a very
+rich man. He explained his riches by saying that he had, while at
+Constantinople, Bucharest, and Sofia, successfully speculated in war wheat.
+He wrote this explanation in the German Socialist paper, <i>Die Glocke</i>, and
+drew from Hugo Hasse the following observation: "I blame nobody for being
+wealthy; I only <a name="Page_324" id="Page_324"></a>ask if it is the r&ocirc;le of a Social Democrat to become a
+profiteer of the war."<a name="FNanchor_85_85" id="FNanchor_85_85"></a><a href="#Footnote_85_85" class="fnanchor">[85]</a> Very soon we find this precious gentleman
+settled in Copenhagen, where he established a "Society for Studying the
+Social Consequences of the War," which was, of course, entirely pro-German.
+This society is said to have exercised considerable influence among the
+Russians in Copenhagen and to have greatly influenced many Danish
+Socialists to take Germany's side. According to <i>Pravda</i>, the Bolshevik
+organ, the German Government, through the intermediary of German Social
+Democrats, established a working relation with Danish trade-unions and the
+Danish Social Democratic party, whereby the Danish unions got the coal
+needed in Copenhagen at a figure below the market price. Then the Danish
+party sent its leader, Borgdjerg, to Petrograd as an emissary to place
+before the Petrograd Soviet the terms of peace of the German Majority
+Socialists, which were, of course, the terms of the German Government. We
+find "Parvus" at the same time, as he is engaged in this sort of intrigue,
+associated with one Furstenberg in shipping drugs into Russia and food from
+Russia into Germany.<a name="FNanchor_86_86" id="FNanchor_86_86"></a><a href="#Footnote_86_86" class="fnanchor">[86]</a> According to Grumbach,<a name="FNanchor_87_87" id="FNanchor_87_87"></a><a href="#Footnote_87_87" class="fnanchor">[87]</a> he sought to induce
+prominent Norwegian Socialists to act as intermediaries to inform certain
+Norwegian syndicates that Germany would grant them a monopoly of coal
+consignments if the Norwegian Social Democratic press would adopt a more
+friendly attitude toward Germany and the Social Democratic members in the
+Norwegian parliament would urge the stoppage or the limitation of fish
+exports to England.</p>
+
+<p>During this period "Parvus" was bitterly denounced <a name="Page_325" id="Page_325"></a>by Plechanov, by
+Alexinsky and other Russian Socialists as an agent of the Central Powers.
+He was denounced also by Lenine and Trotzky and by <i>Pravda</i>. Lenine
+described him as "the vilest of bandits and betrayers." It was therefore
+somewhat astonishing for those familiar with these facts to read the
+following communication, which appeared in the German Socialist press on
+November 30, 1917, and, later, in the British Socialist organ, <i>Justice</i>:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p><span class="smcap">Stockholm</span>, November 20.&mdash;The Foreign Relations Committee
+of the Bolsheviki makes the following communication: "The German
+comrade, 'Parvus,' has brought to the Bolshevik Committee at
+Stockholm the congratulations of the <i>Parteivorstand</i> of the
+Majority Social Democrats, who declare their solidarity with the
+struggles of the Russian proletariat and with its request to begin
+pourparlers immediately on the basis of a democratic peace without
+annexations and indemnities. The Foreign Relations Committee of
+the Bolsheviki has transmitted these declarations to the Central
+Committee at Petrograd, as well as to the Soviets."</p></div>
+
+<p>When Hugo Hasse questioned Philipp Scheidemann about the negotiations which
+were going on through "Parvus," Scheidemann replied that it was the
+Bolsheviki themselves who had invited "Parvus" to come to Stockholm for the
+purpose of opening up negotiations. This statement was denounced as a lie
+by Karl Radek in <i>Pravda</i>. Some day, doubtless, the truth will be known;
+for the present it is enough to note the fact that as early as November the
+Bolsheviki were negotiating through such a discredited agent of the Central
+Powers as Dr. Alexander Helfandt, otherwise "Parvus," the well-known
+Marxist! Such facts as this, added to those previously noticed, tended
+inevitably to strengthen the conviction that Lenine and Trotsky were the
+pliant and conscious tools <a name="Page_326" id="Page_326"></a>of Germany all the time, and that the protests
+of Trotzky at Brest-Litovsk were simply stage-play.</p>
+
+<p>But for all that, unless and until official, documentary evidence is
+forthcoming which proves them to have been in such relations with the
+German Government and military authorities, they ought not to be condemned
+upon the chain of suspicious circumstances, strong as that chain apparently
+is. The fact is that they had to make peace, and make it quickly. Kerensky,
+had he been permitted to hold on, would equally have had to make a separate
+peace, and make it quickly. Only one thing could have delayed that for
+long&mdash;namely, the arrival of an adequate force of Allied troops on the
+Russian front to stiffen the morale and to take the burden of fighting off
+from the Russians. Of that there was no sign and no promise or likelihood.
+Kerensky knew that he would have had to make peace, at almost any cost and
+on almost any terms, if he remained in power. If the Bolsheviki appear in
+the light of traitors to the Allies, it should be remembered that pressure
+of circumstances would have forced even such a loyal friend of the Allies
+as Kerensky certainly proved himself to be to make a separate peace,
+practically on Germany's terms, in a very little while. It was not a matter
+of months, but of weeks at most, probably of days.</p>
+
+<p>Russia had to have peace. The nation was war-weary and exhausted. The
+Allies had not understood the situation&mdash;indeed, they never have understood
+Russia, even to this day&mdash;and had bungled right along. What made it
+possible for the Bolsheviki to assert their rule so easily was the fact
+that they promised immediate peace, and the great mass of the Russian
+workers wanted immediate peace above everything else. They were so eager
+for peace that so long as they could get it they cared at the<a name="Page_327" id="Page_327"></a> time for
+nothing. Literally nothing else mattered. As we have seen, the Bolshevik
+leaders had strenuously denied wanting to make a "separate peace." There is
+little reason for doubting that they were sincere in this in the sense that
+what they wanted was a <i>general</i> peace, if that could be possibly obtained.
+Peace they had to have, as quickly as possible. If they could not persuade
+their Allies to join with them in making such a general peace, they were
+willing to make a <i>separate</i> peace. That is quite different from <i>wanting</i>
+a separate peace from the first. There was, indeed, in the demand made at
+the beginning of December upon the Allies to restate their war aims within
+a period of seven days an arrogant and provocative tone which invited the
+suspicion that the ultimatum&mdash;for such it was&mdash;had not been conceived in
+good faith; that it was deliberately framed in such a manner as to prevent
+compliance by the Allies. And it may well be the fact that Lenine and
+Trotzky counted upon the inevitable refusal to convince the Russian people,
+and especially the Russian army, that the Allied nations were fighting for
+imperialistic ends, just as the Bolsheviki had always charged. The
+Machiavellian cunning of such a policy is entirely characteristic of the
+conspirator type.</p>
+
+<p>On December 14th the armistice was signed at Brest-Litovsk, to last for a
+period of twenty-eight days. On December 5th, the Bolsheviki had published
+the terms upon which they desired to effect the armistice. These terms,
+which the Germans scornfully rejected, provided that the German forces
+which had been occupied on the Russian front should not be sent to other
+fronts to fight against the Allies, and that the German troops should
+retire from the Russian islands held by them. In the armistice as it was
+finally signed at Brest-Litovsk there <a name="Page_328" id="Page_328"></a>was a clause which, upon its face,
+seemed to prove that Trotzky had kept faith with the Allies. The clause
+provided that there should be no transfer of troops by either side, for the
+purpose of military operations, during the armistice, from the front
+between the Baltic and the Black Sea. This, however, was, from the German
+point of view, merely a <i>pro forma</i> arrangement, a "scrap of paper."
+Grumbach wrote to <i>L'Humanit&eacute;</i> that on December 20th Berlin was full of
+German soldiers from the Russian front en route to the western front. He
+said that he had excellent authority for saying that this had been called
+to the attention of Lenine and Trotzky by the Independent Social Democrats,
+but that, "nevertheless, they diplomatically shut their eyes."<a name="FNanchor_88_88" id="FNanchor_88_88"></a><a href="#Footnote_88_88" class="fnanchor">[88]</a> It is
+more than probable that, in the circumstances, neither Lenine nor Trotzky
+cared much if at all for such a breach of the terms of the armistice, but,
+had their attitude been otherwise, what could they have done? They were as
+helpless as ever men were in the world, as subsequent events proved.</p>
+
+<p>As one reads the numerous declamatory utterances of Trotzky in those
+critical days of early December, 1917, the justice of Lenine's scornful
+description of his associate as a "man who blinds himself with
+revolutionary phrases" becomes manifest. It is easy to understand the
+strained relations that existed between the two men. His "neither war nor
+peace" gesture&mdash;it was no more!&mdash;his dramatic refusal to sign the stiffened
+peace terms, his desire to call all Russia to arms again to fight the
+Germans, his determination to create a vast "Red Army" to renew the war
+against Germany, and his professed willingness to "accept the services of
+American officers in training that army," all indicated a mind given to
+illusions and stone <a name="Page_329" id="Page_329"></a>blind to realities. Lenine at least knew that the game
+was up. He knew that the game into which he had so coolly entered when he
+left Switzerland, and which he had played with all his skill and cunning,
+was at an end and that the Germans had won. The Germans behaved with a
+perfidy that is unmatched in modern history, disregarded the armistice they
+had signed, and savagely hurled their forces against the defenseless,
+partially demobilized and trusting Russians. There was nothing left for the
+Bolsheviki to do. They had delivered Russia to the Germans. In March the
+"indecent peace" was signed, with what result we know. Bolshevism had been
+the ally of Prussian militarism. Consciously or unconsciously, willingly or
+unwillingly, Lenine, Trotzky, and the other Bolshevik leaders had done all
+that men could do to make the German military lords masters of the world.
+Had there been a similar movement in France, England, the United States, or
+even Italy, to-day the Hohenzollerns and Habsburgs would be upon their
+thrones, realizing the fulfilment of the Pan-German vision.</p>
+
+
+<h4>VIII</h4>
+
+<p>In view of the fact that so many of our American pacifists have glorified
+the Bolsheviki, it may be well to remind them, if they have forgotten, or
+to inform them, if they do not know it, that their admiration is by no
+means reciprocated. Both Lenine and Trotzky have spoken and written in
+terms of utter disdain of pacifist movements in general and of the
+pacifists of England and America in particular. They have insisted that,
+<i>in present society</i>, disarmament is really a reactionary proposal. The
+inclusion in the Constitution, which they have forced upon Russia by armed
+might, of <i>permanent universal compulsory <a name="Page_330" id="Page_330"></a>military service</i> is not by
+accident. They believe that only when all nations have become Socialist
+nations will it be a proper policy for Socialists to favor disarmament. It
+would be interesting to know how our American admirers and defenders of
+Bolshevism, who are all anti-conscriptionists and ultra-pacifists, so far
+as can be discovered, reconcile their position with that of the Bolsheviki
+who base their state, not as a temporary expedient, <i>but as a matter of
+principle</i>, upon universal, compulsory military service! What, one wonders,
+do these American Bolsheviki worshipers think of the teaching of these
+paragraphs from an article by Lenine?<a name="FNanchor_89_89" id="FNanchor_89_89"></a><a href="#Footnote_89_89" class="fnanchor">[89]</a></p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>Disarmament is a Socialistic ideal. In Socialist society there
+will be no more wars, which means that disarmament will have been
+realized. But he is not a Socialist who expects the realization of
+Socialism <i>without</i> the social revolution and the dictatorship of
+the proletariat. Dictatorship is a government power, depending
+directly upon force, and, in the twentieth century, force means,
+not fists and clubs, but armies. To insert "disarmament" into our
+program is equivalent to saying, we are opposed to the use of
+arms. But such a statement would contain not a grain of Marxism,
+any more than would the equivalent statement, we are opposed to
+the use of force.</p>
+
+<hr style='width: 45%;' />
+
+<p><i>A suppressed class which has no desire to learn the use of arms,
+and to bear arms, deserves nothing else than to be treated as
+slaves</i>. We cannot, unless we wish to transform ourselves into
+mere bourgeois pacifists, forget that we are living in a society
+based on classes, and that there is no escape from such a society,
+except by the class struggle and the overthrow of the power of the
+ruling class.</p>
+
+<p>In every class society, whether it be based on slavery, serfdom,
+or, as at the present moment, on wage-labor, the class of the
+oppressors <a name="Page_331" id="Page_331"></a>is an armed class. Not only the standing army of the
+present day, but also the present-day popular militia&mdash;even in the
+most democratic bourgeois republics, as in Switzerland&mdash;means an
+armament of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat....</p>
+
+<p>How can you, in the face of this fact, ask the revolutionary
+Social Democracy to set up the "demand" of "disarmament"? <i>To ask
+this is to renounce completely the standpoint of the class
+struggle, to give up the very thought of revolution</i>. Our
+watchword must be: to arm the proletariat so that it may defeat,
+expropriate, and disarm the bourgeoisie. This is the only possible
+policy of the revolutionary class, a policy arising directly from
+the <i>actual evolution</i> of capitalistic militarism, in fact,
+dictated by the evolution. Only after having disarmed the
+bourgeoisie can the proletariat, without betraying its historic
+mission, cast all weapons to the scrap-heap; and there is no doubt
+that the proletariat will do this, but only then, and not by any
+possibility before then.</p></div>
+
+<p>How is it possible for our extreme pacifists, with their relentless
+opposition to military force in all its forms to conscription, to universal
+military service, to armaments of all kinds, even for defensive purposes,
+and to voluntarily enlisted armies even, to embrace Bolshevism with
+enthusiasm, resting as it does upon the basis of the philosophy so frankly
+stated by Lenine, is a question for which no answer seems wholly adequate.
+Of course, what Lenine advocates is class armament within the nation, for
+civil war&mdash;the war of the classes. But he is not opposed to national
+armaments, as such, nor willing to support disarmament as a national policy
+<i>until the time comes when an entirely socialized humanity finds itself
+freed from the necessity of arming against anybody</i>. There is probably not
+a militarist in America to-day who, however bitterly opposed to disarmament
+as a present policy, would not agree that if, in some future time, mankind
+reaches the happy condition of universal Socialism, disarmament will then
+become practicable and logical. It <a name="Page_332" id="Page_332"></a>would not be difficult for General Wood
+to subscribe to that doctrine, I think. It would not have been difficult
+for Mr. Roosevelt to subscribe to it.</p>
+
+<p>Not only is Lenine willing to support national armaments, and even to fight
+for the defense of national rights, whenever an attack on these is also an
+attack on proletarian rights&mdash;which he believes to be the case in the
+continued war against Germany, he goes much farther than this <i>and provides
+a theoretical justification for a Socialist policy of passive acceptance of
+ever-increasing militarism</i>. He draws a strangely forced parallel between
+the Socialist attitude toward the trusts and the attitude which ought to be
+taken toward armaments. We know, he argues, that trusts bring great evils.
+Against the evils we struggle, but how? Not by trying to do away with the
+trusts, for we regard the trusts as steps in progress. We must go onward,
+through the trust system to Socialism. In a similar way we should not
+deplore "the militarization of the populations." If the bourgeoisie
+militarizes all the men, and all the boys, nay, even all the women, why&mdash;so
+much the better! "Never will the women of an oppressed class that is really
+revolutionary be content" to demand disarmament. On the contrary, they will
+encourage their sons to bear the arms and "learn well the business of war."
+Of course, this knowledge they will use, "not in order that they may shoot
+at their brothers, the workers of other countries, as they are doing in the
+present war ... but in order that they may struggle against the bourgeoisie
+in their own country, in order that they may put an end to exploitation,
+poverty, and war, not by the path of good-natured wishes, but by the path
+of victory over the bourgeoisie and of disarmament of the bourgeoisie."<a name="FNanchor_90_90" id="FNanchor_90_90"></a><a href="#Footnote_90_90" class="fnanchor">[90]</a><br />
+<span style="margin-left: 0.5em;">Universally the working class has taken a position the</span><a name="Page_333" id="Page_333"></a><br />
+very opposite of this. Universally we find the organized working class
+favoring disarmament, peace agreements, and covenants in general opposing
+extensions of what Lenine describes as "the militarization of populations."
+For this universality of attitude and action there can only be one adequate
+explanation&mdash;namely, the instinctive class consciousness of the workers.
+But, according to Lenine, this instinctive class consciousness is all
+wrong; somehow or other it expresses itself in a "bourgeois" policy. The
+workers ought to welcome the efforts of the ruling class to militarize and
+train in the arts of war not only the men of the nations, but the boys and
+even the women as well. Some day, if this course be followed, there will be
+two great armed classes in every nation and between these will occur the
+decisive war which shall establish the supremacy of the most numerous and
+powerful class. Socialism is thus to be won, not by the conquests of reason
+and of conscience, but by brute force.</p>
+
+<p>Obviously, there is no point of sympathy between this brutal and arrogant
+gospel of force and the striving of modern democracy for the peaceful
+organization of the world, for disarmament, a league of nations, and, in
+general, the supplanting of force of arms by the force of reason and
+morality. There is a Prussian quality in Lenine's philosophy. He is the
+Treitschke of social revolt, brutal, relentless, and unscrupulous, glorying
+in might, which is, for him, the only right. And that is what characterizes
+the whole Bolshevik movement: it is the infusion into the class strife and
+struggles of the world the same brutality and the same faith that might is
+right which made Prussian militarism the menace it was to civilization.</p>
+
+<p>And just as the world of civilized mankind recognized<a name="Page_334" id="Page_334"></a> Prussian militarism
+as its deadly enemy, to be overcome at all costs, so, too, Bolshevism must
+be overcome. And that can best be done, not by attempting to drown it in
+blood, but by courageously and consistently setting ourselves to the task
+of removing the social oppression, the poverty, and the servitude which
+produce the desperation of soul that drives men to Bolshevism. The remedy
+for Bolshevism is a sane and far-reaching program of constructive social
+democracy.</p><p><a name="Page_335" id="Page_335"></a></p>
+
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<h2><a name="POSTSCRIPTUM_A_PERSONAL_STATEMENT" id="POSTSCRIPTUM_A_PERSONAL_STATEMENT"></a>POSTSCRIPTUM: A PERSONAL STATEMENT</h2>
+
+
+<p>This book is the fulfilment of a promise to a friend. Soon after my return
+from Europe, in November, I spent part of a day in New York discussing
+Bolshevism with two friends. One of these is a Russian Socialist, who has
+lived many years in America, a citizen of the United States, and a man
+whose erudition and fidelity to the working-class movement during many
+years have long commanded my admiration and reverence. The other friend is
+a native American, also a Socialist. A sincere Christian, he has identified
+his faith in the religion of Jesus and his faith in democratic Socialism.
+The two are not conflicting forces, or even separate ones, but merely
+different and complementary aspects of the same faith. He is a man who is
+universally loved and honored for his nobility of character and his
+generous idealism. While in Europe I had spent much time consulting with
+Russian friends in Paris, Rome, and other cities, and had collected a
+considerable amount of authentic material relating to Bolshevism and the
+Bolsheviki. I had not the slightest intention of using this material to
+make a book; in fact, my plans contemplated a very different employment of
+my time. But, in the course of the discussion, my American Socialist friend
+asked me to "jot down" for him some of the things I had said, and,
+especially, to write, in a letter, what I believed to be the psychology <a name="Page_336" id="Page_336"></a>of
+Bolshevism. This, in an unguarded moment, I undertook to do.</p>
+
+<p>When I set out, a few days later, to redeem my promise, I found that, in
+order to make things intelligible, it was absolutely necessary to explain
+the historical backgrounds of the Russian revolutionary movement, to
+describe the point of view of various persons and groups with some detail,
+and to quote quite extensively from the documentary material I had
+gathered. Naturally, the limits of a letter were quickly outgrown and I
+found that my response to my friend's innocent request approached the
+length of a small volume. Even so, it was quite unsatisfactory. It left
+many things unexplained and much of my own thought obscure. I decided then
+to rewrite the whole thing and make a book of it, thus making available for
+what I hope will be a large number of readers what I had at first intended
+only for a dear friend.</p>
+
+<p>I am very conscious of the imperfections of the book as it stands. It has
+been written under conditions far from favorable, crowded into a very busy
+life. My keenest critics will, I am sure, be less conscious of its defects
+than I am. It is, however, an earnest contribution to a very important
+discussion, and, I venture to hope, with all its demerits, a useful one. If
+it aids a single person to a clearer comprehension of the inherent
+wrongfulness of the Bolshevist philosophy and method, I shall be rewarded.</p>
+
+<hr style='width: 45%;' />
+
+<p><i>So here, my dear Will, is the fulfilment of my promise.</i></p><p><a name="Page_338" id="Page_338"></a></p>
+
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" />
+<h2><a name="APPENDICES" id="APPENDICES"></a>APPENDICES</h2>
+
+
+<p>I. <span class="smcap">An Appeal To The Proletariat By The Petrograd Workmen's And
+Soldiers' Council</span></p>
+
+<p>II. <span class="smcap">How The Russian Peasants Fought For A Constituent Assembly&mdash;a
+Report To The International Socialist Bureau</span></p>
+
+<p>III. <span class="smcap">Former Socialist Premier Of Finland On Bolshevism</span></p>
+
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><a name="Page_340" id="Page_340"></a></p>
+<h2><a name="APPENDIX_I" id="APPENDIX_I"></a>APPENDIX I</h2>
+
+<h3>AN APPEAL TO THE PROLETARIAT BY THE PETROGRAD WORKMEN'S AND SOLDIERS'
+COUNCIL</h3>
+
+
+<p><span class="smcap">Comrades</span>:</p>
+
+<p><i>Proletarians and Working-people of all Countries</i>:</p>
+
+<p>We, Russian workers and soldiers, united in the Petrograd Workmen's and
+Soldiers' Delegate Council, send you our warmest greetings and the news of
+great events. The democracy of Russia has overthrown the century-old
+despotism of the Czars and enters your ranks as a rightful member and as a
+powerful force in the battle for our common liberation. Our victory is a
+great victory for the freedom and democracy of the world. The principal
+supporter of reaction in the world, the "gendarme of Europe," no longer
+exists. May the earth over his grave become a heavy stone! Long live
+liberty, long live the international solidarity of the proletariat and its
+battle for the final victory!</p>
+
+<p>Our cause is not yet entirely won. Not all the shadows of the old r&eacute;gime
+have been scattered and not a few enemies are gathering their forces
+together against the Russian Revolution. Nevertheless, our conquests are
+great. The peoples of Russia will express their will in the Constitutional
+convention which is to be called within a short time upon the basis of
+universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage. And now it may already be
+said with certainty in advance that the democratic republic will triumph in
+Russia. The Russian people is in possession of complete political liberty.
+Now it can say an authoritative word about the internal self-government of
+the country and about its foreign policy. And in addressing ourselves to
+all the peoples who are being destroyed and ruined in this terrible war, we
+declare that the time has come in which the decisive struggle <a name="Page_341" id="Page_341"></a>against the
+attempts at conquest by the governments of all the nations must be begun.
+The time has come in which the peoples must take the matter of deciding the
+questions of war and peace into their own hands.</p>
+
+<p>Conscious of its own revolutionary strength, the democracy of Russia
+declares that it will fight with all means against the policy of conquest
+of its ruling classes, and it summons the peoples of Europe to united,
+decisive action for peace. We appeal to our brothers, to the
+German-Austrian coalition, and above all to the German proletariat. The
+first day of the war you were made to believe that in raising your weapons
+against absolutist Russia you were defending European civilization against
+Asiatic despotism. In this many of you found the justification of the
+support that was accorded to the war. Now also this justification has
+vanished. Democratic Russia cannot menace freedom and civilization.</p>
+
+<p>We shall firmly defend our own liberty against all reactionary threats,
+whether they come from without or within. The Russian Revolution will not
+retreat before the bayonets of conquerors, and it will not allow itself to
+be trampled to pieces by outside military force. We call upon you to throw
+off the yoke of your absolutist r&eacute;gime, as the Russian people has shaken
+off the autocracy of the Czars. Refuse to serve as the tools of conquest
+and power in the hands of the kings, Junkers, and bankers, and we shall,
+with common efforts, put an end to the fearful butchery that dishonors
+humanity and darkens the great days of the birth of Russian liberty.</p>
+
+<p>Working-men of all countries! In fraternally stretching out our hands to
+you across the mountains of our brothers' bodies, across the sea of
+innocent blood and tears, across the smoking ruins of cities and villages,
+across the destroyed gifts of civilization, we summon you to the work of
+renewing and solidifying international unity. In that lies the guaranty of
+our future triumph and of the complete liberation of humanity.</p>
+
+<p>Working-men of all countries, unite!</p>
+
+<p>
+<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><span class="smcap">Tchcheidze</span>, <i>the President</i>.</span><br />
+<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><span class="smcap">Petrograd</span>, <i>April, 1917</i>.</span><br />
+</p>
+
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><a name="Page_342" id="Page_342"></a></p>
+<h2><a name="APPENDIX_II" id="APPENDIX_II"></a>APPENDIX II</h2>
+
+<h3>HOW THE RUSSIAN PEASANTS FOUGHT FOR A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY<a name="FNanchor_91_91" id="FNanchor_91_91"></a><a href="#Footnote_91_91" class="fnanchor">[91]</a></h3>
+
+
+<p>A report to the International Socialist Bureau by Inna Rakitnikov,
+Vice-President of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Delegates,
+placing themselves upon the grounds of the defense of the Constituent
+Assembly.</p>
+
+<p>With a letter-preface by the citizen, E. Roubanovitch, member of the
+International Socialist Bureau.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p><i>To the Executive Committee of the International Socialist
+Bureau</i>:</p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">Dear Comrades</span>,&mdash;The citizen Inna Rakitnikov has lately
+come from Petrograd to Paris for personal reasons that are
+peculiarly tragic. At the time of her departure the Executive
+Committee of the Second Soviet of Peasant Delegates of All-Russia,
+of which she is one of the vice-presidents, requested her to make
+to the International Socialist Bureau a detailed report of the
+fights that this organization had to make against the Bolsheviki
+in order to realize the convocation of the Constituent Assembly.</p>
+
+<p>This is the report under the title of a document that I present
+here, without commentary, asking you to communicate it without
+delay to all the sections of the International. Two words of
+explanation, only: First, I wish to draw your attention to the
+fact that this is the second time that the Executive Committee of
+the Soviet of the Peasants of All-Russia addresses itself publicly
+to the International.</p>
+
+<p><a name="Page_343" id="Page_343"></a>At the time of my journey to Stockholm in the month of September,
+1917, I made, at a session of the Holland, Scandinavian committee,
+presided over by Branting, a communication in the name of the
+Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasants. I handed over on
+this occasion to our secretary, Camille Huysmans, an appeal to the
+democrats of the entire world, in which the Executive Committee
+indicated clearly its position in the questions of the world war
+and of agrarian reform, and vindicated its place in the Workers'
+and Socialist International family.</p>
+
+<p>I must also present to you the author of this report. The citizen
+Rakitnikov, a member of the Russian Revolutionary Socialist party,
+has worked for a long time in the ranks of this party as a
+publicist and organizer and propagandist, especially among the
+peasants. She has known long years of prison, of Siberia, of
+exile. Before and during the war until the beginning of the
+Revolution she lived as a political fugitive in Paris. While being
+a partizan convinced of the necessity of national defense of
+invaded countries against the imperialistic aggression of German
+militarism&mdash;in which she is in perfect accord with the members of
+our party such as Stepan Sletof, Iakovlef, and many other
+voluntary Russian republicans, all dead facing the enemy in the
+ranks of the French army&mdash;the citizen Rakitnikov belonged to the
+international group. I affirm that her sincere and matured
+testimony cannot be suspected of partizanship or of dogmatic
+partiality against the Bolsheviki, who, as you know, tried to
+cover their follies and their abominable crimes against the plan
+of the Russian people, and against all the other Socialist
+parties, under the lying pretext of internationalist ideas, ideas
+which they have, in reality, trampled under foot and betrayed.</p></div>
+
+<p>
+<span style="margin-left: 2em;">Yours fraternally,</span><br />
+<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><span class="smcap">E. Roubanovitch</span>,</span><br />
+<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>June 28, 1918.</i></span><br />
+<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>Member of the B.S.I.</i></span><br />
+</p>
+
+<p>"The Bolsheviki who promised liberty, equality, peace, etc., have not been
+ashamed to follow in the footsteps of Czarism. It is not liberty; it is
+tyranny." (Extract from a letter of a young Russian Socialist, an
+enthusiast of liberty who died all too soon.)</p><p><a name="Page_344" id="Page_344"></a></p>
+
+
+<h4>I</h4>
+
+<h4><i>Organization of the Peasants after the Revolution in Soviets of Peasant
+Delegates</i></h4>
+
+
+<p>A short time after the Revolution of February the Russian peasants grouped
+themselves in a National Soviet of Peasant Delegates at the First Congress
+of the Peasants of All-Russia, which took place at Petrograd. The Executive
+Committee of this Soviet was elected. It was composed of well-known leaders
+of the Revolutionary Socialist party and of peasant delegates sent from the
+country. Without adhering officially to the Revolutionary Socialist party,
+the Soviet of Peasant Delegates adopted the line of conduct of this party.
+While co-ordinating its tactics with the party's, it nevertheless remained
+an organization completely independent. The Bolsheviki, who at this
+Congress attempted to subject the peasants to their influence, had not at
+the time any success. The speeches of Lenine and the other members of this
+party did not meet with any sympathy, but on the contrary provoked lively
+protest. The Executive Committee had as its organ the paper <i>Izvestya of
+the National Soviet of Peasant Delegates</i>. Thousands of copies of this were
+scattered throughout the country. Besides the central national Soviet there
+existed local organizations, the Soviets, the government districts who were
+in constant communication with the Executive Committee staying at
+Petrograd.</p>
+
+<p>From its foundation the Executive Committee exercised great energy in the
+work of the union and the organization of the peasant masses, and in the
+development of the Socialist conscience in their breasts. Its members
+spread thousands and hundreds of thousands of copies of pamphlets of the
+Revolutionary Socialist party, exposing in simple form the essence of
+Socialism and the history of the International explaining the sense and the
+importance <a name="Page_345" id="Page_345"></a>of the Revolution in Russia, the history of the fight that
+preceded it, showing the significance of the liberties acquired. They
+insisted, above all, on the importance of the socialization of the soil and
+the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. A close and living tie was
+created between the members of the Executive Committee staying at Petrograd
+and the members in the provinces. The Executive Committee was truly the
+expression of the will of the mass of the Russian peasants.</p>
+
+<p>The Minister of Agriculture and the principal agrarian committee were at
+this time occupied in preparing the groundwork of the realization of
+socialization of the soil; the Revolutionary Socialist party did not cease
+to press the government to act in this sense. Agrarian committees were
+formed at once to fight against the disorganized recovery of lands by the
+peasants, and to take under their control large properties where
+exploitation based on the co-operative principle was in progress of
+organization; agricultural improvements highly perfected would thus be
+preserved against destruction and pillage. At the same time agrarian
+committees attended to a just distribution among the peasants of the lands
+of which they had been despoiled.</p>
+
+<p>The peasants, taken in a body, and in spite of the agrarian troubles which
+occurred here and there, awaited the reform with patience, understanding
+all the difficulties which its realization required and all the
+impossibilities of perfecting the thing hastily. The Executive Committee of
+the Soviet of Peasants' Delegates played in this respect an important r&ocirc;le.
+It did all it could to explain to the peasants the complexity of the
+problem in order to prevent them from attempting anything anarchistic, or
+to attempt a disorganized recovery of lands which could end only with the
+further enrichment of peasants who were already rich.</p>
+
+<p>Such was, in its general aspect, the action of the National Soviet of
+Peasants' Delegates, which, in the <a name="Page_346" id="Page_346"></a>month of August, 1917, addressed,
+through the intermediary of the International Socialist Bureau, an appeal
+to the democracies of the world. In order to better understand the events
+which followed, we must consider for a moment the general conditions which
+at that time existed in Russia, and in the midst of which the action of
+this organization was taking place.</p>
+
+
+<h4>II</h4>
+
+<h4><i>The Difficulties of the Beginning of the Revolution</i></h4>
+
+
+<p>The honeymoon of the Revolution had passed rapidly. Joy gave place to cares
+and alarms. Autocracy had bequeathed to the country an unwieldy heritage:
+the army and the whole mechanism of the state were disorganized. Taking
+advantage of the listlessness of the army, the Bolshevist propaganda
+developed and at the same time increased the desire of the soldiers to
+fight no more. The disorganization was felt more and more at the front; at
+the same time anarchy increased in the interior of the country; production
+diminished; the productiveness of labor was lowered, and an eight-hour day
+became in fact a five or six-hour day. The strained relations between the
+workers and the administration were such that certain factories preferred
+to close. The central power suffered frequent crises; the Cadets, fearing
+the responsibilities, preferred to remain out of power.</p>
+
+<p>All this created a state of unrest and hastened the preparations for the
+election of the Constituent Assembly, toward which the eyes of the whole
+country were turned. Nevertheless, the country was far from chaos and from
+the anarchy into which further events plunged it. Young Russia, not
+accustomed to liberty, without experience in political life and autonomous
+action, was far from that hopeless state to which the Bolsheviki reduced it
+some months later. The people had confidence in the Socialists, <a name="Page_347" id="Page_347"></a>in the
+Revolutionary Socialist party, which then held sway everywhere, in the
+municipalities, the zemstvos, and in the Soviets; they had confidence in
+the Constituent Assembly which would restore order and work out the laws.
+All that was necessary was to combat certain characteristics and certain
+peculiarities of the existence of the Russian people, which impelled them
+toward anarchy, instead of encouraging them, as did the Bolsheviki, who, in
+this respect, followed the line of least resistance.</p>
+
+<p>The Bolshevist propaganda did all within its power to weaken the
+Provisional Government, to discredit it in the eyes of the people, to
+increase the licentiousness at the front and disorganization in the
+interior of the country. They proclaimed that the "Imperialists" sent the
+soldiers to be massacred, but what they did not say is that under actual
+conditions it was necessary for a revolutionary people to have a
+revolutionary army to defend its liberty. They spoke loudly for a
+counter-revolution and for counter-revolutionaries who await but the
+propitious moment to take hold of the government, while in reality the
+complete failure of the insurrection of Kornilov showed that the
+counter-revolution could rest on nothing, that there was no place for it
+then in the life of Russia.</p>
+
+<p>In fine, the situation of the country was difficult, but not critical. The
+united efforts of the people and all the thousands of forces of the country
+would have permitted it to come to the end of its difficulties and to find
+a solution of the situation.</p>
+
+
+<h4>III</h4>
+
+<h4><i>The Insurrection of Kornilov</i></h4>
+
+
+<p>But now the insurrection of Kornilov broke out. It was entirely unexpected
+by all the Socialist parties, by their central committees, and, of course,
+by the Socialist Ministers. Petrograd was in no way prepared for an <a name="Page_348" id="Page_348"></a>attack
+of this kind. In the course of the evening of the fatal day when Kornilov
+approached Petrograd, the central committee of the Revolutionary Socialist
+party received by telephone, from the Palace of Hiver, the news of the
+approach of Kornilovien troops. This news revolutionized everybody. A
+meeting of all the organizations took place at Smolny; the members of the
+party alarmed by the news, and other persons wishing to know the truth
+about the events, or to receive indications as to what should be done, came
+there to a reunion. It was a strange picture that Smolny presented that
+night. The human torrent rushed along its corridors, committees and
+commissions sat in its side apartments. They asked one another what was
+happening, what was to be done. News succeeded news. One thing was certain.
+Petrograd was not prepared for the fight. It was not protected by anything,
+and the Cossacks who followed Kornilov could easily take it.</p>
+
+<p>The National Soviet of Peasants' Delegates in the session that it held that
+same night at No. 6 Fontaka Street adopted a resolution calling all the
+peasants to armed resistance against Kornilov. The Central Executive
+Committee with the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates established
+a special organization which was to defend Petrograd and to fight against
+the insurrection. Detachments of volunteers and of soldiers were directed
+toward the locality where Kornilov was, to get information and to organize
+a propaganda among the troops that followed the General, and in case of
+failure to fight hand to hand. As they quit in the morning they did not
+know how things would turn; they were rather pessimistic with regard to the
+issue of the insurrection for the Socialists.</p>
+
+<p>The end of this conspiracy is known. The troops that followed Kornilov left
+him as soon as they found out the truth. In this respect, everything ended
+well, but this event had profound and regrettable circumstances.</p><p><a name="Page_349" id="Page_349"></a></p>
+
+<p>The acute deplorable crisis of the central power became chronic. The
+Cadets, compromised by their participation in the Kornilov conspiracy,
+preferred to remain apart. The Socialist-Revolutionists did not see clearly
+what there was at the bottom of the whole affair. <i>It was as much as any
+one knew at the moment</i>. Kerensky, in presence of the menace of the
+counter-revolution on the right and of the growing anarchy on the extreme
+left, would have called to Petrograd a part of the troops from the front to
+stem the tide. Such was the r&ocirc;le of different persons in this story. It is
+only later, when all the documents will be shown, that the story can be
+verified, but at all events it is beyond doubt that the Revolutionary
+Socialist party was in no wise mixed in this conspiracy. The conspiracy of
+Kornilov completely freed the hands of the Bolsheviki. In the Pravda, and
+in other Bolshevist newspapers, complaints were read of the danger of a new
+counter-revolution which was developing with the complicity of Kerensky
+acting in accord or in agreement with the traitor Cadets. The public was
+excited against the Socialist-Revolutionists, who were accused of having
+secretly helped this counter-revolution. The Bolsheviki alone, said its
+organs, had saved the Revolution; to them alone was due the failure of the
+Kornilov insurrection.</p>
+
+<p>The Bolsheviki agitation assumed large proportions. Copies of the <i>Pravda</i>,
+spread lavishly here and there, were poisoned with calumny, campaigns
+against the other parties, boasting gross flatteries addressed to the
+soldiers and appeals to trouble. Bolsheviki meetings permeated with the
+same spirit were organized at Petrograd, Moscow, and other cities.
+Bolshevist agitators set out for the front at the same time with copies of
+the <i>Pravda</i> and other papers, and the Bolsheviki enjoyed, during this
+time&mdash;as Lenine himself admits&mdash;complete liberty. Their chiefs, compromised
+in the insurrection of June 3d, had been given their freedom.</p>
+
+<p>Their principal watchword was "Down with the war!"<a name="Page_350" id="Page_350"></a> "Kerensky and the other
+conciliators," they cried, "want war and do not want peace. Kerensky will
+give you neither peace, nor land, nor bread, nor Constituent Assembly. Down
+with the traitor and the counter-revolutionists! They want to smother the
+Revolution. We demand peace. We will give you peace, land to the peasants,
+factories and work to the workmen!" Under this simple form the agitation
+was followed up among the masses and found a propitious ground, first among
+the soldiers who were tired of war and athirst for peace. In the Soviet of
+the Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates of Petrograd the Bolshevist party
+soon found itself strengthened and fortified. Its influence was also
+considerable among the sailors of the Baltic fleet. Cronstadt was entirely
+in their hands. New elections of the Central Executive Committee of the
+Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates soon became necessary; they
+gave a big majority to the Bolsheviki. The old bureau, Tchcheidze at its
+head, had to leave; the Bolsheviki triumphed clamorously.</p>
+
+<p>To fight against the Bolsheviki the Executive Committee of the National
+Soviet of Peasants' Delegates decided at the beginning of December to call
+a Second General Peasants' Congress. This was to decide if the peasants
+would defend the Constituent Assembly or if they would follow the
+Bolsheviki. This Congress had, in effect, a decisive importance. It showed
+what was the portion of the peasant class that upheld the Bolsheviki. It
+was principally the peasants in soldiers' dress, the "d&eacute;class&eacute; soldiers,"
+men taken from the country life by the war, from their natural
+surroundings, and desiring but one thing, the end of the war. The peasants
+who had come from the country had, on the contrary, received the mandate to
+uphold the Constituent Assembly. They firmly maintained their point of view
+and resisted all the attempts of the Bolsheviki and the
+"Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left" (who followed them blindly) to make
+their <a name="Page_351" id="Page_351"></a>influence prevail. The speech of Lenine was received with hostility;
+as for Trotzky, who, some time before, had publicly threatened with the
+guillotine all the "enemies of the Revolution," they prevented him from
+speaking, crying out: "Down with the tyrant! Guillotineur! Assassin!" To
+give his speech Trotzky, accompanied by his faithful "capotes," was obliged
+to repair to another hall.</p>
+
+<p>The Second Peasants' Congress was thus distinctly split into two parties.
+The Bolsheviki tried by every means to elude a straight answer to the
+question, "Does the Congress wish to uphold the Constituent Assembly?" They
+prolonged the discussion, driving the peasants to extremities by every kind
+of paltry discussion on foolish questions, hoping to tire them out and thus
+cause a certain number of them to return home. The tiresome discussions
+carried on for ten days, with the effect that a part of the peasants,
+seeing nothing come from it, returned home. But the peasants had, in spite
+of all, the upper hand; by a roll-call vote 359 against 314 pronounced
+themselves for the defense without reserve of the Constituent Assembly.</p>
+
+<p>Any work in common for the future was impossible. The fraction of the
+peasants that pronounced itself for the Constituent Assembly continued to
+sit apart, named its Executive Committee, and decided to continue the fight
+resolutely. The Bolsheviki, on their part, took their partizans to the
+Smolny, declared to be usurpers of the Soviet of Peasants' Delegates who
+pronounced themselves for the defense of the Constituante, and, with the
+aid of soldiers, ejected the former Executive Committee from their premises
+and took possession of their goods, the library, etc.</p>
+
+<p>The new Executive Committee, which did not have at its disposition Red
+Guards, was obliged to look for another place, to collect the money
+necessary for this purpose, etc. Its members were able, with much
+difficulty, to <a name="Page_352" id="Page_352"></a>place everything upon its feet and to assure the
+publication of an organ (the <i>Izvestya</i> of the National Soviet of Peasants'
+Delegates determined to defend the Constituent Assembly), to send delegates
+into different regions, and to establish relations with the provinces, etc.</p>
+
+<p>Together with the peasants, workmen and Socialist parties and numerous
+democratic organizations prepared themselves for the defense of the
+Constituent Assembly: The Union of Postal Employees, a part of the Union of
+Railway Workers, the Bank Employees, the City Employees, the food
+distributors' organizations, the teachers' associations, the zemstvos, the
+co-operatives. These organizations believed that the <i>coup d'&eacute;tat</i> of
+October 25th was neither legal nor just; they demanded a convocation with
+brief delay of the Constituent Assembly and the restoration of the
+liberties that were trampled under foot by the Bolsheviki.</p>
+
+<p>These treated them as <i>saboteurs</i>, "enemies of the people," deprived them
+of their salaries, and expelled them from their lodgings. They ordered
+those who opposed them to be deprived of their food-cards. They published
+lists of strikers, thus running the risk of having them lynched by the
+crowds. At Saratov, for example, the strike of postal workers and
+telegraphers lasted a month and a half. The institutions whose strike would
+have entailed for the population not only disorganization, but an arrest of
+all life (such as the railroads, the organizations of food distributers),
+abstained from striking, only asking the Bolsheviki not to meddle with
+their work. Sometimes, however, the gross interference of the Bolsheviki in
+work of which they understood nothing obliged those opposed to them, in
+spite of everything, to strike. It is to be noted also that the professors
+of secondary schools were obliged to join the strike movements (the
+superior schools had already ceased to function at this time) as well as
+the theatrical artistes: a talented artist, Silotti, was arrested; he
+declared that <a name="Page_353" id="Page_353"></a>even in the time of Czarism nobody was ever uneasy on
+account of his political opinions.</p>
+
+
+<h4>IV</h4>
+
+<h4><i>The Bolsheviki and the Constituent Assembly</i></h4>
+
+
+<p>At the time of the accomplishment of their <i>coup d'&eacute;tat</i>, the Bolsheviki
+cried aloud that the ministry of Kerensky put off a long time the
+convocation of the Constituante (which was a patent lie), that they would
+never call the Assembly, and that they alone, the Bolsheviki, would do it.
+But according as the results of the elections became known their opinions
+changed.</p>
+
+<p>In the beginning they boasted of their electoral victories at Petrograd and
+Moscow. Then they kept silent, as if the elections had no existence
+whatever. But the <i>Pravda</i> and the <i>Izvestya</i> of the Soviet of Workmen's
+and Soldiers' Delegates continued to treat as caluminators those who
+exposed the danger that was threatening the Constituent Assembly at the
+hands of the Bolsheviki. They did not yet dare to assert themselves openly.
+They had to gain time to strengthen their power. They hastily followed up
+peace pourparlers, to place Russia and the Constituent Assembly, if this
+met, before an accomplished fact.</p>
+
+<p>They hastened to attract the peasants to themselves. That was the reason
+which motived the "decree" of Lenine on the socialization of the soil,
+which decree appeared immediately after the <i>coup d'&eacute;tat</i>. This decree was
+simply a reproduction of a Revolutionary Socialists' resolution adopted at
+a Peasants' Congress. What could the socialization of the soil be to Lenine
+and all the Bolsheviki in general? They had been, but a short time before,
+profoundly indifferent with regard to this Socialist-Revolutionist
+"Utopia." It had been for them an object of raillery. But they knew that
+without this "Utopia"<a name="Page_354" id="Page_354"></a> they would have no peasants. And they threw them
+this mouthful, this "decree," which astonished the peasants. "Is it a law?
+Is it not a law? Nobody knows," they said.</p>
+
+<p>It is the same desire to have, cost what it may, the sympathy of the
+peasants that explains the union of the Bolsheviki with those who are
+called the "Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left" (for the name
+Socialist-Revolutionist spoke to the heart of the peasant), who played the
+stupid and shameful r&ocirc;le of followers of the Bolsheviki, with a blind
+weapon between their hands.</p>
+
+<p>A part of the "peasants in uniform" followed the Bolsheviki to Smolny. The
+Germans honored the Bolsheviki by continuing with them the pourparlers for
+peace. The Bolshevist government had at its disposal the Red Guards, well
+paid, created suddenly in the presence of the crumbling of the army for
+fear of remaining without the help of bayonets. These Red Guards, who later
+fled in shameful fashion before the German patrols, advanced into the
+interior of the country and gained victories over the unarmed populace. The
+Bolsheviki felt the ground firm under their feet and threw off the mask. A
+campaign against the Constituent Assembly commenced. At first in <i>Pravda</i>
+and in <i>Izvestya</i> were only questions. What will this Constituent Assembly
+be? Of whom will it be composed? It is possible that it will have a
+majority of servants of the bourgeoisie&mdash;Cadets Socialist-Revolutionists.
+<i>Can we confide to such a Constituent Assembly the destinies of the Russian
+Revolution? Will it recognize the power of the Soviets?</i> Then came certain
+hypocritical "ifs." "If," yes, "if" the personnel of the Constituent
+Assembly is favorable to us; "if" it will recognize the power of the
+Soviets, it can count on their support. <i>If not&mdash;it condemns itself to
+death</i>.</p>
+
+<p>The Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left in their organ, <i>The Flag of
+Labor</i>, repeated in the wake of the Bolsheviki, "We will uphold the
+Constituent Assembly in <i>the measure we</i>&mdash;"</p><p><a name="Page_355" id="Page_355"></a></p>
+
+<p>Afterward we see no longer questions or prudent "ifs," but distinct
+answers. "The majority of the Constituent Assembly is formed," said the
+Bolsheviki, "of Socialist-Revolutionists and Cadets&mdash;that is to say,
+enemies of the people. This composition assures it of a
+counter-revolutionary spirit. Its destiny is therefore clear. Historic
+examples come to its aid. <i>The victorious people has no need of a
+Constituent Assembly. It is above the Constituante</i>. It has gone beyond
+it." The Russian people, half illiterate, were made to believe that in a
+few weeks they had outgrown the end for which millions of Russians had
+fought for almost a century; that they no longer had need of the most
+perfect form of popular representation, such as did not exist even in the
+most cultivated countries of western Europe. To the Constituent Assembly,
+legislative organ due to equal, direct, and secret universal suffrage, they
+opposed the Soviets, with their recruiting done by hazard and their
+elections to two or three degrees,<a name="FNanchor_92_92" id="FNanchor_92_92"></a><a href="#Footnote_92_92" class="fnanchor">[92]</a> the Soviets which were the
+revolutionary organs and not the legislative organs, and whose r&ocirc;le besides
+none of those who fought for the Constituent Assembly sought to diminish.</p>
+
+
+<h4>V</h4>
+
+<h4><i>The Fight Concentrates Around the Constituent Assembly</i></h4>
+
+
+<p>This was a maneuver whose object appeared clearly. The defenders of the
+Constituent Assembly had evidence of what was being prepared. The peasants
+who waited with impatience the opening of the Constituent Assembly sent
+delegates to Petrograd to find out the cause of the delay of the
+convocation. These delegates betook themselves to the Executive Committee
+of the Soviet of Peasants' Delegates (11 Kirillovskaia Street), and to the
+Socialist-Revolutionist fraction of the members of the<a name="Page_356" id="Page_356"></a> Constituante (2
+Bolotnai Street). This last fraction worked actively at its proper
+organization. A bureau of organization was elected, commissions charged to
+elaborate projects of law for the Constituante. The fraction issued
+bulletins explaining to the population the program which the
+Socialist-Revolutionists were going to defend at the Constituante. Active
+relations were undertaken with the provinces. At the same time the members
+of the fraction, among whom were many peasants and workmen, followed up an
+active agitation in the workshops and factories of Petrograd, and among the
+soldiers of the Preobrajenski Regiment and some others. The members of the
+Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasants' Delegates worked in concert
+with them. It was precisely the opinion of the peasants and of the workmen
+which had most importance in the fight against the Bolsheviki. They, the
+true representatives of the people, were listened to everywhere; people
+were obliged to reckon with them.</p>
+
+<p>It was under these conditions that the Democratic Conference met. Called by
+the Provisional Government, it comprised representatives of the Soviets, of
+parties, of organizations of the army, peasant organizations,
+co-operatives, zemstvos, agricultural committees, etc. Its object was to
+solve the question of power until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly.</p>
+
+<p>At this conference the Bolsheviki formed only a small minority; but they
+acted as masters of the situation, calling, in a provocative manner, all
+those who were not in accord with them, "Kornilovist,
+counter-revolutionaries, traitors!" Because of this attitude the
+conference, which ought to have had the character of an assembly deciding
+affairs of state, took on the character of a boisterous meeting, which
+lasted several days of unending twaddle. What the Bolsheviki wanted was a
+verbal victory&mdash;to have shouted more loudly than their opponents. The same
+speeches were repeated every day. Some upheld a power exclusively
+Socialist, others&mdash;the <a name="Page_357" id="Page_357"></a>majority composed of delegates from different
+corners of the country&mdash;sanctioned an agreement with all the democratic
+elements.</p>
+
+<p>The provincial delegates, having come with a view to serious work, returned
+to their homes, carrying with them a painful impression of lost
+opportunities, of useless debates.</p>
+
+<p>There remained but a few weeks before the convocation of the Constituent
+Assembly. Those who voted against a government exclusively Socialist did
+not think that, under the troublesome conditions of the time, they could
+expose the country to the risk of a dispersion of strength; they feared the
+possible isolation of the government in face of certain elements whose help
+could not be relied on. But they did not take into account a fact which had
+resulted from the Kornilovist insurrection: the natural distrust of the
+working masses in presence of all the non-Socialists, of those who&mdash;not
+being in immediate contact with them&mdash;placed themselves, were it ever so
+little, more on the right.</p>
+
+<p>The Democratic conference resulted in the formation of a Pre-Parliament.
+There the relations, between the forces in presence of each other, were
+about the same. Besides the Bolsheviki soon abandoned the Pre-Parliament,
+for they were already preparing their insurrection which curtailed the
+dissolution of that institution.</p>
+
+<p>"We are on the eve of a Bolshevik insurrection"&mdash;such was, at this time,
+the opinion of all those who took part in political life. "We are rushing
+to it with dizzy rapidity. The catastrophe is inevitable." But what is very
+characteristic is this, that, while preparing their insurrection, the
+Bolsheviki, in their press, did not hesitate to treat as liars and
+calumniators all those who spoke of the danger of this insurrection, and
+that on the eve of a conquest of power (with arms ready) premeditated and
+well prepared in advance.</p>
+
+<hr style='width: 45%;' /><p><a name="Page_358" id="Page_358"></a></p>
+
+<p>During the whole period that preceded the Bolshevik insurrection a great
+creative work was being carried on in the country in spite of the
+undesirable phenomena of which we have spoken above.</p>
+
+<p>1. With great difficulty there were established organs of a local,
+autonomous administration, volost and district zemstvos, which were to
+furnish a basis of organization to the government zemstvos. The zemstvo of
+former times was made up of only class representatives; <i>the elections to
+the new zemstvos were effected by universal suffrage, equal, direct, and
+secret</i>. These elections were a kind of schooling for the population,
+showing it the practical significance of universal suffrage, and preparing
+it for the elections to the Constituent Assembly. At the same time they
+laid the foundation of a local autonomous administration.</p>
+
+<p>2. Preparations for the election to the Constituent Assembly were made; an
+agitation, an intense propaganda followed; preparations of a technical
+order were made. This was a difficult task because of the great number of
+electors, the dispersion of the population, the great number of illiterate,
+etc. Everywhere special courts had been established, in view of the
+elections, to train agitators and instructors, who afterward were sent in
+great numbers into the country.</p>
+
+<p>3. <i>At the same time the ground was hurriedly prepared for the law
+concerning the socialization of the soil.</i> The abandonment of his post by
+Tchernov, Minister of Agriculture, did not stop this work. The principal
+agricultural committee and the Minister of Agriculture, directed by
+Rakitnikov and Vikhiliaev, hastened to finish this work before the
+convocation of the Constituent Assembly. The Revolutionary Socialist party
+decided to keep for itself the post of Minister of Agriculture; for the
+position they named S. Maslov, who had to exact from the government an
+immediate vote on the law concerning the socialization of the soil. <i>The
+study of this law in the<a name="Page_359" id="Page_359"></a> Council of Ministers was finished. Nothing more
+remained to be done but to adopt and promulgate it. Because of the
+excitement of the people in the country, it was decided to do this at once,
+without waiting for the Constituent Assembly</i>. Finally, to better realize
+the conditions of the time, it must be added that the whole country awaited
+anxiously the elections to the Constituent Assembly. All believed that this
+was going to settle the life of Russia.</p>
+
+
+<h4>VI</h4>
+
+<h4><i>The Bolshevist Insurrection</i></h4>
+
+
+<p>It was under these conditions that the Bolshevist <i>coup d'&eacute;tat</i> happened.
+In the capitals as well as in the provinces, it was accomplished by armed
+force; at Petrograd, with the help of the sailors of the Baltic fleet, of
+the soldiers of the Preobrajenski, Semenovski, and other regiments, in
+other towns with the aid of the local garrisons. Here, for example, is how
+the Bolshevist <i>coup d'&eacute;tat</i> took place at Saratov. I was a witness to
+these facts myself. Saratov is a big university and intellectual center,
+possessing a great number of schools, libraries, and divers associations
+designed to elevate the intellectual standard of the population. The
+zemstvo of Saratov was one of the best in Russia. The peasant population of
+this province, among whom the Revolutionary Socialist propaganda was
+carried on for several years by the Revolutionary Socialist Party, is wide
+awake and well organized. The municipality and the agricultural committees
+were composed of Socialists. The population was actively preparing for the
+elections to the Constituent Assembly; the people discussed the list of
+candidates, studied the candidates' biographies, as well as the programs of
+the different parties.</p>
+
+<p>On the night of October 28th, by reason of an order that had come from
+Petrograd, the Bolshevik <i>coup d'&eacute;tat</i><a name="Page_360" id="Page_360"></a> broke out at Saratov. The following
+forces were its instruments: the garrison which was a stranger to the
+masses of the population, a weak party of workers, and, in the capacity of
+leaders, some Intellectuals who, up to that time, had played no r&ocirc;le in the
+public life of the town.</p>
+
+<p>It was indeed a military <i>coup d'&eacute;tat</i>. The city hall, where sat the
+Socialists, who were elected by equal, direct, and secret universal
+suffrage, was surrounded by the soldiers; machine-guns were placed in front
+and the bombardment began. This lasted a whole night; some were wounded,
+some killed. The municipal judges were arrested. Soon after a Manifesto
+solemnly announced to the population that the "enemies of the people," the
+"counter-revolutionaries," were overthrown; that the power at Saratov was
+going to pass into the hands of the Soviet (Bolshevist) of the Workmen's
+and Soldiers' Delegates.</p>
+
+<p>The population was perplexed; the people thought that they had sent to the
+Town Hall Socialists, men of their choice. Now these men were declared
+"enemies of the people," were shot down or arrested by other Socialists.
+What did all this mean? And the inhabitant of Saratov felt a fear stealing
+into his soul at the sight of this violence; he began to doubt the value of
+the Socialist idea in general. The faith of former times gave place to
+doubt, disappointment, and discouragement. The <i>coup d'&eacute;tat</i> was followed
+by divers other manifestations of Bolshevist activity&mdash;arrests, searches,
+confiscation of newspapers, ban on meetings. Bands of soldiers looted the
+country houses in the suburbs of the city; a school for the children of the
+people and the buildings of the children's holiday settlement were also
+pillaged. Bands of soldiers were forthwith sent into the country to cause
+trouble there.</p>
+
+<p><i>The sensible part of the population of Saratov severely condemned these
+acts</i> in a series of Manifestos signed by the Printers' Union, the mill
+workers, the City Employees'<a name="Page_361" id="Page_361"></a> Union, Postal and Telegraph Employees,
+students' organizations, and many other democratic associations and
+organizations.</p>
+
+<p>The peasants received the <i>coup d'&eacute;tat</i> with distinct hostility. Meetings
+and reunions were soon organized in the villages. Resolutions were voted
+censuring the <i>coup d'&eacute;tat</i> of violence, deciding to organize to resist the
+Bolsheviki, and demanding the removal of the Bolshevist soldier members
+from the rural communes. The bands of soldiers, who were sent into the
+country, used not only persuasion, but also violence, trying to force the
+peasants to give their votes for the Bolshevik candidates at the time of
+the elections to the Constituent Assembly; they tore up the bulletins of
+the Socialist-Revolutionists, overturned the ballot-boxes, etc.</p>
+
+<p>But the Bolshevik soldiers were not able to disturb the confidence of the
+peasants in the Constituent Assembly, and in the Revolutionary Socialist
+party, whose program they had long since adopted, and whose leaders and
+ways of acting they knew, the inhabitants of the country proved themselves
+in all that concerned the elections wide awake to the highest degree. There
+were hardly any abstentions, <i>90 per cent. of the population took part in
+the voting</i>. The day of the voting was kept as a solemn feast; the priest
+said mass; the peasants dressed in their Sunday clothes; they believed that
+the Constituent Assembly would give them order, laws, the land. In the
+government of Saratov, out of fourteen deputies elected, there were twelve
+Socialist-Revolutionists; there were others (such as the government of
+Pensa, for example) that elected <i>only</i> Socialist-Revolutionists. The
+Bolsheviki had the majority only in Petrograd and Moscow and in certain
+units of the army. The elections to the Constituent Assembly were a
+decisive victory for the Revolutionary Socialist party.</p>
+
+<p>Such was the response of Russia to the Bolshevik <i>coup d'&eacute;tat</i>. To violence
+and conquest of power by force of <a name="Page_362" id="Page_362"></a>arms, the population answered by the
+elections to the Constituent Assembly; the people sent to this assembly,
+not the Bolsheviki, but, by an overwhelming majority,
+Socialist-Revolutionists.</p>
+
+
+<h4>VII</h4>
+
+<h4><i>The Fight Against the Bolsheviki</i></h4>
+
+
+<p>But the final result of the elections was not established forthwith. In
+many places the elections had to be postponed. The Bolshevik <i>coup d'&eacute;tat</i>
+had disorganized life, had upset postal and telegraphic communications, and
+had even destroyed, in certain localities, the electoral mechanism itself
+by the arrest of the active workers. The elections which began in the
+middle of November were not concluded till toward the month of January.</p>
+
+<p>In the mean time, in the country a fierce battle was raging against the
+Bolsheviki. It was not, on the part of their adversaries, a fight for
+power. If the Socialist-Revolutionists had wished they could have seized
+the power; to do that they had only to follow the example of those who were
+called "the Revolutionary Socialists of the Left." Not only did they not
+follow their example, but they also excluded them from their midst. A short
+time after the Bolshevik insurrection, when the part taken in this
+insurrection by certain Revolutionary Socialists of the Left was found out,
+the Central Committee of the Revolutionary Socialist party voted to exclude
+them from the party for having violated the party discipline and having
+adopted tactics contrary to its principles. This exclusion was confirmed
+afterward by the Fourth Congress of the party, which took place in
+December, 1917.</p>
+
+<p>Soon after the <i>coup d'&eacute;tat</i> of October the question was among all parties
+and all organizations: "What is to be done? How will the situation be
+remedied?" The <a name="Page_363" id="Page_363"></a>remedy included three points. First, creation of a power
+composed of the representatives of all Socialist organizations, with the
+"Populist-Socialists" on the extreme right, and with the express condition
+that the principal actors in the Bolshevik <i>coup d'&eacute;tat</i> would not have
+part in the Ministry. Second, immediate establishment of the democratic
+liberties, which were trampled under foot by the Bolsheviki, without which
+any form of Socialism is inconceivable. Third, convocation without delay of
+the Constituent Assembly.</p>
+
+<p>Such were the conditions proposed to the Bolsheviki in the name of several
+Socialist parties (the Revolutionary Socialist party, the Mensheviki, the
+Populist-Socialists, etc.), and of several democratic organizations
+(Railroad Workers' Union, Postal and Telegraphic Employees' Union, etc.).
+The Bolsheviki, at this time, were not sure of being able to hold their
+position; certain Commissaries of the People, soon after they were
+installed in power, handed in their resignation, being terrified by the
+torrents of blood that were shed at Moscow and by the cruelties which
+accompanied the <i>coup d'&eacute;tat</i>. The Bolsheviki pretended to accept the
+pourparlers, but kept them dragging along so as to gain time. In the mean
+time they tried to strengthen themselves in the provinces, where they
+gained victories such as that of Saratov; they actively rushed the
+pourparlers for peace; they had to do it at all cost, even if, in doing it,
+they had to accept the assistance of the traitor and spy, by name Schneur,
+for they had promised peace to the soldiers.</p>
+
+<p>For this it sufficed them to have gained some victories in the provinces,
+and that the Germans accepted the proposition of pourparlers of peace ("the
+German generals came to meet us in gala attire, wearing their ribbons and
+decorations," with triumph announced in their appeal to the Russian people
+the representatives of this "Socialist" government Schneur &amp; Co.), for this
+the Bolsheviki henceforth refused every compromise and all conference <a name="Page_364" id="Page_364"></a>with
+the other parties. For the other parties&mdash;those who did not recognize the
+Bolshevik <i>coup d'&eacute;tat</i> and did not approve of the violence that was
+perpetrated&mdash;there was only one alternative, the fight.</p>
+
+<p>It was the Revolutionary Socialist party and the National Soviet of
+Peasants' Delegates that had to bear the brunt of this fight, which was
+carried on under extremely difficult conditions. All the non-Bolshevik
+newspapers were confiscated or prosecuted and deprived of every means of
+reaching the provinces; their editors' offices and printing establishments
+were looted. After the creation of the "Revolutionary Tribunal," the
+authors of articles that were not pleasing to the Bolsheviki, as well as
+the directors of the newspapers, were brought to judgment and condemned to
+make amends or go to prison, etc.</p>
+
+<p>The premises of numerous organizations were being constantly pillaged; the
+Red Guard came there to search, destroying different documents; frequently
+objects which were found on the premises disappeared. Thus were looted the
+premises of the Central Committee of the Revolutionary Socialist party (27
+Galernaia Street), and, several times, the offices of the paper <i>Dielo
+Narvda</i> (22 Litcinaia Street), as well as the office of the "League for the
+Defense of the Constituent Assembly," the premises of the committees of
+divers sections of the Revolutionary Socialist party, the office of the
+paper <i>Volia Naroda</i>, etc.</p>
+
+<p>Leaders of the different parties were arrested. The arrest of the whole
+Central Committee of the Revolutionary Socialist party was to be carried
+out as well as the arrest of all the Socialist-Revolutionists, and of all
+the Mensheviki in sight. The Bolshevist press became infuriated, exclaiming
+against the "counter-revolution," against their "complicity" with Kornilov
+and Kalodine.</p>
+
+<p>All those who did not adhere to the Bolsheviki were indignant at the sight
+of the crimes committed, and wished to defend the Constituent Assembly.
+Knowingly, <a name="Page_365" id="Page_365"></a>and in a premeditated manner, the Bolshevist press excited the
+soldiers and the workmen against all other parties. And then when the
+unthinking masses, drunk with flattery and hatred, committed acts of
+lynching, the Bolshevist leaders expressed sham regrets! Thus it was after
+the death of Doukhonine, who was cut to pieces by the sailors; and thus it
+was after the dastardly assassination of the Cadets, Shingariev and
+Kokochkine, after the shootings <i>en masse</i> and the drowning of the
+officers.</p>
+
+<p>It was under these conditions that the fight was carried on; and the brunt
+of it, as I have already stated, was sustained by the Revolutionary
+Socialist party and the National Soviet of Peasants' Delegates, and it was
+against these two that the Bolsheviki were particularly infuriated. "Now it
+is not the Cadets who are dangerous to us," said they, "but the
+Socialist-Revolutionists&mdash;these traitors, these enemies of the people." The
+most sacred names of the Revolution were publicly trampled under foot by
+them. Their cynicism went so far as to accuse Breshkovskaya, "the
+Grandmother of the Russian Revolution," of having sold out to the
+Americans. Personally I had the opportunity to hear a Bolshevist orator, a
+member of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers'
+Delegates, express this infamous calumny at a meeting organized by the
+Preobrajenski Regiment. The Bolsheviki tried, by every means, to crush the
+party, to reduce it to a clandestine existence. But the Central Committee
+declared that it would continue to fight against violence&mdash;and that in an
+open manner; it continued to issue a daily paper, only changing its title,
+as in the time of Czarism, and thus continued its propaganda in the
+factories, and helped to form public opinion, etc.</p>
+
+<p>At the Fourth Congress of the party, which took place in December, the
+delegates from the provinces, where the despotism of the Bolsheviki was
+particularly violent, raised the question of introducing terrorist methods
+in the fight against the Bolsheviki. "From the time that <a name="Page_366" id="Page_366"></a>the party is
+placed in a fight under conditions which differ nothing from those of
+Czarism, ancient methods are to be resumed; violence must be opposed to
+violence," they said. But the Congress spurned this means; the
+Revolutionary Socialist party did not adopt the methods of terrorism; it
+could not do it, because the Bolsheviki were, after all, followed by the
+masses&mdash;unthinking, it is true, but the masses, nevertheless. It is by
+educating them, and not by the use of violence, that they are to be fought
+against. Terrorist acts could bring nothing but a bloody suppression.</p>
+
+
+<h4>VIII</h4>
+
+<h4><i>The Second Peasant Congress</i></h4>
+
+
+<p>In the space of a month a great amount of work was accomplished. A breach
+was made in the general misunderstanding. Moral help was assured to the
+Constituent Assembly on the part of the workmen and part of the soldiers of
+Petrograd. There was no longer any confidence placed in the Bolsheviki.
+Besides, the agitation was not the only cause of this change. The workers
+soon came to understand that the Bolshevik tactics could only irritate and
+disgust the great mass of the population, that the Bolsheviki were not the
+representatives of the workers, that their promises of land, of peace, and
+other earthly goods were only a snare. The industrial production diminished
+more and more; numerous factories and shops closed their doors and
+thousands of workmen found themselves on the streets. The population of
+Petrograd, which, at first, received a quarter of a pound of bread per day
+(a black bread made with straw), had now but one-eighth of a pound, while
+in the time of Kerensky the ration was half a pound. The other products
+(oatmeal, butter, eggs, milk) were entirely lacking or cost extremely high
+prices. One ruble fifty copecks for a pound of <a name="Page_367" id="Page_367"></a>potatoes, six rubles a
+pound of meat, etc. The transportation of products to Petrograd had almost
+ceased. The city was on the eve of famine.</p>
+
+<p>The workers were irritated by the violence and the arbitrary manner of the
+Bolsheviki, and by the exploits of the Red Guard, well paid, enjoying all
+the privileges, well nourished, well clothed, and well shod in the midst of
+a Petrograd starving and in rags.</p>
+
+<p>Discontent manifested itself also among the soldiers of the Preobrajenski
+and Litovsky regiments, and others. In this manner in the day of the
+meeting of the Constituent Assembly they were no longer very numerous. What
+loud cries, nevertheless, they had sent forth lately when Kerensky wished
+to send the Preobrajenski and Seminovski regiments from Petrograd! "What?
+Send the revolutionary regiments from Petrograd? To make easier the
+surrender of the capital to the counter-revolution?" The soldiers of the
+Preobrajenski Regiment organized in their barracks frequent meetings, where
+the acts of the Bolsheviki were sharply criticized; they started a paper,
+<i>The Soldiers' Cloak</i>, which was confiscated.</p>
+
+<p>On the other hand, here is one of the resolutions voted by the workers of
+the Putilov factory:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>The Constituent Assembly is the only organ expressing the will of
+the entire people. It alone is able to reconstitute the unity of
+the country.</p></div>
+
+<p>The majority of the deputies to the Constituent Assembly who had for some
+time been elected had arrived in Petrograd, and the Bolsheviki always
+retarded the opening. The Socialist-Revolutionist fraction started
+conferences with the other fractions on the necessity for fixing a day for
+the opening of the Constituante, without waiting the good pleasure of the
+Commissaries of the People. They chose the date, December 27th, but the
+opening could not take place on that day, the Ukrainian fraction having
+suddenly abandoned the majority to join themselves <a name="Page_368" id="Page_368"></a>to the Bolsheviki and
+the Revolutionary Socialists of the Left. Finally, the government fixed the
+opening of the Constituent Assembly for the 5th (18th) of January.</p>
+
+<p>Here is a document which relates this fight for the date of the opening of
+the Constituante:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><h4><i>Bulletin of Members of the Constituent Assembly Belonging to the
+Socialist-Revolutionist Fraction. No. 5, Dec. 31, 1917.</i></h4>
+
+<p><i>To All the Citizens</i>:</p>
+
+<p>The Socialist-Revolutionist fraction of the Constituent Assembly
+addresses the whole people the present expos&eacute; of the reasons for
+which the Constituent Assembly has not been opened until this day:
+it warns them, at the same time, of the danger which threatens the
+sovereign rights of the people.</p>
+
+<p>Let it be thus placed in clear daylight, the true character of
+those who, under pretext of following the well-being of the
+workers, forge new chains for liberated Russia, those who attempt
+to assassinate the Constituent Assembly, which alone is able to
+save Russia from the foreign yoke and from the despotism which has
+been born within.</p>
+
+<p>Let all the citizens know that the hour is near when they must be
+ready to rise like one man for the defense of their liberty and
+their Constituent Assembly.</p>
+
+<p>For, citizens, your salvation is solely in your own hands.</p>
+
+<p>Citizens! you know that on the day assigned for the opening of the
+Constituent Assembly, November 28th, all the
+Socialist-Revolutionist deputies who were elected had come to
+Petrograd. You know that neither violence of a usurping power nor
+arrests of our comrades, by force of arms which were opposed to us
+at the Taurida Palace, could prevent us from assembling and
+fulfilling our duty.</p>
+
+<p>But the civil war which has spread throughout the country retarded
+the election to the Constituent Assembly and the number of
+deputies elected was insufficient.</p>
+
+<p>It was necessary to postpone the opening of the Constituent
+Assembly.</p>
+
+<p>Our fraction utilized this forced delay by an intensive
+preparatory work. We elaborated, in several commissions, projects
+<a name="Page_369" id="Page_369"></a>of law concerning all the fundamental questions that the
+Constituante would have to solve. We adopted the project of our
+fundamental law on the question of the land; we elaborated the
+measures which the Constituante would have to take from the very
+first day in order to arrive at a truly democratic peace, so
+necessary to our country; we discussed the principles which should
+direct the friendly dwelling together of all the nationalities
+which people Russia and assure each people a national point of
+view, the free disposition of itself, thus putting an end to the
+fratricidal war.</p>
+
+<p>Our fraction would have been all ready for the day of the opening
+of the Constituante, in order to commence, from the first, a
+creative work and give to the impoverished country peace, bread,
+land, and liberty.</p>
+
+<p>At the same time, we did our utmost to accelerate the arrival of
+the deputies and the opening of the Assembly.</p>
+
+<p>During this time events became more and more menacing every day,
+the Bolshevik power was more rapidly leading our country to its
+fall. From before the time when the Germans had presented their
+conditions of peace the Bolsheviki had destroyed the army,
+suppressed its provisioning, and stripped the front, while at the
+same time by civil war and the looting of the savings of the
+people they achieved the economic ruin of the country. Actually,
+they recognized themselves that the German conditions were
+unacceptable and invited the reconstruction of the army. In spite
+of this, these criminals do not retire; they will achieve their
+criminal work.</p>
+
+<p>Russia suffers in the midst of famine, of civil war, and enemy
+invasion which threatens to reach even the heart of the country.</p>
+
+<p>No delay is permissible.</p>
+
+<p>Our fraction fixed on the 27th of December the last delay for the
+opening of the Constituante; on this day more than half of the
+deputies could have arrived in Petrograd. We entered into
+conference with the other fractions. The Ukrainians, some other
+national fractions, and the Menshevik Social Democrats adhered to
+our resolution. The Revolutionary Socialists of the Left
+hypocritically declared themselves partizans of an early opening
+of the Constituante. But behold, the Council of the so-called
+"Commissaries of the People" fixed the opening for the 5th of
+January. <i>At the same time they called for the 8th of January a
+Congress of the Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers'<a name="Page_370" id="Page_370"></a> Delegates,
+thus hoping to be able to trick and to cover with the name of this
+Congress their criminal acts</i>. The object of this postponement is
+clear; they did not even hide it and threatened to dissolve the
+Constituent Assembly in case that it did not submit to the
+Bolshevik Congress of Soviets. The same threat was repeated by
+those who are called Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left.</p>
+
+<p>The delegation of the Ukrainian Revolutionary Socialists abandoned
+us also and submitted to the order for the convocation on January
+5th, considering that the fight of the Bolshevik power against the
+Constituent Assembly is an internal question, which interests only
+Greater Russia.</p>
+
+<p>Citizens! We shall be there, too, on January 5th, so that the
+least particle of responsibility for the sabotage of the
+Constituent Assembly may not fall upon us.</p>
+
+<p>But we do not think that we can suspend our activity with regard
+to the speediest possible opening of the Constituent Assembly.</p>
+
+<p>We address an energetic appeal to all the deputies; in the name of
+the fatherland, in the name of the Revolution, in the name of the
+duty which devolves upon you by reason of your election, come,
+all, to Petrograd! On the 1st of January all the deputies present
+will decide on the day for the opening of the Constituent
+Assembly.</p>
+
+<p>We appeal to you, citizens! Remind your elected representatives of
+their duty.</p>
+
+<p>And remember that your salvation is solely in your own hands, a
+mortal danger threatens the Constituent Assembly; be all ready to
+rise in its defense!</p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">The Revolutionary Socialist Fraction of the Constituent
+Assembly.</span></p></div>
+
+<p>On the 3d of January the League for the Defense of the Constituent Assembly
+held a meeting at which were present 210 delegates, representing the
+Socialist parties as well as various democratic organizations and many
+factories&mdash;that of Putilov, that of Oboukhov, and still others from the
+outskirts of Narva, from the districts of Viborg, Spassky, and
+Petrogradsky, from the Isle Vassily. It was decided to organize for January
+5th a peaceful <a name="Page_371" id="Page_371"></a>display in honor of the opening of the Constituent
+Assembly.</p>
+
+<p>The Bolsheviki answered this by furious articles in the <i>Pravda</i>, urging
+the people not to spare the counter-revolutionaries, these bourgeoisie who
+intend, by means of their Constituante, to combat the revolutionary people.
+They advised the people of Petrograd not to go out on the streets that day.
+"We shall act without reserve," they added.</p>
+
+<p>Sailors were called from Cronstadt; cruisers and torpedo-boats came. An
+order was issued to the sailors and to the Red Guards who patrolled all the
+works of the Taurida, to make use of their arms if any one attempted to
+enter the palace. For that day unlimited powers were accorded to the
+military authorities. At the same time an assembly of the representatives
+of the garrison at Petrograd, fixed for that day, was proscribed, and the
+newspaper, <i>The Soldiers' Cloak</i>, was suppressed.</p>
+
+<p>A Congress of Soviets was called for the 8th of January. They prepared the
+dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and they wanted to place the
+Congress before the accomplished fact. The Executive Committee of the
+Soviet of Peasants' Delegates, and the Central Executive Committee of the
+Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates chosen at the first elections
+answered by the two following appeals:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>Peasant Comrades!</p>
+
+<p>The Bolsheviki have fixed the 5th of January for the opening of
+the Constituent Assembly; for the 8th of January they call the III
+Congress of the Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, and
+for the 13th the Peasant Congress.</p>
+
+<p>The peasants are, by design, relegated to the background.</p>
+
+<p>An outrage against the Constituent Assembly is being prepared.</p>
+
+<p>In this historic moment the peasants cannot remain aloof.</p>
+
+<p>The Provisional Executive Committee of the National Soviet of
+Peasants' Delegates, which goes on duty as a guard to the<a name="Page_372" id="Page_372"></a>
+Constituent Assembly, has decided to call, on the 8th of January,
+also, the Third National Congress of the Soviets of Peasants'
+Delegates. The representation remains the same as before. Send
+your delegates at once to Petrograd, Grand Bolotnai, 2A.</p>
+
+<p>The fate of the Constituent Assembly is the fate of Russia, the
+fate of the Revolution.</p>
+
+<p>All up for the defense of the Constituent Assembly, for the
+defense of the Revolution&mdash;not by word alone, but by acts!</p>
+
+<p>[Signed] <i>The Provisional Executive Committee of the National
+Soviet of Peasants' Delegates, upholding the principle of the
+defense of the Constituent Assembly</i>.</p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">Appeal of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of
+Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, Chosen at the First
+Elections</span></p>
+
+<p>To all the Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, to all
+the Committees of the Army and of the Navy, to all the
+organizations associated with the Soviets and Committees, to all
+the members of the Socialist-Revolutionist and Menshevist Social
+Democratic fractions who left the Second Congress of Soviets:</p>
+
+<p>Comrades, workmen, and soldiers! Our cry of alarm is addressed to
+all those to whom the work of the Soviets is dear. Know that a
+traitorous blow threatens the revolutionary fatherland, the
+Constituent Assembly, and even the work of the Soviets. Your duty
+is to prepare yourselves for their defense.</p>
+
+<p>The Central Executive Committee, nominated at the October
+Congress, calls together for the 8th of January a Congress of
+Soviets, destined to bungle the Constituent Assembly.</p>
+
+<p>Comrades! The Second Congress of Soviets assembled at the end of
+October, under conditions particularly unfavorable, at the time
+that the Bolshevik party, won over by its leaders to a policy of
+adventure, a plot unbecoming a class organization, executed at
+Petrograd a <i>coup d'&eacute;tat</i> which gave it power; at a time when
+certain groups with the same viewpoint disorganized even the
+method of convocation of the Second Congress, thus openly aspiring
+to falsify the results; at this same Congress the regular
+representatives of the army were lacking (only two <a name="Page_373" id="Page_373"></a>armies being
+represented), and the Soviets of the provinces were very
+insufficiently represented (only about 120 out of 900). Under
+these conditions it is but natural that the Central Executive
+Committee of the Soviets chosen at the first election would not
+recognize the right of this Congress to decide the politics of the
+Soviets.</p>
+
+<p>However, in spite of the protestations, and even of the departure
+of a great number of delegates (those of the Revolutionary
+Socialist fraction, Mensheviki, and Populist-Socialists), a new
+Executive Committee of the Soviets was elected. To consider this
+last as the central director of all the Soviets of the country was
+absolutely impossible. The delegates who remained in the Congress
+formed only an assembly of a group with a little fraction of the
+Revolutionary Socialists of the Left, who had given their adhesion
+to them. Thus the Central Committee named by their Conference
+could not be considered except as representatives of these two
+groups only.</p>
+
+<p>Bringing to the organization of Soviets an unheard-of disorder,
+establishing by their shameful methods of fighting its domination
+over the Soviets, some of which were taken by surprise, the others
+terrorized and broken in their personnel, deceiving the working
+class and the army by its short-sighted policy of adventure, the
+new Executive Committee during the two months that have since
+passed has attempted to subject all the Soviets of Russia to its
+influence. It succeeded in part in this, in the measure in which
+the confidence of the groups which constituted it in the policy
+was not yet exhausted. But a considerable portion of the Soviets,
+as well as fractions of other Soviets, fractions composed of the
+most devoted and experienced fighters, continued to follow the
+only true revolutionary road; to develop the class organization of
+the working masses, to direct their intellectual and political
+life, to develop the political and social aspects of the
+Revolution, to exert, by all the power of the working class
+organized into Soviets, the necessary pressure to attain the end
+that it proposed. The questions of peace and of war, that of the
+organization of production and of food-supply, and that of the
+fight for the Constituent Assembly are in the first place. The
+policy of adventure of the groups which seized the power is on the
+eve of failure. Peace could not be realized by a rupture with the
+Allies and an entente with the imperialistic orb of the Central
+Powers. By reason of this failure of the policy <a name="Page_374" id="Page_374"></a>of the
+Commissaires of the People, of the disorganization of production
+(which, among other things, has had as a result the creation of
+hundreds of thousands of unemployed), by reason of the civil war
+kindled in the country and the absence of a power recognized by
+the whole people, the Central Powers tend to take hold in the most
+cynical fashion of a whole series of western provinces (Poland,
+Lithuania, Courland), and to subject the whole country to their
+complete economic, if not political, domination.</p>
+
+<p>The question of provisioning has taken on an unheard-of acuteness;
+the gross interference in the functioning of organs already
+created for this object, and the civil war kindled everywhere
+throughout the country, have completely demoralized the
+provisioning of wheat in regions where they had none, the north
+and the army are found on the eve of famine.</p>
+
+<p>Industry is dying. Hundreds of factories and workshops are
+stopped. The short-sighted policy of the Commissaries has caused
+hundreds of workmen to be thrown on the streets and become
+unemployed. The will of the entire people is threatened with being
+violated. The usurpers who in October got hold of the power by
+launching the word of order for a swift convocation of the
+Constituent Assembly strive hard, now that the elections are over,
+to retain the power in their hands by arresting the deputies and
+dissolving the Constituante itself.</p>
+
+<p><i>All that which the country holds of life, and in the first place
+all the working class and all the army, ought to rise with arms in
+their hands to defend the popular power represented by the
+Constituante, which must bring peace to the people and consolidate
+by legislative means the revolutionary conquests of the working
+class.</i></p>
+
+<p>In bringing this to your knowledge, the Central Committee chosen
+at the first elections invites you, Comrades, to place yourself
+immediately in agreement with it.</p>
+
+<p>Considering the Congress of October as incompetent, the Central
+Committee chosen at the first elections has decided to begin a
+preparatory work in view of the convocation of a new Congress of
+the Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates.</p>
+
+<p>In the near future, while the Commissaires of the People, in the
+persons of Lenine and Trotzky, are going to fight against the
+sovereign power of the Constituent Assembly, we shall have to
+intervene with all our energy in the conflict artificially encited
+by the adventurers, between that Assembly and the Soviets.<a name="Page_375" id="Page_375"></a> <i>It
+will be our task to aid the Soviets in taking consciousness of
+their r&ocirc;le, in defining their political lines, and in determining
+their functions and those of the Constituante.</i></p>
+
+<p>Comrades! The convocation of the Congress for the 8th of January
+is dictated by the desire to provoke a conflict between the
+Soviets and the Constituante, and thus botch this last. Anxious
+for the fate of the country, the Executive Committee chosen at the
+first elections decides to convoke at Petrograd for the 8th of
+January an extraordinary assembly of <i>all the Soviets, all the
+Committees of the Army and the Navy, all the fractions of the
+Soviets and military committees, all the organizations that
+cluster around the Soviets and the Committees that are standing
+upon the ground of the defense of the Constituante.</i> The following
+are the Orders of the Day:</p></div>
+
+<p>
+<span style="margin-left: 2em;">1. The power of the Constituent Assembly.</span><br />
+<span style="margin-left: 2em;">2. The fight for the general democratic peace and the re-establishment</span><br />
+<span style="margin-left: 2em;">of the International.</span><br />
+<span style="margin-left: 2em;">3. The immediate problems of the policy of the Soviets.</span><br />
+</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>Comrades! Assure for this extraordinary assembly of Soviets the
+most complete representation of all the organizations of workmen
+and soldiers. Establish at once election centers. We have a fight
+to uphold.</p>
+
+<p>In the name of the Revolution, all the reason and all the energy
+ought to be thrown into the balance.</p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">The Central Executive Committee of Soviets of Workmen's and
+Soldiers' Delegates chosen at the first elections.</span></p>
+
+<p><i>25 December, 1917.</i></p></div>
+
+
+<h4>IX</h4>
+
+<h4><i>The Manifestation of January 5th at Petrograd</i></h4>
+
+
+<p>From eleven o'clock in the morning cort&egrave;ges, composed principally of
+working-men bearing red flags and placards with inscriptions such as
+"Proletarians of All Countries, Unite!" "Land and Liberty!" "Long Live the
+Constituent Assembly!" etc., set out from different parts of the city. The
+members of the Executive Committee <a name="Page_376" id="Page_376"></a>of the Soviet of Peasants' Delegates
+had agreed to meet at the Field, of Mars where a procession coming from the
+Petrogradsky quarter was due to arrive. It was soon learned that a part of
+the participants, coming from the Viborg quarter, had been assailed at the
+Liteiny bridge by gunfire from the Red Guards and were obliged to turn
+back. But that did not check the other parades. The peasant participants,
+united with the workers from Petrogradsky quarter, came to the Field of
+Mars; after having lowered their flags before the tombs of the Revolution
+of February and sung a funeral hymn to their memory, they installed
+themselves on Liteinaia Street. New manifestants came to join them and the
+street was crowded with people. At the corner of Fourstatskaia Street (one
+of the Streets leading to the Taurida Palace) they found themselves all at
+once assailed by shots from the Red Guards.</p>
+
+<p>The Red Guard fired <i>without warning</i>, something that never before
+happened, even in the time of Czarism. The police always began by inviting
+the participators to disperse. Among the first victims was a member of the
+Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasants' Delegates, the Siberian
+peasant, Logvinov. An explosive bullet shot away half of his head (a
+photograph of his body was taken; it was added to the documents which were
+transferred to the Commission of Inquiry). Several workmen and students and
+one militant of the Revolutionary Socialist party, Gorbatchevskaia, were
+killed at the same time. Other processions of participants on their way to
+the Taurida Palace were fired into at the same time. On all the streets
+leading to the palace, groups of Red Guards had been established; they
+received the order "Not to spare the cartridges." On that day at Petrograd
+there were one hundred killed and wounded.</p>
+
+<p>It must be noted that when, at a session of the Constituent Assembly, in
+the Taurida Palace, they learned of this shooting, M. Steinberg,
+Commissioner of Justice, declared in the corridor that it was a lie, that
+he himself <a name="Page_377" id="Page_377"></a>had visited the streets of Petrograd and had found everywhere
+that "all was quiet." Exactly as the Ministers of Nicholas Romanov after
+the suppressions said "Lie. Lie," so cried the Bolsheviki and the
+Revolutionary Socialists of the Left, in response to the question formally
+put on the subject of the shooting by a member of the Constituent Assembly.</p>
+
+<p>The following day the Bolshevik organs and those of the Revolutionary
+Socialists of the Left passed over these facts in silence. This silence
+they kept also on the 9th of January, the day on which literally all
+Petrograd assembled at the funeral of the victims. Public indignation,
+however, obliged them in the end to admit that there had been some small
+groups of participants and to name a Commission of Inquiry concerning the
+street disorders which had taken place on January 5th. This Commission was
+very dilatory in the performance of its duty and it is very doubtful if
+they ever came to any decision.</p>
+
+<p>Analogous manifestations took place at Moscow, at Saratov and other cities;
+everywhere they were accompanied by shootings. The number of victims was
+particularly considerable at Moscow.</p>
+
+
+<h4>X</h4>
+
+<h4><i>At the Taurida Palace on the Day of the Opening of the Constituent
+Assembly</i></h4>
+
+
+<p>The Taurida Palace on that day presented a strange aspect. At every door,
+in the corridors, in the halls, everywhere soldiers and sailors and Red
+Guards armed with guns and hand-grenades, who at every turn demanded your
+pass. It was no easy matter to get into the palace. Nearly all the places
+reserved for the public were occupied by the Bolsheviki and their friends.
+The appearance of the Taurida Palace was not that of a place <a name="Page_378" id="Page_378"></a>where the
+free representatives of a free people were going to assemble.</p>
+
+<p>The Bolsheviki delayed as much as possible the opening of the session. It
+was only at four o'clock instead of at midday that they deigned to make up
+their minds. They and the Revolutionary Socialists of the Left occupied
+seats of the extreme left; then came the Revolutionary Socialists, the
+Mensheviki, and the other Socialist fractions. The seats on the right
+remained vacant. The few Cadets that had been chosen preferred not to come.
+In this manner the Constituent Assembly was composed at this first and last
+session solely of Socialists. This, however, did not prevent the presence
+in the corridors and the session hail of a crowd of sailors and Red Guards
+armed, as if it were a question of an assembly of conspirators, enemies of
+the Revolution.</p>
+
+<p>From the beginning a fight was started by the election of president. The
+majority nominated for the office of president Chernov; the Bolsheviki and
+the Revolutionary Socialists of the Left voted against him. The Bolsheviki
+did not propose any candidate of their own, and placed before the members
+the candidacy of a Revolutionary Socialist of the Left, Marie Spiridonova,
+who was totally incapable of fulfilling this r&ocirc;le. Afterward several
+declarations were read&mdash;that of the Bolsheviki, that of the
+Socialist-Revolutionists (read by Chernov), that of the Mensheviki (read by
+Tseretelli). The partizans of each fraction greeted the reading of their
+own declaration with deafening applause (for the audience was one of
+"comrades" and did not hesitate to take part in the debates); cat-calls and
+shouts greeted the orators of the opposing fractions. Each word of the
+declarations of the Socialist-Revolutionists and of the Mensheviki
+(declarations which every Socialist could sign) was received with a round
+of hisses, shouts, deafening cries, exclamations of contempt for the
+Bolsheviki, the sailors, and the soldiers. The speech of Chernov&mdash;president
+and <a name="Page_379" id="Page_379"></a>member of a detested party&mdash;had above all the honor of such a
+greeting. As for Tseretelli, he was at first greeted by an inconceivable
+din, but was able afterward&mdash;his speech was so full of profound sense&mdash;to
+capture the attention of the Bolsheviki themselves.</p>
+
+<p>A general impression that was extremely distressing came from this historic
+session. The attitude of the Bolsheviki was grossly unbecoming and
+provocative of disdain. It indicated clearly that the dissolution of the
+Constituante was, for them, already decided. Lenine, who continually kept
+contemptuous silence, wound up by stretching himself upon his bench and
+pretending to sleep. Lunotcharsky from his ministerial bench pointed
+contemptuously with his finger toward the white hair of a veteran of the
+Revolutionary Socialist party. The sailors leveled the muzzles of their
+revolvers at the Socialist-Revolutionists. The audience laughed, whistled,
+and shouted.</p>
+
+<p>The Bolsheviki finally left the Assembly, followed, as might be understood,
+by their servants, the Revolutionary Socialists of the Left. The fractions
+which remained voted the law proposed by the Socialist-Revolutionists on
+the transfer of the lands to common ownership (socialization of the soil).
+The sailors and Red Guards attempted several times to interrupt the
+session. At five o'clock in the morning they finally demanded with a loud
+voice that everybody leave.</p>
+
+<p>"We were obliged to go," said, later, the members of the Constituent
+Assembly at a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasants'
+Delegates in recounting these tragic moments, "not that we were afraid of
+being shot; we were prepared for that, and each one of us expected it, but
+fear of something else which is far worse: for fear of insults and gross
+violence. We were only a handful; what was that beside those great big
+fellows full of malice toward the Constituante and of defiance for the
+'enemies of the people,' the 'servants of <a name="Page_380" id="Page_380"></a>the bourgeoisie,' which we were
+in their eyes, thanks to the lies and the calumnies of the Bolsheviki?
+Careful of our dignity, and out of respect for the place where we were, we
+could not permit ourselves to be cuffed, nor that they throw us out of the
+Taurida Palace by force&mdash;and that is what would have inevitably happened."</p>
+
+<p>It was thus that the Constituent Assembly ended. The
+Socialist-Revolutionist fraction maintained an attitude of surprising calm
+and respectful bearing, not allowing itself to be disturbed by any
+provocation. The correspondents of foreign newspapers congratulated the
+members and said to them that in this session to which the Bolsheviki had
+wished to give the character of "any-old-kind-of-a-meeting" all the
+fractions maintained a truly parliamentary attitude.</p>
+
+<p>The Bolshevik terror became rife. <i>All the newspapers that tried to open
+the eyes of the people as to what was happening were confiscated</i>. Every
+attempt to circulate the <i>Dielo Naroda</i> or other newspapers of the
+opposition was severely punished. The volunteer venders of these papers
+were arrested, cruelly struck down by rifle butts, and sometimes even shot.
+The population, indignant, gathered in groups on the streets, but the Red
+Guards dispersed all assemblages.</p>
+
+
+<h4>XI</h4>
+
+<h4><i>The Dissolution of the Third All-Russian Peasants' Congress</i></h4>
+
+
+<p>This is the course of the events which followed the dissolution of the
+Constituante. On the 8th of January the members of the Constituante
+assembled at Bolotnaia; two were arrested; the premises of the fraction
+were occupied by the Red Guards. On the 9th of January took place the
+funeral of the victims, in which all Petrograd took part. The Bolsheviki
+this time did not dare to shoot into the magnificent procession preceded by
+a long <a name="Page_381" id="Page_381"></a>line of coffins. The 10th of January they dispersed the Third
+All-Russian Congress of Peasants which had placed itself on the side of the
+Constituent Assembly. The Congress had been at first arranged for the 8th
+of January (the same day as the Bolshevik Congress of the Soviets), but,
+because of the events, it was postponed to the 10th. The peasants who had
+come to this Congress knew perfectly well that they would have a fight to
+uphold, perhaps even to give their lives. Their neighbors, their
+co-villagers, wept when they saw them set out, as if it were a question of
+men condemned to death. That alone suffices to show to what degree were
+conscious these peasants who had come from all corners of the country to
+prepare themselves for the defense of the Constituent Assembly.</p>
+
+<p>As soon as the Congress was opened sailors and Red Guards, armed with guns
+and hand-grenades, broke into the premises (11 Kirillovskaia Street),
+surrounded the house, poured into the corridors and the session hall, and
+ordered all persons to leave.</p>
+
+<p>"In whose name do you order us, who are Delegates to the Peasants' Congress
+of All-Russia, to disperse?" asked the peasants.</p>
+
+<p>"In the name of the Baltic fleet," the soldiers replied.</p>
+
+<p>The peasants refused; cries of protest were raised. One by one the peasant
+delegates ascended the tribune to stigmatize the Bolsheviki in speeches
+full of indignation, and to express the hopes that they placed in the
+Constituent Assembly.</p>
+
+<p>The sailors listened. They had come to disperse a counter-revolutionary
+Congress, and these speeches troubled them. One sailor, not able to stand
+it any longer, burst into tears.</p>
+
+<p>"Let me speak!" he shouted to the president. "I hear your speeches, peasant
+comrades, and I no longer understand anything.... What is going on? We are
+peasants, and you, too, are peasants. But we are of this side, and <a name="Page_382" id="Page_382"></a>you are
+of the other.... Why? Who has separated us? For we are brothers.... But it
+is as if a barrier had been placed between us." He wept and, seizing his
+revolver, he exclaimed, "No, I would rather kill myself!"</p>
+
+<p>This session of the Congress presented a strange spectacle, disturbed by
+men who confessed that they did not know why they were there; the peasants
+sang revolutionary songs; the sailors, armed with guns and grenades, joined
+them. Then the peasants knelt down to sing a funeral hymn to the memory of
+Logvinov, whose coffin was even yesterday within the room. The soldiers,
+lowering their guns, knelt down also.</p>
+
+<p>The Bolshevik authorities became excited; they did not expect such a turn
+to events. "Enough said," declared the chief; "we have come not to speak,
+but to act. If they do not want to go to Smolny, let them get out of here."
+And they set themselves to the task.</p>
+
+<p>In groups of five the peasants were conducted down-stairs, trampled on,
+and, on their refusal to go to Smolny, pushed out of doors during the night
+in the midst of the enormous city of which they knew nothing.</p>
+
+<p>Members of the Executive Committee were arrested, the premises occupied by
+sailors and Red Guards, the objects found therein stolen.</p>
+
+<p>The peasants found shelter in the homes of the inhabitants of Petrograd,
+who, indignant, offered them hospitality; a certain number were lodged in
+the barracks of the Preobrajenski Regiment. The sailors, who but a few
+minutes before had sung a funeral hymn to Logvinov, and wept when they saw
+that they understood nothing, now became the docile executors of the orders
+of the Bolsheviki. And when they were asked, "Why do you do this?" they
+answered as in the time, still recent, of Czarism: "It is the order. No
+need to talk."</p>
+
+<p>It was thus there was manifested the habit of servile obedience, of
+arbitrary power and violence, which had been taking root for several
+centuries; under a thin veneer <a name="Page_383" id="Page_383"></a>of revolution one finds the servile and
+violent man of yesterday.</p>
+
+<p>In the midst of these exceptional circumstances the peasants gave proof of
+that obstinacy and energy in the pursuit of their rights for which they are
+noted. Thrown out in the middle of the night, robbed, insulted, they
+decided, nevertheless, to continue their Congress. "How, otherwise, can we
+go home?" said they. "We must come to an understanding as to what is to be
+done."</p>
+
+<p>The members of the Executive Committee who were still free succeeded in
+finding new premises (let it be noted that among others the workmen of the
+big Oboukhovsky factory offered them hospitality), and during three days
+the peasants could assemble secretly by hiding themselves from the eyes of
+the Red Guard, and the spies in various quarters of Petrograd, until such
+time as the decisions were given on all great questions. <i>A proc&egrave;s-verbal
+was prepared concerning all that had taken place on Kirillovskaia Street. A
+declaration was made protesting against the acts of the Bolshevik
+government</i>. This declaration was to be read at the Taurida Palace when the
+Soviets were in congress by delegates designated for that purpose. The
+Bolsheviki, however, would not permit the delegates to enter the Taurida
+Palace.</p>
+
+<p>Here are the texts of the declaration and of the proc&egrave;s-verbal:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>At the Third National Congress of Soviets of Peasants' Delegates
+grouped around the principle of the defense of the Constituent
+Assembly, this declaration was sent to the Congress of Workmen's,
+Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates called together by the
+Bolshevist government at the Taurida Palace:</p>
+
+<p>At the Second National Peasants' Congress the 359 delegates who
+had come together for the defense of the Constituent Assembly
+continued the work of the Congress and elected a provisional
+Executive Committee, independently of the 354 delegates who had
+opposed the power of the Constituent Assembly and adhered to the
+Bolsheviki.</p><p><a name="Page_384" id="Page_384"></a></p>
+
+<p>We, peasant delegates, having come to Petrograd, more than 300 in
+number, to participate in a Congress called by the Provisional
+Executive Committee, which is that of those of the Soviets which
+acknowledge the principle of the defense of the Constituent
+Assembly, declare to our electors, to the millions of the peasant
+population, and to the whole country, that the actual government
+which is called "The Government of the Peasants and Workmen" has
+established in their integrity the violence, the arbitrariness,
+and all the horrors of the autocratic r&eacute;gime which was overthrown
+by the great Revolution of February. All the liberties attained by
+that Revolution and won by innumerable sacrifices during several
+generations are scouted and trodden under foot. Liberty of opinion
+does not exist; men who under the government of the Czar had paid
+by years of prison and exile for their devotedness to the
+revolutionary cause are now again thrown into the dungeons of
+fortresses without any accusation whatever, of anything of which
+they might be guilty, being made to them. Again spies and
+informers are in action. Again capital punishment is
+re-established in its most horrible forms; shooting on the streets
+and assassinations without judgment or examination. <i>Peaceful
+processions, on their way to salute the Constituent Assembly, are
+greeted by a fusillade of shots upon the orders of the autocrats
+of Smolny. The liberty of the press does not exist; the papers
+which displease the Bolsheviki are suppressed, their printing
+plants and offices looted, their editors arrested.</i></p>
+
+<p>The organizations which, during the preceding months, were
+established with great difficulty&mdash;zemstvos, municipalities,
+agricultural and food committees&mdash;are foolishly destroyed in an
+excess of savage fanaticism.</p>
+
+<p>The Bolsheviki even try to kill the supreme representation, the
+only one legitimately established, of the popular will&mdash;the
+Constituent Assembly.</p>
+
+<p>To justify this violence and this tyranny they try to allege the
+well-being of the people, but we, peasant workers, we see well
+that their policy will only tighten the cord around the workers'
+necks, while the possibility of a democratic peace becomes more
+remote every day; matters have come to the point where the
+Bolsheviki proclaim a further mobilization&mdash;of salaried
+volunteers, it is true&mdash;to renew the hostilities. They strive to
+represent the war with Ukraine and with the Cossacks <a name="Page_385" id="Page_385"></a>under the
+aspect of a war of classes; it is not, however, the bourgeoisie,
+but the representatives of the working classes who are killed on
+one side and on the other. They promised the Socialist r&eacute;gime, and
+they have only destroyed the production of the factories so as to
+leave the population without product and throw the workers into an
+army of unemployed; the horrible specter of famine occupies the
+void left by the broken organizations of food-supply; millions of
+the money of the people are squandered in maintaining a Red
+Guard&mdash;or sent to Germany to keep up the agitation there, while
+the wives and the widows of our soldiers no longer receive an
+allowance, there being no money in the Treasury, and are obliged
+to live on charity.</p>
+
+<p>The Russian country is threatened with ruin. Death knocks at the
+doors of the hovels of the workmen.</p>
+
+<p>By what forces have the Bolsheviki thus killed our country? Twelve
+days before the organization of the autonomous administration was
+achieved and the elections to the Constituent Assembly begun, at
+the time when there had been organized all the autonomous
+administrations of volosts, districts, governments, and cities,
+chosen by equal, direct, and secret universal suffrage, thus
+assuring the realization of the will of the people and justifying
+the confidence of the population&mdash;even then they seized the power
+and established a r&eacute;gime which subjects all the institutions of
+the country to the unlicensed power of the Commissaries of the
+People. <i>And these Commissaries rely upon the Soviets, which were
+chosen at elections that were carried out according to rank, with
+open balloting and inequality of vote, for therein the peasants
+count only as many representatives as the workmen of the cities,
+although in Russia their number is sixty times greater</i>.</p>
+
+<p>Absence of control permits every abuse of power; absence of secret
+voting permits that into these Soviets at these suspicious
+elections some enter who are attracted by the political r&ocirc;le of
+these institutions; the defeat of inequality in the suffrage
+restrains the expression of the will of the peasants, and,
+accordingly, these cannot have confidence in this system of
+government. The tyranny that presided at these elections was such
+that the Bolsheviki themselves pay no attention to the results,
+and declare that the Soviets that are opposed to themselves are
+bourgeoisie and capitalists. We, representing the peasant workers,
+must declare in the name of our constituents: if anything can save
+Russia, it can only be the re-establishment of <a name="Page_386" id="Page_386"></a>the organs of
+local autonomous administration, chosen by equal, direct, and
+secret universal suffrage and the resumption, without delay, of
+the work of the Constituent Assembly.</p>
+
+<p>The Constituent Assembly alone can express the exact will of the
+working-people, for the system of election which governs it
+includes every measure of precaution against violence, corruption,
+and other abuses, and assures the election of deputies chosen by
+the majority; now, in the country, the majority is composed of the
+working class.</p>
+
+<p>Millions of peasants delegated us to defend the Constituante, but
+this was dissolved as soon as it began to work for the good of the
+people. The work of the Constituante was interrupted at the time
+that it was discussing the law concerning land, when a new
+agricultural r&eacute;gime was being elaborated for the country. For this
+reason, and for this alone, the Constituante adopted only the
+first articles of this law, articles which established the
+definite transfer of all the land to the hands of the workers,
+without any ransom. The other articles of this law, which
+concerned the order of the apportionment of lots, its forms, its
+methods of possession, etc., could not be adopted, although they
+were completely elaborated in the commission and nothing remained
+but to sanction them.</p>
+
+<p>We, peasants assembled in Congress, we, too, have been the object
+of violence and outrages, unheard of even under the Czarist
+r&eacute;gime. Red Guards and sailors, armed, invaded our premises. We
+were searched in the rudest manner. Our goods and the provisions
+which we had brought from home were stolen. Several of our
+comrade-delegates and all the members of the Committee were
+arrested and taken to Peter and Paul Fortress. We ourselves were,
+late at night, put out of doors in a city which we did not know,
+deprived of shelter under which to sleep. All that, to oblige us
+either to go to Smolny, where the Bolshevist government called
+another Congress, or to return to our homes without having
+attained any result. But violence could not stop us; secretly, as
+in the time of Czarist autocracy, we found a place to assemble and
+to continue our work.</p>
+
+<p>In making known these facts to the country and the numerous
+millions of the peasant population, we call upon them to
+stigmatize the revolting policy practised by the Bolshevik
+government with regard to all those who are not in accord with it.
+Returned to our villages, dispersed in every corner of immense<a name="Page_387" id="Page_387"></a>
+Russia, we shall use all our powers to make known to the mass of
+peasants and to the entire country the truth concerning this
+government of violence; to make known in every corner of the
+fatherland that the actual government, which has the hardihood to
+call itself "Government of the Workmen and Peasants," in reality
+shoots down workmen and peasants and shamelessly scoffs at the
+country. We shall use all our strength to induce the population of
+peasant workers to demand an account from this government of
+violence, as well as from their prodigal children, their sons and
+brothers, who in the army and navy give aid to these autocrats in
+the commission of violence.</p>
+
+<p>In the name of millions of peasants, by whom we were delegated, we
+demand that they no longer obstruct the work of the Constituent
+Assembly. We were not allowed to finish the work for which we had
+come; at home we shall continue this work. We shall employ all our
+strength to effect, as soon as possible, the convocation of a new
+National Congress of Peasants' Delegates united on the principle
+of the defense of the Constituante, and that in a place where we
+need not fear a new dissolution. Lately we fought against
+autocracy and Czarist violence; we shall fight with no less energy
+against the new autocrats who practise violence, whoever they may
+be, and whatever may be the shibboleths by which they cover their
+criminal acts. We shall fight for the Constituent Assembly,
+because it is in that alone that we see the salvation of our
+country, that of the Revolution, and that of Land and Liberty.</p>
+
+<p>Charged by our constituents to defend the Constituent Assembly, we
+cannot participate in a Congress called by those who have
+dissolved it; who have profaned the idea which to the people is
+something sacred; who have shot down the defenders of true
+democracy; who have shed the sacred blood of our Logvinov, member
+of the Executive Committee of peasant deputies, who on the 5th of
+January was killed by an explosive bullet during a peaceful
+manifestation, bearing the flag "Land and Liberty."
+Comrade-peasants who have come by chance to this Congress declare
+to these violators that the only Executive Committee that upholds
+the idea of the defense of the Constituante forms a center around
+which are grouped all the peasant workers. We call the entire mass
+of peasants to the work that is common to all&mdash;the fight for "Land
+and Liberty," for the true government of the people. "We all come
+from the <a name="Page_388" id="Page_388"></a>people, children of the same family of workers," and we
+all have to follow a route that leads to happiness and liberty.
+Now this road, which leads to "Land and Liberty," goes through the
+Constituent Assembly alone. The Constituent Assembly was
+dissolved, but it was chosen by the entire people, and it ought to
+live.</p></div>
+
+<p>
+<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>Long live the Constituent Assembly!</i></span><br />
+<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>Down with violence and tyranny!</i></span><br />
+<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>All power to the people, through the agency of the</i></span><br />
+<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>Constituent Assembly!</i></span><br />
+</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>[Signed] The Third National Congress of Soviets of Peasant
+Delegates, United on the Principle of the Defense of the
+Constituent Assembly.</p></div>
+
+
+<h4><span class="smcap">Proc&egrave;s-verbal of the Session of the III National Congress of Soviets Of
+Peasants' Delegates, United on the Principle of the Defense of the
+Constituent Assembly</span></h4>
+
+<p>The Provisional Executive Committee of Soviets of Peasants' Delegates
+nominated by the fraction of the Second National Congress of these Soviets,
+which, to the number of 359 delegates, was organized on the basis of the
+principle of the defense of the Constituent Assembly, had addressed to all
+the Soviets an appeal inviting those who believe in the defense of the
+Constituante to send representatives to the Third Congress, fixed by the
+Committee for the 8th of January, and destined to offset the Congress
+called for the 12th of January by the Committee of that fraction of the
+Congress which, to the number of 314 votes, took sides against the power of
+the Constituent Assembly and joined the Bolsheviki.</p>
+
+<p>The Peasants' Congress, meeting by districts and by governments, as well as
+the local executive committees of Soviets which have chosen us, knew well
+to which Congress they delegated us and had given us precise mandates,
+expressing their confidence in the Constituent Assembly and their blame of
+the Soviets and the Bolshevik organs that impede the work of the
+Constituante and call the peasants to the Congress of January 12th. These
+congresses and these committees have charged us to use all our efforts to
+defend the Constituent Assembly, binding themselves, on their part, in case
+our efforts were insufficient, to rise in a body for its defense.</p><p><a name="Page_389" id="Page_389"></a></p>
+
+<p>By reason of the disorganization of postal and telegraphic communications,
+and because in different localities the calls of the Committee were held up
+by the Bolshevist organizations, the instructions concerning the Congress
+fixed for the 8th of January were not received in many provinces until
+after considerable delay.</p>
+
+<p>Some minutes before the opening of the Conference, which was to take place
+on the premises of the Committee (11 Kirillovskaia Street), where the
+delegates on hand had lodged, there arrived a detachment of sailors and Red
+Guards armed with guns and bombs, who surrounded the house, guarding all
+the entrances, and occupied all the apartments. The Executive Committee,
+performing its duty toward the peasant workers, which duty was to hold
+their flag with a firm hand, not fearing any violence, and not allowing
+themselves to be intimidated by the bayonets and the bombs of the enemies
+of the peasant workers, opened the session at the hour indicated.</p>
+
+<p>The Bolshevist pretorians, however, violating the freedom of assembly,
+broke into the hall and surrounded the office and members of the Conference
+with bayonets drawn. Their leader, Kornilov, staff-commandant of the Red
+Guards of the Rojdestvensky quarter, made a speech to the delegates, in
+which he said that they were to go to the Smolny Institute, to the
+Bolshevist Congress, assuring them that they had come to this Congress by
+mistake; at the end he read a document ordering him to make a search of the
+premises, to confiscate all papers, and to arrest all who would offer
+resistance. In reply to this speech the delegates and the members of the
+Executive Committee spoke in turn; they stigmatized vehemently the criminal
+policy of the Bolshevist government, which dissolved the Constituent
+Assembly, the true representation of the popular will, without having given
+it the time to register a vote on the agricultural law; which shot down
+workers participating in peaceful negotiations; which deprived the people
+of the right of assembly to discuss their needs; which destroyed freedom of
+speech and assembly and trampled in the dust the whole Russian Revolution.
+The delegates, one after another, tried to explain to the Red Guards that
+it was not the delegates that were deceived in coming to this conference,
+but those who were going to Smolny to the Bolshevist Congress, those who,
+by order of the Bolsheviki, kill the peasants' representatives and dissolve
+their Congress.</p><p><a name="Page_390" id="Page_390"></a></p>
+
+<p>In the midst of these speeches Kornilov declared the Congress dissolved; to
+this Comrade Ovtchinnikov, president of the Conference, replied that the
+Congress would not be dissolved except by force, and, besides, that the
+document read by Kornilov did not authorize him to pronounce its
+dissolution. Members of the Congress having entered into arguments with the
+sailors and the Red Guards, concerning the violence inflicted on the
+peasant delegates, the sound of the rattling of guns was heard and the
+leader of the pretorians declared that if the Congress would not submit to
+his orders he would stop at nothing. All the members of the Congress were
+forthwith searched and thrown out of doors in groups of five, with the idea
+that, having come from the provinces, and not knowing Petrograd, they would
+find themselves dispersed in such a way as not to be able to assemble again
+anywhere, and would be obliged either to betake themselves to the railway
+and return home or to direct their steps toward Smolny, the address of
+which was given to each one at the exit. At the same time, without reason,
+the following were arrested: Minor, a deputy to the Constituent Assembly;
+Rakitnikov, Ovtchinnikov, Roussine, Sorokine, and Tchernobaiev, members of
+the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasant Delegates; and Chmelev, a
+soldier. The premises of the Committee, on which were various documents and
+papers which were to be sent into the country, were occupied by Red Guards,
+and machine-guns were placed at the entrance. The search ended about nine
+o'clock in the evening. Some late delegates alone were authorized to spend
+the night on the premises under the supervision of Red Guards.</p>
+
+<p>An inquiry held among the comrades, who had come for this Third National
+Peasants' Congress, established that, at the time when the premises of the
+Executive Committee were seized, January 10, 1918, there were, among the
+sailors and Red Guards of the detachment that did the work, <i>German and
+Austrian prisoners dressed in Russian uniforms</i>; it also established the
+fact that many objects had disappeared in the course of the search. The
+Congress decided: first, to consider as a law the socialization of the soil
+voted by the Constituent Assembly and to apply the same in the country;
+second, to consider that the Constituent Assembly, dispersed by brutal
+force, was nevertheless elected by the whole people and ought to exist and
+to assemble again as soon as that would be possible; third, to <a name="Page_391" id="Page_391"></a>fight
+everywhere in the provinces in the defense of the organs of autonomous
+administration, which the Bolsheviki dispersed by armed force. During these
+few days when the peasants were obliged to assemble in secret and to
+station patrols to protect their meetings, they followed those methods of
+conspiracy that the Russian Socialists had been obliged to employ when they
+fought against the tyranny of autocracy. Returning to their villages, the
+peasants bore with them the greatest hate for the Bolsheviki, whom they
+considered the personification of tyranny and violence. And they took with
+them also a firm resolution to fight against this violence.</p>
+
+<p>The Executive Committee, whose powers were confirmed by the Third Congress,
+found itself thus, for the second time, deprived of all its goods, its
+premises, and its pecuniary resources; it found itself obliged to lead a
+half-clandestine existence, to organize secret assemblies, etc. Miss
+Spiridonova, who, in this fight against the peasants that rose to the
+defense of the Constituent Assembly, gave proof of intolerance and peculiar
+fanaticism, found herself at the head of the "peasants in uniform," sitting
+at Smolny, <i>adopting a decree whereby all the moneys that came by post to
+the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasant Delegates defending the
+Constituent Assembly were to be confiscated.</i></p>
+
+<p>The action of the Executive Committee was thus rendered very difficult. But
+it continued to fight, to publish an organ, to commission delegates, to
+entertain continued relations with the provinces and the country.</p>
+
+
+<h4>XII</h4>
+
+<h4><i>Conclusion</i></h4>
+
+
+<p><i>Morally, Bolshevism was killed in the eyes of the workers in the course of
+these days</i> when a peaceful demonstration was fired upon, the Constituent
+Assembly dissolved, the Peasant Congress (and, very soon, the Congress of
+the Agricultural Committees) dispersed. The Central Committee of the
+Revolutionary Socialist party issued an order for new elections to the
+Soviets, thinking thus to eliminate automatically the Bolsheviki. And, in
+truth, when at Petrograd and in the provinces, these elections <a name="Page_392" id="Page_392"></a>began, the
+Revolutionary Socialists and the Mensheviki received the majority and the
+Bolsheviki were snowed under. But these new elections were thwarted by many
+circumstances: first, because of the lessening of production the workmen
+were discharged in a body and quit the factories; second, the Bolsheviki
+put obstacles in the way of the elections and sometimes openly prohibited
+them. Nevertheless, wherever they could be held, the results were
+unfavorable to the Bolsheviki.</p>
+
+<p>Finally, when the working classes clearly saw the shameful r&ocirc;le played by
+the Bolsheviki in the matter of peace, when they saw the Bolsheviki humbly
+beg for peace at any price from the Germans, they understood that it was
+impossible to continue to tolerate such a government. <i>The Central
+Committee of the Revolutionary Socialist party published a Manifesto
+appealing to an armed fight against the Bolshevik government and the German
+gangs</i> that were overrunning the country.</p>
+
+<p>The frightful results of this "peace," so extolled by the Bolsheviki,
+rendered even the name of the Bolshevist government odious in the eyes of
+every conscientious and honest man.</p>
+
+<hr style='width: 45%;' />
+
+<p>But Bolshevism still endures, for it is based on the armed force of the Red
+Guard, on the supineness of the masses deprived of a political education,
+and not accustomed to fight or to act, and from ancient habit of submitting
+to force.</p>
+
+<p>The causes which produced Bolshevism are: first, the accumulation of all
+the conditions of the historic past of the Russian people; second, their
+psychic character and their habits; third, the conditions of the present
+time; and fourth, the general situation of the world&mdash;that is to say, the
+war.</p>
+
+<p>We also note the vague and hesitating policy of the Provisional Government;
+the lack of political education among the people, ready to follow him who
+promises the most; small development of civic sentiment; the want of any
+attachment whatever to the state&mdash;that of the Romanov having never given
+anything to the people and having taken all from them. Czarism took from
+the miserable peasant his last penny under form of taxes; it took his
+children from him for war; for the least act of disobedience to authority
+he was whipped. He wallowed in misery and in ignorance, deprived of every
+right, human or legal. How could he, this wretched and oppressed peasant
+develop civic sentiments, <a name="Page_393" id="Page_393"></a>a consciousness of his personal dignity? On the
+other hand, we must take into account the immense weariness caused by the
+war and by the disorganization which it brought into the whole cycle of
+existence (to an incomparably greater degree than in western Europe). Such
+were the causes which had established a favorable scope for Bolshevik
+propaganda; to introduce their domination they knew how to make use of the
+shortcomings of the people and the defects of Russian life.</p>
+
+<p>In fine, what is Bolshevism in its essence? <i>It is an experiment, that is
+either criminal or that proceeds from a terrible thoughtlessness, tried,
+without their consent, on the living body of the Russian people</i>. Thus some
+attempt to apply their theories, others wish to measure the height of their
+personal influence, while still others (and they are found in every
+movement) seek to profit by the circumstances.</p>
+
+<p>Bolshevism is a phenomenon brought about by force; it is not a natural
+consequence of the progress of the Russian Revolution. Taken all in all,
+Bolshevism is not Socialism. The Bolshevist <i>coup d'&eacute;tat</i> was accomplished
+contrary to the wish of the majority of the people, who were preparing for
+the Constituent Assembly.</p>
+
+<p><i>It was accomplished with the help of armed force, and it is because of
+this that the Bolshevist r&eacute;gime holds out.</i></p>
+
+<p><i>It has against it the whole conscious portion of the peasant and working
+population and all the Intellectuals.</i></p>
+
+<p><i>It has crushed and trampled under foot the liberty that was won by the
+Russian people.</i></p>
+
+<p>The Bolsheviki pretend to act in the name of the people. Why, then, have
+they dissolved the Constituent Assembly elected by the people?</p>
+
+<p>They pretend to have the majority of the people with them. Why, then, this
+governmental terror that is being used in a manner more cruel even than in
+the time of Czarism?</p>
+
+<p>They say that, to fight against the bourgeoisie, the use of violence is
+necessary. But their principal thrusts are directed not against the
+bourgeoisie, but against the Socialist parties that do not agree with them.
+And they dare give this caricature the name of Dictatorship of the
+Proletariat!</p>
+
+<p>Socialism must necessarily be founded on democratic principles. If not, "it
+cuts off the branch of the tree on which it rests," according to the
+expression of Kautsky.</p><p><a name="Page_394" id="Page_394"></a></p>
+
+<p>Socialism needs constructive elements. It does not limit itself to the
+destruction of ancient forms of existence; it creates new ones. But
+Bolshevism has only destructive elements. It does nothing but destroy,
+always destroy, with a blind hatred, a savage fanaticism.</p>
+
+<p>What has it established? Its "decrees" are only verbal solutions without
+sense, skeletons of ideas, or simply a revolutionary phraseology containing
+nothing real (as for example the famous shibboleth, "neither peace nor
+war").</p>
+
+<p>During the few months of its reign Bolshevism has succeeded in destroying
+many things; nearly everything that the effort of the Russian people had
+established. Life, disorganized almost to its foundations, has become
+almost impossible in Russia. The railroads do not function, or function
+only with great difficulty; the postal and telegraphic communications are
+interrupted in several places. The zemstvos&mdash;bases of the life of the
+country&mdash;are suppressed (they are "bourgeois" institutions); the schools
+and hospitals, whose existence is impossible without the zemstvos, are
+closed. The most complete chaos exists in the food-supply. The
+Intellectuals, who, in Russia, had suffered so much from the Czarist
+tyranny and oppression, are declared "enemies of the people" and compelled
+to lead a clandestine existence; they are dying of hunger. It is the
+Intellectuals and not the bourgeois (who are hiding) that suffer most from
+the Bolshevist r&eacute;gime.</p>
+
+<p>The Soviets alone remain. But the Soviets are not only revolutionary
+organs, they are "guardians of the Revolution," but in no way legislative
+and administrative organs.</p>
+
+<p>Bolshevism is an experiment tried on the Russian people. The people are
+going to pay dearly for it. At least let not this experiment be lost, on
+them, as well as on other peoples! Let the Socialists of western Europe be
+not unduly elated by words or by far-fetched judgments. Let them look the
+cruel reality in the face and examine facts to find out the truth.</p>
+
+<p>A tyranny which is supported by bayonets is always repugnant, wherever it
+comes from, and under whatever name it may strut. It can have nothing in
+common with Socialism, which is not only a doctrine of economic necessity,
+but also a doctrine of superior justice and truth.</p>
+
+<p>"All the societies or individuals adhering to the Internationale will know
+what must be the basis of their conduct toward all <a name="Page_395" id="Page_395"></a>men: Truth, Justice,
+Morality, without Distinction of Color, Creed, or Nationality," said the
+statutes that were drawn up by the prime founders of our Internationale.</p>
+
+<p><i>The Executive Committee of the National Soviet of Peasant Delegates
+Placing themselves on the Grounds of the Defense of the Constituent
+Assembly, having had to examine, in its session of February 8, 1918, the
+violence committed by the Bolsheviki, and to pass in review the
+persecutions that this organization had to suffer from that party and from
+the government of the Commissaries of the People, decided to bring the
+violence committed by the Bolsheviki in the name of Socialism to the
+knowledge of the Socialists of western Europe and of the International
+Socialist Bureau through the citizen, E. Roubanovitch, representative of
+the Revolutionary Socialist party at the International Socialist Bureau and
+intrusted with International relations by the Executive Committee of the
+First Soviet of Peasants.</i></p>
+
+<p><i>The Executive Committee demands the expulsion, from the Socialist family,
+of the Bolshevist leaders, as well as of those of the Revolutionary
+Socialists of the Left, who seized the power by force, held it by violence
+and compromised Socialism in the eyes of the popular masses.</i></p>
+
+<p><i>Let our brothers of western Europe be judges between the Socialist peasants
+who rose in the defense of the Constituent Assembly and the Bolsheviki, who
+dispersed them by armed force, thus trampling under foot the will of the
+Russian people.</i></p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">Inna Rakitnikov</span>,</p>
+
+<p><i>Vice-President of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasant
+Delegates, who stand in Defense of the Constituent Assembly.</i></p>
+
+<p><i>May 30, 1918.</i></p>
+
+
+
+<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p><a name="Page_396" id="Page_396"></a></p>
+<h2><a name="APPENDIX_III" id="APPENDIX_III"></a>APPENDIX III</h2>
+
+<h3>FORMER SOCIALIST PREMIER OF FINLAND ON BOLSHEVISM</h3>
+
+
+<p>The following letter was addressed to Mr. Santeri Nuorteva, who, it will be
+remembered, was appointed Minister to America by the Revolutionary
+Government of Finland. The author of the letter, Oskar Tokoi, was the first
+Socialist Prime Minister in the world. He is a Socialist of long standing,
+who has always been identified with the radical section of the movement.
+Mr. Nuorteva, it should be added, is himself a strong supporter of the
+Bolsheviki, and is their accredited American representative.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p><span class="smcap">Archangel</span>, <i>September 10, 1918.</i></p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">Santeri Nuorteva</span>,</p>
+
+<p><i>Fitchburg, Mass.</i>:</p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">Dear Comrade</span>,&mdash;I deem it my duty to appeal to you and to
+other comrades in America in order to be able to make clear to you
+the trend of events here.</p>
+
+<p>The situation here has become particularly critical. We, the
+Finnish refugees, who, after the unfortunate revolution, had to
+flee from Finland to Russia, find ourselves to-day in a very
+tragic situation. A part of the former Red Guardists who fled here
+have joined the Red Army formed by the Russian Soviet Government;
+another part has formed itself as a special Finnish legion, allied
+with the army of the Allied countries; and a third part, which has
+gone as far as to Siberia, is prowling about there, diffused over
+many sections of the country, and there have been reports that a
+part of those Finns have joined the ranks of the Czecho-Slovaks.
+The Finnish masses, thus divided, <a name="Page_397" id="Page_397"></a>may therefore at any time get
+into fighting each other, which indeed would be the greatest of
+all misfortunes. It is therefore necessary to take a clear
+position, and to induce all the Finns to support it, and we hope
+that you as well, over in America, will support it as much as is
+in your power.</p>
+
+<p>During these my wanderings I have happened to traverse Russia from
+one end to another, and I have become deeply convinced that Russia
+is not able to rise from this state of chaos and confusion by her
+own strength and of her own accord. The magnificent economic
+revolution, which the Bolsheviki in Russia are trying now to bring
+about, is doomed in Russia to complete failure. The economic
+conditions in Russia have not even approximately reached a stage
+to make an economic revolution possible, and the low grade of
+education, as well as the unsteady character of the Russian
+people, makes it still more impossible.</p>
+
+<p>It is true that magnificent theories and plans have been laid
+here, but their putting into practice is altogether impossible,
+principally because of the following reasons: The whole propertied
+class&mdash;which here in Russia, where small property ownership mainly
+prevails, is very numerous&mdash;is opposing and obstructing;
+technically trained people and specialists necessary in the
+industries are obstructing; local committees and sub-organs make
+all systematic action impossible, as they in their respective
+fields determine things quite autocratically and make everything
+unsuccessful which should be based on a strong, coherent, and in
+every respect minutely conceived system as a social production
+should be based. But even if all these, in themselves
+unsurmountable obstacles, could be made away with, there remains
+still the worst one&mdash;and that is the workers themselves.</p>
+
+<p>It is already clear that in the face of such economic conditions
+the whole social order has been upset. Naturally only a small part
+of the people will remain backing such an order. The whole
+propertied class belongs to the opponents of the government,
+including the petty bourgeoisie, the craftsmen, the small
+merchants, the profiteers. The whole Intellectual class and a
+great part of the workers are also opposing the government. In
+comparison with the entire population only a small minority
+supports the government, and, what is worse to the supporters of
+the government, are rallying all the hooligans, robbers, and
+<a name="Page_398" id="Page_398"></a>others to whom this period of confusion promises a good chance of
+individual action. It is also clear that such a r&eacute;gime cannot stay
+but with the help of a stern terror. But, on the other hand, the
+longer the terror continues the more disagreeable and hated it
+becomes. Even a great part of those who from the beginning could
+stay with the government and who still are sincere Social
+Democrats, having seen all this chaos, begin to step aside, or to
+ally themselves with those openly opposing the government.
+Naturally, as time goes by, there remains only the worst and the
+most demoralized element. Terror, arbitrary rule, and open
+brigandage become more and more usual, and the government is not
+able at all to prevent it. And the outcome is clearly to be
+foreseen&mdash;the unavoidable failure of all this magnificently
+planned system.</p>
+
+<p>And what will be the outcome of that? My conviction is that as
+soon as possible we should turn toward the other road&mdash;the road of
+united action. I have seen, and I am convinced that the majority
+of the Russian people is fundamentally democratic and
+whole-heartedly detests a reinstitution of autocracy, and that
+therefore all such elements must, without delay, be made to unite.
+But it is also clear that at first they, even united, will not be
+able to bring about order in this country on their own accord. I
+do not believe that at this time there is in Russia any social
+force which would be able to organize the conditions in the
+country. For that reason, to my mind, we should, to begin with,
+frankly and honestly rely on the help of the Allied Powers. Help
+from Germany cannot be considered, as Germany, because of her own
+interests, is compelled to support the Bolshevik rule as long as
+possible, as Germany from the Bolshevik rule is pressing more and
+more political and economic advantages, to such an extent even
+that all of Russia is becoming practically a colony of Germany.
+Russia thus would serve to compensate Germany for the colonies
+lost in South Africa.</p>
+
+<p>A question presents itself at once whether the Allied Powers are
+better. And it must be answered instantly that neither would they
+establish in Russia any Socialist society. Yet the democratic
+traditions of these countries are some surety that the social
+order established by them will be a democratic one. It is clear as
+day that the policy of the Allied Powers is also imperialistic,
+but the geographical and economic position of <a name="Page_399" id="Page_399"></a>these countries is
+such that even their own interests demand that Russia should be
+able to develop somewhat freely. The problem has finally evolved
+into such a state of affairs where Russia must rely on the help
+either of the Allies or Germany; we must choose, as the saying
+goes, "between two evils," and, things being as badly mixed as
+they are, the lesser evil must be chosen frankly and openly. It
+does not seem possible to get anywhere by dodging the issue.
+Russia perhaps would have saved herself some time ago from this
+unfortunate situation if she had understood immediately after the
+February Revolution the necessity of a union between the more
+democratic elements. Bolshevism undoubtedly has brought Russia a
+big step toward her misfortune, from which she cannot extricate
+herself on her own accord.</p>
+
+<p>Thus there exists no more any purely Socialist army, and all the
+fighting forces and all those who have taken to arms are fighting
+for the interests of the one or the other group of the Great
+Powers. The question therefore finally is only this&mdash;in the
+interests of which group one wants to fight. The revolutionary
+struggles in Russia and in Finland, to my mind, have clearly
+established that a Socialist society cannot be brought about by
+the force of arms and cannot be supported by the force of arms,
+but that a Socialist order must be founded on a conscious and
+living will by an overwhelming majority of the nations, which is
+able to realize its will without the help of arms.</p>
+
+<p>But now that the nations of the world have actually been thrown
+into an armed conflict, and the war, which in itself is the
+greatest crime of the world, still is raging, we must stand it. We
+must, however, destroy the originator and the cause of the war,
+the militarism, by its own arms, and on its ruins we must build,
+in harmony and in peace&mdash;not by force, as the Russian Bolsheviki
+want&mdash;a new and a better social order under the guardianship of
+which the people may develop peacefully and securely.</p>
+
+<p>I have been explaining to you my ideas, expecting that you will
+publish them. You over in America are not able to imagine how
+horrible the life in Russia at the present time is. The period
+after the French Revolution surely must have been as a life in a
+paradise compared with this. Hunger, brigandage, <a name="Page_400" id="Page_400"></a>arrests, and
+murders are such every-day events that nobody pays any attention
+to them. Freedom of assemblage, association, free speech, and free
+press is a far-away ideal which is altogether destroyed at the
+present time. Arbitrary rule and terror are raging everywhere,
+and, what is worst of all, not only the terror proclaimed by the
+government, but individual terror as well.</p>
+
+<p>My greetings to all friends and comrades.</p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">Oskar Tokoi.</span></p></div>
+
+<p>THE END</p>
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Plechanov never formally joined the Menshevik faction, I
+believe, but his writings showed that he favored that faction and the
+Mensheviki acknowledged his intellectual leadership.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> They had gained one member since the election.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Quoted by Litvinov, <i>The Bolshevik Revolution: Its Rise and
+Meaning</i>, p. 22. Litvinov, it must be remembered, was the Bolshevik
+Minister to Great Britain. His authority to speak for the Bolsheviki is not
+to be questioned.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> The date is Russian style&mdash;March 12th, our style.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>The State in Russia&mdash;Old and New</i>, by Leon Trotzky; <i>The
+Class Struggle</i>, Vol. II, No. 2, pp. 213-221.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_6_6" id="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> This document is printed in full at the end of the volume as
+Appendix. I</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_7_7" id="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> The author of the present study is responsible for the use of
+italics in this document.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_8_8" id="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> Litvinov, <i>The Bolshevik Revolution: Its Rise and Meaning</i>, p.
+30.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_9_9" id="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> Lenine is not quite accurate in his statement of Marx's views
+nor quite fair in stating the position of the "opportunists." The argument
+of Marx in <i>The Civil War in France</i> is not that the proletariat must
+"break down" the governmental machinery, but that it must <i>modify</i> it and
+<i>adapt</i> it to the class needs. This is something quite different, of
+course. Moreover, it is the basis of the policy of the "opportunists." The
+Mensheviki and other moderate Socialists in Russia were trying to <i>modify</i>
+and <i>adapt</i> the political state.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_10_10" id="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> The reference is to Karl Kautsky, the great German exponent
+of Marxian theory.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_11_11" id="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_11"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> <i>The New International</i> (American Bolshevik organ), June 30,
+1917.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_12_12" id="Footnote_12_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_12"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> <i>The New International</i>, July 23, 1917.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_13_13" id="Footnote_13_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_13"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> Litvinov, <i>op. cit.</i>, p. 31.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_14_14" id="Footnote_14_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_14"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> <i>The New International</i>, April, 1918.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_15_15" id="Footnote_15_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_15"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> See, <i>e.g.</i>, the article by Lenine, <i>New International</i>,
+April, 1918, and Litvinov, <i>op. cit.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_16_16" id="Footnote_16_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_16"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> See my <i>Syndicalism, Industrial Unionism, and Socialism</i> for
+the I.W.W. philosophy.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_17_17" id="Footnote_17_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_17"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> Bryant, <i>Six Months in Red Russia</i>, p. 141.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_18_18" id="Footnote_18_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_18"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> This appeal is published as Appendix I at the end of this volume.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_19_19" id="Footnote_19_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_19"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> Certain Soviets of Soldiers at the Front had decided
+that they would stay in their trenches for defensive purposes, but
+would obey no commands to go forward, no matter what the military
+situation.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_20_20" id="Footnote_20_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_20"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> Figures supplied by the Russian Information Bureau.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_21_21" id="Footnote_21_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_21"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> "It was with a deep and awful sense of the terrible failure
+before us that I consented to become Premier at that time," Kerensky told
+the present writer.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_22_22" id="Footnote_22_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_22"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> The story was reproduced in <i>New Europe</i> (London), September,
+1917.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_23_23" id="Footnote_23_23"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_23"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> <i>The New International</i>, April, 1918.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_24_24" id="Footnote_24_24"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_24"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> See p. 254.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_25_25" id="Footnote_25_25"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_25"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> See the letter of E. Roubanovitch, Appendix II, p. 331.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_26_26" id="Footnote_26_26"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_26"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> <i>Justice</i>, London, January 31, 1918.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_27_27" id="Footnote_27_27"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_27"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> <i>Justice</i>, London, May 16, 1918.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_28_28" id="Footnote_28_28"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_28"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> <i>Vide</i> Special Memorandum to the International Socialist
+Bureau on behalf of the Revolutionary Socialist party of Russia.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_29_29" id="Footnote_29_29"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_29"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> See Appendix III.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_30_30" id="Footnote_30_30"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_30"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> <i>Pravda</i>, July 5, 1918.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_31_31" id="Footnote_31_31"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_31"><span class="label">[31]</span></a> February, 1918, Protest Against Recognition of Bolshevik
+Representative by British Labor Party Conference.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_32_32" id="Footnote_32_32"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_32"><span class="label">[32]</span></a> Proclamation to People of the Northern Province, etc.,
+December, 1918</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_33_33" id="Footnote_33_33"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_33"><span class="label">[33]</span></a> <i>The New International</i>, April, 1918.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_34_34" id="Footnote_34_34"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_34"><span class="label">[34]</span></a> The dates given are according to the Russian calendar.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_35_35" id="Footnote_35_35"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_35"><span class="label">[35]</span></a> See the Rakitnikov Memorandum&mdash;Appendix.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_36_36" id="Footnote_36_36"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_36"><span class="label">[36]</span></a> <i>The New International</i>, April, 1918.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_37_37" id="Footnote_37_37"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_37"><span class="label">[37]</span></a> The number of votes was over 36,000,000.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_38_38" id="Footnote_38_38"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_38"><span class="label">[38]</span></a> <i>Vide</i> Rakitnikov report.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_39_39" id="Footnote_39_39"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_39"><span class="label">[39]</span></a> Twenty-three members of the Executive Committee were
+arrested and, without any trial, thrown into the Fortress of Peter
+and Paul.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_40_40" id="Footnote_40_40"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_40"><span class="label">[40]</span></a> From a Declaration of Protest by the Executive Committee of
+the Third National Congress of Peasants' Delegates (anti-Bolshevist), sent
+to the Bolshevik Congress of Soviets of Workmen, Soldiers, and Peasants,
+but not permitted to be read to that assembly.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_41_41" id="Footnote_41_41"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_41"><span class="label">[41]</span></a> <i>L'Ouorier Russe</i>, May, 1918.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_42_42" id="Footnote_42_42"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42_42"><span class="label">[42]</span></a> <i>Idem</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_43_43" id="Footnote_43_43"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43_43"><span class="label">[43]</span></a> <i>Izvestya</i>, July 28, 1918.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_44_44" id="Footnote_44_44"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44_44"><span class="label">[44]</span></a> <i>Pravda</i>, October 8, 1918 (No. 216).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_45_45" id="Footnote_45_45"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45_45"><span class="label">[45]</span></a> "Agents-Provocateurs and the Russian Revolution," article in
+<i>Justice,</i>, August 16, 1916, by J. Tchernoff.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_46_46" id="Footnote_46_46"></a><a href="#FNanchor_46_46"><span class="label">[46]</span></a> Most of the information in this paragraph is based upon an
+article in the Swiss newspaper <i>Lausanne Gazette</i> by the well-known Russian
+journalist, Serge Persky, carefully checked up by Russian Socialist exiles
+in Paris.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_47_47" id="Footnote_47_47"></a><a href="#FNanchor_47_47"><span class="label">[47]</span></a> Joseph Martinek, in the <i>Cleveland Press</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_48_48" id="Footnote_48_48"></a><a href="#FNanchor_48_48"><span class="label">[48]</span></a> <i>Justice</i> (London), January 23, 1919.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_49_49" id="Footnote_49_49"></a><a href="#FNanchor_49_49"><span class="label">[49]</span></a> <i>Justice</i>, London, January 31, 1918.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_50_50" id="Footnote_50_50"></a><a href="#FNanchor_50_50"><span class="label">[50]</span></a> Jean Jaur&egrave;s, <i>Studies in Socialism</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_51_51" id="Footnote_51_51"></a><a href="#FNanchor_51_51"><span class="label">[51]</span></a> F. Engels, 1895, Preface to Marx's <i>Civil War in France</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_52_52" id="Footnote_52_52"></a><a href="#FNanchor_52_52"><span class="label">[52]</span></a> The reader is referred to my <i>Sidelights on Contemporary
+Socialism</i> and my <i>Karl Marx: His Life and Works</i> for a fuller account of
+these struggles.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_53_53" id="Footnote_53_53"></a><a href="#FNanchor_53_53"><span class="label">[53]</span></a> Marx, <i>A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy</i>,
+p. 12.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_54_54" id="Footnote_54_54"></a><a href="#FNanchor_54_54"><span class="label">[54]</span></a> Editorial entitled "Bolshevik Problems," in <i>The Liberator</i>,
+April, 1918.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_55_55" id="Footnote_55_55"></a><a href="#FNanchor_55_55"><span class="label">[55]</span></a> The article by Lenine quoted by Mr. Eastman appeared in <i>The
+New International</i>, February, 1918.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_56_56" id="Footnote_56_56"></a><a href="#FNanchor_56_56"><span class="label">[56]</span></a> <i>The Bolsheviks and the Soviets</i>, by Albert Rhys Williams, p.
+6.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_57_57" id="Footnote_57_57"></a><a href="#FNanchor_57_57"><span class="label">[57]</span></a> <i>Ansprache der Centralbehorde an den Bund, vom Marz, 1850</i>:
+Anhang IX der Enthullerngen &uuml;ber den Kommunisten-process Zu Koln, p. 79.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_58_58" id="Footnote_58_58"></a><a href="#FNanchor_58_58"><span class="label">[58]</span></a> Lenine, <i>The Soviets at Work</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_59_59" id="Footnote_59_59"></a><a href="#FNanchor_59_59"><span class="label">[59]</span></a> Wilhelm Liebknecht, <i>No Compromise, No Political Trading</i>, p.
+30.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_60_60" id="Footnote_60_60"></a><a href="#FNanchor_60_60"><span class="label">[60]</span></a> <i>Socialism: a Summary and Interpretation of Socialist
+Principles</i>, by John Spargo, p. 215 (1st edition Macmillan, 1916).</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_61_61" id="Footnote_61_61"></a><a href="#FNanchor_61_61"><span class="label">[61]</span></a> Liebknecht, <i>No Compromise, No Political Trading</i>, p. 16.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_62_62" id="Footnote_62_62"></a><a href="#FNanchor_62_62"><span class="label">[62]</span></a> Liebknecht, <i>No Compromise, No Political Trading</i>, p. 28.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_63_63" id="Footnote_63_63"></a><a href="#FNanchor_63_63"><span class="label">[63]</span></a> This subject is treated in the following, among others, of my
+books:
+</p><p>
+<i>Socialism: a Summary and Interpretation of Socialist Principles</i>; <i>Applied
+Socialism</i>; <i>Syndicalism, Industrial Unionism, and Socialism</i>; <i>Elements of
+Socialism</i> (Spargo and Arner), and <i>Social Democracy Explained</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_64_64" id="Footnote_64_64"></a><a href="#FNanchor_64_64"><span class="label">[64]</span></a> <i>The New International</i>, July 23, 1917.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_65_65" id="Footnote_65_65"></a><a href="#FNanchor_65_65"><span class="label">[65]</span></a> Conversation with Trotzky reported by E.A. Ross, <i>Russia in
+Upheaval</i>, p. 208.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_66_66" id="Footnote_66_66"></a><a href="#FNanchor_66_66"><span class="label">[66]</span></a> Kautsky, <i>The Social Revolution</i>, p. 137.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_67_67" id="Footnote_67_67"></a><a href="#FNanchor_67_67"><span class="label">[67]</span></a> Lenine, <i>The Soviets at Work</i>.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_68_68" id="Footnote_68_68"></a><a href="#FNanchor_68_68"><span class="label">[68]</span></a> Lenine, <i>op. cit.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_69_69" id="Footnote_69_69"></a><a href="#FNanchor_69_69"><span class="label">[69]</span></a> Lenine, <i>op. cit.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_70_70" id="Footnote_70_70"></a><a href="#FNanchor_70_70"><span class="label">[70]</span></a> The best expositions of Guild Socialism are <i>Self-Government
+in Industry</i>, by G.D.H. Cole, and <i>National Guilds</i>, by S.G. Hobson, edited
+by A.R. Orage.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_71_71" id="Footnote_71_71"></a><a href="#FNanchor_71_71"><span class="label">[71]</span></a> Lenine, <i>op. cit.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_72_72" id="Footnote_72_72"></a><a href="#FNanchor_72_72"><span class="label">[72]</span></a> Lenine, <i>op. cit.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_73_73" id="Footnote_73_73"></a><a href="#FNanchor_73_73"><span class="label">[73]</span></a> Lenine, <i>op. cit.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_74_74" id="Footnote_74_74"></a><a href="#FNanchor_74_74"><span class="label">[74]</span></a> Lenine, <i>op. cit.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_75_75" id="Footnote_75_75"></a><a href="#FNanchor_75_75"><span class="label">[75]</span></a> Lenine, <i>op. cit.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_76_76" id="Footnote_76_76"></a><a href="#FNanchor_76_76"><span class="label">[76]</span></a> Of course, Trotzky's statement to Professor Ross about paying
+the capitalists "5 or 6 per cent. a year" was frankly a compromise.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_77_77" id="Footnote_77_77"></a><a href="#FNanchor_77_77"><span class="label">[77]</span></a> E.A. Ross, <i>Russia in Upheaval</i>, pp. 206-207.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_78_78" id="Footnote_78_78"></a><a href="#FNanchor_78_78"><span class="label">[78]</span></a> Litvinov, <i>The Bolshevik Revolution: Its Rise and Meaning</i>,
+p. 39.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_79_79" id="Footnote_79_79"></a><a href="#FNanchor_79_79"><span class="label">[79]</span></a> Marx and Engels speak of the "idiocy of rural life" from
+which capitalism, through the concentration of agriculture and the
+abolition of small holdings, would rescue the peasant proprietors
+(<i>Communist Manifesto</i>). In <i>Capital</i> Marx speaks of the manner in which
+modern industry "annihilates the peasant, <i>the bulwark of the old society</i>"
+(Vol. I, p. 513). Liebknecht says that in 1848 it was the <i>city</i> which
+overthrew the corrupt citizen king and the <i>country</i> which overthrew the
+new republic, chose Louis Bonaparte and prepared the way for the Empire.
+"The French peasantry created an empire through their blind fear of
+proletarian Socialism" (<i>Die Grund und Bodenfrage</i>). Kautsky wrote,
+"Peasants who feel that they are not proletarians, but true peasants, are
+not only not to be won over to our cause, <i>but belong to our most dangerous
+adversaries</i>" (<i>Dat Erfurter Programm und die Land-agitation</i>). It would be
+easy to compile a volume of such utterances.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_80_80" id="Footnote_80_80"></a><a href="#FNanchor_80_80"><span class="label">[80]</span></a> Walling, <i>Russia's Message</i>, p. 118. The italics are mine.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_81_81" id="Footnote_81_81"></a><a href="#FNanchor_81_81"><span class="label">[81]</span></a> "Cabinet lands" are the crown lands, property of the Czar and
+royal family.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_82_82" id="Footnote_82_82"></a><a href="#FNanchor_82_82"><span class="label">[82]</span></a> Ross, <i>op. cit.</i>, pp. 206-207.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_83_83" id="Footnote_83_83"></a><a href="#FNanchor_83_83"><span class="label">[83]</span></a> <i>Justice</i>, London, August 1, 1917.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_84_84" id="Footnote_84_84"></a><a href="#FNanchor_84_84"><span class="label">[84]</span></a> The figures given are quoted by Sack, in <i>The Birth of
+Russian Democracy</i>, and were originally published by the Bolshevist
+Commissaire of Commerce.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_85_85" id="Footnote_85_85"></a><a href="#FNanchor_85_85"><span class="label">[85]</span></a> <i>Parvus et le Parti Socialiste Danois</i>, by P.G. La Chesnais.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_86_86" id="Footnote_86_86"></a><a href="#FNanchor_86_86"><span class="label">[86]</span></a> La Chesnais, <i>op. cit.</i></p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_87_87" id="Footnote_87_87"></a><a href="#FNanchor_87_87"><span class="label">[87]</span></a> In "<i>L'Humanit&eacute;</i>," article condensed in <i>Justice</i>, January
+31, 1918.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_88_88" id="Footnote_88_88"></a><a href="#FNanchor_88_88"><span class="label">[88]</span></a> International Notes, <i>Justice</i>, January 3, 1918.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_89_89" id="Footnote_89_89"></a><a href="#FNanchor_89_89"><span class="label">[89]</span></a> <i>The Disarmament Cry</i>, by N. Lenine, in <i>The Class Struggle</i>,
+May-June, 1918.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_90_90" id="Footnote_90_90"></a><a href="#FNanchor_90_90"><span class="label">[90]</span></a> <i>The "Disarmament" Cry</i>, by N. Lenine, <i>The Class Struggle</i>,
+May-June, 1918.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_91_91" id="Footnote_91_91"></a><a href="#FNanchor_91_91"><span class="label">[91]</span></a> Most, if not all, dates in this document are given as in the
+Russian calendar, which is thirteen days behind ours.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_92_92" id="Footnote_92_92"></a><a href="#FNanchor_92_92"><span class="label">[92]</span></a> This refers, doubtless, to the different basis for voting
+applied to the peasants and the industrial workers, as provided in the
+Soviet Constitution.</p></div>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+<hr class="full" />
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+The Project Gutenberg eBook, Bolshevism, by John Spargo
+
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+
+
+
+Title: Bolshevism
+       The Enemy of Political and Industrial Democracy
+
+
+Author: John Spargo
+
+
+
+Release Date: August 28, 2005  [eBook #16613]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-646-US (US-ASCII)
+
+
+***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK BOLSHEVISM***
+
+
+E-text prepared by Rick Niles, Josephine Paolucci, and the Project
+Gutenberg Online Distributed Proofreading Team (https://www.pgdp.net/)
+
+
+
+Transcriber's note: Minor typographical errors in the original text
+                    have been corrected and footnotes moved to the
+                    end of the book.
+
+
+
+
+
+BOLSHEVISM
+
+The Enemy of Political and Industrial Democracy
+
+by
+
+JOHN SPARGO
+
+Author of
+"Social Democracy Explained" "Socialism, a Summary and Interpretation of
+Socialist Principles" "Applied Socialism" etc.
+
+Harper & Brothers Publishers
+New York and London
+
+1919
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+     *     *     *     *     *     *     *
+
+      BOOKS BY
+
+      JOHN SPARGO
+
+      BOLSHEVISM
+      AMERICANISM AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY
+      SOCIAL DEMOCRACY EXPLAINED
+
+
+      HARPER & BROTHERS, NEW YORK
+
+      ESTABLISHED 1817
+
+
+     *     *     *     *     *     *     *
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+        PREFACE
+
+     I. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
+
+    II. FROM REVOLUTION TO REVOLUTION
+
+   III. THE WAR AND THE PEOPLE
+
+    IV. THE SECOND REVOLUTION
+
+     V. FROM BOURGEOISIE TO BOLSHEVIKI
+
+    VI. THE BOLSHEVIK WAR AGAINST DEMOCRACY
+
+   VII. BOLSHEVIST THEORY AND PRACTICE
+
+        POSTSCRIPTUM: A PERSONAL STATEMENT
+
+
+APPENDICES:
+
+     I. AN APPEAL TO THE PROLETARIAT BY THE PETROGRAD WORKMEN'S AND
+        SOLDIERS' COUNCIL
+
+    II. HOW THE RUSSIAN PEASANTS FOUGHT FOR A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY
+
+   III. FORMER SOCIALIST PREMIER OF FINLAND ON BOLSHEVISM
+
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+
+In the following pages I have tried to make a plain and easily
+understandable outline of the origin, history, and meaning of Bolshevism. I
+have attempted to provide the average American reader with a fair and
+reliable statement of the philosophy, program, and policies of the Russian
+Bolsheviki. In order to avoid confusion, and to keep the matter as simple
+and clear as possible, I have not tried to deal with the numerous
+manifestations of Bolshevism in other lands, but have confined myself
+strictly to the Russian example. With some detail--too much, some of my
+readers may think!--I have sketched the historical background in order that
+the Bolsheviki may be seen in proper perspective and fairly judged in
+connection with the whole revolutionary movement in Russia.
+
+Whoever turns to these pages in the expectation of finding a sensational
+"exposure" of Bolshevism and the Bolsheviki will be disappointed. It has
+been my aim to make a deliberate and scientific study, not an _ex-parte_
+indictment. A great many lurid and sensational stories about the Bolsheviki
+have been published, the net result of which is to make the leaders of this
+phase of the great universal war of the classes appear as brutal and
+depraved monsters of iniquity. There is not a crime known to mankind,
+apparently, of which they have not been loudly declared to be guilty. My
+long experience in the Socialist movement has furnished me with too much
+understanding of the manner and extent to which working-class movements are
+abused and slandered to permit me to accept these stories as gospel truth.
+That experience has forced me to assume that most of the terrible stories
+told about the Bolsheviki are either untrue and without any foundation in
+fact or greatly exaggerated. The "rumor factories" in Geneva, Stockholm,
+Copenhagen, The Hague, and other European capitals, which were so busy
+during the war fabricating and exploiting for profit stories of massacres,
+victories, assassinations, revolutions, peace treaties, and other momentous
+events, which subsequent information proved never to have happened at all,
+seem now to have turned their attention to the Bolsheviki.
+
+However little of a cynic one may be, it is almost impossible to refrain
+from wondering at the fact that so many writers and journals that in the
+quite recent past maintained absolute silence when the czar and his minions
+were committing their infamous outrages against the working-people and
+their leaders, and that were never known to protest against the many crimes
+committed by our own industrial czars against our working-people and their
+leaders--that these writers and journals are now so violently denouncing
+the Bolsheviki for alleged inhumanities. When the same journals that
+defended or apologized for the brutal lynchings of I.W.W. agitators and the
+savage assaults committed upon other peaceful citizens whose only crime was
+exercising their lawful and moral right to organize and strike for better
+wages, denounce the Bolsheviki for their "brutality" and their
+"lawlessness" and cry for vengeance upon them, honest and sincere men
+become bitter and scornful.
+
+I am not a Bolshevik or a defender of the Bolsheviki. As a Social Democrat
+and Internationalist of many years' standing--and therefore loyal to
+America and American ideals--I am absolutely opposed to the principles and
+practices of the Bolsheviki, which, from the very first, I have regarded
+and denounced as an inverted form of Czarism. It is quite clear to my mind,
+however, that there can be no good result from wild abuse or from
+misrepresentation of facts and motives. I am convinced that the stupid
+campaign of calumny which has been waged against the Bolsheviki has won for
+them the sympathy of many intelligent Americans who love fairness and hate
+injustice. In this way lying and abuse react against those who indulge in
+them.
+
+In this study I have completely ignored the flood of newspaper stories of
+Bolshevist "outrages" and "crimes" which has poured forth during the past
+year. I have ignored, too, the remarkable collection of documents edited
+and annotated by Mr. Sisson and published by the United States Committee on
+Public Information. I do not doubt that there is much that is true in that
+collection of documents--indeed, there is some corroboration of some of
+them--but the means of determining what is true and what false are not yet
+available to the student. So much doubt and suspicion is reasonably and
+properly attached to some of the documents that the value of the whole mass
+is greatly impaired. To rely upon these documents to make a case against
+the Bolsheviki, unless and until they have been more fully investigated and
+authenticated than they appear to have been as yet, and corroborated, would
+be like relying upon the testimony of an unreliable witness to convict a
+man serious crime.
+
+That the Bolsheviki have been guilty of many crimes is certain. Ample
+evidence of that fact will be found in the following pages. They have
+committed many crimes against men and women whose splendid service to the
+Russian revolutionary movement serves only to accentuate the crimes in
+question. But their worst crimes have been against political and social
+democracy, which they have shamefully betrayed and opposed with as little
+scruple, and as much brutal injustice, as was ever manifested by the
+Romanovs. This is a terrible charge, I know, but I believe that the most
+sympathetic toward the Bolsheviki among my readers will, if they are
+candid, admit that it is amply sustained by the evidence.
+
+Concerning that evidence it is perhaps necessary to say that I have
+confined myself to the following: official documents issued by the
+Bolshevist government; the writings and addresses of accredited Bolshevik
+leaders and officials--in the form in which they have been published by the
+Bolsheviki themselves; the declarations of Russian Socialist organizations
+of long and honorable standing in the international Socialist movement; the
+statements of equally well-known and trusted Russian Socialists, and of
+responsible Russian Socialist journals.
+
+While I have indicated the sources of most of the evidence against the
+Bolsheviki, either in the text itself or in the foot-notes and references,
+I have not thought it advisable to burden my pages with such foot-notes and
+references concerning matters of general knowledge. To have given
+references and authorities for all the facts summarized in the historical
+outlines, for example, would have been simply a show of pedantry and served
+only to frighten away the ordinary reader.
+
+I have been deeply indebted to the works of other writers, among which I
+may mention the following: Peter Kropotkin's _Memoirs of a Revolutionist_
+and _Ideals and Realities of Russian Literature_; S. Stepniak's
+_Underground Russia_; Leo Deutsch's _Sixteen Years in Siberia_; Alexander
+Ular's _Russia from Within_; William English Walling's _Russia's Message_;
+Zinovy N. Preev's _The Russian Riddle_; Maxim Litvinov's _The Bolshevik
+Revolution: Its Rise and Meaning_; M.J. Olgin's _The Soul of the Russian
+Revolution_; A.J. Sack's _The Birth of Russian Democracy_; E.A. Ross's
+_Russia in Upheaval_; Isaac Don Levine's _The Russian Revolution_; Bessie
+Beatty's _The Red Heart of Russia_; Louise Bryant's _Six Red Months in
+Russia_; Leon Trotzky's _Our Revolution_ and _The Bolsheviki and World
+Peace_; Gabriel Domergue's _La Russe Rouge_; Nikolai Lenine's _The Soviets
+at Work_; Zinoviev and Lenine's _Sozialismus und Krieg_; Emile
+Vandervelde's _Trois Aspects de la Revolution Russe_; P.G. Chesnais's _La
+Revolution et la Paix_ and _Les Bolsheviks_. I have also freely availed
+myself of the many admirable translations of official Bolshevist documents
+published in _The Class Struggle_, of New York, a pro-Bolshevist magazine;
+the collection of documents published by _The Nation_, of New York, a
+journal exceedingly generous in its treatment of Bolshevism and the
+Bolsheviki; and of the mass of material published in its excellent
+"International Notes" by _Justice_, of London, the oldest Socialist
+newspaper in the English language, I believe, and one of the most ably
+edited.
+
+Grateful acknowledgment is hereby made of friendly service rendered and
+valuable information given by Mr. Alexander Kerensky, former Premier of
+Russia; Mr. Henry L. Slobodin, of New York; Mr. A.J. Sack, Director of the
+Russian Information Bureau in the United States; Dr. Boris Takavenko,
+editor of _La Russia Nuova_, Rome, Italy; Mr. William English Walling, New
+York; and my friend, Father Cahill, of Bennington.
+
+Among the Appendices at the end of the volume will be found some important
+documents containing some contemporary Russian Socialist judgments of
+Bolshevism. These documents are, I venture to suggest, of the utmost
+possible value and importance to the student and general reader.
+
+    JOHN SPARGO,
+
+    "NESTLEDOWN,"
+      OLD BENNNIGTON, VERMONT,
+        _End of January, 1919_.
+
+
+
+
+BOLSHEVISM
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
+
+
+I
+
+For almost a full century Russia has been the theater of a great
+revolutionary movement. In the light of Russian history we read with
+cynical amusement that in 1848, when all Europe was in a revolutionary
+ferment, a German economist confidently predicted that revolutionary
+agitation could not live in the peculiar soil of Russian civilization.
+August Franz von Haxthausen was in many respects a competent and even a
+profound student of Russian politics, but he was wrong in his belief that
+the amount of rural communism existing in Russia, particularly the _mir_,
+would make it impossible for storms of revolutionary agitation to arise and
+stir the national life.
+
+As a matter of historical fact, the ferment of revolution had appeared in
+the land of the Czars long before the German economist made his remarkably
+ill-judged forecast. At the end of the Napoleonic wars many young officers
+of the Russian army returned to their native land full of revolutionary
+ideas and ideals acquired in France, Italy, and Germany, and intent upon
+action. At first their intention was simply to make an appeal to Alexander
+I to grant self-government to Russia, which at one time he had seemed
+disposed to do. Soon they found themselves engaged in a secret conspiratory
+movement having for its object the overthrow of Czarism. The story of the
+failure of these romanticists, the manner in which the abortive attempt at
+revolution in December, 1825, was suppressed, and how the leaders were
+punished by Nicholas I--these things are well known to most students of
+Russian history. The Decembrists, as they came to be called, failed, as
+they were bound to do, but it would be a mistake to suppose that their
+efforts were altogether vain. On the contrary, their inspiration was felt
+throughout the next thirty years and was reflected in the literature of the
+period. During that period Russian literature was tinged with the faith in
+social regeneration held by most of the cultured intellectual classes. The
+Decembrists were the spiritual progenitors of the Russian revolutionary
+movement of our time. In the writings of Pushkin--himself a
+Decembrist--Lermontoff, Gogol, Turgeniev, Dostoyevsky, and many others less
+well known, the influence of the Decembrist movement is clearly manifested.
+
+If we are to select a single figure as the founder of the modern social
+revolutionary movement in Russia, that title can be applied to Alexander
+Herzen with greater fitness than to any other. His influence upon the
+movement during many years was enormous. Herzen was half-German, his mother
+being German. He was born at Moscow in 1812, shortly before the French
+occupation of the city. His parents were very rich and he enjoyed the
+advantages of a splendid education, as well as great luxury. At twenty-two
+years of age he was banished to a small town in the Urals, where he spent
+six years, returning to Moscow in 1840. It is noteworthy that the offense
+for which he had been sent into exile was the singing of songs in praise of
+the Decembrist martyrs. This occurred at a meeting of one of the "Students'
+Circles" founded by Herzen for the dissemination of revolutionary Socialist
+ideals among the students.
+
+Upon his return to Moscow in 1840 Herzen, together with Bakunin and other
+friends, again engaged in revolutionary propaganda and in 1842 he was again
+exiled. In 1847, through the influence of powerful friends, he received
+permission to leave Russia for travel abroad. He never again saw his native
+land, all the remaining years of life being spent in exile. After a tour of
+Italy, Herzen arrived in Paris on the eve of the Revolution of 1848,
+joining there his friends, Bakunin and Turgeniev, and many other
+revolutionary leaders. It was impossible for him to participate actively in
+the 1848 uprising, owing to the activity of the Paris police, but he
+watched the Revolution with the profoundest sympathy. And when it failed
+and was followed by the terrible reaction his distress was almost
+unbounded. For a brief period he was the victim of the most appalling
+pessimism, but after a time his faith returned and he joined with Proudhon
+in issuing a radical revolutionary paper, _L'Ami du Peuple_, of which,
+Kropotkin tells us in his admirable study of Russian literature, "almost
+every number was confiscated by the police of Napoleon the Third." The
+paper had a very brief life, and Herzen himself was soon expelled from
+France, going to Switzerland, of which country he became a citizen.
+
+In 1857 Herzen settled in London, where he published for some years a
+remarkable paper, called _Kolokol (The Bell)_, in which he exposed the
+iniquities and shortcomings of Czarism and inspired the youth of Russia
+with his revolutionary ideals. The paper had to be smuggled into Russia, of
+course, and the manner in which the smuggling was done is one of the most
+absorbing stories in all the tragic history of the vast land of the Czars.
+Herzen was a charming writer and a keen thinker, and it is impossible to
+exaggerate the extent of his influence. But when the freedom of the serfs,
+for which he so vigorously contended, was promulgated by Alexander II, and
+other extensive reforms were granted, his influence waned. He died in 1870
+in Switzerland.
+
+
+II
+
+Alexander II was not alone in hoping that the Act of Liberation would usher
+in a new era of prosperity and tranquillity for Russia. Many of the most
+radical of the Intelligentsia, followers of Herzen, believed that Russia
+was destined to outstrip the older nations of western Europe in its
+democracy and its culture. It was not long before disillusionment came: the
+serfs were set free, but the manner in which the land question had been
+dealt with made their freedom almost a mockery. As a result there were
+numerous uprisings of peasants--riots which the government suppressed in
+the most sanguinary manner. From that time until the present the land
+question has been the core of the Russian problem. Every revolutionary
+movement has been essentially concerned with giving the land to the
+peasants.
+
+Within a few months after the liberation of the serfs the revolutionary
+unrest was so wide-spread that the government became alarmed and instituted
+a policy of vigorous repression. Progressive papers, which had sprung up as
+a result of the liberal tendencies characterizing the reign of Alexander
+II thus far, were suppressed and many of the leading writers were
+imprisoned and exiled. Among those thus punished was that brilliant writer,
+Tchernyshevsky, to whom the Russian movement owes so much. His
+_Contemporary Review_ was, during the four critical years 1858-62 the
+principal forum for the discussion of the problems most vital to the life
+of Russia. In it the greatest leaders of Russian thought discussed the land
+question, co-operation, communism, popular education, and similar subjects.
+This served a twofold purpose: in the first place, it brought to the study
+of the pressing problems of the time the ablest and best minds of the
+country; secondly, it provided these Intellectuals with a bond of union and
+stimulus to serve the poor and the oppressed. That Alexander II had been
+influenced to sign the Emancipation Act by Tchernyshevsky and his friends
+did not cause the authorities to spare Tchernyshevsky when, in 1863, he
+engaged in active Socialist propaganda. He was arrested and imprisoned in a
+fortress, where he wrote the novel which has so profoundly influenced two
+generations of discontented and protesting Russians--_What is to Be Done?_
+In form a novel of thrilling interest, this work was really an elaborate
+treatise upon Russian social conditions. It dealt with the vexed problems
+of marriage and divorce, the land question, co-operative production, and
+other similar matters, and the solutions it suggested for these problems
+became widely accepted as the program of revolutionary Russia. Few books in
+any literature have ever produced such a profound impression, or exerted as
+much influence upon the life of a nation. In the following year, 1864,
+Tchernyshevsky was exiled to hard labor in Siberia, remaining there until
+1883, when he returned to Russia. He lived only six years longer, dying in
+1889.
+
+The attempt made by a young student to assassinate Alexander II, on April
+4, 1866, was seized upon by the Czar and his advisers as an excuse for
+instituting a policy of terrible reaction. The most repressive measures
+were taken against the Intelligentsia and all the liberal reforms which had
+been introduced were practically destroyed. It was impossible to restore
+serfdom, of course, but the condition of the peasants without land was even
+worse than if they had remained serfs. Excessive taxation, heavy redemption
+charges, famine, crop failures, and other ills drove the people to
+desperation. Large numbers of students espoused the cause of the peasants
+and a new popular literature appeared in which the sufferings of the people
+were portrayed with fervor and passion. In 1868-69 there were numerous
+demonstrations and riots by way of protest against the reactionary policy
+of the government.
+
+It was at this time that Michael Bakunin, from his exile in Switzerland,
+conspired with Nechaiev to bring about a great uprising of the peasants,
+through the Society for the Liberation of the People. Bakunin advised the
+students to leave the universities and to go among the people to teach them
+and, at the same time, arouse them to revolt. It was at this time, too,
+that Nicholas Tchaykovsky and his friends, the famous Circle of
+Tchaykovsky, began to distribute among students in all parts of the Empire
+books dealing with the condition of the peasants and proposing remedies
+therefor. This work greatly influenced the young Intelligentsia, but the
+immediate results among the peasants were not very encouraging. Even the
+return from Switzerland, by order of the government, of hundreds of
+students who were disciples of Bakunin and Peter Lavrov did not produce any
+great success.
+
+Very soon a new organization appeared. The remnant of the Circle
+Tchaykovsky, together with some followers of Bakunin, formed a society
+called the Land and Freedom Society. This society, which was destined to
+exert a marked influence upon revolutionary Russia, was the most ambitious
+revolutionary effort Russia had known. The society had a constitution and a
+carefully worked out program. It had one special group to carry on
+propaganda among students; another to agitate among the peasants; and a
+third to employ armed force against the government and against those guilty
+of treachery toward the society. The basis of the society was the
+conviction that Russia needed an economic revolution; that only an economic
+revolution, starting with the producers, could overthrow Czarism and
+establish the ideal state of society.
+
+The members of this Land and Freedom Society divided their work into four
+main divisions: (1) Agitation--passive and active. Passive agitation
+included strikes, petitions for reforms, refusal to pay taxes, and so on.
+Active agitation meant riots and uprisings. (2) Organization--the formation
+of a fighting force prepared to bring about a general uprising. (3)
+Education--the spreading of revolutionary knowledge and ideas, a
+continuation of the work of the Tchaykovsky Circle. (4) Secularization--the
+carrying on of systematic work against the Orthodox Church through special
+channels. One of the early leaders of this society was George Plechanov,
+who later founded the Russian Social Democracy and gave to the Russian
+revolutionary movement its Marxian character, inspiring such men as Nikolai
+Lenine and Leon Trotzky, among many others. The society did not attain any
+very great amount of success in its efforts to reach the peasants, and it
+was that fact more than any other which determined Plechanov's future
+course.
+
+
+III
+
+When the failure of the Land and Freedom methods became evident, and the
+government became more and more oppressive, desperate individuals and
+groups resorted to acts of terrorism. It was thus that Vera Zasulich
+attempted the assassination of the infamous Chief of Police Trepov. The
+movement to temper Czarism by assassination systematically pursued was
+beginning. In 1879 the Land and Freedom Society held a conference for the
+purpose of discussing its program. A majority favored resorting to
+terroristic tactics; Plechanov and a few other well-known revolutionists
+were opposed--favoring the old methods. The society split, the majority
+becoming known as the Will of the People and adopting a terroristic
+program. This organization sentenced Czar Alexander II to death and several
+unsuccessful attempts were made to carry out the sentence. The leaders
+believed that the assassination of the Czar would give rise to a general
+revolution throughout the whole of Russia. In February, 1880, occurred the
+famous attempt to blow up the Winter Palace. For a time it seemed that the
+Czar had learned the lesson the Will of the People sought to teach him, and
+that he would institute far-reaching reforms. Pursuing a policy of
+vacillation and fear, however, Alexander II soon fell back into the old
+attitude. On March 1, 1881, a group of revolutionists, among them Sophia
+Perovskaya, made another attempt upon his life, succeeding, at first, only
+in damaging the bottom of the Czar's carriage and wounding a number of
+Cossack soldiers. "Thank God, I am untouched," said the Czar, in response
+to the inquiry of an officer of his guard. "It's too soon to thank God!"
+cried N.I. Grinevitsky, hurling a bomb at the Czar. Within a short time
+Alexander II and his assailant were both dead.
+
+The assassination of Alexander II was a tragic event for Russia. On the
+very morning of his death the ill-fated monarch had approved a plan for
+extensive reforms presented by the liberal Minister, Loris-Melikoff. It had
+been decided to call a conference three days later and to invite a number
+of well-known public men to co-operate in introducing the reforms. These
+reforms would not have been far-reaching enough to satisfy the
+revolutionists, but they would certainly have improved the situation and
+given Russia a new hope. That hope died with Alexander II. His son,
+Alexander III, had always been a pronounced reactionary and had advised his
+father against making any concessions to the agitators. It was not
+surprising, therefore, that he permitted himself to be advised against the
+liberals by the most reactionary bureaucrats in the Empire, and to adopt
+the most oppressive policies.
+
+The new Czar was greatly influenced by his former tutor, the reactionary
+bureaucrat Pobiedonostzev. At first it was believed that out of respect for
+his father's memory Alexander III would carry out the program of reforms
+formulated by Loris-Melikoff, as his father had promised to do. In a
+Manifesto issued on the 29th of April, 1881, Alexander III promised to do
+this, but in the same document there were passages which could only be
+interpreted as meaning that all demands for constitutional reform would be
+resisted and Absolutism upheld at all cost. Doubtless it was due to the
+influence of Pobiedonostzev, Procurator of the Holy Synod, that Alexander
+III soon abandoned all intention of carrying out his father's wishes in the
+matter of reform and instituted such reactionary policies that the peasants
+feared that serfdom was to be restored. A terrible persecution of the Jews
+was begun, lasting for several years. The Poles, too, felt the oppressive
+hand of Pobiedonostzev. The latter was mastered by the Slavophil philosophy
+that the revolutionary unrest in Russia was traceable to the diversity of
+races, languages, and religions. He believed that Nihilism, Anarchism, and
+Socialism flourished because the people were cosmopolitan rather than
+nationalistic in experience and feeling, and that peace and stability could
+come only from the persistent and vigorous development of the three
+principles of Nationality, Orthodoxy, and Autocracy as the basis of the
+state.
+
+In this doctrine we have the whole explanation of the reactionary policy of
+Alexander III. In the Manifesto of April 29th was announced the Czar's
+determination to strengthen and uphold autocracy. That was the foundation
+stone. To uphold orthodoxy was the next logical necessity, for autocracy
+and orthodoxy were, in Russia, closely related. Hence the non-orthodox
+sects--such as the Finnish Protestants, German Lutherans, Polish Roman
+Catholics, the Jews, and the Mohammedans--were increasingly restricted in
+the observance of their religion. They might not build new places of
+worship; their children could not be educated in the faith of their
+parents. In many cases children were taken away from their parents in order
+to be sent to schools where they would be inculcated with the orthodox
+faith. In a similar way, every attempt was made to suppress the use of
+languages other than Russian.
+
+Along with this attempt to force the whole population into a single mold
+went a determined resistance to liberalism in all its forms. All this was
+accompanied by a degree of efficiency in the police service quite unusual
+in Russia, with the result that the terroristic tactics of the Will of the
+People party were unavailing, except in the cases of a few minor officials.
+Plots to assassinate the Czar were laid, but they were generally betrayed
+to the police. The most serious of these plots, in March, 1887, led to the
+arrest of all the conspirators.
+
+In the mean time there had appeared the first definite Marxian Social
+Democratic group in Russia. Plechanov, Vera Zasulich, Leo Deutsch, and
+other Russian revolutionists in Switzerland formed the organization known
+as the Group for the Emancipation of Labor. This organization was based
+upon the principles and tactics of Marxian Socialism and sought to create a
+purely proletarian movement. As we have seen, when revolutionary terrorism
+was at its height Plechanov and his disciples had proclaimed its futility
+and pinned their faith to the nascent class of industrial wage-workers. In
+the early 'eighties this class was so small in Russia that it seemed to
+many of the best and clearest minds of the revolutionary movement quite
+hopeless to rely upon it. Plechanov was derided as a mere theorist and
+closet philosopher, but he never wavered in his conviction that Socialism
+must come in Russia as the natural outcome of capitalist development. By
+means of a number of scholarly polemics against the principles and tactics
+of the Will of the People party, Plechanov gathered to his side of the
+controversy a group of very brilliant and able disciples, and so laid the
+basis for the Social Democratic Labor party. With the relatively rapid
+expansion of capitalism, beginning with the year 1888, and the inevitable
+increase of the city proletariat, the Marxian movement made great progress.
+A strong labor-union movement and a strong political Socialist movement
+were thus developed side by side.
+
+At the same time there was a revival of terrorism, the one available reply
+of the oppressed to brutal autocracy. While the Marxian movement made
+headway among the industrial workers, the older terroristic movement made
+headway among the peasants. Various groups appeared in different parts of
+the country. When Alexander III died, at the end of 1894, both movements
+had developed considerable strength. Working in secret and subject to
+terrible measures of repression, their leaders being constantly imprisoned
+and exiled, these two wings of the Russian revolutionary movement were
+gathering strength in preparation for an uprising more extensive and
+serious than anything that had hitherto been attempted.
+
+Whenever a new Czar ascended the throne in Russia it was the fashion to
+hope for some measure of reform and for a degree of liberality. Frequently,
+as in the case of Alexander III, all such hopes were speedily killed, but
+repeated experiences of the kind did not prevent the birth of new hopes
+with the death of successive Czars. When, therefore, Alexander III was
+succeeded by his son, Nicholas II, liberal Russia expectantly awaited the
+promulgation of constitutional reforms. In this they were doomed to
+disappointment, just as they had been on the occasion of the accession of
+the new Czar's immediate predecessor. Nicholas II was evidently going to be
+quite as reactionary as his father was. This was made manifest in a number
+of ways. When a deputation from one of the zemstvos, which congratulated
+him upon his ascension to the throne, expressed the hope that he would
+listen to "the voice of the people and the expression of its desires," the
+reply of the new Czar was a grim warning of what was to come. Nicholas II
+told the zemstvos that he intended to follow the example of his father and
+uphold the principles of Absolutism, and that any thought of participation
+by the zemstvos or other organizations of the people in state affairs was a
+senseless dream. More significant still, perhaps, was the fact that the
+hated Pobiedonostzev was retained in power.
+
+The revolutionists were roused as they had not been for a decade or more.
+Some of the leaders believed that the new reign of reaction would prove to
+be the occasion and the opportunity for bringing about a union of all the
+revolutionary forces, Anarchists and Socialists alike, peasants and
+industrial workers. This hope was destined to fail, but there was an
+unmistakable revolutionary awakening. In the latter part of January, 1895,
+an open letter to Nicholas II was smuggled into the country from
+Switzerland and widely distributed. It informed the Czar that the
+Socialists would fight to the bitter end the hateful order of things which
+he was responsible for creating, and menacingly said, "It will not be long
+before you find yourself entangled by it."
+
+
+IV
+
+In one respect Nicholas II differed from Alexander III--he was by nature
+more humane and sentimental. Like his father, he was thoroughly dominated
+by Pobiedonostzev's theory that Russia, in order to be secure and stable,
+must be based upon Nationality, Orthodoxy, and Autocracy. He wanted to see
+Holy Russia homogeneous and free from revolutionary disturbances. But his
+sensitive nature shrank from the systematic persecution of the non-orthodox
+sects and the Jews, and he quietly intimated to the officials that he would
+not approve its continuance. At the same time, he was not willing to face
+the issue squarely and openly announce a change of policy or restore
+religious freedom. That would have meant the overthrow of Pobiedonostzev
+and the Czar's emancipation from his sinister influence, and for that
+Nicholas II lacked the necessary courage and stamina. Cowardice and
+weakness of the will characterized his reign from the very beginning.
+
+When the officials, in obedience to their ruler's wishes, relaxed the
+severity which had marked the treatment of the Jews and the non-orthodox
+Christian sects, the change was soon noted by the victims and once more
+there was a revival of hope. But the efforts of the Finns to secure a
+modification of the Russification policy were quite fruitless. When a
+deputation was sent from Finland to represent to the Czar that the rights
+and privileges solemnly reserved to them at the time of the annexation were
+being denied to the people of Finland, Nicholas II refused to grant the
+deputation an audience. Instead of getting relief, the people of Finland
+soon found that the oppression steadily increased. It was evident that
+Finnish nationality was to be crushed out, if possible, in the interest of
+Russian homogeneity.
+
+It soon became apparent, moreover, that Pobiedonostzev was to enjoy even
+more power than he had under Alexander III. In proportion as the character
+of Nicholas II was weaker than that of his father, the power of the
+Procurator of the Holy Synod was greater. And there was a superstitious
+element in the mentality of the new Czar which Pobiedonostzev played upon
+with infinite cunning. He ruled the weak-willed Czar and filled the
+ministries with men who shared his views and upon whom he could rely.
+Notwithstanding the Czar's expressed wishes, he soon found ways and means
+to add to the persecutions of the Jews and the various non-orthodox
+Christian sects. In his determination to hammer the varied racial groups
+into a homogeneous nation, he adopted terrible measures and so roused the
+hatred of the Finns, Armenians, Georgians, and other subject peoples,
+stirring among them passionate resentment and desire for revolutionary
+action. It is impossible to conceive of a policy more dangerous to the
+dynasty than was conceived and followed by this fanatical Russophil. The
+Poles were persecuted and forced, in sheer despair, and by self-interest,
+into the revolutionary movement. Armenians were persecuted and their church
+lands and church funds confiscated; so they, too, were forced into the
+revolutionary current.
+
+Worse than all else was the cruel persecution of the Jews. Not only were
+they compelled to live within the Pale of Settlement, but this was so
+reduced that abominable congestion and poverty resulted. Intolerable
+restrictions were placed upon the facilities for education in the secondary
+schools, the gymnasia, and in the universities. It was hoped in this way to
+destroy the intellectual leadership of the Jews. Pogroms were instigated,
+stirring the civilized world to protest at the horrible outrages. The
+Minister of the Interior, Von Plehve, proclaimed his intention to "drown
+the Revolution in Jewish blood," while Pobiedonostzev's ambition was "to
+force one-third of the Jews to conversion, another third to emigrate"--to
+escape persecution. The other third he expected to die of hunger and
+misery. When Leo Tolstoy challenged these infamies, and called upon the
+civilized world on behalf of the victims, the Holy Synod denounced Tolstoy
+and his followers as a sect "especially dangerous for the Orthodox Church
+and the state." Later, in 1900, the Holy Synod excommunicated Tolstoy from
+the Orthodox Church.
+
+The fatal logic of fanatical fury led to attacks upon the zemstvos. These
+local organizations had been instituted in 1864, by Alexander II, in the
+liberal years of his reign. Elected mainly by the landlords and the
+peasants, they were a vital part of the life of the nation. Possessing no
+political powers or functions, having nothing to do with legislation, they
+were important agencies of local government. The representatives of each
+county constituted a county-zemstvo and the representatives elected by all
+the county-zemstvos in a province constituted a province-zemstvo. Both
+types concerned themselves with much the same range of activities. They
+built roads and telegraph stations; they maintained model farms and
+agricultural experiment stations similar to those maintained by our state
+governments. They maintained schools, bookstores, and libraries:
+co-operative stores; hospitals and banks. They provided the peasants with
+cheap credit, good seeds, fertilizers, agricultural implements, and so
+forth. In many cases they provided for free medical aid to the peasants. In
+some instances they published newspapers and magazines.
+
+It must be remembered that the zemstvos were the only representative public
+bodies elected by any large part of the people. While the suffrage was
+quite undemocratic, being so arranged that the landlords were assured a
+majority over the peasants at all times, nevertheless they did perform a
+great democratic service. But for them, life would have been well-nigh
+impossible for the peasant. In addition to the services already enumerated,
+these civic bodies were the relief agencies of the Empire, and when crop
+failures brought famine to the peasants it was always the zemstvos which
+undertook the work of relief. Hampered at every point, denied the right to
+control the schools they created and maintained, inhibited by law from
+discussing political questions, the zemstvos, nevertheless, became the
+natural channels for the spreading of discontent and opposition to the
+regime through private communication and discussion.
+
+To bureaucrats of the type of Pobiedonostzev and Von Plehve, with their
+fanatical belief in autocracy, these organizations of the people were so
+many plague spots. Not daring to suppress them altogether, they determined
+to restrict them at every opportunity. Some of the zemstvos were suspended
+and disbanded for certain periods of time. Individual members were exiled
+for utterances which Von Plehve regarded as dangerous. The power of the
+zemstvos themselves was lessened by taking from them such important
+functions as the provisioning of famine-stricken districts and by limiting
+in the most arbitrary manner the amount of the budget permitted to each
+zemstvo. Since every decision of the zemstvos was subject to veto by the
+governors of the respective provinces, the government had at all times a
+formidable weapon at hand to use in its fight against the zemstvos. This
+weapon Von Plehve used with great effect; the most reasonable actions of
+the zemstvos were vetoed for no other reason than hatred of any sort of
+representative government.
+
+
+V
+
+The result of all this was to drive the zemstvos toward the revolutionary
+movements of the peasants and the city workers. That the zemstvos were not
+naturally inclined to radicalism and revolution needs no demonstration.
+Economic interest, tradition, and environment all conspired to keep these
+popular bodies conservative. Landowners were always in the majority and in
+general the zemstvos reflected the ideas and ideals of the enlightened
+wealthy and cultivated classes. The peasant representatives in the zemstvos
+were generally peasants of the most successful and prosperous type, hating
+the revolutionists and all their works. By means of a policy incredibly
+insane these conservatively inclined elements of the population were goaded
+to revolt. The newspapers and magazines of the zemstvos became more and
+more critical of the government, more and more outspoken in denunciation of
+existing conditions. Presently, the leaders of the zemstvos followed the
+example of the revolutionists and held a secret convention at which a
+program for common action was agreed upon. Thus they were resorting to
+illegal methods, exactly as the Socialists had done. Finally, many of the
+liberal zemstvo leaders formed themselves into a political party--the Union
+of Liberation--with a special organ of its own, called _Emancipation_. This
+organ, edited by the brilliant and courageous Peter Struve, was published
+in Stuttgart, Germany, and, since its circulation in Russia was forbidden,
+it had to be smuggled into the country and secretly circulated, just as the
+revolutionary Socialist journals were. Thus another bond was established
+between two very different movements.
+
+As was inevitable, revolutionary terrorism enormously increased. In the
+cities the working-men were drawn mainly into the Social Democratic
+Working-men's party, founded by Plechanov and others in 1898, but the
+peasants, in so far as they were aroused at all, rallied around the
+standard of the Socialist-Revolutionists, successors to the Will of the
+People party. This party was peculiarly a party of the peasants, just as
+the party of Plechanov was peculiarly a party of industrial workers. It
+emphasized the land question above all else. It naturally scorned the view,
+largely held by the Marxists in the other party, that Russia must wait
+until her industrial development was perfected before attempting to realize
+Socialism. It scorned the slow, legalistic methods and resolutely answered
+the terrorism of Czarism by a terrorism of the people. It maintained a
+special department for carrying on this grim work. Its Central Committee
+passed sentences of death upon certain officials, and its decrees were
+carried out by the members of its Fighting Organization. To this
+organization within the party belonged many of the ablest and most
+consecrated men and women in Russia.
+
+A few illustrations will suffice to make clear the nature of this
+terroristic retaliation: In March, 1902, Sypiagin, the Minister of the
+Interior, was shot down as he entered his office by a member of the
+Fighting Organization, Stephen Balmashev, who was disguised as an officer.
+Sypiagin had been duly sentenced to death by the Central Committee. He had
+been responsible for upward of sixty thousand political arrests and for the
+suffering of many exiles. Balmashev went to his death with heroic
+fortitude. In May, 1903, Gregory Gershuni and two associates executed the
+reactionary Governor of Ufa. Early in June, 1904, Borikov, Governor-General
+of Finland, was assassinated by a revolutionist. A month later, July 15th,
+the infamous Von Plehve, who had been judged by the Central Committee and
+held responsible for the Kishinev pogrom, was killed by a bomb thrown under
+the wheels of his carriage by Sazanov, a member of the Fighting Force. The
+death of this cruel tyrant thrilled the world. In February, 1905, Ivan
+Kaliaiev executed the death sentence which had been passed upon the
+ruthless Governor-General of Moscow, the Grand-Duke Serghei Alexandrovich.
+
+There was war in Russia--war between two systems of organized terrorism.
+Sometimes the Czar and his Ministers weakened and promised concessions, but
+always there was speedy reaction and, usually, an increased vigor of
+oppression. The assassination of Von Plehve, however, for the first time
+really weakened the government. Czarism was, in fact, already toppling. The
+new Minister of the Interior, Von Plehve's successor, Prince
+Svyatpolk-Mirski, sought to meet the situation by a policy of compromise.
+While he maintained Von Plehve's methods of suppressing the radical
+organizations and their press, and using provocative agents to entrap
+revolutionary leaders, he granted a certain degree of freedom to the
+moderate press and adopted a relatively liberal attitude toward the
+zemstvos. By this means he hoped to avert the impending revolution.
+
+Taking advantage of the new conditions, the leaders of the zemstvos
+organized a national convention. This the government forbade, but it had
+lost much of its power and the leaders of the movement ignored the order
+and proceeded to hold the convention. At this convention, held at St.
+Petersburg, November 6, 1904, attended by many of the ablest lawyers,
+doctors, professors, scientists, and publicists in Russia, a resolution was
+adopted demanding that the government at once call representatives of the
+people together for the purpose of setting up a constitutional government
+in Russia. It was a revolutionary act, a challenge to the autocracy, which
+the latter dared not accept. On the contrary, in December the Czar issued
+an ambiguous ukase in which a number of concessions and reforms were
+promised, but carefully avoiding the fundamental issues at stake.
+
+
+VI
+
+Meanwhile the war with Japan, unpopular from the first, had proved to be an
+unbroken series of military defeats and disasters for Russia. From the
+opening of the war in February to the end of the year the press had been
+permitted to publish very little real news concerning it, but it was not
+possible to hide for long the bitter truth. Taxes mounted higher and
+higher, prices rose, and there was intense suffering, while the loss of
+life was enormous. News of the utter failure and incompetence of the army
+and the navy seeped through. Here was Russia with a population three times
+as large as that of Japan, and with an annual budget of two billions as
+against Japan's paltry sixty millions, defeated at every turn. What did
+this failure signify? In the first place, it signified the weakness and
+utter incompetence of the regime. It meant that imperialist expansion, with
+a corresponding strengthening of the old regime, was out of the question.
+Most intelligent Russians, with no lack of real patriotism, rejoiced at the
+succession of defeats because it proved to the masses the unfitness of the
+bureaucracy.
+
+It signified something else, also. There were many who remembered the
+scandals of the Turkish War, in 1877, when Bessarabia was recovered. At
+that time there was a perfect riot of graft, corruption, and treachery,
+much of which came under the observation of the zemstvos of the border.
+High military officials trafficked in munitions and food-supplies. Food
+intended for the army was stolen and sold--sometimes, it was said, to the
+enemy. Materials were paid for, but never delivered to the army at all. The
+army was demoralized and the Turks repulsed the Russians again and again.
+Now similar stories began to be circulated. Returning victims told stories
+of brutal treatment of the troops by officers; of wounded and dying men
+neglected; of lack of hospital care and medical attention. They told worse
+stories, too, of open treachery by military officials and others; of army
+supplies stolen; of shells ordered which would fit no guns the Russian army
+ever had, and so on. It was suggested, and widely believed, that Germany
+had connived at the systematic corruption of the Russian bureaucracy and
+the Russian army, to serve its own imperialistic and economic ends.
+
+Such was the state of Russia at the end of the year 1904. Then came the
+tragic events of January, 1905, which marked the opening of the Revolution.
+In order to counteract the agitation of the Social Democrats among the city
+workers, and the formation by them of trades-unions, the government had
+caused to be formed "legal" unions--that is, organizations of workmen
+approved by the government. In order to give these organizations some
+semblance to real labor-unions, and thereby the better to deceive the
+workers, strikes were actually inspired by agents of the government from
+time to time. On more than one occasion strikes thus instigated by the
+government spread beyond control and caused great alarm. The Czar and his
+agents were playing with fire.
+
+Among such unions was the Gathering of Industrial Working-men of St.
+Petersburg, which had for its program such innocent and non-revolutionary
+objects as "sober and reasonable pastimes, aimed at physical, intellectual,
+and moral improvement; strengthening of Russian national ideas; development
+of sensible views concerning the rights and duties of working-men and
+improvement of labor conditions and mutual assistance." It was founded by
+Father Gapon, who was opposed to the revolutionary movement, and was
+regarded by the Socialists as a Czarist tool.
+
+On January 3d--Russian calendar--several thousand men belonging to the
+Gathering of Industrial Workin-gmen of St. Petersburg went out on strike.
+By the 6th the strike had assumed the dimensions of a general strike. It
+was estimated that on the latter date fully one hundred and forty thousand
+men were out on strike, practically paralyzing the industrial life of the
+city. At meetings of the strikers speeches were made which had as much to
+do with the political demands for constitutional government as with the
+original grievances of the strikers. The strike was fast becoming a
+revolution. On the 9th Father Gapon led the hosts to the Winter Palace, to
+present a petition to the Czar asking for reforms. The text of the petition
+was widely circulated beforehand. It begged the Czar to order immediately
+"that representatives of all the Russian land, of all classes and groups,
+convene." It outlined a moderate program which had the support of almost
+the entire nation with the exception of the bureaucracy:
+
+    Let every one be equal and free in the right of election; order to
+    this end that election for the Constituent Assembly be based on
+    general, equal, direct, and secret suffrage. This is our main
+    request; in it and upon it everything is founded; this is the only
+    ointment for our painful wounds; and in the absence of this our
+    blood will continue to flow constantly, carrying us swiftly toward
+    death.
+
+    But this measure alone cannot remedy all our wounds. Many others
+    are necessary, and we tell them to you, Sire, directly and openly,
+    as to our Father. We need:
+
+    _I. Measures to counteract the ignorance and legal oppression of
+    the Russian people_:
+
+    (1) Personal freedom and inviolability, freedom of speech and the
+    press, freedom of assemblage, freedom in religious affairs;
+
+    (2) General and compulsory public education at the expense of the
+    state;
+
+    (3) Responsibility of the Ministers to the people, and guaranties
+    of lawfulness in administration;
+
+    (4) Equality before the law for all without exemption;
+
+    (5) Immediate rehabilitation of those punished for their
+    convictions.
+
+    (6) Separation of the Church from the state.
+
+    _II. Measures against the poverty of the people_:
+
+    (1) Abolition of indirect taxes and introduction of direct income
+    taxes on a progressive scale;
+
+    (2) Abolition of the redemption payments, cheap credit, and
+    gradual transferring of the land to the people;
+
+    (3) The orders for the naval and military Ministers should be
+    filled in Russia and not abroad;
+
+    (4) The cessation of the war by the will of the people.
+
+    _III. Measures against oppression of labor by capital_:
+
+    (1) Protection of labor by legislation;
+
+    (2) Freedom of consumers' and producers' leagues and
+    trades-unions;
+
+    (3) An eight-hour workday and a regulation of overtime;
+
+    (4) Freedom of struggle against capital (freedom of labor
+    strikes);
+
+    (5) Participation of labor representatives in the framing of a
+    bill concerning state insurance of working-men;
+
+    (6) Normal wages.
+
+    Those are, Sire, the principal wants with which we have come to
+    you. Let your decree be known, swear that you will satisfy them,
+    and you will make Russia happy and glorious, and your name will be
+    branded in our hearts and in the hearts of our posterity for ever
+    and ever. If, however, you will not reply to our prayer, we shall
+    die here, on the place before your palace. We have no other refuge
+    and no other means. We have two roads before us, one to freedom
+    and happiness, the other to the grave. Tell us, Sire, which, and
+    we will follow obediently, and if it be the road of death, let our
+    lives be a sacrifice for suffering-wearied Russia. We do not
+    regret the sacrifice; we bring it willingly.
+
+Led on by the strange, hypnotic power of the mystical Father Gapon, who was
+clad in the robes of his office, tens of thousands of working-people
+marched that day to the Winter Palace, confident that the Czar would see
+them, receive their petitions, and harken to their prayers. It was not a
+revolutionary demonstration in the accepted sense of that term; the
+marchers did not carry red flags nor sing Socialist songs of revolt.
+Instead, they bore pictures of the Czar and other members of the royal
+family and sang "God Save the Czar" and other well-known religious hymns.
+No attempt was made to prevent the procession from reaching the square in
+front of the Winter Palace. Suddenly, without a word of warning, troops
+appeared from the courtyards, where they were hidden, and fired into the
+crowded mass of human beings, killing more than five hundred and wounding
+nearly three thousand. All who were able to do so turned and fled, among
+them Father Gapon.
+
+Bloody Sunday, as the day is known in Russian annals, is generally regarded
+as the beginning of the First Revolution. Immediately people began to talk
+of armed resistance. On the evening of the day of the tragedy there was a
+meeting of more than seven hundred Intellectuals at which the means for
+carrying on revolution was the topic discussed. This was the first of many
+similar gatherings which took place all over Russia. Soon the Intellectuals
+began to organize unions, ostensibly for the protection of their
+professional interests, but in reality for political purposes. There were
+unions of doctors, writers, lawyers, engineers, professors, editors, and so
+on. Quietly, and almost without design, there was being effected another
+and more important union, namely, the union of all classes against
+autocracy and despotism.
+
+The Czar gave from his private purse fifty thousand rubles for the relief
+of the families of the victims of Bloody Sunday. On the 19th of January he
+received a deputation of carefully selected "loyal" working-men and
+delivered to them a characteristic homily, which infuriated the masses by
+its stupid perversion of the facts connected with the wanton massacre of
+Bloody Sunday. Then, at the end of the month, he proclaimed the appointment
+of a commission to "investigate the causes of labor unrest in St.
+Petersburg and its suburbs and to find means of avoiding them in the
+future." This commission was to consist of representatives of capital and
+labor. The working-men thereupon made the following demands:
+
+(1) That labor be given an equal number of members in the commission with
+capital;
+
+(2) That the working-men be permitted to freely elect their own
+representatives;
+
+(3) That the sessions of the commission be open to the public;
+
+(4) That there be complete freedom of speech for the representatives of
+labor in the commission;
+
+(5) That all the working-people arrested on January 9th be released.
+
+These demands of the working-men's organizations were rejected by the
+government, whereupon the workers agreed to boycott the commission and
+refuse to have anything to do with it. At last it became evident to the
+government that, in the circumstances, the commission could not accomplish
+any good, and it was therefore abandoned. The Czar and his advisers were
+desperate and vacillating. One day they would adopt a conciliatory attitude
+toward the workers, and the next day follow it up with fresh measures of
+repression and punishment.
+
+Little heeding the stupid charge by the Holy Synod that the revolutionary
+leaders were in the pay of the Japanese, the workers went on organizing and
+striking. All over Russia there were strikes, the movement had spread far
+beyond the bounds of St. Petersburg. General strikes took place in many of
+the large cities, such as Riga, Vilna, Libau, Warsaw, Lodz, Batum, Minsk,
+Tiflis, and many others. Conflicts between strikers and soldiers and police
+were common. Russia was aflame with revolution. The movement spread to the
+peasants in a most surprising manner. Numerous extensive and serious
+revolts of peasants occurred in different parts of Russia, the peasants
+looting the mansions of the landowners, and indulging in savage outbreaks
+of rioting.
+
+While this was going on the army was being completely demoralized. The
+terrible defeat of the Russian forces by the Japanese--the foe that had
+been so lightly regarded--at Mukden was a crushing blow which greatly
+impaired the morale of the troops, both those at home and those at the
+front. Disaster followed upon disaster. May saw the destruction of the
+great Russian fleet. In June rebellion broke out in the navy, and the crew
+of the battle-ship _Potyamkin_, which was on the Black Sea, mutinied and
+hoisted the red flag. After making prisoners of their officers, the sailors
+hastened to lend armed assistance to striking working-men at Odessa who
+were in conflict with soldiers and police.
+
+
+VII
+
+It was a time of turbulent unrest and apparent utter confusion. It was not
+easy to discern the underlying significance and purpose of some of the most
+important events. On every hand there were strikes and uprisings, many of
+them without any sort of leadership or plan. Strikes which began over
+questions of wages and hours became political demonstrations in favor of a
+Constituent Assembly. On the other hand, political demonstrations became
+transformed, without any conscious effort on the part of anybody, into
+strikes for immediate economic betterment. There was an intense class
+conflict going on in Russia, as the large number of strikes for increased
+wages and shorter hours proved, yet the larger political struggle dwarfed
+and obscured the class struggle. For the awakened proletariat of the
+cities the struggle in which they were engaged was economic as well as
+political. They wisely regarded the political struggle as part of the class
+struggle, as Plechanov and his friends declared it to be. Yet the fact
+remained that the capitalist class against which the proletariat was
+fighting on the economic field was, for the most part, fighting against
+autocracy, for the overthrow of Czarism and the establishment of political
+democracy, as earnestly, if less violently, than the proletariat was. The
+reason for this was the recognition by the leading capitalists of Russia of
+the fact that industrial progress was retarded by the old regime, and that
+capitalist development requires popular education, a relatively high
+standard of living, political freedom, and stability and order in
+government. It was perfectly natural, therefore, for the great associations
+of manufacturers and merchants to unite in urging the government to grant
+extensive political reforms so long as the class conflict was merely
+incidental.
+
+What had begun mainly as a class war had become the war of all classes
+against autocracy. Of course, in such a merging of classes there
+necessarily appeared many shadings and degrees of interest. Not all the
+social groups and classes were as radical in their demands as the organized
+peasants and city workers, who were the soul of the revolutionary movement.
+There were, broadly speaking, two great divisions of social life with which
+the Revolution was concerned--the political and the economic. With regard
+to the first there was practical unanimity; he would be a blind slave to
+theoretical formulae who sought to maintain the thesis that class interests
+divided masses and classes here. All classes, with the exception of the
+bureaucracy, wanted the abolition of Czarism and Absolutism and the
+establishment of a constitutional government, elected by the people on a
+basis of universal suffrage, and directly responsible to the electorate.
+
+Upon the economic issue there was less agreement, though all parties and
+classes recognized the need of extensive change. It was universally
+recognized that some solution of the land question must be found. There can
+never be social peace or political stability in Russia until that problem
+is settled. Now, it was easy for the Socialist groups, on the one hand, and
+the moderate groups, upon the other, to unite in demanding that the large
+estates be divided among the peasants. But while the Socialist
+groups--those of the peasants as well as those of city workers--demanded
+that the land be taken without compensation, the bourgeois elements,
+especially the leaders of the zemstvos, insisted that the state should pay
+compensation for the land taken. Judgment upon this vital question has long
+been embittered by the experience of the peasants with the "redemption
+payments" which were established when serfdom was abolished. During the
+period of greatest intensity, the summer of 1905, a federation of the
+various revolutionary peasants' organizations was formed and based its
+policy upon the middle ground of favoring the payment of compensation _in
+some cases_.
+
+All through this trying period the Czar and his advisers were temporizing
+and attempting to obtain peace by means of petty concessions. A greater
+degree of religious liberty was granted, and a new representative body, the
+Imperial Duma, was provided for. This body was not to be a parliament in
+any real sense, but a debating society. It could _discuss_ proposed
+legislation, but it had no powers to _enact_ legislation of any kind.
+Absolutism was dying hard, clinging to its powers with remarkable tenacity.
+Of course, the concessions did not satisfy the revolutionists, not even
+the most moderate sections, and the net result was to intensify rather than
+to diminish the flame.
+
+On the 2d of August--10th, according to the old Russian calendar--the war
+with Japan came to an end with the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth.
+Russia had experienced humiliating and disastrous defeat at the hands of a
+nation far inferior in population and wealth, but infinitely superior in
+military capacity and morale. The news of the conditions of peace
+intensified the ardor and determination of the revolting Russian people
+and, on the other hand, added to the already great weakness of the
+government. September witnessed a great revival of revolutionary agitation,
+and by the end of the month a fresh epidemic of strikes had broken out in
+various parts of the country. By the middle of October the whole life of
+Russia, civil, industrial, and commercial, was a chaos. In some of the
+cities the greater part of the population had placed themselves in a state
+of siege, under revolutionary leadership.
+
+On the 17th of October--Russian style--the Czar issued the famous Manifesto
+which acknowledged the victory of the people and the death of Absolutism.
+After the usual amount of pietistic verbiage by way of introduction the
+Manifesto said:
+
+    We make it the duty of the government to execute our firm will:
+
+    (1) To grant the people the unshakable foundations of civic
+    freedom on the basis of real personal inviolability, freedom of
+    conscience, of speech, of assemblage of unions.
+
+    (2) To admit now to participation in the Imperial Duma, without
+    stopping the pending elections and in so far as it is feasible in
+    the short time remaining before the convening of the Duma, all the
+    classes of the population, _leaving the farther development of the
+    principle of universal suffrage to the new legislative order._
+
+    (3) _To establish as an unshakable rule that no law can become
+    binding without the consent of the Imperial Duma, and that the
+    representatives of the people must be guaranteed a real
+    participation in the control over the lawfulness of the
+    authorities appointed by us_.
+
+    We call upon all faithful sons of Russia to remember their duty to
+    their fatherland, to aid in putting an end to the unprecedented
+    disturbances, and to exert with us all their power to restore
+    quiet and peace in our native land.
+
+
+VIII
+
+The Czar's Manifesto rang through the civilized world. In all lands it was
+hailed as the end of despotism and the triumph of democracy and freedom.
+The joy of the Russian people was unbounded. At last, after fourscore years
+of heroic struggle and sacrifice by countless heroes, named and nameless,
+the goal of freedom was attained. Men, women, and children sang in the
+streets to express their joy. Red flags were displayed everywhere and
+solemnly saluted by the officers and men of the Czar's army. But the
+rejoicing was premature, as the events of a few hours clearly proved. With
+that fatal vacillation which characterized his whole life, Nicholas II had
+no sooner issued his Manifesto than he surrendered once more to the evil
+forces by which he was surrounded and harked back to the old ways. The day
+following the issuance of the Manifesto, while the people were still
+rejoicing, there began a series of terrible pogroms. The cry went forth,
+"Kill the Intellectuals and the Jews!"
+
+There had been organized in support of the government, and by its agents,
+bodies of so-called "patriots." These were, in the main, recruited from the
+underworld, a very large number of them being criminals who were released
+from the prison for the purpose. Officially known as the Association of
+the Russian People and the Association to Combat the Revolution, these
+organizations were popularly nicknamed the Black Hundreds. Most of the
+members were paid directly by the government for their services, while
+others were rewarded with petty official positions. The Czar himself
+accepted membership in these infamous organizations of hired assassins.
+Within three weeks after the issuance of the Manifesto more than a hundred
+organized pogroms took place, the number of killed amounting to nearly four
+thousand; the wounded to more than ten thousand, according to the most
+competent authorities. In Odessa alone more than one thousand persons were
+killed and many thousands wounded in a four-days' massacre. In all the
+bloody pages of the history of the Romanovs there is nothing comparable to
+the frightful terror of this period.
+
+Naturally, this brutal vengeance and the deception which Nicholas II and
+his advisers had practised upon the people had the immediate effect of
+increasing the relative strength and prestige of the Socialists in the
+revolutionary movement as against the less radical elements. To meet such
+brutality and force only the most extreme measures were deemed adequate.
+The Council of Workmen's Deputies, which had been organized by the
+proletariat of St. Petersburg a few days before the Czar issued his
+Manifesto, now became a great power, the central guiding power of the
+Revolution. Similar bodies were organized in other great cities. The
+example set by the city workers was followed by the peasants in many places
+and Councils of Peasants' Deputies were organized. In a few cases large
+numbers of soldiers, making common cause with these bodies representing the
+working class, formed Councils of Soldiers' Deputies. Here, then, was a new
+phenomenon; betrayed by the state, weary of the struggle to democratize
+and liberalize the political state, the workers had established a sort of
+revolutionary self-government of a new kind, entirely independent of the
+state. We shall never comprehend the later developments in Russia,
+especially the phenomenon of Bolshevism, unless we have a sympathetic
+understanding of these Soviets--autonomous, non-political units of
+working-class self-government, composed of delegates elected directly by
+the workers.
+
+As the revolutionary resistance to the Black Hundreds increased, and the
+rapidly growing Soviets of workmen's, peasants' and soldiers' delegates
+asserted a constantly increasing indifference to the existing political
+state, the government again tried to stem the tide by making concessions.
+On November 3d--new style--in a vain attempt to appease the incessant
+demand for the release of the thousands of political prisoners, and to put
+an end to the forcible release of such prisoners by infuriated mobs, a
+partial amnesty was declared. On the 16th a sop was thrown to the peasants
+in the shape of a decree abolishing all the remaining land-redemption
+payments. Had this reform come sooner it might have had the effect of
+stemming the tide of revolt among the peasants, but in the circumstances it
+was of no avail. Early in December the press censorship was abolished by
+decree, but that was of very little importance, for the radical press had
+thrown off all its restraints, simply ignoring the censorship. The
+government of Nicholas II was quite as helpless as it was tyrannical,
+corrupt, and inefficient. The army and navy, demoralized by the defeat
+suffered at the hands of Japan, and especially by knowledge of the
+corruption in high places which made that defeat inevitable, were no longer
+dependable. Tens of thousands of soldiers and marines had joined with the
+workmen in the cities in open rebellion. Many more indulged themselves in
+purposeless rioting.
+
+The organization of the various councils of delegates representing
+factory-workers and peasants, inevitable as it seemed to be, had one
+disastrous effect, the seriousness of which cannot be overstated. As we
+have seen, the cruel, blundering policy of the government had united all
+classes against it in a revolutionary movement of unexampled magnitude.
+Given the conditions prevailing in Russia, and especially the lack of
+industrial development and the corresponding numerical weakness of the
+industrial proletariat, it was evident that the only chance of success in
+the Revolution lay in the united effort of all classes against the old
+regime. Nothing could have better served the autocracy, and therefore
+injured the revolutionary cause, than the creation of a division in the
+ranks of the revolutionists.
+
+This was exactly what the separate organizations of the working class
+accomplished. All the provocative agents of the Czar could not have
+contrived anything so serviceable to the reaction. _Divide et impera_ has
+been the guiding principle of cunning despots in all ages, and the astutest
+advisers of Nicholas II must have grinned with Satanic glee when they
+realized how seriously the forces they were contending against were
+dividing. Stupid oppression had driven into one united force the
+wage-earning and wage-paying classes. Working-men and manufacturers made
+common cause against that stupid oppression. Now, however, as the
+inevitable result of the organization of the Soviets, and the predominance
+of these in the Revolution, purely economic issues came to the front. In
+proportion as the class struggle between employers and employed was
+accentuated the common struggle against autocracy was minimized and
+obscured. Numerous strikes for increased wages occurred, forcing the
+employers to organize resistance. Workers in one city--St. Petersburg, for
+example--demanded the immediate introduction of an eight-hour workday, and
+proclaimed it to be in force, quite regardless of the fact that longer
+hours prevailed elsewhere and that, given the competitive system, their
+employers were bound to resist a demand that would be a handicap favoring
+their competitors.
+
+As might have been foreseen, the employers were forced to rely upon the
+government, the very government they had denounced and conspired to
+overthrow. The president of the Council of Workmen's Deputies of St.
+Petersburg, Chrustalev-Nosar, in his _History of the Council of Workmen's
+Deputies_, quotes the order adopted by acclamation on November 11th--new
+style--introducing, from November 13th, an eight-hour workday in all shops
+and factories "in a revolutionary way." By way of commentary, he quotes a
+further order, adopted November 25, repealing the former order and
+declaring:
+
+    The government, headed by Count Witte, _in its endeavor to break
+    the vigor of the revolutionary proletariat, came to the support of
+    capital_, thus turning the question of an eight-hour workday in
+    St. Petersburg into a national problem. The consequence has been
+    that the working-men of St. Petersburg are unable now, apart from
+    the working-men of the entire country, to realize the decree of
+    the Council. The Council of Workmen's Deputies, therefore, deems
+    it necessary to _stop temporarily the immediate and general
+    establishment of an eight-hour workday by force_.
+
+The Councils inaugurated general strike after general strike. At first
+these strikes were successful from a revolutionary point of view. Soon,
+however, it became apparent that the general strike is a weapon which can
+only be used effectively on rare occasions. It is impossible to rekindle
+frequently and at will the sacrificial passion necessary to make a
+successful general strike. This the leaders of the proletariat of Russia
+overlooked. They overlooked, also, the fact that the masses of the workers
+were exhausted by the long series of strikes in which they had engaged and
+were on the verge of starvation. The consequence was that most of the later
+strikes failed to accomplish anything like the ends sought.
+
+Naturally, the government was recovering its confidence and its courage in
+proportion to the class divisions and antagonisms of the opposition. It
+once more suppressed the revolutionary press and prohibited meetings. Once
+more it proclaimed martial law in many cities. With all its old-time
+assurance it caused the arrest of the leaders of the unions of workmen and
+peasants, broke up the organizations and imprisoned their officers. It
+issued a decree which made it a crime to participate in strikes. With the
+full sanction of the government, as was shown by the publication of
+documentary evidence of unquestioned authenticity, the Black Hundreds
+renewed their brutality. The strong Council of Workmen's Deputies of St.
+Petersburg, with which Witte had dealt as though it were part of the
+government itself, was broken up and suppressed. Witte wanted
+constitutional government on the basis of the October Manifesto, but he
+wanted the orderly development of Russian capitalism. In this attitude he
+was supported, of course, by the capitalist organizations. The very men who
+in the summer of 1905 had demanded that the government grant the demands of
+the workers and so end the strikes, and who worked in unison with the
+workers to secure the much-desired political freedom, six months later were
+demanding that the government suppress the strikes and exert its force to
+end disorder.
+
+Recognition of these facts need not imply any lack of sympathy with the
+proletariat in their demands. The class struggle in modern industrial
+society is a fact, and there is abundant justification--the justification
+of necessity and of achievement--for aggressive class consciousness and
+class warfare. But it is quite obvious that there are times when class
+interests and class warfare must be set aside in favor of larger social
+interests. It is obviously dangerous and reactionary--and therefore
+wrong--to insist upon strikes or other forms of class warfare in moments of
+great calamity, as, for example, during disasters like the Johnstown flood
+and the Messina earthquake, or amid the ravages of a pestilential plague.
+Marx, to whom we owe the formulation of the theory of class struggle which
+has guided the Socialist movement, would never have questioned this
+important truth; he would never have supported class separatism under
+conditions such as those prevailing in Russia at the end of 1905. Only
+doctrinaires, slaves to formulae, but blind to reality, could have
+sanctioned such separatism. But doctrinaires always abound in times of
+revolution.
+
+By December the government was stronger than it had been at any time since
+the Revolution began. The zemstvos were no longer an active part of the
+revolutionary movement. Indeed, there had come over these bodies a great
+change, and most of them were now dominated by relatively reactionary
+landowners who, hitherto apathetic and indifferent, had been stirred to
+defensive action by the aggressive class warfare of the workers.
+Practically all the bourgeois moderates had been driven to the more or less
+open support of the government. December witnessed a new outburst in St.
+Petersburg, Moscow, and other cities. Barricades were raised in the streets
+in many places. In Moscow, where the most bitter and sanguinary struggles
+took place, more than a thousand persons were killed. The government was
+better prepared than the workers; the army had recovered no little of its
+lost morale and did not refuse to shoot down the workers as it had done on
+previous occasions. The strikes and insurrections were put down in bloody
+vengeance and there followed a reign of brutal repression indescribably
+horrible and savage. By way of protest and retaliation, there were
+individual acts of terrorism, such as the execution of the Governor of
+Tambov by Marie Spiridonova, but these were of little or no avail. The
+First Revolution was drowned in blood and tears.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+FROM REVOLUTION TO REVOLUTION
+
+
+I
+
+No struggle for human freedom was ever wholly vain. No matter how vast and
+seemingly complete the failure, there is always something of enduring good
+achieved. That is the law of progress, universal and immutable. The First
+Russian Revolution conformed to the law; it had failed and died in a tragic
+way, yet its failure was relative and it left something of substantial
+achievement as the foundation for fresh hope, courage, and effort. Czarism
+had gathered all its mighty black forces and seemed, at the beginning of
+1906, to be stronger than at any time in fifty years. The souls of Russia's
+noblest and best sons and daughters were steeped in bitter pessimism. And
+yet there was reason for hope and rejoicing; out of the ruin and despair
+two great and supremely vital facts stood in bold, challenging relief.
+
+The first of these facts was the new aspect of Czarism, its changed status.
+Absolutism as a legal institution was dead. Nothing that Nicholas II and
+his advisers were able to do could undo the constitutional changes effected
+when the imperial edict made it part of the fundamental law of the nation
+that "no law can become binding without the consent of the Imperial Duma,"
+and that the Duma, elected by the people, had the right to control the
+actions of the officials of the government, even when such officials were
+appointed by the Czar himself. Absolutism was illegal now. Attempts might
+be made to reintroduce it, and, indeed, that was the real significance of
+the policy pursued by the government, but Absolutism could no longer
+possess the moral strength that inheres in the sanctity of law. In fighting
+it the Russian people now had that strength upon their side.
+
+The second vital and hopeful fact was likewise a moral force. Absolutism
+with all its assumed divine prerogatives, in the person of the Czar, had
+declared its firm will "to grant the people the unshakable foundations of
+civic freedom on the basis of real personal inviolability, freedom of
+conscience, of speech, of assemblage and of unions." This civic freedom
+Absolutism had sanctioned. By that act it gave the prestige of legality to
+such assemblages, discussions, and publications as had always hitherto been
+forced to accept risks and disabilities inseparable from illegal conduct.
+Civic freedom had long been outlawed, a thing associated with lawlessness
+and crime, and so long as that condition remained many who believed in
+civic freedom itself, who wanted a free press, freedom of public assemblage
+and of conscience in matters pertaining to religion, were kept from
+participation in the struggle. Respect for law, as law, is deeply rooted in
+civilized mankind--a fact which, while it makes the task of the
+revolutionist hard, and at times impedes progress, is, nevertheless, of
+immense value to human society.
+
+Civic freedom was not yet a fact. It seemed, as a reality, to be as far
+away as ever. Meetings were forbidden by officials and broken up by
+soldiers and police; newspapers were suppressed, as of old; labor-unions,
+and even the unions of the Intellectuals, were ruthlessly persecuted and
+treated as conspiracies against the state. All this and more was true and
+discouraging. Yet there was substantial gain: civic freedom as a practical
+fact did not exist, but civic freedom as a lawful right lived in the minds
+of millions of people--the greatest fact in Russia. The terms of the
+Manifesto of October 17th--Absolutism's solemn covenant with the
+nation--had not been repealed, and the nation knew that the government did
+not dare to repeal it. Not all the Czar's armies and Black Hundreds could
+destroy that consciousness of the lawful right to civic freedom. Nothing
+could restore the old condition. Whereas in the past the government, in
+suppressing the press and popular assemblages, could say to the people, "We
+uphold the law!" now when the government attempted these things, the people
+defiantly cried out, "You break the law!" Absolutism was no longer a thing
+of law.
+
+Nicholas II and all his bureaucrats could not return the chicken to the egg
+from which it had been hatched. They could not unsay the fateful words
+which called into being the Imperial Duma. The Revolution had put into
+their souls a terrible fear of the wrath of the people. The Czar and his
+government had to permit the election of the Duma to proceed, and yet,
+conscious of the fact that the success of the Duma inevitably meant the end
+of the old regime, they were bound, in self-protection, to attempt to kill
+the Duma in the hope that thereby they would kill, or at least paralyze,
+the Revolution itself. Thus it was, while not daring to forbid the
+elections for the Duma to proceed, the government adopted a Machiavellian
+policy.
+
+The essentials of that policy were these: on the one hand, the Duma was not
+to be seriously considered at all, when it should assemble. It would be
+ignored, if possible, and no attention paid to any of its deliberations or
+attempts to legislate. A certain amount of latitude would be given to it
+as a debating society, a sort of safety-valve, but that was all. If this
+policy could not be carried out in its entirety, if, for example, it should
+prove impossible to completely ignore the Duma, it would be easy enough to
+devise a mass of hampering restrictions and regulations which would render
+it impotent, and yet necessitate no formal repudiation of the October
+Manifesto. On the other hand, there was the possibility that the Duma might
+be captured and made a safe ally. The suffrage upon which the elections
+were to be based was most undemocratic and unjust, giving to the landlords
+and the prosperous peasants, together with the wealthy classes in the
+cities, an enormous preponderance in the electorate. By using the Black
+Hundreds to work among the electors--bribing, cajoling, threatening, and
+coercing, as the occasion might require--it might be possible to bring
+about the election of a Duma which would be a pliant and ready tool of the
+government.
+
+One of the favorite devices of the Black Hundreds was to send agents among
+the workers in the cities and among the peasants to discredit the Duma in
+advance, and to spread the idea that it would only represent the
+bourgeoisie. Many of the most influential Socialist leaders unfortunately
+preached the same doctrine. This was the natural and logical outcome of the
+separate action of the classes in the Revolution, and of the manner in
+which the proletariat had forced the economic struggle to the front during
+the political struggle. In the vanguard of the fight for the Duma were the
+Constitutional Democrats, led by Miliukov, Prince Lvov, and many prominent
+leaders of the zemstvos. The divorce between the classes represented by
+these men and the proletariat represented by the Social Democrats was
+absolute. It was not surprising that the leaders of the Social Democratic
+party should be suspicious and distrustful of the Constitutional Democrats
+and refuse to co-operate with them.
+
+But many of the Social Democrats went much farther than this, and, in the
+name of Socialism and proletarian class consciousness, adopted the same
+attitude toward the Duma itself as that which the agents of the Black
+Hundreds were urging upon the people. Among the Socialist leaders who took
+this position was Vladimir Ulyanov, the great propagandist whom the world
+knows to-day as Nikolai Lenine, Bolshevik Prime Minister and Dictator.
+Lenine urged the workers to boycott the Duma and to refuse to participate
+in the elections in any manner whatever. At a time when only a united
+effort by all classes could be expected to accomplish anything, and when
+such a victory of the people over the autocratic regime as might have been
+secured by united action would have meant the triumph of the Revolution,
+Lenine preached separatism. Unfortunately, his influence, even at that
+time, was very great and his counsels prevailed with a great many Socialist
+groups over the wiser counsels of Plechanov and others.
+
+It may be said, in explanation and extenuation of Lenine's course, that the
+boycotting of the elections was the logical outcome of the class antagonism
+and separatism, and that the bourgeois leaders were just as much
+responsible for the separatism as the leaders of the proletariat were. All
+this is true. It is quite true to say that wiser leadership of the
+manufacturing class in the critical days of 1905 would have made
+concessions and granted many of the demands of the striking workmen. By so
+doing they might have maintained unity in the political struggle. But, even
+if so much be granted, it is poor justification and defense of a Socialist
+policy to say that it was neither better nor worse, neither more stupid nor
+more wise, than that of the bourgeoisie! In the circumstances, Lenine's
+policy was most disastrous for Russia. It is not necessary to believe the
+charge that was made at the time and afterward that Lenine was in the pay
+of the government and a tool of the Black Hundreds. Subsequent incidents
+served to fasten grave suspicion upon him, but no one ever offered proof of
+corruption. In all probability, he was then, and throughout the later
+years, honest and sincere--a fanatic, often playing a dangerous game,
+unmoral rather than immoral, believing that the end he sought justified any
+means.
+
+
+II
+
+When the elections for the Duma were held, in March, 1906, the failure of
+the government's attempt to capture the body was complete. It was
+overwhelmingly a progressive parliament that had been elected. The
+Constitutional Democrats, upon a radical program, had elected the largest
+number of members, 178. Next came the representatives of the peasants'
+organizations, with a program of moderate Socialism, numbering 116. This
+group became known in the Duma as the Labor Group. A third group consisted
+of 63 representatives of border provinces, mostly advanced Liberals, called
+Autonomists, on account of their special interest in questions concerning
+local autonomy. There were only 28 avowed supporters of the government.
+Finally, despite the Socialist boycott of the elections, there were almost
+as many Socialists elected as there were supporters of the government.
+
+Once more Russia had spoken for democracy in no uncertain voice. And once
+more Czarism committed the incredible folly of attempting to stem the tide
+of democracy by erecting further measures of autocracy as a dam. Shortly
+before the time came for the assembling of the newly elected Duma, the
+Czar's government announced new fundamental laws which limited the powers
+of the Duma and practically reduced it to a farce. In the first place, the
+Imperial Council was to be reconstituted and set over the Duma as an upper
+chamber, or Senate, having equal rights with the Duma. Half of the members
+of the Imperial Council were to be appointed by the Czar and the other half
+elected from universities, zemstvos, bourses, and by the clergy and the
+nobility. In other words, over the Duma was to be set a body which could
+always be so manipulated as to insure the defeat of any measure displeasing
+to the old regime. And the Czar reserved to himself the power to summon or
+dissolve the Duma at will, as well as the power to declare war and to make
+peace and to enter into treaties with other nations. What a farce was this
+considered as a fulfilment of the solemn assurances given in October, 1905!
+
+But the reactionary madness went even farther; believing the revolutionary
+movement to have been crushed to such a degree that it might act with
+impunity, autocracy took other measures. Three days before the assembling
+of the Duma the Czar replaced his old Ministry by one still more
+reactionary. At the head of the Cabinet, as Prime Minister, he appointed
+the notorious reactionary bureaucrat, Goremykin. With full regard for the
+bloody traditions of the office, the infamous Stolypin, former Governor of
+Saratov, was made Minister of the Interior. At the head of the Department
+of Agriculture, which was charged with responsibility for dealing with
+agrarian problems, was placed Stishinsky, a large landowner, bitterly
+hostile to, and hated by, the peasants. The composition of the new Ministry
+was a defiance of the popular will and sentiment, and was so interpreted.
+
+The Duma opened on April 27th, at the Taurida Palace. St. Petersburg was a
+vast armed camp that day. Tens of thousands of soldiers, fully armed, were
+massed at different points in readiness to suppress any demonstrations by
+the populace. It was said that provocateurs moved among the people, trying
+to stir an uprising which would afford a pretext for action by the
+soldiers. The members of the Duma were first received by the Czar at the
+Winter Palace and addressed by him in a pompous speech which carefully
+avoided all the vital questions in which the Russian people were so keenly
+interested. It was a speech which might as well have been made by the first
+Czar Nicholas. But there was no need of words to tell what was in the mind
+of Nicholas II; that had been made quite evident by the new laws and the
+new Ministry. Before the Duma lay the heavy task of continuing the
+Revolution, despite the fact that the revolutionary army had been scattered
+as chaff is scattered before the winds.
+
+The first formal act of the Duma, after the opening ceremonies were
+finished, was to demand amnesty for all the political prisoners. The
+members of the Duma had come to the Taurida Palace that day through streets
+crowded with people who chanted in monotonous chorus the word "Amnesty."
+The oldest man in the assembly, I.I. Petrunkevitch, was cheered again and
+again as he voiced the popular demand on behalf of "those who have
+sacrificed their freedom to free our dear fatherland." There were some
+seventy-five thousand political prisoners in Russia at that time, the
+flower of Russian manhood and womanhood, treated as common criminals and,
+in many instances, subject to terrible torture. Well might Petrunkevitch
+proclaim: "All the prisons of our country are full. Thousands of hands are
+being stretched out to us in hope and supplication, and I think that the
+duty of our conscience compels us to use all the influence our position
+gives us to see that the freedom that Russia has won costs no more
+sacrifices ... I think, gentlemen ... we cannot refrain just now from
+expressing our deepest feelings, the cry of our heart--that free Russia
+demands the liberation of all prisoners." At the end of the eloquent appeal
+there was an answering cry of: "Amnesty!" "Amnesty!" The chorus of the
+streets was echoed in the Duma itself.
+
+There was no lack of courage in the Duma. One of its first acts was the
+adoption of an address in response to the speech delivered by the Czar to
+the members at the reception at the Winter Palace. The address was in
+reality a statement of the objects and needs of the Russian people, their
+program. It was a radical document, but moderately couched. It demanded
+full political freedom; amnesty for all who had been imprisoned for
+political reasons or for violations of laws in restriction of religious
+liberty; the abolition of martial law and other extraordinary measures;
+abolition of capital punishment; the abolition of the Imperial Council and
+democratization of the laws governing elections to the Duma; autonomy for
+Finland and Poland; the expropriation of state and private lands in the
+interest of the peasants; a comprehensive body of social legislation
+designed to protect the industrial workers. In a word, the program of the
+Duma was a broad and comprehensive program of political and social
+democracy, which, if enacted, would have placed Russia among the foremost
+democracies of the world.
+
+The boldness of the Duma program was a direct challenge to the government
+and was so interpreted by the Czar and his Ministers. By the reactionary
+press it was denounced as a conspiracy to hand the nation over to the
+Socialists. That it should have passed the Duma almost unanimously was an
+indication of the extent to which the liberal bourgeoisie represented by
+the Constitutional Democrats was prepared to go in order to destroy
+autocracy. No wonder that some of the most trusted Marxian Socialists in
+Russia were urging that it was the duty of the Socialists to co-operate
+with the Duma! Yet there was a section of the Marxists engaged in a
+constant agitation against the Duma, preaching the doctrine of the class
+struggle, but blind to the actual fact that the dominant issue was in the
+conflict between the democracy of the Duma and the autocracy of Czarism.
+
+The class consciousness of the old regime was much clearer and more
+intelligent. The Czar refused to receive the committee of the Duma,
+appointed to make formal presentation of the address. Then, on May 12th,
+Goremykin, the Prime Minister, addressed the Duma, making answer to its
+demands. On behalf of the government he rebuked the Duma for its
+unpatriotic conduct in a speech full of studied insult and contemptuous
+defiance. He made it quite clear that the government was not going to grant
+any reforms worthy of mention. More than that, he made it plain to the
+entire nation that Nicholas II and his bureaucracy would never recognize
+the Duma as an independent parliamentary body. Thus the old regime answered
+the challenge of the Duma.
+
+For seventy-two days the Duma worked and fought, seventy-two days of
+parliamentary history for which there is no parallel in the annals of
+parliamentary government. For the sake of the larger aims before it, the
+Duma carried out the demands of the government that it approve certain
+petty measures placed before it for the formality of its approval. On the
+other hand, it formulated and passed numerous measures upon its own
+initiative and demanded that they be recognized as laws of the land. Among
+the measures thus adopted were laws guaranteeing freedom of assemblage;
+equality of all citizens before the law; the right of labor organizations
+to exist and to conduct strikes; reform of judicial procedure in the
+courts; state aid for peasants suffering from crop failure and other
+agrarian reforms; the abolition of capital punishment. In addition to
+pursuing its legislative program, the Duma members voiced the country's
+protest against the shortcomings of the government, subjecting the various
+Ministers to searching interpellation, day after day.
+
+Not a single one of the measures adopted by the Duma received the support
+of the Imperial Council. This body was effectively performing the task for
+which it had been created. To the interpellations of the Duma the Czar's
+Ministers made the most insulting replies, when they happened to take any
+notice of them at all. All the old iniquities were resorted to by the
+government, supported, as always, by the reactionary press. The homes of
+members of the Duma were entered and searched by the police and every
+parliamentary right and privilege was flouted. Even the publication of the
+speeches delivered in the Duma was forbidden.
+
+The Duma had from the first maintained a vigorous protest against "the
+infamy of executions without trial, pogroms, bombardment, and
+imprisonment." Again and again it had been charged that pogroms were
+carried out under the protection of the government, in accordance with the
+old policy of killing the Jews and the Intellectuals. The answer of the
+government was--another pogrom of merciless savagery. On June 1st, at
+Byalostock, upward of eighty men, women, and children were killed, many
+more wounded, and scores of women, young and old, brutally outraged. The
+Duma promptly sent a commission to Byalostock to investigate and report
+upon the facts, and presently the commission made a report which proved
+beyond question the responsibility of the government for the whole brutal
+and bloody business. It was shown that the inflammatory manifestos calling
+upon the "loyal" citizens to make the attack were printed in the office of
+the Police Department; that soldiers in the garrison had been told days in
+advance when the pogrom would take place; and that in the looting and
+sacking of houses and shops, which occurred upon a large scale, officers of
+the garrison had participated. These revelations made a profound impression
+in Russia and throughout Europe.
+
+
+III
+
+The Duma finally brought upon itself the whole weight of Czarism when it
+addressed a special appeal to the peasants of the country in which it dealt
+with candor and sincerity with the great agrarian problems which bore upon
+the peasants so heavily. The appeal outlined the various measures which the
+Duma had tried to enact for the relief of the peasants, and the attitude of
+the Czar's Ministers. The many strong peasants' organizations, and their
+numerous representatives in the Duma, made the circulation of this appeal
+an easy matter. The government could not close these channels of
+communication, nor prevent the Duma's strong plea for lawful rights and
+against lawlessness by government officials from reaching the peasants.
+Only one method of defense remained to the Czar and his Ministers: On July
+9th, like a thunderbolt from the sky, came a new Manifesto from the Czar,
+dissolving the Duma. In the Manifesto all the old arrogance of Absolutism
+reappeared. A more striking contrast to the Manifesto of the previous
+October could not be readily imagined. The Duma was accused of having
+exceeded its rights by "investigating the actions of local authorities
+appointed by the Emperor," notwithstanding the fact that in the October
+Manifesto it had been solemnly covenanted "that the representatives of the
+people must be guaranteed a real participation in the control over the
+lawfulness of the authorities appointed by us." The Duma was condemned for
+"finding imperfections in the fundamental laws which can be altered only by
+the monarch's will" and for its "overtly lawless act of appealing to the
+people." The Manifesto charged that the growing unrest and lawlessness of
+the peasants were due to the failure of the Duma to ameliorate their
+conditions--and this in spite of the record!
+
+When the members of the Duma arrived at the Taurida Palace next day they
+found the place filled with troops who prevented their entrance. They were
+powerless. Some two hundred-odd members adjourned to Viborg, whence they
+issued an appeal to the people to defend their rights. These men were not
+Socialists, most of them belonging to the party of the Constitutional
+Democrats, but they issued an appeal to the people to meet the dissolution
+of the Imperial Duma by a firm refusal to pay taxes, furnish recruits for
+the army, or sanction the legality of any loans to the government. This was
+practically identical with the policy set forth in the Manifesto of the
+Executive Committee of the St. Petersburg Council of Workmen's Deputies at
+the beginning of the previous December, before the elections to the Duma.
+Now, however, the Socialists in the Duma--both the Social Democrats and the
+Socialist-Revolutionists--together with the semi-Socialist Labor Group,
+decided that it was not enough to appeal for passive resistance; that only
+an armed uprising could accomplish anything. They therefore appealed to
+the city proletariat, the peasants, the army, and the navy to rise in armed
+strength against the tyrannical regime.
+
+Neither appeal produced any noteworthy result. The response to the Viborg
+appeal was far less than that which followed the similar appeal of the St.
+Petersburg workmen in December. The signers of the appeal were arrested,
+sentenced to three months' imprisonment, and deprived of their electoral
+rights. To the appeal of the Duma Socialists there was likewise very little
+response, either from city workers, peasants, soldiers, or marines. Russia
+was struggle-weary. The appeals fell upon the ears of a cowed and beaten
+populace. The two documents served only to emphasize one fact, namely, that
+capacity and daring to attempt active and violent resistance was still
+largely confined to the working-class representatives. In appealing to the
+workers to meet the attacks of the government with armed resistance, the
+leaders of the peasants and the city proletariat were ready to take their
+places in the vanguard of the fight. On the other hand, the signers of the
+Viborg appeal for passive resistance manifested no such determination or
+desire, though they must have known that passive resistance could only be a
+temporary phase, that any concerted action by the people to resist the
+collection of taxes and recruiting for the army would have led to attack
+and counter-attack-to a violent revolution.
+
+Feeling perfectly secure, the government, while promising the election of
+another Duma, carried on a policy of vigorous repression of all radical and
+revolutionary agitation and organization. Executions without trial were
+almost daily commonplaces. Prisoners were mercilessly tortured, and, in
+many cases, flogged to death. Hundreds of persons, of both sexes, many of
+them simple bourgeois-liberals and not revolutionists in any sense of the
+word, were exiled to Siberia. The revolutionary organizations of the
+workers were filled with spies and provocateurs, an old and effective
+method of destroying their morale. In all the provinces of Russia field
+court martial was proclaimed. Field court martial is more drastic than
+ordinary court martial and practically amounts to condemnation without
+trial, for trials under it are simply farcical, since neither defense nor
+appeal is granted. Nearly five hundred revolutionists were put to death
+under this system, many of them without even the pretense of a trial.
+
+The Black Hundreds were more active than ever, goaded on by the Holy Synod.
+Goremykin resigned as Premier and his place was taken by the unspeakably
+cruel and bloodthirsty Stolypin, whose "hemp neckties," as the grim jest of
+the masses went, circled the necks of scores of revolutionists swinging
+from as many gallows. There were many resorts to terrorism on the part of
+the revolutionists during the summer of 1906, many officials paying for the
+infamies of the government with their lives. How many of these "executions"
+were genuine revolutionary protests, and how many simple murders instigated
+or committed by provocative agents for the purpose of discrediting the
+revolutionists and affording the government excuses for fresh infamies,
+will perhaps never be known. Certainly, in many cases, there was no
+authorization by any revolutionary body.
+
+In February, 1907, the elections for the Second Duma were held under a
+reign of terror. The bureaucracy was determined to have a "safe and sane"
+body this time, and resorted to every possible nefarious device to attain
+that end. Whole masses of electors whose right to vote had been established
+at the previous election were arbitrarily disfranchised. While every
+facility was given to candidates openly favoring the government, including
+the Octobrists, every possible obstacle was placed in the way of radical
+candidates, especially Socialists. The meetings of the latter were, in
+hundreds of cases, prohibited; in other hundreds of cases they were broken
+up by the Black Hundreds and the police. Many of the most popular
+candidates were arrested and imprisoned without trial, as were members of
+their campaign committees. Yet, notwithstanding all these things, the
+Second Duma was, from the standpoint of the government, worse than the
+first. The Socialists, adopting the tactics of Plechanov, against the
+advice of Lenine, his former pupil and disciple, had decided not to boycott
+the elections this time, but to participate in them. When the returns were
+published it was found that the Social Democrats and the
+Socialist-Revolutionists had each elected over sixty deputies, the total
+being nearly a third of the membership--455. In addition there were some
+ninety members in the peasants' Labor Group, which were semi-Socialist.
+There were 117 Constitutional Democrats. The government supporters,
+including the Octobrists, numbered less than one hundred.
+
+From the first the attitude of the government toward the new Duma was one
+of contemptuous arrogance. "The Czar's Hangman," Stolypin, lectured the
+members as though they were naughty children, forbidding them to invite
+experts to aid them in framing measures, or to communicate with any of the
+zemstvos or municipal councils upon any questions whatsoever. "The Duma was
+not granted the right to express disapproval, reproach, or mistrust of the
+government," he thundered. To the Duma there was left about as much real
+power as is enjoyed by the "governments" of our "juvenile republics."
+
+As a natural consequence of these things, the Second Duma paid less
+attention to legislation than the First Duma had done, and gave its time
+largely to interpellations and protests. Partly because of the absence of
+some of the most able leaders they had had in the First Duma, and partly to
+the aggressive radicalism of the Socialists, which they could only
+half-heartedly approve at best, the Constitutional Democrats were less
+influential than in the former parliament. They occupied a middle
+ground--always a difficult position. The real fight was between the
+Socialists and the reactionaries, supporters of the government. Among the
+latter were perhaps a score of members belonging to the Black Hundreds,
+constituting the extreme right wing of the reactionary group. Between these
+and the Socialists of the extreme left the assembly was kept at fever
+pitch. The Black Hundreds, for the most part, indulged in violent tirades
+of abuse, often in the most disgusting profanity. The Socialists replied
+with proletarian passion and vigor, and riotous scenes were common. The
+Second Duma was hardly a deliberative assembly!
+
+On June 1st Stolypin threw a bombshell into the Duma by accusing the Social
+Democrats of having conspired to form a military plot for the overthrow of
+the government of Nicholas II. Evidence to this effect had been furnished
+to the Police Department by the spy and provocative agent, Azev. Of course
+there was no secret about the fact that the Social Democrats were always
+trying to bring about revolt in the army and the navy. They had openly
+proclaimed this, time and again. In the appeal issued at the time of the
+dissolution of the First Duma they had called upon the army and navy to
+rise in armed revolt. But the betrayal of their plans was a matter of some
+consequence. Azev himself had been loudest and most persistent in urging
+the work on. Stolypin demanded that all the Social Democrats be excluded
+permanently from the Duma and that sixteen of them be handed over to the
+government for imprisonment. The demand was a challenge to the whole Duma,
+since it called into question the right of the Duma to determine its own
+membership. Obviously, if members of parliament are to be dismissed
+whenever an autocratic government orders it, there is an end of
+parliamentary government. The demand created a tremendous sensation and
+gave rise to a long and exciting debate. Before it was ended, however,
+Nicholas II ordered the Duma dissolved. On June 3d the Second Duma met the
+fate of its predecessor, having lasted one hundred days.
+
+
+IV
+
+As on the former occasion, arrangements were at once begun to bring about
+the election of another and more subservient Duma. It is significant that
+throughout Nicholas II and his Cabinet recognized the imperative necessity
+of maintaining the institution in form. They dared not abolish it, greatly
+as they would have liked to do so. On the day that the Duma was dissolved
+the Czar, asserting his divine right to enact and repeal laws at will,
+disregarding again the solemn assurances of the October Manifesto, by edict
+changed the electoral laws, consulting neither the Duma nor the Imperial
+Council. This new law greatly decreased the representation of the city
+workers and the peasants in the Duma and correspondingly increased the
+representation of the rich landowners and capitalists. A docile and "loyal"
+Duma was thus made certain, and no one was very much surprised when the
+elections, held in September, resulted in an immense reactionary majority.
+When the Third Duma met on December 14, 1907, the reactionaries were as
+strong as the Socialist and Labor groups had been in the previous Duma,
+and of the reactionaries the group of members of the Black Hundreds was a
+majority.
+
+In the mean time there had been the familiar rule of brutal reaction. Most
+of the Social Democratic members of the Second Duma were arrested and
+condemned for high treason, being sent to prison and to Siberia. New laws
+and regulations restricting the press were proclaimed and enforced with
+increasing severity. By comparison with the next two years, the period from
+1905 to 1907 was a period of freedom. After the election of the Third Duma
+the bureaucracy grew ever bolder. Books and leaflets which had been
+circulated openly and with perfect freedom during 1905 and 1906 were
+forbidden, and, moreover, their authors were arrested and sentenced to long
+terms of imprisonment. While the law still granted freedom of assemblage
+and the right to organize meetings, these rights did not exist as
+realities. Everywhere the Black Hundreds held sway, patronized by the Czar,
+who wore their emblem and refused to permit the punishment of any of their
+members, even though they might be found guilty by the courts.
+
+It is not necessary to dwell upon the work of the Third Duma. This is not a
+history of Russia, and a detailed study of the servile parliament of
+Nicholas II and Stolypin would take us too far afield from our special
+study--the revolutionary movement. Suffice it, therefore, to say that some
+very useful legislation, necessary to the economic development of Russia,
+was enacted, and that, despite the overwhelming preponderance of
+reactionaries, it was not an absolutely docile body. On several occasions
+the Third Duma exercised the right of criticism quite vigorously, and on
+two or three occasions acted in more or less open defiance of the wishes of
+the government. A notable instance of this was the legislation of 1909,
+considerably extending freedom of religious organization and worship, which
+was, however, greatly curtailed later by the Imperial Council--and then
+nullified by the government.
+
+The period 1906-14 was full of despair for sensitive and aspiring souls.
+The steady and rapid rise in the suicide-rate bore grim and eloquent
+testimony to the character of those years of dark repression. The number of
+suicides in St. Petersburg increased during the period 1905-08 more than
+400 per cent.; in Moscow about 800 per cent.! In the latter city two-fifths
+of the suicides in 1908 were of persons less than twenty years old! And
+yet, withal, there was room for hope, the soul of progress was not dead. In
+various directions there was a hopeful and promising growth. First among
+these hopeful and promising facts was the marvelous growth of the
+Consumers' Co-operatives. After 1905 began the astonishing increase in the
+number of these important organizations, which continued, year after year,
+right up to the Revolution of 1917. In 1905 there were 4,479 such
+co-operatives in Russia; in 1911 there were 19,253. Another hopeful sign
+was the steadily increasing literacy of the masses. Statistics upon this
+point are almost worthless. Russian official statistics are notoriously
+defective and the figures relating to literacy are peculiarly so, but the
+leaders of Russian Socialism have attested to the fact. In this connection
+it is worthy of note that, according to the most authentic official
+records, the number of persons subscribing to the public press grew in a
+single year, from 1908 to 1909, fully 25 per cent. Education and
+organization were going on, hand in hand.
+
+Nor was agitation dead. In the Duma the Socialist and Labor parties and
+groups, knowing that they had no chance to enact their program, made the
+Duma a rostrum from which to address the masses throughout the nation.
+Sometimes, indeed, the newspapers were forbidden to print their speeches,
+but as a rule they were published, at least by the liberal papers, and so
+disseminated among the masses. In these speeches the Social Democrats,
+Socialist-Revolutionaries, Laborites, and more daring of the Constitutional
+Democrats mercilessly exposed the bureaucracy, so keeping the fires of
+discontent alive.
+
+
+V
+
+Of vast significance to mankind was the controversy that was being waged
+within the Socialist movement of Russia during these years, for this was
+the period in which Bolshevism was shaping itself and becoming articulate.
+The words "Bolsheviki" and "Bolshevism" first made their appearance in
+1903, but it was not until 1905 that they began to acquire their present
+meaning. At the second convention of the Social Democratic party, held in
+1903, the party split in two factions. The majority faction, headed by
+Lenine, adopted the name Bolsheviki, a word derived from the Russian word
+"bolshinstvo," meaning "majority." The minority faction, which followed
+Plechanov, though he did not formally join it, was called, in
+contradistinction, the "Mensheviki"--that is, the minority. No question of
+principle was involved in the split, the question at issue being simply
+whether there should be more or less centralization in the organization.
+There was no thought on either side of leaving the Social Democratic party.
+It was simply a factional division in the party itself and did not prevent
+loyal co-operation. Both the Bolsheviki and the Mensheviki remained Social
+Democrats--that is, Socialists of the school of Marx.
+
+During the revolutionary struggle of 1905-06 the breach between the two
+factions was greatly widened. The two groups held utterly irreconcilable
+conceptions of Socialist policy, if not of Socialism as an ideal. The
+psychology of the two groups was radically different. By this time the
+Lenine faction was no longer the majority, being, in fact, a rather small
+minority in the party. The Plechanov faction was greatly in the majority.
+But the old names continued to be used. Although a minority, the Lenine
+faction was still called the Bolsheviki, and the Plechanov faction called
+the Mensheviki, despite the fact that it was the majority. Thus Bolshevism
+no longer connoted the principles and tactics of the majority. It came to
+be used interchangeably with Leninism, as a synonym. The followers of
+Vladimir Ulyanov continued to regard themselves as part of the Social
+Democratic party, its radical left wing, and it was not until after the
+Second Revolution, in 1917, that they manifested any desire to be
+differentiated from the Social Democrats.
+
+Vladimir Ulyanov was born in 1870, at Simbirsk, in central Russia. There is
+no mystery about his use of the alias, Nikolai Lenine, which he has made
+world-famous and by which he chooses to be known. Almost every Russian
+revolutionist has had to adopt various aliases for self-protection and for
+the protection of other Russian Socialists. Ulyanov has followed the rule
+and lived and worked under several aliases, and his writings under the name
+"Nikolai Lenine" made him a great power in the Russian Socialist movement.
+
+Lenine's father was a governmental official employed in the Department of
+Public Instruction. It is one of the many anomalies of the life of the
+Russian Dictator that he himself belongs by birth, training, culture, and
+experience to the bourgeoisie against which he fulminates so furiously.
+Even his habits and tastes are of bourgeois and not proletarian origin. He
+is an Intellectual of the Intellectuals and has never had the slightest
+proletarian experience. As a youth still in his teens he entered the
+University of St. Petersburg, but his stay there was exceedingly brief,
+owing to a tragedy which greatly embittered his life and gave it its
+direction. An older brother, who was also a student in the university, was
+condemned to death, in a secret trial, for complicity in a terrorist plot
+to assassinate Alexander III. Shortly afterward he was put to death. Lenine
+himself was arrested at the same time as his brother, but released for lack
+of evidence connecting him with the affair. It is said, however, that the
+arrest caused his expulsion from the university. Lenine was not the only
+young man to be profoundly impressed by the execution of the youthful
+Alexander Ulyanov; another student, destined to play an important role in
+the great tragedy of revolutionary Russia, was stirred to bitter hatred of
+the system. That young student was Alexander Kerensky, whose father and the
+father of the Ulyanovs were close friends.
+
+Lenine's activities brought him into conflict with the authorities several
+times and forced him to spend a good deal of time in exile. As a youth of
+seventeen, at the time of the execution of his brother, he was dismissed
+from the Law School in St. Petersburg. A few years later he was sent to
+Siberia for a political "crime." Upon various occasions later he was
+compelled to flee from the country, living sometimes in Paris, sometimes in
+London, but more often in Switzerland. It was through his writings mainly
+that he acquired the influence he had in the Russian movement. There is
+nothing unusual or remarkable about this, for the Social Democratic party
+of Russia was practically directed from Geneva. Lenine was in London when
+the Revolution of 1905 broke out and caused him to hurry to St. Petersburg.
+
+As a young man Lenine, like most of the Intelligentsia of the period, gave
+up a good deal of his spare time to teaching small groups of uneducated
+working-men the somewhat abstract and intricate theories and doctrines of
+Socialism. To that excellent practice, no doubt, much of Lenine's skill as
+a lucid expositor and successful propagandist is due. He has written a
+number of important works, most of them being of a polemical nature and
+dealing with party disputations upon questions of theory and tactics. The
+work by which he was best known in Socialist circles prior to his
+sensational rise to the Premiership is a treatise on _The Development of
+Capitalism in Russia_. This work made its appearance in 1899, when the
+Marxian Socialist movement was still very weak. In it Lenine defended the
+position of the Marxians, Plechanov and his group, that Russia was not an
+exception to the general law of capitalist development, as was claimed by
+the leaders of the People's party, the _Narodniki_. The book gave Lenine an
+assured position among the intellectual leaders of the movement, and was
+regarded as a conclusive defense of the position of the Plechanov group, to
+which Lenine belonged. Since his overthrow of the Kerensky regime, and his
+attempt to establish a new kind of social state in Russia, Lenine has been
+frequently confronted by his own earlier reasoning by those who believe his
+position to be contrary to the true Marxian position.
+
+From 1903 to 1906 Lenine's views developed farther and farther away from
+those of his great teacher, George Plechanov. His position in the period of
+the First Duma can best be stated, perhaps, in opposition to the position
+of Plechanov and the Mensheviki. Accepting the Marxian theory of historical
+development, Plechanov and his followers believed that Russia must pass
+through a phase of capitalist development before there could be a
+social--as distinguished from a merely political--revolution. Certainly
+they believed, an intensive development of industry, bringing into
+existence a strong capitalist class, on the one hand, and a strong
+proletariat, on the other hand, must precede any attempt to create a Social
+Democratic state. They believed, furthermore, that a political revolution,
+creating a democratic constitutional system of government, must come before
+the social revolution could be achieved. They accepted the traditional
+Marxian view that the achievement of this political revolution must be
+mainly the task of the bourgeoisie, and that the proletariat, and
+especially the Socialists, should co-operate with the enlightened
+bourgeoisie in attaining that political revolution without which there
+could never be a Socialist commonwealth.
+
+Plechanov was not blind to the dangers of compromise which must be faced in
+basing the policy of a movement of the masses upon this reasoning. He
+argued, however, that there was no choice in the matter at all; that the
+iron law of historical inevitability and necessity determined the matter.
+He pointed out that the bourgeoisie, represented by the Constitutional
+Democrats in the political struggle, were compelled to wage relentless war
+upon Absolutism, the abolition of which was as absolutely essential to the
+realization of their class aims as it was to the realization of the class
+aims of the proletariat. Hence, in this struggle, the capitalist class, as
+yet too weak to accomplish the overthrow of autocracy and Czarism, and the
+proletariat, equally dependent for success upon the overthrow of autocracy
+and Czarism, and equally too weak to accomplish it unaided, had to face the
+fact that historical development had given the two classes which were
+destined to wage a long conflict an immediate unity of interest. Their
+imperative needs at the moment were not conflicting needs, but identical
+ones. To divide their forces, to refuse to co-operate with each other, was
+to play the game of the Czar and his associates, argued Plechanov.
+
+The Mensheviki favored participation in the Duma elections and co-operation
+with the liberal and radical bourgeoisie parties, in so far as might be
+necessary to overthrow the autocracy, and without sacrificing Socialist
+principles. They pointed out that this position was evidently feared by the
+bureaucracy far more than the position of the extremists among the Social
+Democrats and the Socialist-Revolutionists, who refused to consider such
+co-operation, and pointed to the fact that provocateurs in large numbers
+associated themselves with the latter in their organizations and preached
+the same doctrine of absolute isolation and exclusiveness.
+
+It will be seen that the position of the Mensheviki was one of practical
+political opportunism, an opportunism, however, that must be sharply
+distinguished from what Wilhelm Liebknecht used to call "political
+cow-trading." No man in the whole history of international Socialism ever
+more thoroughly despised this species of political opportunism than George
+Plechanov. To those who are familiar with the literature of international
+Socialism it will be unnecessary to say that Plechanov was not the man to
+deprecate the importance of sound theory as a guide to the formulation of
+party policies. For many years he was rightly regarded as one of the
+greatest theoreticians of the movement. Certainly there was only one other
+writer in the whole international movement who could be named as having an
+equal title to be considered the greatest Socialist theorist since
+Marx--Karl Kautsky.
+
+But Plechanov[1]--like Marx himself--set reality above dogma, and regarded
+movement as of infinitely greater importance than theory. The Mensheviki
+wanted to convene a great mass convention of representatives of the
+industrial proletariat during the summer of 1906. "It is a class movement,"
+they said, "not a little sectarian movement. How can there be a _class_
+movement unless the way is open to all the working class to participate?"
+Accordingly, they wanted a convention to which all the factory-workers
+would be invited to send representatives. There should be no doctrinal
+tests, the sole qualification being membership in the working class. It did
+not matter to the advocates of this policy whether a man belonged to the
+Social Democratic party or to any party; whether he called himself a
+revolutionist or anything else. It was, they said, a movement of the
+working class, not the movement of a sect within the working class.
+
+They knew, of course, that in such a great mass movement there would
+probably be some theoretical confusion, more or less muddled thinking. They
+recognized, too, that in the great mass convention they proposed some
+Social Democratic formulations might be rejected and some others adopted
+which did not accord with the Marxian doctrines. But, quoting Marx to the
+effect that "One step of real movement is worth a thousand programs," they
+contended that if there was anything at all in the Marxian theory of
+progress through class struggles, and the historic rule of the working
+class, it must follow that, while they might make mistakes and go
+temporarily astray, the workers could not go far wrong, their class
+interests being a surer guide than any amount of intellectualism could
+produce.
+
+Lenine and his friends, the Bolsheviki, bitterly opposed all this reasoning
+and took a diametrically opposite position upon every one of the questions
+involved. They absolutely opposed any sort of co-operation with bourgeois
+parties of any kind, for any purpose whatever. No matter how progressive a
+particular bourgeois party might be, nor how important the reform aimed at,
+they believed that Social Democrats should remain in "splendid isolation,"
+refusing to make any distinction between more liberal and less liberal,
+progressive and reactionary, groups in the bourgeoisie. Trotzky, who did
+not at first formally join the Bolsheviki, but was a true Bolshevik in his
+intellectual convictions and sympathies, fully shared this view.
+
+Now, Lenine and Trotzky were dogmatic Marxists, and as such they could not
+deny the contention that capitalism must attain a certain development
+before Socialism could be attained in Russia. Nor could they deny that
+Absolutism was an obstacle to the development both of capitalist industry
+and of Socialism. They contended, however, that the peculiar conditions in
+Russia, resulting from the retardation of her economic development for so
+long, made it both possible and necessary to create a revolutionary
+movement which would, at one and the same time, overthrow both autocracy
+and capitalism. Necessarily, therefore, their warfare must be directed
+equally against autocracy and all political parties of the landlord and
+capitalist classes. They were guided throughout by this fundamental
+conviction. The policy of absolute and unqualified isolation in the Duma,
+which they insisted the Social Democrats ought to pursue, was based upon
+that conviction.
+
+
+VI
+
+All this is quite clear and easily intelligible. Granted the premise, the
+logic is admirable. It is not so easy, however, to see why, even granting
+the soundness of their opposition to _co-operation_ with bourgeois parties
+and groups in the Duma, there should be no political _competition_ with
+them--which would seem to be logically implied in the boycott of the Duma
+elections. Non-participation in the elections, consistently pursued as a
+proletarian policy, would leave the proletariat unrepresented in the
+legislative body, without one representative to fight its battles on what
+the world universally regards as one of the most important battle-fields of
+civilization. And yet, here, too, they were entirely logical and
+consistent--they did not believe in parliamentary government. As yet, they
+were not disposed to emphasize this overmuch, not, apparently, because of
+any lack of candor and good faith, but rather because the substitute for
+parliamentary government had not sufficiently shaped itself in their minds.
+The desire not to be confused with the Anarchists was another reason.
+Because the Bolsheviki and the Anarchists both oppose parliamentary
+government and the political state, it has been concluded by many writers
+on the subject that Bolshevism is simply Anarchism in another guise. This
+is a mistake. Bolshevism is quite different from and opposed to Anarchism.
+It requires strongly centralized government, which Anarchism abhors.
+
+Parliamentary government cannot exist except upon the basis of the will of
+the majority. Whoever enters into the parliamentary struggle, therefore,
+must hope and aim to convert the majority. Back of that hope and aim must
+be faith in the intellectual and moral capacity of the majority. At the
+foundation of Bolshevist theory and practice lies the important fact that
+there is no such faith, and, consequently, neither the hope nor the aim to
+convert the majority and with its strength make the Revolution. Out of the
+adult population of Russia at that time approximately 85 per cent. were
+peasants and less than 5 per cent. belonged to the industrial proletariat.
+At that time something like 70 per cent. of the people were illiterate.
+Even in St. Petersburg--where the standard of literacy was higher than in
+any other city--not more than 55 per cent. of the people could sign their
+own names in 1905, according to the most authentic government reports. When
+we contemplate such facts as these can we wonder that impatient
+revolutionaries should shrink from attempting the task of converting a
+majority of the population to an intelligent acceptance of Socialism?
+
+There was another reason besides this, however. Lenine--and he personifies
+Bolshevism--was, and is, a doctrinaire Marxist of the most dogmatic type
+conceivable. As such he believed that the new social order must be the
+creation of that class which is the peculiar product of modern capitalism,
+the industrial proletariat. To that class alone he and his followers pinned
+all their faith and hope, and that class was a small minority of the
+population and bound to remain a minority for a very long period of years.
+Here, then, we have the key. It cannot be too strongly stressed that the
+Bolsheviki did not base their hope upon the working class of Russia, and
+did not trust it. The working class of Russia--if we are to use the term
+with an intelligent regard to realities--was and is mainly composed of
+peasants; the industrial proletariat was and is only a relatively small
+part of the great working class of the nation. _But it is upon that small
+section, as against the rest of the working class, that Bolshevism relies_.
+
+Lenine has always refused to include the peasants in his definition of the
+working class. With almost fanatical intensity he has insisted that the
+peasant, together with the petty manufacturer and trader, would soon
+disappear; that industrial concentration would have its counterpart in a
+great concentration of landownings and agriculture; that the small peasant
+holdings would be swallowed up by large, modern agricultural estates, with
+the result that there would be an immense mass of landless agricultural
+wage-workers. This class would, of course, be a genuinely proletarian
+class, and its interests would be identical with those of the industrial
+proletariat. Until that time came it would be dangerous to rely upon the
+peasants, he urged, because their instincts are bourgeois rather than
+proletarian. Naturally, he has looked askance at the peasant Socialist
+movements, denying that they were truly Socialist at all. They could not be
+Socialist movements in the true sense, he contended, because they lacked
+the essential quality of true Socialists, namely, proletarian class
+consciousness.
+
+Naturally, too, Lenine and his followers have always regarded movements
+which aimed to divide the land among the peasants, and so tend to give
+permanence to a class of petty agriculturists, as essentially reactionary.
+The exigencies of the struggle have forced them into some compromises, of
+course. For example, at first they were not willing to admit that the
+peasants could be admitted into their group at all, but later on they
+admitted some who belonged to the poorest class of peasants. Throughout,
+however, they have insisted that the peasant class as a whole was a class
+of petty bourgeoisie and that its instincts and interests would inevitably
+lead it to side with the bourgeoisie as against the proletariat. Of course,
+this is a very familiar phase of Socialist evolution in every country. It
+lasted in Germany many years. In Russia, however, the question assumed an
+importance it never had in any other country, owing to the vast
+preponderance of peasants in the population. Anything more un-Russian than
+this theorizing cannot be well conceived. It runs counter to every fact in
+Russian experience, to the very basis of her economic life at this stage of
+her history. Lenine is a Russian, but his dogmas are not Russian, but
+German. Bolshevism is the product of perverted German scholasticism.
+
+Even the industrial workers as a whole, in their present stage of
+development, were not to be trusted, according to the Bolshevist leaders.
+They frankly opposed the Mensheviki when the latter proposed to hold their
+great convention of industrial workers, giving as their reason the fear
+that the convention majority would not consist of class-conscious
+revolutionary Marxian Socialists. In other words, they feared that the
+majority would not be on their side, and they had not the time or the
+patience to convert them. There was no pretense of faith in the majority of
+the industrial proletariat, much less of faith in the entire working class
+of Russia. The industrial proletariat was a minority of the working class,
+and the Bolsheviki pinned their faith to a minority of that minority. They
+wanted to establish, not democracy, but dictatorship of Russia by a small,
+disciplined, intelligent, and determined minority of working-men.
+
+The lines of cleavage between the Mensheviki and the Bolsheviki were thus
+clearly drawn. The former, while ready to join in mass uprisings and armed
+insurrections by the masses, believed that the supreme necessity was
+education and organization of all the working-people. Still relying upon
+the industrial proletariat to lead the struggle, they nevertheless
+recognized that the peasants were indispensable. The Bolsheviki, on the
+other hand, relied exclusively upon armed insurrection, initiated and
+directed by desperate minorities. The Mensheviki contended that the time
+for secret, conspiratory action was past; that Russia had outgrown that
+earlier method. As far as possible, they carried the struggle openly into
+the political field. They organized unions, educational societies, and
+co-operatives, confident that through these agencies the workers would
+develop cohesion and strength, which, at the right time, they would use as
+their class interests dictated. The Bolsheviki, on the other hand, clung to
+the old conspiratory methods, always mastered by the idea that a sudden
+_coup_ must some day place the reins of power in the hands of a
+revolutionary minority of the workers and enable them to set up a
+dictatorship. That dictatorship, it must be understood, was not to be
+permanent; democracy, possibly even political democracy, would come later.
+
+As we have already noted, into the ranks of the terrorist
+Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Bolsheviki spies and provocative agents
+wormed their way in large numbers. It is the inevitable fate of secret,
+conspiratory movements that this should be so, and also that it should
+result in saturating the minds of all engaged in the movements with
+distrust and suspicion. More than once the charge of being a provocateur
+was leveled at Lenine and at Trotzky, but without justification,
+apparently. There was, indeed, one incident which placed Lenine in a bad
+light. It belongs to a somewhat later period than we have been discussing,
+but it serves admirably to illustrate conditions which obtained throughout
+the whole dark period between the two great revolutions. One of Lenine's
+close friends and disciples was Roman Malinovsky, a fiery speaker of
+considerable power, distinguished for his bitter attacks upon the bourgeois
+progressive parties and upon the Mensheviki. The tenor of his speeches was
+always the same--only the interest of the proletariat should be considered;
+all bourgeois political parties and groups were equally reactionary, and
+any co-operation with them, for any purpose, was a betrayal of Socialist
+principle.
+
+Malinovsky was trusted by the Bolsheviki. He was elected to the Fourth
+Duma, where he became the leader of the little group of thirteen Social
+Democrats. Like other members of the Bolshevik faction, he entered the
+Duma, despite his contempt for parliamentary action, simply because it
+afforded him a useful opportunity for agitation and demonstrations. In the
+Duma he assailed even a portion of the Social Democratic group as belonging
+to the bourgeoisie, succeeding in splitting it in two factions and becoming
+the leader of the Bolshevik faction, numbering six. This blatant demagogue,
+whom Lenine called "the Russian Bebel," was proposed for membership in the
+International Socialist Bureau, the supreme council of the International
+Socialist movement, and would have been sent as a delegate to that body as
+a representative of Russian Socialist movement but for the discovery of the
+fact that he was a secret agent of the Czar's government!
+
+It was proved that Malinovsky was a provocateur in the pay of the Police
+Department, and that many, if not all, of his speeches had been prepared
+for him in the Police Department by a former director named Beletzky. The
+exposure made a great sensation in Russian Socialist circles at the time,
+and the fact that it was Nikolai Lenine who had proposed that Malinovsky be
+chosen to sit in the International Socialist Bureau naturally caused a
+great deal of unfriendly comment. It cannot be denied that the incident
+placed Lenine in an unfavorable light, but it must be admitted that
+nothing developed to suggest that he was guilty of anything more serious
+than permitting himself to be outwitted and deceived by a cunning
+trickster. The incident serves to show, however, the ease with which the
+extreme fanaticism of the Bolsheviki played into the hands of the
+autocracy.
+
+
+VII
+
+While Bolsheviki and Mensheviki wrangled and disputed, great forces were at
+work among the Russian people. By 1910 the terrible pall of depression and
+despair which had settled upon the nation as a result of the failure of the
+First Revolution began to break. There was a new generation of college
+students, youthful and optimistic spirits who were undeterred by the
+failure of 1905-06, confident that they were wiser and certain to succeed.
+Also there had been an enormous growth of working-class organizations,
+large numbers of unions and co-operative societies having been formed in
+spite of the efforts of the government. The soul of Russia was once more
+stirring.
+
+The end of 1910 and the beginning of 1911 witnessed a new series of
+strikes, such as had not occurred since 1905. The first were students'
+strikes, inaugurated in support of their demand for the abolition of
+capital punishment. These were quickly followed by important strikes in the
+industrial centers for economic ends--better wages and shorter
+working-hours. As in the period immediately preceding the First Revolution,
+the industrial unrest soon manifested itself in political ways. Without any
+conscious leadership at all this would have been inevitable in the existing
+circumstances. But there was leadership. Social Democrats of both factions,
+and Socialists of other groups as well, moved among the workers, preaching
+the old, yet ever new, gospel of revolt. Political strikes followed the
+strikes for immediate economic ends. Throughout the latter part of 1911 and
+the whole of 1912 the revolutionary movement once more spread among the
+masses.
+
+The year 1913 was hardly well begun when revolutionary activities assumed
+formidable proportions. January 9th--Russian calendar--anniversary of
+Bloody Sunday, was celebrated all over the country by great demonstrations
+which were really demonstration-strikes. In St. Petersburg fifty-five
+thousand workers went out--and there were literally hundreds of other
+smaller "strikes" of a similar nature throughout the country. In April
+another anniversary of the martyrdom of revolting working-men was similarly
+celebrated in most of the industrial centers, hundreds of thousands of
+workers striking as a manifestation against the government. The 1st of May
+was celebrated as it had not been celebrated since 1905. In the various
+industrial cities hundreds of thousands of workmen left their work to march
+through the streets and hold mass meetings, and so formidable was the
+movement that the government was cowed and dared not attempt to suppress it
+by force. There was a defiant note of revolution in this great uprising of
+the workers. They demanded an eight-hour day and the right to organize
+unions and make collective bargains. In addition to these demands, they
+protested against the Balkan War and against militarism in general.
+
+Had the great war not intervened, a tragic interlude in Russia's long
+history of struggle, the year 1914 would have seen the greatest struggle
+for the overthrow of Czarism in all that history. Whether it would have
+been more successful than the effort of 1905 can never be known, but it is
+certain that the working-class revolutionary movement was far stronger
+than it was nine years before. On the other hand, there would not have been
+the same degree of support from the other classes, for in the intervening
+period class lines had been more sharply drawn and the class conflict
+greatly intensified. Surging through the masses like a mighty tide was the
+spirit of revolt, manifesting itself much as it had done nine years before.
+All through the early months of the year the revolutionary temper grew. The
+workers became openly defiant and the government, held in check, doubtless,
+by the delicate balance of the international situation, dared not resort to
+force with sufficient vigor to stamp out the agitation. Mass meetings were
+held in spite of all regulations to the contrary; political strikes
+occurred in all parts of the country. In St. Petersburg and Moscow
+barricades were thrown up in the streets as late as July. Then the war
+clouds burst. A greater passion than that of revolution swept over the
+nation and it turned to present a united front to the external foe.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+THE WAR AND THE PEOPLE
+
+
+I
+
+The war against Austria and Germany was not unpopular. Certainly there was
+never an occasion when a declaration of war by their rulers roused so
+little resentment among the Russian people. Wars are practically never
+popular with the great mass of the people in any country, and this is
+especially true of autocratically governed countries. The heavy burdens
+which all great wars impose upon the laboring class, as well as upon the
+petty bourgeoisie, cause even the most righteous wars to be regarded with
+dread and sorrow. The memory of the war with Japan was too fresh and too
+bitter to make it possible for the mass of the Russian people to welcome
+the thought of another war. It cannot, therefore, in truth be said that the
+war with the Central Empires was popular. But it can be said with sincerity
+and the fullest sanction that the war was not unpopular; that it was
+accepted by the greater part of the people as a just and, moreover, a
+necessary war. Opposition to the war was not greater in Russia than in
+England or France, or, later, in America. Of course, there were religious
+pacifists and Socialists who opposed the war and denounced it, as they
+would have denounced any other war, on general principles, no matter what
+the issues involved might be, but their number and their influence were
+small and quite unimportant.
+
+The one great outstanding fact was the manner in which the sense of peril
+to the fatherland rallied to its defense the different races, creeds,
+classes, and parties, the great tidal wave of genuine and sincere
+patriotism sweeping everything before it, even the mighty, passionate
+revolutionary agitation. It can hardly be questioned or doubted that if the
+war had been bitterly resented by the masses it would have precipitated
+revolution instead of retarding it. From this point of view the war was a
+deplorable disaster. That no serious attempt was made to bring about a
+revolution at that time is the best possible evidence that the declaration
+of war did not enrage the people. If not a popular and welcome event,
+therefore, the declaration of war by the Czar was not an unpopular one.
+Never before since his accession to the throne had Nicholas II had the
+support of the nation to anything like the same extent.
+
+Take the Jews, for example. Bitterly hated and persecuted as they had been,
+despised and humiliated beyond description; victims of the knout and the
+pogrom; tortured by Cossacks and Black Hundreds; robbed by official
+extortions; their women shamed and ravaged and their babies doomed to rot
+and die in the noisome Pale--the Jews owed no loyalty to the Czar or even
+to the nation. Had they sought revenge in the hour of Russia's crisis, in
+howsoever grim a manner, it would have been easy to understand their action
+and hard indeed to regard it with condemnation. It is almost unthinkable
+that the Czar could have thought of the Jews in his vast Empire in those
+days without grave apprehension and fear.
+
+Yet, as all the world knows, the Jews resolutely overcame whatever
+suggestion of revenge came to them and, with marvelous solidarity,
+responded to Russia's call without hesitation and without political
+intrigue or bargaining. As a whole, they were as loyal as any of the
+Czar's subjects. How shall we explain this phenomenon?
+
+The explanation is that the leaders of the Jewish people, and practically
+the whole body of Jewish Intellectuals, recognized from the first that the
+war was more than a war of conflicting dynasties; that it was a war of
+conflicting ideals. They recognized that the Entente, as a whole,
+notwithstanding that it included the autocracy of Russia, represented the
+generous, democratic ideals and principles vital to every Jew in that they
+must be securely established before the emancipation of the Jew could be
+realized. Their hatred of Czarism was not engulfed by any maudlin
+sentiment; they knew that they had no "fatherland" to defend. They were not
+swept on a tide of jingoism to forget their tragic history and proclaim
+their loyalty to the infamous oppressor. No. Their loyalty was to the
+Entente, not to the Czar. They were guided by enlightened self-interest, by
+an intelligent understanding of the meaning to them of the great struggle
+against Teutonic militarist-imperialism.
+
+Every intelligent and educated Jew in Russia knew that the real source of
+the brutal anti-Semitism which characterized the rule of the Romanovs was
+Prussian and not Russian. He knew that it had long been one of the main
+features of Germany's foreign policy to instigate and stimulate hatred and
+fear of the Jews by Russian officialdom. There could not be a more tragic
+mistake than to infer from the ruthless oppression of the Jews in Russia
+that anti-Semitism is characteristically Russian. Surely, the fact that the
+First Duma was practically unanimous in deciding to give equal rights to
+the Jews with all the rest of the population proves that the Russian people
+did not hate the Jews. The ill-treatment of the Jews was part of the policy
+by which Germany, for her own ends, cunningly contrived to weaken Russia
+and so prevent the development of her national solidarity. Racial animosity
+and conflict was an ideal instrument for attaining that result. Internal
+war and abortive revolutionary outbreaks which kept the country unsettled,
+and the energies of the government taxed to the uttermost, served the same
+end, and were, therefore, the object of Germany's intrigues in Russia,
+equally with hostility to the Jews, as we shall have occasion to note.
+
+German intrigue in Russia is an interesting study in economic determinism.
+Unless we comprehend it we shall strive in vain to understand Russia's part
+in the war and her role in the history of the past few decades. A brief
+study of the map of Europe by any person who possesses even an elementary
+knowledge of the salient principles of economics will reveal Germany's
+interest in Russia and make quite plain why German statesmen have so
+assiduously aimed to keep Russia in a backward economic condition. As a
+great industrial nation it was to Germany's interest to have Russia remain
+backward industrially, predominantly an agricultural country, quite as
+surely as it was to her interest as a military power to have weakness and
+inefficiency, instead of strength and efficiency, in Russia's military
+organization. As a highly developed industrial nation Russia would of
+necessity have been Germany's formidable rival--perhaps her most formidable
+rival--and by her geographical situation would have possessed an enormous
+advantage in the exploitation of the vast markets in the far East. As a
+feudal agricultural country, on the other hand, Russia would be a great
+market for German manufactured goods, and, at the same time, a most
+convenient supply-depot for raw materials and granary upon which Germany
+could rely for raw materials, wheat, rye, and other staple grains--a
+supply-depot and granary, moreover, accessible by overland transportation
+not subject to naval attack.
+
+For the Russian Jew the defeat of Germany was a vital necessity. The
+victory of Germany and her allies could only serve to strengthen Prussian
+influence in Russia and add to the misery and suffering of the Jewish
+population. That other factors entered into the determination of the
+attitude of the Jews, such as, for example, faith in England as the
+traditional friend of the Jew, and abhorrence at the cruel invasion of
+Belgium, is quite true. But the great determinant was the well-understood
+fact that Germany's rulers had long systematically manipulated Russian
+politics and the Russian bureaucracy to the serious injury of the Jewish
+race. Germany's militarist-imperialism was the soul and inspiration of the
+oppression which cursed every Jew in Russia.
+
+
+II
+
+The democratic elements in Russia were led to support the government by
+very similar reasoning. The same economic and dynastic motives which had
+led Germany to promote racial animosities and struggles in Russia led her
+to take every other possible means to uphold autocracy and prevent the
+establishment of democracy. This had been long recognized by all liberal
+Russians, no matter to what political school or party they might belong. It
+was as much part of the common knowledge as the fact that St. Petersburg
+was the national capital. It was part of the intellectual creed of
+practically every liberal Russian that there was a natural affinity between
+the great autocracies of Germany and Russia, and that a revolution in
+Russia which seriously endangered the existence of monarchical absolutism
+would be suppressed by Prussian guns and bayonets reinforcing those of
+loyal Russian troops. It was generally believed by Russian Socialists that
+in 1905 the Kaiser had promised to send troops into Russia to crush the
+Revolution if called upon for that aid. Many German Socialists, it may be
+added, shared that belief. Autocracies have a natural tendency to combine
+forces against revolutionary movements. It would have been no more strange
+for Wilhelm II to aid Nicholas II in quelling a revolution that menaced his
+throne than it was for Alexander I to aid in putting down revolution in
+Germany; or than it was for Nicholas I to crush the Hungarian Revolution in
+1849, in the interest of Francis Joseph; or than it was for Bismarck to
+rush to the aid of Alexander II in putting down the Polish insurrection in
+1863.
+
+The democrats of Russia knew, moreover, that, in addition to the natural
+affinity which served to bind the two autocracies, the Romanov and
+Hohenzollern dynasties had been closely knit together in a strong union by
+years and years of carefully planned and strongly wrought blood ties. As
+Isaac Don Lenine reminds us in his admirable study of the Russian
+Revolution, Nicholas II was more than seven-eighths German, less than
+one-eighth of his blood heritage being Romanov. Catherine the Great, wife
+of Peter III, was a Prussian by birth and heritage and thoroughly
+Prussianized her court. After her--from 1796 to 1917--six Czars reigned in
+Russia, five of whom married German wives. As was inevitable in such
+circumstances, the Russian court had long been notoriously subject to
+German influences and strongly pro-German in its sympathies--by no means a
+small matter in an autocratic country. Fully aware of their advantage, the
+Kaiser and his Ministers increased the German influence and power at the
+Russian court by encouraging German nobles to marry into Russian court
+circles. The closing decade of the reign of Nicholas II was marked by an
+extraordinary increase of Prussian influence in his court, an achievement
+in which the Kaiser was greatly assisted by the Czarina, who was, it will
+be remembered, a German princess.
+
+Naturally, the German composition and character of the Czar's court was
+reflected in the diplomatic service and in the most important departments
+of the Russian government, including the army. The Russian Secret Service
+was very largely in the hands of Germans and Russians who had married
+German wives. The same thing may be said of the Police Department. Many of
+the generals and other high officers in the Russian army were either of
+German parentage or connected with Germany by marriage ties. In brief, the
+whole Russian bureaucracy was honeycombed by German influence.
+
+Outside official circles, much the same condition existed among the great
+landowners. Those of the Baltic provinces were largely of Teutonic descent,
+of course. Many had married German wives. The result was that the nobility
+of these provinces, long peculiarly influential in the political life of
+Russia, was, to a very large degree, pro-German. In addition to these,
+there were numerous large landowners of German birth, while many, probably
+a big majority, of the superintendents of the large industrial
+establishments and landed estates were German citizens. It is notorious
+that the principal factories upon which Russia had to rely for guns and
+munitions were in charge of Germans, who had been introduced because of
+their high technical efficiency.
+
+In view of these facts, and a mass of similar facts which might be cited,
+it was natural for the democrats of Russia to identify Germany and German
+intrigue and influence with the hated bureaucracy. It was as natural as it
+was for the German influence to be used against the democratic movement in
+Russia, as it invariably was. Practically the entire mass of democratic
+opinion in Russia, including, of course, all the Socialist factions,
+regarded these royal, aristocratic, and bureaucratic German influences as a
+menace to Russia, a cancer that must be cut out. With the exception of a
+section of the Socialists, whose position we shall presently examine, the
+mass of liberal-thinking, progressive, democratic Russians saw in the war a
+welcome breaking of the German yoke. Believing that the victory of Germany
+would restore the yoke, and that her defeat by Russia would eliminate the
+power which had sustained Czarism, they welcomed the war and rallied with
+enthusiasm at the call to arms. They were loyal, but to Russia, not to the
+Czar. They felt that in warring against Prussian militarist-imperialism
+they were undermining Russian Absolutism.
+
+That the capitalists of Russia should want to see the power of Germany to
+hold Russia in chains completely destroyed is easy to understand. To all
+intents and purposes, from the purely economic point of view, Russia was
+virtually a German colony to be exploited for the benefit of Germany. The
+commercial treaties of 1905, which gave Germany such immense trade
+advantages, had become exceedingly unpopular. On the other hand, the
+immense French loan of 1905, the greater part of which had been used to
+develop the industrial life of Russia, had the effect of bringing Russian
+capitalists into closer relations with French capitalists. For further
+capital Russia could only look to France and England with any confident
+hope. Above all, the capitalists of Russia wanted freedom for economic
+development; they wanted stability and national unity, the very things
+Germany was preventing. They wanted efficient government and the
+elimination of the terrible corruption which infested the bureaucracy. The
+law of economic evolution was inexorable and inescapable; the capitalist
+system could not grow within the narrow confines of Absolutism.
+
+For the Russian capitalist class, therefore, it was of the most vital
+importance that Germany's power should not be increased, as it would of
+necessity be if the Entente submitted to her threats and permitted Serbia
+to be crushed by Austria, and the furtherance of the Pan-German
+_Mitteleuropa_ designs. It was vitally necessary to Russian capitalism that
+Germany's strangle-hold upon the inner life of Russia should be broken. The
+issue was not the competition of capitalism, as that is commonly
+understood; it was not the rivalry for markets like that which animates the
+capitalist classes of all lands. The Russian capitalist class was animated
+by no fear of German competition in the sense in which the nations of the
+world have understood that term. They had their own vast home market to
+develop. The industrialization of the country must transform a very large
+part of the peasantry into factory artisans living in cities, having new
+needs and relatively high wages, and, consequently, more money to spend.
+For many years to come their chief reliance must be the home market,
+constantly expanding as the relative importance of manufacturing increased
+and forced improved methods of agriculture upon the nation in the process,
+as it was bound to do.
+
+It was Germany as a persistent meddler in Russian government and politics
+that the capitalists of Russia resented. It was the unfair advantage that
+this underhand political manipulation gave her in their own home field that
+stirred up the leaders of the capitalist class of Russia. That, and the
+knowledge that German intrigue by promoting divisions in Russia was the
+mainstay of the autocracy, solidified the capitalist class of Russia in
+support of the war. There was a small section of this class that went much
+farther than this and entertained more ambitious hopes. They realized fully
+that Turkey had already fallen under the domination of Germany to such a
+degree that in the event of a German victory in the war, or, what really
+amounted to the same thing, the submission of the Entente to her will,
+Germany would become the ruler of the Dardanelles and European Turkey be in
+reality, and perhaps in form, part of the German Empire.
+
+Such a development could not fail, they believed, to have the most
+disastrous consequences for Russia. Inevitably, it would add to German
+prestige and power in the Russian Empire, and weld together the
+Hohenzollern, Habsburg, and Romanov autocracies in a solid, reactionary
+mass, which, under the efficient leadership of Germany, might easily
+dominate the entire world. Moreover, like many of the ablest Russians,
+including the foremost Marxian Socialist scholars, they believed that the
+normal economic development of Russia required a free outlet to the warm
+waters of the Mediterranean, which alone could give her free access to the
+great ocean highways. Therefore they hoped that one result of a victorious
+war by the Entente against the Central Empires, in which Russia would play
+an important part, would be the acquisition of Constantinople by Russia.
+Thus the old vision of the Czars had become the vision of an influential
+and rising class with a solid basis of economic interest.
+
+
+III
+
+As in every other country involved, the Socialist movement was sharply
+divided by the war. Paradoxical as it seems, in spite of the great revival
+of revolutionary hope and sentiment in the first half of the year, the
+Socialist parties and groups were not strong when the war broke out. They
+were, indeed, at a very low state. They had not yet recovered from the
+reaction. The manipulation of the electoral laws following the dissolution
+of the Second Duma, and the systematic oppression and repression of all
+radical organizations by the administration, had greatly reduced the
+Socialist parties in membership and influence. The masses were, for a long
+time, weary of struggle, despondent, and passive. The Socialist factions
+meanwhile were engaged in an apparently interminable controversy upon
+theoretical and tactical questions in which the masses of the
+working-people, when they began to stir at last, took no interest, and
+which they could hardly be supposed to understand. The Socialist parties
+and groups were subject to a very great disability in that their leaders
+were practically all in exile. Had a revolution broken out, as it would
+have done but for the war, Socialist leadership would have asserted itself.
+
+As in all other countries, the divisions of opinion created by the war
+among the Socialists cut across all previous existing lines of separation
+and made it impossible to say that this or that faction adopted a
+particular view. Just as in Germany, France, and England, some of the most
+revolutionary Socialists joined with the more moderate Socialists in
+upholding the war, while extremely moderate Socialists joined with
+Socialists of the opposite extreme in opposing it. It is possible, however,
+to set forth the principal features of the division with tolerable
+accuracy:
+
+A majority of the Socialist-Revolutionary party executive issued an
+anti-war Manifesto. There is no means of telling how far the views
+expressed represented the attitude of the peasant Socialists as a whole,
+owing to the disorganized state of the party and the difficulties of
+assembling the members. The Manifesto read:
+
+    There is no doubt that Austrian imperialism is responsible for the
+    war with Serbia. But is it not equally criminal on the part of
+    Serbs to refuse autonomy to Macedonia and to oppress smaller and
+    weaker nations?
+
+    It is the protection of this state that our government considers
+    its "sacred duty." What hypocrisy! Imagine the intervention of the
+    Czar on behalf of poor Serbia, whilst he martyrizes Poland,
+    Finland and the Jews, and behaves like a brigand toward Persia.
+
+    Whatever may be the course of events, the Russian workers and
+    peasants will continue their heroic fight to obtain for Russia a
+    place among civilized nations.
+
+This Manifesto was issued, as reported in the Socialist press, prior to the
+actual declaration of war. It was a threat of revolution made with a view
+to preventing the war, if possible, and belongs to the same category as the
+similar threats of revolution made by the German Socialists before the war
+to the same end. The mildness of manner which characterizes the Manifesto
+may be attributed to two causes--weakness of the movement and a resulting
+lack of assurance, together with a lack of conviction arising from the fact
+that many of the leaders, while they hated the Czar and all his works, and
+could not reconcile themselves to the idea of making any kind of truce with
+their great enemy, nevertheless were pro-Ally and anxious for the defeat of
+German imperialism. In other words, these leaders shared the national
+feeling against Germany, and, had they been free citizens of a
+democratically governed country, would have loyally supported the war.
+
+When the Duma met, on August 8th, for the purpose of voting the war
+credits, the Social Democrats of both factions, Bolsheviki and Mensheviki,
+fourteen in number,[2] united upon a policy of abstention from voting.
+Valentin Khaustov, on behalf of the two factions, read this statement:
+
+    A terrible and unprecedented calamity has broken upon the people
+    of the entire world. Millions of workers have been torn away from
+    their labor, ruined, and swept away by a bloody torrent. Millions
+    of families have been delivered over to famine.
+
+    War has already begun. While the governments of Europe were
+    preparing for it, the proletariat of the entire world, with the
+    German workers at the head, unanimously protested.
+
+    The hearts of the Russian workers are with the European
+    proletariat. This war is provoked by the policy of expansion for
+    which the ruling classes of all countries are responsible.
+
+    The proletariat will defend the civilization of the world against
+    this attack.
+
+    The conscious proletariat of the belligerent countries has not
+    been sufficiently powerful to prevent this war and the resulting
+    return of barbarism.
+
+    But we are convinced that the working class will find in the
+    international solidarity of the workers the means to force the
+    conclusion of peace at an early date. The terms of that peace will
+    be dictated by the people themselves, and not by the diplomats.
+
+    We are convinced that this war will finally open the eyes of the
+    great masses of Europe, and show them the real causes of all the
+    violence and oppression that they endure, and that therefore this
+    new explosion of barbarism will be the last.
+
+As soon as this declaration was read the fourteen members of the Social
+Democratic group left the chamber in silence. They were immediately
+followed by the Laborites and Socialist-Revolutionists representing the
+peasant Socialists, so that none of the Socialists in the Duma voted for
+the war credits. As we shall see later on, the Laborites and most of the
+Socialist-Revolutionists afterward supported the war. The declaration of
+the Social Democrats in the Duma was as weak and as lacking in definiteness
+of policy as the Manifesto of the Socialist-Revolutionists already quoted.
+We know now that it was a compromise. It was possible to get agreement upon
+a statement of general principles which were commonplaces of Socialist
+propaganda, and to vaguely expressed hopes that "the working class will
+find in the international solidarity of the workers the means to force the
+conclusion of peace at an early date." It was easy enough to do this, but
+it would have been impossible to unite upon a definite policy of resistance
+and opposition to the war. It was easy to agree not to vote for the war
+credits, since there was no danger that this would have any practical
+effect, the voting of the credits--largely a mere form--being quite
+certain. It would have been impossible to get all to agree to vote
+_against_ the credits.
+
+Under the strong leadership of Alexander Kerensky the Labor party soon took
+a decided stand in support of the war. In the name of the entire group of
+the party's representatives in the Duma, Kerensky read at an early session
+a statement which pledged the party to defend the fatherland. "We firmly
+believe," said Kerensky, "that the great flower of Russian democracy,
+together with all the other forces, will throw back the aggressive enemy
+and _will defend their native land_." The party had decided, he said, to
+support the war "in defense of the land of our birth and of our
+civilization created by the blood of our race.... We believe that through
+the agony of the battle-field the brotherhood of the Russian people will be
+strengthened and a common desire created to free the land from its terrible
+internal troubles." Kerensky declared that the workers would take no
+responsibility for the suicidal war into which the governments of Europe
+had plunged their peoples. He strongly criticized the government, but
+ended, nevertheless, in calling upon the peasants and industrial workers to
+support the war:
+
+"The Socialists of England, Belgium, France, and Germany have tried to
+protest against rushing into war. We Russian Socialists were not able at
+the last to raise our voices freely against the war. But, deeply convinced
+of the brotherhood of the workers of all lands, we send our brotherly
+greetings to all who protested against the preparations for this
+fratricidal conflict of peoples. Remember that Russian citizens have no
+enemies among the working classes of the belligerents! _Protect your
+country to the end against aggression by the states whose governments are
+hostile to us, but remember that there would not have been this terrible
+war had the great ideals of democracy, freedom, equality, and brotherhood
+been directing the activities of those who control the destinies of Russia
+and other lands!_ As it is, our authorities, even in this terrible moment,
+show no desire to forget internal strife, grant no amnesty to those who
+have fought for freedom and the country's happiness, show no desire for
+reconciliation with the non-Russian peoples of the Empire.
+
+"And, instead of relieving the condition of the laboring classes of the
+people, the government puts on them especially the heaviest load of the war
+expenses, by tightening the yoke of indirect taxes.
+
+"Peasants and workers, all who want the happiness and well-being of Russia
+in these great trials, harden your spirit! Gather all your strength and,
+having defended your land, free it; and to you, our brothers, who are
+shedding blood for the fatherland, a profound obeisance and fraternal
+greetings."
+
+Kerensky's statement was of tremendous significance. Made on behalf of the
+entire group of which he was leader, it reflected the sober second thought
+of the representatives of the peasant Socialists and socialistically
+inclined radicals. Their solemnly measured protest against the reactionary
+policy of the government was as significant as the announcement that they
+would support the war. It was a fact that at the very time when national
+unity was of the most vital importance the government was already goading
+the people into despairing revolt.
+
+That a section of the Bolsheviki began a secret agitation against the war,
+aiming at a revolt among the soldiers, regardless of the fact that it would
+mean Russia's defeat and Germany's triumph, is a certainty. The government
+soon learned of this movement and promptly took steps to crush it. Many
+Russian Socialists have charged that the policy of the Bolsheviki was
+inspired by provocateurs in the employ of the police, and by them betrayed.
+Others believe that the policy was instigated by German provocateurs, for
+very obvious purposes. It was not uncommon for German secret agents to worm
+their way into the Russian Socialist ranks, nor for the agents of the
+Russian police to keep the German secret service informed of what was going
+on in Russian Socialist circles. Whatever truth there may be in the
+suspicion that the anti-war Bolshevik faction of the Social Democrats were
+the victims of the Russian police espionage system, and were betrayed by
+one whom they had trusted, as the Socialist-Revolutionists had been
+betrayed by Azev, the fact remains that the government ordered the arrest
+of five of the Bolshevist Social Democratic members of the Duma, on
+November 17th. Never before had the government disregarded the principle of
+parliamentary immunity. When members of the First Duma, belonging to
+various parties, and members of the Second Duma, belonging to the Social
+Democratic party, were arrested it was only after the Duma had been
+formally dissolved. The arrest of the five Social Democrats while the Duma
+was still sitting evoked a strong protest, even from the conservatives.
+
+The government based its action upon the following allegations, which
+appear to have been substantially correct: in October arrangements were
+made to convoke a secret conference of delegates of the Social Democratic
+organization to plan for a revolutionary uprising. The police learned of
+the plan, and when at last, on November 17th, the conference was held at
+Viborg, eight miles from Petrograd--as the national capital was now
+called--a detachment of police found eleven persons assembled, including
+five members of the Imperial Duma, Messrs. Petrovsky, Badavev, Mouranov,
+Samoelov, and Chagov. The police arrested six persons, but did not arrest
+the Duma members, on account of their parliamentary position. An examining
+magistrate, however, indicted the whole eleven who attended the conference,
+under Article No. 102 of the Penal Code, and issued warrants for their
+arrest. Among those arrested was Kamanev, one of Lenine's closest friends,
+who behaved so badly at his trial, manifesting so much cowardice, that he
+was censured by his party.
+
+At this conference, according to the government, arrangements were made to
+circulate among the masses a Manifesto which declared that "from the
+viewpoint of the working class and of the laboring masses of all the
+nations of Russia, the defeat of the monarchy of the Czar and of its armies
+would be of extremely little consequence." The Manifesto urged the
+imperative necessity of _carrying on on all sides the propaganda of the
+social revolution among the army and at the theater of the war, and that
+weapons should be directed not against their brothers, the hired slaves of
+other countries, but against the reactionary bourgeois governments_. The
+Manifesto went on, according to the government, to favor the organization
+of a similar propaganda in all languages, among all the armies, with the
+aim of creating republics in Russia, Poland, Germany, Austria, and all
+other European countries, these to be federated into a republican United
+Stares of Europe.
+
+The declaration that the defeat of the Russian armies would be "of
+extremely little consequence" to the workers became the key-note of the
+anti-war agitation of the Bolsheviki. Lenine and Zinoviev, still in exile,
+adopted the view that the defeat of Russia was _actually desirable_ from
+the point of view of the Russian working class. "We are Russians, and for
+that very reason we want Czarism to be defeated," was the cry.[3] In his
+paper, the _Social Democrat_, published in Switzerland, Lenine advocated
+Russian defeat, to be brought about through treachery and revolt in the
+army, as the best means of furthering revolutionary progress. The majority
+of the Bolshevik faction made common cause with the extreme left-wing
+Socialists of the Socialist-Revolutionary party, who shared their views and
+became known as "Porazhentsi"--that is, advocates of defeat. Naturally, the
+charge was made that they were pro-German, and it was even charged that
+they were in the pay of Germany. Possibly some of them were, but it by no
+means follows that because they desired Russia's defeat they were therefore
+consciously pro-German. They were not pro-German, but anti-Czarists. They
+believed quite honestly, most of them, that Russia's defeat was the surest
+and quickest way of bringing about the Revolution in Russia which would
+overthrow Czarism. In many respects their position was quite like that of
+those Irish rebels who desired to see England defeated, even though it
+meant Germany's triumph, not because of any love for Germany, but because
+they hated England and believed that her defeat would be Ireland's
+opportunity. However short-sighted and stupid such a policy may be judged
+to be, it is quite comprehensible and should not be misrepresented. It is a
+remarkable fact that the Bolsheviki, while claiming to be the most radical
+and extreme internationalists, were in practice the most narrow
+nationalists. They were exactly as narrow in their nationalism as the
+Sinn-Feiners of Ireland. They were not blind to the terrible wrongs
+inflicted upon Belgium, or to the fact that Germany's victory over Russia
+would make it possible for her to crush the western democracies, France and
+England. But neither to save Belgium nor to prevent German militarism
+crushing French and English workers under its iron heel would they have the
+Russian workers make any sacrifice. They saw, and cared only for, what they
+believed to be _Russian_ interests.
+
+
+IV
+
+But during the first months of the war the Porazhentsi--including the
+Bolsheviki--were a very small minority. The great majority of the
+Socialist-Revolutionists rallied to the support of the Allied cause. Soon
+after the war began a Socialist Manifesto to the laboring masses of Russia
+was issued. It bore the signature of many of the best-known Russian
+Socialists, representing all the Socialist factions and groups except the
+Bolsheviki. Among the names were those of George Plechanov, Leo Deutsch,
+Gregory Alexinsky, N. Avksentiev, B. Vorovonov, I. Bunakov, and A.
+Bach--representing the best thought of the movement in practically all its
+phases. This document is of the greatest historical importance, not merely
+because it expressed the sentiments of Socialists of so many shades, but
+even more because of its carefully reasoned arguments why Socialists should
+support the war and why the defeat of Germany was essential to Russian and
+international social democracy. Despite its great length, the Manifesto is
+here given in its entirety:
+
+    We, the undersigned, belong to the different shades of Russian
+    Socialistic thought. We differ on many things, but we firmly agree
+    in that the defeat of Russia in her struggle with Germany would
+    mean her defeat in her struggle for freedom, and we think that,
+    guided by this conviction, our adherents in Russia must come
+    together for a common service to their people, in the hour of the
+    grave danger the country is now facing.
+
+    We address ourselves to the politically conscious working-men,
+    peasants, artisans, clerks--to all of those who earn their bread
+    in the sweat of their brow, and who, suffering from the lack of
+    means and want of political rights, are struggling for a better
+    future for themselves, for their children, and for their brethren.
+
+    We send them our hearty greeting, and persistently say to them:
+    Listen to us in this fatal time, when the enemy has conquered the
+    Western strongholds of Russia, has occupied an important part of
+    our territory and is menacing Kiev, Petrograd, and Moscow, these
+    most important centers of our social life.
+
+    Misinformed people may tell you that in defending yourselves from
+    German invasion you support our old political regime. These people
+    want to see Russia defeated because of their hatred of the Czar's
+    government. Like one of the heroes of our genius of satire,
+    Shchedrin, they mix fatherland with its temporary bosses. But
+    Russia belongs not to the Czar, but to the Russian working-people.
+    In defending Russia, the working-people defend themselves, defend
+    the road to their freedom. As we said before, the inevitable
+    consequences of German victory would be the strengthening of our
+    old regime.
+
+    The Russian reactionaries understand this very thoroughly. _In a
+    faint, half-hearted manner they are defending Russia from
+    Germany_. The Ministers who resigned recently, Maklakov and
+    Shcheglovitov, presented a secret report to the Czar, in November,
+    1914, in which they explained how advantageous it would be for the
+    Czar to make a separate peace with Germany. _They understand that
+    the defeat of Germany would be a defeat of the principles of
+    monarchism, so dear to all our European reactionaries_.
+
+    Our people will never forget _the failure of the Czar's government
+    to defend Russia_. But if the progressive, the politically
+    conscious people will not take part in the struggle against
+    Germany, the Czar's government will have an excuse for saying: "It
+    is not our fault that Germany defeats us; it is the fault of the
+    revolutionists who have betrayed their country," and this will
+    vindicate the government in the eyes of the people.
+
+    The political situation in Russia is such that only across the
+    bridge of national defense can we reach freedom. Remember, _we do
+    not tell you, first victory against the external enemy and then
+    revolution against the internal, the Czar's government_.
+
+    In the course of events the defeat of the Czar's government may
+    serve as a necessary preliminary condition for, and even as a
+    guaranty of, the elimination of the German danger. The French
+    revolutionists of the end of the eighteenth century would never
+    have been able to have overcome the enemy, attacking France on all
+    sides, had they not adopted such tactics only when the popular
+    movement against the old regime became mature enough to render
+    their efforts effective.
+
+    Furthermore, you must not be embarrassed by the arguments of those
+    who believe that every one who defends his country refuses thereby
+    to take part in the struggle of the classes. These persons do not
+    know what they are talking about. In the first place, in order
+    that the struggle of the classes in Russia should be successful,
+    certain social and political conditions must exist there. _These
+    conditions will not exist if Germany wins_.
+
+    In the second place, if the working-man of Russia cannot but
+    defend himself against the exploitation of the Russian landed
+    aristocrat and capitalist it seems incomprehensible that he should
+    remain inactive when the lasso of exploitation is being drawn
+    around his neck by the German landed aristocracy (the _Junker_)
+    and the German capitalist who are, unfortunately, at the present
+    time _supported by a considerable part of the German proletariat
+    that has turned traitor to its duty of solidarity with the
+    proletariat of other countries_.
+
+    By striving to the utmost to cut this lasso of German
+    imperialistic exploitation, the proletariat of Russia will
+    continue the struggle of the classes in that form which at the
+    present moment is most appropriate, fruitful, and effective.
+
+    It has been our country's fate once before to suffer from the
+    bloody horrors of a hostile invasion. But never before did it have
+    to defend itself against an enemy so well armed, so skilfully
+    organized, so carefully prepared for his plundering enterprise as
+    he is now.
+
+    The position of the country is dangerous to the highest degree;
+    therefore upon all of you, upon all the politically conscious
+    children of the working-people of Russia, lies an enormous
+    responsibility.
+
+    If you say to yourselves that it is immaterial to you and to your
+    less developed brothers as to who wins in this great international
+    collision going on now, and if you act accordingly, Russia will be
+    crushed by Germany. And when Russia will be crushed by Germany, it
+    will fare badly with the Allies. This does not need any
+    demonstration.
+
+    But if, on the contrary, you become convinced that the defeat of
+    Russia will reflect badly upon the interests of the working
+    population, and if you will help the self-defense of our country
+    with all your forces, our country and her allies will escape the
+    terrible danger menacing them.
+
+    Therefore, go deeply into the situation. You make a great mistake
+    if you imagine that it is not to the interests of the
+    working-people to defend our country. In reality, nobody's
+    interests suffer more terribly from the invasion of an enemy than
+    the interests of the working-population.
+
+    Take, for instance, the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. When the
+    Germans besieged Paris and the cost of all the necessaries of life
+    rose enormously, it was clear that the poor suffered much more
+    than the rich. In the same way, when Germany exacted five billions
+    of contribution from vanquished France, this same, in the final
+    count, was paid by the poor; for paying that contribution indirect
+    taxation was greatly raised, the burden of which nearly entirely
+    falls on the lower classes.
+
+    More than that. The most dangerous consequence to France, due to
+    her defeat in 1870-71, was the retardation of her economic
+    development. In other words, the defeat of France badly reflected
+    upon the contemporary interests of her people, and, even more,
+    upon her entire subsequent development.
+
+    The defeat of Russia by Germany will much more injure our people
+    than the defeat of France injured the French people. The war now
+    exacts incredibly large expenditures. It is more difficult for
+    Russia, a country economically backward, to bear that expenditure
+    than for the wealthy states of western Europe. Russia's back, even
+    before the war, was burdened with a heavy state loan. Now this
+    debt is growing by the hour, and vast regions of Russia are
+    subject to wholesale devastation.
+
+    If the Germans will win the final victory, they will demand from
+    us an enormous contribution, in comparison with which the streams
+    of gold that poured into victorious Germany from vanquished
+    France, after the war of 1871, will seem a mere trifle.
+
+    But that will not be all. The most consequent and outspoken
+    heralds of German imperialism are even now saying that it is
+    necessary to exact from Russia the cession of important territory,
+    which should be cleared from the present population for the
+    greater convenience of German settlers. Never before have
+    plunderers, dreaming of despoiling a conquered people, displayed
+    such cynical heartlessness!
+
+    But for our vanquishers it will not be enough to exact an
+    unheard-of enormous contribution and to tear up our western
+    borderlands. Already, in 1904, Russia, being in a difficult
+    situation, was obliged to conclude a commercial treaty with
+    Germany, very disadvantageous to herself. The treaty hindered, at
+    the same time, the development of our agriculture and the progress
+    of our industries. It affected, with equal disadvantage, the
+    interests of the farmers as well as of those engaged in industry.
+    It is easy to imagine what kind of a treaty victorious German
+    imperialism would impose upon us. In economic matters, Russia
+    would become a German colony. Russia's further economic
+    development would be greatly hindered if not altogether stopped.
+    Degeneration and deprivation would be the result of German victory
+    for an important part of the Russian working-people.
+
+    What will German victory bring to western Europe? After all we
+    have already said, it is needless to expatiate on how many of the
+    unmerited economic calamities it will bring to the people of the
+    western countries allied to Russia. We wish to draw your attention
+    to the following: England, France, even Belgium and Italy, are, in
+    a political sense, far ahead of the German Empire, which has not
+    as yet grown up to a parliamentary regime. German victory over
+    these countries would be the victory of the old over the new, and
+    if the democratic ideal is dear to you, you must wish success to
+    our Western Allies.
+
+    Indifference to the result of this war would be, for us, equal to
+    political suicide. The most important, the most vital interests of
+    the proletariat and of the laboring peasantry demand of you an
+    active participation in the defense of the country. Your watchword
+    must be victory over the foreign enemy. In an active movement
+    toward such victory, the live forces of the people will become
+    free and strong.
+
+    Obedient to this watchword, you must be as wise as serpents.
+    Although in your hearts may burn the flame of noble indignation,
+    in your heads must reign, invariably, cold political reckoning.
+    You must know that zeal without reason is sometimes worse than
+    complete indifference. Every act of agitation in the rear of the
+    army, fighting against the enemy, would be equivalent to high
+    treason, as it would be a service to the foreign enemy.
+
+    The thunders of the war certainly cannot make the Russian
+    manufacturers and merchants more idealistic than they were in time
+    of peace. In the filling of the numerous orders, inevitable during
+    the mobilization of industry for war needs, the capitalists will,
+    as they are accustomed to, take great care of the interests of
+    capital, and will not take care of the interests of hired labor.
+    You will be entirely right if you wax indignant at their conduct.
+    But in all cases, whenever you desire to answer by a strike, you
+    must first think whether such action would not be detrimental to
+    the cause of the defense of Russia.
+
+    The private must be subject to the general. The workmen of every
+    factory must remember that they would commit, without any doubt,
+    the gravest mistake if, considering only their own interests, they
+    forget how severely the interests of the entire Russian
+    proletariat and peasantry would suffer from German victory.
+
+    The tactics which can be defined by the motto, "All or nothing,"
+    are the tactics of anarchy, fully unworthy of the conscious
+    representatives of the proletariat and peasantry. The General
+    Staff of the German Army would greet with pleasure the news that
+    we had adopted such tactics. _Believe us that this Staff is ready
+    to help all those who would like to preach it in our country_.
+    They want trouble in Russia, they want strikes in England, they
+    want everything that would facilitate the achievement of their
+    conquering schemes.
+
+    But you will not make them rejoice. You will not forget the words
+    of our great fabulist: "What the enemy advises is surely bad." You
+    must insist that all your representatives take the most active
+    part in all organizations created now, under the pressure of
+    public opinion, for the struggle with the foe. Your
+    representatives must, if possible, take part not only in the work
+    of the special technical organizations, such as the War-Industrial
+    Committees which have been created for the needs of the army, but
+    also in all other organizations of social and political character.
+
+    The situation is such that we cannot come to freedom in any other
+    way than by the war of national defense.
+
+That the foregoing Manifesto expressed the position of the vast majority of
+Russian Socialists there can be no doubt whatever. Between this position
+and that of the Porazhentsi with their doctrine that Russia's defeat by
+Germany was desirable, there was a middle ground, which was taken by a not
+inconsiderable number of Socialists, including such able leaders as Paul
+Axelrod. Those who took up this intermediate position were both
+anti-Czarists and anti-German-imperialists. They were pro-Ally in the large
+sense, and desired to see the Allies win over the Central Empires, if not a
+"crushing" victory, a very definite and conclusive one. But they regarded
+the alliance of Czarism with the Allies as an unnatural marriage. They
+believed that autocratic Russia's natural alliance was with autocratic
+Germany and Austria. Their hatred of Czarism led them to wish for its
+defeat, even by Germany, provided the victory were not so great as to
+permit Germany to extend her domain over Russia or any large part of it.
+Their position became embodied in the phrase, "Victory by the Allies on the
+west and Russia's defeat on the east." This was, of course, utterly
+unpractical theorizing and bore no relation to reality.
+
+
+V
+
+Thanks in part to the vigorous propaganda of such leaders as Plechanov,
+Deutsch, Bourtzev, Tseretelli, Kerensky, and many others, and in part to
+the instinctive good sense of the masses, support of the war by Socialists
+of all shades and factions--except the extreme Bolsheviki and
+the so-called "Internationalist" sections of Mensheviki and
+Socialist-Revolutionists--became general. The anti-war minority was
+exceedingly small and had no hold upon the masses. Had the government been
+both wise and honestly desirous of presenting a united front to the foe,
+and to that end made intelligent and generous concessions to the democratic
+movement, it is most unlikely that Russia would have collapsed. As it was,
+the government adopted a policy which could not fail to weaken the military
+force of the nation--a policy admirably suited to German needs.
+
+Extremes meet. On the one hand there were the Porazhentsi Socialists,
+contending that the interests of progress would be best served by a German
+victory over Russia, and plotting to weaken and corrupt the morale of the
+Russian army and to stir up internal strife to that end. On the other hand,
+within the royal court, and throughout the bureaucracy, reactionary
+pro-German officials were animated by the belief that the victory of
+Germany was essential to the permanence of Absolutism and autocratic
+government. They, too, like the Socialist "defeatists," aimed to weaken
+and corrupt the morale of the army and to divide the nation.
+
+These Germanophiles in places of power realized that they had unconscious
+but exceedingly useful allies in the Socialist intransigents. Actuated by
+motives however high, the latter played into the hands of the most corrupt
+and reactionary force that ever infested the old regime. This force, the
+reactionary Germanophiles, had from the very first hoped and believed that
+Germany would win the war. They had exerted every ounce of pressure they
+could command to keep the Czar from maintaining the treaty with France and
+entering into the war on her side against Germany and Austria. When they
+failed in this, they bided their time, full of confidence that the superior
+efficiency of the German military machine would soon triumph. But when they
+witnessed the great victorious onward rush of the Russian army, which for a
+time manifested such a degree of efficiency as they had never believed to
+be possible, they began to bestir themselves. From this quarter came the
+suggestion, very early in the war, as Plechanov and his associates charged
+in their Manifesto, that the Czar ought to make an early peace with
+Germany.
+
+They went much farther than this. Through every conceivable channel they
+contrived to obstruct Russia's military effort. They conspired to
+disorganize the transportation system, the hospital service, the
+food-supply, the manufacture of munitions. They, too, in a most effective
+manner, were plotting to weaken and corrupt the morale of the army. There
+was universal uneasiness. In the Allied chancelleries there was fear of a
+treacherous separate peace between Russia and Germany. It was partly to
+avert that catastrophe by means of a heavy bribe that England undertook the
+forcing of the Dardanelles. All over Russia there was an awakening of the
+memories of the graft that ate like a canker-worm at the heart of the
+nation. Men told once more the story of the Russian general in Manchuria,
+in 1904, who, when asked why fifty thousand men were marching barefoot,
+answered that the boots were in the pocket of Grand-Duke Vladimir! They
+told again the story of the cases of "shells" for the Manchurian army which
+were intercepted in the nation's capital, _en route_ to Moscow, and found
+to contain--paving-stones! How General Kuropatkin managed to amass a
+fortune of over six million rubles during the war with Japan was
+remembered. Fear that the same kind of treason was being perpetrated grew
+almost to the panic point.
+
+So bad were conditions in the army, so completely had the Germanophile
+reactionaries sabotaged the organization, that the people themselves took
+the matter in hand. Municipalities all over the country formed a Union of
+Cities to furnish food, clothes, and other necessaries to the army. The
+National Union of Zemstvos did the same thing. More than three thousand
+institutions were established on the different Russian fronts by the
+National Union of Zemstvos. These institutions included hospitals,
+ambulance stations, feeding stations for troops on the march, dental
+stations, veterinary stations, factories for manufacturing supplies, motor
+transportation services, and so on through a long catalogue of things which
+the administration absolutely failed to provide. The same great
+organization furnished millions of tents and millions of pairs of boots and
+socks. Civil Russia was engaged in a great popular struggle to overcome
+incompetence, corruption, and sabotage in the bureaucracy. For this work
+the civilian agencies were not thanked by the government. Instead, they
+were oppressed and hindered. Against them was directed the hate of the
+dark forces of the "occult government" and at the same time the fierce
+opposition and scorn of men who called themselves Socialists and champions
+of proletarian freedom!
+
+There was treachery in the General Staff and throughout the War Department,
+at the very head of which was a corrupt traitor, Sukhomlinov. It was
+treachery in the General Staff which led to the tragic disasters in East
+Prussia. The great drive of the Austrian and German armies in 1915, which
+led to the loss of Poland, Lithuania, and large parts of Volhynia and
+Courland, and almost entirely eliminated Russia from the war, was
+unquestionably brought about by co-operation with the German General Staff
+on the part of the sinister "occult government," as the Germanophile
+reactionary conspiracy in the highest circles came to be known.
+
+No wonder that Plechanov and his friends in their Manifesto to the Russian
+workers declared that the reactionaries were defending Russia from
+subjugation by Germany in "a half-hearted way," and that "our people will
+never forget the failure of the Czar's government to defend Russia." They
+were only saying, in very moderate language, what millions were thinking;
+what, a few months later, many of the liberal spokesmen of the country were
+ready to say in harsher language. As early as January, 1915, the Duma met
+and cautiously expressed its alarm. In July it met again, many of the
+members coming directly from the front, in uniform. Only the fear that a
+revolution would make the continuance of the war impossible prevented a
+revolution at that time. The Duma was in a revolutionary mood. Miliukov,
+for example, thundered:
+
+" ... In January we came here with ... the feeling of patriotic alarm. We
+then kept this feeling to ourselves. Yet in closed sessions of committees
+we told the government all that filled the soul of the people. The answer
+we received did not calm us; it amounted to saying that the government
+could get along without us, without our co-operation. To-day we have
+convened in a grave moment of trial for our fatherland. The patriotic alarm
+of the people has proved to be well founded, to the misfortune of our
+country. Secret things have become open, and the assertions of half a year
+ago have turned out to be mere words. Yet the country cannot be satisfied
+with words. _The people wish to take affairs into their own hands and to
+correct what has been neglected. The people look upon us as legal executors
+of their will_."
+
+Kerensky spoke to the same general effect, adding, "_I appeal to the people
+themselves to take into their hands the salvation of the country and fight
+for a full right to govern the state_." The key-note of revolution was
+being sounded now. For the spirit of revolution breathed in the words, "The
+people wish to take affairs into their own hands," and in Kerensky's
+challenge, "I appeal to the people themselves to take into their hands the
+salvation of the country." The Duma was the logical center around which the
+democratic forces of the country could rally. Its moderate character
+determined this. Only its example was necessary to the development of a
+great national movement to overthrow the old regime with its manifold
+treachery, corruption, and incompetence. When, on August 22d, the
+Progressive Bloc was formed by a coalition of Constitutional Democrats,
+Progressives, Nationalists, and Octobrists--the last-named group having
+hitherto generally supported the government--there was a general chorus of
+approval throughout the country, If the program of the Bloc was not radical
+enough to satisfy the various Socialist groups, even the Laborites, led by
+Kerensky, it was, nevertheless, a program which they could support in the
+main, as far as it went.
+
+All over the country there was approval of the demand for a responsible
+government. The municipal councils of the large cities passed resolutions
+in support of it. The great associations of manufacturers supported it. All
+over the nation the demand for a responsible government was echoed. It was
+generally believed that the Czar and his advisers would accept the
+situation and accede to the popular demand. But once more the influence of
+the reactionaries triumphed, and on September 3d came the defiant answer of
+the government to the people. It was an order suspending the Duma
+indefinitely. The gods make mad those whom they would destroy.
+
+Things went from bad to worse. More and more oppressive grew the
+government; more and more stupidly brutal and reactionary in its dealings
+with the wide-spread popular unrest. Heavier and heavier grew the burden of
+unscientific and unjustly distributed taxation. Worse and worse became the
+condition of the soldiers at the front; ever more scandalous the neglect of
+the sick and wounded. Incompetence, corruption, and treason combined to
+hurry the nation onward to a disastrous collapse. The Germanophiles were
+still industriously at work in the most important and vital places,
+practising sabotage upon a scale never dreamed of before in the history of
+any nation. They played upon the fears of the miserable weakling who was
+the nominal ruler of the vast Russian Empire, and frightened him into
+sanctioning the most suicidal policy of devising new measures of oppression
+instead of making generous concessions.
+
+Russia possessed food in abundance, being far better off in this respect
+than any other belligerent on either side, yet Russia was in the grip of
+famine. There was a vast surplus of food grains and cereals over and above
+the requirements of the army and the civilian population, yet there was
+wide-spread hunger. Prices rose to impossible levels. The most astonishing
+anarchy and disorganization characterized the administration of the
+food-supply. It was possible to get fresh butter within an hour's journey
+from Moscow for twenty-five cents a pound, but in Moscow the price was two
+and a half dollars a pound. Here, as throughout the nation, incompetence
+was reinforced by corruption and pro-German treachery. Many writers have
+called attention to the fact that even in normal times the enormous
+exportation of food grains in Russia went on side by side with per capita
+underconsumption by the peasants whose labor produced the great harvests,
+amounting to not less than 30 per cent. Now, of course, conditions were far
+worse.
+
+When the government was urged to call a convention of national leaders to
+deal with the food situation it stubbornly refused. More than that, it made
+war upon the only organizations which were staving off famine and making it
+possible for the nation to endure. Every conceivable obstacle was placed in
+the way of the National Union of Zemstvos and the Union of Cities; the
+co-operative associations, which were rendering valuable service in meeting
+the distress of working-men's families, were obstructed and restricted in
+every possible way, their national offices being closed by the police. The
+officials of the labor-unions who were co-operating with employers in
+substituting arbitration in place of strikes, establishing soup-kitchens
+and relief funds, and doing other similar work to keep the nation alive,
+were singled out for arrest and imprisonment. The Black Hundreds were
+perniciously active in all this oppression and in the treacherous advocacy
+of a separate peace with Germany.
+
+In October, 1916, a conference of chairmen of province zemstvos adopted and
+published a resolution which declared:
+
+    The tormenting and horrifying suspicion, the sinister rumors of
+    perfidy and treason, of dark forces working in favor of Germany to
+    destroy the unity of the nation, to sow discord and thus prepare
+    conditions for an ignominious peace, have now reached the clear
+    certainty that the hand of the enemy secretly influences the
+    affairs of our state.
+
+
+VI
+
+An adequate comprehension of the things set forth in this terrible summary
+is of the highest importance to every one who would attempt the task of
+reaching an intelligent understanding of the mighty upheaval in Russia and
+its far-reaching consequences. The Russian Revolution of 1917 was not
+responsible for the disastrous separate peace with Germany. The foundations
+for that were laid by the reactionaries of the old regime. It was the
+logical outcome of their long-continued efforts. Lenine, Trotzky, and their
+Bolshevist associates were mere puppets, simple tools whose visions,
+ambitions, and schemes became the channels through which the conspiracy of
+the worst reactionaries in Russia realized one part of an iniquitous
+program.
+
+The Revolution itself was a genuine and sincere effort on the part of the
+Russian people to avert the disaster and shame of a separate peace; to
+serve the Allied cause with all the fidelity of which they were capable.
+There would have been a separate peace if the old regime had remained in
+power a few weeks longer and the Revolution been averted. It is most likely
+that it would have been a more shameful peace than was concluded at
+Brest-Litovsk, and that it would have resulted in an actual and active
+alliance of the Romanov dynasty with the dynasties of the Hohenzollerns and
+the Habsburgs. The Russian Revolution of 1917 had this great merit: it so
+delayed the separate peace between Russia and Germany that the Allies were
+able to prepare for it. It had the merit, also, that it forced the
+attainment of the separate peace to come in such a manner as to reduce
+Germany's military gain on the western front to a minimum.
+
+The manner in which the Bolsheviki in their wild, groping, and frenzied
+efforts to apply theoretical abstractions to the living world, torn as it
+was by the wolves of war, famine, treason, oppression, and despair, served
+the foes of freedom and progress must not be lost sight of. The Bolshevist,
+wherever he may present himself, is the foe of progress and the ally of
+reaction.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+THE SECOND REVOLUTION
+
+
+I
+
+When the Duma assembled On November 14, 1916--new style--the approaching
+doom of Czar Nicholas II was already manifest. Why the Revolution did not
+occur at that time is a puzzle not easy to solve. Perhaps the mere fact
+that the Duma was assembling served to postpone resort to drastic measures.
+The nation waited for the Duma to lead. It is probable, also, that fear
+lest revolution prove disastrous to the military forces exercised a
+restraining influence upon the people. Certain it is that it would have
+been easy enough to kindle the fires of revolution at that time. Never in
+the history of the nation, not even in 1905, were conditions riper for
+revolt, and never had there been a more solid array of the nation against
+the bureaucracy. Discontent and revolutionary temper were not confined to
+Socialists, nor to the lower classes. Landowners, capitalists, military
+officials, and Intellectuals were united with the peasants and artisans, to
+an even greater extent than in the early stages of the First Revolution.
+Conservatives and Moderates joined with Social Democrats and
+Socialist-Revolutionists in opposition to the corrupt and oppressive
+regime. Even the president of the Duma, Michael Rodzianko, a conservative
+landowner, assailed the government.
+
+One of the principal reasons for this unexampled unity against the
+government was the wide-spread conviction, based, as we have seen, upon the
+most damning evidence, that Premier Sturmer and his Cabinet were not loyal
+to the Allies and that they contemplated making a separate peace with
+Germany. All factions in the Duma were bitterly opposed to a separate
+peace. Rodzianko was loudly cheered when he denounced the intrigues against
+the Allies and declared: "Russia gave her word to fight in common with the
+Allies till complete and final victory is won. Russia will not betray her
+friends, and with contempt refuses any consideration of a separate peace.
+Russia will not be a traitor to those who are fighting side by side with
+her sons for a great and just cause." Notwithstanding the intensification
+of the class conflict naturally resulting from the great industrial
+development since 1906, patriotism temporarily overshadowed all class
+consciousness.
+
+The cheers that greeted Rodzianko's declaration, and the remarkable ovation
+to the Allied ambassadors, who were present, amply demonstrated that, in
+spite of the frightful suffering and sacrifice which the nation had
+endured, all classes were united in their determination to win the war.
+Only a corrupt section of the bureaucracy, at one end of the social scale,
+and a small section of extreme left-wing Socialists, at the other end of
+the social scale, were at that time anti-war. There was this difference
+between the Socialist pacifists and the bureaucratic advocates of peace
+with Germany: the former were not pro-German nor anti-Ally, but sincere
+internationalists, honest and brave--however mistaken--advocates of peace.
+Outside of the bureaucracy there was no hostility to the Allies in Russia.
+Except for the insignificant Socialist minority referred to, the masses of
+the Russian people realized that the defeat of the Hohenzollern dynasty
+was necessary to a realization of the ideal of a free Russia. The new and
+greater revolution was already beginning, and determination to defeat the
+Hohenzollern bulwark of the Romanov despotism was almost universal. The
+whole nation was pervaded by this spirit.
+
+Paul Miliukov, leader of the Constitutional Democrats, popularly known as
+the "Cadets," furiously lashed Premier Sturmer and quoted the irrefutable
+evidence of his pro-Germanism and of his corruption. Sturmer reeled under
+the smashing attack. In his rage he forbade the publication of Miliukov's
+speech, but hundreds of thousands of copies of it were secretly printed and
+distributed. Every one recognized that there was war between the Duma and
+the government, and notwithstanding the criticism of the Socialists, who
+naturally regarded it as a bourgeois body, the Duma represented Russia.
+
+Sturmer proposed to his Cabinet the dissolution of the Duma, but failed to
+obtain the support of a majority. Then he determined to get the Czar's
+signature to a decree of dissolution. But the Czar was at the General
+Headquarters of the army at the time and therefore surrounded by army
+officers, practically all of whom were with the Duma and inspired by a
+bitter resentment of the pro-German intrigues, especially the neglect of
+the army organization. The weak will of Nicholas II was thus beyond the
+reach of Sturmer's influence for the time being. Meanwhile, the Ministers
+of the Army and Navy had appeared before the Duma and declared themselves
+to be on the side of the people and their parliament. On his way to visit
+the Czar at General Headquarters, Premier Sturmer was met by one of the
+Czar's messengers and handed his dismissal from office. The Duma had won.
+
+The evil genius which inspired and controlled him led Nicholas II to
+appoint as Sturmer's successor the utterly reactionary bureaucrat,
+Alexander Trepov, and to retain in office as Minister of the Interior the
+infamous Protopopov, associate of the unsavory Rasputin. When Trepov made
+his first appearance as Premier in the Duma he was loudly hissed by the
+Socialists. Other factions, while not concealing their disappointment, were
+more tolerant and even became more hopeful when they realized that from the
+first Trepov was fighting to oust Protopopov. That meant, of course, a
+fight against Rasputin as well. Whatever Trepov's motives might be in
+fighting Protopopov and Rasputin he was helping the opposition. But Trepov
+was no match for such opponents. It soon became evident that as Premier he
+was a mere figurehead and that Rasputin and Protopopov held the government
+in their hands. Protopopov openly defied the Premier and the Duma.
+
+In December it began to be rumored in political circles that Sturmer, who
+was now attached in some not clearly defined capacity to the Foreign
+Office, was about to be sent to a neutral country as ambassador. The rumor
+created the utmost consternation in liberal circles in Russia and in the
+Allied embassies. If true, it could only have one meaning, namely, that
+arrangements were being made to negotiate a separate peace with
+Germany--and that meant that Russia was to become Germany's economic
+vassal.
+
+The Duma demanded a responsible Ministry, a Cabinet directly responsible
+to, and controlled by, the Duma as the people's representative. This demand
+had been constantly made since the First Revolution. Even the Imperial
+Council, upon which the Czar had always been able to rely for support
+against revolutionary movements, now joined forces with the Duma in making
+this demand. That traditionally reactionary, bureaucratic body, composed
+of former Premiers, Cabinet Ministers, and other high officials, formally
+demanded that the Czar take steps to make the government responsible to the
+popularly elected assemblage. This was a small revolution in itself. The
+fabric of Czarism had cracked.
+
+
+II
+
+There can be no doubt in the mind of any student of Russian affairs that
+the unity of the Imperial Council and the Duma, like the unity of classes,
+was due to the strong pro-Ally sentiment which at that time possessed
+practically the entire nation. On December 12th--new style--Germany offered
+Russia a separate peace, and three days later the Foreign Minister,
+Pokrovsky, visited the Duma and announced that Russia would reject the
+offer. The Duma immediately passed a resolution declaring that "the Duma
+unanimously favors a categorical refusal by the Allied governments to
+enter, under present conditions, into any peace negotiations whatever." On
+the 19th a similar resolution was adopted by the Imperial Council, which
+continued to follow the leadership of the Duma. Before adjourning for the
+Christmas holidays the Duma passed another resolution, aimed chiefly at
+Protopopov and Sturmer, protesting against the sinister activities which
+were undermining the war-making forces of the nation, and praising the work
+of the zemstvos and working-class organizations which had struggled bravely
+to sustain the army, feed the people, care for the sick and wounded, and
+avert utter chaos.
+
+On December 30th, in the early hours of the morning, the monk Rasputin was
+murdered and his body thrown into the Neva. The strangest and most evil of
+all the actors in the Russian drama was dead, but the system which made
+him what he was lived. Rasputin dead exercised upon the diseased mind of
+the Czarina--and, through her, upon the Czar--even a greater influence than
+when he was alive. Nicholas II was as powerless to resist the insane
+Czarina's influence as he had proved himself to be when he banished the
+Grand-Duke Nicholas for pointing out that the Czarina was the tool of evil
+and crafty intriguers. Heedless of the warning implied in the murder of
+Rasputin, and of the ever-growing opposition to the government and the
+throne, the Czar inaugurated, or permitted to be inaugurated, new measures
+of reaction and repression.
+
+Trepov was driven from the Premiership and replaced by Prince Golitizin, a
+bureaucrat of small brain and less conscience. The best Minister of
+Education Russia had ever had, Ignatyev, was replaced by one of the
+blackest of all reactionaries. The Czar celebrated the New-Year by issuing
+an edict retiring the progressive members of the Imperial Council, who had
+supported the Duma, and appointing in their stead the most reactionary men
+he could find in the Empire. At the head of the Council as president he
+placed the notorious Jew-hating Stcheglovitov. As always, hatred of the Jew
+sprang from fear of progress.
+
+As one reads the history of January, 1917, in Russia, as it was reported in
+the press day by day, and the numerous accounts of competent and
+trustworthy observers, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that
+Protopopov deliberately sought to precipitate a revolution. Mad as this
+hypothesis seems to be, it is nevertheless the only one which affords a
+rational explanation of the policy of the government. No sooner was
+Golitizin made Premier than it was announced that the opening of the Duma
+would be postponed till the end of January, in order that the Cabinet
+might be reorganized. Later it was announced that the Duma opening would be
+again postponed--this time till the end of February. In the reorganization
+of the Cabinet, Shuvaviev, the War Minister, who had loyally co-operated
+with the zemstvos and had supported the Duma in November, was dismissed.
+Pokrovsky, the Foreign Minister, who had announced to the Duma in December
+the rejection of the German peace offer, was reported to be "sick" and
+given "leave of absence." Other changes were made in the Cabinet, in every
+case to the advantage of the reactionaries. It was practically impossible
+for anyone in Russia to find out who the Ministers of the government were.
+
+Protopopov released Sukhomlinov, the former Minister of War who had been
+justly convicted of treason. This action, taken, it was said, at the
+direction of the Czarina, added to the already wide-spread belief that the
+government was animated by a desire to make peace with Germany. That the
+Czar himself was loyal to the Allies was generally believed, but there was
+no such belief in the loyalty of Protopopov, Sturmer, and their associates.
+The nation meantime was drifting into despair and anarchy. The railway
+system was deliberately permitted to become disorganized. Hunger reigned in
+the cities and the food reserves for the army were deliberately reduced to
+a two days' supply. The terror of hunger spread through the large cities
+and through the army at the front like prairie fire.
+
+It became evident that Protopopov was carrying out the plans of the
+Germanophiles, deliberately trying to disorganize the life of the nation
+and make successful warfare impossible. Socialists and labor leaders
+charged that his agents were encouraging the pacifist minority and opposing
+the patriotic majority among the workers. The work of the War Industries
+Committee which controlled organizations engaged in the manufacture of
+war-supplies which employed hundreds of thousands of workers was hampered
+in every way. It is the testimony of the best-known and most-trusted
+working-class leaders in Russia that the vast majority of the workers,
+while anxious for a general democratic peace, were opposed to a separate
+peace with Germany and favored the continuation of the war against
+Prussianism and the co-operation of all classes to that end. The pacifists
+and "defeatist" Socialists represented a minority. To the minority every
+possible assistance was given, while the leaders of the working class who
+were loyal to the war, and who sought to sustain the morale of the workers
+in support of the war, were opposed and thwarted in their efforts and, in
+many cases, cast into prison. The Black Hundreds were still at work.
+
+Socialist leaders of the working class issued numerous appeals to the
+workers, warning them that Protopopov's secret police agitators were trying
+to bring about strikes, and begging them not to lend themselves to such
+treacherous designs, which could only aid Germany at the expense of
+democracy in Russia and elsewhere. It became known, too, that large numbers
+of machine-guns were being distributed among the police in Petrograd and
+placed at strategic points throughout the city. It was said that Protopopov
+was mad, but it was the methodical madness of a desperate, reactionary,
+autocratic regime.
+
+
+III
+
+Protopopov and Sturmer and their associates recognized as clearly as the
+liberals did the natural kinship and interdependence of the three great
+autocracies, the Romanov, Habsburg, and Hohenzollern dynasties. They knew
+well that the crushing of autocracy in Austria-Hungary and Germany would
+make it impossible to maintain autocracy in Russia. They realized,
+furthermore, that while the nation was not willing to attempt revolution
+during the war, the end of the war would inevitably bring with it
+revolution upon a scale far vaster than had ever been attempted before,
+unless, indeed, the revolutionary leaders could be goaded into making a
+premature attempt to overthrow the monarchy. In that case, it might be
+possible to crush them. Given a rebellion in the cities, which could be
+crushed by the police amply provided with machine-guns, and by "loyal"
+troops, with a vast army unprovided with food and no means of supplying it,
+there would be abundant justification for making a separate peace with
+Germany. Thus the Revolution would be crushed and the whole system of
+autocracy, Russian, Austrian, and German, preserved.
+
+The morning of the 27th of February--new style--was tense with an ominous
+expectancy. In the Allied chancelleries anxious groups were gathered. They
+realized that the fate of the Allies hung in the balance. In Petrograd
+alone three hundred thousand workers went out on strike that day, and the
+police agents did their level best to provoke violence. The large bodies of
+troops massed at various points throughout the city, and the police with
+their machine-guns, testified to the thoroughness with which the government
+had prepared to crush any revolutionary manifestations. Thanks to the
+excellent discipline of the workers, and the fine wisdom of the leaders of
+the Social Democrats, the Socialist-Revolutionists, and the Labor Group,
+who constantly exhorted the workers not to fall into the trap set for them,
+there was no violence.
+
+At the opening session of the Duma, Kerensky, leader of the Labor Group,
+made a characteristic address in which he denounced the arrest of the Labor
+Group members of the War Industries Committee. He directed his attack
+against the "system," not against individuals:
+
+"We are living in a state of anarchy unprecedented in our history. In
+comparison with it the period of 1613 seems like child's play. Chaos has
+enveloped not only the political, but the economic life of the nation as
+well. It destroys the very foundations of the nation's social economic
+structure.
+
+"Things have come to such a pass that recently one of the Ministries,
+shipping coal from Petrograd to a neighboring city, had armed the train
+with a special guard so that other authorities should not confiscate the
+coal on the way! We have arrived already at the primitive stage when each
+person defends with all the resources at his command the material in his
+possession, ready to enter into mortal combat for it with his neighbor. We
+are witnessing the same scenes which France went through at the time of the
+Revolution. Then also the products shipped to Paris were accompanied by
+special detachments of troops to prevent their being seized by the
+provincial authorities....
+
+"Behold the Cabinet of Rittich-Protopopov-Golitizin dragging into the court
+the Labor Group of the War Industries Committee, charged with aiming at the
+creation of a Russian Social-Democratic republic! They did not even know
+that nobody aims at a 'Social-Democratic' republic. One aiming at a
+republic labors for popular government. But has the court anything to say
+about all these distinctions? We know beforehand what sentences are to be
+imposed upon the prisoners....
+
+"I have no desire to criticize the individual members of the Cabinet. The
+greatest mistake of all is to seek traitors, German agents, separate
+Sturmers. _We have a still greater enemy than the German influence, than
+the treachery and treason of individuals. And that enemy is the system--the
+system of a medieval form of government_."
+
+How far the conspiracy of the government of Russia against the war of
+Russia and her Allies extended is shown by the revelations made in the Duma
+on March 3d by one of the members, A. Konovalov. He reported that two days
+previously, March 1st, the only two members of the Labor Group of the War
+Industries Committee who were not in prison issued an appeal to the workers
+not to strike. These two members of the Labor Group of the War Industries
+Committee, Anosovsky and Ostapenko, took their exhortation to the bureau of
+the War Industries Committee for its approval. But, although approved by
+this great and important organization, the appeal was not passed by the
+government censor. When Guchkov, president of the War Industries Committee,
+attempted to get the appeal printed in the newspapers he was prevented by
+action emanating from the office of Protopopov.
+
+
+IV
+
+Through all the early days of March there was labor unrest in Petrograd, as
+well as in some other cities. Petrograd was, naturally, the storm center.
+There were small strikes, but, fortunately, not much rioting. The extreme
+radicals were agitating for the release of the imprisoned leaders of the
+Labor Group and urging drastic action by the workers. Much of this
+agitation was sincere and honest, but no little of it was due to the
+provocative agents. These, disguised as workmen, seized every opportunity
+to urge revolt. Any pretext sufficed them; they stimulated the honest
+agitation to revolt as a protest against the imprisonment of the Labor
+Group, and the desperate threat that unless food was forthcoming revolution
+would be resorted to for sinister purposes. And all the time the police and
+the troops were massed to crush the first rising.
+
+The next few days were destined to reveal the fact that the cunning and
+guile of Protopopov had overreached itself; that the soldiers could not be
+relied upon to crush any uprising of the people. There was some rioting in
+Petrograd on March 3d, and the next day the city was placed under martial
+law. On March 7th the textile workers went out on strike and were quickly
+followed by several thousand workers belonging to other trades. Next day
+there was a tremendous popular demonstration at which the workers demanded
+food. The strike spread during the next two or three days until there was a
+pretty general stoppage of industry. Students from the university joined
+with the striking workmen and there were numerous demonstrations, but
+little disposition to violence. When the Cossacks and mounted police were
+sent to break up the crowds, the Cossacks took great care not to hurt the
+people, fraternizing with them and being cheered by them. It was evident
+that the army would not let itself be used to crush the uprising of the
+people. The police remained "loyal," but they were not adequate in numbers.
+Protopopov had set in motion forces which no human agency could control.
+The Revolution was well under way.
+
+The Duma remained in constant session. Meantime the situation in the
+capital was becoming serious in the extreme. Looting of stores began, and
+there were many victims of the police efforts to disperse the crowds. In
+the midst of the crisis the Duma repudiated the government and broke off
+all relations with it. The resolution of the Duma declared that "The
+government which covered its hands with the blood of the people should no
+longer be admitted to the Duma. With such a government the Duma breaks all
+relations forever." The answer of Czar Nicholas was an order to dissolve
+the Duma, which order the Duma voted to ignore, remaining in session as
+before.
+
+On Sunday, March 11th, there was a great outpouring of people at a
+demonstration. Police established on the roofs of some public buildings
+attacked the closely packed throngs with machine-gun fire, killing and
+wounding hundreds. One of the famous regiments, the Volynski, revolted,
+killed its commander, and joined the people when ordered to fire into the
+crowds. Detachments of soldiers belonging to other regiments followed their
+example and refused to fire upon the people. One or two detachments of
+troops did obey orders and were immediately attacked by the revolutionary
+troops. There was civil war in Petrograd.
+
+While the fighting was still going on, the president of the Duma sent the
+following telegram to the Czar:
+
+    The situation is grave. Anarchy reigns in the capital. The
+    government is paralyzed. The transport of provisions and fuel is
+    completely disorganized. General dissatisfaction is growing.
+    Irregular rifle-firing is occurring in the streets. It is
+    necessary to charge immediately some person enjoying the
+    confidence of the people to form a new government. It is
+    impossible to linger. Any delay means death. Let us pray to God
+    that the responsibility in this hour will not fall upon a crowned
+    head.
+
+    RODZIANKO.
+
+The Duma waited in vain that night for an answer from the Czar. The
+bourgeois elements in the Duma were terrified. Only the leaders of the
+different Socialist groups appeared to possess any idea of providing the
+revolutionary movement with proper direction. While the leaders of the
+bourgeois groups were proclaiming their conviction that the Revolution
+would be crushed in a few hours by the tens of thousands of troops in
+Petrograd who had not yet rebelled, the Socialist leaders were busy
+preparing plans to carry on the struggle. Even those Social Democrats who
+for various reasons had most earnestly tried to avert the Revolution gave
+themselves with whole-hearted enthusiasm to the task of organizing the
+revolutionary forces. Following the example set in the 1905 Revolution,
+there had been formed a central committee of the working-class
+organizations to direct the movement. This body, composed of elected
+representatives of the unions and Socialist societies, was later known as
+the Council of Workmen's Deputies. It was this body which undertook the
+organization of the Revolution. This Revolution, unlike that of 1905, was
+initiated by the bourgeoisie, but its originators manifested little desire
+and less capacity to lead it.
+
+When Monday morning came there was no longer an unorganized, planless mass
+confusedly opposing a carefully organized force, but a compact,
+well-organized, and skilfully led movement. Processions were formed, each
+under responsible directors with very definite instructions. As on the
+previous day, the police stationed upon roofs of buildings, and at various
+strategic points, fired upon the people. As on the previous day, also, the
+soldiers joined the Revolution and refused to shoot the people. The famous
+Guards' Regiment, long the pet and pride of the Czar, was the first to
+rebel. The soldiers killed the officer who ordered them to fire, and then
+with cheers joined the rebels. When the military authorities sent out
+another regiment to suppress the rebel Guards' Regiment they saw the new
+force go over to the Revolution in a body. Other regiments deserted in the
+same manner. The flower of the Russian army had joined the people in
+revolting against the Czar and the system of Czarism.
+
+On the side of the revolutionists were now many thousands of well-trained
+soldiers, fully armed. Soon they took possession of the Arsenal, after
+killing the commander. The soldiers made organized and systematic warfare
+upon the police. Every policeman seen was shot down, police stations were
+set on fire, and prisons were broken open and the prisoners released. The
+numerous political prisoners were triumphantly liberated and took their
+places in the revolutionary ranks. In rapid succession the great bastiles
+fell! Peter and Paul Fortress, scene of infinite martyrdom, fell into the
+hands of the revolutionary forces, and the prisoners, many of them heroes
+and martyrs of other uprisings, were set free amid frenzied cheering. The
+great Schluesselburg Fortress was likewise seized and emptied. With
+twenty-five thousand armed troops on their side, the revolutionists were
+practically masters of the capital. They attacked the headquarters of the
+hated Secret Service and made a vast, significantly symbolical bonfire of
+its archives.
+
+Once more Rodzianko appealed to the Czar. It is no reflection upon
+Rodzianko's honesty, or upon his loyalty to the people, to say that he was
+appalled by the development of the struggle. He sympathized with the people
+in their demand for political democracy and would wage war to the end upon
+Czarism, but he feared the effect of the Revolution upon the army and the
+Allied cause. Moreover, he was a landowner, and he feared Socialism. In
+1906 he had joined forces with the government when the Socialists led the
+masses--and now the Socialist leaders were again at the head of the masses.
+Perhaps the result would have been otherwise if the Duma had followed up
+its repudiation of the government by openly and unreservedly placing itself
+at the head of the uprising. In any other country than Russia that would
+have been done, in all probability, but the Russian bourgeoisie was weak.
+This was due, like so much else in Russia, to the backwardness of the
+industrial system. There was not a strong middle class and, therefore, the
+bourgeoisie left the fighting to the working class. Rodzianko's new appeal
+to the Czar was pathetic. When hundreds of dead and dying lay in the
+streets and in churches, hospitals, and other public buildings, he could
+still imagine that the Czar could save the situation: "The situation is
+growing worse. It is necessary to take measures immediately, for to-morrow
+it will be too late," he telegraphed. "The last hour has struck to decide
+the fate of the country and of the dynasty." Poor, short-sighted bourgeois!
+It was already "too late" for "measures" by the weak-minded Nicholas II to
+avail. The "fate of the country and of the dynasty" was already determined!
+It was just as well that the Czar did not make any reply to the message.
+
+The new ruler of Russia, King Demos, was speaking now. Workers and soldiers
+sent deputations to the Taurida Palace, where the Duma was sitting.
+Rodzianko read to them the message he had sent to the Czar, but that was
+small comfort. Thousands of revolutionists, civilian and military, stormed
+the Taurida Palace and clamored to hear what the Socialists in the Duma had
+to say. In response to this demand Tchcheidze, Kerensky, Skobelev, and
+other Socialists from various groups appeared and addressed the people.
+These men had a message to give; they understood the ferment and were part
+of it. They were of the Revolution--bone of its bone, flesh of its flesh,
+and so they were cheered again and again. And what a triumvirate they made,
+these leaders of the people! Tchcheidze, once a university professor, keen,
+cool, and as witty as George Bernard Shaw, listened to with the deference
+democracy always pays to intellect.
+
+Kerensky, lawyer by profession, matchless as an orator, obviously the
+prophet and inspirer rather than the executive type; Skobelev, blunt,
+direct, and practical, a man little given to romantic illusions. It was
+Skobelev who made the announcement to the crowd outside the Taurida Palace
+that the old system was ended forever and that the Duma would create a
+Provisional Committee. He begged the workers and the soldiers to keep
+order, to refrain from violence against individuals, and to observe strict
+discipline. "Freedom demands discipline and order," he said.
+
+That afternoon the Duma selected a temporary committee to restore order.
+The committee, called the Duma Committee of Safety, consisted of twelve
+members, representing all the parties and groups in the Duma. The hastily
+formed committee of the workers met and decided to call on the workmen to
+hold immediate elections for the Council of Workmen's Deputies--the first
+meeting of which was to be held that evening. That this was a perilous
+thing to do the history of the First Revolution clearly showed, but no
+other course seemed open to the workers, in view of the attitude of the
+bourgeoisie. On behalf of the Duma Committee, Rodzianko issued the
+following proclamation:
+
+    The Provisional Committee of the members of the Imperial Duma,
+    aware of the grave conditions of internal disorder created by the
+    measure of the old government, has found itself compelled to take
+    into its hands the re-establishment of political and civil order.
+    In full consciousness of the responsibility of its decision, the
+    Provisional Committee expresses its trust that the population and
+    the army will help it in the difficult task of creating a new
+    government which will comply with the wishes of the population,
+    and be able to enjoy its confidence.
+
+    MICHAIL RODZIANKO, _Speaker of the Imperial Duma_.
+    February 27, 1917.[4]
+
+That night the first formal session of the Council of Workmen's Deputies
+was held. Tchcheidze was elected president, Kerensky vice-president. The
+deputies had been elected by the working-men of many factories and by the
+members of Socialist organizations. It was not until the following day that
+soldiers' representatives were added and the words "and Soldiers" added to
+the title of the Council. At this first meeting the Council--a most
+moderate and capable body--called for a Constituent Assembly on the basis
+of equal, direct, and secret universal suffrage. This demand was contained
+in an address to the people which read, in part:
+
+    To finish the struggle successfully in the interests of democracy,
+    the people must create their own powerful organization.
+
+    The Council of the Workmen's Deputies, holding its session in the
+    Imperial Duma, makes it its supreme task to organize the people's
+    forces and their struggle for a final securing of political
+    freedom and popular government in Russia.
+
+    We appeal to the entire population of the capital to rally around
+    the Council, to form local committees in the various boroughs, and
+    to take over the management of local affairs.
+
+    All together, with united forces, we will struggle for a final
+    abolition of the old system and the calling of a Constituent
+    Assembly on the basis of universal, equal, direct, and secret
+    suffrage.
+
+This document is of the highest historical importance and merits close
+study. As already noted, Tchcheidze, leader of the Mensheviki, was
+president of the Council, and this appeal to the people shows how fully the
+moderate views of his group prevailed. Indeed, the manner in which the
+moderate counsels of the Mensheviki dominated the Council at a time of
+great excitement and passion, when extremists might have been expected to
+obtain the lead, is one of the most remarkable features of the whole story
+of the Second Russian Revolution. It appeared at this time that the
+Russian proletariat had fully learned the tragic lessons of 1905-06.
+
+It is evident from the text of the appeal that at the time the Council
+looked upon the Revolution as being primarily a political event, not as a
+movement to reconstruct the economic and social system. There is no
+reference to social democracy. Even the land question is not referred to.
+How limited their purpose was at the moment may be gathered from the
+statement, "The Council ... makes it its supreme task to organize the
+people's forces and their struggle for a final securing of political
+freedom and popular government." It is also clearly evident that,
+notwithstanding the fact that the Council itself was a working-class
+organization, a manifestation of the class consciousness of the workers,
+the leaders of the Council did not regard the Revolution as a proletarian
+event, nor doubt the necessity of co-operation on the part of all classes.
+Proletarian exclusiveness came later, but on March 13th the appeal of the
+Council was "to the entire population."
+
+March 14th saw the arrest of many of the leading reactionaries, including
+Protopopov and the traitor Sukhomlinov, and an approach to order. All that
+day the representatives of the Duma and the representatives of the Council
+of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, as it was now called, embryo of the
+first Soviet government, tried to reach an agreement concerning the future
+organization of Russia. The representatives of the Duma were pitifully
+lacking in comprehension of the situation. They wanted the Czar deposed,
+but the monarchy itself retained, subject to constitutional limitations
+analogous to those obtaining in England. They wanted the Romanov dynasty
+retained, their choice being the Czar's brother, Grand-Duke Michael. The
+representatives of the Soviet, on the other hand, would not tolerate the
+suggestion that the monarchy be continued. Standing, as yet, only for
+political democracy, they insisted that the monarchy must be abolished and
+that the new government be republican in form. The statesmanship and
+political skill of these representatives of the workers were immeasurably
+superior to those possessed by the bourgeois representatives of the Duma.
+
+
+V
+
+Thursday, March 15, 1917--new style--was one of the most fateful and
+momentous days in the history of mankind. It will always be remembered as
+the day on which Czarism ceased to exist in Russia. At three o'clock in the
+afternoon Miliukov, leader of the Constitutional Democrats, appeared in
+front of the Taurida Palace and announced to the waiting throngs that an
+agreement had been reached between the Duma and the Council of Workmen's
+and Soldiers' Deputies; that it had been decided to depose the Czar, to
+constitute immediately a Provisional Government composed of representatives
+of all parties and groups, and to proceed with arrangements for the holding
+of a Constituent Assembly at an early date to determine the form of a
+permanent democratic government for Russia.
+
+At the head of the Provisional Government, as Premier, had been placed
+Prince George E. Lvov, who as president of the Union of Zemstvos had proved
+himself to be a democrat of the most liberal school as well as an
+extraordinarily capable organizer. The position of Minister of Foreign
+Affairs was given to Miliukov, whose strong sympathy with the Allies was
+well known. The position of Minister of Justice was given to Alexander
+Kerensky, one of the most extraordinary men in Russia, a leader of the
+Group of Toil, a party of peasant Socialists, vice-president of the Council
+of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies. At the head of the War Department was
+placed Alexander Guchkov, a soldier-politician, leader of the Octobrist
+party, who had turned against the First Revolution in 1905, when it became
+an economic war of the classes, evoking thereby the hatred of the
+Socialists, but who as head of the War Industries Committee had achieved
+truly wonderful results in the present war in face of the opposition of the
+government. The pressing food problem was placed in the hands of Andrei
+Shingarev. As Minister of Agriculture Shingarev belonged to the radical
+left wing of the Cadets.
+
+It cannot be said that the composition of the Provisional Government was
+received with popular satisfaction. It was top-heavy with representatives
+of the bourgeoisie. There was only one Socialist, Kerensky. Miliukov's
+selection, inevitable though it was, and great as his gifts were, was
+condemned by the radical working-men because he was regarded as a dangerous
+"imperialist" on account of his advocacy of the annexation of
+Constantinople. Guchkov's inclusion was equally unpopular on account of his
+record at the time of the First Revolution. The most popular selection was
+undoubtedly Kerensky, because he represented more nearly than any of the
+others the aspirations of the masses. As a whole, it was the fact that the
+Provisional Government was too fully representative of the bourgeois
+parties and groups which gave the Bolsheviki and other radicals a chance to
+condemn it.
+
+The absence of the name of Tchcheidze from the list was a surprise and a
+disappointment to most of the moderate Socialists, for he had come to be
+regarded as one of the most capable and trustworthy leaders of the masses.
+The fact that he was not included in the new government could hardly fail
+to cause uneasy suspicion. It was said later that efforts had been made to
+induce him to join the new government, but that he declined to do so.
+Tchcheidze's position was a very difficult one. Thoroughly in sympathy with
+the plan to form a coalition Provisional Government, and supporting
+Kerensky in his position, Tchcheidze nevertheless declined to enter the new
+Cabinet himself. In this he was quite honest and not at all the tricky
+politician he has been represented as being.
+
+Tchcheidze knew that the Duma had been elected upon a most undemocratic
+suffrage and that it did not and could not represent the masses of the
+peasants and wage-workers. These classes were represented in the Council of
+Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, which continued to exist as a separate
+body, independent of the Duma, but co-operating with it as an equal. From a
+Socialist point of view it would have been a mistake to disband the
+Council, Tchcheidze believed. He saw Soviet government as the need of the
+critical moment, rather than as the permanent, distinctive type of Russian
+Social democracy as the critics of Kerensky have alleged.
+
+While the Provisional Government was being created, the Czar, at General
+Headquarters, was being forced to recognize the bitter fact that the
+Romanov dynasty could no longer live. When he could no more resist the
+pressure brought to bear upon him by the representatives of the Duma, he
+wrote and signed a formal instrument of abdication of the Russian throne,
+naming his brother, Grand-Duke Michael, as his successor. The latter dared
+not attempt to assume the imperial role. He recognized that the end of
+autocracy had been reached and declined to accept the throne unless chosen
+by a popular referendum vote. On March 16th, the day after the abdication
+of Nicholas II, Michael issued a statement in which he said:
+
+    This heavy responsibility has come to me at the voluntary request
+    of my brother, who has transferred the Imperial throne to me
+    during a time of warfare which is accompanied by unprecedented
+    popular disturbances.
+
+    Moved by the thought, which is in the minds of the entire people,
+    that the good of the country is paramount, I have adopted the firm
+    resolution to accept the supreme power only if this be the will of
+    our great people, who, by a plebiscite organized by their
+    representatives in a Constituent Assembly, shall establish a form
+    of government and new fundamental laws for the Russian state.
+
+    Consequently, invoking the benediction of our Lord, I urge all
+    citizens of Russia to submit to the Provisional Government,
+    established upon the initiative of the Duma and invested with full
+    plenary powers, until such time which will follow with as little
+    delay as possible, as the Constituent Assembly, on a basis of
+    universal, direct, equal, and secret suffrage, shall, by its
+    decision as to the new form of government, express the will of the
+    people.
+
+The hated Romanov dynasty was ended at last. It is not likely that
+Grand-Duke Michael entertained the faintest hope that he would ever be
+called to the throne, either by a Constituent Assembly or by a popular
+referendum. Not only was the Romanov dynasty ended, but equally so was
+monarchical Absolutism itself. No other dynasty would replace that of the
+Romanovs. Russia had thrown off the yoke of autocracy. The Second
+Revolution was an accomplished fact; its first phase was complete.
+Thoughtful men among the revolutionists recognized that the next phase
+would be far more perilous and difficult. "The bigger task is still before
+us," said Miliukov, in his address to the crowd that afternoon. A
+Constituent Assembly was to be held and that was bound to intensify the
+differences which had been temporarily composed during the struggle to
+overthrow the system of Absolutism. And the differences which existed
+between the capitalist class and the working class were not greater than
+those which existed within the latter.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+FROM BOURGEOISIE TO BOLSHEVIKI
+
+
+I
+
+It required no great gift of prophecy to foretell the failure of the
+Provisional Government established by the revolutionary coalition headed by
+Prince Lvov. From the very first day it was evident that the Cabinet could
+never satisfy the Russian people. It was an anomaly in that the Revolution
+had been a popular revolution, while the Provisional Government was
+overwhelmingly representative of the landowners, manufacturers, bankers,
+and merchants--the despised and distrusted bourgeoisie. The very meager
+representation given to the working class, through Kerensky, was, in the
+circumstances, remarkable for its stupid effrontery and its disregard of
+the most obvious realities. Much has been said and written of the
+doctrinaire attitude which has characterized the Bolsheviki in the later
+phases of the struggle, but if by doctrinairism is meant subservience to
+preconceived theories and disregard of realities, it must be said that the
+statesmen of the bourgeoisie were as completely its victims as the
+Bolsheviki later proved to be. They were subservient to dogma and
+indifferent to fact.
+
+The bourgeois leaders of Russia--and those Socialists who co-operated with
+them--attempted to ignore the biggest and most vital fact in the whole
+situation, namely, the fact that the Revolution was essentially a
+Socialist Revolution in the sense that the overwhelming mass of the people
+were bent upon the realization of a very comprehensive, though somewhat
+crudely conceived, program of socialization. It was not a mere political
+Revolution, and political changes which left the essential social structure
+unchanged, which did not tend to bring about equality of democratic
+opportunity, and which left the control of the nation in the hands of
+landowners and capitalists, could never satisfy the masses nor fail to
+invite their savage attack. Only the most hopeless and futile of
+doctrinaires could have argued themselves into believing anything else. It
+was quite idle to argue from the experience of other countries that Russia
+must follow the universal rule and establish and maintain bourgeois rule
+for a period more or less prolonged. True, that had been the experience of
+most nations, but it was foolish in the extreme to suppose that it must be
+the experience of Russia, whose conditions were so utterly unlike those
+which had obtained in any nation which had by revolution established
+constitutional government upon a democratic basis.
+
+To begin with, in every other country revolution by the bourgeoisie itself
+had been the main factor in the overthrow of autocracy. Feudalism and
+monarchical autocracy fell in western Europe before the might of a powerful
+rising class. That this class in every case drew to its side the masses and
+benefited by their co-operation must not be allowed to obscure the fact
+that in these other countries of all the classes in society the bourgeoisie
+was the most powerful. It was that fact which established its right to rule
+in place of the deposed rulers. The Russian middle class, however, lacked
+that historic right to rule. In consequence of the backwardness of the
+nation from the point of view of industrial development, the bourgeoisie
+was correspondingly backward and weak. Never in any country had a class so
+weak and uninfluential essayed the role of the ruling class. To believe
+that a class which at the most did not exceed six per cent. of the
+population could assert and maintain its rule over a nation of one hundred
+and eighty millions of people, when these had been stirred by years of
+revolutionary agitation, was at once pedantic and absurd.
+
+The industrial proletariat was as backward and as relatively weak as the
+bourgeoisie. Except by armed force and tyranny of the worst kind, this
+class could not rule Russia. Its fitness and right to rule are not
+appreciably greater than the fitness and right of the bourgeoisie. It
+cannot even be said on its behalf that it had waged the revolutionary
+struggle of the working class, for in truth its share in the Russian
+revolutionary movement had been relatively small, far less than that of the
+peasant organizations. With more than one hundred and thirty-five millions
+of peasants, from whose discontent and struggle the revolutionary movement
+had drawn its main strength, neither the bourgeoisie nor the
+class-conscious section of the industrial proletariat could set up its rule
+without angry protest and attacks which, soon or late, must overturn it.
+Every essential fact in the Russian situation, which was so unique, pointed
+to the need for a genuine and sincere co-operation by the intelligent
+leaders of all the opposition elements until stability was attained,
+together with freedom from the abnormal difficulties due to the war. In any
+event, the domination of the Provisional Government by a class so weak and
+so narrow in its outlook and aims was a disaster. As soon as time for
+reflection had been afforded the masses discontent and distrust were
+inevitable.
+
+
+II
+
+From the first days there were ominous murmurings. Yet it must be confessed
+that the Provisional Government manifested much greater enlightenment than
+might have been expected of it and hastened to enact a program--quite
+remarkable for its liberality and vision; a program which, had it come from
+a government more truly representative in its personnel of revolutionary
+Russia, might, with one important addition, have served as the foundation
+of an enduring structure. On March 18th the Provisional Government issued a
+statement of its program and an appeal to the citizens for support. This
+document, which is said to have been the joint work of P.I. Novgorodtzev,
+N.V. Nekrasov, and P.N. Miliukov, read as follows:
+
+    CITIZENS: The Executive Committee of the Duma, with the
+    aid and support of the garrison of the capital and its
+    inhabitants, has succeeded in triumphing over the obnoxious forces
+    of the old regime so that we can proceed to a more stable
+    organization of the executive power, with men whose past political
+    activity assures them the country's confidence.
+
+    The new Cabinet will base its policy upon the following
+    principles: _First_.--An immediate and general amnesty for all
+    political and religious offenses, including terrorist acts and
+    military and agrarian offenses.
+
+    _Second_.--Liberty of speech and of the press; freedom for
+    alliances, unions, and strikes, with the extension of these
+    liberties to military officials, within the limits admitted by
+    military requirements.
+
+    _Third_.--Abolition of all social, religious, and national
+    restrictions.
+
+    _Fourth_.--To proceed forthwith to the preparation and convocation
+    of a Constituent Assembly, based on universal suffrage. This
+    Assembly will establish a stable universal regime.
+
+    _Fifth_.--The substitution of the police by a national militia,
+    with chiefs to be elected and responsible to the municipalities.
+
+    _Sixth_.--Communal elections to be based on universal, direct,
+    equal, and secret suffrage.
+
+    _Seventh_.--The troops which participated in the revolutionary
+    movement will not be disarmed, but will remain in Petrograd.
+
+    _Eighth_.--While maintaining strict military discipline for troops
+    in active service, it is desirable to abrogate for soldiers all
+    restrictions in the enjoyment of civil rights accorded other
+    citizens.
+
+    The Provisional Government desires to add that it has no intention
+    of taking advantage of war conditions to delay the realization of
+    the measures of reform above mentioned.
+
+This address is worthy of especial attention. The generous liberalism of
+the program it outlines cannot be denied, but it is political liberalism
+only. It is not directly and definitely concerned with the great
+fundamental economic issues which so profoundly affect the life and
+well-being of the working class, peasants, and factory-workers alike. It is
+the program of men who saw in the Revolution only a great epochal political
+advance. In this it reflects its bourgeois origin. With the exception of
+the right to organize unions and strikes--which is a political measure--not
+one of the important economic demands peculiar to the working class is met
+in the program. The land question, which was the economic basis of the
+Revolution, and without which there could have been no Revolution, was not
+even mentioned. And the Manifesto which the Provisional Government
+addressed to the nation on March 20th was equally silent with regard to the
+land question and the socialization of industry.
+
+Evidently the Provisional Government desired to confine itself as closely
+as possible to political democracy, and to leave fundamental economic
+reform to be attended to by the Constituent Assembly. If that were its
+purpose, it would have helped matters to have had the purpose clearly
+stated and not merely left to inference. But whatever the shortcomings of
+its first official statements, the actual program of the Provisional
+Government during the first weeks was far more satisfactory and afforded
+room for great hope. On March 21st the constitution of Finland was
+restored. On the following day amnesty was granted to all political and
+religious offenders. Within a few days freedom and self-government were
+granted to Poland, subject to the ratification of the Constituent Assembly.
+At the same time all laws discriminating against the Jews were repealed by
+the following decree:
+
+All existing legal restrictions upon the rights of Russian citizens, based
+upon faith, religious teaching, or nationality, are revoked. In accordance
+with this, we hereby repeal all laws existing in Russia as a whole, as well
+as for separate localities, concerning:
+
+    1. Selection of place of residence and change of residence.
+
+    2. Acquiring rights of ownership and other material rights in all
+    kinds of movable property and real estate, and likewise in the
+    possession of, the use and managing of all property, or receiving
+    such for security.
+
+    3. Engaging in all kinds of trades, commerce, and industry, not
+    excepting mining; also equal participation in the bidding for
+    government contracts, deliveries, and in public auctions.
+
+    4. Participation in joint-stock and other commercial or industrial
+    companies and partnerships, and also employment in these companies
+    and partnerships in all kinds of positions, either by elections or
+    by employment.
+
+    5. Employment of servants, salesmen, foremen, laborers, and trade
+    apprentices.
+
+    6. Entering the government service, civil as well as military, and
+    the grade or condition of such service; participation in the
+    elections for the institutions for local self-government, and all
+    kinds of public institutions; serving in all kinds of positions of
+    government and public establishments, as well as the prosecution
+    of the duties connected with such positions.
+
+    7. Admission to all kinds of educational institutions, whether
+    private, government, or public, and the pursuing of the courses of
+    instruction of these institutions, and receiving scholarships.
+    Also the pursuance of teaching and other educational professions.
+
+    8. Performing the duties of guardians, trustees, or jurors.
+
+    9. The use of language and dialects, other than Russian, in the
+    proceedings of private societies, or in teaching in all kinds of
+    private educational institutions, and in commercial bookkeeping.
+
+Thus all the humiliating restrictions which had been imposed upon the
+Jewish people were swept away. Had the Provisional Government done nothing
+else than this, it would have justified itself at the bar of history. But
+it accomplished much more than this: before it had been in office a month,
+in addition to its liberation of Finns, Poles, and Jews, the Provisional
+Government abolished the death penalty; removed all the provincial
+governors and substituted for them the elected heads of the provincial
+county councils; _confiscated the large land holdings of the Imperial
+family and of the monasteries_; levied an excess war-profits tax on all war
+industries; and fixed the price of food at rates greatly lower than had
+prevailed before. The Provisional Government had gone farther, and, while
+declaring that these matters must be left to the Constituent Assembly for
+settlement, had declared itself in favor of woman suffrage and of _the
+distribution of all land among the peasants, the terms and conditions of
+expropriation and distribution to be determined by the Constituent
+Assembly_.
+
+The Provisional Government also established a War Cabinet which introduced
+various reforms into the army. All the old oppressive regulations were
+repealed and an attempt made to democratize the military system. Some of
+these reforms were of the utmost value; others were rather dangerous
+experiments. Much criticism has been leveled against the rules providing
+for the election of officers by the men in the ranks, for a conciliation
+board to act in disputes between men and officers over questions of
+discipline, and the abolition of the regulations requiring private soldiers
+to address officers by the title "Sir." It must be borne in mind, however,
+in discussing these things, that these rules represented a great, honest
+effort to restore the morale of an army that had been demoralized, and to
+infuse it with democratic faith and zeal in order that it might "carry on."
+It is not just to judge the rules without considering the conditions which
+called them forth.
+
+Certainly the Provisional Government--which the government of the United
+States formally recognized on March 22d, being followed in this by the
+other Allied governments next day--could not be accused fairly of being
+either slothful or unfaithful. Its accomplishments during those first weeks
+were most remarkable. Nevertheless, as the days went by it became evident
+that it could not hope to satisfy the masses and that, therefore, it could
+not last very long.
+
+
+III
+
+The Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates was pursuing its
+independent existence, under the leadership of Tchcheidze, Skobelev,
+Tseretelli, and other moderate Social Democrats. As yet the Bolsheviki were
+a very small and uninfluential faction, lacking capable leadership. There
+can be very little doubt that the Council represented the feelings of the
+great mass of the organized wage-earners far more satisfactorily than the
+Provisional Government did, or that it was trusted to a far greater degree,
+alike by the wage-earners of the cities and the peasants. A great
+psychological fact existed, a fact which the Provisional Government and the
+governments of the Allied nations might well have reckoned with: the
+Russian working-people, artisans and peasants alike, were aggressively
+class conscious and could trust fully only the leaders of their own class.
+
+The majority of the Social Democratic party was, at the beginning, so far
+from anything like Bolshevism, so thoroughly constructive and opportunistic
+in its policies, that its official organ, _Pravda_--not yet captured by the
+Bolsheviki--put forward a program which might easily have been made the
+basis for an effective coalition. It was in some respects disappointingly
+moderate: like the program of the Provisional Government, it left the land
+question untouched, except in so far as the clause demanding the
+confiscation of the property of the royal family and the Church bore upon
+it. The Social Democratic party, reflecting the interests of the city
+proletariat, had never been enthusiastic about the peasants' claim for
+distribution of the land, and there had been much controversy between its
+leaders and the leaders of the Socialist-Revolutionary party, the party of
+the peasants. The program as printed in Pravda read:
+
+    1. A biennial one-house parliament.
+
+    2. Wide extension of the principle of self-government.
+
+    3. Inviolability of person and dwelling.
+
+    4. Unlimited freedom of the press, of speech, and of assembly.
+
+    5. Freedom of movement in business.
+
+    6. Equal rights for all irrespective of sex, religion, and
+    nationality.
+
+    7. Abolition of class distinction.
+
+    8. Education in native language; native languages everywhere to
+    have equal rights with official language.
+
+    9. Every nationality in the state to have the right of
+    self-definition.
+
+    10. The right of all persons to prosecute officials before a jury.
+
+    11. Election of magistrates.
+
+    12. A citizen army instead of ordinary troops.
+
+    13. Separation of Church from state and school from Church.
+
+    14. Free compulsory education for both sexes to the age of
+    sixteen.
+
+    15. State feeding of poor children.
+
+    16. Confiscation of Church property, also that of the royal
+    family.
+
+    17. Progressive income tax.
+
+    18. An eight-hour day, with six hours for all under eighteen.
+
+    19. Prohibition of female labor where such is harmful to women.
+
+    20. A clear holiday once a week to consist of forty-two hours on
+    end.
+
+It would be a mistake to suppose that this very moderate program embraced
+all that the majority of the Social Democratic party aimed at. It was not
+intended to be more than an ameliorative program for immediate adoption by
+the Constituent Assembly, for the convocation of which the Social Democrats
+were most eager, and which they confidently believed would have a majority
+of Socialists of different factions.
+
+In a brilliant and caustic criticism of conditions as they existed in the
+pre-Bolshevist period, Trotzky denounced what he called "the farce of dual
+authority." In a characteristically clever and biting phrase, he described
+it as "The epoch of Dual Impotence, the government not able, and the Soviet
+not daring," and predicted its culmination in a "crisis of unheard-of
+severity."[5] There was more than a little truth in the scornful phrase. On
+the one hand, there was the Provisional Government, to which the Soviet had
+given its consent and its allegiance, trying to discharge the functions of
+government. On the other hand, there was the Soviet itself, claiming the
+right to control the course of the Provisional Government and indulging in
+systematic criticism of the latter's actions. It was inevitable that the
+Soviet should have been driven irresistibly to the point where it must
+either renounce its own existence or oppose the Provisional Government.
+
+The dominating spirit and thought of the Soviet was that of international
+social democracy. While most of the delegates believed that it was
+necessary to prosecute the war and to defeat the aggressions of the Central
+Empires, they were still Socialists, internationalists, fundamental
+democrats, and anti-imperialists. Not without good and sufficient reason,
+they mistrusted the bourgeois statesmen and believed that some of the most
+influential among them were imperialists, actuated by a desire for
+territorial expansion, especially the annexation of Constantinople, and
+that they were committed to various secret treaties entered into by the old
+regime with England, France, and Italy. In the meetings of the Soviet, and
+in other assemblages of workers, the ugly suspicion grew that the war was
+not simply a war for national defense, for which there was democratic
+sanction and justification, but a war of imperialism, and that the
+Provisional Government was pursuing the old ways of secret diplomacy.
+
+Strength was given to this feeling when Miliukov, the Foreign Minister, in
+an interview championed the annexation of Constantinople as a necessary
+safeguard for the outlet to the Mediterranean which Russian economic
+development needed. Immediately there was an outcry of protest from the
+Soviet, in which, it should be observed, the Bolsheviki were already
+gaining strength and confidence, thanks to the leadership of Kamenev,
+Lenine's colleague, who had returned from Siberian exile. It was not only
+the Bolsheviki, however, who protested against imperialistic tendencies.
+Practically the whole body of Socialists, Mensheviki and Bolsheviki alike,
+agreed in opposing imperialism and secret diplomacy. Socialists loyal to
+the national defense and Socialists who repudiated that policy and deemed
+it treason to the cause of Socialism were united in this one thing.
+
+The storm of protest which Miliukov's interview provoked was stilled
+temporarily when the Premier, Lvov, announced that the Foreign Minister's
+views concerning the annexation of Constantinople were purely personal and
+did not represent the policy of the Provisional Government. Assurances were
+given that the Provisional Government was in accord with the policy of the
+Soviet. On April 16th a national congress of the Councils of Workmen's and
+Soldiers' Delegates adopted a series of resolutions in which there was a
+distinct menace to the Provisional Government. An earlier proclamation by
+the Petrograd Soviet had taken the form of a letter addressed to
+"Proletarians and Working-people of all Countries," but being in fact an
+appeal to the German working class to rise and refuse to fight against
+democratic and free Russia.[6] It declared that the peoples must take the
+matter of deciding questions of war and peace into their own hands. The new
+declaration was addressed to the Russian people:
+
+    _First_.--The Provisional Government, which constituted itself
+    during the Revolution, in agreement with the Council of Workmen's
+    and Soldiers' Delegates of Petrograd, published a proclamation
+    announcing its program. This Congress records that this program
+    contains in principle political demands for Russian democracy, and
+    _recognizes that so far the Provisional Government has faithfully
+    carried out its promises_.
+
+    _Second_.--This Congress appeals to the whole revolutionary
+    democracy of Russia to rally to the support of the Council of
+    Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, which is the center of the
+    organized democratic forces that are capable, in unison with
+    other progressive forces, of counteracting any counter
+    revolutionary attempt and of consolidating the conquests of the
+    revolution.
+
+    _Third_.--The Congress recognizes the necessity of permanent
+    political control, the necessity of exercising an influence over
+    the Provisional Government which will keep it up to a more
+    energetic struggle against anti-revolutionary forces, and the
+    necessity of exercising an influence which will insure its
+    democratizing the whole Russian life and paving the way for a
+    common _peace without annexations or contributions_, but on a
+    basis of free national development of all peoples.
+
+    _Fourth_.--The Congress appeals to the democracy, while declining
+    responsibility for any of its acts, to support the Provisional
+    Government as long as it continues to consolidate and develop the
+    conquest of the Revolution, _and as long as the basis of its
+    foreign policy does not rest upon aspirations for territorial
+    expansion_.
+
+    _Fifth_.--The Congress calls upon the revolutionary democracy of
+    Russia, rallying around the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers'
+    Delegates, to be ready to _vigorously suppress any attempt by the
+    government to elude the control of democracy or to renounce the
+    carrying out of its pledges_.[7]
+
+On April 27th, acting under pressure from the Soviet, the Provisional
+Government published a Manifesto to the Russian people in which it
+announced a foreign policy which conformed to that which the Congress of
+Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates had adopted. On May 1st
+Miliukov, the Foreign Minister, transmitted this Manifesto to the Allied
+governments as a preliminary to an invitation to those governments to
+restate their war aims. Accompanying the Manifesto was a Note of
+explanation, which was interpreted by a great many of the Socialists as an
+intimation to the Allies that the Manifesto was intended merely for home
+consumption, and that the Provisional Government would be glad to have the
+Allies disregard it. It is difficult for any one outside of Russia, whose
+sympathies were with the Entente Allies, to gather such an impression from
+the text of the Note, which simply set forth that enemy attempts to spread
+the belief that Russia was about to make a separate peace with Germany made
+it necessary for the Provisional Government to state its "entire agreement"
+with the aims of the Allies as set forth by their statesmen, including
+President Wilson, and to affirm that "the Provisional Government, in
+safeguarding the right acquired for our country, will maintain a strict
+regard for its agreement with the allies of Russia."
+
+Although it was explained that the Note had been sent with the knowledge
+and approval of the Provisional Government, the storm of fury it produced
+was directed against Miliukov and, in less degree, Guchkov. Tremendous
+demonstrations of protest against "imperialism" were held. In the Soviet a
+vigorous demand for the overthrow of the Provisional Government was made by
+the steadily growing Bolshevik faction and by many anti-Bolsheviki
+Socialists. To avert the disaster of a vote of the Soviet against it, the
+Provisional Government made the following explanation of the so-called
+Miliukov Note:
+
+    The Note was subjected to long and detailed examination by the
+    Provisional Government, and was unanimously approved. This Note,
+    in speaking of a "decisive victory," had in view a solution of the
+    problems mentioned in the communication of April 9th, and which
+    was thus specified:
+
+    "The government deems it to be its right and duty to declare now
+    that free Russia does not aim at the domination of other nations,
+    or at depriving them of their national patrimony, or at occupying
+    by force foreign territories, but that its object is to establish
+    a durable peace on the basis of the rights of nations to decide
+    their own destiny.
+
+    "The Russian nation does not lust after the strengthening of its
+    power abroad at the expense of other nations. Its aim is not to
+    subjugate or humiliate any one. In the name of the higher
+    principles of equity, the Russian people have broken the chains
+    which fettered the Polish nation, but it will not suffer that its
+    own country shall emerge from the great struggle humiliated or
+    weakened in its vital forces.
+
+    "In referring to the 'penalties and guarantees' essential to a
+    durable peace, the Provisional Government had in view the
+    reduction of armaments, the establishment of international
+    tribunals, etc.
+
+    "This explanation will be communicated by the Minister of Foreign
+    Affairs to the Ambassadors of the Allied Powers."
+
+This assurance satisfied a majority of the delegates to the Soviet meeting
+held on the evening of May 4th, and a resolution of confidence in the
+Provisional Government was carried, after a very stormy debate. The
+majority, however, was a very small one, thirty-five in a total vote of
+about twenty-five hundred. It was clearly evident that the political
+government and the Soviet, which was increasingly inclined to assume the
+functions of government, were nearing a serious breach. With each day the
+Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, as the organized expression
+of the great mass of wage-workers in Petrograd, grew in power over the
+Provisional Government and its influence throughout the whole of Russia. On
+May 13th Guchkov resigned, and three days later Miliukov followed his
+example. The party of the Constitutional Democrats had come to be
+identified in the minds of the revolutionary proletariat with imperialism
+and secret diplomacy, and was utterly discredited. The crisis developed an
+intensification of the distrust of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat.
+
+
+IV
+
+The crisis was not due solely to the diplomacy of the Provisional
+Government. Indeed, that was a minor cause. Behind all the discussions and
+disputes over Miliukov's conduct of the affairs of the Foreign Office there
+was the far more serious issue created by the agitation of the Bolsheviki.
+Under the leadership of Kamenev, Lenine, and others less well known, who
+skillfully exploited the friction with the Provisional Government, the idea
+of overthrowing that bourgeois body and of asserting that the Councils of
+Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates would rule Russia in the interests of the
+working class made steady if not rapid progress.
+
+Late in April Lenine and several other active Bolshevik leaders returned to
+Petrograd from Switzerland, together with Martov and other Menshevik
+leaders, who, while differing from the Bolsheviki upon practically all
+other matters, agreed with them in their bitter and uncompromising
+opposition to the war and in demanding an immediate peace.[8] As is well
+known, they were granted special facilities by the German Government in
+order that they might reach Russia safely. Certain Swiss Socialist leaders,
+regarded as strongly pro-German, arranged with the German Government that
+the Russian revolutionists should be permitted to travel across Germany by
+rail, in closed carriages. Unusual courtesies were extended to the
+travelers by the German authorities, and it was quite natural that Lenine
+and his associates should have been suspected of being sympathizers with,
+if not the paid agents and tools of, the German Government. The manner in
+which their actions, when they arrived in Russia, served the ends sought
+by the German military authorities naturally strengthened the suspicion so
+that it became a strong conviction.
+
+Suspicious as the circumstances undoubtedly were, there is a very simple
+explanation of the conduct of Lenine and his companions. It is not at all
+necessary to conclude that they were German agents. Let us look at the
+facts with full candor: Lenine had long openly advocated the view that the
+defeat of Russia, even by Germany, would be good for the Russian
+revolutionary movement. But that was in the days before the overthrow of
+the Czar. Since that time his position had naturally shifted somewhat; he
+had opposed the continuation of the war and urged the Russian workers to
+withhold support from it. He had influenced the Soviets to demand a
+restatement of war aims by the Allies, and to incessantly agitate for
+immediate negotiations looking toward a general and democratic peace. Of
+course, the preaching of such a policy in Russia at that time by a leader
+so powerful and influential as Lenine, bound as it was to divide Russia and
+sow dissension among the Allies, fitted admirably into the German plans.
+That Germany would have been glad to pay for the performance of service so
+valuable can hardly be doubted.
+
+On his side, Lenine is far too astute a thinker to have failed to
+understand that the German Government had its own selfish interests in view
+when it arranged for his passage across Germany. But the fact that the
+Allies would suffer, and that the Central Empires would gain some
+advantage, was of no consequence to him. That was an unavoidable accident
+and was purely incidental. His own purpose, to lead the revolutionary
+movement into a new phase, in which he believed with fanatical
+thoroughness, was the only thing that mattered in the least. If the
+conditions had been reversed, and he could only have reached Russia by the
+co-operation of the Allies, whose cause would be served, however
+unintentionally, by his work, he would have felt exactly the same. On the
+other hand, it was of the essence of his faith that his policy would lead
+to the overthrow of all capitalist-imperialist governments, those of
+Germany and her allies no less than those ranged on the other side. Germany
+might reason that a revolutionary uprising led by Lenine would rid her of
+one of her enemies and enable her to hurl larger forces against the foe on
+the western front. At that reasoning Lenine would smile in derision,
+thoroughly believing that any uprising he might bring about in Russia would
+sweep westward and destroy the whole fabric of Austro-German
+capitalist-imperialism. Lenine knew that he was being used by Germany, but
+he believed that he, in turn, was using Germany. He was supremely confident
+that he could outplay the German statesmen and military leaders.
+
+It was a dangerous game that Lenine was playing, and he knew it, but the
+stakes were high and worth the great risk involved. It was not necessary
+for Germany to buy the service he could render to her; that service would
+be an unavoidable accompaniment of his mission. He argued that his work
+could, at the worst, give only temporary advantage to Germany. So far as
+there is any evidence to show, Lenine has been personally incorruptible.
+Holding lightly what he scornfully derides as "bourgeois morality," unmoral
+rather than immoral, willing to use any and all means to achieve ends which
+he sincerely believes to be the very highest and noblest that ever inspired
+mankind, he would, doubtless, take German money if he saw that it would
+help him to achieve his purposes. He would do so, however, without any
+thought of self-aggrandizement. It is probably safe and just to believe
+that if Lenine ever took money from the Germans, either at that time or
+subsequently, he did so in this spirit, believing that the net result of
+his efforts would be equally disastrous to all the capitalist governments
+concerned in the war. It must be remembered, moreover, that the
+distinctions drawn by most thoughtful men between autocratic governments
+like those which ruled Germany and Austria and the more democratic
+governments of France, England, and America, have very little meaning or
+value to men like Lenine. They regard the political form as relatively
+unimportant; what matters is the fundamental economic class interest
+represented by the governments. Capitalist governments are all equally
+undesirable.
+
+What Lenine's program was when he left Switzerland is easily learned. A few
+days before he left Switzerland he delivered a lecture on "The Russian
+Revolution," in which he made a careful statement of his position. It gives
+a very good idea of Lenine's mental processes. It shows him as a Marxist of
+the most dogmatic type--the type which caused Marx himself to rejoice that
+he was not a "Marxist":
+
+    As to the revolutionary organization and its task, the conquest of
+    the power of the state and militarism: From the praxis of the
+    French Commune of 1871, Marx shows that "the working class cannot
+    simply take over the governmental machinery as built by the
+    bourgeoisie, and use this machinery for its own purposes." The
+    proletariat must break down this machinery. And this has been
+    either concealed or denied by the opportunists.[9] But it is the
+    most valuable lesson of the Paris Commune of 1871 and the
+    Revolution in Russia in 1905. The difference between us and the
+    Anarchists is, that we admit the state is a necessity in the
+    development of our Revolution. The difference with the
+    opportunists and the Kautsky[10] disciples is that we claim that
+    we do not need the bourgeois state machinery as completed in the
+    "democratic" bourgeois republics, but _the direct power of armed
+    and organized workers_. Such was the character of the Commune of
+    1871 and of the Council of Workmen and Soldiers of 1905 and 1917.
+    On this basis we build.[11]
+
+Lenine went on to outline his program of action, which was to begin a new
+phase of the Revolution; to carry the revolt against Czarism onward against
+the bourgeoisie. Notwithstanding his scorn for democracy, he declared at
+that time that his policy included the establishment of a "democratic
+republic," confiscation of the landed estates of the nobility in favor of
+the peasants, and the opening up of immediate peace negotiations. But the
+latter he would take out of the hands of the government entirely. "Peace
+negotiations should not be carried on by and with bourgeois governments,
+but with the proletariat in each of the warring countries." In his
+criticism of Kerensky and Tchcheidze the Bolshevik leader was especially
+scornful and bitter.
+
+In a letter which he addressed to the Socialists of Switzerland immediately
+after his departure for Russia, Lenine gave a careful statement of his own
+position and that of his friends. It shows an opportunistic attitude of
+mind which differs from the opportunistic attitude of the moderate
+Socialists _in direction only_, not in the _quality of being
+opportunistic_:
+
+    Historic conditions have made the Russians, _perhaps for a short
+    period_, the leaders of the revolutionary world proletariat, _but
+    Socialism cannot now prevail in Russia_. We can expect only an
+    agrarian revolution, which will help to create more favorable
+    conditions for further development of the proletarian forces and
+    _may result in measures for the control of production and
+    distribution_.
+
+    The main results of the present Revolution will have to be _the
+    creation of more favorable conditions for further revolutionary
+    development_, and to influence the more highly developed European
+    countries into action.[12]
+
+The Bolsheviki at this period had as their program the following:
+
+(1) The Soviets of Workers, Soldiers, and Peasants to constitute themselves
+into the actual revolutionary government and establish the dictatorship of
+the proletariat; (2) immediate confiscation of landed estates without
+compensation, the seizure to be done by the peasants themselves, without
+waiting for legal forms or processes, the peasants to organize into
+Soviets; (3) measures for the control of production and distribution by the
+revolutionary government, nationalization of monopolies, repudiation of the
+national debt; (4) the workers to take possession of factories and operate
+them in co-operation with the technical staffs; (5) refusal by the Soviets
+to recognize any treaties made by the governments either of the Czar or the
+bourgeoisie, and the immediate publication of all such treaties; (6) the
+workers to propose at once and publicly an immediate truce and negotiations
+of peace, these to be carried on by the proletariat and not by and with the
+bourgeoisie; (7) bourgeois war debts to be paid exclusively by the
+capitalists.
+
+According to Litvinov, who is certainly not an unfriendly authority, as
+soon as Lenine arrived in Russia he submitted a new program to his party
+which was so novel, and so far a departure from accepted Socialist
+principles, that "Lenine's own closest friends shrank from it and refused
+to accept it."[13]
+
+This program involved the abandonment of the plans made for holding the
+Constituent Assembly, or, at any rate, such a radical change as to amount
+to the abandonment of the accepted plans. _He proposed that universal,
+equal, direct, and secret suffrage be frankly abandoned, and that only the
+industrial proletariat and the poorest section of the peasantry be
+permitted to vote at all!_ Against the traditional Socialist view that
+class distinctions must be wiped out and the class war ended by the
+victorious proletariat, Lenine proposed to make the class division more
+rigid and enduring. He proposed to give the sole control of Russia into the
+hands of not more than two hundred thousand workers in a land of one
+hundred and eighty millions of people, more than one hundred and
+thirty-five millions of whom were peasants!
+
+Of course, there could be no reconciliation between such views as these and
+the universally accepted Socialist principle of democratic government.
+Lenine did not hesitate to declare that democracy itself was a "bourgeois
+conception" which the revolutionary proletariat must overthrow, a
+declaration hard to reconcile with his demand for a "democratic republic."
+Russia must not become a democratic republic, he argued, for a democratic
+republic is a bourgeois republic. Again and again, during the time we are
+discussing and later, Lenine assailed the principle of democratic
+government. "Since March, 1917, the word 'democracy' is simply a shackle
+fastened upon the revolutionary nation," he declared in an article written
+after the Bolsheviki had overthrown Kerensky.[14]
+
+When democracy is abolished, parliamentary government goes with it. From
+the first days after his return to Russia Lenine advocated, instead of a
+parliamentary republic similar to that of France or the United States, what
+he called a Soviet republic, which would be formed upon these lines: local
+government would be carried on by local Soviets composed of delegates
+elected by "the working class and the poorest peasantry," to use a common
+Bolshevik phrase which bothers a great many people whose minds insist upon
+classifying peasants as "working-people" and part of the working class.
+What Lenine means when he uses the phrase, and what Litvinov means[15] is
+that the industrial wage-workers--to whom is applied the term "working
+class"--must be sharply distinguished from peasants and small farmers,
+though the very poorest peasants, not being conservative, as more
+prosperous peasants are, can be united with the wage-workers.
+
+These local Soviets functioning in local government would, in Lenine's
+Soviet republic, elect delegates to a central committee of all the Soviets
+in the country, and that central committee would be the state. Except in
+details of organization, this is not materially different from the
+fundamental idea of the I.W.W. with which we are familiar.[16] According to
+the latter, the labor-unions, organized on industrial lines and federated
+through a central council, will take the place of parliamentary government
+elected on territorial lines. According to the Bolshevik plan, Soviets
+would take the place held by the unions in the plan of the I.W.W. It is not
+to be wondered at that, in the words of Litvinov, Lenine's own closest
+friends shrank from his scheme and Lenine "was compelled to drop it for a
+time."
+
+
+V
+
+Bolshevism was greatly strengthened in its leadership by the return of Leon
+Trotzky, who arrived in Petrograd on May 17th. Trotzky was born in Moscow
+about forty-five years ago. Like Lenine, he is of bourgeois origin, his
+father being a wealthy Moscow merchant. He is a Jew and his real name is
+Bronstein. To live under an assumed name has always been a common practice
+among Russian revolutionists, for very good and cogent reasons. Certainly
+all who knew anything at all of the personnel of the Russian revolutionary
+movement during the past twenty years knew that Trotzky was Bronstein, and
+that he was a Jew. The idea, assiduously disseminated by a section of the
+American press, that there must be something discreditable or mysterious
+connected with his adoption of an alias is extremely absurd, and can only
+be explained by monumental ignorance of Russian revolutionary history.
+
+Trotzky has been a fighter in the ranks of the revolutionary army of Russia
+for twenty years. As early as 1900 his activities as a Socialist
+propagandist among students had landed him in prison in solitary
+confinement. In 1902 he was exiled to eastern Siberia, whence he managed to
+escape. During the next three years he lived abroad, except for brief
+intervals spent in Russia, devoting himself to Socialist journalism. His
+first pamphlet, published in Geneva in 1903, was an attempt to reconcile
+the two factions in the Social Democratic party, the Bolsheviki and the
+Mensheviki. He was an orthodox Marxist of the most extreme doctrinaire
+type, and naturally inclined to the Bolshevik view. Yet he never joined the
+Bolsheviki, preferring to remain aloof from both factions and steadfastly
+and earnestly striving to unite them.
+
+When the Revolution of 1905 broke out Trotzky had already attained
+considerable influence among the Socialists. He was regarded as one of the
+ablest of the younger Marxians, and men spoke of him as destined to occupy
+the place of Plechanov. He became one of the most influential leaders of
+the St. Petersburg Soviet, and was elected its president. In that capacity
+he labored with titanic energy and manifested great versatility, as
+organizer, writer, speaker, and arbiter of disputes among warring
+individuals and groups. When the end came he was arrested and thrown into
+prison, where he remained for twelve months. After that he was tried and
+sentenced to life-exile in northern Siberia. From this he managed to
+escape, however, and from 1907 until the outbreak of the war in 1914 he
+lived in Vienna.
+
+The first two years of the war he lived in France, doing editorial work for
+a radical Russian Socialist daily paper, the _Nashe Slovo_. His writing,
+together with his activity in the Zimmerwald movement of anti-war
+Socialists, caused his expulsion from France. The Swiss government having
+refused to permit him to enter Switzerland, he sought refuge in Spain,
+where he was once more arrested and imprisoned for a short time. Released
+through the intervention of Spanish Socialists, he set sail with his family
+for New York, where he arrived early in January, 1917. Soon after the news
+of the Russian Revolution thrilled the world Trotzky, like many other
+Russian exiles, made hasty preparations to return, sailing on March 27th
+on a Norwegian steamer. At Halifax he and his family, together with a
+number of other Russian revolutionists, were taken from the ship and
+interned in a camp for war prisoners, Trotzky resisting violently and
+having to be carried off the ship. The British authorities kept them
+interned for a month, but finally released them at the urgent demand of the
+Foreign Minister of the Russian Provisional Government, Miliukov.
+
+Such, in brief outline, is the history of the man Trotzky. It is a typical
+Russian history: the story of a persistent, courageous, and exceedingly
+able fighter for an ideal believed in with fanatical devotion. Lenine, in
+one of his many disputes with Trotzky, called him "a man who blinds himself
+with revolutionary phrases,"[17] and the description is very apt. He
+possesses all the usual characteristics of the revolutionary Jewish
+Socialists of Russia. To a high-strung, passionate, nervous temperament and
+an exceedingly active imagination he unites a keen intellect which finds
+its highest satisfaction in theoretical abstractions and subtleties, and
+which accepts, phrases as though they were realities.
+
+Understanding of Trotzky's attitude during the recent revolutionary and
+counter-revolutionary struggles is made easier by understanding the
+development of his thought in the First Revolution, 1905-06. He began as an
+extremely orthodox Marxist, and believed that any attempt to establish a
+Socialist order in Russia until a more or less protracted intensive
+economic development, exhausting the possibilities of capitalism, made
+change inevitable, must fail. He accepted the view that a powerful
+capitalist class must be developed and perform its indispensable historical
+role, to be challenged and overthrown in its turn by the proletariat. That
+was the essence of his pure and unadulterated faith. To it he clung with
+all the tenacity of his nature, deriding as "Utopians" and "dreamers" the
+peasant Socialists who refused to accept the Marxian theory of Socialism as
+the product of historic necessity as applicable to Russia.
+
+The great upheaval of 1905 changed his viewpoint. The manner in which
+revolutionary ideas spread among the masses created in Trotzky, as in many
+others, almost unbounded confidence and enthusiasm. In an essay written
+soon after the outbreak of the Revolution he wrote: "The Revolution has
+come. _One move of hers has lifted the people over scores of steps, up
+which in times of peace we would have had to drag ourselves with hardships
+and fatigue_." The idea that the Revolution had "lifted the people over
+scores of steps" possessed him and changed his whole conception of the
+manner in which Socialism was to come. Still calling himself a Marxist, and
+believing as strongly as ever in the fundamental Marxian doctrines, as he
+understood them, he naturally devoted his keen mind with its peculiar
+aptitude for Talmudic hair-splitting to a new interpretation of Marxism. He
+declared his belief that in Russia it was possible to change from
+Absolutism to Socialism immediately, without the necessity of a prolonged
+period of capitalist development. At the same time, he maintained a
+scornful attitude toward the "Utopianism" of the peasant Socialists, who
+had always made the same contention, because he believed they based their
+hopes and their policy upon a wrong conception of Socialism. He had small
+patience for their agrarian Socialism with its economic basis in
+peasant-proprietorship and voluntary co-operation.
+
+He argued that the Russian bourgeoisie was so thoroughly infected with the
+ills of the bureaucratic system that it was itself decadent; not virile
+and progressive as a class aiming to possess the future must be. Since it
+was thus corrupted and weakened, and therefore incapable of fulfilling any
+revolutionary historical role, that became the _immediate_ task of the
+proletariat. Here was an example of the manner in which lifting over
+revolutionary steps was accomplished. Of course, the peasantry was in a
+backward and even primitive state which unfitted it for the proletarian
+role. Nevertheless, it had a class consciousness of its own, and an
+irresistible hunger for land. Without this class supporting it, or, at
+least, acquiescing in its rule, the proletariat could never hope to seize
+and hold the power of government. It would be possible to solve the
+difficulty here presented, Trotzky contended, if the enactment of the
+peasant program were permitted during the Revolution and accepted by the
+proletariat as a _fait accompli_. This would satisfy the peasants and make
+them content to acquiesce in a proletarian dictatorship. Once firmly
+established in power, it would be possible for the proletariat to gradually
+apply the true Socialist solution to the agrarian problem and to convert
+the peasants. "Once in power, the proletariat will appear before the
+peasantry as its liberator," he wrote.
+
+His imagination fired by the manner in which the Soviet of which he was
+president held the loyalty of the masses during the revolutionary uprising,
+and the representative character it developed, Trotzky conceived the idea
+that it lent itself admirably to the scheme of proletarian dictatorship.
+Parliamentary government cannot be used to impose and maintain a
+dictatorship, whether of autocracy or oligarchy, bourgeoisie or
+proletariat. In the Soviet, as a result of six weeks' experience in
+abnormal times, during which it was never for a moment subjected to the
+test of maintaining the economic life of the nation, Trotzky saw the ideal
+proletarian government. He once described the Soviet as "a true,
+unadulterated democracy," but, unless we are to dismiss the description as
+idle and vain rhetoric, we must assume that the word "democracy" was used
+in an entirely new sense, utterly incompatible with its etymological and
+historical meaning. Democracy has always meant absence of class rule;
+proletarian dictatorship is class rule.
+
+In the foregoing analysis of the theoretical and tactical views which
+Trotzky held during and immediately after the First Revolution, it is easy
+to see the genesis of the policies of the Bolshevik government which came
+twelve years later. The intervening years served only to deepen his
+convictions. At the center of all his thinking during that period was his
+belief in the sufficiency of the Soviet, and in the need of proletarian
+dictatorship. Throwing aside the first cautious thought that these things
+arose from the peculiar conditions existing in Russia as a result of her
+retarded economic development, he had come to regard them as applicable to
+all nations and to all peoples, except, perhaps, the peoples still living
+in barbarism or savagery.
+
+
+VI
+
+After the crisis which resulted in the resignation of Miliukov and Guchkov,
+it was evident that the Lvov government could not long endure. The
+situation in the army, as well as in the country, was so bad that the
+complete reorganization of the Provisional Government, upon much more
+radical lines, was imperative. The question arose among the revolutionary
+working-class organizations whether they should consent to co-operation
+with the liberal bourgeoisie in a new coalition Cabinet or whether they
+should refuse such co-operation and fight exclusively on class lines. This,
+of course, opened the entire controversy between Bolsheviki and Mensheviki.
+
+In the mean time the war-weary nation was clamoring for peace. The army was
+demoralized and saturated with the defeatism preached by the Porazhentsi.
+To deal with this grave situation two important conventions were arranged
+for, as follows: the Convention of Soldiers' Delegates from the Front,
+which opened on May 10th and lasted for about a week, and the First
+All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Delegates, which opened on May 17th and
+lasted for about twelve days. Between the two gatherings there was also an
+important meeting of the Petrograd Council of Workmen's and Soldiers'
+Deputies, which dealt with the same grave situation. The dates here are of
+the greatest significance: the first convention was opened three days
+before Miliukov's resignation and was in session when that event occurred;
+the second convention was opened four days after the resignation of
+Miliukov and one day after that of Guchkov. It was Guchkov's unique
+experience to address the convention of Soldiers' Delegates from the Front
+as Minister of War and Marine, explaining and defending his policy with
+great ability, and then, some days later, to address the same assembly as a
+private citizen.
+
+Guchkov drew a terrible picture of the seriousness of the military
+situation. With truly amazing candor he described conditions and explained
+how they had been brought about. He begged the soldiers not to lay down
+their arms, but to fight with new courage. Kerensky followed with a long
+speech, noble and full of pathos. In some respects, it was the most
+powerful of all the appeals it fell to his lot to make to his people, who
+were staggering in the too strong sunlight of an unfamiliar freedom. He
+did not lack courage to speak plainly: "My heart and soul are uneasy. I am
+greatly worried and I must say so openly, no matter what ... the
+consequences will be. The process of resurrecting the country's creative
+forces for the purpose of establishing the new regime rests on the basis of
+liberty and personal responsibility.... A century of slavery has not only
+demoralized the government and transformed the old officials into a band of
+traitors, _but it has also destroyed in the people themselves the
+consciousness of their responsibility for their fate, their country's
+destiny_." It was in this address that he cried out in his anguish: "I
+regret that I did not die two months ago. I would have died happy with the
+dream that the flame of a new life has been kindled in Russia, hopeful of a
+time when we could respect one another's right without resorting to the
+knout."
+
+To the soldiers Kerensky brought this challenge: "You fired on the people
+when the government demanded. But now, when it comes to obeying your own
+revolutionary government, you can no longer endure further sacrifice! Does
+this mean that free Russia is a nation of rebellious slaves?" He closed
+with an eloquent peroration: "I came here because I believe in my right to
+tell the truth as I understand it. People who even under the old regime
+went about their work openly and without fear of death, those people, I
+say, will not be terrorized. The fate of our country is in our hands and
+the country is in great danger. We have sipped of the cup of liberty and we
+are somewhat intoxicated; we are in need of the greatest possible sobriety
+and discipline. We must go down in history meriting the epitaph on our
+tombstones, 'They died, but they were never slaves.'"
+
+From the Petrograd Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies came I.G.
+Tseretelli, who had just returned from ten years' Siberian exile. A native
+of Georgia, a prince, nearly half of his forty-two years had been spent
+either in Socialist service or in exile brought about by such service. A
+man of education, wise in leadership and a brilliant orator, his leadership
+of the Socialist Group in the Second Duma had marked him as one of the
+truly great men of Russia. To the Convention of Soldiers' Delegates from
+the Front Tseretelli brought the decisions of the Council of Workmen's and
+Soldiers' Deputies, in shaping which he had taken an important part with
+Tchcheidze, Skobelev, and others. The Council had decided "to send an
+appeal to the soldiers at the front, and to explain to them that _in order
+to bring about universal peace it is necessary to defend the Revolution and
+Russia by defending the front_." This action had been taken despite the
+opposition of the Bolsheviki, and showed that the moderate Socialists were
+still in control of the Soviet. An Appeal to the Army, drawn up by
+Tseretelli, was adopted by the vote of every member except the Bolsheviki,
+who refrained from voting. This Appeal to the Army Tseretelli presented to
+the Soldiers' Delegates from the Front:
+
+    Comrades, soldiers at the front, in the name of the Revolutionary
+    Democracy, we make a fervent appeal to you.
+
+    A hard task has fallen to your lot. You have paid a dear price,
+    you have paid with your blood, a dear price indeed, for the crimes
+    of the Czar who sent you to fight and left you without arms,
+    without ammunition, without bread!
+
+    Why, the privation you now suffer is the work of the Czar and his
+    coterie of self-seeking associates who brought the country to
+    ruin. And the Revolution will need the efforts of many to overcome
+    the disorganization left her as a heritage by these robbers and
+    executioners.
+
+    The working class did not need the war. The workers did not begin
+    it. It was started by the Czars and capitalists of all countries.
+    Each day of war is for the people only a day of unnecessary
+    suffering and misfortune. Having dethroned the Czar, the Russian
+    people have selected for their first problem the ending of the war
+    in the quickest possible manner.
+
+    The Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies has appealed to
+    all nations to end the butchery. We have appealed to the French
+    and the English, to the Germans and the Austrians.[18] Russia
+    wants an answer to this appeal. Remember, however, comrades and
+    soldiers, that our appeal will be of no value if the regiments of
+    Wilhelm overpower Revolutionary Russia before our brothers, the
+    workers and peasants of other countries, will be able to respond.
+    Our appeal will become "a scrap of paper" if the whole strength of
+    the revolutionary people does not stand behind it, if the triumph
+    of Wilhelm Hohenzollern will be established on the ruins of
+    Russian freedom. The ruin of free Russia will be a tremendous,
+    irreparable misfortune, not only for us, but for the toilers of
+    the whole world.
+
+
+    Comrades, soldiers, defend Revolutionary Russia with all your
+    might!
+
+    The workers and peasants of Russia desire peace with all their
+    soul. But this peace must be universal, a peace for all nations
+    based on the agreement of all.
+
+    What would happen if we should agree to a separate peace--a peace
+    for ourselves alone! What would happen if the Russian soldiers
+    were to stick their bayonets into the ground to-day and say that
+    they do not care to fight any longer, that it makes no difference
+    to them what happens to the whole world!
+
+    Here is what would happen. Having destroyed our allies in the
+    west, German Imperialism would rush in upon us with all the force
+    of its arms. Germany's imperialists, her landowners and
+    capitalists, would put an iron heel on our necks, would occupy our
+    cities, our villages, and our land, and would force us to pay
+    tribute to her. Was it to bow down at the feet of Wilhelm that we
+    overthrew Nicholas?
+
+    Comrades--soldiers! The Council of Workmen's and Soldiers'
+    Deputies leads you to peace by another route. We lead you to peace
+    by calling upon the workers and peasants of Serbia and Austria to
+    rise and revolt; we lead you to peace by calling an international
+    conference of Socialists for a universal and determined revolt
+    against war. There is a great necessity, comrades--soldiers, for
+    the peoples of the world to awaken. Time is needed in order that
+    they should rebel and with an iron hand force their Czars and
+    capitalists to peace. Time is needed so that the toilers of all
+    lands should join with us for a merciless war upon violators and
+    robbers.
+
+    _But remember, comrades--soldiers, this time will never come if
+    you do not stop the advance of the enemy at the front, if your
+    ranks are crushed and under the feet of Wilhelm falls the
+    breathless corpse of the Russian Revolution_.
+
+    Remember, comrades, that at the front, in the trenches, you are
+    now standing in defense of Russia's freedom. You defend the
+    Revolution, you defend your brothers, the workers and peasants.
+    Let this defense be worthy of the great cause and the great
+    sacrifices already made by you. _It is impossible to defend the
+    front if, as has been decided, the soldiers are not to leave the
+    trenches under any circumstances_.[19] At times only an attack can
+    repulse and prevent the advance of the enemy. At times awaiting an
+    attack means patiently waiting for death. Again, only the change
+    to an advance may save you or your brothers, on other sections of
+    the front, from destruction.
+
+
+    Remember this, comrades--soldiers! Having sworn to defend Russian
+    freedom, do not refuse to start the offensive the military
+    situation may require. The freedom and happiness of Russia are in
+    your hands.
+
+    In defending this freedom be on the lookout for betrayal and
+    trickery. The fraternization which is developing on the front can
+    easily turn into such a trap.
+
+    Revolutionary armies may fraternize, but with whom? With an army
+    also revolutionary, which has decided to die for peace and
+    freedom. At present, however, not only in the German army, but
+    even in the Austro-Hungarian army, in spite of the number of
+    individuals politically conscious and honest, there is no
+    revolution. In those countries the armies are still blindly
+    following Wilhelm and Charles, the landowners and capitalists, and
+    agree to annexation of foreign soil, to robberies and violence.
+    There the General Staff will make use not only of your credulity,
+    but also of the blind obedience of their soldiers. You go out to
+    fraternize with open hearts. And to meet you an officer of the
+    General Staff leaves the enemies' trenches, disguised as a common
+    soldier. You speak with the enemy without any trickery. At that
+    very time he photographs the surrounding territory. You stop the
+    shooting to fraternize, but behind the enemies' trenches artillery
+    is being moved, new positions built and troops transferred.
+
+    Comrades--soldiers, not by fraternization will you get peace, not
+    by separate agreements made at the front by single companies,
+    battalions, or regiments. Not in separate peace or in a separate
+    truce lies the salvation of the Russian Revolution, the triumph of
+    peace for the whole world.
+
+    The people who assure you that fraternizing is the road to peace
+    lead you to destruction. Do not believe them. The road to peace is
+    a different one. It has been pointed out to you already by the
+    Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies: tread it. Sweep aside
+    everything that weakens your fighting power, that brings into the
+    army disorganization and loss of spirit.
+
+    Your fighting power serves the cause of peace. The Council of
+    Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies is able to continue its
+    revolutionary work with all its might, to develop its struggle for
+    peace, only by depending on you, knowing that you will not allow
+    the military destruction of Russia.
+
+    Comrades--soldiers, the workers and peasants, not only of Russia,
+    but of the whole world, look to you with confidence and hope.
+
+    Soldiers of the Revolution, you will prove worthy of this faith,
+    for you know that your military tasks serve the cause of peace.
+
+    In the name of the happiness and freedom of Revolutionary Russia,
+    in the name of the coming brotherhood of nations, you will fulfil
+    your military duties with unconquerable strength.
+
+Again and again Tseretelli was interrupted with cheers as he read this
+Appeal to the Army. He was cheered, too, when he explained that the Soviet
+had decided to support the reconstructed Provisional Government and called
+upon the soldiers to do likewise. There was a storm of applause when he
+said: "We well realize the necessity of having a strong power in Russia;
+however, the strength of this power must rely upon its progressive and
+revolutionary policy. Our government must adopt the revolutionary slogans
+of democracy. It must grant the demands of the revolutionary people. It
+must turn over all land to the laboring peasantry. It must safeguard the
+interests of the working class, enacting improved social legislation for
+the protection of labor. It must lead Russia to a speedy and lasting peace
+worthy of a great people."
+
+When Plechanov was introduced to the convention as "the veteran of the
+Russian Revolution" he received an ovation such as few men have ever been
+accorded. The great Socialist theorist plunged into a keen and forceful
+attack upon the theories of the Bolsheviki. He was frequently interrupted
+by angry cries and by impatient questionings, which he answered with
+rapier-like sentences. He was asked what a "democratic" government should
+be, and replied:
+
+"I am asked, 'What should a democratic government be? My answer is: It
+should be a government enjoying the people's full confidence and
+sufficiently strong to prevent any possibility of anarchy. Under what
+condition, then, can such a strong, democratic government be established?
+In my opinion it is necessary, for this purpose, _that the government be
+composed of representatives of all those parts of the population that are
+not interested in the restoration of the old order. What is called a
+coalition Ministry is necessary_. Our comrades, the Socialists,
+acknowledging the necessity of entering the government, can and should set
+forth definite conditions, definite demands. _But there should be no
+demands that would be unacceptable to the representatives of other classes,
+to the spokesmen of other parts of the population_."
+
+"Would you have us Russian proletarians fight in this war for England's
+colonial interests?" was one of the questions hurled at Plechanov, and
+greeted by the jubilant applause of the Bolsheviki. Plechanov replied with
+great spirit, his reply evoking a storm of cheers: "The answer is clear to
+every one who accepts the principle of self-determination of nations," he
+said. "The colonies are not deserts, but populated localities, and their
+populations should also be given the right to determine freely their own
+destinies. It is clear that Russia cannot fight for the sake of any one's
+predatory aspirations. _But I am surprised that the question of annexations
+is raised in Russia, whose sixteen provinces are under the Prussian heel!_
+I do not understand this exclusive solicitude for Germany's interests."
+
+To those who advocated fraternization, who were engaged in spreading the
+idea that the German working class would refuse to fight against the
+Russian revolutionists, the great Socialist teacher, possessing one of the
+ripest minds in the whole international Socialist movement, and an intimate
+knowledge of the history of that movement, made vigorous reply and recited
+a significant page of Socialist history:
+
+"In the fall of 1906, when Wilhelm was planning to move his troops on the
+then revolutionary Russia, I asked my comrades, the German Social
+Democrats, 'What will you do in case Wilhelm declares war on Russia?' At
+the party convention in Mannheim, Bebel gave me an answer to this question.
+Bebel introduced a resolution in favor of the declaration of a general
+strike in the event of war being declared on Russia. But this resolution
+was not adopted; _members of the trade-unions voted against it_. This is a
+fact which you should not forget. Bebel had to beat a retreat and introduce
+another resolution. Kautsky and Rosa Luxemburg were dissatisfied with
+Bebel's conduct. I asked Kautsky whether there is a way to bring about a
+general strike against the workers' will. As there is no such way, there
+was nothing else that Bebel could do. _And if Wilhelm had sent his hordes
+to Russia in 1906, the German workers would not have done an earthly thing
+to prevent the butchery_. In September, 1914, the situation was still
+worse."
+
+The opposition to Plechanov on the part of some of the delegates was an
+evidence of the extent to which disaffection, defeatism, and the readiness
+to make peace at any price almost--a general peace preferably, but, if not,
+then a separate peace--had permeated even the most intelligent part of the
+Russian army. Bolshevism and its ally, defeatism, were far more influential
+in the ranks of the soldiers than in those of the workers in the factories.
+Yet the majority was with Kerensky, Tseretelli, and Plechanov, as the
+following resolutions adopted by the convention prove:
+
+    The first convention of the Delegates from the Front, having heard
+    reports on current problems from the representatives of the
+    Provisional Government, members of the Executive Committee of the
+    Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, and from
+    representatives of the Socialist parties, and having considered
+    the situation, hereby resolves:
+
+    (1) That the disorganization of the food-supply system and the
+    weakening of the army's fighting capacity, due to a distrust of a
+    majority of the military authorities, to lack of inner
+    organization, and to other temporary causes, have reached such a
+    degree that the freedom won by the Revolution is seriously
+    endangered.
+
+    (2) That the sole salvation lies in establishing a government
+    enjoying the full confidence of the toiling masses, in the
+    awakening of a creative revolutionary enthusiasm, and in concerted
+    self-sacrificing work on the part of all the elements of the
+    population.
+
+    The convention extends to the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers'
+    Delegates its warmest appreciation of the latter's
+    self-sacrificing and honest work for the strengthening of the new
+    order in Russia, in the interests of the Russian Democracy and at
+    the same time wishes to see, in the nearest possible future, the
+    above Council transformed into an All-Russian Council of Workmen's
+    and Soldiers' Delegates.
+
+    _The convention is of the opinion that the war is at present
+    conducted for purposes of conquest and against the interests of
+    the masses_, and it, therefore, urges the Council of Workmen's and
+    Soldiers' Delegates to take the most energetic and effective
+    measures for the purpose of ending this butchery, on the basis of
+    free self-determination of nations and of renunciation by all
+    belligerent countries of annexations and indemnities. Not a drop
+    of Russian blood shall be given for aims foreign to us.
+
+    Considering that the earliest possible achievement of this purpose
+    is contingent only upon a strong revolutionary army, which would
+    defend freedom and government, and be fully supported by the
+    organized Revolutionary Democracy, that is, by the Council of
+    Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, responsible for its acts to the
+    whole country, the convention welcomes the responsible decision of
+    the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates to take part in
+    the new Provisional Government.
+
+    The convention demands that the representatives of the Church give
+    up for the country's benefit the treasures and funds now in the
+    possession of churches and monasteries. The convention makes an
+    urgent appeal to all parts of the population.
+
+    1. To the comrade-soldiers in the rear: Comrades! Come to fill up
+    our thinning ranks in the trenches and rise shoulder to shoulder
+    with us for the country's defense!
+
+    2. Comrade-workers! Work energetically and unite your efforts, and
+    in this way help us in our last fight for universal peace for
+    nations! By strengthening the front you will strengthen freedom!
+
+    3. Fellow-citizens of the capitalist class! Follow the historic
+    example of Minin! Even as he, open your treasuries and quickly
+    bring your money to the aid of Russia!
+
+    4. To the peasants: Fathers and Brothers! Bring your last mite to
+    help the weakening front! Give us bread, and oats and hay to our
+    horses. Remember that the future Russia will be yours!
+
+    5. Comrades-Intellectuals! Come to us and bring the light of
+    knowledge into our dark trenches! Share with us the difficult work
+    of advancing Russia's freedom and prepare us for the citizenship
+    of new Russia!
+
+    6. To the Russian women: Support your husbands and sons in the
+    performing of their civil duty to the country! Replace them where
+    this is not beyond your strength! Let your scorn drive away all
+    those who are slackers in these difficult times!
+
+No one can read this declaration without a deep sense of the lofty and
+sincere citizenship of the brave men who adopted it as their expression.
+The fundamental loyalty of these leaders of the common soldiers, their
+spokesmen and delegates, is beyond question. Pardonably weary of a war in
+which they had been more shamefully betrayed and neglected than any other
+army in modern times, frankly suspicious of capitalist governments which
+had made covenants with the hated Romanov dynasty, they were still far from
+being ready to follow the leadership of Bolsheviki. They had, instead,
+adopted the sanely constructive policy of Tchcheidze, Tseretelli, Skobelev,
+Plechanov, and other Socialists who from the first had seen the great
+struggle in its true perspective. That they did not succeed in averting
+disaster is due in part to the fact that the Revolution itself had come too
+late to make military success possible, and in part to the failure of the
+governments allied with Russia to render intelligent aid.
+
+
+VII
+
+The Provisional Government was reorganized. Before we consider the actions
+of the All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Delegates, one of the most
+important gatherings of representatives of Russian workers ever held, the
+reorganization of the Provisional Government merits attention. On the 17th,
+at a special sitting of the Duma, Guchkov and Miliukov explained why they
+had resigned. Guchkov made it a matter of conscience. Anarchy had entered
+into the administration of the army and navy, he said: "In the way of
+reforms the new government has gone very far. Not even in the most
+democratic countries have the principles of self-government, freedom, and
+equality been so extensively applied in military life. We have gone
+somewhat farther than the danger limit, and the impetuous current drives us
+farther still.... I could not consent to this dangerous work; I could not
+sign my name to orders and laws which in my opinion would lead to a rapid
+deterioration of our military forces. A country, and especially an army,
+cannot be administered on the principles of meetings and conferences."
+
+Miliukov told his colleagues of the Duma that he had not resigned of his
+own free will, but under pressure: "I had to resign, yielding not to force,
+but to the wish of a considerable majority of my colleagues. With a clear
+conscience I can say that I did not leave on my own account, but was
+compelled to leave." Nevertheless, he said, the foreign policy he had
+pursued was the correct one. "You could see for yourselves that my activity
+in foreign politics was in accord with your ideas," he declared amid
+applause which eloquently testified to the approval with which the
+bourgeoisie regarded policies and tendencies which the proletariat
+condemned. He pointed out that the pacifist policies of Zimmerwald and
+Keinthal had permeated a large part of the Socialist movement, and that the
+Soviet, the Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, claiming to
+exercise control over the Provisional Government, were divided. He feared
+that the proposal to establish a Coalition Government would not lead to
+success, because of "discord in the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers'
+Delegates itself." Not all the members of the latter body were agreed upon
+entering into a Coalition Government, and "it is evident that those who do
+not enter the government will continue to criticize those who have entered,
+and it is possible that the Socialists who enter the Cabinet will find
+themselves confronted with the same storm of criticism as the government
+did before." Still, because it meant the creation of a stronger government
+at once, which was the most vital need, he, like Guchkov, favored a
+coalition which would ally the Constitutional Democratic party with the
+majority of the Socialists.
+
+The Soviet had decided at its meeting on May 14th to participate in a
+Coalition Ministry. The struggle upon that question between Bolsheviki and
+Mensheviki was long and bitter. The vote, which was forty-one in favor of
+participation to nineteen against, probably fairly represented the full
+strength of Bolshevism in its stronghold. After various conferences between
+Premier Lvov and the other Ministers, on the one side, and representatives
+of the Soviet, on the other side, a new Provisional Government was
+announced, with Prince Lvov again Prime Minister. In the new Cabinet there
+were seven Constitutional Democrats, six Socialists, and two Octobrists. As
+Minister of War and head of the army and navy Alexander Kerensky took the
+place of Guchkov, while P.N. Pereverzev, a clever member of the
+Socialist-Revolutionary party, succeeded Kerensky as Minister of Justice.
+In Miliukov's position at the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was
+placed M.I. Terestchenko, a wealthy sugar-manufacturer, member of the
+Constitutional-Democratic party, who had held the post of Minister of
+Finance, which was now given to A.I. Shingariev, a brilliant member of the
+same party, who had proved his worth and capacity as Minister of
+Agriculture. To the latter post was appointed V.M. Chernov, the leader of
+the Socialist-Revolutionists, one of the most capable Socialists in Russia,
+or, for that matter, the world. Other Socialists of distinction in the new
+Provisional Government were I.G. Tseretelli, as Minister of Posts and
+Telegraphs, and M.I. Skobelev, as Minister of Labor. As Minister of Supply
+an independent Socialist, A.V. Peshekhonov, was chosen.
+
+It was a remarkable Cabinet. So far as the Socialists were concerned, it
+would have been difficult to select worthier or abler representatives. As
+in the formation of the First Provisional Government, attempts had been
+made to induce Tchcheidze to accept a position in the Cabinet, but without
+success. He could not be induced to enter a Coalition Ministry, though he
+strongly and even enthusiastically supported in the Soviet the motion to
+participate in such a Ministry. Apart from the regret caused by
+Tchcheidze's decision, it was felt on every hand that the Socialists had
+sent into the Second Provisional Government their strongest and most
+capable representatives; men who possessed the qualities of statesmen and
+who would fill their posts with honorable distinction and full loyalty. On
+the side of the Constitutional Democrats and the Octobrists, too, there
+were men of sterling character, distinguished ability, and very liberal
+minds. The selection of Terestchenko as Minister of Foreign Affairs was by
+many Socialists looked upon with distrust, but, upon the whole, the
+Coalition Ministry met with warm approbation. If any coalition of the sort
+could succeed, the Cabinet headed by Prince Lvov might be expected to do
+so.
+
+On the 18th, the Petrograd Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates
+adopted a resolution, introduced by Tchcheidze, president of the Council,
+warmly approving the entrance of the Socialist Ministers into the Cabinet
+and accepting the declaration of the new Provisional Government as
+satisfactory. This resolution was bitterly opposed by the Bolsheviki, who
+were led in the fight by Trotzky. This was Trotzky's first speech in
+Petrograd since his arrival the previous day from America. His speech was a
+demagogic appeal against co-operation with any bourgeois elements.
+Participation in the Coalition Ministry by the Socialists was a dangerous
+policy, he argued, since it sacrificed the fundamental principle of class
+struggle. Elaborating his views further, he said: "I never believed that
+the emancipation of the working class will come from above. Division of
+power will not cease with the entrance of the Socialists into the Ministry.
+A strong revolutionary power is necessary. The Russian Revolution will not
+perish. But I believe only in a miracle from below. There are three
+commandments for the proletariat. They are: First, transmission of power to
+the revolutionary people; second, control over their own leaders; and
+third, confidence in their own revolutionary powers."
+
+This was the beginning of Trotzky's warfare upon the Coalition Government,
+a warfare which he afterward systematically waged with all his might.
+Tchcheidze and others effectively replied to the Bolshevik leader's
+criticisms and after long and strenuous debate the resolution of the
+Executive Committee presented by Tchcheidze was carried by a large
+majority, the opposition only mustering seven votes. The resolution read as
+follows:
+
+    Acknowledging that the declaration of the Provisional Government,
+    which has been reconstructed and fortified by the entrance of
+    representatives of the Revolutionary Democracy, conforms to the
+    idea and purpose of strengthening the achievements of the
+    Revolution and its further development, the Council of Workmen's
+    and Soldiers' Delegates has determined:
+
+    I. Representatives of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers'
+    Delegates must enter into the Provisional Government.
+
+    II. Those representatives of the Council of Workmen's and
+    Soldiers' Delegates who join the government must, until the
+    creation of an All-Russian organ of the Council of Workmen's and
+    Soldiers' Delegates, consider themselves responsible to the
+    Petrograd Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, and must
+    pledge themselves to give accounts of all their activities to that
+    Council.
+
+    III. The Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates expresses
+    its full confidence in the new Provisional Government, and urges
+    all friends of democracy to give this government active
+    assistance, which will insure it the full measure of power
+    necessary for the safety of the Revolution's gains and for its
+    further development.
+
+If there is any one thing which may be said with certainty concerning the
+state of working-class opinion in Russia at that time, two months after the
+overthrow of the old regime, it is that the overwhelming majority of the
+working-people, both city workers and peasants, supported the policy of the
+Mensheviki and the Socialist-Revolutionists--the policy of co-operating
+with liberal bourgeois elements to win the war and create a stable
+government--as against the policy of the Bolsheviki. The two votes of the
+Petrograd Soviet told where the city workers stood. That very section of
+the proletariat upon which the Bolsheviki leaders based their hopes had
+repudiated them in the most emphatic manner. The Delegates of the Soldiers
+at the Front had shown that they would not follow the advice of the leaders
+of the Bolsheviki. And at the first opportunity which presented itself the
+peasants placed themselves in definite opposition to Bolshevism.
+
+On the afternoon preceding the action of the Soviet in giving its
+indorsement to the new Provisional Government and instructing its
+representatives to enter the Coalition Cabinet, there assembled in the
+People's House, Petrograd, more than one thousand peasant delegates to the
+first All-Russian Congress of Peasants. Never before had so many peasant
+delegates been gathered together in Russia to consider their special
+problems. There were present delegates from every part of Russia, even from
+the extreme border provinces, and many from the front. On the platform were
+the members of the Organizing Committee, the Executive Committee of the
+Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, the Socialist-Revolutionary
+party, the Social Democratic party, and a number of prominent Socialist
+leaders. As might be expected in a peasants' Congress, members of the
+Socialist-Revolutionary party were in the majority, numbering 537. The next
+largest group was the Social Democratic party, including Bolsheviki and
+Mensheviki, numbering 103. There were 136 delegates described as
+non-partizan; 4 belonged to the group called the "People's Socialists" and
+6 to the Labor Group. It was the most representative body of peasant
+workers ever brought together.
+
+Among the first speakers to address the Congress was the venerable
+"Grandmother" of the Russian Revolution, Catherine Breshkovskaya, who spoke
+with the freedom accorded to her and to her alone. "Tell me," she demanded,
+"is there advantage to us in keeping our front on a war footing and in
+allowing the people to sit in trenches with their hands folded and to die
+from fever, scurvy, and all sorts of contagious diseases? If our army had a
+real desire to help the Allies, the war would be finished in one or two
+months, _but we are prolonging it by sitting with our hands folded_." V.M.
+Chernov, leader of the Socialist-Revolutionary party, the new Minister of
+Agriculture, made a notable address in which he traversed with great skill
+and courage the arguments of the Bolsheviki, making a superb defense of the
+policy of participation in the government.
+
+Kerensky, idol of the peasants, appearing for the first time as Minister of
+War and head of the army and navy, made a vigorous plea for unity, for
+self-discipline, and for enthusiastic support of the new Provisional
+Government. He did not mince matters: "I intend to establish an iron
+discipline in the army. I am certain that I shall succeed in my
+undertaking, because it will be a discipline based upon duty toward the
+country, the duty of honor.... By all means, we must see that the country
+becomes free and strong enough to elect the Constituent Assembly, the
+Assembly which, through its sovereign, absolute power, will give to the
+toiling Russian peasants that for which they have been yearning for
+centuries, the land.... We are afraid of no demagogues, whether they come
+from the right or from the left. We shall attend to our business, quietly
+and firmly." Kerensky begged the peasants to assert their will that there
+should be "no repetition of the sad events of 1905-06, when the entire
+country seemed already in our hands, but slipped out because it became
+involved in anarchy." The speech created a profound impression and it was
+voted to have it printed in millions of copies, at the expense of the
+Congress, and have them distributed throughout the army.
+
+A similar honor was accorded the speech of I.I. Bunakov, one of the best
+known and most popular of the leaders of the Socialist-Revolutionary party.
+With remorseless logic he traversed the arguments of the Bolsheviki and the
+Porazhentsi. Taking the cry that there must be "no annexations," for
+example, he declared that the peasants of Russia could only accept that in
+the sense that Poland be reunited and her independence be restored; that
+the people of Alsace and Lorraine be permitted to be reunited to France;
+that Armenia be taken from Turkey and made independent. The peasants could
+not accept the _status quo ante_ as a basis for peace. He assailed the
+treacherous propaganda for a separate peace with terrific scorn: "But such
+peace is unacceptable to us peasants. A separate peace would kill not only
+our Revolution, but the cause of social revolution the world over. A
+separate peace is dishonor for Russia and treason toward the Allies.... We
+must start an offensive. To remain in the trenches without moving is a
+separate truce, more shameful even than a separate peace. A separate truce
+demoralizes the army and ruins the people. This spring, according to our
+agreement with the Allies, we should have begun a general offensive, but
+instead of that we have concluded a separate truce. _The Allies saved the
+Russian Revolution, but they are becoming exhausted_.... When our Minister
+of War, Kerensky, speaks of starting an offensive, the Russian army must
+support him with all its strength, with all the means available.... From
+here we should send our delegates to the front and urge our army to wage an
+offensive. Let the army know that it must fight and die for Russia's
+freedom, for the peace of the whole world, and for the coming Socialist
+commonwealth."
+
+In the resolutions which were adopted the Congress confined itself to
+outlining a program for the Constituent Assembly, urging the abolition of
+private property in land, forests, water-power, mines, and mineral
+resources. It urged the Provisional Government to "issue an absolutely
+clear and unequivocal statement which would show that on this question the
+Provisional Government will allow nobody to oppose the people's will." It
+also issued a special appeal "to the peasants and the whole wage-earning
+population of Russia" to vote at the forthcoming elections for the
+Constituent Assembly, "only for those candidates who pledge themselves to
+advocate the nationalization of the land without reimbursement on
+principles of equality." In the election for an Executive Committee to
+carry on the work of the Congress and maintain the organization the
+delegates with Bolshevist tendencies were "snowed under." Those who were
+elected were, practically without exception, stalwart supporters of the
+policy of participation in and responsibility for the Provisional
+Government, and known to be ardent believers in the Constituent Assembly.
+Chernov, with 810 votes, led the poll; Breshkovskaya came next with 809;
+Kerensky came third with 804; Avksentiev had 799; Bunakov 790; Vera Finger
+776, and so on. Nineteenth on the list of thirty elected came the venerable
+Nicholas Tchaykovsky, well known in America. Once more a great
+representative body of Russian working-people had spoken and rejected the
+teachings and the advice of the Bolsheviki.
+
+
+VIII
+
+As we have seen, it was with the authority and mandate of the overwhelming
+majority of the organized workers that the Socialists entered the Coalition
+Ministry. It was with that mandate that Kerensky undertook the Herculean
+task of restoring the discipline and morale of the Russian army. In that
+work he was the agent and representative of the organized working class.
+For this reason, if for no other, Kerensky and his associates were entitled
+to expect and to receive the loyal support of all who professed loyalty to
+the working class. Instead of giving that support, however, the Bolsheviki
+devoted themselves to the task of defeating every effort of the Provisional
+Government to carry out its program, which, it must be borne in mind, had
+been approved by the great mass of the organized workers. They availed
+themselves of every means in their power to hamper Kerensky in his work and
+to hinder the organization of the economic resources of the nation to
+sustain the military forces.
+
+Kerensky had promised to organize preparations for a vigorous offensive
+against the Austro-German forces. That such offensive was needed was
+obvious and was denied by none except the ultra-pacifists and the
+Bolsheviki. The Congress of Soldiers' Delegates from the Front and the
+Petrograd Soviet had specifically urged the need of such an offensive, as
+had most of the well-known peasants' leaders. It was a working-class
+policy. But that fact did not prevent the Bolsheviki from throwing
+obstacles in the way of its fulfilment. They carried on an active
+propaganda among the men in the army and the navy, urging insubordination,
+fraternization, and refusal to fight. They encouraged sabotage as a means
+of insuring the failure of the efforts of the Provisional Government. So
+thoroughly did they play into the hands of the German military authorities,
+whether intentionally or otherwise, that the charge of being in the pay of
+Germany was made against them--not by prejudiced bourgeois politicians and
+journalists, but by the most responsible Socialists in Russia.
+
+The epic story of Kerensky's magnificently heroic fight to recreate the
+Russian army is too well known to need retelling here. Though it was vain
+and ended in failure, as it was foredoomed to do, it must forever be
+remembered with gratitude and admiration by all friends of freedom. The
+audacity and the courage with which Kerensky and a few loyal associates
+strove to maintain Russia in the struggle made the Allied nations, and all
+the civilized world, their debtors. Many mistakes were made, it is true,
+yet it is very doubtful if human beings could have achieved more or
+succeeded where they failed. It must be confessed, furthermore, that the
+governments of the nations with which they were allied made many grievous
+mistakes on their part.
+
+Perhaps the greatest blunder that a discriminating posterity will charge to
+Kerensky's account was the signing of the famous Declaration of Soldiers'
+Rights. This document, which was signed on May 27th, can only be regarded
+in the light of a surrender to overpowering forces. In his address to the
+All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Delegates, on May 18th, speaking for the
+first time in his capacity as Minister of War, Kerensky had declared, "I
+intend to establish an iron discipline in the army," yet the Declaration of
+Soldiers' Rights which he signed nine days later was certain to make any
+real discipline impossible. Was it because he was inconsistent,
+vacillating, and weak that Kerensky attached his name to such a document?
+
+Such a judgment would be gravely unjust to a great man. The fact is that
+Kerensky's responsibility was very small indeed. He and his Socialist
+associates in the Cabinet held their positions by authority of the Council
+of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, and they had agreed to be subject to
+its guidance and instruction. The Soviet was responsible for the
+Declaration of Soldiers' Rights. Kerensky was acting under its orders. The
+Soviet had already struck a fatal blow at military discipline by its famous
+Order Number One, which called on the soldiers not to execute the orders of
+their officers unless the orders were first approved by the revolutionary
+authorities--that is, by the Soviet or its accredited agents. That the
+order was prompted by an intense love for revolutionary ideals, or that it
+was justified by the amount of treachery which had been discovered among
+the officers of the army, may explain and even excuse it, but the fact
+remains that it was a deadly blow at military discipline. The fact that
+Kerensky's predecessor, Guchkov, had to appear at a convention of soldiers'
+delegates and explain and defend his policies showed that discipline was at
+a low ebb. It brought the army into the arena of politics and made
+questions of military strategy subject to political maneuvering.
+
+The Declaration of Soldiers' Rights was a further step along a road which
+inevitably led to disaster. That remarkable document provided that soldiers
+and officers of all ranks should enjoy full civic and political rights;
+that they should be free to speak or write upon any subject; that their
+correspondence should be uncensored; that while on duty they should be free
+to receive any printed matter, books, papers, and so on, which they
+desired. It provided for the abolition of the compulsory salute to
+officers; gave the private soldier the right to discard his uniform when
+not actually on service and to leave barracks freely during "off-duty"
+hours. Finally, it placed all matters pertaining to the management in the
+hands of elective committees in the composition of which the men were to
+have four-fifths of the elective power and the officers one-fifth.
+
+Of course, the Declaration of Soldiers' Rights represented a violent
+reaction. Under the old regime the army was a monstrously cruel machine;
+the soldiers were slaves. At the first opportunity they had revolted and,
+as invariably happens, the pendulum had swung too far. On May 28th the
+Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates issued a declaration in which
+it was said: "From now on the soldier-citizen is free from the slavery of
+saluting, and as an equal, free person will greet whomsoever he chooses....
+Discipline in the Revolutionary Army will exist, prompted by popular
+enthusiasm and the sense of duty toward the free country rather than by a
+slavish salute." If we are tempted to laugh at this naive idealism, we
+Americans will do well to remember that it was an American
+statesman-idealist who believed that we could raise an army of a million
+men overnight, and that a shrewd American capitalist-idealist sent forth a
+"peace ship" with a motley crew of dreamers and disputers to end the
+greatest war in history.
+
+
+IX
+
+Throughout the first half of June, while arrangements for a big military
+offensive were being made, and were causing Kerensky and the other
+Socialist Ministers to strain every nerve, Lenine, Trotzky, Kamenev,
+Zinoviev, and other leaders of the Bolsheviki were as strenuously engaged
+in denouncing the offensive and trying to make it impossible. Whatever gift
+or genius these men possessed was devoted wholly to destruction and
+obstruction. The student will search in vain among the multitude of records
+of meetings, conventions, debates, votes, and resolutions for a single
+instance of participation in any constructive act, one positive service to
+the soldiers at the front or the workers' families in need, by any
+Bolshevik leader. But they never missed an opportunity to embarrass those
+who were engaged in such work, and by so doing add to the burden that was
+already too heavy.
+
+Lenine denounced the offensive against Germany as "an act of treason
+against the Socialist International" and poured out the vials of his wrath
+against Kerensky, who was, as we know, simply carrying out the decisions of
+the Soviet and other working-class organizations. Thus we had the
+astonishing and tragic spectacle of one Socialist leader working with
+titanic energy among the troops who had been betrayed and demoralized by
+the old regime, seeking to stir them into action against the greatest
+militarist system in the world, while another Socialist leader worked with
+might and main to defeat that attempt and to prevent the rehabilitation of
+the demoralized army. And all the while the German General Staff gloated at
+every success of the Bolsheviki. There was a regular system of
+communications between the irreconcilable revolutionists and the German
+General Staff. In proof of this statement only one illustration need be
+offered, though many such could be cited: At the All-Russian Congress of
+Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, on June 22d, Kerensky read, in the
+presence of Lenine, a long message, signed by the commander-in-chief of the
+German eastern front, sent by wireless in response to a declaration of
+certain delegates of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates.
+
+At this session Lenine bitterly assailed the proposed offensive. He said
+that it was impossible for either side to win a military victory, revamping
+all the defeatist arguments that were familiar in every country. He
+minimized the loss which Russia had suffered at Germany's hands, and the
+gains Germany had made in Belgium and northern France, pointing out that
+she had, on the other hand, lost her colonies, which England would be very
+unlikely to give back unless compelled to do so by other nations. Taunted
+with being in favor of a separate peace with Germany, Lenine indignantly
+denied the accusation. "It is a lie," he cried. "Down with a separate
+peace! _We Russian revolutionists will never consent to it._" He argued
+that there could be only one policy for Socialists in any country--namely,
+to seize the occasion of war to overthrow the capitalist-class rule in that
+country. No war entered into by a capitalist ruling class, regardless what
+its motives, should be supported by Socialists. He argued that the adoption
+of his policy by the Russian working class would stand ten times the chance
+of succeeding that the military policy would have. The German working class
+would compel their government and the General Staff to follow the example
+of Russia and make peace.
+
+Kerensky was called upon to reply to Lenine. At the time when the
+restoration of the army required all his attention and all his strength, it
+was necessary for Kerensky to attend innumerable and well-nigh interminable
+debates and discussions to maintain stout resistance to the Bolshevik
+offensive always being waged in the rear. That, of course, was part of the
+Bolshevist plan of campaign. So Kerensky, wearied by his tremendous efforts
+to perform the task assigned him by the workers, answered Lenine. His reply
+was a forensic masterpiece. He took the message of the commander-in-chief
+of the German eastern front and hurled it at Lenine's head, figuratively
+speaking, showing how Lenine's reasoning was paralleled in the German
+propaganda. With merciless logic and incisive phrase he showed how the
+Bolsheviki were using the formula, "the self-determination of
+nationalities," as the basis of a propaganda to bring about the
+dismemberment of Russia and its reduction to a chaotic medley of small,
+helpless states. To Lenine's statements about the readiness of the German
+working class to rebel, Kerensky made retort that Lenine should have
+remained in Germany while on his way to Russia and preached his ideas
+there.
+
+A few days earlier, at a session of the same Congress, Trotzky and Kamenev
+had made vigorous assault upon the Coalition Government and upon the
+Socialist policy with reference thereto. In view of what subsequently
+transpired, it is important to note that Trotzky made much of the delay in
+calling together the Constituent Assembly: "The policy of continual
+postponement _and the detailed preparations_ for calling the Constituent
+Assembly is a false policy. It may destroy even the very realization of the
+Constituent Assembly." This profession of concern for the Constituent
+Assembly was hypocritical, dishonest, and insincere. He did not in the
+least care about or believe in the Constituent Assembly, and had not done
+so at any time since the First Revolution of 1905-06. His whole thought
+rejected such a democratic instrument. However, he and his associates knew
+that the demand for a Constituent Assembly was almost universal, and that
+to resist that demand was impossible. Their very obvious policy in the
+circumstances was to try and force the holding of the Assembly prematurely,
+without adequate preparation, and without affording an opportunity for a
+nation-wide electoral campaign. A hastily gathered, badly organized
+Constituent Assembly would be a mob-gathering which could be easily
+stampeded or controlled by a determined minority.
+
+Trotzky assailed the Coalition Government with vitriolic passion. At the
+moment when it was obvious to everybody that unity of effort was the only
+possible condition for the survival of the Revolution, and that any
+division in the ranks of the revolutionists, no matter upon what it might
+be based, must imperil the whole movement, he and all his Bolshevik
+colleagues deliberately stirred up dissension. Even if their opposition to
+political union with non-proletarian parties was right as the basis of a
+sound policy, to insist upon it at the moment of dire peril was either
+treachery or madness. When a house is already on fire the only thing in
+order, the only thing that can have the sanction of wisdom and honor, is to
+work to extinguish the fire. It is obviously not the time to debate whether
+the house was properly built or whether mistakes were made. Russia was a
+house on fire; the Bolsheviki insisted upon endless debating.
+
+Kamenev followed Trotzky's lead in attacking the Coalition Government. In a
+subtle speech he supported the idea of splitting Russia up into a large
+number of petty states, insisting that the formula, "self-determination of
+peoples," applied to the separatist movement in the Ukraine. He insisted
+that for the Russian working-people it was a matter of indifference whether
+the Central Empires or the Entente nations won in the war. He argued that
+the only hope for the Russian Revolution must be the support of the
+revolutionary proletariat in the other European countries, particularly
+those adjacent to Russia: "If the revolutionary proletariat of Europe fails
+to support the Russian Revolution the latter will be ruined. As that
+support is the only guaranty of the safety of the Revolution, we cannot
+change our policy by discussing the question of how much fraternizing will
+stimulate the awakening of the proletariat of Europe." In other words,
+Kamenev was in the position of a desperate gambler who stakes his life and
+his all upon one throw of the dice or one spin of the wheel.
+
+It was in this manner that the Bolshevist leaders conspired to Russia's
+destruction. They were absorbing the time and energies of the men who were
+really trying to do something, compelling them to engage in numerous
+futile debates, to the neglect of their vitally important work, debates,
+moreover, which could have no other effect than to weaken the nation.
+Further, they were actively obstructing the work of the government. Thus
+Tseretelli, Kerensky, Skobelev, and many others whose efforts might have
+saved the Revolution, were thwarted by men wholly without a sense of
+responsibility. Lenine was shrieking for the arrest of capitalists because
+they were capitalists, when it was obvious that the services of those same
+capitalists were needed if the nation was to live. Later on, when
+confronted by the realities and responsibilities of government, he availed
+himself of the special powers and training of the despised capitalists. At
+this earlier period he was, as Tseretelli repeatedly reminded the workers,
+without any sense of responsibility for the practical results of his
+propaganda. And that was equally true of the Bolsheviki as a whole. They
+talked about sending "ultimatums" to the Allies, while the whole system of
+national defense was falling to pieces. Tseretelli made the only reply it
+was possible for a sane man to make:
+
+"It is proposed that we speak to the Allies with ultimatums, but did those
+who made this silly proposal think that this road might lead to the
+breaking of diplomatic relations with the Allies, and to that very separate
+peace which is condemned by all factions among us? Did Lenine think of the
+actual consequences of his proposal to arrest several dozen capitalists at
+this time? Can the Bolsheviki guarantee that their road will lead us to the
+correct solution of the crisis? No. If they guarantee this they do not know
+what they are doing and their guaranty is worthless. The Bolshevik road can
+lead us only to one end, civil war."
+
+Once more the good sense of the working class prevailed. By an
+overwhelming majority of votes the Congress decided to uphold the Coalition
+Government and rejected the Bolshevik proposals. The resolution adopted
+declared that "the passing over of all power to the bourgeoisie elements
+would deal a blow at the revolutionary cause," but that equally the
+transfer of all power to the Soviets would be disastrous to the Revolution,
+and "would greatly weaken her powers by prematurely driving away from her
+elements which are still capable of serving her, and would threaten the
+ruin of the Revolution." Therefore, having heard the explanations of the
+Socialist Ministers and having full confidence in them, the Congress
+insisted that the Socialist Ministers be solely responsible to the
+"plenipotentiary and representative organ of the whole organized
+Revolutionary Democracy of Russia, which organ must be composed of the
+representatives of the All-Russian Congress of Councils of Workmen's and
+Soldiers' Delegates, as well as of representatives of the All-Russian
+Congress of Peasants' Delegates."
+
+But in spite of the fact that the workers upon every opportunity repudiated
+their policies, the Bolsheviki continued their tactics. Lenine, Trotzky,
+Tshitsherin, Zinoviev, and others called upon the workers to stop working
+and to go out into the streets to demonstrate for peace. The All-Russian
+Congress of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates issued an appeal to the
+workers warning them not to heed the call of the Bolsheviki, which had been
+made at the "moment of supreme danger." The appeal said:
+
+    Comrades, in the name of millions of workers, peasants, and
+    soldiers, we tell you, "Do not do that which you are called upon
+    to do." At this dangerous moment you are called out into the
+    streets to demand the overthrow of the Provisional Government, to
+    whom the All-Russian Congress has just found it necessary to give
+    its support. And those who are calling you cannot but know that
+    out of your peaceful demonstrations bloodshed and chaos may
+    result.... You are being called to a demonstration in favor of the
+    Revolution, _but we know that counter-revolutionists want to take
+    advantage of your demonstration ... the counter-revolutionists are
+    eagerly awaiting the moment when strife will develop in the ranks
+    of the Revolutionary Democracy and enable them to crush the
+    Revolution_.
+
+
+X
+
+Not only in this way were the Bolsheviki recklessly attempting to thwart
+the efforts of the Socialist Ministers to carry out the mandates of the
+majority of the working class of Russia, but they were equally active in
+trying to secure the failure of the attempt to restore the army. All
+through June the Bolshevik papers denounced the military offensive. In the
+ranks of the army itself a persistent campaign against further fighting was
+carried on. The Duma had voted, on June 17th, for an immediate offensive,
+and it was approved by the Petrograd Soviet. The Provisional Government on
+that date published a Note to the Allied governments, requesting a
+conference with a view to making a restatement of their war aims. These
+actions were approved by the All-Russian Congress of Workmen's and
+Soldiers' Delegates, as was also the expulsion from Russia of the Swiss
+Socialist, Robert Grimm, who was a notorious agent of the German
+Government. Grimm, as is now well known, was acting under the orders of
+Hoffman, the Swiss Minister of Foreign Affairs, and was trying to bring
+about a separate peace between Russia and Germany. He was also intimately
+connected with the infamous "Parvus," the trusted Social Democrat who was a
+spy and tool of the German Government. As always, the great majority of the
+representatives of the actual working class of Russia took the sane
+course.
+
+But the Bolsheviki were meanwhile holding mass meetings among the troops,
+preaching defeatism and surrender and urging the soldiers not to obey the
+orders of "bourgeois" officers. The Provisional Government was not blind to
+the peril of this propaganda, but it dared not attempt to end it by force,
+conscious that any attempt to do so would provoke revolt which could not be
+stayed. The Bolsheviki, unable to control the Workmen's and Soldiers'
+Council, sought in every possible manner to weaken its influence and to
+discredit it. They conspired to overthrow the Provisional Government. Their
+plot was to bring about an armed revolt on the 24th of June, when the
+All-Russian Congress of Soviets would be in session. They planned to arrest
+the members of the Provisional Government and assume full power. _At the
+same time, all the soldiers at the front were to be called on to leave the
+trenches_. On the eve of the date when it was to be executed this plot was
+divulged. There was treachery within their own ranks. The Bolshevik leaders
+humbly apologized and promised to abandon their plans. Under other
+conditions the Provisional Government might have refused to be satisfied
+with apologies, might have adopted far sterner measures, but it was face to
+face with the bitter fact that the nation was drunk with the strong wine of
+freedom. The time had not yet arrived when the masses could be expected to
+recognize the distinction between liberty within the law and the license
+that leads always to tyranny. It takes time and experience of freedom to
+teach the stern lesson that, as Rousseau has it, freedom comes by way of
+self-imposed compulsions to be free.
+
+The offensive which Kerensky had urged and planned began on July 1st and
+its initial success was encouraging. It seemed as though the miracle of the
+restoration of the Russian army had been achieved, despite everything. Here
+was an army whose killed and dead already amounted to more than three
+million men,[20] an army which had suffered incredible hardships, again
+going into battle with songs. On the 1st of July more than thirty-six
+thousand prisoners were taken by the Russians on the southwestern front.
+Then came the tragic harvest of the Bolshevist propaganda. In northeastern
+Galicia the 607th Russian Regiment left the trenches and forced other units
+to do the same thing, opening a clear way for the German advance. Regiment
+after regiment refused to obey orders. Officers were brutally murdered by
+their men. Along a front of more than one hundred and fifty miles the
+Russians, greatly superior in numbers, retreated without attempting to
+fight, while the enemy steadily advanced. This was made possible by the
+agitation of the Bolsheviki, especially by the mutiny which they provoked
+among the troops in the garrison at Petrograd. On the 17th of July, at the
+very time when the separatist movement in the Ukraine, the resignation of
+the Constitutional Democrats from the government, and the revolt and
+treachery among the troops had produced a grave crisis, seizing the
+opportunity afforded by the general chaos, the Bolsheviki attempted to
+realize their aim of establishing what they called a "dictatorship of the
+proletariat," but which was in reality the dictatorship of a small part of
+the proletariat. There was no pretense that they represented a majority of
+the proletariat, even. It was a desperate effort to impose the dictatorship
+of a small minority of the proletariat upon the whole nation. For two days
+the revolt lasted, more than five hundred men, women, and children being
+killed in the streets of Petrograd.
+
+On the 20th Prince Lvov resigned as Premier. In the mean time the
+Bolshevist uprising had been put down by Cossack troops and the leaders
+were in hiding. Kerensky stepped into Lvov's position as Premier and
+continued to address himself to the task of bringing order out of the
+chaos. There could not have been any selfish ambition in this; no
+place-hunter would have attempted to bear the heavy burden Kerensky then
+assumed, especially with his knowledge of the seriousness of the situation.
+He knew that the undertaking was practically hopeless, yet he determined
+never to give up the struggle so long as there was a single thing to be
+done and his comrades desired him to do it.[21]
+
+There had been created a revolutionary body representing all the organized
+workers, called the United Executive Committee of the All-Russian Councils
+of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates, a body of more than three
+hundred elected representatives of the various Soviets. They represented
+the views of many millions. This body vigorously denounced the Bolsheviki
+and rallied to the support of Kerensky and his colleagues. In a Manifesto
+to the people the Bolsheviki were charged with responsibility for the blood
+of all who had been slain in the uprising. On July 21st a second Manifesto
+was issued by the Committee calling upon the workers to uphold the
+government so long as the authorized representatives of the working class
+determined that to be the proper course to follow. The charge that Lenine,
+Zinoviev, Trotzky, and others were acting under German instructions and
+receiving German money spread until it was upon almost every tongue in
+Petrograd. On July 24th Gregory Alexinsky, a well-known Socialist, in his
+paper, _Bez Lisnih Slov_, published a circumstantial story of German
+intrigue in the Ukraine, revealed by one Yermolenko, an ensign in the 16th
+Siberian Regiment, who had been sent to Russia by the German Government.
+This Yermolenko charged that Lenine had been instructed by the authorities
+in Berlin, just as he himself had been, and that Lenine had been furnished
+with almost unlimited funds by the German Government, the arrangement being
+that it was to be forwarded through one Svendson, at Stockholm.[22] By a
+vote of 300 to 11 the United Executive Committee of the All-Russian
+Councils of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates adopted the
+following resolution:
+
+    The whole Revolutionary Democracy desires that the Bolsheviki
+    group accused of having organized disorders, or inciting revolt,
+    or of having received money from German sources be tried publicly.
+    In consequence, the Executive Committee considers it absolutely
+    inadmissible that Lenine and Zinoviev should escape justice, and
+    demands that the Bolsheviki faction immediately and categorically
+    express its censure of the conduct of its leaders.
+
+Later on, under the "terror," there was some pretense of an "investigation"
+of the charge that Lenine and others had received German money, but there
+has never been a genuine investigation so far as is known. Groups of
+Russian Socialists belonging to various parties and groups have asked that
+a commission of well-known Socialists from the leading countries of Europe
+and from the United States, furnished with reliable interpreters, be sent
+to Russia to make a thorough investigation of the charge.
+
+The United Executive Committee of the workers' organizations adopted a
+resolution demanding that all members and all factions, and the members of
+all affiliated bodies, obey the mandate of the majority, and that all
+majority decisions be absolutely obeyed. They took the position--too late,
+alas!--that the will of the majority must be observed, since the only
+alternative was the rule of the majority by the aggressive minority.
+Repressive measures against the Bolsheviki were adopted by the Kerensky
+Cabinet with the full approval of the Committee. Some of the Bolshevik
+papers were suppressed and the death penalty, which had been abolished at
+the very beginning of the Revolution, was partially restored in that it was
+ordered that it should be applied to traitors and deserters at the front.
+Lenine and Zinoviev were in hiding, but Trotzky, Kamenev, Alexandra
+Kollontay, and many other noted Bolsheviki were imprisoned for a few days.
+
+It was Kerensky's hope that by arranging for an early conference by the
+Allies, at which the war aims would be restated in terms similar to those
+which President Wilson had employed, and by definitely fixing the date for
+the Constituent Assembly elections, September 30th, while sternly
+repressing the Bolsheviki, it might be possible to save Russia. But it was
+too late. Despite his almost superhuman efforts, and the loyal support of
+the great majority of the Soviets, he was defeated. Day after day
+conditions at the front grew worse. By the beginning of August practically
+the whole of Galicia was in the hands of the Germans. Russian soldiers in
+large numbers retreated before inferior numbers of Germans, refusing to
+strike a blow. Germans furnished them with immense quantities of spirits,
+and an orgy of drunkenness took place. The red flag was borne by debauched
+and drunken mobs. What a fate for the symbol of universal freedom and
+human brotherhood!
+
+It was a time of terrible strain and upheaval. Crisis followed upon crisis.
+Chernov resigned his position as Minister of Agriculture. Kerensky resigned
+as Premier, but the members of the Provisional Government by unanimous vote
+declined to accept the resignation. They called a joint meeting of all the
+Cabinet, of leaders of all political parties, of the Duma, of the Soviets
+of workers, peasants, and soldiers. At this meeting the whole critical
+situation was discussed and all present joined in demanding that Kerensky
+continue in office. The political parties represented were the Social
+Democrats, the Socialist-Revolutionists, the Democratic Radicals, the Labor
+Union party, the Popular Socialists, and the Constitutional Democrats. From
+these groups came an appeal which Kerensky could not deny. He said:
+
+"In view of the evident impossibility of establishing, by means of a
+compromise between the various political groups, Socialist as well as
+non-Socialist, a strong revolutionary government ... I was obliged to
+resign. Friday's conference, ... after a prolonged discussion, resulted in
+the parties represented at the conference deciding to intrust me with the
+task of reconstructing the government. Considering it impossible for me in
+the present circumstances, when defeat without and disintegration within
+are threatening the country, to withdraw from the heavy task which is now
+intrusted to me, I regard this task as an express order of the country to
+construct a strong revolutionary government in the shortest possible time
+and in spite of all the obstacles which might arise."
+
+For the second time Kerensky was Premier at the head of a Coalition
+Ministry. No other government was possible for Russia except a strong
+despotism. Theorists might debate the advisability of such coalition, but
+the stern reality was that nothing else was possible. The leader of the
+peasants, Chernov, returned to his old post as Minister of Agriculture and
+the Constitutional Democrats took their share of the burden. There were six
+parties and groups in the new Cabinet, four of them of various shades of
+Socialism and two of them liberal bourgeoisie. Never before, perhaps, and
+certainly only rarely, if ever, have men essayed a heavier or more
+difficult task than that which this new Provisional Government undertook.
+
+Heroically Kerensky sought to make successful the efforts of General
+Kornilov, as commander-in-chief, to restore order and discipline in the
+army, but it was too late. The disintegration had gone too far. The
+measures which the Revolutionary Democracy had introduced into the army, in
+the hope of realizing freedom, had reduced it to a wild mob. Officers were
+butchered by their men; regiment after regiment deserted its post and, in
+some instances, attempted to make a separate peace with the enemy, even
+offering to pay indemnities. Moreover, the industrial organization of the
+country had been utterly demoralized. The manufacture of army supplies had
+fallen off more than 60 per cent., with the result that the state of
+affairs was worse than in the most corrupt period of the old regime.
+
+
+XI
+
+It became evident to the Provisional Government that something big and
+dramatic must be done, without waiting for the results of the Constituent
+Assembly elections. Accordingly, it was decided to call together a great
+extraordinary council, representing all classes and all parties, to
+consider the situation and the best means of meeting it. The Extraordinary
+National Conference, as it was called, was opened in Moscow, on August
+26th, with more than fourteen hundred members in attendance. Some of these
+members--principally those from the Soviets--had been elected as delegates,
+but the others had been invited by the government and could not be said to
+speak as authorized representatives. There were about one hundred and
+ninety men who had been members of one or other of the Dumas; one hundred
+representatives of the peasants' Soviets and other peasant organizations;
+about two hundred and thirty representatives of the Soviets of industrial
+workers and of soldiers; more than three hundred from co-operatives; about
+one hundred and eighty from the trade-unions; about one hundred and fifty
+from municipalities; one hundred and fifty representatives of banks and
+industrial concerns, and about one hundred and twenty from the Union of
+Zemstvos and Towns. It was a Conference more thoroughly representative of
+Russia than any that had ever been held. There were, indeed, no
+representatives of the old regime, and there were few representatives of
+the Bolsheviki. The former had no place in the new Russia that was
+struggling for its existence; the repressive measures that had been found
+necessary accounted for the scant representation of the latter.
+
+It was to this Conference that President Wilson sent his famous message
+giving the assurance of "every material and moral assistance" to the people
+and government of Russia. For three days the great assembly debated and
+listened to speeches from men representing every section of the country,
+every class, and every party. Kerensky, Tseretelli, Tchcheidze, Boublikov,
+Plechanov, Kropotkin, Breshkovskaya, and others, spoke for the workers;
+General Kornilov and General Kaledine spoke for the military command;
+Miliukov, Nekrasov, Guchkov, Maklakov, and others spoke for the
+bourgeoisie. At times feeling ran high, as might have been expected, but
+throughout the great gathering there was displayed a remarkable unanimity
+of feeling and immediate purpose; a common resolve to support the
+Provisional Government, to re-establish discipline in the army and navy, to
+remain loyal to the Allies, and reject with scorn all offers of a separate
+peace, and to work for the success of the Constituent Assembly.
+
+But, notwithstanding the unity upon these immediately vital points, the
+Moscow Conference showed that there was still a great gulf between the
+classes, and that no matter how they might co-operate to meet and overcome
+the peril that hung over the nation like the sword of Damocles, there could
+be no unity in working out the great economic and social program which must
+be the basis for the Social Democratic commonwealth which the workers
+sought to establish, and which the bourgeois elements feared almost as much
+as they feared the triumph of Germany. In some respects the Conference
+intensified class feeling and added to, instead of lessening, the civil
+strife. The Bolsheviki were not slow to exploit this fact. They pointed to
+the Conference as evidence of a desire on the part of the Socialist
+Ministers, and of the officials of the Soviets, to compromise with the
+bourgeoisie. This propaganda had its effect and Bolshevism grew in
+consequence, especially in Petrograd.
+
+Then followed the disastrous military and political events which made it
+practically impossible for the Kerensky government to stand. At the front
+the soldiers were still revolting, deserting, and retreating. Kornilov was
+quite helpless. Germany began a new offensive, and on September 2d German
+armies crossed the Dvina near Riga. On September 3d Riga was surrendered to
+the Germans in the most shameful manner and panic reigned in Petrograd.
+Then on the 9th came the revolt of Kornilov against the Provisional
+Government and the vulgar quarrel between him and Kerensky. Kornilov
+charged that the Provisional Government, under pressure from the
+Bolsheviki, was playing into the hands of the German General Staff.
+Kerensky, backed by the rest of the Cabinet, ordered Kornilov's removal,
+while Kornilov despatched a division of troops, drawn from the front,
+against Petrograd.
+
+It was a most disastrous conflict for which no adequate explanation can be
+found except in the strained mental condition of all the principal parties
+concerned. In less strenuous times, and in a calmer atmosphere, the two
+leaders, equally patriotic, would have found no difficulty in removing
+misunderstandings. As things were, a mischievous intermediary, and two men
+suffering the effects of a prolonged and intense nervous strain, provided
+all the elements of a disaster. Kornilov's revolt was crushed without great
+trouble and with very little bloodshed, Kornilov himself being arrested.
+The Soviets stood by the Provisional Government, for they saw in the revolt
+the attempt to set up a personal dictatorship. Even the Bolsheviki were
+temporarily sobered by the sudden appearance of the "man on horseback."
+Kerensky, by direction of his colleagues, became commander-in-chief of the
+Russian armies. Always, it seemed, through every calamity, all parties
+except the Bolsheviki agreed that he was the one man strong enough to
+undertake the heaviest and hardest tasks.
+
+Toward the end of September what may be termed the Kerensky regime entered
+upon its last phase. For reasons which have been already set forth, the
+Bolsheviki kept up a bitter attack upon the Provisional Government, and
+upon the official leaders of the Soviets, on account of the Moscow
+Conference. They demanded that the United Executive Committee of the
+Soviets convoke a new Conference. They contended that the Moscow Conference
+had been convoked by the government, not by the Soviets, and that the
+United Executive Committee must act for the latter. The United Executive
+Committee complied and summoned a new National Democratic Conference, which
+assembled on September 27th. By this time, as a result of the exhaustion of
+the patience of many workers, many of the Soviets had ceased to exist,
+while others existed on paper only. According to the _Izvestya Soveta_,
+there had been more than eight hundred region organizations at one time,
+many scores of which had disappeared. According to the same authority, the
+peasants were drawing away from the Workers' and Soldiers' Soviets. The
+United Executive Committee, which had been elected in June, was, of course,
+dominated by anti-Bolsheviki--that is, by Menshevik Social Democrats and by
+Socialist-Revolutionists.
+
+The Democratic Conference was not confined to the Soviets. It embraced
+delegates from Soviets of peasants, soldiers, and industrial workers; from
+municipalities, from zemstvos, co-operatives, and other organizations. It
+differed from the Moscow Conference principally in that the delegates were
+elected and that it did not include so many representatives of the
+capitalist class. The petty bourgeoisie was represented, but not the great
+capitalists. There were more than a thousand members in attendance at this
+Democratic Conference, which was dominated by the most moderate section of
+the Social Democrats. The Socialist-Revolutionists were not very numerous.
+
+This Conference created another Coalition Cabinet, the last of the Kerensky
+regime. Kerensky continued as Premier and as commander-in-chief of the
+army. There were in the Cabinet five Social Democrats, two
+Socialist-Revolutionists, eight Constitutional Democrats, and two
+non-partisans. It was therefore as far as its predecessors from meeting the
+standards insisted upon by many radical Socialists, who, while not
+Bolsheviki, still believed that there should be at least an absolute
+Socialist predominance in the Provisional Government. Of course, the new
+Coalition Ministry infuriated the Bolsheviki. From his hiding-place Lenine
+issued a series of "Letters to the Comrades," which were published in the
+_Rabochiy Put_, in which he urged the necessity of an armed uprising like
+that of July, only upon a larger scale. In these letters he scoffed at the
+Constituent Assembly as a poor thing to satisfy hungry men. Meanwhile,
+Trotzky, out of prison again, and other Bolshevik leaders were agitating by
+speeches, proclamations, and newspaper articles for an uprising. The
+Provisional Government dared not try to suppress them. Its hold upon the
+people was now too weak.
+
+The Democratic Conference introduced one innovation. It created a
+Preliminary Parliament, as the new body came to be known, though its first
+official title was the Provisional Council of the Republic. This new body
+was to function as a parliament until the Constituent Assembly convened,
+when it would give place to whatever form of parliamentary body the
+Constituent Assembly might create. This Preliminary Parliament and its
+functions were thus described:
+
+    This Council, in which all classes of the population will be
+    represented, and in which the delegates elected to the Democratic
+    Conference will also participate, will be given the right of
+    addressing questions to the government and of securing replies to
+    them in a definite period of time, of working out legislative acts
+    and discussing all those questions which will be presented for
+    consideration by the Provisional Government, as well as those
+    which will arise on its own initiative. Resting on the
+    co-operation of such a Council, the government, preserving, in
+    accordance with its pledge, the unity of the governmental power
+    created by the Revolution, will regard it its duty to consider the
+    great public significance of such a Council in all its acts up to
+    the time when the Constituent Assembly gives full and complete
+    representation to all classes of the population of Russia.
+
+This Preliminary Parliament was really another Duma--that is, it was a very
+limited parliamentary body. Its life was short and quite uneventful. It
+assembled for the first time on October 8th and was dispersed by the
+Bolsheviki on November 7th. When it assembled there were 555 members--the
+number fixed by the decree of the Provisional Government. Of these, 53 were
+Bolsheviki, but these withdrew almost at the opening with three others,
+thus reducing the actual membership of the body to less than five hundred.
+Even with the Bolsheviki withdrawn, when Kerensky appeared before the
+Preliminary Parliament on November 6th and made his last appeal, a
+resolution expressing confidence in his government was carried only by a
+small majority. Only about three hundred members were in attendance on this
+occasion, and of these 123 voted the expression of confidence, while 102
+voted against it, and 26 declined to vote at all.
+
+The Bolsheviki had forced the United Executive Committee to convene a new
+All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and the date of its meeting had been fixed
+at November 7th. While the elections and arrangements for this Congress
+were proceeding, the Bolsheviki were actively and openly organizing an
+uprising. In their papers and at their meetings they announced that on
+November 7th there would be an armed uprising against the government. Their
+intentions were, therefore, thoroughly well known, and it was believed that
+the government had taken every necessary step to repress any attempt to
+carry those intentions into practice. It was said that of the delegates to
+the All-Russian Congress of Soviets-numbering 676 as against more than one
+thousand at the former Congress of peasant Soviets alone--a majority were
+Bolsheviki. It was charged that the Bolsheviki had intimidated many workers
+into voting for their candidates; that they had, in some instances, put
+forward their men as anti-Bolsheviki and secured their election by false
+pretenses; that they had practised fraud in many instances. It was quite
+certain that a great many Soviets had refused to send delegates, and that
+many thousands of workers, and these all anti-Bolsheviki, had simply grown
+weary and disgusted with the whole struggle. Whatever the explanation might
+be, the fact remained that of the 676 delegates 390 were generally rated as
+Bolsheviki, while 230 were Socialist-Revolutionists and Mensheviki. Not all
+of the Socialist-Revolutionists could be counted as anti-Bolsheviki,
+moreover. There were fifty-six delegates whose position was not quite
+clearly defined, but who were regarded as being, if not Bolsheviki, at
+least anti-government. For the first time in the whole struggle the
+Bolsheviki apparently had a majority of delegates in a working-class
+convention.
+
+On the night of the 6th, a few hours before the opening of the Congress of
+Soviets, the Bolsheviki struck the blow they had been so carefully
+planning. They were not met with the resistance they had expected--for
+reasons which have never been satisfactorily explained. Kerensky recognized
+that it was useless for him to attempt to carry on the fight. The
+Bolsheviki had organized their Red Guards, and these, directed by military
+leaders, occupied the principal government buildings, such as the central
+telephone and telegraph offices, the military-staff barracks, and so on.
+Part of the Petrograd garrison joined with the Bolsheviki, the other part
+simply refusing to do anything. On the morning of November 7th the members
+of the Provisional Government were arrested in the Winter Palace, but
+Kerensky managed to escape. The Bolshevik _coup d'etat_ was thus
+accomplished practically without bloodshed. A new government was formed,
+called the Council of People's Commissaries, of which Nikolai Lenine was
+President and Leon Trotzky Commissioner for Foreign Affairs. The
+"dictatorship of the proletariat" was thus begun. Kerensky's attempt to
+rally forces enough to put an end to this dictatorship was a pathetic
+failure, as it was bound to be. It was like the last fitful flicker with
+which a great flame dies. The masses wanted peace--for that they would
+tolerate even a dictatorship.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+THE BOLSHEVIK WAR AGAINST DEMOCRACY
+
+
+I
+
+The defenders and supporters of the Bolsheviki have made much of the fact
+that there was very little bloodshed connected with the successful
+Bolshevik uprising in Petrograd. That ought not to be permitted, however,
+to obscure the fundamental fact that it was a military _coup d'etat_, the
+triumph of brute force over the will of the vast majority of the people. It
+was a crime against democracy. That the people were passive, worn out, and
+distracted, content to wait for the Constituent Assembly, only makes the
+Bolshevik crime appear the greater. Let us consider the facts very briefly.
+Less than three weeks away was the date set for the Constituent Assembly
+elections. Campaigns for the election of representatives to that great
+democratic convention were already in progress. It was to be the most
+democratic constitutional convention that ever existed in any country, its
+members being elected by the entire population, every man and woman in
+Russia being entitled to vote. The suffrage was equal, direct, universal,
+and secret.
+
+Moreover, there was a great democratic reconstruction of the nation
+actually in progress at the time. The building up of autonomous democratic
+local governing bodies, in the shape of a new type of zemstvos, was rapidly
+progressing. The old-time zemstvos had been undemocratic and did not
+represent the working-people, but the new zemstvos were composed of
+representatives nominated and elected by universal suffrage, equal, secret,
+and direct. Instead of being very limited in their powers as the old
+zemstvos were, the new zemstvos were charged with all the ordinary
+functions of local government. The elections to these bodies served as an
+admirable practical education in democracy, making it more certain than
+would otherwise have been the case that the Russian people would know how
+to use their new political instrument so as to secure a Constituent
+Assembly fully representing their will and their desire.
+
+At the same time active preparations for holding the election of members to
+the Constituent Assembly were actually under way. The Socialist parties
+were making special efforts to educate the illiterate voters how to use
+their ballots correctly. The Provisional Government, on its part, was
+pushing the preparations for the elections as rapidly as possible. All over
+the country special courts were established, in central places, to train
+the necessary workers so that the elections might be properly conducted.
+Above all, the great problem of the socialization of the land which had
+been agitated for so many years had now reached the stage at which its
+solution might almost have been said to be complete. The National Soviet of
+Peasants, together with the Socialist Revolutionary party, had formulated a
+law on the subject which represented the aspiration and the best thought of
+the leaders of the peasants' movement. That law had been approved in the
+Council of Ministers and was ready for immediate promulgation. Peasant
+leaders like Chernov, Rakitnikov, Vikhiliaev, and Maslov had put an immense
+amount of work into the formulation of this law, which aimed to avoid
+anarchy, to see to it that instead of an individualistic scramble by the
+peasants for the land, in small and unorganized holdings, the problem
+should be scientifically dealt with, lands being justly distributed among
+the peasant communes, and among the peasants who had been despoiled, and
+large estates co-operatively organized and managed.
+
+All this the Bolsheviki knew, for it was common knowledge. There is no
+truth whatever in the claim set up by many of the apologists for the
+Bolsheviki that they became enraged and resorted to desperate tactics
+because nothing effective was being done to realize the aims of the
+Revolution, to translate its ideals into fact. Quite the contrary is true.
+_The Bolshevik insurrection was precipitated by its leaders precisely
+because they saw that the Provisional Government was loyally and
+intelligently carrying out the program of the Revolution, in co-operation
+with the majority of the working-class organizations and their leaders._
+
+The Bolsheviki did not want the ideals of the Revolution to be realized,
+for the very simple reason that they were opposed to those ideals. In all
+the long struggle from Herzen to Kerensky the revolutionary movement of
+Russia had stood for political democracy first of all. Now, at the moment
+when political democracy was being realized, the Bolsheviki sought to kill
+it and to set up something else--namely, a dictatorship of a small party of
+less than two hundred thousand over a nation of one hundred and eighty
+millions. There can be no dispute as to this aim; it has been stated by
+Lenine with great frankness. "_Just as one hundred and fifty thousand
+lordly landowners under Czarism dominated the one hundred and thirty
+millions of Russian peasants, so two hundred thousand members of the
+Bolshevik party are imposing their proletarian will on the mass, but this
+time in the interest of the latter._"[23]
+
+Lenine's figures probably exaggerate the Bolshevik numbers, but, assuming
+them to be accurate, can anybody in his right mind, knowing anything of the
+history of the Russian revolutionary movement, believe that the
+substitution of a ruling class of one hundred and fifty thousand by one of
+two hundred thousand, to govern a nation of one hundred and eighty
+millions, was the end to which so many lives were sacrificed? Can any sane
+and sincere person believe that the class domination described by the great
+arch-Bolshevik himself comes within measurable distance of being as much of
+a realization of the ideals of the Revolution as did the Constituent
+Assembly plan with its basis of political democracy, universal, equal,
+direct, secret, all-determining suffrage? We do not forget Lenine's
+statement that this new domination of the people by a ruling minority
+differs from the old regime in that the Bolsheviki are imposing their will
+upon the mass "_in the interest of the latter_." What ruling class ever
+failed to make that claim? Was it not the habit of the Czars, all of them,
+during the whole revolutionary epoch, to indulge in the pious cant of
+proclaiming that they were motived only by their solicitude for the
+interests and well-being of the peasants?
+
+It is a curious illustration of the superficial character of the Bolshevist
+mentality that a man so gifted intellectually as Lenine undoubtedly is
+should advance in justification of his policy a plea so repugnant to
+morality and intelligence, and that it should be quietly accepted by men
+and women calling themselves radical revolutionists. Some years ago a
+well-known American capitalist announced with great solemnity that he and
+men like himself were the agents of Providence, charged with managing
+industry "for the good of the people." Naturally, his naive claim provoked
+the scornful laughter of every radical in the land. Yet, strange as it may
+seem, whenever I have pointed out to popular audiences that Lenine asserted
+the right of two hundred thousand proletarians to impose their rule upon
+Russia, always, without a single exception, some defender of the
+Bolsheviki--generally a Socialist or a member of the I.W.W.--has entered
+the plea, "Yes, but it is for the good of the people!"
+
+If the Bolsheviki had wanted to see the realization of the ideals of the
+Revolution, they would have found in the conditions existing immediately
+prior to their insurrection a challenge calling them to the service of the
+nation, in support of the Provisional Government and the Preliminary
+Parliament. They would have permitted nothing to imperil the success of the
+program that was so well advanced. As it was, determination to defeat that
+program was their impelling motive. Not only did they fear and oppose
+_political_ democracy; they were equally opposed to democracy in
+_industry_, to that democracy in the economic life of the nation which
+every Socialist movement in the world had at all times acknowledged to be
+its goal. As we shall see, they united to political dictatorship industrial
+dictatorship. They did not want democracy, but power; they did not want
+peace, even, as they wanted power.
+
+The most painstaking and sympathetic study of the Russian Revolution will
+not disclose any great ideal or principle, moral or political, underlying
+the distinctive Bolshevik agitation and program. Nothing could well be
+farther from the truth than the view taken by many amiable people who,
+while disavowing the actions of the Bolsheviki, seek to mitigate the
+judgment which mankind pronounces against them by the plea that, after
+all, they are extreme idealists, misguided, of course, but, nevertheless,
+inspired by a noble ideal; that they are trying, as John Brown and many
+others have tried, to realize a great ideal, but have been made incapable
+of seeing their ideal in its proper perspective, and, therefore, of making
+the compromises and adjustments which the transmutation of ideals to
+reality always requires.
+
+No sympathizer with Russia--certainly no Socialist--can fail to wish that
+this indulgent criticism were true. Its acceptance would lighten the
+darkest chapter in Russian history, and, at the same time, remove from the
+great international Socialist movement a shameful reproach. But the facts
+are incompatible with such a theory. Instead of being fanatical idealists,
+incapable of compromises and adjustments, the Bolsheviki have, from the
+very beginning, been loudly scornful of rigid and unbending idealism; have
+made numerous compromises, alliances, and "political deals," and have
+repeatedly shifted their ground in accordance with political expediency.
+They have been consistently loyal to no aim save one--the control of power.
+They have been opportunists of the most extreme type. There is not a single
+Socialist or democratic principle which they have not abandoned when it
+served, their political ends; not a single instrument, principle, or device
+of autocratic despotism which they have not used when by so doing they
+could gain power. For the motto of Bolshevism we might well paraphrase the
+well-known line of Horace, and make it read, "Get power, honestly, if you
+can, if not--somehow or other."
+
+Of course, this judgment applies only to Bolshevism as such: to the special
+and peculiar methods and ideas which distinguish the Bolsheviki from their
+fellow-Socialists. It is not to be questioned that as Socialists and
+revolutionists they have been inspired by some of the great ideals common
+to all Socialists everywhere. But they differed from the great mass of
+Russian Socialists so fundamentally that they separated themselves from
+them and became a separate and distinct party. _That which caused this
+separation is the essence of Bolshevism--not the ideals held in common_. No
+understanding of Bolshevism is possible unless this fundamental fact is
+first fully understood. Power, to be gained at any cost, and ruthlessly
+applied, by the proletarian minority, is the basic principle of Bolshevism
+as a distinct form of revolutionary movement. Of course, the Bolshevik
+leaders sought this power for no sordid, self-aggrandizing ends; they are
+not self-seeking adventurers, as many would have us believe. They are
+sincerely and profoundly convinced that the goal of social and economic
+freedom and justice can be more easily attained by their method than by the
+method of democratic Socialism. Still, the fact remains that what social
+ideals they hold are no part of Bolshevism. They are Socialist ideals.
+Bolshevism is a distinctive method and a program, and its essence is the
+relentless use of power by the proletariat against the rest of society in
+the same manner that the bourgeois and military rulers of nations have
+commonly used it against the proletariat. Bolshevism has simply inverted
+the old Czarist regime.
+
+The fairness and justice of this judgment are demonstrated by the
+Bolsheviki themselves. They denounced Kerensky's government for not holding
+the elections for the Constituent Assembly sooner, posing as the champions
+of the Constituante. When they had themselves assumed control of the
+government they delayed the meeting of the Constituent Assembly and then
+suppressed it by force of arms! They denounced Kerensky for having
+restored the death penalty in the army in cases of gross treachery,
+professing an intense horror of capital punishment as a form of "bourgeois
+savagery." When they came into power they instituted capital punishment for
+_civil_ and _political offenses_, establishing public hangings and
+floggings as a means of impressing the population![24] They had bitterly
+assailed Kerensky for his "militarism," for trying to build up the army and
+for urging men to fight. In less critical circumstances they themselves
+resorted to forced conscription. They condemned Kerensky and his colleagues
+for "interfering with freedom of speech and press." When they came into
+power they suppressed all non-Bolshevist papers and meetings in a manner
+differing not at all from that of the Czar's regime, forcing the other
+Socialist parties and groups to resort to the old pre-Revolution
+"underground" methods.
+
+The evidence of all these things, and things even worse than these, is
+conclusive and unimpeachable. It is contained in the records of the
+Bolshevik government, in its publications, and in the reports of the great
+Socialist parties of Russia, officially made to the International Socialist
+Bureau. Surely the evidence sustains the charge that, whatever else they
+may or may not be, the Bolsheviki are not unbending and uncompromising
+idealists of the type of John Brown and William Lloyd Garrison, as they are
+so often represented as being by well-meaning sentimentalists whose
+indulgence of the Bolsheviki is as unlimited as their ignorance concerning
+them.
+
+Some day, perhaps, a competent psychologist will attempt the task of
+explaining the psychology of our fellow-citizens who are so ready to defend
+the Bolsheviki for doing the very things they themselves hate and condemn.
+In any list of men and women in this country friendly to the Bolsheviki it
+will be found that they are practically all pacifists and
+anti-conscriptionists, while a great many are non-resistants and
+conscientious objectors to military service. Practically all of them are
+vigorous defenders of the freedom of the press, of the right of public
+assemblage and of free speech. With the exception of a few Anarchists, they
+are almost universally strong advocates of radical political democracy. How
+can high-minded and intelligent men and women--as many of them are--holding
+such beliefs as these give countenance to the Bolsheviki, who bitterly and
+resolutely oppose all of them? How can they denounce America's adoption of
+conscription and say that it means that "Democracy is dead in America"
+while, at the same time, hailing the birth of democracy in Russia, where
+conscription is enforced by the Bolsheviki? How, again, can they at one and
+the same time condemn American democracy for its imperfections, as in the
+matter of suffrage, while upholding and defending the very men who, in
+Russia, deliberately set out to destroy the universal equal suffrage
+already achieved? How can they demand freedom of the press and of
+assemblage, even in war-time, and denounce such restrictions as we have had
+to endure here in America, and at the same time uphold the men responsible
+for suppressing the press and public assemblages in Russia in a manner
+worse than was attempted by the Czar? Is there no logical sense in the
+average radical's mind? Or can it be that, after all, the people who make
+up the Bolshevist following, and who are so much given to engaging in
+protest demonstrations of various kinds, are simply restless, unanchored
+spirits, for whom the stimulant and excitation of revolt is a necessity?
+How many are simply victims of subtle neuroses occasioned by sex
+derangements, by religious chaos, and similar causes?
+
+
+II
+
+The Bolshevik rule began as a reign of terror. We must not make the mistake
+of supposing that it was imposed upon the rest of Russia as easily as it
+was imposed upon Petrograd, where conditions were exceptional. In the
+latter city, with the assistance of the Preobrajenski and Seminovsky
+regiments from the garrison, and of detachments of sailors from the Baltic
+fleet, to all of whom most extravagant promises were made, the _coup
+d'etat_ was easily managed with little bloodshed. But in a great many other
+places the Bolshevist rule was effected in no such peaceful fashion, but by
+means of a bloody terror. Here, for example, is the account of the manner
+in which the counter-revolution of the Bolsheviki was accomplished at
+Saratov, as given by a competent eye-witness, a well-known Russian
+Socialist whose long and honorable service in the revolutionary movement
+entitles her to the honor of every friend of Free Russia--Inna
+Rakitnikov:[25]
+
+    Here ... is how the Bolshevist _coup d'etat_ took place at
+    Saratov. I was witness to these facts myself. Saratov is a big
+    university and intellectual center, possessing a great number of
+    schools, libraries, and divers associations designed to elevate
+    the intellectual standard of the population. The Zemstvo of
+    Saratov was one of the best in Russia. The peasant population of
+    this province, among whom the revolutionary Socialist propaganda
+    was carried on for several years, by the Revolutionary Socialist
+    party, is wide awake and well organized. The Municipality and the
+    Agricultural Committees were composed of Socialists. The
+    population was actively preparing for the elections to the
+    Constituent Assembly; the people discussed the list of candidates,
+    studied the candidates' biographies, as well as the programs of
+    the different parties. On the night of October 28th [November
+    10th, European calendar], by reason of an order that had come from
+    Petrograd, the Bolshevik _coup d'etat_ broke out at Saratov. The
+    following forces were its instruments: the garrison, which was a
+    stranger to the mass of the population, a weak party of workers,
+    and, in the capacity of leaders, some Intellectuals, who, up to
+    that time, had played no role in the public life of the town.
+
+    It was indeed a military _coup d'etat. The city hall, where sat
+    the Socialists, who were elected by equal, direct, and secret
+    universal suffrage, was surrounded by soldiers; machine-guns were
+    placed in front and the bombardment began. This lasted a whole
+    night; some were wounded, some killed_. The municipal judges were
+    arrested. Soon after a Manifesto solemnly announced to the
+    population that the "enemies of the people," the
+    "counter-revolutionaries," were overthrown; that the power of
+    Saratov was going to pass into the hands of the Soviet
+    (Bolshevist) of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates.
+
+As soon as the overthrow of the existing authorities was effected and the
+Bolsheviki, through their Red Guards and other means, were in a position to
+exert their authority, they resorted to every method of oppression and
+repression known to the old autocratic regime. They suppressed the papers
+of the Socialist parties and groups opposed to them, and in some instances
+confiscated the plants, turned out the editors, and used the papers
+themselves. In one of his "Letters to the Comrades," published in the
+_Rabochiy Put_, a few days before the insurrection, Lenine had confessed
+that Kerensky had maintained freedom of the press and of assemblage. The
+passage is worth quoting, not only for the information it contains
+concerning the Kerensky regime, but also because it affords a standard by
+which to judge the Bolsheviki. Lenine wrote:
+
+    The Germans have only one Liebknecht, no newspapers, no freedom of
+    assemblage, no councils; they are working against the intense
+    hostility of all classes of the population, including the wealthy
+    peasants--with the imperialist bourgeoisie splendidly
+    organized--and yet the Germans are making some attempt at
+    agitation; _while we, with tens of papers, with freedom of
+    assemblage, with the majority of the Council with us, we, the best
+    situated of all the proletarian internationalists, can we refuse
+    to support the German revolutionists in organizing a revolt?_
+
+That it was not the "German revolutionists" who in November, 1917, wanted
+the Russians to revolt against the Kerensky government, but the Majority
+Socialists, upon whom Lenine had poured his contempt, on the one hand, and
+the German General Staff, on the other hand, is a mere detail. The
+important thing is that Lenine admitted that under the Kerensky government
+the Russian workers, including the Bolsheviki, were "the best situated of
+all the proletarian internationalists," and that they had "tens of papers,
+with freedom of assemblage." In the face of such statements by Lenine
+himself, written a few days before the Bolshevik counter-revolution, what
+becomes of the charge that the suppression of popular liberties under
+Kerensky was one of the main causes of the revolt of the Bolsheviki?
+
+Against the tolerance of Kerensky, the arbitrary and despotic methods of
+the Bolsheviki stand out in strong contrast. Many non-Bolshevist Socialist
+organs were suppressed; papers containing matter displeasing to the
+Bolshevik authorities were suspended, whole issues were confiscated, and
+editors were imprisoned, precisely as in the days of the Czar. It became
+necessary for the Socialist-Revolutionists to issue their paper with a
+different title, and from a different place, every day. Here is the
+testimony of Inna Rakitnikov again, contained in an official report to the
+International Socialist Bureau:
+
+    All the non-Bolshevik newspapers were confiscated or prosecuted
+    and deprived of every means of reaching the provinces; their
+    editors' offices and printing-establishments were looted. After
+    the creation of the "Revolutionary Tribunal" the authors of
+    articles that were not pleasing to the Bolsheviki, as well as the
+    directors of newspapers, were brought to judgment and condemned to
+    make amends or go to prison, etc.
+
+    The premises of numerous organizations were being constantly
+    pillaged. The Red Guard came there to search, destroying different
+    documents; frequently objects which were found on the premises
+    disappeared. Thus were looted the premises of the Central
+    Committee of the Revolutionary Socialist party (27 Galernaia
+    Street) and--several times--the office of the paper _Dielo Naroda_
+    (22 Liteinia Street) ... the office of the paper Volya Naroda,
+    etc.... But the Central Committee ... continued to issue a daily
+    paper, only changing its title, as in the time of Czarism, and
+    thus continued its propaganda....
+
+The _Yolya Naroda_, referred to by Inna Rakitnikov, was the official organ
+of the Socialist-Revolutionary party. It was raided on several occasions.
+For example, in January, 1918, the leaders of the party reported that a
+detachment of Bolshevik Red Guards had broken into the office of the paper,
+committed various depredations, and made several arrests.[26] Here is
+another Socialist witness: One of the ablest of the leaders of the Bohemian
+Socialists in the United States is Joseph Martinek, the brilliant and
+scholarly editor of the Bohemian Socialist weekly, the _Delnicke Listy_. He
+has always been identified with the radical section of the movement. A
+student of Russian history, speaking the language fluently, it was his good
+fortune to spend several weeks in Petrograd immediately before and after
+the Bolshevik counter-revolution. He testifies that the "freedom of the
+press established by Kerensky" was "terminated by the Bolsheviki."[27]
+This is not the testimony of "capitalist newspapers," but of Socialists of
+unquestionable authority and standing. The _Dielo Naroda_ was a Socialist
+paper, and the volunteer venders of it, who were brutally beaten and shot
+down by Red Guards, were Socialist working-men.[28] When Oskar Tokoi, the
+well-known revolutionary Finnish Socialist leader, former Prime Minister of
+Finland, declares that "freedom of assemblage, association, free speech,
+and free press is altogether destroyed,"[29] the Bolsheviki and their
+sympathizers cannot plead that they are the victims of "capitalist
+misrepresentation." The attitude of the Bolshevik leaders toward the
+freedom of the press has been frankly stated editorially in Pravda, their
+official organ, in the following words:
+
+    The press is a most dangerous weapon in the hands of our enemies.
+    We will tear it from them, we will reduce it to impotence. It is
+    the moment for us to prepare battle. We will be inflexible in our
+    defense of the rights of the exploited. The struggle will be
+    decisive. We are going to smite the journals with fines, to shut
+    them up, to arrest the editors, and hold them as hostages.[30]
+
+Is it any wonder that Paul Axelrod, who was one of the representatives of
+Russia on the International Socialist Bureau prior to the outbreak of the
+war, has been forced to declare that the Bolsheviki have "introduced into
+Russia a system worse than Czarism, suppressing the Constituent Assembly
+and the liberty of the press"?[31] Or that the beloved veteran of the
+Russian Revolution, Nicholas Tchaykovsky, should lament that "the
+Bolshevik usurpation is the continuation of the government by which Czarism
+held the country in an iron grip"?[32]
+
+
+III
+
+Lenine, Trotzky, Zinoviev, and other Bolshevik leaders early found
+themselves so much at variance with the accepted Socialist position that
+they decided to change their party name. They had been Social Democrats, a
+part of the Social Democratic party of Russia. Now ever since Bronterre
+O'Brien first used the terms "Social Democrat" and "Social Democracy," in
+1839, their meaning has been pretty well established. A Social Democrat is
+one who aims to base government and industry upon democracy. Certainly,
+this cannot be said to be an accurate description of the position of men
+who believe in the rule of a nation of one hundred and eighty millions by a
+small party of two hundred thousand or less--or even by an entire class
+representing not more than six per cent. of the population--and Lenine and
+his friends, recognizing the fact, decided to change the name of their
+group to the _Communist party_, by which name they are now known in Russia.
+Lenine frankly admits that it would be a mistake to speak of this party as
+a party of democracy. He says:
+
+    The word "democracy" cannot be scientifically applied to the
+    Communist party. Since March, 1917, the word democracy is simply a
+    shackle fastened upon the revolutionary nation and preventing it
+    from establishing boldly, freely, and regardless of all obstacles
+    a new form of power; the Council of Workmen's, Soldiers' and
+    Peasants' Deputies, harbinger of the abolition of every form of
+    authority.[33]
+
+The phrase "harbinger of the abolition of every form of authority" would
+seem to indicate that Lenine's ideal is that of the old Nihilists--or of
+Anarchists of the Bakuninist school. That is very far from the truth. The
+phrase in question is merely a rhetorical flourish. No man has more
+caustically criticized and ridiculed the Anarchists for their dream of
+organization without authority than Nikolai Lenine. Moreover, his
+conception of Soviet government provides for a very strong central
+authority. It is a new kind of state, but a state, nevertheless, and, as we
+shall discover, far more powerful than the political state with which we
+are familiar, exercising far greater control over the life of the
+individual. It is not to be a democratic state, but a very despotic one, a
+dictatorship by a small but powerful ruling class. It was not the word
+"democracy" which Lenine felt to be a "shackle upon the revolutionary
+nation," but democracy itself.
+
+The manner in which they betrayed the Constituent Assembly will prove the
+complete hostility of the Bolsheviki to democratic government. In order to
+excuse and justify the Bolsheviki's actions in this regard, their
+supporters in this country have assiduously circulated two statements. They
+are, first, that the Provisional Government purposely and with malicious
+intent delayed the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, hoping to stave
+it off altogether; second, that such a long time had elapsed between the
+elections and the convocation that when the latter date was reached the
+delegates no longer represented the true feeling of the electorate.
+
+With regard to the first of these statements, which is a repetition of a
+charge made by Trotzky before the Bolshevik revolt, it is to be noted that
+it is offered in justification of the Bolshevik _coup d'etat_. If the
+charge made were true, instead of false, as it can easily be shown to be,
+it would only justify the counter-revolution if the counter-revolution
+itself were made the instrument for insuring the safety of the Constituent
+Assembly. But the Bolsheviki _suppressed the Constituent Assembly_. By what
+process of reasoning do we reach the result that because the Provisional
+Government delayed the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, which the
+people desired, a counter-revolutionary movement to _suppress it
+altogether_, by force of arms, was right and proper?
+
+With regard to the second statement, which is a repetition of an argument
+advanced in Russia, it should be sufficient to emphasize a few dates. The
+Bolsheviki seized the power of government on November 7th and the elections
+for the Constituent Assembly took place on November 25th--nearly three
+weeks later. The date set by the Kerensky government for the opening of the
+Constituent Assembly was December 12th and on that date some forty-odd
+members put in an appearance. Recognizing that they could not begin
+business until a quorum appeared, these decided to wait until at least a
+quorum should be present. They did not attempt to do any work. What
+happened is told in the following passages from a signed statement by 109
+members--all Socialist-Revolutionists.[34]
+
+    On the appointed day and hour of the opening of the session of the
+    Constituent Assembly ... the delegates to the Constituent Assembly
+    who had arrived in Petrograd gathered at the Tavrichesky Palace.
+    The elected representatives of the people beheld innumerable
+    banners and large crowds surrounding the palace. This was
+    Petrograd greeting the representatives of the people. At the doors
+    of the palace the picture changed. There stood armed guards and at
+    the orders of the usurpers, the Bolsheviki, they refused to let
+    the delegates pass into the Tavrichesky Palace. It appeared that,
+    in order to enter the building, the _delegates had first to pay
+    respects to the Commissaire, a satellite of Lenine and Trotzky,
+    and there receive special permission_. The delegates would not
+    submit to that; elected by the people and equipped with formal
+    authorization, they had the right to freely enter any public
+    building assigned for their meeting. The delegates decided to
+    enter the Tavrichesky Palace without asking the new authorities,
+    and they succeeded in doing so. On the first day the guards did
+    not dare to lift their arms against the people's elected
+    representatives and allowed them to enter the building without
+    molestation.
+
+    There was no struggle, no violence, no sacrifices; the delegates
+    demanded that the guards respect their rights; they demanded to be
+    admitted, and the guards yielded.
+
+    In the Tavrichesky Palace the delegates opened their meeting; V.M.
+    Chernov was elected chairman. There were, altogether, about forty
+    delegates present. They realized that there were not enough
+    present to start the work of the Constituent Assembly. _It was
+    decided that it would be advisable to await the arrival of the
+    other delegates and start the work of the Constituent Assembly
+    only when a sufficient number were present_. Those already there
+    decided to meet daily at the Tavrichesky Palace in order to count
+    all the delegates as they arrived, and on an appointed day to
+    publicly announce the day and hour of the beginning of the
+    activities of the Constituent Assembly.
+
+    When the delegates finished their session and adjourned, the old
+    guards had been dismissed for their submissive attitude toward the
+    delegates and replaced by armed civilian followers of Lenine and
+    Trotzky. The latter issued an order to disband the delegates, but
+    there were none to be disbanded.
+
+    The following day the government of the Bolsheviki dishonestly and
+    basely slandered the people's representatives in their official
+    announcement which appeared in Pravda. That lying newspaper wrote
+    that the representatives of the people had forced their way into
+    the palace, accompanied by Junkers and the White Guards of the
+    bourgeoisie, that the representatives wanted to take advantage of
+    their small numbers and had begun the work of the Constituent
+    Assembly. Every one knows that this is slanderous as regards the
+    representatives of the people. Such lies and slanders were
+    resorted to by the old regime.
+
+    The aim of the slanders and the lies is clear. _The usurpers do
+    not want the people's representatives to have the supreme power
+    and therefore are preparing to disband the Constituent Assembly_.
+    On the 28th of November, in the evening, _having begun to arrest
+    members of the Constitutional-Democratic party, the Bolsheviki
+    violated the inviolability of the Constituent Assembly. On
+    December 3d a delegate to the Constituent Assembly, the
+    Socialist-Revolutionist, Filippovsky, who was elected by the army
+    on the southwestern front, was arrested_.
+
+    In accordance with their decision reached on November 28th, the
+    delegates gathered at the Tavrichesky Palace on November 29th and
+    30th. As on the first day, armed soldiers stood guard at the
+    entrance of the palace and would not let any one pass. The
+    delegates, however, insisted and were finally allowed to enter.
+
+    On the third day, scenes of brutal violence toward the people's
+    representatives took place at the palace. Peasants were the
+    unfortunate victims of this violence.
+
+    When the delegates had ended their session and all that remained
+    was the affixing of the signatures to the minutes, sailors forced
+    their way into the hall; these were headed by a Bolshevik officer,
+    _a former commander of the Fortress of St. Peter and St. Paul_.
+    The commander demanded that the delegates disband. In reply it was
+    stated that the delegates would disband after they had finished
+    their business. Then at the order of the commander the sailors
+    took the delegate Ilyan, elected by the peasants of the Province
+    of Tambov, by the arm and dragged him to the exit. After Ilyan,
+    the sailors dragged out the peasant delegate from the Province of
+    Moscow, Bikov; then the sailors approached Maltzev, a peasant
+    delegate from the Province of Kostroma. He, however, shouted out
+    that he would rather be shot than to submit to such violence. His
+    courage appealed to the sailors and they stopped.
+
+    Now all the halls in the Tavrichesky Palace are locked and it is
+    impossible to meet there. The delegates who come to the
+    Tavrichesky Palace cannot even gather in the lobby, for as soon
+    as a group gathers, the armed hirelings of Lenine and Trotzky
+    disperse them. Thus, in former times, behaved the servants of the
+    Czar and the enemies of the people, policemen and gendarmes.
+
+This is not the testimony of correspondents of bourgeois journals; it is
+from a statement prepared at the time and signed by more than a hundred
+Socialists, members of the oldest and largest Socialist party in Russia,
+many of them men whose long and honorable service has endeared them to
+their comrades in all lands. It is not testimony that can be impeached or
+controverted. It forms part of the report of these well-known and trusted
+Socialists to their comrades in Russia and elsewhere. The claim that the
+elections to the Constituent Assembly were held on the basis of an obsolete
+register, before the people had a chance to become acquainted with the
+Bolshevist program, and that so long a time had elapsed since the elections
+that the delegates could not be regarded as true representatives of the
+people, was first put forward by the Bolsheviki when the Constituent
+Assembly was finally convened, on January 18th. It was an absurd claim for
+the Bolsheviki to make, for one of the very earliest acts of the Bolshevik
+government, after the overthrow of Kerensky, was to issue a decree ordering
+that the elections be held as arranged. By that act they assumed
+responsibility for the elections, and could not fairly and honorably enter
+the plea, later on, that the elections were not valid.
+
+Here is the story of the struggle for the Constituent Assembly, briefly
+summarized. The first Provisional Government issued a Manifesto on March
+20, 1917, promising to convoke the Constituent Assembly "as soon as
+possible." This promise was repeated by the Provisional Government when it
+was reorganized after the resignation of Miliukov and Guchkov in the
+middle of May. That the promise was sincere there can be no reasonable
+doubt, for the Provisional Government at once set about creating a
+commission to work out the necessary machinery and was for the election by
+popular vote of delegates to the Constituent Assembly. Russia was not like
+a country which had ample electoral machinery already existing; new
+machinery had to be devised for the purpose. This commission was opened on
+June 7, 1917; its work was undertaken with great earnestness, and completed
+in a remarkably short time, with the result that on July 22d the
+Provisional Government--Kerensky at its head--announced that the elections
+to the Constituent Assembly would be held on September 30th, and the
+convocation of the Assembly itself on the 12th of December. It was soon
+found, however, that it would be physically impossible for the local
+authorities all to be prepared to hold the election on the date set--it was
+necessary, among other things, to first elect the local authorities which
+were to arrange for the election of the delegates to the Constituent
+Assembly--and so, on August 22d, Kerensky signed the following decree,
+making _the one and only postponement_ of the Constituent Assembly, so far
+as the Provisional Government was concerned:
+
+    Desiring to assure the convocation of the Constituent Assembly as
+    soon as possible, the Provisional Government designated the 30th
+    of September as election-day, in which case the whole burden of
+    making up the election lists must fall on the municipalities and
+    the newly elected zemstvos. _The enormous labor of holding the
+    elections for the local institution has taken time_. At present,
+    in view of the date of establishment of the local institutions, on
+    the basis decreed by the government--direct, general, equal, and
+    secret suffrage--the Provisional Government has decided:
+
+    To set aside as the day for the elections to the Constituent
+    Assembly the 25th of November, of the year 1917, and as the date
+    for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly the 12th of
+    December, of the year 1917.
+
+Notwithstanding this clear and honorable record, we find Trotzky, at a
+Conference of Northern Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, on
+October 25th, when he well knew that arrangements for holding the
+Constituent Assembly elections were in full swing, charging that Kerensky
+was engaged in preventing the convocation of the Constituent Assembly! He
+demanded at that time that all power should be taken from the Provisional
+Government and transferred to the Soviets. These, he said, would convoke
+the Assembly on the date that had been assigned, December 12th.
+
+The Bolshevik _coup d'etat_ took place, as already noted, less than three
+weeks before the date set for the elections, for which every preparation
+had been made by the government and the local authorities. It was at the
+beginning of the campaign, and the Bolsheviki had their own candidates in
+the field in many places. It was a foregone conclusion that the Constituent
+Assembly brought into being by the universal suffrage would be dominated by
+Socialists. There was never the slightest fear that it would be dominated
+by the bourgeois parties. What followed is best told in the exact language
+of a protest to the International Socialist Bureau by Inna Rakitnikov,
+representative of the Revolutionary Socialist party, which was, be it
+remembered, the largest and the oldest of the Russian Socialist parties:
+
+    The _coup d'etat_ was followed by various other manifestations of
+    Bolshevist activity--arrests, searches, confiscation of
+    newspapers, ban on meetings. Bands of soldiers looted the country
+    houses in the suburbs of the city; a school for the children of
+    the people and the buildings of the Children's Holiday Settlement
+    were also pillaged. Bands of soldiers were forthwith sent into the
+    country to cause trouble there.... The bands of soldiers who were
+    sent into the country used not only persuasion, but also violence,
+    _trying to force the peasants to give their votes for the
+    Bolshevik candidates at the time of the elections to the
+    Constituent Assembly; they tore up the bulletins of the
+    Socialist-Revolutionists, overturned the ballot-boxes, etc_....
+    The inhabitants of the country proved themselves in all that
+    concerned the elections wide awake to the highest degree. There
+    were hardly any abstentions; _90 per cent. of the population took
+    part in the voting_. The day of the voting was kept as a solemn
+    feast; the priest said mass; the peasants dressed in their best
+    clothes; they believed that the Constituent Assembly would give
+    them order, laws, the land. In the Government of Saratov, out of
+    fourteen deputies elected, there were twelve
+    Socialist-Revolutionists. There were others (such as the
+    Government of Pensa, for example) that elected only
+    Socialist-Revolutionists. The Bolsheviki had the majority only in
+    Petrograd and Moscow and in certain units of the army. To violence
+    and conquest of power by force of arms the population answered by
+    the elections to the Constituent Assembly, the people sent to this
+    Assembly, not the Bolsheviki, but, by an overwhelming majority,
+    Socialist-Revolutionists.
+
+Of course, this is the testimony of one who is confessedly anti-Bolshevist,
+one who has suffered deep injury at the hands of the Bolsheviki of whom she
+writes. For all that, her testimony cannot be ignored or laughed aside. It
+has been indorsed by E. Roubanovitch, a member of the International
+Socialist Bureau, and a man of the highest integrity, in the following
+words: "I affirm that her sincere and matured testimony cannot be suspected
+of partizanship or of dogmatic partiality against the Bolsheviki." What is
+more important, however, is that the subsequent conduct of the Bolsheviki
+in all matters relating to the Constituent Assembly was such as to confirm
+belief in her statements.
+
+No Bolshevik spokesman has ever yet challenged the accuracy of the
+statement that an overwhelming majority of the deputies elected to the
+Constituent Assembly were representatives of the Revolutionary Socialist
+party. As a matter of fact, the Bolsheviki elected less than one-third of
+the deputies. In the announcement of their withdrawal from the Constituent
+Assembly when it assembled in January the Bolshevik members admitted that
+the Socialist-Revolutionists had "obtained a majority of the Constituent
+Assembly."
+
+The attitude of the Bolsheviki toward the Constituent Assembly changed as
+their electoral prospects changed. At first, believing that, as a result of
+their successful _coup_, they would have the support of the great mass of
+the peasants and city workers, they were vigorous in their support of the
+Assembly. In the first of their "decrees" after the overthrow of the
+Kerensky Cabinet, the Bolshevik "Commissaries of the People" announced that
+they were to exercise complete power "until the meeting of the Constituent
+Assembly," which was nothing less than a pledge that they would regard the
+latter body as the supreme, ultimate authority. Three days after the revolt
+Lenine, as president of the People's Commissaries, published this decree:
+
+    In the name of the Government of the Republic, elected by the
+    All-Russian Congress of Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers'
+    Delegates, with the participation of the Peasants' Delegates, the
+    Council of the People's Commissaries decrees:
+
+    1. That the elections to the Constituent Assembly shall be held on
+    November 25th, the day set aside for this purpose.
+
+    2. All electoral committees, all local organizations, the Councils
+    of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates and the soldiers'
+    organizations at the front are to bend every effort toward
+    safeguarding the freedom of the voters and fair play at the
+    elections to the Constituent Assembly, which will be held on the
+    appointed date.
+
+If this attitude had been maintained throughout, and had the Bolsheviki
+loyally accepted the verdict of the electorate when it was given, there
+could have been no complaint. But the evidence shows that their early
+attitude was not maintained. Later on, as reports received from the
+interior of the country showed that the masses were not flocking to their
+banners, they began to assume a critical attitude toward the Constituent
+Assembly. The leaders of the Socialist-Revolutionary party were warning
+their followers that the Bolsheviki would try to wreck the Constituent
+Assembly, for which they were bitterly denounced in organs like _Pravda_
+and _Izvestya_. Very soon, however, these Bolshevist organs began to
+discuss the Constituent Assembly in a very critical spirit. It was
+possible, they pointed out, that it would have a bourgeois majority,
+treating the Socialist-Revolutionists and the Cadets as being on the same
+level, equally servants of the bourgeoisie. Then appeared editorials to
+show that it would not be possible to place the destinies of Russia in the
+hands of such people, even though they were elected by the "unthinking
+masses." Finally, when it was clear that the Socialist-Revolutionary party
+had elected a majority of the members, _Pravda_ and _Izvestya_ took the
+position that _the victorious people did not need a Constituent Assembly_;
+that a new instrument had been created which made the old democratic method
+obsolete.[35] The "new instrument" was, of course, the Bolshevist Soviet.
+
+
+IV
+
+For the moment we are not concerned with the merits or the failings of the
+Soviet considered as an instrument of government. We are concerned only
+with democracy and the relation of the Bolshevist method to democracy. From
+this point of view, then, let us consider the facts. The Soviet was not
+something new, as so many of our American drawing-room champions of
+Bolshevism seem to think. The Soviet was the type of organization common to
+Russia. There were Soviets of peasants, of soldiers, of teachers, of
+industrial workers, of officers, of professional men, and so on. Every
+class and every group in the classes had its own Soviet. The Soviet in its
+simplest form is a delegate body consisting of representatives of a
+particular group--a peasants' Soviet, for example. Another type, more
+important, roughly corresponds to the Central Labor Union in an American
+city, in that it is composed of representatives of workers of all kinds.
+These delegates are, in the main, chosen by the workers in the shops and
+factories and in the meetings of the unions. The anti-Bolshevist
+Socialists, such as the Mensheviki and the Socialist-Revolutionists, were
+not opposed to Soviets as working-class organizations. On the contrary,
+they approved of them, supported them, and, generally, belonged to them.
+
+They were opposed only to the theory that these Soviets, recruited in a
+more or less haphazard manner, as such organizations must necessarily be,
+were better adapted to the governing of a great country like Russia than a
+legal body which received its mandate in elections based upon universal,
+equal, direct, and secret suffrage. No one ever pretended that the Soviets
+represented all the workers of Russia--including peasants in that term--or
+even a majority of them. No one ever pretended that the Soviet, as such,
+was a stable and constant factor. New Soviets were always springing up and
+others dying out. Many existed only in name, on paper. _There never has
+been an accurate list of the Soviets existing in Russia_. Many lists have
+been made, but always by the time they could be tabulated and published
+there have been many changes. For these and other reasons which will
+suggest themselves to the mind of any thoughtful reader, many of the
+leaders of the revolutionary movement in Russia have doubted the value of
+the Soviet as a _unit of government, while highly valuing it as a unit of
+working-class organization and struggle_.
+
+Back of all the strife between the Bolsheviki centered around the Soviets
+and the Socialist-Revolutionists and Mensheviki, centered around the
+Constituent Assembly, was a greater fact than any we have been discussing,
+however. The Bolsheviki with their doctrinaire Marxism had carried the
+doctrine of the class struggle to such extreme lengths that they virtually
+placed the great mass of the peasants with the bourgeoisie. The Revolution
+must be controlled by the proletariat, they argued. The control of the
+government and of industry by the people, which was the slogan of the old
+democracy, will not do, for the term "the people" includes bourgeois
+elements. Even if it is narrowed by excluding the great capitalists and
+landowners, still it embraces the lesser capitalists, small landowners,
+shopkeepers, and the petty bourgeoisie in general. These elements weaken
+the militancy of the proletariat. What is needed is the dictatorship of the
+proletariat. Now, only a very small part of the peasantry, the very poor
+peasants, can be safely linked to the proletariat--and even these must be
+carefully watched. It was a phase of the old and familiar conflict between
+agrarian and industrial groups in the Socialist movement. It is not very
+many years since the Socialist party of America was convulsed by a similar
+discussion. Could the farmer ever be a genuine and sincere and trustworthy
+Socialist? The question was asked in the party papers in all seriousness,
+and in one or two state organizations measures were taken to limit the
+number of farmers entering the party, so that at all times there might be
+the certainty of a preponderance of proletarian over farmer votes.
+
+Similar distrust, only upon a much bigger scale, explains the fight for and
+against the Constituent Assembly. Lenine and his followers distrusted the
+peasants as a class whose interests were akin to the class of small
+property-owners. He would only unite with the poor, propertyless peasants.
+The leaders of the peasantry, on the other hand, supported by the more
+liberal Marxians, would expand the meaning of the term "working class" and
+embrace within its meaning all the peasants as well as all city workers,
+most of the professional classes, and so on. We can get some idea of this
+strife from a criticism which Lenine directs against the Mensheviki:
+
+    In its class composition this party is not Socialist at all. It
+    does not represent the toiling masses. It represents fairly
+    prosperous peasants and working-men, petty traders, many small and
+    some even fairly large capitalists, and a certain number of real
+    but gullible proletarians who have been caught in the bourgeois
+    net.[36]
+
+It is clear from this criticism that Lenine does not believe that a genuine
+Socialist party--and, presumably, therefore, the same must apply to a
+Socialist government--can represent "fairly prosperous peasants and
+working-men." We now know how to appraise the Soviet government. The
+constitution of Russia under the rule of the Bolsheviki is required by law
+to be posted in all public places in Russia. In Article II, Chapter V,
+paragraph 9, of this document it is set forth that "the Constitution of the
+Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic involves, in view of the
+present transition period, the establishment of a dictatorship of the urban
+and rural proletariat and the poorest peasantry in the form of a powerful
+All-Russian Soviet authority." Attention is called to this passage here,
+not for the sake of pointing out the obvious need for some exact definition
+of the loose expression, "the poorest peasantry," nor for the sake of any
+captious criticism, but solely to point out the important fact that Lenine
+only admits a part of the peasantry--the poorest--to share in the
+dictatorship of the proletariat.
+
+Turning to another part of the same important document--Article III,
+Chapter VI, Section A, paragraph 25--we find the basis of representation in
+the All-Russian Congress of Soviets stated. There are representatives of
+town Soviets and representatives of provincial congresses of Soviets. The
+former represent the industrial workers; the latter represent the peasants
+almost exclusively. It is important, therefore, to note that there is one
+delegate for every twenty-five thousand city voters and one for every one
+hundred and twenty-five thousand peasant voters! In Section B of the same
+Article, Chapter X, paragraph 53, we find the same discrimination: it takes
+five peasants' votes to equal the vote of one city voter; it was this
+general attitude of the Bolsheviki toward the peasants, dividing them into
+classes and treating the great majority of them as petty, rural
+bourgeoisie, which roused the resentment of the peasants' leaders. They
+naturally insisted that the peasants constituted a distinct class,
+co-operating with the proletariat, not to be ruled by it. Even Marie
+Spiridonova, who at first joined with the Bolsheviki, was compelled, later
+on, to assert this point of view.
+
+It is easy to understand the distrust of the Bolsheviki by the Socialist
+parties and groups which represented the peasants. The latter class
+constituted more than 85 per cent. of the population. Moreover, it had
+furnished the great majority of the fighters in the revolutionary movement.
+Its leaders and spokesmen resented the idea that they were to be dictated
+to and controlled by a minority, which was, as Lenine himself admitted, not
+materially more numerous than the old ruling class of landowners had been.
+They wanted a democratic governmental system, free from class rule, while
+the Bolsheviki wanted class rule. Generalizations are proverbially
+perilous, and should be very cautiously made and applied to great currents
+of thought and of life. But in a broad sense we may fairly say that the
+Socialism of the Socialist-Revolutionists and the Mensheviki, the Socialism
+of Kerensky and the men who were the majority of the Constituent Assembly,
+was the product of Russian life and Russian economic development, while the
+Socialism that the Bolsheviki tried by force of arms to impose upon Russia
+was as un-Russian as it could be. The Bolshevist conception of Socialism
+had its origin in Marxian theory. Both Marx and Engels freely predicted the
+setting up of "a dictatorship of the proletariat"--the phrase which the
+Bolsheviki have made their own.
+
+Yet, the Bolsheviki are not Marxians. Their Socialism is as little Marxian
+as Russian. When Marx and Engels forecasted the establishment of
+proletarian dictatorship it was part of their theorem that economic
+evolution would have reduced practically all the masses to a proletarian
+state; that industrial and commercial concentration would have reached such
+a stage of development that there would be on the one side a small class
+of owners, and, on the other side, the proletariat. There would be, they
+believed, no middle class. The disappearance of the middle class was, for
+them and for their followers, a development absolutely certain to take
+place. They saw the same process going on with the same result in
+agriculture. It might be less rapid in its progress, but not one whit less
+certain. It was only as the inevitable climax to this evolution that they
+believed the "dictatorship of the proletariat" would be achieved. In other
+words, the proletariat would be composed of the overwhelming majority of
+the body politic and social. That is very different from the Bolshevist
+attempt to set up the dictatorship of the proletariat in a land where more
+than 85 per cent, of the people are peasants; where industrial development
+is behind the rest of the world, and where dictatorship of the proletariat
+means the domination of more than one hundred and eighty millions of people
+by two hundred thousand "proletarians and the poorest peasants," according
+to Lenine's statement, or by six per cent. of the population _if we assume
+the entire proletariat to be united in the dictatorship!_
+
+
+V
+
+At the time of the disturbances which took place in Petrograd in December,
+over the delay in holding the Constituent Assembly, the Bolshevik
+government announced that the Constituante would be permitted to convene on
+January 18th, provided that not less than four hundred delegates were in
+attendance. Accordingly, the defenders of the Constituent Assembly arranged
+for a great demonstration to take place on that day in honor of the event.
+It was also intended to be a warning to the Bolsheviki not to try to
+further interfere with the Constituante. An earnest but entirely peaceful
+mass of people paraded with flags and banners and signs containing such
+inscriptions as "Proletarians of All Countries, Unite!" "Land and Liberty,"
+"Long Live the Constituent Assembly," and many others. They set out from
+different parts of the city to unite at the Field of Mars and march to the
+Taurida Palace to protest against any interference with the Constituent
+Assembly. As they neared the Taurida Palace they were confronted by Red
+Guards, who, without any preliminary warning or any effort at persuasion,
+fired into the crowd. Among the first victims was a member of the Executive
+Committee of the Soviet of Peasants' Delegates, the Siberian peasant
+Logvinov, part of whose head was shot away by an explosive bullet. Another
+victim was the militant Socialist-Revolutionist Gorbatchevskaia. Several
+students and a number of workmen were also killed. Similar massacres
+occurred at the same time in other parts of the city. Other processions
+wending their way toward the meeting-place were fired into. Altogether one
+hundred persons were either killed or very seriously wounded by the Red
+Guards, who said that they had received orders "not to spare the
+cartridges." Similar demonstrations were held in Moscow and other cities
+and were similarly treated by the Red Guards. In Moscow especially the loss
+of life was great. Yet the Bolshevist organs passed these tragic events
+over in complete silence. They did not mention the massacres, nor did they
+mention the great demonstration at the funeral of the victims, four days
+later.
+
+When the Constituent Assembly was formally opened, on January 18th, it was
+well known on every hand that the Bolshevik government would use force to
+destroy it if the deputies refused to do exactly as they were told. The
+corridors were filled with armed soldiers and sailors, ready for action.
+
+The Lenine-Trotzky Ministry had summoned an extraordinary Congress of
+Soviets to meet in Petrograd at the same time, and it was well understood
+that they were determined to erect this Soviet Congress into the supreme
+legislative power. If the Constituent Assembly would consent to this, so
+much the better, of course. In that case there would be a valuable legal
+sanction, the sanction of a democratically elected body expressly charged
+with the task of determining the form and manner of government for Free
+Russia. Should the Constituent Assembly not be willing, there was an
+opportunity for another _coup d'etat_.
+
+In precisely the same way as the Ministry during the last years of Czarism
+would lay before the Duma certain documents and demand that they be
+approved, so the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets--the Bolshevik
+power--demanded that the Constituent Assembly meekly assent to a document
+prepared for it in advance. It was at once a test and a challenge; if the
+Assembly was willing to accept orders from the Soviet authority and content
+itself with rubber-stamping the decrees of the latter, as ordered, it could
+be permitted to go on--at least for a time. At the head of the Constituent
+Assembly, as president, the deputies elected Victor Chernov, who had been
+Minister of Agriculture under Kerensky. At the head of the Bolshevik
+faction was Sverdlov, chairman of the Executive Committee of the Soviets.
+He it was who opened the fight, demanding that the following declaration be
+adopted by the Constituante as the basis of a Constitution for Russia:
+
+    DECLARATION OF THE RIGHT'S OF THE TOILING AND EXPLOITED
+    PEOPLE
+
+    I
+
+    1. Russia is to be declared a republic of the workers', soldiers'
+    and peasants' Soviets. All power in the cities and in the country
+    belongs to the Soviets.
+
+    2. The Russian Soviet Republic is based on the free federation of
+    free peoples, on the federation of national Soviet republics.
+
+    II
+
+    Assuming as its duty the destruction of all exploitation of the
+    workers, the complete abolition of the class system of society,
+    and the placing of society upon a socialistic basis, and the
+    ultimate bringing about of victory for Socialism in every country,
+    the Constituent Assembly further decides:
+
+    1. That the socialization of land be realized, private ownership
+    of land be abolished, all the land be proclaimed common property
+    of the people and turned over to the toiling masses without
+    compensation on the basis of equal right to the use of land.
+
+    All forests, mines, and waters which are of social importance, as
+    well as all living and other forms of property, and all
+    agricultural enterprises, are declared national property.
+
+    2. To confirm the decree of the Soviets concerning the inspection
+    of working conditions, the highest department of national economy,
+    which is the first step in achieving the ownership by the Soviets
+    of the factories, mines, railroads, and means of production and
+    transportation.
+
+    3. To confirm the decree of the Soviets transferring all banks to
+    the ownership of the Soviet Republic, as one of the steps in the
+    freeing of the toiling masses from the yoke of capitalism.
+
+    4. To enforce general compulsory labor, in order to destroy the
+    class of parasites, and to reorganize the economic life. In order
+    to make the power of the toiling masses secure and to prevent the
+    restoration of the rule of the exploiters, the toiling masses will
+    be armed and a Red Guard composed of workers and peasants formed,
+    and the exploiting classes shall be disarmed.
+
+    III
+
+    1. Declaring its firm determination to make society free from the
+    chaos of capitalism and imperialism, which has drenched the
+    country in blood in this most criminal war of all wars, the
+    Constituent Assembly accepts completely the policy of the Soviets,
+    whose duty it is to publish all secret treaties, to organize the
+    most extensive fraternization between the workers and peasants of
+    warring armies, and by revolutionary methods to bring about a
+    democratic peace among the belligerent nations without annexations
+    and indemnities, on the basis of the free self-determination of
+    nations--at any price.
+
+    2. For this purpose the Constituent Assembly declares its complete
+    separation from the brutal policy of the bourgeoisie, which
+    furthers the well-being of the exploiters in a few selected
+    nations by enslaving hundreds of millions of the toiling peoples
+    of the colonies and the small nations generally.
+
+    The Constituent Assembly accepts the policy of the Council of
+    People's Commissars in giving complete independence to Finland, in
+    beginning the withdrawal of troops from Persia, and in declaring
+    for Armenia the right of self-determination.
+
+    A blow at international financial capital is the Soviet decree
+    which annuls foreign loans made by the governments of the Czar,
+    the landowners and the bourgeoisie. The Soviet government is to
+    continue firmly on this road until the final victory from the yoke
+    of capitalism is won through international workers' revolt.
+
+    As the Constituent Assembly was elected on the basis of lists of
+    candidates nominated before the November Revolution, when the
+    people as a whole could not yet rise against their exploiters, and
+    did not know how powerful would be the strength of the exploiters
+    in defending their privileges, and had not yet begun to create a
+    Socialist society, the Constituent Assembly considers it, even
+    from a formal point of view, unjust to oppose the Soviet power.
+    The Constituent Assembly is of the opinion that at this moment, in
+    the decisive hour of the struggle of the people against their
+    exploiters, the exploiters must not have a seat in any government
+    organization or institution. The power completely and without
+    exception belongs to the people and its authorized
+    representatives--the workers', soldiers' and peasants' Soviets.
+
+    Supporting the Soviet rule and accepting the orders of the Council
+    of People's Commissars, the Constituent Assembly acknowledges its
+    duty to outline a form for the reorganization of society.
+
+    Striving at the same time to organize a free and voluntary, and
+    thereby also a complete and strong, union among the toiling
+    classes of all the Russian nations, the Constituent Assembly
+    limits itself to outlining the basis of the federation of Russian
+    Soviet Republics, leaving to the people, to the workers and
+    soldiers, to decide for themselves, in their own Soviet meetings,
+    if they are willing, and on what conditions they prefer, to join
+    the federated government and other federations of Soviet
+    enterprise. These general principles are to be published without
+    delay, and the official representatives of the Soviets are
+    required to read them at the opening of the Constituent Assembly.
+
+The demand for the adoption of this declaration gave rise to a long and
+stormy debate. The leaders of the Socialist-Revolutionists and the
+Mensheviki stoutly contended that the adoption of the declaration would be
+virtually an abdication of the task for which the Constituent Assembly had
+been elected by the people, and, therefore, a betrayal of trust. They could
+not admit the impudent claim that an election held in November, based upon
+universal suffrage, on lists made up as recently as September, could in
+January be set aside as being "obsolete" and "unrepresentative." That a
+majority of the Bolshevik candidates put forward had been defeated,
+nullified, they argued, the claim of the Bolsheviki that the fact that the
+candidates had all been nominated before the November insurrection should
+be regarded as reason for acknowledging the Bolshevik Soviet as superior to
+the Constituent Assembly. They insisted upon the point, which the Bolshevik
+spokesmen did not attempt to controvert, that the Constituent Assembly
+represented the votes of many millions of men and women,[37] while the
+total actual membership represented by the Soviet power did not at the time
+number one hundred thousand!
+
+As might have been expected, the proposal to adopt the declaration
+submitted to the Constituent Assembly in this arrogant fashion was rejected
+by an enormous majority. The Bolshevik members, who had tried to make the
+session a farce, thereupon withdrew after submitting a statement in which
+they charged the Constituent Assembly with being a counter-revolutionary
+body, and the Revolutionary-Socialist party with being a traitorous party
+"directing the fight of the bourgeoisie against the workers' revolution."
+The statement said that the Bolshevik members withdrew "in order to permit
+the Soviet power to determine what relations it would hold with the
+counter-revolutionary section of the Constituent Assembly"--a threat which
+needed no interpretation.
+
+After the withdrawal of the Bolshevik members, the majority very quickly
+adopted a declaration which had been carefully prepared by the
+Socialist-Revolutionists during the weeks which had elapsed since the
+elections in the preliminary conferences which had been held for that
+purpose. The declaration read as follows:
+
+
+    RUSSIA'S FORM OF GOVERNMENT
+
+    In the name of the peoples who compose the Russian state, the
+    All-Russian Constituent Assembly proclaims the Russian State to be
+    the Russian Democratic Federated Republic, uniting indissolubly
+    into one whole the peoples and territories which are sovereign
+    within the limits prescribed by the Federal Constitution.
+
+    LAWS REGARDING LAND OWNERSHIP
+
+    1. _The right to privately own land within the boundaries of the
+    Russian Republic is hereby abolished forever._
+
+    2. All land within the boundaries of the Russian Republic, with
+    all mines, forests, and waters, is hereby declared the property of
+    the nation.
+
+    3. The republic has the right to control all land, with all the
+    mines, forests, and waters thereof, through the central and local
+    administration, in accordance with the regulation provided by the
+    present law.
+
+    4. The autonomous provinces of the Russian Republic have title to
+    land on the basis of the present law and in accordance with the
+    Federal Constitution.
+
+    5. The tasks of the central and local governments as regards the
+    use of lands, mines, forests, and waters are:
+
+    a. The creation of conditions conducive to the best possible
+    utilization of the country's natural resources and the highest
+    possible development of its productive forces.
+
+    b. The fair distribution of all natural wealth among the people.
+
+    6. The rights of individuals and institutions to land, mines,
+    forests, and waters are restricted merely to utilization by said
+    individuals and institutions.
+
+    7. The use of all mines, forests, land, and waters is free to all
+    citizens of the Russian Republic, regardless of nationality or
+    creed. This includes all unions of citizens, also governmental and
+    public institutions.
+
+    8. The right to use the land is to be acquired and discontinued on
+    the basis prescribed by this fundamental law.
+
+    9. _All titles to land at present held by the individuals,
+    associations, and institutions are abolished in so far as they
+    contradict this law._
+
+    10. All land, mines, forests, waters, at present owned by and
+    otherwise in the possession of individuals, associations, and
+    institutions, _are confiscated without compensation for the loss
+    incurred._
+
+    DEMOCRATIC PEACE
+
+    In the name of the peoples of the Russian Republic, the
+    All-Russian Constituent Assembly expresses the firm will of the
+    people to _immediately discontinue the war_ and conclude a just
+    and general peace, appeals to the Allied countries proposing to
+    define jointly the exact terms of the democratic peace acceptable
+    to all the belligerent nations, in order to present these terms,
+    in behalf of the Allies, to the governments fighting against the
+    Russian Republic and her allies.
+
+    The Constituent Assembly firmly believes that the attempts of the
+    peoples of Russia to end the disastrous war will meet with a
+    unanimous response on the part of the peoples and the governments
+    of the Allied countries, and that by common efforts a speedy peace
+    will be attained, which will safeguard the well-being and dignity
+    of all the belligerent countries.
+
+    The Constituent Assembly resolves to elect from its midst an
+    authorized delegation which will carry on negotiations with the
+    representatives of the Allied countries and which will present the
+    appeal to jointly formulate terms upon which a speedy termination
+    of the war will be possible, as well as for the purpose of
+    carrying out the decisions of the Constituent Assembly regarding
+    the question of peace negotiations with the countries fighting
+    against us.
+
+    This delegation, which is to be under the guidance of the
+    Constituent Assembly, is to immediately start fulfilling the
+    duties imposed upon it.
+
+    Expressing, in the name of the peoples of Russia, its regret that
+    the negotiations with Germany, which were started without
+    preliminary agreement with the Allied countries, have assumed the
+    character of negotiations for a separate peace, the Constituent
+    Assembly, in the name of the peoples of the Federated Republic,
+    _while continuing the armistice, accepts the further carrying on
+    of the negotiations with the countries warring against us_ in
+    order to work toward a general democratic peace which shall be in
+    accordance "with the people's will and protect Russia's
+    interests."
+
+
+VI
+
+Immediately following the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly a body of
+Red Guards shot the two Constitutional Democrats, Kokoshkin and Shingariev,
+who were at the time confined as prisoners who were ill in the Naval
+Hospital. The reason for the brutal murder of these men was that they were
+bourgeoisie and, therefore, enemies of the working class! It is only just
+to add that the foul deed was immediately condemned by the Bolshevik
+government and by the Soviet of Petrograd. "The working class will never
+approve of any outrages upon our prisoners, whatever may have been their
+political offense against the people and their Revolution," the latter body
+declared, in a resolution on the subject of the assassinations. Two days
+after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly twenty-three
+Socialist-Revolutionist members of that body, assembled at the office of
+their party, were arrested, and the premises occupied by Red Guards, the
+procedure being exactly as it used to be in the old days under the Czar.
+
+There is a relentless logic of life and action from which there can be no
+escape. Czarism was a product of that inexorable process. All its
+oppression and brutality proceeded by an inevitable and irresistible
+sequence from the first determination and effort to realize the principle
+of autocracy. Any dictatorship, whether of a single man, a group or class,
+must rest ultimately upon oppressive and coercive force. Believing that the
+means would be justified by the end, Lenine and Trotzky and their
+associates had suppressed the Constituent Assembly, claiming that
+parliamentary government, based upon the equal and free suffrage of all
+classes, was, during the transition period, dangerous to the proletariat;
+that in its stead a new type of government must be established--government
+by associations of wage-earners, soldiers, and peasants, called Soviets.
+
+But what if among these there should develop a purpose contrary to the
+purpose of the Bolsheviki? Would men who, starting out with a belief in the
+Constituante, and as its champions, used force to destroy and suppress it
+the moment it became evident that its purpose was not their purpose,
+hesitate to suppress and destroy any Soviet movement which adopted
+policies contrary to their own? What assurance could there be, once their
+point of view, their initial principle, was granted, that the freedom
+denied to the Constituante would be assured to the Soviets? In the very
+nature of the case there could be no such assurance. However honest and
+sincere the Bolsheviki themselves might be in their belief that there would
+be such assurance, there could in fact be none, for the logic of life is
+stronger than any human will.
+
+As was inevitable, the Bolsheviki soon found themselves in the position of
+suppressing Soviets which they could not control as freely and in the same
+manner as they had suppressed the Constituent Assembly. When, for example,
+the soldiers of the Preobrajenski Regiment--the very men who helped the
+Bolsheviki into power--became dissatisfied and organized, publishing their
+own organ, _The Soldier's Cloak_, the paper was confiscated and the
+organization suppressed.[38] The forcible suppression of Soviets was
+common. The Central Executive Committee of the National Soviet of Peasants'
+Delegates, together with the old Central Executive Committee of the Soviets
+of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates (who had never acknowledged the
+October elections), convoked an extraordinary assembly of Soviets on
+January 8th, the same date as that on which the Bolshevik Congress of
+Soviets was convoked. Circumstances compelled the opening to be deferred
+until two days later, the 10th. This conference, called the Third
+All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Soviets, was suppressed by force, many of
+the 359 delegates and all the members of the Executive Committee being
+arrested. The following extract from a declaration of protest addressed by
+the outraged peasants to the Congress of Soviets of Workmen, Soldiers, and
+Peasants convoked by the Bolshevik government tells the story:
+
+    As soon as the Congress was opened, sailors and Red Guards, armed
+    with guns and hand-grenades, broke into the premises (11
+    Kirillovskaia Street), surrounded the house, poured into the
+    corridors and the session hall, and ordered all persons to leave.
+
+    "In whose name do you order us, who are Delegates to the Peasants'
+    Congress of All-Russia, to disperse?" asked the peasants.
+
+    "In the name of the Baltic fleet," the sailor's replied.
+
+    The peasants refused; cries of protest were raised. One by one the
+    peasants ascended the tribune to stigmatize the Bolsheviki in
+    speeches full of indignation, and to express the hopes that they
+    placed in the Constituent Assembly....
+
+    This session of the Congress presented a strange spectacle:
+    disturbed by men who confessed that they did not know why they
+    were there, the peasants sang revolutionary songs; the sailors,
+    armed with guns and grenades, joined them. Then the peasants knelt
+    down to sing a funeral hymn to the memory of Logvinov, whose
+    coffin was even yesterday within the room. The soldiers, lowering
+    their guns, knelt down also.
+
+    The Bolshevik authorities became excited; they did not expect such
+    a turn of events. "Enough said," declared the chiefs; "we have
+    come not to speak, but to act. If they do not want to go to
+    Smolny, let them get out of here." And they set themselves to the
+    task.
+
+    In groups of five the peasants were conducted down-stairs,
+    trampled upon, and, on their refusal to go to Smolny, pushed out
+    of doors during the night in the midst of the enormous city of
+    which they knew nothing.
+
+    Members of the Executive Committee were arrested,[39] the premises
+    occupied by sailors and Red Guards, the objects found therein
+    stolen.
+
+
+    The peasants found shelter in the homes of the inhabitants of
+    Petrograd, who, indignant, offered them hospitality. A certain
+    number were lodged in the barracks of the Preobrajenski Regiment.
+    The sailors, who but a few minutes before had sung a funeral hymn
+    to Logvinov, and wept when they saw that they had understood
+    nothing, now became the docile executioners of the orders of the
+    Bolsheviki. And when they were asked, "Why do you do this?" they
+    answered, as in the time, still recent, of Czarism: "It is the
+    order. No need to talk."[40]
+
+We do not need to rely upon the testimony of witnesses belonging to the
+Revolutionary Socialist party, the Mensheviki, or other factions unfriendly
+to the Bolsheviki. However trustworthy such testimony may be, and however
+well corroborated, we cannot expect it to be convincing to those who pin
+their faith to the Bolsheviki. Such people will believe only what the
+Bolsheviki themselves say about Bolshevism. It is well, therefore, that we
+can supplement the testimony already given by equally definite and direct
+testimony from official Bolshevist sources to the same effect. From the
+official organs of the Bolsheviki it can be shown that the Bolshevik
+authorities suppressed Soviet after Soviet; that when they found that
+Soviets were controlled by Socialists who belonged to other factions they
+dissolved them and ordered new elections, refusing to permit the free
+choice of the members to be expressed in selecting their officers.
+
+The Bolsheviki did this, it should be remembered, not merely in cases where
+Mensheviki or Socialist-Revolutionists were in the majority, but
+also in cases where the majority consisted of members of the
+Socialist-Revolutionary party of the Left--the faction which had united
+with the Bolsheviki in suppressing the Constituante. Their union with the
+Bolsheviki was from the first a compromise, based upon the political
+opportunism of both sides. The Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left did not
+believe in the Bolshevik theories or program, but they wanted the political
+assistance of the Bolsheviki. The latter did not believe in the theories or
+program of the Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left, but they wanted their
+political support. The union could not long endure; the differences were
+too deeply rooted. Before very long the Bolsheviki were fighting their
+former allies and the Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left, like Marie
+Spiridonova, for example, were fighting the Bolsheviki. At Kazan, where
+Lenine went to school, the Soviet was dissolved because it was controlled
+by Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left, former allies, now hostile to the
+Bolsheviki. Here are two paragraphs from _Izvestya_, one of the Bolshevist
+official organs:
+
+    KAZAN, _July 26th. As the important offices in the Soviet
+    were occupied by Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left, the
+    Extraordinary Commission has dissolved the Provisional Soviet. The
+    governmental power is now represented by a Revolutionary
+    Committee. (Izvestya, July 28, 1918.)_
+
+    KAZAN, _August 1_. The state of mind of the workmen is
+    revolutionary. _If the Mensheviki dare to carry on their
+    propaganda, death menaces them. (Idem, August 3.)_
+
+And here is confirmation from another official organ of the Bolsheviki,
+_Pravda_:
+
+    KAZAN, _August 4th_. The Provisional Congress of the
+    Soviets of the Peasants has been dissolved because of the absence
+    from it of poor peasants and _because its state of mind is
+    obviously counter-revolutionary. (Pravda, August 6, 1918.)_
+
+As early as April, 1918, the Soviet at Jaroslav was dissolved by the
+Bolshevik authorities and new elections ordered.[41] In these elections
+the Mensheviki and the Socialist-Revolutionists everywhere gained an
+absolute majority.[42] The population here wanted the Constituent Assembly
+and they wanted Russia to fight on with the Allies. Attempts to suppress
+this majority led to insurrection, which the Bolsheviki crushed in the most
+brutal manner, and when the people, overpowered and helpless, sought to
+make peace, the Bolsheviki only _increased the artillery fire_! Here is an
+"Official Bulletin," published in _Izvestya_, July 21, 1918:
+
+    At Jaroslav the adversary, gripped in the iron ring of our troops,
+    has tried to enter into negotiations. _The reply has been given
+    under the form of redoubled artillery fire._
+
+_Izvestya_ published, on July 25th, a Bolshevist military proclamation
+addressed to the inhabitants of Jaroslav concerning the insurrection which
+originally arose from the suppression of the Soviet and other popular
+assemblages:
+
+    The General Staff notifies to the population of Jaroslav that all
+    those who desire to live are invited to abandon the town in the
+    course of twenty-four hours and to meet near the America Bridge.
+    Those who remain will be treated as insurgents, _and no quarter
+    will be given to any one_. Heavy artillery fire and gas-bombs will
+    be used against them. _All those who remain will perish In the
+    ruins of the town with the insurrectionists, the traitors, and the
+    enemies of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolution._
+
+Next day, July 26th, _Izvestya_ published the information that "after
+minute questionings and full inquiry" a special commission appointed to
+inquire into the events relating to the insurrection at Jaroslav had listed
+350 persons as having "taken an active part in the insurrection and had
+relations with the Czecho-Slovaks," and that by order of the commissioners
+the whole band of 350 had been shot!
+
+It is needless to multiply the illustrations of brutal oppression--of men
+and women arrested and imprisoned for no other crime than that of engaging
+in propaganda in favor of government by universal suffrage; of newspapers
+confiscated and suppressed; of meetings banned and Soviets dissolved
+because the members' "state of mind" did not please the Bolsheviki. Maxim
+Gorky declared in his _Novya Zhizn_ that there had been "ten thousand
+lynchings." Upon what authority Gorky--who was inclined to sympathize with
+the Bolsheviki, and who even accepted office under them--based that
+statement is not known. Probably it is an exaggeration. One thing, however,
+is quite certain, namely, that a reign of terror surpassing the worst days
+of the old regime was inflicted upon unhappy Russia by the Bolsheviki. At
+the very beginning of the Bolshevik regime Trotzky laughed to scorn all the
+protests against violence, threatening that resort would be had to the
+guillotine. Speaking to the opponents of the Bolshevik policy in the
+Petrograd Soviet, he said:
+
+"You are perturbed by the mild terror we are applying against our class
+enemies, but know that not later than a month hence this terror will take a
+more terrible form on the model of the terror of the great revolutionaries
+of France. Not a fortress, but the guillotine will be for our enemies."
+
+That threat was not literally carried out, but there was a near approach to
+it when public hangings for civil offenses were established. For
+reintroducing the death penalty into the army as a means of putting an end
+to treason and the brutal murder of officers by rebellious soldiers, the
+Bolsheviki excoriated Kerensky. _Yet they themselves introduced hanging and
+flogging in public for petty civil crimes!_ The death penalty was never
+inflicted for civil crimes under the late Czar. It was never inflicted for
+political offenses. Only rarely was it inflicted for murder. It remained
+for a so-called "Socialist" government to resort to such savagery as we
+find described in the following extract from the recognized official organ
+of the Bolshevik government:
+
+Two village robbers were condemned to death. All the people of Semenovskaia
+and the surrounding communes were invited to the ceremony. On July 6th, at
+midday, a great crowd of interested spectators arrived at the village of
+Loupia. The organizers of the execution gave to each of the bystanders the
+opportunity of flogging the condemned to obtain from them supplementary
+confessions. The number of blows was unlimited. Then a vote of the
+spectators was taken as to the method of execution. The majority was for
+hanging. In order that the spectacle could be easily seen, the spectators
+were ranged in three ranks--the first row sat down, the second rested on
+the knee, and the third stood up.[43]
+
+The Bolshevik government created an All-Russian Extraordinary Commission,
+which in turn created Provincial and District Extraordinary Commissions.
+These bodies--the local not less than the national--were empowered to make
+arrests and even decree and carry out capital sentences. There was no
+appeal from their decisions; they were simply required to _report
+afterward_! Only members of the Bolshevik party were immune from this
+terror. Alminsky, a Bolshevist writer of note, felt called upon to protest
+against this hideous travesty of democratic justice, and wrote in
+_Pravda_:
+
+The absence of the necessary restraint makes one feel appalled at the
+"instruction" issued by the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission to "All
+Provincial Extraordinary Commissions," which says: "The All-Russian
+Extraordinary Commission is perfectly independent in its work, carrying out
+house searches, arrests, executions, of which it _afterward_ reports to the
+Council of the People's Commissaries and to the Central Executive Council."
+Further, the Provincial and District Extraordinary Commissions "are
+independent in their activities, and when called upon by the local
+Executive Council present a report of their work." In so far as house
+searches and arrests are concerned, a report made _afterward_ may result in
+putting right irregularities committed owing to lack of restraint. The same
+cannot be said of executions.... It can also be seen from the "instruction"
+that personal safety is to a certain extent guaranteed only to members of
+the government, of the Central Council, and of the local Executive
+Committees. With the exception of these few persons all members of the
+local committees of the [Bolshevik] Party, of the Control Committees, and
+of the Executive Committee of the party may be shot at any time by the
+decision of any Extraordinary Commission of a small district town if they
+happen to be on its territory, and a report of that made _afterward._[44]
+
+
+VII
+
+While in some respects, such as this terrible savagery, Bolshevism has
+out-Heroded Herod and surpassed the regime of the Romanovs in cruel
+oppression, upon the whole its methods have been very like that of the
+latter. There is really not much to choose between the ways of Stolypin and
+Von Plehve and those of the Lenine-Trotzky rule. The methods employed have
+been very similar and in not a few instances the same men who acted as the
+agents of espionage and tyranny for the Czar have served the Bolsheviki in
+the same capacity. Just as under Czarism there was alliance with the Black
+Hundreds and with all sorts of corrupt and vicious criminal agents, so we
+find the same phenomenon recurring under the Bolsheviki. The time has not
+yet arrived for the compilation of the full record of Bolshevism in this
+particular, but enough is known to justify the charge here made. That
+agents-provocateurs, spies, informers, police agents, and pogrom-makers
+formerly in the service of the Czar have been given positions of trust and
+honor by Lenine and Trotzky unfortunately admits of no doubt whatever.
+
+It was stated at a meeting of Russians held in Paris in the summer of 1917
+that one of the first Russian regiments which refused to obey orders to
+advance "contained 120 former political or civil police agents out of 181
+refractory soldiers." During the Kerensky regime, at the time when Lenine
+was carrying on his propaganda through _Pravda_,[45] Vladimir Bourtzev
+exposed three notorious agents of the old police terror, provocateurs, who
+were working on the paper. In August, 1917, the Jewish Conjoint Committee
+in London published a long telegram from the representative of the Jewish
+Committee in Petrograd, calling attention to the fact that Lenine's party
+was working in tacit agreement with the Black Hundreds. The telegram is
+here given in full:
+
+    Extreme Russian reactionaries have allied themselves closely with
+    extreme revolutionaries, and Black Hundreds have entered into
+    tacit coalition with the Lenine party. In the army the former
+    agents and detectives of the political police carry on ardent
+    campaign for defeat, and in the rear the former
+    agents-provocateurs prepare and direct endless troubles.
+
+    The motives of this policy on the part of the reactionaries are
+    clear. It is the direct road to a counter-revolution. The
+    troubles, the insurrections, and shocking disorders which follow
+    provoke disgust at the Revolution, while the military defeats
+    prepare the ground for an intervention of the old friend of the
+    Russian Black Hundreds, William II, the counter-revolutionaries
+    work systematically for the defeat of the Russian armies,
+    sometimes openly, cynically.
+
+    Thus in their press and proclamations they go so far as to throw
+    the whole responsibility for the war and for the obstacles placed
+    in the way of a peace with Germany on the Jews. It is these
+    "diabolical Jews," they say, who prevent the conclusion of peace
+    and insist on the continuation of the war, because they desire to
+    ruin Russia. Proclamations in this sense have been found, together
+    with a voluminous anti-Semitic literature, in the offices of the
+    party of Lenine Bolsheviki (Maximalists), and particularly at the
+    headquarters of the extreme revolutionaries, Chateau
+    Knheshinskaja. Salutations. BLANK.
+
+That the leaders of the Bolsheviki, particularly Lenine and Trotzky, ever
+entered into any "agreement" with the Black Hundreds, or took any part in
+the anti-Semitic campaign referred to, is highly improbable. Unless and
+until it is supported by ample evidence of a competent nature, we shall be
+justified in refusing to believe anything of the sort. It is, however,
+quite probable that provocateurs worming their way into Lenine's and
+Trotzky's good graces tried to use the Bolshevik agitation as a cover for
+their own nefarious work. As we have seen already, Lenine had previously
+been imposed upon by a notorious secret police agent, Malinovsky. But the
+open association of the Bolsheviki with men who played a despicable role
+under the old regime is not to be denied. The simple-minded reader of
+Bolshevist literature who believes that the Bolshevik government, whatever
+its failings, has the merit of being a government by real working-men and
+working-women, needs to be enlightened. Not only are Lenine and Trotzky not
+of the proletariat themselves, but they have associated with themselves
+men whose lives have been spent, not as workers, not even as simple
+bourgeoisie, but as servants of the terror-system of the Czar. They have
+associated with themselves, too, some of the most corrupt criminals in
+Russia. Here are a few of them:
+
+Professor Kobozev, of Riga, joined the Bolsheviki and was active as a
+delegate to the Municipal Council of Petrograd. According to the
+information possessed by the Russian revolutionary leaders, this Professor
+Kobozev used to be a police spy, his special job being to make reports to
+the police concerning the political opinions and actions of students and
+faculty members. One of the very first men released from prison by the
+Bolsheviki was one Doctor Doubrovine, who had been a leader of the Black
+Hundreds, an organizer of many pogroms. He became an active Bolshevik.
+Kamenev, the Bolshevik leader, friend of Lenine, is a journalist. He was
+formerly a member of the old Social Democratic party. Soon after the war
+broke out he was arrested and behaved so badly that he was censured by his
+party. Early in the Revolution of 1917 he was accused of serving the secret
+police at Kiev. Bonno Brouevitch, Military Councilor to the Bolshevik
+government, was a well-known anti-Semite who had been dismissed from his
+military office on two occasions, once by the Czar's government and once by
+the Provisional Government. General Komisarov, another of Lenine's trusted
+military officials and advisers, was formerly a chief official of the
+Czar's secret police, known for his terrible persecution of the
+revolutionists. Accused of high treason by the Provisional Government, he
+fled, but returned and joined the Lenine-Trotzky forces. Prince Andronikov,
+associate of Rasputin; (Lenine's "My friend, the Prince"); Orlov, police
+agent and "denouncer" and secretary of the infamous Protopopov; Postnikov,
+convicted and imprisoned as a German spy in 1910; Lepinsky, formerly in the
+Czar's secret police; and Gualkine, friend of the unspeakable Rasputin, are
+some of the other men who have been closely identified with the
+"proletarian regime" of the Bolsheviki.[46] The man they released from
+prison and placed in the important position of Military Commander of
+Petrograd was Muraviev, who had been chief of the Czar's police and was
+regarded by even the moderate members of the Provisional Government, both
+under Lvov and Kerensky, as a dangerous reactionary.[47] Karl Radek, the
+Bohemian, a notorious leader of the Russian Bolsheviki, who undertook to
+stir up the German workers and direct the Spartacide revolt, was, according
+to _Justice_, expelled from the German Social Democratic party before the
+war as a thief and a police spy.[48] How shall we justify men calling
+themselves Socialists and proletarian revolutionists, who ally themselves
+with such men as these, but imprison, harry, and abuse such men and women
+as Bourtzev, Kropotkin, Plechanov, Breshkovskaya, Tchaykovsky, Spiridonova,
+Agounov, Larokine, Avksentiev, and many other Socialists like them?
+
+In surveying the fight of the Bolsheviki to establish their rule it is
+impossible to fail to observe that their chief animus has been directed
+against other Socialists, rather than against members of the reactionary
+parties. That this has been the fact they do not themselves deny. For
+example, the "People's Commissary of Justice," G.I. Oppokov, better known
+as "Lomov," declared in an interview in January, 1918: "Our chief enemies
+are not the Cadets. Our most irreconcilable opponents are the Moderate
+Socialists. This explains the arrests of Socialists and the closing down of
+Socialist newspapers. Such measures of repression are, however, only
+temporary."[49] And in the Soviet at Petrograd, July 30, 1918,
+according to _Pravda_, Lachevitch, one of the delegates, said: "The
+Socialist-Revolutionists of the Right and the Mensheviki are more dangerous
+for the government of the Soviets than the bourgeoisie. But these enemies
+are not yet exterminated and can move about freely. The proletariat
+must act. We ought, once for all, to rid ourselves of the
+Socialist-Revolutionists of the Right and of the Mensheviki."
+
+In this summary of the Bolsheviki war against democracy, it will be
+observed, no attempt has been made to gather all the lurid and fantastic
+stories which have been published by sensational journalists. The testimony
+comes from Socialist sources of the utmost reliability, much of it from
+official Bolshevist sources. The system of oppression it describes is twin
+brother to that which existed under the Romanovs, to end which hundreds of
+thousands of the noblest and best of our humankind gave up their lives.
+Under the banner of Social Democracy a tyranny has been established as
+infamous as anything in the annals of autocracy.
+
+    "_O Liberty, what monstrous crimes are committed in thy great
+    name!_"
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+BOLSHEVIST THEORY AND PRACTICE
+
+
+I
+
+Utopia-making is among the easiest and most fascinating of all intellectual
+occupations. Few employments which can be called intellectual are easier
+than that of devising panaceas for the ills of society, of demonstrating on
+paper how the rough places of life may be made plain and its crooked ones
+made straight. And it is not a vain and fruitless waste of effort and of
+time, as things so easy of achievement often are. Many of the noblest minds
+of all lands and all ages have found pleasure and satisfaction in the
+imagining of ideal commonwealths and by so doing have rendered great
+service to mankind, enriching literature and, what is more important,
+stimulating the urge and passion for improvement and the faith of men in
+their power to climb to the farthest heights of their dreams. But the
+material of life is hard and lacks the plastic quality of inspired
+imagination. Though there is probably no single evil which exists for which
+a solution has not been devised in the wonderful laboratory of visioning,
+the perversity of the subtle and mysterious thing called life is such that
+many great and grave evils continue to challenge, perplex, and harass our
+humankind.
+
+Yet, notwithstanding the plain lesson of history and experience, the
+reminder impressed on every page of humanity's record, that between the
+glow and the glamour of the vision and its actual realization stretches a
+long, long road, there are many simple-minded souls to whom the vision
+gleamed is as the goal attained. They do not distinguish between schemes on
+paper and ideals crystallized into living realities. This type of mind is
+far more common than is generally recognized; that is why so many people
+quite seriously believe that the Bolsheviki have really established in
+Russia a society which conforms to the generous ideals of social democracy.
+They have read the rhetorical "decrees" and "proclamations" in which the
+shibboleths of freedom and democracy abound, and are satisfied. Yet it
+ought to be plainly evident to any intelligent person that, even if the
+decrees and proclamations were as sound as they are in fact unsound, and as
+definite as they are in fact vague, they would afford no real basis for
+judging Bolshevism as an actual experiment in social polity. There is, in
+ultimate analysis, only one test to apply to Bolshevism--namely, the test
+of reality. We must ask what the Bolsheviki did, not what they professed;
+what was the performance, not what was the promise.
+
+Of course, this does not mean that we are to judge result wholly without
+regard to aim. Admirable intention is still admirable as intention, even
+when untoward circumstance defeats it and brings deplorable results.
+Bolshevism is not merely a body of belief and speculation. When the
+Bolsheviki seized the government of Russia and began to attempt to carry
+out their ideas, Bolshevism became a living movement in a world of reality
+and subject to the acid test of pragmatic criteria. It must be judged by
+such a matter-of-fact standard as the extent to which it has enlarged or
+diminished the happiness, health, comfort, freedom, well-being,
+satisfaction, and efficiency of the greatest number of individuals. Unless
+the test shows that it has increased the sum of good available for the
+mass, Bolshevism cannot be regarded as a gain. If, on the contrary, the
+test shows that it has resulted in sensibly diminishing the sum of good
+available to the greatest number of people, Bolshevism must be counted as a
+move in the wrong direction, as so much effort lost. Nothing that can be
+urged on philosophical or moral grounds for or against the moral or
+intellectual impulses that prompted it can fundamentally change the
+verdict. Yet, for all that, it is well to examine the theory which inspires
+the practice; well to know the manner and method of thinking, and the view
+of life, from which Bolshevism as a movement of masses of men and women
+proceeds.
+
+Theoretically, Bolshevism, as such, has no necessary connection with the
+philosophy or the program of Socialism. Certain persons have established a
+working relation between Socialism, a program, and Bolshevism, a method.
+The connection is not inherently logical, but, on the contrary, wholly
+adventitious. As a matter of fact, Bolshevism can only be linked to the
+program of Socialism by violently and disastrously weakening the latter and
+destroying its fundamental character. We shall do well to remember this; to
+remember that the method of action, and, back of the method, the philosophy
+on which it rests and from which it springs, are separate and distinct from
+Socialism. They are incalculably older and they have been associated with
+vastly different programs. All that is new in Bolshevism is that a very old
+method of action, and a very old philosophy of action, have been seized
+upon by a new class which attempts to unite them to a new program.
+
+That is all that is implied in the "dictatorship of the proletariat."
+Dictatorship by small minorities is not a new political phenomenon. All
+that is new when the minority attempting to establish its dictatorship is
+composed of poor, propertyless people, is the fact of their economic
+condition and status. That is the only difference between the dictatorship
+of Russia by the Romanov dynasty and the dictatorship of Russia by a small
+minority of determined, class-conscious working-people. It is not only the
+precise forms of oppressive power used by them that are identically
+characteristic of Czarism and Bolshevism, but their underlying philosophy.
+Both forms of dictatorship rest upon the philosophy of might as the only
+valid right. Militarism, especially as it was developed under Prussian
+leadership, has exactly the same philosophy and aims at the same general
+result, namely, to establish the domination and control of society by a
+minority class. The Bolsheviki have simply inverted Czarism and Militarism.
+
+What really shocks the majority of people is not, after all, the methods or
+the philosophy of Bolshevism, but the fact that the Bolsheviki, belonging
+to a subject class, have seized upon the methods and philosophy of the most
+powerful ruling classes and turned them to their own account. There is a
+class morality and a class psychology the subtle influences of which few
+perceive as a matter of habit, which, however, to a great extent shape our
+judgments, our sympathies, and our antipathies. Men who never were shocked
+when a Czar, speaking the language of piety and religion, indulged in the
+most infamous methods and deeds of terror and oppression, are shocked
+beyond all power of adequate expression when former subjects of that same
+Czar, speaking the language of the religion of democracy and freedom,
+resort to the same infamous methods of terror and oppression.
+
+
+II
+
+The idea that a revolting proletarian minority might by force impose its
+rule upon society runs through the history of the modern working class, a
+note of impatient, desperate, menacing despair. The Bolsheviki say that
+they are Marxian Socialists; that Marx believed in and advocated the
+setting up, during the transitory period of social revolution, of the
+"dictatorship of the proletariat." They are not quite honest in this claim,
+however; they are indulging in verbal tricks. It is true that Marx taught
+that the proletarian dominion of society, as a preliminary to the abolition
+of all class rule of every kind, must be regarded as certain and
+inevitable. But it is not honest to claim the sanction of his teaching for
+the seizure of political power by a small class, consisting of about 6 per
+cent. of the population, and the imposition by force of its rule upon the
+majority of the population that is either unwilling or passive. That is the
+negation of Marxian Socialism. _It is the essence of Marx's teaching that
+the social revolution must come as a historical necessity when the
+proletariat itself comprises an overwhelming majority of the people_.
+
+Let us summarize the theory as it appears in the _Communist Manifesto_:
+Marx begins by setting forth the fact that class conflict is as old as
+civilization itself, that history is very largely the record of conflicts
+between contending social classes. In our epoch, he argues, class conflict
+is greatly simplified; there is really only one division, that which
+divides the bourgeoisie and the proletariat: "Society as a whole is more
+and more splitting up into great hostile camps, into two great classes
+directly facing each other, bourgeoisie and proletariat." ... "With the
+development of industry the proletariat not only increases in numbers; it
+becomes concentrated in great masses, its strength grows, and it feels that
+strength more." ... "The proletarian movement is the _self-conscious,
+independent movement of the immense majority in the interests of the
+immense majority_." It is this "immense majority" that is to establish its
+dominion. Marx expressly points out that "all previous historical movements
+were movements of minorities, or in the interest of minorities." It is the
+great merit of the movement of the proletariat, as he conceives it, that it
+is the "movement of the immense majority, in the interests of the immense
+majority."
+
+Clearly, when Lenine and his followers say that they take their doctrine of
+the "dictatorship of the proletariat" from Marx, they pervert the truth;
+they take from Marx only the phrase, not their fundamental policy. It is
+not to be denied that there were times when Marx himself momentarily lapsed
+into the error of Blanqui and the older school of Utopian, conspiratory
+Socialists who believed that they could find a short cut to social
+democracy; that by a surprise stroke, carefully prepared and daringly
+executed, a small and desperate minority could overthrow the existing
+social order and bring about Socialism. As Jaures has pointed out,[50] the
+mind of Marx sometimes harked back to the dramatic side of the French
+Revolution, and was captivated by such episodes as the conspiracy of Babeuf
+and his friends, who in their day, while the proletariat was a small
+minority, even as it is in Russia now, sought to establish its dominion.
+But it is well known that after the failure of the Paris Commune, in 1871,
+Marx once and for all abandoned all belief in this form of the
+"dictatorship of the proletariat," and in the possibility of securing
+Socialism through the conspiratory action of minorities. He was even rather
+unwilling that the _Manifesto_ should be republished after that, except as
+a purely historical document. It was in that spirit of reaction that he and
+Engels wrote in 1872 that passage--to which Lenine has given such an
+unwarranted interpretation--in which they say that the Commune had shown
+that "the working classes cannot simply take possession of the ready-made
+state machine and set it in motion for their own aims."
+
+It was no less an interpreter of Marx than his great collaborator and
+friend, Frederick Engels, who, in 1895, stated the reasons for abandoning
+all belief in the possibility of accomplishing anything through political
+surprises and through the action of small conscious and determined
+minorities at the head of unconscious masses:
+
+    History proved that we were wrong--we and those who like us, in
+    1848, awaited the speedy success of the proletariat. It became
+    perfectly clear _that economic conditions all over the Continent
+    were by no means as yet sufficiently matured for superseding the
+    capitalist organization of production_. This was proved by the
+    economic revolution which commenced on the continent of Europe
+    after 1848 and developed in France, Austria-Hungary, Poland, and,
+    recently, also in Russia, and made Germany into an industrial
+    state of the first rank--all on a capitalist basis, _which shows
+    that in 1848 the prevailing conditions were still capable of
+    expansion_. And to-day we have a huge international army of
+    Socialists.... If this mighty proletarian army has not yet reached
+    its goal, if it is destined to gain its ends only in a long drawn
+    out struggle, making headway but slowly, step by step, this only
+    proves how impossible it was in 1848 to change social conditions
+    by forcible means ... the time for small minorities to place
+    themselves at the head of the ignorant masses and resort to force
+    in order to bring about revolutions, is gone. _A complete change
+    in the organization of society can be brought about only by the
+    conscious co-operation of the masses_; they must be alive to the
+    aim in view; they must know what they want. The history of the
+    last fifty years has taught us that.[51]
+
+What Engels had in mind when he stressed the fact that history showed that
+in 1848 "the prevailing conditions were still capable of expansion" is the
+central Marxian doctrine of historical inevitability. It is surely less
+than honest to claim the prestige and authority of Marx's teachings upon
+the slender basis of a distorted version of his early thought, while
+completely ignoring the matured body of his doctrines. It may not matter
+much to the world to-day what Marx thought, or how far Lenine follows his
+teachings, but it is of importance that the claim set up by Lenine and
+Trotzky and many of their followers that they are guided by the principles
+of Marxian Socialism is itself demonstrably an evidence of moral or
+intellectual obliquity, which makes them very dangerous guides to follow.
+It is of importance, too, that the claim they make allures many Socialists
+of trusting and uncritical minds to follow them.
+
+Many times in his long life Marx, together with Engels, found himself
+engaged in a fierce war against the very things Lenine and Trotzky and
+their associates have been trying to do. He thundered against Weitling, who
+wanted to have a "daring minority" seize the power of the state and
+establish its dictatorship by a _coup d'etat_. He was denounced as a
+"reactionary" by Willich and Kinkel because, in 1850, he rejected with
+scorn the idea of a sudden seizure of political power through conspiratory
+action, and had the courage to say that it would take fifty years for the
+workers "to fit themselves for political power." He opposed Lassalle's idea
+of an armed insurrection in 1862, because he was certain that the economic
+development had not yet reached the stage which alone could make a social
+change possible. He fought with all the fierce impetuousness of his nature
+every attempt of Bakunin to lead the workers to attempt the seizure of
+political power and forcibly establish their rule while still a
+minority.[52] He fought all these men because he had become profoundly
+convinced that "_no social order ever disappears before all the productive
+forces for which there is room in it have been developed; and new and
+higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions
+of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society_."[53] No
+"dictatorship of the proletariat," no action by any minority, however well
+armed or however desperate, can overcome that great law.
+
+The "dictatorship of the proletariat" in the sense in which that term is
+used by the Russian Bolshevik leaders, and by those who in other countries
+are urging that their example be followed, is not a policy of Marxian
+Socialism. It is not a product of modern conditions. Rather it harks back
+to the earlier conspiratory Socialism of Blanqui, with its traditions
+inherited from Robespierre and Babeuf. So far as its advocates are
+concerned, Marx and the whole modern Socialist movement might as well never
+have existed at all. They take us back three-quarters of a century, to the
+era before Marx, to that past so remote in intellectual and moral
+character, though recent in point of time, when the working class of no
+country in Europe possessed the right to vote--when the workers were
+indeed proletarians and not citizens; not only propertyless, but also
+"without a fatherland."
+
+In truth, it is not difficult to understand how this theory has found
+acceptance in Russia. It was not difficult to understand why Marx's
+doctrine of economic evolution was for many years rejected by most Russian
+Socialists; why the latter took the view that Socialism must be more
+quickly attained, that capitalism was not a necessary precursor of
+Socialism in Russia, but that an intelligent leadership of passive masses
+would successfully establish Socialism on the basis of the old Russian
+communal institutions. It was quite easy to understand the change that came
+with Russia's industrial awakening, how the development of factory
+production gave an impetus to the Marxian theories. And, though it presents
+a strange paradox, in that it comes at a time when, despite everything,
+Russian capitalism continues to develop, it is really not difficult to
+understand how and why pre-Marxian conceptions reappear in that great land
+of paradoxes. Politically and intellectually the position of the
+proletariat of Russia before the recent Revolution was that of the
+proletariat of France in 1848.
+
+But that which baffles the mind of the serious investigator is the
+readiness of so many presumably intelligent people living in countries
+where--as in America--wholly different conditions prevail to ignore the
+differences and be ready to abandon all the democratic advance made by the
+workers. There is nothing more certain in the whole range of social and
+political life than the fact that the doctrine that the power of the state
+must be seized and used by the proletariat against the non-proletarian
+classes, even for a relatively brief period, _can only be carried out by
+destroying all the democracy thus far achieved_.
+
+
+III
+
+The validity of the foregoing contention can scarcely be questioned, except
+by those to whom phrases are of more consequence than facts, who place
+theories above realities. The moment the Bolsheviki tried to translate
+their rhetorical propaganda for the dictatorship of the proletariat into
+the concrete terms of political reality they found that they were compelled
+to direct their main opposition, not against the bourgeoisie, or even
+against capitalism, but against the newly created democracy. In the
+movement to create a democratic government resting upon the basis of
+universal, direct, equal, and secret suffrage they saw a peril to their
+scheme far more formidable than militarism or capitalism. It was for this
+reason that they set themselves to the task of suppressing the Constituent
+Assembly. Only political simpletons will seriously regard the Bolshevik
+attempt to camouflage their motive by pretending that they determined to
+crush the Constituent Assembly because its members were elected on a
+register that was "obsolete" and therefore no longer truly represented the
+people.
+
+The German Spartacides, who were acting in full accord with the Russian
+Bolsheviki, had not that miserable excuse. Yet they set out by force of
+arms to _prevent any election being held_. In this they were quite
+consistent; they wanted to set up a dictatorship, and they knew that the
+overwhelming mass of the people wanted something very different. At a
+dinner of the Inter-Collegiate Socialist Society in New York, in December,
+1918, a spokesman for the German variety of Bolshevism blandly explained
+that "Karl Liebknecht and his comrades know that they cannot hope to get a
+majority, therefore they are determined that no elections shall be held.
+They will prevent this by force. After some time, perhaps, when a
+proletarian regime has existed long enough, and people have become
+convinced of the superiority of the Socialist way, or at least grown used
+to it, _and it is safe to do so_, popular elections may be permitted."
+Incredible as it seems, this declaration was received with cheers by an
+audience which only a few minutes before had cheered with equal fervor
+denunciations of "encroachments upon American democracy."
+
+Curiously enough, the precise manner in which the Bolsheviki have acted
+against democracy was set forth, as far back as 1850, by a German, Johann
+von Miquel, in a letter to Karl Marx. Miquel was born in Hanover, but his
+ancestors were of French origin. He studied at Heidelberg and Goettingen,
+and became associated with the Socialist movement of the period. He settled
+down to the practice of law, however, and when Hanover was annexed by
+Prussia he entered the Prussian parliament. After the "dismissal of the
+pilot," Bismarck, he became Prussian Minister of Finance, holding that
+position for ten years. Liebknecht referred to him as "my former _comrade
+in communismo_ and present Chancellor _in re_." This Miquel, while he was
+still a Socialist, in 1850 wrote to Marx as follows:
+
+    The workers' party may succeed against the upper middle class and
+    what remains of the feudal element, _but it will be attacked on
+    its flank by the democracy_. We can perhaps give an anti-bourgeois
+    tone to the Revolution for a little while, _we can destroy the
+    essential conditions of bourgeois production_; but we cannot
+    possibly put down the small tradesmen and shopkeeping class, the
+    petty bourgeoisie. My motto is to secure all we can get. We should
+    prevent the lower and middle class from _forming any organizations
+    for as long a time as possible_ after the first victory, and
+    especially oppose ourselves in serried ranks to the plan of
+    calling a Constitutional Assembly. Partial terrorism, local
+    anarchy, must replace for us what we lack in bulk.
+
+What a remarkable anticipation of the Bolshevist methods of 1917-18 is thus
+outlined in this letter, written sixty-seven years before the Bolshevik
+_coup d'etat!_ How literally Lenine, Trotzky and Co. have followed Herr von
+Miquel! They have desperately tried to "give an anti-bourgeois tone to the
+Revolution," denouncing as bourgeois reactionaries the men and women whose
+labors and sacrifices have made the Russian Socialist movement. They have
+destroyed "the essential conditions" of bourgeois and of any other than the
+most primitive production. They have set themselves in serried ranks in
+opposition to "the plan of calling a Constitutional Assembly." They have
+suppressed not only the organizations of the "lower and middle class," but
+also those of a great part of the working class, thus going beyond Miquel.
+Finally, to replace what they lack in bulk, they have resorted to "partial
+terrorism and local anarchy."
+
+And it is in the name of revolutionary progress, of ultra-radicalism, that
+we are called upon to revert to the tactics of desperation born of the
+discouraging conditions of nearly seventy years ago. A new philosophy has
+taken possession of the easily possessed minds of Greenwich Village
+philosophers and parlor revolutionists--a new philosophy of progress,
+according to which revolutionary progress consists in the unraveling by
+feverish fingers of the fabric woven through years of sacrifice; in
+abandoning high levels attained for the lower levels from which the
+struggles of the past raised us; in harking back to the thoughts and the
+tactics of men who shouted their despairing, defiant cries into the gloom
+of the blackest period of the nineteenth century!
+
+Universal, secret, equal, and direct suffrage was a fact in Russia, the
+first great achievement of the Revolution. Upon that foundation, and upon
+no other, it was possible to build an enduring, comprehensive social
+democracy. Against that foundation the Bolsheviki hurled their destructive
+power, creating a discriminating class suffrage, disfranchising a great
+part of the Russian people--not merely the bourgeoisie, but a considerable
+part of the working class itself. Chapter XIII of Article 4 of the
+Constitution of the "Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic" sets
+forth the qualifications for voting, as follows:
+
+    THE RIGHT TO VOTE
+
+    CHAPTER THIRTEEN
+
+
+    64. The right to vote and to be elected to the Soviets is enjoyed
+    by the following citizens, irrespective of religion, nationality,
+    domicile, etc., of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet
+    Republic, of both sexes, who shall have completed their eighteenth
+    year by the day of election:
+
+    a. All who have acquired the means of living through labor that is
+    productive and useful to society, and also persons engaged in
+    housekeeping which enables the former to do productive work--i.e.,
+    laborers and employees of all classes who are employed in
+    industry, trade, agriculture, etc.; and peasants and Cossack
+    agricultural laborers who employ no help for the purpose of making
+    profits.
+
+    b. Soldiers of the army and navy of the Soviets.
+
+    c. Citizens of the two preceding categories who have to any degree
+    lost their capacity to work.
+
+    Note 1: Local Soviets may, upon approval of the central power,
+    lower the age standard mentioned herein.
+
+    Note 2: Non-citizens mentioned in Paragraph 20 (Article 2, Chapter
+    Five) have the right to vote.
+
+    65. The following persons enjoy neither the right to vote nor the
+    right to be voted for, even though they belong to one of the
+    categories enumerated above, namely:
+
+    a. Persons who employ hired labor in order to obtain from it an
+    increase in profits.
+
+    b. Persons who have an income without doing any work, such as
+    interest from capital, receipts from property, etc.
+
+    c. Private merchants, trade, and commercial brokers.
+
+    d. Monks and clergy of all denominations.
+
+    e. Employees and agents of the former police, the gendarme corps,
+    and the Okhrana (Czar's secret service), also members of the
+    former reigning dynasty.
+
+    f. Persons who have in legal form been declared demented or
+    mentally deficient, and also persons under guardianship.
+
+    g. Persons who have been deprived by a Soviet of their rights of
+    citizenship because of selfish or dishonorable offenses, for the
+    period fixed by the sentence.
+
+Apparently the Constitution does not provide any standard for determining
+what labor is "useful and productive to society," and leaves the way open
+for a degree of arbitrariness on the part of some authority or other that
+is wholly incompatible with any generally accepted ideal of freedom and
+democracy. It is apparent from the text of paragraph 64, subdivision "a" of
+the foregoing chapter that housekeeping as such is not included in the
+category of "labor that is productive and useful to society," for a
+separate category is made of it. The language used is that "The right to
+vote and to be elected to the Soviets is enjoyed by.... All who have
+acquired the means of living through labor that is productive and useful to
+society, _and also_ persons engaged in housekeeping, which enables the
+former to do productive work--_i.e._, laborers and employees of all classes
+who are employed in industry, trade, agriculture, etc."
+
+This _seems_ to mean that persons engaged in housekeeping can only vote if
+and when they are so engaged in order to enable other persons than
+themselves to do "productive work." It appears that housekeeping for
+persons not engaged in such productive work--for children, for
+example--would not confer the right to vote. It is not possible to tell
+with certainty what it _does_ mean, however, for there is probably not a
+single person in Russia or in the world who can tell exactly what this
+precious instrument actually means. What standard is to be established to
+determine what labor is "productive" and "useful"? Is the journalist, for
+instance, engaged in useful and productive labor? Is the novelist? is the
+agitator? Presumably the journalist employed in defending the Soviet
+Republic against attacks by unfriendly critics would be doing useful work
+and be entitled to vote, but what about the journalist employed in making
+the criticisms? Would the wife of the latter, no matter how much she might
+disagree with her husband's views, be barred from voting, simply because
+she was "engaged in housekeeping" for one whose labors were not regarded
+"productive and useful to society"? If the language used means anything at
+all, apparently she would be so disfranchised.
+
+Upon what ground is it decided that the "private merchant" may not vote?
+Certainly it is not because his labor is of necessity neither productive
+nor useful, for paragraph 65 says that even though belonging to one of the
+categories of persons otherwise qualified to vote, the private merchant may
+"enjoy neither the right to vote nor to be voted for." The keeper of a
+little grocery store, even though his income is not greater than that of a
+mechanic, and despite the fact that his store meets a local need and makes
+his services, therefore, "useful" in the highest degree, cannot enjoy civic
+rights, simply because he is a "merchant"! The clergy of all denominations
+are excluded from the franchise. It does not matter, according to this
+constitution, that a minister belongs to a church independent of any
+connection with the state, that he is elected by people who desire his
+services and is paid by them, that he satisfies them and is therefore
+doing a "useful service"--if utility means the satisfying of needs--because
+he is so employed he cannot vote.
+
+It is clearly provided that "peasants and Cossack agricultural laborers who
+employ no help for the purpose of making profits" can vote and be voted
+for. But no persons "who employ hired labor in order to obtain from it an
+increase in profits" may vote or be elected to office, _even though the
+work they do is productive and useful to society._ A peasant who hires no
+assistance may vote, but if he decides that by employing a boy to help him
+he will be able to give better attention to certain crops and make more
+money, even though he pays the boy every penny that the service is worth,
+judged by any standard whatever, he loses his vote and his civic status
+because, forsooth, he has gained in his net income as a result of his
+enterprise. And this is seriously put forward as the basis of government in
+a nation needing an intense and universal stimulation of its economic
+production.
+
+A militant suffragist friend of mine, whose passion for universal suffrage
+in America is so great that it leads her to join in all sorts of
+demonstrations protesting against the failure of the United States Senate
+to pass the Susan B. Anthony amendment--even leading her to join in the
+public burning of President Wilson's speeches, a queer emulation of the
+ancient ecclesiastical bigotry of burning heretical books!--manages to
+unite to her passion for equal and unrestricted suffrage an equally
+passionate admiration for the Bolsheviki, arch-enemies of equal and
+unrestricted suffrage. Her case is not exceptional: it is rather typical of
+the Bolshevik following in England and in America. Such minds are not
+governed and directed by rational processes, but by emotional impulses,
+generally of pathological origin.
+
+What the Bolshevik constitution would mean if practically applied to
+American life to-day can be briefly indicated. The following classes would
+certainly be entitled to vote and to be elected to office:
+
+1. All wage-earners engaged in the production of goods and utilities
+regarded by some designated authority as "productive and useful to
+society."
+
+2. Teachers and educators engaged in the public service.
+
+3. All farmers owning and working their own farms without hired help of any
+kind.
+
+4. All wage-earners engaged in the public service as employees of the
+state, subdivisions of the state, or public service corporations-such as
+postal clerks, street-railway workers, electricians, and so on.
+
+5. Wives and others engaged in keeping the homes of the foregoing, so as to
+enable them to work.
+
+6. The "soldiers of the army and navy"--whether all officers are included
+is not clear from the text.
+
+Now let us see what classes would be as certainly excluded from the right
+to vote and to be voted for.
+
+1. Every merchant from the keeper of a corner grocery store to the owner of
+a great mercantile establishment.
+
+2. Every banker, every commission agent, every broker, every insurance
+agent, every real-estate dealer.
+
+3. Every farmer who hires help of any kind--even a single "hand."
+
+4. Every petty contractor, garage-keeper, or other person employing any
+hired help whatever, including the professional writer who hires a
+stenographer, the doctor who hires a chauffeur, and the dentist who hires a
+mechanic assistant.
+
+5. Every clergyman and minister of the Gospel.
+
+6. Every person whose income is derived from inherited wealth or from
+invested earnings, including all who live upon annuities provided by gift
+or bequest.
+
+7. Every person engaged in housekeeping for persons included in any of the
+foregoing six categories--including the wives of such disqualified persons.
+
+There are many occupational groups whose civic status is not so easily
+defined. The worker engaged in making articles of luxury, enjoyed only by
+the privileged few, could hardly have a better claim to a vote than the
+housekeeper of a man whose income was derived from foreign investments, or
+than the chauffeur of a man whose income was derived from government bonds.
+All three represent, presumably, types of that parasitic labor which
+subjects those engaged in it to disfranchisement. Apparently, though not
+certainly, then, the following would also be disfranchised:
+
+1. All lawyers except those engaged by the public authorities for the
+public service.
+
+2. All teachers and educators other than those engaged in the public
+service.
+
+3. All bankers, managers of industries, commercial travelers, experts, and
+accountants except those employed in the public service, or whose labor is
+judged by a competent tribunal to be necessary and useful.
+
+4. All editors, journalists, authors of books and plays, except as special
+provision might be provided for individuals.
+
+5. All persons engaged in occupations which a competent tribunal decided to
+classify as non-essential or non-productive.
+
+Any serious attempt to introduce such restrictions and limitations of the
+right of suffrage in America would provoke irresistible revolt. It would be
+justly and properly regarded as an attempt to arrest the forward march of
+the nation and to turn its energies in a backward direction. It would be
+just as reactionary in the political world as it would be in the industrial
+world to revert back to hand-tool production; to substitute the ox-team for
+the railway system, the hand-loom for the power-loom, the flail for the
+threshing-machine, the sickle for the modern harvesting-machine, the human
+courier for the electric telegraph.
+
+Yet we find a radical like Mr. Max Eastman giving his benediction and
+approval to precisely such a program in Russia as a substitute for
+universal suffrage. We find him quoting with apparent approval an article
+setting forth Lenine's plan, hardly disguised, to disfranchise every farmer
+who employs even a single hired helper.[54]
+
+Lenine's position is quite clear. "Only the proletariat leading on the
+poorest peasants (the semi-proletariat as they are called in our program)
+... may undertake the steps toward Socialism that have become absolutely
+unavoidable and non-postponable.... The peasants want to retain their small
+holdings and to arrive at some place of equal distribution.... So be it. No
+sensible Socialist will quarrel with a pauper peasant on this ground. If
+the lands are confiscated, _so long as the proletarians rule in the great
+centers, and all political power is handed over to the proletariat_, the
+rest will take care of itself."[55] Yet, in spite of Lenine's insistence
+that all political power be "handed over to the proletariat," in spite of a
+score of similar utterances which might be quoted, and, finally, in spite
+of the Soviet Constitution which so obviously excludes from the right to
+vote a large part of the adult population, an American Bolshevist
+pamphleteer has the effrontery to insult the intelligence of his readers
+by the stupidly and palpably false statement that "even at the present time
+95 per cent. in Russia can vote, while in the United States only about 65
+per cent. can vote."[56]
+
+Of course it is only as a temporary measure that this dictatorship of a
+class is to be maintained. It is designed only for the period of transition
+and adjustment. In time the adjustment will be made, all forms of social
+parasitism and economic exploitation will disappear, and then it will be
+both possible and natural to revert to democratic government. Too simple
+and naive to be trusted alone in a world so full of trickery and tricksters
+as ours are they who find any asurance in this promise. They are surely
+among the most gullible of our humankind!
+
+Of course, the answer to the claim is a very simple one: it is that no
+class gaining privilege and power ever surrenders it until it is compelled
+to do so. Every one who has read the pre-Marxian literature dealing with
+the dictatorship of the proletariat knows how insistent is the demand that
+the period of dictatorship must be _prolonged as much as possible_. Even
+Marx himself insisted, on one occasion at least, that it must be maintained
+as long as possible,[57] and in the letter of Johann von Miquel, already
+quoted, we find the same thought expressed in the same terms, "as long as
+possible." But even if we put aside these warnings of human experience and
+of recorded history, and persuade ourselves that in Russia we have a wholly
+new phenomenon, a class possessing powers of dictatorship animated by a
+burning passion to relinquish those powers as quickly as possible, is it
+not still evident that the social adjustments that must be made to reach
+the stage where, according to the Bolshevik standards, political democracy
+can be introduced, must, under the most favorable circumstances
+conceivable, take many, many years? Even Lenine admits that "a sound
+solution of the problem of increasing the productivity of labor" (which
+lies at the very heart of the problem we are now discussing) "requires at
+least (especially after a most distressing and destructive war) several
+years."[58]
+
+From the point of view of social democracy the basis of the Bolshevik state
+is reactionary and unsound. The true Socialist policy is that set forth by
+Wilhelm Liebknecht in the following words: "The political power which the
+Social Democracy aims at and which it will win, no matter what its enemies
+may do, _has not for its object the establishment of the dictatorship of
+the proletariat, but the suppression of the dictatorship of the
+bourgeoisie_."[59]
+
+
+IV
+
+
+Democracy in government and in industry must characterize any system of
+society which can be justly called Socialist. Thirteen years ago I wrote,
+"Socialism without democracy is as impossible as a shadow without
+light."[60] That seemed to me then, as it seems to-day, axiomatic. And so
+the greatest Socialist thinkers and leaders always regarded it. "We have
+perceived that Socialism and democracy are inseparable," declared William
+Liebknecht, the well-beloved, in 1899.[61] Thirty years earlier, in 1869,
+he had given lucid expression to the same conviction in these words:
+"Socialism and democracy are not the same, but they are only different
+expressions of the same fundamental idea. They belong to each other, round
+out each other, and can never stand in contradiction to each other.
+Socialism without democracy is pseudo-Socialism, just as democracy without
+Socialism is pseudo-democracy."[62] Democracy in industry is, as I have
+insisted in my writing with unfailing consistency, as inseparable from
+Socialism as democracy in government.[63] Unless industry is brought within
+the control of democracy and made responsive to the common will, Socialism
+is not attained.
+
+Everywhere the organized working class aspires to attain that industrial
+democracy which is the counterpart of political democracy. Syndicalism,
+with all its vagaries, its crude reversal to outworn ideas and methods, is,
+nevertheless, fundamentally an expression of that yearning. It is the same
+passion that lies back of the Shop Stewards' movement in England, and that
+inspires the much more patiently and carefully developed theories and plans
+of the advocates of "Guild Socialism." Motived by the same desire, our
+American labor-unions are demanding, and steadily gaining, an increasing
+share in the actual direction of industry. Joint control by boards composed
+of representatives of employers, employees, and the general public is, to
+an ever-increasing extent, determining the conditions of employment, wage
+standards, work standards, hours of labor, choice and conduct of foremen,
+and many other matters of vital importance to the wage-earners. That we
+are still a long way from anything like industrial democracy is all too
+painfully true and obvious, but it is equally obvious that we are
+struggling toward the goal, and that there is a serious purpose and
+intention to realize the ideal.
+
+Impelled by the inexorable logic of its own existence as a dictatorship,
+the Bolshevik government has had to set itself against any and every
+manifestation of democracy in industry with the same relentless force as it
+opposed democracy in government. True, owing to the fact that, following
+the line of industrial evolution, the trade-union movement was not strongly
+enough developed to even attempt any organization for the expression of
+industrial democracy comparable to the Constituent Assembly. It is equally
+true, however, that had such an organization existed the necessity to
+suppress it, as the political organization was suppressed, would have
+proceeded inevitably and irresistibly from the creation of a dictatorship.
+_There cannot be, in any country, as co-existent forces, political
+dictatorship and industrial democracy._ It is also true that such
+democratic agencies as there were existing the Bolsheviki neglected.
+
+That the Bolsheviki did not establish industrial democracy in its fullest
+sense is not to be charged to their discredit. Had Bolshevism never
+appeared, and had the Constituent Assembly been permitted to function
+unmolested and free, it would have taken many years to realize anything
+like a well-rounded industrial democracy, for which a highly developed
+industrial system is absolutely essential. The leaders of the Bolshevik
+movement recognized from the first that the time had not yet arrived for
+even attempting to set up a Socialist commonwealth based on the social
+ownership and democratic control of industry. Lenine frankly declared that
+"Socialism cannot now prevail in Russia,"[64] and Trotzky said, a month
+after the _coup d'etat_: "We are not ready yet to take over all
+industry.... For the present, we expect of the earnings of a factory to pay
+the owner 5 or 6 per cent. yearly on his actual investment. What we aim at
+now is _control_ rather than _ownership_."[65] He did not tell Professor
+Ross, who records this statement, on what grounds the owner of the property
+thus controlled by the Soviet government, and who thus becomes a partner of
+the government, is to be excluded from the exercise of the franchise. But
+let that pass.
+
+When the Bolsheviki seized the power of the state, they found themselves
+confronted by a terrific task. Russia was utterly demoralized. An
+undeveloped nation industrially, war and internal strife had wrought havoc
+with the industrial life she had. Her railways were neglected and the whole
+transportation system, entirely inadequate even for peace needs, had, under
+the strain of the war, fallen into chaos. After the March Revolution, as a
+natural consequence of the intoxication of the new freedom, such
+disciplines as had existed were broken down. Production fell off in a most
+alarming manner. During the Kerensky regime Skobelev, as Minister of Labor,
+repeatedly begged the workers to prove their loyalty to the Revolution by
+increased exertion and faithfulness in the workshops and factories. The
+Bolsheviki, on their part, as a means of fighting the Provisional
+Government, preached the opposite doctrine, that of sabotage. In every
+manner possible they encouraged the workers to limit production, to waste
+time and materials, strike for trivial reasons, and, in short, do all that
+was possible to defeat the effort to place industry upon a sound basis.
+
+When they found themselves in possession of the powers of government the
+Bolshevik leaders soon had to face the stern realities of the conditions
+essential to the life of a great nation. They could not escape the
+necessity of intensifying production. They had not only promised peace, but
+bread, and bread comes only from labor. Every serious student of the
+problem has realized that the first great task of any Socialist society
+must be _to increase the productivity of labor_. It is all very well for a
+popular propaganda among the masses to promise a great reduction in the
+hours of labor and, at the same time, a great improvement in the standards
+of living. The translation of such promises into actual achievements must
+prove to be an enormous task. To build the better homes, make the better
+and more abundant clothing, shoes, furniture, and other things required to
+fulfil the promise, will require a great deal of labor, and such an
+organization of industry upon a basis of efficiency as no nation has yet
+developed. If the working class of this or any other country should take
+possession of the existing organization of production, there would not be
+enough in the fund now going to the capitalist class to satisfy the
+requirements of the workers, _even if not a penny of compensation were paid
+to the expropriated owners_. Kautsky, among others, has courageously faced
+this fact and insisted that "it will be one of the imperative tasks of the
+Social Revolution not simply to continue, but to increase production; the
+victorious proletariat must extend production rapidly if it is to be able
+to satisfy the enormous demands that will be made upon the new regime."[66]
+ From the first
+this problem had to be faced by the Bolshevik government. We find Lenine
+insisting that the workers must be inspired with "idealism, self-sacrifice,
+and persistence" to turn out as large a product as possible; that the
+productivity of labor must be raised and a high level of industrial
+performance as the duty of every worker be rigorously insisted upon. It is
+not enough to have destroyed feudalism and the monarchy:
+
+    In every Socialist revolution, however, the main task of the
+    proletariat, and of the poorest peasantry led by it--and, hence,
+    also in the Socialist revolution in Russia inaugurated by us on
+    November 7, 1917, consists in the positive and constructive work
+    of establishing an extremely complex and delicate net of newly
+    organized relationships covering the systematic production and
+    distribution of products which are necessary for the existence of
+    tens of millions of people. The successful realization of such a
+    revolution depends on the original historical creative work of the
+    majority of the population, and first of all of the majority of
+    the toilers. _The victory of the Socialist revolution will not be
+    assured unless the proletariat and the poorest peasantry manifest
+    sufficient consciousness, idealism, self-sacrifice, and
+    persistence._ With the creation of a new--the Soviet--type of
+    state, offering to the oppressed toiling masses the opportunity to
+    participate actively in the free construction of a new society, we
+    have solved only a small part of the difficult task. _The main
+    difficulty is in the economic domain; to raise the productivity of
+    labor, to establish strict and universal accounting and control of
+    production and distribution, and actually to socialize
+    production._[67]
+
+Lenine recognizes, as every thoughtful person must, that this task of
+organizing production and distribution cannot be undertaken by "the
+proletariat and the poorest peasants." It requires a vast amount of highly
+developed technical knowledge and skill, the result of long training and
+superior education. This kind of service is so highly paid, in comparison
+with the wages paid to the manual workers, that it lifts those who perform
+the service and receive the high salaries into the ranks of the
+bourgeoisie. Certainly, even though they are engaged in performing work of
+the highest value and the most vital consequence, the specialists, experts,
+and directing managers of industry are not of the "working class," as that
+term is commonly employed. And no matter how we may speculate upon the
+possible attainment of approximate equality of income in some future near
+or remote, the fact is that the labor of such men can only be secured by
+paying much more than is paid to the manual workers.
+
+Quite wisely, the Bolshevik government decided that it must have such
+services, no matter that they must be highly paid for; that they could only
+be rendered by the hated bourgeoisie and that, in consequence, certain
+compromises and relations with the bourgeoisie became necessary the moment
+the services were engaged. The Bolshevik government recognized the
+imperative necessity of the service which only highly paid specialists
+could give and wisely decided that no prejudice or theory must be permitted
+to block the necessary steps for Russia's reconstruction. In a spirit of
+intelligent opportunism, therefore, they subordinated shibboleths,
+prejudices, dogmas, and theories to Russia's necessity. The sanity of this
+opportunistic attitude is altogether admirable, but it contrasts strangely
+with the refusal to co-operate with the bourgeoisie in establishing a
+stable democratic government--no less necessary for Russia's reconstruction
+and for Socialism. As a matter of fact, the very promptitude and sanity of
+their opportunism when faced by responsibility, serves to demonstrate the
+truth of the contention made in these pages, that in refusing to co-operate
+with others in building up a permanently secure democratic government,
+they were actuated by no high moral principle, but simply by a desire to
+gain power. The position of Russia to-day would have been vastly different
+if the wisdom manifested in the following paragraphs had governed Lenine
+and his associates in the days when Kerensky was trying to save Russian
+democracy:
+
+    _Without the direction of specialists of different branches of
+    knowledge, technique, and experience, the transformation toward
+    Socialism is impossible_, for Socialism demands a conscious mass
+    movement toward a higher productivity of labor in comparison with
+    capitalism and on the basis which had been attained by capitalism.
+    Socialism must accomplish this movement forward in its own way, by
+    its own methods--to make it more definite, by Soviet methods. But
+    the specialists are inevitably bourgeois on account of the whole
+    environment of social life which made them specialists.... In view
+    of the considerable delay in accounting and control in general,
+    although we have succeeded in defeating sabotage, we have _not
+    yet_ created an environment which would put at our disposal the
+    bourgeois specialists. Many sabotagers are coming into our
+    service, but the best organizers and the biggest specialists can
+    be used by the state either in the old bourgeois way (that is, for
+    a higher salary) or in the new proletarian way (that is, by
+    creating such an environment of universal accounting and control
+    which would inevitably and naturally attract and gain the
+    submission of specialists). We were forced now to make use of the
+    old bourgeois method and agree to a very high remuneration for the
+    services of the biggest of the bourgeois specialists. All those
+    who are acquainted with the facts understand this, but not all
+    give sufficient thought to the significance of such a measure on
+    the part of the proletarian state. _It is clear that the measure
+    is a compromise, that it is a defection from the principles of the
+    Paris Commune and of any proletarian rule, which demand the
+    reduction of salaries to the standard of remuneration of the
+    average workers_--principles which demand that "career hunting" be
+    fought by deeds, not words.
+
+    Furthermore, it is clear that such a measure is not merely a halt
+    in a certain part and to a certain degree of the offensive against
+    capitalism (for capitalism is not a quantity of money, but a
+    definite social relationship), _but also a step backward by our
+    Socialist Soviet state_, which has from the very beginning
+    proclaimed and carried on a policy of reducing high salaries to
+    the standard of wages of the average worker.
+
+    ... The corrupting influence of high salaries is beyond
+    question--both on the Soviets ... and on the mass of the workers.
+    But all thinking and honest workers and peasants will agree with
+    us and will admit that we are unable to get rid at once of the
+    evil heritage of capitalism.... The sooner we ourselves, workers
+    and peasants, learn better labor discipline and a higher technique
+    of toil, making use of the bourgeois specialists for this purpose,
+    the sooner we will get rid of the need of paying tribute to these
+    specialists.[68]
+
+We find the same readiness to compromise and to follow the line of least
+resistance in dealing with the co-operatives. From 1906 onward there had
+been an enormous growth of co-operatives in Russia. They were of various
+kinds and animated by varied degrees of social consciousness. They did not
+differ materially from the co-operatives of England, Belgium, Denmark,
+Italy, or Germany except in the one important particular that they relied
+upon bourgeois Intellectuals for leadership and direction to a greater
+extent than do the co-operatives in the countries named. They were
+admirably fitted to be the nuclei of a socialized system of distribution.
+Out of office the Bolsheviki had sneered at these working-class
+organizations and denounced them as "bourgeois corruptions of the militant
+proletariat." Necessity and responsibility soon forced the adoption of a
+new attitude toward them. The Bolshevik government had to accept the
+despised co-operatives, and even compromise Bolshevist principles as the
+price of securing their services:
+
+    A Socialist state can come into existence only as a net of
+    production and consumption communes, which keep conscientious
+    accounts of their production and consumption, economize labor,
+    steadily increasing its productivity and thus making it possible
+    to lower the workday to seven, six, or even less hours. Anything
+    less than rigorous, universal, thorough accounting and control of
+    grain and of the production of grain, and later also of all other
+    necessary products, will not do. We have inherited from capitalism
+    mass organizations which can facilitate the transition to mass
+    accounting and control of distribution--the consumers'
+    co-operatives. They are developed in Russia less than in the more
+    advanced countries, but they comprise more than 10,000,000
+    members. The decree on consumers' associations which was recently
+    issued is extremely significant, showing clearly the peculiarity
+    of the position and of the problem of the Socialist Soviet
+    Republic at the present time.
+
+    The decree is an agreement with the bourgeois co-operatives and
+    with the workmen's co-operatives adhering to the bourgeois
+    standpoint. The agreement or compromise consists, firstly, in the
+    fact that the representatives of these institutions not only
+    participated in the deliberations on this decree, but had
+    practically received a determining voice, for parts of the decree
+    which met determined opposition from these institutions were
+    rejected. Secondly and essentially, the compromise consists in the
+    rejection by the Soviet authority of the principle of free
+    admission to the co-operatives (the only consistent principle from
+    the proletarian standpoint), and that the whole population of a
+    given locality should be _united in a single co-operative_. The
+    defection from this, the only Socialist principle, which is in
+    accord with the problem of doing away with classes, allows the
+    existence of working-class co-operatives (which in this case call
+    themselves working-class co-operatives only because they submit to
+    the class interests of the bourgeoisie). Lastly, the proposition
+    of the Soviet government completely to exclude the bourgeoisie
+    from the administration of the co-operatives was also considerably
+    weakened, and only owners of capitalistic commercial and
+    industrial enterprises are excluded from the administration.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+    If the proletariat, acting through the Soviets, should
+    successfully establish accounting and control on a national scale,
+    there would be no need for such compromise. Through the Food
+    Departments of the Soviets, through their organs of supply, we
+    would unite the population in one co-operative directed by the
+    proletariat, without the assistance from bourgeois co-operatives,
+    without concessions to the purely bourgeois principle which
+    compels the labor co-operatives to remain side by side with the
+    bourgeois co-operatives instead of wholly subjecting these
+    bourgeois co-operatives, fusing both?[69]
+
+
+V
+
+It is no mood of captious, unfriendly criticism that attention is specially
+directed to these compromises. Only political charlatans, ineffective
+quacks, and irresponsible soap-box orators see crime against the
+revolutionary program of the masses in a wise and honest opportunism.
+History will not condemn the Bolsheviki for the give-and-take,
+compromise-where-necessary policy outlined in the foregoing paragraphs. Its
+condemnation will be directed rather against their failure to act in that
+spirit from the moment the first Provisional Government arose. Had they
+joined with the other Socialists and established a strong Coalition
+Government, predominantly Socialist, but including representatives of the
+most liberal and democratic elements of the bourgeoisie, it would have been
+possible to bring the problems of labor organization and labor discipline
+under democratic direction. It would not have been possible to establish
+complete industrial democracy, fully developed Socialism, nor will it be
+possible to do this for many years to come.
+
+But it would have been easy and natural for the state to secure to the
+workers a degree of economic assurance and protection not otherwise
+possible. It would have been possible, too, for the workers'
+organizations, recognized by and co-operating with the state, to have
+undertaken, in a large degree, the control of the conditions of their own
+employment which labor organizations everywhere are demanding and gradually
+gaining. The best features of "Guild Socialism" could nowhere have been so
+easily adopted.[70] But instead of effort in these directions, we find the
+Bolsheviki resorting to the _Taylor System of Scientific Management
+enforced by an individual dictator whose word is final and absolute, to
+disobey whom is treason_! There is not a nation in the world with a
+working-class movement of any strength where it would be possible to
+introduce the industrial servitude here described:
+
+    The most conscious vanguard of the Russian proletariat has already
+    turned to the problem of increasing labor discipline. For
+    instance, the central committee of the Metallurgical Union and the
+    Central Council of the Trades Unions have begun work on respective
+    measures and drafts of decrees. This work should be supported and
+    advanced by all means. _We should immediately introduce piece work
+    and try it out in practice. We should try out every scientific and
+    progressive suggestion of the Taylor System_; we should compare
+    the earnings with the general total of production, or the
+    exploitation results of railroad and water transportation, and so
+    on.
+
+    The Russian is a poor worker in comparison with the workers of the
+    advanced nations, and this could not be otherwise under the regime
+    of the Czar and other remnants of feudalism. The last word of
+    capitalism in this respect, the Taylor System--as well as all
+    progressive measures of capitalism--combine the refined cruelty of
+    bourgeois exploitation and a number of most valuable scientific
+    attainments in the analysis of mechanical motions during work, in
+    dismissing superfluous and useless motions, in determining the
+    most correct methods of the work, the best systems of accounting
+    and control, etc. The Soviet Republic must adopt valuable and
+    scientific and technical advance in this field. _The possibility
+    of Socialism will be determined by our success in combining the
+    Soviet rule and the Soviet organization of management with the
+    latest progressive measures of capitalism. We must introduce in
+    Russia the study and the teaching of the Taylor System and its
+    systematic trial and adaptation_. While working to increase the
+    productivity of labor, we must at the same time take into account
+    the peculiarities of the transition period from capitalism to
+    Socialism, which require, on one hand, that we lay the foundation
+    for the Socialist organization of emulation, and, on the other
+    hand, _require the use of compulsion so that the slogan of the
+    dictatorship of the proletariat should not be weakened by the
+    practice of a too mild proletarian government_.
+
+    The resolution of the last (Moscow) Congress of the Soviets
+    advocates, as the most important problem at present, the creation
+    of "efficient organization" and higher discipline. Such
+    resolutions are now readily supported by everybody. But that their
+    realization requires compulsion, and _compulsion in the form of a
+    dictatorship_, is ordinarily not comprehended. And yet, it would
+    be the greatest stupidity and the most absurd opportunism to
+    suppose that the transition from capitalism to Socialism is
+    possible without compulsion and dictatorship. The Marxian theory
+    has long ago criticized beyond misunderstanding this petty
+    bourgeois-democratic and anarchistic nonsense. And Russia of
+    1917-18 confirms in this respect the Marxian theory so clearly,
+    palpably, and convincingly that only those who are hopelessly
+    stupid or who have firmly determined to ignore the truth can still
+    err in this respect. Either a Kornilov dictatorship (if Kornilov
+    be taken as Russian type of a bourgeois Cavaignac) or a
+    dictatorship of the proletariat--no other alternative is possible
+    for a country which is passing through an unusually swift
+    development with unusually difficult transitions and which suffers
+    from desperate disorganization created by the most horrible
+    war.[71]
+
+This dictatorship is to be no light affair, no purely nominal force, but a
+relentless iron-hand rule. Lenine is afraid that the proletariat is too
+soft-hearted and lenient. He says:
+
+    But "dictatorship" is a great word. And great words must not be
+    used in vain. A dictatorship is an iron rule, with revolutionary
+    daring and swift and merciless in the suppression of the
+    exploiters as well as of the thugs (hooligans). And our rule is
+    too mild, quite frequently resembling jam rather than iron.[72]
+
+And so the dictatorship of the proletariat becomes the _dictatorship of a
+single person_, a super-boss and industrial autocrat: We must learn to
+combine the stormy, energetic breaking of all restraint on the part of the
+toiling masses _with iron discipline during work, with absolute submission
+to the will of one person, the Soviet director, during work_.[73]
+
+As I copy these words from Lenine's book my memory recalls the days, more
+than twenty years ago, when as a workman in England and as shop steward of
+my union I joined with my comrades in breaking down the very things Lenine
+here proposes to set up in the name of Socialism. "Absolute submission to
+the will of one person" is not a state toward which free men will strive.
+Not willingly will men who enjoy the degree of personal freedom existing in
+democratic nations turn to this:
+
+    With respect to ... the significance of individual dictatorial
+    power from the standpoint of the specific problems of the present
+    period, we must say that every large machine industry--which is
+    the material productive source and basis of Socialism--requires an
+    absolute and strict unity of the will which directs the joint work
+    of hundreds, thousands, and tens of thousands of people. This
+    necessity is obvious from the technical, economical, and
+    historical standpoint, and has always been recognized by all those
+    who had given any thought to Socialism, as its prerequisite. But
+    how can we secure a strict unity of will? _By subjecting the will
+    of thousands_ to the will of one.
+
+    This subjection, _if the participants in the common work are
+    ideally conscious and disciplined_, may resemble the mild leading
+    of an orchestra conductor; but may take the acute form of a
+    dictatorship--if there is no ideal discipline and consciousness.
+    But at any rate, _complete submission to a single will is
+    absolutely necessary for the success of the processes of work
+    which is organized on the type of large machine industry_. This is
+    doubly true of the railways. And just this transition from one
+    political problem to another, which in appearance has no
+    resemblance to the first, constitutes the peculiarity of the
+    present period. The Revolution has just broken the oldest, the
+    strongest, and the heaviest chains to which the masses were
+    compelled to submit. So it was yesterday. And to-day, the same
+    Revolution (and indeed in the interest of Socialism) demands the
+    _absolute submission_ of the masses to the _single will_ of those
+    who direct the labor process. It is self-evident that it can be
+    realized only after great upheavals, crises, returns to the old;
+    only through the greatest strain of the energy of the proletarian
+    vanguard which is leading the people to the new order....
+
+    To the extent to which the principal problem of the Soviet rule
+    changes from military suppression to administration, suppression
+    and compulsion will, _as a rule, be manifested in trials, and not
+    in shooting on the spot_. And in this respect the revolutionary
+    masses have taken, after November 7, 1918, the right road and have
+    proved the vitality of the Revolution, when they started to
+    organize their own workmen's and peasants' tribunals, before any
+    decrees were issued dismissing the bourgeois-democratic judicial
+    apparatus. _But our revolutionary and popular tribunals are
+    excessively and incredibly weak. It is apparent that the popular
+    view of the courts--which was inherited from the regime of the
+    landowners and the bourgeoisie--as not their own, has not yet been
+    completely destroyed_. It is not sufficiently appreciated that the
+    courts serve to attract all the poor to administration (for
+    judicial activity is one of the functions of state
+    administration); that the court is _an organ of the rule of the
+    proletariat and of the poorest peasantry; that the court is a
+    means of training in discipline_. There is a lack of appreciation
+    of the simple and obvious fact that, if the chief misfortunes of
+    Russia are famine and unemployment, these misfortunes cannot be
+    overcome by any outbursts of enthusiasm, but only by thorough and
+    universal organization and discipline, in order to increase the
+    production of bread for men and fuel for industry, to transport it
+    in time, and to distribute it in the right way. That therefore
+    _responsibility_ for the pangs of famine and unemployment falls on
+    _every one who violates the labor discipline in any enterprise and
+    in any business_. That those who are responsible should be
+    discovered, tried, and _punished without mercy_. The petty
+    bourgeois environment, which we will have to combat persistently
+    now, shows particularly in the lack of comprehension of the
+    economic and political connection between famine and unemployment
+    and the _prevailing dissoluteness in organization and
+    discipline_--in the firm hold of the view of the small proprietor
+    that "nothing matters, if only I gain as much as possible."
+
+    A characteristic struggle occurred on this basis in connection
+    with the last decree on railway management, the decree which
+    granted dictatorial (or "unlimited") power to individual
+    directors. The conscious (and mostly, probably, unconscious)
+    representatives of petty bourgeois dissoluteness contended that
+    the granting of "unlimited" (_i.e._, dictatorial) power to
+    individuals was a defection from the principle of board
+    administration, from the democratic and other principles of the
+    Soviet rule. Some of the Socialist-Revolutionists of the left wing
+    carried on a plainly demagogic agitation against the decree on
+    dictatorship, appealing to the evil instincts and to the petty
+    bourgeois desire for personal gain. The question thus presented is
+    of really great significance; firstly, the question of principle
+    is, in general, the appointment of individuals endowed with
+    unlimited power, the appointment of dictators, in accord with the
+    fundamental principles of the Soviet rule; secondly, in what
+    relation is this case--this precedent, if you wish--to the special
+    problems of the Soviet rule during the present concrete period?
+    Both questions deserve serious consideration.[74]
+
+With characteristic ingenuity Lenine attempts to provide this dictatorship
+with a theoretical basis which will pass muster as Marxian Socialism. He
+uses the term "Soviet democracy" as a synonym for democratic Socialism and
+says there is "absolutely no contradiction in principle" between it and
+"the use of dictatorial power of individuals." By what violence to reason
+and to language is the word _democracy_ applied to the system described by
+Lenine? To use words with such scant respect to their meanings, established
+by etymology, history, and universal agreement in usage, is to invite and
+indeed compel the contempt of minds disciplined by reason's practices. As
+for the claim that there is no contradiction in principle between
+democratic Socialism and the exercise of dictatorial power by individuals,
+before it can be accepted every Socialist teacher and leader of any
+standing anywhere, the programs of all the Socialist parties, and their
+practice, must be denied and set aside. Whether democratic Socialism be
+wise or unwise, a practical possibility or an unrealizable idea, at least
+it has nothing in common with such reactionary views as are expressed in
+the following:
+
+    That the dictatorship of individuals has very frequently in the
+    history of revolutionary movements served as an expression and
+    means of realization of the dictatorship of the revolutionary
+    classes is confirmed by the undisputed experience of history. With
+    bourgeois democratic principles, the dictatorship of individuals
+    has undoubtedly been compatible. But this point is always treated
+    adroitly by the bourgeois critics of the Soviet rule and by their
+    petty bourgeois aides. On one hand, they declared the Soviet rule
+    simply something absurd and anarchically wild, carefully avoiding
+    all our historical comparisons and theoretical proofs that the
+    Soviets are a higher form of democracy; nay, more, the beginning
+    of a _Socialist_ form of democracy. On the other hand, they demand
+    of us a higher democracy than the bourgeois and argue: with your
+    Bolshevist (_i.e._, Socialist, not bourgeois) democratic
+    principles, with the Soviet democratic principles, individual
+    dictatorship is absolutely incompatible.
+
+    Extremely poor arguments, these. If we are not Anarchists, we must
+    admit the necessity of a state--that is, of _compulsion_, for the
+    transition from capitalism to Socialism. The form of compulsion is
+    determined by the degree of development of the particular
+    revolutionary class, then by such special circumstances as, for
+    instance, the heritage of a long and reactionary war, and then by
+    the forms of resistance of the bourgeoisie and the petty
+    bourgeoisie. _There is therefore absolutely no contradiction in
+    principle between the Soviet (Socialist) democracy and the use of
+    dictatorial power of individuals_. The distinction between a
+    proletarian and a bourgeois dictatorship consists in this: that
+    the first directs its attacks against the exploiting minority in
+    the interests of the exploited majority; and, further, in this,
+    that the first is accomplished (also through individuals) not only
+    by the masses of the exploited toilers, but also by the
+    organizations which are so constructed that they arouse these
+    masses to historical creative work (the Soviets belong to this
+    kind of organization).[75]
+
+This, then, is Bolshevism, not as it is seen and described by unfriendly
+"bourgeois" writers, but as it is seen and described by the acknowledged
+intellectual and political leader of the Bolsheviki, Nikolai Lenine. I have
+not taken any non-Bolshevist authority; I have not even restated his views
+in a summary of my own, lest into the summary might be injected some
+reflexes of my own critical thought. Bolshevism is revealed in all its
+reactionary repulsiveness as something between which and absolute,
+individual dictatorial power there is "absolutely no contradiction in
+principle." It will not avail for our American followers and admirers of
+the Bolsheviki to plead that these things are temporary, compromises with
+the ideal due to the extraordinary circumstances prevailing in Russia, and
+to beg a mitigation of the severity of our judgment on that account.
+
+The answer to the plea is twofold: in the first place, they who offer it
+must, if they are sincere, abandon the savagely critical attitude they have
+seen fit to adopt toward our own government and nation because with
+"extraordinary conditions prevailing" we have had introduced conscription,
+unusual restrictions of movement and of utterance, and so forth. How else,
+indeed, can their sincerity be demonstrated? If the fact that extraordinary
+conditions justified Lenine and his associates in instituting a regime so
+tyrannical, what rule of reason or of morals must be invoked to refuse to
+count the extraordinary conditions produced in our own nation by the war as
+justification for the special measures of military service and discipline
+here introduced?
+
+But there is a second answer to the claim which is more direct and
+conclusive. It is not open to argument at all. It is found in the words of
+Lenine himself, in his claim that there is absolutely no contradiction
+between the principle of individual dictatorship, ruling with iron hand,
+and the principle upon which Soviet government rests. There has been no
+compromise here, for if there is no contradiction in principle no
+compromise could have been required. Lenine is not afraid to make or to
+admit making compromises; he admits that compromises have been made. It was
+a compromise to employ highly salaried specialists from the bourgeoisie, "a
+defection from the principles of the Paris Commune and of any proletarian
+rule," as he says. It was a compromise, another "defection from the only
+Socialist principle," to admit the right of the co-operatives to determine
+their own conditions of membership. Having made these declarations quite
+candidly, he takes pains to assure us that there was no such defection from
+principle in establishing the absolute rule of an individual dictator,
+that there was absolutely no contradiction in principle in this.[76]
+
+Moreover, there is no reason for regarding this dictatorship as a temporary
+thing, if Lenine himself is to be accepted as an authoritative spokesman.
+Obviously, if there is nothing in the principle of an absolute individual
+dictatorship which is in contradiction to the Bolshevik ideal, there can be
+no Bolshevik principle which necessarily requires for its realization the
+ending of such dictatorship. Why, therefore, may it not be continued
+indefinitely? Certainly, if the dictatorship is abolished it will not
+be--if Lenine is to be seriously considered--on account of its
+incompatibility with Bolshevik principles.
+
+
+VI
+
+The Bolshevik government of Russia is credited by many of its admirers in
+this country with having solved the great land problem and with having
+satisfied the land-hunger of the peasants. It is charged, moreover, that
+the bitter opposition to the Bolsheviki is mainly due to agitation by the
+bourgeoisie, led by the expropriated landowners, who want to defeat the
+Revolution and to have their former titles to the land restored. Of course,
+it is true that, so far as they dare to do so, the former landowners
+actively oppose the Bolsheviki. No expropriated class ever acted otherwise,
+and it would be foolish to expect anything else. But any person who
+believes that the opposition of the great peasant Socialist organizations,
+and especially of the Socialist-Revolutionists, is due to the confiscation
+of the land, either consciously or unconsciously, is capable of believing
+anything and quite immune from rationality.
+
+The facts in the case are, briefly, as follows: First, as Professor Ross
+has pointed out,[77] the land policy of the Bolshevik government was a
+compromise of the principles long advocated by its leaders, a compromise
+made for political reasons only. Second, as Marie Spiridonova abundantly
+demonstrated at an All-Russian Soviet Conference in July, 1918, the
+Bolshevik government did not honorably live up to its agreement with the
+Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left. Third, so far as the land problem was
+concerned there was not the slightest need or justification for the
+Bolshevik _coup d'etat_, for the reason that the problem had already been
+solved on the precise lines afterward followed in the Soviet decree and the
+leaders of the peasants were satisfied. We have the authority of no less
+competent a witness than Litvinov, Bolshevist Minister to England, that
+"the land measure had been 'lifted' bodily from the program of the
+Socialist-Revolutionists."[78] Each of these statements is amply sustained
+by evidence which cannot be disputed or overcome.
+
+That the "land decree" which the Bolshevik government promulgated was a
+compromise with their long-cherished principles admits of no doubt
+whatever. Every one who has kept informed concerning Russian revolutionary
+movements during the past twenty or twenty-five years knows that during all
+that time one of the principal subjects of controversy among Socialists was
+the land question and the proper method of solving it. The "Narodniki," or
+peasant Socialists, later organized into the Socialist-Revolutionary party,
+wanted distribution of the land belonging to the big estates among the
+peasant communes, to be co-operatively owned and managed. They did not want
+land nationalization, which was the program of the Marxists--the Social
+Democrats. This latter program meant that, instead of the land being
+divided among the peasants' communal organizations, it should be owned,
+used, and managed by the state, the principles of large-scale production
+and wage labor being applied to agriculture in the same manner as to
+industry.
+
+The attitude of the Social Democratic party toward the peasant Socialists
+and their program was characterized by that same certainty that small
+agricultural holdings were to pass away, and by the same contemptuous
+attitude toward the peasant life and peasant aspirations that we find in
+the writings of Marx, Engels, Liebknecht, and many other Marxists.[79]
+Lenine himself had always adopted this attitude. He never trusted the
+peasants and was opposed to any program which would give the land to them
+as they desired. Mr. Walling, who spent nearly three years in Russia,
+including the whole period of the Revolution of 1905-06, writes of Lenine's
+position at that time:
+
+    Like Alexinsky, Lenine awaits the agrarian movement ... and hopes
+    that a railway strike with the destruction of the lines of
+    communication and _the support of the peasantry_ may some day put
+    the government of Russia into the people's hands. However, I was
+    shocked to find that this important leader also, though he expects
+    a full co-operation with the peasants on equal terms, _during the
+    Revolution_, feels toward them a very _deep distrust_, thinking
+    them to a large extent bigoted and blindly patriotic, and fearing
+    that they may some day shoot down the working-men as the French
+    peasants did during the Paris Commune.
+
+    The chief basis for this distrust is, of course, the prejudiced
+    feeling that the peasants are not likely to become good
+    Socialists. _It is on this account that Lenine and all the Social
+    Democratic leaders place their hopes on a future development of
+    large agricultural estates in Russia and the increase of the
+    landless agricultural working class, which alone they believe
+    would prove truly Socialist_.[80]
+
+The Russian Social Democratic Labor party, to which Lenine belonged, and of
+which he was an influential leader, adopted in 1906 the following program
+with regard to land ownership:
+
+    1. Confiscation of Church, Monastery, Appanage, Cabinet,[81] and
+    private estate lands, _except small holdings_, and turning them
+    over, together with the state lands, to the great organs of local
+    administration, which have been democratically elected. Land,
+    however, which is necessary as a basis for future colonization,
+    together with the forests and bodies of water, which are of
+    national importance, are to pass into the control of the
+    democratic state.
+
+    2. Wherever conditions are unfavorable for this transformation,
+    the party declares itself in favor of a division among the
+    peasants of such of the private estates as already have the petty
+    farming conditions, or which may be necessary to round out a
+    reasonable holding.
+
+This program was at the time regarded as a compromise. It did not wholly
+suit anybody. The peasant leaders feared the amount of state ownership and
+management involved. On the other hand, the extreme left wing of the Social
+Democrats--Lenine and his friends--wanted the party to proclaim itself in
+favor of _the complete nationalization of all privately owned land, even
+that of the small peasant owners_, but were willing, provided the principle
+were this stated, to accept, as a temporary expedient, division of the land
+in certain exceptional instances. On the other hand, the
+Socialist-Revolutionists wanted, not the distribution of lands among a
+multitude of private owners, as is very generally supposed, but its
+socialization. Their program provided for "the socialization of all
+privately owned lands--that is, the taking of them out of the private
+ownership of persons into the public ownership and _their management by
+democratically organized leagues of communities with the purpose of an
+equitable utilization_." They wanted to avoid the creation of a great army
+of what they described as "wage-slaves of the state" and, on the other
+hand, they wanted to build upon the basis of Russian communism and, as far
+as possible, prevent the extension of capitalist methods--and therefore of
+the class struggle--into the agrarian life of Russia.
+
+When the Bolsheviki came into power they sought first of all to split the
+peasant Socialist movement and gain the support of its extreme left wing.
+For this reason they agreed to adopt the program of the Revolutionary
+Socialist party. It was Marie Spiridonova who made that arrangement
+possible. It was, in fact, a political deal. Lenine and Trotzky, on behalf
+of the Bolshevik government, agreed to accept the land policy of the
+Socialist-Revolutionists, and in return Spiridonova and her friends agreed
+to support the Bolsheviki. There is abundant evidence of the truth of the
+following account of Professor Ross:
+
+    Among the first acts of the Bolsheviki in power was to square
+    their debt to the left wing of the Social Revolutionists, their
+    ally in the _coup d'etat_. The latter would accept only one kind
+    of currency--the expropriation of the private landowners without
+    compensation and the transfer of all land into the hands of the
+    peasant communes. The Bolsheviki themselves, as good Marxists,
+    took no stock in the peasants' commune. As such, pending the
+    introduction of Socialism, they should, perhaps, have nationalized
+    the land and rented it to the highest bidder, regardless of
+    whether it was to be tilled in small parcels without hired labor
+    or in large blocks on the capitalistic plan. The land edict of
+    November does, indeed, decree land nationalism; however, the vital
+    proviso is added that "the use of the land must be equalized--that
+    is, according to local conditions and according to the ability to
+    work and the needs of each individual," and further that "the
+    hiring of labor is not permitted." The administrative machinery is
+    thus described: "All the confiscated land becomes the land capital
+    of the nation. Its distribution among the working-people is to be
+    in charge of the local and central authorities, beginning with the
+    organized rural and urban communities and ending with the
+    provincial central organs." Such is the irony of fate. _Those who
+    had charged the rural land commune with being the most serious
+    brake upon Russia's progress, and who had stigmatized the
+    People-ists as reactionaries and Utopians, now came to enact into
+    law most of their tenets--the equalization of the use of land, the
+    prohibition of the hiring of labor, and everything else!_[82]
+
+The much-praised land policy of the Bolsheviki is, in fact, not a Bolshevik
+policy at all, but one which they have accepted as a compromise for
+temporary political advantage. "Claim everything in sight," said a noted
+American politician on one occasion to his followers. Our followers of the
+Bolsheviki, taught by a very clever propaganda, seem to be acting upon that
+maxim. They claim for the Bolsheviki everything which can in the slightest
+manner win favor with the American public, notwithstanding that it involves
+claiming for the Bolsheviki credit to which they are not entitled. As early
+as May 18, 1917, it was announced by the Provisional Government that the
+"question of the transfer of the land to the toilers" was to be left to the
+Constituent Assembly, and there was never a doubt in the mind of any
+Russian Socialist how that body would settle it; never a moment when it was
+doubted that the Constituent Assembly would be controlled by the
+Socialist-Revolutionary party. When Kerensky became Prime Minister one of
+the first acts of his Cabinet was to create a special committee for the
+purpose of preparing the law for the socialization of the land and the
+necessary machinery for carrying the law into effect. The All-Russian
+Peasants' Congress had, as early as May, five months before the Bolshevik
+counter-revolution, adopted the land policy for which the Bolsheviki now
+are being praised by their admirers in this country. That policy had been
+crystallized into a carefully prepared law which had been approved by the
+Council of Ministers. The Bolsheviki did no more than to issue a crudely
+conceived "decree" which they have never at any time had the power to
+enforce in more than about a fourth of Russia--in place of a law which
+would have embraced all Russia and have been secure and permanent.
+
+On July 16, 1918, Marie Spiridonova, in an address delivered in Petrograd,
+protested vehemently against the manner in which the Bolshevik government
+was departing from the policy it had agreed to maintain with regard to the
+land, and going back to the old Social Democratic ideas. She declared that
+she had been responsible for the decree of February, which provided for the
+socialization of the land. That measure provided for the abolition of
+private property in land, and placed all land in the hands of and under the
+direction of the peasant communes. It was the old Socialist-Revolutionist
+program. But the Bolshevik government had not carried out the law of
+February. Instead, it had resorted to the Social Democratic method of
+nationalization. In the western governments, she said, "great estates were
+being taken over by government departments and were being managed by
+officials, on the ground that state control would yield better results than
+communal ownership. Under this system the peasants were being reduced to
+the state of slaves paid wages by the state. Yet the law provided that
+these estates should be divided among the peasant communes to be tilled by
+the peasants on a co-operative system."[83] Spiridonova protested against
+the attitude of the Bolsheviki toward the peasants, against dividing them
+into classes and placing the greater part of them with the bourgeoisie. She
+insisted that the peasants be regarded as a single class, co-operating with
+the industrial proletariat, yet distinct from it and from the bourgeoisie.
+For our present purpose, it does not matter whether the leaders of the
+Bolsheviki were right or wrong in their decision that state operation was
+better than operation by village co-operatives. Our sole concern here and
+now is the fact that they did not keep faith with the section of the
+peasants they had won over to their side, and the fact that, as this
+incident shows, we cannot regard the formal decrees of the Soviet Republic
+as descriptions of realities.
+
+The Bolsheviki remain to-day, as at the beginning, a counter-revolutionary
+power imposing its rule upon the great mass of the Russian people by armed
+force. There can be little doubt that if a free election could be had
+immediately upon the same basis as that on which the Constituent Assembly
+was elected--namely, universal, secret, equal, direct suffrage, the
+Bolsheviki would be overwhelmingly beaten. There can be little doubt that
+the great mass of the peasantry would support, as before, the candidates of
+the Socialist-Revolutionary party. It is quite true that some of the
+leaders of that party have consented to work with the Bolshevik government.
+Compromises have been effected; the Bolsheviki have conciliated the
+peasants somewhat, and the latter have, in many cases, sought to make the
+best of a bad situation. Many have adopted a passive attitude. But there
+can be no greater mistake than to believe that the Bolsheviki have solved
+the land question to the satisfaction of the peasants and so won their
+allegiance.
+
+
+VII
+
+This survey of the theories and practices of the Bolsheviki would invite
+criticism and distrust if the peace program which culminated in the
+shameful surrender to Germany, the "indecent peace" as the Russians call
+it, were passed over without mention. And yet there is no need to tell here
+a story with which every one is familiar. By that humiliating peace Russia
+lost 780,000 square kilometers of territory, occupied by 56,000,000
+inhabitants. She lost one-third of her total mileage of railways, amounting
+to more than 13,000 miles. She lost, also, 73 per cent. of her iron
+production; 89 per cent. of her coal production, and many thousands of
+factories of various kinds. These latter included 268 sugar-refineries, 918
+textile-factories, 574 breweries, 133 tobacco-factories, 1,685
+distilleries, 244 chemical-factories, 615 paper-mills, and 1,073
+machine-factories.[84] Moreover, it was not an enduring peace and war
+against Germany had to be resumed.
+
+In judging the manner in which the Bolsheviki concluded peace with Germany,
+it is necessary to be on guard against prejudice engendered by the war and
+its passions. The tragi-comedy of Brest-Litovsk, and the pitiable role of
+Trotzky, have naturally been linked together with the manner in which
+Lenine and his companions reached Russia with the aid of the German
+Government, the way in which all the well-known leaders of the Bolsheviki
+had deliberately weakened the morale of the troops at the front, and their
+persistent opposition to all the efforts of Kerensky to restore the
+fighting spirit of the army--all these things combined have convinced many
+thoughtful and close observers that the Bolsheviki were in league with the
+Germans against the Allies. Perhaps the time is not yet ripe for passing
+final judgment upon this matter. Certainly there were ugly-looking
+incidents which appeared to indicate a close co-operation with the Germans.
+
+There was, for example, the acknowledged fact that the Bolsheviki on
+seizing the power of government immediately entered into negotiations with
+the notorious "Parvus," whose role as an agent of the German Government is
+now thoroughly established. "Parvus" is the pseudonym of one of the most
+sinister figures in the history of the Socialist movement, Dr. Alexander
+Helfandt. Born at Odessa, of German-Jewish descent, he studied in Germany
+and in the early eighteen-nineties attained prominence as a prolific and
+brilliant contributor to the German Socialist review, _Die Neue Zeit_. He
+was early "exiled" from Russia, but it was suspected by a great many
+Socialists that in reality his "exile" was simply a device to cover
+employment in the Russian Secret Service as a spy and informer, for which
+the prestige he had gained in Socialist circles was a valuable aid. When
+the Revolution of 1905 broke out Helfandt returned to Russia under the
+terms of the amnesty declared at that time. He at once joined the Leninist
+section of the Social Democratic party, the Bolsheviki. A scandal occurred
+some time later, when the connection of "Parvus" with the Russian
+Government was freely charged against him. Among those who attacked him and
+accused him of being an agent-provocateur were Tseretelli, the
+Socialist-Revolutionist, and Miliukov, the leader of the Cadets.
+
+Some years later, at the time of the uprisings in connection with the Young
+Turk movement, "Parvus" turned up in Constantinople, where he was
+presumably engaged in work for the German Government. This was commonly
+believed in European political circles, though denied at the time by
+"Parvus" himself. One thing is certain, namely, that although he was
+notoriously poor when he went there--his financial condition was well known
+to his Socialist associates--he returned at the beginning of 1915 a very
+rich man. He explained his riches by saying that he had, while at
+Constantinople, Bucharest, and Sofia, successfully speculated in war wheat.
+He wrote this explanation in the German Socialist paper, _Die Glocke_, and
+drew from Hugo Hasse the following observation: "I blame nobody for being
+wealthy; I only ask if it is the role of a Social Democrat to become a
+profiteer of the war."[85] Very soon we find this precious gentleman
+settled in Copenhagen, where he established a "Society for Studying the
+Social Consequences of the War," which was, of course, entirely pro-German.
+This society is said to have exercised considerable influence among the
+Russians in Copenhagen and to have greatly influenced many Danish
+Socialists to take Germany's side. According to _Pravda_, the Bolshevik
+organ, the German Government, through the intermediary of German Social
+Democrats, established a working relation with Danish trade-unions and the
+Danish Social Democratic party, whereby the Danish unions got the coal
+needed in Copenhagen at a figure below the market price. Then the Danish
+party sent its leader, Borgdjerg, to Petrograd as an emissary to place
+before the Petrograd Soviet the terms of peace of the German Majority
+Socialists, which were, of course, the terms of the German Government. We
+find "Parvus" at the same time, as he is engaged in this sort of intrigue,
+associated with one Furstenberg in shipping drugs into Russia and food from
+Russia into Germany.[86] According to Grumbach,[87] he sought to induce
+prominent Norwegian Socialists to act as intermediaries to inform certain
+Norwegian syndicates that Germany would grant them a monopoly of coal
+consignments if the Norwegian Social Democratic press would adopt a more
+friendly attitude toward Germany and the Social Democratic members in the
+Norwegian parliament would urge the stoppage or the limitation of fish
+exports to England.
+
+During this period "Parvus" was bitterly denounced by Plechanov, by
+Alexinsky and other Russian Socialists as an agent of the Central Powers.
+He was denounced also by Lenine and Trotzky and by _Pravda_. Lenine
+described him as "the vilest of bandits and betrayers." It was therefore
+somewhat astonishing for those familiar with these facts to read the
+following communication, which appeared in the German Socialist press on
+November 30, 1917, and, later, in the British Socialist organ, _Justice_:
+
+    STOCKHOLM, November 20.--The Foreign Relations Committee
+    of the Bolsheviki makes the following communication: "The German
+    comrade, 'Parvus,' has brought to the Bolshevik Committee at
+    Stockholm the congratulations of the _Parteivorstand_ of the
+    Majority Social Democrats, who declare their solidarity with the
+    struggles of the Russian proletariat and with its request to begin
+    pourparlers immediately on the basis of a democratic peace without
+    annexations and indemnities. The Foreign Relations Committee of
+    the Bolsheviki has transmitted these declarations to the Central
+    Committee at Petrograd, as well as to the Soviets."
+
+When Hugo Hasse questioned Philipp Scheidemann about the negotiations which
+were going on through "Parvus," Scheidemann replied that it was the
+Bolsheviki themselves who had invited "Parvus" to come to Stockholm for the
+purpose of opening up negotiations. This statement was denounced as a lie
+by Karl Radek in _Pravda_. Some day, doubtless, the truth will be known;
+for the present it is enough to note the fact that as early as November the
+Bolsheviki were negotiating through such a discredited agent of the Central
+Powers as Dr. Alexander Helfandt, otherwise "Parvus," the well-known
+Marxist! Such facts as this, added to those previously noticed, tended
+inevitably to strengthen the conviction that Lenine and Trotsky were the
+pliant and conscious tools of Germany all the time, and that the protests
+of Trotzky at Brest-Litovsk were simply stage-play.
+
+But for all that, unless and until official, documentary evidence is
+forthcoming which proves them to have been in such relations with the
+German Government and military authorities, they ought not to be condemned
+upon the chain of suspicious circumstances, strong as that chain apparently
+is. The fact is that they had to make peace, and make it quickly. Kerensky,
+had he been permitted to hold on, would equally have had to make a separate
+peace, and make it quickly. Only one thing could have delayed that for
+long--namely, the arrival of an adequate force of Allied troops on the
+Russian front to stiffen the morale and to take the burden of fighting off
+from the Russians. Of that there was no sign and no promise or likelihood.
+Kerensky knew that he would have had to make peace, at almost any cost and
+on almost any terms, if he remained in power. If the Bolsheviki appear in
+the light of traitors to the Allies, it should be remembered that pressure
+of circumstances would have forced even such a loyal friend of the Allies
+as Kerensky certainly proved himself to be to make a separate peace,
+practically on Germany's terms, in a very little while. It was not a matter
+of months, but of weeks at most, probably of days.
+
+Russia had to have peace. The nation was war-weary and exhausted. The
+Allies had not understood the situation--indeed, they never have understood
+Russia, even to this day--and had bungled right along. What made it
+possible for the Bolsheviki to assert their rule so easily was the fact
+that they promised immediate peace, and the great mass of the Russian
+workers wanted immediate peace above everything else. They were so eager
+for peace that so long as they could get it they cared at the time for
+nothing. Literally nothing else mattered. As we have seen, the Bolshevik
+leaders had strenuously denied wanting to make a "separate peace." There is
+little reason for doubting that they were sincere in this in the sense that
+what they wanted was a _general_ peace, if that could be possibly obtained.
+Peace they had to have, as quickly as possible. If they could not persuade
+their Allies to join with them in making such a general peace, they were
+willing to make a _separate_ peace. That is quite different from _wanting_
+a separate peace from the first. There was, indeed, in the demand made at
+the beginning of December upon the Allies to restate their war aims within
+a period of seven days an arrogant and provocative tone which invited the
+suspicion that the ultimatum--for such it was--had not been conceived in
+good faith; that it was deliberately framed in such a manner as to prevent
+compliance by the Allies. And it may well be the fact that Lenine and
+Trotzky counted upon the inevitable refusal to convince the Russian people,
+and especially the Russian army, that the Allied nations were fighting for
+imperialistic ends, just as the Bolsheviki had always charged. The
+Machiavellian cunning of such a policy is entirely characteristic of the
+conspirator type.
+
+On December 14th the armistice was signed at Brest-Litovsk, to last for a
+period of twenty-eight days. On December 5th, the Bolsheviki had published
+the terms upon which they desired to effect the armistice. These terms,
+which the Germans scornfully rejected, provided that the German forces
+which had been occupied on the Russian front should not be sent to other
+fronts to fight against the Allies, and that the German troops should
+retire from the Russian islands held by them. In the armistice as it was
+finally signed at Brest-Litovsk there was a clause which, upon its face,
+seemed to prove that Trotzky had kept faith with the Allies. The clause
+provided that there should be no transfer of troops by either side, for the
+purpose of military operations, during the armistice, from the front
+between the Baltic and the Black Sea. This, however, was, from the German
+point of view, merely a _pro forma_ arrangement, a "scrap of paper."
+Grumbach wrote to _L'Humanite_ that on December 20th Berlin was full of
+German soldiers from the Russian front en route to the western front. He
+said that he had excellent authority for saying that this had been called
+to the attention of Lenine and Trotzky by the Independent Social Democrats,
+but that, "nevertheless, they diplomatically shut their eyes."[88] It is
+more than probable that, in the circumstances, neither Lenine nor Trotzky
+cared much if at all for such a breach of the terms of the armistice, but,
+had their attitude been otherwise, what could they have done? They were as
+helpless as ever men were in the world, as subsequent events proved.
+
+As one reads the numerous declamatory utterances of Trotzky in those
+critical days of early December, 1917, the justice of Lenine's scornful
+description of his associate as a "man who blinds himself with
+revolutionary phrases" becomes manifest. It is easy to understand the
+strained relations that existed between the two men. His "neither war nor
+peace" gesture--it was no more!--his dramatic refusal to sign the stiffened
+peace terms, his desire to call all Russia to arms again to fight the
+Germans, his determination to create a vast "Red Army" to renew the war
+against Germany, and his professed willingness to "accept the services of
+American officers in training that army," all indicated a mind given to
+illusions and stone blind to realities. Lenine at least knew that the game
+was up. He knew that the game into which he had so coolly entered when he
+left Switzerland, and which he had played with all his skill and cunning,
+was at an end and that the Germans had won. The Germans behaved with a
+perfidy that is unmatched in modern history, disregarded the armistice they
+had signed, and savagely hurled their forces against the defenseless,
+partially demobilized and trusting Russians. There was nothing left for the
+Bolsheviki to do. They had delivered Russia to the Germans. In March the
+"indecent peace" was signed, with what result we know. Bolshevism had been
+the ally of Prussian militarism. Consciously or unconsciously, willingly or
+unwillingly, Lenine, Trotzky, and the other Bolshevik leaders had done all
+that men could do to make the German military lords masters of the world.
+Had there been a similar movement in France, England, the United States, or
+even Italy, to-day the Hohenzollerns and Habsburgs would be upon their
+thrones, realizing the fulfilment of the Pan-German vision.
+
+
+VIII
+
+In view of the fact that so many of our American pacifists have glorified
+the Bolsheviki, it may be well to remind them, if they have forgotten, or
+to inform them, if they do not know it, that their admiration is by no
+means reciprocated. Both Lenine and Trotzky have spoken and written in
+terms of utter disdain of pacifist movements in general and of the
+pacifists of England and America in particular. They have insisted that,
+_in present society_, disarmament is really a reactionary proposal. The
+inclusion in the Constitution, which they have forced upon Russia by armed
+might, of _permanent universal compulsory military service_ is not by
+accident. They believe that only when all nations have become Socialist
+nations will it be a proper policy for Socialists to favor disarmament. It
+would be interesting to know how our American admirers and defenders of
+Bolshevism, who are all anti-conscriptionists and ultra-pacifists, so far
+as can be discovered, reconcile their position with that of the Bolsheviki
+who base their state, not as a temporary expedient, _but as a matter of
+principle_, upon universal, compulsory military service! What, one wonders,
+do these American Bolsheviki worshipers think of the teaching of these
+paragraphs from an article by Lenine?[89]
+
+    Disarmament is a Socialistic ideal. In Socialist society there
+    will be no more wars, which means that disarmament will have been
+    realized. But he is not a Socialist who expects the realization of
+    Socialism _without_ the social revolution and the dictatorship of
+    the proletariat. Dictatorship is a government power, depending
+    directly upon force, and, in the twentieth century, force means,
+    not fists and clubs, but armies. To insert "disarmament" into our
+    program is equivalent to saying, we are opposed to the use of
+    arms. But such a statement would contain not a grain of Marxism,
+    any more than would the equivalent statement, we are opposed to
+    the use of force.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+    _A suppressed class which has no desire to learn the use of arms,
+    and to bear arms, deserves nothing else than to be treated as
+    slaves_. We cannot, unless we wish to transform ourselves into
+    mere bourgeois pacifists, forget that we are living in a society
+    based on classes, and that there is no escape from such a society,
+    except by the class struggle and the overthrow of the power of the
+    ruling class.
+
+    In every class society, whether it be based on slavery, serfdom,
+    or, as at the present moment, on wage-labor, the class of the
+    oppressors is an armed class. Not only the standing army of the
+    present day, but also the present-day popular militia--even in the
+    most democratic bourgeois republics, as in Switzerland--means an
+    armament of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat....
+
+    How can you, in the face of this fact, ask the revolutionary
+    Social Democracy to set up the "demand" of "disarmament"? _To ask
+    this is to renounce completely the standpoint of the class
+    struggle, to give up the very thought of revolution_. Our
+    watchword must be: to arm the proletariat so that it may defeat,
+    expropriate, and disarm the bourgeoisie. This is the only possible
+    policy of the revolutionary class, a policy arising directly from
+    the _actual evolution_ of capitalistic militarism, in fact,
+    dictated by the evolution. Only after having disarmed the
+    bourgeoisie can the proletariat, without betraying its historic
+    mission, cast all weapons to the scrap-heap; and there is no doubt
+    that the proletariat will do this, but only then, and not by any
+    possibility before then.
+
+How is it possible for our extreme pacifists, with their relentless
+opposition to military force in all its forms to conscription, to universal
+military service, to armaments of all kinds, even for defensive purposes,
+and to voluntarily enlisted armies even, to embrace Bolshevism with
+enthusiasm, resting as it does upon the basis of the philosophy so frankly
+stated by Lenine, is a question for which no answer seems wholly adequate.
+Of course, what Lenine advocates is class armament within the nation, for
+civil war--the war of the classes. But he is not opposed to national
+armaments, as such, nor willing to support disarmament as a national policy
+_until the time comes when an entirely socialized humanity finds itself
+freed from the necessity of arming against anybody_. There is probably not
+a militarist in America to-day who, however bitterly opposed to disarmament
+as a present policy, would not agree that if, in some future time, mankind
+reaches the happy condition of universal Socialism, disarmament will then
+become practicable and logical. It would not be difficult for General Wood
+to subscribe to that doctrine, I think. It would not have been difficult
+for Mr. Roosevelt to subscribe to it.
+
+Not only is Lenine willing to support national armaments, and even to fight
+for the defense of national rights, whenever an attack on these is also an
+attack on proletarian rights--which he believes to be the case in the
+continued war against Germany, he goes much farther than this _and provides
+a theoretical justification for a Socialist policy of passive acceptance of
+ever-increasing militarism_. He draws a strangely forced parallel between
+the Socialist attitude toward the trusts and the attitude which ought to be
+taken toward armaments. We know, he argues, that trusts bring great evils.
+Against the evils we struggle, but how? Not by trying to do away with the
+trusts, for we regard the trusts as steps in progress. We must go onward,
+through the trust system to Socialism. In a similar way we should not
+deplore "the militarization of the populations." If the bourgeoisie
+militarizes all the men, and all the boys, nay, even all the women, why--so
+much the better! "Never will the women of an oppressed class that is really
+revolutionary be content" to demand disarmament. On the contrary, they will
+encourage their sons to bear the arms and "learn well the business of war."
+Of course, this knowledge they will use, "not in order that they may shoot
+at their brothers, the workers of other countries, as they are doing in the
+present war ... but in order that they may struggle against the bourgeoisie
+in their own country, in order that they may put an end to exploitation,
+poverty, and war, not by the path of good-natured wishes, but by the path
+of victory over the bourgeoisie and of disarmament of the bourgeoisie."[90]
+ Universally the working class has taken a position the
+very opposite of this. Universally we find the organized working class
+favoring disarmament, peace agreements, and covenants in general opposing
+extensions of what Lenine describes as "the militarization of populations."
+For this universality of attitude and action there can only be one adequate
+explanation--namely, the instinctive class consciousness of the workers.
+But, according to Lenine, this instinctive class consciousness is all
+wrong; somehow or other it expresses itself in a "bourgeois" policy. The
+workers ought to welcome the efforts of the ruling class to militarize and
+train in the arts of war not only the men of the nations, but the boys and
+even the women as well. Some day, if this course be followed, there will be
+two great armed classes in every nation and between these will occur the
+decisive war which shall establish the supremacy of the most numerous and
+powerful class. Socialism is thus to be won, not by the conquests of reason
+and of conscience, but by brute force.
+
+Obviously, there is no point of sympathy between this brutal and arrogant
+gospel of force and the striving of modern democracy for the peaceful
+organization of the world, for disarmament, a league of nations, and, in
+general, the supplanting of force of arms by the force of reason and
+morality. There is a Prussian quality in Lenine's philosophy. He is the
+Treitschke of social revolt, brutal, relentless, and unscrupulous, glorying
+in might, which is, for him, the only right. And that is what characterizes
+the whole Bolshevik movement: it is the infusion into the class strife and
+struggles of the world the same brutality and the same faith that might is
+right which made Prussian militarism the menace it was to civilization.
+
+And just as the world of civilized mankind recognized Prussian militarism
+as its deadly enemy, to be overcome at all costs, so, too, Bolshevism must
+be overcome. And that can best be done, not by attempting to drown it in
+blood, but by courageously and consistently setting ourselves to the task
+of removing the social oppression, the poverty, and the servitude which
+produce the desperation of soul that drives men to Bolshevism. The remedy
+for Bolshevism is a sane and far-reaching program of constructive social
+democracy.
+
+
+
+
+POSTSCRIPTUM: A PERSONAL STATEMENT
+
+
+This book is the fulfilment of a promise to a friend. Soon after my return
+from Europe, in November, I spent part of a day in New York discussing
+Bolshevism with two friends. One of these is a Russian Socialist, who has
+lived many years in America, a citizen of the United States, and a man
+whose erudition and fidelity to the working-class movement during many
+years have long commanded my admiration and reverence. The other friend is
+a native American, also a Socialist. A sincere Christian, he has identified
+his faith in the religion of Jesus and his faith in democratic Socialism.
+The two are not conflicting forces, or even separate ones, but merely
+different and complementary aspects of the same faith. He is a man who is
+universally loved and honored for his nobility of character and his
+generous idealism. While in Europe I had spent much time consulting with
+Russian friends in Paris, Rome, and other cities, and had collected a
+considerable amount of authentic material relating to Bolshevism and the
+Bolsheviki. I had not the slightest intention of using this material to
+make a book; in fact, my plans contemplated a very different employment of
+my time. But, in the course of the discussion, my American Socialist friend
+asked me to "jot down" for him some of the things I had said, and,
+especially, to write, in a letter, what I believed to be the psychology of
+Bolshevism. This, in an unguarded moment, I undertook to do.
+
+When I set out, a few days later, to redeem my promise, I found that, in
+order to make things intelligible, it was absolutely necessary to explain
+the historical backgrounds of the Russian revolutionary movement, to
+describe the point of view of various persons and groups with some detail,
+and to quote quite extensively from the documentary material I had
+gathered. Naturally, the limits of a letter were quickly outgrown and I
+found that my response to my friend's innocent request approached the
+length of a small volume. Even so, it was quite unsatisfactory. It left
+many things unexplained and much of my own thought obscure. I decided then
+to rewrite the whole thing and make a book of it, thus making available for
+what I hope will be a large number of readers what I had at first intended
+only for a dear friend.
+
+I am very conscious of the imperfections of the book as it stands. It has
+been written under conditions far from favorable, crowded into a very busy
+life. My keenest critics will, I am sure, be less conscious of its defects
+than I am. It is, however, an earnest contribution to a very important
+discussion, and, I venture to hope, with all its demerits, a useful one. If
+it aids a single person to a clearer comprehension of the inherent
+wrongfulness of the Bolshevist philosophy and method, I shall be rewarded.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+_So here, my dear Will, is the fulfilment of my promise._
+
+
+
+
+APPENDICES
+
+
+I. AN APPEAL TO THE PROLETARIAT BY THE PETROGRAD WORKMEN'S AND
+SOLDIERS' COUNCIL
+
+II. HOW THE RUSSIAN PEASANTS FOUGHT FOR A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY--A
+REPORT TO THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST BUREAU
+
+III. FORMER SOCIALIST PREMIER OF FINLAND ON BOLSHEVISM
+
+
+
+
+APPENDIX I
+
+AN APPEAL TO THE PROLETARIAT BY THE PETROGRAD WORKMEN'S AND SOLDIERS'
+COUNCIL
+
+
+COMRADES:
+
+_Proletarians and Working-people of all Countries_:
+
+We, Russian workers and soldiers, united in the Petrograd Workmen's and
+Soldiers' Delegate Council, send you our warmest greetings and the news of
+great events. The democracy of Russia has overthrown the century-old
+despotism of the Czars and enters your ranks as a rightful member and as a
+powerful force in the battle for our common liberation. Our victory is a
+great victory for the freedom and democracy of the world. The principal
+supporter of reaction in the world, the "gendarme of Europe," no longer
+exists. May the earth over his grave become a heavy stone! Long live
+liberty, long live the international solidarity of the proletariat and its
+battle for the final victory!
+
+Our cause is not yet entirely won. Not all the shadows of the old regime
+have been scattered and not a few enemies are gathering their forces
+together against the Russian Revolution. Nevertheless, our conquests are
+great. The peoples of Russia will express their will in the Constitutional
+convention which is to be called within a short time upon the basis of
+universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage. And now it may already be
+said with certainty in advance that the democratic republic will triumph in
+Russia. The Russian people is in possession of complete political liberty.
+Now it can say an authoritative word about the internal self-government of
+the country and about its foreign policy. And in addressing ourselves to
+all the peoples who are being destroyed and ruined in this terrible war, we
+declare that the time has come in which the decisive struggle against the
+attempts at conquest by the governments of all the nations must be begun.
+The time has come in which the peoples must take the matter of deciding the
+questions of war and peace into their own hands.
+
+Conscious of its own revolutionary strength, the democracy of Russia
+declares that it will fight with all means against the policy of conquest
+of its ruling classes, and it summons the peoples of Europe to united,
+decisive action for peace. We appeal to our brothers, to the
+German-Austrian coalition, and above all to the German proletariat. The
+first day of the war you were made to believe that in raising your weapons
+against absolutist Russia you were defending European civilization against
+Asiatic despotism. In this many of you found the justification of the
+support that was accorded to the war. Now also this justification has
+vanished. Democratic Russia cannot menace freedom and civilization.
+
+We shall firmly defend our own liberty against all reactionary threats,
+whether they come from without or within. The Russian Revolution will not
+retreat before the bayonets of conquerors, and it will not allow itself to
+be trampled to pieces by outside military force. We call upon you to throw
+off the yoke of your absolutist regime, as the Russian people has shaken
+off the autocracy of the Czars. Refuse to serve as the tools of conquest
+and power in the hands of the kings, Junkers, and bankers, and we shall,
+with common efforts, put an end to the fearful butchery that dishonors
+humanity and darkens the great days of the birth of Russian liberty.
+
+Working-men of all countries! In fraternally stretching out our hands to
+you across the mountains of our brothers' bodies, across the sea of
+innocent blood and tears, across the smoking ruins of cities and villages,
+across the destroyed gifts of civilization, we summon you to the work of
+renewing and solidifying international unity. In that lies the guaranty of
+our future triumph and of the complete liberation of humanity.
+
+Working-men of all countries, unite!
+
+    TCHCHEIDZE, _the President_.
+    PETROGRAD, _April, 1917_.
+
+
+
+
+APPENDIX II
+
+HOW THE RUSSIAN PEASANTS FOUGHT FOR A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY[91]
+
+
+A report to the International Socialist Bureau by Inna Rakitnikov,
+Vice-President of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Delegates,
+placing themselves upon the grounds of the defense of the Constituent
+Assembly.
+
+With a letter-preface by the citizen, E. Roubanovitch, member of the
+International Socialist Bureau.
+
+    _To the Executive Committee of the International Socialist
+    Bureau_:
+
+    DEAR COMRADES,--The citizen Inna Rakitnikov has lately
+    come from Petrograd to Paris for personal reasons that are
+    peculiarly tragic. At the time of her departure the Executive
+    Committee of the Second Soviet of Peasant Delegates of All-Russia,
+    of which she is one of the vice-presidents, requested her to make
+    to the International Socialist Bureau a detailed report of the
+    fights that this organization had to make against the Bolsheviki
+    in order to realize the convocation of the Constituent Assembly.
+
+    This is the report under the title of a document that I present
+    here, without commentary, asking you to communicate it without
+    delay to all the sections of the International. Two words of
+    explanation, only: First, I wish to draw your attention to the
+    fact that this is the second time that the Executive Committee of
+    the Soviet of the Peasants of All-Russia addresses itself publicly
+    to the International.
+
+    At the time of my journey to Stockholm in the month of September,
+    1917, I made, at a session of the Holland, Scandinavian committee,
+    presided over by Branting, a communication in the name of the
+    Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasants. I handed over on
+    this occasion to our secretary, Camille Huysmans, an appeal to the
+    democrats of the entire world, in which the Executive Committee
+    indicated clearly its position in the questions of the world war
+    and of agrarian reform, and vindicated its place in the Workers'
+    and Socialist International family.
+
+    I must also present to you the author of this report. The citizen
+    Rakitnikov, a member of the Russian Revolutionary Socialist party,
+    has worked for a long time in the ranks of this party as a
+    publicist and organizer and propagandist, especially among the
+    peasants. She has known long years of prison, of Siberia, of
+    exile. Before and during the war until the beginning of the
+    Revolution she lived as a political fugitive in Paris. While being
+    a partizan convinced of the necessity of national defense of
+    invaded countries against the imperialistic aggression of German
+    militarism--in which she is in perfect accord with the members of
+    our party such as Stepan Sletof, Iakovlef, and many other
+    voluntary Russian republicans, all dead facing the enemy in the
+    ranks of the French army--the citizen Rakitnikov belonged to the
+    international group. I affirm that her sincere and matured
+    testimony cannot be suspected of partizanship or of dogmatic
+    partiality against the Bolsheviki, who, as you know, tried to
+    cover their follies and their abominable crimes against the plan
+    of the Russian people, and against all the other Socialist
+    parties, under the lying pretext of internationalist ideas, ideas
+    which they have, in reality, trampled under foot and betrayed.
+
+    Yours fraternally,
+    E. ROUBANOVITCH,
+    _June 28, 1918._
+    _Member of the B.S.I._
+
+"The Bolsheviki who promised liberty, equality, peace, etc., have not been
+ashamed to follow in the footsteps of Czarism. It is not liberty; it is
+tyranny." (Extract from a letter of a young Russian Socialist, an
+enthusiast of liberty who died all too soon.)
+
+
+I
+
+_Organization of the Peasants after the Revolution in Soviets of Peasant
+Delegates_
+
+
+A short time after the Revolution of February the Russian peasants grouped
+themselves in a National Soviet of Peasant Delegates at the First Congress
+of the Peasants of All-Russia, which took place at Petrograd. The Executive
+Committee of this Soviet was elected. It was composed of well-known leaders
+of the Revolutionary Socialist party and of peasant delegates sent from the
+country. Without adhering officially to the Revolutionary Socialist party,
+the Soviet of Peasant Delegates adopted the line of conduct of this party.
+While co-ordinating its tactics with the party's, it nevertheless remained
+an organization completely independent. The Bolsheviki, who at this
+Congress attempted to subject the peasants to their influence, had not at
+the time any success. The speeches of Lenine and the other members of this
+party did not meet with any sympathy, but on the contrary provoked lively
+protest. The Executive Committee had as its organ the paper _Izvestya of
+the National Soviet of Peasant Delegates_. Thousands of copies of this were
+scattered throughout the country. Besides the central national Soviet there
+existed local organizations, the Soviets, the government districts who were
+in constant communication with the Executive Committee staying at
+Petrograd.
+
+From its foundation the Executive Committee exercised great energy in the
+work of the union and the organization of the peasant masses, and in the
+development of the Socialist conscience in their breasts. Its members
+spread thousands and hundreds of thousands of copies of pamphlets of the
+Revolutionary Socialist party, exposing in simple form the essence of
+Socialism and the history of the International explaining the sense and the
+importance of the Revolution in Russia, the history of the fight that
+preceded it, showing the significance of the liberties acquired. They
+insisted, above all, on the importance of the socialization of the soil and
+the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. A close and living tie was
+created between the members of the Executive Committee staying at Petrograd
+and the members in the provinces. The Executive Committee was truly the
+expression of the will of the mass of the Russian peasants.
+
+The Minister of Agriculture and the principal agrarian committee were at
+this time occupied in preparing the groundwork of the realization of
+socialization of the soil; the Revolutionary Socialist party did not cease
+to press the government to act in this sense. Agrarian committees were
+formed at once to fight against the disorganized recovery of lands by the
+peasants, and to take under their control large properties where
+exploitation based on the co-operative principle was in progress of
+organization; agricultural improvements highly perfected would thus be
+preserved against destruction and pillage. At the same time agrarian
+committees attended to a just distribution among the peasants of the lands
+of which they had been despoiled.
+
+The peasants, taken in a body, and in spite of the agrarian troubles which
+occurred here and there, awaited the reform with patience, understanding
+all the difficulties which its realization required and all the
+impossibilities of perfecting the thing hastily. The Executive Committee of
+the Soviet of Peasants' Delegates played in this respect an important role.
+It did all it could to explain to the peasants the complexity of the
+problem in order to prevent them from attempting anything anarchistic, or
+to attempt a disorganized recovery of lands which could end only with the
+further enrichment of peasants who were already rich.
+
+Such was, in its general aspect, the action of the National Soviet of
+Peasants' Delegates, which, in the month of August, 1917, addressed,
+through the intermediary of the International Socialist Bureau, an appeal
+to the democracies of the world. In order to better understand the events
+which followed, we must consider for a moment the general conditions which
+at that time existed in Russia, and in the midst of which the action of
+this organization was taking place.
+
+
+II
+
+_The Difficulties of the Beginning of the Revolution_
+
+
+The honeymoon of the Revolution had passed rapidly. Joy gave place to cares
+and alarms. Autocracy had bequeathed to the country an unwieldy heritage:
+the army and the whole mechanism of the state were disorganized. Taking
+advantage of the listlessness of the army, the Bolshevist propaganda
+developed and at the same time increased the desire of the soldiers to
+fight no more. The disorganization was felt more and more at the front; at
+the same time anarchy increased in the interior of the country; production
+diminished; the productiveness of labor was lowered, and an eight-hour day
+became in fact a five or six-hour day. The strained relations between the
+workers and the administration were such that certain factories preferred
+to close. The central power suffered frequent crises; the Cadets, fearing
+the responsibilities, preferred to remain out of power.
+
+All this created a state of unrest and hastened the preparations for the
+election of the Constituent Assembly, toward which the eyes of the whole
+country were turned. Nevertheless, the country was far from chaos and from
+the anarchy into which further events plunged it. Young Russia, not
+accustomed to liberty, without experience in political life and autonomous
+action, was far from that hopeless state to which the Bolsheviki reduced it
+some months later. The people had confidence in the Socialists, in the
+Revolutionary Socialist party, which then held sway everywhere, in the
+municipalities, the zemstvos, and in the Soviets; they had confidence in
+the Constituent Assembly which would restore order and work out the laws.
+All that was necessary was to combat certain characteristics and certain
+peculiarities of the existence of the Russian people, which impelled them
+toward anarchy, instead of encouraging them, as did the Bolsheviki, who, in
+this respect, followed the line of least resistance.
+
+The Bolshevist propaganda did all within its power to weaken the
+Provisional Government, to discredit it in the eyes of the people, to
+increase the licentiousness at the front and disorganization in the
+interior of the country. They proclaimed that the "Imperialists" sent the
+soldiers to be massacred, but what they did not say is that under actual
+conditions it was necessary for a revolutionary people to have a
+revolutionary army to defend its liberty. They spoke loudly for a
+counter-revolution and for counter-revolutionaries who await but the
+propitious moment to take hold of the government, while in reality the
+complete failure of the insurrection of Kornilov showed that the
+counter-revolution could rest on nothing, that there was no place for it
+then in the life of Russia.
+
+In fine, the situation of the country was difficult, but not critical. The
+united efforts of the people and all the thousands of forces of the country
+would have permitted it to come to the end of its difficulties and to find
+a solution of the situation.
+
+
+III
+
+_The Insurrection of Kornilov_
+
+
+But now the insurrection of Kornilov broke out. It was entirely unexpected
+by all the Socialist parties, by their central committees, and, of course,
+by the Socialist Ministers. Petrograd was in no way prepared for an attack
+of this kind. In the course of the evening of the fatal day when Kornilov
+approached Petrograd, the central committee of the Revolutionary Socialist
+party received by telephone, from the Palace of Hiver, the news of the
+approach of Kornilovien troops. This news revolutionized everybody. A
+meeting of all the organizations took place at Smolny; the members of the
+party alarmed by the news, and other persons wishing to know the truth
+about the events, or to receive indications as to what should be done, came
+there to a reunion. It was a strange picture that Smolny presented that
+night. The human torrent rushed along its corridors, committees and
+commissions sat in its side apartments. They asked one another what was
+happening, what was to be done. News succeeded news. One thing was certain.
+Petrograd was not prepared for the fight. It was not protected by anything,
+and the Cossacks who followed Kornilov could easily take it.
+
+The National Soviet of Peasants' Delegates in the session that it held that
+same night at No. 6 Fontaka Street adopted a resolution calling all the
+peasants to armed resistance against Kornilov. The Central Executive
+Committee with the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates established
+a special organization which was to defend Petrograd and to fight against
+the insurrection. Detachments of volunteers and of soldiers were directed
+toward the locality where Kornilov was, to get information and to organize
+a propaganda among the troops that followed the General, and in case of
+failure to fight hand to hand. As they quit in the morning they did not
+know how things would turn; they were rather pessimistic with regard to the
+issue of the insurrection for the Socialists.
+
+The end of this conspiracy is known. The troops that followed Kornilov left
+him as soon as they found out the truth. In this respect, everything ended
+well, but this event had profound and regrettable circumstances.
+
+The acute deplorable crisis of the central power became chronic. The
+Cadets, compromised by their participation in the Kornilov conspiracy,
+preferred to remain apart. The Socialist-Revolutionists did not see clearly
+what there was at the bottom of the whole affair. _It was as much as any
+one knew at the moment_. Kerensky, in presence of the menace of the
+counter-revolution on the right and of the growing anarchy on the extreme
+left, would have called to Petrograd a part of the troops from the front to
+stem the tide. Such was the role of different persons in this story. It is
+only later, when all the documents will be shown, that the story can be
+verified, but at all events it is beyond doubt that the Revolutionary
+Socialist party was in no wise mixed in this conspiracy. The conspiracy of
+Kornilov completely freed the hands of the Bolsheviki. In the Pravda, and
+in other Bolshevist newspapers, complaints were read of the danger of a new
+counter-revolution which was developing with the complicity of Kerensky
+acting in accord or in agreement with the traitor Cadets. The public was
+excited against the Socialist-Revolutionists, who were accused of having
+secretly helped this counter-revolution. The Bolsheviki alone, said its
+organs, had saved the Revolution; to them alone was due the failure of the
+Kornilov insurrection.
+
+The Bolsheviki agitation assumed large proportions. Copies of the _Pravda_,
+spread lavishly here and there, were poisoned with calumny, campaigns
+against the other parties, boasting gross flatteries addressed to the
+soldiers and appeals to trouble. Bolsheviki meetings permeated with the
+same spirit were organized at Petrograd, Moscow, and other cities.
+Bolshevist agitators set out for the front at the same time with copies of
+the _Pravda_ and other papers, and the Bolsheviki enjoyed, during this
+time--as Lenine himself admits--complete liberty. Their chiefs, compromised
+in the insurrection of June 3d, had been given their freedom.
+
+Their principal watchword was "Down with the war!" "Kerensky and the other
+conciliators," they cried, "want war and do not want peace. Kerensky will
+give you neither peace, nor land, nor bread, nor Constituent Assembly. Down
+with the traitor and the counter-revolutionists! They want to smother the
+Revolution. We demand peace. We will give you peace, land to the peasants,
+factories and work to the workmen!" Under this simple form the agitation
+was followed up among the masses and found a propitious ground, first among
+the soldiers who were tired of war and athirst for peace. In the Soviet of
+the Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates of Petrograd the Bolshevist party
+soon found itself strengthened and fortified. Its influence was also
+considerable among the sailors of the Baltic fleet. Cronstadt was entirely
+in their hands. New elections of the Central Executive Committee of the
+Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates soon became necessary; they
+gave a big majority to the Bolsheviki. The old bureau, Tchcheidze at its
+head, had to leave; the Bolsheviki triumphed clamorously.
+
+To fight against the Bolsheviki the Executive Committee of the National
+Soviet of Peasants' Delegates decided at the beginning of December to call
+a Second General Peasants' Congress. This was to decide if the peasants
+would defend the Constituent Assembly or if they would follow the
+Bolsheviki. This Congress had, in effect, a decisive importance. It showed
+what was the portion of the peasant class that upheld the Bolsheviki. It
+was principally the peasants in soldiers' dress, the "declasse soldiers,"
+men taken from the country life by the war, from their natural
+surroundings, and desiring but one thing, the end of the war. The peasants
+who had come from the country had, on the contrary, received the mandate to
+uphold the Constituent Assembly. They firmly maintained their point of view
+and resisted all the attempts of the Bolsheviki and the
+"Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left" (who followed them blindly) to make
+their influence prevail. The speech of Lenine was received with hostility;
+as for Trotzky, who, some time before, had publicly threatened with the
+guillotine all the "enemies of the Revolution," they prevented him from
+speaking, crying out: "Down with the tyrant! Guillotineur! Assassin!" To
+give his speech Trotzky, accompanied by his faithful "capotes," was obliged
+to repair to another hall.
+
+The Second Peasants' Congress was thus distinctly split into two parties.
+The Bolsheviki tried by every means to elude a straight answer to the
+question, "Does the Congress wish to uphold the Constituent Assembly?" They
+prolonged the discussion, driving the peasants to extremities by every kind
+of paltry discussion on foolish questions, hoping to tire them out and thus
+cause a certain number of them to return home. The tiresome discussions
+carried on for ten days, with the effect that a part of the peasants,
+seeing nothing come from it, returned home. But the peasants had, in spite
+of all, the upper hand; by a roll-call vote 359 against 314 pronounced
+themselves for the defense without reserve of the Constituent Assembly.
+
+Any work in common for the future was impossible. The fraction of the
+peasants that pronounced itself for the Constituent Assembly continued to
+sit apart, named its Executive Committee, and decided to continue the fight
+resolutely. The Bolsheviki, on their part, took their partizans to the
+Smolny, declared to be usurpers of the Soviet of Peasants' Delegates who
+pronounced themselves for the defense of the Constituante, and, with the
+aid of soldiers, ejected the former Executive Committee from their premises
+and took possession of their goods, the library, etc.
+
+The new Executive Committee, which did not have at its disposition Red
+Guards, was obliged to look for another place, to collect the money
+necessary for this purpose, etc. Its members were able, with much
+difficulty, to place everything upon its feet and to assure the
+publication of an organ (the _Izvestya_ of the National Soviet of Peasants'
+Delegates determined to defend the Constituent Assembly), to send delegates
+into different regions, and to establish relations with the provinces, etc.
+
+Together with the peasants, workmen and Socialist parties and numerous
+democratic organizations prepared themselves for the defense of the
+Constituent Assembly: The Union of Postal Employees, a part of the Union of
+Railway Workers, the Bank Employees, the City Employees, the food
+distributors' organizations, the teachers' associations, the zemstvos, the
+co-operatives. These organizations believed that the _coup d'etat_ of
+October 25th was neither legal nor just; they demanded a convocation with
+brief delay of the Constituent Assembly and the restoration of the
+liberties that were trampled under foot by the Bolsheviki.
+
+These treated them as _saboteurs_, "enemies of the people," deprived them
+of their salaries, and expelled them from their lodgings. They ordered
+those who opposed them to be deprived of their food-cards. They published
+lists of strikers, thus running the risk of having them lynched by the
+crowds. At Saratov, for example, the strike of postal workers and
+telegraphers lasted a month and a half. The institutions whose strike would
+have entailed for the population not only disorganization, but an arrest of
+all life (such as the railroads, the organizations of food distributers),
+abstained from striking, only asking the Bolsheviki not to meddle with
+their work. Sometimes, however, the gross interference of the Bolsheviki in
+work of which they understood nothing obliged those opposed to them, in
+spite of everything, to strike. It is to be noted also that the professors
+of secondary schools were obliged to join the strike movements (the
+superior schools had already ceased to function at this time) as well as
+the theatrical artistes: a talented artist, Silotti, was arrested; he
+declared that even in the time of Czarism nobody was ever uneasy on
+account of his political opinions.
+
+
+IV
+
+_The Bolsheviki and the Constituent Assembly_
+
+
+At the time of the accomplishment of their _coup d'etat_, the Bolsheviki
+cried aloud that the ministry of Kerensky put off a long time the
+convocation of the Constituante (which was a patent lie), that they would
+never call the Assembly, and that they alone, the Bolsheviki, would do it.
+But according as the results of the elections became known their opinions
+changed.
+
+In the beginning they boasted of their electoral victories at Petrograd and
+Moscow. Then they kept silent, as if the elections had no existence
+whatever. But the _Pravda_ and the _Izvestya_ of the Soviet of Workmen's
+and Soldiers' Delegates continued to treat as caluminators those who
+exposed the danger that was threatening the Constituent Assembly at the
+hands of the Bolsheviki. They did not yet dare to assert themselves openly.
+They had to gain time to strengthen their power. They hastily followed up
+peace pourparlers, to place Russia and the Constituent Assembly, if this
+met, before an accomplished fact.
+
+They hastened to attract the peasants to themselves. That was the reason
+which motived the "decree" of Lenine on the socialization of the soil,
+which decree appeared immediately after the _coup d'etat_. This decree was
+simply a reproduction of a Revolutionary Socialists' resolution adopted at
+a Peasants' Congress. What could the socialization of the soil be to Lenine
+and all the Bolsheviki in general? They had been, but a short time before,
+profoundly indifferent with regard to this Socialist-Revolutionist
+"Utopia." It had been for them an object of raillery. But they knew that
+without this "Utopia" they would have no peasants. And they threw them
+this mouthful, this "decree," which astonished the peasants. "Is it a law?
+Is it not a law? Nobody knows," they said.
+
+It is the same desire to have, cost what it may, the sympathy of the
+peasants that explains the union of the Bolsheviki with those who are
+called the "Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left" (for the name
+Socialist-Revolutionist spoke to the heart of the peasant), who played the
+stupid and shameful role of followers of the Bolsheviki, with a blind
+weapon between their hands.
+
+A part of the "peasants in uniform" followed the Bolsheviki to Smolny. The
+Germans honored the Bolsheviki by continuing with them the pourparlers for
+peace. The Bolshevist government had at its disposal the Red Guards, well
+paid, created suddenly in the presence of the crumbling of the army for
+fear of remaining without the help of bayonets. These Red Guards, who later
+fled in shameful fashion before the German patrols, advanced into the
+interior of the country and gained victories over the unarmed populace. The
+Bolsheviki felt the ground firm under their feet and threw off the mask. A
+campaign against the Constituent Assembly commenced. At first in _Pravda_
+and in _Izvestya_ were only questions. What will this Constituent Assembly
+be? Of whom will it be composed? It is possible that it will have a
+majority of servants of the bourgeoisie--Cadets Socialist-Revolutionists.
+_Can we confide to such a Constituent Assembly the destinies of the Russian
+Revolution? Will it recognize the power of the Soviets?_ Then came certain
+hypocritical "ifs." "If," yes, "if" the personnel of the Constituent
+Assembly is favorable to us; "if" it will recognize the power of the
+Soviets, it can count on their support. _If not--it condemns itself to
+death_.
+
+The Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left in their organ, _The Flag of
+Labor_, repeated in the wake of the Bolsheviki, "We will uphold the
+Constituent Assembly in _the measure we_--"
+
+Afterward we see no longer questions or prudent "ifs," but distinct
+answers. "The majority of the Constituent Assembly is formed," said the
+Bolsheviki, "of Socialist-Revolutionists and Cadets--that is to say,
+enemies of the people. This composition assures it of a
+counter-revolutionary spirit. Its destiny is therefore clear. Historic
+examples come to its aid. _The victorious people has no need of a
+Constituent Assembly. It is above the Constituante_. It has gone beyond
+it." The Russian people, half illiterate, were made to believe that in a
+few weeks they had outgrown the end for which millions of Russians had
+fought for almost a century; that they no longer had need of the most
+perfect form of popular representation, such as did not exist even in the
+most cultivated countries of western Europe. To the Constituent Assembly,
+legislative organ due to equal, direct, and secret universal suffrage, they
+opposed the Soviets, with their recruiting done by hazard and their
+elections to two or three degrees,[92] the Soviets which were the
+revolutionary organs and not the legislative organs, and whose role besides
+none of those who fought for the Constituent Assembly sought to diminish.
+
+
+V
+
+_The Fight Concentrates Around the Constituent Assembly_
+
+
+This was a maneuver whose object appeared clearly. The defenders of the
+Constituent Assembly had evidence of what was being prepared. The peasants
+who waited with impatience the opening of the Constituent Assembly sent
+delegates to Petrograd to find out the cause of the delay of the
+convocation. These delegates betook themselves to the Executive Committee
+of the Soviet of Peasants' Delegates (11 Kirillovskaia Street), and to the
+Socialist-Revolutionist fraction of the members of the Constituante (2
+Bolotnai Street). This last fraction worked actively at its proper
+organization. A bureau of organization was elected, commissions charged to
+elaborate projects of law for the Constituante. The fraction issued
+bulletins explaining to the population the program which the
+Socialist-Revolutionists were going to defend at the Constituante. Active
+relations were undertaken with the provinces. At the same time the members
+of the fraction, among whom were many peasants and workmen, followed up an
+active agitation in the workshops and factories of Petrograd, and among the
+soldiers of the Preobrajenski Regiment and some others. The members of the
+Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasants' Delegates worked in concert
+with them. It was precisely the opinion of the peasants and of the workmen
+which had most importance in the fight against the Bolsheviki. They, the
+true representatives of the people, were listened to everywhere; people
+were obliged to reckon with them.
+
+It was under these conditions that the Democratic Conference met. Called by
+the Provisional Government, it comprised representatives of the Soviets, of
+parties, of organizations of the army, peasant organizations,
+co-operatives, zemstvos, agricultural committees, etc. Its object was to
+solve the question of power until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly.
+
+At this conference the Bolsheviki formed only a small minority; but they
+acted as masters of the situation, calling, in a provocative manner,
+all those who were not in accord with them, "Kornilovist,
+counter-revolutionaries, traitors!" Because of this attitude the
+conference, which ought to have had the character of an assembly deciding
+affairs of state, took on the character of a boisterous meeting, which
+lasted several days of unending twaddle. What the Bolsheviki wanted was a
+verbal victory--to have shouted more loudly than their opponents. The same
+speeches were repeated every day. Some upheld a power exclusively
+Socialist, others--the majority composed of delegates from different
+corners of the country--sanctioned an agreement with all the democratic
+elements.
+
+The provincial delegates, having come with a view to serious work, returned
+to their homes, carrying with them a painful impression of lost
+opportunities, of useless debates.
+
+There remained but a few weeks before the convocation of the Constituent
+Assembly. Those who voted against a government exclusively Socialist did
+not think that, under the troublesome conditions of the time, they could
+expose the country to the risk of a dispersion of strength; they feared the
+possible isolation of the government in face of certain elements whose help
+could not be relied on. But they did not take into account a fact which had
+resulted from the Kornilovist insurrection: the natural distrust of the
+working masses in presence of all the non-Socialists, of those who--not
+being in immediate contact with them--placed themselves, were it ever so
+little, more on the right.
+
+The Democratic conference resulted in the formation of a Pre-Parliament.
+There the relations, between the forces in presence of each other, were
+about the same. Besides the Bolsheviki soon abandoned the Pre-Parliament,
+for they were already preparing their insurrection which curtailed the
+dissolution of that institution.
+
+"We are on the eve of a Bolshevik insurrection"--such was, at this time,
+the opinion of all those who took part in political life. "We are rushing
+to it with dizzy rapidity. The catastrophe is inevitable." But what is very
+characteristic is this, that, while preparing their insurrection, the
+Bolsheviki, in their press, did not hesitate to treat as liars and
+calumniators all those who spoke of the danger of this insurrection, and
+that on the eve of a conquest of power (with arms ready) premeditated and
+well prepared in advance.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+During the whole period that preceded the Bolshevik insurrection a great
+creative work was being carried on in the country in spite of the
+undesirable phenomena of which we have spoken above.
+
+1. With great difficulty there were established organs of a local,
+autonomous administration, volost and district zemstvos, which were to
+furnish a basis of organization to the government zemstvos. The zemstvo of
+former times was made up of only class representatives; _the elections to
+the new zemstvos were effected by universal suffrage, equal, direct, and
+secret_. These elections were a kind of schooling for the population,
+showing it the practical significance of universal suffrage, and preparing
+it for the elections to the Constituent Assembly. At the same time they
+laid the foundation of a local autonomous administration.
+
+2. Preparations for the election to the Constituent Assembly were made; an
+agitation, an intense propaganda followed; preparations of a technical
+order were made. This was a difficult task because of the great number of
+electors, the dispersion of the population, the great number of illiterate,
+etc. Everywhere special courts had been established, in view of the
+elections, to train agitators and instructors, who afterward were sent in
+great numbers into the country.
+
+3. _At the same time the ground was hurriedly prepared for the law
+concerning the socialization of the soil._ The abandonment of his post by
+Tchernov, Minister of Agriculture, did not stop this work. The principal
+agricultural committee and the Minister of Agriculture, directed by
+Rakitnikov and Vikhiliaev, hastened to finish this work before the
+convocation of the Constituent Assembly. The Revolutionary Socialist party
+decided to keep for itself the post of Minister of Agriculture; for the
+position they named S. Maslov, who had to exact from the government an
+immediate vote on the law concerning the socialization of the soil. _The
+study of this law in the Council of Ministers was finished. Nothing more
+remained to be done but to adopt and promulgate it. Because of the
+excitement of the people in the country, it was decided to do this at once,
+without waiting for the Constituent Assembly_. Finally, to better realize
+the conditions of the time, it must be added that the whole country awaited
+anxiously the elections to the Constituent Assembly. All believed that this
+was going to settle the life of Russia.
+
+
+VI
+
+_The Bolshevist Insurrection_
+
+
+It was under these conditions that the Bolshevist _coup d'etat_ happened.
+In the capitals as well as in the provinces, it was accomplished by armed
+force; at Petrograd, with the help of the sailors of the Baltic fleet, of
+the soldiers of the Preobrajenski, Semenovski, and other regiments, in
+other towns with the aid of the local garrisons. Here, for example, is how
+the Bolshevist _coup d'etat_ took place at Saratov. I was a witness to
+these facts myself. Saratov is a big university and intellectual center,
+possessing a great number of schools, libraries, and divers associations
+designed to elevate the intellectual standard of the population. The
+zemstvo of Saratov was one of the best in Russia. The peasant population of
+this province, among whom the Revolutionary Socialist propaganda was
+carried on for several years by the Revolutionary Socialist Party, is wide
+awake and well organized. The municipality and the agricultural committees
+were composed of Socialists. The population was actively preparing for the
+elections to the Constituent Assembly; the people discussed the list of
+candidates, studied the candidates' biographies, as well as the programs of
+the different parties.
+
+On the night of October 28th, by reason of an order that had come from
+Petrograd, the Bolshevik _coup d'etat_ broke out at Saratov. The following
+forces were its instruments: the garrison which was a stranger to the
+masses of the population, a weak party of workers, and, in the capacity of
+leaders, some Intellectuals who, up to that time, had played no role in the
+public life of the town.
+
+It was indeed a military _coup d'etat_. The city hall, where sat the
+Socialists, who were elected by equal, direct, and secret universal
+suffrage, was surrounded by the soldiers; machine-guns were placed in front
+and the bombardment began. This lasted a whole night; some were wounded,
+some killed. The municipal judges were arrested. Soon after a Manifesto
+solemnly announced to the population that the "enemies of the people," the
+"counter-revolutionaries," were overthrown; that the power at Saratov was
+going to pass into the hands of the Soviet (Bolshevist) of the Workmen's
+and Soldiers' Delegates.
+
+The population was perplexed; the people thought that they had sent to the
+Town Hall Socialists, men of their choice. Now these men were declared
+"enemies of the people," were shot down or arrested by other Socialists.
+What did all this mean? And the inhabitant of Saratov felt a fear stealing
+into his soul at the sight of this violence; he began to doubt the value of
+the Socialist idea in general. The faith of former times gave place to
+doubt, disappointment, and discouragement. The _coup d'etat_ was followed
+by divers other manifestations of Bolshevist activity--arrests, searches,
+confiscation of newspapers, ban on meetings. Bands of soldiers looted the
+country houses in the suburbs of the city; a school for the children of the
+people and the buildings of the children's holiday settlement were also
+pillaged. Bands of soldiers were forthwith sent into the country to cause
+trouble there.
+
+_The sensible part of the population of Saratov severely condemned these
+acts_ in a series of Manifestos signed by the Printers' Union, the mill
+workers, the City Employees' Union, Postal and Telegraph Employees,
+students' organizations, and many other democratic associations and
+organizations.
+
+The peasants received the _coup d'etat_ with distinct hostility. Meetings
+and reunions were soon organized in the villages. Resolutions were voted
+censuring the _coup d'etat_ of violence, deciding to organize to resist the
+Bolsheviki, and demanding the removal of the Bolshevist soldier members
+from the rural communes. The bands of soldiers, who were sent into the
+country, used not only persuasion, but also violence, trying to force the
+peasants to give their votes for the Bolshevik candidates at the time of
+the elections to the Constituent Assembly; they tore up the bulletins of
+the Socialist-Revolutionists, overturned the ballot-boxes, etc.
+
+But the Bolshevik soldiers were not able to disturb the confidence of the
+peasants in the Constituent Assembly, and in the Revolutionary Socialist
+party, whose program they had long since adopted, and whose leaders and
+ways of acting they knew, the inhabitants of the country proved themselves
+in all that concerned the elections wide awake to the highest degree. There
+were hardly any abstentions, _90 per cent. of the population took part in
+the voting_. The day of the voting was kept as a solemn feast; the priest
+said mass; the peasants dressed in their Sunday clothes; they believed that
+the Constituent Assembly would give them order, laws, the land. In the
+government of Saratov, out of fourteen deputies elected, there were twelve
+Socialist-Revolutionists; there were others (such as the government of
+Pensa, for example) that elected _only_ Socialist-Revolutionists. The
+Bolsheviki had the majority only in Petrograd and Moscow and in certain
+units of the army. The elections to the Constituent Assembly were a
+decisive victory for the Revolutionary Socialist party.
+
+Such was the response of Russia to the Bolshevik _coup d'etat_. To violence
+and conquest of power by force of arms, the population answered by the
+elections to the Constituent Assembly; the people sent to this
+assembly, not the Bolsheviki, but, by an overwhelming majority,
+Socialist-Revolutionists.
+
+
+VII
+
+_The Fight Against the Bolsheviki_
+
+
+But the final result of the elections was not established forthwith. In
+many places the elections had to be postponed. The Bolshevik _coup d'etat_
+had disorganized life, had upset postal and telegraphic communications, and
+had even destroyed, in certain localities, the electoral mechanism itself
+by the arrest of the active workers. The elections which began in the
+middle of November were not concluded till toward the month of January.
+
+In the mean time, in the country a fierce battle was raging against the
+Bolsheviki. It was not, on the part of their adversaries, a fight for
+power. If the Socialist-Revolutionists had wished they could have seized
+the power; to do that they had only to follow the example of those who were
+called "the Revolutionary Socialists of the Left." Not only did they not
+follow their example, but they also excluded them from their midst. A short
+time after the Bolshevik insurrection, when the part taken in this
+insurrection by certain Revolutionary Socialists of the Left was found out,
+the Central Committee of the Revolutionary Socialist party voted to exclude
+them from the party for having violated the party discipline and having
+adopted tactics contrary to its principles. This exclusion was confirmed
+afterward by the Fourth Congress of the party, which took place in
+December, 1917.
+
+Soon after the _coup d'etat_ of October the question was among all parties
+and all organizations: "What is to be done? How will the situation be
+remedied?" The remedy included three points. First, creation of a power
+composed of the representatives of all Socialist organizations, with the
+"Populist-Socialists" on the extreme right, and with the express condition
+that the principal actors in the Bolshevik _coup d'etat_ would not have
+part in the Ministry. Second, immediate establishment of the democratic
+liberties, which were trampled under foot by the Bolsheviki, without which
+any form of Socialism is inconceivable. Third, convocation without delay of
+the Constituent Assembly.
+
+Such were the conditions proposed to the Bolsheviki in the name of several
+Socialist parties (the Revolutionary Socialist party, the Mensheviki, the
+Populist-Socialists, etc.), and of several democratic organizations
+(Railroad Workers' Union, Postal and Telegraphic Employees' Union, etc.).
+The Bolsheviki, at this time, were not sure of being able to hold their
+position; certain Commissaries of the People, soon after they were
+installed in power, handed in their resignation, being terrified by the
+torrents of blood that were shed at Moscow and by the cruelties which
+accompanied the _coup d'etat_. The Bolsheviki pretended to accept the
+pourparlers, but kept them dragging along so as to gain time. In the mean
+time they tried to strengthen themselves in the provinces, where they
+gained victories such as that of Saratov; they actively rushed the
+pourparlers for peace; they had to do it at all cost, even if, in doing it,
+they had to accept the assistance of the traitor and spy, by name Schneur,
+for they had promised peace to the soldiers.
+
+For this it sufficed them to have gained some victories in the provinces,
+and that the Germans accepted the proposition of pourparlers of peace ("the
+German generals came to meet us in gala attire, wearing their ribbons and
+decorations," with triumph announced in their appeal to the Russian people
+the representatives of this "Socialist" government Schneur & Co.), for this
+the Bolsheviki henceforth refused every compromise and all conference with
+the other parties. For the other parties--those who did not recognize the
+Bolshevik _coup d'etat_ and did not approve of the violence that was
+perpetrated--there was only one alternative, the fight.
+
+It was the Revolutionary Socialist party and the National Soviet of
+Peasants' Delegates that had to bear the brunt of this fight, which was
+carried on under extremely difficult conditions. All the non-Bolshevik
+newspapers were confiscated or prosecuted and deprived of every means of
+reaching the provinces; their editors' offices and printing establishments
+were looted. After the creation of the "Revolutionary Tribunal," the
+authors of articles that were not pleasing to the Bolsheviki, as well as
+the directors of the newspapers, were brought to judgment and condemned to
+make amends or go to prison, etc.
+
+The premises of numerous organizations were being constantly pillaged; the
+Red Guard came there to search, destroying different documents; frequently
+objects which were found on the premises disappeared. Thus were looted the
+premises of the Central Committee of the Revolutionary Socialist party (27
+Galernaia Street), and, several times, the offices of the paper _Dielo
+Narvda_ (22 Litcinaia Street), as well as the office of the "League for the
+Defense of the Constituent Assembly," the premises of the committees of
+divers sections of the Revolutionary Socialist party, the office of the
+paper _Volia Naroda_, etc.
+
+Leaders of the different parties were arrested. The arrest of the whole
+Central Committee of the Revolutionary Socialist party was to be carried
+out as well as the arrest of all the Socialist-Revolutionists, and of all
+the Mensheviki in sight. The Bolshevist press became infuriated, exclaiming
+against the "counter-revolution," against their "complicity" with Kornilov
+and Kalodine.
+
+All those who did not adhere to the Bolsheviki were indignant at the sight
+of the crimes committed, and wished to defend the Constituent Assembly.
+Knowingly, and in a premeditated manner, the Bolshevist press excited the
+soldiers and the workmen against all other parties. And then when the
+unthinking masses, drunk with flattery and hatred, committed acts of
+lynching, the Bolshevist leaders expressed sham regrets! Thus it was after
+the death of Doukhonine, who was cut to pieces by the sailors; and thus it
+was after the dastardly assassination of the Cadets, Shingariev and
+Kokochkine, after the shootings _en masse_ and the drowning of the
+officers.
+
+It was under these conditions that the fight was carried on; and the brunt
+of it, as I have already stated, was sustained by the Revolutionary
+Socialist party and the National Soviet of Peasants' Delegates, and it was
+against these two that the Bolsheviki were particularly infuriated. "Now it
+is not the Cadets who are dangerous to us," said they, "but the
+Socialist-Revolutionists--these traitors, these enemies of the people." The
+most sacred names of the Revolution were publicly trampled under foot by
+them. Their cynicism went so far as to accuse Breshkovskaya, "the
+Grandmother of the Russian Revolution," of having sold out to the
+Americans. Personally I had the opportunity to hear a Bolshevist orator, a
+member of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers'
+Delegates, express this infamous calumny at a meeting organized by the
+Preobrajenski Regiment. The Bolsheviki tried, by every means, to crush the
+party, to reduce it to a clandestine existence. But the Central Committee
+declared that it would continue to fight against violence--and that in an
+open manner; it continued to issue a daily paper, only changing its title,
+as in the time of Czarism, and thus continued its propaganda in the
+factories, and helped to form public opinion, etc.
+
+At the Fourth Congress of the party, which took place in December, the
+delegates from the provinces, where the despotism of the Bolsheviki was
+particularly violent, raised the question of introducing terrorist methods
+in the fight against the Bolsheviki. "From the time that the party is
+placed in a fight under conditions which differ nothing from those of
+Czarism, ancient methods are to be resumed; violence must be opposed to
+violence," they said. But the Congress spurned this means; the
+Revolutionary Socialist party did not adopt the methods of terrorism; it
+could not do it, because the Bolsheviki were, after all, followed by the
+masses--unthinking, it is true, but the masses, nevertheless. It is by
+educating them, and not by the use of violence, that they are to be fought
+against. Terrorist acts could bring nothing but a bloody suppression.
+
+
+VIII
+
+_The Second Peasant Congress_
+
+
+In the space of a month a great amount of work was accomplished. A breach
+was made in the general misunderstanding. Moral help was assured to the
+Constituent Assembly on the part of the workmen and part of the soldiers of
+Petrograd. There was no longer any confidence placed in the Bolsheviki.
+Besides, the agitation was not the only cause of this change. The workers
+soon came to understand that the Bolshevik tactics could only irritate and
+disgust the great mass of the population, that the Bolsheviki were not the
+representatives of the workers, that their promises of land, of peace, and
+other earthly goods were only a snare. The industrial production diminished
+more and more; numerous factories and shops closed their doors and
+thousands of workmen found themselves on the streets. The population of
+Petrograd, which, at first, received a quarter of a pound of bread per day
+(a black bread made with straw), had now but one-eighth of a pound, while
+in the time of Kerensky the ration was half a pound. The other products
+(oatmeal, butter, eggs, milk) were entirely lacking or cost extremely high
+prices. One ruble fifty copecks for a pound of potatoes, six rubles a
+pound of meat, etc. The transportation of products to Petrograd had almost
+ceased. The city was on the eve of famine.
+
+The workers were irritated by the violence and the arbitrary manner of the
+Bolsheviki, and by the exploits of the Red Guard, well paid, enjoying all
+the privileges, well nourished, well clothed, and well shod in the midst of
+a Petrograd starving and in rags.
+
+Discontent manifested itself also among the soldiers of the Preobrajenski
+and Litovsky regiments, and others. In this manner in the day of the
+meeting of the Constituent Assembly they were no longer very numerous. What
+loud cries, nevertheless, they had sent forth lately when Kerensky wished
+to send the Preobrajenski and Seminovski regiments from Petrograd! "What?
+Send the revolutionary regiments from Petrograd? To make easier the
+surrender of the capital to the counter-revolution?" The soldiers of the
+Preobrajenski Regiment organized in their barracks frequent meetings, where
+the acts of the Bolsheviki were sharply criticized; they started a paper,
+_The Soldiers' Cloak_, which was confiscated.
+
+On the other hand, here is one of the resolutions voted by the workers of
+the Putilov factory:
+
+    The Constituent Assembly is the only organ expressing the will of
+    the entire people. It alone is able to reconstitute the unity of
+    the country.
+
+The majority of the deputies to the Constituent Assembly who had for some
+time been elected had arrived in Petrograd, and the Bolsheviki always
+retarded the opening. The Socialist-Revolutionist fraction started
+conferences with the other fractions on the necessity for fixing a day for
+the opening of the Constituante, without waiting the good pleasure of the
+Commissaries of the People. They chose the date, December 27th, but the
+opening could not take place on that day, the Ukrainian fraction having
+suddenly abandoned the majority to join themselves to the Bolsheviki and
+the Revolutionary Socialists of the Left. Finally, the government fixed the
+opening of the Constituent Assembly for the 5th (18th) of January.
+
+Here is a document which relates this fight for the date of the opening of
+the Constituante:
+
+    _Bulletin of Members of the Constituent Assembly Belonging to the
+    Socialist-Revolutionist Fraction. No. 5, Dec. 31, 1917._
+
+    _To All the Citizens_:
+
+    The Socialist-Revolutionist fraction of the Constituent Assembly
+    addresses the whole people the present expose of the reasons for
+    which the Constituent Assembly has not been opened until this day:
+    it warns them, at the same time, of the danger which threatens the
+    sovereign rights of the people.
+
+    Let it be thus placed in clear daylight, the true character of
+    those who, under pretext of following the well-being of the
+    workers, forge new chains for liberated Russia, those who attempt
+    to assassinate the Constituent Assembly, which alone is able to
+    save Russia from the foreign yoke and from the despotism which has
+    been born within.
+
+    Let all the citizens know that the hour is near when they must be
+    ready to rise like one man for the defense of their liberty and
+    their Constituent Assembly.
+
+    For, citizens, your salvation is solely in your own hands.
+
+    Citizens! you know that on the day assigned for the opening of the
+    Constituent Assembly, November 28th, all the
+    Socialist-Revolutionist deputies who were elected had come to
+    Petrograd. You know that neither violence of a usurping power nor
+    arrests of our comrades, by force of arms which were opposed to us
+    at the Taurida Palace, could prevent us from assembling and
+    fulfilling our duty.
+
+    But the civil war which has spread throughout the country retarded
+    the election to the Constituent Assembly and the number of
+    deputies elected was insufficient.
+
+    It was necessary to postpone the opening of the Constituent
+    Assembly.
+
+    Our fraction utilized this forced delay by an intensive
+    preparatory work. We elaborated, in several commissions, projects
+    of law concerning all the fundamental questions that the
+    Constituante would have to solve. We adopted the project of our
+    fundamental law on the question of the land; we elaborated the
+    measures which the Constituante would have to take from the very
+    first day in order to arrive at a truly democratic peace, so
+    necessary to our country; we discussed the principles which should
+    direct the friendly dwelling together of all the nationalities
+    which people Russia and assure each people a national point of
+    view, the free disposition of itself, thus putting an end to the
+    fratricidal war.
+
+    Our fraction would have been all ready for the day of the opening
+    of the Constituante, in order to commence, from the first, a
+    creative work and give to the impoverished country peace, bread,
+    land, and liberty.
+
+    At the same time, we did our utmost to accelerate the arrival of
+    the deputies and the opening of the Assembly.
+
+    During this time events became more and more menacing every day,
+    the Bolshevik power was more rapidly leading our country to its
+    fall. From before the time when the Germans had presented their
+    conditions of peace the Bolsheviki had destroyed the army,
+    suppressed its provisioning, and stripped the front, while at the
+    same time by civil war and the looting of the savings of the
+    people they achieved the economic ruin of the country. Actually,
+    they recognized themselves that the German conditions were
+    unacceptable and invited the reconstruction of the army. In spite
+    of this, these criminals do not retire; they will achieve their
+    criminal work.
+
+    Russia suffers in the midst of famine, of civil war, and enemy
+    invasion which threatens to reach even the heart of the country.
+
+    No delay is permissible.
+
+    Our fraction fixed on the 27th of December the last delay for the
+    opening of the Constituante; on this day more than half of the
+    deputies could have arrived in Petrograd. We entered into
+    conference with the other fractions. The Ukrainians, some other
+    national fractions, and the Menshevik Social Democrats adhered to
+    our resolution. The Revolutionary Socialists of the Left
+    hypocritically declared themselves partizans of an early opening
+    of the Constituante. But behold, the Council of the so-called
+    "Commissaries of the People" fixed the opening for the 5th of
+    January. _At the same time they called for the 8th of January a
+    Congress of the Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates,
+    thus hoping to be able to trick and to cover with the name of this
+    Congress their criminal acts_. The object of this postponement is
+    clear; they did not even hide it and threatened to dissolve the
+    Constituent Assembly in case that it did not submit to the
+    Bolshevik Congress of Soviets. The same threat was repeated by
+    those who are called Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left.
+
+    The delegation of the Ukrainian Revolutionary Socialists abandoned
+    us also and submitted to the order for the convocation on January
+    5th, considering that the fight of the Bolshevik power against the
+    Constituent Assembly is an internal question, which interests only
+    Greater Russia.
+
+    Citizens! We shall be there, too, on January 5th, so that the
+    least particle of responsibility for the sabotage of the
+    Constituent Assembly may not fall upon us.
+
+    But we do not think that we can suspend our activity with regard
+    to the speediest possible opening of the Constituent Assembly.
+
+    We address an energetic appeal to all the deputies; in the name of
+    the fatherland, in the name of the Revolution, in the name of the
+    duty which devolves upon you by reason of your election, come,
+    all, to Petrograd! On the 1st of January all the deputies present
+    will decide on the day for the opening of the Constituent
+    Assembly.
+
+    We appeal to you, citizens! Remind your elected representatives of
+    their duty.
+
+    And remember that your salvation is solely in your own hands, a
+    mortal danger threatens the Constituent Assembly; be all ready to
+    rise in its defense!
+
+    THE REVOLUTIONARY SOCIALIST FRACTION OF THE CONSTITUENT
+    ASSEMBLY.
+
+On the 3d of January the League for the Defense of the Constituent Assembly
+held a meeting at which were present 210 delegates, representing the
+Socialist parties as well as various democratic organizations and many
+factories--that of Putilov, that of Oboukhov, and still others from the
+outskirts of Narva, from the districts of Viborg, Spassky, and
+Petrogradsky, from the Isle Vassily. It was decided to organize for January
+5th a peaceful display in honor of the opening of the Constituent
+Assembly.
+
+The Bolsheviki answered this by furious articles in the _Pravda_, urging
+the people not to spare the counter-revolutionaries, these bourgeoisie who
+intend, by means of their Constituante, to combat the revolutionary people.
+They advised the people of Petrograd not to go out on the streets that day.
+"We shall act without reserve," they added.
+
+Sailors were called from Cronstadt; cruisers and torpedo-boats came. An
+order was issued to the sailors and to the Red Guards who patrolled all the
+works of the Taurida, to make use of their arms if any one attempted to
+enter the palace. For that day unlimited powers were accorded to the
+military authorities. At the same time an assembly of the representatives
+of the garrison at Petrograd, fixed for that day, was proscribed, and the
+newspaper, _The Soldiers' Cloak_, was suppressed.
+
+A Congress of Soviets was called for the 8th of January. They prepared the
+dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and they wanted to place the
+Congress before the accomplished fact. The Executive Committee of the
+Soviet of Peasants' Delegates, and the Central Executive Committee of the
+Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates chosen at the first elections
+answered by the two following appeals:
+
+    Peasant Comrades!
+
+    The Bolsheviki have fixed the 5th of January for the opening of
+    the Constituent Assembly; for the 8th of January they call the III
+    Congress of the Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, and
+    for the 13th the Peasant Congress.
+
+    The peasants are, by design, relegated to the background.
+
+    An outrage against the Constituent Assembly is being prepared.
+
+    In this historic moment the peasants cannot remain aloof.
+
+    The Provisional Executive Committee of the National Soviet of
+    Peasants' Delegates, which goes on duty as a guard to the
+    Constituent Assembly, has decided to call, on the 8th of January,
+    also, the Third National Congress of the Soviets of Peasants'
+    Delegates. The representation remains the same as before. Send
+    your delegates at once to Petrograd, Grand Bolotnai, 2A.
+
+    The fate of the Constituent Assembly is the fate of Russia, the
+    fate of the Revolution.
+
+    All up for the defense of the Constituent Assembly, for the
+    defense of the Revolution--not by word alone, but by acts!
+
+    [Signed] _The Provisional Executive Committee of the National
+    Soviet of Peasants' Delegates, upholding the principle of the
+    defense of the Constituent Assembly_.
+
+    APPEAL OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE SOVIETS OF
+    WORKMEN'S AND SOLDIERS' DELEGATES, CHOSEN AT THE FIRST
+    ELECTIONS
+
+    To all the Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, to all
+    the Committees of the Army and of the Navy, to all the
+    organizations associated with the Soviets and Committees, to all
+    the members of the Socialist-Revolutionist and Menshevist Social
+    Democratic fractions who left the Second Congress of Soviets:
+
+    Comrades, workmen, and soldiers! Our cry of alarm is addressed to
+    all those to whom the work of the Soviets is dear. Know that a
+    traitorous blow threatens the revolutionary fatherland, the
+    Constituent Assembly, and even the work of the Soviets. Your duty
+    is to prepare yourselves for their defense.
+
+    The Central Executive Committee, nominated at the October
+    Congress, calls together for the 8th of January a Congress of
+    Soviets, destined to bungle the Constituent Assembly.
+
+    Comrades! The Second Congress of Soviets assembled at the end of
+    October, under conditions particularly unfavorable, at the time
+    that the Bolshevik party, won over by its leaders to a policy of
+    adventure, a plot unbecoming a class organization, executed at
+    Petrograd a _coup d'etat_ which gave it power; at a time when
+    certain groups with the same viewpoint disorganized even the
+    method of convocation of the Second Congress, thus openly aspiring
+    to falsify the results; at this same Congress the regular
+    representatives of the army were lacking (only two armies being
+    represented), and the Soviets of the provinces were very
+    insufficiently represented (only about 120 out of 900). Under
+    these conditions it is but natural that the Central Executive
+    Committee of the Soviets chosen at the first election would not
+    recognize the right of this Congress to decide the politics of the
+    Soviets.
+
+    However, in spite of the protestations, and even of the departure
+    of a great number of delegates (those of the Revolutionary
+    Socialist fraction, Mensheviki, and Populist-Socialists), a new
+    Executive Committee of the Soviets was elected. To consider this
+    last as the central director of all the Soviets of the country was
+    absolutely impossible. The delegates who remained in the Congress
+    formed only an assembly of a group with a little fraction of the
+    Revolutionary Socialists of the Left, who had given their adhesion
+    to them. Thus the Central Committee named by their Conference
+    could not be considered except as representatives of these two
+    groups only.
+
+    Bringing to the organization of Soviets an unheard-of disorder,
+    establishing by their shameful methods of fighting its domination
+    over the Soviets, some of which were taken by surprise, the others
+    terrorized and broken in their personnel, deceiving the working
+    class and the army by its short-sighted policy of adventure, the
+    new Executive Committee during the two months that have since
+    passed has attempted to subject all the Soviets of Russia to its
+    influence. It succeeded in part in this, in the measure in which
+    the confidence of the groups which constituted it in the policy
+    was not yet exhausted. But a considerable portion of the Soviets,
+    as well as fractions of other Soviets, fractions composed of the
+    most devoted and experienced fighters, continued to follow the
+    only true revolutionary road; to develop the class organization of
+    the working masses, to direct their intellectual and political
+    life, to develop the political and social aspects of the
+    Revolution, to exert, by all the power of the working class
+    organized into Soviets, the necessary pressure to attain the end
+    that it proposed. The questions of peace and of war, that of the
+    organization of production and of food-supply, and that of the
+    fight for the Constituent Assembly are in the first place. The
+    policy of adventure of the groups which seized the power is on the
+    eve of failure. Peace could not be realized by a rupture with the
+    Allies and an entente with the imperialistic orb of the Central
+    Powers. By reason of this failure of the policy of the
+    Commissaires of the People, of the disorganization of production
+    (which, among other things, has had as a result the creation of
+    hundreds of thousands of unemployed), by reason of the civil war
+    kindled in the country and the absence of a power recognized by
+    the whole people, the Central Powers tend to take hold in the most
+    cynical fashion of a whole series of western provinces (Poland,
+    Lithuania, Courland), and to subject the whole country to their
+    complete economic, if not political, domination.
+
+    The question of provisioning has taken on an unheard-of acuteness;
+    the gross interference in the functioning of organs already
+    created for this object, and the civil war kindled everywhere
+    throughout the country, have completely demoralized the
+    provisioning of wheat in regions where they had none, the north
+    and the army are found on the eve of famine.
+
+    Industry is dying. Hundreds of factories and workshops are
+    stopped. The short-sighted policy of the Commissaries has caused
+    hundreds of workmen to be thrown on the streets and become
+    unemployed. The will of the entire people is threatened with being
+    violated. The usurpers who in October got hold of the power by
+    launching the word of order for a swift convocation of the
+    Constituent Assembly strive hard, now that the elections are over,
+    to retain the power in their hands by arresting the deputies and
+    dissolving the Constituante itself.
+
+    _All that which the country holds of life, and in the first place
+    all the working class and all the army, ought to rise with arms in
+    their hands to defend the popular power represented by the
+    Constituante, which must bring peace to the people and consolidate
+    by legislative means the revolutionary conquests of the working
+    class._
+
+    In bringing this to your knowledge, the Central Committee chosen
+    at the first elections invites you, Comrades, to place yourself
+    immediately in agreement with it.
+
+    Considering the Congress of October as incompetent, the Central
+    Committee chosen at the first elections has decided to begin a
+    preparatory work in view of the convocation of a new Congress of
+    the Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates.
+
+    In the near future, while the Commissaires of the People, in the
+    persons of Lenine and Trotzky, are going to fight against the
+    sovereign power of the Constituent Assembly, we shall have to
+    intervene with all our energy in the conflict artificially encited
+    by the adventurers, between that Assembly and the Soviets. _It
+    will be our task to aid the Soviets in taking consciousness of
+    their role, in defining their political lines, and in determining
+    their functions and those of the Constituante._
+
+    Comrades! The convocation of the Congress for the 8th of January
+    is dictated by the desire to provoke a conflict between the
+    Soviets and the Constituante, and thus botch this last. Anxious
+    for the fate of the country, the Executive Committee chosen at the
+    first elections decides to convoke at Petrograd for the 8th of
+    January an extraordinary assembly of _all the Soviets, all the
+    Committees of the Army and the Navy, all the fractions of the
+    Soviets and military committees, all the organizations that
+    cluster around the Soviets and the Committees that are standing
+    upon the ground of the defense of the Constituante._ The following
+    are the Orders of the Day:
+
+    1. The power of the Constituent Assembly.
+    2. The fight for the general democratic peace and the re-establishment
+    of the International.
+    3. The immediate problems of the policy of the Soviets.
+
+    Comrades! Assure for this extraordinary assembly of Soviets the
+    most complete representation of all the organizations of workmen
+    and soldiers. Establish at once election centers. We have a fight
+    to uphold.
+
+    In the name of the Revolution, all the reason and all the energy
+    ought to be thrown into the balance.
+
+    THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF SOVIETS OF WORKMEN'S AND
+    SOLDIERS' DELEGATES CHOSEN AT THE FIRST ELECTIONS.
+
+    _25 December, 1917._
+
+
+IX
+
+_The Manifestation of January 5th at Petrograd_
+
+
+From eleven o'clock in the morning corteges, composed principally of
+working-men bearing red flags and placards with inscriptions such as
+"Proletarians of All Countries, Unite!" "Land and Liberty!" "Long Live the
+Constituent Assembly!" etc., set out from different parts of the city. The
+members of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasants' Delegates
+had agreed to meet at the Field, of Mars where a procession coming from the
+Petrogradsky quarter was due to arrive. It was soon learned that a part of
+the participants, coming from the Viborg quarter, had been assailed at the
+Liteiny bridge by gunfire from the Red Guards and were obliged to turn
+back. But that did not check the other parades. The peasant participants,
+united with the workers from Petrogradsky quarter, came to the Field of
+Mars; after having lowered their flags before the tombs of the Revolution
+of February and sung a funeral hymn to their memory, they installed
+themselves on Liteinaia Street. New manifestants came to join them and the
+street was crowded with people. At the corner of Fourstatskaia Street (one
+of the Streets leading to the Taurida Palace) they found themselves all at
+once assailed by shots from the Red Guards.
+
+The Red Guard fired _without warning_, something that never before
+happened, even in the time of Czarism. The police always began by inviting
+the participators to disperse. Among the first victims was a member of the
+Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasants' Delegates, the Siberian
+peasant, Logvinov. An explosive bullet shot away half of his head (a
+photograph of his body was taken; it was added to the documents which were
+transferred to the Commission of Inquiry). Several workmen and students and
+one militant of the Revolutionary Socialist party, Gorbatchevskaia, were
+killed at the same time. Other processions of participants on their way to
+the Taurida Palace were fired into at the same time. On all the streets
+leading to the palace, groups of Red Guards had been established; they
+received the order "Not to spare the cartridges." On that day at Petrograd
+there were one hundred killed and wounded.
+
+It must be noted that when, at a session of the Constituent Assembly, in
+the Taurida Palace, they learned of this shooting, M. Steinberg,
+Commissioner of Justice, declared in the corridor that it was a lie, that
+he himself had visited the streets of Petrograd and had found everywhere
+that "all was quiet." Exactly as the Ministers of Nicholas Romanov after
+the suppressions said "Lie. Lie," so cried the Bolsheviki and the
+Revolutionary Socialists of the Left, in response to the question formally
+put on the subject of the shooting by a member of the Constituent Assembly.
+
+The following day the Bolshevik organs and those of the Revolutionary
+Socialists of the Left passed over these facts in silence. This silence
+they kept also on the 9th of January, the day on which literally all
+Petrograd assembled at the funeral of the victims. Public indignation,
+however, obliged them in the end to admit that there had been some small
+groups of participants and to name a Commission of Inquiry concerning the
+street disorders which had taken place on January 5th. This Commission was
+very dilatory in the performance of its duty and it is very doubtful if
+they ever came to any decision.
+
+Analogous manifestations took place at Moscow, at Saratov and other cities;
+everywhere they were accompanied by shootings. The number of victims was
+particularly considerable at Moscow.
+
+
+X
+
+_At the Taurida Palace on the Day of the Opening of the Constituent
+Assembly_
+
+
+The Taurida Palace on that day presented a strange aspect. At every door,
+in the corridors, in the halls, everywhere soldiers and sailors and Red
+Guards armed with guns and hand-grenades, who at every turn demanded your
+pass. It was no easy matter to get into the palace. Nearly all the places
+reserved for the public were occupied by the Bolsheviki and their friends.
+The appearance of the Taurida Palace was not that of a place where the
+free representatives of a free people were going to assemble.
+
+The Bolsheviki delayed as much as possible the opening of the session. It
+was only at four o'clock instead of at midday that they deigned to make up
+their minds. They and the Revolutionary Socialists of the Left occupied
+seats of the extreme left; then came the Revolutionary Socialists, the
+Mensheviki, and the other Socialist fractions. The seats on the right
+remained vacant. The few Cadets that had been chosen preferred not to come.
+In this manner the Constituent Assembly was composed at this first and last
+session solely of Socialists. This, however, did not prevent the presence
+in the corridors and the session hail of a crowd of sailors and Red Guards
+armed, as if it were a question of an assembly of conspirators, enemies of
+the Revolution.
+
+From the beginning a fight was started by the election of president. The
+majority nominated for the office of president Chernov; the Bolsheviki and
+the Revolutionary Socialists of the Left voted against him. The Bolsheviki
+did not propose any candidate of their own, and placed before the members
+the candidacy of a Revolutionary Socialist of the Left, Marie Spiridonova,
+who was totally incapable of fulfilling this role. Afterward several
+declarations were read--that of the Bolsheviki, that of the
+Socialist-Revolutionists (read by Chernov), that of the Mensheviki (read by
+Tseretelli). The partizans of each fraction greeted the reading of their
+own declaration with deafening applause (for the audience was one of
+"comrades" and did not hesitate to take part in the debates); cat-calls and
+shouts greeted the orators of the opposing fractions. Each word of the
+declarations of the Socialist-Revolutionists and of the Mensheviki
+(declarations which every Socialist could sign) was received with a round
+of hisses, shouts, deafening cries, exclamations of contempt for the
+Bolsheviki, the sailors, and the soldiers. The speech of Chernov--president
+and member of a detested party--had above all the honor of such a
+greeting. As for Tseretelli, he was at first greeted by an inconceivable
+din, but was able afterward--his speech was so full of profound sense--to
+capture the attention of the Bolsheviki themselves.
+
+A general impression that was extremely distressing came from this historic
+session. The attitude of the Bolsheviki was grossly unbecoming and
+provocative of disdain. It indicated clearly that the dissolution of the
+Constituante was, for them, already decided. Lenine, who continually kept
+contemptuous silence, wound up by stretching himself upon his bench and
+pretending to sleep. Lunotcharsky from his ministerial bench pointed
+contemptuously with his finger toward the white hair of a veteran of the
+Revolutionary Socialist party. The sailors leveled the muzzles of their
+revolvers at the Socialist-Revolutionists. The audience laughed, whistled,
+and shouted.
+
+The Bolsheviki finally left the Assembly, followed, as might be understood,
+by their servants, the Revolutionary Socialists of the Left. The fractions
+which remained voted the law proposed by the Socialist-Revolutionists on
+the transfer of the lands to common ownership (socialization of the soil).
+The sailors and Red Guards attempted several times to interrupt the
+session. At five o'clock in the morning they finally demanded with a loud
+voice that everybody leave.
+
+"We were obliged to go," said, later, the members of the Constituent
+Assembly at a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasants'
+Delegates in recounting these tragic moments, "not that we were afraid of
+being shot; we were prepared for that, and each one of us expected it, but
+fear of something else which is far worse: for fear of insults and gross
+violence. We were only a handful; what was that beside those great big
+fellows full of malice toward the Constituante and of defiance for the
+'enemies of the people,' the 'servants of the bourgeoisie,' which we were
+in their eyes, thanks to the lies and the calumnies of the Bolsheviki?
+Careful of our dignity, and out of respect for the place where we were, we
+could not permit ourselves to be cuffed, nor that they throw us out of the
+Taurida Palace by force--and that is what would have inevitably happened."
+
+It was thus that the Constituent Assembly ended. The
+Socialist-Revolutionist fraction maintained an attitude of surprising calm
+and respectful bearing, not allowing itself to be disturbed by any
+provocation. The correspondents of foreign newspapers congratulated the
+members and said to them that in this session to which the Bolsheviki had
+wished to give the character of "any-old-kind-of-a-meeting" all the
+fractions maintained a truly parliamentary attitude.
+
+The Bolshevik terror became rife. _All the newspapers that tried to open
+the eyes of the people as to what was happening were confiscated_. Every
+attempt to circulate the _Dielo Naroda_ or other newspapers of the
+opposition was severely punished. The volunteer venders of these papers
+were arrested, cruelly struck down by rifle butts, and sometimes even shot.
+The population, indignant, gathered in groups on the streets, but the Red
+Guards dispersed all assemblages.
+
+
+XI
+
+_The Dissolution of the Third All-Russian Peasants' Congress_
+
+
+This is the course of the events which followed the dissolution of the
+Constituante. On the 8th of January the members of the Constituante
+assembled at Bolotnaia; two were arrested; the premises of the fraction
+were occupied by the Red Guards. On the 9th of January took place the
+funeral of the victims, in which all Petrograd took part. The Bolsheviki
+this time did not dare to shoot into the magnificent procession preceded by
+a long line of coffins. The 10th of January they dispersed the Third
+All-Russian Congress of Peasants which had placed itself on the side of the
+Constituent Assembly. The Congress had been at first arranged for the 8th
+of January (the same day as the Bolshevik Congress of the Soviets), but,
+because of the events, it was postponed to the 10th. The peasants who had
+come to this Congress knew perfectly well that they would have a fight to
+uphold, perhaps even to give their lives. Their neighbors, their
+co-villagers, wept when they saw them set out, as if it were a question of
+men condemned to death. That alone suffices to show to what degree were
+conscious these peasants who had come from all corners of the country to
+prepare themselves for the defense of the Constituent Assembly.
+
+As soon as the Congress was opened sailors and Red Guards, armed with guns
+and hand-grenades, broke into the premises (11 Kirillovskaia Street),
+surrounded the house, poured into the corridors and the session hall, and
+ordered all persons to leave.
+
+"In whose name do you order us, who are Delegates to the Peasants' Congress
+of All-Russia, to disperse?" asked the peasants.
+
+"In the name of the Baltic fleet," the soldiers replied.
+
+The peasants refused; cries of protest were raised. One by one the peasant
+delegates ascended the tribune to stigmatize the Bolsheviki in speeches
+full of indignation, and to express the hopes that they placed in the
+Constituent Assembly.
+
+The sailors listened. They had come to disperse a counter-revolutionary
+Congress, and these speeches troubled them. One sailor, not able to stand
+it any longer, burst into tears.
+
+"Let me speak!" he shouted to the president. "I hear your speeches, peasant
+comrades, and I no longer understand anything.... What is going on? We are
+peasants, and you, too, are peasants. But we are of this side, and you are
+of the other.... Why? Who has separated us? For we are brothers.... But it
+is as if a barrier had been placed between us." He wept and, seizing his
+revolver, he exclaimed, "No, I would rather kill myself!"
+
+This session of the Congress presented a strange spectacle, disturbed by
+men who confessed that they did not know why they were there; the peasants
+sang revolutionary songs; the sailors, armed with guns and grenades, joined
+them. Then the peasants knelt down to sing a funeral hymn to the memory of
+Logvinov, whose coffin was even yesterday within the room. The soldiers,
+lowering their guns, knelt down also.
+
+The Bolshevik authorities became excited; they did not expect such a turn
+to events. "Enough said," declared the chief; "we have come not to speak,
+but to act. If they do not want to go to Smolny, let them get out of here."
+And they set themselves to the task.
+
+In groups of five the peasants were conducted down-stairs, trampled on,
+and, on their refusal to go to Smolny, pushed out of doors during the night
+in the midst of the enormous city of which they knew nothing.
+
+Members of the Executive Committee were arrested, the premises occupied by
+sailors and Red Guards, the objects found therein stolen.
+
+The peasants found shelter in the homes of the inhabitants of Petrograd,
+who, indignant, offered them hospitality; a certain number were lodged in
+the barracks of the Preobrajenski Regiment. The sailors, who but a few
+minutes before had sung a funeral hymn to Logvinov, and wept when they saw
+that they understood nothing, now became the docile executors of the orders
+of the Bolsheviki. And when they were asked, "Why do you do this?" they
+answered as in the time, still recent, of Czarism: "It is the order. No
+need to talk."
+
+It was thus there was manifested the habit of servile obedience, of
+arbitrary power and violence, which had been taking root for several
+centuries; under a thin veneer of revolution one finds the servile and
+violent man of yesterday.
+
+In the midst of these exceptional circumstances the peasants gave proof of
+that obstinacy and energy in the pursuit of their rights for which they are
+noted. Thrown out in the middle of the night, robbed, insulted, they
+decided, nevertheless, to continue their Congress. "How, otherwise, can we
+go home?" said they. "We must come to an understanding as to what is to be
+done."
+
+The members of the Executive Committee who were still free succeeded in
+finding new premises (let it be noted that among others the workmen of the
+big Oboukhovsky factory offered them hospitality), and during three days
+the peasants could assemble secretly by hiding themselves from the eyes of
+the Red Guard, and the spies in various quarters of Petrograd, until such
+time as the decisions were given on all great questions. _A proces-verbal
+was prepared concerning all that had taken place on Kirillovskaia Street. A
+declaration was made protesting against the acts of the Bolshevik
+government_. This declaration was to be read at the Taurida Palace when the
+Soviets were in congress by delegates designated for that purpose. The
+Bolsheviki, however, would not permit the delegates to enter the Taurida
+Palace.
+
+Here are the texts of the declaration and of the proces-verbal:
+
+    At the Third National Congress of Soviets of Peasants' Delegates
+    grouped around the principle of the defense of the Constituent
+    Assembly, this declaration was sent to the Congress of Workmen's,
+    Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates called together by the
+    Bolshevist government at the Taurida Palace:
+
+    At the Second National Peasants' Congress the 359 delegates who
+    had come together for the defense of the Constituent Assembly
+    continued the work of the Congress and elected a provisional
+    Executive Committee, independently of the 354 delegates who had
+    opposed the power of the Constituent Assembly and adhered to the
+    Bolsheviki.
+
+    We, peasant delegates, having come to Petrograd, more than 300 in
+    number, to participate in a Congress called by the Provisional
+    Executive Committee, which is that of those of the Soviets which
+    acknowledge the principle of the defense of the Constituent
+    Assembly, declare to our electors, to the millions of the peasant
+    population, and to the whole country, that the actual government
+    which is called "The Government of the Peasants and Workmen" has
+    established in their integrity the violence, the arbitrariness,
+    and all the horrors of the autocratic regime which was overthrown
+    by the great Revolution of February. All the liberties attained by
+    that Revolution and won by innumerable sacrifices during several
+    generations are scouted and trodden under foot. Liberty of opinion
+    does not exist; men who under the government of the Czar had paid
+    by years of prison and exile for their devotedness to the
+    revolutionary cause are now again thrown into the dungeons of
+    fortresses without any accusation whatever, of anything of which
+    they might be guilty, being made to them. Again spies and
+    informers are in action. Again capital punishment is
+    re-established in its most horrible forms; shooting on the streets
+    and assassinations without judgment or examination. _Peaceful
+    processions, on their way to salute the Constituent Assembly, are
+    greeted by a fusillade of shots upon the orders of the autocrats
+    of Smolny. The liberty of the press does not exist; the papers
+    which displease the Bolsheviki are suppressed, their printing
+    plants and offices looted, their editors arrested._
+
+    The organizations which, during the preceding months, were
+    established with great difficulty--zemstvos, municipalities,
+    agricultural and food committees--are foolishly destroyed in an
+    excess of savage fanaticism.
+
+    The Bolsheviki even try to kill the supreme representation, the
+    only one legitimately established, of the popular will--the
+    Constituent Assembly.
+
+    To justify this violence and this tyranny they try to allege the
+    well-being of the people, but we, peasant workers, we see well
+    that their policy will only tighten the cord around the workers'
+    necks, while the possibility of a democratic peace becomes more
+    remote every day; matters have come to the point where the
+    Bolsheviki proclaim a further mobilization--of salaried
+    volunteers, it is true--to renew the hostilities. They strive to
+    represent the war with Ukraine and with the Cossacks under the
+    aspect of a war of classes; it is not, however, the bourgeoisie,
+    but the representatives of the working classes who are killed on
+    one side and on the other. They promised the Socialist regime, and
+    they have only destroyed the production of the factories so as to
+    leave the population without product and throw the workers into an
+    army of unemployed; the horrible specter of famine occupies the
+    void left by the broken organizations of food-supply; millions of
+    the money of the people are squandered in maintaining a Red
+    Guard--or sent to Germany to keep up the agitation there, while
+    the wives and the widows of our soldiers no longer receive an
+    allowance, there being no money in the Treasury, and are obliged
+    to live on charity.
+
+    The Russian country is threatened with ruin. Death knocks at the
+    doors of the hovels of the workmen.
+
+    By what forces have the Bolsheviki thus killed our country? Twelve
+    days before the organization of the autonomous administration was
+    achieved and the elections to the Constituent Assembly begun, at
+    the time when there had been organized all the autonomous
+    administrations of volosts, districts, governments, and cities,
+    chosen by equal, direct, and secret universal suffrage, thus
+    assuring the realization of the will of the people and justifying
+    the confidence of the population--even then they seized the power
+    and established a regime which subjects all the institutions of
+    the country to the unlicensed power of the Commissaries of the
+    People. _And these Commissaries rely upon the Soviets, which were
+    chosen at elections that were carried out according to rank, with
+    open balloting and inequality of vote, for therein the peasants
+    count only as many representatives as the workmen of the cities,
+    although in Russia their number is sixty times greater_.
+
+    Absence of control permits every abuse of power; absence of secret
+    voting permits that into these Soviets at these suspicious
+    elections some enter who are attracted by the political role of
+    these institutions; the defeat of inequality in the suffrage
+    restrains the expression of the will of the peasants, and,
+    accordingly, these cannot have confidence in this system of
+    government. The tyranny that presided at these elections was such
+    that the Bolsheviki themselves pay no attention to the results,
+    and declare that the Soviets that are opposed to themselves are
+    bourgeoisie and capitalists. We, representing the peasant workers,
+    must declare in the name of our constituents: if anything can save
+    Russia, it can only be the re-establishment of the organs of
+    local autonomous administration, chosen by equal, direct, and
+    secret universal suffrage and the resumption, without delay, of
+    the work of the Constituent Assembly.
+
+    The Constituent Assembly alone can express the exact will of the
+    working-people, for the system of election which governs it
+    includes every measure of precaution against violence, corruption,
+    and other abuses, and assures the election of deputies chosen by
+    the majority; now, in the country, the majority is composed of the
+    working class.
+
+    Millions of peasants delegated us to defend the Constituante, but
+    this was dissolved as soon as it began to work for the good of the
+    people. The work of the Constituante was interrupted at the time
+    that it was discussing the law concerning land, when a new
+    agricultural regime was being elaborated for the country. For this
+    reason, and for this alone, the Constituante adopted only the
+    first articles of this law, articles which established the
+    definite transfer of all the land to the hands of the workers,
+    without any ransom. The other articles of this law, which
+    concerned the order of the apportionment of lots, its forms, its
+    methods of possession, etc., could not be adopted, although they
+    were completely elaborated in the commission and nothing remained
+    but to sanction them.
+
+    We, peasants assembled in Congress, we, too, have been the object
+    of violence and outrages, unheard of even under the Czarist
+    regime. Red Guards and sailors, armed, invaded our premises. We
+    were searched in the rudest manner. Our goods and the provisions
+    which we had brought from home were stolen. Several of our
+    comrade-delegates and all the members of the Committee were
+    arrested and taken to Peter and Paul Fortress. We ourselves were,
+    late at night, put out of doors in a city which we did not know,
+    deprived of shelter under which to sleep. All that, to oblige us
+    either to go to Smolny, where the Bolshevist government called
+    another Congress, or to return to our homes without having
+    attained any result. But violence could not stop us; secretly, as
+    in the time of Czarist autocracy, we found a place to assemble and
+    to continue our work.
+
+    In making known these facts to the country and the numerous
+    millions of the peasant population, we call upon them to
+    stigmatize the revolting policy practised by the Bolshevik
+    government with regard to all those who are not in accord with it.
+    Returned to our villages, dispersed in every corner of immense
+    Russia, we shall use all our powers to make known to the mass of
+    peasants and to the entire country the truth concerning this
+    government of violence; to make known in every corner of the
+    fatherland that the actual government, which has the hardihood to
+    call itself "Government of the Workmen and Peasants," in reality
+    shoots down workmen and peasants and shamelessly scoffs at the
+    country. We shall use all our strength to induce the population of
+    peasant workers to demand an account from this government of
+    violence, as well as from their prodigal children, their sons and
+    brothers, who in the army and navy give aid to these autocrats in
+    the commission of violence.
+
+    In the name of millions of peasants, by whom we were delegated, we
+    demand that they no longer obstruct the work of the Constituent
+    Assembly. We were not allowed to finish the work for which we had
+    come; at home we shall continue this work. We shall employ all our
+    strength to effect, as soon as possible, the convocation of a new
+    National Congress of Peasants' Delegates united on the principle
+    of the defense of the Constituante, and that in a place where we
+    need not fear a new dissolution. Lately we fought against
+    autocracy and Czarist violence; we shall fight with no less energy
+    against the new autocrats who practise violence, whoever they may
+    be, and whatever may be the shibboleths by which they cover their
+    criminal acts. We shall fight for the Constituent Assembly,
+    because it is in that alone that we see the salvation of our
+    country, that of the Revolution, and that of Land and Liberty.
+
+    Charged by our constituents to defend the Constituent Assembly, we
+    cannot participate in a Congress called by those who have
+    dissolved it; who have profaned the idea which to the people is
+    something sacred; who have shot down the defenders of true
+    democracy; who have shed the sacred blood of our Logvinov, member
+    of the Executive Committee of peasant deputies, who on the 5th of
+    January was killed by an explosive bullet during a peaceful
+    manifestation, bearing the flag "Land and Liberty."
+    Comrade-peasants who have come by chance to this Congress declare
+    to these violators that the only Executive Committee that upholds
+    the idea of the defense of the Constituante forms a center around
+    which are grouped all the peasant workers. We call the entire mass
+    of peasants to the work that is common to all--the fight for "Land
+    and Liberty," for the true government of the people. "We all come
+    from the people, children of the same family of workers," and we
+    all have to follow a route that leads to happiness and liberty.
+    Now this road, which leads to "Land and Liberty," goes through the
+    Constituent Assembly alone. The Constituent Assembly was
+    dissolved, but it was chosen by the entire people, and it ought to
+    live.
+
+    _Long live the Constituent Assembly!_
+    _Down with violence and tyranny!_
+    _All power to the people, through the agency of the_
+    _Constituent Assembly!_
+
+    [Signed] The Third National Congress of Soviets of Peasant
+    Delegates, United on the Principle of the Defense of the
+    Constituent Assembly.
+
+
+PROCES-VERBAL OF THE SESSION OF THE III NATIONAL CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OF
+PEASANTS' DELEGATES, UNITED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF THE DEFENSE OF THE
+CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY
+
+The Provisional Executive Committee of Soviets of Peasants' Delegates
+nominated by the fraction of the Second National Congress of these Soviets,
+which, to the number of 359 delegates, was organized on the basis of the
+principle of the defense of the Constituent Assembly, had addressed to all
+the Soviets an appeal inviting those who believe in the defense of the
+Constituante to send representatives to the Third Congress, fixed by the
+Committee for the 8th of January, and destined to offset the Congress
+called for the 12th of January by the Committee of that fraction of the
+Congress which, to the number of 314 votes, took sides against the power of
+the Constituent Assembly and joined the Bolsheviki.
+
+The Peasants' Congress, meeting by districts and by governments, as well as
+the local executive committees of Soviets which have chosen us, knew well
+to which Congress they delegated us and had given us precise mandates,
+expressing their confidence in the Constituent Assembly and their blame of
+the Soviets and the Bolshevik organs that impede the work of the
+Constituante and call the peasants to the Congress of January 12th. These
+congresses and these committees have charged us to use all our efforts to
+defend the Constituent Assembly, binding themselves, on their part, in case
+our efforts were insufficient, to rise in a body for its defense.
+
+By reason of the disorganization of postal and telegraphic communications,
+and because in different localities the calls of the Committee were held up
+by the Bolshevist organizations, the instructions concerning the Congress
+fixed for the 8th of January were not received in many provinces until
+after considerable delay.
+
+Some minutes before the opening of the Conference, which was to take place
+on the premises of the Committee (11 Kirillovskaia Street), where the
+delegates on hand had lodged, there arrived a detachment of sailors and Red
+Guards armed with guns and bombs, who surrounded the house, guarding all
+the entrances, and occupied all the apartments. The Executive Committee,
+performing its duty toward the peasant workers, which duty was to hold
+their flag with a firm hand, not fearing any violence, and not allowing
+themselves to be intimidated by the bayonets and the bombs of the enemies
+of the peasant workers, opened the session at the hour indicated.
+
+The Bolshevist pretorians, however, violating the freedom of assembly,
+broke into the hall and surrounded the office and members of the Conference
+with bayonets drawn. Their leader, Kornilov, staff-commandant of the Red
+Guards of the Rojdestvensky quarter, made a speech to the delegates, in
+which he said that they were to go to the Smolny Institute, to the
+Bolshevist Congress, assuring them that they had come to this Congress by
+mistake; at the end he read a document ordering him to make a search of the
+premises, to confiscate all papers, and to arrest all who would offer
+resistance. In reply to this speech the delegates and the members of the
+Executive Committee spoke in turn; they stigmatized vehemently the criminal
+policy of the Bolshevist government, which dissolved the Constituent
+Assembly, the true representation of the popular will, without having given
+it the time to register a vote on the agricultural law; which shot down
+workers participating in peaceful negotiations; which deprived the people
+of the right of assembly to discuss their needs; which destroyed freedom of
+speech and assembly and trampled in the dust the whole Russian Revolution.
+The delegates, one after another, tried to explain to the Red Guards that
+it was not the delegates that were deceived in coming to this conference,
+but those who were going to Smolny to the Bolshevist Congress, those who,
+by order of the Bolsheviki, kill the peasants' representatives and dissolve
+their Congress.
+
+In the midst of these speeches Kornilov declared the Congress dissolved; to
+this Comrade Ovtchinnikov, president of the Conference, replied that the
+Congress would not be dissolved except by force, and, besides, that the
+document read by Kornilov did not authorize him to pronounce its
+dissolution. Members of the Congress having entered into arguments with the
+sailors and the Red Guards, concerning the violence inflicted on the
+peasant delegates, the sound of the rattling of guns was heard and the
+leader of the pretorians declared that if the Congress would not submit to
+his orders he would stop at nothing. All the members of the Congress were
+forthwith searched and thrown out of doors in groups of five, with the idea
+that, having come from the provinces, and not knowing Petrograd, they would
+find themselves dispersed in such a way as not to be able to assemble again
+anywhere, and would be obliged either to betake themselves to the railway
+and return home or to direct their steps toward Smolny, the address of
+which was given to each one at the exit. At the same time, without reason,
+the following were arrested: Minor, a deputy to the Constituent Assembly;
+Rakitnikov, Ovtchinnikov, Roussine, Sorokine, and Tchernobaiev, members of
+the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasant Delegates; and Chmelev, a
+soldier. The premises of the Committee, on which were various documents and
+papers which were to be sent into the country, were occupied by Red Guards,
+and machine-guns were placed at the entrance. The search ended about nine
+o'clock in the evening. Some late delegates alone were authorized to spend
+the night on the premises under the supervision of Red Guards.
+
+An inquiry held among the comrades, who had come for this Third National
+Peasants' Congress, established that, at the time when the premises of the
+Executive Committee were seized, January 10, 1918, there were, among the
+sailors and Red Guards of the detachment that did the work, _German and
+Austrian prisoners dressed in Russian uniforms_; it also established the
+fact that many objects had disappeared in the course of the search. The
+Congress decided: first, to consider as a law the socialization of the soil
+voted by the Constituent Assembly and to apply the same in the country;
+second, to consider that the Constituent Assembly, dispersed by brutal
+force, was nevertheless elected by the whole people and ought to exist and
+to assemble again as soon as that would be possible; third, to fight
+everywhere in the provinces in the defense of the organs of autonomous
+administration, which the Bolsheviki dispersed by armed force. During these
+few days when the peasants were obliged to assemble in secret and to
+station patrols to protect their meetings, they followed those methods of
+conspiracy that the Russian Socialists had been obliged to employ when they
+fought against the tyranny of autocracy. Returning to their villages, the
+peasants bore with them the greatest hate for the Bolsheviki, whom they
+considered the personification of tyranny and violence. And they took with
+them also a firm resolution to fight against this violence.
+
+The Executive Committee, whose powers were confirmed by the Third Congress,
+found itself thus, for the second time, deprived of all its goods, its
+premises, and its pecuniary resources; it found itself obliged to lead a
+half-clandestine existence, to organize secret assemblies, etc. Miss
+Spiridonova, who, in this fight against the peasants that rose to the
+defense of the Constituent Assembly, gave proof of intolerance and peculiar
+fanaticism, found herself at the head of the "peasants in uniform," sitting
+at Smolny, _adopting a decree whereby all the moneys that came by post to
+the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasant Delegates defending the
+Constituent Assembly were to be confiscated._
+
+The action of the Executive Committee was thus rendered very difficult. But
+it continued to fight, to publish an organ, to commission delegates, to
+entertain continued relations with the provinces and the country.
+
+
+XII
+
+_Conclusion_
+
+
+_Morally, Bolshevism was killed in the eyes of the workers in the course of
+these days_ when a peaceful demonstration was fired upon, the Constituent
+Assembly dissolved, the Peasant Congress (and, very soon, the Congress of
+the Agricultural Committees) dispersed. The Central Committee of the
+Revolutionary Socialist party issued an order for new elections to the
+Soviets, thinking thus to eliminate automatically the Bolsheviki. And, in
+truth, when at Petrograd and in the provinces, these elections began, the
+Revolutionary Socialists and the Mensheviki received the majority and the
+Bolsheviki were snowed under. But these new elections were thwarted by many
+circumstances: first, because of the lessening of production the workmen
+were discharged in a body and quit the factories; second, the Bolsheviki
+put obstacles in the way of the elections and sometimes openly prohibited
+them. Nevertheless, wherever they could be held, the results were
+unfavorable to the Bolsheviki.
+
+Finally, when the working classes clearly saw the shameful role played by
+the Bolsheviki in the matter of peace, when they saw the Bolsheviki humbly
+beg for peace at any price from the Germans, they understood that it was
+impossible to continue to tolerate such a government. _The Central
+Committee of the Revolutionary Socialist party published a Manifesto
+appealing to an armed fight against the Bolshevik government and the German
+gangs_ that were overrunning the country.
+
+The frightful results of this "peace," so extolled by the Bolsheviki,
+rendered even the name of the Bolshevist government odious in the eyes of
+every conscientious and honest man.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+But Bolshevism still endures, for it is based on the armed force of the Red
+Guard, on the supineness of the masses deprived of a political education,
+and not accustomed to fight or to act, and from ancient habit of submitting
+to force.
+
+The causes which produced Bolshevism are: first, the accumulation of all
+the conditions of the historic past of the Russian people; second, their
+psychic character and their habits; third, the conditions of the present
+time; and fourth, the general situation of the world--that is to say, the
+war.
+
+We also note the vague and hesitating policy of the Provisional Government;
+the lack of political education among the people, ready to follow him who
+promises the most; small development of civic sentiment; the want of any
+attachment whatever to the state--that of the Romanov having never given
+anything to the people and having taken all from them. Czarism took from
+the miserable peasant his last penny under form of taxes; it took his
+children from him for war; for the least act of disobedience to authority
+he was whipped. He wallowed in misery and in ignorance, deprived of every
+right, human or legal. How could he, this wretched and oppressed peasant
+develop civic sentiments, a consciousness of his personal dignity? On the
+other hand, we must take into account the immense weariness caused by the
+war and by the disorganization which it brought into the whole cycle of
+existence (to an incomparably greater degree than in western Europe). Such
+were the causes which had established a favorable scope for Bolshevik
+propaganda; to introduce their domination they knew how to make use of the
+shortcomings of the people and the defects of Russian life.
+
+In fine, what is Bolshevism in its essence? _It is an experiment, that is
+either criminal or that proceeds from a terrible thoughtlessness, tried,
+without their consent, on the living body of the Russian people_. Thus some
+attempt to apply their theories, others wish to measure the height of their
+personal influence, while still others (and they are found in every
+movement) seek to profit by the circumstances.
+
+Bolshevism is a phenomenon brought about by force; it is not a natural
+consequence of the progress of the Russian Revolution. Taken all in all,
+Bolshevism is not Socialism. The Bolshevist _coup d'etat_ was accomplished
+contrary to the wish of the majority of the people, who were preparing for
+the Constituent Assembly.
+
+_It was accomplished with the help of armed force, and it is because of
+this that the Bolshevist regime holds out._
+
+_It has against it the whole conscious portion of the peasant and working
+population and all the Intellectuals._
+
+_It has crushed and trampled under foot the liberty that was won by the
+Russian people._
+
+The Bolsheviki pretend to act in the name of the people. Why, then, have
+they dissolved the Constituent Assembly elected by the people?
+
+They pretend to have the majority of the people with them. Why, then, this
+governmental terror that is being used in a manner more cruel even than in
+the time of Czarism?
+
+They say that, to fight against the bourgeoisie, the use of violence is
+necessary. But their principal thrusts are directed not against the
+bourgeoisie, but against the Socialist parties that do not agree with them.
+And they dare give this caricature the name of Dictatorship of the
+Proletariat!
+
+Socialism must necessarily be founded on democratic principles. If not, "it
+cuts off the branch of the tree on which it rests," according to the
+expression of Kautsky.
+
+Socialism needs constructive elements. It does not limit itself to the
+destruction of ancient forms of existence; it creates new ones. But
+Bolshevism has only destructive elements. It does nothing but destroy,
+always destroy, with a blind hatred, a savage fanaticism.
+
+What has it established? Its "decrees" are only verbal solutions without
+sense, skeletons of ideas, or simply a revolutionary phraseology containing
+nothing real (as for example the famous shibboleth, "neither peace nor
+war").
+
+During the few months of its reign Bolshevism has succeeded in destroying
+many things; nearly everything that the effort of the Russian people had
+established. Life, disorganized almost to its foundations, has become
+almost impossible in Russia. The railroads do not function, or function
+only with great difficulty; the postal and telegraphic communications are
+interrupted in several places. The zemstvos--bases of the life of the
+country--are suppressed (they are "bourgeois" institutions); the schools
+and hospitals, whose existence is impossible without the zemstvos, are
+closed. The most complete chaos exists in the food-supply. The
+Intellectuals, who, in Russia, had suffered so much from the Czarist
+tyranny and oppression, are declared "enemies of the people" and compelled
+to lead a clandestine existence; they are dying of hunger. It is the
+Intellectuals and not the bourgeois (who are hiding) that suffer most from
+the Bolshevist regime.
+
+The Soviets alone remain. But the Soviets are not only revolutionary
+organs, they are "guardians of the Revolution," but in no way legislative
+and administrative organs.
+
+Bolshevism is an experiment tried on the Russian people. The people are
+going to pay dearly for it. At least let not this experiment be lost, on
+them, as well as on other peoples! Let the Socialists of western Europe be
+not unduly elated by words or by far-fetched judgments. Let them look the
+cruel reality in the face and examine facts to find out the truth.
+
+A tyranny which is supported by bayonets is always repugnant, wherever it
+comes from, and under whatever name it may strut. It can have nothing in
+common with Socialism, which is not only a doctrine of economic necessity,
+but also a doctrine of superior justice and truth.
+
+"All the societies or individuals adhering to the Internationale will know
+what must be the basis of their conduct toward all men: Truth, Justice,
+Morality, without Distinction of Color, Creed, or Nationality," said the
+statutes that were drawn up by the prime founders of our Internationale.
+
+_The Executive Committee of the National Soviet of Peasant Delegates
+Placing themselves on the Grounds of the Defense of the Constituent
+Assembly, having had to examine, in its session of February 8, 1918, the
+violence committed by the Bolsheviki, and to pass in review the
+persecutions that this organization had to suffer from that party and from
+the government of the Commissaries of the People, decided to bring the
+violence committed by the Bolsheviki in the name of Socialism to the
+knowledge of the Socialists of western Europe and of the International
+Socialist Bureau through the citizen, E. Roubanovitch, representative of
+the Revolutionary Socialist party at the International Socialist Bureau and
+intrusted with International relations by the Executive Committee of the
+First Soviet of Peasants.
+
+The Executive Committee demands the expulsion, from the Socialist family,
+of the Bolshevist leaders, as well as of those of the Revolutionary
+Socialists of the Left, who seized the power by force, held it by violence
+and compromised Socialism in the eyes of the popular masses.
+
+Let our brothers of western Europe be judges between the Socialist peasants
+who rose in the defense of the Constituent Assembly and the Bolsheviki, who
+dispersed them by armed force, thus trampling under foot the will of the
+Russian people._
+
+INNA RAKITNIKOV,
+
+_Vice-President of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasant
+Delegates, who stand in Defense of the Constituent Assembly._
+
+_May 30, 1918._
+
+
+
+
+APPENDIX III
+
+FORMER SOCIALIST PREMIER OF FINLAND ON BOLSHEVISM
+
+
+The following letter was addressed to Mr. Santeri Nuorteva, who, it will be
+remembered, was appointed Minister to America by the Revolutionary
+Government of Finland. The author of the letter, Oskar Tokoi, was the first
+Socialist Prime Minister in the world. He is a Socialist of long standing,
+who has always been identified with the radical section of the movement.
+Mr. Nuorteva, it should be added, is himself a strong supporter of the
+Bolsheviki, and is their accredited American representative.
+
+    ARCHANGEL, _September 10, 1918._
+
+    SANTERI NUORTEVA,
+
+    _Fitchburg, Mass._:
+
+    DEAR COMRADE,--I deem it my duty to appeal to you and to
+    other comrades in America in order to be able to make clear to you
+    the trend of events here.
+
+    The situation here has become particularly critical. We, the
+    Finnish refugees, who, after the unfortunate revolution, had to
+    flee from Finland to Russia, find ourselves to-day in a very
+    tragic situation. A part of the former Red Guardists who fled here
+    have joined the Red Army formed by the Russian Soviet Government;
+    another part has formed itself as a special Finnish legion, allied
+    with the army of the Allied countries; and a third part, which has
+    gone as far as to Siberia, is prowling about there, diffused over
+    many sections of the country, and there have been reports that a
+    part of those Finns have joined the ranks of the Czecho-Slovaks.
+    The Finnish masses, thus divided, may therefore at any time get
+    into fighting each other, which indeed would be the greatest of
+    all misfortunes. It is therefore necessary to take a clear
+    position, and to induce all the Finns to support it, and we hope
+    that you as well, over in America, will support it as much as is
+    in your power.
+
+    During these my wanderings I have happened to traverse Russia from
+    one end to another, and I have become deeply convinced that Russia
+    is not able to rise from this state of chaos and confusion by her
+    own strength and of her own accord. The magnificent economic
+    revolution, which the Bolsheviki in Russia are trying now to bring
+    about, is doomed in Russia to complete failure. The economic
+    conditions in Russia have not even approximately reached a stage
+    to make an economic revolution possible, and the low grade of
+    education, as well as the unsteady character of the Russian
+    people, makes it still more impossible.
+
+    It is true that magnificent theories and plans have been laid
+    here, but their putting into practice is altogether impossible,
+    principally because of the following reasons: The whole propertied
+    class--which here in Russia, where small property ownership mainly
+    prevails, is very numerous--is opposing and obstructing;
+    technically trained people and specialists necessary in the
+    industries are obstructing; local committees and sub-organs make
+    all systematic action impossible, as they in their respective
+    fields determine things quite autocratically and make everything
+    unsuccessful which should be based on a strong, coherent, and in
+    every respect minutely conceived system as a social production
+    should be based. But even if all these, in themselves
+    unsurmountable obstacles, could be made away with, there remains
+    still the worst one--and that is the workers themselves.
+
+    It is already clear that in the face of such economic conditions
+    the whole social order has been upset. Naturally only a small part
+    of the people will remain backing such an order. The whole
+    propertied class belongs to the opponents of the government,
+    including the petty bourgeoisie, the craftsmen, the small
+    merchants, the profiteers. The whole Intellectual class and a
+    great part of the workers are also opposing the government. In
+    comparison with the entire population only a small minority
+    supports the government, and, what is worse to the supporters of
+    the government, are rallying all the hooligans, robbers, and
+    others to whom this period of confusion promises a good chance of
+    individual action. It is also clear that such a regime cannot stay
+    but with the help of a stern terror. But, on the other hand, the
+    longer the terror continues the more disagreeable and hated it
+    becomes. Even a great part of those who from the beginning could
+    stay with the government and who still are sincere Social
+    Democrats, having seen all this chaos, begin to step aside, or to
+    ally themselves with those openly opposing the government.
+    Naturally, as time goes by, there remains only the worst and the
+    most demoralized element. Terror, arbitrary rule, and open
+    brigandage become more and more usual, and the government is not
+    able at all to prevent it. And the outcome is clearly to be
+    foreseen--the unavoidable failure of all this magnificently
+    planned system.
+
+    And what will be the outcome of that? My conviction is that as
+    soon as possible we should turn toward the other road--the road of
+    united action. I have seen, and I am convinced that the majority
+    of the Russian people is fundamentally democratic and
+    whole-heartedly detests a reinstitution of autocracy, and that
+    therefore all such elements must, without delay, be made to unite.
+    But it is also clear that at first they, even united, will not be
+    able to bring about order in this country on their own accord. I
+    do not believe that at this time there is in Russia any social
+    force which would be able to organize the conditions in the
+    country. For that reason, to my mind, we should, to begin with,
+    frankly and honestly rely on the help of the Allied Powers. Help
+    from Germany cannot be considered, as Germany, because of her own
+    interests, is compelled to support the Bolshevik rule as long as
+    possible, as Germany from the Bolshevik rule is pressing more and
+    more political and economic advantages, to such an extent even
+    that all of Russia is becoming practically a colony of Germany.
+    Russia thus would serve to compensate Germany for the colonies
+    lost in South Africa.
+
+    A question presents itself at once whether the Allied Powers are
+    better. And it must be answered instantly that neither would they
+    establish in Russia any Socialist society. Yet the democratic
+    traditions of these countries are some surety that the social
+    order established by them will be a democratic one. It is clear as
+    day that the policy of the Allied Powers is also imperialistic,
+    but the geographical and economic position of these countries is
+    such that even their own interests demand that Russia should be
+    able to develop somewhat freely. The problem has finally evolved
+    into such a state of affairs where Russia must rely on the help
+    either of the Allies or Germany; we must choose, as the saying
+    goes, "between two evils," and, things being as badly mixed as
+    they are, the lesser evil must be chosen frankly and openly. It
+    does not seem possible to get anywhere by dodging the issue.
+    Russia perhaps would have saved herself some time ago from this
+    unfortunate situation if she had understood immediately after the
+    February Revolution the necessity of a union between the more
+    democratic elements. Bolshevism undoubtedly has brought Russia a
+    big step toward her misfortune, from which she cannot extricate
+    herself on her own accord.
+
+    Thus there exists no more any purely Socialist army, and all the
+    fighting forces and all those who have taken to arms are fighting
+    for the interests of the one or the other group of the Great
+    Powers. The question therefore finally is only this--in the
+    interests of which group one wants to fight. The revolutionary
+    struggles in Russia and in Finland, to my mind, have clearly
+    established that a Socialist society cannot be brought about by
+    the force of arms and cannot be supported by the force of arms,
+    but that a Socialist order must be founded on a conscious and
+    living will by an overwhelming majority of the nations, which is
+    able to realize its will without the help of arms.
+
+    But now that the nations of the world have actually been thrown
+    into an armed conflict, and the war, which in itself is the
+    greatest crime of the world, still is raging, we must stand it. We
+    must, however, destroy the originator and the cause of the war,
+    the militarism, by its own arms, and on its ruins we must build,
+    in harmony and in peace--not by force, as the Russian Bolsheviki
+    want--a new and a better social order under the guardianship of
+    which the people may develop peacefully and securely.
+
+    I have been explaining to you my ideas, expecting that you will
+    publish them. You over in America are not able to imagine how
+    horrible the life in Russia at the present time is. The period
+    after the French Revolution surely must have been as a life in a
+    paradise compared with this. Hunger, brigandage, arrests, and
+    murders are such every-day events that nobody pays any attention
+    to them. Freedom of assemblage, association, free speech, and free
+    press is a far-away ideal which is altogether destroyed at the
+    present time. Arbitrary rule and terror are raging everywhere,
+    and, what is worst of all, not only the terror proclaimed by the
+    government, but individual terror as well.
+
+    My greetings to all friends and comrades.
+
+    OSKAR TOKOI.
+
+THE END
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[1] Plechanov never formally joined the Menshevik faction, I believe, but
+his writings showed that he favored that faction and the Mensheviki
+acknowledged his intellectual leadership.
+
+[2] They had gained one member since the election.
+
+[3] Quoted by Litvinov, _The Bolshevik Revolution: Its Rise and Meaning_,
+p. 22. Litvinov, it must be remembered, was the Bolshevik Minister to Great
+Britain. His authority to speak for the Bolsheviki is not to be questioned.
+
+[4] The date is Russian style--March 12th, our style.
+
+[5] _The State in Russia--Old and New_, by Leon Trotzky; _The Class
+Struggle_, Vol. II, No. 2, pp. 213-221.
+
+[6] This document is printed in full at the end of the volume as Appendix.
+I
+
+[7] The author of the present study is responsible for the use of italics
+in this document.
+
+[8] Litvinov, _The Bolshevik Revolution: Its Rise and Meaning_, p. 30.
+
+[9] Lenine is not quite accurate in his statement of Marx's views nor quite
+fair in stating the position of the "opportunists." The argument of Marx in
+_The Civil War in France_ is not that the proletariat must "break down" the
+governmental machinery, but that it must _modify_ it and _adapt_ it to the
+class needs. This is something quite different, of course. Moreover, it is
+the basis of the policy of the "opportunists." The Mensheviki and other
+moderate Socialists in Russia were trying to _modify_ and _adapt_ the
+political state.
+
+[10] The reference is to Karl Kautsky, the great German exponent of Marxian
+theory.
+
+[11] _The New International_ (American Bolshevik organ), June 30, 1917.
+
+[12] _The New International_, July 23, 1917.
+
+[13] Litvinov, _op. cit._, p. 31.
+
+[14] _The New International_, April, 1918.
+
+[15] See, _e.g._, the article by Lenine, _New International_, April, 1918,
+and Litvinov, _op. cit._
+
+[16] See my _Syndicalism, Industrial Unionism, and Socialism_ for the
+I.W.W. philosophy.
+
+[17] Bryant, _Six Months in Red Russia_, p. 141.
+
+[18] This appeal is published as Appendix I at the end of this volume.
+
+[19] Certain Soviets of Soldiers at the Front had decided that they would
+stay in their trenches for defensive purposes, but would obey no commands
+to go forward, no matter what the military situation.
+
+[20] Figures supplied by the Russian Information Bureau.
+
+[21] "It was with a deep and awful sense of the terrible failure before us
+that I consented to become Premier at that time," Kerensky told the present
+writer.
+
+[22] The story was reproduced in _New Europe_ (London), September, 1917.
+
+[23] _The New International_, April, 1918.
+
+[24] See p. 254.
+
+[25] See the letter of E. Roubanovitch, Appendix II, p. 331.
+
+[26] _Justice_, London, January 31, 1918.
+
+[27] _Justice_, London, May 16, 1918.
+
+[28] _Vide_ Special Memorandum to the International Socialist Bureau on
+behalf of the Revolutionary Socialist party of Russia.
+
+[29] See Appendix III.
+
+[30] _Pravda_, July 5, 1918.
+
+[31] February, 1918, Protest Against Recognition of Bolshevik
+Representative by British Labor Party Conference.
+
+[32] Proclamation to People of the Northern Province, etc., December, 1918
+
+[33] _The New International_, April, 1918.
+
+[34] The dates given are according to the Russian calendar.
+
+[35] See the Rakitnikov Memorandum--Appendix.
+
+[36] _The New International_, April, 1918.
+
+[37] The number of votes was over 36,000,000.
+
+[38] _Vide_ Rakitnikov report.
+
+[39] Twenty-three members of the Executive Committee were arrested and,
+without any trial, thrown into the Fortress of Peter and Paul.
+
+[40] From a Declaration of Protest by the Executive Committee of the Third
+National Congress of Peasants' Delegates (anti-Bolshevist), sent to the
+Bolshevik Congress of Soviets of Workmen, Soldiers, and Peasants, but not
+permitted to be read to that assembly.
+
+[41] _L'Ouorier Russe_, May, 1918.
+
+[42] _Idem_.
+
+[43] _Izvestya_, July 28, 1918.
+
+[44] _Pravda_, October 8, 1918 (No. 216).
+
+[45] "Agents-Provocateurs and the Russian Revolution," article in
+_Justice,_, August 16, 1916, by J. Tchernoff.
+
+[46] Most of the information in this paragraph is based upon an article in
+the Swiss newspaper _Lausanne Gazette_ by the well-known Russian
+journalist, Serge Persky, carefully checked up by Russian Socialist exiles
+in Paris.
+
+[47] Joseph Martinek, in the _Cleveland Press_.
+
+[48] _Justice_ (London), January 23, 1919.
+
+[49] _Justice_, London, January 31, 1918.
+
+[50] Jean Jaures, _Studies in Socialism_.
+
+[51] F. Engels, 1895, Preface to Marx's _Civil War in France_.
+
+[52] The reader is referred to my _Sidelights on Contemporary Socialism_
+and my _Karl Marx: His Life and Works_ for a fuller account of these
+struggles.
+
+[53] Marx, _A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy_, p. 12.
+
+[54] Editorial entitled "Bolshevik Problems," in _The Liberator_, April,
+1918.
+
+[55] The article by Lenine quoted by Mr. Eastman appeared in _The New
+International_, February, 1918.
+
+[56] _The Bolsheviks and the Soviets_, by Albert Rhys Williams, p. 6.
+
+[57] _Ansprache der Centralbehorde an den Bund, vom Marz, 1850_: Anhang IX
+der Enthullerngen ueber den Kommunisten-process Zu Koln, p. 79.
+
+[58] Lenine, _The Soviets at Work_.
+
+[59] Wilhelm Liebknecht, _No Compromise, No Political Trading_, p. 30.
+
+[60] _Socialism: a Summary and Interpretation of Socialist Principles_, by
+John Spargo, p. 215 (1st edition Macmillan, 1916).
+
+[61] Liebknecht, _No Compromise, No Political Trading_, p. 16.
+
+[62] Liebknecht, _No Compromise, No Political Trading_, p. 28.
+
+[63] This subject is treated in the following, among others, of my books:
+
+_Socialism: a Summary and Interpretation of Socialist Principles_; _Applied
+Socialism_; _Syndicalism, Industrial Unionism, and Socialism_; _Elements of
+Socialism_ (Spargo and Arner), and _Social Democracy Explained_.
+
+[64] _The New International_, July 23, 1917.
+
+[65] Conversation with Trotzky reported by E.A. Ross, _Russia in Upheaval_,
+p. 208.
+
+[66] Kautsky, _The Social Revolution_, p. 137.
+
+[67] Lenine, _The Soviets at Work_.
+
+[68] Lenine, _op. cit._
+
+[69] Lenine, _op. cit._
+
+[70] The best expositions of Guild Socialism are _Self-Government in
+Industry_, by G.D.H. Cole, and _National Guilds_, by S.G. Hobson, edited by
+A.R. Orage.
+
+[71] Lenine, _op. cit._
+
+[72] Lenine, _op. cit._
+
+[73] Lenine, _op. cit._
+
+[74] Lenine, _op. cit._
+
+[75] Lenine, _op. cit._
+
+[76] Of course, Trotzky's statement to Professor Ross about paying the
+capitalists "5 or 6 per cent. a year" was frankly a compromise.
+
+[77] E.A. Ross, _Russia in Upheaval_, pp. 206-207.
+
+[78] Litvinov, _The Bolshevik Revolution: Its Rise and Meaning_, p. 39.
+
+[79] Marx and Engels speak of the "idiocy of rural life" from which
+capitalism, through the concentration of agriculture and the abolition of
+small holdings, would rescue the peasant proprietors (_Communist
+Manifesto_). In _Capital_ Marx speaks of the manner in which modern
+industry "annihilates the peasant, _the bulwark of the old society_" (Vol.
+I, p. 513). Liebknecht says that in 1848 it was the _city_ which overthrew
+the corrupt citizen king and the _country_ which overthrew the new
+republic, chose Louis Bonaparte and prepared the way for the Empire. "The
+French peasantry created an empire through their blind fear of proletarian
+Socialism" (_Die Grund und Bodenfrage_). Kautsky wrote, "Peasants who feel
+that they are not proletarians, but true peasants, are not only not to be
+won over to our cause, _but belong to our most dangerous adversaries_"
+(_Dat Erfurter Programm und die Land-agitation_). It would be easy to
+compile a volume of such utterances.
+
+[80] Walling, _Russia's Message_, p. 118. The italics are mine.
+
+[81] "Cabinet lands" are the crown lands, property of the Czar and royal
+family.
+
+[82] Ross, _op. cit._, pp. 206-207.
+
+[83] _Justice_, London, August 1, 1917.
+
+[84] The figures given are quoted by Sack, in _The Birth of Russian
+Democracy_, and were originally published by the Bolshevist Commissaire of
+Commerce.
+
+[85] _Parvus et le Parti Socialiste Danois_, by P.G. La Chesnais.
+
+[86] La Chesnais, _op. cit._
+
+[87] In "_L'Humanite_," article condensed in _Justice_, January 31, 1918.
+
+[88] International Notes, _Justice_, January 3, 1918.
+
+[89] _The Disarmament Cry_, by N. Lenine, in _The Class Struggle_,
+May-June, 1918.
+
+[90] _The "Disarmament" Cry_, by N. Lenine, _The Class Struggle_, May-June,
+1918.
+
+[91] Most, if not all, dates in this document are given as in the Russian
+calendar, which is thirteen days behind ours.
+
+[92] This refers, doubtless, to the different basis for voting applied to
+the peasants and the industrial workers, as provided in the Soviet
+Constitution.
+
+
+
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