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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/15076-8.txt b/15076-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5f3bb81 --- /dev/null +++ b/15076-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,10363 @@ +The Project Gutenberg eBook, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, by +Julian Stafford Corbett + + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + + + + +Title: Some Principles of Maritime Strategy + +Author: Julian Stafford Corbett + +Release Date: February 16, 2005 [eBook #15076] + +Language: english + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + + +***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SOME PRINCIPLES OF MARITIME +STRATEGY*** + + +E-text prepared by Suzanne Shell, Keith Edkins, and the Project Gutenberg +Online Distributed Proofreading Team + + + +SOME PRINCIPLES OF MARITIME STRATEGY + +JULIAN S. CORBETT + +London + +1911 + + + + + + + +[Illustration: _Sir Julian Corbett (courtesy D.M. Schurman)_] + + + + + +CONTENTS + + +INTRODUCTION + + THE THEORETICAL STUDY OF WAR--ITS USE AND LIMITATIONS + +PART I. THEORY OF WAR + + I. THE THEORY OF WAR + II. NATURES OF WARS--OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE + III. NATURES OF WARS--LIMITED AND UNLIMITED + IV. LIMITED WAR AND MARITIME EMPIRES + V. WARS OF INTERVENTION--LIMITED INTERFERENCE IN UNLIMITED WAR + VI. CONDITIONS OF STRENGTH IN LIMITED WAR + +PART II. THEORY OF NAVAL WAR + + I. THEORY OF THE OBJECT--COMMAND OF THE SEA + II. THEORY OF THE MEANS--THE CONSTITUTION OF FLEETS + III. THEORY OF THE METHOD--CONCENTRATION AND DISPERSAL OF FORCE + +PART III. CONDUCT OF NAVAL WAR + + I. INTRODUCTORY-- + 1. INHERENT DIFFERENCES IN THE CONDITIONS OF WAR ON LAND AND ON SEA + 2. TYPICAL FORMS OF NAVAL OPERATIONS + II. METHODS OF SECURING COMMAND-- + 1. ON OBTAINING A DECISION + 2. BLOCKADE + III. METHODS OF DISPUTING COMMAND-- + 1. DEFENSIVE FLEET OPERATIONS--"A FLEET IN BEING" + 2. MINOR COUNTER-ATTACKS + IV. METHODS OF EXERCISING COMMAND-- + 1. DEFENCE AGAINST INVASION + 2. ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF TRADE + 3. ATTACK, DEFENCE, AND SUPPORT OF MILITARY EXPEDITIONS + + Appendix: The "Green Pamphlet" + + INDEX + + + + + * * * * * + + INTRODUCTION + + The Theoretical Study of War--Its Use and + Limitations + + * * * * * + +At first sight nothing can appear more unpractical, less promising of +useful result, than to approach the study of war with a theory. There seems +indeed to be something essentially antagonistic between the habit of mind +that seeks theoretical guidance and that which makes for the successful +conduct of war. The conduct of war is so much a question of personality, of +character, of common-sense, of rapid decision upon complex and +ever-shifting factors, and those factors themselves are so varied, so +intangible, so dependent upon unstable moral and physical conditions, that +it seems incapable of being reduced to anything like true scientific +analysis. At the bare idea of a theory or "science" of war the mind recurs +uneasily to well-known cases where highly "scientific" officers failed as +leaders. Yet, on the other hand, no one will deny that since the great +theorists of the early nineteenth century attempted to produce a reasoned +theory of war, its planning and conduct have acquired a method, a +precision, and a certainty of grasp which were unknown before. Still less +will any one deny the value which the shrewdest and most successful leaders +in war have placed upon the work of the classical strategical writers. + +The truth is that the mistrust of theory arises from a misconception of +what it is that theory claims to do. It does not pretend to give the power +of conduct in the field; it claims no more than to increase the effective +power of conduct. Its main practical value is that it can assist a capable +man to acquire a broad outlook whereby he may be the surer his plan shall +cover all the ground, and whereby he may with greater rapidity and +certainty seize all the factors of a sudden situation. The greatest of the +theorists himself puts the matter quite frankly. Of theoretical study he +says, "It should educate the mind of the man who is to lead in war, or +rather guide him to self-education, but it should not accompany him on the +field of battle." + +Its practical utility, however, is not by any means confined to its effects +upon the powers of a leader. It is not enough that a leader should have the +ability to decide rightly; his subordinates must seize at once the full +meaning of his decision and be able to express it with certainty in +well-adjusted action. For this every man concerned must have been trained +to think in the same plane; the chief's order must awake in every brain the +same process of thought; his words must have the same meaning for all. If a +theory of tactics had existed in 1780, and if Captain Carkett had had a +sound training in such a theory, he could not possibly have misunderstood +Rodney's signal. As it was, the real intention of the signal was obscure, +and Rodney's neglect to explain the tactical device it indicated robbed his +country of a victory at an hour of the direst need. There had been no +previous theoretical training to supply the omission, and Rodney's fine +conception was unintelligible to anybody but himself. + +Nor is it only for the sake of mental solidarity between a chief and his +subordinates that theory is indispensable. It is of still higher value for +producing a similar solidarity between him and his superiors at the Council +table at home. How often have officers dumbly acquiesced in ill-advised +operations simply for lack of the mental power and verbal apparatus to +convince an impatient Minister where the errors of his plan lay? How often, +moreover, have statesmen and officers, even in the most harmonious +conference, been unable to decide on a coherent plan of war from inability +to analyse scientifically the situation they had to face, and to recognise +the general character of the struggle in which they were about to engage. +That the true nature of a war should be realised by contemporaries as +clearly as it comes to be seen afterwards in the fuller light of history is +seldom to be expected. At close range accidental factors will force +themselves into undue prominence and tend to obscure the true horizon. Such +error can scarcely ever be eliminated, but by theoretical study we can +reduce it, nor by any other means can we hope to approach the clearness of +vision with which posterity will read our mistakes. Theory is, in fact, a +question of education and deliberation, and not of execution at all. That +depends on the combination of intangible human qualities which we call +executive ability. + +This, then, is all the great authorities ever claimed for theory, but to +this claim the chief of them at least, after years of active service on the +Staff, attached the highest importance. "In actual operations," he wrote in +one of his latest memoranda, "men are guided solely by their judgment, and +it will hit the mark more or less accurately according as they possess more +or less genius. This is the way all great generals have acted.... Thus it +will always be in action, and so far judgment will suffice. But when it is +a question not of taking action yourself, but of convincing others at the +Council table, then everything depends on clear conceptions and the +exposition of the inherent relations of things. So little progress has been +made in this respect that most deliberations are merely verbal contentions +which rest on no firm foundation, and end either in every one retaining his +own opinion, or in a compromise from considerations of mutual respect--a +middle course of no actual value."[1] + + [1] Clausewitz, _On War_, p. ix. The references are to Colonel Graham's + translation of the third German edition, but his wording is not always + followed exactly. + +The writer's experience of such discussions was rich and at first hand. +Clear conceptions of the ideas and factors involved in a war problem, and a +definite exposition of the relations between them, were in his eyes the +remedy for loose and purposeless discussion; and such conceptions and +expositions are all we mean by the theory or the science of war. It is a +process by which we co-ordinate our ideas, define the meaning of the words +we use, grasp the difference between essential and unessential factors, and +fix and expose the fundamental data on which every one is agreed. In this +way we prepare the apparatus of practical discussion; we secure the means +of arranging the factors in manageable shape, and of deducing from them +with precision and rapidity a practical course of action. Without such an +apparatus no two men can even think on the same line; much less can they +ever hope to detach the real point of difference that divides them and +isolate it for quiet solution. + +In our own case this view of the value of strategical theory has a special +significance, and one far wider than its continental enunciators +contemplated. For a world-wide maritime Empire the successful conduct of +war will often turn not only on the decisions of the Council chamber at +home, but on the outcome of conferences in all parts of the world between +squadronal commanders and the local authorities, both civil and military, +and even between commanders-in-chief of adjacent stations. In time of war +or of preparation for war, in which the Empire is concerned, arrangements +must always be based to an exceptional degree on the mutual relation of +naval, military, and political considerations. The line of mean efficiency, +though indicated from home, must be worked out locally, and worked out on +factors of which no one service is master. Conference is always necessary, +and for conference to succeed there must be a common vehicle of expression +and a common plane of thought. It is for this essential preparation that +theoretical study alone can provide; and herein lies its practical value +for all who aspire to the higher responsibilities of the Imperial service. + +So great indeed is the value of abstract strategical study from this point +of view, that it is necessary to guard ourselves against over-valuation. So +far from claiming for their so-called science more than the possibilities +we have indicated, the classical strategists insist again and again on the +danger of seeking from it what it cannot give. They even repudiate the very +name of "Science." They prefer the older term "Art." They will permit no +laws or rules. Such laws, they say, can only mislead in practice, for the +friction to which they are subject from the incalculable human factors +alone is such that the friction is stronger than the law. It is an old +adage of lawyers that nothing is so misleading as a legal maxim, but a +strategical maxim is undoubtedly and in every way less to be trusted in +action. + +What then, it will be asked, are the tangible results which we can hope to +attain from theory? If all on which we have to build is so indeterminate, +how are any practical conclusions to be reached? That the factors are +infinitely varied and difficult to determine is true, but that, it must be +remembered, is just what emphasises the necessity of reaching such firm +standpoints as are attainable. The vaguer the problem to be solved, the +more resolute must we be in seeking points of departure from which we can +begin to lay a course, keeping always an eye open for the accidents that +will beset us, and being always alive to their deflecting influences. And +this is just what the theoretical study of strategy can do. It can at least +determine the normal. By careful collation of past events it becomes clear +that certain lines of conduct tend normally to produce certain effects; +that wars tend to take certain forms each with a marked idiosyncrasy; that +these forms are normally related to the object of the war and to its value +to one or both belligerents; that a system of operations which suits one +form may not be that best suited to another. We can even go further. By +pursuing an historical and comparative method we can detect that even the +human factor is not quite indeterminable. We can assert that certain +situations will normally produce, whether in ourselves or in our +adversaries, certain moral states on which we may calculate. + +Having determined the normal, we are at once in a stronger position. Any +proposal can be compared with it, and we can proceed to discuss clearly the +weight of the factors which prompt us to depart from the normal. Every case +must be judged on its merits, but without a normal to work from we cannot +form any real judgment at all; we can only guess. Every case will assuredly +depart from the normal to a greater or less extent, and it is equally +certain that the greatest successes in war have been the boldest departures +from the normal. But for the most part they have been departures made with +open eyes by geniuses who could perceive in the accidents of the case a +just reason for the departure. + +Take an analogous example, and the province of strategical theory becomes +clear at once. Navigation and the parts of seamanship that belong to it +have to deal with phenomena as varied and unreliable as those of the +conduct of war. Together they form an art which depends quite as much as +generalship on the judgment of individuals. The law of storms and tides, of +winds and currents, and the whole of meteorology are subject to infinite +and incalculable deflections, and yet who will deny nowadays that by the +theoretical study of such things the seaman's art has gained in coherence +and strength? Such study will not by itself make a seaman or a navigator, +but without it no seaman or navigator can nowadays pretend to the name. +Because storms do not always behave in the same way, because currents are +erratic, will the most practical seaman deny that the study of the normal +conditions are useless to him in his practical decisions? + +If, then, the theoretical study of strategy be approached in this way--if, +that is, it be regarded not as a substitute for judgment and experience, +but as a means of fertilising both, it can do no man harm. Individual +thought and common-sense will remain the masters and remain the guides to +point the general direction when the mass of facts begins to grow +bewildering. Theory will warn us the moment we begin to leave the beaten +track, and enable us to decide with open eyes whether the divergence is +necessary or justifiable. Above all, when men assemble in Council it will +hold discussion to the essential lines, and help to keep side issues in +their place. + +But beyond all this there lies in the theory of war yet another element of +peculiar value to a maritime Empire. We are accustomed, partly for +convenience and partly from lack of a scientific habit of thought, to speak +of naval strategy and military strategy as though they were distinct +branches of knowledge which had no common ground. It is the theory of war +which brings out their intimate relation. It reveals that embracing them +both is a larger strategy which regards the fleet and army as one weapon, +which co-ordinates their action, and indicates the lines on which each must +move to realise the full power of both. It will direct us to assign to each +its proper function in a plan of war; it will enable each service to +realise the better the limitations and the possibilities of the function +with which it is charged, and how and when its own necessities must give +way to a higher or more pressing need of the other. It discloses, in short, +that naval strategy is not a thing by itself, that its problems can seldom +or never be solved on naval considerations alone, but that it is only a +part of maritime strategy--the higher learning which teaches us that for a +maritime State to make successful war and to realise her special strength, +army and navy must be used and thought of as instruments no less intimately +connected than are the three arms ashore. + +It is for these reasons that it is of little use to approach naval strategy +except through the theory of war. Without such theory we can never really +understand its scope or meaning, nor can we hope to grasp the forces which +most profoundly affect its conclusions. + + * * * * * + + PART ONE + + THEORY OF WAR + + * * * * * + + CHAPTER ONE + + THE THEORY OF WAR + + * * * * * + +The last thing that an explorer arrives at is a complete map that will +cover the whole ground he has travelled, but for those who come after him +and would profit by and extend his knowledge his map is the first thing +with which they will begin. So it is with strategy. Before we start upon +its study we seek a chart which will show us at a glance what exactly is +the ground we have to cover and what are the leading features which +determine its form and general characteristics. Such a chart a "theory of +war" alone can provide. It is for this reason that in the study of war we +must get our theory clear before we can venture in search of practical +conclusions. So great is the complexity of war that without such a guide we +are sure to go astray amidst the bewildering multiplicity of tracks and +obstacles that meet us at every step. If for continental strategy its value +has been proved abundantly, then for maritime strategy, where the +conditions are far more complex, the need of it is even greater. + +By maritime strategy we mean the principles which govern a war in which the +sea is a substantial factor. Naval strategy is but that part of it which +determines the movements of the fleet when maritime strategy has determined +what part the fleet must play in relation to the action of the land forces; +for it scarcely needs saying that it is almost impossible that a war can be +decided by naval action alone. Unaided, naval pressure can only work by a +process of exhaustion. Its effects must always be slow, and so galling both +to our own commercial community and to neutrals, that the tendency is +always to accept terms of peace that are far from conclusive. For a firm +decision a quicker and more drastic form of pressure is required. Since men +live upon the land and not upon the sea, great issues between nations at +war have always been decided--except in the rarest cases--either by what +your army can do against your enemy's territory and national life or else +by the fear of what the fleet makes it possible for your army to do. + +The paramount concern, then, of maritime strategy is to determine the +mutual relations of your army and navy in a plan of war. When this is done, +and not till then, naval strategy can begin to work out the manner in which +the fleet can best discharge the function assigned to it. + +The problem of such co-ordination is one that is susceptible of widely +varying solutions. It may be that the command of the sea is of so urgent an +importance that the army will have to devote itself to assisting the fleet +in its special task before it can act directly against the enemy's +territory and land forces; on the other hand, it may be that the immediate +duty of the fleet will be to forward military action ashore before it is +free to devote itself whole-heartedly to the destruction of the enemy's +fleets. The crude maxims as to primary objects which seem to have served +well enough in continental warfare have never worked so clearly where the +sea enters seriously into a war. In such cases it will not suffice to say +the primary object of the army is to destroy the enemy's army, or that of +the fleet to destroy the enemy's fleet. The delicate interactions of the +land and sea factors produce conditions too intricate for such blunt +solutions. Even the initial equations they present are too complex to be +reduced by the simple application of rough-and-ready maxims. Their right +handling depends upon the broadest and most fundamental principles of war, +and it is as a standpoint from which to get a clear and unobstructed view +of the factors in their true relations that a theory of war has perhaps its +highest value. + +The theory which now holds the field is that war in a fundamental sense is +a continuation of policy by other means. The process by which the +continental strategists arrived at it involved some hard philosophical +reasoning. Practical and experienced veterans as they were, their method is +not one that works easily with our own habit of thought. It will be well, +therefore, to endeavour first to present their conclusions in a concrete +form, which will make the pith of the matter intelligible at once. Take, +now, the ordinary case of a naval or military Staff being asked to prepare +a war plan against a certain State and to advise what means it will +require. To any one who has considered such matters it is obvious the reply +must be another question--What will the war be about? Without a definite +answer or alternative answers to that question a Staff can scarcely do more +than engage in making such forces as the country can afford as efficient as +possible. Before they take any sure step further they must know many +things. They must know whether they are expected to take something from the +enemy, or to prevent his taking something either from us or from some other +State. If from some other State, the measures to be taken will depend on +its geographical situation and on its relative strength by land and sea. +Even when the object is clear it will be necessary to know how much value +the enemy attaches to it. Is it one for which he will be likely to fight to +the death, or one which he will abandon in the face of comparatively slight +resistance? If the former, we cannot hope to succeed without entirely +overthrowing his powers of resistance. If the latter, it will suffice, as +it often has sufficed, to aim at something less costly and hazardous and +better within our means. All these are questions which lie in the lap of +Ministers charged with the foreign policy of the country, and before the +Staff can proceed with a war plan they must be answered by Ministers. + +In short, the Staff must ask of them what is the policy which your +diplomacy is pursuing, and where, and why, do you expect it to break down +and force you to take up arms? The Staff has to carry on in fact when +diplomacy has failed to achieve the object in view, and the method they +will use will depend on the nature of that object. So we arrive crudely at +our theory that war is a continuation of policy, a form of political +intercourse in which we fight battles instead of writing notes. + +It was this theory, simple and even meaningless as it appears at first +sight, that gave the key to the practical work of framing a modern war plan +and revolutionised the study of strategy. It was not till the beginning of +the nineteenth century that such a theory was arrived at. For centuries men +had written on the "Art of War," but for want of a working theory their +labours as a whole had been unscientific, concerned for the most part with +the discussion of passing fashions and the elaboration of platitudes. Much +good work it is true was done on details, but no broad outlook had been +obtained to enable us to determine their relation to the fundamental +constants of the subject. No standpoint had been found from which we could +readily detach such constants from what was merely accidental. The result +was a tendency to argue too exclusively from the latest examples and to +become entangled in erroneous thought by trying to apply the methods which +had attained the last success to war as a whole. There was no means of +determining how far the particular success was due to special conditions +and how far it was due to factors common to all wars. + +It was the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, coinciding as they did with a +period of philosophic activity, that revealed the shallowness and empirical +nature of all that had been done up to that time. Napoleon's methods +appeared to his contemporaries to have produced so strenuous a revolution +in the conduct of land warfare that it assumed a wholly new aspect, and it +was obvious that those conceptions which had sufficed previously had become +inadequate as a basis of sound study. War on land seemed to have changed +from a calculated affair of thrust and parry between standing armies to a +headlong rush of one nation in arms upon another, each thirsting for the +other's life, and resolved to have it or perish in the attempt. Men felt +themselves faced with a manifestation of human energy which had had no +counterpart, at least in civilised times. + +The assumption was not entirely true. For although the Continent had never +before adopted the methods in question, our own country was no stranger to +them either on sea or land. As we shall see, our own Revolution in the +seventeenth century had produced strenuous methods of making war which were +closely related to those which Napoleon took over from the French +Revolutionary leaders. A more philosophic outlook might have suggested that +the phenomenon was not really exceptional, but rather the natural outcome +of popular energy inspired by a stirring political ideal. But the British +precedent was forgotten, and so profound was the disturbance caused by the +new French methods that its effects are with us still. We are in fact still +dominated by the idea that since the Napoleonic era war has been +essentially a different thing. Our teachers incline to insist that there is +now only one way of making war, and that is Napoleon's way. Ignoring the +fact that he failed in the end, they brand as heresy the bare suggestion +that there may be other ways, and not content with assuming that his system +will fit all land wars, however much their natures and objects may differ, +they would force naval warfare into the same uniform under the impression +apparently that they are thereby making it presentable and giving it some +new force. + +Seeing how cramping the Napoleonic idea has become, it will be convenient +before going further to determine its special characteristics exactly, but +that is no easy matter. The moment we approach it in a critical spirit, it +begins to grow nebulous and very difficult to define. We can dimly make out +four distinct ideas mingled in the current notion. First, there is the idea +of making war not merely with a professional standing army, but with the +whole armed nation--a conception which of course was not really Napoleon's. +It was inherited by him from the Revolution, but was in fact far older. It +was but a revival of the universal practice which obtained in the barbaric +stages of social development, and which every civilisation in turn had +abandoned as economically unsound and subversive of specialisation in +citizenship. The results of the abandonment were sometimes good and +sometimes bad, but the determining conditions have been studied as yet too +imperfectly to justify any broad generalisation. Secondly, there is the +idea of strenuous and persistent effort--not resting to secure each minor +advantage, but pressing the enemy without pause or rest till he is utterly +overthrown--an idea in which Cromwell had anticipated Napoleon by a century +and a half. Scarcely distinguishable from this is a third idea--that of +taking the offensive, in which there was really nothing new at all, since +its advantages had always been understood, and Frederick the Great had +pressed it to extremity with little less daring than Napoleon himself--nay +even to culpable rashness, as the highest exponents of the Napoleonic idea +admit. Finally, there is the notion of making the armed forces of the enemy +and not his territory or any part of it your main objective. This perhaps +is regarded as the strongest characteristic of Napoleon's methods, and yet +even here we are confused by the fact that undoubtedly on some very +important occasions--the Austerlitz campaign, for example--Napoleon made +the hostile capital his objective as though he believed its occupation was +the most effective step towards the overthrow of the enemy's power and will +to resist. He certainly did not make the enemy's main army his primary +objective--for their main army was not Mack's but that of the Archduke +Charles. + +On the whole then, when men speak of the Napoleonic system they seem to +include two groups of ideas--one which comprises the conception of war made +with the whole force of the nation; the other, a group which includes the +Cromwellian idea of persistent effort, Frederick's preference for the +offensive at almost any risk, and finally the idea of the enemy's armed +forces as the main objective, which was also Cromwell's. + +It is the combination of these by no means original or very distinct ideas +that we are told has brought about so entire a change in the conduct of war +that it has become altogether a different thing. It is unnecessary for our +purpose to consider how far the facts seem to support such a conclusion, +for in the inherent nature of things it must be radically unsound. Neither +war nor anything else can change in its essentials. If it appears to do so, +it is because we are still mistaking accidents for essentials, and this is +exactly how it struck the acutest thinkers of Napoleonic times. + +For a while it is true they were bewildered, but so soon as they had had +time to clear their heads from the din of the struggle in which they had +taken part, they began to see that the new phenomena were but accidents +after all. They perceived that Napoleon's methods, which had taken the +world by storm, had met with success in wars of a certain nature only, and +that when he tried to extend those methods to other natures of war he had +met with failure and even disaster. How was this to be explained? What +theory, for instance, would cover Napoleon's successes in Germany and +Italy, as well as his failures in Spain and Russia? If the whole conception +of war had changed, how could you account for the success of England, who +had not changed her methods? To us the answer to these questions is of +living and infinite importance. Our standpoint remains still unchanged. Is +there anything inherent in the conception of war that justifies that +attitude in our case? Are we entitled to expect from it again the same +success it met with in the past? + +The first man to enunciate a theory which would explain the phenomena of +the Napoleonic era and co-ordinate them with previous history was General +Carl von Clausewitz, a man whose arduous service on the Staff and the +actual work of higher instruction had taught the necessity of systematising +the study of his profession. He was no mere professor, but a soldier bred +in the severest school of war. The pupil and friend of Sharnhorst and +Gneisenau, he had served on the Staff of Blücher in 1813, he had been Chief +of the Staff to Wallmoden in his campaign against Davoust on the Lower +Elbe, and also to the Third Prussian Army Corps in the campaign of 1815. +Thereafter for more than ten years he was Director of the General Academy +of War at Berlin, and died in 1831 as Chief of the Staff to Marshal +Gneisenau. For the fifty years that followed his death his theories and +system were, as he expected they would be, attacked from all sides. Yet +to-day his work is more firmly established than ever as the necessary basis +of all strategical thought, and above all in the "blood and iron" school of +Germany. + +The process by which he reached his famous theory can be followed in his +classical work _On War_ and the _Notes_ regarding it which he left behind +him. In accordance with the philosophic fashion of his time he began by +trying to formulate an abstract idea of war. The definition he started with +was that "War is an act of violence to compel our opponent to do our will." +But that act of violence was not merely "the shock of armies," as +Montecuccoli had defined it a century and a half before. If the abstract +idea of war be followed to its logical conclusion, the act of violence must +be performed with the whole of the means at our disposal and with the +utmost exertion of our will. Consequently we get the conception of two +armed nations flinging themselves one upon the other, and continuing the +struggle with the utmost strength and energy they can command till one or +other is no longer capable of resistance. This Clausewitz called "Absolute +War." But his practical experience and ripe study of history told him at +once that "Real War" was something radically different. It was true, as he +said, that Napoleon's methods had approximated to the absolute and had +given some colour to the use of the absolute idea as a working theory. "But +shall we," he acutely asks, "rest satisfied with this idea and judge all +wars by it however much they may differ from it--shall we deduce from it +all the requirements of theory? We must decide the point, for we can say +nothing trustworthy about a war plan until we have made up our minds +whether war should only be of this kind or whether it may be of another +kind." He saw at once that a theory formed upon the abstract or absolute +idea of war would not cover the ground, and therefore failed to give what +was required for practical purposes. It would exclude almost the whole of +war from Alexander's time to Napoleon's. And what guarantee was there that +the next war would confirm to the Napoleonic type and accommodate itself to +the abstract theory? "This theory," he says, "is still quite powerless +against the force of circumstances." And so it proved, for the wars of the +middle nineteenth century did in fact revert to the pre-Napoleonic type. + +In short, Clausewitz's difficulty in adopting his abstract theory as a +working rule was that his practical mind could not forget that war had not +begun with the Revolutionary era, nor was it likely to end with it. If that +era had changed the conduct of war, it must be presumed that war would +change again with other times and other conditions. A theory of war which +did not allow for this and did not cover all that had gone before was no +theory at all. If a theory of war was to be of any use as a practical guide +it must cover and explain not only the extreme manifestation of hostility +which he himself had witnessed, but every manifestation that had occurred +in the past or was likely to recur in the future. + +It was in casting about for the underlying causes of the oscillations +manifested in the energy and intensity of hostile relations that he found +his solution. His experience on the Staff, and his study of the inner +springs of war, told him it was never in fact a question of purely military +endeavour aiming always at the extreme of what was possible or expedient +from a purely military point of view. The energy exhibited would always be +modified by political considerations and by the depth of the national +interest in the object of the war. He saw that real war was in fact an +international relation which differed from other international relations +only in the method we adopted to achieve the object of our policy. So it +was he arrived at his famous theory--"that war is a mere continuation of +policy by other means." + +At first sight there seems little enough in it. It may seem perhaps that we +have been watching a mountain in labour and nothing but a mouse has been +produced. But it is only upon some such simple, even obvious, formula that +any scientific system can be constructed with safety. We have only to +develop the meaning of this one to see how important and practical are the +guiding lines which flow from it. + +With the conception of war as a continuation of political intercourse +before us, it is clear that everything which lies outside the political +conception, everything, that is, which is strictly peculiar to military and +naval operations, relates merely to the means which we use to achieve our +policy. Consequently, the first desideratum of a war plan is that the means +adopted must conflict as little as possible with the political conditions +from which the war springs. In practice, of course, as in all human +relations, there will be a compromise between the means and the end, +between the political and the military exigencies. But Clausewitz held that +policy must always be the master. The officer charged with the conduct of +the war may of course demand that the tendencies and views of policy shall +not be incompatible with the military means which are placed at his +disposal; but however strongly this demand may react on policy in +particular cases, military action must still be regarded only as a +manifestation of policy. It must never supersede policy. The policy is +always the object; war is only the means by which we obtain the object, and +the means must always keep the end in view. + +The practical importance of this conception will now become clear. It will +be seen to afford the logical or theoretical exposition of what we began by +stating in its purely concrete form. When a Chief of Staff is asked for a +war plan he must not say we will make war in such and such a way because it +was Napoleon's or Moltke's way. He will ask what is the political object of +the war, what are the political conditions, and how much does the question +at issue mean respectively to us and to our adversary. It is these +considerations which determine the nature of the war. This primordial +question settled, he will be in a position to say whether the war is of the +same nature as those in which Napoleon's and Moltke's methods were +successful, or whether it is of another nature in which those methods +failed. He will then design and offer a war plan, not because it has the +hall-mark of this or that great master of war, but because it is one that +has been proved to fit the kind of war in hand. To assume that one method +of conducting war will suit all kinds of war is to fall a victim to +abstract theory, and not to be a prophet of reality, as the narrowest +disciples of the Napoleonic school are inclined to see themselves. + +Hence, says Clausewitz, the first, the greatest and most critical decision +upon which the Statesman and the General have to exercise their judgment is +to determine the nature of the war, to be sure they do not mistake it for +something nor seek to make of it something which from its inherent +conditions it can never be. "This," he declares, "is the first and the most +far-reaching of all strategical questions." + +The first value, then, of his theory of war is that it gives a clear line +on which we may proceed to determine the nature of a war in which we are +about to engage, and to ensure that we do not try to apply to one nature of +war any particular course of operations simply because they have proved +successful in another nature of war. It is only, he insists, by regarding +war not as an independent thing but as a political instrument that we can +read aright the lessons of history and understand for our practical +guidance how wars must differ in character according to the nature of the +motives and circumstances from which they proceed. This conception, he +claims, is the first ray of light to guide us to a true theory of war and +thereby enable us to classify wars and distinguish them one from another. + +Jomini, his great contemporary and rival, though proceeding by a less +philosophical but no less lucid method, entirely endorses this view. A +Swiss soldier of fortune, his experience was much the same as that of +Clausewitz. It was obtained mainly on the Staff of Marshal Ney and +subsequently on the Russian headquarter Staff. He reached no definite +theory of war, but his fundamental conclusions were the same. The first +chapter of his final work, _Précis de l'art de la Guerre_, is devoted to +"La Politique de la Guerre." In it he classifies wars into nine categories +according to their political object, and he lays it down as a base +proposition "That these different kinds of war will have more or less +influence on the nature of the operations which will be demanded to attain +the end in view, on the amount of energy that must be put forth, and on the +extent of the undertakings in which we must engage." "There will," he adds, +"be a great difference in the operations according to the risks we have to +run." + +Both men, therefore, though on details of means they were often widely +opposed, are agreed that the fundamental conception of war is political. +Both of course agree that if we isolate in our mind the forces engaged in +any theatre of war the abstract conception reappears. So far as those +forces are concerned, war is a question of fighting in which each +belligerent should endeavour by all means at his command and with all his +energy to destroy the other. But even so they may find that certain means +are barred to them for political reasons, and at any moment the fortune of +war or a development of the political conditions with which it is entangled +may throw them back upon the fundamental political theory. + +That theory it will be unprofitable to labour further at this point. Let it +suffice for the present to mark that it gives us a conception of war as an +exertion of violence to secure a political end which we desire to attain, +and that from this broad and simple formula we are able to deduce at once +that wars will vary according to the nature of the end and the intensity of +our desire to attain it. Here we may leave it to gather force and coherence +as we examine the practical considerations which are its immediate outcome. + + * * * * * + + CHAPTER TWO + + NATURES OF WARS-- + OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE + + * * * * * + +Having determined that wars must vary in character according to the nature +and importance of their object, we are faced with the difficulty that the +variations will be of infinite number and of all degrees of distinction. So +complex indeed is the graduation presented that at first sight it appears +scarcely possible to make it the basis of practical study. But on further +examination it will be seen that by applying the usual analytical method +the whole subject is susceptible of much simplification. We must in short +attempt to reach some system of classification; that is, we must see if it +is not possible to group the variations into some well-founded categories. +With a subject so complex and intangible the grouping must of course be to +some extent arbitrary, and in some places the lines of demarcation will be +shadowy; but if classification has been found possible and helpful in +Zoology or Botany, with the infinite and minute individual variations with +which they have to deal, it should be no less possible and helpful in the +study of war. + +The political theory of war will at any rate give us two broad and +well-marked classifications. The first is simple and well known, depending +on whether the political object of the war is positive or negative. If it +be positive--that is, if our aim is to wrest something from the enemy--then +our war in its main lines will be offensive. If, on the other hand, our aim +be negative, and we simply seek to prevent the enemy wresting some +advantage to our detriment, then the war in its general direction will be +defensive. + +It is only as a broad conception that this classification has value. Though +it fixes the general trend of our operations, it will not in itself affect +their character. For a maritime Power at least it is obvious that this must +be so. For in any circumstances it is impossible for such a Power either to +establish its defence or develop fully its offence without securing a +working control of the sea by aggressive action against the enemy's fleets. +Furthermore, we have always found that however strictly our aim may be +defensive, the most effective means of securing it has been by +counter-attack over-sea, either to support an ally directly or to deprive +our enemy of his colonial possessions. Neither category, then, excludes the +use of offensive operations nor the idea of overthrowing our enemy so far +as is necessary to gain our end. In neither case does the conception lead +us eventually to any other objective than the enemy's armed forces, and +particularly his naval forces. The only real difference is this--that if +our object be positive our general plan must be offensive, and we should at +least open with a true offensive movement; whereas if our object be +negative our general plan will be preventive, and we may bide our time for +our counter-attack. To this extent our action must always tend to the +offensive. For counter-attack is the soul of defence. Defence is not a +passive attitude, for that is the negation of war. Rightly conceived, it is +an attitude of alert expectation. We wait for the moment when the enemy +shall expose himself to a counter-stroke, the success of which will so far +cripple him as to render us relatively strong enough to pass to the +offensive ourselves. + +From these considerations it will appear that, real and logical as the +classification is, to give it the designation "offensive and defensive" is +objectionable from every point of view. To begin with, it does not +emphasise what the real and logical distinction is. It suggests that the +basis of the classification is not so much a difference of object as a +difference in the means employed to achieve the object. Consequently we +find ourselves continually struggling with the false assumption that +positive war means using attack, and negative war being content with +defence. + +That is confusing enough, but a second objection to the designation is far +more serious and more fertile of error. For the classification "offensive +and defensive" implies that offensive and defensive are mutually exclusive +ideas, whereas the truth is, and it is a fundamental truth of war, that +they are mutually complementary. All war and every form of it must be both +offensive and defensive. No matter how clear our positive aim nor how high +our offensive spirit, we cannot develop an aggressive line of strategy to +the full without the support of the defensive on all but the main lines of +operation. In tactics it is the same. The most convinced devotee of attack +admits the spade as well as the rifle. And even when it comes to men and +material, we know that without a certain amount of protection neither +ships, guns, nor men can develop their utmost energy and endurance in +striking power. There is never, in fact, a clean choice between attack and +defence. In aggressive operations the question always is, how far must +defence enter into the methods we employ in order to enable us to do the +utmost within our resources to break or paralyse the strength of the enemy. +So also with defence. Even in its most legitimate use, it must always be +supplemented by attack. Even behind the walls of a fortress men know that +sooner or later the place must fall unless by counter-attack on the enemy's +siege works or communications they can cripple his power of attack. + +It would seem, therefore, that it were better to lay aside the designation +"offensive and defensive" altogether and substitute the terms "positive and +negative." But here again we are confronted with a difficulty. There have +been many wars in which positive methods have been used all through to +secure a negative end, and such wars will not sit easily in either class. +For instance, in the War of Spanish Succession our object was mainly to +prevent the Mediterranean becoming a French lake by the union of the French +and Spanish crowns, but the method by which we succeeded in achieving our +end was to seize the naval positions of Gibraltar and Minorca, and so in +practice our method was positive. Again, in the late Russo-Japanese War the +main object of Japan was to prevent Korea being absorbed by Russia. That +aim was preventive and negative. But the only effective way of securing her +aim was to take Korea herself, and so for her the war was in practice +positive. + +On the other hand, we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that in the majority +of wars the side with the positive object has acted generally on the +offensive and the other generally on the defensive. Unpractical therefore +as the distinction seems to be, it is impossible to dismiss it without +inquiring why this was so, and it is in this inquiry that the practical +results of the classification will be found to lie--that is, it forces us +to analyse the comparative advantages of offence and defence. A clear +apprehension of their relative possibilities is the corner stone of +strategical study. + +Now the advantages of the offensive are patent and admitted. It is only the +offensive that can produce positive results, while the strength and energy +which are born of the moral stimulation of attack are of a practical value +that outweighs almost every other consideration. Every man of spirit would +desire to use the offensive whether his object were positive or negative, +and yet there are a number of cases in which some of the most energetic +masters of war have chosen the defensive, and chosen with success. They +have chosen it when they have found themselves inferior in physical force +to their enemy, and when they believed that no amount of aggressive spirit +could redress that inferiority. + +Obviously, then, for all the inferiority of the defensive as a drastic form +of war it must have some inherent advantage which the offensive does not +enjoy. In war we adopt every method for which we have sufficient strength. +If, then, we adopt the less desirable method of defence, it must be either +that we have not sufficient strength for offence, or that the defence gives +us some special strength for the attainment of our object. + +What, then, are these elements of strength? It is very necessary to +inquire, not only that we may know that if for a time we are forced back +upon the defensive all is not lost, but also that we may judge with how +much daring we should push our offensive to prevent the enemy securing the +advantages of defence. + +As a general principle we all know that possession is nine points of the +law. It is easier to keep money in our pocket than to take it from another +man's. If one man would rob another he must be the stronger or better armed +unless he can do it by dexterity or stealth, and there lies one of the +advantages of offence. The side which takes the initiative has usually the +better chance of securing advantage by dexterity or stealth. But it is not +always so. If either by land or sea we can take a defensive position so +good that it cannot be turned and must be broken down before our enemy can +reach his objective, then the advantage of dexterity and stealth passes to +us. We choose our own ground for the trial of strength. We are hidden on +familiar ground; he is exposed on ground that is less familiar. We can lay +traps and prepare surprises by counter-attack, when he is most dangerously +exposed. Hence the paradoxical doctrine that where defence is sound and +well designed the advantage of surprise is against the attack. + +It will be seen therefore that whatever advantages lie in defence they +depend on the preservation of the offensive spirit. Its essence is the +counter-attack--waiting deliberately for a chance to strike--not cowering +in inactivity. Defence is a condition of restrained activity--not a mere +condition of rest. Its real weakness is that if unduly prolonged it tends +to deaden the spirit of offence. This is a truth so vital that some +authorities in their eagerness to enforce it have travestied it into the +misleading maxim, "That attack is the best defence." Hence again an +amateurish notion that defence is always stupid or pusillanimous, leading +always to defeat, and that what is called "the military spirit" means +nothing but taking the offensive. Nothing is further from the teaching or +the practice of the best masters. Like Wellington at Torres Vedras, they +all at times used the defensive till the elements of strength inherent in +that form of war, as opposed to the exhausting strain inherent in the form +that they had fixed upon their opponents, lifted them to a position where +they in their turn were relatively strong enough to use the more exhausting +form. + +The confusion of thought which has led to the misconceptions about defence +as a method of war is due to several obvious causes. Counter-attacks from a +general defensive attitude have been regarded as a true offensive, as, for +instance, in Frederick the Great's best-known operations, or in Admiral +Tegetthoff's brilliant counterstroke at Lissa, or our own operations +against the Spanish Armada. Again, the defensive has acquired an ill name +by its being confused with a wrongly arrested offensive, where the superior +Power with the positive object lacked the spirit to use his material +superiority with sufficient activity and perseverance. Against such a Power +an inferior enemy can always redress his inferiority by passing to a bold +and quick offensive, thus acquiring a momentum both moral and physical +which more than compensates his lack of weight. The defensive has also +failed by the choice of a bad position which the enemy was able to turn or +avoid. A defensive attitude is nothing at all, its elements of strength +entirely disappear, unless it is such that the enemy must break it down by +force before he can reach his ultimate objective. Even more often has it +failed when the belligerent adopting it, finding he has no available +defensive position which will bar the enemy's progress, attempts to guard +every possible line of attack. The result is of course that by attenuating +his force he only accentuates his inferiority. + +Clear and well proven as these considerations are for land warfare, their +application to the sea is not so obvious. It will be objected that at sea +there is no defensive. This is generally true for tactics, but even so not +universally true. Defensive tactical positions are possible at sea, as in +defended anchorages. These were always a reality, and the mine has +increased their possibilities. In the latest developments of naval warfare +we have seen the Japanese at the Elliot Islands preparing a real defensive +position to cover the landing of their Second Army in the Liaotung +Peninsula. Strategically the proposition is not true at all. A strategical +defensive has been quite as common at sea as on land, and our own gravest +problems have often been how to break down such an attitude when our enemy +assumed it. It usually meant that the enemy remained in his own waters and +near his own bases, where it was almost impossible for us to attack him +with decisive result, and whence he always threatened us with counterattack +at moments of exhaustion, as the Dutch did at Sole Bay and in the Medway. +The difficulty of dealing decisively with an enemy who adopted this course +was realised by our service very early, and from first to last one of our +chief preoccupations was to prevent the enemy availing himself of this +device and to force him to fight in the open, or at least to get between +him and his base and force an action there. + +Probably the most remarkable manifestation of the advantages that may be +derived in suitable conditions from a strategical defensive is also to be +found in the late Russo-Japanese War. In the final crisis of the naval +struggle the Japanese fleet was able to take advantage of a defensive +attitude in its own waters which the Russian Baltic fleet would have to +break down to attain its end, and the result was the most decisive naval +victory ever recorded. + +The deterrent power of active and dexterous operations from such a position +was well known to our old tradition. The device was used several times, +particularly in our home waters, to prevent a fleet, which for the time we +were locally too weak to destroy, from carrying out the work assigned to +it. A typical position of the kind was off Scilly, and it was proved again +and again that even a superior fleet could not hope to effect anything in +the Channel till the fleet off Scilly had been brought to decisive action. +But the essence of the device was the preservation of the aggressive spirit +in its most daring form. For success it depended on at least the will to +seize every occasion for bold and harassing counter-attacks such as Drake +and his colleagues struck at the Armada. + +To submit to blockade in order to engage the attention of a superior +enemy's fleet is another form of defensive, but one that is almost wholly +evil. For a short time it may do good by permitting offensive operations +elsewhere which otherwise would be impossible. But if prolonged, it will +sooner or later destroy the spirit of your force and render it incapable of +effective aggression. + +The conclusion then is that although for the practical purpose of framing +or appreciating plans of war the classification of wars into offensive and +defensive is of little use, a clear apprehension of the inherent relative +advantages of offence and defence is essential. We must realise that in +certain cases, provided always we preserve the aggressive spirit, the +defensive will enable an inferior force to achieve points when the +offensive would probably lead to its destruction. But the elements of +strength depend entirely on the will and insight to deal rapid blows in the +enemy's unguarded moments. So soon as the defensive ceases to be regarded +as a means of fostering power to strike and of reducing the enemy's power +of attack it loses all its strength. It ceases to be even a suspended +activity, and anything that is not activity is not war. + +With these general indications of the relative advantages of offence and +defence we may leave the subject for the present. It is possible of course +to catalogue the advantages and disadvantages of each form, but any such +bald statement--without concrete examples to explain the meaning--must +always appear controversial and is apt to mislead. It is better to reserve +their fuller consideration till we come to deal with strategical operations +and are able to note their actual effect upon the conduct of war in its +various forms. Leaving therefore our first classification of wars into +offensive and defensive we will pass on to the second, which is the only +one of real practical importance. + + * * * * * + + CHAPTER THREE + + NATURES OF WARS-- + LIMITED AND UNLIMITED + + * * * * * + +The second classification to which we are led by the political theory of +war, is one which Clausewitz was the first to formulate and one to which he +came to attach the highest importance. It becomes necessary therefore to +examine his views in some detail--not because there is any need to regard a +continental soldier, however distinguished, as an indispensable authority +for a maritime nation. The reason is quite the reverse. It is because a +careful examination of his doctrine on this point will lay open what are +the radical and essential differences between the German or Continental +School of Strategy and the British or Maritime School--that is, our own +traditional School, which too many writers both at home and abroad quietly +assume to have no existence. The evil tendency of that assumption cannot be +too strongly emphasised, and the main purpose of this and the following +chapters will be to show how and why even the greatest of the continental +strategists fell short of realising fully the characteristic conception of +the British tradition. + +By the classification in question Clausewitz distinguished wars into those +with a "Limited" object and those whose object was "Unlimited." Such a +classification was entirely characteristic of him, for it rested not alone +upon the material nature of the object, but on certain moral considerations +to which he was the first to attach their real value in war. Other writers +such as Jomini had attempted to classify wars by the special purpose for +which they were fought, but Clausewitz's long course of study convinced him +that such a distinction was unphilosophical and bore no just relation to +any tenable theory of war. Whether, that is, a war was positive or negative +mattered much, but its special purpose, whether, for instance, according to +Jomini's system, it was a war "to assert rights" or "to assist an ally" or +"to acquire territory," mattered not at all. + +Whatever the object, the vital and paramount question was the intensity +with which the spirit of the nation was absorbed in its attainment. The +real point to determine in approaching any war plan was what did the object +mean to the two belligerents, what sacrifices would they make for it, what +risks were they prepared to run? It was thus he stated his view. "The +smaller the sacrifice we demand from our opponent, the smaller presumably +will be the means of resistance he will employ, and the smaller his means, +the smaller will ours be required to be. Similarly the smaller our +political object, the less value shall we set upon it and the more easily +we shall be induced to abandon it." Thus the political object of the war, +its original motive, will not only determine for both belligerents +reciprocally the aim of the force they use, but it will also be the +standard of the intensity of the efforts they will make. So he concludes +there may be wars of all degrees of importance and energy from a war of +extermination down to the use of an army of observation. So also in the +naval sphere there may be a life and death struggle for maritime supremacy +or hostilities which never rise beyond a blockade. + +Such a view of the subject was of course a wide departure from the theory +of "Absolute War" on which Clausewitz had started working. Under that +theory "Absolute War" was the ideal form to which all war ought to attain, +and those which fell short of it were imperfect wars cramped by a lack of +true military spirit. But so soon as he had seized the fact that in actual +life the moral factor always must override the purely military factor, he +saw that he had been working on too narrow a basis--a basis that was purely +theoretical in that it ignored the human factor. He began to perceive that +it was logically unsound to assume as the foundation of a strategical +system that there was one pattern to which all wars ought to conform. In +the light of his full and final apprehension of the value of the human +factor he saw wars falling into two well-marked categories, each of which +would legitimately be approached in a radically different manner, and not +necessarily on the lines of "Absolute War." + +He saw that there was one class of war where the political object was of so +vital an importance to both belligerents that they would tend to fight to +the utmost limit of their endurance to secure it. But there was another +class where the object was of less importance, that is to say, where its +value to one or both the belligerents was not so great as to be worth +unlimited sacrifices of blood and treasure. It was these two kinds of war +he designated provisionally "Unlimited" and "Limited," by which he meant +not that you were not to exert the force employed with all the vigour you +could develop, but that there might be a limit beyond which it would be bad +policy to spend that vigour, a point at which, long before your force was +exhausted or even fully developed, it would be wiser to abandon your object +rather than to spend more upon it. + +This distinction it is very necessary to grasp quite clearly, for it is +often superficially confused with the distinction already referred to, +which Clausewitz drew in the earlier part of his work--that is, the +distinction between what he called the character of modern war and the +character of the wars which preceded the Napoleonic era. It will be +remembered he insisted that the wars of his own time had been wars between +armed nations with a tendency to throw the whole weight of the nation into +the fighting line, whereas in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries wars +were waged by standing armies and not by the whole nation in arms. The +distinction of course is real and of far-reaching consequences, but it has +no relation to the distinction between "Limited" and "Unlimited" war. War +may be waged on the Napoleonic system either for a limited or an unlimited +object. + +A modern instance will serve to clear the field. The recent Russo-Japanese +War was fought for a limited object--the assertion of certain claims over +territory which formed no part of the possessions of either belligerent. +Hostilities were conducted on entirely modern lines by two armed nations +and not by standing armies alone. But in the case of one belligerent her +interest in the object was so limited as to cause her to abandon it long +before her whole force as an armed nation was exhausted or even put forth. +The expense of life and treasure which the struggle was involving was +beyond what the object was worth. + +This second distinction--that is, between Limited and Unlimited +wars--Clausewitz regarded as of greater importance than his previous one +founded on the negative or positive nature of the object. He was long in +reaching it. His great work _On War_ as he left it proceeds almost entirely +on the conception of offensive or defensive as applied to the Napoleonic +ideal of absolute war. The new idea came to him towards the end in the full +maturity of his prolonged study, and it came to him in endeavouring to +apply his strategical speculations to the practical process of framing a +war plan in anticipation of a threatened breach with France. It was only in +his final section _On War Plans_ that he began to deal with it. By that +time he had grasped the first practical result to which his theory led. He +saw that the distinction between Limited and Unlimited war connoted a +cardinal distinction in the methods of waging it. When the object was +unlimited, and would consequently call forth your enemy's whole war power, +it was evident that no firm decision of the struggle could be reached till +his war power was entirely crushed. Unless you had a reasonable hope of +being able to do this it was bad policy to seek your end by force--that is, +you ought not to go to war. In the case of a limited object, however, the +complete destruction of the enemy's armed force was beyond what was +necessary. Clearly you could achieve your end if you could seize the +object, and by availing yourself of the elements of strength inherent in +the defensive could set up such a situation that it would cost the enemy +more to turn you out than the object was worth to him. + +Here then was a wide difference in the fundamental postulate of your war +plan. In the case of an unlimited war your main strategical offensive must +be directed against the armed forces of the enemy; in the case of a limited +war, even where its object was positive, it need not be. If conditions were +favourable, it would suffice to make the object itself the objective of +your main strategical offensive. Clearly, then, he had reached a +theoretical distinction which modified his whole conception of strategy. No +longer is there logically but one kind of war, the Absolute, and no longer +is there but one legitimate objective, the enemy's armed forces. Being +sound theory, it of course had an immediate practical value, for obviously +it was a distinction from which the actual work of framing a war plan must +take its departure. + +A curious corroboration of the soundness of these views is that Jomini +reached an almost identical standpoint independently and by an entirely +different road. His method was severely concrete, based on the comparison +of observed facts, but it brought him as surely as the abstract method of +his rival to the conclusion that there were two distinct classes of object. +"They are of two different kinds," he says, "one which may be called +territorial or geographical ... the other on the contrary consists +exclusively in the destruction or disorganisation of the enemy's forces +without concerning yourself with geographical points of any kind." It is +under the first category of his first main classification "Of offensive +wars to assert rights," that he deals with what Clausewitz would call +"Limited Wars." Citing as an example Frederick the Great's war for the +conquest of Silesia, he says, "In such a war ... the offensive operations +ought to be proportional to the end in view. The first move is naturally to +occupy the provinces claimed" (not, be it noted, to direct your blow at the +enemy's main force). "Afterwards," he proceeds, "you can push the offensive +according to circumstances and your relative strength in order to obtain +the desired cession by menacing the enemy at home." Here we have +Clausewitz's whole doctrine of "Limited War"; firstly, the primary or +territorial stage, in which you endeavour to occupy the geographical +object, and then the secondary or coercive stage, in which you seek by +exerting general pressure upon your enemy to force him to accept the +adverse situation you have set up. + +Such a method of making war obviously differs in a fundamental manner from +that which Napoleon habitually adopted, and yet we have it presented by +Jomini and Clausewitz, the two apostles of the Napoleonic method. The +explanation is, of course, that both of them had seen too much not to know +that Napoleon's method was only applicable when you could command a real +physical or moral preponderance. Given such a preponderance, both were +staunch for the use of extreme means in Napoleon's manner. It is not as +something better than the higher road that they commend the lower one, but +being veteran staff-officers and not mere theorists, they knew well that a +belligerent must sometimes find the higher road beyond his strength, or +beyond the effort which the spirit of the nation is prepared to make for +the end in view, and like the practical men they were, they set themselves +to study the potentialities of the lower road should hard necessity force +them to travel it. They found that these potentialities in certain +circumstances were great. As an example of a case where the lower form was +more appropriate Jomini cites Napoleon's campaign against Russia in 1812. +In his opinion it would have been better if Napoleon had been satisfied to +begin on the lower method with a limited territorial object, and he +attributes his failure to the abuse of a method which, however well suited +to his wars in Germany, was incapable of achieving success in the +conditions presented by a war with Russia. + +Seeing how high was Napoleon's opinion of Jomini as a master of the science +of war, it is curious how his views on the two natures of wars have been +ignored in the present day. It is even more curious in the case of +Clausewitz, since we know that in the plenitude of his powers he came to +regard this classification as the master-key of the subject. The +explanation is that the distinction is not very clearly formulated in his +first seven books, which alone he left in anything like a finished +condition. It was not till he came to write his eighth book _On War Plans_ +that he saw the vital importance of the distinction round which he had been +hovering. In that book the distinction is clearly laid down, but the book +unhappily was never completed. With his manuscript, however, he left a +"Note" warning us against regarding his earlier books as a full +presentation of his developed ideas. From the note it is also evident that +he thought the classification on which he had lighted was of the utmost +importance, that he believed it would clear up all the difficulties which +he had encountered in his earlier books--difficulties which he had come to +see arose from a too exclusive consideration of the Napoleonic method of +conducting war. "I look upon the first six books," he wrote in 1827, "as +only a mass of material which is still in a manner without form and which +has still to be revised again. In this revision the two kinds of wars will +be kept more distinctly in view all through, and thereby all ideas will +gain in clearness, in precision, and in exactness of application." +Evidently he had grown dissatisfied with the theory of Absolute War on +which he had started. His new discovery had convinced him that that theory +would not serve as a standard for all natures of wars. "Shall we," he asks +in his final book, "shall we now rest satisfied with this idea and by it +judge of all wars, however much they may differ?"[2] He answers his +question in the negative. "You cannot determine the requirements of all +wars from the Napoleonic type. Keep that type and its absolute method +before you to use _when you can_ or _when you must_, but keep equally +before you that there are two main natures of war." + + [2] Clausewitz, On War, Book viii, chap, ii + +In his note written at this time, when the distinction first came to him, +he defines these two natures of war as follows: "First, those in which the +object is the _overthrow of the enemy_, whether it be we aim at his +political destruction or merely at disarming him and forcing him to +conclude peace on our terms; and secondly, those in which our object is +_merely to make some conquests on the frontiers of his country_, either for +the purpose of retaining them permanently or of turning them to account as +a matter of exchange in settling terms of peace."[3] It was in his eighth +book that he intended, had he lived, to have worked out the comprehensive +idea he had conceived. Of that book he says, "The chief object will be to +make good the two points of view above mentioned, by which everything will +be simplified and at the same time be given the breath of life. I hope in +this book to iron out many creases in the heads of strategists and +statesmen, and at least to show the object of action and the real point to +be considered in war."[4] + + [3] Ibid, Preparatory Notice, p. vii. + + [4] Ibid, p. viii + +That hope was never realised, and that perhaps is why his penetrating +analysis has been so much ignored. The eighth book as we have it is only a +fragment. In the spring of 1830--an anxious moment, when it seemed that +Prussia would require all her best for another struggle single-handed with +France--he was called away to an active command. What he left of the book +on "War Plans" he describes as "merely a track roughly cleared, as it were, +through the mass, in order to ascertain the points of greatest moment." It +was his intention, he says, to "carry the spirit of these ideas into his +first six books"--to put the crown on his work, in fact, by elaborating and +insisting upon his two great propositions, viz. that war was a form of +policy, and that being so it might be Limited or Unlimited. + +The extent to which he would have infused his new idea into the whole every +one is at liberty to judge for himself; but this indisputable fact remains. +In the winter in view of the threatening attitude of France in regard to +Belgium he drew up a war plan, and it was designed not on the Napoleonic +method of making the enemy's armed force the main strategical objective, +but on seizing a limited territorial object and forcing a disadvantageous +counter-offensive upon the French. The revolutionary movement throughout +Europe had broken the Holy Alliance to pieces. Not only did Prussia find +herself almost single-handed against France, but she herself was sapped by +revolution. To adopt the higher form of war and seek to destroy the armed +force of the enemy was beyond her power. But she could still use the lower +form, and by seizing Belgium she could herself force so exhausting a task +on France that success was well within her strength. It was exactly so we +endeavoured to begin the Seven Years' War; and it was exactly so the +Japanese successfully conducted their war with Russia; and what is more +striking, it was on similar lines that in 1859 Moltke in similar +circumstances drew up his first war plan against France. His idea at that +time was on the lines which Jomini held should have been Napoleon's in +1812. It was not to strike directly at Paris or the French main army, but +to occupy Alsace-Lorraine and hold that territory till altered conditions +should give him the necessary preponderance for proceeding to the higher +form or forcing a favourable peace. + +In conclusion, then, we have to note that the matured fruit of the +Napoleonic period was a theory of war based not on the single absolute +idea, but on the dual distinction of Limited and Unlimited. Whatever +practical importance we may attach to the distinction, so much must be +admitted on the clear and emphatic pronouncements of Clausewitz and Jomini. +The practical importance is another matter. It may fairly be argued that in +continental warfare--in spite of the instances quoted by both the classical +writers--it is not very great, for reasons that will appear directly. But +it must be remembered that continental warfare is not the only form in +which great international issues are decided. Standing at the final point +which Clausewitz and Jomini reached, we are indeed only on the threshold of +the subject. We have to begin where they left off and inquire what their +ideas have to tell for the modern conditions of worldwide imperial States, +where the sea becomes a direct and vital factor. + + * * * * * + + CHAPTER FOUR + + LIMITED WAR AND MARITIME EMPIRES-- + + Development of Clausewitz's and Jomini's + Theory of a Limited Territorial Object, and Its + Application to Modern Imperial Conditions + + * * * * * + +The German war plans already cited, which were based respectively on the +occupation of Belgium and Alsace-Lorraine, and Jomini's remarks on +Napoleon's disastrous Russian campaign serve well to show the point to +which continental strategists have advanced along the road which Clausewitz +was the first to indicate clearly. We have now to consider its application +to modern imperial conditions, and above all where the maritime element +forcibly asserts itself. We shall then see how small that advance has been +compared with its far-reaching effects for a maritime and above all an +insular Power. + +It is clear that Clausewitz himself never apprehended the full significance +of his brilliant theory. His outlook was still purely continental, and the +limitations of continental warfare tend to veil the fuller meaning of the +principle he had framed. Had he lived, there is little doubt he would have +worked it out to its logical conclusion, but his death condemned his theory +of limited war to remain in the inchoate condition in which he had left it. + +It will be observed, as was natural enough, that all through his work +Clausewitz had in his mind war between two contiguous or at least adjacent +continental States, and a moment's consideration will show that in that +type of war the principle of the limited object can rarely if ever assert +itself in perfect precision. Clausewitz himself put it quite clearly. +Assuming a case where "the overthrow of the enemy"--that is, unlimited +war--is beyond our strength, he points out that we need not therefore +necessarily act on the defensive. Our action may still be positive and +offensive, but the object can be nothing more than "the conquest of part of +the enemy's country." Such a conquest he knew might so far weaken your +enemy or strengthen your own position as to enable you to secure a +satisfactory peace. The path of history is indeed strewn with such cases. +But he was careful to point out that such a form of war was open to the +gravest objections. Once you had occupied the territory you aimed at, your +offensive action was, as a rule, arrested. A defensive attitude had to be +assumed, and such an arrest of offensive action he had previously shown was +inherently vicious, if only for moral reasons. Added to this you might find +that in your effort to occupy the territorial object you had so +irretrievably separated your striking force from your home-defence force as +to be in no position to meet your enemy if he was able to retort by acting +on unlimited lines with a stroke at your heart. A case in point was the +Austerlitz campaign, where Austria's object was to wrest North Italy from +Napoleon's empire. She sent her main army under the Archduke Charles to +seize the territory she desired. Napoleon immediately struck at Vienna, +destroyed her home army, and occupied the capital before the Archduke could +turn to bar his way. + +The argument is this: that, as all strategic attack tends to leave points +of your own uncovered, it always involves greater or less provision for +their defence. It is obvious, therefore, that if we are aiming at a limited +territorial object the proportion of defence required will tend to be much +greater than if we are directing our attack on the main forces of the +enemy. In unlimited war our attack will itself tend to defend everything +elsewhere, by forcing the enemy to concentrate against our attack. Whether +the limited form is justifiable or not therefore depends, as Clausewitz +points out, on the geographical position of the object. + +So far British experience is with him, but he then goes on to say the more +closely the territory in question is an annex of our own the safer is this +form of war, because then our offensive action will the more surely cover +our home country. As a case in point he cites Frederick the Great's opening +of the Seven Years' War with the occupation of Saxony--a piece of work +which materially strengthened Prussian defence. Of the British opening in +Canada he says nothing. His outlook was too exclusively continental for it +to occur to him to test his doctrine with a conspicuously successful case +in which the territory aimed at was distant from the home territory and in +no way covered it. Had he done so he must have seen how much stronger an +example of the strength of limited war was the case of Canada than the case +of Saxony. Moreover, he would have seen that the difficulties, which in +spite of his faith in his discovery accompanied his attempt to apply it, +arose from the fact that the examples he selected were not really examples +at all. + +When he conceived the idea, the only kind of limited object he had in his +mind was, to use his own words, "some conquests on the frontiers of the +enemy's country," such as Silesia and Saxony for Frederick the Great, +Belgium in his own war plan, and Alsace-Lorraine in that of Moltke. Now it +is obvious that such objects are not truly limited, for two reasons. In the +first place, such territory is usually an organic part of your enemy's +country, or otherwise of so much importance to him that he will be willing +to use unlimited effort to retain it. In the second place, there will be no +strategical obstacle to his being able to use his whole force to that end. +To satisfy the full conception of a limited object, one of two conditions +is essential. Firstly, it must be not merely limited in area, but of really +limited political importance; and secondly, it must be so situated as to be +strategically isolated or to be capable of being reduced to practical +isolation by strategical operations. Unless this condition exists, it is in +the power of either belligerent, as Clausewitz himself saw, to pass to +unlimited war if he so desires, and, ignoring the territorial objective, to +strike at the heart of his enemy and force him to desist. + +If, then, we only regard war between contiguous continental States, in +which the object is the conquest of territory on either of their frontiers, +we get no real generic difference between limited and unlimited war. The +line between them is in any case too shadowy or unstable to give a +classification of any solidity. It is a difference of degree rather than of +kind. If, on the other hand, we extend our view to wars between worldwide +empires, the distinction at once becomes organic. Possessions which lie +oversea or at the extremities of vast areas of imperfectly settled +territory are in an entirely different category from those limited objects +which Clausewitz contemplated. History shows that they can never have the +political importance of objects which are organically part of the European +system, and it shows further that they can be isolated by naval action +sufficiently to set up the conditions of true limited war. + +Jomini approaches the point, but without clearly detaching it. In his +chapter "On Great Invasions and Distant Expeditions," he points out how +unsafe it is to take the conditions of war between contiguous States and +apply them crudely to cases where the belligerents are separated by large +areas of land or sea. He hovers round the sea factor, feeling how great a +difference it makes, but without getting close to the real distinction. His +conception of the inter-action of fleets and armies never rises above their +actual co-operation in touch one with the other in a distant theatre. He +has in mind the assistance which the British fleet afforded Wellington in +the Peninsula, and Napoleon's dreams of Asiatic conquest, pronouncing such +distant invasions as impossible in modern times except perhaps in +combination with a powerful fleet that could provide the army of invasion +with successive advanced bases. Of the paramount value of the fleet's +isolating and preventive functions he gives no hint. + +Even when he deals with oversea expeditions, as he does at some length, his +grip of the point is no closer. It is indeed significant of how entirely +continental thought had failed to penetrate the subject that in devoting +over thirty pages to an enumeration of the principles of oversea +expeditions, he, like Clausewitz, does not so much as mention the conquest +of Canada; and yet it is the leading case of a weak military Power +succeeding by the use of the limited form of war in forcing its will upon a +strong one, and succeeding because it was able by naval action to secure +its home defence and isolate the territorial object. + +For our ideas of true limited objects, therefore, we must leave the +continental theatres and turn to mixed or maritime wars. We have to look to +such cases as Canada and Havana in the Seven Years' War, and Cuba in the +Spanish-American War, cases in which complete isolation of the object by +naval action was possible, or to such examples as the Crimea and Korea, +where sufficient isolation was attainable by naval action owing to the +length and difficulty of the enemy's land communications and to the +strategical situation of the territory at stake. + +These examples will also serve to illustrate and enforce the second +essential of this kind of war. As has been already said, for a true limited +object we must have not only the power of isolation, but also the power by +a secure home defence of barring an unlimited counterstroke. In all the +above cases this condition existed. In all of them the belligerents had no +contiguous frontiers, and this point is vital. For it is obvious that if +two belligerents have a common frontier, it is open to the superior of +them, no matter how distant or how easy to isolate the limited object may +be, to pass at will to unlimited war by invasion. This process is even +possible when the belligerents are separated by a neutral State, since the +territory of a weak neutral will be violated if the object be of sufficient +importance, or if the neutral be too strong to coerce, there still remains +the possibility that his alliance may be secured. + +We come, then, to this final proposition--that limited war is only +permanently possible to island Powers or between Powers which are separated +by sea, and then only when the Power desiring limited war is able to +command the sea to such a degree as to be able not only to isolate the +distant object, but also to render impossible the invasion of his home +territory. + +Here, then, we reach the true meaning and highest military value of what we +call the command of the sea, and here we touch the secret of England's +success against Powers so greatly superior to herself in military strength. +It is only fitting that such a secret should have been first penetrated by +an Englishman. For so it was, though it must be said that except in the +light of Clausewitz's doctrine the full meaning of Bacon's famous aphorism +is not revealed. "This much is certain," said the great Elizabethan on the +experience of our first imperial war; "he that commands the sea is at great +liberty and may take as much or as little of the war as he will, whereas +those that be strongest by land are many times nevertheless in great +straits." It would be difficult to state more pithily the ultimate +significance of Clausewitz's doctrine. Its cardinal truth is clearly +indicated--that limited wars do not turn upon the armed strength of the +belligerents, but upon the amount of that strength which they are able or +willing to bring to bear at the decisive point. + +It is much to be regretted that Clausewitz did not live to see with Bacon's +eyes and to work out the full comprehensiveness of his doctrine. His +ambition was to formulate a theory which would explain all wars. He +believed he had done so, and yet it is clear he never knew how complete was +his success, nor how wide was the field he had covered. To the end it would +seem he was unaware that he had found an explanation of one of the most +inscrutable problems in history--the expansion of England--at least so far +as it has been due to successful war. That a small country with a weak army +should have been able to gather to herself the most desirable regions of +the earth, and to gather them at the expense of the greatest military +Powers, is a paradox to which such Powers find it hard to be reconciled. +The phenomenon seemed always a matter of chance-an accident without any +foundation in the essential constants of war. It remained for Clausewitz, +unknown to himself, to discover that explanation, and he reveals it to us +in the inherent strength of limited war when means and conditions are +favourable for its use. + +We find, then, if we take a wider view than was open to Clausewitz and +submit his latest ideas to the test of present imperial conditions, so far +from failing to cover the ground they gain a fuller meaning and a firmer +basis. Apply them to maritime warfare and it becomes clear that his +distinction between limited and unlimited war does not rest alone on the +moral factor. A war may be limited not only because the importance of the +object is too limited to call forth the whole national force, but also +because the sea may be made to present an insuperable physical obstacle to +the whole national force being brought to bear. That is to say, a war may +be limited physically by the strategical isolation of the object, as well +as morally by its comparative unimportance. + + * * * * * + + CHAPTER FIVE + + WARS OF INTERVENTION-- + LIMITED INTERFERENCE IN UNLIMITED WAR + + * * * * * + +Before leaving the general consideration of limited war, we have still to +deal with a form of it that has not yet been mentioned. Clausewitz gave it +provisionally the name of "War limited by contingent," and could find no +place for it in his system. It appeared to him to differ essentially from +war limited by its political object, or as Jomini put it, war with a +territorial object. Yet it had to be taken into account and explained, if +only for the part it had played in European history. + +For us it calls for the most careful examination, not only because it +baffled the great German strategist to reconcile it with his theory of war, +but also because it is the form in which Great Britain most successfully +demonstrated the potentiality for direct continental interference of a +small army acting in conjunction with a dominant fleet. + +The combined operations which were the normal expression of the British +method of making war on the limited basis were of two main classes. +Firstly, there were those designed purely for the conquest of the objects +for which we went to war, which were usually colonial or distant oversea +territory; and secondly, operations more or less upon the European seaboard +designed not for permanent conquest, but as a method of disturbing our +enemy's plans and strengthening the hands of our allies and our own +position. Such operations might take the form of insignificant coastal +diversions, or they might rise through all degrees of importance till, as +in Wellington's operations in the Peninsula, they became indistinguishable +in form from regular continental warfare. + +It would seem, therefore, that these operations were distinguished not so +much by the nature of the object as by the fact that we devoted to them, +not the whole of our military strength, but only a certain part of it which +was known as our "disposal force." Consequently, they appear to call for +some such special classification, and to fall naturally into the category +which Clausewitz called "War limited by contingent." + +It was a nature of war well enough known in another form on the Continent. +During the eighteenth century there had been a large number of cases of war +actually limited by contingent--that is, cases where a country not having a +vital interest in the object made war by furnishing the chief belligerent +with an auxiliary force of a stipulated strength. + +It was in the sixth chapter of his last book that Clausewitz intended to +deal with this anomalous form of hostility. His untimely death, however, +has left us with no more than a fragment, in which he confesses that such +cases are "embarrassing to his theory." If, he adds, the auxiliary force +were placed unreservedly at the disposal of the chief belligerent, the +problem would be simple enough. It would then, in effect, be the same thing +as unlimited war with the aid of a subsidised force. But in fact, as he +observes, this seldom happened, for the contingent was always more or less +controlled in accordance with the special political aims of the Government +which furnished it. Consequently, the only conclusion he succeeded in +reaching was that it was a form of war that had to be taken into account, +and that it was a form of limited war that appeared to differ essentially +from war limited by object. We are left, in fact, with an impression that +there must be two kinds of limited war. + +But if we pursue his historical method and examine the cases in which this +nature of war was successful, and those in which it was unsuccessful, we +shall find that wherever success is taken as an index of its legitimate +employment, the practical distinction between the two kinds of limited war +tends to disappear. The indications are that where the essential factors +which justify the use of war limited by object are present in war limited +by contingent, then that form of war tends to succeed, but not otherwise. +We are brought, in fact, to this proposition, that the distinction "Limited +by contingent" is not one that is inherent in war, and is quite out of line +with the theory in hand--that, in reality, it is not a _form_ of war, but a +_method_ which may be employed either for limited or unlimited war. In +other words, war limited by contingent, if it is to be regarded as a +legitimate form of war at all, must take frankly the one shape or the +other. Either the contingent must act as an organic unit of the force +making unlimited war without any reservations whatever, or else it should +be given a definite territorial object, with an independent organisation +and an independent limited function. + +Our own experience seems to indicate that war by contingent or war with "a +disposal force" attains the highest success when it approaches most closely +to true limited war--that is, as in the case of the Peninsula and the +Crimea, where its object is to wrest or secure from the enemy a definite +piece of territory that to a greater or less extent can be isolated by +naval action. Its operative power, in fact, appears to bear some direct +relation to the intimacy with which naval and military action can be +combined to give the contingent a weight and mobility that are beyond its +intrinsic power. + +If, then, we would unravel the difficulties of war limited by contingent, +it seems necessary to distinguish between the continental and the British +form of it. The continental form, as we have seen, differs but little in +conception from unlimited war. The contingent is furnished at least +ostensibly with the idea that it is to be used by the chief belligerent to +assist him in overthrowing the common enemy, and that its objective will be +the enemy's organised forces or his capital. Or it may be that the +contingent is to be used as an army of observation to prevent a +counterstroke, so as to facilitate and secure the main offensive movement +of the chief belligerent. In either case, however small may be our +contribution to the allied force, we are using the unlimited form and +aiming at an unlimited and not a mere territorial object. + +If now we turn to British experience of war limited by contingent, we find +that the continental form has frequently been used, but we also find it +almost invariably accompanied by a popular repugnance, as though there were +something in it antagonistic to the national instinct. A leading case is +the assistance we sent to Frederick the Great in the Seven Years' War. At +the opening of the war, so great was the popular repugnance that the +measure was found impossible, and it was not till Frederick's dazzling +resistance to the Catholic powers had clothed him with the glory of a +Protestant hero, that Pitt could do what he wanted. The old religious fire +was stirred. The most potent of all national instincts kindled the people +to a generous warmth which overcame their inborn antipathy to continental +operations, and it was possible to send a substantial contingent to +Frederick's assistance. In the end the support fully achieved its purpose, +but it must be noted that even in this case the operations were limited not +only by contingent but also by object. It is true that Frederick was +engaged in an unlimited war in which the continued existence of Prussia was +at stake, and that the British force was an organic element in his war +plan. Nevertheless, it formed part of a British subsidised army under +Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, who though nominated by Frederick was a +British commander-in-chief. His army was in organisation entirely distinct +from that of Frederick, and it was assigned the very definite and limited +function of preventing the French occupying Hanover and so turning the +Prussian right flank. Finally it must be noted that its ability to perform +this function was due to the fact that the theatre of operations assigned +to it was such that in no probable event could it lose touch with the sea, +nor could the enemy cut its lines of supply and retreat. + +These features of the enterprise should be noted. They differentiate it +from our earlier use of war limited by contingent in the continental +manner, of which Marlborough's campaigns were typical, and they exhibit the +special form which Marlborough would have chosen had political exigencies +permitted and which was to become characteristic of British effort from +Pitt's time onward. In the method of our greatest War Minister we have not +only the limit by contingent but also the limit of a definite and +independent function, and finally we have touch with the sea. This is the +really vital factor, and upon it, as will presently appear, depends the +strength of the method. + +In the earlier part of the Great War we employed the same form in our +operations in North-Western Europe. There we had also the limited function +of securing Holland, and also complete touch with the sea, but our theatre +of operations was not independent. Intimate concerted action with other +forces was involved, and the result in every case was failure. Later on in +Sicily, where absolute isolation was attainable, the strength of the method +enabled us to achieve a lasting result with very slender means. But the +result was purely defensive. It was not till the Peninsular War developed +that we found a theatre for war limited by contingent in which all the +conditions that make for success were present. Even there so long as our +army was regarded as a contingent auxiliary to the Spanish army the usual +failure ensued. Only in Portugal, the defence of which was a true limited +object, and where we had a sea-girt theatre independent of extraneous +allies, was success achieved from the first. So strong was the method here, +and so exhausting the method which it forced on the enemy, that the local +balance of force was eventually reversed and we were able to pass to a +drastic offensive. + +The real secret of Wellington's success--apart from his own genius--was +that in perfect conditions he was applying the limited form to an unlimited +war. Our object was unlimited. It was nothing less than the overthrow of +Napoleon. Complete success at sea had failed to do it, but that success had +given us the power of applying the limited form, which was the most +decisive form of offence within our means. Its substantial contribution to +the final achievement of the object is now universally recognised. + +The general result, then, of these considerations is that war by contingent +in the continental form seldom or never differs generically from unlimited +war, for the conditions required by limited war are seldom or never +present. But what may be called the British or maritime form is in fact the +application of the limited method to the unlimited form, as ancillary to +the larger operations of our allies--a method which has usually been open +to us because the control of the sea has enabled us to select a theatre in +effect truly limited.[5] + + [5] Wellington's view of the essential factor was expressed to Rear + Admiral Martin, who was sent to Spain by the Admiralty to confer with him + in September 1813. "If anyone," he said, "wishes to know the history of + this war, I will tell them it is our maritime superiority gives me the + power of maintaining my army while the enemy are unable to do so." + (_Letters of Sir T. Byam Martin_) [Navy Records Society], ii, p. 499. + +But what if the conditions of the struggle in which we wish to intervene +are such that no truly limited theatre is available? In that case we have +to choose between placing a contingent frankly at the disposal of our ally, +or confining ourselves to coastal diversion, as we did at Frederick the +Great's request in the early campaigns of the Seven Years' War. Such +operations can seldom be satisfactory to either party. The small positive +results of our efforts to intervene in this way have indeed done more than +anything to discredit this form of war, and to brand it as unworthy of a +first-class Power. Yet the fact remains that all the great continental +masters of war have feared or valued British intervention of this character +even in the most unfavourable conditions. It was because they looked for +its effects rather in the threat than in the performance. They did not +reckon for positive results at all. So long as such intervention took an +amphibious form they knew its disturbing effect upon a European situation +was always out of all proportion to the intrinsic strength employed or the +positive results it could give. Its operative action was that it threatened +positive results unless it were strongly met. Its effect, in short, was +negative. Its value lay in its power of containing force greater than its +own. That is all that can be claimed for it, but it may be all that is +required. It is not the most drastic method of intervention, but it has +proved itself the most drastic for a Power whose forces are not adapted for +the higher method. Frederick the Great was the first great soldier to +recognise it, and Napoleon was the last. For years he shut his eyes to it, +laughed at it, covered it with a contempt that grew ever more irritable. In +1805 he called Craig's expedition a "pygmy combination," yet the +preparation of another combined force for an entirely different destination +caused him to see the first as an advance guard of a movement he could not +ignore, and he sacrificed his fleet in an impotent effort to deal with it. + +It was not, however, till four years later that he was forced to place on +record his recognition of the principle. Then, curiously enough, he was +convinced by an expedition which we have come to regard as above all others +condemnatory of amphibious operations against the Continent. The Walcheren +expedition is now usually held as the leading case of fatuous war +administration. Historians can find no words too bad for it. They ignore +the fact that it was a step--the final and most difficult step--in our +post-Trafalgar policy of using the army to perfect our command of the sea +against a fleet acting stubbornly on the defensive. It began with +Copenhagen in 1807. It failed at the Dardanelles because fleet and army +were separated; it succeeded at Lisbon and at Cadiz by demonstration alone. +Walcheren, long contemplated, had been put off till the last as the most +formidable and the least pressing. Napoleon had been looking for the +attempt ever since the idea was first broached in this country, but as time +passed and the blow did not fall, the danger came to be more and more +ignored. Finally, the moment came when he was heavily engaged in Austria +and forced to call up the bulk of his strength to deal with the Archduke +Charles. The risks were still great, but the British Government faced them +boldly with open eyes. It was now or never. They were bent on developing +their utmost military strength in the Peninsula, and so long as a potent +and growing fleet remained in the North Sea it would always act as an +increasing drag on such development. The prospective gain of success was in +the eyes of the Government out of all proportion to the probable loss by +failure. So when Napoleon least expected it they determined to act, and +caught him napping. The defences of Antwerp had been left incomplete. There +was no army to meet the blow--nothing but a polyglot rabble without staff +or even officers. For a week at least success was in our hands. Napoleon's +fleet only escaped by twenty-four hours, and yet the failure was not only +complete but disastrous. Still so entirely were the causes of failure +accidental, and so near had it come to success, that Napoleon received a +thorough shock and looked for a quick repetition of the attempt. So +seriously indeed did he regard his narrow escape that he found himself +driven to reconsider his whole system of home defence. Not only did he deem +it necessary to spend large sums in increasing the fixed defences of +Antwerp and Toulon, but his Director of Conscription was called upon to +work out a scheme for providing a permanent force of no less than 300,000 +men from the National Guard to defend the French coasts. "With 30,000 men +in transports at the Downs," the Emperor wrote, "the English can paralyse +300,000 of my army, and that will reduce us to the rank of a second-class +Power."[6] + + [6] _Correspondance de Napoléon_, xix, 421, 4 September. + +The concentration of the British efforts in the Peninsula apparently +rendered the realisation of this project unnecessary--that is, our line of +operation was declared and the threat ceased. But none the less Napoleon's +recognition of the principle remains on record--not in one of his speeches +made for some ulterior purpose, but in a staff order to the principal +officer concerned. + +It is generally held that modern developments in military organisation and +transport will enable a great continental Power to ignore such threats. +Napoleon ignored them in the past, but only to verify the truth that in war +to ignore a threat is too often to create an opportunity. Such +opportunities may occur late or early. As both Lord Ligonier and Wolfe laid +it down for such operations, surprise is not necessarily to be looked for +at the beginning. We have usually had to create or wait for our +opportunity--too often because we were either not ready or not bold enough +to seize the first that occurred. + +The cases in which such intervention has been most potent have been of two +classes. Firstly, there is the intrusion into a war plan which our enemy +has designed without allowing for our intervention, and to which he is +irrevocably committed by his opening movements. Secondly, there is +intervention to deprive the enemy of the fruits of victory. This form finds +its efficacy in the principle that unlimited wars are not always decided by +the destruction of armies. There usually remains the difficult work of +conquering the people afterwards with an exhausted army. The intrusion of a +small fresh force from the sea in such cases may suffice to turn the scale, +as it did in the Peninsula, and as, in the opinion of some high +authorities, it might have done in France in 1871. + +Such a suggestion will appear to be almost heretical as sinning against the +principle which condemns a strategical reserve. We say that the whole +available force should be developed for the vital period of the struggle. +No one can be found to dispute it nowadays. It is too obviously true when +it is a question of a conflict between organised forces, but in the absence +of all proof we are entitled to doubt whether it is true for that +exhausting and demoralising period which lies beyond the shock of armies. + + * * * * * + + CHAPTER SIX + + CONDITIONS OF STRENGTH IN LIMITED WAR + + * * * * * + +The elements of strength in limited war are closely analogous to those +generally inherent in defence. That is to say, that as a correct use of +defence will sometimes enable an inferior force to gain its end against a +superior one, so are there instances in which the correct use of the +limited form of war has enabled a weak military Power to attain success +against a much stronger one, and these instances are too numerous to permit +us to regard the results as accidental. + +An obvious element of strength is that where the geographical conditions +are favourable we are able by the use of our navy to restrict the amount of +force our army will have to deal with. We can in fact bring up our fleet to +redress the adverse balance of our land force. But apart from this very +practical reason there is another, which is rooted in the first principles +of strategy. + +It is that limited war permits the use of the defensive without its usual +drawbacks to a degree that is impossible in unlimited war. These drawbacks +are chiefly that it tends to surrender the initiative to the enemy and that +it deprives us of the moral exhilaration of the offensive. But in limited +war, as we shall see, this need not be the case, and if without making +these sacrifices we are able to act mainly on the defensive our position +becomes exceedingly strong. + +The proposition really admits of no doubt. For even if we be not in +whole-hearted agreement with Clausewitz's doctrine of the strength of +defence, still we may at least accept Moltke's modification of it. He held +that the strongest form of war--that is, the form which economically makes +for the highest development of strength in a given force--is strategic +offensive combined with tactical defensive. Now these are in effect the +conditions which limited war should give--that is, if the theatre and +method be rightly chosen. Let it be remembered that the use of this form of +war presupposes that we are able by superior readiness or mobility or by +being more conveniently situated to establish ourselves in the territorial +object before our opponent can gather strength to prevent us. This done, we +have the initiative, and the enemy being unable by hypothesis to attack us +at home, must conform to our opening by endeavouring to turn us out. We are +in a position to meet his attack on ground of our own choice and to avail +ourselves of such opportunities of counter-attack as his distant and +therefore exhausting offensive movements are likely to offer. Assuming, as +in our own case we always must assume, that the territorial object is +sea-girt and our enemy is not able to command the sea, such opportunities +are certain to present themselves, and even if they are not used will +greatly embarrass the main attack--as was abundantly shown in the Russian +nervousness during their advance into the Liaotung Peninsula, due to the +fear of a counter-stroke from the Gulf of Pe-chi-li. + +The actual situation which this method of procedure sets up is that our +major strategy is offensive--that is, our main movement is positive, having +for its aim the occupation of the territorial object. The minor strategy +that follows should be in its general lines defensive, designed, so soon as +the enemy sets about dislodging us, to develop the utmost energy of +counter-attack which our force and opportunities justify. + +Now if we consider that by universal agreement it is no longer possible in +the present conditions of land warfare to draw a line between tactics and +minor strategy, we have in our favour for all practical purposes the +identical position which Moltke regarded as constituting the strongest form +of war. That is to say, our major strategy is offensive and our minor +strategy is defensive. + +If, then, the limited form of war has this element of strength over and +above the unlimited form, it must be correct to use it when we are not +strong enough to use the more exhausting form and when the object is +limited; just as much as it is correct to use the defensive when our object +is negative and we are too weak for the offensive. The point is of the +highest importance, for it is a direct negation of the current doctrine +that in war there can be but one legitimate object, the overthrow of the +enemy's means of resistance, and that the primary objective must always be +his armed forces. It raises in fact the whole question as to whether it is +not sometimes legitimate and even correct to aim directly at the ulterior +object of the war. + +An impression appears to prevail--in spite of all that Clausewitz and +Jomini had to say on the point--that the question admits of only one +answer. Von der Goltz, for instance, is particularly emphatic in asserting +that the overthrow of the enemy must always be the object in modern war. He +lays it down as "the first principle of modern warfare," that "the +immediate objective against which all our efforts must be directed is the +hostile main army." Similarly Prince Kraft has the maxim that "the first +aim should be to overcome the enemy's army. Everything else, the occupation +of the country, &c., only comes in the second line." + +It will be observed that he here admits that the process of occupying the +enemy's territory is an operation distinct from the overthrow of the +enemy's force. Von der Goltz goes further, and protests against the common +error of regarding the annihilation of the enemy's principal army as +synonymous with the complete attainment of the object. He is careful to +assert that the current doctrine only holds good "when the two belligerent +states are of approximately the same nature." If, then, there are cases in +which the occupation of territory must be undertaken as an operation +distinct from defeating the enemy's forces, and if in such cases the +conditions are such that we can occupy the territory with advantage without +first defeating the enemy, it is surely mere pedantry to insist that we +should put off till to-morrow what we can do better to-day. If the +occupation of the enemy's whole territory is involved, or even a +substantial part of it, the German principle of course holds good, but all +wars are not of that character. + +Insistence on the principle of "overthrow," and even its exaggeration, was +of value, in its day, to prevent a recurrence to the old and discredited +methods. But its work is done, and blind adherence to it without regard to +the principles on which it rests tends to turn the art of war into mere +bludgeon play. + +Clausewitz, at any rate, as General Von Caemmerer has pointed out,[7] was +far too practical a soldier to commit himself to so abstract a proposition +in all its modern crudity. If it were true, it would never be possible for +a weaker Power to make successful war against a stronger one in any cause +whatever--a conclusion abundantly refuted by historical experience. That +the higher form like the offensive is the more drastic is certain, if +conditions are suitable for its use, but Clausewitz, it must be remembered, +distinctly lays it down that such conditions presuppose in the belligerent +employing the higher form a great physical or moral superiority or a great +spirit of enterprise--an innate propensity for extreme hazards. Jomini did +not go even so far as this. He certainly would have ruled out "an innate +propensity to extreme hazards," for in his judgment it was this innate +propensity which led Napoleon to abuse the higher form to his own undoing. +So entirely indeed does history, no less than theory, fail to support the +idea of the one answer, that it would seem that even in Germany a reaction +to Clausewitz's real teaching is beginning. In expounding it Von Caemmerer +says, "Since the majority of the most prominent military authors of our +time uphold the principle that in war our efforts must always be directed +to their utmost limits and that a deliberate employment of lower means +betrays more or less weakness, I feel bound to declare that the wideness of +Clausewitz's views have inspired me with a high degree of admiration." + + [7] _Development of Strategical Science._ + +Now what Clausewitz held precisely was this--that when the conditions are +not favourable for the use of the higher form, the seizure of a small part +of the enemy's territory may be regarded as a correct alternative to +destroying his armed forces. But he clearly regards this form of war only +as a make-shift. His purely continental outlook prevented his considering +that there might be cases where the object was actually so limited in +character that the lower form of war would be at once the more effective +and the more economical to use. In continental warfare, as we have seen, +such cases can hardly occur, but they tend to declare themselves strongly +when the maritime factor is introduced to any serious extent. + +The tendency of British warfare to take the lower or limited form has +always been as clearly marked as is the opposite tendency on the Continent. +To attribute such a tendency, as is sometimes the fashion, to an inherent +lack of warlike spirit is sufficiently contradicted by the results it has +achieved. There is no reason indeed to put it down to anything but a +sagacious instinct for the kind of war that best accords with the +conditions of our existence. So strong has this instinct been that it has +led us usually to apply the lower form not only where the object of the war +was a well-defined territorial one, but to cases in which its correctness +was less obvious. As has been explained in the last chapter, we have +applied it, and applied it on the whole with success, when we have been +acting in concert with continental allies for an unlimited object--where, +that is, the common object has been the overthrow of the common enemy. + +The choice between the two forms really depends upon the circumstances of +each case. We have to consider whether the political object is in fact +limited, whether if unlimited in the abstract it can be reduced to a +concrete object that is limited, and finally whether the strategical +conditions are such as lend themselves to the successful application of the +limited form. + +What we require now is to determine those conditions with greater +exactness, and this will be best done by changing our method to the +concrete and taking a leading case. + +The one which presents them in their clearest and simplest form is without +doubt the recent war between Russia and Japan. Here we have a particularly +striking example of a small Power having forced her will upon a much +greater Power without "overthrowing" her--that is, without having crushed +her power of resistance. That was entirely beyond the strength of Japan. So +manifest was the fact that everywhere upon the Continent, where the +overthrow of your enemy was regarded as the only admissible form of war, +the action of the Japanese in resorting to hostilities was regarded as +madness. Only in England, with her tradition and instinct for what an +island Power may achieve by the lower means, was Japan considered to have +any reasonable chance of success. + +The case is particularly striking; for every one felt that the real object +of the war was in the abstract unlimited, that it was in fact to decide +whether Russia or Japan was to be the predominant power in the Far East. +Like the Franco-German War of 1870 it had all the aspect of what the +Germans call "a trial of strength." Such a war is one which above all +appears incapable of decision except by the complete overthrow of the one +Power or the other. There was no complication of alliances nor any +expectation of them. The Anglo-Japanese Treaty had isolated the struggle. +If ever issue hung on the sheer fighting force of the two belligerents it +would seem to have been this one. After the event we are inclined to +attribute the result to the moral qualities and superior training and +readiness of the victors. These qualities indeed played their part, and +they must not be minimised; but who will contend that if Japan had tried to +make her war with Russia, as Napoleon made his, she could have fared even +as well as he did? She had no such preponderance as Clausewitz laid down as +a condition precedent to attempting the overthrow of her enemy--the +employment of unlimited war. + +Fortunately for her the circumstances did not call for the employment of +such extreme means. The political and geographical conditions were such +that she was able to reduce the intangible object of asserting her prestige +to the purely concrete form of a territorial objective. The penetration of +Russia into Manchuria threatened the absorption of Korea into the Russian +Empire, and this Japan regarded as fatal to her own position and future +development. Her power to maintain Korean integrity would be the outward +and visible sign of her ability to assert herself as a Pacific Power. Her +abstract quarrel with Russia could therefore be crystallised into a +concrete objective in the same way as the quarrel of the Western Powers +with Russia in 1854 crystallised into the concrete objective of Sebastopol. + +In the Japanese case the immediate political object was exceptionally well +adapted for the use of limited war. Owing to the geographical position of +Korea and to the vast and undeveloped territories which separate it from +the centre of Russian power, it could be practically isolated by naval +action. Further than this, it fulfilled the condition to which Clausewitz +attached the greatest importance--that is to say, the seizure of the +particular object so far from weakening the home defence of Japan would +have the effect of greatly increasing the strength of her position. Though +offensive in effect and intention it was also, like Frederick's seizure of +Saxony, a sound piece of defensive work. So far from exposing her heart, it +served to cover it almost impregnably. The reason is plain. Owing to the +wide separation of the two Russian arsenals at Port Arthur and +Vladivostock, with a defile controlled by Japan interposed, the Russian +naval position was very faulty. The only way of correcting it was for +Russia to secure a base in the Straits of Korea, and for this she had been +striving by diplomatic means at Seoul for some time. Strategically the +integrity of Korea was for Japan very much what the integrity of the Low +Countries was for us, but in the case of the Low Countries, since they were +incapable of isolation, our power of direct action was always comparatively +weak. Portugal, with its unrivalled strategical harbour at Lisbon, was an +analogous case in our old oceanic wars, and since it was capable of being +in a measure isolated from the strength of our great rival by naval means +we were there almost uniformly successful. On the whole it must be said +that notwithstanding the success we achieved in our long series of wars +waged on a limited basis, in none of them were the conditions so favourable +for us as in this case they were for Japan. In none of them did our main +offensive movement so completely secure our home defence. Canada was as +eccentric as possible to our line of home defence, while in the Crimea so +completely did our offensive uncover the British Islands, that we had to +supplement our movement against the limited object by sending our main +fighting fleet to hold the exit of the Baltic against the danger of an +unlimited counter-stroke.[8] + + [8] The strategical object with which the Baltic fleet was sent was + certainly to prevent a counter-stroke--that is, its main function in our + war plan was negative. Its positive function was minor and diversionary + only. It also had a political object as a demonstration to further our + efforts to form a Baltic coalition against Russia, which entirely failed. + Public opinion mistaking the whole situation expected direct positive + results from this fleet, even the capture of St. Petersburg. Such an + operation would have converted the war from a limited one to an unlimited + one. It would have meant the "overthrow of the enemy," a task quite + beyond the strength of the allies without the assistance of the Baltic + Powers, and even so their assistance would not have justified changing + the nature of the war, unless both Sweden and Russia had been ready to + make unlimited war and nothing was further from their intention. + +Whether or not it was on this principle that the Japanese conceived the war +from the outset matters little. The main considerations are that with so +favourable a territorial object as Korea limited war was possible in its +most formidable shape, that the war did in fact develop on limited lines, +and that it was entirely successful. Without waiting to secure the command +of the sea, Japan opened by a surprise seizure of Seoul, and then under +cover of minor operations of the fleet proceeded to complete her occupation +of Korea. As she faced the second stage, that of making good the defence of +her conquest, the admirable nature of her geographical object was further +displayed. The theoretical weakness of limited war at this point is the +arrest of your offensive action. But in this case such arrest was neither +necessary nor possible, and for these reasons. To render the conquest +secure not only must the Korean frontier be made inviolable, but Korea must +be permanently isolated by sea. This involved the destruction of the +Russian fleet, and this in its turn entailed the reduction of Port Arthur +by military means. Here, then, in the second stage Japan found herself +committed to two lines of operation with two distinct objectives, Port +Arthur and the Russian army that was slowly concentrating in Manchuria--a +thoroughly vicious situation. So fortunate, however, was the geographical +conformation of the theatre that by promptitude and the bold use of an +uncommanded sea it could be reduced to something far more correct. By +continuing the advance of the Korean army into Manchuria and landing +another force between it and the Port Arthur army the three corps could be +concentrated and the vicious separation of the lines of operations turned +to good account. They could be combined in such a way as to threaten an +enveloping counter-attack on Liao-yang before the Russian offensive +concentration could be completed. Not only was Liao-yang the Russian point +of concentration, but it also was a sound position both for defending Korea +and covering the siege of Port Arthur. Once secured, it gave the Japanese +all the advantages of defence and forced the Russians to exhaust themselves +in offensive operations which were beyond their strength. Nor was it only +ashore that this advantage was gained. The success of the system, which +culminated in the fall of Port Arthur, went further still. Not only did it +make Japan relatively superior at sea, but it enabled her to assume a naval +defensive and so to force the final naval decision on Russia with every +advantage of time, place, and strength in her own favour. + +By the battle of Tsushima the territorial object was completely isolated by +sea, and the position of Japan in Korea was rendered as impregnable as that +of Wellington at Torres Vedras. All that remained was to proceed to the +third stage and demonstrate to Russia that the acceptance of the situation +that had been set up was more to her advantage than the further attempt to +break it down. This the final advance to Mukden accomplished, and Japan +obtained her end very far short of having overthrown her enemy. The +offensive power of Russia had never been so strong, while that of Japan was +almost if not quite exhausted. + +Approached in this way, the Far Eastern struggle is seen to develop on the +same lines as all our great maritime wars of the past, which continental +strategists have so persistently excluded from their field of study. It +presents the normal three phases--the initial offensive movement to seize +the territorial object, the secondary phase, which forces an attenuated +offensive on the enemy, and the final stage of pressure, in which there is +a return to the offensive "according," as Jomini puts it, "to circumstances +and your relative force in order to obtain the cession desired." + +It must not of course be asked that these phases shall be always clearly +defined. Strategical analysis can never give exact results. It aims only at +approximations, at groupings which will serve to guide but will always +leave much to the judgment. The three phases in the Russo-Japanese War, +though unusually well defined, continually overlapped. It must be so; for +in war the effect of an operation is never confined to the limits of its +immediate or primary intention. Thus the occupation of Korea had the +secondary defensive effect of covering the home country, while the initial +blow which Admiral Togo delivered at Port Arthur to cover the primary +offensive movement proved, by the demoralisation it caused in the Russian +fleet, to be a distinct step in the secondary phase of isolating the +conquest. In the later stages of the war the line between what was +essential to set up the second phase of perfecting the isolation and the +third phase of general pressure seems to have grown very nebulous. + +It was at this stage that the Japanese strategy has been most severely +criticised, and it was just here they seem to have lost hold of the +conception of a limited war, if in fact they had ever securely grasped the +conception as the elder Pitt understood it. It has been argued that in +their eagerness to deal a blow at the enemy's main army they neglected to +devote sufficient force to reduce Port Arthur, an essential step to +complete the second phase. Whether or not the exigencies of the case +rendered such distribution of force inevitable or whether it was due to +miscalculation of difficulties, the result was a most costly set-back. For +not only did it entail a vast loss of time and life at Port Arthur itself, +but when the sortie of the Russian fleet in June brought home to them their +error, the offensive movement on Liao-yang had to be delayed, and the +opportunity passed for a decisive counter-stroke at the enemy's +concentration ashore. + +This misfortune, which was to cost the Japanese so dear, may perhaps be +attributed at least in part to the continental influences under which their +army had been trained. We at least can trace the unlimited outlook in the +pages of the German Staff history. In dealing with the Japanese plan of +operations it is assumed that the occupation of Korea and the isolation of +Port Arthur were but preliminaries to a concentric advance on Liao-yang, +"which was kept in view as the first objective of the operations on land." +But surely on every theory of the war the first objective of the Japanese +on land was Seoul, where they expected to have to fight their first +important action against troops advancing from the Yalu; and surely their +second was Port Arthur, with its fleet and arsenal, which they expected to +reduce with little more difficulty than they had met with ten years before +against the Chinese. Such at least was the actual progression of events, +and a criticism which regards operations of such magnitude and ultimate +importance as mere incidents of strategic deployment is only to be +explained by the domination of the Napoleonic idea of war, against the +universal application of which Clausewitz so solemnly protested. It is the +work of men who have a natural difficulty in conceiving a war plan that +does not culminate in a Jena or a Sedan. It is a view surely which is the +child of theory, bearing no relation to the actuality of the war in +question and affording no explanation of its ultimate success. The truth +is, that so long as the Japanese acted on the principles of limited war, as +laid down by Clausewitz and Jomini and plainly deducible from our own rich +experience, they progressed beyond all their expectations, but so soon as +they departed from them and suffered themselves to be confused with +continental theories they were surprised by unaccountable failure. + +The expression "Limited war" is no doubt not entirely happy. Yet no other +has been found to condense the ideas of limited object and limited +interest, which are its special characteristics. Still if the above example +be kept in mind as a typical case, the meaning of the term will not be +mistaken. It only remains to emphasise one important point. The fact that +the doctrine of limited war traverses the current belief that our primary +objective must always be the enemy's armed forces is liable to carry with +it a false inference that it also rejects the corollary that war means the +use of battles. Nothing is further from the conception. Whatever the form +of war, there is no likelihood of our ever going back to the old fallacy of +attempting to decide wars by manoeuvres. All forms alike demand the use of +battles. By our fundamental theory war is always "a continuation of +political intercourse, in which fighting is substituted for writing notes." +However great the controlling influence of the political object, it must +never obscure the fact that it is by fighting we have to gain our end. + +It is the more necessary to insist on this point, for the idea of making a +piece of territory your object is liable to be confused with the older +method of conducting war, in which armies were content to manoeuvre for +strategical positions, and a battle came almost to be regarded as a mark of +bad generalship. With such parading limited war has nothing to do. Its +conduct differs only from that of unlimited war in that instead of having +to destroy our enemy's whole power of resistance, we need only overthrow so +much of his active force as he is able or willing to bring to bear in order +to prevent or terminate our occupation of the territorial object. + +The first consideration, then, in entering on such a war is to endeavour to +determine what the force will amount to. It will depend, firstly, on the +importance the enemy attaches to the limited object, coupled with the +nature and extent of his preoccupations elsewhere, and, secondly, it will +depend upon the natural difficulties of his lines of communication and the +extent to which we can increase those difficulties by our conduct of the +initial operations. In favourable circumstances therefore (and here lies +the great value of the limited form) we are able to control the amount of +force we shall have to encounter. The most favourable circumstances and the +only circumstances by which we ourselves can profit are such as permit the +more or less complete isolation of the object by naval action, and such +isolation can never be established until we have entirely overthrown the +enemy's naval forces. + +Here, then, we enter the field of naval strategy. We can now leave behind +us the theory of war in general and, in order to pave the way to our final +conclusions, devote our attention to the theory of naval warfare in +particular. + + * * * * * + + PART TWO + + THEORY OF NAVAL WAR + + * * * * * + + CHAPTER ONE + + THEORY OF THE OBJECT-- + COMMAND OF THE SEA + + * * * * * + +The object of naval warfare must always be directly or indirectly either to +secure the command of the sea or to prevent the enemy from securing it. + +The second part of the proposition should be noted with special care in +order to exclude a habit of thought, which is one of the commonest sources +of error in naval speculation. That error is the very general assumption +that if one belligerent loses the command of the sea it passes at once to +the other belligerent. The most cursory study of naval history is enough to +reveal the falseness of such an assumption. It tells us that the most +common situation in naval war is that neither side has the command; that +the normal position is not a commanded sea, but an uncommanded sea. The +mere assertion, which no one denies, that the object of naval warfare is to +get command of the sea actually connotes the proposition that the command +is normally in dispute. It is this state of dispute with which naval +strategy is most nearly concerned, for when the command is lost or won pure +naval strategy comes to an end. + +This truth is so obvious that it would scarcely be worth mentioning were it +not for the constant recurrence of such phrases as: "If England were to +lose command of the sea, it would be all over with her." The fallacy of the +idea is that it ignores the power of the strategical defensive. It assumes +that if in the face of some extraordinary hostile coalition or through some +extraordinary mischance we found ourselves without sufficient strength to +keep the command, we should therefore be too weak to prevent the enemy +getting it--a negation of the whole theory of war, which at least requires +further support than it ever receives. + +And not only is this assumption a negation of theory; it is a negation both +of practical experience and of the expressed opinion of our greatest +masters. We ourselves have used the defensive at sea with success, as under +William the Third and in the War of American Independence, while in our +long wars with France she habitually used it in such a way that sometimes +for years, though we had a substantial preponderance, we could not get +command, and for years were unable to carry out our war plan without +serious interruption from her fleet. + +So far from the defensive being a negligible factor at sea, or even the +mere pestilent heresy it is generally represented, it is of course inherent +in all war, and, as we have seen, the paramount questions of strategy both +at sea and on land turn on the relative possibilities of offensive and +defensive, and upon the relative proportions in which each should enter +into our plan of war. At sea the most powerful and aggressively-minded +belligerent can no more avoid his alternating periods of defence, which +result from inevitable arrests of offensive action, than they can be +avoided on land. The defensive, then, has to be considered; but before we +are in a position to do so with profit, we have to proceed with our +analysis of the phrase, "Command of the Sea," and ascertain exactly what it +is we mean by it in war. + +In the first place, "Command of the Sea" is not identical in its +strategical conditions with the conquest of territory. You cannot argue +from the one to the other, as has been too commonly done. Such phrases as +the "Conquest of water territory" and "Making the enemy's coast our +frontier" had their use and meaning in the mouths of those who framed them, +but they are really little but rhetorical expressions founded on false +analogy, and false analogy is not a secure basis for a theory of war. + +The analogy is false for two reasons, both of which enter materially into +the conduct of naval war. You cannot conquer sea because it is not +susceptible of ownership, at least outside territorial waters. You cannot, +as lawyers say, "reduce it into possession," because you cannot exclude +neutrals from it as you can from territory you conquer. In the second +place, you cannot subsist your armed force upon it as you can upon enemy's +territory. Clearly, then, to make deductions from an assumption that +command of the sea is analogous to conquest of territory is unscientific, +and certain to lead to error. + +The only safe method is to inquire what it is we can secure for ourselves, +and what it is we can deny the enemy by command of the sea. Now, if we +exclude fishery rights, which are irrelevant to the present matter, the +only right we or our enemy can have on the sea is the right of passage; in +other words, the only positive value which the high seas have for national +life is as a means of communication. For the active life of a nation such +means may stand for much or it may stand for little, but to every maritime +State it has some value. Consequently by denying an enemy this means of +passage we check the movement of his national life at sea in the same kind +of way that we check it on land by occupying his territory. So far the +analogy holds good, but no further. + +So much for the positive value which the sea has in national life. It has +also a negative value. For not only is it a means of communication, but, +unlike the means of communication ashore, it is also a barrier. By winning +command of the sea we remove that barrier from our own path, thereby +placing ourselves in position to exert direct military pressure upon the +national life of our enemy ashore, while at the same time we solidify it +against him and prevent his exerting direct military pressure upon +ourselves. + +Command of the sea, therefore, means nothing but the control of maritime +communications, whether for commercial or military purposes. The object of +naval warfare is the control of communications, and not, as in land +warfare, the conquest of territory. The difference is fundamental. True, it +is rightly said that strategy ashore is mainly a question of +communications, but they are communications in another sense. The phrase +refers to the communications of the army alone, and not to the wider +communications which are part of the life of the nation. + +But on land also there are communications of a kind which are essential to +national life--the internal communications which connect the points of +distribution. Here again we touch an analogy between the two kinds of war. +Land warfare, as the most devoted adherents of the modern view admit, +cannot attain its end by military victories alone. The destruction of your +enemy's forces will not avail for certain unless you have in reserve +sufficient force to complete the occupation of his inland communications +and principal points of distribution. This power is the real fruit of +victory, the power to strangle the whole national life. It is not until +this is done that a high-spirited nation, whose whole heart is in the war, +will consent to make peace and do your will. It is precisely in the same +way that the command of the sea works towards peace, though of course in a +far less coercive manner, against a continental State. By occupying her +maritime communications and closing the points of distribution in which +they terminate we destroy the national life afloat, and thereby check the +vitality of that life ashore so far as the one is dependent on the other. +Thus we see that so long as we retain the power and right to stop maritime +communications, the analogy between command of the sea and the conquest of +territory is in this aspect very close. And the analogy is of the utmost +practical importance, for on it turns the most burning question of maritime +war, which it will be well to deal with in this place. + +It is obvious that if the object and end of naval warfare is the control of +communications it must carry with it the right to forbid, if we can, the +passage of both public and private property upon the sea. Now the only +means we have of enforcing such control of commercial communications at sea +is in the last resort the capture or destruction of sea-borne property. +Such capture or destruction is the penalty which we impose upon our enemy +for attempting to use the communications of which he does not hold the +control. In the language of jurisprudence, it is the ultimate sanction of +the interdict which we are seeking to enforce. The current term "Commerce +destruction" is not in fact a logical expression of the strategical idea. +To make the position clear we should say "Commerce prevention." + +The methods of this "Commerce prevention" have no more connection with the +old and barbarous idea of plunder and reprisal than orderly requisitions +ashore have with the old idea of plunder and ravaging. No form of war +indeed causes so little human suffering as the capture of property at sea. +It is more akin to process of law, such as distress for rent, or execution +of judgment, or arrest of a ship, than to a military operation. Once, it is +true, it was not so. In the days of privateers it was accompanied too +often, and particularly in the Mediterranean and the West Indies, with +lamentable cruelty and lawlessness, and the existence of such abuses was +the real reason for the general agreement to the Declaration of Paris by +which privateering was abolished. + +But it was not the only reason. The idea of privateering was a survival of +a primitive and unscientific conception of war, which was governed mainly +by a general notion of doing your enemy as much damage as possible and +making reprisal for wrongs he had done you. To the same class of ideas +belonged the practice of plunder and ravaging ashore. But neither of these +methods of war was abolished for humanitarian reasons. They disappeared +indeed as a general practice before the world had begun to talk of +humanity. They were abolished because war became more scientific. The right +to plunder and ravage was not denied. But plunder was found to demoralise +your troops and unfit them for fighting, and ravaging proved to be a less +powerful means of coercing your enemy than exploiting the occupied country +by means of regular requisitions for the supply of your own army and the +increase of its offensive range. In short, the reform arose from a desire +to husband your enemy's resources for your own use instead of wantonly +wasting them. + +In a similar way privateering always had a debilitating effect upon our own +regular force. It greatly increased the difficulty of manning the navy, and +the occasional large profits had a demoralising influence on detached +cruiser commanders. It tended to keep alive the mediaeval corsair spirit at +the expense of the modern military spirit which made for direct operations +against the enemy's armed forces. It was inevitable that as the new +movement of opinion gathered force it should carry with it a conviction +that for operating against sea-borne trade sporadic attack could never be +so efficient as an organised system of operations to secure a real +strategical control of the enemy's maritime communications. A riper and +sounder view of war revealed that what may be called tactical commercial +blockade--that is, the blockade of ports--could be extended to and +supplemented by a strategical blockade of the great trade routes. In moral +principle there is no difference between the two. Admit the principle of +tactical or close blockade, and as between belligerents you cannot condemn +the principle of strategical or distant blockade. Except in their effect +upon neutrals, there is no juridical difference between the two. + +Why indeed should this humane yet drastic process of war be rejected at sea +if the same thing is permitted on land? If on land you allow contributions +and requisitions, if you permit the occupation of towns, ports, and inland +communications, without which no conquest is complete and no effective war +possible, why should you refuse similar procedure at sea where it causes +far less individual suffering? If you refuse the right of controlling +communications at sea, you must also refuse the right on land. If you admit +the right of contributions on land, you must admit the right of capture at +sea. Otherwise you will permit to military Powers the extreme rights of war +and leave to the maritime Powers no effective rights at all. Their ultimate +argument would be gone. + +In so far as the idea of abolishing private capture at sea is humanitarian, +and in so far as it rests on a belief that it would strengthen our position +as a commercial maritime State, let it be honourably dealt with. But so far +as its advocates have as yet expressed themselves, the proposal appears to +be based on two fallacies. One is, that you can avoid attack by depriving +yourself of the power of offence and resting on defence alone, and the +other, the idea that war consists entirely of battles between armies or +fleets. It ignores the fundamental fact that battles are only the means of +enabling you to do that which really brings wars to an end-that is, to +exert pressure on the citizens and their collective life. "After shattering +the hostile main army," says Von der Goltz, "we still have the forcing of a +peace as a separate and, in certain circumstances, a more difficult task +... to make the enemy's country feel the burdens of war with such weight +that the desire for peace will prevail. This is the point in which Napoleon +failed.... It may be necessary to seize the harbours, commercial centres, +important lines of traffic, fortifications and arsenals, in other words, +all important property necessary to the existence of the people and army." + +If, then, we are deprived of the right to use analogous means at sea, the +object for which we fight battles almost ceases to exist. Defeat the +enemy's fleets as we may, he will be but little the worse. We shall have +opened the way for invasion, but any of the great continental Powers can +laugh at our attempts to invade single-handed. If we cannot reap the +harvest of our success by deadening his national activities at sea, the +only legitimate means of pressure within our strength will be denied us. +Our fleet, if it would proceed with such secondary operations as are +essential for forcing a peace, will be driven to such barbarous expedients +as the bombardment of seaport towns and destructive raids upon the hostile +coasts. + +If the means of pressure which follow successful fighting were abolished +both on land and sea there would be this argument in favour of the change, +that it would mean perhaps for civilised States the entire cessation of +war; for war would become so impotent, that no one would care to engage in +it. It would be an affair between regular armies and fleets, with which the +people had little concern. International quarrels would tend to take the +form of the mediaeval private disputes which were settled by champions in +trial by battle, an absurdity which led rapidly to the domination of purely +legal procedure. If international quarrels could go the same way, humanity +would have advanced a long stride. But the world is scarcely ripe for such +a revolution. Meanwhile to abolish the right of interference with the flow +of private property at sea without abolishing the corresponding right +ashore would only defeat the ends of humanitarians. The great deterrent, +the most powerful check on war, would be gone. It is commerce and finance +which now more than ever control or check the foreign policy of nations. If +commerce and finance stand to lose by war, their influence for a peaceful +solution will be great; and so long as the right of private capture at sea +exists, they stand to lose in every maritime war immediately and inevitably +whatever the ultimate result may be. Abolish the right, and this deterrent +disappears; nay, they will even stand to win immediate gains owing to the +sudden expansion of Government expenditure which the hostilities will +entail, and the expansion of sea commerce which the needs of the armed +forces will create. Any such losses as maritime warfare under existing +conditions must immediately inflict will be remote if interference with +property is confined to the land. They will never indeed be serious except +in the case of complete defeat, and no one enters upon war expecting +defeat. It is in the hope of victory and gain that aggressive wars are +born. The fear of quick and certain loss is their surest preventive. +Humanity, then, will surely beware how in a too hasty pursuit of peaceful +ideals it lets drop the best weapon it has for scotching the evil it has as +yet no power to kill. + +In what follows, therefore, it is intended to regard the right of private +capture at sea as still subsisting. Without it, indeed, naval warfare is +almost inconceivable, and in any case no one has any experience of such a +truncated method of war on which profitable study can be founded. + +The primary method, then, in which we use victory or preponderance at sea +and bring it to bear on the enemy's population to secure peace, is by the +capture or destruction of the enemy's property, whether public or private. +But in comparing the process with the analogous occupation of territory and +the levying of contributions and requisitions we have to observe a marked +difference. Both processes are what may be called economic pressure. But +ashore the economic pressure can only be exerted as the consequence of +victory or acquired domination by military success. At sea the process +begins at once. Indeed, more often than not, the first act of hostility in +maritime wars has been the capture of private property at sea. In a sense +this is also true ashore. The first step of an invader after crossing the +frontier will be to control to a less or greater extent such private +property as he is able to use for his purposes. But such interference with +private property is essentially a military act, and does not belong to the +secondary phase of economic pressure. At sea it does, and the reason why +this should be so lies in certain fundamental differences between land and +sea warfare which are implicit in the communication theory of naval war. + +To elucidate the point, it must be repeated that maritime communications, +which are the root of the idea of command of the sea, are not analogous to +military communications in the ordinary use of the term. Military +communications refer solely to the army's lines of supply and retreat. +Maritime communications have a wider meaning. Though in effect embracing +the lines of fleet supply, they correspond in strategical values not to +military lines of supply, but to those internal lines of communication by +which the flow of national life is maintained ashore. Consequently maritime +communications are on a wholly different footing from land communications. +At sea the communications are, for the most part, common to both +belligerents, whereas ashore each possesses his own in his own territory. +The strategical effect is of far-reaching importance, for it means that at +sea strategical offence and defence tend to merge in a way that is unknown +ashore. Since maritime communications are common, we as a rule cannot +attack those of the enemy without defending our own. In military operations +the converse is the rule. Normally, an attack on our enemy's communications +tends to expose their own. + +The theory of common communications will become clear by taking an example. +In our wars with France our communications with the Mediterranean, India, +and America ran down from the Channel mouth past Finisterre and St. +Vincent; and those of France, at least from her Atlantic ports, were +identical for almost their entire distance. In our wars with the Dutch the +identity was even closer. Even in the case of Spain, her great trade routes +followed the same lines as our own for the greater part of their extent. +Consequently the opening moves which we generally made to defend our trade +by the occupation of those lines placed us in a position to attack our +enemy's trade. The same situation arose even when our opening dispositions +were designed as defence against home invasion or against attacks upon our +colonies, for the positions our fleet had to take up to those ends always +lay on or about the terminal and focal points of trade routes. Whether our +immediate object were to bring the enemy's main fleets to action or to +exercise economic pressure, it made but little difference. If the enemy +were equally anxious to engage, it was at one of the terminal or focal +areas we were almost certain to get contact. If he wished to avoid a +decision, the best way to force him to action was to occupy his trade +routes at the same vital points. + +Thus it comes about that, whereas on land the process of economic pressure, +at least in the modern conception of war, should only begin after decisive +victory, at sea it starts automatically from the first. Indeed such +pressure may be the only means of forcing the decision we seek, as will +appear more clearly when we come to deal with the other fundamental +difference between land and sea warfare. + +Meanwhile we may note that at sea the use of economic pressure from the +commencement is justified for two reasons. The first is, as we have seen, +that it is an economy of means to use our defensive positions for attack +when attack does not vitiate those positions, and it will not vitiate them +if fleet cruisers operate with restraint. The second is, that interference +with the enemy's trade has two aspects. It is not only a means of exerting +the secondary economic pressure, it is also a primary means towards +overthrowing the enemy's power of resistance. Wars are not decided +exclusively by military and naval force. Finance is scarcely less +important. When other things are equal, it is the longer purse that wins. +It has even many times redressed an unfavourable balance of armed force and +given victory to the physically weaker Power. Anything, therefore, which we +are able to achieve towards crippling our enemy's finance is a direct step +to his overthrow, and the most effective means we can employ to this end +against a maritime State is to deny him the resources of seaborne trade. + +It will be seen, therefore, that in naval warfare, however closely we may +concentrate our efforts on the destruction of our enemy's armed forces as +the direct means to his overthrow, it would be folly to stay our hands when +opportunities occur, as they will automatically, for undermining his +financial position on which the continued vigour of those armed forces so +largely depends. Thus the occupation of our enemy's sea communications and +the confiscatory operations it connotes are in a sense primary operations, +and not, as on land, secondary. + +Such, then, are the abstract conclusions at which we arrive in our attempt +to analyse the idea of command of the sea and to give it precision as the +control of common communications. Their concrete value will appear when we +come to deal with the various forms which naval operations may take, such +as, "seeking out the enemy's fleet," blockade, attack and defence of trade, +and the safeguarding of combined expeditions. For the present it remains to +deal with the various kinds of sea command which flow from the +communication idea. + +If the object of the command of the sea is to control communications, it is +obvious it may exist in various degrees. We may be able to control the +whole of the common communications as the result either of great initial +preponderance or of decisive victory. If we are not sufficiently strong to +do this, we may still be able to control some of the communications; that +is, our control may be general or local. Obvious as the point is, it needs +emphasising, because of a maxim that has become current that "the sea is +all one." Like other maxims of the kind, it conveys a truth with a trail of +error in its wake. The truth it contains seems to be simply this, that as a +rule local control can only avail us temporarily, for so long as the enemy +has a sufficient fleet anywhere, it is theoretically in his power to +overthrow our control of any special sea area. + +It amounts indeed to little more than a rhetorical expression, used to +emphasise the high mobility of fleets as contrasted with that of armies and +the absence of physical obstacles to restrict that mobility. That this +vital feature of naval warfare should be consecrated in a maxim is well, +but when it is caricatured into a doctrine, as it sometimes is, that you +cannot move a battalion oversea till you have entirely overthrown your +enemy's fleet, it deserves gibbeting. It would be as wise to hold that in +war you must never risk anything. + +It would seem to have been the evil influence of this travestied maxim +which had much to do with the cramped and timorous strategy of the +Americans in their late war with Spain. They had ample naval force to +secure such a local and temporary command of the Gulf of Mexico as to have +justified them at once in throwing all the troops they had ready into Cuba +to support the insurgents, in accordance with their war plan. They had also +sufficient strength to ensure that the communications with the +expeditionary force could not be interrupted permanently. And yet, because +the Spaniards had an undefeated fleet at sea somewhere, they hesitated, and +were nearly lost. The Japanese had no such illusions. Without having struck +a naval blow of any kind, and with a hostile fleet actually within the +theatre of operations, they started their essential military movement +oversea, content that though they might not be able to secure the control +of the line of passage, they were in a position to deny effective control +to the enemy. Our own history is full of such operations. There are cases +in plenty where the results promised by a successful military blow oversea, +before permanent command had been obtained, were great enough to justify a +risk which, like the Japanese, we knew how to minimise by judicious use of +our favourable geographical position, and of a certain system of +protection, which must be dealt with later. + +For the purpose, then, of framing a plan of war or campaign, it must be +taken that command may exist in various states or degrees, each of which +has its special possibilities and limitations. It may be general or local, +and it may be permanent or temporary. General command may be permanent or +temporary, but mere local command, except in very favourable geographical +conditions, should scarcely ever be regarded as more than temporary, since +normally it is always liable to interruption from other theatres so long as +the enemy possesses an effective naval force. + +Finally, it has to be noted that even permanent general command can never +in practice be absolute. No degree of naval superiority can ensure our +communications against sporadic attack from detached cruisers, or even +raiding squadrons if they be boldly led and are prepared to risk +destruction. Even after Hawke's decisive victory at Quiberon had completed +the overthrow of the enemy's sea forces, a British transport was captured +between Cork and Portsmouth, and an Indiaman in sight of the Lizard, while +Wellington's complaints in the Peninsula of the insecurity of his +communications are well known.[9] By general and permanent control we do +not mean that the enemy can do nothing, but that he cannot interfere with +our maritime trade and oversea operations so seriously as to affect the +issue of the war, and that he cannot carry on his own trade and operations +except at such risk and hazard as to remove them from the field of +practical strategy. In other words, it means that the enemy can no longer +attack our lines of passage and communication effectively, and that he +cannot use or defend his own. + + [9] In justice to Wellington, it should be said that his complaints were + due to false reports that exaggerated a couple of insignificant captures + into a serious interruption. + +To complete our equipment for appreciating any situation for which +operations have to be designed, it is necessary to remember that when the +command is in dispute the general conditions may give a stable or an +unstable equilibrium. It may be that the power of neither side +preponderates to any appreciable extent. It may also be that the +preponderance is with ourselves, or it may be that it lies with the enemy. +Such preponderance of course will not depend entirely on actual relative +strength, either physical or moral, but will be influenced by the +inter-relation of naval positions and the comparative convenience of their +situation in regard to the object of the war or campaign. By naval +positions we mean, firstly, naval bases and, secondly, the terminals of the +greater lines of communication or trade-routes and the focal areas where +they tend to converge, as at Finisterre, Gibraltar, Suez, the Cape, +Singapore, and many others. + +Upon the degree and distribution of this preponderance will depend in a +general way the extent to which our plans will be governed by the idea of +defence or offence. Generally speaking, it will be to the advantage of the +preponderating side to seek a decision as quickly as possible in order to +terminate the state of dispute. Conversely, the weaker side will as a rule +seek to avoid or postpone a decision in hope of being able by minor +operations, the chances of war, or the development of fresh strength, to +turn the balance in its favour. Such was the line which France adopted +frequently in her wars with us, sometimes legitimately, but sometimes to +such an excess as seriously to demoralise her fleet. Her experience has led +to a hasty deduction that the defensive at sea for even a weaker Power is +an unmixed evil. Such a conclusion is foreign to the fundamental principles +of war. It is idle to exclude the use of an expectant attitude because in +itself it cannot lead to final success, and because if used to excess it +ends in demoralisation and the loss of will to attack. The misconception +appears to have arisen from insistence on the drawbacks of defence by +writers seeking to persuade their country to prepare in time of peace +sufficient naval strength to justify offence from the outset. + +Having now determined the fundamental principles which underlie the idea of +Command of the Sea, we are in a position to consider the manner in which +fleets are constituted in order to fit them for their task. + + * * * * * + + CHAPTER TWO + + * * * * * + + THEORY OF THE MEANS-- + THE CONSTITUTION OF FLEETS + + * * * * * + +In all eras of naval warfare fighting ships have exhibited a tendency to +differentiate into groups in accordance with the primary function each +class was designed to serve. These groupings or classifications are what is +meant by the constitution of a fleet. A threefold differentiation into +battleships, cruisers, and flotilla has so long dominated naval thought +that we have come to regard it as normal, and even essential. It may be so, +but such a classification has been by no means constant. Other ideas of +fleet constitution have not only existed, but have stood the test of war +for long periods, and it is unscientific and unsafe to ignore such facts if +we wish to arrive at sound doctrine. + +The truth is, that the classes of ships which constitute a fleet are, or +ought to be, the expression in material of the strategical and tactical +ideas that prevail at any given time, and consequently they have varied not +only with the ideas, but also with the material in vogue. It may also be +said more broadly that they have varied with the theory of war, by which +more or less consciously naval thought was dominated. It is true that few +ages have formulated a theory of war, or even been clearly aware of its +influence; but nevertheless such theories have always existed, and even in +their most nebulous and intangible shapes seem to have exerted an +ascertainable influence on the constitution of fleets. + +Going back to the dawn of modern times, we note that at the opening of the +sixteenth century, when galley warfare reached its culmination, the +constitution was threefold, bearing a superficial analogy to that which we +have come to regard as normal. There were the galeasses and heavy galleys +corresponding to our battleships, light galleys corresponding to our +cruisers, while the flotilla was represented by the small "frigates," +"brigantines," and similar craft, which had no slave gang for propulsion, +but were rowed by the fighting crew. Such armed sailing ships as then +existed were regarded as auxiliaries, and formed a category apart, as +fireships and bomb-vessels did in the sailing period, and as mine-layers do +now. But the parallel must not be overstrained. The distinction of function +between the two classes of galleys was not so strongly marked as that +between the lighter craft and the galleys; that is to say, the scientific +differentiation between battleships and cruisers had not yet been so firmly +developed as it was destined to become in later times, and the smaller +galleys habitually took their place in the fighting line. + +With the rise of the sailing vessel as the typical ship-of-war an entirely +new constitution made its appearance. The dominating classification became +twofold. It was a classification into vessels of subservient movement using +sails, and vessels of free movement using oars. It was on these lines that +our true Royal Navy was first organised by Henry the Eighth, an expert who, +in the science of war, was one of the most advanced masters in Europe. In +this constitution there appears even less conception than in that of the +galley period of a radical distinction between battleships and cruisers. As +Henry's fleet was originally designed, practically the whole of the +battleships were sailing vessels, though it is true that when the French +brought up galleys from the Mediterranean, he gave some of the smartest of +them oars. The constitution was in fact one of battleships and flotilla. Of +cruisers there were none as we understand them. Fleet scouting was done by +the "Row-barges" and newly introduced "Pinnaces" of the flotilla, while as +for commerce protection, merchant vessels had usually to look after +themselves, the larger ones being regularly armed for their own defence. + +The influence of this twofold constitution continued long after the +conditions of its origin had passed away. In ever-lessening degree indeed +it may be said to have lasted for two hundred years. During the Dutch wars +of the seventeenth century, which finally established the dominant status +of the sailing warship, practically all true sailing vessels--that is, +vessels that had no auxiliary oar propulsion--took station in the line. The +"Frigates" of that time differed not at all from the "Great Ship" in their +functions, but only in their design. By the beginning of the eighteenth +century, however, the old tendency to a threefold organisation began to +reassert itself, but it was not till the middle of the century that the +process of development can be regarded as complete. + +Down to the end of the War of the Austrian Succession--a period which is +usually deemed to be one of conspicuous depression in the naval art--the +classification of our larger sailing vessels was purely arbitrary. The +"Rates" (which had been introduced during the Dutch wars) bore no relation +to any philosophical conception of the complex duties of a fleet. In the +first rate were 100-gun ships; in the second, 90-gun ships--all +three-deckers. So far the system of rating was sound enough, but when we +come to the third rate we find it includes 80-gun ships, which were also of +three decks, while the bulk of the rest were 70-gun two-deckers. The fourth +rate was also composed of two-decked ships--weak battle-units of 60 and 50 +guns--and this was far the largest class. All these four rates were classed +as ships-of-the-line. Below them came the fifth rates, which, though they +were used as cruisers, had no distinct class name. They differed indeed +only in degree from the ship-of-the-line, being all cramped two-deckers of +44 and 40 guns, and they must be regarded, in so far as they expressed any +logical idea of naval warfare, as the forerunners of the "Intermediate" +class, represented in the succeeding epochs by 50-gun ships, and in our own +time by armoured cruisers. The only true cruiser is found in the sixth +rate, which comprised small and weakly armed 20-gun ships, and between them +and the "Forties" there was nothing. Below them, but again without any +clear differentiation, came the unrated sloops representing the flotilla. + +In such a system of rating there is no logical distinction either between +large and small battleships or between battleships and cruisers, or between +cruisers and flotilla. The only marked break in the gradual descent is that +between the 40-gun two-deckers and the 20-gun cruisers. As these latter +vessels as well as the sloops used sweeps for auxiliary propulsion, we are +forced to conclude that the only basis of the classification was that +adopted by Henry the Eighth, which, sound as it was in his time, had long +ceased to have any real relation to the actuality of naval war. + +It was not till Anson's memorable administration that a scientific system +of rating was re-established and the fleet at last assumed the logical +constitution which it retained up to our own time. In the first two rates +appear the fleet flagship class, three-deckers of 100 and 90 guns +respectively. All smaller three-deckers are eliminated. In the next two +rates we have the rank and file of the battle-line, two-deckers of +increased size-namely, seventy-fours in the third rate, and sixty-fours in +the fourth. Here, however, is a slight break in the perfection of the +system, for the fourth rate also included 50-gun ships of two decks, which, +during the progress of the Seven Years' War, ceased to be regarded as +ships-of-the-line. War experience was eliminating small battleships, and +therewith it called for a type intermediate between battleships and +cruisers, with whose functions we shall have to deal directly. In practice +these units soon formed a rate by themselves, into which, by the same +tendency, 60-gun ships were destined to sink half a century later. + +But most pregnant of all Anson's reforms was the introduction of the true +cruiser, no longer a small battleship, but a vessel specialised for its +logical functions, and distinct in design both from the battle rates and +the flotilla. Both 40-gun and 20-gun types were abolished, and in their +place appear two cruiser rates, and the fifth consisting of 32-gun true +frigates, and the sixth of 28-gun frigates, both completely divorced from +any battle function. Finally, after a very distinct gap, came the unrated +sloops and smaller craft, which formed the flotilla for coastwise and +inshore work, despatch service, and kindred duties. + +The reforms of the great First Lord amounted in fact to a clearly +apprehended threefold constitution, in which the various groups were +frankly specialised in accordance with the functions each was expected to +perform. Specialisation, it will be observed, is the note of the process of +development. We have no longer an endeavour to adapt the fleet to its +multifarious duties by multiplying a comparatively weak nature of +fighting-ship, which could act in the line and yet be had in sufficient +numbers to protect commerce, but which was not well fitted for either +service. Instead we note a definite recognition of the principle that +battleships should be as powerful as possible, and that in order to permit +of their due development they must be relieved of their cruising functions +by a class of vessel specially adapted for the purpose. The question we +have to consider is, was this specialisation, which has asserted itself +down to our own times, in the true line of development? Was it, in fact, a +right expression of the needs which are indicated by the theory of naval +war? + +By the theory of naval war it must be reiterated we mean nothing but an +enunciation of the fundamental principles which underlie all naval war. +Those principles, if we have determined them correctly, should be found +giving shape not only to strategy and tactics, but also to material, +whatever method and means of naval warfare may be in use at any given time. +Conversely, if we find strategy, tactics, or organisation exhibiting a +tendency to reproduce the same forms under widely differing conditions of +method and material, we should be able to show that those forms bear a +constant and definite relation to the principles which our theory +endeavours to express. + +In the case of Anson's threefold organisation, the relation is not far to +seek, though it has become obscured by two maxims. The one is, that "the +command of the sea depends upon battleships," and the other, that "cruisers +are the eyes of the fleet." It is the inherent evil of maxims that they +tend to get stretched beyond their original meaning. Both of these express +a truth, but neither expresses the whole truth. On no theory of naval +warfare can we expect to command the sea with battleships, nor, on the +communication theory, can we regard the primary function of cruisers as +being to scout for a battle-fleet. It is perfectly true that the control +depends ultimately on the battle-fleet if control is disputed by a hostile +battle-fleet, as it usually is. It is also true that, so far as is +necessary to enable the battle-fleet to secure the control, we have to +furnish it with eyes from our cruiser force. But it does not follow that +this is the primary function of cruisers. The truth is, we have to withdraw +them from their primary function in order to do work for the battle-fleet +which it cannot do for itself. + +Well established as is the "Eyes of the fleet" maxim, it would be very +difficult to show that scouting was ever regarded as the primary function +of cruisers by the highest authorities. In Nelson's practice at least their +paramount function was to exercise the control which he was securing with +his battle-squadron. Nothing is more familiar in naval history than his +incessant cry from the Mediterranean for more cruisers, but the +significance of that cry has become obscured. It was not that his cruisers +were not numerous in proportion to his battleships--they were usually +nearly double in number--but it was rather that he was so deeply convinced +of their true function, that he used them to exercise control to an extent +which sometimes reduced his fleet cruisers below the limit of bare +necessity. The result on a memorable occasion was the escape of the enemy's +battle-fleet, but the further result is equally important. It was that the +escape of that fleet did not deprive him of the control which he was +charged to maintain. His judgment may have been at fault, but the +strategical distribution of his force was consistent throughout the whole +period of his Mediterranean command. Judged by his record, no man ever +grasped more clearly than Nelson that the object of naval warfare was to +control communications, and if he found that he had not a sufficient number +of cruisers to exercise that control and to furnish eyes for his +battle-fleet as well, it was the battle-fleet that was made to suffer, and +surely this is at least the logical view. Had the French been ready to risk +settling the question of the control in a fleet action, it would have been +different. He would then have been right to sacrifice the exercise of +control for the time in order to make sure that the action should take +place and end decisively in his favour. But he knew they were not ready to +take such a risk, and he refused to permit a purely defensive attitude on +the part of the enemy to delude him from the special function with which he +had been charged. + +If the object of naval warfare is to control communications, then the +fundamental requirement is the means of exercising that control. Logically, +therefore, if the enemy holds back from battle decision, we must relegate +the battle-fleet to a secondary position, for cruisers are the means of +exercising control; the battle-fleet is but the means of preventing their +being interfered with in their work. Put it to the test of actual practice. +In no case can we exercise control by battleships alone. Their +specialisation has rendered them unfit for the work, and has made them too +costly ever to be numerous enough. Even, therefore, if our enemy had no +battle-fleet we could not make control effective with battleships alone. We +should still require cruisers specialised for the work and in sufficient +numbers to cover the necessary ground. But the converse is not true. We +could exercise control with cruisers alone if the enemy had no battle-fleet +to interfere with them. + +If, then, we seek a formula that will express the practical results of our +theory, it would take some such shape as this. On cruisers depends our +exercise of control; on the battle-fleet depends the security of control. +That is the logical sequence of ideas, and it shows us that the current +maxim is really the conclusion of a logical argument in which the initial +steps must not be ignored. The maxim that the command of the sea depends on +the battle-fleet is then perfectly sound so long as it is taken to include +all the other facts on which it hangs. The true function of the +battle-fleet is to protect cruisers and flotilla at their special work. The +best means of doing this is of course to destroy the enemy's power of +interference. The doctrine of destroying the enemy's armed forces as the +paramount object here reasserts itself, and reasserts itself so strongly as +to permit for most practical purposes the rough generalisation that the +command depends upon the battle-fleet. + +Of what practical use then, it may be asked, is all this hairsplitting? Why +not leave untainted the conviction that our first and foremost business is +to crush the enemy's battle-fleet, and that to this end our whole effort +should be concentrated? The answer is to point to Nelson's dilemma. It was +a dilemma which, in the golden age of naval warfare, every admiral at sea +had had to solve for himself, and it was always one of the most difficult +details of every naval war plan. If we seek to ensure the effective action +of the battle-fleet by giving it a large proportion of cruisers, by so much +do we weaken the actual and continuous exercise of control. If we seek to +make that control effective by devoting to the service a large proportion +of cruisers, by so much do we prejudice our chance of getting contact with +and defeating the enemy's battle-fleet, which is the only means of +perfecting control. + +The correct solution of the dilemma will of course depend upon the +conditions of each case--mainly upon the relative strength and activity of +the hostile battle-fleet and our enemy's probable intentions. But no matter +how completely we have tabulated all the relevant facts, we can never hope +to come to a sound conclusion upon them without a just appreciation of all +the elements which go to give command, and without the power of gauging +their relative importance. This, and this alone, will ultimately settle the +vital question of what proportion of our cruiser force it is right to +devote to the battle-fleet. + +If the doctrine of cruiser control be correct, then every cruiser attached +to the battle-fleet is one withdrawn from its true function. Such +withdrawals are inevitable. A squadron of battleships is an imperfect +organism unable to do its work without cruiser assistance, and since the +performance of its work is essential to cruiser freedom, some cruisers must +be sacrificed. But in what proportion? If we confine ourselves to the view +that command depends on the battle-fleet, then we shall attach to it such a +number as its commander may deem necessary to make contact with the enemy +absolutely certain and to surround himself with an impenetrable screen. If +we knew the enemy was as anxious for a decision as ourselves, such a course +might be justified. But the normal condition is that if we desire a +decision it is because we have definite hopes of success, and consequently +the enemy will probably seek to avoid one on our terms. In practice this +means that if we have perfected our arrangements for the destruction of his +main fleet he will refuse to expose it till he sees a more favourable +opportunity. And what will be the result? He remains on the defensive, and +theoretically all the ensuing period of inaction tends to fall into his +scale. Without stirring from port his fleet is doing its work. The more +closely he induces us to concentrate our cruiser force in face of his +battle-fleet, the more he frees the sea for the circulation of his own +trade, and the more he exposes ours to cruiser raids. + +Experience, then, and theory alike dictate that as a general principle +cruisers should be regarded as primarily concerned with the active +occupation of communications, and that withdrawals for fleet purposes +should be reduced to the furthest margin of reasonable risk. What that +margin should be can only be decided on the circumstances of each case as +it arises, and by the personal characteristics of the officers who are +responsible. Nelson's practice was to reduce fleet cruisers lower than +perhaps any other commander. So small indeed was the margin of efficiency +he left, that in the campaign already cited, when his judgment was ripest, +one stroke of ill-luck--a chance betrayal of his position by a +neutral--availed to deprive him of the decision he sought, and to let the +enemy's fleet escape. + +We arrive, then, at this general conclusion. The object of naval warfare is +to control maritime communications. In order to exercise that control +effectively we must have a numerous class of vessels specially adapted for +pursuit. But their power of exercising control is in proportion to our +degree of command, that is, to our power of preventing their operations +being interfered with by the enemy. Their own power of resistance is in +inverse proportion to their power of exercising control; that is to say, +the more numerous and better adapted they are for preying on commerce and +transports, the weaker will be their individual fighting power. We cannot +give them as a whole the power of resisting disturbance without at the same +time reducing their power of exercising control. The accepted solution of +the difficulty during the great period of Anson's school was to provide +them with a covering force of battle units specially adapted for fighting. +But here arises a correlative difficulty. In so far as we give our battle +units fighting power we deny them scouting power, and scouting is essential +to their effective operation. The battle-fleet must have eyes. Now, vessels +adapted for control of communications are also well adapted for "eyes." It +becomes the practice, therefore, to withdraw from control operations a +sufficient number of units to enable the battle-fleet to cover effectively +the operations of those that remain. + +Such were the broad principles on which the inevitable dilemma always had +to be solved, and on which Anson's organisation was based. They flow +naturally from the communication theory of maritime war, and it was this +theory which then dominated naval thought, as is apparent from the +technical use of such phrases as "lines of passage and communication." The +war plans of the great strategists from Anson and Barham can always be +resolved into these simple elements, and where we find the Admiralty grip +of them loosened, we have the confusion and quite unnecessary failures of +the War of American Independence. In that mismanaged contest the cardinal +mistake was that we suffered the enemy's battle-fleets to get upon and +occupy the vital lines of "passage and communication" without first +bringing them to action, an error partly due to the unreadiness of a weak +administration, and partly to an insufficient allocation of cruisers to +secure contact at the right places. + +So far, then, the principles on which our naval supremacy was built up are +clear. For the enemies with whom we had to deal Anson's system was +admirably conceived. Both Spain and France held the communication theory so +strongly, that they were content to count as success the power of +continually disturbing our control without any real attempt to secure it +for themselves. To defeat such a policy Anson's constitution and the +strategy it connoted were thoroughly well adapted and easy to work. But it +by no means follows that his doctrine is the last word. Even in his own +time complications had begun to develop which tended to confuse the +precision of his system. By the culminating year of Trafalgar there were +indications that it was getting worn out, while the new methods and +material used by the Americans in 1812 made a serious rent in it. The +disturbances then inaugurated have continued to develop, and it is +necessary to consider how seriously they have confused the problem of fleet +constitution. + +Firstly, there is the general recognition, always patent to ourselves, that +by far the most drastic, economical, and effective way of securing control +is to destroy the enemy's means of interfering with it. In our own service +this "overthrow" idea always tended to assert itself so strongly, that +occasionally the means became for a time more important than the end; that +is to say, circumstances were such that on occasions it was considered +advisable to sacrifice the exercise of control for a time in order quickly +and permanently to deprive the enemy of all means of interference. When +there was reasonable hope of the enemy risking a decision this +consideration tended to override all others; but when, as in Nelson's case +in the Mediterranean, the hope was small, the exercise of control tended to +take the paramount place. + +The second complexity arose from the fact that however strong might be our +battleship cover, it is impossible for it absolutely to secure cruiser +control from disturbance by sporadic attack. Isolated heavy ships, taking +advantage of the chances of the sea, could elude even the strictest +blockade, and one such ship, if she succeeded in getting upon a line of +communication, might paralyse the operations of a number of weaker units. +They must either run or concentrate, and in either case the control was +broken. If it were a squadron of heavy ships that caused the disturbance, +the practice was to detach against it a division of the covering +battle-fleet. But it was obviously highly inconvenient and contrary to the +whole idea on which the constitution of the fleet was based to allow every +slight danger to cruiser control to loosen the cohesion of the main fleet. + +It was necessary, then, to give cruiser lines some power of resistance. +This necessity once admitted, there seemed no point at which you could stop +increasing the fighting power of your cruisers, and sooner or later, unless +some means of checking the process were found, the distinction between +cruisers and battleships would practically disappear. Such a means was +found in what may be called the "Intermediate" ship. Frigates did indeed +continue to increase in size and fighting power throughout the remainder of +the sailing era, but it was not only in this manner that the power of +resistance was gained. The evil results of the movement were checked by the +introduction of a supporting ship, midway between frigates and true +ships-of-the-line. Sometimes classed as a battleship, and taking her place +in the line, the 50-gun ship came to be essentially a type for stiffening +cruiser squadrons. They most commonly appear as the flagships of cruiser +commodores, or stationed in terminal waters or at focal points where +sporadic raids were likely to fall and be most destructive. The strategical +effect of the presence of such a vessel in a cruiser line was to give the +whole line in some degree the strength of the intermediate ship; for any +hostile cruiser endeavouring to disturb the line was liable to have to deal +with the supporting ship, while if a frigate and a 50-gun ship got together +they were a match even for a small ship-of-the-line. + +In sailing days, of course, this power of the supporting ship was weak +owing to the imperfection of the means of distant communication between +ships at sea and the non-existence of such means beyond extreme range of +vision. But as wireless telegraphy develops it is not unreasonable to +expect that the strategic value of the supporting or intermediate ship will +be found greater than it ever was in sailing days, and that for dealing +with sporadic disturbance the tendency will be for a cruiser line to +approximate more and more in power of resistance to that of its strongest +unit. + +For fleet service a cruiser's power of resistance was hardly less valuable; +for though we speak of fleet cruisers as the eyes of the fleet, their +purpose is almost equally to blindfold the enemy. Their duty is not only to +disclose the movements of the enemy, but also to act as a screen to conceal +our own. The point was specially well marked in the blockades, where the +old 50-gun ships are almost always found with the inshore cruiser squadron, +preventing that squadron being forced by inquisitive frigates. Important as +this power of resistance in the screen was in the old days, it is tenfold +more important now, and the consequent difficulty of keeping cruisers +distinct from battleships is greater than ever. The reason for this is best +considered under the third and most serious cause of complexity. + +The third cause is the acquisition by the flotilla of battle power. It is a +feature of naval warfare that is entirely new.[10] For all practical +purposes it was unknown until the full development of the mobile torpedo. +It is true that the fireship as originally conceived was regarded as having +something of the same power. During the Dutch wars--the heyday of its +vogue--its assigned power was on some occasions actually realised, as in +the burning of Lord Sandwich's flagship at the battle of Solebay, and the +destruction of the Spanish-Dutch fleet at Palermo by Duquesne. But as the +"nimbleness" of great-ships increased with the ripening of seamanship and +naval architecture, the fireship as a battle weapon became almost +negligible, while a fleet at anchor was found to be thoroughly defensible +by its own picket-boats. Towards the middle of the eighteenth century +indeed the occasions on which the fireship could be used for its special +purpose was regarded as highly exceptional, and though the type was +retained till the end of the century, its normal functions differed not at +all from those of the rest of the flotilla of which it then formed part. + + [10] But not without analogous precedent. In the later Middle Ages small + craft were assigned the function in battle of trying to wedge up the + rudders of great ships or bore holes between wind and water. See Fighting + Instructions (Navy Record Society), p. 13. + +Those functions, as we have seen, expressed the cruising idea in its purest +sense. It was numbers and mobility that determined flotilla types rather +than armament or capacity for sea-endurance. Their primary purpose was to +control communications in home and colonial waters against weakly armed +privateers. The type which these duties determined fitted them adequately +for the secondary purpose of inshore and despatch work with a fleet. It +was, moreover, on the ubiquity which their numbers gave them, and on their +power of dealing with unarmed or lightly armed vessels, that we relied for +our first line of defence against invasion. These latter duties were of +course exceptional, and the Navy List did not carry as a rule sufficient +numbers for the purpose. But a special value of the class was that it was +capable of rapid and almost indefinite expansion from the mercantile +marine. Anything that could carry a gun had its use, and during the period +of the Napoleonic threat the defence flotilla rose all told to considerably +over a thousand units. + +Formidable and effective as was a flotilla of this type for the ends it was +designed to serve, it obviously in no way affected the security of a +battle-fleet. But so soon as the flotilla acquired battle power the whole +situation was changed, and the old principles of cruiser design and +distribution were torn to shreds. The battle-fleet became a more imperfect +organism than ever. Formerly it was only its offensive power that required +supplementing. The new condition meant that unaided it could no longer +ensure its own defence. It now required screening, not only from +observation, but also from flotilla attack. The theoretical weakness of an +arrested offensive received a practical and concrete illustration to a +degree that war had scarcely ever known. Our most dearly cherished +strategical traditions were shaken to the bottom. The "proper place" for +our battle-fleet had always been "on the enemy's coasts," and now that was +precisely where the enemy would be best pleased to see it. What was to be +done? So splendid a tradition could not lightly be laid aside, but the +attempt to preserve it involved us still deeper in heresy. The vital, most +difficult, and most absorbing problem has become not how to increase the +power of a battle-fleet for attack, which is a comparatively simple matter, +but how to defend it. As the offensive power of the flotilla developed, the +problem pressed with an almost bewildering intensity. With every increase +in the speed and sea-keeping power of torpedo craft, the problem of the +screen grew more exacting. To keep the hostile flotilla out of night range +the screen must be flung out wider and wider, and this meant more and more +cruisers withdrawn from their primary function. And not only this. The +screen must not only be far flung, but it must be made as far as possible +impenetrable. In other words, its own power of resistance must be increased +all along the line. Whole squadrons of armoured cruisers had to be attached +to battle-fleets to support the weaker members of the screen. The crying +need for this type of ship set up a rapid movement for increasing their +fighting power, and with it fell with equal rapidity the economic +possibility of giving the cruiser class its essential attribute of numbers. + +As an inevitable result we find ourselves involved in an effort to restore +to the flotilla some of its old cruiser capacity, by endowing it with gun +armament, higher sea-keeping power, and facilities for distant +communication, all at the cost of specialisation and of greater economic +strain. Still judged by past experience, some means of increasing numbers +in the cruising types is essential, nor is it clear how it is possible to +secure that essential in the ranks of the true cruiser. No point has been +found at which it was possible to stop the tendency of this class of vessel +to increase in size and cost, or to recall it to the strategical position +it used to occupy. So insecure is the battle-squadron, so imperfect as a +self-contained weapon has it become, that its need has overridden the old +order of things, and the primary function of the cruising ship inclines to +be no longer the exercise of control under cover of the battle-fleet. The +battle-fleet now demands protection by the cruising ship, and what the +battle-fleet needs is held to be the first necessity. + +Judged by the old naval practice, it is an anomalous position to have +reached. But the whole naval art has suffered a revolution beyond all +previous experience, and it is possible the old practice is no longer a +safe guide. Driven by the same necessities, every naval Power is following +the same course. It may be right, it may be wrong; no one at least but the +ignorant or hasty will venture to pass categorical judgment. The best we +can do is to endeavour to realise the situation to which, in spite of all +misgivings, we have been forced, and to determine its relations to the +developments of the past. + +It is undoubtedly a difficult task. As we have seen, there have prevailed +in the constitution of fleets at various times several methods of +expressing the necessities of naval war. The present system differs from +them all. On the one hand, we have the fact that the latest developments of +cruiser power have finally obliterated all logical distinction between +cruisers and battleships, and we thus find ourselves hand in hand with the +fleet constitution of the old Dutch wars. On the other, however, we have +armoured cruisers organised in squadrons and attached to battle-fleets not +only for strategical purposes, but also with as yet undeveloped tactical +functions in battle. Here we come close to the latest development of the +sailing era, when "Advanced" or "Light" squadrons began to appear in the +organisation of battle-fleets. + +The system arose towards the end of the eighteenth century in the +Mediterranean, where the conditions of control called for so wide a +dispersal of cruisers and so great a number of them, that it was almost +imperative for a battle-squadron in that sea to do much of its own +scouting. It was certainly for this purpose that the fastest and lightest +ships-of-the-line were formed into a separate unit, and the first +designation it received was that of "Observation Squadron." It remained for +Nelson to endeavour to endow it with a tactical function, but his idea was +never realised either by himself or any of his successors. + +Side by side with this new element in the organisation of a battle-fleet, +which perhaps is best designated as a "Light Division," we have another +significant fact. Not only was it not always composed entirely of +ships-of-the-line, especially in the French service, but in 1805, the year +of the full development, we have Sir Richard Strachan using the heavy +frigates attached to his battle-squadron as a "Light Division," and giving +them a definite tactical function. The collapse of the French Navy put a +stop to further developments of either idea. Whither they would have led we +cannot tell. But it is impossible to shut our eyes to the indication of a +growing tendency towards the system that exists at present. It is difficult +at least to ignore the fact that both Nelson and Strachan in that +culminating year found the actuality of war calling for something for which +there was then no provision in the constitution of the fleet, but which it +does contain to-day. What Nelson felt for was a battleship of cruiser +speed. What Strachan desired was a cruiser fit to take a tactical part in a +fleet action. We have them both, but with what result? Anson's +specialisation of types has almost disappeared, and our present fleet +constitution is scarcely to be distinguished from that of the seventeenth +century. We retain the three-fold nomenclature, but the system itself has +really gone. Battleships grade into armoured cruisers, armoured cruisers +into protected cruisers. We can scarcely detect any real distinction except +a twofold one between vessels whose primary armament is the gun and vessels +whose primary armament is the torpedo. But even here the existence of a +type of cruiser designed to act with flotillas blurs the outline, while, as +we have seen, the larger units of the flotilla are grading up to cruiser +level. + +We are thus face to face with a situation which has its closest counterpart +in the structureless fleets of the seventeenth century. That naval thought +should have so nearly retraced its steps in the course of two centuries is +curious enough, but it is still more striking when we consider how widely +the underlying causes differ in each case. The pressure which has forced +the present situation is due most obviously to two causes. One is the +excessive development of the "intermediate" ship originally devised for +purposes of commerce protection, and dictated by a menace which the +experience of the American War had taught us to respect. The other is the +introduction of the torpedo, and the consequent vulnerability of +battle-squadrons that are not securely screened. Nothing of the kind had +any influence on the fleet constitution of the seventeenth century. But if +we seek deeper, there is a less obvious consideration which for what it is +worth is too striking to be ignored. + +It has been suggested above that the constitution of fleets appears to have +some more or less recognisable relation to the prevalent theory of war. +Now, amongst all our uncertainty we can assert with confidence that the +theory which holds the field at the present day bears the closest possible +resemblance to that which dominated the soldier-admirals of the Dutch war. +It was the "Overthrow" theory, the firm faith in the decisive action as the +key of all strategical problems. They carried it to sea with them from the +battlefields of the New Model Army, and the Dutch met them squarely. In the +first war at least their commerce had to give place to the exigencies of +throwing into the battle everything that could affect the issue. It is not +of course pretended that this attitude was dictated by any clearly +conceived theory of absolute war. It was due rather to the fact that, owing +to the relative geographical conditions, all attempts to guard trade +communications were useless without the command of the home waters in the +North Sea, and the truth received a clinching moral emphasis from the +British claim to the actual dominion of the Narrow Seas. It was, in fact, a +war which resembled rather the continental conditions of territorial +conquest than the naval procedure that characterised our rivalry with +France. + +Is it then possible, however much we may resist the conclusion in loyalty +to the eighteenth-century tradition, that the rise of a new naval Power in +the room of Holland must bring us back to the drastic, if crude, methods of +the Dutch wars, and force us to tread under foot the nicer ingenuity of +Anson's system? Is it this which has tempted us to mistrust any type of +vessel which cannot be flung into the battle? The recurrence of a +formidable rival in the North Sea was certainly not the first cause of the +reaction. It began before that menace arose. Still it has undoubtedly +forced the pace, and even if it be not a cause, it may well be a +justification. + + * * * * * + + CHAPTER THREE + + * * * * * + + THEORY OF THE METHOD-- + CONCENTRATION AND DISPERSAL OF FORCE + + * * * * * + +From the point of view of the method by which its ends are obtained, +strategy is often described as the art of assembling the utmost force at +the right time and place; and this method is called "Concentration." + +At first sight the term seems simple and expressive enough, but on analysis +it will be found to include several distinct ideas, to all of which the +term is applied indifferently. The result is a source of some confusion, +even to the most lucid writers. "The word concentration," says one of the +most recent of them, "evokes the idea of a grouping of forces. We believe, +in fact, that we cannot make war without grouping ships into squadrons and +squadrons into fleets."[11] Here in one sentence the word hovers between +the formation of fleets and their strategical distribution. Similar +looseness will embarrass the student at every turn. At one time he will +find the word used to express the antithesis of division or dispersal of +force; at another, to express strategic deployment, which implies division +to a greater or less extent. He will find it used of the process of +assembling a force, as well as of the state of a force when the process is +complete. The truth is that the term, which is one of the most common and +most necessary in strategical discussion, has never acquired a very precise +meaning, and this lack of precision is one of the commonest causes of +conflicting opinion and questionable judgments. No strategical term indeed +calls more urgently for a clear determination of the ideas for which it +stands. + + [11] Daveluy, _L'Esprit de la Guerre Navale_, vol. i, p. 27, note. + +Military phraseology, from which the word is taken, employs "concentration" +in three senses. It is used for assembling the units of an army after they +have been mobilised. In this sense, concentration is mainly an +administrative process; logically, it means the complement of the process +of mobilisation, whereby the army realises its war organisation and becomes +ready to take the field. In a second sense it is used for the process of +moving the army when formed, or in process of formation, to the localities +from which operations can best begin. This is a true strategical stage, and +it culminates in what is known as strategic deployment. Finally, it is used +for the ultimate stage when the army so deployed is closed up upon a +definite line of operations in immediate readiness for tactical +deployment--gathered up, that is, to deal a concentrated blow. + +Well as this terminology appears to serve on land, where the processes tend +to overlap, something more exact is required if we try to extend it to the +sea. Such extension magnifies the error at every step, and clear thinking +becomes difficult. Even if we set aside the first meaning, that is, the +final stage of mobilisation, we have still to deal with the two others +which, in a great measure, are mutually contradictory. The essential +distinction of strategic deployment, which contemplates dispersal with a +view to a choice of combinations, is flexibility and free movement. The +characteristic of an army massed for a blow is rigidity and restricted +mobility. In the one sense of concentration we contemplate a disposal of +force which will conceal our intention from the enemy and will permit us to +adapt our movements to the plan of operations he develops. In the other, +strategic concealment is at an end. We have made our choice, and are +committed to a definite operation. Clearly, then, if we would apply the +principles of land concentration to naval warfare it is desirable to settle +which of the two phases of an operation we mean by the term. + +Which meaning, then, is most closely connected with the ordinary use of the +word? The dictionaries define concentration as "the state of being brought +to a common point or centre," and this coincides very exactly with the +stage of a war plan which intervenes between the completion of mobilisation +and the final massing or deployment for battle. It is an incomplete and +continuing act. Its ultimate consequence is the mass. It is a method of +securing mass at the right time and place. As we have seen, the essence of +the state of strategic deployment to which it leads is flexibility. In war +the choice of time and place will always be influenced by the enemy's +dispositions and movements, or by our desire to deal him an unexpected +blow. The merit of concentration, then, in this sense, is its power of +permitting us to form our mass in time at one of the greatest number of +different points where mass may be required. + +It is for this stage that the more recent text-books incline to specialise +concentration--qualifying it as "strategic concentration." But even that +term scarcely meets the case, for the succeeding process of gathering up +the army into a position for tactical deployment is also a strategical +concentration. Some further specialisation is required. The analytical +difference between the two processes is that the first is an operation of +major strategy and the other of minor, and if they are to be fully +expressed, we have to weight ourselves with the terms "major and minor +strategic concentration." + +Such cumbrous terminology is too forbidding to use. It serves only to mark +that the middle stage differs logically from the third as much as it does +from the first. In practice it comes to this. If we are going to use +concentration in its natural sense, we must regard it as something that +comes after complete mobilisation and stops short of the formation of mass. + +In naval warfare at least this distinction between concentration and mass +is essential to clear appreciation. It leads us to conclusions that are of +the first importance. For instance, when once the mass is formed, +concealment and flexibility are at an end. The further, therefore, from the +formation of the ultimate mass we can stop the process of concentration the +better designed it will be. The less we are committed to any particular +mass, and the less we indicate what and where our mass is to be, the more +formidable our concentration. To concentration, therefore, the idea of +division is as essential as the idea of connection. It is this view of the +process which, at least for naval warfare, a weighty critical authority has +most strongly emphasised. "Such," he says, "is concentration reasonably +understood--not huddled together like a drove of sheep, but distributed +with a regard to a common purpose, and linked together by the effectual +energy of a single will."[12] Vessels in a state of concentration he +compares to a fan that opens and shuts. In this view concentration connotes +not a homogeneous body, but a compound organism controlled from a common +centre, and elastic enough to permit it to cover a wide field without +sacrificing the mutual support of its parts. + + [12] Mahan, _War of 1812_, i, 316. + +If, then, we exclude the meaning of mere assembling and the meaning of the +mass, we have left a signification which expresses coherent disposal about +a strategical centre, and this it will be seen gives for naval warfare just +the working definition that we want as the counterpart of strategic +deployment on land. The object of a naval concentration like that of +strategic deployment will be to cover the widest possible area, and to +preserve at the same time elastic cohesion, so as to secure rapid +condensations of any two or more of the parts of the organism, and in any +part of the area to be covered, at the will of the controlling mind; and +above all, a sure and rapid condensation of the whole at the strategical +centre. + +Concentration of this nature, moreover, will be the expression of a war +plan which, while solidly based on an ultimate central mass, still +preserves the faculty of delivering or meeting minor attacks in any +direction. It will permit us to exercise control of the sea while we await +and work for the opportunity of a decision which shall permanently secure +control, and it will permit this without prejudicing our ability of +bringing the utmost force to bear when the moment for the decision arrives. +Concentration, in fact, implies a continual conflict between cohesion and +reach, and for practical purposes it is the right adjustment of those two +tensions--ever shifting in force--which constitutes the greater part of +practical strategy. + +In naval warfare this concentration stage has a peculiar significance in +the development of a campaign, and at sea it is more clearly detached than +ashore. Owing to the vast size of modern armies, and the restricted nature +of their lines of movement, no less than their lower intrinsic mobility as +compared with fleets, the processes of assembly, concentration, and forming +the battle mass tend to grade into one another without any demarcation of +practical value. An army frequently reaches the stage of strategic +deployment direct from the mobilisation bases of its units, and on famous +occasions its only real concentration has taken place on the battlefield. +In Continental warfare, then, there is less difficulty in using the term to +cover all three processes. Their tendency is always to overlap. But at sea, +where communications are free and unrestricted by obstacles, and where +mobility is high, they are susceptible of sharper differentiation. The +normal course is for a fleet to assemble at a naval port; thence by a +distinct movement it proceeds to the strategical centre and reaches out in +divisions as required. The concentration about that centre may be very far +from a mass, and the final formation of the mass will bear no resemblance +to either of the previous movements, and will be quite distinct. + +But free as a fleet is from the special fetters of an army, there always +exist at sea peculiar conditions of friction which clog its freedom of +disposition. One source of this friction is commerce protection. However +much our war plan may press for close concentration, the need of commerce +protection will always be calling for dispersal. The other source is the +peculiar freedom and secrecy of movements at sea. As the sea knows no roads +to limit or indicate our own lines of operation, so it tells little about +those of the enemy. The most distant and widely dispersed points must be +kept in view as possible objectives of the enemy. When we add to this that +two or more fleets can act in conjunction from widely separated bases with +far greater certainty than is possible for armies, it is obvious that the +variety of combinations is much higher at sea than on land, and variety of +combination is in constant opposition to the central mass. + +It follows that so long as the enemy's fleet is divided, and thereby +retains various possibilities of either concentrated or sporadic action, +our distribution will be dictated by the need of being able to deal with a +variety of combinations and to protect a variety of objectives. Our +concentrations must therefore be kept as open and flexible as possible. +History accordingly shows us that the riper and fresher our experience and +the surer our grip of war, the looser were our concentrations. The idea of +massing, as a virtue in itself, is bred in peace and not in war. It +indicates the debilitating idea that in war we must seek rather to avoid +than to inflict defeat. True, advocates of the mass entrench themselves in +the plausible conception that their aim is to inflict crushing defeats. But +this too is an idea of peace. War has proved to the hilt that victories +have not only to be won, but worked for. They must be worked for by bold +strategical combinations, which as a rule entail at least apparent +dispersal. They can only be achieved by taking risks, and the greatest and +most effective of these is division. + +The effect of prolonged peace has been to make "concentration" a kind of +shibboleth, so that the division of a fleet tends almost to be regarded as +a sure mark of bad leadership. Critics have come to lose sight of the old +war experience, that without division no strategical combinations are +possible. In truth they must be founded on division. Division is bad only +when it is pushed beyond the limits of well-knit deployment. It is +theoretically wrong to place a section of the fleet in such a position that +it may be prevented from falling back on its strategical centre when it is +encountered by a superior force. Such retreats of course can never be made +certain; they will always depend in some measure on the skill and resource +of the opposing commanders, and on the chances of weather: but risks must +be taken. If we risk nothing, we shall seldom perform anything. The great +leader is the man who can measure rightly to what breadth of deployment he +can stretch his concentration. This power of bold and sure adjustment +between cohesion and reach is indeed a supreme test of that judgment which +in the conduct of war takes the place of strategical theory. + +In British naval history examples of faulty division are hard to find. The +case most commonly cited is an early one. It occurred in 1666 during the +second Dutch war. Monk and Rupert were in command of the main fleet, which +from its mobilisation bases in the Thames and at Spithead had concentrated +in the Downs. There they were awaiting De Ruyter's putting to sea in a +position from which they could deal with him whether his object was an +attack on the Thames or to join hands with the French. In this position a +rumour reached them that the Toulon squadron was on its way to the Channel +to co-operate with the Dutch. Upon this false intelligence the fleet was +divided, and Rupert went back to Portsmouth to cover that position in case +it might be the French objective. De Ruyter at once put to sea with a fleet +greatly superior to Monk's division. Monk, however, taking advantage of +thick weather that had supervened, surprised him at anchor, and believing +he had a sufficient tactical advantage attacked him impetuously. Meanwhile +the real situation became known. There was no French fleet, and Rupert was +recalled. He succeeded in rejoining Monk after his action with De Ruyter +had lasted three days. In the course of it Monk had been very severely +handled and forced to retreat to the Thames, and it was generally believed +that it was only the belated arrival of Rupert that saved us from a real +disaster. + +The strategy in this case is usually condemned out of hand and made to bear +the entire blame of the reverse. Monk, who as a soldier had proved himself +one of the finest strategists of the time, is held to have blundered from +sheer ignorance of elementary principles. It is assumed that he should have +kept his fleet massed; but his critics fail to observe that at least in the +opinion of the time this would not have met the case. Had he kept the whole +to deal with De Ruyter, it is probable that De Ruyter would not have put to +sea, and it is certain Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight would have lain +open to the French had they come. If he had moved his mass to deal with the +French, he would have exposed the Thames to De Ruyter. It was a situation +that could not be solved by a simple application of what the French call +the _masse centrale_. The only way to secure both places from attack was to +divide the fleet, just as in 1801 Nelson in the same theatre was compelled +to divide his defence force. In neither case was division a fault, because +it was a necessity. The fault in Monk's and Rupert's case was that they +extended their reach with no proper provision to preserve cohesion. Close +cruiser connection should have been maintained between the two divisions, +and Monk should not have engaged deeply till he felt Rupert at his elbow. +This we are told was the opinion of most of his flag-officers. They held +that he should not have fought when he did. His correct course, on +Kempenfelt's principle, would have been to hang on De Ruyter so as to +prevent his doing anything, and to have slowly fallen back, drawing the +Dutch after him till his loosened concentration was closed up again. If De +Ruyter had refused to follow him through the Straits, there would have been +plenty of time to mass the fleet. If De Ruyter had followed, he could have +been fought in a position from which there would have been no escape. The +fault, in fact, was not strategical, but rather one of tactical judgment. +Monk over-estimated the advantage of his surprise and the relative fighting +values of the two fleets, and believed he saw his way to victory +single-handed. The danger of division is being surprised and forced to +fight in inferiority. This was not Monk's case. He was not surprised, and +he could easily have avoided action had he so desired. To judge such a case +simply by using concentration as a touchstone can only tend to set up such +questionable habits of thought as have condemned the more famous division +which occurred in the crisis of the campaign of 1805, and with which we +must deal later. + +Apart from the general danger of using either words or maxims in this way, +it is obviously specially unwise in the case of concentration and division. +The current rule is that it is bad to divide unless you have a great +superiority; yet there have been numerous occasions when, being at war with +an inferior enemy, we have found our chief embarrassment in the fact that +he kept his fleet divided, and was able thereby to set up something like a +deadlock. The main object of our naval operations would then be to break it +down. To force an inferior enemy to concentrate is indeed the almost +necessary preliminary to securing one of those crushing victories at which +we must always aim, but which so seldom are obtained. It is by forcing the +enemy to attempt to concentrate that we get our opportunity by sagacious +dispersal of crushing his divisions in detail. It is by inducing him to +mass that we simplify our problem and compel him to choose between leaving +to us the exercise of command and putting it to the decision of a great +action. + +Advocates of close concentration will reply that that is true enough. We do +often seek to force our enemy to concentrate, but that does not show that +concentration is sometimes a disadvantage, for we ourselves must +concentrate closely to force a similar concentration on the enemy. The +maxim, indeed, has become current that concentration begets concentration, +but it is not too much to say that it is a maxim which history flatly +contradicts. If the enemy is willing to hazard all on a battle, it is true. +But if we are too superior, or our concentration too well arranged for him +to hope for victory, then our concentration has almost always had the +effect of forcing him to disperse for sporadic action. So certain was this +result, that in our old wars, in which we were usually superior, we always +adopted the loosest possible concentrations in order to prevent sporadic +action. True, the tendency of the French to adopt this mode of warfare is +usually set down to some constitutional ineptitude that is outside +strategical theory, but this view is due rather to the irritation which the +method caused us, than to sober reasoning. For a comparatively weak +belligerent sporadic action was better than nothing, and the only other +alternative was for him to play into our hands by hazarding the decision +which it was our paramount interest to obtain. Sporadic action alone could +never give our enemy command of the sea, but it could do us injury and +embarrass our plans, and there was always hope it might so much loosen our +concentration as to give him a fair chance of obtaining a series of +successful minor decisions. + +Take, now, the leading case of 1805. In that campaign our distribution was +very wide, and was based on several concentrations. The first had its +centre in the Downs, and extended not only athwart the invading army's line +of passage, but also over the whole North Sea, so as to prevent +interference with our trade or our system of coast defence either from the +Dutch in the Texel or from French squadrons arriving north-about. The +second, which was known as the Western Squadron, had its centre off Ushant, +and was spread over the whole Bay of Biscay by means of advanced squadrons +before Ferrol and Rochefort. With a further squadron off the coast of +Ireland, it was able also to reach far out into the Atlantic in order to +receive our trade. It kept guard, in fact, not only over the French naval +ports, but over the approaches to the Channel, where were the home +terminals of the great southern and western trade-routes. A third +concentration was in the Mediterranean, whose centre under Nelson was at +Sardinia. It had outlying sub-centres at Malta and Gibraltar, and covered +the whole ground from Cape St. Vincent outside the Straits to Toulon, +Trieste, and the Dardanelles. When war broke out with Spain in 1804, it was +considered advisable to divide this command, and Spanish waters outside the +Straits were held by a fourth concentration, whose centre was off Cadiz, +and whose northern limit was Cape Finisterre, where it joined the Ushant +concentration. For reasons which were personal rather than strategical this +arrangement was not continued long, nor indeed after a few months was there +the same need for it, for the Toulon squadron had changed its base to +Cadiz. By this comprehensive system the whole of the European seas were +controlled both for military and trade purposes. In the distant terminal +areas, like the East and West Indies, there were nucleus concentrations +with the necessary connective machinery permanently established, and to +render them effective, provision was made by which the various European +squadrons could throw off detachments to bring up their force to any +strength which the movements of the enemy might render necessary. + +Wide as was this distribution, and great as its reach, a high degree of +cohesion was maintained not only between the parts of each concentration, +but between the several concentrations themselves. By means of a minor +cruiser centre at the Channel Islands, the Downs and Ushant concentrations +could rapidly cohere. Similarly the Cadiz concentration was linked up with +that of Ushant at Finisterre, and but for personal friction and repulsion, +the cohesion between the Mediterranean and Cadiz concentrations would have +been equally strong. Finally, there was a masterly provision made for all +the concentrations to condense into one great mass at the crucial point off +Ushant before by any calculable chance a hostile mass could gather there. + +For Napoleon's best admirals, "who knew the craft of the sea," the British +fleet thus disposed was in a state of concentration that nothing but a +stroke of luck beyond the limit of sober calculation could break. Decrès +and Bruix had no doubt of it, and the knowledge overpowered Villeneuve when +the crisis came. After he had carried the concentration which Napoleon had +planned so far as to have united three divisions in Ferrol, he knew that +the outlying sections of our Western Squadron had disappeared from before +Ferrol and Rochefort. In his eyes, as well as those of the British +Admiralty, this squadron, in spite of its dispersal in the Bay of Biscay, +had always been in a state of concentration. It was not this which caused +his heart to fail. It was the news that Nelson had reappeared at Gibraltar, +and had been seen steering northward. It meant for him that the whole of +his enemy's European fleet was in a state of concentration. "Their +concentration of force," he afterwards wrote, "was at the moment more +serious than in any previous disposition, and such that they were in a +position to meet in superiority the combined forces of Brest and Ferrol," +and for that reason, he explained, he had given up the game as lost. But to +Napoleon's unpractised eye it was impossible to see what it was he had to +deal with. Measuring the elasticity of the British naval distribution by +the comparatively cumbrous and restricted mobility of armies, he saw it as +a rash and unwarlike dispersal. Its looseness seemed to indicate so great a +tenderness for the distant objectives that lay open to his scattered +squadrons, that he believed by a show of sporadic action he could further +disperse our fleet, and then by a close concentration crush the essential +part in detail. It was a clear case of the enemy's dispersal forcing us to +adopt the loosest concentration, and of our comparative dispersal tempting +the enemy to concentrate and hazard a decision. It cannot be said we forced +the fatal move upon him intentionally. It was rather the operation of +strategical law set in motion by our bold distribution. We were determined +that his threat of invasion, formidable as it was, should not force upon us +so close a concentration as to leave our widespread interests open to his +attack. Neither can it be said that our first aim was to prevent his +attempting to concentrate. Every one of his naval ports was watched by a +squadron, but it was recognised that this would not prevent concentration. +The escape of one division might well break the chain. But that +consideration made no difference. The distribution of our squadrons before +his naval ports was essential for preventing sporadic action. Their +distribution was dictated sufficiently by the defence of commerce and of +colonial and allied territory, by our need, that is, to exercise a general +command even if we could not destroy the enemy's force. + +The whole of Nelson's correspondence for this period shows that his main +object was the protection of our Mediterranean trade and of Neapolitan and +Turkish territory. When Villeneuve escaped him, his irritation was caused +not by the prospect of a French concentration, which had no anxieties for +him, for he knew counter-concentrations were provided for. It was caused +rather by his having lost the opportunity which the attempt to concentrate +had placed within his reach. He followed Villeneuve to the West Indies, not +to prevent concentration, but, firstly, to protect the local trade and +Jamaica, and secondly, in hope of another chance of dealing the blow he had +missed. Lord Barham took precisely the same view. When on news of +Villeneuve's return from the West Indies he moved out the three divisions +of the Western Squadron, that is, the Ushant concentration, to meet him, he +expressly stated, not that his object was to prevent concentration, but +that it was to deter the French from attempting sporadic action. "The +interception of the fleet in question," he wrote, "on its return to Europe +would be a greater object than any I know. It would damp all future +expeditions, and would show to Europe that it might be advisable to relax +in the blockading system occasionally for the express purpose of putting +them in our hands at a convenient opportunity." + +Indeed we had no reason for preventing the enemy's concentration. It was +our best chance of solving effectually the situation we have to confront. +Our true policy was to secure permanent command by a great naval decision. +So long as the enemy remained divided, no such decision could be expected. +It was not, in fact, till he attempted his concentration, and its last +stage had been reached, that the situation was in our hands. The intricate +problem with which we had been struggling was simplified down to closing up +our own concentration to the strategical centre off Ushant. But at the last +stage the enemy could not face the formidable position we held. His +concentration was stopped. Villeneuve fell back on Cadiz, and the problem +began to assume for us something of its former intricacy. So long as we +held the mass off Ushant which our great concentration had produced, we +were safe from invasion. But that was not enough. It left the seas open to +sporadic action from Spanish ports. There were convoys from the East and +West Indies at hand, and there was our expedition in the Mediterranean in +jeopardy, and another on the point of sailing from Cork. Neither Barham at +the Admiralty nor Cornwallis in command off Ushant hesitated an hour. By a +simultaneous induction they both decided the mass must be divided. The +concentration must be opened out again, and it was done. Napoleon called +the move an _insigne betise_, but it was the move that beat him, and must +have beaten him, whatever the skill of his admirals, for the two squadrons +never lost touch. He found himself caught in a situation from which there +was nothing to hope. His fleet was neither concentrated for a decisive blow +nor spread for sporadic action. He had merely simplified his enemy's +problem. Our hold was surer than ever, and in a desperate attempt to +extricate himself he was forced to expose his fleet to the final decision +we required. + +The whole campaign serves well to show what was understood by concentration +at the end of the great naval wars. To Lord Barham and the able admirals +who interpreted his plans it meant the possibility of massing at the right +time and place. It meant, in close analogy to strategic deployment on land, +the disposal of squadrons about a strategical centre from which fleets +could condense for massed action in any required direction, and upon which +they could fall back when unduly pressed. In this case the ultimate centre +was the narrows of the Channel, where Napoleon's army lay ready to cross, +but there was no massing there. So crude a distribution would have meant a +purely defensive attitude. It would have meant waiting to be struck instead +of seeking to strike, and such an attitude was arch-heresy to our old +masters of war. + +So far we have only considered concentration as applied to wars in which we +have a preponderance of naval force, but the principles are at least +equally valid when a coalition places us in inferiority. The leading case +is the home campaign of 1782. It was strictly on defensive lines. Our +information was that France and Spain intended to end the war with a great +combined effort against our West Indian islands, and particularly Jamaica. +It was recognised that the way to meet the threat was to concentrate for +offensive action in the Caribbean Sea everything that was not absolutely +needed for home defence. Instead, therefore, of trying to be strong enough +to attempt the offensive in both areas, it was decided to make sure of the +area that was most critical. To do this the home fleet had to be reduced so +low relatively to what the enemy had in European waters that offence was +out of the question. + +While Rodney took the offensive area, Lord Howe was given the other. His +task was to prevent the coalition obtaining such a command of home waters +as would place our trade and coasts at their mercy, and it was not likely +to prove a light one. We knew that the enemy's plan was to combine their +attack on the West Indies with an attempt to control the North Sea, and +possibly the Straits of Dover, with a Dutch squadron of twelve to fifteen +of the line, while a combined Franco-Spanish fleet of at least forty sail +would occupy the mouth of the Channel. It was also possible that these two +forces would endeavour to form a junction. In any case the object of the +joint operations would be to paralyse our trade and annoy our coasts, and +thereby force us to neglect the West Indian area and the two Spanish +objectives, Minorca and Gibraltar. All told we had only about thirty of the +line on the home station, and though a large proportion of these were +three-deckers, a good many could not be ready for sea till the summer. + +Inferior as was the available force, there was no thought of a purely +passive defence. It would not meet the case. Something must be done to +interfere with the offensive operations of the allies in the West Indies +and against Gibraltar, or they would attain the object of their home +campaign. It was resolved to effect this by minor counterstrokes on their +line of communications to the utmost limit of our defensive reach. It would +mean a considerable stretch of our concentration, but we were determined to +do what we could to prevent reinforcements from reaching the West Indies +from Brest, to intercept French trade as occasion offered, and, finally, at +almost any risk to relieve Gibraltar. + +In these conditions the defensive concentration was based on a central mass +or reserve at Spithead, a squadron in the Downs to watch the Texel for the +safety of the North Sea trade, and another to the westward to watch Brest +and interrupt its transatlantic communications. Kempenfelt in command of +the latter squadron had just shown what could be done by his great exploit +of capturing Guichen's convoy of military and naval stores for the West +Indies. Early in the spring he was relieved by Barrington, who sailed on +April 5th to resume the Ushant position. His instructions were not to fight +a superior enemy unless in favourable circumstances, but to retire on +Spithead. He was away three weeks, and returned with a French East India +convoy with troops and stores, and two of the ships of-the-line which +formed its escort. + +Up to this time there had been no immediate sign of the great movement from +the south. The Franco-Spanish fleet which had assembled at Cadiz was +occupied ineffectually in trying to stop small reliefs reaching Gibraltar +and in covering their own homeward-bound trade. The Dutch, however, were +becoming active, and the season was approaching for our Baltic trade to +come home. Ross in the North Sea had but four of the line to watch the +Texel, and was in no position to deal with the danger. Accordingly early in +May the weight of the home concentration was thrown into the North Sea. On +the 10th Howe sailed with Barrington and the bulk of the fleet to join Ross +in the Downs, while Kempenfelt again took the Ushant position. Only about +half the Brest Squadron had gone down to join the Spaniards at Cadiz, and +he was told his first duty was to intercept the rest if it put to sea, but, +as in Barrington's instructions, if he met a superior squadron he was to +retire up Channel under the English coast and join hands with Howe. In +spite of the fact that influenza was now raging in the fleet, he succeeded +in holding the French inactive. Howe with the same difficulty to face was +equally successful. The Dutch had put to sea, but returned immediately they +knew of his movement, and cruising off the Texel, he held them there, and +kept complete command of the North Sea till our Baltic trade was safe home. + +By the end of May it was done, and as our intelligence indicated that the +great movement from Cadiz was at last about to begin, Howe, to whom a +certain discretion had been left, decided it was time to shift the weight +to his other wing and close on Kempenfelt. The Government, however, seemed +to think that he ought to be able to use his position for offensive +operations against Dutch trade, but in the admiral's opinion this was to +lose hold of the design and sacrifice cohesion too much to reach. He +informed them that he had not deemed it advisable to make detachments from +his squadron against the trade, "not knowing how suddenly there might be a +call, for the greater part of it at least, to the westward." In accordance, +therefore, with his general instructions he left with Ross a strong +squadron of nine of the line, sufficient to hold in check, and even "to +take and destroy," the comparatively weak ships of the Dutch, and with the +rest returned to the westward.[13] His intention was to proceed with all +possible expedition to join Kempenfelt on the coast of France, but this, +owing to the ravages of the influenza, he was unable to do. Kempenfelt was +forced to come in, and on June 5th the junction was made at Spithead. + + [13] The Dutch were believed to have sixteen of the line--one + seventy-four, seven sixty-eights, and the rest under sixty guns. In + Ross's squadron were one three-decker and two eighties. + +For three weeks, so severe was the epidemic, they could not move. Then came +news that the Cadiz fleet under Langara had sailed the day Howe had reached +Spithead, and he resolved to make a dash with every ship fit to put to sea +to cut it off from Brest. He was too late. Before he could get into +position the junction between Langara and the Brest squadron was made, and +in their full force the allies had occupied the mouth of the Channel. With +the addition of the Brest ships the combined fleet numbered forty of the +line, while all Howe could muster was twenty-two, but amongst them were +seven three-deckers and three eighties, and he would soon be reinforced. +Three of Ross's smallest ships were recalled, and five others were nearly +ready, but for these Howe could not wait. The homeward-bound Jamaica convoy +was at hand, and at all hazards it must be saved. + +What was to be done? So soon as he sighted the enemy he realised that a +successful action was out of the question. Early in the morning of July +12th, "being fifteen leagues S.S.E. from Scilly," Langara with thirty-six +of the line was seen to the westward. "As soon," wrote Howe, "as their +force had been ascertained, I thought proper to avoid coming to battle with +them as then circumstanced, and therefore steered to the north to pass +between Scilly and the Land's End. My purpose therein was to get to the +westward of the enemy, both for protecting the Jamaica convoy and to gain +the advantage of situation for bringing them to action which the difference +in our numbers renders desirable." + +By a most brilliant effort of seamanship the dangerous movement was +effected safely that night, and it proved an entire success. Till Howe was +met with and defeated, the allies would not venture into the Channel, and +his unprecedented feat had effectually thrown them off. Assuming apparently +that he must have passed round their rear to seaward, they sought him to +the southward, and there for a month beat up and down in ineffective +search. Meanwhile Howe, sending his cruisers ahead to the convoy's +rendezvous off the south-west coast of Iceland, had taken his whole fleet +about two hundred miles west of the Skelligs to meet it. Northerly winds +prevented his reaching the right latitude in time, but it mattered little. +The convoy passed in between him and the south of Ireland, and as the enemy +had taken a cast down to Ushant, it was able to enter the Channel in safety +without sighting an enemy's sail. Ignorant of what had happened, Howe +cruised for a week practising the ships "in connected movements so +particularly necessary on the present occasion." Then with his fleet in +fine condition to carry out preventive tactics in accordance with +Kempenfelt's well-known exposition,[14] he returned to seek the enemy to +the eastward, in order to try to draw them from their station at Scilly and +open the Channel. On his way he learnt the convoy had passed in, and with +this anxiety off his mind he bore up for the Lizard, where his +reinforcements were awaiting him. There he found the Channel was free. From +lack of supplies the enemy had been forced to retire to port, and he +returned to Spithead to make preparations for the relief of Gibraltar. +While this work was going on, the North Sea squadron was again strengthened +that it might resume the blockade of the Texel and cover the arrival of the +autumn convoys from the Baltic. It was done with complete success. Not a +single ship fell into the enemy's hands, and the campaign, and indeed the +war, ended by Howe taking the mass of his force down to Gibraltar and +performing his remarkable feat of relieving it in the face of the Spanish +squadron. For the power and reach of a well-designed concentration there +can be no finer example. + + [14] See post, pp. 222-24. + +If, now, we seek from the above and similar examples for principles to +serve as a guide between concentration and division we shall find, firstly, +this one. The degree of division we shall require is in proportion to the +number of naval ports from which the enemy can act against our maritime +interests and to the extent of coastline along which they are spread. It is +a principle which springs from the soul of our old tradition that we must +always seek, not merely to prevent the enemy striking at our heart, but +also to strike him the moment he attempts to do anything. We must make of +his every attempt an opportunity for a counterstroke. The distribution this +aim entailed varied greatly with different enemies. In our wars with +France, and particularly when Spain and Holland were in alliance with her, +the number of the ports to be dealt with was very considerable and their +distribution very wide. In our wars with the Dutch alone, on the other +hand, the number and distribution were comparatively small, and in this +case our concentration was always close. + +This measure of distribution, however, will never stand alone. +Concentration will not depend solely upon the number and position of the +enemy's naval ports. It will be modified by the extent to which the lines +of operation starting from those ports traverse our own home waters. The +reason is plain. Whatever the enemy opposed to us, and whatever the nature +of the war, we must always keep a fleet at home. In any circumstances it is +essential for the defence of our home trade terminals, and it is essential +as a central reserve from which divisions can be thrown off to reinforce +distant terminals and to seize opportunities for counterstrokes. It is "the +mainspring," as Lord Barham put it, "from which all offensive operations +must proceed." This squadron, then, being permanent and fixed as the +foundation of our whole system, it is clear that if, as in the case of the +French wars, the enemy's lines of operation do not traverse our home +waters, close concentration upon it will not serve our turn. If, on the +other hand, as in the case of the Dutch wars, the lines do traverse home +waters, a home concentration is all that is required. Our division will +then be measured by the amount of our surplus strength, and by the extent +to which we feel able to detach squadrons for offensive action against the +enemy's distant maritime interests without prejudicing our hold on the home +terminals of his lines of operation and our power of striking directly he +moves. These remarks apply, of course, to the main fleet operations. If +such an enemy has distant colonial bases from which he can annoy our trade, +minor concentrations must naturally be arranged in those areas. + +Next we have to note that where the enemy's squadrons are widely +distributed in numerous bases, we cannot always simplify the problem by +leaving some of them open so as to entice him to concentrate and reduce the +number of ports to be watched. For if we do this, we leave the unwatched +squadrons free for sporadic action. Unless we are sure he intends to +concentrate with a view to a decisive action, our only means of simplifying +the situation is to watch every port closely enough to interfere +effectually with sporadic action. Then, sporadic action being denied him, +the enemy must either do nothing or concentrate. + +The next principle is flexibility. Concentration should be so arranged that +any two parts may freely cohere, and that all parts may quickly condense +into a mass at any point in the area of concentration. The object of +holding back from forming the mass is to deny the enemy knowledge of our +actual distribution or its intention at any given moment, and at the same +time to ensure that it will be adjusted to meet any dangerous movement that +is open to him. Further than this our aim should be not merely to prevent +any part being overpowered by a superior force, but to regard every +detached squadron as a trap to lure the enemy to destruction. The ideal +concentration, in short, is an appearance of weakness that covers a reality +of strength. + + * * * * * + + PART THREE + + CONDUCT OF NAVAL WAR + + * * * * * + + CHAPTER ONE + + INTRODUCTORY + + * * * * * + +I. INHERENT DIFFERENCES IN THE +CONDITIONS OF WAR ON LAND AND ON SEA + +Before attempting to apply the foregoing general principles in a definite +manner to the conduct of naval war, it is necessary to clear the ground of +certain obstacles to right judgment. The gradual elucidation of the theory +of war, it must be remembered, has been almost entirely the work of +soldiers, but so admirable is the work they have done, and so philosophical +the method they have adopted, that a very natural tendency has arisen to +assume that their broad-based conclusions are of universal application. +That the leading lines which they have charted are in a certain sense those +which must govern all strategy no one will deny. They are the real +pioneers, and their methods must be in the main our methods, but what we +have to remember is that the country we have to travel is radically +different from that in which they acquired their skill. + +A moment's consideration will reveal how far-reaching the differences are. +Let us ask ourselves what are the main ideas around which all the military +lore turns. It may be taken broadly that the general principles are three +in number. Firstly, there is the idea of concentration of force, that is, +the idea of overthrowing the enemy's main strength by bringing to bear upon +it the utmost accumulation of weight and energy within your means; +secondly, there is the idea that strategy is mainly a question of definite +lines of communication; and thirdly, there is the idea of concentration of +effort, which means keeping a single eye on the force you wish to overthrow +without regard to ulterior objects. Now if we examine the conditions which +give these principles so firm a footing on land, we shall find that in all +three cases they differ at sea, and differ materially. + +Take the first, which, in spite of all the deductions we have to make from +it in the case of limited wars, is the dominating one. The pithy maxim +which expresses its essence is that our primary objective is the enemy's +main force. In current naval literature the maxim is applied to the sea in +some such form as this: "The primary object of our battle-fleet is to seek +out and destroy that of the enemy." On the surface nothing could look +sounder, but what are the conditions which underlie the one and the other? + +The practical value of the military maxim is based upon the fact that in +land warfare it is always theoretically possible to strike at your enemy's +army, that is, if you have the strength and spirit to overcome the +obstacles and face the risks. But at sea this is not so. In naval warfare +we have a far-reaching fact which is entirely unknown on land. It is simply +this--that it is possible for your enemy to remove his fleet from the board +altogether. He may withdraw it into a defended port, where it is absolutely +out of your reach without the assistance of an army. No amount of naval +force, and no amount of offensive spirit, can avail you. The result is that +in naval warfare an embarrassing dilemma tends to assert itself. If you are +in a superiority that justifies a vigorous offensive and prompts you to +seek out your enemy with a view to a decision, the chances are you will +find him in a position where you cannot touch him. Your offence is +arrested, and you find yourself in what, at least theoretically, is the +weakest general position known to war. + +This was one of our earliest discoveries in strategy. It followed indeed +immediately and inevitably upon our discovery that the most drastic way of +making war was to concentrate every effort on the enemy's armed forces. In +dealing with the theory of war in general a caveat has already been entered +against the too common assumption that this method was an invention of +Napoleon's or Frederick's, or that it was a foreign importation at all. In +the view at least of our own military historians the idea was born in our +Civil Wars with Cromwell and the New Model Army. It was the conspicuous +feature that distinguished our Civil War from all previous wars of modern +times. So astonishing was its success--as foreign observers remarked--that +it was naturally applied by our soldier-admirals at sea so soon as war +broke out with the Dutch. Whatever may be the claims of the Cromwellian +soldiers to have invented for land warfare what is regarded abroad as the +chief characteristic of the Napoleonic method, it is beyond doubt that they +deserve the credit of it at sea. All three Dutch wars had a commercial +object, and yet after the first campaign the general idea never was to make +the enemy's commerce a primary objective. That place was occupied +throughout by their battle-fleets, and under Monk and Rupert at least those +objectives were pursued with a singleness of purpose and a persistent +vehemence that was entirely Napoleonic. + +But in the later stages of the struggle, when we began to gain a +preponderance, it was found that the method ceased to work. The attempt to +seek the enemy with a view to a decisive action was again and again +frustrated by his retiring to his own coasts, where either we could not +reach him or his facilities for retreat made a decisive result impossible. +He assumed, in fact, a defensive attitude with which we were powerless to +deal, and in the true spirit of defence he sprang out from time to time to +deal us a counterstroke as he saw his opportunity. + +It was soon perceived that the only way of dealing with this attitude was +to adopt some means of forcing the enemy to sea and compelling him to +expose himself to the decision we sought. The most cogent means at hand was +to threaten his commerce. Instead, therefore, of attempting to seek out his +fleet directly, our own would sit upon the fairway of his homeward-bound +trade, either on the Dogger Bank or elsewhere, thereby setting up a +situation which it was hoped would cost him either his trade or his +battle-fleet, or possibly both. Thus in spite of the fact that with our +increasing preponderance our preoccupation with the idea of battle decision +had become stronger than ever, we found ourselves forced to fall back upon +subsidiary operations of an ulterior strategical character. It is a curious +paradox, but it is one that seems inherent in the special feature of naval +war, which permits the armed force to be removed from the board altogether. + +The second distinguishing characteristic of naval warfare which relates to +the communication idea is not so well marked, but it is scarcely less +important. It will be recalled that this characteristic is concerned with +lines of communication in so far as they tend to determine lines of +operation. It is a simple question of roads and obstacles. In land warfare +we can determine with some precision the limits and direction of our +enemy's possible movements. We know that they must be determined mainly by +roads and obstacles. But afloat neither roads nor obstacles exist. There is +nothing of the kind on the face of the sea to assist us in locating him and +determining his movements. True it is that in sailing days his movements +were to some extent limited by prevailing winds and by the elimination of +impossible courses, but with steam even these determinants have gone, and +there is practically nothing to limit the freedom of his movement except +the exigencies of fuel. Consequently in seeking to strike our enemy the +liability to miss him is much greater at sea than on land, and the chances +of being eluded by the enemy whom we are seeking to bring to battle become +so serious a check upon our offensive action as to compel us to handle the +maxim of "Seeking out the enemy's fleet" with caution. + +The difficulty obtruded itself from the moment the idea was born. It may be +traced back--so far at least as modern warfare is concerned--to Sir Francis +Drake's famous appreciation in the year of the Armada. This memorable +despatch was written when an acute difference of opinion had arisen as to +whether it were better to hold our fleet back in home waters or to send it +forward to the coast of Spain. The enemy's objective was very uncertain. We +could not tell whether the blow was to fall in the Channel or Ireland or +Scotland, and the situation was complicated by a Spanish army of invasion +ready to cross from the Flemish coast, and the possibility of combined +action by the Guises from France. Drake was for solving the problem by +taking station off the Armada's port of departure, and fully aware of the +risk such a move entailed, he fortified his purely strategical reasons with +moral considerations of the highest moment. But the Government was +unconvinced, not as is usually assumed out of sheer pusillanimity and lack +of strategical insight, but because the chances of Drake's missing contact +were too great if the Armada should sail before our own fleet could get +into position. + +Our third elementary principle is the idea of concentration of effort, and +the third characteristic of naval warfare which clashes with it is that +over and above the duty of winning battles, fleets are charged with the +duty of protecting commerce. In land warfare, at least since laying waste +an undefended part of your enemy's country ceased to be a recognised +strategical operation, there is no corresponding deflection of purely +military operations. It is idle for purists to tell us that the deflection +of commerce protection should not be permitted to turn us from our main +purpose. We have to do with the hard facts of war, and experience tells us +that for economic reasons alone, apart from the pressure of public opinion, +no one has ever found it possible to ignore the deflection entirely. So +vital indeed is financial vigour in war, that more often than not the +maintenance of the flow of trade has been felt as a paramount +consideration. Even in the best days of our Dutch wars, when the whole plan +was based on ignoring the enemy's commerce as an objective, we found +ourselves at times forced to protect our own trade with seriously +disturbing results. + +Nor is it more profitable to declare that the only sound way to protect +your commerce is to destroy the enemy's fleet. As an enunciation of a +principle it is a truism--no one would dispute it. As a canon of practical +strategy, it is untrue; for here our first deflection again asserts itself. +What are you to do if the enemy refuses to permit you to destroy his +fleets? You cannot leave your trade exposed to squadronal or cruiser raids +while you await your opportunity, and the more you concentrate your force +and efforts to secure the desired decision, the more you will expose your +trade to sporadic attack. The result is that you are not always free to +adopt the plan which is best calculated to bring your enemy to a decision. +You may find yourself compelled to occupy, not the best positions, but +those which will give a fair chance of getting contact in favourable +conditions, and at the same time afford reasonable cover for your trade. +Hence the maxim that the enemy's coast should be our frontier. It is not a +purely military maxim like that for seeking out the enemy's fleet, though +the two are often used as though they were interchangeable. Our usual +positions on the enemy's coast were dictated quite as much by the +exigencies of commerce protection as by primary strategical reasons. To +maintain a rigorous watch close off the enemy's ports was never the +likeliest way to bring him to decisive action--we have Nelson's well-known +declaration on the point--but it was the best way, and often the only way, +to keep the sea clear for the passage of our own trade and for the +operations of our cruisers against that of the enemy. + +For the present these all-important points need not be elaborated further. +As we proceed to deal with the methods of naval warfare they will gather +force and lucidity. Enough has been said to mark the shoals and warn us +that, admirably constructed as is the craft which the military strategists +have provided for our use, we must be careful with our navigation. + +But before proceeding further it is necessary to simplify what lies before +us by endeavouring to group the complex variety of naval operations into +manageable shape. + +II. TYPICAL FORMS OF NAVAL OPERATIONS + +In the conduct of naval war all operations will be found to relate to two +broad classes of object. The one is to obtain or dispute the command of the +sea, and the other to exercise such control of communications as we have, +whether the complete command has been secured or not. + +It was on the logical and practical distinction between these two kinds of +naval object, as we have seen, that the constitution of fleets was based in +the fulness of the sailing period, when maritime wars were nearly incessant +and were shaping the existing distribution of power in the world. During +that period at any rate the dual conception lay at the root of naval +methods and naval policy, and as it is also the logical outcome of the +theory of war, we may safely take it as the basis of our analysis of the +conduct of naval operations. + +Practically, of course, we can seldom assert categorically that any +operation of war has but one clearly defined object. A battle-squadron +whose primary function was to secure command was often so placed as to +enable it to exercise control; and, _vice versa_, cruiser lines intended +primarily to exercise control upon the trade routes were regarded as +outposts of the battle-fleet to give it warning of the movements of hostile +squadrons. Thus Cornwallis during his blockade of Brest had sometimes to +loosen his hold in order to cover the arrival of convoys against raiding +squadrons; and thus also when Nelson was asked by Lord Barham for his views +on cruiser patrol lines, he expressed himself as follows: "Ships on this +service would not only prevent the depredations of privateers, but be in +the way to watch any squadron of the enemy should they pass on their +track.... Therefore intelligence will be quickly conveyed, and the enemy +never, I think, lost sight of."[15] Instructions in this sense were issued +by Lord Barham to the commodores concerned. In both cases, it will be seen, +the two classes of operation overlapped. Still for purposes of analysis the +distinction holds good, and is valuable for obtaining a clear view of the +field. + + [15] Nelson to Barham, 29 August 1805. + +Take, first, the methods of securing command, by which we mean putting it +out of the enemy's power to use effectually the common communications or +materially to interfere with our use of them. We find the means employed +were two: decision by battle, and blockade. Of the two, the first was the +less frequently attainable, but it was the one the British service always +preferred. It was only natural that it should be so, seeing that our normal +position was one of preponderance over our enemy, and so long as the policy +of preponderance is maintained, the chances are the preference will also be +maintained. + +But further than this, the idea seems to be rooted in the oldest traditions +of the Royal Navy. As we have seen, the conviction of the sea service that +war is primarily a question of battles, and that battles once joined on +anything like equal terms must be pressed to the last gasp, is one that has +had nothing to learn from more recent continental discoveries. The +Cromwellian admirals handed down to us the memory of battles lasting three, +and even four, days. Their creed is enshrined in the robust article of war +under which Byng and Calder were condemned; and in the apotheosis of Nelson +the service has deified the battle idea. + +It is true there were periods when the idea seemed to have lost its colour, +but nevertheless it is so firmly embedded in the British conception of +naval warfare, that there would be nothing left to say but for the +unavoidable modification with which we have to temper the doctrine of +overthrow. "Use that means," said its best-known advocate, "when you can +and when you must." Devoutly as we may hold the battle faith, it is not +always possible or wise to act upon it. If we are strong, we press to the +issue of battle when we can. If we are weak, we do not accept the issue +unless we must. If circumstances are advantageous to us, we are not always +able to effect a decision; and if they are disadvantageous, we are not +always obliged to fight. Hence we find the apparently simple doctrine of +the battle was almost always entangled in two of the most difficult +problems that beset our old admirals. The most thorny questions they had to +decide were these. In the normal case of strength, it was not how to defeat +the enemy, but how to bring him to action; and in casual cases of temporary +weakness, it was not how to sell your life dearly, but how to maintain the +fleet actively on the defensive so as at once to deny the enemy the +decision he sought and to prevent his attaining his ulterior object. + +From these considerations it follows that we are able to group all naval +operations in some such way as this. Firstly, on the only assumption we can +permit ourselves, namely, that we start with a preponderance of force or +advantage, we adopt methods for securing command. These methods, again, +fall under two heads. Firstly, there are operations for securing a decision +by battle, under which head, as has been explained, we shall be chiefly +concerned with methods of bringing an unwilling enemy to action, and with +the value to that end of the maxim of "Seeking out the enemy's fleet." +Secondly, there are the operations which become necessary when no decision +is obtainable and our war plan demands the immediate control of +communications. Under this head it will be convenient to treat all forms of +blockade, whether military or commercial, although, as we shall see, +certain forms of military, and even commercial, blockade are primarily +concerned with forcing the enemy to a decision. + +Our second main group covers operations to which we have to resort when our +relative strength is not adequate for either class of operations to secure +command. In these conditions we have to content ourselves with endeavouring +to hold the command in dispute; that is, we endeavour by active defensive +operations to prevent the enemy either securing or exercising control for +the objects he has in view. Such are the operations which are connoted by +the true conception of "A fleet in being." Under this head also should fall +those new forms of minor counter-attack which have entered the field of +strategy since the introduction of the mobile torpedo and offensive mining. + +In the third main group we have to deal with the methods of exercising +control of passage and communication. These operations vary in character +according to the several purposes for which the control is desired, and +they will be found to take one of three general forms. Firstly, the control +of the lines of passage of an invading army; secondly, the control of trade +routes and trade terminals for the attack and defence of commerce; and +thirdly, the control of passage and communication for our own oversea +expeditions, and the control of their objective area for the active support +of their operations. + +For clearness we may summarise the whole in tabulated analysis, thus:-- + + 1. Methods of securing command: + (a) By obtaining a decision. + (b) By blockade. + 2. Methods of disputing command: + (a) Principle of "the fleet in being." + (b) Minor counter-attacks. + 3. Methods of exercising command: + (a) Defence against invasion. + (b) Attack and defence of commerce. + (c) Attack, defence, and support of military expeditions. + + * * * * * + + CHAPTER TWO + + METHODS OF SECURING COMMAND + + * * * * * + +I. ON OBTAINING A DECISION + +Whatever the nature of the war in which we are engaged, whether it be +limited or unlimited, permanent and general command of the sea is the +condition of ultimate success. The only way of securing such a command by +naval means is to obtain a decision by battle against the enemy's fleet. +Sooner or later it must be done, and the sooner the better. That was the +old British creed. It is still our creed, and needs no labouring. No one +will dispute it, no one will care even to discuss it, and we pass with +confidence to the conclusion that the first business of our fleet is to +seek out the enemy's fleet and destroy it. + +No maxim can so well embody the British spirit of making war upon the sea, +and nothing must be permitted to breathe on that spirit. To examine its +claim to be the logical conclusion of our theory of war will even be held +dangerous, yet nothing is so dangerous in the study of war as to permit +maxims to become a substitute for judgment. Let us examine its credentials, +and as a first step put it to the test of the two most modern instances. + +Both of them, it must be noted, were instances of Limited War, the most +usual form of our own activities, and indeed the only one to which our war +organisation, with its essential preponderance of the naval element, has +ever been really adapted. The first instance is the Spanish-American War, +and the second that between Russia and Japan. + +In the former case the Americans took up arms in order to liberate Cuba +from Spanish domination--a strictly limited object. There is no evidence +that the nature of the war was ever clearly formulated by either side, but +in just conformity with the general political conditions the American war +plan aimed at opening with a movement to secure the territorial object. At +the earliest possible moment they intended to establish themselves in the +west of Cuba in support of the Colonial insurgents. Everything depended on +the initiative being seized with decision and rapidity. Its moral and +physical importance justified the utmost risk, and such was the +conformation of the sea which the American army had to pass, that a +strictly defensive or covering attitude with their fleet could reduce the +risk almost to security. Yet so unwisely dominated were the Americans by +recently rediscovered maxims, that when on the eve of executing the vital +movement they heard a Spanish squadron was crossing the Atlantic, their own +covering force was diverted from its defensive position and sent away to +"seek out the enemy's fleet and destroy it." + +Puerto Rico was the most obvious point at which to seek it, and thither +Admiral Sampson was permitted to go, regardless of the elementary truth +that in such cases what is obvious to you is also usually obvious to your +enemy. The result was that not only did the Americans fail to get contact, +but they also uncovered their own army's line of passage and paralysed the +initial movement. In the end it was only pure chance that permitted them to +retrieve the mistake they had made. Had the Spanish squadron put into a +Cuban port in railway communication with the main Royalist army, such as +Cienfuegos or Havana, instead of hurrying into Santiago, the whole campaign +must have been lost. "It appears now," wrote Admiral Mahan, in his _Lessons +of the War with Spain_, "not only that the eastward voyage of our Havana +division was unfortunate, but it should have been seen beforehand to be a +mistake, because inconsistent with a well and generally accepted principle +of war, the non-observance of which was not commanded by the conditions. +The principle is that which condemns eccentric movements. By the disregard +of rule in this case we uncovered both Havana and Cienfuegos, which it was +our object to close to the enemy's division." + +Whether or not we regard Admiral Mahan's exposition of the error as +penetrating to the real principle that was violated, the movement was in +fact not only eccentric, but unnecessary. Had the Americans been content to +keep their fleet concentrated in its true defensive position, not only +would they have covered their army's line of passage and their blockade of +the territorial objective, but they would have had a far better chance of +bringing the Spaniards to action. The Spaniards were bound to come to them +or remain outside the theatre of operations where they could in no way +affect the issue of the war except adversely to themselves by sapping the +spirit of their own Cuban garrison. It is a clear case of the letter +killing the spirit, of an attractive maxim being permitted to shut the door +upon judgment. Strategical offence in this case was not the best defence. +"Seeking out the enemy's fleet" was almost bound to end in a blow in the +air, which not only would fail to gain any offensive result, but would +sacrifice the main defensive plank in the American war plan upon which +their offensive relied for success. To stigmatise such a movement as merely +eccentric is to pass very lenient censure. + +In the Russo-Japanese War we have a converse case, in which judgment kept +the aphorism silent. It is true that during the earlier stage of the naval +operations the Japanese did in a sense seek out the enemy's fleet, in so +far as they advanced their base close to Port Arthur; but this was done, +not with any fixed intention of destroying the Russian fleet--there was +small hope of that at sea--but rather because by no other means could they +cover the army's lines of passage, which it was the function of the fleet +to secure, the true offensive operations being on land. Never except once, +under express orders from Tokio, did either Admiral Togo or Admiral +Kamimura press offensive movements in such a way as to jeopardise the +preventive duty with which the war plan charged them. Still less in the +later stage, when everything depended on the destruction of the Baltic +fleet, did Admiral Togo "seek it out." He was content, as the Americans +should have been content, to have set up such a situation that the enemy +must come and break it down if they were to affect the issue of the war. So +he waited on the defensive, assured his enemy must come to him, and thereby +he rendered it, as certain as war can be, that when the moment for the +tactical offensive came his blow should be sure and sudden, in overwhelming +strength of concentration, and decisive beyond all precedent. + +Clearly, then, the maxim of "seeking out" for all its moral exhilaration, +for all its value as an expression of high and sound naval spirit, must not +be permitted to displace well-reasoned judgment. Trusty servant as it is, +it will make a bad master, as the Americans found to their serious +jeopardy. Yet we feel instinctively that it expresses, as no other aphorism +does, the secret of British success at sea. We cannot do without it; we +cannot do with it in its nakedness. Let us endeavour to clothe it with its +real meaning, with the true principles that it connotes. Let us endeavour +to determine the stuff that it is made of, and for this purpose there is no +better way than to trace its gradual growth from the days when it was born +of the crude and virile instinct of the earliest masters. + +The germ is to be found in the despatch already mentioned which Drake wrote +from Plymouth at the end of March in 1588. His arguments were not purely +naval, for it was a combined problem, a problem of defence against +invasion, that had to be solved. What he wished to persuade the Government +was, that the kernel of the situation was not so much Parma's army of +invasion in Flanders, as the fleet that was preparing in Spain to clear its +passage. The Government appeared to be acting on the opposite view. Howard +with the bulk of the fleet was at the base in the Medway within supporting +distance of the light squadron that was blockading the Flemish ports in +concert with the Dutch. Drake himself with another light squadron had been +sent to the westward with some indeterminate idea of his serving as an +observation squadron, or being used in the mediaeval fashion for an +eccentric counterstroke. Being invited to give his opinion on this +disposition, he pronounced it vicious. In his eyes, what was demanded was +an offensive movement against the enemy's main fleet. "If there may be such +a stay or stop made," he urged, "by any means of this fleet in Spain, so +that they may not come through the seas as conquerors, then shall the +Prince of Parma have such a check thereby as were meet." What he had in his +mind is clearly not so much a decision in the open as an interruption of +the enemy's incomplete mobilisation, such as he had so brilliantly effected +the previous year. For later on he says that "Next under God's mighty +protection the advantage of time and place will be the only and chief means +for our good, wherein I most humbly beseech your good lordships to +persevere as you have begun, for with fifty sail of shipping we shall do +more upon their own coast than a great many more will do here at home; and +the sooner we are gone, the better we shall be able to impeach them." He +does not say "destroy." "Impeach" meant "to prevent." + +Clearly, then, what he had in his mind was a repetition of the previous +year's strategy, whereby he had been able to break up the Spanish +mobilisation and "impeach" the Armada from sailing. He did not even ask for +a concentration of the whole fleet for the purpose, but only that his own +squadron should be reinforced as was thought convenient. The actual reasons +he gave for his advice were purely moral--that is, he dwelt on the +enheartening effect of striking the first blow, and attacking instead of +waiting to be attacked. The nation, he urged, "will be persuaded that the +Lord will put into Her Majesty and her people courage and boldness not to +fear invasion, but to seek God's enemies and Her Majesty's where they may +be found." + +Here is the germ of the maxim. The consequence of his despatch was a +summons to attend the Council. The conference was followed, not by the half +measure, which was all he had ventured to advise in his despatch, but by +something that embodied a fuller expression of his general idea, and +closely resembled what was to be consecrated as our regular disposition in +such cases. The whole of the main fleet, except the squadron watching the +Flemish coast, was massed to the westward to cover the blockade of Parma's +transports, but the position assigned to it was inside the Channel instead +of outside, which tactically was bad, for it was almost certain to give the +Armada the weather gage. No movement to the coast of Spain was +permitted--not necessarily, be it remembered, out of pusillanimity or +failure to grasp Drake's idea, but for fear that, as in the recent American +case, a forward movement was likely to result in a blow in the air, and to +uncover the vital position without bringing the enemy to action. + +When, however, the sailing of the Armada was so long delayed Drake's +importunity was renewed, with that of Howard and all his colleagues to back +it. It brought eventually the desired permission. The fleet sailed for +Coruña, where it was known the Armada, after an abortive start from Lisbon, +had been driven by bad weather, and something like what the Government +feared happened. Before it could reach its destination it met southerly +gales, its offensive power was exhausted, and it had to return to Plymouth +impotent for immediate action as the Armada finally sailed. When the +Spaniards appeared it was still in port refitting and victualling. It was +only by an unprecedented feat of seamanship that the situation was saved, +and Howard was able to gain the orthodox position to seaward of his enemy. + +So far, then, the Government's cautious clinging to a general defensive +attitude, instead of seeking out the enemy's fleet, was justified, but it +must be remembered that Drake from the first had insisted it was a question +of time as well as place. If he had been permitted to make the movement +when he first proposed it, there is good reason to believe that the final +stages of the Spanish mobilisation could not have been carried out that +year; that is to say, the various divisions of the Armada could not have +been assembled into a fleet. But information as to its condition was at the +time very uncertain, and in view of the negotiations that were on foot, +there were, moreover, high political reasons for our not taking too drastic +an offensive if a reasonable alternative existed. + +The principles, then, which we distil from this, the original case of +"seeking out," are, firstly, the moral value of seizing the initiative, +and, secondly, the importance of striking before the enemy's mobilisation +is complete. The idea of overthrow by a great fleet action is not present, +unless we find it in a not clearly formulated idea of the Elizabethan +admirals of striking a fleet when it is demoralised, as the Armada was by +its first rebuff, or immediately on its leaving port before it had settled +down. + +In our next naval struggle with the Dutch in the latter half of the +seventeenth century the principle of overthrow, as we have seen, became +fully developed. It was the keynote of the strategy which was evolved, and +the conditions which forced it to recognition also emphasised the +principles of seeking out and destroying. It was a case of a purely naval +struggle, in which there were no military considerations to deflect naval +strategy. It was, moreover, a question of narrow seas, and the risk of +missing contact which had cramped the Elizabethans in their oceanic theatre +was a negligible factor. Yet fresh objections to using the "seeking out" +maxim as a strategical panacea soon declared themselves. + +The first war opened without any trace of the new principle. The first +campaign was concerned in the old fashion entirely with the attack and +defence of trade, and such indecisive actions as occurred were merely +incidental to the process. No one appears to have realised the fallacy of +such method except, perhaps, Tromp. The general instructions he received +were that "the first and principal object was to do all possible harm to +the English," and to that end "he was given a fleet in order to sail to the +damage and offence of the English fleet, and also to give convoy to the +west." Seeing at once the incompatibility of the two functions, he asked +for more definite instructions. What, for instance, was he to do if he +found a chance of blockading the main English fleet at its base? Was he to +devote himself to the blockade and "leave the whole fleet of merchantmen to +be a prey to a squadron of fast-sailing frigates," or was he to continue +his escort duty? Full as he was of desire to deal with the enemy's main +fleet, he was perplexed with the practical difficulty--too often +forgotten--that the mere domination of the enemy's battle strength does not +solve the problem of control of the sea. No fresh instructions were +forthcoming to clear his perplexity, and he could only protest again. "I +could wish," he wrote, "to be so fortunate as to have only one of these two +duties--to seek out the enemy, or to give convoy, for to do both is +attended with great difficulties." + +The indecisive campaign which naturally resulted from this lack of +strategical grip and concentration of effort came to an end with Tromp's +partial defeat of Blake off Dungeness on 30th November 1652. Though charged +in spite of his protests with a vast convoy, the Dutch admiral had sent it +back to Ostend when he found Blake was in the Downs, and then, free from +all preoccupation, he had gone to seek out his enemy. + +It was the effect which this unexpected blow had upon the strong military +insight of the Cromwellian Government that led to those famous reforms +which made this winter so memorable a landmark in British naval history. +Monk, the most finished professional soldier in the English service, and +Deane, another general, were joined in the command with Blake, and with +their coming was breathed into the sea service the high military spirit of +the New Model Army. To that winter we owe not only the Articles of War, +which made discipline possible, and the first attempt to formulate Fighting +Instructions, in which a regular tactical system was conceived, but also +two other conceptions that go to make up the modern idea of naval warfare. +One was the conviction that war upon the sea meant operations against the +enemy's armed fleets in order to destroy his power of naval resistance as +distinguished from operations by way of reprisal against his trade; and the +other, that such warfare required for its effective use a fleet of +State-owned ships specialised for war, with as little assistance as +possible from private-owned ships. It was not unnatural that all four ideas +should have taken shape together, so closely are they related. The end +connotes the means. Discipline, fleet tactics, and a navy of warships were +indispensable for making war in the modern sense of the term. + +The results were seen in the three great actions of the following spring, +the first under the three Generals, and the other two under Monk alone. In +the last, he carried the new ideas so far as to forbid taking possession of +disabled vessels, that nothing might check the work of destruction. All +were to be sunk with as much tenderness for human life as destruction would +permit. In like manner the second war was characterised by three great +naval actions, one of which, after Monk had resumed command, lasted no less +than four days. The new doctrine was indeed carried to exaggeration. So +entirely was naval thought centred on the action of the battle-fleets, that +no provision was made for an adequate exercise of control. In our own case +at least, massing for offensive action was pressed so far that no thought +was given to sustaining it by reliefs. Consequently our offensive power +suffered periods of exhaustion when the fleet had to return to its base, +and the Dutch were left sufficient freedom not only to secure their own +trade, but to strike severely at ours. Their counterstrokes culminated in +the famous attack upon Sheerness and Chatham. That such an opportunity was +allowed them can be traced directly to an exaggeration of the new doctrine. +In the belief of the British Government the "St. James's Fight"--the last +of the three actions--had settled the question of command. Negotiations for +peace were opened, and they were content to reap the fruit of the great +battles in preying on Dutch trade. Having done its work, as was believed, +the bulk of the battle-fleet for financial reasons was laid up, and the +Dutch seized the opportunity to demonstrate the limitations of the abused +doctrine. The lesson is one we have never forgotten, but its value is half +lost if we attribute the disaster to lack of grasp of the battle-fleet +doctrine rather than to an exaggeration of its possibilities. + +The truth is, that we had not obtained a victory sufficiently decisive to +destroy the enemy's fleet. The most valuable lesson of the war was that +such victories required working for, and particularly in cases where the +belligerents face each other from either side of a narrow sea. In such +conditions it was proved that owing to the facility of retreat and the +restricted possibilities of pursuit a complete decision is not to be looked +for without very special strategical preparation. The new doctrine in fact +gave that new direction to strategy which has been already referred to. It +was no longer a question of whether to make the enemy's trade or his fleet +the primary objective, but of how to get contact with his fleet in such a +way as to lead to decisive action. Merely to seek him out on his own coasts +was to ensure that no decisive action would take place. Measures had to be +taken to force him to sea away from his own bases. The favourite device was +to substitute organised strategical operations against his trade in place +of the old sporadic attacks; that is, the fleet took a position calculated +to stop his trade altogether, not on his own coasts, but far to sea in the +main fairway. The operations failed for lack of provision for enabling the +fleet by systematic relief to retain its position, but nevertheless it was +the germ of the system which afterwards, under riper organisation, was to +prove so effective, and to produce such actions as the "Glorious First of +June." + +In the third war, after this device had failed again and again, a new one +was tried. It was Charles the Second's own conception. His idea was to use +the threat of a military expedition. Some 15,000 men in transports were +brought to Yarmouth in the hope that the Dutch would come out to bar their +passage across the open North Sea, and would thus permit our fleet to cut +in behind them. There was, however, no proper coordination of the two +forces, and the project failed. + +This method of securing a decision was not lost sight of; Anson tried to +use it in the Seven Years' War. For two years every attempt to seek out the +enemy's fleet had led to nothing but the exhaustion of our own. But when +Pitt began his raids on the French coast, Anson, who had little faith in +their value for military purposes, thought he saw in them definite naval +possibilities. Accordingly when, in 1758, he was placed in command of the +Channel Fleet to cover the expedition against St. Malo, he raised the +blockade of Brest, and took up a position near the Isle of Batz between the +enemy's main fleet and the army's line of passage. The Brest fleet, +however, was in no condition to move, and again there was no result. It was +not till 1805 that there was any clear case of the device succeeding, and +then it was not used deliberately. It was a joint Anglo-Russian expedition +in the Mediterranean that forced from Napoleon his reckless order for +Villeneuve to put to sea from Cadiz, and so solved the problem out of which +Nelson had seen no issue. Lissa may be taken as an analogous case. But +there the Italians, treating the territorial attack as a real attack +instead of as a strategical device, suffered themselves to be surprised by +the Austrian fleet and defeated. + +This instance serves well to introduce the important fact, that although +our own military expeditions have seldom succeeded in leading to a naval +decision, the converse was almost always true. The attempt of the enemy to +use his army against our territory has been the most fertile source of our +great naval victories. The knowledge that our enemy intends to invade these +shores, or to make some serious expedition against our oversea dominions or +interests, should always be welcomed. Unless History belie herself, we know +that such attempts are the surest means of securing what we want. We have +the memories of La Hogue, Quiberon, and the Nile to assure us that sooner +or later they must lead to a naval decision, and the chance of a real +decision is all we can ask of the Fortune of War. + +Enough has now been said to show that "seeking out the enemy's fleet" is +not in itself sufficient to secure such a decision. What the maxim really +means is that we should endeavour from the first to secure contact in the +best position for bringing about a complete decision in our favour, and as +soon as the other parts of our war plan, military or political, will +permit. If the main offensive is military, as it was in the Japanese and +American cases, then if possible the effort to secure such control must be +subordinated to the movement of the army, otherwise we give the defensive +precedence of the offensive. If, however, the military offensive cannot be +ensured until the naval defensive is perfected, as will be the case if the +enemy brings a fleet up to our army's line of passage, then our first move +must be to secure naval contact. + +The vice of the opposite method of procedure is obvious. If we assume the +maxim that the first duty of our fleet is to seek out the enemy wherever he +may be, it means in its nakedness that we merely conform to the enemy's +dispositions and movements. It is open to him to lead us wherever he likes. +It was one of the fallacies that underlay all Napoleon's naval +combinations, that he believed that our hard-bitten admirals would behave +in this guileless manner. But nothing was further from their cunning. There +is a typical order of Cornwallis's which serves well to mark their +attitude. It was one he gave to Admiral Cotton, his second in command, in +July 1804 on handing over to his charge the Western Squadron off Ushant: +"If the French put to sea," he says, "without any of your vessels seeing +them, do not follow them, unless you are absolutely sure of the course they +have taken. If you leave the entrance of the Channel without protection, +the enemy might profit by it, and assist the invasion which threatens His +Majesty's dominions, the protection of which is your principal object." + +It is indeed a common belief that Nelson never permitted himself but a +single purpose, the pursuit of the enemy's fleet, and that, ignoring the +caution which Cornwallis impressed upon Cotton, he fell into the simple +trap. But it has to be noted that he never suffered himself to be led in +pursuit of a fleet away from the position he had been charged to maintain, +unless and until he had made that position secure behind him. His famous +chase to the West Indies is the case which has led to most misconception on +the point from an insufficient regard to the surrounding circumstances. +Nelson did not pursue Villeneuve with the sole, or even the primary, object +of bringing him to action. His dominant object was to save Jamaica from +capture. If it had only been a question of getting contact, he would +certainly have felt in a surer position by waiting for Villeneuve's return +off St. Vincent or closing in to the strategical centre off Ushant. +Further, it must be observed that Nelson by his pursuit did not uncover +what it was his duty to defend. The Mediterranean position was rendered +quite secure before he ventured on his eccentric movement. Finally, we have +the important fact that though the moral effect of Nelson's implacable +persistence and rapidity was of priceless value, it is impossible to show +that as a mere strategical movement it had any influence on the course of +the campaign. His appearance in the West Indies may have saved one or two +small islands from ransom and a good deal of trade from capture. It may +also have hastened Villeneuve's return by a few days, but that was not to +our advantage. Had he returned even a week later there would have been no +need to raise the Rochefort blockade. Barham would have had enough ships at +his command to preserve the whole of his blockades, as he had intended to +do till the _Curieux's_ news of Villeneuve's precipitate return forced his +hand before he was ready. + +If we desire a typical example of the way the old masters used the doctrine +of seeking out, it is to be found, not in Nelson's magnificent chase, but +in the restrained boldness of Barham's orders to Cornwallis and Calder. +Their instructions for seeking out Villeneuve were to move out on his two +possible lines of approach for such a time and such a distance as would +make decisive action almost certain, and at the same time, if contact were +missed, would ensure the preservation of the vital defensive positions. +Barham was far too astute to play into Napoleon's hands, and by blindly +following his enemy's lead to be jockeyed into sacrificing the position +which his enemy wished to secure. If our maxim be suffered to usurp the +place of instructed judgment, the almost inevitable result will be that it +will lead us into just the kind of mistake which Barham avoided. + +II. BLOCKADE + +Under the term blockade we include operations which vary widely in +character and in strategical intention. In the first place, blockade may be +either naval or commercial. By naval blockade we seek either to prevent an +enemy's armed force leaving port, or to make certain it shall be brought to +action before it can carry out the ulterior purpose for which it puts to +sea. That armed force may be purely naval, or it may consist wholly or in +part of a military expedition. If it be purely naval, then our blockade is +a method of securing command. If it be purely military, it is a method of +exercising command, and as such will be dealt with when we come to consider +defence against invasion. But in so far as military expeditions are +normally accompanied by a naval escort, operations to prevent their sailing +are not purely concerned with the exercise of command. Naval blockade, +therefore, may be regarded for practical purposes as a method of securing +command and as a function of battle-squadrons. Commercial blockade, on the +other hand, is essentially a method of exercising command, and is mainly an +affair of cruisers. Its immediate object is to stop the flow of the enemy's +sea-borne trade, whether carried in his own or neutral bottoms, by denying +him the use of trade communications. + +From the point of view of the conduct of war, therefore, we have two +well-defined categories of blockade, naval and commercial. But our +classification must go further; for naval blockade itself is equally varied +in intention, and must be subdivided. Strictly speaking, the term implies a +desire to close the blockaded port and to prevent the enemy putting to sea. +But this was not always the intention. As often as not our wish was that he +should put to sea that we might bring him to action, and in order to do +this, before he could effect his purpose, we had to watch the port with a +fleet more or less closely. For this operation there was no special name. +Widely as it differed in object from the other, it was also usually called +blockade, and Nelson's protest against the consequent confusion of thought +is well known. "It is not my intention," he said, "to close-watch Toulon"; +and again, "My system is the very contrary of blockading. Every opportunity +has been offered the enemy to put to sea." It is desirable, therefore, to +adopt terms to distinguish the two forms. "Close" and "open" express the +antithesis suggested by Nelson's letter, and the two terms serve well +enough to mark the characteristic feature of each operation. Close +blockade, it is true, as formerly conceived, is generally regarded as no +longer practicable; but the antithetical ideas, which the two forms of +blockade connote, can never be eliminated from strategical consideration. +It must always be with the relations of these two forms, whatever shape +they may take in future, that the strategy of naval blockade is chiefly +concerned. + +With regard to commercial blockade, in strict analysis it should be +eliminated from an inquiry that concerns methods of securing command and +postponed to that section of exercising command which deals with the attack +and defence of trade. It is, however, necessary to treat certain of its +aspects in conjunction with naval blockade for two reasons: one, that as a +rule naval blockade is indissolubly united to a subordinate commercial +blockade; and the other, that the commercial form, though its immediate +object is the exercise of control, has almost invariably an ulterior object +which is concerned with securing control; that is to say, while its +immediate object was to keep the enemy's commercial ports closed, its +ulterior object was to force his fleet to sea. + +Commercial blockade, therefore, has an intimate relation with naval +blockade in its open form. We adopt that form when we wish his fleet to put +to sea, and commercial blockade is usually the most effective means we have +of forcing upon him the movement we leave him free to attempt. By closing +his commercial ports we exercise the highest power of injuring him which +the command of the sea can give us. We choke the flow of his national +activity afloat in the same way that military occupation of his territory +chokes it ashore. He must, therefore, either tamely submit to the worst +which a naval defeat can inflict upon him, or he must fight to release +himself. He may see fit to choose the one course or the other, but in any +case we can do no more by naval means alone to force our will upon him. + +In the long run a rigorous and uninterrupted blockade is almost sure to +exhaust him before it exhausts us, but the end will be far and costly. As a +rule, therefore, we have found that where we had a substantial predominance +our enemy preferred to submit to commercial blockade in hope that by the +chances of war or the development of fresh force he might later on be in a +better position to come out into the open. That he should come out and +stake the issue in battle was nearly always our wish, and it was obvious +that too rigorous a naval blockade was not the way to achieve the desired +end, or to reap the strategical result which we might expect from +paralysing his commerce. Consequently where the desire for a decision at +sea was not crossed by higher military considerations, as in the case of +imminent invasion, or where we ourselves had an important expedition in +hand, it was to our interest to incline the enemy's mind towards the bolder +choice. + +The means was to tempt him with a prospect of success, either by leading +him to believe the blockading force was smaller than it was, or by removing +it to such a distance as would induce him to attempt to evade it, or both. +A leading case of such an open blockade was Nelson's disposition of his +fleet off Cadiz when he was seeking to bring Villeneuve to action in 1805. +But merely to leave a port open does not fulfil the idea of open blockade, +and in this case to opportunity and temptation Nelson added the pressure of +a commercial blockade of the adjacent ports in hope of starving Villeneuve +into the necessity of taking to the sea. + +Finally, in a general comparison of the two forms, we have to observe that +close blockade is characteristically a method of securing local and +temporary command. Its dominating purpose will usually be to prevent the +enemy's fleet acting in a certain area and for a certain purpose. Whereas +open blockade, in that it aims at the destruction of an enemy's naval +force, is a definite step towards securing permanent command. + +Enough has now been said to show that the question of choice between close +and open blockade is one of extreme complexity. Our naval literature, it is +true, presents the old masters as divided into two schools on the subject, +implying that one was in favour of the close form always, and the other of +the open form. We are even led to believe that the choice depended on the +military spirit of the officer concerned. If his military spirit was high, +he chose the close and more exacting form; if it were low, he was content +with the open and less exacting form. True, we are told that men of the +latter school based their objections to close blockade on the excessive +wear and tear of a fleet that it involved, but it is too often suggested +that this attitude was no more than a mask for a defective spirit. Seldom +if ever are we invited to compare their decisions with the attendant +strategical intention, with the risks which the conditions justified, or +with the expenditure of energy which the desired result could legitimately +demand. Yet all these considerations must enter into the choice, and on +closer examination of the leading cases it will be found that they bear a +striking and almost constant relation to the nature of the blockade +employed. + +In considering open blockade, three postulates must be kept in mind. +Firstly, since our object is to get the enemy to sea, our position must be +such as will give him an opportunity of doing so. Secondly, since we desire +contact for a decisive battle, that position must be no further away from +his port than is compatible with bringing him to action before he can +effect his purpose. Thirdly, there is the idea of economy--that is, the +idea of adopting the method which is least exhausting to our fleet, and +which will best preserve its battle fitness. It is on the last point that +the greatest difference of opinion has existed. A close blockade always +tended to exhaust a fleet, and always must do so. But, on the other hand, +it was contended that the exhaustion is compensated by the high temper and +moral domination which the maintenance of a close blockade produces in a +good fleet, whereas the comparative ease of distant and secure watch tended +to deterioration. Before considering these opposed views, one warning is +necessary. It is usually assumed that the alternative to close blockade is +watching the enemy from one of our own ports, but this is not essential. +What is required is an interior and, if possible, a secret position which +will render contact certain; and with modern developments in the means of +distant communication, such a position is usually better found at sea than +in port. A watching position can in fact be obtained free from the strain +of dangerous navigation and incessant liability to attack without sacrifice +of sea training. With this very practical point in mind, we may proceed to +test the merits of the two forms on abstract principles. + +It was always obvious that a close naval blockade was one of the weakest +and least desirable forms of war. Here again when we say "weakest" we do +not mean "least effective," but that it was exhausting, and that it tended +to occupy a force greater than that against which it was acting. This was +not because a blockading fleet, tempered and toughened by its watch, and +with great advantage of tactical position, could not be counted on to +engage successfully a raw fleet of equal force issuing from port, but +because in order to maintain its active efficiency it required large +reserves for its relief. So severe was the wear and tear both to men and +ships, that even the most strenuous exponents of the system considered that +at least a fifth of the force should always be refitting, and in every case +two admirals were employed to relieve one another. In 1794 one of the +highest authorities in the service considered that to maintain an effective +close blockade of Brest two complete sets of flag-officers were necessary, +and that no less than one-fourth of the squadron should always be in +port.[16] + + [16] Captain Philip Patton to Sir Charles Middleton, 27 June 1794. + _Barham Papers_, ii, 393. Patton had probably wider war experience than + any officer then living. He was regarded as possessing a very special + knowledge of personnel, and as vice admiral became second sea lord under + Barham in 1804. + +Now these weaknesses, being inherent in close blockade, necessarily +affected the appreciation of its value. The weight of the objection tended +of course to decrease as seamanship, material, or organisation improved, +but it was always a factor. It is true also that it seems to have had more +weight with some men than with others, but it will appear equally true, if +we endeavour to trace the movement of opinion on the subject, that it was +far from being the sole determinant. + +It was in the Seven Years' War under Anson's administration that continuous +and close blockade was first used systematically, but it was Hawke who +originated it. In the first three campaigns the old system of watching +Brest from a British western port had been in vogue, but it had twice +failed to prevent a French concentration in the vital Canadian theatre. In +the spring of 1759 Hawke was in command of the Channel Fleet with the usual +instructions for watching, but being directed to stand over and look into +Brest, he intimated his intention, unless he received orders to the +contrary, to remain off the port instead of returning to Torbay. His reason +was that he had found there a squadron which he believed was intended for +the West Indies, and he considered it better to prevent its sailing than to +let it put to sea and try to catch it. In other words, he argued that none +of the usual western watching ports afforded a position interior to the +usual French route from Brest to the West Indies. + +Since rumours of invasion were in the air, it was obviously the better +course to deal with the enemy's squadrons in home waters and avoid +dispersal of the fleet in seeking them out. In spite of extraordinarily bad +weather, therefore, he was permitted to act as he advised. With Boscawen as +relief, the new form of blockade was kept up thenceforward, and with entire +success. But it must be noted that this success was rather due to the fact +that the French made no further effort to cross the Atlantic, than to the +fact that the blockade was maintained with sufficient strictness to prevent +their doing so. In certain states of weather our fleet was forced to raise +the blockade and run to Torbay or Plymouth. Such temporary reversions to +the open form nearly always afforded an opportunity for the French to get +away to the southward with two or three days' start. Against any attempt, +however, to get to the east or the north in order to dispute command of the +Channel or other home waters the system was thoroughly efficient, and was +unaffected by the intervals of the open form. + +It may have been these considerations which in the War of American +Independence induced so fine an officer as Howe to be strongly in favour of +a reversion to the old system. The vital theatre was then again across the +Atlantic, and there was no serious preparation for invasion. It should also +be borne in mind in judging Howe against Hawke, that in the Seven Years' +War we had such a preponderance at sea as permitted ample reserves to +nourish a close blockade, whereas in the latter war we were numerically +inferior to the hostile coalition. Since it was impossible to prevent the +French reaching the West Indies and North America if they so determined, +our policy was to follow them with equal fleets and reduce the home force +as low as that policy demanded and as was consistent with a reasonable +degree of safety. The force required might well be inferior to the enemy, +since it was certain that all attempts upon the Channel would be made with +an unwieldy and ill-knit force composed of Spanish and French units. + +In Howe's opinion this particular situation was not to be solved by +attempting to close Brest, and nothing can be more misleading than to +stretch such an opinion beyond the circumstances it was intended to meet. +He did not consider it was in his power to close the port. The enemy, he +held, could always be in readiness to escape after a gale of wind by which +the blockading squadron would be drawn off or dispersed, the ships much +damaged, and the enemy enheartened. "An enemy," he said, "is not to be +restrained from putting to sea by a station taken off their port with a +barely superior squadron." The experience of 1805 appears to contradict +him. Then a barely superior squadron did succeed in preventing Ganteaume's +exit, but though the squadron actually employed was barely superior, it had +ample fleet reserves to sustain its numbers in efficiency. It was, +moreover, only for a short time that it had to deal with any real effort to +escape. After May 20th, Ganteaume was forbidden to put to sea. There were +certainly several occasions during that famous blockade when he could have +escaped to the southward had Napoleon wished it. + +This case, then, cannot be taken to condemn Howe's judgment. His special +function in the war plan was, with a force reduced to defensive strength, +to prevent the enemy obtaining command of our home waters. It was certainly +not his duty to undertake operations to which his force was not equal. His +first duty was to keep it in being for its paramount purpose. To this end +he decided on open blockade based on a general reserve at Spithead or St. +Helen's, where he could husband the ships and train his recruits, while at +the same time he protected our trade and communications and harassed those +of the enemy. Kempenfelt, than whom there was no warmer advocate of +activity, entirely approved the policy at least for the winter months, and +in his case no one will be found to suggest that the idea was prompted by +lack of spirit or love of ease. So far as the summer was concerned there +was really little difference of opinion as to whether the fleet should be +kept at sea or not, for sea-training during summer more than compensated +for the exhaustion of material likely to be caused by intermittent spells +of bad weather. Even for the winter the two policies came to much the same +thing. Thus in Hawke's blockade at the end of 1759, during the critical +month from mid-October to mid-November, he was unable to keep his station +for nearly half the time, and when he did get contact with Conflans it was +from Torbay and not Ushant. Still it may be doubted if without the +confidence bred of his stormy vigil the battle of Quiberon would have been +fought as it was. + +With all this experience fresh in his mind Kempenfelt frankly advocated +keeping the fleet in port for the winter. "Suppose," he wrote from Torbay +in November 1779, "the enemy should put to sea with their fleet (that is, +from Brest)--a thing much to be wished for by us--let us act wisely and +keep ours in port. Leave them to the mercy of long nights and hard gales. +They will do more in favour of you than your fleet can." Far better he +thought to devote the winter to preparing the fleet for the next campaign +so as to have "the advantage of being the first in the field." "Let us," he +concluded, "keep a stout squadron to the westward ready to attend the +motions of the enemy. I don't mean to keep them at sea, disabling +themselves in buffeting the winds, but at Torbay ready to act as +intelligence may suggest."[17] It will be seen, therefore, that the +conclusion that close blockade was always the best means of rendering the +fleet most efficient for the function it had to perform must not be +accepted too hastily. The reasons which induced Howe and Kempenfelt to +prefer open blockade were mainly based on this very consideration. Having +in mind the whole of the surrounding conditions, in their highly +experienced opinion careful preparation in the winter and tactical +evolutions in the summer were the surest road to battle fitness in the +force available. + + [17] _Barham Papers_, i, 302. + +On the other hand, we have the fact that during the War of American +Independence the open system was not very successful. But before condemning +it out of hand, it must be remembered that the causes of failure were not +all inherent in the system. In the first place, the need of relieving +Gibraltar from time to time prevented the Western Squadron devoting itself +entirely to its watch. In the next place, owing to defective administration +the winters were not devoted with sufficient energy to preparing the fleet +to be first in the field in the spring. Finally, we have to recognise that +the lack of success was due not so much to permitting the French to cross +the Atlantic, as to the failure to deal faithfully with them when contact +was obtained at their destination. Obviously there is nothing to be said +for the policy of "seeking out" as against that of preventing exit unless +you are determined when you find to destroy or to be destroyed. It was here +that Rodney and his fellows were found wanting. The system failed from +defective execution quite as much as from defective design. + +In the next war Howe was still in the ascendant and in command of the +Channel fleet. He retained his system. Leaving Brest open he forced the +French by operating against their trade to put to sea, and he was rewarded +with the battle of the First of June. No attempt was made to maintain a +close blockade during the following winter. The French were allowed to +sail, and their disastrous cruise of January 1795 fully justified +Kempenfelt's anticipations. So great was the damage done that they +abandoned all idea of using their fleet as a whole. Howe's system was +continued, but no longer with entirely successful results. In 1796 the +French were able to make descents upon Ireland, and Howe in consequence has +come in for the severest castigations. His method is contemptuously +contrasted with that which St. Vincent adopted four years later, without +any regard to the situation each admiral had to meet, and again on the +assumption that the closing of Brest would have solved the one problem as +well as it did the other. + +In 1796 we were not on the defensive as we were in 1800. The French fleet +had been practically destroyed. No invasion threatened. With a view to +forcing peace our policy was directed to offensive action against French +trade and territory in order by general pressure to back our overtures for +a settlement. The policy may have been mistaken, but that is not the +question. The question is, whether or not the strategy fitted the policy. +We were also, it must be remembered, at war with Holland and expecting war +with Spain, an eventuality which forced us to keep an eye on the defence of +Portugal. In these circumstances nothing was further from our desire than +to keep what was left of the Brest fleet in port. Our hope was by our +offensive action against French maritime interests to force it to expose +itself for their defence. To devote the fleet to the closing of Brest was +to cripple it for offensive action and to play the enemy's game. The actual +disposition of the home fleet was designed so as to preserve its offensive +activity, and at the same time to ensure superiority in any part of the +home waters in which the enemy might attempt a counterstroke. It was +distributed in three active squadrons, one in the North Sea, one before +Brest, and one cruising to the westward, with a strong reserve at +Portsmouth. It is the location of the reserve that has been most lightly +ridiculed, on the hasty assumption that it was merely the reserve of the +squadron before Brest; whereas in truth it was a general reserve designed +to act in the North Sea or wherever else it might be needed. At the same +time it served as a training and depot squadron for increasing our power at +sea in view of the probable addition of the Spanish fleet to Napoleon's +naval force. To have exhausted our fleet merely to prevent raids leaving +Brest which might equally well leave the Texel or Dunkirk was just what the +enemy would have desired. The disposition was in fact a good example of +concentration--that is, disposal about a strategical centre to preserve +flexibility for offence without risking defensive needs, and yet it is by +the most ardent advocates of concentration and the offensive that Howe's +dispositions at this time have been most roundly condemned. + +In the end the disposition did fail to prevent the landing of part of the +force intended for Ireland, but it made the venture so difficult that it +had to be deferred till mid-winter, and then the weather which rendered +evasion possible broke up the expedition and denied it all chance of +serious success. It was, in fact, another example of the working of +Kempenfelt's rule concerning winter weather. So far as naval defence can +go, the disposition was all that was required. The Irish expedition was +seen leaving Brest by our inshore cruiser squadron. It was reported to +Colpoys, who had the battle-squadron outside, and it was only a dense fog +that enabled it to escape. It was, in fact, nothing more than the evasion +of a small raiding force--an eventuality against which no naval defence can +provide certain guarantee, especially in winter. + +It was under wholly different conditions that at the end of 1800 Hawke's +system was revived. St. Vincent's succession to the control of the fleet +coincided with Napoleon's definite assumption of the control of the +destinies of France. Our great duel with him had begun. The measures he was +taking made it obvious we were once more facing the old life and death +struggle for naval supremacy; we were openly threatened with invasion, and +we had a distinct preponderance at sea. In short, we have to recognize the +fact that the methods of the Seven Years' War were revived when the +problems and factors of that war were renewed. As those problems grew more +intense, as they did after the Peace of Amiens, and the threat of invasion +became really formidable, so did the rigour of the close blockade increase. +Under Cornwallis and Gardner it was maintained in such a way as to deny, so +far as human effort could go, all possibility of exit without fighting. In +spite of the importance of dealing with the enemy's squadrons in detail no +risks were taken to bring Ganteaume to decisive action. Our first necessity +was absolute local command. The acuteness of the invasion crisis demanded +that the Brest fleet should be kept in port, and every time Ganteaume +showed a foot the British admiral flew at him and drove him back. Once only +during the continuation of the crisis was the rigour of this attitude +relaxed, and that was to deal with what for the moment was the higher +object. It was to meet Villeneuve on his return from the West Indies, but +even then so nicely was the relaxation calculated, that Ganteaume was given +no time to take advantage of it. + +The analogy between the conditions of the blockade which St. Vincent +inaugurated and those of the Seven Years' War becomes all the more +significant when we note that while Cornwallis and Gardner in home waters +were pressing close blockade to its utmost limit of rigour, Nelson in the +Mediterranean was not using it at all. Yet with him also the chief concern +was to prevent an invasion. His main function, as he and his Government saw +it, was to prevent a descent from Southern France upon Neapolitan or +Levantine territory. Why, then, did he not employ close blockade? It is +usually assumed that it was because of his overpowering desire to bring the +Toulon squadron to action. Occasional expressions in his letters give +colour to such a view, but his dispositions show clearly that his desire to +bring the fleet to action was kept in scientific subordination to the +defensive duty with which he was charged. Close blockade was the most +effectual means of securing this end, but in his case one of the +conditions, which we have found always accompanying successful close +blockade, was absent. He had no such preponderance of force as would enable +him to nourish it up to the point of perfect continuity. In the +circumstances the close form was too weak or exhausting for him to use with +the force at his disposal. + +If this case be not considered conclusive as to Nelson's views, we have a +perfectly clear endorsement from his pen in 1801. It is a particularly +strong testimony, for he was at the time actually charged with defence +against the invasion of England. With several cruiser squadrons he had to +prevent the enemy's force issuing from a number of ports extending from +Flushing to Dieppe, and he was directing the operations from the Downs. On +the approach of winter he was impressed with the inexpediency of attempting +to continue a close blockade, and wrote to the Admiralty as follows: "I am +of opinion, and submit to their Lordships' better judgment, that care +should be taken to keep our squadrons compact and in good order ... under +Dungeness to be their principal station.... In fine weather our squadrons +to go out and show themselves, but never to risk either being crippled or +drawn into the North Sea; thus we shall always be sure of an effective +force, ready to act as occasion calls for it."[18] + + [18] To Evan Nepean, 4 September 1801. Nicolas, _Nelson Despatches_, iv, + 484. + +The case of course is not entirely in point, for it concerns the question +of direct resistance to invasion and not to securing general command. Its +value is that it gives Nelson's views on the broad question of balancing +the risks--that is, the risk of relaxing close watch against the risk of +destroying the efficiency of the ships by maintaining it too rigorously. + +With Nelson holding this view, it is not surprising to find that as late as +1804 naval opinion was not quite settled on the relative advantages of +close and open blockade even in the case of threatened invasion. Just a +year before Trafalgar was fought, Cornwallis pressed the Admiralty for more +strength to enable him to keep his blockade efficient. Lord Melville, who +at this time had Barham at his elbow, replied recommending the "policy of +relaxing the strictness of blockade, formerly resorted to." He protested +the means available were insufficient for "sustaining the necessary extent +of naval force, if your ships are to be torn to pieces by an eternal +conflict with the elements during the tempestuous months of winter."[19] +Melville was craving for a decisive action to end the insupportable strain. +"Allow me to remind you," he added, "that the occasions when we have been +able to bring our enemy to battle and our fleets to victory have generally +been when we were at a distance from the blockading station." In the end, +as we know, Cornwallis had his way, and the verdict of history has been to +approve the decision for its moral effect alone. Such conflicts must always +arise. "War," as Wolfe said, "is an option of difficulties," and the choice +must sway to the one side or the other as the circumstances tend to develop +the respective advantages of each form. We can never say that close +blockade is better than open, or the reverse. It must always be a matter of +judgment. + + [19] For Barham's final views, 1805, see _Barham Papers_, iii, 90-93. + +Are there, then, no principles which we can deduce from the old practice +for the strengthening of judgment? Certain broad lines of guidance at least +are to be traced. The main question will be, is it to our advantage, in +regard to all the strategical conditions, to keep the enemy in and get him +to sea for a decision? Presumably it will always be our policy to get a +decision as soon as possible. Still that desire may be overridden by the +necessity or special advantage of closely blockading one or more of his +squadrons. This situation may arise in two ways. Firstly, it may be +essential to provide for the local and temporary command of a certain +theatre of operations, as when an invasion threatens in that area, or when +we wish to pass a military expedition across it, or from special exigencies +in regard to the attack or defence of commerce. Secondly, even where we are +seeking a great decision, we may blockade one squadron closely in order to +induce a decision at the point most advantageous to ourselves; that is to +say, we may blockade one or more squadrons in order to induce the enemy to +attempt with one or more other squadrons to break that blockade. In this +way we may lead him either to expose himself to be struck in detail, or to +concentrate where we desire his concentration. + +For any of these reasons we may decide that the best way of realising our +object is to use close blockade, but the matter does not end there. We have +still to consider whether close blockade is within the limit of the force +we have available, and whether it is the best method of developing the +fullest potentialities of that force. Close blockade being the more +exhausting form will require the greater strength; we cannot blockade +closely for any length of time without a force relatively superior; but if +by open blockade of a squadron we permit it to put to sea with contact +assured, we know that, even with a slightly inferior force, we can so deal +with it as to prevent its getting local control sufficient to break down +our mobile flotilla defence or to interfere seriously with our trade. + +Finally, there is the question of risk. In the old days, before free +movement and wireless telegraphy, and before the flotilla had acquired +battle power, there was always to be faced the risk of not getting contact +in time to prevent mischief. This consideration was specially dominant +where the enemy had a squadron within or near the critical theatre of +operations. Therefore when the invasion threatened, our developed policy +was to blockade Brest closely at almost any sacrifice. There was always a +vague possibility that by evasion or chance of wind a squadron so close to +the line of invasion might get sufficient temporary command in the vital +area before it could be brought to action. It was a possibility that was +never realised in the Narrow Seas, and since mobility of fleets and means +of distant communication have so greatly increased in range and certainty, +and since the power of resistance in the flotilla has become so high, the +risk is probably much less than ever, and the field for open blockade is +consequently less restricted. + +There is no need, however, to accept these principles as incontrovertible. +Even if we take the great blockade of 1803-5, which has most firmly +dominated thought on the subject ever since, it may be argued with some +plausibility that the situation could have been solved more quickly and +effectually by letting Ganteaume get out from Brest into the open, at least +as far as Admiral Togo was forced to permit the Russians to emerge from +Port Arthur, though his reasons for keeping them in were even stronger than +ours in 1805. But in any case, the whole trend of the evidence will admit +no doubt as to the inherent weakness of close blockade as a form of war. As +under modern developments the possibilities of open blockade have +increased, so the difficulties and dangers of close blockade have certainly +not decreased. It is also probable that certain advantages which in the +sailing era went far to compensate for its weakness have lost much of their +force. A sailing fleet cooped up in port not only rapidly lost its spirit, +but, being barred from sea-training, could not be kept in a condition of +efficiency, whereas the blockading fleet was quickly raised to the highest +temper by the stress of vigilance and danger that was its incessant +portion. So long as the strain did not pass the limit of human endurance, +it was all to the good. In the old days, with very moderate reliefs, the +limit was never reached, and the sacrifices that were made to those +exhausting vigils were rewarded twentyfold in exuberant confidence on the +day of battle. Can we expect the same compensation now? Will the balance of +strength and weakness remain as it used to be? In the face of the vast +change of conditions and the thinness of experience, it is to general +principles we must turn for the answer. + +What, in fact, is the inherent weakness of close blockade? Strategical +theory will at once reply that it is an operation which involves "an arrest +of the offensive," a situation which is usually taken to exhibit every kind +of drawback. Close blockade is essentially an offensive operation, although +its object is usually negative; that is, it is a forward movement to +prevent the enemy carrying out some offensive operation either direct or by +way of counterstroke. So far the common tendency to confuse "Seeking out +the enemy's fleet" with "Making the enemy's coast your frontier" may be +condoned. But the two operations are widely different in that they have +different objectives. In "seeking out," our objective is the enemy's armed +force. In "making the enemy's coast our frontier," the objective is +inseparable from the ulterior object of the naval war. In this case the +objective is the common communications. By establishing a blockade we +operate offensively against those communications. We occupy them, and then +we can do no more. Our offensive is arrested; we cannot carry it on to the +destruction of the enemy's fleet. We have to wait in a defensive attitude, +holding the communications we have seized, till he chooses to attack in +order to break our hold; and during that period of arrest the advantage of +surprise--the all-important advantage in war--passes by a well recognised +rule to our enemy. We, in fact, are held upon the defensive, with none of +the material advantages of the defensive. The moral advantage of having +taken the initiative remains, but that is all. The advantage which we thus +gain will of course have the same kind of depressing effect upon the +blockaded fleet as it had of old, but scarcely in so high a degree. The +degradation of a steam fleet in port can scarcely be so rapid or +debilitating as it was when nine-tenths of seamanship lay in the smart +handling of sails. For the blockading fleet it is also true that the +effects of weather, which formerly were the main cause of wear and tear, +can scarcely be so severe. But, on the other hand, the physical strain to +officers and men, and the difficulty of supply, will be far greater, so +long at least as coal is the chief fuel. The wind no longer sets a measure +on the enemy's movements. Vigilance close and unremitting beyond all our +predecessors knew is the portion of the blockaders to prevent surprise. +Furthermore, in the old days surprise meant at worst the enemy's escape; +now it may mean our own destruction by mine or torpedo. It is unnecessary +to labour the point. It is too obvious that a close blockade of the old +type exhibits under present conditions the defects of "arrested offence" in +so high a degree as practically to prohibit its use. + +What, then, can be done? Must we rest content in all situations with Howe's +system, which riper experience condemned for cases of extreme necessity? +Cannot the old close blockade be given a modern form? Assuredly it can. In +old days the shoreward limit of the blockading fleet was just beyond the +range of the coast batteries, and this position it held continuously by +means of an inshore squadron. In these days of mobile defence that limit is +by analogy the night range of destroyers and the day range of submarines, +that is, half the distance they can traverse between dark and dawn or dawn +and dark respectively, unless within that limit a torpedo-proof base can be +established. A blockade of this nature will correspond in principle to a +close blockade of the old type; nor in practice, as was proved in the +Japanese blockade of Port Arthur, will its incidents be materially +different. The distance at which the battle-squadron must keep will seem at +first sight to deny it certainty of immediate contact--the essence of close +blockade. But in truth other new factors already noticed will reduce that +distance relatively. Quicker and more certain means of communication +between the admiral and his scouts, the absolute freedom of movement and +the power of delaying the enemy's actual exit by mining, may go far to +bring things back to their old relations. At Port Arthur they did so +entirely. If then, as in that case, our paramount object is to keep the +enemy in, there seems still no reason why we should not make our +dispositions on the principle of close blockade. Distances will be greater, +but that is all. + +Nor must it be forgotten that for a squadron to take station off a port in +the old manner is not the only means of close blockade. It may still effect +its purpose, at least temporarily, by supporting mining vessels or block +ships--"sinkers," as they used to be called. The latter expedient, it is +true, had little success in the latest experiments, but even in the +Russo-Japanese War its possibilities were by no means exhausted. We have +therefore to conclude that where the strategical conditions call obviously +for close blockade, our plan of operations will be modified in that +direction with the means still at our disposal. + +If, however, our object is not so sharply defined, if in spite of our +desire to deny the enemy the sea we are ready to take risks in order to +bring about a decision, the case is not so clear. It will be observed that +the looseness which the new conditions force upon close blockade-increasing +as they are in intensity year by year-must tend more and more to +approximate it in practice to open blockade. The question will therefore +present itself whether it would not be more in accordance with the +fundamental elements of strength to adopt open blockade frankly for all +purposes. We should thus substitute a true defensive disposition for an +arrested offence, and, theoretically, that in itself is a great advantage. +The practical benefits, whatever the correlative drawbacks, are equally +clear, nor are they less great now than they appeared to Howe and +Kempenfelt. We avoid exhaustion of machinery, coal, and men, and this, at +least for the necessary flotilla screen, will be greater than anything that +had to be faced in former days. We have at least the opportunity of +occupying a position secure from surprise, and of keeping the fleet +continually up to its highest striking energy. Finally, assuming the +geographical conditions give reasonable promise of contact, a quick +decision, which modern war demands with ever greater insistence, is more +probable. In such a disposition of course contact can rarely be made +certain. The enemy, whom the hypothesis of blockade assumes to be anxious +to avoid action, will always have a chance of evasion, but this will always +be so, even with the closest blockade now possible. We may even go further +and claim for open blockade that in favourable conditions it may give the +better chance of contact. For by adopting the principle of open blockade we +shall have, in accordance with the theory of defence, the further +advantages of being able the better to conceal our dispositions, and +consequently to lay traps for our enemy, such as that which Nelson prepared +for Villeneuve in the Gulf of Lyons in 1805. + +The objection to such a course which appears to have the most weight with +current opinion is the moral one, which is inseparable from all deliberate +choices of the defensive. If the watching fleet remains in a home fortified +base, it may be assumed that the usual moral degradation will set in. But +the method does not entail the inglorious security of such a base. A sound +position may well be found at a spot such as Admiral Togo occupied while +waiting for the Baltic fleet, and in that case there was no observable +degradation of any kind. Nor is there much evidence that this objection +weighed materially with the opponents of Howe's view. Their objection was +of a purely physical kind. Open blockade left the enemy too much freedom to +raid our trade routes. The watching system might be sufficient to keep an +unwilling battle-fleet in port or to bring a more adventurous one to +action, but it could not control raiding squadrons. This was certainly +Barham's objection. "If," he wrote to Pitt in 1794, "the French should have +any intention of sending their fleet to sea with this easterly wind, and +Lord Howe continues at Torbay, our Mediterranean and Jamaica convoys are in +a very critical situation. Both fleets must by this time be drawing near +the Channel, and cannot enter it while the easterly wind holds." This +danger must always be with us, especially in narrow waters such as the +North Sea. In more open theatres the difficulty is not so obtrusive, for +with sufficient sea room trade may take naturally or by direction a course +which our watching dispositions will cover. Thus with Nelson in the case of +Toulon, his normal positions on the Sardinian coast covered effectually the +flow of our trade to the Levant and the Two Sicilies, which was all there +was at the time. + +The truth is, that in endeavouring to decide between open and close +blockade we find ourselves confronted with those special difficulties which +so sharply distinguish naval warfare from warfare on land. We cannot choose +on purely naval considerations. In naval warfare, however great may be our +desire to concentrate our effort on the enemy's main forces, the ulterior +object will always obtrude itself. We must from the first do our best to +control sea communications, and since those communications are usually +common, we cannot refrain from occupying those of the enemy without at the +same time neglecting and exposing our own. Thus in the case of Brest a +close blockade was always desirable, and especially at convoy seasons, +because the great trade routes which passed within striking distance of the +port were all common, whereas in the region of Toulon the main lines were +not common except along the coasts of Africa and Southern Italy, and these +Nelson's open blockade amply secured. + +The general conclusion, then, is that however high may be the purely naval +and strategical reasons for adopting open blockade as the best means of +securing a decision against the enemy's fleet, yet the inevitable intrusion +of the ulterior object in the form of trade protection or the security of +military expeditions will seldom leave us entirely free to use the open +method. We must be prepared, in fact, to find ourselves at least at times +faced with the necessity of using a form of blockade as nearly modelled on +the old close blockade as changed conditions will permit. + + * * * * * + + CHAPTER THREE + + METHODS OF DISPUTING COMMAND + + * * * * * + +I. DEFENSIVE FLEET OPERATIONS--"A FLEET IN BEING" + +In dealing with the theory of sea command, attention was called to the +error of assuming that if we are unable to win the command we therefore +lose it. It was pointed out that this proposition, which is too often +implied in strategical discussion, denies in effect that there can be such +a thing as strategical defensive at sea, and ignores the fact that the +normal condition in war is for the command to be in dispute. Theory and +history are at one on the point. Together they affirm that a Power too weak +to win command by offensive operations may yet succeed in holding the +command in dispute by assuming a general defensive attitude. + +That such an attitude in itself cannot lead to any positive result at sea +goes without saying, but nevertheless even over prolonged periods it can +prevent an enemy securing positive results, and so give time for the other +belligerent to dominate the situation by securing his ends ashore. + +It is seldom that we have been forced even for a time to adopt such an +attitude, but our enemies have done so frequently to our serious annoyance +and loss. In the Seven Years' War, for instance, the French by avoiding +offensive operations likely to lead to a decision, and confining themselves +to active defence, were able for five campaigns to prevent our reducing +Canada, which was the object of the war. Had they staked the issue on a +great fleet action in the first campaign, and had the result been against +them, we could certainly have achieved our object in half the time. In the +end, of course, they failed to prevent the conquest, but during all the +time the catastrophe was postponed France had abundant opportunity of +gaining offensively elsewhere territory which, as she at all events +believed, would have compelled us to give up our conquest at the peace. + +Again, in our last great naval war Napoleon by avoiding general actions was +able to keep the command in dispute till by alliances and otherwise he had +gathered force which he deemed sufficient to warrant a return to the +offensive. Eventually that force proved unequal to the task, yet when it +failed and the command passed to his enemy, he had had time to consolidate +his power so far that the loss of his fleet seemed scarcely to affect it, +and for nine years more he was able to continue the struggle. + +Such examples--and there are many of them--serve to show how serious a +matter is naval defence in the hands of a great military Power with other +means of offence. They tell us how difficult it is to deal with, and how +serious therefore for even the strongest naval Power is the need to give it +careful study. + +And not for this reason only, but also because the strongest naval Power, +if faced with a coalition, may find it impossible to exert a drastic +offensive anywhere without temporarily reducing its force in certain areas +to a point relatively so low as to permit of nothing higher than the +defensive. The leading case of such a state of affairs, which we must +further consider presently, was our own position in the War of American +Independence, when, as we have seen, in order to secure an adequate +concentration for offence in the West Indies we were forced to reduce our +home fleet to defensive level. + +What, then, do we mean by naval defence? To arrive at a right answer we +must first clear our mind of all confusing shadows cast by the accidents of +land defence. Both on land and at sea defence means of course taking +certain measures to defer a decision until military or political +developments so far redress the balance of strength that we are able to +pass to the offensive. In the operations of armies the most usual means +employed are the holding of positions and forcing our superior enemy to +exhaust his strength in attacking them. Consequently the idea of military +defence is dominated by the conception of entrenched positions and +fortresses. + +In naval warfare this is not so. At sea the main conception is avoiding +decisive action by strategical or tactical activity, so as to keep our +fleet in being till the situation develops in our favour. In the golden age +of our navy the keynote of naval defence was mobility, not rest. The idea +was to dispute the control by harassing operations, to exercise control at +any place or at any moment as we saw a chance, and to prevent the enemy +exercising control in spite of his superiority by continually occupying his +attention. The idea of mere resistance was hardly present at all. +Everything was counterattack, whether upon the enemy's force or his +maritime communications. On land, of course, such methods of defence are +also well known, but they belong much more to guerilla warfare than to +regular operations. In regular warfare with standing armies, however +brilliantly harassing operations and counter-attack are used, the +fundamental conception is the defended or defensible position. + +Similarly at sea, although the essence of defence is mobility and an +untiring aggressive spirit rather than rest and resistance, yet there also +defended and defensible positions are not excluded. But they are only used +in the last resort. A fleet may retire temporarily into waters difficult of +access, where it can only be attacked at great risk, or into a fortified +base, where it is practically removed from the board and cannot be attacked +at all by a fleet alone. But the occasions on which such expedients can be +used at sea are far rarer than on land. Indeed except for the most +temporary purposes they can scarcely be regarded as admissible at sea, +however great their value on land. The reason is simple. A fleet +withdrawing to such a position leaves open to the enemy the ulterior +object, which is the control of sea communications, whereas on land an army +in a good position may even for a prolonged period cover the ulterior +object, which is usually territory. An army in position, moreover, is +always doing something to exhaust its opponent and redress the unfavourable +balance, but a fleet in inactivity is too often permitting the enemy to +carry on operations which tend to exhaust the resources of its own country. + +For a maritime Power, then, a naval defensive means nothing but keeping the +fleet actively in being-not merely in existence, but in active and vigorous +life. No phrase can better express the full significance of the idea than +"A fleet in being," if it be rightly understood. Unfortunately it has come +to be restricted, by a misunderstanding of the circumstances in which it +was first invented, to one special class of defence. We speak of it as +though it were essentially a method of defence against invasion, and so +miss its fuller meaning. If, however, it be extended to express defence +against any kind of maritime attack, whether against territory or sea +communications, its broad truth will become apparent, and it will give us +the true conception of the idea as held in the British service. + +The occasion on which it was first used was one that well exhibits the +special possibilities of a naval defensive. It was in the year 1690, when, +in alliance with the Dutch, we were at war with France, and though really +superior, had been caught in a situation which placed us temporarily at a +great disadvantage in home waters. The French by a surprising rapidity of +mobilisation and concentration had stolen a march on us before either our +mobilisation or our concentration was complete. King William, with the best +of the army, was in Ireland dealing with a French invasion in support of +James, and a squadron of seven sail under Sir Cloudesley Shovel had been +detached into the Irish Sea to guard his communications. Another squadron, +consisting of sixteen of the line, British and Dutch, had been sent to +Gibraltar under Admiral Killigrew to take down the trade and to keep an eye +on Chateaurenault, who with a slightly inferior squadron was at Toulon. It +was assumed he would probably make a push for Brest, where the French main +fleet was mobilising under the Comte de Tourville, and Killigrew had orders +to follow him if he got through the Straits. Chateaurenault did get +through; Killigrew failed to bring him to action, and instead of following +him immediately, he went into Cadiz to complete his arrangements for +forwarding his outward-bound convoy and escorting the one he was to bring +home. What of course he should have done, according to the practice of more +experienced times, was to have left this work to a cruiser detachment, and +failing contact with Chateaurenault, should have closed at once to the +strategical centre with his battle-squadron. + +Meanwhile the home fleet, which Lord Torrington was to command, was still +unformed. It lay in three divisions, at the Downs, Portsmouth, and +Plymouth, while a considerable part of the promised Dutch contingent had +not made its appearance. It was a splendid chance for the French to seize +the command of the Channel before the concentration could take place and to +crush the British in detail. Accordingly, on June 13th, as soon as +Chateaurenault had arrived, Tourville put to sea with some seventy of the +line. The day before, however, Torrington, having hoisted his flag in the +Downs, had massed his two main divisions at Portsmouth, and by the time +Tourville appeared off the Isle of Wight he had with later arrivals, both +Dutch and British, about fifty-six of the line in St. Helen's Road. Not +knowing that the Toulon contingent had joined, he put to sea intending to +fight, but on discovering the great superiority of the French, he decided +in concert with his council of war to act on the defensive, and before +offering battle to endeavour to secure a concentration with Killigrew and +Shovel and the Plymouth division by getting to the westward. If he found +this course impossible without fighting an action, his plan was to retire +before Tourville "even to the Gunfleet," where amidst the shoals of the +Thames estuary he felt he would have a good chance of repelling an attack +with success. There, too, he counted on being reinforced not only by the +ships still at Chatham, but also possibly by ships from the westward which +might steal along the coast and join him "over the flats" by channels +unknown to the French. To fight as he was he considered to be only playing +the enemy's game. "If we are beaten," he said in communicating his plan to +the Government, "they being absolute masters of the sea will be at great +liberty of doing many things which they dare not do whilst we observe them +and are in a possibility of joining Admiral Killigrew and our ships to the +westward." + +It was a plan conceived on the best principles of defence--waiting till the +acquisition of fresh force justified a return to the offensive. It is +further interesting as a pure case of naval defence, with no ulterior +object other than control of home waters. In the minds of the Government +there was no apprehension of any definite attempt to invade across the +Channel, but the invasion of Ireland was in full progress, and all +nourishment of it must be stopped and our own communications kept free. +There was, moreover, serious anxiety lest the French should extend their +operations to Scotland, and there was Killigrew's homeward-bound convoy +approaching. The situation was one that obviously could not be solved +effectually except by winning a general command of the sea, but in +Torrington's judgment it could be rendered innocuous by holding the command +in dispute. His design, therefore, was to act upon the defensive and +prevent the enemy achieving any positive result until he was in a position +to fight them with a fair chance of victory. A temporary defensive he +considered was the only way to win the command, while to hazard a decision +in inferior strength was the best way to lose it. + +Nothing could be in closer harmony with the principles of good strategy as +we understand them now. It was undoubtedly in advance of anything that had +been done up to that time, and it was little wonder if the Government, as +is usually said, failed to appreciate the design. Their rejection of it has +come in for very severe criticism. But it would seem that they +misunderstood rather than failed to appreciate. The Earl of Nottingham, who +was at the head of the Government, believed, as his reply to the admiral +clearly shows, that Torrington meant to retire to the Gunfleet at once; +whereas it is equally clear to us that the Gunfleet was to be his extreme +point, and that he did not mean to retire so far unless the French forced +him. The Minister failed, as others have done since, to grasp what the +admiral meant by "A fleet in being." He thought that in Torrington's view a +fleet safe in port and not in contact with the enemy was "in being," +whereas Torrington had no such idea. As Nottingham conceived the admiral's +intention he saw that although it might preserve the fleet, it would expose +everything else to destruction; that is, he was oppressed with the special +characteristic of naval warfare which always permits action against the +ulterior object when the enemy denies you any chance of acting against his +armed force. + +Under this misapprehension, which indeed was not justified by the words of +Torrington's despatch, he procured from the Queen an order in these terms: +"We apprehend," it ran, "the consequences of your retiring to the Gunfleet +to be so fatal, that we choose rather you should upon any advantage of the +wind give battle to the enemy than retreat farther than is necessary to get +an advantage upon the enemy." It was, however, left to his discretion to +proceed to the westward to complete his concentration that way, provided, +it said, "you by no means ever lose sight of the French fleet whereby they +may have opportunity of making attempts upon the shore or in the rivers of +Medway or Thames, or get away without fighting." + +This order has been very hardly dealt with by modern critics, although it +clearly contemplates true preventive observation, and even, as the last +words suggest, the idea contained in Nelson's well-known saying, "that by +the time the enemy had beat our fleet soundly they would do us no more harm +this year." It is true that Nelson could rely on the proved superiority of +the British at that time unit for unit, but it is also true that Nottingham +and his colleagues in the Government had information which led them greatly +to underestimate Tourville's strength. This was evident on the face of +Nottingham's despatch which covered the order, so evident indeed that +Torrington might well perhaps have suspended the execution of an order so +obviously based on incorrect information. But knowing probably what +intrigues were going on against him at Court, he chose to regard it as a +peremptory command to engage whenever he found himself to windward. + +Much as a more scientific view of naval strategy may admire Torrington's +conception, there seems no reason for losing temper over the Government's +plan. It was certainly one way of solving the problem, and seeing how large +were our reserves, a defeat need not have meant disaster. Still, it was +doubtless dictated by an inability to grasp, the strategical strength of +Torrington's novel plan, a plan which was not only safer, but was +calculated to achieve greater positive results in the end. The real fallacy +of the Government's plan was that although it had a specious appearance of +a bold offensive, it could have achieved nothing but a negative result. The +most a battle could have given in the circumstances could only have left +the command in dispute, and the worst would have given the enemy a positive +result, which must have gravely compromised William's campaign in Ireland. + +On these lines Torrington replied to the Government. Dealing with their +anxiety for the ships to the westward and the Mediterranean convoy, whose +danger was their expressed reason for forbidding him the Gunfleet, he +pointed out that they could not run much hazard if they took care of +themselves. For, as he repeated, "while we observe the French, they cannot +make any attempt on ships or shore without running great hazard, and if we +are beaten, all is exposed to their mercy." Thus without specially noticing +the Minister's misinterpretation of his despatch, he intimated that his +intention was observation, and not simple retreat. + +By the time Torrington sent this reply he had been pressed back as far as +Beachy Head; it was no longer possible to get to the westward; and the +following day, finding himself to windward, he attacked. But still +confirmed in his idea of defence, and carrying it on to his tactics, he +refused to give the French the chance of a real decision, and disengaged as +soon as a drop in the wind permitted. So far he felt justified in +interpreting orders which he knew were founded on false information. He was +sure, as he said in justification of the way he fought the action, "that +the Queen could not have been prevailed with to sign an order for it, had +not both our weakness and the strength of the enemy been disguised to her." + +So severely was his fleet crippled that he believed his plan could no +longer act. "What the consequences of this unfortunate battle may be," he +wrote in his Journal, "God Almighty only knows, but this I dare be positive +in, had I been left to my liberty I had prevented any attempt upon the +land, and secured the western ships, Killigrew, and the merchantmen." +Actually in all this he was successful. Slowly retiring eastward he drew +the French after him as far as Dover before he ran to the Nore; and +Tourville was unable to get back to the westward, till all the endangered +ships were safe in Plymouth. In spite of Torrington's being forced to fight +an action at the wrong time and place, his design had so far succeeded. Not +only had he prevented the French doing anything that could affect the issue +of the war, but he had completely foiled Tourville's plan of destroying the +British fleet in detail. That he had done, but retribution by passing to +the offensive was no longer in his power. + +That Tourville or his Government was impressed with the efficacy of the +method was demonstrated the following year, when he in his turn found +himself in an inferiority that denied him hope of a successful battle +decision. During the summer he kept his fleet hovering off the mouth of the +Channel without giving the British admiral a chance of contact. His method, +however, differed from that of Torrington, and he only achieved his +negative object by keeping out of sight of his enemy altogether. In his +opinion, if a fleet remained at sea in close observation of an active enemy +an action could not be avoided. "If (the admiral)," he wrote in his +memorandum on the subject, "be ordered to keep the sea to try to amuse the +enemy and to let them know we are in a position to attack in case they +attempt a descent, I think it my duty to say that in that case we must make +up our mind to have to fight them in the end; for if they have really +sought an action, they will have been able to fight, seeing that it is +impossible to pirouette so long near a fleet without coming to grips."[20] +This is as much as to say that a sure point of temporary retreat is +necessary to "a fleet in being," and this was an essential part of +Torrington's idea. + + [20] Delarbre, _Tourville et la marine de son temps_, p. 339. (Author's + note.) + +In Torrington's and Tourville's time, when ships were unhandy and fleet +tactics in their infancy, the difficulty of avoiding action, when a +determined enemy had once got contact, were undoubtedly great, unless a +port of retreat was kept open. But as the art of naval warfare developed, +the possibilities of "a fleet in being" were regarded as much wider, at +least in the British service. It was nearly a hundred years before we were +again forced to use the same device on a large scale, and then it was +believed that superior speed and tactical precision were factors that could +be counted on to an almost unlimited extent. In the darkest days of the War +of American Independence we have a memorandum of the subject by Kempenfelt, +which not only gives the developed idea of "a fleet in being" and the high +aggressive spirit that is its essence, but also explains its value, not +merely as a defensive expedient, but as a means of permitting a drastic +offensive even when you are as a whole inferior. "When you know the enemy's +designs," he says, "in order to do something effectual you must endeavour +to be superior to them in some part where they have designs to execute, and +where, if they succeed, they would most injure you. If your fleet is +divided as to be in all places inferior to the enemy, they will have a fair +chance of succeeding everywhere in their attempts. If a squadron cannot be +formed sufficient to face the enemy's at home, it would be more +advantageous to let your inferiority be still greater in order by it to +gain the superiority elsewhere." + +"When inferior to the enemy, and you have only a squadron of observation to +watch and attend upon their motions, such a squadron should be composed of +two-decked ships only [that is, ships of the highest mobility] as to assure +it purpose. It must have the advantage of the enemy in sailing, else under +certain circumstances it will be liable to be forced to battle or to give +up some of its heavy sailers. It is highly necessary to have such a flying +squadron to hang on the enemy's large fleet, as it will prevent their +dividing into separate squadrons for intercepting your trade or spreading +their ships for a more extensive view. You will be at hand to profit from +any accidental separation or dispersion of their fleet from hard gales, +fogs, or other causes. You may intercept supplies, intelligence, &c, sent +to them. In fine, such a squadron will be a check and restraint upon their +motions, and prevent a good deal of the mischief they might otherwise do." + +Three years before, when first called to be Chief of the Staff in the +Channel, he had emphasised the same points. "Much," he wrote in July 1779, +"I may say all, depends upon this fleet. 'Tis an inferior against a +superior fleet. Therefore the greatest skill and address is requisite to +counteract the designs of the enemy, to watch and seize the favourable +opportunity for action, and to catch the advantage of making the effort at +some or other feeble part of the enemy's line; or if such opportunities +don't offer, to hover near the enemy, keep him at bay, and prevent his +attempting anything but at risk and hazard; to command their attention, and +oblige them to think of nothing but being on their guard against your +attack."[21] + + [21] _Barham Papers_, i, 292. + +It was on these lines the war was conducted. The West Indian area, in which +lay the enemy's principal object, was treated as the offensive theatre and +the home waters as the defensive. Inferior as was the Channel fleet to the +home fleet of the allies, its defensive operations proved adequate to +prevent their achieving any success. Nor was this all, for Kempenfelt was +able to demonstrate the positive side of his theory in the most brilliant +and convincing manner. In dealing with concentration we have seen how, in +command of such a flying squadron as he postulated, he was able off Ushant +to seize a favourable opportunity for action, which resulted in his +capturing a convoy of military stores essential to the French operations in +the West Indies under the nose of De Guichen with an escort of nearly twice +his force. + +Nelson certainly shared Kempenfelt's views as to the possibilities of an +inferior fleet kept actively in being. "As to our fleet," he wrote from the +Mediterranean in 1796, "under such a commander-in-chief as Sir John Jervis +nobody has any fear ... We are now twenty-two sail of the line. The +combined fleet will not be above thirty-five.... I will venture my life Sir +John Jervis defeats them. I do not mean by a regular battle, but by the +skill of our admiral and the activity and spirit of our officers and +seamen. This country is the most favourable possible for that skill with an +inferior fleet; for the winds are so variable, that some one time in +twenty-four hours you must be able to attack a part of a large fleet, and +the other will be becalmed or have a contrary wind. Therefore I hope the +Government will not be alarmed for our safety." + +Such a conception of the defensive may indeed be said to have become +current in the British service. It was part of the reasoning which in 1805, +after Villeneuve's escape from the Mediterranean, decided Sir John Orde to +fall back on Ushant instead of entering the Straits. "I dare believe," he +wrote, "Lord Nelson will be found in condition with his twelve of the line +and numerous frigates to act on the defensive without loss and even to hang +on to the skirts of the enemy's fleet should it attempt any material +service, especially when encumbered with troops." + +In all this consideration of the potentialities of "a fleet in being" +operating defensively it must never be forgotten that we are dealing with +its possibilities in relation to a general command of the sea--to its +general power of holding such command in dispute, as Torrington used it. +Its power of preventing a particular operation, such as oversea invasion, +is another matter, which will always depend upon the local conditions. If +the "fleet in being" can be contained in such a way that it is impossible +for it to reach the invading line of passage, it will be no bar to +invasion. In 1690, so far as Torrington's fleet was concerned, the French, +had they been so minded, might have made a descent, say, at Portsmouth +while Torrington was at the Nore. But Torrington's fleet was not the only +factor. His retreat forced Tourville to leave behind him unfought the +squadrons of Shovel and Killigrew, and so far as commanding a line of +invasion passage was concerned Tourville was himself as well contained as +Torrington. The conditions of naval defence against invasion are in fact so +complex compared with those of general naval defence that they must be +treated later as a special branch of the subject. + +The doctrine of the "Fleet in being" as formulated and practised by +Torrington and developed by Kempenfelt goes no further than this, that +where the enemy regards the general command of a sea area as necessary to +his offensive purposes, you may be able to prevent his gaining such command +by using your fleet defensively, refusing what Nelson called a regular +battle, and seizing every opportunity for a counterstroke. To use it as it +was used by the French in the case of Tourville's famous deterrent cruise, +where the whole object of the French was offensive and could not be +obtained except by offence, is quite another thing. + +It is indeed difficult to understand the admiration with which his +_campagne au large_ has been treated in France. He kept the sea off the +mouth of the Channel for fifty days in the summer of 1691, and for forty of +those days our Channel fleet was making no systematic effort to seek him +out. He had been sent to sea in hope of intercepting our great "Smyrna +convoy," which was then the backbone of our oversea trade. Russell with the +British main fleet simply took positions to cover its approach until it was +safe, knowing presumably that Tourville must come to him if he wished to +accomplish his purpose. When the convoy was safe Russell proceeded off +Ushant, that is, between the enemy and his base. Tourville's communications +were thus cut, his line of retreat threatened, and he seized the first +opportunity to elude Russell and to return into port. Beyond taking a few +ships from one of the West India convoys, he accomplished nothing. The +central French offensive in Ireland was broken at the battle of the Boyne, +and the prestige of England at sea was restored. It is true our trade +suffered in the North Sea, but this was not directly due to the +concentration which Tourville's cruise forced upon us, but rather to the +failure of the Dutch--apparently by a misunderstanding-to provide for an +effective blockade of Dunkirk. + +To British eyes it will seem that the heresy which was latent in +Tourville's instructions was a seed that choked all the finer aspirations +of the French navy. In 1691 the plan of his cruise may possibly be defended +as sufficiently aggressive, since, seeing how unstable was William's new +throne, a resounding blow at British trade, combined with an expected +victory in Ireland, might have been enough to upset it. But afterwards the +idea was stretched to occasions it would not fit. It seems to have bred a +belief that where the object of the war plainly depended on winning a real +command of the sea, that object could yet be attained by naval defensive +operations. Many times it is true a policy which had starved the navy of +France left no other course open to her seamen, and had they in their +inferiority attempted the offensive, the end must have been swifter if not +more certain. In criticising the maritime history of France we must be +careful to distinguish policy from strategy. It was not always the +defensive strategy that was bad, but the policy that condemned her admirals +to negative operations. Seeing that she was a continental Power with +continental aspirations, it was often a policy from which her military +exigencies permitted no escape. Nevertheless the policy was twice accursed: +it cursed her when she was weak, and cursed her when she was strong. The +prolonged use of the defensive bred a habit of mind which seems to have +rendered her incapable of striking hard when she had the strength. In no +other way at least can we account for the behaviour of so high-spirited a +nation when her chance of revenge came in the War of American Independence. + +It is here in its moral reactions lies the danger of the defensive, a +danger so insidious in its working as to tempt us never to utter the word. +Yet with the voice of Torrington, Kempenfelt, and Nelson in our ears, it +would be folly to ignore it for ourselves, and still more to ignore the +exhausting strain its use by our enemy may impose upon us. It must be +studied, if for no other reasons than to learn how to break it down. Nor +will the study have danger, if only we keep well in view the spirit of +restless and vigilant counter-attack which Kempenfelt and Nelson regarded +as its essence. True, some of the conditions which in the days of sails +made for opportunity have passed away, but many still remain. Shifts of +wind and calms will no longer bring them, but weather thick or violent can +yet make seamanship, nimbleness, and cohesion tell as it always did; and +there is no reason to doubt that it is still possible for hard sea-training +to make "the activity and spirit of our officers and seamen" give the +results which Nelson so confidently expected. + +II. MINOR COUNTER-ATTACKS + +For the weaker of two belligerents minor-attack has always exercised a +certain fascination. Where a Power was so inferior in naval force that it +could scarcely count even on disputing command by fleet operations, there +remained a hope of reducing the relative inferiority by putting part of the +enemy's force out of action. Such hopes were rarely realised. In 1587 Drake +succeeded in stopping the Spanish invasion by such a counter-attack on the +Cadiz division of the Armada while it was still unmobilised. In 1667 the +Dutch achieved a similar success against our Chatham division when it was +demobilised and undefended, and thereby probably secured rather more +favourable terms of peace. But it cannot be said that the old wars present +any case where the ultimate question of command was seriously affected by a +minor counterattack. + +The advent of the torpedo, however, has given the idea a new importance +that cannot be overlooked. The degree of that importance is at present +beyond calculation. There is at least no evidence that it would be very +high in normal conditions and between ordinarily efficient fleets. The +comparative success of the opening Japanese attack on the Port Arthur +squadron is the only case in point, and where only one case exists, it is +necessary to use extreme caution in estimating its significance. Before we +can deduce anything of permanent value we must consider very carefully both +its conditions and results. + +To begin with, it was a new experience of a new class of weapon, and it by +no means follows that the success of a new expedient will be repeated with +anything like equal result. It will not be irrelevant again to recall the +case of fireships. At the outset of the sailing era in 1588, this device +prepared the way for a decisive success against a fleet in the open. In the +succeeding wars the new weapon found a prominent place in the organisation +of sea-going fleets, but its success was never repeated. Against ships in +ill-defended harbours it did occasionally produce good results, and during +the infancy of tactics its moral and even material effects in fleet actions +were frequently demonstrated. But as naval science developed and the +limitations of the weapon were more accurately measured, it was able to +achieve less and less, till in the eighteenth century it was regarded as +almost negligible. Even its moral effect was lost, and it ceased to be +considered as a battle unit. + +Now, if we examine closely the Port Arthur case, we shall find it pointing +to the existence of certain inherent conditions not dissimilar from those +which discredited fireships as a decisive factor in war. In spite of the +apparently formidable nature of a surprise attack by torpedo the +indications from the one case in point are that these conditions make for +greater power in the defence than in the attack. The first condition +relates to the difficulty of locating the objective accurately. It is +obvious that for this kind of operation the most precise intelligence is +essential, and of all intelligence the most difficult to obtain in war is +the distribution of an enemy's fleet from day to day. The Japanese had +fairly certain information that the bulk of the Port Arthur squadron was +lying in the outer anchorage, but it had been constantly moving, and there +was a report that three battleships had just been detached from it. The +report was false, but the result was that of the five divisions of +destroyers which the Japanese had available, two were diverted against +Dalny, where no enemy was found. Such uncertainty must always exist, and in +no circumstances is it likely to be less than where, as in the Japanese +case, the attack is made before declaration, and while the ordinary +channels of intelligence are still open. + +Further, it is to be noted that in spite of the fact that relations for +some weeks had been highly strained, and a surprise torpedo attack was +regarded as probable, the Russians had taken no precautions to confuse +their enemy. It is obvious that measures to prevent accurate locating can, +and should, be taken in such cases. We may go further. From confusing the +enemy by such means it is but a step to lead him to a wrong conclusion, and +to lay for him a trap which may swallow up the bulk of his destroyer force +in the first hours of the war. It is to be feared, however, that the risks +of such an eventuality are so great in minor counter-attacks of this +nature, that it will probably be very difficult to tempt an inferior enemy +to expose his flotilla in this way. + +This view receives emphasis from the second point which the Port Arthur +case serves to demonstrate, and that is the great power of even the +flimsiest defence against such attacks; in other words, the chances of +success can scarcely ever be great enough to justify the risk. Everything +was in favour of the Japanese. Orders had been issued in the Russian +squadron for two or three nights previously to prepare for a torpedo +attack, but so low had discipline fallen, that the orders were obeyed in a +very perfunctory manner. Guns were not loaded, their crews were not at +quarters, nor were the nets got out. The only real precaution taken was +that two destroyers and no more had been sent out as guard patrol, but even +they were forbidden to fire on anything they met until they had reported to +the admiral or had themselves been fired on. Defence against a surprise +attack could scarcely have been more feeble, and yet so high was the +nervous tension in the attacking force, that it proved stronger than could +reasonably have been expected. The mere existence of the patrol and the +necessity of evading it threw the Japanese approach into a confusion from +which it was unable to recover entirely, and the attack lost its essential +momentum and cohesion. Again, defective as were the arrangements in the +squadron itself, and lax as were its training and discipline, no torpedo +hits were made, so far as we can judge, after the Russian guns and +searchlights got into play. + +Such development of strength in the defence seems inherent in the +conditions of minor attack, and there appears to be no reason for expecting +better results for such attacks in normal cases. But in deducing principles +from the Port Arthur case, it must always be remembered that it was far +from normal. It was a blow before declaration, when the menace of strained +relations, though realised, had been almost entirely ignored by the +Russians. In such exceptional and almost incredible circumstances a minor +attack might always be counted on for a certain measure of success. To this +we have to add the fact that the Russian squadron was not ordinarily +efficient, but appears to have fallen into a lax condition such as could +scarcely recur in the case of any other naval Power. + +Finally, we must ask what, with every condition abnormally in favour of the +attack, was the actual material result? Did it have any real influence on +the ultimate question of command? It is true that it so far swung the +balance in favour of the Japanese that they were able to exercise the local +control long enough to land their troops and isolate Port Arthur. But the +Japanese plan for securing ultimate command rested on their power of taking +Port Arthur by military operation and sustaining the siege from the sea. +Yet in spite of every condition of success the physical effect of the blow +was so small, that even without the help of an adequate dockyard the +squadron recovered from it and became potent again before the siege could +even be formed. The minor attacks which followed the first blow were all +failures, and whether delivered at the port or upon the squadron in the +open had no appreciable effect whatever. + +At the same time it must be remembered that since that war the art of +torpedo warfare has developed very rapidly. Its range and offensive power +have increased in a higher ratio than the means of resisting it. Still +those means have advanced, and it is probable that a squadron in a naval +port or in a properly defended anchorage is not more easy to injure than it +ever was; while a squadron at sea, so long as it constantly shifts its +position, still remains very difficult to locate with sufficient precision +for successful minor attack. + +The unproved value of submarines only deepens the mist which overhangs the +next naval war. From a strategical point of view we can say no more than +that we have to count with a new factor, which gives a new possibility to +minor counterattack. It is a possibility which on the whole tells in favour +of naval defence, a new card which, skilfully played in combination with +defensive fleet operations, may lend fresh importance to the "Fleet in +being." It may further be expected that whatever the effective +possibilities of minor operations may ultimately prove to be in regard to +securing command, the moral influence will be considerable, and at least at +the beginning of a future war will tend to deflect and hamper the major +operations and rob of their precision the lines which formerly led so +frankly to the issue by battle. + +In the absence of a sufficient volume of experience it would be idle to go +further, particularly as torpedo attack, like fireship attack, depends for +success more than any other on the spirit and skill of officers and men. +With regard to the torpedo as the typical arm of mobile coastal defence, it +is a different matter. What has been said applies only to its power towards +securing command of the sea, and not to the exercise or to disputing the +exercise of command. This is a question which is concerned with defence +against invasion, and to that we must now turn. + + * * * * * + + CHAPTER FOUR + + METHODS OF EXERCISING COMMAND + + * * * * * + +I. DEFENCE AGAINST INVASION + +In methods of exercising command are included all operations not directly +concerned with securing command or with preventing its being secured by the +enemy. We engage in exercising command whenever we conduct operations which +are directed not against the enemy's battle-fleet, but to using sea +communications for our own purposes, or to interfering with the enemy's use +of them. Such operations, though logically of secondary importance, have +always occupied the larger part of naval warfare. Naval warfare does not +begin and end with the destruction of the enemy's battle-fleet, nor even +with breaking his cruiser power. Beyond all this there is the actual work +of preventing his passing an army across the sea and of protecting the +passage of our own military expeditions. There is also the obstruction of +his trade and the protection of our own. In all such operations we are +concerned with the exercise of command. We are using the sea, or +interfering with its use by the enemy; we are not endeavouring to secure +the use or to prevent the enemy from securing it. The two categories of +operation differ radically in conception and purpose, and strategically +they are on wholly different planes. + +Logically, of course, operations for exercising command should follow those +for securing command; that is to say, that since the attainment of command +is the special object of naval warfare, and since that command can only be +obtained permanently by the destruction of the enemy's armed forces afloat, +it follows that in strictness no other objects should be allowed to +interfere with our concentration of effort on the supreme end of securing +command by destruction. War, however, is not conducted by logic, and the +order of proceeding which logic prescribes cannot always be adhered to in +practice. We have seen how, owing to the special conditions of naval +warfare, extraneous necessities intrude themselves which make it inevitable +that operations for exercising command should accompany as well as follow +operations for securing command. War being, as it is, a complex sum of +naval, military, political, financial, and moral factors, its actuality can +seldom offer to a naval staff a clean slate on which strategical problems +can be solved by well-turned syllogisms. The naval factor can never ignore +the others. From the outset one or more of them will always call for some +act of exercising command which will not wait for its turn in the logical +progression. To a greater or less extent in all ordinary cases both +categories of operation will have to be put in motion from the beginning. + +Hence the importance of realising the distinction between the two generic +forms of naval activity. In the hurry and stress of war confusion between +them is easy. By keeping a firm grip upon the difference we can see at +least what we are doing. We can judge how far any given operation that may +be called for is a sacrifice of security to exercise, how far such a +sacrifice may be justified, and how far the one end may be made to serve +the other. By applying the distinction as a test much error may be avoided. +The risk we take may be great, but we shall be able to weigh it accurately +against the value of the end, and we shall take it with our eyes open and +of set purpose. Above all, it will enable the Staff to settle clearly for +each squadronal commander what is to be his primary objective, and what the +object or purpose of the operations entrusted to him. It is above all in +this last consideration, and particularly in the determination of the +objective, that lies the main practical value of the distinction. + +This will become clear the moment we begin to consider defence against +invasion, which naturally takes the first place amongst operations for the +exercise of control. Of all the current assumptions, not one is so +confusing for the finer adjustments of strategy as that which affirms that +the primary objective of our fleet is always the enemy's fleet. Of the +battle-fleet and its attendant units it is of course true, so long at least +as the enemy has a battle-fleet in being. It is true, that is, of all +operations for securing control, but of operations for exercising control +it is not true. In the case we have now to consider-defence against +invasion-the objective of the special operations is, and always has been, +the enemy's army. On this fundamental postulate our plans for resisting +invasion have always been constructed from the year of the Armada to 1805. + +In the old service tradition the point was perfectly well established. +Admirals' instructions constantly insist on the fact that the transports +are the "principal object." The whole disposition of the fleet during +Hawke's blockade in 1759 was based on keeping a firm hold on the transports +in the Morbihan, and when he sought to extend his operations against the +Rochefort squadron, he was sharply reminded by Anson that "the principal +object of attention at this time" was, firstly, "the interception of the +embarkations of the enemy at Morbihan," and secondly, "the keeping of the +ships of war from coming out of Brest." Similarly Commodore Warren in 1796, +when he had the permanent frigate guard before Brest, issued orders to his +captains that in case of encountering enemy's transports under escort they +were "to run them down or destroy them in the most expeditious manner +possible previous to attacking the ships of war, but to preserve such a +situation as to effect that purpose when directed by signal." Lord Keith's +orders when watching Napoleon's flotilla were to the same effect. +"Directing your chief attention," they run, "to the destruction of the +ships, vessels, or boats having men, horses, or artillery on board (in +preference to that of the vessels by which they are protected), and in the +strict execution of this important duty losing sight entirely of the +possibility of idle censure for avoiding contact with an armed force, +because the prevention of debarkation is the object of primary importance +to which every other consideration must give way."[22] + + [22] _Admiralty Secretary's In-Letters_, 537, 8 August 1803. + +In tactics, then, the idea was the same as in strategy. The army was the +primary objective round which all dispositions turned. In the French +service the strength and soundness of the British practice was understood +at least by the best men. When in 1805 Napoleon consulted Ganteaume as to +the possibility of the flotilla of transports effecting its passage by +evasion, the admiral told him it was impossible, since no weather could +avail to relax the British hold sufficiently. "In former wars," he said, +"the English vigilance was miraculous." + +To this rule there was no exception, not even when circumstances rendered +it difficult to distinguish between the enemy's fleet and army as +objectives. This situation could occur in two ways. Firstly, when the +invading army was designed to sail with the battle-fleet, as in the case of +Napoleon's invasion of Egypt; and secondly, when, although the design was +that the two should operate on separate lines, our system of defence forced +the fleet to come up to the army's line of passage in order to clear it, as +happened in the case of the Armada and the French attempt of 1744. + +In the latter case the invading army, whose objective was unknown, was at +Dunkirk, and a French fleet was coming up the Channel to cover the passage. +Sir John Norris, in command of the home fleet, was in the Downs. Though his +name is now almost forgotten, he was one of the great founders of our naval +tradition, and a strategist of the first order. In informing the Government +of his plan of operations, he said he intended to proceed with his whole +squadron off Dunkirk to prevent the transports sailing. "But," he says, "if +they should unfortunately get out and pass us in the night and go +northward, I intend to detach a superior force to endeavour to overtake and +destroy them; and with the remainder of my squadron either to fight the +French fleet now in the Channel, or observe them and cover the country as +our circumstances will admit of; or I shall pursue the embarkation with all +my strength." In this case there had been no time to organise a special +squadron or flotilla, in the usual way, to bar the line of passage, and the +battle-fleet had to be used for the purpose. This being so, Norris was not +going to allow the presence of an enemy's battle-fleet to entice him away +from his grip on the invading army, and so resolutely did he hold to the +principle, that he meant if the transports put to sea to direct his +offensive against them, while he merely contained the enemy's battle-fleet +by defensive observation. + +In the Egyptian case there was no distinction between the two objectives at +all. Napoleon's expedition sailed in one mass. Yet in the handling of his +fleet Nelson preserved the essential idea. He organised it into three +"sub-squadrons," one of six sail and two of four each. "Two of these +sub-squadrons," says Berry, his flag-captain, "were to attack the ships of +war, while the third was to pursue the transports and to sink and destroy +as many as it could"; that is, he intended, in order to make sure of +Napoleon's army, to use no more than ten, and possibly only eight, of his +own battleships against the eleven of the enemy. + +Many other examples could be given of British insistence on making the +enemy's army the primary objective and not his fleet in cases of invasion. +No point in the old tradition was more firmly established. Its value was of +course more strongly marked where the army and the fleet of the enemy +endeavoured to act on separate lines of operation; that is, where the army +took the real offensive line and the fleet the covering or preventive line, +and where consequently for our own fleet there was no confusion between the +two objectives. This was the normal case, and the reason it was so is +simple enough. It may be stated at once, since it serves to enunciate the +general principle upon which our traditional system of defence was based. + +An invasion of Great Britain must always be an attempt over an uncommanded +sea. It may be that our fleet predominates or it may be that it does not, +but the command must always be in dispute. If we have gained complete +command, no invasion can take place, nor will it be attempted. If we have +lost it completely no invasion will be necessary, since, quite apart from +the threat of invasion, we must make peace on the best terms we can get. +Now, if the sea be uncommanded, there are obviously two ways in which an +invasion may be attempted. Firstly, the enemy may endeavour to force it +through our naval defence with transports and fleet in one mass. This was +the primitive idea on which the Spanish invasion of Philip the Second was +originally planned by his famous admiral, Santa-Cruz. Ripening military +science, however, was able to convince him of its weakness. A mass of +transports and warships is the most cumbrous and vulnerable engine of war +ever known. The weaker the naval defence of the threatened country, the +more devoutly will it pray the invader may use this device. Where contact +with the enemy's fleet is certain, and particularly in narrow seas, as it +was in this case, such a course will give the defender all the chances he +could desire, and success for the invader is inconceivable, provided always +we resolutely determine to make the army in its transports our main +objective, and are not to be induced to break our head against its escort. + +Where, however, contact is not certain, the invasion over an uncommanded +sea may succeed by evasion of the defender's battle-fleet, as it did in the +case of Napoleon's invasion of Egypt. But that operation belongs to an +entirely different category from that which we are now considering. None of +the factors on which the traditional system of British defence is based +were present. It was an operation over an open sea against a distant and +undetermined objective that had no naval defence of its own, whereas in our +own case the determining factors are permanent naval defence, an +approximately determined objective, and a narrow sea where evasion by any +force of invasion strength is impossible. Napoleon's exploit was in fact +nothing more than the evasion of an open blockade which had no naval +defence beyond it. The vital importance of these things will appear as we +proceed and note the characteristics which marked every attempt to invade +England. From such attempts we of course exclude the various descents upon +Ireland, which, not being of invasion strength, fall into another class, to +be dealt with hereafter. + +Since the expedient of forcing an invasion by the strength of a powerful +battleship escort has always been rejected as an inadmissible operation, +the invader has had no choice but to adopt a separate line for his army, +and operate with his fleet in such a way as may promise to prevent the +enemy controlling that line. That, in short, is the problem of invasion +over an uncommanded sea. In spite of an unbroken record of failure scored +at times with naval disaster, continental strategists from Parma to +Napoleon have clung obstinately to the belief that there is a solution +short of a complete fleet decision. They have tried every conceivable +expedient again and again. They have tried it by simple surprise evasion +and by evasion through diversion or dispersal of our naval defence. They +have tried it by seeking local control through a local naval success +prepared by surprise, or by attempting to entice our fleet away from home +waters to a sufficient extent to give them temporarily local superiority. +But the end has always been the same. Try as they would, they were faced +ultimately by one of two alternatives--they must either defeat our covering +battle-fleet in battle, or they must close their own battle-fleet on the +transports, and so set up the very situation which it was their main design +to avoid. + +The truth is, that all attempts to invade England without command of the +sea have moved in a vicious circle, from which no escape was ever found. No +matter how ingenious or complex the enemy's design, a determined hold on +their army as the primary naval objective has always set up a process of +degradation which rendered the enterprise impracticable. Its stages are +distinct and recurrent, and may be expressed as it were diagrammatically as +follows:-- + +Two lines of operation having been decided on, the invading army is +gathered at a point as close as possible to the coast to be invaded; that +is, where the intervening sea is narrowest, and where the army's passage +will be exposed to interference for the shortest time. The covering fleet +will operate from a point as distant as convenient, so as to entice the +enemy as far as possible from the army's line of passage. The defender +replies by blockading the army's ports of departure with a flotilla of +light vessels capable of dealing with transports, or by establishing a +mobile defence of the threatened coasts which transports cannot break +unaided, or more probably he will combine both expedients. The first +fallacy of the invasion plan is then apparent. The narrower the sea, the +easier it is to watch. Pure evasion becomes impossible, and it is necessary +to give the transports sufficient armed strength by escort or otherwise to +protect them against flotilla attack. The defender at once stiffens his +flotilla defence with cruisers and intermediate ships, and the invader has +to arrange for breaking the barrier with a battle-squadron. So weak and +disturbing a position is then set up that the whole scheme begins to give +way, if, that is, the defender has clung stubbornly to the strategy we +always used. Our battle-fleet refused to seek out that of the invader. It +has always held a position between the invader's fleet and the blockaded +invasion base, covering the blockade and flotilla defence. To enable a +battle-squadron to break our hold and to reinforce the army escort, the +invader must either force this covering position by battle, or disturb it +so effectively as to permit the reinforcing squadron to evade it. But since +_ex hypothesi_ he is trying to invade without securing the command by +battle, he will first try to reinforce his transport escort by evasion. At +once he is faced with new difficulty. The reinforcement entails dividing +his fleet, and this is an expedient so vicious and disturbing to morale, +that no invader has ever been found to risk it. And for this reason. To +make evasion possible for the detached squadron, he must bring up the rest +of his force and engage the attention of the enemy's fleet, and thus unless +he is in very great superiority, and by hypothesis is not--he runs the +hazard of having his two divisions beaten in detail. This method has +sometimes been urged by Governments, but so loud have been the protests +both from the fleet and the army, that it has always been dropped, and the +invader finds himself at the end of the vicious circle. Unable to reinforce +his transport escort sufficiently without dividing his battle-fleet, he is +forced to bring his whole force up to the army or abandon the attempt till +command shall have been secured by battle. + +Thus the traditional British system has never failed to bring about the +deadlock, and it will be observed it is founded on making the invading army +the primary objective. We keep a hold on it, firstly, by flotilla blockade +and defence stiffened as circumstances may dictate by higher units, and +secondly, by battle-fleet cover. It is on the flotilla hold that the whole +system is built up. It is the local danger to that hold which determines +the amount of stiffening the flotilla demands, and it is the security of +that hold which determines the position and action of the battle-fleet. + +A few typical examples will serve to show how the system worked in practice +under all kinds of conditions. The first scientific attempt to work on two +lines of operation, as distinguished from the crude mass methods of the +Middle Ages, was the Spanish enterprise of 1588. Though internal support +from Catholic malcontents was expected, it was designed as a true invasion, +that is, a continuing operation for permanent conquest. Parma, the military +commander-in-chief, laid it down that the Spanish fleet would have not only +to protect his passage and support his landing, but also "to keep open his +communications for the flow of provisions and munition." + +In advising the dual line of operation, Parma's original intention was to +get his army across by surprise. As always, however, it proved impossible +to conceal the design, and long before he was ready he found himself +securely blockaded by a Dutch flotilla supported by an English squadron. So +firm indeed was the English hold on the army, that for a time it was +overdone. The bulk of the English fleet was kept on the line of passage +under Howard, while Drake alone was sent to the westward. It was only under +the great sailor's importunity that the disposition, which was to become +traditional, was perfected, and the whole fleet, with the exception of the +squadron supporting the flotilla blockade, was massed in a covering +position to the westward. The normal situation was then set up, and it +could only have one result. Surprise was out of the question. Parma could +not move till the blockade was broken, nor in face of the covering fleet +could the Spanish fleet hope to break it by a sudden intrusion. The vague +prospects the Spaniards had conceived of keeping the English fleet away +from the line of passage by threatening a descent in the West Country or +blockading it in a western port would no longer do. No such expedient would +release Parma, and the Duke of Medina-Sidonia was ordered to proceed direct +to Dunkirk if possible without fighting, there to break the blockade and +secure the passage. + +There was some idea in the King's mind that he would be able to do this +without a battle, but Parma and every seasoned Spanish sailor knew that the +English fleet would have to be totally defeated before the transports could +venture out of port. Such a battle was indeed inevitable, and the English +dispositions secured that the Spaniards would have to fight it under every +disadvantage which was inherent in the plan of dual lines of operation. The +English would secure certain contact at such a distance from the line of +passage as would permit prolonged harassing attacks in waters unfamiliar to +the enemy and close to their own sources of support and supply. No battle +to the death would be necessary until the Spaniards were herded into the +confined and narrow waters which the army's passage demanded, and where +both sections of the British fleet would be massed for the final struggle. +They must arrive there dispirited with indecisive actions and with the +terrors of unknown and difficult seas at the highest point. All this was no +matter of chance. It was inherent in the strategical and geographical +conditions. The English dispositions had taken every advantage of them, and +the result was that not only was the Spanish army unable even to move, but +the English advantages in the final battle were so great, that it was only +a lucky shift of wind that saved the Armada from being driven to total +destruction upon the Dutch banks. + +In this case, of course, there had been ample time to make the necessary +dispositions. It will be well to follow it with an example in which +surprise came as near to being complete as it is possible to conceive, and +where the arrangements for defence had to be improvised on the spur of the +moment. + +A case in point was the French attempt of 1744. In that year everything was +in favour of the invader. England was undermined with Jacobite sedition; +Scotland was restless and threatening; the navy had sunk to what is +universally regarded as its worst for spirit, organisation, and command; +and the government was in the hands of the notorious "Drunken +Administration." For three years we had been making unsuccessful war with +Spain, and had been supporting Maria Theresa on the Continent against +France, with the result that our home defence was reduced to its lowest +ebb. The navy then numbered 183 sail--about equal to that of France and +Spain combined--but owing to the strain of the war in the Mediterranean and +Transatlantic stations only forty-three, including eighteen of the line, +were available for home waters. Even counting all cruising ships "within +call," as the phrase then was, the Government had barely one-fourth of the +fleet at hand to meet the crisis. With the land forces it was little +better. Considerably more than half the home army was abroad with the King, +who was assisting the Empress-Queen as Elector of Hanover. Between France +and England, however, there was no war. In the summer the King won the +battle of Dettingen; a formal alliance with Maria Theresa followed in the +autumn; France responded with a secret alliance with Spain; and to prevent +further British action on the Continent, she resolved to strike a blow at +London in combination with a Jacobite insurrection. It was to be a "bolt +from the blue" before declaration and in mid-winter, when the best ships of +the home fleet were laid up. The operation was planned on dual lines, the +army to start from Dunkirk, the covering fleet from Brest. + +The surprise was admirably designed. The port of Dunkirk had been destroyed +under the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, and though the French had been +restoring it secretly for some time, it was still unfit to receive a fleet +of transports. In spite of the warnings of Sir John Norris, the senior +admiral in the service, the assembling of troops in its neighbourhood from +the French army in Flanders could only be taken for a movement into winter +quarters, and that no suspicion might be aroused the necessary transports +were secretly taken up in other ports under false charter-parties, and were +only to assemble off Dunkirk at the last moment. With equal skill the +purpose of the naval mobilisation at Brest was concealed. By false +information cleverly imparted to our spies and by parade of victualling for +a long voyage, the British Government was led to believe that the main +fleet was intended to join the Spaniards in the Mediterranean, while a +detachment, which was designed to escort the transports, was ostensibly +equipped for a raid in the West Indies. + +So far as concealment was concerned the arrangement was perfect. Yet it +contained within it the fatal ingredient. The army was to strike in the +Thames at Tilbury; but complete as was the secrecy, Marshal Saxe, who was +to command, could not face the passage without escort. There were too many +privateers and armed merchantmen always in the river, besides cruisers +moving to and fro on commerce-protection duty. The division, therefore, +which we supposed to be for the West Indies was to be detached from the +Brest fleet after it entered the Channel and was to proceed to join the +transports off Dunkirk, while the Marquis de Roquefeuil with the main fleet +held what British ships might be ready in Portsmouth either by battle or +blockade. + +Nothing could look simpler or more certain of success. The British +Government seemed quite asleep. The blow was timed for the first week in +January, and it was mid-December before they even began to watch Brest with +cruisers regularly. On these cruisers' reports measures were taken to +prepare an equal squadron for sea by the new year. By this time nearly +twenty of the line were ready or nearly so at the Nore, Portsmouth, and +Plymouth, and a press was ordered to man them. Owing to various causes the +French had now to postpone their venture. Finally it was not till February +6th that Roquefeuil was seen to leave Brest with nineteen of the line. The +news reached London on the 12th, and next day Norris was ordered to hoist +his flag at Spithead. His instructions were "to take the most effectual +measures to prevent the making of any descent upon the kingdoms." It was +nothing but news that the young Pretender had left Rome for France that led +to this precaution. The Government had still no suspicion of what was +brewing at Dunkirk. It was not till the 20th that a Dover smuggler brought +over information which at last opened their eyes. + +A day or two later the French transports were seen making for Dunkirk, and +were mistaken for the Brest fleet. Orders were consequently sent down to +Norris to follow them. In vain he protested at the interference. He knew +the French were still to the westward of him, but his orders were repeated, +and he had to go. Tiding it up-Channel against easterly winds, he reached +the Downs and joined the Nore Division there on the 28th. History usually +speaks of this false movement as the happy chance which saved the country +from invasion. But it was not so. Saxe had determined not to face the +Thames ships without escort. They were ample to destroy him had he done so. +In truth the move which the Government forced on Norris spoilt the campaign +and prevented his destroying the Brest fleet as well as stopping the +invasion. + +Roquefeuil had just received his final orders off the Start. He was +instructed by all possible means to bring the main British fleet to action, +or at least to prevent further concentration, while he was also to detach +the special division of four of the line under Admiral Barraille to Dunkirk +to escort the transports. It was in fact the inevitable order, caused by +our hold on the army, to divide the fleet. Both officers as usual began to +be upset, and as with Medina-Sidonia, they decided to keep company till +they reached the Isle of Wight and remain there till they could get touch +with Saxe and pilots for the Dover Strait. They were beset with the +nervousness that seems inseparable from this form of operation. Roquefeuil +explained to his Government that it was impossible to tell what ships the +enemy had passed to the Downs, and that Barraille when he arrived off +Dunkirk might well find himself in inferiority. He ended in the usual way +by urging that the whole fleet must move in a body to the line of passage. +On arriving off Portsmouth, however, a reconnaissance in thick weather led +him to believe that the whole of Norris's fleet was still there, and he +therefore detached Barraille, who reached Dunkirk in safety. + +Not knowing that Norris was in the Downs, Saxe began immediately to embark +his troops, but bad weather delayed the operation for three days, and so +saved the expedition, exposed as it was in the open roads, from destruction +by an attack which Norris was on the point of delivering with his flotilla +of fireships and bomb vessels. + +The Brest squadron had an equally narrow escape. Saxe and his staff having +heard rumours of Norris's movement to the Downs had become seized with the +sea-sickness which always seems to afflict an army as it waits to face the +dangers of an uncommanded passage. They too wanted the whole fleet to +escort them, and orders had been sent to Roquefeuille to do as he had +suggested. All unconscious of Norris's presence in the Downs with a score +of the line more powerful than his own, he came on with the fifteen he had +still with his flag to close on Barraille. Norris was informed of his +approach, and it was now he wrote his admirable appreciation, already +quoted, for dealing with the situation. + +"As I think it," he said, "of the greatest consequence to his Majesty's +service to prevent the landing of these troops in any part of the country, +I have ... determined to anchor without the sands of Dunkirk, where we +shall be in the fairest way for keeping them in." That is, he determined to +keep hold of the army regardless of the enemy's fleet, and as Saxe's +objective was not quite certain, he would do it by close blockade. "But +if," he continued, "they should unfortunately get out and pass in the night +and go northward [that is, for Scotland], I intend to detach a superior +force to endeavour to overtake and destroy them, and with the remainder of +my squadron either fight the French fleet now in the Channel, or observe +them and cover the country as our circumstances will admit of; or I shall +pursue the embarkation [that is, follow the transports] with all my +strength." This meant he would treat the enemy's army offensively and their +fleet defensively, and his plan was entirely approved by the King. + +As to which of the two plans he would adopt, the inference is that his +choice would depend on the strength of the enemy, for it was reported the +Rochefort squadron had joined Roquefeuille. The doubt was quickly settled. +On the morrow he heard that Roquefeuille was at Dungeness with only fifteen +of the line. In a moment he seized all the advantage of the interior +position which Roquefeuille's necessity to close on the army had given him. +With admirable insight he saw there was time to fling his whole force at +the enemy's fleet without losing his hold on the army's line of passage. +The movement was made immediately. The moment the French were sighted +"General chase" was signalled, and Roquefeuille was within an ace of being +surprised at his anchorage when a calm stopped the attack. The calm was +succeeded by another furious gale, in which the French escaped in a +disastrous _sauve qui peut_, and the fleet of transports was destroyed. The +outcome of it all was not only the failure of the invasion, but that we +secured the command of home waters for the rest of the war. + +The whole attempt, it will be seen, with everything in its favour, had +exhibited the normal course of degradation. For all the nicely framed plan +and the perfect deception, the inherent difficulties, when it came to the +point of execution, had as usual forced a clumsy concentration of the +enemy's battle-fleet with his transports, and we on our part were able to +forestall it with every advantage in our favour by the simple expedient of +a central mass on a revealed and certain line of passage. + +In the next project, that of 1759, a new and very clever plan was devised +for turning the difficulty. The first idea of Marshal Belleisle, like that +of Napoleon, was to gather the army at Ambleteuse and Boulogne, and to +avoid the assemblage of transports by passing it across the Strait by +stealth in flat boats. But this idea was abandoned before it had gone very +far for something much more subtle. The fallacious advantage of a short +passage was dropped, and the army was to start from three widely separated +points all in more open waters--a diversionary raid from Dunkirk and two +more formidable forces from Havre and the Morbihan in South Brittany. To +secure sufficient control there was to be a concentration on the Brest +fleet from the Mediterranean and the West Indies. + +The new feature, it will be observed, was that our covering fleet--that is, +the Western Squadron off Brest--would have two cruiser blockades to secure, +one on either side of it. Difficult as the situation looked, it was solved +on the old lines. The two divisions of the French army at Dunkirk and +Morbihan were held by cruiser squadrons capable of following them over the +open sea if by chance they escaped, while the third division at Havre, +which had nothing but flat boats for transport, was held by a flotilla well +supported. Its case was hopeless. It could not move without a squadron to +release it, and no fortune of weather could possibly bring a squadron from +Brest. Hawke, who had the main blockade, might be blown off, but he could +scarcely fail to bring to action any squadron that attempted to enter the +Channel. With the Morbihan force it was different. Any time that Hawke was +blown off a squadron could reach it from Brest and break the cruiser +blockade. The French Government actually ordered a portion of the fleet to +make the attempt. Conflans however, who was in command, protested his force +was too weak to divide, owing to the failure of the intended concentration. +Boscawen had caught and beaten the Mediterranean squadron off Lagos, and +though the West Indian squadron got in, it proved, as in Napoleon's great +plan of concentration, unfit for further service. The old situation had +arisen, forced by the old method of defence; and in the end there was +nothing for it but for Conflans to take his whole fleet to the Morbihan +transports. Hawke was upon him at once, and the disastrous day of Quiberon +was the result. The Dunkirk division alone got free, but the smallness of +its size, which permitted it to evade the watch, also prevented its doing +any harm. Its escort, after landing its handful of troops in Ireland, was +entirely destroyed; and so again the attempt of the French to invade over +an uncommanded sea produced no effect but the loss of their fleet. + +The project of 1779 marked these principles even more strongly, for it +demonstrated them working even when our home fleet was greatly inferior to +that of the enemy. In this case the invader's idea was to form two +expeditionary forces at Cherbourg and Havre, and under cover of an +overwhelming combination of the Spanish and French fleets, to unite them at +sea and seize Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight. It was in the early summer +we got wind of the scheme, and two cruiser squadrons and flotillas were at +once formed at the Downs and Channel Islands to watch the French coasts and +prevent the concentration of transports. Spain had not yet declared war, +but she was suspected, and the main fleet, under the veteran Sir Charles +Hardy, who had been Norris's second in command in 1744, was ordered to +proceed off Brest and prevent any Spanish squadron that might appear from +entering that port. The French, however, outmanoeuvred us by putting to sea +before Hardy could reach his station and forming a junction with the +Spaniards off Finisterre. The combined fleet contained about fifty of the +line, nearly double our own. The army of invasion, with Dumouriez for its +Chief of the Staff, numbered some 50,000 men, a force we were in no +condition to meet ashore. Everything, therefore, was in favour of success, +and yet in the navy, at least, a feeling of confidence prevailed that no +invasion could take place. + +The brains of the naval defence were Lord Barham (then Sir Charles +Middleton) at the Admiralty and Kempenfelt as Chief of the Staff in the +fleet; and it is to their correspondence at this time that we owe some of +the most valuable strategical appreciations we possess. The idea of the +French was to come into the Channel in their overwhelming force, and while +they destroyed or held Hardy, to detach a sufficient squadron to break the +cruiser blockade and escort the troops across. Kempenfelt was confident +that it could not be done. He was sure that the unwieldy combined mass +could be rendered powerless by his comparatively homogeneous and mobile +fleet, inferior as it was, so long as he could keep it at sea and to the +westward. The appreciation of the power of a nimble inferior fleet which he +wrote at this time has already been given.[23] When the worst of the +position was fully known, and the enemy was reported off the mouth of the +Channel, he wrote another to Middleton. His only doubt was whether his +fleet had the necessary cohesion and mobility. "We don't seem," he said, +"to have considered sufficiently a certain fact that the comparative force +of two fleets depends much upon their sailing. The fleet that sails fastest +has much the advantage, as they can engage or not as they please, and so +have always in their power to choose the favourable opportunity to attack. +I think I may safely hazard an opinion that twenty-five sail of the line +coppered would be sufficient to harass and tease this great unwieldy +combined Armada so as to prevent their effecting anything, hanging +continually upon them, ready to catch at any opportunity of a separation +from night, gale or fog, to dart upon the separated, to cut off convoys of +provisions coming to them, and if they attempted an invasion, to oblige +their whole fleet to escort the transports, and even then it would be +impossible to protect them entirely from so active and nimble a fleet." + + [23] _Supra_, p. 222. + +Here we have from the pen of one of the greatest masters the real key of +the solution--the power, that is, of forcing the mass of the enemy's fleet +to escort the transports. Hardy, of course, knew it well from his +experience of 1744, and acted accordingly. This case is the more striking, +since defence against the threatened invasion was not the whole of the +problem he had to solve. It was complicated by instructions that he must +also prevent a possible descent on Ireland, and cover the arrival of the +great convoys. In reply, on August 1st, he announced his intention of +taking station ten to twenty leagues W.S.W. of Scilly, "which I am of +opinion," he said, "is the most proper station for the security of the +trade expected from the East and West Indies, and for the meeting of the +fleets of the enemy _should they attempt to come into the Channel_." He +underlined the last words, indicating, apparently, his belief that they +would not venture to do so so long as he could keep his fleet to the +westward and undefeated. This at least he did, till a month later he found +it necessary to come in for supplies. Then, still avoiding the enemy, he +ran not to Plymouth, but right up to St. Helen's. The movement is always +regarded as an unworthy retreat, and it caused much dissatisfaction in the +fleet at the time. But it is to be observed that his conduct was strictly +in accordance with the principle which makes the invading army the primary +objective. If Hardy's fleet was no longer fit to keep the sea without +replenishment, then the proper place to seek replenishment was on the +invader's line of passage. So long as he was there, invasion could not take +place till he was defeated. The allies, it was true, were now free to join +their transports, but the prospect of such a movement gave the admiral no +uneasiness, for it would bring him the chance of serving his enemy as the +Spaniards were served in 1588. "I shall do my utmost," he said, "to drive +them up the Channel." It is the old principle. If the worst comes to the +worst, so long as you are able to force the covering fleet upon the +transports, and especially in narrow waters, invasion becomes an operation +beyond the endurable risks of war. + +So it proved. On August 14th Count d'Orvilliers, the allied +commander-in-chief, had made the Lizard, and for a fortnight had striven to +bring Hardy to decisive action. Until he had done so he dared neither enter +the Channel with his fleet nor detach a squadron to break the cruiser +blockades at the invasion bases. His ineffectual efforts exhausted his +fleet's endurance, which the distant concentration at Finisterre had +already severely sapped, and he was forced to return impotent to Brest +before anything had been accomplished. The allies were not able to take the +sea again that campaign, but even had it been in their power to do so, +Hardy and Kempenfelt could have played their defensive game indefinitely, +and with ever-increasing chances, as the winter drew near, of dealing a +paralysing blow. + +There was never any real chance of success, though it is true Dumouriez +thought otherwise. He believed the enterprise might have gone through if a +diversion had been made by the bulk of the fleet against Ireland, and under +cover of it a _coup de main_ delivered upon the Isle of Wight, "for which," +he said, "six or eight of the line would have been enough." But it is +inconceivable that old hands like Hardy and Kempenfelt would have been so +easily beguiled of their hold on the line of passage. Had such a division +been detached up the Channel from the allied fleet they would surely, +according to tradition, have followed it with either a superior force or +their whole squadron. + +The well-known projects of the Great War followed the same course. Under +Napoleon's directions they ran the whole gamut of every scheme that ever +raised delusive hope before. Beginning from the beginning with the idea of +stealing his army across in flat-boats, he was met with the usual flotilla +defence. Then came his only new idea, which was to arm his transport +flotilla to the point of giving it power to force a passage for itself. We +replied by strengthening our flotilla. Convinced by experiment that his +scheme was now impracticable, he set his mind on breaking the blockade by +the sudden intrusion of a flying squadron from a distance. To this end +various plausible schemes were worked out, but plan after plan melted in +his hand, till he was forced to face the inevitable necessity of bringing +an overwhelming battle force up to his transports. The experience of two +centuries had taught him nothing. By a more distant concentration than had +ever been attempted before he believed he could break the fatal hold of his +enemy. The only result was so severely to exhaust his fleet that it never +could get within reach of the real difficulties of its task, a task which +every admiral in his service knew to be beyond the strength of the Imperial +Navy. Nor did Napoleon even approach a solution of the problem he had set +himself--invasion over an uncommanded sea. With our impregnable flotilla +hold covered by an automatic concentration of battle-squadrons off Ushant, +his army could never even have put forth, unless he had inflicted upon our +covering fleet such a defeat as would have given him command of the sea, +and with absolute control of the sea the passage of an army presents no +difficulties. + +Of the working of these principles under modern conditions we have no +example. The acquisition of free movement must necessarily modify their +application, and since the advent of steam there have been only two +invasions over uncommanded seas--that of the Crimea in 1854, and that of +Manchuria in 1904--and neither of these cases is in point, for in neither +was there any attempt at naval defence. Still there seems no reason to +believe that such defence applied in the old manner would be less effective +than formerly. The flotilla was its basis, and since the introduction of +the torpedo the power of the flotilla has greatly increased. Its real and +moral effect against transports must certainly be greater than ever, and +the power of squadrons to break a flotilla blockade is more restricted. +Mines, again, tell almost entirely in favour of defence, so much so indeed +as to render a rapid _coup de main_ against any important port almost an +impossibility. In the absence of all experience it is to such theoretical +considerations we must turn for light. + +Theoretically stated, the success of our old system of defence depended on +four relations. Firstly, there is the relation between the rapidity with +which an invasion force could be mobilised and embarked, and the rapidity +with which restlessness in foreign ports and _places d'armes_ could be +reported; that is to say, the chance of surprise and evasion are as the +speed of preparation to the speed of intelligence. + +Secondly, there is the relation of the speed of convoys to the speed of +cruisers and flotilla; that is to say, our ability to get contact with a +convoy after it has put to sea and before the expedition can be disembarked +is as the speed of our cruisers and flotilla to the speed of the convoy. + +Thirdly, there is the relation between the destructive power of modern +cruisers and flotillas against a convoy unescorted or weakly escorted and +the corresponding power in sailing days. + +Fourthly, there is the relation between the speed of convoys and the speed +of battle-squadrons, which is of importance where the enemy's transports +are likely to be strongly escorted. On this relation depends the facility +with which the battle-squadron covering our mobile defence can secure an +interior position from which it may strike either the enemy's +battle-squadron if it moves or his convoy before it can complete its +passage and effect the landing. + +All these relations appear to have been modified by modern developments in +favour of the defence. In the first ratio, that of speed of mobilisation to +speed of intelligence, it is obviously so. Although military mobilisation +may be still relatively as rapid as the mobilisation of fleets, yet +intelligence has outstripped both. This is true both for gaining and for +conveying intelligence. Preparations for oversea invasion were never easy +to conceal, owing to the disturbance of the flow of shipping that they +caused. Elaborate precautions were taken to prevent commercial leakage of +intelligence, but they never entirely succeeded. Yet formerly, in the +condition of comparative crudeness with which international trade was then +organised, concealment was relatively easy, at least for a time. But the +ever-growing sensitiveness of world-wide commerce, when market movements +are reported from hour to hour instead of from week to week, has greatly +increased the difficulty. And apart from the rapidity with which +information may be gathered through this alert and intimate sympathy +between Exchanges, there is the still more important fact that with +wireless the speed of conveying naval intelligence has increased in a far +higher ratio than the speed of sea transit. + +As regards the ratio between cruiser and convoy speeds, on which evasion so +much depends, it is the same. In frigate days the ratio appears to have +been not more than seven to five. Now in the case at any rate of large +convoys it would be nearly double. + +Of the destructive power of the flotilla, growing as it does from year to +year, enough has been said already. With the advent of the torpedo and +submarine it has probably increased tenfold. In a lesser degree the same is +true of cruisers. In former days the physical power of a cruiser to injure +a dispersing convoy was comparatively low, owing to her relatively low +excess of speed and the restricted range and destructive power of her guns. +With higher speed and higher energy and range in gun power the ability of +cruisers to cut up a convoy renders its practical annihilation almost +certain if once it be caught, and consequently affords a moral deterrent +against trusting to evasion beyond anything that was known before. + +The increased ratio of battle-fleet speed to that of large convoys is +equally indisputable and no less important, for the facility of finding +interior positions which it implies goes to the root of the old system. So +long as our battle-fleet is in a position whence it can cover our flotilla +blockade or strike the enemy's convoy in transit, it forces his +battle-fleet in the last resort to close up on the convoy, and that, as +Kempenfelt pointed out, is practically fatal to the success of invasion. + +From whatever point of view, then, we regard the future chances of +successful invasion over an uncommanded sea, it would seem that not only +does the old system hold good, but that all modern developments which touch +the question bid fair to intensify the results which our sea service at +least used so confidently to expect, and which it never failed to secure. + +II. ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF TRADE + +The base idea of the attack and defence of trade may be summed up in the +old adage, "Where the carcase is, there will the eagles be gathered +together." The most fertile areas always attracted the strongest attack, +and therefore required the strongest defence; and between the fertile and +the infertile areas it was possible to draw a line which for strategical +purposes was definite and constant. The fertile areas were the terminals of +departure and destination where trade tends to be crowded, and in a +secondary degree the focal points where, owing to the conformation of the +land, trade tends to converge. The infertile areas were the great routes +which passed through the focal points and connected the terminal areas. +Consequently attack on commerce tends to take one of two forms. It may be +terminal or it may be pelagic, terminal attack being the more profitable, +but demanding the greater force and risk, and pelagic attack being the more +uncertain, but involving less force and risk. + +These considerations lead us directly to the paradox which underlies the +unbroken failure of our enemies to exercise decisive pressure upon us by +operations against our trade. It is that where attack is most to be feared, +there defence is easiest. A plan of war which has the destruction of trade +for its primary object implies in the party using it an inferiority at sea. +Had he superiority, his object would be to convert that superiority to a +working command by battle or blockade. Except, therefore, in the rare cases +where the opposed forces are equal, we must assume that the belligerent who +makes commerce destruction his primary object will have to deal with a +superior fleet. Now, it is true that the difficulty of defending trade lies +mainly in the extent of sea it covers. But, on the other hand, the areas in +which it tends to congregate, and in which alone it is seriously +vulnerable, are few and narrow, and can be easily occupied if we are in +superior force. Beyond those areas effective occupation is impossible, but +so also is effective attack. Hence the controlling fact of war on commerce, +that facility of attack means facility of defence. + +Beside this fundamental principle we must place another that is scarcely +less important. Owing to the general common nature of sea communications, +attack and defence of trade are so intimately connected that the one +operation is almost indistinguishable from the other. Both ideas are +satisfied by occupying the common communications. The strongest form of +attack is the occupation of the enemy's terminals, and the establishment of +a commercial blockade of the ports they contain. But as this operation +usually requires the blockade of an adjacent naval port, it also +constitutes, as a rule, a defensive disposition for our own trade, even +when the enemy's terminal area does not overlap one of our own. In the +occupation of focal areas the two ideas are even more inseparable, since +most, if not all, such areas are on lines of communication that are common. +It will suffice, therefore, to deal with the general aspect of the subject +from the point of view of defence. + +It was in conformity with the distinction between fertile and infertile +areas that our old system of trade defence was developed. Broadly speaking, +that system was to hold the terminals in strength, and in important cases +the focal points as well. By means of a battle-squadron with a full +complement of cruisers they were constituted defended areas, or "tracts" as +the old term was, and the trade was regarded as safe when it entered them. +The intervening trade-routes were left as a rule undefended. Thus our home +terminals were held by two battle-squadrons, the Western Squadron at the +mouth of the Channel, and the North Sea or Eastern Squadron with its +headquarters usually in the Downs. To these was added a cruiser squadron on +the Irish station based at Cork, which was sometimes subordinate to the +Western Squadron and sometimes an independent organisation. The area of the +Western Squadron in the French wars extended, as we have seen, over the +whole Bay of Biscay, with the double function, so far as commerce was +concerned, of preventing the issue of raiding squadrons from the enemy's +ports, and acting offensively against his Atlantic trade. That of the North +Sea squadron extended to the mouth of the Baltic and the north-about +passage. Its main function during the great naval coalitions against us was +to check the operations of Dutch squadrons or to prevent the intrusion of +French ones north-about against our Baltic trade. Like the Western +Squadron, it threw out divisions usually located at Yarmouth and Leith for +the protection of our coastwise trade from privateers and sporadic cruisers +acting from ports within the defended area. Similarly, between the Downs +and the Western Squadron was usually one or more smaller squadrons, mainly +cruisers, and generally located about Havre and the Channel Islands, which +served the same purpose for the Norman and North Breton ports. To complete +the system there were flotilla patrols acting under the port admirals and +doing their best to police the routes of the coastwise and local traffic, +which then had an importance long since lost. The home system of course +differed at different times, but it was always on these general lines. The +naval defence was supplemented by defended ports of refuge, the principal +ones being on the coast of Ireland to shelter the ocean trade, but others +in great numbers were provided within the defended areas against the +operations of privateers, and the ruins of batteries all round the British +shores testify how complete was the organisation. + +A similar system prevailed in the colonial areas, but there the naval +defence consisted normally of cruiser squadrons stiffened with one or two +ships-of-the-line mainly for the purpose of carrying the flag. They were +only occupied by battle-squadrons when the enemy threatened operations with +a similar force. The minor or interior defence against local privateers was +to a large extent local; that is, the great part of the flotilla was +furnished by sloops built or hired on the spot, as being best adapted for +the service. + +Focal points were not then so numerous as they have become since the +development of the Far Eastern trade. The most important of them, the +Straits of Gibraltar, was treated as a defended area. From the point of +view of commerce-protection it was held by the Mediterranean squadron. By +keeping watch on Toulon that squadron covered not only the Straits, but +also the focal points within the sea. It too had its extended divisions, +sometimes as many as four, one about the approaches to Leghorn, one in the +Adriatic, a third at Malta, and the fourth at Gibraltar. In cases of war +with Spain the latter was very strong, so as to secure the focal area +against Cartagena and Cadiz. On one occasion indeed, in 1804-5, as we have +seen, it was constituted for a short time an independent area with a +special squadron. But in any case the Gibraltar area had its own internal +flotilla guard under the direction of the port admiral as a defence against +local privateers and pirates. + +The general theory of these defended terminal and focal areas, it will be +seen, was to hold in force those waters which converging trade made most +fertile, and which therefore furnished an adequate field for the operations +of raiding squadrons. In spite of the elaborate defensive system, such +squadrons might, and sometimes did, intrude by surprise or stealth, and +were then able to set at defiance both convoy escorts and the cruiser +outposts. But, as experience proved, the system of terminal defence by +battle-squadrons made it impossible for such raiding squadrons to remain +long enough on the ground to cause any serious interruption or to do +serious harm. It was only by a regular fleet of superior strength that the +system could be broken down. In other words, the defence could only fall +when our means of local control was destroyed by battle. + +So much for the defended areas. With regard to the great routes that +connected them, it has been said they were left undefended. By this is +meant that the security of ships passing along them was provided for, not +by patrols but by escort. The convoy system was adopted, and the theory of +that system is that while vessels are on the great routes they are normally +liable only to sporadic attack, and they are consequently collected into +fleets and furnished with an escort sufficient to repel sporadic attack. In +theory, cruiser escort is sufficient, but in practice it was found +convenient and economical to assign the duty in part to ships-of-the-line +which were going out to join the distant terminal squadron or returning +from it for a refit or some other reason; in other words, the system of +foreign reliefs was made to work in with the supplementary escort system. +Where no such ships were available and the convoys were of great value, or +enemy's ships-of-the-line were known to be out, similar units were +specially detailed for convoy duty to go and return, but this use of battle +units was exceptional. + +Such a method of dealing with the great routes is the corollary of the idea +of defended areas. As those areas were fertile and likely to attract +raiding squadrons, so the great routes were infertile, and no enemy could +afford to spend squadrons upon them. It is obvious, however, that the +system had its weak side, for the mere fact that a convoy was upon a great +route tended to attract a squadron, and the comparative immunity of those +routes was lost. The danger was provided for to a great extent by the fact +that the enemy's ports from which a squadron could issue were all within +defended areas and watched by our own squadrons. Still, the guard could not +be made impenetrable. There was always the chance of a squadron escaping, +and if it escaped towards a critical trade-route, it must be followed. +Hence there were times when the convoy system seriously disturbed our +dispositions, as, for instance, in the crisis of the Trafalgar campaign, +when for a short time our chain of defended areas was broken down by the +escape of the Toulon squadron. That escape eventually forced a close +concentration on the Western Squadron, but all other considerations apart, +it was felt to be impossible to retain the mass for more than two days +owing to the fact that the great East and West Indies convoys were +approaching, and Villeneuve's return to Ferrol from Martinique exposed them +to squadronal attack. It was, in fact, impossible to tell whether the mass +had not been forced upon us with this special end in view. + +In the liability to deflection of this kind lay the most serious +strategical objection to the convoy system. It was sought to minimise it by +giving the convoys a secret route when there was apprehension of squadronal +interference. It was done in the case just cited, but the precaution seemed +in no way to lessen the anxiety. It may have been because in those days of +slow communication there could be no such certainty that the secret route +had been received as there would be now. + +Modern developments and changes in shipping and naval material have indeed +so profoundly modified the whole conditions of commerce protection, that +there is no part of strategy where historical deduction is more difficult +or more liable to error. To avoid such error as far as possible, it is +essential to keep those developments in mind at every step. The more +important of them are three in number. Firstly, the abolition of +privateering; secondly, the reduced range of action for all warships; and +thirdly, the development of wireless telegraphy. There are others which +must be dealt with in their place, but these three go to the root of the +whole problem. + +Difficult as it is to arrive at exact statistics of commerce destruction in +the old wars, one thing seems certain--that the bulk of captures, which +were reckoned in hundreds and sometimes even in thousands, were due to the +action of privateers. Further, it seems certain that, reckoning at least by +numbers, the greater part of the damage was done by small privateers +operating close to their bases, either home or colonial, against coastwise +and local traffic. The complaints of merchants, so far as they are known, +relate mainly to this kind of work in the West Indies and home waters, +while accounts of serious captures by large privateers on the high seas are +comparatively rare. The actual damage done by the swarm of small vessels +may not have been great, but its moral effects were very serious. It was +impossible for the strongest Governments to ignore them, and the +consequence was a chronic disturbance of the larger strategical +dispositions. While these dispositions were adequate to check the +operations of large privateers acting in the same way as regular cruisers, +the smaller ones found very free play amidst the ribwork of the protective +system, and they could only be dealt with by filling up the spaces with a +swarm of small cruisers to the serious detriment of the larger +arrangements. Even so, the proximity of the enemy's ports made escape so +easy, that the work of repression was very ineffective. The state of the +case was indeed almost identical with a people's war. The ordinary devices +of strategy failed to deal with it, as completely as Napoleon's broadly +planned methods failed to deal with the _guerilleros_ in Spain, or as our +own failed for so long in South Africa. + +By the abolition of privateering, then, it would seem that the most +disturbing part of the problem has been eliminated. It is, of course, +uncertain how far the Declaration of Paris will hold good in practice. It +is still open even to the parties to it to evade its restrictions to a +greater or less extent by taking up and commissioning merchantmen as +regular ships of war. But it is unlikely that such methods will extend +beyond the larger privately owned vessels. Any attempt to revive in this +way the old _picaresque_ methods could only amount to a virtual repudiation +of statutory international law, which would bring its own retribution. +Moreover, for home waters at least, the conditions which favoured this +_picaresque_ warfare no longer exist. In the old wars the bulk of our trade +came into the Thames, and thence the greater part of it was distributed in +small coasting vessels. It was against this coastwise traffic that the +small, short-range privateers found their opportunity and their richest +harvest. But, now that so many other great centres of distribution have +established themselves, and that the bulk of the distribution is done by +internal lines of communication, the Channel is no longer the sole artery, +and the old troublesome disturbance can be avoided without a vital +dislocation of our commercial system. + +The probability, then, is that in the future the whole problem will be +found to be simplified, and that the work of commerce protection will lie +much more within the scope of large strategical treatment than it ever did +before, with the result that the change should be found to tell +substantially in favour of defence and against attack. + +The reduction of range of action is scarcely less important. In the old +days a cruising ship could be stored for six months, and so long as she +could occasionally renew her fuel and water, she was free to range the sea +outside the defended areas for the whole of the period with unimpaired +vitality. For such pelagic operations her movement was practically +unrestricted. She could run for two or three days from a superior enemy or +chase for as long without loss of energy, and she could wait indefinitely +at a likely spot, or change her ground, as danger or hope of plunder +dictated. So long as she had men left to man her prizes, her power of +mischief was almost unlimited. All this is now changed. The capacity of +each cruise of a ship to-day is very small. She is confined to short dashes +within a strategically defended area, or if she is bent on pelagic +operations, is compelled to proceed so far to find undefended waters that +her coal will scarcely permit of more than a few days' actual cruising. A +couple of chases at high speed during that period may force her to return +at once, subject only to the precarious possibility of renewing her coal +from a prize. She has, further, to face the fact that manning prizes must +necessarily reduce her capacity for speed, which depends so much on a fully +manned engine-room. This will tend to jeopardise her chances of return +through or near defended areas. The only escape from this difficulty is to +sink the captured ship. But this course has objections scarcely less +weighty than the other. No Power will incur the odium of sinking a prize +with all hands, and their removal to the captor's ship takes time, +especially in bad weather, and the presence of such prisoners in a cruiser +in any number soon becomes a serious check on her fighting power. In the +case of large ships, moreover, the work of destruction is no easy matter. +In the most favourable circumstances it takes a considerable time, and thus +not only eats into the cruiser's endurance, but decreases her chances of +evasion. + +From these and similar considerations it is obvious that the possibilities +of operations on the great trade-routes are much less extensive than they +were formerly, while to speak of cruisers "infesting" those routes is sheer +hyperbole. Under modern conditions it is scarcely more feasible than it +would be to keep up a permanent blockade of the British Islands. It would +require a flow of ships in such numbers as no country but our own can +contemplate possessing, and such as could not be maintained without having +first secured a very decided preponderance at sea. The loss of radius of +action therefore, though it does not increase the power of defence, +sensibly lessens that of attack by pelagic operations. + +For the great increase in the powers of defence we must turn to the +extraordinary development in the means of distant communication. Under +former conditions it was possible for a cruising ship to remain for days +upon a fertile spot and make a number of captures before her presence was +known. But since most large merchantmen have been fitted with wireless +installations, she cannot now attack a single one of them without fear of +calling down upon her an adversary. Moreover, when she is once located, +every ship within wireless reach can be warned of her presence and avoid +her. She must widely and constantly shift her position, thereby still +further reducing her staying power. On the whole, then, it would appear +that in so far as modern developments affect the problem, they certainly +render pelagic operations far more difficult and uncertain than they used +to be. Upon the great routes the power of attack has been reduced and the +means of evasion has increased to such an extent as to demand entire +reconsideration of the defence of trade between terminal areas. The whole +basis of the old system would seem to be involved. That basis was the +convoy system, and it now becomes doubtful whether the additional security +which convoys afforded is sufficient to outweigh their economical drawbacks +and their liability to cause strategical disturbance. + +Over and above the considerations already noticed, there are three others, +all of which favour the security of our trade by permitting a much more +extended choice of route. The first is, that steam vessels are not forced +by prevailing winds to keep to particular courses. The second is, that the +improvements in the art of navigation no longer render it so necessary to +make well-known landfalls during transit. The third is, that the +multiplication of our great ports of distribution have divided the old main +flow of trade to the Channel into a number of minor streams that cover a +much wider area and demand a greater distribution of force for effective +attack. It will be obvious that the combined effect of these considerations +is to increase still further the chances of individual vessels evading the +enemy's cruisers and to lessen the risk of dispensing with escort. + +Nor are the new practical difficulties of sporadic operations on the great +routes the only arguments that minimise the value of convoys. We have also +to remember that while the number of vessels trading across the ocean has +enormously increased since 1815, it is scarcely possible, even if the +abolition of privateering prove abortive, that the number of cruisers +available for pelagic attack could exceed, or even equal, the number +employed in sailing days. This consideration, then, must also be thrown +into the scale against convoys; for it is certain that the amount of +serious operative damage which an enemy can do to our trade by pelagic +operation is mainly determined by the ratio which his available cruiser +strength bears to the volume of that trade. This aspect of the question is, +however, part of a much wider one, which concerns the relation which the +volume of our trade bears to the difficulty of its defence, and this must +be considered later. + +It remains, first, to deal with the final link in the old system of +defence. The statement that the great routes were left undefended will seem +to be in opposition to a prevailing impression derived from the fact that +frigates are constantly mentioned as being "on a cruise." The assumption is +that they in effect patrolled the great routes. But this was not so, nor +did they rove the sea at will. They constituted a definite and necessary +part of the system. Though that system was founded on a distinction between +defended terminals and undefended routes, which was a real strategical +distinction, it was impossible to draw an actual line where the one sphere +began and the other ended. Outside the regularly defended areas lay a +region which, as the routes began to converge, was comparatively fertile. +In this region enemies' cruisers and their larger privateers found the mean +between risk and profit. Here too convoys, as they entered the zone, were +in their greatest danger for fear of their escorts being overpowered by +raiding squadrons. Consequently it was the practice, when the approach of +convoys was expected, to throw forward from the defended area groups of +powerful cruisers, and even battleship divisions, to meet them and +reinforce their escorts. Outward-bound convoys had their escorts similarly +strengthened till they were clear of the danger zone. The system was in +regular use both for home and colonial areas. In no sense did it constitute +a patrol of the routes. It was in practice and conception a system of +outposts, which at seasons of special risk amounted to an extension of the +defended areas combining with a reinforcement of the convoy escorts. Focal +points of lesser importance, such as Capes Finisterre and St. Vincent, were +similarly held by one or two powerful cruisers, and if necessary by a +squadron. + +As has been already explained, owing to the peculiar conditions of the sea +and the common nature of maritime communications, these dispositions were +adopted as well for attack as defence, and the fertile areas, for the +defence of which a frigate captain was sent "on a cruise," were always +liable to bring him rich reward. His mission of defence carried with it the +best opportunities for attack. + +In the full development of the system patrol lines did exist, but not for +the great routes. They were established to link up adjacent defended areas +and as a more scientific organisation of the cruiser outposts. In 1805 the +Gibraltar and the home areas were thus connected by a patrol line which +stretched from Cape St. Vincent through the Finisterre focal area to Cape +Clear, with a branch extending to the strategical centre off Ushant. The +new system was introduced at a time when we had reason to expect that the +French and Spanish fleets were to be devoted entirely to operations in +small raiding squadrons against our trade and colonies. Special provision +was therefore necessary to locate any such squadrons that might elude the +regular blockades, and to ensure that they should be adequately pursued. +The new lines were in fact intelligence patrols primarily, though they were +also regarded as the only means of protecting efficiently the southern +trade-route where it was flanked by French and Spanish ports.[24] + + [24] It should be said that Cornwallis did not regard this system as new + except for the extension from Finisterre to St. Vincent, which Nelson + advised. In acknowledging the order from Ushant he wrote, "The + instructions ... are nearly the same as have generally been given. I can + therefore only guess why a copy of the order was sent to + me."--_Admiralty, In-Letters_, 129, 28 September 1805. + +The whole system, it will be observed, though not conflicting with the main +object of bringing the enemy's fleets to action, did entail an expenditure +of force and deflecting preoccupations such as are unknown in land warfare. +Large numbers of cruisers had to be employed otherwise than as the eyes of +the battle-squadrons, while the coming and going of convoys produced +periodical oscillations in the general distribution. + +Embarrassing as was this commercial deflection in the old wars, an +impression appears to prevail that in the future it must be much more +serious. It is argued plausibly enough not only that our trade is far +larger and richer than it was, but also that, owing to certain well-known +economic changes, it is far more a matter of life and death to the nation +than in the days when food and raw material did not constitute the bulk of +our imports. In view of the new conditions it is held that we are more +vulnerable through our trade now than formerly, and that, consequently, we +must devote relatively more attention and force to its defence. + +If this were true, it is obvious that war with a strong naval combination +would present difficulties of the most formidable kind, greater indeed than +we have ever experienced; for since with modern developments the demand for +fleet cruisers is much greater than formerly, the power of devoting +cruisers to trade defence is relatively much less. + +It cannot be denied that at first sight the conclusion looks +irreproachable. But on analysis it will be found to involve two +assumptions, both of which are highly questionable. The first is, that the +vulnerability of a sea Power through its maritime trade is as the volume of +that trade. The second is, that the difficulty of defending sea-borne trade +is also as its volume--that is to say, the larger the amount of the trade, +the larger must be the force devoted to its protection. This idea indeed is +carried so far, that we are frequently invited to fix the standard of our +naval strength by comparing it with the proportion which the naval strength +of other Powers bears to their sea-borne trade. + +It is hoped that the foregoing sketch of our traditional system of trade +defence will avail to raise a doubt whether either assumption can be +accepted without very careful consideration. In the history of that system +there is no indication that it was affected by the volume of the trade it +was designed to protect. Nor has any one succeeded in showing that the +pressure which an enemy could exert upon us through our commerce increased +in effect with the volume of our seaborne trade. The broad indications +indeed are the other way--that the greater the volume of our trade, the +less was the effective impression which an enemy could make upon it, even +when he devoted his whole naval energies to that end. It is not too much to +say that in every case where he took this course his own trade dwindled to +nothing, while ours continually increased. + +It may be objected that this was because the only periods in which he +devoted his main efforts to trade destruction were when we had dominated +his navy, and being no longer able to dispute the command, he could do no +more than interfere with its exercise. But this must always be so whether +we have positively dominated his navy or not. If he tries to ignore our +battle-fleets, and devotes himself to operations against trade, he cannot +dispute the command. Whatever his strength, he must leave the command to +us. He cannot do both systematically, and unless he attacks our trade +systematically by sustained strategical operation, he cannot hope to make +any real impression. + +If, now, we take the two assumptions and test them by the application of +elementary principles, both will appear theoretically unsound. Let us take +first the relation of vulnerability to volume. Since the object of war is +to force our will upon the enemy, the only way in which we can expect war +on commerce to serve our end is to inflict so much damage upon it as will +cause our enemy to prefer peace on our terms to a continuation of the +struggle. The pressure on his trade must be insupportable, not merely +annoying. It must seriously cripple his finance or seriously threaten to +strangle his national life and activities. If his total trade be a hundred +millions, and we succeed in destroying five, he will feel it no more than +he does the ordinary fluctuations to which he is accustomed in time of +peace. If, however, we can destroy fifty millions, his trade equilibrium +will be overthrown, and the issue of the war will be powerfully affected. +In other words, to affect the issue the impression made on trade must be a +percentage or relative impression. The measure of a nation's vulnerability +through its trade is the percentage of destruction that an enemy can +effect. + +Now, it is true that the amount of damage which a belligerent can inflict +with a given force on an enemy's commerce will vary to some extent with its +volume; for the greater the volume of commerce, the more fertile will be +the undefended cruising grounds. But no matter how fertile such areas might +be, the destructive power of a cruiser was always limited, and it must be +still more limited in the future. It was limited by the fact that it was +physically impossible to deal with more than a certain number of prizes in +a certain time, and, for the reasons already indicated, this limit has +suffered a very marked restriction. When this limit of capacity in a given +force is passed, the volume of commerce will not affect the issue; and +seeing how low that capacity must be in the future and how enormous is the +volume of our trade, the limit of destructive power, at least as against +ourselves, provided we have a reasonably well-organised system of defence, +must be relatively low. It must, in fact, be passed at a percentage figure +well within what we have easily supported in the past. There is reason, +therefore, to believe that so far from the assumption in question being +true, the effective vulnerability of sea-borne trade is not in direct but +in inverse proportion to its volume. In other words, the greater the +volume, the more difficult it is to make an effective percentage +impression. + +Similarly, it will be observed that the strain of trade defence was +proportioned not to the volume of that trade, but to the number and +exposure of its terminals and focal points. Whatever the volume of the +trade these remained the same in number, and the amount of force required +for their defence varied only with the strength that could readily be +brought to bear against them. It varied, that is, with the distribution of +the enemy's bases and the amount of his naval force. Thus in the war of +1812 with the United States, the West Indian and North American areas were +much more exposed than they had been when we were at war with France alone +and when American ports were not open to her as bases. They became +vulnerable not only to the United States fleet, but also in a much higher +degree to that of France, and consequently the force we found necessary to +devote to trade defence in the North Atlantic was out of all proportion to +the naval strength of the new belligerent. Our protective force had to be +increased enormously, while the volume of our trade remained precisely the +same. + +This relation of trade defence to terminal and focal areas is of great +importance, for it is in the increase of such areas in the Far East that +lies the only radical change in the problem. The East Indian seas were +always of course to some extent treated as a defended area, but the problem +was simplified by the partial survival in those regions of the old method +of defence. Till about the end of the seventeenth century long-range trade +was expected to defend itself, at least outside the home area, and the +retention of their armament by East Indiamen was the last survival of the +practice. Beyond the important focal area of St. Helena they relied mainly +on their own power of resistance or to such escort as could be provided by +the relief ships of the East Indian station. As a rule, their escort proper +went no farther outward-bound than St. Helena, whence it returned with the +homeward-bound vessels that gathered there from India, China, and the South +Sea whaling grounds. The idea of the system was to provide escort for that +part of the great route which was exposed to attack from French or Spanish +colonial bases on the African coasts and in the adjacent islands. + +For obvious reasons this system would have to be reconsidered in the +future. The expansion of the great European Powers have changed the +conditions for which it sufficed, and in a war with any one of them the +system of defended terminal and focal areas would require a great extension +eastward, absorbing an appreciable section of our force, and entailing a +comparatively weak prolongation of our chain of concentrations. Here, then, +we must mark a point where trade defence has increased in difficulty, and +there is one other. + +Although minor hostile bases within a defended area have lost most of their +menace to trade, they have acquired as torpedo bases a power of disturbing +the defence itself. So long as such bases exist with a potent flotilla +within them, it is obvious that the actual provision for defence cannot be +so simple a matter as it was formerly. Other and more complex arrangements +may have to be made. Still, the principle of defended areas seems to remain +unshaken, and if it is to work with its old effectiveness, the means and +the disposition for securing those areas will have to be adapted to the new +tactical possibilities. The old strategical conditions, so far as can be +seen, are unaltered except in so far as the reactions of modern material +make them tell in favour of defence rather than of attack. + +If we desire to formulate the principles on which this conclusion rests we +shall find them in the two broad rules, firstly, that the vulnerability of +trade is in inverse ratio to its volume, and secondly, that facility of +attack means facility of defence. The latter, which was always true, +receives special emphasis from modern developments. Facility of attack +means the power of exercising control. For exercise of control we require +not only numbers, but also speed and endurance, qualities which can only be +obtained in two ways: it must be at the cost of armour and armament, or at +the cost of increased size. By increasing size we at once lose numbers. If +by sacrificing armament and armour we seek to maintain numbers and so +facilitate attack, we at the same time facilitate defence. Vessels of low +fighting power indeed cannot hope to operate in fertile areas without +support to overpower the defence. Every powerful unit detached for such +support sets free a unit on the other side, and when this process is once +begun, there is no halting-place. Supporting units to be effective must +multiply into squadrons, and sooner or later the inferior Power seeking to +substitute commerce destruction for the clash of squadrons will have +squadronal warfare thrust upon him, provided again the superior Power +adopts a reasonably sound system of defence. It was always so, and, so far +as it is possible to penetrate the mists which veil the future, it would +seem that with higher mobility and better means of communication the +squadronal stage must be reached long before any adequate percentage +impression can have been made by the sporadic action of commerce +destroyers. Ineffectual as such warfare has always been in the past, until +a general command has been established, its prospects in the future, judged +by the old established principles, are less promising than ever. + +Finally, in approaching the problem of trade protection, and especially for +the actual determination of the force and distribution it requires, there +is a dominant limitation to be kept in mind. By no conceivable means is it +possible to give trade absolute protection. We cannot make an omelette +without breaking eggs. We cannot make war without losing ships. To aim at a +standard of naval strength or a strategical distribution which would make +our trade absolutely invulnerable is to march to economic ruin. It is to +cripple our power of sustaining war to a successful issue, and to seek a +position of maritime despotism which, even if it were attainable, would set +every man's hand against us. All these evils would be upon us, and our goal +would still be in the far distance. In 1870 the second naval Power in the +world was at war with an enemy that could not be considered a naval Power +at all, and yet she lost ships by capture. Never in the days of our most +complete domination upon the seas was our trade invulnerable, and it never +can be. To seek invulnerability is to fall into the strategical vice of +trying to be superior everywhere, to forfeit the attainment of the +essential for fear of risking the unessential, to base our plans on an +assumption that war may be waged without loss, that it is, in short, +something that it never has been and never can be. Such peace-bred dreams +must be rigorously abjured. Our standard must be the mean of economic +strength--the line which on the one hand will permit us to nourish our +financial resources for the evil day, and on the other, when that day +comes, will deny to the enemy the possibility of choking our financial +vigour by sufficiently checking the flow of our trade. + +III. ATTACK, DEFENCE, AND SUPPORT OF +MILITARY EXPEDITIONS + +The attack and defence of oversea expeditions are governed in a large +measure by the principles of attack and defence of trade. In both cases it +is a question of control of communications, and in a general way it may be +said, if we control them for the one purpose, we control them for the +other. But with combined expeditions freedom of passage is not the only +consideration. The duties of the fleet do not end with the protection of +the troops during transit, as in the case of convoys, unless indeed, as +with convoys, the destination is a friendly country. In the normal case of +a hostile destination, where resistance is to be expected from the +commencement of the operations, the fleet is charged with further duties of +a most exacting kind. They may be described generally as duties of support, +and it is the intrusion of these duties which distinguish the naval +arrangements for combined operations most sharply from those for the +protection of trade. Except for this consideration there need be no +difference in the method of defence. In each case the strength required +would be measured by the dangers of interference in transit. But as it is, +that standard will not serve for combined expeditions; for however small +those risks, the protective arrangements must be sufficiently extensive to +include arrangements for support. + +Before dealing with this, the most complex aspect of the question, it will +be well to dismiss attack. From the strategical point of view its +principles differ not at all from those already laid down for active +resistance of invasion. Whether the expedition that threatens us be small +or of invasion strength, the cardinal rule has always been that the +transports and not the escort must be the primary objective of the fleet. +The escort, according to the old practice, must be turned or contained, but +never treated as a primary objective unless both turning and containing +prove to be impracticable. It is needless to repeat the words of the old +masters in which this principle lies embalmed. It is seldom that we find a +rule of naval strategy laid down in precise technical terms, but this one +is an exception. In the old squadronal instructions, "The transports of the +enemy are to be your principal object," became something like a common +form. + +Nor did this rule apply only to cases where the transports were protected +by a mere escort. It held good even in the exceptional cases where the +military force was accompanied or guarded by the whole available battle +strength of the enemy. We have seen how in 1744 Norris was prepared to +follow the French transports if necessary with his whole force, and how in +1798 Nelson organised his fleet in such a way as to contain rather than +destroy the enemy's battle-squadron, so that he might provide for an +overwhelming attack upon the transports. + +Exceptions to this as to all strategical rules may be conceived. Conditions +might exist in which, if the enemy's battle-fleet accompanied his +transports, it would be worth our while, for ulterior objects of our own, +to risk the escape of the transports in order to seize the opportunity of +destroying the fleet. But even in such a case the distinction would be +little more than academical; for our best chance of securing a decisive +tactical advantage against the enemy's fleet would usually be to compel it +to conform to our movements by threatening an attack on the transports. It +is well known that it is in the embarrassment arising from the presence of +transports that lies the special weakness of a fleet in charge of them. + +There is, however, one condition which radically differentiates +comparatively small expeditions from great invasions and that is the power +of evasion. Our experience has proved beyond dispute that the navy alone +cannot guarantee defence against such expeditions. It cannot be sure of +preventing their sailing or of attacking them in transit, and this is +especially the case where an open sea gives them a free choice of route, as +in the case of the French expeditions against Ireland. It is for this +reason that, although an adequate navy has always proved sufficient to +prevent an invasion, for defence against expeditions it must be +supplemented by a home army. To perfect our defence, or, in other words, +our power of attack, such an army must be adequate to ensure that all +expeditions small enough to evade the fleet shall do no effective harm when +they land. If in numbers, training, organisation, and distribution it is +adequate for this purpose, an enemy cannot hope to affect the issue of the +war except by raising his expeditions to invasion strength, and so finding +himself involved in a problem that no one has ever yet solved for an +uncommanded sea. + +Still, even for expeditions below invasion strength the navy will only +regard the army as a second line, and its strategy must provide in the +event of evasion for co-operation with that line. By means of a just +distribution of its coastal flotilla it will provide for getting contact +with the expedition at the earliest moment after its destination is +declared. It will press the principle of making the army its objective to +the utmost limit by the most powerful and energetic cruiser pursuit, and +with wireless and the increased ratio of cruiser speed, such pursuit is far +more formidable than it ever was. No expedition nowadays, however +successful its evasion, can be guaranteed against naval interruption in the +process of landing. Still less can it be guaranteed against naval +interference in its rear or flanks while it is securing its front against +the home army. It may seek by using large transports to reduce their number +and secure higher speed, but while that will raise its chance of evasion, +it will prolong the critical period of landing. If it seek by using smaller +transports to quicken disembarkation, that will decrease its chances of +evasion by lowering its speed and widening the sea area it will occupy in +transit. All the modern developments in fact which make for defence in case +of invasion over an uncommanded sea also go to facilitate timely contact +with an expedition seeking to operate by evasion. Nor must it be forgotten, +since the problem is a combined one, that the corresponding developments +ashore tell with little less force in favour of the defending army. Such +appear to be the broad principles which govern an enemy's attempts to act +with combined expeditions in our own waters, where by hypothesis we are in +sufficient naval strength to deny him permanent local command. We may now +turn to the larger and more complex question of the conduct of such +expeditions where the naval conditions are reversed. + +By the conduct, be it remembered, we mean not only their defence but also +their support, and for this reason the starting-point of our inquiry is to +be found, as above indicated, in the contrast of combined expeditions with +convoys. A convoy consists of two elements--a fleet of merchantmen and an +escort. But a combined expedition does not consist simply of an army and a +squadron. It is an organism at once more complex and more homogeneous. Its +constitution is fourfold. There is, firstly, the army; secondly, the +transports and landing flotilla--that is, the flotilla of flat-boats and +steamboats for towing them, all of which may be carried in the transports +or accompany them; thirdly, the "Squadron in charge of transports," as it +came to be called, which includes the escort proper and the supporting +flotilla of lighter craft for inshore work; and lastly, the "Covering +squadron." + +Such at least is a combined expedition in logical analysis. But so +essentially is it a single organism, that in practice these various +elements can seldom be kept sharply distinct. They may be interwoven in the +most intricate manner. Indeed to a greater or less extent each will always +have to discharge some of the functions of the others. Thus the covering +squadron may not only be indistinguishable from the escort and support, but +it will often provide the greater part of the landing flotilla and even a +portion of the landing force. Similarly, the escort may also serve as +transport, and provide in part not only the supporting force, but also the +landing flotilla. The fourfold constitution is therefore in a great measure +theoretical. Still its use is not merely that it serves to define the +varied functions which the fleet will have to discharge. As we proceed it +will be seen to have a practical strategical value. + +From a naval point of view it is the covering squadron which calls first +for consideration, because of the emphasis with which its necessity marks +not only the distinction between the conduct of combined expeditions and +the conduct of commercial convoys, but also the fact that such expeditions +are actually a combined force, and not merely an army escorted by a fleet. + +In our system of commerce protection the covering squadron had no place. +The battle-fleet, as we have seen, was employed in holding definite +terminal areas, and had no organic connection with the convoys. The convoys +had no further protection than their own escort and the reinforcements that +met them as they approached the terminal areas. But where a convoy of +transports forming part of a combined expedition was destined for an +enemy's country and would have to overcome resistance by true combined +operations, a covering battle-squadron was always provided. In the case of +distant objectives it might be that the covering squadron was not attached +till the whole expedition assembled in the theatre of operations; during +transit to that theatre the transports might have commerce protection +escort only. But once the operations began from the point of concentration, +a covering squadron was always in touch. + +It was only where the destination of the troops was a friendly country, and +the line of passage was well protected by our permanent blockades, that a +covering squadron could be dispensed with altogether. Thus our various +expeditions for the assistance of Portugal were treated exactly like +commercial convoys, but in such cases as Wolfe's expedition to Quebec or +Amherst's to Louisburg, or indeed any of those which were continually +launched against the West Indies, a battle-squadron was always provided as +an integral part in the theatre of operations. Our arrangements in the +Crimean War illustrate the point exactly. Our troops were sent out at first +to land at Gallipoli in a friendly territory, and to act within that +territory as an army of observation. It was not a true combined expedition, +and the transports were given no covering squadron. Their passage was +sufficiently covered by our Channel and Mediterranean fleets occupying the +exits of the Baltic and the Black Sea. But so soon as the original war plan +proved ineffective and combined offensive operations against Sebastopol +were decided on, the Mediterranean fleet lost its independent character, +and thenceforth its paramount function was to furnish a covering squadron +in touch with the troops. + +Seeing how important are the support duties of such a force, the term +"Covering squadron" may seem ill-chosen to describe it. But it is adopted +for two reasons. In the first place, it was the one employed officially in +our service on the last mentioned occasion which was our last great +combined expedition. In preparing the descent on the Crimea, Sir Edmund +Lyons, who was acting as Chief of the Staff to Sir James Dundas, and had +charge of the combined operations, organised the fleet into a "Covering +squadron" and a "Squadron in charge of transports." In the second place, +the designation serves to emphasise what is its main and primary function. +For important as it is to keep in mind its support duties, they must not be +permitted to overshadow the fact that its paramount function is to prevent +interference with the actual combined operations--that is, the landing, +support, and supply of the army. Thus in 1705, when Shovel and Peterborough +were operating against Barcelona, Shovel was covering the amphibious siege +from the French squadron in Toulon. Peterborough required the assistance of +the marines ashore to execute a _coup de main_, and Shovel only consented +to land them on the express understanding that the moment his cruisers +passed the signal that the Toulon squadron was putting to sea, they would +have to be recalled to the fleet no matter what the state of the land +operations. And to this Peterborough agreed. The principle involved, it +will be seen, is precisely that which Lyons's term "Covering squadron" +embodies. + +To quote anything that happened in the Crimean War as a precedent without +such traditional support will scarcely appear convincing. In our British +way we have fostered a legend that so far as organisation and staff work +were concerned that war was nothing but a collection of deterrent examples. +But in truth as a combined operation its opening movement both in +conception and organisation was perhaps the most daring, brilliant, and +successful thing of the kind we ever did. Designed as the expedition was to +assist an ally in his own country, it was suddenly called upon without any +previous preparation to undertake a combined operation of the most +difficult kind against the territory of a well-warned enemy. It involved a +landing late in the year on an open and stormy coast within striking +distance of a naval fortress which contained an army of unknown strength, +and a fleet not much inferior in battle power and undefeated. It was an +operation comparable to the capture of Louisburg and the landing of the +Japanese in the Liaotung Peninsula, but the conditions were far more +difficult. Both those operations had been rehearsed a few years previously, +and they had been long prepared on the fullest knowledge. In the Crimea +everything was in the dark; even steam was an unproved element, and +everything had to be improvised. The French had practically to demobilise +their fleet to supply transport, and so hazardous did the enterprise +appear, that they resisted its being undertaken with every military +argument. We had in fact, besides all the other difficulties, to carry an +unwilling ally upon our backs. Yet it was accomplished, and so far at least +as the naval part was concerned, the methods which achieved success mark +the culmination of all we had learnt in three centuries of rich experience. + +The first of the lessons was that for operations in uncommanded or +imperfectly commanded seas there was need of a covering squadron +differentiated from the squadron in charge of transports. Its main function +was to secure the necessary local command, whether for transit or for the +actual operations. But as a rule transit was secured by our regular +blockading squadrons, and generally the covering squadron only assembled in +the theatre of operations. When therefore the theatre was within a defended +terminal area, as in our descents upon the northern and Atlantic coasts of +France, then the terminal defence squadron was usually also sufficient to +protect the actual operations. It thus formed automatically the covering +squadron, and either continued its blockade, or, as in the case of our +attack on St. Malo in 1758, took up a position between the enemy's squadron +and the expedition's line of operation. If, however, the theatre of +operation was not within a terminal area, or lay within a distant one that +was weakly held, the expedition was given its own covering squadron, in +which the local squadron was more or less completely merged. Whatever, in +fact, was necessary to secure the local control was done, though, as we +have seen, and must presently consider more fully, this necessity was not +always the standard by which the strength of the covering squadron was +measured. + +The strength of the covering squadron being determined, the next question +is the position or "tract" which it should occupy. Like most other +strategical problems, it is "an option of difficulties." In so far as the +squadron is designed for support--that is, support from its men, boats, and +guns--it will be desirable to station it as near as possible to the +objective; but as a covering squadron, with the duty of preventing the +intrusion of an enemy's force, it should be as far away as possible, so as +to engage such a force at the earliest possible moment of its attempt to +interfere. There is also the paramount necessity that its position must be +such that favourable contact with the enemy is certain if he tries to +interrupt. Usually such certainty is only to be found either in touch with +the enemy's naval base or in touch with your own landing force. Where the +objective is the local naval base of the enemy these two points, of course, +tend to be identical strategically, and the position of the covering +squadron becomes a tactical rather than a strategical question. But the +vital principle of an independent existence holds good, and no matter how +great the necessity of support, the covering squadron should never be so +deeply engaged with the landing force as to be unable to disentangle itself +for action as a purely naval unit in time to discharge its naval function. +In other words, it must always be able to act in the same way as a free +field army covering a siege. + +Where the objective of the expedition is not the local naval base, the +choice of a position for the covering squadron will turn mainly on the +amount of support which the army is likely to require. If it cannot act by +surprise, and serious military resistance is consequently to be expected, +or where the coast defences are too strong for the transport squadron to +overpower, then the scale will incline to a position close to the army, +though the extent to which, under modern conditions, ships at sea can +usefully perform the delicate operation of supporting an infantry attack +with gun fire, except by enfilading the enemy's position, remains to be +proved. A similar choice will be indicated where strong support of men and +boats is required, as when a sufficiency of flat-boats and steam towage +cannot be provided by the transports and their attendant squadron; or again +where the locality is such that amphibious operations beyond the actual +landing are likely to be called for, and the assistance of a large number +of boats and seamen acting with the army is necessary to give it the +amphibious tactical mobility which it would otherwise lack. Such cases +occurred at Quebec in 1759, where Saunders took his covering +battle-squadron right up the St. Lawrence, although its covering functions +could have been discharged even better by a position several hundreds of +miles away from the objective; and again in 1800 at Alexandria, where Lord +Keith ran the extremest hazard to his covering functions in order to +undertake the supply of General Abercromby's army by inland waters and give +him the mobility he required. + +If, on the other hand, the transport squadron is able to furnish all the +support necessary, the covering squadron will take station as close as +possible to the enemy's naval base, and there it will operate according to +the ordinary laws of blockade. If nothing is desired but to prevent +interference, its guard will take the form of a close blockade. But if +there be a subsidiary purpose of using the expedition as a means of forcing +the enemy to sea, the open form will be employed; as, for instance, in +Anson's case above cited, when he covered the St. Malo expedition not by +closely blockading Brest, but by taking a position to the eastward at the +Isle de Batz. + +In the Japanese operations against Manchuria and the Kuantung Peninsula +these old principles displayed themselves in undiminished vitality. In the +surprise descents against Seoul and at Takusan the work of support was left +entirely with the transport squadron, while Admiral Togo took up a covering +position far away at Port Arthur. The two elements of the fleet were kept +separate all through. But in the operations for the isolation and +subsequent siege of Port Arthur they were so closely united as to appear +frequently indistinguishable. Still, so far as the closeness of the landing +place to the objective permitted, the two acted independently. For the +actual landing of the Second Army the boats of the covering squadron were +used, but it remained a live naval unit all through, and was never +organically mingled with the transport squadron. Its operations throughout +were, so far as modern conditions permit, on the lines of a close blockade. +To prevent interference was its paramount function, undisturbed, so far as +we are able to judge, by any subsidiary purpose of bringing the enemy to +decisive action. + +All through the operations, however, there was a new influence which tended +to confuse the precision of the old methods. Needless to say it was the +torpedo and the mine. Their deflective pressure was curious and +interesting. In our own operations against Sebastopol, to which the Port +Arthur case is most closely comparable, the old rules still held good. On +the traditional principle, dating from Drake's attack on San Domingo in +1585, a landing place was chosen which gave the mean between facility for a +_coup de main_ and freedom from opposition; that is, it was chosen at the +nearest practicable point to the objective which was undefended by +batteries and out of reach of the enemy's main army. + +In the handling of the covering squadron Admiral Dundas, the +Commander-in-Chief, gave it its dual function. After explaining the +constitution of the transport squadron he says, "The remainder of my force +... will act as a covering squadron, and where practicable assist in the +general disembarkation." With these two objects in mind he took a station +near enough to the landing place to support the army with his guns if it +were opposed, but still in sight of his cruisers before Sebastopol, and at +such a distance that at the first sign of the Russians moving he would have +time to get before the port and engage them before they could get well to +sea; that is, he took a position as near to the army as was compatible with +preventing interference, or, it may be said, his position was as near to +the enemy's base as was compatible with supporting the landing. From either +aspect in fact the position was the same, and its choice presented no +complexity owing mainly to the fact that for the first time steam +simplified the factors of time and distance. + +In the Japanese case the application of these principles was not so easy. +In selecting the nearest undefended point for a landing, it was not only +batteries, or even the army in Port Arthur, or the troops dispersed in the +Liaotung Peninsula that had to be considered, but rather, as must always be +the case in the future, mines and mobile torpedo defence. The point they +chose was the nearest practicable bay that was unmined. It was not strictly +out of mobile defence range, but it so happened that it lay behind islands +which lent themselves to the creation of fixed defences, and thus it +fulfilled all the recognised conditions. But in so far as the defences +could be turned by the Russian fleet a covering squadron was necessary, and +the difficulty of choosing a position for it was complicated by the fact +that the objective of the combined operations was not merely Port Arthur +itself, but also the squadron it contained. It was necessary, therefore, +not only to hold off that squadron, but to prevent its escape. This +indicated a close blockade. But for close blockade a position out of night +torpedo range is necessary, and the nearest point where such a position +could be secured was behind the defences that covered the disembarkation. +Consequently, in spite of what the strategical conditions dictated, the +covering squadron was more or less continuously forced back upon the army +and its supporting force, even when the support of the battle-squadron was +no longer required. + +In the conditions that existed nothing was lost. For the lines of the +Japanese fixed defences were so near to the enemy's base, that by mining +the entrance of the port Admiral Togo ensured that the enemy's exit would +be slow enough for him to be certain of getting contact from his defended +anchorage before the Russians could get far to sea. What would happen in a +case when no such position could be secured is another matter. The landing +place and supply base of the army must be secured against torpedo attack, +and the principle of concentration of effort would suggest that the means +of defence should not be attenuated by providing the covering squadron with +a defended anchorage elsewhere. Thus it would appear that unless the +geographical conditions permit the covering squadron to use one of its own +national bases, the drift of recent developments will be to force it back +on the army, and thus tend to confuse its duties with those of the +transport squadron. Hence the increased importance of keeping clear the +difference in function between the two squadrons. + +To emphasise the principle of the covering squadron, these two cases may be +contrasted with the Lissa episode at the end of the Austro-Italian War of +1866. In that case it was entirely neglected, with disastrous results. The +Austrian admiral, Tegethoff, with an inferior fleet had by higher order +been acting throughout on the defensive, and was still in Pola waiting for +a chance of a counter-stroke. Persano with the superior Italian fleet was +at Ancona, where he practically dominated the Adriatic. In July the +Italians, owing to the failure of the army, were confronted with the +prospect of being forced to make peace on unfavourable terms. To improve +the position Persano was ordered to take possession of the Austrian island +of Lissa. Without any attempt to organise his fleet on the orthodox British +principle he proceeded to conduct the operation with his entire force. +Practically the whole of it became involved in amphibious work, and as soon +as Persano was thus committed, Tegethoff put to sea and surprised him. +Persano was unable to disentangle a sufficient force in time to meet the +attack, and having no compact squadron fit for independent naval action, he +was decisively defeated by the inferior enemy. According to British +practice, it was clearly a case where, if the operation were to be +undertaken at all, an independent covering squadron should have been told +off either to hold Tegethoff in Pola or to bring him to timely action, +according to whether the island or the Austrian fleet was the primary +objective. The reason it was not done may be that Persano was not given a +proper landing force, and he seems to have considered that the whole +strength of his fleet was needed for the successful seizure of the +objective. If so, it is only one more proof of the rule that no matter what +fleet support the landing operations may require, it should never be given +in an imperfectly commanded sea to an extent which will deny the +possibility of a covering squadron being left free for independent naval +action. + +The length to which the supporting functions of the fleet may be carried +will always be a delicate question. The suggestion that its strength must +be affected by the need of the army for the men of the fleet or its boats, +which imply its men as well, will appear heretical. A battle-squadron, we +say, is intended to deal with the enemy's battle-squadron and its men to +fight the ships, and the mind revolts at the idea of the strength of a +squadron being fixed by any other standard. Theoretically nothing can seem +more true, but it is an idea of peace and the study. The atmosphere of war +engendered a wider and more practical view. The men of the old wars knew +that when a squadron is attached to a combined expedition it is something +different from a purely naval unit. They knew, moreover, that an army +acting oversea against hostile territory is an incomplete organism +incapable of striking its blow in the most effective manner without the +assistance of the men of the fleet. It was the office, then, of the naval +portion of the force not only to defend the striking part of the organism, +but to complete its deficiencies and lend it the power to strike. Alone and +unaided the army cannot depend on getting itself ashore, it cannot supply +itself, it cannot secure its retreat, nor can it avail itself of the +highest advantages of an amphibious force, the sudden shift of base or line +of operation. These things the fleet must do for it, and it must do them +with its men.[25] + + [25] The Japanese in the late war attempted to do this work by means of a + highly organized Army Disembarkation Staff, but except in perfect + conditions of weather and locality it does not seem to have worked well, + and in almost all cases the assistance of the navy was called in. + +The authority for this view is abundant. In 1800, for instance, when +General Maitland was charged with an expedition against Belleisle, he was +invited to state what naval force he would require. He found it difficult +to fix with precision. "Speaking loosely, however," he wrote, "three or +four sail of the line and four or five active frigates appear to me to be +properly adequate to the proposed service. The frigates to blockade." +(Meaning, of course, to blockade the objective and prevent reinforcements +reaching it from the mainland, always one of the supporting functions of +the squadron attached to the transports.) "The line-of-battle ships," he +adds, "to furnish us with the number of men necessary for land operations." +In this case our permanent blockading squadrons supplied the cover, and +what Maitland meant was that the battleships he asked for were to be added +to the transport squadron not as being required for escort, but for +support. St. Vincent, who was then First Lord, not only endorsed his +request, but gave him for disembarkation work one more ship-of-the-line +than he had asked for. At this time our general command of the sea had been +very fully secured, and we had plenty of naval force to spare for its +exercise. It will be well to compare it with a case in which the +circumstances were different. + +When in 1795 the expedition under Admiral Christian and General Abercromby +was being prepared for the West Indies, the admiral in concert with Jervis +drew up a memorandum as to the naval force required.[26] The force he asked +for was considerable. Both he and Jervis considered that the escort and +local cover must be very strong, because it was impossible to count on +closing either Brest or Toulon effectually by blockade. But this was not +the only reason. The plan of operations involved three distinct landings, +and each would require at least two of the line, and perhaps three, "not +only as protection, but as the means by which flat-boats must be manned, +cannon landed, and the other necessary services of fatigue executed." +Christian also required the necessary frigates and three or four brigs "to +cover [that is, support] the operations of the smaller vessels [that is, +the landing flotillas doing inshore work]." The main attack would require +at least four of the line and seven frigates, with brigs and schooners in +proportion. In all he considered, the ships-of-the-line [the frigates being +"otherwise employed"] would have to provide landing parties to the number +of 2000 men "for the flat-boats, landing and moving guns, water, and +provisions," and this would be their daily task. The military force these +landing parties were to serve amounted to about 18,000 men. + + [26] Sir Hugh Cloberry Christian was an officer of high distinction with + a remarkable record of battle service. He had been serving as Howe's + second captain just before his promotion to flag rank in 1795, and died + as Commander-in-Chief at the Cape at the early age of fifty-one. + +Lord Barham, it must be said, who as Sir Charles Middleton was then First +Sea Lord, objected to the requirements as excessive, particularly in the +demand for a strong escort, as he considered that the transit could be +safeguarded by special vigilance on the part of the permanent blockading +squadrons. The need for large shore parties he seems to have ignored. His +opinion, however, is not quite convincing, for from the first he had taken +up an antagonistic attitude to the whole idea of the expedition. He +regarded the policy which dictated it as radically unsound, and was +naturally anxious to restrict the force that was to be spent upon it. His +opposition was based on the broad and far-sighted principles that were +characteristic of his strategy. He believed that in view of the threatening +attitude of Spain the right course was to husband the navy so as to bring +it up to a two-Power standard for the coming struggle, and to keep it +concentrated for decisive naval action the moment Spain showed her hand. In +short, he stoutly condemned a policy which entailed a serious dissipation +of naval force for a secondary object before a working command of the sea +had been secured. It was, in fact, the arrangements for this expedition +which forced him to resign before the preparations were complete. But it is +to be observed that his objections to the plan were really due, not to the +principle of its organisation, but to our having insufficient force to give +it adequate naval support without prejudicing the higher consideration of +our whole position at sea.[27] + + [27] On analogous grounds almost every military critic has condemned the + policy of this disastrous expedition as involving a dispersal of our + slender military force at a time when everything called for its + concentration in Europe. + +It is obvious that the foregoing considerations, beyond the strategical +reactions already noted, will have another of the first importance, in that +they must influence the choice of a landing place. The interest of the army +will always be to fix it as near to the objective as is compatible with an +unopposed landing. The ideal was one night's march, but this could rarely +be attained except in the case of very small expeditions, which could be +landed rapidly at the close of day and advance in the dark. In larger +expeditions, the aim was to effect the landing far enough from the +objective to prevent the garrison of the place or the enemy's local forces +offering opposition before a footing was secured. The tendency of the navy +will usually be in the opposite direction; for normally the further they +can land the army away from the enemy's strength, the surer are they of +being able to protect it against naval interference. Their ideal will be a +place far enough away to be out of torpedo range, and to enable them to +work the covering and the transport squadron in sound strategical +independence. + +To reduce these divergencies to a mean of efficiency some kind of joint +Staff is necessary, and to ensure its smooth working it is no less +desirable to ascertain, so far as possible, the principles and method on +which it should proceed. In the best recent precedents the process has been +for the Army Staff to present the limits of coast-line within which the +landing must take place for the operation to have the desired effect, and +to indicate the known practicable landing points in the order they would +prefer them. It will then be for the Naval Staff to say how nearly in +accordance with the views of the army they are prepared to act. Their +decision will turn on the difficulties of protection and the essentials of +a landing place from the point of view of weather, currents, beach and the +like, and also in a secondary measure upon the extent to which the +conformation of the coast will permit of tactical support by gun-fire and +feints. If the Naval Staff are unwilling to agree to the point or points +their colleagues most desire, a question of balance of risk is set up, +which the higher Joint Staff must adjust. It will be the duty of the Naval +Staff to set out frankly and clearly all the sea risks the proposal of the +army entails, and if possible to suggest an alternative by which the risk +of naval interference can be lessened without laying too heavy a burden on +the army. Balancing these risks against those stated by the army, the +superior Staff must decide which line is to be taken, and each service then +will do its best to minimise the difficulties it has to face. Whether the +superior Staff will incline to the naval or the military view will depend +upon whether the greater danger likely to be incurred is from the sea or on +land. + +Where the naval conditions are fairly well known the line of operations can +be fixed in this way with much precision. But if, as usually happens, the +probable action of the enemy at sea cannot be divined with sufficient +approximation, then assuming there is serious possibility of naval +interference, the final choice within the limited area must be left to the +admiral. The practice has been to give him instructions which define in +order of merit the points the army desire, and direct him to select the one +which in the circumstances, as he finds them, he considers within +reasonable risk of war. Similarly, if the danger of naval interference be +small and the local conditions ashore imperfectly known, the final choice +will be with the general, subject only to the practicable possibilities of +the landing place he would choose. + +During the best period of our old wars there was seldom any difficulty in +making things work smoothly on these lines. After the first inglorious +failure at Rochefort in 1757 the practice was, where discretion of this +kind had been allowed, for the two commanders-in-chief to make a joint +coast-reconnaissance in the same boat and settle the matter amicably on the +spot. + +It was on these lines the conduct of our combined operations was always +arranged thenceforth. Since the elder Pitt's time it has never been our +practice to place combined expeditions under either a naval or a military +commander-in-chief and allow him to decide between naval and military +exigencies. The danger of possible friction between two commanders-in-chief +came to be regarded as small compared with the danger of a single one +making mistakes through unfamiliarity with the limitations of the service +to which he does not belong. + +The system has usually worked well even when questions arose which were +essentially questions for a joint superior Staff. The exceptions indeed are +very few. A fine example of how such difficulties can be settled, when the +spirit is willing, occurred in the Crimea. The naval difficulties, as we +have already seen, were as formidable as they could well be short of +rendering the whole attempt madness. When it came to the point of execution +a joint council of war was held, at which sat the allied Staffs of both +services. So great were the differences of opinion between the French and +British Generals, and so imperfectly was the terrain known, that they could +not indicate a landing place with any precision. All the admirals knew was +that it must be on an open coast, which they had not been able to +reconnoitre, where the weather might at any time interrupt communications +with the shore, and where they were liable to be attacked by a force which, +until their own ships were cleared of troops, would not be inferior. All +these objections they laid before the Council General. Lord Raglan then +said the army now perfectly understood the risk, and was prepared to take +it. Whereupon the allied admirals replied that they were ready to proceed +and do their best to set the army ashore and support it at any point that +should be chosen. + +There remains a form of support which has not yet been considered, and that +is diversionary movements or feints by the fleet to draw the enemy's +attention away from the landing place. This will naturally be a function of +the covering battle-squadron or its attendant cruisers and flotilla. The +device appears in Drake's attack on San Domingo in 1585, an attack which +may be regarded as our earliest precedent in modern times and as the +pattern to which all subsequent operations of the kind conformed so far as +circumstances allowed. In that case, while Drake landed the troops a +night's march from the place, the bulk of the fleet moved before it, kept +it in alarm all night, and at dawn made a demonstration with the boats of +forcing a direct landing under cover of its guns. The result was the +garrison moved out to meet the threat and were surprised in flank by the +real landing force. Passing from this simple case to the most elaborate in +our annals, we find Saunders doing the same thing at Quebec. In preparation +for Wolfe's night landing he made a show of arrangements for a bombardment +of Montcalm's lines below the city, and in the morning with the boats of +the fleet began a demonstration of landing his marines. By this device he +held Montcalm away from Wolfe's landing place till a secure footing had +been obtained. Similar demonstrations had been made above the city, and the +combined result was that Wolfe was able to penetrate the centre of the +French position unopposed. + +Such work belongs of course to the region of tactics rather than of +strategy, but the device has been used with equal effect strategically. So +great is the secrecy as well as the mobility of an amphibious force, that +it is extremely difficult for an enemy to distinguish a real attack from a +feint. Even at the last moment, when a landing is actually in progress, it +is impossible for the defenders to tell that all the troops are being +landed at the one point if a demonstration is going on elsewhere. At Quebec +it was not till Montcalm was face to face with Wolfe that he knew he had to +deal with the whole British force. Still less from a strategical point of +view can we be certain whether a particular landing represents an advance +guard or is a diversionary operation to mask a larger landing elsewhere. +This is a special difficulty when in the case of large operations the +landing army arrives in echelon like the Second Japanese army. In that +instance the naval feint was used strategically, and apparently with +conspicuous effect. The Russians were always apprehensive that the Japanese +would strike for Newchuang at the head of the Gulf of Pe-chi-li, and for +this reason General Stakelberg, who had command of the troops in the +peninsula, was not permitted to concentrate for effective action in its +southern part, where the Japanese had fixed their landing place. Admiral +Togo, in spite of the strain on his fleet in effecting and securing the +disembarkation of the army, detached a cruiser squadron to demonstrate in +the Gulf. The precise effect of this feint upon the Russian Staff cannot be +measured with certainty. All we know is that Stakelberg was held back from +his concentration so long that he was unable to strike the Japanese army +before it was complete for the field and able to deal him a staggering +counter-stroke. + +This power of disturbing the enemy with feints is of course inherent in the +peculiar attributes of combined expeditions, in the facility with which +their line of operation can be concealed or changed, and there seems no +reason why in the future it should be less than in the past. Good railway +connections in the theatre of the descent will of course diminish the +effect of feints, but, on the other hand, the means of making them have +increased. In mine-sweeping vessels, for instance, there is a new +instrument which in the Russo-Japanese War proved capable of creating a +very strong impression at small cost to the fleet. Should a flotilla of +such craft appear at any practicable part of a threatened coast and make a +show of clearing it, it will be almost a moral impossibility to ignore the +demonstration. + +On the whole then, assuming the old methods are followed, it would seem +that with a reasonable naval preponderance the power of carrying out such +operations over an uncommanded sea is not less than it has proved to be +hitherto. The rapidity and precision of steam propulsion perhaps places +that power higher than ever. It would at any rate be difficult to find in +the past a parallel to the brilliant movement on Seoul with which the +Japanese opened the war in 1904. It is true the Russians at the last moment +decided for political reasons to permit the occupation to take place +without opposition, but this was unknown to the Japanese, and their +arrangements were made on the assumption that their enemy would use the +formidable means at his disposal to obstruct the operation. The risk was +accepted, skillfully measured, and adequately provided for on principles +identical with those of the British tradition. But, on the other hand, +there has been nothing to show that where the enemy has a working command +of the sea the hazard of such enterprises has been reduced. Against an +enemy controlling the line of passage in force, the well-tried methods of +covering and protecting an oversea expedition will no more work to-day than +they did in the past. Until his hold is broken by purely naval action, +combined work remains beyond all legitimate risk of war. + + * * * * * + +APPENDIX + + * * * * * + +THE +"GREEN PAMPHLET" + + * * * * * + +WAR COURSE + + * * * * * + +Strategical Terms +and Definitions +used in +Lectures on Naval History + +BY + +JULIAN S. CORBETT, ESQ., L.L.M. + + * * * * * + +NAVAL STRATEGY + +Naval strategy does not exist as a separate branch of knowledge. It is only +a section of a division of the art of war. + +The study for officers is the art of war, specialising in Naval Strategy. + +The true method of procedure then is to get hold of a general theory of +war, and so ascertain the exact relations of Naval Strategy to the whole. + +War is a form of political intercourse, a continuation of foreign politics +which begins when force is introduced to attain our ends. + +OBJECTS. + +We seek our ends by directing force upon certain objects, which may be +ulterior or immediate. + +Immediate objects (also called "Primary") are the ends of particular +operations or movements. But it must be remembered that every primary +object has also its ulterior object; that is, every operation must be +regarded, not only from the point of view of its special object, but also +as a step to the end of the campaign or war. + +Strategy is the art of directing force to the ends in view. Classified by +the object it is Major Strategy, dealing with ulterior objects; Minor +Strategy, with primary objects. + +This also means that every operation of an army or fleet must be regarded +in a double light, _i.e._, it must be planned and conducted in relation (1) +to the general progress of the war; (2) to the object to which it is +immediately directed. + +Major Strategy (always regarding the ulterior object) has for its province +the plan of the war, and includes: (1) Selection of the immediate or +primary objects to be aimed at for attaining the ulterior object; (2) +Selection of the force to be used, i.e., it determines the relative +functions of the naval and military forces. + + NOTE.--Major Strategy in its broadest sense has also to deal with the + whole resources of the nation for war. It is a branch of statesmanship. + It regards the Army and Navy as parts of one force, to be handled + together; they are instruments of war. But it also has to keep in view + constantly the politico-diplomatic position of the country (on which + depends the effective action of the instrument), and its commercial and + financial position (by which the energy for working the instrument is + maintained). The friction of these two considerations is inherent in + war, and we call it the deflection of strategy by politics. It is + usually regarded as a disease. It is really a vital factor in every + strategical problem. It may be taken as a general rule that no question + of grand strategy can be decided apart from diplomacy, and vice versa. + For a line of action or an object which is expedient from the point of + view of strategy may be barred by diplomatic considerations, and vice + versa. To decide a question of grand strategy without consideration of + its diplomatic aspect, is to decide on half the factors only. Neither + strategy or diplomacy has ever a clean slate. This interaction has to + be accepted by commanding officers as part of the inevitable "friction + of war." A good example is Pitt's refusal to send a fleet into the + Baltic to assist Frederick the Great during the Seven Years War, for + fear of compromising our relations with the Scandinavian Powers. + +Minor Strategy has for its province the plans of operations. It deals +with-- + + (1) The selection of the "objectives," that is, the particular forces + of the enemy or the strategical points to be dealt with in order + to secure the object of the particular operation. + (2) The directing of the force assigned for the operation. + +Minor Strategy may be of three kinds:-- + + (1) Naval, where the immediate object is to be attained by a fleet + only. + (2) Military, where the immediate object is to be attained by an army + only. + (3) Combined, where the immediate object is to be attained by army + and navy together. + + NOTE.--It will be seen that what is usually called Naval Strategy or + Fleet Strategy, is only a sub-division of a division of strategy, and + that, therefore, strategy cannot be studied from the point of view of + naval operations only. + + NOTE.--Naval Strategy, being only a part of General Strategy, is + subject to the same friction as Major Strategy, though in a less + degree. Individual commanders have often to take a decision + independently of the central government, or headquarters; they should, + therefore, always keep in mind the possible ulterior effects of any + line of action they may take, endeavouring to be sure that what is + strategically expedient is not diplomatically inexpedient. + + EXAMPLE.--Boscawen's attack on De la Motte on the eve of the Seven + Years War. + +NATURE OF OBJECT + +The solution of every strategical problem, whether of Major or Minor +Strategy, depends primarily on the nature of the object in view. + +All objects, whether ulterior or not, may be positive or negative. + +A positive object is where we seek to assert or acquire something for +ourselves. + +A negative object is where we seek to deny the enemy something or prevent +his gaining something. + +Where the object is positive, Strategy is offensive. + +Where the object is negative, Strategy is defensive. + + EXAMPLE.--When Togo attacked Rojesvensky his primary object was + offensive, _i.e._, to capture or destroy the Russian Fleet. His + ulterior object was to maintain the defensive function which had been + assigned to the Japanese Fleet. + + NOTES.--This is a good example of true defensive; that is, Togo's + operations, though drastically offensive in action, were all strictly + within the strategical defensive sphere assigned to him. + +The Offensive, being positive in its aim is naturally the more effective +form of war (_i.e._, it leads more directly to a final decision), and, as a +rule, should be adopted by the stronger Power. + +The Defensive, being negative in its aim, is naturally the stronger form of +war; _i.e._, it requires less force, and, as a rule, is adopted by the +weaker Power. + + NOTE.--The general truth of this proposition is not affected by + apparent exceptions where the contrary appears to be true. + + _The Offensive must not be confused with the Initiative._ It is + possible to seize the Initiative, under certain conditions, by taking a + defensive position from which the enemy is bound to dislodge us or + abandon the operation. + + In most cases where the weaker side successfully assumes the offensive, + it is due to his doing so before the enemy's mobilization or + concentration is complete, whereby the attacking force is able to deal + in succession with locally inferior forces of the enemy. + +The advantages of the Offensive are well known. + +Its disadvantages are:-- + + (1) That it grows weaker as it advances, by prolonging its + communications. + (2) That it tends to operations on unfamiliar ground. + (3) That it continually increases the difficulty of retreat. + +The advantages of Defence are chiefly:-- + + (1) Proximity to base. + (2) Familiar ground. + (3) Facility for arranging surprise by counter attack. + + NOTE.--In modern Naval warfare these advantages--that is, the + advantages of fighting on your own ground--are specially high as giving + greater facility for the use of mine and torpedo. + + The disadvantages are mainly moral or when the enemy's objective or + line of operations cannot be ascertained, but this disadvantage can be + neutralised when it is possible to secure an interior position. + +GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DEFENSIVE. + +True Defensive means waiting for a chance to strike. + + NOTE.--When the Dutch burnt our ships at Chatham, we were not acting on + the defensive, we had laid them up and were doing nothing at all. + +The strength and the essence of the defensive is the counter-stroke. + +A well designed defensive will always threaten or conceal an attack. + +A general defensive policy may consist of a series of minor offensive +operations. + +The maxim is: If you are not relatively strong enough to assume the +offensive, assume the defensive till you become so-- + +(1) Either by inducing the enemy to weaken himself by attacks or otherwise; + +(2) Or by increasing your own strength, by developing new forces or +securing allies. + +Except as a preparation or a cover for offensive action the defensive is +seldom or never of any use; for by the defensive alone we can never acquire +anything, we can only prevent the enemy acquiring. But where we are too +weak to assume the offensive it is often necessary to assume the defensive, +and wait in expectation of time turning the scale in our favour and +permitting us to accumulate strength relatively greater than the enemy's; +we then pass to the offensive, for which our defensive has been a +preparation. + +As a cover or support for the offensive, the defensive will enable us to +intensify the attack; for by assuming the defensive in one or more minor +theatres of operation we can reduce our forces in those theatres to a +minimum, and concentrate to a maximum for the offensive in the most +important theatre. + +OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS USED WITH A DEFENSIVE INTENTION + + (A) Counter attacks. + (B) Diversions. + +(A) _Counter attacks_ are those which are made upon an enemy who exposes +himself anywhere in the theatre of his offensive operations. It is this +form of attack which constitutes what Clausewitz calls the "surprise +advantage of defence." + +(B) _Diversions_ are similar operations undertaken against an enemy outside +the limit of his theatre of offensive operations. + +Diversions are designed to confuse his strategy, to distract his attention, +and to draw off his forces from his main attack. If well planned, they +should divert a force greater than their own. They should, therefore, be +small. The nearer they approach the importance of a real attack the less +likely they are to divert a force greater than their own. + +It is only their power of diverting or containing a larger force than their +own that justifies the breach of the law of concentration which they +involve. + +This power depends mainly on suddenness and mobility, and these qualities +are most highly developed in combined expeditions. + + NOTE.--_Diversions_ must be carefully distinguished from _eccentric + attacks_. _Eccentric attacks_ are true offensive movements. They have a + positive object, _i.e._, they aim to acquire something from the enemy; + whereas diversions have a negative object, _i.e._, they aim at + preventing the enemy doing or acquiring something. Being in the + category of the weaker form of war, eccentric attacks are usually made + in greater force than diversions. + + EXAMPLES.--_Diversion._--Our raid on Washington in 1815. Landing force, + about 4,000 men. Object, according to official instructions, "a + diversion on the coasts of United States of America in favour of the + army employed in the defence of Canada"; _i.e._, the intention was + negative--preventative--defensive. + + 2. _Eccentric Attack._--Operations against New Orleans in 1815. + Intended force 15,000 to 20,000 men. Object, "to obtain command of + embouchure of the Mississippi, and, secondly, to occupy some important + and valuable possession, by the restoration of which the conditions of + peace might be improved, &c."; _i.e._, the intention was positive--to + acquire. Compare Rochefort Expedition (diversion) and Belleisle + (eccentric attack) in the Seven Years War. + + Note 2.--This distinction gives a threefold classification of combined + expeditions, as used by Elizabethan strategists. + + Raids = Diversions. + Incursions = Eccentric attacks. + Invasions = True direct offence. + + Compare these with Sir John Ardagh's classification (Report of Royal + Commission on Reserve Forces, 1904):-- + + "Raids," not exceeding 10,000 men. + "Small expeditions," not exceeding 50,000 men. + "Dangerous invasion," not exceeding 150,000 men. + +NATURE OF ULTERIOR OBJECT + +From the nature of the ulterior object we get an important classification +of wars, according to whether such object is _limited_ or _unlimited_. + + (1) War with _limited object_ ("limited war") is where we merely seek + to take from the enemy some particular part of his possessions, or + interests; _e.g._, Spanish-American War, where the object was the + liberation of Cuba. + + (2) _War with an unlimited object_ is where we seek to overthrow the + enemy completely, so that to save himself from destruction he must + agree to do our will (become subservient); _e.g._, Franco-German War. + + NOTE.--Ulterior objects are not necessarily the same in their nature as + the immediate (primary or secondary) objects which lead up to them; + _e.g._, ulterior objects may be offensive, while one or more of the + immediate objects may be defensive, and _vice versâ_. + + EXAMPLE 1.--Japanese position in the late war. Ulterior object of the + war (to drive Russians from Manchuria) was offensive (positive). + Function or ulterior object of the fleet (to cover the invasion) was + defensive (negative). Its primary object to effect this was to attack + and destroy the Russian naval force. This was offensive (positive). + + EXAMPLE 2.--In the Spanish-American War the ulterior object of the war + was (for the Americans) to eject the Spanish Government from Cuba. This + was offensive. The ulterior object of the fleet was to prevent the + Spaniards sending reinforcements or interfering with the intended + American invasion. This was defensive. The primary object of the fleet + was to bring the Spanish Fleet to action. This was offensive. + +SYSTEM OF OPERATIONS + +Having determined the nature of the war by the nature of its object +(_i.e._, whether it is offensive or defensive and whether it is limited or +unlimited), strategy has to decide on the system of operations or "plan of +the war." + +This depends upon:-- + (1) The theatre of the war. + (2) The means at our disposal. + +1. _Theatre of the War._--Usually defined as "all the territory upon which +the hostile parties may assail each other." This is insufficient. For an +island power the theatre of war will always include sea areas. Truer +definition: "geographical areas within which lie the ulterior objects of +the war and the subordinate objects that lead up to them." + +A "theatre of war" may contain several "theatres of operations." + +2. _Theatre of Operations_.--Is generally used of the operations of one +belligerent only. + +An "operation" is any considerable strategical undertaking. + +A "theatre of operations" is usually defined as embracing all the territory +we seek to take possession of or to defend. + +A truer definition is, "the area, whether of sea or land or both, within +which the enemy must be overpowered before we can secure the object of the +particular operation." + +Consequently, since the nature of the war varies with the object, it may be +defensive in one theatre of operations and offensive in another. + +Where the operations are defensive in character any special movement or +movements may be offensive. + +OBJECTIVE + +An objective is "any point or force against which an offensive movement is +directed." Thus where the _object_ in any theatre of operation is to get +command of a certain sea in which the enemy maintains a fleet, that fleet +will usually be the _objective_. + +LINES OF OPERATION + +A line of operation is "the area of land or sea through which we operate +from our base or starting point to reach our objectives." + +Lines of operation may be exterior or interior. We are said to hold the +interior lines when we hold such a position, in regard to a theatre of +operations, that we can reach its chief objective points, or forces, more +quickly than the enemy can move to their defence or assistance. Such a +position is called an interior position. "Exterior Lines" and "Exterior +Position" are the converse of these. + +LINES OF COMMUNICATION + +This expression is used of three different things:-- + + (1) _Lines of supply_, running from the base of operations to the point + which the operating force has reached. + + (2) _Lines of lateral communication_ by which several forces engaged in + one theatre of operations can communicate with each other and move to + each other's support. + + (3) _Lines of retreat_, which are lines of supply reversed, _i.e._, + leading back to the base. + +These three ideas are best described by the term "lines of passage and +communication," which we had in use at the end of the eighteenth century. + +Ashore, lines of passage and communication are roads, railways, waterways, +&c. + +At sea, they may be regarded as those waters over which passes the normal +course of vessels proceeding from the base to the objective or the force to +be supplied. + +In Land Strategy the great majority of problems are problems of +communication. Maritime Strategy has never been regarded as hinging on +communications, but probably it does so even more than Land Strategy, as +will appear from a consideration of maritime communications, and the extent +to which they are the main preoccupation of Naval operations. + +MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS + +The various kinds of Maritime Communications for or against which a fleet +may have to operate are:-- + + (1) Its own communications, or those of its adversary (which correspond + to the communications of armies operating ashore). These tend to + increase in importance strategically with the increasing hunger of + modern fleets (for coal, ammunition, &c). + + (2) The communications of an army operating from an advanced oversea + base, that is communication between the advanced and the main base. + + (3) Trade Routes, that is the communications upon which depend the + national resources and the supply of the main bases, as well as the + "lateral" or connecting communications between various parts of + belligerents' possessions. + +N.B.--Such "lines of passage and communication" are the preoccupation of +Naval Strategy; that is to say, problems of Naval Strategy can be reduced +to terms of "passage and communication" and this is probably the best +method of solving them. + +NAVAL STRATEGY CONSIDERED AS A +QUESTION OF PASSAGE AND +COMMUNICATION + +By "Naval Strategy" we mean the art of conducting the operations of the +Fleet. Such operations must always have for their object "passage and +communication"; that is, the Fleet is mainly occupied in guarding our own +communications and seizing those of the enemy. + +PROOF I.--_Deductive_.--We say the aim of Naval Strategy is to get command +of the sea. What does this mean? It is something quite different from the +Military idea of occupying territory, for the sea cannot be the subject of +political dominion or ownership. We cannot subsist upon it (like an army on +conquered territory), nor can we exclude neutrals from it. Admiral Colomb's +theory of "conquest of water territory," therefore, involves a false +analogy, and is not safe as the basis of a strategical system. What then is +the value of the sea in the political system of the world? Its value is as +a means of communication between States and parts of States. Therefore the +"command of the sea" means the control of communications in which the +belligerents are adversely concerned. + + COROLLARY.--The command of the sea can never be, like the conquest of + territory, the ulterior object of a war, unless it be a purely maritime + war, as were approximately our wars with the Dutch in the 17th century, + but it may be a primary or immediate object, and even the ulterior + object of particular operations. + +PROOF II.--_Inductive_, from history or past experience.--History shows +that the actual functions of the Fleet (except in purely maritime wars) +have been threefold. + +1. The prevention or securing of alliances (_i.e._, deterring or persuading +neutrals as to participating in the war). + + EXAMPLES.--The operations of Rooke in the first years of the War of the + Spanish Succession, 1702-04, to secure the adhesion of Savoy and + Portugal to the Grand Alliance. Operations of Nelson to maintain the + alliance of the Kingdom of Naples. + + In the first case there came a crisis when it was more important to + demonstrate to Savoy and Portugal what they stood to lose by joining + Louis XIV than to act immediately against the Toulon Fleet. In the + second, the Neapolitan Alliance was essential to our operations in the + Eastern Mediterranean; the destruction of the Toulon Fleet was not. + +2. The protection or destruction of commerce. + +3. The furtherance or hindrance of military operations ashore. + +NOTE.--The above is the best working "Definition of Naval Strategy," as +emphasising its intimate connection with diplomatic, financial, and +military aspects of major strategy. + +These functions may be discharged in two ways:-- + + (1) By direct territorial attacks, threatened or performed + (bombardment, landing, raiding parties, &c). + + (2) By getting command of the sea, _i.e._, establishing ourselves in + such a position that we can control the maritime communications of all + parties concerned, so that we can operate by sea against their + territory, commerce, and allies, and they cannot operate against ours. + + NOTE.--The power of the second method, by controlling communications, + is out of all proportion to the first--direct attack. Indeed, the first + can seldom be performed with any serious effect without the second. + Thus, from this point of view also, it is clear that Naval Strategy is + mainly a question of communications. + + But not entirely. Circumstances have arisen when the Fleet must + discharge part of its function by direct action before there is time + to get general control of the communications. (That is, political and + military considerations may deflect normal operation of Naval + Strategy.) + + EXAMPLE.--Rooke's capture of Gibraltar in 1704, in the face of the + unshaken Toulon Fleet. Japanese invasion of Manchuria. + +COMMAND OF THE SEA + +Command of the sea exists only in a state of war. If we say we have command +of the sea in time of peace it is a rhetorical expression meaning that we +have (a) adequate Naval positions; (b) an adequate Fleet to secure the +command when war breaks out. + +VARIOUS CONDITIONS OF COMMAND + +1. It may be (a) general; (b) local. + +(a) _General command_ is secured when the enemy is no longer able to act +dangerously against our line of passage and communication or to defend his +own, or (in other words) when he is no longer able to interfere seriously +with our trade or our military or diplomatic operations. + +This condition exists practically when the enemy is no longer able to send +squadrons to sea. + + NOTE.--Command of the sea does not mean that the enemy can do + absolutely nothing, but that he cannot _seriously_ interfere with the + undertakings by which we seek to secure the object of the war, or to + force our will upon him. + +(b) _Local command_ implies a state of things in which we are able to +prevent the enemy from interfering with our passage and communication in +one or more theatres of operation. + +2. Both local and general command may be (a) temporary; (b) permanent. + +(a) _Temporary command_ is when we are able to prevent the enemy from +interfering with our passage and communication in all or some theatres of +operation during the period required for gaining the object in view +(_i.e._, the object of a particular operation or of a particular campaign). +This condition existed after Togo's first action. + +(b) _Permanent command_ is when time ceases to be a vital factor in the +situation, _i.e._, when the possibility of the enemy's recovering his +maritime position is too remote to be a practical consideration. This +condition existed after Tsushima. + +3. Command, whether general, local, or temporary, may be in three different +states:-- + + (a) With us. + (b) With the enemy. + (c) In dispute. + +If in dispute, it may be that:-- + + (1) We have preponderance. + (2) Our enemy has preponderance. + (3) Neither side preponderates. + +COMMAND IN DISPUTE + +The state of dispute is the most important for practical strategy, since it +is the normal condition, at least in the early stages of the war, and +frequently all through it. + +The state of dispute continues till a final decision is obtained, _i.e._, +till one side is no longer able to send a squadron to sea. + +It is to the advantage of the preponderating Navy to end the state of +dispute by seeking a decision. Hence the French tradition to avoid decisive +actions as a rule when at war with England. + +The truth of this appears from the fact that _general command of the sea is +not essential to all oversea operations_. + +In a state of dispute the preponderating Power may concentrate in one +theatre of operations, and so secure the local or temporary command +sufficient for obtaining the special object in view. The weaker Power may +take advantage of such local concentration to operate safely elsewhere. + +_Rule 1._ So long as a state of dispute can force the preponderating Power +to concentrate, operating by evasion is possibly open to the weaker. + +_Rule 2._ In a state of dispute although the weaker Power may not be able +to obstruct the passage and communication of the stronger, it may be able +to defend its own. + + EXAMPLES.--This condition of dispute existed during the first three + years of the Seven Years War, until Hawke and Boscawen obtained a + decision by defeating Conflans and De la Cloue; also in the Great War + up to Trafalgar. + +SHOULD COMMAND OF THE SEA ALWAYS BE THE +PRIMARY OBJECT? + +When the preponderating Power fails or neglects to get command (_i.e._, +leaves the general command in dispute), the disadvantage to him is not so +much the danger to his own operations as the facility given to the enemy +for carrying out counter operations elsewhere. + +Under certain conditions, therefore, it may not be the primary function of +the fleet to seek out the enemy's fleet and destroy it, because general +command may be in dispute while local command may be with us, and political +or military considerations may demand of us an operation, for which such +local command is sufficient, and which cannot be delayed until we have +obtained a complete decision. + +From the above it will appear "command of the sea" is too loose an +expression for strategical discussion. For practical purposes should be +substituted "_control of passage and communication_." + +The question then in the consideration of any proposed operation or line of +operations will be, not "Have we the command of the sea?" but "Can we +secure the necessary lines of communication from obstruction by the enemy?" + +METHODS OF SECURING CONTROL + +1. _Permanent general control_ can only be secured by the practical +annihilation of the enemy's fleet by successful actions. + +2. _Local and temporary control_ may be secured by:-- + + (a) A defensive action not necessarily entirely successful + (containing). + + (b) Forcing concentration on the enemy elsewhere (diversion). + + (c) Superior concentration so as to render impotent the enemy's force + available in the special theatre of operations (masking or containing). + +BLOCKADE + +Blockades are of two natures, according to the object review. The object +may be:-- + +(d) Blockade. + + i. _Close blockade_ to prevent the enemy putting to sea. The object + being usually to secure local or temporary control. + + ii. _Observation blockade_, to force the enemy to put to sea _by + occupying the common lines of communications_ (_see_ below). In this + case you are seeking a decision as a step towards general control. + +Both natures are operations upon the lines of passage and communication, +but in case (1) the primary intention is defensive, to secure our own line; +in case (2) the primary intention is offensive, to seize the enemy's line +and compel him to expose himself in an attempt to recover it. + +GENERAL RULES FOR CONDUCTING BLOCKADES + +In case (1) (defensive intention) blockade should be as close as is +compatible with security from torpedo attack. + +In case (2) (offensive intention) it should be as distant as is compatible +with bringing enemy to action if he comes out. + + Examples:--_Case_ (1): First stage of Togo's blockade of Port Arthur. + _Case_ (2): Nelson off Toulon. + _Confusion of the two_: Sampson's attempt to close Santiago + simultaneously with an attempt to force Cervera to sea. + +THE PECULIARITY OF MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS + +Since the whole idea of command of the sea and the whole theory of blockade +rest on the control of communications, neither can be fully apprehended +without a thorough understanding of the nature of maritime communications. + +Ashore, the respective lines of communications of each belligerent tend to +run more or less approximately in opposite directions, until they meet in +the theatre of operations or the objective point. + +At sea the reverse is the case; for in maritime warfare the great lines of +communications of either belligerent tend to run approximately parallel, +if, indeed, they are not identical. + +Thus, in the case of a war with Germany, the object of which lay in the +Eastern Mediterranean, or in America, or South Africa, our respective lines +of communication would be identical. + +This was also the case in all our imperial wars with France. + +_This peculiarity is the controlling influence of maritime warfare._ Nearly +all our current maxims of Naval strategy can be traced to the pressure it +exerts on Naval thought. + +It is at the root of the fundamental difference between Military and Naval +strategy, and affords the explanation of much strategical error and +confusion, which has arisen from applying the principles of land warfare to +the sea without allowing for the antagonistic conditions of the +communications and operations against them in each case. + +On land the chief reason for not always striking the enemy's communications +at once is that as a rule we cannot do so without exposing our own. + +At sea, on the contrary, since the great lines are common to both, we +cannot defend our own without striking at the enemy's. + +Therefore, at sea, the obvious opening is to get your fleet into such a +position that it controls the common lines, unless defeated or evaded. + + EXAMPLE.--This was usually done in our old wars with France, by our + getting a fleet off Brest before the French could sail. + +Hence the maxim "that the proper place for our fleets is off the enemy's +coast," "the enemy's coast is our true frontier," and the like. + +But these maxims are not universally true, witness Togo's strategy against +Rojesvensky, when he remained correctly upon his own coast. + +Take again the maxim that the primary object of the fleet is to seek out +the enemy's fleet and destroy it. + +Here again Togo's practice was the reverse of the maxim. + +The true maxim is "The primary object of the fleet is to secure +communications, and if the enemy's fleet is in a position to render them +unsafe it must be put out of action." + +The enemy's fleet usually is in this position, but not always. + + EXAMPLE.--Opening of War of Spanish Succession. The operations of 1702 + were to secure some point (Cadiz, Gibraltar, or Ferrol) on the Spanish + trade communications, the French lateral communications, and our own + lines of passage to the Mediterranean, where was to be our chief + theatre of operation. These last two lines were identical. 1703.--Chief + operations had for their object to secure the alliance of Savoy, and + particularly of Portugal, and with same object in view, Rooke's + official instructions directed that the French fleet was to be ignored + unless it threatened our communications. + + RESULT.--By 1704 we had gained a Naval position from which France could + not eject us, and she abandoned struggle for sea communications. + +But nine times out of ten the maxim of seeking out the enemy's fleet, &c., +is sound and applicable:-- + + (a) Because for us _general permanent command_ is usually essential + to ultimate success, and this cannot be obtained without destroying the + enemy's fleet. + + (b) Because usually the enemy's fleet opens with an attempt _to + control the common communications_. + + (c) Because usually the functions of the fleet are so complex + (_i.e._, the calls upon it so numerous) that it will seek to strike a + blow which solve all the difficulties; _e.g._, Sir Palmes Fairborne's + solution of the problem in 1703 (_England in the Mediterranean_, Vol. + II., p. 234). + +Also it must be remembered that nine times out of ten the most effective +way of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" (_i.e._, forcing an action on him) +is to seize a position which controls communications vital to his plan of +campaign. + +This was what happened in 1704. Rooke was unable to seek out the Toulon +fleet, but by seizing Gibraltar he made it come to him (not intentionally, +but by the operation of inevitable strategical law). + +Compare Togo's strategy and that of the Americans in 1898. + +Practically all great Naval actions have been brought about in this way, +that is they have been the outcome on an effort to clear essential +communications from the enemy's fleet, _e.g._, Gravelines, La Hogue, +Quiberon, Trafalgar, Tsushima. + +Similarly the great actions of the old Dutch wars were brought about +because our geographical position placed us astride the Dutch trade +communications, and they were forced to seek a decision against our fleet. + +FINAL NOTE + +In applying the maxim of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" it should be borne +in mind:-- + + (1) That if you seek it out with a superior force you will probably + find it in a place where you cannot destroy it except at heavy cost. + + (2) That seeing that the defensive is a stronger form of war than the + offensive, it is _prima facie_ better strategy to make the enemy come + to you than to go to him and seek a decision on his own ground. + + * * * * * + +WAR COURSE + + * * * * * + +Notes on Strategy + + * * * * * + +PART ONE + +GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND DEFINITIONS + +INTRODUCTORY + +Naval strategy is a section of the Art of War. + +The study for officers is the Art of War, which includes Naval Strategy. + +War is the application of force to the attainment of political ends. + +MAJOR AND MINOR STRATEGY + +We seek our ends by directing force upon certain objects, which may be +ulterior or primary. + +_Primary objects_ are the special objects of particular operations or +movements which we undertake in order to gain the ulterior object of the +campaign. Consequently it must be remembered that every particular +operation or movement must be regarded, not only from the point of view of +its special object, but also as a step to the end of the campaign or war. + +Strategy is the art of directing force to the ends in view. There are two +kinds--Major Strategy, dealing with ulterior objects; Minor Strategy, with +primary objects. + +Every operation of an army or fleet must be planned and conducted in +relation (1) to the general plan of the war; (2) to the object to which it +is immediately directed. + +Major Strategy, always regarding the ulterior object, has for its province +the plan of the war and includes: (1) Selection of the immediate or primary +objects to be aimed at for attaining the ulterior object; (2) Selection of +the force to be used, _i.e._, it determines the relative functions of the +naval and military forces. Major Strategy in its broadest sense deals with +the whole resources of the nation for war. It is a branch of statesmanship +which regards the Army and Navy as parts of one force, to be handled +together as the instrument of war. But it also has to keep in constant +touch with the political and diplomatic position of the country (on which +depends the effective action of the instrument), and the commercial and +financial position (by which the energy for working the instrument is +maintained). The friction due to these considerations is inherent in war, +and is called the deflection of strategy by politics. It is usually +regarded as a disease. It is really a vital factor in every strategical +problem. It may be taken as a general rule that no question of major +strategy can be decided apart from diplomacy, and _vice versâ_. For a line +of action or an object which is expedient from the point of view of +strategy may be barred by diplomatic considerations, and _vice versâ_. To +decide a question of Major Strategy, without consideration of its +diplomatic aspect, is to decide on half the factors only. Neither strategy +or diplomacy has ever a clean slate. This inter-action has to be accepted +as part of the inevitable "friction of war." A good example is Pitt's +refusal to send a fleet into the Baltic to assist Frederick the Great +during the Seven Years' War, for fear of compromising our relations with +the Scandinavian Powers. + +Minor Strategy has for its province the plans of operations. It deals +with-- + + (1) The selection of the "objectives," that is, the particular forces + of the enemy or the strategical points to be dealt with in order to + secure the object of the particular operation. + + (2) The direction of the force assigned for the operation. + +Minor Strategy may, therefore, be of three kinds:-- + + (1) Naval, where the immediate object is to be attained by a fleet + only. + + (2) Military, where the immediate object is to be attained by an army + only. + + (3) Combined, where the immediate object is to be attained by army and + navy together. + +It will be seen, therefore, that what is usually called Naval Strategy or +Fleet Strategy is only a sub-division of Strategy, and that therefore +Strategy cannot be studied from the point of view of naval operations only. +Naval Strategy, being a part of General Strategy, is subject to the same +friction as Major Strategy, though in a less degree. Individual commanders +have often to take a decision independently of the central government or +headquarters; they should, therefore, always keep in mind the possible +ulterior effects of any line of action they may take, endeavouring to be +sure that what is strategically expedient is not diplomatically +inexpedient. + +Example.--For example, take Boscawen's attack on De la Motte on the eve of +the Seven Years' War in 1755. His orders were to prevent the troops and +warlike stores which De la Motte was taking out from reaching Canada. It +was not diplomatically expedient to open hostilities; but if Boscawen +succeeded, the result would have been worth the diplomatic consequences it +would entail. He missed the expedition, but captured two isolated vessels; +thus striking the first blow in such a way as to entail the utmost amount +of harm with the least possible good. + +OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE + +_Nature of Object_ + +Upon the nature of the object depends the fundamental distinction between +_offensive_ and _defensive_, upon which all strategical calculation must be +based. Consequently, the solution of every strategical problem, whether of +Major or Minor Strategy, depends primarily on the nature of the object in +view. + +All objects, whether ulterior or not, may be positive or negative. + +A _positive_ object is where we seek to assert or acquire something for +ourselves. + +A _negative_ object is where we seek to deny the enemy something or prevent +his gaining something. + +Where the object is positive, Strategy is offensive. + +Where the object is negative, Strategy is defensive. + +This is the only certain test by which we can decide whether any particular +operation is offensive or defensive. + +Ulterior objects are not necessarily the same in their nature as the +primary or secondary objects which lead up to them; _e.g._, ulterior +objects may be offensive, while one or more of the primary objects may be +defensive, and _vice versâ_. For example, in the Russo-Japanese War the +ulterior object of the war (to drive Russians from Manchuria) was offensive +(positive). The ulterior object of the fleet (to cover the invasion) was +defensive (negative). Its primary object to effect this was to attack and +destroy the Russian naval force. This was offensive (positive). + +_Relation of Offensive to Defensive_ + +The Offensive, being positive in its aim, is naturally the more effective +form of war and, as a rule, should be adopted by the stronger Power. The +Defensive, being negative in its aim, is the more lasting form of war, +since it requires less force to keep what one has than to take what is +another's, and, as a rule, is adopted by the weaker Power. In most cases +where the weaker side successfully assumes the offensive, it is due to his +doing so before the enemy's mobilization or concentration is complete, +whereby the attacking force is able to deal in succession with locally +inferior forces of the enemy. + +The advantages of the Offensive are well known. + +Its disadvantages are:-- + + That it grows weaker as it advances, by prolonging its communications, + and that it tends to operations on unfamiliar ground. + +The advantages of the Defensive are chiefly:-- + + Proximity to the base of supply and repair stations, familiar ground, + facility for arranging surprise by counter attack, and power of + organising in advance. + +The disadvantages of the Defensive are mainly moral. They become, however, +real and practical when the enemy's objective or line of operations cannot +be ascertained, for then we have to spread or attenuate our force to cover +all probable objectives, but this disadvantage can be neutralised when it +is possible to secure an interior position. + +_Functions and Characteristics of the Defensive_ + +True Defensive means waiting for a chance to strike. + +To assume the defensive does not necessarily mean that we do not feel +strong enough to attack. It may mean that we see our way by using the +defensive to force certain movements on the enemy which will enable us to +hit harder. + +A well-designed defensive will always threaten or conceal an attack. Unless +it does this it will not deflect the enemy's strategy in our favour. Thus, +in 1756, the French, by assuming the defensive in the Channel, threatened +an attack on our coasts, and concealed their attack on Minorca. + +This power inherent in the defensive is peculiarly strong in naval warfare, +since the mobility of fleets enables them to pass instantaneously from the +defensive to the offensive without any warning. When we assume the +defensive because we are too weak for the offensive, we still do not lay +aside attack. The whole strength and essence of the defensive is the +counter-stroke. Its cardinal idea is to force the enemy to attack us in a +position where he will expose himself to a counter-stroke. + +The stock instance upon which naval defensive is usually condemned is the +burning of our ships at Chatham by the Dutch. But in that case we were not +_acting on the defensive_ at all. We had laid up our battle fleet and were +doing nothing. We were purely passive, in expectation of peace. It is +really an instance of the successful use of defensive _by the Dutch_. Being +no longer strong enough for a general offensive, they assumed the +defensive, and induced us to lay up our ships and so expose ourselves to a +counter-stroke. It was a counterstroke by the worsted belligerent to get +better terms of peace. + +So far is the defensive from excluding the idea of attack, that it may +consist entirely of a series of minor offensive operations. Clausewitz +calls it "a shield of blows." It is often called _offensive-defensive,_ or +_active defence_. Neither term is really necessary. For a defensive which +excludes the idea of offence or action is not war at all-at least at sea. +The old Elizabethan term _Preventive_ most closely expresses the idea. + +The most important function of the defensive is that of covering, +buttressing, and intensifying the main attack. No plan of campaign, however +strong the offensive intention, is perfect which does not contemplate the +use of the defensive. Without some use of the defensive the cardinal +principle of concentration can rarely be fully developed. To develop the +highest possible degree of concentration upon the main object or objective, +the defensive must be assumed everywhere else. Because it is only by using +the defensive in the minor or less important theatres of operation that the +forces in those theatres can be reduced to the minimum of security, and the +maximum of concentration can thereby be obtained in the main theatre. + +In considering the defensive as a general plan of campaign the maxim is: If +not relatively strong enough to assume the offensive, assume the defensive +till you become so-- + + (1) Either by inducing the enemy to weaken himself by attacks or + otherwise; + + (2) Or by increasing your own strength, by developing new forces or + securing allies. + +It must always be remembered that, except as a preparation or a cover for +offensive action, the defensive is seldom or never of any use; for by the +continued use of the defensive alone nothing can be acquired, though the +enemy may be prevented from acquiring anything. But where we are too weak +to assume the offensive it is often necessary to assume the defensive, and +wait in expectation of time turning the scale in our favour and permitting +us to accumulate strength relatively greater than the enemy's; we then pass +to the offensive, for which our defensive has been a preparation. At sea we +have had little occasion for the defensive as a general plan. But that is +no reason for neglecting its study. In despising the defensive ourselves we +have consistently ignored the strength it gives our enemies. The bulk of +our naval history is the story of how we have been baffled and thwarted by +our enemies assuming the defensive at sea in support of their offensive on +land. We have seldom succeeded in treating this attitude with success, and +it is only by studying the defensive we can hope to do so. + +_Offensive Operations used with a Defensive Intention_ + +(A) Counter attacks. +(B) Diversions. + +_Counter attacks_ are those which are made upon an enemy who exposes +himself anywhere in the theatre of his offensive operations. It is this +form of attack which constitutes what Clausewitz calls the "surprise +advantage of defence." + +_Diversions_ are similar operations undertaken against an enemy outside the +limit of his theatre of offensive operations. + +Diversions are designed to confuse his strategy, to distract his attention, +and to draw off his forces from his main attack. If well planned, they +should divert a force greater than their own. They should, therefore, be +small. The nearer they approach the importance of a real attack the less +likely they are to divert a force greater than their own. + +Diversions involve a breach of the law of concentration, and it is only +their power of diverting or containing a larger force than their own that +justifies their use. + +This power depends mainly on suddenness and mobility, and these qualities +are most highly developed in combined expeditions. + +_Diversions_ must be carefully distinguished from _eccentric attacks. +Eccentric attacks_ are true offensive movements. They have a positive +object, _i.e._, they aim to acquire something from the enemy; whereas +diversions have a negative object, _i.e._, they aim at preventing the enemy +doing or acquiring something. Eccentric attacks are usually made in greater +force than diversions. + +Examples.--Diversion.--Our raid on Washington in 1815. Landing force, +about 4,000 men. Object, according to official instruction, "a diversion +on the coasts of United States of America in favour of the army +employed in the defence of Canada"; _i.e._, the intention was +negative--preventive--defensive. _Eccentric Attack._--Operations against +New Orleans in 1815. Intended force, 15,000 to 20,000 men. Object, "to +obtain command of the embouchure of the Mississippi, and, secondly, to +occupy some important and valuable possession, by the restoration of which +the conditions of peace might be improved, &c."; _i.e._, the intention was +positive--to acquire. Compare Rochefort Expedition (diversion) with those +against Martinique and Belleisle (eccentric attacks) in the Seven Years' +War. + +This distinction gives a threefold classification of combined expeditions, +as used by Elizabethan strategists, viz., raids, incursions, and invasions. +These correspond respectively with our modern diversions, eccentric +attacks, and true direct offensive. + +LIMITED AND UNLIMITED WARS + +From the nature of the ulterior object we get an important classification +of wars, according to whether such object is _limited_ or _unlimited_. + + (1) _War with limited object_ ("limited war") is where the object is + merely to take from the enemy some particular part of his possessions + or interests; _e.g._, Spanish-American War, where the object was the + liberation of Cuba. + + (2) _War with an unlimited object_ is where the object is to overthrow + the enemy completely, so that to save himself from destruction he must + agree to do our will (become subservient); _e.g._, Franco-German War. + +PLANS OF WAR + +_System of Operations_ + +Having determined the nature of the war by the nature of its object +(_i.e._, whether it is offensive or defensive and whether it is limited or +unlimited), Strategy has to decide on the system of operations or "plan of +the war." + +Apart from the means at our disposal a plan of war depends mainly upon-- + + (1) The theatre of the war. + (2) The various theatres of operation available within it. + +1. _Theatre of the War._--Usually defined as "All the territory upon which +the hostile parties may assail each other." This is insufficient. For an +Island Power the theatre of war will always include sea areas. Truer +definition: "Geographical areas within which must lie the operations +necessary for the attainment of the ulterior objects of the war and of the +subordinate objects that lead up to them." + +A "theatre of war" may contain several "theatres of operations." + +2. _Theatre of Operations._--Is generally used of the operations of one +belligerent only. + +An "operation" is any considerable strategical undertaking. + +A "theatre of operations" is usually defined as embracing all the territory +we seek to take possession of or to defend. + +A truer definition is: "The area, whether of sea or land or both, within +which the enemy must be overpowered before we can secure the object of the +particular operation." + +Consequently, since the nature of the war varies with the object, it may be +defensive in one theatre of operations and offensive in another. + +Where the operations are defensive in character any special movement or +movements may be offensive. + +As the plan of war determines the theatres of operation in the theatre of +war, so in each theatre of operation it determines the _lines of operation_ +and the _objectives_. + +_Objective_ + +An objective is "any point or force against which an offensive movement is +directed." Thus, where the _object_ in any theatre of operation is to get +command of a certain sea in which the enemy maintains a fleet, that fleet +will usually be the _objective_. + +"Objective" in ordinary use is frequently confused with "object." For +purposes of strategical discussion it is desirable to keep them sharply +distinguished. _Objective_ is the end of some particular movement or +operation, and is the special concern of the officer in command. _Object_ +is the end of a system of operations and is the special concern of the +general staff or director of the war. An _objective_ is some definite point +which we wish to get from the enemy or prevent his occupying, or some part +of his strength which we wish to destroy. It is incorrect to use the term +of anything we already possess. Thus, Vladivostock is often said to have +been Rojesvensky's _objective_. It was, strictly speaking, only his +_destination_. To reach it and concentrate with the units already there was +the _primary object_ of the operations entrusted to him. He had no true +_objective_ before him except Togo's fleet. + +An _objective_ is always subordinate to some _object_. It is a step to the +attainment of that object. + +_Lines of Operation_ + +A line of operation is "the area of land or sea through which we operate +from our base or starting point to reach our objectives." + +Lines of operation may be _exterior_ or _interior_. We are said to hold the +_interior_ lines when we hold such a position, in regard to a theatre of +operations, that we can reach its chief objective points, or forces, more +quickly than the enemy can move to their defence or assistance. Such a +position is called an _interior position_. "Exterior Lines" and "Exterior +Positions" are the converse of these. + +_Lines of Communication_ + +This expression is used of three different things:-- + + (1) _Lines of supply_, running from the base of operations to the point + which the operating force has reached. + + (2) _Lines of lateral communication_ by which several forces engaged in + one theatre of operations can communicate with each other and move to + each other's support. + + (3) _Lines of retreat_, which are usually lines of supply reversed, + _i.e._, leading back to the base. + +For naval purposes these three ideas are best described by the term "lines +of passage and communication," which were in use at the end of the 18th +century, and they may be regarded as those waters over which passes the +normal course of vessels proceeding from the base to the objective or the +force to be supplied. + +_Maritime Communications_ + +The various kinds of Maritime Communications for or against which a fleet +may have to operate are:-- + + (1) Its own communications, or those of its adversary (which correspond + to the communications of armies operating ashore). These have greatly + increased in importance strategically with the increased dependence of + modern fleets on a regular supply of coals, stores, ammunition, &c. + + (2) The communications of an army operating from an advanced oversea + base, that is, communication between the advanced and the main base. + + (3) Trade Routes, that is, the communications upon which depend the + national resources and the supply of the main bases, as well as the + "lateral" or connecting communications between various parts of + belligerents' possessions. + +In Land Strategy the great majority of problems are problems of +communication. Maritime Strategy has never been regarded as hinging on +communications, but probably it does so, as will appear from a +consideration of Maritime Communications, and the extent to which they are +the main preoccupation of naval operations; that is to say, all problems of +Naval Strategy can be reduced to terms of "passage and communication," and +this is probably the best method of solving them. + + * * * * * + +PART TWO + +NAVAL STRATEGY CONSIDERED AS A +QUESTION OF PASSAGE AND +COMMUNICATION + +NAVAL STRATEGY DEFINED + +By "Naval Strategy" we mean the art of conducting the major operations of +the fleet. Such operations have for their object "passage and +communication"; that is, the fleet is mainly occupied in guarding our own +communications and seizing those of the enemy. + +We say the aim of Naval Strategy is to get command of the sea. This means +something quite different from the military idea of occupying territory, +for the sea cannot be the subject of political dominion or ownership. We +cannot subsist upon it (like an army on conquered territory), nor can we +exclude neutrals from it. The value of the sea in the political system of +the world is as a means of communication between States and parts of +States. Therefore the "command of the sea" means the control of +communications in which the belligerents are adversely concerned. The +command of the sea can never be, like the conquest of territory, the +ulterior object of a war, unless it be a purely maritime war, as were +approximately our wars with the Dutch in the 17th century, but it may be a +primary or immediate object, and even the ulterior object of particular +operations. + +History shows that the actual functions of the fleet (except in purely +maritime wars) have been threefold:-- + + 1. The furtherance or hindrance of military operations ashore. + + 2. The protection or destruction of commerce. + + 3. The prevention or securing of alliances (_i.e._, deterring or + persuading neutrals as to participating in the war). + +EXAMPLES.--The operations of Rooke in the first years of the War of the +Spanish Succession, 1702-04, to secure the adhesion of Savoy and Portugal +to the Grand Alliance. Operations of Nelson to maintain the alliance of the +Kingdom of Naples. + +In the first case, there came a crisis when it was more important to +demonstrate to Savoy and Portugal what they stood to lose by joining Louis +XIV, than to act immediately against the Toulon Fleet. In the second, the +Neapolitan Alliance was essential to our operations in the Eastern +Mediterranean; the destruction of the Toulon Fleet was not. + +In this way we get a _Definition of the Aim of Naval Strategy_, expressed +in terms of the actual functions of the fleet. For practical purposes it +will be found the most useful definition as emphasising the intimate +connection of Naval Strategy with the diplomatic, financial, and military +aspects of Major Strategy. + +These functions of the fleet may be discharged in two ways:-- + + (1) By direct territorial attacks, threatened or performed + (bombardment, landings, raiding parties, &c.). + + (2) By getting command of the sea, _i.e._, establishing ourselves in + such a position that we can control the maritime communications of all + parties concerned, so that we can operate by sea against the enemy's + territory, commerce, and allies, and they cannot operate against ours. + +The power of the second method, by controlling communications, is out of +all proportion to that of the first--direct attack. Indeed, the first can +seldom be performed with any serious effect without the second. Thus, from +this point of view also, it is clear that Naval Strategy is mainly a +question of communications. + +But not entirely. Circumstances have arisen when the fleet must discharge +part of its function by direct action against territory before there is +time to get general control of the communications. (That is, political and +military considerations may deflect the normal operation of Naval +Strategy.) + +EXAMPLES.--Rooke's capture of Gibraltar in 1704, in the face of the +unshaken Toulon Fleet. Holmes's capture of Emden in 1758. + +Still, the fact remains that the key to the effective performance of the +fleet's duties is almost always to secure communications as soon as +possible by battle. + +COMMAND OF THE SEA + +Command of the sea exists only in a state of war. If we say we have command +of the sea in time of peace it is a rhetorical expression meaning that we +have adequate naval positions, and an adequate fleet to secure the command +when war breaks out. + +Command of the sea does not mean that the enemy can do absolutely nothing, +but that he cannot _seriously_ interfere with the undertakings by which we +seek to secure the object of the war and to force our will upon him. + +_Various Conditions of Command_ + +1. It may be (a) general; (b) local. + +(a) _General command_ is secured when the enemy is no longer able to act +dangerously against our line of passage and communication or to use or +defend his own, or (in other words) when he is no longer able to interfere +seriously with our trade or our military or diplomatic operations. + +This condition exists practically when the enemy is no longer able to send +squadrons to sea. + +(b) _Local command_ implies a state of things in which we are able to +prevent the enemy from interfering with our passage and communication in +one or more theatres of operation. + +2. Both general and local command may be (a) temporary; (b) permanent. + +(a) _Temporary command_ is when we are able to prevent the +enemy from interfering with our passage and communication in all +or some theatres of operation during the period required for gaining +the object in view (_i.e._, the object of a particular operation or of +a particular campaign). This condition existed after Togo's first +action. It was also that at which Napoleon aimed in his instructions +to Villeneuve in 1805. + +(b) _Permanent command_ is when time ceases to be a vital factor in the +situation, _i.e._, when the possibility of the enemy's recovering his +maritime position is too remote to be a practical consideration. This +condition existed after Tsushima. + +_Command in Dispute_ + +The state of dispute is the most important for practical strategy, since it +is the normal condition, at least in the early stages of the war, and +frequently all through it. + +The state of dispute continues till a final decision is obtained, _i.e._, +till one side is no longer able to send a squadron to sea. + +_It is to the advantage of the preponderating Navy to end the state of +dispute by seeking a decision._ Hence the French tradition to avoid +decisive actions as a rule when at war with England. + +It must be remembered that _general command of the sea is not essential to +all oversea operations_. + +In a state of dispute the preponderating Power may concentrate or be +induced to concentrate in one theatre of operations, and so secure the +local or temporary command sufficient for obtaining the special object in +view, while the weaker Power takes advantage of such local concentration to +operate safely elsewhere. + +Thus in a state of dispute, although the weaker Power may not be able to +obstruct the passage and communication of the stronger, it may be able to +defend its own. + +EXAMPLES.--This condition of dispute existed during the first three years +of the Seven Years' War, until Hawke and Boscawen obtained a decision by +defeating Conflans and De la Clue; also in the Great War up to Trafalgar. + +When the preponderating Power fails or neglects to get command (_i.e._, +leaves the general command in dispute), the disadvantage to him is not so +much the danger to his own operations as the facility given to the enemy +for carrying out counter operations elsewhere. + +METHODS OF SECURING CONTROL. + +1. _Permanent general control_ can only be secured by the practical +annihilation of the enemy's fleet by successful actions. + +2. _Local and temporary control_ may be secured by-- + + (a) An action not necessarily entirely successful (containing). + + (b) Inducing concentration on the enemy elsewhere (diversion). + + (c) Superior concentration so as to render impotent the enemy's force + available in the special theatre of operations (masking or containing). + + (d) Blockade. + +_Action of a Fleet off an Enemy's Port_ + +A belligerent fleet off an enemy's port may carry out three different +operations, for certain purposes; each quite separate from the others, and +intended to obtain an entirely different result:-- + +(1) _Close Blockade._--This is to prevent the enemy's fighting ships from +putting to sea. In this case the object is to secure local control for some +purpose that is not purely naval, such as was carried out by the Japanese +off Port Arthur in 1904, so as to enable their transports to cross the +Yellow Sea without fear of molestation from any of the Russian ships in +Port Arthur. Since the cruisers in Vladivostok were able to emerge (that +port not being blockaded), the operation was not complete, and a danger of +interference always existed. + +This method of blockade is far more difficult to carry out in the present +day, than formerly; owing to the existence of submarines and torpedo craft, +the blockading ships have to remain further away from the port; there have +to be inner lines of cruisers, scouts and destroyers; and quick +concentration takes longer owing to the greater space covered by the +blockading force, and more ships of all natures are required for the same +reason. + +Greater and more vigilance are required than in former days, because the +enemy's ships can come out regardless of weather (thick weather would be +their opportunity), and it is most important that not a single craft, from +a battleship to a torpedo boat, be allowed to escape. + +This method of blockade includes the commercial blockade, and all countries +would be informed of its having been established. + +(2) _Commercial Blockade._--To prevent floating commerce from entering or +leaving the blockaded harbour. The blockading force would not be powerful +enough to prevent a squadron of battleships or cruisers from entering or +leaving the port blockaded; and it would not be instituted outside a +fortified military port, or one containing a strong naval force. But it +would be able to stop scouts and torpedo craft from entering or emerging, +unless in very great numbers; and if unable to stop them from emerging, +would give warning of their escape and the direction in which they are +going. + +In both these forms of blockade it is usual, as a matter of courtesy, to +allow neutral armed ships belonging to foreign navies to enter and leave +for their own purposes, presumably connected with the subjects of their own +country who are in the blockaded port. This, however, is not a right, and +the country to which the blockading ships belong has a right to refuse it, +and to back her refusal by force. + +All countries must be notified of a properly instituted commercial +blockade, in accordance with International Agreement. + +(3) _Observing a Port._--This, with its subsidiary operations, should be +conducted in such a way as to induce the enemy to put to sea, the object of +observing the port being primarily a naval one, viz., to bring him to +decisive action. + +The principal observing force (consisting of battleships and cruisers) +would be either in one squadron, or more, provided that they were in +supporting reach of each other, and so placed as to be able to cut off the +enemy's fleet on emerging from the port observed before it can get +dangerously near its probable objective, and yet sufficiently far out to +ensure a battle before it can regain the shelter of its own ports. It is +also worth noting that the battle should, if possible, be fought so as to +make it difficult for the enemy's damaged ships to obtain the shelter of a +friendly neutral's harbours before being captured. + +The observed port must be watched closely, so that immediate notice of the +enemy's exit may be given; and this would be done by small cruisers, scouts +and destroyers, which should be strong and numerous enough to attack any +torpedo craft trying to get to sea. + +In order to induce the enemy's main force to put to sea it is important +that every means be used to prevent his knowing that our fleet is observing +the port, or if that be impossible, to do nothing which will lead him to +suppose that his port is being observed. + +This operation is not a blockade. + +Subsidiary operations to induce the enemy's fleet to put to sea, may take +the form of a diversion on the enemy's coast, or against some important +part of his sea-borne trade, either by the observing fleet or by a force +affiliated to it, or by any oversea movements calculated to interfere +seriously with the enemy's war plan. + +_Concentration_ + +The guiding feature of modern preparation for war is to be ready for rapid +action. It is true at sea, more even than on land, that upon the first +movements depend the initiative, the power of controlling the enemy's +strategy, and of making him conform to our movements. This readiness for +rapid action will depend on a proper distribution of the fleet so as to +meet all the requirements. + +The distribution of the fleet should be dominated by the idea of +concentration, but it must be understood clearly what concentration means. +Clausewitz says:--"The best strategy is always to be sufficiently strong, +at first generally, then at the decisive point. There is therefore no +higher or simpler law for strategy than this--keep your forces together." + +The maxim "Keep your forces together" does not, however, necessarily mean +keeping them all concentrated in one mass, but rather keeping them so +disposed that they can unite readily at will. At sea it is more difficult +than on land to foretell where the decisive point will be; but since it is +quicker and easier at sea to concentrate forces at any particular point +than on land, in applying this maxim for our purposes, the rule should be +to dispose the forces at sea so as to be able to concentrate them in time +at the decisive point so soon as this point is determined, and also so as +to conceal from the enemy what it is intended to make the decisive point. + +If the forces are rightly disposed within due limits, adequate control of +all the lines of passage and communication can be assured, and if the enemy +undertakes any operations it should be possible to ensure that sufficient +forces can be concentrated in time to defeat his object. On the other hand, +if the forces are concentrated in one mass, there can be little chance of +deceiving or confusing the enemy, while it gives him an opportunity of +successfully carrying out some operation by evasion. + +THE PECULIARITY OF MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS + +Since the whole idea of command of the sea rests on the control of +communications, it cannot be fully apprehended without a thorough +understanding of the nature of maritime communications. + +Ashore, the respective lines of communications of each belligerent tend as +a rule to run more or less approximately in opposite directions, until they +meet in the theatre of operations or the objective point. + +At sea, the reverse is frequently the case; for in maritime warfare the +great lines of communications of either belligerent often tend to run +approximately parallel if, indeed, they are not identical. + +Thus, in the case of a war with Germany, the object of which lay in the +Eastern Mediterranean, or in America, or South Africa, our respective lines +of communication would be identical. + +This was also the case in all our imperial wars with France. + +_This peculiarity is the controlling influence of maritime warfare._ Nearly +all our current maxims of Naval Strategy can be traced to the pressure it +exerts on naval thought. + +It is at the root of the fundamental difference between Military and Naval +Strategy, and affords the explanation of much strategical error and +confusion which have arisen from applying the principles of land warfare to +the sea without allowing for the antagonistic conditions of the +communications and the operations against them in each case. + +On land, the chief reason for not always striking the enemy's +communications at once is that, as a rule, we cannot do so without exposing +our own. At sea, on the contrary, when the great lines are common to both, +we cannot defend our own without striking at the enemy's. + +Therefore, at sea, the obvious opening is to get our fleet into such a +position that it controls the common lines, unless defeated or evaded. This +was usually done in our old wars with France, by our attempting to get a +fleet off Brest before the French could sail. + +Hence the maxims "That the proper place for our fleets is off the enemy's +coast," "The enemy's coast is our true frontier," and the like. + +But these maxims are not universally true; witness Togo's strategy against +Rojesvensky, when he remained correctly upon his own coast. + +Take, again, the maxim that the primary object of the fleet is to seek out +the enemy's fleet and destroy it. Here, again, Togo's practice was the +reverse of the maxim. + +The true maxim is "The primary object of the fleet is to secure +communications, and if the enemy's fleet is in a position to render them +unsafe it must be put out of action." + +The enemy's fleet usually is in this position, but not always. + +EXAMPLE.--Opening of the War of the Spanish Succession. The operations of +1702 were to secure some point (Cadiz, Gibraltar, or Ferrol) on the Spanish +trade communications, the French lateral communications, and our own lines +of passage to the Mediterranean, where was to be our chief theatre of +operation. These last two lines were identical. In 1703, the chief +operations had for their object to secure the alliance of Savoy, and +particularly of Portugal. Rooke's official instructions directed that the +French fleet was to be ignored unless it threatened the common +communications. + +RESULT.--By 1704 we had gained a naval position from which France could not +eject us, and she abandoned the struggle for sea communications. + +But nine times out of ten the maxim of seeking out the enemy's fleet, &c., +is sound and applicable-- + + (a) Because for us _general permanent command_ is usually essential + to ultimate success, and this cannot be obtained without destroying the + enemy's fleet. + + (b) Because usually the enemy's fleet opens with an attempt to + _dispute the control of the common communications_. + + (c) Because usually the functions of the fleet are so complex + (_i.e._, the calls upon it so numerous) that it will seek to strike a + blow which will solve all the difficulties; _e.g._, Sir. Palmes + Fairborne's solution of the problem in 1703. + +Also it must be remembered that nine times out of ten the most effective +way of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" (_i.e._, forcing an action on him) +is to seize a position which controls communications vital to his plan of +campaign. + +This was what happened in 1704. Rooke was unable to seek out the Toulon +Fleet, but by seizing Gibraltar he made it come to him (not intentionally, +but by the operation of strategical law). + +Practically all great naval actions have been brought about in this way, +that is, they have been the outcome of an effort to clear essential +communications from the enemy's fleet; _e.g._, Gravelines, La Hogue, +Quiberon, Trafalgar, Tsushima. + +Similarly the great actions of the old Dutch wars were brought about +because our geographical position placed us astride the Dutch trade +communications, and they were forced to seek a decision against our fleet. + +In applying the maxim of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" it should be borne +in mind that if you seek it out with a superior force you will probably +find it in a place where you cannot destroy it, except at very heavy cost. +It is far better to make it come to you, and this has often been done by +merely sitting on the common communications. + +Again, if you seek out the enemy's fleet without being certain of getting +contact, you may merely assist it in evading you, and enable it to get into +a position on your own communications, from which it may be very costly to +dislodge it. It was for this reason that the Elizabethan Government kept +the fleet in home waters in 1588. Sampson, in the Spanish-American War, was +actually permitted to make this mistake. By going to seek out Cervera +without being sure of contact, he left him a clear run into Cienfuegos or +even Havana, which it was the main function of the fleet to prevent. +Captain Mahan has since modified this maxim as follows:--"Seek out the +enemy's fleet, if you are sure of getting contact." A truer maxim would +seem to be "Seek contact with the enemy's fleet in the most certain and +favourable manner that is open to you." To seek out the enemy's fleet is +only one way of doing this, and not always the best way. It must be +remembered that other conditions being equal, it is an obvious advantage to +fight in your own waters rather than in those of the enemy, and more likely +to ensure that a defeat of the enemy will be decisive. + + RN WAR COLLEGE PORTSMOUTH + JANUARY 1909 + + * * * * * + + INDEX + + Abercromby, General Sir Ralph, 290, 296 + Absolute War, 25, 42-44 + Alexandria, 289 + Alsace-Lorraine, 51-52, 55 + Ambleteuse, 251 + Amherst, General Lord, 285 + Anglo-Japanese Treaty, 79 + Anson, Admiral Lord, 110-12, 118, 189, 290 + Antwerp, 69 + Armada, Spanish, 159-60, 172-74, 227, 243, 245, 255 + Articles of War, 176 + Austerlitz Campaign, 21, 53 + + Bacon, Sir Francis, 58 + Baltic Fleet, 81, 170, 285, 327 + Baltic trade, 263 + Barcelona, 286 + Barham, Admiral Sir Charles Middleton, 118, 142-44, 151, 162-63, 183, + 199, 207, 254, 297 + Barraille, Admiral, 249-51 + Barrington, Admiral Samuel, 146-47 + Batz, Isle de, 179, 290 + Beachy Head, 218 + Belgium, 50-52, 55 + Belleisle, Marechal de, 295, 332 + Belleisle, 312 + Berry, Captain Sir Edward, 238 + Biscay, Bay of, 139, 142, 263 + Black Sea, 285 + Blake, Colonel Robert, 176 + Blockade, method of, 102, 121, 183-86, 235, 244, 252, 256-58, 260-62, + 269, 272, 284, 341; + ethics of, 39; + tactical and strategic, 97; + insecurity of, 119; + close and open, 97, 184, 187-91, 193-94, 197-201, 205, 207-208, 240, + 250, 292, 295-97, 321, 340; + theory of, 142, 163, 169, 175, 202-204, 242, 287-88, 322 + Blücher, Field Marshal Gebhard von, 23 + Boscawen, Admiral Edward, 189, 252, 320, 328, 339 + Boulogne, 251 + Brest, 141, 145, 147-48, 162, 179, 189, 193-97, 201-202, 208, 235-36, + 248-49, 252-53, 290, 296, 323 + Bruix, Admiral, 140 + Byng, Admiral Sir George, 163 + + Cadiz, 134-40, 143, 146, 148, 179, 186, 213, 227, 264, 323 + Caemmerer, General von, 76-77 + Calder, Admiral Sir Robert, 163, 183 + Canada, 54, 56-57, 81, 189, 210, 312, 328, 332 + Cape Clear, 272 + Caribbean Sea, 144 + Carkett, Captain Robert, 4 + Cartagena, 264 + Channel Islands, 140, 253 + Charles II of England, 179 + Charles of Austria, 21, 54, 69 + Chateaurenault, Admiral Comte de, 213-14 + Chatham, 177, 215, 227 + Cherbourg, 253 + Christian, Admiral Sir Hugh, 296 + Cienfuegos, 169, 344 + Clausewitz, General Karl von, 79-80, 85, 330-31; + theory, 25, 27-29, 41-46, 51-56, 60-61, 73-74, 76-77, 311, 341; + his service, 23-24; + _On War_, 24, 44; + his war plans, 44 + Colpoys, Admiral Sir John, 196 + Command at sea, theory of, 91-106, 165-66 + Commerce prevention, 95 + Communications, maritime, 94, 165, 315-16, 335; + common theory of, 100-102, 118 + Conflans, Admiral Comte de, 192, 252-53, 320, 339 + Copenhagen, 68 + Cornwallis, Admiral Sir William, 143, 162, 181, 183, 197-200 + Coruña, 173 + Cotton, Admiral Sir Charles, 181 + Covering squadron, 283, 286-88, 291 + Craig's expedition, 67 + Crimea, 57, 62, 81, 258, 285-87, 300 + Cromwell, 20, 22, 157, 163, 176 + Cuba, 57, 103, 168, 313, 332 + _Curieux_, 182 + + Dalny, 229 + Dardanelles, 68, 139 + Davout, Louis-Nicolas, 23 + Deane, Colonel Richard, 176 + Declaration of Paris, 96, 267 + Dettingen, 246 + Dogger Bank, 158 + Downs, the, 139-40, 146, 176, 198, 214, 249-50, 253, 263 + Drake, Sir Francis, 39, 159-60, 171, 173-74, 227, 244, 291, 301 + Dumouriez, General, 254, 257 + Dundas, Admiral Sir James, 286, 291 + Dungeness, 176, 199 + Dunkirk, 225, 237, 244, 246-50, 252-53 + Duquesne, Admiral Abraham, 121 + + Egypt, 237-38, 240 + Elliot Islands, 37 + + Ferrol, 139, 141, 266, 323 + Finisterre, Cape, 101, 106, 139-40, 253, 256, 272 + Flanders, 171, 246 + Frederick the Great, 21-22, 36, 46, 54-55, 63-64, 66-67, 80, 157, 327 + + Gallipoli, 285 + Ganteaume, Admiral Comte, 191, 197-98, 202, 236 + Gardner, Admiral Lord, 197-98 + Gibraltar, 34, 105, 139, 141, 145-46, 213, 264, 272, 318, 323, 337, 344 + Gneisenau, Field Marshal August von, 23 + Goltz, General von der, 75, 97 + Guichen, Admiral Comte de, 146, 223 + + Hanover, 64, 246 + Hardy, Admiral Sir Charles, 253-57 + Havana, 57, 169 + Havre, 252-53, 263 + Hawke, Admiral Sir Edward, 104, 189-90, 192, 196, 235, 252-53, 320, 339 + Henry VIII, 108-110 + Holland, 65, 195 + Howe, Admiral Earl, 144, 147-50, 190-191, 194, 204, 206-207 + Howard of Effingham, Admiral Lord, 171, 173-74, 244 + + Iberian Peninsula, 56, 61-62, 64, 69-71, 105 + India, 101 + Ireland, 194, 196, 213, 215, 225-26, 240, 253, 255, 257, 263, 282 + + Jamaica, 142, 144, 149, 182, 207 + Jervis, Sir John, 223, 296 + Jomini, General Baron de, 28-30, 42, 45-47, 51-52, 56, 60, 74, 85 + + Kamimura, Admiral, 170 + Keith, Admiral Lord, 236, 289 + Kempenfelt, Admiral Richard, 137, 146-48, 150, 192-94, 196, 206, 220, + 222-24, 227, 254, 257, 260 + Killigrew, Admiral Henry, 213-15, 219, 224 + Korea, 34, 57, 79-80, 82-85 + Kraft zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, Prince, 75 + Kuantung Peninsula, 290 + + Lagos, 252 + La Hogue, 180, 324, 344 + Langara, Admiral Don Juan, 148-49 + Leghorn, 264 + Leith, 263 + Liaotung Peninsula, 37, 73, 287, 292 + Liao-yang, 82, 85 + Light squadrons, 125 + Ligonier, General Lord, 70 + Limited War, 41, 46, 51-59, 72-87, 313 + Lisbon, 68, 173 + Lissa, 36, 179, 293 + Lizard, the, 150, 256 + Louisburg, 285, 287 + Lyons, Admiral Sir Edmund, 285-86 + + Mack, General, 21 + Mahan, Admiral, 131n, 169, 344 + Maitland, General, 295 + Malta, 139, 264 + Manchuria, 79, 82, 258, 290, 313, 318, 329 + Maria Theresa, 246 + Marlborough, John, Duke of, 64 + Maxims: "Conquest of water territory," 93; + "Enemy's coast our frontier," 93; + "Eyes of the fleet," 112, 117, 120-21; + "Fleet in being," 224, 231; + "The sea is all one," 103; + "Seeking out the enemy's fleet," 102, 156, 161, 164, 167-68, + 170-71, 174, 180, 203, 324, 344-45 + Medina-Sidonia, Duke of, 244, 249 + Mediterranean, 95, 101, 108, 113-14, 119, 125, 139-40, 143, 179, 182, + 198, 207, 218, 223, 247, 252, 264, 285, 322, 337 + Medway, 38, 217 + Melville, Lord, 199-200 + Middleton. _See_ Barham + Minorca, 34, 145, 330 + Moltke, General von, 27, 51, 55, 73-74 + Monk, George, Duke of Albemarle, 135-37, 157, 176-77 + Montecuculi, Prince, 24 + Montcalm, General Marquis de, 302 + Morbihan, 235, 252-53 + Mukden, 83 + + Napoleon, 43-44, 54, 68, 77, 79, 85, 98, 251, 257-58, 338; + methods, 19-23, 25, 27-28, 46-48, 65, 141, 144, 157, 183, 210, 237-38, + 240-41; + views on naval warfare, 56, 143, 179, 181, 191, 236; + his Russian campaign, 47, 52; + on "pygmy combinations," 67; + his conversion, 68-70 + Narrow seas, 127, 202 + Nelson, Admiral Lord, 119, 125-26, 226, 317, 322, 336; + his influence, 161-63, 217; + his use of cruisers, 113-15, 117; + on defensive fleet operations, 223-24, 227; + on blockade, 184, 186, 198-99, 208; + his strategy, 136, 139, 141-42, 199, 238, 281 + New Model Army, 157, 176 + Ney, Marshal Michael, 29 + Nile, 180 + Norris, Admiral Sir John, 237-38, 246, 249, 253, 281 + North Sea, 69, 127, 139, 145, 150, 179, 195-96, 199, 207, 225, 263 + Nottingham, Daniel Finch, Earl of, 216-17 + + Observation squadrons, 125 + Offence, theory of, 31-36, 39-40 + Orde, Admiral Sir John, 223 + Orvilliers, Admiral Comte de, 256 + + Palermo, 121 + Paris, Declaration of, 96, 267 + Parma, Prince Alexander Farnese, Duke of, 171-73, 241, 243-44 + Pe-chi-li, Gulf of, 73, 302 + Persano, Admiral, 293-94 + Philip II, 239 + Pitt, William, Earl of Chatham, 63-64, 84, 300, 327 + Plymouth, 171, 173, 190, 214, 220, 248, 256 + Pola, 293-94 + Port Arthur, 80, 82-85, 170, 202, 204-205, 227-31, 290-92, 322, 340 + Portsmouth, 195, 214, 224, 248-49, 253 + Portugal, 65, 80, 195, 317, 323, 336 + Privateering, 266-68 + Prussia, 23, 49-50, 64 + Puerto Rico, 168 + + Quebec, 285, 289, 301-302 + Quiberon, 105, 180, 192, 253, 324 + + Raglan, General Lord, 301 + "Real War," 25 + Revolution, French, 19, 65 + Rochefort, 139, 141, 182, 235, 250, 300, 312, 332 + Rodney, Admiral Sir George B., 5, 144, 194 + Roquefeuille, Admiral Marquis de, 247-51 + Ross, Admiral John, 147, 149 + Rupert, Prince, 135-36, 157 + Russell, Admiral Edward, 225 + Ruyter, Admiral de, 135-37 + + St. Helena, 277 + St. James's fight, 177-78 + St. Vincent, Admiral Sir John, 179, 194, 196, 272, 288, 290, 296 + St. Vincent, Cape, 139, 182 + San Domingo, 291, 301 + Santa Cruz, Marquess of, 239 + Santiago, 169, 322 + Sampson, Admiral, 168, 322, 344 + Sandwich, Admiral, the Earl of, 121 + Sardinia, 139, 207 + Saunders, Admiral Sir Charles, 289, 301 + Saxe, Marshal, 247-50 + Saxony, 54-55, 80 + Scilly, 39, 149-50, 255 + Sebastopol, 80, 285, 291 + Seoul, 82, 85, 290, 303 + Sharnhorst, General Gerhard von, 23 + Shovel, Admiral Sir Cloudesley, 213-14, 224, 286 + Sicily, 65, 207 + Silesia, 46, 55 + Skelligs, the, 150 + Smyrna convoy, 225 + Sole Bay, 38 + Spanish Armada, 159-60, 172-74, 227, 243, 245, 255 + Spithead, 135, 146, 192, 248 + Stakelberg, General, 302-303 + Strachan, Admiral Sir Richard, 125-26 + Strategy, naval and maritime, 15; + major and minor, 308-309, 327-28 + + Tegetthoff, Admiral, 36, 293-94 + Texel, the, 139, 146-47, 150, 197 + Thames, the, 135-38, 214, 217, 247-48, 268 + Theory of war, 15-30, 107-52 + Tilbury, 247 + Togo, Admiral, 84, 170, 202, 207, 290, 292, 303, 319, 322-24, 338 + Torbay, 189-90, 192-93, 207 + Torres Vedras, 36, 83 + Torrington, Admiral Lord, 214-18, 220, 224, 226 + Toulon, 69, 135, 139, 184, 198, 207-208, 213-14, 264, 266, 286, 296, + 317-18, 322, 324, 337, 344 + Tourville, Admiral Comte de, 213-14, 217, 219-20, 224-26 + Trafalgar, 68, 118, 199, 266, 320, 324, 339 + Trieste, 139 + Tromp, Admiral Martin H., 175-76 + Tsushima, 83, 319, 324, 338 + + Unlimited War, 40-51, 60-71 + Ushant, 142-43, 147, 181-82, 192, 223-25, 258, 272 + Utrecht, 246 + Villeneuve, Admiral, 140, 142-43, 179, 182-83, 186, 197, 206, 223, 266, + 338 + Vladivostock, 340 + + Walcheren, 68-69 + Warren, Commodore Sir John B., 235 + Wars: + Anglo-American (1812), 119, 276; + Anglo-Dutch, 109; + Anglo-Spanish (1588), 109; + American Independence, 92, 118, 190, 193, 210, 221, 226; + Austro-Italian (1866), 36, 179, 293; + Crimean, 258, 285-88; + Franco-German (1870), 71, 79, 333; + Franco-Russian (1812), 47, 49, 51-52; + Russo-Japanese, 34, 38, 44, 51, 78-79, 84, 168, 170, 205, 303, 328-29; + Seven Years', 51, 54, 57, 63, 66, 111, 179, 189-90, 197-98, 209, 312, + 320, 327-28, 332, 339; + Spanish-American, 57, 168-69, 313, 332, 344; + Spanish Succession, 34, 317, 323, 336 + Wellington, Duke of, 36, 56, 61, 65, 83, 105 + West Indies, 95, 140, 142-43, 182, 189-90, 197, 210, 222-23, 225, 247, + 252, 255, 266-67, 285, 296 + Western Squadron, 42, 181, 193, 252, 263, 266 + Wight, Isle of, 136, 214, 249, 253, 257 + Wolfe, General, 70, 200, 285, 301-302 + + Yalu, 85 + Yarmouth, 263 + Yellow Sea, 340 + + + +***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SOME PRINCIPLES OF MARITIME +STRATEGY*** + + +******* This file should be named 15076-8.txt or 15076-8.zip ******* + + +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: +https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/1/5/0/7/15076 + + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at <a href = "https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a></pre> +<p>Title: Some Principles of Maritime Strategy</p> +<p>Author: Julian Stafford Corbett</p> +<p>Release Date: February 16, 2005 [eBook #15076]</p> +<p>Language: english</p> +<p>Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1</p> +<p>***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SOME PRINCIPLES OF MARITIME STRATEGY***</p> +<p> </p> +<h3>E-text prepared by Suzanne Shell, Keith Edkins,<br /> + and the Project Gutenberg Online Distributed Proofreading Team</h3> +<p> </p> +<hr class="full" /> + <h1>Some principles of maritime strategy</h1> + <hr /> + + <div class="center"> + <img src="images/001.jpg" + alt="Portrait of Sir Julian Corbett" /> + </div> + + <p class="center"><i>Sir Julian Corbett (courtesy D.M. + Schurman)</i></p><br /> + + <h3>LONDON 1911.</h3> + <hr /> + + <h2>CONTENTS</h2> + <hr /> + + <div class="center"> + <table summary="contents"> + <tr> + <td colspan="2"> </td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td colspan="2"> + <h3>INTRODUCTION</h3> + </td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td>THE THEORETICAL STUDY OF WAR—ITS USE AND + LIMITATIONS</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_3">3</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td colspan="2"> </td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td colspan="2"> + <h3>PART I. THEORY OF WAR</h3> + </td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td>I. THE THEORY OF WAR</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_15">15</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td>II. NATURES OF WARS—OFFENSIVE AND + DEFENSIVE</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_31">31</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td>III. NATURES OF WARS—LIMITED AND + UNLIMITED</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_41">41</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td>IV. LIMITED WAR AND MARITIME EMPIRES</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_52">52</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td>V. WARS OF INTERVENTION—LIMITED + INTERFERENCE IN UNLIMITED WAR</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_60">60</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td>VI. CONDITIONS OF STRENGTH IN LIMITED WAR</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_72">72</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td colspan="2"> </td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td colspan="2"> + <h3>PART II. THEORY OF NAVAL WAR</h3> + </td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td>I. THEORY OF THE OBJECT—COMMAND OF THE + SEA</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_91">91</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td>II. THEORY OF THE MEANS—THE CONSTITUTION + OF FLEETS</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_107">107</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td>III. THEORY OF THE METHOD—CONCENTRATION + AND DISPERSAL OF FORCE</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_128">128</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td colspan="2"> + <!-- Page 2 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2" + id="Page_2"></a>[pg 2]</span> </td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td colspan="2"> + <h3>PART III. CONDUCT OF NAVAL WAR</h3> + </td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td>I. INTRODUCTORY—</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_155">155</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td> 1. INHERENT DIFFERENCES IN THE + CONDITIONS OF WAR ON LAND AND ON SEA</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_155">155</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td> 2. TYPICAL FORMS OF NAVAL + OPERATIONS</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_161">161</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td>II. METHODS OF SECURING COMMAND—</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_167">167</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td> 1. ON OBTAINING A DECISION</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_167">167</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td> 2. BLOCKADE</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_183">183</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td>III. METHODS OF DISPUTING COMMAND—</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_209">209</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td> 1. DEFENSIVE FLEET + OPERATIONS—"A FLEET IN BEING"</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_209">209</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td> 2. MINOR COUNTER-ATTACKS</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_227">227</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td>IV. METHODS OF EXERCISING COMMAND—</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_233">233</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td> 1. DEFENCE AGAINST INVASION</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_233">233</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td> 2. ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF + TRADE</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_261">261</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td> 3. ATTACK, DEFENCE, AND SUPPORT OF + MILITARY EXPEDITIONS</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_280">280</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td colspan="2"> </td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td>Appendix: The "Green Pamphlet"</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_305">305</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td>INDEX</td> + + <td class="right"><a href="#Page_346">346</a></td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td colspan="2"> </td> + </tr> + </table> + </div><!-- Page 3 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_3" + id="Page_3"></a>[pg 3]</span> + <hr /> + + <h1>INTRODUCTION</h1> + + <h3>The Theoretical Study of War—Its Use and<br /> + Limitations</h3> + <hr /> + + <p>At first sight nothing can appear more unpractical, less + promising of useful result, than to approach the study of war + with a theory. There seems indeed to be something essentially + antagonistic between the habit of mind that seeks theoretical + guidance and that which makes for the successful conduct of + war. The conduct of war is so much a question of personality, + of character, of common-sense, of rapid decision upon complex + and ever-shifting factors, and those factors themselves are so + varied, so intangible, so dependent upon unstable moral and + physical conditions, that it seems incapable of being reduced + to anything like true scientific analysis. At the bare idea of + a theory or "science" of war the mind recurs uneasily to + well-known cases where highly "scientific" officers failed as + leaders. Yet, on the other hand, no one will deny that since + the great theorists of the early nineteenth century attempted + to produce a reasoned theory of war, its planning and conduct + have acquired a method, a precision, and a certainty of grasp + which were unknown before. Still less will any one deny the + value which the shrewdest and most successful leaders in war + have placed upon the work of the classical strategical + writers.</p> + + <p>The truth is that the mistrust of theory arises from a + misconception of what it is that theory claims to do. It does + not <!-- Page 4 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" + id="Page_4"></a>[pg 4]</span> pretend to give the power of + conduct in the field; it claims no more than to increase the + effective power of conduct. Its main practical value is that + it can assist a capable man to acquire a broad outlook + whereby he may be the surer his plan shall cover all the + ground, and whereby he may with greater rapidity and + certainty seize all the factors of a sudden situation. The + greatest of the theorists himself puts the matter quite + frankly. Of theoretical study he says, "It should educate + the mind of the man who is to lead in war, or rather guide + him to self-education, but it should not accompany him on + the field of battle."</p> + + <p>Its practical utility, however, is not by any means confined + to its effects upon the powers of a leader. It is not enough + that a leader should have the ability to decide rightly; his + subordinates must seize at once the full meaning of his + decision and be able to express it with certainty in + well-adjusted action. For this every man concerned must have + been trained to think in the same plane; the chief's order must + awake in every brain the same process of thought; his words + must have the same meaning for all. If a theory of tactics had + existed in 1780, and if Captain Carkett had had a sound + training in + <!-- Page 5 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" + id="Page_5"></a>[pg 5]</span> such a theory, he could not + possibly have misunderstood Rodney's signal. As it was, the + real intention of the signal was obscure, and Rodney's + neglect to explain the tactical device it indicated robbed + his country of a victory at an hour of the direst need. + There had been no previous theoretical training to supply + the omission, and Rodney's fine conception was + unintelligible to anybody but himself.</p> + + <p>Nor is it only for the sake of mental solidarity between a + chief and his subordinates that theory is indispensable. It is + of still higher value for producing a similar solidarity + between him and his superiors at the Council table at home. How + often have officers dumbly acquiesced in ill-advised operations + simply for lack of the mental power and verbal apparatus to + convince an impatient Minister where the errors of his plan + lay? How often, moreover, have statesmen and officers, even in + the most harmonious conference, been unable to decide on a + coherent plan of war from inability to analyse scientifically + the situation they had to face, and to recognise the general + character of the struggle in which they were about + <!-- Page 6 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" + id="Page_6"></a>[pg 6]</span> to engage. That the true + nature of a war should be realised by contemporaries as + clearly as it comes to be seen afterwards in the fuller + light of history is seldom to be expected. At close range + accidental factors will force themselves into undue + prominence and tend to obscure the true horizon. Such error + can scarcely ever be eliminated, but by theoretical study we + can reduce it, nor by any other means can we hope to + approach the clearness of vision with which posterity will + read our mistakes. Theory is, in fact, a question of + education and deliberation, and not of execution at all. + That depends on the combination of intangible human + qualities which we call executive ability.</p> + + <p>This, then, is all the great authorities ever claimed for + theory, but to this claim the chief of them at least, after + years of active service on the Staff, attached the highest + importance. "In actual operations," he wrote in one of his + latest memoranda, "men are guided solely by their judgment, and + it will hit the mark more or less accurately according as they + possess more or less genius. This is the way all great generals + have acted.... Thus it will always be in action, and so far + judgment will suffice. But when it is a question not of taking + action yourself, but of convincing others at the Council table, + then everything depends on clear conceptions and the exposition + of the inherent relations of things. So little progress has + been made in this respect that most deliberations are merely + verbal contentions which rest on no firm foundation, and end + either in every one retaining his own opinion, or in a + compromise from considerations of mutual respect—a middle + course of no actual value."<a name="NtA_1" + id="NtA_1"></a><a href="#Nt_1"><sup>1</sup></a></p> + + <p>The writer's experience of such discussions was rich and at + <!-- Page + 7 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" + id="Page_7"></a>[pg 7]</span> first hand. Clear conceptions + of the ideas and factors involved in a war problem, and a + definite exposition of the relations between them, were in + his eyes the remedy for loose and purposeless discussion; + and such conceptions and expositions are all we mean by the + theory or the science of war. It is a process by which we + co-ordinate our ideas, define the meaning of the words we + use, grasp the difference between essential and unessential + factors, and fix and expose the fundamental data on which + every one is agreed. In this way we prepare the apparatus of + practical discussion; we secure the means of arranging the + factors in manageable shape, and of deducing from them with + precision and rapidity a practical course of action. Without + such an apparatus no two men can even think on the same + line; much less can they ever hope to detach the real point + of difference that divides them and isolate it for quiet + solution.</p> + + <p>In our own case this view of the value of strategical theory + has a special significance, and one far wider than its + continental enunciators contemplated. For a world-wide maritime + Empire the successful conduct of war will often turn not only + on the decisions of the Council chamber at home, but on the + outcome of conferences in all parts of the world between + <!-- Page 8 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" + id="Page_8"></a>[pg 8]</span> squadronal commanders and the + local authorities, both civil and military, and even between + commanders-in-chief of adjacent stations. In time of war or + of preparation for war, in which the Empire is concerned, + arrangements must always be based to an exceptional degree + on the mutual relation of naval, military, and political + considerations. The line of mean efficiency, though + indicated from home, must be worked out locally, and worked + out on factors of which no one service is master. Conference + is always necessary, and for conference to succeed there + must be a common vehicle of expression and a common plane of + thought. It is for this essential preparation that + theoretical study alone can provide; and herein lies its + practical value for all who aspire to the higher + responsibilities of the Imperial service.</p> + + <p>So great indeed is the value of abstract strategical study + from this point of view, that it is necessary to guard + ourselves against over-valuation. So far from claiming for + their so-called science more than the possibilities we have + indicated, the classical strategists insist again and again on + the danger of seeking from it what it cannot give. They even + repudiate the very name of "Science." They prefer the older + term "Art." They will permit no laws or rules. Such laws, they + say, can only mislead in practice, for the friction to which + they are subject from the incalculable human factors alone is + such that the friction is stronger than the law. It is an old + adage of lawyers that nothing is so misleading as a legal + maxim, but a strategical maxim is undoubtedly and in every way + less to be trusted in action.</p> + + <p>What then, it will be asked, are the tangible results which + we can hope to attain from theory? If all on which we have to + build is so indeterminate, how are any practical conclusions to + be reached? That the factors are infinitely varied and + difficult to determine is true, but that, it must be + remembered, is just what emphasises the necessity of reaching + such firm standpoints as are attainable. The vaguer the problem + to be <!-- Page 9 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" + id="Page_9"></a>[pg 9]</span> solved, the more resolute must + we be in seeking points of departure from which we can begin + to lay a course, keeping always an eye open for the + accidents that will beset us, and being always alive to + their deflecting influences. And this is just what the + theoretical study of strategy can do. It can at least + determine the normal. By careful collation of past events it + becomes clear that certain lines of conduct tend normally to + produce certain effects; that wars tend to take certain + forms each with a marked idiosyncrasy; that these forms are + normally related to the object of the war and to its value + to one or both belligerents; that a system of operations + which suits one form may not be that best suited to another. + We can even go further. By pursuing an historical and + comparative method we can detect that even the human factor + is not quite indeterminable. We can assert that certain + situations will normally produce, whether in ourselves or in + our adversaries, certain moral states on which we may + calculate.</p> + + <p>Having determined the normal, we are at once in a stronger + position. Any proposal can be compared with it, and we can + proceed to discuss clearly the weight of the factors which + prompt us to depart from the normal. Every case must be judged + on its merits, but without a normal to work from we cannot form + any real judgment at all; we can only guess. Every case will + assuredly depart from the normal to a greater or less extent, + and it is equally certain that the greatest successes in war + have been the boldest departures from the normal. But for the + most part they have been departures made with open eyes by + geniuses who could perceive in the accidents of the case a just + reason for the departure.</p> + + <p>Take an analogous example, and the province of strategical + theory becomes clear at once. Navigation and the parts of + seamanship that belong to it have to deal with phenomena as + varied and unreliable as those of the conduct of war. Together + they form an art which depends quite as much as generalship on + the judgment of individuals. The law of <!-- Page 10 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" + id="Page_10"></a>[pg 10]</span> storms and tides, of winds + and currents, and the whole of meteorology are subject to + infinite and incalculable deflections, and yet who will deny + nowadays that by the theoretical study of such things the + seaman's art has gained in coherence and strength? Such + study will not by itself make a seaman or a navigator, but + without it no seaman or navigator can nowadays pretend to + the name. Because storms do not always behave in the same + way, because currents are erratic, will the most practical + seaman deny that the study of the normal conditions are + useless to him in his practical decisions?</p> + + <p>If, then, the theoretical study of strategy be approached in + this way—if, that is, it be regarded not as a substitute + for judgment and experience, but as a means of fertilising + both, it can do no man harm. Individual thought and + common-sense will remain the masters and remain the guides to + point the general direction when the mass of facts begins to + grow bewildering. Theory will warn us the moment we begin to + leave the beaten track, and enable us to decide with open eyes + whether the divergence is necessary or justifiable. Above all, + when men assemble in Council it will hold discussion to the + essential lines, and help to keep side issues in their + place.</p> + + <p>But beyond all this there lies in the theory of war yet + another element of peculiar value to a maritime Empire. We are + accustomed, partly for convenience and partly from lack of a + scientific habit of thought, to speak of naval strategy and + military strategy as though they were distinct branches of + knowledge which had no common ground. It is the theory of war + which brings out their intimate relation. It reveals that + embracing them both is a larger strategy which regards the + fleet and army as one weapon, which co-ordinates their action, + and indicates the lines on which each must move to realise the + full power of both. It will direct us to assign to each its + proper function in a plan of war; it will enable each service + to realise the better the limitations and the possibilities of + the function with which it is charged, and how and <!-- Page 11 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" + id="Page_11"></a>[pg 11]</span> when its own necessities + must give way to a higher or more pressing need of the + other. It discloses, in short, that naval strategy is not a + thing by itself, that its problems can seldom or never be + solved on naval considerations alone, but that it is only a + part of maritime strategy—the higher learning which + teaches us that for a maritime State to make successful war + and to realise her special strength, army and navy must be + used and thought of as instruments no less intimately + connected than are the three arms ashore.</p> + + <p>It is for these reasons that it is of little use to approach + naval strategy except through the theory of war. Without such + theory we can never really understand its scope or meaning, nor + can we hope to grasp the forces which most profoundly affect + its conclusions.</p><!-- Page 12 blank --> + <!-- Page 13 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" + id="Page_13"></a>[pg 13]</span> + <hr /> + + <h3>PART ONE</h3> + <hr /> + + <h1>THEORY OF WAR</h1> + <hr /> + <!-- Page 14 blank --> + <!-- Page 15 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" + id="Page_15"></a>[pg 15]</span> + + <h3>CHAPTER ONE</h3> + <hr /> + + <h2>THE THEORY<br /> + OF WAR</h2> + <hr /> + + <p>The last thing that an explorer arrives at is a complete map + that will cover the whole ground he has travelled, but for + those who come after him and would profit by and extend his + knowledge his map is the first thing with which they will + begin. So it is with strategy. Before we start upon its study + we seek a chart which will show us at a glance what exactly is + the ground we have to cover and what are the leading features + which determine its form and general characteristics. Such a + chart a "theory of war" alone can provide. It is for this + reason that in the study of war we must get our theory clear + before we can venture in search of practical conclusions. So + great is the complexity of war that without such a guide we are + sure to go astray amidst the bewildering multiplicity of tracks + and obstacles that meet us at every step. If for continental + strategy its value has been proved abundantly, then for + maritime strategy, where the conditions are far more complex, + the need of it is even greater.</p> + + <p>By maritime strategy we mean the principles which govern a + war in which the sea is a substantial factor. Naval strategy is + but that part of it which determines the movements of the fleet + when maritime strategy has determined what part the fleet must + play in relation to the action of the land forces; for it + scarcely needs saying that it is almost impossible that a war + can be decided by naval action alone. Unaided, naval pressure + <!-- Page 16 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" + id="Page_16"></a>[pg 16]</span> can only work by a process + of exhaustion. Its effects must always be slow, and so + galling both to our own commercial community and to + neutrals, that the tendency is always to accept terms of + peace that are far from conclusive. For a firm decision a + quicker and more drastic form of pressure is required. Since + men live upon the land and not upon the sea, great issues + between nations at war have always been decided—except + in the rarest cases—either by what your army can do + against your enemy's territory and national life or else by + the fear of what the fleet makes it possible for your army + to do.</p> + + <p>The paramount concern, then, of maritime strategy is to + determine the mutual relations of your army and navy in a plan + of war. When this is done, and not till then, naval strategy + can begin to work out the manner in which the fleet can best + discharge the function assigned to it.</p> + + <p>The problem of such co-ordination is one that is susceptible + of widely varying solutions. It may be that the command of the + sea is of so urgent an importance that the army will have to + devote itself to assisting the fleet in its special task before + it can act directly against the enemy's territory and land + forces; on the other hand, it may be that the immediate duty of + the fleet will be to forward military action ashore before it + is free to devote itself whole-heartedly to the destruction of + the enemy's fleets. The crude maxims as to primary objects + which seem to have served well enough in continental warfare + have never worked so clearly where the sea enters seriously + into a war. In such cases it will not suffice to say the + primary object of the army is to destroy the enemy's army, or + that of the fleet to destroy the enemy's fleet. The delicate + interactions of the land and sea factors produce conditions too + intricate for such blunt solutions. Even the initial equations + they present are too complex to be reduced by the simple + application of rough-and-ready maxims. Their right handling + depends upon the broadest and most fundamental + <!-- Page 17 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" + id="Page_17"></a>[pg 17]</span> principles of war, and it is + as a standpoint from which to get a clear and unobstructed + view of the factors in their true relations that a theory of + war has perhaps its highest value.</p> + + <p>The theory which now holds the field is that war in a + fundamental sense is a continuation of policy by other means. + The process by which the continental strategists arrived at it + involved some hard philosophical reasoning. Practical and + experienced veterans as they were, their method is not one that + works easily with our own habit of thought. It will be well, + therefore, to endeavour first to present their conclusions in a + concrete form, which will make the pith of the matter + intelligible at once. Take, now, the ordinary case of a naval + or military Staff being asked to prepare a war plan against a + certain State and to advise what means it will require. To any + one who has considered such matters it is obvious the reply + must be another question—What will the war be about? + Without a definite answer or alternative answers to that + question a Staff can scarcely do more than engage in making + such forces as the country can afford as efficient as possible. + Before they take any sure step further they must know many + things. They must know whether they are expected to take + something from the enemy, or to prevent his taking something + either from us or from some other State. If from some other + State, the measures to be taken will depend on its geographical + situation and on its relative strength by land and sea. Even + when the object is clear it will be necessary to know how much + value the enemy attaches to it. Is it one for which he will be + likely to fight to the death, or one which he will abandon in + the face of comparatively slight resistance? If the former, we + cannot hope to succeed without entirely overthrowing his powers + of resistance. If the latter, it <!-- + Page 18 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" + id="Page_18"></a>[pg 18]</span> will suffice, as it often + has sufficed, to aim at something less costly and hazardous + and better within our means. All these are questions which + lie in the lap of Ministers charged with the foreign policy + of the country, and before the Staff can proceed with a war + plan they must be answered by Ministers.</p> + + <p>In short, the Staff must ask of them what is the policy + which your diplomacy is pursuing, and where, and why, do you + expect it to break down and force you to take up arms? The + Staff has to carry on in fact when diplomacy has failed to + achieve the object in view, and the method they will use will + depend on the nature of that object. So we arrive crudely at + our theory that war is a continuation of policy, a form of + political intercourse in which we fight battles instead of + writing notes.</p> + + <p>It was this theory, simple and even meaningless as it + appears at first sight, that gave the key to the practical work + of framing a modern war plan and revolutionised the study of + strategy. It was not till the beginning of the nineteenth + century that such a theory was arrived at. For centuries men + had written on the "Art of War," but for want of a working + theory their labours as a whole had been unscientific, + concerned for the most part with the discussion of passing + fashions and the elaboration of platitudes. Much good work it + is true was done on details, but no broad outlook had been + obtained to enable us to determine their relation to the + fundamental constants of the subject. No standpoint had been + found from which we could readily detach such constants from + what was merely accidental. The result was a tendency to argue + too exclusively from the latest examples and to become + entangled in erroneous thought by trying to apply the methods + which had attained the last success to war as a + <!-- Page 19 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" + id="Page_19"></a>[pg 19]</span> whole. There was no means of + determining how far the particular success was due to + special conditions and how far it was due to factors common + to all wars.</p> + + <p>It was the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, coinciding as + they did with a period of philosophic activity, that revealed + the shallowness and empirical nature of all that had been done + up to that time. Napoleon's methods appeared to his + contemporaries to have produced so strenuous a revolution in + the conduct of land warfare that it assumed a wholly new + aspect, and it was obvious that those conceptions which had + sufficed previously had become inadequate as a basis of sound + study. War on land seemed to have changed from a calculated + affair of thrust and parry between standing armies to a + headlong rush of one nation in arms upon another, each + thirsting for the other's life, and resolved to have it or + perish in the attempt. Men felt themselves faced with a + manifestation of human energy which had had no counterpart, at + least in civilised times.</p> + + <p>The assumption was not entirely true. For although the + Continent had never before adopted the methods in question, our + own country was no stranger to them either on sea or land. As + we shall see, our own Revolution in the seventeenth century had + produced strenuous methods of making war which were closely + related to those which Napoleon took over from the French + Revolutionary leaders. A more philosophic outlook might have + suggested that the phenomenon was not really exceptional, but + rather the natural outcome of popular energy inspired by a + stirring political ideal. But the British precedent was + forgotten, and so profound was the disturbance caused by the + new French methods that its effects <!-- Page + 20 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" + id="Page_20"></a>[pg 20]</span> are with us still. We are in + fact still dominated by the idea that since the Napoleonic + era war has been essentially a different thing. Our teachers + incline to insist that there is now only one way of making + war, and that is Napoleon's way. Ignoring the fact that he + failed in the end, they brand as heresy the bare suggestion + that there may be other ways, and not content with assuming + that his system will fit all land wars, however much their + natures and objects may differ, they would force naval + warfare into the same uniform under the impression + apparently that they are thereby making it presentable and + giving it some new force.</p> + + <p>Seeing how cramping the Napoleonic idea has become, it will + be convenient before going further to determine its special + characteristics exactly, but that is no easy matter. The moment + we approach it in a critical spirit, it begins to grow nebulous + and very difficult to define. We can dimly make out four + distinct ideas mingled in the current notion. First, there is + the idea of making war not merely with a professional standing + army, but with the whole armed nation—a conception which + of course was not really Napoleon's. It was inherited by him + from the Revolution, but was in fact far older. It was but a + revival of the universal practice which obtained in the + barbaric stages of social development, and which every + civilisation in turn had abandoned as economically unsound and + subversive of specialisation in citizenship. The results of the + abandonment were sometimes good and sometimes bad, but the + determining conditions have been studied as yet too imperfectly + to justify any broad generalisation. Secondly, there is the + idea of strenuous and persistent effort—not resting to + secure each minor advantage, but pressing the enemy without + pause or rest till he is utterly overthrown—an idea in + which Cromwell had anticipated Napoleon by a century and + <!-- Page 21 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" + id="Page_21"></a>[pg 21]</span> a half. Scarcely + distinguishable from this is a third idea—that of + taking the offensive, in which there was really nothing new + at all, since its advantages had always been understood, and + Frederick the Great had pressed it to extremity with little + less daring than Napoleon himself—nay even to culpable + rashness, as the highest exponents of the Napoleonic idea + admit. Finally, there is the notion of making the armed + forces of the enemy and not his territory or any part of it + your main objective. This perhaps is regarded as the + strongest characteristic of Napoleon's methods, and yet even + here we are confused by the fact that undoubtedly on some + very important occasions—the Austerlitz campaign, for + example—Napoleon made the hostile capital his + objective as though he believed its occupation was the most + effective step towards the overthrow of the enemy's power + and will to resist. He certainly did not make the enemy's + main army his primary objective—for their main army + was not Mack's but that of the Archduke Charles.</p> + <!-- Page 22 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" + id="Page_22"></a>[pg 22]</span> + + <p>On the whole then, when men speak of the Napoleonic system + they seem to include two groups of ideas—one which + comprises the conception of war made with the whole force of + the nation; the other, a group which includes the Cromwellian + idea of persistent effort, Frederick's preference for the + offensive at almost any risk, and finally the idea of the + enemy's armed forces as the main objective, which was also + Cromwell's.</p> + + <p>It is the combination of these by no means original or very + distinct ideas that we are told has brought about so entire a + change in the conduct of war that it has become altogether a + different thing. It is unnecessary for our purpose to consider + how far the facts seem to support such a conclusion, for in the + inherent nature of things it must be radically unsound. Neither + war nor anything else can change in its essentials. If it + appears to do so, it is because we are still mistaking + accidents for essentials, and this is exactly how it struck the + acutest thinkers of Napoleonic times.</p> + + <p>For a while it is true they were bewildered, but so soon as + they had had time to clear their heads from the din of the + struggle in which they had taken part, they began to see that + the new phenomena were but accidents after all. They perceived + that Napoleon's methods, which had taken the world by storm, + had met with success in wars of a certain nature only, and that + when he tried to extend those methods to other natures of war + he had met with failure and even disaster. How was this to be + explained? What theory, for instance, would cover Napoleon's + successes in Germany and Italy, as well as his failures in + Spain and Russia? If the whole conception of war had changed, + how could you account for the success of England, who had not + changed her methods? To us the answer to these questions is of + living and infinite importance. Our standpoint remains still + unchanged. Is there anything inherent in the conception of war + that justifies that attitude in our case? Are we entitled to + expect from it again the same success it met with in the + past?</p><!-- Page 23 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" + id="Page_23"></a>[pg 23]</span> + + <p>The first man to enunciate a theory which would explain the + phenomena of the Napoleonic era and co-ordinate them with + previous history was General Carl von Clausewitz, a man whose + arduous service on the Staff and the actual work of higher + instruction had taught the necessity of systematising the study + of his profession. He was no mere professor, but a soldier bred + in the severest school of war. The pupil and friend of + Sharnhorst and Gneisenau, he had served on the Staff of + Blücher in 1813, he had been Chief of the Staff to + Wallmoden in his campaign against Davoust on the Lower Elbe, + and also to the Third Prussian Army Corps in + <!-- Page 24 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" + id="Page_24"></a>[pg 24]</span> the campaign of 1815. + Thereafter for more than ten years he was Director of the + General Academy of War at Berlin, and died in 1831 as Chief + of the Staff to Marshal Gneisenau. For the fifty years that + followed his death his theories and system were, as he + expected they would be, attacked from all sides. Yet to-day + his work is more firmly established than ever as the + necessary basis of all strategical thought, and above all in + the "blood and iron" school of Germany.</p> + + <p>The process by which he reached his famous theory can be + followed in his classical work <i>On War</i> and the + <i>Notes</i> regarding it which he left behind him. In + accordance with the philosophic fashion of his time he began by + trying to formulate an abstract idea of war. The definition he + started with was that "War is an act of violence to compel our + opponent to do our will." But that act of violence was not + merely "the shock of armies," as Montecuccoli had defined it a + century and a half before. If the abstract idea of war be + followed to its logical conclusion, the act of violence must be + performed with the whole of the means at our disposal and with + the utmost exertion of our will. Consequently we get the + conception of two armed nations flinging themselves one upon + the other, and continuing the struggle with the utmost strength + <!-- Page 25 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" + id="Page_25"></a>[pg 25]</span> and energy they can command + till one or other is no longer capable of resistance. This + Clausewitz called "Absolute War." But his practical + experience and ripe study of history told him at once that + "Real War" was something radically different. It was true, + as he said, that Napoleon's methods had approximated to the + absolute and had given some colour to the use of the + absolute idea as a working theory. "But shall we," he + acutely asks, "rest satisfied with this idea and judge all + wars by it however much they may differ from it—shall + we deduce from it all the requirements of theory? We must + decide the point, for we can say nothing trustworthy about a + war plan until we have made up our minds whether war should + only be of this kind or whether it may be of another kind." + He saw at once that a theory formed upon the abstract or + absolute idea of war would not cover the ground, and + therefore failed to give what was required for practical + purposes. It would exclude almost the whole of war from + Alexander's time to Napoleon's. And what guarantee was there + that the next war would confirm to the Napoleonic type and + accommodate itself to the abstract theory? "This theory," he + says, "is still quite powerless against the force of + circumstances." And so it proved, for the wars of the middle + nineteenth century did in fact revert to the pre-Napoleonic + type.</p> + + <p>In short, Clausewitz's difficulty in adopting his abstract + theory as a working rule was that his practical mind could not + forget that war had not begun with the Revolutionary era, nor + was it likely to end with it. If that era had changed + <!-- Page 26 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" + id="Page_26"></a>[pg 26]</span> the conduct of war, it must + be presumed that war would change again with other times and + other conditions. A theory of war which did not allow for + this and did not cover all that had gone before was no + theory at all. If a theory of war was to be of any use as a + practical guide it must cover and explain not only the + extreme manifestation of hostility which he himself had + witnessed, but every manifestation that had occurred in the + past or was likely to recur in the future.</p> + + <p>It was in casting about for the underlying causes of the + oscillations manifested in the energy and intensity of hostile + relations that he found his solution. His experience on the + Staff, and his study of the inner springs of war, told him it + was never in fact a question of purely military endeavour + aiming always at the extreme of what was possible or expedient + from a purely military point of view. The energy exhibited + would always be modified by political considerations and by the + depth of the national interest in the object of the war. He saw + that real war was in fact an international relation which + differed from other international relations only in the method + we adopted to achieve the object of our policy. So it was he + arrived at his famous theory—"that war is a mere + continuation of policy by other means."</p> + + <p>At first sight there seems little enough in it. It may seem + perhaps that we have been watching a mountain in labour and + nothing but a mouse has been produced. But it is only upon some + such simple, even obvious, formula that any scientific system + can be constructed with safety. We have only to develop the + meaning of this one to see how important and practical are the + guiding lines which flow from it.</p> + + <p>With the conception of war as a continuation of political + intercourse before us, it is clear that everything which lies + outside the political conception, everything, that is, which is + <!-- Page 27 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" + id="Page_27"></a>[pg 27]</span> strictly peculiar to + military and naval operations, relates merely to the means + which we use to achieve our policy. Consequently, the first + desideratum of a war plan is that the means adopted must + conflict as little as possible with the political conditions + from which the war springs. In practice, of course, as in + all human relations, there will be a compromise between the + means and the end, between the political and the military + exigencies. But Clausewitz held that policy must always be + the master. The officer charged with the conduct of the war + may of course demand that the tendencies and views of policy + shall not be incompatible with the military means which are + placed at his disposal; but however strongly this demand may + react on policy in particular cases, military action must + still be regarded only as a manifestation of policy. It must + never supersede policy. The policy is always the object; war + is only the means by which we obtain the object, and the + means must always keep the end in view.</p> + + <p>The practical importance of this conception will now become + clear. It will be seen to afford the logical or theoretical + exposition of what we began by stating in its purely concrete + form. When a Chief of Staff is asked for a war plan he must not + say we will make war in such and such a way because it was + Napoleon's or Moltke's way. He will ask what is the political + object of the war, what are the political conditions, and how + much does the question at issue mean respectively to us and to + our adversary. It is these considerations which determine the + nature of the war. This primordial question settled, he will be + in a position to say whether the war is of the same nature as + those in which Napoleon's and Moltke's methods were successful, + or whether it is of another nature in which those methods + failed. He will then design and offer a <!-- Page 28 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" + id="Page_28"></a>[pg 28]</span> war plan, not because it has + the hall-mark of this or that great master of war, but + because it is one that has been proved to fit the kind of + war in hand. To assume that one method of conducting war + will suit all kinds of war is to fall a victim to abstract + theory, and not to be a prophet of reality, as the narrowest + disciples of the Napoleonic school are inclined to see + themselves.</p> + + <p>Hence, says Clausewitz, the first, the greatest and most + critical decision upon which the Statesman and the General have + to exercise their judgment is to determine the nature of the + war, to be sure they do not mistake it for something nor seek + to make of it something which from its inherent conditions it + can never be. "This," he declares, "is the first and the most + far-reaching of all strategical questions."</p> + + <p>The first value, then, of his theory of war is that it gives + a clear line on which we may proceed to determine the nature of + a war in which we are about to engage, and to ensure that we do + not try to apply to one nature of war any particular course of + operations simply because they have proved successful in + another nature of war. It is only, he insists, by regarding war + not as an independent thing but as a political instrument that + we can read aright the lessons of history and understand for + our practical guidance how wars must differ in character + according to the nature of the motives and circumstances from + which they proceed. This conception, he claims, is the first + ray of light to guide us to a true theory of war and thereby + enable us to classify wars and distinguish them one from + another.</p> + + <p>Jomini, his great contemporary and rival, though proceeding + by a less philosophical but no less lucid method, entirely + endorses this view. A Swiss soldier of fortune, his + <!-- Page 29 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" + id="Page_29"></a>[pg 29]</span> experience was much the same + as that of Clausewitz. It was obtained mainly on the Staff + of Marshal Ney and subsequently on the Russian headquarter + Staff. He reached no definite theory of war, but his + fundamental conclusions were the same. The first chapter of + his final work, <i>Précis de l'art de la Guerre</i>, + is devoted to "La Politique de la Guerre." In it he + classifies wars into nine categories according to their + political object, and he lays it down as a base proposition + "That these + <!-- Page 30 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" + id="Page_30"></a>[pg 30]</span> different kinds of war will + have more or less influence on the nature of the operations + which will be demanded to attain the end in view, on the + amount of energy that must be put forth, and on the extent + of the undertakings in which we must engage." "There will," + he adds, "be a great difference in the operations according + to the risks we have to run."</p> + + <p>Both men, therefore, though on details of means they were + often widely opposed, are agreed that the fundamental + conception of war is political. Both of course agree that if we + isolate in our mind the forces engaged in any theatre of war + the abstract conception reappears. So far as those forces are + concerned, war is a question of fighting in which each + belligerent should endeavour by all means at his command and + with all his energy to destroy the other. But even so they may + find that certain means are barred to them for political + reasons, and at any moment the fortune of war or a development + of the political conditions with which it is entangled may + throw them back upon the fundamental political theory.</p> + + <p>That theory it will be unprofitable to labour further at + this point. Let it suffice for the present to mark that it + gives us a conception of war as an exertion of violence to + secure a political end which we desire to attain, and that from + this broad and simple formula we are able to deduce at once + that wars will vary according to the nature of the end and the + intensity of our desire to attain it. Here we may leave it to + gather force and coherence as we examine the practical + considerations which are its immediate outcome.</p> + <!-- Page 31 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" + id="Page_31"></a>[pg 31]</span> + <hr /> + + <h3>CHAPTER TWO</h3> + <hr /> + + <h2>NATURES OF WARS—<br /> + OFFENSIVE AND<br /> + DEFENSIVE</h2> + <hr /> + + <p>Having determined that wars must vary in character according + to the nature and importance of their object, we are faced with + the difficulty that the variations will be of infinite number + and of all degrees of distinction. So complex indeed is the + graduation presented that at first sight it appears scarcely + possible to make it the basis of practical study. But on + further examination it will be seen that by applying the usual + analytical method the whole subject is susceptible of much + simplification. We must in short attempt to reach some system + of classification; that is, we must see if it is not possible + to group the variations into some well-founded categories. With + a subject so complex and intangible the grouping must of course + be to some extent arbitrary, and in some places the lines of + demarcation will be shadowy; but if classification has been + found possible and helpful in Zoology or Botany, with the + infinite and minute individual variations with which they have + to deal, it should be no less possible and helpful in the study + of war.</p> + + <p>The political theory of war will at any rate give us two + broad and well-marked classifications. The first is simple and + well known, depending on whether the political object of the + war is positive or negative. If it be positive—that is, + if our aim is to wrest something from the enemy—then our + war in its main lines will be offensive. If, on the other hand, + our aim <!-- Page 32 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" + id="Page_32"></a>[pg 32]</span> be negative, and we simply + seek to prevent the enemy wresting some advantage to our + detriment, then the war in its general direction will be + defensive.</p> + + <p>It is only as a broad conception that this classification + has value. Though it fixes the general trend of our operations, + it will not in itself affect their character. For a maritime + Power at least it is obvious that this must be so. For in any + circumstances it is impossible for such a Power either to + establish its defence or develop fully its offence without + securing a working control of the sea by aggressive action + against the enemy's fleets. Furthermore, we have always found + that however strictly our aim may be defensive, the most + effective means of securing it has been by counter-attack + over-sea, either to support an ally directly or to deprive our + enemy of his colonial possessions. Neither category, then, + excludes the use of offensive operations nor the idea of + overthrowing our enemy so far as is necessary to gain our end. + In neither case does the conception lead us eventually to any + other objective than the enemy's armed forces, and particularly + his naval forces. The only real difference is this—that + if our object be positive our general plan must be offensive, + and we should at least open with a true offensive movement; + whereas if our object be negative our general plan will be + preventive, and we may bide our time for our counter-attack. To + this extent our action must always tend to the offensive. For + counter-attack is the soul of defence. Defence is not a passive + attitude, for that is the negation of war. Rightly conceived, + it is an attitude of alert expectation. We wait for the moment + when the enemy shall expose himself to a counter-stroke, the + success of which will so far cripple him as to render us + relatively strong enough to pass to the offensive + ourselves.</p> + + <p>From these considerations it will appear that, real and + logical as the classification is, to give it the designation + "offensive and defensive" is objectionable from every point of + view. To begin with, it does not emphasise what the real and + logical <!-- Page 33 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" + id="Page_33"></a>[pg 33]</span> distinction is. It suggests + that the basis of the classification is not so much a + difference of object as a difference in the means employed + to achieve the object. Consequently we find ourselves + continually struggling with the false assumption that + positive war means using attack, and negative war being + content with defence.</p> + + <p>That is confusing enough, but a second objection to the + designation is far more serious and more fertile of error. For + the classification "offensive and defensive" implies that + offensive and defensive are mutually exclusive ideas, whereas + the truth is, and it is a fundamental truth of war, that they + are mutually complementary. All war and every form of it must + be both offensive and defensive. No matter how clear our + positive aim nor how high our offensive spirit, we cannot + develop an aggressive line of strategy to the full without the + support of the defensive on all but the main lines of + operation. In tactics it is the same. The most convinced + devotee of attack admits the spade as well as the rifle. And + even when it comes to men and material, we know that without a + certain amount of protection neither ships, guns, nor men can + develop their utmost energy and endurance in striking power. + There is never, in fact, a clean choice between attack and + defence. In aggressive operations the question always is, how + far must defence enter into the methods we employ in order to + enable us to do the utmost within our resources to break or + paralyse the strength of the enemy. So also with defence. Even + in its most legitimate use, it must always be supplemented by + attack. Even behind the walls of a fortress men know that + sooner or later the place must fall unless by counter-attack on + the enemy's siege works or communications they can cripple his + power of attack.</p> + + <p>It would seem, therefore, that it were better to lay aside + the designation "offensive and defensive" altogether and + substitute the terms "positive and negative." But here again we + are confronted with a difficulty. There have been many wars in + <!-- Page 34 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" + id="Page_34"></a>[pg 34]</span> which positive methods have + been used all through to secure a negative end, and such + wars will not sit easily in either class. For instance, in + the War of Spanish Succession our object was mainly to + prevent the Mediterranean becoming a French lake by the + union of the French and Spanish crowns, but the method by + which we succeeded in achieving our end was to seize the + naval positions of Gibraltar and Minorca, and so in practice + our method was positive. Again, in the late Russo-Japanese + War the main object of Japan was to prevent Korea being + absorbed by Russia. That aim was preventive and negative. + But the only effective way of securing her aim was to take + Korea herself, and so for her the war was in practice + positive.</p> + + <p>On the other hand, we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that + in the majority of wars the side with the positive object has + acted generally on the offensive and the other generally on the + defensive. Unpractical therefore as the distinction seems to + be, it is impossible to dismiss it without inquiring why this + was so, and it is in this inquiry that the practical results of + the classification will be found to lie—that is, it + forces us to analyse the comparative advantages of offence and + defence. A clear apprehension of their relative possibilities + is the corner stone of strategical study.</p> + + <p>Now the advantages of the offensive are patent and admitted. + It is only the offensive that can produce positive results, + while the strength and energy which are born of the moral + stimulation of attack are of a practical value that outweighs + almost every other consideration. Every man of spirit would + desire to use the offensive whether his object were positive or + <!-- Page 35 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" + id="Page_35"></a>[pg 35]</span> negative, and yet there are + a number of cases in which some of the most energetic + masters of war have chosen the defensive, and chosen with + success. They have chosen it when they have found themselves + inferior in physical force to their enemy, and when they + believed that no amount of aggressive spirit could redress + that inferiority.</p> + + <p>Obviously, then, for all the inferiority of the defensive as + a drastic form of war it must have some inherent advantage + which the offensive does not enjoy. In war we adopt every + method for which we have sufficient strength. If, then, we + adopt the less desirable method of defence, it must be either + that we have not sufficient strength for offence, or that the + defence gives us some special strength for the attainment of + our object.</p> + + <p>What, then, are these elements of strength? It is very + necessary to inquire, not only that we may know that if for a + time we are forced back upon the defensive all is not lost, but + also that we may judge with how much daring we should push our + offensive to prevent the enemy securing the advantages of + defence.</p> + + <p>As a general principle we all know that possession is nine + points of the law. It is easier to keep money in our pocket + than to take it from another man's. If one man would rob + another he must be the stronger or better armed unless he can + do it by dexterity or stealth, and there lies one of the + advantages of offence. The side which takes the initiative has + usually the better chance of securing advantage by dexterity or + stealth. But it is not always so. If either by land or sea we + can take a defensive position so good that it cannot be turned + and must be broken down before our enemy can reach his + objective, then the advantage of dexterity and stealth passes + to us. We choose our own ground for the trial of strength. We + are hidden on familiar ground; he is exposed on ground that is + less familiar. We can lay traps and prepare surprises by + counter-attack, when he is most dangerously exposed. Hence + <!-- Page 36 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" + id="Page_36"></a>[pg 36]</span> the paradoxical doctrine + that where defence is sound and well designed the advantage + of surprise is against the attack.</p> + + <p>It will be seen therefore that whatever advantages lie in + defence they depend on the preservation of the offensive + spirit. Its essence is the counter-attack—waiting + deliberately for a chance to strike—not cowering in + inactivity. Defence is a condition of restrained + activity—not a mere condition of rest. Its real weakness + is that if unduly prolonged it tends to deaden the spirit of + offence. This is a truth so vital that some authorities in + their eagerness to enforce it have travestied it into the + misleading maxim, "That attack is the best defence." Hence + again an amateurish notion that defence is always stupid or + pusillanimous, leading always to defeat, and that what is + called "the military spirit" means nothing but taking the + offensive. Nothing is further from the teaching or the practice + of the best masters. Like Wellington at Torres Vedras, they all + at times used the defensive till the elements of strength + inherent in that form of war, as opposed to the exhausting + strain inherent in the form that they had fixed upon their + opponents, lifted them to a position where they in their turn + were relatively strong enough to use the more exhausting + form.</p> + + <p>The confusion of thought which has led to the misconceptions + about defence as a method of war is due to several obvious + causes. Counter-attacks from a general defensive attitude have + been regarded as a true offensive, as, for instance, in + Frederick the Great's best-known operations, or in Admiral + Tegetthoff's brilliant counterstroke at Lissa, or our own + <!-- Page 37 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" + id="Page_37"></a>[pg 37]</span> operations against the + Spanish Armada. Again, the defensive has acquired an ill + name by its being confused with a wrongly arrested + offensive, where the superior Power with the positive object + lacked the spirit to use his material superiority with + sufficient activity and perseverance. Against such a Power + an inferior enemy can always redress his inferiority by + passing to a bold and quick offensive, thus acquiring a + momentum both moral and physical which more than compensates + his lack of weight. The defensive has also failed by the + choice of a bad position which the enemy was able to turn or + avoid. A defensive attitude is nothing at all, its elements + of strength entirely disappear, unless it is such that the + enemy must break it down by force before he can reach his + ultimate objective. Even more often has it failed when the + belligerent adopting it, finding he has no available + defensive position which will bar the enemy's progress, + attempts to guard every possible line of attack. The result + is of course that by attenuating his force he only + accentuates his inferiority.</p> + + <p>Clear and well proven as these considerations are for land + warfare, their application to the sea is not so obvious. It + will be objected that at sea there is no defensive. This is + generally true for tactics, but even so not universally true. + Defensive tactical positions are possible at sea, as in + defended anchorages. These were always a reality, and the mine + has increased their possibilities. In the latest developments + of naval warfare we have seen the Japanese at the Elliot + Islands preparing a real defensive position to cover the + landing of their Second Army in the Liaotung Peninsula. + Strategically the proposition is not true at all. A strategical + defensive has been quite as common at sea as on land, and our + own gravest problems have often been how to break down such an + attitude when + <!-- Page 38 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" + id="Page_38"></a>[pg 38]</span> our enemy assumed it. It + usually meant that the enemy remained in his own waters and + near his own bases, where it was almost impossible for us to + attack him with decisive result, and whence he always + threatened us with counterattack at moments of exhaustion, + as the Dutch did at Sole Bay and in the Medway. The + difficulty of dealing decisively with an enemy who adopted + this course was realised by our service very early, and from + first to last one of our chief preoccupations was to prevent + the enemy availing himself of this device and to force him + to fight in the open, or at least to get between him and his + base and force an action there.</p> + + <p>Probably the most remarkable manifestation of the advantages + that may be derived in suitable conditions from a strategical + defensive is also to be found in the late Russo-Japanese War. + In the final crisis of the naval struggle the Japanese fleet + was able to take advantage of a defensive attitude in its own + waters which the Russian Baltic fleet would have to break down + to attain its end, and the result was the most decisive naval + victory ever recorded.</p> + + <p>The deterrent power of active and dexterous operations from + such a position was well known to our old tradition. The device + was used several times, particularly in our home waters, to + prevent a fleet, which for the time we were locally + <!-- Page 39 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" + id="Page_39"></a>[pg 39]</span> too weak to destroy, from + carrying out the work assigned to it. A typical position of + the kind was off Scilly, and it was proved again and again + that even a superior fleet could not hope to effect anything + in the Channel till the fleet off Scilly had been brought to + decisive action. But the essence of the device was the + preservation of the aggressive spirit in its most daring + form. For success it depended on at least the will to seize + every occasion for bold and harassing counter-attacks such + as Drake and his colleagues struck at the Armada.</p> + + <p>To submit to blockade in order to engage the attention of a + superior enemy's fleet is another form of defensive, but one + that is almost wholly evil. For a short time it may do good by + permitting offensive operations elsewhere which otherwise would + be impossible. But if prolonged, it will sooner or later + destroy the spirit of your force and render it incapable of + effective aggression.</p> + + <p>The conclusion then is that although for the practical + purpose of framing or appreciating plans of war the + classification of wars into offensive and defensive is of + little use, a clear apprehension of the inherent relative + advantages of offence and defence is essential. We must realise + that in certain cases, provided always we preserve the + aggressive spirit, the + <!-- Page 40 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" + id="Page_40"></a>[pg 40]</span> defensive will enable an + inferior force to achieve points when the offensive would + probably lead to its destruction. But the elements of + strength depend entirely on the will and insight to deal + rapid blows in the enemy's unguarded moments. So soon as the + defensive ceases to be regarded as a means of fostering + power to strike and of reducing the enemy's power of attack + it loses all its strength. It ceases to be even a suspended + activity, and anything that is not activity is not war.</p> + + <p>With these general indications of the relative advantages of + offence and defence we may leave the subject for the present. + It is possible of course to catalogue the advantages and + disadvantages of each form, but any such bald + statement—without concrete examples to explain the + meaning—must always appear controversial and is apt to + mislead. It is better to reserve their fuller consideration + till we come to deal with strategical operations and are able + to note their actual effect upon the conduct of war in its + various forms. Leaving therefore our first classification of + wars into offensive and defensive we will pass on to the + second, which is the only one of real practical importance.</p> + <!-- Page 41 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" + id="Page_41"></a>[pg 41]</span> + <hr /> + + <h3>CHAPTER THREE</h3> + <hr /> + + <h2>NATURES OF WARS—<br /> + LIMITED AND<br /> + UNLIMITED</h2> + <hr /> + + <p>The second classification to which we are led by the + political theory of war, is one which Clausewitz was the first + to formulate and one to which he came to attach the highest + importance. It becomes necessary therefore to examine his views + in some detail—not because there is any need to regard a + continental soldier, however distinguished, as an indispensable + authority for a maritime nation. The reason is quite the + reverse. It is because a careful examination of his doctrine on + this point will lay open what are the radical and essential + differences between the German or Continental School of + Strategy and the British or Maritime School—that is, our + own traditional School, which too many writers both at home and + abroad quietly assume to have no existence. The evil tendency + of that assumption cannot be too strongly emphasised, and the + main purpose of this and the following chapters will be to show + how and why even the greatest of the continental strategists + fell short of realising fully the characteristic conception of + the British tradition.</p> + + <p>By the classification in question Clausewitz distinguished + wars into those with a "Limited" object and those whose object + was "Unlimited." Such a classification was entirely + characteristic of him, for it rested not alone upon the + material nature of the object, but on certain moral + considerations to which he was the first to attach their real + value in war. Other + <!-- Page 42 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" + id="Page_42"></a>[pg 42]</span> writers such as Jomini had + attempted to classify wars by the special purpose for which + they were fought, but Clausewitz's long course of study + convinced him that such a distinction was unphilosophical + and bore no just relation to any tenable theory of war. + Whether, that is, a war was positive or negative mattered + much, but its special purpose, whether, for instance, + according to Jomini's system, it was a war "to assert + rights" or "to assist an ally" or "to acquire territory," + mattered not at all.</p> + + <p>Whatever the object, the vital and paramount question was + the intensity with which the spirit of the nation was absorbed + in its attainment. The real point to determine in approaching + any war plan was what did the object mean to the two + belligerents, what sacrifices would they make for it, what + risks were they prepared to run? It was thus he stated his + view. "The smaller the sacrifice we demand from our opponent, + the smaller presumably will be the means of resistance he will + employ, and the smaller his means, the smaller will ours be + required to be. Similarly the smaller our political object, the + less value shall we set upon it and the more easily we shall be + induced to abandon it." Thus the political object of the war, + its original motive, will not only determine for both + belligerents reciprocally the aim of the force they use, but it + will also be the standard of the intensity of the efforts they + will make. So he concludes there may be wars of all degrees of + importance and energy from a war of extermination down to the + use of an army of observation. So also in the naval sphere + there may be a life and death struggle for maritime supremacy + or hostilities which never rise beyond a blockade.</p> + + <p>Such a view of the subject was of course a wide departure + from the theory of "Absolute War" on which Clausewitz had + started working. Under that theory "Absolute War" was the + <!-- Page 43 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" + id="Page_43"></a>[pg 43]</span> ideal form to which all war + ought to attain, and those which fell short of it were + imperfect wars cramped by a lack of true military spirit. + But so soon as he had seized the fact that in actual life + the moral factor always must override the purely military + factor, he saw that he had been working on too narrow a + basis—a basis that was purely theoretical in that it + ignored the human factor. He began to perceive that it was + logically unsound to assume as the foundation of a + strategical system that there was one pattern to which all + wars ought to conform. In the light of his full and final + apprehension of the value of the human factor he saw wars + falling into two well-marked categories, each of which would + legitimately be approached in a radically different manner, + and not necessarily on the lines of "Absolute War."</p> + + <p>He saw that there was one class of war where the political + object was of so vital an importance to both belligerents that + they would tend to fight to the utmost limit of their endurance + to secure it. But there was another class where the object was + of less importance, that is to say, where its value to one or + both the belligerents was not so great as to be worth unlimited + sacrifices of blood and treasure. It was these two kinds of war + he designated provisionally "Unlimited" and "Limited," by which + he meant not that you were not to exert the force employed with + all the vigour you could develop, but that there might be a + limit beyond which it would be bad policy to spend that vigour, + a point at which, long before your force was exhausted or even + fully developed, it would be wiser to abandon your object + rather than to spend more upon it.</p> + + <p>This distinction it is very necessary to grasp quite + clearly, for it is often superficially confused with the + distinction already referred to, which Clausewitz drew in the + earlier part of his work—that is, the distinction between + what he called the character of modern war and the character of + the wars which preceded the Napoleonic era. It will be + remembered he + <!-- Page 44 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" + id="Page_44"></a>[pg 44]</span> insisted that the wars of + his own time had been wars between armed nations with a + tendency to throw the whole weight of the nation into the + fighting line, whereas in the seventeenth and eighteenth + centuries wars were waged by standing armies and not by the + whole nation in arms. The distinction of course is real and + of far-reaching consequences, but it has no relation to the + distinction between "Limited" and "Unlimited" war. War may + be waged on the Napoleonic system either for a limited or an + unlimited object.</p> + + <p>A modern instance will serve to clear the field. The recent + Russo-Japanese War was fought for a limited object—the + assertion of certain claims over territory which formed no part + of the possessions of either belligerent. Hostilities were + conducted on entirely modern lines by two armed nations and not + by standing armies alone. But in the case of one belligerent + her interest in the object was so limited as to cause her to + abandon it long before her whole force as an armed nation was + exhausted or even put forth. The expense of life and treasure + which the struggle was involving was beyond what the object was + worth.</p> + + <p>This second distinction—that is, between Limited and + Unlimited wars—Clausewitz regarded as of greater + importance than his previous one founded on the negative or + positive nature of the object. He was long in reaching it. His + great work <i>On War</i> as he left it proceeds almost entirely + on the conception of offensive or defensive as applied to the + Napoleonic ideal of absolute war. The new idea came to him + towards the end in the full maturity of his prolonged study, + and it came to him in endeavouring to apply his strategical + speculations to the practical process of framing a war plan in + anticipation of a threatened breach with France. It was only in + his final section <i>On War Plans</i> that he began to deal + with it. By that time he had grasped the first practical result + to <!-- Page 45 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" + id="Page_45"></a>[pg 45]</span> which his theory led. He saw + that the distinction between Limited and Unlimited war + connoted a cardinal distinction in the methods of waging it. + When the object was unlimited, and would consequently call + forth your enemy's whole war power, it was evident that no + firm decision of the struggle could be reached till his war + power was entirely crushed. Unless you had a reasonable hope + of being able to do this it was bad policy to seek your end + by force—that is, you ought not to go to war. In the + case of a limited object, however, the complete destruction + of the enemy's armed force was beyond what was necessary. + Clearly you could achieve your end if you could seize the + object, and by availing yourself of the elements of strength + inherent in the defensive could set up such a situation that + it would cost the enemy more to turn you out than the object + was worth to him.</p> + + <p>Here then was a wide difference in the fundamental postulate + of your war plan. In the case of an unlimited war your main + strategical offensive must be directed against the armed forces + of the enemy; in the case of a limited war, even where its + object was positive, it need not be. If conditions were + favourable, it would suffice to make the object itself the + objective of your main strategical offensive. Clearly, then, he + had reached a theoretical distinction which modified his whole + conception of strategy. No longer is there logically but one + kind of war, the Absolute, and no longer is there but one + legitimate objective, the enemy's armed forces. Being sound + theory, it of course had an immediate practical value, for + obviously it was a distinction from which the actual work of + framing a war plan must take its departure.</p> + + <p>A curious corroboration of the soundness of these views is + that Jomini reached an almost identical standpoint + independently and by an entirely different road. His method was + severely concrete, based on the comparison of observed facts, + but it brought him as surely as the abstract method of his + rival to the conclusion that there were two distinct classes of + <!-- + Page 46 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" + id="Page_46"></a>[pg 46]</span> object. "They are of two + different kinds," he says, "one which may be called + territorial or geographical ... the other on the contrary + consists exclusively in the destruction or disorganisation + of the enemy's forces without concerning yourself with + geographical points of any kind." It is under the first + category of his first main classification "Of offensive wars + to assert rights," that he deals with what Clausewitz would + call "Limited Wars." Citing as an example Frederick the + Great's war for the conquest of Silesia, he says, "In such a + war ... the offensive operations ought to be proportional to + the end in view. The first move is naturally to occupy the + provinces claimed" (not, be it noted, to direct your blow at + the enemy's main force). "Afterwards," he proceeds, "you can + push the offensive according to circumstances and your + relative strength in order to obtain the desired cession by + menacing the enemy at home." Here we have Clausewitz's whole + doctrine of "Limited War"; firstly, the primary or + territorial stage, in which you endeavour to occupy the + geographical object, and then the secondary or coercive + stage, in which you seek by exerting general pressure upon + your enemy to force him to accept the adverse situation you + have set up.</p> + + <p>Such a method of making war obviously differs in a + fundamental manner from that which Napoleon habitually adopted, + and yet we have it presented by Jomini and Clausewitz, + <!-- Page 47 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" + id="Page_47"></a>[pg 47]</span> the two apostles of the + Napoleonic method. The explanation is, of course, that both + of them had seen too much not to know that Napoleon's method + was only applicable when you could command a real physical + or moral preponderance. Given such a preponderance, both + were staunch for the use of extreme means in Napoleon's + manner. It is not as something better than the higher road + that they commend the lower one, but being veteran + staff-officers and not mere theorists, they knew well that a + belligerent must sometimes find the higher road beyond his + strength, or beyond the effort which the spirit of the + nation is prepared to make for the end in view, and like the + practical men they were, they set themselves to study the + potentialities of the lower road should hard necessity force + them to travel it. They found that these potentialities in + certain circumstances were great. As an example of a case + where the lower form was more appropriate Jomini cites + Napoleon's campaign against Russia in 1812. In his opinion + it would have been better if Napoleon had been satisfied to + begin on the lower method with a limited territorial object, + and he attributes his failure to the abuse of a method + which, however well suited to his wars in Germany, was + incapable of achieving success in the conditions presented + by a war with Russia.</p> + + <p>Seeing how high was Napoleon's opinion of Jomini as a master + of the science of war, it is curious how his views on the two + natures of wars have been ignored in the present day. It is + even more curious in the case of Clausewitz, since we know that + in the plenitude of his powers he came to regard this + classification as the master-key of the subject. The + explanation is that the distinction is not very clearly + formulated in his first seven books, which alone he left in + anything like a finished condition. It was not till he came to + write his eighth book <i>On War Plans</i> that he saw the vital + importance of the distinction round which he had been hovering. + In that book the distinction is clearly laid down, but the book + unhappily + <!-- Page 48 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" + id="Page_48"></a>[pg 48]</span> was never completed. With + his manuscript, however, he left a "Note" warning us against + regarding his earlier books as a full presentation of his + developed ideas. From the note it is also evident that he + thought the classification on which he had lighted was of + the utmost importance, that he believed it would clear up + all the difficulties which he had encountered in his earlier + books—difficulties which he had come to see arose from + a too exclusive consideration of the Napoleonic method of + conducting war. "I look upon the first six books," he wrote + in 1827, "as only a mass of material which is still in a + manner without form and which has still to be revised again. + In this revision the two kinds of wars will be kept more + distinctly in view all through, and thereby all ideas will + gain in clearness, in precision, and in exactness of + application." Evidently he had grown dissatisfied with the + theory of Absolute War on which he had started. His new + discovery had convinced him that that theory would not serve + as a standard for all natures of wars. "Shall we," he asks + in his final book, "shall we now rest satisfied with this + idea and by it judge of all wars, however much they may + differ?"<a name="NtA_2" + id="NtA_2"></a><a href="#Nt_2"><sup>2</sup></a> He answers + his question in the negative. "You cannot determine the + requirements of all wars from the Napoleonic type. Keep that + type and its absolute method before you to use <i>when you + can</i> or <i>when you must</i>, but keep equally before you + that there are two main natures of war."</p> + + <p>In his note written at this time, when the distinction first + came to him, he defines these two natures of war as follows: + "First, those in which the object is the <i>overthrow of the + enemy</i>, whether it be we aim at his political destruction or + merely at disarming him and forcing him to conclude peace + <!-- Page 49 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" + id="Page_49"></a>[pg 49]</span> on our terms; and secondly, + those in which our object is <i>merely to make some + conquests on the frontiers of his country</i>, either for + the purpose of retaining them permanently or of turning them + to account as a matter of exchange in settling terms of + peace."<a name="NtA_3" + id="NtA_3"></a><a href="#Nt_3"><sup>3</sup></a> It was in + his eighth book that he intended, had he lived, to have + worked out the comprehensive idea he had conceived. Of that + book he says, "The chief object will be to make good the two + points of view above mentioned, by which everything will be + simplified and at the same time be given the breath of life. + I hope in this book to iron out many creases in the heads of + strategists and statesmen, and at least to show the object + of action and the real point to be considered in + war."<a name="NtA_4" + id="NtA_4"></a><a href="#Nt_4"><sup>4</sup></a></p> + + <p>That hope was never realised, and that perhaps is why his + penetrating analysis has been so much ignored. The eighth book + as we have it is only a fragment. In the spring of + 1830—an anxious moment, when it seemed that Prussia would + require all her best for another struggle single-handed with + France—he was called away to an active command. What + <!-- Page 50 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" + id="Page_50"></a>[pg 50]</span> he left of the book on "War + Plans" he describes as "merely a track roughly cleared, as + it were, through the mass, in order to ascertain the points + of greatest moment." It was his intention, he says, to + "carry the spirit of these ideas into his first six + books"—to put the crown on his work, in fact, by + elaborating and insisting upon his two great propositions, + viz. that war was a form of policy, and that being so it + might be Limited or Unlimited.</p> + + <p>The extent to which he would have infused his new idea into + the whole every one is at liberty to judge for himself; but + this indisputable fact remains. In the winter in view of the + threatening attitude of France in regard to Belgium he drew up + a war plan, and it was designed not on the Napoleonic method of + making the enemy's armed force the main strategical objective, + but on seizing a limited territorial object and forcing a + disadvantageous counter-offensive upon the French. The + revolutionary movement throughout Europe had broken the Holy + Alliance to pieces. Not only did Prussia find herself almost + single-handed against France, but she herself was sapped by + revolution. To adopt the higher form <!-- Page + 51 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" + id="Page_51"></a>[pg 51]</span> of war and seek to destroy + the armed force of the enemy was beyond her power. But she + could still use the lower form, and by seizing Belgium she + could herself force so exhausting a task on France that + success was well within her strength. It was exactly so we + endeavoured to begin the Seven Years' War; and it was + exactly so the Japanese successfully conducted their war + with Russia; and what is more striking, it was on similar + lines that in 1859 Moltke in similar circumstances drew up + his first war plan against France. His idea at that time was + on the lines which Jomini held should have been Napoleon's + in 1812. It was not to strike directly at Paris or the + French main army, but to occupy Alsace-Lorraine and hold + that territory till altered conditions should give him the + necessary preponderance for proceeding to the higher form or + forcing a favourable peace.</p> + + <p>In conclusion, then, we have to note that the matured fruit + of the Napoleonic period was a theory of war based not on the + single absolute idea, but on the dual distinction of Limited + and Unlimited. Whatever practical importance we may attach to + the distinction, so much must be admitted on the clear and + emphatic pronouncements of Clausewitz and Jomini. The practical + importance is another matter. It may fairly be argued that in + continental warfare—in spite of the instances quoted by + both the classical writers—it is not very great, for + reasons that will appear directly. But it must be remembered + that continental warfare is not the only form in which great + international issues are decided. Standing at the final point + which Clausewitz and Jomini reached, we are indeed only on the + threshold of the subject. We have to begin where they left off + and inquire what their ideas have to tell for the modern + conditions of worldwide imperial States, where the sea becomes + a direct and vital factor.</p> + <!-- Page 52 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" + id="Page_52"></a>[pg 52]</span> + <hr /> + + <h3>CHAPTER FOUR</h3> + <hr /> + + <h2>LIMITED WAR AND<br /> + MARITIME EMPIRES—</h2> + + <h3>Development of Clausewitz's and Jomini's<br /> + Theory of a Limited Territorial Object, and Its<br /> + Application to Modern Imperial Conditions</h3> + <hr /> + + <p>The German war plans already cited, which were based + respectively on the occupation of Belgium and Alsace-Lorraine, + and Jomini's remarks on Napoleon's disastrous Russian campaign + serve well to show the point to which continental strategists + have advanced along the road which Clausewitz was the first to + indicate clearly. We have now to consider its application to + modern imperial conditions, and above all where the maritime + element forcibly asserts itself. We shall then see how small + that advance has been compared with its far-reaching effects + for a maritime and above all an insular Power.</p> + + <p>It is clear that Clausewitz himself never apprehended the + full significance of his brilliant theory. His outlook was + still purely continental, and the limitations of continental + warfare tend to veil the fuller meaning of the principle he had + framed. Had he lived, there is little doubt he would have + worked it out to its logical conclusion, but his death + condemned his theory of limited war to remain in the inchoate + condition in which he had left it.</p> + + <p>It will be observed, as was natural enough, that all through + his work Clausewitz had in his mind war between two contiguous + or at least adjacent continental States, and a moment's + consideration will show that in that type of war the principle + of the limited object can rarely if ever assert itself in + <!-- Page 53 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" + id="Page_53"></a>[pg 53]</span> perfect precision. + Clausewitz himself put it quite clearly. Assuming a case + where "the overthrow of the enemy"—that is, unlimited + war—is beyond our strength, he points out that we need + not therefore necessarily act on the defensive. Our action + may still be positive and offensive, but the object can be + nothing more than "the conquest of part of the enemy's + country." Such a conquest he knew might so far weaken your + enemy or strengthen your own position as to enable you to + secure a satisfactory peace. The path of history is indeed + strewn with such cases. But he was careful to point out that + such a form of war was open to the gravest objections. Once + you had occupied the territory you aimed at, your offensive + action was, as a rule, arrested. A defensive attitude had to + be assumed, and such an arrest of offensive action he had + previously shown was inherently vicious, if only for moral + reasons. Added to this you might find that in your effort to + occupy the territorial object you had so irretrievably + separated your striking force from your home-defence force + as to be in no position to meet your enemy if he was able to + retort by acting on unlimited lines with a stroke at your + heart. A case in point was the Austerlitz campaign, where + Austria's object was to wrest North Italy from Napoleon's + empire. She sent her main army under the Archduke Charles to + seize the territory she desired. Napoleon immediately struck + at Vienna, destroyed her home army, and occupied the capital + before the Archduke could turn to bar his way.</p> + + <p>The argument is this: that, as all strategic attack tends to + leave points of your own uncovered, it always involves greater + or less provision for their defence. It is obvious, therefore, + that if we are aiming at a limited territorial object the + <!-- Page 54 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" + id="Page_54"></a>[pg 54]</span> proportion of defence + required will tend to be much greater than if we are + directing our attack on the main forces of the enemy. In + unlimited war our attack will itself tend to defend + everything elsewhere, by forcing the enemy to concentrate + against our attack. Whether the limited form is justifiable + or not therefore depends, as Clausewitz points out, on the + geographical position of the object.</p> + + <p>So far British experience is with him, but he then goes on + to say the more closely the territory in question is an annex + of our own the safer is this form of war, because then our + offensive action will the more surely cover our home country. + As a case in point he cites Frederick the Great's opening of + the Seven Years' War with the occupation of Saxony—a + piece of work which materially strengthened Prussian defence. + Of the British opening in Canada he says nothing. His outlook + was too exclusively continental for it to occur to him to test + his doctrine with a conspicuously successful case in which the + territory aimed at was distant from the home territory and in + no way covered it. Had he done so he must have seen how much + stronger an example of the strength of limited war was the case + of Canada than the case of Saxony. Moreover, he would have seen + that the difficulties, which in spite of his faith in his + discovery accompanied his attempt to apply it, arose from the + fact that the examples he selected were not really examples at + all.</p> + + <p>When he conceived the idea, the only kind of limited object + he had in his mind was, to use his own words, "some conquests + on the frontiers of the enemy's country," such as Silesia and + Saxony for Frederick the Great, Belgium in his own war plan, + and Alsace-Lorraine in that of Moltke. Now it is obvious that + such objects are not truly limited, for two reasons. In the + first place, such territory is usually an organic part of your + enemy's country, or otherwise of so much importance to him that + he will be willing to use unlimited effort to retain it. In the + second place, there will be no strategical + <!-- Page 55 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" + id="Page_55"></a>[pg 55]</span> obstacle to his being able + to use his whole force to that end. To satisfy the full + conception of a limited object, one of two conditions is + essential. Firstly, it must be not merely limited in area, + but of really limited political importance; and secondly, it + must be so situated as to be strategically isolated or to be + capable of being reduced to practical isolation by + strategical operations. Unless this condition exists, it is + in the power of either belligerent, as Clausewitz himself + saw, to pass to unlimited war if he so desires, and, + ignoring the territorial objective, to strike at the heart + of his enemy and force him to desist.</p> + + <p>If, then, we only regard war between contiguous continental + States, in which the object is the conquest of territory on + either of their frontiers, we get no real generic difference + between limited and unlimited war. The line between them is in + any case too shadowy or unstable to give a classification of + any solidity. It is a difference of degree rather than of kind. + If, on the other hand, we extend our view to wars between + worldwide empires, the distinction at once becomes organic. + Possessions which lie oversea or at the extremities of vast + areas of imperfectly settled territory are in an entirely + different category from those limited objects which Clausewitz + contemplated. History shows that they can never have the + political importance of objects which are organically part of + the European system, and it shows further that they can be + isolated by naval action sufficiently to set up the conditions + of true limited war.</p> + + <p>Jomini approaches the point, but without clearly detaching + it. In his chapter "On Great Invasions and Distant + Expeditions," he points out how unsafe it is to take the + conditions of war between contiguous States and apply them + crudely to cases where the belligerents are separated by large + areas of + <!-- Page 56 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" + id="Page_56"></a>[pg 56]</span> land or sea. He hovers round + the sea factor, feeling how great a difference it makes, but + without getting close to the real distinction. His + conception of the inter-action of fleets and armies never + rises above their actual co-operation in touch one with the + other in a distant theatre. He has in mind the assistance + which the British fleet afforded Wellington in the + Peninsula, and Napoleon's dreams of Asiatic conquest, + pronouncing such distant invasions as impossible in modern + times except perhaps in combination with a powerful fleet + that could provide the army of invasion with successive + advanced bases. Of the paramount value of the fleet's + isolating and preventive functions he gives no hint.</p> + + <p>Even when he deals with oversea expeditions, as he does at + some length, his grip of the point is no closer. It is indeed + significant of how entirely continental thought had failed to + penetrate the subject that in devoting over thirty pages to an + enumeration of the principles of oversea expeditions, he, like + Clausewitz, does not so much as mention the conquest of Canada; + and yet it is the leading case of a weak military Power + succeeding by the use of the limited form of war in forcing its + will upon a strong one, and succeeding because it was able by + naval action to secure its home defence and isolate the + territorial object.</p> + + <p>For our ideas of true limited objects, therefore, we must + leave the continental theatres and turn to mixed or maritime + wars. We have to look to such cases as Canada and Havana in the + Seven Years' War, and Cuba in the Spanish-American War, cases + in which complete isolation of the object by naval action was + possible, or to such examples as the Crimea <!-- Page + 57 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" + id="Page_57"></a>[pg 57]</span> and Korea, where sufficient + isolation was attainable by naval action owing to the length + and difficulty of the enemy's land communications and to the + strategical situation of the territory at stake.</p> + + <p>These examples will also serve to illustrate and enforce the + second essential of this kind of war. As has been already said, + for a true limited object we must have not only the power of + isolation, but also the power by a secure home defence of + barring an unlimited counterstroke. In all the above cases this + condition existed. In all of them the belligerents had no + contiguous frontiers, and this point is vital. For it is + obvious that if two belligerents have a common frontier, it is + open to the superior of them, no matter how distant or how easy + to isolate the limited object may be, to pass at will to + unlimited war by invasion. This process is even possible when + the belligerents are separated by a neutral State, since the + territory of a weak neutral will be violated if the object be + of sufficient importance, or if the neutral be too strong to + coerce, there still remains the possibility that his alliance + may be secured.</p> + + <p>We come, then, to this final proposition—that limited + war is only permanently possible to island Powers or between + Powers which are separated by sea, and then only when the Power + desiring limited war is able to command the sea to such a + degree as to be able not only to isolate the distant object, + but also to render impossible the invasion of his home + territory.</p> + + <p>Here, then, we reach the true meaning and highest military + value of what we call the command of the sea, and here we touch + the secret of England's success against Powers so greatly + superior to herself in military strength. It is only fitting + <!-- Page 58 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" + id="Page_58"></a>[pg 58]</span> that such a secret should + have been first penetrated by an Englishman. For so it was, + though it must be said that except in the light of + Clausewitz's doctrine the full meaning of Bacon's famous + aphorism is not revealed. "This much is certain," said the + great Elizabethan on the experience of our first imperial + war; "he that commands the sea is at great liberty and may + take as much or as little of the war as he will, whereas + those that be strongest by land are many times nevertheless + in great straits." It would be difficult to state more + pithily the ultimate significance of Clausewitz's doctrine. + Its cardinal truth is clearly indicated—that limited + wars do not turn upon the armed strength of the + belligerents, but upon the amount of that strength which + they are able or willing to bring to bear at the decisive + point.</p> + + <p>It is much to be regretted that Clausewitz did not live to + see with Bacon's eyes and to work out the full + comprehensiveness of his doctrine. His ambition was to + formulate a theory which would explain all wars. He believed he + had done so, and yet it is clear he never knew how complete was + his success, nor how wide was the field he had covered. To the + end it would seem he was unaware that he had found an + explanation of one of the most inscrutable problems in + history—the expansion of England—at least so far as + it has been due to successful war. That a small country with a + weak army should have been able to gather to herself the most + desirable regions of the earth, and to gather them at the + expense of the greatest military Powers, is a paradox to which + such Powers find it hard to be reconciled. The phenomenon + seemed always a matter of chance-an accident without any + foundation in the essential constants of war. It remained for + Clausewitz, + <!-- Page 59 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" + id="Page_59"></a>[pg 59]</span> unknown to himself, to + discover that explanation, and he reveals it to us in the + inherent strength of limited war when means and conditions + are favourable for its use.</p> + + <p>We find, then, if we take a wider view than was open to + Clausewitz and submit his latest ideas to the test of present + imperial conditions, so far from failing to cover the ground + they gain a fuller meaning and a firmer basis. Apply them to + maritime warfare and it becomes clear that his distinction + between limited and unlimited war does not rest alone on the + moral factor. A war may be limited not only because the + importance of the object is too limited to call forth the whole + national force, but also because the sea may be made to present + an insuperable physical obstacle to the whole national force + being brought to bear. That is to say, a war may be limited + physically by the strategical isolation of the object, as well + as morally by its comparative unimportance.</p> + <!-- Page 60 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" + id="Page_60"></a>[pg 60]</span> + <hr /> + + <h3>CHAPTER FIVE</h3> + <hr /> + + <h2>WARS OF<br /> + INTERVENTION—LIMITED<br /> + INTERFERENCE<br /> + IN UNLIMITED WAR</h2> + <hr /> + + <p>Before leaving the general consideration of limited war, we + have still to deal with a form of it that has not yet been + mentioned. Clausewitz gave it provisionally the name of "War + limited by contingent," and could find no place for it in his + system. It appeared to him to differ essentially from war + limited by its political object, or as Jomini put it, war with + a territorial object. Yet it had to be taken into account and + explained, if only for the part it had played in European + history.</p> + + <p>For us it calls for the most careful examination, not only + because it baffled the great German strategist to reconcile it + with his theory of war, but also because it is the form in + which Great Britain most successfully demonstrated the + potentiality for direct continental interference of a small + army acting in conjunction with a dominant fleet.</p> + + <p>The combined operations which were the normal expression of + the British method of making war on the limited basis were of + two main classes. Firstly, there were those designed purely for + the conquest of the objects for which we went to war, which + were usually colonial or distant oversea territory; + <!-- Page 61 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" + id="Page_61"></a>[pg 61]</span> and secondly, operations + more or less upon the European seaboard designed not for + permanent conquest, but as a method of disturbing our + enemy's plans and strengthening the hands of our allies and + our own position. Such operations might take the form of + insignificant coastal diversions, or they might rise through + all degrees of importance till, as in Wellington's + operations in the Peninsula, they became indistinguishable + in form from regular continental warfare.</p> + + <p>It would seem, therefore, that these operations were + distinguished not so much by the nature of the object as by the + fact that we devoted to them, not the whole of our military + strength, but only a certain part of it which was known as our + "disposal force." Consequently, they appear to call for some + such special classification, and to fall naturally into the + category which Clausewitz called "War limited by + contingent."</p> + + <p>It was a nature of war well enough known in another form on + the Continent. During the eighteenth century there had been a + large number of cases of war actually limited by + contingent—that is, cases where a country not having a + vital interest in the object made war by furnishing the chief + belligerent with an auxiliary force of a stipulated + strength.</p> + + <p>It was in the sixth chapter of his last book that Clausewitz + intended to deal with this anomalous form of hostility. His + untimely death, however, has left us with no more than a + fragment, in which he confesses that such cases are + "embarrassing to his theory." If, he adds, the auxiliary force + were placed unreservedly at the disposal of the chief + belligerent, the problem would be simple enough. It would then, + in effect, be the same thing as unlimited war with the aid of a + subsidised force. But in fact, as he observes, this seldom + happened, for the contingent was always more or less controlled + in <!-- Page 62 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_62" + id="Page_62"></a>[pg 62]</span> accordance with the special + political aims of the Government which furnished it. + Consequently, the only conclusion he succeeded in reaching + was that it was a form of war that had to be taken into + account, and that it was a form of limited war that appeared + to differ essentially from war limited by object. We are + left, in fact, with an impression that there must be two + kinds of limited war.</p> + + <p>But if we pursue his historical method and examine the cases + in which this nature of war was successful, and those in which + it was unsuccessful, we shall find that wherever success is + taken as an index of its legitimate employment, the practical + distinction between the two kinds of limited war tends to + disappear. The indications are that where the essential factors + which justify the use of war limited by object are present in + war limited by contingent, then that form of war tends to + succeed, but not otherwise. We are brought, in fact, to this + proposition, that the distinction "Limited by contingent" is + not one that is inherent in war, and is quite out of line with + the theory in hand—that, in reality, it is not a + <i>form</i> of war, but a <i>method</i> which may be employed + either for limited or unlimited war. In other words, war + limited by contingent, if it is to be regarded as a legitimate + form of war at all, must take frankly the one shape or the + other. Either the contingent must act as an organic unit of the + force making unlimited war without any reservations whatever, + or else it should be given a definite territorial object, with + an independent organisation and an independent limited + function.</p> + + <p>Our own experience seems to indicate that war by contingent + or war with "a disposal force" attains the highest success when + it approaches most closely to true limited war—that is, + as in the case of the Peninsula and the Crimea, where its + object is to wrest or secure from the enemy a definite piece of + territory that to a greater or less extent can be isolated by + naval action. Its operative power, in fact, appears to bear + some direct relation to the intimacy with which naval and + <!-- Page + 63 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_63" + id="Page_63"></a>[pg 63]</span> military action can be + combined to give the contingent a weight and mobility that + are beyond its intrinsic power.</p> + + <p>If, then, we would unravel the difficulties of war limited + by contingent, it seems necessary to distinguish between the + continental and the British form of it. The continental form, + as we have seen, differs but little in conception from + unlimited war. The contingent is furnished at least ostensibly + with the idea that it is to be used by the chief belligerent to + assist him in overthrowing the common enemy, and that its + objective will be the enemy's organised forces or his capital. + Or it may be that the contingent is to be used as an army of + observation to prevent a counterstroke, so as to facilitate and + secure the main offensive movement of the chief belligerent. In + either case, however small may be our contribution to the + allied force, we are using the unlimited form and aiming at an + unlimited and not a mere territorial object.</p> + + <p>If now we turn to British experience of war limited by + contingent, we find that the continental form has frequently + been used, but we also find it almost invariably accompanied by + a popular repugnance, as though there were something in it + antagonistic to the national instinct. A leading case is the + assistance we sent to Frederick the Great in the Seven Years' + War. At the opening of the war, so great was the popular + repugnance that the measure was found impossible, and it was + not till Frederick's dazzling resistance to the Catholic powers + had clothed him with the glory of a Protestant hero, that Pitt + could do what he wanted. The old religious fire was stirred. + The most potent of all national instincts kindled the people to + a generous warmth which overcame their inborn <!-- + Page 64 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_64" + id="Page_64"></a>[pg 64]</span> antipathy to continental + operations, and it was possible to send a substantial + contingent to Frederick's assistance. In the end the support + fully achieved its purpose, but it must be noted that even + in this case the operations were limited not only by + contingent but also by object. It is true that Frederick was + engaged in an unlimited war in which the continued existence + of Prussia was at stake, and that the British force was an + organic element in his war plan. Nevertheless, it formed + part of a British subsidised army under Prince Ferdinand of + Brunswick, who though nominated by Frederick was a British + commander-in-chief. His army was in organisation entirely + distinct from that of Frederick, and it was assigned the + very definite and limited function of preventing the French + occupying Hanover and so turning the Prussian right flank. + Finally it must be noted that its ability to perform this + function was due to the fact that the theatre of operations + assigned to it was such that in no probable event could it + lose touch with the sea, nor could the enemy cut its lines + of supply and retreat.</p> + + <p>These features of the enterprise should be noted. They + differentiate it from our earlier use of war limited by + contingent in the continental manner, of which Marlborough's + campaigns were typical, and they exhibit the special form which + Marlborough would have chosen had political exigencies + permitted and which was to become characteristic of British + effort from Pitt's time onward. In the method of our greatest + War Minister we have not only the limit by contingent but + <!-- Page 65 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" + id="Page_65"></a>[pg 65]</span> also the limit of a definite + and independent function, and finally we have touch with the + sea. This is the really vital factor, and upon it, as will + presently appear, depends the strength of the method.</p> + + <p>In the earlier part of the Great War we employed the same + form in our operations in North-Western Europe. There we had + also the limited function of securing Holland, and also + complete touch with the sea, but our theatre of operations was + not independent. Intimate concerted action with other forces + was involved, and the result in every case was failure. Later + on in Sicily, where absolute isolation was attainable, the + strength of the method enabled us to achieve a lasting result + with very slender means. But the result was purely defensive. + It was not till the Peninsular War developed that we found a + theatre for war limited by contingent in which all the + conditions that make for success were present. Even there so + long as our army was regarded as a contingent auxiliary to the + Spanish army the usual failure ensued. Only in Portugal, the + defence of which was a true limited object, and where we had a + sea-girt theatre independent of extraneous allies, was success + achieved from the first. So strong was the method here, and so + exhausting the method which it forced on the enemy, that the + local balance of force was eventually reversed and we were able + to pass to a drastic offensive.</p> + + <p>The real secret of Wellington's success—apart from his + own genius—was that in perfect conditions he was applying + the limited form to an unlimited war. Our object was unlimited. + It was nothing less than the overthrow of Napoleon. Complete + success at sea had failed to do it, but that success had given + us the power of applying the limited form, which was the most + decisive form of offence within our means. Its <!-- + Page 66 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" + id="Page_66"></a>[pg 66]</span> substantial contribution to + the final achievement of the object is now universally + recognised.</p> + + <p>The general result, then, of these considerations is that + war by contingent in the continental form seldom or never + differs generically from unlimited war, for the conditions + required by limited war are seldom or never present. But what + may be called the British or maritime form is in fact the + application of the limited method to the unlimited form, as + ancillary to the larger operations of our allies—a method + which has usually been open to us because the control of the + sea has enabled us to select a theatre in effect truly + limited.<a name="NtA_5" + id="NtA_5"></a><a href="#Nt_5"><sup>5</sup></a></p> + + <p>But what if the conditions of the struggle in which we wish + to intervene are such that no truly limited theatre is + available? In that case we have to choose between placing a + contingent frankly at the disposal of our ally, or confining + ourselves to coastal diversion, as we did at Frederick the + Great's request in the early campaigns of the Seven Years' War. + Such operations can seldom be satisfactory to either party. The + small positive results of our efforts to intervene in this way + have indeed done more than anything to discredit this form of + war, and to brand it as unworthy of a first-class Power. Yet + the fact remains that all the great continental masters of war + have feared or valued British intervention of this character + even in the most unfavourable conditions. It was because + <!-- Page 67 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" + id="Page_67"></a>[pg 67]</span> they looked for its effects + rather in the threat than in the performance. They did not + reckon for positive results at all. So long as such + intervention took an amphibious form they knew its + disturbing effect upon a European situation was always out + of all proportion to the intrinsic strength employed or the + positive results it could give. Its operative action was + that it threatened positive results unless it were strongly + met. Its effect, in short, was negative. Its value lay in + its power of containing force greater than its own. That is + all that can be claimed for it, but it may be all that is + required. It is not the most drastic method of intervention, + but it has proved itself the most drastic for a Power whose + forces are not adapted for the higher method. Frederick the + Great was the first great soldier to recognise it, and + Napoleon was the last. For years he shut his eyes to it, + laughed at it, covered it with a contempt that grew ever + more irritable. In 1805 he called Craig's expedition a + "pygmy combination," yet the preparation of another combined + force for an entirely different destination caused him to + see the first as an advance guard of a movement he could not + ignore, and he sacrificed his fleet in an impotent effort to + deal with it.</p> + <!-- Page 68 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" + id="Page_68"></a>[pg 68]</span> + + <p>It was not, however, till four years later that he was + forced to place on record his recognition of the principle. + Then, curiously enough, he was convinced by an expedition which + we have come to regard as above all others condemnatory of + amphibious operations against the Continent. The Walcheren + expedition is now usually held as the leading case of fatuous + war administration. Historians can find no words too bad for + it. They ignore the fact that it was a step—the final and + most difficult step—in our post-Trafalgar policy of using + the army to perfect our command of the sea against a fleet + acting stubbornly on the defensive. It began with Copenhagen in + 1807. It failed at the Dardanelles because fleet and army were + separated; it succeeded at Lisbon and at Cadiz by demonstration + alone. Walcheren, long contemplated, had been put off till the + last as the most formidable and the least pressing. Napoleon + had been looking for the attempt ever since the idea was first + broached in this country, but as time passed and the blow did + not fall, the danger came to be more and more ignored. Finally, + the moment came when he was heavily engaged in Austria and + forced to call up + <!-- Page 69 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" + id="Page_69"></a>[pg 69]</span> the bulk of his strength to + deal with the Archduke Charles. The risks were still great, + but the British Government faced them boldly with open eyes. + It was now or never. They were bent on developing their + utmost military strength in the Peninsula, and so long as a + potent and growing fleet remained in the North Sea it would + always act as an increasing drag on such development. The + prospective gain of success was in the eyes of the + Government out of all proportion to the probable loss by + failure. So when Napoleon least expected it they determined + to act, and caught him napping. The defences of Antwerp had + been left incomplete. There was no army to meet the + blow—nothing but a polyglot rabble without staff or + even officers. For a week at least success was in our hands. + Napoleon's fleet only escaped by twenty-four hours, and yet + the failure was not only complete but disastrous. Still so + entirely were the causes of failure accidental, and so near + had it come to success, that Napoleon received a thorough + shock and looked for a quick repetition of the attempt. So + seriously indeed did he regard his narrow escape that he + found himself driven to reconsider his whole system of home + defence. Not only did he deem it necessary to spend large + sums in increasing the fixed defences of Antwerp and Toulon, + but his Director of Conscription was called upon to work out + a scheme for providing a permanent force of no less than + 300,000 men from the National Guard to defend the French + coasts. "With 30,000 men in transports at the Downs," the + Emperor wrote, "the English can paralyse 300,000 of my army, + and that will reduce us to the rank of a second-class + Power."<a name="NtA_6" + id="NtA_6"></a><a href="#Nt_6"><sup>6</sup></a></p> + <!-- Page 70 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" + id="Page_70"></a>[pg 70]</span> + + <p>The concentration of the British efforts in the Peninsula + apparently rendered the realisation of this project + unnecessary—that is, our line of operation was declared + and the threat ceased. But none the less Napoleon's recognition + of the principle remains on record—not in one of his + speeches made for some ulterior purpose, but in a staff order + to the principal officer concerned.</p> + + <p>It is generally held that modern developments in military + organisation and transport will enable a great continental + Power to ignore such threats. Napoleon ignored them in the + past, but only to verify the truth that in war to ignore a + threat is too often to create an opportunity. Such + opportunities may occur late or early. As both Lord Ligonier + and Wolfe laid it down for such operations, surprise is not + necessarily to be looked for at the beginning. We have usually + had to create or wait for our opportunity—too often + because we were either not ready or not bold enough to seize + the first that occurred.</p> + + <p>The cases in which such intervention has been most potent + have been of two classes. Firstly, there is the intrusion into + a war plan which our enemy has designed without allowing for + our intervention, and to which he is irrevocably committed by + his opening movements. Secondly, there is intervention to + deprive the enemy of the fruits of victory. This form finds its + efficacy in the principle that unlimited wars are not always + decided by the destruction of armies. There usually remains the + difficult work of conquering the people afterwards with an + exhausted army. The intrusion of a small fresh force from the + sea in such cases may suffice to turn the scale, as it did in + <!-- Page 71 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" + id="Page_71"></a>[pg 71]</span> the Peninsula, and as, in + the opinion of some high authorities, it might have done in + France in 1871.</p> + + <p>Such a suggestion will appear to be almost heretical as + sinning against the principle which condemns a strategical + reserve. We say that the whole available force should be + developed for the vital period of the struggle. No one can be + found to dispute it nowadays. It is too obviously true when it + is a question of a conflict between organised forces, but in + the absence of all proof we are entitled to doubt whether it is + true for that exhausting and demoralising period which lies + beyond the shock of armies.</p> + <!-- Page 72 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" + id="Page_72"></a>[pg 72]</span> + <hr /> + + <h3>CHAPTER SIX</h3> + <hr /> + + <h2>CONDITIONS OF<br /> + STRENGTH IN LIMITED<br /> + WAR</h2> + <hr /> + + <p>The elements of strength in limited war are closely + analogous to those generally inherent in defence. That is to + say, that as a correct use of defence will sometimes enable an + inferior force to gain its end against a superior one, so are + there instances in which the correct use of the limited form of + war has enabled a weak military Power to attain success against + a much stronger one, and these instances are too numerous to + permit us to regard the results as accidental.</p> + + <p>An obvious element of strength is that where the + geographical conditions are favourable we are able by the use + of our navy to restrict the amount of force our army will have + to deal with. We can in fact bring up our fleet to redress the + adverse balance of our land force. But apart from this very + practical reason there is another, which is rooted in the first + principles of strategy.</p> + + <p>It is that limited war permits the use of the defensive + without its usual drawbacks to a degree that is impossible in + unlimited war. These drawbacks are chiefly that it tends to + surrender the initiative to the enemy and that it deprives us + of the moral exhilaration of the offensive. But in limited war, + as we shall see, this need not be the case, and if without + making these sacrifices we are able to act mainly on the + defensive our position becomes exceedingly strong.</p> + + <p>The proposition really admits of no doubt. For even if we + <!-- Page 73 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" + id="Page_73"></a>[pg 73]</span> be not in whole-hearted + agreement with Clausewitz's doctrine of the strength of + defence, still we may at least accept Moltke's modification + of it. He held that the strongest form of war—that is, + the form which economically makes for the highest + development of strength in a given force—is strategic + offensive combined with tactical defensive. Now these are in + effect the conditions which limited war should + give—that is, if the theatre and method be rightly + chosen. Let it be remembered that the use of this form of + war presupposes that we are able by superior readiness or + mobility or by being more conveniently situated to establish + ourselves in the territorial object before our opponent can + gather strength to prevent us. This done, we have the + initiative, and the enemy being unable by hypothesis to + attack us at home, must conform to our opening by + endeavouring to turn us out. We are in a position to meet + his attack on ground of our own choice and to avail + ourselves of such opportunities of counter-attack as his + distant and therefore exhausting offensive movements are + likely to offer. Assuming, as in our own case we always must + assume, that the territorial object is sea-girt and our + enemy is not able to command the sea, such opportunities are + certain to present themselves, and even if they are not used + will greatly embarrass the main attack—as was + abundantly shown in the Russian nervousness during their + advance into the Liaotung Peninsula, due to the fear of a + counter-stroke from the Gulf of Pe-chi-li.</p> + <!-- Page 74 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" + id="Page_74"></a>[pg 74]</span> + + <p>The actual situation which this method of procedure sets up + is that our major strategy is offensive—that is, our main + movement is positive, having for its aim the occupation of the + territorial object. The minor strategy that follows should be + in its general lines defensive, designed, so soon as the enemy + sets about dislodging us, to develop the utmost energy of + counter-attack which our force and opportunities justify.</p> + + <p>Now if we consider that by universal agreement it is no + longer possible in the present conditions of land warfare to + draw a line between tactics and minor strategy, we have in our + favour for all practical purposes the identical position which + Moltke regarded as constituting the strongest form of war. That + is to say, our major strategy is offensive and our minor + strategy is defensive.</p> + + <p>If, then, the limited form of war has this element of + strength over and above the unlimited form, it must be correct + to use it when we are not strong enough to use the more + exhausting form and when the object is limited; just as much as + it is correct to use the defensive when our object is negative + and we are too weak for the offensive. The point is of the + highest importance, for it is a direct negation of the current + doctrine that in war there can be but one legitimate object, + the overthrow of the enemy's means of resistance, and that the + primary objective must always be his armed forces. It raises in + fact the whole question as to whether it is not sometimes + legitimate and even correct to aim directly at the ulterior + object of the war.</p> + + <p>An impression appears to prevail—in spite of all that + Clausewitz and Jomini had to say on the point—that the + question <!-- Page 75 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" + id="Page_75"></a>[pg 75]</span> admits of only one answer. + Von der Goltz, for instance, is particularly emphatic in + asserting that the overthrow of the enemy must always be the + object in modern war. He lays it down as "the first + principle of modern warfare," that "the immediate objective + against which all our efforts must be directed is the + hostile main army." Similarly Prince Kraft has the maxim + that "the first aim should be to overcome the enemy's army. + Everything else, the occupation of the country, &c., + only comes in the second line."</p> + + <p>It will be observed that he here admits that the process of + occupying the enemy's territory is an operation distinct from + the overthrow of the enemy's force. Von der Goltz goes further, + and protests against the common error of regarding the + annihilation of the enemy's principal army as synonymous with + the complete attainment of the object. He is careful to assert + that the current doctrine only holds good "when the two + belligerent states are of approximately the same nature." + <!-- Page 76 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" + id="Page_76"></a>[pg 76]</span> If, then, there are cases in + which the occupation of territory must be undertaken as an + operation distinct from defeating the enemy's forces, and if + in such cases the conditions are such that we can occupy the + territory with advantage without first defeating the enemy, + it is surely mere pedantry to insist that we should put off + till to-morrow what we can do better to-day. If the + occupation of the enemy's whole territory is involved, or + even a substantial part of it, the German principle of + course holds good, but all wars are not of that + character.</p> + + <p>Insistence on the principle of "overthrow," and even its + exaggeration, was of value, in its day, to prevent a recurrence + to the old and discredited methods. But its work is done, and + blind adherence to it without regard to the principles on which + it rests tends to turn the art of war into mere bludgeon + play.</p> + + <p>Clausewitz, at any rate, as General Von Caemmerer has + pointed out,<a name="NtA_7" + id="NtA_7"></a><a href="#Nt_7"><sup>7</sup></a> was far too + practical a soldier to commit himself to so abstract a + proposition in all its modern crudity. If it were true, it + would never be possible for a weaker Power to make + successful war against a stronger one in any cause + whatever—a conclusion abundantly refuted by historical + experience. That the higher form like the offensive is the + more drastic is certain, if conditions are suitable for its + use, but Clausewitz, it must be remembered, distinctly lays + it down that such conditions presuppose in the belligerent + employing the higher form a great physical or moral + superiority or a + <!-- Page 77 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_77" + id="Page_77"></a>[pg 77]</span> great spirit of + enterprise—an innate propensity for extreme hazards. + Jomini did not go even so far as this. He certainly would + have ruled out "an innate propensity to extreme hazards," + for in his judgment it was this innate propensity which led + Napoleon to abuse the higher form to his own undoing. So + entirely indeed does history, no less than theory, fail to + support the idea of the one answer, that it would seem that + even in Germany a reaction to Clausewitz's real teaching is + beginning. In expounding it Von Caemmerer says, "Since the + majority of the most prominent military authors of our time + uphold the principle that in war our efforts must always be + directed to their utmost limits and that a deliberate + employment of lower means betrays more or less weakness, I + feel bound to declare that the wideness of Clausewitz's + views have inspired me with a high degree of + admiration."</p> + + <p>Now what Clausewitz held precisely was this—that when + the conditions are not favourable for the use of the higher + form, the seizure of a small part of the enemy's territory may + be regarded as a correct alternative to destroying his armed + forces. But he clearly regards this form of war only as a + make-shift. His purely continental outlook prevented his + considering that there might be cases where the object was + actually so limited in character that the lower form of war + would be at once the more effective and the more economical to + use. In continental warfare, as we have seen, such cases can + hardly occur, but they tend to declare themselves strongly when + the maritime factor is introduced to any serious extent.</p> + + <p>The tendency of British warfare to take the lower or limited + form has always been as clearly marked as is the opposite + tendency on the Continent. To attribute such a tendency, as is + sometimes the fashion, to an inherent lack of warlike spirit is + sufficiently contradicted by the results it has achieved. + <!-- Page 78 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_78" + id="Page_78"></a>[pg 78]</span> There is no reason indeed to + put it down to anything but a sagacious instinct for the + kind of war that best accords with the conditions of our + existence. So strong has this instinct been that it has led + us usually to apply the lower form not only where the object + of the war was a well-defined territorial one, but to cases + in which its correctness was less obvious. As has been + explained in the last chapter, we have applied it, and + applied it on the whole with success, when we have been + acting in concert with continental allies for an unlimited + object—where, that is, the common object has been the + overthrow of the common enemy.</p> + + <p>The choice between the two forms really depends upon the + circumstances of each case. We have to consider whether the + political object is in fact limited, whether if unlimited in + the abstract it can be reduced to a concrete object that is + limited, and finally whether the strategical conditions are + such as lend themselves to the successful application of the + limited form.</p> + + <p>What we require now is to determine those conditions with + greater exactness, and this will be best done by changing our + method to the concrete and taking a leading case.</p> + + <p>The one which presents them in their clearest and simplest + form is without doubt the recent war between Russia and Japan. + Here we have a particularly striking example of a small Power + having forced her will upon a much greater Power without + "overthrowing" her—that is, without having crushed her + power of resistance. That was entirely beyond the strength of + Japan. So manifest was the fact that everywhere upon the + Continent, where the overthrow of your enemy was regarded as + the only admissible form of war, the action of the Japanese in + resorting to hostilities was regarded as madness. Only in + England, with her tradition and instinct for what an island + Power may achieve by the lower means, was Japan considered to + have any reasonable chance of success.</p> + + <p>The case is particularly striking; for every one felt that + the <!-- + Page 79 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" + id="Page_79"></a>[pg 79]</span> real object of the war was + in the abstract unlimited, that it was in fact to decide + whether Russia or Japan was to be the predominant power in + the Far East. Like the Franco-German War of 1870 it had all + the aspect of what the Germans call "a trial of strength." + Such a war is one which above all appears incapable of + decision except by the complete overthrow of the one Power + or the other. There was no complication of alliances nor any + expectation of them. The Anglo-Japanese Treaty had isolated + the struggle. If ever issue hung on the sheer fighting force + of the two belligerents it would seem to have been this one. + After the event we are inclined to attribute the result to + the moral qualities and superior training and readiness of + the victors. These qualities indeed played their part, and + they must not be minimised; but who will contend that if + Japan had tried to make her war with Russia, as Napoleon + made his, she could have fared even as well as he did? She + had no such preponderance as Clausewitz laid down as a + condition precedent to attempting the overthrow of her + enemy—the employment of unlimited war.</p> + + <p>Fortunately for her the circumstances did not call for the + employment of such extreme means. The political and + geographical conditions were such that she was able to reduce + the intangible object of asserting her prestige to the purely + concrete form of a territorial objective. The penetration of + Russia into Manchuria threatened the absorption of Korea into + the Russian Empire, and this Japan regarded as fatal to her own + position and future development. Her power to maintain Korean + integrity would be the outward and visible sign of her ability + to assert herself as a Pacific Power. Her abstract quarrel with + Russia could therefore be crystallised into a concrete + objective in the same way as the quarrel of the + <!-- Page 80 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_80" + id="Page_80"></a>[pg 80]</span> Western Powers with Russia + in 1854 crystallised into the concrete objective of + Sebastopol.</p> + + <p>In the Japanese case the immediate political object was + exceptionally well adapted for the use of limited war. Owing to + the geographical position of Korea and to the vast and + undeveloped territories which separate it from the centre of + Russian power, it could be practically isolated by naval + action. Further than this, it fulfilled the condition to which + Clausewitz attached the greatest importance—that is to + say, the seizure of the particular object so far from weakening + the home defence of Japan would have the effect of greatly + increasing the strength of her position. Though offensive in + effect and intention it was also, like Frederick's seizure of + Saxony, a sound piece of defensive work. So far from exposing + her heart, it served to cover it almost impregnably. The reason + is plain. Owing to the wide separation of the two Russian + arsenals at Port Arthur and Vladivostock, with a defile + controlled by Japan interposed, the Russian naval position was + very faulty. The only way of correcting it was for Russia to + secure a base in the Straits of Korea, and for this she had + been striving by diplomatic means at Seoul for some time. + Strategically the integrity of Korea was for Japan very much + what the integrity of the Low Countries was for us, but in the + case of the Low Countries, since they were incapable of + isolation, our power of direct action was always comparatively + weak. Portugal, with its unrivalled strategical harbour at + Lisbon, was an analogous case in our old oceanic wars, and + since it was capable of being in a measure isolated from the + strength of our great rival by naval means we were there almost + uniformly successful. On the whole it must be said that + notwithstanding the success we achieved in our long series of + wars waged on a limited basis, in none of them were + <!-- Page 81 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" + id="Page_81"></a>[pg 81]</span> the conditions so favourable + for us as in this case they were for Japan. In none of them + did our main offensive movement so completely secure our + home defence. Canada was as eccentric as possible to our + line of home defence, while in the Crimea so completely did + our offensive uncover the British Islands, that we had to + supplement our movement against the limited object by + sending our main fighting fleet to hold the exit of the + Baltic against the danger of an unlimited + counter-stroke.<a name="NtA_8" + id="NtA_8"></a><a href="#Nt_8"><sup>8</sup></a></p> + + <p>Whether or not it was on this principle that the Japanese + conceived the war from the outset matters little. The main + considerations are that with so favourable a territorial object + as Korea limited war was possible in its most formidable + <!-- Page 82 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" + id="Page_82"></a>[pg 82]</span> shape, that the war did in + fact develop on limited lines, and that it was entirely + successful. Without waiting to secure the command of the + sea, Japan opened by a surprise seizure of Seoul, and then + under cover of minor operations of the fleet proceeded to + complete her occupation of Korea. As she faced the second + stage, that of making good the defence of her conquest, the + admirable nature of her geographical object was further + displayed. The theoretical weakness of limited war at this + point is the arrest of your offensive action. But in this + case such arrest was neither necessary nor possible, and for + these reasons. To render the conquest secure not only must + the Korean frontier be made inviolable, but Korea must be + permanently isolated by sea. This involved the destruction + of the Russian fleet, and this in its turn entailed the + reduction of Port Arthur by military means. Here, then, in + the second stage Japan found herself committed to two lines + of operation with two distinct objectives, Port Arthur and + the Russian army that was slowly concentrating in + Manchuria—a thoroughly vicious situation. So + fortunate, however, was the geographical conformation of the + theatre that by promptitude and the bold use of an + uncommanded sea it could be reduced to something far more + correct. By continuing the advance of the Korean army into + Manchuria and landing another force between it and the Port + Arthur army the three corps could be concentrated and the + vicious separation of the lines of operations turned to good + account. They could be combined in such a way as to threaten + an enveloping counter-attack on Liao-yang before the Russian + offensive concentration could be completed. Not only was + Liao-yang the Russian point of concentration, but it also + was a sound position both for defending + <!-- Page 83 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" + id="Page_83"></a>[pg 83]</span> Korea and covering the siege + of Port Arthur. Once secured, it gave the Japanese all the + advantages of defence and forced the Russians to exhaust + themselves in offensive operations which were beyond their + strength. Nor was it only ashore that this advantage was + gained. The success of the system, which culminated in the + fall of Port Arthur, went further still. Not only did it + make Japan relatively superior at sea, but it enabled her to + assume a naval defensive and so to force the final naval + decision on Russia with every advantage of time, place, and + strength in her own favour.</p> + + <p>By the battle of Tsushima the territorial object was + completely isolated by sea, and the position of Japan in Korea + was rendered as impregnable as that of Wellington at Torres + Vedras. All that remained was to proceed to the third stage and + demonstrate to Russia that the acceptance of the situation that + had been set up was more to her advantage than the further + attempt to break it down. This the final advance to Mukden + accomplished, and Japan obtained her end very far short of + having overthrown her enemy. The offensive power of Russia had + never been so strong, while that of Japan was almost if not + quite exhausted.</p> + + <p>Approached in this way, the Far Eastern struggle is seen to + develop on the same lines as all our great maritime wars of the + past, which continental strategists have so persistently + excluded from their field of study. It presents the normal + three phases—the initial offensive movement to seize the + territorial object, the secondary phase, which forces an + attenuated offensive on the enemy, and the final stage of + pressure, in which there is a return to the offensive + "according," as Jomini puts it, "to circumstances and your + relative force in order to obtain the cession desired."</p> + + <p>It must not of course be asked that these phases shall be + always clearly defined. Strategical analysis can never give + exact results. It aims only at approximations, at groupings + which will serve to guide but will always leave much to the + <!-- Page 84 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" + id="Page_84"></a>[pg 84]</span> judgment. The three phases + in the Russo-Japanese War, though unusually well defined, + continually overlapped. It must be so; for in war the effect + of an operation is never confined to the limits of its + immediate or primary intention. Thus the occupation of Korea + had the secondary defensive effect of covering the home + country, while the initial blow which Admiral Togo delivered + at Port Arthur to cover the primary offensive movement + proved, by the demoralisation it caused in the Russian + fleet, to be a distinct step in the secondary phase of + isolating the conquest. In the later stages of the war the + line between what was essential to set up the second phase + of perfecting the isolation and the third phase of general + pressure seems to have grown very nebulous.</p> + + <p>It was at this stage that the Japanese strategy has been + most severely criticised, and it was just here they seem to + have lost hold of the conception of a limited war, if in fact + they had ever securely grasped the conception as the elder Pitt + understood it. It has been argued that in their eagerness to + deal a blow at the enemy's main army they neglected to devote + sufficient force to reduce Port Arthur, an essential step to + complete the second phase. Whether or not the exigencies of the + case rendered such distribution of force inevitable or whether + it was due to miscalculation of difficulties, the result was a + most costly set-back. For not only did it entail a vast loss of + time and life at Port Arthur itself, but when the sortie of the + Russian fleet in June brought home to them their + <!-- Page 85 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" + id="Page_85"></a>[pg 85]</span> error, the offensive + movement on Liao-yang had to be delayed, and the opportunity + passed for a decisive counter-stroke at the enemy's + concentration ashore.</p> + + <p>This misfortune, which was to cost the Japanese so dear, may + perhaps be attributed at least in part to the continental + influences under which their army had been trained. We at least + can trace the unlimited outlook in the pages of the German + Staff history. In dealing with the Japanese plan of operations + it is assumed that the occupation of Korea and the isolation of + Port Arthur were but preliminaries to a concentric advance on + Liao-yang, "which was kept in view as the first objective of + the operations on land." But surely on every theory of the war + the first objective of the Japanese on land was Seoul, where + they expected to have to fight their first important action + against troops advancing from the Yalu; and surely their second + was Port Arthur, with its fleet and arsenal, which they + expected to reduce with little more difficulty than they had + met with ten years before against the Chinese. Such at least + was the actual progression of events, and a criticism which + regards operations of such magnitude and ultimate importance as + mere incidents of strategic deployment is only to be explained + by the domination of the Napoleonic idea of war, against the + universal application of which Clausewitz so solemnly + protested. It is the work of men who have a natural difficulty + in conceiving a war plan that does not culminate in a Jena or a + Sedan. It is a view surely which is the child of theory, + bearing no relation to the actuality of the war in question and + affording no explanation of its ultimate success. The truth is, + that so long as the Japanese acted on the principles of limited + war, as laid down by Clausewitz and Jomini and plainly + deducible from our own <!-- Page 86 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" + id="Page_86"></a>[pg 86]</span> rich experience, they + progressed beyond all their expectations, but so soon as + they departed from them and suffered themselves to be + confused with continental theories they were surprised by + unaccountable failure.</p> + + <p>The expression "Limited war" is no doubt not entirely happy. + Yet no other has been found to condense the ideas of limited + object and limited interest, which are its special + characteristics. Still if the above example be kept in mind as + a typical case, the meaning of the term will not be mistaken. + It only remains to emphasise one important point. The fact that + the doctrine of limited war traverses the current belief that + our primary objective must always be the enemy's armed forces + is liable to carry with it a false inference that it also + rejects the corollary that war means the use of battles. + Nothing is further from the conception. Whatever the form of + war, there is no likelihood of our ever going back to the old + fallacy of attempting to decide wars by manoeuvres. All forms + alike demand the use of battles. By our fundamental theory war + is always "a continuation of political intercourse, in which + fighting is substituted for writing notes." However great the + controlling influence of the political object, it must never + obscure the fact that it is by fighting we have to gain our + end.</p> + + <p>It is the more necessary to insist on this point, for the + idea of making a piece of territory your object is liable to be + confused with the older method of conducting war, in which + armies were content to manoeuvre for strategical positions, and + a battle came almost to be regarded as a mark of bad + generalship. With such parading limited war has nothing to do. + Its conduct differs only from that of unlimited war in that + instead of having to destroy our enemy's whole power of + resistance, we need only overthrow so much of his active force + as he is able or willing to bring to bear in order to prevent + or terminate our occupation of the territorial object.</p> + + <p>The first consideration, then, in entering on such a war is + to endeavour to determine what the force will amount to. It + <!-- Page 87 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" + id="Page_87"></a>[pg 87]</span> will depend, firstly, on the + importance the enemy attaches to the limited object, coupled + with the nature and extent of his preoccupations elsewhere, + and, secondly, it will depend upon the natural difficulties + of his lines of communication and the extent to which we can + increase those difficulties by our conduct of the initial + operations. In favourable circumstances therefore (and here + lies the great value of the limited form) we are able to + control the amount of force we shall have to encounter. The + most favourable circumstances and the only circumstances by + which we ourselves can profit are such as permit the more or + less complete isolation of the object by naval action, and + such isolation can never be established until we have + entirely overthrown the enemy's naval forces.</p> + + <p>Here, then, we enter the field of naval strategy. We can now + leave behind us the theory of war in general and, in order to + pave the way to our final conclusions, devote our attention to + the theory of naval warfare in particular.</p> + <!-- Page 88 blank --> + <!-- Page 89 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" + id="Page_89"></a>[pg 89]</span> + <hr /> + + <h2>PART TWO</h2> + <hr /> + + <h1>THEORY<br /> + OF<br /> + NAVAL WAR</h1><!-- Page 90 blank --> + <!-- Page 91 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" + id="Page_91"></a>[pg 91]</span> + <hr /> + + <h3>CHAPTER ONE</h3> + <hr /> + + <h2>THEORY OF THE<br /> + OBJECT—COMMAND<br /> + OF THE SEA</h2> + <hr /> + + <p>The object of naval warfare must always be directly or + indirectly either to secure the command of the sea or to + prevent the enemy from securing it.</p> + + <p>The second part of the proposition should be noted with + special care in order to exclude a habit of thought, which is + one of the commonest sources of error in naval speculation. + That error is the very general assumption that if one + belligerent loses the command of the sea it passes at once to + the other belligerent. The most cursory study of naval history + is enough to reveal the falseness of such an assumption. It + tells us that the most common situation in naval war is that + neither side has the command; that the normal position is not a + commanded sea, but an uncommanded sea. The mere assertion, + which no one denies, that the object of naval warfare is to get + command of the sea actually connotes the proposition that the + command is normally in dispute. It is this state of dispute + with which naval strategy is most nearly concerned, for when + the command is lost or won pure naval strategy comes to an + end.</p> + + <p>This truth is so obvious that it would scarcely be worth + mentioning were it not for the constant recurrence of such + phrases as: "If England were to lose command of the sea, it + would be all over with her." The fallacy of the idea is that it + ignores the power of the strategical defensive. It assumes that + <!-- Page 92 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_92" + id="Page_92"></a>[pg 92]</span> if in the face of some + extraordinary hostile coalition or through some + extraordinary mischance we found ourselves without + sufficient strength to keep the command, we should therefore + be too weak to prevent the enemy getting it—a negation + of the whole theory of war, which at least requires further + support than it ever receives.</p> + + <p>And not only is this assumption a negation of theory; it is + a negation both of practical experience and of the expressed + opinion of our greatest masters. We ourselves have used the + defensive at sea with success, as under William the Third and + in the War of American Independence, while in our long wars + with France she habitually used it in such a way that sometimes + for years, though we had a substantial preponderance, we could + not get command, and for years were unable to carry out our war + plan without serious interruption from her fleet.</p> + + <p>So far from the defensive being a negligible factor at sea, + or even the mere pestilent heresy it is generally represented, + it is of course inherent in all war, and, as we have seen, the + paramount questions of strategy both at sea and on land turn on + the relative possibilities of offensive and defensive, and upon + the relative proportions in which each should enter into our + plan of war. At sea the most powerful and aggressively-minded + belligerent can no more avoid his alternating periods of + defence, which result from inevitable arrests of offensive + action, than they can be avoided on land. The defensive, then, + has to be considered; but before we are in a position to do so + with profit, we have to proceed with our analysis of the + <!-- Page 93 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_93" + id="Page_93"></a>[pg 93]</span> phrase, "Command of the + Sea," and ascertain exactly what it is we mean by it in + war.</p> + + <p>In the first place, "Command of the Sea" is not identical in + its strategical conditions with the conquest of territory. You + cannot argue from the one to the other, as has been too + commonly done. Such phrases as the "Conquest of water + territory" and "Making the enemy's coast our frontier" had + their use and meaning in the mouths of those who framed them, + but they are really little but rhetorical expressions founded + on false analogy, and false analogy is not a secure basis for a + theory of war.</p> + + <p>The analogy is false for two reasons, both of which enter + materially into the conduct of naval war. You cannot conquer + sea because it is not susceptible of ownership, at least + outside territorial waters. You cannot, as lawyers say, "reduce + it into possession," because you cannot exclude neutrals from + it as you can from territory you conquer. In the second place, + you cannot subsist your armed force upon it as you can upon + enemy's territory. Clearly, then, to make deductions from an + assumption that command of the sea is analogous to conquest of + territory is unscientific, and certain to lead to error.</p> + + <p>The only safe method is to inquire what it is we can secure + for ourselves, and what it is we can deny the enemy by command + of the sea. Now, if we exclude fishery rights, which are + irrelevant to the present matter, the only right we or our + enemy can have on the sea is the right of passage; in other + words, the only positive value which the high seas have for + national life is as a means of communication. For the active + life of a nation such means may stand for much or it may stand + for little, but to every maritime State it has some value. + Consequently by denying an enemy this means of passage we check + the movement of his national life at sea in the same kind of + way that we check it on land by occupying his territory. So far + the analogy holds good, but no further.</p> + <!-- Page 94 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94" + id="Page_94"></a>[pg 94]</span> + + <p>So much for the positive value which the sea has in national + life. It has also a negative value. For not only is it a means + of communication, but, unlike the means of communication + ashore, it is also a barrier. By winning command of the sea we + remove that barrier from our own path, thereby placing + ourselves in position to exert direct military pressure upon + the national life of our enemy ashore, while at the same time + we solidify it against him and prevent his exerting direct + military pressure upon ourselves.</p> + + <p>Command of the sea, therefore, means nothing but the control + of maritime communications, whether for commercial or military + purposes. The object of naval warfare is the control of + communications, and not, as in land warfare, the conquest of + territory. The difference is fundamental. True, it is rightly + said that strategy ashore is mainly a question of + communications, but they are communications in another sense. + The phrase refers to the communications of the army alone, and + not to the wider communications which are part of the life of + the nation.</p> + + <p>But on land also there are communications of a kind which + are essential to national life—the internal + communications which connect the points of distribution. Here + again we touch an analogy between the two kinds of war. Land + warfare, as the most devoted adherents of the modern view + admit, cannot attain its end by military victories alone. The + destruction of your enemy's forces will not avail for certain + unless you have in reserve sufficient force to complete the + occupation of his inland communications and principal points of + distribution. This power is the real fruit of victory, the + power to strangle the whole national life. It is not until this + is done that a high-spirited nation, whose whole heart is in + the war, will consent to make peace and do your will. It is + precisely in the same way that the command of the sea works + towards peace, though of course in a far less coercive manner, + against a continental State. By occupying her maritime + <!-- Page 95 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_95" + id="Page_95"></a>[pg 95]</span> communications and closing + the points of distribution in which they terminate we + destroy the national life afloat, and thereby check the + vitality of that life ashore so far as the one is dependent + on the other. Thus we see that so long as we retain the + power and right to stop maritime communications, the analogy + between command of the sea and the conquest of territory is + in this aspect very close. And the analogy is of the utmost + practical importance, for on it turns the most burning + question of maritime war, which it will be well to deal with + in this place.</p> + + <p>It is obvious that if the object and end of naval warfare is + the control of communications it must carry with it the right + to forbid, if we can, the passage of both public and private + property upon the sea. Now the only means we have of enforcing + such control of commercial communications at sea is in the last + resort the capture or destruction of sea-borne property. Such + capture or destruction is the penalty which we impose upon our + enemy for attempting to use the communications of which he does + not hold the control. In the language of jurisprudence, it is + the ultimate sanction of the interdict which we are seeking to + enforce. The current term "Commerce destruction" is not in fact + a logical expression of the strategical idea. To make the + position clear we should say "Commerce prevention."</p> + + <p>The methods of this "Commerce prevention" have no more + connection with the old and barbarous idea of plunder and + reprisal than orderly requisitions ashore have with the old + idea of plunder and ravaging. No form of war indeed causes so + little human suffering as the capture of property at sea. It is + more akin to process of law, such as distress for rent, or + execution of judgment, or arrest of a ship, than to a military + operation. Once, it is true, it was not so. In the days of + privateers it was accompanied too often, and particularly in + the Mediterranean and the West Indies, with lamentable cruelty + and lawlessness, and the existence of such abuses was the + <!-- Page 96 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_96" + id="Page_96"></a>[pg 96]</span> real reason for the general + agreement to the Declaration of Paris by which privateering + was abolished.</p> + + <p>But it was not the only reason. The idea of privateering was + a survival of a primitive and unscientific conception of war, + which was governed mainly by a general notion of doing your + enemy as much damage as possible and making reprisal for wrongs + he had done you. To the same class of ideas belonged the + practice of plunder and ravaging ashore. But neither of these + methods of war was abolished for humanitarian reasons. They + disappeared indeed as a general practice before the world had + begun to talk of humanity. They were abolished because war + became more scientific. The right to plunder and ravage was not + denied. But plunder was found to demoralise your troops and + unfit them for fighting, and ravaging proved to be a less + powerful means of coercing your enemy than exploiting the + occupied country by means of regular requisitions for the + supply of your own army and the increase of its offensive + range. In short, the reform arose from a desire to husband your + enemy's resources for your own use instead of wantonly wasting + them.</p> + + <p>In a similar way privateering always had a debilitating + effect upon our own regular force. It greatly increased the + difficulty of manning the navy, and the occasional large + profits had a demoralising influence on detached cruiser + commanders. It tended to keep alive the mediaeval corsair + spirit at the expense of the modern military spirit which made + for direct operations against the enemy's armed forces. It was + inevitable that as the new movement of opinion gathered force + it should carry with it a conviction that for operating against + sea-borne trade sporadic attack could never be so efficient as + an organised system of operations to secure a real strategical + control of the enemy's maritime communications. + <!-- Page 97 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_97" + id="Page_97"></a>[pg 97]</span> A riper and sounder view of + war revealed that what may be called tactical commercial + blockade—that is, the blockade of ports—could be + extended to and supplemented by a strategical blockade of + the great trade routes. In moral principle there is no + difference between the two. Admit the principle of tactical + or close blockade, and as between belligerents you cannot + condemn the principle of strategical or distant blockade. + Except in their effect upon neutrals, there is no juridical + difference between the two.</p> + + <p>Why indeed should this humane yet drastic process of war be + rejected at sea if the same thing is permitted on land? If on + land you allow contributions and requisitions, if you permit + the occupation of towns, ports, and inland communications, + without which no conquest is complete and no effective war + possible, why should you refuse similar procedure at sea where + it causes far less individual suffering? If you refuse the + right of controlling communications at sea, you must also + refuse the right on land. If you admit the right of + contributions on land, you must admit the right of capture at + sea. Otherwise you will permit to military Powers the extreme + rights of war and leave to the maritime Powers no effective + rights at all. Their ultimate argument would be gone.</p> + + <p>In so far as the idea of abolishing private capture at sea + is humanitarian, and in so far as it rests on a belief that it + would strengthen our position as a commercial maritime State, + let it be honourably dealt with. But so far as its advocates + have as yet expressed themselves, the proposal appears to be + based on two fallacies. One is, that you can avoid attack by + depriving yourself of the power of offence and resting on + defence alone, and the other, the idea that war consists + entirely of battles between armies or fleets. It ignores the + fundamental fact that battles are only the means of enabling + you to do that which really brings wars to an end-that is, to + exert pressure on the citizens and their collective life. + "After shattering the hostile main army," says Von der Goltz, + "we still have the + <!-- Page 98 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_98" + id="Page_98"></a>[pg 98]</span> forcing of a peace as a + separate and, in certain circumstances, a more difficult + task ... to make the enemy's country feel the burdens of war + with such weight that the desire for peace will prevail. + This is the point in which Napoleon failed.... It may be + necessary to seize the harbours, commercial centres, + important lines of traffic, fortifications and arsenals, in + other words, all important property necessary to the + existence of the people and army."</p> + + <p>If, then, we are deprived of the right to use analogous + means at sea, the object for which we fight battles almost + ceases to exist. Defeat the enemy's fleets as we may, he will + be but little the worse. We shall have opened the way for + invasion, but any of the great continental Powers can laugh at + our attempts to invade single-handed. If we cannot reap the + harvest of our success by deadening his national activities at + sea, the only legitimate means of pressure within our strength + will be denied us. Our fleet, if it would proceed with such + secondary operations as are essential for forcing a peace, will + be driven to such barbarous expedients as the bombardment of + seaport towns and destructive raids upon the hostile + coasts.</p> + + <p>If the means of pressure which follow successful fighting + were abolished both on land and sea there would be this + argument in favour of the change, that it would mean perhaps + for civilised States the entire cessation of war; for war would + become so impotent, that no one would care to engage in it. It + would be an affair between regular armies and fleets, with + which the people had little concern. International quarrels + would tend to take the form of the mediaeval private disputes + which were settled by champions in trial by battle, an + absurdity which led rapidly to the domination of purely legal + procedure. If international quarrels could go the same way, + humanity would have advanced a long stride. But the world is + scarcely ripe for such a revolution. Meanwhile to <!-- Page + 99 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_99" + id="Page_99"></a>[pg 99]</span> abolish the right of + interference with the flow of private property at sea + without abolishing the corresponding right ashore would only + defeat the ends of humanitarians. The great deterrent, the + most powerful check on war, would be gone. It is commerce + and finance which now more than ever control or check the + foreign policy of nations. If commerce and finance stand to + lose by war, their influence for a peaceful solution will be + great; and so long as the right of private capture at sea + exists, they stand to lose in every maritime war immediately + and inevitably whatever the ultimate result may be. Abolish + the right, and this deterrent disappears; nay, they will + even stand to win immediate gains owing to the sudden + expansion of Government expenditure which the hostilities + will entail, and the expansion of sea commerce which the + needs of the armed forces will create. Any such losses as + maritime warfare under existing conditions must immediately + inflict will be remote if interference with property is + confined to the land. They will never indeed be serious + except in the case of complete defeat, and no one enters + upon war expecting defeat. It is in the hope of victory and + gain that aggressive wars are born. The fear of quick and + certain loss is their surest preventive. Humanity, then, + will surely beware how in a too hasty pursuit of peaceful + ideals it lets drop the best weapon it has for scotching the + evil it has as yet no power to kill.</p> + + <p>In what follows, therefore, it is intended to regard the + right of private capture at sea as still subsisting. Without + it, indeed, naval warfare is almost inconceivable, and in any + case no one has any experience of such a truncated method of + war on which profitable study can be founded.</p> + + <p>The primary method, then, in which we use victory or + preponderance at sea and bring it to bear on the enemy's + population to secure peace, is by the capture or destruction of + the enemy's property, whether public or private. But in + comparing the process with the analogous occupation of + territory and the levying of contributions and requisitions we + have to + <!-- Page 100 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_100" + id="Page_100"></a>[pg 100]</span> observe a marked + difference. Both processes are what may be called economic + pressure. But ashore the economic pressure can only be + exerted as the consequence of victory or acquired domination + by military success. At sea the process begins at once. + Indeed, more often than not, the first act of hostility in + maritime wars has been the capture of private property at + sea. In a sense this is also true ashore. The first step of + an invader after crossing the frontier will be to control to + a less or greater extent such private property as he is able + to use for his purposes. But such interference with private + property is essentially a military act, and does not belong + to the secondary phase of economic pressure. At sea it does, + and the reason why this should be so lies in certain + fundamental differences between land and sea warfare which + are implicit in the communication theory of naval war.</p> + + <p>To elucidate the point, it must be repeated that maritime + communications, which are the root of the idea of command of + the sea, are not analogous to military communications in the + ordinary use of the term. Military communications refer solely + to the army's lines of supply and retreat. Maritime + communications have a wider meaning. Though in effect embracing + the lines of fleet supply, they correspond in strategical + values not to military lines of supply, but to those internal + lines of communication by which the flow of national life is + maintained ashore. Consequently maritime communications are on + a wholly different footing from land communications. At sea the + communications are, for the most part, common to both + belligerents, whereas ashore each possesses his own in his own + territory. The strategical effect is of far-reaching + importance, for it means that at sea strategical offence and + defence tend to merge in a way that is unknown ashore. Since + maritime communications are common, we as a rule cannot attack + those of the enemy without defending our own. In military + operations the converse is the rule. Normally, an attack on our + enemy's communications tends to expose their own.</p> + <!-- Page 101 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_101" + id="Page_101"></a>[pg 101]</span> + + <p>The theory of common communications will become clear by + taking an example. In our wars with France our communications + with the Mediterranean, India, and America ran down from the + Channel mouth past Finisterre and St. Vincent; and those of + France, at least from her Atlantic ports, were identical for + almost their entire distance. In our wars with the Dutch the + identity was even closer. Even in the case of Spain, her great + trade routes followed the same lines as our own for the greater + part of their extent. Consequently the opening moves which we + generally made to defend our trade by the occupation of those + lines placed us in a position to attack our enemy's trade. The + same situation arose even when our opening dispositions were + designed as defence against home invasion or against attacks + upon our colonies, for the positions our fleet had to take up + to those ends always lay on or about the terminal and focal + points of trade routes. Whether our immediate object were to + bring the enemy's main fleets to action or to exercise economic + pressure, it made but little difference. If the enemy were + equally anxious to engage, it was at one of the terminal or + focal areas we were almost certain to get contact. If he wished + to avoid a decision, the best way to force him to action was to + occupy his trade routes at the same vital points.</p> + + <p>Thus it comes about that, whereas on land the process of + economic pressure, at least in the modern conception of war, + should only begin after decisive victory, at sea it starts + automatically from the first. Indeed such pressure may be the + only means of forcing the decision we seek, as will appear more + clearly when we come to deal with the other fundamental + difference between land and sea warfare.</p> + + <p>Meanwhile we may note that at sea the use of economic + <!-- Page 102 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_102" + id="Page_102"></a>[pg 102]</span> pressure from the + commencement is justified for two reasons. The first is, as + we have seen, that it is an economy of means to use our + defensive positions for attack when attack does not vitiate + those positions, and it will not vitiate them if fleet + cruisers operate with restraint. The second is, that + interference with the enemy's trade has two aspects. It is + not only a means of exerting the secondary economic + pressure, it is also a primary means towards overthrowing + the enemy's power of resistance. Wars are not decided + exclusively by military and naval force. Finance is scarcely + less important. When other things are equal, it is the + longer purse that wins. It has even many times redressed an + unfavourable balance of armed force and given victory to the + physically weaker Power. Anything, therefore, which we are + able to achieve towards crippling our enemy's finance is a + direct step to his overthrow, and the most effective means + we can employ to this end against a maritime State is to + deny him the resources of seaborne trade.</p> + + <p>It will be seen, therefore, that in naval warfare, however + closely we may concentrate our efforts on the destruction of + our enemy's armed forces as the direct means to his overthrow, + it would be folly to stay our hands when opportunities occur, + as they will automatically, for undermining his financial + position on which the continued vigour of those armed forces so + largely depends. Thus the occupation of our enemy's sea + communications and the confiscatory operations it connotes are + in a sense primary operations, and not, as on land, + secondary.</p> + + <p>Such, then, are the abstract conclusions at which we arrive + in our attempt to analyse the idea of command of the sea and to + give it precision as the control of common communications. + Their concrete value will appear when we come to deal with the + various forms which naval operations may take, such as, + "seeking out the enemy's fleet," blockade, attack and defence + of trade, and the safeguarding of combined expeditions. + <!-- Page 103 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_103" + id="Page_103"></a>[pg 103]</span> For the present it remains + to deal with the various kinds of sea command which flow + from the communication idea.</p> + + <p>If the object of the command of the sea is to control + communications, it is obvious it may exist in various degrees. + We may be able to control the whole of the common + communications as the result either of great initial + preponderance or of decisive victory. If we are not + sufficiently strong to do this, we may still be able to control + some of the communications; that is, our control may be general + or local. Obvious as the point is, it needs emphasising, + because of a maxim that has become current that "the sea is all + one." Like other maxims of the kind, it conveys a truth with a + trail of error in its wake. The truth it contains seems to be + simply this, that as a rule local control can only avail us + temporarily, for so long as the enemy has a sufficient fleet + anywhere, it is theoretically in his power to overthrow our + control of any special sea area.</p> + + <p>It amounts indeed to little more than a rhetorical + expression, used to emphasise the high mobility of fleets as + contrasted with that of armies and the absence of physical + obstacles to restrict that mobility. That this vital feature of + naval warfare should be consecrated in a maxim is well, but + when it is caricatured into a doctrine, as it sometimes is, + that you cannot move a battalion oversea till you have entirely + overthrown your enemy's fleet, it deserves gibbeting. It would + be as wise to hold that in war you must never risk + anything.</p> + + <p>It would seem to have been the evil influence of this + travestied maxim which had much to do with the cramped and + timorous strategy of the Americans in their late war with + Spain. They had ample naval force to secure such a local and + temporary command of the Gulf of Mexico as to have justified + them at once in throwing all the troops they had ready into + Cuba to support the insurgents, in accordance with their war + plan. They had also sufficient strength to ensure that the + communications with the expeditionary force could not be + <!-- Page 104 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_104" + id="Page_104"></a>[pg 104]</span> interrupted permanently. + And yet, because the Spaniards had an undefeated fleet at + sea somewhere, they hesitated, and were nearly lost. The + Japanese had no such illusions. Without having struck a + naval blow of any kind, and with a hostile fleet actually + within the theatre of operations, they started their + essential military movement oversea, content that though + they might not be able to secure the control of the line of + passage, they were in a position to deny effective control + to the enemy. Our own history is full of such operations. + There are cases in plenty where the results promised by a + successful military blow oversea, before permanent command + had been obtained, were great enough to justify a risk + which, like the Japanese, we knew how to minimise by + judicious use of our favourable geographical position, and + of a certain system of protection, which must be dealt with + later.</p> + + <p>For the purpose, then, of framing a plan of war or campaign, + it must be taken that command may exist in various states or + degrees, each of which has its special possibilities and + limitations. It may be general or local, and it may be + permanent or temporary. General command may be permanent or + temporary, but mere local command, except in very favourable + geographical conditions, should scarcely ever be regarded as + more than temporary, since normally it is always liable to + interruption from other theatres so long as the enemy possesses + an effective naval force.</p> + + <p>Finally, it has to be noted that even permanent general + command can never in practice be absolute. No degree of naval + superiority can ensure our communications against sporadic + attack from detached cruisers, or even raiding squadrons if + they be boldly led and are prepared to risk destruction. Even + after Hawke's decisive victory at <!-- Page 105 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_105" + id="Page_105"></a>[pg 105]</span> Quiberon had completed the + overthrow of the enemy's sea forces, a British transport was + captured between Cork and Portsmouth, and an Indiaman in + sight of the Lizard, while Wellington's complaints in the + Peninsula of the insecurity of his communications are well + known.<a name="NtA_9" + id="NtA_9"></a><a href="#Nt_9"><sup>9</sup></a> By general + and permanent control we do not mean that the enemy can do + nothing, but that he cannot interfere with our maritime + trade and oversea operations so seriously as to affect the + issue of the war, and that he cannot carry on his own trade + and operations except at such risk and hazard as to remove + them from the field of practical strategy. In other words, + it means that the enemy can no longer attack our lines of + passage and communication effectively, and that he cannot + use or defend his own.</p> + + <p>To complete our equipment for appreciating any situation for + which operations have to be designed, it is necessary to + remember that when the command is in dispute the general + conditions may give a stable or an unstable equilibrium. It may + be that the power of neither side preponderates to any + appreciable extent. It may also be that the preponderance is + with ourselves, or it may be that it lies with the enemy. Such + preponderance of course will not depend entirely on actual + relative strength, either physical or moral, but will be + influenced by the inter-relation of naval positions and the + comparative convenience of their situation in regard to the + object of the war or campaign. By naval positions we mean, + firstly, + <!-- Page 106 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_106" + id="Page_106"></a>[pg 106]</span> naval bases and, secondly, + the terminals of the greater lines of communication or + trade-routes and the focal areas where they tend to + converge, as at Finisterre, Gibraltar, Suez, the Cape, + Singapore, and many others.</p> + + <p>Upon the degree and distribution of this preponderance will + depend in a general way the extent to which our plans will be + governed by the idea of defence or offence. Generally speaking, + it will be to the advantage of the preponderating side to seek + a decision as quickly as possible in order to terminate the + state of dispute. Conversely, the weaker side will as a rule + seek to avoid or postpone a decision in hope of being able by + minor operations, the chances of war, or the development of + fresh strength, to turn the balance in its favour. Such was the + line which France adopted frequently in her wars with us, + sometimes legitimately, but sometimes to such an excess as + seriously to demoralise her fleet. Her experience has led to a + hasty deduction that the defensive at sea for even a weaker + Power is an unmixed evil. Such a conclusion is foreign to the + fundamental principles of war. It is idle to exclude the use of + an expectant attitude because in itself it cannot lead to final + success, and because if used to excess it ends in + demoralisation and the loss of will to attack. The + misconception appears to have arisen from insistence on the + drawbacks of defence by writers seeking to persuade their + country to prepare in time of peace sufficient naval strength + to justify offence from the outset.</p> + + <p>Having now determined the fundamental principles which + underlie the idea of Command of the Sea, we are in a position + to consider the manner in which fleets are constituted in order + to fit them for their task.</p> + <!-- Page 107 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_107" + id="Page_107"></a>[pg 107]</span> + <hr /> + + <h3>CHAPTER TWO</h3> + <hr /> + + <h2>THEORY OF THE<br /> + MEANS—THE<br /> + CONSTITUTION OF<br /> + FLEETS</h2> + <hr /> + + <p>In all eras of naval warfare fighting ships have exhibited a + tendency to differentiate into groups in accordance with the + primary function each class was designed to serve. These + groupings or classifications are what is meant by the + constitution of a fleet. A threefold differentiation into + battleships, cruisers, and flotilla has so long dominated naval + thought that we have come to regard it as normal, and even + essential. It may be so, but such a classification has been by + no means constant. Other ideas of fleet constitution have not + only existed, but have stood the test of war for long periods, + and it is unscientific and unsafe to ignore such facts if we + wish to arrive at sound doctrine.</p> + + <p>The truth is, that the classes of ships which constitute a + fleet are, or ought to be, the expression in material of the + strategical and tactical ideas that prevail at any given time, + and consequently they have varied not only with the ideas, but + also with the material in vogue. It may also be said more + broadly that they have varied with the theory of war, by which + more or less consciously naval thought was dominated. It is + true that few ages have formulated a theory of war, or even + been clearly aware of its influence; but nevertheless such + theories have always existed, and even in their most nebulous + and intangible shapes seem to have exerted an ascertainable + influence on the constitution of fleets.</p> + <!-- Page 108 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_108" + id="Page_108"></a>[pg 108]</span> + + <p>Going back to the dawn of modern times, we note that at the + opening of the sixteenth century, when galley warfare reached + its culmination, the constitution was threefold, bearing a + superficial analogy to that which we have come to regard as + normal. There were the galeasses and heavy galleys + corresponding to our battleships, light galleys corresponding + to our cruisers, while the flotilla was represented by the + small "frigates," "brigantines," and similar craft, which had + no slave gang for propulsion, but were rowed by the fighting + crew. Such armed sailing ships as then existed were regarded as + auxiliaries, and formed a category apart, as fireships and + bomb-vessels did in the sailing period, and as mine-layers do + now. But the parallel must not be overstrained. The distinction + of function between the two classes of galleys was not so + strongly marked as that between the lighter craft and the + galleys; that is to say, the scientific differentiation between + battleships and cruisers had not yet been so firmly developed + as it was destined to become in later times, and the smaller + galleys habitually took their place in the fighting line.</p> + + <p>With the rise of the sailing vessel as the typical + ship-of-war an entirely new constitution made its appearance. + The dominating classification became twofold. It was a + classification into vessels of subservient movement using + sails, and vessels of free movement using oars. It was on these + lines that our true Royal Navy was first organised by Henry the + Eighth, an expert who, in the science of war, was one of the + most advanced masters in Europe. In this constitution there + appears even less conception than in that of the galley period + of a radical distinction between battleships and cruisers. As + Henry's fleet was originally designed, practically the whole of + the battleships were sailing vessels, though it is true that + when the French brought up galleys from the Mediterranean, he + <!-- Page 109 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_109" + id="Page_109"></a>[pg 109]</span> gave some of the smartest + of them oars. The constitution was in fact one of + battleships and flotilla. Of cruisers there were none as we + understand them. Fleet scouting was done by the "Row-barges" + and newly introduced "Pinnaces" of the flotilla, while as + for commerce protection, merchant vessels had usually to + look after themselves, the larger ones being regularly armed + for their own defence.</p> + + <p>The influence of this twofold constitution continued long + after the conditions of its origin had passed away. In + ever-lessening degree indeed it may be said to have lasted for + two hundred years. During the Dutch wars of the seventeenth + century, which finally established the dominant status of the + sailing warship, practically all true sailing + vessels—that is, vessels that had no auxiliary oar + propulsion—took station in the line. The "Frigates" of + that time differed not at all from the "Great Ship" in their + functions, but only in their design. By the beginning of the + eighteenth century, however, the old tendency to a threefold + organisation began to reassert itself, but it was not till the + middle of the century that the process of development can be + regarded as complete.</p> + + <p>Down to the end of the War of the Austrian + Succession—a period which is usually deemed to be one of + conspicuous depression in the naval art—the + classification of our larger sailing vessels was purely + arbitrary. The "Rates" (which had been introduced during the + Dutch wars) bore no relation to any philosophical conception of + the complex duties of a fleet. In the first rate were 100-gun + ships; in the second, 90-gun ships—all three-deckers. So + far the system of rating was sound enough, but when we come to + the third rate we find it includes 80-gun ships, which were + also of three decks, while + <!-- Page 110 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_110" + id="Page_110"></a>[pg 110]</span> the bulk of the rest were + 70-gun two-deckers. The fourth rate was also composed of + two-decked ships—weak battle-units of 60 and 50 + guns—and this was far the largest class. All these + four rates were classed as ships-of-the-line. Below them + came the fifth rates, which, though they were used as + cruisers, had no distinct class name. They differed indeed + only in degree from the ship-of-the-line, being all cramped + two-deckers of 44 and 40 guns, and they must be regarded, in + so far as they expressed any logical idea of naval warfare, + as the forerunners of the "Intermediate" class, represented + in the succeeding epochs by 50-gun ships, and in our own + time by armoured cruisers. The only true cruiser is found in + the sixth rate, which comprised small and weakly armed + 20-gun ships, and between them and the "Forties" there was + nothing. Below them, but again without any clear + differentiation, came the unrated sloops representing the + flotilla.</p> + + <p>In such a system of rating there is no logical distinction + either between large and small battleships or between + battleships and cruisers, or between cruisers and flotilla. The + only marked break in the gradual descent is that between the + 40-gun two-deckers and the 20-gun cruisers. As these latter + vessels as well as the sloops used sweeps for auxiliary + propulsion, we are forced to conclude that the only basis of + the classification was that adopted by Henry the Eighth, which, + sound as it was in his time, had long ceased to have any real + relation to the actuality of naval war.</p> + + <p>It was not till Anson's memorable administration that a + scientific system of rating was re-established and the fleet at + <!-- Page 111 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_111" + id="Page_111"></a>[pg 111]</span> last assumed the logical + constitution which it retained up to our own time. In the + first two rates appear the fleet flagship class, + three-deckers of 100 and 90 guns respectively. All smaller + three-deckers are eliminated. In the next two rates we have + the rank and file of the battle-line, two-deckers of + increased size-namely, seventy-fours in the third rate, and + sixty-fours in the fourth. Here, however, is a slight break + in the perfection of the system, for the fourth rate also + included 50-gun ships of two decks, which, during the + progress of the Seven Years' War, ceased to be regarded as + ships-of-the-line. War experience was eliminating small + battleships, and therewith it called for a type intermediate + between battleships and cruisers, with whose functions we + shall have to deal directly. In practice these units soon + formed a rate by themselves, into which, by the same + tendency, 60-gun ships were destined to sink half a century + later.</p> + + <p>But most pregnant of all Anson's reforms was the + introduction of the true cruiser, no longer a small battleship, + but a vessel specialised for its logical functions, and + distinct in design both from the battle rates and the flotilla. + Both 40-gun and 20-gun types were abolished, and in their place + appear two cruiser rates, and the fifth consisting of 32-gun + true frigates, and the sixth of 28-gun frigates, both + completely divorced from any battle function. Finally, after a + very distinct gap, came the unrated sloops and smaller craft, + which formed the flotilla for coastwise and inshore work, + despatch service, and kindred duties.</p> + + <p>The reforms of the great First Lord amounted in fact to a + clearly apprehended threefold constitution, in which the + various groups were frankly specialised in accordance with the + functions each was expected to perform. Specialisation, it will + be observed, is the note of the process of development. + <!-- Page 112 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_112" + id="Page_112"></a>[pg 112]</span> We have no longer an + endeavour to adapt the fleet to its multifarious duties by + multiplying a comparatively weak nature of fighting-ship, + which could act in the line and yet be had in sufficient + numbers to protect commerce, but which was not well fitted + for either service. Instead we note a definite recognition + of the principle that battleships should be as powerful as + possible, and that in order to permit of their due + development they must be relieved of their cruising + functions by a class of vessel specially adapted for the + purpose. The question we have to consider is, was this + specialisation, which has asserted itself down to our own + times, in the true line of development? Was it, in fact, a + right expression of the needs which are indicated by the + theory of naval war?</p> + + <p>By the theory of naval war it must be reiterated we mean + nothing but an enunciation of the fundamental principles which + underlie all naval war. Those principles, if we have determined + them correctly, should be found giving shape not only to + strategy and tactics, but also to material, whatever method and + means of naval warfare may be in use at any given time. + Conversely, if we find strategy, tactics, or organisation + exhibiting a tendency to reproduce the same forms under widely + differing conditions of method and material, we should be able + to show that those forms bear a constant and definite relation + to the principles which our theory endeavours to express.</p> + + <p>In the case of Anson's threefold organisation, the relation + is not far to seek, though it has become obscured by two + maxims. The one is, that "the command of the sea depends upon + battleships," and the other, that "cruisers are the eyes of the + fleet." It is the inherent evil of maxims that they tend to get + stretched beyond their original meaning. Both of these express + a truth, but neither expresses the whole truth. On no theory of + naval warfare can we expect to command the sea with + battleships, nor, on the communication theory, can we regard + the primary function of cruisers as being to scout for a + <!-- Page 113 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_113" + id="Page_113"></a>[pg 113]</span> battle-fleet. It is + perfectly true that the control depends ultimately on the + battle-fleet if control is disputed by a hostile + battle-fleet, as it usually is. It is also true that, so far + as is necessary to enable the battle-fleet to secure the + control, we have to furnish it with eyes from our cruiser + force. But it does not follow that this is the primary + function of cruisers. The truth is, we have to withdraw them + from their primary function in order to do work for the + battle-fleet which it cannot do for itself.</p> + + <p>Well established as is the "Eyes of the fleet" maxim, it + would be very difficult to show that scouting was ever regarded + as the primary function of cruisers by the highest authorities. + In Nelson's practice at least their paramount function was to + exercise the control which he was securing with his + battle-squadron. Nothing is more familiar in naval history than + his incessant cry from the Mediterranean for more cruisers, but + the significance of that cry has become obscured. It was not + that his cruisers were not numerous in proportion to his + battleships—they were usually nearly double in + number—but it was rather that he was so deeply convinced + of their true function, that he used them to exercise control + to an extent which sometimes reduced his fleet cruisers below + the limit of bare necessity. The result on a memorable occasion + was the escape of the enemy's battle-fleet, but the further + result is equally important. It was that the escape of that + fleet did not deprive him of the control which he was + <!-- Page 114 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_114" + id="Page_114"></a>[pg 114]</span> charged to maintain. His + judgment may have been at fault, but the strategical + distribution of his force was consistent throughout the + whole period of his Mediterranean command. Judged by his + record, no man ever grasped more clearly than Nelson that + the object of naval warfare was to control communications, + and if he found that he had not a sufficient number of + cruisers to exercise that control and to furnish eyes for + his battle-fleet as well, it was the battle-fleet that was + made to suffer, and surely this is at least the logical + view. Had the French been ready to risk settling the + question of the control in a fleet action, it would have + been different. He would then have been right to sacrifice + the exercise of control for the time in order to make sure + that the action should take place and end decisively in his + favour. But he knew they were not ready to take such a risk, + and he refused to permit a purely defensive attitude on the + part of the enemy to delude him from the special function + with which he had been charged.</p> + + <p>If the object of naval warfare is to control communications, + then the fundamental requirement is the means of exercising + that control. Logically, therefore, if the enemy holds back + from battle decision, we must relegate the battle-fleet to a + secondary position, for cruisers are the means of exercising + control; the battle-fleet is but the means of preventing their + being interfered with in their work. Put it to the test of + actual practice. In no case can we exercise control by + battleships alone. Their specialisation has rendered them unfit + for the work, and has made them too costly ever to be numerous + enough. Even, therefore, if our enemy had no battle-fleet we + could not make control effective with battleships alone. We + should still require cruisers specialised for the work and in + sufficient numbers to cover the necessary ground. But the + converse is not true. We could exercise control with cruisers + alone if the enemy had no battle-fleet to interfere with + them.</p> + + <p>If, then, we seek a formula that will express the practical + <!-- Page + 115 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_115" + id="Page_115"></a>[pg 115]</span> results of our theory, it + would take some such shape as this. On cruisers depends our + exercise of control; on the battle-fleet depends the + security of control. That is the logical sequence of ideas, + and it shows us that the current maxim is really the + conclusion of a logical argument in which the initial steps + must not be ignored. The maxim that the command of the sea + depends on the battle-fleet is then perfectly sound so long + as it is taken to include all the other facts on which it + hangs. The true function of the battle-fleet is to protect + cruisers and flotilla at their special work. The best means + of doing this is of course to destroy the enemy's power of + interference. The doctrine of destroying the enemy's armed + forces as the paramount object here reasserts itself, and + reasserts itself so strongly as to permit for most practical + purposes the rough generalisation that the command depends + upon the battle-fleet.</p> + + <p>Of what practical use then, it may be asked, is all this + hairsplitting? Why not leave untainted the conviction that our + first and foremost business is to crush the enemy's + battle-fleet, and that to this end our whole effort should be + concentrated? The answer is to point to Nelson's dilemma. It + was a dilemma which, in the golden age of naval warfare, every + admiral at sea had had to solve for himself, and it was always + one of the most difficult details of every naval war plan. If + we seek to ensure the effective action of the battle-fleet by + giving it a large proportion of cruisers, by so much do we + weaken the actual and continuous exercise of control. If we + seek to make that control effective by devoting to the service + a large proportion of cruisers, by so much do we prejudice our + chance of getting contact with and defeating the enemy's + battle-fleet, which is the only means of perfecting + control.</p> + + <p>The correct solution of the dilemma will of course depend + upon the conditions of each case—mainly upon the relative + strength and activity of the hostile battle-fleet and our + enemy's probable intentions. But no matter how completely we + <!-- Page 116 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_116" + id="Page_116"></a>[pg 116]</span> have tabulated all the + relevant facts, we can never hope to come to a sound + conclusion upon them without a just appreciation of all the + elements which go to give command, and without the power of + gauging their relative importance. This, and this alone, + will ultimately settle the vital question of what proportion + of our cruiser force it is right to devote to the + battle-fleet.</p> + + <p>If the doctrine of cruiser control be correct, then every + cruiser attached to the battle-fleet is one withdrawn from its + true function. Such withdrawals are inevitable. A squadron of + battleships is an imperfect organism unable to do its work + without cruiser assistance, and since the performance of its + work is essential to cruiser freedom, some cruisers must be + sacrificed. But in what proportion? If we confine ourselves to + the view that command depends on the battle-fleet, then we + shall attach to it such a number as its commander may deem + necessary to make contact with the enemy absolutely certain and + to surround himself with an impenetrable screen. If we knew the + enemy was as anxious for a decision as ourselves, such a course + might be justified. But the normal condition is that if we + desire a decision it is because we have definite hopes of + success, and consequently the enemy will probably seek to avoid + one on our terms. In practice this means that if we have + perfected our arrangements for the destruction of his main + fleet he will refuse to expose it till he sees a more + favourable opportunity. And what will be the result? He remains + on the defensive, and theoretically all the ensuing period of + inaction tends to fall into his scale. Without stirring from + port his fleet is doing its work. The more closely he induces + us to concentrate our cruiser force in face of his + battle-fleet, the more he frees the sea for the circulation of + his own trade, and the more he exposes ours to cruiser + raids.</p> + + <p>Experience, then, and theory alike dictate that as a general + principle cruisers should be regarded as primarily concerned + with the active occupation of communications, and that + <!-- Page 117 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_117" + id="Page_117"></a>[pg 117]</span> withdrawals for fleet + purposes should be reduced to the furthest margin of + reasonable risk. What that margin should be can only be + decided on the circumstances of each case as it arises, and + by the personal characteristics of the officers who are + responsible. Nelson's practice was to reduce fleet cruisers + lower than perhaps any other commander. So small indeed was + the margin of efficiency he left, that in the campaign + already cited, when his judgment was ripest, one stroke of + ill-luck—a chance betrayal of his position by a + neutral—availed to deprive him of the decision he + sought, and to let the enemy's fleet escape.</p> + + <p>We arrive, then, at this general conclusion. The object of + naval warfare is to control maritime communications. In order + to exercise that control effectively we must have a numerous + class of vessels specially adapted for pursuit. But their power + of exercising control is in proportion to our degree of + command, that is, to our power of preventing their operations + being interfered with by the enemy. Their own power of + resistance is in inverse proportion to their power of + exercising control; that is to say, the more numerous and + better adapted they are for preying on commerce and transports, + the weaker will be their individual fighting power. We cannot + give them as a whole the power of resisting disturbance without + at the same time reducing their power of exercising control. + The accepted solution of the difficulty during the great period + of Anson's school was to provide them with a covering force of + battle units specially adapted for fighting. But here arises a + correlative difficulty. In so far as we give our battle units + fighting power we deny them scouting power, and scouting is + essential to their effective operation. The battle-fleet must + have eyes. Now, vessels adapted for control of communications + are also well adapted for "eyes." It becomes the practice, + therefore, to withdraw from control operations a sufficient + number of units to enable the battle-fleet to cover effectively + the operations of those that remain.</p> + <!-- Page 118 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_118" + id="Page_118"></a>[pg 118]</span> + + <p>Such were the broad principles on which the inevitable + dilemma always had to be solved, and on which Anson's + organisation was based. They flow naturally from the + communication theory of maritime war, and it was this theory + which then dominated naval thought, as is apparent from the + technical use of such phrases as "lines of passage and + communication." The war plans of the great strategists from + Anson and Barham can always be resolved into these simple + elements, and where we find the Admiralty grip of them + loosened, we have the confusion and quite unnecessary failures + of the War of American Independence. In that mismanaged contest + the cardinal mistake was that we suffered the enemy's + battle-fleets to get upon and occupy the vital lines of + "passage and communication" without first bringing them to + action, an error partly due to the unreadiness of a weak + administration, and partly to an insufficient allocation of + cruisers to secure contact at the right places.</p> + + <p>So far, then, the principles on which our naval supremacy + was built up are clear. For the enemies with whom we had to + deal Anson's system was admirably conceived. Both Spain and + France held the communication theory so strongly, that they + were content to count as success the power of continually + disturbing our control without any real attempt to secure it + for themselves. To defeat such a policy Anson's constitution + and the strategy it connoted were thoroughly well adapted and + easy to work. But it by no means follows that his doctrine is + the last word. Even in his own time complications had begun to + develop which tended to confuse the precision of his system. By + the culminating year of Trafalgar there <!-- + Page 119 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_119" + id="Page_119"></a>[pg 119]</span> were indications that it + was getting worn out, while the new methods and material + used by the Americans in 1812 made a serious rent in it. The + disturbances then inaugurated have continued to develop, and + it is necessary to consider how seriously they have confused + the problem of fleet constitution.</p> + + <p>Firstly, there is the general recognition, always patent to + ourselves, that by far the most drastic, economical, and + effective way of securing control is to destroy the enemy's + means of interfering with it. In our own service this + "overthrow" idea always tended to assert itself so strongly, + that occasionally the means became for a time more important + than the end; that is to say, circumstances were such that on + occasions it was considered advisable to sacrifice the exercise + of control for a time in order quickly and permanently to + deprive the enemy of all means of interference. When there was + reasonable hope of the enemy risking a decision this + consideration tended to override all others; but when, as in + Nelson's case in the Mediterranean, the hope was small, the + exercise of control tended to take the paramount place.</p> + + <p>The second complexity arose from the fact that however + strong might be our battleship cover, it is impossible for it + absolutely to secure cruiser control from disturbance by + sporadic attack. Isolated heavy ships, taking advantage of the + chances of the sea, could elude even the strictest blockade, + and one such ship, if she succeeded in getting upon a line of + communication, might paralyse the operations of a number of + weaker units. They must either run or concentrate, and in + either case the control was broken. If it were a squadron of + heavy ships that caused the disturbance, the practice was to + detach against it a division of the covering battle-fleet. But + it was obviously highly inconvenient and contrary to the whole + idea on which the constitution of the fleet was based to allow + every slight danger to cruiser control to loosen the cohesion + of the main fleet.</p> + + <p>It was necessary, then, to give cruiser lines some power of + <!-- Page + 120 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_120" + id="Page_120"></a>[pg 120]</span> resistance. This necessity + once admitted, there seemed no point at which you could stop + increasing the fighting power of your cruisers, and sooner + or later, unless some means of checking the process were + found, the distinction between cruisers and battleships + would practically disappear. Such a means was found in what + may be called the "Intermediate" ship. Frigates did indeed + continue to increase in size and fighting power throughout + the remainder of the sailing era, but it was not only in + this manner that the power of resistance was gained. The + evil results of the movement were checked by the + introduction of a supporting ship, midway between frigates + and true ships-of-the-line. Sometimes classed as a + battleship, and taking her place in the line, the 50-gun + ship came to be essentially a type for stiffening cruiser + squadrons. They most commonly appear as the flagships of + cruiser commodores, or stationed in terminal waters or at + focal points where sporadic raids were likely to fall and be + most destructive. The strategical effect of the presence of + such a vessel in a cruiser line was to give the whole line + in some degree the strength of the intermediate ship; for + any hostile cruiser endeavouring to disturb the line was + liable to have to deal with the supporting ship, while if a + frigate and a 50-gun ship got together they were a match + even for a small ship-of-the-line.</p> + + <p>In sailing days, of course, this power of the supporting + ship was weak owing to the imperfection of the means of distant + communication between ships at sea and the non-existence of + such means beyond extreme range of vision. But as wireless + telegraphy develops it is not unreasonable to expect that the + strategic value of the supporting or intermediate ship will be + found greater than it ever was in sailing days, and that for + dealing with sporadic disturbance the tendency will be for a + cruiser line to approximate more and more in power of + resistance to that of its strongest unit.</p> + + <p>For fleet service a cruiser's power of resistance was hardly + less valuable; for though we speak of fleet cruisers as the + eyes <!-- Page 121 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_121" + id="Page_121"></a>[pg 121]</span> of the fleet, their + purpose is almost equally to blindfold the enemy. Their duty + is not only to disclose the movements of the enemy, but also + to act as a screen to conceal our own. The point was + specially well marked in the blockades, where the old 50-gun + ships are almost always found with the inshore cruiser + squadron, preventing that squadron being forced by + inquisitive frigates. Important as this power of resistance + in the screen was in the old days, it is tenfold more + important now, and the consequent difficulty of keeping + cruisers distinct from battleships is greater than ever. The + reason for this is best considered under the third and most + serious cause of complexity.</p> + + <p>The third cause is the acquisition by the flotilla of battle + power. It is a feature of naval warfare that is entirely + new.<a name="NtA_10" + id="NtA_10"></a><a href="#Nt_10"><sup>10</sup></a> For all + practical purposes it was unknown until the full development + of the mobile torpedo. It is true that the fireship as + originally conceived was regarded as having something of the + same power. During the Dutch wars—the heyday of its + vogue—its assigned power was on some occasions + actually realised, as in the burning of Lord Sandwich's + flagship at the battle of Solebay, and the destruction of + the Spanish-Dutch fleet at Palermo by Duquesne. But as the + "nimbleness" + <!-- Page 122 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_122" + id="Page_122"></a>[pg 122]</span> of great-ships increased + with the ripening of seamanship and naval architecture, the + fireship as a battle weapon became almost negligible, while + a fleet at anchor was found to be thoroughly defensible by + its own picket-boats. Towards the middle of the eighteenth + century indeed the occasions on which the fireship could be + used for its special purpose was regarded as highly + exceptional, and though the type was retained till the end + of the century, its normal functions differed not at all + from those of the rest of the flotilla of which it then + formed part.</p> + + <p>Those functions, as we have seen, expressed the cruising + idea in its purest sense. It was numbers and mobility that + determined flotilla types rather than armament or capacity for + sea-endurance. Their primary purpose was to control + communications in home and colonial waters against weakly armed + privateers. The type which these duties determined fitted them + adequately for the secondary purpose of inshore and despatch + work with a fleet. It was, moreover, on the ubiquity which + their numbers gave them, and on their power of dealing with + unarmed or lightly armed vessels, that we relied for our first + line of defence against invasion. These latter duties were of + course exceptional, and the Navy List did not carry as a rule + sufficient numbers for the purpose. But a special value of the + class was that it was capable of rapid and almost indefinite + expansion from the mercantile marine. Anything that could carry + a gun had its use, and during the period of the Napoleonic + threat the defence flotilla rose all told to considerably over + a thousand units.</p> + + <p>Formidable and effective as was a flotilla of this type for + the ends it was designed to serve, it obviously in no way + affected the security of a battle-fleet. But so soon as the + flotilla acquired battle power the whole situation was changed, + and the old principles of cruiser design and distribution were + torn to shreds. The battle-fleet became a more imperfect + organism than ever. Formerly it was only its offensive power + <!-- Page 123 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_123" + id="Page_123"></a>[pg 123]</span> that required + supplementing. The new condition meant that unaided it could + no longer ensure its own defence. It now required screening, + not only from observation, but also from flotilla attack. + The theoretical weakness of an arrested offensive received a + practical and concrete illustration to a degree that war had + scarcely ever known. Our most dearly cherished strategical + traditions were shaken to the bottom. The "proper place" for + our battle-fleet had always been "on the enemy's coasts," + and now that was precisely where the enemy would be best + pleased to see it. What was to be done? So splendid a + tradition could not lightly be laid aside, but the attempt + to preserve it involved us still deeper in heresy. The + vital, most difficult, and most absorbing problem has become + not how to increase the power of a battle-fleet for attack, + which is a comparatively simple matter, but how to defend + it. As the offensive power of the flotilla developed, the + problem pressed with an almost bewildering intensity. With + every increase in the speed and sea-keeping power of torpedo + craft, the problem of the screen grew more exacting. To keep + the hostile flotilla out of night range the screen must be + flung out wider and wider, and this meant more and more + cruisers withdrawn from their primary function. And not only + this. The screen must not only be far flung, but it must be + made as far as possible impenetrable. In other words, its + own power of resistance must be increased all along the + line. Whole squadrons of armoured cruisers had to be + attached to battle-fleets to support the weaker members of + the screen. The crying need for this type of ship set up a + rapid movement for increasing their fighting power, and with + it fell with equal rapidity the economic possibility of + giving the cruiser class its essential attribute of + numbers.</p> + + <p>As an inevitable result we find ourselves involved in an + effort to restore to the flotilla some of its old cruiser + capacity, by endowing it with gun armament, higher sea-keeping + power, and facilities for distant communication, all at the + <!-- Page 124 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_124" + id="Page_124"></a>[pg 124]</span> cost of specialisation and + of greater economic strain. Still judged by past experience, + some means of increasing numbers in the cruising types is + essential, nor is it clear how it is possible to secure that + essential in the ranks of the true cruiser. No point has + been found at which it was possible to stop the tendency of + this class of vessel to increase in size and cost, or to + recall it to the strategical position it used to occupy. So + insecure is the battle-squadron, so imperfect as a + self-contained weapon has it become, that its need has + overridden the old order of things, and the primary function + of the cruising ship inclines to be no longer the exercise + of control under cover of the battle-fleet. The battle-fleet + now demands protection by the cruising ship, and what the + battle-fleet needs is held to be the first necessity.</p> + + <p>Judged by the old naval practice, it is an anomalous + position to have reached. But the whole naval art has suffered + a revolution beyond all previous experience, and it is possible + the old practice is no longer a safe guide. Driven by the same + necessities, every naval Power is following the same course. It + may be right, it may be wrong; no one at least but the ignorant + or hasty will venture to pass categorical judgment. The best we + can do is to endeavour to realise the situation to which, in + spite of all misgivings, we have been forced, and to determine + its relations to the developments of the past.</p> + + <p>It is undoubtedly a difficult task. As we have seen, there + have prevailed in the constitution of fleets at various times + several methods of expressing the necessities of naval war. The + present system differs from them all. On the one hand, we have + the fact that the latest developments of cruiser power have + finally obliterated all logical distinction between cruisers + and battleships, and we thus find ourselves hand in hand with + the fleet constitution of the old Dutch <!-- Page 125 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_125" + id="Page_125"></a>[pg 125]</span> wars. On the other, + however, we have armoured cruisers organised in squadrons + and attached to battle-fleets not only for strategical + purposes, but also with as yet undeveloped tactical + functions in battle. Here we come close to the latest + development of the sailing era, when "Advanced" or "Light" + squadrons began to appear in the organisation of + battle-fleets.</p> + + <p>The system arose towards the end of the eighteenth century + in the Mediterranean, where the conditions of control called + for so wide a dispersal of cruisers and so great a number of + them, that it was almost imperative for a battle-squadron in + that sea to do much of its own scouting. It was certainly for + this purpose that the fastest and lightest ships-of-the-line + were formed into a separate unit, and the first designation it + received was that of "Observation Squadron." It remained for + Nelson to endeavour to endow it with a tactical function, but + his idea was never realised either by himself or any of his + successors.</p> + + <p>Side by side with this new element in the organisation of a + battle-fleet, which perhaps is best designated as a "Light + Division," we have another significant fact. Not only was it + not always composed entirely of ships-of-the-line, especially + in the French service, but in 1805, the year of the full + development, we have Sir Richard Strachan using the heavy + frigates attached to his battle-squadron as a "Light Division," + and giving them a definite tactical function. The collapse of + the French Navy put a stop to further developments of either + idea. Whither they would have led we cannot tell. But it is + impossible to shut our eyes to the indication of a growing + tendency towards the system that exists at present. It is + difficult at least to ignore the fact that both Nelson and + Strachan in that culminating year found the actuality of war + calling for + <!-- Page 126 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_126" + id="Page_126"></a>[pg 126]</span> something for which there + was then no provision in the constitution of the fleet, but + which it does contain to-day. What Nelson felt for was a + battleship of cruiser speed. What Strachan desired was a + cruiser fit to take a tactical part in a fleet action. We + have them both, but with what result? Anson's specialisation + of types has almost disappeared, and our present fleet + constitution is scarcely to be distinguished from that of + the seventeenth century. We retain the three-fold + nomenclature, but the system itself has really gone. + Battleships grade into armoured cruisers, armoured cruisers + into protected cruisers. We can scarcely detect any real + distinction except a twofold one between vessels whose + primary armament is the gun and vessels whose primary + armament is the torpedo. But even here the existence of a + type of cruiser designed to act with flotillas blurs the + outline, while, as we have seen, the larger units of the + flotilla are grading up to cruiser level.</p> + + <p>We are thus face to face with a situation which has its + closest counterpart in the structureless fleets of the + seventeenth century. That naval thought should have so nearly + retraced its steps in the course of two centuries is curious + enough, but it is still more striking when we consider how + widely the underlying causes differ in each case. The pressure + which has forced the present situation is due most obviously to + two causes. One is the excessive development of the + "intermediate" ship originally devised for purposes of commerce + protection, and dictated by a menace which the experience of + the American War had taught us to respect. The other is the + introduction of the torpedo, and the consequent vulnerability + of battle-squadrons that are not securely screened. Nothing of + the kind had any influence on the fleet constitution of the + seventeenth century. But if we seek deeper, there is a less + obvious consideration which for what it is worth is too + striking to be ignored.</p> + + <p>It has been suggested above that the constitution of fleets + appears to have some more or less recognisable relation to + <!-- Page 127 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_127" + id="Page_127"></a>[pg 127]</span> the prevalent theory of + war. Now, amongst all our uncertainty we can assert with + confidence that the theory which holds the field at the + present day bears the closest possible resemblance to that + which dominated the soldier-admirals of the Dutch war. It + was the "Overthrow" theory, the firm faith in the decisive + action as the key of all strategical problems. They carried + it to sea with them from the battlefields of the New Model + Army, and the Dutch met them squarely. In the first war at + least their commerce had to give place to the exigencies of + throwing into the battle everything that could affect the + issue. It is not of course pretended that this attitude was + dictated by any clearly conceived theory of absolute war. It + was due rather to the fact that, owing to the relative + geographical conditions, all attempts to guard trade + communications were useless without the command of the home + waters in the North Sea, and the truth received a clinching + moral emphasis from the British claim to the actual dominion + of the Narrow Seas. It was, in fact, a war which resembled + rather the continental conditions of territorial conquest + than the naval procedure that characterised our rivalry with + France.</p> + + <p>Is it then possible, however much we may resist the + conclusion in loyalty to the eighteenth-century tradition, that + the rise of a new naval Power in the room of Holland must bring + us back to the drastic, if crude, methods of the Dutch wars, + and force us to tread under foot the nicer ingenuity of Anson's + system? Is it this which has tempted us to mistrust any type of + vessel which cannot be flung into the battle? The recurrence of + a formidable rival in the North Sea was certainly not the first + cause of the reaction. It began before that menace arose. Still + it has undoubtedly forced the pace, and even if it be not a + cause, it may well be a justification.</p> + <!-- Page 128 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_128" + id="Page_128"></a>[pg 128]</span> + <hr /> + + <h3>CHAPTER THREE</h3> + <hr /> + + <h2>THEORY OF THE<br /> + METHOD—CONCENTRATION<br /> + AND DISPERSAL OF<br /> + FORCE</h2> + <hr /> + + <p>From the point of view of the method by which its ends are + obtained, strategy is often described as the art of assembling + the utmost force at the right time and place; and this method + is called "Concentration."</p> + + <p>At first sight the term seems simple and expressive enough, + but on analysis it will be found to include several distinct + ideas, to all of which the term is applied indifferently. The + result is a source of some confusion, even to the most lucid + writers. "The word concentration," says one of the most recent + of them, "evokes the idea of a grouping of forces. We believe, + in fact, that we cannot make war without grouping ships into + squadrons and squadrons into fleets."<a name="NtA_11" + id="NtA_11"></a><a href="#Nt_11"><sup>11</sup></a> Here in + one sentence the word hovers between the formation of fleets + and their strategical distribution. Similar looseness will + embarrass the student at every turn. At one time he will + find the word + <!-- Page 129 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_129" + id="Page_129"></a>[pg 129]</span> used to express the + antithesis of division or dispersal of force; at another, to + express strategic deployment, which implies division to a + greater or less extent. He will find it used of the process + of assembling a force, as well as of the state of a force + when the process is complete. The truth is that the term, + which is one of the most common and most necessary in + strategical discussion, has never acquired a very precise + meaning, and this lack of precision is one of the commonest + causes of conflicting opinion and questionable judgments. No + strategical term indeed calls more urgently for a clear + determination of the ideas for which it stands.</p> + + <p>Military phraseology, from which the word is taken, employs + "concentration" in three senses. It is used for assembling the + units of an army after they have been mobilised. In this sense, + concentration is mainly an administrative process; logically, + it means the complement of the process of mobilisation, whereby + the army realises its war organisation and becomes ready to + take the field. In a second sense it is used for the process of + moving the army when formed, or in process of formation, to the + localities from which operations can best begin. This is a true + strategical stage, and it culminates in what is known as + strategic deployment. Finally, it is used for the ultimate + stage when the army so deployed is closed up upon a definite + line of operations in immediate readiness for tactical + deployment—gathered up, that is, to deal a concentrated + blow.</p> + + <p>Well as this terminology appears to serve on land, where the + processes tend to overlap, something more exact is required if + we try to extend it to the sea. Such extension magnifies the + error at every step, and clear thinking becomes difficult. Even + if we set aside the first meaning, that is, the final stage of + mobilisation, we have still to deal with the two others which, + in a great measure, are mutually contradictory. The essential + distinction of strategic deployment, which contemplates + dispersal with a view to a choice of combinations, + <!-- Page 130 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_130" + id="Page_130"></a>[pg 130]</span> is flexibility and free + movement. The characteristic of an army massed for a blow is + rigidity and restricted mobility. In the one sense of + concentration we contemplate a disposal of force which will + conceal our intention from the enemy and will permit us to + adapt our movements to the plan of operations he develops. + In the other, strategic concealment is at an end. We have + made our choice, and are committed to a definite operation. + Clearly, then, if we would apply the principles of land + concentration to naval warfare it is desirable to settle + which of the two phases of an operation we mean by the + term.</p> + + <p>Which meaning, then, is most closely connected with the + ordinary use of the word? The dictionaries define concentration + as "the state of being brought to a common point or centre," + and this coincides very exactly with the stage of a war plan + which intervenes between the completion of mobilisation and the + final massing or deployment for battle. It is an incomplete and + continuing act. Its ultimate consequence is the mass. It is a + method of securing mass at the right time and place. As we have + seen, the essence of the state of strategic deployment to which + it leads is flexibility. In war the choice of time and place + will always be influenced by the enemy's dispositions and + movements, or by our desire to deal him an unexpected blow. The + merit of concentration, then, in this sense, is its power of + permitting us to form our mass in time at one of the greatest + number of different points where mass may be required.</p> + + <p>It is for this stage that the more recent text-books incline + to specialise concentration—qualifying it as "strategic + concentration." But even that term scarcely meets the case, for + the succeeding process of gathering up the army into a position + for tactical deployment is also a strategical concentration. + Some further specialisation is required. The analytical + difference between the two processes is that the first is an + operation of major strategy and the other of minor, and if they + are <!-- Page 131 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_131" + id="Page_131"></a>[pg 131]</span> to be fully expressed, we + have to weight ourselves with the terms "major and minor + strategic concentration."</p> + + <p>Such cumbrous terminology is too forbidding to use. It + serves only to mark that the middle stage differs logically + from the third as much as it does from the first. In practice + it comes to this. If we are going to use concentration in its + natural sense, we must regard it as something that comes after + complete mobilisation and stops short of the formation of + mass.</p> + + <p>In naval warfare at least this distinction between + concentration and mass is essential to clear appreciation. It + leads us to conclusions that are of the first importance. For + instance, when once the mass is formed, concealment and + flexibility are at an end. The further, therefore, from the + formation of the ultimate mass we can stop the process of + concentration the better designed it will be. The less we are + committed to any particular mass, and the less we indicate what + and where our mass is to be, the more formidable our + concentration. To concentration, therefore, the idea of + division is as essential as the idea of connection. It is this + view of the process which, at least for naval warfare, a + weighty critical authority has most strongly emphasised. + "Such," he says, "is concentration reasonably + understood—not huddled together like a drove of sheep, + but distributed with a regard to a common purpose, and linked + together by the effectual energy of a single + will."<a name="NtA_12" + id="NtA_12"></a><a href="#Nt_12"><sup>12</sup></a> Vessels + in a state of concentration he compares to a fan that opens + and shuts. In this view concentration connotes not a + homogeneous body, but a compound organism controlled from a + common centre, and elastic enough to permit it to cover a + wide field without sacrificing the mutual support of its + parts.</p> + <!-- Page 132 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_132" + id="Page_132"></a>[pg 132]</span> + + <p>If, then, we exclude the meaning of mere assembling and the + meaning of the mass, we have left a signification which + expresses coherent disposal about a strategical centre, and + this it will be seen gives for naval warfare just the working + definition that we want as the counterpart of strategic + deployment on land. The object of a naval concentration like + that of strategic deployment will be to cover the widest + possible area, and to preserve at the same time elastic + cohesion, so as to secure rapid condensations of any two or + more of the parts of the organism, and in any part of the area + to be covered, at the will of the controlling mind; and above + all, a sure and rapid condensation of the whole at the + strategical centre.</p> + + <p>Concentration of this nature, moreover, will be the + expression of a war plan which, while solidly based on an + ultimate central mass, still preserves the faculty of + delivering or meeting minor attacks in any direction. It will + permit us to exercise control of the sea while we await and + work for the opportunity of a decision which shall permanently + secure control, and it will permit this without prejudicing our + ability of bringing the utmost force to bear when the moment + for the decision arrives. Concentration, in fact, implies a + continual conflict between cohesion and reach, and for + practical purposes it is the right adjustment of those two + tensions—ever shifting in force—which constitutes + the greater part of practical strategy.</p> + + <p>In naval warfare this concentration stage has a peculiar + significance in the development of a campaign, and at sea it is + more clearly detached than ashore. Owing to the vast size of + modern armies, and the restricted nature of their lines of + movement, no less than their lower intrinsic mobility as + compared with fleets, the processes of assembly, concentration, + and forming the battle mass tend to grade into one another + without any demarcation of practical value. An army frequently + reaches the stage of strategic deployment direct from + <!-- Page 133 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_133" + id="Page_133"></a>[pg 133]</span> the mobilisation bases of + its units, and on famous occasions its only real + concentration has taken place on the battlefield. In + Continental warfare, then, there is less difficulty in using + the term to cover all three processes. Their tendency is + always to overlap. But at sea, where communications are free + and unrestricted by obstacles, and where mobility is high, + they are susceptible of sharper differentiation. The normal + course is for a fleet to assemble at a naval port; thence by + a distinct movement it proceeds to the strategical centre + and reaches out in divisions as required. The concentration + about that centre may be very far from a mass, and the final + formation of the mass will bear no resemblance to either of + the previous movements, and will be quite distinct.</p> + + <p>But free as a fleet is from the special fetters of an army, + there always exist at sea peculiar conditions of friction which + clog its freedom of disposition. One source of this friction is + commerce protection. However much our war plan may press for + close concentration, the need of commerce protection will + always be calling for dispersal. The other source is the + peculiar freedom and secrecy of movements at sea. As the sea + knows no roads to limit or indicate our own lines of operation, + so it tells little about those of the enemy. The most distant + and widely dispersed points must be kept in view as possible + objectives of the enemy. When we add to this that two or more + fleets can act in conjunction from widely separated bases with + far greater certainty than is possible for armies, it is + obvious that the variety of combinations is much higher at sea + than on land, and variety of combination is in constant + opposition to the central mass.</p> + + <p>It follows that so long as the enemy's fleet is divided, and + thereby retains various possibilities of either concentrated or + sporadic action, our distribution will be dictated by the need + of being able to deal with a variety of combinations and to + protect a variety of objectives. Our concentrations must + therefore be kept as open and flexible as possible. History + <!-- Page 134 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_134" + id="Page_134"></a>[pg 134]</span> accordingly shows us that + the riper and fresher our experience and the surer our grip + of war, the looser were our concentrations. The idea of + massing, as a virtue in itself, is bred in peace and not in + war. It indicates the debilitating idea that in war we must + seek rather to avoid than to inflict defeat. True, advocates + of the mass entrench themselves in the plausible conception + that their aim is to inflict crushing defeats. But this too + is an idea of peace. War has proved to the hilt that + victories have not only to be won, but worked for. They must + be worked for by bold strategical combinations, which as a + rule entail at least apparent dispersal. They can only be + achieved by taking risks, and the greatest and most + effective of these is division.</p> + + <p>The effect of prolonged peace has been to make + "concentration" a kind of shibboleth, so that the division of a + fleet tends almost to be regarded as a sure mark of bad + leadership. Critics have come to lose sight of the old war + experience, that without division no strategical combinations + are possible. In truth they must be founded on division. + Division is bad only when it is pushed beyond the limits of + well-knit deployment. It is theoretically wrong to place a + section of the fleet in such a position that it may be + prevented from falling back on its strategical centre when it + is encountered by a superior force. Such retreats of course can + never be made certain; they will always depend in some measure + on the skill and resource of the opposing commanders, and on + the chances of weather: but risks must be taken. If we risk + nothing, we shall seldom perform anything. The great leader is + the man who can measure rightly to what breadth of deployment + he can stretch his concentration. This power of bold and sure + adjustment between cohesion and reach is indeed a supreme test + of that judgment which in the conduct of war takes the place of + strategical theory.</p> + + <p>In British naval history examples of faulty division are + hard to find. The case most commonly cited is an early one. It + <!-- Page 135 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_135" + id="Page_135"></a>[pg 135]</span> occurred in 1666 during + the second Dutch war. Monk and Rupert were in command of the + main fleet, which from its mobilisation bases in the Thames + and at Spithead had concentrated in the Downs. There they + were awaiting De Ruyter's putting to sea in a position from + which they could deal with him whether his object was an + attack on the Thames or to join hands with the French. In + this position a rumour reached them that the Toulon squadron + was on its way to the Channel to co-operate with the Dutch. + Upon this false intelligence the fleet was divided, and + Rupert went back to Portsmouth to cover that position in + case it might be the French objective. De Ruyter at once put + to sea with a fleet greatly superior to Monk's division. + Monk, however, taking advantage of thick weather that had + supervened, surprised him at + <!-- Page 136 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_136" + id="Page_136"></a>[pg 136]</span> anchor, and believing he + had a sufficient tactical advantage attacked him + impetuously. Meanwhile the real situation became known. + There was no French fleet, and Rupert was recalled. He + succeeded in rejoining Monk after his action with De Ruyter + had lasted three days. In the course of it Monk had been + very severely handled and forced to retreat to the Thames, + and it was generally believed that it was only the belated + arrival of Rupert that saved us from a real disaster.</p> + + <p>The strategy in this case is usually condemned out of hand + and made to bear the entire blame of the reverse. Monk, who as + a soldier had proved himself one of the finest strategists of + the time, is held to have blundered from sheer ignorance of + elementary principles. It is assumed that he should have kept + his fleet massed; but his critics fail to observe that at least + in the opinion of the time this would not have met the case. + Had he kept the whole to deal with De Ruyter, it is probable + that De Ruyter would not have put to sea, and it is certain + Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight would have lain open to the + French had they come. If he had moved his mass to deal with the + French, he would have exposed the Thames to De Ruyter. It was a + situation that could not be solved by a simple application of + what the French call the <i>masse centrale</i>. The only way to + secure both places from attack was to divide the fleet, just as + in 1801 Nelson in the same theatre was compelled to divide his + defence force. In neither case was division a fault, because it + was a necessity. The fault in Monk's and Rupert's case was that + they extended their reach with no proper provision to preserve + cohesion. Close cruiser connection should have been maintained + between the two divisions, and Monk should not have engaged + deeply till he felt Rupert at his elbow. This we are told was + the opinion of most of his flag-officers. They held that he + should not have fought when he + <!-- Page 137 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_137" + id="Page_137"></a>[pg 137]</span> did. His correct course, + on Kempenfelt's principle, would have been to hang on De + Ruyter so as to prevent his doing anything, and to have + slowly fallen back, drawing the Dutch after him till his + loosened concentration was closed up again. If De Ruyter had + refused to follow him through the Straits, there would have + been plenty of time to mass the fleet. If De Ruyter had + followed, he could have been fought in a position from which + there would have been no escape. The fault, in fact, was not + strategical, but rather one of tactical judgment. Monk + over-estimated the advantage of his surprise and the + relative fighting values of the two fleets, and believed he + saw his way to victory single-handed. The danger of division + is being surprised and forced to fight in inferiority. This + was not Monk's case. He was not surprised, and he could + easily have avoided action had he so desired. To judge such + a case simply by using concentration as a touchstone can + only tend to set up such questionable habits of thought as + have condemned the more famous division which occurred in + the crisis of the campaign of 1805, and with which we must + deal later.</p> + + <p>Apart from the general danger of using either words or + maxims in this way, it is obviously specially unwise in the + case of concentration and division. The current rule is that it + is bad to divide unless you have a great superiority; yet there + have been numerous occasions when, being at war with an + inferior enemy, we have found our chief embarrassment in the + fact that he kept his fleet divided, and was able thereby to + set up something like a deadlock. The main object of our naval + operations would then be to break it down. To force an inferior + enemy to concentrate is indeed the almost necessary preliminary + to securing one of those crushing victories at + <!-- Page 138 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_138" + id="Page_138"></a>[pg 138]</span> which we must always aim, + but which so seldom are obtained. It is by forcing the enemy + to attempt to concentrate that we get our opportunity by + sagacious dispersal of crushing his divisions in detail. It + is by inducing him to mass that we simplify our problem and + compel him to choose between leaving to us the exercise of + command and putting it to the decision of a great + action.</p> + + <p>Advocates of close concentration will reply that that is + true enough. We do often seek to force our enemy to + concentrate, but that does not show that concentration is + sometimes a disadvantage, for we ourselves must concentrate + closely to force a similar concentration on the enemy. The + maxim, indeed, has become current that concentration begets + concentration, but it is not too much to say that it is a maxim + which history flatly contradicts. If the enemy is willing to + hazard all on a battle, it is true. But if we are too superior, + or our concentration too well arranged for him to hope for + victory, then our concentration has almost always had the + effect of forcing him to disperse for sporadic action. So + certain was this result, that in our old wars, in which we were + usually superior, we always adopted the loosest possible + concentrations in order to prevent sporadic action. True, the + tendency of the French to adopt this mode of warfare is usually + set down to some constitutional ineptitude that is outside + strategical theory, but this view is due rather to the + irritation which the method caused us, than to sober reasoning. + For a comparatively weak belligerent sporadic action was better + than nothing, and the only other alternative was for him to + play into our hands by hazarding the decision which it was our + paramount interest to obtain. Sporadic action alone could never + give our enemy command of the sea, but it could do us injury + and embarrass our plans, and there was always hope it might so + much loosen our concentration as to give him a fair chance of + obtaining a series of successful minor decisions.</p> + + <p>Take, now, the leading case of 1805. In that campaign our + <!-- Page + 139 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_139" + id="Page_139"></a>[pg 139]</span> distribution was very + wide, and was based on several concentrations. The first had + its centre in the Downs, and extended not only athwart the + invading army's line of passage, but also over the whole + North Sea, so as to prevent interference with our trade or + our system of coast defence either from the Dutch in the + Texel or from French squadrons arriving north-about. The + second, which was known as the Western Squadron, had its + centre off Ushant, and was spread over the whole Bay of + Biscay by means of advanced squadrons before Ferrol and + Rochefort. With a further squadron off the coast of Ireland, + it was able also to reach far out into the Atlantic in order + to receive our trade. It kept guard, in fact, not only over + the French naval ports, but over the approaches to the + Channel, where were the home terminals of the great southern + and western trade-routes. A third concentration was in the + Mediterranean, whose centre under Nelson was at Sardinia. It + had outlying sub-centres at Malta and Gibraltar, and covered + the whole ground from Cape St. Vincent outside the Straits + to Toulon, Trieste, and the Dardanelles. When war broke out + with Spain in 1804, it was considered advisable to divide + this command, and Spanish waters outside the Straits were + held by a fourth concentration, whose centre was off Cadiz, + and whose northern limit was Cape Finisterre, where it + joined the Ushant concentration. For reasons which were + personal rather than strategical this arrangement was not + continued long, nor indeed after a few months was there the + same need for it, for the Toulon squadron had changed its + base to Cadiz. By this comprehensive system the whole of the + <!-- Page 140 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_140" + id="Page_140"></a>[pg 140]</span> European seas were + controlled both for military and trade purposes. In the + distant terminal areas, like the East and West Indies, there + were nucleus concentrations with the necessary connective + machinery permanently established, and to render them + effective, provision was made by which the various European + squadrons could throw off detachments to bring up their + force to any strength which the movements of the enemy might + render necessary.</p> + + <p>Wide as was this distribution, and great as its reach, a + high degree of cohesion was maintained not only between the + parts of each concentration, but between the several + concentrations themselves. By means of a minor cruiser centre + at the Channel Islands, the Downs and Ushant concentrations + could rapidly cohere. Similarly the Cadiz concentration was + linked up with that of Ushant at Finisterre, and but for + personal friction and repulsion, the cohesion between the + Mediterranean and Cadiz concentrations would have been equally + strong. Finally, there was a masterly provision made for all + the concentrations to condense into one great mass at the + crucial point off Ushant before by any calculable chance a + hostile mass could gather there.</p> + + <p>For Napoleon's best admirals, "who knew the craft of the + sea," the British fleet thus disposed was in a state of + concentration that nothing but a stroke of luck beyond the + limit of sober calculation could break. Decrès and Bruix + had no doubt of it, and the knowledge overpowered Villeneuve + <!-- Page 141 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_141" + id="Page_141"></a>[pg 141]</span> when the crisis came. + After he had carried the concentration which Napoleon had + planned so far as to have united three divisions in Ferrol, + he knew that the outlying sections of our Western Squadron + had disappeared from before Ferrol and Rochefort. In his + eyes, as well as those of the British Admiralty, this + squadron, in spite of its dispersal in the Bay of Biscay, + had always been in a state of concentration. It was not this + which caused his heart to fail. It was the news that Nelson + had reappeared at Gibraltar, and had been seen steering + northward. It meant for him that the whole of his enemy's + European fleet was in a state of concentration. "Their + concentration of force," he afterwards wrote, "was at the + moment more serious than in any previous disposition, and + such that they were in a position to meet in superiority the + combined forces of Brest and Ferrol," and for that reason, + he explained, he had given up the game as lost. But to + Napoleon's unpractised eye it was impossible to see what it + was he had to deal with. Measuring the elasticity of the + British naval distribution by the comparatively cumbrous and + restricted mobility of armies, he saw it as a rash and + unwarlike dispersal. Its looseness seemed to indicate so + great a tenderness for the distant objectives that lay open + to his scattered squadrons, that he believed by a show of + sporadic action he could further disperse our fleet, and + then by a close concentration crush the essential part in + detail. It was a clear case of the enemy's dispersal forcing + us to adopt the loosest concentration, and of our + comparative dispersal tempting the enemy to concentrate and + hazard a decision. It cannot be said we forced the fatal + move upon him intentionally. It was rather the operation of + strategical law set in motion by our bold distribution. We + were determined that his threat of invasion, formidable as + it was, should not force upon us so close a concentration as + to leave our widespread interests open to his attack. + Neither can it be said that our first aim was to prevent + <!-- Page 142 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_142" + id="Page_142"></a>[pg 142]</span> his attempting to + concentrate. Every one of his naval ports was watched by a + squadron, but it was recognised that this would not prevent + concentration. The escape of one division might well break + the chain. But that consideration made no difference. The + distribution of our squadrons before his naval ports was + essential for preventing sporadic action. Their distribution + was dictated sufficiently by the defence of commerce and of + colonial and allied territory, by our need, that is, to + exercise a general command even if we could not destroy the + enemy's force.</p> + + <p>The whole of Nelson's correspondence for this period shows + that his main object was the protection of our Mediterranean + trade and of Neapolitan and Turkish territory. When Villeneuve + escaped him, his irritation was caused not by the prospect of a + French concentration, which had no anxieties for him, for he + knew counter-concentrations were provided for. It was caused + rather by his having lost the opportunity which the attempt to + concentrate had placed within his reach. He followed Villeneuve + to the West Indies, not to prevent concentration, but, firstly, + to protect the local trade and Jamaica, and secondly, in hope + of another chance of dealing the blow he had missed. Lord + Barham took precisely the same view. When on news of + Villeneuve's return from the West Indies he moved out the three + divisions of the Western Squadron, that is, the Ushant + concentration, to meet him, he expressly stated, not that his + object was to prevent concentration, but that it was to deter + the French from attempting sporadic action. "The interception + of the fleet in question," he wrote, "on its return to Europe + would be a greater object than any I know. It would damp all + future expeditions, and would show to Europe that it might be + advisable to relax in the blockading system occasionally for + the express purpose of putting them in our hands at a + convenient opportunity."</p> + <!-- Page 143 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_143" + id="Page_143"></a>[pg 143]</span> + + <p>Indeed we had no reason for preventing the enemy's + concentration. It was our best chance of solving effectually + the situation we have to confront. Our true policy was to + secure permanent command by a great naval decision. So long as + the enemy remained divided, no such decision could be expected. + It was not, in fact, till he attempted his concentration, and + its last stage had been reached, that the situation was in our + hands. The intricate problem with which we had been struggling + was simplified down to closing up our own concentration to the + strategical centre off Ushant. But at the last stage the enemy + could not face the formidable position we held. His + concentration was stopped. Villeneuve fell back on Cadiz, and + the problem began to assume for us something of its former + intricacy. So long as we held the mass off Ushant which our + great concentration had produced, we were safe from invasion. + But that was not enough. It left the seas open to sporadic + action from Spanish ports. There were convoys from the East and + West Indies at hand, and there was our expedition in the + Mediterranean in jeopardy, and another on the point of sailing + from Cork. Neither Barham at the Admiralty nor Cornwallis in + command off Ushant hesitated an hour. By a simultaneous + induction they both decided the mass must be divided. The + concentration must be opened out again, and it was done. + Napoleon called the move an <i>insigne betise</i>, but it was + the move that beat him, and must have beaten him, whatever the + skill of his admirals, for the two squadrons never lost touch. + He found himself caught in a situation from which there was + nothing to hope. His fleet was neither concentrated for a + decisive blow nor spread for sporadic action. He had merely + simplified his enemy's problem. Our hold was surer than ever, + and in a desperate attempt to extricate himself he was forced + to expose his fleet to the final decision we required.</p> + <!-- Page 144 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_144" + id="Page_144"></a>[pg 144]</span> + + <p>The whole campaign serves well to show what was understood + by concentration at the end of the great naval wars. To Lord + Barham and the able admirals who interpreted his plans it meant + the possibility of massing at the right time and place. It + meant, in close analogy to strategic deployment on land, the + disposal of squadrons about a strategical centre from which + fleets could condense for massed action in any required + direction, and upon which they could fall back when unduly + pressed. In this case the ultimate centre was the narrows of + the Channel, where Napoleon's army lay ready to cross, but + there was no massing there. So crude a distribution would have + meant a purely defensive attitude. It would have meant waiting + to be struck instead of seeking to strike, and such an attitude + was arch-heresy to our old masters of war.</p> + + <p>So far we have only considered concentration as applied to + wars in which we have a preponderance of naval force, but the + principles are at least equally valid when a coalition places + us in inferiority. The leading case is the home campaign of + 1782. It was strictly on defensive lines. Our information was + that France and Spain intended to end the war with a great + combined effort against our West Indian islands, and + particularly Jamaica. It was recognised that the way to meet + the threat was to concentrate for offensive action in the + Caribbean Sea everything that was not absolutely needed for + home defence. Instead, therefore, of trying to be strong enough + to attempt the offensive in both areas, it was decided to make + sure of the area that was most critical. To do this the home + fleet had to be reduced so low relatively to what the enemy had + in European waters that offence was out of the question.</p> + + <p>While Rodney took the offensive area, Lord Howe was + <!-- Page 145 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_145" + id="Page_145"></a>[pg 145]</span> given the other. His task + was to prevent the coalition obtaining such a command of + home waters as would place our trade and coasts at their + mercy, and it was not likely to prove a light one. We knew + that the enemy's plan was to combine their attack on the + West Indies with an attempt to control the North Sea, and + possibly the Straits of Dover, with a Dutch squadron of + twelve to fifteen of the line, while a combined + Franco-Spanish fleet of at least forty sail would occupy the + mouth of the Channel. It was also possible that these two + forces would endeavour to form a junction. In any case the + object of the joint operations would be to paralyse our + trade and annoy our coasts, and thereby force us to neglect + the West Indian area and the two Spanish objectives, Minorca + and Gibraltar. All told we had only about thirty of the line + on the home station, and though a large proportion of these + were three-deckers, a good many could not be ready for sea + till the summer.</p> + + <p>Inferior as was the available force, there was no thought of + a purely passive defence. It would not meet the case. Something + must be done to interfere with the offensive operations of the + allies in the West Indies and against Gibraltar, or they would + attain the object of their home campaign. It was resolved to + effect this by minor counterstrokes on their line of + communications to the utmost limit of our defensive reach. It + would mean a considerable stretch of our concentration, but we + were determined to do what we could to prevent reinforcements + from reaching the West Indies from Brest, to intercept + <!-- Page 146 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_146" + id="Page_146"></a>[pg 146]</span> French trade as occasion + offered, and, finally, at almost any risk to relieve + Gibraltar.</p> + + <p>In these conditions the defensive concentration was based on + a central mass or reserve at Spithead, a squadron in the Downs + to watch the Texel for the safety of the North Sea trade, and + another to the westward to watch Brest and interrupt its + transatlantic communications. Kempenfelt in command of the + latter squadron had just shown what could be done by his great + exploit of capturing Guichen's convoy of military and naval + stores for the West Indies. Early in the spring he was relieved + by Barrington, who sailed on April 5th to resume the Ushant + position. His instructions were not to fight a superior enemy + unless in favourable circumstances, but to retire on Spithead. + He was away three weeks, and returned with a French East India + convoy with troops and stores, and two of the ships of-the-line + which formed its escort.</p> + + <p>Up to this time there had been no immediate sign of the + great movement from the south. The Franco-Spanish fleet which + had assembled at Cadiz was occupied ineffectually in trying to + stop small reliefs reaching Gibraltar and in covering their own + homeward-bound trade. The Dutch, however, <!-- + Page 147 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_147" + id="Page_147"></a>[pg 147]</span> were becoming active, and + the season was approaching for our Baltic trade to come + home. Ross in the North Sea had but four of the line to + watch the Texel, and was in no position to deal with the + danger. Accordingly early in May the weight of the home + concentration was thrown into the North Sea. On the 10th + Howe sailed with Barrington and the bulk of the fleet to + join Ross in the Downs, while Kempenfelt again took the + Ushant position. Only about half the Brest Squadron had gone + down to join the Spaniards at Cadiz, and he was told his + first duty was to intercept the rest if it put to sea, but, + as in Barrington's instructions, if he met a superior + squadron he was to retire up Channel under the English coast + and join hands with Howe. In spite of the fact that + influenza was now raging in the fleet, he succeeded in + holding the French inactive. Howe with the same difficulty + to face was equally successful. The Dutch had put to sea, + but returned immediately they knew of his movement, and + cruising off the Texel, he held them there, and kept + complete command of the North Sea till our Baltic trade was + safe home.</p> + + <p>By the end of May it was done, and as our intelligence + indicated that the great movement from Cadiz was at last about + to begin, Howe, to whom a certain discretion had been left, + decided it was time to shift the weight to his other wing and + close on Kempenfelt. The Government, however, seemed to think + that he ought to be able to use his position for offensive + operations against Dutch trade, but in the admiral's opinion + this was to lose hold of the design and sacrifice cohesion too + much to reach. He informed them that he had not deemed it + advisable to make detachments from his squadron against the + trade, "not knowing how suddenly there might be + <!-- Page 148 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_148" + id="Page_148"></a>[pg 148]</span> a call, for the greater + part of it at least, to the westward." In accordance, + therefore, with his general instructions he left with Ross a + strong squadron of nine of the line, sufficient to hold in + check, and even "to take and destroy," the comparatively + weak ships of the Dutch, and with the rest returned to the + westward.<a name="NtA_13" + id="NtA_13"></a><a href="#Nt_13"><sup>13</sup></a> His + intention was to proceed with all possible expedition to + join Kempenfelt on the coast of France, but this, owing to + the ravages of the influenza, he was unable to do. + Kempenfelt was forced to come in, and on June 5th the + junction was made at Spithead.</p> + + <p>For three weeks, so severe was the epidemic, they could not + move. Then came news that the Cadiz fleet under Langara had + sailed the day Howe had reached Spithead, and he resolved to + make a dash with every ship fit to put to sea to cut it off + from Brest. He was too late. Before he could get into position + the junction between Langara and the Brest squadron was made, + and in their full force the allies had occupied the mouth of + the Channel. With the addition of the Brest ships the combined + fleet numbered forty of the line, while all + <!-- Page 149 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_149" + id="Page_149"></a>[pg 149]</span> Howe could muster was + twenty-two, but amongst them were seven three-deckers and + three eighties, and he would soon be reinforced. Three of + Ross's smallest ships were recalled, and five others were + nearly ready, but for these Howe could not wait. The + homeward-bound Jamaica convoy was at hand, and at all + hazards it must be saved.</p> + + <p>What was to be done? So soon as he sighted the enemy he + realised that a successful action was out of the question. + Early in the morning of July 12th, "being fifteen leagues + S.S.E. from Scilly," Langara with thirty-six of the line was + seen to the westward. "As soon," wrote Howe, "as their force + had been ascertained, I thought proper to avoid coming to + battle with them as then circumstanced, and therefore steered + to the north to pass between Scilly and the Land's End. My + purpose therein was to get to the westward of the enemy, both + for protecting the Jamaica convoy and to gain the advantage of + situation for bringing them to action which the difference in + our numbers renders desirable."</p> + + <p>By a most brilliant effort of seamanship the dangerous + movement was effected safely that night, and it proved an + entire success. Till Howe was met with and defeated, the allies + would not venture into the Channel, and his unprecedented feat + had effectually thrown them off. Assuming apparently that he + must have passed round their rear to seaward, they sought him + to the southward, and there for a month beat up and down in + ineffective search. Meanwhile Howe, sending his cruisers ahead + to the convoy's rendezvous off the south-west coast of Iceland, + had taken his whole fleet + <!-- Page 150 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_150" + id="Page_150"></a>[pg 150]</span> about two hundred miles + west of the Skelligs to meet it. Northerly winds prevented + his reaching the right latitude in time, but it mattered + little. The convoy passed in between him and the south of + Ireland, and as the enemy had taken a cast down to Ushant, + it was able to enter the Channel in safety without sighting + an enemy's sail. Ignorant of what had happened, Howe cruised + for a week practising the ships "in connected movements so + particularly necessary on the present occasion." Then with + his fleet in fine condition to carry out preventive tactics + in accordance with Kempenfelt's well-known + exposition,<a name="NtA_14" + id="NtA_14"></a><a href="#Nt_14"><sup>14</sup></a> he + returned to seek the enemy to the eastward, in order to try + to draw them from their station at Scilly and open the + Channel. On his way he learnt the convoy had passed in, and + with this anxiety off his mind he bore up for the Lizard, + where his reinforcements were awaiting him. There he found + the Channel was free. From lack of supplies the enemy had + been forced to retire to port, and he returned to Spithead + to make preparations for the relief of Gibraltar. While this + work was going on, the North Sea squadron was again + strengthened that it might resume the blockade of the Texel + and cover the arrival of the autumn convoys from the Baltic. + It was done with complete success. Not a single ship fell + into the enemy's hands, and the campaign, and indeed the + war, ended by Howe taking the mass of his force down to + Gibraltar and performing his remarkable feat of relieving it + in the face of the Spanish squadron. For the power and reach + of a well-designed concentration there can be no finer + example.</p> + <!-- Page 151 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_151" + id="Page_151"></a>[pg 151]</span> + + <p>If, now, we seek from the above and similar examples for + principles to serve as a guide between concentration and + division we shall find, firstly, this one. The degree of + division we shall require is in proportion to the number of + naval ports from which the enemy can act against our maritime + interests and to the extent of coastline along which they are + spread. It is a principle which springs from the soul of our + old tradition that we must always seek, not merely to prevent + the enemy striking at our heart, but also to strike him the + moment he attempts to do anything. We must make of his every + attempt an opportunity for a counterstroke. The distribution + this aim entailed varied greatly with different enemies. In our + wars with France, and particularly when Spain and Holland were + in alliance with her, the number of the ports to be dealt with + was very considerable and their distribution very wide. In our + wars with the Dutch alone, on the other hand, the number and + distribution were comparatively small, and in this case our + concentration was always close.</p> + + <p>This measure of distribution, however, will never stand + alone. Concentration will not depend solely upon the number and + position of the enemy's naval ports. It will be modified by the + extent to which the lines of operation starting from those + ports traverse our own home waters. The reason is plain. + Whatever the enemy opposed to us, and whatever the nature of + the war, we must always keep a fleet at home. In any + circumstances it is essential for the defence of our home trade + terminals, and it is essential as a central reserve from which + divisions can be thrown off to reinforce distant terminals and + to seize opportunities for counterstrokes. It is "the + mainspring," as Lord Barham put it, "from which all offensive + operations must proceed." This squadron, then, being permanent + and fixed as the foundation of our whole system, it is clear + that if, as in the case of the French wars, the enemy's lines + of operation do not traverse our home waters, close + concentration upon it will not serve our turn. If, on the + <!-- Page 152 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_152" + id="Page_152"></a>[pg 152]</span> other hand, as in the case + of the Dutch wars, the lines do traverse home waters, a home + concentration is all that is required. Our division will + then be measured by the amount of our surplus strength, and + by the extent to which we feel able to detach squadrons for + offensive action against the enemy's distant maritime + interests without prejudicing our hold on the home terminals + of his lines of operation and our power of striking directly + he moves. These remarks apply, of course, to the main fleet + operations. If such an enemy has distant colonial bases from + which he can annoy our trade, minor concentrations must + naturally be arranged in those areas.</p> + + <p>Next we have to note that where the enemy's squadrons are + widely distributed in numerous bases, we cannot always simplify + the problem by leaving some of them open so as to entice him to + concentrate and reduce the number of ports to be watched. For + if we do this, we leave the unwatched squadrons free for + sporadic action. Unless we are sure he intends to concentrate + with a view to a decisive action, our only means of simplifying + the situation is to watch every port closely enough to + interfere effectually with sporadic action. Then, sporadic + action being denied him, the enemy must either do nothing or + concentrate.</p> + + <p>The next principle is flexibility. Concentration should be + so arranged that any two parts may freely cohere, and that all + parts may quickly condense into a mass at any point in the area + of concentration. The object of holding back from forming the + mass is to deny the enemy knowledge of our actual distribution + or its intention at any given moment, and at the same time to + ensure that it will be adjusted to meet any dangerous movement + that is open to him. Further than this our aim should be not + merely to prevent any part being overpowered by a superior + force, but to regard every detached squadron as a trap to lure + the enemy to destruction. The ideal concentration, in short, is + an appearance of weakness that covers a reality of + strength.</p><!-- Page 153 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_153" + id="Page_153"></a>[pg 153]</span> + <hr /> + + <h2>PART THREE</h2> + <hr /> + + <h1>CONDUCT<br /> + OF<br /> + NAVAL WAR</h1><!-- Page 154 blank --> + <!-- Page 155 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_155" + id="Page_155"></a>[pg 155]</span> + <hr /> + + <h3>CHAPTER ONE</h3> + <hr /> + + <h2>INTRODUCTORY</h2> + <hr /> + + <h3>I. INHERENT DIFFERENCES IN THE<br /> + CONDITIONS OF WAR ON LAND AND ON SEA</h3> + + <p>Before attempting to apply the foregoing general principles + in a definite manner to the conduct of naval war, it is + necessary to clear the ground of certain obstacles to right + judgment. The gradual elucidation of the theory of war, it must + be remembered, has been almost entirely the work of soldiers, + but so admirable is the work they have done, and so + philosophical the method they have adopted, that a very natural + tendency has arisen to assume that their broad-based + conclusions are of universal application. That the leading + lines which they have charted are in a certain sense those + which must govern all strategy no one will deny. They are the + real pioneers, and their methods must be in the main our + methods, but what we have to remember is that the country we + have to travel is radically different from that in which they + acquired their skill.</p> + + <p>A moment's consideration will reveal how far-reaching the + differences are. Let us ask ourselves what are the main ideas + around which all the military lore turns. It may be taken + broadly that the general principles are three in number. + Firstly, there is the idea of concentration of force, that is, + the idea of overthrowing the enemy's main strength by bringing + <!-- Page 156 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_156" + id="Page_156"></a>[pg 156]</span> to bear upon it the utmost + accumulation of weight and energy within your means; + secondly, there is the idea that strategy is mainly a + question of definite lines of communication; and thirdly, + there is the idea of concentration of effort, which means + keeping a single eye on the force you wish to overthrow + without regard to ulterior objects. Now if we examine the + conditions which give these principles so firm a footing on + land, we shall find that in all three cases they differ at + sea, and differ materially.</p> + + <p>Take the first, which, in spite of all the deductions we + have to make from it in the case of limited wars, is the + dominating one. The pithy maxim which expresses its essence is + that our primary objective is the enemy's main force. In + current naval literature the maxim is applied to the sea in + some such form as this: "The primary object of our battle-fleet + is to seek out and destroy that of the enemy." On the surface + nothing could look sounder, but what are the conditions which + underlie the one and the other?</p> + + <p>The practical value of the military maxim is based upon the + fact that in land warfare it is always theoretically possible + to strike at your enemy's army, that is, if you have the + strength and spirit to overcome the obstacles and face the + risks. But at sea this is not so. In naval warfare we have a + far-reaching fact which is entirely unknown on land. It is + simply this—that it is possible for your enemy to remove + his fleet from the board altogether. He may withdraw it into a + defended port, where it is absolutely out of your reach without + the assistance of an army. No amount of naval force, and no + amount of offensive spirit, can avail you. The result is that + in naval warfare an embarrassing dilemma tends to assert + itself. If you are in a superiority that justifies a vigorous + offensive and prompts you to seek out your enemy with a view to + a decision, the chances are you will find him in a position + where you cannot touch him. Your offence is arrested, and + <!-- Page 157 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_157" + id="Page_157"></a>[pg 157]</span> you find yourself in what, + at least theoretically, is the weakest general position + known to war.</p> + + <p>This was one of our earliest discoveries in strategy. It + followed indeed immediately and inevitably upon our discovery + that the most drastic way of making war was to concentrate + every effort on the enemy's armed forces. In dealing with the + theory of war in general a caveat has already been entered + against the too common assumption that this method was an + invention of Napoleon's or Frederick's, or that it was a + foreign importation at all. In the view at least of our own + military historians the idea was born in our Civil Wars with + Cromwell and the New Model Army. It was the conspicuous feature + that distinguished our Civil War from all previous wars of + modern times. So astonishing was its success—as foreign + observers remarked—that it was naturally applied by our + soldier-admirals at sea so soon as war broke out with the + Dutch. Whatever may be the claims of the Cromwellian soldiers + to have invented for land warfare what is regarded abroad as + the chief characteristic of the Napoleonic method, it is beyond + doubt that they deserve the credit of it at sea. All three + Dutch wars had a commercial object, and yet after the first + campaign the general idea never was to make the enemy's + commerce a primary objective. That place was occupied + throughout by their battle-fleets, and under Monk and Rupert at + least those objectives were pursued with a singleness of + purpose and a persistent vehemence that was entirely + Napoleonic.</p> + + <p>But in the later stages of the struggle, when we began to + gain a preponderance, it was found that the method ceased to + <!-- Page 158 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_158" + id="Page_158"></a>[pg 158]</span> work. The attempt to seek + the enemy with a view to a decisive action was again and + again frustrated by his retiring to his own coasts, where + either we could not reach him or his facilities for retreat + made a decisive result impossible. He assumed, in fact, a + defensive attitude with which we were powerless to deal, and + in the true spirit of defence he sprang out from time to + time to deal us a counterstroke as he saw his + opportunity.</p> + + <p>It was soon perceived that the only way of dealing with this + attitude was to adopt some means of forcing the enemy to sea + and compelling him to expose himself to the decision we sought. + The most cogent means at hand was to threaten his commerce. + Instead, therefore, of attempting to seek out his fleet + directly, our own would sit upon the fairway of his + homeward-bound trade, either on the Dogger Bank or elsewhere, + thereby setting up a situation which it was hoped would cost + him either his trade or his battle-fleet, or possibly both. + Thus in spite of the fact that with our increasing + preponderance our preoccupation with the idea of battle + decision had become stronger than ever, we found ourselves + forced to fall back upon subsidiary operations of an ulterior + strategical character. It is a curious paradox, but it is one + that seems inherent in the special feature of naval war, which + permits the armed force to be removed from the board + altogether.</p> + + <p>The second distinguishing characteristic of naval warfare + which relates to the communication idea is not so well marked, + but it is scarcely less important. It will be recalled that + this characteristic is concerned with lines of communication in + so far as they tend to determine lines of operation. It is a + simple question of roads and obstacles. In land warfare we can + determine with some precision the limits and direction of our + enemy's possible movements. We know that they must be + determined mainly by roads and obstacles. But afloat neither + roads nor obstacles exist. There is nothing of the kind on the + <!-- Page 159 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_159" + id="Page_159"></a>[pg 159]</span> face of the sea to assist + us in locating him and determining his movements. True it is + that in sailing days his movements were to some extent + limited by prevailing winds and by the elimination of + impossible courses, but with steam even these determinants + have gone, and there is practically nothing to limit the + freedom of his movement except the exigencies of fuel. + Consequently in seeking to strike our enemy the liability to + miss him is much greater at sea than on land, and the + chances of being eluded by the enemy whom we are seeking to + bring to battle become so serious a check upon our offensive + action as to compel us to handle the maxim of "Seeking out + the enemy's fleet" with caution.</p> + + <p>The difficulty obtruded itself from the moment the idea was + born. It may be traced back—so far at least as modern + warfare is concerned—to Sir Francis Drake's famous + appreciation in the year of the Armada. This memorable despatch + was written when an acute difference of opinion had arisen as + to whether it were better to hold our fleet back in home waters + or to send it forward to the coast of Spain. The enemy's + objective was very uncertain. We could not tell whether the + blow was to fall in the Channel or Ireland or Scotland, and the + situation was complicated by a Spanish army of invasion ready + to cross from the Flemish coast, and the possibility of + combined action by the Guises from France. Drake was for + solving the problem by taking station off the Armada's port of + departure, and fully aware of the risk such a move entailed, he + fortified his purely strategical reasons with moral + considerations of the highest moment. But the Government was + unconvinced, not as is usually assumed out of sheer + <!-- Page 160 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_160" + id="Page_160"></a>[pg 160]</span> pusillanimity and lack of + strategical insight, but because the chances of Drake's + missing contact were too great if the Armada should sail + before our own fleet could get into position.</p> + + <p>Our third elementary principle is the idea of concentration + of effort, and the third characteristic of naval warfare which + clashes with it is that over and above the duty of winning + battles, fleets are charged with the duty of protecting + commerce. In land warfare, at least since laying waste an + undefended part of your enemy's country ceased to be a + recognised strategical operation, there is no corresponding + deflection of purely military operations. It is idle for + purists to tell us that the deflection of commerce protection + should not be permitted to turn us from our main purpose. We + have to do with the hard facts of war, and experience tells us + that for economic reasons alone, apart from the pressure of + public opinion, no one has ever found it possible to ignore the + deflection entirely. So vital indeed is financial vigour in + war, that more often than not the maintenance of the flow of + trade has been felt as a paramount consideration. Even in the + best days of our Dutch wars, when the whole plan was based on + ignoring the enemy's commerce as an objective, we found + ourselves at times forced to protect our own trade with + seriously disturbing results.</p> + + <p>Nor is it more profitable to declare that the only sound way + to protect your commerce is to destroy the enemy's fleet. As an + enunciation of a principle it is a truism—no one would + dispute it. As a canon of practical strategy, it is untrue; for + here our first deflection again asserts itself. What are you to + do if the enemy refuses to permit you to destroy his fleets? + You cannot leave your trade exposed to squadronal or cruiser + raids while you await your opportunity, and the more you + concentrate your force and efforts to secure the desired + decision, the more you will expose your trade to sporadic + attack. The result is that you are not always free to adopt the + plan which is best calculated to bring your enemy to a + decision. + <!-- Page 161 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_161" + id="Page_161"></a>[pg 161]</span> You may find yourself + compelled to occupy, not the best positions, but those which + will give a fair chance of getting contact in favourable + conditions, and at the same time afford reasonable cover for + your trade. Hence the maxim that the enemy's coast should be + our frontier. It is not a purely military maxim like that + for seeking out the enemy's fleet, though the two are often + used as though they were interchangeable. Our usual + positions on the enemy's coast were dictated quite as much + by the exigencies of commerce protection as by primary + strategical reasons. To maintain a rigorous watch close off + the enemy's ports was never the likeliest way to bring him + to decisive action—we have Nelson's well-known + declaration on the point—but it was the best way, and + often the only way, to keep the sea clear for the passage of + our own trade and for the operations of our cruisers against + that of the enemy.</p> + + <p>For the present these all-important points need not be + elaborated further. As we proceed to deal with the methods of + naval warfare they will gather force and lucidity. Enough has + been said to mark the shoals and warn us that, admirably + constructed as is the craft which the military strategists have + provided for our use, we must be careful with our + navigation.</p> + + <p>But before proceeding further it is necessary to simplify + what lies before us by endeavouring to group the complex + variety of naval operations into manageable shape.</p> + + <h3>II. TYPICAL FORMS OF NAVAL OPERATIONS</h3> + + <p>In the conduct of naval war all operations will be found to + relate to two broad classes of object. The one is to obtain or + dispute the command of the sea, and the other to exercise such + control of communications as we have, whether the complete + command has been secured or not.</p> + + <p>It was on the logical and practical distinction between + <!-- Page 162 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_162" + id="Page_162"></a>[pg 162]</span> these two kinds of naval + object, as we have seen, that the constitution of fleets was + based in the fulness of the sailing period, when maritime + wars were nearly incessant and were shaping the existing + distribution of power in the world. During that period at + any rate the dual conception lay at the root of naval + methods and naval policy, and as it is also the logical + outcome of the theory of war, we may safely take it as the + basis of our analysis of the conduct of naval + operations.</p> + + <p>Practically, of course, we can seldom assert categorically + that any operation of war has but one clearly defined object. A + battle-squadron whose primary function was to secure command + was often so placed as to enable it to exercise control; and, + <i>vice versa</i>, cruiser lines intended primarily to exercise + control upon the trade routes were regarded as outposts of the + battle-fleet to give it warning of the movements of hostile + squadrons. Thus Cornwallis during his blockade of Brest had + sometimes to loosen his hold in order to cover the arrival of + convoys against raiding squadrons; and thus also when Nelson + was asked by Lord Barham for his views on cruiser patrol lines, + he expressed himself as follows: "Ships on this service would + not only prevent the depredations of privateers, but be in the + way to watch any squadron of the enemy should they pass on + their track.... Therefore intelligence will be quickly + conveyed, and the enemy never, I think, lost sight + of."<a name="NtA_15" + id="NtA_15"></a><a href="#Nt_15"><sup>15</sup></a> + Instructions in this sense were issued by + <!-- Page 163 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_163" + id="Page_163"></a>[pg 163]</span> Lord Barham to the + commodores concerned. In both cases, it will be seen, the + two classes of operation overlapped. Still for purposes of + analysis the distinction holds good, and is valuable for + obtaining a clear view of the field.</p> + + <p>Take, first, the methods of securing command, by which we + mean putting it out of the enemy's power to use effectually the + common communications or materially to interfere with our use + of them. We find the means employed were two: decision by + battle, and blockade. Of the two, the first was the less + frequently attainable, but it was the one the British service + always preferred. It was only natural that it should be so, + seeing that our normal position was one of preponderance over + our enemy, and so long as the policy of preponderance is + maintained, the chances are the preference will also be + maintained.</p> + + <p>But further than this, the idea seems to be rooted in the + oldest traditions of the Royal Navy. As we have seen, the + conviction of the sea service that war is primarily a question + of battles, and that battles once joined on anything like equal + terms must be pressed to the last gasp, is one that has had + nothing to learn from more recent continental discoveries. The + Cromwellian admirals handed down to us the memory of battles + lasting three, and even four, days. Their creed is enshrined in + the robust article of war under which Byng and Calder were + condemned; and in the apotheosis of Nelson the service has + deified the battle idea.</p> + <!-- Page 164 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_164" + id="Page_164"></a>[pg 164]</span> + + <p>It is true there were periods when the idea seemed to have + lost its colour, but nevertheless it is so firmly embedded in + the British conception of naval warfare, that there would be + nothing left to say but for the unavoidable modification with + which we have to temper the doctrine of overthrow. "Use that + means," said its best-known advocate, "when you can and when + you must." Devoutly as we may hold the battle faith, it is not + always possible or wise to act upon it. If we are strong, we + press to the issue of battle when we can. If we are weak, we do + not accept the issue unless we must. If circumstances are + advantageous to us, we are not always able to effect a + decision; and if they are disadvantageous, we are not always + obliged to fight. Hence we find the apparently simple doctrine + of the battle was almost always entangled in two of the most + difficult problems that beset our old admirals. The most thorny + questions they had to decide were these. In the normal case of + strength, it was not how to defeat the enemy, but how to bring + him to action; and in casual cases of temporary weakness, it + was not how to sell your life dearly, but how to maintain the + fleet actively on the defensive so as at once to deny the enemy + the decision he sought and to prevent his attaining his + ulterior object.</p> + + <p>From these considerations it follows that we are able to + group all naval operations in some such way as this. Firstly, + on the only assumption we can permit ourselves, namely, that we + start with a preponderance of force or advantage, we adopt + methods for securing command. These methods, again, fall under + two heads. Firstly, there are operations for securing a + decision by battle, under which head, as has been explained, we + shall be chiefly concerned with methods of bringing an + unwilling enemy to action, and with the value to that end of + the maxim of "Seeking out the enemy's fleet." + <!-- Page 165 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_165" + id="Page_165"></a>[pg 165]</span> Secondly, there are the + operations which become necessary when no decision is + obtainable and our war plan demands the immediate control of + communications. Under this head it will be convenient to + treat all forms of blockade, whether military or commercial, + although, as we shall see, certain forms of military, and + even commercial, blockade are primarily concerned with + forcing the enemy to a decision.</p> + + <p>Our second main group covers operations to which we have to + resort when our relative strength is not adequate for either + class of operations to secure command. In these conditions we + have to content ourselves with endeavouring to hold the command + in dispute; that is, we endeavour by active defensive + operations to prevent the enemy either securing or exercising + control for the objects he has in view. Such are the operations + which are connoted by the true conception of "A fleet in + being." Under this head also should fall those new forms of + minor counter-attack which have entered the field of strategy + since the introduction of the mobile torpedo and offensive + mining.</p> + + <p>In the third main group we have to deal with the methods of + exercising control of passage and communication. These + operations vary in character according to the several purposes + for which the control is desired, and they will be found to + take one of three general forms. Firstly, the control of the + lines of passage of an invading army; secondly, the control of + trade routes and trade terminals for the attack and defence of + commerce; and thirdly, the control of passage and communication + for our own oversea expeditions, and the control of their + objective area for the active support of their operations.</p> + + <p>For clearness we may summarise the whole in tabulated + analysis, thus:—</p> + + <div class="noflo"> + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>1. Methods of securing command:</p> + + <p class="i2">(<i>a</i>) By obtaining a decision.</p> + + <p class="i2">(<i>b</i>) By blockade.</p> + <!-- Page 166 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_166" + id="Page_166"></a>[pg 166]</span> + + <p>2. Methods of disputing command:</p> + + <p class="i2">(<i>a</i>) Principle of "the fleet in + being."</p> + + <p class="i2">(<i>b</i>) Minor counter-attacks.</p> + + <p>3. Methods of exercising command:</p> + + <p class="i2">(<i>a</i>) Defence against invasion.</p> + + <p class="i2">(<i>b</i>) Attack and defence of + commerce.</p> + + <p class="i2">(<i>c</i>) Attack, defence, and support + of military expeditions.</p> + </div> + </div><!-- Page 167 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_167" + id="Page_167"></a>[pg 167]</span> + <hr /> + + <h3>CHAPTER TWO</h3> + <hr /> + + <h2>METHODS OF<br /> + SECURING COMMAND</h2> + <hr /> + + <h3>I. ON OBTAINING A DECISION</h3> + + <p>Whatever the nature of the war in which we are engaged, + whether it be limited or unlimited, permanent and general + command of the sea is the condition of ultimate success. The + only way of securing such a command by naval means is to obtain + a decision by battle against the enemy's fleet. Sooner or later + it must be done, and the sooner the better. That was the old + British creed. It is still our creed, and needs no labouring. + No one will dispute it, no one will care even to discuss it, + and we pass with confidence to the conclusion that the first + business of our fleet is to seek out the enemy's fleet and + destroy it.</p> + + <p>No maxim can so well embody the British spirit of making war + upon the sea, and nothing must be permitted to breathe on that + spirit. To examine its claim to be the logical conclusion of + our theory of war will even be held dangerous, yet nothing is + so dangerous in the study of war as to permit maxims to become + a substitute for judgment. Let us examine its credentials, and + as a first step put it to the test of the two most modern + instances.</p> + + <p>Both of them, it must be noted, were instances of Limited + War, the most usual form of our own activities, and indeed the + only one to which our war organisation, with its essential + <!-- Page 168 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_168" + id="Page_168"></a>[pg 168]</span> preponderance of the naval + element, has ever been really adapted. The first instance is + the Spanish-American War, and the second that between Russia + and Japan.</p> + + <p>In the former case the Americans took up arms in order to + liberate Cuba from Spanish domination—a strictly limited + object. There is no evidence that the nature of the war was + ever clearly formulated by either side, but in just conformity + with the general political conditions the American war plan + aimed at opening with a movement to secure the territorial + object. At the earliest possible moment they intended to + establish themselves in the west of Cuba in support of the + Colonial insurgents. Everything depended on the initiative + being seized with decision and rapidity. Its moral and physical + importance justified the utmost risk, and such was the + conformation of the sea which the American army had to pass, + that a strictly defensive or covering attitude with their fleet + could reduce the risk almost to security. Yet so unwisely + dominated were the Americans by recently rediscovered maxims, + that when on the eve of executing the vital movement they heard + a Spanish squadron was crossing the Atlantic, their own + covering force was diverted from its defensive position and + sent away to "seek out the enemy's fleet and destroy it."</p> + + <p>Puerto Rico was the most obvious point at which to seek it, + and thither Admiral Sampson was permitted to go, regardless of + the elementary truth that in such cases what is obvious to you + is also usually obvious to your enemy. The result was that not + only did the Americans fail to get contact, but they also + uncovered their own army's line of passage and paralysed the + initial movement. In the end it was only pure chance <!-- + Page 169 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_169" + id="Page_169"></a>[pg 169]</span> that permitted them to + retrieve the mistake they had made. Had the Spanish squadron + put into a Cuban port in railway communication with the main + Royalist army, such as Cienfuegos or Havana, instead of + hurrying into Santiago, the whole campaign must have been + lost. "It appears now," wrote Admiral Mahan, in his + <i>Lessons of the War with Spain</i>, "not only that the + eastward voyage of our Havana division was unfortunate, but + it should have been seen beforehand to be a mistake, because + inconsistent with a well and generally accepted principle of + war, the non-observance of which was not commanded by the + conditions. The principle is that which condemns eccentric + movements. By the disregard of rule in this case we + uncovered both Havana and Cienfuegos, which it was our + object to close to the enemy's division."</p> + + <p>Whether or not we regard Admiral Mahan's exposition of the + error as penetrating to the real principle that was violated, + the movement was in fact not only eccentric, but unnecessary. + Had the Americans been content to keep their fleet concentrated + in its true defensive position, not only would they have + covered their army's line of passage and their blockade of the + territorial objective, but they would have had a far better + chance of bringing the Spaniards to action. The Spaniards were + bound to come to them or remain outside the theatre of + operations where they could in no way affect the issue of the + war except adversely to themselves by sapping the spirit of + their own Cuban garrison. It is a clear case of the letter + killing the spirit, of an attractive maxim being permitted + <!-- Page 170 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_170" + id="Page_170"></a>[pg 170]</span> to shut the door upon + judgment. Strategical offence in this case was not the best + defence. "Seeking out the enemy's fleet" was almost bound to + end in a blow in the air, which not only would fail to gain + any offensive result, but would sacrifice the main defensive + plank in the American war plan upon which their offensive + relied for success. To stigmatise such a movement as merely + eccentric is to pass very lenient censure.</p> + + <p>In the Russo-Japanese War we have a converse case, in which + judgment kept the aphorism silent. It is true that during the + earlier stage of the naval operations the Japanese did in a + sense seek out the enemy's fleet, in so far as they advanced + their base close to Port Arthur; but this was done, not with + any fixed intention of destroying the Russian fleet—there + was small hope of that at sea—but rather because by no + other means could they cover the army's lines of passage, which + it was the function of the fleet to secure, the true offensive + operations being on land. Never except once, under express + orders from Tokio, did either Admiral Togo or Admiral Kamimura + press offensive movements in such a way as to jeopardise the + preventive duty with which the war plan charged them. Still + less in the later stage, when everything depended on the + destruction of the Baltic fleet, did Admiral Togo "seek it + out." He was content, as the Americans should have been + content, to have set up such a situation that the enemy must + come and break it down if they were to affect the issue of the + war. So he waited on the defensive, assured his enemy must come + to him, and thereby he rendered it, as <!-- Page 171 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_171" + id="Page_171"></a>[pg 171]</span> certain as war can be, + that when the moment for the tactical offensive came his + blow should be sure and sudden, in overwhelming strength of + concentration, and decisive beyond all precedent.</p> + + <p>Clearly, then, the maxim of "seeking out" for all its moral + exhilaration, for all its value as an expression of high and + sound naval spirit, must not be permitted to displace + well-reasoned judgment. Trusty servant as it is, it will make a + bad master, as the Americans found to their serious jeopardy. + Yet we feel instinctively that it expresses, as no other + aphorism does, the secret of British success at sea. We cannot + do without it; we cannot do with it in its nakedness. Let us + endeavour to clothe it with its real meaning, with the true + principles that it connotes. Let us endeavour to determine the + stuff that it is made of, and for this purpose there is no + better way than to trace its gradual growth from the days when + it was born of the crude and virile instinct of the earliest + masters.</p> + + <p>The germ is to be found in the despatch already mentioned + which Drake wrote from Plymouth at the end of March in 1588. + His arguments were not purely naval, for it was a combined + problem, a problem of defence against invasion, that had to be + solved. What he wished to persuade the Government was, that the + kernel of the situation was not so much Parma's army of + invasion in Flanders, as the fleet that was preparing in Spain + to clear its passage. The Government appeared to be acting on + the opposite view. Howard with the bulk of the fleet was at the + base in the Medway within supporting distance of the light + squadron that was blockading the Flemish ports in concert with + the Dutch. Drake himself with another light squadron had been + sent to the westward + <!-- Page 172 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_172" + id="Page_172"></a>[pg 172]</span> with some indeterminate + idea of his serving as an observation squadron, or being + used in the mediaeval fashion for an eccentric + counterstroke. Being invited to give his opinion on this + disposition, he pronounced it vicious. In his eyes, what was + demanded was an offensive movement against the enemy's main + fleet. "If there may be such a stay or stop made," he urged, + "by any means of this fleet in Spain, so that they may not + come through the seas as conquerors, then shall the Prince + of Parma have such a check thereby as were meet." What he + had in his mind is clearly not so much a decision in the + open as an interruption of the enemy's incomplete + mobilisation, such as he had so brilliantly effected the + previous year. For later on he says that "Next under God's + mighty protection the advantage of time and place will be + the only and chief means for our good, wherein I most humbly + beseech your good lordships to persevere as you have begun, + for with fifty sail of shipping we shall do more upon their + own coast than a great many more will do here at home; and + the sooner we are gone, the better we shall be able to + impeach them." He does not say "destroy." "Impeach" meant + "to prevent."</p> + + <p>Clearly, then, what he had in his mind was a repetition of + the previous year's strategy, whereby he had been able to break + up the Spanish mobilisation and "impeach" the Armada from + sailing. He did not even ask for a concentration of the whole + fleet for the purpose, but only that his own squadron should be + reinforced as was thought convenient. The actual reasons he + gave for his advice were purely moral—that is, he dwelt + on the enheartening effect of striking the first blow, and + attacking instead of waiting to be attacked. The nation, he + urged, "will be persuaded that the Lord will put + <!-- Page 173 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_173" + id="Page_173"></a>[pg 173]</span> into Her Majesty and her + people courage and boldness not to fear invasion, but to + seek God's enemies and Her Majesty's where they may be + found."</p> + + <p>Here is the germ of the maxim. The consequence of his + despatch was a summons to attend the Council. The conference + was followed, not by the half measure, which was all he had + ventured to advise in his despatch, but by something that + embodied a fuller expression of his general idea, and closely + resembled what was to be consecrated as our regular disposition + in such cases. The whole of the main fleet, except the squadron + watching the Flemish coast, was massed to the westward to cover + the blockade of Parma's transports, but the position assigned + to it was inside the Channel instead of outside, which + tactically was bad, for it was almost certain to give the + Armada the weather gage. No movement to the coast of Spain was + permitted—not necessarily, be it remembered, out of + pusillanimity or failure to grasp Drake's idea, but for fear + that, as in the recent American case, a forward movement was + likely to result in a blow in the air, and to uncover the vital + position without bringing the enemy to action.</p> + + <p>When, however, the sailing of the Armada was so long delayed + Drake's importunity was renewed, with that of Howard and all + his colleagues to back it. It brought eventually the desired + permission. The fleet sailed for Coruña, where it was + known the Armada, after an abortive start from Lisbon, had been + driven by bad weather, and something like what the Government + feared happened. Before it could reach its destination it met + southerly gales, its offensive power was exhausted, and it had + to return to Plymouth impotent for immediate action as the + Armada finally sailed. When the Spaniards appeared it was still + in port refitting and victualling. It was only by an + unprecedented feat of seamanship that <!-- + Page 174 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_174" + id="Page_174"></a>[pg 174]</span> the situation was saved, + and Howard was able to gain the orthodox position to seaward + of his enemy.</p> + + <p>So far, then, the Government's cautious clinging to a + general defensive attitude, instead of seeking out the enemy's + fleet, was justified, but it must be remembered that Drake from + the first had insisted it was a question of time as well as + place. If he had been permitted to make the movement when he + first proposed it, there is good reason to believe that the + final stages of the Spanish mobilisation could not have been + carried out that year; that is to say, the various divisions of + the Armada could not have been assembled into a fleet. But + information as to its condition was at the time very uncertain, + and in view of the negotiations that were on foot, there were, + moreover, high political reasons for our not taking too drastic + an offensive if a reasonable alternative existed.</p> + + <p>The principles, then, which we distil from this, the + original case of "seeking out," are, firstly, the moral value + of seizing the initiative, and, secondly, the importance of + striking before the enemy's mobilisation is complete. The idea + of overthrow by a great fleet action is not present, unless we + find it in a not clearly formulated idea of the Elizabethan + admirals of striking a fleet when it is demoralised, as the + Armada was by its first rebuff, or immediately on its leaving + port before it had settled down.</p> + + <p>In our next naval struggle with the Dutch in the latter half + of the seventeenth century the principle of overthrow, as we + have seen, became fully developed. It was the keynote of the + strategy which was evolved, and the conditions which forced it + to recognition also emphasised the principles of seeking out + and destroying. It was a case of a purely naval struggle, in + which there were no military considerations to deflect naval + strategy. It was, moreover, a question of narrow seas, and the + risk of missing contact which had cramped the Elizabethans in + their oceanic theatre was a negligible factor. Yet fresh + objections to using the "seeking out" maxim as a strategical + panacea soon declared themselves.</p> + <!-- Page 175 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_175" + id="Page_175"></a>[pg 175]</span> + + <p>The first war opened without any trace of the new principle. + The first campaign was concerned in the old fashion entirely + with the attack and defence of trade, and such indecisive + actions as occurred were merely incidental to the process. No + one appears to have realised the fallacy of such method except, + perhaps, Tromp. The general instructions he received were that + "the first and principal object was to do all possible harm to + the English," and to that end "he was given a fleet in order to + sail to the damage and offence of the English fleet, and also + to give convoy to the west." Seeing at once the incompatibility + of the two functions, he asked for more definite instructions. + What, for instance, was he to do if he found a chance of + blockading the main English fleet at its base? Was he to devote + himself to the blockade and "leave the whole fleet of + merchantmen to be a prey to a squadron of fast-sailing + frigates," or was he to continue his escort duty? Full as he + was of desire to deal with the enemy's main fleet, he was + perplexed with the practical difficulty—too often + forgotten—that the mere domination of the enemy's battle + strength does not solve the problem of control of the sea. No + fresh instructions were forthcoming to clear his perplexity, + and he could only protest again. "I could wish," he wrote, "to + be so fortunate as to have only one of these two + duties—to seek out the enemy, or to give convoy, for to + do both is attended with great difficulties."</p> + + <p>The indecisive campaign which naturally resulted from this + lack of strategical grip and concentration of effort came to an + <!-- Page 176 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_176" + id="Page_176"></a>[pg 176]</span> end with Tromp's partial + defeat of Blake off Dungeness on 30th November 1652. Though + charged in spite of his protests with a vast convoy, the + Dutch admiral had sent it back to Ostend when he found Blake + was in the Downs, and then, free from all preoccupation, he + had gone to seek out his enemy.</p> + + <p>It was the effect which this unexpected blow had upon the + strong military insight of the Cromwellian Government that led + to those famous reforms which made this winter so memorable a + landmark in British naval history. Monk, the most finished + professional soldier in the English service, and Deane, another + general, were joined in the command with Blake, and with their + coming was breathed into the sea service the high military + spirit of the New Model Army. To that winter we owe not only + the Articles of War, which made discipline possible, and the + first attempt to formulate Fighting Instructions, in which a + regular tactical system was conceived, but also two other + conceptions that go to make up the modern idea of naval + warfare. One was the conviction that war upon the sea meant + operations against the enemy's armed fleets in order to destroy + his power of naval resistance as distinguished from operations + by way of reprisal against his trade; and the other, that such + warfare required for its <!-- + Page 177 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_177" + id="Page_177"></a>[pg 177]</span> effective use a fleet of + State-owned ships specialised for war, with as little + assistance as possible from private-owned ships. It was not + unnatural that all four ideas should have taken shape + together, so closely are they related. The end connotes the + means. Discipline, fleet tactics, and a navy of warships + were indispensable for making war in the modern sense of the + term.</p> + + <p>The results were seen in the three great actions of the + following spring, the first under the three Generals, and the + other two under Monk alone. In the last, he carried the new + ideas so far as to forbid taking possession of disabled + vessels, that nothing might check the work of destruction. All + were to be sunk with as much tenderness for human life as + destruction would permit. In like manner the second war was + characterised by three great naval actions, one of which, after + Monk had resumed command, lasted no less than four days. The + new doctrine was indeed carried to exaggeration. So entirely + was naval thought centred on the action of the battle-fleets, + that no provision was made for an adequate exercise of control. + In our own case at least, massing for offensive action was + pressed so far that no thought was given to sustaining it by + reliefs. Consequently our offensive power suffered periods of + exhaustion when the fleet had to return to its base, and the + Dutch were left sufficient freedom not only to secure their own + trade, but to strike severely at ours. Their counterstrokes + culminated in the famous attack upon Sheerness and Chatham. + That such an opportunity was allowed them can be traced + directly to an exaggeration of the new doctrine. In the belief + of the British Government the "St. <!-- Page 178 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_178" + id="Page_178"></a>[pg 178]</span> James's Fight"—the + last of the three actions—had settled the question of + command. Negotiations for peace were opened, and they were + content to reap the fruit of the great battles in preying on + Dutch trade. Having done its work, as was believed, the bulk + of the battle-fleet for financial reasons was laid up, and + the Dutch seized the opportunity to demonstrate the + limitations of the abused doctrine. The lesson is one we + have never forgotten, but its value is half lost if we + attribute the disaster to lack of grasp of the battle-fleet + doctrine rather than to an exaggeration of its + possibilities.</p> + + <p>The truth is, that we had not obtained a victory + sufficiently decisive to destroy the enemy's fleet. The most + valuable lesson of the war was that such victories required + working for, and particularly in cases where the belligerents + face each other from either side of a narrow sea. In such + conditions it was proved that owing to the facility of retreat + and the restricted possibilities of pursuit a complete decision + is not to be looked for without very special strategical + preparation. The new doctrine in fact gave that new direction + to strategy which has been already referred to. It was no + longer a question of whether to make the enemy's trade or his + fleet the primary objective, but of how to get contact with his + fleet in such a way as to lead to decisive action. Merely to + seek him out on his own coasts was to ensure that no decisive + action would take place. Measures had to be taken to force him + to sea away from his own bases. The favourite device was to + substitute organised strategical operations against his trade + in place of the old sporadic attacks; that is, the fleet took a + position calculated to stop his trade altogether, not on his + own coasts, but far to sea in the main fairway. The operations + failed for lack of provision for enabling the fleet by + systematic relief to retain its position, but nevertheless it + was <!-- Page 179 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_179" + id="Page_179"></a>[pg 179]</span> the germ of the system + which afterwards, under riper organisation, was to prove so + effective, and to produce such actions as the "Glorious + First of June."</p> + + <p>In the third war, after this device had failed again and + again, a new one was tried. It was Charles the Second's own + conception. His idea was to use the threat of a military + expedition. Some 15,000 men in transports were brought to + Yarmouth in the hope that the Dutch would come out to bar their + passage across the open North Sea, and would thus permit our + fleet to cut in behind them. There was, however, no proper + coordination of the two forces, and the project failed.</p> + + <p>This method of securing a decision was not lost sight of; + Anson tried to use it in the Seven Years' War. For two years + every attempt to seek out the enemy's fleet had led to nothing + but the exhaustion of our own. But when Pitt began his raids on + the French coast, Anson, who had little faith in their value + for military purposes, thought he saw in them definite naval + possibilities. Accordingly when, in 1758, he was placed in + command of the Channel Fleet to cover the expedition against + St. Malo, he raised the blockade of Brest, and took up a + position near the Isle of Batz between the enemy's main fleet + and the army's line of passage. The Brest fleet, however, was + in no condition to move, and again there was no result. It was + not till 1805 that there was any clear case of the device + succeeding, and then it was not used deliberately. It was a + joint Anglo-Russian expedition in the Mediterranean that forced + from Napoleon his reckless order for Villeneuve to put to sea + from Cadiz, and so solved the problem out of which Nelson had + seen no issue. Lissa may be taken as an analogous + <!-- Page 180 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_180" + id="Page_180"></a>[pg 180]</span> case. But there the + Italians, treating the territorial attack as a real attack + instead of as a strategical device, suffered themselves to + be surprised by the Austrian fleet and defeated.</p> + + <p>This instance serves well to introduce the important fact, + that although our own military expeditions have seldom + succeeded in leading to a naval decision, the converse was + almost always true. The attempt of the enemy to use his army + against our territory has been the most fertile source of our + great naval victories. The knowledge that our enemy intends to + invade these shores, or to make some serious expedition against + our oversea dominions or interests, should always be welcomed. + Unless History belie herself, we know that such attempts are + the surest means of securing what we want. We have the memories + of La Hogue, Quiberon, and the Nile to assure us that sooner or + later they must lead to a naval decision, and the chance of a + real decision is all we can ask of the Fortune of War.</p> + + <p>Enough has now been said to show that "seeking out the + enemy's fleet" is not in itself sufficient to secure such a + decision. What the maxim really means is that we should + endeavour from the first to secure contact in the best position + for bringing about a complete decision in our favour, and as + soon as the other parts of our war plan, military or political, + will permit. If the main offensive is military, as it was in + the Japanese and American cases, then if possible the effort to + secure such control must be subordinated to the movement of + <!-- Page 181 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_181" + id="Page_181"></a>[pg 181]</span> the army, otherwise we + give the defensive precedence of the offensive. If, however, + the military offensive cannot be ensured until the naval + defensive is perfected, as will be the case if the enemy + brings a fleet up to our army's line of passage, then our + first move must be to secure naval contact.</p> + + <p>The vice of the opposite method of procedure is obvious. If + we assume the maxim that the first duty of our fleet is to seek + out the enemy wherever he may be, it means in its nakedness + that we merely conform to the enemy's dispositions and + movements. It is open to him to lead us wherever he likes. It + was one of the fallacies that underlay all Napoleon's naval + combinations, that he believed that our hard-bitten admirals + would behave in this guileless manner. But nothing was further + from their cunning. There is a typical order of Cornwallis's + which serves well to mark their attitude. It was one he gave to + Admiral Cotton, his second in command, in July 1804 on handing + over to his charge the Western Squadron off Ushant: "If the + French put to sea," he says, "without any of your vessels + seeing them, do not follow them, unless you are absolutely sure + of the course they have taken. If you leave the entrance of the + Channel without protection, the enemy might profit by it, and + assist the invasion which threatens His Majesty's dominions, + the protection of which is your principal object."</p> + + <p>It is indeed a common belief that Nelson never permitted + himself but a single purpose, the pursuit of the enemy's fleet, + and that, ignoring the caution which Cornwallis impressed upon + Cotton, he fell into the simple trap. But it has to be noted + that he never suffered himself to be led in pursuit of a fleet + away from the position he had been charged to maintain, unless + and until he had made that position secure behind him. His + famous chase to the West Indies is the case + <!-- Page 182 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_182" + id="Page_182"></a>[pg 182]</span> which has led to most + misconception on the point from an insufficient regard to + the surrounding circumstances. Nelson did not pursue + Villeneuve with the sole, or even the primary, object of + bringing him to action. His dominant object was to save + Jamaica from capture. If it had only been a question of + getting contact, he would certainly have felt in a surer + position by waiting for Villeneuve's return off St. Vincent + or closing in to the strategical centre off Ushant. Further, + it must be observed that Nelson by his pursuit did not + uncover what it was his duty to defend. The Mediterranean + position was rendered quite secure before he ventured on his + eccentric movement. Finally, we have the important fact that + though the moral effect of Nelson's implacable persistence + and rapidity was of priceless value, it is impossible to + show that as a mere strategical movement it had any + influence on the course of the campaign. His appearance in + the West Indies may have saved one or two small islands from + ransom and a good deal of trade from capture. It may also + have hastened Villeneuve's return by a few days, but that + was not to our advantage. Had he returned even a week later + there would have been no need to raise the Rochefort + blockade. Barham would have had enough ships at his command + to preserve the whole of his blockades, as he had intended + to do till the <i>Curieux's</i> news of Villeneuve's + precipitate return forced his hand before he was ready.</p> + + <p>If we desire a typical example of the way the old masters + used the doctrine of seeking out, it is to be found, not in + <!-- Page 183 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_183" + id="Page_183"></a>[pg 183]</span> Nelson's magnificent + chase, but in the restrained boldness of Barham's orders to + Cornwallis and Calder. Their instructions for seeking out + Villeneuve were to move out on his two possible lines of + approach for such a time and such a distance as would make + decisive action almost certain, and at the same time, if + contact were missed, would ensure the preservation of the + vital defensive positions. Barham was far too astute to play + into Napoleon's hands, and by blindly following his enemy's + lead to be jockeyed into sacrificing the position which his + enemy wished to secure. If our maxim be suffered to usurp + the place of instructed judgment, the almost inevitable + result will be that it will lead us into just the kind of + mistake which Barham avoided.</p> + + <h3>II. BLOCKADE</h3> + + <p>Under the term blockade we include operations which vary + widely in character and in strategical intention. In the first + place, blockade may be either naval or commercial. By naval + blockade we seek either to prevent an enemy's armed force + leaving port, or to make certain it shall be brought to action + before it can carry out the ulterior purpose for which it puts + to sea. That armed force may be purely naval, or it may consist + wholly or in part of a military expedition. If it be purely + naval, then our blockade is a method of securing command. If it + be purely military, it is a method of exercising command, and + as such will be dealt with when we come to consider defence + against invasion. But in so far as military expeditions are + normally accompanied by a naval escort, operations to prevent + their sailing are not purely concerned with the exercise of + command. Naval blockade, therefore, may be regarded for + practical purposes as a method of securing command and as a + function of battle-squadrons. Commercial blockade, on the other + hand, is essentially a method of exercising command, and is + mainly an affair of cruisers. Its + <!-- Page 184 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_184" + id="Page_184"></a>[pg 184]</span> immediate object is to + stop the flow of the enemy's sea-borne trade, whether + carried in his own or neutral bottoms, by denying him the + use of trade communications.</p> + + <p>From the point of view of the conduct of war, therefore, we + have two well-defined categories of blockade, naval and + commercial. But our classification must go further; for naval + blockade itself is equally varied in intention, and must be + subdivided. Strictly speaking, the term implies a desire to + close the blockaded port and to prevent the enemy putting to + sea. But this was not always the intention. As often as not our + wish was that he should put to sea that we might bring him to + action, and in order to do this, before he could effect his + purpose, we had to watch the port with a fleet more or less + closely. For this operation there was no special name. Widely + as it differed in object from the other, it was also usually + called blockade, and Nelson's protest against the consequent + confusion of thought is well known. "It is not my intention," + he said, "to close-watch Toulon"; and again, "My system is the + very contrary of blockading. Every opportunity has been offered + the enemy to put to sea." It is desirable, therefore, to adopt + terms to distinguish the two forms. "Close" and "open" express + the antithesis suggested by Nelson's letter, and the two terms + serve well enough to mark the characteristic feature of each + operation. Close blockade, it is true, as formerly conceived, + is generally regarded as no longer practicable; but the + antithetical ideas, which the two forms of blockade connote, + can never be eliminated from strategical consideration. It must + always be with the relations of these two forms, whatever shape + they may take in future, that the strategy of naval blockade is + chiefly concerned.</p> + + <p>With regard to commercial blockade, in strict analysis it + <!-- Page + 185 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_185" + id="Page_185"></a>[pg 185]</span> should be eliminated from + an inquiry that concerns methods of securing command and + postponed to that section of exercising command which deals + with the attack and defence of trade. It is, however, + necessary to treat certain of its aspects in conjunction + with naval blockade for two reasons: one, that as a rule + naval blockade is indissolubly united to a subordinate + commercial blockade; and the other, that the commercial + form, though its immediate object is the exercise of + control, has almost invariably an ulterior object which is + concerned with securing control; that is to say, while its + immediate object was to keep the enemy's commercial ports + closed, its ulterior object was to force his fleet to + sea.</p> + + <p>Commercial blockade, therefore, has an intimate relation + with naval blockade in its open form. We adopt that form when + we wish his fleet to put to sea, and commercial blockade is + usually the most effective means we have of forcing upon him + the movement we leave him free to attempt. By closing his + commercial ports we exercise the highest power of injuring him + which the command of the sea can give us. We choke the flow of + his national activity afloat in the same way that military + occupation of his territory chokes it ashore. He must, + therefore, either tamely submit to the worst which a naval + defeat can inflict upon him, or he must fight to release + himself. He may see fit to choose the one course or the other, + but in any case we can do no more by naval means alone to force + our will upon him.</p> + + <p>In the long run a rigorous and uninterrupted blockade is + almost sure to exhaust him before it exhausts us, but the end + will be far and costly. As a rule, therefore, we have found + that where we had a substantial predominance our enemy + preferred to submit to commercial blockade in hope that by the + chances of war or the development of fresh force he might later + on be in a better position to come out into the open. That he + should come out and stake the issue in battle was nearly always + our wish, and it was obvious that too rigorous + <!-- Page 186 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_186" + id="Page_186"></a>[pg 186]</span> a naval blockade was not + the way to achieve the desired end, or to reap the + strategical result which we might expect from paralysing his + commerce. Consequently where the desire for a decision at + sea was not crossed by higher military considerations, as in + the case of imminent invasion, or where we ourselves had an + important expedition in hand, it was to our interest to + incline the enemy's mind towards the bolder choice.</p> + + <p>The means was to tempt him with a prospect of success, + either by leading him to believe the blockading force was + smaller than it was, or by removing it to such a distance as + would induce him to attempt to evade it, or both. A leading + case of such an open blockade was Nelson's disposition of his + fleet off Cadiz when he was seeking to bring Villeneuve to + action in 1805. But merely to leave a port open does not fulfil + the idea of open blockade, and in this case to opportunity and + temptation Nelson added the pressure of a commercial blockade + of the adjacent ports in hope of starving Villeneuve into the + necessity of taking to the sea.</p> + + <p>Finally, in a general comparison of the two forms, we have + to observe that close blockade is characteristically a method + of securing local and temporary command. Its dominating purpose + will usually be to prevent the enemy's fleet acting in a + certain area and for a certain purpose. Whereas open blockade, + in that it aims at the destruction of an enemy's naval force, + is a definite step towards securing permanent command.</p> + + <p>Enough has now been said to show that the question of choice + between close and open blockade is one of extreme complexity. + Our naval literature, it is true, presents the old masters as + divided into two schools on the subject, implying that one was + in favour of the close form always, and the other of the open + form. We are even led to believe that the choice depended on + the military spirit of the officer concerned. If his military + spirit was high, he chose the close and <!-- Page 187 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_187" + id="Page_187"></a>[pg 187]</span> more exacting form; if it + were low, he was content with the open and less exacting + form. True, we are told that men of the latter school based + their objections to close blockade on the excessive wear and + tear of a fleet that it involved, but it is too often + suggested that this attitude was no more than a mask for a + defective spirit. Seldom if ever are we invited to compare + their decisions with the attendant strategical intention, + with the risks which the conditions justified, or with the + expenditure of energy which the desired result could + legitimately demand. Yet all these considerations must enter + into the choice, and on closer examination of the leading + cases it will be found that they bear a striking and almost + constant relation to the nature of the blockade + employed.</p> + + <p>In considering open blockade, three postulates must be kept + in mind. Firstly, since our object is to get the enemy to sea, + our position must be such as will give him an opportunity of + doing so. Secondly, since we desire contact for a decisive + battle, that position must be no further away from his port + than is compatible with bringing him to action before he can + effect his purpose. Thirdly, there is the idea of + economy—that is, the idea of adopting the method which is + least exhausting to our fleet, and which will best preserve its + battle fitness. It is on the last point that the greatest + difference of opinion has existed. A close blockade always + tended to exhaust a fleet, and always must do so. But, on the + other hand, it was contended that the exhaustion is compensated + by the high temper and moral domination which the maintenance + of a close blockade produces in a good fleet, whereas the + comparative ease of distant and secure watch tended to + deterioration. Before considering these opposed views, one + warning is necessary. It is usually assumed that the + alternative to close blockade is watching the enemy from one of + our own ports, but this is not essential. What is required is + an interior and, if possible, a secret position which will + render contact certain; and with modern developments in the + means of distant communication, + <!-- Page 188 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_188" + id="Page_188"></a>[pg 188]</span> such a position is usually + better found at sea than in port. A watching position can in + fact be obtained free from the strain of dangerous + navigation and incessant liability to attack without + sacrifice of sea training. With this very practical point in + mind, we may proceed to test the merits of the two forms on + abstract principles.</p> + + <p>It was always obvious that a close naval blockade was one of + the weakest and least desirable forms of war. Here again when + we say "weakest" we do not mean "least effective," but that it + was exhausting, and that it tended to occupy a force greater + than that against which it was acting. This was not because a + blockading fleet, tempered and toughened by its watch, and with + great advantage of tactical position, could not be counted on + to engage successfully a raw fleet of equal force issuing from + port, but because in order to maintain its active efficiency it + required large reserves for its relief. So severe was the wear + and tear both to men and ships, that even the most strenuous + exponents of the system considered that at least a fifth of the + force should always be refitting, and in every case two + admirals were employed to relieve one another. In 1794 one of + the highest authorities in the service considered that to + maintain an effective close blockade of Brest two complete sets + of flag-officers were necessary, and that no less than + one-fourth of the squadron should always be in + port.<a name="NtA_16" + id="NtA_16"></a><a href="#Nt_16"><sup>16</sup></a></p> + + <p>Now these weaknesses, being inherent in close blockade, + necessarily affected the appreciation of its value. The weight + <!-- Page 189 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_189" + id="Page_189"></a>[pg 189]</span> of the objection tended of + course to decrease as seamanship, material, or organisation + improved, but it was always a factor. It is true also that + it seems to have had more weight with some men than with + others, but it will appear equally true, if we endeavour to + trace the movement of opinion on the subject, that it was + far from being the sole determinant.</p> + + <p>It was in the Seven Years' War under Anson's administration + that continuous and close blockade was first used + systematically, but it was Hawke who originated it. In the + first three campaigns the old system of watching Brest from a + British western port had been in vogue, but it had twice failed + to prevent a French concentration in the vital Canadian + theatre. In the spring of 1759 Hawke was in command of the + Channel Fleet with the usual instructions for watching, but + being directed to stand over and look into Brest, he intimated + his intention, unless he received orders to the contrary, to + remain off the port instead of returning to Torbay. His reason + was that he had found there a squadron which he believed was + intended for the West Indies, and he considered it better to + prevent its sailing than to let it put to sea and try to catch + it. In other words, he argued that none of the usual western + watching ports afforded a position interior to the usual French + route from Brest to the West Indies.</p> + + <p>Since rumours of invasion were in the air, it was obviously + the better course to deal with the enemy's squadrons in home + waters and avoid dispersal of the fleet in seeking them out. In + spite of extraordinarily bad weather, therefore, he was + permitted to act as he advised. With Boscawen as relief, the + <!-- Page 190 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_190" + id="Page_190"></a>[pg 190]</span> new form of blockade was + kept up thenceforward, and with entire success. But it must + be noted that this success was rather due to the fact that + the French made no further effort to cross the Atlantic, + than to the fact that the blockade was maintained with + sufficient strictness to prevent their doing so. In certain + states of weather our fleet was forced to raise the blockade + and run to Torbay or Plymouth. Such temporary reversions to + the open form nearly always afforded an opportunity for the + French to get away to the southward with two or three days' + start. Against any attempt, however, to get to the east or + the north in order to dispute command of the Channel or + other home waters the system was thoroughly efficient, and + was unaffected by the intervals of the open form.</p> + + <p>It may have been these considerations which in the War of + American Independence induced so fine an officer as Howe to be + strongly in favour of a reversion to the old system. The vital + theatre was then again across the Atlantic, and there was no + serious preparation for invasion. It should also be borne in + mind in judging Howe against Hawke, that in the Seven Years' + War we had such a preponderance at sea as permitted ample + reserves to nourish a close blockade, whereas in the latter war + we were numerically inferior to the hostile coalition. Since it + was impossible to prevent the French reaching the West Indies + and North America if they so determined, our policy was to + follow them with equal fleets and reduce the home force as low + as that policy demanded + <!-- Page 191 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_191" + id="Page_191"></a>[pg 191]</span> and as was consistent with + a reasonable degree of safety. The force required might well + be inferior to the enemy, since it was certain that all + attempts upon the Channel would be made with an unwieldy and + ill-knit force composed of Spanish and French units.</p> + + <p>In Howe's opinion this particular situation was not to be + solved by attempting to close Brest, and nothing can be more + misleading than to stretch such an opinion beyond the + circumstances it was intended to meet. He did not consider it + was in his power to close the port. The enemy, he held, could + always be in readiness to escape after a gale of wind by which + the blockading squadron would be drawn off or dispersed, the + ships much damaged, and the enemy enheartened. "An enemy," he + said, "is not to be restrained from putting to sea by a station + taken off their port with a barely superior squadron." The + experience of 1805 appears to contradict him. Then a barely + superior squadron did succeed in preventing Ganteaume's exit, + but though the squadron actually employed was barely superior, + it had ample fleet reserves to sustain its numbers in + efficiency. It was, moreover, only for a short time that it had + to deal with any real effort to escape. After May 20th, + Ganteaume was forbidden to put to sea. There were certainly + several occasions during that famous blockade when he could + have escaped to the southward had Napoleon wished it.</p> + + <p>This case, then, cannot be taken to condemn Howe's judgment. + <!-- Page + 192 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_192" + id="Page_192"></a>[pg 192]</span> His special function in + the war plan was, with a force reduced to defensive + strength, to prevent the enemy obtaining command of our home + waters. It was certainly not his duty to undertake + operations to which his force was not equal. His first duty + was to keep it in being for its paramount purpose. To this + end he decided on open blockade based on a general reserve + at Spithead or St. Helen's, where he could husband the ships + and train his recruits, while at the same time he protected + our trade and communications and harassed those of the + enemy. Kempenfelt, than whom there was no warmer advocate of + activity, entirely approved the policy at least for the + winter months, and in his case no one will be found to + suggest that the idea was prompted by lack of spirit or love + of ease. So far as the summer was concerned there was really + little difference of opinion as to whether the fleet should + be kept at sea or not, for sea-training during summer more + than compensated for the exhaustion of material likely to be + caused by intermittent spells of bad weather. Even for the + winter the two policies came to much the same thing. Thus in + Hawke's blockade at the end of 1759, during the critical + month from mid-October to mid-November, he was unable to + keep his station for nearly half the time, and when he did + get contact with Conflans it was from Torbay and not Ushant. + Still it may be doubted if without the confidence bred of + his stormy vigil the battle of Quiberon would have been + fought as it was.</p> + <!-- Page 193 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_193" + id="Page_193"></a>[pg 193]</span> + + <p>With all this experience fresh in his mind Kempenfelt + frankly advocated keeping the fleet in port for the winter. + "Suppose," he wrote from Torbay in November 1779, "the enemy + should put to sea with their fleet (that is, from + Brest)—a thing much to be wished for by us—let us + act wisely and keep ours in port. Leave them to the mercy of + long nights and hard gales. They will do more in favour of you + than your fleet can." Far better he thought to devote the + winter to preparing the fleet for the next campaign so as to + have "the advantage of being the first in the field." "Let us," + he concluded, "keep a stout squadron to the westward ready to + attend the motions of the enemy. I don't mean to keep them at + sea, disabling themselves in buffeting the winds, but at Torbay + ready to act as intelligence may suggest."<a name="NtA_17" + id="NtA_17"></a><a href="#Nt_17"><sup>17</sup></a> It will + be seen, therefore, that the conclusion that close blockade + was always the best means of rendering the fleet most + efficient for the function it had to perform must not be + accepted too hastily. The reasons which induced Howe and + Kempenfelt to prefer open blockade were mainly based on this + very consideration. Having in mind the whole of the + surrounding conditions, in their highly experienced opinion + careful preparation in the winter and tactical evolutions in + the summer were the surest road to battle fitness in the + force available.</p> + + <p>On the other hand, we have the fact that during the War of + American Independence the open system was not very successful. + But before condemning it out of hand, it must be remembered + that the causes of failure were not all inherent in the system. + In the first place, the need of relieving Gibraltar from time + to time prevented the Western Squadron devoting + <!-- Page 194 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_194" + id="Page_194"></a>[pg 194]</span> itself entirely to its + watch. In the next place, owing to defective administration + the winters were not devoted with sufficient energy to + preparing the fleet to be first in the field in the spring. + Finally, we have to recognise that the lack of success was + due not so much to permitting the French to cross the + Atlantic, as to the failure to deal faithfully with them + when contact was obtained at their destination. Obviously + there is nothing to be said for the policy of "seeking out" + as against that of preventing exit unless you are determined + when you find to destroy or to be destroyed. It was here + that Rodney and his fellows were found wanting. The system + failed from defective execution quite as much as from + defective design.</p> + + <p>In the next war Howe was still in the ascendant and in + command of the Channel fleet. He retained his system. Leaving + Brest open he forced the French by operating against their + trade to put to sea, and he was rewarded with the battle of the + First of June. No attempt was made to maintain a close blockade + during the following winter. The French were allowed to sail, + and their disastrous cruise of January 1795 fully justified + Kempenfelt's anticipations. So great was the damage done that + they abandoned all idea of using their fleet as a whole. Howe's + system was continued, but no longer with entirely successful + results. In 1796 the French were able to make descents upon + Ireland, and Howe in consequence has come in for the severest + castigations. His method is contemptuously contrasted with that + which St. Vincent adopted <!-- Page + 195 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_195" + id="Page_195"></a>[pg 195]</span> four years later, without + any regard to the situation each admiral had to meet, and + again on the assumption that the closing of Brest would have + solved the one problem as well as it did the other.</p> + + <p>In 1796 we were not on the defensive as we were in 1800. The + French fleet had been practically destroyed. No invasion + threatened. With a view to forcing peace our policy was + directed to offensive action against French trade and territory + in order by general pressure to back our overtures for a + settlement. The policy may have been mistaken, but that is not + the question. The question is, whether or not the strategy + fitted the policy. We were also, it must be remembered, at war + with Holland and expecting war with Spain, an eventuality which + forced us to keep an eye on the defence of Portugal. In these + circumstances nothing was further from our desire than to keep + what was left of the Brest fleet in port. Our hope was by our + offensive action against French maritime interests to force it + to expose itself for their defence. To devote the fleet to the + closing of Brest was to cripple it for offensive action and to + play the enemy's game. The actual disposition of the home fleet + was designed so as to preserve its offensive activity, and at + the same time to ensure superiority in any part of the home + waters in which the enemy might attempt a counterstroke. It was + distributed in three active squadrons, one in the North Sea, + one before Brest, and one cruising to the westward, with a + strong reserve at Portsmouth. It is the location of the reserve + that has been most lightly ridiculed, on the hasty assumption + that it was merely the reserve of the squadron before Brest; + whereas in truth it was a general reserve + <!-- Page 196 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_196" + id="Page_196"></a>[pg 196]</span> designed to act in the + North Sea or wherever else it might be needed. At the same + time it served as a training and depot squadron for + increasing our power at sea in view of the probable addition + of the Spanish fleet to Napoleon's naval force. To have + exhausted our fleet merely to prevent raids leaving Brest + which might equally well leave the Texel or Dunkirk was just + what the enemy would have desired. The disposition was in + fact a good example of concentration—that is, disposal + about a strategical centre to preserve flexibility for + offence without risking defensive needs, and yet it is by + the most ardent advocates of concentration and the offensive + that Howe's dispositions at this time have been most roundly + condemned.</p> + + <p>In the end the disposition did fail to prevent the landing + of part of the force intended for Ireland, but it made the + venture so difficult that it had to be deferred till + mid-winter, and then the weather which rendered evasion + possible broke up the expedition and denied it all chance of + serious success. It was, in fact, another example of the + working of Kempenfelt's rule concerning winter weather. So far + as naval defence can go, the disposition was all that was + required. The Irish expedition was seen leaving Brest by our + inshore cruiser squadron. It was reported to Colpoys, who had + the battle-squadron outside, and it was only a dense fog that + enabled it to escape. It was, in fact, nothing more than the + evasion of a small raiding force—an eventuality against + which no naval defence can provide certain guarantee, + especially in winter.</p> + + <p>It was under wholly different conditions that at the end of + 1800 Hawke's system was revived. St. Vincent's succession + <!-- Page 197 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_197" + id="Page_197"></a>[pg 197]</span> to the control of the + fleet coincided with Napoleon's definite assumption of the + control of the destinies of France. Our great duel with him + had begun. The measures he was taking made it obvious we + were once more facing the old life and death struggle for + naval supremacy; we were openly threatened with invasion, + and we had a distinct preponderance at sea. In short, we + have to recognize the fact that the methods of the Seven + Years' War were revived when the problems and factors of + that war were renewed. As those problems grew more intense, + as they did after the Peace of Amiens, and the threat of + invasion became really formidable, so did the rigour of the + close blockade increase. Under Cornwallis and Gardner it was + maintained in such a way as to deny, so far as human effort + could go, all possibility of exit without fighting. In spite + of the importance of dealing with the enemy's squadrons in + detail no risks were taken to bring Ganteaume to decisive + action. Our first necessity was absolute local command. The + acuteness of the invasion crisis demanded that the Brest + fleet should be kept in port, and every time Ganteaume + showed a foot the British admiral flew at him and drove him + back. Once only during the continuation of the crisis was + the rigour of this attitude relaxed, and that was to deal + with what for the moment was the higher object. It was to + meet Villeneuve on his return from the West Indies, but even + then so nicely was the relaxation calculated, that Ganteaume + was given no time to take advantage of it.</p> + <!-- Page 198 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_198" + id="Page_198"></a>[pg 198]</span> + + <p>The analogy between the conditions of the blockade which St. + Vincent inaugurated and those of the Seven Years' War becomes + all the more significant when we note that while Cornwallis and + Gardner in home waters were pressing close blockade to its + utmost limit of rigour, Nelson in the Mediterranean was not + using it at all. Yet with him also the chief concern was to + prevent an invasion. His main function, as he and his + Government saw it, was to prevent a descent from Southern + France upon Neapolitan or Levantine territory. Why, then, did + he not employ close blockade? It is usually assumed that it was + because of his overpowering desire to bring the Toulon squadron + to action. Occasional expressions in his letters give colour to + such a view, but his dispositions show clearly that his desire + to bring the fleet to action was kept in scientific + subordination to the defensive duty with which he was charged. + Close blockade was the most effectual means of securing this + end, but in his case one of the conditions, which we have found + always accompanying successful close blockade, was absent. He + had no such preponderance of force as would enable him to + nourish it up to the point of perfect continuity. In the + circumstances the close form was too weak or exhausting for him + to use with the force at his disposal.</p> + + <p>If this case be not considered conclusive as to Nelson's + views, we have a perfectly clear endorsement from his pen in + 1801. It is a particularly strong testimony, for he was at the + time actually charged with defence against the invasion of + England. With several cruiser squadrons he had to prevent the + enemy's force issuing from a number of ports extending from + Flushing to Dieppe, and he was directing the operations from + the Downs. On the approach of winter he was impressed with the + inexpediency of attempting to continue a close blockade, and + wrote to the Admiralty as follows: "I am of opinion, and submit + to their Lordships' better judgment, that care should be taken + to keep our squadrons compact and + <!-- Page 199 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_199" + id="Page_199"></a>[pg 199]</span> in good order ... under + Dungeness to be their principal station.... In fine weather + our squadrons to go out and show themselves, but never to + risk either being crippled or drawn into the North Sea; thus + we shall always be sure of an effective force, ready to act + as occasion calls for it."<a name="NtA_18" + id="NtA_18"></a><a href="#Nt_18"><sup>18</sup></a></p> + + <p>The case of course is not entirely in point, for it concerns + the question of direct resistance to invasion and not to + securing general command. Its value is that it gives Nelson's + views on the broad question of balancing the risks—that + is, the risk of relaxing close watch against the risk of + destroying the efficiency of the ships by maintaining it too + rigorously.</p> + + <p>With Nelson holding this view, it is not surprising to find + that as late as 1804 naval opinion was not quite settled on the + relative advantages of close and open blockade even in the case + of threatened invasion. Just a year before Trafalgar was + fought, Cornwallis pressed the Admiralty for more strength to + enable him to keep his blockade efficient. Lord Melville, who + at this time had Barham at his elbow, replied recommending the + "policy of relaxing the strictness of blockade, formerly + resorted to." He protested the means available were + insufficient for "sustaining the necessary extent of naval + force, if your ships are to be torn to pieces by an eternal + conflict with the elements during the tempestuous months of + <!-- Page 200 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_200" + id="Page_200"></a>[pg 200]</span> winter."<a name="NtA_19" + id="NtA_19"></a><a href="#Nt_19"><sup>19</sup></a> Melville + was craving for a decisive action to end the insupportable + strain. "Allow me to remind you," he added, "that the + occasions when we have been able to bring our enemy to + battle and our fleets to victory have generally been when we + were at a distance from the blockading station." In the end, + as we know, Cornwallis had his way, and the verdict of + history has been to approve the decision for its moral + effect alone. Such conflicts must always arise. "War," as + Wolfe said, "is an option of difficulties," and the choice + must sway to the one side or the other as the circumstances + tend to develop the respective advantages of each form. We + can never say that close blockade is better than open, or + the reverse. It must always be a matter of judgment.</p> + + <p>Are there, then, no principles which we can deduce from the + old practice for the strengthening of judgment? Certain broad + lines of guidance at least are to be traced. The main question + will be, is it to our advantage, in regard to all the + strategical conditions, to keep the enemy in and get him to sea + for a decision? Presumably it will always be our policy to get + a decision as soon as possible. Still that desire may be + overridden by the necessity or special advantage of closely + <!-- Page + 201 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_201" + id="Page_201"></a>[pg 201]</span> blockading one or more of + his squadrons. This situation may arise in two ways. + Firstly, it may be essential to provide for the local and + temporary command of a certain theatre of operations, as + when an invasion threatens in that area, or when we wish to + pass a military expedition across it, or from special + exigencies in regard to the attack or defence of commerce. + Secondly, even where we are seeking a great decision, we may + blockade one squadron closely in order to induce a decision + at the point most advantageous to ourselves; that is to say, + we may blockade one or more squadrons in order to induce the + enemy to attempt with one or more other squadrons to break + that blockade. In this way we may lead him either to expose + himself to be struck in detail, or to concentrate where we + desire his concentration.</p> + + <p>For any of these reasons we may decide that the best way of + realising our object is to use close blockade, but the matter + does not end there. We have still to consider whether close + blockade is within the limit of the force we have available, + and whether it is the best method of developing the fullest + potentialities of that force. Close blockade being the more + exhausting form will require the greater strength; we cannot + blockade closely for any length of time without a force + relatively superior; but if by open blockade of a squadron we + permit it to put to sea with contact assured, we know that, + even with a slightly inferior force, we can so deal with it as + to prevent its getting local control sufficient to break down + our mobile flotilla defence or to interfere seriously with our + trade.</p> + + <p>Finally, there is the question of risk. In the old days, + before free movement and wireless telegraphy, and before the + flotilla had acquired battle power, there was always to be + faced the risk of not getting contact in time to prevent + mischief. This consideration was specially dominant where the + enemy had a squadron within or near the critical theatre of + operations. Therefore when the invasion threatened, our + developed policy was to blockade Brest closely at almost any + sacrifice. + <!-- Page 202 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_202" + id="Page_202"></a>[pg 202]</span> There was always a vague + possibility that by evasion or chance of wind a squadron so + close to the line of invasion might get sufficient temporary + command in the vital area before it could be brought to + action. It was a possibility that was never realised in the + Narrow Seas, and since mobility of fleets and means of + distant communication have so greatly increased in range and + certainty, and since the power of resistance in the flotilla + has become so high, the risk is probably much less than + ever, and the field for open blockade is consequently less + restricted.</p> + + <p>There is no need, however, to accept these principles as + incontrovertible. Even if we take the great blockade of 1803-5, + which has most firmly dominated thought on the subject ever + since, it may be argued with some plausibility that the + situation could have been solved more quickly and effectually + by letting Ganteaume get out from Brest into the open, at least + as far as Admiral Togo was forced to permit the Russians to + emerge from Port Arthur, though his reasons for keeping them in + were even stronger than ours in 1805. But in any case, the + whole trend of the evidence will admit no doubt as to the + inherent weakness of close blockade as a form of war. As under + modern developments the possibilities of open blockade have + increased, so the difficulties and dangers of close blockade + have certainly not decreased. It is also probable that certain + advantages which in the sailing era went far to compensate for + its weakness have lost much of their force. A sailing fleet + cooped up in port not only rapidly lost its spirit, but, being + barred from sea-training, could not be kept in a condition of + efficiency, whereas the blockading fleet was quickly raised to + the highest temper by the stress of vigilance and danger that + was its incessant portion. So long as the strain did not pass + the limit of human endurance, it was all to the good. In the + old days, with very moderate + <!-- Page 203 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_203" + id="Page_203"></a>[pg 203]</span> reliefs, the limit was + never reached, and the sacrifices that were made to those + exhausting vigils were rewarded twentyfold in exuberant + confidence on the day of battle. Can we expect the same + compensation now? Will the balance of strength and weakness + remain as it used to be? In the face of the vast change of + conditions and the thinness of experience, it is to general + principles we must turn for the answer.</p> + + <p>What, in fact, is the inherent weakness of close blockade? + Strategical theory will at once reply that it is an operation + which involves "an arrest of the offensive," a situation which + is usually taken to exhibit every kind of drawback. Close + blockade is essentially an offensive operation, although its + object is usually negative; that is, it is a forward movement + to prevent the enemy carrying out some offensive operation + either direct or by way of counterstroke. So far the common + tendency to confuse "Seeking out the enemy's fleet" with + "Making the enemy's coast your frontier" may be condoned. But + the two operations are widely different in that they have + different objectives. In "seeking out," our objective is the + enemy's armed force. In "making the enemy's coast our + frontier," the objective is inseparable from the ulterior + object of the naval war. In this case the objective is the + common communications. By establishing a blockade we operate + offensively against those communications. We occupy them, and + then we can do no more. Our offensive is arrested; we cannot + carry it on to the destruction of the enemy's fleet. We have to + wait in a defensive attitude, holding the communications we + have seized, till he chooses to attack in order to break our + hold; and during that period of arrest the advantage of + surprise—the all-important advantage in war—passes + by a well recognised rule to our enemy. We, in fact, are held + upon the defensive, with none of the material advantages of the + defensive. The moral advantage of having taken the initiative + remains, but that is all. The advantage which we thus gain will + of course have the same kind of depressing effect upon the + <!-- Page 204 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_204" + id="Page_204"></a>[pg 204]</span> blockaded fleet as it had + of old, but scarcely in so high a degree. The degradation of + a steam fleet in port can scarcely be so rapid or + debilitating as it was when nine-tenths of seamanship lay in + the smart handling of sails. For the blockading fleet it is + also true that the effects of weather, which formerly were + the main cause of wear and tear, can scarcely be so severe. + But, on the other hand, the physical strain to officers and + men, and the difficulty of supply, will be far greater, so + long at least as coal is the chief fuel. The wind no longer + sets a measure on the enemy's movements. Vigilance close and + unremitting beyond all our predecessors knew is the portion + of the blockaders to prevent surprise. Furthermore, in the + old days surprise meant at worst the enemy's escape; now it + may mean our own destruction by mine or torpedo. It is + unnecessary to labour the point. It is too obvious that a + close blockade of the old type exhibits under present + conditions the defects of "arrested offence" in so high a + degree as practically to prohibit its use.</p> + + <p>What, then, can be done? Must we rest content in all + situations with Howe's system, which riper experience condemned + for cases of extreme necessity? Cannot the old close blockade + be given a modern form? Assuredly it can. In old days the + shoreward limit of the blockading fleet was just beyond the + range of the coast batteries, and this position it held + continuously by means of an inshore squadron. In these days of + mobile defence that limit is by analogy the night range of + destroyers and the day range of submarines, that is, half the + distance they can traverse between dark and dawn or dawn and + dark respectively, unless within that limit a torpedo-proof + base can be established. A blockade of this nature will + correspond in principle to a close blockade of the old type; + nor in practice, as was proved in the Japanese blockade of Port + Arthur, will its incidents be materially different. The + distance at which the battle-squadron must keep will seem at + first sight to deny it certainty of immediate contact—the + essence + <!-- Page 205 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_205" + id="Page_205"></a>[pg 205]</span> of close blockade. But in + truth other new factors already noticed will reduce that + distance relatively. Quicker and more certain means of + communication between the admiral and his scouts, the + absolute freedom of movement and the power of delaying the + enemy's actual exit by mining, may go far to bring things + back to their old relations. At Port Arthur they did so + entirely. If then, as in that case, our paramount object is + to keep the enemy in, there seems still no reason why we + should not make our dispositions on the principle of close + blockade. Distances will be greater, but that is all.</p> + + <p>Nor must it be forgotten that for a squadron to take station + off a port in the old manner is not the only means of close + blockade. It may still effect its purpose, at least + temporarily, by supporting mining vessels or block + ships—"sinkers," as they used to be called. The latter + expedient, it is true, had little success in the latest + experiments, but even in the Russo-Japanese War its + possibilities were by no means exhausted. We have therefore to + conclude that where the strategical conditions call obviously + for close blockade, our plan of operations will be modified in + that direction with the means still at our disposal.</p> + + <p>If, however, our object is not so sharply defined, if in + spite of our desire to deny the enemy the sea we are ready to + take risks in order to bring about a decision, the case is not + so clear. It will be observed that the looseness which the new + conditions force upon close blockade-increasing as they are in + intensity year by year-must tend more and more to approximate + it in practice to open blockade. The question will therefore + present itself whether it would not be more in accordance with + the fundamental elements of strength to adopt open blockade + frankly for all purposes. We should thus substitute a true + defensive disposition for an arrested offence, and, + theoretically, that in itself is a great advantage. The + practical benefits, whatever the correlative drawbacks, are + <!-- Page 206 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_206" + id="Page_206"></a>[pg 206]</span> equally clear, nor are + they less great now than they appeared to Howe and + Kempenfelt. We avoid exhaustion of machinery, coal, and men, + and this, at least for the necessary flotilla screen, will + be greater than anything that had to be faced in former + days. We have at least the opportunity of occupying a + position secure from surprise, and of keeping the fleet + continually up to its highest striking energy. Finally, + assuming the geographical conditions give reasonable promise + of contact, a quick decision, which modern war demands with + ever greater insistence, is more probable. In such a + disposition of course contact can rarely be made certain. + The enemy, whom the hypothesis of blockade assumes to be + anxious to avoid action, will always have a chance of + evasion, but this will always be so, even with the closest + blockade now possible. We may even go further and claim for + open blockade that in favourable conditions it may give the + better chance of contact. For by adopting the principle of + open blockade we shall have, in accordance with the theory + of defence, the further advantages of being able the better + to conceal our dispositions, and consequently to lay traps + for our enemy, such as that which Nelson prepared for + Villeneuve in the Gulf of Lyons in 1805.</p> + + <p>The objection to such a course which appears to have the + most weight with current opinion is the moral one, which is + inseparable from all deliberate choices of the defensive. If + the watching fleet remains in a home fortified base, it may be + assumed that the usual moral degradation will set in. But the + method does not entail the inglorious security of such a base. + A sound position may well be found at a spot such as Admiral + <!-- Page 207 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_207" + id="Page_207"></a>[pg 207]</span> Togo occupied while + waiting for the Baltic fleet, and in that case there was no + observable degradation of any kind. Nor is there much + evidence that this objection weighed materially with the + opponents of Howe's view. Their objection was of a purely + physical kind. Open blockade left the enemy too much freedom + to raid our trade routes. The watching system might be + sufficient to keep an unwilling battle-fleet in port or to + bring a more adventurous one to action, but it could not + control raiding squadrons. This was certainly Barham's + objection. "If," he wrote to Pitt in 1794, "the French + should have any intention of sending their fleet to sea with + this easterly wind, and Lord Howe continues at Torbay, our + Mediterranean and Jamaica convoys are in a very critical + situation. Both fleets must by this time be drawing near the + Channel, and cannot enter it while the easterly wind holds." + This danger must always be with us, especially in narrow + waters such as the North Sea. In more open theatres the + difficulty is not so obtrusive, for with sufficient sea room + trade may take naturally or by direction a course which our + watching dispositions will cover. Thus with Nelson in the + case of Toulon, his normal positions on the Sardinian coast + covered effectually the flow of our trade to the Levant and + the Two Sicilies, which was all there was at the time.</p> + + <p>The truth is, that in endeavouring to decide between open + and close blockade we find ourselves confronted with those + special difficulties which so sharply distinguish naval warfare + from warfare on land. We cannot choose on purely naval + considerations. In naval warfare, however great may be our + desire to concentrate our effort on the enemy's main forces, + the ulterior object will always obtrude itself. We must from + the first do our best to control sea communications, and since + those communications are usually common, we cannot refrain + <!-- Page 208 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_208" + id="Page_208"></a>[pg 208]</span> from occupying those of + the enemy without at the same time neglecting and exposing + our own. Thus in the case of Brest a close blockade was + always desirable, and especially at convoy seasons, because + the great trade routes which passed within striking distance + of the port were all common, whereas in the region of Toulon + the main lines were not common except along the coasts of + Africa and Southern Italy, and these Nelson's open blockade + amply secured.</p> + + <p>The general conclusion, then, is that however high may be + the purely naval and strategical reasons for adopting open + blockade as the best means of securing a decision against the + enemy's fleet, yet the inevitable intrusion of the ulterior + object in the form of trade protection or the security of + military expeditions will seldom leave us entirely free to use + the open method. We must be prepared, in fact, to find + ourselves at least at times faced with the necessity of using a + form of blockade as nearly modelled on the old close blockade + as changed conditions will permit.</p> + <!-- Page 209 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_209" + id="Page_209"></a>[pg 209]</span> + <hr /> + + <h3>CHAPTER THREE</h3> + <hr /> + + <h2>METHODS OF<br /> + DISPUTING COMMAND</h2> + <hr /> + + <h3>I. DEFENSIVE FLEET OPERATIONS—"A FLEET IN<br /> + BEING"</h3> + + <p>In dealing with the theory of sea command, attention was + called to the error of assuming that if we are unable to win + the command we therefore lose it. It was pointed out that this + proposition, which is too often implied in strategical + discussion, denies in effect that there can be such a thing as + strategical defensive at sea, and ignores the fact that the + normal condition in war is for the command to be in dispute. + Theory and history are at one on the point. Together they + affirm that a Power too weak to win command by offensive + operations may yet succeed in holding the command in dispute by + assuming a general defensive attitude.</p> + + <p>That such an attitude in itself cannot lead to any positive + result at sea goes without saying, but nevertheless even over + prolonged periods it can prevent an enemy securing positive + results, and so give time for the other belligerent to dominate + the situation by securing his ends ashore.</p> + + <p>It is seldom that we have been forced even for a time to + adopt such an attitude, but our enemies have done so frequently + to our serious annoyance and loss. In the Seven Years' War, for + instance, the French by avoiding offensive operations likely to + lead to a decision, and confining themselves + <!-- Page 210 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_210" + id="Page_210"></a>[pg 210]</span> to active defence, were + able for five campaigns to prevent our reducing Canada, + which was the object of the war. Had they staked the issue + on a great fleet action in the first campaign, and had the + result been against them, we could certainly have achieved + our object in half the time. In the end, of course, they + failed to prevent the conquest, but during all the time the + catastrophe was postponed France had abundant opportunity of + gaining offensively elsewhere territory which, as she at all + events believed, would have compelled us to give up our + conquest at the peace.</p> + + <p>Again, in our last great naval war Napoleon by avoiding + general actions was able to keep the command in dispute till by + alliances and otherwise he had gathered force which he deemed + sufficient to warrant a return to the offensive. Eventually + that force proved unequal to the task, yet when it failed and + the command passed to his enemy, he had had time to consolidate + his power so far that the loss of his fleet seemed scarcely to + affect it, and for nine years more he was able to continue the + struggle.</p> + + <p>Such examples—and there are many of them—serve + to show how serious a matter is naval defence in the hands of a + great military Power with other means of offence. They tell us + how difficult it is to deal with, and how serious therefore for + even the strongest naval Power is the need to give it careful + study.</p> + + <p>And not for this reason only, but also because the strongest + naval Power, if faced with a coalition, may find it impossible + to exert a drastic offensive anywhere without temporarily + reducing its force in certain areas to a point relatively so + low as to permit of nothing higher than the defensive. The + leading case of such a state of affairs, which we must further + consider presently, was our own position in the War of American + Independence, when, as we have seen, in order to secure an + adequate concentration for offence in the West Indies we were + forced to reduce our home fleet to defensive level.</p> + <!-- Page 211 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_211" + id="Page_211"></a>[pg 211]</span> + + <p>What, then, do we mean by naval defence? To arrive at a + right answer we must first clear our mind of all confusing + shadows cast by the accidents of land defence. Both on land and + at sea defence means of course taking certain measures to defer + a decision until military or political developments so far + redress the balance of strength that we are able to pass to the + offensive. In the operations of armies the most usual means + employed are the holding of positions and forcing our superior + enemy to exhaust his strength in attacking them. Consequently + the idea of military defence is dominated by the conception of + entrenched positions and fortresses.</p> + + <p>In naval warfare this is not so. At sea the main conception + is avoiding decisive action by strategical or tactical + activity, so as to keep our fleet in being till the situation + develops in our favour. In the golden age of our navy the + keynote of naval defence was mobility, not rest. The idea was + to dispute the control by harassing operations, to exercise + control at any place or at any moment as we saw a chance, and + to prevent the enemy exercising control in spite of his + superiority by continually occupying his attention. The idea of + mere resistance was hardly present at all. Everything was + counterattack, whether upon the enemy's force or his maritime + communications. On land, of course, such methods of defence are + also well known, but they belong much more to guerilla warfare + than to regular operations. In regular warfare with standing + armies, however brilliantly harassing operations and + counter-attack are used, the fundamental conception is the + defended or defensible position.</p> + + <p>Similarly at sea, although the essence of defence is + mobility and an untiring aggressive spirit rather than rest and + resistance, yet there also defended and defensible positions + are not excluded. But they are only used in the last resort. A + fleet may retire temporarily into waters difficult of access, + where it can only be attacked at great risk, or into a + fortified base, where it is practically removed from the board + and cannot be + <!-- Page 212 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_212" + id="Page_212"></a>[pg 212]</span> attacked at all by a fleet + alone. But the occasions on which such expedients can be + used at sea are far rarer than on land. Indeed except for + the most temporary purposes they can scarcely be regarded as + admissible at sea, however great their value on land. The + reason is simple. A fleet withdrawing to such a position + leaves open to the enemy the ulterior object, which is the + control of sea communications, whereas on land an army in a + good position may even for a prolonged period cover the + ulterior object, which is usually territory. An army in + position, moreover, is always doing something to exhaust its + opponent and redress the unfavourable balance, but a fleet + in inactivity is too often permitting the enemy to carry on + operations which tend to exhaust the resources of its own + country.</p> + + <p>For a maritime Power, then, a naval defensive means nothing + but keeping the fleet actively in being-not merely in + existence, but in active and vigorous life. No phrase can + better express the full significance of the idea than "A fleet + in being," if it be rightly understood. Unfortunately it has + come to be restricted, by a misunderstanding of the + circumstances in which it was first invented, to one special + class of defence. We speak of it as though it were essentially + a method of defence against invasion, and so miss its fuller + meaning. If, however, it be extended to express defence against + any kind of maritime attack, whether against territory or sea + communications, its broad truth will become apparent, and it + will give us the true conception of the idea as held in the + British service.</p> + + <p>The occasion on which it was first used was one that well + exhibits the special possibilities of a naval defensive. It was + in the year 1690, when, in alliance with the Dutch, we were at + war with France, and though really superior, had been caught in + a situation which placed us temporarily at a great disadvantage + in home waters. The French by a surprising rapidity of + mobilisation and concentration had stolen a <!-- + Page 213 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_213" + id="Page_213"></a>[pg 213]</span> march on us before either + our mobilisation or our concentration was complete. King + William, with the best of the army, was in Ireland dealing + with a French invasion in support of James, and a squadron + of seven sail under Sir Cloudesley Shovel had been detached + into the Irish Sea to guard his communications. Another + squadron, consisting of sixteen of the line, British and + Dutch, had been sent to Gibraltar under Admiral Killigrew to + take down the trade and to keep an eye on Chateaurenault, + who with a slightly inferior squadron was at Toulon. It was + assumed he would probably make a push for Brest, where the + French main fleet was mobilising under the Comte de + Tourville, and Killigrew had orders to follow him if he got + through the Straits. Chateaurenault did get through; + Killigrew failed to bring him to action, and instead of + following him immediately, he went into Cadiz to complete + his arrangements for forwarding his outward-bound convoy and + escorting the one he was to bring home. What of course he + should have done, according to the practice of more + experienced times, was to have left this work to a + <!-- Page 214 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_214" + id="Page_214"></a>[pg 214]</span> cruiser detachment, and + failing contact with Chateaurenault, should have closed at + once to the strategical centre with his battle-squadron.</p> + + <p>Meanwhile the home fleet, which Lord Torrington was to + command, was still unformed. It lay in three divisions, at the + Downs, Portsmouth, and Plymouth, while a considerable part of + the promised Dutch contingent had not made its appearance. It + was a splendid chance for the French to seize the command of + the Channel before the concentration could take place and to + crush the British in detail. Accordingly, on June 13th, as soon + as Chateaurenault had arrived, Tourville put to sea with some + seventy of the line. The day before, however, Torrington, + having hoisted his flag in the Downs, had massed his two main + divisions at Portsmouth, and by the time Tourville appeared off + the Isle of Wight he had with later arrivals, both Dutch and + British, about fifty-six of the line in St. Helen's Road. Not + knowing that the Toulon contingent had joined, he put to sea + intending to fight, but on discovering the great superiority of + the French, he decided in concert with his council of war to + act on the defensive, and before offering battle to endeavour + to secure a concentration with Killigrew and Shovel and the + Plymouth division by getting to the westward. If he found this + course impossible without fighting an action, his plan was to + retire before Tourville "even to the Gunfleet," where amidst + the shoals of the Thames estuary he felt he would have a good + chance of repelling an attack with success. There, too, he + counted on being reinforced not only <!-- + Page 215 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_215" + id="Page_215"></a>[pg 215]</span> by the ships still at + Chatham, but also possibly by ships from the westward which + might steal along the coast and join him "over the flats" by + channels unknown to the French. To fight as he was he + considered to be only playing the enemy's game. "If we are + beaten," he said in communicating his plan to the + Government, "they being absolute masters of the sea will be + at great liberty of doing many things which they dare not do + whilst we observe them and are in a possibility of joining + Admiral Killigrew and our ships to the westward."</p> + + <p>It was a plan conceived on the best principles of + defence—waiting till the acquisition of fresh force + justified a return to the offensive. It is further interesting + as a pure case of naval defence, with no ulterior object other + than control of home waters. In the minds of the Government + there was no apprehension of any definite attempt to invade + across the Channel, but the invasion of Ireland was in full + progress, and all nourishment of it must be stopped and our own + communications kept free. There was, moreover, serious anxiety + lest the French should extend their operations to Scotland, and + there was Killigrew's homeward-bound convoy approaching. The + situation was one that obviously could not be solved + effectually except by winning a general command of the sea, but + in Torrington's judgment it could be rendered innocuous by + holding the command in dispute. His design, therefore, was to + act upon the defensive and prevent the enemy achieving any + positive result until he was in a position to fight them with a + fair chance of victory. A temporary defensive he considered was + the only way to win the command, while to hazard a decision in + inferior strength was the best way to lose it.</p> + + <p>Nothing could be in closer harmony with the principles of + good strategy as we understand them now. It was undoubtedly + <!-- Page 216 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_216" + id="Page_216"></a>[pg 216]</span> in advance of anything + that had been done up to that time, and it was little wonder + if the Government, as is usually said, failed to appreciate + the design. Their rejection of it has come in for very + severe criticism. But it would seem that they misunderstood + rather than failed to appreciate. The Earl of Nottingham, + who was at the head of the Government, believed, as his + reply to the admiral clearly shows, that Torrington meant to + retire to the Gunfleet at once; whereas it is equally clear + to us that the Gunfleet was to be his extreme point, and + that he did not mean to retire so far unless the French + forced him. The Minister failed, as others have done since, + to grasp what the admiral meant by "A fleet in being." He + thought that in Torrington's view a fleet safe in port and + not in contact with the enemy was "in being," whereas + Torrington had no such idea. As Nottingham conceived the + admiral's intention he saw that although it might preserve + the fleet, it would expose everything else to destruction; + that is, he was oppressed with the special characteristic of + naval warfare which always permits action against the + ulterior object when the enemy denies you any chance of + acting against his armed force.</p> + + <p>Under this misapprehension, which indeed was not justified + by the words of Torrington's despatch, he procured from the + Queen an order in these terms: "We apprehend," it ran, "the + consequences of your retiring to the Gunfleet to be so fatal, + that we choose rather you should upon any advantage of the wind + give battle to the enemy than retreat farther than is necessary + to get an advantage upon the enemy." It was, however, left to + his discretion to proceed to the westward to complete his + concentration that way, provided, it said, "you by no means + ever lose sight of the French fleet whereby they + <!-- Page 217 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_217" + id="Page_217"></a>[pg 217]</span> may have opportunity of + making attempts upon the shore or in the rivers of Medway or + Thames, or get away without fighting."</p> + + <p>This order has been very hardly dealt with by modern + critics, although it clearly contemplates true preventive + observation, and even, as the last words suggest, the idea + contained in Nelson's well-known saying, "that by the time the + enemy had beat our fleet soundly they would do us no more harm + this year." It is true that Nelson could rely on the proved + superiority of the British at that time unit for unit, but it + is also true that Nottingham and his colleagues in the + Government had information which led them greatly to + underestimate Tourville's strength. This was evident on the + face of Nottingham's despatch which covered the order, so + evident indeed that Torrington might well perhaps have + suspended the execution of an order so obviously based on + incorrect information. But knowing probably what intrigues were + going on against him at Court, he chose to regard it as a + peremptory command to engage whenever he found himself to + windward.</p> + + <p>Much as a more scientific view of naval strategy may admire + Torrington's conception, there seems no reason for losing + temper over the Government's plan. It was certainly one way of + solving the problem, and seeing how large were our reserves, a + defeat need not have meant disaster. Still, it was doubtless + dictated by an inability to grasp, the strategical strength of + Torrington's novel plan, a plan which was not + <!-- Page 218 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_218" + id="Page_218"></a>[pg 218]</span> only safer, but was + calculated to achieve greater positive results in the end. + The real fallacy of the Government's plan was that although + it had a specious appearance of a bold offensive, it could + have achieved nothing but a negative result. The most a + battle could have given in the circumstances could only have + left the command in dispute, and the worst would have given + the enemy a positive result, which must have gravely + compromised William's campaign in Ireland.</p> + + <p>On these lines Torrington replied to the Government. Dealing + with their anxiety for the ships to the westward and the + Mediterranean convoy, whose danger was their expressed reason + for forbidding him the Gunfleet, he pointed out that they could + not run much hazard if they took care of themselves. For, as he + repeated, "while we observe the French, they cannot make any + attempt on ships or shore without running great hazard, and if + we are beaten, all is exposed to their mercy." Thus without + specially noticing the Minister's misinterpretation of his + despatch, he intimated that his intention was observation, and + not simple retreat.</p> + + <p>By the time Torrington sent this reply he had been pressed + back as far as Beachy Head; it was no longer possible to get to + the westward; and the following day, finding himself to + windward, he attacked. But still confirmed in his idea of + defence, and carrying it on to his tactics, he refused to give + the French the chance of a real decision, and disengaged as + soon as a drop in the wind permitted. So far he felt justified + in <!-- + Page 219 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_219" + id="Page_219"></a>[pg 219]</span> interpreting orders which + he knew were founded on false information. He was sure, as + he said in justification of the way he fought the action, + "that the Queen could not have been prevailed with to sign + an order for it, had not both our weakness and the strength + of the enemy been disguised to her."</p> + + <p>So severely was his fleet crippled that he believed his plan + could no longer act. "What the consequences of this unfortunate + battle may be," he wrote in his Journal, "God Almighty only + knows, but this I dare be positive in, had I been left to my + liberty I had prevented any attempt upon the land, and secured + the western ships, Killigrew, and the merchantmen." Actually in + all this he was successful. Slowly retiring eastward he drew + the French after him as far as Dover before he ran to the Nore; + and Tourville was unable to get back to + <!-- Page 220 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_220" + id="Page_220"></a>[pg 220]</span> the westward, till all the + endangered ships were safe in Plymouth. In spite of + Torrington's being forced to fight an action at the wrong + time and place, his design had so far succeeded. Not only + had he prevented the French doing anything that could affect + the issue of the war, but he had completely foiled + Tourville's plan of destroying the British fleet in detail. + That he had done, but retribution by passing to the + offensive was no longer in his power.</p> + + <p>That Tourville or his Government was impressed with the + efficacy of the method was demonstrated the following year, + when he in his turn found himself in an inferiority that denied + him hope of a successful battle decision. During the summer he + kept his fleet hovering off the mouth of the Channel without + giving the British admiral a chance of contact. His method, + however, differed from that of Torrington, and he only achieved + his negative object by keeping out of sight of his enemy + altogether. In his opinion, if a fleet remained at sea in close + observation of an active enemy an action could not be avoided. + "If (the admiral)," he wrote in his memorandum on the subject, + "be ordered to keep the sea to try to amuse the enemy and to + let them know we are in a position to attack in case they + attempt a descent, I think it my duty to say that in that case + we must make up our mind to have to fight them in the end; for + if they have really sought an action, they will have been able + to fight, seeing that it is impossible to pirouette so long + near a fleet without coming to grips."<a name="NtA_20" + id="NtA_20"></a><a href="#Nt_20"><sup>20</sup></a> This is + as much as to say that a sure point of temporary retreat is + necessary to "a fleet in being," and this was an essential + part of Torrington's idea.</p> + + <p>In Torrington's and Tourville's time, when ships were + unhandy and fleet tactics in their infancy, the difficulty of + avoiding <!-- Page 221 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_221" + id="Page_221"></a>[pg 221]</span> action, when a determined + enemy had once got contact, were undoubtedly great, unless a + port of retreat was kept open. But as the art of naval + warfare developed, the possibilities of "a fleet in being" + were regarded as much wider, at least in the British + service. It was nearly a hundred years before we were again + forced to use the same device on a large scale, and then it + was believed that superior speed and tactical precision were + factors that could be counted on to an almost unlimited + extent. In the darkest days of the War of American + Independence we have a memorandum of the subject by + Kempenfelt, which not only gives the developed idea of "a + fleet in being" and the high aggressive spirit that is its + essence, but also explains its value, not merely as a + defensive expedient, but as a means of permitting a drastic + offensive even when you are as a whole inferior. "When you + know the enemy's designs," he says, "in order to do + something effectual you must endeavour to be superior to + them in some part where they have designs to execute, and + where, if they succeed, they would most injure you. If your + fleet is divided as to be in all places inferior to the + enemy, they will have a fair chance of succeeding everywhere + in their attempts. If a squadron cannot be formed sufficient + to face the enemy's at home, it would be more advantageous + to let your inferiority be still greater in order by it to + gain the superiority elsewhere."</p> + + <p>"When inferior to the enemy, and you have only a squadron of + observation to watch and attend upon their motions, such a + squadron should be composed of two-decked ships only [that is, + ships of the highest mobility] as to assure it purpose. It must + have the advantage of the enemy in sailing, else under certain + circumstances it will be liable to be forced to battle or to + give up some of its heavy sailers. It is highly necessary to + have such a flying squadron to hang on the enemy's large fleet, + as it will prevent their dividing into separate squadrons for + intercepting your trade or spreading their + <!-- Page 222 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_222" + id="Page_222"></a>[pg 222]</span> ships for a more extensive + view. You will be at hand to profit from any accidental + separation or dispersion of their fleet from hard gales, + fogs, or other causes. You may intercept supplies, + intelligence, &c, sent to them. In fine, such a squadron + will be a check and restraint upon their motions, and + prevent a good deal of the mischief they might otherwise + do."</p> + + <p>Three years before, when first called to be Chief of the + Staff in the Channel, he had emphasised the same points. + "Much," he wrote in July 1779, "I may say all, depends upon + this fleet. 'Tis an inferior against a superior fleet. + Therefore the greatest skill and address is requisite to + counteract the designs of the enemy, to watch and seize the + favourable opportunity for action, and to catch the advantage + of making the effort at some or other feeble part of the + enemy's line; or if such opportunities don't offer, to hover + near the enemy, keep him at bay, and prevent his attempting + anything but at risk and hazard; to command their attention, + and oblige them to think of nothing but being on their guard + against your attack."<a name="NtA_21" + id="NtA_21"></a><a href="#Nt_21"><sup>21</sup></a></p> + + <p>It was on these lines the war was conducted. The West Indian + area, in which lay the enemy's principal object, was treated as + the offensive theatre and the home waters as the defensive. + Inferior as was the Channel fleet to the home fleet of the + allies, its defensive operations proved adequate to prevent + their achieving any success. Nor was this all, for Kempenfelt + was able to demonstrate the positive side of his theory in the + most brilliant and convincing manner. In dealing with + <!-- Page 223 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_223" + id="Page_223"></a>[pg 223]</span> concentration we have seen + how, in command of such a flying squadron as he postulated, + he was able off Ushant to seize a favourable opportunity for + action, which resulted in his capturing a convoy of military + stores essential to the French operations in the West Indies + under the nose of De Guichen with an escort of nearly twice + his force.</p> + + <p>Nelson certainly shared Kempenfelt's views as to the + possibilities of an inferior fleet kept actively in being. "As + to our fleet," he wrote from the Mediterranean in 1796, "under + such a commander-in-chief as Sir John Jervis nobody has any + fear ... We are now twenty-two sail of the line. The combined + fleet will not be above thirty-five.... I will venture my life + Sir John Jervis defeats them. I do not mean by a regular + battle, but by the skill of our admiral and the activity and + spirit of our officers and seamen. This country is the most + favourable possible for that skill with an inferior fleet; for + the winds are so variable, that some one time in twenty-four + hours you must be able to attack a part of a large fleet, and + the other will be becalmed or have a contrary wind. Therefore I + hope the Government will not be alarmed for our safety."</p> + + <p>Such a conception of the defensive may indeed be said to + have become current in the British service. It was part of the + reasoning which in 1805, after Villeneuve's escape from the + Mediterranean, decided Sir John Orde to fall back on + <!-- Page 224 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_224" + id="Page_224"></a>[pg 224]</span> Ushant instead of entering + the Straits. "I dare believe," he wrote, "Lord Nelson will + be found in condition with his twelve of the line and + numerous frigates to act on the defensive without loss and + even to hang on to the skirts of the enemy's fleet should it + attempt any material service, especially when encumbered + with troops."</p> + + <p>In all this consideration of the potentialities of "a fleet + in being" operating defensively it must never be forgotten that + we are dealing with its possibilities in relation to a general + command of the sea—to its general power of holding such + command in dispute, as Torrington used it. Its power of + preventing a particular operation, such as oversea invasion, is + another matter, which will always depend upon the local + conditions. If the "fleet in being" can be contained in such a + way that it is impossible for it to reach the invading line of + passage, it will be no bar to invasion. In 1690, so far as + Torrington's fleet was concerned, the French, had they been so + minded, might have made a descent, say, at Portsmouth while + Torrington was at the Nore. But Torrington's fleet was not the + only factor. His retreat forced Tourville to leave behind him + unfought the squadrons of Shovel and Killigrew, and so far as + commanding a line of invasion passage was concerned Tourville + was himself as well contained as Torrington. The conditions of + naval defence against invasion are in fact so complex compared + with those of general naval defence that they must be treated + later as a special branch of the subject.</p> + + <p>The doctrine of the "Fleet in being" as formulated and + practised by Torrington and developed by Kempenfelt goes no + further than this, that where the enemy regards the general + command of a sea area as necessary to his offensive purposes, + you may be able to prevent his gaining such command by using + your fleet defensively, refusing what Nelson <!-- Page + 225 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_225" + id="Page_225"></a>[pg 225]</span> called a regular battle, + and seizing every opportunity for a counterstroke. To use it + as it was used by the French in the case of Tourville's + famous deterrent cruise, where the whole object of the + French was offensive and could not be obtained except by + offence, is quite another thing.</p> + + <p>It is indeed difficult to understand the admiration with + which his <i>campagne au large</i> has been treated in France. + He kept the sea off the mouth of the Channel for fifty days in + the summer of 1691, and for forty of those days our Channel + fleet was making no systematic effort to seek him out. He had + been sent to sea in hope of intercepting our great "Smyrna + convoy," which was then the backbone of our oversea trade. + Russell with the British main fleet simply took positions to + cover its approach until it was safe, knowing presumably that + Tourville must come to him if he wished to accomplish his + purpose. When the convoy was safe Russell proceeded off Ushant, + that is, between the enemy and his base. Tourville's + communications were thus cut, his line of retreat threatened, + and he seized the first opportunity to elude Russell and to + return into port. Beyond taking a few ships from one of the + West India convoys, he accomplished nothing. The central French + offensive in Ireland was broken at the battle of the Boyne, and + the prestige of England at sea was restored. It is true our + trade suffered in the North Sea, but this was not directly due + to the concentration which Tourville's cruise forced upon us, + but rather to the failure of the Dutch—apparently by a + misunderstanding-to provide for an effective blockade of + Dunkirk.</p> + <!-- Page 226 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_226" + id="Page_226"></a>[pg 226]</span> + + <p>To British eyes it will seem that the heresy which was + latent in Tourville's instructions was a seed that choked all + the finer aspirations of the French navy. In 1691 the plan of + his cruise may possibly be defended as sufficiently aggressive, + since, seeing how unstable was William's new throne, a + resounding blow at British trade, combined with an expected + victory in Ireland, might have been enough to upset it. But + afterwards the idea was stretched to occasions it would not + fit. It seems to have bred a belief that where the object of + the war plainly depended on winning a real command of the sea, + that object could yet be attained by naval defensive + operations. Many times it is true a policy which had starved + the navy of France left no other course open to her seamen, and + had they in their inferiority attempted the offensive, the end + must have been swifter if not more certain. In criticising the + maritime history of France we must be careful to distinguish + policy from strategy. It was not always the defensive strategy + that was bad, but the policy that condemned her admirals to + negative operations. Seeing that she was a continental Power + with continental aspirations, it was often a policy from which + her military exigencies permitted no escape. Nevertheless the + policy was twice accursed: it cursed her when she was weak, and + cursed her when she was strong. The prolonged use of the + defensive bred a habit of mind which seems to have rendered her + incapable of striking hard when she had the strength. In no + other way at least can we account for the behaviour of so + high-spirited a nation when her chance of revenge came in the + War of American Independence.</p> + + <p>It is here in its moral reactions lies the danger of the + defensive, a danger so insidious in its working as to tempt us + never to utter the word. Yet with the voice of Torrington, + Kempenfelt, and Nelson in our ears, it would be folly to ignore + it for ourselves, and still more to ignore the exhausting + strain its use by our enemy may impose upon us. It must be + studied, if for no other reasons than to learn how to break it + down. Nor + <!-- Page 227 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_227" + id="Page_227"></a>[pg 227]</span> will the study have + danger, if only we keep well in view the spirit of restless + and vigilant counter-attack which Kempenfelt and Nelson + regarded as its essence. True, some of the conditions which + in the days of sails made for opportunity have passed away, + but many still remain. Shifts of wind and calms will no + longer bring them, but weather thick or violent can yet make + seamanship, nimbleness, and cohesion tell as it always did; + and there is no reason to doubt that it is still possible + for hard sea-training to make "the activity and spirit of + our officers and seamen" give the results which Nelson so + confidently expected.</p> + + <h3>II. MINOR COUNTER-ATTACKS</h3> + + <p>For the weaker of two belligerents minor-attack has always + exercised a certain fascination. Where a Power was so inferior + in naval force that it could scarcely count even on disputing + command by fleet operations, there remained a hope of reducing + the relative inferiority by putting part of the enemy's force + out of action. Such hopes were rarely realised. In 1587 Drake + succeeded in stopping the Spanish invasion by such a + counter-attack on the Cadiz division of the Armada while it was + still unmobilised. In 1667 the Dutch achieved a similar success + against our Chatham division when it was demobilised and + undefended, and thereby probably secured rather more favourable + terms of peace. But it cannot be said that the old wars present + any case where the ultimate question of command was seriously + affected by a minor counterattack.</p> + + <p>The advent of the torpedo, however, has given the idea a new + importance that cannot be overlooked. The degree of that + importance is at present beyond calculation. There is at least + no evidence that it would be very high in normal conditions and + between ordinarily efficient fleets. The comparative success of + the opening Japanese attack on the Port Arthur + <!-- Page 228 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_228" + id="Page_228"></a>[pg 228]</span> squadron is the only case + in point, and where only one case exists, it is necessary to + use extreme caution in estimating its significance. Before + we can deduce anything of permanent value we must consider + very carefully both its conditions and results.</p> + + <p>To begin with, it was a new experience of a new class of + weapon, and it by no means follows that the success of a new + expedient will be repeated with anything like equal result. It + will not be irrelevant again to recall the case of fireships. + At the outset of the sailing era in 1588, this device prepared + the way for a decisive success against a fleet in the open. In + the succeeding wars the new weapon found a prominent place in + the organisation of sea-going fleets, but its success was never + repeated. Against ships in ill-defended harbours it did + occasionally produce good results, and during the infancy of + tactics its moral and even material effects in fleet actions + were frequently demonstrated. But as naval science developed + and the limitations of the weapon were more accurately + measured, it was able to achieve less and less, till in the + eighteenth century it was regarded as almost negligible. Even + its moral effect was lost, and it ceased to be considered as a + battle unit.</p> + + <p>Now, if we examine closely the Port Arthur case, we shall + find it pointing to the existence of certain inherent + conditions not dissimilar from those which discredited + fireships as a decisive factor in war. In spite of the + apparently formidable nature of a surprise attack by torpedo + the indications from the one case in point are that these + conditions make for greater power in the defence than in the + attack. The first <!-- Page + 229 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_229" + id="Page_229"></a>[pg 229]</span> condition relates to the + difficulty of locating the objective accurately. It is + obvious that for this kind of operation the most precise + intelligence is essential, and of all intelligence the most + difficult to obtain in war is the distribution of an enemy's + fleet from day to day. The Japanese had fairly certain + information that the bulk of the Port Arthur squadron was + lying in the outer anchorage, but it had been constantly + moving, and there was a report that three battleships had + just been detached from it. The report was false, but the + result was that of the five divisions of destroyers which + the Japanese had available, two were diverted against Dalny, + where no enemy was found. Such uncertainty must always + exist, and in no circumstances is it likely to be less than + where, as in the Japanese case, the attack is made before + declaration, and while the ordinary channels of intelligence + are still open.</p> + + <p>Further, it is to be noted that in spite of the fact that + relations for some weeks had been highly strained, and a + surprise torpedo attack was regarded as probable, the Russians + had taken no precautions to confuse their enemy. It is obvious + that measures to prevent accurate locating can, and should, be + taken in such cases. We may go further. From confusing the + enemy by such means it is but a step to lead him to a wrong + conclusion, and to lay for him a trap which may swallow up the + bulk of his destroyer force in the first hours of the war. It + is to be feared, however, that the risks of such an eventuality + are so great in minor counter-attacks of this nature, that it + will probably be very difficult to tempt an inferior enemy to + expose his flotilla in this way.</p> + + <p>This view receives emphasis from the second point which the + Port Arthur case serves to demonstrate, and that is the great + power of even the flimsiest defence against such attacks; in + other words, the chances of success can scarcely ever + <!-- Page 230 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_230" + id="Page_230"></a>[pg 230]</span> be great enough to justify + the risk. Everything was in favour of the Japanese. Orders + had been issued in the Russian squadron for two or three + nights previously to prepare for a torpedo attack, but so + low had discipline fallen, that the orders were obeyed in a + very perfunctory manner. Guns were not loaded, their crews + were not at quarters, nor were the nets got out. The only + real precaution taken was that two destroyers and no more + had been sent out as guard patrol, but even they were + forbidden to fire on anything they met until they had + reported to the admiral or had themselves been fired on. + Defence against a surprise attack could scarcely have been + more feeble, and yet so high was the nervous tension in the + attacking force, that it proved stronger than could + reasonably have been expected. The mere existence of the + patrol and the necessity of evading it threw the Japanese + approach into a confusion from which it was unable to + recover entirely, and the attack lost its essential momentum + and cohesion. Again, defective as were the arrangements in + the squadron itself, and lax as were its training and + discipline, no torpedo hits were made, so far as we can + judge, after the Russian guns and searchlights got into + play.</p> + + <p>Such development of strength in the defence seems inherent + in the conditions of minor attack, and there appears to be no + reason for expecting better results for such attacks in normal + cases. But in deducing principles from the Port Arthur case, it + must always be remembered that it was far from normal. It was a + blow before declaration, when the menace of strained relations, + though realised, had been almost entirely ignored by the + Russians. In such exceptional and almost incredible + circumstances a minor attack might always be counted on for a + certain measure of success. To this we have to add the fact + that the Russian squadron was not ordinarily efficient, but + appears to have fallen into a lax condition such as could + scarcely recur in the case of any other naval Power.</p> + <!-- Page 231 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_231" + id="Page_231"></a>[pg 231]</span> + + <p>Finally, we must ask what, with every condition abnormally + in favour of the attack, was the actual material result? Did it + have any real influence on the ultimate question of command? It + is true that it so far swung the balance in favour of the + Japanese that they were able to exercise the local control long + enough to land their troops and isolate Port Arthur. But the + Japanese plan for securing ultimate command rested on their + power of taking Port Arthur by military operation and + sustaining the siege from the sea. Yet in spite of every + condition of success the physical effect of the blow was so + small, that even without the help of an adequate dockyard the + squadron recovered from it and became potent again before the + siege could even be formed. The minor attacks which followed + the first blow were all failures, and whether delivered at the + port or upon the squadron in the open had no appreciable effect + whatever.</p> + + <p>At the same time it must be remembered that since that war + the art of torpedo warfare has developed very rapidly. Its + range and offensive power have increased in a higher ratio than + the means of resisting it. Still those means have advanced, and + it is probable that a squadron in a naval port or in a properly + defended anchorage is not more easy to injure than it ever was; + while a squadron at sea, so long as it constantly shifts its + position, still remains very difficult to locate with + sufficient precision for successful minor attack.</p> + + <p>The unproved value of submarines only deepens the mist which + overhangs the next naval war. From a strategical point of view + we can say no more than that we have to count with a new + factor, which gives a new possibility to minor counterattack. + It is a possibility which on the whole tells in favour of naval + defence, a new card which, skilfully played in combination with + defensive fleet operations, may lend fresh importance to the + "Fleet in being." It may further be expected that whatever the + effective possibilities of minor operations may ultimately + prove to be in regard to securing command, the + <!-- Page 232 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_232" + id="Page_232"></a>[pg 232]</span> moral influence will be + considerable, and at least at the beginning of a future war + will tend to deflect and hamper the major operations and rob + of their precision the lines which formerly led so frankly + to the issue by battle.</p> + + <p>In the absence of a sufficient volume of experience it would + be idle to go further, particularly as torpedo attack, like + fireship attack, depends for success more than any other on the + spirit and skill of officers and men. With regard to the + torpedo as the typical arm of mobile coastal defence, it is a + different matter. What has been said applies only to its power + towards securing command of the sea, and not to the exercise or + to disputing the exercise of command. This is a question which + is concerned with defence against invasion, and to that we must + now turn.</p> + <!-- Page 233 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_233" + id="Page_233"></a>[pg 233]</span> + <hr /> + + <h3>CHAPTER FOUR</h3> + <hr /> + + <h2>METHODS OF EXERCISING COMMAND</h2> + <hr /> + + <h3>I. DEFENCE AGAINST INVASION</h3> + + <p>In methods of exercising command are included all operations + not directly concerned with securing command or with preventing + its being secured by the enemy. We engage in exercising command + whenever we conduct operations which are directed not against + the enemy's battle-fleet, but to using sea communications for + our own purposes, or to interfering with the enemy's use of + them. Such operations, though logically of secondary + importance, have always occupied the larger part of naval + warfare. Naval warfare does not begin and end with the + destruction of the enemy's battle-fleet, nor even with breaking + his cruiser power. Beyond all this there is the actual work of + preventing his passing an army across the sea and of protecting + the passage of our own military expeditions. There is also the + obstruction of his trade and the protection of our own. In all + such operations we are concerned with the exercise of command. + We are using the sea, or interfering with its use by the enemy; + we are not endeavouring to secure the use or to prevent the + enemy from securing it. The two categories of operation differ + radically in conception and purpose, and strategically they are + on wholly different planes.</p> + + <p>Logically, of course, operations for exercising command + <!-- Page 234 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_234" + id="Page_234"></a>[pg 234]</span> should follow those for + securing command; that is to say, that since the attainment + of command is the special object of naval warfare, and since + that command can only be obtained permanently by the + destruction of the enemy's armed forces afloat, it follows + that in strictness no other objects should be allowed to + interfere with our concentration of effort on the supreme + end of securing command by destruction. War, however, is not + conducted by logic, and the order of proceeding which logic + prescribes cannot always be adhered to in practice. We have + seen how, owing to the special conditions of naval warfare, + extraneous necessities intrude themselves which make it + inevitable that operations for exercising command should + accompany as well as follow operations for securing command. + War being, as it is, a complex sum of naval, military, + political, financial, and moral factors, its actuality can + seldom offer to a naval staff a clean slate on which + strategical problems can be solved by well-turned + syllogisms. The naval factor can never ignore the others. + From the outset one or more of them will always call for + some act of exercising command which will not wait for its + turn in the logical progression. To a greater or less extent + in all ordinary cases both categories of operation will have + to be put in motion from the beginning.</p> + + <p>Hence the importance of realising the distinction between + the two generic forms of naval activity. In the hurry and + stress of war confusion between them is easy. By keeping a firm + grip upon the difference we can see at least what we are doing. + We can judge how far any given operation that may be called for + is a sacrifice of security to exercise, how far such a + sacrifice may be justified, and how far the one end may be made + to serve the other. By applying the distinction as a test much + error may be avoided. The risk we take may be great, but we + shall be able to weigh it accurately against the value of the + end, and we shall take it with our eyes open and of set + purpose. Above all, it will enable the Staff to settle clearly + for each squadronal commander what is to be his primary + objective, + <!-- Page 235 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_235" + id="Page_235"></a>[pg 235]</span> and what the object or + purpose of the operations entrusted to him. It is above all + in this last consideration, and particularly in the + determination of the objective, that lies the main practical + value of the distinction.</p> + + <p>This will become clear the moment we begin to consider + defence against invasion, which naturally takes the first place + amongst operations for the exercise of control. Of all the + current assumptions, not one is so confusing for the finer + adjustments of strategy as that which affirms that the primary + objective of our fleet is always the enemy's fleet. Of the + battle-fleet and its attendant units it is of course true, so + long at least as the enemy has a battle-fleet in being. It is + true, that is, of all operations for securing control, but of + operations for exercising control it is not true. In the case + we have now to consider-defence against invasion-the objective + of the special operations is, and always has been, the enemy's + army. On this fundamental postulate our plans for resisting + invasion have always been constructed from the year of the + Armada to 1805.</p> + + <p>In the old service tradition the point was perfectly well + established. Admirals' instructions constantly insist on the + fact that the transports are the "principal object." The whole + disposition of the fleet during Hawke's blockade in 1759 was + based on keeping a firm hold on the transports in the Morbihan, + and when he sought to extend his operations against the + Rochefort squadron, he was sharply reminded by Anson that "the + principal object of attention at this time" was, firstly, "the + interception of the embarkations of the enemy at Morbihan," and + secondly, "the keeping of the ships of war from coming out of + Brest." Similarly Commodore Warren + <!-- Page 236 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_236" + id="Page_236"></a>[pg 236]</span> in 1796, when he had the + permanent frigate guard before Brest, issued orders to his + captains that in case of encountering enemy's transports + under escort they were "to run them down or destroy them in + the most expeditious manner possible previous to attacking + the ships of war, but to preserve such a situation as to + effect that purpose when directed by signal." Lord Keith's + orders when watching Napoleon's flotilla were to the same + effect. "Directing your chief attention," they run, "to the + destruction of the ships, vessels, or boats having men, + horses, or artillery on board (in preference to that of the + vessels by which they are protected), and in the strict + execution of this important duty losing sight entirely of + the possibility of idle censure for avoiding contact with an + armed force, because the prevention of debarkation is the + object of primary importance to which every other + consideration must give way."<a name="NtA_22" + id="NtA_22"></a><a href="#Nt_22"><sup>22</sup></a></p> + + <p>In tactics, then, the idea was the same as in strategy. The + army was the primary objective round which all dispositions + turned. In the French service the strength and soundness of the + British practice was understood at least by the best men. When + in 1805 Napoleon consulted Ganteaume as to the possibility of + the flotilla of transports effecting its passage by evasion, + the admiral told him it was impossible, since no <!-- Page 237 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_237" + id="Page_237"></a>[pg 237]</span> weather could avail to + relax the British hold sufficiently. "In former wars," he + said, "the English vigilance was miraculous."</p> + + <p>To this rule there was no exception, not even when + circumstances rendered it difficult to distinguish between the + enemy's fleet and army as objectives. This situation could + occur in two ways. Firstly, when the invading army was designed + to sail with the battle-fleet, as in the case of Napoleon's + invasion of Egypt; and secondly, when, although the design was + that the two should operate on separate lines, our system of + defence forced the fleet to come up to the army's line of + passage in order to clear it, as happened in the case of the + Armada and the French attempt of 1744.</p> + + <p>In the latter case the invading army, whose objective was + unknown, was at Dunkirk, and a French fleet was coming up the + Channel to cover the passage. Sir John Norris, in command of + the home fleet, was in the Downs. Though his name is now almost + forgotten, he was one of the great founders of our naval + tradition, and a strategist of the first order. In informing + the Government of his plan of operations, he said he intended + to proceed with his whole squadron off Dunkirk to prevent the + transports sailing. "But," he says, "if they should + unfortunately get out and pass us in the night and go + northward, I intend to detach a superior force to endeavour to + overtake and destroy them; and with the remainder of my + squadron either to fight the French fleet now in the Channel, + <!-- Page 238 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_238" + id="Page_238"></a>[pg 238]</span> or observe them and cover + the country as our circumstances will admit of; or I shall + pursue the embarkation with all my strength." In this case + there had been no time to organise a special squadron or + flotilla, in the usual way, to bar the line of passage, and + the battle-fleet had to be used for the purpose. This being + so, Norris was not going to allow the presence of an enemy's + battle-fleet to entice him away from his grip on the + invading army, and so resolutely did he hold to the + principle, that he meant if the transports put to sea to + direct his offensive against them, while he merely contained + the enemy's battle-fleet by defensive observation.</p> + + <p>In the Egyptian case there was no distinction between the + two objectives at all. Napoleon's expedition sailed in one + mass. Yet in the handling of his fleet Nelson preserved the + essential idea. He organised it into three "sub-squadrons," one + of six sail and two of four each. "Two of these sub-squadrons," + says Berry, his flag-captain, "were to attack the ships of war, + while the third was to pursue the transports and to sink and + destroy as many as it could"; that is, he intended, in order to + make sure of Napoleon's army, to use no more than ten, and + possibly only eight, of his own battleships against the eleven + of the enemy.</p> + <!-- Page 239 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_239" + id="Page_239"></a>[pg 239]</span> + + <p>Many other examples could be given of British insistence on + making the enemy's army the primary objective and not his fleet + in cases of invasion. No point in the old tradition was more + firmly established. Its value was of course more strongly + marked where the army and the fleet of the enemy endeavoured to + act on separate lines of operation; that is, where the army + took the real offensive line and the fleet the covering or + preventive line, and where consequently for our own fleet there + was no confusion between the two objectives. This was the + normal case, and the reason it was so is simple enough. It may + be stated at once, since it serves to enunciate the general + principle upon which our traditional system of defence was + based.</p> + + <p>An invasion of Great Britain must always be an attempt over + an uncommanded sea. It may be that our fleet predominates or it + may be that it does not, but the command must always be in + dispute. If we have gained complete command, no invasion can + take place, nor will it be attempted. If we have lost it + completely no invasion will be necessary, since, quite apart + from the threat of invasion, we must make peace on the best + terms we can get. Now, if the sea be uncommanded, there are + obviously two ways in which an invasion may be attempted. + Firstly, the enemy may endeavour to force it through our naval + defence with transports and fleet in one mass. This was the + primitive idea on which the Spanish invasion of Philip the + Second was originally planned by his famous admiral, + Santa-Cruz. Ripening military science, however, was able to + convince him of its weakness. A mass of transports and warships + is the most cumbrous and vulnerable + <!-- Page 240 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_240" + id="Page_240"></a>[pg 240]</span> engine of war ever known. + The weaker the naval defence of the threatened country, the + more devoutly will it pray the invader may use this device. + Where contact with the enemy's fleet is certain, and + particularly in narrow seas, as it was in this case, such a + course will give the defender all the chances he could + desire, and success for the invader is inconceivable, + provided always we resolutely determine to make the army in + its transports our main objective, and are not to be induced + to break our head against its escort.</p> + + <p>Where, however, contact is not certain, the invasion over an + uncommanded sea may succeed by evasion of the defender's + battle-fleet, as it did in the case of Napoleon's invasion of + Egypt. But that operation belongs to an entirely different + category from that which we are now considering. None of the + factors on which the traditional system of British defence is + based were present. It was an operation over an open sea + against a distant and undetermined objective that had no naval + defence of its own, whereas in our own case the determining + factors are permanent naval defence, an approximately + determined objective, and a narrow sea where evasion by any + force of invasion strength is impossible. Napoleon's exploit + was in fact nothing more than the evasion of an open blockade + which had no naval defence beyond it. The vital importance of + these things will appear as we proceed and note the + characteristics which marked every attempt to invade England. + From such attempts we of course exclude the various descents + upon Ireland, which, not being of invasion strength, fall into + another class, to be dealt with hereafter.</p> + + <p>Since the expedient of forcing an invasion by the strength + of a powerful battleship escort has always been rejected as an + inadmissible operation, the invader has had no choice but to + adopt a separate line for his army, and operate with his fleet + in such a way as may promise to prevent the enemy controlling + that line. That, in short, is the problem of invasion over + <!-- Page 241 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_241" + id="Page_241"></a>[pg 241]</span> an uncommanded sea. In + spite of an unbroken record of failure scored at times with + naval disaster, continental strategists from Parma to + Napoleon have clung obstinately to the belief that there is + a solution short of a complete fleet decision. They have + tried every conceivable expedient again and again. They have + tried it by simple surprise evasion and by evasion through + diversion or dispersal of our naval defence. They have tried + it by seeking local control through a local naval success + prepared by surprise, or by attempting to entice our fleet + away from home waters to a sufficient extent to give them + temporarily local superiority. But the end has always been + the same. Try as they would, they were faced ultimately by + one of two alternatives—they must either defeat our + covering battle-fleet in battle, or they must close their + own battle-fleet on the transports, and so set up the very + situation which it was their main design to avoid.</p> + + <p>The truth is, that all attempts to invade England without + command of the sea have moved in a vicious circle, from which + no escape was ever found. No matter how ingenious or complex + the enemy's design, a determined hold on their army as the + primary naval objective has always set up a process of + degradation which rendered the enterprise impracticable. Its + stages are distinct and recurrent, and may be expressed as it + were diagrammatically as follows:—</p> + + <p>Two lines of operation having been decided on, the invading + army is gathered at a point as close as possible to the coast + to be invaded; that is, where the intervening sea is narrowest, + and where the army's passage will be exposed to interference + for the shortest time. The covering fleet will operate from a + point as distant as convenient, so as to entice the enemy as + far as possible from the army's line of passage. The <!-- Page + 242 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_242" + id="Page_242"></a>[pg 242]</span> defender replies by + blockading the army's ports of departure with a flotilla of + light vessels capable of dealing with transports, or by + establishing a mobile defence of the threatened coasts which + transports cannot break unaided, or more probably he will + combine both expedients. The first fallacy of the invasion + plan is then apparent. The narrower the sea, the easier it + is to watch. Pure evasion becomes impossible, and it is + necessary to give the transports sufficient armed strength + by escort or otherwise to protect them against flotilla + attack. The defender at once stiffens his flotilla defence + with cruisers and intermediate ships, and the invader has to + arrange for breaking the barrier with a battle-squadron. So + weak and disturbing a position is then set up that the whole + scheme begins to give way, if, that is, the defender has + clung stubbornly to the strategy we always used. Our + battle-fleet refused to seek out that of the invader. It has + always held a position between the invader's fleet and the + blockaded invasion base, covering the blockade and flotilla + defence. To enable a battle-squadron to break our hold and + to reinforce the army escort, the invader must either force + this covering position by battle, or disturb it so + effectively as to permit the reinforcing squadron to evade + it. But since <i>ex hypothesi</i> he is trying to invade + without securing the command by battle, he will first try to + reinforce his transport escort by evasion. At once he is + faced with new difficulty. The reinforcement entails + dividing his fleet, and this is an expedient so vicious and + disturbing to morale, that no invader has ever been found to + risk it. And for this reason. To make evasion possible for + the detached squadron, he must bring up the rest of his + force and engage the attention of the enemy's fleet, and + thus unless he is in very great superiority, and by + hypothesis is not—he runs the hazard of having his two + divisions beaten in detail. This method has sometimes been + urged by Governments, but so loud have been the protests + both from the fleet and the army, that it has always been + dropped, and the invader finds himself + <!-- Page 243 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_243" + id="Page_243"></a>[pg 243]</span> at the end of the vicious + circle. Unable to reinforce his transport escort + sufficiently without dividing his battle-fleet, he is forced + to bring his whole force up to the army or abandon the + attempt till command shall have been secured by battle.</p> + + <p>Thus the traditional British system has never failed to + bring about the deadlock, and it will be observed it is founded + on making the invading army the primary objective. We keep a + hold on it, firstly, by flotilla blockade and defence stiffened + as circumstances may dictate by higher units, and secondly, by + battle-fleet cover. It is on the flotilla hold that the whole + system is built up. It is the local danger to that hold which + determines the amount of stiffening the flotilla demands, and + it is the security of that hold which determines the position + and action of the battle-fleet.</p> + + <p>A few typical examples will serve to show how the system + worked in practice under all kinds of conditions. The first + scientific attempt to work on two lines of operation, as + distinguished from the crude mass methods of the Middle Ages, + was the Spanish enterprise of 1588. Though internal support + from Catholic malcontents was expected, it was designed as a + true invasion, that is, a continuing operation for permanent + conquest. Parma, the military commander-in-chief, laid it down + that the Spanish fleet would have not only to protect his + passage and support his landing, but also "to keep open his + communications for the flow of provisions and munition."</p> + <!-- Page 244 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_244" + id="Page_244"></a>[pg 244]</span> + + <p>In advising the dual line of operation, Parma's original + intention was to get his army across by surprise. As always, + however, it proved impossible to conceal the design, and long + before he was ready he found himself securely blockaded by a + Dutch flotilla supported by an English squadron. So firm indeed + was the English hold on the army, that for a time it was + overdone. The bulk of the English fleet was kept on the line of + passage under Howard, while Drake alone was sent to the + westward. It was only under the great sailor's importunity that + the disposition, which was to become traditional, was + perfected, and the whole fleet, with the exception of the + squadron supporting the flotilla blockade, was massed in a + covering position to the westward. The normal situation was + then set up, and it could only have one result. Surprise was + out of the question. Parma could not move till the blockade was + broken, nor in face of the covering fleet could the Spanish + fleet hope to break it by a sudden intrusion. The vague + prospects the Spaniards had conceived of keeping the English + fleet away from the line of passage by threatening a descent in + the West Country or blockading it in a western port would no + longer do. No such expedient would release Parma, and the Duke + of Medina-Sidonia was ordered to proceed direct to Dunkirk if + possible without fighting, there to break the blockade and + secure the passage.</p> + + <p>There was some idea in the King's mind that he would be able + to do this without a battle, but Parma and every seasoned + Spanish sailor knew that the English fleet would have to be + totally defeated before the transports could venture out of + port. Such a battle was indeed inevitable, and the English + dispositions secured that the Spaniards would have to fight it + <!-- Page 245 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_245" + id="Page_245"></a>[pg 245]</span> under every disadvantage + which was inherent in the plan of dual lines of operation. + The English would secure certain contact at such a distance + from the line of passage as would permit prolonged harassing + attacks in waters unfamiliar to the enemy and close to their + own sources of support and supply. No battle to the death + would be necessary until the Spaniards were herded into the + confined and narrow waters which the army's passage + demanded, and where both sections of the British fleet would + be massed for the final struggle. They must arrive there + dispirited with indecisive actions and with the terrors of + unknown and difficult seas at the highest point. All this + was no matter of chance. It was inherent in the strategical + and geographical conditions. The English dispositions had + taken every advantage of them, and the result was that not + only was the Spanish army unable even to move, but the + English advantages in the final battle were so great, that + it was only a lucky shift of wind that saved the Armada from + being driven to total destruction upon the Dutch banks.</p> + + <p>In this case, of course, there had been ample time to make + the necessary dispositions. It will be well to follow it with + an example in which surprise came as near to being complete as + it is possible to conceive, and where the arrangements for + defence had to be improvised on the spur of the moment.</p> + + <p>A case in point was the French attempt of 1744. In that year + everything was in favour of the invader. England was undermined + with Jacobite sedition; Scotland was restless and threatening; + the navy had sunk to what is universally regarded as its worst + for spirit, organisation, and command; and the government was + in the hands of the notorious "Drunken Administration." For + three years we had been making unsuccessful war with Spain, and + had been supporting <!-- Page 246 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_246" + id="Page_246"></a>[pg 246]</span> Maria Theresa on the + Continent against France, with the result that our home + defence was reduced to its lowest ebb. The navy then + numbered 183 sail—about equal to that of France and + Spain combined—but owing to the strain of the war in + the Mediterranean and Transatlantic stations only + forty-three, including eighteen of the line, were available + for home waters. Even counting all cruising ships "within + call," as the phrase then was, the Government had barely + one-fourth of the fleet at hand to meet the crisis. With the + land forces it was little better. Considerably more than + half the home army was abroad with the King, who was + assisting the Empress-Queen as Elector of Hanover. Between + France and England, however, there was no war. In the summer + the King won the battle of Dettingen; a formal alliance with + Maria Theresa followed in the autumn; France responded with + a secret alliance with Spain; and to prevent further British + action on the Continent, she resolved to strike a blow at + London in combination with a Jacobite insurrection. It was + to be a "bolt from the blue" before declaration and in + mid-winter, when the best ships of the home fleet were laid + up. The operation was planned on dual lines, the army to + start from Dunkirk, the covering fleet from Brest.</p> + + <p>The surprise was admirably designed. The port of Dunkirk had + been destroyed under the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, and though + the French had been restoring it secretly for some time, it was + still unfit to receive a fleet of transports. In spite of the + warnings of Sir John Norris, the senior admiral in the service, + the assembling of troops in its neighbourhood from the French + army in Flanders could only be taken for a movement into winter + quarters, and that no suspicion might be <!-- Page + 247 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_247" + id="Page_247"></a>[pg 247]</span> aroused the necessary + transports were secretly taken up in other ports under false + charter-parties, and were only to assemble off Dunkirk at + the last moment. With equal skill the purpose of the naval + mobilisation at Brest was concealed. By false information + cleverly imparted to our spies and by parade of victualling + for a long voyage, the British Government was led to believe + that the main fleet was intended to join the Spaniards in + the Mediterranean, while a detachment, which was designed to + escort the transports, was ostensibly equipped for a raid in + the West Indies.</p> + + <p>So far as concealment was concerned the arrangement was + perfect. Yet it contained within it the fatal ingredient. The + army was to strike in the Thames at Tilbury; but complete as + was the secrecy, Marshal Saxe, who was to command, could not + face the passage without escort. There were too many privateers + and armed merchantmen always in the river, besides cruisers + moving to and fro on commerce-protection duty. The division, + therefore, which we supposed to be for the West Indies was to + be detached from the Brest fleet after it entered the Channel + and was to proceed to join the transports off Dunkirk, while + the Marquis de Roquefeuil with the main fleet held what British + ships might be ready in Portsmouth either by battle or + blockade.</p> + + <p>Nothing could look simpler or more certain of success. The + British Government seemed quite asleep. The blow was timed for + the first week in January, and it was mid-December before they + even began to watch Brest with cruisers regularly. On these + cruisers' reports measures were taken to prepare an equal + squadron for sea by the new year. By this time nearly + <!-- Page 248 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_248" + id="Page_248"></a>[pg 248]</span> twenty of the line were + ready or nearly so at the Nore, Portsmouth, and Plymouth, + and a press was ordered to man them. Owing to various causes + the French had now to postpone their venture. Finally it was + not till February 6th that Roquefeuil was seen to leave + Brest with nineteen of the line. The news reached London on + the 12th, and next day Norris was ordered to hoist his flag + at Spithead. His instructions were "to take the most + effectual measures to prevent the making of any descent upon + the kingdoms." It was nothing but news that the young + Pretender had left Rome for France that led to this + precaution. The Government had still no suspicion of what + was brewing at Dunkirk. It was not till the 20th that a + Dover smuggler brought over information which at last opened + their eyes.</p> + + <p>A day or two later the French transports were seen making + for Dunkirk, and were mistaken for the Brest fleet. Orders were + consequently sent down to Norris to follow them. In vain he + protested at the interference. He knew the French were still to + the westward of him, but his orders were repeated, and he had + to go. Tiding it up-Channel against easterly winds, he reached + the Downs and joined the Nore Division there on the 28th. + History usually speaks of this false movement as the happy + chance which saved the country from invasion. But it was not + so. Saxe had determined not to face the Thames ships without + escort. They were ample to destroy him had he done so. In truth + the move which the Government forced on Norris spoilt the + campaign and prevented his destroying the Brest fleet as well + as stopping the invasion.</p> + + <p>Roquefeuil had just received his final orders off the Start. + <!-- Page + 249 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_249" + id="Page_249"></a>[pg 249]</span> He was instructed by all + possible means to bring the main British fleet to action, or + at least to prevent further concentration, while he was also + to detach the special division of four of the line under + Admiral Barraille to Dunkirk to escort the transports. It + was in fact the inevitable order, caused by our hold on the + army, to divide the fleet. Both officers as usual began to + be upset, and as with Medina-Sidonia, they decided to keep + company till they reached the Isle of Wight and remain there + till they could get touch with Saxe and pilots for the Dover + Strait. They were beset with the nervousness that seems + inseparable from this form of operation. Roquefeuil + explained to his Government that it was impossible to tell + what ships the enemy had passed to the Downs, and that + Barraille when he arrived off Dunkirk might well find + himself in inferiority. He ended in the usual way by urging + that the whole fleet must move in a body to the line of + passage. On arriving off Portsmouth, however, a + reconnaissance in thick weather led him to believe that the + whole of Norris's fleet was still there, and he therefore + detached Barraille, who reached Dunkirk in safety.</p> + + <p>Not knowing that Norris was in the Downs, Saxe began + immediately to embark his troops, but bad weather delayed the + operation for three days, and so saved the expedition, exposed + as it was in the open roads, from destruction by an attack + which Norris was on the point of delivering with his flotilla + of fireships and bomb vessels.</p> + + <p>The Brest squadron had an equally narrow escape. Saxe and + his staff having heard rumours of Norris's movement to the + Downs had become seized with the sea-sickness which always + seems to afflict an army as it waits to face the dangers + <!-- Page 250 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_250" + id="Page_250"></a>[pg 250]</span> of an uncommanded passage. + They too wanted the whole fleet to escort them, and orders + had been sent to Roquefeuille to do as he had suggested. All + unconscious of Norris's presence in the Downs with a score + of the line more powerful than his own, he came on with the + fifteen he had still with his flag to close on Barraille. + Norris was informed of his approach, and it was now he wrote + his admirable appreciation, already quoted, for dealing with + the situation.</p> + + <p>"As I think it," he said, "of the greatest consequence to + his Majesty's service to prevent the landing of these troops in + any part of the country, I have ... determined to anchor + without the sands of Dunkirk, where we shall be in the fairest + way for keeping them in." That is, he determined to keep hold + of the army regardless of the enemy's fleet, and as Saxe's + objective was not quite certain, he would do it by close + blockade. "But if," he continued, "they should unfortunately + get out and pass in the night and go northward [that is, for + Scotland], I intend to detach a superior force to endeavour to + overtake and destroy them, and with the remainder of my + squadron either fight the French fleet now in the Channel, or + observe them and cover the country as our circumstances will + admit of; or I shall pursue the embarkation [that is, follow + the transports] with all my strength." This meant he would + treat the enemy's army offensively and their fleet defensively, + and his plan was entirely approved by the King.</p> + + <p>As to which of the two plans he would adopt, the inference + is that his choice would depend on the strength of the enemy, + for it was reported the Rochefort squadron had joined + Roquefeuille. The doubt was quickly settled. On the morrow he + heard that Roquefeuille was at Dungeness with only fifteen of + <!-- Page 251 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_251" + id="Page_251"></a>[pg 251]</span> the line. In a moment he + seized all the advantage of the interior position which + Roquefeuille's necessity to close on the army had given him. + With admirable insight he saw there was time to fling his + whole force at the enemy's fleet without losing his hold on + the army's line of passage. The movement was made + immediately. The moment the French were sighted "General + chase" was signalled, and Roquefeuille was within an ace of + being surprised at his anchorage when a calm stopped the + attack. The calm was succeeded by another furious gale, in + which the French escaped in a disastrous <i>sauve qui + peut</i>, and the fleet of transports was destroyed. The + outcome of it all was not only the failure of the invasion, + but that we secured the command of home waters for the rest + of the war.</p> + + <p>The whole attempt, it will be seen, with everything in its + favour, had exhibited the normal course of degradation. For all + the nicely framed plan and the perfect deception, the inherent + difficulties, when it came to the point of execution, had as + usual forced a clumsy concentration of the enemy's battle-fleet + with his transports, and we on our part were able to forestall + it with every advantage in our favour by the simple expedient + of a central mass on a revealed and certain line of + passage.</p> + + <p>In the next project, that of 1759, a new and very clever + plan was devised for turning the difficulty. The first idea of + Marshal Belleisle, like that of Napoleon, was to gather the + army at Ambleteuse and Boulogne, and to avoid the assemblage of + transports by passing it across the Strait by stealth in flat + boats. But this idea was abandoned before it had gone + <!-- Page 252 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_252" + id="Page_252"></a>[pg 252]</span> very far for something + much more subtle. The fallacious advantage of a short + passage was dropped, and the army was to start from three + widely separated points all in more open waters—a + diversionary raid from Dunkirk and two more formidable + forces from Havre and the Morbihan in South Brittany. To + secure sufficient control there was to be a concentration on + the Brest fleet from the Mediterranean and the West + Indies.</p> + + <p>The new feature, it will be observed, was that our covering + fleet—that is, the Western Squadron off Brest—would + have two cruiser blockades to secure, one on either side of it. + Difficult as the situation looked, it was solved on the old + lines. The two divisions of the French army at Dunkirk and + Morbihan were held by cruiser squadrons capable of following + them over the open sea if by chance they escaped, while the + third division at Havre, which had nothing but flat boats for + transport, was held by a flotilla well supported. Its case was + hopeless. It could not move without a squadron to release it, + and no fortune of weather could possibly bring a squadron from + Brest. Hawke, who had the main blockade, might be blown off, + but he could scarcely fail to bring to action any squadron that + attempted to enter the Channel. With the Morbihan force it was + different. Any time that Hawke was blown off a squadron could + reach it from Brest and break the cruiser blockade. The French + Government actually ordered a portion of the fleet to make the + attempt. Conflans however, who was in command, protested his + force was too weak to divide, owing to the failure of the + intended concentration. Boscawen had caught and beaten the + Mediterranean squadron off Lagos, and though the West Indian + squadron got in, it proved, as in Napoleon's great plan of + concentration, unfit for further service. The old situation had + arisen, forced by the old method of defence; and in the end + <!-- Page 253 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_253" + id="Page_253"></a>[pg 253]</span> there was nothing for it + but for Conflans to take his whole fleet to the Morbihan + transports. Hawke was upon him at once, and the disastrous + day of Quiberon was the result. The Dunkirk division alone + got free, but the smallness of its size, which permitted it + to evade the watch, also prevented its doing any harm. Its + escort, after landing its handful of troops in Ireland, was + entirely destroyed; and so again the attempt of the French + to invade over an uncommanded sea produced no effect but the + loss of their fleet.</p> + + <p>The project of 1779 marked these principles even more + strongly, for it demonstrated them working even when our home + fleet was greatly inferior to that of the enemy. In this case + the invader's idea was to form two expeditionary forces at + Cherbourg and Havre, and under cover of an overwhelming + combination of the Spanish and French fleets, to unite them at + sea and seize Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight. It was in the + early summer we got wind of the scheme, and two cruiser + squadrons and flotillas were at once formed at the Downs and + Channel Islands to watch the French coasts and prevent the + concentration of transports. Spain had not yet declared war, + but she was suspected, and the main fleet, under the veteran + Sir Charles Hardy, who had been Norris's second in command in + 1744, was ordered to proceed off Brest and prevent any Spanish + squadron that might appear from entering that port. The French, + however, outmanoeuvred us by putting to sea before Hardy could + reach his station and forming a junction with the Spaniards off + Finisterre. The combined fleet contained about fifty of the + line, <!-- Page 254 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_254" + id="Page_254"></a>[pg 254]</span> nearly double our own. The + army of invasion, with Dumouriez for its Chief of the Staff, + numbered some 50,000 men, a force we were in no condition to + meet ashore. Everything, therefore, was in favour of + success, and yet in the navy, at least, a feeling of + confidence prevailed that no invasion could take place.</p> + + <p>The brains of the naval defence were Lord Barham (then Sir + Charles Middleton) at the Admiralty and Kempenfelt as Chief of + the Staff in the fleet; and it is to their correspondence at + this time that we owe some of the most valuable strategical + appreciations we possess. The idea of the French was to come + into the Channel in their overwhelming force, and while they + destroyed or held Hardy, to detach a sufficient squadron to + break the cruiser blockade and escort the troops across. + Kempenfelt was confident that it could not be done. He was sure + that the unwieldy combined mass could be rendered powerless by + his comparatively homogeneous and mobile fleet, inferior as it + was, so long as he could keep it at sea and to the westward. + The appreciation of the power of a nimble inferior fleet which + he wrote at this time has already been given.<a name="NtA_23" + id="NtA_23"></a><a href="#Nt_23"><sup>23</sup></a> When the + worst of the position was fully known, and the enemy was + reported off the mouth of the Channel, he wrote another to + Middleton. His only doubt was whether his fleet had the + necessary cohesion and mobility. "We don't seem," he said, + "to have considered sufficiently a certain fact that the + comparative force of two fleets depends much upon their + sailing. The fleet that sails fastest has much the + advantage, as they can engage or not as they please, and so + have always in + <!-- Page 255 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_255" + id="Page_255"></a>[pg 255]</span> their power to choose the + favourable opportunity to attack. I think I may safely + hazard an opinion that twenty-five sail of the line coppered + would be sufficient to harass and tease this great unwieldy + combined Armada so as to prevent their effecting anything, + hanging continually upon them, ready to catch at any + opportunity of a separation from night, gale or fog, to dart + upon the separated, to cut off convoys of provisions coming + to them, and if they attempted an invasion, to oblige their + whole fleet to escort the transports, and even then it would + be impossible to protect them entirely from so active and + nimble a fleet."</p> + + <p>Here we have from the pen of one of the greatest masters the + real key of the solution—the power, that is, of forcing + the mass of the enemy's fleet to escort the transports. Hardy, + of course, knew it well from his experience of 1744, and acted + accordingly. This case is the more striking, since defence + against the threatened invasion was not the whole of the + problem he had to solve. It was complicated by instructions + that he must also prevent a possible descent on Ireland, and + cover the arrival of the great convoys. In reply, on August + 1st, he announced his intention of taking station ten to twenty + leagues W.S.W. of Scilly, "which I am of opinion," he said, "is + the most proper station for the security of the trade expected + from the East and West Indies, and for the meeting of the + fleets of the enemy <i>should they attempt to come into the + Channel</i>." He underlined the last words, indicating, + apparently, his belief that they would not venture to do so so + long as he could keep his fleet to the westward and undefeated. + This at least he did, till a month later he found it + <!-- Page 256 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_256" + id="Page_256"></a>[pg 256]</span> necessary to come in for + supplies. Then, still avoiding the enemy, he ran not to + Plymouth, but right up to St. Helen's. The movement is + always regarded as an unworthy retreat, and it caused much + dissatisfaction in the fleet at the time. But it is to be + observed that his conduct was strictly in accordance with + the principle which makes the invading army the primary + objective. If Hardy's fleet was no longer fit to keep the + sea without replenishment, then the proper place to seek + replenishment was on the invader's line of passage. So long + as he was there, invasion could not take place till he was + defeated. The allies, it was true, were now free to join + their transports, but the prospect of such a movement gave + the admiral no uneasiness, for it would bring him the chance + of serving his enemy as the Spaniards were served in 1588. + "I shall do my utmost," he said, "to drive them up the + Channel." It is the old principle. If the worst comes to the + worst, so long as you are able to force the covering fleet + upon the transports, and especially in narrow waters, + invasion becomes an operation beyond the endurable risks of + war.</p> + + <p>So it proved. On August 14th Count d'Orvilliers, the allied + commander-in-chief, had made the Lizard, and for a fortnight + had striven to bring Hardy to decisive action. Until he had + done so he dared neither enter the Channel with his fleet nor + detach a squadron to break the cruiser blockades at the + invasion bases. His ineffectual efforts exhausted his fleet's + endurance, which the distant concentration at Finisterre had + <!-- Page 257 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_257" + id="Page_257"></a>[pg 257]</span> already severely sapped, + and he was forced to return impotent to Brest before + anything had been accomplished. The allies were not able to + take the sea again that campaign, but even had it been in + their power to do so, Hardy and Kempenfelt could have played + their defensive game indefinitely, and with ever-increasing + chances, as the winter drew near, of dealing a paralysing + blow.</p> + + <p>There was never any real chance of success, though it is + true Dumouriez thought otherwise. He believed the enterprise + might have gone through if a diversion had been made by the + bulk of the fleet against Ireland, and under cover of it a + <i>coup de main</i> delivered upon the Isle of Wight, "for + which," he said, "six or eight of the line would have been + enough." But it is inconceivable that old hands like Hardy and + Kempenfelt would have been so easily beguiled of their hold on + the line of passage. Had such a division been detached up the + Channel from the allied fleet they would surely, according to + tradition, have followed it with either a superior force or + their whole squadron.</p> + + <p>The well-known projects of the Great War followed the same + course. Under Napoleon's directions they ran the whole gamut of + every scheme that ever raised delusive hope before. Beginning + from the beginning with the idea of stealing his army across in + flat-boats, he was met with the usual flotilla defence. Then + came his only new idea, which was to arm his transport flotilla + to the point of giving it power to force a passage for itself. + We replied by strengthening our flotilla. Convinced by + experiment that his scheme was now impracticable, he set his + mind on breaking the blockade by the sudden intrusion of a + flying squadron from a distance. To this end various plausible + schemes were worked out, but plan after plan melted in his + hand, till he was forced to face the inevitable necessity of + bringing an overwhelming battle force up to his transports. The + experience of two centuries had taught him nothing. By a more + distant concentration than + <!-- Page 258 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_258" + id="Page_258"></a>[pg 258]</span> had ever been attempted + before he believed he could break the fatal hold of his + enemy. The only result was so severely to exhaust his fleet + that it never could get within reach of the real + difficulties of its task, a task which every admiral in his + service knew to be beyond the strength of the Imperial Navy. + Nor did Napoleon even approach a solution of the problem he + had set himself—invasion over an uncommanded sea. With + our impregnable flotilla hold covered by an automatic + concentration of battle-squadrons off Ushant, his army could + never even have put forth, unless he had inflicted upon our + covering fleet such a defeat as would have given him command + of the sea, and with absolute control of the sea the passage + of an army presents no difficulties.</p> + + <p>Of the working of these principles under modern conditions + we have no example. The acquisition of free movement must + necessarily modify their application, and since the advent of + steam there have been only two invasions over uncommanded + seas—that of the Crimea in 1854, and that of Manchuria in + 1904—and neither of these cases is in point, for in + neither was there any attempt at naval defence. Still there + seems no reason to believe that such defence applied in the old + manner would be less effective than formerly. The flotilla was + its basis, and since the introduction of the torpedo the power + of the flotilla has greatly increased. Its real and moral + effect against transports must certainly be greater than ever, + and the power of squadrons to break a flotilla blockade is more + restricted. Mines, again, tell almost entirely in favour of + defence, so much so indeed as to render a rapid <i>coup de + main</i> against any important port almost an impossibility. In + the absence of all experience it is to such theoretical + considerations we must turn for light.</p> + + <p>Theoretically stated, the success of our old system of + defence depended on four relations. Firstly, there is the + relation between the rapidity with which an invasion force + could be mobilised and embarked, and the rapidity with which + restlessness + <!-- Page 259 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_259" + id="Page_259"></a>[pg 259]</span> in foreign ports and + <i>places d'armes</i> could be reported; that is to say, the + chance of surprise and evasion are as the speed of + preparation to the speed of intelligence.</p> + + <p>Secondly, there is the relation of the speed of convoys to + the speed of cruisers and flotilla; that is to say, our ability + to get contact with a convoy after it has put to sea and before + the expedition can be disembarked is as the speed of our + cruisers and flotilla to the speed of the convoy.</p> + + <p>Thirdly, there is the relation between the destructive power + of modern cruisers and flotillas against a convoy unescorted or + weakly escorted and the corresponding power in sailing + days.</p> + + <p>Fourthly, there is the relation between the speed of convoys + and the speed of battle-squadrons, which is of importance where + the enemy's transports are likely to be strongly escorted. On + this relation depends the facility with which the + battle-squadron covering our mobile defence can secure an + interior position from which it may strike either the enemy's + battle-squadron if it moves or his convoy before it can + complete its passage and effect the landing.</p> + + <p>All these relations appear to have been modified by modern + developments in favour of the defence. In the first ratio, that + of speed of mobilisation to speed of intelligence, it is + obviously so. Although military mobilisation may be still + relatively as rapid as the mobilisation of fleets, yet + intelligence has outstripped both. This is true both for + gaining and for conveying intelligence. Preparations for + oversea invasion were never easy to conceal, owing to the + disturbance of the flow of shipping that they caused. Elaborate + precautions were taken to prevent commercial leakage of + intelligence, but they never entirely succeeded. Yet formerly, + in the condition of comparative crudeness with which + international trade was then organised, concealment was + relatively easy, at least for a time. But the ever-growing + sensitiveness of world-wide commerce, when market movements are + reported from hour to <!-- + Page 260 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_260" + id="Page_260"></a>[pg 260]</span> hour instead of from week + to week, has greatly increased the difficulty. And apart + from the rapidity with which information may be gathered + through this alert and intimate sympathy between Exchanges, + there is the still more important fact that with wireless + the speed of conveying naval intelligence has increased in a + far higher ratio than the speed of sea transit.</p> + + <p>As regards the ratio between cruiser and convoy speeds, on + which evasion so much depends, it is the same. In frigate days + the ratio appears to have been not more than seven to five. Now + in the case at any rate of large convoys it would be nearly + double.</p> + + <p>Of the destructive power of the flotilla, growing as it does + from year to year, enough has been said already. With the + advent of the torpedo and submarine it has probably increased + tenfold. In a lesser degree the same is true of cruisers. In + former days the physical power of a cruiser to injure a + dispersing convoy was comparatively low, owing to her + relatively low excess of speed and the restricted range and + destructive power of her guns. With higher speed and higher + energy and range in gun power the ability of cruisers to cut up + a convoy renders its practical annihilation almost certain if + once it be caught, and consequently affords a moral deterrent + against trusting to evasion beyond anything that was known + before.</p> + + <p>The increased ratio of battle-fleet speed to that of large + convoys is equally indisputable and no less important, for the + facility of finding interior positions which it implies goes to + the root of the old system. So long as our battle-fleet is in a + position whence it can cover our flotilla blockade or strike + the enemy's convoy in transit, it forces his battle-fleet in + the last resort to close up on the convoy, and that, as + Kempenfelt pointed out, is practically fatal to the success of + invasion.</p> + + <p>From whatever point of view, then, we regard the future + chances of successful invasion over an uncommanded sea, it + <!-- Page 261 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_261" + id="Page_261"></a>[pg 261]</span> would seem that not only + does the old system hold good, but that all modern + developments which touch the question bid fair to intensify + the results which our sea service at least used so + confidently to expect, and which it never failed to + secure.</p> + + <h3>II. ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF TRADE</h3> + + <p>The base idea of the attack and defence of trade may be + summed up in the old adage, "Where the carcase is, there will + the eagles be gathered together." The most fertile areas always + attracted the strongest attack, and therefore required the + strongest defence; and between the fertile and the infertile + areas it was possible to draw a line which for strategical + purposes was definite and constant. The fertile areas were the + terminals of departure and destination where trade tends to be + crowded, and in a secondary degree the focal points where, + owing to the conformation of the land, trade tends to converge. + The infertile areas were the great routes which passed through + the focal points and connected the terminal areas. Consequently + attack on commerce tends to take one of two forms. It may be + terminal or it may be pelagic, terminal attack being the more + profitable, but demanding the greater force and risk, and + pelagic attack being the more uncertain, but involving less + force and risk.</p> + + <p>These considerations lead us directly to the paradox which + underlies the unbroken failure of our enemies to exercise + decisive pressure upon us by operations against our trade. It + is that where attack is most to be feared, there defence is + easiest. A plan of war which has the destruction of trade for + its primary object implies in the party using it an inferiority + at sea. Had he superiority, his object would be to convert that + superiority to a working command by battle or blockade. Except, + therefore, in the rare cases where the opposed forces are + equal, we must assume that the belligerent who makes commerce + destruction his primary object will have to deal + <!-- Page 262 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_262" + id="Page_262"></a>[pg 262]</span> with a superior fleet. + Now, it is true that the difficulty of defending trade lies + mainly in the extent of sea it covers. But, on the other + hand, the areas in which it tends to congregate, and in + which alone it is seriously vulnerable, are few and narrow, + and can be easily occupied if we are in superior force. + Beyond those areas effective occupation is impossible, but + so also is effective attack. Hence the controlling fact of + war on commerce, that facility of attack means facility of + defence.</p> + + <p>Beside this fundamental principle we must place another that + is scarcely less important. Owing to the general common nature + of sea communications, attack and defence of trade are so + intimately connected that the one operation is almost + indistinguishable from the other. Both ideas are satisfied by + occupying the common communications. The strongest form of + attack is the occupation of the enemy's terminals, and the + establishment of a commercial blockade of the ports they + contain. But as this operation usually requires the blockade of + an adjacent naval port, it also constitutes, as a rule, a + defensive disposition for our own trade, even when the enemy's + terminal area does not overlap one of our own. In the + occupation of focal areas the two ideas are even more + inseparable, since most, if not all, such areas are on lines of + communication that are common. It will suffice, therefore, to + deal with the general aspect of the subject from the point of + view of defence.</p> + + <p>It was in conformity with the distinction between fertile + and infertile areas that our old system of trade defence was + developed. Broadly speaking, that system was to hold the + terminals in strength, and in important cases the focal points + as well. By means of a battle-squadron with a full complement + of cruisers they were constituted defended areas, or "tracts" + as the old term was, and the trade was regarded as safe when it + entered them. The intervening trade-routes were left as a rule + undefended. Thus our home terminals were held <!-- Page + 263 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_263" + id="Page_263"></a>[pg 263]</span> by two battle-squadrons, + the Western Squadron at the mouth of the Channel, and the + North Sea or Eastern Squadron with its headquarters usually + in the Downs. To these was added a cruiser squadron on the + Irish station based at Cork, which was sometimes subordinate + to the Western Squadron and sometimes an independent + organisation. The area of the Western Squadron in the French + wars extended, as we have seen, over the whole Bay of + Biscay, with the double function, so far as commerce was + concerned, of preventing the issue of raiding squadrons from + the enemy's ports, and acting offensively against his + Atlantic trade. That of the North Sea squadron extended to + the mouth of the Baltic and the north-about passage. Its + main function during the great naval coalitions against us + was to check the operations of Dutch squadrons or to prevent + the intrusion of French ones north-about against our Baltic + trade. Like the Western Squadron, it threw out divisions + usually located at Yarmouth and Leith for the protection of + our coastwise trade from privateers and sporadic cruisers + acting from ports within the defended area. Similarly, + between the Downs and the Western Squadron was usually one + or more smaller squadrons, mainly cruisers, and generally + located about Havre and the Channel Islands, which served + the same purpose for the Norman and North Breton ports. To + complete the system there were flotilla patrols acting under + the port admirals and doing their best to police the routes + of the coastwise and local traffic, which then had an + importance long since lost. The home system of course + differed at different times, but it was always on these + general lines. The naval defence was supplemented by + defended ports of refuge, the principal ones being on the + coast of Ireland to shelter the ocean trade, but others in + great numbers were provided within the defended areas + against the operations of privateers, and the ruins of + batteries all round the British shores testify how complete + was the organisation.</p> + + <p>A similar system prevailed in the colonial areas, but there + <!-- Page + 264 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_264" + id="Page_264"></a>[pg 264]</span> the naval defence + consisted normally of cruiser squadrons stiffened with one + or two ships-of-the-line mainly for the purpose of carrying + the flag. They were only occupied by battle-squadrons when + the enemy threatened operations with a similar force. The + minor or interior defence against local privateers was to a + large extent local; that is, the great part of the flotilla + was furnished by sloops built or hired on the spot, as being + best adapted for the service.</p> + + <p>Focal points were not then so numerous as they have become + since the development of the Far Eastern trade. The most + important of them, the Straits of Gibraltar, was treated as a + defended area. From the point of view of commerce-protection it + was held by the Mediterranean squadron. By keeping watch on + Toulon that squadron covered not only the Straits, but also the + focal points within the sea. It too had its extended divisions, + sometimes as many as four, one about the approaches to Leghorn, + one in the Adriatic, a third at Malta, and the fourth at + Gibraltar. In cases of war with Spain the latter was very + strong, so as to secure the focal area against Cartagena and + Cadiz. On one occasion indeed, in 1804-5, as we have seen, it + was constituted for a short time an independent area with a + special squadron. But in any case the Gibraltar area had its + own internal flotilla guard under the direction of the port + admiral as a defence against local privateers and pirates.</p> + + <p>The general theory of these defended terminal and focal + areas, it will be seen, was to hold in force those waters which + converging trade made most fertile, and which therefore + furnished an adequate field for the operations of raiding + squadrons. In spite of the elaborate defensive system, such + squadrons might, and sometimes did, intrude by surprise or + stealth, and were then able to set at defiance both convoy + escorts and the cruiser outposts. But, as experience proved, + the system of terminal defence by battle-squadrons made it + impossible for such raiding squadrons to remain long enough on + the ground + <!-- Page 265 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_265" + id="Page_265"></a>[pg 265]</span> to cause any serious + interruption or to do serious harm. It was only by a regular + fleet of superior strength that the system could be broken + down. In other words, the defence could only fall when our + means of local control was destroyed by battle.</p> + + <p>So much for the defended areas. With regard to the great + routes that connected them, it has been said they were left + undefended. By this is meant that the security of ships passing + along them was provided for, not by patrols but by escort. The + convoy system was adopted, and the theory of that system is + that while vessels are on the great routes they are normally + liable only to sporadic attack, and they are consequently + collected into fleets and furnished with an escort sufficient + to repel sporadic attack. In theory, cruiser escort is + sufficient, but in practice it was found convenient and + economical to assign the duty in part to ships-of-the-line + which were going out to join the distant terminal squadron or + returning from it for a refit or some other reason; in other + words, the system of foreign reliefs was made to work in with + the supplementary escort system. Where no such ships were + available and the convoys were of great value, or enemy's + ships-of-the-line were known to be out, similar units were + specially detailed for convoy duty to go and return, but this + use of battle units was exceptional.</p> + + <p>Such a method of dealing with the great routes is the + corollary of the idea of defended areas. As those areas were + fertile and likely to attract raiding squadrons, so the great + routes were infertile, and no enemy could afford to spend + squadrons upon them. It is obvious, however, that the system + had its weak side, for the mere fact that a convoy was upon a + great route tended to attract a squadron, and the comparative + immunity of those routes was lost. The danger was provided for + to a great extent by the fact that the enemy's ports from which + a squadron could issue were all within defended areas and + watched by our own squadrons. Still, the guard could + <!-- Page 266 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_266" + id="Page_266"></a>[pg 266]</span> not be made impenetrable. + There was always the chance of a squadron escaping, and if + it escaped towards a critical trade-route, it must be + followed. Hence there were times when the convoy system + seriously disturbed our dispositions, as, for instance, in + the crisis of the Trafalgar campaign, when for a short time + our chain of defended areas was broken down by the escape of + the Toulon squadron. That escape eventually forced a close + concentration on the Western Squadron, but all other + considerations apart, it was felt to be impossible to retain + the mass for more than two days owing to the fact that the + great East and West Indies convoys were approaching, and + Villeneuve's return to Ferrol from Martinique exposed them + to squadronal attack. It was, in fact, impossible to tell + whether the mass had not been forced upon us with this + special end in view.</p> + + <p>In the liability to deflection of this kind lay the most + serious strategical objection to the convoy system. It was + sought to minimise it by giving the convoys a secret route when + there was apprehension of squadronal interference. It was done + in the case just cited, but the precaution seemed in no way to + lessen the anxiety. It may have been because in those days of + slow communication there could be no such certainty that the + secret route had been received as there would be now.</p> + + <p>Modern developments and changes in shipping and naval + material have indeed so profoundly modified the whole + conditions of commerce protection, that there is no part of + strategy where historical deduction is more difficult or more + liable to error. To avoid such error as far as possible, it is + essential to keep those developments in mind at every step. The + more important of them are three in number. Firstly, the + abolition of privateering; secondly, the reduced range of + action for all warships; and thirdly, the development of + wireless telegraphy. There are others which must be dealt with + in their place, but these three go to the root of the whole + problem.</p> + + <p>Difficult as it is to arrive at exact statistics of commerce + <!-- Page + 267 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_267" + id="Page_267"></a>[pg 267]</span> destruction in the old + wars, one thing seems certain—that the bulk of + captures, which were reckoned in hundreds and sometimes even + in thousands, were due to the action of privateers. Further, + it seems certain that, reckoning at least by numbers, the + greater part of the damage was done by small privateers + operating close to their bases, either home or colonial, + against coastwise and local traffic. The complaints of + merchants, so far as they are known, relate mainly to this + kind of work in the West Indies and home waters, while + accounts of serious captures by large privateers on the high + seas are comparatively rare. The actual damage done by the + swarm of small vessels may not have been great, but its + moral effects were very serious. It was impossible for the + strongest Governments to ignore them, and the consequence + was a chronic disturbance of the larger strategical + dispositions. While these dispositions were adequate to + check the operations of large privateers acting in the same + way as regular cruisers, the smaller ones found very free + play amidst the ribwork of the protective system, and they + could only be dealt with by filling up the spaces with a + swarm of small cruisers to the serious detriment of the + larger arrangements. Even so, the proximity of the enemy's + ports made escape so easy, that the work of repression was + very ineffective. The state of the case was indeed almost + identical with a people's war. The ordinary devices of + strategy failed to deal with it, as completely as Napoleon's + broadly planned methods failed to deal with the + <i>guerilleros</i> in Spain, or as our own failed for so + long in South Africa.</p> + + <p>By the abolition of privateering, then, it would seem that + the most disturbing part of the problem has been eliminated. It + is, of course, uncertain how far the Declaration of Paris + <!-- Page 268 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_268" + id="Page_268"></a>[pg 268]</span> will hold good in + practice. It is still open even to the parties to it to + evade its restrictions to a greater or less extent by taking + up and commissioning merchantmen as regular ships of war. + But it is unlikely that such methods will extend beyond the + larger privately owned vessels. Any attempt to revive in + this way the old <i>picaresque</i> methods could only amount + to a virtual repudiation of statutory international law, + which would bring its own retribution. Moreover, for home + waters at least, the conditions which favoured this + <i>picaresque</i> warfare no longer exist. In the old wars + the bulk of our trade came into the Thames, and thence the + greater part of it was distributed in small coasting + vessels. It was against this coastwise traffic that the + small, short-range privateers found their opportunity and + their richest harvest. But, now that so many other great + centres of distribution have established themselves, and + that the bulk of the distribution is done by internal lines + of communication, the Channel is no longer the sole artery, + and the old troublesome disturbance can be avoided without a + vital dislocation of our commercial system.</p> + + <p>The probability, then, is that in the future the whole + problem will be found to be simplified, and that the work of + commerce protection will lie much more within the scope of + large strategical treatment than it ever did before, with the + result that the change should be found to tell substantially in + favour of defence and against attack.</p> + + <p>The reduction of range of action is scarcely less important. + In the old days a cruising ship could be stored for six months, + and so long as she could occasionally renew her fuel and water, + she was free to range the sea outside the defended areas for + the whole of the period with unimpaired vitality. For such + pelagic operations her movement was practically unrestricted. + She could run for two or three days from a superior enemy or + chase for as long without loss of energy, and she could wait + indefinitely at a likely spot, or change her ground, as danger + or hope of plunder dictated. So long as she had men left to man + her prizes, her power of mischief was + <!-- Page 269 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_269" + id="Page_269"></a>[pg 269]</span> almost unlimited. All this + is now changed. The capacity of each cruise of a ship to-day + is very small. She is confined to short dashes within a + strategically defended area, or if she is bent on pelagic + operations, is compelled to proceed so far to find + undefended waters that her coal will scarcely permit of more + than a few days' actual cruising. A couple of chases at high + speed during that period may force her to return at once, + subject only to the precarious possibility of renewing her + coal from a prize. She has, further, to face the fact that + manning prizes must necessarily reduce her capacity for + speed, which depends so much on a fully manned engine-room. + This will tend to jeopardise her chances of return through + or near defended areas. The only escape from this difficulty + is to sink the captured ship. But this course has objections + scarcely less weighty than the other. No Power will incur + the odium of sinking a prize with all hands, and their + removal to the captor's ship takes time, especially in bad + weather, and the presence of such prisoners in a cruiser in + any number soon becomes a serious check on her fighting + power. In the case of large ships, moreover, the work of + destruction is no easy matter. In the most favourable + circumstances it takes a considerable time, and thus not + only eats into the cruiser's endurance, but decreases her + chances of evasion.</p> + + <p>From these and similar considerations it is obvious that the + possibilities of operations on the great trade-routes are much + less extensive than they were formerly, while to speak of + cruisers "infesting" those routes is sheer hyperbole. Under + modern conditions it is scarcely more feasible than it would be + to keep up a permanent blockade of the British Islands. It + would require a flow of ships in such numbers as no country but + our own can contemplate possessing, and such as could not be + maintained without having first secured a very decided + preponderance at sea. The loss of radius of action therefore, + though it does not increase the power of defence, sensibly + lessens that of attack by pelagic operations.</p> + + <p>For the great increase in the powers of defence we must + <!-- Page 270 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_270" + id="Page_270"></a>[pg 270]</span> turn to the extraordinary + development in the means of distant communication. Under + former conditions it was possible for a cruising ship to + remain for days upon a fertile spot and make a number of + captures before her presence was known. But since most large + merchantmen have been fitted with wireless installations, + she cannot now attack a single one of them without fear of + calling down upon her an adversary. Moreover, when she is + once located, every ship within wireless reach can be warned + of her presence and avoid her. She must widely and + constantly shift her position, thereby still further + reducing her staying power. On the whole, then, it would + appear that in so far as modern developments affect the + problem, they certainly render pelagic operations far more + difficult and uncertain than they used to be. Upon the great + routes the power of attack has been reduced and the means of + evasion has increased to such an extent as to demand entire + reconsideration of the defence of trade between terminal + areas. The whole basis of the old system would seem to be + involved. That basis was the convoy system, and it now + becomes doubtful whether the additional security which + convoys afforded is sufficient to outweigh their economical + drawbacks and their liability to cause strategical + disturbance.</p> + + <p>Over and above the considerations already noticed, there are + three others, all of which favour the security of our trade by + permitting a much more extended choice of route. The first is, + that steam vessels are not forced by prevailing winds to keep + to particular courses. The second is, that the improvements in + the art of navigation no longer render it so necessary to make + well-known landfalls during transit. The third is, that the + multiplication of our great ports of distribution have divided + the old main flow of trade to the Channel into a number of + minor streams that cover a much wider area and demand a greater + distribution of force for effective attack. It will be obvious + that the combined effect of these considerations is to increase + still further the chances of individual + <!-- Page 271 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_271" + id="Page_271"></a>[pg 271]</span> vessels evading the + enemy's cruisers and to lessen the risk of dispensing with + escort.</p> + + <p>Nor are the new practical difficulties of sporadic + operations on the great routes the only arguments that minimise + the value of convoys. We have also to remember that while the + number of vessels trading across the ocean has enormously + increased since 1815, it is scarcely possible, even if the + abolition of privateering prove abortive, that the number of + cruisers available for pelagic attack could exceed, or even + equal, the number employed in sailing days. This consideration, + then, must also be thrown into the scale against convoys; for + it is certain that the amount of serious operative damage which + an enemy can do to our trade by pelagic operation is mainly + determined by the ratio which his available cruiser strength + bears to the volume of that trade. This aspect of the question + is, however, part of a much wider one, which concerns the + relation which the volume of our trade bears to the difficulty + of its defence, and this must be considered later.</p> + + <p>It remains, first, to deal with the final link in the old + system of defence. The statement that the great routes were + left undefended will seem to be in opposition to a prevailing + impression derived from the fact that frigates are constantly + mentioned as being "on a cruise." The assumption is that they + in effect patrolled the great routes. But this was not so, nor + did they rove the sea at will. They constituted a definite and + necessary part of the system. Though that system was founded on + a distinction between defended terminals and undefended routes, + which was a real strategical distinction, it was impossible to + draw an actual line where the one sphere began and the other + ended. Outside the regularly defended areas lay a region which, + as the routes began to converge, was comparatively fertile. In + this region enemies' cruisers and their larger privateers found + the mean between risk and profit. Here too convoys, as they + entered the zone, were in their greatest danger for fear of + their escorts being overpowered + <!-- Page 272 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_272" + id="Page_272"></a>[pg 272]</span> by raiding squadrons. + Consequently it was the practice, when the approach of + convoys was expected, to throw forward from the defended + area groups of powerful cruisers, and even battleship + divisions, to meet them and reinforce their escorts. + Outward-bound convoys had their escorts similarly + strengthened till they were clear of the danger zone. The + system was in regular use both for home and colonial areas. + In no sense did it constitute a patrol of the routes. It was + in practice and conception a system of outposts, which at + seasons of special risk amounted to an extension of the + defended areas combining with a reinforcement of the convoy + escorts. Focal points of lesser importance, such as Capes + Finisterre and St. Vincent, were similarly held by one or + two powerful cruisers, and if necessary by a squadron.</p> + + <p>As has been already explained, owing to the peculiar + conditions of the sea and the common nature of maritime + communications, these dispositions were adopted as well for + attack as defence, and the fertile areas, for the defence of + which a frigate captain was sent "on a cruise," were always + liable to bring him rich reward. His mission of defence carried + with it the best opportunities for attack.</p> + + <p>In the full development of the system patrol lines did + exist, but not for the great routes. They were established to + link up adjacent defended areas and as a more scientific + organisation of the cruiser outposts. In 1805 the Gibraltar and + the home areas were thus connected by a patrol line which + stretched from Cape St. Vincent through the Finisterre focal + area to Cape Clear, with a branch extending to the strategical + centre off Ushant. The new system was introduced at a time when + we had reason to expect that the French and Spanish fleets were + to be devoted entirely to operations in small raiding squadrons + against our trade and colonies. Special provision was therefore + necessary to locate any such squadrons that might elude the + regular blockades, and to ensure that they should be adequately + pursued. The new lines were in fact + <!-- Page 273 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_273" + id="Page_273"></a>[pg 273]</span> intelligence patrols + primarily, though they were also regarded as the only means + of protecting efficiently the southern trade-route where it + was flanked by French and Spanish ports.<a name="NtA_24" + id="NtA_24"></a><a href="#Nt_24"><sup>24</sup></a></p> + + <p>The whole system, it will be observed, though not + conflicting with the main object of bringing the enemy's fleets + to action, did entail an expenditure of force and deflecting + preoccupations such as are unknown in land warfare. Large + numbers of cruisers had to be employed otherwise than as the + eyes of the battle-squadrons, while the coming and going of + convoys produced periodical oscillations in the general + distribution.</p> + + <p>Embarrassing as was this commercial deflection in the old + wars, an impression appears to prevail that in the future it + must be much more serious. It is argued plausibly enough not + only that our trade is far larger and richer than it was, but + also that, owing to certain well-known economic changes, it is + far more a matter of life and death to the nation than in the + days when food and raw material did not constitute the bulk of + our imports. In view of the new conditions it is held that we + are more vulnerable through our trade now than formerly, and + that, consequently, we must devote relatively more attention + and force to its defence.</p> + + <p>If this were true, it is obvious that war with a strong + naval combination would present difficulties of the most + formidable kind, greater indeed than we have ever experienced; + for since with modern developments the demand for fleet + cruisers is much greater than formerly, the power of devoting + cruisers to trade defence is relatively much less.</p> + <!-- Page 274 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_274" + id="Page_274"></a>[pg 274]</span> + + <p>It cannot be denied that at first sight the conclusion looks + irreproachable. But on analysis it will be found to involve two + assumptions, both of which are highly questionable. The first + is, that the vulnerability of a sea Power through its maritime + trade is as the volume of that trade. The second is, that the + difficulty of defending sea-borne trade is also as its + volume—that is to say, the larger the amount of the + trade, the larger must be the force devoted to its protection. + This idea indeed is carried so far, that we are frequently + invited to fix the standard of our naval strength by comparing + it with the proportion which the naval strength of other Powers + bears to their sea-borne trade.</p> + + <p>It is hoped that the foregoing sketch of our traditional + system of trade defence will avail to raise a doubt whether + either assumption can be accepted without very careful + consideration. In the history of that system there is no + indication that it was affected by the volume of the trade it + was designed to protect. Nor has any one succeeded in showing + that the pressure which an enemy could exert upon us through + our commerce increased in effect with the volume of our + seaborne trade. The broad indications indeed are the other + way—that the greater the volume of our trade, the less + was the effective impression which an enemy could make upon it, + even when he devoted his whole naval energies to that end. It + is not too much to say that in every case where he took this + course his own trade dwindled to nothing, while ours + continually increased.</p> + + <p>It may be objected that this was because the only periods in + which he devoted his main efforts to trade destruction were + when we had dominated his navy, and being no longer able to + dispute the command, he could do no more than interfere with + its exercise. But this must always be so whether we have + positively dominated his navy or not. If he tries to ignore our + battle-fleets, and devotes himself to operations against trade, + he cannot dispute the command. Whatever his strength, he + <!-- Page 275 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_275" + id="Page_275"></a>[pg 275]</span> must leave the command to + us. He cannot do both systematically, and unless he attacks + our trade systematically by sustained strategical operation, + he cannot hope to make any real impression.</p> + + <p>If, now, we take the two assumptions and test them by the + application of elementary principles, both will appear + theoretically unsound. Let us take first the relation of + vulnerability to volume. Since the object of war is to force + our will upon the enemy, the only way in which we can expect + war on commerce to serve our end is to inflict so much damage + upon it as will cause our enemy to prefer peace on our terms to + a continuation of the struggle. The pressure on his trade must + be insupportable, not merely annoying. It must seriously + cripple his finance or seriously threaten to strangle his + national life and activities. If his total trade be a hundred + millions, and we succeed in destroying five, he will feel it no + more than he does the ordinary fluctuations to which he is + accustomed in time of peace. If, however, we can destroy fifty + millions, his trade equilibrium will be overthrown, and the + issue of the war will be powerfully affected. In other words, + to affect the issue the impression made on trade must be a + percentage or relative impression. The measure of a nation's + vulnerability through its trade is the percentage of + destruction that an enemy can effect.</p> + + <p>Now, it is true that the amount of damage which a + belligerent can inflict with a given force on an enemy's + commerce will vary to some extent with its volume; for the + greater the volume of commerce, the more fertile will be the + undefended cruising grounds. But no matter how fertile such + areas might be, the destructive power of a cruiser was always + limited, and it must be still more limited in the future. It + was limited by the fact that it was physically impossible to + deal with more than a certain number of prizes in a certain + time, and, for the reasons already indicated, this limit has + suffered a very marked restriction. When this limit of capacity + in a given + <!-- Page 276 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_276" + id="Page_276"></a>[pg 276]</span> force is passed, the + volume of commerce will not affect the issue; and seeing how + low that capacity must be in the future and how enormous is + the volume of our trade, the limit of destructive power, at + least as against ourselves, provided we have a reasonably + well-organised system of defence, must be relatively low. It + must, in fact, be passed at a percentage figure well within + what we have easily supported in the past. There is reason, + therefore, to believe that so far from the assumption in + question being true, the effective vulnerability of + sea-borne trade is not in direct but in inverse proportion + to its volume. In other words, the greater the volume, the + more difficult it is to make an effective percentage + impression.</p> + + <p>Similarly, it will be observed that the strain of trade + defence was proportioned not to the volume of that trade, but + to the number and exposure of its terminals and focal points. + Whatever the volume of the trade these remained the same in + number, and the amount of force required for their defence + varied only with the strength that could readily be brought to + bear against them. It varied, that is, with the distribution of + the enemy's bases and the amount of his naval force. Thus in + the war of 1812 with the United States, the West Indian and + North American areas were much more exposed than they had been + when we were at war with France alone and when American ports + were not open to her as bases. They became vulnerable not only + to the United States fleet, but also in a much higher degree to + that of France, and consequently the force we found necessary + to devote to trade defence in the North Atlantic was out of all + proportion to the naval strength of the new belligerent. Our + protective force had to be increased enormously, while the + volume of our trade remained precisely the same.</p> + + <p>This relation of trade defence to terminal and focal areas + is of great importance, for it is in the increase of such areas + in the Far East that lies the only radical change in the + problem. + <!-- Page 277 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_277" + id="Page_277"></a>[pg 277]</span> The East Indian seas were + always of course to some extent treated as a defended area, + but the problem was simplified by the partial survival in + those regions of the old method of defence. Till about the + end of the seventeenth century long-range trade was expected + to defend itself, at least outside the home area, and the + retention of their armament by East Indiamen was the last + survival of the practice. Beyond the important focal area of + St. Helena they relied mainly on their own power of + resistance or to such escort as could be provided by the + relief ships of the East Indian station. As a rule, their + escort proper went no farther outward-bound than St. Helena, + whence it returned with the homeward-bound vessels that + gathered there from India, China, and the South Sea whaling + grounds. The idea of the system was to provide escort for + that part of the great route which was exposed to attack + from French or Spanish colonial bases on the African coasts + and in the adjacent islands.</p> + + <p>For obvious reasons this system would have to be + reconsidered in the future. The expansion of the great European + Powers have changed the conditions for which it sufficed, and + in a war with any one of them the system of defended terminal + and focal areas would require a great extension eastward, + absorbing an appreciable section of our force, and entailing a + comparatively weak prolongation of our chain of concentrations. + Here, then, we must mark a point where trade defence has + increased in difficulty, and there is one other.</p> + + <p>Although minor hostile bases within a defended area have + lost most of their menace to trade, they have acquired as + torpedo bases a power of disturbing the defence itself. So long + as such bases exist with a potent flotilla within them, it is + obvious that the actual provision for defence cannot be so + simple a matter as it was formerly. Other and more complex + arrangements may have to be made. Still, the principle of + <!-- Page 278 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_278" + id="Page_278"></a>[pg 278]</span> defended areas seems to + remain unshaken, and if it is to work with its old + effectiveness, the means and the disposition for securing + those areas will have to be adapted to the new tactical + possibilities. The old strategical conditions, so far as can + be seen, are unaltered except in so far as the reactions of + modern material make them tell in favour of defence rather + than of attack.</p> + + <p>If we desire to formulate the principles on which this + conclusion rests we shall find them in the two broad rules, + firstly, that the vulnerability of trade is in inverse ratio to + its volume, and secondly, that facility of attack means + facility of defence. The latter, which was always true, + receives special emphasis from modern developments. Facility of + attack means the power of exercising control. For exercise of + control we require not only numbers, but also speed and + endurance, qualities which can only be obtained in two ways: it + must be at the cost of armour and armament, or at the cost of + increased size. By increasing size we at once lose numbers. If + by sacrificing armament and armour we seek to maintain numbers + and so facilitate attack, we at the same time facilitate + defence. Vessels of low fighting power indeed cannot hope to + operate in fertile areas without support to overpower the + defence. Every powerful unit detached for such support sets + free a unit on the other side, and when this process is once + begun, there is no halting-place. Supporting units to be + effective must multiply into squadrons, and sooner or later the + inferior Power seeking to substitute commerce destruction for + the clash of squadrons will have squadronal warfare thrust upon + him, provided again the superior Power adopts a reasonably + sound system of defence. It was always so, and, so far as it is + possible to penetrate the mists which veil the future, it would + seem that with higher mobility and better means of + communication the squadronal stage must be reached long before + any adequate percentage impression can have been + <!-- Page 279 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_279" + id="Page_279"></a>[pg 279]</span> made by the sporadic + action of commerce destroyers. Ineffectual as such warfare + has always been in the past, until a general command has + been established, its prospects in the future, judged by the + old established principles, are less promising than + ever.</p> + + <p>Finally, in approaching the problem of trade protection, and + especially for the actual determination of the force and + distribution it requires, there is a dominant limitation to be + kept in mind. By no conceivable means is it possible to give + trade absolute protection. We cannot make an omelette without + breaking eggs. We cannot make war without losing ships. To aim + at a standard of naval strength or a strategical distribution + which would make our trade absolutely invulnerable is to march + to economic ruin. It is to cripple our power of sustaining war + to a successful issue, and to seek a position of maritime + despotism which, even if it were attainable, would set every + man's hand against us. All these evils would be upon us, and + our goal would still be in the far distance. In 1870 the second + naval Power in the world was at war with an enemy that could + not be considered a naval Power at all, and yet she lost ships + by capture. Never in the days of our most complete domination + upon the seas was our trade invulnerable, and it never can be. + To seek invulnerability is to fall into the strategical vice of + trying to be superior everywhere, to forfeit the attainment of + the essential for fear of risking the unessential, to base our + plans on an assumption that war may be waged without loss, that + it is, in short, something that it never has been and never can + be. Such peace-bred dreams must be rigorously abjured. Our + standard must be the mean of economic strength—the line + which on the one hand will permit us to nourish our financial + resources for the evil day, and on the other, when that day + comes, will deny to the enemy the possibility of choking our + financial vigour by sufficiently checking the flow of our + trade.</p><!-- Page 280 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_280" + id="Page_280"></a>[pg 280]</span> + + <h3>III. ATTACK, DEFENCE, AND SUPPORT OF<br /> + MILITARY EXPEDITIONS</h3> + + <p>The attack and defence of oversea expeditions are governed + in a large measure by the principles of attack and defence of + trade. In both cases it is a question of control of + communications, and in a general way it may be said, if we + control them for the one purpose, we control them for the + other. But with combined expeditions freedom of passage is not + the only consideration. The duties of the fleet do not end with + the protection of the troops during transit, as in the case of + convoys, unless indeed, as with convoys, the destination is a + friendly country. In the normal case of a hostile destination, + where resistance is to be expected from the commencement of the + operations, the fleet is charged with further duties of a most + exacting kind. They may be described generally as duties of + support, and it is the intrusion of these duties which + distinguish the naval arrangements for combined operations most + sharply from those for the protection of trade. Except for this + consideration there need be no difference in the method of + defence. In each case the strength required would be measured + by the dangers of interference in transit. But as it is, that + standard will not serve for combined expeditions; for however + small those risks, the protective arrangements must be + sufficiently extensive to include arrangements for support.</p> + + <p>Before dealing with this, the most complex aspect of the + question, it will be well to dismiss attack. From the + strategical point of view its principles differ not at all from + those already laid down for active resistance of invasion. + Whether the expedition that threatens us be small or of + invasion strength, the cardinal rule has always been that the + transports and not the escort must be the primary objective of + the fleet. The escort, according to the old practice, must be + turned or contained, but never treated as a primary objective + unless both turning and containing prove to be impracticable. + It is <!-- Page 281 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_281" + id="Page_281"></a>[pg 281]</span> needless to repeat the + words of the old masters in which this principle lies + embalmed. It is seldom that we find a rule of naval strategy + laid down in precise technical terms, but this one is an + exception. In the old squadronal instructions, "The + transports of the enemy are to be your principal object," + became something like a common form.</p> + + <p>Nor did this rule apply only to cases where the transports + were protected by a mere escort. It held good even in the + exceptional cases where the military force was accompanied or + guarded by the whole available battle strength of the enemy. We + have seen how in 1744 Norris was prepared to follow the French + transports if necessary with his whole force, and how in 1798 + Nelson organised his fleet in such a way as to contain rather + than destroy the enemy's battle-squadron, so that he might + provide for an overwhelming attack upon the transports.</p> + + <p>Exceptions to this as to all strategical rules may be + conceived. Conditions might exist in which, if the enemy's + battle-fleet accompanied his transports, it would be worth our + while, for ulterior objects of our own, to risk the escape of + the transports in order to seize the opportunity of destroying + the fleet. But even in such a case the distinction would be + little more than academical; for our best chance of securing a + decisive tactical advantage against the enemy's fleet would + usually be to compel it to conform to our movements by + threatening an attack on the transports. It is well known that + it is in the embarrassment arising from the presence of + transports that lies the special weakness of a fleet in charge + of them.</p> + + <p>There is, however, one condition which radically + differentiates comparatively small expeditions from great + invasions and that is the power of evasion. Our experience has + proved beyond dispute that the navy alone cannot guarantee + defence against such expeditions. It cannot be sure of + preventing their sailing or of attacking them in transit, and + this is especially + <!-- Page 282 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_282" + id="Page_282"></a>[pg 282]</span> the case where an open sea + gives them a free choice of route, as in the case of the + French expeditions against Ireland. It is for this reason + that, although an adequate navy has always proved sufficient + to prevent an invasion, for defence against expeditions it + must be supplemented by a home army. To perfect our defence, + or, in other words, our power of attack, such an army must + be adequate to ensure that all expeditions small enough to + evade the fleet shall do no effective harm when they land. + If in numbers, training, organisation, and distribution it + is adequate for this purpose, an enemy cannot hope to affect + the issue of the war except by raising his expeditions to + invasion strength, and so finding himself involved in a + problem that no one has ever yet solved for an uncommanded + sea.</p> + + <p>Still, even for expeditions below invasion strength the navy + will only regard the army as a second line, and its strategy + must provide in the event of evasion for co-operation with that + line. By means of a just distribution of its coastal flotilla + it will provide for getting contact with the expedition at the + earliest moment after its destination is declared. It will + press the principle of making the army its objective to the + utmost limit by the most powerful and energetic cruiser + pursuit, and with wireless and the increased ratio of cruiser + speed, such pursuit is far more formidable than it ever was. No + expedition nowadays, however successful its evasion, can be + guaranteed against naval interruption in the process of + landing. Still less can it be guaranteed against naval + interference in its rear or flanks while it is securing its + front against the home army. It may seek by using large + transports to reduce their number and secure higher speed, but + while that will raise its chance of evasion, it will prolong + the critical period of landing. If it seek by using smaller + transports to quicken disembarkation, that will decrease its + chances of evasion by lowering its speed and widening the sea + area it will occupy in transit. All the modern developments in + fact which make for + <!-- Page 283 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_283" + id="Page_283"></a>[pg 283]</span> defence in case of + invasion over an uncommanded sea also go to facilitate + timely contact with an expedition seeking to operate by + evasion. Nor must it be forgotten, since the problem is a + combined one, that the corresponding developments ashore + tell with little less force in favour of the defending army. + Such appear to be the broad principles which govern an + enemy's attempts to act with combined expeditions in our own + waters, where by hypothesis we are in sufficient naval + strength to deny him permanent local command. We may now + turn to the larger and more complex question of the conduct + of such expeditions where the naval conditions are + reversed.</p> + + <p>By the conduct, be it remembered, we mean not only their + defence but also their support, and for this reason the + starting-point of our inquiry is to be found, as above + indicated, in the contrast of combined expeditions with + convoys. A convoy consists of two elements—a fleet of + merchantmen and an escort. But a combined expedition does not + consist simply of an army and a squadron. It is an organism at + once more complex and more homogeneous. Its constitution is + fourfold. There is, firstly, the army; secondly, the transports + and landing flotilla—that is, the flotilla of flat-boats + and steamboats for towing them, all of which may be carried in + the transports or accompany them; thirdly, the "Squadron in + charge of transports," as it came to be called, which includes + the escort proper and the supporting flotilla of lighter craft + for inshore work; and lastly, the "Covering squadron."</p> + + <p>Such at least is a combined expedition in logical analysis. + But so essentially is it a single organism, that in practice + these various elements can seldom be kept sharply distinct. + They may be interwoven in the most intricate manner. Indeed to + a greater or less extent each will always have to discharge + some of the functions of the others. Thus the covering squadron + may not only be indistinguishable from the escort and support, + but it will often provide the greater part of the landing <!-- + Page 284 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_284" + id="Page_284"></a>[pg 284]</span> flotilla and even a + portion of the landing force. Similarly, the escort may also + serve as transport, and provide in part not only the + supporting force, but also the landing flotilla. The + fourfold constitution is therefore in a great measure + theoretical. Still its use is not merely that it serves to + define the varied functions which the fleet will have to + discharge. As we proceed it will be seen to have a practical + strategical value.</p> + + <p>From a naval point of view it is the covering squadron which + calls first for consideration, because of the emphasis with + which its necessity marks not only the distinction between the + conduct of combined expeditions and the conduct of commercial + convoys, but also the fact that such expeditions are actually a + combined force, and not merely an army escorted by a fleet.</p> + + <p>In our system of commerce protection the covering squadron + had no place. The battle-fleet, as we have seen, was employed + in holding definite terminal areas, and had no organic + connection with the convoys. The convoys had no further + protection than their own escort and the reinforcements that + met them as they approached the terminal areas. But where a + convoy of transports forming part of a combined expedition was + destined for an enemy's country and would have to overcome + resistance by true combined operations, a covering + battle-squadron was always provided. In the case of distant + objectives it might be that the covering squadron was not + attached till the whole expedition assembled in the theatre of + operations; during transit to that theatre the transports might + have commerce protection escort only. But once the operations + began from the point of concentration, a covering squadron was + always in touch.</p> + + <p>It was only where the destination of the troops was a + friendly country, and the line of passage was well protected by + our permanent blockades, that a covering squadron could be + dispensed with altogether. Thus our various expeditions for the + assistance of Portugal were treated exactly like commercial + <!-- Page 285 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_285" + id="Page_285"></a>[pg 285]</span> convoys, but in such cases + as Wolfe's expedition to Quebec or Amherst's to Louisburg, + or indeed any of those which were continually launched + against the West Indies, a battle-squadron was always + provided as an integral part in the theatre of operations. + Our arrangements in the Crimean War illustrate the point + exactly. Our troops were sent out at first to land at + Gallipoli in a friendly territory, and to act within that + territory as an army of observation. It was not a true + combined expedition, and the transports were given no + covering squadron. Their passage was sufficiently covered by + our Channel and Mediterranean fleets occupying the exits of + the Baltic and the Black Sea. But so soon as the original + war plan proved ineffective and combined offensive + operations against Sebastopol were decided on, the + Mediterranean fleet lost its independent character, and + thenceforth its paramount function was to furnish a covering + squadron in touch with the troops.</p> + + <p>Seeing how important are the support duties of such a force, + the term "Covering squadron" may seem ill-chosen to describe + it. But it is adopted for two reasons. In the first place, it + was the one employed officially in our service on the last + mentioned occasion which was our last great combined + expedition. In preparing the descent on the Crimea, Sir Edmund + Lyons, who was acting as Chief of the Staff to Sir + <!-- Page 286 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_286" + id="Page_286"></a>[pg 286]</span> James Dundas, and had + charge of the combined operations, organised the fleet into + a "Covering squadron" and a "Squadron in charge of + transports." In the second place, the designation serves to + emphasise what is its main and primary function. For + important as it is to keep in mind its support duties, they + must not be permitted to overshadow the fact that its + paramount function is to prevent interference with the + actual combined operations—that is, the landing, + support, and supply of the army. Thus in 1705, when Shovel + and Peterborough were operating against Barcelona, Shovel + was covering the amphibious siege from the French squadron + in Toulon. Peterborough required the assistance of the + marines ashore to execute a <i>coup de main</i>, and Shovel + only consented to land them on the express understanding + that the moment his cruisers passed the signal that the + Toulon squadron was putting to sea, they would have to be + recalled to the fleet no matter what the state of the land + operations. And to this Peterborough agreed. The principle + involved, it will be seen, is precisely that which Lyons's + term "Covering squadron" embodies.</p> + + <p>To quote anything that happened in the Crimean War as a + precedent without such traditional support will scarcely appear + convincing. In our British way we have fostered a legend that + so far as organisation and staff work were concerned that war + was nothing but a collection of deterrent examples. But in + truth as a combined operation its opening movement + <!-- Page 287 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_287" + id="Page_287"></a>[pg 287]</span> both in conception and + organisation was perhaps the most daring, brilliant, and + successful thing of the kind we ever did. Designed as the + expedition was to assist an ally in his own country, it was + suddenly called upon without any previous preparation to + undertake a combined operation of the most difficult kind + against the territory of a well-warned enemy. It involved a + landing late in the year on an open and stormy coast within + striking distance of a naval fortress which contained an + army of unknown strength, and a fleet not much inferior in + battle power and undefeated. It was an operation comparable + to the capture of Louisburg and the landing of the Japanese + in the Liaotung Peninsula, but the conditions were far more + difficult. Both those operations had been rehearsed a few + years previously, and they had been long prepared on the + fullest knowledge. In the Crimea everything was in the dark; + even steam was an unproved element, and everything had to be + improvised. The French had practically to demobilise their + fleet to supply transport, and so hazardous did the + enterprise appear, that they resisted its being undertaken + with every military argument. We had in fact, besides all + the other difficulties, to carry an unwilling ally upon our + backs. Yet it was accomplished, and so far at least as the + naval part was concerned, the methods which achieved success + mark the culmination of all we had learnt in three centuries + of rich experience.</p> + + <p>The first of the lessons was that for operations in + uncommanded or imperfectly commanded seas there was need of a + covering squadron differentiated from the squadron in charge of + transports. Its main function was to secure the necessary local + command, whether for transit or for the actual operations. But + as a rule transit was secured by our regular blockading + squadrons, and generally the covering squadron only assembled + in the theatre of operations. When therefore the theatre was + within a defended terminal area, as in our descents upon the + northern and Atlantic coasts of + <!-- Page 288 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_288" + id="Page_288"></a>[pg 288]</span> France, then the terminal + defence squadron was usually also sufficient to protect the + actual operations. It thus formed automatically the covering + squadron, and either continued its blockade, or, as in the + case of our attack on St. Malo in 1758, took up a position + between the enemy's squadron and the expedition's line of + operation. If, however, the theatre of operation was not + within a terminal area, or lay within a distant one that was + weakly held, the expedition was given its own covering + squadron, in which the local squadron was more or less + completely merged. Whatever, in fact, was necessary to + secure the local control was done, though, as we have seen, + and must presently consider more fully, this necessity was + not always the standard by which the strength of the + covering squadron was measured.</p> + + <p>The strength of the covering squadron being determined, the + next question is the position or "tract" which it should + occupy. Like most other strategical problems, it is "an option + of difficulties." In so far as the squadron is designed for + support—that is, support from its men, boats, and + guns—it will be desirable to station it as near as + possible to the objective; but as a covering squadron, with the + duty of preventing the intrusion of an enemy's force, it should + be as far away as possible, so as to engage such a force at the + earliest possible moment of its attempt to interfere. There is + also the paramount necessity that its position must be such + that favourable contact with the enemy is certain if he tries + to interrupt. Usually such certainty is only to be found either + in touch with the enemy's naval base or in touch with your own + landing force. Where the objective is the local naval base of + the enemy these two points, of course, tend to be identical + strategically, and the position of the covering squadron + becomes a tactical rather than a strategical question. But the + vital principle of an independent existence holds good, and no + matter how great the necessity of support, the covering + squadron should never be so deeply engaged with the landing + force as + <!-- Page 289 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_289" + id="Page_289"></a>[pg 289]</span> to be unable to + disentangle itself for action as a purely naval unit in time + to discharge its naval function. In other words, it must + always be able to act in the same way as a free field army + covering a siege.</p> + + <p>Where the objective of the expedition is not the local naval + base, the choice of a position for the covering squadron will + turn mainly on the amount of support which the army is likely + to require. If it cannot act by surprise, and serious military + resistance is consequently to be expected, or where the coast + defences are too strong for the transport squadron to + overpower, then the scale will incline to a position close to + the army, though the extent to which, under modern conditions, + ships at sea can usefully perform the delicate operation of + supporting an infantry attack with gun fire, except by + enfilading the enemy's position, remains to be proved. A + similar choice will be indicated where strong support of men + and boats is required, as when a sufficiency of flat-boats and + steam towage cannot be provided by the transports and their + attendant squadron; or again where the locality is such that + amphibious operations beyond the actual landing are likely to + be called for, and the assistance of a large number of boats + and seamen acting with the army is necessary to give it the + amphibious tactical mobility which it would otherwise lack. + Such cases occurred at Quebec in 1759, where Saunders took his + covering battle-squadron right up the St. Lawrence, although + its covering functions could have been discharged even better + by a position several hundreds of miles away from the + objective; and again in 1800 at Alexandria, where Lord Keith + ran the extremest hazard to his covering functions + <!-- Page 290 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_290" + id="Page_290"></a>[pg 290]</span> in order to undertake the + supply of General Abercromby's army by inland waters and + give him the mobility he required.</p> + + <p>If, on the other hand, the transport squadron is able to + furnish all the support necessary, the covering squadron will + take station as close as possible to the enemy's naval base, + and there it will operate according to the ordinary laws of + blockade. If nothing is desired but to prevent interference, + its guard will take the form of a close blockade. But if there + be a subsidiary purpose of using the expedition as a means of + forcing the enemy to sea, the open form will be employed; as, + for instance, in Anson's case above cited, when he covered the + St. Malo expedition not by closely blockading Brest, but by + taking a position to the eastward at the Isle de Batz.</p> + + <p>In the Japanese operations against Manchuria and the + Kuantung Peninsula these old principles displayed themselves in + undiminished vitality. In the surprise descents against Seoul + and at Takusan the work of support was left entirely with the + transport squadron, while Admiral Togo took up a covering + position far away at Port Arthur. The two elements of the fleet + were kept separate all through. But in the operations for the + isolation and subsequent siege of Port Arthur they were so + closely united as to appear frequently indistinguishable. + Still, so far as the closeness of the landing place to the + objective permitted, the two acted independently. For the + actual landing of the Second Army the boats of the covering + squadron were used, but it remained a live naval unit all + through, and was never organically mingled with the transport + squadron. Its operations throughout were, so far as modern + conditions permit, on the lines of a close blockade. + <!-- Page 291 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_291" + id="Page_291"></a>[pg 291]</span> To prevent interference + was its paramount function, undisturbed, so far as we are + able to judge, by any subsidiary purpose of bringing the + enemy to decisive action.</p> + + <p>All through the operations, however, there was a new + influence which tended to confuse the precision of the old + methods. Needless to say it was the torpedo and the mine. Their + deflective pressure was curious and interesting. In our own + operations against Sebastopol, to which the Port Arthur case is + most closely comparable, the old rules still held good. On the + traditional principle, dating from Drake's attack on San + Domingo in 1585, a landing place was chosen which gave the mean + between facility for a <i>coup de main</i> and freedom from + opposition; that is, it was chosen at the nearest practicable + point to the objective which was undefended by batteries and + out of reach of the enemy's main army.</p> + + <p>In the handling of the covering squadron Admiral Dundas, the + Commander-in-Chief, gave it its dual function. After explaining + the constitution of the transport squadron he says, "The + remainder of my force ... will act as a covering squadron, and + where practicable assist in the general disembarkation." With + these two objects in mind he took a station near enough to the + landing place to support the army with his guns if it were + opposed, but still in sight of his cruisers before Sebastopol, + and at such a distance that at the first sign of the Russians + moving he would have time to get before the port and engage + them before they could get well to sea; that is, he took a + position as near to the army as was compatible with preventing + interference, or, it may be said, + <!-- Page 292 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_292" + id="Page_292"></a>[pg 292]</span> his position was as near + to the enemy's base as was compatible with supporting the + landing. From either aspect in fact the position was the + same, and its choice presented no complexity owing mainly to + the fact that for the first time steam simplified the + factors of time and distance.</p> + + <p>In the Japanese case the application of these principles was + not so easy. In selecting the nearest undefended point for a + landing, it was not only batteries, or even the army in Port + Arthur, or the troops dispersed in the Liaotung Peninsula that + had to be considered, but rather, as must always be the case in + the future, mines and mobile torpedo defence. The point they + chose was the nearest practicable bay that was unmined. It was + not strictly out of mobile defence range, but it so happened + that it lay behind islands which lent themselves to the + creation of fixed defences, and thus it fulfilled all the + recognised conditions. But in so far as the defences could be + turned by the Russian fleet a covering squadron was necessary, + and the difficulty of choosing a position for it was + complicated by the fact that the objective of the combined + operations was not merely Port Arthur itself, but also the + squadron it contained. It was necessary, therefore, not only to + hold off that squadron, but to prevent its escape. This + indicated a close blockade. But for close blockade a position + out of night torpedo range is necessary, and the nearest point + where such a position could be secured was behind the defences + that covered the disembarkation. Consequently, in spite of what + the strategical conditions dictated, the covering squadron was + more or less continuously forced back upon the army and its + supporting force, even when the support of the battle-squadron + was no longer required.</p> + + <p>In the conditions that existed nothing was lost. For the + lines of the Japanese fixed defences were so near to the + enemy's base, that by mining the entrance of the port Admiral + Togo ensured that the enemy's exit would be slow enough for him + to be certain of getting contact from his defended anchorage + <!-- Page 293 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_293" + id="Page_293"></a>[pg 293]</span> before the Russians could + get far to sea. What would happen in a case when no such + position could be secured is another matter. The landing + place and supply base of the army must be secured against + torpedo attack, and the principle of concentration of effort + would suggest that the means of defence should not be + attenuated by providing the covering squadron with a + defended anchorage elsewhere. Thus it would appear that + unless the geographical conditions permit the covering + squadron to use one of its own national bases, the drift of + recent developments will be to force it back on the army, + and thus tend to confuse its duties with those of the + transport squadron. Hence the increased importance of + keeping clear the difference in function between the two + squadrons.</p> + + <p>To emphasise the principle of the covering squadron, these + two cases may be contrasted with the Lissa episode at the end + of the Austro-Italian War of 1866. In that case it was entirely + neglected, with disastrous results. The Austrian admiral, + Tegethoff, with an inferior fleet had by higher order been + acting throughout on the defensive, and was still in Pola + waiting for a chance of a counter-stroke. Persano with the + superior Italian fleet was at Ancona, where he practically + dominated the Adriatic. In July the Italians, owing to the + failure of the army, were confronted with the prospect of being + forced to make peace on unfavourable terms. To improve the + position Persano was ordered to take possession of the Austrian + island of Lissa. Without any attempt to organise his fleet on + the orthodox British principle he proceeded to conduct the + operation with his entire force. Practically the whole of it + became involved in amphibious work, and as soon as Persano was + thus committed, Tegethoff put to sea and surprised him. Persano + was unable to disentangle a sufficient force in time to + <!-- Page 294 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_294" + id="Page_294"></a>[pg 294]</span> meet the attack, and + having no compact squadron fit for independent naval action, + he was decisively defeated by the inferior enemy. According + to British practice, it was clearly a case where, if the + operation were to be undertaken at all, an independent + covering squadron should have been told off either to hold + Tegethoff in Pola or to bring him to timely action, + according to whether the island or the Austrian fleet was + the primary objective. The reason it was not done may be + that Persano was not given a proper landing force, and he + seems to have considered that the whole strength of his + fleet was needed for the successful seizure of the + objective. If so, it is only one more proof of the rule that + no matter what fleet support the landing operations may + require, it should never be given in an imperfectly + commanded sea to an extent which will deny the possibility + of a covering squadron being left free for independent naval + action.</p> + + <p>The length to which the supporting functions of the fleet + may be carried will always be a delicate question. The + suggestion that its strength must be affected by the need of + the army for the men of the fleet or its boats, which imply its + men as well, will appear heretical. A battle-squadron, we say, + is intended to deal with the enemy's battle-squadron and its + men to fight the ships, and the mind revolts at the idea of the + strength of a squadron being fixed by any other standard. + Theoretically nothing can seem more true, but it is an idea of + peace and the study. The atmosphere of war engendered a wider + and more practical view. The men of the old wars knew that when + a squadron is attached to a combined expedition it is something + different from a purely naval unit. They knew, moreover, that + an army acting oversea against hostile territory is an + incomplete organism incapable of striking its blow in the most + effective manner without the assistance of the men of the + fleet. It was the office, then, of the naval portion of the + force not only to defend the striking part of the organism, but + to complete its deficiencies and lend it the + <!-- Page 295 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_295" + id="Page_295"></a>[pg 295]</span> power to strike. Alone and + unaided the army cannot depend on getting itself ashore, it + cannot supply itself, it cannot secure its retreat, nor can + it avail itself of the highest advantages of an amphibious + force, the sudden shift of base or line of operation. These + things the fleet must do for it, and it must do them with + its men.<a name="NtA_25" + id="NtA_25"></a><a href="#Nt_25"><sup>25</sup></a></p> + + <p>The authority for this view is abundant. In 1800, for + instance, when General Maitland was charged with an expedition + against Belleisle, he was invited to state what naval force he + would require. He found it difficult to fix with precision. + "Speaking loosely, however," he wrote, "three or four sail of + the line and four or five active frigates appear to me to be + properly adequate to the proposed service. The frigates to + blockade." (Meaning, of course, to blockade the objective and + prevent reinforcements reaching it from the mainland, always + one of the supporting functions of the squadron attached to the + transports.) "The line-of-battle ships," he adds, "to furnish + us with the number of men necessary for land operations." In + this case our permanent blockading squadrons supplied the + cover, and what Maitland meant was that the battleships he + asked for were to be added to the transport + <!-- Page 296 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_296" + id="Page_296"></a>[pg 296]</span> squadron not as being + required for escort, but for support. St. Vincent, who was + then First Lord, not only endorsed his request, but gave him + for disembarkation work one more ship-of-the-line than he + had asked for. At this time our general command of the sea + had been very fully secured, and we had plenty of naval + force to spare for its exercise. It will be well to compare + it with a case in which the circumstances were + different.</p> + + <p>When in 1795 the expedition under Admiral Christian and + General Abercromby was being prepared for the West Indies, the + admiral in concert with Jervis drew up a memorandum as to the + naval force required.<a name="NtA_26" + id="NtA_26"></a><a href="#Nt_26"><sup>26</sup></a> The force + he asked for was considerable. Both he and Jervis considered + that the escort and local cover must be very strong, because + it was impossible to count on closing either Brest or Toulon + effectually by blockade. But this was not the only reason. + The plan of operations involved three distinct landings, and + each would require at least two of the line, and perhaps + three, "not only as protection, but as the means by which + flat-boats must be manned, cannon landed, and the other + necessary services of fatigue executed." Christian also + required the necessary frigates and three or four brigs "to + cover [that is, support] the operations of the smaller + vessels [that is, the landing flotillas doing inshore + work]." The main attack would require at least four of the + line and seven frigates, with brigs and schooners in + proportion. In all he considered, the ships-of-the-line [the + frigates being "otherwise employed"] would have to provide + landing parties to the number of 2000 men "for the + flat-boats, <!-- Page 297 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_297" + id="Page_297"></a>[pg 297]</span> landing and moving guns, + water, and provisions," and this would be their daily task. + The military force these landing parties were to serve + amounted to about 18,000 men.</p> + + <p>Lord Barham, it must be said, who as Sir Charles Middleton + was then First Sea Lord, objected to the requirements as + excessive, particularly in the demand for a strong escort, as + he considered that the transit could be safeguarded by special + vigilance on the part of the permanent blockading squadrons. + The need for large shore parties he seems to have ignored. His + opinion, however, is not quite convincing, for from the first + he had taken up an antagonistic attitude to the whole idea of + the expedition. He regarded the policy which dictated it as + radically unsound, and was naturally anxious to restrict the + force that was to be spent upon it. His opposition was based on + the broad and far-sighted principles that were characteristic + of his strategy. He believed that in view of the threatening + attitude of Spain the right course was to husband the navy so + as to bring it up to a two-Power standard for the coming + struggle, and to keep it concentrated for decisive naval action + the moment Spain showed her hand. In short, he stoutly + condemned a policy which entailed a serious dissipation of + naval force for a secondary object before a working command of + the sea had been secured. It was, in fact, the arrangements for + this expedition which forced him to resign + <!-- Page 298 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_298" + id="Page_298"></a>[pg 298]</span> before the preparations + were complete. But it is to be observed that his objections + to the plan were really due, not to the principle of its + organisation, but to our having insufficient force to give + it adequate naval support without prejudicing the higher + consideration of our whole position at sea.<a name="NtA_27" + id="NtA_27"></a><a href="#Nt_27"><sup>27</sup></a></p> + + <p>It is obvious that the foregoing considerations, beyond the + strategical reactions already noted, will have another of the + first importance, in that they must influence the choice of a + landing place. The interest of the army will always be to fix + it as near to the objective as is compatible with an unopposed + landing. The ideal was one night's march, but this could rarely + be attained except in the case of very small expeditions, which + could be landed rapidly at the close of day and advance in the + dark. In larger expeditions, the aim was to effect the landing + far enough from the objective to prevent the garrison of the + place or the enemy's local forces offering opposition before a + footing was secured. The tendency of the navy will usually be + in the opposite direction; for normally the further they can + land the army away from the enemy's strength, the surer are + they of being able to protect it against naval interference. + Their ideal will be a place far enough away to be out of + torpedo range, and to enable them to work the covering and the + transport squadron in sound strategical independence.</p> + + <p>To reduce these divergencies to a mean of efficiency some + kind of joint Staff is necessary, and to ensure its smooth + working it is no less desirable to ascertain, so far as + possible, the principles and method on which it should proceed. + In the best recent precedents the process has been for the Army + Staff to present the limits of coast-line within which the + landing + <!-- Page 299 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_299" + id="Page_299"></a>[pg 299]</span> must take place for the + operation to have the desired effect, and to indicate the + known practicable landing points in the order they would + prefer them. It will then be for the Naval Staff to say how + nearly in accordance with the views of the army they are + prepared to act. Their decision will turn on the + difficulties of protection and the essentials of a landing + place from the point of view of weather, currents, beach and + the like, and also in a secondary measure upon the extent to + which the conformation of the coast will permit of tactical + support by gun-fire and feints. If the Naval Staff are + unwilling to agree to the point or points their colleagues + most desire, a question of balance of risk is set up, which + the higher Joint Staff must adjust. It will be the duty of + the Naval Staff to set out frankly and clearly all the sea + risks the proposal of the army entails, and if possible to + suggest an alternative by which the risk of naval + interference can be lessened without laying too heavy a + burden on the army. Balancing these risks against those + stated by the army, the superior Staff must decide which + line is to be taken, and each service then will do its best + to minimise the difficulties it has to face. Whether the + superior Staff will incline to the naval or the military + view will depend upon whether the greater danger likely to + be incurred is from the sea or on land.</p> + + <p>Where the naval conditions are fairly well known the line of + operations can be fixed in this way with much precision. But + if, as usually happens, the probable action of the enemy at sea + cannot be divined with sufficient approximation, then assuming + there is serious possibility of naval interference, the final + choice within the limited area must be left to the admiral. The + practice has been to give him instructions which define in + order of merit the points the army desire, and direct him to + select the one which in the circumstances, as he finds them, he + considers within reasonable risk of war. Similarly, if the + danger of naval interference be small and the local conditions + ashore imperfectly known, the final choice will be with + <!-- Page 300 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_300" + id="Page_300"></a>[pg 300]</span> the general, subject only + to the practicable possibilities of the landing place he + would choose.</p> + + <p>During the best period of our old wars there was seldom any + difficulty in making things work smoothly on these lines. After + the first inglorious failure at Rochefort in 1757 the practice + was, where discretion of this kind had been allowed, for the + two commanders-in-chief to make a joint coast-reconnaissance in + the same boat and settle the matter amicably on the spot.</p> + + <p>It was on these lines the conduct of our combined operations + was always arranged thenceforth. Since the elder Pitt's time it + has never been our practice to place combined expeditions under + either a naval or a military commander-in-chief and allow him + to decide between naval and military exigencies. The danger of + possible friction between two commanders-in-chief came to be + regarded as small compared with the danger of a single one + making mistakes through unfamiliarity with the limitations of + the service to which he does not belong.</p> + + <p>The system has usually worked well even when questions arose + which were essentially questions for a joint superior Staff. + The exceptions indeed are very few. A fine example of how such + difficulties can be settled, when the spirit is willing, + occurred in the Crimea. The naval difficulties, as we have + already seen, were as formidable as they could well be short of + rendering the whole attempt madness. When it came to the point + of execution a joint council of war was held, at which sat the + allied Staffs of both services. So great were the differences + of opinion between the French and British Generals, and so + imperfectly was the terrain known, that they could + <!-- Page 301 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_301" + id="Page_301"></a>[pg 301]</span> not indicate a landing + place with any precision. All the admirals knew was that it + must be on an open coast, which they had not been able to + reconnoitre, where the weather might at any time interrupt + communications with the shore, and where they were liable to + be attacked by a force which, until their own ships were + cleared of troops, would not be inferior. All these + objections they laid before the Council General. Lord Raglan + then said the army now perfectly understood the risk, and + was prepared to take it. Whereupon the allied admirals + replied that they were ready to proceed and do their best to + set the army ashore and support it at any point that should + be chosen.</p> + + <p>There remains a form of support which has not yet been + considered, and that is diversionary movements or feints by the + fleet to draw the enemy's attention away from the landing + place. This will naturally be a function of the covering + battle-squadron or its attendant cruisers and flotilla. The + device appears in Drake's attack on San Domingo in 1585, an + attack which may be regarded as our earliest precedent in + modern times and as the pattern to which all subsequent + operations of the kind conformed so far as circumstances + allowed. In that case, while Drake landed the troops a night's + march from the place, the bulk of the fleet moved before it, + kept it in alarm all night, and at dawn made a demonstration + with the boats of forcing a direct landing under cover of its + guns. The result was the garrison moved out to meet the threat + and were surprised in flank by the real landing force. Passing + from this simple case to the most elaborate in our annals, we + find Saunders doing the same thing at Quebec. In preparation + for Wolfe's night landing he made a show of arrangements + <!-- Page 302 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_302" + id="Page_302"></a>[pg 302]</span> for a bombardment of + Montcalm's lines below the city, and in the morning with the + boats of the fleet began a demonstration of landing his + marines. By this device he held Montcalm away from Wolfe's + landing place till a secure footing had been obtained. + Similar demonstrations had been made above the city, and the + combined result was that Wolfe was able to penetrate the + centre of the French position unopposed.</p> + + <p>Such work belongs of course to the region of tactics rather + than of strategy, but the device has been used with equal + effect strategically. So great is the secrecy as well as the + mobility of an amphibious force, that it is extremely difficult + for an enemy to distinguish a real attack from a feint. Even at + the last moment, when a landing is actually in progress, it is + impossible for the defenders to tell that all the troops are + being landed at the one point if a demonstration is going on + elsewhere. At Quebec it was not till Montcalm was face to face + with Wolfe that he knew he had to deal with the whole British + force. Still less from a strategical point of view can we be + certain whether a particular landing represents an advance + guard or is a diversionary operation to mask a larger landing + elsewhere. This is a special difficulty when in the case of + large operations the landing army arrives in echelon like the + Second Japanese army. In that instance the naval feint was used + strategically, and apparently with conspicuous effect. The + Russians were always apprehensive that the Japanese would + strike for Newchuang at the head of the Gulf of Pe-chi-li, and + for this reason General Stakelberg, who had command of the + troops in the peninsula, was not permitted to concentrate + <!-- Page 303 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_303" + id="Page_303"></a>[pg 303]</span> for effective action in + its southern part, where the Japanese had fixed their + landing place. Admiral Togo, in spite of the strain on his + fleet in effecting and securing the disembarkation of the + army, detached a cruiser squadron to demonstrate in the + Gulf. The precise effect of this feint upon the Russian + Staff cannot be measured with certainty. All we know is that + Stakelberg was held back from his concentration so long that + he was unable to strike the Japanese army before it was + complete for the field and able to deal him a staggering + counter-stroke.</p> + + <p>This power of disturbing the enemy with feints is of course + inherent in the peculiar attributes of combined expeditions, in + the facility with which their line of operation can be + concealed or changed, and there seems no reason why in the + future it should be less than in the past. Good railway + connections in the theatre of the descent will of course + diminish the effect of feints, but, on the other hand, the + means of making them have increased. In mine-sweeping vessels, + for instance, there is a new instrument which in the + Russo-Japanese War proved capable of creating a very strong + impression at small cost to the fleet. Should a flotilla of + such craft appear at any practicable part of a threatened coast + and make a show of clearing it, it will be almost a moral + impossibility to ignore the demonstration.</p> + + <p>On the whole then, assuming the old methods are followed, it + would seem that with a reasonable naval preponderance the power + of carrying out such operations over an uncommanded sea is not + less than it has proved to be hitherto. The rapidity and + precision of steam propulsion perhaps places that power higher + than ever. It would at any rate be difficult to find in the + past a parallel to the brilliant movement on Seoul with which + the Japanese opened the war in 1904. It is true the Russians at + the last moment decided for political reasons to permit the + occupation to take place without opposition, but this was + unknown to the Japanese, and <!-- + Page 304 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_304" + id="Page_304"></a>[pg 304]</span> their arrangements were + made on the assumption that their enemy would use the + formidable means at his disposal to obstruct the operation. + The risk was accepted, skillfully measured, and adequately + provided for on principles identical with those of the + British tradition. But, on the other hand, there has been + nothing to show that where the enemy has a working command + of the sea the hazard of such enterprises has been reduced. + Against an enemy controlling the line of passage in force, + the well-tried methods of covering and protecting an oversea + expedition will no more work to-day than they did in the + past. Until his hold is broken by purely naval action, + combined work remains beyond all legitimate risk of war.</p> + <!-- Page 305 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_305" + id="Page_305"></a>[pg 305]</span> + <hr /> + + <h3>APPENDIX</h3> + <hr /> + + <h2>THE<br /> + "GREEN PAMPHLET"</h2> + <hr /> + <!-- Page 306 blank --> + <!-- Page 307 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_307" + id="Page_307"></a>[pg 307]</span> + + <h2>WAR COURSE</h2> + <hr /> + + <h2>Strategical Terms<br /> + and Definitions<br /> + used in<br /> + Lectures on Naval History</h2> + + <h3>BY</h3> + + <h3>JULIAN S. CORBETT, ESQ., L.L.M.</h3> + <hr /> + + <h3>NAVAL + STRATEGY</h3><span class="sidenote">Introductory.</span> + + <p>Naval strategy does not exist as a separate branch of + knowledge. It is only a section of a division of the art of + war.</p> + + <p>The study for officers is the art of war, specialising in + Naval Strategy.</p> + + <p>The true method of procedure then is to get hold of a + general theory of war, and so ascertain the exact relations of + Naval Strategy to the whole.</p><span class="sidenote">Theory + of war.</span> + + <p>War is a form of political intercourse, a continuation of + foreign politics which begins when force is introduced to + attain our ends.</p> + + <h4>OBJECTS.</h4> + + <p>We seek our ends by directing force upon certain objects, + which may be ulterior or immediate.</p> + + <p>Immediate objects (also called "Primary") are the ends of + particular operations or movements. But it must be remembered + that every primary object has also its ulterior object; that + is, every operation must be regarded, not only from the point + of view of its special object, but also as a step to the end of + the campaign or war.</p> + <!-- Page 308 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_308" + id="Page_308"></a>[pg 308]<br /> + Strategy.</span> + + <p>Strategy is the art of directing force to the ends in view. + Classified by the object it is Major Strategy, dealing with + ulterior objects; Minor Strategy, with primary objects.</p> + + <p>This also means that every operation of an army or fleet + must be regarded in a double light, <i>i.e.</i>, it must be + planned and conducted in relation (1) to the general progress + of the war; (2) to the object to which it is immediately + directed.</p><span class="sidenote">Major Strategy.</span> + + <p>Major Strategy (always regarding the ulterior object) has + for its province the plan of the war, and includes: (1) + Selection of the immediate or primary objects to be aimed at + for attaining the ulterior object; (2) Selection of the force + to be used, <i>i.e.</i>, it determines the relative functions + of the naval and military forces.</p> + + <blockquote> + NOTE.—Major Strategy in its broadest sense has also + to deal with the whole resources of the nation for war. It + is a branch of statesmanship. It regards the Army and Navy + as parts of one force, to be handled together; they are + instruments of war. But it also has to keep in view + constantly the politico-diplomatic position of the country + (on which depends the effective action of the instrument), + and its commercial and financial position (by which the + energy for working the instrument is maintained). The + friction of these two considerations is inherent in war, + and we call it the deflection of strategy by politics. It + is usually regarded as a disease. It is really a vital + factor in every strategical problem. It may be taken as a + general rule that no question of grand strategy can be + decided apart from diplomacy, and vice versa. For a line of + action or an object which is expedient from the point of + view of strategy may be barred by diplomatic + considerations, and vice versa. To decide a question of + grand strategy without consideration of its diplomatic + aspect, is to decide on half the factors only. Neither + strategy or diplomacy has ever a clean slate. This + interaction has to be accepted by commanding officers as + part of the inevitable "friction of war." A good example is + Pitt's refusal to send a fleet into the Baltic to assist + Frederick the Great during the Seven Years War, for fear of + compromising our relations with the Scandinavian Powers. + </blockquote><span class="sidenote">Minor Strategy.</span> + + <p>Minor Strategy has for its province the plans of operations. + It deals with—</p> + + <blockquote> + (1) The selection of the "objectives," that is, the + particular forces of the enemy or the strategical points to + be dealt with in order to secure the object of the + particular operation.<br /> + (2) The directing of the force assigned for the operation. + </blockquote> + <!-- Page 309 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_309" + id="Page_309"></a>[pg 309]</span> + + <p>Minor Strategy may be of three kinds:—</p> + + <blockquote> + (1) Naval, where the immediate object is to be attained by + a fleet only.<br /> + (2) Military, where the immediate object is to be attained + by an army only.<br /> + (3) Combined, where the immediate object is to be attained + by army and navy together. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + NOTE.—It will be seen that what is usually called + Naval Strategy or Fleet Strategy, is only a sub-division of + a division of strategy, and that, therefore, strategy + cannot be studied from the point of view of naval + operations only. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + NOTE.—Naval Strategy, being only a part of General + Strategy, is subject to the same friction as Major + Strategy, though in a less degree. Individual commanders + have often to take a decision independently of the central + government, or headquarters; they should, therefore, always + keep in mind the possible ulterior effects of any line of + action they may take, endeavouring to be sure that what is + strategically expedient is not diplomatically inexpedient. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + EXAMPLE.—Boscawen's attack on De la Motte on the eve + of the Seven Years War. + </blockquote> + + <h4>NATURE OF OBJECT</h4><span class="sidenote">Nature of + object. Offensive and defensive.</span> + + <p>The solution of every strategical problem, whether of Major + or Minor Strategy, depends primarily on the nature of the + object in view.</p> + + <p>All objects, whether ulterior or not, may be positive or + negative.</p> + + <p>A positive object is where we seek to assert or acquire + something for ourselves.</p> + + <p>A negative object is where we seek to deny the enemy + something or prevent his gaining something.</p> + + <p>Where the object is positive, Strategy is offensive.</p> + + <p>Where the object is negative, Strategy is defensive.</p> + + <blockquote> + EXAMPLE.—When Togo attacked Rojesvensky his primary + object was offensive, <i>i.e.</i>, to capture or destroy + the Russian Fleet. His ulterior object was to maintain the + defensive function which had been assigned to the Japanese + Fleet. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + NOTES.—This is a good example of true defensive; that + is, Togo's operations, though drastically offensive in + action, were all strictly within the strategical defensive + sphere assigned to him. + </blockquote><!-- Page 310 --> + <span class="sidenote"><a name="Page_310" + id="Page_310"></a>[pg 310]<br /> + Relation of offensive to defensive.</span> + + <p>The Offensive, being positive in its aim is naturally the + more effective form of war (<i>i.e.</i>, it leads more directly + to a final decision), and, as a rule, should be adopted by the + stronger Power.</p> + + <p>The Defensive, being negative in its aim, is naturally the + stronger form of war; <i>i.e.</i>, it requires less force, and, + as a rule, is adopted by the weaker Power.</p> + + <blockquote> + NOTE.—The general truth of this proposition is not + affected by apparent exceptions where the contrary appears + to be true. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + <i>The Offensive must not be confused with the + Initiative.</i> It is possible to seize the Initiative, + under certain conditions, by taking a defensive position + from which the enemy is bound to dislodge us or abandon the + operation. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + In most cases where the weaker side successfully assumes + the offensive, it is due to his doing so before the enemy's + mobilization or concentration is complete, whereby the + attacking force is able to deal in succession with locally + inferior forces of the enemy. + </blockquote> + + <p>The advantages of the Offensive are well known.</p> + + <p>Its disadvantages are:—</p> + + <blockquote> + (1) That it grows weaker as it advances, by prolonging its + communications.<br /> + (2) That it tends to operations on unfamiliar + ground.<br /> + (3) That it continually increases the difficulty of + retreat. + </blockquote> + + <p>The advantages of Defence are chiefly:—</p> + + <blockquote> + (1) Proximity to base.<br /> + (2) Familiar ground.<br /> + (3) Facility for arranging surprise by counter attack. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + NOTE.—In modern Naval warfare these + advantages—that is, the advantages of fighting on + your own ground—are specially high as giving greater + facility for the use of mine and torpedo. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + The disadvantages are mainly moral or when the enemy's + objective or line of operations cannot be ascertained, but + this disadvantage can be neutralised when it is possible to + secure an interior position. + </blockquote> + + <h4>GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DEFENSIVE.</h4> + + <p>True Defensive means waiting for a chance to strike.</p> + + <blockquote> + NOTE.—When the Dutch burnt our ships at Chatham, we + were not acting on the defensive, we had laid them up and + were doing nothing at all. + </blockquote> + <!-- Page 311 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_311" + id="Page_311"></a>[pg 311]</span> + + <p>The strength and the essence of the defensive is the + counter-stroke.</p> + + <p>A well designed defensive will always threaten or conceal an + attack.</p> + + <p>A general defensive policy may consist of a series of minor + offensive operations.</p> + + <p>The maxim is: If you are not relatively strong enough to + assume the offensive, assume the defensive till you become + so—</p> + + <blockquote> + (1) Either by inducing the enemy to weaken himself by + attacks or otherwise;<br /> + (2) Or by increasing your own strength, by developing new + forces or securing allies. + </blockquote> + + <p>Except as a preparation or a cover for offensive action the + defensive is seldom or never of any use; for by the defensive + alone we can never acquire anything, we can only prevent the + enemy acquiring. But where we are too weak to assume the + offensive it is often necessary to assume the defensive, and + wait in expectation of time turning the scale in our favour and + permitting us to accumulate strength relatively greater than + the enemy's; we then pass to the offensive, for which our + defensive has been a preparation.</p> + + <p>As a cover or support for the offensive, the defensive will + enable us to intensify the attack; for by assuming the + defensive in one or more minor theatres of operation we can + reduce our forces in those theatres to a minimum, and + concentrate to a maximum for the offensive in the most + important theatre.</p> + + <h4>OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS USED WITH A DEFENSIVE INTENTION</h4> + + <p class="center">(A) Counter attacks.<br /> + (B) Diversions.</p> + + <p>(A) <i>Counter attacks</i> are those which are made upon an + enemy who exposes himself anywhere in the theatre of his + offensive operations. It is this form of attack which + constitutes what Clausewitz calls the "surprise advantage of + defence."</p> + <!-- Page 312 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_312" + id="Page_312"></a>[pg 312]</span> + + <p>(B) <i>Diversions</i> are similar operations undertaken + against an enemy outside the limit of his theatre of offensive + operations.</p> + + <p>Diversions are designed to confuse his strategy, to distract + his attention, and to draw off his forces from his main attack. + If well planned, they should divert a force greater than their + own. They should, therefore, be small. The nearer they approach + the importance of a real attack the less likely they are to + divert a force greater than their own.</p> + + <p>It is only their power of diverting or containing a larger + force than their own that justifies the breach of the law of + concentration which they involve.</p> + + <p>This power depends mainly on suddenness and mobility, and + these qualities are most highly developed in combined + expeditions.</p> + + <blockquote> + NOTE.—<i>Diversions</i> must be carefully + distinguished from <i>eccentric attacks</i>. <i>Eccentric + attacks</i> are true offensive movements. They have a + positive object, <i>i.e.</i>, they aim to acquire something + from the enemy; whereas diversions have a negative object, + <i>i.e.</i>, they aim at preventing the enemy doing or + acquiring something. Being in the category of the weaker + form of war, eccentric attacks are usually made in greater + force than diversions. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + EXAMPLES.—<i>Diversion.</i>—Our raid on + Washington in 1815. Landing force, about 4,000 men. Object, + according to official instructions, "a diversion on the + coasts of United States of America in favour of the army + employed in the defence of Canada"; <i>i.e.</i>, the + intention was negative—preventative—defensive. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + 2. <i>Eccentric Attack.</i>—Operations against New + Orleans in 1815. Intended force 15,000 to 20,000 men. + Object, "to obtain command of embouchure of the + Mississippi, and, secondly, to occupy some important and + valuable possession, by the restoration of which the + conditions of peace might be improved, &c."; + <i>i.e.</i>, the intention was positive—to acquire. + Compare Rochefort Expedition (diversion) and Belleisle + (eccentric attack) in the Seven Years War. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + Note 2.—This distinction gives a threefold + classification of combined expeditions, as used by + Elizabethan strategists. + </blockquote> + + <div class="noflo"> + <div class="nofblk"> + <p class="i8">Raids = Diversions.</p> + + <p class="i8">Incursions = Eccentric attacks.</p> + + <p class="i8">Invasions = True direct offence.</p> + </div> + </div> + + <blockquote> + Compare these with Sir John Ardagh's classification (Report + of Royal Commission on Reserve Forces, 1904):— + </blockquote> + + <div class="noflo"> + <div class="nofblk"> + <p class="i4">"Raids," not exceeding 10,000 men.</p> + + <p class="i4">"Small expeditions," not exceeding 50,000 + men.</p> + + <p class="i4">"Dangerous invasion," not exceeding + 150,000 men.</p> + </div> + </div><!-- Page 313 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_313" + id="Page_313"></a>[pg 313]</span> + + <h4>NATURE OF ULTERIOR + OBJECT</h4><span class="sidenote">Limited and unlimited + wars.</span> + + <p>From the nature of the ulterior object we get an important + classification of wars, according to whether such object is + <i>limited</i> or <i>unlimited</i>.</p> + + <blockquote> + (1) War with <i>limited object</i> ("limited war") is where + we merely seek to take from the enemy some particular part + of his possessions, or interests; <i>e.g.</i>, + Spanish-American War, where the object was the liberation + of Cuba. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (2) <i>War with an unlimited object</i> is where we seek to + overthrow the enemy completely, so that to save himself + from destruction he must agree to do our will (become + subservient); <i>e.g.</i>, Franco-German War. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + NOTE.—Ulterior objects are not necessarily the same + in their nature as the immediate (primary or secondary) + objects which lead up to them; <i>e.g.</i>, ulterior + objects may be offensive, while one or more of the + immediate objects may be defensive, and <i>vice + versâ</i>. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + EXAMPLE 1.—Japanese position in the late war. + Ulterior object of the war (to drive Russians from + Manchuria) was offensive (positive). Function or ulterior + object of the fleet (to cover the invasion) was defensive + (negative). Its primary object to effect this was to attack + and destroy the Russian naval force. This was offensive + (positive). + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + EXAMPLE 2.—In the Spanish-American War the ulterior + object of the war was (for the Americans) to eject the + Spanish Government from Cuba. This was offensive. The + ulterior object of the fleet was to prevent the Spaniards + sending reinforcements or interfering with the intended + American invasion. This was defensive. The primary object + of the fleet was to bring the Spanish Fleet to action. This + was offensive. + </blockquote> + + <h4>SYSTEM OF OPERATIONS</h4> + + <p>Having determined the nature of the war by the nature of its + object (i.e., whether it is offensive or defensive and whether + it is limited or unlimited), strategy has to decide on the + system of operations or "plan of the war."</p> + + <p>This depends upon:—</p> + + <blockquote> + (1) The theatre of the war.<br /> + (2) The means at our disposal. + </blockquote> + <!-- Page 314 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_314" + id="Page_314"></a>[pg 314]</span> + + <p>1. <i>Theatre of the War.</i>—Usually defined as "all + the territory upon which the hostile parties may assail each + other." This is insufficient. For an island power the theatre + of war will always include sea areas. Truer definition: + "geographical areas within which lie the ulterior objects of + the war and the subordinate objects that lead up to them."</p> + + <p>A "theatre of war" may contain several "theatres of + operations."</p> + + <p>2. <i>Theatre of Operations</i>.—Is generally used of + the operations of one belligerent only.</p> + + <p>An "operation" is any considerable strategical + undertaking.</p> + + <p>A "theatre of operations" is usually defined as embracing + all the territory we seek to take possession of or to + defend.</p> + + <p>A truer definition is, "the area, whether of sea or land or + both, within which the enemy must be overpowered before we can + secure the object of the particular operation."</p> + + <p>Consequently, since the nature of the war varies with the + object, it may be defensive in one theatre of operations and + offensive in another.</p> + + <p>Where the operations are defensive in character any special + movement or movements may be offensive.</p> + + <h4>OBJECTIVE</h4><span class="sidenote">Objective</span> + + <p>An objective is "any point or force against which an + offensive movement is directed." Thus where the <i>object</i> + in any theatre of operation is to get command of a certain sea + in which the enemy maintains a fleet, that fleet will usually + be the <i>objective</i>.</p> + + <h4>LINES OF OPERATION</h4><span class="sidenote">Lines of + operation.</span> + + <p>A line of operation is "the area of land or sea through + which we operate from our base or starting point to reach our + objectives."</p> + + <p>Lines of operation may be exterior or interior. We are said + to hold the interior lines when we hold such a + <!-- Page 315 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_315" + id="Page_315"></a>[pg 315]</span> position, in regard to a + theatre of operations, that we can reach its chief objective + points, or forces, more quickly than the enemy can move to + their defence or assistance. Such a position is called an + interior position. "Exterior Lines" and "Exterior Position" + are the converse of these.</p> + + <h4>LINES OF COMMUNICATION</h4><span class="sidenote">Lines of + communication.</span> + + <p>This expression is used of three different + things:—</p> + + <blockquote> + (1) <i>Lines of supply</i>, running from the base of + operations to the point which the operating force has + reached. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (2) <i>Lines of lateral communication</i> by which several + forces engaged in one theatre of operations can communicate + with each other and move to each other's support. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (3) <i>Lines of retreat</i>, which are lines of supply + reversed, <i>i.e.</i>, leading back to the base. + </blockquote> + + <p>These three ideas are best described by the term "lines of + passage and communication," which we had in use at the end of + the eighteenth century.</p> + + <p>Ashore, lines of passage and communication are roads, + railways, waterways, &c.</p> + + <p>At sea, they may be regarded as those waters over which + passes the normal course of vessels proceeding from the base to + the objective or the force to be supplied.</p> + + <p>In Land Strategy the great majority of problems are problems + of communication. Maritime Strategy has never been regarded as + hinging on communications, but probably it does so even more + than Land Strategy, as will appear from a consideration of + maritime communications, and the extent to which they are the + main preoccupation of Naval operations.</p> + + <h4>MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS</h4> + + <p>The various kinds of Maritime Communications for or against + which a fleet may have to operate are:—</p> + <!-- Page 316 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_316" + id="Page_316"></a>[pg 316]</span> + + <blockquote> + (1) Its own communications, or those of its adversary + (which correspond to the communications of armies operating + ashore). These tend to increase in importance strategically + with the increasing hunger of modern fleets (for coal, + ammunition, &c). + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (2) The communications of an army operating from an + advanced oversea base, that is communication between the + advanced and the main base. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (3) Trade Routes, that is the communications upon which + depend the national resources and the supply of the main + bases, as well as the "lateral" or connecting + communications between various parts of belligerents' + possessions. + </blockquote> + + <p>N.B.—Such "lines of passage and communication" are the + preoccupation of Naval Strategy; that is to say, problems of + Naval Strategy can be reduced to terms of "passage and + communication" and this is probably the best method of solving + them.</p> + + <h3>NAVAL STRATEGY CONSIDERED AS A QUESTION OF PASSAGE AND + COMMUNICATION</h3> + + <p>By "Naval Strategy" we mean the art of conducting the + operations of the Fleet. Such operations must always have for + their object "passage and communication"; that is, the Fleet is + mainly occupied in guarding our own communications and seizing + those of the enemy.</p> + + <p>PROOF I.—<i>Deductive</i>.—We say the aim of + Naval Strategy is to get command of the sea. What does this + mean? It is something quite different from the Military idea of + occupying territory, for the sea cannot be the subject of + political dominion or ownership. We cannot subsist upon it + (like an army on conquered territory), nor can we exclude + neutrals from it. Admiral Colomb's theory of "conquest of water + territory," therefore, involves a false analogy, and is not + safe as the basis of a + <!-- Page 317 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_317" + id="Page_317"></a>[pg 317]</span> strategical system. What + then is the value of the sea in the political system of the + world? Its value is as a means of communication between + States and parts of States. Therefore the "command of the + sea" means the control of communications in which the + belligerents are adversely concerned.</p> + + <blockquote> + COROLLARY.—The command of the sea can never be, like + the conquest of territory, the ulterior object of a war, + unless it be a purely maritime war, as were approximately + our wars with the Dutch in the 17th century, but it may be + a primary or immediate object, and even the ulterior object + of particular operations. + </blockquote> + + <p>PROOF II.—<i>Inductive</i>, from history or past + experience.—History shows that the actual functions of + the Fleet (except in purely maritime wars) have been + threefold.</p> + + <p>1. The prevention or securing of alliances (<i>i.e.</i>, + deterring or persuading neutrals as to participating in the + war).</p> + + <blockquote> + EXAMPLES.—The operations of Rooke in the first years + of the War of the Spanish Succession, 1702-04, to secure + the adhesion of Savoy and Portugal to the Grand Alliance. + Operations of Nelson to maintain the alliance of the + Kingdom of Naples. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + In the first case there came a crisis when it was more + important to demonstrate to Savoy and Portugal what they + stood to lose by joining Louis XIV than to act immediately + against the Toulon Fleet. In the second, the Neapolitan + Alliance was essential to our operations in the Eastern + Mediterranean; the destruction of the Toulon Fleet was not. + </blockquote> + + <p>2. The protection or destruction of commerce.</p> + + <p>3. The furtherance or hindrance of military operations + ashore.</p> + + <p>NOTE.—The above is the best working "Definition of + Naval Strategy," as emphasising its intimate connection with + diplomatic, financial, and military aspects of major + strategy.</p> + + <p>These functions may be discharged in two ways:—</p> + + <blockquote> + (1) By direct territorial attacks, threatened or performed + (bombardment, landing, raiding parties, &c). + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (2) By getting command of the sea, <i>i.e.</i>, + establishing ourselves in such a position that we can + control the maritime communications of all parties + <!-- Page 318 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_318" + id="Page_318"></a>[pg 318]</span> concerned, so that we + can operate by sea against their territory, commerce, + and allies, and they cannot operate against ours. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + NOTE.—The power of the second method, by controlling + communications, is out of all proportion to the + first—direct attack. Indeed, the first can seldom be + performed with any serious effect without the second. Thus, + from this point of view also, it is clear that Naval + Strategy is mainly a question of communications. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + But not entirely. Circumstances have arisen when the Fleet + must discharge part of its function by direct action before + there is time to get general control of the communications. + (That is, political and military considerations may deflect + normal operation of Naval Strategy.) + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + EXAMPLE.—Rooke's capture of Gibraltar in 1704, in the + face of the unshaken Toulon Fleet. Japanese invasion of + Manchuria. + </blockquote> + + <h4>COMMAND OF THE SEA</h4> + + <p>Command of the sea exists only in a state of war. If we say + we have command of the sea in time of peace it is a rhetorical + expression meaning that we have (<i>a</i>) adequate Naval + positions; (<i>b</i>) an adequate Fleet to secure the command + when war breaks out.</p> + + <h4>VARIOUS CONDITIONS OF COMMAND</h4> + + <p>1. It may be (<i>a</i>) general; (<i>b</i>) local.</p> + + <p>(<i>a</i>) <i>General command</i> is secured when the enemy + is no longer able to act dangerously against our line of + passage and communication or to defend his own, or (in other + words) when he is no longer able to interfere seriously with + our trade or our military or diplomatic operations.</p> + + <p>This condition exists practically when the enemy is no + longer able to send squadrons to sea.</p> + + <blockquote> + NOTE.—Command of the sea does not mean that the enemy + can do absolutely nothing, but that he cannot + <i>seriously</i> interfere with the undertakings by which + we seek to secure the object of the war, or to force our + will upon him. + </blockquote> + + <p>(<i>b</i>) <i>Local command</i> implies a state of things in + which we are able to prevent the enemy from interfering with + our passage and communication in one or more theatres of + operation.</p> + <!-- Page 319 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_319" + id="Page_319"></a>[pg 319]</span> + + <p>2. Both local and general command may be (<i>a</i>) + temporary; (<i>b</i>) permanent.</p> + + <p>(<i>a</i>) <i>Temporary command</i> is when we are able to + prevent the enemy from interfering with our passage and + communication in all or some theatres of operation during the + period required for gaining the object in view (<i>i.e.</i>, + the object of a particular operation or of a particular + campaign). This condition existed after Togo's first + action.</p> + + <p>(<i>b</i>) <i>Permanent command</i> is when time ceases to + be a vital factor in the situation, <i>i.e.</i>, when the + possibility of the enemy's recovering his maritime position is + too remote to be a practical consideration. This condition + existed after Tsushima.</p> + + <p>3. Command, whether general, local, or temporary, may be in + three different states:—</p> + + <div class="noflo"> + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>(<i>a</i>) With us.</p> + + <p>(<i>b</i>) With the enemy.</p> + + <p>(<i>c</i>) In dispute.</p> + </div> + </div> + + <p>If in dispute, it may be that:—</p> + + <div class="noflo"> + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>(1) We have preponderance.</p> + + <p>(2) Our enemy has preponderance.</p> + + <p>(3) Neither side preponderates.</p> + </div> + </div> + + <h4>COMMAND IN DISPUTE</h4> + + <p>The state of dispute is the most important for practical + strategy, since it is the normal condition, at least in the + early stages of the war, and frequently all through it.</p> + + <p>The state of dispute continues till a final decision is + obtained, <i>i.e.</i>, till one side is no longer able to send + a squadron to sea.</p> + + <p>It is to the advantage of the preponderating Navy to end the + state of dispute by seeking a decision. Hence the French + tradition to avoid decisive actions as a rule when at war with + England.</p> + + <p>The truth of this appears from the fact that <i>general + command of the sea is not essential to all oversea + operations</i>.</p> + + <p>In a state of dispute the preponderating Power may + concentrate in one theatre of operations, and so secure + <!-- Page 320 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_320" + id="Page_320"></a>[pg 320]</span> the local or temporary + command sufficient for obtaining the special object in view. + The weaker Power may take advantage of such local + concentration to operate safely elsewhere.</p> + + <p><i>Rule 1.</i> So long as a state of dispute can force the + preponderating Power to concentrate, operating by evasion is + possibly open to the weaker.</p> + + <p><i>Rule 2.</i> In a state of dispute although the weaker + Power may not be able to obstruct the passage and communication + of the stronger, it may be able to defend its own.</p> + + <blockquote> + EXAMPLES.—This condition of dispute existed during + the first three years of the Seven Years War, until Hawke + and Boscawen obtained a decision by defeating Conflans and + De la Cloue; also in the Great War up to Trafalgar. + </blockquote> + + <h4>SHOULD COMMAND OF THE SEA ALWAYS BE THE PRIMARY + OBJECT?</h4> + + <p>When the preponderating Power fails or neglects to get + command (<i>i.e.</i>, leaves the general command in dispute), + the disadvantage to him is not so much the danger to his own + operations as the facility given to the enemy for carrying out + counter operations elsewhere.</p> + + <p>Under certain conditions, therefore, it may not be the + primary function of the fleet to seek out the enemy's fleet and + destroy it, because general command may be in dispute while + local command may be with us, and political or military + considerations may demand of us an operation, for which such + local command is sufficient, and which cannot be delayed until + we have obtained a complete decision.</p> + + <p>From the above it will appear "command of the sea" is too + loose an expression for strategical discussion. For practical + purposes should be substituted "<i>control of passage and + communication</i>."</p> + + <p>The question then in the consideration of any proposed + operation or line of operations will be, not "Have we the + command of the sea?" but "Can we secure the necessary lines of + communication from obstruction by the enemy?"</p> + <!-- Page 321 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_321" + id="Page_321"></a>[pg 321]</span> + + <h4>METHODS OF SECURING CONTROL</h4> + + <p>1. <i>Permanent general control</i> can only be secured by + the practical annihilation of the enemy's fleet by successful + actions.</p> + + <p>2. <i>Local and temporary control</i> may be secured + by:—</p> + + <blockquote> + (<i>a</i>) A defensive action not necessarily entirely + successful (containing). + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (<i>b</i>) Forcing concentration on the enemy elsewhere + (diversion). + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (<i>c</i>) Superior concentration so as to render impotent + the enemy's force available in the special theatre of + operations (masking or containing). + </blockquote> + + <h4>BLOCKADE</h4> + + <p>Blockades are of two natures, according to the object + review. The object may be:—</p> + + <p>(<i>d</i>) Blockade.</p> + + <blockquote> + i. <i>Close blockade</i> to prevent the enemy putting to + sea. The object being usually to secure local or temporary + control. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + ii. <i>Observation blockade</i>, to force the enemy to put + to sea <i>by occupying the common lines of + communications</i> (<i>see</i> below). In this case you are + seeking a decision as a step towards general control. + </blockquote> + + <p>Both natures are operations upon the lines of passage and + communication, but in case (1) the primary intention is + defensive, to secure our own line; in case (2) the primary + intention is offensive, to seize the enemy's line and compel + him to expose himself in an attempt to recover it.</p> + + <h4>GENERAL RULES FOR CONDUCTING BLOCKADES</h4> + + <p>In case (1) (defensive intention) blockade should be as + close as is compatible with security from torpedo attack.</p> + + <p>In case (2) (offensive intention) it should be as distant + <!-- Page + 322 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_322" + id="Page_322"></a>[pg 322]</span> as is compatible with + bringing enemy to action if he comes out.</p> + + <blockquote> + Examples:—<i>Case</i> (1): First stage of Togo's + blockade of Port Arthur.<br /> + <i>Case</i> (2): Nelson off Toulon.<br /> + <i>Confusion of the two</i>: Sampson's attempt to close + Santiago simultaneously with an attempt to force Cervera to + sea. + </blockquote> + + <h4>THE PECULIARITY OF MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS</h4> + + <p>Since the whole idea of command of the sea and the whole + theory of blockade rest on the control of communications, + neither can be fully apprehended without a thorough + understanding of the nature of maritime communications.</p> + + <p>Ashore, the respective lines of communications of each + belligerent tend to run more or less approximately in opposite + directions, until they meet in the theatre of operations or the + objective point.</p> + + <p>At sea the reverse is the case; for in maritime warfare the + great lines of communications of either belligerent tend to run + approximately parallel, if, indeed, they are not identical.</p> + + <p>Thus, in the case of a war with Germany, the object of which + lay in the Eastern Mediterranean, or in America, or South + Africa, our respective lines of communication would be + identical.</p> + + <p>This was also the case in all our imperial wars with + France.</p> + + <p><i>This peculiarity is the controlling influence of maritime + warfare.</i> Nearly all our current maxims of Naval strategy + can be traced to the pressure it exerts on Naval thought.</p> + + <p>It is at the root of the fundamental difference between + Military and Naval strategy, and affords the explanation of + much strategical error and confusion, which has arisen from + applying the principles of land warfare to the sea without + allowing for the antagonistic conditions of the communications + and operations against them in each case.</p> + + <p>On land the chief reason for not always striking the + <!-- Page 323 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_323" + id="Page_323"></a>[pg 323]</span> enemy's communications at + once is that as a rule we cannot do so without exposing our + own.</p> + + <p>At sea, on the contrary, since the great lines are common to + both, we cannot defend our own without striking at the + enemy's.</p> + + <p>Therefore, at sea, the obvious opening is to get your fleet + into such a position that it controls the common lines, unless + defeated or evaded.</p> + + <blockquote> + EXAMPLE.—This was usually done in our old wars with + France, by our getting a fleet off Brest before the French + could sail. + </blockquote> + + <p>Hence the maxim "that the proper place for our fleets is off + the enemy's coast," "the enemy's coast is our true frontier," + and the like.</p> + + <p>But these maxims are not universally true, witness Togo's + strategy against Rojesvensky, when he remained correctly upon + his own coast.</p> + + <p>Take again the maxim that the primary object of the fleet is + to seek out the enemy's fleet and destroy it.</p> + + <p>Here again Togo's practice was the reverse of the maxim.</p> + + <p>The true maxim is "The primary object of the fleet is to + secure communications, and if the enemy's fleet is in a + position to render them unsafe it must be put out of + action."</p> + + <p>The enemy's fleet usually is in this position, but not + always.</p> + + <blockquote> + EXAMPLE.—Opening of War of Spanish Succession. The + operations of 1702 were to secure some point (Cadiz, + Gibraltar, or Ferrol) on the Spanish trade communications, + the French lateral communications, and our own lines of + passage to the Mediterranean, where was to be our chief + theatre of operation. These last two lines were identical. + 1703.—Chief operations had for their object to secure + the alliance of Savoy, and particularly of Portugal, and + with same object in view, Rooke's official instructions + directed that the French fleet was to be ignored unless it + threatened our communications. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + RESULT.—By 1704 we had gained a Naval position from + which France could not eject us, and she abandoned struggle + for sea communications. + </blockquote> + + <p>But nine times out of ten the maxim of seeking out the + enemy's fleet, &c., is sound and applicable:—</p> + + <blockquote> + (<i>a</i>) Because for us <i>general permanent command</i> + is + <!-- Page 324 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_324" + id="Page_324"></a>[pg 324]</span> usually essential to + ultimate success, and this cannot be obtained without + destroying the enemy's fleet. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (<i>b</i>) Because usually the enemy's fleet opens with an + attempt <i>to control the common communications</i>. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (<i>c</i>) Because usually the functions of the fleet are + so complex (<i>i.e.</i>, the calls upon it so numerous) + that it will seek to strike a blow which solve all the + difficulties; <i>e.g.</i>, Sir Palmes Fairborne's solution + of the problem in 1703 (<i>England in the + Mediterranean</i>, Vol. II., p. 234). + </blockquote> + + <p>Also it must be remembered that nine times out of ten the + most effective way of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" + (<i>i.e.</i>, forcing an action on him) is to seize a position + which controls communications vital to his plan of + campaign.</p> + + <p>This was what happened in 1704. Rooke was unable to seek out + the Toulon fleet, but by seizing Gibraltar he made it come to + him (not intentionally, but by the operation of inevitable + strategical law).</p> + + <p>Compare Togo's strategy and that of the Americans in + 1898.</p> + + <p>Practically all great Naval actions have been brought about + in this way, that is they have been the outcome on an effort to + clear essential communications from the enemy's fleet, + <i>e.g.</i>, Gravelines, La Hogue, Quiberon, Trafalgar, + Tsushima.</p> + + <p>Similarly the great actions of the old Dutch wars were + brought about because our geographical position placed us + astride the Dutch trade communications, and they were forced to + seek a decision against our fleet.</p> + + <h4>FINAL NOTE</h4> + + <p>In applying the maxim of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" it + should be borne in mind:—</p> + + <blockquote> + (1) That if you seek it out with a superior force you will + probably find it in a place where you cannot destroy it + except at heavy cost. + </blockquote> + <!-- Page 325 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_325" + id="Page_325"></a>[pg 325]</span> + + <blockquote> + (2) That seeing that the defensive is a stronger form of + war than the offensive, it is <i>prima facie</i> better + strategy to make the enemy come to you than to go to him + and seek a decision on his own ground. + </blockquote> + <!-- Page 326 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_326" + id="Page_326"></a>[pg 326]</span> + <hr /> + + <h2>WAR COURSE</h2> + <hr /> + + <h2>Notes on Strategy</h2> + <hr /> + + <h3>PART ONE</h3> + + <h3>GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND DEFINITIONS</h3> + + <h4>INTRODUCTORY</h4> + + <p>Naval strategy is a section of the Art of War.</p> + + <p>The study for officers is the Art of War, which includes + Naval Strategy.</p> + + <p>War is the application of force to the attainment of + political ends.</p> + + <h4>MAJOR AND MINOR STRATEGY</h4> + + <p>We seek our ends by directing force upon certain objects, + which may be ulterior or primary.</p> + + <p><i>Primary objects</i> are the special objects of particular + operations or movements which we undertake in order to gain the + ulterior object of the campaign. Consequently it must be + remembered that every particular operation or movement must be + regarded, not only from the point of view of its special + object, but also as a step to the end of the campaign or + war.</p> + + <p>Strategy is the art of directing force to the ends in view. + There are two kinds—Major Strategy, dealing with ulterior + objects; Minor Strategy, with primary objects.</p> + + <p>Every operation of an army or fleet must be planned and + conducted in relation (1) to the general plan of the war; (2) + to the object to which it is immediately directed.</p> + + <p>Major Strategy, always regarding the ulterior object, has + for its province the plan of the war and includes: (1) + Selection of the immediate or primary objects to be aimed at + for attaining the ulterior <!-- Page + 327 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_327" + id="Page_327"></a>[pg 327]</span> object; (2) Selection of + the force to be used, <i>i.e.</i>, it determines the + relative functions of the naval and military forces. Major + Strategy in its broadest sense deals with the whole + resources of the nation for war. It is a branch of + statesmanship which regards the Army and Navy as parts of + one force, to be handled together as the instrument of war. + But it also has to keep in constant touch with the political + and diplomatic position of the country (on which depends the + effective action of the instrument), and the commercial and + financial position (by which the energy for working the + instrument is maintained). The friction due to these + considerations is inherent in war, and is called the + deflection of strategy by politics. It is usually regarded + as a disease. It is really a vital factor in every + strategical problem. It may be taken as a general rule that + no question of major strategy can be decided apart from + diplomacy, and <i>vice versâ</i>. For a line of action + or an object which is expedient from the point of view of + strategy may be barred by diplomatic considerations, and + <i>vice versâ</i>. To decide a question of Major + Strategy, without consideration of its diplomatic aspect, is + to decide on half the factors only. Neither strategy or + diplomacy has ever a clean slate. This inter-action has to + be accepted as part of the inevitable "friction of war." A + good example is Pitt's refusal to send a fleet into the + Baltic to assist Frederick the Great during the Seven Years' + War, for fear of compromising our relations with the + Scandinavian Powers.</p> + + <p>Minor Strategy has for its province the plans of operations. + It deals with—</p> + + <blockquote> + (1) The selection of the "objectives," that is, the + particular forces of the enemy or the strategical points to + be dealt with in order to secure the object of the + particular operation. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (2) The direction of the force assigned for the operation. + </blockquote> + + <p>Minor Strategy may, therefore, be of three kinds:—</p> + + <blockquote> + (1) Naval, where the immediate object is to be attained by + a fleet only. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (2) Military, where the immediate object is to be attained + by an army only. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (3) Combined, where the immediate object is to be attained + by army and navy together. + </blockquote> + <!-- Page 328 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_328" + id="Page_328"></a>[pg 328]</span> + + <p>It will be seen, therefore, that what is usually called + Naval Strategy or Fleet Strategy is only a sub-division of + Strategy, and that therefore Strategy cannot be studied from + the point of view of naval operations only. Naval Strategy, + being a part of General Strategy, is subject to the same + friction as Major Strategy, though in a less degree. Individual + commanders have often to take a decision independently of the + central government or headquarters; they should, therefore, + always keep in mind the possible ulterior effects of any line + of action they may take, endeavouring to be sure that what is + strategically expedient is not diplomatically inexpedient.</p> + + <p>Example.—For example, take Boscawen's attack on De la + Motte on the eve of the Seven Years' War in 1755. His orders + were to prevent the troops and warlike stores which De la Motte + was taking out from reaching Canada. It was not diplomatically + expedient to open hostilities; but if Boscawen succeeded, the + result would have been worth the diplomatic consequences it + would entail. He missed the expedition, but captured two + isolated vessels; thus striking the first blow in such a way as + to entail the utmost amount of harm with the least possible + good.</p> + + <h4>OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE</h4> + + <p class="center"><i>Nature of Object</i></p> + + <p>Upon the nature of the object depends the fundamental + distinction between <i>offensive</i> and <i>defensive</i>, upon + which all strategical calculation must be based. Consequently, + the solution of every strategical problem, whether of Major or + Minor Strategy, depends primarily on the nature of the object + in view.</p> + + <p>All objects, whether ulterior or not, may be positive or + negative.</p> + + <p>A <i>positive</i> object is where we seek to assert or + acquire something for ourselves.</p> + + <p>A <i>negative</i> object is where we seek to deny the enemy + something or prevent his gaining something.</p> + + <p>Where the object is positive, Strategy is offensive.</p> + + <p>Where the object is negative, Strategy is defensive.</p> + + <p>This is the only certain test by which we can decide whether + any particular operation is offensive or defensive.</p> + + <p>Ulterior objects are not necessarily the same in their + nature as the primary or secondary objects which lead up to + them; <i>e.g.</i>, ulterior objects may be offensive, while one + or more of the primary objects may be defensive, and <i>vice + versâ</i>. For example, in the Russo-Japanese <!-- + Page 329 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_329" + id="Page_329"></a>[pg 329]</span> War the ulterior object of + the war (to drive Russians from Manchuria) was offensive + (positive). The ulterior object of the fleet (to cover the + invasion) was defensive (negative). Its primary object to + effect this was to attack and destroy the Russian naval + force. This was offensive (positive).</p> + + <p class="center"><i>Relation of Offensive to Defensive</i></p> + + <p>The Offensive, being positive in its aim, is naturally the + more effective form of war and, as a rule, should be adopted by + the stronger Power. The Defensive, being negative in its aim, + is the more lasting form of war, since it requires less force + to keep what one has than to take what is another's, and, as a + rule, is adopted by the weaker Power. In most cases where the + weaker side successfully assumes the offensive, it is due to + his doing so before the enemy's mobilization or concentration + is complete, whereby the attacking force is able to deal in + succession with locally inferior forces of the enemy.</p> + + <p>The advantages of the Offensive are well known.</p> + + <p>Its disadvantages are:—</p> + + <blockquote> + That it grows weaker as it advances, by prolonging its + communications, and that it tends to operations on + unfamiliar ground. + </blockquote> + + <p>The advantages of the Defensive are chiefly:—</p> + + <blockquote> + Proximity to the base of supply and repair stations, + familiar ground, facility for arranging surprise by counter + attack, and power of organising in advance. + </blockquote> + + <p>The disadvantages of the Defensive are mainly moral. They + become, however, real and practical when the enemy's objective + or line of operations cannot be ascertained, for then we have + to spread or attenuate our force to cover all probable + objectives, but this disadvantage can be neutralised when it is + possible to secure an interior position.</p> + + <p class="center"><i>Functions and Characteristics of the + Defensive</i></p> + + <p>True Defensive means waiting for a chance to strike.</p> + + <p>To assume the defensive does not necessarily mean that we do + not feel strong enough to attack. It may mean that we see our + way by using the defensive to force certain movements on the + enemy which will enable us to hit harder.</p> + <!-- Page 330 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_330" + id="Page_330"></a>[pg 330]</span> + + <p>A well-designed defensive will always threaten or conceal an + attack. Unless it does this it will not deflect the enemy's + strategy in our favour. Thus, in 1756, the French, by assuming + the defensive in the Channel, threatened an attack on our + coasts, and concealed their attack on Minorca.</p> + + <p>This power inherent in the defensive is peculiarly strong in + naval warfare, since the mobility of fleets enables them to + pass instantaneously from the defensive to the offensive + without any warning. When we assume the defensive because we + are too weak for the offensive, we still do not lay aside + attack. The whole strength and essence of the defensive is the + counter-stroke. Its cardinal idea is to force the enemy to + attack us in a position where he will expose himself to a + counter-stroke.</p> + + <p>The stock instance upon which naval defensive is usually + condemned is the burning of our ships at Chatham by the Dutch. + But in that case we were not <i>acting on the defensive</i> at + all. We had laid up our battle fleet and were doing nothing. We + were purely passive, in expectation of peace. It is really an + instance of the successful use of defensive <i>by the + Dutch</i>. Being no longer strong enough for a general + offensive, they assumed the defensive, and induced us to lay up + our ships and so expose ourselves to a counter-stroke. It was a + counterstroke by the worsted belligerent to get better terms of + peace.</p> + + <p>So far is the defensive from excluding the idea of attack, + that it may consist entirely of a series of minor offensive + operations. Clausewitz calls it "a shield of blows." It is + often called <i>offensive-defensive,</i> or <i>active + defence</i>. Neither term is really necessary. For a defensive + which excludes the idea of offence or action is not war at + all-at least at sea. The old Elizabethan term <i>Preventive</i> + most closely expresses the idea.</p> + + <p>The most important function of the defensive is that of + covering, buttressing, and intensifying the main attack. No + plan of campaign, however strong the offensive intention, is + perfect which does not contemplate the use of the defensive. + Without some use of the defensive the cardinal principle of + concentration can rarely be fully developed. To develop the + highest possible degree of concentration upon the main object + or objective, the defensive must be assumed everywhere else. + Because it is only by using the defensive in the minor or less + important theatres of operation that the forces in those + theatres can be reduced to the minimum of security, and the + maximum of concentration can thereby be obtained in the main + theatre.</p> + <!-- Page 331 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_331" + id="Page_331"></a>[pg 331]</span> + + <p>In considering the defensive as a general plan of campaign + the maxim is: If not relatively strong enough to assume the + offensive, assume the defensive till you become so—</p> + + <blockquote> + (1) Either by inducing the enemy to weaken himself by + attacks or otherwise; + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (2) Or by increasing your own strength, by developing new + forces or securing allies. + </blockquote> + + <p>It must always be remembered that, except as a preparation + or a cover for offensive action, the defensive is seldom or + never of any use; for by the continued use of the defensive + alone nothing can be acquired, though the enemy may be + prevented from acquiring anything. But where we are too weak to + assume the offensive it is often necessary to assume the + defensive, and wait in expectation of time turning the scale in + our favour and permitting us to accumulate strength relatively + greater than the enemy's; we then pass to the offensive, for + which our defensive has been a preparation. At sea we have had + little occasion for the defensive as a general plan. But that + is no reason for neglecting its study. In despising the + defensive ourselves we have consistently ignored the strength + it gives our enemies. The bulk of our naval history is the + story of how we have been baffled and thwarted by our enemies + assuming the defensive at sea in support of their offensive on + land. We have seldom succeeded in treating this attitude with + success, and it is only by studying the defensive we can hope + to do so.</p> + + <p class="center"><i>Offensive Operations used with a Defensive + Intention</i></p> + + <p class="center">(A) Counter attacks.<br /> + (B) Diversions.</p> + + <p><i>Counter attacks</i> are those which are made upon an + enemy who exposes himself anywhere in the theatre of his + offensive operations. It is this form of attack which + constitutes what Clausewitz calls the "surprise advantage of + defence."</p> + + <p><i>Diversions</i> are similar operations undertaken against + an enemy outside the limit of his theatre of offensive + operations.</p> + + <p>Diversions are designed to confuse his strategy, to distract + his attention, and to draw off his forces from his main attack. + If well planned, they should divert a force greater than their + own. They <!-- + Page 332 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_332" + id="Page_332"></a>[pg 332]</span> should, therefore, be + small. The nearer they approach the importance of a real + attack the less likely they are to divert a force greater + than their own.</p> + + <p>Diversions involve a breach of the law of concentration, and + it is only their power of diverting or containing a larger + force than their own that justifies their use.</p> + + <p>This power depends mainly on suddenness and mobility, and + these qualities are most highly developed in combined + expeditions.</p> + + <p><i>Diversions</i> must be carefully distinguished from + <i>eccentric attacks. Eccentric attacks</i> are true offensive + movements. They have a positive object, <i>i.e.</i>, they aim + to acquire something from the enemy; whereas diversions have a + negative object, <i>i.e.</i>, they aim at preventing the enemy + doing or acquiring something. Eccentric attacks are usually + made in greater force than diversions.</p> + + <p>Examples.—Diversion.—Our raid on Washington in + 1815. Landing force, about 4,000 men. Object, according to + official instruction, "a diversion on the coasts of United + States of America in favour of the army employed in the defence + of Canada"; <i>i.e.</i>, the intention was + negative—preventive—defensive. <i>Eccentric + Attack.</i>—Operations against New Orleans in 1815. + Intended force, 15,000 to 20,000 men. Object, "to obtain + command of the embouchure of the Mississippi, and, secondly, to + occupy some important and valuable possession, by the + restoration of which the conditions of peace might be improved, + &c."; <i>i.e.</i>, the intention was positive—to + acquire. Compare Rochefort Expedition (diversion) with those + against Martinique and Belleisle (eccentric attacks) in the + Seven Years' War.</p> + + <p>This distinction gives a threefold classification of + combined expeditions, as used by Elizabethan strategists, viz., + raids, incursions, and invasions. These correspond respectively + with our modern diversions, eccentric attacks, and true direct + offensive.</p> + + <h4>LIMITED AND UNLIMITED WARS</h4> + + <p>From the nature of the ulterior object we get an important + classification of wars, according to whether such object is + <i>limited</i> or <i>unlimited</i>.</p> + + <blockquote> + (1) <i>War with limited object</i> ("limited war") is where + the object is merely to take from the enemy some particular + part of his possessions or interests; <i>e.g.</i>, + Spanish-American War, where the object was the liberation + of Cuba. + </blockquote> + <!-- Page 333 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_333" + id="Page_333"></a>[pg 333]</span> + + <blockquote> + (2) <i>War with an unlimited object</i> is where the object + is to overthrow the enemy completely, so that to save + himself from destruction he must agree to do our will + (become subservient); <i>e.g.</i>, Franco-German War. + </blockquote> + + <h4>PLANS OF WAR</h4> + + <p class="center"><i>System of Operations</i></p> + + <p>Having determined the nature of the war by the nature of its + object (i.e., whether it is offensive or defensive and whether + it is limited or unlimited), Strategy has to decide on the + system of operations or "plan of the war."</p> + + <p>Apart from the means at our disposal a plan of war depends + mainly upon—</p> + + <div class="noflo"> + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>(1) The theatre of the war.</p> + + <p>(2) The various theatres of operation available + within it.</p> + </div> + </div> + + <p>1. <i>Theatre of the War.</i>—Usually defined as "All + the territory upon which the hostile parties may assail each + other." This is insufficient. For an Island Power the theatre + of war will always include sea areas. Truer definition: + "Geographical areas within which must lie the operations + necessary for the attainment of the ulterior objects of the war + and of the subordinate objects that lead up to them."</p> + + <p>A "theatre of war" may contain several "theatres of + operations."</p> + + <p>2. <i>Theatre of Operations.</i>—Is generally used of + the operations of one belligerent only.</p> + + <p>An "operation" is any considerable strategical + undertaking.</p> + + <p>A "theatre of operations" is usually defined as embracing + all the territory we seek to take possession of or to + defend.</p> + + <p>A truer definition is: "The area, whether of sea or land or + both, within which the enemy must be overpowered before we can + secure the object of the particular operation."</p> + + <p>Consequently, since the nature of the war varies with the + object, it may be defensive in one theatre of operations and + offensive in another.</p> + + <p>Where the operations are defensive in character any special + movement or movements may be offensive.</p> + + <p>As the plan of war determines the theatres of operation in + the theatre of war, so in each theatre of operation it + determines the <i>lines of operation</i> and the + <i>objectives</i>.</p> + <!-- Page 334 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_334" + id="Page_334"></a>[pg 334]</span> + + <p class="center"><i>Objective</i></p> + + <p>An objective is "any point or force against which an + offensive movement is directed." Thus, where the <i>object</i> + in any theatre of operation is to get command of a certain sea + in which the enemy maintains a fleet, that fleet will usually + be the <i>objective</i>.</p> + + <p>"Objective" in ordinary use is frequently confused with + "object." For purposes of strategical discussion it is + desirable to keep them sharply distinguished. <i>Objective</i> + is the end of some particular movement or operation, and is the + special concern of the officer in command. <i>Object</i> is the + end of a system of operations and is the special concern of the + general staff or director of the war. An <i>objective</i> is + some definite point which we wish to get from the enemy or + prevent his occupying, or some part of his strength which we + wish to destroy. It is incorrect to use the term of anything we + already possess. Thus, Vladivostock is often said to have been + Rojesvensky's <i>objective</i>. It was, strictly speaking, only + his <i>destination</i>. To reach it and concentrate with the + units already there was the <i>primary object</i> of the + operations entrusted to him. He had no true <i>objective</i> + before him except Togo's fleet.</p> + + <p>An <i>objective</i> is always subordinate to some + <i>object</i>. It is a step to the attainment of that + object.</p> + + <p class="center"><i>Lines of Operation</i></p> + + <p>A line of operation is "the area of land or sea through + which we operate from our base or starting point to reach our + objectives."</p> + + <p>Lines of operation may be <i>exterior</i> or + <i>interior</i>. We are said to hold the <i>interior</i> lines + when we hold such a position, in regard to a theatre of + operations, that we can reach its chief objective points, or + forces, more quickly than the enemy can move to their defence + or assistance. Such a position is called an <i>interior + position</i>. "Exterior Lines" and "Exterior Positions" are the + converse of these.</p> + + <p class="center"><i>Lines of Communication</i></p> + + <p>This expression is used of three different + things:—</p> + + <blockquote> + (1) <i>Lines of supply</i>, running from the base of + operations to the point which the operating force has + reached. + </blockquote> + <!-- Page 335 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_335" + id="Page_335"></a>[pg 335]</span> + + <blockquote> + (2) <i>Lines of lateral communication</i> by which several + forces engaged in one theatre of operations can communicate + with each other and move to each other's support. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (3) <i>Lines of retreat</i>, which are usually lines of + supply reversed, <i>i.e.</i>, leading back to the base. + </blockquote> + + <p>For naval purposes these three ideas are best described by + the term "lines of passage and communication," which were in + use at the end of the 18th century, and they may be regarded as + those waters over which passes the normal course of vessels + proceeding from the base to the objective or the force to be + supplied.</p> + + <p class="center"><i>Maritime Communications</i></p> + + <p>The various kinds of Maritime Communications for or against + which a fleet may have to operate are:—</p> + + <blockquote> + (1) Its own communications, or those of its adversary + (which correspond to the communications of armies operating + ashore). These have greatly increased in importance + strategically with the increased dependence of modern + fleets on a regular supply of coals, stores, ammunition, + &c. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (2) The communications of an army operating from an + advanced oversea base, that is, communication between the + advanced and the main base. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (3) Trade Routes, that is, the communications upon which + depend the national resources and the supply of the main + bases, as well as the "lateral" or connecting + communications between various parts of belligerents' + possessions. + </blockquote> + + <p>In Land Strategy the great majority of problems are problems + of communication. Maritime Strategy has never been regarded as + hinging on communications, but probably it does so, as will + appear from a consideration of Maritime Communications, and the + extent to which they are the main preoccupation of naval + operations; that is to say, all problems of Naval Strategy can + be reduced to terms of "passage and communication," and this is + probably the best method of solving them.</p> + <!-- Page 336 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_336" + id="Page_336"></a>[pg 336]</span> + <hr /> + + <h2>PART TWO</h2> + + <h3>NAVAL STRATEGY CONSIDERED AS A<br /> + QUESTION OF PASSAGE AND<br /> + COMMUNICATION</h3> + + <h4>NAVAL STRATEGY DEFINED</h4> + + <p>By "Naval Strategy" we mean the art of conducting the major + operations of the fleet. Such operations have for their object + "passage and communication"; that is, the fleet is mainly + occupied in guarding our own communications and seizing those + of the enemy.</p> + + <p>We say the aim of Naval Strategy is to get command of the + sea. This means something quite different from the military + idea of occupying territory, for the sea cannot be the subject + of political dominion or ownership. We cannot subsist upon it + (like an army on conquered territory), nor can we exclude + neutrals from it. The value of the sea in the political system + of the world is as a means of communication between States and + parts of States. Therefore the "command of the sea" means the + control of communications in which the belligerents are + adversely concerned. The command of the sea can never be, like + the conquest of territory, the ulterior object of a war, unless + it be a purely maritime war, as were approximately our wars + with the Dutch in the 17th century, but it may be a primary or + immediate object, and even the ulterior object of particular + operations.</p> + + <p>History shows that the actual functions of the fleet (except + in purely maritime wars) have been threefold:—</p> + + <blockquote> + 1. The furtherance or hindrance of military operations + ashore. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + 2. The protection or destruction of commerce. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + 3. The prevention or securing of alliances (<i>i.e.</i>, + deterring or persuading neutrals as to participating in the + war). + </blockquote> + + <p>EXAMPLES.—The operations of Rooke in the first years + of the War of the Spanish Succession, 1702-04, to secure the + adhesion of Savoy and Portugal to the Grand Alliance. + Operations of Nelson to maintain the alliance of the Kingdom of + Naples.</p> + + <p>In the first case, there came a crisis when it was more + important to demonstrate to Savoy and Portugal what they stood + to lose by <!-- Page + 337 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_337" + id="Page_337"></a>[pg 337]</span> joining Louis XIV, than to + act immediately against the Toulon Fleet. In the second, the + Neapolitan Alliance was essential to our operations in the + Eastern Mediterranean; the destruction of the Toulon Fleet + was not.</p> + + <p>In this way we get a <i>Definition of the Aim of Naval + Strategy</i>, expressed in terms of the actual functions of the + fleet. For practical purposes it will be found the most useful + definition as emphasising the intimate connection of Naval + Strategy with the diplomatic, financial, and military aspects + of Major Strategy.</p> + + <p>These functions of the fleet may be discharged in two + ways:—</p> + + <blockquote> + (1) By direct territorial attacks, threatened or performed + (bombardment, landings, raiding parties, &c.). + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (2) By getting command of the sea, <i>i.e.</i>, + establishing ourselves in such a position that we can + control the maritime communications of all parties + concerned, so that we can operate by sea against the + enemy's territory, commerce, and allies, and they cannot + operate against ours. + </blockquote> + + <p>The power of the second method, by controlling + communications, is out of all proportion to that of the + first—direct attack. Indeed, the first can seldom be + performed with any serious effect without the second. Thus, + from this point of view also, it is clear that Naval Strategy + is mainly a question of communications.</p> + + <p>But not entirely. Circumstances have arisen when the fleet + must discharge part of its function by direct action against + territory before there is time to get general control of the + communications. (That is, political and military considerations + may deflect the normal operation of Naval Strategy.)</p> + + <p>EXAMPLES.—Rooke's capture of Gibraltar in 1704, in the + face of the unshaken Toulon Fleet. Holmes's capture of Emden in + 1758.</p> + + <p>Still, the fact remains that the key to the effective + performance of the fleet's duties is almost always to secure + communications as soon as possible by battle.</p> + + <h4>COMMAND OF THE SEA</h4> + + <p>Command of the sea exists only in a state of war. If we say + we have command of the sea in time of peace it is a rhetorical + expression meaning that we have adequate naval positions, and + an adequate fleet to secure the command when war breaks + out.</p><!-- Page 338 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_338" + id="Page_338"></a>[pg 338]</span> + + <p>Command of the sea does not mean that the enemy can do + absolutely nothing, but that he cannot <i>seriously</i> + interfere with the undertakings by which we seek to secure the + object of the war and to force our will upon him.</p> + + <p class="center"><i>Various Conditions of Command</i></p> + + <p>1. It may be (<i>a</i>) general; (<i>b</i>) local.</p> + + <p>(<i>a</i>) <i>General command</i> is secured when the enemy + is no longer able to act dangerously against our line of + passage and communication or to use or defend his own, or (in + other words) when he is no longer able to interfere seriously + with our trade or our military or diplomatic operations.</p> + + <p>This condition exists practically when the enemy is no + longer able to send squadrons to sea.</p> + + <p>(<i>b</i>) <i>Local command</i> implies a state of things in + which we are able to prevent the enemy from interfering with + our passage and communication in one or more theatres of + operation.</p> + + <p>2. Both general and local command may be (<i>a</i>) + temporary; {<i>b</i>) permanent.</p>{<i>a</i>) <i>Temporary + command</i> is when we are able to prevent the enemy from + interfering with our passage and communication in all or some + theatres of operation during the period required for gaining + the object in view (<i>i.e.</i>, the object of a particular + operation or of a particular campaign). This condition existed + after Togo's first action. It was also that at which Napoleon + aimed in his instructions to Villeneuve in 1805. + + <p>(<i>b</i>) <i>Permanent command</i> is when time ceases to + be a vital factor in the situation, <i>i.e.</i>, when the + possibility of the enemy's recovering his maritime position is + too remote to be a practical consideration. This condition + existed after Tsushima.</p> + + <p class="center"><i>Command in Dispute</i></p> + + <p>The state of dispute is the most important for practical + strategy, since it is the normal condition, at least in the + early stages of the war, and frequently all through it.</p> + + <p>The state of dispute continues till a final decision is + obtained, <i>i.e.</i>, till one side is no longer able to send + a squadron to sea.</p> + <!-- Page 339 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_339" + id="Page_339"></a>[pg 339]</span> + + <p><i>It is to the advantage of the preponderating Navy to end + the state of dispute by seeking a decision.</i> Hence the + French tradition to avoid decisive actions as a rule when at + war with England.</p> + + <p>It must be remembered that <i>general command of the sea is + not essential to all oversea operations</i>.</p> + + <p>In a state of dispute the preponderating Power may + concentrate or be induced to concentrate in one theatre of + operations, and so secure the local or temporary command + sufficient for obtaining the special object in view, while the + weaker Power takes advantage of such local concentration to + operate safely elsewhere.</p> + + <p>Thus in a state of dispute, although the weaker Power may + not be able to obstruct the passage and communication of the + stronger, it may be able to defend its own.</p> + + <p>EXAMPLES.—This condition of dispute existed during the + first three years of the Seven Years' War, until Hawke and + Boscawen obtained a decision by defeating Conflans and De la + Clue; also in the Great War up to Trafalgar.</p> + + <p>When the preponderating Power fails or neglects to get + command (<i>i.e.</i>, leaves the general command in dispute), + the disadvantage to him is not so much the danger to his own + operations as the facility given to the enemy for carrying out + counter operations elsewhere.</p> + + <h4>METHODS OF SECURING CONTROL.</h4> + + <p>1. <i>Permanent general control</i> can only be secured by + the practical annihilation of the enemy's fleet by successful + actions.</p> + + <p>2. <i>Local and temporary control</i> may be secured + by—</p> + + <blockquote> + (<i>a</i>) An action not necessarily entirely successful + (containing). + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (<i>b</i>) Inducing concentration on the enemy elsewhere + (diversion). + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (<i>c</i>) Superior concentration so as to render impotent + the enemy's force available in the special theatre of + operations (masking or containing). + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (<i>d</i>) Blockade. + </blockquote> + + <p class="center"><i>Action of a Fleet off an Enemy's + Port</i></p> + + <p>A belligerent fleet off an enemy's port may carry out three + different operations, for certain purposes; each quite separate + from the others, and intended to obtain an entirely different + result:—</p> + <!-- Page 340 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_340" + id="Page_340"></a>[pg 340]</span> + + <p>(1) <i>Close Blockade.</i>—This is to prevent the + enemy's fighting ships from putting to sea. In this case the + object is to secure local control for some purpose that is not + purely naval, such as was carried out by the Japanese off Port + Arthur in 1904, so as to enable their transports to cross the + Yellow Sea without fear of molestation from any of the Russian + ships in Port Arthur. Since the cruisers in Vladivostok were + able to emerge (that port not being blockaded), the operation + was not complete, and a danger of interference always + existed.</p> + + <p>This method of blockade is far more difficult to carry out + in the present day, than formerly; owing to the existence of + submarines and torpedo craft, the blockading ships have to + remain further away from the port; there have to be inner lines + of cruisers, scouts and destroyers; and quick concentration + takes longer owing to the greater space covered by the + blockading force, and more ships of all natures are required + for the same reason.</p> + + <p>Greater and more vigilance are required than in former days, + because the enemy's ships can come out regardless of weather + (thick weather would be their opportunity), and it is most + important that not a single craft, from a battleship to a + torpedo boat, be allowed to escape.</p> + + <p>This method of blockade includes the commercial blockade, + and all countries would be informed of its having been + established.</p> + + <p>(2) <i>Commercial Blockade.</i>—To prevent floating + commerce from entering or leaving the blockaded harbour. The + blockading force would not be powerful enough to prevent a + squadron of battleships or cruisers from entering or leaving + the port blockaded; and it would not be instituted outside a + fortified military port, or one containing a strong naval + force. But it would be able to stop scouts and torpedo craft + from entering or emerging, unless in very great numbers; and if + unable to stop them from emerging, would give warning of their + escape and the direction in which they are going.</p> + + <p>In both these forms of blockade it is usual, as a matter of + courtesy, to allow neutral armed ships belonging to foreign + navies to enter and leave for their own purposes, presumably + connected with the subjects of their own country who are in the + blockaded port. This, however, is not a right, and the country + to which the blockading ships belong has a right to refuse it, + and to back her refusal by force.</p> + + <p>All countries must be notified of a properly instituted + commercial blockade, in accordance with International + Agreement.</p><!-- Page 341 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_341" + id="Page_341"></a>[pg 341]</span> + + <p>(3) <i>Observing a Port.</i>—This, with its subsidiary + operations, should be conducted in such a way as to induce the + enemy to put to sea, the object of observing the port being + primarily a naval one, viz., to bring him to decisive + action.</p> + + <p>The principal observing force (consisting of battleships and + cruisers) would be either in one squadron, or more, provided + that they were in supporting reach of each other, and so placed + as to be able to cut off the enemy's fleet on emerging from the + port observed before it can get dangerously near its probable + objective, and yet sufficiently far out to ensure a battle + before it can regain the shelter of its own ports. It is also + worth noting that the battle should, if possible, be fought so + as to make it difficult for the enemy's damaged ships to obtain + the shelter of a friendly neutral's harbours before being + captured.</p> + + <p>The observed port must be watched closely, so that immediate + notice of the enemy's exit may be given; and this would be done + by small cruisers, scouts and destroyers, which should be + strong and numerous enough to attack any torpedo craft trying + to get to sea.</p> + + <p>In order to induce the enemy's main force to put to sea it + is important that every means be used to prevent his knowing + that our fleet is observing the port, or if that be impossible, + to do nothing which will lead him to suppose that his port is + being observed.</p> + + <p>This operation is not a blockade.</p> + + <p>Subsidiary operations to induce the enemy's fleet to put to + sea, may take the form of a diversion on the enemy's coast, or + against some important part of his sea-borne trade, either by + the observing fleet or by a force affiliated to it, or by any + oversea movements calculated to interfere seriously with the + enemy's war plan.</p> + + <p class="center"><i>Concentration</i></p> + + <p>The guiding feature of modern preparation for war is to be + ready for rapid action. It is true at sea, more even than on + land, that upon the first movements depend the initiative, the + power of controlling the enemy's strategy, and of making him + conform to our movements. This readiness for rapid action will + depend on a proper distribution of the fleet so as to meet all + the requirements.</p> + + <p>The distribution of the fleet should be dominated by the + idea of concentration, but it must be understood clearly what + concentration means. Clausewitz says:—"The best strategy + is always to be sufficiently strong, at first generally, then + at the decisive point. <!-- + Page 342 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_342" + id="Page_342"></a>[pg 342]</span> There is therefore no + higher or simpler law for strategy than this—keep your + forces together."</p> + + <p>The maxim "Keep your forces together" does not, however, + necessarily mean keeping them all concentrated in one mass, but + rather keeping them so disposed that they can unite readily at + will. At sea it is more difficult than on land to foretell + where the decisive point will be; but since it is quicker and + easier at sea to concentrate forces at any particular point + than on land, in applying this maxim for our purposes, the rule + should be to dispose the forces at sea so as to be able to + concentrate them in time at the decisive point so soon as this + point is determined, and also so as to conceal from the enemy + what it is intended to make the decisive point.</p> + + <p>If the forces are rightly disposed within due limits, + adequate control of all the lines of passage and communication + can be assured, and if the enemy undertakes any operations it + should be possible to ensure that sufficient forces can be + concentrated in time to defeat his object. On the other hand, + if the forces are concentrated in one mass, there can be little + chance of deceiving or confusing the enemy, while it gives him + an opportunity of successfully carrying out some operation by + evasion.</p> + + <h4>THE PECULIARITY OF MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS</h4> + + <p>Since the whole idea of command of the sea rests on the + control of communications, it cannot be fully apprehended + without a thorough understanding of the nature of maritime + communications.</p> + + <p>Ashore, the respective lines of communications of each + belligerent tend as a rule to run more or less approximately in + opposite directions, until they meet in the theatre of + operations or the objective point.</p> + + <p>At sea, the reverse is frequently the case; for in maritime + warfare the great lines of communications of either belligerent + often tend to run approximately parallel if, indeed, they are + not identical.</p> + + <p>Thus, in the case of a war with Germany, the object of which + lay in the Eastern Mediterranean, or in America, or South + Africa, our respective lines of communication would be + identical.</p> + + <p>This was also the case in all our imperial wars with + France.</p> + + <p><i>This peculiarity is the controlling influence of maritime + warfare.</i> Nearly all our current maxims of Naval Strategy + can be traced to the pressure it exerts on naval thought.</p> + + <p>It is at the root of the fundamental difference between + Military <!-- + Page 343 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_343" + id="Page_343"></a>[pg 343]</span> and Naval Strategy, and + affords the explanation of much strategical error and + confusion which have arisen from applying the principles of + land warfare to the sea without allowing for the + antagonistic conditions of the communications and the + operations against them in each case.</p> + + <p>On land, the chief reason for not always striking the + enemy's communications at once is that, as a rule, we cannot do + so without exposing our own. At sea, on the contrary, when the + great lines are common to both, we cannot defend our own + without striking at the enemy's.</p> + + <p>Therefore, at sea, the obvious opening is to get our fleet + into such a position that it controls the common lines, unless + defeated or evaded. This was usually done in our old wars with + France, by our attempting to get a fleet off Brest before the + French could sail.</p> + + <p>Hence the maxims "That the proper place for our fleets is + off the enemy's coast," "The enemy's coast is our true + frontier," and the like.</p> + + <p>But these maxims are not universally true; witness Togo's + strategy against Rojesvensky, when he remained correctly upon + his own coast.</p> + + <p>Take, again, the maxim that the primary object of the fleet + is to seek out the enemy's fleet and destroy it. Here, again, + Togo's practice was the reverse of the maxim.</p> + + <p>The true maxim is "The primary object of the fleet is to + secure communications, and if the enemy's fleet is in a + position to render them unsafe it must be put out of + action."</p> + + <p>The enemy's fleet usually is in this position, but not + always.</p> + + <p>EXAMPLE.—Opening of the War of the Spanish Succession. + The operations of 1702 were to secure some point (Cadiz, + Gibraltar, or Ferrol) on the Spanish trade communications, the + French lateral communications, and our own lines of passage to + the Mediterranean, where was to be our chief theatre of + operation. These last two lines were identical. In 1703, the + chief operations had for their object to secure the alliance of + Savoy, and particularly of Portugal. Rooke's official + instructions directed that the French fleet was to be ignored + unless it threatened the common communications.</p> + + <p>RESULT.—By 1704 we had gained a naval position from + which France could not eject us, and she abandoned the struggle + for sea communications.</p> + + <p>But nine times out of ten the maxim of seeking out the + enemy's fleet, &c., is sound and applicable—</p> + <!-- Page 344 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_344" + id="Page_344"></a>[pg 344]</span> + + <blockquote> + (<i>a</i>) Because for us <i>general permanent command</i> + is usually essential to ultimate success, and this cannot + be obtained without destroying the enemy's fleet. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (<i>b</i>) Because usually the enemy's fleet opens with an + attempt to <i>dispute the control of the common + communications</i>. + </blockquote> + + <blockquote> + (<i>c</i>) Because usually the functions of the fleet are + so complex (<i>i.e.</i>, the calls upon it so numerous) + that it will seek to strike a blow which will solve all the + difficulties; <i>e.g.</i>, Sir. Palmes Fairborne's solution + of the problem in 1703. + </blockquote> + + <p>Also it must be remembered that nine times out of ten the + most effective way of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" + (<i>i.e.</i>, forcing an action on him) is to seize a position + which controls communications vital to his plan of + campaign.</p> + + <p>This was what happened in 1704. Rooke was unable to seek out + the Toulon Fleet, but by seizing Gibraltar he made it come to + him (not intentionally, but by the operation of strategical + law).</p> + + <p>Practically all great naval actions have been brought about + in this way, that is, they have been the outcome of an effort + to clear essential communications from the enemy's fleet; + <i>e.g.</i>, Gravelines, La Hogue, Quiberon, Trafalgar, + Tsushima.</p> + + <p>Similarly the great actions of the old Dutch wars were + brought about because our geographical position placed us + astride the Dutch trade communications, and they were forced to + seek a decision against our fleet.</p> + + <p>In applying the maxim of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" it + should be borne in mind that if you seek it out with a superior + force you will probably find it in a place where you cannot + destroy it, except at very heavy cost. It is far better to make + it come to you, and this has often been done by merely sitting + on the common communications.</p> + + <p>Again, if you seek out the enemy's fleet without being + certain of getting contact, you may merely assist it in evading + you, and enable it to get into a position on your own + communications, from which it may be very costly to dislodge + it. It was for this reason that the Elizabethan Government kept + the fleet in home waters in 1588. Sampson, in the + Spanish-American War, was actually permitted to make this + mistake. By going to seek out Cervera without being sure of + contact, he left him a clear run into Cienfuegos or even + Havana, which it was the main function of the fleet to prevent. + Captain Mahan has since modified this maxim as + follows:—"Seek out the + <!-- Page 345 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_345" + id="Page_345"></a>[pg 345]</span> enemy's fleet, if you are + sure of getting contact." A truer maxim would seem to be + "Seek contact with the enemy's fleet in the most certain and + favourable manner that is open to you." To seek out the + enemy's fleet is only one way of doing this, and not always + the best way. It must be remembered that other conditions + being equal, it is an obvious advantage to fight in your own + waters rather than in those of the enemy, and more likely to + ensure that a defeat of the enemy will be decisive.</p> + + <div class="noflo"> + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>RN WAR COLLEGE PORTSMOUTH</p> + + <p>JANUARY 1909</p> + </div> + </div><!-- Page 346 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_346" + id="Page_346"></a>[pg 346]</span> + <hr /> + + <h2>INDEX</h2> + + <div class="noflo"> + <div class="nofblk"></div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Abercromby, General Sir Ralph, + <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, + <a href="#Page_296">296</a></p> + + <p>Absolute War, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, + <a href="#Page_42">42</a>-44</p> + + <p>Alexandria, <a href="#Page_289">289</a></p> + + <p>Alsace-Lorraine, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>-52, + <a href="#Page_55">55</a></p> + + <p>Ambleteuse, <a href="#Page_251">251</a></p> + + <p>Amherst, General Lord, + <a href="#Page_285">285</a></p> + + <p>Anglo-Japanese Treaty, <a href="#Page_79">79</a></p> + + <p>Anson, Admiral Lord, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>-12, + <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, + <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, + <a href="#Page_290">290</a></p> + + <p>Antwerp, <a href="#Page_69">69</a></p> + + <p>Armada, Spanish, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>-60, + <a href="#Page_172">172</a>-74, + <a href="#Page_227">227</a>, + <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, + <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, + <a href="#Page_255">255</a></p> + + <p>Articles of War, <a href="#Page_176">176</a></p> + + <p>Austerlitz Campaign, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, + <a href="#Page_53">53</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Bacon, Sir Francis, <a href="#Page_58">58</a></p> + + <p>Baltic Fleet, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, + <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, + <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, + <a href="#Page_327">327</a></p> + + <p>Baltic trade, <a href="#Page_263">263</a></p> + + <p>Barcelona, <a href="#Page_286">286</a></p> + + <p>Barham, Admiral Sir Charles Middleton, + <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, + <a href="#Page_142">142</a>-44, + <a href="#Page_151">151</a>, + <a href="#Page_162">162</a>-63, + <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, + <a href="#Page_199">199</a>, + <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, + <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, + <a href="#Page_297">297</a></p> + + <p>Barraille, Admiral, + <a href="#Page_249">249</a>-51</p> + + <p>Barrington, Admiral Samuel, + <a href="#Page_146">146</a>-47</p> + + <p>Batz, Isle de, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, + <a href="#Page_290">290</a></p> + + <p>Beachy Head, <a href="#Page_218">218</a></p> + + <p>Belgium, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>-52, + <a href="#Page_55">55</a></p> + + <p>Belleisle, Marechal de, <a href="#Page_295">295</a>, + <a href="#Page_332">332</a></p> + + <p>Belleisle, <a href="#Page_312">312</a></p> + + <p>Berry, Captain Sir Edward, + <a href="#Page_238">238</a></p> + + <p>Biscay, Bay of, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, + <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, + <a href="#Page_263">263</a></p> + + <p>Black Sea, <a href="#Page_285">285</a></p> + + <p>Blake, Colonel Robert, + <a href="#Page_176">176</a></p> + + <p>Blockade, method of, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, + <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, + <a href="#Page_183">183</a>-86, + <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, + <a href="#Page_244">244</a>, + <a href="#Page_252">252</a>, + <a href="#Page_256">256</a>-58, + <a href="#Page_260">260</a>-62, + <a href="#Page_269">269</a>, + <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, + <a href="#Page_284">284</a>, + <a href="#Page_341">341</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">ethics of, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">tactical and strategic, + <a href="#Page_97">97</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">insecurity of, + <a href="#Page_119">119</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">close and open, + <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, + <a href="#Page_187">187</a>-91, + <a href="#Page_193">193</a>-94, + <a href="#Page_197">197</a>-201, + <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, + <a href="#Page_207">207</a>-208, + <a href="#Page_240">240</a>, + <a href="#Page_250">250</a>, + <a href="#Page_292">292</a>, + <a href="#Page_295">295</a>-97, + <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, + <a href="#Page_340">340</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">theory of, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, + <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, + <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, + <a href="#Page_175">175</a>, + <a href="#Page_202">202</a>-204, + <a href="#Page_242">242</a>, + <a href="#Page_287">287</a>-88, + <a href="#Page_322">322</a></p> + + <p>Blücher, Field Marshal Gebhard von, + <a href="#Page_23">23</a></p> + + <p>Boscawen, Admiral Edward, + <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, + <a href="#Page_252">252</a>, + <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, + <a href="#Page_328">328</a>, + <a href="#Page_339">339</a></p> + + <p>Boulogne, <a href="#Page_251">251</a></p> + + <p>Brest, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, + <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, + <a href="#Page_147">147</a>-48, + <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, + <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, + <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, + <a href="#Page_193">193</a>-97, + <a href="#Page_201">201</a>-202, + <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, + <a href="#Page_235">235</a>-36, + <a href="#Page_248">248</a>-49, + <a href="#Page_252">252</a>-53, + <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, + <a href="#Page_296">296</a>, + <a href="#Page_323">323</a></p> + + <p>Bruix, Admiral, <a href="#Page_140">140</a></p> + + <p>Byng, Admiral Sir George, + <a href="#Page_163">163</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p> + <!-- Page 347 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_347" + id="Page_347"></a>[pg 347]</span></p> + + <p>Cadiz, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>-40, + <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, + <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, + <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, + <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, + <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, + <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, + <a href="#Page_227">227</a>, + <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, + <a href="#Page_323">323</a></p> + + <p>Caemmerer, General von, + <a href="#Page_76">76</a>-77</p> + + <p>Calder, Admiral Sir Robert, + <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, + <a href="#Page_183">183</a></p> + + <p>Canada, 54, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>-57, + <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, + <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, + <a href="#Page_312">312</a>, + <a href="#Page_328">328</a>, + <a href="#Page_332">332</a></p> + + <p>Cape Clear, <a href="#Page_272">272</a></p> + + <p>Caribbean Sea, <a href="#Page_144">144</a></p> + + <p>Carkett, Captain Robert, <a href="#Page_4">4</a></p> + + <p>Cartagena, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></p> + + <p>Channel Islands, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, + <a href="#Page_253">253</a></p> + + <p>Charles II of England, + <a href="#Page_179">179</a></p> + + <p>Charles of Austria, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, + <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, + <a href="#Page_69">69</a></p> + + <p>Chateaurenault, Admiral Comte de, + <a href="#Page_213">213</a>-14</p> + + <p>Chatham, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, + <a href="#Page_215">215</a>, + <a href="#Page_227">227</a></p> + + <p>Cherbourg, <a href="#Page_253">253</a></p> + + <p>Christian, Admiral Sir Hugh, + <a href="#Page_296">296</a></p> + + <p>Cienfuegos, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, + <a href="#Page_344">344</a></p> + + <p>Clausewitz, General Karl von, + <a href="#Page_79">79</a>-80, + <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, + <a href="#Page_330">330</a>-31;</p> + + <p class="i2">theory, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, + <a href="#Page_27">27</a>-29, + <a href="#Page_41">41</a>-46, + <a href="#Page_51">51</a>-56, + <a href="#Page_60">60</a>-61, + <a href="#Page_73">73</a>-74, + <a href="#Page_76">76</a>-77, + <a href="#Page_311">311</a>, + <a href="#Page_341">341</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">his service, + <a href="#Page_23">23</a>-24;</p> + + <p class="i2"><i>On War</i>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, + <a href="#Page_44">44</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">his war plans, + <a href="#Page_44">44</a></p> + + <p>Colpoys, Admiral Sir John, + <a href="#Page_196">196</a></p> + + <p>Command at sea, theory of, + <a href="#Page_91">91</a>-106, + <a href="#Page_165">165</a>-66</p> + + <p>Commerce prevention, <a href="#Page_95">95</a></p> + + <p>Communications, maritime, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, + <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, + <a href="#Page_315">315</a>-16, + <a href="#Page_335">335</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">common theory of, + <a href="#Page_100">100</a>-102, + <a href="#Page_118">118</a></p> + + <p>Conflans, Admiral Comte de, + <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, + <a href="#Page_252">252</a>-53, + <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, + <a href="#Page_339">339</a></p> + + <p>Copenhagen, <a href="#Page_68">68</a></p> + + <p>Cornwallis, Admiral Sir William, + <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, + <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, + <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, + <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, + <a href="#Page_197">197</a>-200</p> + + <p>Coruña, <a href="#Page_173">173</a></p> + + <p>Cotton, Admiral Sir Charles, + <a href="#Page_181">181</a></p> + + <p>Covering squadron, <a href="#Page_283">283</a>, + <a href="#Page_286">286</a>-88, + <a href="#Page_291">291</a></p> + + <p>Craig's expedition, <a href="#Page_67">67</a></p> + + <p>Crimea, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, + <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, + <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, + <a href="#Page_285">285</a>-87, + <a href="#Page_300">300</a></p> + + <p>Cromwell, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, + <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, + <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, + <a href="#Page_176">176</a></p> + + <p>Cuba, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, + <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, + <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, + <a href="#Page_313">313</a>, + <a href="#Page_332">332</a></p> + + <p><i>Curieux</i>, <a href="#Page_182">182</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Dalny, <a href="#Page_229">229</a></p> + + <p>Dardanelles, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, + <a href="#Page_139">139</a></p> + + <p>Davout, Louis-Nicolas, <a href="#Page_23">23</a></p> + + <p>Deane, Colonel Richard, + <a href="#Page_176">176</a></p> + + <p>Declaration of Paris, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, + <a href="#Page_267">267</a></p> + + <p>Dettingen, <a href="#Page_246">246</a></p> + + <p>Dogger Bank, <a href="#Page_158">158</a></p> + + <p>Downs, the, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>-40, + <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, + <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, + <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, + <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, + <a href="#Page_249">249</a>-50, + <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, + <a href="#Page_263">263</a></p> + + <p>Drake, Sir Francis, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, + <a href="#Page_159">159</a>-60, + <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, + <a href="#Page_173">173</a>-74, + <a href="#Page_227">227</a>, + <a href="#Page_244">244</a>, + <a href="#Page_291">291</a>, + <a href="#Page_301">301</a></p> + + <p>Dumouriez, General, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, + <a href="#Page_257">257</a></p> + + <p>Dundas, Admiral Sir James, + <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, + <a href="#Page_291">291</a></p> + + <p>Dungeness, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>, + <a href="#Page_199">199</a></p> + + <p>Dunkirk, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, + <a href="#Page_237">237</a>, + <a href="#Page_244">244</a>, + <a href="#Page_246">246</a>-50, + <a href="#Page_252">252</a>-53</p> + + <p>Duquesne, Admiral Abraham, + <a href="#Page_121">121</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Egypt, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>-38, + <a href="#Page_240">240</a></p> + + <p>Elliot Islands, <a href="#Page_37">37</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Ferrol, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, + <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, + <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, + <a href="#Page_323">323</a></p> + + <p>Finisterre, Cape, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, + <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, + <a href="#Page_139">139</a>-40, + <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, + <a href="#Page_256">256</a>, + <a href="#Page_272">272</a></p> + + <p>Flanders, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, + <a href="#Page_246">246</a></p> + + <p>Frederick the Great, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>-22, + <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, + <a href="#Page_54">54</a>-55, + <a href="#Page_63">63</a>-64, + <a href="#Page_66">66</a>-67, + <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, + <a href="#Page_327">327</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Gallipoli, <a href="#Page_285">285</a></p> + + <p>Ganteaume, Admiral Comte, + <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, + <a href="#Page_197">197</a>-98, + <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, + <a href="#Page_236">236</a></p> + + <p> + <!-- Page 348 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_348" + id="Page_348"></a>[pg 348]</span></p> + + <p>Gardner, Admiral Lord, + <a href="#Page_197">197</a>-98</p> + + <p>Gibraltar, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, + <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, + <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, + <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, + <a href="#Page_145">145</a>-46, + <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, + <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, + <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, + <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, + <a href="#Page_323">323</a>, + <a href="#Page_337">337</a>, + <a href="#Page_344">344</a></p> + + <p>Gneisenau, Field Marshal August von, + <a href="#Page_23">23</a></p> + + <p>Goltz, General von der, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, + <a href="#Page_97">97</a></p> + + <p>Guichen, Admiral Comte de, + <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, + <a href="#Page_223">223</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Hanover, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, + <a href="#Page_246">246</a></p> + + <p>Hardy, Admiral Sir Charles, + <a href="#Page_253">253</a>-57</p> + + <p>Havana, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, + <a href="#Page_169">169</a></p> + + <p>Havre, <a href="#Page_252">252</a>-53, + <a href="#Page_263">263</a></p> + + <p>Hawke, Admiral Sir Edward, + <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, + <a href="#Page_189">189</a>-90, + <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, + <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, + <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, + <a href="#Page_252">252</a>-53, + <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, + <a href="#Page_339">339</a></p> + + <p>Henry VIII, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>-110</p> + + <p>Holland, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, + <a href="#Page_195">195</a></p> + + <p>Howe, Admiral Earl, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, + <a href="#Page_147">147</a>-50, + <a href="#Page_190">190</a>-191, + <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, + <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, + <a href="#Page_206">206</a>-207</p> + + <p>Howard of Effingham, Admiral Lord, + <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, + <a href="#Page_173">173</a>-74, + <a href="#Page_244">244</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Iberian Peninsula, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, + <a href="#Page_61">61</a>-62, + <a href="#Page_64">64</a>, + <a href="#Page_69">69</a>-71, + <a href="#Page_105">105</a></p> + + <p>India, <a href="#Page_101">101</a></p> + + <p>Ireland, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, + <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, + <a href="#Page_213">213</a>, + <a href="#Page_215">215</a>, + <a href="#Page_225">225</a>-26, + <a href="#Page_240">240</a>, + <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, + <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, + <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, + <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, + <a href="#Page_282">282</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Jamaica, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, + <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, + <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, + <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, + <a href="#Page_207">207</a></p> + + <p>Jervis, Sir John, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, + <a href="#Page_296">296</a></p> + + <p>Jomini, General Baron de, + <a href="#Page_28">28</a>-30, + <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, + <a href="#Page_45">45</a>-47, + <a href="#Page_51">51</a>-52, + <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, + <a href="#Page_74">74</a>, + <a href="#Page_85">85</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Kamimura, Admiral, <a href="#Page_170">170</a></p> + + <p>Keith, Admiral Lord, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, + <a href="#Page_289">289</a></p> + + <p>Kempenfelt, Admiral Richard, + <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, + <a href="#Page_146">146</a>-48, + <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, + <a href="#Page_192">192</a>-94, + <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, + <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, + <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, + <a href="#Page_222">222</a>-24, + <a href="#Page_227">227</a>, + <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, + <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, + <a href="#Page_260">260</a></p> + + <p>Killigrew, Admiral Henry, + <a href="#Page_213">213</a>-15, + <a href="#Page_219">219</a>, + <a href="#Page_224">224</a></p> + + <p>Korea, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, + <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, + <a href="#Page_79">79</a>-80, + <a href="#Page_82">82</a>-85</p> + + <p>Kraft zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, Prince, + <a href="#Page_75">75</a></p> + + <p>Kuantung Peninsula, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Lagos, <a href="#Page_252">252</a></p> + + <p>La Hogue, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, + <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, + <a href="#Page_344">344</a></p> + + <p>Langara, Admiral Don Juan, + <a href="#Page_148">148</a>-49</p> + + <p>Leghorn, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></p> + + <p>Leith, <a href="#Page_263">263</a></p> + + <p>Liaotung Peninsula, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, + <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a>, + <a href="#Page_292">292</a></p> + + <p>Liao-yang, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, + <a href="#Page_85">85</a></p> + + <p>Light squadrons, <a href="#Page_125">125</a></p> + + <p>Ligonier, General Lord, + <a href="#Page_70">70</a></p> + + <p>Limited War, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, + <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, + <a href="#Page_51">51</a>-59, + <a href="#Page_72">72</a>-87, + <a href="#Page_313">313</a></p> + + <p>Lisbon, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, + <a href="#Page_173">173</a></p> + + <p>Lissa, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, + <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, + <a href="#Page_293">293</a></p> + + <p>Lizard, the, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, + <a href="#Page_256">256</a></p> + + <p>Louisburg, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, + <a href="#Page_287">287</a></p> + + <p>Lyons, Admiral Sir Edmund, + <a href="#Page_285">285</a>-86</p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Mack, General, <a href="#Page_21">21</a></p> + + <p>Mahan, Admiral, <a href="#Nt_12">131n</a>, + <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, + <a href="#Page_344">344</a></p> + + <p>Maitland, General, <a href="#Page_295">295</a></p> + + <p>Malta, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, + <a href="#Page_264">264</a></p> + + <p>Manchuria, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, + <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, + <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, + <a href="#Page_313">313</a>, + <a href="#Page_318">318</a>, + <a href="#Page_329">329</a></p> + + <p>Maria Theresa, <a href="#Page_246">246</a></p> + + <p>Marlborough, John, Duke of, + <a href="#Page_64">64</a></p> + + <p> + <!-- Page 349 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_349" + id="Page_349"></a>[pg 349]</span></p> + + <p>Maxims: "Conquest of water territory," + <a href="#Page_93">93</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">"Enemy's coast our frontier," + <a href="#Page_93">93</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">"Eyes of the fleet," + <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, + <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, + <a href="#Page_120">120</a>-21;</p> + + <p class="i2">"Fleet in being," + <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, + <a href="#Page_231">231</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">"The sea is all one," + <a href="#Page_103">103</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">"Seeking out the enemy's fleet," + <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, + <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, + <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, + <a href="#Page_164">164</a>, + <a href="#Page_167">167</a>-68,</p> + + <p class="i4"><a href="#Page_170">170</a>-71, + <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, + <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, + <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, + <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, + <a href="#Page_344">344</a>-45</p> + + <p>Medina-Sidonia, Duke of, + <a href="#Page_244">244</a>, + <a href="#Page_249">249</a></p> + + <p>Mediterranean, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, + <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, + <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, + <a href="#Page_113">113</a>-14, + <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, + <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, + <a href="#Page_139">139</a>-40, + <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, + <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, + <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, + <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, + <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, + <a href="#Page_218">218</a>, + <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, + <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, + <a href="#Page_252">252</a>, + <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, + <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, + <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, + <a href="#Page_337">337</a></p> + + <p>Medway, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, + <a href="#Page_217">217</a></p> + + <p>Melville, Lord, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>-200</p> + + <p>Middleton. <i>See</i> Barham</p> + + <p>Minorca, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, + <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, + <a href="#Page_330">330</a></p> + + <p>Moltke, General von, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, + <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>, + <a href="#Page_73">73</a>-74</p> + + <p>Monk, George, Duke of Albemarle, + <a href="#Page_135">135</a>-37, + <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, + <a href="#Page_176">176</a>-77</p> + + <p>Montecuculi, Prince, <a href="#Page_24">24</a></p> + + <p>Montcalm, General Marquis de, + <a href="#Page_302">302</a></p> + + <p>Morbihan, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, + <a href="#Page_252">252</a>-53</p> + + <p>Mukden, <a href="#Page_83">83</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Napoleon, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>-44, + <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, + <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, + <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, + <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, + <a href="#Page_257">257</a>-58, + <a href="#Page_338">338</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">methods, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>-23, + <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, + <a href="#Page_27">27</a>-28, + <a href="#Page_46">46</a>-48, + <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, + <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, + <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, + <a href="#Page_183">183</a>, + <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, + <a href="#Page_237">237</a>-38, + <a href="#Page_240">240</a>-41;</p> + + <p class="i2">views on naval warfare, + <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, + <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, + <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, + <a href="#Page_191">191</a>, + <a href="#Page_236">236</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">his Russian campaign, + <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, + <a href="#Page_52">52</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">on "pygmy combinations," + <a href="#Page_67">67</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">his conversion, + <a href="#Page_68">68</a>-70</p> + + <p>Narrow seas, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, + <a href="#Page_202">202</a></p> + + <p>Nelson, Admiral Lord, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, + <a href="#Page_125">125</a>-26, + <a href="#Page_226">226</a>, + <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, + <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, + <a href="#Page_336">336</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">his influence, + <a href="#Page_161">161</a>-63, + <a href="#Page_217">217</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">his use of cruisers, + <a href="#Page_113">113</a>-15, + <a href="#Page_117">117</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">on defensive fleet operations, + <a href="#Page_223">223</a>-24, + <a href="#Page_227">227</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">on blockade, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, + <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, + <a href="#Page_198">198</a>-99, + <a href="#Page_208">208</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">his strategy, + <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, + <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, + <a href="#Page_141">141</a>-42, + <a href="#Page_199">199</a>, + <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, + <a href="#Page_281">281</a></p> + + <p>New Model Army, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, + <a href="#Page_176">176</a></p> + + <p>Ney, Marshal Michael, <a href="#Page_29">29</a></p> + + <p>Nile, <a href="#Page_180">180</a></p> + + <p>Norris, Admiral Sir John, + <a href="#Page_237">237</a>-38, + <a href="#Page_246">246</a>, + <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, + <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, + <a href="#Page_281">281</a></p> + + <p>North Sea, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, + <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, + <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, + <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, + <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, + <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, + <a href="#Page_195">195</a>-96, + <a href="#Page_199">199</a>, + <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, + <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, + <a href="#Page_263">263</a></p> + + <p>Nottingham, Daniel Finch, Earl of, + <a href="#Page_216">216</a>-17</p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Observation squadrons, + <a href="#Page_125">125</a></p> + + <p>Offence, theory of, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>-36, + <a href="#Page_39">39</a>-40</p> + + <p>Orde, Admiral Sir John, + <a href="#Page_223">223</a></p> + + <p>Orvilliers, Admiral Comte de, + <a href="#Page_256">256</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Palermo, <a href="#Page_121">121</a></p> + + <p>Paris, Declaration of, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, + <a href="#Page_267">267</a></p> + + <p>Parma, Prince Alexander Farnese, Duke of, + <a href="#Page_171">171</a>-73, + <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, + <a href="#Page_243">243</a>-44</p> + + <p>Pe-chi-li, Gulf of, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, + <a href="#Page_302">302</a></p> + + <p>Persano, Admiral, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>-94</p> + + <p>Philip II, <a href="#Page_239">239</a></p> + + <p>Pitt, William, Earl of Chatham, + <a href="#Page_63">63</a>-64, + <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_300">300</a>, + <a href="#Page_327">327</a></p> + + <p>Plymouth, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, + <a href="#Page_173">173</a>, + <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, + <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, + <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, + <a href="#Page_248">248</a>, + <a href="#Page_256">256</a></p> + + <p>Pola, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>-94</p> + + <p>Port Arthur, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, + <a href="#Page_82">82</a>-85, + <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, + <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, + <a href="#Page_204">204</a>-205, + <a href="#Page_227">227</a>-31, + <a href="#Page_290">290</a>-92, + <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, + <a href="#Page_340">340</a></p> + + <p> + <!-- Page 350 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_350" + id="Page_350"></a>[pg 350]</span></p> + + <p>Portsmouth, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, + <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, + <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, + <a href="#Page_248">248</a>-49, + <a href="#Page_253">253</a></p> + + <p>Portugal, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, + <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, + <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, + <a href="#Page_323">323</a>, + <a href="#Page_336">336</a></p> + + <p>Privateering, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>-68</p> + + <p>Prussia, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, + <a href="#Page_49">49</a>-50, + <a href="#Page_64">64</a></p> + + <p>Puerto Rico, <a href="#Page_168">168</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Quebec, <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, + <a href="#Page_289">289</a>, + <a href="#Page_301">301</a>-302</p> + + <p>Quiberon, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, + <a href="#Page_180">180</a>, + <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, + <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, + <a href="#Page_324">324</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Raglan, General Lord, + <a href="#Page_301">301</a></p> + + <p>"Real War," <a href="#Page_25">25</a></p> + + <p>Revolution, French, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, + <a href="#Page_65">65</a></p> + + <p>Rochefort, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, + <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, + <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, + <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, + <a href="#Page_250">250</a>, + <a href="#Page_300">300</a>, + <a href="#Page_312">312</a>, + <a href="#Page_332">332</a></p> + + <p>Rodney, Admiral Sir George B., + <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, + <a href="#Page_194">194</a></p> + + <p>Roquefeuille, Admiral Marquis de, + <a href="#Page_247">247</a>-51</p> + + <p>Ross, Admiral John, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, + <a href="#Page_149">149</a></p> + + <p>Rupert, Prince, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>-36, + <a href="#Page_157">157</a></p> + + <p>Russell, Admiral Edward, + <a href="#Page_225">225</a></p> + + <p>Ruyter, Admiral de, + <a href="#Page_135">135</a>-37</p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>St. Helena, <a href="#Page_277">277</a></p> + + <p>St. James's fight, + <a href="#Page_177">177</a>-78</p> + + <p>St. Vincent, Admiral Sir John, + <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, + <a href="#Page_194">194</a>, + <a href="#Page_196">196</a>, + <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, + <a href="#Page_288">288</a>, + <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, + <a href="#Page_296">296</a></p> + + <p>St. Vincent, Cape, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, + <a href="#Page_182">182</a></p> + + <p>San Domingo, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>, + <a href="#Page_301">301</a></p> + + <p>Santa Cruz, Marquess of, + <a href="#Page_239">239</a></p> + + <p>Santiago, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>, + <a href="#Page_322">322</a></p> + + <p>Sampson, Admiral, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, + <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, + <a href="#Page_344">344</a></p> + + <p>Sandwich, Admiral, the Earl of, + <a href="#Page_121">121</a></p> + + <p>Sardinia, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, + <a href="#Page_207">207</a></p> + + <p>Saunders, Admiral Sir Charles, + <a href="#Page_289">289</a>, + <a href="#Page_301">301</a></p> + + <p>Saxe, Marshal, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>-50</p> + + <p>Saxony, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>-55, + <a href="#Page_80">80</a></p> + + <p>Scilly, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, + <a href="#Page_149">149</a>-50, + <a href="#Page_255">255</a></p> + + <p>Sebastopol, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, + <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, + <a href="#Page_291">291</a></p> + + <p>Seoul, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, + <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, + <a href="#Page_303">303</a></p> + + <p>Sharnhorst, General Gerhard von, + <a href="#Page_23">23</a></p> + + <p>Shovel, Admiral Sir Cloudesley, + <a href="#Page_213">213</a>-14, + <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, + <a href="#Page_286">286</a></p> + + <p>Sicily, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, + <a href="#Page_207">207</a></p> + + <p>Silesia, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, + <a href="#Page_55">55</a></p> + + <p>Skelligs, the, <a href="#Page_150">150</a></p> + + <p>Smyrna convoy, <a href="#Page_225">225</a></p> + + <p>Sole Bay, <a href="#Page_38">38</a></p> + + <p>Spanish Armada, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>-60, + <a href="#Page_172">172</a>-74, + <a href="#Page_227">227</a>, + <a href="#Page_243">243</a>, + <a href="#Page_245">245</a>, + <a href="#Page_255">255</a></p> + + <p>Spithead, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, + <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, + <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, + <a href="#Page_248">248</a></p> + + <p>Stakelberg, General, + <a href="#Page_302">302</a>-303</p> + + <p>Strachan, Admiral Sir Richard, + <a href="#Page_125">125</a>-26</p> + + <p>Strategy, naval and maritime, + <a href="#Page_15">15</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">major and minor, + <a href="#Page_308">308</a>-309, + <a href="#Page_327">327</a>-28</p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Tegetthoff, Admiral, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, + <a href="#Page_293">293</a>-94</p> + + <p>Texel, the, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, + <a href="#Page_146">146</a>-47, + <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, + <a href="#Page_197">197</a></p> + + <p>Thames, the, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>-38, + <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, + <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, + <a href="#Page_247">247</a>-48, + <a href="#Page_268">268</a></p> + + <p>Theory of war, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>-30, + <a href="#Page_107">107</a>-52</p> + + <p>Tilbury, <a href="#Page_247">247</a></p> + + <p>Togo, Admiral, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, + <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, + <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, + <a href="#Page_207">207</a>, + <a href="#Page_290">290</a>, + <a href="#Page_292">292</a>, + <a href="#Page_303">303</a>, + <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, + <a href="#Page_322">322</a>-24, + <a href="#Page_338">338</a></p> + + <p>Torbay, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>-90, + <a href="#Page_192">192</a>-93, + <a href="#Page_207">207</a></p> + + <p>Torres Vedras, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, + <a href="#Page_83">83</a></p> + + <p>Torrington, Admiral Lord, + <a href="#Page_214">214</a>-18, + <a href="#Page_220">220</a>, + <a href="#Page_224">224</a>, + <a href="#Page_226">226</a></p> + + <p>Toulon, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, + <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, + <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, + <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, + <a href="#Page_198">198</a>, + <a href="#Page_207">207</a>-208, + <a href="#Page_213">213</a>-14, + <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, + <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, + <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, + <a href="#Page_296">296</a>, + <a href="#Page_317">317</a>-18, + <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, + <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, + <a href="#Page_337">337</a>, + <a href="#Page_344">344</a></p> + + <p>Tourville, Admiral Comte de, + <a href="#Page_213">213</a>-14, + <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, + <a href="#Page_219">219</a>-20, + <a href="#Page_224">224</a>-26</p> + + <p> + <!-- Page 351 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_351" + id="Page_351"></a>[pg 351]</span></p> + + <p>Trafalgar, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, + <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, + <a href="#Page_199">199</a>, + <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, + <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, + <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, + <a href="#Page_339">339</a></p> + + <p>Trieste, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></p> + + <p>Tromp, Admiral Martin H., + <a href="#Page_175">175</a>-76</p> + + <p>Tsushima, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, + <a href="#Page_319">319</a>, + <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, + <a href="#Page_338">338</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Unlimited War, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>-51, + <a href="#Page_60">60</a>-71</p> + + <p>Ushant, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>-43, + <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, + <a href="#Page_181">181</a>-82, + <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, + <a href="#Page_223">223</a>-25, + <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, + <a href="#Page_272">272</a></p> + + <p>Utrecht, <a href="#Page_246">246</a></p> + + <p>Villeneuve, Admiral, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, + <a href="#Page_142">142</a>-43, + <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, + <a href="#Page_182">182</a>-83, + <a href="#Page_186">186</a>, + <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, + <a href="#Page_206">206</a>, + <a href="#Page_223">223</a>, + <a href="#Page_266">266</a>, + <a href="#Page_338">338</a></p> + + <p>Vladivostock, <a href="#Page_340">340</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Walcheren, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>-69</p> + + <p>Warren, Commodore Sir John B., + <a href="#Page_235">235</a></p> + + <p>Wars:</p> + + <p class="i2">Anglo-American (1812), + <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, + <a href="#Page_276">276</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">Anglo-Dutch, + <a href="#Page_109">109</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">Anglo-Spanish (1588), + <a href="#Page_109">109</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">American Independence, + <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, + <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, + <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, + <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, + <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, + <a href="#Page_226">226</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">Austro-Italian (1866), + <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, + <a href="#Page_293">293</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">Crimean, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>, + <a href="#Page_285">285</a>-88;</p> + + <p class="i2">Franco-German (1870), + <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>, + <a href="#Page_333">333</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">Franco-Russian (1812), + <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, + <a href="#Page_51">51</a>-52;</p> + + <p class="i2">Russo-Japanese, + <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, + <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, + <a href="#Page_78">78</a>-79, + <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>, + <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, + <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, + <a href="#Page_303">303</a>, + <a href="#Page_328">328</a>-29;</p> + + <p class="i2">Seven Years', <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, + <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, + <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, + <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, + <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, + <a href="#Page_189">189</a>-90, + <a href="#Page_197">197</a>-98, + <a href="#Page_209">209</a>, + <a href="#Page_312">312</a>, + <a href="#Page_320">320</a>, + <a href="#Page_327">327</a>-28, + <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, + <a href="#Page_339">339</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">Spanish-American, + <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, + <a href="#Page_168">168</a>-69, + <a href="#Page_313">313</a>, + <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, + <a href="#Page_344">344</a>;</p> + + <p class="i2">Spanish Succession, + <a href="#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_317">317</a>, + <a href="#Page_323">323</a>, + <a href="#Page_336">336</a></p> + + <p>Wellington, Duke of, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, + <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, + <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, + <a href="#Page_105">105</a></p> + + <p>West Indies, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, + <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, + <a href="#Page_142">142</a>-43, + <a href="#Page_182">182</a>, + <a href="#Page_189">189</a>-90, + <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, + <a href="#Page_210">210</a>, + <a href="#Page_222">222</a>-23, + <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, + <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, + <a href="#Page_252">252</a>, + <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, + <a href="#Page_266">266</a>-67, + <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, + <a href="#Page_296">296</a></p> + + <p>Western Squadron, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, + <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, + <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, + <a href="#Page_252">252</a>, + <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, + <a href="#Page_266">266</a></p> + + <p>Wight, Isle of, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, + <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, + <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, + <a href="#Page_253">253</a>, + <a href="#Page_257">257</a></p> + + <p>Wolfe, General, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>, + <a href="#Page_200">200</a>, + <a href="#Page_285">285</a>, + <a href="#Page_301">301</a>-302</p> + </div> + + <div class="nofblk"> + <p>Yalu, <a href="#Page_85">85</a></p> + + <p>Yarmouth, <a href="#Page_263">263</a></p> + + <p>Yellow Sea, <a href="#Page_340">340</a></p> + </div> + </div> + <hr /> + <a name="Footnotes" + id="Footnotes"></a> + + <h2>Footnotes.</h2> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_1" + id="Nt_1"></a><a href="#NtA_1">1</a> Clausewitz, <i>On + War</i>, p. ix. The references are to Colonel Graham's + translation of the third German edition, but his wording is + not always followed exactly.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_2" + id="Nt_2"></a><a href="#NtA_2">2</a> Clausewitz, On War, + Book viii, chap, ii</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_3" + id="Nt_3"></a><a href="#NtA_3">3</a> Ibid, Preparatory + Notice, p. vii.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_4" + id="Nt_4"></a><a href="#NtA_4">4</a> Ibid, p. viii</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_5" + id="Nt_5"></a><a href="#NtA_5">5</a> Wellington's view of + the essential factor was expressed to Rear Admiral Martin, + who was sent to Spain by the Admiralty to confer with him in + September 1813. "If anyone," he said, "wishes to know the + history of this war, I will tell them it is our maritime + superiority gives me the power of maintaining my army while + the enemy are unable to do so." (<i>Letters of Sir T. Byam + Martin</i>) [Navy Records Society], ii, p. 499.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_6" + id="Nt_6"></a><a href="#NtA_6">6</a> <i>Correspondance de + Napoléon</i>, xix, 421, 4 September.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_7" + id="Nt_7"></a><a href="#NtA_7">7</a> <i>Development of + Strategical Science.</i></p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_8" + id="Nt_8"></a><a href="#NtA_8">8</a> The strategical object + with which the Baltic fleet was sent was certainly to + prevent a counter-stroke—that is, its main function in + our war plan was negative. Its positive function was minor + and diversionary only. It also had a political object as a + demonstration to further our efforts to form a Baltic + coalition against Russia, which entirely failed. Public + opinion mistaking the whole situation expected direct + positive results from this fleet, even the capture of St. + Petersburg. Such an operation would have converted the war + from a limited one to an unlimited one. It would have meant + the "overthrow of the enemy," a task quite beyond the + strength of the allies without the assistance of the Baltic + Powers, and even so their assistance would not have + justified changing the nature of the war, unless both Sweden + and Russia had been ready to make unlimited war and nothing + was further from their intention.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_9" + id="Nt_9"></a><a href="#NtA_9">9</a> In justice to + Wellington, it should be said that his complaints were due + to false reports that exaggerated a couple of insignificant + captures into a serious interruption.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_10" + id="Nt_10"></a><a href="#NtA_10">10</a> But not without + analogous precedent. In the later Middle Ages small craft + were assigned the function in battle of trying to wedge up + the rudders of great ships or bore holes between wind and + water. See Fighting Instructions (Navy Record Society), p. + 13.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_11" + id="Nt_11"></a><a href="#NtA_11">11</a> Daveluy, <i>L'Esprit + de la Guerre Navale</i>, vol. i, p. 27, note.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_12" + id="Nt_12"></a><a href="#NtA_12">12</a> Mahan, <i>War of + 1812</i>, i, 316.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_13" + id="Nt_13"></a><a href="#NtA_13">13</a> The Dutch were + believed to have sixteen of the line—one seventy-four, + seven sixty-eights, and the rest under sixty guns. In Ross's + squadron were one three-decker and two eighties.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_14" + id="Nt_14"></a><a href="#NtA_14">14</a> See post, pp. + <a href="#Page_222">222</a>-24.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_15" + id="Nt_15"></a><a href="#NtA_15">15</a> Nelson to Barham, 29 + August 1805.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_16" + id="Nt_16"></a><a href="#NtA_16">16</a> Captain Philip + Patton to Sir Charles Middleton, 27 June 1794. <i>Barham + Papers</i>, ii, 393. Patton had probably wider war + experience than any officer then living. He was regarded as + possessing a very special knowledge of personnel, and as + vice admiral became second sea lord under Barham in + 1804.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_17" + id="Nt_17"></a><a href="#NtA_17">17</a> <i>Barham + Papers</i>, i, 302.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_18" + id="Nt_18"></a><a href="#NtA_18">18</a> To Evan Nepean, 4 + September 1801. Nicolas, <i>Nelson Despatches</i>, iv, + 484.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_19" + id="Nt_19"></a><a href="#NtA_19">19</a> For Barham's final + views, 1805, see <i>Barham Papers</i>, iii, 90-93.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_20" + id="Nt_20"></a><a href="#NtA_20">20</a> Delarbre, + <i>Tourville et la marine de son temps</i>, p. 339.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_21" + id="Nt_21"></a><a href="#NtA_21">21</a> <i>Barham + Papers</i>, i, 292.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_22" + id="Nt_22"></a><a href="#NtA_22">22</a> <i>Admiralty + Secretary's In-Letters</i>, 537, 8 August 1803.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_23" + id="Nt_23"></a><a href="#NtA_23">23</a> <i>Supra</i>, p. + <a href="#Page_222">222</a>.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_24" + id="Nt_24"></a><a href="#NtA_24">24</a> It should be said + that Cornwallis did not regard this system as new except for + the extension from Finisterre to St. Vincent, which Nelson + advised. In acknowledging the order from Ushant he wrote, + "The instructions ... are nearly the same as have generally + been given. I can therefore only guess why a copy of the + order was sent to me."—<i>Admiralty, In-Letters</i>, + 129, 28 September 1805.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_25" + id="Nt_25"></a><a href="#NtA_25">25</a> The Japanese in the + late war attempted to do this work by means of a highly + organized Army Disembarkation Staff, but except in perfect + conditions of weather and locality it does not seem to have + worked well, and in almost all cases the assistance of the + navy was called in.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_26" + id="Nt_26"></a><a href="#NtA_26">26</a> Sir Hugh Cloberry + Christian was an officer of high distinction with a + remarkable record of battle service. He had been serving as + Howe's second captain just before his promotion to flag rank + in 1795, and died as Commander-in-Chief at the Cape at the + early age of fifty-one.</p> + + <p class="note"><a name="Nt_27" + id="Nt_27"></a><a href="#NtA_27">27</a> On analogous grounds + almost every military critic has condemned the policy of + this disastrous expedition as involving a dispersal of our + slender military force at a time when everything called for + its concentration in Europe.</p> + +<p> </p> +<hr class="full" /> +<p>***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SOME PRINCIPLES OF MARITIME STRATEGY***</p> +<p>******* This file should be named 15076-h.txt or 15076-h.zip *******</p> +<p>This and all associated files of various formats will be found in:<br /> +<a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/1/5/0/7/15076">https://www.gutenberg.org/1/5/0/7/15076</a></p> +<p>Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed.</p> + +<p>Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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For +example an eBook of filename 10234 would be found at: + +https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/1/0/2/3/10234 + +or filename 24689 would be found at: +https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/4/6/8/24689 + +An alternative method of locating eBooks: +<a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/GUTINDEX.ALL">https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/GUTINDEX.ALL</a> + +*** END: FULL LICENSE *** +</pre> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/15076-h/images/001.jpg b/15076-h/images/001.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..99f93d3 --- /dev/null +++ b/15076-h/images/001.jpg diff --git a/15076.txt b/15076.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c63406e --- /dev/null +++ b/15076.txt @@ -0,0 +1,10363 @@ +The Project Gutenberg eBook, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, by +Julian Stafford Corbett + + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + + + + +Title: Some Principles of Maritime Strategy + +Author: Julian Stafford Corbett + +Release Date: February 16, 2005 [eBook #15076] + +Language: english + +Character set encoding: ISO-646-US (US-ASCII) + + +***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SOME PRINCIPLES OF MARITIME +STRATEGY*** + + +E-text prepared by Suzanne Shell, Keith Edkins, and the Project Gutenberg +Online Distributed Proofreading Team + + + +SOME PRINCIPLES OF MARITIME STRATEGY + +JULIAN S. CORBETT + +London + +1911 + + + + + + + +[Illustration: _Sir Julian Corbett (courtesy D.M. Schurman)_] + + + + + +CONTENTS + + +INTRODUCTION + + THE THEORETICAL STUDY OF WAR--ITS USE AND LIMITATIONS + +PART I. THEORY OF WAR + + I. THE THEORY OF WAR + II. NATURES OF WARS--OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE + III. NATURES OF WARS--LIMITED AND UNLIMITED + IV. LIMITED WAR AND MARITIME EMPIRES + V. WARS OF INTERVENTION--LIMITED INTERFERENCE IN UNLIMITED WAR + VI. CONDITIONS OF STRENGTH IN LIMITED WAR + +PART II. THEORY OF NAVAL WAR + + I. THEORY OF THE OBJECT--COMMAND OF THE SEA + II. THEORY OF THE MEANS--THE CONSTITUTION OF FLEETS + III. THEORY OF THE METHOD--CONCENTRATION AND DISPERSAL OF FORCE + +PART III. CONDUCT OF NAVAL WAR + + I. INTRODUCTORY-- + 1. INHERENT DIFFERENCES IN THE CONDITIONS OF WAR ON LAND AND ON SEA + 2. TYPICAL FORMS OF NAVAL OPERATIONS + II. METHODS OF SECURING COMMAND-- + 1. ON OBTAINING A DECISION + 2. BLOCKADE + III. METHODS OF DISPUTING COMMAND-- + 1. DEFENSIVE FLEET OPERATIONS--"A FLEET IN BEING" + 2. MINOR COUNTER-ATTACKS + IV. METHODS OF EXERCISING COMMAND-- + 1. DEFENCE AGAINST INVASION + 2. ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF TRADE + 3. ATTACK, DEFENCE, AND SUPPORT OF MILITARY EXPEDITIONS + + Appendix: The "Green Pamphlet" + + INDEX + + + + + * * * * * + + INTRODUCTION + + The Theoretical Study of War--Its Use and + Limitations + + * * * * * + +At first sight nothing can appear more unpractical, less promising of +useful result, than to approach the study of war with a theory. There seems +indeed to be something essentially antagonistic between the habit of mind +that seeks theoretical guidance and that which makes for the successful +conduct of war. The conduct of war is so much a question of personality, of +character, of common-sense, of rapid decision upon complex and +ever-shifting factors, and those factors themselves are so varied, so +intangible, so dependent upon unstable moral and physical conditions, that +it seems incapable of being reduced to anything like true scientific +analysis. At the bare idea of a theory or "science" of war the mind recurs +uneasily to well-known cases where highly "scientific" officers failed as +leaders. Yet, on the other hand, no one will deny that since the great +theorists of the early nineteenth century attempted to produce a reasoned +theory of war, its planning and conduct have acquired a method, a +precision, and a certainty of grasp which were unknown before. Still less +will any one deny the value which the shrewdest and most successful leaders +in war have placed upon the work of the classical strategical writers. + +The truth is that the mistrust of theory arises from a misconception of +what it is that theory claims to do. It does not pretend to give the power +of conduct in the field; it claims no more than to increase the effective +power of conduct. Its main practical value is that it can assist a capable +man to acquire a broad outlook whereby he may be the surer his plan shall +cover all the ground, and whereby he may with greater rapidity and +certainty seize all the factors of a sudden situation. The greatest of the +theorists himself puts the matter quite frankly. Of theoretical study he +says, "It should educate the mind of the man who is to lead in war, or +rather guide him to self-education, but it should not accompany him on the +field of battle." + +Its practical utility, however, is not by any means confined to its effects +upon the powers of a leader. It is not enough that a leader should have the +ability to decide rightly; his subordinates must seize at once the full +meaning of his decision and be able to express it with certainty in +well-adjusted action. For this every man concerned must have been trained +to think in the same plane; the chief's order must awake in every brain the +same process of thought; his words must have the same meaning for all. If a +theory of tactics had existed in 1780, and if Captain Carkett had had a +sound training in such a theory, he could not possibly have misunderstood +Rodney's signal. As it was, the real intention of the signal was obscure, +and Rodney's neglect to explain the tactical device it indicated robbed his +country of a victory at an hour of the direst need. There had been no +previous theoretical training to supply the omission, and Rodney's fine +conception was unintelligible to anybody but himself. + +Nor is it only for the sake of mental solidarity between a chief and his +subordinates that theory is indispensable. It is of still higher value for +producing a similar solidarity between him and his superiors at the Council +table at home. How often have officers dumbly acquiesced in ill-advised +operations simply for lack of the mental power and verbal apparatus to +convince an impatient Minister where the errors of his plan lay? How often, +moreover, have statesmen and officers, even in the most harmonious +conference, been unable to decide on a coherent plan of war from inability +to analyse scientifically the situation they had to face, and to recognise +the general character of the struggle in which they were about to engage. +That the true nature of a war should be realised by contemporaries as +clearly as it comes to be seen afterwards in the fuller light of history is +seldom to be expected. At close range accidental factors will force +themselves into undue prominence and tend to obscure the true horizon. Such +error can scarcely ever be eliminated, but by theoretical study we can +reduce it, nor by any other means can we hope to approach the clearness of +vision with which posterity will read our mistakes. Theory is, in fact, a +question of education and deliberation, and not of execution at all. That +depends on the combination of intangible human qualities which we call +executive ability. + +This, then, is all the great authorities ever claimed for theory, but to +this claim the chief of them at least, after years of active service on the +Staff, attached the highest importance. "In actual operations," he wrote in +one of his latest memoranda, "men are guided solely by their judgment, and +it will hit the mark more or less accurately according as they possess more +or less genius. This is the way all great generals have acted.... Thus it +will always be in action, and so far judgment will suffice. But when it is +a question not of taking action yourself, but of convincing others at the +Council table, then everything depends on clear conceptions and the +exposition of the inherent relations of things. So little progress has been +made in this respect that most deliberations are merely verbal contentions +which rest on no firm foundation, and end either in every one retaining his +own opinion, or in a compromise from considerations of mutual respect--a +middle course of no actual value."[1] + + [1] Clausewitz, _On War_, p. ix. The references are to Colonel Graham's + translation of the third German edition, but his wording is not always + followed exactly. + +The writer's experience of such discussions was rich and at first hand. +Clear conceptions of the ideas and factors involved in a war problem, and a +definite exposition of the relations between them, were in his eyes the +remedy for loose and purposeless discussion; and such conceptions and +expositions are all we mean by the theory or the science of war. It is a +process by which we co-ordinate our ideas, define the meaning of the words +we use, grasp the difference between essential and unessential factors, and +fix and expose the fundamental data on which every one is agreed. In this +way we prepare the apparatus of practical discussion; we secure the means +of arranging the factors in manageable shape, and of deducing from them +with precision and rapidity a practical course of action. Without such an +apparatus no two men can even think on the same line; much less can they +ever hope to detach the real point of difference that divides them and +isolate it for quiet solution. + +In our own case this view of the value of strategical theory has a special +significance, and one far wider than its continental enunciators +contemplated. For a world-wide maritime Empire the successful conduct of +war will often turn not only on the decisions of the Council chamber at +home, but on the outcome of conferences in all parts of the world between +squadronal commanders and the local authorities, both civil and military, +and even between commanders-in-chief of adjacent stations. In time of war +or of preparation for war, in which the Empire is concerned, arrangements +must always be based to an exceptional degree on the mutual relation of +naval, military, and political considerations. The line of mean efficiency, +though indicated from home, must be worked out locally, and worked out on +factors of which no one service is master. Conference is always necessary, +and for conference to succeed there must be a common vehicle of expression +and a common plane of thought. It is for this essential preparation that +theoretical study alone can provide; and herein lies its practical value +for all who aspire to the higher responsibilities of the Imperial service. + +So great indeed is the value of abstract strategical study from this point +of view, that it is necessary to guard ourselves against over-valuation. So +far from claiming for their so-called science more than the possibilities +we have indicated, the classical strategists insist again and again on the +danger of seeking from it what it cannot give. They even repudiate the very +name of "Science." They prefer the older term "Art." They will permit no +laws or rules. Such laws, they say, can only mislead in practice, for the +friction to which they are subject from the incalculable human factors +alone is such that the friction is stronger than the law. It is an old +adage of lawyers that nothing is so misleading as a legal maxim, but a +strategical maxim is undoubtedly and in every way less to be trusted in +action. + +What then, it will be asked, are the tangible results which we can hope to +attain from theory? If all on which we have to build is so indeterminate, +how are any practical conclusions to be reached? That the factors are +infinitely varied and difficult to determine is true, but that, it must be +remembered, is just what emphasises the necessity of reaching such firm +standpoints as are attainable. The vaguer the problem to be solved, the +more resolute must we be in seeking points of departure from which we can +begin to lay a course, keeping always an eye open for the accidents that +will beset us, and being always alive to their deflecting influences. And +this is just what the theoretical study of strategy can do. It can at least +determine the normal. By careful collation of past events it becomes clear +that certain lines of conduct tend normally to produce certain effects; +that wars tend to take certain forms each with a marked idiosyncrasy; that +these forms are normally related to the object of the war and to its value +to one or both belligerents; that a system of operations which suits one +form may not be that best suited to another. We can even go further. By +pursuing an historical and comparative method we can detect that even the +human factor is not quite indeterminable. We can assert that certain +situations will normally produce, whether in ourselves or in our +adversaries, certain moral states on which we may calculate. + +Having determined the normal, we are at once in a stronger position. Any +proposal can be compared with it, and we can proceed to discuss clearly the +weight of the factors which prompt us to depart from the normal. Every case +must be judged on its merits, but without a normal to work from we cannot +form any real judgment at all; we can only guess. Every case will assuredly +depart from the normal to a greater or less extent, and it is equally +certain that the greatest successes in war have been the boldest departures +from the normal. But for the most part they have been departures made with +open eyes by geniuses who could perceive in the accidents of the case a +just reason for the departure. + +Take an analogous example, and the province of strategical theory becomes +clear at once. Navigation and the parts of seamanship that belong to it +have to deal with phenomena as varied and unreliable as those of the +conduct of war. Together they form an art which depends quite as much as +generalship on the judgment of individuals. The law of storms and tides, of +winds and currents, and the whole of meteorology are subject to infinite +and incalculable deflections, and yet who will deny nowadays that by the +theoretical study of such things the seaman's art has gained in coherence +and strength? Such study will not by itself make a seaman or a navigator, +but without it no seaman or navigator can nowadays pretend to the name. +Because storms do not always behave in the same way, because currents are +erratic, will the most practical seaman deny that the study of the normal +conditions are useless to him in his practical decisions? + +If, then, the theoretical study of strategy be approached in this way--if, +that is, it be regarded not as a substitute for judgment and experience, +but as a means of fertilising both, it can do no man harm. Individual +thought and common-sense will remain the masters and remain the guides to +point the general direction when the mass of facts begins to grow +bewildering. Theory will warn us the moment we begin to leave the beaten +track, and enable us to decide with open eyes whether the divergence is +necessary or justifiable. Above all, when men assemble in Council it will +hold discussion to the essential lines, and help to keep side issues in +their place. + +But beyond all this there lies in the theory of war yet another element of +peculiar value to a maritime Empire. We are accustomed, partly for +convenience and partly from lack of a scientific habit of thought, to speak +of naval strategy and military strategy as though they were distinct +branches of knowledge which had no common ground. It is the theory of war +which brings out their intimate relation. It reveals that embracing them +both is a larger strategy which regards the fleet and army as one weapon, +which co-ordinates their action, and indicates the lines on which each must +move to realise the full power of both. It will direct us to assign to each +its proper function in a plan of war; it will enable each service to +realise the better the limitations and the possibilities of the function +with which it is charged, and how and when its own necessities must give +way to a higher or more pressing need of the other. It discloses, in short, +that naval strategy is not a thing by itself, that its problems can seldom +or never be solved on naval considerations alone, but that it is only a +part of maritime strategy--the higher learning which teaches us that for a +maritime State to make successful war and to realise her special strength, +army and navy must be used and thought of as instruments no less intimately +connected than are the three arms ashore. + +It is for these reasons that it is of little use to approach naval strategy +except through the theory of war. Without such theory we can never really +understand its scope or meaning, nor can we hope to grasp the forces which +most profoundly affect its conclusions. + + * * * * * + + PART ONE + + THEORY OF WAR + + * * * * * + + CHAPTER ONE + + THE THEORY OF WAR + + * * * * * + +The last thing that an explorer arrives at is a complete map that will +cover the whole ground he has travelled, but for those who come after him +and would profit by and extend his knowledge his map is the first thing +with which they will begin. So it is with strategy. Before we start upon +its study we seek a chart which will show us at a glance what exactly is +the ground we have to cover and what are the leading features which +determine its form and general characteristics. Such a chart a "theory of +war" alone can provide. It is for this reason that in the study of war we +must get our theory clear before we can venture in search of practical +conclusions. So great is the complexity of war that without such a guide we +are sure to go astray amidst the bewildering multiplicity of tracks and +obstacles that meet us at every step. If for continental strategy its value +has been proved abundantly, then for maritime strategy, where the +conditions are far more complex, the need of it is even greater. + +By maritime strategy we mean the principles which govern a war in which the +sea is a substantial factor. Naval strategy is but that part of it which +determines the movements of the fleet when maritime strategy has determined +what part the fleet must play in relation to the action of the land forces; +for it scarcely needs saying that it is almost impossible that a war can be +decided by naval action alone. Unaided, naval pressure can only work by a +process of exhaustion. Its effects must always be slow, and so galling both +to our own commercial community and to neutrals, that the tendency is +always to accept terms of peace that are far from conclusive. For a firm +decision a quicker and more drastic form of pressure is required. Since men +live upon the land and not upon the sea, great issues between nations at +war have always been decided--except in the rarest cases--either by what +your army can do against your enemy's territory and national life or else +by the fear of what the fleet makes it possible for your army to do. + +The paramount concern, then, of maritime strategy is to determine the +mutual relations of your army and navy in a plan of war. When this is done, +and not till then, naval strategy can begin to work out the manner in which +the fleet can best discharge the function assigned to it. + +The problem of such co-ordination is one that is susceptible of widely +varying solutions. It may be that the command of the sea is of so urgent an +importance that the army will have to devote itself to assisting the fleet +in its special task before it can act directly against the enemy's +territory and land forces; on the other hand, it may be that the immediate +duty of the fleet will be to forward military action ashore before it is +free to devote itself whole-heartedly to the destruction of the enemy's +fleets. The crude maxims as to primary objects which seem to have served +well enough in continental warfare have never worked so clearly where the +sea enters seriously into a war. In such cases it will not suffice to say +the primary object of the army is to destroy the enemy's army, or that of +the fleet to destroy the enemy's fleet. The delicate interactions of the +land and sea factors produce conditions too intricate for such blunt +solutions. Even the initial equations they present are too complex to be +reduced by the simple application of rough-and-ready maxims. Their right +handling depends upon the broadest and most fundamental principles of war, +and it is as a standpoint from which to get a clear and unobstructed view +of the factors in their true relations that a theory of war has perhaps its +highest value. + +The theory which now holds the field is that war in a fundamental sense is +a continuation of policy by other means. The process by which the +continental strategists arrived at it involved some hard philosophical +reasoning. Practical and experienced veterans as they were, their method is +not one that works easily with our own habit of thought. It will be well, +therefore, to endeavour first to present their conclusions in a concrete +form, which will make the pith of the matter intelligible at once. Take, +now, the ordinary case of a naval or military Staff being asked to prepare +a war plan against a certain State and to advise what means it will +require. To any one who has considered such matters it is obvious the reply +must be another question--What will the war be about? Without a definite +answer or alternative answers to that question a Staff can scarcely do more +than engage in making such forces as the country can afford as efficient as +possible. Before they take any sure step further they must know many +things. They must know whether they are expected to take something from the +enemy, or to prevent his taking something either from us or from some other +State. If from some other State, the measures to be taken will depend on +its geographical situation and on its relative strength by land and sea. +Even when the object is clear it will be necessary to know how much value +the enemy attaches to it. Is it one for which he will be likely to fight to +the death, or one which he will abandon in the face of comparatively slight +resistance? If the former, we cannot hope to succeed without entirely +overthrowing his powers of resistance. If the latter, it will suffice, as +it often has sufficed, to aim at something less costly and hazardous and +better within our means. All these are questions which lie in the lap of +Ministers charged with the foreign policy of the country, and before the +Staff can proceed with a war plan they must be answered by Ministers. + +In short, the Staff must ask of them what is the policy which your +diplomacy is pursuing, and where, and why, do you expect it to break down +and force you to take up arms? The Staff has to carry on in fact when +diplomacy has failed to achieve the object in view, and the method they +will use will depend on the nature of that object. So we arrive crudely at +our theory that war is a continuation of policy, a form of political +intercourse in which we fight battles instead of writing notes. + +It was this theory, simple and even meaningless as it appears at first +sight, that gave the key to the practical work of framing a modern war plan +and revolutionised the study of strategy. It was not till the beginning of +the nineteenth century that such a theory was arrived at. For centuries men +had written on the "Art of War," but for want of a working theory their +labours as a whole had been unscientific, concerned for the most part with +the discussion of passing fashions and the elaboration of platitudes. Much +good work it is true was done on details, but no broad outlook had been +obtained to enable us to determine their relation to the fundamental +constants of the subject. No standpoint had been found from which we could +readily detach such constants from what was merely accidental. The result +was a tendency to argue too exclusively from the latest examples and to +become entangled in erroneous thought by trying to apply the methods which +had attained the last success to war as a whole. There was no means of +determining how far the particular success was due to special conditions +and how far it was due to factors common to all wars. + +It was the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, coinciding as they did with a +period of philosophic activity, that revealed the shallowness and empirical +nature of all that had been done up to that time. Napoleon's methods +appeared to his contemporaries to have produced so strenuous a revolution +in the conduct of land warfare that it assumed a wholly new aspect, and it +was obvious that those conceptions which had sufficed previously had become +inadequate as a basis of sound study. War on land seemed to have changed +from a calculated affair of thrust and parry between standing armies to a +headlong rush of one nation in arms upon another, each thirsting for the +other's life, and resolved to have it or perish in the attempt. Men felt +themselves faced with a manifestation of human energy which had had no +counterpart, at least in civilised times. + +The assumption was not entirely true. For although the Continent had never +before adopted the methods in question, our own country was no stranger to +them either on sea or land. As we shall see, our own Revolution in the +seventeenth century had produced strenuous methods of making war which were +closely related to those which Napoleon took over from the French +Revolutionary leaders. A more philosophic outlook might have suggested that +the phenomenon was not really exceptional, but rather the natural outcome +of popular energy inspired by a stirring political ideal. But the British +precedent was forgotten, and so profound was the disturbance caused by the +new French methods that its effects are with us still. We are in fact still +dominated by the idea that since the Napoleonic era war has been +essentially a different thing. Our teachers incline to insist that there is +now only one way of making war, and that is Napoleon's way. Ignoring the +fact that he failed in the end, they brand as heresy the bare suggestion +that there may be other ways, and not content with assuming that his system +will fit all land wars, however much their natures and objects may differ, +they would force naval warfare into the same uniform under the impression +apparently that they are thereby making it presentable and giving it some +new force. + +Seeing how cramping the Napoleonic idea has become, it will be convenient +before going further to determine its special characteristics exactly, but +that is no easy matter. The moment we approach it in a critical spirit, it +begins to grow nebulous and very difficult to define. We can dimly make out +four distinct ideas mingled in the current notion. First, there is the idea +of making war not merely with a professional standing army, but with the +whole armed nation--a conception which of course was not really Napoleon's. +It was inherited by him from the Revolution, but was in fact far older. It +was but a revival of the universal practice which obtained in the barbaric +stages of social development, and which every civilisation in turn had +abandoned as economically unsound and subversive of specialisation in +citizenship. The results of the abandonment were sometimes good and +sometimes bad, but the determining conditions have been studied as yet too +imperfectly to justify any broad generalisation. Secondly, there is the +idea of strenuous and persistent effort--not resting to secure each minor +advantage, but pressing the enemy without pause or rest till he is utterly +overthrown--an idea in which Cromwell had anticipated Napoleon by a century +and a half. Scarcely distinguishable from this is a third idea--that of +taking the offensive, in which there was really nothing new at all, since +its advantages had always been understood, and Frederick the Great had +pressed it to extremity with little less daring than Napoleon himself--nay +even to culpable rashness, as the highest exponents of the Napoleonic idea +admit. Finally, there is the notion of making the armed forces of the enemy +and not his territory or any part of it your main objective. This perhaps +is regarded as the strongest characteristic of Napoleon's methods, and yet +even here we are confused by the fact that undoubtedly on some very +important occasions--the Austerlitz campaign, for example--Napoleon made +the hostile capital his objective as though he believed its occupation was +the most effective step towards the overthrow of the enemy's power and will +to resist. He certainly did not make the enemy's main army his primary +objective--for their main army was not Mack's but that of the Archduke +Charles. + +On the whole then, when men speak of the Napoleonic system they seem to +include two groups of ideas--one which comprises the conception of war made +with the whole force of the nation; the other, a group which includes the +Cromwellian idea of persistent effort, Frederick's preference for the +offensive at almost any risk, and finally the idea of the enemy's armed +forces as the main objective, which was also Cromwell's. + +It is the combination of these by no means original or very distinct ideas +that we are told has brought about so entire a change in the conduct of war +that it has become altogether a different thing. It is unnecessary for our +purpose to consider how far the facts seem to support such a conclusion, +for in the inherent nature of things it must be radically unsound. Neither +war nor anything else can change in its essentials. If it appears to do so, +it is because we are still mistaking accidents for essentials, and this is +exactly how it struck the acutest thinkers of Napoleonic times. + +For a while it is true they were bewildered, but so soon as they had had +time to clear their heads from the din of the struggle in which they had +taken part, they began to see that the new phenomena were but accidents +after all. They perceived that Napoleon's methods, which had taken the +world by storm, had met with success in wars of a certain nature only, and +that when he tried to extend those methods to other natures of war he had +met with failure and even disaster. How was this to be explained? What +theory, for instance, would cover Napoleon's successes in Germany and +Italy, as well as his failures in Spain and Russia? If the whole conception +of war had changed, how could you account for the success of England, who +had not changed her methods? To us the answer to these questions is of +living and infinite importance. Our standpoint remains still unchanged. Is +there anything inherent in the conception of war that justifies that +attitude in our case? Are we entitled to expect from it again the same +success it met with in the past? + +The first man to enunciate a theory which would explain the phenomena of +the Napoleonic era and co-ordinate them with previous history was General +Carl von Clausewitz, a man whose arduous service on the Staff and the +actual work of higher instruction had taught the necessity of systematising +the study of his profession. He was no mere professor, but a soldier bred +in the severest school of war. The pupil and friend of Sharnhorst and +Gneisenau, he had served on the Staff of Bluecher in 1813, he had been +Chief of the Staff to Wallmoden in his campaign against Davoust on the +Lower Elbe, and also to the Third Prussian Army Corps in the campaign of +1815. Thereafter for more than ten years he was Director of the General +Academy of War at Berlin, and died in 1831 as Chief of the Staff to Marshal +Gneisenau. For the fifty years that followed his death his theories and +system were, as he expected they would be, attacked from all sides. Yet +to-day his work is more firmly established than ever as the necessary basis +of all strategical thought, and above all in the "blood and iron" school of +Germany. + +The process by which he reached his famous theory can be followed in his +classical work _On War_ and the _Notes_ regarding it which he left behind +him. In accordance with the philosophic fashion of his time he began by +trying to formulate an abstract idea of war. The definition he started with +was that "War is an act of violence to compel our opponent to do our will." +But that act of violence was not merely "the shock of armies," as +Montecuccoli had defined it a century and a half before. If the abstract +idea of war be followed to its logical conclusion, the act of violence must +be performed with the whole of the means at our disposal and with the +utmost exertion of our will. Consequently we get the conception of two +armed nations flinging themselves one upon the other, and continuing the +struggle with the utmost strength and energy they can command till one or +other is no longer capable of resistance. This Clausewitz called "Absolute +War." But his practical experience and ripe study of history told him at +once that "Real War" was something radically different. It was true, as he +said, that Napoleon's methods had approximated to the absolute and had +given some colour to the use of the absolute idea as a working theory. "But +shall we," he acutely asks, "rest satisfied with this idea and judge all +wars by it however much they may differ from it--shall we deduce from it +all the requirements of theory? We must decide the point, for we can say +nothing trustworthy about a war plan until we have made up our minds +whether war should only be of this kind or whether it may be of another +kind." He saw at once that a theory formed upon the abstract or absolute +idea of war would not cover the ground, and therefore failed to give what +was required for practical purposes. It would exclude almost the whole of +war from Alexander's time to Napoleon's. And what guarantee was there that +the next war would confirm to the Napoleonic type and accommodate itself to +the abstract theory? "This theory," he says, "is still quite powerless +against the force of circumstances." And so it proved, for the wars of the +middle nineteenth century did in fact revert to the pre-Napoleonic type. + +In short, Clausewitz's difficulty in adopting his abstract theory as a +working rule was that his practical mind could not forget that war had not +begun with the Revolutionary era, nor was it likely to end with it. If that +era had changed the conduct of war, it must be presumed that war would +change again with other times and other conditions. A theory of war which +did not allow for this and did not cover all that had gone before was no +theory at all. If a theory of war was to be of any use as a practical guide +it must cover and explain not only the extreme manifestation of hostility +which he himself had witnessed, but every manifestation that had occurred +in the past or was likely to recur in the future. + +It was in casting about for the underlying causes of the oscillations +manifested in the energy and intensity of hostile relations that he found +his solution. His experience on the Staff, and his study of the inner +springs of war, told him it was never in fact a question of purely military +endeavour aiming always at the extreme of what was possible or expedient +from a purely military point of view. The energy exhibited would always be +modified by political considerations and by the depth of the national +interest in the object of the war. He saw that real war was in fact an +international relation which differed from other international relations +only in the method we adopted to achieve the object of our policy. So it +was he arrived at his famous theory--"that war is a mere continuation of +policy by other means." + +At first sight there seems little enough in it. It may seem perhaps that we +have been watching a mountain in labour and nothing but a mouse has been +produced. But it is only upon some such simple, even obvious, formula that +any scientific system can be constructed with safety. We have only to +develop the meaning of this one to see how important and practical are the +guiding lines which flow from it. + +With the conception of war as a continuation of political intercourse +before us, it is clear that everything which lies outside the political +conception, everything, that is, which is strictly peculiar to military and +naval operations, relates merely to the means which we use to achieve our +policy. Consequently, the first desideratum of a war plan is that the means +adopted must conflict as little as possible with the political conditions +from which the war springs. In practice, of course, as in all human +relations, there will be a compromise between the means and the end, +between the political and the military exigencies. But Clausewitz held that +policy must always be the master. The officer charged with the conduct of +the war may of course demand that the tendencies and views of policy shall +not be incompatible with the military means which are placed at his +disposal; but however strongly this demand may react on policy in +particular cases, military action must still be regarded only as a +manifestation of policy. It must never supersede policy. The policy is +always the object; war is only the means by which we obtain the object, and +the means must always keep the end in view. + +The practical importance of this conception will now become clear. It will +be seen to afford the logical or theoretical exposition of what we began by +stating in its purely concrete form. When a Chief of Staff is asked for a +war plan he must not say we will make war in such and such a way because it +was Napoleon's or Moltke's way. He will ask what is the political object of +the war, what are the political conditions, and how much does the question +at issue mean respectively to us and to our adversary. It is these +considerations which determine the nature of the war. This primordial +question settled, he will be in a position to say whether the war is of the +same nature as those in which Napoleon's and Moltke's methods were +successful, or whether it is of another nature in which those methods +failed. He will then design and offer a war plan, not because it has the +hall-mark of this or that great master of war, but because it is one that +has been proved to fit the kind of war in hand. To assume that one method +of conducting war will suit all kinds of war is to fall a victim to +abstract theory, and not to be a prophet of reality, as the narrowest +disciples of the Napoleonic school are inclined to see themselves. + +Hence, says Clausewitz, the first, the greatest and most critical decision +upon which the Statesman and the General have to exercise their judgment is +to determine the nature of the war, to be sure they do not mistake it for +something nor seek to make of it something which from its inherent +conditions it can never be. "This," he declares, "is the first and the most +far-reaching of all strategical questions." + +The first value, then, of his theory of war is that it gives a clear line +on which we may proceed to determine the nature of a war in which we are +about to engage, and to ensure that we do not try to apply to one nature of +war any particular course of operations simply because they have proved +successful in another nature of war. It is only, he insists, by regarding +war not as an independent thing but as a political instrument that we can +read aright the lessons of history and understand for our practical +guidance how wars must differ in character according to the nature of the +motives and circumstances from which they proceed. This conception, he +claims, is the first ray of light to guide us to a true theory of war and +thereby enable us to classify wars and distinguish them one from another. + +Jomini, his great contemporary and rival, though proceeding by a less +philosophical but no less lucid method, entirely endorses this view. A +Swiss soldier of fortune, his experience was much the same as that of +Clausewitz. It was obtained mainly on the Staff of Marshal Ney and +subsequently on the Russian headquarter Staff. He reached no definite +theory of war, but his fundamental conclusions were the same. The first +chapter of his final work, _Precis de l'art de la Guerre_, is devoted to +"La Politique de la Guerre." In it he classifies wars into nine categories +according to their political object, and he lays it down as a base +proposition "That these different kinds of war will have more or less +influence on the nature of the operations which will be demanded to attain +the end in view, on the amount of energy that must be put forth, and on the +extent of the undertakings in which we must engage." "There will," he adds, +"be a great difference in the operations according to the risks we have to +run." + +Both men, therefore, though on details of means they were often widely +opposed, are agreed that the fundamental conception of war is political. +Both of course agree that if we isolate in our mind the forces engaged in +any theatre of war the abstract conception reappears. So far as those +forces are concerned, war is a question of fighting in which each +belligerent should endeavour by all means at his command and with all his +energy to destroy the other. But even so they may find that certain means +are barred to them for political reasons, and at any moment the fortune of +war or a development of the political conditions with which it is entangled +may throw them back upon the fundamental political theory. + +That theory it will be unprofitable to labour further at this point. Let it +suffice for the present to mark that it gives us a conception of war as an +exertion of violence to secure a political end which we desire to attain, +and that from this broad and simple formula we are able to deduce at once +that wars will vary according to the nature of the end and the intensity of +our desire to attain it. Here we may leave it to gather force and coherence +as we examine the practical considerations which are its immediate outcome. + + * * * * * + + CHAPTER TWO + + NATURES OF WARS-- + OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE + + * * * * * + +Having determined that wars must vary in character according to the nature +and importance of their object, we are faced with the difficulty that the +variations will be of infinite number and of all degrees of distinction. So +complex indeed is the graduation presented that at first sight it appears +scarcely possible to make it the basis of practical study. But on further +examination it will be seen that by applying the usual analytical method +the whole subject is susceptible of much simplification. We must in short +attempt to reach some system of classification; that is, we must see if it +is not possible to group the variations into some well-founded categories. +With a subject so complex and intangible the grouping must of course be to +some extent arbitrary, and in some places the lines of demarcation will be +shadowy; but if classification has been found possible and helpful in +Zoology or Botany, with the infinite and minute individual variations with +which they have to deal, it should be no less possible and helpful in the +study of war. + +The political theory of war will at any rate give us two broad and +well-marked classifications. The first is simple and well known, depending +on whether the political object of the war is positive or negative. If it +be positive--that is, if our aim is to wrest something from the enemy--then +our war in its main lines will be offensive. If, on the other hand, our aim +be negative, and we simply seek to prevent the enemy wresting some +advantage to our detriment, then the war in its general direction will be +defensive. + +It is only as a broad conception that this classification has value. Though +it fixes the general trend of our operations, it will not in itself affect +their character. For a maritime Power at least it is obvious that this must +be so. For in any circumstances it is impossible for such a Power either to +establish its defence or develop fully its offence without securing a +working control of the sea by aggressive action against the enemy's fleets. +Furthermore, we have always found that however strictly our aim may be +defensive, the most effective means of securing it has been by +counter-attack over-sea, either to support an ally directly or to deprive +our enemy of his colonial possessions. Neither category, then, excludes the +use of offensive operations nor the idea of overthrowing our enemy so far +as is necessary to gain our end. In neither case does the conception lead +us eventually to any other objective than the enemy's armed forces, and +particularly his naval forces. The only real difference is this--that if +our object be positive our general plan must be offensive, and we should at +least open with a true offensive movement; whereas if our object be +negative our general plan will be preventive, and we may bide our time for +our counter-attack. To this extent our action must always tend to the +offensive. For counter-attack is the soul of defence. Defence is not a +passive attitude, for that is the negation of war. Rightly conceived, it is +an attitude of alert expectation. We wait for the moment when the enemy +shall expose himself to a counter-stroke, the success of which will so far +cripple him as to render us relatively strong enough to pass to the +offensive ourselves. + +From these considerations it will appear that, real and logical as the +classification is, to give it the designation "offensive and defensive" is +objectionable from every point of view. To begin with, it does not +emphasise what the real and logical distinction is. It suggests that the +basis of the classification is not so much a difference of object as a +difference in the means employed to achieve the object. Consequently we +find ourselves continually struggling with the false assumption that +positive war means using attack, and negative war being content with +defence. + +That is confusing enough, but a second objection to the designation is far +more serious and more fertile of error. For the classification "offensive +and defensive" implies that offensive and defensive are mutually exclusive +ideas, whereas the truth is, and it is a fundamental truth of war, that +they are mutually complementary. All war and every form of it must be both +offensive and defensive. No matter how clear our positive aim nor how high +our offensive spirit, we cannot develop an aggressive line of strategy to +the full without the support of the defensive on all but the main lines of +operation. In tactics it is the same. The most convinced devotee of attack +admits the spade as well as the rifle. And even when it comes to men and +material, we know that without a certain amount of protection neither +ships, guns, nor men can develop their utmost energy and endurance in +striking power. There is never, in fact, a clean choice between attack and +defence. In aggressive operations the question always is, how far must +defence enter into the methods we employ in order to enable us to do the +utmost within our resources to break or paralyse the strength of the enemy. +So also with defence. Even in its most legitimate use, it must always be +supplemented by attack. Even behind the walls of a fortress men know that +sooner or later the place must fall unless by counter-attack on the enemy's +siege works or communications they can cripple his power of attack. + +It would seem, therefore, that it were better to lay aside the designation +"offensive and defensive" altogether and substitute the terms "positive and +negative." But here again we are confronted with a difficulty. There have +been many wars in which positive methods have been used all through to +secure a negative end, and such wars will not sit easily in either class. +For instance, in the War of Spanish Succession our object was mainly to +prevent the Mediterranean becoming a French lake by the union of the French +and Spanish crowns, but the method by which we succeeded in achieving our +end was to seize the naval positions of Gibraltar and Minorca, and so in +practice our method was positive. Again, in the late Russo-Japanese War the +main object of Japan was to prevent Korea being absorbed by Russia. That +aim was preventive and negative. But the only effective way of securing her +aim was to take Korea herself, and so for her the war was in practice +positive. + +On the other hand, we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that in the majority +of wars the side with the positive object has acted generally on the +offensive and the other generally on the defensive. Unpractical therefore +as the distinction seems to be, it is impossible to dismiss it without +inquiring why this was so, and it is in this inquiry that the practical +results of the classification will be found to lie--that is, it forces us +to analyse the comparative advantages of offence and defence. A clear +apprehension of their relative possibilities is the corner stone of +strategical study. + +Now the advantages of the offensive are patent and admitted. It is only the +offensive that can produce positive results, while the strength and energy +which are born of the moral stimulation of attack are of a practical value +that outweighs almost every other consideration. Every man of spirit would +desire to use the offensive whether his object were positive or negative, +and yet there are a number of cases in which some of the most energetic +masters of war have chosen the defensive, and chosen with success. They +have chosen it when they have found themselves inferior in physical force +to their enemy, and when they believed that no amount of aggressive spirit +could redress that inferiority. + +Obviously, then, for all the inferiority of the defensive as a drastic form +of war it must have some inherent advantage which the offensive does not +enjoy. In war we adopt every method for which we have sufficient strength. +If, then, we adopt the less desirable method of defence, it must be either +that we have not sufficient strength for offence, or that the defence gives +us some special strength for the attainment of our object. + +What, then, are these elements of strength? It is very necessary to +inquire, not only that we may know that if for a time we are forced back +upon the defensive all is not lost, but also that we may judge with how +much daring we should push our offensive to prevent the enemy securing the +advantages of defence. + +As a general principle we all know that possession is nine points of the +law. It is easier to keep money in our pocket than to take it from another +man's. If one man would rob another he must be the stronger or better armed +unless he can do it by dexterity or stealth, and there lies one of the +advantages of offence. The side which takes the initiative has usually the +better chance of securing advantage by dexterity or stealth. But it is not +always so. If either by land or sea we can take a defensive position so +good that it cannot be turned and must be broken down before our enemy can +reach his objective, then the advantage of dexterity and stealth passes to +us. We choose our own ground for the trial of strength. We are hidden on +familiar ground; he is exposed on ground that is less familiar. We can lay +traps and prepare surprises by counter-attack, when he is most dangerously +exposed. Hence the paradoxical doctrine that where defence is sound and +well designed the advantage of surprise is against the attack. + +It will be seen therefore that whatever advantages lie in defence they +depend on the preservation of the offensive spirit. Its essence is the +counter-attack--waiting deliberately for a chance to strike--not cowering +in inactivity. Defence is a condition of restrained activity--not a mere +condition of rest. Its real weakness is that if unduly prolonged it tends +to deaden the spirit of offence. This is a truth so vital that some +authorities in their eagerness to enforce it have travestied it into the +misleading maxim, "That attack is the best defence." Hence again an +amateurish notion that defence is always stupid or pusillanimous, leading +always to defeat, and that what is called "the military spirit" means +nothing but taking the offensive. Nothing is further from the teaching or +the practice of the best masters. Like Wellington at Torres Vedras, they +all at times used the defensive till the elements of strength inherent in +that form of war, as opposed to the exhausting strain inherent in the form +that they had fixed upon their opponents, lifted them to a position where +they in their turn were relatively strong enough to use the more exhausting +form. + +The confusion of thought which has led to the misconceptions about defence +as a method of war is due to several obvious causes. Counter-attacks from a +general defensive attitude have been regarded as a true offensive, as, for +instance, in Frederick the Great's best-known operations, or in Admiral +Tegetthoff's brilliant counterstroke at Lissa, or our own operations +against the Spanish Armada. Again, the defensive has acquired an ill name +by its being confused with a wrongly arrested offensive, where the superior +Power with the positive object lacked the spirit to use his material +superiority with sufficient activity and perseverance. Against such a Power +an inferior enemy can always redress his inferiority by passing to a bold +and quick offensive, thus acquiring a momentum both moral and physical +which more than compensates his lack of weight. The defensive has also +failed by the choice of a bad position which the enemy was able to turn or +avoid. A defensive attitude is nothing at all, its elements of strength +entirely disappear, unless it is such that the enemy must break it down by +force before he can reach his ultimate objective. Even more often has it +failed when the belligerent adopting it, finding he has no available +defensive position which will bar the enemy's progress, attempts to guard +every possible line of attack. The result is of course that by attenuating +his force he only accentuates his inferiority. + +Clear and well proven as these considerations are for land warfare, their +application to the sea is not so obvious. It will be objected that at sea +there is no defensive. This is generally true for tactics, but even so not +universally true. Defensive tactical positions are possible at sea, as in +defended anchorages. These were always a reality, and the mine has +increased their possibilities. In the latest developments of naval warfare +we have seen the Japanese at the Elliot Islands preparing a real defensive +position to cover the landing of their Second Army in the Liaotung +Peninsula. Strategically the proposition is not true at all. A strategical +defensive has been quite as common at sea as on land, and our own gravest +problems have often been how to break down such an attitude when our enemy +assumed it. It usually meant that the enemy remained in his own waters and +near his own bases, where it was almost impossible for us to attack him +with decisive result, and whence he always threatened us with counterattack +at moments of exhaustion, as the Dutch did at Sole Bay and in the Medway. +The difficulty of dealing decisively with an enemy who adopted this course +was realised by our service very early, and from first to last one of our +chief preoccupations was to prevent the enemy availing himself of this +device and to force him to fight in the open, or at least to get between +him and his base and force an action there. + +Probably the most remarkable manifestation of the advantages that may be +derived in suitable conditions from a strategical defensive is also to be +found in the late Russo-Japanese War. In the final crisis of the naval +struggle the Japanese fleet was able to take advantage of a defensive +attitude in its own waters which the Russian Baltic fleet would have to +break down to attain its end, and the result was the most decisive naval +victory ever recorded. + +The deterrent power of active and dexterous operations from such a position +was well known to our old tradition. The device was used several times, +particularly in our home waters, to prevent a fleet, which for the time we +were locally too weak to destroy, from carrying out the work assigned to +it. A typical position of the kind was off Scilly, and it was proved again +and again that even a superior fleet could not hope to effect anything in +the Channel till the fleet off Scilly had been brought to decisive action. +But the essence of the device was the preservation of the aggressive spirit +in its most daring form. For success it depended on at least the will to +seize every occasion for bold and harassing counter-attacks such as Drake +and his colleagues struck at the Armada. + +To submit to blockade in order to engage the attention of a superior +enemy's fleet is another form of defensive, but one that is almost wholly +evil. For a short time it may do good by permitting offensive operations +elsewhere which otherwise would be impossible. But if prolonged, it will +sooner or later destroy the spirit of your force and render it incapable of +effective aggression. + +The conclusion then is that although for the practical purpose of framing +or appreciating plans of war the classification of wars into offensive and +defensive is of little use, a clear apprehension of the inherent relative +advantages of offence and defence is essential. We must realise that in +certain cases, provided always we preserve the aggressive spirit, the +defensive will enable an inferior force to achieve points when the +offensive would probably lead to its destruction. But the elements of +strength depend entirely on the will and insight to deal rapid blows in the +enemy's unguarded moments. So soon as the defensive ceases to be regarded +as a means of fostering power to strike and of reducing the enemy's power +of attack it loses all its strength. It ceases to be even a suspended +activity, and anything that is not activity is not war. + +With these general indications of the relative advantages of offence and +defence we may leave the subject for the present. It is possible of course +to catalogue the advantages and disadvantages of each form, but any such +bald statement--without concrete examples to explain the meaning--must +always appear controversial and is apt to mislead. It is better to reserve +their fuller consideration till we come to deal with strategical operations +and are able to note their actual effect upon the conduct of war in its +various forms. Leaving therefore our first classification of wars into +offensive and defensive we will pass on to the second, which is the only +one of real practical importance. + + * * * * * + + CHAPTER THREE + + NATURES OF WARS-- + LIMITED AND UNLIMITED + + * * * * * + +The second classification to which we are led by the political theory of +war, is one which Clausewitz was the first to formulate and one to which he +came to attach the highest importance. It becomes necessary therefore to +examine his views in some detail--not because there is any need to regard a +continental soldier, however distinguished, as an indispensable authority +for a maritime nation. The reason is quite the reverse. It is because a +careful examination of his doctrine on this point will lay open what are +the radical and essential differences between the German or Continental +School of Strategy and the British or Maritime School--that is, our own +traditional School, which too many writers both at home and abroad quietly +assume to have no existence. The evil tendency of that assumption cannot be +too strongly emphasised, and the main purpose of this and the following +chapters will be to show how and why even the greatest of the continental +strategists fell short of realising fully the characteristic conception of +the British tradition. + +By the classification in question Clausewitz distinguished wars into those +with a "Limited" object and those whose object was "Unlimited." Such a +classification was entirely characteristic of him, for it rested not alone +upon the material nature of the object, but on certain moral considerations +to which he was the first to attach their real value in war. Other writers +such as Jomini had attempted to classify wars by the special purpose for +which they were fought, but Clausewitz's long course of study convinced him +that such a distinction was unphilosophical and bore no just relation to +any tenable theory of war. Whether, that is, a war was positive or negative +mattered much, but its special purpose, whether, for instance, according to +Jomini's system, it was a war "to assert rights" or "to assist an ally" or +"to acquire territory," mattered not at all. + +Whatever the object, the vital and paramount question was the intensity +with which the spirit of the nation was absorbed in its attainment. The +real point to determine in approaching any war plan was what did the object +mean to the two belligerents, what sacrifices would they make for it, what +risks were they prepared to run? It was thus he stated his view. "The +smaller the sacrifice we demand from our opponent, the smaller presumably +will be the means of resistance he will employ, and the smaller his means, +the smaller will ours be required to be. Similarly the smaller our +political object, the less value shall we set upon it and the more easily +we shall be induced to abandon it." Thus the political object of the war, +its original motive, will not only determine for both belligerents +reciprocally the aim of the force they use, but it will also be the +standard of the intensity of the efforts they will make. So he concludes +there may be wars of all degrees of importance and energy from a war of +extermination down to the use of an army of observation. So also in the +naval sphere there may be a life and death struggle for maritime supremacy +or hostilities which never rise beyond a blockade. + +Such a view of the subject was of course a wide departure from the theory +of "Absolute War" on which Clausewitz had started working. Under that +theory "Absolute War" was the ideal form to which all war ought to attain, +and those which fell short of it were imperfect wars cramped by a lack of +true military spirit. But so soon as he had seized the fact that in actual +life the moral factor always must override the purely military factor, he +saw that he had been working on too narrow a basis--a basis that was purely +theoretical in that it ignored the human factor. He began to perceive that +it was logically unsound to assume as the foundation of a strategical +system that there was one pattern to which all wars ought to conform. In +the light of his full and final apprehension of the value of the human +factor he saw wars falling into two well-marked categories, each of which +would legitimately be approached in a radically different manner, and not +necessarily on the lines of "Absolute War." + +He saw that there was one class of war where the political object was of so +vital an importance to both belligerents that they would tend to fight to +the utmost limit of their endurance to secure it. But there was another +class where the object was of less importance, that is to say, where its +value to one or both the belligerents was not so great as to be worth +unlimited sacrifices of blood and treasure. It was these two kinds of war +he designated provisionally "Unlimited" and "Limited," by which he meant +not that you were not to exert the force employed with all the vigour you +could develop, but that there might be a limit beyond which it would be bad +policy to spend that vigour, a point at which, long before your force was +exhausted or even fully developed, it would be wiser to abandon your object +rather than to spend more upon it. + +This distinction it is very necessary to grasp quite clearly, for it is +often superficially confused with the distinction already referred to, +which Clausewitz drew in the earlier part of his work--that is, the +distinction between what he called the character of modern war and the +character of the wars which preceded the Napoleonic era. It will be +remembered he insisted that the wars of his own time had been wars between +armed nations with a tendency to throw the whole weight of the nation into +the fighting line, whereas in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries wars +were waged by standing armies and not by the whole nation in arms. The +distinction of course is real and of far-reaching consequences, but it has +no relation to the distinction between "Limited" and "Unlimited" war. War +may be waged on the Napoleonic system either for a limited or an unlimited +object. + +A modern instance will serve to clear the field. The recent Russo-Japanese +War was fought for a limited object--the assertion of certain claims over +territory which formed no part of the possessions of either belligerent. +Hostilities were conducted on entirely modern lines by two armed nations +and not by standing armies alone. But in the case of one belligerent her +interest in the object was so limited as to cause her to abandon it long +before her whole force as an armed nation was exhausted or even put forth. +The expense of life and treasure which the struggle was involving was +beyond what the object was worth. + +This second distinction--that is, between Limited and Unlimited +wars--Clausewitz regarded as of greater importance than his previous one +founded on the negative or positive nature of the object. He was long in +reaching it. His great work _On War_ as he left it proceeds almost entirely +on the conception of offensive or defensive as applied to the Napoleonic +ideal of absolute war. The new idea came to him towards the end in the full +maturity of his prolonged study, and it came to him in endeavouring to +apply his strategical speculations to the practical process of framing a +war plan in anticipation of a threatened breach with France. It was only in +his final section _On War Plans_ that he began to deal with it. By that +time he had grasped the first practical result to which his theory led. He +saw that the distinction between Limited and Unlimited war connoted a +cardinal distinction in the methods of waging it. When the object was +unlimited, and would consequently call forth your enemy's whole war power, +it was evident that no firm decision of the struggle could be reached till +his war power was entirely crushed. Unless you had a reasonable hope of +being able to do this it was bad policy to seek your end by force--that is, +you ought not to go to war. In the case of a limited object, however, the +complete destruction of the enemy's armed force was beyond what was +necessary. Clearly you could achieve your end if you could seize the +object, and by availing yourself of the elements of strength inherent in +the defensive could set up such a situation that it would cost the enemy +more to turn you out than the object was worth to him. + +Here then was a wide difference in the fundamental postulate of your war +plan. In the case of an unlimited war your main strategical offensive must +be directed against the armed forces of the enemy; in the case of a limited +war, even where its object was positive, it need not be. If conditions were +favourable, it would suffice to make the object itself the objective of +your main strategical offensive. Clearly, then, he had reached a +theoretical distinction which modified his whole conception of strategy. No +longer is there logically but one kind of war, the Absolute, and no longer +is there but one legitimate objective, the enemy's armed forces. Being +sound theory, it of course had an immediate practical value, for obviously +it was a distinction from which the actual work of framing a war plan must +take its departure. + +A curious corroboration of the soundness of these views is that Jomini +reached an almost identical standpoint independently and by an entirely +different road. His method was severely concrete, based on the comparison +of observed facts, but it brought him as surely as the abstract method of +his rival to the conclusion that there were two distinct classes of object. +"They are of two different kinds," he says, "one which may be called +territorial or geographical ... the other on the contrary consists +exclusively in the destruction or disorganisation of the enemy's forces +without concerning yourself with geographical points of any kind." It is +under the first category of his first main classification "Of offensive +wars to assert rights," that he deals with what Clausewitz would call +"Limited Wars." Citing as an example Frederick the Great's war for the +conquest of Silesia, he says, "In such a war ... the offensive operations +ought to be proportional to the end in view. The first move is naturally to +occupy the provinces claimed" (not, be it noted, to direct your blow at the +enemy's main force). "Afterwards," he proceeds, "you can push the offensive +according to circumstances and your relative strength in order to obtain +the desired cession by menacing the enemy at home." Here we have +Clausewitz's whole doctrine of "Limited War"; firstly, the primary or +territorial stage, in which you endeavour to occupy the geographical +object, and then the secondary or coercive stage, in which you seek by +exerting general pressure upon your enemy to force him to accept the +adverse situation you have set up. + +Such a method of making war obviously differs in a fundamental manner from +that which Napoleon habitually adopted, and yet we have it presented by +Jomini and Clausewitz, the two apostles of the Napoleonic method. The +explanation is, of course, that both of them had seen too much not to know +that Napoleon's method was only applicable when you could command a real +physical or moral preponderance. Given such a preponderance, both were +staunch for the use of extreme means in Napoleon's manner. It is not as +something better than the higher road that they commend the lower one, but +being veteran staff-officers and not mere theorists, they knew well that a +belligerent must sometimes find the higher road beyond his strength, or +beyond the effort which the spirit of the nation is prepared to make for +the end in view, and like the practical men they were, they set themselves +to study the potentialities of the lower road should hard necessity force +them to travel it. They found that these potentialities in certain +circumstances were great. As an example of a case where the lower form was +more appropriate Jomini cites Napoleon's campaign against Russia in 1812. +In his opinion it would have been better if Napoleon had been satisfied to +begin on the lower method with a limited territorial object, and he +attributes his failure to the abuse of a method which, however well suited +to his wars in Germany, was incapable of achieving success in the +conditions presented by a war with Russia. + +Seeing how high was Napoleon's opinion of Jomini as a master of the science +of war, it is curious how his views on the two natures of wars have been +ignored in the present day. It is even more curious in the case of +Clausewitz, since we know that in the plenitude of his powers he came to +regard this classification as the master-key of the subject. The +explanation is that the distinction is not very clearly formulated in his +first seven books, which alone he left in anything like a finished +condition. It was not till he came to write his eighth book _On War Plans_ +that he saw the vital importance of the distinction round which he had been +hovering. In that book the distinction is clearly laid down, but the book +unhappily was never completed. With his manuscript, however, he left a +"Note" warning us against regarding his earlier books as a full +presentation of his developed ideas. From the note it is also evident that +he thought the classification on which he had lighted was of the utmost +importance, that he believed it would clear up all the difficulties which +he had encountered in his earlier books--difficulties which he had come to +see arose from a too exclusive consideration of the Napoleonic method of +conducting war. "I look upon the first six books," he wrote in 1827, "as +only a mass of material which is still in a manner without form and which +has still to be revised again. In this revision the two kinds of wars will +be kept more distinctly in view all through, and thereby all ideas will +gain in clearness, in precision, and in exactness of application." +Evidently he had grown dissatisfied with the theory of Absolute War on +which he had started. His new discovery had convinced him that that theory +would not serve as a standard for all natures of wars. "Shall we," he asks +in his final book, "shall we now rest satisfied with this idea and by it +judge of all wars, however much they may differ?"[2] He answers his +question in the negative. "You cannot determine the requirements of all +wars from the Napoleonic type. Keep that type and its absolute method +before you to use _when you can_ or _when you must_, but keep equally +before you that there are two main natures of war." + + [2] Clausewitz, On War, Book viii, chap, ii + +In his note written at this time, when the distinction first came to him, +he defines these two natures of war as follows: "First, those in which the +object is the _overthrow of the enemy_, whether it be we aim at his +political destruction or merely at disarming him and forcing him to +conclude peace on our terms; and secondly, those in which our object is +_merely to make some conquests on the frontiers of his country_, either for +the purpose of retaining them permanently or of turning them to account as +a matter of exchange in settling terms of peace."[3] It was in his eighth +book that he intended, had he lived, to have worked out the comprehensive +idea he had conceived. Of that book he says, "The chief object will be to +make good the two points of view above mentioned, by which everything will +be simplified and at the same time be given the breath of life. I hope in +this book to iron out many creases in the heads of strategists and +statesmen, and at least to show the object of action and the real point to +be considered in war."[4] + + [3] Ibid, Preparatory Notice, p. vii. + + [4] Ibid, p. viii + +That hope was never realised, and that perhaps is why his penetrating +analysis has been so much ignored. The eighth book as we have it is only a +fragment. In the spring of 1830--an anxious moment, when it seemed that +Prussia would require all her best for another struggle single-handed with +France--he was called away to an active command. What he left of the book +on "War Plans" he describes as "merely a track roughly cleared, as it were, +through the mass, in order to ascertain the points of greatest moment." It +was his intention, he says, to "carry the spirit of these ideas into his +first six books"--to put the crown on his work, in fact, by elaborating and +insisting upon his two great propositions, viz. that war was a form of +policy, and that being so it might be Limited or Unlimited. + +The extent to which he would have infused his new idea into the whole every +one is at liberty to judge for himself; but this indisputable fact remains. +In the winter in view of the threatening attitude of France in regard to +Belgium he drew up a war plan, and it was designed not on the Napoleonic +method of making the enemy's armed force the main strategical objective, +but on seizing a limited territorial object and forcing a disadvantageous +counter-offensive upon the French. The revolutionary movement throughout +Europe had broken the Holy Alliance to pieces. Not only did Prussia find +herself almost single-handed against France, but she herself was sapped by +revolution. To adopt the higher form of war and seek to destroy the armed +force of the enemy was beyond her power. But she could still use the lower +form, and by seizing Belgium she could herself force so exhausting a task +on France that success was well within her strength. It was exactly so we +endeavoured to begin the Seven Years' War; and it was exactly so the +Japanese successfully conducted their war with Russia; and what is more +striking, it was on similar lines that in 1859 Moltke in similar +circumstances drew up his first war plan against France. His idea at that +time was on the lines which Jomini held should have been Napoleon's in +1812. It was not to strike directly at Paris or the French main army, but +to occupy Alsace-Lorraine and hold that territory till altered conditions +should give him the necessary preponderance for proceeding to the higher +form or forcing a favourable peace. + +In conclusion, then, we have to note that the matured fruit of the +Napoleonic period was a theory of war based not on the single absolute +idea, but on the dual distinction of Limited and Unlimited. Whatever +practical importance we may attach to the distinction, so much must be +admitted on the clear and emphatic pronouncements of Clausewitz and Jomini. +The practical importance is another matter. It may fairly be argued that in +continental warfare--in spite of the instances quoted by both the classical +writers--it is not very great, for reasons that will appear directly. But +it must be remembered that continental warfare is not the only form in +which great international issues are decided. Standing at the final point +which Clausewitz and Jomini reached, we are indeed only on the threshold of +the subject. We have to begin where they left off and inquire what their +ideas have to tell for the modern conditions of worldwide imperial States, +where the sea becomes a direct and vital factor. + + * * * * * + + CHAPTER FOUR + + LIMITED WAR AND MARITIME EMPIRES-- + + Development of Clausewitz's and Jomini's + Theory of a Limited Territorial Object, and Its + Application to Modern Imperial Conditions + + * * * * * + +The German war plans already cited, which were based respectively on the +occupation of Belgium and Alsace-Lorraine, and Jomini's remarks on +Napoleon's disastrous Russian campaign serve well to show the point to +which continental strategists have advanced along the road which Clausewitz +was the first to indicate clearly. We have now to consider its application +to modern imperial conditions, and above all where the maritime element +forcibly asserts itself. We shall then see how small that advance has been +compared with its far-reaching effects for a maritime and above all an +insular Power. + +It is clear that Clausewitz himself never apprehended the full significance +of his brilliant theory. His outlook was still purely continental, and the +limitations of continental warfare tend to veil the fuller meaning of the +principle he had framed. Had he lived, there is little doubt he would have +worked it out to its logical conclusion, but his death condemned his theory +of limited war to remain in the inchoate condition in which he had left it. + +It will be observed, as was natural enough, that all through his work +Clausewitz had in his mind war between two contiguous or at least adjacent +continental States, and a moment's consideration will show that in that +type of war the principle of the limited object can rarely if ever assert +itself in perfect precision. Clausewitz himself put it quite clearly. +Assuming a case where "the overthrow of the enemy"--that is, unlimited +war--is beyond our strength, he points out that we need not therefore +necessarily act on the defensive. Our action may still be positive and +offensive, but the object can be nothing more than "the conquest of part of +the enemy's country." Such a conquest he knew might so far weaken your +enemy or strengthen your own position as to enable you to secure a +satisfactory peace. The path of history is indeed strewn with such cases. +But he was careful to point out that such a form of war was open to the +gravest objections. Once you had occupied the territory you aimed at, your +offensive action was, as a rule, arrested. A defensive attitude had to be +assumed, and such an arrest of offensive action he had previously shown was +inherently vicious, if only for moral reasons. Added to this you might find +that in your effort to occupy the territorial object you had so +irretrievably separated your striking force from your home-defence force as +to be in no position to meet your enemy if he was able to retort by acting +on unlimited lines with a stroke at your heart. A case in point was the +Austerlitz campaign, where Austria's object was to wrest North Italy from +Napoleon's empire. She sent her main army under the Archduke Charles to +seize the territory she desired. Napoleon immediately struck at Vienna, +destroyed her home army, and occupied the capital before the Archduke could +turn to bar his way. + +The argument is this: that, as all strategic attack tends to leave points +of your own uncovered, it always involves greater or less provision for +their defence. It is obvious, therefore, that if we are aiming at a limited +territorial object the proportion of defence required will tend to be much +greater than if we are directing our attack on the main forces of the +enemy. In unlimited war our attack will itself tend to defend everything +elsewhere, by forcing the enemy to concentrate against our attack. Whether +the limited form is justifiable or not therefore depends, as Clausewitz +points out, on the geographical position of the object. + +So far British experience is with him, but he then goes on to say the more +closely the territory in question is an annex of our own the safer is this +form of war, because then our offensive action will the more surely cover +our home country. As a case in point he cites Frederick the Great's opening +of the Seven Years' War with the occupation of Saxony--a piece of work +which materially strengthened Prussian defence. Of the British opening in +Canada he says nothing. His outlook was too exclusively continental for it +to occur to him to test his doctrine with a conspicuously successful case +in which the territory aimed at was distant from the home territory and in +no way covered it. Had he done so he must have seen how much stronger an +example of the strength of limited war was the case of Canada than the case +of Saxony. Moreover, he would have seen that the difficulties, which in +spite of his faith in his discovery accompanied his attempt to apply it, +arose from the fact that the examples he selected were not really examples +at all. + +When he conceived the idea, the only kind of limited object he had in his +mind was, to use his own words, "some conquests on the frontiers of the +enemy's country," such as Silesia and Saxony for Frederick the Great, +Belgium in his own war plan, and Alsace-Lorraine in that of Moltke. Now it +is obvious that such objects are not truly limited, for two reasons. In the +first place, such territory is usually an organic part of your enemy's +country, or otherwise of so much importance to him that he will be willing +to use unlimited effort to retain it. In the second place, there will be no +strategical obstacle to his being able to use his whole force to that end. +To satisfy the full conception of a limited object, one of two conditions +is essential. Firstly, it must be not merely limited in area, but of really +limited political importance; and secondly, it must be so situated as to be +strategically isolated or to be capable of being reduced to practical +isolation by strategical operations. Unless this condition exists, it is in +the power of either belligerent, as Clausewitz himself saw, to pass to +unlimited war if he so desires, and, ignoring the territorial objective, to +strike at the heart of his enemy and force him to desist. + +If, then, we only regard war between contiguous continental States, in +which the object is the conquest of territory on either of their frontiers, +we get no real generic difference between limited and unlimited war. The +line between them is in any case too shadowy or unstable to give a +classification of any solidity. It is a difference of degree rather than of +kind. If, on the other hand, we extend our view to wars between worldwide +empires, the distinction at once becomes organic. Possessions which lie +oversea or at the extremities of vast areas of imperfectly settled +territory are in an entirely different category from those limited objects +which Clausewitz contemplated. History shows that they can never have the +political importance of objects which are organically part of the European +system, and it shows further that they can be isolated by naval action +sufficiently to set up the conditions of true limited war. + +Jomini approaches the point, but without clearly detaching it. In his +chapter "On Great Invasions and Distant Expeditions," he points out how +unsafe it is to take the conditions of war between contiguous States and +apply them crudely to cases where the belligerents are separated by large +areas of land or sea. He hovers round the sea factor, feeling how great a +difference it makes, but without getting close to the real distinction. His +conception of the inter-action of fleets and armies never rises above their +actual co-operation in touch one with the other in a distant theatre. He +has in mind the assistance which the British fleet afforded Wellington in +the Peninsula, and Napoleon's dreams of Asiatic conquest, pronouncing such +distant invasions as impossible in modern times except perhaps in +combination with a powerful fleet that could provide the army of invasion +with successive advanced bases. Of the paramount value of the fleet's +isolating and preventive functions he gives no hint. + +Even when he deals with oversea expeditions, as he does at some length, his +grip of the point is no closer. It is indeed significant of how entirely +continental thought had failed to penetrate the subject that in devoting +over thirty pages to an enumeration of the principles of oversea +expeditions, he, like Clausewitz, does not so much as mention the conquest +of Canada; and yet it is the leading case of a weak military Power +succeeding by the use of the limited form of war in forcing its will upon a +strong one, and succeeding because it was able by naval action to secure +its home defence and isolate the territorial object. + +For our ideas of true limited objects, therefore, we must leave the +continental theatres and turn to mixed or maritime wars. We have to look to +such cases as Canada and Havana in the Seven Years' War, and Cuba in the +Spanish-American War, cases in which complete isolation of the object by +naval action was possible, or to such examples as the Crimea and Korea, +where sufficient isolation was attainable by naval action owing to the +length and difficulty of the enemy's land communications and to the +strategical situation of the territory at stake. + +These examples will also serve to illustrate and enforce the second +essential of this kind of war. As has been already said, for a true limited +object we must have not only the power of isolation, but also the power by +a secure home defence of barring an unlimited counterstroke. In all the +above cases this condition existed. In all of them the belligerents had no +contiguous frontiers, and this point is vital. For it is obvious that if +two belligerents have a common frontier, it is open to the superior of +them, no matter how distant or how easy to isolate the limited object may +be, to pass at will to unlimited war by invasion. This process is even +possible when the belligerents are separated by a neutral State, since the +territory of a weak neutral will be violated if the object be of sufficient +importance, or if the neutral be too strong to coerce, there still remains +the possibility that his alliance may be secured. + +We come, then, to this final proposition--that limited war is only +permanently possible to island Powers or between Powers which are separated +by sea, and then only when the Power desiring limited war is able to +command the sea to such a degree as to be able not only to isolate the +distant object, but also to render impossible the invasion of his home +territory. + +Here, then, we reach the true meaning and highest military value of what we +call the command of the sea, and here we touch the secret of England's +success against Powers so greatly superior to herself in military strength. +It is only fitting that such a secret should have been first penetrated by +an Englishman. For so it was, though it must be said that except in the +light of Clausewitz's doctrine the full meaning of Bacon's famous aphorism +is not revealed. "This much is certain," said the great Elizabethan on the +experience of our first imperial war; "he that commands the sea is at great +liberty and may take as much or as little of the war as he will, whereas +those that be strongest by land are many times nevertheless in great +straits." It would be difficult to state more pithily the ultimate +significance of Clausewitz's doctrine. Its cardinal truth is clearly +indicated--that limited wars do not turn upon the armed strength of the +belligerents, but upon the amount of that strength which they are able or +willing to bring to bear at the decisive point. + +It is much to be regretted that Clausewitz did not live to see with Bacon's +eyes and to work out the full comprehensiveness of his doctrine. His +ambition was to formulate a theory which would explain all wars. He +believed he had done so, and yet it is clear he never knew how complete was +his success, nor how wide was the field he had covered. To the end it would +seem he was unaware that he had found an explanation of one of the most +inscrutable problems in history--the expansion of England--at least so far +as it has been due to successful war. That a small country with a weak army +should have been able to gather to herself the most desirable regions of +the earth, and to gather them at the expense of the greatest military +Powers, is a paradox to which such Powers find it hard to be reconciled. +The phenomenon seemed always a matter of chance-an accident without any +foundation in the essential constants of war. It remained for Clausewitz, +unknown to himself, to discover that explanation, and he reveals it to us +in the inherent strength of limited war when means and conditions are +favourable for its use. + +We find, then, if we take a wider view than was open to Clausewitz and +submit his latest ideas to the test of present imperial conditions, so far +from failing to cover the ground they gain a fuller meaning and a firmer +basis. Apply them to maritime warfare and it becomes clear that his +distinction between limited and unlimited war does not rest alone on the +moral factor. A war may be limited not only because the importance of the +object is too limited to call forth the whole national force, but also +because the sea may be made to present an insuperable physical obstacle to +the whole national force being brought to bear. That is to say, a war may +be limited physically by the strategical isolation of the object, as well +as morally by its comparative unimportance. + + * * * * * + + CHAPTER FIVE + + WARS OF INTERVENTION-- + LIMITED INTERFERENCE IN UNLIMITED WAR + + * * * * * + +Before leaving the general consideration of limited war, we have still to +deal with a form of it that has not yet been mentioned. Clausewitz gave it +provisionally the name of "War limited by contingent," and could find no +place for it in his system. It appeared to him to differ essentially from +war limited by its political object, or as Jomini put it, war with a +territorial object. Yet it had to be taken into account and explained, if +only for the part it had played in European history. + +For us it calls for the most careful examination, not only because it +baffled the great German strategist to reconcile it with his theory of war, +but also because it is the form in which Great Britain most successfully +demonstrated the potentiality for direct continental interference of a +small army acting in conjunction with a dominant fleet. + +The combined operations which were the normal expression of the British +method of making war on the limited basis were of two main classes. +Firstly, there were those designed purely for the conquest of the objects +for which we went to war, which were usually colonial or distant oversea +territory; and secondly, operations more or less upon the European seaboard +designed not for permanent conquest, but as a method of disturbing our +enemy's plans and strengthening the hands of our allies and our own +position. Such operations might take the form of insignificant coastal +diversions, or they might rise through all degrees of importance till, as +in Wellington's operations in the Peninsula, they became indistinguishable +in form from regular continental warfare. + +It would seem, therefore, that these operations were distinguished not so +much by the nature of the object as by the fact that we devoted to them, +not the whole of our military strength, but only a certain part of it which +was known as our "disposal force." Consequently, they appear to call for +some such special classification, and to fall naturally into the category +which Clausewitz called "War limited by contingent." + +It was a nature of war well enough known in another form on the Continent. +During the eighteenth century there had been a large number of cases of war +actually limited by contingent--that is, cases where a country not having a +vital interest in the object made war by furnishing the chief belligerent +with an auxiliary force of a stipulated strength. + +It was in the sixth chapter of his last book that Clausewitz intended to +deal with this anomalous form of hostility. His untimely death, however, +has left us with no more than a fragment, in which he confesses that such +cases are "embarrassing to his theory." If, he adds, the auxiliary force +were placed unreservedly at the disposal of the chief belligerent, the +problem would be simple enough. It would then, in effect, be the same thing +as unlimited war with the aid of a subsidised force. But in fact, as he +observes, this seldom happened, for the contingent was always more or less +controlled in accordance with the special political aims of the Government +which furnished it. Consequently, the only conclusion he succeeded in +reaching was that it was a form of war that had to be taken into account, +and that it was a form of limited war that appeared to differ essentially +from war limited by object. We are left, in fact, with an impression that +there must be two kinds of limited war. + +But if we pursue his historical method and examine the cases in which this +nature of war was successful, and those in which it was unsuccessful, we +shall find that wherever success is taken as an index of its legitimate +employment, the practical distinction between the two kinds of limited war +tends to disappear. The indications are that where the essential factors +which justify the use of war limited by object are present in war limited +by contingent, then that form of war tends to succeed, but not otherwise. +We are brought, in fact, to this proposition, that the distinction "Limited +by contingent" is not one that is inherent in war, and is quite out of line +with the theory in hand--that, in reality, it is not a _form_ of war, but a +_method_ which may be employed either for limited or unlimited war. In +other words, war limited by contingent, if it is to be regarded as a +legitimate form of war at all, must take frankly the one shape or the +other. Either the contingent must act as an organic unit of the force +making unlimited war without any reservations whatever, or else it should +be given a definite territorial object, with an independent organisation +and an independent limited function. + +Our own experience seems to indicate that war by contingent or war with "a +disposal force" attains the highest success when it approaches most closely +to true limited war--that is, as in the case of the Peninsula and the +Crimea, where its object is to wrest or secure from the enemy a definite +piece of territory that to a greater or less extent can be isolated by +naval action. Its operative power, in fact, appears to bear some direct +relation to the intimacy with which naval and military action can be +combined to give the contingent a weight and mobility that are beyond its +intrinsic power. + +If, then, we would unravel the difficulties of war limited by contingent, +it seems necessary to distinguish between the continental and the British +form of it. The continental form, as we have seen, differs but little in +conception from unlimited war. The contingent is furnished at least +ostensibly with the idea that it is to be used by the chief belligerent to +assist him in overthrowing the common enemy, and that its objective will be +the enemy's organised forces or his capital. Or it may be that the +contingent is to be used as an army of observation to prevent a +counterstroke, so as to facilitate and secure the main offensive movement +of the chief belligerent. In either case, however small may be our +contribution to the allied force, we are using the unlimited form and +aiming at an unlimited and not a mere territorial object. + +If now we turn to British experience of war limited by contingent, we find +that the continental form has frequently been used, but we also find it +almost invariably accompanied by a popular repugnance, as though there were +something in it antagonistic to the national instinct. A leading case is +the assistance we sent to Frederick the Great in the Seven Years' War. At +the opening of the war, so great was the popular repugnance that the +measure was found impossible, and it was not till Frederick's dazzling +resistance to the Catholic powers had clothed him with the glory of a +Protestant hero, that Pitt could do what he wanted. The old religious fire +was stirred. The most potent of all national instincts kindled the people +to a generous warmth which overcame their inborn antipathy to continental +operations, and it was possible to send a substantial contingent to +Frederick's assistance. In the end the support fully achieved its purpose, +but it must be noted that even in this case the operations were limited not +only by contingent but also by object. It is true that Frederick was +engaged in an unlimited war in which the continued existence of Prussia was +at stake, and that the British force was an organic element in his war +plan. Nevertheless, it formed part of a British subsidised army under +Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, who though nominated by Frederick was a +British commander-in-chief. His army was in organisation entirely distinct +from that of Frederick, and it was assigned the very definite and limited +function of preventing the French occupying Hanover and so turning the +Prussian right flank. Finally it must be noted that its ability to perform +this function was due to the fact that the theatre of operations assigned +to it was such that in no probable event could it lose touch with the sea, +nor could the enemy cut its lines of supply and retreat. + +These features of the enterprise should be noted. They differentiate it +from our earlier use of war limited by contingent in the continental +manner, of which Marlborough's campaigns were typical, and they exhibit the +special form which Marlborough would have chosen had political exigencies +permitted and which was to become characteristic of British effort from +Pitt's time onward. In the method of our greatest War Minister we have not +only the limit by contingent but also the limit of a definite and +independent function, and finally we have touch with the sea. This is the +really vital factor, and upon it, as will presently appear, depends the +strength of the method. + +In the earlier part of the Great War we employed the same form in our +operations in North-Western Europe. There we had also the limited function +of securing Holland, and also complete touch with the sea, but our theatre +of operations was not independent. Intimate concerted action with other +forces was involved, and the result in every case was failure. Later on in +Sicily, where absolute isolation was attainable, the strength of the method +enabled us to achieve a lasting result with very slender means. But the +result was purely defensive. It was not till the Peninsular War developed +that we found a theatre for war limited by contingent in which all the +conditions that make for success were present. Even there so long as our +army was regarded as a contingent auxiliary to the Spanish army the usual +failure ensued. Only in Portugal, the defence of which was a true limited +object, and where we had a sea-girt theatre independent of extraneous +allies, was success achieved from the first. So strong was the method here, +and so exhausting the method which it forced on the enemy, that the local +balance of force was eventually reversed and we were able to pass to a +drastic offensive. + +The real secret of Wellington's success--apart from his own genius--was +that in perfect conditions he was applying the limited form to an unlimited +war. Our object was unlimited. It was nothing less than the overthrow of +Napoleon. Complete success at sea had failed to do it, but that success had +given us the power of applying the limited form, which was the most +decisive form of offence within our means. Its substantial contribution to +the final achievement of the object is now universally recognised. + +The general result, then, of these considerations is that war by contingent +in the continental form seldom or never differs generically from unlimited +war, for the conditions required by limited war are seldom or never +present. But what may be called the British or maritime form is in fact the +application of the limited method to the unlimited form, as ancillary to +the larger operations of our allies--a method which has usually been open +to us because the control of the sea has enabled us to select a theatre in +effect truly limited.[5] + + [5] Wellington's view of the essential factor was expressed to Rear + Admiral Martin, who was sent to Spain by the Admiralty to confer with him + in September 1813. "If anyone," he said, "wishes to know the history of + this war, I will tell them it is our maritime superiority gives me the + power of maintaining my army while the enemy are unable to do so." + (_Letters of Sir T. Byam Martin_) [Navy Records Society], ii, p. 499. + +But what if the conditions of the struggle in which we wish to intervene +are such that no truly limited theatre is available? In that case we have +to choose between placing a contingent frankly at the disposal of our ally, +or confining ourselves to coastal diversion, as we did at Frederick the +Great's request in the early campaigns of the Seven Years' War. Such +operations can seldom be satisfactory to either party. The small positive +results of our efforts to intervene in this way have indeed done more than +anything to discredit this form of war, and to brand it as unworthy of a +first-class Power. Yet the fact remains that all the great continental +masters of war have feared or valued British intervention of this character +even in the most unfavourable conditions. It was because they looked for +its effects rather in the threat than in the performance. They did not +reckon for positive results at all. So long as such intervention took an +amphibious form they knew its disturbing effect upon a European situation +was always out of all proportion to the intrinsic strength employed or the +positive results it could give. Its operative action was that it threatened +positive results unless it were strongly met. Its effect, in short, was +negative. Its value lay in its power of containing force greater than its +own. That is all that can be claimed for it, but it may be all that is +required. It is not the most drastic method of intervention, but it has +proved itself the most drastic for a Power whose forces are not adapted for +the higher method. Frederick the Great was the first great soldier to +recognise it, and Napoleon was the last. For years he shut his eyes to it, +laughed at it, covered it with a contempt that grew ever more irritable. In +1805 he called Craig's expedition a "pygmy combination," yet the +preparation of another combined force for an entirely different destination +caused him to see the first as an advance guard of a movement he could not +ignore, and he sacrificed his fleet in an impotent effort to deal with it. + +It was not, however, till four years later that he was forced to place on +record his recognition of the principle. Then, curiously enough, he was +convinced by an expedition which we have come to regard as above all others +condemnatory of amphibious operations against the Continent. The Walcheren +expedition is now usually held as the leading case of fatuous war +administration. Historians can find no words too bad for it. They ignore +the fact that it was a step--the final and most difficult step--in our +post-Trafalgar policy of using the army to perfect our command of the sea +against a fleet acting stubbornly on the defensive. It began with +Copenhagen in 1807. It failed at the Dardanelles because fleet and army +were separated; it succeeded at Lisbon and at Cadiz by demonstration alone. +Walcheren, long contemplated, had been put off till the last as the most +formidable and the least pressing. Napoleon had been looking for the +attempt ever since the idea was first broached in this country, but as time +passed and the blow did not fall, the danger came to be more and more +ignored. Finally, the moment came when he was heavily engaged in Austria +and forced to call up the bulk of his strength to deal with the Archduke +Charles. The risks were still great, but the British Government faced them +boldly with open eyes. It was now or never. They were bent on developing +their utmost military strength in the Peninsula, and so long as a potent +and growing fleet remained in the North Sea it would always act as an +increasing drag on such development. The prospective gain of success was in +the eyes of the Government out of all proportion to the probable loss by +failure. So when Napoleon least expected it they determined to act, and +caught him napping. The defences of Antwerp had been left incomplete. There +was no army to meet the blow--nothing but a polyglot rabble without staff +or even officers. For a week at least success was in our hands. Napoleon's +fleet only escaped by twenty-four hours, and yet the failure was not only +complete but disastrous. Still so entirely were the causes of failure +accidental, and so near had it come to success, that Napoleon received a +thorough shock and looked for a quick repetition of the attempt. So +seriously indeed did he regard his narrow escape that he found himself +driven to reconsider his whole system of home defence. Not only did he deem +it necessary to spend large sums in increasing the fixed defences of +Antwerp and Toulon, but his Director of Conscription was called upon to +work out a scheme for providing a permanent force of no less than 300,000 +men from the National Guard to defend the French coasts. "With 30,000 men +in transports at the Downs," the Emperor wrote, "the English can paralyse +300,000 of my army, and that will reduce us to the rank of a second-class +Power."[6] + + [6] _Correspondance de Napoleon_, xix, 421, 4 September. + +The concentration of the British efforts in the Peninsula apparently +rendered the realisation of this project unnecessary--that is, our line of +operation was declared and the threat ceased. But none the less Napoleon's +recognition of the principle remains on record--not in one of his speeches +made for some ulterior purpose, but in a staff order to the principal +officer concerned. + +It is generally held that modern developments in military organisation and +transport will enable a great continental Power to ignore such threats. +Napoleon ignored them in the past, but only to verify the truth that in war +to ignore a threat is too often to create an opportunity. Such +opportunities may occur late or early. As both Lord Ligonier and Wolfe laid +it down for such operations, surprise is not necessarily to be looked for +at the beginning. We have usually had to create or wait for our +opportunity--too often because we were either not ready or not bold enough +to seize the first that occurred. + +The cases in which such intervention has been most potent have been of two +classes. Firstly, there is the intrusion into a war plan which our enemy +has designed without allowing for our intervention, and to which he is +irrevocably committed by his opening movements. Secondly, there is +intervention to deprive the enemy of the fruits of victory. This form finds +its efficacy in the principle that unlimited wars are not always decided by +the destruction of armies. There usually remains the difficult work of +conquering the people afterwards with an exhausted army. The intrusion of a +small fresh force from the sea in such cases may suffice to turn the scale, +as it did in the Peninsula, and as, in the opinion of some high +authorities, it might have done in France in 1871. + +Such a suggestion will appear to be almost heretical as sinning against the +principle which condemns a strategical reserve. We say that the whole +available force should be developed for the vital period of the struggle. +No one can be found to dispute it nowadays. It is too obviously true when +it is a question of a conflict between organised forces, but in the absence +of all proof we are entitled to doubt whether it is true for that +exhausting and demoralising period which lies beyond the shock of armies. + + * * * * * + + CHAPTER SIX + + CONDITIONS OF STRENGTH IN LIMITED WAR + + * * * * * + +The elements of strength in limited war are closely analogous to those +generally inherent in defence. That is to say, that as a correct use of +defence will sometimes enable an inferior force to gain its end against a +superior one, so are there instances in which the correct use of the +limited form of war has enabled a weak military Power to attain success +against a much stronger one, and these instances are too numerous to permit +us to regard the results as accidental. + +An obvious element of strength is that where the geographical conditions +are favourable we are able by the use of our navy to restrict the amount of +force our army will have to deal with. We can in fact bring up our fleet to +redress the adverse balance of our land force. But apart from this very +practical reason there is another, which is rooted in the first principles +of strategy. + +It is that limited war permits the use of the defensive without its usual +drawbacks to a degree that is impossible in unlimited war. These drawbacks +are chiefly that it tends to surrender the initiative to the enemy and that +it deprives us of the moral exhilaration of the offensive. But in limited +war, as we shall see, this need not be the case, and if without making +these sacrifices we are able to act mainly on the defensive our position +becomes exceedingly strong. + +The proposition really admits of no doubt. For even if we be not in +whole-hearted agreement with Clausewitz's doctrine of the strength of +defence, still we may at least accept Moltke's modification of it. He held +that the strongest form of war--that is, the form which economically makes +for the highest development of strength in a given force--is strategic +offensive combined with tactical defensive. Now these are in effect the +conditions which limited war should give--that is, if the theatre and +method be rightly chosen. Let it be remembered that the use of this form of +war presupposes that we are able by superior readiness or mobility or by +being more conveniently situated to establish ourselves in the territorial +object before our opponent can gather strength to prevent us. This done, we +have the initiative, and the enemy being unable by hypothesis to attack us +at home, must conform to our opening by endeavouring to turn us out. We are +in a position to meet his attack on ground of our own choice and to avail +ourselves of such opportunities of counter-attack as his distant and +therefore exhausting offensive movements are likely to offer. Assuming, as +in our own case we always must assume, that the territorial object is +sea-girt and our enemy is not able to command the sea, such opportunities +are certain to present themselves, and even if they are not used will +greatly embarrass the main attack--as was abundantly shown in the Russian +nervousness during their advance into the Liaotung Peninsula, due to the +fear of a counter-stroke from the Gulf of Pe-chi-li. + +The actual situation which this method of procedure sets up is that our +major strategy is offensive--that is, our main movement is positive, having +for its aim the occupation of the territorial object. The minor strategy +that follows should be in its general lines defensive, designed, so soon as +the enemy sets about dislodging us, to develop the utmost energy of +counter-attack which our force and opportunities justify. + +Now if we consider that by universal agreement it is no longer possible in +the present conditions of land warfare to draw a line between tactics and +minor strategy, we have in our favour for all practical purposes the +identical position which Moltke regarded as constituting the strongest form +of war. That is to say, our major strategy is offensive and our minor +strategy is defensive. + +If, then, the limited form of war has this element of strength over and +above the unlimited form, it must be correct to use it when we are not +strong enough to use the more exhausting form and when the object is +limited; just as much as it is correct to use the defensive when our object +is negative and we are too weak for the offensive. The point is of the +highest importance, for it is a direct negation of the current doctrine +that in war there can be but one legitimate object, the overthrow of the +enemy's means of resistance, and that the primary objective must always be +his armed forces. It raises in fact the whole question as to whether it is +not sometimes legitimate and even correct to aim directly at the ulterior +object of the war. + +An impression appears to prevail--in spite of all that Clausewitz and +Jomini had to say on the point--that the question admits of only one +answer. Von der Goltz, for instance, is particularly emphatic in asserting +that the overthrow of the enemy must always be the object in modern war. He +lays it down as "the first principle of modern warfare," that "the +immediate objective against which all our efforts must be directed is the +hostile main army." Similarly Prince Kraft has the maxim that "the first +aim should be to overcome the enemy's army. Everything else, the occupation +of the country, &c., only comes in the second line." + +It will be observed that he here admits that the process of occupying the +enemy's territory is an operation distinct from the overthrow of the +enemy's force. Von der Goltz goes further, and protests against the common +error of regarding the annihilation of the enemy's principal army as +synonymous with the complete attainment of the object. He is careful to +assert that the current doctrine only holds good "when the two belligerent +states are of approximately the same nature." If, then, there are cases in +which the occupation of territory must be undertaken as an operation +distinct from defeating the enemy's forces, and if in such cases the +conditions are such that we can occupy the territory with advantage without +first defeating the enemy, it is surely mere pedantry to insist that we +should put off till to-morrow what we can do better to-day. If the +occupation of the enemy's whole territory is involved, or even a +substantial part of it, the German principle of course holds good, but all +wars are not of that character. + +Insistence on the principle of "overthrow," and even its exaggeration, was +of value, in its day, to prevent a recurrence to the old and discredited +methods. But its work is done, and blind adherence to it without regard to +the principles on which it rests tends to turn the art of war into mere +bludgeon play. + +Clausewitz, at any rate, as General Von Caemmerer has pointed out,[7] was +far too practical a soldier to commit himself to so abstract a proposition +in all its modern crudity. If it were true, it would never be possible for +a weaker Power to make successful war against a stronger one in any cause +whatever--a conclusion abundantly refuted by historical experience. That +the higher form like the offensive is the more drastic is certain, if +conditions are suitable for its use, but Clausewitz, it must be remembered, +distinctly lays it down that such conditions presuppose in the belligerent +employing the higher form a great physical or moral superiority or a great +spirit of enterprise--an innate propensity for extreme hazards. Jomini did +not go even so far as this. He certainly would have ruled out "an innate +propensity to extreme hazards," for in his judgment it was this innate +propensity which led Napoleon to abuse the higher form to his own undoing. +So entirely indeed does history, no less than theory, fail to support the +idea of the one answer, that it would seem that even in Germany a reaction +to Clausewitz's real teaching is beginning. In expounding it Von Caemmerer +says, "Since the majority of the most prominent military authors of our +time uphold the principle that in war our efforts must always be directed +to their utmost limits and that a deliberate employment of lower means +betrays more or less weakness, I feel bound to declare that the wideness of +Clausewitz's views have inspired me with a high degree of admiration." + + [7] _Development of Strategical Science._ + +Now what Clausewitz held precisely was this--that when the conditions are +not favourable for the use of the higher form, the seizure of a small part +of the enemy's territory may be regarded as a correct alternative to +destroying his armed forces. But he clearly regards this form of war only +as a make-shift. His purely continental outlook prevented his considering +that there might be cases where the object was actually so limited in +character that the lower form of war would be at once the more effective +and the more economical to use. In continental warfare, as we have seen, +such cases can hardly occur, but they tend to declare themselves strongly +when the maritime factor is introduced to any serious extent. + +The tendency of British warfare to take the lower or limited form has +always been as clearly marked as is the opposite tendency on the Continent. +To attribute such a tendency, as is sometimes the fashion, to an inherent +lack of warlike spirit is sufficiently contradicted by the results it has +achieved. There is no reason indeed to put it down to anything but a +sagacious instinct for the kind of war that best accords with the +conditions of our existence. So strong has this instinct been that it has +led us usually to apply the lower form not only where the object of the war +was a well-defined territorial one, but to cases in which its correctness +was less obvious. As has been explained in the last chapter, we have +applied it, and applied it on the whole with success, when we have been +acting in concert with continental allies for an unlimited object--where, +that is, the common object has been the overthrow of the common enemy. + +The choice between the two forms really depends upon the circumstances of +each case. We have to consider whether the political object is in fact +limited, whether if unlimited in the abstract it can be reduced to a +concrete object that is limited, and finally whether the strategical +conditions are such as lend themselves to the successful application of the +limited form. + +What we require now is to determine those conditions with greater +exactness, and this will be best done by changing our method to the +concrete and taking a leading case. + +The one which presents them in their clearest and simplest form is without +doubt the recent war between Russia and Japan. Here we have a particularly +striking example of a small Power having forced her will upon a much +greater Power without "overthrowing" her--that is, without having crushed +her power of resistance. That was entirely beyond the strength of Japan. So +manifest was the fact that everywhere upon the Continent, where the +overthrow of your enemy was regarded as the only admissible form of war, +the action of the Japanese in resorting to hostilities was regarded as +madness. Only in England, with her tradition and instinct for what an +island Power may achieve by the lower means, was Japan considered to have +any reasonable chance of success. + +The case is particularly striking; for every one felt that the real object +of the war was in the abstract unlimited, that it was in fact to decide +whether Russia or Japan was to be the predominant power in the Far East. +Like the Franco-German War of 1870 it had all the aspect of what the +Germans call "a trial of strength." Such a war is one which above all +appears incapable of decision except by the complete overthrow of the one +Power or the other. There was no complication of alliances nor any +expectation of them. The Anglo-Japanese Treaty had isolated the struggle. +If ever issue hung on the sheer fighting force of the two belligerents it +would seem to have been this one. After the event we are inclined to +attribute the result to the moral qualities and superior training and +readiness of the victors. These qualities indeed played their part, and +they must not be minimised; but who will contend that if Japan had tried to +make her war with Russia, as Napoleon made his, she could have fared even +as well as he did? She had no such preponderance as Clausewitz laid down as +a condition precedent to attempting the overthrow of her enemy--the +employment of unlimited war. + +Fortunately for her the circumstances did not call for the employment of +such extreme means. The political and geographical conditions were such +that she was able to reduce the intangible object of asserting her prestige +to the purely concrete form of a territorial objective. The penetration of +Russia into Manchuria threatened the absorption of Korea into the Russian +Empire, and this Japan regarded as fatal to her own position and future +development. Her power to maintain Korean integrity would be the outward +and visible sign of her ability to assert herself as a Pacific Power. Her +abstract quarrel with Russia could therefore be crystallised into a +concrete objective in the same way as the quarrel of the Western Powers +with Russia in 1854 crystallised into the concrete objective of Sebastopol. + +In the Japanese case the immediate political object was exceptionally well +adapted for the use of limited war. Owing to the geographical position of +Korea and to the vast and undeveloped territories which separate it from +the centre of Russian power, it could be practically isolated by naval +action. Further than this, it fulfilled the condition to which Clausewitz +attached the greatest importance--that is to say, the seizure of the +particular object so far from weakening the home defence of Japan would +have the effect of greatly increasing the strength of her position. Though +offensive in effect and intention it was also, like Frederick's seizure of +Saxony, a sound piece of defensive work. So far from exposing her heart, it +served to cover it almost impregnably. The reason is plain. Owing to the +wide separation of the two Russian arsenals at Port Arthur and +Vladivostock, with a defile controlled by Japan interposed, the Russian +naval position was very faulty. The only way of correcting it was for +Russia to secure a base in the Straits of Korea, and for this she had been +striving by diplomatic means at Seoul for some time. Strategically the +integrity of Korea was for Japan very much what the integrity of the Low +Countries was for us, but in the case of the Low Countries, since they were +incapable of isolation, our power of direct action was always comparatively +weak. Portugal, with its unrivalled strategical harbour at Lisbon, was an +analogous case in our old oceanic wars, and since it was capable of being +in a measure isolated from the strength of our great rival by naval means +we were there almost uniformly successful. On the whole it must be said +that notwithstanding the success we achieved in our long series of wars +waged on a limited basis, in none of them were the conditions so favourable +for us as in this case they were for Japan. In none of them did our main +offensive movement so completely secure our home defence. Canada was as +eccentric as possible to our line of home defence, while in the Crimea so +completely did our offensive uncover the British Islands, that we had to +supplement our movement against the limited object by sending our main +fighting fleet to hold the exit of the Baltic against the danger of an +unlimited counter-stroke.[8] + + [8] The strategical object with which the Baltic fleet was sent was + certainly to prevent a counter-stroke--that is, its main function in our + war plan was negative. Its positive function was minor and diversionary + only. It also had a political object as a demonstration to further our + efforts to form a Baltic coalition against Russia, which entirely failed. + Public opinion mistaking the whole situation expected direct positive + results from this fleet, even the capture of St. Petersburg. Such an + operation would have converted the war from a limited one to an unlimited + one. It would have meant the "overthrow of the enemy," a task quite + beyond the strength of the allies without the assistance of the Baltic + Powers, and even so their assistance would not have justified changing + the nature of the war, unless both Sweden and Russia had been ready to + make unlimited war and nothing was further from their intention. + +Whether or not it was on this principle that the Japanese conceived the war +from the outset matters little. The main considerations are that with so +favourable a territorial object as Korea limited war was possible in its +most formidable shape, that the war did in fact develop on limited lines, +and that it was entirely successful. Without waiting to secure the command +of the sea, Japan opened by a surprise seizure of Seoul, and then under +cover of minor operations of the fleet proceeded to complete her occupation +of Korea. As she faced the second stage, that of making good the defence of +her conquest, the admirable nature of her geographical object was further +displayed. The theoretical weakness of limited war at this point is the +arrest of your offensive action. But in this case such arrest was neither +necessary nor possible, and for these reasons. To render the conquest +secure not only must the Korean frontier be made inviolable, but Korea must +be permanently isolated by sea. This involved the destruction of the +Russian fleet, and this in its turn entailed the reduction of Port Arthur +by military means. Here, then, in the second stage Japan found herself +committed to two lines of operation with two distinct objectives, Port +Arthur and the Russian army that was slowly concentrating in Manchuria--a +thoroughly vicious situation. So fortunate, however, was the geographical +conformation of the theatre that by promptitude and the bold use of an +uncommanded sea it could be reduced to something far more correct. By +continuing the advance of the Korean army into Manchuria and landing +another force between it and the Port Arthur army the three corps could be +concentrated and the vicious separation of the lines of operations turned +to good account. They could be combined in such a way as to threaten an +enveloping counter-attack on Liao-yang before the Russian offensive +concentration could be completed. Not only was Liao-yang the Russian point +of concentration, but it also was a sound position both for defending Korea +and covering the siege of Port Arthur. Once secured, it gave the Japanese +all the advantages of defence and forced the Russians to exhaust themselves +in offensive operations which were beyond their strength. Nor was it only +ashore that this advantage was gained. The success of the system, which +culminated in the fall of Port Arthur, went further still. Not only did it +make Japan relatively superior at sea, but it enabled her to assume a naval +defensive and so to force the final naval decision on Russia with every +advantage of time, place, and strength in her own favour. + +By the battle of Tsushima the territorial object was completely isolated by +sea, and the position of Japan in Korea was rendered as impregnable as that +of Wellington at Torres Vedras. All that remained was to proceed to the +third stage and demonstrate to Russia that the acceptance of the situation +that had been set up was more to her advantage than the further attempt to +break it down. This the final advance to Mukden accomplished, and Japan +obtained her end very far short of having overthrown her enemy. The +offensive power of Russia had never been so strong, while that of Japan was +almost if not quite exhausted. + +Approached in this way, the Far Eastern struggle is seen to develop on the +same lines as all our great maritime wars of the past, which continental +strategists have so persistently excluded from their field of study. It +presents the normal three phases--the initial offensive movement to seize +the territorial object, the secondary phase, which forces an attenuated +offensive on the enemy, and the final stage of pressure, in which there is +a return to the offensive "according," as Jomini puts it, "to circumstances +and your relative force in order to obtain the cession desired." + +It must not of course be asked that these phases shall be always clearly +defined. Strategical analysis can never give exact results. It aims only at +approximations, at groupings which will serve to guide but will always +leave much to the judgment. The three phases in the Russo-Japanese War, +though unusually well defined, continually overlapped. It must be so; for +in war the effect of an operation is never confined to the limits of its +immediate or primary intention. Thus the occupation of Korea had the +secondary defensive effect of covering the home country, while the initial +blow which Admiral Togo delivered at Port Arthur to cover the primary +offensive movement proved, by the demoralisation it caused in the Russian +fleet, to be a distinct step in the secondary phase of isolating the +conquest. In the later stages of the war the line between what was +essential to set up the second phase of perfecting the isolation and the +third phase of general pressure seems to have grown very nebulous. + +It was at this stage that the Japanese strategy has been most severely +criticised, and it was just here they seem to have lost hold of the +conception of a limited war, if in fact they had ever securely grasped the +conception as the elder Pitt understood it. It has been argued that in +their eagerness to deal a blow at the enemy's main army they neglected to +devote sufficient force to reduce Port Arthur, an essential step to +complete the second phase. Whether or not the exigencies of the case +rendered such distribution of force inevitable or whether it was due to +miscalculation of difficulties, the result was a most costly set-back. For +not only did it entail a vast loss of time and life at Port Arthur itself, +but when the sortie of the Russian fleet in June brought home to them their +error, the offensive movement on Liao-yang had to be delayed, and the +opportunity passed for a decisive counter-stroke at the enemy's +concentration ashore. + +This misfortune, which was to cost the Japanese so dear, may perhaps be +attributed at least in part to the continental influences under which their +army had been trained. We at least can trace the unlimited outlook in the +pages of the German Staff history. In dealing with the Japanese plan of +operations it is assumed that the occupation of Korea and the isolation of +Port Arthur were but preliminaries to a concentric advance on Liao-yang, +"which was kept in view as the first objective of the operations on land." +But surely on every theory of the war the first objective of the Japanese +on land was Seoul, where they expected to have to fight their first +important action against troops advancing from the Yalu; and surely their +second was Port Arthur, with its fleet and arsenal, which they expected to +reduce with little more difficulty than they had met with ten years before +against the Chinese. Such at least was the actual progression of events, +and a criticism which regards operations of such magnitude and ultimate +importance as mere incidents of strategic deployment is only to be +explained by the domination of the Napoleonic idea of war, against the +universal application of which Clausewitz so solemnly protested. It is the +work of men who have a natural difficulty in conceiving a war plan that +does not culminate in a Jena or a Sedan. It is a view surely which is the +child of theory, bearing no relation to the actuality of the war in +question and affording no explanation of its ultimate success. The truth +is, that so long as the Japanese acted on the principles of limited war, as +laid down by Clausewitz and Jomini and plainly deducible from our own rich +experience, they progressed beyond all their expectations, but so soon as +they departed from them and suffered themselves to be confused with +continental theories they were surprised by unaccountable failure. + +The expression "Limited war" is no doubt not entirely happy. Yet no other +has been found to condense the ideas of limited object and limited +interest, which are its special characteristics. Still if the above example +be kept in mind as a typical case, the meaning of the term will not be +mistaken. It only remains to emphasise one important point. The fact that +the doctrine of limited war traverses the current belief that our primary +objective must always be the enemy's armed forces is liable to carry with +it a false inference that it also rejects the corollary that war means the +use of battles. Nothing is further from the conception. Whatever the form +of war, there is no likelihood of our ever going back to the old fallacy of +attempting to decide wars by manoeuvres. All forms alike demand the use of +battles. By our fundamental theory war is always "a continuation of +political intercourse, in which fighting is substituted for writing notes." +However great the controlling influence of the political object, it must +never obscure the fact that it is by fighting we have to gain our end. + +It is the more necessary to insist on this point, for the idea of making a +piece of territory your object is liable to be confused with the older +method of conducting war, in which armies were content to manoeuvre for +strategical positions, and a battle came almost to be regarded as a mark of +bad generalship. With such parading limited war has nothing to do. Its +conduct differs only from that of unlimited war in that instead of having +to destroy our enemy's whole power of resistance, we need only overthrow so +much of his active force as he is able or willing to bring to bear in order +to prevent or terminate our occupation of the territorial object. + +The first consideration, then, in entering on such a war is to endeavour to +determine what the force will amount to. It will depend, firstly, on the +importance the enemy attaches to the limited object, coupled with the +nature and extent of his preoccupations elsewhere, and, secondly, it will +depend upon the natural difficulties of his lines of communication and the +extent to which we can increase those difficulties by our conduct of the +initial operations. In favourable circumstances therefore (and here lies +the great value of the limited form) we are able to control the amount of +force we shall have to encounter. The most favourable circumstances and the +only circumstances by which we ourselves can profit are such as permit the +more or less complete isolation of the object by naval action, and such +isolation can never be established until we have entirely overthrown the +enemy's naval forces. + +Here, then, we enter the field of naval strategy. We can now leave behind +us the theory of war in general and, in order to pave the way to our final +conclusions, devote our attention to the theory of naval warfare in +particular. + + * * * * * + + PART TWO + + THEORY OF NAVAL WAR + + * * * * * + + CHAPTER ONE + + THEORY OF THE OBJECT-- + COMMAND OF THE SEA + + * * * * * + +The object of naval warfare must always be directly or indirectly either to +secure the command of the sea or to prevent the enemy from securing it. + +The second part of the proposition should be noted with special care in +order to exclude a habit of thought, which is one of the commonest sources +of error in naval speculation. That error is the very general assumption +that if one belligerent loses the command of the sea it passes at once to +the other belligerent. The most cursory study of naval history is enough to +reveal the falseness of such an assumption. It tells us that the most +common situation in naval war is that neither side has the command; that +the normal position is not a commanded sea, but an uncommanded sea. The +mere assertion, which no one denies, that the object of naval warfare is to +get command of the sea actually connotes the proposition that the command +is normally in dispute. It is this state of dispute with which naval +strategy is most nearly concerned, for when the command is lost or won pure +naval strategy comes to an end. + +This truth is so obvious that it would scarcely be worth mentioning were it +not for the constant recurrence of such phrases as: "If England were to +lose command of the sea, it would be all over with her." The fallacy of the +idea is that it ignores the power of the strategical defensive. It assumes +that if in the face of some extraordinary hostile coalition or through some +extraordinary mischance we found ourselves without sufficient strength to +keep the command, we should therefore be too weak to prevent the enemy +getting it--a negation of the whole theory of war, which at least requires +further support than it ever receives. + +And not only is this assumption a negation of theory; it is a negation both +of practical experience and of the expressed opinion of our greatest +masters. We ourselves have used the defensive at sea with success, as under +William the Third and in the War of American Independence, while in our +long wars with France she habitually used it in such a way that sometimes +for years, though we had a substantial preponderance, we could not get +command, and for years were unable to carry out our war plan without +serious interruption from her fleet. + +So far from the defensive being a negligible factor at sea, or even the +mere pestilent heresy it is generally represented, it is of course inherent +in all war, and, as we have seen, the paramount questions of strategy both +at sea and on land turn on the relative possibilities of offensive and +defensive, and upon the relative proportions in which each should enter +into our plan of war. At sea the most powerful and aggressively-minded +belligerent can no more avoid his alternating periods of defence, which +result from inevitable arrests of offensive action, than they can be +avoided on land. The defensive, then, has to be considered; but before we +are in a position to do so with profit, we have to proceed with our +analysis of the phrase, "Command of the Sea," and ascertain exactly what it +is we mean by it in war. + +In the first place, "Command of the Sea" is not identical in its +strategical conditions with the conquest of territory. You cannot argue +from the one to the other, as has been too commonly done. Such phrases as +the "Conquest of water territory" and "Making the enemy's coast our +frontier" had their use and meaning in the mouths of those who framed them, +but they are really little but rhetorical expressions founded on false +analogy, and false analogy is not a secure basis for a theory of war. + +The analogy is false for two reasons, both of which enter materially into +the conduct of naval war. You cannot conquer sea because it is not +susceptible of ownership, at least outside territorial waters. You cannot, +as lawyers say, "reduce it into possession," because you cannot exclude +neutrals from it as you can from territory you conquer. In the second +place, you cannot subsist your armed force upon it as you can upon enemy's +territory. Clearly, then, to make deductions from an assumption that +command of the sea is analogous to conquest of territory is unscientific, +and certain to lead to error. + +The only safe method is to inquire what it is we can secure for ourselves, +and what it is we can deny the enemy by command of the sea. Now, if we +exclude fishery rights, which are irrelevant to the present matter, the +only right we or our enemy can have on the sea is the right of passage; in +other words, the only positive value which the high seas have for national +life is as a means of communication. For the active life of a nation such +means may stand for much or it may stand for little, but to every maritime +State it has some value. Consequently by denying an enemy this means of +passage we check the movement of his national life at sea in the same kind +of way that we check it on land by occupying his territory. So far the +analogy holds good, but no further. + +So much for the positive value which the sea has in national life. It has +also a negative value. For not only is it a means of communication, but, +unlike the means of communication ashore, it is also a barrier. By winning +command of the sea we remove that barrier from our own path, thereby +placing ourselves in position to exert direct military pressure upon the +national life of our enemy ashore, while at the same time we solidify it +against him and prevent his exerting direct military pressure upon +ourselves. + +Command of the sea, therefore, means nothing but the control of maritime +communications, whether for commercial or military purposes. The object of +naval warfare is the control of communications, and not, as in land +warfare, the conquest of territory. The difference is fundamental. True, it +is rightly said that strategy ashore is mainly a question of +communications, but they are communications in another sense. The phrase +refers to the communications of the army alone, and not to the wider +communications which are part of the life of the nation. + +But on land also there are communications of a kind which are essential to +national life--the internal communications which connect the points of +distribution. Here again we touch an analogy between the two kinds of war. +Land warfare, as the most devoted adherents of the modern view admit, +cannot attain its end by military victories alone. The destruction of your +enemy's forces will not avail for certain unless you have in reserve +sufficient force to complete the occupation of his inland communications +and principal points of distribution. This power is the real fruit of +victory, the power to strangle the whole national life. It is not until +this is done that a high-spirited nation, whose whole heart is in the war, +will consent to make peace and do your will. It is precisely in the same +way that the command of the sea works towards peace, though of course in a +far less coercive manner, against a continental State. By occupying her +maritime communications and closing the points of distribution in which +they terminate we destroy the national life afloat, and thereby check the +vitality of that life ashore so far as the one is dependent on the other. +Thus we see that so long as we retain the power and right to stop maritime +communications, the analogy between command of the sea and the conquest of +territory is in this aspect very close. And the analogy is of the utmost +practical importance, for on it turns the most burning question of maritime +war, which it will be well to deal with in this place. + +It is obvious that if the object and end of naval warfare is the control of +communications it must carry with it the right to forbid, if we can, the +passage of both public and private property upon the sea. Now the only +means we have of enforcing such control of commercial communications at sea +is in the last resort the capture or destruction of sea-borne property. +Such capture or destruction is the penalty which we impose upon our enemy +for attempting to use the communications of which he does not hold the +control. In the language of jurisprudence, it is the ultimate sanction of +the interdict which we are seeking to enforce. The current term "Commerce +destruction" is not in fact a logical expression of the strategical idea. +To make the position clear we should say "Commerce prevention." + +The methods of this "Commerce prevention" have no more connection with the +old and barbarous idea of plunder and reprisal than orderly requisitions +ashore have with the old idea of plunder and ravaging. No form of war +indeed causes so little human suffering as the capture of property at sea. +It is more akin to process of law, such as distress for rent, or execution +of judgment, or arrest of a ship, than to a military operation. Once, it is +true, it was not so. In the days of privateers it was accompanied too +often, and particularly in the Mediterranean and the West Indies, with +lamentable cruelty and lawlessness, and the existence of such abuses was +the real reason for the general agreement to the Declaration of Paris by +which privateering was abolished. + +But it was not the only reason. The idea of privateering was a survival of +a primitive and unscientific conception of war, which was governed mainly +by a general notion of doing your enemy as much damage as possible and +making reprisal for wrongs he had done you. To the same class of ideas +belonged the practice of plunder and ravaging ashore. But neither of these +methods of war was abolished for humanitarian reasons. They disappeared +indeed as a general practice before the world had begun to talk of +humanity. They were abolished because war became more scientific. The right +to plunder and ravage was not denied. But plunder was found to demoralise +your troops and unfit them for fighting, and ravaging proved to be a less +powerful means of coercing your enemy than exploiting the occupied country +by means of regular requisitions for the supply of your own army and the +increase of its offensive range. In short, the reform arose from a desire +to husband your enemy's resources for your own use instead of wantonly +wasting them. + +In a similar way privateering always had a debilitating effect upon our own +regular force. It greatly increased the difficulty of manning the navy, and +the occasional large profits had a demoralising influence on detached +cruiser commanders. It tended to keep alive the mediaeval corsair spirit at +the expense of the modern military spirit which made for direct operations +against the enemy's armed forces. It was inevitable that as the new +movement of opinion gathered force it should carry with it a conviction +that for operating against sea-borne trade sporadic attack could never be +so efficient as an organised system of operations to secure a real +strategical control of the enemy's maritime communications. A riper and +sounder view of war revealed that what may be called tactical commercial +blockade--that is, the blockade of ports--could be extended to and +supplemented by a strategical blockade of the great trade routes. In moral +principle there is no difference between the two. Admit the principle of +tactical or close blockade, and as between belligerents you cannot condemn +the principle of strategical or distant blockade. Except in their effect +upon neutrals, there is no juridical difference between the two. + +Why indeed should this humane yet drastic process of war be rejected at sea +if the same thing is permitted on land? If on land you allow contributions +and requisitions, if you permit the occupation of towns, ports, and inland +communications, without which no conquest is complete and no effective war +possible, why should you refuse similar procedure at sea where it causes +far less individual suffering? If you refuse the right of controlling +communications at sea, you must also refuse the right on land. If you admit +the right of contributions on land, you must admit the right of capture at +sea. Otherwise you will permit to military Powers the extreme rights of war +and leave to the maritime Powers no effective rights at all. Their ultimate +argument would be gone. + +In so far as the idea of abolishing private capture at sea is humanitarian, +and in so far as it rests on a belief that it would strengthen our position +as a commercial maritime State, let it be honourably dealt with. But so far +as its advocates have as yet expressed themselves, the proposal appears to +be based on two fallacies. One is, that you can avoid attack by depriving +yourself of the power of offence and resting on defence alone, and the +other, the idea that war consists entirely of battles between armies or +fleets. It ignores the fundamental fact that battles are only the means of +enabling you to do that which really brings wars to an end-that is, to +exert pressure on the citizens and their collective life. "After shattering +the hostile main army," says Von der Goltz, "we still have the forcing of a +peace as a separate and, in certain circumstances, a more difficult task +... to make the enemy's country feel the burdens of war with such weight +that the desire for peace will prevail. This is the point in which Napoleon +failed.... It may be necessary to seize the harbours, commercial centres, +important lines of traffic, fortifications and arsenals, in other words, +all important property necessary to the existence of the people and army." + +If, then, we are deprived of the right to use analogous means at sea, the +object for which we fight battles almost ceases to exist. Defeat the +enemy's fleets as we may, he will be but little the worse. We shall have +opened the way for invasion, but any of the great continental Powers can +laugh at our attempts to invade single-handed. If we cannot reap the +harvest of our success by deadening his national activities at sea, the +only legitimate means of pressure within our strength will be denied us. +Our fleet, if it would proceed with such secondary operations as are +essential for forcing a peace, will be driven to such barbarous expedients +as the bombardment of seaport towns and destructive raids upon the hostile +coasts. + +If the means of pressure which follow successful fighting were abolished +both on land and sea there would be this argument in favour of the change, +that it would mean perhaps for civilised States the entire cessation of +war; for war would become so impotent, that no one would care to engage in +it. It would be an affair between regular armies and fleets, with which the +people had little concern. International quarrels would tend to take the +form of the mediaeval private disputes which were settled by champions in +trial by battle, an absurdity which led rapidly to the domination of purely +legal procedure. If international quarrels could go the same way, humanity +would have advanced a long stride. But the world is scarcely ripe for such +a revolution. Meanwhile to abolish the right of interference with the flow +of private property at sea without abolishing the corresponding right +ashore would only defeat the ends of humanitarians. The great deterrent, +the most powerful check on war, would be gone. It is commerce and finance +which now more than ever control or check the foreign policy of nations. If +commerce and finance stand to lose by war, their influence for a peaceful +solution will be great; and so long as the right of private capture at sea +exists, they stand to lose in every maritime war immediately and inevitably +whatever the ultimate result may be. Abolish the right, and this deterrent +disappears; nay, they will even stand to win immediate gains owing to the +sudden expansion of Government expenditure which the hostilities will +entail, and the expansion of sea commerce which the needs of the armed +forces will create. Any such losses as maritime warfare under existing +conditions must immediately inflict will be remote if interference with +property is confined to the land. They will never indeed be serious except +in the case of complete defeat, and no one enters upon war expecting +defeat. It is in the hope of victory and gain that aggressive wars are +born. The fear of quick and certain loss is their surest preventive. +Humanity, then, will surely beware how in a too hasty pursuit of peaceful +ideals it lets drop the best weapon it has for scotching the evil it has as +yet no power to kill. + +In what follows, therefore, it is intended to regard the right of private +capture at sea as still subsisting. Without it, indeed, naval warfare is +almost inconceivable, and in any case no one has any experience of such a +truncated method of war on which profitable study can be founded. + +The primary method, then, in which we use victory or preponderance at sea +and bring it to bear on the enemy's population to secure peace, is by the +capture or destruction of the enemy's property, whether public or private. +But in comparing the process with the analogous occupation of territory and +the levying of contributions and requisitions we have to observe a marked +difference. Both processes are what may be called economic pressure. But +ashore the economic pressure can only be exerted as the consequence of +victory or acquired domination by military success. At sea the process +begins at once. Indeed, more often than not, the first act of hostility in +maritime wars has been the capture of private property at sea. In a sense +this is also true ashore. The first step of an invader after crossing the +frontier will be to control to a less or greater extent such private +property as he is able to use for his purposes. But such interference with +private property is essentially a military act, and does not belong to the +secondary phase of economic pressure. At sea it does, and the reason why +this should be so lies in certain fundamental differences between land and +sea warfare which are implicit in the communication theory of naval war. + +To elucidate the point, it must be repeated that maritime communications, +which are the root of the idea of command of the sea, are not analogous to +military communications in the ordinary use of the term. Military +communications refer solely to the army's lines of supply and retreat. +Maritime communications have a wider meaning. Though in effect embracing +the lines of fleet supply, they correspond in strategical values not to +military lines of supply, but to those internal lines of communication by +which the flow of national life is maintained ashore. Consequently maritime +communications are on a wholly different footing from land communications. +At sea the communications are, for the most part, common to both +belligerents, whereas ashore each possesses his own in his own territory. +The strategical effect is of far-reaching importance, for it means that at +sea strategical offence and defence tend to merge in a way that is unknown +ashore. Since maritime communications are common, we as a rule cannot +attack those of the enemy without defending our own. In military operations +the converse is the rule. Normally, an attack on our enemy's communications +tends to expose their own. + +The theory of common communications will become clear by taking an example. +In our wars with France our communications with the Mediterranean, India, +and America ran down from the Channel mouth past Finisterre and St. +Vincent; and those of France, at least from her Atlantic ports, were +identical for almost their entire distance. In our wars with the Dutch the +identity was even closer. Even in the case of Spain, her great trade routes +followed the same lines as our own for the greater part of their extent. +Consequently the opening moves which we generally made to defend our trade +by the occupation of those lines placed us in a position to attack our +enemy's trade. The same situation arose even when our opening dispositions +were designed as defence against home invasion or against attacks upon our +colonies, for the positions our fleet had to take up to those ends always +lay on or about the terminal and focal points of trade routes. Whether our +immediate object were to bring the enemy's main fleets to action or to +exercise economic pressure, it made but little difference. If the enemy +were equally anxious to engage, it was at one of the terminal or focal +areas we were almost certain to get contact. If he wished to avoid a +decision, the best way to force him to action was to occupy his trade +routes at the same vital points. + +Thus it comes about that, whereas on land the process of economic pressure, +at least in the modern conception of war, should only begin after decisive +victory, at sea it starts automatically from the first. Indeed such +pressure may be the only means of forcing the decision we seek, as will +appear more clearly when we come to deal with the other fundamental +difference between land and sea warfare. + +Meanwhile we may note that at sea the use of economic pressure from the +commencement is justified for two reasons. The first is, as we have seen, +that it is an economy of means to use our defensive positions for attack +when attack does not vitiate those positions, and it will not vitiate them +if fleet cruisers operate with restraint. The second is, that interference +with the enemy's trade has two aspects. It is not only a means of exerting +the secondary economic pressure, it is also a primary means towards +overthrowing the enemy's power of resistance. Wars are not decided +exclusively by military and naval force. Finance is scarcely less +important. When other things are equal, it is the longer purse that wins. +It has even many times redressed an unfavourable balance of armed force and +given victory to the physically weaker Power. Anything, therefore, which we +are able to achieve towards crippling our enemy's finance is a direct step +to his overthrow, and the most effective means we can employ to this end +against a maritime State is to deny him the resources of seaborne trade. + +It will be seen, therefore, that in naval warfare, however closely we may +concentrate our efforts on the destruction of our enemy's armed forces as +the direct means to his overthrow, it would be folly to stay our hands when +opportunities occur, as they will automatically, for undermining his +financial position on which the continued vigour of those armed forces so +largely depends. Thus the occupation of our enemy's sea communications and +the confiscatory operations it connotes are in a sense primary operations, +and not, as on land, secondary. + +Such, then, are the abstract conclusions at which we arrive in our attempt +to analyse the idea of command of the sea and to give it precision as the +control of common communications. Their concrete value will appear when we +come to deal with the various forms which naval operations may take, such +as, "seeking out the enemy's fleet," blockade, attack and defence of trade, +and the safeguarding of combined expeditions. For the present it remains to +deal with the various kinds of sea command which flow from the +communication idea. + +If the object of the command of the sea is to control communications, it is +obvious it may exist in various degrees. We may be able to control the +whole of the common communications as the result either of great initial +preponderance or of decisive victory. If we are not sufficiently strong to +do this, we may still be able to control some of the communications; that +is, our control may be general or local. Obvious as the point is, it needs +emphasising, because of a maxim that has become current that "the sea is +all one." Like other maxims of the kind, it conveys a truth with a trail of +error in its wake. The truth it contains seems to be simply this, that as a +rule local control can only avail us temporarily, for so long as the enemy +has a sufficient fleet anywhere, it is theoretically in his power to +overthrow our control of any special sea area. + +It amounts indeed to little more than a rhetorical expression, used to +emphasise the high mobility of fleets as contrasted with that of armies and +the absence of physical obstacles to restrict that mobility. That this +vital feature of naval warfare should be consecrated in a maxim is well, +but when it is caricatured into a doctrine, as it sometimes is, that you +cannot move a battalion oversea till you have entirely overthrown your +enemy's fleet, it deserves gibbeting. It would be as wise to hold that in +war you must never risk anything. + +It would seem to have been the evil influence of this travestied maxim +which had much to do with the cramped and timorous strategy of the +Americans in their late war with Spain. They had ample naval force to +secure such a local and temporary command of the Gulf of Mexico as to have +justified them at once in throwing all the troops they had ready into Cuba +to support the insurgents, in accordance with their war plan. They had also +sufficient strength to ensure that the communications with the +expeditionary force could not be interrupted permanently. And yet, because +the Spaniards had an undefeated fleet at sea somewhere, they hesitated, and +were nearly lost. The Japanese had no such illusions. Without having struck +a naval blow of any kind, and with a hostile fleet actually within the +theatre of operations, they started their essential military movement +oversea, content that though they might not be able to secure the control +of the line of passage, they were in a position to deny effective control +to the enemy. Our own history is full of such operations. There are cases +in plenty where the results promised by a successful military blow oversea, +before permanent command had been obtained, were great enough to justify a +risk which, like the Japanese, we knew how to minimise by judicious use of +our favourable geographical position, and of a certain system of +protection, which must be dealt with later. + +For the purpose, then, of framing a plan of war or campaign, it must be +taken that command may exist in various states or degrees, each of which +has its special possibilities and limitations. It may be general or local, +and it may be permanent or temporary. General command may be permanent or +temporary, but mere local command, except in very favourable geographical +conditions, should scarcely ever be regarded as more than temporary, since +normally it is always liable to interruption from other theatres so long as +the enemy possesses an effective naval force. + +Finally, it has to be noted that even permanent general command can never +in practice be absolute. No degree of naval superiority can ensure our +communications against sporadic attack from detached cruisers, or even +raiding squadrons if they be boldly led and are prepared to risk +destruction. Even after Hawke's decisive victory at Quiberon had completed +the overthrow of the enemy's sea forces, a British transport was captured +between Cork and Portsmouth, and an Indiaman in sight of the Lizard, while +Wellington's complaints in the Peninsula of the insecurity of his +communications are well known.[9] By general and permanent control we do +not mean that the enemy can do nothing, but that he cannot interfere with +our maritime trade and oversea operations so seriously as to affect the +issue of the war, and that he cannot carry on his own trade and operations +except at such risk and hazard as to remove them from the field of +practical strategy. In other words, it means that the enemy can no longer +attack our lines of passage and communication effectively, and that he +cannot use or defend his own. + + [9] In justice to Wellington, it should be said that his complaints were + due to false reports that exaggerated a couple of insignificant captures + into a serious interruption. + +To complete our equipment for appreciating any situation for which +operations have to be designed, it is necessary to remember that when the +command is in dispute the general conditions may give a stable or an +unstable equilibrium. It may be that the power of neither side +preponderates to any appreciable extent. It may also be that the +preponderance is with ourselves, or it may be that it lies with the enemy. +Such preponderance of course will not depend entirely on actual relative +strength, either physical or moral, but will be influenced by the +inter-relation of naval positions and the comparative convenience of their +situation in regard to the object of the war or campaign. By naval +positions we mean, firstly, naval bases and, secondly, the terminals of the +greater lines of communication or trade-routes and the focal areas where +they tend to converge, as at Finisterre, Gibraltar, Suez, the Cape, +Singapore, and many others. + +Upon the degree and distribution of this preponderance will depend in a +general way the extent to which our plans will be governed by the idea of +defence or offence. Generally speaking, it will be to the advantage of the +preponderating side to seek a decision as quickly as possible in order to +terminate the state of dispute. Conversely, the weaker side will as a rule +seek to avoid or postpone a decision in hope of being able by minor +operations, the chances of war, or the development of fresh strength, to +turn the balance in its favour. Such was the line which France adopted +frequently in her wars with us, sometimes legitimately, but sometimes to +such an excess as seriously to demoralise her fleet. Her experience has led +to a hasty deduction that the defensive at sea for even a weaker Power is +an unmixed evil. Such a conclusion is foreign to the fundamental principles +of war. It is idle to exclude the use of an expectant attitude because in +itself it cannot lead to final success, and because if used to excess it +ends in demoralisation and the loss of will to attack. The misconception +appears to have arisen from insistence on the drawbacks of defence by +writers seeking to persuade their country to prepare in time of peace +sufficient naval strength to justify offence from the outset. + +Having now determined the fundamental principles which underlie the idea of +Command of the Sea, we are in a position to consider the manner in which +fleets are constituted in order to fit them for their task. + + * * * * * + + CHAPTER TWO + + * * * * * + + THEORY OF THE MEANS-- + THE CONSTITUTION OF FLEETS + + * * * * * + +In all eras of naval warfare fighting ships have exhibited a tendency to +differentiate into groups in accordance with the primary function each +class was designed to serve. These groupings or classifications are what is +meant by the constitution of a fleet. A threefold differentiation into +battleships, cruisers, and flotilla has so long dominated naval thought +that we have come to regard it as normal, and even essential. It may be so, +but such a classification has been by no means constant. Other ideas of +fleet constitution have not only existed, but have stood the test of war +for long periods, and it is unscientific and unsafe to ignore such facts if +we wish to arrive at sound doctrine. + +The truth is, that the classes of ships which constitute a fleet are, or +ought to be, the expression in material of the strategical and tactical +ideas that prevail at any given time, and consequently they have varied not +only with the ideas, but also with the material in vogue. It may also be +said more broadly that they have varied with the theory of war, by which +more or less consciously naval thought was dominated. It is true that few +ages have formulated a theory of war, or even been clearly aware of its +influence; but nevertheless such theories have always existed, and even in +their most nebulous and intangible shapes seem to have exerted an +ascertainable influence on the constitution of fleets. + +Going back to the dawn of modern times, we note that at the opening of the +sixteenth century, when galley warfare reached its culmination, the +constitution was threefold, bearing a superficial analogy to that which we +have come to regard as normal. There were the galeasses and heavy galleys +corresponding to our battleships, light galleys corresponding to our +cruisers, while the flotilla was represented by the small "frigates," +"brigantines," and similar craft, which had no slave gang for propulsion, +but were rowed by the fighting crew. Such armed sailing ships as then +existed were regarded as auxiliaries, and formed a category apart, as +fireships and bomb-vessels did in the sailing period, and as mine-layers do +now. But the parallel must not be overstrained. The distinction of function +between the two classes of galleys was not so strongly marked as that +between the lighter craft and the galleys; that is to say, the scientific +differentiation between battleships and cruisers had not yet been so firmly +developed as it was destined to become in later times, and the smaller +galleys habitually took their place in the fighting line. + +With the rise of the sailing vessel as the typical ship-of-war an entirely +new constitution made its appearance. The dominating classification became +twofold. It was a classification into vessels of subservient movement using +sails, and vessels of free movement using oars. It was on these lines that +our true Royal Navy was first organised by Henry the Eighth, an expert who, +in the science of war, was one of the most advanced masters in Europe. In +this constitution there appears even less conception than in that of the +galley period of a radical distinction between battleships and cruisers. As +Henry's fleet was originally designed, practically the whole of the +battleships were sailing vessels, though it is true that when the French +brought up galleys from the Mediterranean, he gave some of the smartest of +them oars. The constitution was in fact one of battleships and flotilla. Of +cruisers there were none as we understand them. Fleet scouting was done by +the "Row-barges" and newly introduced "Pinnaces" of the flotilla, while as +for commerce protection, merchant vessels had usually to look after +themselves, the larger ones being regularly armed for their own defence. + +The influence of this twofold constitution continued long after the +conditions of its origin had passed away. In ever-lessening degree indeed +it may be said to have lasted for two hundred years. During the Dutch wars +of the seventeenth century, which finally established the dominant status +of the sailing warship, practically all true sailing vessels--that is, +vessels that had no auxiliary oar propulsion--took station in the line. The +"Frigates" of that time differed not at all from the "Great Ship" in their +functions, but only in their design. By the beginning of the eighteenth +century, however, the old tendency to a threefold organisation began to +reassert itself, but it was not till the middle of the century that the +process of development can be regarded as complete. + +Down to the end of the War of the Austrian Succession--a period which is +usually deemed to be one of conspicuous depression in the naval art--the +classification of our larger sailing vessels was purely arbitrary. The +"Rates" (which had been introduced during the Dutch wars) bore no relation +to any philosophical conception of the complex duties of a fleet. In the +first rate were 100-gun ships; in the second, 90-gun ships--all +three-deckers. So far the system of rating was sound enough, but when we +come to the third rate we find it includes 80-gun ships, which were also of +three decks, while the bulk of the rest were 70-gun two-deckers. The fourth +rate was also composed of two-decked ships--weak battle-units of 60 and 50 +guns--and this was far the largest class. All these four rates were classed +as ships-of-the-line. Below them came the fifth rates, which, though they +were used as cruisers, had no distinct class name. They differed indeed +only in degree from the ship-of-the-line, being all cramped two-deckers of +44 and 40 guns, and they must be regarded, in so far as they expressed any +logical idea of naval warfare, as the forerunners of the "Intermediate" +class, represented in the succeeding epochs by 50-gun ships, and in our own +time by armoured cruisers. The only true cruiser is found in the sixth +rate, which comprised small and weakly armed 20-gun ships, and between them +and the "Forties" there was nothing. Below them, but again without any +clear differentiation, came the unrated sloops representing the flotilla. + +In such a system of rating there is no logical distinction either between +large and small battleships or between battleships and cruisers, or between +cruisers and flotilla. The only marked break in the gradual descent is that +between the 40-gun two-deckers and the 20-gun cruisers. As these latter +vessels as well as the sloops used sweeps for auxiliary propulsion, we are +forced to conclude that the only basis of the classification was that +adopted by Henry the Eighth, which, sound as it was in his time, had long +ceased to have any real relation to the actuality of naval war. + +It was not till Anson's memorable administration that a scientific system +of rating was re-established and the fleet at last assumed the logical +constitution which it retained up to our own time. In the first two rates +appear the fleet flagship class, three-deckers of 100 and 90 guns +respectively. All smaller three-deckers are eliminated. In the next two +rates we have the rank and file of the battle-line, two-deckers of +increased size-namely, seventy-fours in the third rate, and sixty-fours in +the fourth. Here, however, is a slight break in the perfection of the +system, for the fourth rate also included 50-gun ships of two decks, which, +during the progress of the Seven Years' War, ceased to be regarded as +ships-of-the-line. War experience was eliminating small battleships, and +therewith it called for a type intermediate between battleships and +cruisers, with whose functions we shall have to deal directly. In practice +these units soon formed a rate by themselves, into which, by the same +tendency, 60-gun ships were destined to sink half a century later. + +But most pregnant of all Anson's reforms was the introduction of the true +cruiser, no longer a small battleship, but a vessel specialised for its +logical functions, and distinct in design both from the battle rates and +the flotilla. Both 40-gun and 20-gun types were abolished, and in their +place appear two cruiser rates, and the fifth consisting of 32-gun true +frigates, and the sixth of 28-gun frigates, both completely divorced from +any battle function. Finally, after a very distinct gap, came the unrated +sloops and smaller craft, which formed the flotilla for coastwise and +inshore work, despatch service, and kindred duties. + +The reforms of the great First Lord amounted in fact to a clearly +apprehended threefold constitution, in which the various groups were +frankly specialised in accordance with the functions each was expected to +perform. Specialisation, it will be observed, is the note of the process of +development. We have no longer an endeavour to adapt the fleet to its +multifarious duties by multiplying a comparatively weak nature of +fighting-ship, which could act in the line and yet be had in sufficient +numbers to protect commerce, but which was not well fitted for either +service. Instead we note a definite recognition of the principle that +battleships should be as powerful as possible, and that in order to permit +of their due development they must be relieved of their cruising functions +by a class of vessel specially adapted for the purpose. The question we +have to consider is, was this specialisation, which has asserted itself +down to our own times, in the true line of development? Was it, in fact, a +right expression of the needs which are indicated by the theory of naval +war? + +By the theory of naval war it must be reiterated we mean nothing but an +enunciation of the fundamental principles which underlie all naval war. +Those principles, if we have determined them correctly, should be found +giving shape not only to strategy and tactics, but also to material, +whatever method and means of naval warfare may be in use at any given time. +Conversely, if we find strategy, tactics, or organisation exhibiting a +tendency to reproduce the same forms under widely differing conditions of +method and material, we should be able to show that those forms bear a +constant and definite relation to the principles which our theory +endeavours to express. + +In the case of Anson's threefold organisation, the relation is not far to +seek, though it has become obscured by two maxims. The one is, that "the +command of the sea depends upon battleships," and the other, that "cruisers +are the eyes of the fleet." It is the inherent evil of maxims that they +tend to get stretched beyond their original meaning. Both of these express +a truth, but neither expresses the whole truth. On no theory of naval +warfare can we expect to command the sea with battleships, nor, on the +communication theory, can we regard the primary function of cruisers as +being to scout for a battle-fleet. It is perfectly true that the control +depends ultimately on the battle-fleet if control is disputed by a hostile +battle-fleet, as it usually is. It is also true that, so far as is +necessary to enable the battle-fleet to secure the control, we have to +furnish it with eyes from our cruiser force. But it does not follow that +this is the primary function of cruisers. The truth is, we have to withdraw +them from their primary function in order to do work for the battle-fleet +which it cannot do for itself. + +Well established as is the "Eyes of the fleet" maxim, it would be very +difficult to show that scouting was ever regarded as the primary function +of cruisers by the highest authorities. In Nelson's practice at least their +paramount function was to exercise the control which he was securing with +his battle-squadron. Nothing is more familiar in naval history than his +incessant cry from the Mediterranean for more cruisers, but the +significance of that cry has become obscured. It was not that his cruisers +were not numerous in proportion to his battleships--they were usually +nearly double in number--but it was rather that he was so deeply convinced +of their true function, that he used them to exercise control to an extent +which sometimes reduced his fleet cruisers below the limit of bare +necessity. The result on a memorable occasion was the escape of the enemy's +battle-fleet, but the further result is equally important. It was that the +escape of that fleet did not deprive him of the control which he was +charged to maintain. His judgment may have been at fault, but the +strategical distribution of his force was consistent throughout the whole +period of his Mediterranean command. Judged by his record, no man ever +grasped more clearly than Nelson that the object of naval warfare was to +control communications, and if he found that he had not a sufficient number +of cruisers to exercise that control and to furnish eyes for his +battle-fleet as well, it was the battle-fleet that was made to suffer, and +surely this is at least the logical view. Had the French been ready to risk +settling the question of the control in a fleet action, it would have been +different. He would then have been right to sacrifice the exercise of +control for the time in order to make sure that the action should take +place and end decisively in his favour. But he knew they were not ready to +take such a risk, and he refused to permit a purely defensive attitude on +the part of the enemy to delude him from the special function with which he +had been charged. + +If the object of naval warfare is to control communications, then the +fundamental requirement is the means of exercising that control. Logically, +therefore, if the enemy holds back from battle decision, we must relegate +the battle-fleet to a secondary position, for cruisers are the means of +exercising control; the battle-fleet is but the means of preventing their +being interfered with in their work. Put it to the test of actual practice. +In no case can we exercise control by battleships alone. Their +specialisation has rendered them unfit for the work, and has made them too +costly ever to be numerous enough. Even, therefore, if our enemy had no +battle-fleet we could not make control effective with battleships alone. We +should still require cruisers specialised for the work and in sufficient +numbers to cover the necessary ground. But the converse is not true. We +could exercise control with cruisers alone if the enemy had no battle-fleet +to interfere with them. + +If, then, we seek a formula that will express the practical results of our +theory, it would take some such shape as this. On cruisers depends our +exercise of control; on the battle-fleet depends the security of control. +That is the logical sequence of ideas, and it shows us that the current +maxim is really the conclusion of a logical argument in which the initial +steps must not be ignored. The maxim that the command of the sea depends on +the battle-fleet is then perfectly sound so long as it is taken to include +all the other facts on which it hangs. The true function of the +battle-fleet is to protect cruisers and flotilla at their special work. The +best means of doing this is of course to destroy the enemy's power of +interference. The doctrine of destroying the enemy's armed forces as the +paramount object here reasserts itself, and reasserts itself so strongly as +to permit for most practical purposes the rough generalisation that the +command depends upon the battle-fleet. + +Of what practical use then, it may be asked, is all this hairsplitting? Why +not leave untainted the conviction that our first and foremost business is +to crush the enemy's battle-fleet, and that to this end our whole effort +should be concentrated? The answer is to point to Nelson's dilemma. It was +a dilemma which, in the golden age of naval warfare, every admiral at sea +had had to solve for himself, and it was always one of the most difficult +details of every naval war plan. If we seek to ensure the effective action +of the battle-fleet by giving it a large proportion of cruisers, by so much +do we weaken the actual and continuous exercise of control. If we seek to +make that control effective by devoting to the service a large proportion +of cruisers, by so much do we prejudice our chance of getting contact with +and defeating the enemy's battle-fleet, which is the only means of +perfecting control. + +The correct solution of the dilemma will of course depend upon the +conditions of each case--mainly upon the relative strength and activity of +the hostile battle-fleet and our enemy's probable intentions. But no matter +how completely we have tabulated all the relevant facts, we can never hope +to come to a sound conclusion upon them without a just appreciation of all +the elements which go to give command, and without the power of gauging +their relative importance. This, and this alone, will ultimately settle the +vital question of what proportion of our cruiser force it is right to +devote to the battle-fleet. + +If the doctrine of cruiser control be correct, then every cruiser attached +to the battle-fleet is one withdrawn from its true function. Such +withdrawals are inevitable. A squadron of battleships is an imperfect +organism unable to do its work without cruiser assistance, and since the +performance of its work is essential to cruiser freedom, some cruisers must +be sacrificed. But in what proportion? If we confine ourselves to the view +that command depends on the battle-fleet, then we shall attach to it such a +number as its commander may deem necessary to make contact with the enemy +absolutely certain and to surround himself with an impenetrable screen. If +we knew the enemy was as anxious for a decision as ourselves, such a course +might be justified. But the normal condition is that if we desire a +decision it is because we have definite hopes of success, and consequently +the enemy will probably seek to avoid one on our terms. In practice this +means that if we have perfected our arrangements for the destruction of his +main fleet he will refuse to expose it till he sees a more favourable +opportunity. And what will be the result? He remains on the defensive, and +theoretically all the ensuing period of inaction tends to fall into his +scale. Without stirring from port his fleet is doing its work. The more +closely he induces us to concentrate our cruiser force in face of his +battle-fleet, the more he frees the sea for the circulation of his own +trade, and the more he exposes ours to cruiser raids. + +Experience, then, and theory alike dictate that as a general principle +cruisers should be regarded as primarily concerned with the active +occupation of communications, and that withdrawals for fleet purposes +should be reduced to the furthest margin of reasonable risk. What that +margin should be can only be decided on the circumstances of each case as +it arises, and by the personal characteristics of the officers who are +responsible. Nelson's practice was to reduce fleet cruisers lower than +perhaps any other commander. So small indeed was the margin of efficiency +he left, that in the campaign already cited, when his judgment was ripest, +one stroke of ill-luck--a chance betrayal of his position by a +neutral--availed to deprive him of the decision he sought, and to let the +enemy's fleet escape. + +We arrive, then, at this general conclusion. The object of naval warfare is +to control maritime communications. In order to exercise that control +effectively we must have a numerous class of vessels specially adapted for +pursuit. But their power of exercising control is in proportion to our +degree of command, that is, to our power of preventing their operations +being interfered with by the enemy. Their own power of resistance is in +inverse proportion to their power of exercising control; that is to say, +the more numerous and better adapted they are for preying on commerce and +transports, the weaker will be their individual fighting power. We cannot +give them as a whole the power of resisting disturbance without at the same +time reducing their power of exercising control. The accepted solution of +the difficulty during the great period of Anson's school was to provide +them with a covering force of battle units specially adapted for fighting. +But here arises a correlative difficulty. In so far as we give our battle +units fighting power we deny them scouting power, and scouting is essential +to their effective operation. The battle-fleet must have eyes. Now, vessels +adapted for control of communications are also well adapted for "eyes." It +becomes the practice, therefore, to withdraw from control operations a +sufficient number of units to enable the battle-fleet to cover effectively +the operations of those that remain. + +Such were the broad principles on which the inevitable dilemma always had +to be solved, and on which Anson's organisation was based. They flow +naturally from the communication theory of maritime war, and it was this +theory which then dominated naval thought, as is apparent from the +technical use of such phrases as "lines of passage and communication." The +war plans of the great strategists from Anson and Barham can always be +resolved into these simple elements, and where we find the Admiralty grip +of them loosened, we have the confusion and quite unnecessary failures of +the War of American Independence. In that mismanaged contest the cardinal +mistake was that we suffered the enemy's battle-fleets to get upon and +occupy the vital lines of "passage and communication" without first +bringing them to action, an error partly due to the unreadiness of a weak +administration, and partly to an insufficient allocation of cruisers to +secure contact at the right places. + +So far, then, the principles on which our naval supremacy was built up are +clear. For the enemies with whom we had to deal Anson's system was +admirably conceived. Both Spain and France held the communication theory so +strongly, that they were content to count as success the power of +continually disturbing our control without any real attempt to secure it +for themselves. To defeat such a policy Anson's constitution and the +strategy it connoted were thoroughly well adapted and easy to work. But it +by no means follows that his doctrine is the last word. Even in his own +time complications had begun to develop which tended to confuse the +precision of his system. By the culminating year of Trafalgar there were +indications that it was getting worn out, while the new methods and +material used by the Americans in 1812 made a serious rent in it. The +disturbances then inaugurated have continued to develop, and it is +necessary to consider how seriously they have confused the problem of fleet +constitution. + +Firstly, there is the general recognition, always patent to ourselves, that +by far the most drastic, economical, and effective way of securing control +is to destroy the enemy's means of interfering with it. In our own service +this "overthrow" idea always tended to assert itself so strongly, that +occasionally the means became for a time more important than the end; that +is to say, circumstances were such that on occasions it was considered +advisable to sacrifice the exercise of control for a time in order quickly +and permanently to deprive the enemy of all means of interference. When +there was reasonable hope of the enemy risking a decision this +consideration tended to override all others; but when, as in Nelson's case +in the Mediterranean, the hope was small, the exercise of control tended to +take the paramount place. + +The second complexity arose from the fact that however strong might be our +battleship cover, it is impossible for it absolutely to secure cruiser +control from disturbance by sporadic attack. Isolated heavy ships, taking +advantage of the chances of the sea, could elude even the strictest +blockade, and one such ship, if she succeeded in getting upon a line of +communication, might paralyse the operations of a number of weaker units. +They must either run or concentrate, and in either case the control was +broken. If it were a squadron of heavy ships that caused the disturbance, +the practice was to detach against it a division of the covering +battle-fleet. But it was obviously highly inconvenient and contrary to the +whole idea on which the constitution of the fleet was based to allow every +slight danger to cruiser control to loosen the cohesion of the main fleet. + +It was necessary, then, to give cruiser lines some power of resistance. +This necessity once admitted, there seemed no point at which you could stop +increasing the fighting power of your cruisers, and sooner or later, unless +some means of checking the process were found, the distinction between +cruisers and battleships would practically disappear. Such a means was +found in what may be called the "Intermediate" ship. Frigates did indeed +continue to increase in size and fighting power throughout the remainder of +the sailing era, but it was not only in this manner that the power of +resistance was gained. The evil results of the movement were checked by the +introduction of a supporting ship, midway between frigates and true +ships-of-the-line. Sometimes classed as a battleship, and taking her place +in the line, the 50-gun ship came to be essentially a type for stiffening +cruiser squadrons. They most commonly appear as the flagships of cruiser +commodores, or stationed in terminal waters or at focal points where +sporadic raids were likely to fall and be most destructive. The strategical +effect of the presence of such a vessel in a cruiser line was to give the +whole line in some degree the strength of the intermediate ship; for any +hostile cruiser endeavouring to disturb the line was liable to have to deal +with the supporting ship, while if a frigate and a 50-gun ship got together +they were a match even for a small ship-of-the-line. + +In sailing days, of course, this power of the supporting ship was weak +owing to the imperfection of the means of distant communication between +ships at sea and the non-existence of such means beyond extreme range of +vision. But as wireless telegraphy develops it is not unreasonable to +expect that the strategic value of the supporting or intermediate ship will +be found greater than it ever was in sailing days, and that for dealing +with sporadic disturbance the tendency will be for a cruiser line to +approximate more and more in power of resistance to that of its strongest +unit. + +For fleet service a cruiser's power of resistance was hardly less valuable; +for though we speak of fleet cruisers as the eyes of the fleet, their +purpose is almost equally to blindfold the enemy. Their duty is not only to +disclose the movements of the enemy, but also to act as a screen to conceal +our own. The point was specially well marked in the blockades, where the +old 50-gun ships are almost always found with the inshore cruiser squadron, +preventing that squadron being forced by inquisitive frigates. Important as +this power of resistance in the screen was in the old days, it is tenfold +more important now, and the consequent difficulty of keeping cruisers +distinct from battleships is greater than ever. The reason for this is best +considered under the third and most serious cause of complexity. + +The third cause is the acquisition by the flotilla of battle power. It is a +feature of naval warfare that is entirely new.[10] For all practical +purposes it was unknown until the full development of the mobile torpedo. +It is true that the fireship as originally conceived was regarded as having +something of the same power. During the Dutch wars--the heyday of its +vogue--its assigned power was on some occasions actually realised, as in +the burning of Lord Sandwich's flagship at the battle of Solebay, and the +destruction of the Spanish-Dutch fleet at Palermo by Duquesne. But as the +"nimbleness" of great-ships increased with the ripening of seamanship and +naval architecture, the fireship as a battle weapon became almost +negligible, while a fleet at anchor was found to be thoroughly defensible +by its own picket-boats. Towards the middle of the eighteenth century +indeed the occasions on which the fireship could be used for its special +purpose was regarded as highly exceptional, and though the type was +retained till the end of the century, its normal functions differed not at +all from those of the rest of the flotilla of which it then formed part. + + [10] But not without analogous precedent. In the later Middle Ages small + craft were assigned the function in battle of trying to wedge up the + rudders of great ships or bore holes between wind and water. See Fighting + Instructions (Navy Record Society), p. 13. + +Those functions, as we have seen, expressed the cruising idea in its purest +sense. It was numbers and mobility that determined flotilla types rather +than armament or capacity for sea-endurance. Their primary purpose was to +control communications in home and colonial waters against weakly armed +privateers. The type which these duties determined fitted them adequately +for the secondary purpose of inshore and despatch work with a fleet. It +was, moreover, on the ubiquity which their numbers gave them, and on their +power of dealing with unarmed or lightly armed vessels, that we relied for +our first line of defence against invasion. These latter duties were of +course exceptional, and the Navy List did not carry as a rule sufficient +numbers for the purpose. But a special value of the class was that it was +capable of rapid and almost indefinite expansion from the mercantile +marine. Anything that could carry a gun had its use, and during the period +of the Napoleonic threat the defence flotilla rose all told to considerably +over a thousand units. + +Formidable and effective as was a flotilla of this type for the ends it was +designed to serve, it obviously in no way affected the security of a +battle-fleet. But so soon as the flotilla acquired battle power the whole +situation was changed, and the old principles of cruiser design and +distribution were torn to shreds. The battle-fleet became a more imperfect +organism than ever. Formerly it was only its offensive power that required +supplementing. The new condition meant that unaided it could no longer +ensure its own defence. It now required screening, not only from +observation, but also from flotilla attack. The theoretical weakness of an +arrested offensive received a practical and concrete illustration to a +degree that war had scarcely ever known. Our most dearly cherished +strategical traditions were shaken to the bottom. The "proper place" for +our battle-fleet had always been "on the enemy's coasts," and now that was +precisely where the enemy would be best pleased to see it. What was to be +done? So splendid a tradition could not lightly be laid aside, but the +attempt to preserve it involved us still deeper in heresy. The vital, most +difficult, and most absorbing problem has become not how to increase the +power of a battle-fleet for attack, which is a comparatively simple matter, +but how to defend it. As the offensive power of the flotilla developed, the +problem pressed with an almost bewildering intensity. With every increase +in the speed and sea-keeping power of torpedo craft, the problem of the +screen grew more exacting. To keep the hostile flotilla out of night range +the screen must be flung out wider and wider, and this meant more and more +cruisers withdrawn from their primary function. And not only this. The +screen must not only be far flung, but it must be made as far as possible +impenetrable. In other words, its own power of resistance must be increased +all along the line. Whole squadrons of armoured cruisers had to be attached +to battle-fleets to support the weaker members of the screen. The crying +need for this type of ship set up a rapid movement for increasing their +fighting power, and with it fell with equal rapidity the economic +possibility of giving the cruiser class its essential attribute of numbers. + +As an inevitable result we find ourselves involved in an effort to restore +to the flotilla some of its old cruiser capacity, by endowing it with gun +armament, higher sea-keeping power, and facilities for distant +communication, all at the cost of specialisation and of greater economic +strain. Still judged by past experience, some means of increasing numbers +in the cruising types is essential, nor is it clear how it is possible to +secure that essential in the ranks of the true cruiser. No point has been +found at which it was possible to stop the tendency of this class of vessel +to increase in size and cost, or to recall it to the strategical position +it used to occupy. So insecure is the battle-squadron, so imperfect as a +self-contained weapon has it become, that its need has overridden the old +order of things, and the primary function of the cruising ship inclines to +be no longer the exercise of control under cover of the battle-fleet. The +battle-fleet now demands protection by the cruising ship, and what the +battle-fleet needs is held to be the first necessity. + +Judged by the old naval practice, it is an anomalous position to have +reached. But the whole naval art has suffered a revolution beyond all +previous experience, and it is possible the old practice is no longer a +safe guide. Driven by the same necessities, every naval Power is following +the same course. It may be right, it may be wrong; no one at least but the +ignorant or hasty will venture to pass categorical judgment. The best we +can do is to endeavour to realise the situation to which, in spite of all +misgivings, we have been forced, and to determine its relations to the +developments of the past. + +It is undoubtedly a difficult task. As we have seen, there have prevailed +in the constitution of fleets at various times several methods of +expressing the necessities of naval war. The present system differs from +them all. On the one hand, we have the fact that the latest developments of +cruiser power have finally obliterated all logical distinction between +cruisers and battleships, and we thus find ourselves hand in hand with the +fleet constitution of the old Dutch wars. On the other, however, we have +armoured cruisers organised in squadrons and attached to battle-fleets not +only for strategical purposes, but also with as yet undeveloped tactical +functions in battle. Here we come close to the latest development of the +sailing era, when "Advanced" or "Light" squadrons began to appear in the +organisation of battle-fleets. + +The system arose towards the end of the eighteenth century in the +Mediterranean, where the conditions of control called for so wide a +dispersal of cruisers and so great a number of them, that it was almost +imperative for a battle-squadron in that sea to do much of its own +scouting. It was certainly for this purpose that the fastest and lightest +ships-of-the-line were formed into a separate unit, and the first +designation it received was that of "Observation Squadron." It remained for +Nelson to endeavour to endow it with a tactical function, but his idea was +never realised either by himself or any of his successors. + +Side by side with this new element in the organisation of a battle-fleet, +which perhaps is best designated as a "Light Division," we have another +significant fact. Not only was it not always composed entirely of +ships-of-the-line, especially in the French service, but in 1805, the year +of the full development, we have Sir Richard Strachan using the heavy +frigates attached to his battle-squadron as a "Light Division," and giving +them a definite tactical function. The collapse of the French Navy put a +stop to further developments of either idea. Whither they would have led we +cannot tell. But it is impossible to shut our eyes to the indication of a +growing tendency towards the system that exists at present. It is difficult +at least to ignore the fact that both Nelson and Strachan in that +culminating year found the actuality of war calling for something for which +there was then no provision in the constitution of the fleet, but which it +does contain to-day. What Nelson felt for was a battleship of cruiser +speed. What Strachan desired was a cruiser fit to take a tactical part in a +fleet action. We have them both, but with what result? Anson's +specialisation of types has almost disappeared, and our present fleet +constitution is scarcely to be distinguished from that of the seventeenth +century. We retain the three-fold nomenclature, but the system itself has +really gone. Battleships grade into armoured cruisers, armoured cruisers +into protected cruisers. We can scarcely detect any real distinction except +a twofold one between vessels whose primary armament is the gun and vessels +whose primary armament is the torpedo. But even here the existence of a +type of cruiser designed to act with flotillas blurs the outline, while, as +we have seen, the larger units of the flotilla are grading up to cruiser +level. + +We are thus face to face with a situation which has its closest counterpart +in the structureless fleets of the seventeenth century. That naval thought +should have so nearly retraced its steps in the course of two centuries is +curious enough, but it is still more striking when we consider how widely +the underlying causes differ in each case. The pressure which has forced +the present situation is due most obviously to two causes. One is the +excessive development of the "intermediate" ship originally devised for +purposes of commerce protection, and dictated by a menace which the +experience of the American War had taught us to respect. The other is the +introduction of the torpedo, and the consequent vulnerability of +battle-squadrons that are not securely screened. Nothing of the kind had +any influence on the fleet constitution of the seventeenth century. But if +we seek deeper, there is a less obvious consideration which for what it is +worth is too striking to be ignored. + +It has been suggested above that the constitution of fleets appears to have +some more or less recognisable relation to the prevalent theory of war. +Now, amongst all our uncertainty we can assert with confidence that the +theory which holds the field at the present day bears the closest possible +resemblance to that which dominated the soldier-admirals of the Dutch war. +It was the "Overthrow" theory, the firm faith in the decisive action as the +key of all strategical problems. They carried it to sea with them from the +battlefields of the New Model Army, and the Dutch met them squarely. In the +first war at least their commerce had to give place to the exigencies of +throwing into the battle everything that could affect the issue. It is not +of course pretended that this attitude was dictated by any clearly +conceived theory of absolute war. It was due rather to the fact that, owing +to the relative geographical conditions, all attempts to guard trade +communications were useless without the command of the home waters in the +North Sea, and the truth received a clinching moral emphasis from the +British claim to the actual dominion of the Narrow Seas. It was, in fact, a +war which resembled rather the continental conditions of territorial +conquest than the naval procedure that characterised our rivalry with +France. + +Is it then possible, however much we may resist the conclusion in loyalty +to the eighteenth-century tradition, that the rise of a new naval Power in +the room of Holland must bring us back to the drastic, if crude, methods of +the Dutch wars, and force us to tread under foot the nicer ingenuity of +Anson's system? Is it this which has tempted us to mistrust any type of +vessel which cannot be flung into the battle? The recurrence of a +formidable rival in the North Sea was certainly not the first cause of the +reaction. It began before that menace arose. Still it has undoubtedly +forced the pace, and even if it be not a cause, it may well be a +justification. + + * * * * * + + CHAPTER THREE + + * * * * * + + THEORY OF THE METHOD-- + CONCENTRATION AND DISPERSAL OF FORCE + + * * * * * + +From the point of view of the method by which its ends are obtained, +strategy is often described as the art of assembling the utmost force at +the right time and place; and this method is called "Concentration." + +At first sight the term seems simple and expressive enough, but on analysis +it will be found to include several distinct ideas, to all of which the +term is applied indifferently. The result is a source of some confusion, +even to the most lucid writers. "The word concentration," says one of the +most recent of them, "evokes the idea of a grouping of forces. We believe, +in fact, that we cannot make war without grouping ships into squadrons and +squadrons into fleets."[11] Here in one sentence the word hovers between +the formation of fleets and their strategical distribution. Similar +looseness will embarrass the student at every turn. At one time he will +find the word used to express the antithesis of division or dispersal of +force; at another, to express strategic deployment, which implies division +to a greater or less extent. He will find it used of the process of +assembling a force, as well as of the state of a force when the process is +complete. The truth is that the term, which is one of the most common and +most necessary in strategical discussion, has never acquired a very precise +meaning, and this lack of precision is one of the commonest causes of +conflicting opinion and questionable judgments. No strategical term indeed +calls more urgently for a clear determination of the ideas for which it +stands. + + [11] Daveluy, _L'Esprit de la Guerre Navale_, vol. i, p. 27, note. + +Military phraseology, from which the word is taken, employs "concentration" +in three senses. It is used for assembling the units of an army after they +have been mobilised. In this sense, concentration is mainly an +administrative process; logically, it means the complement of the process +of mobilisation, whereby the army realises its war organisation and becomes +ready to take the field. In a second sense it is used for the process of +moving the army when formed, or in process of formation, to the localities +from which operations can best begin. This is a true strategical stage, and +it culminates in what is known as strategic deployment. Finally, it is used +for the ultimate stage when the army so deployed is closed up upon a +definite line of operations in immediate readiness for tactical +deployment--gathered up, that is, to deal a concentrated blow. + +Well as this terminology appears to serve on land, where the processes tend +to overlap, something more exact is required if we try to extend it to the +sea. Such extension magnifies the error at every step, and clear thinking +becomes difficult. Even if we set aside the first meaning, that is, the +final stage of mobilisation, we have still to deal with the two others +which, in a great measure, are mutually contradictory. The essential +distinction of strategic deployment, which contemplates dispersal with a +view to a choice of combinations, is flexibility and free movement. The +characteristic of an army massed for a blow is rigidity and restricted +mobility. In the one sense of concentration we contemplate a disposal of +force which will conceal our intention from the enemy and will permit us to +adapt our movements to the plan of operations he develops. In the other, +strategic concealment is at an end. We have made our choice, and are +committed to a definite operation. Clearly, then, if we would apply the +principles of land concentration to naval warfare it is desirable to settle +which of the two phases of an operation we mean by the term. + +Which meaning, then, is most closely connected with the ordinary use of the +word? The dictionaries define concentration as "the state of being brought +to a common point or centre," and this coincides very exactly with the +stage of a war plan which intervenes between the completion of mobilisation +and the final massing or deployment for battle. It is an incomplete and +continuing act. Its ultimate consequence is the mass. It is a method of +securing mass at the right time and place. As we have seen, the essence of +the state of strategic deployment to which it leads is flexibility. In war +the choice of time and place will always be influenced by the enemy's +dispositions and movements, or by our desire to deal him an unexpected +blow. The merit of concentration, then, in this sense, is its power of +permitting us to form our mass in time at one of the greatest number of +different points where mass may be required. + +It is for this stage that the more recent text-books incline to specialise +concentration--qualifying it as "strategic concentration." But even that +term scarcely meets the case, for the succeeding process of gathering up +the army into a position for tactical deployment is also a strategical +concentration. Some further specialisation is required. The analytical +difference between the two processes is that the first is an operation of +major strategy and the other of minor, and if they are to be fully +expressed, we have to weight ourselves with the terms "major and minor +strategic concentration." + +Such cumbrous terminology is too forbidding to use. It serves only to mark +that the middle stage differs logically from the third as much as it does +from the first. In practice it comes to this. If we are going to use +concentration in its natural sense, we must regard it as something that +comes after complete mobilisation and stops short of the formation of mass. + +In naval warfare at least this distinction between concentration and mass +is essential to clear appreciation. It leads us to conclusions that are of +the first importance. For instance, when once the mass is formed, +concealment and flexibility are at an end. The further, therefore, from the +formation of the ultimate mass we can stop the process of concentration the +better designed it will be. The less we are committed to any particular +mass, and the less we indicate what and where our mass is to be, the more +formidable our concentration. To concentration, therefore, the idea of +division is as essential as the idea of connection. It is this view of the +process which, at least for naval warfare, a weighty critical authority has +most strongly emphasised. "Such," he says, "is concentration reasonably +understood--not huddled together like a drove of sheep, but distributed +with a regard to a common purpose, and linked together by the effectual +energy of a single will."[12] Vessels in a state of concentration he +compares to a fan that opens and shuts. In this view concentration connotes +not a homogeneous body, but a compound organism controlled from a common +centre, and elastic enough to permit it to cover a wide field without +sacrificing the mutual support of its parts. + + [12] Mahan, _War of 1812_, i, 316. + +If, then, we exclude the meaning of mere assembling and the meaning of the +mass, we have left a signification which expresses coherent disposal about +a strategical centre, and this it will be seen gives for naval warfare just +the working definition that we want as the counterpart of strategic +deployment on land. The object of a naval concentration like that of +strategic deployment will be to cover the widest possible area, and to +preserve at the same time elastic cohesion, so as to secure rapid +condensations of any two or more of the parts of the organism, and in any +part of the area to be covered, at the will of the controlling mind; and +above all, a sure and rapid condensation of the whole at the strategical +centre. + +Concentration of this nature, moreover, will be the expression of a war +plan which, while solidly based on an ultimate central mass, still +preserves the faculty of delivering or meeting minor attacks in any +direction. It will permit us to exercise control of the sea while we await +and work for the opportunity of a decision which shall permanently secure +control, and it will permit this without prejudicing our ability of +bringing the utmost force to bear when the moment for the decision arrives. +Concentration, in fact, implies a continual conflict between cohesion and +reach, and for practical purposes it is the right adjustment of those two +tensions--ever shifting in force--which constitutes the greater part of +practical strategy. + +In naval warfare this concentration stage has a peculiar significance in +the development of a campaign, and at sea it is more clearly detached than +ashore. Owing to the vast size of modern armies, and the restricted nature +of their lines of movement, no less than their lower intrinsic mobility as +compared with fleets, the processes of assembly, concentration, and forming +the battle mass tend to grade into one another without any demarcation of +practical value. An army frequently reaches the stage of strategic +deployment direct from the mobilisation bases of its units, and on famous +occasions its only real concentration has taken place on the battlefield. +In Continental warfare, then, there is less difficulty in using the term to +cover all three processes. Their tendency is always to overlap. But at sea, +where communications are free and unrestricted by obstacles, and where +mobility is high, they are susceptible of sharper differentiation. The +normal course is for a fleet to assemble at a naval port; thence by a +distinct movement it proceeds to the strategical centre and reaches out in +divisions as required. The concentration about that centre may be very far +from a mass, and the final formation of the mass will bear no resemblance +to either of the previous movements, and will be quite distinct. + +But free as a fleet is from the special fetters of an army, there always +exist at sea peculiar conditions of friction which clog its freedom of +disposition. One source of this friction is commerce protection. However +much our war plan may press for close concentration, the need of commerce +protection will always be calling for dispersal. The other source is the +peculiar freedom and secrecy of movements at sea. As the sea knows no roads +to limit or indicate our own lines of operation, so it tells little about +those of the enemy. The most distant and widely dispersed points must be +kept in view as possible objectives of the enemy. When we add to this that +two or more fleets can act in conjunction from widely separated bases with +far greater certainty than is possible for armies, it is obvious that the +variety of combinations is much higher at sea than on land, and variety of +combination is in constant opposition to the central mass. + +It follows that so long as the enemy's fleet is divided, and thereby +retains various possibilities of either concentrated or sporadic action, +our distribution will be dictated by the need of being able to deal with a +variety of combinations and to protect a variety of objectives. Our +concentrations must therefore be kept as open and flexible as possible. +History accordingly shows us that the riper and fresher our experience and +the surer our grip of war, the looser were our concentrations. The idea of +massing, as a virtue in itself, is bred in peace and not in war. It +indicates the debilitating idea that in war we must seek rather to avoid +than to inflict defeat. True, advocates of the mass entrench themselves in +the plausible conception that their aim is to inflict crushing defeats. But +this too is an idea of peace. War has proved to the hilt that victories +have not only to be won, but worked for. They must be worked for by bold +strategical combinations, which as a rule entail at least apparent +dispersal. They can only be achieved by taking risks, and the greatest and +most effective of these is division. + +The effect of prolonged peace has been to make "concentration" a kind of +shibboleth, so that the division of a fleet tends almost to be regarded as +a sure mark of bad leadership. Critics have come to lose sight of the old +war experience, that without division no strategical combinations are +possible. In truth they must be founded on division. Division is bad only +when it is pushed beyond the limits of well-knit deployment. It is +theoretically wrong to place a section of the fleet in such a position that +it may be prevented from falling back on its strategical centre when it is +encountered by a superior force. Such retreats of course can never be made +certain; they will always depend in some measure on the skill and resource +of the opposing commanders, and on the chances of weather: but risks must +be taken. If we risk nothing, we shall seldom perform anything. The great +leader is the man who can measure rightly to what breadth of deployment he +can stretch his concentration. This power of bold and sure adjustment +between cohesion and reach is indeed a supreme test of that judgment which +in the conduct of war takes the place of strategical theory. + +In British naval history examples of faulty division are hard to find. The +case most commonly cited is an early one. It occurred in 1666 during the +second Dutch war. Monk and Rupert were in command of the main fleet, which +from its mobilisation bases in the Thames and at Spithead had concentrated +in the Downs. There they were awaiting De Ruyter's putting to sea in a +position from which they could deal with him whether his object was an +attack on the Thames or to join hands with the French. In this position a +rumour reached them that the Toulon squadron was on its way to the Channel +to co-operate with the Dutch. Upon this false intelligence the fleet was +divided, and Rupert went back to Portsmouth to cover that position in case +it might be the French objective. De Ruyter at once put to sea with a fleet +greatly superior to Monk's division. Monk, however, taking advantage of +thick weather that had supervened, surprised him at anchor, and believing +he had a sufficient tactical advantage attacked him impetuously. Meanwhile +the real situation became known. There was no French fleet, and Rupert was +recalled. He succeeded in rejoining Monk after his action with De Ruyter +had lasted three days. In the course of it Monk had been very severely +handled and forced to retreat to the Thames, and it was generally believed +that it was only the belated arrival of Rupert that saved us from a real +disaster. + +The strategy in this case is usually condemned out of hand and made to bear +the entire blame of the reverse. Monk, who as a soldier had proved himself +one of the finest strategists of the time, is held to have blundered from +sheer ignorance of elementary principles. It is assumed that he should have +kept his fleet massed; but his critics fail to observe that at least in the +opinion of the time this would not have met the case. Had he kept the whole +to deal with De Ruyter, it is probable that De Ruyter would not have put to +sea, and it is certain Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight would have lain +open to the French had they come. If he had moved his mass to deal with the +French, he would have exposed the Thames to De Ruyter. It was a situation +that could not be solved by a simple application of what the French call +the _masse centrale_. The only way to secure both places from attack was to +divide the fleet, just as in 1801 Nelson in the same theatre was compelled +to divide his defence force. In neither case was division a fault, because +it was a necessity. The fault in Monk's and Rupert's case was that they +extended their reach with no proper provision to preserve cohesion. Close +cruiser connection should have been maintained between the two divisions, +and Monk should not have engaged deeply till he felt Rupert at his elbow. +This we are told was the opinion of most of his flag-officers. They held +that he should not have fought when he did. His correct course, on +Kempenfelt's principle, would have been to hang on De Ruyter so as to +prevent his doing anything, and to have slowly fallen back, drawing the +Dutch after him till his loosened concentration was closed up again. If De +Ruyter had refused to follow him through the Straits, there would have been +plenty of time to mass the fleet. If De Ruyter had followed, he could have +been fought in a position from which there would have been no escape. The +fault, in fact, was not strategical, but rather one of tactical judgment. +Monk over-estimated the advantage of his surprise and the relative fighting +values of the two fleets, and believed he saw his way to victory +single-handed. The danger of division is being surprised and forced to +fight in inferiority. This was not Monk's case. He was not surprised, and +he could easily have avoided action had he so desired. To judge such a case +simply by using concentration as a touchstone can only tend to set up such +questionable habits of thought as have condemned the more famous division +which occurred in the crisis of the campaign of 1805, and with which we +must deal later. + +Apart from the general danger of using either words or maxims in this way, +it is obviously specially unwise in the case of concentration and division. +The current rule is that it is bad to divide unless you have a great +superiority; yet there have been numerous occasions when, being at war with +an inferior enemy, we have found our chief embarrassment in the fact that +he kept his fleet divided, and was able thereby to set up something like a +deadlock. The main object of our naval operations would then be to break it +down. To force an inferior enemy to concentrate is indeed the almost +necessary preliminary to securing one of those crushing victories at which +we must always aim, but which so seldom are obtained. It is by forcing the +enemy to attempt to concentrate that we get our opportunity by sagacious +dispersal of crushing his divisions in detail. It is by inducing him to +mass that we simplify our problem and compel him to choose between leaving +to us the exercise of command and putting it to the decision of a great +action. + +Advocates of close concentration will reply that that is true enough. We do +often seek to force our enemy to concentrate, but that does not show that +concentration is sometimes a disadvantage, for we ourselves must +concentrate closely to force a similar concentration on the enemy. The +maxim, indeed, has become current that concentration begets concentration, +but it is not too much to say that it is a maxim which history flatly +contradicts. If the enemy is willing to hazard all on a battle, it is true. +But if we are too superior, or our concentration too well arranged for him +to hope for victory, then our concentration has almost always had the +effect of forcing him to disperse for sporadic action. So certain was this +result, that in our old wars, in which we were usually superior, we always +adopted the loosest possible concentrations in order to prevent sporadic +action. True, the tendency of the French to adopt this mode of warfare is +usually set down to some constitutional ineptitude that is outside +strategical theory, but this view is due rather to the irritation which the +method caused us, than to sober reasoning. For a comparatively weak +belligerent sporadic action was better than nothing, and the only other +alternative was for him to play into our hands by hazarding the decision +which it was our paramount interest to obtain. Sporadic action alone could +never give our enemy command of the sea, but it could do us injury and +embarrass our plans, and there was always hope it might so much loosen our +concentration as to give him a fair chance of obtaining a series of +successful minor decisions. + +Take, now, the leading case of 1805. In that campaign our distribution was +very wide, and was based on several concentrations. The first had its +centre in the Downs, and extended not only athwart the invading army's line +of passage, but also over the whole North Sea, so as to prevent +interference with our trade or our system of coast defence either from the +Dutch in the Texel or from French squadrons arriving north-about. The +second, which was known as the Western Squadron, had its centre off Ushant, +and was spread over the whole Bay of Biscay by means of advanced squadrons +before Ferrol and Rochefort. With a further squadron off the coast of +Ireland, it was able also to reach far out into the Atlantic in order to +receive our trade. It kept guard, in fact, not only over the French naval +ports, but over the approaches to the Channel, where were the home +terminals of the great southern and western trade-routes. A third +concentration was in the Mediterranean, whose centre under Nelson was at +Sardinia. It had outlying sub-centres at Malta and Gibraltar, and covered +the whole ground from Cape St. Vincent outside the Straits to Toulon, +Trieste, and the Dardanelles. When war broke out with Spain in 1804, it was +considered advisable to divide this command, and Spanish waters outside the +Straits were held by a fourth concentration, whose centre was off Cadiz, +and whose northern limit was Cape Finisterre, where it joined the Ushant +concentration. For reasons which were personal rather than strategical this +arrangement was not continued long, nor indeed after a few months was there +the same need for it, for the Toulon squadron had changed its base to +Cadiz. By this comprehensive system the whole of the European seas were +controlled both for military and trade purposes. In the distant terminal +areas, like the East and West Indies, there were nucleus concentrations +with the necessary connective machinery permanently established, and to +render them effective, provision was made by which the various European +squadrons could throw off detachments to bring up their force to any +strength which the movements of the enemy might render necessary. + +Wide as was this distribution, and great as its reach, a high degree of +cohesion was maintained not only between the parts of each concentration, +but between the several concentrations themselves. By means of a minor +cruiser centre at the Channel Islands, the Downs and Ushant concentrations +could rapidly cohere. Similarly the Cadiz concentration was linked up with +that of Ushant at Finisterre, and but for personal friction and repulsion, +the cohesion between the Mediterranean and Cadiz concentrations would have +been equally strong. Finally, there was a masterly provision made for all +the concentrations to condense into one great mass at the crucial point off +Ushant before by any calculable chance a hostile mass could gather there. + +For Napoleon's best admirals, "who knew the craft of the sea," the British +fleet thus disposed was in a state of concentration that nothing but a +stroke of luck beyond the limit of sober calculation could break. Decres +and Bruix had no doubt of it, and the knowledge overpowered Villeneuve when +the crisis came. After he had carried the concentration which Napoleon had +planned so far as to have united three divisions in Ferrol, he knew that +the outlying sections of our Western Squadron had disappeared from before +Ferrol and Rochefort. In his eyes, as well as those of the British +Admiralty, this squadron, in spite of its dispersal in the Bay of Biscay, +had always been in a state of concentration. It was not this which caused +his heart to fail. It was the news that Nelson had reappeared at Gibraltar, +and had been seen steering northward. It meant for him that the whole of +his enemy's European fleet was in a state of concentration. "Their +concentration of force," he afterwards wrote, "was at the moment more +serious than in any previous disposition, and such that they were in a +position to meet in superiority the combined forces of Brest and Ferrol," +and for that reason, he explained, he had given up the game as lost. But to +Napoleon's unpractised eye it was impossible to see what it was he had to +deal with. Measuring the elasticity of the British naval distribution by +the comparatively cumbrous and restricted mobility of armies, he saw it as +a rash and unwarlike dispersal. Its looseness seemed to indicate so great a +tenderness for the distant objectives that lay open to his scattered +squadrons, that he believed by a show of sporadic action he could further +disperse our fleet, and then by a close concentration crush the essential +part in detail. It was a clear case of the enemy's dispersal forcing us to +adopt the loosest concentration, and of our comparative dispersal tempting +the enemy to concentrate and hazard a decision. It cannot be said we forced +the fatal move upon him intentionally. It was rather the operation of +strategical law set in motion by our bold distribution. We were determined +that his threat of invasion, formidable as it was, should not force upon us +so close a concentration as to leave our widespread interests open to his +attack. Neither can it be said that our first aim was to prevent his +attempting to concentrate. Every one of his naval ports was watched by a +squadron, but it was recognised that this would not prevent concentration. +The escape of one division might well break the chain. But that +consideration made no difference. The distribution of our squadrons before +his naval ports was essential for preventing sporadic action. Their +distribution was dictated sufficiently by the defence of commerce and of +colonial and allied territory, by our need, that is, to exercise a general +command even if we could not destroy the enemy's force. + +The whole of Nelson's correspondence for this period shows that his main +object was the protection of our Mediterranean trade and of Neapolitan and +Turkish territory. When Villeneuve escaped him, his irritation was caused +not by the prospect of a French concentration, which had no anxieties for +him, for he knew counter-concentrations were provided for. It was caused +rather by his having lost the opportunity which the attempt to concentrate +had placed within his reach. He followed Villeneuve to the West Indies, not +to prevent concentration, but, firstly, to protect the local trade and +Jamaica, and secondly, in hope of another chance of dealing the blow he had +missed. Lord Barham took precisely the same view. When on news of +Villeneuve's return from the West Indies he moved out the three divisions +of the Western Squadron, that is, the Ushant concentration, to meet him, he +expressly stated, not that his object was to prevent concentration, but +that it was to deter the French from attempting sporadic action. "The +interception of the fleet in question," he wrote, "on its return to Europe +would be a greater object than any I know. It would damp all future +expeditions, and would show to Europe that it might be advisable to relax +in the blockading system occasionally for the express purpose of putting +them in our hands at a convenient opportunity." + +Indeed we had no reason for preventing the enemy's concentration. It was +our best chance of solving effectually the situation we have to confront. +Our true policy was to secure permanent command by a great naval decision. +So long as the enemy remained divided, no such decision could be expected. +It was not, in fact, till he attempted his concentration, and its last +stage had been reached, that the situation was in our hands. The intricate +problem with which we had been struggling was simplified down to closing up +our own concentration to the strategical centre off Ushant. But at the last +stage the enemy could not face the formidable position we held. His +concentration was stopped. Villeneuve fell back on Cadiz, and the problem +began to assume for us something of its former intricacy. So long as we +held the mass off Ushant which our great concentration had produced, we +were safe from invasion. But that was not enough. It left the seas open to +sporadic action from Spanish ports. There were convoys from the East and +West Indies at hand, and there was our expedition in the Mediterranean in +jeopardy, and another on the point of sailing from Cork. Neither Barham at +the Admiralty nor Cornwallis in command off Ushant hesitated an hour. By a +simultaneous induction they both decided the mass must be divided. The +concentration must be opened out again, and it was done. Napoleon called +the move an _insigne betise_, but it was the move that beat him, and must +have beaten him, whatever the skill of his admirals, for the two squadrons +never lost touch. He found himself caught in a situation from which there +was nothing to hope. His fleet was neither concentrated for a decisive blow +nor spread for sporadic action. He had merely simplified his enemy's +problem. Our hold was surer than ever, and in a desperate attempt to +extricate himself he was forced to expose his fleet to the final decision +we required. + +The whole campaign serves well to show what was understood by concentration +at the end of the great naval wars. To Lord Barham and the able admirals +who interpreted his plans it meant the possibility of massing at the right +time and place. It meant, in close analogy to strategic deployment on land, +the disposal of squadrons about a strategical centre from which fleets +could condense for massed action in any required direction, and upon which +they could fall back when unduly pressed. In this case the ultimate centre +was the narrows of the Channel, where Napoleon's army lay ready to cross, +but there was no massing there. So crude a distribution would have meant a +purely defensive attitude. It would have meant waiting to be struck instead +of seeking to strike, and such an attitude was arch-heresy to our old +masters of war. + +So far we have only considered concentration as applied to wars in which we +have a preponderance of naval force, but the principles are at least +equally valid when a coalition places us in inferiority. The leading case +is the home campaign of 1782. It was strictly on defensive lines. Our +information was that France and Spain intended to end the war with a great +combined effort against our West Indian islands, and particularly Jamaica. +It was recognised that the way to meet the threat was to concentrate for +offensive action in the Caribbean Sea everything that was not absolutely +needed for home defence. Instead, therefore, of trying to be strong enough +to attempt the offensive in both areas, it was decided to make sure of the +area that was most critical. To do this the home fleet had to be reduced so +low relatively to what the enemy had in European waters that offence was +out of the question. + +While Rodney took the offensive area, Lord Howe was given the other. His +task was to prevent the coalition obtaining such a command of home waters +as would place our trade and coasts at their mercy, and it was not likely +to prove a light one. We knew that the enemy's plan was to combine their +attack on the West Indies with an attempt to control the North Sea, and +possibly the Straits of Dover, with a Dutch squadron of twelve to fifteen +of the line, while a combined Franco-Spanish fleet of at least forty sail +would occupy the mouth of the Channel. It was also possible that these two +forces would endeavour to form a junction. In any case the object of the +joint operations would be to paralyse our trade and annoy our coasts, and +thereby force us to neglect the West Indian area and the two Spanish +objectives, Minorca and Gibraltar. All told we had only about thirty of the +line on the home station, and though a large proportion of these were +three-deckers, a good many could not be ready for sea till the summer. + +Inferior as was the available force, there was no thought of a purely +passive defence. It would not meet the case. Something must be done to +interfere with the offensive operations of the allies in the West Indies +and against Gibraltar, or they would attain the object of their home +campaign. It was resolved to effect this by minor counterstrokes on their +line of communications to the utmost limit of our defensive reach. It would +mean a considerable stretch of our concentration, but we were determined to +do what we could to prevent reinforcements from reaching the West Indies +from Brest, to intercept French trade as occasion offered, and, finally, at +almost any risk to relieve Gibraltar. + +In these conditions the defensive concentration was based on a central mass +or reserve at Spithead, a squadron in the Downs to watch the Texel for the +safety of the North Sea trade, and another to the westward to watch Brest +and interrupt its transatlantic communications. Kempenfelt in command of +the latter squadron had just shown what could be done by his great exploit +of capturing Guichen's convoy of military and naval stores for the West +Indies. Early in the spring he was relieved by Barrington, who sailed on +April 5th to resume the Ushant position. His instructions were not to fight +a superior enemy unless in favourable circumstances, but to retire on +Spithead. He was away three weeks, and returned with a French East India +convoy with troops and stores, and two of the ships of-the-line which +formed its escort. + +Up to this time there had been no immediate sign of the great movement from +the south. The Franco-Spanish fleet which had assembled at Cadiz was +occupied ineffectually in trying to stop small reliefs reaching Gibraltar +and in covering their own homeward-bound trade. The Dutch, however, were +becoming active, and the season was approaching for our Baltic trade to +come home. Ross in the North Sea had but four of the line to watch the +Texel, and was in no position to deal with the danger. Accordingly early in +May the weight of the home concentration was thrown into the North Sea. On +the 10th Howe sailed with Barrington and the bulk of the fleet to join Ross +in the Downs, while Kempenfelt again took the Ushant position. Only about +half the Brest Squadron had gone down to join the Spaniards at Cadiz, and +he was told his first duty was to intercept the rest if it put to sea, but, +as in Barrington's instructions, if he met a superior squadron he was to +retire up Channel under the English coast and join hands with Howe. In +spite of the fact that influenza was now raging in the fleet, he succeeded +in holding the French inactive. Howe with the same difficulty to face was +equally successful. The Dutch had put to sea, but returned immediately they +knew of his movement, and cruising off the Texel, he held them there, and +kept complete command of the North Sea till our Baltic trade was safe home. + +By the end of May it was done, and as our intelligence indicated that the +great movement from Cadiz was at last about to begin, Howe, to whom a +certain discretion had been left, decided it was time to shift the weight +to his other wing and close on Kempenfelt. The Government, however, seemed +to think that he ought to be able to use his position for offensive +operations against Dutch trade, but in the admiral's opinion this was to +lose hold of the design and sacrifice cohesion too much to reach. He +informed them that he had not deemed it advisable to make detachments from +his squadron against the trade, "not knowing how suddenly there might be a +call, for the greater part of it at least, to the westward." In accordance, +therefore, with his general instructions he left with Ross a strong +squadron of nine of the line, sufficient to hold in check, and even "to +take and destroy," the comparatively weak ships of the Dutch, and with the +rest returned to the westward.[13] His intention was to proceed with all +possible expedition to join Kempenfelt on the coast of France, but this, +owing to the ravages of the influenza, he was unable to do. Kempenfelt was +forced to come in, and on June 5th the junction was made at Spithead. + + [13] The Dutch were believed to have sixteen of the line--one + seventy-four, seven sixty-eights, and the rest under sixty guns. In + Ross's squadron were one three-decker and two eighties. + +For three weeks, so severe was the epidemic, they could not move. Then came +news that the Cadiz fleet under Langara had sailed the day Howe had reached +Spithead, and he resolved to make a dash with every ship fit to put to sea +to cut it off from Brest. He was too late. Before he could get into +position the junction between Langara and the Brest squadron was made, and +in their full force the allies had occupied the mouth of the Channel. With +the addition of the Brest ships the combined fleet numbered forty of the +line, while all Howe could muster was twenty-two, but amongst them were +seven three-deckers and three eighties, and he would soon be reinforced. +Three of Ross's smallest ships were recalled, and five others were nearly +ready, but for these Howe could not wait. The homeward-bound Jamaica convoy +was at hand, and at all hazards it must be saved. + +What was to be done? So soon as he sighted the enemy he realised that a +successful action was out of the question. Early in the morning of July +12th, "being fifteen leagues S.S.E. from Scilly," Langara with thirty-six +of the line was seen to the westward. "As soon," wrote Howe, "as their +force had been ascertained, I thought proper to avoid coming to battle with +them as then circumstanced, and therefore steered to the north to pass +between Scilly and the Land's End. My purpose therein was to get to the +westward of the enemy, both for protecting the Jamaica convoy and to gain +the advantage of situation for bringing them to action which the difference +in our numbers renders desirable." + +By a most brilliant effort of seamanship the dangerous movement was +effected safely that night, and it proved an entire success. Till Howe was +met with and defeated, the allies would not venture into the Channel, and +his unprecedented feat had effectually thrown them off. Assuming apparently +that he must have passed round their rear to seaward, they sought him to +the southward, and there for a month beat up and down in ineffective +search. Meanwhile Howe, sending his cruisers ahead to the convoy's +rendezvous off the south-west coast of Iceland, had taken his whole fleet +about two hundred miles west of the Skelligs to meet it. Northerly winds +prevented his reaching the right latitude in time, but it mattered little. +The convoy passed in between him and the south of Ireland, and as the enemy +had taken a cast down to Ushant, it was able to enter the Channel in safety +without sighting an enemy's sail. Ignorant of what had happened, Howe +cruised for a week practising the ships "in connected movements so +particularly necessary on the present occasion." Then with his fleet in +fine condition to carry out preventive tactics in accordance with +Kempenfelt's well-known exposition,[14] he returned to seek the enemy to +the eastward, in order to try to draw them from their station at Scilly and +open the Channel. On his way he learnt the convoy had passed in, and with +this anxiety off his mind he bore up for the Lizard, where his +reinforcements were awaiting him. There he found the Channel was free. From +lack of supplies the enemy had been forced to retire to port, and he +returned to Spithead to make preparations for the relief of Gibraltar. +While this work was going on, the North Sea squadron was again strengthened +that it might resume the blockade of the Texel and cover the arrival of the +autumn convoys from the Baltic. It was done with complete success. Not a +single ship fell into the enemy's hands, and the campaign, and indeed the +war, ended by Howe taking the mass of his force down to Gibraltar and +performing his remarkable feat of relieving it in the face of the Spanish +squadron. For the power and reach of a well-designed concentration there +can be no finer example. + + [14] See post, pp. 222-24. + +If, now, we seek from the above and similar examples for principles to +serve as a guide between concentration and division we shall find, firstly, +this one. The degree of division we shall require is in proportion to the +number of naval ports from which the enemy can act against our maritime +interests and to the extent of coastline along which they are spread. It is +a principle which springs from the soul of our old tradition that we must +always seek, not merely to prevent the enemy striking at our heart, but +also to strike him the moment he attempts to do anything. We must make of +his every attempt an opportunity for a counterstroke. The distribution this +aim entailed varied greatly with different enemies. In our wars with +France, and particularly when Spain and Holland were in alliance with her, +the number of the ports to be dealt with was very considerable and their +distribution very wide. In our wars with the Dutch alone, on the other +hand, the number and distribution were comparatively small, and in this +case our concentration was always close. + +This measure of distribution, however, will never stand alone. +Concentration will not depend solely upon the number and position of the +enemy's naval ports. It will be modified by the extent to which the lines +of operation starting from those ports traverse our own home waters. The +reason is plain. Whatever the enemy opposed to us, and whatever the nature +of the war, we must always keep a fleet at home. In any circumstances it is +essential for the defence of our home trade terminals, and it is essential +as a central reserve from which divisions can be thrown off to reinforce +distant terminals and to seize opportunities for counterstrokes. It is "the +mainspring," as Lord Barham put it, "from which all offensive operations +must proceed." This squadron, then, being permanent and fixed as the +foundation of our whole system, it is clear that if, as in the case of the +French wars, the enemy's lines of operation do not traverse our home +waters, close concentration upon it will not serve our turn. If, on the +other hand, as in the case of the Dutch wars, the lines do traverse home +waters, a home concentration is all that is required. Our division will +then be measured by the amount of our surplus strength, and by the extent +to which we feel able to detach squadrons for offensive action against the +enemy's distant maritime interests without prejudicing our hold on the home +terminals of his lines of operation and our power of striking directly he +moves. These remarks apply, of course, to the main fleet operations. If +such an enemy has distant colonial bases from which he can annoy our trade, +minor concentrations must naturally be arranged in those areas. + +Next we have to note that where the enemy's squadrons are widely +distributed in numerous bases, we cannot always simplify the problem by +leaving some of them open so as to entice him to concentrate and reduce the +number of ports to be watched. For if we do this, we leave the unwatched +squadrons free for sporadic action. Unless we are sure he intends to +concentrate with a view to a decisive action, our only means of simplifying +the situation is to watch every port closely enough to interfere +effectually with sporadic action. Then, sporadic action being denied him, +the enemy must either do nothing or concentrate. + +The next principle is flexibility. Concentration should be so arranged that +any two parts may freely cohere, and that all parts may quickly condense +into a mass at any point in the area of concentration. The object of +holding back from forming the mass is to deny the enemy knowledge of our +actual distribution or its intention at any given moment, and at the same +time to ensure that it will be adjusted to meet any dangerous movement that +is open to him. Further than this our aim should be not merely to prevent +any part being overpowered by a superior force, but to regard every +detached squadron as a trap to lure the enemy to destruction. The ideal +concentration, in short, is an appearance of weakness that covers a reality +of strength. + + * * * * * + + PART THREE + + CONDUCT OF NAVAL WAR + + * * * * * + + CHAPTER ONE + + INTRODUCTORY + + * * * * * + +I. INHERENT DIFFERENCES IN THE +CONDITIONS OF WAR ON LAND AND ON SEA + +Before attempting to apply the foregoing general principles in a definite +manner to the conduct of naval war, it is necessary to clear the ground of +certain obstacles to right judgment. The gradual elucidation of the theory +of war, it must be remembered, has been almost entirely the work of +soldiers, but so admirable is the work they have done, and so philosophical +the method they have adopted, that a very natural tendency has arisen to +assume that their broad-based conclusions are of universal application. +That the leading lines which they have charted are in a certain sense those +which must govern all strategy no one will deny. They are the real +pioneers, and their methods must be in the main our methods, but what we +have to remember is that the country we have to travel is radically +different from that in which they acquired their skill. + +A moment's consideration will reveal how far-reaching the differences are. +Let us ask ourselves what are the main ideas around which all the military +lore turns. It may be taken broadly that the general principles are three +in number. Firstly, there is the idea of concentration of force, that is, +the idea of overthrowing the enemy's main strength by bringing to bear upon +it the utmost accumulation of weight and energy within your means; +secondly, there is the idea that strategy is mainly a question of definite +lines of communication; and thirdly, there is the idea of concentration of +effort, which means keeping a single eye on the force you wish to overthrow +without regard to ulterior objects. Now if we examine the conditions which +give these principles so firm a footing on land, we shall find that in all +three cases they differ at sea, and differ materially. + +Take the first, which, in spite of all the deductions we have to make from +it in the case of limited wars, is the dominating one. The pithy maxim +which expresses its essence is that our primary objective is the enemy's +main force. In current naval literature the maxim is applied to the sea in +some such form as this: "The primary object of our battle-fleet is to seek +out and destroy that of the enemy." On the surface nothing could look +sounder, but what are the conditions which underlie the one and the other? + +The practical value of the military maxim is based upon the fact that in +land warfare it is always theoretically possible to strike at your enemy's +army, that is, if you have the strength and spirit to overcome the +obstacles and face the risks. But at sea this is not so. In naval warfare +we have a far-reaching fact which is entirely unknown on land. It is simply +this--that it is possible for your enemy to remove his fleet from the board +altogether. He may withdraw it into a defended port, where it is absolutely +out of your reach without the assistance of an army. No amount of naval +force, and no amount of offensive spirit, can avail you. The result is that +in naval warfare an embarrassing dilemma tends to assert itself. If you are +in a superiority that justifies a vigorous offensive and prompts you to +seek out your enemy with a view to a decision, the chances are you will +find him in a position where you cannot touch him. Your offence is +arrested, and you find yourself in what, at least theoretically, is the +weakest general position known to war. + +This was one of our earliest discoveries in strategy. It followed indeed +immediately and inevitably upon our discovery that the most drastic way of +making war was to concentrate every effort on the enemy's armed forces. In +dealing with the theory of war in general a caveat has already been entered +against the too common assumption that this method was an invention of +Napoleon's or Frederick's, or that it was a foreign importation at all. In +the view at least of our own military historians the idea was born in our +Civil Wars with Cromwell and the New Model Army. It was the conspicuous +feature that distinguished our Civil War from all previous wars of modern +times. So astonishing was its success--as foreign observers remarked--that +it was naturally applied by our soldier-admirals at sea so soon as war +broke out with the Dutch. Whatever may be the claims of the Cromwellian +soldiers to have invented for land warfare what is regarded abroad as the +chief characteristic of the Napoleonic method, it is beyond doubt that they +deserve the credit of it at sea. All three Dutch wars had a commercial +object, and yet after the first campaign the general idea never was to make +the enemy's commerce a primary objective. That place was occupied +throughout by their battle-fleets, and under Monk and Rupert at least those +objectives were pursued with a singleness of purpose and a persistent +vehemence that was entirely Napoleonic. + +But in the later stages of the struggle, when we began to gain a +preponderance, it was found that the method ceased to work. The attempt to +seek the enemy with a view to a decisive action was again and again +frustrated by his retiring to his own coasts, where either we could not +reach him or his facilities for retreat made a decisive result impossible. +He assumed, in fact, a defensive attitude with which we were powerless to +deal, and in the true spirit of defence he sprang out from time to time to +deal us a counterstroke as he saw his opportunity. + +It was soon perceived that the only way of dealing with this attitude was +to adopt some means of forcing the enemy to sea and compelling him to +expose himself to the decision we sought. The most cogent means at hand was +to threaten his commerce. Instead, therefore, of attempting to seek out his +fleet directly, our own would sit upon the fairway of his homeward-bound +trade, either on the Dogger Bank or elsewhere, thereby setting up a +situation which it was hoped would cost him either his trade or his +battle-fleet, or possibly both. Thus in spite of the fact that with our +increasing preponderance our preoccupation with the idea of battle decision +had become stronger than ever, we found ourselves forced to fall back upon +subsidiary operations of an ulterior strategical character. It is a curious +paradox, but it is one that seems inherent in the special feature of naval +war, which permits the armed force to be removed from the board altogether. + +The second distinguishing characteristic of naval warfare which relates to +the communication idea is not so well marked, but it is scarcely less +important. It will be recalled that this characteristic is concerned with +lines of communication in so far as they tend to determine lines of +operation. It is a simple question of roads and obstacles. In land warfare +we can determine with some precision the limits and direction of our +enemy's possible movements. We know that they must be determined mainly by +roads and obstacles. But afloat neither roads nor obstacles exist. There is +nothing of the kind on the face of the sea to assist us in locating him and +determining his movements. True it is that in sailing days his movements +were to some extent limited by prevailing winds and by the elimination of +impossible courses, but with steam even these determinants have gone, and +there is practically nothing to limit the freedom of his movement except +the exigencies of fuel. Consequently in seeking to strike our enemy the +liability to miss him is much greater at sea than on land, and the chances +of being eluded by the enemy whom we are seeking to bring to battle become +so serious a check upon our offensive action as to compel us to handle the +maxim of "Seeking out the enemy's fleet" with caution. + +The difficulty obtruded itself from the moment the idea was born. It may be +traced back--so far at least as modern warfare is concerned--to Sir Francis +Drake's famous appreciation in the year of the Armada. This memorable +despatch was written when an acute difference of opinion had arisen as to +whether it were better to hold our fleet back in home waters or to send it +forward to the coast of Spain. The enemy's objective was very uncertain. We +could not tell whether the blow was to fall in the Channel or Ireland or +Scotland, and the situation was complicated by a Spanish army of invasion +ready to cross from the Flemish coast, and the possibility of combined +action by the Guises from France. Drake was for solving the problem by +taking station off the Armada's port of departure, and fully aware of the +risk such a move entailed, he fortified his purely strategical reasons with +moral considerations of the highest moment. But the Government was +unconvinced, not as is usually assumed out of sheer pusillanimity and lack +of strategical insight, but because the chances of Drake's missing contact +were too great if the Armada should sail before our own fleet could get +into position. + +Our third elementary principle is the idea of concentration of effort, and +the third characteristic of naval warfare which clashes with it is that +over and above the duty of winning battles, fleets are charged with the +duty of protecting commerce. In land warfare, at least since laying waste +an undefended part of your enemy's country ceased to be a recognised +strategical operation, there is no corresponding deflection of purely +military operations. It is idle for purists to tell us that the deflection +of commerce protection should not be permitted to turn us from our main +purpose. We have to do with the hard facts of war, and experience tells us +that for economic reasons alone, apart from the pressure of public opinion, +no one has ever found it possible to ignore the deflection entirely. So +vital indeed is financial vigour in war, that more often than not the +maintenance of the flow of trade has been felt as a paramount +consideration. Even in the best days of our Dutch wars, when the whole plan +was based on ignoring the enemy's commerce as an objective, we found +ourselves at times forced to protect our own trade with seriously +disturbing results. + +Nor is it more profitable to declare that the only sound way to protect +your commerce is to destroy the enemy's fleet. As an enunciation of a +principle it is a truism--no one would dispute it. As a canon of practical +strategy, it is untrue; for here our first deflection again asserts itself. +What are you to do if the enemy refuses to permit you to destroy his +fleets? You cannot leave your trade exposed to squadronal or cruiser raids +while you await your opportunity, and the more you concentrate your force +and efforts to secure the desired decision, the more you will expose your +trade to sporadic attack. The result is that you are not always free to +adopt the plan which is best calculated to bring your enemy to a decision. +You may find yourself compelled to occupy, not the best positions, but +those which will give a fair chance of getting contact in favourable +conditions, and at the same time afford reasonable cover for your trade. +Hence the maxim that the enemy's coast should be our frontier. It is not a +purely military maxim like that for seeking out the enemy's fleet, though +the two are often used as though they were interchangeable. Our usual +positions on the enemy's coast were dictated quite as much by the +exigencies of commerce protection as by primary strategical reasons. To +maintain a rigorous watch close off the enemy's ports was never the +likeliest way to bring him to decisive action--we have Nelson's well-known +declaration on the point--but it was the best way, and often the only way, +to keep the sea clear for the passage of our own trade and for the +operations of our cruisers against that of the enemy. + +For the present these all-important points need not be elaborated further. +As we proceed to deal with the methods of naval warfare they will gather +force and lucidity. Enough has been said to mark the shoals and warn us +that, admirably constructed as is the craft which the military strategists +have provided for our use, we must be careful with our navigation. + +But before proceeding further it is necessary to simplify what lies before +us by endeavouring to group the complex variety of naval operations into +manageable shape. + +II. TYPICAL FORMS OF NAVAL OPERATIONS + +In the conduct of naval war all operations will be found to relate to two +broad classes of object. The one is to obtain or dispute the command of the +sea, and the other to exercise such control of communications as we have, +whether the complete command has been secured or not. + +It was on the logical and practical distinction between these two kinds of +naval object, as we have seen, that the constitution of fleets was based in +the fulness of the sailing period, when maritime wars were nearly incessant +and were shaping the existing distribution of power in the world. During +that period at any rate the dual conception lay at the root of naval +methods and naval policy, and as it is also the logical outcome of the +theory of war, we may safely take it as the basis of our analysis of the +conduct of naval operations. + +Practically, of course, we can seldom assert categorically that any +operation of war has but one clearly defined object. A battle-squadron +whose primary function was to secure command was often so placed as to +enable it to exercise control; and, _vice versa_, cruiser lines intended +primarily to exercise control upon the trade routes were regarded as +outposts of the battle-fleet to give it warning of the movements of hostile +squadrons. Thus Cornwallis during his blockade of Brest had sometimes to +loosen his hold in order to cover the arrival of convoys against raiding +squadrons; and thus also when Nelson was asked by Lord Barham for his views +on cruiser patrol lines, he expressed himself as follows: "Ships on this +service would not only prevent the depredations of privateers, but be in +the way to watch any squadron of the enemy should they pass on their +track.... Therefore intelligence will be quickly conveyed, and the enemy +never, I think, lost sight of."[15] Instructions in this sense were issued +by Lord Barham to the commodores concerned. In both cases, it will be seen, +the two classes of operation overlapped. Still for purposes of analysis the +distinction holds good, and is valuable for obtaining a clear view of the +field. + + [15] Nelson to Barham, 29 August 1805. + +Take, first, the methods of securing command, by which we mean putting it +out of the enemy's power to use effectually the common communications or +materially to interfere with our use of them. We find the means employed +were two: decision by battle, and blockade. Of the two, the first was the +less frequently attainable, but it was the one the British service always +preferred. It was only natural that it should be so, seeing that our normal +position was one of preponderance over our enemy, and so long as the policy +of preponderance is maintained, the chances are the preference will also be +maintained. + +But further than this, the idea seems to be rooted in the oldest traditions +of the Royal Navy. As we have seen, the conviction of the sea service that +war is primarily a question of battles, and that battles once joined on +anything like equal terms must be pressed to the last gasp, is one that has +had nothing to learn from more recent continental discoveries. The +Cromwellian admirals handed down to us the memory of battles lasting three, +and even four, days. Their creed is enshrined in the robust article of war +under which Byng and Calder were condemned; and in the apotheosis of Nelson +the service has deified the battle idea. + +It is true there were periods when the idea seemed to have lost its colour, +but nevertheless it is so firmly embedded in the British conception of +naval warfare, that there would be nothing left to say but for the +unavoidable modification with which we have to temper the doctrine of +overthrow. "Use that means," said its best-known advocate, "when you can +and when you must." Devoutly as we may hold the battle faith, it is not +always possible or wise to act upon it. If we are strong, we press to the +issue of battle when we can. If we are weak, we do not accept the issue +unless we must. If circumstances are advantageous to us, we are not always +able to effect a decision; and if they are disadvantageous, we are not +always obliged to fight. Hence we find the apparently simple doctrine of +the battle was almost always entangled in two of the most difficult +problems that beset our old admirals. The most thorny questions they had to +decide were these. In the normal case of strength, it was not how to defeat +the enemy, but how to bring him to action; and in casual cases of temporary +weakness, it was not how to sell your life dearly, but how to maintain the +fleet actively on the defensive so as at once to deny the enemy the +decision he sought and to prevent his attaining his ulterior object. + +From these considerations it follows that we are able to group all naval +operations in some such way as this. Firstly, on the only assumption we can +permit ourselves, namely, that we start with a preponderance of force or +advantage, we adopt methods for securing command. These methods, again, +fall under two heads. Firstly, there are operations for securing a decision +by battle, under which head, as has been explained, we shall be chiefly +concerned with methods of bringing an unwilling enemy to action, and with +the value to that end of the maxim of "Seeking out the enemy's fleet." +Secondly, there are the operations which become necessary when no decision +is obtainable and our war plan demands the immediate control of +communications. Under this head it will be convenient to treat all forms of +blockade, whether military or commercial, although, as we shall see, +certain forms of military, and even commercial, blockade are primarily +concerned with forcing the enemy to a decision. + +Our second main group covers operations to which we have to resort when our +relative strength is not adequate for either class of operations to secure +command. In these conditions we have to content ourselves with endeavouring +to hold the command in dispute; that is, we endeavour by active defensive +operations to prevent the enemy either securing or exercising control for +the objects he has in view. Such are the operations which are connoted by +the true conception of "A fleet in being." Under this head also should fall +those new forms of minor counter-attack which have entered the field of +strategy since the introduction of the mobile torpedo and offensive mining. + +In the third main group we have to deal with the methods of exercising +control of passage and communication. These operations vary in character +according to the several purposes for which the control is desired, and +they will be found to take one of three general forms. Firstly, the control +of the lines of passage of an invading army; secondly, the control of trade +routes and trade terminals for the attack and defence of commerce; and +thirdly, the control of passage and communication for our own oversea +expeditions, and the control of their objective area for the active support +of their operations. + +For clearness we may summarise the whole in tabulated analysis, thus:-- + + 1. Methods of securing command: + (a) By obtaining a decision. + (b) By blockade. + 2. Methods of disputing command: + (a) Principle of "the fleet in being." + (b) Minor counter-attacks. + 3. Methods of exercising command: + (a) Defence against invasion. + (b) Attack and defence of commerce. + (c) Attack, defence, and support of military expeditions. + + * * * * * + + CHAPTER TWO + + METHODS OF SECURING COMMAND + + * * * * * + +I. ON OBTAINING A DECISION + +Whatever the nature of the war in which we are engaged, whether it be +limited or unlimited, permanent and general command of the sea is the +condition of ultimate success. The only way of securing such a command by +naval means is to obtain a decision by battle against the enemy's fleet. +Sooner or later it must be done, and the sooner the better. That was the +old British creed. It is still our creed, and needs no labouring. No one +will dispute it, no one will care even to discuss it, and we pass with +confidence to the conclusion that the first business of our fleet is to +seek out the enemy's fleet and destroy it. + +No maxim can so well embody the British spirit of making war upon the sea, +and nothing must be permitted to breathe on that spirit. To examine its +claim to be the logical conclusion of our theory of war will even be held +dangerous, yet nothing is so dangerous in the study of war as to permit +maxims to become a substitute for judgment. Let us examine its credentials, +and as a first step put it to the test of the two most modern instances. + +Both of them, it must be noted, were instances of Limited War, the most +usual form of our own activities, and indeed the only one to which our war +organisation, with its essential preponderance of the naval element, has +ever been really adapted. The first instance is the Spanish-American War, +and the second that between Russia and Japan. + +In the former case the Americans took up arms in order to liberate Cuba +from Spanish domination--a strictly limited object. There is no evidence +that the nature of the war was ever clearly formulated by either side, but +in just conformity with the general political conditions the American war +plan aimed at opening with a movement to secure the territorial object. At +the earliest possible moment they intended to establish themselves in the +west of Cuba in support of the Colonial insurgents. Everything depended on +the initiative being seized with decision and rapidity. Its moral and +physical importance justified the utmost risk, and such was the +conformation of the sea which the American army had to pass, that a +strictly defensive or covering attitude with their fleet could reduce the +risk almost to security. Yet so unwisely dominated were the Americans by +recently rediscovered maxims, that when on the eve of executing the vital +movement they heard a Spanish squadron was crossing the Atlantic, their own +covering force was diverted from its defensive position and sent away to +"seek out the enemy's fleet and destroy it." + +Puerto Rico was the most obvious point at which to seek it, and thither +Admiral Sampson was permitted to go, regardless of the elementary truth +that in such cases what is obvious to you is also usually obvious to your +enemy. The result was that not only did the Americans fail to get contact, +but they also uncovered their own army's line of passage and paralysed the +initial movement. In the end it was only pure chance that permitted them to +retrieve the mistake they had made. Had the Spanish squadron put into a +Cuban port in railway communication with the main Royalist army, such as +Cienfuegos or Havana, instead of hurrying into Santiago, the whole campaign +must have been lost. "It appears now," wrote Admiral Mahan, in his _Lessons +of the War with Spain_, "not only that the eastward voyage of our Havana +division was unfortunate, but it should have been seen beforehand to be a +mistake, because inconsistent with a well and generally accepted principle +of war, the non-observance of which was not commanded by the conditions. +The principle is that which condemns eccentric movements. By the disregard +of rule in this case we uncovered both Havana and Cienfuegos, which it was +our object to close to the enemy's division." + +Whether or not we regard Admiral Mahan's exposition of the error as +penetrating to the real principle that was violated, the movement was in +fact not only eccentric, but unnecessary. Had the Americans been content to +keep their fleet concentrated in its true defensive position, not only +would they have covered their army's line of passage and their blockade of +the territorial objective, but they would have had a far better chance of +bringing the Spaniards to action. The Spaniards were bound to come to them +or remain outside the theatre of operations where they could in no way +affect the issue of the war except adversely to themselves by sapping the +spirit of their own Cuban garrison. It is a clear case of the letter +killing the spirit, of an attractive maxim being permitted to shut the door +upon judgment. Strategical offence in this case was not the best defence. +"Seeking out the enemy's fleet" was almost bound to end in a blow in the +air, which not only would fail to gain any offensive result, but would +sacrifice the main defensive plank in the American war plan upon which +their offensive relied for success. To stigmatise such a movement as merely +eccentric is to pass very lenient censure. + +In the Russo-Japanese War we have a converse case, in which judgment kept +the aphorism silent. It is true that during the earlier stage of the naval +operations the Japanese did in a sense seek out the enemy's fleet, in so +far as they advanced their base close to Port Arthur; but this was done, +not with any fixed intention of destroying the Russian fleet--there was +small hope of that at sea--but rather because by no other means could they +cover the army's lines of passage, which it was the function of the fleet +to secure, the true offensive operations being on land. Never except once, +under express orders from Tokio, did either Admiral Togo or Admiral +Kamimura press offensive movements in such a way as to jeopardise the +preventive duty with which the war plan charged them. Still less in the +later stage, when everything depended on the destruction of the Baltic +fleet, did Admiral Togo "seek it out." He was content, as the Americans +should have been content, to have set up such a situation that the enemy +must come and break it down if they were to affect the issue of the war. So +he waited on the defensive, assured his enemy must come to him, and thereby +he rendered it, as certain as war can be, that when the moment for the +tactical offensive came his blow should be sure and sudden, in overwhelming +strength of concentration, and decisive beyond all precedent. + +Clearly, then, the maxim of "seeking out" for all its moral exhilaration, +for all its value as an expression of high and sound naval spirit, must not +be permitted to displace well-reasoned judgment. Trusty servant as it is, +it will make a bad master, as the Americans found to their serious +jeopardy. Yet we feel instinctively that it expresses, as no other aphorism +does, the secret of British success at sea. We cannot do without it; we +cannot do with it in its nakedness. Let us endeavour to clothe it with its +real meaning, with the true principles that it connotes. Let us endeavour +to determine the stuff that it is made of, and for this purpose there is no +better way than to trace its gradual growth from the days when it was born +of the crude and virile instinct of the earliest masters. + +The germ is to be found in the despatch already mentioned which Drake wrote +from Plymouth at the end of March in 1588. His arguments were not purely +naval, for it was a combined problem, a problem of defence against +invasion, that had to be solved. What he wished to persuade the Government +was, that the kernel of the situation was not so much Parma's army of +invasion in Flanders, as the fleet that was preparing in Spain to clear its +passage. The Government appeared to be acting on the opposite view. Howard +with the bulk of the fleet was at the base in the Medway within supporting +distance of the light squadron that was blockading the Flemish ports in +concert with the Dutch. Drake himself with another light squadron had been +sent to the westward with some indeterminate idea of his serving as an +observation squadron, or being used in the mediaeval fashion for an +eccentric counterstroke. Being invited to give his opinion on this +disposition, he pronounced it vicious. In his eyes, what was demanded was +an offensive movement against the enemy's main fleet. "If there may be such +a stay or stop made," he urged, "by any means of this fleet in Spain, so +that they may not come through the seas as conquerors, then shall the +Prince of Parma have such a check thereby as were meet." What he had in his +mind is clearly not so much a decision in the open as an interruption of +the enemy's incomplete mobilisation, such as he had so brilliantly effected +the previous year. For later on he says that "Next under God's mighty +protection the advantage of time and place will be the only and chief means +for our good, wherein I most humbly beseech your good lordships to +persevere as you have begun, for with fifty sail of shipping we shall do +more upon their own coast than a great many more will do here at home; and +the sooner we are gone, the better we shall be able to impeach them." He +does not say "destroy." "Impeach" meant "to prevent." + +Clearly, then, what he had in his mind was a repetition of the previous +year's strategy, whereby he had been able to break up the Spanish +mobilisation and "impeach" the Armada from sailing. He did not even ask for +a concentration of the whole fleet for the purpose, but only that his own +squadron should be reinforced as was thought convenient. The actual reasons +he gave for his advice were purely moral--that is, he dwelt on the +enheartening effect of striking the first blow, and attacking instead of +waiting to be attacked. The nation, he urged, "will be persuaded that the +Lord will put into Her Majesty and her people courage and boldness not to +fear invasion, but to seek God's enemies and Her Majesty's where they may +be found." + +Here is the germ of the maxim. The consequence of his despatch was a +summons to attend the Council. The conference was followed, not by the half +measure, which was all he had ventured to advise in his despatch, but by +something that embodied a fuller expression of his general idea, and +closely resembled what was to be consecrated as our regular disposition in +such cases. The whole of the main fleet, except the squadron watching the +Flemish coast, was massed to the westward to cover the blockade of Parma's +transports, but the position assigned to it was inside the Channel instead +of outside, which tactically was bad, for it was almost certain to give the +Armada the weather gage. No movement to the coast of Spain was +permitted--not necessarily, be it remembered, out of pusillanimity or +failure to grasp Drake's idea, but for fear that, as in the recent American +case, a forward movement was likely to result in a blow in the air, and to +uncover the vital position without bringing the enemy to action. + +When, however, the sailing of the Armada was so long delayed Drake's +importunity was renewed, with that of Howard and all his colleagues to back +it. It brought eventually the desired permission. The fleet sailed for +Coruna, where it was known the Armada, after an abortive start from Lisbon, +had been driven by bad weather, and something like what the Government +feared happened. Before it could reach its destination it met southerly +gales, its offensive power was exhausted, and it had to return to Plymouth +impotent for immediate action as the Armada finally sailed. When the +Spaniards appeared it was still in port refitting and victualling. It was +only by an unprecedented feat of seamanship that the situation was saved, +and Howard was able to gain the orthodox position to seaward of his enemy. + +So far, then, the Government's cautious clinging to a general defensive +attitude, instead of seeking out the enemy's fleet, was justified, but it +must be remembered that Drake from the first had insisted it was a question +of time as well as place. If he had been permitted to make the movement +when he first proposed it, there is good reason to believe that the final +stages of the Spanish mobilisation could not have been carried out that +year; that is to say, the various divisions of the Armada could not have +been assembled into a fleet. But information as to its condition was at the +time very uncertain, and in view of the negotiations that were on foot, +there were, moreover, high political reasons for our not taking too drastic +an offensive if a reasonable alternative existed. + +The principles, then, which we distil from this, the original case of +"seeking out," are, firstly, the moral value of seizing the initiative, +and, secondly, the importance of striking before the enemy's mobilisation +is complete. The idea of overthrow by a great fleet action is not present, +unless we find it in a not clearly formulated idea of the Elizabethan +admirals of striking a fleet when it is demoralised, as the Armada was by +its first rebuff, or immediately on its leaving port before it had settled +down. + +In our next naval struggle with the Dutch in the latter half of the +seventeenth century the principle of overthrow, as we have seen, became +fully developed. It was the keynote of the strategy which was evolved, and +the conditions which forced it to recognition also emphasised the +principles of seeking out and destroying. It was a case of a purely naval +struggle, in which there were no military considerations to deflect naval +strategy. It was, moreover, a question of narrow seas, and the risk of +missing contact which had cramped the Elizabethans in their oceanic theatre +was a negligible factor. Yet fresh objections to using the "seeking out" +maxim as a strategical panacea soon declared themselves. + +The first war opened without any trace of the new principle. The first +campaign was concerned in the old fashion entirely with the attack and +defence of trade, and such indecisive actions as occurred were merely +incidental to the process. No one appears to have realised the fallacy of +such method except, perhaps, Tromp. The general instructions he received +were that "the first and principal object was to do all possible harm to +the English," and to that end "he was given a fleet in order to sail to the +damage and offence of the English fleet, and also to give convoy to the +west." Seeing at once the incompatibility of the two functions, he asked +for more definite instructions. What, for instance, was he to do if he +found a chance of blockading the main English fleet at its base? Was he to +devote himself to the blockade and "leave the whole fleet of merchantmen to +be a prey to a squadron of fast-sailing frigates," or was he to continue +his escort duty? Full as he was of desire to deal with the enemy's main +fleet, he was perplexed with the practical difficulty--too often +forgotten--that the mere domination of the enemy's battle strength does not +solve the problem of control of the sea. No fresh instructions were +forthcoming to clear his perplexity, and he could only protest again. "I +could wish," he wrote, "to be so fortunate as to have only one of these two +duties--to seek out the enemy, or to give convoy, for to do both is +attended with great difficulties." + +The indecisive campaign which naturally resulted from this lack of +strategical grip and concentration of effort came to an end with Tromp's +partial defeat of Blake off Dungeness on 30th November 1652. Though charged +in spite of his protests with a vast convoy, the Dutch admiral had sent it +back to Ostend when he found Blake was in the Downs, and then, free from +all preoccupation, he had gone to seek out his enemy. + +It was the effect which this unexpected blow had upon the strong military +insight of the Cromwellian Government that led to those famous reforms +which made this winter so memorable a landmark in British naval history. +Monk, the most finished professional soldier in the English service, and +Deane, another general, were joined in the command with Blake, and with +their coming was breathed into the sea service the high military spirit of +the New Model Army. To that winter we owe not only the Articles of War, +which made discipline possible, and the first attempt to formulate Fighting +Instructions, in which a regular tactical system was conceived, but also +two other conceptions that go to make up the modern idea of naval warfare. +One was the conviction that war upon the sea meant operations against the +enemy's armed fleets in order to destroy his power of naval resistance as +distinguished from operations by way of reprisal against his trade; and the +other, that such warfare required for its effective use a fleet of +State-owned ships specialised for war, with as little assistance as +possible from private-owned ships. It was not unnatural that all four ideas +should have taken shape together, so closely are they related. The end +connotes the means. Discipline, fleet tactics, and a navy of warships were +indispensable for making war in the modern sense of the term. + +The results were seen in the three great actions of the following spring, +the first under the three Generals, and the other two under Monk alone. In +the last, he carried the new ideas so far as to forbid taking possession of +disabled vessels, that nothing might check the work of destruction. All +were to be sunk with as much tenderness for human life as destruction would +permit. In like manner the second war was characterised by three great +naval actions, one of which, after Monk had resumed command, lasted no less +than four days. The new doctrine was indeed carried to exaggeration. So +entirely was naval thought centred on the action of the battle-fleets, that +no provision was made for an adequate exercise of control. In our own case +at least, massing for offensive action was pressed so far that no thought +was given to sustaining it by reliefs. Consequently our offensive power +suffered periods of exhaustion when the fleet had to return to its base, +and the Dutch were left sufficient freedom not only to secure their own +trade, but to strike severely at ours. Their counterstrokes culminated in +the famous attack upon Sheerness and Chatham. That such an opportunity was +allowed them can be traced directly to an exaggeration of the new doctrine. +In the belief of the British Government the "St. James's Fight"--the last +of the three actions--had settled the question of command. Negotiations for +peace were opened, and they were content to reap the fruit of the great +battles in preying on Dutch trade. Having done its work, as was believed, +the bulk of the battle-fleet for financial reasons was laid up, and the +Dutch seized the opportunity to demonstrate the limitations of the abused +doctrine. The lesson is one we have never forgotten, but its value is half +lost if we attribute the disaster to lack of grasp of the battle-fleet +doctrine rather than to an exaggeration of its possibilities. + +The truth is, that we had not obtained a victory sufficiently decisive to +destroy the enemy's fleet. The most valuable lesson of the war was that +such victories required working for, and particularly in cases where the +belligerents face each other from either side of a narrow sea. In such +conditions it was proved that owing to the facility of retreat and the +restricted possibilities of pursuit a complete decision is not to be looked +for without very special strategical preparation. The new doctrine in fact +gave that new direction to strategy which has been already referred to. It +was no longer a question of whether to make the enemy's trade or his fleet +the primary objective, but of how to get contact with his fleet in such a +way as to lead to decisive action. Merely to seek him out on his own coasts +was to ensure that no decisive action would take place. Measures had to be +taken to force him to sea away from his own bases. The favourite device was +to substitute organised strategical operations against his trade in place +of the old sporadic attacks; that is, the fleet took a position calculated +to stop his trade altogether, not on his own coasts, but far to sea in the +main fairway. The operations failed for lack of provision for enabling the +fleet by systematic relief to retain its position, but nevertheless it was +the germ of the system which afterwards, under riper organisation, was to +prove so effective, and to produce such actions as the "Glorious First of +June." + +In the third war, after this device had failed again and again, a new one +was tried. It was Charles the Second's own conception. His idea was to use +the threat of a military expedition. Some 15,000 men in transports were +brought to Yarmouth in the hope that the Dutch would come out to bar their +passage across the open North Sea, and would thus permit our fleet to cut +in behind them. There was, however, no proper coordination of the two +forces, and the project failed. + +This method of securing a decision was not lost sight of; Anson tried to +use it in the Seven Years' War. For two years every attempt to seek out the +enemy's fleet had led to nothing but the exhaustion of our own. But when +Pitt began his raids on the French coast, Anson, who had little faith in +their value for military purposes, thought he saw in them definite naval +possibilities. Accordingly when, in 1758, he was placed in command of the +Channel Fleet to cover the expedition against St. Malo, he raised the +blockade of Brest, and took up a position near the Isle of Batz between the +enemy's main fleet and the army's line of passage. The Brest fleet, +however, was in no condition to move, and again there was no result. It was +not till 1805 that there was any clear case of the device succeeding, and +then it was not used deliberately. It was a joint Anglo-Russian expedition +in the Mediterranean that forced from Napoleon his reckless order for +Villeneuve to put to sea from Cadiz, and so solved the problem out of which +Nelson had seen no issue. Lissa may be taken as an analogous case. But +there the Italians, treating the territorial attack as a real attack +instead of as a strategical device, suffered themselves to be surprised by +the Austrian fleet and defeated. + +This instance serves well to introduce the important fact, that although +our own military expeditions have seldom succeeded in leading to a naval +decision, the converse was almost always true. The attempt of the enemy to +use his army against our territory has been the most fertile source of our +great naval victories. The knowledge that our enemy intends to invade these +shores, or to make some serious expedition against our oversea dominions or +interests, should always be welcomed. Unless History belie herself, we know +that such attempts are the surest means of securing what we want. We have +the memories of La Hogue, Quiberon, and the Nile to assure us that sooner +or later they must lead to a naval decision, and the chance of a real +decision is all we can ask of the Fortune of War. + +Enough has now been said to show that "seeking out the enemy's fleet" is +not in itself sufficient to secure such a decision. What the maxim really +means is that we should endeavour from the first to secure contact in the +best position for bringing about a complete decision in our favour, and as +soon as the other parts of our war plan, military or political, will +permit. If the main offensive is military, as it was in the Japanese and +American cases, then if possible the effort to secure such control must be +subordinated to the movement of the army, otherwise we give the defensive +precedence of the offensive. If, however, the military offensive cannot be +ensured until the naval defensive is perfected, as will be the case if the +enemy brings a fleet up to our army's line of passage, then our first move +must be to secure naval contact. + +The vice of the opposite method of procedure is obvious. If we assume the +maxim that the first duty of our fleet is to seek out the enemy wherever he +may be, it means in its nakedness that we merely conform to the enemy's +dispositions and movements. It is open to him to lead us wherever he likes. +It was one of the fallacies that underlay all Napoleon's naval +combinations, that he believed that our hard-bitten admirals would behave +in this guileless manner. But nothing was further from their cunning. There +is a typical order of Cornwallis's which serves well to mark their +attitude. It was one he gave to Admiral Cotton, his second in command, in +July 1804 on handing over to his charge the Western Squadron off Ushant: +"If the French put to sea," he says, "without any of your vessels seeing +them, do not follow them, unless you are absolutely sure of the course they +have taken. If you leave the entrance of the Channel without protection, +the enemy might profit by it, and assist the invasion which threatens His +Majesty's dominions, the protection of which is your principal object." + +It is indeed a common belief that Nelson never permitted himself but a +single purpose, the pursuit of the enemy's fleet, and that, ignoring the +caution which Cornwallis impressed upon Cotton, he fell into the simple +trap. But it has to be noted that he never suffered himself to be led in +pursuit of a fleet away from the position he had been charged to maintain, +unless and until he had made that position secure behind him. His famous +chase to the West Indies is the case which has led to most misconception on +the point from an insufficient regard to the surrounding circumstances. +Nelson did not pursue Villeneuve with the sole, or even the primary, object +of bringing him to action. His dominant object was to save Jamaica from +capture. If it had only been a question of getting contact, he would +certainly have felt in a surer position by waiting for Villeneuve's return +off St. Vincent or closing in to the strategical centre off Ushant. +Further, it must be observed that Nelson by his pursuit did not uncover +what it was his duty to defend. The Mediterranean position was rendered +quite secure before he ventured on his eccentric movement. Finally, we have +the important fact that though the moral effect of Nelson's implacable +persistence and rapidity was of priceless value, it is impossible to show +that as a mere strategical movement it had any influence on the course of +the campaign. His appearance in the West Indies may have saved one or two +small islands from ransom and a good deal of trade from capture. It may +also have hastened Villeneuve's return by a few days, but that was not to +our advantage. Had he returned even a week later there would have been no +need to raise the Rochefort blockade. Barham would have had enough ships at +his command to preserve the whole of his blockades, as he had intended to +do till the _Curieux's_ news of Villeneuve's precipitate return forced his +hand before he was ready. + +If we desire a typical example of the way the old masters used the doctrine +of seeking out, it is to be found, not in Nelson's magnificent chase, but +in the restrained boldness of Barham's orders to Cornwallis and Calder. +Their instructions for seeking out Villeneuve were to move out on his two +possible lines of approach for such a time and such a distance as would +make decisive action almost certain, and at the same time, if contact were +missed, would ensure the preservation of the vital defensive positions. +Barham was far too astute to play into Napoleon's hands, and by blindly +following his enemy's lead to be jockeyed into sacrificing the position +which his enemy wished to secure. If our maxim be suffered to usurp the +place of instructed judgment, the almost inevitable result will be that it +will lead us into just the kind of mistake which Barham avoided. + +II. BLOCKADE + +Under the term blockade we include operations which vary widely in +character and in strategical intention. In the first place, blockade may be +either naval or commercial. By naval blockade we seek either to prevent an +enemy's armed force leaving port, or to make certain it shall be brought to +action before it can carry out the ulterior purpose for which it puts to +sea. That armed force may be purely naval, or it may consist wholly or in +part of a military expedition. If it be purely naval, then our blockade is +a method of securing command. If it be purely military, it is a method of +exercising command, and as such will be dealt with when we come to consider +defence against invasion. But in so far as military expeditions are +normally accompanied by a naval escort, operations to prevent their sailing +are not purely concerned with the exercise of command. Naval blockade, +therefore, may be regarded for practical purposes as a method of securing +command and as a function of battle-squadrons. Commercial blockade, on the +other hand, is essentially a method of exercising command, and is mainly an +affair of cruisers. Its immediate object is to stop the flow of the enemy's +sea-borne trade, whether carried in his own or neutral bottoms, by denying +him the use of trade communications. + +From the point of view of the conduct of war, therefore, we have two +well-defined categories of blockade, naval and commercial. But our +classification must go further; for naval blockade itself is equally varied +in intention, and must be subdivided. Strictly speaking, the term implies a +desire to close the blockaded port and to prevent the enemy putting to sea. +But this was not always the intention. As often as not our wish was that he +should put to sea that we might bring him to action, and in order to do +this, before he could effect his purpose, we had to watch the port with a +fleet more or less closely. For this operation there was no special name. +Widely as it differed in object from the other, it was also usually called +blockade, and Nelson's protest against the consequent confusion of thought +is well known. "It is not my intention," he said, "to close-watch Toulon"; +and again, "My system is the very contrary of blockading. Every opportunity +has been offered the enemy to put to sea." It is desirable, therefore, to +adopt terms to distinguish the two forms. "Close" and "open" express the +antithesis suggested by Nelson's letter, and the two terms serve well +enough to mark the characteristic feature of each operation. Close +blockade, it is true, as formerly conceived, is generally regarded as no +longer practicable; but the antithetical ideas, which the two forms of +blockade connote, can never be eliminated from strategical consideration. +It must always be with the relations of these two forms, whatever shape +they may take in future, that the strategy of naval blockade is chiefly +concerned. + +With regard to commercial blockade, in strict analysis it should be +eliminated from an inquiry that concerns methods of securing command and +postponed to that section of exercising command which deals with the attack +and defence of trade. It is, however, necessary to treat certain of its +aspects in conjunction with naval blockade for two reasons: one, that as a +rule naval blockade is indissolubly united to a subordinate commercial +blockade; and the other, that the commercial form, though its immediate +object is the exercise of control, has almost invariably an ulterior object +which is concerned with securing control; that is to say, while its +immediate object was to keep the enemy's commercial ports closed, its +ulterior object was to force his fleet to sea. + +Commercial blockade, therefore, has an intimate relation with naval +blockade in its open form. We adopt that form when we wish his fleet to put +to sea, and commercial blockade is usually the most effective means we have +of forcing upon him the movement we leave him free to attempt. By closing +his commercial ports we exercise the highest power of injuring him which +the command of the sea can give us. We choke the flow of his national +activity afloat in the same way that military occupation of his territory +chokes it ashore. He must, therefore, either tamely submit to the worst +which a naval defeat can inflict upon him, or he must fight to release +himself. He may see fit to choose the one course or the other, but in any +case we can do no more by naval means alone to force our will upon him. + +In the long run a rigorous and uninterrupted blockade is almost sure to +exhaust him before it exhausts us, but the end will be far and costly. As a +rule, therefore, we have found that where we had a substantial predominance +our enemy preferred to submit to commercial blockade in hope that by the +chances of war or the development of fresh force he might later on be in a +better position to come out into the open. That he should come out and +stake the issue in battle was nearly always our wish, and it was obvious +that too rigorous a naval blockade was not the way to achieve the desired +end, or to reap the strategical result which we might expect from +paralysing his commerce. Consequently where the desire for a decision at +sea was not crossed by higher military considerations, as in the case of +imminent invasion, or where we ourselves had an important expedition in +hand, it was to our interest to incline the enemy's mind towards the bolder +choice. + +The means was to tempt him with a prospect of success, either by leading +him to believe the blockading force was smaller than it was, or by removing +it to such a distance as would induce him to attempt to evade it, or both. +A leading case of such an open blockade was Nelson's disposition of his +fleet off Cadiz when he was seeking to bring Villeneuve to action in 1805. +But merely to leave a port open does not fulfil the idea of open blockade, +and in this case to opportunity and temptation Nelson added the pressure of +a commercial blockade of the adjacent ports in hope of starving Villeneuve +into the necessity of taking to the sea. + +Finally, in a general comparison of the two forms, we have to observe that +close blockade is characteristically a method of securing local and +temporary command. Its dominating purpose will usually be to prevent the +enemy's fleet acting in a certain area and for a certain purpose. Whereas +open blockade, in that it aims at the destruction of an enemy's naval +force, is a definite step towards securing permanent command. + +Enough has now been said to show that the question of choice between close +and open blockade is one of extreme complexity. Our naval literature, it is +true, presents the old masters as divided into two schools on the subject, +implying that one was in favour of the close form always, and the other of +the open form. We are even led to believe that the choice depended on the +military spirit of the officer concerned. If his military spirit was high, +he chose the close and more exacting form; if it were low, he was content +with the open and less exacting form. True, we are told that men of the +latter school based their objections to close blockade on the excessive +wear and tear of a fleet that it involved, but it is too often suggested +that this attitude was no more than a mask for a defective spirit. Seldom +if ever are we invited to compare their decisions with the attendant +strategical intention, with the risks which the conditions justified, or +with the expenditure of energy which the desired result could legitimately +demand. Yet all these considerations must enter into the choice, and on +closer examination of the leading cases it will be found that they bear a +striking and almost constant relation to the nature of the blockade +employed. + +In considering open blockade, three postulates must be kept in mind. +Firstly, since our object is to get the enemy to sea, our position must be +such as will give him an opportunity of doing so. Secondly, since we desire +contact for a decisive battle, that position must be no further away from +his port than is compatible with bringing him to action before he can +effect his purpose. Thirdly, there is the idea of economy--that is, the +idea of adopting the method which is least exhausting to our fleet, and +which will best preserve its battle fitness. It is on the last point that +the greatest difference of opinion has existed. A close blockade always +tended to exhaust a fleet, and always must do so. But, on the other hand, +it was contended that the exhaustion is compensated by the high temper and +moral domination which the maintenance of a close blockade produces in a +good fleet, whereas the comparative ease of distant and secure watch tended +to deterioration. Before considering these opposed views, one warning is +necessary. It is usually assumed that the alternative to close blockade is +watching the enemy from one of our own ports, but this is not essential. +What is required is an interior and, if possible, a secret position which +will render contact certain; and with modern developments in the means of +distant communication, such a position is usually better found at sea than +in port. A watching position can in fact be obtained free from the strain +of dangerous navigation and incessant liability to attack without sacrifice +of sea training. With this very practical point in mind, we may proceed to +test the merits of the two forms on abstract principles. + +It was always obvious that a close naval blockade was one of the weakest +and least desirable forms of war. Here again when we say "weakest" we do +not mean "least effective," but that it was exhausting, and that it tended +to occupy a force greater than that against which it was acting. This was +not because a blockading fleet, tempered and toughened by its watch, and +with great advantage of tactical position, could not be counted on to +engage successfully a raw fleet of equal force issuing from port, but +because in order to maintain its active efficiency it required large +reserves for its relief. So severe was the wear and tear both to men and +ships, that even the most strenuous exponents of the system considered that +at least a fifth of the force should always be refitting, and in every case +two admirals were employed to relieve one another. In 1794 one of the +highest authorities in the service considered that to maintain an effective +close blockade of Brest two complete sets of flag-officers were necessary, +and that no less than one-fourth of the squadron should always be in +port.[16] + + [16] Captain Philip Patton to Sir Charles Middleton, 27 June 1794. + _Barham Papers_, ii, 393. Patton had probably wider war experience than + any officer then living. He was regarded as possessing a very special + knowledge of personnel, and as vice admiral became second sea lord under + Barham in 1804. + +Now these weaknesses, being inherent in close blockade, necessarily +affected the appreciation of its value. The weight of the objection tended +of course to decrease as seamanship, material, or organisation improved, +but it was always a factor. It is true also that it seems to have had more +weight with some men than with others, but it will appear equally true, if +we endeavour to trace the movement of opinion on the subject, that it was +far from being the sole determinant. + +It was in the Seven Years' War under Anson's administration that continuous +and close blockade was first used systematically, but it was Hawke who +originated it. In the first three campaigns the old system of watching +Brest from a British western port had been in vogue, but it had twice +failed to prevent a French concentration in the vital Canadian theatre. In +the spring of 1759 Hawke was in command of the Channel Fleet with the usual +instructions for watching, but being directed to stand over and look into +Brest, he intimated his intention, unless he received orders to the +contrary, to remain off the port instead of returning to Torbay. His reason +was that he had found there a squadron which he believed was intended for +the West Indies, and he considered it better to prevent its sailing than to +let it put to sea and try to catch it. In other words, he argued that none +of the usual western watching ports afforded a position interior to the +usual French route from Brest to the West Indies. + +Since rumours of invasion were in the air, it was obviously the better +course to deal with the enemy's squadrons in home waters and avoid +dispersal of the fleet in seeking them out. In spite of extraordinarily bad +weather, therefore, he was permitted to act as he advised. With Boscawen as +relief, the new form of blockade was kept up thenceforward, and with entire +success. But it must be noted that this success was rather due to the fact +that the French made no further effort to cross the Atlantic, than to the +fact that the blockade was maintained with sufficient strictness to prevent +their doing so. In certain states of weather our fleet was forced to raise +the blockade and run to Torbay or Plymouth. Such temporary reversions to +the open form nearly always afforded an opportunity for the French to get +away to the southward with two or three days' start. Against any attempt, +however, to get to the east or the north in order to dispute command of the +Channel or other home waters the system was thoroughly efficient, and was +unaffected by the intervals of the open form. + +It may have been these considerations which in the War of American +Independence induced so fine an officer as Howe to be strongly in favour of +a reversion to the old system. The vital theatre was then again across the +Atlantic, and there was no serious preparation for invasion. It should also +be borne in mind in judging Howe against Hawke, that in the Seven Years' +War we had such a preponderance at sea as permitted ample reserves to +nourish a close blockade, whereas in the latter war we were numerically +inferior to the hostile coalition. Since it was impossible to prevent the +French reaching the West Indies and North America if they so determined, +our policy was to follow them with equal fleets and reduce the home force +as low as that policy demanded and as was consistent with a reasonable +degree of safety. The force required might well be inferior to the enemy, +since it was certain that all attempts upon the Channel would be made with +an unwieldy and ill-knit force composed of Spanish and French units. + +In Howe's opinion this particular situation was not to be solved by +attempting to close Brest, and nothing can be more misleading than to +stretch such an opinion beyond the circumstances it was intended to meet. +He did not consider it was in his power to close the port. The enemy, he +held, could always be in readiness to escape after a gale of wind by which +the blockading squadron would be drawn off or dispersed, the ships much +damaged, and the enemy enheartened. "An enemy," he said, "is not to be +restrained from putting to sea by a station taken off their port with a +barely superior squadron." The experience of 1805 appears to contradict +him. Then a barely superior squadron did succeed in preventing Ganteaume's +exit, but though the squadron actually employed was barely superior, it had +ample fleet reserves to sustain its numbers in efficiency. It was, +moreover, only for a short time that it had to deal with any real effort to +escape. After May 20th, Ganteaume was forbidden to put to sea. There were +certainly several occasions during that famous blockade when he could have +escaped to the southward had Napoleon wished it. + +This case, then, cannot be taken to condemn Howe's judgment. His special +function in the war plan was, with a force reduced to defensive strength, +to prevent the enemy obtaining command of our home waters. It was certainly +not his duty to undertake operations to which his force was not equal. His +first duty was to keep it in being for its paramount purpose. To this end +he decided on open blockade based on a general reserve at Spithead or St. +Helen's, where he could husband the ships and train his recruits, while at +the same time he protected our trade and communications and harassed those +of the enemy. Kempenfelt, than whom there was no warmer advocate of +activity, entirely approved the policy at least for the winter months, and +in his case no one will be found to suggest that the idea was prompted by +lack of spirit or love of ease. So far as the summer was concerned there +was really little difference of opinion as to whether the fleet should be +kept at sea or not, for sea-training during summer more than compensated +for the exhaustion of material likely to be caused by intermittent spells +of bad weather. Even for the winter the two policies came to much the same +thing. Thus in Hawke's blockade at the end of 1759, during the critical +month from mid-October to mid-November, he was unable to keep his station +for nearly half the time, and when he did get contact with Conflans it was +from Torbay and not Ushant. Still it may be doubted if without the +confidence bred of his stormy vigil the battle of Quiberon would have been +fought as it was. + +With all this experience fresh in his mind Kempenfelt frankly advocated +keeping the fleet in port for the winter. "Suppose," he wrote from Torbay +in November 1779, "the enemy should put to sea with their fleet (that is, +from Brest)--a thing much to be wished for by us--let us act wisely and +keep ours in port. Leave them to the mercy of long nights and hard gales. +They will do more in favour of you than your fleet can." Far better he +thought to devote the winter to preparing the fleet for the next campaign +so as to have "the advantage of being the first in the field." "Let us," he +concluded, "keep a stout squadron to the westward ready to attend the +motions of the enemy. I don't mean to keep them at sea, disabling +themselves in buffeting the winds, but at Torbay ready to act as +intelligence may suggest."[17] It will be seen, therefore, that the +conclusion that close blockade was always the best means of rendering the +fleet most efficient for the function it had to perform must not be +accepted too hastily. The reasons which induced Howe and Kempenfelt to +prefer open blockade were mainly based on this very consideration. Having +in mind the whole of the surrounding conditions, in their highly +experienced opinion careful preparation in the winter and tactical +evolutions in the summer were the surest road to battle fitness in the +force available. + + [17] _Barham Papers_, i, 302. + +On the other hand, we have the fact that during the War of American +Independence the open system was not very successful. But before condemning +it out of hand, it must be remembered that the causes of failure were not +all inherent in the system. In the first place, the need of relieving +Gibraltar from time to time prevented the Western Squadron devoting itself +entirely to its watch. In the next place, owing to defective administration +the winters were not devoted with sufficient energy to preparing the fleet +to be first in the field in the spring. Finally, we have to recognise that +the lack of success was due not so much to permitting the French to cross +the Atlantic, as to the failure to deal faithfully with them when contact +was obtained at their destination. Obviously there is nothing to be said +for the policy of "seeking out" as against that of preventing exit unless +you are determined when you find to destroy or to be destroyed. It was here +that Rodney and his fellows were found wanting. The system failed from +defective execution quite as much as from defective design. + +In the next war Howe was still in the ascendant and in command of the +Channel fleet. He retained his system. Leaving Brest open he forced the +French by operating against their trade to put to sea, and he was rewarded +with the battle of the First of June. No attempt was made to maintain a +close blockade during the following winter. The French were allowed to +sail, and their disastrous cruise of January 1795 fully justified +Kempenfelt's anticipations. So great was the damage done that they +abandoned all idea of using their fleet as a whole. Howe's system was +continued, but no longer with entirely successful results. In 1796 the +French were able to make descents upon Ireland, and Howe in consequence has +come in for the severest castigations. His method is contemptuously +contrasted with that which St. Vincent adopted four years later, without +any regard to the situation each admiral had to meet, and again on the +assumption that the closing of Brest would have solved the one problem as +well as it did the other. + +In 1796 we were not on the defensive as we were in 1800. The French fleet +had been practically destroyed. No invasion threatened. With a view to +forcing peace our policy was directed to offensive action against French +trade and territory in order by general pressure to back our overtures for +a settlement. The policy may have been mistaken, but that is not the +question. The question is, whether or not the strategy fitted the policy. +We were also, it must be remembered, at war with Holland and expecting war +with Spain, an eventuality which forced us to keep an eye on the defence of +Portugal. In these circumstances nothing was further from our desire than +to keep what was left of the Brest fleet in port. Our hope was by our +offensive action against French maritime interests to force it to expose +itself for their defence. To devote the fleet to the closing of Brest was +to cripple it for offensive action and to play the enemy's game. The actual +disposition of the home fleet was designed so as to preserve its offensive +activity, and at the same time to ensure superiority in any part of the +home waters in which the enemy might attempt a counterstroke. It was +distributed in three active squadrons, one in the North Sea, one before +Brest, and one cruising to the westward, with a strong reserve at +Portsmouth. It is the location of the reserve that has been most lightly +ridiculed, on the hasty assumption that it was merely the reserve of the +squadron before Brest; whereas in truth it was a general reserve designed +to act in the North Sea or wherever else it might be needed. At the same +time it served as a training and depot squadron for increasing our power at +sea in view of the probable addition of the Spanish fleet to Napoleon's +naval force. To have exhausted our fleet merely to prevent raids leaving +Brest which might equally well leave the Texel or Dunkirk was just what the +enemy would have desired. The disposition was in fact a good example of +concentration--that is, disposal about a strategical centre to preserve +flexibility for offence without risking defensive needs, and yet it is by +the most ardent advocates of concentration and the offensive that Howe's +dispositions at this time have been most roundly condemned. + +In the end the disposition did fail to prevent the landing of part of the +force intended for Ireland, but it made the venture so difficult that it +had to be deferred till mid-winter, and then the weather which rendered +evasion possible broke up the expedition and denied it all chance of +serious success. It was, in fact, another example of the working of +Kempenfelt's rule concerning winter weather. So far as naval defence can +go, the disposition was all that was required. The Irish expedition was +seen leaving Brest by our inshore cruiser squadron. It was reported to +Colpoys, who had the battle-squadron outside, and it was only a dense fog +that enabled it to escape. It was, in fact, nothing more than the evasion +of a small raiding force--an eventuality against which no naval defence can +provide certain guarantee, especially in winter. + +It was under wholly different conditions that at the end of 1800 Hawke's +system was revived. St. Vincent's succession to the control of the fleet +coincided with Napoleon's definite assumption of the control of the +destinies of France. Our great duel with him had begun. The measures he was +taking made it obvious we were once more facing the old life and death +struggle for naval supremacy; we were openly threatened with invasion, and +we had a distinct preponderance at sea. In short, we have to recognize the +fact that the methods of the Seven Years' War were revived when the +problems and factors of that war were renewed. As those problems grew more +intense, as they did after the Peace of Amiens, and the threat of invasion +became really formidable, so did the rigour of the close blockade increase. +Under Cornwallis and Gardner it was maintained in such a way as to deny, so +far as human effort could go, all possibility of exit without fighting. In +spite of the importance of dealing with the enemy's squadrons in detail no +risks were taken to bring Ganteaume to decisive action. Our first necessity +was absolute local command. The acuteness of the invasion crisis demanded +that the Brest fleet should be kept in port, and every time Ganteaume +showed a foot the British admiral flew at him and drove him back. Once only +during the continuation of the crisis was the rigour of this attitude +relaxed, and that was to deal with what for the moment was the higher +object. It was to meet Villeneuve on his return from the West Indies, but +even then so nicely was the relaxation calculated, that Ganteaume was given +no time to take advantage of it. + +The analogy between the conditions of the blockade which St. Vincent +inaugurated and those of the Seven Years' War becomes all the more +significant when we note that while Cornwallis and Gardner in home waters +were pressing close blockade to its utmost limit of rigour, Nelson in the +Mediterranean was not using it at all. Yet with him also the chief concern +was to prevent an invasion. His main function, as he and his Government saw +it, was to prevent a descent from Southern France upon Neapolitan or +Levantine territory. Why, then, did he not employ close blockade? It is +usually assumed that it was because of his overpowering desire to bring the +Toulon squadron to action. Occasional expressions in his letters give +colour to such a view, but his dispositions show clearly that his desire to +bring the fleet to action was kept in scientific subordination to the +defensive duty with which he was charged. Close blockade was the most +effectual means of securing this end, but in his case one of the +conditions, which we have found always accompanying successful close +blockade, was absent. He had no such preponderance of force as would enable +him to nourish it up to the point of perfect continuity. In the +circumstances the close form was too weak or exhausting for him to use with +the force at his disposal. + +If this case be not considered conclusive as to Nelson's views, we have a +perfectly clear endorsement from his pen in 1801. It is a particularly +strong testimony, for he was at the time actually charged with defence +against the invasion of England. With several cruiser squadrons he had to +prevent the enemy's force issuing from a number of ports extending from +Flushing to Dieppe, and he was directing the operations from the Downs. On +the approach of winter he was impressed with the inexpediency of attempting +to continue a close blockade, and wrote to the Admiralty as follows: "I am +of opinion, and submit to their Lordships' better judgment, that care +should be taken to keep our squadrons compact and in good order ... under +Dungeness to be their principal station.... In fine weather our squadrons +to go out and show themselves, but never to risk either being crippled or +drawn into the North Sea; thus we shall always be sure of an effective +force, ready to act as occasion calls for it."[18] + + [18] To Evan Nepean, 4 September 1801. Nicolas, _Nelson Despatches_, iv, + 484. + +The case of course is not entirely in point, for it concerns the question +of direct resistance to invasion and not to securing general command. Its +value is that it gives Nelson's views on the broad question of balancing +the risks--that is, the risk of relaxing close watch against the risk of +destroying the efficiency of the ships by maintaining it too rigorously. + +With Nelson holding this view, it is not surprising to find that as late as +1804 naval opinion was not quite settled on the relative advantages of +close and open blockade even in the case of threatened invasion. Just a +year before Trafalgar was fought, Cornwallis pressed the Admiralty for more +strength to enable him to keep his blockade efficient. Lord Melville, who +at this time had Barham at his elbow, replied recommending the "policy of +relaxing the strictness of blockade, formerly resorted to." He protested +the means available were insufficient for "sustaining the necessary extent +of naval force, if your ships are to be torn to pieces by an eternal +conflict with the elements during the tempestuous months of winter."[19] +Melville was craving for a decisive action to end the insupportable strain. +"Allow me to remind you," he added, "that the occasions when we have been +able to bring our enemy to battle and our fleets to victory have generally +been when we were at a distance from the blockading station." In the end, +as we know, Cornwallis had his way, and the verdict of history has been to +approve the decision for its moral effect alone. Such conflicts must always +arise. "War," as Wolfe said, "is an option of difficulties," and the choice +must sway to the one side or the other as the circumstances tend to develop +the respective advantages of each form. We can never say that close +blockade is better than open, or the reverse. It must always be a matter of +judgment. + + [19] For Barham's final views, 1805, see _Barham Papers_, iii, 90-93. + +Are there, then, no principles which we can deduce from the old practice +for the strengthening of judgment? Certain broad lines of guidance at least +are to be traced. The main question will be, is it to our advantage, in +regard to all the strategical conditions, to keep the enemy in and get him +to sea for a decision? Presumably it will always be our policy to get a +decision as soon as possible. Still that desire may be overridden by the +necessity or special advantage of closely blockading one or more of his +squadrons. This situation may arise in two ways. Firstly, it may be +essential to provide for the local and temporary command of a certain +theatre of operations, as when an invasion threatens in that area, or when +we wish to pass a military expedition across it, or from special exigencies +in regard to the attack or defence of commerce. Secondly, even where we are +seeking a great decision, we may blockade one squadron closely in order to +induce a decision at the point most advantageous to ourselves; that is to +say, we may blockade one or more squadrons in order to induce the enemy to +attempt with one or more other squadrons to break that blockade. In this +way we may lead him either to expose himself to be struck in detail, or to +concentrate where we desire his concentration. + +For any of these reasons we may decide that the best way of realising our +object is to use close blockade, but the matter does not end there. We have +still to consider whether close blockade is within the limit of the force +we have available, and whether it is the best method of developing the +fullest potentialities of that force. Close blockade being the more +exhausting form will require the greater strength; we cannot blockade +closely for any length of time without a force relatively superior; but if +by open blockade of a squadron we permit it to put to sea with contact +assured, we know that, even with a slightly inferior force, we can so deal +with it as to prevent its getting local control sufficient to break down +our mobile flotilla defence or to interfere seriously with our trade. + +Finally, there is the question of risk. In the old days, before free +movement and wireless telegraphy, and before the flotilla had acquired +battle power, there was always to be faced the risk of not getting contact +in time to prevent mischief. This consideration was specially dominant +where the enemy had a squadron within or near the critical theatre of +operations. Therefore when the invasion threatened, our developed policy +was to blockade Brest closely at almost any sacrifice. There was always a +vague possibility that by evasion or chance of wind a squadron so close to +the line of invasion might get sufficient temporary command in the vital +area before it could be brought to action. It was a possibility that was +never realised in the Narrow Seas, and since mobility of fleets and means +of distant communication have so greatly increased in range and certainty, +and since the power of resistance in the flotilla has become so high, the +risk is probably much less than ever, and the field for open blockade is +consequently less restricted. + +There is no need, however, to accept these principles as incontrovertible. +Even if we take the great blockade of 1803-5, which has most firmly +dominated thought on the subject ever since, it may be argued with some +plausibility that the situation could have been solved more quickly and +effectually by letting Ganteaume get out from Brest into the open, at least +as far as Admiral Togo was forced to permit the Russians to emerge from +Port Arthur, though his reasons for keeping them in were even stronger than +ours in 1805. But in any case, the whole trend of the evidence will admit +no doubt as to the inherent weakness of close blockade as a form of war. As +under modern developments the possibilities of open blockade have +increased, so the difficulties and dangers of close blockade have certainly +not decreased. It is also probable that certain advantages which in the +sailing era went far to compensate for its weakness have lost much of their +force. A sailing fleet cooped up in port not only rapidly lost its spirit, +but, being barred from sea-training, could not be kept in a condition of +efficiency, whereas the blockading fleet was quickly raised to the highest +temper by the stress of vigilance and danger that was its incessant +portion. So long as the strain did not pass the limit of human endurance, +it was all to the good. In the old days, with very moderate reliefs, the +limit was never reached, and the sacrifices that were made to those +exhausting vigils were rewarded twentyfold in exuberant confidence on the +day of battle. Can we expect the same compensation now? Will the balance of +strength and weakness remain as it used to be? In the face of the vast +change of conditions and the thinness of experience, it is to general +principles we must turn for the answer. + +What, in fact, is the inherent weakness of close blockade? Strategical +theory will at once reply that it is an operation which involves "an arrest +of the offensive," a situation which is usually taken to exhibit every kind +of drawback. Close blockade is essentially an offensive operation, although +its object is usually negative; that is, it is a forward movement to +prevent the enemy carrying out some offensive operation either direct or by +way of counterstroke. So far the common tendency to confuse "Seeking out +the enemy's fleet" with "Making the enemy's coast your frontier" may be +condoned. But the two operations are widely different in that they have +different objectives. In "seeking out," our objective is the enemy's armed +force. In "making the enemy's coast our frontier," the objective is +inseparable from the ulterior object of the naval war. In this case the +objective is the common communications. By establishing a blockade we +operate offensively against those communications. We occupy them, and then +we can do no more. Our offensive is arrested; we cannot carry it on to the +destruction of the enemy's fleet. We have to wait in a defensive attitude, +holding the communications we have seized, till he chooses to attack in +order to break our hold; and during that period of arrest the advantage of +surprise--the all-important advantage in war--passes by a well recognised +rule to our enemy. We, in fact, are held upon the defensive, with none of +the material advantages of the defensive. The moral advantage of having +taken the initiative remains, but that is all. The advantage which we thus +gain will of course have the same kind of depressing effect upon the +blockaded fleet as it had of old, but scarcely in so high a degree. The +degradation of a steam fleet in port can scarcely be so rapid or +debilitating as it was when nine-tenths of seamanship lay in the smart +handling of sails. For the blockading fleet it is also true that the +effects of weather, which formerly were the main cause of wear and tear, +can scarcely be so severe. But, on the other hand, the physical strain to +officers and men, and the difficulty of supply, will be far greater, so +long at least as coal is the chief fuel. The wind no longer sets a measure +on the enemy's movements. Vigilance close and unremitting beyond all our +predecessors knew is the portion of the blockaders to prevent surprise. +Furthermore, in the old days surprise meant at worst the enemy's escape; +now it may mean our own destruction by mine or torpedo. It is unnecessary +to labour the point. It is too obvious that a close blockade of the old +type exhibits under present conditions the defects of "arrested offence" in +so high a degree as practically to prohibit its use. + +What, then, can be done? Must we rest content in all situations with Howe's +system, which riper experience condemned for cases of extreme necessity? +Cannot the old close blockade be given a modern form? Assuredly it can. In +old days the shoreward limit of the blockading fleet was just beyond the +range of the coast batteries, and this position it held continuously by +means of an inshore squadron. In these days of mobile defence that limit is +by analogy the night range of destroyers and the day range of submarines, +that is, half the distance they can traverse between dark and dawn or dawn +and dark respectively, unless within that limit a torpedo-proof base can be +established. A blockade of this nature will correspond in principle to a +close blockade of the old type; nor in practice, as was proved in the +Japanese blockade of Port Arthur, will its incidents be materially +different. The distance at which the battle-squadron must keep will seem at +first sight to deny it certainty of immediate contact--the essence of close +blockade. But in truth other new factors already noticed will reduce that +distance relatively. Quicker and more certain means of communication +between the admiral and his scouts, the absolute freedom of movement and +the power of delaying the enemy's actual exit by mining, may go far to +bring things back to their old relations. At Port Arthur they did so +entirely. If then, as in that case, our paramount object is to keep the +enemy in, there seems still no reason why we should not make our +dispositions on the principle of close blockade. Distances will be greater, +but that is all. + +Nor must it be forgotten that for a squadron to take station off a port in +the old manner is not the only means of close blockade. It may still effect +its purpose, at least temporarily, by supporting mining vessels or block +ships--"sinkers," as they used to be called. The latter expedient, it is +true, had little success in the latest experiments, but even in the +Russo-Japanese War its possibilities were by no means exhausted. We have +therefore to conclude that where the strategical conditions call obviously +for close blockade, our plan of operations will be modified in that +direction with the means still at our disposal. + +If, however, our object is not so sharply defined, if in spite of our +desire to deny the enemy the sea we are ready to take risks in order to +bring about a decision, the case is not so clear. It will be observed that +the looseness which the new conditions force upon close blockade-increasing +as they are in intensity year by year-must tend more and more to +approximate it in practice to open blockade. The question will therefore +present itself whether it would not be more in accordance with the +fundamental elements of strength to adopt open blockade frankly for all +purposes. We should thus substitute a true defensive disposition for an +arrested offence, and, theoretically, that in itself is a great advantage. +The practical benefits, whatever the correlative drawbacks, are equally +clear, nor are they less great now than they appeared to Howe and +Kempenfelt. We avoid exhaustion of machinery, coal, and men, and this, at +least for the necessary flotilla screen, will be greater than anything that +had to be faced in former days. We have at least the opportunity of +occupying a position secure from surprise, and of keeping the fleet +continually up to its highest striking energy. Finally, assuming the +geographical conditions give reasonable promise of contact, a quick +decision, which modern war demands with ever greater insistence, is more +probable. In such a disposition of course contact can rarely be made +certain. The enemy, whom the hypothesis of blockade assumes to be anxious +to avoid action, will always have a chance of evasion, but this will always +be so, even with the closest blockade now possible. We may even go further +and claim for open blockade that in favourable conditions it may give the +better chance of contact. For by adopting the principle of open blockade we +shall have, in accordance with the theory of defence, the further +advantages of being able the better to conceal our dispositions, and +consequently to lay traps for our enemy, such as that which Nelson prepared +for Villeneuve in the Gulf of Lyons in 1805. + +The objection to such a course which appears to have the most weight with +current opinion is the moral one, which is inseparable from all deliberate +choices of the defensive. If the watching fleet remains in a home fortified +base, it may be assumed that the usual moral degradation will set in. But +the method does not entail the inglorious security of such a base. A sound +position may well be found at a spot such as Admiral Togo occupied while +waiting for the Baltic fleet, and in that case there was no observable +degradation of any kind. Nor is there much evidence that this objection +weighed materially with the opponents of Howe's view. Their objection was +of a purely physical kind. Open blockade left the enemy too much freedom to +raid our trade routes. The watching system might be sufficient to keep an +unwilling battle-fleet in port or to bring a more adventurous one to +action, but it could not control raiding squadrons. This was certainly +Barham's objection. "If," he wrote to Pitt in 1794, "the French should have +any intention of sending their fleet to sea with this easterly wind, and +Lord Howe continues at Torbay, our Mediterranean and Jamaica convoys are in +a very critical situation. Both fleets must by this time be drawing near +the Channel, and cannot enter it while the easterly wind holds." This +danger must always be with us, especially in narrow waters such as the +North Sea. In more open theatres the difficulty is not so obtrusive, for +with sufficient sea room trade may take naturally or by direction a course +which our watching dispositions will cover. Thus with Nelson in the case of +Toulon, his normal positions on the Sardinian coast covered effectually the +flow of our trade to the Levant and the Two Sicilies, which was all there +was at the time. + +The truth is, that in endeavouring to decide between open and close +blockade we find ourselves confronted with those special difficulties which +so sharply distinguish naval warfare from warfare on land. We cannot choose +on purely naval considerations. In naval warfare, however great may be our +desire to concentrate our effort on the enemy's main forces, the ulterior +object will always obtrude itself. We must from the first do our best to +control sea communications, and since those communications are usually +common, we cannot refrain from occupying those of the enemy without at the +same time neglecting and exposing our own. Thus in the case of Brest a +close blockade was always desirable, and especially at convoy seasons, +because the great trade routes which passed within striking distance of the +port were all common, whereas in the region of Toulon the main lines were +not common except along the coasts of Africa and Southern Italy, and these +Nelson's open blockade amply secured. + +The general conclusion, then, is that however high may be the purely naval +and strategical reasons for adopting open blockade as the best means of +securing a decision against the enemy's fleet, yet the inevitable intrusion +of the ulterior object in the form of trade protection or the security of +military expeditions will seldom leave us entirely free to use the open +method. We must be prepared, in fact, to find ourselves at least at times +faced with the necessity of using a form of blockade as nearly modelled on +the old close blockade as changed conditions will permit. + + * * * * * + + CHAPTER THREE + + METHODS OF DISPUTING COMMAND + + * * * * * + +I. DEFENSIVE FLEET OPERATIONS--"A FLEET IN BEING" + +In dealing with the theory of sea command, attention was called to the +error of assuming that if we are unable to win the command we therefore +lose it. It was pointed out that this proposition, which is too often +implied in strategical discussion, denies in effect that there can be such +a thing as strategical defensive at sea, and ignores the fact that the +normal condition in war is for the command to be in dispute. Theory and +history are at one on the point. Together they affirm that a Power too weak +to win command by offensive operations may yet succeed in holding the +command in dispute by assuming a general defensive attitude. + +That such an attitude in itself cannot lead to any positive result at sea +goes without saying, but nevertheless even over prolonged periods it can +prevent an enemy securing positive results, and so give time for the other +belligerent to dominate the situation by securing his ends ashore. + +It is seldom that we have been forced even for a time to adopt such an +attitude, but our enemies have done so frequently to our serious annoyance +and loss. In the Seven Years' War, for instance, the French by avoiding +offensive operations likely to lead to a decision, and confining themselves +to active defence, were able for five campaigns to prevent our reducing +Canada, which was the object of the war. Had they staked the issue on a +great fleet action in the first campaign, and had the result been against +them, we could certainly have achieved our object in half the time. In the +end, of course, they failed to prevent the conquest, but during all the +time the catastrophe was postponed France had abundant opportunity of +gaining offensively elsewhere territory which, as she at all events +believed, would have compelled us to give up our conquest at the peace. + +Again, in our last great naval war Napoleon by avoiding general actions was +able to keep the command in dispute till by alliances and otherwise he had +gathered force which he deemed sufficient to warrant a return to the +offensive. Eventually that force proved unequal to the task, yet when it +failed and the command passed to his enemy, he had had time to consolidate +his power so far that the loss of his fleet seemed scarcely to affect it, +and for nine years more he was able to continue the struggle. + +Such examples--and there are many of them--serve to show how serious a +matter is naval defence in the hands of a great military Power with other +means of offence. They tell us how difficult it is to deal with, and how +serious therefore for even the strongest naval Power is the need to give it +careful study. + +And not for this reason only, but also because the strongest naval Power, +if faced with a coalition, may find it impossible to exert a drastic +offensive anywhere without temporarily reducing its force in certain areas +to a point relatively so low as to permit of nothing higher than the +defensive. The leading case of such a state of affairs, which we must +further consider presently, was our own position in the War of American +Independence, when, as we have seen, in order to secure an adequate +concentration for offence in the West Indies we were forced to reduce our +home fleet to defensive level. + +What, then, do we mean by naval defence? To arrive at a right answer we +must first clear our mind of all confusing shadows cast by the accidents of +land defence. Both on land and at sea defence means of course taking +certain measures to defer a decision until military or political +developments so far redress the balance of strength that we are able to +pass to the offensive. In the operations of armies the most usual means +employed are the holding of positions and forcing our superior enemy to +exhaust his strength in attacking them. Consequently the idea of military +defence is dominated by the conception of entrenched positions and +fortresses. + +In naval warfare this is not so. At sea the main conception is avoiding +decisive action by strategical or tactical activity, so as to keep our +fleet in being till the situation develops in our favour. In the golden age +of our navy the keynote of naval defence was mobility, not rest. The idea +was to dispute the control by harassing operations, to exercise control at +any place or at any moment as we saw a chance, and to prevent the enemy +exercising control in spite of his superiority by continually occupying his +attention. The idea of mere resistance was hardly present at all. +Everything was counterattack, whether upon the enemy's force or his +maritime communications. On land, of course, such methods of defence are +also well known, but they belong much more to guerilla warfare than to +regular operations. In regular warfare with standing armies, however +brilliantly harassing operations and counter-attack are used, the +fundamental conception is the defended or defensible position. + +Similarly at sea, although the essence of defence is mobility and an +untiring aggressive spirit rather than rest and resistance, yet there also +defended and defensible positions are not excluded. But they are only used +in the last resort. A fleet may retire temporarily into waters difficult of +access, where it can only be attacked at great risk, or into a fortified +base, where it is practically removed from the board and cannot be attacked +at all by a fleet alone. But the occasions on which such expedients can be +used at sea are far rarer than on land. Indeed except for the most +temporary purposes they can scarcely be regarded as admissible at sea, +however great their value on land. The reason is simple. A fleet +withdrawing to such a position leaves open to the enemy the ulterior +object, which is the control of sea communications, whereas on land an army +in a good position may even for a prolonged period cover the ulterior +object, which is usually territory. An army in position, moreover, is +always doing something to exhaust its opponent and redress the unfavourable +balance, but a fleet in inactivity is too often permitting the enemy to +carry on operations which tend to exhaust the resources of its own country. + +For a maritime Power, then, a naval defensive means nothing but keeping the +fleet actively in being-not merely in existence, but in active and vigorous +life. No phrase can better express the full significance of the idea than +"A fleet in being," if it be rightly understood. Unfortunately it has come +to be restricted, by a misunderstanding of the circumstances in which it +was first invented, to one special class of defence. We speak of it as +though it were essentially a method of defence against invasion, and so +miss its fuller meaning. If, however, it be extended to express defence +against any kind of maritime attack, whether against territory or sea +communications, its broad truth will become apparent, and it will give us +the true conception of the idea as held in the British service. + +The occasion on which it was first used was one that well exhibits the +special possibilities of a naval defensive. It was in the year 1690, when, +in alliance with the Dutch, we were at war with France, and though really +superior, had been caught in a situation which placed us temporarily at a +great disadvantage in home waters. The French by a surprising rapidity of +mobilisation and concentration had stolen a march on us before either our +mobilisation or our concentration was complete. King William, with the best +of the army, was in Ireland dealing with a French invasion in support of +James, and a squadron of seven sail under Sir Cloudesley Shovel had been +detached into the Irish Sea to guard his communications. Another squadron, +consisting of sixteen of the line, British and Dutch, had been sent to +Gibraltar under Admiral Killigrew to take down the trade and to keep an eye +on Chateaurenault, who with a slightly inferior squadron was at Toulon. It +was assumed he would probably make a push for Brest, where the French main +fleet was mobilising under the Comte de Tourville, and Killigrew had orders +to follow him if he got through the Straits. Chateaurenault did get +through; Killigrew failed to bring him to action, and instead of following +him immediately, he went into Cadiz to complete his arrangements for +forwarding his outward-bound convoy and escorting the one he was to bring +home. What of course he should have done, according to the practice of more +experienced times, was to have left this work to a cruiser detachment, and +failing contact with Chateaurenault, should have closed at once to the +strategical centre with his battle-squadron. + +Meanwhile the home fleet, which Lord Torrington was to command, was still +unformed. It lay in three divisions, at the Downs, Portsmouth, and +Plymouth, while a considerable part of the promised Dutch contingent had +not made its appearance. It was a splendid chance for the French to seize +the command of the Channel before the concentration could take place and to +crush the British in detail. Accordingly, on June 13th, as soon as +Chateaurenault had arrived, Tourville put to sea with some seventy of the +line. The day before, however, Torrington, having hoisted his flag in the +Downs, had massed his two main divisions at Portsmouth, and by the time +Tourville appeared off the Isle of Wight he had with later arrivals, both +Dutch and British, about fifty-six of the line in St. Helen's Road. Not +knowing that the Toulon contingent had joined, he put to sea intending to +fight, but on discovering the great superiority of the French, he decided +in concert with his council of war to act on the defensive, and before +offering battle to endeavour to secure a concentration with Killigrew and +Shovel and the Plymouth division by getting to the westward. If he found +this course impossible without fighting an action, his plan was to retire +before Tourville "even to the Gunfleet," where amidst the shoals of the +Thames estuary he felt he would have a good chance of repelling an attack +with success. There, too, he counted on being reinforced not only by the +ships still at Chatham, but also possibly by ships from the westward which +might steal along the coast and join him "over the flats" by channels +unknown to the French. To fight as he was he considered to be only playing +the enemy's game. "If we are beaten," he said in communicating his plan to +the Government, "they being absolute masters of the sea will be at great +liberty of doing many things which they dare not do whilst we observe them +and are in a possibility of joining Admiral Killigrew and our ships to the +westward." + +It was a plan conceived on the best principles of defence--waiting till the +acquisition of fresh force justified a return to the offensive. It is +further interesting as a pure case of naval defence, with no ulterior +object other than control of home waters. In the minds of the Government +there was no apprehension of any definite attempt to invade across the +Channel, but the invasion of Ireland was in full progress, and all +nourishment of it must be stopped and our own communications kept free. +There was, moreover, serious anxiety lest the French should extend their +operations to Scotland, and there was Killigrew's homeward-bound convoy +approaching. The situation was one that obviously could not be solved +effectually except by winning a general command of the sea, but in +Torrington's judgment it could be rendered innocuous by holding the command +in dispute. His design, therefore, was to act upon the defensive and +prevent the enemy achieving any positive result until he was in a position +to fight them with a fair chance of victory. A temporary defensive he +considered was the only way to win the command, while to hazard a decision +in inferior strength was the best way to lose it. + +Nothing could be in closer harmony with the principles of good strategy as +we understand them now. It was undoubtedly in advance of anything that had +been done up to that time, and it was little wonder if the Government, as +is usually said, failed to appreciate the design. Their rejection of it has +come in for very severe criticism. But it would seem that they +misunderstood rather than failed to appreciate. The Earl of Nottingham, who +was at the head of the Government, believed, as his reply to the admiral +clearly shows, that Torrington meant to retire to the Gunfleet at once; +whereas it is equally clear to us that the Gunfleet was to be his extreme +point, and that he did not mean to retire so far unless the French forced +him. The Minister failed, as others have done since, to grasp what the +admiral meant by "A fleet in being." He thought that in Torrington's view a +fleet safe in port and not in contact with the enemy was "in being," +whereas Torrington had no such idea. As Nottingham conceived the admiral's +intention he saw that although it might preserve the fleet, it would expose +everything else to destruction; that is, he was oppressed with the special +characteristic of naval warfare which always permits action against the +ulterior object when the enemy denies you any chance of acting against his +armed force. + +Under this misapprehension, which indeed was not justified by the words of +Torrington's despatch, he procured from the Queen an order in these terms: +"We apprehend," it ran, "the consequences of your retiring to the Gunfleet +to be so fatal, that we choose rather you should upon any advantage of the +wind give battle to the enemy than retreat farther than is necessary to get +an advantage upon the enemy." It was, however, left to his discretion to +proceed to the westward to complete his concentration that way, provided, +it said, "you by no means ever lose sight of the French fleet whereby they +may have opportunity of making attempts upon the shore or in the rivers of +Medway or Thames, or get away without fighting." + +This order has been very hardly dealt with by modern critics, although it +clearly contemplates true preventive observation, and even, as the last +words suggest, the idea contained in Nelson's well-known saying, "that by +the time the enemy had beat our fleet soundly they would do us no more harm +this year." It is true that Nelson could rely on the proved superiority of +the British at that time unit for unit, but it is also true that Nottingham +and his colleagues in the Government had information which led them greatly +to underestimate Tourville's strength. This was evident on the face of +Nottingham's despatch which covered the order, so evident indeed that +Torrington might well perhaps have suspended the execution of an order so +obviously based on incorrect information. But knowing probably what +intrigues were going on against him at Court, he chose to regard it as a +peremptory command to engage whenever he found himself to windward. + +Much as a more scientific view of naval strategy may admire Torrington's +conception, there seems no reason for losing temper over the Government's +plan. It was certainly one way of solving the problem, and seeing how large +were our reserves, a defeat need not have meant disaster. Still, it was +doubtless dictated by an inability to grasp, the strategical strength of +Torrington's novel plan, a plan which was not only safer, but was +calculated to achieve greater positive results in the end. The real fallacy +of the Government's plan was that although it had a specious appearance of +a bold offensive, it could have achieved nothing but a negative result. The +most a battle could have given in the circumstances could only have left +the command in dispute, and the worst would have given the enemy a positive +result, which must have gravely compromised William's campaign in Ireland. + +On these lines Torrington replied to the Government. Dealing with their +anxiety for the ships to the westward and the Mediterranean convoy, whose +danger was their expressed reason for forbidding him the Gunfleet, he +pointed out that they could not run much hazard if they took care of +themselves. For, as he repeated, "while we observe the French, they cannot +make any attempt on ships or shore without running great hazard, and if we +are beaten, all is exposed to their mercy." Thus without specially noticing +the Minister's misinterpretation of his despatch, he intimated that his +intention was observation, and not simple retreat. + +By the time Torrington sent this reply he had been pressed back as far as +Beachy Head; it was no longer possible to get to the westward; and the +following day, finding himself to windward, he attacked. But still +confirmed in his idea of defence, and carrying it on to his tactics, he +refused to give the French the chance of a real decision, and disengaged as +soon as a drop in the wind permitted. So far he felt justified in +interpreting orders which he knew were founded on false information. He was +sure, as he said in justification of the way he fought the action, "that +the Queen could not have been prevailed with to sign an order for it, had +not both our weakness and the strength of the enemy been disguised to her." + +So severely was his fleet crippled that he believed his plan could no +longer act. "What the consequences of this unfortunate battle may be," he +wrote in his Journal, "God Almighty only knows, but this I dare be positive +in, had I been left to my liberty I had prevented any attempt upon the +land, and secured the western ships, Killigrew, and the merchantmen." +Actually in all this he was successful. Slowly retiring eastward he drew +the French after him as far as Dover before he ran to the Nore; and +Tourville was unable to get back to the westward, till all the endangered +ships were safe in Plymouth. In spite of Torrington's being forced to fight +an action at the wrong time and place, his design had so far succeeded. Not +only had he prevented the French doing anything that could affect the issue +of the war, but he had completely foiled Tourville's plan of destroying the +British fleet in detail. That he had done, but retribution by passing to +the offensive was no longer in his power. + +That Tourville or his Government was impressed with the efficacy of the +method was demonstrated the following year, when he in his turn found +himself in an inferiority that denied him hope of a successful battle +decision. During the summer he kept his fleet hovering off the mouth of the +Channel without giving the British admiral a chance of contact. His method, +however, differed from that of Torrington, and he only achieved his +negative object by keeping out of sight of his enemy altogether. In his +opinion, if a fleet remained at sea in close observation of an active enemy +an action could not be avoided. "If (the admiral)," he wrote in his +memorandum on the subject, "be ordered to keep the sea to try to amuse the +enemy and to let them know we are in a position to attack in case they +attempt a descent, I think it my duty to say that in that case we must make +up our mind to have to fight them in the end; for if they have really +sought an action, they will have been able to fight, seeing that it is +impossible to pirouette so long near a fleet without coming to grips."[20] +This is as much as to say that a sure point of temporary retreat is +necessary to "a fleet in being," and this was an essential part of +Torrington's idea. + + [20] Delarbre, _Tourville et la marine de son temps_, p. 339. (Author's + note.) + +In Torrington's and Tourville's time, when ships were unhandy and fleet +tactics in their infancy, the difficulty of avoiding action, when a +determined enemy had once got contact, were undoubtedly great, unless a +port of retreat was kept open. But as the art of naval warfare developed, +the possibilities of "a fleet in being" were regarded as much wider, at +least in the British service. It was nearly a hundred years before we were +again forced to use the same device on a large scale, and then it was +believed that superior speed and tactical precision were factors that could +be counted on to an almost unlimited extent. In the darkest days of the War +of American Independence we have a memorandum of the subject by Kempenfelt, +which not only gives the developed idea of "a fleet in being" and the high +aggressive spirit that is its essence, but also explains its value, not +merely as a defensive expedient, but as a means of permitting a drastic +offensive even when you are as a whole inferior. "When you know the enemy's +designs," he says, "in order to do something effectual you must endeavour +to be superior to them in some part where they have designs to execute, and +where, if they succeed, they would most injure you. If your fleet is +divided as to be in all places inferior to the enemy, they will have a fair +chance of succeeding everywhere in their attempts. If a squadron cannot be +formed sufficient to face the enemy's at home, it would be more +advantageous to let your inferiority be still greater in order by it to +gain the superiority elsewhere." + +"When inferior to the enemy, and you have only a squadron of observation to +watch and attend upon their motions, such a squadron should be composed of +two-decked ships only [that is, ships of the highest mobility] as to assure +it purpose. It must have the advantage of the enemy in sailing, else under +certain circumstances it will be liable to be forced to battle or to give +up some of its heavy sailers. It is highly necessary to have such a flying +squadron to hang on the enemy's large fleet, as it will prevent their +dividing into separate squadrons for intercepting your trade or spreading +their ships for a more extensive view. You will be at hand to profit from +any accidental separation or dispersion of their fleet from hard gales, +fogs, or other causes. You may intercept supplies, intelligence, &c, sent +to them. In fine, such a squadron will be a check and restraint upon their +motions, and prevent a good deal of the mischief they might otherwise do." + +Three years before, when first called to be Chief of the Staff in the +Channel, he had emphasised the same points. "Much," he wrote in July 1779, +"I may say all, depends upon this fleet. 'Tis an inferior against a +superior fleet. Therefore the greatest skill and address is requisite to +counteract the designs of the enemy, to watch and seize the favourable +opportunity for action, and to catch the advantage of making the effort at +some or other feeble part of the enemy's line; or if such opportunities +don't offer, to hover near the enemy, keep him at bay, and prevent his +attempting anything but at risk and hazard; to command their attention, and +oblige them to think of nothing but being on their guard against your +attack."[21] + + [21] _Barham Papers_, i, 292. + +It was on these lines the war was conducted. The West Indian area, in which +lay the enemy's principal object, was treated as the offensive theatre and +the home waters as the defensive. Inferior as was the Channel fleet to the +home fleet of the allies, its defensive operations proved adequate to +prevent their achieving any success. Nor was this all, for Kempenfelt was +able to demonstrate the positive side of his theory in the most brilliant +and convincing manner. In dealing with concentration we have seen how, in +command of such a flying squadron as he postulated, he was able off Ushant +to seize a favourable opportunity for action, which resulted in his +capturing a convoy of military stores essential to the French operations in +the West Indies under the nose of De Guichen with an escort of nearly twice +his force. + +Nelson certainly shared Kempenfelt's views as to the possibilities of an +inferior fleet kept actively in being. "As to our fleet," he wrote from the +Mediterranean in 1796, "under such a commander-in-chief as Sir John Jervis +nobody has any fear ... We are now twenty-two sail of the line. The +combined fleet will not be above thirty-five.... I will venture my life Sir +John Jervis defeats them. I do not mean by a regular battle, but by the +skill of our admiral and the activity and spirit of our officers and +seamen. This country is the most favourable possible for that skill with an +inferior fleet; for the winds are so variable, that some one time in +twenty-four hours you must be able to attack a part of a large fleet, and +the other will be becalmed or have a contrary wind. Therefore I hope the +Government will not be alarmed for our safety." + +Such a conception of the defensive may indeed be said to have become +current in the British service. It was part of the reasoning which in 1805, +after Villeneuve's escape from the Mediterranean, decided Sir John Orde to +fall back on Ushant instead of entering the Straits. "I dare believe," he +wrote, "Lord Nelson will be found in condition with his twelve of the line +and numerous frigates to act on the defensive without loss and even to hang +on to the skirts of the enemy's fleet should it attempt any material +service, especially when encumbered with troops." + +In all this consideration of the potentialities of "a fleet in being" +operating defensively it must never be forgotten that we are dealing with +its possibilities in relation to a general command of the sea--to its +general power of holding such command in dispute, as Torrington used it. +Its power of preventing a particular operation, such as oversea invasion, +is another matter, which will always depend upon the local conditions. If +the "fleet in being" can be contained in such a way that it is impossible +for it to reach the invading line of passage, it will be no bar to +invasion. In 1690, so far as Torrington's fleet was concerned, the French, +had they been so minded, might have made a descent, say, at Portsmouth +while Torrington was at the Nore. But Torrington's fleet was not the only +factor. His retreat forced Tourville to leave behind him unfought the +squadrons of Shovel and Killigrew, and so far as commanding a line of +invasion passage was concerned Tourville was himself as well contained as +Torrington. The conditions of naval defence against invasion are in fact so +complex compared with those of general naval defence that they must be +treated later as a special branch of the subject. + +The doctrine of the "Fleet in being" as formulated and practised by +Torrington and developed by Kempenfelt goes no further than this, that +where the enemy regards the general command of a sea area as necessary to +his offensive purposes, you may be able to prevent his gaining such command +by using your fleet defensively, refusing what Nelson called a regular +battle, and seizing every opportunity for a counterstroke. To use it as it +was used by the French in the case of Tourville's famous deterrent cruise, +where the whole object of the French was offensive and could not be +obtained except by offence, is quite another thing. + +It is indeed difficult to understand the admiration with which his +_campagne au large_ has been treated in France. He kept the sea off the +mouth of the Channel for fifty days in the summer of 1691, and for forty of +those days our Channel fleet was making no systematic effort to seek him +out. He had been sent to sea in hope of intercepting our great "Smyrna +convoy," which was then the backbone of our oversea trade. Russell with the +British main fleet simply took positions to cover its approach until it was +safe, knowing presumably that Tourville must come to him if he wished to +accomplish his purpose. When the convoy was safe Russell proceeded off +Ushant, that is, between the enemy and his base. Tourville's communications +were thus cut, his line of retreat threatened, and he seized the first +opportunity to elude Russell and to return into port. Beyond taking a few +ships from one of the West India convoys, he accomplished nothing. The +central French offensive in Ireland was broken at the battle of the Boyne, +and the prestige of England at sea was restored. It is true our trade +suffered in the North Sea, but this was not directly due to the +concentration which Tourville's cruise forced upon us, but rather to the +failure of the Dutch--apparently by a misunderstanding-to provide for an +effective blockade of Dunkirk. + +To British eyes it will seem that the heresy which was latent in +Tourville's instructions was a seed that choked all the finer aspirations +of the French navy. In 1691 the plan of his cruise may possibly be defended +as sufficiently aggressive, since, seeing how unstable was William's new +throne, a resounding blow at British trade, combined with an expected +victory in Ireland, might have been enough to upset it. But afterwards the +idea was stretched to occasions it would not fit. It seems to have bred a +belief that where the object of the war plainly depended on winning a real +command of the sea, that object could yet be attained by naval defensive +operations. Many times it is true a policy which had starved the navy of +France left no other course open to her seamen, and had they in their +inferiority attempted the offensive, the end must have been swifter if not +more certain. In criticising the maritime history of France we must be +careful to distinguish policy from strategy. It was not always the +defensive strategy that was bad, but the policy that condemned her admirals +to negative operations. Seeing that she was a continental Power with +continental aspirations, it was often a policy from which her military +exigencies permitted no escape. Nevertheless the policy was twice accursed: +it cursed her when she was weak, and cursed her when she was strong. The +prolonged use of the defensive bred a habit of mind which seems to have +rendered her incapable of striking hard when she had the strength. In no +other way at least can we account for the behaviour of so high-spirited a +nation when her chance of revenge came in the War of American Independence. + +It is here in its moral reactions lies the danger of the defensive, a +danger so insidious in its working as to tempt us never to utter the word. +Yet with the voice of Torrington, Kempenfelt, and Nelson in our ears, it +would be folly to ignore it for ourselves, and still more to ignore the +exhausting strain its use by our enemy may impose upon us. It must be +studied, if for no other reasons than to learn how to break it down. Nor +will the study have danger, if only we keep well in view the spirit of +restless and vigilant counter-attack which Kempenfelt and Nelson regarded +as its essence. True, some of the conditions which in the days of sails +made for opportunity have passed away, but many still remain. Shifts of +wind and calms will no longer bring them, but weather thick or violent can +yet make seamanship, nimbleness, and cohesion tell as it always did; and +there is no reason to doubt that it is still possible for hard sea-training +to make "the activity and spirit of our officers and seamen" give the +results which Nelson so confidently expected. + +II. MINOR COUNTER-ATTACKS + +For the weaker of two belligerents minor-attack has always exercised a +certain fascination. Where a Power was so inferior in naval force that it +could scarcely count even on disputing command by fleet operations, there +remained a hope of reducing the relative inferiority by putting part of the +enemy's force out of action. Such hopes were rarely realised. In 1587 Drake +succeeded in stopping the Spanish invasion by such a counter-attack on the +Cadiz division of the Armada while it was still unmobilised. In 1667 the +Dutch achieved a similar success against our Chatham division when it was +demobilised and undefended, and thereby probably secured rather more +favourable terms of peace. But it cannot be said that the old wars present +any case where the ultimate question of command was seriously affected by a +minor counterattack. + +The advent of the torpedo, however, has given the idea a new importance +that cannot be overlooked. The degree of that importance is at present +beyond calculation. There is at least no evidence that it would be very +high in normal conditions and between ordinarily efficient fleets. The +comparative success of the opening Japanese attack on the Port Arthur +squadron is the only case in point, and where only one case exists, it is +necessary to use extreme caution in estimating its significance. Before we +can deduce anything of permanent value we must consider very carefully both +its conditions and results. + +To begin with, it was a new experience of a new class of weapon, and it by +no means follows that the success of a new expedient will be repeated with +anything like equal result. It will not be irrelevant again to recall the +case of fireships. At the outset of the sailing era in 1588, this device +prepared the way for a decisive success against a fleet in the open. In the +succeeding wars the new weapon found a prominent place in the organisation +of sea-going fleets, but its success was never repeated. Against ships in +ill-defended harbours it did occasionally produce good results, and during +the infancy of tactics its moral and even material effects in fleet actions +were frequently demonstrated. But as naval science developed and the +limitations of the weapon were more accurately measured, it was able to +achieve less and less, till in the eighteenth century it was regarded as +almost negligible. Even its moral effect was lost, and it ceased to be +considered as a battle unit. + +Now, if we examine closely the Port Arthur case, we shall find it pointing +to the existence of certain inherent conditions not dissimilar from those +which discredited fireships as a decisive factor in war. In spite of the +apparently formidable nature of a surprise attack by torpedo the +indications from the one case in point are that these conditions make for +greater power in the defence than in the attack. The first condition +relates to the difficulty of locating the objective accurately. It is +obvious that for this kind of operation the most precise intelligence is +essential, and of all intelligence the most difficult to obtain in war is +the distribution of an enemy's fleet from day to day. The Japanese had +fairly certain information that the bulk of the Port Arthur squadron was +lying in the outer anchorage, but it had been constantly moving, and there +was a report that three battleships had just been detached from it. The +report was false, but the result was that of the five divisions of +destroyers which the Japanese had available, two were diverted against +Dalny, where no enemy was found. Such uncertainty must always exist, and in +no circumstances is it likely to be less than where, as in the Japanese +case, the attack is made before declaration, and while the ordinary +channels of intelligence are still open. + +Further, it is to be noted that in spite of the fact that relations for +some weeks had been highly strained, and a surprise torpedo attack was +regarded as probable, the Russians had taken no precautions to confuse +their enemy. It is obvious that measures to prevent accurate locating can, +and should, be taken in such cases. We may go further. From confusing the +enemy by such means it is but a step to lead him to a wrong conclusion, and +to lay for him a trap which may swallow up the bulk of his destroyer force +in the first hours of the war. It is to be feared, however, that the risks +of such an eventuality are so great in minor counter-attacks of this +nature, that it will probably be very difficult to tempt an inferior enemy +to expose his flotilla in this way. + +This view receives emphasis from the second point which the Port Arthur +case serves to demonstrate, and that is the great power of even the +flimsiest defence against such attacks; in other words, the chances of +success can scarcely ever be great enough to justify the risk. Everything +was in favour of the Japanese. Orders had been issued in the Russian +squadron for two or three nights previously to prepare for a torpedo +attack, but so low had discipline fallen, that the orders were obeyed in a +very perfunctory manner. Guns were not loaded, their crews were not at +quarters, nor were the nets got out. The only real precaution taken was +that two destroyers and no more had been sent out as guard patrol, but even +they were forbidden to fire on anything they met until they had reported to +the admiral or had themselves been fired on. Defence against a surprise +attack could scarcely have been more feeble, and yet so high was the +nervous tension in the attacking force, that it proved stronger than could +reasonably have been expected. The mere existence of the patrol and the +necessity of evading it threw the Japanese approach into a confusion from +which it was unable to recover entirely, and the attack lost its essential +momentum and cohesion. Again, defective as were the arrangements in the +squadron itself, and lax as were its training and discipline, no torpedo +hits were made, so far as we can judge, after the Russian guns and +searchlights got into play. + +Such development of strength in the defence seems inherent in the +conditions of minor attack, and there appears to be no reason for expecting +better results for such attacks in normal cases. But in deducing principles +from the Port Arthur case, it must always be remembered that it was far +from normal. It was a blow before declaration, when the menace of strained +relations, though realised, had been almost entirely ignored by the +Russians. In such exceptional and almost incredible circumstances a minor +attack might always be counted on for a certain measure of success. To this +we have to add the fact that the Russian squadron was not ordinarily +efficient, but appears to have fallen into a lax condition such as could +scarcely recur in the case of any other naval Power. + +Finally, we must ask what, with every condition abnormally in favour of the +attack, was the actual material result? Did it have any real influence on +the ultimate question of command? It is true that it so far swung the +balance in favour of the Japanese that they were able to exercise the local +control long enough to land their troops and isolate Port Arthur. But the +Japanese plan for securing ultimate command rested on their power of taking +Port Arthur by military operation and sustaining the siege from the sea. +Yet in spite of every condition of success the physical effect of the blow +was so small, that even without the help of an adequate dockyard the +squadron recovered from it and became potent again before the siege could +even be formed. The minor attacks which followed the first blow were all +failures, and whether delivered at the port or upon the squadron in the +open had no appreciable effect whatever. + +At the same time it must be remembered that since that war the art of +torpedo warfare has developed very rapidly. Its range and offensive power +have increased in a higher ratio than the means of resisting it. Still +those means have advanced, and it is probable that a squadron in a naval +port or in a properly defended anchorage is not more easy to injure than it +ever was; while a squadron at sea, so long as it constantly shifts its +position, still remains very difficult to locate with sufficient precision +for successful minor attack. + +The unproved value of submarines only deepens the mist which overhangs the +next naval war. From a strategical point of view we can say no more than +that we have to count with a new factor, which gives a new possibility to +minor counterattack. It is a possibility which on the whole tells in favour +of naval defence, a new card which, skilfully played in combination with +defensive fleet operations, may lend fresh importance to the "Fleet in +being." It may further be expected that whatever the effective +possibilities of minor operations may ultimately prove to be in regard to +securing command, the moral influence will be considerable, and at least at +the beginning of a future war will tend to deflect and hamper the major +operations and rob of their precision the lines which formerly led so +frankly to the issue by battle. + +In the absence of a sufficient volume of experience it would be idle to go +further, particularly as torpedo attack, like fireship attack, depends for +success more than any other on the spirit and skill of officers and men. +With regard to the torpedo as the typical arm of mobile coastal defence, it +is a different matter. What has been said applies only to its power towards +securing command of the sea, and not to the exercise or to disputing the +exercise of command. This is a question which is concerned with defence +against invasion, and to that we must now turn. + + * * * * * + + CHAPTER FOUR + + METHODS OF EXERCISING COMMAND + + * * * * * + +I. DEFENCE AGAINST INVASION + +In methods of exercising command are included all operations not directly +concerned with securing command or with preventing its being secured by the +enemy. We engage in exercising command whenever we conduct operations which +are directed not against the enemy's battle-fleet, but to using sea +communications for our own purposes, or to interfering with the enemy's use +of them. Such operations, though logically of secondary importance, have +always occupied the larger part of naval warfare. Naval warfare does not +begin and end with the destruction of the enemy's battle-fleet, nor even +with breaking his cruiser power. Beyond all this there is the actual work +of preventing his passing an army across the sea and of protecting the +passage of our own military expeditions. There is also the obstruction of +his trade and the protection of our own. In all such operations we are +concerned with the exercise of command. We are using the sea, or +interfering with its use by the enemy; we are not endeavouring to secure +the use or to prevent the enemy from securing it. The two categories of +operation differ radically in conception and purpose, and strategically +they are on wholly different planes. + +Logically, of course, operations for exercising command should follow those +for securing command; that is to say, that since the attainment of command +is the special object of naval warfare, and since that command can only be +obtained permanently by the destruction of the enemy's armed forces afloat, +it follows that in strictness no other objects should be allowed to +interfere with our concentration of effort on the supreme end of securing +command by destruction. War, however, is not conducted by logic, and the +order of proceeding which logic prescribes cannot always be adhered to in +practice. We have seen how, owing to the special conditions of naval +warfare, extraneous necessities intrude themselves which make it inevitable +that operations for exercising command should accompany as well as follow +operations for securing command. War being, as it is, a complex sum of +naval, military, political, financial, and moral factors, its actuality can +seldom offer to a naval staff a clean slate on which strategical problems +can be solved by well-turned syllogisms. The naval factor can never ignore +the others. From the outset one or more of them will always call for some +act of exercising command which will not wait for its turn in the logical +progression. To a greater or less extent in all ordinary cases both +categories of operation will have to be put in motion from the beginning. + +Hence the importance of realising the distinction between the two generic +forms of naval activity. In the hurry and stress of war confusion between +them is easy. By keeping a firm grip upon the difference we can see at +least what we are doing. We can judge how far any given operation that may +be called for is a sacrifice of security to exercise, how far such a +sacrifice may be justified, and how far the one end may be made to serve +the other. By applying the distinction as a test much error may be avoided. +The risk we take may be great, but we shall be able to weigh it accurately +against the value of the end, and we shall take it with our eyes open and +of set purpose. Above all, it will enable the Staff to settle clearly for +each squadronal commander what is to be his primary objective, and what the +object or purpose of the operations entrusted to him. It is above all in +this last consideration, and particularly in the determination of the +objective, that lies the main practical value of the distinction. + +This will become clear the moment we begin to consider defence against +invasion, which naturally takes the first place amongst operations for the +exercise of control. Of all the current assumptions, not one is so +confusing for the finer adjustments of strategy as that which affirms that +the primary objective of our fleet is always the enemy's fleet. Of the +battle-fleet and its attendant units it is of course true, so long at least +as the enemy has a battle-fleet in being. It is true, that is, of all +operations for securing control, but of operations for exercising control +it is not true. In the case we have now to consider-defence against +invasion-the objective of the special operations is, and always has been, +the enemy's army. On this fundamental postulate our plans for resisting +invasion have always been constructed from the year of the Armada to 1805. + +In the old service tradition the point was perfectly well established. +Admirals' instructions constantly insist on the fact that the transports +are the "principal object." The whole disposition of the fleet during +Hawke's blockade in 1759 was based on keeping a firm hold on the transports +in the Morbihan, and when he sought to extend his operations against the +Rochefort squadron, he was sharply reminded by Anson that "the principal +object of attention at this time" was, firstly, "the interception of the +embarkations of the enemy at Morbihan," and secondly, "the keeping of the +ships of war from coming out of Brest." Similarly Commodore Warren in 1796, +when he had the permanent frigate guard before Brest, issued orders to his +captains that in case of encountering enemy's transports under escort they +were "to run them down or destroy them in the most expeditious manner +possible previous to attacking the ships of war, but to preserve such a +situation as to effect that purpose when directed by signal." Lord Keith's +orders when watching Napoleon's flotilla were to the same effect. +"Directing your chief attention," they run, "to the destruction of the +ships, vessels, or boats having men, horses, or artillery on board (in +preference to that of the vessels by which they are protected), and in the +strict execution of this important duty losing sight entirely of the +possibility of idle censure for avoiding contact with an armed force, +because the prevention of debarkation is the object of primary importance +to which every other consideration must give way."[22] + + [22] _Admiralty Secretary's In-Letters_, 537, 8 August 1803. + +In tactics, then, the idea was the same as in strategy. The army was the +primary objective round which all dispositions turned. In the French +service the strength and soundness of the British practice was understood +at least by the best men. When in 1805 Napoleon consulted Ganteaume as to +the possibility of the flotilla of transports effecting its passage by +evasion, the admiral told him it was impossible, since no weather could +avail to relax the British hold sufficiently. "In former wars," he said, +"the English vigilance was miraculous." + +To this rule there was no exception, not even when circumstances rendered +it difficult to distinguish between the enemy's fleet and army as +objectives. This situation could occur in two ways. Firstly, when the +invading army was designed to sail with the battle-fleet, as in the case of +Napoleon's invasion of Egypt; and secondly, when, although the design was +that the two should operate on separate lines, our system of defence forced +the fleet to come up to the army's line of passage in order to clear it, as +happened in the case of the Armada and the French attempt of 1744. + +In the latter case the invading army, whose objective was unknown, was at +Dunkirk, and a French fleet was coming up the Channel to cover the passage. +Sir John Norris, in command of the home fleet, was in the Downs. Though his +name is now almost forgotten, he was one of the great founders of our naval +tradition, and a strategist of the first order. In informing the Government +of his plan of operations, he said he intended to proceed with his whole +squadron off Dunkirk to prevent the transports sailing. "But," he says, "if +they should unfortunately get out and pass us in the night and go +northward, I intend to detach a superior force to endeavour to overtake and +destroy them; and with the remainder of my squadron either to fight the +French fleet now in the Channel, or observe them and cover the country as +our circumstances will admit of; or I shall pursue the embarkation with all +my strength." In this case there had been no time to organise a special +squadron or flotilla, in the usual way, to bar the line of passage, and the +battle-fleet had to be used for the purpose. This being so, Norris was not +going to allow the presence of an enemy's battle-fleet to entice him away +from his grip on the invading army, and so resolutely did he hold to the +principle, that he meant if the transports put to sea to direct his +offensive against them, while he merely contained the enemy's battle-fleet +by defensive observation. + +In the Egyptian case there was no distinction between the two objectives at +all. Napoleon's expedition sailed in one mass. Yet in the handling of his +fleet Nelson preserved the essential idea. He organised it into three +"sub-squadrons," one of six sail and two of four each. "Two of these +sub-squadrons," says Berry, his flag-captain, "were to attack the ships of +war, while the third was to pursue the transports and to sink and destroy +as many as it could"; that is, he intended, in order to make sure of +Napoleon's army, to use no more than ten, and possibly only eight, of his +own battleships against the eleven of the enemy. + +Many other examples could be given of British insistence on making the +enemy's army the primary objective and not his fleet in cases of invasion. +No point in the old tradition was more firmly established. Its value was of +course more strongly marked where the army and the fleet of the enemy +endeavoured to act on separate lines of operation; that is, where the army +took the real offensive line and the fleet the covering or preventive line, +and where consequently for our own fleet there was no confusion between the +two objectives. This was the normal case, and the reason it was so is +simple enough. It may be stated at once, since it serves to enunciate the +general principle upon which our traditional system of defence was based. + +An invasion of Great Britain must always be an attempt over an uncommanded +sea. It may be that our fleet predominates or it may be that it does not, +but the command must always be in dispute. If we have gained complete +command, no invasion can take place, nor will it be attempted. If we have +lost it completely no invasion will be necessary, since, quite apart from +the threat of invasion, we must make peace on the best terms we can get. +Now, if the sea be uncommanded, there are obviously two ways in which an +invasion may be attempted. Firstly, the enemy may endeavour to force it +through our naval defence with transports and fleet in one mass. This was +the primitive idea on which the Spanish invasion of Philip the Second was +originally planned by his famous admiral, Santa-Cruz. Ripening military +science, however, was able to convince him of its weakness. A mass of +transports and warships is the most cumbrous and vulnerable engine of war +ever known. The weaker the naval defence of the threatened country, the +more devoutly will it pray the invader may use this device. Where contact +with the enemy's fleet is certain, and particularly in narrow seas, as it +was in this case, such a course will give the defender all the chances he +could desire, and success for the invader is inconceivable, provided always +we resolutely determine to make the army in its transports our main +objective, and are not to be induced to break our head against its escort. + +Where, however, contact is not certain, the invasion over an uncommanded +sea may succeed by evasion of the defender's battle-fleet, as it did in the +case of Napoleon's invasion of Egypt. But that operation belongs to an +entirely different category from that which we are now considering. None of +the factors on which the traditional system of British defence is based +were present. It was an operation over an open sea against a distant and +undetermined objective that had no naval defence of its own, whereas in our +own case the determining factors are permanent naval defence, an +approximately determined objective, and a narrow sea where evasion by any +force of invasion strength is impossible. Napoleon's exploit was in fact +nothing more than the evasion of an open blockade which had no naval +defence beyond it. The vital importance of these things will appear as we +proceed and note the characteristics which marked every attempt to invade +England. From such attempts we of course exclude the various descents upon +Ireland, which, not being of invasion strength, fall into another class, to +be dealt with hereafter. + +Since the expedient of forcing an invasion by the strength of a powerful +battleship escort has always been rejected as an inadmissible operation, +the invader has had no choice but to adopt a separate line for his army, +and operate with his fleet in such a way as may promise to prevent the +enemy controlling that line. That, in short, is the problem of invasion +over an uncommanded sea. In spite of an unbroken record of failure scored +at times with naval disaster, continental strategists from Parma to +Napoleon have clung obstinately to the belief that there is a solution +short of a complete fleet decision. They have tried every conceivable +expedient again and again. They have tried it by simple surprise evasion +and by evasion through diversion or dispersal of our naval defence. They +have tried it by seeking local control through a local naval success +prepared by surprise, or by attempting to entice our fleet away from home +waters to a sufficient extent to give them temporarily local superiority. +But the end has always been the same. Try as they would, they were faced +ultimately by one of two alternatives--they must either defeat our covering +battle-fleet in battle, or they must close their own battle-fleet on the +transports, and so set up the very situation which it was their main design +to avoid. + +The truth is, that all attempts to invade England without command of the +sea have moved in a vicious circle, from which no escape was ever found. No +matter how ingenious or complex the enemy's design, a determined hold on +their army as the primary naval objective has always set up a process of +degradation which rendered the enterprise impracticable. Its stages are +distinct and recurrent, and may be expressed as it were diagrammatically as +follows:-- + +Two lines of operation having been decided on, the invading army is +gathered at a point as close as possible to the coast to be invaded; that +is, where the intervening sea is narrowest, and where the army's passage +will be exposed to interference for the shortest time. The covering fleet +will operate from a point as distant as convenient, so as to entice the +enemy as far as possible from the army's line of passage. The defender +replies by blockading the army's ports of departure with a flotilla of +light vessels capable of dealing with transports, or by establishing a +mobile defence of the threatened coasts which transports cannot break +unaided, or more probably he will combine both expedients. The first +fallacy of the invasion plan is then apparent. The narrower the sea, the +easier it is to watch. Pure evasion becomes impossible, and it is necessary +to give the transports sufficient armed strength by escort or otherwise to +protect them against flotilla attack. The defender at once stiffens his +flotilla defence with cruisers and intermediate ships, and the invader has +to arrange for breaking the barrier with a battle-squadron. So weak and +disturbing a position is then set up that the whole scheme begins to give +way, if, that is, the defender has clung stubbornly to the strategy we +always used. Our battle-fleet refused to seek out that of the invader. It +has always held a position between the invader's fleet and the blockaded +invasion base, covering the blockade and flotilla defence. To enable a +battle-squadron to break our hold and to reinforce the army escort, the +invader must either force this covering position by battle, or disturb it +so effectively as to permit the reinforcing squadron to evade it. But since +_ex hypothesi_ he is trying to invade without securing the command by +battle, he will first try to reinforce his transport escort by evasion. At +once he is faced with new difficulty. The reinforcement entails dividing +his fleet, and this is an expedient so vicious and disturbing to morale, +that no invader has ever been found to risk it. And for this reason. To +make evasion possible for the detached squadron, he must bring up the rest +of his force and engage the attention of the enemy's fleet, and thus unless +he is in very great superiority, and by hypothesis is not--he runs the +hazard of having his two divisions beaten in detail. This method has +sometimes been urged by Governments, but so loud have been the protests +both from the fleet and the army, that it has always been dropped, and the +invader finds himself at the end of the vicious circle. Unable to reinforce +his transport escort sufficiently without dividing his battle-fleet, he is +forced to bring his whole force up to the army or abandon the attempt till +command shall have been secured by battle. + +Thus the traditional British system has never failed to bring about the +deadlock, and it will be observed it is founded on making the invading army +the primary objective. We keep a hold on it, firstly, by flotilla blockade +and defence stiffened as circumstances may dictate by higher units, and +secondly, by battle-fleet cover. It is on the flotilla hold that the whole +system is built up. It is the local danger to that hold which determines +the amount of stiffening the flotilla demands, and it is the security of +that hold which determines the position and action of the battle-fleet. + +A few typical examples will serve to show how the system worked in practice +under all kinds of conditions. The first scientific attempt to work on two +lines of operation, as distinguished from the crude mass methods of the +Middle Ages, was the Spanish enterprise of 1588. Though internal support +from Catholic malcontents was expected, it was designed as a true invasion, +that is, a continuing operation for permanent conquest. Parma, the military +commander-in-chief, laid it down that the Spanish fleet would have not only +to protect his passage and support his landing, but also "to keep open his +communications for the flow of provisions and munition." + +In advising the dual line of operation, Parma's original intention was to +get his army across by surprise. As always, however, it proved impossible +to conceal the design, and long before he was ready he found himself +securely blockaded by a Dutch flotilla supported by an English squadron. So +firm indeed was the English hold on the army, that for a time it was +overdone. The bulk of the English fleet was kept on the line of passage +under Howard, while Drake alone was sent to the westward. It was only under +the great sailor's importunity that the disposition, which was to become +traditional, was perfected, and the whole fleet, with the exception of the +squadron supporting the flotilla blockade, was massed in a covering +position to the westward. The normal situation was then set up, and it +could only have one result. Surprise was out of the question. Parma could +not move till the blockade was broken, nor in face of the covering fleet +could the Spanish fleet hope to break it by a sudden intrusion. The vague +prospects the Spaniards had conceived of keeping the English fleet away +from the line of passage by threatening a descent in the West Country or +blockading it in a western port would no longer do. No such expedient would +release Parma, and the Duke of Medina-Sidonia was ordered to proceed direct +to Dunkirk if possible without fighting, there to break the blockade and +secure the passage. + +There was some idea in the King's mind that he would be able to do this +without a battle, but Parma and every seasoned Spanish sailor knew that the +English fleet would have to be totally defeated before the transports could +venture out of port. Such a battle was indeed inevitable, and the English +dispositions secured that the Spaniards would have to fight it under every +disadvantage which was inherent in the plan of dual lines of operation. The +English would secure certain contact at such a distance from the line of +passage as would permit prolonged harassing attacks in waters unfamiliar to +the enemy and close to their own sources of support and supply. No battle +to the death would be necessary until the Spaniards were herded into the +confined and narrow waters which the army's passage demanded, and where +both sections of the British fleet would be massed for the final struggle. +They must arrive there dispirited with indecisive actions and with the +terrors of unknown and difficult seas at the highest point. All this was no +matter of chance. It was inherent in the strategical and geographical +conditions. The English dispositions had taken every advantage of them, and +the result was that not only was the Spanish army unable even to move, but +the English advantages in the final battle were so great, that it was only +a lucky shift of wind that saved the Armada from being driven to total +destruction upon the Dutch banks. + +In this case, of course, there had been ample time to make the necessary +dispositions. It will be well to follow it with an example in which +surprise came as near to being complete as it is possible to conceive, and +where the arrangements for defence had to be improvised on the spur of the +moment. + +A case in point was the French attempt of 1744. In that year everything was +in favour of the invader. England was undermined with Jacobite sedition; +Scotland was restless and threatening; the navy had sunk to what is +universally regarded as its worst for spirit, organisation, and command; +and the government was in the hands of the notorious "Drunken +Administration." For three years we had been making unsuccessful war with +Spain, and had been supporting Maria Theresa on the Continent against +France, with the result that our home defence was reduced to its lowest +ebb. The navy then numbered 183 sail--about equal to that of France and +Spain combined--but owing to the strain of the war in the Mediterranean and +Transatlantic stations only forty-three, including eighteen of the line, +were available for home waters. Even counting all cruising ships "within +call," as the phrase then was, the Government had barely one-fourth of the +fleet at hand to meet the crisis. With the land forces it was little +better. Considerably more than half the home army was abroad with the King, +who was assisting the Empress-Queen as Elector of Hanover. Between France +and England, however, there was no war. In the summer the King won the +battle of Dettingen; a formal alliance with Maria Theresa followed in the +autumn; France responded with a secret alliance with Spain; and to prevent +further British action on the Continent, she resolved to strike a blow at +London in combination with a Jacobite insurrection. It was to be a "bolt +from the blue" before declaration and in mid-winter, when the best ships of +the home fleet were laid up. The operation was planned on dual lines, the +army to start from Dunkirk, the covering fleet from Brest. + +The surprise was admirably designed. The port of Dunkirk had been destroyed +under the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, and though the French had been +restoring it secretly for some time, it was still unfit to receive a fleet +of transports. In spite of the warnings of Sir John Norris, the senior +admiral in the service, the assembling of troops in its neighbourhood from +the French army in Flanders could only be taken for a movement into winter +quarters, and that no suspicion might be aroused the necessary transports +were secretly taken up in other ports under false charter-parties, and were +only to assemble off Dunkirk at the last moment. With equal skill the +purpose of the naval mobilisation at Brest was concealed. By false +information cleverly imparted to our spies and by parade of victualling for +a long voyage, the British Government was led to believe that the main +fleet was intended to join the Spaniards in the Mediterranean, while a +detachment, which was designed to escort the transports, was ostensibly +equipped for a raid in the West Indies. + +So far as concealment was concerned the arrangement was perfect. Yet it +contained within it the fatal ingredient. The army was to strike in the +Thames at Tilbury; but complete as was the secrecy, Marshal Saxe, who was +to command, could not face the passage without escort. There were too many +privateers and armed merchantmen always in the river, besides cruisers +moving to and fro on commerce-protection duty. The division, therefore, +which we supposed to be for the West Indies was to be detached from the +Brest fleet after it entered the Channel and was to proceed to join the +transports off Dunkirk, while the Marquis de Roquefeuil with the main fleet +held what British ships might be ready in Portsmouth either by battle or +blockade. + +Nothing could look simpler or more certain of success. The British +Government seemed quite asleep. The blow was timed for the first week in +January, and it was mid-December before they even began to watch Brest with +cruisers regularly. On these cruisers' reports measures were taken to +prepare an equal squadron for sea by the new year. By this time nearly +twenty of the line were ready or nearly so at the Nore, Portsmouth, and +Plymouth, and a press was ordered to man them. Owing to various causes the +French had now to postpone their venture. Finally it was not till February +6th that Roquefeuil was seen to leave Brest with nineteen of the line. The +news reached London on the 12th, and next day Norris was ordered to hoist +his flag at Spithead. His instructions were "to take the most effectual +measures to prevent the making of any descent upon the kingdoms." It was +nothing but news that the young Pretender had left Rome for France that led +to this precaution. The Government had still no suspicion of what was +brewing at Dunkirk. It was not till the 20th that a Dover smuggler brought +over information which at last opened their eyes. + +A day or two later the French transports were seen making for Dunkirk, and +were mistaken for the Brest fleet. Orders were consequently sent down to +Norris to follow them. In vain he protested at the interference. He knew +the French were still to the westward of him, but his orders were repeated, +and he had to go. Tiding it up-Channel against easterly winds, he reached +the Downs and joined the Nore Division there on the 28th. History usually +speaks of this false movement as the happy chance which saved the country +from invasion. But it was not so. Saxe had determined not to face the +Thames ships without escort. They were ample to destroy him had he done so. +In truth the move which the Government forced on Norris spoilt the campaign +and prevented his destroying the Brest fleet as well as stopping the +invasion. + +Roquefeuil had just received his final orders off the Start. He was +instructed by all possible means to bring the main British fleet to action, +or at least to prevent further concentration, while he was also to detach +the special division of four of the line under Admiral Barraille to Dunkirk +to escort the transports. It was in fact the inevitable order, caused by +our hold on the army, to divide the fleet. Both officers as usual began to +be upset, and as with Medina-Sidonia, they decided to keep company till +they reached the Isle of Wight and remain there till they could get touch +with Saxe and pilots for the Dover Strait. They were beset with the +nervousness that seems inseparable from this form of operation. Roquefeuil +explained to his Government that it was impossible to tell what ships the +enemy had passed to the Downs, and that Barraille when he arrived off +Dunkirk might well find himself in inferiority. He ended in the usual way +by urging that the whole fleet must move in a body to the line of passage. +On arriving off Portsmouth, however, a reconnaissance in thick weather led +him to believe that the whole of Norris's fleet was still there, and he +therefore detached Barraille, who reached Dunkirk in safety. + +Not knowing that Norris was in the Downs, Saxe began immediately to embark +his troops, but bad weather delayed the operation for three days, and so +saved the expedition, exposed as it was in the open roads, from destruction +by an attack which Norris was on the point of delivering with his flotilla +of fireships and bomb vessels. + +The Brest squadron had an equally narrow escape. Saxe and his staff having +heard rumours of Norris's movement to the Downs had become seized with the +sea-sickness which always seems to afflict an army as it waits to face the +dangers of an uncommanded passage. They too wanted the whole fleet to +escort them, and orders had been sent to Roquefeuille to do as he had +suggested. All unconscious of Norris's presence in the Downs with a score +of the line more powerful than his own, he came on with the fifteen he had +still with his flag to close on Barraille. Norris was informed of his +approach, and it was now he wrote his admirable appreciation, already +quoted, for dealing with the situation. + +"As I think it," he said, "of the greatest consequence to his Majesty's +service to prevent the landing of these troops in any part of the country, +I have ... determined to anchor without the sands of Dunkirk, where we +shall be in the fairest way for keeping them in." That is, he determined to +keep hold of the army regardless of the enemy's fleet, and as Saxe's +objective was not quite certain, he would do it by close blockade. "But +if," he continued, "they should unfortunately get out and pass in the night +and go northward [that is, for Scotland], I intend to detach a superior +force to endeavour to overtake and destroy them, and with the remainder of +my squadron either fight the French fleet now in the Channel, or observe +them and cover the country as our circumstances will admit of; or I shall +pursue the embarkation [that is, follow the transports] with all my +strength." This meant he would treat the enemy's army offensively and their +fleet defensively, and his plan was entirely approved by the King. + +As to which of the two plans he would adopt, the inference is that his +choice would depend on the strength of the enemy, for it was reported the +Rochefort squadron had joined Roquefeuille. The doubt was quickly settled. +On the morrow he heard that Roquefeuille was at Dungeness with only fifteen +of the line. In a moment he seized all the advantage of the interior +position which Roquefeuille's necessity to close on the army had given him. +With admirable insight he saw there was time to fling his whole force at +the enemy's fleet without losing his hold on the army's line of passage. +The movement was made immediately. The moment the French were sighted +"General chase" was signalled, and Roquefeuille was within an ace of being +surprised at his anchorage when a calm stopped the attack. The calm was +succeeded by another furious gale, in which the French escaped in a +disastrous _sauve qui peut_, and the fleet of transports was destroyed. The +outcome of it all was not only the failure of the invasion, but that we +secured the command of home waters for the rest of the war. + +The whole attempt, it will be seen, with everything in its favour, had +exhibited the normal course of degradation. For all the nicely framed plan +and the perfect deception, the inherent difficulties, when it came to the +point of execution, had as usual forced a clumsy concentration of the +enemy's battle-fleet with his transports, and we on our part were able to +forestall it with every advantage in our favour by the simple expedient of +a central mass on a revealed and certain line of passage. + +In the next project, that of 1759, a new and very clever plan was devised +for turning the difficulty. The first idea of Marshal Belleisle, like that +of Napoleon, was to gather the army at Ambleteuse and Boulogne, and to +avoid the assemblage of transports by passing it across the Strait by +stealth in flat boats. But this idea was abandoned before it had gone very +far for something much more subtle. The fallacious advantage of a short +passage was dropped, and the army was to start from three widely separated +points all in more open waters--a diversionary raid from Dunkirk and two +more formidable forces from Havre and the Morbihan in South Brittany. To +secure sufficient control there was to be a concentration on the Brest +fleet from the Mediterranean and the West Indies. + +The new feature, it will be observed, was that our covering fleet--that is, +the Western Squadron off Brest--would have two cruiser blockades to secure, +one on either side of it. Difficult as the situation looked, it was solved +on the old lines. The two divisions of the French army at Dunkirk and +Morbihan were held by cruiser squadrons capable of following them over the +open sea if by chance they escaped, while the third division at Havre, +which had nothing but flat boats for transport, was held by a flotilla well +supported. Its case was hopeless. It could not move without a squadron to +release it, and no fortune of weather could possibly bring a squadron from +Brest. Hawke, who had the main blockade, might be blown off, but he could +scarcely fail to bring to action any squadron that attempted to enter the +Channel. With the Morbihan force it was different. Any time that Hawke was +blown off a squadron could reach it from Brest and break the cruiser +blockade. The French Government actually ordered a portion of the fleet to +make the attempt. Conflans however, who was in command, protested his force +was too weak to divide, owing to the failure of the intended concentration. +Boscawen had caught and beaten the Mediterranean squadron off Lagos, and +though the West Indian squadron got in, it proved, as in Napoleon's great +plan of concentration, unfit for further service. The old situation had +arisen, forced by the old method of defence; and in the end there was +nothing for it but for Conflans to take his whole fleet to the Morbihan +transports. Hawke was upon him at once, and the disastrous day of Quiberon +was the result. The Dunkirk division alone got free, but the smallness of +its size, which permitted it to evade the watch, also prevented its doing +any harm. Its escort, after landing its handful of troops in Ireland, was +entirely destroyed; and so again the attempt of the French to invade over +an uncommanded sea produced no effect but the loss of their fleet. + +The project of 1779 marked these principles even more strongly, for it +demonstrated them working even when our home fleet was greatly inferior to +that of the enemy. In this case the invader's idea was to form two +expeditionary forces at Cherbourg and Havre, and under cover of an +overwhelming combination of the Spanish and French fleets, to unite them at +sea and seize Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight. It was in the early summer +we got wind of the scheme, and two cruiser squadrons and flotillas were at +once formed at the Downs and Channel Islands to watch the French coasts and +prevent the concentration of transports. Spain had not yet declared war, +but she was suspected, and the main fleet, under the veteran Sir Charles +Hardy, who had been Norris's second in command in 1744, was ordered to +proceed off Brest and prevent any Spanish squadron that might appear from +entering that port. The French, however, outmanoeuvred us by putting to sea +before Hardy could reach his station and forming a junction with the +Spaniards off Finisterre. The combined fleet contained about fifty of the +line, nearly double our own. The army of invasion, with Dumouriez for its +Chief of the Staff, numbered some 50,000 men, a force we were in no +condition to meet ashore. Everything, therefore, was in favour of success, +and yet in the navy, at least, a feeling of confidence prevailed that no +invasion could take place. + +The brains of the naval defence were Lord Barham (then Sir Charles +Middleton) at the Admiralty and Kempenfelt as Chief of the Staff in the +fleet; and it is to their correspondence at this time that we owe some of +the most valuable strategical appreciations we possess. The idea of the +French was to come into the Channel in their overwhelming force, and while +they destroyed or held Hardy, to detach a sufficient squadron to break the +cruiser blockade and escort the troops across. Kempenfelt was confident +that it could not be done. He was sure that the unwieldy combined mass +could be rendered powerless by his comparatively homogeneous and mobile +fleet, inferior as it was, so long as he could keep it at sea and to the +westward. The appreciation of the power of a nimble inferior fleet which he +wrote at this time has already been given.[23] When the worst of the +position was fully known, and the enemy was reported off the mouth of the +Channel, he wrote another to Middleton. His only doubt was whether his +fleet had the necessary cohesion and mobility. "We don't seem," he said, +"to have considered sufficiently a certain fact that the comparative force +of two fleets depends much upon their sailing. The fleet that sails fastest +has much the advantage, as they can engage or not as they please, and so +have always in their power to choose the favourable opportunity to attack. +I think I may safely hazard an opinion that twenty-five sail of the line +coppered would be sufficient to harass and tease this great unwieldy +combined Armada so as to prevent their effecting anything, hanging +continually upon them, ready to catch at any opportunity of a separation +from night, gale or fog, to dart upon the separated, to cut off convoys of +provisions coming to them, and if they attempted an invasion, to oblige +their whole fleet to escort the transports, and even then it would be +impossible to protect them entirely from so active and nimble a fleet." + + [23] _Supra_, p. 222. + +Here we have from the pen of one of the greatest masters the real key of +the solution--the power, that is, of forcing the mass of the enemy's fleet +to escort the transports. Hardy, of course, knew it well from his +experience of 1744, and acted accordingly. This case is the more striking, +since defence against the threatened invasion was not the whole of the +problem he had to solve. It was complicated by instructions that he must +also prevent a possible descent on Ireland, and cover the arrival of the +great convoys. In reply, on August 1st, he announced his intention of +taking station ten to twenty leagues W.S.W. of Scilly, "which I am of +opinion," he said, "is the most proper station for the security of the +trade expected from the East and West Indies, and for the meeting of the +fleets of the enemy _should they attempt to come into the Channel_." He +underlined the last words, indicating, apparently, his belief that they +would not venture to do so so long as he could keep his fleet to the +westward and undefeated. This at least he did, till a month later he found +it necessary to come in for supplies. Then, still avoiding the enemy, he +ran not to Plymouth, but right up to St. Helen's. The movement is always +regarded as an unworthy retreat, and it caused much dissatisfaction in the +fleet at the time. But it is to be observed that his conduct was strictly +in accordance with the principle which makes the invading army the primary +objective. If Hardy's fleet was no longer fit to keep the sea without +replenishment, then the proper place to seek replenishment was on the +invader's line of passage. So long as he was there, invasion could not take +place till he was defeated. The allies, it was true, were now free to join +their transports, but the prospect of such a movement gave the admiral no +uneasiness, for it would bring him the chance of serving his enemy as the +Spaniards were served in 1588. "I shall do my utmost," he said, "to drive +them up the Channel." It is the old principle. If the worst comes to the +worst, so long as you are able to force the covering fleet upon the +transports, and especially in narrow waters, invasion becomes an operation +beyond the endurable risks of war. + +So it proved. On August 14th Count d'Orvilliers, the allied +commander-in-chief, had made the Lizard, and for a fortnight had striven to +bring Hardy to decisive action. Until he had done so he dared neither enter +the Channel with his fleet nor detach a squadron to break the cruiser +blockades at the invasion bases. His ineffectual efforts exhausted his +fleet's endurance, which the distant concentration at Finisterre had +already severely sapped, and he was forced to return impotent to Brest +before anything had been accomplished. The allies were not able to take the +sea again that campaign, but even had it been in their power to do so, +Hardy and Kempenfelt could have played their defensive game indefinitely, +and with ever-increasing chances, as the winter drew near, of dealing a +paralysing blow. + +There was never any real chance of success, though it is true Dumouriez +thought otherwise. He believed the enterprise might have gone through if a +diversion had been made by the bulk of the fleet against Ireland, and under +cover of it a _coup de main_ delivered upon the Isle of Wight, "for which," +he said, "six or eight of the line would have been enough." But it is +inconceivable that old hands like Hardy and Kempenfelt would have been so +easily beguiled of their hold on the line of passage. Had such a division +been detached up the Channel from the allied fleet they would surely, +according to tradition, have followed it with either a superior force or +their whole squadron. + +The well-known projects of the Great War followed the same course. Under +Napoleon's directions they ran the whole gamut of every scheme that ever +raised delusive hope before. Beginning from the beginning with the idea of +stealing his army across in flat-boats, he was met with the usual flotilla +defence. Then came his only new idea, which was to arm his transport +flotilla to the point of giving it power to force a passage for itself. We +replied by strengthening our flotilla. Convinced by experiment that his +scheme was now impracticable, he set his mind on breaking the blockade by +the sudden intrusion of a flying squadron from a distance. To this end +various plausible schemes were worked out, but plan after plan melted in +his hand, till he was forced to face the inevitable necessity of bringing +an overwhelming battle force up to his transports. The experience of two +centuries had taught him nothing. By a more distant concentration than had +ever been attempted before he believed he could break the fatal hold of his +enemy. The only result was so severely to exhaust his fleet that it never +could get within reach of the real difficulties of its task, a task which +every admiral in his service knew to be beyond the strength of the Imperial +Navy. Nor did Napoleon even approach a solution of the problem he had set +himself--invasion over an uncommanded sea. With our impregnable flotilla +hold covered by an automatic concentration of battle-squadrons off Ushant, +his army could never even have put forth, unless he had inflicted upon our +covering fleet such a defeat as would have given him command of the sea, +and with absolute control of the sea the passage of an army presents no +difficulties. + +Of the working of these principles under modern conditions we have no +example. The acquisition of free movement must necessarily modify their +application, and since the advent of steam there have been only two +invasions over uncommanded seas--that of the Crimea in 1854, and that of +Manchuria in 1904--and neither of these cases is in point, for in neither +was there any attempt at naval defence. Still there seems no reason to +believe that such defence applied in the old manner would be less effective +than formerly. The flotilla was its basis, and since the introduction of +the torpedo the power of the flotilla has greatly increased. Its real and +moral effect against transports must certainly be greater than ever, and +the power of squadrons to break a flotilla blockade is more restricted. +Mines, again, tell almost entirely in favour of defence, so much so indeed +as to render a rapid _coup de main_ against any important port almost an +impossibility. In the absence of all experience it is to such theoretical +considerations we must turn for light. + +Theoretically stated, the success of our old system of defence depended on +four relations. Firstly, there is the relation between the rapidity with +which an invasion force could be mobilised and embarked, and the rapidity +with which restlessness in foreign ports and _places d'armes_ could be +reported; that is to say, the chance of surprise and evasion are as the +speed of preparation to the speed of intelligence. + +Secondly, there is the relation of the speed of convoys to the speed of +cruisers and flotilla; that is to say, our ability to get contact with a +convoy after it has put to sea and before the expedition can be disembarked +is as the speed of our cruisers and flotilla to the speed of the convoy. + +Thirdly, there is the relation between the destructive power of modern +cruisers and flotillas against a convoy unescorted or weakly escorted and +the corresponding power in sailing days. + +Fourthly, there is the relation between the speed of convoys and the speed +of battle-squadrons, which is of importance where the enemy's transports +are likely to be strongly escorted. On this relation depends the facility +with which the battle-squadron covering our mobile defence can secure an +interior position from which it may strike either the enemy's +battle-squadron if it moves or his convoy before it can complete its +passage and effect the landing. + +All these relations appear to have been modified by modern developments in +favour of the defence. In the first ratio, that of speed of mobilisation to +speed of intelligence, it is obviously so. Although military mobilisation +may be still relatively as rapid as the mobilisation of fleets, yet +intelligence has outstripped both. This is true both for gaining and for +conveying intelligence. Preparations for oversea invasion were never easy +to conceal, owing to the disturbance of the flow of shipping that they +caused. Elaborate precautions were taken to prevent commercial leakage of +intelligence, but they never entirely succeeded. Yet formerly, in the +condition of comparative crudeness with which international trade was then +organised, concealment was relatively easy, at least for a time. But the +ever-growing sensitiveness of world-wide commerce, when market movements +are reported from hour to hour instead of from week to week, has greatly +increased the difficulty. And apart from the rapidity with which +information may be gathered through this alert and intimate sympathy +between Exchanges, there is the still more important fact that with +wireless the speed of conveying naval intelligence has increased in a far +higher ratio than the speed of sea transit. + +As regards the ratio between cruiser and convoy speeds, on which evasion so +much depends, it is the same. In frigate days the ratio appears to have +been not more than seven to five. Now in the case at any rate of large +convoys it would be nearly double. + +Of the destructive power of the flotilla, growing as it does from year to +year, enough has been said already. With the advent of the torpedo and +submarine it has probably increased tenfold. In a lesser degree the same is +true of cruisers. In former days the physical power of a cruiser to injure +a dispersing convoy was comparatively low, owing to her relatively low +excess of speed and the restricted range and destructive power of her guns. +With higher speed and higher energy and range in gun power the ability of +cruisers to cut up a convoy renders its practical annihilation almost +certain if once it be caught, and consequently affords a moral deterrent +against trusting to evasion beyond anything that was known before. + +The increased ratio of battle-fleet speed to that of large convoys is +equally indisputable and no less important, for the facility of finding +interior positions which it implies goes to the root of the old system. So +long as our battle-fleet is in a position whence it can cover our flotilla +blockade or strike the enemy's convoy in transit, it forces his +battle-fleet in the last resort to close up on the convoy, and that, as +Kempenfelt pointed out, is practically fatal to the success of invasion. + +From whatever point of view, then, we regard the future chances of +successful invasion over an uncommanded sea, it would seem that not only +does the old system hold good, but that all modern developments which touch +the question bid fair to intensify the results which our sea service at +least used so confidently to expect, and which it never failed to secure. + +II. ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF TRADE + +The base idea of the attack and defence of trade may be summed up in the +old adage, "Where the carcase is, there will the eagles be gathered +together." The most fertile areas always attracted the strongest attack, +and therefore required the strongest defence; and between the fertile and +the infertile areas it was possible to draw a line which for strategical +purposes was definite and constant. The fertile areas were the terminals of +departure and destination where trade tends to be crowded, and in a +secondary degree the focal points where, owing to the conformation of the +land, trade tends to converge. The infertile areas were the great routes +which passed through the focal points and connected the terminal areas. +Consequently attack on commerce tends to take one of two forms. It may be +terminal or it may be pelagic, terminal attack being the more profitable, +but demanding the greater force and risk, and pelagic attack being the more +uncertain, but involving less force and risk. + +These considerations lead us directly to the paradox which underlies the +unbroken failure of our enemies to exercise decisive pressure upon us by +operations against our trade. It is that where attack is most to be feared, +there defence is easiest. A plan of war which has the destruction of trade +for its primary object implies in the party using it an inferiority at sea. +Had he superiority, his object would be to convert that superiority to a +working command by battle or blockade. Except, therefore, in the rare cases +where the opposed forces are equal, we must assume that the belligerent who +makes commerce destruction his primary object will have to deal with a +superior fleet. Now, it is true that the difficulty of defending trade lies +mainly in the extent of sea it covers. But, on the other hand, the areas in +which it tends to congregate, and in which alone it is seriously +vulnerable, are few and narrow, and can be easily occupied if we are in +superior force. Beyond those areas effective occupation is impossible, but +so also is effective attack. Hence the controlling fact of war on commerce, +that facility of attack means facility of defence. + +Beside this fundamental principle we must place another that is scarcely +less important. Owing to the general common nature of sea communications, +attack and defence of trade are so intimately connected that the one +operation is almost indistinguishable from the other. Both ideas are +satisfied by occupying the common communications. The strongest form of +attack is the occupation of the enemy's terminals, and the establishment of +a commercial blockade of the ports they contain. But as this operation +usually requires the blockade of an adjacent naval port, it also +constitutes, as a rule, a defensive disposition for our own trade, even +when the enemy's terminal area does not overlap one of our own. In the +occupation of focal areas the two ideas are even more inseparable, since +most, if not all, such areas are on lines of communication that are common. +It will suffice, therefore, to deal with the general aspect of the subject +from the point of view of defence. + +It was in conformity with the distinction between fertile and infertile +areas that our old system of trade defence was developed. Broadly speaking, +that system was to hold the terminals in strength, and in important cases +the focal points as well. By means of a battle-squadron with a full +complement of cruisers they were constituted defended areas, or "tracts" as +the old term was, and the trade was regarded as safe when it entered them. +The intervening trade-routes were left as a rule undefended. Thus our home +terminals were held by two battle-squadrons, the Western Squadron at the +mouth of the Channel, and the North Sea or Eastern Squadron with its +headquarters usually in the Downs. To these was added a cruiser squadron on +the Irish station based at Cork, which was sometimes subordinate to the +Western Squadron and sometimes an independent organisation. The area of the +Western Squadron in the French wars extended, as we have seen, over the +whole Bay of Biscay, with the double function, so far as commerce was +concerned, of preventing the issue of raiding squadrons from the enemy's +ports, and acting offensively against his Atlantic trade. That of the North +Sea squadron extended to the mouth of the Baltic and the north-about +passage. Its main function during the great naval coalitions against us was +to check the operations of Dutch squadrons or to prevent the intrusion of +French ones north-about against our Baltic trade. Like the Western +Squadron, it threw out divisions usually located at Yarmouth and Leith for +the protection of our coastwise trade from privateers and sporadic cruisers +acting from ports within the defended area. Similarly, between the Downs +and the Western Squadron was usually one or more smaller squadrons, mainly +cruisers, and generally located about Havre and the Channel Islands, which +served the same purpose for the Norman and North Breton ports. To complete +the system there were flotilla patrols acting under the port admirals and +doing their best to police the routes of the coastwise and local traffic, +which then had an importance long since lost. The home system of course +differed at different times, but it was always on these general lines. The +naval defence was supplemented by defended ports of refuge, the principal +ones being on the coast of Ireland to shelter the ocean trade, but others +in great numbers were provided within the defended areas against the +operations of privateers, and the ruins of batteries all round the British +shores testify how complete was the organisation. + +A similar system prevailed in the colonial areas, but there the naval +defence consisted normally of cruiser squadrons stiffened with one or two +ships-of-the-line mainly for the purpose of carrying the flag. They were +only occupied by battle-squadrons when the enemy threatened operations with +a similar force. The minor or interior defence against local privateers was +to a large extent local; that is, the great part of the flotilla was +furnished by sloops built or hired on the spot, as being best adapted for +the service. + +Focal points were not then so numerous as they have become since the +development of the Far Eastern trade. The most important of them, the +Straits of Gibraltar, was treated as a defended area. From the point of +view of commerce-protection it was held by the Mediterranean squadron. By +keeping watch on Toulon that squadron covered not only the Straits, but +also the focal points within the sea. It too had its extended divisions, +sometimes as many as four, one about the approaches to Leghorn, one in the +Adriatic, a third at Malta, and the fourth at Gibraltar. In cases of war +with Spain the latter was very strong, so as to secure the focal area +against Cartagena and Cadiz. On one occasion indeed, in 1804-5, as we have +seen, it was constituted for a short time an independent area with a +special squadron. But in any case the Gibraltar area had its own internal +flotilla guard under the direction of the port admiral as a defence against +local privateers and pirates. + +The general theory of these defended terminal and focal areas, it will be +seen, was to hold in force those waters which converging trade made most +fertile, and which therefore furnished an adequate field for the operations +of raiding squadrons. In spite of the elaborate defensive system, such +squadrons might, and sometimes did, intrude by surprise or stealth, and +were then able to set at defiance both convoy escorts and the cruiser +outposts. But, as experience proved, the system of terminal defence by +battle-squadrons made it impossible for such raiding squadrons to remain +long enough on the ground to cause any serious interruption or to do +serious harm. It was only by a regular fleet of superior strength that the +system could be broken down. In other words, the defence could only fall +when our means of local control was destroyed by battle. + +So much for the defended areas. With regard to the great routes that +connected them, it has been said they were left undefended. By this is +meant that the security of ships passing along them was provided for, not +by patrols but by escort. The convoy system was adopted, and the theory of +that system is that while vessels are on the great routes they are normally +liable only to sporadic attack, and they are consequently collected into +fleets and furnished with an escort sufficient to repel sporadic attack. In +theory, cruiser escort is sufficient, but in practice it was found +convenient and economical to assign the duty in part to ships-of-the-line +which were going out to join the distant terminal squadron or returning +from it for a refit or some other reason; in other words, the system of +foreign reliefs was made to work in with the supplementary escort system. +Where no such ships were available and the convoys were of great value, or +enemy's ships-of-the-line were known to be out, similar units were +specially detailed for convoy duty to go and return, but this use of battle +units was exceptional. + +Such a method of dealing with the great routes is the corollary of the idea +of defended areas. As those areas were fertile and likely to attract +raiding squadrons, so the great routes were infertile, and no enemy could +afford to spend squadrons upon them. It is obvious, however, that the +system had its weak side, for the mere fact that a convoy was upon a great +route tended to attract a squadron, and the comparative immunity of those +routes was lost. The danger was provided for to a great extent by the fact +that the enemy's ports from which a squadron could issue were all within +defended areas and watched by our own squadrons. Still, the guard could not +be made impenetrable. There was always the chance of a squadron escaping, +and if it escaped towards a critical trade-route, it must be followed. +Hence there were times when the convoy system seriously disturbed our +dispositions, as, for instance, in the crisis of the Trafalgar campaign, +when for a short time our chain of defended areas was broken down by the +escape of the Toulon squadron. That escape eventually forced a close +concentration on the Western Squadron, but all other considerations apart, +it was felt to be impossible to retain the mass for more than two days +owing to the fact that the great East and West Indies convoys were +approaching, and Villeneuve's return to Ferrol from Martinique exposed them +to squadronal attack. It was, in fact, impossible to tell whether the mass +had not been forced upon us with this special end in view. + +In the liability to deflection of this kind lay the most serious +strategical objection to the convoy system. It was sought to minimise it by +giving the convoys a secret route when there was apprehension of squadronal +interference. It was done in the case just cited, but the precaution seemed +in no way to lessen the anxiety. It may have been because in those days of +slow communication there could be no such certainty that the secret route +had been received as there would be now. + +Modern developments and changes in shipping and naval material have indeed +so profoundly modified the whole conditions of commerce protection, that +there is no part of strategy where historical deduction is more difficult +or more liable to error. To avoid such error as far as possible, it is +essential to keep those developments in mind at every step. The more +important of them are three in number. Firstly, the abolition of +privateering; secondly, the reduced range of action for all warships; and +thirdly, the development of wireless telegraphy. There are others which +must be dealt with in their place, but these three go to the root of the +whole problem. + +Difficult as it is to arrive at exact statistics of commerce destruction in +the old wars, one thing seems certain--that the bulk of captures, which +were reckoned in hundreds and sometimes even in thousands, were due to the +action of privateers. Further, it seems certain that, reckoning at least by +numbers, the greater part of the damage was done by small privateers +operating close to their bases, either home or colonial, against coastwise +and local traffic. The complaints of merchants, so far as they are known, +relate mainly to this kind of work in the West Indies and home waters, +while accounts of serious captures by large privateers on the high seas are +comparatively rare. The actual damage done by the swarm of small vessels +may not have been great, but its moral effects were very serious. It was +impossible for the strongest Governments to ignore them, and the +consequence was a chronic disturbance of the larger strategical +dispositions. While these dispositions were adequate to check the +operations of large privateers acting in the same way as regular cruisers, +the smaller ones found very free play amidst the ribwork of the protective +system, and they could only be dealt with by filling up the spaces with a +swarm of small cruisers to the serious detriment of the larger +arrangements. Even so, the proximity of the enemy's ports made escape so +easy, that the work of repression was very ineffective. The state of the +case was indeed almost identical with a people's war. The ordinary devices +of strategy failed to deal with it, as completely as Napoleon's broadly +planned methods failed to deal with the _guerilleros_ in Spain, or as our +own failed for so long in South Africa. + +By the abolition of privateering, then, it would seem that the most +disturbing part of the problem has been eliminated. It is, of course, +uncertain how far the Declaration of Paris will hold good in practice. It +is still open even to the parties to it to evade its restrictions to a +greater or less extent by taking up and commissioning merchantmen as +regular ships of war. But it is unlikely that such methods will extend +beyond the larger privately owned vessels. Any attempt to revive in this +way the old _picaresque_ methods could only amount to a virtual repudiation +of statutory international law, which would bring its own retribution. +Moreover, for home waters at least, the conditions which favoured this +_picaresque_ warfare no longer exist. In the old wars the bulk of our trade +came into the Thames, and thence the greater part of it was distributed in +small coasting vessels. It was against this coastwise traffic that the +small, short-range privateers found their opportunity and their richest +harvest. But, now that so many other great centres of distribution have +established themselves, and that the bulk of the distribution is done by +internal lines of communication, the Channel is no longer the sole artery, +and the old troublesome disturbance can be avoided without a vital +dislocation of our commercial system. + +The probability, then, is that in the future the whole problem will be +found to be simplified, and that the work of commerce protection will lie +much more within the scope of large strategical treatment than it ever did +before, with the result that the change should be found to tell +substantially in favour of defence and against attack. + +The reduction of range of action is scarcely less important. In the old +days a cruising ship could be stored for six months, and so long as she +could occasionally renew her fuel and water, she was free to range the sea +outside the defended areas for the whole of the period with unimpaired +vitality. For such pelagic operations her movement was practically +unrestricted. She could run for two or three days from a superior enemy or +chase for as long without loss of energy, and she could wait indefinitely +at a likely spot, or change her ground, as danger or hope of plunder +dictated. So long as she had men left to man her prizes, her power of +mischief was almost unlimited. All this is now changed. The capacity of +each cruise of a ship to-day is very small. She is confined to short dashes +within a strategically defended area, or if she is bent on pelagic +operations, is compelled to proceed so far to find undefended waters that +her coal will scarcely permit of more than a few days' actual cruising. A +couple of chases at high speed during that period may force her to return +at once, subject only to the precarious possibility of renewing her coal +from a prize. She has, further, to face the fact that manning prizes must +necessarily reduce her capacity for speed, which depends so much on a fully +manned engine-room. This will tend to jeopardise her chances of return +through or near defended areas. The only escape from this difficulty is to +sink the captured ship. But this course has objections scarcely less +weighty than the other. No Power will incur the odium of sinking a prize +with all hands, and their removal to the captor's ship takes time, +especially in bad weather, and the presence of such prisoners in a cruiser +in any number soon becomes a serious check on her fighting power. In the +case of large ships, moreover, the work of destruction is no easy matter. +In the most favourable circumstances it takes a considerable time, and thus +not only eats into the cruiser's endurance, but decreases her chances of +evasion. + +From these and similar considerations it is obvious that the possibilities +of operations on the great trade-routes are much less extensive than they +were formerly, while to speak of cruisers "infesting" those routes is sheer +hyperbole. Under modern conditions it is scarcely more feasible than it +would be to keep up a permanent blockade of the British Islands. It would +require a flow of ships in such numbers as no country but our own can +contemplate possessing, and such as could not be maintained without having +first secured a very decided preponderance at sea. The loss of radius of +action therefore, though it does not increase the power of defence, +sensibly lessens that of attack by pelagic operations. + +For the great increase in the powers of defence we must turn to the +extraordinary development in the means of distant communication. Under +former conditions it was possible for a cruising ship to remain for days +upon a fertile spot and make a number of captures before her presence was +known. But since most large merchantmen have been fitted with wireless +installations, she cannot now attack a single one of them without fear of +calling down upon her an adversary. Moreover, when she is once located, +every ship within wireless reach can be warned of her presence and avoid +her. She must widely and constantly shift her position, thereby still +further reducing her staying power. On the whole, then, it would appear +that in so far as modern developments affect the problem, they certainly +render pelagic operations far more difficult and uncertain than they used +to be. Upon the great routes the power of attack has been reduced and the +means of evasion has increased to such an extent as to demand entire +reconsideration of the defence of trade between terminal areas. The whole +basis of the old system would seem to be involved. That basis was the +convoy system, and it now becomes doubtful whether the additional security +which convoys afforded is sufficient to outweigh their economical drawbacks +and their liability to cause strategical disturbance. + +Over and above the considerations already noticed, there are three others, +all of which favour the security of our trade by permitting a much more +extended choice of route. The first is, that steam vessels are not forced +by prevailing winds to keep to particular courses. The second is, that the +improvements in the art of navigation no longer render it so necessary to +make well-known landfalls during transit. The third is, that the +multiplication of our great ports of distribution have divided the old main +flow of trade to the Channel into a number of minor streams that cover a +much wider area and demand a greater distribution of force for effective +attack. It will be obvious that the combined effect of these considerations +is to increase still further the chances of individual vessels evading the +enemy's cruisers and to lessen the risk of dispensing with escort. + +Nor are the new practical difficulties of sporadic operations on the great +routes the only arguments that minimise the value of convoys. We have also +to remember that while the number of vessels trading across the ocean has +enormously increased since 1815, it is scarcely possible, even if the +abolition of privateering prove abortive, that the number of cruisers +available for pelagic attack could exceed, or even equal, the number +employed in sailing days. This consideration, then, must also be thrown +into the scale against convoys; for it is certain that the amount of +serious operative damage which an enemy can do to our trade by pelagic +operation is mainly determined by the ratio which his available cruiser +strength bears to the volume of that trade. This aspect of the question is, +however, part of a much wider one, which concerns the relation which the +volume of our trade bears to the difficulty of its defence, and this must +be considered later. + +It remains, first, to deal with the final link in the old system of +defence. The statement that the great routes were left undefended will seem +to be in opposition to a prevailing impression derived from the fact that +frigates are constantly mentioned as being "on a cruise." The assumption is +that they in effect patrolled the great routes. But this was not so, nor +did they rove the sea at will. They constituted a definite and necessary +part of the system. Though that system was founded on a distinction between +defended terminals and undefended routes, which was a real strategical +distinction, it was impossible to draw an actual line where the one sphere +began and the other ended. Outside the regularly defended areas lay a +region which, as the routes began to converge, was comparatively fertile. +In this region enemies' cruisers and their larger privateers found the mean +between risk and profit. Here too convoys, as they entered the zone, were +in their greatest danger for fear of their escorts being overpowered by +raiding squadrons. Consequently it was the practice, when the approach of +convoys was expected, to throw forward from the defended area groups of +powerful cruisers, and even battleship divisions, to meet them and +reinforce their escorts. Outward-bound convoys had their escorts similarly +strengthened till they were clear of the danger zone. The system was in +regular use both for home and colonial areas. In no sense did it constitute +a patrol of the routes. It was in practice and conception a system of +outposts, which at seasons of special risk amounted to an extension of the +defended areas combining with a reinforcement of the convoy escorts. Focal +points of lesser importance, such as Capes Finisterre and St. Vincent, were +similarly held by one or two powerful cruisers, and if necessary by a +squadron. + +As has been already explained, owing to the peculiar conditions of the sea +and the common nature of maritime communications, these dispositions were +adopted as well for attack as defence, and the fertile areas, for the +defence of which a frigate captain was sent "on a cruise," were always +liable to bring him rich reward. His mission of defence carried with it the +best opportunities for attack. + +In the full development of the system patrol lines did exist, but not for +the great routes. They were established to link up adjacent defended areas +and as a more scientific organisation of the cruiser outposts. In 1805 the +Gibraltar and the home areas were thus connected by a patrol line which +stretched from Cape St. Vincent through the Finisterre focal area to Cape +Clear, with a branch extending to the strategical centre off Ushant. The +new system was introduced at a time when we had reason to expect that the +French and Spanish fleets were to be devoted entirely to operations in +small raiding squadrons against our trade and colonies. Special provision +was therefore necessary to locate any such squadrons that might elude the +regular blockades, and to ensure that they should be adequately pursued. +The new lines were in fact intelligence patrols primarily, though they were +also regarded as the only means of protecting efficiently the southern +trade-route where it was flanked by French and Spanish ports.[24] + + [24] It should be said that Cornwallis did not regard this system as new + except for the extension from Finisterre to St. Vincent, which Nelson + advised. In acknowledging the order from Ushant he wrote, "The + instructions ... are nearly the same as have generally been given. I can + therefore only guess why a copy of the order was sent to + me."--_Admiralty, In-Letters_, 129, 28 September 1805. + +The whole system, it will be observed, though not conflicting with the main +object of bringing the enemy's fleets to action, did entail an expenditure +of force and deflecting preoccupations such as are unknown in land warfare. +Large numbers of cruisers had to be employed otherwise than as the eyes of +the battle-squadrons, while the coming and going of convoys produced +periodical oscillations in the general distribution. + +Embarrassing as was this commercial deflection in the old wars, an +impression appears to prevail that in the future it must be much more +serious. It is argued plausibly enough not only that our trade is far +larger and richer than it was, but also that, owing to certain well-known +economic changes, it is far more a matter of life and death to the nation +than in the days when food and raw material did not constitute the bulk of +our imports. In view of the new conditions it is held that we are more +vulnerable through our trade now than formerly, and that, consequently, we +must devote relatively more attention and force to its defence. + +If this were true, it is obvious that war with a strong naval combination +would present difficulties of the most formidable kind, greater indeed than +we have ever experienced; for since with modern developments the demand for +fleet cruisers is much greater than formerly, the power of devoting +cruisers to trade defence is relatively much less. + +It cannot be denied that at first sight the conclusion looks +irreproachable. But on analysis it will be found to involve two +assumptions, both of which are highly questionable. The first is, that the +vulnerability of a sea Power through its maritime trade is as the volume of +that trade. The second is, that the difficulty of defending sea-borne trade +is also as its volume--that is to say, the larger the amount of the trade, +the larger must be the force devoted to its protection. This idea indeed is +carried so far, that we are frequently invited to fix the standard of our +naval strength by comparing it with the proportion which the naval strength +of other Powers bears to their sea-borne trade. + +It is hoped that the foregoing sketch of our traditional system of trade +defence will avail to raise a doubt whether either assumption can be +accepted without very careful consideration. In the history of that system +there is no indication that it was affected by the volume of the trade it +was designed to protect. Nor has any one succeeded in showing that the +pressure which an enemy could exert upon us through our commerce increased +in effect with the volume of our seaborne trade. The broad indications +indeed are the other way--that the greater the volume of our trade, the +less was the effective impression which an enemy could make upon it, even +when he devoted his whole naval energies to that end. It is not too much to +say that in every case where he took this course his own trade dwindled to +nothing, while ours continually increased. + +It may be objected that this was because the only periods in which he +devoted his main efforts to trade destruction were when we had dominated +his navy, and being no longer able to dispute the command, he could do no +more than interfere with its exercise. But this must always be so whether +we have positively dominated his navy or not. If he tries to ignore our +battle-fleets, and devotes himself to operations against trade, he cannot +dispute the command. Whatever his strength, he must leave the command to +us. He cannot do both systematically, and unless he attacks our trade +systematically by sustained strategical operation, he cannot hope to make +any real impression. + +If, now, we take the two assumptions and test them by the application of +elementary principles, both will appear theoretically unsound. Let us take +first the relation of vulnerability to volume. Since the object of war is +to force our will upon the enemy, the only way in which we can expect war +on commerce to serve our end is to inflict so much damage upon it as will +cause our enemy to prefer peace on our terms to a continuation of the +struggle. The pressure on his trade must be insupportable, not merely +annoying. It must seriously cripple his finance or seriously threaten to +strangle his national life and activities. If his total trade be a hundred +millions, and we succeed in destroying five, he will feel it no more than +he does the ordinary fluctuations to which he is accustomed in time of +peace. If, however, we can destroy fifty millions, his trade equilibrium +will be overthrown, and the issue of the war will be powerfully affected. +In other words, to affect the issue the impression made on trade must be a +percentage or relative impression. The measure of a nation's vulnerability +through its trade is the percentage of destruction that an enemy can +effect. + +Now, it is true that the amount of damage which a belligerent can inflict +with a given force on an enemy's commerce will vary to some extent with its +volume; for the greater the volume of commerce, the more fertile will be +the undefended cruising grounds. But no matter how fertile such areas might +be, the destructive power of a cruiser was always limited, and it must be +still more limited in the future. It was limited by the fact that it was +physically impossible to deal with more than a certain number of prizes in +a certain time, and, for the reasons already indicated, this limit has +suffered a very marked restriction. When this limit of capacity in a given +force is passed, the volume of commerce will not affect the issue; and +seeing how low that capacity must be in the future and how enormous is the +volume of our trade, the limit of destructive power, at least as against +ourselves, provided we have a reasonably well-organised system of defence, +must be relatively low. It must, in fact, be passed at a percentage figure +well within what we have easily supported in the past. There is reason, +therefore, to believe that so far from the assumption in question being +true, the effective vulnerability of sea-borne trade is not in direct but +in inverse proportion to its volume. In other words, the greater the +volume, the more difficult it is to make an effective percentage +impression. + +Similarly, it will be observed that the strain of trade defence was +proportioned not to the volume of that trade, but to the number and +exposure of its terminals and focal points. Whatever the volume of the +trade these remained the same in number, and the amount of force required +for their defence varied only with the strength that could readily be +brought to bear against them. It varied, that is, with the distribution of +the enemy's bases and the amount of his naval force. Thus in the war of +1812 with the United States, the West Indian and North American areas were +much more exposed than they had been when we were at war with France alone +and when American ports were not open to her as bases. They became +vulnerable not only to the United States fleet, but also in a much higher +degree to that of France, and consequently the force we found necessary to +devote to trade defence in the North Atlantic was out of all proportion to +the naval strength of the new belligerent. Our protective force had to be +increased enormously, while the volume of our trade remained precisely the +same. + +This relation of trade defence to terminal and focal areas is of great +importance, for it is in the increase of such areas in the Far East that +lies the only radical change in the problem. The East Indian seas were +always of course to some extent treated as a defended area, but the problem +was simplified by the partial survival in those regions of the old method +of defence. Till about the end of the seventeenth century long-range trade +was expected to defend itself, at least outside the home area, and the +retention of their armament by East Indiamen was the last survival of the +practice. Beyond the important focal area of St. Helena they relied mainly +on their own power of resistance or to such escort as could be provided by +the relief ships of the East Indian station. As a rule, their escort proper +went no farther outward-bound than St. Helena, whence it returned with the +homeward-bound vessels that gathered there from India, China, and the South +Sea whaling grounds. The idea of the system was to provide escort for that +part of the great route which was exposed to attack from French or Spanish +colonial bases on the African coasts and in the adjacent islands. + +For obvious reasons this system would have to be reconsidered in the +future. The expansion of the great European Powers have changed the +conditions for which it sufficed, and in a war with any one of them the +system of defended terminal and focal areas would require a great extension +eastward, absorbing an appreciable section of our force, and entailing a +comparatively weak prolongation of our chain of concentrations. Here, then, +we must mark a point where trade defence has increased in difficulty, and +there is one other. + +Although minor hostile bases within a defended area have lost most of their +menace to trade, they have acquired as torpedo bases a power of disturbing +the defence itself. So long as such bases exist with a potent flotilla +within them, it is obvious that the actual provision for defence cannot be +so simple a matter as it was formerly. Other and more complex arrangements +may have to be made. Still, the principle of defended areas seems to remain +unshaken, and if it is to work with its old effectiveness, the means and +the disposition for securing those areas will have to be adapted to the new +tactical possibilities. The old strategical conditions, so far as can be +seen, are unaltered except in so far as the reactions of modern material +make them tell in favour of defence rather than of attack. + +If we desire to formulate the principles on which this conclusion rests we +shall find them in the two broad rules, firstly, that the vulnerability of +trade is in inverse ratio to its volume, and secondly, that facility of +attack means facility of defence. The latter, which was always true, +receives special emphasis from modern developments. Facility of attack +means the power of exercising control. For exercise of control we require +not only numbers, but also speed and endurance, qualities which can only be +obtained in two ways: it must be at the cost of armour and armament, or at +the cost of increased size. By increasing size we at once lose numbers. If +by sacrificing armament and armour we seek to maintain numbers and so +facilitate attack, we at the same time facilitate defence. Vessels of low +fighting power indeed cannot hope to operate in fertile areas without +support to overpower the defence. Every powerful unit detached for such +support sets free a unit on the other side, and when this process is once +begun, there is no halting-place. Supporting units to be effective must +multiply into squadrons, and sooner or later the inferior Power seeking to +substitute commerce destruction for the clash of squadrons will have +squadronal warfare thrust upon him, provided again the superior Power +adopts a reasonably sound system of defence. It was always so, and, so far +as it is possible to penetrate the mists which veil the future, it would +seem that with higher mobility and better means of communication the +squadronal stage must be reached long before any adequate percentage +impression can have been made by the sporadic action of commerce +destroyers. Ineffectual as such warfare has always been in the past, until +a general command has been established, its prospects in the future, judged +by the old established principles, are less promising than ever. + +Finally, in approaching the problem of trade protection, and especially for +the actual determination of the force and distribution it requires, there +is a dominant limitation to be kept in mind. By no conceivable means is it +possible to give trade absolute protection. We cannot make an omelette +without breaking eggs. We cannot make war without losing ships. To aim at a +standard of naval strength or a strategical distribution which would make +our trade absolutely invulnerable is to march to economic ruin. It is to +cripple our power of sustaining war to a successful issue, and to seek a +position of maritime despotism which, even if it were attainable, would set +every man's hand against us. All these evils would be upon us, and our goal +would still be in the far distance. In 1870 the second naval Power in the +world was at war with an enemy that could not be considered a naval Power +at all, and yet she lost ships by capture. Never in the days of our most +complete domination upon the seas was our trade invulnerable, and it never +can be. To seek invulnerability is to fall into the strategical vice of +trying to be superior everywhere, to forfeit the attainment of the +essential for fear of risking the unessential, to base our plans on an +assumption that war may be waged without loss, that it is, in short, +something that it never has been and never can be. Such peace-bred dreams +must be rigorously abjured. Our standard must be the mean of economic +strength--the line which on the one hand will permit us to nourish our +financial resources for the evil day, and on the other, when that day +comes, will deny to the enemy the possibility of choking our financial +vigour by sufficiently checking the flow of our trade. + +III. ATTACK, DEFENCE, AND SUPPORT OF +MILITARY EXPEDITIONS + +The attack and defence of oversea expeditions are governed in a large +measure by the principles of attack and defence of trade. In both cases it +is a question of control of communications, and in a general way it may be +said, if we control them for the one purpose, we control them for the +other. But with combined expeditions freedom of passage is not the only +consideration. The duties of the fleet do not end with the protection of +the troops during transit, as in the case of convoys, unless indeed, as +with convoys, the destination is a friendly country. In the normal case of +a hostile destination, where resistance is to be expected from the +commencement of the operations, the fleet is charged with further duties of +a most exacting kind. They may be described generally as duties of support, +and it is the intrusion of these duties which distinguish the naval +arrangements for combined operations most sharply from those for the +protection of trade. Except for this consideration there need be no +difference in the method of defence. In each case the strength required +would be measured by the dangers of interference in transit. But as it is, +that standard will not serve for combined expeditions; for however small +those risks, the protective arrangements must be sufficiently extensive to +include arrangements for support. + +Before dealing with this, the most complex aspect of the question, it will +be well to dismiss attack. From the strategical point of view its +principles differ not at all from those already laid down for active +resistance of invasion. Whether the expedition that threatens us be small +or of invasion strength, the cardinal rule has always been that the +transports and not the escort must be the primary objective of the fleet. +The escort, according to the old practice, must be turned or contained, but +never treated as a primary objective unless both turning and containing +prove to be impracticable. It is needless to repeat the words of the old +masters in which this principle lies embalmed. It is seldom that we find a +rule of naval strategy laid down in precise technical terms, but this one +is an exception. In the old squadronal instructions, "The transports of the +enemy are to be your principal object," became something like a common +form. + +Nor did this rule apply only to cases where the transports were protected +by a mere escort. It held good even in the exceptional cases where the +military force was accompanied or guarded by the whole available battle +strength of the enemy. We have seen how in 1744 Norris was prepared to +follow the French transports if necessary with his whole force, and how in +1798 Nelson organised his fleet in such a way as to contain rather than +destroy the enemy's battle-squadron, so that he might provide for an +overwhelming attack upon the transports. + +Exceptions to this as to all strategical rules may be conceived. Conditions +might exist in which, if the enemy's battle-fleet accompanied his +transports, it would be worth our while, for ulterior objects of our own, +to risk the escape of the transports in order to seize the opportunity of +destroying the fleet. But even in such a case the distinction would be +little more than academical; for our best chance of securing a decisive +tactical advantage against the enemy's fleet would usually be to compel it +to conform to our movements by threatening an attack on the transports. It +is well known that it is in the embarrassment arising from the presence of +transports that lies the special weakness of a fleet in charge of them. + +There is, however, one condition which radically differentiates +comparatively small expeditions from great invasions and that is the power +of evasion. Our experience has proved beyond dispute that the navy alone +cannot guarantee defence against such expeditions. It cannot be sure of +preventing their sailing or of attacking them in transit, and this is +especially the case where an open sea gives them a free choice of route, as +in the case of the French expeditions against Ireland. It is for this +reason that, although an adequate navy has always proved sufficient to +prevent an invasion, for defence against expeditions it must be +supplemented by a home army. To perfect our defence, or, in other words, +our power of attack, such an army must be adequate to ensure that all +expeditions small enough to evade the fleet shall do no effective harm when +they land. If in numbers, training, organisation, and distribution it is +adequate for this purpose, an enemy cannot hope to affect the issue of the +war except by raising his expeditions to invasion strength, and so finding +himself involved in a problem that no one has ever yet solved for an +uncommanded sea. + +Still, even for expeditions below invasion strength the navy will only +regard the army as a second line, and its strategy must provide in the +event of evasion for co-operation with that line. By means of a just +distribution of its coastal flotilla it will provide for getting contact +with the expedition at the earliest moment after its destination is +declared. It will press the principle of making the army its objective to +the utmost limit by the most powerful and energetic cruiser pursuit, and +with wireless and the increased ratio of cruiser speed, such pursuit is far +more formidable than it ever was. No expedition nowadays, however +successful its evasion, can be guaranteed against naval interruption in the +process of landing. Still less can it be guaranteed against naval +interference in its rear or flanks while it is securing its front against +the home army. It may seek by using large transports to reduce their number +and secure higher speed, but while that will raise its chance of evasion, +it will prolong the critical period of landing. If it seek by using smaller +transports to quicken disembarkation, that will decrease its chances of +evasion by lowering its speed and widening the sea area it will occupy in +transit. All the modern developments in fact which make for defence in case +of invasion over an uncommanded sea also go to facilitate timely contact +with an expedition seeking to operate by evasion. Nor must it be forgotten, +since the problem is a combined one, that the corresponding developments +ashore tell with little less force in favour of the defending army. Such +appear to be the broad principles which govern an enemy's attempts to act +with combined expeditions in our own waters, where by hypothesis we are in +sufficient naval strength to deny him permanent local command. We may now +turn to the larger and more complex question of the conduct of such +expeditions where the naval conditions are reversed. + +By the conduct, be it remembered, we mean not only their defence but also +their support, and for this reason the starting-point of our inquiry is to +be found, as above indicated, in the contrast of combined expeditions with +convoys. A convoy consists of two elements--a fleet of merchantmen and an +escort. But a combined expedition does not consist simply of an army and a +squadron. It is an organism at once more complex and more homogeneous. Its +constitution is fourfold. There is, firstly, the army; secondly, the +transports and landing flotilla--that is, the flotilla of flat-boats and +steamboats for towing them, all of which may be carried in the transports +or accompany them; thirdly, the "Squadron in charge of transports," as it +came to be called, which includes the escort proper and the supporting +flotilla of lighter craft for inshore work; and lastly, the "Covering +squadron." + +Such at least is a combined expedition in logical analysis. But so +essentially is it a single organism, that in practice these various +elements can seldom be kept sharply distinct. They may be interwoven in the +most intricate manner. Indeed to a greater or less extent each will always +have to discharge some of the functions of the others. Thus the covering +squadron may not only be indistinguishable from the escort and support, but +it will often provide the greater part of the landing flotilla and even a +portion of the landing force. Similarly, the escort may also serve as +transport, and provide in part not only the supporting force, but also the +landing flotilla. The fourfold constitution is therefore in a great measure +theoretical. Still its use is not merely that it serves to define the +varied functions which the fleet will have to discharge. As we proceed it +will be seen to have a practical strategical value. + +From a naval point of view it is the covering squadron which calls first +for consideration, because of the emphasis with which its necessity marks +not only the distinction between the conduct of combined expeditions and +the conduct of commercial convoys, but also the fact that such expeditions +are actually a combined force, and not merely an army escorted by a fleet. + +In our system of commerce protection the covering squadron had no place. +The battle-fleet, as we have seen, was employed in holding definite +terminal areas, and had no organic connection with the convoys. The convoys +had no further protection than their own escort and the reinforcements that +met them as they approached the terminal areas. But where a convoy of +transports forming part of a combined expedition was destined for an +enemy's country and would have to overcome resistance by true combined +operations, a covering battle-squadron was always provided. In the case of +distant objectives it might be that the covering squadron was not attached +till the whole expedition assembled in the theatre of operations; during +transit to that theatre the transports might have commerce protection +escort only. But once the operations began from the point of concentration, +a covering squadron was always in touch. + +It was only where the destination of the troops was a friendly country, and +the line of passage was well protected by our permanent blockades, that a +covering squadron could be dispensed with altogether. Thus our various +expeditions for the assistance of Portugal were treated exactly like +commercial convoys, but in such cases as Wolfe's expedition to Quebec or +Amherst's to Louisburg, or indeed any of those which were continually +launched against the West Indies, a battle-squadron was always provided as +an integral part in the theatre of operations. Our arrangements in the +Crimean War illustrate the point exactly. Our troops were sent out at first +to land at Gallipoli in a friendly territory, and to act within that +territory as an army of observation. It was not a true combined expedition, +and the transports were given no covering squadron. Their passage was +sufficiently covered by our Channel and Mediterranean fleets occupying the +exits of the Baltic and the Black Sea. But so soon as the original war plan +proved ineffective and combined offensive operations against Sebastopol +were decided on, the Mediterranean fleet lost its independent character, +and thenceforth its paramount function was to furnish a covering squadron +in touch with the troops. + +Seeing how important are the support duties of such a force, the term +"Covering squadron" may seem ill-chosen to describe it. But it is adopted +for two reasons. In the first place, it was the one employed officially in +our service on the last mentioned occasion which was our last great +combined expedition. In preparing the descent on the Crimea, Sir Edmund +Lyons, who was acting as Chief of the Staff to Sir James Dundas, and had +charge of the combined operations, organised the fleet into a "Covering +squadron" and a "Squadron in charge of transports." In the second place, +the designation serves to emphasise what is its main and primary function. +For important as it is to keep in mind its support duties, they must not be +permitted to overshadow the fact that its paramount function is to prevent +interference with the actual combined operations--that is, the landing, +support, and supply of the army. Thus in 1705, when Shovel and Peterborough +were operating against Barcelona, Shovel was covering the amphibious siege +from the French squadron in Toulon. Peterborough required the assistance of +the marines ashore to execute a _coup de main_, and Shovel only consented +to land them on the express understanding that the moment his cruisers +passed the signal that the Toulon squadron was putting to sea, they would +have to be recalled to the fleet no matter what the state of the land +operations. And to this Peterborough agreed. The principle involved, it +will be seen, is precisely that which Lyons's term "Covering squadron" +embodies. + +To quote anything that happened in the Crimean War as a precedent without +such traditional support will scarcely appear convincing. In our British +way we have fostered a legend that so far as organisation and staff work +were concerned that war was nothing but a collection of deterrent examples. +But in truth as a combined operation its opening movement both in +conception and organisation was perhaps the most daring, brilliant, and +successful thing of the kind we ever did. Designed as the expedition was to +assist an ally in his own country, it was suddenly called upon without any +previous preparation to undertake a combined operation of the most +difficult kind against the territory of a well-warned enemy. It involved a +landing late in the year on an open and stormy coast within striking +distance of a naval fortress which contained an army of unknown strength, +and a fleet not much inferior in battle power and undefeated. It was an +operation comparable to the capture of Louisburg and the landing of the +Japanese in the Liaotung Peninsula, but the conditions were far more +difficult. Both those operations had been rehearsed a few years previously, +and they had been long prepared on the fullest knowledge. In the Crimea +everything was in the dark; even steam was an unproved element, and +everything had to be improvised. The French had practically to demobilise +their fleet to supply transport, and so hazardous did the enterprise +appear, that they resisted its being undertaken with every military +argument. We had in fact, besides all the other difficulties, to carry an +unwilling ally upon our backs. Yet it was accomplished, and so far at least +as the naval part was concerned, the methods which achieved success mark +the culmination of all we had learnt in three centuries of rich experience. + +The first of the lessons was that for operations in uncommanded or +imperfectly commanded seas there was need of a covering squadron +differentiated from the squadron in charge of transports. Its main function +was to secure the necessary local command, whether for transit or for the +actual operations. But as a rule transit was secured by our regular +blockading squadrons, and generally the covering squadron only assembled in +the theatre of operations. When therefore the theatre was within a defended +terminal area, as in our descents upon the northern and Atlantic coasts of +France, then the terminal defence squadron was usually also sufficient to +protect the actual operations. It thus formed automatically the covering +squadron, and either continued its blockade, or, as in the case of our +attack on St. Malo in 1758, took up a position between the enemy's squadron +and the expedition's line of operation. If, however, the theatre of +operation was not within a terminal area, or lay within a distant one that +was weakly held, the expedition was given its own covering squadron, in +which the local squadron was more or less completely merged. Whatever, in +fact, was necessary to secure the local control was done, though, as we +have seen, and must presently consider more fully, this necessity was not +always the standard by which the strength of the covering squadron was +measured. + +The strength of the covering squadron being determined, the next question +is the position or "tract" which it should occupy. Like most other +strategical problems, it is "an option of difficulties." In so far as the +squadron is designed for support--that is, support from its men, boats, and +guns--it will be desirable to station it as near as possible to the +objective; but as a covering squadron, with the duty of preventing the +intrusion of an enemy's force, it should be as far away as possible, so as +to engage such a force at the earliest possible moment of its attempt to +interfere. There is also the paramount necessity that its position must be +such that favourable contact with the enemy is certain if he tries to +interrupt. Usually such certainty is only to be found either in touch with +the enemy's naval base or in touch with your own landing force. Where the +objective is the local naval base of the enemy these two points, of course, +tend to be identical strategically, and the position of the covering +squadron becomes a tactical rather than a strategical question. But the +vital principle of an independent existence holds good, and no matter how +great the necessity of support, the covering squadron should never be so +deeply engaged with the landing force as to be unable to disentangle itself +for action as a purely naval unit in time to discharge its naval function. +In other words, it must always be able to act in the same way as a free +field army covering a siege. + +Where the objective of the expedition is not the local naval base, the +choice of a position for the covering squadron will turn mainly on the +amount of support which the army is likely to require. If it cannot act by +surprise, and serious military resistance is consequently to be expected, +or where the coast defences are too strong for the transport squadron to +overpower, then the scale will incline to a position close to the army, +though the extent to which, under modern conditions, ships at sea can +usefully perform the delicate operation of supporting an infantry attack +with gun fire, except by enfilading the enemy's position, remains to be +proved. A similar choice will be indicated where strong support of men and +boats is required, as when a sufficiency of flat-boats and steam towage +cannot be provided by the transports and their attendant squadron; or again +where the locality is such that amphibious operations beyond the actual +landing are likely to be called for, and the assistance of a large number +of boats and seamen acting with the army is necessary to give it the +amphibious tactical mobility which it would otherwise lack. Such cases +occurred at Quebec in 1759, where Saunders took his covering +battle-squadron right up the St. Lawrence, although its covering functions +could have been discharged even better by a position several hundreds of +miles away from the objective; and again in 1800 at Alexandria, where Lord +Keith ran the extremest hazard to his covering functions in order to +undertake the supply of General Abercromby's army by inland waters and give +him the mobility he required. + +If, on the other hand, the transport squadron is able to furnish all the +support necessary, the covering squadron will take station as close as +possible to the enemy's naval base, and there it will operate according to +the ordinary laws of blockade. If nothing is desired but to prevent +interference, its guard will take the form of a close blockade. But if +there be a subsidiary purpose of using the expedition as a means of forcing +the enemy to sea, the open form will be employed; as, for instance, in +Anson's case above cited, when he covered the St. Malo expedition not by +closely blockading Brest, but by taking a position to the eastward at the +Isle de Batz. + +In the Japanese operations against Manchuria and the Kuantung Peninsula +these old principles displayed themselves in undiminished vitality. In the +surprise descents against Seoul and at Takusan the work of support was left +entirely with the transport squadron, while Admiral Togo took up a covering +position far away at Port Arthur. The two elements of the fleet were kept +separate all through. But in the operations for the isolation and +subsequent siege of Port Arthur they were so closely united as to appear +frequently indistinguishable. Still, so far as the closeness of the landing +place to the objective permitted, the two acted independently. For the +actual landing of the Second Army the boats of the covering squadron were +used, but it remained a live naval unit all through, and was never +organically mingled with the transport squadron. Its operations throughout +were, so far as modern conditions permit, on the lines of a close blockade. +To prevent interference was its paramount function, undisturbed, so far as +we are able to judge, by any subsidiary purpose of bringing the enemy to +decisive action. + +All through the operations, however, there was a new influence which tended +to confuse the precision of the old methods. Needless to say it was the +torpedo and the mine. Their deflective pressure was curious and +interesting. In our own operations against Sebastopol, to which the Port +Arthur case is most closely comparable, the old rules still held good. On +the traditional principle, dating from Drake's attack on San Domingo in +1585, a landing place was chosen which gave the mean between facility for a +_coup de main_ and freedom from opposition; that is, it was chosen at the +nearest practicable point to the objective which was undefended by +batteries and out of reach of the enemy's main army. + +In the handling of the covering squadron Admiral Dundas, the +Commander-in-Chief, gave it its dual function. After explaining the +constitution of the transport squadron he says, "The remainder of my force +... will act as a covering squadron, and where practicable assist in the +general disembarkation." With these two objects in mind he took a station +near enough to the landing place to support the army with his guns if it +were opposed, but still in sight of his cruisers before Sebastopol, and at +such a distance that at the first sign of the Russians moving he would have +time to get before the port and engage them before they could get well to +sea; that is, he took a position as near to the army as was compatible with +preventing interference, or, it may be said, his position was as near to +the enemy's base as was compatible with supporting the landing. From either +aspect in fact the position was the same, and its choice presented no +complexity owing mainly to the fact that for the first time steam +simplified the factors of time and distance. + +In the Japanese case the application of these principles was not so easy. +In selecting the nearest undefended point for a landing, it was not only +batteries, or even the army in Port Arthur, or the troops dispersed in the +Liaotung Peninsula that had to be considered, but rather, as must always be +the case in the future, mines and mobile torpedo defence. The point they +chose was the nearest practicable bay that was unmined. It was not strictly +out of mobile defence range, but it so happened that it lay behind islands +which lent themselves to the creation of fixed defences, and thus it +fulfilled all the recognised conditions. But in so far as the defences +could be turned by the Russian fleet a covering squadron was necessary, and +the difficulty of choosing a position for it was complicated by the fact +that the objective of the combined operations was not merely Port Arthur +itself, but also the squadron it contained. It was necessary, therefore, +not only to hold off that squadron, but to prevent its escape. This +indicated a close blockade. But for close blockade a position out of night +torpedo range is necessary, and the nearest point where such a position +could be secured was behind the defences that covered the disembarkation. +Consequently, in spite of what the strategical conditions dictated, the +covering squadron was more or less continuously forced back upon the army +and its supporting force, even when the support of the battle-squadron was +no longer required. + +In the conditions that existed nothing was lost. For the lines of the +Japanese fixed defences were so near to the enemy's base, that by mining +the entrance of the port Admiral Togo ensured that the enemy's exit would +be slow enough for him to be certain of getting contact from his defended +anchorage before the Russians could get far to sea. What would happen in a +case when no such position could be secured is another matter. The landing +place and supply base of the army must be secured against torpedo attack, +and the principle of concentration of effort would suggest that the means +of defence should not be attenuated by providing the covering squadron with +a defended anchorage elsewhere. Thus it would appear that unless the +geographical conditions permit the covering squadron to use one of its own +national bases, the drift of recent developments will be to force it back +on the army, and thus tend to confuse its duties with those of the +transport squadron. Hence the increased importance of keeping clear the +difference in function between the two squadrons. + +To emphasise the principle of the covering squadron, these two cases may be +contrasted with the Lissa episode at the end of the Austro-Italian War of +1866. In that case it was entirely neglected, with disastrous results. The +Austrian admiral, Tegethoff, with an inferior fleet had by higher order +been acting throughout on the defensive, and was still in Pola waiting for +a chance of a counter-stroke. Persano with the superior Italian fleet was +at Ancona, where he practically dominated the Adriatic. In July the +Italians, owing to the failure of the army, were confronted with the +prospect of being forced to make peace on unfavourable terms. To improve +the position Persano was ordered to take possession of the Austrian island +of Lissa. Without any attempt to organise his fleet on the orthodox British +principle he proceeded to conduct the operation with his entire force. +Practically the whole of it became involved in amphibious work, and as soon +as Persano was thus committed, Tegethoff put to sea and surprised him. +Persano was unable to disentangle a sufficient force in time to meet the +attack, and having no compact squadron fit for independent naval action, he +was decisively defeated by the inferior enemy. According to British +practice, it was clearly a case where, if the operation were to be +undertaken at all, an independent covering squadron should have been told +off either to hold Tegethoff in Pola or to bring him to timely action, +according to whether the island or the Austrian fleet was the primary +objective. The reason it was not done may be that Persano was not given a +proper landing force, and he seems to have considered that the whole +strength of his fleet was needed for the successful seizure of the +objective. If so, it is only one more proof of the rule that no matter what +fleet support the landing operations may require, it should never be given +in an imperfectly commanded sea to an extent which will deny the +possibility of a covering squadron being left free for independent naval +action. + +The length to which the supporting functions of the fleet may be carried +will always be a delicate question. The suggestion that its strength must +be affected by the need of the army for the men of the fleet or its boats, +which imply its men as well, will appear heretical. A battle-squadron, we +say, is intended to deal with the enemy's battle-squadron and its men to +fight the ships, and the mind revolts at the idea of the strength of a +squadron being fixed by any other standard. Theoretically nothing can seem +more true, but it is an idea of peace and the study. The atmosphere of war +engendered a wider and more practical view. The men of the old wars knew +that when a squadron is attached to a combined expedition it is something +different from a purely naval unit. They knew, moreover, that an army +acting oversea against hostile territory is an incomplete organism +incapable of striking its blow in the most effective manner without the +assistance of the men of the fleet. It was the office, then, of the naval +portion of the force not only to defend the striking part of the organism, +but to complete its deficiencies and lend it the power to strike. Alone and +unaided the army cannot depend on getting itself ashore, it cannot supply +itself, it cannot secure its retreat, nor can it avail itself of the +highest advantages of an amphibious force, the sudden shift of base or line +of operation. These things the fleet must do for it, and it must do them +with its men.[25] + + [25] The Japanese in the late war attempted to do this work by means of a + highly organized Army Disembarkation Staff, but except in perfect + conditions of weather and locality it does not seem to have worked well, + and in almost all cases the assistance of the navy was called in. + +The authority for this view is abundant. In 1800, for instance, when +General Maitland was charged with an expedition against Belleisle, he was +invited to state what naval force he would require. He found it difficult +to fix with precision. "Speaking loosely, however," he wrote, "three or +four sail of the line and four or five active frigates appear to me to be +properly adequate to the proposed service. The frigates to blockade." +(Meaning, of course, to blockade the objective and prevent reinforcements +reaching it from the mainland, always one of the supporting functions of +the squadron attached to the transports.) "The line-of-battle ships," he +adds, "to furnish us with the number of men necessary for land operations." +In this case our permanent blockading squadrons supplied the cover, and +what Maitland meant was that the battleships he asked for were to be added +to the transport squadron not as being required for escort, but for +support. St. Vincent, who was then First Lord, not only endorsed his +request, but gave him for disembarkation work one more ship-of-the-line +than he had asked for. At this time our general command of the sea had been +very fully secured, and we had plenty of naval force to spare for its +exercise. It will be well to compare it with a case in which the +circumstances were different. + +When in 1795 the expedition under Admiral Christian and General Abercromby +was being prepared for the West Indies, the admiral in concert with Jervis +drew up a memorandum as to the naval force required.[26] The force he asked +for was considerable. Both he and Jervis considered that the escort and +local cover must be very strong, because it was impossible to count on +closing either Brest or Toulon effectually by blockade. But this was not +the only reason. The plan of operations involved three distinct landings, +and each would require at least two of the line, and perhaps three, "not +only as protection, but as the means by which flat-boats must be manned, +cannon landed, and the other necessary services of fatigue executed." +Christian also required the necessary frigates and three or four brigs "to +cover [that is, support] the operations of the smaller vessels [that is, +the landing flotillas doing inshore work]." The main attack would require +at least four of the line and seven frigates, with brigs and schooners in +proportion. In all he considered, the ships-of-the-line [the frigates being +"otherwise employed"] would have to provide landing parties to the number +of 2000 men "for the flat-boats, landing and moving guns, water, and +provisions," and this would be their daily task. The military force these +landing parties were to serve amounted to about 18,000 men. + + [26] Sir Hugh Cloberry Christian was an officer of high distinction with + a remarkable record of battle service. He had been serving as Howe's + second captain just before his promotion to flag rank in 1795, and died + as Commander-in-Chief at the Cape at the early age of fifty-one. + +Lord Barham, it must be said, who as Sir Charles Middleton was then First +Sea Lord, objected to the requirements as excessive, particularly in the +demand for a strong escort, as he considered that the transit could be +safeguarded by special vigilance on the part of the permanent blockading +squadrons. The need for large shore parties he seems to have ignored. His +opinion, however, is not quite convincing, for from the first he had taken +up an antagonistic attitude to the whole idea of the expedition. He +regarded the policy which dictated it as radically unsound, and was +naturally anxious to restrict the force that was to be spent upon it. His +opposition was based on the broad and far-sighted principles that were +characteristic of his strategy. He believed that in view of the threatening +attitude of Spain the right course was to husband the navy so as to bring +it up to a two-Power standard for the coming struggle, and to keep it +concentrated for decisive naval action the moment Spain showed her hand. In +short, he stoutly condemned a policy which entailed a serious dissipation +of naval force for a secondary object before a working command of the sea +had been secured. It was, in fact, the arrangements for this expedition +which forced him to resign before the preparations were complete. But it is +to be observed that his objections to the plan were really due, not to the +principle of its organisation, but to our having insufficient force to give +it adequate naval support without prejudicing the higher consideration of +our whole position at sea.[27] + + [27] On analogous grounds almost every military critic has condemned the + policy of this disastrous expedition as involving a dispersal of our + slender military force at a time when everything called for its + concentration in Europe. + +It is obvious that the foregoing considerations, beyond the strategical +reactions already noted, will have another of the first importance, in that +they must influence the choice of a landing place. The interest of the army +will always be to fix it as near to the objective as is compatible with an +unopposed landing. The ideal was one night's march, but this could rarely +be attained except in the case of very small expeditions, which could be +landed rapidly at the close of day and advance in the dark. In larger +expeditions, the aim was to effect the landing far enough from the +objective to prevent the garrison of the place or the enemy's local forces +offering opposition before a footing was secured. The tendency of the navy +will usually be in the opposite direction; for normally the further they +can land the army away from the enemy's strength, the surer are they of +being able to protect it against naval interference. Their ideal will be a +place far enough away to be out of torpedo range, and to enable them to +work the covering and the transport squadron in sound strategical +independence. + +To reduce these divergencies to a mean of efficiency some kind of joint +Staff is necessary, and to ensure its smooth working it is no less +desirable to ascertain, so far as possible, the principles and method on +which it should proceed. In the best recent precedents the process has been +for the Army Staff to present the limits of coast-line within which the +landing must take place for the operation to have the desired effect, and +to indicate the known practicable landing points in the order they would +prefer them. It will then be for the Naval Staff to say how nearly in +accordance with the views of the army they are prepared to act. Their +decision will turn on the difficulties of protection and the essentials of +a landing place from the point of view of weather, currents, beach and the +like, and also in a secondary measure upon the extent to which the +conformation of the coast will permit of tactical support by gun-fire and +feints. If the Naval Staff are unwilling to agree to the point or points +their colleagues most desire, a question of balance of risk is set up, +which the higher Joint Staff must adjust. It will be the duty of the Naval +Staff to set out frankly and clearly all the sea risks the proposal of the +army entails, and if possible to suggest an alternative by which the risk +of naval interference can be lessened without laying too heavy a burden on +the army. Balancing these risks against those stated by the army, the +superior Staff must decide which line is to be taken, and each service then +will do its best to minimise the difficulties it has to face. Whether the +superior Staff will incline to the naval or the military view will depend +upon whether the greater danger likely to be incurred is from the sea or on +land. + +Where the naval conditions are fairly well known the line of operations can +be fixed in this way with much precision. But if, as usually happens, the +probable action of the enemy at sea cannot be divined with sufficient +approximation, then assuming there is serious possibility of naval +interference, the final choice within the limited area must be left to the +admiral. The practice has been to give him instructions which define in +order of merit the points the army desire, and direct him to select the one +which in the circumstances, as he finds them, he considers within +reasonable risk of war. Similarly, if the danger of naval interference be +small and the local conditions ashore imperfectly known, the final choice +will be with the general, subject only to the practicable possibilities of +the landing place he would choose. + +During the best period of our old wars there was seldom any difficulty in +making things work smoothly on these lines. After the first inglorious +failure at Rochefort in 1757 the practice was, where discretion of this +kind had been allowed, for the two commanders-in-chief to make a joint +coast-reconnaissance in the same boat and settle the matter amicably on the +spot. + +It was on these lines the conduct of our combined operations was always +arranged thenceforth. Since the elder Pitt's time it has never been our +practice to place combined expeditions under either a naval or a military +commander-in-chief and allow him to decide between naval and military +exigencies. The danger of possible friction between two commanders-in-chief +came to be regarded as small compared with the danger of a single one +making mistakes through unfamiliarity with the limitations of the service +to which he does not belong. + +The system has usually worked well even when questions arose which were +essentially questions for a joint superior Staff. The exceptions indeed are +very few. A fine example of how such difficulties can be settled, when the +spirit is willing, occurred in the Crimea. The naval difficulties, as we +have already seen, were as formidable as they could well be short of +rendering the whole attempt madness. When it came to the point of execution +a joint council of war was held, at which sat the allied Staffs of both +services. So great were the differences of opinion between the French and +British Generals, and so imperfectly was the terrain known, that they could +not indicate a landing place with any precision. All the admirals knew was +that it must be on an open coast, which they had not been able to +reconnoitre, where the weather might at any time interrupt communications +with the shore, and where they were liable to be attacked by a force which, +until their own ships were cleared of troops, would not be inferior. All +these objections they laid before the Council General. Lord Raglan then +said the army now perfectly understood the risk, and was prepared to take +it. Whereupon the allied admirals replied that they were ready to proceed +and do their best to set the army ashore and support it at any point that +should be chosen. + +There remains a form of support which has not yet been considered, and that +is diversionary movements or feints by the fleet to draw the enemy's +attention away from the landing place. This will naturally be a function of +the covering battle-squadron or its attendant cruisers and flotilla. The +device appears in Drake's attack on San Domingo in 1585, an attack which +may be regarded as our earliest precedent in modern times and as the +pattern to which all subsequent operations of the kind conformed so far as +circumstances allowed. In that case, while Drake landed the troops a +night's march from the place, the bulk of the fleet moved before it, kept +it in alarm all night, and at dawn made a demonstration with the boats of +forcing a direct landing under cover of its guns. The result was the +garrison moved out to meet the threat and were surprised in flank by the +real landing force. Passing from this simple case to the most elaborate in +our annals, we find Saunders doing the same thing at Quebec. In preparation +for Wolfe's night landing he made a show of arrangements for a bombardment +of Montcalm's lines below the city, and in the morning with the boats of +the fleet began a demonstration of landing his marines. By this device he +held Montcalm away from Wolfe's landing place till a secure footing had +been obtained. Similar demonstrations had been made above the city, and the +combined result was that Wolfe was able to penetrate the centre of the +French position unopposed. + +Such work belongs of course to the region of tactics rather than of +strategy, but the device has been used with equal effect strategically. So +great is the secrecy as well as the mobility of an amphibious force, that +it is extremely difficult for an enemy to distinguish a real attack from a +feint. Even at the last moment, when a landing is actually in progress, it +is impossible for the defenders to tell that all the troops are being +landed at the one point if a demonstration is going on elsewhere. At Quebec +it was not till Montcalm was face to face with Wolfe that he knew he had to +deal with the whole British force. Still less from a strategical point of +view can we be certain whether a particular landing represents an advance +guard or is a diversionary operation to mask a larger landing elsewhere. +This is a special difficulty when in the case of large operations the +landing army arrives in echelon like the Second Japanese army. In that +instance the naval feint was used strategically, and apparently with +conspicuous effect. The Russians were always apprehensive that the Japanese +would strike for Newchuang at the head of the Gulf of Pe-chi-li, and for +this reason General Stakelberg, who had command of the troops in the +peninsula, was not permitted to concentrate for effective action in its +southern part, where the Japanese had fixed their landing place. Admiral +Togo, in spite of the strain on his fleet in effecting and securing the +disembarkation of the army, detached a cruiser squadron to demonstrate in +the Gulf. The precise effect of this feint upon the Russian Staff cannot be +measured with certainty. All we know is that Stakelberg was held back from +his concentration so long that he was unable to strike the Japanese army +before it was complete for the field and able to deal him a staggering +counter-stroke. + +This power of disturbing the enemy with feints is of course inherent in the +peculiar attributes of combined expeditions, in the facility with which +their line of operation can be concealed or changed, and there seems no +reason why in the future it should be less than in the past. Good railway +connections in the theatre of the descent will of course diminish the +effect of feints, but, on the other hand, the means of making them have +increased. In mine-sweeping vessels, for instance, there is a new +instrument which in the Russo-Japanese War proved capable of creating a +very strong impression at small cost to the fleet. Should a flotilla of +such craft appear at any practicable part of a threatened coast and make a +show of clearing it, it will be almost a moral impossibility to ignore the +demonstration. + +On the whole then, assuming the old methods are followed, it would seem +that with a reasonable naval preponderance the power of carrying out such +operations over an uncommanded sea is not less than it has proved to be +hitherto. The rapidity and precision of steam propulsion perhaps places +that power higher than ever. It would at any rate be difficult to find in +the past a parallel to the brilliant movement on Seoul with which the +Japanese opened the war in 1904. It is true the Russians at the last moment +decided for political reasons to permit the occupation to take place +without opposition, but this was unknown to the Japanese, and their +arrangements were made on the assumption that their enemy would use the +formidable means at his disposal to obstruct the operation. The risk was +accepted, skillfully measured, and adequately provided for on principles +identical with those of the British tradition. But, on the other hand, +there has been nothing to show that where the enemy has a working command +of the sea the hazard of such enterprises has been reduced. Against an +enemy controlling the line of passage in force, the well-tried methods of +covering and protecting an oversea expedition will no more work to-day than +they did in the past. Until his hold is broken by purely naval action, +combined work remains beyond all legitimate risk of war. + + * * * * * + +APPENDIX + + * * * * * + +THE +"GREEN PAMPHLET" + + * * * * * + +WAR COURSE + + * * * * * + +Strategical Terms +and Definitions +used in +Lectures on Naval History + +BY + +JULIAN S. CORBETT, ESQ., L.L.M. + + * * * * * + +NAVAL STRATEGY + +Naval strategy does not exist as a separate branch of knowledge. It is only +a section of a division of the art of war. + +The study for officers is the art of war, specialising in Naval Strategy. + +The true method of procedure then is to get hold of a general theory of +war, and so ascertain the exact relations of Naval Strategy to the whole. + +War is a form of political intercourse, a continuation of foreign politics +which begins when force is introduced to attain our ends. + +OBJECTS. + +We seek our ends by directing force upon certain objects, which may be +ulterior or immediate. + +Immediate objects (also called "Primary") are the ends of particular +operations or movements. But it must be remembered that every primary +object has also its ulterior object; that is, every operation must be +regarded, not only from the point of view of its special object, but also +as a step to the end of the campaign or war. + +Strategy is the art of directing force to the ends in view. Classified by +the object it is Major Strategy, dealing with ulterior objects; Minor +Strategy, with primary objects. + +This also means that every operation of an army or fleet must be regarded +in a double light, _i.e._, it must be planned and conducted in relation (1) +to the general progress of the war; (2) to the object to which it is +immediately directed. + +Major Strategy (always regarding the ulterior object) has for its province +the plan of the war, and includes: (1) Selection of the immediate or +primary objects to be aimed at for attaining the ulterior object; (2) +Selection of the force to be used, i.e., it determines the relative +functions of the naval and military forces. + + NOTE.--Major Strategy in its broadest sense has also to deal with the + whole resources of the nation for war. It is a branch of statesmanship. + It regards the Army and Navy as parts of one force, to be handled + together; they are instruments of war. But it also has to keep in view + constantly the politico-diplomatic position of the country (on which + depends the effective action of the instrument), and its commercial and + financial position (by which the energy for working the instrument is + maintained). The friction of these two considerations is inherent in + war, and we call it the deflection of strategy by politics. It is + usually regarded as a disease. It is really a vital factor in every + strategical problem. It may be taken as a general rule that no question + of grand strategy can be decided apart from diplomacy, and vice versa. + For a line of action or an object which is expedient from the point of + view of strategy may be barred by diplomatic considerations, and vice + versa. To decide a question of grand strategy without consideration of + its diplomatic aspect, is to decide on half the factors only. Neither + strategy or diplomacy has ever a clean slate. This interaction has to + be accepted by commanding officers as part of the inevitable "friction + of war." A good example is Pitt's refusal to send a fleet into the + Baltic to assist Frederick the Great during the Seven Years War, for + fear of compromising our relations with the Scandinavian Powers. + +Minor Strategy has for its province the plans of operations. It deals +with-- + + (1) The selection of the "objectives," that is, the particular forces + of the enemy or the strategical points to be dealt with in order + to secure the object of the particular operation. + (2) The directing of the force assigned for the operation. + +Minor Strategy may be of three kinds:-- + + (1) Naval, where the immediate object is to be attained by a fleet + only. + (2) Military, where the immediate object is to be attained by an army + only. + (3) Combined, where the immediate object is to be attained by army + and navy together. + + NOTE.--It will be seen that what is usually called Naval Strategy or + Fleet Strategy, is only a sub-division of a division of strategy, and + that, therefore, strategy cannot be studied from the point of view of + naval operations only. + + NOTE.--Naval Strategy, being only a part of General Strategy, is + subject to the same friction as Major Strategy, though in a less + degree. Individual commanders have often to take a decision + independently of the central government, or headquarters; they should, + therefore, always keep in mind the possible ulterior effects of any + line of action they may take, endeavouring to be sure that what is + strategically expedient is not diplomatically inexpedient. + + EXAMPLE.--Boscawen's attack on De la Motte on the eve of the Seven + Years War. + +NATURE OF OBJECT + +The solution of every strategical problem, whether of Major or Minor +Strategy, depends primarily on the nature of the object in view. + +All objects, whether ulterior or not, may be positive or negative. + +A positive object is where we seek to assert or acquire something for +ourselves. + +A negative object is where we seek to deny the enemy something or prevent +his gaining something. + +Where the object is positive, Strategy is offensive. + +Where the object is negative, Strategy is defensive. + + EXAMPLE.--When Togo attacked Rojesvensky his primary object was + offensive, _i.e._, to capture or destroy the Russian Fleet. His + ulterior object was to maintain the defensive function which had been + assigned to the Japanese Fleet. + + NOTES.--This is a good example of true defensive; that is, Togo's + operations, though drastically offensive in action, were all strictly + within the strategical defensive sphere assigned to him. + +The Offensive, being positive in its aim is naturally the more effective +form of war (_i.e._, it leads more directly to a final decision), and, as a +rule, should be adopted by the stronger Power. + +The Defensive, being negative in its aim, is naturally the stronger form of +war; _i.e._, it requires less force, and, as a rule, is adopted by the +weaker Power. + + NOTE.--The general truth of this proposition is not affected by + apparent exceptions where the contrary appears to be true. + + _The Offensive must not be confused with the Initiative._ It is + possible to seize the Initiative, under certain conditions, by taking a + defensive position from which the enemy is bound to dislodge us or + abandon the operation. + + In most cases where the weaker side successfully assumes the offensive, + it is due to his doing so before the enemy's mobilization or + concentration is complete, whereby the attacking force is able to deal + in succession with locally inferior forces of the enemy. + +The advantages of the Offensive are well known. + +Its disadvantages are:-- + + (1) That it grows weaker as it advances, by prolonging its + communications. + (2) That it tends to operations on unfamiliar ground. + (3) That it continually increases the difficulty of retreat. + +The advantages of Defence are chiefly:-- + + (1) Proximity to base. + (2) Familiar ground. + (3) Facility for arranging surprise by counter attack. + + NOTE.--In modern Naval warfare these advantages--that is, the + advantages of fighting on your own ground--are specially high as giving + greater facility for the use of mine and torpedo. + + The disadvantages are mainly moral or when the enemy's objective or + line of operations cannot be ascertained, but this disadvantage can be + neutralised when it is possible to secure an interior position. + +GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DEFENSIVE. + +True Defensive means waiting for a chance to strike. + + NOTE.--When the Dutch burnt our ships at Chatham, we were not acting on + the defensive, we had laid them up and were doing nothing at all. + +The strength and the essence of the defensive is the counter-stroke. + +A well designed defensive will always threaten or conceal an attack. + +A general defensive policy may consist of a series of minor offensive +operations. + +The maxim is: If you are not relatively strong enough to assume the +offensive, assume the defensive till you become so-- + +(1) Either by inducing the enemy to weaken himself by attacks or otherwise; + +(2) Or by increasing your own strength, by developing new forces or +securing allies. + +Except as a preparation or a cover for offensive action the defensive is +seldom or never of any use; for by the defensive alone we can never acquire +anything, we can only prevent the enemy acquiring. But where we are too +weak to assume the offensive it is often necessary to assume the defensive, +and wait in expectation of time turning the scale in our favour and +permitting us to accumulate strength relatively greater than the enemy's; +we then pass to the offensive, for which our defensive has been a +preparation. + +As a cover or support for the offensive, the defensive will enable us to +intensify the attack; for by assuming the defensive in one or more minor +theatres of operation we can reduce our forces in those theatres to a +minimum, and concentrate to a maximum for the offensive in the most +important theatre. + +OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS USED WITH A DEFENSIVE INTENTION + + (A) Counter attacks. + (B) Diversions. + +(A) _Counter attacks_ are those which are made upon an enemy who exposes +himself anywhere in the theatre of his offensive operations. It is this +form of attack which constitutes what Clausewitz calls the "surprise +advantage of defence." + +(B) _Diversions_ are similar operations undertaken against an enemy outside +the limit of his theatre of offensive operations. + +Diversions are designed to confuse his strategy, to distract his attention, +and to draw off his forces from his main attack. If well planned, they +should divert a force greater than their own. They should, therefore, be +small. The nearer they approach the importance of a real attack the less +likely they are to divert a force greater than their own. + +It is only their power of diverting or containing a larger force than their +own that justifies the breach of the law of concentration which they +involve. + +This power depends mainly on suddenness and mobility, and these qualities +are most highly developed in combined expeditions. + + NOTE.--_Diversions_ must be carefully distinguished from _eccentric + attacks_. _Eccentric attacks_ are true offensive movements. They have a + positive object, _i.e._, they aim to acquire something from the enemy; + whereas diversions have a negative object, _i.e._, they aim at + preventing the enemy doing or acquiring something. Being in the + category of the weaker form of war, eccentric attacks are usually made + in greater force than diversions. + + EXAMPLES.--_Diversion._--Our raid on Washington in 1815. Landing force, + about 4,000 men. Object, according to official instructions, "a + diversion on the coasts of United States of America in favour of the + army employed in the defence of Canada"; _i.e._, the intention was + negative--preventative--defensive. + + 2. _Eccentric Attack._--Operations against New Orleans in 1815. + Intended force 15,000 to 20,000 men. Object, "to obtain command of + embouchure of the Mississippi, and, secondly, to occupy some important + and valuable possession, by the restoration of which the conditions of + peace might be improved, &c."; _i.e._, the intention was positive--to + acquire. Compare Rochefort Expedition (diversion) and Belleisle + (eccentric attack) in the Seven Years War. + + Note 2.--This distinction gives a threefold classification of combined + expeditions, as used by Elizabethan strategists. + + Raids = Diversions. + Incursions = Eccentric attacks. + Invasions = True direct offence. + + Compare these with Sir John Ardagh's classification (Report of Royal + Commission on Reserve Forces, 1904):-- + + "Raids," not exceeding 10,000 men. + "Small expeditions," not exceeding 50,000 men. + "Dangerous invasion," not exceeding 150,000 men. + +NATURE OF ULTERIOR OBJECT + +From the nature of the ulterior object we get an important classification +of wars, according to whether such object is _limited_ or _unlimited_. + + (1) War with _limited object_ ("limited war") is where we merely seek + to take from the enemy some particular part of his possessions, or + interests; _e.g._, Spanish-American War, where the object was the + liberation of Cuba. + + (2) _War with an unlimited object_ is where we seek to overthrow the + enemy completely, so that to save himself from destruction he must + agree to do our will (become subservient); _e.g._, Franco-German War. + + NOTE.--Ulterior objects are not necessarily the same in their nature as + the immediate (primary or secondary) objects which lead up to them; + _e.g._, ulterior objects may be offensive, while one or more of the + immediate objects may be defensive, and _vice versa_. + + EXAMPLE 1.--Japanese position in the late war. Ulterior object of the + war (to drive Russians from Manchuria) was offensive (positive). + Function or ulterior object of the fleet (to cover the invasion) was + defensive (negative). Its primary object to effect this was to attack + and destroy the Russian naval force. This was offensive (positive). + + EXAMPLE 2.--In the Spanish-American War the ulterior object of the war + was (for the Americans) to eject the Spanish Government from Cuba. This + was offensive. The ulterior object of the fleet was to prevent the + Spaniards sending reinforcements or interfering with the intended + American invasion. This was defensive. The primary object of the fleet + was to bring the Spanish Fleet to action. This was offensive. + +SYSTEM OF OPERATIONS + +Having determined the nature of the war by the nature of its object +(_i.e._, whether it is offensive or defensive and whether it is limited or +unlimited), strategy has to decide on the system of operations or "plan of +the war." + +This depends upon:-- + (1) The theatre of the war. + (2) The means at our disposal. + +1. _Theatre of the War._--Usually defined as "all the territory upon which +the hostile parties may assail each other." This is insufficient. For an +island power the theatre of war will always include sea areas. Truer +definition: "geographical areas within which lie the ulterior objects of +the war and the subordinate objects that lead up to them." + +A "theatre of war" may contain several "theatres of operations." + +2. _Theatre of Operations_.--Is generally used of the operations of one +belligerent only. + +An "operation" is any considerable strategical undertaking. + +A "theatre of operations" is usually defined as embracing all the territory +we seek to take possession of or to defend. + +A truer definition is, "the area, whether of sea or land or both, within +which the enemy must be overpowered before we can secure the object of the +particular operation." + +Consequently, since the nature of the war varies with the object, it may be +defensive in one theatre of operations and offensive in another. + +Where the operations are defensive in character any special movement or +movements may be offensive. + +OBJECTIVE + +An objective is "any point or force against which an offensive movement is +directed." Thus where the _object_ in any theatre of operation is to get +command of a certain sea in which the enemy maintains a fleet, that fleet +will usually be the _objective_. + +LINES OF OPERATION + +A line of operation is "the area of land or sea through which we operate +from our base or starting point to reach our objectives." + +Lines of operation may be exterior or interior. We are said to hold the +interior lines when we hold such a position, in regard to a theatre of +operations, that we can reach its chief objective points, or forces, more +quickly than the enemy can move to their defence or assistance. Such a +position is called an interior position. "Exterior Lines" and "Exterior +Position" are the converse of these. + +LINES OF COMMUNICATION + +This expression is used of three different things:-- + + (1) _Lines of supply_, running from the base of operations to the point + which the operating force has reached. + + (2) _Lines of lateral communication_ by which several forces engaged in + one theatre of operations can communicate with each other and move to + each other's support. + + (3) _Lines of retreat_, which are lines of supply reversed, _i.e._, + leading back to the base. + +These three ideas are best described by the term "lines of passage and +communication," which we had in use at the end of the eighteenth century. + +Ashore, lines of passage and communication are roads, railways, waterways, +&c. + +At sea, they may be regarded as those waters over which passes the normal +course of vessels proceeding from the base to the objective or the force to +be supplied. + +In Land Strategy the great majority of problems are problems of +communication. Maritime Strategy has never been regarded as hinging on +communications, but probably it does so even more than Land Strategy, as +will appear from a consideration of maritime communications, and the extent +to which they are the main preoccupation of Naval operations. + +MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS + +The various kinds of Maritime Communications for or against which a fleet +may have to operate are:-- + + (1) Its own communications, or those of its adversary (which correspond + to the communications of armies operating ashore). These tend to + increase in importance strategically with the increasing hunger of + modern fleets (for coal, ammunition, &c). + + (2) The communications of an army operating from an advanced oversea + base, that is communication between the advanced and the main base. + + (3) Trade Routes, that is the communications upon which depend the + national resources and the supply of the main bases, as well as the + "lateral" or connecting communications between various parts of + belligerents' possessions. + +N.B.--Such "lines of passage and communication" are the preoccupation of +Naval Strategy; that is to say, problems of Naval Strategy can be reduced +to terms of "passage and communication" and this is probably the best +method of solving them. + +NAVAL STRATEGY CONSIDERED AS A +QUESTION OF PASSAGE AND +COMMUNICATION + +By "Naval Strategy" we mean the art of conducting the operations of the +Fleet. Such operations must always have for their object "passage and +communication"; that is, the Fleet is mainly occupied in guarding our own +communications and seizing those of the enemy. + +PROOF I.--_Deductive_.--We say the aim of Naval Strategy is to get command +of the sea. What does this mean? It is something quite different from the +Military idea of occupying territory, for the sea cannot be the subject of +political dominion or ownership. We cannot subsist upon it (like an army on +conquered territory), nor can we exclude neutrals from it. Admiral Colomb's +theory of "conquest of water territory," therefore, involves a false +analogy, and is not safe as the basis of a strategical system. What then is +the value of the sea in the political system of the world? Its value is as +a means of communication between States and parts of States. Therefore the +"command of the sea" means the control of communications in which the +belligerents are adversely concerned. + + COROLLARY.--The command of the sea can never be, like the conquest of + territory, the ulterior object of a war, unless it be a purely maritime + war, as were approximately our wars with the Dutch in the 17th century, + but it may be a primary or immediate object, and even the ulterior + object of particular operations. + +PROOF II.--_Inductive_, from history or past experience.--History shows +that the actual functions of the Fleet (except in purely maritime wars) +have been threefold. + +1. The prevention or securing of alliances (_i.e._, deterring or persuading +neutrals as to participating in the war). + + EXAMPLES.--The operations of Rooke in the first years of the War of the + Spanish Succession, 1702-04, to secure the adhesion of Savoy and + Portugal to the Grand Alliance. Operations of Nelson to maintain the + alliance of the Kingdom of Naples. + + In the first case there came a crisis when it was more important to + demonstrate to Savoy and Portugal what they stood to lose by joining + Louis XIV than to act immediately against the Toulon Fleet. In the + second, the Neapolitan Alliance was essential to our operations in the + Eastern Mediterranean; the destruction of the Toulon Fleet was not. + +2. The protection or destruction of commerce. + +3. The furtherance or hindrance of military operations ashore. + +NOTE.--The above is the best working "Definition of Naval Strategy," as +emphasising its intimate connection with diplomatic, financial, and +military aspects of major strategy. + +These functions may be discharged in two ways:-- + + (1) By direct territorial attacks, threatened or performed + (bombardment, landing, raiding parties, &c). + + (2) By getting command of the sea, _i.e._, establishing ourselves in + such a position that we can control the maritime communications of all + parties concerned, so that we can operate by sea against their + territory, commerce, and allies, and they cannot operate against ours. + + NOTE.--The power of the second method, by controlling communications, + is out of all proportion to the first--direct attack. Indeed, the first + can seldom be performed with any serious effect without the second. + Thus, from this point of view also, it is clear that Naval Strategy is + mainly a question of communications. + + But not entirely. Circumstances have arisen when the Fleet must + discharge part of its function by direct action before there is time + to get general control of the communications. (That is, political and + military considerations may deflect normal operation of Naval + Strategy.) + + EXAMPLE.--Rooke's capture of Gibraltar in 1704, in the face of the + unshaken Toulon Fleet. Japanese invasion of Manchuria. + +COMMAND OF THE SEA + +Command of the sea exists only in a state of war. If we say we have command +of the sea in time of peace it is a rhetorical expression meaning that we +have (a) adequate Naval positions; (b) an adequate Fleet to secure the +command when war breaks out. + +VARIOUS CONDITIONS OF COMMAND + +1. It may be (a) general; (b) local. + +(a) _General command_ is secured when the enemy is no longer able to act +dangerously against our line of passage and communication or to defend his +own, or (in other words) when he is no longer able to interfere seriously +with our trade or our military or diplomatic operations. + +This condition exists practically when the enemy is no longer able to send +squadrons to sea. + + NOTE.--Command of the sea does not mean that the enemy can do + absolutely nothing, but that he cannot _seriously_ interfere with the + undertakings by which we seek to secure the object of the war, or to + force our will upon him. + +(b) _Local command_ implies a state of things in which we are able to +prevent the enemy from interfering with our passage and communication in +one or more theatres of operation. + +2. Both local and general command may be (a) temporary; (b) permanent. + +(a) _Temporary command_ is when we are able to prevent the enemy from +interfering with our passage and communication in all or some theatres of +operation during the period required for gaining the object in view +(_i.e._, the object of a particular operation or of a particular campaign). +This condition existed after Togo's first action. + +(b) _Permanent command_ is when time ceases to be a vital factor in the +situation, _i.e._, when the possibility of the enemy's recovering his +maritime position is too remote to be a practical consideration. This +condition existed after Tsushima. + +3. Command, whether general, local, or temporary, may be in three different +states:-- + + (a) With us. + (b) With the enemy. + (c) In dispute. + +If in dispute, it may be that:-- + + (1) We have preponderance. + (2) Our enemy has preponderance. + (3) Neither side preponderates. + +COMMAND IN DISPUTE + +The state of dispute is the most important for practical strategy, since it +is the normal condition, at least in the early stages of the war, and +frequently all through it. + +The state of dispute continues till a final decision is obtained, _i.e._, +till one side is no longer able to send a squadron to sea. + +It is to the advantage of the preponderating Navy to end the state of +dispute by seeking a decision. Hence the French tradition to avoid decisive +actions as a rule when at war with England. + +The truth of this appears from the fact that _general command of the sea is +not essential to all oversea operations_. + +In a state of dispute the preponderating Power may concentrate in one +theatre of operations, and so secure the local or temporary command +sufficient for obtaining the special object in view. The weaker Power may +take advantage of such local concentration to operate safely elsewhere. + +_Rule 1._ So long as a state of dispute can force the preponderating Power +to concentrate, operating by evasion is possibly open to the weaker. + +_Rule 2._ In a state of dispute although the weaker Power may not be able +to obstruct the passage and communication of the stronger, it may be able +to defend its own. + + EXAMPLES.--This condition of dispute existed during the first three + years of the Seven Years War, until Hawke and Boscawen obtained a + decision by defeating Conflans and De la Cloue; also in the Great War + up to Trafalgar. + +SHOULD COMMAND OF THE SEA ALWAYS BE THE +PRIMARY OBJECT? + +When the preponderating Power fails or neglects to get command (_i.e._, +leaves the general command in dispute), the disadvantage to him is not so +much the danger to his own operations as the facility given to the enemy +for carrying out counter operations elsewhere. + +Under certain conditions, therefore, it may not be the primary function of +the fleet to seek out the enemy's fleet and destroy it, because general +command may be in dispute while local command may be with us, and political +or military considerations may demand of us an operation, for which such +local command is sufficient, and which cannot be delayed until we have +obtained a complete decision. + +From the above it will appear "command of the sea" is too loose an +expression for strategical discussion. For practical purposes should be +substituted "_control of passage and communication_." + +The question then in the consideration of any proposed operation or line of +operations will be, not "Have we the command of the sea?" but "Can we +secure the necessary lines of communication from obstruction by the enemy?" + +METHODS OF SECURING CONTROL + +1. _Permanent general control_ can only be secured by the practical +annihilation of the enemy's fleet by successful actions. + +2. _Local and temporary control_ may be secured by:-- + + (a) A defensive action not necessarily entirely successful + (containing). + + (b) Forcing concentration on the enemy elsewhere (diversion). + + (c) Superior concentration so as to render impotent the enemy's force + available in the special theatre of operations (masking or containing). + +BLOCKADE + +Blockades are of two natures, according to the object review. The object +may be:-- + +(d) Blockade. + + i. _Close blockade_ to prevent the enemy putting to sea. The object + being usually to secure local or temporary control. + + ii. _Observation blockade_, to force the enemy to put to sea _by + occupying the common lines of communications_ (_see_ below). In this + case you are seeking a decision as a step towards general control. + +Both natures are operations upon the lines of passage and communication, +but in case (1) the primary intention is defensive, to secure our own line; +in case (2) the primary intention is offensive, to seize the enemy's line +and compel him to expose himself in an attempt to recover it. + +GENERAL RULES FOR CONDUCTING BLOCKADES + +In case (1) (defensive intention) blockade should be as close as is +compatible with security from torpedo attack. + +In case (2) (offensive intention) it should be as distant as is compatible +with bringing enemy to action if he comes out. + + Examples:--_Case_ (1): First stage of Togo's blockade of Port Arthur. + _Case_ (2): Nelson off Toulon. + _Confusion of the two_: Sampson's attempt to close Santiago + simultaneously with an attempt to force Cervera to sea. + +THE PECULIARITY OF MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS + +Since the whole idea of command of the sea and the whole theory of blockade +rest on the control of communications, neither can be fully apprehended +without a thorough understanding of the nature of maritime communications. + +Ashore, the respective lines of communications of each belligerent tend to +run more or less approximately in opposite directions, until they meet in +the theatre of operations or the objective point. + +At sea the reverse is the case; for in maritime warfare the great lines of +communications of either belligerent tend to run approximately parallel, +if, indeed, they are not identical. + +Thus, in the case of a war with Germany, the object of which lay in the +Eastern Mediterranean, or in America, or South Africa, our respective lines +of communication would be identical. + +This was also the case in all our imperial wars with France. + +_This peculiarity is the controlling influence of maritime warfare._ Nearly +all our current maxims of Naval strategy can be traced to the pressure it +exerts on Naval thought. + +It is at the root of the fundamental difference between Military and Naval +strategy, and affords the explanation of much strategical error and +confusion, which has arisen from applying the principles of land warfare to +the sea without allowing for the antagonistic conditions of the +communications and operations against them in each case. + +On land the chief reason for not always striking the enemy's communications +at once is that as a rule we cannot do so without exposing our own. + +At sea, on the contrary, since the great lines are common to both, we +cannot defend our own without striking at the enemy's. + +Therefore, at sea, the obvious opening is to get your fleet into such a +position that it controls the common lines, unless defeated or evaded. + + EXAMPLE.--This was usually done in our old wars with France, by our + getting a fleet off Brest before the French could sail. + +Hence the maxim "that the proper place for our fleets is off the enemy's +coast," "the enemy's coast is our true frontier," and the like. + +But these maxims are not universally true, witness Togo's strategy against +Rojesvensky, when he remained correctly upon his own coast. + +Take again the maxim that the primary object of the fleet is to seek out +the enemy's fleet and destroy it. + +Here again Togo's practice was the reverse of the maxim. + +The true maxim is "The primary object of the fleet is to secure +communications, and if the enemy's fleet is in a position to render them +unsafe it must be put out of action." + +The enemy's fleet usually is in this position, but not always. + + EXAMPLE.--Opening of War of Spanish Succession. The operations of 1702 + were to secure some point (Cadiz, Gibraltar, or Ferrol) on the Spanish + trade communications, the French lateral communications, and our own + lines of passage to the Mediterranean, where was to be our chief + theatre of operation. These last two lines were identical. 1703.--Chief + operations had for their object to secure the alliance of Savoy, and + particularly of Portugal, and with same object in view, Rooke's + official instructions directed that the French fleet was to be ignored + unless it threatened our communications. + + RESULT.--By 1704 we had gained a Naval position from which France could + not eject us, and she abandoned struggle for sea communications. + +But nine times out of ten the maxim of seeking out the enemy's fleet, &c., +is sound and applicable:-- + + (a) Because for us _general permanent command_ is usually essential + to ultimate success, and this cannot be obtained without destroying the + enemy's fleet. + + (b) Because usually the enemy's fleet opens with an attempt _to + control the common communications_. + + (c) Because usually the functions of the fleet are so complex + (_i.e._, the calls upon it so numerous) that it will seek to strike a + blow which solve all the difficulties; _e.g._, Sir Palmes Fairborne's + solution of the problem in 1703 (_England in the Mediterranean_, Vol. + II., p. 234). + +Also it must be remembered that nine times out of ten the most effective +way of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" (_i.e._, forcing an action on him) +is to seize a position which controls communications vital to his plan of +campaign. + +This was what happened in 1704. Rooke was unable to seek out the Toulon +fleet, but by seizing Gibraltar he made it come to him (not intentionally, +but by the operation of inevitable strategical law). + +Compare Togo's strategy and that of the Americans in 1898. + +Practically all great Naval actions have been brought about in this way, +that is they have been the outcome on an effort to clear essential +communications from the enemy's fleet, _e.g._, Gravelines, La Hogue, +Quiberon, Trafalgar, Tsushima. + +Similarly the great actions of the old Dutch wars were brought about +because our geographical position placed us astride the Dutch trade +communications, and they were forced to seek a decision against our fleet. + +FINAL NOTE + +In applying the maxim of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" it should be borne +in mind:-- + + (1) That if you seek it out with a superior force you will probably + find it in a place where you cannot destroy it except at heavy cost. + + (2) That seeing that the defensive is a stronger form of war than the + offensive, it is _prima facie_ better strategy to make the enemy come + to you than to go to him and seek a decision on his own ground. + + * * * * * + +WAR COURSE + + * * * * * + +Notes on Strategy + + * * * * * + +PART ONE + +GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND DEFINITIONS + +INTRODUCTORY + +Naval strategy is a section of the Art of War. + +The study for officers is the Art of War, which includes Naval Strategy. + +War is the application of force to the attainment of political ends. + +MAJOR AND MINOR STRATEGY + +We seek our ends by directing force upon certain objects, which may be +ulterior or primary. + +_Primary objects_ are the special objects of particular operations or +movements which we undertake in order to gain the ulterior object of the +campaign. Consequently it must be remembered that every particular +operation or movement must be regarded, not only from the point of view of +its special object, but also as a step to the end of the campaign or war. + +Strategy is the art of directing force to the ends in view. There are two +kinds--Major Strategy, dealing with ulterior objects; Minor Strategy, with +primary objects. + +Every operation of an army or fleet must be planned and conducted in +relation (1) to the general plan of the war; (2) to the object to which it +is immediately directed. + +Major Strategy, always regarding the ulterior object, has for its province +the plan of the war and includes: (1) Selection of the immediate or primary +objects to be aimed at for attaining the ulterior object; (2) Selection of +the force to be used, _i.e._, it determines the relative functions of the +naval and military forces. Major Strategy in its broadest sense deals with +the whole resources of the nation for war. It is a branch of statesmanship +which regards the Army and Navy as parts of one force, to be handled +together as the instrument of war. But it also has to keep in constant +touch with the political and diplomatic position of the country (on which +depends the effective action of the instrument), and the commercial and +financial position (by which the energy for working the instrument is +maintained). The friction due to these considerations is inherent in war, +and is called the deflection of strategy by politics. It is usually +regarded as a disease. It is really a vital factor in every strategical +problem. It may be taken as a general rule that no question of major +strategy can be decided apart from diplomacy, and _vice versa_. For a line +of action or an object which is expedient from the point of view of +strategy may be barred by diplomatic considerations, and _vice versa_. To +decide a question of Major Strategy, without consideration of its +diplomatic aspect, is to decide on half the factors only. Neither strategy +or diplomacy has ever a clean slate. This inter-action has to be accepted +as part of the inevitable "friction of war." A good example is Pitt's +refusal to send a fleet into the Baltic to assist Frederick the Great +during the Seven Years' War, for fear of compromising our relations with +the Scandinavian Powers. + +Minor Strategy has for its province the plans of operations. It deals +with-- + + (1) The selection of the "objectives," that is, the particular forces + of the enemy or the strategical points to be dealt with in order to + secure the object of the particular operation. + + (2) The direction of the force assigned for the operation. + +Minor Strategy may, therefore, be of three kinds:-- + + (1) Naval, where the immediate object is to be attained by a fleet + only. + + (2) Military, where the immediate object is to be attained by an army + only. + + (3) Combined, where the immediate object is to be attained by army and + navy together. + +It will be seen, therefore, that what is usually called Naval Strategy or +Fleet Strategy is only a sub-division of Strategy, and that therefore +Strategy cannot be studied from the point of view of naval operations only. +Naval Strategy, being a part of General Strategy, is subject to the same +friction as Major Strategy, though in a less degree. Individual commanders +have often to take a decision independently of the central government or +headquarters; they should, therefore, always keep in mind the possible +ulterior effects of any line of action they may take, endeavouring to be +sure that what is strategically expedient is not diplomatically +inexpedient. + +Example.--For example, take Boscawen's attack on De la Motte on the eve of +the Seven Years' War in 1755. His orders were to prevent the troops and +warlike stores which De la Motte was taking out from reaching Canada. It +was not diplomatically expedient to open hostilities; but if Boscawen +succeeded, the result would have been worth the diplomatic consequences it +would entail. He missed the expedition, but captured two isolated vessels; +thus striking the first blow in such a way as to entail the utmost amount +of harm with the least possible good. + +OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE + +_Nature of Object_ + +Upon the nature of the object depends the fundamental distinction between +_offensive_ and _defensive_, upon which all strategical calculation must be +based. Consequently, the solution of every strategical problem, whether of +Major or Minor Strategy, depends primarily on the nature of the object in +view. + +All objects, whether ulterior or not, may be positive or negative. + +A _positive_ object is where we seek to assert or acquire something for +ourselves. + +A _negative_ object is where we seek to deny the enemy something or prevent +his gaining something. + +Where the object is positive, Strategy is offensive. + +Where the object is negative, Strategy is defensive. + +This is the only certain test by which we can decide whether any particular +operation is offensive or defensive. + +Ulterior objects are not necessarily the same in their nature as the +primary or secondary objects which lead up to them; _e.g._, ulterior +objects may be offensive, while one or more of the primary objects may be +defensive, and _vice versa_. For example, in the Russo-Japanese War the +ulterior object of the war (to drive Russians from Manchuria) was offensive +(positive). The ulterior object of the fleet (to cover the invasion) was +defensive (negative). Its primary object to effect this was to attack and +destroy the Russian naval force. This was offensive (positive). + +_Relation of Offensive to Defensive_ + +The Offensive, being positive in its aim, is naturally the more effective +form of war and, as a rule, should be adopted by the stronger Power. The +Defensive, being negative in its aim, is the more lasting form of war, +since it requires less force to keep what one has than to take what is +another's, and, as a rule, is adopted by the weaker Power. In most cases +where the weaker side successfully assumes the offensive, it is due to his +doing so before the enemy's mobilization or concentration is complete, +whereby the attacking force is able to deal in succession with locally +inferior forces of the enemy. + +The advantages of the Offensive are well known. + +Its disadvantages are:-- + + That it grows weaker as it advances, by prolonging its communications, + and that it tends to operations on unfamiliar ground. + +The advantages of the Defensive are chiefly:-- + + Proximity to the base of supply and repair stations, familiar ground, + facility for arranging surprise by counter attack, and power of + organising in advance. + +The disadvantages of the Defensive are mainly moral. They become, however, +real and practical when the enemy's objective or line of operations cannot +be ascertained, for then we have to spread or attenuate our force to cover +all probable objectives, but this disadvantage can be neutralised when it +is possible to secure an interior position. + +_Functions and Characteristics of the Defensive_ + +True Defensive means waiting for a chance to strike. + +To assume the defensive does not necessarily mean that we do not feel +strong enough to attack. It may mean that we see our way by using the +defensive to force certain movements on the enemy which will enable us to +hit harder. + +A well-designed defensive will always threaten or conceal an attack. Unless +it does this it will not deflect the enemy's strategy in our favour. Thus, +in 1756, the French, by assuming the defensive in the Channel, threatened +an attack on our coasts, and concealed their attack on Minorca. + +This power inherent in the defensive is peculiarly strong in naval warfare, +since the mobility of fleets enables them to pass instantaneously from the +defensive to the offensive without any warning. When we assume the +defensive because we are too weak for the offensive, we still do not lay +aside attack. The whole strength and essence of the defensive is the +counter-stroke. Its cardinal idea is to force the enemy to attack us in a +position where he will expose himself to a counter-stroke. + +The stock instance upon which naval defensive is usually condemned is the +burning of our ships at Chatham by the Dutch. But in that case we were not +_acting on the defensive_ at all. We had laid up our battle fleet and were +doing nothing. We were purely passive, in expectation of peace. It is +really an instance of the successful use of defensive _by the Dutch_. Being +no longer strong enough for a general offensive, they assumed the +defensive, and induced us to lay up our ships and so expose ourselves to a +counter-stroke. It was a counterstroke by the worsted belligerent to get +better terms of peace. + +So far is the defensive from excluding the idea of attack, that it may +consist entirely of a series of minor offensive operations. Clausewitz +calls it "a shield of blows." It is often called _offensive-defensive,_ or +_active defence_. Neither term is really necessary. For a defensive which +excludes the idea of offence or action is not war at all-at least at sea. +The old Elizabethan term _Preventive_ most closely expresses the idea. + +The most important function of the defensive is that of covering, +buttressing, and intensifying the main attack. No plan of campaign, however +strong the offensive intention, is perfect which does not contemplate the +use of the defensive. Without some use of the defensive the cardinal +principle of concentration can rarely be fully developed. To develop the +highest possible degree of concentration upon the main object or objective, +the defensive must be assumed everywhere else. Because it is only by using +the defensive in the minor or less important theatres of operation that the +forces in those theatres can be reduced to the minimum of security, and the +maximum of concentration can thereby be obtained in the main theatre. + +In considering the defensive as a general plan of campaign the maxim is: If +not relatively strong enough to assume the offensive, assume the defensive +till you become so-- + + (1) Either by inducing the enemy to weaken himself by attacks or + otherwise; + + (2) Or by increasing your own strength, by developing new forces or + securing allies. + +It must always be remembered that, except as a preparation or a cover for +offensive action, the defensive is seldom or never of any use; for by the +continued use of the defensive alone nothing can be acquired, though the +enemy may be prevented from acquiring anything. But where we are too weak +to assume the offensive it is often necessary to assume the defensive, and +wait in expectation of time turning the scale in our favour and permitting +us to accumulate strength relatively greater than the enemy's; we then pass +to the offensive, for which our defensive has been a preparation. At sea we +have had little occasion for the defensive as a general plan. But that is +no reason for neglecting its study. In despising the defensive ourselves we +have consistently ignored the strength it gives our enemies. The bulk of +our naval history is the story of how we have been baffled and thwarted by +our enemies assuming the defensive at sea in support of their offensive on +land. We have seldom succeeded in treating this attitude with success, and +it is only by studying the defensive we can hope to do so. + +_Offensive Operations used with a Defensive Intention_ + +(A) Counter attacks. +(B) Diversions. + +_Counter attacks_ are those which are made upon an enemy who exposes +himself anywhere in the theatre of his offensive operations. It is this +form of attack which constitutes what Clausewitz calls the "surprise +advantage of defence." + +_Diversions_ are similar operations undertaken against an enemy outside the +limit of his theatre of offensive operations. + +Diversions are designed to confuse his strategy, to distract his attention, +and to draw off his forces from his main attack. If well planned, they +should divert a force greater than their own. They should, therefore, be +small. The nearer they approach the importance of a real attack the less +likely they are to divert a force greater than their own. + +Diversions involve a breach of the law of concentration, and it is only +their power of diverting or containing a larger force than their own that +justifies their use. + +This power depends mainly on suddenness and mobility, and these qualities +are most highly developed in combined expeditions. + +_Diversions_ must be carefully distinguished from _eccentric attacks. +Eccentric attacks_ are true offensive movements. They have a positive +object, _i.e._, they aim to acquire something from the enemy; whereas +diversions have a negative object, _i.e._, they aim at preventing the enemy +doing or acquiring something. Eccentric attacks are usually made in greater +force than diversions. + +Examples.--Diversion.--Our raid on Washington in 1815. Landing force, +about 4,000 men. Object, according to official instruction, "a diversion +on the coasts of United States of America in favour of the army +employed in the defence of Canada"; _i.e._, the intention was +negative--preventive--defensive. _Eccentric Attack._--Operations against +New Orleans in 1815. Intended force, 15,000 to 20,000 men. Object, "to +obtain command of the embouchure of the Mississippi, and, secondly, to +occupy some important and valuable possession, by the restoration of which +the conditions of peace might be improved, &c."; _i.e._, the intention was +positive--to acquire. Compare Rochefort Expedition (diversion) with those +against Martinique and Belleisle (eccentric attacks) in the Seven Years' +War. + +This distinction gives a threefold classification of combined expeditions, +as used by Elizabethan strategists, viz., raids, incursions, and invasions. +These correspond respectively with our modern diversions, eccentric +attacks, and true direct offensive. + +LIMITED AND UNLIMITED WARS + +From the nature of the ulterior object we get an important classification +of wars, according to whether such object is _limited_ or _unlimited_. + + (1) _War with limited object_ ("limited war") is where the object is + merely to take from the enemy some particular part of his possessions + or interests; _e.g._, Spanish-American War, where the object was the + liberation of Cuba. + + (2) _War with an unlimited object_ is where the object is to overthrow + the enemy completely, so that to save himself from destruction he must + agree to do our will (become subservient); _e.g._, Franco-German War. + +PLANS OF WAR + +_System of Operations_ + +Having determined the nature of the war by the nature of its object +(_i.e._, whether it is offensive or defensive and whether it is limited or +unlimited), Strategy has to decide on the system of operations or "plan of +the war." + +Apart from the means at our disposal a plan of war depends mainly upon-- + + (1) The theatre of the war. + (2) The various theatres of operation available within it. + +1. _Theatre of the War._--Usually defined as "All the territory upon which +the hostile parties may assail each other." This is insufficient. For an +Island Power the theatre of war will always include sea areas. Truer +definition: "Geographical areas within which must lie the operations +necessary for the attainment of the ulterior objects of the war and of the +subordinate objects that lead up to them." + +A "theatre of war" may contain several "theatres of operations." + +2. _Theatre of Operations._--Is generally used of the operations of one +belligerent only. + +An "operation" is any considerable strategical undertaking. + +A "theatre of operations" is usually defined as embracing all the territory +we seek to take possession of or to defend. + +A truer definition is: "The area, whether of sea or land or both, within +which the enemy must be overpowered before we can secure the object of the +particular operation." + +Consequently, since the nature of the war varies with the object, it may be +defensive in one theatre of operations and offensive in another. + +Where the operations are defensive in character any special movement or +movements may be offensive. + +As the plan of war determines the theatres of operation in the theatre of +war, so in each theatre of operation it determines the _lines of operation_ +and the _objectives_. + +_Objective_ + +An objective is "any point or force against which an offensive movement is +directed." Thus, where the _object_ in any theatre of operation is to get +command of a certain sea in which the enemy maintains a fleet, that fleet +will usually be the _objective_. + +"Objective" in ordinary use is frequently confused with "object." For +purposes of strategical discussion it is desirable to keep them sharply +distinguished. _Objective_ is the end of some particular movement or +operation, and is the special concern of the officer in command. _Object_ +is the end of a system of operations and is the special concern of the +general staff or director of the war. An _objective_ is some definite point +which we wish to get from the enemy or prevent his occupying, or some part +of his strength which we wish to destroy. It is incorrect to use the term +of anything we already possess. Thus, Vladivostock is often said to have +been Rojesvensky's _objective_. It was, strictly speaking, only his +_destination_. To reach it and concentrate with the units already there was +the _primary object_ of the operations entrusted to him. He had no true +_objective_ before him except Togo's fleet. + +An _objective_ is always subordinate to some _object_. It is a step to the +attainment of that object. + +_Lines of Operation_ + +A line of operation is "the area of land or sea through which we operate +from our base or starting point to reach our objectives." + +Lines of operation may be _exterior_ or _interior_. We are said to hold the +_interior_ lines when we hold such a position, in regard to a theatre of +operations, that we can reach its chief objective points, or forces, more +quickly than the enemy can move to their defence or assistance. Such a +position is called an _interior position_. "Exterior Lines" and "Exterior +Positions" are the converse of these. + +_Lines of Communication_ + +This expression is used of three different things:-- + + (1) _Lines of supply_, running from the base of operations to the point + which the operating force has reached. + + (2) _Lines of lateral communication_ by which several forces engaged in + one theatre of operations can communicate with each other and move to + each other's support. + + (3) _Lines of retreat_, which are usually lines of supply reversed, + _i.e._, leading back to the base. + +For naval purposes these three ideas are best described by the term "lines +of passage and communication," which were in use at the end of the 18th +century, and they may be regarded as those waters over which passes the +normal course of vessels proceeding from the base to the objective or the +force to be supplied. + +_Maritime Communications_ + +The various kinds of Maritime Communications for or against which a fleet +may have to operate are:-- + + (1) Its own communications, or those of its adversary (which correspond + to the communications of armies operating ashore). These have greatly + increased in importance strategically with the increased dependence of + modern fleets on a regular supply of coals, stores, ammunition, &c. + + (2) The communications of an army operating from an advanced oversea + base, that is, communication between the advanced and the main base. + + (3) Trade Routes, that is, the communications upon which depend the + national resources and the supply of the main bases, as well as the + "lateral" or connecting communications between various parts of + belligerents' possessions. + +In Land Strategy the great majority of problems are problems of +communication. Maritime Strategy has never been regarded as hinging on +communications, but probably it does so, as will appear from a +consideration of Maritime Communications, and the extent to which they are +the main preoccupation of naval operations; that is to say, all problems of +Naval Strategy can be reduced to terms of "passage and communication," and +this is probably the best method of solving them. + + * * * * * + +PART TWO + +NAVAL STRATEGY CONSIDERED AS A +QUESTION OF PASSAGE AND +COMMUNICATION + +NAVAL STRATEGY DEFINED + +By "Naval Strategy" we mean the art of conducting the major operations of +the fleet. Such operations have for their object "passage and +communication"; that is, the fleet is mainly occupied in guarding our own +communications and seizing those of the enemy. + +We say the aim of Naval Strategy is to get command of the sea. This means +something quite different from the military idea of occupying territory, +for the sea cannot be the subject of political dominion or ownership. We +cannot subsist upon it (like an army on conquered territory), nor can we +exclude neutrals from it. The value of the sea in the political system of +the world is as a means of communication between States and parts of +States. Therefore the "command of the sea" means the control of +communications in which the belligerents are adversely concerned. The +command of the sea can never be, like the conquest of territory, the +ulterior object of a war, unless it be a purely maritime war, as were +approximately our wars with the Dutch in the 17th century, but it may be a +primary or immediate object, and even the ulterior object of particular +operations. + +History shows that the actual functions of the fleet (except in purely +maritime wars) have been threefold:-- + + 1. The furtherance or hindrance of military operations ashore. + + 2. The protection or destruction of commerce. + + 3. The prevention or securing of alliances (_i.e._, deterring or + persuading neutrals as to participating in the war). + +EXAMPLES.--The operations of Rooke in the first years of the War of the +Spanish Succession, 1702-04, to secure the adhesion of Savoy and Portugal +to the Grand Alliance. Operations of Nelson to maintain the alliance of the +Kingdom of Naples. + +In the first case, there came a crisis when it was more important to +demonstrate to Savoy and Portugal what they stood to lose by joining Louis +XIV, than to act immediately against the Toulon Fleet. In the second, the +Neapolitan Alliance was essential to our operations in the Eastern +Mediterranean; the destruction of the Toulon Fleet was not. + +In this way we get a _Definition of the Aim of Naval Strategy_, expressed +in terms of the actual functions of the fleet. For practical purposes it +will be found the most useful definition as emphasising the intimate +connection of Naval Strategy with the diplomatic, financial, and military +aspects of Major Strategy. + +These functions of the fleet may be discharged in two ways:-- + + (1) By direct territorial attacks, threatened or performed + (bombardment, landings, raiding parties, &c.). + + (2) By getting command of the sea, _i.e._, establishing ourselves in + such a position that we can control the maritime communications of all + parties concerned, so that we can operate by sea against the enemy's + territory, commerce, and allies, and they cannot operate against ours. + +The power of the second method, by controlling communications, is out of +all proportion to that of the first--direct attack. Indeed, the first can +seldom be performed with any serious effect without the second. Thus, from +this point of view also, it is clear that Naval Strategy is mainly a +question of communications. + +But not entirely. Circumstances have arisen when the fleet must discharge +part of its function by direct action against territory before there is +time to get general control of the communications. (That is, political and +military considerations may deflect the normal operation of Naval +Strategy.) + +EXAMPLES.--Rooke's capture of Gibraltar in 1704, in the face of the +unshaken Toulon Fleet. Holmes's capture of Emden in 1758. + +Still, the fact remains that the key to the effective performance of the +fleet's duties is almost always to secure communications as soon as +possible by battle. + +COMMAND OF THE SEA + +Command of the sea exists only in a state of war. If we say we have command +of the sea in time of peace it is a rhetorical expression meaning that we +have adequate naval positions, and an adequate fleet to secure the command +when war breaks out. + +Command of the sea does not mean that the enemy can do absolutely nothing, +but that he cannot _seriously_ interfere with the undertakings by which we +seek to secure the object of the war and to force our will upon him. + +_Various Conditions of Command_ + +1. It may be (a) general; (b) local. + +(a) _General command_ is secured when the enemy is no longer able to act +dangerously against our line of passage and communication or to use or +defend his own, or (in other words) when he is no longer able to interfere +seriously with our trade or our military or diplomatic operations. + +This condition exists practically when the enemy is no longer able to send +squadrons to sea. + +(b) _Local command_ implies a state of things in which we are able to +prevent the enemy from interfering with our passage and communication in +one or more theatres of operation. + +2. Both general and local command may be (a) temporary; (b) permanent. + +(a) _Temporary command_ is when we are able to prevent the +enemy from interfering with our passage and communication in all +or some theatres of operation during the period required for gaining +the object in view (_i.e._, the object of a particular operation or of +a particular campaign). This condition existed after Togo's first +action. It was also that at which Napoleon aimed in his instructions +to Villeneuve in 1805. + +(b) _Permanent command_ is when time ceases to be a vital factor in the +situation, _i.e._, when the possibility of the enemy's recovering his +maritime position is too remote to be a practical consideration. This +condition existed after Tsushima. + +_Command in Dispute_ + +The state of dispute is the most important for practical strategy, since it +is the normal condition, at least in the early stages of the war, and +frequently all through it. + +The state of dispute continues till a final decision is obtained, _i.e._, +till one side is no longer able to send a squadron to sea. + +_It is to the advantage of the preponderating Navy to end the state of +dispute by seeking a decision._ Hence the French tradition to avoid +decisive actions as a rule when at war with England. + +It must be remembered that _general command of the sea is not essential to +all oversea operations_. + +In a state of dispute the preponderating Power may concentrate or be +induced to concentrate in one theatre of operations, and so secure the +local or temporary command sufficient for obtaining the special object in +view, while the weaker Power takes advantage of such local concentration to +operate safely elsewhere. + +Thus in a state of dispute, although the weaker Power may not be able to +obstruct the passage and communication of the stronger, it may be able to +defend its own. + +EXAMPLES.--This condition of dispute existed during the first three years +of the Seven Years' War, until Hawke and Boscawen obtained a decision by +defeating Conflans and De la Clue; also in the Great War up to Trafalgar. + +When the preponderating Power fails or neglects to get command (_i.e._, +leaves the general command in dispute), the disadvantage to him is not so +much the danger to his own operations as the facility given to the enemy +for carrying out counter operations elsewhere. + +METHODS OF SECURING CONTROL. + +1. _Permanent general control_ can only be secured by the practical +annihilation of the enemy's fleet by successful actions. + +2. _Local and temporary control_ may be secured by-- + + (a) An action not necessarily entirely successful (containing). + + (b) Inducing concentration on the enemy elsewhere (diversion). + + (c) Superior concentration so as to render impotent the enemy's force + available in the special theatre of operations (masking or containing). + + (d) Blockade. + +_Action of a Fleet off an Enemy's Port_ + +A belligerent fleet off an enemy's port may carry out three different +operations, for certain purposes; each quite separate from the others, and +intended to obtain an entirely different result:-- + +(1) _Close Blockade._--This is to prevent the enemy's fighting ships from +putting to sea. In this case the object is to secure local control for some +purpose that is not purely naval, such as was carried out by the Japanese +off Port Arthur in 1904, so as to enable their transports to cross the +Yellow Sea without fear of molestation from any of the Russian ships in +Port Arthur. Since the cruisers in Vladivostok were able to emerge (that +port not being blockaded), the operation was not complete, and a danger of +interference always existed. + +This method of blockade is far more difficult to carry out in the present +day, than formerly; owing to the existence of submarines and torpedo craft, +the blockading ships have to remain further away from the port; there have +to be inner lines of cruisers, scouts and destroyers; and quick +concentration takes longer owing to the greater space covered by the +blockading force, and more ships of all natures are required for the same +reason. + +Greater and more vigilance are required than in former days, because the +enemy's ships can come out regardless of weather (thick weather would be +their opportunity), and it is most important that not a single craft, from +a battleship to a torpedo boat, be allowed to escape. + +This method of blockade includes the commercial blockade, and all countries +would be informed of its having been established. + +(2) _Commercial Blockade._--To prevent floating commerce from entering or +leaving the blockaded harbour. The blockading force would not be powerful +enough to prevent a squadron of battleships or cruisers from entering or +leaving the port blockaded; and it would not be instituted outside a +fortified military port, or one containing a strong naval force. But it +would be able to stop scouts and torpedo craft from entering or emerging, +unless in very great numbers; and if unable to stop them from emerging, +would give warning of their escape and the direction in which they are +going. + +In both these forms of blockade it is usual, as a matter of courtesy, to +allow neutral armed ships belonging to foreign navies to enter and leave +for their own purposes, presumably connected with the subjects of their own +country who are in the blockaded port. This, however, is not a right, and +the country to which the blockading ships belong has a right to refuse it, +and to back her refusal by force. + +All countries must be notified of a properly instituted commercial +blockade, in accordance with International Agreement. + +(3) _Observing a Port._--This, with its subsidiary operations, should be +conducted in such a way as to induce the enemy to put to sea, the object of +observing the port being primarily a naval one, viz., to bring him to +decisive action. + +The principal observing force (consisting of battleships and cruisers) +would be either in one squadron, or more, provided that they were in +supporting reach of each other, and so placed as to be able to cut off the +enemy's fleet on emerging from the port observed before it can get +dangerously near its probable objective, and yet sufficiently far out to +ensure a battle before it can regain the shelter of its own ports. It is +also worth noting that the battle should, if possible, be fought so as to +make it difficult for the enemy's damaged ships to obtain the shelter of a +friendly neutral's harbours before being captured. + +The observed port must be watched closely, so that immediate notice of the +enemy's exit may be given; and this would be done by small cruisers, scouts +and destroyers, which should be strong and numerous enough to attack any +torpedo craft trying to get to sea. + +In order to induce the enemy's main force to put to sea it is important +that every means be used to prevent his knowing that our fleet is observing +the port, or if that be impossible, to do nothing which will lead him to +suppose that his port is being observed. + +This operation is not a blockade. + +Subsidiary operations to induce the enemy's fleet to put to sea, may take +the form of a diversion on the enemy's coast, or against some important +part of his sea-borne trade, either by the observing fleet or by a force +affiliated to it, or by any oversea movements calculated to interfere +seriously with the enemy's war plan. + +_Concentration_ + +The guiding feature of modern preparation for war is to be ready for rapid +action. It is true at sea, more even than on land, that upon the first +movements depend the initiative, the power of controlling the enemy's +strategy, and of making him conform to our movements. This readiness for +rapid action will depend on a proper distribution of the fleet so as to +meet all the requirements. + +The distribution of the fleet should be dominated by the idea of +concentration, but it must be understood clearly what concentration means. +Clausewitz says:--"The best strategy is always to be sufficiently strong, +at first generally, then at the decisive point. There is therefore no +higher or simpler law for strategy than this--keep your forces together." + +The maxim "Keep your forces together" does not, however, necessarily mean +keeping them all concentrated in one mass, but rather keeping them so +disposed that they can unite readily at will. At sea it is more difficult +than on land to foretell where the decisive point will be; but since it is +quicker and easier at sea to concentrate forces at any particular point +than on land, in applying this maxim for our purposes, the rule should be +to dispose the forces at sea so as to be able to concentrate them in time +at the decisive point so soon as this point is determined, and also so as +to conceal from the enemy what it is intended to make the decisive point. + +If the forces are rightly disposed within due limits, adequate control of +all the lines of passage and communication can be assured, and if the enemy +undertakes any operations it should be possible to ensure that sufficient +forces can be concentrated in time to defeat his object. On the other hand, +if the forces are concentrated in one mass, there can be little chance of +deceiving or confusing the enemy, while it gives him an opportunity of +successfully carrying out some operation by evasion. + +THE PECULIARITY OF MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS + +Since the whole idea of command of the sea rests on the control of +communications, it cannot be fully apprehended without a thorough +understanding of the nature of maritime communications. + +Ashore, the respective lines of communications of each belligerent tend as +a rule to run more or less approximately in opposite directions, until they +meet in the theatre of operations or the objective point. + +At sea, the reverse is frequently the case; for in maritime warfare the +great lines of communications of either belligerent often tend to run +approximately parallel if, indeed, they are not identical. + +Thus, in the case of a war with Germany, the object of which lay in the +Eastern Mediterranean, or in America, or South Africa, our respective lines +of communication would be identical. + +This was also the case in all our imperial wars with France. + +_This peculiarity is the controlling influence of maritime warfare._ Nearly +all our current maxims of Naval Strategy can be traced to the pressure it +exerts on naval thought. + +It is at the root of the fundamental difference between Military and Naval +Strategy, and affords the explanation of much strategical error and +confusion which have arisen from applying the principles of land warfare to +the sea without allowing for the antagonistic conditions of the +communications and the operations against them in each case. + +On land, the chief reason for not always striking the enemy's +communications at once is that, as a rule, we cannot do so without exposing +our own. At sea, on the contrary, when the great lines are common to both, +we cannot defend our own without striking at the enemy's. + +Therefore, at sea, the obvious opening is to get our fleet into such a +position that it controls the common lines, unless defeated or evaded. This +was usually done in our old wars with France, by our attempting to get a +fleet off Brest before the French could sail. + +Hence the maxims "That the proper place for our fleets is off the enemy's +coast," "The enemy's coast is our true frontier," and the like. + +But these maxims are not universally true; witness Togo's strategy against +Rojesvensky, when he remained correctly upon his own coast. + +Take, again, the maxim that the primary object of the fleet is to seek out +the enemy's fleet and destroy it. Here, again, Togo's practice was the +reverse of the maxim. + +The true maxim is "The primary object of the fleet is to secure +communications, and if the enemy's fleet is in a position to render them +unsafe it must be put out of action." + +The enemy's fleet usually is in this position, but not always. + +EXAMPLE.--Opening of the War of the Spanish Succession. The operations of +1702 were to secure some point (Cadiz, Gibraltar, or Ferrol) on the Spanish +trade communications, the French lateral communications, and our own lines +of passage to the Mediterranean, where was to be our chief theatre of +operation. These last two lines were identical. In 1703, the chief +operations had for their object to secure the alliance of Savoy, and +particularly of Portugal. Rooke's official instructions directed that the +French fleet was to be ignored unless it threatened the common +communications. + +RESULT.--By 1704 we had gained a naval position from which France could not +eject us, and she abandoned the struggle for sea communications. + +But nine times out of ten the maxim of seeking out the enemy's fleet, &c., +is sound and applicable-- + + (a) Because for us _general permanent command_ is usually essential + to ultimate success, and this cannot be obtained without destroying the + enemy's fleet. + + (b) Because usually the enemy's fleet opens with an attempt to + _dispute the control of the common communications_. + + (c) Because usually the functions of the fleet are so complex + (_i.e._, the calls upon it so numerous) that it will seek to strike a + blow which will solve all the difficulties; _e.g._, Sir. Palmes + Fairborne's solution of the problem in 1703. + +Also it must be remembered that nine times out of ten the most effective +way of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" (_i.e._, forcing an action on him) +is to seize a position which controls communications vital to his plan of +campaign. + +This was what happened in 1704. Rooke was unable to seek out the Toulon +Fleet, but by seizing Gibraltar he made it come to him (not intentionally, +but by the operation of strategical law). + +Practically all great naval actions have been brought about in this way, +that is, they have been the outcome of an effort to clear essential +communications from the enemy's fleet; _e.g._, Gravelines, La Hogue, +Quiberon, Trafalgar, Tsushima. + +Similarly the great actions of the old Dutch wars were brought about +because our geographical position placed us astride the Dutch trade +communications, and they were forced to seek a decision against our fleet. + +In applying the maxim of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" it should be borne +in mind that if you seek it out with a superior force you will probably +find it in a place where you cannot destroy it, except at very heavy cost. +It is far better to make it come to you, and this has often been done by +merely sitting on the common communications. + +Again, if you seek out the enemy's fleet without being certain of getting +contact, you may merely assist it in evading you, and enable it to get into +a position on your own communications, from which it may be very costly to +dislodge it. It was for this reason that the Elizabethan Government kept +the fleet in home waters in 1588. Sampson, in the Spanish-American War, was +actually permitted to make this mistake. By going to seek out Cervera +without being sure of contact, he left him a clear run into Cienfuegos or +even Havana, which it was the main function of the fleet to prevent. +Captain Mahan has since modified this maxim as follows:--"Seek out the +enemy's fleet, if you are sure of getting contact." A truer maxim would +seem to be "Seek contact with the enemy's fleet in the most certain and +favourable manner that is open to you." To seek out the enemy's fleet is +only one way of doing this, and not always the best way. It must be +remembered that other conditions being equal, it is an obvious advantage to +fight in your own waters rather than in those of the enemy, and more likely +to ensure that a defeat of the enemy will be decisive. + + RN WAR COLLEGE PORTSMOUTH + JANUARY 1909 + + * * * * * + + INDEX + + Abercromby, General Sir Ralph, 290, 296 + Absolute War, 25, 42-44 + Alexandria, 289 + Alsace-Lorraine, 51-52, 55 + Ambleteuse, 251 + Amherst, General Lord, 285 + Anglo-Japanese Treaty, 79 + Anson, Admiral Lord, 110-12, 118, 189, 290 + Antwerp, 69 + Armada, Spanish, 159-60, 172-74, 227, 243, 245, 255 + Articles of War, 176 + Austerlitz Campaign, 21, 53 + + Bacon, Sir Francis, 58 + Baltic Fleet, 81, 170, 285, 327 + Baltic trade, 263 + Barcelona, 286 + Barham, Admiral Sir Charles Middleton, 118, 142-44, 151, 162-63, 183, + 199, 207, 254, 297 + Barraille, Admiral, 249-51 + Barrington, Admiral Samuel, 146-47 + Batz, Isle de, 179, 290 + Beachy Head, 218 + Belgium, 50-52, 55 + Belleisle, Marechal de, 295, 332 + Belleisle, 312 + Berry, Captain Sir Edward, 238 + Biscay, Bay of, 139, 142, 263 + Black Sea, 285 + Blake, Colonel Robert, 176 + Blockade, method of, 102, 121, 183-86, 235, 244, 252, 256-58, 260-62, + 269, 272, 284, 341; + ethics of, 39; + tactical and strategic, 97; + insecurity of, 119; + close and open, 97, 184, 187-91, 193-94, 197-201, 205, 207-208, 240, + 250, 292, 295-97, 321, 340; + theory of, 142, 163, 169, 175, 202-204, 242, 287-88, 322 + Bluecher, Field Marshal Gebhard von, 23 + Boscawen, Admiral Edward, 189, 252, 320, 328, 339 + Boulogne, 251 + Brest, 141, 145, 147-48, 162, 179, 189, 193-97, 201-202, 208, 235-36, + 248-49, 252-53, 290, 296, 323 + Bruix, Admiral, 140 + Byng, Admiral Sir George, 163 + + Cadiz, 134-40, 143, 146, 148, 179, 186, 213, 227, 264, 323 + Caemmerer, General von, 76-77 + Calder, Admiral Sir Robert, 163, 183 + Canada, 54, 56-57, 81, 189, 210, 312, 328, 332 + Cape Clear, 272 + Caribbean Sea, 144 + Carkett, Captain Robert, 4 + Cartagena, 264 + Channel Islands, 140, 253 + Charles II of England, 179 + Charles of Austria, 21, 54, 69 + Chateaurenault, Admiral Comte de, 213-14 + Chatham, 177, 215, 227 + Cherbourg, 253 + Christian, Admiral Sir Hugh, 296 + Cienfuegos, 169, 344 + Clausewitz, General Karl von, 79-80, 85, 330-31; + theory, 25, 27-29, 41-46, 51-56, 60-61, 73-74, 76-77, 311, 341; + his service, 23-24; + _On War_, 24, 44; + his war plans, 44 + Colpoys, Admiral Sir John, 196 + Command at sea, theory of, 91-106, 165-66 + Commerce prevention, 95 + Communications, maritime, 94, 165, 315-16, 335; + common theory of, 100-102, 118 + Conflans, Admiral Comte de, 192, 252-53, 320, 339 + Copenhagen, 68 + Cornwallis, Admiral Sir William, 143, 162, 181, 183, 197-200 + Coruna, 173 + Cotton, Admiral Sir Charles, 181 + Covering squadron, 283, 286-88, 291 + Craig's expedition, 67 + Crimea, 57, 62, 81, 258, 285-87, 300 + Cromwell, 20, 22, 157, 163, 176 + Cuba, 57, 103, 168, 313, 332 + _Curieux_, 182 + + Dalny, 229 + Dardanelles, 68, 139 + Davout, Louis-Nicolas, 23 + Deane, Colonel Richard, 176 + Declaration of Paris, 96, 267 + Dettingen, 246 + Dogger Bank, 158 + Downs, the, 139-40, 146, 176, 198, 214, 249-50, 253, 263 + Drake, Sir Francis, 39, 159-60, 171, 173-74, 227, 244, 291, 301 + Dumouriez, General, 254, 257 + Dundas, Admiral Sir James, 286, 291 + Dungeness, 176, 199 + Dunkirk, 225, 237, 244, 246-50, 252-53 + Duquesne, Admiral Abraham, 121 + + Egypt, 237-38, 240 + Elliot Islands, 37 + + Ferrol, 139, 141, 266, 323 + Finisterre, Cape, 101, 106, 139-40, 253, 256, 272 + Flanders, 171, 246 + Frederick the Great, 21-22, 36, 46, 54-55, 63-64, 66-67, 80, 157, 327 + + Gallipoli, 285 + Ganteaume, Admiral Comte, 191, 197-98, 202, 236 + Gardner, Admiral Lord, 197-98 + Gibraltar, 34, 105, 139, 141, 145-46, 213, 264, 272, 318, 323, 337, 344 + Gneisenau, Field Marshal August von, 23 + Goltz, General von der, 75, 97 + Guichen, Admiral Comte de, 146, 223 + + Hanover, 64, 246 + Hardy, Admiral Sir Charles, 253-57 + Havana, 57, 169 + Havre, 252-53, 263 + Hawke, Admiral Sir Edward, 104, 189-90, 192, 196, 235, 252-53, 320, 339 + Henry VIII, 108-110 + Holland, 65, 195 + Howe, Admiral Earl, 144, 147-50, 190-191, 194, 204, 206-207 + Howard of Effingham, Admiral Lord, 171, 173-74, 244 + + Iberian Peninsula, 56, 61-62, 64, 69-71, 105 + India, 101 + Ireland, 194, 196, 213, 215, 225-26, 240, 253, 255, 257, 263, 282 + + Jamaica, 142, 144, 149, 182, 207 + Jervis, Sir John, 223, 296 + Jomini, General Baron de, 28-30, 42, 45-47, 51-52, 56, 60, 74, 85 + + Kamimura, Admiral, 170 + Keith, Admiral Lord, 236, 289 + Kempenfelt, Admiral Richard, 137, 146-48, 150, 192-94, 196, 206, 220, + 222-24, 227, 254, 257, 260 + Killigrew, Admiral Henry, 213-15, 219, 224 + Korea, 34, 57, 79-80, 82-85 + Kraft zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, Prince, 75 + Kuantung Peninsula, 290 + + Lagos, 252 + La Hogue, 180, 324, 344 + Langara, Admiral Don Juan, 148-49 + Leghorn, 264 + Leith, 263 + Liaotung Peninsula, 37, 73, 287, 292 + Liao-yang, 82, 85 + Light squadrons, 125 + Ligonier, General Lord, 70 + Limited War, 41, 46, 51-59, 72-87, 313 + Lisbon, 68, 173 + Lissa, 36, 179, 293 + Lizard, the, 150, 256 + Louisburg, 285, 287 + Lyons, Admiral Sir Edmund, 285-86 + + Mack, General, 21 + Mahan, Admiral, 131n, 169, 344 + Maitland, General, 295 + Malta, 139, 264 + Manchuria, 79, 82, 258, 290, 313, 318, 329 + Maria Theresa, 246 + Marlborough, John, Duke of, 64 + Maxims: "Conquest of water territory," 93; + "Enemy's coast our frontier," 93; + "Eyes of the fleet," 112, 117, 120-21; + "Fleet in being," 224, 231; + "The sea is all one," 103; + "Seeking out the enemy's fleet," 102, 156, 161, 164, 167-68, + 170-71, 174, 180, 203, 324, 344-45 + Medina-Sidonia, Duke of, 244, 249 + Mediterranean, 95, 101, 108, 113-14, 119, 125, 139-40, 143, 179, 182, + 198, 207, 218, 223, 247, 252, 264, 285, 322, 337 + Medway, 38, 217 + Melville, Lord, 199-200 + Middleton. _See_ Barham + Minorca, 34, 145, 330 + Moltke, General von, 27, 51, 55, 73-74 + Monk, George, Duke of Albemarle, 135-37, 157, 176-77 + Montecuculi, Prince, 24 + Montcalm, General Marquis de, 302 + Morbihan, 235, 252-53 + Mukden, 83 + + Napoleon, 43-44, 54, 68, 77, 79, 85, 98, 251, 257-58, 338; + methods, 19-23, 25, 27-28, 46-48, 65, 141, 144, 157, 183, 210, 237-38, + 240-41; + views on naval warfare, 56, 143, 179, 181, 191, 236; + his Russian campaign, 47, 52; + on "pygmy combinations," 67; + his conversion, 68-70 + Narrow seas, 127, 202 + Nelson, Admiral Lord, 119, 125-26, 226, 317, 322, 336; + his influence, 161-63, 217; + his use of cruisers, 113-15, 117; + on defensive fleet operations, 223-24, 227; + on blockade, 184, 186, 198-99, 208; + his strategy, 136, 139, 141-42, 199, 238, 281 + New Model Army, 157, 176 + Ney, Marshal Michael, 29 + Nile, 180 + Norris, Admiral Sir John, 237-38, 246, 249, 253, 281 + North Sea, 69, 127, 139, 145, 150, 179, 195-96, 199, 207, 225, 263 + Nottingham, Daniel Finch, Earl of, 216-17 + + Observation squadrons, 125 + Offence, theory of, 31-36, 39-40 + Orde, Admiral Sir John, 223 + Orvilliers, Admiral Comte de, 256 + + Palermo, 121 + Paris, Declaration of, 96, 267 + Parma, Prince Alexander Farnese, Duke of, 171-73, 241, 243-44 + Pe-chi-li, Gulf of, 73, 302 + Persano, Admiral, 293-94 + Philip II, 239 + Pitt, William, Earl of Chatham, 63-64, 84, 300, 327 + Plymouth, 171, 173, 190, 214, 220, 248, 256 + Pola, 293-94 + Port Arthur, 80, 82-85, 170, 202, 204-205, 227-31, 290-92, 322, 340 + Portsmouth, 195, 214, 224, 248-49, 253 + Portugal, 65, 80, 195, 317, 323, 336 + Privateering, 266-68 + Prussia, 23, 49-50, 64 + Puerto Rico, 168 + + Quebec, 285, 289, 301-302 + Quiberon, 105, 180, 192, 253, 324 + + Raglan, General Lord, 301 + "Real War," 25 + Revolution, French, 19, 65 + Rochefort, 139, 141, 182, 235, 250, 300, 312, 332 + Rodney, Admiral Sir George B., 5, 144, 194 + Roquefeuille, Admiral Marquis de, 247-51 + Ross, Admiral John, 147, 149 + Rupert, Prince, 135-36, 157 + Russell, Admiral Edward, 225 + Ruyter, Admiral de, 135-37 + + St. Helena, 277 + St. James's fight, 177-78 + St. Vincent, Admiral Sir John, 179, 194, 196, 272, 288, 290, 296 + St. Vincent, Cape, 139, 182 + San Domingo, 291, 301 + Santa Cruz, Marquess of, 239 + Santiago, 169, 322 + Sampson, Admiral, 168, 322, 344 + Sandwich, Admiral, the Earl of, 121 + Sardinia, 139, 207 + Saunders, Admiral Sir Charles, 289, 301 + Saxe, Marshal, 247-50 + Saxony, 54-55, 80 + Scilly, 39, 149-50, 255 + Sebastopol, 80, 285, 291 + Seoul, 82, 85, 290, 303 + Sharnhorst, General Gerhard von, 23 + Shovel, Admiral Sir Cloudesley, 213-14, 224, 286 + Sicily, 65, 207 + Silesia, 46, 55 + Skelligs, the, 150 + Smyrna convoy, 225 + Sole Bay, 38 + Spanish Armada, 159-60, 172-74, 227, 243, 245, 255 + Spithead, 135, 146, 192, 248 + Stakelberg, General, 302-303 + Strachan, Admiral Sir Richard, 125-26 + Strategy, naval and maritime, 15; + major and minor, 308-309, 327-28 + + Tegetthoff, Admiral, 36, 293-94 + Texel, the, 139, 146-47, 150, 197 + Thames, the, 135-38, 214, 217, 247-48, 268 + Theory of war, 15-30, 107-52 + Tilbury, 247 + Togo, Admiral, 84, 170, 202, 207, 290, 292, 303, 319, 322-24, 338 + Torbay, 189-90, 192-93, 207 + Torres Vedras, 36, 83 + Torrington, Admiral Lord, 214-18, 220, 224, 226 + Toulon, 69, 135, 139, 184, 198, 207-208, 213-14, 264, 266, 286, 296, + 317-18, 322, 324, 337, 344 + Tourville, Admiral Comte de, 213-14, 217, 219-20, 224-26 + Trafalgar, 68, 118, 199, 266, 320, 324, 339 + Trieste, 139 + Tromp, Admiral Martin H., 175-76 + Tsushima, 83, 319, 324, 338 + + Unlimited War, 40-51, 60-71 + Ushant, 142-43, 147, 181-82, 192, 223-25, 258, 272 + Utrecht, 246 + Villeneuve, Admiral, 140, 142-43, 179, 182-83, 186, 197, 206, 223, 266, + 338 + Vladivostock, 340 + + Walcheren, 68-69 + Warren, Commodore Sir John B., 235 + Wars: + Anglo-American (1812), 119, 276; + Anglo-Dutch, 109; + Anglo-Spanish (1588), 109; + American Independence, 92, 118, 190, 193, 210, 221, 226; + Austro-Italian (1866), 36, 179, 293; + Crimean, 258, 285-88; + Franco-German (1870), 71, 79, 333; + Franco-Russian (1812), 47, 49, 51-52; + Russo-Japanese, 34, 38, 44, 51, 78-79, 84, 168, 170, 205, 303, 328-29; + Seven Years', 51, 54, 57, 63, 66, 111, 179, 189-90, 197-98, 209, 312, + 320, 327-28, 332, 339; + Spanish-American, 57, 168-69, 313, 332, 344; + Spanish Succession, 34, 317, 323, 336 + Wellington, Duke of, 36, 56, 61, 65, 83, 105 + West Indies, 95, 140, 142-43, 182, 189-90, 197, 210, 222-23, 225, 247, + 252, 255, 266-67, 285, 296 + Western Squadron, 42, 181, 193, 252, 263, 266 + Wight, Isle of, 136, 214, 249, 253, 257 + Wolfe, General, 70, 200, 285, 301-302 + + Yalu, 85 + Yarmouth, 263 + Yellow Sea, 340 + + + +***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SOME PRINCIPLES OF MARITIME +STRATEGY*** + + +******* This file should be named 15076.txt or 15076.zip ******* + + +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: +https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/1/5/0/7/15076 + + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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