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| author | Roger Frank <rfrank@pglaf.org> | 2025-10-15 04:44:33 -0700 |
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| committer | Roger Frank <rfrank@pglaf.org> | 2025-10-15 04:44:33 -0700 |
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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/14459-0.txt b/14459-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5c002f8 --- /dev/null +++ b/14459-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,5496 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 14459 *** + +PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION APPLIED TO PARTY GOVERNMENT + +A NEW ELECTORAL SYSTEM + +BY + +T.R. ASHWORTH (_President of the Victorian Division, Australian Free +Trade and Liberal Association_) + +AND + +H.P.C. ASHWORTH (_Civil Engineer_) + + + +LONDON + +SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO., LIM. + +PATERNOSTER SQUARE + +1901 + + + + +CONTENTS. + + +CHAPTER PAGE + +I.--THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 1 + +II.--THE SO-CALLED REPRESENTATIVE PRINCIPLE 22 + +III.--THE PRESENT POSITION or PARTY GOVERNMENT 47 + +IV.--THE REFORM: TRUE PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION 97 + +V.--HOW THE EVILS OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM WILL + BE REMEDIED 122 + +VI.--THE HARE SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL DELEGATION 141 + +VII.--THE FREE LIST SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL + DELEGATION 162 + +VIII.--PREFERENTIAL VOTING, THE BLOCK VOTE, + THE LIMITED VOTE, &C. 172 + +IX.--ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE THE PRESENT SYSTEM 188 + +X.--APPLICATION OF THE REFORM TO AUSTRALIAN + LEGISLATURES 194 + +XI.--THE CONDITIONS OF SOCIAL PROGRESS 208 + + + + + "Majority and minority, in and for themselves, are the first + requisite of popular government, and not the development or + representation of separate groups."--Bradford's "Lesson of Popular + Government," vol. ii., page 179. + + + + +PREFACE. + + +The subject of electoral reform has been brought into prominence in +Australia by a clause in the Commonwealth Bill which provides that the +Federal Senate shall consist of six senators from each State, directly +chosen by the people, voting as one electorate. The problem thus +presented has been keenly discussed. On the one hand we have the +advocates of the Block Vote asserting that the party in a majority is +entitled to return all six senators; and on the other, a small band of +ardent reformers pressing the claims of the Hare system, which would +allow the people in each State to group themselves into six sections, +each returning one senator. The claim that every section of the people +is entitled to representation appears at first sight so just that it +seems intolerable that a method should have been used all these years +which excludes the minority in each electorate from any share of +representation; and, of course, the injustice becomes more evident when +the electorate returns several members. But in view of the adage that +it is the excellence of old institutions which preserves them, it is +surely a rash conclusion that the present method of election has no +compensating merit. We believe there is such a merit--namely, that _the +present method of election has developed the party system_. Once this +truth is grasped, it is quite evident that the Hare system would be +absolutely destructive to party government, since each electorate would +be contested, not by two organized parties, but by several groups. For +it is precisely this splitting into groups which is causing such anxiety +among thoughtful observers as to the future of representative +institutions; Mr. Lecky has attributed to it, in his "Democracy and +Liberty," the decline in the parliamentary system which has accompanied +the progress of democracy all over the world. The object of this book is +to suggest a reform, which possesses the advantages of both methods and +the disadvantages of neither; which will still ensure that each +electorate is contested by the two main parties, but will allow its just +share of representation to each; and which will, by discouraging the +formation of minor groups, provide a remedy for the evil instead of +aggravating it. + + T.R.A. + H.P.C.A. + +325 COLLINS STREET, MELBOURNE. + + + + +PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION + +APPLIED TO + +PARTY GOVERNMENT. + + + + +CHAPTER I. + +THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION. + + +Old establishments, like the British Constitution, said Edmund Burke, +"are not often constructed after any theory; theories are rather drawn +from them." In setting out on an endeavour to understand the principles +underlying political representation, the saying expresses exactly the +course which should be followed. The inquiry is the more necessary as, +although representation more than anything else in the domain of +government distinguishes the modern from the ancient world, the ideas +which prevail as to the part it has played, is playing, and is destined +to play on the world's stage are not merely hazy, but extremely +inaccurate. The intimate connection of representation with the progress +which has followed its introduction is so little recognized that the +most advanced democracies are now willing to listen to any proposal to +return to direct government. In spite of the fact that the nineteenth +century has witnessed the triumph of the historical method in most +fields of social inquiry, the dangers of _a priori_ speculation on +political institutions are as much in evidence as when Burke wrote. + +If we would understand, then, the meaning of representative +institutions, it is in the gradual development of the "mother of +parliaments" that we must seek for the most reliable information. We +must be careful, however, to leave out of sight those features of the +growth of the British Constitution which are merely the expression of +transitory social conditions, and to confine our attention to the +landmarks which bear directly on the inquiry. The subject is best +divided into two stages; the first characterized by the origin of +representation; and the second by the division into parties, and the +creation of cabinet government. + ++The First Stage of Representation.+--Rightly to understand the +conditions which led to the introduction and development of the +representative principle, we must look back to the period immediately +following the signing of the Great Charter by the tyrant King John. + +The Charter reaffirmed the ancient principle that free Englishmen should +not be taxed without their consent, and representation was the natural +outcome of that provision. A brief glance at the social conditions of +the time is necessary to understand why this was so. First, it must be +remembered that the true political unit of ancient times was the city +or local community. England at that time was a collection of local +communities, having more or less a corporate life. Then, again, there +were the three estates of the realm--the clergy, the lords, and the +commons--who were accustomed to confer with the King on public affairs. +The stage which marks the birth of representation was when these +different estates and communities were asked to tax themselves to +relieve the necessities of the King. It was obviously impossible that +the consent of every freeman should be obtained, hence the duty had to +be deputed to agents. Now, the idea of agency was not unknown in the +ancient world, but that agents should have power to bind those for whom +they acted was something entirely new. It was necessary, however, that +they should have this power, and it suited the King's convenience that +they should exercise it. Already, in the earliest writ of which we have +knowledge, summoning each shire to send two good and discreet knights, +it was provided that they should be chosen in the stead of each and all. +This happened in 1254, and in the following year the clergy were also +summoned for the same purpose of granting aid to the King. In the +meantime the merchants and trade guilds in the cities were growing rich. +The King cast longing eyes on their possessions, and wished to tax them. +So we find that in 1264 Simon de Montfort, Earl of Leicester, issued the +celebrated writ summoning each of the cities and boroughs to send two +of its more discreet and worthy citizens and burgesses. This is +sometimes regarded as the beginning of the House of Commons, but it was +really not until the fourteenth century that these several assemblies, +each of which up till then taxed itself separately and legislated in its +own sphere, coalesced into the present Houses. First the lower clergy +fell out, and, with the knights, citizens, and burgesses, were merged +into the House of Commons; and the higher prelates with the earls and +barons formed the House of Lords. + +This, then, is the first stage of representation. What was the nature of +this new force which had come into the world and was destined to so +profoundly affect the whole course of human affairs? One result of +immense importance is apparent at a glance. It solved a problem which +had baffled the ancients--that of the nationalization of local +communities on a free basis. But it is generally assumed that the only +difficulty overcome was that of size; that the representative assembly +is a mere substitute for the larger assembly of the whole nation. +Starting with this assumption, it is claimed that the representative +assembly should be a mirror of the people on a small scale, and the more +faithfully it reflects their faults as well as their virtues, their +ignorance as well as their intelligence, the more truly representative +it is said to be. It is even asserted that with the modern facilities +for taking a poll, representative government might be dispensed with +and the people allowed to govern themselves. Democracy, we are assured, +means that every man should exercise an equality of political power. +Now, if this conception is correct, we should at once insist that every +law should be submitted to a direct referendum of the people; that +legislators should be mere agents for drawing up laws; and that the +executive should be directly responsible to and elected by the people. +But if representation is not a mere substitute for the direct action of +the people this idea as to the true line of democratic progress falls to +the ground. The whole question, therefore, hinges on what representation +is and what are the principles underlying it. + +Looking back to the history of its introduction, we have seen that it +was only in proportion as the deputies of the local communities were not +regarded as delegates or agents that they became representatives. +Professor E. Jenks has written an interesting article in the +_Contemporary Review_ for December, 1898, in which he advances the +theory that representation is a union of the ideas of agency, borrowed +from the Roman law, and of vicarious liability from barbaric sources. As +to the latter he points out that in Anglo-Saxon times the only way for +the King to control the free local communities was to exact hostages +till crimes were punished or fines paid. In England, where these ideas +were combined, constitutional monarchy was firmly established; but in +France, Germany, &c, in whose medieval parliaments the idea of agency +prevailed, and where in consequence the parliamentary idea was weak, +absolute monarchy held its ground. When Edward I. desired for purposes +of his own to emphasize the unlimited liability of political +representatives, and insisted that they should have "full and sufficient +power to do what of common council shall be ordained," he probably never +realized that a body having power to bind the shires and towns was a +formidable institution, or that the trembling hostages would become in +time haughty plenipotentiaries. But whatever may have been the social +conditions which gave rise to the idea, it is certain that it was the +power of binding those to whom they owed their selection which enabled +the representatives to resist the encroachments of the monarchy on the +liberties of the people. At first they were not legislators, but merely +sought to uphold the ancient laws. They presented petitions to redress +their grievances; but in time these petitions became demands; and they +refused to grant the King's subsidies till the demands were complied +with. It was, therefore, this first stage of representation which +enabled the people to start that long struggle against the power of the +King and nobles which has ended in complete self-government; nay, more, +it was necessary that they should pass through this first stage before +they could learn to govern themselves. Yet we have seen that if we apply +the modern ideas on representation the start could never have been +made. In what respects, then, did these early representative +institutions differ from the modern conception as a reproduction of the +people on a small scale? One obvious difference at once suggests itself. +The representatives were not average members of the communities; they +were the most influential; they were selected because of their special +fitness for the work to be done; they were leaders of the people, not +followers; they did not take inspiration from the people, but brought it +to them; and having selected these men the people deferred to their +judgment to act for them and protect their interests. Here, then, we +arrive at the first principle involved in representation, which is +leadership. + +But there is another and still more important difference between a +representative assembly and a primary assembly of the people. It is +this: that a representative cannot be a violent partisan of a small +section of his constituents; he must be in general favour with all +sections. Therefore a representative assembly is composed of moderate +men, representing a compromise of the views of their individual +supporters. Moreover, the representatives appeal to the people to sink +their minor differences for the general welfare. This feature is very +prominent in the early parliaments. The local communities were arrayed +as a united people against the aggression of the monarchy. The principle +which is here apparent is that of organization. In the first stage of +English parliamentary history we may say at once that these two +principles--organization and leadership--were most conspicuous. The +people, sinking all minor differences, formed one united party; and +recognised that their struggle against the party of prerogative depended +on the ability, influence, and integrity of their deputies. + ++The Second Stage of Representation.+--There is no need to enter into +that long struggle between the nation and the monarchy which followed. +We pass on, then, to the time when the parliaments, having wrested a +share of power, began to split up into parties. It was natural that when +power became divided two parties should arise; one upholding the +authority of the Parliament against the King; and the other favouring +the divine right of Kings. The Puritans and Cavaliers in the troublous +times of Charles I. were the earliest signs of this tendency. The Long +Parliament, which met in 1640, was divided on these lines; the +misdemeanors of the King brought on civil war; the parliamentary troops +defeated the royal troops after a bloody struggle; and the King was +brought to execution. The succeeding events were full of instruction. +The Parliament attempted to govern the nation--or, rather, we should say +the House of Commons did, for the House of Lords was abolished. But it +proved quite unfit for the purpose. It was thoroughly disorganized, and +rent by violent factions. The anarchy which ensued was ended by a +military despot, Oliver Cromwell, who entered the House of Commons in +1653 with his soldiers. The Speaker was pulled from his chair; the +members were driven from the House; and Cromwell was proclaimed +dictator. It is strange, indeed, that the lesson which is to be drawn +from this event, and which has been repeated in France time after time +since the Revolution, has not yet been learned: the only escape from +continued political anarchy is despotism. But the weakness of despotism +is that it ends with the life of the despot. Cromwell's son was forced +to abdicate, and the monarchy was restored. The same division of parties +in the Parliament continued, and they began to take the names of Whigs +and Tories. Towards the end of the seventeenth century, the dissensions +of these two factions again threatened to make government impossible. In +administration the evil was felt most; the union of ministers of both +parties was proving unworkable. So fickle did legislation become that no +one could say one day what the House would do the next. It was at this +crisis, and about the year 1693, that William III., who cared more for a +strong administration than for political differences, created what is +known as cabinet government, and, as Professor Gardiner says, "refounded +the government of England on a new basis." Recognizing that power should +not be separated from responsibility, he affirmed the principle that the +ministers of state should be selected from the party which had a +majority in the House of Commons. But the time was not yet ripe for the +complete application of this principle. Early in the eighteenth century +Sir Robert Walpole set the example of resigning when he no longer +possessed the confidence of a majority of the House of Commons; but in +the latter half of the century the great Earl of Chatham introduced +again the practice of selecting ministers irrespective of party. Despite +the fact that he was supported by the personal influence of George III., +the attempt failed. A succession of weak ministries followed; and out of +the confusion the modern division of Liberals and Conservatives emerged. +Thus it was not until the beginning of the present century that the +doctrines of the solidarity of the Cabinet and its complete dependence +on a majority of the House of Commons were thoroughly developed in their +present form. England, now grown into the United Kingdom, had at last, +after six centuries of strife, won her national independence, and for +one brief century has enjoyed a full measure of self-government. + ++Comparison of the Two Stages.+--How do the conditions presented by the +nineteenth century differ from those of the fourteenth? And how is the +problem of representation affected? We have seen that the great forces +which animated the nation in the fourteenth century were organization +and leadership. Have these forces ceased to operate? Assuredly not. In +the fourteenth century we had a united people organized under its chosen +leaders against the encroachments of the King and nobility on its +national liberty. In the nineteenth century the people have won their +political independence, but the struggle is now carried on between two +great organized parties. The principle of leadership is still as strong +as ever. The careers of Pitt, Peel, Palmerston, Beaconsfield, and +Gladstone attest that fact. The one great difference, then, between the +fourteenth and the nineteenth centuries is that instead of one party +there are two. The problem of representation in the fourteenth century +was to keep the people together in one united party, and to allow them +to select their most popular leaders. Surely the problem is different in +the nineteenth century. The requirements now are to organize the people +into two great parties, and to allow each party separately to elect its +most popular leaders. And yet we are still using the same method of +election as our forefathers used six centuries ago. Although the +conditions have entirely changed, we have not adapted the electoral +machinery to the change. The system of single-membered electorates was +rational in the fourteenth century, because there was only one party. Is +it not on the face of it absurd to-day, when there are two parties? + ++The Meaning of Party Government.+--Why should there be two parties +instead of one in order that the people should be able to govern +themselves? To answer this question we must start at the beginning, and +consider what is the problem of popular government. The best definition +is that it is to promote the general welfare--to reconcile or average +the real interests of all sections of the community. Now, if the people +could all agree what is best in the interests of all, unity of action +might certainly be obtained; but even then the problem would not be +solved, for the people are not infallible. The greater part of the +problem consists in finding out what is best in the interests of all, +and no amount of mere abstract speculation can solve this part. So +diverse and so complex are the interests to be reconciled, so interwoven +and interdependent one with another, that the problem of securing a just +balance is incapable of solution by anything short of omniscience. But +in any case the people cannot be always got to agree to one course of +action. Therefore the people cannot govern themselves as one united +party. The only workable basis is, then, the rule of the majority, and +the problem of popular government is how to ensure that the majority +shall rule in the interests of all. + +Party government provides the best known means of solving this problem. +The only way of finding out what is best for the whole people is by the +incessant action and interaction of two great organized parties under +their chosen leaders; each putting forth its energies to prove its +fitness to hold the reins of government; each anxious to expose the +defects of the other. This healthy emulation as to what is best for all, +with the people to judge, is the real secret of free government. The +two parties are virtually struggling as to which shall be king. Each is +striving to gain the support of a majority of the people; and the +grounds on which it appeals for support are that the measures it +proposes are the best for the country, and that the men it puts forward +are the best men for passing those measures into law and carrying on the +administration of the country. This constant agitation, and this mutual +competition to devise new measures, and to bring forward new men, +prevent stagnation. Both sides of every leading public question of the +day are presented in the rival party policies, and the people are +invited to decide between them. The forces on which the parties rely to +move the people are enthusiasm for measures and enthusiasm for +men--party and personality, or, in other words, organization and +leadership. It is in opposing these forces to counteract the selfish and +anti-social passions that party government acquires its virtue. By +appealing to their higher nature it induces the people to subordinate +their class prejudices to the general welfare, and by setting before +them definite moral ideals, and appealing to them by the force of +personality, it raises the character of public opinion, and moulds +individual and national character to an extent that is seldom +appreciated. Here, then, is the key of human progress. Direct +democracies may hold together so long as there are external enemies to +induce the people to sink their differences in the common interest, or +so long as there is a slave caste to do the menial work, as in the +ancient democracies; but representative democracy offers the only hope +of welding together a free people into a united whole. The unrestrained +rule of the majority under direct democracy must degenerate into the +tyranny of the majority. Instead of the equality of political power +which it promises, the minority is deprived of all power. Representative +democracy, on the other hand, deprives the people of the personal +exercise of political power, in order to save them from the free play of +their self-assertive passions, but still leaves to every man an equality +of influence in deciding the direction of progress. Thus every man is +induced to express his opinion as to the direction of progress; and the +party policy is the resultant direction of progress of all the party +electors, and therefore represents their organized opinion. Now, bear in +mind that the true direction of progress is not known, and can only be +found out by constant experiment directed by the most far-seeing and +capable minds. It is the means of carrying on this experiment which +party government provides. The party representing the organized opinion +of the majority has, rightly, complete control of the direction of +progress so long as it remains in a majority. But, although deliberation +is the work of many, execution is the work of one. Hence the creation of +a small committee of the party in power--the cabinet--associated with +the leader of the party, who becomes for the time being the Prime +Minister, the cabinet ministers being jointly responsible for the +control of administration and the initiation of measures for the public +good. But an organized minority is quite as essential to progress as an +organized majority--not merely to oppose, but to criticise and expose +the errors of the party in power, and to supplant it when it ceases to +possess the confidence of the country. Hence progress under party +government may be compared to a zigzag line, in which the changes in +direction correspond to changes in ministry. By this mutual action and +alternation of parties every vote cast has, in the long run, an equal +influence in guiding progress. The only justification for majority rule +sanctioned by free government is that when two parties differ as to what +is best for the whole people the majority shall prevail, and party +government tends to realize this condition. But direct government by the +people offers no check whatever on the power of the majority, which is +as absolute as that of the Czar of Russia. As Calhoun, the American +statesman, writes in his "Disquisition on Government," "the principle by +which constitutional governments are upheld, is _compromise_, that of +absolute governments is _force_!" Now, the significance of party +government as a guarantee of free government lies in this: that party +policies represent a compromise of what every section composing each +party supposes to be the interests of the whole people; and the parties +are engaged in fighting out a compromise of the real interests of every +section of the people. + +Lest it be thought that in this panegyric on party government we have +been indulging in a wild flight into the region of speculative politics, +we hasten to add that the ideal condition we have pictured has never +been reached. The British Parliament has perhaps most nearly approached +it, but already shows signs of retrogression. America and the Australian +colonies are drifting further away from it. Already political +philosophers are shaking their heads and predicting the failure of +popular government. The cry everywhere is for a stronger executive. +Party organization is breaking down; small factions actuated by +self-interest hold the balance of power between the main parties, and +render government unstable and capricious. The main parties themselves +tend to degenerate into factions. Personality is declining--the demand +is for followers, not leaders. Compromise is supplanted by log-rolling +and lobbying. And, to crown all, the rumbling of class strife grows +ominously louder. The danger is that these tendencies may be allowed to +go too far before reform is attempted--that the confidence between +classes may be destroyed. + ++Organization and Leadership.+--We have shown that the two great +principles underlying representation are organization and leadership. +Now, after all, there is nothing very profound in this conclusion. Is +there a single department of concerted human action in which these same +principles are not apparent? What would be thought of an army without +discipline and without generals; or of a musical production in which +every performer played his own tune? Even in the region of sport, can a +cricket or a football team dispense with its captain and its places? And +yet many people imagine that a disorganized collection of delegates of +various sections can rule a nation? Such an assembly would be as much a +mob as any primary assembly of the people, and would in no sense be a +representative assembly. The fact is that the growing intensity of the +evils which beset representative institutions throughout the civilized +world to-day is due to imperfect expression of these two principles. +Representative assemblies are not properly organized into two coherent +parties, nor is each party allowed free play to select its most popular +leaders. What is the remedy? + ++A Change in Electoral Machinery the Key to Reform.+--The great mistake +made by all writers on electoral reform is that they have failed to +recognize that the character of public opinion depends upon the way it +is expressed. If the electoral machinery be adapted to give effect to +those principles of organization and leadership which lie at the root of +representation, then the character of public opinion will be improved. +Representation, in fact, is not only a means of expressing public +opinion, but also of guiding, informing, educating, and organizing it. +Therefore, the method of election is an all-important factor. + +The first and greatest necessity is to counteract the tendency of the +people to split up into factions. It may seem a startling conclusion +that this is a mere matter of electoral machinery, but it is +nevertheless quite true. It must be remembered that we are dealing with +human beings and not with insentient figures. If the method of election +allows representation to two sections only, the people will group +themselves into two sections. But if it allows representation to a large +number of sections, then the people will group themselves into as many +sections as are allowed. Now, party government offers every hope of +preventing two sections degenerating into factions, but with a number of +sections there is absolutely none. + +Here, then, we see the one great merit of the present system of +election, which explains why it has persisted so long, with all its +faults. It is that it tends to confine representation to the two main +parties, since each electorate is generally contested by them; but in so +far as it does not completely effect that object and allows +representation to independent factions it is defective. Moreover, the +merit we have indicated is purchased at too high a price. It is these +defects which are causing the degradation of representative institutions +throughout the world to-day. + +It is obviously impossible to give a just share of representation to two +parties and allow each party to elect its most popular leaders, in an +electorate which returns only a single representative. Hence the first +necessity for reform is to enlarge electorates, so that each may return +several representatives. Now, the requirements for giving effect to the +principles of organization and leadership in such an electorate are:-- + + 1. Proportional representation to the two main parties--Ministerial + and Opposition, the majority and the minority. + + 2. The election by each party of its most popular + candidates--_i.e._, those most in general favour with all sections + of the party. + +This is the problem of representation as it presents itself to us. +Leaving a detailed account of the means by which it is proposed to give +effect to these great desiderata to a later chapter, let us indicate +briefly where they strike at the root of the evils of the present +system. + ++Enlarged Electorates.+--With enlarged electorates the minority will not +be excluded. Each party will secure its just share of representation. +When both parties are represented in each electorate the interests of +the electorate will not be bargained for as the price of support. +Members will cease to be mere local delegates. + ++Proportional Representation to the Two Main Parties.+--Representation +must be absolutely confined to the two main parties, and each party must +be allowed its just share. Every candidate should be required to +nominate either as a Ministerialist or Oppositionist, and each party +should be allotted a number of representatives proportional to the total +amount of support received. If democracy means that every man's opinion, +as expressed by his vote, is to have the same weight, it follows that +the parties should be represented in the Legislature in the same +proportion as among the people, otherwise it is ridiculous to talk of +the rule of the majority. The present system sometimes results in +minority rule and sometimes in minority extermination; it is difficult +to say which alternative is the worse. + ++Election of its Most Popular Candidates by each Party.+--It would be +little use to confine representation to the two main parties if the +parties were allowed to split up into factions. The only way to prevent +this is to provide such electoral machinery as will ensure the return of +the candidates most in general favour with all sections, and will +exclude the favourites of sections within the party. This distinction is +vital. The general favourite is a representative; the favourite of a +faction is a delegate. A representative is not only independent of any +one section, but if he does favour a faction he will sink in general +favour. He therefore represents a compromise of the demands of all +sections. But a delegate is the mouthpiece of a faction--a follower, not +a leader of the people. + +No section will be disfranchised by this proposal, for the true +function of all minor sections is to influence the policies of the two +main parties. Thus every section will be proportionally represented in +one or the other policy and by all the party candidates. Not only will +each party be proportionally represented but all the sections which +compose each party will be proportionally represented in its policy. +This is the only true meaning of proportional representation. + + + + +CHAPTER II. + +THE SO-CALLED REPRESENTATIVE PRINCIPLE. + + +All schemes of electoral reform hitherto proposed under the name of +proportional representation are based on the so-called "representative +principle"--viz., that every section of the people is entitled to +separate representation in proportion to its numbers. The ideal varies +somewhat, but the usual conception, is that if each member represents a +different section or interest the assembly will represent all sections +or all interests. Now this is simply an attempt to return to what we +have described as the first stage of representation, but without the +fear of the monarchy to keep the sections together. For a deliberative +body or a king's council it might be suitable, but for an assembly +charged with the complete control of government in the interests of all +it is utterly impracticable. Each representative must represent all +interests; he must be elected on a definite policy as to what is best +for all the people. If he is sent in as the agent of one interest or one +section of the people, he ceases to be a representative and becomes a +delegate. All these schemes are therefore not proportional +representation at all, but proportional delegation. + +We have shown that representation means the organization of public +opinion into two definite lines of policy, and that this is the only way +to prevent political anarchy. But the proportionalists (as they like to +call themselves) say that it means representing men and the opinions +they hold in proportion to their numbers. The fundamental error is that +they neglect the all-important factor of human nature. They look on +public opinion as something having an independent existence apart from +the questions about which it is expressed and from the means of +expressing it; and they fail to recognize that the character of public +opinion depends on the manner in which it is expressed and organized. It +is but a natural consequence that they also conceive the number of +sections of opinion awaiting representation as pre-existing and +independent of the electoral machinery. + +In short, they reduce the whole problem to a nice little exercise in +mathematics, requiring only for its clear exposition some columns of +figures and a few coloured diagrams to represent the different shades of +public opinion. No better example of the dangers of _a priori_ +speculation could be adduced than this chimerical idea of the +proportionalists that public opinion is something to be divided into +fractions like a mathematical quantity, unless it be, perhaps, the +conclusion that if you gather together delegates representing these +fractions you will have an assembly representing the sum total of public +opinion. + +The issue is quite clear. Are we to have two parties aiming at the +control of administration and appealing to all sections for support, or +the separate delegation of a number of sections? In the one case we will +have parties based on national policies, and in the other case we will +have a number of factions, each wanting something different and +determined to block progress till it gets it. Remember that it is a mere +matter of electoral machinery which will determine the choice. It is +true that at present we do not have two very coherent parties, but that +is the fault of the present electoral system. + +It would seem that there can be but one answer to this question, and yet +the "representative principle" shows such wonderful vitality that it is +worth while considering the arguments on which it is based, and the +various stages through which the idea has passed. + ++Mr. Hare's Scheme.+--The "representative principle" was first +propounded in England in 1857 by Mr. Thomas Hare. He proposed that the +United Kingdom should be constituted one huge electorate for the return +of the 654 members of the House of Commons. The people were to group +themselves into 654 voluntary unanimous sections, each returning one +member, and each gathered from every corner of the kingdom. We propose +to consider here not the scheme itself but only the principle on which +it was founded. Mr. Hare rightly conceived that the great evil of the +present system is the exclusion of the minority in each electorate, but +he altogether failed to appreciate that the excluded minority nearly +always represented one of the two main parties. He could not see, in +fact, that to divide each electorate into majority and minority is to +divide the whole country into majority and minority, nor that the +injustice is tolerated because it is usually as bad for one party as the +other. Instead, therefore, of proposing to do justice to both the +majority and the minority in each electorate, he proposed to allow +representation to as many minorities as possible. To him, the rule of +the majority was the rule of a majority of interests; this he called the +constitutional majority, as opposed to the "mere rule of numbers." Now, +at the time Mr. Hare wrote party government was rather weak in England. +He quotes with approval a statement of Mr. Sidney Herbert, M.P., that +the House was divided into many parties, or rather no party, because the +country was divided into many parties or no party, and that the division +into two parties would never be restored again. It is amusing, in view +of after events, to find Mr. Hare asking what would be the result of any +contrivance to re-establish party. Assuming that _party_ representation +was dead, Mr. Hare proposed to substitute _personal_ representation. It +is positively ludicrous at this interval of time to note how the +electors were expected to group themselves. They were to take personal +merit as the basis of representation; every vote cast was to be a +spontaneous tribute to the qualities and attainments of the person for +whom it was given. And in order, presumably, that they should choose +good men in preference to corrupt men, the polling-day was to be set +apart as a sacred holiday, and church services were to be held to +solemnize the public act and seek for the Divine blessing! + +The maintenance of a responsible ministry in such a House presented no +difficulty to Mr. Hare. The electors were to indicate whom they +considered the most illustrious statesmen, and no one would dare to +question their decision! + +It seems strange now that this scheme should have received serious +consideration. Mr. Hare was so much under the spell of the apparent +justice of the underlying principle that he was blind to its results. +But it was soon perceived that the electors would not group themselves +as Mr. Hare supposed; that the personal ideal of every class of electors +would be simply men of their own class. It was further pointed out that +cranks and faddists and every organization founded on questions of the +remotest interest would combine to secure representation. Mr. Disraeli +declared it to be "opposed to every sound principle, its direct effect +being to create a stagnant representation ... an admirable scheme for +bringing crotchety men into the House." Mr. Shaw-Lefevre condemned it +as "a vicious principle based upon a theory of classes," and Mr. +Gladstone said that it regarded electors "not as rational and thinking +beings, but merely as the equivalents of one another." Walter Bagehot, +in his standard work on the "English Constitution," opposes the +principle of voluntary constituencies, because it would promote a +constituency-making trade. "But upon the plan suggested," he writes, +"the House would be made up of party politicians selected by a party +committee, chained to that committee, and pledged to party violence, and +of characteristic, and therefore unmoderate, representatives for every +'ism' in all England. Instead of a deliberate assembly of moderate and +judicious men, we should have a various compound of all sorts of +violence. I may seem to be drawing a caricature, but I have not reached +the worst. Bad as these members would be if they were left to +themselves--if in a free Parliament they were confronted with the perils +of government, close responsibility might improve them, and make them +tolerable. But they would not be left to themselves. A voluntary +constituency will nearly always be a despotic constituency." + +The practical difficulties in the application of Mr. Hare's scheme are +almost insuperable, but it is not worth while pursuing the subject, +since it is now admitted by recent advocates that the faddist argument +is fatal. This is an admission that Mr. Hare completely neglected the +factor of human nature. Professor Nanson writes:--"Hare proposed that +there should be only one electorate, consisting of the whole State. It +is unfortunate that this proposal was made. There can be no doubt that +it has retarded the progress of true electoral reform for at least a +generation ... it would inevitably lead to the election of a certain +number of faddists." + ++John Stuart Mill.+--The great vogue which the Hare system has obtained +is to be traced more to the influence of John Stuart Mill than to that +of anyone else. Mill was captivated by the apparent justice of the +proposal, and devoted a chapter of his "Representative Government" to +it, wherein he declared:--"Mr. Hare's scheme has the almost unparalleled +merit of carrying out a great principle of government in a manner +approaching to ideal perfection, while it attains incidentally several +other things of scarcely inferior importance." Believing in the absolute +justice of the principle, Mill and Hare were certainly consistent in +setting no limit to its application except the size of the assembly. +Mill is emphatic on this point. "Real equality of representation," he +asserted, "is not obtained unless any set of electors, amounting to +average number of a constituency, wherever they happen to reside, have +the power of combining with one another to return a representative." +Now, the recent disciples of Mr. Hare are never tired of claiming the +support of Mill, although they have thrown this definition to the +winds. But they are guilty of far more than that, for in another chapter +of Mill's book we find that his conception of a representative assembly +elected by the Hare system is a purely deliberative body. He expressly +declares it to be radically unfit for legislation, which he proposes to +hand over to a commission appointed by the Crown. The value of his +testimony is very much discounted by this fact. + ++Sir John Lubbock.+[1]--We have asserted that the proportional principle +should be applied to two parties only--the majority and the minority, +and that every section can then be represented. Mill and Hare thought +that no limit should be set except the size of the assembly. All the +recent advocates of the system take up an intermediate position. +Appreciating the serious objections against allowing independent +representation to a large number of small sections, Sir John Lubbock, +president of the English Proportional Representation Society, proposes +to constitute electorates returning only three to five members each, +thus confining representation to only three to five sections in each +electorate, and sacrificing to a great extent accurate proportional +representation. In his book on "Representation," he writes:--"I have +assumed that Parliament should be 'a mirror of the nation;' if the +object were to secure unity of action rather than freedom of discussion, +to form an executive body such as a Government, a Board of Directors, or +a Vestry, the case would be quite different. It is, however, I presume, +our wish that Parliament should be a deliberative assembly in which all +parties should be fairly represented." But to make Parliament a +deliberative body is to destroy its power to secure unity of action at +all, and to render it useless as a working machine. + ++Miss Spence.+--An active campaign has for some time been carried on for +the adoption of the Hare system in Australia. Miss C.H. Spence, of South +Australia, was the pioneer reformer, and has laboured in the cause by +pen and voice for no less than forty years. Great credit is undoubtedly +due to Miss Spence for the clear and simple manner in which she has +expounded the system, and for the good work she has done in exposing the +defects of the present methods. Not only has she lectured in all parts +of Australia, but she has made visits to England, where she met Mr. Hare +and Sir John Lubbock, and also to America. But we may admire Miss +Spence's courage and devotion to principle without agreeing with her +conclusions. + +At a meeting held at River House, Chelsea, London, in 1894, Miss Spence +submitted an analysis of 8,824 votes recorded at 50 public meetings in +South Australia. The audiences were in each case asked to select six +representatives out of twelve candidates. The result of a scrutiny of +all the votes combined was that the following six "parties" secured one +"representative" each--viz., Capital, Labour, Single Tax, Irish +Catholic, Prohibition, and Women's Suffrage. Miss Spence frankly +confesses that these "parties" are minorities, but holds that a majority +can be formed by the union of minorities, and that party responsible +government can still be carried on. Now, can any sensible man or woman +imagine a working ministry formed by a union of any four of these +"parties?" Capital would certainly be permanently opposed to Labour and +to Single Tax, and as for the others, there is not a single principle in +common. How, then, could a union be formed? The only possible way is by +log-rolling; they must make a bargain to support one another's demands. +Such a union could not possibly be stable, because the minority is free +to offer a better bargain to any one of the "parties" to induce it to +desert. Again, it may be called the rule of the majority, but what sort +of a majority? Is it not plainly the rule of a majority in the interests +of minorities? That is very different to the rule of the majority in the +interests of all, which free government demands. The simple truth is +that the "parties" are factions, and that the "representatives" are mere +delegates of those factions. + +But in practice the case would be far worse than we have assumed. There +is not the slightest guarantee that the same six factions would be +elected in each six-seat electorate. We might have an unlimited number +of delegates of various religions, classes, races, localities, and +political organizations on all kinds of single questions. An assembly +formed on these lines could hardly be dignified with the name of a +representative assembly. + +Mr. G. Bradford, in his work on "The Lesson of Popular Government," +displays a more intimate knowledge of human nature than any other recent +writer. Of these schemes for the representation of minorities he says:-- + + As an illustration of the effect in popular government of looking + to popular impulse for the initiation of measures, it may be + observed that perhaps the worst of all expedients for remedying the + defective working of a government by a legislature like ours, that + which combines the evils of them all, is one which is urged by + perfectly disinterested advocates of reform, and is known as + proportional representation. If there is one principle at the base + of popular government it is that the majority shall rule. If the + largest of three or four fractions is to rule it ceases to be + popular government, and becomes government by faction. If the + tyranny of the majority is bad a tyranny of the minority is still + worse. (Vol. i., p. 505.) + +And the following picture could hardly be better drawn:-- + + If the basis of carrying on the government is to be the wishes of + some millions of units, it is evident that they must to a greater + or less extent agree in wishing for something. It is equally + evident that they cannot all agree in wishing for the same thing at + the same time, while if they, or any considerable number of groups, + want different things at the same time, the result in so far is + anarchy. Government is paralysed, and with the well-known + excitability of humanity in groups men begin to confound the + importance of the thing wanted with the importance of getting what + they want. The clash of contending factions is apt to suggest the + clash of arms. The first necessity, therefore, is the formation of + large and coherent parties, not merely for the purpose of + accomplishing what is desired by the majority of the people, but + also for suppressing agitation and social disturbance on behalf of + what may be called merely objects of passion or private interest + with comparatively small groups, at least until those objects + enlist the support of a large minority. (Vol. i., pp. 492, 493.) + ++Professor Nanson.+--In Victoria the Hare system is championed by Mr. +E.J. Nanson, Professor of Mathematics at Melbourne University. Professor +Nanson approaches the subject entirely from a mathematical standpoint, +and resolutely refuses to admit the factor of human nature into his +calculations. Following Mr. Hare, he is a declared opponent of party +government, and "would like to see it pushed further into the +background." Moreover, he regards every step in the process as an end in +itself. Thus the act of voting is one end, representation is another, +and the rule of the majority a third. Leaving aside for the present, +however, the elaborate mathematical devices which are proposed for +attaining these supposed ends, let us take only the principles on which +they are based. These are laid down as follows:-- + + (_a_) The rule of the majority. + + (_b_) The fair representation of all parties in proportion to their + strength. + + (_c_) Perfect freedom to every elector to vote exactly as he + pleases. + + (_d_) The emancipation of the voters from the tyranny of the + political "boss" or caucus. + + (_e_) The full value of his vote to each voter without loss or + waste. + +The principles involved, we are assured, "must appeal to every democrat, +to every Liberal, to every lover of true and just representation." + +As to the first claim, we are willing to grant the rule of the majority, +if the words are added "in the interests of minorities." The second +could also be granted if by "all parties" were meant both parties, for +there cannot be more than two parties in the true sense of the word. But +Professor Nanson proposes such large electorates that any small section, +from one-sixth to one-twelfth, can secure independent representation. +Notwithstanding this, he claims that it is quite possible to give fair +representation to the main parties and to small sections at the same +time. In illustrating the system he avoids the issue as to the character +of these sections by giving them a "scientific" nomenclature, such as +Colour, Place, Pursuits, Qualities, &c. These abstractions are very +misleading, as attention is diverted from the fact that they refer to +voluntary groups of men united for some political purpose. The real +question is, on what basis are these groups likely to be formed? When +the element of human nature is taken into account it must be apparent +that they will be formed for the propaganda of some sectional interest; +some on a religious basis, others on a class basis, &c. Now, if we were +to ask each candidate to declare his religion, we could easily take +religions as the basis of representation and allow proportional +representation to each religion; and similarly with classes, races, and +so on. But we could only take one basis at a time, and the important +deduction is that if we were to take religions as the basis of +representation, the people would be induced to vote according to +religion; if we were to take classes, according to class, and so on. +Now, no one but the fanatic or the demagogue will claim that the +majority is entitled to rule where religions only or classes only are +represented. The questions then arise--What is the correct basis of +representation? How should the people be induced to vote? And the answer +is clearly that the people should be induced to vote on questions of +general public policy, on the leading questions of the day which decide +the party lines, and that, therefore, _the policies of the two main +parties should form the primary basis of proportional representation_. +But the Hare system, by taking individual candidates as the basis of +representation, induces the elector to vote on any basis or on sectional +lines. It promotes dissension instead of repressing it, and instead of +encouraging all sections to express their opinion as to what is best for +the general well-being, it encourages them to express their opinion as +to what they imagine to be best for themselves. Public opinion expressed +on these lines would be worse than useless. But Professor Nanson thinks +that the electors would still have regard for the main parties, even +though they grouped themselves into small sections. He declares that +"any party amounting to anything like a quota would not only have two +candidates of its own--one Liberal and one Conservative--but would also +be wooed by candidates of both leading parties." We may well question +whether factions would trouble themselves about the main parties; but, +granting the assumption, the small parties might just as well be single +electorates as far as the main parties are concerned. The Liberal +candidates might be successful in all of them, and the Conservatives be +unrepresented. The peculiar feature is that the defeated Conservatives +are expected to transfer their votes to the Liberals to make up the +quotas for the small parties! + +The third claim is that electors should have perfect freedom to vote +exactly as they please, and yet Professor Nanson, in condemning Mr. +Hare's original scheme, has denied that they are free to vote as +faddists; but he still holds that they are free to vote on any basis if +only they form one-sixth to one-twelfth of an electorate. Thus the +amount of freedom is variable and a matter of opinion. Now, we +altogether deny that electors should be given the opportunity to +subordinate the national interests to factious interests. Just as the +faddist argument is fatal to Mr. Hare's original scheme, so the +splitting up into factions is fatal to Professor Nanson's present +scheme. Where is the freedom which Professor Nanson claims under the +present system of election? Is it not the fact that throughout England, +America, and Australia the electors have very often a choice between two +candidates only--one Ministerialist and one Oppositionist? By all means +let us have as many political organizations as possible to make known +the wishes of all sections; but the true function of all such +organizations is to influence the policies of the two main parties, and +not to secure independent delegates in Parliament. This means simply +that the compromise among the different sections supporting a party must +be effected in the electors' minds, and at the elections, and not on the +floor of the Legislature. + +The fourth claim is the emancipation of the voters from the tyranny of +the "boss." Now, the power of the "boss" lies in the control of +nominations, and although to some extent this control is necessary with +the present system of election, it is not essential to party government, +as we hope to show. But with government by faction there would be no +escape from this control. The tyranny of a faction is worse than the +tyranny of the "boss." The voters need saving from their own selfish +passions far more than from the "boss." + +The final claim that each elector is entitled to the full value of his +vote, regardless of the way in which it is used, is really a claim to an +equality of political power, _i.e._, to direct government. It means +that electors are absolutely free to combine for their own interests, or +for their interest as a class, in opposition to the public welfare. +These combinations would, with an equality of direct political power, +soon bring on social disruption. + ++Professor Jethro Brown.+--In the preface to "The New Democracy," by +Professor Jethro Brown, the two fundamental difficulties of present-day +politics are correctly stated to be--how to express public opinion, and +how to improve its value. For the first of these Professor Brown +recommends the Hare system, and for the second the study of history. +Later on he writes:--"How is the amelioration of popular sovereignty to +be effected? Not, I venture to believe, by the pursuit of the policy +which hopes to play off ignorance against ignorance and prejudice +against prejudice, and to secure good government by the arts of +flattery, manipulation, and intrigue; nor, indeed, by the improvement of +democratic machinery, though this is extremely desirable, and calls for +immediate attention. For, above all, towers the question of character." +It is quite evident that Professor Brown shares the delusion of the +other advocates of the Hare system, that the manner of expressing public +opinion has nothing to do with the character of public opinion. The two +difficulties laid down are essentially one. The cardinal fact underlying +representation is that it is a real social force, capable of reacting +upon and moulding character, and therefore of improving the value of +public opinion. The independence, love of freedom, respect for +minorities, and capacity for self-government, which are the most +distinctive traits in the English character, are not innate, but are +largely the products of the British Constitution. If the only chance of +improving the value of public opinion lay in the hope of inducing the +individual electors to study the lessons of history, the prospect would +be indeed gloomy. + +Professor Brown regards party government as a necessary evil, resulting +from the mechanical difficulty of securing unity of action from a +plurality of wills. This is practically equivalent to saying that +legislation itself is a necessary evil. But he writes:--"Whatever may be +the evils of party government, there can be no doubt of the utility as +well as of the necessity of the institution itself. The alternative to +party government is the system of government by small groups. In +Australia the evils of this alternative have been occasionally displayed +in practical politics; but it is to France that we must look for their +supreme illustration." Turning to the chapter on the Hare system, we +find that Professor Brown believes that the electors would still divide +themselves into two parties, even if given the opportunity to form small +groups. "I cannot believe," he writes, "that the reputation of our race +for sound common-sense is so far misplaced that a provision for the +faithful representation of the people would end in an immoderate +Legislature! For, although the Hare system is not perfect, it does +undoubtedly afford an opportunity for an absolutely _fair +representation_. Of course the opportunity would be abused by some; but +to argue that the abuse would be general, or if at all general, would +long continue, is to argue that the people would prove themselves +unworthy of the opportunity offered." While he was at the University of +Tasmania the first election under the Hare system was held, and +Professor Brown's opinions are based on the result. A second election +has, however, just been held, which shows the futility of his hopes. + ++The Tasmanian Experiment.+--Despite the fact that it has been advocated +for over forty years, the trial now being made of the Hare system in +Tasmania is the first application of the "representative principle" to +any assembly modelled on the English plan of party government, and +therefore deserves more than passing notice. But the experiment is on +such a small scale, and has been conducted for such a short time, that +the result can hardly be expected to be conclusive as yet. The objection +against the Hare system is not so much that it is not suitable to +present conditions as that it will speedily bring about altered +conditions. It is interesting to find that this is exactly what is +taking place. The system is applied in two electorates only, at Hobart +and Launceston the former returning six members and the latter four. At +the first election, in 1897, the possibilities of the system were not +appreciated, and electors voted on the old lines; and although the +results were rather erratic and unexpected, they were considered fairly +satisfactory. But the second election, held early in the present year, +proved a great blow to the system. No less than three of the successful +candidates were intensely unpopular; and one of them, an ex-minister, +had recently been banished from public life on the report of a select +committee of the House. His reinstatement aroused a storm of indignation +throughout the colony, and he was forced to retire again before +Parliament met. It will be as well to take the evidence of a strong +advocate of the system--the _Argus_ correspondent. Of one candidate he +writes:--"Judging by all available definite evidences, it seemed that +five-sixths of the electors of Hobart were directly in favour of the +construction of the railway by the present Great Western Railway +Syndicate; while those of the remaining sixth were variously opposed to +the company or to the project of constructing such a railway by private +enterprise at all. This sixth is represented by Mr. R.C. Patterson, who +headed the poll." Of another candidate we learn that "Mr. Mulcahy had +fought a hard fight, and it is a fair assumption that on the list of the +elected he represents the Roman Catholic vote. As a member of a +generally popular Government, the extent of Mr. Mulcahy's personal +unpopularity was remarkable and probably unique." But it was over the +return of Mr. Miles that the storm raged most. The excuse is made that +"the fault of Mr. Miles's return (assuming that it is a fault) lies with +the electors who returned him, and not with the system under which his +return was accomplished.... Once grant that a section of Hobart electors +have the right to select for their representative whom they choose, and +it would seem that the Hare system must be held free of all +responsibility for the return of Mr. Miles." But this is precisely what +cannot be granted for a moment, as we have endeavoured to show. The +assertion is made that Mr. Miles would have been returned as easily +under the old system, but this is not a fact. He polled only one-eighth +of the votes, so that, even supposing that his supporters were twice as +strong in a single electorate, he would have had only one-fourth of the +votes. It is safe to say, from the small proportion of second and third +preferences which he secured, that if the Block Vote had been adopted he +would have been at the bottom of the poll. Commenting on these results, +the _Argus_ declares that the Hare system does not pretend to reform or +guide the people. Very likely not! But is it not quite evident that it +has the opposite effect? + +Is it too much to say that, if the Hobart experiment be persevered with, +the ultimate tendency will be the return of six members, each acceptable +to one-sixth of the electors, and obnoxious to the other five-sixths? +It is quite obvious already that the usual party lines are entirely +disregarded. + ++Professor Commons.+--The best book on the subject yet published is the +"Proportional Representation" of John E. Commons, Professor of Sociology +in Syracuse University, U.S. Its great merit is that the political and +social bearings of the reform are fully treated. Professor Commons +rejects the Hare system in favour of the Free List system. He +writes:--"The Hare system is advocated by those who, in a too +_doctrinaire_ fashion, wish to abolish political parties. They +apparently do not realize the impossibility of acting in politics +without large groupings of individuals." He makes a great step in +advance of the disciples of Mr. Hare in recognizing that the +proportional principle should be applied to parties, and not to +individuals, and he even defines parties correctly as being based "not +altogether on sectional divisions, but on social and economic problems +of national scope;" but, unfortunately, he fails to see that there can +be only two parties, and that the representation of small parties would +not reform the main parties, but break them up altogether. At the same +time he is no mere theorist, for he declares:--"If a practicable and +effective method of proportional representation cannot be discovered, +the theoretical principle is a mere dream." Moreover, he prudently +recognizes that his arguments as regards Federal and State Legislatures +in America are in advance of what the public is ready to accept, and +adds:--"We, as a people are not yet ready to abandon the notion that +party responsibility in Federal affairs is essential to safety." His +immediate object is, therefore, the reform of city councils, which in +America are controlled by the national parties, and are exploited by the +notorious "machine" organizations. We may sympathize with this object, +for parties in an administrative body are a serious evil, but with +legislatures the case is quite different. Professor Commons admits that +third and fourth parties, if given their proportionate weight in +legislation, would hold the balance of power, but he declares that "the +weight of this objection, the most serious yet presented against +proportional representation, varies in different grades of government." +He then proceeds to examine the objection "as applied to Congress (and +incidentally to the State Legislatures), where it has its greatest +force, and where pre-eminently party responsibility may be expected to +be decisive." And the only answer he can find is that the objection +"overlooks the principle of equality and justice in representation. It +may prove here that justice is the wisest expediency. It is a curious +anomaly, showing confusion of thought regarding democracy, that a people +who insist on universal suffrage, and who go to ludicrous limits in +granting it, should deny the right of representation to those minor +political parties whose existence is the natural fruit of this +suffrage." But these minor parties would not be denied representation if +they were allowed to exercise freely their true function, which is to +influence the policies of the main parties; and it is essential to the +working of the political machine that they be limited to that function. +Professor Commons continues:--"The argument, however, of those who fear +that third parties will hold the balance of power is not based solely on +a dread of the corrupt classes, but rather of the idealists, the +reformers, 'faddists,' and 'cranks,' so called. They would retain +exclusive majority rule and party responsibility in order to prevent the +disproportionate influence of these petty groups. They overlook, of +course, the weight of the argument already made that individual +responsibility is more important for the people than the corporate +responsibility of parties." The assumption is here made that the +complete suppression of individuality is an essential feature of party +government, whereas it is in fact a peculiar feature of American +politics, due to "machine" control of nominations. The one point which +Professor Commons has missed is that individual candidature can be +permitted and representation still be confined to the two main parties. + ++Conclusion.+--The advocates of proportional delegation have failed to +grasp the importance of the principles of organization and leadership, +which underlie representation. Mr. Hare thought that the effect of doing +away with organization would be to improve leadership. But he reckoned +without his host--Human Nature. Organization cannot be dispensed with +without destroying leadership and bringing on the strife of factions. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[1] Now Lord Avebury. + + + + +CHAPTER III. + +THE PRESENT POSITION OF PARTY GOVERNMENT. + + ++England.+--We have seen that the fundamental error of the +proportionalists is that they have failed to distinguish between the two +stages of representation. In constantly appealing back to the earlier +parliaments they altogether overlook the fact that the functions which +Parliament now exercises were then vested in the King. But this error is +not confined to the proportionalists, most of whom, indeed, however +inconsistently, favour party government. It is also put forth as an +argument by those who lay all the blame of present evils on the party +system, and who think that all sections should work together as one +united party. Take, for instance, the diatribe of Mr. W.S. Lilly on "The +Price of Party Government" in the _Fortnightly Review_ for June, 1900. +Mr. Lilly complains bitterly that the infallible oracle in politics +to-day is "the man in the street." He asserts that all issues are +settled "by counting heads, in entire disregard of what the heads +contain." His bugbear is the extension of the franchise. "Representative +institutions, for example," he asks, "what do they represent? The true +theory unquestionably is that they should represent all the features of +national life, all the living forces of society, all that makes the +country what it is; and that in due proportion. And such was the +Constitution of England up to the date of the first _Parliamentary +Reform Act_. Its ideal was, to use the words of Bishop Stubbs, 'an +organized collection of the several orders, states, and conditions of +men, recognized as possessing political power.'" Could anything be more +ridiculous? Political power is to be apportioned in the nineteenth +century as it was in the fourteenth century! The people are to be always +governed by their superiors! Mr. Lilly continues:--"It appears to me +that the root of the falsification of our parliamentary system by the +party game is to be found in the falsification of our representative +system by the principle of political atomism. Men are not equal in +rights any more than they are equal in mights. They are unequal in +political value. They ought not to be equal in political power." + +The mistake here is in the premise. Has not the demagogue more power +than his dupes, or the Member of Parliament more power than the elector? +We have hardly yet reached, and are never likely to reach, that ideal of +direct government. But what is this price which Mr. Lilly is railing at? +"The price may be stated in eight words. 'The complete subordination of +national to party interests.' The _complete_ subordination. I use the +adjective advisedly. Party interests are not only the first thought of +politicians in England, but, too often, the last and only thought." All +this is sheer nonsense. The coincidence of party aims with the real +interests of the people which the British Parliament has displayed since +the _Reform Act_ of 1832 has never been even remotely approached by any +other country. Two causes have contributed to this great result; first, +the gradual extension of the franchise to all sections of the people, +and second, the fact that the principles of organization and leadership +have been highly developed. In one respect, however, Mr. Lilly is right. +The zenith has been passed. Party government is not the same to-day in +England as it was twenty years ago. But the fault lies not with the +extension of the suffrage, but with the fact that the principles of +organization and leadership are less operative. True, the extension of +the franchise is indirectly concerned in the failure, but the primary +cause is that the present system of election is unable to bear the +increased strain. It no longer suffices to organize the people into two +coherent parties. The effect on the parties is correctly noted by Mr. +Lilly. "A danger which ever besets them," he declares, "is that of +sinking into factions." + +Now, the result of the want of organization is the presence in +Parliament of small independent factions, which, by holding the balance +of power, cause the main parties to degenerate into factions. + +This tendency is apparent even in England, and the rock on which the +parties have split is the Irish faction. Into the merits of the Irish +question we do not propose to enter; it is the career of the faction in +Parliament which interests us. But it may be noted that the Irish party +rests on a three-fold basis as a faction; it is based mainly on a class +grievance, and is also partly racial and partly religious. It was the +Irish party in the House of Commons which first discovered that, by +keeping aloof from the two main parties, it could terrorize both; and +thus found out the weak spot in party government. Its tactics were +successful up to a certain point, for Mr. Gladstone succumbed to the +temptation to purchase its support, and brought in the Home Rule Bill. +The result is known to all; the historical Liberal party was rent in +twain; party lines were readjusted; Mr. Gladstone was left in a hopeless +minority; and the remnant of his following is to-day in the same +condition. What is the lesson to be learned from these events? That +these tactics cannot succeed in the long run. All interests suffer, but +the culprits most of all. Moreover, such tactics are unconstitutional, +and would in some circumstances justify retaliatory measures. Let us +trace the constitutional course. The Irish members could have exerted a +considerable influence on the policies of both Liberals and +Conservatives, just as the Scotch did. If they had followed this course, +might they not have been in a better position to-day? + +Of course, the Irish faction can hardly be said to be the result of the +present system of election; it is mainly the expression of old wrongs. +But it has set the example, and the disintegration of the old parties is +rapidly proceeding. One feature, however, in connection with the present +system in Ireland may be mentioned, and that is the permanent +disfranchisement of the minority. In the greater part of Ireland there +is no such thing as a contest between the main parties. If a system were +introduced by which the minority could get its share of representation +the parties would compete on even terms for the support of the people, +and good feeling would tend to be restored. + +To return to Mr. Lilly. The present position of party government in +England is not due to defects in the institution itself, still less to +the extension of the suffrage, but to imperfect organization. The true +remedy is, therefore, to improve organization, not to restrict the +suffrage. By this means such a condition will be brought about that if +either party favours a faction it will lose in general favour; then, +indeed, we may hope that the main parties themselves will cease to +degenerate into factions. + +The same number of the _Fortnightly_ contains an unsigned article on +"Lord Rosebery and a National Cabinet," in which the party system is +alluded to as defunct, and in which the suggestion is thrown out that on +the retirement of Lord Salisbury a national cabinet should be formed, +comprising both Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Rosebery. Impending foreign +complications are given as the excuse for terminating party action. Now, +it is not to be denied that party government is more suitable for what +Mr. Herbert Spencer calls the industrial type of society than for the +militant type. Quite recently Lord Salisbury blamed the British +Constitution for the state of unpreparedness for the present war. But it +is equally true that in foreign affairs party action is generally +suspended: in the control of India, for instance, it is so. The real +question, then, is this: Is the danger of foreign aggression so serious +that all questions of internal policy can be permanently set aside? If +we have reached this stage, the end of modern civilization is in sight. +In effect, the proposal is a return to the first stage of +representation, with the difference that all sections of the people are +expected to be held together by the fear of foreign aggression, instead +of the fear of the aggression of the monarchy. + +Mr. David Syme is a censor of a very different type. So far from wishing +to take control from the people, he would give the people absolute +control over everything, and at all times. Seldom has the case against +party government been more powerfully presented than in his work on +"Representative Government in England." But Mr. Syme founds his proposed +remedies on a theory of representation which is based on the literal +meaning of the word. No one has put the delegation theory more clearly +than in the following passage, or gone so far in applying it:-- + + Representation is a mental act; it is the presentation or + reproduction of the state of mind of another person; and before one + person can represent another person he must first know what the + opinions of that other person are. A representative is a + substitute; he stands in the place of, and acts for, another + person. But one man cannot act for another unless he knows what + that other would do were he acting for himself. In other words, he + requires to know the motives which actuate that other person, or + what influences his motives, namely, his principles and beliefs. + The House of Commons is a representative body, not because every + individual member of it represents the opinions of the whole + nation, but because members in the aggregate represent those + opinions, (p. 170). + +This position is diametrically opposed to the principles we have laid +down, for it eliminates entirely the ideas of organization and +leadership. Again, Mr. Syme says:--"If the government is to be carried +on for the benefit of all classes, representatives should be chosen from +all classes. We had class representation in the early parliaments, but +then all classes were fairly represented." We have shown that the +analogy from early parliaments is fallacious. Representatives should now +be chosen irrespective of class, and not as class delegates. But Mr. +Syme does not carry his theory to its logical conclusion. For if +representatives merely express the thoughts of others, and should be +class delegates, surely all classes are entitled to have their thoughts +"represented;" and Mr. Syme should range himself among the disciples of +Mr. Hare. But here comes in an interesting difference. Mr. Syme would +retain the present system and make members continually responsible to a +majority of their constituents; he would even give this majority power +to dismiss them at any time. Now, this is practically an admission that +representation involves the existence of a majority and a minority, or, +in other words, is a means of organizing the people into a majority and +a minority. Again, as regards leadership, the theory will hardly bear +the test of facts. Could a man like Gladstone be said to merely express +the thoughts of his constituents? Was he not rather a guide and leader +of the thoughts of a great part of the British nation? + +In addition to the continual responsibility of members to their +constituents, Mr. Syme would also make the individual ministers of state +responsible to a majority of the members. He adds:--"The whole system of +party government could in this manner be quietly and effectively got rid +of." We do not propose to criticise the latter suggestion, as we do not +believe it would be put forward to-day, in the light of fuller +knowledge. Mr. Syme's book was written nearly twenty years ago. But, as +regards the continual responsibility of members, we consider it +important that the electors should not have their way on single +questions. They should periodically express their opinion as to the +general line of progress, and the representatives should then have +complete control. The necessity for this is to save the people from +their anti-social tendencies, which we have already stated as the great +objection to all forms of direct government. Lord Macaulay once defined +the position exactly in a letter addressed to the electors of Edinburgh. +"My opinion," he declared, "is that electors ought at first to choose +cautiously; then to confide liberally; and when the term for which they +have selected their member has expired to review his conduct equitably, +and to pronounce on the whole taken together." + +We hope to have left on the reader's mind by this time no doubt as to +the intimate connection between the machinery of election and the +resulting character of the legislature. Now it is a most extraordinary +fact that this connection is hardly noticed by the leading +constitutional authorities. It is true they often recognize that +suggested changes like the Hare system would debase our legislatures, +but it never seems to occur to them that present evils might be cured by +a change in the electoral machinery. They point out the evils indeed, +but only to indulge in gloomy forebodings at the onward march of +democracy, or as warnings of the necessity for placing checks on the +people. + +Take Bagehot's study of the House of Commons in his standard work on +"The English Constitution," where he classifies the functions exercised +by the House. He insists that the most important of these is the +elective function--its power to elect and dismiss the ministry. In +addition, it exercises an expressive function, a teaching function, an +informing function, and, lastly, the function of legislation. But not a +word is said of the relation of these functions to representation, or to +the method of election. It is asserted that the reason the House of +Commons is able to exercise these functions is because England is a +deferential nation, and the people leave government in the hands of +their betters, the higher classes. On one point he is emphatic, and that +is the absolute necessity of party. He writes:-- + + The moment, indeed, that we distinctly conceive that the House of + Commons is mainly and above all things an elective assembly, we at + once perceive that party is of its essence. The House of Commons + lives in a state of perpetual potential choice; at any moment it + can choose a ruler and dismiss a ruler. And therefore party is + inherent in it, is bone of its bone, and breath of its breath. + +As to the present trend of affairs, the opinion of a foreign observer, +Gneist--"History of the English Constitution"--may be quoted:-- + + England, too, will experience the fact that the transition to the + new order of industrial society is brought about through a process + of dissolution of the old cohesions, upon which the constitution of + Parliament is based. The unrepresented social mass, which is now + flooding the substructure of the English Constitution, will only + stay its course at a universal suffrage, and a thorough and + arithmetical equalization of the constituencies, and will thus + attempt, and in a great measure achieve, a further dissolution of + the elective bodies. To meet the coming storm a certain fusion of + the old parties seems to be immediately requisite, though the + propertied classes, in defending their possessions, will certainly + not at first display their best qualities. As, further, a regular + formation in two parties cannot be kept up, a splitting up into + fractions, as in the parliaments of the Continent, will ensue, and + the changing of the ministry will modify itself accordingly, so + that the Crown will no longer be able to commit the helm of the + state in simple alternation to the leader of the one or the other + majority. And then a time will recur in which the _King in Council_ + may have to undertake the actual leadership. (Vol. ii., pp. 452, + 453.) + +In other words, that an industrial society is incapable of +self-government! Note the reason for this remarkable conclusion--a +splitting up into fractions, _i.e._, imperfect organization. + +Take now the evidence of the distinguished historian and publicist, Mr. +W.E.H. Leeky, M.P., as given in his recent work on "Democracy and +Liberty":-- + + After all due weight has been given to the possible remedies that + have been considered, it still seems to me that the parliamentary + system, when it rests on manhood suffrage, or something closely + approaching to manhood suffrage, is extremely unlikely to be + permanent. This was evidently the opinion of Tocqueville, who was + strongly persuaded that the natural result of democracy was a + highly concentrated, enervating, but mild despotism. It is the + opinion of many of the most eminent contemporary thinkers in France + and Germany, and it is, I think, steadily growing in England. This + does not mean that parliaments will cease, or that a wide suffrage + will be abolished. It means that parliaments, if constructed on + this type, cannot permanently remain the supreme power among the + nations of the world. Sooner or later they will sink by their own + vices and inefficiencies into a lower plane. They will lose the + power of making and unmaking ministries, and it will be found + absolutely necessary to establish some strong executive + independently of their fluctuations. Very probably this executive + may be established, as in America and under the French Empire, upon + a broad basis of an independent suffrage. Very possibly upper + chambers, constituted upon some sagacious plan, will again play a + great restraining and directing part in the government of the + world. Few persons who have watched the changes that have passed + over our own House of Commons within the last few years will either + believe or wish that in fifty years' time it can exercise the power + it now does. It is only too probable that some great catastrophe or + the stress of a great war may accelerate the change. (Vol. i., pp. + 300, 301.) + +And the reason assigned for this very unsatisfactory state of affairs is +precisely as before: + + All the signs of the times point to the probability in England as + elsewhere of many ministries resting on precarious majorities + formed out of independent or heterogeneous groups. There are few + conditions less favourable to the healthy working of parliamentary + institutions or in which the danger of an uncontrolled House of + Commons is more evident. One consequence of this disintegration of + Parliament is a greatly increasing probability that policies which + the nation does not really wish for may be carried into effect. The + process which the Americans call "log-rolling" becomes very easy. + One minority will agree to support the objects of another minority + on condition of receiving in return a similar assistance, and a + number of small minorities aiming at different objects, no one of + which is really desired by the majority of the nation, may attain + their several ends by forming themselves into a political syndicate + and mutually co-operating. (Vol. i., pp. 152, 153.) + +Mr. Lecky, too, holds out very little hope for the future:-- + + When the present evils infecting our parliamentary system have + grown still graver; when a democratic House, more and more broken + up into small groups, more and more governed by sectional and + interested motives, shall have shown itself evidently incompetent + to conduct the business of the country with honour, efficiency, and + safety; when the public has learned more fully the enormous danger + to national prosperity as well as individual happiness of + dissociating power from property and giving the many an unlimited + right of confiscating by taxation the possessions of the few--some + great reconstruction of government is sure to be demanded. Fifty or + even twenty-five years hence the current of political opinion in + England will be as different from that of our own day as + contemporary political tendencies are different from those in the + generation of our fathers. Experience and arguments that are now + dismissed may then revive, and play no small part in the politics + of the future. + +Why make democracy the scapegoat for all these evils, when they are +simply due to the imperfect organization of democracy? In any case, the +most that could rightly be urged would be that universal suffrage had +come before its time. The conclusion that its time will never come is +certainly not warranted. Universal suffrage cannot be condemned till it +has had a fair trial under a rational system of election. Mr. Lecky +appreciates so little the connection between the method of election and +the splitting up into groups that he views without alarm the Hare +system, which would still further develop groups. + +But perhaps no one has caught the spirit of party government more truly +than Mr. Lecky. Dealing with the motives which should actuate the +statesman, in his latest work, "The Map of Life," he writes:-- + + In free countries party government is the best if not the only way + of conducting public affairs, but it is impossible without a large + amount of moral compromise; without a frequent surrender of private + judgment and will. A good man will choose his party through + disinterested motives, and with a firm and honest conviction that + it represents the cast of policy most beneficial to the country. He + will on grave occasions assert his independence of party, but in + the large majority of cases he must act with his party, even if + they are pursuing courses in some degree contrary to his own + judgment. + + Everyone who is actively engaged in politics--everyone especially + who is a member of the House of Commons--must soon learn that if + the absolute independence of individual judgment were pushed to its + extreme, political anarchy would ensue. The complete concurrence of + a large number of independent judgments in a complicated measure is + impossible. If party government is to be carried on there must be, + both in the Cabinet and in Parliament, perpetual compromise. The + first condition of its success is that the Government should have a + stable, permanent, disciplined support behind it, and in order that + this should be attained the individual member must in most cases + vote with his party. Sometimes he must support a measure which he + knows to be bad, because its rejection would involve a change of + government, which he believes would be a still greater evil than + its acceptance, and in order to prevent this evil he may have to + vote a direct negative to some resolution containing a statement + which he believes to be true, (p. 112.) + +Mr. Lecky goes on to point out that "many things have to be done from +which a very rigid and austere nature would recoil;" but he +adds:--"Those who refuse to accept the conditions of parliamentary life +should abstain from entering into it." Moreover, he holds that +"inconsistency is no necessary condemnation of a politician, and +parties as well as individual statesmen have abundantly shown it." But +still "all this curious and indispensable mechanism of party government +is compatible with a high and genuine sense of public duty." + +The American theory of government is that checks must be placed on a +democratic legislature by a fixed Constitution and a separate executive +exercising a veto. The late Professor Freeman Snow, of Harvard +University, was a strong supporter of this school. His objections to +cabinet government are given in the "Annals of the American Academy of +Political and Social Science" for July, 1892:-- + + Cabinet government is the government of a party; and for its + successful operation it must have at all times a majority at its + back in Parliament. If it were possible to direct the current of + public opinion into exactly two channels, there would be but two + parties, one of which would generally be in the ascendency; but in + practice this is found to be a very difficult thing to accomplish, + and it becomes the more difficult as the right of suffrage is + extended to the mass of the people, with their ever-varying + interests. In the countries of continental Europe parties, if + indeed they may be said to exist, are broken up into groups, no two + or more of which ever act together for any considerable length of + time; and ministries are without a moment's notice confronted at + brief intervals with opposing majorities, and must give place to + others, whose tenure of office is, however, equally unstable and + ephemeral. There is no other alternative; one of the two great + parties must yield to any faction which becomes strong enough to + hold the balance of power between them, or suffer the inevitable + consequences--instability and impotence of government. + +Dr. Snow evidently thought that it is not possible to direct the +current of public opinion into exactly two channels. He certainly had +not the slightest idea that it might be a matter of electoral machinery. + +Finally, we may quote the opinion of Mr. James Bryce, M.P., whose +"American Commonwealth" is one of the most complete studies of the +tendencies of democracy in existence. Comparing the English and American +systems, he writes of the former:-- + + That system could not be deemed to have reached its maturity till + the power of the people at large had been established by the Reform + Act of 1832. For its essence resides in the delicate equipoise it + creates between the three powers, the ministry, the House of + Commons, and the people. The House is strong because it can call + the ministry to account for every act, and can by refusing supplies + compel their resignation. The ministry are not defenceless, because + they can dissolve Parliament, and ask the people to judge between + it and them. Parliament, when it displaces a ministry, does not + strike at executive authority; it merely changes its agents. The + ministry when they dissolve Parliament do not attack Parliament as + an institution; they recognise the supremacy of the body in asking + the country to change the individuals who compose it. Both the + House of Commons and the ministry act and move in the full view of + the people, who sit as arbiters, prepared to judge in any + controversy that may arise. The House is in touch with the people, + because every member must watch the lights and shadows of sentiment + which play over his own constituency. The ministry are in touch + with the people, because they are not only themselves + representatives, but are heads of a great party, sensitive to its + feelings, forced to weigh the effect of every act they do upon the + confidence which the party places in them.... The drawback to this + system of exquisite equipoise is the liability of its equilibrium + to be frequently disturbed, each disturbance involving either a + change of government, with immense temporary inconvenience to the + departments, or a general election, with immense expenditure of + money and trouble in the country. It is a system whose successful + working presupposes the existence of two great parties and no more, + parties each strong enough to restrain the violence of the other, + yet one of them steadily predominant in any given House of Commons. + Where a third, perhaps a fourth, party appears, the conditions are + changed. The scales of Parliament oscillate as the weight of this + detached group is thrown on one side or the other; dissolutions + become more frequent, and even dissolutions may fail to restore + stability. The recent history of the French Republic has shown the + difficulties of working a Chamber composed of groups, nor is the + same source of difficulty unknown in England. (Vol. i., pp. 286, + 287.) + +Thus we find the opinion unanimously held that the one great fault to +which cabinet government is liable is instability of the ministry, owing +to imperfect organization of public opinion into two definite lines of +policy. Bagehot called it a case of unstable equilibrium, and Bradford, +in "The Lesson of Popular Government," goes further when he +declares:--"Not to speak disrespectfully, the ministry is like a company +of men who, after excessive conviviality, are able to stand upright only +by holding on to each other." + +Yet, after all, the amount of stability simply depends on the state of +organization; and England has demonstrated in the golden period of her +political history (about the middle of the present century) that the +cabinet form of government can be quite as stable as the presidential +form. Therefore, if the present position gives cause for alarm, it is +not in the abolition of the cabinet or the restriction of the suffrage +that the remedy must be sought, but in improved organization. And this, +we hope to show, involves improved electoral machinery. + ++France.+--Turn to France. Is there no lesson to be drawn from the +history of that unstable country since the Revolution let loose its +flood of human passions, ambitions, and aspirations? Has not every +attempt at popular government failed for the same cause--want of +organization? + +France before the Revolution had groaned for centuries under the burden +of a decayed feudalism and an absolute monarchy. The last vestige of +constitutional forms had disappeared. The representatives of the estates +had not been convened since the meeting of the States-General in 1614. +The widespread and unprecedented misery of the people caused them to +revolt against being taxed without their consent, and a cry went up for +a convocation of the estates. The finances were in such a bad way that +Louis XVI. was forced to consent, and the three estates--clergy, nobles, +and commons--met at Versailles in 1789. At first they called themselves +the National Assembly, but the King foolishly took up such a position +with regard to the people's representatives that they swore solemnly +that they would not separate till they had laid the foundation of a new +Constitution, and henceforth were known as the Constituent Assembly. It +was determined that the King should no longer be absolute, and the +choice lay between a constitutional monarchy and a republic. The +Declaration of the Rights of Man was first drawn up, and the Assembly +settled down to its task. The leading spirit was Mirabeau. He had been +to England, and had studied the British Constitution, and he rightly saw +that France was too distracted by faction to maintain an independent +executive. He therefore openly advocated a constitutional monarchy with +a cabinet chosen from among the majority of the representatives. But, +unfortunately, the Assembly refused to follow his lead; nor would the +King take his advice to make a separate appeal to the people. In the +midst of the negotiations Mirabeau died, and the last chance of +establishing a constitutional monarchy disappeared. The King realized +this, and tried to escape to the German frontier but was brought back. +He then accepted the new Constitution, and the Legislative Assembly was +elected in 1791. From the first it had no elements of stability, being +split up into groups, and subject to the fear of the Paris mob. The King +continued to plot with the emigrant nobles against the Constitution, and +the foreign armies massed on the frontier. The danger brought on the +triumph of the revolutionary spirit in 1792. The Paris commune +overwhelmed both the King and the Assembly, and the republic was +proclaimed. Then followed the execution of the King, the Reign of +Terror, the control of the Committee of Public Safety, till finally the +anarchy was ended by the military despotism of Bonaparte, who became +First Consul and afterwards Emperor. + +What is the significance of these events in the light of our previous +examination of English history? Simply this: That the French, in passing +at once from absolutism and feudalism to complete self-government, were +trying to jump to the Second stage of representation without passing +through the first stage. Mirabeau was right; the republic was foredoomed +to failure because the people had learned neither the power of nor the +necessity for organization. + +In many respects the French Revolution parallels the English Revolution. +In each case the King was beheaded; in each case the anarchy of a +disorganized representative body was succeeded by a military despotism; +and in each case the monarchy was restored. + +It was after the restoration that the English system of party government +was developed. Why did this system not now take root in France? Partly +because France was not blessed with a king like William of Orange, and +partly because the new _systeme de bascule_, the balance system, in +which the king allows each faction in turn to hold the reins of power, +was discovered. So, instead of the gradual growth of constitutional +liberty which took place in England, the tendency in France was back to +absolutism. In 1830 Charles X., finding that he could not manage the +Chamber of Deputies, issued the ordinances of St. Cloud, suspending the +liberty of the press and dissolving the Legislature. Paris immediately +broke out into insurrection, and the King was forced to abdicate. The +crown was offered to Louis Philippe, and a second attempt at +constitutional monarchy was made. But France was too divided by her +unfortunate legacy of faction to maintain a continuous policy. The +Legitimists, the Republicans, and the Bonapartists were all awaiting +their opportunity. In 1848 the second revolution broke out in Paris; the +king fled to England, and a republic was again tried. But the +imperialist idea revived when Louis Napoleon was elected President. In +1851 he carried out his famous _coup d'etat,_ and again the Constitution +was swept away. In the following year he was accepted as Emperor by an +almost unanimous vote. Thus France again elected to be ruled by an +irresponsible head. The Third Empire ended with the capture of Napoleon +III. at Sedan in 1870, and since then France has carried on her third +experiment in republicanism. But still the fatal defect of +disorganization retards her progress; the Legislature is still split up +into contending factions, and in consequence it has been found +impossible to maintain a strong executive. Occasionally the factions +sink their differences for a time when their patriotism is appealed to, +as they have agreed to do during the currency of the present Exhibition, +but it is abundantly evident that France can never be well governed +till the people are able to organize two coherent parties. There is +ground for hope that the monarchical and imperialist ideas are +declining, and that the people are settling down to the conviction that +there is nothing left but the republic. What makes recovery difficult is +that the national character has been affected by the continual strife in +the direction of excitability and desire for change. + +Those who wish to understand the forces which brought about the +different changes and revolutions, traced by one who has grasped their +meaning, should read the account in the first volume of Mr. Bradford's +"Lesson of Popular Government." His conclusion only need be quoted +here:-- + + As has been said, that which constitutes the strength of the + English. Government, that which has made up its history for the + last two hundred years, is the growth and continuity of two solid + and coherent parties. Occasionally they have wavered when available + leaders and issues were wanting, but as soon as a strong man came + forward to take the reins the ranks closed up and the work of + mutual competition again went on. On the other hand, the curse and + the cause of failure of representative government on the Continent + of Europe is the formation within the legislature of unstable and + dissolving groups. In France the Extreme Eight, the Eight, the + Eight Centre, the Left Centre, the Left, and the Extreme Left are + names of differing factions which unite only for temporary purposes + and to accomplish a victory over some other unit, but which are + fatal to stable and firm government. The same is true of Italy, + Spain, and Austria, and if not of Germany it is because military + despotism holds all alike in subjection. + +Mr. Bodley has come to the same conclusion in his work on "France." He +writes:-- + + There is no restraining power in the French parliamentary system to + arrest a member on his easy descent, and he knows that if he + escapes penal condemnation he will enjoy relative impunity. Many + deputies are men of high integrity; but virtue in a large assembly + is of small force without organization, and, moreover, a group of + legislators leagued together as a vigilance committee would have + neither consistency nor durability, which the discipline of party + can alone effect. Corruption of this kind, which has undermined the + republic, could not co-exist with party government. A party whose + ministers or supporters had incurred as much suspicion as fell on + the politicians acquitted in the Panama affair would under it be + swept out of existence for a period. When the first denunciations + appeared, the leaders of the party, to avert that fate, would have + said to their implicated colleagues--"In spite of your abilities + and of the manifest exaggeration of these charges we must part + company, for though you may have been culpable only of + indiscretion, we cannot afford to be identified with doubtful + transactions;" and the Opposition, eager not to lose its vantage, + would scan with equal keenness the acts of its own members. With + party government the electorate would not have appeared to condone + those scandals. But as it was, when a deputy involved in them went + down before his constituents, whose local interest he had well + served, with no opponent more formidable than the nominee of some + decayed or immature group, they gave their votes to the old member, + whose influence with the prefecture in the past had benefited the + district, rather than to the new comer, whose denunciations had no + authority; whereas, had each electoral district been the scene of a + contest between organized parties, the same spectacle would not + have been presented." (Vol. ii., pp. 302, 303.) + +Mr. Bodley has, in this last sentence, touched the heart of the +problem. If the salvation of France depends on making each electoral +district the scene of a contest between two organized parties, is not +electoral machinery destined to play an important part in the solution? + ++The United States.+--The third great experiment in representative +democracy which the nineteenth century has furnished is that which is +being conducted in the United States. The contrast with France is +remarkable. Just as France is the supreme example of want of +organization, so America is the most conspicuous instance of perfect +organization into two great national parties which the world has seen. +Yet both experiments were started by a revolution, and practically at +the same time. The difference lay in the fact that the Americans +inherited the capacity for self-government from their British ancestors, +and had already practised it in colonial times, while the French only +inherited innumerable causes of dissension. + +But organization is not the only characteristic feature of American +politics. Strange to say, it is accompanied by a suppression of +individuality just as complete. It is organization without responsible +leadership. For, in the first place, the politicians look on themselves +not as leaders but as followers of the people; and in the second place, +there are no leaders in Congress, corresponding to the cabinet ministers +of British countries. + +Now, the view which we wish to emphasize here is that the present +position of American politics is the natural result of the principles +embodied in the Constitution adopted in 1789, when the Union was formed. +The complete organization and the want of leadership are directly to be +traced to the labours of George Washington and his associates. A brief +glance at the Constitution and the early history of its working will +make this clear. + +The thirteen States which revolted from England worked fairly well +together under the "Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union" as +long as the war lasted, but as soon as peace was proclaimed it was, as +Washington said, no better than anarchy. The famous Convention of 1787 +was therefore held, and the Constitution was drawn up. One guiding +principle of its framers was to divide power so as to place checks on +the will of the people, and on outbursts of popular passion, which were +then greatly dreaded. One means of attaining this object was the +attempted separation of the legislative and executive functions. We say +attempted advisedly, for time has but shown that the two are +inseparable. But the framers of the Constitution divided the legislative +function between the two Houses, and vested the executive function +almost entirely, as they thought, in the President. Montesquieu, in his +"_Esprit des Lois_" had laid down that the great merit of the English +Constitution was the separation of these functions, and the Americans +accepted this view. But, in truth, the English cabinet system had not +then been fully developed. The King was still, not only in appearance, +but to some extent also in fact, the head of the executive, and there +was nothing to indicate that ministers were so soon to become the real +leaders. + +The effect of this provision was a struggle between the two branches for +supremacy, and the legislatures have won. The President has been +degraded to a mere agent, and the legislatures have absorbed the greater +part of executive functions, even to the control of finance. Now, the +framers of the Constitution were apprehensive that the President might +become a mere party agent, and they tried to strengthen his position by +two devices. First, they gave him the power to veto statutes unless +overruled by a two-thirds majority of Congress; and, secondly, they +provided for his election by an electoral college, or by a double system +of election. This second provision was designed to ensure the election +of a President for personal instead of for party reasons; but it has +proved a complete failure. Almost from the first the electoral delegates +have had to pledge themselves to support the party nominee. The veto, +therefore, has also become practically useless. Thus it has come about +that Congress is a body entirely without leaders. + +A second defect in the Constitution was that it said nothing about the +right of any State to withdraw from the Union. After nearly 70 years +this omission was responsible for the Civil War. The legal basis for +secession was then abandoned, but combinations of States have since been +regarded with the greatest apprehension. This conviction that the Union +must be maintained at any price has had very important consequences on +the party system. The danger of allowing combinations of States to +dominate party lines was demonstrated; and the division of each State by +the same national parties was recognized as essential to safety. + +In the meantime, as we have seen, Congress had practically got control +of the executive functions, which were supposed to be exercised by the +President, including the nominations to office. Thus every member of the +party in a majority had a share of the plunder, and "the spoils to the +victors" became the basis of party organization. The system soon +underwent such a remarkable development that nearly 200,000 public +offices were at the disposal of the victors at each election. The party +organizations immediately became omnipotent. The secret of their power +lay in the control of nominations. Each party would nominate one +candidate only, and the electors voted neither for men nor measures, but +blindly for party. As Mr. Bryce declares:--"The class of professional +politicians was therefore the first crop which the spoils system--the +system of using public office as private prize of war--bore. Bosses +were the second crop." + +The development which these party organizations have now reached is +extraordinary. Practically we may say that there are only two +parties--Republicans and Democrats--and they dominate not only Federal +and State politics but also city government. Each party has its list of +registered electors, and each holds a primary election before the real +election, to decide the party candidate. But these primary elections are +a mere matter of form. Only a small fraction of the electors attend +them, and only those who have always supported the party are allowed to +vote. The nominations are therefore really controlled, by fraud if +necessary, by the "ring" of party managers. Generally there is one man +who can pull the most strings, and he becomes the "boss." All power is +centred in the hands of this irresponsible despot. The men who are +elected owe their positions to him, and are responsible to him, not to +the public. + +Remember that these "machine" organizations have absolute sway in every +electorate, from one end of the United States to the other. It may be +wondered why the people tolerate them, but they are powerless. Sometimes +an independent movement is attempted, but it very rarely succeeds, and +even when it does the two "machines" combine against it and agree to +divide the spoils. Mr. Bryce writes:-- + + The disgust is less than a European expects, for it is mingled + with amusement. The "boss" is a sort of joke, albeit an expensive + joke. "After all," people say, "it is our own fault. If we all went + to the primaries, or if we all voted an independent ticket, we + could make an end of the 'boss.'" There is a sort of fatalism in + their view of democracy. (Vol ii., p. 241.) + +What is the meaning of all this wonderful party machinery? It is this: +that organization without responsible leadership can only be founded on +corruption. In other words, _the spoils system is the price which the +United States pay for maintaining the Union under the present +Constitution_. The fault lies ultimately, therefore, in the +Constitution, which tends to repress responsible leadership. + +Now, the mass of public opinion in America, as Mr. Bryce continually +points out, is sound, and attempts have not been wanting to put an end +to the system of rotation in public offices. A sustained agitation for +civil service reform was entered upon, and the system of competitive +examination was applied to a large number of offices. Now at last, the +reformers thought, American politics would be purified. But, no! The +corruption, simply took a new and more alarming turn. Direct money +contributions took the place of the spoils. It became the practice to +levy blackmail on corporations either to be let alone, or for the +purpose of fleecing the public. The monopolies granted to protected +industries are the source of a large share of these "campaign funds." +The Legislatures are crowded by professional lobbyists, and it is, in +consequence, impossible to obtain justice against the corporations. +Surely no stronger proof can be needed that corruption is and must +remain the basis of organization so long as there is no responsible +leadership. + +It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that the Americans are not +alive to the failure of their representative institutions. Since Mr. +Bryce's great work on "The American Commonwealth" was published two +books by American authors have appeared which are very outspoken in +condemnation. These are "The Unforeseen Tendencies of Democracy," by Mr. +E.L. Godkin; and "The Lesson of Popular Government," by Mr. Gamaliel +Bradford. The keynote of the first of these two books is to abolish +corruption by destroying the power of the "machine" and the "boss," and +of the second to introduce responsible leadership. Mr. Godkin traces the +disappearance of distinguished men from public life to the control of +all entrance to it by the "machine." The reform of primary elections, he +holds, is then the first necessity, since "independent voting" has +ceased to be a remedy. But he fails to find a solution. The conclusion +he comes to is as follows:-- + + Is the situation then hopeless? Are we tied up inexorably simply to + a choice of evils? I think not. It seems to me that the nomination + of candidates is another of the problems of democracy which are + never seriously attacked without prolonged perception and + discussion of their importance. One of these was the formation of + the federal government; another was the abolition of slavery; + another was the reform of the civil service. Every one of them + looked hopeless in the beginning; but the solution came in each + case, through the popular determination to find some better way. + (Pp. 92, 93.) + +But the evil goes far deeper than Mr. Godkin appears to think. To +abolish corruption is to take away the present basis of organization +without substituting any other. If irresponsible leadership is to be +abandoned, responsible leadership must be introduced. Mr. Bradford's +plan, therefore, promises more, for if responsible leadership could be +introduced into Congress corruption would then be abolished also. + +Mr. Bradford's whole book may be said to be a study of the relations of +the executive to the legislature, and the conclusions at which he +arrives are a complete vindication of cabinet government. But he finds +one fault, and that is the instability of ministries, which he confesses +has not been apparent so far in the British House of Commons. He holds, +however, that it will become more apparent with the rising tide of +democracy. It is rather amusing to find that the greatest obstacle which +has to be overcome in proposing a responsible executive is the +veneration in which the Constitution is still held and the dislike to +copying anything from England. His plan is, therefore, an adaptation of +the cabinet to the conditions imposed by the Constitution. He holds that +the ministers appointed by the President should sit in Congress and have +control of the initiation of legislation. It is to be feared that this +would hardly realize the idea of responsible leadership. Mr. Bradford +establishes a chain of responsibility by the fact that the ministers are +responsible to the President and the President is responsible to the +people; but that is a very different thing to the continual +responsibility of the cabinet to a majority of the legislature. It is +probable that the President's ministers would have to encounter the +opposition of a majority in one or both Houses, and it is difficult to +see how a deadlock could be avoided. Mr. Bradford contemplates that the +people would settle any issues which arise between the two branches at +the end of the Presidential term of four years; but it is just as likely +that there would then be a new President in any case. We are driven to +the conclusion, therefore, that responsible leadership is incompatible +with the American system of divided powers and fixed terms of office. + +Mr. Bryce comments on the proposal as follows:-- + + It is hard to say, when one begins to make alterations in an old + house, how far one will be led on in rebuilding, and I doubt + whether this change in the present American system, possibly in + itself desirable, might not be found to involve a reconstruction + large enough to put a new face upon several parts of that system. + (Vol. i, pp. 290, 291.) + +This is very true, but is not a new building required? Is not the old +house built on a rotten foundation? Mr. Bradford has certainly +overlooked the effect of his proposal on party organization for one +thing. If the power over legislation, and especially over expenditure of +public money, is to be taken away from the irresponsible committees of +Congress, the basis of party organization would cease to be corruption, +and both representatives and parties would have to take on an entirely +new character. As to the present character of representatives, Mr. Bryce +advances a number of reasons why the best men do not go in for politics, +such as the want of a social and commercial capital, the residential +qualification, the comparative dullness of politics, the attractiveness +of other careers, &c, but Mr. Bradford declares that the one explanation +which goes further than all these is the absorption of all the powers of +the government by the legislature, and the consequent suppression of +individuality. He writes:-- + + The voters are urged to send to Congress men of character, ability, + and public spirit. They might as well be asked to select men of + that quality to follow the profession of burglars, a comparison + which is not intended to convey any disrespect to the number of + honest and respectable men who constantly are sent to Congress. + Chosen as burglars, they would fail just the same in the + business.... It is the organization of Congress which offers every + facility to those who wish to buy and those who wish to be bought. + +Again, as to the present character of parties, Mr. Bradford declares:-- + + The names of the two great parties, Republicans and Democrats, have + in themselves and at the present time no meaning at all. + +Simply because the basis of organization is corruption, and not +questions of public policy. For the same reason recent elections have +been fought on popular "crazes," such as the silver question. But Mr. +Bradford says:-- + + New parties cannot be formed on constantly changing issues, since + to have any strength they must have a certain degree of permanence. + The only two nations which have succeeded in forming great national + parties are Great Britain and the United States. In other European + countries the splitting into groups has almost made representative + government impossible. + +What Mr. Bradford has failed to appreciate is that the absolutely rigid +division into two camps which prevails in America is founded on +corruption, and will disappear when corruption is abolished. In the +United States such a thing as a Congressman deserting one party for the +other is practically unknown. In Great Britain, on the contrary, party +lines do continually change as new issues arise; and when they are +founded on questions of public policy it must be so. What gives them +permanence is that certain principles underlie most questions, and men +who have the same political principles are likely to think the same on +any single question; and further that a member would rather follow his +party and sacrifice his opinion on a single question than sacrifice most +of his principles. + +Therefore, even if the Americans do succeed in purifying their politics, +they will be faced with the same difficulty as exists elsewhere--namely, +such improved organization as will secure the return of representatives +on questions of general public policy only. The present system of +single-membered electorates will not suffice. The only remedy lies in +enlarged electorates with electoral machinery which will organize public +opinion into two definite lines of policy, and will, by allowing +individual candidature merge the primary election into the actual +election. + +All this involves a radical alteration, both in the Constitution and in +the methods of election. But the United States have the great advantage +over France that it does not involve also a serious change in the +national character. It is not unlikely that some such reform must be +brought about before long. + +The present position cannot last. The Republican party has so long +identified itself with Capital in all its forms, with the protected +monopolists, the trusts and the corporations, that the mass of Labour +threatens to support the Democrats; and as the latter party maintains +the doctrines of direct government and the infallibility of the +majority, the result will be such a financial crisis and such an +industrial revolution that the Americans will have at last to admit that +their government needs total reconstruction. + ++Australia.+--On the first day of the nineteenth century the Union of +the Parliaments of Great Britain and Ireland was accomplished; on the +first day of the twentieth century Britain's daughters in the southern +seas will inaugurate, under her ægis, a new experiment in +democracy--the Australian Commonwealth. The time is opportune, then, for +a review of the tendencies of Australian politics, and for a comparison +with the other great democracies. Thus only can we attempt to cast the +horoscope of the new nation. + +Australia starts with many advantages over France and America. The +science of government is better understood now than when they started; +the folly of placing too many checks on the people is recognized; and +the British system of responsible leadership by a cabinet in the +legislature is fully developed. All these features are embodied in the +Constitution, and it only remains for the people to prove their fitness +to work it. + +Applying the same tests as we have used in the case of the great +democracies to the present position of Australian politics, what is the +result? First, as regards organization, where do we stand? It must be +confessed that we are far behind Great Britain and America, though +certainly we are not in the same sad plight as France. Still there is +the fact that we are classed among the failures. Take the evidence of +Mr. E.L. Godkin in "Unforeseen Tendencies of Democracy:"-- + + In his Journals during a visit to Turin in 1850, Senior records a + conversation with Cesare Balbo, a member of the Chamber in the + first Piedmontese Parliament, in which Balbo said, after an + exciting financial debate:--"We have not yet acquired parliamentary + discipline. Most of the members are more anxious about their own + crotchets or their own consistency than about the country. The + ministry has a large nominal majority, but every member of it is + ready to put them in a minority for any whim of his own." This was + probably true of every legislative body on the Continent, and it + continues true to this day in Italy, Greece, France, Austria, + Germany, and the new Australian democracies. (Pp. 102, 103.) + +He adduces in support of the statement the fact that the three colonies +of New South Wales, South Australia, and Victoria have had respectively +twenty-eight, forty-two, and twenty-six ministries in forty years. Is +the prospect any brighter for the new Commonwealth? It is to be feared +not, if the present tendencies towards disintegration are allowed to +grow. For in the last decade a change has come over Australian politics +which portends the gravest danger. We refer to the direct class +representation which, under the name of Labour parties, has spread all +over the colonies. These so-called Labour "parties" are neither more nor +less than class factions. Their policy is everywhere the same--viz., the +use of the "balance system," which has proved so disastrous to France. +The worst effect is that they prevent the main parties from working out +definite policies on public questions, and cause them also to degenerate +into factions. In Victoria we have actually had the ludicrous spectacle +of the Opposition saving the Government time after time when deserted by +its own followers. In New South Wales the individual member is sunk in +the party; he must vote as the majority decides. Mr. Reid's term of +office was ended by one such caucus. In Queensland, where the party is +strongest, it has now practically become one of the main parties, and +the whole colony is divided on class lines. Already an Intercolonial +Labour Conference has been held, and a pledge drawn up which must be +signed by all candidates for the party support at Federal elections. The +danger of these tactics is not rightly apprehended in Australia. In +reality they mark the first step towards social disruption. We may cite +the authority of Mr. James Bryce on this point. After pointing out in +"The American Commonwealth" that since the Civil War combinations of +States have always acted through the national parties, he writes:-- + + This is an important security against disruption. And a similar + security against the risk of civil strife or revolution is to be + found in the fact that the parties are not based on or sensibly + affected by differences either of wealth or of social position. + Their cleavage is not horizontal, according to social strata, but + vertical. This would be less true if it were stated either of the + Northern States separately, or of the Southern States separately: + it is true of the Union taken as a whole. It might cease to be true + if the new Labour party were to grow till it absorbed or superseded + either of the existing parties. The same feature has characterized + English politics as compared with those of most European countries, + and has been a main cause of the stability of the English + government and of the good feeling between different classes in the + community. (Vol. ii., p. 38.) + +How is it that the public conscience is not alive to the enormity of +this anti-social crime? Mainly, we think, because the true principles of +representation are not properly understood. It is almost universally +assumed that there is no real distinction between direct and +representative government. Minorities are tacitly allowed to have as +much right to representation as the minority, and the confusion of terms +is passed over. The working classes are told by self-seeking demagogues +that they are in a majority; that the majority is entitled to rule; and +that they have only to organize to come into their heritage. These +sycophants, who, as Aristotle of old pointed out, bear the greatest +resemblance to the court favourite of the tyrant, ask the people to +believe the silly paradox that the united wisdom of the whole people is +greater than that of the wisest part. The truth is that no people is fit +to exercise equal political rights which is not sensible enough to +choose the wisest part to carry on the government, providing only they +have control over their selection, and can hold them responsible. Are +the working classes in Australia going to demonstrate that they are +unfit for the exercise of political rights? Are they going to justify +the prognostications of the opponents of popular government? That is the +real question at issue. Unless public opinion be aroused to the iniquity +of class delegation, the further degradation of Australian politics is +inevitable. Let it not be thought that we are decrying the organization +of the working classes for political purposes. On the contrary, we hold +that the organization of every class and every interest is necessary in +order that it shall exert its just share of influence. But the only way +in which every class can get its just share is by acting through the +two main parties. A class which holds aloof can exert for a short time +an undue share of influence, as a faction holding the balance of power, +but only at the expense of paralyzing the government. + +But the working classes are hardly to be blamed in this matter, for it +is a fact that before their action they were not able to exert their +just share of influence. The government was such as to promote the rule +of private interests instead of the general welfare, and, consequently, +their interests were shamefully neglected. The real cause of the +mischief was, as in America, the nominating system, which is inseparably +connected with the present method of election. The consideration of this +question brings us to the second characteristic of Australian +politics--namely, the irresponsible leadership of the press. + +We have seen how in America organization has been effected without +responsible leadership in Congress, only at the expense of the +irresponsible leadership of the "rings" and "bosses" who control the +"machines." In Australia an analogous result has been brought about by +different causes. We have not had civil strife to teach us the necessity +of organization, nor have we a spoils system available as a basis, but +the disorganized state of the legislatures and the consequent weakness +of the executive have thrown a large share of leadership into the hands +of the press. Both in America and in Australia the prevalence of the +ultra-democratic theory that representatives should follow and not lead +the people has been a powerful contributing cause. And yet it is as +clear as possible that the choice lies between two alternatives. The +people must either submit to responsible leadership in Parliament or to +irresponsible leadership outside. The ultra-democrats hold that +responsible leadership in Parliament is incompatible with popular +government. We believe that this is the fundamental error which is +leading both the Australian and the American democracies astray. On the +contrary, it is the irresponsible despotism which is exercised by the +"bosses" in America and the newspapers in Australia which is really +incompatible with free government. + +The source of the error lies in the failure to grasp the meaning of the +term "responsible leadership." It is assumed that either the people must +lead and the representatives follow, or the representatives must lead +and the people follow. Bagehot may be taken as an exponent of the latter +position. He thought that cabinet government was only possible with a +deferential nation as opposed to a democratic nation. England he held to +be the type of deferential nations, because the people were content to +leave the government to the "great governing families"--_i.e._, to defer +to caste, which is in principle the same as deferring to a king, who is +supposed to rule by divine right. Mr. Bradford also gives a somewhat +exaggerated idea of the importance of the force of personality when he +declares that the mass of the people have no "views" on public +questions; all they want is to be well governed. The late Professor +Freeman Snow, of Harvard University, U.S., was a supporter of the +ultra-democratic view. In the "Annals of the American Academy of +Political and Social Science" for July, 1892, he declares:-- + + Mr. Bryce thinks that, "like other crowds, a legislature must be + led and ruled." And he has formulated a theory which he believes to + be "the essence of free or popular government, and the + justification for vesting power in numbers." "Every question that + arises in the conduct of government," he asserts, "is either a + question of ends or a question of means." And as the "masses are + better judges of what will conduce to their happiness than are + the-classes placed above them, they must be allowed to determine + ends." But, assuming the end to be given, they--the masses--should + leave to their leaders--the trained statesmen--the choice of means. + The defect in this theory is that it depends for its successful + operation upon the continued "deference of the multitude for the + classes placed above them ... upon the principle of _noblesse + oblige_," a principle, by the way, derived from feudal monarchy, + which has no existence in the United States, and which ought to be + considered a misfortune in any free country.... + + Mr. Bryce has made a step in advance of Mr Bagehot in trusting the + people to determine ends, whatever they may be; why not go one step + further, and trust them to determine all questions of policy? + +These are the two opposite points of view. They are both equally wrong. +The first is simply irresponsible leadership, and the second amounts to +the same thing in practice, however much the people may appear to lead +in theory. The true position is that the relation between the +representatives and the people is reciprocal. Both lead and both follow. +The people defer to the representatives, not on account of rank or +caste, nor upon the principle of _noblesse oblige_, but only in so far +as the representatives are able to demonstrate their fitness to devise +measures for the general welfare. The people, on the other hand, are the +ultimate judges, both of measures and of men. This mutual action and +reaction constitutes the responsible leadership, which is one of the +fundamental principles underlying the device of representation. To it we +have already traced the virtue of representation as a social force, +capable of moulding national character and of appealing to the higher +nature of the people. + +An elector who is unable or unwilling to decide grave questions of +public policy himself may be a very shrewd judge as to who is best +fitted to decide them; and deference to ability is totally different in +principle to deference to caste. In a country in the transitional stage +between aristocracy and democracy, his judgment may be based partly on +the principle of _noblesse oblige_; but there is not the slightest +reason why in a democratic country he should require the representative +to defer to him. He will merely require a higher standard and a closer +and a more constant demonstration that the measures proposed are +conducive to the public well-being. Moreover, it is still necessary that +the representatives should be judged periodically on general lines of +policy, and that the elector should not have the power of exercising +control on single questions. Under these conditions the result of the +mutual relation will be an improvement on both sides. But if, under the +influence of irresponsible leadership outside Parliament, the people +insist on increasing control over their representatives, then not only +is Parliament degraded, but progress towards government in the general +welfare is stopped. + +This long digression as to the real meaning of responsible leadership is +necessary in order to gauge the drift of the prevailing tendency towards +the irresponsible leadership of the press in Australia. The evil exists +in all the colonies, but it is perhaps worse in our own colony of +Victoria than in any other country in the world, although it is said to +be very bad in Switzerland since the referendum was introduced. We have +two morning newspapers in Melbourne, which take opposite sides on nearly +every question which arises. They admit into their columns no facts and +no arguments which tell against the position they have taken up; nay, +more, they resort to downright misrepresentation to support it. It will +be said that this is only a form of the party game, but the danger lies +in the fact that they circulate in different classes, and therefore +these classes see only one side of every question. Moreover, in their +competition for the support of classes in which they desire to increase +their circulation they use their influence to secure legislation which +will appeal to class prejudices, or even undertake a prolonged agitation +to relieve special interests from legitimate charges. The _Age_ has for +a long time thrived by pandering to the prejudices of the working +classes, and especially of the artisans; the _Argus_ now seeks to get +even by creating dissension between town and country. + +All this interference with the functions of Parliament has a baneful +influence on the working of the political machine. The party lines are +practically decided by the newspaper contest. We have spoken of the +resemblance to the "machine" control over American politics. One of the +newspapers is, in effect, managed by a "ring," the other by a "boss." +The despotism of David Syme in Melbourne is as unquestioned as that of +Richard Croker in New York, or Matthew Quay in Pennsylvania. How close +the analogy is may be inferred from the fact that Mr. Syme has +exercised, and still claims the right to exercise, control over +nominations to Parliament. It is notorious that the ten delegates who +"represented" Victoria at the Federation Convention were elected on the +_Age_ "ticket." Again, Mr. Syme is known as "the father of protection," +and has been able, by the force of his indomitable will, to impose on +the colony a tariff which can be compared only to the M'Kinley tariff +in America, thus showing that irresponsible leadership in either form is +more favourable to the rule of private interests than to the general +welfare. + +We have said enough to show that in internal affairs the influence of +the press, when it directly interferes with Parliament is an anti-social +force. In matters of foreign policy the case is still worse. The press +is almost universally jingoistic, because it is financially interested +in sensationalism. A war generally means a fortune to newspaper +proprietors. In such matters, therefore, responsible leadership by +Parliament is still more urgently required. + +We now come to the claim of those ultra-democrats who preach the +poisonous doctrines of direct government and of unrestrained majority +rule, that responsible leadership is incompatible with popular +government. This claim, is of course, supported by the radical press in +Australia. We have already quoted from Mr. Syme's work on +"Representative Government in England" the extreme views in which he +confuses representation with delegation. "Popular government," he +declares, "can only exist where the people can exercise control over +their representatives at all times and under all circumstances." The +method proposed to obtain this control is to give a majority of the +constituents power to dismiss a representative at any time, and is +utterly impracticable. Imagine the position of a member elected by a +majority of one or two votes! The true way to prevent members abusing +their trust is not to increase the direct control of the people, but to +prevent the control of the press and all other irresponsible agencies +over them; and so to ensure the return of better men. + +Perhaps the most striking anomaly in Mr. Syme's position is that, while +he would confine the office of Parliament to expressing public opinion, +he declares in the same work that "the press at once forms and expresses +public opinion."[2] Now, it is quite true that if Parliament is weak and +disorganized, or occupies itself in fighting for the spoils of office, +the power of forming public opinion is thrown into the hands of the +press. But the more power is seized by the press, the more Parliament is +degraded, and the less is the chance of recovery. The situation presents +little difficulty to Mr. Syme. Every newspaper reader, he declares, +"becomes, as it were, a member of that vast assembly, which may be said +to embrace the whole nation, so widely are newspapers now read. Had we +only the machinery for recording the votes of that assembly, we might +easily dispense with Parliament altogether." + +These ideas are not of mere academic interest; they have dominated the +trend of Victorian politics for many years. The time has now arrived for +the people to consider whether it is better to keep a Parliament of weak +delegates to express the public opinion which is formed by the press +than to elect a Parliament of "leaders of the people," highly-trained +legists, economists, and sociologists, to form and direct the public +opinion which is expressed by the newspapers. Why should the principle +of leadership, as exemplified in Mr. Syme's own career, be given full +scope in the press, and entirely repressed in Parliament? As to the kind +of influence we mean, no better description could be given than that of +the well-known Labour leader, Mr. H.H. Champion. In an open letter to +Mr. David Syme in the _Champion_ of 22nd June, 1895, he wrote:-- + + Yet, if you rose to-morrow morning with the resolve to dismiss the + ministry or to reverse the policy of the country, to stop + retrenchment or to recommence borrowing, that resolve would + infallibly translate itself into fact in a few weeks. + + In no country that I know of has any organ in the press so much + influence as your paper. It is practically the sole source of + information for the majority of the people. It has no competitors. + It can make any person or policy popular or unpopular. It can fail + to report any man or thing, and for four-fifths of the citizens it + is as though that man or thing were not. It can misrepresent any + speech or movement, and the printed lie alone will reach the + electors. It could teach the people anything you choose. It has + ruled the country for a couple of decades. It rules the country + to-day. + +Professor Jethro Brown shows himself alive to the danger of press +domination in Australia. In "The New Democracy" he writes:--"The +_prestige_ of Parliament is destroyed when its deliberations and +conclusions cease to be the determining factor in legislation. The +transfer of the real responsibility for legislation to a new power +implies the discrediting of the old school for training leaders." And he +quotes with approval the expression of opinion by the Honourable B.R. +Wise in the Federal Convention:-- + + There may be, as Mr. David Syme suggests, no risk involved in the + change of masters; but for my part I would sooner trust the + destinies of the country to the worst Parliament the people of + Australia would elect than to the best newspaper the mind of man + has ever imagined. + +It is little use, therefore, for the press to further degrade Parliament +in the eyes of the people by railing at it in the following terms:-- + + So it is that Parliament as a working machine is about the + clumsiest and least effective that can be conceived of. All our + Parliaments are modelled on the necessities of bygone centuries. We + want a working Parliament improved up to date; but we lack + political invention, and have to jog along with the old lumbering + machine--a sort of bullock dray trying to compete with an age of + electric railways and motor cars.[3] + +The remedy lies with the press itself. Let it abandon all illegitimate +influence, and use its power in a legitimate direction to give effect to +the principles of organization and responsible leadership in Parliament. +But just as the Labour faction cannot altogether be blamed for the +present disintegration of Parliament, so the press cannot be held +responsible for its degradation. In both eases cause and effect have +been interrelated. The mistake which the press has made has been in not +perceiving that the more it interferes with the legitimate functions of +Parliament, even although with the best intentions, the more it degrades +Parliament. + +We have now passed in review the two great dangers which assail the +Commonwealth at the inception of federation. We have shown how +intimately related they are to the two great principles underlying +representative government--organization and leadership. Nay, we have +seen that all the varied phenomena presented by the great democracies of +the world can be expressed in terms of the same two principles. + +It remains to show that to give effect to the expression of these two +principles in a more perfect manner than ever yet attained is a problem +of electoral machinery. This task we shall now undertake. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[2] "Representative Government in England," p. 123. + +[3] _Age_, 28th June, 1900. + + + + +CHAPTER IV. + +THE REFORM: TRUE PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. + + +How to give effect to the principles of organization and leadership in +an electoral reform--that is the problem which we shall now attempt to +solve. We have already laid down the theoretical requirements, which are +(1) proportional representation to the two parties--the majority and the +minority, and (2) the election by each party separately of its most +popular leaders; and we shall now have to consider also how these +requirements are modified by practical considerations. + ++Proportional Representation to the Two Parties, the Majority and the +Minority.+--It will be as well to illustrate the method proposed by +reference to the conditions imposed by an actual election, such as that +for the Federal Senate. The Commonwealth Bill provides that each State +shall be polled as a single electorate, returning six senators. Suppose +that 120,000 electors vote on party lines in any State. It is clear that +a party which has the support of 20,000 electors is entitled to one +senator; also, that a party which has the support of 40,000 electors is +entitled to two senators; of 60,000 electors to three senators, and so +on. Now, suppose that one party has the support of 50,000 electors, and +the other of 70,000 electors, then the minority is entitled to two and a +half senators, and the majority to three and a half senators. But +senators are living units, and cannot be divided into fractions. The +question therefore arises, Which is entitled to the odd senator, the +majority or the minority? And the answer is that they are both equally +entitled to him; for it is as much a tie as if each party has the +support of 10,000 electors in a single-seat electorate. But if the +minority had the support of 49,999 electors, or one elector less, it +would be entitled to only two senators, and if it had the support of +50,001 electors, or one elector more, it would be entitled to three +senators. + +From the above simple facts can be deduced general rules applicable to +any particular case. It is evident that the result is not affected by +the number of votes allowed to each elector, providing only that each +elector has the same number of votes. It is also quite irrespective of +the number of candidates nominated in the interests of each party. But +it would never do to allow party organizations to control nominations. +How are we to combine individual candidature with party nomination? The +only way to do this is to require that each candidate shall declare, +either when nominating or a few days before the election, on which side +of the House he intends to sit, and be classified accordingly as +Ministerialist or Oppositionist. To decide the relative strengths of the +two parties, it is then only necessary to take the aggregate votes +polled by all the candidates nominated for each party as a measure of +the amount of support which it receives. + +The great advantages of this provision are at once apparent. There is no +incentive to limit the number of candidates so as to prevent splitting +the votes. On the contrary, it is to the interest of each party to get +as many strong candidates as possible to stand in its interests. There +will be no necessity to ask any candidate to retire for fear of losing a +seat to the party. Thus the control of nominations, which leads to the +worst abuses of the present system, will be entirely obviated. + +Now, suppose that in the instance we have already given each elector is +allowed to vote for one candidate only, the total number of votes +recorded will be 120,000. Then the _unit of representation_ or number of +votes which entitle a party to one senator will be 20,000 votes; each +party will be entitled to one senator for every whole unit of +representation, and the odd senator will go to the party having the +larger remainder. For instance, if the aggregate votes polled by all the +Ministerialist candidates be 72,000, and by the Oppositionist candidates +48,000, the Ministerialists, having three units plus 12,000 remainder, +are entitled to four senators, and the Opposition, having two units plus +8,000, to two senators. + +Similarly, if each elector be allowed to vote for a number of +candidates, all these figures will be increased in proportion. For +example, if each elector has three votes, the unit of representation +would be 60,000 votes. The following general rules may therefore be +stated:-- + + 1. The unit of representation is equal to the total number of valid + votes cast at the election, divided by the number of seats. + + 2. Each party is entitled to one seat for every whole unit of + representation contained in the aggregate votes polled by all its + candidates, and the odd seat goes to the party which has the larger + remainder. + +The fact that the last seat has to be assigned to the party which has +the larger remainder is sometimes advanced as an objection, but it is +evidently the fairest possible division that the size of the electorate +will permit. Of course, the larger the electorate the more accurately +proportioned will be the representation. Hence the representation would +be most accurate if the whole assembly were elected in one large +electorate. But if, for the sake of convenience, the assembly be elected +in a large number of electorates in which the relative proportions of +two parties vary the gains which a party makes in some electorates will +be balanced by losses in others, so that the final result would be +almost as accurate as if the whole country were polled as one +electorate. It must be remembered that the result in any electorate +cannot be foreseen, and that it is a matter of chance which party gains +the advantage. Now, if the limits of variation comprise even a single +unit of representation, each party will stand an equal chance of +gaining, and therefore the laws of chance will ensure that the gains +balance the losses in the different electorates. Supposing a party which +averages 40 per cent. in the whole country to vary between 30 per cent. +and 50 per cent, in the different electorates (which may be taken as a +fair assumption), the unit of representation should equal 20 per cent., +or one-fifth. Under these conditions the laws of chance will ensure +correct representation, so long as the electorates do not contain less +than five seats. + +The above facts furnish a complete answer to the arguments advanced by +Mr. J.W. M'Cay, ex-M.L.A., in a series of articles in the _Age_ against +the application of proportional representation to the Federal Senate. +While apparently recognizing that it is utterly impossible for the +minority to secure a majority of the representation, he based his +objection solely on the fact that a minority is able with electorates +containing an even number of seats to secure one-half of the +representation, and thus lead to what he terms "the minority block." + +The force of the objection will entirely depend on the size of the +minority which is able thus to thwart the will of the majority. The +Federal Senate will consist of 36 senators, each of the original States +contributing six. No reasonable man would complain if the minority, +being only entitled to 17 senators, actually returned 18, but Mr. M'Cay +points out that it is possible for a minority entitled to 15 senators to +return 18. To bring about this result he makes the absurd assumption +that in each of the six States the minority polls exactly two whole +units of representation, and a bare majority of a third unit. It is safe +to say that this would not happen once in a thousand years. If the +relative proportions of the two parties vary in the slightest in the +different States some must be under and some over the assumed +proportion. It is most probable that it will be under it in three States +and over it in the other three States; and, under these circumstances, +the party will return 15 senators, the exact number to which it is +entitled. It may happen to be under the assumed proportion in only two +of the States and over in the other four, and that the party will get +one more senator than it is entitled to; but it is extremely improbable +that it will get two more, and virtually impossible that it will get +three more senators than its just proportion. Mr. M'Cay's conclusion +that proportional representation can only be used in electorates +returning an odd number of representatives is shown to be entirely +unwarranted. Equally fallacious is Professor Nanson's rebutting +statement that "scientific proportionalists recommend odd electorates." +While the number of States remains even, the mathematical chance of a +minority securing one-half of the representation is precisely the same +whether the States return an odd or an even number of senators. As a +matter of fact, the danger of a minority securing one-half of the +representation is much greater at the intermediate elections for the +Senate, when each State returns three senators, the reason being the +smaller field. + +We have dwelt at some length on the preceding example, because it serves +to refute another error into which some of the proportionalists have +fallen. It is held that the unit of representation should be ascertained +by dividing the total votes, not by the number of seats, but by the +seats increased by one. This unit is generally known as the Droop quota, +having been proposed in a work published by Mr. H.R. Droop in 1869. +Since one vote more than one-half of the total votes is sufficient for +election in a single-seat electorate, it is argued that one vote more +than one-third suffices in a two-seat electorate, one vote more than +one-fourth in a three-seat electorate, and so on. The unit in a six-seat +electorate would be one-seventh of the votes instead of one-sixth, and +it is pointed out that by this means the whole six seats would be filled +by whole units, leaving an unrepresented residuum of one-seventh of the +votes divided between the two parties. + +The error lies precisely as before in concentrating attention on one of +the electorates, and in neglecting the theory of probability. The Droop +quota introduces the condition that each party must pay a certain +minimum number of votes for each seat, and the real distinction is that, +instead of the minority and the majority having an equal chance of +securing any advantage, the chances are in the same proportion as their +relative strengths. If the majority be twice as strong as the minority, +it will have twice the chance of gaining the advantage. To prove this, +consider the position of a one-third minority in a number of five-seat +electorates. The Droop quota being one-sixth of the votes, the minority +will secure two seats or 40 per cent. in those electorates where it is +just over one-third, and one seat or 20 per cent. where it is just +under. Since the mathematical chances are that it will be over in one +half and under in the other half, it will, on the average, secure only +30 per cent., although entitled to 33 per cent. Again, if the 670 +members of the House of Commons were elected in three to five-seat +electorates, and the Droop quota used as proposed by Sir John Lubbock, +and if the Ministerialists were twice as strong as the Oppositionists, +they would, on the average, return 30 more members than the two-thirds +to which they are entitled, and this would count 60 members on a +division. + +The following table illustrates the erroneous result obtained by +applying the Droop quota when a number of grouped-electorates are +concerned. It will be noticed that where parties are nearly equal it +makes very little difference which unit is used:-- + ++-------------+--------------------------------------------+ +| STRENGTH OF | AVERAGE REPRESENTATION. | +| +----------------------+---------------------+ +| PARTY |Five-Seat Electorates.|Ten-Seat Electorates.| ++-------------+----------------------+---------------------+ +| 10 per cent.| 2 per cent. | 6 per cent. | +| 20 " " | 14 " " | 17 " " | +| 30 " " | 26 " " | 28 " " | +| 40 " " | 38 " " | 39 " " | +| 50 " " | 50 " " | 50 " " | ++-------------+----------------------+---------------------+ + +The Droop quota, therefore, gives, not proportional, but disproportional +representation. + ++Election by Each Party of its Most Popular Candidates.+--Still keeping +in mind the six-seat electorate for the Federal Senate, we may note that +there are two rival systems in the field--the _scrutin de liste_ or +Block Vote, in which each elector votes for any six of the candidates, +and the Hare system, which allows each elector an effective vote for one +candidate only. The adoption of either of these systems would be +unfortunate. To force each elector to vote for six candidates is +probably to require him to vote for more than he is inclined to support, +and certainly for more than his party is entitled to return; and, also, +to put it in the power of the majority to return all six senators. To +allow him to vote for one candidate only, on the other hand, is to break +up both parties into factions by allowing the favourites of sections +within the parties to be elected, instead of those most in general +favour with all sections composing each party. An intermediate position +is therefore best. No elector should be required to vote for more than +three candidates, and no elector should be allowed to vote for less. +Because in the first place it is evident that each party will, on the +average, return three senators, and, secondly, it may be taken for +granted that even the minority will nominate at least three candidates. +Two alternative proposals may be submitted as fulfilling these +conditions:-- + + _1. Each elector should vote for any three candidates, or + + 2. Each elector should have six votes, and have the option of giving + two votes to individual candidates._ + +The first plan is the simpler, but the second is probably the better, as +it allows more discrimination without sacrificing any of the advantages. +Either proposal is practically equivalent to applying the Block Vote to +each party separately; and whatever may be the objections to applying +the Block Vote to two or more parties it is the simplest and best system +to elect the candidates most in general favour when one party only is +concerned. It is true that the majority will return rather more than +one-half of the representatives and the minority rather less than +one-half, so that the minority will have more votes in proportion to its +strength. But with two parties of fairly equal but fluctuating strength +the fairest way is to require each elector to vote for at least one-half +of the number of representatives. Besides, apart from the fact that it +is not known before the election how many seats each party will obtain, +it is absolutely necessary that each elector shall have the same number +of votes in order that each party be allotted its just share of +representation. Moreover it is not proposed to limit the elector's +freedom of choice in the slightest by confining him to the candidates of +one party. The great majority of electors will vote on party lines, +because every vote given to a candidate of the opposing party tells +against the representation of their own party. The reason of this is +that every vote counts individually for the candidate and collectively +for the whole party. Any elector, therefore, who divides his voting +power equally between the two parties practically wastes it as far as +the party representation is concerned. But it is neither necessary nor +desirable to bring about such a rigid party division as prevails in +America, for instance, where a man is born, lives, and dies Republican +or Democrat. If electors were confined to the candidates of one party, +an elector who wished to vote for an individual candidate of the +opposing party would be placed in the dilemma of deserting either his +favourite or his party. The division into parties is really required in +the elected body, and not in the constituent body. + ++Rules for the Reform.+--We are now in a position to draw up a list of +rules for the proposed reform, applicable to all legislatures in which +party government prevails:-- + +1. Electorates to be grouped so as to contain at least three seats, and +preferably not less than five seats nor more than twenty seats. + +2. Candidates to declare when nominating, or a few days before the +election, whether they are in favour of or opposed to the party in +power, and to be classified accordingly as Ministerialists or +Oppositionists. + +3. Ballot papers to contain the names of all candidates nominated, +arranged in two parallel columns, one headed Ministerialists, and the +other Oppositionists. The list of candidates under each heading to be +arranged in alphabetical order. + +4. Each elector to have as many votes as there are seats, and to be +allowed to give either one or two votes to any candidate. The votes to +be distributed as he pleases among all the candidates of both lists. + +5. The total number of valid votes cast at the election to be divided by +the number of seats; the quotient to be known as the "unit of +representation." + +6. Each party to be allowed one seat for every whole unit of +representation contained in the aggregate votes polled by all its +candidates, and the last seat to go to the party which has the larger +remainder. + +7. The candidates of each party having the highest number of votes to be +declared elected to the number of seats to which each party is entitled +in accordance with the preceding rule. + +8. In case of a tie between candidates or parties the lot decides. + +The alternative plan for rule 4, which is somewhat simpler, would read +as follows:-- + +4. Each elector to vote for half the number of candidates that there are +seats, _i.e._, three votes in a five or six-seat electorate, four votes +in a seven or eight-seat electorate, &c. The votes to be distributed as +he pleases among all the candidates of both lists. + +It is unnecessary to dwell on the absolute simplicity of these rules. +They involve no radical departure from existing methods of voting or of +counting votes. Once the totals are added up, the calculations necessary +to decide the successful candidates are within the reach of a school +child. + +EXAMPLE.--Take as an example 13 candidates in a six-seat electorate who +poll as follows:-- + + MINISTERIALISTS. OPPOSITIONISTS. +BROWN 83,000 YOUNG 53,000 +RYAN 74,000 BELL 51,000 +COX 44,000 HUME 47,000 +WHITE 42,000 JONES 45,000 +PEEL 38,000 BLACK 34,000 +ADAMS 35,000 ------- +GREY 33,000 230,000 +SWIFT 21,000 + ------- + 370,000 + +Total votes = 370,000 + 230,000 = 600,000. + +Unit of representation = 600,000/6 = 100,000. + +Ministerialists: 3 units + 70,000 remainder = 4 seats. + +Oppositionists: 2 units + 30,000 remainder = 2 seats. + +The Ministerialists, having the larger remainder, secure the last seat. +The successful candidates are Brown, Ryan, Cox, and White (M.), Young +and Bell (O.) + +It will be noted that without the proportional principle the +Ministerialists would have returned two members only, and the +Oppositionists four. + +It is to be distinctly understood that the simpler plan of voting for +half the number of candidates that there are seats is practically as +good as the other. In order to show, however, that the plan we have +favoured may be simplified, we illustrate by a sample ballot paper a +method which has been used in Belgium. Two white spots are printed +opposite each candidate's name. An ink pad and stamp are then provided +at each polling booth, and the elector stamps out a white spot for each +vote he wishes to give. In the paper illustrated two votes are given to +Brown, two to Jones, one to Grey, and one to Swift. This elector has, +therefore, given two-thirds of his voting power to the Ministerial +party, and one-third to the Opposition, and has thus directly influenced +both policies. A further advantage of the proposal is the ease with +which such a paper can be read by the returning officer. + + +BALLOT PAPER + + * * * * * + +Ministerialists. Oppositionists. + ++---------------+ +---------------+ +| | | | | | +| o o | ADAMS | | o o | BELL | +| | | | | | ++---------------+ +---------------+ +| | | | | | +| x x | BROWN | | o o | BLACK | +| | | | | | ++-----+---------+ +---------------+ +| | | | | | +| o o | COX | | o o | HUME | +| | | | | | ++-----+---------+ +---------------+ +| | | | | | +| o x | GREY | | x x | JONES | +| | | | | | ++-----+---------+ +---------------+ +| | | | | | +| o o | PEEL | | o o | YOUNG | +| | | | | | ++-----+---------+ +---------------+ +| | | +| o o | RYAN | +| | | ++-----+---------+ +| | | +| x o | SWIFT | +| | | ++-----+---------+ +| | | +| o o | WHITE | +| | | ++-----+---------+ + +1. You are allowed Six votes, and can give either one or two votes to +any candidate on either list. + +2. Stamp out one of the white spots if you wish to give a candidate one +vote. + +3. Stamp out the two white spots if you wish to give a candidate two +votes. + +4. Your ballot paper will be invalid if you stamp out more or less than +Six white spots. + ++Character of Parties.+--We must now prove that the methods proposed +will actually organize the people into two coherent parties. Let us +suppose either party to be composed of three sections. The problem is to +induce these three sections to work together, and to sink their petty +differences in the general interest, in short to unite as a party, +aiming at the control of administration with a definite policy on public +questions. Let us further suppose the party entitled to three +representatives. Now, it is quite conceivable that exactly the same +three candidates would be elected if each elector had any number of +votes from one to three, and this would actually tend to be the case the +more united the party is. But herein lies the difference: that with one +vote only any one section holding narrow and violent views can return an +independent delegate, and therefore has a direct inducement to do so, +while with three votes it is forced to work with the other two sections, +for if it refuses to do so it is in their power to exclude its nominee. +It is this power to exclude independent factions which is the first +requisite to prevent the main parties degenerating into factions. Now, +the advocates of the Hare system declare that each elector should have +one effective vote only, no matter how many seats the party is entitled +to. The elector would therefore only express his opinion as to the +delegate of his own section, and not as to the constitution of the whole +party, and there would be nothing whatever to prevent the election of +the favourites of sections, instead of the representatives most in +general favour with all sections. + +But if there were only one party it would be impossible to make all the +sections work together in this manner. Some of them would combine into a +majority of the party, and would exclude the minority. With two great +competing parties, however, the case is quite different. So far from +either party wishing to exclude any small minority, both will compete +for its support, providing only that it will fall into line with the +other sections on the main questions of policy. Each section will +therefore support the party which will consent to embody the most +favourable compromise of its demands in its policy. If its demands are +such that both parties refuse to entertain them, it will exercise no +influence in the direction of furthering its own views. From this +statement it is evident that no system of independent direct +proportional representation within the party can be recognized as a +right to which the different sections are entitled, as it would +inevitably break up the party, and lead to sectional delegation. The +sections would then change in character, and become violent factions. +But, nevertheless, if the sections work together as described, every +section will be proportionately represented in the party policy, and +therefore by every representative of the party. Moreover, no section can +dictate to either party, or obtain more than a fair compromise. For all +the sections are interdependent, and any section which attempts to exert +more than its just share of influence will sink in general favour, and +will find those who are inclined to support its pretensions rejected at +the election. + +The difference between the two stages of representation may now be +clearly appreciated. In the first stage we have seen that the fear of +the aggression of the monarchy held all sections together in one party. +In the second stage, however, it has been abundantly demonstrated by +experience that the fear of each other will not hold the sections of the +two parties together. The electoral machinery must, therefore, supply +the deficiency. + ++Party Lines.+--With the altered character of parties there is ground +for hope that the basis of division will become questions of general +public policy, and that all causes of factious dissension and of social +disruption will tend to be repressed. This improvement is indeed +urgently needed. For if in any country party lines are decided by +geographical considerations, as town _v._ country; by class, as Capital +_v._ Labour; by race as in South Africa; by religion as in Belgium; or +by personal ambition for the spoils of office--in any of these cases the +future of that country is open to the gravest doubt. + +Perhaps the greatest danger which assails most democratic countries +to-day is the risk of the working classes being persuaded by demagogues +that equal political rights have been extended to them in order that +they shall govern, instead of in order that they shall not be +misgoverned. If the general welfare is to be advanced, all classes must +influence the policies of both parties. This condition is indispensable +to bring about the ideal condition of two parties differing only as to +what is best for all. + +Equally to be condemned is the narrow-minded and intolerant view of +those who can see no virtue in an opposing party; who define, for +instance, the distinction between parties as the party for things as +they are, and the party for things as they ought to be; the latter +being, of course, their own party. This is one of the objectionable +features of Australian newspaper-made politics. + +A more rational view of the distinction which often underlies party +divisions is between those who desire change and those who oppose +change. J.S. Mill points out how the latter may often be useful in +preventing progress in a wrong direction. There are times when such +attitude is called for, but generally speaking we may say that the +fundamental distinction between parties should be a difference of +opinion as to the direction of progress. Nor is it inconsistent for a +party to change its opinion or alter its policy; on the contrary, it is +essential to progress. The majority must often modify its policy in the +light of the criticism of the minority, and the minority must often drop +the unpopular proposals which have put it in a minority. These features +are all essential to the working of the political machine. + ++The Character of Representatives.+--Granting that all sections of each +party can be induced to work together, the beneficial effect on the +character of representatives would be incalculable. Instead of being +forced to pander to every small section for support, they would appeal +to all sections. The enlarged electorates which are contemplated would +be arranged to embrace the widest diversity of interest, and a +representative would then be free to follow his own independent +judgment, unfettered by the dictation of small cliques. His actions +might offend some sections who supported his election; but he has a wide +field, and may gain the support of other sections by them. Therefore, he +may actually improve his position by gaining more supporters than he +loses. Contrast this with the present system, in which the +representatives are cooped up in single-membered electorates to denned +sets of supporters. The very principle of community of interest on which +these electorates must be arranged in order to get a fair result is +destructive of the idea of representation. It is no wonder, then, that +the present system is tending towards delegation. Local delegation we +have always had, more or less, but we are now threatened by class +delegation also. + +The conclusion of Mr. Kent in "The English Radicals" may be quoted on +this point. He says:-- + + The question of the relationship of members to their constituents + is at the present time perplexed and undetermined; for though the + control of Parliament by the people is an indisputable fact, yet it + is maintained by means of quite another kind from those which the + early Radicals proposed. The result is somewhat paradoxical, for + while the system of pledges has been contemptuously rejected, yet + the theory that a member is a delegate tacitly prevails in English + politics. That members of the House of Commons have tended and do + tend to lose their independence it is impossible to doubt. A + distinguished French publicist, M. Boutmy, for instance, has + remarked the fact; and he thinks that in consequence a + deterioration of the tone of politicians is likely to recur. Mr. + E.L. Godkin, an American writer, whose judgments are entitled to + respect, has expressed much the same opinion; "the delegate + theory," he says, "has been gaining ground in England, and in + America has almost completely succeeded in asserting its sway, so + that we have seen many cases in which members of Congress have + openly declared their dissent from the measures for which they + voted in obedience to their constituents." + +It is one of the greatest merits of the proposed reform that this vexed +question of representation or delegation would be definitely settled. +For, although the area of independent action is enlarged, definite +limits are set to it. + ++Possible Objections.+--We may now reply to some objections which have +been or might be urged. At the outset we would point out that the +critics nearly always base their objections on the conditions which have +prevailed in the past or do exist in the present chaotic state of +parties; and seldom appreciate the fact that they would lose force if a +better condition could be brought about. Let us take the Melbourne +_Argus_ report of Professor Nanson's objections:-- + + Professor Nanson pointed out that the scheme depended for its + efficacy on the existence of party government, which the Professor + was glad to say was being pushed more and more into the background. + He took a practical illustration from the defeat of the O'Loghlen + Government in 1883. In that case, after the election the Government + came back with a following of one-tenth. The other combined party + had nine-tenths, and of these a little more than half were Liberals + and a little less than half were Conservatives. He pointed out that + under Mr. Ashworth's system the Liberals would have got the whole + of the Opposition seats and the Conservatives none, whereas under + any intelligent modification of the Hare system the parties would + have been returned in the proportion of five Liberals, four + Conservatives, and one O'Loghlenite. The system contained the evils + of the _scrutin de liste_ doubled by being applied to two parties, + the evils of the Limited Vote, which had been condemned by all + leading statesmen, and it played into the hands of these who were + best able to organize. + +Take the latter statements first. The evil of the Block Vote or +_scrutin de liste_ is that it gives all the representation to the +majority, and excludes the minority; its merit is that it prevents the +formation of a number of minorities. How this evil will be doubled if it +is entirely removed by allowing both majority and minority their just +share of representation we leave the Professor to explain. The statement +that the scheme would play into the hands of those who are best able to +organize is absolutely without foundation. On the contrary, the +organization is automatic. It would certainly encourage the formation of +organizations to influence the policies of the parties, since every +organization would be able to exert its proportionate influence, but +that is an advantage, not an evil. We will leave the statement about +party government alone, and now take the "practical illustration." The +Professor here assumes three distinct parties, but it is quite evident +there are only two. It is not usual for Liberal Unionists and +Conservatives to fight one another at elections in Great Britain at +present. In the same way, if a section of Liberals and a section of +Conservatives unite to oppose a Government, they will work together and +not try to exclude one another. Moreover, they will have a common +policy, so that it matters little who are elected so long as they are +the best men to carry out the policy. Is it likely the Conservatives +would join the Liberals, if the latter were trying to get all the +seats? Thus all the Professor's assumptions are incorrect. But even if +they were correct the conclusion is still wrong. The Liberal section +could not get all the seats if they tried. Imagine a ten-seat +electorate, in which the combined party is entitled to nine members. The +electors would not be required to vote for more than five candidates, +whereas the Professor has assumed that they would be forced to vote for +nine. He has forgotten that the Block Vote becomes the Limited Vote +under the conditions named, and that the Limited Vote allows the +minority a share of representation. Besides, in any case, these +conditions would never arise in a country in a healthy state of +political activity, because then parties would tend more nearly to +equalize each other in strength. + +It has also been objected that a Ministerialist candidate, say, might +stand as an Oppositionist, if the votes of the Opposition candidates +were more split up and it was likely to require less votes for election +in that party. This is a rather fantastic suggestion. The candidate in +question would have to declare himself in favour of a number of things +which he would oppose immediately he was elected. If not, he would have +to openly declare his intention, but that could easily be made illegal. +In any case there would be very little gained, and there is further the +risk that, if defeated, all his votes would count to the Opposition. + +Another possible objection is that too many candidates might stand, +since it is to the interest of each party to get all the support it can. +But candidates are not likely to stand to oblige the party or when there +is no chance of being elected. It is quite possible that, in a country +already split up into numerous groups, the groups would refuse to act +together, and that each group would nominate its own list. This is an +extreme assumption, and certainly would not happen in British countries. +And there would be a constant incentive to the groups to compromise, +since a combination can return its candidates. + +We hope now to have at least established the fact that the organization +of a democracy into two coherent parties--a majority and a minority--is +vitally connected with the electoral machinery. We do not claim that the +method we have proposed will induce a people to vote on true party lines +all at once, for human nature cannot be changed in a day; but we do +confidently assert that it will greatly accelerate that desirable +result, and will tend to give effect to the principles of organization +and responsible leadership. + + + + +CHAPTER V. + +HOW THE EVILS OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM WILL BE REMEDIED. + + +From the inception of the representative system it has been usual to +elect representatives in small districts, returning only one or two +members, and the single-membered electorate is now almost universal. In +the early Parliaments, however, elections were not contested as they are +nowadays. It was merely a choice of the most suitable men to represent a +corporate local community. Hence an indirect method of election was +generally resorted to, the final choice being left to a small committee +of the most important men. With the gradual rise of the party system the +conditions entirely changed; and it is important to gain a clear idea of +what is involved in the change. + +In the first stage we have referred to it is not probable that there +were any candidates at all. The position of member of Parliament was not +sought after; it was rather thrust upon the man selected as a duty he +owed the community. The choice would usually be unanimous, since there +would be some men whose recognized influence and attainments would mark +them off as most fitted for the position. If there was any difference of +opinion it would be merely as to who was best fitted to represent all, +and therefore there would never be any excluded minority. + +The essential difference in the second stage is that every election is +contested by two organized parties. The choice is now not of men only, +but of measures and of men as well. It is a contest in the first place +within each party as to who is best fitted to represent the party, and +in the second place between the two parties for the support of the +people. The party in a majority secures all the representation; the +party in a minority none. Now, the minority is certainly not represented +by the choice of the majority; on the contrary, its views are exactly +the opposite. Hence the question arises: Is not this exclusion of the +minority an injustice? Does it not amount to disfranchisement? The usual +reply is either that the majority must rule or that the injustice done +in some electorates is balanced in others, so that in the long run rough +justice is obtained. + +As to the first contention, it is the party which has the support of a +majority of the whole people which should rule; and the excluded +minority in some of the electorates belongs to this party. The second +practically amounts to the statement that two wrongs make a right. + +A practice prevails in the United States which will illustrate the +position. Each State sends a number of representatives to Congress +proportional to its population, and the division into electorates is +left to the State. By manipulating the electoral boundaries the party +which has a majority in each State is enabled to arrange that the +injustice done to itself is a minimum, and that the injustice done to +the opposing party is a maximum. By this iniquitous practice, which is +known as the gerrymander, the party in a minority in each State is +allowed to get only about one-half or one-quarter of its proper share of +representation. But as the practice is universal in all the States, the +injustice done to a party in some States is balanced in others. Will +those who seek to excuse the injustice done to the minority in each +electorate by the present system of election seriously contend that the +same argument justifies the gerrymander? + +The truth is that the present system has survived the passage from the +first stage of representation into the second, not because it does +justice to both parties, but because it has operated largely to prevent +the formation of more than two parties. It has, therefore, been a means +of giving effect to the central feature of representation, viz.: the +organization of public opinion into two definite lines of policy. But it +is a comparatively ineffective means, and it no longer suffices to +prevent sectional delegation in any of the democracies we have examined. +Besides, it is accompanied by a series of other evils, which in so far +as they lead to the suppression of responsible leadership, tend to the +degradation of public life. We propose now to consider the effect of the +reform in remedying these defects of the present system. + ++Parties Not Represented in the Legislature in the Same Proportion as in +the Country.+--Representation under the present system is purely +arbitrary; the amount which each party secures is a matter of chance. If +a party with a majority in the whole country has a majority in each of +the electorates it will secure all the representation. On the other +hand, if it splits up its votes in each electorate, or even only in +those electorates where it has a majority, it may secure none at all. +Theoretically, then, any result is possible. The argument would lose its +force, however, if in practice the result usually came out about right. +But this seldom happens, and, speaking generally, two cases may be +distinguished: first, when parties are nearly equal, the minority is +almost as likely as the majority to return a majority of the +representatives, thus defeating the principle of majority rule; and, +second, when one party has a substantial majority, it generally sweeps +the board and annihilates the minority. A few examples will illustrate +these facts. + +The 1895 election for the Imperial Parliament is analyzed by Sir John +Lubbock in the _Proportional Representation Review_. He shows that out +of 481 contested seats, the Liberals, with 1,800,000 votes were +entitled to 242, and the Conservatives and Liberal Unionists, with +1,775,000 to 239, a majority of three seats for the Liberals. But the +Conservatives and Unionists actually returned 279, and the Liberals only +202, a majority of 77 seats. The Conservatives and Unionists obtained +also a majority of 75 of the uncontested seats, giving them a total +majority of 152, instead of the 72 to which they were entitled. + +Recent elections for the United States Congress are shown by Professor +Commons to present striking inequalities. At the election for the 51st +Congress, 1888, the Republicans polled 5,348,379, and the Democrats +5,502,581. But the Republican minority actually secured 164 seats +against 161, a majority of 3, and were enabled to carry the McKinley +tariff law. For the 52nd Congress, 1890, the Republicans, with 4,217,266 +votes, only elected 88, while the Democrats, with 4,974,450 votes, +elected 235, and the Populists, with 354,217 votes, elected 9 +Congressmen. The Democratic majority should have been only 2, instead of +138. Compared with the 51st Congress, their proportion of the popular +vote increased only 1 per cent., but their proportion of the +representatives increased 21 per cent. It required 47,923 votes to elect +a Republican, 44,276 to elect a Populist, and only 21,078 to elect a +Democrat. + +To come nearer home, did not Mr. Reid return to power at the 1898 +election in New South Wales although the Opposition polled a majority of +15,000 against him? The last election in Victoria illustrates nothing so +much as the chaotic state of parties, brought about by newspaper +influence in promoting false lines of division. No less than 30 seats, +representing 81,857 votes, were contested only by candidates who +professed to be Ministerialists of various shades. Of 52 seats contested +by Ministerial and Opposition candidates, each party secured 26; but the +Ministerialists paid 59,255 votes for their seats as against 44,327 cast +for the Opposition. 13 seats were uncontested, 9 Ministerial and 4 +Opposition, giving a total of 65 members to the Ministerial party and 30 +members to the Opposition. + +The arbitrary and haphazard character of these results is obvious. It +would be entirely removed by the reform. Every election would reflect +the true feeling of the country; the right of the majority to rule would +be rendered certain, and the right of the minority to a fair hearing +would be assured. Taking the country as a whole, the Ministerialists +would pay almost exactly the same number of votes for each seat as the +Opposition. In each separate electorate the accuracy would not be so +great, but the rectification of even this slight and unavoidable +inequality would, instead of being arbitrary, be subject to the laws of +chance. + ++Ineffective Votes.+--Under the present system, all votes cast for +rejected candidates are ineffective; therefore nearly one-half of the +electors have no voice in the Government. A Liberal elector may live in +a Conservative constituency all his life without having the opportunity +to cast an effective vote. The evil of popular indifference is largely +to be explained by this fact. It is no answer to say that it affects +both parties equally. The trouble is that nearly one-half of the +electors of each party have no influence in deciding who are to +represent the party, and therefore do not help to frame its policy. + +This evil would also be entirely removed. Every vote cast would count to +one or the other party. It is not necessary that every vote should be +counted to some one candidate, as the advocates of the Hare system +claim. Votes given to rejected candidates would be in effect just as +much transferred to the successful candidates as by the Hare system. +Moreover, it is an important gain that the candidates of each party +would be ranged in order of favour, as the relative position of the +candidates would be an index of the feeling of each electorate, not only +as regards men but also as regards measures. Therefore, even the votes +given to rejected candidates would affect the framing of the party +policy, and show the progress of public opinion. + ++Uncontested Seats.+--At the 1895 election for the Imperial Parliament +no less than 189 seats out of 670 were uncontested. Thus one-quarter of +the people had no opportunity of expressing any opinion. In Australia +the proportion is often quite as large. The present Legislative Council +of Victoria is an extreme instance. One-third of the Council retires +every three years; and at the last election not a single seat was +contested. Only 4 out of the 48 sitting members have had to contest +election. Under these circumstances the holding of an election at all +becomes a farce. No doubt it is very convenient for the favoured +individuals; but as the primary object of elections is the ascertainment +of public opinion, it is very desirable that every seat should be +contested. + +The chief cause of this evil is that when one party is strong in an +electorate it is hopeless for the minority to contest it, unless the +majority nominates more than one candidate. On the other hand, the +majority knows that if it does split its votes the minority will +probably win the seat. The result is that the sitting member has a great +advantage, and is often tolerated even though he is acceptable to only a +minority of his own party. + +With the reform each electorate would become the scene of a contest +between the two parties for their proportional share of representation. +It is very unlikely, indeed, that in any electorate no more candidates +would be nominated than are required to be elected. + ++Limitation of Choice.+--Even when seats are contested, the elector's +choice is very limited under the present system. Wherever party +government is strong, each party nominates only one candidate, owing to +the danger of splitting up its votes and so losing the seat. The elector +has then practically no choice. He may disapprove of the candidate +standing for his own party, but the only alternative is to stultify +himself by supporting the opposing candidate. If in disgust he abstains +from voting altogether, it is the same as giving each candidate half his +vote. Even when two or three candidates of his own party are nominated, +and he supports the one whose views coincide most closely with his own, +he can exert very little direct influence on the party policy. Besides, +he will often think it wise to support the strongest candidate rather +than the one he favours most. + +These considerations show what a very imperfect instrument the present +system is for expressing public opinion. The test which should be +applied to any system of election is whether it allows each elector to +express his opinion on general policy, and from this point of view the +present system fails lamentably; all opinion which does not run in the +direct channel of party is excluded. Mr. Bryce has fixed on this defect +as the weak point of the party system, but the fault really lies in the +limitation of choice connected with the present system of election. It +is quite true that "in every country voting for a man is an inadequate +way of expressing one's views of policy, because the candidate is sure +to differ in one or more questions from many of those who belong to the +party."[4] But if, in the first place, the incentive to limit the number +of candidates be removed and the field of choice widened, and if, in the +second place, each elector be allowed to vote for several candidates +instead of one only, the defect would be remedied. Now, the reform makes +both these provisions, and the importance of the improvement can hardly +be overrated. It means, first, that every elector will be not only +allowed, but also induced, to express his opinion on general policy. He +may give his votes to candidates either for their general views or for +some particular view; or, if he lays less stress on measures than on +men, he may give them to men of high character or of great +administrative ability. It means, secondly, that every section of +opinion composing each party will be fairly represented, and that none +will be excluded, because the candidates of each party will compete +among themselves for the support of all sections, in order to decide +those most in general favour. Hence every section will directly help to +frame and influence the party policy, and there will be not the +slightest excuse for independent action outside the two main parties. In +the third place, it means the substitution of individual responsibility +for the corporate responsibility of parties, since the electors will +have the power to reject those who wish to modify party action in any +direction contrary to the general wish. It means, finally, that every +elector's opinion, as expressed by his vote, will have equal influence +in deciding the direction of party action. + ++Control of Nominations.+--There is a constant incentive with the +present system of election to limit the number of candidates to two, one +representing each party. For if either party splits up its votes on more +than one candidate it will risk losing the seat. But the necessity to +limit the candidates involves some control of the nominations, and this +is perhaps the worst feature of the system. It means that, instead of +the electors being allowed to select their representative, he is chosen +for them by some irresponsible body. We have seen how in the United +States the nominating system is the source of the power of the "boss" +and the "machine;" and the same result is only a matter of time in +British countries. The registration of voters is not yet conducted in +the same rigid manner as in America, nor is the farce of holding a +primary election gone through; but whether the control be exercised by a +political organization, a newspaper, a local committee, or a secret +society, the principle is the same. Mr. Bryce has noticed the rapid +change in the practice of England on this point:--"As late as the +general elections of 1868 and 1874 nearly all candidates offered +themselves to the constituency, though some professed to do so in +pursuance of requisitions emanating from the electors. In 1880 many--I +think most--Liberal candidates in boroughs and some in counties were +chosen by the local party associations, and appealed to the Liberal +electors on the ground of having been so chosen. In 1885, and again in +1892, all, or nearly all, new Liberal candidates were so chosen, and a +man offering himself against the nominee of the association was +denounced as an interloper and traitor to the party. The same process +has been going on in the Tory party, though more slowly. The influence +of the locally wealthy, and also that of the central party office, is +somewhat greater among the Tories, but in course of time choice by +representative associations will doubtless become the rule."[5] Is it to +be expected that this power will not be abused as in America? The +trouble is that no association can represent all the party electors, and +that the representative becomes responsible to the managers of the +association, to whom he really owes his election. Any control of this +kind is fatal to the principle of responsible leadership. And yet the +only alternative with the present method of election is the break-up of +the party system. This is the dilemma in which all modern democracies +are placed. The evil will be completely obviated by the reform. Instead +of limiting the candidates, it will be to the advantage of each party to +induce the strongest and most popular candidates to stand on its behalf, +since the number of seats it will obtain depends only on the aggregate +votes polled by all the candidates. With individual candidature there +can be no "machine" control of nominations. All are free to appeal +directly to the people. + ++Localization of Politics.+--The local delegate is unfortunately the +prevailing type of Australian politician. The value of a member is too +often measured by the services he renders to his constituents +individually or the amount of money he can get the Government to spend +in his constituency. Hence the nefarious practice of log-rolling in +Parliament. Is it any wonder that some of the colonies promise to rival +France in the proportion of unreproductive works constructed out of loan +money? + +How few of our members approach the ideal expressed by Edmund Burke in +his address to the electors of Bristol:--"Parliament is not a congress +of ambassadors from different and hostile interests, which interests +each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and +advocates; but Parliament is a deliberative assembly of our nation, with +one interest--that of the whole--where not local purposes, not local +prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the +general reason of the whole. You choose a member, indeed, but when you +have chosen him he is not a member of Bristol, but he is a member of +Parliament." It must be confessed, however, that Burke's ideal is rather +exalted; it is the duty of a member to make known the requirements of +his district. It is the ministry which is specially charged with +looking after the interest of the whole and of resisting illegitimate +demands. But it cannot do so if its position is so insecure that it must +purchase the support of the "parish pump" politician. + +The only way to nationalize politics is to ensure that every electorate +shall be contested on national issues by organized parties, and that +every locality shall be represented on both parties. The proposed system +will provide this remedy. In enlarged electorates each party will take +good care that its candidates are men of local influence in the most +important divisions of the electorate; therefore, sectional and local +interests will be represented, but they will be subordinated to the +interests of the whole electorate; and where there are a few large +divisions the interests of each will more nearly coincide with national +interests than where there are a large number of small divisions. +Besides, log-rolling will not be so easy between groups of +representatives as among single representatives. + ++Incentive to Bribery and Corruption.+--We now come to a class of evils +which to a large extent result from the fact that a few votes in each +electorate decide whether a party gets all the representation or none at +all. Candidates are impelled, in order to gain support from every +faction, to acts degrading to themselves and destructive to the moral +tone of the people. Foremost among these evils is the great incentive to +bribery and corruption; it is manifested not only in direct expenditure +at the elections, but also in promises of patronage and class +advantages. Direct bribery is perhaps worst in America; Professor M. +Cook states, in a paper on "The Alarming Proportion of Venal Voters" in +the _Forum_ for September, 1892, that in twenty-one towns of Connecticut +16 per cent, of the voters are venal. As Professor Commons remarks:--"It +is plain that the bribable voters themselves are adequate to hold the +balance of power between the parties. The single-membered district, +therefore, places a magnificent premium upon bribery." In England the +_Corrupt Practices Act_ has done immense good: nothing reflects so much +honour on the Imperial Parliament as the voluntary transference of the +duty of deciding cases to the judiciary. In Australia this much-needed +reform has not yet been introduced, and direct bribery prevails to a +much larger extent than would be supposed from the number of cases +investigated. Members of Parliament are naturally loth to convict one of +their own number, and the knowledge of this fact prevents petitions +being lodged. + +The mere existence of secret bribery is bad enough, but a greater danger +is that acts of indirect bribery are openly practised, with the tacit +approval of electors. "There have been instances," says Mr. Lecky, in +his "Democracy and Liberty," "in which the political votes of the police +force, of the P.O. officials, of the civil service clerks have been +avowedly marshalled for the purpose of obtaining particular class +advantages--a disintegrated majority is strongly tempted to conciliate +every detached group of votes." In Australia this has become a regular +practice; and a still worse feature is that Members of Parliament have +free access to public departments to promote class and local interests. +Class legislation is frequently brought forward on the eve of an +election with the sole object of influencing votes. These conditions +favour the wire-pullers and mere self-seekers, and, in so far as they +prevent the electors from voting on the political views and personal +merits of the candidates, they are inimical to the public interests. Mr. +Lecky has pointed out that a certain amount of moral compromise is +necessary in public life, and that a politician may indulge in +popularity-hunting from honourable public motives; the danger is that +unworthy politicians may screen themselves under shelter of this excuse. + +We do not claim that the proposed system would abolish corruption, but +we are justified in hoping that it would mitigate it very much. Even if +the venal vote still held the balance of power between parties, parties +are not so easily corrupted as individuals. But the most important gain +is that it could only exert an influence proportional to its numbers; it +could not decide whether a party gets all the representation or none at +all, as at present. In most cases it would be doubtful if it would +affect a single candidate. Consider, again, the case of individual +candidates of the same party; any candidate resorting to bribery in +order to increase his chance of election would do so partly at the +expense of the other candidates of his own party, who would immediately +denounce him. Instead of being forced to conciliate selfish factions, +the candidates would be free to appeal for the support of the unselfish +sections. + ++Continual Change in Electoral Boundaries.+--The irregular growth of +population necessitates a periodical revision of the electoral +boundaries of single-membered electorates. Owing to the influence of +vested interests, this is generally effected in an arbitrary manner; and +the glaring anomalies only are rectified. We have in Victoria at the +present day some country electorates with 6,000 electors on the rolls +and others with only 1,500. An elector in the latter has four times the +voting power of an elector in the former. The process of alteration of +the boundaries offers great temptation to unfairness; and in American +politics the opportunity is taken full advantage of by a practice which +has received the name of the gerrymander. In his work on "Proportional +Representation" Professor Commons writes:-- + + It is difficult to express the opprobrium rightly belonging to so + iniquitous a practice as the gerrymander; but its enormity is not + appreciated, just as brutal prize-fighting is not reprobated + providing it be fought according to the rules. Both political + parties practise it, and neither can condemn the other. They simply + do what is natural: make the most of their opportunities as far as + permitted by the constitution and system under which both are + working. The gerrymander is not produced by the iniquity of + parties, it is the outcome of the district system. If + representatives are elected in this way there must be some public + authority for outlining the districts. And who shall be the judge + to say where the line shall be drawn? Exact equality is impossible, + and who shall set the limit beyond which inequality shall not be + pressed? Every apportionment act that has been passed in this or + any other country has involved inequality; and it would be absurd + to ask a political party to pass such an act and give the advantage + of the inequality to the opposite party. Consequently, every + apportionment act involves more or less of the gerrymander. The + gerrymander is simply such a thoughtful construction of districts + as will economize the votes of the party in power by giving it + small majorities in a large number of districts, and coop up the + opposing party with overwhelming majorities in a large number of + districts. This may involve a very distortionate and uncomely + "scientific" boundary, and the joining together of distant and + unrelated localities into a single district; such was the case in + the famous original act of Governor Gerry, of Massachusetts, whence + the practice obtained its amphibian name.[6] But it is not always + necessary that districts be cut into distortionate shapes in order + to accomplish these unjust results. (pp. 49, 50.) + +He illustrates a gerrymander which actually made one Democratic vote +equal to five Republican votes. We have quoted this description of the +methods of the gerrymander not so much because the evil has attained any +magnitude in Australia as because it offers a warning of the probable +result of adopting the single-membered district system for our Federal +legislature. + +With enlarged or grouped electorates the periodical revision of +boundaries would be entirely obviated, because the size of the +electorate may be kept constant, and the number of representatives +varied. Under such a system all unfairness would disappear, and the +gerrymander would be impossible. Representation would automatically +follow the movements of population. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[4] Bryce, "The American Commonwealth," vol ii, p 325 + +[5] Bryce, "The American Commonwealth," vol. ii., note on p. 81. + +[6] Governor Gerry contrived an electorate which resembled a salamander +in shape. + + + + +CHAPTER VI. + +THE HARE SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL DELEGATION. + + +The single transferable vote, generally known as the Hare system, was +first invented by a Danish statesman, M. Andrae, and was used for the +election of a portion of the "Rigsraad" in 1855. In 1857 Mr. Thomas +Hare, barrister-at-law, published it independently in England in a +pamphlet on "The Machinery of Representation." This formed the basis of +the scheme elaborated in his "Election of Representatives," which +appeared in 1859. + +He proposed to abolish all geographical boundaries by constituting the +whole of the United Kingdom one electorate for the return of the 654 +members of the House of Commons. Each member was to be elected by an +equal unanimous number of electors. The method of election was therefore +so contrived as to allow the electors to group themselves into 654 +constituencies, each group bound only by the tie of voluntary +association, and gathered from every corner of the Kingdom. The total +number of votes cast (about a million) was to be divided by 654, and the +quotient, say about 1,500, would be the quota or number of votes +required to elect a member. But some of the candidates would naturally +receive more votes than the quota, and a great many more would receive +less. How were all the votes to be equally divided among 654 members so +that each should secure exactly the quota? The single transferable vote +was proposed to attain this result. Each elector's vote was to count for +one candidate only, but he was allowed to say in advance to whom he +would wish his vote transferred in case it could not be used for his +first choice. Each ballot paper was, therefore, to contain the names of +a number of candidates in order of preference--1, 2, 3, &c. Then all the +candidates having more than a quota of first choices were to have the +surplus votes taken from them and transferred to the second choice on +the papers, or if the second choice already had enough votes, to the +third choice, and so on. When all the surpluses were distributed a +certain number of members would be declared elected, each with a quota +of votes. The candidates who had received the least amount of support +were then to be gradually eliminated. The lowest candidate would be +first rejected, and his votes transferred to the next available +preference on his ballot papers; then the next lowest would be rejected, +and so on till all the votes were equally distributed among the 654 +members. Such was the Hare system as propounded by its author. The +electors were to divide themselves into voluntary groups; then the +groups which were too large were to be cut down by transferring the +surplus votes, and the smaller groups were to be excluded and the votes +also transferred until the groups were reduced to 654 equal +constituencies. These two processes, transferring surplus votes and +transferring votes from excluded candidates, are the main features of +the system. Mr. Hare's rules for carrying them out are drawn up in the +form of a proposed electoral law, and in the different editions of his +work the clauses vary somewhat. They are also complicated by an +impossible attempt to retain the local nomenclature of members. As +regards surplus votes it was provided that the ballot papers which had +the most preferences expressed should be transferred; still a good deal +was left to chance or to the sweet will of the returning officer, and +this has always been admitted as a serious objection. The process of +elimination is still more unsatisfactory. Mr. Hare was from the first +strongly opposed to the elimination of the candidate who had least first +preferences, and he therefore proposed that, in order to decide which +candidate had least support, all expressed preferences should be +counted. This involved such enormous complication that in the 1861 +edition of his work he abandoned the process of elimination altogether +in favour of a process of selection. He then proposed to distribute +surplus votes only, and to elect the highest of the remainder, +regardless of the fact that they had less than a quota. He then +wrote:--"The reduction of the number of candidates remaining at this +stage of the election may be effected by taking out the names of all +those who have the smallest number of actual votes--that is, who are +named at the _head_ of the smallest number of voting papers, and +appropriating each vote to the candidate standing _next_ in order on +each paper. This process would be so arbitrary and inequitable in its +operation as to be intolerable. It might have the effect of cancelling +step by step more votes given to one candidate than would be sufficient +to return another.... Such a process disregards the legitimate rights +both of electors and of candidates." But the process of selection was +not proportional representation at all, being practically equivalent to +a single untransferable vote, and Mr. Hare finally adopted, in spite of +its defects, the "arbitrary and inequitable" process of elimination in +his last edition in 1873. And all his recent disciples have been forced +to do the same, because nothing better is known. + +Mr. Hare's scheme has ceased to be of any practical interest, since it +is now generally admitted that electorates should not return more than +ten or twenty members. Moreover, it is admitted that the electors would +group themselves in very undesirable ways, and not as Mr. Hare expected. +And yet the only effect of limiting the size of the electorates is to +reduce the number of undesirable ways in which electors might group +themselves. Let us briefly note the different proposals which have been +made. + ++1. Sir John Lubbock's Method.+--In his work on "Representation," Sir +John Lubbock says:--"The full advantage of the single transferable vote +would require a system of large constituencies returning three or five +members each, thus securing a true representation of opinion." +Three-seat electorates are, however, too small to secure accurate +proportional representation; with parties evenly balanced, for instance, +one must secure twice as much representation as the other. + +The following rules are given to explain the working of the system:-- + +(1) Each voter shall have one vote, but may vote in the alternative for +as many of the candidates as he pleases by writing the figures 1, 2, 3, +&c, opposite the names of those candidates in the order of his +preference. + +COUNTING VOTES. + +(2) The ballot papers, having been all mixed, shall be drawn out in +succession and stamped with numbers so that no two shall bear the same +number. + +(3) The number obtained by dividing the whole number of good ballot +papers tendered at the election by the number of members to be elected +plus one, and increasing the quotient (or where it is fractional the +integral part of the quotient) by one, shall be called the quota. + +(4) Every candidate who has a number of first votes equal to or greater +than the quota shall be declared elected, and so many of the ballot +papers containing those votes as shall be equal in number to the quota +(being those stamped with the lowest numerals) shall be set aside as of +no further use. On all ballot papers the name of the elected candidate +shall be deemed to be cancelled, with the effect of raising by so much +in the order of preference all votes given to other candidates after +him. This process shall be repeated until no candidate has more than a +quota of first votes or votes deemed first. + +(5) Then the candidate or candidates having the fewest first votes, or +votes deemed first, shall be declared not to be elected, with the effect +of raising by so much in the order of preference all votes given to +candidates after him or them, and rule 4 shall be again applied if +possible. + +(6) When by successive applications of rules 4 and 5 the number of +candidates is reduced to the number of members remaining to be elected, +the remaining candidates shall be declared elected. + +Objection is commonly taken to this method on account of the element of +chance involved in the distribution of surplus votes. Suppose the quota +to be 1,000, and a candidate to receive 1,100 votes, the 100 votes to be +transferred would be those stamped with the highest numerals. But if the +hundred stamped with the lowest numerals or any other hundred had been +taken the second choices would be different. + +Strictly speaking, however, this is not a chance selection--it is an +arbitrary selection. The returning officer must transfer certain +definite papers; if he were allowed to make a chance selection it would +be in his power to favour some of the candidates. + +Sir John Lubbock points out that the element of chance might be +eliminated by distributing the second votes proportionally to the second +choices on the whole 1,100 papers, and that it might be desirable to +leave any candidate the right to claim that this should be done if he +thought it worth while. + ++2.--The Hare-Clark Method.+--The Hare system has been in actual use in +Tasmania for the last two elections. It is applied only in a six-seat +electorate at Hobart and a four-seat electorate at Launceston. The rules +for distributing surplus votes proportionally were drawn up by Mr. A.I. +Clark, late Attorney-General. The problem is not so simple as it appears +at first sight. There is no difficulty with a surplus on the first +count; it is when surpluses are created in subsequent counts by +transferred votes that the conditions become complicated. Mr. Clark +adopts a rule that in the latter case the transferred papers only are to +be taken into account in deciding the proportional distribution of the +surplus. Suppose, as before, the quota to be 1,000 votes, and a +candidate to have 1,100 votes, 550 of which are marked in the second +place to one of the other candidates. Then the latter is entitled to 50 +of the surplus votes, and a chance selection is made of the 550 papers. +The element of chance still remains, therefore, if this surplus +contributes to a fresh surplus. + ++3.--The Droop-Gregory Method.+--This method, advocated by Professor +Nanson, of the Melbourne University, is claimed to entirely eliminate +the element of chance. The Gregory plan of transferring surplus votes is +defined as a fractional method. If a candidate needs only nine-tenths of +his votes to make up his quota, instead of distributing the surplus of +one-tenth of the papers all the papers are distributed with one-tenth of +their value. Reverting to our former example, if a candidate is marked +second on 550 out of 1,100 votes, the quota being 1,000 and the surplus +100, then instead of selecting 50 out of the 550 papers, the whole of +them would be transferred in a packet, the value of the packet being 50 +votes, or, as Professor Nanson prefers to put it, the value of each +paper in the packet being one-eleventh of a vote. Should this packet +contribute to a new surplus the third choices on the whole of the papers +are available as a basis for the redistribution. The packet would be +divided into smaller packets, and each assigned its reduced value. It +might here be pointed out that the use of fractions is quite +unnecessary, the value of each packet in votes being all that is +required, and that the-same process may be used with the Hare-Clark +method to avoid the chance selection of papers. The only real +difference is this: that when a surplus is created by transferred votes +Mr. Clark distributes it by reference to the next preference on all the +transferred papers, and Professor Nanson by reference to the last packet +of transferred papers only--the packet which raises the candidate above +the quota. + +Which of these methods is correct? Should we select the surplus from all +votes, original and transferred, as Sir John Lubbock proposes; from all +transferred votes only, with Mr. Clark; or from the last packet only of +transferred votes, with Professor Nanson? Consider a group of electors +having somewhat more than a quota of votes at its disposal. If it +nominates one candidate only every one of the electors will have a voice +in the distribution of the surplus, but if it puts up three candidates, +two of whom are excluded and the third elected, Mr. Clark would allow +those who supported the two excluded candidates to decide the +distribution of the surplus, and Professor Nanson only those who +supported the last candidate excluded. Both are clearly wrong, for the +only rational view to take is that when a candidate is excluded it is +the same as if he had never been nominated and the transferred votes had +formed part of the original votes of those to whom they are transferred. +Whenever a surplus is created it should therefore be distributed by +reference to all votes, original and transferred. As regards these +surpluses, Mr. Clark and Professor Nanson have adopted an arbitrary +basis, which is no more than Sir John Lubbock has done; and they have +therefore eliminated the element of chance only for surpluses on the +first count. It may be asked, Why cannot all surpluses be distributed by +reference to all the papers, if that is the correct method? The answer +is that the complication involved is enormous. Yet this was the plan +first advocated by Professor Nanson, who wrote, in reply to a definite +inquiry how the Gregory principle was applied:--"I explain by an +example. A has 2,000 votes, the quota being 1,000. A then requires only +half the value of each vote cast for him. Each paper cast for him is +then stamped as having lost one-half of its value, and the whole of A's +papers are then transferred with diminished value to the second name +(unelected, of course). The same principle applies all through. Whenever +anyone has a surplus all the papers are passed to the next man with +diminished value." Now, the effect of this extraordinary proposal would +be that the whole of the papers would have to be kept in circulation +till the last candidate was elected, with diminishing compound +fractional values. In a ten-seat electorate a large proportion would +pass through several transfers, and would towards the end of the count +have such a ridiculously small fractional value that it would take +several millions of the ballot-papers to make a single vote! It is no +wonder that this method was abandoned when the complications to which +it would lead were realized. + +A simple method of avoiding this complexity would be to treat +transferred surplus papers as if the preferences were exhausted. It must +be remembered that in all transfers a certain number of papers are lost +owing to the preferences being exhausted, and the additional loss would +be small. Thus at the first Hobart election 206 votes were wasted, and +this number would have been increased by two only. Every surplus would +then be transferred by reference to the next choice, wherever expressed, +on both original papers and papers transferred from excluded candidates. + +It might be provided, however, for greater accuracy that all papers +contributing to surpluses on the first count only should be transferred +in packets. Should these contribute to a new surplus, it should be +divided into two parts, proportional to (1) original votes and votes +transferred from excluded candidates, and (2) the value of the packet in +votes. Each part would then be distributed proportionally to the next +available preferences wherever expressed. To divide the packets into +sub-packets is a useless complication. The loss involved in neglecting +them would usually be less than one-thousandth part of the loss due to +exhausted papers. + +Having now dealt with the main features of the different variations of +the Hare system, we may proceed to consider some details which are +common to all of them. A difference of opinion exists, however, as +regards the quota. Sir John Lubbock and Professor Nanson advocate the +Droop quota, which we have shown to be a mathematical error; Miss Spence +and Mr. Clark use the correct quota. + ++The Wrong Candidates are Liable to be Elected.+--The Hare system may be +criticised from two points of view; first, as applied to the conditions +prevailing when it is introduced, and, secondly, as regards the new +conditions it would bring about. Its advocates confine themselves to the +first point of view, and invariably use illustrations based on the +existence of parties. + +We readily grant that if the electors vote on party lines, and transfer +their votes within the party as assumed, the Hare system would give +proportional representation to the parties; but even then it would +sacrifice the interests of individual candidates, for it affords no +guarantee that the right candidates will be elected. The constant +tendency is that favourites of factions within the party will be +preferred to general favourites. This at the same time destroys party +cohesion, and tends to split up parties. Nor can this result be wondered +at, since the very foundation of the system is the separate +representation of a number of sections. + +One reason why the wrong candidates are liable to be elected is that the +electors will not record their honest preferences if the one vote only +is effective. They will give their vote to the candidate who is thought +to need it most, and the best men will go to the wall because they are +thought to be safe. Mr. R.M. Johnston, Government Statistician of +Tasmania, confirms this view when he declares--"The aggregate of all +counts, whether effective or not, would seem to be the truer index of +the general favour in which each candidate stands, because the numbers +polled at the first count may be greatly disturbed by the action of +those who are interested in the success of two or more favourites who +may be pretty well assured of success, but whose order of preference +might by some be altered if sudden rumour suggested fears for any one of +the favoured group. This accidental action would tend to conceal the +true exact measure of favour in the first count." If this statement +means anything it is that the three preferences which are required to be +expressed should have been all counted as effective votes at the Hobart +election instead of one only; and this is exactly what we advocate. It +is also admitted that when two candidates ran together at the first +Launceston election the more popular candidate was defeated; and again +the _Argus_ correspondent writes of the recent Hobart election:--"The +defeat of Mr. Nicholls was doubtless due to the fact of his supporters' +over-confidence--nothing else explains it. Many people gave him No. 2 +votes who would have given him No. 1 votes had they not felt assured of +his success." + +A second reason why the wrong candidates are liable to be elected is +that the process of elimination adopted by all the Hare methods has no +mathematical justification. The candidate who is first excluded has one +preference only taken account of, while others have many preferences +given effect to. We have shown that this glaring injustice was +recognized by Mr. Hare, and only adopted as a last resort. Professor +Nanson admits that "the process of elimination which has been adopted by +all the exponents of Hare's system is not satisfactory," and adds--"I do +not know a scientific solution of the difficulty." To bring home the +inequity of the process, consider a party which nominates six +candidates, A, B, C, D, E, and F, and whose numbers entitle it to three +seats, and suppose the electors to vote in the proportions and order +shown below on the first count. + + FIRST SECOND THIRD FOURTH + COUNT. COUNT. COUNT. COUNT. +7-vote ADEFBC ADEBC AEBC ABC +6-vote EFDACB EDACB EACB ACB +5-vote CEBDFA CEBDA CEBA CBA +4-vote BDFACE BDACE BACE BAC +4-vote DCEFBA DCEBA CEBA CBA +3-vote FBAECD BAECD BAEC BAC + +It will be noted that F, having fewest first votes, is eliminated from +the second count, D from the third count, and E from the fourth. A has +then 13 votes, B 7, and C 9. If the quota be 9 votes, A's surplus would +be passed on to B, and A, B, and C would be declared elected. But D, E, +and F are the candidates most in general favour, and ought to have been +elected. For if any one of the rejected candidates be compared with any +one of the successful candidates it will be found that in every case the +rejected candidate is higher in order of favour on a majority of the +papers. Again, if the Block Vote be applied, by counting three effective +votes, the result would be--A 10 votes, B 12, C 9, D 21, E 22, and F 13. +D, E, and F would therefore be elected. Thus we see that A, B, and C, +the favourites of sections within the party, are elected, and D, E, and +F, the candidates most in general favour--those who represent a +compromise among the sections--are rejected. + +In practice, then, the Hare system discourages compromise among parties, +and among sections of parties; and therefore tends to obliterate party +lines. This has already happened in Tasmania, where all experience goes +to show that the Hare system is equivalent to compulsory plumping. In +every election the result would have been exactly the same if each +elector voted for one candidate only. The theory that it does not matter +how many candidates stand for each party, since votes will be +transferred within the party, has been completely disproved. Votes are +actually transferred almost indiscriminately. The candidates have not +been slow to grasp this fact, and at the last election handbills were +distributed giving "explicit reasons why the electors should give their +No. 1 to Mr. So-and-so, and their No. 2 to any other person they +chose."[7] Three out of every four first preferences are found to be +effective, but only one out of every five second preferences, and one +out of fifty third preferences. The first preferences, therefore, decide +the election. + +The actual result is that, in the long run, the Hare system is +practically the same as the single untransferable vote. The whole of the +elaborate machinery for recording preferences and transferring votes +might just as well be entirely dispensed with. The "automatic +organization" which it was to provide exists only in the calculations of +mathematicians. + ++A Number of Votes are Wasted.+--It is claimed for the Hare system that +every vote cast is effective, because it counts for some one candidate. +But unless every elector places all the candidates in order of +preference some votes are wasted because the preferences become +exhausted. + +When a paper to be transferred has no further available preferences +expressed it is lost. In order to reduce this waste, a vote is held to +be informal in the six-seat electorate at Hobart unless at least three +preferences are given. Notwithstanding this, the number of such votes +wasted was 7 per cent, at the first election and 10 per cent, at the +second. + +The effect of this waste is that some of the candidates are elected +with less than the quota. At the last Hobart election only three out of +six members were elected on full quotas, and at Launceston only one out +of four. The result is to favour small, compact minorities, and to lead +sections to scheme to get representation on the lowest possible terms. + +The Droop quota, being smaller than the Tasmanian quota, would have the +effect of electing more members on full quotas, and it is often +recommended on that account. Indeed, Professor Nanson declares:--"In no +circumstances is any candidate elected on less than a quota of votes. +The seats for which a quota has not been obtained are filled one after +the other, each by a candidate elected by an absolute majority of the +whole of the voters. For the seats to be filled in this way all +candidates as yet unelected enter into competition. The matter is +settled by a reference to the whole of the voting papers. If any +unelected candidate now stands first on an absolute majority of all +these papers he is elected. But if not, then the weeding-out process is +applied until an absolute majority is obtained. The candidate who gets +the absolute majority is elected. Should there be another seat, the same +process is repeated. If an absolute majority of the whole of the voters +cannot be obtained for any candidate, then the candidate who comes +nearest to the absolute majority is elected." It will be seen that +Professor Nanson proposes to bring to life again all the eliminated +candidates, in order to compete against those who have less than the +quota. The proportional principle is then to be entirely abandoned, and +the seats practically given to the stronger party, although the minority +may be clearly entitled to them. The vaunted "one vote one value" is +also to be violated, because those who supported the elected candidates +are to have an equal voice with those still unrepresented. And finally, +the evil is not cured, it is only aggravated, if an eliminated candidate +is elected. + ++The Hare System is not Preferential.+--The idea is sedulously fostered +that the Hare system is a form of preferential voting, and many people +are misled thereby. The act of voting is exalted into an end in itself. +The most elaborate provisions are now suggested by Professor Nanson to +allow the elector to express his opinion only as far as he likes. The +simple and practical method in use in Tasmania of requiring each elector +to place a definite number of candidates in order of preference is +denounced as an infringement of the elector's freedom. Why force him to +express preferences where he does not feel any? The Professor has +therefore invented "the principle of the bracket." If the elector cannot +discriminate between the merits of a number of candidates he may bracket +them all equal in order of favour. Indeed, where he does not indicate +any preference at all, the names unmarked are deemed equal. Therefore, +if he does not wish his vote transferred to any candidate, he must +strike out his name. It is pointed out that a ballot paper can thus be +used if there is any kind of preference expressed at all, and the risk +of informality is reduced to a minimum. All the bracket papers are to be +put into a separate parcel, and do not become "definite" till all the +candidates bracketed, except one, are either elected or rejected; the +vote is then transferred to that candidate. And as bracketed candidates +will occur in original papers, surplus papers, and excluded candidates' +papers at every stage of the count, the degree of complication in store +for the unhappy returning officer can be imagined. + +The whole of these intricate provisions are founded on a patent fallacy. +Preferences are not expressed in the Hare system, as in true +preferential voting, that they may be given effect to in deciding the +election, but simply in order to allow the elector to say in advance to +whom he would wish his vote transferred if it cannot be used for his +first choice. The elector is allowed to express his opinion about a +number of candidates, certainly, but after being put to this trouble +only one of his preferences is used. And which one is used depends +entirely on the vagaries of the system. The principle of the bracket +illustrates this fact; if the elector has no preference the system +decides for him. If his first choice just receives the quota the other +preferences are not even looked at. Again, of all the electors who vote +for rejected candidates, those who are fortunate enough to vote for the +worst (who are first excluded) have their second or third preferences +given effect to, and few of their votes are wasted; but the votes of +those who support the best of them (who are last excluded) are either +wasted or given to their remote preferences. In Mr. Hare's original +scheme, for instance, the votes of the last 50 candidates excluded would +have been nearly all wasted, unless some hundreds of preferences were +expressed. + +Another claim on which great stress is laid is that by the process of +transferring votes every vote counts to some one candidate. This means +nothing more than that the votes of rejected candidates are transferred +to the successful candidates. Where is the necessity for this? So long +as each party secures its just share of representation and elects its +most favoured candidates, there is no advantage gained by transferring +the votes. Miss Spence even declares that "every Senator elected in this +way will represent an equal number of votes, and will rightly have equal +weight in the House. According to the block system, there is often a +wide disparity between the number of votes for the highest and the +lowest man elected." Surely the mere fact of transferring votes till +they are equally distributed does not make all the successful candidates +equally popular! On the contrary, it is very desirable to know which +candidates are most in favour with each party. + ++Ballot Papers Must be Brought Together for Counting.+--This is a +practical objection to the Hare system, which puts it out of court for +large electorates. If the whole of Victoria were constituted one +electorate, as at the Federal Convention election, the transference of +votes could not be commenced till all the ballot papers had come in from +the remote parts of the colony, two or three weeks after the election. +On this point Professor Nanson writes:--"In an actual election in +Victoria this 'first state of the poll' could be arrived at with the +same rapidity as was the result of the recent poll on the Commonwealth +Bill. In both cases but one fact is to be gleaned from each voting +paper. The results from all parts of the colony would be posted in +Collins-street on election day. These results would show exactly how the +cat was going to jump. The final results as regards parties would be +obvious to all observers, although the result as regards individual +candidates would be far from clear. But this, although of vast +importance to the candidates themselves, would be a matter of small +concern to the great mass of the people." These remarks are based on the +assumption that the electors vote on strictly party lines, which a +reference to Tasmanian returns will show is not usually the case. Few +will be disposed to agree that a knowledge of the successful candidates +is a matter of small moment. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[7] _Hobart Mercury_ + + + + +CHAPTER VII. + +FREE LIST SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL DELEGATION. + + +The _Liste Libre_, or Free List system, is a far simpler and more +practical method of proportional representation than the Hare system. +The distinctive feature is that it applies the proportional principle +not to individual candidates but to parties. But, like the Hare system, +it places no restriction on the number of parties. It is therefore +particularly adapted to the circumstances of the countries on the +Continent of Europe, which, having already a number of strong party +organizations, wish to retain them and to do justice to each. +Accordingly we find that nearly all experiments in proportional +representation to the present time have been confined to those +countries. + +Perhaps the very earliest attempt to apply the proportional principle +was that of Mr. Thomas Gilpin, in a pamphlet, "On the Representation of +Minorities of Electors to act with the Majority in Elected Assemblies," +published at Philadelphia in 1844. He proposed that electorates should +be enlarged, and that each party should nominate a list of candidates +equal to the number required to be elected, and should place them in +order of preference. Each elector could then vote for one of these +lists; and each party would be allotted a number of representatives +proportional to the amount of support it received. The highest on each +list, to the number allotted, would be elected. It will be seen that +this is really a system of double election; for the order of favour of +the candidates of any party would have to be decided before the +nominations were made. + +Only two years afterwards M. Victor Considerant published a similar +scheme at Geneva, Switzerland. Each elector was to vote first for a +party and then for any number of candidates on the party list whom he +preferred. The party votes were to decide the number of members allotted +to each list, and the individual votes the successful candidates. + +The little republic of Switzerland has been the scene of nearly all +subsequent improvement. In 1867 Professor Ernest Naville founded the +_Association Réformiste_ at Geneva to advocate the principle of +proportional representation. In 1871 the Association adopted the _Liste +Libre_ system, invented by M. Borely, of Nimes, France, in which each +elector was to place all the candidates of his party in order of +preference. But as this allows the electors little direct influence on +their own candidates and none outside of them, a combination of the +cumulative vote and the _Liste Libre_ was adopted in 1875. Each elector +was to have as many votes as there were seats to be filled, but he +could not only give them to any candidates on any list, but he could +also give as many votes as he liked to any one candidate. Thus if there +were ten seats to be filled the elector could give ten votes to one +candidate, or one vote to each of ten candidates, or five votes to one +candidate and divide the remaining five among others, and so on. The +only condition necessary was that his votes added up to ten. The +aggregate votes given to all the candidates of each party were then to +be taken as the basis of proportional distribution among the parties and +the highest on each list to the number decided were to be elected. + +It was not till the year 1890 that this scheme was actually put into +practice. The election of 1889 had resulted so unjustly to the Liberal +party in the canton of Ticino that an insurrection broke out. This +forced the hand of the Federal Government, which had to quell the +disturbance, and proportional representation was recommended and +adopted. Several other cantons followed suit, and it is expected that +the whole of Switzerland will soon adopt the reform. + +A modification of this plan has lately been adopted by the Swiss +Association. In this later plan electors can give a single vote only to +individual candidates, but if they do not use all their votes in this +way they may cumulate the balance on any one party list by marking at +the head of the list. Thus if the elector in a ten-seat electorate gives +five votes to individual candidates, and places a mark at the head of +one of the lists, the balance of five votes will count to that list. The +aggregate votes given to individual candidates on any list, plus the +votes placed at the head of the list, will form the basis of +proportional distribution among the lists. This is the plan adopted by +the American Proportional Representation League as most nearly suited to +American habits, and recommended by Professor Commons in his book on +"Proportional Representation." + +Belgium has also quite recently adopted a scheme of proportional +representation. As in Switzerland, its advent was hastened by political +disturbances. The Catholic party, not satisfied with exerting a +preponderating influence in the country districts, wished to obtain also +its proportionate share of representation in the cities, and proposed a +scheme of proportional representation for them only. This caused such +ill feeling that riots took place in the streets of Brussels. Finally, +proportional representation was promised all round, and became law for +both the Chamber of Representatives and the Senate at the latter end of +1899. In Brussels, where there are 18 seats to be filled, a trial +election had already been held in 1893 with satisfactory results. Six +lists were nominated, the largest being that of the Socialists, who +nominated ten candidates; and over 12,000 electors voted. Each elector +was allowed 18 votes, and the methods in which he could distribute them +were somewhat complicated. He might (1) mark at the head of a list, (2) +mark at the head of a list and also opposite one or more candidates on +the same list, (3) mark opposite the names of not more than 18 +candidates on any list. In the first case his 18 votes counted to the +list marked, in the second case one vote was counted to each of the +individual candidates marked and the balance counted for the list; in +the third case one vote was counted to each candidate marked. The +aggregate of votes marked at the head of each list, plus the individual +votes on the list, was then taken as the basis of proportional +distribution. So many of the votes were cumulated on lists that only +about one-fifth of the votes cast were operative in the selection of +candidates. + +In the bill which has recently become law a new method has therefore +been adopted, which gives more power to the party committees, but allows +the electors to modify their choice. For this purpose the party +organization nominates the candidates in order of preference. The +elector may then accept this order by marking at the head of the list, +or he may give his vote to any one candidate on the list. If all the +electors of a party vote in the first way, those nominated highest on +the list, to the number to which the party becomes entitled, are +elected. But if all the electors vote in the second way, those with the +highest single votes are elected. The actual result will usually be a +compromise between the two, and it is evidently the interest of the +party organization to place the candidates in their real order of +favour, in order that the electors may accept the list. For if an +unpopular candidate were placed at the head of the list few would accept +it. + +The first election under this system has just taken place, and the +result was, as expected, to reduce the Clerical representation +considerably. + +In all the above variations of the Free List system the distribution of +seats is effected by dividing the aggregate votes polled by each party +by a unit of representation, but three different methods of determining +this unit are in use. The first is obtained by simply dividing the total +number of votes by the number of seats. + +The objection to this unit is that when there are several parties, part +of the seats only can be allotted on full units, and the rest have to be +allotted to those parties which have the highest remainders or fractions +of a unit, and this unduly favours small parties, who do not poll even a +single unit. The rule to divide the total votes by the number of seats +increased by one, which was first proposed by Mr. H.R. Droop, reduces +slightly the number of seats allotted on remainders, and was adopted by +the canton of Soluthern in 1895. In Belgium a third plan, devised by +Professor D'Hondt, of Brussels, is used, which is designed to prevent +any seats being allotted on remainders. This unit is evidently smaller +than either of the others, and is to be found by trial. It is only +necessary that the sum of the quotients obtained by dividing it into +each of the lists shall be equal to the number of seats to be filled. + +Suppose a five-seat electorate in which 6,000 votes are divided among +four parties, who poll 2,500, 1,850, 900, and 750 votes respectively. +Then if we take one-fifth, or 1,200 votes, as the unit, the result would +be the following:-- + +(1) 2,500 = 2 units of representation + 100 remainder = 2 seats. + +(2) 1,850 = 1 unit of representation + 650 remainder = 1 seat. + +(3) 900 = unit of representation + 900 remainder = 1 seat. + +(4) 750 = unit of representation + 750 remainder = 1 seat. + +If the Droop unit of one-sixth, or 1,000 votes, be used, the result will +be different:-- + +(1) 2,500 = 2 units of representation + 500 remainder = 2 seats. + +(2) 1,850 = 1 unit of representation + 850 remainder = 2 seats. + +(3) 900 = unit of representation + 900 remainder = 1 seat. + +(4) 750 = unit of representation + 750 remainder = seat. + +By the third method any number of votes between 834 and 900 will be +found to comply with Professor D'Hondt's condition, and the result +would, in this instance, be the same as by the Droop method. Although +the highest number was at first used, the lower limit has been adopted +in the new bill. + +In no case can the proportional distribution be considered satisfactory. +If the electorates are small, and the number of parties large, accurate +proportional representation is quite out of the question. In +Switzerland, however, the electorates are made to contain sometimes as +many as 30 seats. The effect of such large electorates must be in time +to encourage the formation of a great number of small factions. At the +same time there is not so much incentive to split up the parties as by +the Hare system. + +Passing now to the selection of party candidates, none of the methods +can be said to ensure the election of those most in general favour. When +electors are allowed to cumulate on individual candidates, the +favourites of sections within the party will be elected. If, on the +other hand, they are allowed to cumulate on party lists, all votes thus +given are ineffective in the selection of the successful candidates. It +may be noted that although the nomination of candidates in lists by +party organizations is less in accordance with the practice of British +countries than the individual candidature of the Hare system, there is +nothing to prevent one candidate being nominated to stand in the place +of a party. + +A word of warning must be added as to the danger of holding up Belgium +and Switzerland as examples of true electoral justice to Australia. The +direct government of the people which Switzerland has adopted bears not +the slightest resemblance to the representative institutions of British +countries. Both the referendum and proportional delegation are suited to +direct government and are destructive to party responsible government. +The Swiss adopted the referendum to save themselves from the lobbying +and plutocratic character of their legislatures. The initiative and +proportional delegation have followed because they are complementary +reforms. The consequence is that the legislators have been degraded to +mere agents for drawing up measures, and leadership has been transferred +to the press. It is the peculiar conditions of Switzerland which enable +it to tolerate unrestrained majority rule. It is a small country, +surrounded by powerful neighbours, whose strength lies in its weakness. +Moreover, the people are very conservative. In Zurich, for instance, +which is largely devoted to manufactures, a proposal to limit the hours +of work in factories to twelve hours a day was rejected by the people. +Nor is direct government proving a success; the tyranny of the majority +is already apparent. The first federal initiative demanded a measure to +prevent the slaughter of animals by bleeding, designed to interfere +with the religious rites of the Jews. Despite the fact that it was +opposed by the Federal Council, as contrary to the right of religious +liberty guaranteed by the Constitution, it was carried by the +referendum. Belgium, again, can hardly be taken as a model of +constitutional liberty. Surely we in Australia do not want the factious +strife of religious, racial, and class sections, which so nearly brought +on a revolution last year. Yet this is exactly what proportional +delegation to sections would bring about. Belgium has a hard task to +reconcile two races so differently constituted as the Walloons and +Flemings, and has been able to avoid instability of the ministry so far +only because the Clerical party, which is mostly Flemish, still has a +majority. The new system has only consecrated the sectional principle, +and will do nothing to restore harmony. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII. + +PREFERENTIAL VOTING, THE BLOCK VOTE, ETC. + + ++Preferential Voting.+--Laplace, the great mathematician, to whom we owe +so much of the theory of probability, showed more than a century ago +that although individual electors may have very different views as to +the relative merits of a number of candidates for any office, still the +expression of the degree of favour in which the candidates are held by +the whole body of electors will be the same if each elector be assumed +to have a uniform gradation of preference. Suppose that there are ten +candidates, and it is required to place them in order of general favour. +Each elector should be required to place the whole ten in the order of +his preference, 1, 2, 3, &c. Let the maximum degree of merit be denoted +by ten marks, so that every first preference will count as ten marks. +Then, although an individual elector might be disposed to give his +second preference only five marks, and the rest of his preferences, say, +two marks, Laplace demonstrated that it is most probable that the total +result would be the same if each elector be assumed to give his second +preference nine marks, his third preference eight marks, and so on. +Therefore, if all first preferences be multiplied by ten, second +preferences by nine, and so on in regular order down to last preferences +multiplied by one, the total number of marks will be an index of the +order in general favour. If there is one office to be filled, the +candidate with the highest number of marks should be elected; if there +are two offices, the two highest candidates, and so on. + +But the assumed condition must be rigidly complied with; each elector +must express his honest preferences. Whether he will do so or not +depends upon the circumstances. Laplace recognized this element of human +nature, and declared that if electors are swayed by other considerations +independent of the merit of the candidates the system would not apply. +For instance, if the candidates are the nominees of a number of +independent sections, each of which is anxious only to secure the return +of its own candidate, and to defeat those who stand most in his way, the +tendency will be general to place the more popular candidates, those +whose success is most feared, at the bottom of the list, so as to give +them as few marks as possible. The result would be to favour mediocre +men, or even in extreme cases the most inferior. + +Practically, therefore, the system is not applicable where any of the +electors are personally interested in the result. If a number of judges +were called on to decide the relative merits of several essays or prize +designs, and the competitors' names were not known to them, the system +might be used. But even in such a case a simpler method is available; +for, although it may be difficult to pick out the best, it is generally +easy to agree upon the worst. It is usual, then, to gradually eliminate +the worst, and when the number is reduced to two to take the decision of +the majority. + +This process of elimination may be, however, combined with the +preferential system, and the result is more accurate than if one count +only be made. At the first count the candidate with the fewest marks +would be eliminated and his name struck out on all the papers. All those +under him on each paper would then go up one point in order of favour, +and further counts would be held, eliminating the lowest candidate each +time till the candidates were reduced to the number desired. This method +is very complicated, and involves a great amount of trouble. + +Consider now the case of a voluntary association of individuals, such as +a club or society; and suppose that it is required to elect a president +or committee. The condition is clearly that he or they should be most in +general favour with all the members; and the question whether +Preferential Voting is applicable will depend on how united the members +are. Now, clubs are not usually, nor should they be, divided into +cliques or parties; indeed, if a serious split does take place it +generally results in the resignation of part of the club and the +formation of a separate organization. But in a live club it is +impossible to prevent slight differences of opinion; and an +officer-bearer who has the interests of the club at heart must often +offend small sections who want to exert undue influence. In an election +for president this office-bearer would stand no chance of election if +there are several candidates and any small section likes to put him at +the bottom of the list, so as to give him as many bad marks as possible. +This is the weak point in Preferential Voting; any small section can +ensure the rejection of a general favourite. The greater the number of +candidates the smaller the minority which is able to do this; dummy +candidates may therefore be introduced to make it more certain. The risk +would, however, be very much lessened if the process of gradual +elimination we have described were adopted. + +When we come to the election of representatives to a legislature it is +evident at once that Preferential Voting is not applicable at all. We +have shown that the true condition required is not the return of +candidates most in general favour with both parties, but the return of +the candidates most in general favour with each party separately. +Preferential Voting would therefore only be applicable if the electors +of each party voted separately for its own candidates; and even then it +would be open to the objection we have already urged. If it were applied +to the two parties voting together the electors would certainly not be +influenced only by the merit of the candidates. They might record their +honest preferences as regards the candidates of their own party, but +they would naturally place the candidates of the opposing party in +inverse order of merit. The candidates most in general favour would be +those who represented neither party. Suppose there are three candidates +for a single seat, two representing large parties of 49 per cent, each, +and the third a small party of 2 per cent. The electors of the large +parties would be more afraid of one another than of the small party, and +would give their second preferences to its candidate. This candidate, +representing one-fiftieth of the electors, would then actually be +elected; he would receive 202 marks, and neither of the others could +possibly secure more than 200. Moreover, he would still be elected if +the process of elimination were adopted, since on the second count he +would beat either of the other candidates separately by 51 votes to 49. + +These plain facts are indisputable. What is to be thought, then, of the +claim made by Professor Nanson that Preferential Voting, with the +process of elimination, is the most perfect system known for +single-membered electorates. + ++The Block Vote.+--The Block Vote, General Ticket, or _scrutin de +liste_, is in general use when there is more than one seat to be filled. +Each elector has as many votes as there are members to be elected, and +the highest on the list, to the number of representatives required, are +successful. Dealing first with elections to a legislative body, the +system is eminently unjust to parties. A rigid control of nominations is +necessary in the first place, because any party which splits up its +votes spoils its chance. Each party will therefore nominate only as many +candidates as there are seats, and the stronger of two parties, or the +strongest of a number of parties, will elect the entire list. A minority +might in the latter case secure all the representation, but the +practical effect of the Block Vote is to force the electors to group +themselves into two parties only. It therefore has the same beneficial +effect as the single electorate of confining representation to the two +main parties. This is apparently nob recognized by Professor Nanson, who +writes, in his pamphlet on the Hare system:--"Contrast with this the +results of the Block system. With strict party voting, which has been +assumed throughout, each of the five parties would put forward seven +candidates. The seven seats would all be secured by Form, with 44 votes +out of a total of 125, and the remaining 81, or more than two-thirds of +the voters, would be wholly unrepresented." Does the Professor really +think that the 81 (who, by the way, are _less_ than two-thirds) would be +so foolish as not to combine and secure all the seats? + +The exclusion of the minority in a single-membered electorate excites +only a feeling of hopelessness, but when it fails to secure a single +representative in an electorate returning several members, a spirit of +rankling injustice is aroused. The Block Vote has, therefore, never been +tolerated for long in large electorates. In the early history of the +United States many of the States adopted it, and sent to Congress a +solid delegation of one party or the other. This proved so unjust, and +operated so adversely to the federal spirit in promoting combinations of +States, that Congress, in 1842, made the single-membered electorate +obligatory on all the States. + +In France it was adopted at the election for the Chamber of Deputies in +1885. The result as regards parties was about as good as with the single +electorate system. The Republicans and Conservative-Monarchists, whose +numbers entitled them to 311 and 257 seats respectively, actually +secured 366 and 202. But it was abandoned after a trial at this one +election. + +The Block Vote was adopted in Australia for the election of ten +delegates from each colony to the Federal Convention. This was a work in +which all parties might fairly have joined together; and in most +colonies the people did select the best men, regardless of party. In +Victoria, however, the newspapers took on the _rôle_ of the "machine," +and the ten candidates nominated by the _Age_ were elected. Many of the +supporters of the defeated candidates voted for some on the successful +list who just defeated their own favourites. Had this been foreseen they +would have thrown away these votes by giving them to those sure to be +elected or to those least likely to be elected. The injustice of forcing +each elector to vote for the whole ten is thus brought home. We are now +threatened with the adoption of the Block Vote for the Federal Senate, +and in some of the States for the House of Representatives as well; and +it is in the hope of preventing this wrong that the present book is +written. + +So far we have been considering the Block Vote as applied to the +election of a legislature with two or more parties; we now propose to +consider it as applied to one party only. It is a matter of common +knowledge that the Block Vote, when used for such an election as that of +the committee of a club, works very well, and results in the return of +the candidates most in general favour with all sections. The reason is, +of course, that all sections work together, and members vote for the +best men, regardless of sectional lines. We will go further and say that +the Block Vote is by far the best method for such purposes, and is +superior even to Preferential Voting. In the first place it is free from +the defect that a small section can ensure the rejection of a general +favourite; and in the second place it rests on at least as secure a +theoretical basis. To fix our ideas, suppose there are ten candidates +for five members of a committee. Laplace assumed (1) that each member +would have a knowledge of the merits of all the ten candidates, (2) that +his estimate of the respective candidates would vary arbitrarily +between nothing and a maximum degree of merit, (3) that each member +would express his honest preferences. The Block Vote, on the other hand, +assumes (1) that each member can pick out the five best candidates, and +therefore express his opinion as to how the committee should be +constituted, (2) that he will be inclined to place these five candidates +on one plane of favour and the other five on one plane of non-favour. We +submit that the latter assumptions agree more closely with the actual +state of affairs. The members can distinguish between candidates who +have merit and those who have no merit or of whose merit they are +ignorant; to force them, therefore, to place all the candidates in order +of preference is to make them express preferences where none exist.[8] +On the whole, then, the Block Vote is more likely to place the +candidates in their real order of favour. + +But some reservation must be made. The Block Vote works best when the +number of candidates does not exceed two or three times the number of +vacancies. Suppose, first, that the candidates present in the final +result a fairly regular order of favour from lowest to highest. Each of +the successful candidates will then be supported by at least an absolute +majority of the members, providing the number of candidates be not +greater than twice the number of vacancies. But if there are four or +five times as many candidates as vacancies, none of the successful +candidates will have the support of a majority of the members. On the +other hand, however, the candidates do not usually present a regular +order of favour from lowest to highest when there are a large number of +candidates, for there may be a long "tail" of candidates who receive +very few votes. The following general rule may therefore be laid +down:--The Block Vote works best when the total votes given to rejected +candidates do not exceed the total votes given to successful candidates. + +The difficulties indicated above were met by the Australian Natives' +Association by a plan which provided that no candidate should be elected +except by an absolute majority of the voters. The Block Vote is used +throughout; and if at the first ballot the required number of candidates +do not obtain an absolute majority a second ballot is held, from which +those at the bottom of the poll and those who have been elected are +eliminated. This process is continued till all the vacancies are filled. +Four or five ballots are sometimes required, and the proceedings become +very irksome. A sub-committee was recently appointed to investigate the +subject, and reported in favour of the Preferential System with one +count only. The process of elimination was considered too complicated to +be practicable. Now, the conditions presented by these elections, in +which a very large number of candidates are generally nominated, are +precisely those in which Preferential Voting lends itself most easily to +abuse. An insignificant minority may defeat a candidate who should be +elected, by placing him at the bottom of their lists. + +A variation of the Block Vote may be suggested which is much simpler and +better. The preferential ballot papers should be used, and two counts +should be made. At the first count the primary half of the preferences +should be counted as effective votes, and the candidates should be +reduced to twice the number of vacancies. A second count should then be +made of the ballot papers, using the Block Vote. All or nearly all the +candidates would then obtain an absolute majority, and it is practically +impossible that any candidate should be eliminated by the first count +who would have had any chance of election in the second. + +This plan is far superior to the original method. It is right that +members who vote for candidates who are hopelessly out of it should be +allowed to transfer their votes; but it is not right that members who +first help to elect some candidates at one ballot should have the same +voting power as others at subsequent ballots. + +The Hare system is sometimes advocated for clubs on account of its +supposed just principle. Any live club which adopts it runs the risk of +disruption. It merely encourages the formation of cliques and sections; +any slight split would be accentuated and rendered permanent. + ++The Limited Vote.+--The injustice of the Block Vote led to the +introduction of the Limited Vote, which allows the minority some share +of the representation. We have seen that the Block Vote forces each +party to try to return all the representation, and of course one party +only can succeed. But if neither party be forced to try to return more +than it is entitled to each party will get its correct share of +representation, providing both parties are equally organized. This leads +to the Limited Vote, in which each elector has a number of votes +somewhat less than the number of seats. + +The Limited Vote was used in England for a number of three-seat +electorates, which were created by the Reform Bill of 1867, each elector +being allowed to vote for two candidates only. By this means the +majority would usually return two candidates and the minority one. Thus +the Limited Vote has the same advantage as the Block Vote and the single +electorate system, that it tends to confine representation to the two +main parties, but it creates an artificial proportion of representation +between them. Moreover, it renders strict party organization even more +necessary, since each party must arrange to use its voting resources to +the best advantage. Consider the three-seat electorate, for instance. +The minority will, if it is wise, nominate two candidates only; and the +majority may nominate either two or three. But if the majority does +divide its votes among three candidates it runs the risk of securing one +only. It can do so safely when two conditions are fulfilled: first, it +must be sure of polling more than three-fifths of the votes; and, +second, it must arrange to distribute all its votes equally among the +three candidates. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the +Limited Vote was responsible for introducing "machine" tactics into +England. In Birmingham, when Mr. Joseph Chamberlain organized the +Liberals and succeeded in carrying all three seats, the electors in each +ward were directed how to vote so that as few votes as possible might be +wasted. These three-cornered constituencies were abolished by the +_Redistribution Act_ of 1884; and Sir John Lubbock, reviewing the +experiment, declared--"On the whole, it cannot be denied that under the +Limited Vote the views of the electors have been fairly represented." + +The system has also been tried to a smaller extent in the United States. +In New York 32 of the delegates to a constitutional convention were +elected from the State polled as one electorate, each elector being +allowed to vote for 16 candidates. Both parties were afraid to split +their votes, and the result was that each returned 16. The rest of the +delegates were elected in single-membered electorates, and of these the +Republicans secured 81 and the Democrats 47. It might here be pointed +out that the Republicans might have secured more than 16 of the +delegates from the State at large if they had nominated 20 candidates +and allowed the laws of chance to regulate their organization. Each +elector might have been directed to put the twenty names into his hat, +and to reject the first four he pulled out. The same evil is apparent in +Boston, where twelve aldermen are elected at large, each elector being +allowed seven votes. Each party nominates seven candidates only; and the +majority invariably elects seven and the minority five. + +The Limited Vote is therefore not a satisfactory solution of the problem +of representation. It gives an artificial instead of proportional +representation, and it necessitates strict party organization and +control of nominations. At the same time it will generally give a very +fair representation if parties are not strictly organized, and might +well have been adopted for the Federal Convention, five or six votes +being allowed instead of ten. Newspaper domination would thus have been +prevented. + ++Election of the Candidate Most in General Favour.+--It is often +required to ascertain the candidate most in general favour where one +party only is concerned, such as an election for leader of the +Opposition or president of a club; and the methods in general use are +very defective. We do not refer to the theoretical difficulty, which +perplexes some persons, of giving effect to the actual degree of favour +in which the candidates stand in the electors' minds, but to the simple +problem of finding out who is preferred most by the bulk of the +electors. Thus it is universally recognised that when two candidates +stand the candidate who has the support of an absolute majority of the +electors is entitled to election. Yet it is possible that the rejected +candidate may be nearly twice as popular. This might happen if the +majority held that there was little to choose between the two +candidates, while the minority thought they could not be compared. But +it is quite evident that such distinctions cannot be recognized; the +candidate who is preferred by an absolute majority must be elected. It +is when there are more than two candidates that the difficulty arises. +To elect the candidate who has most first preferences is open to very +serious objection; he may have a small minority of the total votes, and +each of the other candidates might be able to beat him single-handed. + +The best way to overcome the difficulty is undoubtedly by some process +of gradually eliminating the least popular candidates till the number is +reduced to two; the candidate with the absolute majority is then +elected. We propose to consider the different ways in which elimination +might be made. We assume, in the first place, that each elector has cast +an advance vote--_i.e._, that he has placed all the candidates in order +of preference. The most primitive method is to eliminate at each +successive count the candidate who has least first preferences. This is +the method adopted in the Hare system, and we have already shown that +it is very defective; in fact, it is no improvement at all. The +eliminated candidate might be most in general favour, and might be able +to beat each of the other candidates single-handed. A second method is +to use Preferential Voting to decide which candidate should be +eliminated at each successive count. This is far superior, but it is +extremely complicated, and is open to the objection that when there are +a large number of candidates a small section may cause the rejection of +the general favourite. We propose to describe a method based on the +Block Vote which is much simpler, and which does not lend itself to +abuse. We have shown that the Block Vote works best when the candidates +can be divided into two equal sections of favour and non-favour. Suppose +there are four candidates, the first two preferences should therefore be +counted as effective votes, instead of the first preference only. The +eliminated candidate will then be the least in general favour. A second +count is then made of the three candidates left, and the first +preferences and half of the second preferences are counted as effective, +and the lowest again eliminated. The candidate who has an absolute +majority is then elected. The method may be indefinitely extended; if +there are five candidates the first two preferences and one-half of the +third preferences are counted, and so on. But when there are a great +many candidates more than one might be eliminated. Any number up to +eight could be safely reduced to four at the first count. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[8] The bracket principle introduced by Professor Nanson into the Hare +system involves a partial recognition of this fact. + + + + +CHAPTER IX. + +ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE THE PRESENT SYSTEM. + + ++The Double Election.+--In the preceding chapter we have strongly +insisted that the different methods considered for ensuring the return +of the candidate acceptable to all sections are not applicable to the +election of legislators. The true principles of political representation +require, not the election of the candidate most in general favour with +both parties, but the election by each party separately of its own most +favoured candidates. But as it is impossible for both parties to be +represented in a single-membered electorate, the best alternative is +that both should contest the seat and one be represented. The present +system of election has largely tended to realize this alternative, +especially in those countries in which party government was strong, such +as England and the United States; and representation has in consequence +been confined to the two main parties. In England, where the party +system was gradually developed, this result was attained without any +rigid control of nominations, because the true party spirit prevailed +and personal ambition was subordinated to political principle; and in +the United States it was only brought about at the cost of "machine" +control of nominations. But on the Continent of Europe, where party +government was transplanted from England, it has never really taken +root. Each small group nominated its own candidates, and the successful +candidate represented only a plurality, and not a majority, of the +electors. Instead of a contest between two organized parties there was a +scramble among numerous factions. + +In France, Belgium, Italy, and Germany an attempt has been made to check +this evil by the double election. If at the first election no candidate +secures an absolute majority of the votes, a second election is held, +for which only the two candidates who head the poll at the first +election are allowed to compete. One must then get an absolute majority. +The double election has undoubtedly tended to prevent a further +splitting up into groups, but the Continental countries offer such poor +soil for the growth of party government that it has only restricted the +contest to two factions in each electorate; and, of course, the dominant +factions are not the same in the various electorates. + ++The Advance Vote.+--In Australia the same evil has become increasingly +evident, and it is now no uncommon thing for a candidate to be elected +by less than one-third or one-quarter of the total votes. In Queensland +a plan has been introduced to meet the evil, under the name of the +Advance Vote, which is designed to secure the advantages of the French +plan without the trouble and expense of a second election. The electors +simply declare in advance at the first election how they would vote at +the second election. All that is necessary is that they place the +candidates in order of preference, 1, 2, 3, 4, &c. Then, instead of +holding a second election between the two who have the greatest number +of first preferences, it is merely necessary for the returning officer +to consult each ballot paper and see which of these two candidates is +higher in order of favour. Thus if one is marked 3 and the other 4, the +vote is counted to the candidate marked 3. This device is assumed to +give exactly the same result as the French plan, providing only that the +same electors vote at both elections, and do not change their views +between the two elections. + +But in reality it possesses hardly any of the advantages of the French +plan. It is another instance of the danger of neglecting the factor of +human nature. The French do not go to the trouble and expense of a +second election for nothing. Their plan is far the better. First of all, +consider the candidates. They know well beforehand that unless one of +them gets an absolute majority of the votes at the first election they +will be put to the expense and delay of a second election, therefore it +is to their interest that the number of candidates be restricted. This +tends to keep down the representation to two sections. Next, consider +the electors. They know also that unless they give a majority of votes +to one of the candidates they will be put to the trouble of voting a +second time, therefore they will take good care the votes are not split +up, even if the candidates wanted it. What is the result? Simply that in +the vast majority of cases one of the candidates gets a majority at the +first election, and no second election is necessary; and, most important +of all, the tendency to split up is counteracted. + +Now take the Queensland system. None of these checks operate. The +splitting up into groups is actually encouraged, and it is to the +interest of each group to see as many more groups as possible formed, in +order to increase its own relative importance, for the delegates of the +two strongest groups have a chance of election instead of the strongest +group only. + +In practice the plan threatens to break down, owing to a practical point +being overlooked. It is evident that the success of the Advance Vote +depends on the electors marking all the preferences. The ballot paper +should be made informal unless all the preferences are given. In +Queensland this has not been done, and the consequence is that a large +proportion of the electors refuse to give more than one preference. No +more conclusive evidence is needed that the scheme has promoted the +growth of factions. These electors voluntarily disfranchise themselves +rather than vote for any of the other candidates, and of course the very +object of the scheme is defeated; the successful candidate cannot secure +a majority of the votes cast. + ++The Exhaustive Ballot.+--A bill has just been introduced into the +Legislative Assembly of Victoria, providing for a further extension of +the principle of the Advance Vote. The plan is favoured by Professor +Nanson, and professes to be an improvement on the Queensland plan, +although it is only an "instalment of reform" in view of the ultimate +adoption of the more perfect Preferential Voting. The Queensland plan is +objected to because all but the two highest candidates are thrown out. +Suppose, for instance, two candidates stand for the weaker party and +three for the stronger party, it is quite likely that all the candidates +of the stronger party will be thrown out. Therefore the lowest candidate +only of the five should be thrown out. All his papers should be +transferred to the candidate who is marked 2 on them; and those below +him on all the papers should go up one point in order of favour. If he +stood 3 on a paper, the candidate who was 4 would now become 3. Another +count of first preferences should then be made, and the lowest again +thrown out; and so on till one candidate gets an absolute majority. It +is pointed out triumphantly that this plan, which is known as the +Exhaustive Ballot, actually saves in this instance all the trouble and +expense of no less than three separate elections. The process of +elimination is the same as that adopted in the Hare system, and is +little, if at all, better than the Queensland plan in securing the +election of the right candidate, while as regards the formation of +groups it is worse. For this plan actually encourages the groups to +split up, since if one candidate nominated by a group is thrown out his +vote will be transferred to the others. Therefore the double election is +much better than either form of the Advance Vote. They would do nothing +towards restoring the one redeeming merit of the single electorate, of +confining representation to the two main parties. And all other +mathematical schemes founded on the _a priori_ assumption that the +candidate most favoured by all sections is entitled to the seat are just +as objectionable. + +The conclusion that must be reached from all these considerations is +that, except when there is a single candidate standing in the interests +of each of the two main parties, it is impossible to say with the +present system who ought to be elected. The difficulty is one of +fundamental principle. The only way to do justice to both parties is to +enlarge the electorates so that each can get its proportionate share of +representation, and then to provide such machinery as will allow each +party separately to elect its most favoured candidates. In no other way +can the people be induced to organize into two coherent parties. + + + + +CHAPTER X. + +APPLICATION OF THE REFORM TO AUSTRALIAN LEGISLATURES. + + ++Federal Legislatures.+--The keynote of the Australian Federal +Constitution, as expressed in the Commonwealth Bill, is full and +unreserved trust in the people. This is in direct contrast with the +American Constitution, which seeks to place checks on the people by +dividing power among the President, the Senate, and the House of +Representatives, and assigning to each separate functions. Do we fully +realize the dangers as well as the glorious possibilities of unfettered +action? Do we sufficiently feel the weight of the responsibility we have +undertaken? In reality we have declared to the world the fitness of the +Australian democracy to work a Constitution from which the most advanced +of the other nations would shrink! We do not hesitate to avow our firm +belief that there is only one thing that can save the situation. Unless +Australia is to show to the world a warning instead of an example, all +her energies must be bent on the formation of two coherent organized +parties, dividing each State on national issues, and competing for the +support of all classes and all interests in every electorate throughout +the Commonwealth. + +That is the lesson we have endeavoured to inculcate throughout this +book, and we are tempted to quote in support of it the opinion of an +American author, Professor Paul S. Reinsch, in a work just published on +"World Politics." He says:-- + + The political experience of the last two centuries has proved that + free government and party government are almost convertible terms. + It is still as true as when Burke wrote his famous defence of + party, in his _Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents_, + that, for the realization of political freedom, the organization of + the electorate into regular and permanent parties is necessary. + Parliamentary government has attained its highest success only in + those countries where political power is held alternately by two + great national parties. As soon as factional interests become + predominant; as soon as the stability of government depends upon + the artificial grouping of minor conflicting interests; as soon as + the nation lacks the tonic effect of the mutual criticisms of great + organizations, the highest form of free government becomes + unattainable. (pp. 327, 328.) + +The greatest strain on the Constitution will probably be felt at the +outset. Both people and politicians are suddenly called upon to rise to +a higher plane of political thought and action. The idea that each State +is to send representatives to fight for its own interests must first be +got rid of. The only way in which all interests can be reconciled is by +each State acting through the national parties. The greatest danger +which assails the Commonwealth is the risk of combinations of States +dominating party lines; and it is the more imminent that divergent +opinions between the larger and the smaller States were already apparent +at the Convention. The four smaller States, Western Australia, South +Australia, Queensland, and Tasmania, with about one-third of the +population, will have two-thirds of the representation in the Senate; +while the two large States, Victoria and New South Wales, will have +about two-thirds of the representation in the House of Representatives. +At the Convention the fear was expressed that the former, representing a +majority of the States, and the latter, representing a majority of the +people, might come into conflict, and that a deadlock would ensue. It +was on this issue that the great struggle at the Convention took place, +resulting in the adoption of a double dissolution and a subsequent joint +sitting of the two Houses if necessary. By this machinery all disputes +will be finally settled. But what will happen if some of the States +consider themselves unjustly treated? Even apart from conflicts between +the two Houses, if only one State stood aloof from the main parties it +could paralyze government, just as Ireland did in the Imperial +Parliament. It is evident, then, that the very existence of the Union is +bound up in the immediate formation of national parties. + +In the United States this lesson was not learned till the Civil War had +demonstrated the danger of combinations of States. Since then two great +parties have been maintained, even though their existence involves the +spoils system and machine organization. In Switzerland, too, the federal +tie was not drawn close till after the revolution in 1847, in which the +Catholic cantons attempted to secede. + +Unfortunately, another cause of dissension menaces the Commonwealth. We +allude to the class representation which we have already animadverted +upon. The separate representation of sections or classes within the +States is just as much to be dreaded as the separate representation of +States, and bodes as much ill. It seems not unlikely that the fate of +the first Federal ministry will be in the hands of the Labour party, +which will be able to dictate its policy. It is utterly inconsistent +with the democratic theory that a small minority should have this power; +and it is to be hoped that in the wider field of federal politics its +true character will be recognized. It is only by the mutual action of +two great national parties that the true direction of progress, favoured +by the people, can be worked out; a small minority studying only its own +interests is sure to be a bad guide. A steady pressure maintained +through the two national parties will ensure the recognition of all just +demands; such extreme and ill-considered demands as that for the +initiative and national referendum can only provoke opposition and cause +reaction. Even those who sympathize with the ultimate objects of the +Labour unions must see the folly of their present unpatriotic and +suicidal tactics. + +It is a matter for hope that in the wider sphere of federal politics the +irresponsible leadership of the press is not likely to be the power for +harm that it is in some of the individual States at present. But while +it may not dominate the Federal Parliament as a whole to the same +extent, its control over nominations in the States will be quite as +great, and immeasurably greater if the Block Vote is adopted. Nor are +signs wanting of a union of some of the larger newspaper ventures in the +principal States, with a view to increase their power. + +Such is a brief review of the outlook. The great requisites essential +for progress are the organization of two national parties and +responsible leadership in the Federal Parliament. The dangers to the +Commonwealth may be summed up under the two heads of lack of +organization and irresponsible leadership outside Parliament. Is it +possible that the dangers may be avoided and the requisites secured by a +change in electoral machinery? Those who have no conception of the +working of social forces, and who do not trace the law of causation into +the realm of mind, will be inclined to scoff at the suggestion. To them +the only hope of improvement lies in appealing to the people to elect +better men. They ignore entirely the reciprocal relation of the +Parliament and the people, and while recognizing the influence of the +people on the character of Parliament, they deny the influence of +Parliament on the character of the people. They declare that the people +are "free agents" and will have better government when they make up +their minds to get it; and no electoral machinery or parliamentary +machinery can influence the result. Such is the passive attitude which +consciously or unconsciously is almost universally assumed. Yet who can +study the history of the British Constitution without being impressed +with the fact that every step in the evolution of its machinery was a +true sociological invention and had the effect of directing the people's +will, which is the motive force, into channels conducive to the general +welfare? Take away the responsible leadership of the Cabinet in the +British Parliament, and it would become a sink of corruption like the +United States Congress; take away its organization into two national +parties, and it would become a rabble like the French Chambers. Now, is +not the electoral machinery the connecting link between the people and +Parliament, and therefore a vital part in the machinery of government? +Does it not actually decide the constitution of Parliament? If this be +granted, it follows that unless the electoral machinery be adapted to +give effect to these two great principles, parliaments will inevitably +decline; and that the present method of election is a very inadequate +means of giving effect to them few will deny. + +Our claim for the application of the electoral reform set forth in the +preceding pages rests simply on the fact that it will give effect to +these principles under conditions in which the present system would +fail. We press especially for its application to the Federal House of +Representatives, which will be the most important Australian +representative assembly; for it it there that organization and +responsible leadership are most urgently needed. That they will not be +obtained if the present schemes of dividing the States into +single-membered electorates are adopted is morally certain; and the +result can only be disaster and bitter disappointment. If the +mathematical devices described in the last chapter are added, the +disorganization will be still more complete. And as for the scheme for +allowing separate delegation to a number of sections, which is advocated +under the name of the Hare system, it would be absolutely fatal. Who can +believe that if Mr. Hare's wild scheme to divide the British people into +several hundred sections had been adopted 40 years ago the Imperial +Parliament would now be an organized assembly? + +Take the conditions presented by the first elections for the Federal +Parliament, to be held early next year. In some respects it is fortunate +that a definite issue is available as a basis of party organization; for +there is a general consensus of opinion that all other considerations +must be subordinated to a pronouncement on the tariff issue. In an +article on "The Liberal Outlook" in _United Australia_, the Hon. Alfred +Deakin writes:--"By the very circumstances of the case the tariff issue +cannot but dominate the first election, and determine the fate of the +first ministry of the Commonwealth. There will be no time for second +thoughts or for suspense of judgment. The first choice of the people +will be final on this head. The first Parliament must be either +Protectionist or anti-Protectionist, and its first great work an +Australian tariff. That is the clear-cut issue. The risk is that a +proportion of the representatives may be returned upon other grounds, as +the electors as a whole may not realize all that is at stake or make the +necessary sacrifices of opinions and preferences to express themselves +emphatically on this point." Now, the only way to avoid the risk +indicated is to take this one definite issue as the basis of +proportional representation. Each State should be divided on it, and +should elect its proportional number of Freetrade and Protectionist +representatives. Tasmania and Western Australia could conveniently be +polled for this purpose each as one electorate; South Australia might be +divided into two electorates, Queensland into three, and Victoria and +New South Wales into four or five. + +It is very desirable that the first election be contested on definite +policies advanced by the prospective party leaders; the suggestion that +the first ministry should be merely a provisional ministry, to act till +the first responsible ministry is formed after the election, is +therefore open to serious objection. The leader of the Freetrade party +or the leader of the Protectionist party should be chosen as first +Federal Premier, and the first election should decide which policy is to +be adopted. + +Contrast this scheme with the proposals now under consideration. In +Victoria, New South Wales, and Queensland bills have been introduced +dividing the States into single-membered electorates, and some of the +smaller States are inclined to use the Block Vote. In Victoria a bad +precedent has been established by giving the party in power the duty of +determining boundaries. From time to time it will be necessary to +rearrange the boundaries, not only on account of movements of population +within the State, but also because the number of representatives which +the State is entitled to will vary. Look forward to the time when the +State becomes entitled to one more representative; every one of the 23 +electorates, in which vested interests will have been created, will have +to be altered These are precisely the conditions which have led to the +growth of the gerrymander in the United States. + +Already the first scheme submitted to the Assembly has been defeated by +a combination of country members, who held that Melbourne was allotted a +larger share of representation than it now has in the local Parliament. +Whatever may be the arguments by which the disparity between the size +of town and country electorates be supported in local affairs, surely +they cannot apply where national issues only are at stake. The principle +of equal electorates is recognized in the Commonwealth Bill by the rules +for allotting representation to the States. Why not, then, for the +divisions of each State? It is said that a larger proportion of the +electors vote in the town, but it is not those only who vote who are +represented. + +In dividing a State into electorates for the purpose of the reform, the +number of electors in each division should therefore form the basis of +proportional distribution. The unit of representation would be the total +number of electors in the State divided by the number of seats. One +representative would be allowed to each division of the State for each +unit of representation, and the remaining seats, if any, would go to +those divisions with the largest remainders. + +Coming now to the Federal Senate, the bill provides that every State, +except Queensland, must be polled as one electorate for the election of +six senators at the first election and in case of a double dissolution; +at intermediate elections three senators only will be elected, as they +retire in rotation. This equal representation of the States might be +taken to imply that the Senate is intended to represent State rights, +and the provision that each State is to be polled as one electorate +would seem to support that view. On the other hand, the senators are not +required to vote according to States, for it is provided that "each +senator shall have one vote;" the vote of a State may therefore be +neutralized by its representatives. And again, the Senate is to be +elected directly by the people and not by the State legislatures, as at +first proposed. To some extent, therefore, the Federal Senate as now +constituted presents a new problem in representation, on which it is not +advisable to dogmatize. Personal considerations will probably have more +weight than in the selection of representatives; but when we reflect +that it is really little more than a revising assembly, elected by the +same voters as the House of Representatives to deal with the same +questions, and having no special functions of its own, the conclusion +seems irresistible that the election must be contested by the same +national parties, and that the same method of election should be +adopted. + +Until the Parliament of the Commonwealth prescribes a uniform method of +choosing senators, the duty is to be left to the State parliaments; and +it is to be regretted that the States have taken no steps to secure +uniform action at the first election. In Victoria a fierce newspaper +contest is being waged over the Block Vote and the Hare system, and the +arguments, being mutually destructive, only go to prove that both are +equally objectionable. The _Age_ naturally wishes to have the privilege +of electing six senators as it did ten delegates to the Federal +Convention, and contends that the majority should elect all the +senators; the _Argus_ rushes to the other extreme in declaring that six +separate minorities ought to be represented, and ignores the risk that +these minorities would be formed on a class or religious basis. The +middle position advocated in this book--namely, that majority and +minority should each return its proportional share of representation--is +free from the objections to both these extreme views. + ++State Legislatures.+--Even after federation the State Houses will still +continue to touch at most points the daily lives of the people; they +will merely be shorn of some of their powers and drained of some of +their best leaders. The fiscal issue, which has had great influence in +deciding party lines in the past, will be removed from the arena of +strife, leaving no other than an indefinite line of division into +Liberals and Conservatives, which in practice tends to become a division +into lower and upper classes. This is the danger ahead; and it can only +be avoided by the formation of strong party organizations appealing to +all classes to work together for the general welfare. Party government +is just as necessary in State politics as in national politics. + +The present position is intolerable; the disintegration of parties is so +complete that there is not a responsible ministry in Australia worthy of +the name. Among the causes which have led to this deplorable state of +affairs the present method of election is undoubtedly the most potent; +it frequently happens that four or five candidates, representing as +many groups, contest a single seat. In Victoria, where the state of +chaos is perhaps worst, the influence of the press, the existence of a +strong Labour section in the Lower House, and the class character of the +Upper House, representing property and capital, have been the principal +contributing causes. + +With the advent of federation a revision of the State constitution is +widely demanded, and is likely to be conceded. One of the first steps +necessary to restore harmony must be reform of the Upper House by a +gradual extension of the franchise and a lowering of the qualification, +so as to ensure that elections are freely contested; it is its present +unrepresentative character which gives force to the appeals of the +radical press and intensifies class divisions. + +The relation of State parties to the national parties is an important +subject. In the article from which we have already quoted, in _United +Australia_, Mr. Deakin writes:--"There cannot be a series of Liberal +parties, one Federal and the others in the States, each going its own +way. There must be but one party, with one programme, to which effect +will require to be given continuously in both the States and the +Commonwealth." He therefore deplores that the Liberal party, together +with its "left wing," the Labour class, will be split on the fiscal +issue. "It is this apparently unavoidable rupture in the party," he +declares, "which endangers its prospects and presents an opportunity to +the Conservative classes of either seizing or sharing an authority to +which they could not otherwise aspire." If this means that the "Liberal" +and Labour classes are entitled by reason of their numbers to a +perpetual lease of power in both domains, there can be no more dangerous +doctrine. Parties should be decided by questions of progress and +financial policy, and not on class lines; and since the State and +Federal legislatures have separate spheres of action, parties should be +separate also, unless, indeed, they are to be founded on corruption, as +in the United States, where the same two parties control not only +national and State politics, but city government also. + +In the consolidation of public opinion into two definite lines of policy +based on the questions to be dealt with lies the only hope, then, of the +progress of the individual States within their own range; and in +promoting this desirable result the reform advocated in these pages +finds its true application. + + + + +CHAPTER XI. + +THE CONDITIONS OF SOCIAL PROGRESS. + + ++The Agent of Progress.+--If the analysis made in the preceding pages of +the principles underlying political representation comes to be regarded +as correct, the science of sociology must be profoundly affected: for it +is a fact that not only the importance but the very existence of the +principles involved has been completely missed by speculators in that +field. The view we have taken is that representation is the most +important sociological invention which has been made in the whole +history of the human race; that the successive steps taken in the +evolution of the British Constitution mark a series of inventions +scarcely less important, and that the resulting institution of party and +responsible government is the indispensable agent of democratic +progress. We have traced throughout the electoral and parliamentary +machinery on which the institution is based the action of two great +principles--organization and responsible leadership--and we have shown +that these are the mainsprings of the whole mechanism. Yet we find even +such an authority as Mr. Herbert Spencer objecting to the party system, +on the ground that it lends itself to a one-man or a one-party +tyranny.[9] The fact is that it is only when representative government +is weak, and approaches direct government, that such a result can +happen, and the distinction is so little recognized that a brief +recapitulation may be permitted. + +The fundamental error is in conceiving representation as merely a means +of registering the popular will; many even go so far as to regard it as +an imperfect means of ensuring that each single question will be decided +according to the will of the majority. All such conceptions really +amount to direct government, and where they are given effect to, whether +by the referendum or sectional delegation, society is not organized for +consistent progress. Indeed, if the lessons of history can be trusted, +such a state of society is bound to be wrecked from within by +anti-social influences; political power becomes the object of factious +strife, and the rule of the majority degenerates into the tyranny of the +majority. + +We have endeavoured to show that the true conception of representative +government involves a recognition of the principles of organization and +leadership, and that representation is in consequence a means not only +of registering the popular will, but also of organizing and guiding it. +In both cases, therefore, the popular will is the ultimate motive force, +but in the one case the desires of the people clash, while in the other +they are directed into channels conducive to the general welfare. We +have regarded it as an essential condition of representative government +that the popular will be expressed only as to the direction of progress, +that is to say on general policy and not on single questions, and that +complete control of progress be then left to the representative body. In +no other way can the people be saved from their anti-social tendencies, +and induced to express their opinion as to what is best for all. We have +seen how the electoral machinery is adapted to organize this expression +of the popular will into two alternative directions of progress; how +this is effected by the fact of two parties competing for the support of +the people on policies expressing these lines of progress; and how the +parliamentary machinery allows the stronger of these two parties for the +time being complete control of administration and of the direction of +progress. The effect of this organization is that the popular will is +reduced to effective action in one direction at a time--a result which +is not possible with direct government. + +Nor is the principle of responsible leadership which is involved in the +reciprocal relation of the representative body and the people any less +important. Society cannot progress faster than the individual units +composing it. True progress lies therefore in raising the standard of +public opinion, and it is this principle which ensures that result by +reacting upon and moulding individual character. Hence we find that in +countries like England, where the principle is operative, progress is +effected without supervision and undue interference in the affairs of +the individual by the State, while in countries where the principle is +not operative, such as the Continental countries of Europe and some of +the Australian colonies, the contrary is the case. Legislation should +therefore be directed to changing the nature of the individual, and +should not be too far in advance of public opinion. This is what Mr. +Lester F. Ward, in his work on "Outlines of Sociology," calls attractive +legislation. He writes:-- + + The principle involved in attraction, when applied to social + affairs, is simply that of _inducing_ men to act for the good of + society. It is that of harmonizing the interests of the individual + with those of society, of making it advantageous to the individual + to do that which is socially beneficial; not merely in a negative + form as an alternative of two evils, as is done when a penalty is + attached to an action, but positively, in such a manner that he + will exert himself to do those things that society most needs to + have done. The sociologist and the statesman should co-operate in + discovering the laws of society and the methods of utilizing them, + so as to let the social forces flow freely and strongly, + untrammelled by penal statutes, mandatory laws, irritating + prohibitions, and annoying obstacles. (p. 274.) + +Now, we submit that this attractive legislation is possible only when +there is no oppressed minority, and is therefore the peculiar province +of representative government; for we have shown that the whole machinery +is adapted to induce the people to desire only what is best in the +interests of society. + +Let us briefly examine the bearing of the view that representative +machinery is the agent of progress on previous theories of social +progress. + ++Professor Huxley.+--No one has more clearly laid down the conditions of +social progress than the late Professor Huxley in his essay on +_Evolution and Ethics_. The gradual strengthening of the social bond by +the practise of self-restraint in the interests of society he called the +ethical process, and he showed that social progress means a checking of +the cosmic process at every step and the substitution of this ethical +process. This action he compares to that of a gardener in clearing a +patch of waste ground. If he relaxes his efforts to maintain the state +of art within the garden, weeds will overrun it and the state of nature +will return. So the human race is doomed to a constant struggle to +maintain the state of art of an organized polity in opposition to the +state of nature; to substitute as far as possible social progress for +cosmic evolution. He says:-- + + Let us understand, once for all, that the ethical progress of + society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in + running away from it, but in combating it. It may seem an audacious + proposal thus to pit the microcosm against the macrocosm, and to + set man to subdue nature to his higher ends; but I venture to think + that the great intellectual difference between the ancient times + with which we have been occupied and our day, lies in the solid + foundation we have acquired for the hope that such an enterprise + may meet with a certain measure of success....[10] + + Moreover, the cosmic nature born with us, and to a large extent + necessary for our maintenance, is the outcome of millions of years + of severe training, and it would be folly to imagine that a few + centuries will suffice to subdue its masterfulness to purely + ethical ends. Ethical nature may count upon having to reckon with a + tenacious and powerful enemy as long as the world lasts. But, on + the other hand, I see no limit to the extent to which intelligence + and will, guided by sound principles of investigation, and + organized in common effort, may modify the conditions of existence + for a period longer than that now covered by history. And much may + be done to change the nature of man himself. The intelligence which + has converted the brother of the wolf into the faithful guardian of + the flock ought to be able to do something towards curbing the + instincts of savagery in civilized men.[11] + +But Huxley never realized that the real cause of the better prospects of +success in modern as contrasted with ancient times is the discovery of +representative machinery. "The business," he declared, "of the sovereign +authority--which is, or ought to be, simply a delegation of the people +appointed to act for its good--appears to me to be not only to enforce +the renunciation of the anti-social desires, but wherever it may be +necessary to promote the satisfaction of those which are conducive to +progress."[12] There is no conception here of the principles of +organization and responsible leadership, so necessary in constituting +this "delegation." + ++Herbert Spencer.+--By a great many sociologists it is denied that man +has his destiny in his own hands, or can by common effort modify the +conditions of existence so as to promote progress. The conception which +is held to justify this view is that there is an exact correspondence +between the progress of human society and the growth of an organism. +Foremost among those who take this view is Mr. Herbert Spencer. The +close analogy which the progress of the assumed social organism bears to +the growth of the physiological organism is worked out in great detail +throughout the "Synthetic Philosophy," and is taken to establish "that +Biology and Sociology will more or less interpret each other." The +practical conclusion which is drawn is that the growth of society must +not be interfered with; if the State goes beyond the duty of protection, +it becomes an aggressor. So Mr. Spencer is a most uncompromising +opponent of State action, even education and public sanitation coming in +for his condemnation. Moreover, he holds that if the social organism be +let alone it will tend to a future state of society in which social +altruism will be so developed that the individual will voluntarily +sacrifice himself in the interests of society. + +In an essay on _The Social Organism_ ("Essays," Second Series), he +writes:-- + + Strange as the assertion will be thought, our Houses of Parliament + discharge in the social economy functions that are, in sundry + respects, comparable to those discharged by the cerebral masses in + a vertebrate animal.... We may describe the office of the brain as + that of _averaging_ the interests of life, physical, intellectual, + moral, social; and a good brain is one in which the desires + answering to their respective interests are so balanced that the + conduct they jointly dictate sacrifices none of them. Similarly we + may describe the office of Parliament as that of _averaging_ the + interests of the various classes in a community; and a good + Parliament is one in which the parties answering to these + respective interests are so balanced that their united legislation + concedes to each class as much as consists with the claims of the + rest. + +The error of regarding society merely as an aggregate is here clearly +shown, for if the "parties" in Parliament were based on class +delegation, as assumed, social progress would be blocked. The only real +foundation for the resemblance between society and an organism is this: +that unless the individual units composing society reduce themselves to +unity of action in a definite direction, society as a whole cannot +progress; or, in other words, that the principles of organization and +leadership are essential to progress. Yet Mr. Spencer denies that there +is any sphere of collective action for the operation of these +principles! + ++Benjamin Kidd.+--The "social organism" theory is also the foundation of +the theory of social progress with which Mr. Benjamin Kidd startled the +scientific world a few years ago in "Social Evolution." While +appreciating the importance of the factor of individual reason, he +contended that self-restraint by the individual in the interests of +society is impossible without an ultra-rational sanction; that, in +fact, without this the reason is the most anti-social and +anti-evolutionary of all human qualities. The central fact therefore +with which we are confronted in our progressive societies is stated as +follows:--"_The interests of the social organism and those of the +individuals comprising it at any particular time are actually +antagonistic; they can never be reconciled; they are inherently and +essentially irreconcilable._" What becomes of this extraordinary +proposition if it is clearly established that the amount of +reconciliation depends on the extent to which the principles of +organization and responsible leadership are given effect to by +representative machinery? + ++Past Progress.+--The question will naturally be raised: If a +representative body is now the indispensable agent of social progress, +how can progress previous to the introduction of representation be +explained? The answer is that the same principles were operative, but in +different forms, more suited to the stage of social development. Indeed, +we may say that, from the time that man emerged from the brute stage and +became a social animal, the types of society which have survived in the +struggle for existence with the state of nature and with other types +have been those in which the principles of organization and leadership +have been most active. Even the lowest types of savages, such as the +native tribes studied by Professor Baldwin Spencer and Mr. Gillen in +Central Australia, have a complicated system of organization, the +peculiar feature of which is totemism, or group marriage; but this is +more the result of development than of conscious effort. Leadership also +is rudimentary, for, although the old men have control of the elaborate +ceremonies described, they conform almost entirely to custom and +tradition. Out of this savage stage there grew in favoured countries the +second type of human society--the patriarchal, in which leadership +becomes personal, and centred in a chief who exercises despotic +authority. Patriarchal society grew out of the necessities of a pastoral +existence; indeed, it was the discovery of the domestication of animals +which gave rise to it. Among other interesting features which were +developed are permanent marriage, slavery, and ancestor worship. There +can be no doubt that the latter played an important part in binding the +tribe into one organization, and in inducing all the tribe to submit to +the leadership of the chief. There is a second stage of patriarchal +society in which the large tribes break up into clans and become less +nomadic. Professor Jenks has shown, in his "Short History of Politics," +how this stage originated in the adoption of agriculture. We begin now +to have the village community, bound by the tie of kinship, and +submitting to the leadership of a lord; and are already on the threshold +of modern political society, in which all these ancient barriers are +broken down and the individual becomes the social unit. The cause of +this momentous change is development of the art of warfare. But before +we reach the modern State there is an intermediate stage, namely, +feudalism. The feudal chief is simply the successful warrior--the leader +of a band of adventurers who get control of a definite territory and +exact military allegiance from its inhabitants. Out of the consolidation +of these bands, or by conquest, modern States were founded. Leadership +was now vested in an irresponsible despot--the king; and the trouble was +to render this new institution permanent, and to induce the people to +submit to it. The former result was attained by making the kingship +hereditary, but the latter has always been a difficult task. It is +doubtful if it would ever have been accomplished but for a significant +alliance--that of Church and State. The convenient fiction of the divine +right of kings was invented, and religion was used to bolster up the +institution and to provide a sanction for submission to absolutism. In +other words, irresponsible leadership was tolerated because +responsibility was supposed to exist to a Higher Power. So we find that +all the great religious movements--Christianity, Mohammedanism, and even +Buddhism--have been associated with the establishment of mighty +kingdoms. Moreover, the only two kingdoms in Europe in which absolutism +still holds out are Russia and Turkey, in which the head of the State is +also head of the Church. But military despotism, which was based solely +on the exploitation of weaker communities, of which ancient Rome was +the culminating type, wanted the elements of permanent progress, and was +bound to disappear before a new type which rested on the development of +internal resources. Militarism must therefore be looked on as a real +stage of progress; for in contrast with patriarchal society it was +competitive, and it broke down many ancient barriers, and prepared the +way for industrial co-operation. Thus we arrive at the conditions +favourable to the rise of representative institutions. For when the cost +of wars had to be raised out of the national resources kings found it +convenient to get the consent of the people to taxation. Hence the great +movement throughout Western Europe for the establishment of parliaments +in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Why is it that in England alone +this movement was successful? Partly no doubt because its isolated +position was favourable to internal progress, but mainly because it was +the only State in which the principles of organization and responsible +leadership were continuously given effect to. So it is that in England +there was developed that wonderful machinery of representative +government which has enabled the people to substitute responsible for +irresponsible leadership, and has made the national character what it +is. This machinery has now been adopted nearly all over the world, +wherever it has been desired to make the popular will felt, but in no +case has it sufficed to give effect to the underlying principles to the +same extent; and success has been attained only in so far as they have +been effective. The lesson of the last century has been that the +machinery which proved sufficient in England, where progress was uniform +through several centuries, breaks down when the pace of progress is +increased. An extreme instance is the recent attempt to introduce party +government into Japan, a country just emerging from the feudal stage, an +interesting account of which is given in the _Nineteenth Century_ for +July, 1899. The experiment failed because the clans could not be divided +on questions of political principle. In a greater or less degree that is +the fundamental source of difficulty everywhere; if the representative +machinery produces only sectional delegation the tendency is back +through anarchy to absolutism. Is it not an extraordinary fact, then, +that the vital distinction between representation and delegation is so +universally ignored? + +Such is a brief outline of the evolution of human society; however +inadequate it may be, it at least serves to illustrate the truth that +social progress has never been made in the past except when the +principles of organization and leadership have been operative. + ++Future Progress.+--As to the ultimate tendency of future progress it +would be pedantry to dogmatize; our task has been the humbler one of +pointing out the means by which progress is to be attained. We have +assumed, however, that there is a separate sphere of collective action +in which government is an instrument for the positive amelioration of +social conditions. We are aware that this conclusion is at variance with +the two extreme schools of modern thought; on the one hand, with the +individualists, who hold that government should only be used for mutual +protection and to keep order; and on the other hand, with the +socialists, who would leave nothing to individual action. Professor +Huxley has reduced the claims of these two schools to absurdity and +impossibility respectively; and we believe that the problem of the +future is to find out that middle course between the anarchy of the one +and the despotism of the other which makes for progress. It seems likely +that the state of society we are approaching will be one in which, while +natural inequalities will be recognized, neither the artificial +inequalities of fanatical individualism nor the artificial equalities of +regimental socialism will be tolerated, and every man will enter the +rivalry of life on terms of an equality of opportunity. This is the +state foreshadowed by Mr. Lester Ward in his "Outlines of Sociology" and +called by him _Sociocracy_. Such ideals, however, serve only to refute +false conceptions and offer little practical guidance. What is wanted is +a clear recognition of the fact that _progress depends on collective +effort acting through representative machinery, the efficiency of which +depends on the extent to which the principles of organization and +responsible leadership are operative._ The question with which +democratic countries are faced to-day is this: Must it be acknowledged +that the people are unfit for self-government, or is the representative +machinery defective? We have supported the view that the latter is the +case as regards English-speaking-countries at all events; and we have +shown that in British countries the remedy lies in improved electoral +machinery, while in the United States both electoral and parliamentary +machinery are at fault. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[9] "Principles of Ethics." + +[10] "Collected Essays," vol. ix., p. 83. + +[11] _Ibid._, p. 85. + +[12] "Collected Essays," vol. i., pp. 275-276. + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Proportional Representation Applied To +Party Government, by T. R. Ashworth and H. P. C. Ashworth + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 14459 *** diff --git a/14459-h/14459-h.htm b/14459-h/14459-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..239e751 --- /dev/null +++ b/14459-h/14459-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,5658 @@ +<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> +<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> + +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + <head> + <title> + The Project Gutenberg eBook of Proportional Representation Applied To Party Government, by T.R. Ashworth and H.P.C. Ashworth + </title> + <style type="text/css"> +/*<![CDATA[ XML blockout */ +<!-- + p { margin-top: .75em; + text-align: justify; + margin-bottom: .75em; + } + h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6 { + text-align: center; /* all headings centered */ + clear: both; + } + hr { width: 33%; + margin-top: 2em; + margin-bottom: 2em; + margin-left: auto; + margin-right: auto; + clear: both; + } + + table {margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;} + + body{margin-left: 10%; + margin-right: 10%; + } + + + ul li { padding-top: .5em ; } + ul ul ul, ul li ul li { padding: 0; } + ul { list-style: none; } + ul, ul ul ul li { display: inline; } + .subitem { display: block; padding-left: 2em; } + + + .center {text-align: center;} + .right {text-align: right;} + + // --> + /* XML end ]]>*/ + </style> + </head> +<body> +<div>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 14459 ***</div> + +<h1>PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION APPLIED TO PARTY GOVERNMENT</h1> + +<h2>A NEW ELECTORAL SYSTEM</h2> + +<h3>BY</h3> + +<h2>T.R. ASHWORTH</h2> +<p class='center'>(<i>President of the Victorian Division, Australian Free Trade and Liberal Association</i>)</p> + +<h3>AND</h3> + +<h2>H.P.C. ASHWORTH</h2> +<p class='center'>(<i>Civil Engineer</i>)</p> + +<h3>LONDON</h3> + +<h3>SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO., LIM.</h3> + +<h3>PATERNOSTER SQUARE</h3> + +<h3>1901</h3> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CONTENTS" id="CONTENTS" />CONTENTS.</h2> + +<ul> + <li><a href="#CHAPTER_I">CHAPTER I</a>—THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION + </li> + <li><a href="#CHAPTER_II">CHAPTER II</a>—THE SO-CALLED REPRESENTATIVE PRINCIPLE + </li> + <li><a href="#CHAPTER_III">CHAPTER III</a>—THE PRESENT POSITION or PARTY GOVERNMENT + </li> + <li><a href="#CHAPTER_IV">CHAPTER IV</a>—THE REFORM: TRUE PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION + </li> + <li><a href="#CHAPTER_V">CHAPTER V</a>—HOW THE EVILS OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM WILL BE REMEDIED + </li> + <li><a href="#CHAPTER_VI">CHAPTER VI</a>—THE HARE SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL DELEGATION + </li> + <li><a href="#CHAPTER_VII">CHAPTER VII</a>—THE FREE LIST SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL DELEGATION + </li> + <li><a href="#CHAPTER_VIII">CHAPTER VIII</a>—PREFERENTIAL VOTING, THE BLOCK VOTE, THE LIMITED VOTE, ETC. + </li> + <li><a href="#CHAPTER_IX">CHAPTER IX</a>—ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE THE PRESENT SYSTEM + </li> + <li><a href="#CHAPTER_X">CHAPTER X</a>—APPLICATION OF THE REFORM TO AUSTRALIAN LEGISLATURES + </li> + <li><a href="#CHAPTER_XI">CHAPTER XI</a>—THE CONDITIONS OF SOCIAL PROGRESS + </li> + +</ul> + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> + +<blockquote><p>"Majority and minority, in and for themselves, are the first + requisite of popular government, and not the development or + representation of separate groups."—Bradford's "Lesson of Popular + Government," vol. ii., page 179.</p></blockquote> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="PREFACE" id="PREFACE" />PREFACE.</h2> + + +<p>The subject of electoral reform has been brought into prominence in +Australia by a clause in the Commonwealth Bill which provides that the +Federal Senate shall consist of six senators from each State, directly +chosen by the people, voting as one electorate. The problem thus +presented has been keenly discussed. On the one hand we have the +advocates of the Block Vote asserting that the party in a majority is +entitled to return all six senators; and on the other, a small band of +ardent reformers pressing the claims of the Hare system, which would +allow the people in each State to group themselves into six sections, +each returning one senator. The claim that every section of the people +is entitled to representation appears at first sight so just that it +seems intolerable that a method should have been used all these years +which excludes the minority in each electorate from any share of +representation; and, of course, the injustice becomes more evident when +the electorate returns several members. But in view of the adage that +it is the excellence of old institutions which preserves them, it is +surely a rash conclusion that the present method of election has no +compensating merit. We believe there is such a merit—namely, that <i>the +present method of election has developed the party system</i>. Once this +truth is grasped, it is quite evident that the Hare system would be +absolutely destructive to party government, since each electorate would +be contested, not by two organized parties, but by several groups. For +it is precisely this splitting into groups which is causing such anxiety +among thoughtful observers as to the future of representative +institutions; Mr. Lecky has attributed to it, in his "Democracy and +Liberty," the decline in the parliamentary system which has accompanied +the progress of democracy all over the world. The object of this book is +to suggest a reform, which possesses the advantages of both methods and +the disadvantages of neither; which will still ensure that each +electorate is contested by the two main parties, but will allow its just +share of representation to each; and which will, by discouraging the +formation of minor groups, provide a remedy for the evil instead of +aggravating it.</p> + +<p class='right'>T.R.A.<br /> +H.P.C.A.</p> + +<p>325 COLLINS STREET, MELBOURNE.</p> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="PROPORTIONAL_REPRESENTATION" id="PROPORTIONAL_REPRESENTATION" /><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1" />PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION APPLIED TO PARTY GOVERNMENT.</h2> + + +<hr style="width: 25%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_I" id="CHAPTER_I" />CHAPTER I.</h2> + +<p class='center'>THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION.</p> + + +<p>Old establishments, like the British Constitution, said Edmund Burke, +"are not often constructed after any theory; theories are rather drawn +from them." In setting out on an endeavour to understand the principles +underlying political representation, the saying expresses exactly the +course which should be followed. The inquiry is the more necessary as, +although representation more than anything else in the domain of +government distinguishes the modern from the ancient world, the ideas +which prevail as to the part it has played, is playing, and is destined +to play on the world's stage are not merely hazy, but extremely +inaccurate. The intimate connection of representation with the progress +which has followed its introduction is so little recognized that the +most advanced democracies are now willing to listen to any proposal to +return to direct government. In spite of <a name="Page_2" id="Page_2" />the fact that the nineteenth +century has witnessed the triumph of the historical method in most +fields of social inquiry, the dangers of <i>a priori</i> speculation on +political institutions are as much in evidence as when Burke wrote.</p> + +<p>If we would understand, then, the meaning of representative +institutions, it is in the gradual development of the "mother of +parliaments" that we must seek for the most reliable information. We +must be careful, however, to leave out of sight those features of the +growth of the British Constitution which are merely the expression of +transitory social conditions, and to confine our attention to the +landmarks which bear directly on the inquiry. The subject is best +divided into two stages; the first characterized by the origin of +representation; and the second by the division into parties, and the +creation of cabinet government.</p> + +<p><b>The First Stage of Representation.</b>—Rightly to understand the +conditions which led to the introduction and development of the +representative principle, we must look back to the period immediately +following the signing of the Great Charter by the tyrant King John.</p> + +<p>The Charter reaffirmed the ancient principle that free Englishmen should +not be taxed without their consent, and representation was the natural +outcome of that provision. A brief glance at the social conditions of +the time is necessary to understand why this was so. First, it must be +remembered <a name="Page_3" id="Page_3" />that the true political unit of ancient times was the city +or local community. England at that time was a collection of local +communities, having more or less a corporate life. Then, again, there +were the three estates of the realm—the clergy, the lords, and the +commons—who were accustomed to confer with the King on public affairs. +The stage which marks the birth of representation was when these +different estates and communities were asked to tax themselves to +relieve the necessities of the King. It was obviously impossible that +the consent of every freeman should be obtained, hence the duty had to +be deputed to agents. Now, the idea of agency was not unknown in the +ancient world, but that agents should have power to bind those for whom +they acted was something entirely new. It was necessary, however, that +they should have this power, and it suited the King's convenience that +they should exercise it. Already, in the earliest writ of which we have +knowledge, summoning each shire to send two good and discreet knights, +it was provided that they should be chosen in the stead of each and all. +This happened in 1254, and in the following year the clergy were also +summoned for the same purpose of granting aid to the King. In the +meantime the merchants and trade guilds in the cities were growing rich. +The King cast longing eyes on their possessions, and wished to tax them. +So we find that in 1264 Simon de Montfort, Earl of Leicester, issued the +celebrated writ summoning <a name="Page_4" id="Page_4" />each of the cities and boroughs to send two +of its more discreet and worthy citizens and burgesses. This is +sometimes regarded as the beginning of the House of Commons, but it was +really not until the fourteenth century that these several assemblies, +each of which up till then taxed itself separately and legislated in its +own sphere, coalesced into the present Houses. First the lower clergy +fell out, and, with the knights, citizens, and burgesses, were merged +into the House of Commons; and the higher prelates with the earls and +barons formed the House of Lords.</p> + +<p>This, then, is the first stage of representation. What was the nature of +this new force which had come into the world and was destined to so +profoundly affect the whole course of human affairs? One result of +immense importance is apparent at a glance. It solved a problem which +had baffled the ancients—that of the nationalization of local +communities on a free basis. But it is generally assumed that the only +difficulty overcome was that of size; that the representative assembly +is a mere substitute for the larger assembly of the whole nation. +Starting with this assumption, it is claimed that the representative +assembly should be a mirror of the people on a small scale, and the more +faithfully it reflects their faults as well as their virtues, their +ignorance as well as their intelligence, the more truly representative +it is said to be. It is even asserted that with the modern facilities +for taking a poll, representative government might be <a name="Page_5" id="Page_5" />dispensed with +and the people allowed to govern themselves. Democracy, we are assured, +means that every man should exercise an equality of political power. +Now, if this conception is correct, we should at once insist that every +law should be submitted to a direct referendum of the people; that +legislators should be mere agents for drawing up laws; and that the +executive should be directly responsible to and elected by the people. +But if representation is not a mere substitute for the direct action of +the people this idea as to the true line of democratic progress falls to +the ground. The whole question, therefore, hinges on what representation +is and what are the principles underlying it.</p> + +<p>Looking back to the history of its introduction, we have seen that it +was only in proportion as the deputies of the local communities were not +regarded as delegates or agents that they became representatives. +Professor E. Jenks has written an interesting article in the +<i>Contemporary Review</i> for December, 1898, in which he advances the +theory that representation is a union of the ideas of agency, borrowed +from the Roman law, and of vicarious liability from barbaric sources. As +to the latter he points out that in Anglo-Saxon times the only way for +the King to control the free local communities was to exact hostages +till crimes were punished or fines paid. In England, where these ideas +were combined, constitutional monarchy was firmly established; but in +France, <a name="Page_6" id="Page_6" />Germany, etc, in whose medieval parliaments the idea of agency +prevailed, and where in consequence the parliamentary idea was weak, +absolute monarchy held its ground. When Edward I. desired for purposes +of his own to emphasize the unlimited liability of political +representatives, and insisted that they should have "full and sufficient +power to do what of common council shall be ordained," he probably never +realized that a body having power to bind the shires and towns was a +formidable institution, or that the trembling hostages would become in +time haughty plenipotentiaries. But whatever may have been the social +conditions which gave rise to the idea, it is certain that it was the +power of binding those to whom they owed their selection which enabled +the representatives to resist the encroachments of the monarchy on the +liberties of the people. At first they were not legislators, but merely +sought to uphold the ancient laws. They presented petitions to redress +their grievances; but in time these petitions became demands; and they +refused to grant the King's subsidies till the demands were complied +with. It was, therefore, this first stage of representation which +enabled the people to start that long struggle against the power of the +King and nobles which has ended in complete self-government; nay, more, +it was necessary that they should pass through this first stage before +they could learn to govern themselves. Yet we have seen that if we apply +the modern ideas on representa<a name="Page_7" id="Page_7" />tion the start could never have been +made. In what respects, then, did these early representative +institutions differ from the modern conception as a reproduction of the +people on a small scale? One obvious difference at once suggests itself. +The representatives were not average members of the communities; they +were the most influential; they were selected because of their special +fitness for the work to be done; they were leaders of the people, not +followers; they did not take inspiration from the people, but brought it +to them; and having selected these men the people deferred to their +judgment to act for them and protect their interests. Here, then, we +arrive at the first principle involved in representation, which is +leadership.</p> + +<p>But there is another and still more important difference between a +representative assembly and a primary assembly of the people. It is +this: that a representative cannot be a violent partisan of a small +section of his constituents; he must be in general favour with all +sections. Therefore a representative assembly is composed of moderate +men, representing a compromise of the views of their individual +supporters. Moreover, the representatives appeal to the people to sink +their minor differences for the general welfare. This feature is very +prominent in the early parliaments. The local communities were arrayed +as a united people against the aggression of the monarchy. The principle +which is here apparent is that of organ<a name="Page_8" id="Page_8" />ization. In the first stage of +English parliamentary history we may say at once that these two +principles—organization and leadership—were most conspicuous. The +people, sinking all minor differences, formed one united party; and +recognised that their struggle against the party of prerogative depended +on the ability, influence, and integrity of their deputies.</p> + +<p><b>The Second Stage of Representation.</b>—There is no need to enter into +that long struggle between the nation and the monarchy which followed. +We pass on, then, to the time when the parliaments, having wrested a +share of power, began to split up into parties. It was natural that when +power became divided two parties should arise; one upholding the +authority of the Parliament against the King; and the other favouring +the divine right of Kings. The Puritans and Cavaliers in the troublous +times of Charles I. were the earliest signs of this tendency. The Long +Parliament, which met in 1640, was divided on these lines; the +misdemeanors of the King brought on civil war; the parliamentary troops +defeated the royal troops after a bloody struggle; and the King was +brought to execution. The succeeding events were full of instruction. +The Parliament attempted to govern the nation—or, rather, we should say +the House of Commons did, for the House of Lords was abolished. But it +proved quite unfit for the purpose. It was thoroughly disorganized, and +rent by violent factions. The anarchy which ensued was ended by a +military despot, Oliver <a name="Page_9" id="Page_9" />Cromwell, who entered the House of Commons in +1653 with his soldiers. The Speaker was pulled from his chair; the +members were driven from the House; and Cromwell was proclaimed +dictator. It is strange, indeed, that the lesson which is to be drawn +from this event, and which has been repeated in France time after time +since the Revolution, has not yet been learned: the only escape from +continued political anarchy is despotism. But the weakness of despotism +is that it ends with the life of the despot. Cromwell's son was forced +to abdicate, and the monarchy was restored. The same division of parties +in the Parliament continued, and they began to take the names of Whigs +and Tories. Towards the end of the seventeenth century, the dissensions +of these two factions again threatened to make government impossible. In +administration the evil was felt most; the union of ministers of both +parties was proving unworkable. So fickle did legislation become that no +one could say one day what the House would do the next. It was at this +crisis, and about the year 1693, that William III., who cared more for a +strong administration than for political differences, created what is +known as cabinet government, and, as Professor Gardiner says, "refounded +the government of England on a new basis." Recognizing that power should +not be separated from responsibility, he affirmed the principle that the +ministers of state should be selected from the party which had a +majority in the House of Commons. But <a name="Page_10" id="Page_10" />the time was not yet ripe for the +complete application of this principle. Early in the eighteenth century +Sir Robert Walpole set the example of resigning when he no longer +possessed the confidence of a majority of the House of Commons; but in +the latter half of the century the great Earl of Chatham introduced +again the practice of selecting ministers irrespective of party. Despite +the fact that he was supported by the personal influence of George III., +the attempt failed. A succession of weak ministries followed; and out of +the confusion the modern division of Liberals and Conservatives emerged. +Thus it was not until the beginning of the present century that the +doctrines of the solidarity of the Cabinet and its complete dependence +on a majority of the House of Commons were thoroughly developed in their +present form. England, now grown into the United Kingdom, had at last, +after six centuries of strife, won her national independence, and for +one brief century has enjoyed a full measure of self-government.</p> + +<p><b>Comparison of the Two Stages.</b>—How do the conditions presented by the +nineteenth century differ from those of the fourteenth? And how is the +problem of representation affected? We have seen that the great forces +which animated the nation in the fourteenth century were organization +and leadership. Have these forces ceased to operate? Assuredly not. In +the fourteenth century we had a united people organized under its chosen +leaders against the <a name="Page_11" id="Page_11" />encroachments of the King and nobility on its +national liberty. In the nineteenth century the people have won their +political independence, but the struggle is now carried on between two +great organized parties. The principle of leadership is still as strong +as ever. The careers of Pitt, Peel, Palmerston, Beaconsfield, and +Gladstone attest that fact. The one great difference, then, between the +fourteenth and the nineteenth centuries is that instead of one party +there are two. The problem of representation in the fourteenth century +was to keep the people together in one united party, and to allow them +to select their most popular leaders. Surely the problem is different in +the nineteenth century. The requirements now are to organize the people +into two great parties, and to allow each party separately to elect its +most popular leaders. And yet we are still using the same method of +election as our forefathers used six centuries ago. Although the +conditions have entirely changed, we have not adapted the electoral +machinery to the change. The system of single-membered electorates was +rational in the fourteenth century, because there was only one party. Is +it not on the face of it absurd to-day, when there are two parties?</p> + +<p><b>The Meaning of Party Government.</b>—Why should there be two parties +instead of one in order that the people should be able to govern +themselves? To answer this question we must start at the beginning, and +consider what is the problem of popular govern<a name="Page_12" id="Page_12" />ment. The best definition +is that it is to promote the general welfare—to reconcile or average +the real interests of all sections of the community. Now, if the people +could all agree what is best in the interests of all, unity of action +might certainly be obtained; but even then the problem would not be +solved, for the people are not infallible. The greater part of the +problem consists in finding out what is best in the interests of all, +and no amount of mere abstract speculation can solve this part. So +diverse and so complex are the interests to be reconciled, so interwoven +and interdependent one with another, that the problem of securing a just +balance is incapable of solution by anything short of omniscience. But +in any case the people cannot be always got to agree to one course of +action. Therefore the people cannot govern themselves as one united +party. The only workable basis is, then, the rule of the majority, and +the problem of popular government is how to ensure that the majority +shall rule in the interests of all.</p> + +<p>Party government provides the best known means of solving this problem. +The only way of finding out what is best for the whole people is by the +incessant action and interaction of two great organized parties under +their chosen leaders; each putting forth its energies to prove its +fitness to hold the reins of government; each anxious to expose the +defects of the other. This healthy emulation as to what is best for all, +with the people to judge, is the real secret of free govern<a name="Page_13" id="Page_13" />ment. The +two parties are virtually struggling as to which shall be king. Each is +striving to gain the support of a majority of the people; and the +grounds on which it appeals for support are that the measures it +proposes are the best for the country, and that the men it puts forward +are the best men for passing those measures into law and carrying on the +administration of the country. This constant agitation, and this mutual +competition to devise new measures, and to bring forward new men, +prevent stagnation. Both sides of every leading public question of the +day are presented in the rival party policies, and the people are +invited to decide between them. The forces on which the parties rely to +move the people are enthusiasm for measures and enthusiasm for +men—party and personality, or, in other words, organization and +leadership. It is in opposing these forces to counteract the selfish and +anti-social passions that party government acquires its virtue. By +appealing to their higher nature it induces the people to subordinate +their class prejudices to the general welfare, and by setting before +them definite moral ideals, and appealing to them by the force of +personality, it raises the character of public opinion, and moulds +individual and national character to an extent that is seldom +appreciated. Here, then, is the key of human progress. Direct +democracies may hold together so long as there are external enemies to +induce the people to sink their differences in the common interest, or +so long as there <a name="Page_14" id="Page_14" />is a slave caste to do the menial work, as in the +ancient democracies; but representative democracy offers the only hope +of welding together a free people into a united whole. The unrestrained +rule of the majority under direct democracy must degenerate into the +tyranny of the majority. Instead of the equality of political power +which it promises, the minority is deprived of all power. Representative +democracy, on the other hand, deprives the people of the personal +exercise of political power, in order to save them from the free play of +their self-assertive passions, but still leaves to every man an equality +of influence in deciding the direction of progress. Thus every man is +induced to express his opinion as to the direction of progress; and the +party policy is the resultant direction of progress of all the party +electors, and therefore represents their organized opinion. Now, bear in +mind that the true direction of progress is not known, and can only be +found out by constant experiment directed by the most far-seeing and +capable minds. It is the means of carrying on this experiment which +party government provides. The party representing the organized opinion +of the majority has, rightly, complete control of the direction of +progress so long as it remains in a majority. But, although deliberation +is the work of many, execution is the work of one. Hence the creation of +a small committee of the party in power—the cabinet—associated with +the leader of the party, <a name="Page_15" id="Page_15" />who becomes for the time being the Prime +Minister, the cabinet ministers being jointly responsible for the +control of administration and the initiation of measures for the public +good. But an organized minority is quite as essential to progress as an +organized majority—not merely to oppose, but to criticise and expose +the errors of the party in power, and to supplant it when it ceases to +possess the confidence of the country. Hence progress under party +government may be compared to a zigzag line, in which the changes in +direction correspond to changes in ministry. By this mutual action and +alternation of parties every vote cast has, in the long run, an equal +influence in guiding progress. The only justification for majority rule +sanctioned by free government is that when two parties differ as to what +is best for the whole people the majority shall prevail, and party +government tends to realize this condition. But direct government by the +people offers no check whatever on the power of the majority, which is +as absolute as that of the Czar of Russia. As Calhoun, the American +statesman, writes in his "Disquisition on Government," "the principle by +which constitutional governments are upheld, is <i>compromise</i>, that of +absolute governments is <i>force</i>!" Now, the significance of party +government as a guarantee of free government lies in this: that party +policies represent a compromise of what every section composing each +party supposes to be the interests of the whole people; and the parties +<a name="Page_16" id="Page_16" />are engaged in fighting out a compromise of the real interests of every +section of the people.</p> + +<p>Lest it be thought that in this panegyric on party government we have +been indulging in a wild flight into the region of speculative politics, +we hasten to add that the ideal condition we have pictured has never +been reached. The British Parliament has perhaps most nearly approached +it, but already shows signs of retrogression. America and the Australian +colonies are drifting further away from it. Already political +philosophers are shaking their heads and predicting the failure of +popular government. The cry everywhere is for a stronger executive. +Party organization is breaking down; small factions actuated by +self-interest hold the balance of power between the main parties, and +render government unstable and capricious. The main parties themselves +tend to degenerate into factions. Personality is declining—the demand +is for followers, not leaders. Compromise is supplanted by log-rolling +and lobbying. And, to crown all, the rumbling of class strife grows +ominously louder. The danger is that these tendencies may be allowed to +go too far before reform is attempted—that the confidence between +classes may be destroyed.</p> + +<p><b>Organization and Leadership.</b>—We have shown that the two great +principles underlying representation are organization and leadership. +Now, after all, there is nothing very profound in this conclusion. Is +there a <a name="Page_17" id="Page_17" />single department of concerted human action in which these same +principles are not apparent? What would be thought of an army without +discipline and without generals; or of a musical production in which +every performer played his own tune? Even in the region of sport, can a +cricket or a football team dispense with its captain and its places? And +yet many people imagine that a disorganized collection of delegates of +various sections can rule a nation? Such an assembly would be as much a +mob as any primary assembly of the people, and would in no sense be a +representative assembly. The fact is that the growing intensity of the +evils which beset representative institutions throughout the civilized +world to-day is due to imperfect expression of these two principles. +Representative assemblies are not properly organized into two coherent +parties, nor is each party allowed free play to select its most popular +leaders. What is the remedy?</p> + +<p><b>A Change in Electoral Machinery the Key to Reform.</b>—The great mistake +made by all writers on electoral reform is that they have failed to +recognize that the character of public opinion depends upon the way it +is expressed. If the electoral machinery be adapted to give effect to +those principles of organization and leadership which lie at the root of +representation, then the character of public opinion will be improved. +Representation, in fact, is not only a means of expressing public +opinion, but also of guiding, informing, <a name="Page_18" id="Page_18" />educating, and organizing it. +Therefore, the method of election is an all-important factor.</p> + +<p>The first and greatest necessity is to counteract the tendency of the +people to split up into factions. It may seem a startling conclusion +that this is a mere matter of electoral machinery, but it is +nevertheless quite true. It must be remembered that we are dealing with +human beings and not with insentient figures. If the method of election +allows representation to two sections only, the people will group +themselves into two sections. But if it allows representation to a large +number of sections, then the people will group themselves into as many +sections as are allowed. Now, party government offers every hope of +preventing two sections degenerating into factions, but with a number of +sections there is absolutely none.</p> + +<p>Here, then, we see the one great merit of the present system of +election, which explains why it has persisted so long, with all its +faults. It is that it tends to confine representation to the two main +parties, since each electorate is generally contested by them; but in so +far as it does not completely effect that object and allows +representation to independent factions it is defective. Moreover, the +merit we have indicated is purchased at too high a price. It is these +defects which are causing the degradation of representative institutions +throughout the world to-day.</p> + +<p>It is obviously impossible to give a just share of representation to two +parties and allow each party <a name="Page_19" id="Page_19" />to elect its most popular leaders, in an +electorate which returns only a single representative. Hence the first +necessity for reform is to enlarge electorates, so that each may return +several representatives. Now, the requirements for giving effect to the +principles of organization and leadership in such an electorate are:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>1. Proportional representation to the two main parties—Ministerial + and Opposition, the majority and the minority.</p> + +<p> 2. The election by each party of its most popular + candidates—<i>i.e.</i>, those most in general favour with all sections + of the party.</p></blockquote> + +<p>This is the problem of representation as it presents itself to us. +Leaving a detailed account of the means by which it is proposed to give +effect to these great desiderata to a later chapter, let us indicate +briefly where they strike at the root of the evils of the present +system.</p> + +<p><b>Enlarged Electorates.</b>—With enlarged electorates the minority will not +be excluded. Each party will secure its just share of representation. +When both parties are represented in each electorate the interests of +the electorate will not be bargained for as the price of support. +Members will cease to be mere local delegates.</p> + +<p><b>Proportional Representation to the Two Main Parties.</b>—Representation +must be absolutely confined to the two main parties, and each party must +be <a name="Page_20" id="Page_20" />allowed its just share. Every candidate should be required to +nominate either as a Ministerialist or Oppositionist, and each party +should be allotted a number of representatives proportional to the total +amount of support received. If democracy means that every man's opinion, +as expressed by his vote, is to have the same weight, it follows that +the parties should be represented in the Legislature in the same +proportion as among the people, otherwise it is ridiculous to talk of +the rule of the majority. The present system sometimes results in +minority rule and sometimes in minority extermination; it is difficult +to say which alternative is the worse.</p> + +<p><b>Election of its Most Popular Candidates by each Party.</b>—It would be +little use to confine representation to the two main parties if the +parties were allowed to split up into factions. The only way to prevent +this is to provide such electoral machinery as will ensure the return of +the candidates most in general favour with all sections, and will +exclude the favourites of sections within the party. This distinction is +vital. The general favourite is a representative; the favourite of a +faction is a delegate. A representative is not only independent of any +one section, but if he does favour a faction he will sink in general +favour. He therefore represents a compromise of the demands of all +sections. But a delegate is the mouthpiece of a faction—a follower, not +a leader of the people.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21" />No section will be disfranchised by this proposal, for the true +function of all minor sections is to influence the policies of the two +main parties. Thus every section will be proportionally represented in +one or the other policy and by all the party candidates. Not only will +each party be proportionally represented but all the sections which +compose each party will be proportionally represented in its policy. +This is the only true meaning of proportional representation.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_II" id="CHAPTER_II" /><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22" />CHAPTER II.</h2> + +<p class='center'>THE SO-CALLED REPRESENTATIVE PRINCIPLE.</p> + + +<p>All schemes of electoral reform hitherto proposed under the name of +proportional representation are based on the so-called "representative +principle"—viz., that every section of the people is entitled to +separate representation in proportion to its numbers. The ideal varies +somewhat, but the usual conception, is that if each member represents a +different section or interest the assembly will represent all sections +or all interests. Now this is simply an attempt to return to what we +have described as the first stage of representation, but without the +fear of the monarchy to keep the sections together. For a deliberative +body or a king's council it might be suitable, but for an assembly +charged with the complete control of government in the interests of all +it is utterly impracticable. Each representative must represent all +interests; he must be elected on a definite policy as to what is best +for all the people. If he is sent in as the agent of one interest or one +section of the people, he ceases to be a representative and becomes a +delegate. All these schemes are there<a name="Page_23" id="Page_23" />fore not proportional +representation at all, but proportional delegation.</p> + +<p>We have shown that representation means the organization of public +opinion into two definite lines of policy, and that this is the only way +to prevent political anarchy. But the proportionalists (as they like to +call themselves) say that it means representing men and the opinions +they hold in proportion to their numbers. The fundamental error is that +they neglect the all-important factor of human nature. They look on +public opinion as something having an independent existence apart from +the questions about which it is expressed and from the means of +expressing it; and they fail to recognize that the character of public +opinion depends on the manner in which it is expressed and organized. It +is but a natural consequence that they also conceive the number of +sections of opinion awaiting representation as pre-existing and +independent of the electoral machinery.</p> + +<p>In short, they reduce the whole problem to a nice little exercise in +mathematics, requiring only for its clear exposition some columns of +figures and a few coloured diagrams to represent the different shades of +public opinion. No better example of the dangers of <i>a priori</i> +speculation could be adduced than this chimerical idea of the +proportionalists that public opinion is something to be divided into +fractions like a mathematical quantity, unless it be, perhaps, the +conclusion that if you gather together delegates repre<a name="Page_24" id="Page_24" />senting these +fractions you will have an assembly representing the sum total of public +opinion.</p> + +<p>The issue is quite clear. Are we to have two parties aiming at the +control of administration and appealing to all sections for support, or +the separate delegation of a number of sections? In the one case we will +have parties based on national policies, and in the other case we will +have a number of factions, each wanting something different and +determined to block progress till it gets it. Remember that it is a mere +matter of electoral machinery which will determine the choice. It is +true that at present we do not have two very coherent parties, but that +is the fault of the present electoral system.</p> + +<p>It would seem that there can be but one answer to this question, and yet +the "representative principle" shows such wonderful vitality that it is +worth while considering the arguments on which it is based, and the +various stages through which the idea has passed.</p> + +<p><b>Mr. Hare's Scheme.</b>—The "representative principle" was first +propounded in England in 1857 by Mr. Thomas Hare. He proposed that the +United Kingdom should be constituted one huge electorate for the return +of the 654 members of the House of Commons. The people were to group +themselves into 654 voluntary unanimous sections, each returning one +member, and each gathered from every corner of the kingdom. We propose +to consider here not the scheme itself but only the principle on which +it was founded. Mr. Hare <a name="Page_25" id="Page_25" />rightly conceived that the great evil of the +present system is the exclusion of the minority in each electorate, but +he altogether failed to appreciate that the excluded minority nearly +always represented one of the two main parties. He could not see, in +fact, that to divide each electorate into majority and minority is to +divide the whole country into majority and minority, nor that the +injustice is tolerated because it is usually as bad for one party as the +other. Instead, therefore, of proposing to do justice to both the +majority and the minority in each electorate, he proposed to allow +representation to as many minorities as possible. To him, the rule of +the majority was the rule of a majority of interests; this he called the +constitutional majority, as opposed to the "mere rule of numbers." Now, +at the time Mr. Hare wrote party government was rather weak in England. +He quotes with approval a statement of Mr. Sidney Herbert, M.P., that +the House was divided into many parties, or rather no party, because the +country was divided into many parties or no party, and that the division +into two parties would never be restored again. It is amusing, in view +of after events, to find Mr. Hare asking what would be the result of any +contrivance to re-establish party. Assuming that <i>party</i> representation +was dead, Mr. Hare proposed to substitute <i>personal</i> representation. It +is positively ludicrous at this interval of time to note how the +electors were expected to group themselves. They <a name="Page_26" id="Page_26" />were to take personal +merit as the basis of representation; every vote cast was to be a +spontaneous tribute to the qualities and attainments of the person for +whom it was given. And in order, presumably, that they should choose +good men in preference to corrupt men, the polling-day was to be set +apart as a sacred holiday, and church services were to be held to +solemnize the public act and seek for the Divine blessing!</p> + +<p>The maintenance of a responsible ministry in such a House presented no +difficulty to Mr. Hare. The electors were to indicate whom they +considered the most illustrious statesmen, and no one would dare to +question their decision!</p> + +<p>It seems strange now that this scheme should have received serious +consideration. Mr. Hare was so much under the spell of the apparent +justice of the underlying principle that he was blind to its results. +But it was soon perceived that the electors would not group themselves +as Mr. Hare supposed; that the personal ideal of every class of electors +would be simply men of their own class. It was further pointed out that +cranks and faddists and every organization founded on questions of the +remotest interest would combine to secure representation. Mr. Disraeli +declared it to be "opposed to every sound principle, its direct effect +being to create a stagnant representation ... an admirable scheme for +bringing crotchety men into the House." Mr. Shaw-Lefevre <a name="Page_27" id="Page_27" />condemned it +as "a vicious principle based upon a theory of classes," and Mr. +Gladstone said that it regarded electors "not as rational and thinking +beings, but merely as the equivalents of one another." Walter Bagehot, +in his standard work on the "English Constitution," opposes the +principle of voluntary constituencies, because it would promote a +constituency-making trade. "But upon the plan suggested," he writes, +"the House would be made up of party politicians selected by a party +committee, chained to that committee, and pledged to party violence, and +of characteristic, and therefore unmoderate, representatives for every +'ism' in all England. Instead of a deliberate assembly of moderate and +judicious men, we should have a various compound of all sorts of +violence. I may seem to be drawing a caricature, but I have not reached +the worst. Bad as these members would be if they were left to +themselves—if in a free Parliament they were confronted with the perils +of government, close responsibility might improve them, and make them +tolerable. But they would not be left to themselves. A voluntary +constituency will nearly always be a despotic constituency."</p> + +<p>The practical difficulties in the application of Mr. Hare's scheme are +almost insuperable, but it is not worth while pursuing the subject, +since it is now admitted by recent advocates that the faddist argument +is fatal. This is an admission that Mr. Hare <a name="Page_28" id="Page_28" />completely neglected the +factor of human nature. Professor Nanson writes:—"Hare proposed that +there should be only one electorate, consisting of the whole State. It +is unfortunate that this proposal was made. There can be no doubt that +it has retarded the progress of true electoral reform for at least a +generation ... it would inevitably lead to the election of a certain +number of faddists."</p> + +<p><b>John Stuart Mill.</b>—The great vogue which the Hare system has obtained +is to be traced more to the influence of John Stuart Mill than to that +of anyone else. Mill was captivated by the apparent justice of the +proposal, and devoted a chapter of his "Representative Government" to +it, wherein he declared:—"Mr. Hare's scheme has the almost unparalleled +merit of carrying out a great principle of government in a manner +approaching to ideal perfection, while it attains incidentally several +other things of scarcely inferior importance." Believing in the absolute +justice of the principle, Mill and Hare were certainly consistent in +setting no limit to its application except the size of the assembly. +Mill is emphatic on this point. "Real equality of representation," he +asserted, "is not obtained unless any set of electors, amounting to +average number of a constituency, wherever they happen to reside, have +the power of combining with one another to return a representative." +Now, the recent disciples of Mr. Hare are never tired of claiming the +support of Mill, although they have thrown this <a name="Page_29" id="Page_29" />definition to the +winds. But they are guilty of far more than that, for in another chapter +of Mill's book we find that his conception of a representative assembly +elected by the Hare system is a purely deliberative body. He expressly +declares it to be radically unfit for legislation, which he proposes to +hand over to a commission appointed by the Crown. The value of his +testimony is very much discounted by this fact.</p> + +<p><b>Sir John Lubbock.</b><a name="FNanchor_1" href="#Footnote_1">[1]</a>—We have asserted that the proportional principle +should be applied to two parties only—the majority and the minority, +and that every section can then be represented. Mill and Hare thought +that no limit should be set except the size of the assembly. All the +recent advocates of the system take up an intermediate position. +Appreciating the serious objections against allowing independent +representation to a large number of small sections, Sir John Lubbock, +president of the English Proportional Representation Society, proposes +to constitute electorates returning only three to five members each, +thus confining representation to only three to five sections in each +electorate, and sacrificing to a great extent accurate proportional +representation. In his book on "Representation," he writes:—"I have +assumed that Parliament should be 'a mirror of the nation;' if the +object were to secure unity of action rather than freedom of discussion, +to form an executive body such as a Government, a Board of Directors, or +a <a name="Page_30" id="Page_30" />Vestry, the case would be quite different. It is, however, I presume, +our wish that Parliament should be a deliberative assembly in which all +parties should be fairly represented." But to make Parliament a +deliberative body is to destroy its power to secure unity of action at +all, and to render it useless as a working machine.</p> + +<p><b>Miss Spence.</b>—An active campaign has for some time been carried on for +the adoption of the Hare system in Australia. Miss C.H. Spence, of South +Australia, was the pioneer reformer, and has laboured in the cause by +pen and voice for no less than forty years. Great credit is undoubtedly +due to Miss Spence for the clear and simple manner in which she has +expounded the system, and for the good work she has done in exposing the +defects of the present methods. Not only has she lectured in all parts +of Australia, but she has made visits to England, where she met Mr. Hare +and Sir John Lubbock, and also to America. But we may admire Miss +Spence's courage and devotion to principle without agreeing with her +conclusions.</p> + +<p>At a meeting held at River House, Chelsea, London, in 1894, Miss Spence +submitted an analysis of 8,824 votes recorded at 50 public meetings in +South Australia. The audiences were in each case asked to select six +representatives out of twelve candidates. The result of a scrutiny of +all the votes combined was that the following six "parties" secured one +"representative" each—viz., Capital, Labour, Single Tax, <a name="Page_31" id="Page_31" />Irish +Catholic, Prohibition, and Women's Suffrage. Miss Spence frankly +confesses that these "parties" are minorities, but holds that a majority +can be formed by the union of minorities, and that party responsible +government can still be carried on. Now, can any sensible man or woman +imagine a working ministry formed by a union of any four of these +"parties?" Capital would certainly be permanently opposed to Labour and +to Single Tax, and as for the others, there is not a single principle in +common. How, then, could a union be formed? The only possible way is by +log-rolling; they must make a bargain to support one another's demands. +Such a union could not possibly be stable, because the minority is free +to offer a better bargain to any one of the "parties" to induce it to +desert. Again, it may be called the rule of the majority, but what sort +of a majority? Is it not plainly the rule of a majority in the interests +of minorities? That is very different to the rule of the majority in the +interests of all, which free government demands. The simple truth is +that the "parties" are factions, and that the "representatives" are mere +delegates of those factions.</p> + +<p>But in practice the case would be far worse than we have assumed. There +is not the slightest guarantee that the same six factions would be +elected in each six-seat electorate. We might have an unlimited number +of delegates of various religions, classes, races, localities, and +political organizations on <a name="Page_32" id="Page_32" />all kinds of single questions. An assembly +formed on these lines could hardly be dignified with the name of a +representative assembly.</p> + +<p>Mr. G. Bradford, in his work on "The Lesson of Popular Government," +displays a more intimate knowledge of human nature than any other recent +writer. Of these schemes for the representation of minorities he says:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>As an illustration of the effect in popular government of looking + to popular impulse for the initiation of measures, it may be + observed that perhaps the worst of all expedients for remedying the + defective working of a government by a legislature like ours, that + which combines the evils of them all, is one which is urged by + perfectly disinterested advocates of reform, and is known as + proportional representation. If there is one principle at the base + of popular government it is that the majority shall rule. If the + largest of three or four fractions is to rule it ceases to be + popular government, and becomes government by faction. If the + tyranny of the majority is bad a tyranny of the minority is still + worse. (Vol. i., p. 505.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>And the following picture could hardly be better drawn:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>If the basis of carrying on the government is to be the wishes of + some millions of units, it is evident that they must to a greater + or less extent agree in wishing for something. It is equally + evident that they cannot all agree in wishing for the same thing at + the same time, while if they, or any considerable number of groups, + want different things at the same time, the result in so far is + anarchy. Government is paralysed, and with the well-known + excitability of humanity in groups men begin to confound the + importance of the thing wanted with the importance of getting what + they want. The clash of contending factions is apt to suggest the + clash of arms. The first neces<a name="Page_33" id="Page_33" />sity, therefore, is the formation of + large and coherent parties, not merely for the purpose of + accomplishing what is desired by the majority of the people, but + also for suppressing agitation and social disturbance on behalf of + what may be called merely objects of passion or private interest + with comparatively small groups, at least until those objects + enlist the support of a large minority. (Vol. i., pp. 492, 493.)</p></blockquote> + +<p><b>Professor Nanson.</b>—In Victoria the Hare system is championed by Mr. +E.J. Nanson, Professor of Mathematics at Melbourne University. Professor +Nanson approaches the subject entirely from a mathematical standpoint, +and resolutely refuses to admit the factor of human nature into his +calculations. Following Mr. Hare, he is a declared opponent of party +government, and "would like to see it pushed further into the +background." Moreover, he regards every step in the process as an end in +itself. Thus the act of voting is one end, representation is another, +and the rule of the majority a third. Leaving aside for the present, +however, the elaborate mathematical devices which are proposed for +attaining these supposed ends, let us take only the principles on which +they are based. These are laid down as follows:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>(<i>a</i>) The rule of the majority.</p> + +<p> (<i>b</i>) The fair representation of all parties in proportion to their + strength.</p> + +<p> (<i>c</i>) Perfect freedom to every elector to vote exactly as he + pleases.</p> + +<p> (<i>d</i>) The emancipation of the voters from the tyranny of the + political "boss" or caucus.</p> + +<p> <a name="Page_34" id="Page_34" />(<i>e</i>) The full value of his vote to each voter without loss or + waste.</p></blockquote> + +<p>The principles involved, we are assured, "must appeal to every democrat, +to every Liberal, to every lover of true and just representation."</p> + +<p>As to the first claim, we are willing to grant the rule of the majority, +if the words are added "in the interests of minorities." The second +could also be granted if by "all parties" were meant both parties, for +there cannot be more than two parties in the true sense of the word. But +Professor Nanson proposes such large electorates that any small section, +from one-sixth to one-twelfth, can secure independent representation. +Notwithstanding this, he claims that it is quite possible to give fair +representation to the main parties and to small sections at the same +time. In illustrating the system he avoids the issue as to the character +of these sections by giving them a "scientific" nomenclature, such as +Colour, Place, Pursuits, Qualities, &c. These abstractions are very +misleading, as attention is diverted from the fact that they refer to +voluntary groups of men united for some political purpose. The real +question is, on what basis are these groups likely to be formed? When +the element of human nature is taken into account it must be apparent +that they will be formed for the propaganda of some sectional interest; +some on a religious basis, others on a class basis, &c. Now, if we were +to ask each candidate to declare his religion, <a name="Page_35" id="Page_35" />we could easily take +religions as the basis of representation and allow proportional +representation to each religion; and similarly with classes, races, and +so on. But we could only take one basis at a time, and the important +deduction is that if we were to take religions as the basis of +representation, the people would be induced to vote according to +religion; if we were to take classes, according to class, and so on. +Now, no one but the fanatic or the demagogue will claim that the +majority is entitled to rule where religions only or classes only are +represented. The questions then arise—What is the correct basis of +representation? How should the people be induced to vote? And the answer +is clearly that the people should be induced to vote on questions of +general public policy, on the leading questions of the day which decide +the party lines, and that, therefore, <i>the policies of the two main +parties should form the primary basis of proportional representation</i>. +But the Hare system, by taking individual candidates as the basis of +representation, induces the elector to vote on any basis or on sectional +lines. It promotes dissension instead of repressing it, and instead of +encouraging all sections to express their opinion as to what is best for +the general well-being, it encourages them to express their opinion as +to what they imagine to be best for themselves. Public opinion expressed +on these lines would be worse than useless. But Professor Nanson thinks +that the electors would <a name="Page_36" id="Page_36" />still have regard for the main parties, even +though they grouped themselves into small sections. He declares that +"any party amounting to anything like a quota would not only have two +candidates of its own—one Liberal and one Conservative—but would also +be wooed by candidates of both leading parties." We may well question +whether factions would trouble themselves about the main parties; but, +granting the assumption, the small parties might just as well be single +electorates as far as the main parties are concerned. The Liberal +candidates might be successful in all of them, and the Conservatives be +unrepresented. The peculiar feature is that the defeated Conservatives +are expected to transfer their votes to the Liberals to make up the +quotas for the small parties!</p> + +<p>The third claim is that electors should have perfect freedom to vote +exactly as they please, and yet Professor Nanson, in condemning Mr. +Hare's original scheme, has denied that they are free to vote as +faddists; but he still holds that they are free to vote on any basis if +only they form one-sixth to one-twelfth of an electorate. Thus the +amount of freedom is variable and a matter of opinion. Now, we +altogether deny that electors should be given the opportunity to +subordinate the national interests to factious interests. Just as the +faddist argument is fatal to Mr. Hare's original scheme, so the +splitting up into factions is fatal to Professor Nanson's present +<a name="Page_37" id="Page_37" />scheme. Where is the freedom which Professor Nanson claims under the +present system of election? Is it not the fact that throughout England, +America, and Australia the electors have very often a choice between two +candidates only—one Ministerialist and one Oppositionist? By all means +let us have as many political organizations as possible to make known +the wishes of all sections; but the true function of all such +organizations is to influence the policies of the two main parties, and +not to secure independent delegates in Parliament. This means simply +that the compromise among the different sections supporting a party must +be effected in the electors' minds, and at the elections, and not on the +floor of the Legislature.</p> + +<p>The fourth claim is the emancipation of the voters from the tyranny of +the "boss." Now, the power of the "boss" lies in the control of +nominations, and although to some extent this control is necessary with +the present system of election, it is not essential to party government, +as we hope to show. But with government by faction there would be no +escape from this control. The tyranny of a faction is worse than the +tyranny of the "boss." The voters need saving from their own selfish +passions far more than from the "boss."</p> + +<p>The final claim that each elector is entitled to the full value of his +vote, regardless of the way in which it is used, is really a claim to an +equality of political <a name="Page_38" id="Page_38" />power, <i>i.e.</i>, to direct government. It means +that electors are absolutely free to combine for their own interests, or +for their interest as a class, in opposition to the public welfare. +These combinations would, with an equality of direct political power, +soon bring on social disruption.</p> + +<p><b>Professor Jethro Brown.</b>—In the preface to "The New Democracy," by +Professor Jethro Brown, the two fundamental difficulties of present-day +politics are correctly stated to be—how to express public opinion, and +how to improve its value. For the first of these Professor Brown +recommends the Hare system, and for the second the study of history. +Later on he writes:—"How is the amelioration of popular sovereignty to +be effected? Not, I venture to believe, by the pursuit of the policy +which hopes to play off ignorance against ignorance and prejudice +against prejudice, and to secure good government by the arts of +flattery, manipulation, and intrigue; nor, indeed, by the improvement of +democratic machinery, though this is extremely desirable, and calls for +immediate attention. For, above all, towers the question of character." +It is quite evident that Professor Brown shares the delusion of the +other advocates of the Hare system, that the manner of expressing public +opinion has nothing to do with the character of public opinion. The two +difficulties laid down are essentially one. The cardinal fact underlying +representation is that it is a real <a name="Page_39" id="Page_39" />social force, capable of reacting +upon and moulding character, and therefore of improving the value of +public opinion. The independence, love of freedom, respect for +minorities, and capacity for self-government, which are the most +distinctive traits in the English character, are not innate, but are +largely the products of the British Constitution. If the only chance of +improving the value of public opinion lay in the hope of inducing the +individual electors to study the lessons of history, the prospect would +be indeed gloomy.</p> + +<p>Professor Brown regards party government as a necessary evil, resulting +from the mechanical difficulty of securing unity of action from a +plurality of wills. This is practically equivalent to saying that +legislation itself is a necessary evil. But he writes:—"Whatever may be +the evils of party government, there can be no doubt of the utility as +well as of the necessity of the institution itself. The alternative to +party government is the system of government by small groups. In +Australia the evils of this alternative have been occasionally displayed +in practical politics; but it is to France that we must look for their +supreme illustration." Turning to the chapter on the Hare system, we +find that Professor Brown believes that the electors would still divide +themselves into two parties, even if given the opportunity to form small +groups. "I cannot believe," he writes, "that the reputation of our race +for sound common-sense is so far misplaced that <a name="Page_40" id="Page_40" />a provision for the +faithful representation of the people would end in an immoderate +Legislature! For, although the Hare system is not perfect, it does +undoubtedly afford an opportunity for an absolutely <i>fair +representation</i>. Of course the opportunity would be abused by some; but +to argue that the abuse would be general, or if at all general, would +long continue, is to argue that the people would prove themselves +unworthy of the opportunity offered." While he was at the University of +Tasmania the first election under the Hare system was held, and +Professor Brown's opinions are based on the result. A second election +has, however, just been held, which shows the futility of his hopes.</p> + +<p><b>The Tasmanian Experiment.</b>—Despite the fact that it has been advocated +for over forty years, the trial now being made of the Hare system in +Tasmania is the first application of the "representative principle" to +any assembly modelled on the English plan of party government, and +therefore deserves more than passing notice. But the experiment is on +such a small scale, and has been conducted for such a short time, that +the result can hardly be expected to be conclusive as yet. The objection +against the Hare system is not so much that it is not suitable to +present conditions as that it will speedily bring about altered +conditions. It is interesting to find that this is exactly what is +taking place. The system is applied in two electorates only, at Hobart +and Launceston <a name="Page_41" id="Page_41" />the former returning six members and the latter four. At +the first election, in 1897, the possibilities of the system were not +appreciated, and electors voted on the old lines; and although the +results were rather erratic and unexpected, they were considered fairly +satisfactory. But the second election, held early in the present year, +proved a great blow to the system. No less than three of the successful +candidates were intensely unpopular; and one of them, an ex-minister, +had recently been banished from public life on the report of a select +committee of the House. His reinstatement aroused a storm of indignation +throughout the colony, and he was forced to retire again before +Parliament met. It will be as well to take the evidence of a strong +advocate of the system—the <i>Argus</i> correspondent. Of one candidate he +writes:—"Judging by all available definite evidences, it seemed that +five-sixths of the electors of Hobart were directly in favour of the +construction of the railway by the present Great Western Railway +Syndicate; while those of the remaining sixth were variously opposed to +the company or to the project of constructing such a railway by private +enterprise at all. This sixth is represented by Mr. R.C. Patterson, who +headed the poll." Of another candidate we learn that "Mr. Mulcahy had +fought a hard fight, and it is a fair assumption that on the list of the +elected he represents the Roman Catholic vote. As a member of a +generally popular Government, the extent of Mr. Mulcahy's personal +<a name="Page_42" id="Page_42" />unpopularity was remarkable and probably unique." But it was over the +return of Mr. Miles that the storm raged most. The excuse is made that +"the fault of Mr. Miles's return (assuming that it is a fault) lies with +the electors who returned him, and not with the system under which his +return was accomplished.... Once grant that a section of Hobart electors +have the right to select for their representative whom they choose, and +it would seem that the Hare system must be held free of all +responsibility for the return of Mr. Miles." But this is precisely what +cannot be granted for a moment, as we have endeavoured to show. The +assertion is made that Mr. Miles would have been returned as easily +under the old system, but this is not a fact. He polled only one-eighth +of the votes, so that, even supposing that his supporters were twice as +strong in a single electorate, he would have had only one-fourth of the +votes. It is safe to say, from the small proportion of second and third +preferences which he secured, that if the Block Vote had been adopted he +would have been at the bottom of the poll. Commenting on these results, +the <i>Argus</i> declares that the Hare system does not pretend to reform or +guide the people. Very likely not! But is it not quite evident that it +has the opposite effect?</p> + +<p>Is it too much to say that, if the Hobart experiment be persevered with, +the ultimate tendency will be the return of six members, each acceptable +to one-sixth of <a name="Page_43" id="Page_43" />the electors, and obnoxious to the other five-sixths? +It is quite obvious already that the usual party lines are entirely +disregarded.</p> + +<p><b>Professor Commons.</b>—The best book on the subject yet published is the +"Proportional Representation" of John E. Commons, Professor of Sociology +in Syracuse University, U.S. Its great merit is that the political and +social bearings of the reform are fully treated. Professor Commons +rejects the Hare system in favour of the Free List system. He +writes:—"The Hare system is advocated by those who, in a too +<i>doctrinaire</i> fashion, wish to abolish political parties. They +apparently do not realize the impossibility of acting in politics +without large groupings of individuals." He makes a great step in +advance of the disciples of Mr. Hare in recognizing that the +proportional principle should be applied to parties, and not to +individuals, and he even defines parties correctly as being based "not +altogether on sectional divisions, but on social and economic problems +of national scope;" but, unfortunately, he fails to see that there can +be only two parties, and that the representation of small parties would +not reform the main parties, but break them up altogether. At the same +time he is no mere theorist, for he declares:—"If a practicable and +effective method of proportional representation cannot be discovered, +the theoretical principle is a mere dream." Moreover, he prudently +recognizes that his arguments as regards Federal and State <a name="Page_44" id="Page_44" />Legislatures +in America are in advance of what the public is ready to accept, and +adds:—"We, as a people are not yet ready to abandon the notion that +party responsibility in Federal affairs is essential to safety." His +immediate object is, therefore, the reform of city councils, which in +America are controlled by the national parties, and are exploited by the +notorious "machine" organizations. We may sympathize with this object, +for parties in an administrative body are a serious evil, but with +legislatures the case is quite different. Professor Commons admits that +third and fourth parties, if given their proportionate weight in +legislation, would hold the balance of power, but he declares that "the +weight of this objection, the most serious yet presented against +proportional representation, varies in different grades of government." +He then proceeds to examine the objection "as applied to Congress (and +incidentally to the State Legislatures), where it has its greatest +force, and where pre-eminently party responsibility may be expected to +be decisive." And the only answer he can find is that the objection +"overlooks the principle of equality and justice in representation. It +may prove here that justice is the wisest expediency. It is a curious +anomaly, showing confusion of thought regarding democracy, that a people +who insist on universal suffrage, and who go to ludicrous limits in +granting it, should deny the right of representation to those minor +political parties whose existence is the <a name="Page_45" id="Page_45" />natural fruit of this +suffrage." But these minor parties would not be denied representation if +they were allowed to exercise freely their true function, which is to +influence the policies of the main parties; and it is essential to the +working of the political machine that they be limited to that function. +Professor Commons continues:—"The argument, however, of those who fear +that third parties will hold the balance of power is not based solely on +a dread of the corrupt classes, but rather of the idealists, the +reformers, 'faddists,' and 'cranks,' so called. They would retain +exclusive majority rule and party responsibility in order to prevent the +disproportionate influence of these petty groups. They overlook, of +course, the weight of the argument already made that individual +responsibility is more important for the people than the corporate +responsibility of parties." The assumption is here made that the +complete suppression of individuality is an essential feature of party +government, whereas it is in fact a peculiar feature of American +politics, due to "machine" control of nominations. The one point which +Professor Commons has missed is that individual candidature can be +permitted and representation still be confined to the two main parties.</p> + +<p><b>Conclusion.</b>—The advocates of proportional delegation have failed to +grasp the importance of the principles of organization and leadership, +which underlie representation. Mr. Hare thought that the effect of doing +away with organization would be to <a name="Page_46" id="Page_46" />improve leadership. But he reckoned +without his host—Human Nature. Organization cannot be dispensed with +without destroying leadership and bringing on the strife of factions.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47" />FOOTNOTE:</p> + +<p><a name="Footnote_1" href="#FNanchor_1">[1]</a> Now Lord Avebury.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_III" id="CHAPTER_III" />CHAPTER III.</h2> + +<p class='center'>THE PRESENT POSITION OF PARTY GOVERNMENT.</p> + + +<p><b>England.</b>—We have seen that the fundamental error of the +proportionalists is that they have failed to distinguish between the two +stages of representation. In constantly appealing back to the earlier +parliaments they altogether overlook the fact that the functions which +Parliament now exercises were then vested in the King. But this error is +not confined to the proportionalists, most of whom, indeed, however +inconsistently, favour party government. It is also put forth as an +argument by those who lay all the blame of present evils on the party +system, and who think that all sections should work together as one +united party. Take, for instance, the diatribe of Mr. W.S. Lilly on "The +Price of Party Government" in the <i>Fortnightly Review</i> for June, 1900. +Mr. Lilly complains bitterly that the infallible oracle in politics +to-day is "the man in the street." He asserts that all issues are +settled "by counting heads, in entire disregard of what the heads +contain." His bugbear is the extension of the franchise. "Representative +institutions, for example," he asks, "what do they represent? <a name="Page_48" id="Page_48" />The true +theory unquestionably is that they should represent all the features of +national life, all the living forces of society, all that makes the +country what it is; and that in due proportion. And such was the +Constitution of England up to the date of the first <i>Parliamentary +Reform Act</i>. Its ideal was, to use the words of Bishop Stubbs, 'an +organized collection of the several orders, states, and conditions of +men, recognized as possessing political power.'" Could anything be more +ridiculous? Political power is to be apportioned in the nineteenth +century as it was in the fourteenth century! The people are to be always +governed by their superiors! Mr. Lilly continues:—"It appears to me +that the root of the falsification of our parliamentary system by the +party game is to be found in the falsification of our representative +system by the principle of political atomism. Men are not equal in +rights any more than they are equal in mights. They are unequal in +political value. They ought not to be equal in political power."</p> + +<p>The mistake here is in the premise. Has not the demagogue more power +than his dupes, or the Member of Parliament more power than the elector? +We have hardly yet reached, and are never likely to reach, that ideal of +direct government. But what is this price which Mr. Lilly is railing at? +"The price may be stated in eight words. 'The complete subordination of +national to party interests.' The <i>complete</i> subordination. I use the +adjective <a name="Page_49" id="Page_49" />advisedly. Party interests are not only the first thought of +politicians in England, but, too often, the last and only thought." All +this is sheer nonsense. The coincidence of party aims with the real +interests of the people which the British Parliament has displayed since +the <i>Reform Act</i> of 1832 has never been even remotely approached by any +other country. Two causes have contributed to this great result; first, +the gradual extension of the franchise to all sections of the people, +and second, the fact that the principles of organization and leadership +have been highly developed. In one respect, however, Mr. Lilly is right. +The zenith has been passed. Party government is not the same to-day in +England as it was twenty years ago. But the fault lies not with the +extension of the suffrage, but with the fact that the principles of +organization and leadership are less operative. True, the extension of +the franchise is indirectly concerned in the failure, but the primary +cause is that the present system of election is unable to bear the +increased strain. It no longer suffices to organize the people into two +coherent parties. The effect on the parties is correctly noted by Mr. +Lilly. "A danger which ever besets them," he declares, "is that of +sinking into factions."</p> + +<p>Now, the result of the want of organization is the presence in +Parliament of small independent factions, which, by holding the balance +of power, cause the main parties to degenerate into factions.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50" />This tendency is apparent even in England, and the rock on which the +parties have split is the Irish faction. Into the merits of the Irish +question we do not propose to enter; it is the career of the faction in +Parliament which interests us. But it may be noted that the Irish party +rests on a three-fold basis as a faction; it is based mainly on a class +grievance, and is also partly racial and partly religious. It was the +Irish party in the House of Commons which first discovered that, by +keeping aloof from the two main parties, it could terrorize both; and +thus found out the weak spot in party government. Its tactics were +successful up to a certain point, for Mr. Gladstone succumbed to the +temptation to purchase its support, and brought in the Home Rule Bill. +The result is known to all; the historical Liberal party was rent in +twain; party lines were readjusted; Mr. Gladstone was left in a hopeless +minority; and the remnant of his following is to-day in the same +condition. What is the lesson to be learned from these events? That +these tactics cannot succeed in the long run. All interests suffer, but +the culprits most of all. Moreover, such tactics are unconstitutional, +and would in some circumstances justify retaliatory measures. Let us +trace the constitutional course. The Irish members could have exerted a +considerable influence on the policies of both Liberals and +Conservatives, just as the Scotch did. If they had followed this course, +might they not have been in a better position to-day?</p> + +<p><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51" />Of course, the Irish faction can hardly be said to be the result of the +present system of election; it is mainly the expression of old wrongs. +But it has set the example, and the disintegration of the old parties is +rapidly proceeding. One feature, however, in connection with the present +system in Ireland may be mentioned, and that is the permanent +disfranchisement of the minority. In the greater part of Ireland there +is no such thing as a contest between the main parties. If a system were +introduced by which the minority could get its share of representation +the parties would compete on even terms for the support of the people, +and good feeling would tend to be restored.</p> + +<p>To return to Mr. Lilly. The present position of party government in +England is not due to defects in the institution itself, still less to +the extension of the suffrage, but to imperfect organization. The true +remedy is, therefore, to improve organization, not to restrict the +suffrage. By this means such a condition will be brought about that if +either party favours a faction it will lose in general favour; then, +indeed, we may hope that the main parties themselves will cease to +degenerate into factions.</p> + +<p>The same number of the <i>Fortnightly</i> contains an unsigned article on +"Lord Rosebery and a National Cabinet," in which the party system is +alluded to as defunct, and in which the suggestion is thrown out that on +the retirement of Lord Salisbury a national <a name="Page_52" id="Page_52" />cabinet should be formed, +comprising both Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Rosebery. Impending foreign +complications are given as the excuse for terminating party action. Now, +it is not to be denied that party government is more suitable for what +Mr. Herbert Spencer calls the industrial type of society than for the +militant type. Quite recently Lord Salisbury blamed the British +Constitution for the state of unpreparedness for the present war. But it +is equally true that in foreign affairs party action is generally +suspended: in the control of India, for instance, it is so. The real +question, then, is this: Is the danger of foreign aggression so serious +that all questions of internal policy can be permanently set aside? If +we have reached this stage, the end of modern civilization is in sight. +In effect, the proposal is a return to the first stage of +representation, with the difference that all sections of the people are +expected to be held together by the fear of foreign aggression, instead +of the fear of the aggression of the monarchy.</p> + +<p>Mr. David Syme is a censor of a very different type. So far from wishing +to take control from the people, he would give the people absolute +control over everything, and at all times. Seldom has the case against +party government been more powerfully presented than in his work on +"Representative Government in England." But Mr. Syme founds his proposed +remedies on a theory of representation which is based <a name="Page_53" id="Page_53" />on the literal +meaning of the word. No one has put the delegation theory more clearly +than in the following passage, or gone so far in applying it:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>Representation is a mental act; it is the presentation or + reproduction of the state of mind of another person; and before one + person can represent another person he must first know what the + opinions of that other person are. A representative is a + substitute; he stands in the place of, and acts for, another + person. But one man cannot act for another unless he knows what + that other would do were he acting for himself. In other words, he + requires to know the motives which actuate that other person, or + what influences his motives, namely, his principles and beliefs. + The House of Commons is a representative body, not because every + individual member of it represents the opinions of the whole + nation, but because members in the aggregate represent those + opinions, (p. 170).</p></blockquote> + +<p>This position is diametrically opposed to the principles we have laid +down, for it eliminates entirely the ideas of organization and +leadership. Again, Mr. Syme says:—"If the government is to be carried +on for the benefit of all classes, representatives should be chosen from +all classes. We had class representation in the early parliaments, but +then all classes were fairly represented." We have shown that the +analogy from early parliaments is fallacious. Representatives should now +be chosen irrespective of class, and not as class delegates. But Mr. +Syme does not carry his theory to its logical conclusion. For if +representatives merely express the thoughts of others, and should be +class delegates, surely all classes are entitled to have <a name="Page_54" id="Page_54" />their thoughts +"represented;" and Mr. Syme should range himself among the disciples of +Mr. Hare. But here comes in an interesting difference. Mr. Syme would +retain the present system and make members continually responsible to a +majority of their constituents; he would even give this majority power +to dismiss them at any time. Now, this is practically an admission that +representation involves the existence of a majority and a minority, or, +in other words, is a means of organizing the people into a majority and +a minority. Again, as regards leadership, the theory will hardly bear +the test of facts. Could a man like Gladstone be said to merely express +the thoughts of his constituents? Was he not rather a guide and leader +of the thoughts of a great part of the British nation?</p> + +<p>In addition to the continual responsibility of members to their +constituents, Mr. Syme would also make the individual ministers of state +responsible to a majority of the members. He adds:—"The whole system of +party government could in this manner be quietly and effectively got rid +of." We do not propose to criticise the latter suggestion, as we do not +believe it would be put forward to-day, in the light of fuller +knowledge. Mr. Syme's book was written nearly twenty years ago. But, as +regards the continual responsibility of members, we consider it +important that the electors should not have their way on single +questions. They should periodically express their <a name="Page_55" id="Page_55" />opinion as to the +general line of progress, and the representatives should then have +complete control. The necessity for this is to save the people from +their anti-social tendencies, which we have already stated as the great +objection to all forms of direct government. Lord Macaulay once defined +the position exactly in a letter addressed to the electors of Edinburgh. +"My opinion," he declared, "is that electors ought at first to choose +cautiously; then to confide liberally; and when the term for which they +have selected their member has expired to review his conduct equitably, +and to pronounce on the whole taken together."</p> + +<p>We hope to have left on the reader's mind by this time no doubt as to +the intimate connection between the machinery of election and the +resulting character of the legislature. Now it is a most extraordinary +fact that this connection is hardly noticed by the leading +constitutional authorities. It is true they often recognize that +suggested changes like the Hare system would debase our legislatures, +but it never seems to occur to them that present evils might be cured by +a change in the electoral machinery. They point out the evils indeed, +but only to indulge in gloomy forebodings at the onward march of +democracy, or as warnings of the necessity for placing checks on the +people.</p> + +<p>Take Bagehot's study of the House of Commons in his standard work on +"The English Constitution," where he classifies the functions exercised +by the <a name="Page_56" id="Page_56" />House. He insists that the most important of these is the +elective function—its power to elect and dismiss the ministry. In +addition, it exercises an expressive function, a teaching function, an +informing function, and, lastly, the function of legislation. But not a +word is said of the relation of these functions to representation, or to +the method of election. It is asserted that the reason the House of +Commons is able to exercise these functions is because England is a +deferential nation, and the people leave government in the hands of +their betters, the higher classes. On one point he is emphatic, and that +is the absolute necessity of party. He writes:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>The moment, indeed, that we distinctly conceive that the House of + Commons is mainly and above all things an elective assembly, we at + once perceive that party is of its essence. The House of Commons + lives in a state of perpetual potential choice; at any moment it + can choose a ruler and dismiss a ruler. And therefore party is + inherent in it, is bone of its bone, and breath of its breath.</p></blockquote> + +<p>As to the present trend of affairs, the opinion of a foreign observer, +Gneist—"History of the English Constitution"—may be quoted:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>England, too, will experience the fact that the transition to the + new order of industrial society is brought about through a process + of dissolution of the old cohesions, upon which the constitution of + Parliament is based. The unrepresented social mass, which is now + flooding the substructure of the English Constitution, will only + stay its course at a universal suffrage, and a thorough and + arithmetical equalization of the constituencies, and will thus + attempt, and in a great measure achieve, a further dissolution of + the elective bodies. To meet <a name="Page_57" id="Page_57" />the coming storm a certain fusion of + the old parties seems to be immediately requisite, though the + propertied classes, in defending their possessions, will certainly + not at first display their best qualities. As, further, a regular + formation in two parties cannot be kept up, a splitting up into + fractions, as in the parliaments of the Continent, will ensue, and + the changing of the ministry will modify itself accordingly, so + that the Crown will no longer be able to commit the helm of the + state in simple alternation to the leader of the one or the other + majority. And then a time will recur in which the <i>King in Council</i> + may have to undertake the actual leadership. (Vol. ii., pp. 452, + 453.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>In other words, that an industrial society is incapable of +self-government! Note the reason for this remarkable conclusion—a +splitting up into fractions, <i>i.e.</i>, imperfect organization.</p> + +<p>Take now the evidence of the distinguished historian and publicist, Mr. +W.E.H. Leeky, M.P., as given in his recent work on "Democracy and +Liberty":—</p> + +<blockquote><p>After all due weight has been given to the possible remedies that + have been considered, it still seems to me that the parliamentary + system, when it rests on manhood suffrage, or something closely + approaching to manhood suffrage, is extremely unlikely to be + permanent. This was evidently the opinion of Tocqueville, who was + strongly persuaded that the natural result of democracy was a + highly concentrated, enervating, but mild despotism. It is the + opinion of many of the most eminent contemporary thinkers in France + and Germany, and it is, I think, steadily growing in England. This + does not mean that parliaments will cease, or that a wide suffrage + will be abolished. It means that parliaments, if constructed on + this type, cannot permanently remain the supreme power among the + nations of the world. Sooner or later they will sink by their own + vices and inefficiencies into a lower plane. They will lose the + power <a name="Page_58" id="Page_58" />of making and unmaking ministries, and it will be found + absolutely necessary to establish some strong executive + independently of their fluctuations. Very probably this executive + may be established, as in America and under the French Empire, upon + a broad basis of an independent suffrage. Very possibly upper + chambers, constituted upon some sagacious plan, will again play a + great restraining and directing part in the government of the + world. Few persons who have watched the changes that have passed + over our own House of Commons within the last few years will either + believe or wish that in fifty years' time it can exercise the power + it now does. It is only too probable that some great catastrophe or + the stress of a great war may accelerate the change. (Vol. i., pp. + 300, 301.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>And the reason assigned for this very unsatisfactory state of affairs is +precisely as before:</p> + +<blockquote><p>All the signs of the times point to the probability in England as + elsewhere of many ministries resting on precarious majorities + formed out of independent or heterogeneous groups. There are few + conditions less favourable to the healthy working of parliamentary + institutions or in which the danger of an uncontrolled House of + Commons is more evident. One consequence of this disintegration of + Parliament is a greatly increasing probability that policies which + the nation does not really wish for may be carried into effect. The + process which the Americans call "log-rolling" becomes very easy. + One minority will agree to support the objects of another minority + on condition of receiving in return a similar assistance, and a + number of small minorities aiming at different objects, no one of + which is really desired by the majority of the nation, may attain + their several ends by forming themselves into a political syndicate + and mutually co-operating. (Vol. i., pp. 152, 153.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>Mr. Lecky, too, holds out very little hope for the future:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>When the present evils infecting our parliamentary system have + grown still graver; when a democratic House, more and <a name="Page_59" id="Page_59" />more broken + up into small groups, more and more governed by sectional and + interested motives, shall have shown itself evidently incompetent + to conduct the business of the country with honour, efficiency, and + safety; when the public has learned more fully the enormous danger + to national prosperity as well as individual happiness of + dissociating power from property and giving the many an unlimited + right of confiscating by taxation the possessions of the few—some + great reconstruction of government is sure to be demanded. Fifty or + even twenty-five years hence the current of political opinion in + England will be as different from that of our own day as + contemporary political tendencies are different from those in the + generation of our fathers. Experience and arguments that are now + dismissed may then revive, and play no small part in the politics + of the future.</p></blockquote> + +<p>Why make democracy the scapegoat for all these evils, when they are +simply due to the imperfect organization of democracy? In any case, the +most that could rightly be urged would be that universal suffrage had +come before its time. The conclusion that its time will never come is +certainly not warranted. Universal suffrage cannot be condemned till it +has had a fair trial under a rational system of election. Mr. Lecky +appreciates so little the connection between the method of election and +the splitting up into groups that he views without alarm the Hare +system, which would still further develop groups.</p> + +<p>But perhaps no one has caught the spirit of party government more truly +than Mr. Lecky. Dealing with the motives which should actuate the +statesman, in his latest work, "The Map of Life," he writes:—<a name="Page_60" id="Page_60" /></p> + +<blockquote><p>In free countries party government is the best if not the only way + of conducting public affairs, but it is impossible without a large + amount of moral compromise; without a frequent surrender of private + judgment and will. A good man will choose his party through + disinterested motives, and with a firm and honest conviction that + it represents the cast of policy most beneficial to the country. He + will on grave occasions assert his independence of party, but in + the large majority of cases he must act with his party, even if + they are pursuing courses in some degree contrary to his own + judgment.</p> + +<p> Everyone who is actively engaged in politics—everyone especially + who is a member of the House of Commons—must soon learn that if + the absolute independence of individual judgment were pushed to its + extreme, political anarchy would ensue. The complete concurrence of + a large number of independent judgments in a complicated measure is + impossible. If party government is to be carried on there must be, + both in the Cabinet and in Parliament, perpetual compromise. The + first condition of its success is that the Government should have a + stable, permanent, disciplined support behind it, and in order that + this should be attained the individual member must in most cases + vote with his party. Sometimes he must support a measure which he + knows to be bad, because its rejection would involve a change of + government, which he believes would be a still greater evil than + its acceptance, and in order to prevent this evil he may have to + vote a direct negative to some resolution containing a statement + which he believes to be true, (p. 112.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>Mr. Lecky goes on to point out that "many things have to be done from +which a very rigid and austere nature would recoil;" but he +adds:—"Those who refuse to accept the conditions of parliamentary life +should abstain from entering into it." Moreover, he holds that +"inconsistency is no necessary condemnation <a name="Page_61" id="Page_61" />of a politician, and +parties as well as individual statesmen have abundantly shown it." But +still "all this curious and indispensable mechanism of party government +is compatible with a high and genuine sense of public duty."</p> + +<p>The American theory of government is that checks must be placed on a +democratic legislature by a fixed Constitution and a separate executive +exercising a veto. The late Professor Freeman Snow, of Harvard +University, was a strong supporter of this school. His objections to +cabinet government are given in the "Annals of the American Academy of +Political and Social Science" for July, 1892:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>Cabinet government is the government of a party; and for its + successful operation it must have at all times a majority at its + back in Parliament. If it were possible to direct the current of + public opinion into exactly two channels, there would be but two + parties, one of which would generally be in the ascendency; but in + practice this is found to be a very difficult thing to accomplish, + and it becomes the more difficult as the right of suffrage is + extended to the mass of the people, with their ever-varying + interests. In the countries of continental Europe parties, if + indeed they may be said to exist, are broken up into groups, no two + or more of which ever act together for any considerable length of + time; and ministries are without a moment's notice confronted at + brief intervals with opposing majorities, and must give place to + others, whose tenure of office is, however, equally unstable and + ephemeral. There is no other alternative; one of the two great + parties must yield to any faction which becomes strong enough to + hold the balance of power between them, or suffer the inevitable + consequences—instability and impotence of government.</p></blockquote> + +<p>Dr. Snow evidently thought that it is not possible <a name="Page_62" id="Page_62" />to direct the +current of public opinion into exactly two channels. He certainly had +not the slightest idea that it might be a matter of electoral machinery.</p> + +<p>Finally, we may quote the opinion of Mr. James Bryce, M.P., whose +"American Commonwealth" is one of the most complete studies of the +tendencies of democracy in existence. Comparing the English and American +systems, he writes of the former:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>That system could not be deemed to have reached its maturity till + the power of the people at large had been established by the Reform + Act of 1832. For its essence resides in the delicate equipoise it + creates between the three powers, the ministry, the House of + Commons, and the people. The House is strong because it can call + the ministry to account for every act, and can by refusing supplies + compel their resignation. The ministry are not defenceless, because + they can dissolve Parliament, and ask the people to judge between + it and them. Parliament, when it displaces a ministry, does not + strike at executive authority; it merely changes its agents. The + ministry when they dissolve Parliament do not attack Parliament as + an institution; they recognise the supremacy of the body in asking + the country to change the individuals who compose it. Both the + House of Commons and the ministry act and move in the full view of + the people, who sit as arbiters, prepared to judge in any + controversy that may arise. The House is in touch with the people, + because every member must watch the lights and shadows of sentiment + which play over his own constituency. The ministry are in touch + with the people, because they are not only themselves + representatives, but are heads of a great party, sensitive to its + feelings, forced to weigh the effect of every act they do upon the + confidence which the party places in them.... The drawback to this + system of exquisite equipoise is the liability of its equilibrium + to be frequently disturbed, each disturbance involving either a + change of government, with immense temporary inconvenience to the + departments, or a <a name="Page_63" id="Page_63" />general election, with immense expenditure of + money and trouble in the country. It is a system whose successful + working presupposes the existence of two great parties and no more, + parties each strong enough to restrain the violence of the other, + yet one of them steadily predominant in any given House of Commons. + Where a third, perhaps a fourth, party appears, the conditions are + changed. The scales of Parliament oscillate as the weight of this + detached group is thrown on one side or the other; dissolutions + become more frequent, and even dissolutions may fail to restore + stability. The recent history of the French Republic has shown the + difficulties of working a Chamber composed of groups, nor is the + same source of difficulty unknown in England. (Vol. i., pp. 286, + 287.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>Thus we find the opinion unanimously held that the one great fault to +which cabinet government is liable is instability of the ministry, owing +to imperfect organization of public opinion into two definite lines of +policy. Bagehot called it a case of unstable equilibrium, and Bradford, +in "The Lesson of Popular Government," goes further when he +declares:—"Not to speak disrespectfully, the ministry is like a company +of men who, after excessive conviviality, are able to stand upright only +by holding on to each other."</p> + +<p>Yet, after all, the amount of stability simply depends on the state of +organization; and England has demonstrated in the golden period of her +political history (about the middle of the present century) that the +cabinet form of government can be quite as stable as the presidential +form. Therefore, if the present position gives cause for alarm, it is +not in the <a name="Page_64" id="Page_64" />abolition of the cabinet or the restriction of the suffrage +that the remedy must be sought, but in improved organization. And this, +we hope to show, involves improved electoral machinery.</p> + +<p><b>France.</b>—Turn to France. Is there no lesson to be drawn from the +history of that unstable country since the Revolution let loose its +flood of human passions, ambitions, and aspirations? Has not every +attempt at popular government failed for the same cause—want of +organization?</p> + +<p>France before the Revolution had groaned for centuries under the burden +of a decayed feudalism and an absolute monarchy. The last vestige of +constitutional forms had disappeared. The representatives of the estates +had not been convened since the meeting of the States-General in 1614. +The widespread and unprecedented misery of the people caused them to +revolt against being taxed without their consent, and a cry went up for +a convocation of the estates. The finances were in such a bad way that +Louis XVI. was forced to consent, and the three estates—clergy, nobles, +and commons—met at Versailles in 1789. At first they called themselves +the National Assembly, but the King foolishly took up such a position +with regard to the people's representatives that they swore solemnly +that they would not separate till they had laid the foundation of a new +Constitution, and henceforth were known as the Constituent Assembly. It +was determined that the King should no longer be <a name="Page_65" id="Page_65" />absolute, and the +choice lay between a constitutional monarchy and a republic. The +Declaration of the Rights of Man was first drawn up, and the Assembly +settled down to its task. The leading spirit was Mirabeau. He had been +to England, and had studied the British Constitution, and he rightly saw +that France was too distracted by faction to maintain an independent +executive. He therefore openly advocated a constitutional monarchy with +a cabinet chosen from among the majority of the representatives. But, +unfortunately, the Assembly refused to follow his lead; nor would the +King take his advice to make a separate appeal to the people. In the +midst of the negotiations Mirabeau died, and the last chance of +establishing a constitutional monarchy disappeared. The King realized +this, and tried to escape to the German frontier but was brought back. +He then accepted the new Constitution, and the Legislative Assembly was +elected in 1791. From the first it had no elements of stability, being +split up into groups, and subject to the fear of the Paris mob. The King +continued to plot with the emigrant nobles against the Constitution, and +the foreign armies massed on the frontier. The danger brought on the +triumph of the revolutionary spirit in 1792. The Paris commune +overwhelmed both the King and the Assembly, and the republic was +proclaimed. Then followed the execution of the King, the Reign of +Terror, the control of the Committee of Public Safety, till finally <a name="Page_66" id="Page_66" />the +anarchy was ended by the military despotism of Bonaparte, who became +First Consul and afterwards Emperor.</p> + +<p>What is the significance of these events in the light of our previous +examination of English history? Simply this: That the French, in passing +at once from absolutism and feudalism to complete self-government, were +trying to jump to the Second stage of representation without passing +through the first stage. Mirabeau was right; the republic was foredoomed +to failure because the people had learned neither the power of nor the +necessity for organization.</p> + +<p>In many respects the French Revolution parallels the English Revolution. +In each case the King was beheaded; in each case the anarchy of a +disorganized representative body was succeeded by a military despotism; +and in each case the monarchy was restored.</p> + +<p>It was after the restoration that the English system of party government +was developed. Why did this system not now take root in France? Partly +because France was not blessed with a king like William of Orange, and +partly because the new <i>systeme de bascule</i>, the balance system, in +which the king allows each faction in turn to hold the reins of power, +was discovered. So, instead of the gradual growth of constitutional +liberty which took place in England, the tendency in France was back to +absolutism. In 1830 Charles X., finding that he could not manage the +<a name="Page_67" id="Page_67" />Chamber of Deputies, issued the ordinances of St. Cloud, suspending the +liberty of the press and dissolving the Legislature. Paris immediately +broke out into insurrection, and the King was forced to abdicate. The +crown was offered to Louis Philippe, and a second attempt at +constitutional monarchy was made. But France was too divided by her +unfortunate legacy of faction to maintain a continuous policy. The +Legitimists, the Republicans, and the Bonapartists were all awaiting +their opportunity. In 1848 the second revolution broke out in Paris; the +king fled to England, and a republic was again tried. But the +imperialist idea revived when Louis Napoleon was elected President. In +1851 he carried out his famous <i>coup d'etat,</i> and again the Constitution +was swept away. In the following year he was accepted as Emperor by an +almost unanimous vote. Thus France again elected to be ruled by an +irresponsible head. The Third Empire ended with the capture of Napoleon +III. at Sedan in 1870, and since then France has carried on her third +experiment in republicanism. But still the fatal defect of +disorganization retards her progress; the Legislature is still split up +into contending factions, and in consequence it has been found +impossible to maintain a strong executive. Occasionally the factions +sink their differences for a time when their patriotism is appealed to, +as they have agreed to do during the currency of the present Exhibition, +but it is abundantly evident that France <a name="Page_68" id="Page_68" />can never be well governed +till the people are able to organize two coherent parties. There is +ground for hope that the monarchical and imperialist ideas are +declining, and that the people are settling down to the conviction that +there is nothing left but the republic. What makes recovery difficult is +that the national character has been affected by the continual strife in +the direction of excitability and desire for change.</p> + +<p>Those who wish to understand the forces which brought about the +different changes and revolutions, traced by one who has grasped their +meaning, should read the account in the first volume of Mr. Bradford's +"Lesson of Popular Government." His conclusion only need be quoted +here:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>As has been said, that which constitutes the strength of the + English. Government, that which has made up its history for the + last two hundred years, is the growth and continuity of two solid + and coherent parties. Occasionally they have wavered when available + leaders and issues were wanting, but as soon as a strong man came + forward to take the reins the ranks closed up and the work of + mutual competition again went on. On the other hand, the curse and + the cause of failure of representative government on the Continent + of Europe is the formation within the legislature of unstable and + dissolving groups. In France the Extreme Eight, the Eight, the + Eight Centre, the Left Centre, the Left, and the Extreme Left are + names of differing factions which unite only for temporary purposes + and to accomplish a victory over some other unit, but which are + fatal to stable and firm government. The same is true of Italy, + Spain, and Austria, and if not of Germany it is because military + despotism holds all alike in subjection.</p></blockquote> + +<p><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69" />Mr. Bodley has come to the same conclusion in his work on "France." He +writes:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>There is no restraining power in the French parliamentary system to + arrest a member on his easy descent, and he knows that if he + escapes penal condemnation he will enjoy relative impunity. Many + deputies are men of high integrity; but virtue in a large assembly + is of small force without organization, and, moreover, a group of + legislators leagued together as a vigilance committee would have + neither consistency nor durability, which the discipline of party + can alone effect. Corruption of this kind, which has undermined the + republic, could not co-exist with party government. A party whose + ministers or supporters had incurred as much suspicion as fell on + the politicians acquitted in the Panama affair would under it be + swept out of existence for a period. When the first denunciations + appeared, the leaders of the party, to avert that fate, would have + said to their implicated colleagues—"In spite of your abilities + and of the manifest exaggeration of these charges we must part + company, for though you may have been culpable only of + indiscretion, we cannot afford to be identified with doubtful + transactions;" and the Opposition, eager not to lose its vantage, + would scan with equal keenness the acts of its own members. With + party government the electorate would not have appeared to condone + those scandals. But as it was, when a deputy involved in them went + down before his constituents, whose local interest he had well + served, with no opponent more formidable than the nominee of some + decayed or immature group, they gave their votes to the old member, + whose influence with the prefecture in the past had benefited the + district, rather than to the new comer, whose denunciations had no + authority; whereas, had each electoral district been the scene of a + contest between organized parties, the same spectacle would not + have been presented." (Vol. ii., pp. 302, 303.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>Mr. Bodley has, in this last sentence, touched the <a name="Page_70" id="Page_70" />heart of the +problem. If the salvation of France depends on making each electoral +district the scene of a contest between two organized parties, is not +electoral machinery destined to play an important part in the solution?</p> + +<p><b>The United States.</b>—The third great experiment in representative +democracy which the nineteenth century has furnished is that which is +being conducted in the United States. The contrast with France is +remarkable. Just as France is the supreme example of want of +organization, so America is the most conspicuous instance of perfect +organization into two great national parties which the world has seen. +Yet both experiments were started by a revolution, and practically at +the same time. The difference lay in the fact that the Americans +inherited the capacity for self-government from their British ancestors, +and had already practised it in colonial times, while the French only +inherited innumerable causes of dissension.</p> + +<p>But organization is not the only characteristic feature of American +politics. Strange to say, it is accompanied by a suppression of +individuality just as complete. It is organization without responsible +leadership. For, in the first place, the politicians look on themselves +not as leaders but as followers of the people; and in the second place, +there are no leaders in Congress, corresponding to the cabinet ministers +of British countries.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71" />Now, the view which we wish to emphasize here is that the present +position of American politics is the natural result of the principles +embodied in the Constitution adopted in 1789, when the Union was formed. +The complete organization and the want of leadership are directly to be +traced to the labours of George Washington and his associates. A brief +glance at the Constitution and the early history of its working will +make this clear.</p> + +<p>The thirteen States which revolted from England worked fairly well +together under the "Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union" as +long as the war lasted, but as soon as peace was proclaimed it was, as +Washington said, no better than anarchy. The famous Convention of 1787 +was therefore held, and the Constitution was drawn up. One guiding +principle of its framers was to divide power so as to place checks on +the will of the people, and on outbursts of popular passion, which were +then greatly dreaded. One means of attaining this object was the +attempted separation of the legislative and executive functions. We say +attempted advisedly, for time has but shown that the two are +inseparable. But the framers of the Constitution divided the legislative +function between the two Houses, and vested the executive function +almost entirely, as they thought, in the President. Montesquieu, in his +"<i>Esprit des Lois</i>" had laid down that the great merit of the English +Constitution was the separation of these functions, <a name="Page_72" id="Page_72" />and the Americans +accepted this view. But, in truth, the English cabinet system had not +then been fully developed. The King was still, not only in appearance, +but to some extent also in fact, the head of the executive, and there +was nothing to indicate that ministers were so soon to become the real +leaders.</p> + +<p>The effect of this provision was a struggle between the two branches for +supremacy, and the legislatures have won. The President has been +degraded to a mere agent, and the legislatures have absorbed the greater +part of executive functions, even to the control of finance. Now, the +framers of the Constitution were apprehensive that the President might +become a mere party agent, and they tried to strengthen his position by +two devices. First, they gave him the power to veto statutes unless +overruled by a two-thirds majority of Congress; and, secondly, they +provided for his election by an electoral college, or by a double system +of election. This second provision was designed to ensure the election +of a President for personal instead of for party reasons; but it has +proved a complete failure. Almost from the first the electoral delegates +have had to pledge themselves to support the party nominee. The veto, +therefore, has also become practically useless. Thus it has come about +that Congress is a body entirely without leaders.</p> + +<p>A second defect in the Constitution was that it said <a name="Page_73" id="Page_73" />nothing about the +right of any State to withdraw from the Union. After nearly 70 years +this omission was responsible for the Civil War. The legal basis for +secession was then abandoned, but combinations of States have since been +regarded with the greatest apprehension. This conviction that the Union +must be maintained at any price has had very important consequences on +the party system. The danger of allowing combinations of States to +dominate party lines was demonstrated; and the division of each State by +the same national parties was recognized as essential to safety.</p> + +<p>In the meantime, as we have seen, Congress had practically got control +of the executive functions, which were supposed to be exercised by the +President, including the nominations to office. Thus every member of the +party in a majority had a share of the plunder, and "the spoils to the +victors" became the basis of party organization. The system soon +underwent such a remarkable development that nearly 200,000 public +offices were at the disposal of the victors at each election. The party +organizations immediately became omnipotent. The secret of their power +lay in the control of nominations. Each party would nominate one +candidate only, and the electors voted neither for men nor measures, but +blindly for party. As Mr. Bryce declares:—"The class of professional +politicians was therefore the first crop which the spoils system—the +system of using public office <a name="Page_74" id="Page_74" />as private prize of war—bore. Bosses +were the second crop."</p> + +<p>The development which these party organizations have now reached is +extraordinary. Practically we may say that there are only two +parties—Republicans and Democrats—and they dominate not only Federal +and State politics but also city government. Each party has its list of +registered electors, and each holds a primary election before the real +election, to decide the party candidate. But these primary elections are +a mere matter of form. Only a small fraction of the electors attend +them, and only those who have always supported the party are allowed to +vote. The nominations are therefore really controlled, by fraud if +necessary, by the "ring" of party managers. Generally there is one man +who can pull the most strings, and he becomes the "boss." All power is +centred in the hands of this irresponsible despot. The men who are +elected owe their positions to him, and are responsible to him, not to +the public.</p> + +<p>Remember that these "machine" organizations have absolute sway in every +electorate, from one end of the United States to the other. It may be +wondered why the people tolerate them, but they are powerless. Sometimes +an independent movement is attempted, but it very rarely succeeds, and +even when it does the two "machines" combine against it and agree to +divide the spoils. Mr. Bryce writes:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>The disgust is less than a European expects, for it is mingled + <a name="Page_75" id="Page_75" />with amusement. The "boss" is a sort of joke, albeit an expensive + joke. "After all," people say, "it is our own fault. If we all went + to the primaries, or if we all voted an independent ticket, we + could make an end of the 'boss.'" There is a sort of fatalism in + their view of democracy. (Vol ii., p. 241.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>What is the meaning of all this wonderful party machinery? It is this: +that organization without responsible leadership can only be founded on +corruption. In other words, <i>the spoils system is the price which the +United States pay for maintaining the Union under the present +Constitution</i>. The fault lies ultimately, therefore, in the +Constitution, which tends to repress responsible leadership.</p> + +<p>Now, the mass of public opinion in America, as Mr. Bryce continually +points out, is sound, and attempts have not been wanting to put an end +to the system of rotation in public offices. A sustained agitation for +civil service reform was entered upon, and the system of competitive +examination was applied to a large number of offices. Now at last, the +reformers thought, American politics would be purified. But, no! The +corruption, simply took a new and more alarming turn. Direct money +contributions took the place of the spoils. It became the practice to +levy blackmail on corporations either to be let alone, or for the +purpose of fleecing the public. The monopolies granted to protected +industries are the source of a large share of these "campaign funds." +The Legislatures are crowded by professional lobbyists, and it is, <a name="Page_76" id="Page_76" />in +consequence, impossible to obtain justice against the corporations. +Surely no stronger proof can be needed that corruption is and must +remain the basis of organization so long as there is no responsible +leadership.</p> + +<p>It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that the Americans are not +alive to the failure of their representative institutions. Since Mr. +Bryce's great work on "The American Commonwealth" was published two +books by American authors have appeared which are very outspoken in +condemnation. These are "The Unforeseen Tendencies of Democracy," by Mr. +E.L. Godkin; and "The Lesson of Popular Government," by Mr. Gamaliel +Bradford. The keynote of the first of these two books is to abolish +corruption by destroying the power of the "machine" and the "boss," and +of the second to introduce responsible leadership. Mr. Godkin traces the +disappearance of distinguished men from public life to the control of +all entrance to it by the "machine." The reform of primary elections, he +holds, is then the first necessity, since "independent voting" has +ceased to be a remedy. But he fails to find a solution. The conclusion +he comes to is as follows:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>Is the situation then hopeless? Are we tied up inexorably simply to + a choice of evils? I think not. It seems to me that the nomination + of candidates is another of the problems of democracy which are + never seriously attacked without prolonged perception and + discussion of their importance. One of these was the formation of + the federal government; another was the abolition of slavery; + another was the reform of the <a name="Page_77" id="Page_77" />civil service. Every one of them + looked hopeless in the beginning; but the solution came in each + case, through the popular determination to find some better way. + (Pp. 92, 93.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>But the evil goes far deeper than Mr. Godkin appears to think. To +abolish corruption is to take away the present basis of organization +without substituting any other. If irresponsible leadership is to be +abandoned, responsible leadership must be introduced. Mr. Bradford's +plan, therefore, promises more, for if responsible leadership could be +introduced into Congress corruption would then be abolished also.</p> + +<p>Mr. Bradford's whole book may be said to be a study of the relations of +the executive to the legislature, and the conclusions at which he +arrives are a complete vindication of cabinet government. But he finds +one fault, and that is the instability of ministries, which he confesses +has not been apparent so far in the British House of Commons. He holds, +however, that it will become more apparent with the rising tide of +democracy. It is rather amusing to find that the greatest obstacle which +has to be overcome in proposing a responsible executive is the +veneration in which the Constitution is still held and the dislike to +copying anything from England. His plan is, therefore, an adaptation of +the cabinet to the conditions imposed by the Constitution. He holds that +the ministers appointed by the President should sit in Congress and have +control of the initiation of legislation. It is to be feared that this +would hardly realize <a name="Page_78" id="Page_78" />the idea of responsible leadership. Mr. Bradford +establishes a chain of responsibility by the fact that the ministers are +responsible to the President and the President is responsible to the +people; but that is a very different thing to the continual +responsibility of the cabinet to a majority of the legislature. It is +probable that the President's ministers would have to encounter the +opposition of a majority in one or both Houses, and it is difficult to +see how a deadlock could be avoided. Mr. Bradford contemplates that the +people would settle any issues which arise between the two branches at +the end of the Presidential term of four years; but it is just as likely +that there would then be a new President in any case. We are driven to +the conclusion, therefore, that responsible leadership is incompatible +with the American system of divided powers and fixed terms of office.</p> + +<p>Mr. Bryce comments on the proposal as follows:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>It is hard to say, when one begins to make alterations in an old + house, how far one will be led on in rebuilding, and I doubt + whether this change in the present American system, possibly in + itself desirable, might not be found to involve a reconstruction + large enough to put a new face upon several parts of that system. + (Vol. i, pp. 290, 291.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>This is very true, but is not a new building required? Is not the old +house built on a rotten foundation? Mr. Bradford has certainly +overlooked the effect of his proposal on party organization for one +thing. If the power over legislation, and especially over expenditure of +public money, is to be taken away from the <a name="Page_79" id="Page_79" />irresponsible committees of +Congress, the basis of party organization would cease to be corruption, +and both representatives and parties would have to take on an entirely +new character. As to the present character of representatives, Mr. Bryce +advances a number of reasons why the best men do not go in for politics, +such as the want of a social and commercial capital, the residential +qualification, the comparative dullness of politics, the attractiveness +of other careers, etc, but Mr. Bradford declares that the one explanation +which goes further than all these is the absorption of all the powers of +the government by the legislature, and the consequent suppression of +individuality. He writes:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>The voters are urged to send to Congress men of character, ability, + and public spirit. They might as well be asked to select men of + that quality to follow the profession of burglars, a comparison + which is not intended to convey any disrespect to the number of + honest and respectable men who constantly are sent to Congress. + Chosen as burglars, they would fail just the same in the + business.... It is the organization of Congress which offers every + facility to those who wish to buy and those who wish to be bought.</p></blockquote> + +<p>Again, as to the present character of parties, Mr. Bradford declares:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>The names of the two great parties, Republicans and Democrats, have + in themselves and at the present time no meaning at all.</p></blockquote> + +<p>Simply because the basis of organization is corruption, and not +questions of public policy. For the same <a name="Page_80" id="Page_80" />reason recent elections have +been fought on popular "crazes," such as the silver question. But Mr. +Bradford says:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>New parties cannot be formed on constantly changing issues, since + to have any strength they must have a certain degree of permanence. + The only two nations which have succeeded in forming great national + parties are Great Britain and the United States. In other European + countries the splitting into groups has almost made representative + government impossible.</p></blockquote> + +<p>What Mr. Bradford has failed to appreciate is that the absolutely rigid +division into two camps which prevails in America is founded on +corruption, and will disappear when corruption is abolished. In the +United States such a thing as a Congressman deserting one party for the +other is practically unknown. In Great Britain, on the contrary, party +lines do continually change as new issues arise; and when they are +founded on questions of public policy it must be so. What gives them +permanence is that certain principles underlie most questions, and men +who have the same political principles are likely to think the same on +any single question; and further that a member would rather follow his +party and sacrifice his opinion on a single question than sacrifice most +of his principles.</p> + +<p>Therefore, even if the Americans do succeed in purifying their politics, +they will be faced with the same difficulty as exists elsewhere—namely, +such improved organization as will secure the return of <a name="Page_81" id="Page_81" />representatives +on questions of general public policy only. The present system of +single-membered electorates will not suffice. The only remedy lies in +enlarged electorates with electoral machinery which will organize public +opinion into two definite lines of policy, and will, by allowing +individual candidature merge the primary election into the actual +election.</p> + +<p>All this involves a radical alteration, both in the Constitution and in +the methods of election. But the United States have the great advantage +over France that it does not involve also a serious change in the +national character. It is not unlikely that some such reform must be +brought about before long.</p> + +<p>The present position cannot last. The Republican party has so long +identified itself with Capital in all its forms, with the protected +monopolists, the trusts and the corporations, that the mass of Labour +threatens to support the Democrats; and as the latter party maintains +the doctrines of direct government and the infallibility of the +majority, the result will be such a financial crisis and such an +industrial revolution that the Americans will have at last to admit that +their government needs total reconstruction.</p> + +<p><b>Australia.</b>—On the first day of the nineteenth century the Union of +the Parliaments of Great Britain and Ireland was accomplished; on the +first day of the twentieth century Britain's daughters in the southern +seas will inaugurate, under her ægis, a new experiment <a name="Page_82" id="Page_82" />in +democracy—the Australian Commonwealth. The time is opportune, then, for +a review of the tendencies of Australian politics, and for a comparison +with the other great democracies. Thus only can we attempt to cast the +horoscope of the new nation.</p> + +<p>Australia starts with many advantages over France and America. The +science of government is better understood now than when they started; +the folly of placing too many checks on the people is recognized; and +the British system of responsible leadership by a cabinet in the +legislature is fully developed. All these features are embodied in the +Constitution, and it only remains for the people to prove their fitness +to work it.</p> + +<p>Applying the same tests as we have used in the case of the great +democracies to the present position of Australian politics, what is the +result? First, as regards organization, where do we stand? It must be +confessed that we are far behind Great Britain and America, though +certainly we are not in the same sad plight as France. Still there is +the fact that we are classed among the failures. Take the evidence of +Mr. E.L. Godkin in "Unforeseen Tendencies of Democracy:"—</p> + +<blockquote><p>In his Journals during a visit to Turin in 1850, Senior records a + conversation with Cesare Balbo, a member of the Chamber in the + first Piedmontese Parliament, in which Balbo said, after an + exciting financial debate:—"We have not yet acquired parliamentary + discipline. Most of the members are more anxious about their own + crotchets or their own consis<a name="Page_83" id="Page_83" />tency than about the country. The + ministry has a large nominal majority, but every member of it is + ready to put them in a minority for any whim of his own." This was + probably true of every legislative body on the Continent, and it + continues true to this day in Italy, Greece, France, Austria, + Germany, and the new Australian democracies. (Pp. 102, 103.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>He adduces in support of the statement the fact that the three colonies +of New South Wales, South Australia, and Victoria have had respectively +twenty-eight, forty-two, and twenty-six ministries in forty years. Is +the prospect any brighter for the new Commonwealth? It is to be feared +not, if the present tendencies towards disintegration are allowed to +grow. For in the last decade a change has come over Australian politics +which portends the gravest danger. We refer to the direct class +representation which, under the name of Labour parties, has spread all +over the colonies. These so-called Labour "parties" are neither more nor +less than class factions. Their policy is everywhere the same—viz., the +use of the "balance system," which has proved so disastrous to France. +The worst effect is that they prevent the main parties from working out +definite policies on public questions, and cause them also to degenerate +into factions. In Victoria we have actually had the ludicrous spectacle +of the Opposition saving the Government time after time when deserted by +its own followers. In New South Wales the individual member is sunk in +the party; he must vote as the majority decides. Mr. Reid's term of +office was ended <a name="Page_84" id="Page_84" />by one such caucus. In Queensland, where the party is +strongest, it has now practically become one of the main parties, and +the whole colony is divided on class lines. Already an Intercolonial +Labour Conference has been held, and a pledge drawn up which must be +signed by all candidates for the party support at Federal elections. The +danger of these tactics is not rightly apprehended in Australia. In +reality they mark the first step towards social disruption. We may cite +the authority of Mr. James Bryce on this point. After pointing out in +"The American Commonwealth" that since the Civil War combinations of +States have always acted through the national parties, he writes:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>This is an important security against disruption. And a similar + security against the risk of civil strife or revolution is to be + found in the fact that the parties are not based on or sensibly + affected by differences either of wealth or of social position. + Their cleavage is not horizontal, according to social strata, but + vertical. This would be less true if it were stated either of the + Northern States separately, or of the Southern States separately: + it is true of the Union taken as a whole. It might cease to be true + if the new Labour party were to grow till it absorbed or superseded + either of the existing parties. The same feature has characterized + English politics as compared with those of most European countries, + and has been a main cause of the stability of the English + government and of the good feeling between different classes in the + community. (Vol. ii., p. 38.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>How is it that the public conscience is not alive to the enormity of +this anti-social crime? Mainly, we think, because the true principles of +representation are not properly understood. It is almost universally +<a name="Page_85" id="Page_85" />assumed that there is no real distinction between direct and +representative government. Minorities are tacitly allowed to have as +much right to representation as the minority, and the confusion of terms +is passed over. The working classes are told by self-seeking demagogues +that they are in a majority; that the majority is entitled to rule; and +that they have only to organize to come into their heritage. These +sycophants, who, as Aristotle of old pointed out, bear the greatest +resemblance to the court favourite of the tyrant, ask the people to +believe the silly paradox that the united wisdom of the whole people is +greater than that of the wisest part. The truth is that no people is fit +to exercise equal political rights which is not sensible enough to +choose the wisest part to carry on the government, providing only they +have control over their selection, and can hold them responsible. Are +the working classes in Australia going to demonstrate that they are +unfit for the exercise of political rights? Are they going to justify +the prognostications of the opponents of popular government? That is the +real question at issue. Unless public opinion be aroused to the iniquity +of class delegation, the further degradation of Australian politics is +inevitable. Let it not be thought that we are decrying the organization +of the working classes for political purposes. On the contrary, we hold +that the organization of every class and every interest is necessary in +order that it shall exert its just share of influence. But the only way +in <a name="Page_86" id="Page_86" />which every class can get its just share is by acting through the +two main parties. A class which holds aloof can exert for a short time +an undue share of influence, as a faction holding the balance of power, +but only at the expense of paralyzing the government.</p> + +<p>But the working classes are hardly to be blamed in this matter, for it +is a fact that before their action they were not able to exert their +just share of influence. The government was such as to promote the rule +of private interests instead of the general welfare, and, consequently, +their interests were shamefully neglected. The real cause of the +mischief was, as in America, the nominating system, which is inseparably +connected with the present method of election. The consideration of this +question brings us to the second characteristic of Australian +politics—namely, the irresponsible leadership of the press.</p> + +<p>We have seen how in America organization has been effected without +responsible leadership in Congress, only at the expense of the +irresponsible leadership of the "rings" and "bosses" who control the +"machines." In Australia an analogous result has been brought about by +different causes. We have not had civil strife to teach us the necessity +of organization, nor have we a spoils system available as a basis, but +the disorganized state of the legislatures and the consequent weakness +of the executive have thrown a large share of leadership into the hands +of <a name="Page_87" id="Page_87" />the press. Both in America and in Australia the prevalence of the +ultra-democratic theory that representatives should follow and not lead +the people has been a powerful contributing cause. And yet it is as +clear as possible that the choice lies between two alternatives. The +people must either submit to responsible leadership in Parliament or to +irresponsible leadership outside. The ultra-democrats hold that +responsible leadership in Parliament is incompatible with popular +government. We believe that this is the fundamental error which is +leading both the Australian and the American democracies astray. On the +contrary, it is the irresponsible despotism which is exercised by the +"bosses" in America and the newspapers in Australia which is really +incompatible with free government.</p> + +<p>The source of the error lies in the failure to grasp the meaning of the +term "responsible leadership." It is assumed that either the people must +lead and the representatives follow, or the representatives must lead +and the people follow. Bagehot may be taken as an exponent of the latter +position. He thought that cabinet government was only possible with a +deferential nation as opposed to a democratic nation. England he held to +be the type of deferential nations, because the people were content to +leave the government to the "great governing families"—<i>i.e.</i>, to defer +to caste, which is in principle the same as deferring to a king, who is +supposed to rule by divine right. Mr. <a name="Page_88" id="Page_88" />Bradford also gives a somewhat +exaggerated idea of the importance of the force of personality when he +declares that the mass of the people have no "views" on public +questions; all they want is to be well governed. The late Professor +Freeman Snow, of Harvard University, U.S., was a supporter of the +ultra-democratic view. In the "Annals of the American Academy of +Political and Social Science" for July, 1892, he declares:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>Mr. Bryce thinks that, "like other crowds, a legislature must be + led and ruled." And he has formulated a theory which he believes to + be "the essence of free or popular government, and the + justification for vesting power in numbers." "Every question that + arises in the conduct of government," he asserts, "is either a + question of ends or a question of means." And as the "masses are + better judges of what will conduce to their happiness than are + the-classes placed above them, they must be allowed to determine + ends." But, assuming the end to be given, they—the masses—should + leave to their leaders—the trained statesmen—the choice of means. + The defect in this theory is that it depends for its successful + operation upon the continued "deference of the multitude for the + classes placed above them ... upon the principle of <i>noblesse + oblige</i>," a principle, by the way, derived from feudal monarchy, + which has no existence in the United States, and which ought to be + considered a misfortune in any free country....</p> + +<p> Mr. Bryce has made a step in advance of Mr Bagehot in trusting the + people to determine ends, whatever they may be; why not go one step + further, and trust them to determine all questions of policy?</p></blockquote> + +<p>These are the two opposite points of view. They are both equally wrong. +The first is simply irresponsible leadership, and the second amounts to +<a name="Page_89" id="Page_89" />the same thing in practice, however much the people may appear to lead +in theory. The true position is that the relation between the +representatives and the people is reciprocal. Both lead and both follow. +The people defer to the representatives, not on account of rank or +caste, nor upon the principle of <i>noblesse oblige</i>, but only in so far +as the representatives are able to demonstrate their fitness to devise +measures for the general welfare. The people, on the other hand, are the +ultimate judges, both of measures and of men. This mutual action and +reaction constitutes the responsible leadership, which is one of the +fundamental principles underlying the device of representation. To it we +have already traced the virtue of representation as a social force, +capable of moulding national character and of appealing to the higher +nature of the people.</p> + +<p>An elector who is unable or unwilling to decide grave questions of +public policy himself may be a very shrewd judge as to who is best +fitted to decide them; and deference to ability is totally different in +principle to deference to caste. In a country in the transitional stage +between aristocracy and democracy, his judgment may be based partly on +the principle of <i>noblesse oblige</i>; but there is not the slightest +reason why in a democratic country he should require the representative +to defer to him. He will merely require a higher standard and a closer +and a more constant demonstration that <a name="Page_90" id="Page_90" />the measures proposed are +conducive to the public well-being. Moreover, it is still necessary that +the representatives should be judged periodically on general lines of +policy, and that the elector should not have the power of exercising +control on single questions. Under these conditions the result of the +mutual relation will be an improvement on both sides. But if, under the +influence of irresponsible leadership outside Parliament, the people +insist on increasing control over their representatives, then not only +is Parliament degraded, but progress towards government in the general +welfare is stopped.</p> + +<p>This long digression as to the real meaning of responsible leadership is +necessary in order to gauge the drift of the prevailing tendency towards +the irresponsible leadership of the press in Australia. The evil exists +in all the colonies, but it is perhaps worse in our own colony of +Victoria than in any other country in the world, although it is said to +be very bad in Switzerland since the referendum was introduced. We have +two morning newspapers in Melbourne, which take opposite sides on nearly +every question which arises. They admit into their columns no facts and +no arguments which tell against the position they have taken up; nay, +more, they resort to downright misrepresentation to support it. It will +be said that this is only a form of the party game, but the danger lies +in the fact that they circulate in different classes, and therefore +these classes see only <a name="Page_91" id="Page_91" />one side of every question. Moreover, in their +competition for the support of classes in which they desire to increase +their circulation they use their influence to secure legislation which +will appeal to class prejudices, or even undertake a prolonged agitation +to relieve special interests from legitimate charges. The <i>Age</i> has for +a long time thrived by pandering to the prejudices of the working +classes, and especially of the artisans; the <i>Argus</i> now seeks to get +even by creating dissension between town and country.</p> + +<p>All this interference with the functions of Parliament has a baneful +influence on the working of the political machine. The party lines are +practically decided by the newspaper contest. We have spoken of the +resemblance to the "machine" control over American politics. One of the +newspapers is, in effect, managed by a "ring," the other by a "boss." +The despotism of David Syme in Melbourne is as unquestioned as that of +Richard Croker in New York, or Matthew Quay in Pennsylvania. How close +the analogy is may be inferred from the fact that Mr. Syme has +exercised, and still claims the right to exercise, control over +nominations to Parliament. It is notorious that the ten delegates who +"represented" Victoria at the Federation Convention were elected on the +<i>Age</i> "ticket." Again, Mr. Syme is known as "the father of protection," +and has been able, by the force of his indomitable will, to impose on +the colony a tariff which can be compared only to the M'Kinley <a name="Page_92" id="Page_92" />tariff +in America, thus showing that irresponsible leadership in either form is +more favourable to the rule of private interests than to the general +welfare.</p> + +<p>We have said enough to show that in internal affairs the influence of +the press, when it directly interferes with Parliament is an anti-social +force. In matters of foreign policy the case is still worse. The press +is almost universally jingoistic, because it is financially interested +in sensationalism. A war generally means a fortune to newspaper +proprietors. In such matters, therefore, responsible leadership by +Parliament is still more urgently required.</p> + +<p>We now come to the claim of those ultra-democrats who preach the +poisonous doctrines of direct government and of unrestrained majority +rule, that responsible leadership is incompatible with popular +government. This claim, is of course, supported by the radical press in +Australia. We have already quoted from Mr. Syme's work on +"Representative Government in England" the extreme views in which he +confuses representation with delegation. "Popular government," he +declares, "can only exist where the people can exercise control over +their representatives at all times and under all circumstances." The +method proposed to obtain this control is to give a majority of the +constituents power to dismiss a representative at any time, and is +utterly impracticable. Imagine the position of a member elected by a +majority of one or two votes! The true way to prevent members <a name="Page_93" id="Page_93" />abusing +their trust is not to increase the direct control of the people, but to +prevent the control of the press and all other irresponsible agencies +over them; and so to ensure the return of better men.</p> + +<p>Perhaps the most striking anomaly in Mr. Syme's position is that, while +he would confine the office of Parliament to expressing public opinion, +he declares in the same work that "the press at once forms and expresses +public opinion."<a name="FNanchor_2" href="#Footnote_2">[2]</a> Now, it is quite true that if Parliament is weak and +disorganized, or occupies itself in fighting for the spoils of office, +the power of forming public opinion is thrown into the hands of the +press. But the more power is seized by the press, the more Parliament is +degraded, and the less is the chance of recovery. The situation presents +little difficulty to Mr. Syme. Every newspaper reader, he declares, +"becomes, as it were, a member of that vast assembly, which may be said +to embrace the whole nation, so widely are newspapers now read. Had we +only the machinery for recording the votes of that assembly, we might +easily dispense with Parliament altogether."</p> + +<p>These ideas are not of mere academic interest; they have dominated the +trend of Victorian politics for many years. The time has now arrived for +the people to consider whether it is better to keep a Parliament of weak +delegates to express the public opinion which <a name="Page_94" id="Page_94" />is formed by the press +than to elect a Parliament of "leaders of the people," highly-trained +legists, economists, and sociologists, to form and direct the public +opinion which is expressed by the newspapers. Why should the principle +of leadership, as exemplified in Mr. Syme's own career, be given full +scope in the press, and entirely repressed in Parliament? As to the kind +of influence we mean, no better description could be given than that of +the well-known Labour leader, Mr. H.H. Champion. In an open letter to +Mr. David Syme in the <i>Champion</i> of 22nd June, 1895, he wrote:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>Yet, if you rose to-morrow morning with the resolve to dismiss the + ministry or to reverse the policy of the country, to stop + retrenchment or to recommence borrowing, that resolve would + infallibly translate itself into fact in a few weeks.</p> + +<p> In no country that I know of has any organ in the press so much + influence as your paper. It is practically the sole source of + information for the majority of the people. It has no competitors. + It can make any person or policy popular or unpopular. It can fail + to report any man or thing, and for four-fifths of the citizens it + is as though that man or thing were not. It can misrepresent any + speech or movement, and the printed lie alone will reach the + electors. It could teach the people anything you choose. It has + ruled the country for a couple of decades. It rules the country + to-day.</p></blockquote> + +<p>Professor Jethro Brown shows himself alive to the danger of press +domination in Australia. In "The New Democracy" he writes:—"The +<i>prestige</i> of Parliament is destroyed when its deliberations and +conclusions <a name="Page_95" id="Page_95" />cease to be the determining factor in legislation. The +transfer of the real responsibility for legislation to a new power +implies the discrediting of the old school for training leaders." And he +quotes with approval the expression of opinion by the Honourable B.R. +Wise in the Federal Convention:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>There may be, as Mr. David Syme suggests, no risk involved in the + change of masters; but for my part I would sooner trust the + destinies of the country to the worst Parliament the people of + Australia would elect than to the best newspaper the mind of man + has ever imagined.</p></blockquote> + +<p>It is little use, therefore, for the press to further degrade Parliament +in the eyes of the people by railing at it in the following terms:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>So it is that Parliament as a working machine is about the + clumsiest and least effective that can be conceived of. All our + Parliaments are modelled on the necessities of bygone centuries. We + want a working Parliament improved up to date; but we lack + political invention, and have to jog along with the old lumbering + machine—a sort of bullock dray trying to compete with an age of + electric railways and motor cars.<a name="FNanchor_3" href="#Footnote_3">[3]</a></p></blockquote> + +<p>The remedy lies with the press itself. Let it abandon all illegitimate +influence, and use its power in a legitimate direction to give effect to +the principles of organization and responsible leadership in Parliament. +But just as the Labour faction cannot altogether be blamed for the +present disintegration of Parliament, so the press cannot be held +responsible for <a name="Page_96" id="Page_96" />its degradation. In both eases cause and effect have +been interrelated. The mistake which the press has made has been in not +perceiving that the more it interferes with the legitimate functions of +Parliament, even although with the best intentions, the more it degrades +Parliament.</p> + +<p>We have now passed in review the two great dangers which assail the +Commonwealth at the inception of federation. We have shown how +intimately related they are to the two great principles underlying +representative government—organization and leadership. Nay, we have +seen that all the varied phenomena presented by the great democracies of +the world can be expressed in terms of the same two principles.</p> + +<p>It remains to show that to give effect to the expression of these two +principles in a more perfect manner than ever yet attained is a problem +of electoral machinery. This task we shall now undertake.</p> + +<p>FOOTNOTES:<a name="Page_97" id="Page_97" /></p> + +<p><a name="Footnote_2" href="#FNanchor_2">[2]</a> "Representative Government in England," p. 123.</p> + +<p><a name="Footnote_3" href="#FNanchor_3">[3]</a> <i>Age</i>, 28th June, 1900.</p> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IV" id="CHAPTER_IV" />CHAPTER IV.</h2> + +<p class='center'>THE REFORM: TRUE PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.</p> + + +<p>How to give effect to the principles of organization and leadership in +an electoral reform—that is the problem which we shall now attempt to +solve. We have already laid down the theoretical requirements, which are +(1) proportional representation to the two parties—the majority and the +minority, and (2) the election by each party separately of its most +popular leaders; and we shall now have to consider also how these +requirements are modified by practical considerations.</p> + +<p><b>Proportional Representation to the Two Parties, the Majority and the +Minority.</b>—It will be as well to illustrate the method proposed by +reference to the conditions imposed by an actual election, such as that +for the Federal Senate. The Commonwealth Bill provides that each State +shall be polled as a single electorate, returning six senators. Suppose +that 120,000 electors vote on party lines in any State. It is clear that +a party which has the support of 20,000 electors is entitled to one +senator; also, that a party <a name="Page_98" id="Page_98" />which has the support of 40,000 electors is +entitled to two senators; of 60,000 electors to three senators, and so +on. Now, suppose that one party has the support of 50,000 electors, and +the other of 70,000 electors, then the minority is entitled to two and a +half senators, and the majority to three and a half senators. But +senators are living units, and cannot be divided into fractions. The +question therefore arises, Which is entitled to the odd senator, the +majority or the minority? And the answer is that they are both equally +entitled to him; for it is as much a tie as if each party has the +support of 10,000 electors in a single-seat electorate. But if the +minority had the support of 49,999 electors, or one elector less, it +would be entitled to only two senators, and if it had the support of +50,001 electors, or one elector more, it would be entitled to three +senators.</p> + +<p>From the above simple facts can be deduced general rules applicable to +any particular case. It is evident that the result is not affected by +the number of votes allowed to each elector, providing only that each +elector has the same number of votes. It is also quite irrespective of +the number of candidates nominated in the interests of each party. But +it would never do to allow party organizations to control nominations. +How are we to combine individual candidature with party nomination? The +only way to do this is to require that each candidate shall declare, +either when nominating or a few days <a name="Page_99" id="Page_99" />before the election, on which side +of the House he intends to sit, and be classified accordingly as +Ministerialist or Oppositionist. To decide the relative strengths of the +two parties, it is then only necessary to take the aggregate votes +polled by all the candidates nominated for each party as a measure of +the amount of support which it receives.</p> + +<p>The great advantages of this provision are at once apparent. There is no +incentive to limit the number of candidates so as to prevent splitting +the votes. On the contrary, it is to the interest of each party to get +as many strong candidates as possible to stand in its interests. There +will be no necessity to ask any candidate to retire for fear of losing a +seat to the party. Thus the control of nominations, which leads to the +worst abuses of the present system, will be entirely obviated.</p> + +<p>Now, suppose that in the instance we have already given each elector is +allowed to vote for one candidate only, the total number of votes +recorded will be 120,000. Then the <i>unit of representation</i> or number of +votes which entitle a party to one senator will be 20,000 votes; each +party will be entitled to one senator for every whole unit of +representation, and the odd senator will go to the party having the +larger remainder. For instance, if the aggregate votes polled by all the +Ministerialist candidates be 72,000, and by the Oppositionist candidates +48,000, the Ministerialists, having three units plus 12,000 re<a name="Page_100" id="Page_100" />mainder, +are entitled to four senators, and the Opposition, having two units plus +8,000, to two senators.</p> + +<p>Similarly, if each elector be allowed to vote for a number of +candidates, all these figures will be increased in proportion. For +example, if each elector has three votes, the unit of representation +would be 60,000 votes. The following general rules may therefore be +stated:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>1. The unit of representation is equal to the total number of valid + votes cast at the election, divided by the number of seats.</p> + +<p> 2. Each party is entitled to one seat for every whole unit of + representation contained in the aggregate votes polled by all its + candidates, and the odd seat goes to the party which has the larger + remainder.</p></blockquote> + +<p>The fact that the last seat has to be assigned to the party which has +the larger remainder is sometimes advanced as an objection, but it is +evidently the fairest possible division that the size of the electorate +will permit. Of course, the larger the electorate the more accurately +proportioned will be the representation. Hence the representation would +be most accurate if the whole assembly were elected in one large +electorate. But if, for the sake of convenience, the assembly be elected +in a large number of electorates in which the relative proportions of +two parties vary the gains which a party makes in some electorates will +be balanced by losses in others, so <a name="Page_101" id="Page_101" />that the final result would be +almost as accurate as if the whole country were polled as one +electorate. It must be remembered that the result in any electorate +cannot be foreseen, and that it is a matter of chance which party gains +the advantage. Now, if the limits of variation comprise even a single +unit of representation, each party will stand an equal chance of +gaining, and therefore the laws of chance will ensure that the gains +balance the losses in the different electorates. Supposing a party which +averages 40 per cent. in the whole country to vary between 30 per cent. +and 50 per cent, in the different electorates (which may be taken as a +fair assumption), the unit of representation should equal 20 per cent., +or one-fifth. Under these conditions the laws of chance will ensure +correct representation, so long as the electorates do not contain less +than five seats.</p> + +<p>The above facts furnish a complete answer to the arguments advanced by +Mr. J.W. M'Cay, ex-M.L.A., in a series of articles in the <i>Age</i> against +the application of proportional representation to the Federal Senate. +While apparently recognizing that it is utterly impossible for the +minority to secure a majority of the representation, he based his +objection solely on the fact that a minority is able with electorates +containing an even number of seats to secure one-half of the +representation, and thus lead to what he terms "the minority block."</p> + +<p>The force of the objection will entirely depend on <a name="Page_102" id="Page_102" />the size of the +minority which is able thus to thwart the will of the majority. The +Federal Senate will consist of 36 senators, each of the original States +contributing six. No reasonable man would complain if the minority, +being only entitled to 17 senators, actually returned 18, but Mr. M'Cay +points out that it is possible for a minority entitled to 15 senators to +return 18. To bring about this result he makes the absurd assumption +that in each of the six States the minority polls exactly two whole +units of representation, and a bare majority of a third unit. It is safe +to say that this would not happen once in a thousand years. If the +relative proportions of the two parties vary in the slightest in the +different States some must be under and some over the assumed +proportion. It is most probable that it will be under it in three States +and over it in the other three States; and, under these circumstances, +the party will return 15 senators, the exact number to which it is +entitled. It may happen to be under the assumed proportion in only two +of the States and over in the other four, and that the party will get +one more senator than it is entitled to; but it is extremely improbable +that it will get two more, and virtually impossible that it will get +three more senators than its just proportion. Mr. M'Cay's conclusion +that proportional representation can only be used in electorates +returning an odd number of representatives is shown to be entirely +unwarranted. Equally fallacious is Professor Nanson's rebutting +<a name="Page_103" id="Page_103" />statement that "scientific proportionalists recommend odd electorates." +While the number of States remains even, the mathematical chance of a +minority securing one-half of the representation is precisely the same +whether the States return an odd or an even number of senators. As a +matter of fact, the danger of a minority securing one-half of the +representation is much greater at the intermediate elections for the +Senate, when each State returns three senators, the reason being the +smaller field.</p> + +<p>We have dwelt at some length on the preceding example, because it serves +to refute another error into which some of the proportionalists have +fallen. It is held that the unit of representation should be ascertained +by dividing the total votes, not by the number of seats, but by the +seats increased by one. This unit is generally known as the Droop quota, +having been proposed in a work published by Mr. H.R. Droop in 1869. +Since one vote more than one-half of the total votes is sufficient for +election in a single-seat electorate, it is argued that one vote more +than one-third suffices in a two-seat electorate, one vote more than +one-fourth in a three-seat electorate, and so on. The unit in a six-seat +electorate would be one-seventh of the votes instead of one-sixth, and +it is pointed out that by this means the whole six seats would be filled +by whole units, leaving an unrepresented residuum of one-seventh of the +votes divided between the two parties.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104" />The error lies precisely as before in concentrating attention on one of +the electorates, and in neglecting the theory of probability. The Droop +quota introduces the condition that each party must pay a certain +minimum number of votes for each seat, and the real distinction is that, +instead of the minority and the majority having an equal chance of +securing any advantage, the chances are in the same proportion as their +relative strengths. If the majority be twice as strong as the minority, +it will have twice the chance of gaining the advantage. To prove this, +consider the position of a one-third minority in a number of five-seat +electorates. The Droop quota being one-sixth of the votes, the minority +will secure two seats or 40 per cent. in those electorates where it is +just over one-third, and one seat or 20 per cent. where it is just +under. Since the mathematical chances are that it will be over in one +half and under in the other half, it will, on the average, secure only +30 per cent., although entitled to 33 per cent. Again, if the 670 +members of the House of Commons were elected in three to five-seat +electorates, and the Droop quota used as proposed by Sir John Lubbock, +and if the Ministerialists were twice as strong as the Oppositionists, +they would, on the average, return 30 more members than the two-thirds +to which they are entitled, and this would count 60 members on a +division.</p> + +<p>The following table illustrates the erroneous result <a name="Page_105" id="Page_105" />obtained by +applying the Droop quota when a number of grouped-electorates are +concerned. It will be noticed that where parties are nearly equal it +makes very little difference which unit is used:—</p> + +<table border='1' cellspacing="0" cellpadding="5" > + + <tr> + <th rowspan="2" align="center">STRENGTH OF <br />PARTY</th> + <th colspan="2" align="center">AVERAGE REPRESENTATION</th> + </tr> + <tr> + <th>Five-Seat Electorates</th> + <th>Ten-Seat Electorates</th> + </tr> + <tr align="center"> + <td>10 per cent.</td> + <td>6 per cent.</td> + <td>2 per cent.</td> + </tr> + <tr align="center"> + <td>20 per cent.</td> + <td>14 per cent.</td> + <td>17 per cent.</td> + </tr> + <tr align="center"> + <td>30 per cent.</td> + <td>26 per cent.</td> + <td>28 per cent.</td> + </tr> + <tr align="center"> + <td>40 per cent.</td> + <td>38 per cent.</td> + <td>39 per cent.</td> + </tr> + <tr align="center"> + <td>50 per cent.</td> + <td>50 per cent.</td> + <td>50 per cent.</td> + </tr> + +</table> + + +<p>The Droop quota, therefore, gives, not proportional, but disproportional +representation.</p> + +<p><b>Election by Each Party of its Most Popular Candidates.</b>—Still keeping +in mind the six-seat electorate for the Federal Senate, we may note that +there are two rival systems in the field—the <i>scrutin de liste</i> or +Block Vote, in which each elector votes for any six of the candidates, +and the Hare system, which allows each elector an effective vote for one +candidate only. The adoption of either of these systems would be +unfortunate. To force each elector to vote for six candidates is +probably to require him to vote for more than he is inclined to support, +and certainly for more than his <a name="Page_106" id="Page_106" />party is entitled to return; and, also, +to put it in the power of the majority to return all six senators. To +allow him to vote for one candidate only, on the other hand, is to break +up both parties into factions by allowing the favourites of sections +within the parties to be elected, instead of those most in general +favour with all sections composing each party. An intermediate position +is therefore best. No elector should be required to vote for more than +three candidates, and no elector should be allowed to vote for less. +Because in the first place it is evident that each party will, on the +average, return three senators, and, secondly, it may be taken for +granted that even the minority will nominate at least three candidates. +Two alternative proposals may be submitted as fulfilling these +conditions:—</p> + +<blockquote><p><i>1. Each elector should vote for any three candidates, or</i></p> + +<p><i>2. Each elector should have six votes, and have the option of giving two +votes to individual candidates.</i></p></blockquote> + +<p>The first plan is the simpler, but the second is probably the better, as +it allows more discrimination without sacrificing any of the advantages. +Either proposal is practically equivalent to applying the Block Vote to +each party separately; and whatever may be the objection<a name="Page_107" id="Page_107" />s to applying +the Block Vote to two or more parties it is the simplest and best system +to elect the candidates most in general favour when one party only is +concerned. It is true that the majority will return rather more than +one-half of the representatives and the minority rather less than +one-half, so that the minority will have more votes in proportion to its +strength. But with two parties of fairly equal but fluctuating strength +the fairest way is to require each elector to vote for at least one-half +of the number of representatives. Besides, apart from the fact that it +is not known before the election how many seats each party will obtain, +it is absolutely necessary that each elector shall have the same number +of votes in order that each party be allotted its just share of +representation. Moreover it is not proposed to limit the elector's +freedom of choice in the slightest by confining him to the candidates of +one party. The great majority of electors will vote on party lines, +because every vote given to a candidate of the opposing party tells +against the representation of their own party. The reason of this is +that every vote counts individually for the candidate and collectively +for the whole party. Any elector, therefore, who divides his voting +power equally between the two parties practically wastes it as far as +the party representation is concerned. But it is neither necessary nor +desirable to bring about such a rigid party division as prevails in +America, for instance,<a name="Page_108" id="Page_108" /> where a man is born, lives, and dies Republican +or Democrat. If electors were confined to the candidates of one party, +an elector who wished to vote for an individual candidate of the +opposing party would be placed in the dilemma of deserting either his +favourite or his party. The division into parties is really required in +the elected body, and not in the constituent body.</p> + +<p><b>Rules for the Reform.</b>—We are now in a position to draw up a list of +rules for the proposed reform, applicable to all legislatures in which +party government prevails:—</p> + +<p>1. Electorates to be grouped so as to contain at least three seats, and +preferably not less than five seats nor more than twenty seats.</p> + +<p>2. Candidates to declare when nominating, or a few days before the +election, whether they are in favour of or opposed to the party in +power, and to be classified accordingly as Ministerialists or +Oppositionists.</p> + +<p>3. Ballot papers to contain the names of all candidates nominated, +arranged in two parallel columns, one headed Ministerialists, and the +other Oppositionists. The list of candidates under each heading to be +arranged in alphabetical order.</p> + +<p>4. Each elector to have as many votes as there are seats, and to be +allowed to give either one or two votes to any candidate. The votes to +be distributed as he pleases among all the candidates of both lists.<a name="Page_109" id="Page_109" /></p> + +<p>5. The total number of valid votes cast at the election to be divided by +the number of seats; the quotient to be known as the "unit of +representation."</p> + +<p>6. Each party to be allowed one seat for every whole unit of +representation contained in the aggregate votes polled by all its +candidates, and the last seat to go to the party which has the larger +remainder.</p> + +<p>7. The candidates of each party having the highest number of votes to be +declared elected to the number of seats to which each party is entitled +in accordance with the preceding rule.</p> + +<p>8. In case of a tie between candidates or parties the lot decides.</p> + +<p>The alternative plan for rule 4, which is somewhat simpler, would read +as follows:—</p> + +<p>4. Each elector to vote for half the number of candidates that there are +seats, <i>i.e.</i>, three votes in a five or six-seat electorate, four votes +in a seven or eight-seat electorate, &c. The votes to be distributed as +he pleases among all the candidates of both lists.</p> + +<p>It is unnecessary to dwell on the absolute simplicity of these rules. +They involve no radical departure from existing methods of voting or of +counting votes. Once the totals are added up, the calculations necessary +to decide the successful candidates are within the reach of a school +child.</p> + +<p>EXAMPLE.—Take as an example 13 candidates in a six-seat electorate who +<a name="Page_110" id="Page_110" />poll as follows:—</p> + +<table border='0' cellspacing="5" cellpadding="5"> + + <tr> + <th colspan="2" align="center">MINISTERIALISTS.</th> + <td rowspan='10'></td> + <th colspan="2" align="center">OPPOSITIONISTS.</th> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>BROWN</td> + <td>83,000</td> + <td>YOUNG</td> + <td>53,000</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>RYAN</td> + <td>74,000</td> + <td>BELL</td> + <td>51,000</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>COX</td> + <td>44,000</td> + <td>HUME</td> + <td>47,000</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>WHITE</td> + <td>42,000</td> + <td>JONES</td> + <td>45,000</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>PEEL</td> + <td>38,000</td> + <td>BLACK</td> + <td>34,000</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>ADAMS</td> + <td>35,000</td> + <td valign="top" align="right" colspan="2" rowspan="4">---------<br />230,000</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>GREY</td> + <td>33,000</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>SWIFT</td> + <td>21,000</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td align="right" colspan="2">---------<br />370,000</td> + </tr> +</table> + +<p class='center'>Total votes = 370,000 + 230,000 = 600,000.</p> + +<p class='center'>Unit of representation = 600,000/6 = 100,000.</p> + +<p class='center'>Ministerialists: 3 units + 70,000 remainder = 4 seats.</p> + +<p class='center'>Oppositionists: 2 units + 30,000 remainder = 2 seats.</p> + +<p class='center'>The Ministerialists, having the larger remainder, secure the last seat. +The successful candidates are Brown, Ryan, Cox, and White (M.), Young +and Bell (O.)</p> + + +<p>It will be noted that without the proportional principle the +Ministerialists would have returned two members only, and the +Oppositionists four.</p> + +<p>It is to be distinctly understood that the simpler plan of voting for +half the number of candidates that there are seats is practically as +good as the other. In order to<a name="Page_111" id="Page_111" /><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112" /> show, however, that the plan we have +favoured may be simplified, we illustrate by a sample ballot paper a +method which has been used in Belgium. Two white spots are printed +opposite each candidate's name. An ink pad and stamp are then provided +at each polling booth, and the elector stamps out a white spot for each +vote he wishes to give. In the paper illustrated two votes are given to +Brown, two to Jones, one to Grey, and one to Swift. This elector has, +therefore, given two-thirds of his voting power to the Ministerial +party, and one-third to the Opposition, and has thus directly influenced +both policies. A further advantage of the proposal is the ease with +which such a paper can be read by the returning officer.</p> + +<h2>BALLOT PAPER</h2> + +<hr style='width: 25%;' /> + +<h3>Ministerialists. Oppositionists.</h3> + +<table border='1' cellspacing="0" cellpadding="5" > + + <tr align="center"> + <td>O O</td> + <td>ADAMS</td> + <td rowspan="10"></td> + <td>O O</td> + <td>BELL</td> + </tr> + <tr align="center"> + <td></td> + <td>BROWN</td> + <td>O O</td> + <td>BLACK</td> + </tr> + <tr align="center"> + <td>O O</td> + <td>COX</td> + <td>O O</td> + <td>HUME</td> + </tr> + <tr align="center"> + <td>O </td> + <td>GREY</td> + <td></td> + <td>JONES</td> + </tr> + <tr align="center"> + <td>O O</td> + <td>PEEL</td> + <td>O O</td> + <td>YOUNG</td> + </tr> + <tr align="center"> + <td>O O</td> + <td>RYAN</td> + <td colspan="2" rowspan="3" ></td> + </tr> + <tr align="center"> + <td> O</td> + <td>SWIFT</td> + </tr> + <tr align="center"> + <td>O O</td> + <td>WHITE</td> + </tr> +</table> + +<blockquote><p>1. You are allowed Six votes, and can give either one or two votes to +any candidate on either list.</p> + +<p>2. Stamp out one of the white spots if you wish to give a candidate one +vote.</p> + +<p>3. Stamp out the two white spots if you wish to give a candidate two +votes.</p> + +<p>4. Your ballot paper will be invalid if you stamp out more or less than +Six white spots.</p></blockquote> + + +<p><b>Character of Parties.</b>—We must now prove that the methods proposed +will actually organize the people into two coherent parties. Let us +suppose either party to be composed of three sections. The problem is to +induce these three sections to work together, and to sink their petty +differences in the general interest, in short to unite as a party, +aiming at the control of administration with a definite policy on public +questions. Let us further suppose the party entitled to three +representatives. Now, it is quite conceivable that exactly the same +three candidates would be elected if each elector had any number of +votes from one to three, and this would actually tend to be the case the +more united the party is. But herein lies the dif<a name="Page_113" id="Page_113" />ference: that with one +vote only any one section holding narrow and violent views can return an +independent delegate, and therefore has a direct inducement to do so, +while with three votes it is forced to work with the other two sections, +for if it refuses to do so it is in their power to exclude its nominee. +It is this power to exclude independent factions which is the first +requisite to prevent the main parties degenerating into factions. Now, +the advocates of the Hare system declare that each elector should have +one effective vote only, no matter how many seats the party is entitled +to. The elector would therefore only express his opinion as to the +delegate of his own section, and not as to the constitution of the whole +party, and there would be nothing whatever to prevent the election of +the favourites of sections, instead of the representatives most in +general favour with all sections.</p> + +<p>But if there were only one party it would be impossible to make all the +sections work together in this manner. Some of them would combine into a +majority of the party, and would exclude the minority. With two great +competing parties, however, the case is quite different. So far from +either party wishing to exclude any small minority, both will compete +for its support, providing only that it will fall into line with the +other sections on the main questions of policy. Each section will +therefore support the party which will consent to embody the most +favourable<a name="Page_114" id="Page_114" /> compromise of its demands in its policy. If its demands are +such that both parties refuse to entertain them, it will exercise no +influence in the direction of furthering its own views. From this +statement it is evident that no system of independent direct +proportional representation within the party can be recognized as a +right to which the different sections are entitled, as it would +inevitably break up the party, and lead to sectional delegation. The +sections would then change in character, and become violent factions. +But, nevertheless, if the sections work together as described, every +section will be proportionately represented in the party policy, and +therefore by every representative of the party. Moreover, no section can +dictate to either party, or obtain more than a fair compromise. For all +the sections are interdependent, and any section which attempts to exert +more than its just share of influence will sink in general favour, and +will find those who are inclined to support its pretensions rejected at +the election.</p> + +<p>The difference between the two stages of representation may now be +clearly appreciated. In the first stage we have seen that the fear of +the aggression of the monarchy held all sections together in one party. +In the second stage, however, it has been abundantly demonstrated by +experience that the fear of each other will not hold the sections of the +two parties together. The electoral machinery must, therefore, supply +the deficiency.<a name="Page_115" id="Page_115" /></p> + +<p><b>Party Lines.</b>—With the altered character of parties there is ground +for hope that the basis of division will become questions of general +public policy, and that all causes of factious dissension and of social +disruption will tend to be repressed. This improvement is indeed +urgently needed. For if in any country party lines are decided by +geographical considerations, as town <i>v.</i> country; by class, as Capital +<i>v.</i> Labour; by race as in South Africa; by religion as in Belgium; or +by personal ambition for the spoils of office—in any of these cases the +future of that country is open to the gravest doubt.</p> + +<p>Perhaps the greatest danger which assails most democratic countries +to-day is the risk of the working classes being persuaded by demagogues +that equal political rights have been extended to them in order that +they shall govern, instead of in order that they shall not be +misgoverned. If the general welfare is to be advanced, all classes must +influence the policies of both parties. This condition is indispensable +to bring about the ideal condition of two parties differing only as to +what is best for all.</p> + +<p>Equally to be condemned is the narrow-minded and intolerant view of +those who can see no virtue in an opposing party; who define, for +instance, the distinction between parties as the party for things as +they are, and the party for things as they ought to be; the latter +being, of course, their own party. This is one of the objectionable +features of Australian newspaper-made politics<a name="Page_116" id="Page_116" />.</p> + +<p>A more rational view of the distinction which often underlies party +divisions is between those who desire change and those who oppose +change. J.S. Mill points out how the latter may often be useful in +preventing progress in a wrong direction. There are times when such +attitude is called for, but generally speaking we may say that the +fundamental distinction between parties should be a difference of +opinion as to the direction of progress. Nor is it inconsistent for a +party to change its opinion or alter its policy; on the contrary, it is +essential to progress. The majority must often modify its policy in the +light of the criticism of the minority, and the minority must often drop +the unpopular proposals which have put it in a minority. These features +are all essential to the working of the political machine.</p> + +<p><b>The Character of Representatives.</b>—Granting that all sections of each +party can be induced to work together, the beneficial effect on the +character of representatives would be incalculable. Instead of being +forced to pander to every small section for support, they would appeal +to all sections. The enlarged electorates which are contemplated would +be arranged to embrace the widest diversity of interest, and a +representative would then be free to follow his own independent +judgment, unfettered by the dictation of small cliques. His actions +might offend some section<a name="Page_117" id="Page_117" />s who supported his election; but he has a wide +field, and may gain the support of other sections by them. Therefore, he +may actually improve his position by gaining more supporters than he +loses. Contrast this with the present system, in which the +representatives are cooped up in single-membered electorates to denned +sets of supporters. The very principle of community of interest on which +these electorates must be arranged in order to get a fair result is +destructive of the idea of representation. It is no wonder, then, that +the present system is tending towards delegation. Local delegation we +have always had, more or less, but we are now threatened by class +delegation also.</p> + +<p>The conclusion of Mr. Kent in "The English Radicals" may be quoted on +this point. He says:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>The question of the relationship of members to their constituents + is at the present time perplexed and undetermined; for though the + control of Parliament by the people is an indisputable fact, yet it + is maintained by means of quite another kind from those which the + early Radicals proposed. The result is somewhat paradoxical, for + while the system of pledges has been contemptuously rejected, yet + the theory that a member is a delegate tacitly prevails in English + politics. That members of the House of Commons have tended and do + tend to lose their independence it is impossible to doubt. A + distinguished French publicist, M. Boutmy, for instance, has + remarked the fact; and he thinks that in consequence a + deterioration of the tone of politicians is likely to recur. Mr. + E.L. Godkin, an American writer, whose judgments are entitled to + respect, has expressed much the same opinion; "the delegate + theory," he says, "has been gaining ground in England, and in + America has almost completely succeeded in asserting its sway, so + that we have seen many cases in which members of Congress have + openly declared their dissent from the measures for which they + voted in obedience to their constituents."<a name="Page_118" id="Page_118" /></p></blockquote> + +<p>It is one of the greatest merits of the proposed reform that this vexed +question of representation or delegation would be definitely settled. +For, although the area of independent action is enlarged, definite +limits are set to it.</p> + +<p><b>Possible Objections.</b>—We may now reply to some objections which have +been or might be urged. At the outset we would point out that the +critics nearly always base their objections on the conditions which have +prevailed in the past or do exist in the present chaotic state of +parties; and seldom appreciate the fact that they would lose force if a +better condition could be brought about. Let us take the Melbourne +<i>Argus</i> report of Professor Nanson's objections:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>Professor Nanson pointed out that the scheme depended for its + efficacy on the existence of party government, which the Professor + was glad to say was being pushed more and more into the background. + He took a practical illustration from the defeat of the O'Loghlen + Government in 1883. In that case, after the election the Government + came back with a following of one-tenth. The other combined party + had nine-tenths, and of these a little more than half were Liberals + and a little less than half were Conservatives. He pointed out that + under Mr. Ashworth's system the Liberals would have got the whole + of the Opposition seats and the Conservatives none, whereas under + any intelligent modification of the Hare system the parties would + have been returned in the proportion of five Liberals, four + Conservatives, and one O'Loghlenite. The system contained the evils + of the <i>scrutin de liste</i> doubled by being applied to two parties, + the evils of the Limited Vote, which had been condemned by all + leading statesmen, and it played into the hands of these who were + best able to organize.<a name="Page_119" id="Page_119" /></p></blockquote> + +<p>Take the latter statements first. The evil of the Block Vote or +<i>scrutin de liste</i> is that it gives all the representation to the +majority, and excludes the minority; its merit is that it prevents the +formation of a number of minorities. How this evil will be doubled if it +is entirely removed by allowing both majority and minority their just +share of representation we leave the Professor to explain. The statement +that the scheme would play into the hands of those who are best able to +organize is absolutely without foundation. On the contrary, the +organization is automatic. It would certainly encourage the formation of +organizations to influence the policies of the parties, since every +organization would be able to exert its proportionate influence, but +that is an advantage, not an evil. We will leave the statement about +party government alone, and now take the "practical illustration." The +Professor here assumes three distinct parties, but it is quite evident +there are only two. It is not usual for Liberal Unionists and +Conservatives to fight one another at elections in Great Britain at +present. In the same way, if a section of Liberals and a section of +Conservatives unite to oppose a Government, they will work together and +not try to exclude one another. Moreover, they will have a common +policy, so that it matters little who are elected so l<a name="Page_120" id="Page_120" />ong as they are +the best men to carry out the policy. Is it likely the Conservatives +would join the Liberals, if the latter were trying to get all the +seats? Thus all the Professor's assumptions are incorrect. But even if +they were correct the conclusion is still wrong. The Liberal section +could not get all the seats if they tried. Imagine a ten-seat +electorate, in which the combined party is entitled to nine members. The +electors would not be required to vote for more than five candidates, +whereas the Professor has assumed that they would be forced to vote for +nine. He has forgotten that the Block Vote becomes the Limited Vote +under the conditions named, and that the Limited Vote allows the +minority a share of representation. Besides, in any case, these +conditions would never arise in a country in a healthy state of +political activity, because then parties would tend more nearly to +equalize each other in strength.</p> + +<p>It has also been objected that a Ministerialist candidate, say, might +stand as an Oppositionist, if the votes of the Opposition candidates +were more split up and it was likely to require less votes for election +in that party. This is a rather fantastic suggestion. The candidate in +question would have to declare himself in favour of a number of things +which he would oppose immediately he was elected. If not, he would have +to openly declare his intention, but that could easily be made illegal. +In any case there would be very little gained, and there is further the +risk that, if defeated, all his votes would count<a name="Page_121" id="Page_121" /> to the Opposition.</p> + +<p>Another possible objection is that too many candidates might stand, +since it is to the interest of each party to get all the support it can. +But candidates are not likely to stand to oblige the party or when there +is no chance of being elected. It is quite possible that, in a country +already split up into numerous groups, the groups would refuse to act +together, and that each group would nominate its own list. This is an +extreme assumption, and certainly would not happen in British countries. +And there would be a constant incentive to the groups to compromise, +since a combination can return its candidates.</p> + +<p>We hope now to have at least established the fact that the organization +of a democracy into two coherent parties—a majority and a minority—is +vitally connected with the electoral machinery. We do not claim that the +method we have proposed will induce a people to vote on true party lines +all at once, for human nature cannot be changed in a day; but we do +confidently assert that it will greatly accelerate that desirable +result, and will tend to give effect to the principles of organization +and responsible leadership.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122" /><a name="CHAPTER_V" id="CHAPTER_V" />CHAPTER V.</h2> + +<p class='center'>HOW THE EVILS OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM WILL BE REMEDIED.</p> + + +<p>From the inception of the representative system it has been usual to +elect representatives in small districts, returning only one or two +members, and the single-membered electorate is now almost universal. In +the early Parliaments, however, elections were not contested as they are +nowadays. It was merely a choice of the most suitable men to represent a +corporate local community. Hence an indirect method of election was +generally resorted to, the final choice being left to a small committee +of the most important men. With the gradual rise of the party system the +conditions entirely changed; and it is important to gain a clear idea of +what is involved in the change.</p> + +<p>In the first stage we have referred to it is not probable that there +were any candidates at all. The posit<a name="Page_123" id="Page_123" />ion of member of Parliament was not +sought after; it was rather thrust upon the man selected as a duty he +owed the community. The choice would usually be unanimous, since there +would be some men whose recognized influence and attainments would mark +them off as most fitted for the position. If there was any difference of +opinion it would be merely as to who was best fitted to represent all, +and therefore there would never be any excluded minority.</p> + +<p>The essential difference in the second stage is that every election is +contested by two organized parties. The choice is now not of men only, +but of measures and of men as well. It is a contest in the first place +within each party as to who is best fitted to represent the party, and +in the second place between the two parties for the support of the +people. The party in a majority secures all the representation; the +party in a minority none. Now, the minority is certainly not represented +by the choice of the majority; on the contrary, its views are exactly +the opposite. Hence the question arises: Is not this exclusion of the +minority an injustice? Does it not amount to disfranchisement? The usual +reply is either that the majority must rule or that the injustice done +in some electorates is balanced in others, so that in the long run rough +justice is obtained.</p> + +<p>As to the first contention, it is the party which has the support of a +majority of the whole people which should rule; and the excluded +minority in some of the electorates belongs to this party. The second +<a name="Page_124" id="Page_124" />practically amounts to the statement that two wrongs make a right.</p> + +<p>A practice prevails in the United States which will illustrate the +position. Each State sends a number of representatives to Congress +proportional to its population, and the division into electorates is +left to the State. By manipulating the electoral boundaries the party +which has a majority in each State is enabled to arrange that the +injustice done to itself is a minimum, and that the injustice done to +the opposing party is a maximum. By this iniquitous practice, which is +known as the gerrymander, the party in a minority in each State is +allowed to get only about one-half or one-quarter of its proper share of +representation. But as the practice is universal in all the States, the +injustice done to a party in some States is balanced in others. Will +those who seek to excuse the injustice done to the minority in each +electorate by the present system of election seriously contend that the +same argument justifies the gerrymander?</p> + +<p>The truth is that the present system has survived the passage from the +first stage of representation into the second, not because it does +justice to both parties, but because it has operated largely to prevent +the formation of more than two parties. It has, therefore, been a means +of giving effect to the central feature of representation, viz.: the +organization of public opinion into two definite lines of policy. But it +is a comparativ<a name="Page_125" id="Page_125" />ely ineffective means, and it no longer suffices to +prevent sectional delegation in any of the democracies we have examined. +Besides, it is accompanied by a series of other evils, which in so far +as they lead to the suppression of responsible leadership, tend to the +degradation of public life. We propose now to consider the effect of the +reform in remedying these defects of the present system.</p> + +<p><b>Parties Not Represented in the Legislature in the Same Proportion as in +the Country.</b>—Representation under the present system is purely +arbitrary; the amount which each party secures is a matter of chance. If +a party with a majority in the whole country has a majority in each of +the electorates it will secure all the representation. On the other +hand, if it splits up its votes in each electorate, or even only in +those electorates where it has a majority, it may secure none at all. +Theoretically, then, any result is possible. The argument would lose its +force, however, if in practice the result usually came out about right. +But this seldom happens, and, speaking generally, two cases may be +distinguished: first, when parties are nearly equal, the minority is +almost as likely as the majority to return a majority of the +representatives, thus defeating the principle of majority rule; and, +second, when one party has a substantial majority, it generally sweeps +the board and annihilates the minority. A few examples will illustrate +these facts.</p> + +<p>The 189<a name="Page_126" id="Page_126" />5 election for the Imperial Parliament is analyzed by Sir John +Lubbock in the <i>Proportional Representation Review</i>. He shows that out +of 481 contested seats, the Liberals, with 1,800,000 votes were +entitled to 242, and the Conservatives and Liberal Unionists, with +1,775,000 to 239, a majority of three seats for the Liberals. But the +Conservatives and Unionists actually returned 279, and the Liberals only +202, a majority of 77 seats. The Conservatives and Unionists obtained +also a majority of 75 of the uncontested seats, giving them a total +majority of 152, instead of the 72 to which they were entitled.</p> + +<p>Recent elections for the United States Congress are shown by Professor +Commons to present striking inequalities. At the election for the 51st +Congress, 1888, the Republicans polled 5,348,379, and the Democrats +5,502,581. But the Republican minority actually secured 164 seats +against 161, a majority of 3, and were enabled to carry the McKinley +tariff law. For the 52nd Congress, 1890, the Republicans, with 4,217,266 +votes, only elected 88, while the Democrats, with 4,974,450 votes, +elected 235, and the Populists, with 354,217 votes, elected 9 +Congressmen. The Democratic majority should have been only 2, instead of +138. Compared with the 51st Congress, their proportion of the popular +vote increased only 1 per cent., but their proportion of the +representatives increased 21 per cent. It required 47,923 votes to elect +a Republican, 44,276 to elect a Populist, and only 21,078 to elect a +Democrat.<a name="Page_127" id="Page_127" /></p> + +<p>To come nearer home, did not Mr. Reid return to power at the 1898 +election in New South Wales although the Opposition polled a majority of +15,000 against him? The last election in Victoria illustrates nothing so +much as the chaotic state of parties, brought about by newspaper +influence in promoting false lines of division. No less than 30 seats, +representing 81,857 votes, were contested only by candidates who +professed to be Ministerialists of various shades. Of 52 seats contested +by Ministerial and Opposition candidates, each party secured 26; but the +Ministerialists paid 59,255 votes for their seats as against 44,327 cast +for the Opposition. 13 seats were uncontested, 9 Ministerial and 4 +Opposition, giving a total of 65 members to the Ministerial party and 30 +members to the Opposition.</p> + +<p>The arbitrary and haphazard character of these results is obvious. It +would be entirely removed by the reform. Every election would reflect +the true feeling of the country; the right of the majority to rule would +be rendered certain, and the right of the minority to a fair hearing +would be assured. Taking the country as a whole, the Ministerialists +would pay almost exactly the same number of votes for each seat as the +Opposition. In each separate electorate the accuracy would not be so +great, but the rectification of even this slight and unavoidable +inequality would, instead of being arbitrary, be subject to the laws of +chance.<a name="Page_128" id="Page_128" /></p> + +<p><b>Ineffective Votes.</b>—Under the present system, all votes cast for +rejected candidates are ineffective; therefore nearly one-half of the +electors have no voice in the Government. A Liberal elector may live in +a Conservative constituency all his life without having the opportunity +to cast an effective vote. The evil of popular indifference is largely +to be explained by this fact. It is no answer to say that it affects +both parties equally. The trouble is that nearly one-half of the +electors of each party have no influence in deciding who are to +represent the party, and therefore do not help to frame its policy.</p> + +<p>This evil would also be entirely removed. Every vote cast would count to +one or the other party. It is not necessary that every vote should be +counted to some one candidate, as the advocates of the Hare system +claim. Votes given to rejected candidates would be in effect just as +much transferred to the successful candidates as by the Hare system. +Moreover, it is an important gain that the candidates of each party +would be ranged in order of favour, as the relative position of the +candidates would be an index of the feeling of each electorate, not only +as regards men but also as regards measures. Therefore, even the votes +given to rejected candidates would affect the framing of the party +policy, and show the progress of public opinion.</p> + +<p><b>Uncontes<a name="Page_129" id="Page_129" />ted Seats.</b>—At the 1895 election for the Imperial Parliament +no less than 189 seats out of 670 were uncontested. Thus one-quarter of +the people had no opportunity of expressing any opinion. In Australia +the proportion is often quite as large. The present Legislative Council +of Victoria is an extreme instance. One-third of the Council retires +every three years; and at the last election not a single seat was +contested. Only 4 out of the 48 sitting members have had to contest +election. Under these circumstances the holding of an election at all +becomes a farce. No doubt it is very convenient for the favoured +individuals; but as the primary object of elections is the ascertainment +of public opinion, it is very desirable that every seat should be +contested.</p> + +<p>The chief cause of this evil is that when one party is strong in an +electorate it is hopeless for the minority to contest it, unless the +majority nominates more than one candidate. On the other hand, the +majority knows that if it does split its votes the minority will +probably win the seat. The result is that the sitting member has a great +advantage, and is often tolerated even though he is acceptable to only a +minority of his own party.</p> + +<p>With the reform each electorate would become the scene of a contest +between the two parties for their proportional share of representation. +It is very unlikely, indeed, that in any electorate no more candidates +would be nominated than are required to be elected.<a name="Page_130" id="Page_130" /></p> + +<p><b>Limitation of Choice.</b>—Even when seats are contested, the elector's +choice is very limited under the present system. Wherever party +government is strong, each party nominates only one candidate, owing to +the danger of splitting up its votes and so losing the seat. The elector +has then practically no choice. He may disapprove of the candidate +standing for his own party, but the only alternative is to stultify +himself by supporting the opposing candidate. If in disgust he abstains +from voting altogether, it is the same as giving each candidate half his +vote. Even when two or three candidates of his own party are nominated, +and he supports the one whose views coincide most closely with his own, +he can exert very little direct influence on the party policy. Besides, +he will often think it wise to support the strongest candidate rather +than the one he favours most.</p> + +<p>These considerations show what a very imperfect instrument the present +system is for expressing public opinion. The test which should be +applied to any system of election is whether it allows each elector to +express his opinion on general policy, and from this point of view the +present system fails lamentably; all opinion which does not run in the +direct channel of party is excluded. Mr. Bryce has fixed on this defect +as the weak point of the party system, but the fault really lies in the +limitation of choice connected with the present system of election. It +is quite true that "in every countr<a name="Page_131" id="Page_131" />y voting for a man is an inadequate +way of expressing one's views of policy, because the candidate is sure +to differ in one or more questions from many of those who belong to the +party."<a name="FNanchor_4" href="#Footnote_4">[4]</a> But if, in the first place, the incentive to limit the number +of candidates be removed and the field of choice widened, and if, in the +second place, each elector be allowed to vote for several candidates +instead of one only, the defect would be remedied. Now, the reform makes +both these provisions, and the importance of the improvement can hardly +be overrated. It means, first, that every elector will be not only +allowed, but also induced, to express his opinion on general policy. He +may give his votes to candidates either for their general views or for +some particular view; or, if he lays less stress on measures than on +men, he may give them to men of high character or of great +administrative ability. It means, secondly, that every section of +opinion composing each party will be fairly represented, and that none +will be excluded, because the candidates of each party will compete +among themselves for the support of all sections, in order to decide +those most in general favour. Hence every section will directly help to +frame and influence the party policy, and there will be not the +slightest excuse for independent action outside the two main parties. In +the third place, it means the substitution of individual responsibility +for the corporate responsibility of parties, since the electors <a name="Page_132" id="Page_132" />will +have the power to reject those who wish to modify party action in any +direction contrary to the general wish. It means, finally, that every +elector's opinion, as expressed by his vote, will have equal influence +in deciding the direction of party action.</p> + +<p><b>Control of Nominations.</b>—There is a constant incentive with the +present system of election to limit the number of candidates to two, one +representing each party. For if either party splits up its votes on more +than one candidate it will risk losing the seat. But the necessity to +limit the candidates involves some control of the nominations, and this +is perhaps the worst feature of the system. It means that, instead of +the electors being allowed to select their representative, he is chosen +for them by some irresponsible body. We have seen how in the United +States the nominating system is the source of the power of the "boss" +and the "machine;" and the same result is only a matter of time in +British countries. The registration of voters is not yet conducted in +the same rigid manner as in America, nor is the farce of holding a +primary election gone through; but whether the control be exercised by a +political organization, a newspaper, a local committee, or a secret +society, the principle is the same. Mr. Bryce has noticed the rapid +change in the practice of England on this point:—"As late as the +general elections of 1868 and 1874 nearly all candidates offered +themselves to the constituency, though some<a name="Page_133" id="Page_133" /> professed to do so in +pursuance of requisitions emanating from the electors. In 1880 many—I +think most—Liberal candidates in boroughs and some in counties were +chosen by the local party associations, and appealed to the Liberal +electors on the ground of having been so chosen. In 1885, and again in +1892, all, or nearly all, new Liberal candidates were so chosen, and a +man offering himself against the nominee of the association was +denounced as an interloper and traitor to the party. The same process +has been going on in the Tory party, though more slowly. The influence +of the locally wealthy, and also that of the central party office, is +somewhat greater among the Tories, but in course of time choice by +representative associations will doubtless become the rule."<a name="FNanchor_5" href="#Footnote_5">[5]</a> Is it to +be expected that this power will not be abused as in America? The +trouble is that no association can represent all the party electors, and +that the representative becomes responsible to the managers of the +association, to whom he really owes his election. Any control of this +kind is fatal to the principle of responsible leadership. And yet the +only alternative with the present method of election is the break-up of +the party system. This is the dilemma in which all modern democracies +are placed. The evil will be completely obviated by the reform. Instead +of limiting the candidates, it will be to the advantage of each party to +induce the strongest and most popular can<a name="Page_134" id="Page_134" />didates to stand on its behalf, +since the number of seats it will obtain depends only on the aggregate +votes polled by all the candidates. With individual candidature there +can be no "machine" control of nominations. All are free to appeal +directly to the people.</p> + +<p><b>Localization of Politics.</b>—The local delegate is unfortunately the +prevailing type of Australian politician. The value of a member is too +often measured by the services he renders to his constituents +individually or the amount of money he can get the Government to spend +in his constituency. Hence the nefarious practice of log-rolling in +Parliament. Is it any wonder that some of the colonies promise to rival +France in the proportion of unreproductive works constructed out of loan +money?</p> + +<p>How few of our members approach the ideal expressed by Edmund Burke in +his address to the electors of Bristol:—"Parliament is not a congress +of ambassadors from different and hostile interests, which interests +each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and +advocates; but Parliament is a deliberative assembly of our nation, with +one interest—that of the whole—where not local purposes, not local +prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the +general reason of the whole. You choose a member, indeed, but when you +have chosen him he is not a member of Bristol, but he is a member of +Parliament." It must be confessed, however, that Bur<a name="Page_135" id="Page_135" />ke's ideal is rather +exalted; it is the duty of a member to make known the requirements of +his district. It is the ministry which is specially charged with +looking after the interest of the whole and of resisting illegitimate +demands. But it cannot do so if its position is so insecure that it must +purchase the support of the "parish pump" politician.</p> + +<p>The only way to nationalize politics is to ensure that every electorate +shall be contested on national issues by organized parties, and that +every locality shall be represented on both parties. The proposed system +will provide this remedy. In enlarged electorates each party will take +good care that its candidates are men of local influence in the most +important divisions of the electorate; therefore, sectional and local +interests will be represented, but they will be subordinated to the +interests of the whole electorate; and where there are a few large +divisions the interests of each will more nearly coincide with national +interests than where there are a large number of small divisions. +Besides, log-rolling will not be so easy between groups of +representatives as among single representatives.</p> + +<p><b>Incentive to Bribery and Corruption.</b>—We now come to a class of evils +which to a large extent result from the fact that a few votes in each +electorate decide whether a party gets all the representation or none at +all. Candidates are impelled, in order to gain support from every +faction, to acts degrading to themselves and destruct<a name="Page_136" id="Page_136" />ive to the moral +tone of the people. Foremost among these evils is the great incentive to +bribery and corruption; it is manifested not only in direct expenditure +at the elections, but also in promises of patronage and class +advantages. Direct bribery is perhaps worst in America; Professor M. +Cook states, in a paper on "The Alarming Proportion of Venal Voters" in +the <i>Forum</i> for September, 1892, that in twenty-one towns of Connecticut +16 per cent, of the voters are venal. As Professor Commons remarks:—"It +is plain that the bribable voters themselves are adequate to hold the +balance of power between the parties. The single-membered district, +therefore, places a magnificent premium upon bribery." In England the +<i>Corrupt Practices Act</i> has done immense good: nothing reflects so much +honour on the Imperial Parliament as the voluntary transference of the +duty of deciding cases to the judiciary. In Australia this much-needed +reform has not yet been introduced, and direct bribery prevails to a +much larger extent than would be supposed from the number of cases +investigated. Members of Parliament are naturally loth to convict one of +their own number, and the knowledge of this fact prevents petitions +being lodged.</p> + +<p>The mere existence of secret bribery is bad enough, but a greater danger +is that acts of indirect bribery are openly practised, with the tacit +approval of electors. "There have been instances," says Mr. Lecky, in +his "Demo<a name="Page_137" id="Page_137" />cracy and Liberty," "in which the political votes of the police +force, of the P.O. officials, of the civil service clerks have been +avowedly marshalled for the purpose of obtaining particular class +advantages—a disintegrated majority is strongly tempted to conciliate +every detached group of votes." In Australia this has become a regular +practice; and a still worse feature is that Members of Parliament have +free access to public departments to promote class and local interests. +Class legislation is frequently brought forward on the eve of an +election with the sole object of influencing votes. These conditions +favour the wire-pullers and mere self-seekers, and, in so far as they +prevent the electors from voting on the political views and personal +merits of the candidates, they are inimical to the public interests. Mr. +Lecky has pointed out that a certain amount of moral compromise is +necessary in public life, and that a politician may indulge in +popularity-hunting from honourable public motives; the danger is that +unworthy politicians may screen themselves under shelter of this excuse.</p> + +<p>We do not claim that the proposed system would abolish corruption, but +we are justified in hoping that it would mitigate it very much. Even if +the venal vote still held the balance of power between parties, parties +are not so easily corrupted as individuals. But the most important gain +is that it could only exert an influence proportional to its numbers; it +could not decide whether a party gets all the representation or none at +<a name="Page_138" id="Page_138" />all, as at present. In most cases it would be doubtful if it would +affect a single candidate. Consider, again, the case of individual +candidates of the same party; any candidate resorting to bribery in +order to increase his chance of election would do so partly at the +expense of the other candidates of his own party, who would immediately +denounce him. Instead of being forced to conciliate selfish factions, +the candidates would be free to appeal for the support of the unselfish +sections.</p> + +<p><b>Continual Change in Electoral Boundaries.</b>—The irregular growth of +population necessitates a periodical revision of the electoral +boundaries of single-membered electorates. Owing to the influence of +vested interests, this is generally effected in an arbitrary manner; and +the glaring anomalies only are rectified. We have in Victoria at the +present day some country electorates with 6,000 electors on the rolls +and others with only 1,500. An elector in the latter has four times the +voting power of an elector in the former. The process of alteration of +the boundaries offers great temptation to unfairness; and in American +politics the opportunity is taken full advantage of by a practice which +has received the name of the gerrymander. In his work on "Proportional +Representation" Professor Commons writes:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>It is difficult to express the opprobrium rightly belonging to so + iniquitous a practice as the gerrymander; but its enormity is not + appreciated, just as brutal prize-fighting is not reprobated + providing it be fought according to the rules. Both political + parties practise it, and neither can cond<a name="Page_139" id="Page_139" />emn the other. They simply + do what is natural: make the most of their opportunities as far as + permitted by the constitution and system under which both are + working. The gerrymander is not produced by the iniquity of + parties, it is the outcome of the district system. If + representatives are elected in this way there must be some public + authority for outlining the districts. And who shall be the judge + to say where the line shall be drawn? Exact equality is impossible, + and who shall set the limit beyond which inequality shall not be + pressed? Every apportionment act that has been passed in this or + any other country has involved inequality; and it would be absurd + to ask a political party to pass such an act and give the advantage + of the inequality to the opposite party. Consequently, every + apportionment act involves more or less of the gerrymander. The + gerrymander is simply such a thoughtful construction of districts + as will economize the votes of the party in power by giving it + small majorities in a large number of districts, and coop up the + opposing party with overwhelming majorities in a large number of + districts. This may involve a very distortionate and uncomely + "scientific" boundary, and the joining together of distant and + unrelated localities into a single district; such was the case in + the famous original act of Governor Gerry, of Massachusetts, whence + the practice obtained its amphibian name.<a name="FNanchor_6" href="#Footnote_6">[6]</a> But it is not always + necessary that districts be cut into distortionate shapes in order + to accomplish these unjust results. (pp. 49, 50.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>He illustrates a gerrymander which actually made one Democratic vote +equal to five Republican votes. We have quoted this description of the +methods of the gerrymander not so much because the evil has attained any +magnitude in Australia as because it offers a warning of the probable +result of adopting the single-membered district system for our Federal +<a name="Page_140" id="Page_140" />legislature.</p> + +<p>With enlarged or grouped electorates the periodical revision of +boundaries would be entirely obviated, because the size of the +electorate may be kept constant, and the number of representatives +varied. Under such a system all unfairness would disappear, and the +gerrymander would be impossible. Representation would automatically +<a name="Page_141" id="Page_141" />follow the movements of population.</p> + +<p>FOOTNOTES:</p> + +<p><a name="Footnote_4" href="#FNanchor_4">[4]</a> Bryce, "The American Commonwealth," vol ii, p 325</p> + +<p><a name="Footnote_5" href="#FNanchor_5">[5]</a> Bryce, "The American Commonwealth," vol. ii., note on p. 81.</p> + +<p><a name="Footnote_6" href="#FNanchor_6">[6]</a> Governor Gerry contrived an electorate which resembled a salamander +in shape.</p> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VI" id="CHAPTER_VI" />CHAPTER VI.</h2> + +<p class='center'>THE HARE SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL DELEGATION.</p> + + +<p>The single transferable vote, generally known as the Hare system, was +first invented by a Danish statesman, M. Andrae, and was used for the +election of a portion of the "Rigsraad" in 1855. In 1857 Mr. Thomas +Hare, barrister-at-law, published it independently in England in a +pamphlet on "The Machinery of Representation." This formed the basis of +the scheme elaborated in his "Election of Representatives," which +appeared in 1859.</p> + +<p>He proposed to abolish all geographical boundaries by constituting the +whole of the United Kingdom one electorate for the return of the 654 +members of the House of Commons. Each member was to be elected by an +equal unanimous number of electors. The method of election was therefore +so contrived as to allow the electors to group themselves into 654 +constituencies, each group bound only by the tie of voluntary +<a name="Page_142" id="Page_142" />association, and gathered from every corner of the Kingdom. The total +number of votes cast (about a million) was to be divided by 654, and the +quotient, say about 1,500, would be the quota or number of votes +required to elect a member. But some of the candidates would naturally +receive more votes than the quota, and a great many more would receive +less. How were all the votes to be equally divided among 654 members so +that each should secure exactly the quota? The single transferable vote +was proposed to attain this result. Each elector's vote was to count for +one candidate only, but he was allowed to say in advance to whom he +would wish his vote transferred in case it could not be used for his +first choice. Each ballot paper was, therefore, to contain the names of +a number of candidates in order of preference—1, 2, 3, &c. Then all the +candidates having more than a quota of first choices were to have the +surplus votes taken from them and transferred to the second choice on +the papers, or if the second choice already had enough votes, to the +third choice, and so on. When all the surpluses were distributed a +certain number of members would be declared elected, each with a quota +of votes. The candidates who had received the least amount of support +were then to be gradually eliminated. The lowest candidate would be +first rejected, and his votes transferred to the next available +preference on his ballot papers; then the next lowest w<a name="Page_143" id="Page_143" />ould be rejected, +and so on till all the votes were equally distributed among the 654 +members. Such was the Hare system as propounded by its author. The +electors were to divide themselves into voluntary groups; then the +groups which were too large were to be cut down by transferring the +surplus votes, and the smaller groups were to be excluded and the votes +also transferred until the groups were reduced to 654 equal +constituencies. These two processes, transferring surplus votes and +transferring votes from excluded candidates, are the main features of +the system. Mr. Hare's rules for carrying them out are drawn up in the +form of a proposed electoral law, and in the different editions of his +work the clauses vary somewhat. They are also complicated by an +impossible attempt to retain the local nomenclature of members. As +regards surplus votes it was provided that the ballot papers which had +the most preferences expressed should be transferred; still a good deal +was left to chance or to the sweet will of the returning officer, and +this has always been admitted as a serious objection. The process of +elimination is still more unsatisfactory. Mr. Hare was from the first +strongly opposed to the elimination of the candidate who had least first +preferences, and he therefore proposed that, in order to decide which +candidate had least support, all expressed preferences should be +counted. This involved such enormous complication that in the 1861 +edition of his work <a name="Page_144" id="Page_144" />he abandoned the process of elimination altogether +in favour of a process of selection. He then proposed to distribute +surplus votes only, and to elect the highest of the remainder, +regardless of the fact that they had less than a quota. He then +wrote:—"The reduction of the number of candidates remaining at this +stage of the election may be effected by taking out the names of all +those who have the smallest number of actual votes—that is, who are +named at the <i>head</i> of the smallest number of voting papers, and +appropriating each vote to the candidate standing <i>next</i> in order on +each paper. This process would be so arbitrary and inequitable in its +operation as to be intolerable. It might have the effect of cancelling +step by step more votes given to one candidate than would be sufficient +to return another.... Such a process disregards the legitimate rights +both of electors and of candidates." But the process of selection was +not proportional representation at all, being practically equivalent to +a single untransferable vote, and Mr. Hare finally adopted, in spite of +its defects, the "arbitrary and inequitable" process of elimination in +his last edition in 1873. And all his recent disciples have been forced +to do the same, because nothing better is known.</p> + +<p>Mr. Hare's scheme has ceased to be of any practical interest, since it +is now generally admitted that electorates should not return more than +ten or twenty members. M<a name="Page_145" id="Page_145" />oreover, it is admitted that the electors would +group themselves in very undesirable ways, and not as Mr. Hare expected. +And yet the only effect of limiting the size of the electorates is to +reduce the number of undesirable ways in which electors might group +themselves. Let us briefly note the different proposals which have been +made.</p> + +<p><b>1. Sir John Lubbock's Method.</b>—In his work on "Representation," Sir +John Lubbock says:—"The full advantage of the single transferable vote +would require a system of large constituencies returning three or five +members each, thus securing a true representation of opinion." +Three-seat electorates are, however, too small to secure accurate +proportional representation; with parties evenly balanced, for instance, +one must secure twice as much representation as the other.</p> + +<p>The following rules are given to explain the working of the system:—</p> + +<p>(1) Each voter shall have one vote, but may vote in the alternative for +as many of the candidates as he pleases by writing the figures 1, 2, 3, +etc, opposite the names of those candidates in the order of his +preference.</p> + +<p class='center'>COUNTING VOTES.</p> + +<p>(2) The ballot papers, having been all mixed, shall be drawn out in +succession and stamped with numbers so that no two shall bear the same +number.</p> + +<p>(3) The number obtained by dividing the whole number of good ballot +papers tendered at the election by the number of members to be elected +plus one, and increasing the quotient (or where it is fractional the +<a name="Page_146" id="Page_146" />integral part of the quotient) by one, shall be called the quota.</p> + +<p>(4) Every candidate who has a number of first votes equal to or greater +than the quota shall be declared elected, and so many of the ballot +papers containing those votes as shall be equal in number to the quota +(being those stamped with the lowest numerals) shall be set aside as of +no further use. On all ballot papers the name of the elected candidate +shall be deemed to be cancelled, with the effect of raising by so much +in the order of preference all votes given to other candidates after +him. This process shall be repeated until no candidate has more than a +quota of first votes or votes deemed first.</p> + +<p>(5) Then the candidate or candidates having the fewest first votes, or +votes deemed first, shall be declared not to be elected, with the effect +of raising by so much in the order of preference all votes given to +candidates after him or them, and rule 4 shall be again applied if +possible.</p> + +<p>(6) When by successive applications of rules 4 and 5 the number of +candidates is reduced to the number of members remaining to be elected, +the remaining candidates shall be declared elected.</p> + +<p>Objection is commonly taken to this method on account of the element of +chance involved in the distribution of surplus votes. Suppose the quota +to be 1,000, and a candidate to receive 1,100 votes, t<a name="Page_147" id="Page_147" />he 100 votes to be +transferred would be those stamped with the highest numerals. But if the +hundred stamped with the lowest numerals or any other hundred had been +taken the second choices would be different.</p> + +<p>Strictly speaking, however, this is not a chance selection—it is an +arbitrary selection. The returning officer must transfer certain +definite papers; if he were allowed to make a chance selection it would +be in his power to favour some of the candidates.</p> + +<p>Sir John Lubbock points out that the element of chance might be +eliminated by distributing the second votes proportionally to the second +choices on the whole 1,100 papers, and that it might be desirable to +leave any candidate the right to claim that this should be done if he +thought it worth while.</p> + +<p><b>2.—The Hare-Clark Method.</b>—The Hare system has been in actual use in +Tasmania for the last two elections. It is applied only in a six-seat +electorate at Hobart and a four-seat electorate at Launceston. The rules +for distributing surplus votes proportionally were drawn up by Mr. A.I. +Clark, late Attorney-General. The problem is not so simple as it appears +at first sight. There is no difficulty with a surplus on the first +count; it is when surpluses are created in subsequent counts by +transferred votes that the conditions become complicated. Mr. Clark +adopts a rule that in the latter case the transferred papers only are to +be taken into account in deciding the proportional distribution of the +surplus. <a name="Page_148" id="Page_148" />Suppose, as before, the quota to be 1,000 votes, and a +candidate to have 1,100 votes, 550 of which are marked in the second +place to one of the other candidates. Then the latter is entitled to 50 +of the surplus votes, and a chance selection is made of the 550 papers. +The element of chance still remains, therefore, if this surplus +contributes to a fresh surplus.</p> + +<p><b>3.—The Droop-Gregory Method.</b>—This method, advocated by Professor +Nanson, of the Melbourne University, is claimed to entirely eliminate +the element of chance. The Gregory plan of transferring surplus votes is +defined as a fractional method. If a candidate needs only nine-tenths of +his votes to make up his quota, instead of distributing the surplus of +one-tenth of the papers all the papers are distributed with one-tenth of +their value. Reverting to our former example, if a candidate is marked +second on 550 out of 1,100 votes, the quota being 1,000 and the surplus +100, then instead of selecting 50 out of the 550 papers, the whole of +them would be transferred in a packet, the value of the packet being 50 +votes, or, as Professor Nanson prefers to put it, the value of each +paper in the packet being one-eleventh of a vote. Should this packet +contribute to a new surplus the third choices on the whole of the papers +are available as a basis for the redistribution. The packet would be +divided into smaller packets, and each assigned its reduced value. It +might here be pointed out that the use of fractions is quite +unneces<a name="Page_149" id="Page_149" />sary, the value of each packet in votes being all that is +required, and that the-same process may be used with the Hare-Clark +method to avoid the chance selection of papers. The only real +difference is this: that when a surplus is created by transferred votes +Mr. Clark distributes it by reference to the next preference on all the +transferred papers, and Professor Nanson by reference to the last packet +of transferred papers only—the packet which raises the candidate above +the quota.</p> + +<p>Which of these methods is correct? Should we select the surplus from all +votes, original and transferred, as Sir John Lubbock proposes; from all +transferred votes only, with Mr. Clark; or from the last packet only of +transferred votes, with Professor Nanson? Consider a group of electors +having somewhat more than a quota of votes at its disposal. If it +nominates one candidate only every one of the electors will have a voice +in the distribution of the surplus, but if it puts up three candidates, +two of whom are excluded and the third elected, Mr. Clark would allow +those who supported the two excluded candidates to decide the +distribution of the surplus, and Professor Nanson only those who +supported the last candidate excluded. Both are clearly wrong, for the +only rational view to take is that when a candidate is excluded it is +the same as if he had never been nominated and the transferred votes had +formed part of the original votes of those to whom they are transferred. +Whenever a <a name="Page_150" id="Page_150" />surplus is created it should therefore be distributed by +reference to all votes, original and transferred. As regards these +surpluses, Mr. Clark and Professor Nanson have adopted an arbitrary +basis, which is no more than Sir John Lubbock has done; and they have +therefore eliminated the element of chance only for surpluses on the +first count. It may be asked, Why cannot all surpluses be distributed by +reference to all the papers, if that is the correct method? The answer +is that the complication involved is enormous. Yet this was the plan +first advocated by Professor Nanson, who wrote, in reply to a definite +inquiry how the Gregory principle was applied:—"I explain by an +example. A has 2,000 votes, the quota being 1,000. A then requires only +half the value of each vote cast for him. Each paper cast for him is +then stamped as having lost one-half of its value, and the whole of A's +papers are then transferred with diminished value to the second name +(unelected, of course). The same principle applies all through. Whenever +anyone has a surplus all the papers are passed to the next man with +diminished value." Now, the effect of this extraordinary proposal would +be that the whole of the papers would have to be kept in circulation +till the last candidate was elected, with diminishing compound +fractional values. In a ten-seat electorate a large proportion would +pass through several transfers, and would towards the end of the count +have such a ridiculously small f<a name="Page_151" id="Page_151" />ractional value that it would take +several millions of the ballot-papers to make a single vote! It is no +wonder that this method was abandoned when the complications to which +it would lead were realized.</p> + +<p>A simple method of avoiding this complexity would be to treat +transferred surplus papers as if the preferences were exhausted. It must +be remembered that in all transfers a certain number of papers are lost +owing to the preferences being exhausted, and the additional loss would +be small. Thus at the first Hobart election 206 votes were wasted, and +this number would have been increased by two only. Every surplus would +then be transferred by reference to the next choice, wherever expressed, +on both original papers and papers transferred from excluded candidates.</p> + +<p>It might be provided, however, for greater accuracy that all papers +contributing to surpluses on the first count only should be transferred +in packets. Should these contribute to a new surplus, it should be +divided into two parts, proportional to (1) original votes and votes +transferred from excluded candidates, and (2) the value of the packet in +votes. Each part would then be distributed proportionally to the next +available preferences wherever expressed. To divide the packets into +sub-packets is a useless complication. The loss involved in neglecting +them would usually be less than one-thousandth part of the loss due to +exhausted papers.<a name="Page_152" id="Page_152" /></p> + +<p>Having now dealt with the main features of the different variations of +the Hare system, we may proceed to consider some details which are +common to all of them. A difference of opinion exists, however, as +regards the quota. Sir John Lubbock and Professor Nanson advocate the +Droop quota, which we have shown to be a mathematical error; Miss Spence +and Mr. Clark use the correct quota.</p> + +<p><b>The Wrong Candidates are Liable to be Elected.</b>—The Hare system may be +criticised from two points of view; first, as applied to the conditions +prevailing when it is introduced, and, secondly, as regards the new +conditions it would bring about. Its advocates confine themselves to the +first point of view, and invariably use illustrations based on the +existence of parties.</p> + +<p>We readily grant that if the electors vote on party lines, and transfer +their votes within the party as assumed, the Hare system would give +proportional representation to the parties; but even then it would +sacrifice the interests of individual candidates, for it affords no +guarantee that the right candidates will be elected. The constant +tendency is that favourites of factions within the party will be +preferred to general favourites. This at the same time destroys party +cohesion, and tends to split up parties. Nor can this result be wondered +at, since the very foundation of the system is the separate +representation of a number of sections.</p> + +<p>One reason why<a name="Page_153" id="Page_153" /> the wrong candidates are liable to be elected is that the +electors will not record their honest preferences if the one vote only +is effective. They will give their vote to the candidate who is thought +to need it most, and the best men will go to the wall because they are +thought to be safe. Mr. R.M. Johnston, Government Statistician of +Tasmania, confirms this view when he declares—"The aggregate of all +counts, whether effective or not, would seem to be the truer index of +the general favour in which each candidate stands, because the numbers +polled at the first count may be greatly disturbed by the action of +those who are interested in the success of two or more favourites who +may be pretty well assured of success, but whose order of preference +might by some be altered if sudden rumour suggested fears for any one of +the favoured group. This accidental action would tend to conceal the +true exact measure of favour in the first count." If this statement +means anything it is that the three preferences which are required to be +expressed should have been all counted as effective votes at the Hobart +election instead of one only; and this is exactly what we advocate. It +is also admitted that when two candidates ran together at the first +Launceston election the more popular candidate was defeated; and again +the <i>Argus</i> correspondent writes of the recent Hobart election:—"The +defeat of Mr. Nicholls was doubtless due to the fact of his supporters' +over-confidence—nothing else explains it. Many people gave him No. 2 +votes who would have given him No. 1 votes had they not felt assured of +<a name="Page_154" id="Page_154" />his success."</p> + +<p>A second reason why the wrong candidates are liable to be elected is +that the process of elimination adopted by all the Hare methods has no +mathematical justification. The candidate who is first excluded has one +preference only taken account of, while others have many preferences +given effect to. We have shown that this glaring injustice was +recognized by Mr. Hare, and only adopted as a last resort. Professor +Nanson admits that "the process of elimination which has been adopted by +all the exponents of Hare's system is not satisfactory," and adds—"I do +not know a scientific solution of the difficulty." To bring home the +inequity of the process, consider a party which nominates six +candidates, A, B, C, D, E, and F, and whose numbers entitle it to three +seats, and suppose the electors to vote in the proportions and order +shown below on the first count.</p> + + +<table border='0' cellspacing="0" cellpadding="10"> + + <tr align="center"> + <th></th> + <th>FIRST<br />COUNT.</th> + <th>SECOND<br />COUNT.</th> + <th>THIRD<br />COUNT.</th> + <th>FOURTH<br />COUNT.</th> + </tr> + <tr align="center"> + <td>7-vote</td> + <td>ADEFBC</td> + <td>ADEBC</td> + <td>AEBC</td> + <td>ABC</td> + </tr> + <tr align="center"> + <td>6-vote</td> + <td>EFDACB</td> + <td>EDACB</td> + <td>EACB</td> + <td>ACB</td> + </tr> + <tr align="center"> + <td>5-vote</td> + <td>CEBDFA</td> + <td>CEBDA</td> + <td>CEBA</td> + <td>CBA</td> + </tr> + <tr align="center"> + <td>4-vote</td> + <td>BDFACE</td> + <td>BDACE</td> + <td>BACE</td> + <td>BAC</td> + </tr> + <tr align="center"> + <td>4-vote</td> + <td>DCEFBA</td> + <td>DCEBA</td> + <td>CEBA</td> + <td>CBA</td> + </tr> + <tr align="center"> + <td>3-vote</td> + <td>FBAECD</td> + <td>BAECD</td> + <td>BAEC</td> + <td>BAC</td> + </tr> + +</table> + +<p>It will be noted that F, having fewest first votes, is eliminated <a name="Page_155" id="Page_155" />from +the second count, D from the third count, and E from the fourth. A has +then 13 votes, B 7, and C 9. If the quota be 9 votes, A's surplus would +be passed on to B, and A, B, and C would be declared elected. But D, E, +and F are the candidates most in general favour, and ought to have been +elected. For if any one of the rejected candidates be compared with any +one of the successful candidates it will be found that in every case the +rejected candidate is higher in order of favour on a majority of the +papers. Again, if the Block Vote be applied, by counting three effective +votes, the result would be—A 10 votes, B 12, C 9, D 21, E 22, and F 13. +D, E, and F would therefore be elected. Thus we see that A, B, and C, +the favourites of sections within the party, are elected, and D, E, and +F, the candidates most in general favour—those who represent a +compromise among the sections—are rejected.</p> + +<p>In practice, then, the Hare system discourages compromise among parties, +and among sections of parties; and therefore tends to obliterate party +lines. This has already happened in Tasmania, where all experience goes +to show that the Hare system is equivalent to compulsory plumping. In +every election the result would have been exactly the same if each +elector voted for one candidate only. The theory that it does not matter +how many candidates stand for each party, since votes will be +transferred within the party, has been completely disproved. Votes are +actually transferre<a name="Page_156" id="Page_156" />d almost indiscriminately. The candidates have not +been slow to grasp this fact, and at the last election handbills were +distributed giving "explicit reasons why the electors should give their +No. 1 to Mr. So-and-so, and their No. 2 to any other person they +chose."<a name="FNanchor_7" href="#Footnote_7">[7]</a> Three out of every four first preferences are found to be +effective, but only one out of every five second preferences, and one +out of fifty third preferences. The first preferences, therefore, decide +the election.</p> + +<p>The actual result is that, in the long run, the Hare system is +practically the same as the single untransferable vote. The whole of the +elaborate machinery for recording preferences and transferring votes +might just as well be entirely dispensed with. The "automatic +organization" which it was to provide exists only in the calculations of +mathematicians.</p> + +<p><b>A Number of Votes are Wasted.</b>—It is claimed for the Hare system that +every vote cast is effective, because it counts for some one candidate. +But unless every elector places all the candidates in order of +preference some votes are wasted because the preferences become +exhausted.</p> + +<p>When a paper to be transferred has no further available preferences +expressed it is lost. In order to reduce this waste, a vote is held to +be informal in the six-seat electorate at Hobart unless at least three +preferences are given. Notwithstanding this, the number of such votes +wasted was 7 per cent, at the first election and 10 per cent, at the +second.<a name="Page_157" id="Page_157" /></p> + +<p>The effect of this waste is that some of the candidates are elected +with less than the quota. At the last Hobart election only three out of +six members were elected on full quotas, and at Launceston only one out +of four. The result is to favour small, compact minorities, and to lead +sections to scheme to get representation on the lowest possible terms.</p> + +<p>The Droop quota, being smaller than the Tasmanian quota, would have the +effect of electing more members on full quotas, and it is often +recommended on that account. Indeed, Professor Nanson declares:—"In no +circumstances is any candidate elected on less than a quota of votes. +The seats for which a quota has not been obtained are filled one after +the other, each by a candidate elected by an absolute majority of the +whole of the voters. For the seats to be filled in this way all +candidates as yet unelected enter into competition. The matter is +settled by a reference to the whole of the voting papers. If any +unelected candidate now stands first on an absolute majority of all +these papers he is elected. But if not, then the weeding-out process is +applied until an absolute majority is obtained. The candidate who gets +the absolute majority is elected. Should there be another seat, the same +process is repeated. If an absolute majority of the whole of the voters +cannot be obtained for any candidate, then the candidate who comes +nearest to the absolute <a name="Page_158" id="Page_158" />majority is elected." It will be seen that +Professor Nanson proposes to bring to life again all the eliminated +candidates, in order to compete against those who have less than the +quota. The proportional principle is then to be entirely abandoned, and +the seats practically given to the stronger party, although the minority +may be clearly entitled to them. The vaunted "one vote one value" is +also to be violated, because those who supported the elected candidates +are to have an equal voice with those still unrepresented. And finally, +the evil is not cured, it is only aggravated, if an eliminated candidate +is elected.</p> + +<p><b>The Hare System is not Preferential.</b>—The idea is sedulously fostered +that the Hare system is a form of preferential voting, and many people +are misled thereby. The act of voting is exalted into an end in itself. +The most elaborate provisions are now suggested by Professor Nanson to +allow the elector to express his opinion only as far as he likes. The +simple and practical method in use in Tasmania of requiring each elector +to place a definite number of candidates in order of preference is +denounced as an infringement of the elector's freedom. Why force him to +express preferences where he does not feel any? The Professor has +therefore invented "the principle of the bracket." If the elector cannot +discriminate between the merits of a number of candidates he may bracket +them all equal in order of favour. Indeed, where he does no<a name="Page_159" id="Page_159" />t indicate +any preference at all, the names unmarked are deemed equal. Therefore, +if he does not wish his vote transferred to any candidate, he must +strike out his name. It is pointed out that a ballot paper can thus be +used if there is any kind of preference expressed at all, and the risk +of informality is reduced to a minimum. All the bracket papers are to be +put into a separate parcel, and do not become "definite" till all the +candidates bracketed, except one, are either elected or rejected; the +vote is then transferred to that candidate. And as bracketed candidates +will occur in original papers, surplus papers, and excluded candidates' +papers at every stage of the count, the degree of complication in store +for the unhappy returning officer can be imagined.</p> + +<p>The whole of these intricate provisions are founded on a patent fallacy. +Preferences are not expressed in the Hare system, as in true +preferential voting, that they may be given effect to in deciding the +election, but simply in order to allow the elector to say in advance to +whom he would wish his vote transferred if it cannot be used for his +first choice. The elector is allowed to express his opinion about a +number of candidates, certainly, but after being put to this trouble +only one of his preferences is used. And which one is used depends +entirely on the vagaries of the system. The principle of the bracket +illustrates this fact; if the elector has no preference the system +decides for him. I<a name="Page_160" id="Page_160" />f his first choice just receives the quota the other +preferences are not even looked at. Again, of all the electors who vote +for rejected candidates, those who are fortunate enough to vote for the +worst (who are first excluded) have their second or third preferences +given effect to, and few of their votes are wasted; but the votes of +those who support the best of them (who are last excluded) are either +wasted or given to their remote preferences. In Mr. Hare's original +scheme, for instance, the votes of the last 50 candidates excluded would +have been nearly all wasted, unless some hundreds of preferences were +expressed.</p> + +<p>Another claim on which great stress is laid is that by the process of +transferring votes every vote counts to some one candidate. This means +nothing more than that the votes of rejected candidates are transferred +to the successful candidates. Where is the necessity for this? So long +as each party secures its just share of representation and elects its +most favoured candidates, there is no advantage gained by transferring +the votes. Miss Spence even declares that "every Senator elected in this +way will represent an equal number of votes, and will rightly have equal +weight in the House. According to the block system, there is often a +wide disparity between the number of votes for the highest and the +lowest man elected." Surely the mere fact of transferring votes till +they are equally distributed does not make all the successful candidates +equally popular! On the contrary, it is very desirable to know which +<a name="Page_161" id="Page_161" />candidates are most in favour with each party.</p> + +<p><b>Ballot Papers Must be Brought Together for Counting.</b>—This is a +practical objection to the Hare system, which puts it out of court for +large electorates. If the whole of Victoria were constituted one +electorate, as at the Federal Convention election, the transference of +votes could not be commenced till all the ballot papers had come in from +the remote parts of the colony, two or three weeks after the election. +On this point Professor Nanson writes:—"In an actual election in +Victoria this 'first state of the poll' could be arrived at with the +same rapidity as was the result of the recent poll on the Commonwealth +Bill. In both cases but one fact is to be gleaned from each voting +paper. The results from all parts of the colony would be posted in +Collins-street on election day. These results would show exactly how the +cat was going to jump. The final results as regards parties would be +obvious to all observers, although the result as regards individual +candidates would be far from clear. But this, although of vast +importance to the candidates themselves, would be a matter of small +concern to the great mass of the people." These remarks are based on the +assumption that the electors vote on strictly party lines, which a +reference to Tasmanian returns will show is not usually the case. Few +will be disposed to agree that a knowledge of the successful candidates +<a name="Page_162" id="Page_162" />is a matter of small moment.</p> + +<p>FOOTNOTE:</p> + +<p><a name="Footnote_7" href="#FNanchor_7">[7]</a> <i>Hobart Mercury</i></p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VII" id="CHAPTER_VII" />CHAPTER VII.</h2> + +<p class='center'>FREE LIST SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL DELEGATION.</p> + + +<p>The <i>Liste Libre</i>, or Free List system, is a far simpler and more +practical method of proportional representation than the Hare system. +The distinctive feature is that it applies the proportional principle +not to individual candidates but to parties. But, like the Hare system, +it places no restriction on the number of parties. It is therefore +particularly adapted to the circumstances of the countries on the +Continent of Europe, which, having already a number of strong party +organizations, wish to retain them and to do justice to each. +Accordingly we find that nearly all experiments in proportional +representation to the present time have been confined to those +countries.</p> + +<p>Perhaps the very earliest attempt to apply the proportional principle +was that of Mr. Thomas Gilpin, in a pamphlet, "On the Representation of +Minorities of Electors to act with the Majority in Elected Assemblies," +publis<a name="Page_163" id="Page_163" />hed at Philadelphia in 1844. He proposed that electorates should +be enlarged, and that each party should nominate a list of candidates +equal to the number required to be elected, and should place them in +order of preference. Each elector could then vote for one of these +lists; and each party would be allotted a number of representatives +proportional to the amount of support it received. The highest on each +list, to the number allotted, would be elected. It will be seen that +this is really a system of double election; for the order of favour of +the candidates of any party would have to be decided before the +nominations were made.</p> + +<p>Only two years afterwards M. Victor Considerant published a similar +scheme at Geneva, Switzerland. Each elector was to vote first for a +party and then for any number of candidates on the party list whom he +preferred. The party votes were to decide the number of members allotted +to each list, and the individual votes the successful candidates.</p> + +<p>The little republic of Switzerland has been the scene of nearly all +subsequent improvement. In 1867 Professor Ernest Naville founded the +<i>Association Réformiste</i> at Geneva to advocate the principle of +proportional representation. In 1871 the Association adopted the <i>Liste +Libre</i> system, invented by M. Borely, of Nimes, France, in which each +elector was to place all the candidates of his party in order of +preference. But as this allows the electors little direct influence on +their own candi<a name="Page_164" id="Page_164" />dates and none outside of them, a combination of the +cumulative vote and the <i>Liste Libre</i> was adopted in 1875. Each elector +was to have as many votes as there were seats to be filled, but he +could not only give them to any candidates on any list, but he could +also give as many votes as he liked to any one candidate. Thus if there +were ten seats to be filled the elector could give ten votes to one +candidate, or one vote to each of ten candidates, or five votes to one +candidate and divide the remaining five among others, and so on. The +only condition necessary was that his votes added up to ten. The +aggregate votes given to all the candidates of each party were then to +be taken as the basis of proportional distribution among the parties and +the highest on each list to the number decided were to be elected.</p> + +<p>It was not till the year 1890 that this scheme was actually put into +practice. The election of 1889 had resulted so unjustly to the Liberal +party in the canton of Ticino that an insurrection broke out. This +forced the hand of the Federal Government, which had to quell the +disturbance, and proportional representation was recommended and +adopted. Several other cantons followed suit, and it is expected that +the whole of Switzerland will soon adopt the reform.</p> + +<p>A modification of this plan has lately been adopted by the Swiss +Association. In this later plan electors can give a sing<a name="Page_165" id="Page_165" />le vote only to +individual candidates, but if they do not use all their votes in this +way they may cumulate the balance on any one party list by marking at +the head of the list. Thus if the elector in a ten-seat electorate gives +five votes to individual candidates, and places a mark at the head of +one of the lists, the balance of five votes will count to that list. The +aggregate votes given to individual candidates on any list, plus the +votes placed at the head of the list, will form the basis of +proportional distribution among the lists. This is the plan adopted by +the American Proportional Representation League as most nearly suited to +American habits, and recommended by Professor Commons in his book on +"Proportional Representation."</p> + +<p>Belgium has also quite recently adopted a scheme of proportional +representation. As in Switzerland, its advent was hastened by political +disturbances. The Catholic party, not satisfied with exerting a +preponderating influence in the country districts, wished to obtain also +its proportionate share of representation in the cities, and proposed a +scheme of proportional representation for them only. This caused such +ill feeling that riots took place in the streets of Brussels. Finally, +proportional representation was promised all round, and became law for +both the Chamber of Representatives and the Senate at the latter end of +1899. In Brussels, where there are 18 seats to be filled, a trial +election had already been held in 1893 with satisfactory result<a name="Page_166" id="Page_166" />s. Six +lists were nominated, the largest being that of the Socialists, who +nominated ten candidates; and over 12,000 electors voted. Each elector +was allowed 18 votes, and the methods in which he could distribute them +were somewhat complicated. He might (1) mark at the head of a list, (2) +mark at the head of a list and also opposite one or more candidates on +the same list, (3) mark opposite the names of not more than 18 +candidates on any list. In the first case his 18 votes counted to the +list marked, in the second case one vote was counted to each of the +individual candidates marked and the balance counted for the list; in +the third case one vote was counted to each candidate marked. The +aggregate of votes marked at the head of each list, plus the individual +votes on the list, was then taken as the basis of proportional +distribution. So many of the votes were cumulated on lists that only +about one-fifth of the votes cast were operative in the selection of +candidates.</p> + +<p>In the bill which has recently become law a new method has therefore +been adopted, which gives more power to the party committees, but allows +the electors to modify their choice. For this purpose the party +organization nominates the candidates in order of preference. The +elector may then accept this order by marking at the head of the list, +or he may give his vote to any one candidate on the list. If all the +electors of a party vote in the first way, those nominated highest on +the list<a name="Page_167" id="Page_167" />, to the number to which the party becomes entitled, are +elected. But if all the electors vote in the second way, those with the +highest single votes are elected. The actual result will usually be a +compromise between the two, and it is evidently the interest of the +party organization to place the candidates in their real order of +favour, in order that the electors may accept the list. For if an +unpopular candidate were placed at the head of the list few would accept +it.</p> + +<p>The first election under this system has just taken place, and the +result was, as expected, to reduce the Clerical representation +considerably.</p> + +<p>In all the above variations of the Free List system the distribution of +seats is effected by dividing the aggregate votes polled by each party +by a unit of representation, but three different methods of determining +this unit are in use. The first is obtained by simply dividing the total +number of votes by the number of seats.</p> + +<p>The objection to this unit is that when there are several parties, part +of the seats only can be allotted on full units, and the rest have to be +allotted to those parties which have the highest remainders or fractions +of a unit, and this unduly favours small parties, who do not poll even a +single unit. The rule to divide the total votes by the number of seats +increased by one, which was first proposed by Mr. H.R. Droop, reduces +slightly the number of seats allotted on remainder<a name="Page_168" id="Page_168" />s, and was adopted by +the canton of Soluthern in 1895. In Belgium a third plan, devised by +Professor D'Hondt, of Brussels, is used, which is designed to prevent +any seats being allotted on remainders. This unit is evidently smaller +than either of the others, and is to be found by trial. It is only +necessary that the sum of the quotients obtained by dividing it into +each of the lists shall be equal to the number of seats to be filled.</p> + +<p>Suppose a five-seat electorate in which 6,000 votes are divided among +four parties, who poll 2,500, 1,850, 900, and 750 votes respectively. +Then if we take one-fifth, or 1,200 votes, as the unit, the result would +be the following:—</p> + +<p>(1) 2,500 = 2 units of representation + 100 remainder = 2 seats.</p> + +<p>(2) 1,850 = 1 unit of representation + 650 remainder = 1 seat.</p> + +<p>(3) 900 = unit of representation + 900 remainder = 1 seat.</p> + +<p>(4) 750 = unit of representation + 750 remainder = 1 seat.</p> + +<p>If the Droop unit of one-sixth, or 1,000 votes, be used, the result will +be different:—</p> + +<p>(1) 2,500 = 2 units of representation + 500 remainder = 2 seats.</p> + +<p>(2) 1,850 = 1 unit of representation + 850 remainder = 2 seats.</p> + +<p>(3) 900 = unit of representation + 900 remainder = 1 seat.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169" />(4) 750 = unit of representation + 750 remainder = seat.</p> + +<p>By the third method any number of votes between 834 and 900 will be +found to comply with Professor D'Hondt's condition, and the result +would, in this instance, be the same as by the Droop method. Although +the highest number was at first used, the lower limit has been adopted +in the new bill.</p> + +<p>In no case can the proportional distribution be considered satisfactory. +If the electorates are small, and the number of parties large, accurate +proportional representation is quite out of the question. In +Switzerland, however, the electorates are made to contain sometimes as +many as 30 seats. The effect of such large electorates must be in time +to encourage the formation of a great number of small factions. At the +same time there is not so much incentive to split up the parties as by +the Hare system.</p> + +<p>Passing now to the selection of party candidates, none of the methods +can be said to ensure the election of those most in general favour. When +electors are allowed to cumulate on individual candidates, the +favourites of sections within the party will be elected. If, on the +other hand, they are allowed to cumulate on party lists, all votes thus +given are ineffective in the selection of the successful candidates. It +may be noted that although the nomination of candidates in lists by +party organizations is less in ac<a name="Page_170" id="Page_170" />cordance with the practice of British +countries than the individual candidature of the Hare system, there is +nothing to prevent one candidate being nominated to stand in the place +of a party.</p> + +<p>A word of warning must be added as to the danger of holding up Belgium +and Switzerland as examples of true electoral justice to Australia. The +direct government of the people which Switzerland has adopted bears not +the slightest resemblance to the representative institutions of British +countries. Both the referendum and proportional delegation are suited to +direct government and are destructive to party responsible government. +The Swiss adopted the referendum to save themselves from the lobbying +and plutocratic character of their legislatures. The initiative and +proportional delegation have followed because they are complementary +reforms. The consequence is that the legislators have been degraded to +mere agents for drawing up measures, and leadership has been transferred +to the press. It is the peculiar conditions of Switzerland which enable +it to tolerate unrestrained majority rule. It is a small country, +surrounded by powerful neighbours, whose strength lies in its weakness. +Moreover, the people are very conservative. In Zurich, for instance, +which is largely devoted to manufactures, a proposal to limit the hours +of work in factories to twelve hours a day was rejected by the people. +Nor is direc<a name="Page_171" id="Page_171" />t government proving a success; the tyranny of the majority +is already apparent. The first federal initiative demanded a measure to +prevent the slaughter of animals by bleeding, designed to interfere +with the religious rites of the Jews. Despite the fact that it was +opposed by the Federal Council, as contrary to the right of religious +liberty guaranteed by the Constitution, it was carried by the +referendum. Belgium, again, can hardly be taken as a model of +constitutional liberty. Surely we in Australia do not want the factious +strife of religious, racial, and class sections, which so nearly brought +on a revolution last year. Yet this is exactly what proportional +delegation to sections would bring about. Belgium has a hard task to +reconcile two races so differently constituted as the Walloons and +Flemings, and has been able to avoid instability of the ministry so far +only because the Clerical party, which is mostly Flemish, still has a +majority. The new system has only consecrated the sectional principle, +and will do nothing to restore harmony.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172" /><a name="CHAPTER_VIII" id="CHAPTER_VIII" />CHAPTER VIII.</h2> + +<p class='center'>PREFERENTIAL VOTING, THE BLOCK VOTE, ETC.</p> + + +<p><b>Preferential Voting.</b>—Laplace, the great mathematician, to whom we owe +so much of the theory of probability, showed more than a century ago +that although individual electors may have very different views as to +the relative merits of a number of candidates for any office, still the +expression of the degree of favour in which the candidates are held by +the whole body of electors will be the same if each elector be assumed +to have a uniform gradation of preference. Suppose that there are ten +candidates, and it is required to place them in order of general favour. +Each elector should be required to place the whole ten in the order of +his preference, 1, 2, 3, &c. Let the maximum degree of merit be denoted +by ten marks, so that every first preference will count as ten marks. +Then, although an individual elector might be disposed to give his +second preference only five marks, and the rest of his preferences, say, +two marks, Laplace demonstrated that <a name="Page_173" id="Page_173" />it is most probable that the total +result would be the same if each elector be assumed to give his second +preference nine marks, his third preference eight marks, and so on. +Therefore, if all first preferences be multiplied by ten, second +preferences by nine, and so on in regular order down to last preferences +multiplied by one, the total number of marks will be an index of the +order in general favour. If there is one office to be filled, the +candidate with the highest number of marks should be elected; if there +are two offices, the two highest candidates, and so on.</p> + +<p>But the assumed condition must be rigidly complied with; each elector +must express his honest preferences. Whether he will do so or not +depends upon the circumstances. Laplace recognized this element of human +nature, and declared that if electors are swayed by other considerations +independent of the merit of the candidates the system would not apply. +For instance, if the candidates are the nominees of a number of +independent sections, each of which is anxious only to secure the return +of its own candidate, and to defeat those who stand most in his way, the +tendency will be general to place the more popular candidates, those +whose success is most feared, at the bottom of the list, so as to give +them as few marks as possible. The result would be to favour mediocre +men, or even in extreme cases the most inferior.</p> + +<p>Practically, therefore, the system is not applicable where any of the +electors are personally interested in the result. I<a name="Page_174" id="Page_174" />f a number of judges +were called on to decide the relative merits of several essays or prize +designs, and the competitors' names were not known to them, the system +might be used. But even in such a case a simpler method is available; +for, although it may be difficult to pick out the best, it is generally +easy to agree upon the worst. It is usual, then, to gradually eliminate +the worst, and when the number is reduced to two to take the decision of +the majority.</p> + +<p>This process of elimination may be, however, combined with the +preferential system, and the result is more accurate than if one count +only be made. At the first count the candidate with the fewest marks +would be eliminated and his name struck out on all the papers. All those +under him on each paper would then go up one point in order of favour, +and further counts would be held, eliminating the lowest candidate each +time till the candidates were reduced to the number desired. This method +is very complicated, and involves a great amount of trouble.</p> + +<p>Consider now the case of a voluntary association of individuals, such as +a club or society; and suppose that it is required to elect a president +or committee. The condition is clearly that he or they should be most in +general favour with all the members; and the question whether +Preferential Voting is applicable will depend on how united the members +are. Now, clubs are not usually, nor should they be, divided into +cliques or parties; indeed, if a serious split does take place it +ge<a name="Page_175" id="Page_175" />nerally results in the resignation of part of the club and the +formation of a separate organization. But in a live club it is +impossible to prevent slight differences of opinion; and an +officer-bearer who has the interests of the club at heart must often +offend small sections who want to exert undue influence. In an election +for president this office-bearer would stand no chance of election if +there are several candidates and any small section likes to put him at +the bottom of the list, so as to give him as many bad marks as possible. +This is the weak point in Preferential Voting; any small section can +ensure the rejection of a general favourite. The greater the number of +candidates the smaller the minority which is able to do this; dummy +candidates may therefore be introduced to make it more certain. The risk +would, however, be very much lessened if the process of gradual +elimination we have described were adopted.</p> + +<p>When we come to the election of representatives to a legislature it is +evident at once that Preferential Voting is not applicable at all. We +have shown that the true condition required is not the return of +candidates most in general favour with both parties, but the return of +the candidates most in general favour with each party separately. +Preferential Voting would therefore only be applicable if the electors +of each party voted separately for its own candidates; and even then it +would be open to the objection w<a name="Page_176" id="Page_176" />e have already urged. If it were applied +to the two parties voting together the electors would certainly not be +influenced only by the merit of the candidates. They might record their +honest preferences as regards the candidates of their own party, but +they would naturally place the candidates of the opposing party in +inverse order of merit. The candidates most in general favour would be +those who represented neither party. Suppose there are three candidates +for a single seat, two representing large parties of 49 per cent, each, +and the third a small party of 2 per cent. The electors of the large +parties would be more afraid of one another than of the small party, and +would give their second preferences to its candidate. This candidate, +representing one-fiftieth of the electors, would then actually be +elected; he would receive 202 marks, and neither of the others could +possibly secure more than 200. Moreover, he would still be elected if +the process of elimination were adopted, since on the second count he +would beat either of the other candidates separately by 51 votes to 49.</p> + +<p>These plain facts are indisputable. What is to be thought, then, of the +claim made by Professor Nanson that Preferential Voting, with the +process of elimination, is the most perfect system known for +single-membered electorates.</p> + +<p><b>The Block Vote.</b>—The Block Vote, General Ticket, or <i>scrutin de +liste</i>, is in general use when there is more than<a name="Page_177" id="Page_177" /> one seat to be filled. +Each elector has as many votes as there are members to be elected, and +the highest on the list, to the number of representatives required, are +successful. Dealing first with elections to a legislative body, the +system is eminently unjust to parties. A rigid control of nominations is +necessary in the first place, because any party which splits up its +votes spoils its chance. Each party will therefore nominate only as many +candidates as there are seats, and the stronger of two parties, or the +strongest of a number of parties, will elect the entire list. A minority +might in the latter case secure all the representation, but the +practical effect of the Block Vote is to force the electors to group +themselves into two parties only. It therefore has the same beneficial +effect as the single electorate of confining representation to the two +main parties. This is apparently nob recognized by Professor Nanson, who +writes, in his pamphlet on the Hare system:—"Contrast with this the +results of the Block system. With strict party voting, which has been +assumed throughout, each of the five parties would put forward seven +candidates. The seven seats would all be secured by Form, with 44 votes +out of a total of 125, and the remaining 81, or more than two-thirds of +the voters, would be wholly unrepresented." Does the Professor really +think that the 81 (who, by the way, are <i>less</i> than two-thirds) would be +so foolish as not to combine and secure all the seats?</p> + +<p>The exclusion of the <a name="Page_178" id="Page_178" />minority in a single-membered electorate excites +only a feeling of hopelessness, but when it fails to secure a single +representative in an electorate returning several members, a spirit of +rankling injustice is aroused. The Block Vote has, therefore, never been +tolerated for long in large electorates. In the early history of the +United States many of the States adopted it, and sent to Congress a +solid delegation of one party or the other. This proved so unjust, and +operated so adversely to the federal spirit in promoting combinations of +States, that Congress, in 1842, made the single-membered electorate +obligatory on all the States.</p> + +<p>In France it was adopted at the election for the Chamber of Deputies in +1885. The result as regards parties was about as good as with the single +electorate system. The Republicans and Conservative-Monarchists, whose +numbers entitled them to 311 and 257 seats respectively, actually +secured 366 and 202. But it was abandoned after a trial at this one +election.</p> + +<p>The Block Vote was adopted in Australia for the election of ten +delegates from each colony to the Federal Convention. This was a work in +which all parties might fairly have joined together; and in most +colonies the people did select the best men, regardless of party. In +Victoria, however, the newspapers took on the <i>rôle</i> of the "machine," +and the ten candidates nominated by the <i>Age</i> were elected. Many of the +supporters <a name="Page_179" id="Page_179" />of the defeated candidates voted for some on the successful +list who just defeated their own favourites. Had this been foreseen they +would have thrown away these votes by giving them to those sure to be +elected or to those least likely to be elected. The injustice of forcing +each elector to vote for the whole ten is thus brought home. We are now +threatened with the adoption of the Block Vote for the Federal Senate, +and in some of the States for the House of Representatives as well; and +it is in the hope of preventing this wrong that the present book is +written.</p> + +<p>So far we have been considering the Block Vote as applied to the +election of a legislature with two or more parties; we now propose to +consider it as applied to one party only. It is a matter of common +knowledge that the Block Vote, when used for such an election as that of +the committee of a club, works very well, and results in the return of +the candidates most in general favour with all sections. The reason is, +of course, that all sections work together, and members vote for the +best men, regardless of sectional lines. We will go further and say that +the Block Vote is by far the best method for such purposes, and is +superior even to Preferential Voting. In the first place it is free from +the defect that a small section can ensure the rejection of a general +favourite; and in the second place it rests on at least as secure a +theoretical basis. To fix our ideas, suppose there are ten candidates +<a name="Page_180" id="Page_180" />for five members of a committee. Laplace assumed (1) that each member +would have a knowledge of the merits of all the ten candidates, (2) that +his estimate of the respective candidates would vary arbitrarily +between nothing and a maximum degree of merit, (3) that each member +would express his honest preferences. The Block Vote, on the other hand, +assumes (1) that each member can pick out the five best candidates, and +therefore express his opinion as to how the committee should be +constituted, (2) that he will be inclined to place these five candidates +on one plane of favour and the other five on one plane of non-favour. We +submit that the latter assumptions agree more closely with the actual +state of affairs. The members can distinguish between candidates who +have merit and those who have no merit or of whose merit they are +ignorant; to force them, therefore, to place all the candidates in order +of preference is to make them express preferences where none exist.<a name="FNanchor_8" href="#Footnote_8">[8]</a> +On the whole, then, the Block Vote is more likely to place the +candidates in their real order of favour.</p> + +<p>But some reservation must be made. The Block Vote works best when the +number of candidates does not exceed two or three times the number of +vacancies. Suppose, first, that the candidates present in the final +result a fairly regular order of favour from lowest to highest. Each of +<a name="Page_181" id="Page_181" />the successful candidates will then be supported by at least an absolute +majority of the members, providing the number of candidates be not +greater than twice the number of vacancies. But if there are four or +five times as many candidates as vacancies, none of the successful +candidates will have the support of a majority of the members. On the +other hand, however, the candidates do not usually present a regular +order of favour from lowest to highest when there are a large number of +candidates, for there may be a long "tail" of candidates who receive +very few votes. The following general rule may therefore be laid +down:—The Block Vote works best when the total votes given to rejected +candidates do not exceed the total votes given to successful candidates.</p> + +<p>The difficulties indicated above were met by the Australian Natives' +Association by a plan which provided that no candidate should be elected +except by an absolute majority of the voters. The Block Vote is used +throughout; and if at the first ballot the required number of candidates +do not obtain an absolute majority a second ballot is held, from which +those at the bottom of the poll and those who have been elected are +eliminated. This process is continued till all the vacancies are filled. +Four or five ballots are sometimes required, and the proceedings become +very irksome. A sub-committee was recently appointed to investigate the +subject, and reported in favour of t<a name="Page_182" id="Page_182" />he Preferential System with one +count only. The process of elimination was considered too complicated to +be practicable. Now, the conditions presented by these elections, in +which a very large number of candidates are generally nominated, are +precisely those in which Preferential Voting lends itself most easily to +abuse. An insignificant minority may defeat a candidate who should be +elected, by placing him at the bottom of their lists.</p> + +<p>A variation of the Block Vote may be suggested which is much simpler and +better. The preferential ballot papers should be used, and two counts +should be made. At the first count the primary half of the preferences +should be counted as effective votes, and the candidates should be +reduced to twice the number of vacancies. A second count should then be +made of the ballot papers, using the Block Vote. All or nearly all the +candidates would then obtain an absolute majority, and it is practically +impossible that any candidate should be eliminated by the first count +who would have had any chance of election in the second.</p> + +<p>This plan is far superior to the original method. It is right that +members who vote for candidates who are hopelessly out of it should be +allowed to transfer their votes; but it is not right that members who +first help to elect some candidates at one ballot should have the same +voting power as others at subsequent ballots.</p> + +<p>The Hare system is sometimes advocated for clubs on account of it<a name="Page_183" id="Page_183" />s +supposed just principle. Any live club which adopts it runs the risk of +disruption. It merely encourages the formation of cliques and sections; +any slight split would be accentuated and rendered permanent.</p> + +<p><b>The Limited Vote.</b>—The injustice of the Block Vote led to the +introduction of the Limited Vote, which allows the minority some share +of the representation. We have seen that the Block Vote forces each +party to try to return all the representation, and of course one party +only can succeed. But if neither party be forced to try to return more +than it is entitled to each party will get its correct share of +representation, providing both parties are equally organized. This leads +to the Limited Vote, in which each elector has a number of votes +somewhat less than the number of seats.</p> + +<p>The Limited Vote was used in England for a number of three-seat +electorates, which were created by the Reform Bill of 1867, each elector +being allowed to vote for two candidates only. By this means the +majority would usually return two candidates and the minority one. Thus +the Limited Vote has the same advantage as the Block Vote and the single +electorate system, that it tends to confine representation to the two +main parties, but it creates an artificial proportion of representation +between them. Moreover, it renders strict party organization even more +necessary, since each party must arrange to use its voting<a name="Page_184" id="Page_184" /> resources to +the best advantage. Consider the three-seat electorate, for instance. +The minority will, if it is wise, nominate two candidates only; and the +majority may nominate either two or three. But if the majority does +divide its votes among three candidates it runs the risk of securing one +only. It can do so safely when two conditions are fulfilled: first, it +must be sure of polling more than three-fifths of the votes; and, +second, it must arrange to distribute all its votes equally among the +three candidates. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the +Limited Vote was responsible for introducing "machine" tactics into +England. In Birmingham, when Mr. Joseph Chamberlain organized the +Liberals and succeeded in carrying all three seats, the electors in each +ward were directed how to vote so that as few votes as possible might be +wasted. These three-cornered constituencies were abolished by the +<i>Redistribution Act</i> of 1884; and Sir John Lubbock, reviewing the +experiment, declared—"On the whole, it cannot be denied that under the +Limited Vote the views of the electors have been fairly represented."</p> + +<p>The system has also been tried to a smaller extent in the United States. +In New York 32 of the delegates to a constitutional convention were +elected from the State polled as one electorate, each elector being +allowed to vote for 16 candidates. Both parties were afraid to split +their votes, and the result was that each returned 16. The rest of the +delegates were elected in single-mem<a name="Page_185" id="Page_185" />bered electorates, and of these the +Republicans secured 81 and the Democrats 47. It might here be pointed +out that the Republicans might have secured more than 16 of the +delegates from the State at large if they had nominated 20 candidates +and allowed the laws of chance to regulate their organization. Each +elector might have been directed to put the twenty names into his hat, +and to reject the first four he pulled out. The same evil is apparent in +Boston, where twelve aldermen are elected at large, each elector being +allowed seven votes. Each party nominates seven candidates only; and the +majority invariably elects seven and the minority five.</p> + +<p>The Limited Vote is therefore not a satisfactory solution of the problem +of representation. It gives an artificial instead of proportional +representation, and it necessitates strict party organization and +control of nominations. At the same time it will generally give a very +fair representation if parties are not strictly organized, and might +well have been adopted for the Federal Convention, five or six votes +being allowed instead of ten. Newspaper domination would thus have been +prevented.</p> + +<p><b>Election of the Candidate Most in General Favour.</b>—It is often +required to ascertain the candidate most in general favour where one +party only is concerned, such as an election for leader of the +Opposition or president of a club; and the methods in general use are +very defective. We do not refer to the theoretical difficulty, wh<a name="Page_186" id="Page_186" />ich +perplexes some persons, of giving effect to the actual degree of favour +in which the candidates stand in the electors' minds, but to the simple +problem of finding out who is preferred most by the bulk of the +electors. Thus it is universally recognised that when two candidates +stand the candidate who has the support of an absolute majority of the +electors is entitled to election. Yet it is possible that the rejected +candidate may be nearly twice as popular. This might happen if the +majority held that there was little to choose between the two +candidates, while the minority thought they could not be compared. But +it is quite evident that such distinctions cannot be recognized; the +candidate who is preferred by an absolute majority must be elected. It +is when there are more than two candidates that the difficulty arises. +To elect the candidate who has most first preferences is open to very +serious objection; he may have a small minority of the total votes, and +each of the other candidates might be able to beat him single-handed.</p> + +<p>The best way to overcome the difficulty is undoubtedly by some process +of gradually eliminating the least popular candidates till the number is +reduced to two; the candidate with the absolute majority is then +elected. We propose to consider the different ways in which elimination +might be made. We assume, in the first place, that each elector has cast +an advance vote—<i>i.e.</i>, that he has placed all the candidates in order +of preference. The most primitive method is to elim<a name="Page_187" id="Page_187" />inate at each +successive count the candidate who has least first preferences. This is +the method adopted in the Hare system, and we have already shown that +it is very defective; in fact, it is no improvement at all. The +eliminated candidate might be most in general favour, and might be able +to beat each of the other candidates single-handed. A second method is +to use Preferential Voting to decide which candidate should be +eliminated at each successive count. This is far superior, but it is +extremely complicated, and is open to the objection that when there are +a large number of candidates a small section may cause the rejection of +the general favourite. We propose to describe a method based on the +Block Vote which is much simpler, and which does not lend itself to +abuse. We have shown that the Block Vote works best when the candidates +can be divided into two equal sections of favour and non-favour. Suppose +there are four candidates, the first two preferences should therefore be +counted as effective votes, instead of the first preference only. The +eliminated candidate will then be the least in general favour. A second +count is then made of the three candidates left, and the first +preferences and half of the second preferences are counted as effective, +and the lowest again eliminated. The candidate who has an absolute +majority is then elected. The method may be indefinitely extended; if +there are five candidates the first two preferences and one-half of the +third preferences are counted, and so on. But when there are a great +many candidates more than one might be eliminated. Any number up to +<a name="Page_188" id="Page_188" />eight could be safely reduced to four at the first count.</p> + +<p>FOOTNOTE:</p> + +<p><a name="Footnote_8" href="#FNanchor_8">[8]</a> The bracket principle introduced by Professor Nanson into the Hare +system involves a partial recognition of this fact.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IX" id="CHAPTER_IX" />CHAPTER IX.</h2> + +<p class='center'>ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE THE PRESENT SYSTEM.</p> + + +<p><b>The Double Election.</b>—In the preceding chapter we have strongly +insisted that the different methods considered for ensuring the return +of the candidate acceptable to all sections are not applicable to the +election of legislators. The true principles of political representation +require, not the election of the candidate most in general favour with +both parties, but the election by each party separately of its own most +favoured candidates. But as it is impossible for both parties to be +represented in a single-membered electorate, the best alternative is +that both should contest the seat and one be represented. The present +system of election has largely tended to realize this alternative, +especially in those countries in which party government was strong, such +as England and the United States; and representation has in consequence +been confined to the two main parties. In England, where the party +system was gradually developed, this result was attained without an<a name="Page_189" id="Page_189" />y +rigid control of nominations, because the true party spirit prevailed +and personal ambition was subordinated to political principle; and in +the United States it was only brought about at the cost of "machine" +control of nominations. But on the Continent of Europe, where party +government was transplanted from England, it has never really taken +root. Each small group nominated its own candidates, and the successful +candidate represented only a plurality, and not a majority, of the +electors. Instead of a contest between two organized parties there was a +scramble among numerous factions.</p> + +<p>In France, Belgium, Italy, and Germany an attempt has been made to check +this evil by the double election. If at the first election no candidate +secures an absolute majority of the votes, a second election is held, +for which only the two candidates who head the poll at the first +election are allowed to compete. One must then get an absolute majority. +The double election has undoubtedly tended to prevent a further +splitting up into groups, but the Continental countries offer such poor +soil for the growth of party government that it has only restricted the +contest to two factions in each electorate; and, of course, the dominant +factions are not the same in the various electorates.</p> + +<p><b>The Advance Vote.</b>—In Australia the same evil has become increasingly +evident, and it is now no uncommon thing for a candidate to be elected +by less than one-third or one-quarter of the total votes. In Queensland +<a name="Page_190" id="Page_190" />a plan has been introduced to meet the evil, under the name of the +Advance Vote, which is designed to secure the advantages of the French +plan without the trouble and expense of a second election. The electors +simply declare in advance at the first election how they would vote at +the second election. All that is necessary is that they place the +candidates in order of preference, 1, 2, 3, 4, &c. Then, instead of +holding a second election between the two who have the greatest number +of first preferences, it is merely necessary for the returning officer +to consult each ballot paper and see which of these two candidates is +higher in order of favour. Thus if one is marked 3 and the other 4, the +vote is counted to the candidate marked 3. This device is assumed to +give exactly the same result as the French plan, providing only that the +same electors vote at both elections, and do not change their views +between the two elections.</p> + +<p>But in reality it possesses hardly any of the advantages of the French +plan. It is another instance of the danger of neglecting the factor of +human nature. The French do not go to the trouble and expense of a +second election for nothing. Their plan is far the better. First of all, +consider the candidates. They know well beforehand that unless one of +them gets an absolute majority of the votes at the first election they +will be put to the expense and delay of a second election, therefore it +is to their interest that the number of c<a name="Page_191" id="Page_191" />andidates be restricted. This +tends to keep down the representation to two sections. Next, consider +the electors. They know also that unless they give a majority of votes +to one of the candidates they will be put to the trouble of voting a +second time, therefore they will take good care the votes are not split +up, even if the candidates wanted it. What is the result? Simply that in +the vast majority of cases one of the candidates gets a majority at the +first election, and no second election is necessary; and, most important +of all, the tendency to split up is counteracted.</p> + +<p>Now take the Queensland system. None of these checks operate. The +splitting up into groups is actually encouraged, and it is to the +interest of each group to see as many more groups as possible formed, in +order to increase its own relative importance, for the delegates of the +two strongest groups have a chance of election instead of the strongest +group only.</p> + +<p>In practice the plan threatens to break down, owing to a practical point +being overlooked. It is evident that the success of the Advance Vote +depends on the electors marking all the preferences. The ballot paper +should be made informal unless all the preferences are given. In +Queensland this has not been done, and the consequence is that a large +proportion of the electors refuse to give more than one preference. No +more conclusive evidence is needed that the scheme has promoted the +growth of factions. These electors voluntarily disfranchise themselves +rather than vote for any of the other candidates, and of course the very +object of the scheme is defeated; the successful candidate cannot secure +<a name="Page_192" id="Page_192" />a majority of the votes cast.</p> + +<p><b>The Exhaustive Ballot.</b>—A bill has just been introduced into the +Legislative Assembly of Victoria, providing for a further extension of +the principle of the Advance Vote. The plan is favoured by Professor +Nanson, and professes to be an improvement on the Queensland plan, +although it is only an "instalment of reform" in view of the ultimate +adoption of the more perfect Preferential Voting. The Queensland plan is +objected to because all but the two highest candidates are thrown out. +Suppose, for instance, two candidates stand for the weaker party and +three for the stronger party, it is quite likely that all the candidates +of the stronger party will be thrown out. Therefore the lowest candidate +only of the five should be thrown out. All his papers should be +transferred to the candidate who is marked 2 on them; and those below +him on all the papers should go up one point in order of favour. If he +stood 3 on a paper, the candidate who was 4 would now become 3. Another +count of first preferences should then be made, and the lowest again +thrown out; and so on till one candidate gets an absolute majority. It +is pointed out triumphantly that this plan, which is known as the +Exhaustive Ballot, actually saves in this instance all the trouble and +expense of no less than three separate elections. The process of +elimination is the same as that adopted in the Hare sy<a name="Page_193" id="Page_193" />stem, and is +little, if at all, better than the Queensland plan in securing the +election of the right candidate, while as regards the formation of +groups it is worse. For this plan actually encourages the groups to +split up, since if one candidate nominated by a group is thrown out his +vote will be transferred to the others. Therefore the double election is +much better than either form of the Advance Vote. They would do nothing +towards restoring the one redeeming merit of the single electorate, of +confining representation to the two main parties. And all other +mathematical schemes founded on the <i>a priori</i> assumption that the +candidate most favoured by all sections is entitled to the seat are just +as objectionable.</p> + +<p>The conclusion that must be reached from all these considerations is +that, except when there is a single candidate standing in the interests +of each of the two main parties, it is impossible to say with the +present system who ought to be elected. The difficulty is one of +fundamental principle. The only way to do justice to both parties is to +enlarge the electorates so that each can get its proportionate share of +representation, and then to provide such machinery as will allow each +party separately to elect its most favoured candidates. In no other way +can the people be induced to organize into two coherent parties.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194" /><a name="CHAPTER_X" id="CHAPTER_X" />CHAPTER X.</h2> + +<p class='center'>APPLICATION OF THE REFORM TO AUSTRALIAN LEGISLATURES.</p> + + +<p><b>Federal Legislatures.</b>—The keynote of the Australian Federal +Constitution, as expressed in the Commonwealth Bill, is full and +unreserved trust in the people. This is in direct contrast with the +American Constitution, which seeks to place checks on the people by +dividing power among the President, the Senate, and the House of +Representatives, and assigning to each separate functions. Do we fully +realize the dangers as well as the glorious possibilities of unfettered +action? Do we sufficiently feel the weight of the responsibility we have +undertaken? In reality we have declared to the world the fitness of the +Australian democracy to work a Constitution from which the most advanced +of the other nations would shrink! We do not hesitate to avow our firm +belief that there is only one thing that can save the situation. Unless +Australia is to sh<a name="Page_195" id="Page_195" />ow to the world a warning instead of an example, all +her energies must be bent on the formation of two coherent organized +parties, dividing each State on national issues, and competing for the +support of all classes and all interests in every electorate throughout +the Commonwealth.</p> + +<p>That is the lesson we have endeavoured to inculcate throughout this +book, and we are tempted to quote in support of it the opinion of an +American author, Professor Paul S. Reinsch, in a work just published on +"World Politics." He says:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>The political experience of the last two centuries has proved that + free government and party government are almost convertible terms. + It is still as true as when Burke wrote his famous defence of + party, in his <i>Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents</i>, + that, for the realization of political freedom, the organization of + the electorate into regular and permanent parties is necessary. + Parliamentary government has attained its highest success only in + those countries where political power is held alternately by two + great national parties. As soon as factional interests become + predominant; as soon as the stability of government depends upon + the artificial grouping of minor conflicting interests; as soon as + the nation lacks the tonic effect of the mutual criticisms of great + organizations, the highest form of free government becomes + unattainable. (pp. 327, 328.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>The greatest strain on the Constitution will probably be felt at the +outset. Both people and politicians are suddenly called upon to rise to +a higher plane of political thought and action. The idea that each State +is to send representatives to fight for its own interests mus<a name="Page_196" id="Page_196" />t first be +got rid of. The only way in which all interests can be reconciled is by +each State acting through the national parties. The greatest danger +which assails the Commonwealth is the risk of combinations of States +dominating party lines; and it is the more imminent that divergent +opinions between the larger and the smaller States were already apparent +at the Convention. The four smaller States, Western Australia, South +Australia, Queensland, and Tasmania, with about one-third of the +population, will have two-thirds of the representation in the Senate; +while the two large States, Victoria and New South Wales, will have +about two-thirds of the representation in the House of Representatives. +At the Convention the fear was expressed that the former, representing a +majority of the States, and the latter, representing a majority of the +people, might come into conflict, and that a deadlock would ensue. It +was on this issue that the great struggle at the Convention took place, +resulting in the adoption of a double dissolution and a subsequent joint +sitting of the two Houses if necessary. By this machinery all disputes +will be finally settled. But what will happen if some of the States +consider themselves unjustly treated? Even apart from conflicts between +the two Houses, if only one State stood aloof from the main parties it +could paralyze government, just as Ireland did in the Imperial +Parliament. It is evident, then, that the very existence of the Union is +bound up in the immediate formation of national parties.<a name="Page_197" id="Page_197" /></p> + +<p>In the United States this lesson was not learned till the Civil War had +demonstrated the danger of combinations of States. Since then two great +parties have been maintained, even though their existence involves the +spoils system and machine organization. In Switzerland, too, the federal +tie was not drawn close till after the revolution in 1847, in which the +Catholic cantons attempted to secede.</p> + +<p>Unfortunately, another cause of dissension menaces the Commonwealth. We +allude to the class representation which we have already animadverted +upon. The separate representation of sections or classes within the +States is just as much to be dreaded as the separate representation of +States, and bodes as much ill. It seems not unlikely that the fate of +the first Federal ministry will be in the hands of the Labour party, +which will be able to dictate its policy. It is utterly inconsistent +with the democratic theory that a small minority should have this power; +and it is to be hoped that in the wider field of federal politics its +true character will be recognized. It is only by the mutual action of +two great national parties that the true direction of progress, favoured +by the people, can be worked out; a small minority studying only its own +interests is sure to be a bad guide. A steady pressure maintained +through the two national parties will ensure the recognition of all just +demands; such extreme and ill-considered demands as that for the +initiat<a name="Page_198" id="Page_198" />ive and national referendum can only provoke opposition and cause +reaction. Even those who sympathize with the ultimate objects of the +Labour unions must see the folly of their present unpatriotic and +suicidal tactics.</p> + +<p>It is a matter for hope that in the wider sphere of federal politics the +irresponsible leadership of the press is not likely to be the power for +harm that it is in some of the individual States at present. But while +it may not dominate the Federal Parliament as a whole to the same +extent, its control over nominations in the States will be quite as +great, and immeasurably greater if the Block Vote is adopted. Nor are +signs wanting of a union of some of the larger newspaper ventures in the +principal States, with a view to increase their power.</p> + +<p>Such is a brief review of the outlook. The great requisites essential +for progress are the organization of two national parties and +responsible leadership in the Federal Parliament. The dangers to the +Commonwealth may be summed up under the two heads of lack of +organization and irresponsible leadership outside Parliament. Is it +possible that the dangers may be avoided and the requisites secured by a +change in electoral machinery? Those who have no conception of the +working of social forces, and who do not trace the law of causation into +the realm of mind, will be inclined to scoff at the suggestion. To them +the only hope of improvement lies in appealing to the people to elect +better men. Th<a name="Page_199" id="Page_199" />ey ignore entirely the reciprocal relation of the +Parliament and the people, and while recognizing the influence of the +people on the character of Parliament, they deny the influence of +Parliament on the character of the people. They declare that the people +are "free agents" and will have better government when they make up +their minds to get it; and no electoral machinery or parliamentary +machinery can influence the result. Such is the passive attitude which +consciously or unconsciously is almost universally assumed. Yet who can +study the history of the British Constitution without being impressed +with the fact that every step in the evolution of its machinery was a +true sociological invention and had the effect of directing the people's +will, which is the motive force, into channels conducive to the general +welfare? Take away the responsible leadership of the Cabinet in the +British Parliament, and it would become a sink of corruption like the +United States Congress; take away its organization into two national +parties, and it would become a rabble like the French Chambers. Now, is +not the electoral machinery the connecting link between the people and +Parliament, and therefore a vital part in the machinery of government? +Does it not actually decide the constitution of Parliament? If this be +granted, it follows that unless the electoral machinery be adapted to +give effect to these two great principles, parliaments will inevitably +decline; and that the present method of election is a very inadequate +<a name="Page_200" id="Page_200" />means of giving effect to them few will deny.</p> + +<p>Our claim for the application of the electoral reform set forth in the +preceding pages rests simply on the fact that it will give effect to +these principles under conditions in which the present system would +fail. We press especially for its application to the Federal House of +Representatives, which will be the most important Australian +representative assembly; for it it there that organization and +responsible leadership are most urgently needed. That they will not be +obtained if the present schemes of dividing the States into +single-membered electorates are adopted is morally certain; and the +result can only be disaster and bitter disappointment. If the +mathematical devices described in the last chapter are added, the +disorganization will be still more complete. And as for the scheme for +allowing separate delegation to a number of sections, which is advocated +under the name of the Hare system, it would be absolutely fatal. Who can +believe that if Mr. Hare's wild scheme to divide the British people into +several hundred sections had been adopted 40 years ago the Imperial +Parliament would now be an organized assembly?</p> + +<p>Take the conditions presented by the first elections for the Federal +Parliament, to be held early next year. In some respects it is fortunate +that a definite issue is available as a basis of party organization; for +there is a general consensus of o<a name="Page_201" id="Page_201" />pinion that all other considerations +must be subordinated to a pronouncement on the tariff issue. In an +article on "The Liberal Outlook" in <i>United Australia</i>, the Hon. Alfred +Deakin writes:—"By the very circumstances of the case the tariff issue +cannot but dominate the first election, and determine the fate of the +first ministry of the Commonwealth. There will be no time for second +thoughts or for suspense of judgment. The first choice of the people +will be final on this head. The first Parliament must be either +Protectionist or anti-Protectionist, and its first great work an +Australian tariff. That is the clear-cut issue. The risk is that a +proportion of the representatives may be returned upon other grounds, as +the electors as a whole may not realize all that is at stake or make the +necessary sacrifices of opinions and preferences to express themselves +emphatically on this point." Now, the only way to avoid the risk +indicated is to take this one definite issue as the basis of +proportional representation. Each State should be divided on it, and +should elect its proportional number of Freetrade and Protectionist +representatives. Tasmania and Western Australia could conveniently be +polled for this purpose each as one electorate; South Australia might be +divided into two electorates, Queensland into three, and Victoria and +New South Wales into four or five.</p> + +<p>It is very desirable that the first election be contested on definite +poli<a name="Page_202" id="Page_202" />cies advanced by the prospective party leaders; the suggestion that +the first ministry should be merely a provisional ministry, to act till +the first responsible ministry is formed after the election, is +therefore open to serious objection. The leader of the Freetrade party +or the leader of the Protectionist party should be chosen as first +Federal Premier, and the first election should decide which policy is to +be adopted.</p> + +<p>Contrast this scheme with the proposals now under consideration. In +Victoria, New South Wales, and Queensland bills have been introduced +dividing the States into single-membered electorates, and some of the +smaller States are inclined to use the Block Vote. In Victoria a bad +precedent has been established by giving the party in power the duty of +determining boundaries. From time to time it will be necessary to +rearrange the boundaries, not only on account of movements of population +within the State, but also because the number of representatives which +the State is entitled to will vary. Look forward to the time when the +State becomes entitled to one more representative; every one of the 23 +electorates, in which vested interests will have been created, will have +to be altered These are precisely the conditions which have led to the +growth of the gerrymander in the United States.</p> + +<p>Already the first scheme submitted to the Assembly has been defeated by +a combination of country membe<a name="Page_203" id="Page_203" />rs, who held that Melbourne was allotted a +larger share of representation than it now has in the local Parliament. +Whatever may be the arguments by which the disparity between the size +of town and country electorates be supported in local affairs, surely +they cannot apply where national issues only are at stake. The principle +of equal electorates is recognized in the Commonwealth Bill by the rules +for allotting representation to the States. Why not, then, for the +divisions of each State? It is said that a larger proportion of the +electors vote in the town, but it is not those only who vote who are +represented.</p> + +<p>In dividing a State into electorates for the purpose of the reform, the +number of electors in each division should therefore form the basis of +proportional distribution. The unit of representation would be the total +number of electors in the State divided by the number of seats. One +representative would be allowed to each division of the State for each +unit of representation, and the remaining seats, if any, would go to +those divisions with the largest remainders.</p> + +<p>Coming now to the Federal Senate, the bill provides that every State, +except Queensland, must be polled as one electorate for the election of +six senators at the first election and in case of a double dissolution; +at intermediate elections three senators only will be elected, as they +retire in rotation. This equal representation of the States might be +taken to imply that the Senate is intended to represent State rights, +and the provision<a name="Page_204" id="Page_204" /> that each State is to be polled as one electorate +would seem to support that view. On the other hand, the senators are not +required to vote according to States, for it is provided that "each +senator shall have one vote;" the vote of a State may therefore be +neutralized by its representatives. And again, the Senate is to be +elected directly by the people and not by the State legislatures, as at +first proposed. To some extent, therefore, the Federal Senate as now +constituted presents a new problem in representation, on which it is not +advisable to dogmatize. Personal considerations will probably have more +weight than in the selection of representatives; but when we reflect +that it is really little more than a revising assembly, elected by the +same voters as the House of Representatives to deal with the same +questions, and having no special functions of its own, the conclusion +seems irresistible that the election must be contested by the same +national parties, and that the same method of election should be +adopted.</p> + +<p>Until the Parliament of the Commonwealth prescribes a uniform method of +choosing senators, the duty is to be left to the State parliaments; and +it is to be regretted that the States have taken no steps to secure +uniform action at the first election. In Victoria a fierce newspaper +contest is being waged over the Block Vote and the Hare system, and the +arguments, being mutually destructive, only go to prove that both are +equally objectionable. The <i>Age</i> naturally wishes t<a name="Page_205" id="Page_205" />o have the privilege +of electing six senators as it did ten delegates to the Federal +Convention, and contends that the majority should elect all the +senators; the <i>Argus</i> rushes to the other extreme in declaring that six +separate minorities ought to be represented, and ignores the risk that +these minorities would be formed on a class or religious basis. The +middle position advocated in this book—namely, that majority and +minority should each return its proportional share of representation—is +free from the objections to both these extreme views.</p> + +<p><b>State Legislatures.</b>—Even after federation the State Houses will still +continue to touch at most points the daily lives of the people; they +will merely be shorn of some of their powers and drained of some of +their best leaders. The fiscal issue, which has had great influence in +deciding party lines in the past, will be removed from the arena of +strife, leaving no other than an indefinite line of division into +Liberals and Conservatives, which in practice tends to become a division +into lower and upper classes. This is the danger ahead; and it can only +be avoided by the formation of strong party organizations appealing to +all classes to work together for the general welfare. Party government +is just as necessary in State politics as in national politics.</p> + +<p>The present position is intolerable; the disintegration of parties is so +complete that there is not a responsible ministry in Australia worthy of +the name. Among the ca<a name="Page_206" id="Page_206" />uses which have led to this deplorable state of +affairs the present method of election is undoubtedly the most potent; +it frequently happens that four or five candidates, representing as +many groups, contest a single seat. In Victoria, where the state of +chaos is perhaps worst, the influence of the press, the existence of a +strong Labour section in the Lower House, and the class character of the +Upper House, representing property and capital, have been the principal +contributing causes.</p> + +<p>With the advent of federation a revision of the State constitution is +widely demanded, and is likely to be conceded. One of the first steps +necessary to restore harmony must be reform of the Upper House by a +gradual extension of the franchise and a lowering of the qualification, +so as to ensure that elections are freely contested; it is its present +unrepresentative character which gives force to the appeals of the +radical press and intensifies class divisions.</p> + +<p>The relation of State parties to the national parties is an important +subject. In the article from which we have already quoted, in <i>United +Australia</i>, Mr. Deakin writes:—"There cannot be a series of Liberal +parties, one Federal and the others in the States, each going its own +way. There must be but one party, with one programme, to which effect +will require to be given continuously in both the States and the +Commonwealth." He therefore deplores that the Liberal party, together +<a name="Page_207" id="Page_207" />with its "left wing," the Labour class, will be split on the fiscal +issue. "It is this apparently unavoidable rupture in the party," he +declares, "which endangers its prospects and presents an opportunity to +the Conservative classes of either seizing or sharing an authority to +which they could not otherwise aspire." If this means that the "Liberal" +and Labour classes are entitled by reason of their numbers to a +perpetual lease of power in both domains, there can be no more dangerous +doctrine. Parties should be decided by questions of progress and +financial policy, and not on class lines; and since the State and +Federal legislatures have separate spheres of action, parties should be +separate also, unless, indeed, they are to be founded on corruption, as +in the United States, where the same two parties control not only +national and State politics, but city government also.</p> + +<p>In the consolidation of public opinion into two definite lines of policy +based on the questions to be dealt with lies the only hope, then, of the +progress of the individual States within their own range; and in +promoting this desirable result the reform advocated in these pages +finds its true application.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208" /><a name="CHAPTER_XI" id="CHAPTER_XI" />CHAPTER XI.</h2> + +<p class='center'>THE CONDITIONS OF SOCIAL PROGRESS.</p> + + +<p><b>The Agent of Progress.</b>—If the analysis made in the preceding pages of +the principles underlying political representation comes to be regarded +as correct, the science of sociology must be profoundly affected: for it +is a fact that not only the importance but the very existence of the +principles involved has been completely missed by speculators in that +field. The view we have taken is that representation is the most +important sociological invention which has been made in the whole +history of the human race; that the successive steps taken in the +evolution of the British Constitution mark a series of inventions +scarcely less important, and that the resulting institution of party and +responsible government is the indispensable agent of democratic +progress. We have traced throughout the electoral and parliamentary +machinery on which the institution is based the action of two great +principles—organization and responsible leadership—and we have shown +<a name="Page_209" id="Page_209" />that these are the mainsprings of the whole mechanism. Yet we find even +such an authority as Mr. Herbert Spencer objecting to the party system, +on the ground that it lends itself to a one-man or a one-party +tyranny.<a name="FNanchor_9" href="#Footnote_9">[9]</a> The fact is that it is only when representative government +is weak, and approaches direct government, that such a result can +happen, and the distinction is so little recognized that a brief +recapitulation may be permitted.</p> + +<p>The fundamental error is in conceiving representation as merely a means +of registering the popular will; many even go so far as to regard it as +an imperfect means of ensuring that each single question will be decided +according to the will of the majority. All such conceptions really +amount to direct government, and where they are given effect to, whether +by the referendum or sectional delegation, society is not organized for +consistent progress. Indeed, if the lessons of history can be trusted, +such a state of society is bound to be wrecked from within by +anti-social influences; political power becomes the object of factious +strife, and the rule of the majority degenerates into the tyranny of the +majority.</p> + +<p>We have endeavoured to show that the true conception of representative +government involves a recognition of the principles of organization and +leadership, and that representation is in consequence a means not only +of registering the popular will, but also of o<a name="Page_210" id="Page_210" />rganizing and guiding it. +In both cases, therefore, the popular will is the ultimate motive force, +but in the one case the desires of the people clash, while in the other +they are directed into channels conducive to the general welfare. We +have regarded it as an essential condition of representative government +that the popular will be expressed only as to the direction of progress, +that is to say on general policy and not on single questions, and that +complete control of progress be then left to the representative body. In +no other way can the people be saved from their anti-social tendencies, +and induced to express their opinion as to what is best for all. We have +seen how the electoral machinery is adapted to organize this expression +of the popular will into two alternative directions of progress; how +this is effected by the fact of two parties competing for the support of +the people on policies expressing these lines of progress; and how the +parliamentary machinery allows the stronger of these two parties for the +time being complete control of administration and of the direction of +progress. The effect of this organization is that the popular will is +reduced to effective action in one direction at a time—a result which +is not possible with direct government.</p> + +<p>Nor is the principle of responsible leadership which is involved in the +reciprocal relation of the representative body and the people any less +important. Society cannot progress faster than the individual units +composing it. True<a name="Page_211" id="Page_211" /> progress lies therefore in raising the standard of +public opinion, and it is this principle which ensures that result by +reacting upon and moulding individual character. Hence we find that in +countries like England, where the principle is operative, progress is +effected without supervision and undue interference in the affairs of +the individual by the State, while in countries where the principle is +not operative, such as the Continental countries of Europe and some of +the Australian colonies, the contrary is the case. Legislation should +therefore be directed to changing the nature of the individual, and +should not be too far in advance of public opinion. This is what Mr. +Lester F. Ward, in his work on "Outlines of Sociology," calls attractive +legislation. He writes:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>The principle involved in attraction, when applied to social + affairs, is simply that of <i>inducing</i> men to act for the good of + society. It is that of harmonizing the interests of the individual + with those of society, of making it advantageous to the individual + to do that which is socially beneficial; not merely in a negative + form as an alternative of two evils, as is done when a penalty is + attached to an action, but positively, in such a manner that he + will exert himself to do those things that society most needs to + have done. The sociologist and the statesman should co-operate in + discovering the laws of society and the methods of utilizing them, + so as to let the social forces flow freely and strongly, + untrammelled by penal statutes, mandatory laws, irritating + prohibitions, and annoying obstacles. (p. 274.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>Now, we submit that this attractive legislation is possible only when +there is no oppressed minority, and<a name="Page_212" id="Page_212" /> is therefore the peculiar province +of representative government; for we have shown that the whole machinery +is adapted to induce the people to desire only what is best in the +interests of society.</p> + +<p>Let us briefly examine the bearing of the view that representative +machinery is the agent of progress on previous theories of social +progress.</p> + +<p><b>Professor Huxley.</b>—No one has more clearly laid down the conditions of +social progress than the late Professor Huxley in his essay on +<i>Evolution and Ethics</i>. The gradual strengthening of the social bond by +the practise of self-restraint in the interests of society he called the +ethical process, and he showed that social progress means a checking of +the cosmic process at every step and the substitution of this ethical +process. This action he compares to that of a gardener in clearing a +patch of waste ground. If he relaxes his efforts to maintain the state +of art within the garden, weeds will overrun it and the state of nature +will return. So the human race is doomed to a constant struggle to +maintain the state of art of an organized polity in opposition to the +state of nature; to substitute as far as possible social progress for +cosmic evolution. He says:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>Let us understand, once for all, that the ethical progress of + society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in + running away from it, but in combating it. It may seem an audacious + proposal thus to pit the microcosm against the macrocosm, and to + set man to subdue nature to his higher ends; but I venture to think + that the great inte<a name="Page_213" id="Page_213" />llectual difference between the ancient times + with which we have been occupied and our day, lies in the solid + foundation we have acquired for the hope that such an enterprise + may meet with a certain measure of success....<a name="FNanchor_10" href="#Footnote_10">[10]</a></p> + +<p> Moreover, the cosmic nature born with us, and to a large extent + necessary for our maintenance, is the outcome of millions of years + of severe training, and it would be folly to imagine that a few + centuries will suffice to subdue its masterfulness to purely + ethical ends. Ethical nature may count upon having to reckon with a + tenacious and powerful enemy as long as the world lasts. But, on + the other hand, I see no limit to the extent to which intelligence + and will, guided by sound principles of investigation, and + organized in common effort, may modify the conditions of existence + for a period longer than that now covered by history. And much may + be done to change the nature of man himself. The intelligence which + has converted the brother of the wolf into the faithful guardian of + the flock ought to be able to do something towards curbing the + instincts of savagery in civilized men.<a name="FNanchor_11" href="#Footnote_11">[11]</a></p></blockquote> + +<p>But Huxley never realized that the real cause of the better prospects of +success in modern as contrasted with ancient times is the discovery of +representative machinery. "The business," he declared, "of the sovereign +authority—which is, or ought to be, simply a delegation of the people +appointed to act for its good—appears to me to be not only to enforce +the renunciation of the anti-social desires, but wherever it may be +necessary to promote the satisfaction of those which are conducive to +progress."<a name="FNanchor_12" href="#Footnote_12">[12]</a> There is no conception here of the principles of +organization and responsible leadership, so necessary in constituting +<a name="Page_214" id="Page_214" />this "delegation."</p> + +<p><b>Herbert Spencer.</b>—By a great many sociologists it is denied that man +has his destiny in his own hands, or can by common effort modify the +conditions of existence so as to promote progress. The conception which +is held to justify this view is that there is an exact correspondence +between the progress of human society and the growth of an organism. +Foremost among those who take this view is Mr. Herbert Spencer. The +close analogy which the progress of the assumed social organism bears to +the growth of the physiological organism is worked out in great detail +throughout the "Synthetic Philosophy," and is taken to establish "that +Biology and Sociology will more or less interpret each other." The +practical conclusion which is drawn is that the growth of society must +not be interfered with; if the State goes beyond the duty of protection, +it becomes an aggressor. So Mr. Spencer is a most uncompromising +opponent of State action, even education and public sanitation coming in +for his condemnation. Moreover, he holds that if the social organism be +let alone it will tend to a future state of society in which social +altruism will be so developed that the individual will voluntarily +sacrifice himself in the interests of society.</p> + +<p>In an essay on <i>The Social Organism</i> ("Essays," Second Series), he +writes:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>Strange as the assertion will be thought, our Houses of Parliament<a name="Page_215" id="Page_215" /> + discharge in the social economy functions that are, in sundry + respects, comparable to those discharged by the cerebral masses in + a vertebrate animal.... We may describe the office of the brain as + that of <i>averaging</i> the interests of life, physical, intellectual, + moral, social; and a good brain is one in which the desires + answering to their respective interests are so balanced that the + conduct they jointly dictate sacrifices none of them. Similarly we + may describe the office of Parliament as that of <i>averaging</i> the + interests of the various classes in a community; and a good + Parliament is one in which the parties answering to these + respective interests are so balanced that their united legislation + concedes to each class as much as consists with the claims of the + rest.</p></blockquote> + +<p>The error of regarding society merely as an aggregate is here clearly +shown, for if the "parties" in Parliament were based on class +delegation, as assumed, social progress would be blocked. The only real +foundation for the resemblance between society and an organism is this: +that unless the individual units composing society reduce themselves to +unity of action in a definite direction, society as a whole cannot +progress; or, in other words, that the principles of organization and +leadership are essential to progress. Yet Mr. Spencer denies that there +is any sphere of collective action for the operation of these +principles!</p> + +<p><b>Benjamin Kidd.</b>—The "social organism" theory is also the foundation of +the theory of social progress with which Mr. Benjamin Kidd startled the +scientific world a few years ago in "Social Evolution." While +appreciating the importance of<a name="Page_216" id="Page_216" /> the factor of individual reason, he +contended that self-restraint by the individual in the interests of +society is impossible without an ultra-rational sanction; that, in +fact, without this the reason is the most anti-social and +anti-evolutionary of all human qualities. The central fact therefore +with which we are confronted in our progressive societies is stated as +follows:—"<i>The interests of the social organism and those of the +individuals comprising it at any particular time are actually +antagonistic; they can never be reconciled; they are inherently and +essentially irreconcilable.</i>" What becomes of this extraordinary +proposition if it is clearly established that the amount of +reconciliation depends on the extent to which the principles of +organization and responsible leadership are given effect to by +representative machinery?</p> + +<p><b>Past Progress.</b>—The question will naturally be raised: If a +representative body is now the indispensable agent of social progress, +how can progress previous to the introduction of representation be +explained? The answer is that the same principles were operative, but in +different forms, more suited to the stage of social development. Indeed, +we may say that, from the time that man emerged from the brute stage and +became a social animal, the types of society which have survived in the +struggle for existence with the state of nature and with other types +have been those in which the principles of organization and leadership +have been most active. Eve<a name="Page_217" id="Page_217" />n the lowest types of savages, such as the +native tribes studied by Professor Baldwin Spencer and Mr. Gillen in +Central Australia, have a complicated system of organization, the +peculiar feature of which is totemism, or group marriage; but this is +more the result of development than of conscious effort. Leadership also +is rudimentary, for, although the old men have control of the elaborate +ceremonies described, they conform almost entirely to custom and +tradition. Out of this savage stage there grew in favoured countries the +second type of human society—the patriarchal, in which leadership +becomes personal, and centred in a chief who exercises despotic +authority. Patriarchal society grew out of the necessities of a pastoral +existence; indeed, it was the discovery of the domestication of animals +which gave rise to it. Among other interesting features which were +developed are permanent marriage, slavery, and ancestor worship. There +can be no doubt that the latter played an important part in binding the +tribe into one organization, and in inducing all the tribe to submit to +the leadership of the chief. There is a second stage of patriarchal +society in which the large tribes break up into clans and become less +nomadic. Professor Jenks has shown, in his "Short History of Politics," +how this stage originated in the adoption of agriculture. We begin now +to have the village community, bound by the tie of kinship, and +submitting to the leadership of a lord; and are already on the threshold +of mo<a name="Page_218" id="Page_218" />dern political society, in which all these ancient barriers are +broken down and the individual becomes the social unit. The cause of +this momentous change is development of the art of warfare. But before +we reach the modern State there is an intermediate stage, namely, +feudalism. The feudal chief is simply the successful warrior—the leader +of a band of adventurers who get control of a definite territory and +exact military allegiance from its inhabitants. Out of the consolidation +of these bands, or by conquest, modern States were founded. Leadership +was now vested in an irresponsible despot—the king; and the trouble was +to render this new institution permanent, and to induce the people to +submit to it. The former result was attained by making the kingship +hereditary, but the latter has always been a difficult task. It is +doubtful if it would ever have been accomplished but for a significant +alliance—that of Church and State. The convenient fiction of the divine +right of kings was invented, and religion was used to bolster up the +institution and to provide a sanction for submission to absolutism. In +other words, irresponsible leadership was tolerated because +responsibility was supposed to exist to a Higher Power. So we find that +all the great religious movements—Christianity, Mohammedanism, and even +Buddhism—have been associated with the establishment of mighty +kingdoms. Moreover, the only two kingdoms in Europe in which absolutism +still holds out are <a name="Page_219" id="Page_219" />Russia and Turkey, in which the head of the State is +also head of the Church. But military despotism, which was based solely +on the exploitation of weaker communities, of which ancient Rome was +the culminating type, wanted the elements of permanent progress, and was +bound to disappear before a new type which rested on the development of +internal resources. Militarism must therefore be looked on as a real +stage of progress; for in contrast with patriarchal society it was +competitive, and it broke down many ancient barriers, and prepared the +way for industrial co-operation. Thus we arrive at the conditions +favourable to the rise of representative institutions. For when the cost +of wars had to be raised out of the national resources kings found it +convenient to get the consent of the people to taxation. Hence the great +movement throughout Western Europe for the establishment of parliaments +in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Why is it that in England alone +this movement was successful? Partly no doubt because its isolated +position was favourable to internal progress, but mainly because it was +the only State in which the principles of organization and responsible +leadership were continuously given effect to. So it is that in England +there was developed that wonderful machinery of representative +government which has enabled the people to substitute responsible for +irresponsible leadership, and has made the national character what it +is. This mac<a name="Page_220" id="Page_220" />hinery has now been adopted nearly all over the world, +wherever it has been desired to make the popular will felt, but in no +case has it sufficed to give effect to the underlying principles to the +same extent; and success has been attained only in so far as they have +been effective. The lesson of the last century has been that the +machinery which proved sufficient in England, where progress was uniform +through several centuries, breaks down when the pace of progress is +increased. An extreme instance is the recent attempt to introduce party +government into Japan, a country just emerging from the feudal stage, an +interesting account of which is given in the <i>Nineteenth Century</i> for +July, 1899. The experiment failed because the clans could not be divided +on questions of political principle. In a greater or less degree that is +the fundamental source of difficulty everywhere; if the representative +machinery produces only sectional delegation the tendency is back +through anarchy to absolutism. Is it not an extraordinary fact, then, +that the vital distinction between representation and delegation is so +universally ignored?</p> + +<p>Such is a brief outline of the evolution of human society; however +inadequate it may be, it at least serves to illustrate the truth that +social progress has never been made in the past except when the +principles of organization and leadership have been operative.</p> + +<p><b>Future Progres<a name="Page_221" id="Page_221" />s.</b>—As to the ultimate tendency of future progress it +would be pedantry to dogmatize; our task has been the humbler one of +pointing out the means by which progress is to be attained. We have +assumed, however, that there is a separate sphere of collective action +in which government is an instrument for the positive amelioration of +social conditions. We are aware that this conclusion is at variance with +the two extreme schools of modern thought; on the one hand, with the +individualists, who hold that government should only be used for mutual +protection and to keep order; and on the other hand, with the +socialists, who would leave nothing to individual action. Professor +Huxley has reduced the claims of these two schools to absurdity and +impossibility respectively; and we believe that the problem of the +future is to find out that middle course between the anarchy of the one +and the despotism of the other which makes for progress. It seems likely +that the state of society we are approaching will be one in which, while +natural inequalities will be recognized, neither the artificial +inequalities of fanatical individualism nor the artificial equalities of +regimental socialism will be tolerated, and every man will enter the +rivalry of life on terms of an equality of opportunity. This is the +state foreshadowed by Mr. Lester Ward in his "Outlines of Sociology" and +called by him <i>Sociocracy</i>. Such ideals, however, serve only to refute +false conceptions and offer little practical guidance. What is wanted is +a clear recogni<a name="Page_222" id="Page_222" />tion of the fact that <i>progress depends on collective +effort acting through representative machinery, the efficiency of which +depends on the extent to which the principles of organization and +responsible leadership are operative.</i> The question with which +democratic countries are faced to-day is this: Must it be acknowledged +that the people are unfit for self-government, or is the representative +machinery defective? We have supported the view that the latter is the +case as regards English-speaking-countries at all events; and we have +shown that in British countries the remedy lies in improved electoral +machinery, while in the United States both electoral and parliamentary +machinery are at fault.</p> + +<p>FOOTNOTES:</p> + +<p><a name="Footnote_9" href="#FNanchor_9">[9]</a> "Principles of Ethics."</p> + +<p><a name="Footnote_10" href="#FNanchor_10">[10]</a> "Collected Essays," vol. ix., p. 83.</p> + +<p><a name="Footnote_11" href="#FNanchor_11">[11]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 85.</p> + +<p><a name="Footnote_12" href="#FNanchor_12">[12]</a> "Collected Essays," vol. i., pp. 275-276.</p> + +<div>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 14459 ***</div> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..94fa418 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #14459 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/14459) diff --git a/old/14459-8.txt b/old/14459-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5f16aad --- /dev/null +++ b/old/14459-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,5883 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Proportional Representation Applied To +Party Government, by T. R. Ashworth and H. P. C. Ashworth + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Proportional Representation Applied To Party Government + +Author: T. R. Ashworth and H. P. C. Ashworth + +Release Date: December 25, 2004 [EBook #14459] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION *** + + + + +Produced by Martin Pettit and the PG Online Distributed Proofreading Team + + + + + + +PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION APPLIED TO PARTY GOVERNMENT + +A NEW ELECTORAL SYSTEM + +BY + +T.R. ASHWORTH (_President of the Victorian Division, Australian Free +Trade and Liberal Association_) + +AND + +H.P.C. ASHWORTH (_Civil Engineer_) + + + +LONDON + +SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO., LIM. + +PATERNOSTER SQUARE + +1901 + + + + +CONTENTS. + + +CHAPTER PAGE + +I.--THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 1 + +II.--THE SO-CALLED REPRESENTATIVE PRINCIPLE 22 + +III.--THE PRESENT POSITION or PARTY GOVERNMENT 47 + +IV.--THE REFORM: TRUE PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION 97 + +V.--HOW THE EVILS OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM WILL + BE REMEDIED 122 + +VI.--THE HARE SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL DELEGATION 141 + +VII.--THE FREE LIST SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL + DELEGATION 162 + +VIII.--PREFERENTIAL VOTING, THE BLOCK VOTE, + THE LIMITED VOTE, &C. 172 + +IX.--ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE THE PRESENT SYSTEM 188 + +X.--APPLICATION OF THE REFORM TO AUSTRALIAN + LEGISLATURES 194 + +XI.--THE CONDITIONS OF SOCIAL PROGRESS 208 + + + + + "Majority and minority, in and for themselves, are the first + requisite of popular government, and not the development or + representation of separate groups."--Bradford's "Lesson of Popular + Government," vol. ii., page 179. + + + + +PREFACE. + + +The subject of electoral reform has been brought into prominence in +Australia by a clause in the Commonwealth Bill which provides that the +Federal Senate shall consist of six senators from each State, directly +chosen by the people, voting as one electorate. The problem thus +presented has been keenly discussed. On the one hand we have the +advocates of the Block Vote asserting that the party in a majority is +entitled to return all six senators; and on the other, a small band of +ardent reformers pressing the claims of the Hare system, which would +allow the people in each State to group themselves into six sections, +each returning one senator. The claim that every section of the people +is entitled to representation appears at first sight so just that it +seems intolerable that a method should have been used all these years +which excludes the minority in each electorate from any share of +representation; and, of course, the injustice becomes more evident when +the electorate returns several members. But in view of the adage that +it is the excellence of old institutions which preserves them, it is +surely a rash conclusion that the present method of election has no +compensating merit. We believe there is such a merit--namely, that _the +present method of election has developed the party system_. Once this +truth is grasped, it is quite evident that the Hare system would be +absolutely destructive to party government, since each electorate would +be contested, not by two organized parties, but by several groups. For +it is precisely this splitting into groups which is causing such anxiety +among thoughtful observers as to the future of representative +institutions; Mr. Lecky has attributed to it, in his "Democracy and +Liberty," the decline in the parliamentary system which has accompanied +the progress of democracy all over the world. The object of this book is +to suggest a reform, which possesses the advantages of both methods and +the disadvantages of neither; which will still ensure that each +electorate is contested by the two main parties, but will allow its just +share of representation to each; and which will, by discouraging the +formation of minor groups, provide a remedy for the evil instead of +aggravating it. + + T.R.A. + H.P.C.A. + +325 COLLINS STREET, MELBOURNE. + + + + +PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION + +APPLIED TO + +PARTY GOVERNMENT. + + + + +CHAPTER I. + +THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION. + + +Old establishments, like the British Constitution, said Edmund Burke, +"are not often constructed after any theory; theories are rather drawn +from them." In setting out on an endeavour to understand the principles +underlying political representation, the saying expresses exactly the +course which should be followed. The inquiry is the more necessary as, +although representation more than anything else in the domain of +government distinguishes the modern from the ancient world, the ideas +which prevail as to the part it has played, is playing, and is destined +to play on the world's stage are not merely hazy, but extremely +inaccurate. The intimate connection of representation with the progress +which has followed its introduction is so little recognized that the +most advanced democracies are now willing to listen to any proposal to +return to direct government. In spite of the fact that the nineteenth +century has witnessed the triumph of the historical method in most +fields of social inquiry, the dangers of _a priori_ speculation on +political institutions are as much in evidence as when Burke wrote. + +If we would understand, then, the meaning of representative +institutions, it is in the gradual development of the "mother of +parliaments" that we must seek for the most reliable information. We +must be careful, however, to leave out of sight those features of the +growth of the British Constitution which are merely the expression of +transitory social conditions, and to confine our attention to the +landmarks which bear directly on the inquiry. The subject is best +divided into two stages; the first characterized by the origin of +representation; and the second by the division into parties, and the +creation of cabinet government. + ++The First Stage of Representation.+--Rightly to understand the +conditions which led to the introduction and development of the +representative principle, we must look back to the period immediately +following the signing of the Great Charter by the tyrant King John. + +The Charter reaffirmed the ancient principle that free Englishmen should +not be taxed without their consent, and representation was the natural +outcome of that provision. A brief glance at the social conditions of +the time is necessary to understand why this was so. First, it must be +remembered that the true political unit of ancient times was the city +or local community. England at that time was a collection of local +communities, having more or less a corporate life. Then, again, there +were the three estates of the realm--the clergy, the lords, and the +commons--who were accustomed to confer with the King on public affairs. +The stage which marks the birth of representation was when these +different estates and communities were asked to tax themselves to +relieve the necessities of the King. It was obviously impossible that +the consent of every freeman should be obtained, hence the duty had to +be deputed to agents. Now, the idea of agency was not unknown in the +ancient world, but that agents should have power to bind those for whom +they acted was something entirely new. It was necessary, however, that +they should have this power, and it suited the King's convenience that +they should exercise it. Already, in the earliest writ of which we have +knowledge, summoning each shire to send two good and discreet knights, +it was provided that they should be chosen in the stead of each and all. +This happened in 1254, and in the following year the clergy were also +summoned for the same purpose of granting aid to the King. In the +meantime the merchants and trade guilds in the cities were growing rich. +The King cast longing eyes on their possessions, and wished to tax them. +So we find that in 1264 Simon de Montfort, Earl of Leicester, issued the +celebrated writ summoning each of the cities and boroughs to send two +of its more discreet and worthy citizens and burgesses. This is +sometimes regarded as the beginning of the House of Commons, but it was +really not until the fourteenth century that these several assemblies, +each of which up till then taxed itself separately and legislated in its +own sphere, coalesced into the present Houses. First the lower clergy +fell out, and, with the knights, citizens, and burgesses, were merged +into the House of Commons; and the higher prelates with the earls and +barons formed the House of Lords. + +This, then, is the first stage of representation. What was the nature of +this new force which had come into the world and was destined to so +profoundly affect the whole course of human affairs? One result of +immense importance is apparent at a glance. It solved a problem which +had baffled the ancients--that of the nationalization of local +communities on a free basis. But it is generally assumed that the only +difficulty overcome was that of size; that the representative assembly +is a mere substitute for the larger assembly of the whole nation. +Starting with this assumption, it is claimed that the representative +assembly should be a mirror of the people on a small scale, and the more +faithfully it reflects their faults as well as their virtues, their +ignorance as well as their intelligence, the more truly representative +it is said to be. It is even asserted that with the modern facilities +for taking a poll, representative government might be dispensed with +and the people allowed to govern themselves. Democracy, we are assured, +means that every man should exercise an equality of political power. +Now, if this conception is correct, we should at once insist that every +law should be submitted to a direct referendum of the people; that +legislators should be mere agents for drawing up laws; and that the +executive should be directly responsible to and elected by the people. +But if representation is not a mere substitute for the direct action of +the people this idea as to the true line of democratic progress falls to +the ground. The whole question, therefore, hinges on what representation +is and what are the principles underlying it. + +Looking back to the history of its introduction, we have seen that it +was only in proportion as the deputies of the local communities were not +regarded as delegates or agents that they became representatives. +Professor E. Jenks has written an interesting article in the +_Contemporary Review_ for December, 1898, in which he advances the +theory that representation is a union of the ideas of agency, borrowed +from the Roman law, and of vicarious liability from barbaric sources. As +to the latter he points out that in Anglo-Saxon times the only way for +the King to control the free local communities was to exact hostages +till crimes were punished or fines paid. In England, where these ideas +were combined, constitutional monarchy was firmly established; but in +France, Germany, &c, in whose medieval parliaments the idea of agency +prevailed, and where in consequence the parliamentary idea was weak, +absolute monarchy held its ground. When Edward I. desired for purposes +of his own to emphasize the unlimited liability of political +representatives, and insisted that they should have "full and sufficient +power to do what of common council shall be ordained," he probably never +realized that a body having power to bind the shires and towns was a +formidable institution, or that the trembling hostages would become in +time haughty plenipotentiaries. But whatever may have been the social +conditions which gave rise to the idea, it is certain that it was the +power of binding those to whom they owed their selection which enabled +the representatives to resist the encroachments of the monarchy on the +liberties of the people. At first they were not legislators, but merely +sought to uphold the ancient laws. They presented petitions to redress +their grievances; but in time these petitions became demands; and they +refused to grant the King's subsidies till the demands were complied +with. It was, therefore, this first stage of representation which +enabled the people to start that long struggle against the power of the +King and nobles which has ended in complete self-government; nay, more, +it was necessary that they should pass through this first stage before +they could learn to govern themselves. Yet we have seen that if we apply +the modern ideas on representation the start could never have been +made. In what respects, then, did these early representative +institutions differ from the modern conception as a reproduction of the +people on a small scale? One obvious difference at once suggests itself. +The representatives were not average members of the communities; they +were the most influential; they were selected because of their special +fitness for the work to be done; they were leaders of the people, not +followers; they did not take inspiration from the people, but brought it +to them; and having selected these men the people deferred to their +judgment to act for them and protect their interests. Here, then, we +arrive at the first principle involved in representation, which is +leadership. + +But there is another and still more important difference between a +representative assembly and a primary assembly of the people. It is +this: that a representative cannot be a violent partisan of a small +section of his constituents; he must be in general favour with all +sections. Therefore a representative assembly is composed of moderate +men, representing a compromise of the views of their individual +supporters. Moreover, the representatives appeal to the people to sink +their minor differences for the general welfare. This feature is very +prominent in the early parliaments. The local communities were arrayed +as a united people against the aggression of the monarchy. The principle +which is here apparent is that of organization. In the first stage of +English parliamentary history we may say at once that these two +principles--organization and leadership--were most conspicuous. The +people, sinking all minor differences, formed one united party; and +recognised that their struggle against the party of prerogative depended +on the ability, influence, and integrity of their deputies. + ++The Second Stage of Representation.+--There is no need to enter into +that long struggle between the nation and the monarchy which followed. +We pass on, then, to the time when the parliaments, having wrested a +share of power, began to split up into parties. It was natural that when +power became divided two parties should arise; one upholding the +authority of the Parliament against the King; and the other favouring +the divine right of Kings. The Puritans and Cavaliers in the troublous +times of Charles I. were the earliest signs of this tendency. The Long +Parliament, which met in 1640, was divided on these lines; the +misdemeanors of the King brought on civil war; the parliamentary troops +defeated the royal troops after a bloody struggle; and the King was +brought to execution. The succeeding events were full of instruction. +The Parliament attempted to govern the nation--or, rather, we should say +the House of Commons did, for the House of Lords was abolished. But it +proved quite unfit for the purpose. It was thoroughly disorganized, and +rent by violent factions. The anarchy which ensued was ended by a +military despot, Oliver Cromwell, who entered the House of Commons in +1653 with his soldiers. The Speaker was pulled from his chair; the +members were driven from the House; and Cromwell was proclaimed +dictator. It is strange, indeed, that the lesson which is to be drawn +from this event, and which has been repeated in France time after time +since the Revolution, has not yet been learned: the only escape from +continued political anarchy is despotism. But the weakness of despotism +is that it ends with the life of the despot. Cromwell's son was forced +to abdicate, and the monarchy was restored. The same division of parties +in the Parliament continued, and they began to take the names of Whigs +and Tories. Towards the end of the seventeenth century, the dissensions +of these two factions again threatened to make government impossible. In +administration the evil was felt most; the union of ministers of both +parties was proving unworkable. So fickle did legislation become that no +one could say one day what the House would do the next. It was at this +crisis, and about the year 1693, that William III., who cared more for a +strong administration than for political differences, created what is +known as cabinet government, and, as Professor Gardiner says, "refounded +the government of England on a new basis." Recognizing that power should +not be separated from responsibility, he affirmed the principle that the +ministers of state should be selected from the party which had a +majority in the House of Commons. But the time was not yet ripe for the +complete application of this principle. Early in the eighteenth century +Sir Robert Walpole set the example of resigning when he no longer +possessed the confidence of a majority of the House of Commons; but in +the latter half of the century the great Earl of Chatham introduced +again the practice of selecting ministers irrespective of party. Despite +the fact that he was supported by the personal influence of George III., +the attempt failed. A succession of weak ministries followed; and out of +the confusion the modern division of Liberals and Conservatives emerged. +Thus it was not until the beginning of the present century that the +doctrines of the solidarity of the Cabinet and its complete dependence +on a majority of the House of Commons were thoroughly developed in their +present form. England, now grown into the United Kingdom, had at last, +after six centuries of strife, won her national independence, and for +one brief century has enjoyed a full measure of self-government. + ++Comparison of the Two Stages.+--How do the conditions presented by the +nineteenth century differ from those of the fourteenth? And how is the +problem of representation affected? We have seen that the great forces +which animated the nation in the fourteenth century were organization +and leadership. Have these forces ceased to operate? Assuredly not. In +the fourteenth century we had a united people organized under its chosen +leaders against the encroachments of the King and nobility on its +national liberty. In the nineteenth century the people have won their +political independence, but the struggle is now carried on between two +great organized parties. The principle of leadership is still as strong +as ever. The careers of Pitt, Peel, Palmerston, Beaconsfield, and +Gladstone attest that fact. The one great difference, then, between the +fourteenth and the nineteenth centuries is that instead of one party +there are two. The problem of representation in the fourteenth century +was to keep the people together in one united party, and to allow them +to select their most popular leaders. Surely the problem is different in +the nineteenth century. The requirements now are to organize the people +into two great parties, and to allow each party separately to elect its +most popular leaders. And yet we are still using the same method of +election as our forefathers used six centuries ago. Although the +conditions have entirely changed, we have not adapted the electoral +machinery to the change. The system of single-membered electorates was +rational in the fourteenth century, because there was only one party. Is +it not on the face of it absurd to-day, when there are two parties? + ++The Meaning of Party Government.+--Why should there be two parties +instead of one in order that the people should be able to govern +themselves? To answer this question we must start at the beginning, and +consider what is the problem of popular government. The best definition +is that it is to promote the general welfare--to reconcile or average +the real interests of all sections of the community. Now, if the people +could all agree what is best in the interests of all, unity of action +might certainly be obtained; but even then the problem would not be +solved, for the people are not infallible. The greater part of the +problem consists in finding out what is best in the interests of all, +and no amount of mere abstract speculation can solve this part. So +diverse and so complex are the interests to be reconciled, so interwoven +and interdependent one with another, that the problem of securing a just +balance is incapable of solution by anything short of omniscience. But +in any case the people cannot be always got to agree to one course of +action. Therefore the people cannot govern themselves as one united +party. The only workable basis is, then, the rule of the majority, and +the problem of popular government is how to ensure that the majority +shall rule in the interests of all. + +Party government provides the best known means of solving this problem. +The only way of finding out what is best for the whole people is by the +incessant action and interaction of two great organized parties under +their chosen leaders; each putting forth its energies to prove its +fitness to hold the reins of government; each anxious to expose the +defects of the other. This healthy emulation as to what is best for all, +with the people to judge, is the real secret of free government. The +two parties are virtually struggling as to which shall be king. Each is +striving to gain the support of a majority of the people; and the +grounds on which it appeals for support are that the measures it +proposes are the best for the country, and that the men it puts forward +are the best men for passing those measures into law and carrying on the +administration of the country. This constant agitation, and this mutual +competition to devise new measures, and to bring forward new men, +prevent stagnation. Both sides of every leading public question of the +day are presented in the rival party policies, and the people are +invited to decide between them. The forces on which the parties rely to +move the people are enthusiasm for measures and enthusiasm for +men--party and personality, or, in other words, organization and +leadership. It is in opposing these forces to counteract the selfish and +anti-social passions that party government acquires its virtue. By +appealing to their higher nature it induces the people to subordinate +their class prejudices to the general welfare, and by setting before +them definite moral ideals, and appealing to them by the force of +personality, it raises the character of public opinion, and moulds +individual and national character to an extent that is seldom +appreciated. Here, then, is the key of human progress. Direct +democracies may hold together so long as there are external enemies to +induce the people to sink their differences in the common interest, or +so long as there is a slave caste to do the menial work, as in the +ancient democracies; but representative democracy offers the only hope +of welding together a free people into a united whole. The unrestrained +rule of the majority under direct democracy must degenerate into the +tyranny of the majority. Instead of the equality of political power +which it promises, the minority is deprived of all power. Representative +democracy, on the other hand, deprives the people of the personal +exercise of political power, in order to save them from the free play of +their self-assertive passions, but still leaves to every man an equality +of influence in deciding the direction of progress. Thus every man is +induced to express his opinion as to the direction of progress; and the +party policy is the resultant direction of progress of all the party +electors, and therefore represents their organized opinion. Now, bear in +mind that the true direction of progress is not known, and can only be +found out by constant experiment directed by the most far-seeing and +capable minds. It is the means of carrying on this experiment which +party government provides. The party representing the organized opinion +of the majority has, rightly, complete control of the direction of +progress so long as it remains in a majority. But, although deliberation +is the work of many, execution is the work of one. Hence the creation of +a small committee of the party in power--the cabinet--associated with +the leader of the party, who becomes for the time being the Prime +Minister, the cabinet ministers being jointly responsible for the +control of administration and the initiation of measures for the public +good. But an organized minority is quite as essential to progress as an +organized majority--not merely to oppose, but to criticise and expose +the errors of the party in power, and to supplant it when it ceases to +possess the confidence of the country. Hence progress under party +government may be compared to a zigzag line, in which the changes in +direction correspond to changes in ministry. By this mutual action and +alternation of parties every vote cast has, in the long run, an equal +influence in guiding progress. The only justification for majority rule +sanctioned by free government is that when two parties differ as to what +is best for the whole people the majority shall prevail, and party +government tends to realize this condition. But direct government by the +people offers no check whatever on the power of the majority, which is +as absolute as that of the Czar of Russia. As Calhoun, the American +statesman, writes in his "Disquisition on Government," "the principle by +which constitutional governments are upheld, is _compromise_, that of +absolute governments is _force_!" Now, the significance of party +government as a guarantee of free government lies in this: that party +policies represent a compromise of what every section composing each +party supposes to be the interests of the whole people; and the parties +are engaged in fighting out a compromise of the real interests of every +section of the people. + +Lest it be thought that in this panegyric on party government we have +been indulging in a wild flight into the region of speculative politics, +we hasten to add that the ideal condition we have pictured has never +been reached. The British Parliament has perhaps most nearly approached +it, but already shows signs of retrogression. America and the Australian +colonies are drifting further away from it. Already political +philosophers are shaking their heads and predicting the failure of +popular government. The cry everywhere is for a stronger executive. +Party organization is breaking down; small factions actuated by +self-interest hold the balance of power between the main parties, and +render government unstable and capricious. The main parties themselves +tend to degenerate into factions. Personality is declining--the demand +is for followers, not leaders. Compromise is supplanted by log-rolling +and lobbying. And, to crown all, the rumbling of class strife grows +ominously louder. The danger is that these tendencies may be allowed to +go too far before reform is attempted--that the confidence between +classes may be destroyed. + ++Organization and Leadership.+--We have shown that the two great +principles underlying representation are organization and leadership. +Now, after all, there is nothing very profound in this conclusion. Is +there a single department of concerted human action in which these same +principles are not apparent? What would be thought of an army without +discipline and without generals; or of a musical production in which +every performer played his own tune? Even in the region of sport, can a +cricket or a football team dispense with its captain and its places? And +yet many people imagine that a disorganized collection of delegates of +various sections can rule a nation? Such an assembly would be as much a +mob as any primary assembly of the people, and would in no sense be a +representative assembly. The fact is that the growing intensity of the +evils which beset representative institutions throughout the civilized +world to-day is due to imperfect expression of these two principles. +Representative assemblies are not properly organized into two coherent +parties, nor is each party allowed free play to select its most popular +leaders. What is the remedy? + ++A Change in Electoral Machinery the Key to Reform.+--The great mistake +made by all writers on electoral reform is that they have failed to +recognize that the character of public opinion depends upon the way it +is expressed. If the electoral machinery be adapted to give effect to +those principles of organization and leadership which lie at the root of +representation, then the character of public opinion will be improved. +Representation, in fact, is not only a means of expressing public +opinion, but also of guiding, informing, educating, and organizing it. +Therefore, the method of election is an all-important factor. + +The first and greatest necessity is to counteract the tendency of the +people to split up into factions. It may seem a startling conclusion +that this is a mere matter of electoral machinery, but it is +nevertheless quite true. It must be remembered that we are dealing with +human beings and not with insentient figures. If the method of election +allows representation to two sections only, the people will group +themselves into two sections. But if it allows representation to a large +number of sections, then the people will group themselves into as many +sections as are allowed. Now, party government offers every hope of +preventing two sections degenerating into factions, but with a number of +sections there is absolutely none. + +Here, then, we see the one great merit of the present system of +election, which explains why it has persisted so long, with all its +faults. It is that it tends to confine representation to the two main +parties, since each electorate is generally contested by them; but in so +far as it does not completely effect that object and allows +representation to independent factions it is defective. Moreover, the +merit we have indicated is purchased at too high a price. It is these +defects which are causing the degradation of representative institutions +throughout the world to-day. + +It is obviously impossible to give a just share of representation to two +parties and allow each party to elect its most popular leaders, in an +electorate which returns only a single representative. Hence the first +necessity for reform is to enlarge electorates, so that each may return +several representatives. Now, the requirements for giving effect to the +principles of organization and leadership in such an electorate are:-- + + 1. Proportional representation to the two main parties--Ministerial + and Opposition, the majority and the minority. + + 2. The election by each party of its most popular + candidates--_i.e._, those most in general favour with all sections + of the party. + +This is the problem of representation as it presents itself to us. +Leaving a detailed account of the means by which it is proposed to give +effect to these great desiderata to a later chapter, let us indicate +briefly where they strike at the root of the evils of the present +system. + ++Enlarged Electorates.+--With enlarged electorates the minority will not +be excluded. Each party will secure its just share of representation. +When both parties are represented in each electorate the interests of +the electorate will not be bargained for as the price of support. +Members will cease to be mere local delegates. + ++Proportional Representation to the Two Main Parties.+--Representation +must be absolutely confined to the two main parties, and each party must +be allowed its just share. Every candidate should be required to +nominate either as a Ministerialist or Oppositionist, and each party +should be allotted a number of representatives proportional to the total +amount of support received. If democracy means that every man's opinion, +as expressed by his vote, is to have the same weight, it follows that +the parties should be represented in the Legislature in the same +proportion as among the people, otherwise it is ridiculous to talk of +the rule of the majority. The present system sometimes results in +minority rule and sometimes in minority extermination; it is difficult +to say which alternative is the worse. + ++Election of its Most Popular Candidates by each Party.+--It would be +little use to confine representation to the two main parties if the +parties were allowed to split up into factions. The only way to prevent +this is to provide such electoral machinery as will ensure the return of +the candidates most in general favour with all sections, and will +exclude the favourites of sections within the party. This distinction is +vital. The general favourite is a representative; the favourite of a +faction is a delegate. A representative is not only independent of any +one section, but if he does favour a faction he will sink in general +favour. He therefore represents a compromise of the demands of all +sections. But a delegate is the mouthpiece of a faction--a follower, not +a leader of the people. + +No section will be disfranchised by this proposal, for the true +function of all minor sections is to influence the policies of the two +main parties. Thus every section will be proportionally represented in +one or the other policy and by all the party candidates. Not only will +each party be proportionally represented but all the sections which +compose each party will be proportionally represented in its policy. +This is the only true meaning of proportional representation. + + + + +CHAPTER II. + +THE SO-CALLED REPRESENTATIVE PRINCIPLE. + + +All schemes of electoral reform hitherto proposed under the name of +proportional representation are based on the so-called "representative +principle"--viz., that every section of the people is entitled to +separate representation in proportion to its numbers. The ideal varies +somewhat, but the usual conception, is that if each member represents a +different section or interest the assembly will represent all sections +or all interests. Now this is simply an attempt to return to what we +have described as the first stage of representation, but without the +fear of the monarchy to keep the sections together. For a deliberative +body or a king's council it might be suitable, but for an assembly +charged with the complete control of government in the interests of all +it is utterly impracticable. Each representative must represent all +interests; he must be elected on a definite policy as to what is best +for all the people. If he is sent in as the agent of one interest or one +section of the people, he ceases to be a representative and becomes a +delegate. All these schemes are therefore not proportional +representation at all, but proportional delegation. + +We have shown that representation means the organization of public +opinion into two definite lines of policy, and that this is the only way +to prevent political anarchy. But the proportionalists (as they like to +call themselves) say that it means representing men and the opinions +they hold in proportion to their numbers. The fundamental error is that +they neglect the all-important factor of human nature. They look on +public opinion as something having an independent existence apart from +the questions about which it is expressed and from the means of +expressing it; and they fail to recognize that the character of public +opinion depends on the manner in which it is expressed and organized. It +is but a natural consequence that they also conceive the number of +sections of opinion awaiting representation as pre-existing and +independent of the electoral machinery. + +In short, they reduce the whole problem to a nice little exercise in +mathematics, requiring only for its clear exposition some columns of +figures and a few coloured diagrams to represent the different shades of +public opinion. No better example of the dangers of _a priori_ +speculation could be adduced than this chimerical idea of the +proportionalists that public opinion is something to be divided into +fractions like a mathematical quantity, unless it be, perhaps, the +conclusion that if you gather together delegates representing these +fractions you will have an assembly representing the sum total of public +opinion. + +The issue is quite clear. Are we to have two parties aiming at the +control of administration and appealing to all sections for support, or +the separate delegation of a number of sections? In the one case we will +have parties based on national policies, and in the other case we will +have a number of factions, each wanting something different and +determined to block progress till it gets it. Remember that it is a mere +matter of electoral machinery which will determine the choice. It is +true that at present we do not have two very coherent parties, but that +is the fault of the present electoral system. + +It would seem that there can be but one answer to this question, and yet +the "representative principle" shows such wonderful vitality that it is +worth while considering the arguments on which it is based, and the +various stages through which the idea has passed. + ++Mr. Hare's Scheme.+--The "representative principle" was first +propounded in England in 1857 by Mr. Thomas Hare. He proposed that the +United Kingdom should be constituted one huge electorate for the return +of the 654 members of the House of Commons. The people were to group +themselves into 654 voluntary unanimous sections, each returning one +member, and each gathered from every corner of the kingdom. We propose +to consider here not the scheme itself but only the principle on which +it was founded. Mr. Hare rightly conceived that the great evil of the +present system is the exclusion of the minority in each electorate, but +he altogether failed to appreciate that the excluded minority nearly +always represented one of the two main parties. He could not see, in +fact, that to divide each electorate into majority and minority is to +divide the whole country into majority and minority, nor that the +injustice is tolerated because it is usually as bad for one party as the +other. Instead, therefore, of proposing to do justice to both the +majority and the minority in each electorate, he proposed to allow +representation to as many minorities as possible. To him, the rule of +the majority was the rule of a majority of interests; this he called the +constitutional majority, as opposed to the "mere rule of numbers." Now, +at the time Mr. Hare wrote party government was rather weak in England. +He quotes with approval a statement of Mr. Sidney Herbert, M.P., that +the House was divided into many parties, or rather no party, because the +country was divided into many parties or no party, and that the division +into two parties would never be restored again. It is amusing, in view +of after events, to find Mr. Hare asking what would be the result of any +contrivance to re-establish party. Assuming that _party_ representation +was dead, Mr. Hare proposed to substitute _personal_ representation. It +is positively ludicrous at this interval of time to note how the +electors were expected to group themselves. They were to take personal +merit as the basis of representation; every vote cast was to be a +spontaneous tribute to the qualities and attainments of the person for +whom it was given. And in order, presumably, that they should choose +good men in preference to corrupt men, the polling-day was to be set +apart as a sacred holiday, and church services were to be held to +solemnize the public act and seek for the Divine blessing! + +The maintenance of a responsible ministry in such a House presented no +difficulty to Mr. Hare. The electors were to indicate whom they +considered the most illustrious statesmen, and no one would dare to +question their decision! + +It seems strange now that this scheme should have received serious +consideration. Mr. Hare was so much under the spell of the apparent +justice of the underlying principle that he was blind to its results. +But it was soon perceived that the electors would not group themselves +as Mr. Hare supposed; that the personal ideal of every class of electors +would be simply men of their own class. It was further pointed out that +cranks and faddists and every organization founded on questions of the +remotest interest would combine to secure representation. Mr. Disraeli +declared it to be "opposed to every sound principle, its direct effect +being to create a stagnant representation ... an admirable scheme for +bringing crotchety men into the House." Mr. Shaw-Lefevre condemned it +as "a vicious principle based upon a theory of classes," and Mr. +Gladstone said that it regarded electors "not as rational and thinking +beings, but merely as the equivalents of one another." Walter Bagehot, +in his standard work on the "English Constitution," opposes the +principle of voluntary constituencies, because it would promote a +constituency-making trade. "But upon the plan suggested," he writes, +"the House would be made up of party politicians selected by a party +committee, chained to that committee, and pledged to party violence, and +of characteristic, and therefore unmoderate, representatives for every +'ism' in all England. Instead of a deliberate assembly of moderate and +judicious men, we should have a various compound of all sorts of +violence. I may seem to be drawing a caricature, but I have not reached +the worst. Bad as these members would be if they were left to +themselves--if in a free Parliament they were confronted with the perils +of government, close responsibility might improve them, and make them +tolerable. But they would not be left to themselves. A voluntary +constituency will nearly always be a despotic constituency." + +The practical difficulties in the application of Mr. Hare's scheme are +almost insuperable, but it is not worth while pursuing the subject, +since it is now admitted by recent advocates that the faddist argument +is fatal. This is an admission that Mr. Hare completely neglected the +factor of human nature. Professor Nanson writes:--"Hare proposed that +there should be only one electorate, consisting of the whole State. It +is unfortunate that this proposal was made. There can be no doubt that +it has retarded the progress of true electoral reform for at least a +generation ... it would inevitably lead to the election of a certain +number of faddists." + ++John Stuart Mill.+--The great vogue which the Hare system has obtained +is to be traced more to the influence of John Stuart Mill than to that +of anyone else. Mill was captivated by the apparent justice of the +proposal, and devoted a chapter of his "Representative Government" to +it, wherein he declared:--"Mr. Hare's scheme has the almost unparalleled +merit of carrying out a great principle of government in a manner +approaching to ideal perfection, while it attains incidentally several +other things of scarcely inferior importance." Believing in the absolute +justice of the principle, Mill and Hare were certainly consistent in +setting no limit to its application except the size of the assembly. +Mill is emphatic on this point. "Real equality of representation," he +asserted, "is not obtained unless any set of electors, amounting to +average number of a constituency, wherever they happen to reside, have +the power of combining with one another to return a representative." +Now, the recent disciples of Mr. Hare are never tired of claiming the +support of Mill, although they have thrown this definition to the +winds. But they are guilty of far more than that, for in another chapter +of Mill's book we find that his conception of a representative assembly +elected by the Hare system is a purely deliberative body. He expressly +declares it to be radically unfit for legislation, which he proposes to +hand over to a commission appointed by the Crown. The value of his +testimony is very much discounted by this fact. + ++Sir John Lubbock.+[1]--We have asserted that the proportional principle +should be applied to two parties only--the majority and the minority, +and that every section can then be represented. Mill and Hare thought +that no limit should be set except the size of the assembly. All the +recent advocates of the system take up an intermediate position. +Appreciating the serious objections against allowing independent +representation to a large number of small sections, Sir John Lubbock, +president of the English Proportional Representation Society, proposes +to constitute electorates returning only three to five members each, +thus confining representation to only three to five sections in each +electorate, and sacrificing to a great extent accurate proportional +representation. In his book on "Representation," he writes:--"I have +assumed that Parliament should be 'a mirror of the nation;' if the +object were to secure unity of action rather than freedom of discussion, +to form an executive body such as a Government, a Board of Directors, or +a Vestry, the case would be quite different. It is, however, I presume, +our wish that Parliament should be a deliberative assembly in which all +parties should be fairly represented." But to make Parliament a +deliberative body is to destroy its power to secure unity of action at +all, and to render it useless as a working machine. + ++Miss Spence.+--An active campaign has for some time been carried on for +the adoption of the Hare system in Australia. Miss C.H. Spence, of South +Australia, was the pioneer reformer, and has laboured in the cause by +pen and voice for no less than forty years. Great credit is undoubtedly +due to Miss Spence for the clear and simple manner in which she has +expounded the system, and for the good work she has done in exposing the +defects of the present methods. Not only has she lectured in all parts +of Australia, but she has made visits to England, where she met Mr. Hare +and Sir John Lubbock, and also to America. But we may admire Miss +Spence's courage and devotion to principle without agreeing with her +conclusions. + +At a meeting held at River House, Chelsea, London, in 1894, Miss Spence +submitted an analysis of 8,824 votes recorded at 50 public meetings in +South Australia. The audiences were in each case asked to select six +representatives out of twelve candidates. The result of a scrutiny of +all the votes combined was that the following six "parties" secured one +"representative" each--viz., Capital, Labour, Single Tax, Irish +Catholic, Prohibition, and Women's Suffrage. Miss Spence frankly +confesses that these "parties" are minorities, but holds that a majority +can be formed by the union of minorities, and that party responsible +government can still be carried on. Now, can any sensible man or woman +imagine a working ministry formed by a union of any four of these +"parties?" Capital would certainly be permanently opposed to Labour and +to Single Tax, and as for the others, there is not a single principle in +common. How, then, could a union be formed? The only possible way is by +log-rolling; they must make a bargain to support one another's demands. +Such a union could not possibly be stable, because the minority is free +to offer a better bargain to any one of the "parties" to induce it to +desert. Again, it may be called the rule of the majority, but what sort +of a majority? Is it not plainly the rule of a majority in the interests +of minorities? That is very different to the rule of the majority in the +interests of all, which free government demands. The simple truth is +that the "parties" are factions, and that the "representatives" are mere +delegates of those factions. + +But in practice the case would be far worse than we have assumed. There +is not the slightest guarantee that the same six factions would be +elected in each six-seat electorate. We might have an unlimited number +of delegates of various religions, classes, races, localities, and +political organizations on all kinds of single questions. An assembly +formed on these lines could hardly be dignified with the name of a +representative assembly. + +Mr. G. Bradford, in his work on "The Lesson of Popular Government," +displays a more intimate knowledge of human nature than any other recent +writer. Of these schemes for the representation of minorities he says:-- + + As an illustration of the effect in popular government of looking + to popular impulse for the initiation of measures, it may be + observed that perhaps the worst of all expedients for remedying the + defective working of a government by a legislature like ours, that + which combines the evils of them all, is one which is urged by + perfectly disinterested advocates of reform, and is known as + proportional representation. If there is one principle at the base + of popular government it is that the majority shall rule. If the + largest of three or four fractions is to rule it ceases to be + popular government, and becomes government by faction. If the + tyranny of the majority is bad a tyranny of the minority is still + worse. (Vol. i., p. 505.) + +And the following picture could hardly be better drawn:-- + + If the basis of carrying on the government is to be the wishes of + some millions of units, it is evident that they must to a greater + or less extent agree in wishing for something. It is equally + evident that they cannot all agree in wishing for the same thing at + the same time, while if they, or any considerable number of groups, + want different things at the same time, the result in so far is + anarchy. Government is paralysed, and with the well-known + excitability of humanity in groups men begin to confound the + importance of the thing wanted with the importance of getting what + they want. The clash of contending factions is apt to suggest the + clash of arms. The first necessity, therefore, is the formation of + large and coherent parties, not merely for the purpose of + accomplishing what is desired by the majority of the people, but + also for suppressing agitation and social disturbance on behalf of + what may be called merely objects of passion or private interest + with comparatively small groups, at least until those objects + enlist the support of a large minority. (Vol. i., pp. 492, 493.) + ++Professor Nanson.+--In Victoria the Hare system is championed by Mr. +E.J. Nanson, Professor of Mathematics at Melbourne University. Professor +Nanson approaches the subject entirely from a mathematical standpoint, +and resolutely refuses to admit the factor of human nature into his +calculations. Following Mr. Hare, he is a declared opponent of party +government, and "would like to see it pushed further into the +background." Moreover, he regards every step in the process as an end in +itself. Thus the act of voting is one end, representation is another, +and the rule of the majority a third. Leaving aside for the present, +however, the elaborate mathematical devices which are proposed for +attaining these supposed ends, let us take only the principles on which +they are based. These are laid down as follows:-- + + (_a_) The rule of the majority. + + (_b_) The fair representation of all parties in proportion to their + strength. + + (_c_) Perfect freedom to every elector to vote exactly as he + pleases. + + (_d_) The emancipation of the voters from the tyranny of the + political "boss" or caucus. + + (_e_) The full value of his vote to each voter without loss or + waste. + +The principles involved, we are assured, "must appeal to every democrat, +to every Liberal, to every lover of true and just representation." + +As to the first claim, we are willing to grant the rule of the majority, +if the words are added "in the interests of minorities." The second +could also be granted if by "all parties" were meant both parties, for +there cannot be more than two parties in the true sense of the word. But +Professor Nanson proposes such large electorates that any small section, +from one-sixth to one-twelfth, can secure independent representation. +Notwithstanding this, he claims that it is quite possible to give fair +representation to the main parties and to small sections at the same +time. In illustrating the system he avoids the issue as to the character +of these sections by giving them a "scientific" nomenclature, such as +Colour, Place, Pursuits, Qualities, &c. These abstractions are very +misleading, as attention is diverted from the fact that they refer to +voluntary groups of men united for some political purpose. The real +question is, on what basis are these groups likely to be formed? When +the element of human nature is taken into account it must be apparent +that they will be formed for the propaganda of some sectional interest; +some on a religious basis, others on a class basis, &c. Now, if we were +to ask each candidate to declare his religion, we could easily take +religions as the basis of representation and allow proportional +representation to each religion; and similarly with classes, races, and +so on. But we could only take one basis at a time, and the important +deduction is that if we were to take religions as the basis of +representation, the people would be induced to vote according to +religion; if we were to take classes, according to class, and so on. +Now, no one but the fanatic or the demagogue will claim that the +majority is entitled to rule where religions only or classes only are +represented. The questions then arise--What is the correct basis of +representation? How should the people be induced to vote? And the answer +is clearly that the people should be induced to vote on questions of +general public policy, on the leading questions of the day which decide +the party lines, and that, therefore, _the policies of the two main +parties should form the primary basis of proportional representation_. +But the Hare system, by taking individual candidates as the basis of +representation, induces the elector to vote on any basis or on sectional +lines. It promotes dissension instead of repressing it, and instead of +encouraging all sections to express their opinion as to what is best for +the general well-being, it encourages them to express their opinion as +to what they imagine to be best for themselves. Public opinion expressed +on these lines would be worse than useless. But Professor Nanson thinks +that the electors would still have regard for the main parties, even +though they grouped themselves into small sections. He declares that +"any party amounting to anything like a quota would not only have two +candidates of its own--one Liberal and one Conservative--but would also +be wooed by candidates of both leading parties." We may well question +whether factions would trouble themselves about the main parties; but, +granting the assumption, the small parties might just as well be single +electorates as far as the main parties are concerned. The Liberal +candidates might be successful in all of them, and the Conservatives be +unrepresented. The peculiar feature is that the defeated Conservatives +are expected to transfer their votes to the Liberals to make up the +quotas for the small parties! + +The third claim is that electors should have perfect freedom to vote +exactly as they please, and yet Professor Nanson, in condemning Mr. +Hare's original scheme, has denied that they are free to vote as +faddists; but he still holds that they are free to vote on any basis if +only they form one-sixth to one-twelfth of an electorate. Thus the +amount of freedom is variable and a matter of opinion. Now, we +altogether deny that electors should be given the opportunity to +subordinate the national interests to factious interests. Just as the +faddist argument is fatal to Mr. Hare's original scheme, so the +splitting up into factions is fatal to Professor Nanson's present +scheme. Where is the freedom which Professor Nanson claims under the +present system of election? Is it not the fact that throughout England, +America, and Australia the electors have very often a choice between two +candidates only--one Ministerialist and one Oppositionist? By all means +let us have as many political organizations as possible to make known +the wishes of all sections; but the true function of all such +organizations is to influence the policies of the two main parties, and +not to secure independent delegates in Parliament. This means simply +that the compromise among the different sections supporting a party must +be effected in the electors' minds, and at the elections, and not on the +floor of the Legislature. + +The fourth claim is the emancipation of the voters from the tyranny of +the "boss." Now, the power of the "boss" lies in the control of +nominations, and although to some extent this control is necessary with +the present system of election, it is not essential to party government, +as we hope to show. But with government by faction there would be no +escape from this control. The tyranny of a faction is worse than the +tyranny of the "boss." The voters need saving from their own selfish +passions far more than from the "boss." + +The final claim that each elector is entitled to the full value of his +vote, regardless of the way in which it is used, is really a claim to an +equality of political power, _i.e._, to direct government. It means +that electors are absolutely free to combine for their own interests, or +for their interest as a class, in opposition to the public welfare. +These combinations would, with an equality of direct political power, +soon bring on social disruption. + ++Professor Jethro Brown.+--In the preface to "The New Democracy," by +Professor Jethro Brown, the two fundamental difficulties of present-day +politics are correctly stated to be--how to express public opinion, and +how to improve its value. For the first of these Professor Brown +recommends the Hare system, and for the second the study of history. +Later on he writes:--"How is the amelioration of popular sovereignty to +be effected? Not, I venture to believe, by the pursuit of the policy +which hopes to play off ignorance against ignorance and prejudice +against prejudice, and to secure good government by the arts of +flattery, manipulation, and intrigue; nor, indeed, by the improvement of +democratic machinery, though this is extremely desirable, and calls for +immediate attention. For, above all, towers the question of character." +It is quite evident that Professor Brown shares the delusion of the +other advocates of the Hare system, that the manner of expressing public +opinion has nothing to do with the character of public opinion. The two +difficulties laid down are essentially one. The cardinal fact underlying +representation is that it is a real social force, capable of reacting +upon and moulding character, and therefore of improving the value of +public opinion. The independence, love of freedom, respect for +minorities, and capacity for self-government, which are the most +distinctive traits in the English character, are not innate, but are +largely the products of the British Constitution. If the only chance of +improving the value of public opinion lay in the hope of inducing the +individual electors to study the lessons of history, the prospect would +be indeed gloomy. + +Professor Brown regards party government as a necessary evil, resulting +from the mechanical difficulty of securing unity of action from a +plurality of wills. This is practically equivalent to saying that +legislation itself is a necessary evil. But he writes:--"Whatever may be +the evils of party government, there can be no doubt of the utility as +well as of the necessity of the institution itself. The alternative to +party government is the system of government by small groups. In +Australia the evils of this alternative have been occasionally displayed +in practical politics; but it is to France that we must look for their +supreme illustration." Turning to the chapter on the Hare system, we +find that Professor Brown believes that the electors would still divide +themselves into two parties, even if given the opportunity to form small +groups. "I cannot believe," he writes, "that the reputation of our race +for sound common-sense is so far misplaced that a provision for the +faithful representation of the people would end in an immoderate +Legislature! For, although the Hare system is not perfect, it does +undoubtedly afford an opportunity for an absolutely _fair +representation_. Of course the opportunity would be abused by some; but +to argue that the abuse would be general, or if at all general, would +long continue, is to argue that the people would prove themselves +unworthy of the opportunity offered." While he was at the University of +Tasmania the first election under the Hare system was held, and +Professor Brown's opinions are based on the result. A second election +has, however, just been held, which shows the futility of his hopes. + ++The Tasmanian Experiment.+--Despite the fact that it has been advocated +for over forty years, the trial now being made of the Hare system in +Tasmania is the first application of the "representative principle" to +any assembly modelled on the English plan of party government, and +therefore deserves more than passing notice. But the experiment is on +such a small scale, and has been conducted for such a short time, that +the result can hardly be expected to be conclusive as yet. The objection +against the Hare system is not so much that it is not suitable to +present conditions as that it will speedily bring about altered +conditions. It is interesting to find that this is exactly what is +taking place. The system is applied in two electorates only, at Hobart +and Launceston the former returning six members and the latter four. At +the first election, in 1897, the possibilities of the system were not +appreciated, and electors voted on the old lines; and although the +results were rather erratic and unexpected, they were considered fairly +satisfactory. But the second election, held early in the present year, +proved a great blow to the system. No less than three of the successful +candidates were intensely unpopular; and one of them, an ex-minister, +had recently been banished from public life on the report of a select +committee of the House. His reinstatement aroused a storm of indignation +throughout the colony, and he was forced to retire again before +Parliament met. It will be as well to take the evidence of a strong +advocate of the system--the _Argus_ correspondent. Of one candidate he +writes:--"Judging by all available definite evidences, it seemed that +five-sixths of the electors of Hobart were directly in favour of the +construction of the railway by the present Great Western Railway +Syndicate; while those of the remaining sixth were variously opposed to +the company or to the project of constructing such a railway by private +enterprise at all. This sixth is represented by Mr. R.C. Patterson, who +headed the poll." Of another candidate we learn that "Mr. Mulcahy had +fought a hard fight, and it is a fair assumption that on the list of the +elected he represents the Roman Catholic vote. As a member of a +generally popular Government, the extent of Mr. Mulcahy's personal +unpopularity was remarkable and probably unique." But it was over the +return of Mr. Miles that the storm raged most. The excuse is made that +"the fault of Mr. Miles's return (assuming that it is a fault) lies with +the electors who returned him, and not with the system under which his +return was accomplished.... Once grant that a section of Hobart electors +have the right to select for their representative whom they choose, and +it would seem that the Hare system must be held free of all +responsibility for the return of Mr. Miles." But this is precisely what +cannot be granted for a moment, as we have endeavoured to show. The +assertion is made that Mr. Miles would have been returned as easily +under the old system, but this is not a fact. He polled only one-eighth +of the votes, so that, even supposing that his supporters were twice as +strong in a single electorate, he would have had only one-fourth of the +votes. It is safe to say, from the small proportion of second and third +preferences which he secured, that if the Block Vote had been adopted he +would have been at the bottom of the poll. Commenting on these results, +the _Argus_ declares that the Hare system does not pretend to reform or +guide the people. Very likely not! But is it not quite evident that it +has the opposite effect? + +Is it too much to say that, if the Hobart experiment be persevered with, +the ultimate tendency will be the return of six members, each acceptable +to one-sixth of the electors, and obnoxious to the other five-sixths? +It is quite obvious already that the usual party lines are entirely +disregarded. + ++Professor Commons.+--The best book on the subject yet published is the +"Proportional Representation" of John E. Commons, Professor of Sociology +in Syracuse University, U.S. Its great merit is that the political and +social bearings of the reform are fully treated. Professor Commons +rejects the Hare system in favour of the Free List system. He +writes:--"The Hare system is advocated by those who, in a too +_doctrinaire_ fashion, wish to abolish political parties. They +apparently do not realize the impossibility of acting in politics +without large groupings of individuals." He makes a great step in +advance of the disciples of Mr. Hare in recognizing that the +proportional principle should be applied to parties, and not to +individuals, and he even defines parties correctly as being based "not +altogether on sectional divisions, but on social and economic problems +of national scope;" but, unfortunately, he fails to see that there can +be only two parties, and that the representation of small parties would +not reform the main parties, but break them up altogether. At the same +time he is no mere theorist, for he declares:--"If a practicable and +effective method of proportional representation cannot be discovered, +the theoretical principle is a mere dream." Moreover, he prudently +recognizes that his arguments as regards Federal and State Legislatures +in America are in advance of what the public is ready to accept, and +adds:--"We, as a people are not yet ready to abandon the notion that +party responsibility in Federal affairs is essential to safety." His +immediate object is, therefore, the reform of city councils, which in +America are controlled by the national parties, and are exploited by the +notorious "machine" organizations. We may sympathize with this object, +for parties in an administrative body are a serious evil, but with +legislatures the case is quite different. Professor Commons admits that +third and fourth parties, if given their proportionate weight in +legislation, would hold the balance of power, but he declares that "the +weight of this objection, the most serious yet presented against +proportional representation, varies in different grades of government." +He then proceeds to examine the objection "as applied to Congress (and +incidentally to the State Legislatures), where it has its greatest +force, and where pre-eminently party responsibility may be expected to +be decisive." And the only answer he can find is that the objection +"overlooks the principle of equality and justice in representation. It +may prove here that justice is the wisest expediency. It is a curious +anomaly, showing confusion of thought regarding democracy, that a people +who insist on universal suffrage, and who go to ludicrous limits in +granting it, should deny the right of representation to those minor +political parties whose existence is the natural fruit of this +suffrage." But these minor parties would not be denied representation if +they were allowed to exercise freely their true function, which is to +influence the policies of the main parties; and it is essential to the +working of the political machine that they be limited to that function. +Professor Commons continues:--"The argument, however, of those who fear +that third parties will hold the balance of power is not based solely on +a dread of the corrupt classes, but rather of the idealists, the +reformers, 'faddists,' and 'cranks,' so called. They would retain +exclusive majority rule and party responsibility in order to prevent the +disproportionate influence of these petty groups. They overlook, of +course, the weight of the argument already made that individual +responsibility is more important for the people than the corporate +responsibility of parties." The assumption is here made that the +complete suppression of individuality is an essential feature of party +government, whereas it is in fact a peculiar feature of American +politics, due to "machine" control of nominations. The one point which +Professor Commons has missed is that individual candidature can be +permitted and representation still be confined to the two main parties. + ++Conclusion.+--The advocates of proportional delegation have failed to +grasp the importance of the principles of organization and leadership, +which underlie representation. Mr. Hare thought that the effect of doing +away with organization would be to improve leadership. But he reckoned +without his host--Human Nature. Organization cannot be dispensed with +without destroying leadership and bringing on the strife of factions. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[1] Now Lord Avebury. + + + + +CHAPTER III. + +THE PRESENT POSITION OF PARTY GOVERNMENT. + + ++England.+--We have seen that the fundamental error of the +proportionalists is that they have failed to distinguish between the two +stages of representation. In constantly appealing back to the earlier +parliaments they altogether overlook the fact that the functions which +Parliament now exercises were then vested in the King. But this error is +not confined to the proportionalists, most of whom, indeed, however +inconsistently, favour party government. It is also put forth as an +argument by those who lay all the blame of present evils on the party +system, and who think that all sections should work together as one +united party. Take, for instance, the diatribe of Mr. W.S. Lilly on "The +Price of Party Government" in the _Fortnightly Review_ for June, 1900. +Mr. Lilly complains bitterly that the infallible oracle in politics +to-day is "the man in the street." He asserts that all issues are +settled "by counting heads, in entire disregard of what the heads +contain." His bugbear is the extension of the franchise. "Representative +institutions, for example," he asks, "what do they represent? The true +theory unquestionably is that they should represent all the features of +national life, all the living forces of society, all that makes the +country what it is; and that in due proportion. And such was the +Constitution of England up to the date of the first _Parliamentary +Reform Act_. Its ideal was, to use the words of Bishop Stubbs, 'an +organized collection of the several orders, states, and conditions of +men, recognized as possessing political power.'" Could anything be more +ridiculous? Political power is to be apportioned in the nineteenth +century as it was in the fourteenth century! The people are to be always +governed by their superiors! Mr. Lilly continues:--"It appears to me +that the root of the falsification of our parliamentary system by the +party game is to be found in the falsification of our representative +system by the principle of political atomism. Men are not equal in +rights any more than they are equal in mights. They are unequal in +political value. They ought not to be equal in political power." + +The mistake here is in the premise. Has not the demagogue more power +than his dupes, or the Member of Parliament more power than the elector? +We have hardly yet reached, and are never likely to reach, that ideal of +direct government. But what is this price which Mr. Lilly is railing at? +"The price may be stated in eight words. 'The complete subordination of +national to party interests.' The _complete_ subordination. I use the +adjective advisedly. Party interests are not only the first thought of +politicians in England, but, too often, the last and only thought." All +this is sheer nonsense. The coincidence of party aims with the real +interests of the people which the British Parliament has displayed since +the _Reform Act_ of 1832 has never been even remotely approached by any +other country. Two causes have contributed to this great result; first, +the gradual extension of the franchise to all sections of the people, +and second, the fact that the principles of organization and leadership +have been highly developed. In one respect, however, Mr. Lilly is right. +The zenith has been passed. Party government is not the same to-day in +England as it was twenty years ago. But the fault lies not with the +extension of the suffrage, but with the fact that the principles of +organization and leadership are less operative. True, the extension of +the franchise is indirectly concerned in the failure, but the primary +cause is that the present system of election is unable to bear the +increased strain. It no longer suffices to organize the people into two +coherent parties. The effect on the parties is correctly noted by Mr. +Lilly. "A danger which ever besets them," he declares, "is that of +sinking into factions." + +Now, the result of the want of organization is the presence in +Parliament of small independent factions, which, by holding the balance +of power, cause the main parties to degenerate into factions. + +This tendency is apparent even in England, and the rock on which the +parties have split is the Irish faction. Into the merits of the Irish +question we do not propose to enter; it is the career of the faction in +Parliament which interests us. But it may be noted that the Irish party +rests on a three-fold basis as a faction; it is based mainly on a class +grievance, and is also partly racial and partly religious. It was the +Irish party in the House of Commons which first discovered that, by +keeping aloof from the two main parties, it could terrorize both; and +thus found out the weak spot in party government. Its tactics were +successful up to a certain point, for Mr. Gladstone succumbed to the +temptation to purchase its support, and brought in the Home Rule Bill. +The result is known to all; the historical Liberal party was rent in +twain; party lines were readjusted; Mr. Gladstone was left in a hopeless +minority; and the remnant of his following is to-day in the same +condition. What is the lesson to be learned from these events? That +these tactics cannot succeed in the long run. All interests suffer, but +the culprits most of all. Moreover, such tactics are unconstitutional, +and would in some circumstances justify retaliatory measures. Let us +trace the constitutional course. The Irish members could have exerted a +considerable influence on the policies of both Liberals and +Conservatives, just as the Scotch did. If they had followed this course, +might they not have been in a better position to-day? + +Of course, the Irish faction can hardly be said to be the result of the +present system of election; it is mainly the expression of old wrongs. +But it has set the example, and the disintegration of the old parties is +rapidly proceeding. One feature, however, in connection with the present +system in Ireland may be mentioned, and that is the permanent +disfranchisement of the minority. In the greater part of Ireland there +is no such thing as a contest between the main parties. If a system were +introduced by which the minority could get its share of representation +the parties would compete on even terms for the support of the people, +and good feeling would tend to be restored. + +To return to Mr. Lilly. The present position of party government in +England is not due to defects in the institution itself, still less to +the extension of the suffrage, but to imperfect organization. The true +remedy is, therefore, to improve organization, not to restrict the +suffrage. By this means such a condition will be brought about that if +either party favours a faction it will lose in general favour; then, +indeed, we may hope that the main parties themselves will cease to +degenerate into factions. + +The same number of the _Fortnightly_ contains an unsigned article on +"Lord Rosebery and a National Cabinet," in which the party system is +alluded to as defunct, and in which the suggestion is thrown out that on +the retirement of Lord Salisbury a national cabinet should be formed, +comprising both Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Rosebery. Impending foreign +complications are given as the excuse for terminating party action. Now, +it is not to be denied that party government is more suitable for what +Mr. Herbert Spencer calls the industrial type of society than for the +militant type. Quite recently Lord Salisbury blamed the British +Constitution for the state of unpreparedness for the present war. But it +is equally true that in foreign affairs party action is generally +suspended: in the control of India, for instance, it is so. The real +question, then, is this: Is the danger of foreign aggression so serious +that all questions of internal policy can be permanently set aside? If +we have reached this stage, the end of modern civilization is in sight. +In effect, the proposal is a return to the first stage of +representation, with the difference that all sections of the people are +expected to be held together by the fear of foreign aggression, instead +of the fear of the aggression of the monarchy. + +Mr. David Syme is a censor of a very different type. So far from wishing +to take control from the people, he would give the people absolute +control over everything, and at all times. Seldom has the case against +party government been more powerfully presented than in his work on +"Representative Government in England." But Mr. Syme founds his proposed +remedies on a theory of representation which is based on the literal +meaning of the word. No one has put the delegation theory more clearly +than in the following passage, or gone so far in applying it:-- + + Representation is a mental act; it is the presentation or + reproduction of the state of mind of another person; and before one + person can represent another person he must first know what the + opinions of that other person are. A representative is a + substitute; he stands in the place of, and acts for, another + person. But one man cannot act for another unless he knows what + that other would do were he acting for himself. In other words, he + requires to know the motives which actuate that other person, or + what influences his motives, namely, his principles and beliefs. + The House of Commons is a representative body, not because every + individual member of it represents the opinions of the whole + nation, but because members in the aggregate represent those + opinions, (p. 170). + +This position is diametrically opposed to the principles we have laid +down, for it eliminates entirely the ideas of organization and +leadership. Again, Mr. Syme says:--"If the government is to be carried +on for the benefit of all classes, representatives should be chosen from +all classes. We had class representation in the early parliaments, but +then all classes were fairly represented." We have shown that the +analogy from early parliaments is fallacious. Representatives should now +be chosen irrespective of class, and not as class delegates. But Mr. +Syme does not carry his theory to its logical conclusion. For if +representatives merely express the thoughts of others, and should be +class delegates, surely all classes are entitled to have their thoughts +"represented;" and Mr. Syme should range himself among the disciples of +Mr. Hare. But here comes in an interesting difference. Mr. Syme would +retain the present system and make members continually responsible to a +majority of their constituents; he would even give this majority power +to dismiss them at any time. Now, this is practically an admission that +representation involves the existence of a majority and a minority, or, +in other words, is a means of organizing the people into a majority and +a minority. Again, as regards leadership, the theory will hardly bear +the test of facts. Could a man like Gladstone be said to merely express +the thoughts of his constituents? Was he not rather a guide and leader +of the thoughts of a great part of the British nation? + +In addition to the continual responsibility of members to their +constituents, Mr. Syme would also make the individual ministers of state +responsible to a majority of the members. He adds:--"The whole system of +party government could in this manner be quietly and effectively got rid +of." We do not propose to criticise the latter suggestion, as we do not +believe it would be put forward to-day, in the light of fuller +knowledge. Mr. Syme's book was written nearly twenty years ago. But, as +regards the continual responsibility of members, we consider it +important that the electors should not have their way on single +questions. They should periodically express their opinion as to the +general line of progress, and the representatives should then have +complete control. The necessity for this is to save the people from +their anti-social tendencies, which we have already stated as the great +objection to all forms of direct government. Lord Macaulay once defined +the position exactly in a letter addressed to the electors of Edinburgh. +"My opinion," he declared, "is that electors ought at first to choose +cautiously; then to confide liberally; and when the term for which they +have selected their member has expired to review his conduct equitably, +and to pronounce on the whole taken together." + +We hope to have left on the reader's mind by this time no doubt as to +the intimate connection between the machinery of election and the +resulting character of the legislature. Now it is a most extraordinary +fact that this connection is hardly noticed by the leading +constitutional authorities. It is true they often recognize that +suggested changes like the Hare system would debase our legislatures, +but it never seems to occur to them that present evils might be cured by +a change in the electoral machinery. They point out the evils indeed, +but only to indulge in gloomy forebodings at the onward march of +democracy, or as warnings of the necessity for placing checks on the +people. + +Take Bagehot's study of the House of Commons in his standard work on +"The English Constitution," where he classifies the functions exercised +by the House. He insists that the most important of these is the +elective function--its power to elect and dismiss the ministry. In +addition, it exercises an expressive function, a teaching function, an +informing function, and, lastly, the function of legislation. But not a +word is said of the relation of these functions to representation, or to +the method of election. It is asserted that the reason the House of +Commons is able to exercise these functions is because England is a +deferential nation, and the people leave government in the hands of +their betters, the higher classes. On one point he is emphatic, and that +is the absolute necessity of party. He writes:-- + + The moment, indeed, that we distinctly conceive that the House of + Commons is mainly and above all things an elective assembly, we at + once perceive that party is of its essence. The House of Commons + lives in a state of perpetual potential choice; at any moment it + can choose a ruler and dismiss a ruler. And therefore party is + inherent in it, is bone of its bone, and breath of its breath. + +As to the present trend of affairs, the opinion of a foreign observer, +Gneist--"History of the English Constitution"--may be quoted:-- + + England, too, will experience the fact that the transition to the + new order of industrial society is brought about through a process + of dissolution of the old cohesions, upon which the constitution of + Parliament is based. The unrepresented social mass, which is now + flooding the substructure of the English Constitution, will only + stay its course at a universal suffrage, and a thorough and + arithmetical equalization of the constituencies, and will thus + attempt, and in a great measure achieve, a further dissolution of + the elective bodies. To meet the coming storm a certain fusion of + the old parties seems to be immediately requisite, though the + propertied classes, in defending their possessions, will certainly + not at first display their best qualities. As, further, a regular + formation in two parties cannot be kept up, a splitting up into + fractions, as in the parliaments of the Continent, will ensue, and + the changing of the ministry will modify itself accordingly, so + that the Crown will no longer be able to commit the helm of the + state in simple alternation to the leader of the one or the other + majority. And then a time will recur in which the _King in Council_ + may have to undertake the actual leadership. (Vol. ii., pp. 452, + 453.) + +In other words, that an industrial society is incapable of +self-government! Note the reason for this remarkable conclusion--a +splitting up into fractions, _i.e._, imperfect organization. + +Take now the evidence of the distinguished historian and publicist, Mr. +W.E.H. Leeky, M.P., as given in his recent work on "Democracy and +Liberty":-- + + After all due weight has been given to the possible remedies that + have been considered, it still seems to me that the parliamentary + system, when it rests on manhood suffrage, or something closely + approaching to manhood suffrage, is extremely unlikely to be + permanent. This was evidently the opinion of Tocqueville, who was + strongly persuaded that the natural result of democracy was a + highly concentrated, enervating, but mild despotism. It is the + opinion of many of the most eminent contemporary thinkers in France + and Germany, and it is, I think, steadily growing in England. This + does not mean that parliaments will cease, or that a wide suffrage + will be abolished. It means that parliaments, if constructed on + this type, cannot permanently remain the supreme power among the + nations of the world. Sooner or later they will sink by their own + vices and inefficiencies into a lower plane. They will lose the + power of making and unmaking ministries, and it will be found + absolutely necessary to establish some strong executive + independently of their fluctuations. Very probably this executive + may be established, as in America and under the French Empire, upon + a broad basis of an independent suffrage. Very possibly upper + chambers, constituted upon some sagacious plan, will again play a + great restraining and directing part in the government of the + world. Few persons who have watched the changes that have passed + over our own House of Commons within the last few years will either + believe or wish that in fifty years' time it can exercise the power + it now does. It is only too probable that some great catastrophe or + the stress of a great war may accelerate the change. (Vol. i., pp. + 300, 301.) + +And the reason assigned for this very unsatisfactory state of affairs is +precisely as before: + + All the signs of the times point to the probability in England as + elsewhere of many ministries resting on precarious majorities + formed out of independent or heterogeneous groups. There are few + conditions less favourable to the healthy working of parliamentary + institutions or in which the danger of an uncontrolled House of + Commons is more evident. One consequence of this disintegration of + Parliament is a greatly increasing probability that policies which + the nation does not really wish for may be carried into effect. The + process which the Americans call "log-rolling" becomes very easy. + One minority will agree to support the objects of another minority + on condition of receiving in return a similar assistance, and a + number of small minorities aiming at different objects, no one of + which is really desired by the majority of the nation, may attain + their several ends by forming themselves into a political syndicate + and mutually co-operating. (Vol. i., pp. 152, 153.) + +Mr. Lecky, too, holds out very little hope for the future:-- + + When the present evils infecting our parliamentary system have + grown still graver; when a democratic House, more and more broken + up into small groups, more and more governed by sectional and + interested motives, shall have shown itself evidently incompetent + to conduct the business of the country with honour, efficiency, and + safety; when the public has learned more fully the enormous danger + to national prosperity as well as individual happiness of + dissociating power from property and giving the many an unlimited + right of confiscating by taxation the possessions of the few--some + great reconstruction of government is sure to be demanded. Fifty or + even twenty-five years hence the current of political opinion in + England will be as different from that of our own day as + contemporary political tendencies are different from those in the + generation of our fathers. Experience and arguments that are now + dismissed may then revive, and play no small part in the politics + of the future. + +Why make democracy the scapegoat for all these evils, when they are +simply due to the imperfect organization of democracy? In any case, the +most that could rightly be urged would be that universal suffrage had +come before its time. The conclusion that its time will never come is +certainly not warranted. Universal suffrage cannot be condemned till it +has had a fair trial under a rational system of election. Mr. Lecky +appreciates so little the connection between the method of election and +the splitting up into groups that he views without alarm the Hare +system, which would still further develop groups. + +But perhaps no one has caught the spirit of party government more truly +than Mr. Lecky. Dealing with the motives which should actuate the +statesman, in his latest work, "The Map of Life," he writes:-- + + In free countries party government is the best if not the only way + of conducting public affairs, but it is impossible without a large + amount of moral compromise; without a frequent surrender of private + judgment and will. A good man will choose his party through + disinterested motives, and with a firm and honest conviction that + it represents the cast of policy most beneficial to the country. He + will on grave occasions assert his independence of party, but in + the large majority of cases he must act with his party, even if + they are pursuing courses in some degree contrary to his own + judgment. + + Everyone who is actively engaged in politics--everyone especially + who is a member of the House of Commons--must soon learn that if + the absolute independence of individual judgment were pushed to its + extreme, political anarchy would ensue. The complete concurrence of + a large number of independent judgments in a complicated measure is + impossible. If party government is to be carried on there must be, + both in the Cabinet and in Parliament, perpetual compromise. The + first condition of its success is that the Government should have a + stable, permanent, disciplined support behind it, and in order that + this should be attained the individual member must in most cases + vote with his party. Sometimes he must support a measure which he + knows to be bad, because its rejection would involve a change of + government, which he believes would be a still greater evil than + its acceptance, and in order to prevent this evil he may have to + vote a direct negative to some resolution containing a statement + which he believes to be true, (p. 112.) + +Mr. Lecky goes on to point out that "many things have to be done from +which a very rigid and austere nature would recoil;" but he +adds:--"Those who refuse to accept the conditions of parliamentary life +should abstain from entering into it." Moreover, he holds that +"inconsistency is no necessary condemnation of a politician, and +parties as well as individual statesmen have abundantly shown it." But +still "all this curious and indispensable mechanism of party government +is compatible with a high and genuine sense of public duty." + +The American theory of government is that checks must be placed on a +democratic legislature by a fixed Constitution and a separate executive +exercising a veto. The late Professor Freeman Snow, of Harvard +University, was a strong supporter of this school. His objections to +cabinet government are given in the "Annals of the American Academy of +Political and Social Science" for July, 1892:-- + + Cabinet government is the government of a party; and for its + successful operation it must have at all times a majority at its + back in Parliament. If it were possible to direct the current of + public opinion into exactly two channels, there would be but two + parties, one of which would generally be in the ascendency; but in + practice this is found to be a very difficult thing to accomplish, + and it becomes the more difficult as the right of suffrage is + extended to the mass of the people, with their ever-varying + interests. In the countries of continental Europe parties, if + indeed they may be said to exist, are broken up into groups, no two + or more of which ever act together for any considerable length of + time; and ministries are without a moment's notice confronted at + brief intervals with opposing majorities, and must give place to + others, whose tenure of office is, however, equally unstable and + ephemeral. There is no other alternative; one of the two great + parties must yield to any faction which becomes strong enough to + hold the balance of power between them, or suffer the inevitable + consequences--instability and impotence of government. + +Dr. Snow evidently thought that it is not possible to direct the +current of public opinion into exactly two channels. He certainly had +not the slightest idea that it might be a matter of electoral machinery. + +Finally, we may quote the opinion of Mr. James Bryce, M.P., whose +"American Commonwealth" is one of the most complete studies of the +tendencies of democracy in existence. Comparing the English and American +systems, he writes of the former:-- + + That system could not be deemed to have reached its maturity till + the power of the people at large had been established by the Reform + Act of 1832. For its essence resides in the delicate equipoise it + creates between the three powers, the ministry, the House of + Commons, and the people. The House is strong because it can call + the ministry to account for every act, and can by refusing supplies + compel their resignation. The ministry are not defenceless, because + they can dissolve Parliament, and ask the people to judge between + it and them. Parliament, when it displaces a ministry, does not + strike at executive authority; it merely changes its agents. The + ministry when they dissolve Parliament do not attack Parliament as + an institution; they recognise the supremacy of the body in asking + the country to change the individuals who compose it. Both the + House of Commons and the ministry act and move in the full view of + the people, who sit as arbiters, prepared to judge in any + controversy that may arise. The House is in touch with the people, + because every member must watch the lights and shadows of sentiment + which play over his own constituency. The ministry are in touch + with the people, because they are not only themselves + representatives, but are heads of a great party, sensitive to its + feelings, forced to weigh the effect of every act they do upon the + confidence which the party places in them.... The drawback to this + system of exquisite equipoise is the liability of its equilibrium + to be frequently disturbed, each disturbance involving either a + change of government, with immense temporary inconvenience to the + departments, or a general election, with immense expenditure of + money and trouble in the country. It is a system whose successful + working presupposes the existence of two great parties and no more, + parties each strong enough to restrain the violence of the other, + yet one of them steadily predominant in any given House of Commons. + Where a third, perhaps a fourth, party appears, the conditions are + changed. The scales of Parliament oscillate as the weight of this + detached group is thrown on one side or the other; dissolutions + become more frequent, and even dissolutions may fail to restore + stability. The recent history of the French Republic has shown the + difficulties of working a Chamber composed of groups, nor is the + same source of difficulty unknown in England. (Vol. i., pp. 286, + 287.) + +Thus we find the opinion unanimously held that the one great fault to +which cabinet government is liable is instability of the ministry, owing +to imperfect organization of public opinion into two definite lines of +policy. Bagehot called it a case of unstable equilibrium, and Bradford, +in "The Lesson of Popular Government," goes further when he +declares:--"Not to speak disrespectfully, the ministry is like a company +of men who, after excessive conviviality, are able to stand upright only +by holding on to each other." + +Yet, after all, the amount of stability simply depends on the state of +organization; and England has demonstrated in the golden period of her +political history (about the middle of the present century) that the +cabinet form of government can be quite as stable as the presidential +form. Therefore, if the present position gives cause for alarm, it is +not in the abolition of the cabinet or the restriction of the suffrage +that the remedy must be sought, but in improved organization. And this, +we hope to show, involves improved electoral machinery. + ++France.+--Turn to France. Is there no lesson to be drawn from the +history of that unstable country since the Revolution let loose its +flood of human passions, ambitions, and aspirations? Has not every +attempt at popular government failed for the same cause--want of +organization? + +France before the Revolution had groaned for centuries under the burden +of a decayed feudalism and an absolute monarchy. The last vestige of +constitutional forms had disappeared. The representatives of the estates +had not been convened since the meeting of the States-General in 1614. +The widespread and unprecedented misery of the people caused them to +revolt against being taxed without their consent, and a cry went up for +a convocation of the estates. The finances were in such a bad way that +Louis XVI. was forced to consent, and the three estates--clergy, nobles, +and commons--met at Versailles in 1789. At first they called themselves +the National Assembly, but the King foolishly took up such a position +with regard to the people's representatives that they swore solemnly +that they would not separate till they had laid the foundation of a new +Constitution, and henceforth were known as the Constituent Assembly. It +was determined that the King should no longer be absolute, and the +choice lay between a constitutional monarchy and a republic. The +Declaration of the Rights of Man was first drawn up, and the Assembly +settled down to its task. The leading spirit was Mirabeau. He had been +to England, and had studied the British Constitution, and he rightly saw +that France was too distracted by faction to maintain an independent +executive. He therefore openly advocated a constitutional monarchy with +a cabinet chosen from among the majority of the representatives. But, +unfortunately, the Assembly refused to follow his lead; nor would the +King take his advice to make a separate appeal to the people. In the +midst of the negotiations Mirabeau died, and the last chance of +establishing a constitutional monarchy disappeared. The King realized +this, and tried to escape to the German frontier but was brought back. +He then accepted the new Constitution, and the Legislative Assembly was +elected in 1791. From the first it had no elements of stability, being +split up into groups, and subject to the fear of the Paris mob. The King +continued to plot with the emigrant nobles against the Constitution, and +the foreign armies massed on the frontier. The danger brought on the +triumph of the revolutionary spirit in 1792. The Paris commune +overwhelmed both the King and the Assembly, and the republic was +proclaimed. Then followed the execution of the King, the Reign of +Terror, the control of the Committee of Public Safety, till finally the +anarchy was ended by the military despotism of Bonaparte, who became +First Consul and afterwards Emperor. + +What is the significance of these events in the light of our previous +examination of English history? Simply this: That the French, in passing +at once from absolutism and feudalism to complete self-government, were +trying to jump to the Second stage of representation without passing +through the first stage. Mirabeau was right; the republic was foredoomed +to failure because the people had learned neither the power of nor the +necessity for organization. + +In many respects the French Revolution parallels the English Revolution. +In each case the King was beheaded; in each case the anarchy of a +disorganized representative body was succeeded by a military despotism; +and in each case the monarchy was restored. + +It was after the restoration that the English system of party government +was developed. Why did this system not now take root in France? Partly +because France was not blessed with a king like William of Orange, and +partly because the new _systeme de bascule_, the balance system, in +which the king allows each faction in turn to hold the reins of power, +was discovered. So, instead of the gradual growth of constitutional +liberty which took place in England, the tendency in France was back to +absolutism. In 1830 Charles X., finding that he could not manage the +Chamber of Deputies, issued the ordinances of St. Cloud, suspending the +liberty of the press and dissolving the Legislature. Paris immediately +broke out into insurrection, and the King was forced to abdicate. The +crown was offered to Louis Philippe, and a second attempt at +constitutional monarchy was made. But France was too divided by her +unfortunate legacy of faction to maintain a continuous policy. The +Legitimists, the Republicans, and the Bonapartists were all awaiting +their opportunity. In 1848 the second revolution broke out in Paris; the +king fled to England, and a republic was again tried. But the +imperialist idea revived when Louis Napoleon was elected President. In +1851 he carried out his famous _coup d'etat,_ and again the Constitution +was swept away. In the following year he was accepted as Emperor by an +almost unanimous vote. Thus France again elected to be ruled by an +irresponsible head. The Third Empire ended with the capture of Napoleon +III. at Sedan in 1870, and since then France has carried on her third +experiment in republicanism. But still the fatal defect of +disorganization retards her progress; the Legislature is still split up +into contending factions, and in consequence it has been found +impossible to maintain a strong executive. Occasionally the factions +sink their differences for a time when their patriotism is appealed to, +as they have agreed to do during the currency of the present Exhibition, +but it is abundantly evident that France can never be well governed +till the people are able to organize two coherent parties. There is +ground for hope that the monarchical and imperialist ideas are +declining, and that the people are settling down to the conviction that +there is nothing left but the republic. What makes recovery difficult is +that the national character has been affected by the continual strife in +the direction of excitability and desire for change. + +Those who wish to understand the forces which brought about the +different changes and revolutions, traced by one who has grasped their +meaning, should read the account in the first volume of Mr. Bradford's +"Lesson of Popular Government." His conclusion only need be quoted +here:-- + + As has been said, that which constitutes the strength of the + English. Government, that which has made up its history for the + last two hundred years, is the growth and continuity of two solid + and coherent parties. Occasionally they have wavered when available + leaders and issues were wanting, but as soon as a strong man came + forward to take the reins the ranks closed up and the work of + mutual competition again went on. On the other hand, the curse and + the cause of failure of representative government on the Continent + of Europe is the formation within the legislature of unstable and + dissolving groups. In France the Extreme Eight, the Eight, the + Eight Centre, the Left Centre, the Left, and the Extreme Left are + names of differing factions which unite only for temporary purposes + and to accomplish a victory over some other unit, but which are + fatal to stable and firm government. The same is true of Italy, + Spain, and Austria, and if not of Germany it is because military + despotism holds all alike in subjection. + +Mr. Bodley has come to the same conclusion in his work on "France." He +writes:-- + + There is no restraining power in the French parliamentary system to + arrest a member on his easy descent, and he knows that if he + escapes penal condemnation he will enjoy relative impunity. Many + deputies are men of high integrity; but virtue in a large assembly + is of small force without organization, and, moreover, a group of + legislators leagued together as a vigilance committee would have + neither consistency nor durability, which the discipline of party + can alone effect. Corruption of this kind, which has undermined the + republic, could not co-exist with party government. A party whose + ministers or supporters had incurred as much suspicion as fell on + the politicians acquitted in the Panama affair would under it be + swept out of existence for a period. When the first denunciations + appeared, the leaders of the party, to avert that fate, would have + said to their implicated colleagues--"In spite of your abilities + and of the manifest exaggeration of these charges we must part + company, for though you may have been culpable only of + indiscretion, we cannot afford to be identified with doubtful + transactions;" and the Opposition, eager not to lose its vantage, + would scan with equal keenness the acts of its own members. With + party government the electorate would not have appeared to condone + those scandals. But as it was, when a deputy involved in them went + down before his constituents, whose local interest he had well + served, with no opponent more formidable than the nominee of some + decayed or immature group, they gave their votes to the old member, + whose influence with the prefecture in the past had benefited the + district, rather than to the new comer, whose denunciations had no + authority; whereas, had each electoral district been the scene of a + contest between organized parties, the same spectacle would not + have been presented." (Vol. ii., pp. 302, 303.) + +Mr. Bodley has, in this last sentence, touched the heart of the +problem. If the salvation of France depends on making each electoral +district the scene of a contest between two organized parties, is not +electoral machinery destined to play an important part in the solution? + ++The United States.+--The third great experiment in representative +democracy which the nineteenth century has furnished is that which is +being conducted in the United States. The contrast with France is +remarkable. Just as France is the supreme example of want of +organization, so America is the most conspicuous instance of perfect +organization into two great national parties which the world has seen. +Yet both experiments were started by a revolution, and practically at +the same time. The difference lay in the fact that the Americans +inherited the capacity for self-government from their British ancestors, +and had already practised it in colonial times, while the French only +inherited innumerable causes of dissension. + +But organization is not the only characteristic feature of American +politics. Strange to say, it is accompanied by a suppression of +individuality just as complete. It is organization without responsible +leadership. For, in the first place, the politicians look on themselves +not as leaders but as followers of the people; and in the second place, +there are no leaders in Congress, corresponding to the cabinet ministers +of British countries. + +Now, the view which we wish to emphasize here is that the present +position of American politics is the natural result of the principles +embodied in the Constitution adopted in 1789, when the Union was formed. +The complete organization and the want of leadership are directly to be +traced to the labours of George Washington and his associates. A brief +glance at the Constitution and the early history of its working will +make this clear. + +The thirteen States which revolted from England worked fairly well +together under the "Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union" as +long as the war lasted, but as soon as peace was proclaimed it was, as +Washington said, no better than anarchy. The famous Convention of 1787 +was therefore held, and the Constitution was drawn up. One guiding +principle of its framers was to divide power so as to place checks on +the will of the people, and on outbursts of popular passion, which were +then greatly dreaded. One means of attaining this object was the +attempted separation of the legislative and executive functions. We say +attempted advisedly, for time has but shown that the two are +inseparable. But the framers of the Constitution divided the legislative +function between the two Houses, and vested the executive function +almost entirely, as they thought, in the President. Montesquieu, in his +"_Esprit des Lois_" had laid down that the great merit of the English +Constitution was the separation of these functions, and the Americans +accepted this view. But, in truth, the English cabinet system had not +then been fully developed. The King was still, not only in appearance, +but to some extent also in fact, the head of the executive, and there +was nothing to indicate that ministers were so soon to become the real +leaders. + +The effect of this provision was a struggle between the two branches for +supremacy, and the legislatures have won. The President has been +degraded to a mere agent, and the legislatures have absorbed the greater +part of executive functions, even to the control of finance. Now, the +framers of the Constitution were apprehensive that the President might +become a mere party agent, and they tried to strengthen his position by +two devices. First, they gave him the power to veto statutes unless +overruled by a two-thirds majority of Congress; and, secondly, they +provided for his election by an electoral college, or by a double system +of election. This second provision was designed to ensure the election +of a President for personal instead of for party reasons; but it has +proved a complete failure. Almost from the first the electoral delegates +have had to pledge themselves to support the party nominee. The veto, +therefore, has also become practically useless. Thus it has come about +that Congress is a body entirely without leaders. + +A second defect in the Constitution was that it said nothing about the +right of any State to withdraw from the Union. After nearly 70 years +this omission was responsible for the Civil War. The legal basis for +secession was then abandoned, but combinations of States have since been +regarded with the greatest apprehension. This conviction that the Union +must be maintained at any price has had very important consequences on +the party system. The danger of allowing combinations of States to +dominate party lines was demonstrated; and the division of each State by +the same national parties was recognized as essential to safety. + +In the meantime, as we have seen, Congress had practically got control +of the executive functions, which were supposed to be exercised by the +President, including the nominations to office. Thus every member of the +party in a majority had a share of the plunder, and "the spoils to the +victors" became the basis of party organization. The system soon +underwent such a remarkable development that nearly 200,000 public +offices were at the disposal of the victors at each election. The party +organizations immediately became omnipotent. The secret of their power +lay in the control of nominations. Each party would nominate one +candidate only, and the electors voted neither for men nor measures, but +blindly for party. As Mr. Bryce declares:--"The class of professional +politicians was therefore the first crop which the spoils system--the +system of using public office as private prize of war--bore. Bosses +were the second crop." + +The development which these party organizations have now reached is +extraordinary. Practically we may say that there are only two +parties--Republicans and Democrats--and they dominate not only Federal +and State politics but also city government. Each party has its list of +registered electors, and each holds a primary election before the real +election, to decide the party candidate. But these primary elections are +a mere matter of form. Only a small fraction of the electors attend +them, and only those who have always supported the party are allowed to +vote. The nominations are therefore really controlled, by fraud if +necessary, by the "ring" of party managers. Generally there is one man +who can pull the most strings, and he becomes the "boss." All power is +centred in the hands of this irresponsible despot. The men who are +elected owe their positions to him, and are responsible to him, not to +the public. + +Remember that these "machine" organizations have absolute sway in every +electorate, from one end of the United States to the other. It may be +wondered why the people tolerate them, but they are powerless. Sometimes +an independent movement is attempted, but it very rarely succeeds, and +even when it does the two "machines" combine against it and agree to +divide the spoils. Mr. Bryce writes:-- + + The disgust is less than a European expects, for it is mingled + with amusement. The "boss" is a sort of joke, albeit an expensive + joke. "After all," people say, "it is our own fault. If we all went + to the primaries, or if we all voted an independent ticket, we + could make an end of the 'boss.'" There is a sort of fatalism in + their view of democracy. (Vol ii., p. 241.) + +What is the meaning of all this wonderful party machinery? It is this: +that organization without responsible leadership can only be founded on +corruption. In other words, _the spoils system is the price which the +United States pay for maintaining the Union under the present +Constitution_. The fault lies ultimately, therefore, in the +Constitution, which tends to repress responsible leadership. + +Now, the mass of public opinion in America, as Mr. Bryce continually +points out, is sound, and attempts have not been wanting to put an end +to the system of rotation in public offices. A sustained agitation for +civil service reform was entered upon, and the system of competitive +examination was applied to a large number of offices. Now at last, the +reformers thought, American politics would be purified. But, no! The +corruption, simply took a new and more alarming turn. Direct money +contributions took the place of the spoils. It became the practice to +levy blackmail on corporations either to be let alone, or for the +purpose of fleecing the public. The monopolies granted to protected +industries are the source of a large share of these "campaign funds." +The Legislatures are crowded by professional lobbyists, and it is, in +consequence, impossible to obtain justice against the corporations. +Surely no stronger proof can be needed that corruption is and must +remain the basis of organization so long as there is no responsible +leadership. + +It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that the Americans are not +alive to the failure of their representative institutions. Since Mr. +Bryce's great work on "The American Commonwealth" was published two +books by American authors have appeared which are very outspoken in +condemnation. These are "The Unforeseen Tendencies of Democracy," by Mr. +E.L. Godkin; and "The Lesson of Popular Government," by Mr. Gamaliel +Bradford. The keynote of the first of these two books is to abolish +corruption by destroying the power of the "machine" and the "boss," and +of the second to introduce responsible leadership. Mr. Godkin traces the +disappearance of distinguished men from public life to the control of +all entrance to it by the "machine." The reform of primary elections, he +holds, is then the first necessity, since "independent voting" has +ceased to be a remedy. But he fails to find a solution. The conclusion +he comes to is as follows:-- + + Is the situation then hopeless? Are we tied up inexorably simply to + a choice of evils? I think not. It seems to me that the nomination + of candidates is another of the problems of democracy which are + never seriously attacked without prolonged perception and + discussion of their importance. One of these was the formation of + the federal government; another was the abolition of slavery; + another was the reform of the civil service. Every one of them + looked hopeless in the beginning; but the solution came in each + case, through the popular determination to find some better way. + (Pp. 92, 93.) + +But the evil goes far deeper than Mr. Godkin appears to think. To +abolish corruption is to take away the present basis of organization +without substituting any other. If irresponsible leadership is to be +abandoned, responsible leadership must be introduced. Mr. Bradford's +plan, therefore, promises more, for if responsible leadership could be +introduced into Congress corruption would then be abolished also. + +Mr. Bradford's whole book may be said to be a study of the relations of +the executive to the legislature, and the conclusions at which he +arrives are a complete vindication of cabinet government. But he finds +one fault, and that is the instability of ministries, which he confesses +has not been apparent so far in the British House of Commons. He holds, +however, that it will become more apparent with the rising tide of +democracy. It is rather amusing to find that the greatest obstacle which +has to be overcome in proposing a responsible executive is the +veneration in which the Constitution is still held and the dislike to +copying anything from England. His plan is, therefore, an adaptation of +the cabinet to the conditions imposed by the Constitution. He holds that +the ministers appointed by the President should sit in Congress and have +control of the initiation of legislation. It is to be feared that this +would hardly realize the idea of responsible leadership. Mr. Bradford +establishes a chain of responsibility by the fact that the ministers are +responsible to the President and the President is responsible to the +people; but that is a very different thing to the continual +responsibility of the cabinet to a majority of the legislature. It is +probable that the President's ministers would have to encounter the +opposition of a majority in one or both Houses, and it is difficult to +see how a deadlock could be avoided. Mr. Bradford contemplates that the +people would settle any issues which arise between the two branches at +the end of the Presidential term of four years; but it is just as likely +that there would then be a new President in any case. We are driven to +the conclusion, therefore, that responsible leadership is incompatible +with the American system of divided powers and fixed terms of office. + +Mr. Bryce comments on the proposal as follows:-- + + It is hard to say, when one begins to make alterations in an old + house, how far one will be led on in rebuilding, and I doubt + whether this change in the present American system, possibly in + itself desirable, might not be found to involve a reconstruction + large enough to put a new face upon several parts of that system. + (Vol. i, pp. 290, 291.) + +This is very true, but is not a new building required? Is not the old +house built on a rotten foundation? Mr. Bradford has certainly +overlooked the effect of his proposal on party organization for one +thing. If the power over legislation, and especially over expenditure of +public money, is to be taken away from the irresponsible committees of +Congress, the basis of party organization would cease to be corruption, +and both representatives and parties would have to take on an entirely +new character. As to the present character of representatives, Mr. Bryce +advances a number of reasons why the best men do not go in for politics, +such as the want of a social and commercial capital, the residential +qualification, the comparative dullness of politics, the attractiveness +of other careers, &c, but Mr. Bradford declares that the one explanation +which goes further than all these is the absorption of all the powers of +the government by the legislature, and the consequent suppression of +individuality. He writes:-- + + The voters are urged to send to Congress men of character, ability, + and public spirit. They might as well be asked to select men of + that quality to follow the profession of burglars, a comparison + which is not intended to convey any disrespect to the number of + honest and respectable men who constantly are sent to Congress. + Chosen as burglars, they would fail just the same in the + business.... It is the organization of Congress which offers every + facility to those who wish to buy and those who wish to be bought. + +Again, as to the present character of parties, Mr. Bradford declares:-- + + The names of the two great parties, Republicans and Democrats, have + in themselves and at the present time no meaning at all. + +Simply because the basis of organization is corruption, and not +questions of public policy. For the same reason recent elections have +been fought on popular "crazes," such as the silver question. But Mr. +Bradford says:-- + + New parties cannot be formed on constantly changing issues, since + to have any strength they must have a certain degree of permanence. + The only two nations which have succeeded in forming great national + parties are Great Britain and the United States. In other European + countries the splitting into groups has almost made representative + government impossible. + +What Mr. Bradford has failed to appreciate is that the absolutely rigid +division into two camps which prevails in America is founded on +corruption, and will disappear when corruption is abolished. In the +United States such a thing as a Congressman deserting one party for the +other is practically unknown. In Great Britain, on the contrary, party +lines do continually change as new issues arise; and when they are +founded on questions of public policy it must be so. What gives them +permanence is that certain principles underlie most questions, and men +who have the same political principles are likely to think the same on +any single question; and further that a member would rather follow his +party and sacrifice his opinion on a single question than sacrifice most +of his principles. + +Therefore, even if the Americans do succeed in purifying their politics, +they will be faced with the same difficulty as exists elsewhere--namely, +such improved organization as will secure the return of representatives +on questions of general public policy only. The present system of +single-membered electorates will not suffice. The only remedy lies in +enlarged electorates with electoral machinery which will organize public +opinion into two definite lines of policy, and will, by allowing +individual candidature merge the primary election into the actual +election. + +All this involves a radical alteration, both in the Constitution and in +the methods of election. But the United States have the great advantage +over France that it does not involve also a serious change in the +national character. It is not unlikely that some such reform must be +brought about before long. + +The present position cannot last. The Republican party has so long +identified itself with Capital in all its forms, with the protected +monopolists, the trusts and the corporations, that the mass of Labour +threatens to support the Democrats; and as the latter party maintains +the doctrines of direct government and the infallibility of the +majority, the result will be such a financial crisis and such an +industrial revolution that the Americans will have at last to admit that +their government needs total reconstruction. + ++Australia.+--On the first day of the nineteenth century the Union of +the Parliaments of Great Britain and Ireland was accomplished; on the +first day of the twentieth century Britain's daughters in the southern +seas will inaugurate, under her ægis, a new experiment in +democracy--the Australian Commonwealth. The time is opportune, then, for +a review of the tendencies of Australian politics, and for a comparison +with the other great democracies. Thus only can we attempt to cast the +horoscope of the new nation. + +Australia starts with many advantages over France and America. The +science of government is better understood now than when they started; +the folly of placing too many checks on the people is recognized; and +the British system of responsible leadership by a cabinet in the +legislature is fully developed. All these features are embodied in the +Constitution, and it only remains for the people to prove their fitness +to work it. + +Applying the same tests as we have used in the case of the great +democracies to the present position of Australian politics, what is the +result? First, as regards organization, where do we stand? It must be +confessed that we are far behind Great Britain and America, though +certainly we are not in the same sad plight as France. Still there is +the fact that we are classed among the failures. Take the evidence of +Mr. E.L. Godkin in "Unforeseen Tendencies of Democracy:"-- + + In his Journals during a visit to Turin in 1850, Senior records a + conversation with Cesare Balbo, a member of the Chamber in the + first Piedmontese Parliament, in which Balbo said, after an + exciting financial debate:--"We have not yet acquired parliamentary + discipline. Most of the members are more anxious about their own + crotchets or their own consistency than about the country. The + ministry has a large nominal majority, but every member of it is + ready to put them in a minority for any whim of his own." This was + probably true of every legislative body on the Continent, and it + continues true to this day in Italy, Greece, France, Austria, + Germany, and the new Australian democracies. (Pp. 102, 103.) + +He adduces in support of the statement the fact that the three colonies +of New South Wales, South Australia, and Victoria have had respectively +twenty-eight, forty-two, and twenty-six ministries in forty years. Is +the prospect any brighter for the new Commonwealth? It is to be feared +not, if the present tendencies towards disintegration are allowed to +grow. For in the last decade a change has come over Australian politics +which portends the gravest danger. We refer to the direct class +representation which, under the name of Labour parties, has spread all +over the colonies. These so-called Labour "parties" are neither more nor +less than class factions. Their policy is everywhere the same--viz., the +use of the "balance system," which has proved so disastrous to France. +The worst effect is that they prevent the main parties from working out +definite policies on public questions, and cause them also to degenerate +into factions. In Victoria we have actually had the ludicrous spectacle +of the Opposition saving the Government time after time when deserted by +its own followers. In New South Wales the individual member is sunk in +the party; he must vote as the majority decides. Mr. Reid's term of +office was ended by one such caucus. In Queensland, where the party is +strongest, it has now practically become one of the main parties, and +the whole colony is divided on class lines. Already an Intercolonial +Labour Conference has been held, and a pledge drawn up which must be +signed by all candidates for the party support at Federal elections. The +danger of these tactics is not rightly apprehended in Australia. In +reality they mark the first step towards social disruption. We may cite +the authority of Mr. James Bryce on this point. After pointing out in +"The American Commonwealth" that since the Civil War combinations of +States have always acted through the national parties, he writes:-- + + This is an important security against disruption. And a similar + security against the risk of civil strife or revolution is to be + found in the fact that the parties are not based on or sensibly + affected by differences either of wealth or of social position. + Their cleavage is not horizontal, according to social strata, but + vertical. This would be less true if it were stated either of the + Northern States separately, or of the Southern States separately: + it is true of the Union taken as a whole. It might cease to be true + if the new Labour party were to grow till it absorbed or superseded + either of the existing parties. The same feature has characterized + English politics as compared with those of most European countries, + and has been a main cause of the stability of the English + government and of the good feeling between different classes in the + community. (Vol. ii., p. 38.) + +How is it that the public conscience is not alive to the enormity of +this anti-social crime? Mainly, we think, because the true principles of +representation are not properly understood. It is almost universally +assumed that there is no real distinction between direct and +representative government. Minorities are tacitly allowed to have as +much right to representation as the minority, and the confusion of terms +is passed over. The working classes are told by self-seeking demagogues +that they are in a majority; that the majority is entitled to rule; and +that they have only to organize to come into their heritage. These +sycophants, who, as Aristotle of old pointed out, bear the greatest +resemblance to the court favourite of the tyrant, ask the people to +believe the silly paradox that the united wisdom of the whole people is +greater than that of the wisest part. The truth is that no people is fit +to exercise equal political rights which is not sensible enough to +choose the wisest part to carry on the government, providing only they +have control over their selection, and can hold them responsible. Are +the working classes in Australia going to demonstrate that they are +unfit for the exercise of political rights? Are they going to justify +the prognostications of the opponents of popular government? That is the +real question at issue. Unless public opinion be aroused to the iniquity +of class delegation, the further degradation of Australian politics is +inevitable. Let it not be thought that we are decrying the organization +of the working classes for political purposes. On the contrary, we hold +that the organization of every class and every interest is necessary in +order that it shall exert its just share of influence. But the only way +in which every class can get its just share is by acting through the +two main parties. A class which holds aloof can exert for a short time +an undue share of influence, as a faction holding the balance of power, +but only at the expense of paralyzing the government. + +But the working classes are hardly to be blamed in this matter, for it +is a fact that before their action they were not able to exert their +just share of influence. The government was such as to promote the rule +of private interests instead of the general welfare, and, consequently, +their interests were shamefully neglected. The real cause of the +mischief was, as in America, the nominating system, which is inseparably +connected with the present method of election. The consideration of this +question brings us to the second characteristic of Australian +politics--namely, the irresponsible leadership of the press. + +We have seen how in America organization has been effected without +responsible leadership in Congress, only at the expense of the +irresponsible leadership of the "rings" and "bosses" who control the +"machines." In Australia an analogous result has been brought about by +different causes. We have not had civil strife to teach us the necessity +of organization, nor have we a spoils system available as a basis, but +the disorganized state of the legislatures and the consequent weakness +of the executive have thrown a large share of leadership into the hands +of the press. Both in America and in Australia the prevalence of the +ultra-democratic theory that representatives should follow and not lead +the people has been a powerful contributing cause. And yet it is as +clear as possible that the choice lies between two alternatives. The +people must either submit to responsible leadership in Parliament or to +irresponsible leadership outside. The ultra-democrats hold that +responsible leadership in Parliament is incompatible with popular +government. We believe that this is the fundamental error which is +leading both the Australian and the American democracies astray. On the +contrary, it is the irresponsible despotism which is exercised by the +"bosses" in America and the newspapers in Australia which is really +incompatible with free government. + +The source of the error lies in the failure to grasp the meaning of the +term "responsible leadership." It is assumed that either the people must +lead and the representatives follow, or the representatives must lead +and the people follow. Bagehot may be taken as an exponent of the latter +position. He thought that cabinet government was only possible with a +deferential nation as opposed to a democratic nation. England he held to +be the type of deferential nations, because the people were content to +leave the government to the "great governing families"--_i.e._, to defer +to caste, which is in principle the same as deferring to a king, who is +supposed to rule by divine right. Mr. Bradford also gives a somewhat +exaggerated idea of the importance of the force of personality when he +declares that the mass of the people have no "views" on public +questions; all they want is to be well governed. The late Professor +Freeman Snow, of Harvard University, U.S., was a supporter of the +ultra-democratic view. In the "Annals of the American Academy of +Political and Social Science" for July, 1892, he declares:-- + + Mr. Bryce thinks that, "like other crowds, a legislature must be + led and ruled." And he has formulated a theory which he believes to + be "the essence of free or popular government, and the + justification for vesting power in numbers." "Every question that + arises in the conduct of government," he asserts, "is either a + question of ends or a question of means." And as the "masses are + better judges of what will conduce to their happiness than are + the-classes placed above them, they must be allowed to determine + ends." But, assuming the end to be given, they--the masses--should + leave to their leaders--the trained statesmen--the choice of means. + The defect in this theory is that it depends for its successful + operation upon the continued "deference of the multitude for the + classes placed above them ... upon the principle of _noblesse + oblige_," a principle, by the way, derived from feudal monarchy, + which has no existence in the United States, and which ought to be + considered a misfortune in any free country.... + + Mr. Bryce has made a step in advance of Mr Bagehot in trusting the + people to determine ends, whatever they may be; why not go one step + further, and trust them to determine all questions of policy? + +These are the two opposite points of view. They are both equally wrong. +The first is simply irresponsible leadership, and the second amounts to +the same thing in practice, however much the people may appear to lead +in theory. The true position is that the relation between the +representatives and the people is reciprocal. Both lead and both follow. +The people defer to the representatives, not on account of rank or +caste, nor upon the principle of _noblesse oblige_, but only in so far +as the representatives are able to demonstrate their fitness to devise +measures for the general welfare. The people, on the other hand, are the +ultimate judges, both of measures and of men. This mutual action and +reaction constitutes the responsible leadership, which is one of the +fundamental principles underlying the device of representation. To it we +have already traced the virtue of representation as a social force, +capable of moulding national character and of appealing to the higher +nature of the people. + +An elector who is unable or unwilling to decide grave questions of +public policy himself may be a very shrewd judge as to who is best +fitted to decide them; and deference to ability is totally different in +principle to deference to caste. In a country in the transitional stage +between aristocracy and democracy, his judgment may be based partly on +the principle of _noblesse oblige_; but there is not the slightest +reason why in a democratic country he should require the representative +to defer to him. He will merely require a higher standard and a closer +and a more constant demonstration that the measures proposed are +conducive to the public well-being. Moreover, it is still necessary that +the representatives should be judged periodically on general lines of +policy, and that the elector should not have the power of exercising +control on single questions. Under these conditions the result of the +mutual relation will be an improvement on both sides. But if, under the +influence of irresponsible leadership outside Parliament, the people +insist on increasing control over their representatives, then not only +is Parliament degraded, but progress towards government in the general +welfare is stopped. + +This long digression as to the real meaning of responsible leadership is +necessary in order to gauge the drift of the prevailing tendency towards +the irresponsible leadership of the press in Australia. The evil exists +in all the colonies, but it is perhaps worse in our own colony of +Victoria than in any other country in the world, although it is said to +be very bad in Switzerland since the referendum was introduced. We have +two morning newspapers in Melbourne, which take opposite sides on nearly +every question which arises. They admit into their columns no facts and +no arguments which tell against the position they have taken up; nay, +more, they resort to downright misrepresentation to support it. It will +be said that this is only a form of the party game, but the danger lies +in the fact that they circulate in different classes, and therefore +these classes see only one side of every question. Moreover, in their +competition for the support of classes in which they desire to increase +their circulation they use their influence to secure legislation which +will appeal to class prejudices, or even undertake a prolonged agitation +to relieve special interests from legitimate charges. The _Age_ has for +a long time thrived by pandering to the prejudices of the working +classes, and especially of the artisans; the _Argus_ now seeks to get +even by creating dissension between town and country. + +All this interference with the functions of Parliament has a baneful +influence on the working of the political machine. The party lines are +practically decided by the newspaper contest. We have spoken of the +resemblance to the "machine" control over American politics. One of the +newspapers is, in effect, managed by a "ring," the other by a "boss." +The despotism of David Syme in Melbourne is as unquestioned as that of +Richard Croker in New York, or Matthew Quay in Pennsylvania. How close +the analogy is may be inferred from the fact that Mr. Syme has +exercised, and still claims the right to exercise, control over +nominations to Parliament. It is notorious that the ten delegates who +"represented" Victoria at the Federation Convention were elected on the +_Age_ "ticket." Again, Mr. Syme is known as "the father of protection," +and has been able, by the force of his indomitable will, to impose on +the colony a tariff which can be compared only to the M'Kinley tariff +in America, thus showing that irresponsible leadership in either form is +more favourable to the rule of private interests than to the general +welfare. + +We have said enough to show that in internal affairs the influence of +the press, when it directly interferes with Parliament is an anti-social +force. In matters of foreign policy the case is still worse. The press +is almost universally jingoistic, because it is financially interested +in sensationalism. A war generally means a fortune to newspaper +proprietors. In such matters, therefore, responsible leadership by +Parliament is still more urgently required. + +We now come to the claim of those ultra-democrats who preach the +poisonous doctrines of direct government and of unrestrained majority +rule, that responsible leadership is incompatible with popular +government. This claim, is of course, supported by the radical press in +Australia. We have already quoted from Mr. Syme's work on +"Representative Government in England" the extreme views in which he +confuses representation with delegation. "Popular government," he +declares, "can only exist where the people can exercise control over +their representatives at all times and under all circumstances." The +method proposed to obtain this control is to give a majority of the +constituents power to dismiss a representative at any time, and is +utterly impracticable. Imagine the position of a member elected by a +majority of one or two votes! The true way to prevent members abusing +their trust is not to increase the direct control of the people, but to +prevent the control of the press and all other irresponsible agencies +over them; and so to ensure the return of better men. + +Perhaps the most striking anomaly in Mr. Syme's position is that, while +he would confine the office of Parliament to expressing public opinion, +he declares in the same work that "the press at once forms and expresses +public opinion."[2] Now, it is quite true that if Parliament is weak and +disorganized, or occupies itself in fighting for the spoils of office, +the power of forming public opinion is thrown into the hands of the +press. But the more power is seized by the press, the more Parliament is +degraded, and the less is the chance of recovery. The situation presents +little difficulty to Mr. Syme. Every newspaper reader, he declares, +"becomes, as it were, a member of that vast assembly, which may be said +to embrace the whole nation, so widely are newspapers now read. Had we +only the machinery for recording the votes of that assembly, we might +easily dispense with Parliament altogether." + +These ideas are not of mere academic interest; they have dominated the +trend of Victorian politics for many years. The time has now arrived for +the people to consider whether it is better to keep a Parliament of weak +delegates to express the public opinion which is formed by the press +than to elect a Parliament of "leaders of the people," highly-trained +legists, economists, and sociologists, to form and direct the public +opinion which is expressed by the newspapers. Why should the principle +of leadership, as exemplified in Mr. Syme's own career, be given full +scope in the press, and entirely repressed in Parliament? As to the kind +of influence we mean, no better description could be given than that of +the well-known Labour leader, Mr. H.H. Champion. In an open letter to +Mr. David Syme in the _Champion_ of 22nd June, 1895, he wrote:-- + + Yet, if you rose to-morrow morning with the resolve to dismiss the + ministry or to reverse the policy of the country, to stop + retrenchment or to recommence borrowing, that resolve would + infallibly translate itself into fact in a few weeks. + + In no country that I know of has any organ in the press so much + influence as your paper. It is practically the sole source of + information for the majority of the people. It has no competitors. + It can make any person or policy popular or unpopular. It can fail + to report any man or thing, and for four-fifths of the citizens it + is as though that man or thing were not. It can misrepresent any + speech or movement, and the printed lie alone will reach the + electors. It could teach the people anything you choose. It has + ruled the country for a couple of decades. It rules the country + to-day. + +Professor Jethro Brown shows himself alive to the danger of press +domination in Australia. In "The New Democracy" he writes:--"The +_prestige_ of Parliament is destroyed when its deliberations and +conclusions cease to be the determining factor in legislation. The +transfer of the real responsibility for legislation to a new power +implies the discrediting of the old school for training leaders." And he +quotes with approval the expression of opinion by the Honourable B.R. +Wise in the Federal Convention:-- + + There may be, as Mr. David Syme suggests, no risk involved in the + change of masters; but for my part I would sooner trust the + destinies of the country to the worst Parliament the people of + Australia would elect than to the best newspaper the mind of man + has ever imagined. + +It is little use, therefore, for the press to further degrade Parliament +in the eyes of the people by railing at it in the following terms:-- + + So it is that Parliament as a working machine is about the + clumsiest and least effective that can be conceived of. All our + Parliaments are modelled on the necessities of bygone centuries. We + want a working Parliament improved up to date; but we lack + political invention, and have to jog along with the old lumbering + machine--a sort of bullock dray trying to compete with an age of + electric railways and motor cars.[3] + +The remedy lies with the press itself. Let it abandon all illegitimate +influence, and use its power in a legitimate direction to give effect to +the principles of organization and responsible leadership in Parliament. +But just as the Labour faction cannot altogether be blamed for the +present disintegration of Parliament, so the press cannot be held +responsible for its degradation. In both eases cause and effect have +been interrelated. The mistake which the press has made has been in not +perceiving that the more it interferes with the legitimate functions of +Parliament, even although with the best intentions, the more it degrades +Parliament. + +We have now passed in review the two great dangers which assail the +Commonwealth at the inception of federation. We have shown how +intimately related they are to the two great principles underlying +representative government--organization and leadership. Nay, we have +seen that all the varied phenomena presented by the great democracies of +the world can be expressed in terms of the same two principles. + +It remains to show that to give effect to the expression of these two +principles in a more perfect manner than ever yet attained is a problem +of electoral machinery. This task we shall now undertake. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[2] "Representative Government in England," p. 123. + +[3] _Age_, 28th June, 1900. + + + + +CHAPTER IV. + +THE REFORM: TRUE PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. + + +How to give effect to the principles of organization and leadership in +an electoral reform--that is the problem which we shall now attempt to +solve. We have already laid down the theoretical requirements, which are +(1) proportional representation to the two parties--the majority and the +minority, and (2) the election by each party separately of its most +popular leaders; and we shall now have to consider also how these +requirements are modified by practical considerations. + ++Proportional Representation to the Two Parties, the Majority and the +Minority.+--It will be as well to illustrate the method proposed by +reference to the conditions imposed by an actual election, such as that +for the Federal Senate. The Commonwealth Bill provides that each State +shall be polled as a single electorate, returning six senators. Suppose +that 120,000 electors vote on party lines in any State. It is clear that +a party which has the support of 20,000 electors is entitled to one +senator; also, that a party which has the support of 40,000 electors is +entitled to two senators; of 60,000 electors to three senators, and so +on. Now, suppose that one party has the support of 50,000 electors, and +the other of 70,000 electors, then the minority is entitled to two and a +half senators, and the majority to three and a half senators. But +senators are living units, and cannot be divided into fractions. The +question therefore arises, Which is entitled to the odd senator, the +majority or the minority? And the answer is that they are both equally +entitled to him; for it is as much a tie as if each party has the +support of 10,000 electors in a single-seat electorate. But if the +minority had the support of 49,999 electors, or one elector less, it +would be entitled to only two senators, and if it had the support of +50,001 electors, or one elector more, it would be entitled to three +senators. + +From the above simple facts can be deduced general rules applicable to +any particular case. It is evident that the result is not affected by +the number of votes allowed to each elector, providing only that each +elector has the same number of votes. It is also quite irrespective of +the number of candidates nominated in the interests of each party. But +it would never do to allow party organizations to control nominations. +How are we to combine individual candidature with party nomination? The +only way to do this is to require that each candidate shall declare, +either when nominating or a few days before the election, on which side +of the House he intends to sit, and be classified accordingly as +Ministerialist or Oppositionist. To decide the relative strengths of the +two parties, it is then only necessary to take the aggregate votes +polled by all the candidates nominated for each party as a measure of +the amount of support which it receives. + +The great advantages of this provision are at once apparent. There is no +incentive to limit the number of candidates so as to prevent splitting +the votes. On the contrary, it is to the interest of each party to get +as many strong candidates as possible to stand in its interests. There +will be no necessity to ask any candidate to retire for fear of losing a +seat to the party. Thus the control of nominations, which leads to the +worst abuses of the present system, will be entirely obviated. + +Now, suppose that in the instance we have already given each elector is +allowed to vote for one candidate only, the total number of votes +recorded will be 120,000. Then the _unit of representation_ or number of +votes which entitle a party to one senator will be 20,000 votes; each +party will be entitled to one senator for every whole unit of +representation, and the odd senator will go to the party having the +larger remainder. For instance, if the aggregate votes polled by all the +Ministerialist candidates be 72,000, and by the Oppositionist candidates +48,000, the Ministerialists, having three units plus 12,000 remainder, +are entitled to four senators, and the Opposition, having two units plus +8,000, to two senators. + +Similarly, if each elector be allowed to vote for a number of +candidates, all these figures will be increased in proportion. For +example, if each elector has three votes, the unit of representation +would be 60,000 votes. The following general rules may therefore be +stated:-- + + 1. The unit of representation is equal to the total number of valid + votes cast at the election, divided by the number of seats. + + 2. Each party is entitled to one seat for every whole unit of + representation contained in the aggregate votes polled by all its + candidates, and the odd seat goes to the party which has the larger + remainder. + +The fact that the last seat has to be assigned to the party which has +the larger remainder is sometimes advanced as an objection, but it is +evidently the fairest possible division that the size of the electorate +will permit. Of course, the larger the electorate the more accurately +proportioned will be the representation. Hence the representation would +be most accurate if the whole assembly were elected in one large +electorate. But if, for the sake of convenience, the assembly be elected +in a large number of electorates in which the relative proportions of +two parties vary the gains which a party makes in some electorates will +be balanced by losses in others, so that the final result would be +almost as accurate as if the whole country were polled as one +electorate. It must be remembered that the result in any electorate +cannot be foreseen, and that it is a matter of chance which party gains +the advantage. Now, if the limits of variation comprise even a single +unit of representation, each party will stand an equal chance of +gaining, and therefore the laws of chance will ensure that the gains +balance the losses in the different electorates. Supposing a party which +averages 40 per cent. in the whole country to vary between 30 per cent. +and 50 per cent, in the different electorates (which may be taken as a +fair assumption), the unit of representation should equal 20 per cent., +or one-fifth. Under these conditions the laws of chance will ensure +correct representation, so long as the electorates do not contain less +than five seats. + +The above facts furnish a complete answer to the arguments advanced by +Mr. J.W. M'Cay, ex-M.L.A., in a series of articles in the _Age_ against +the application of proportional representation to the Federal Senate. +While apparently recognizing that it is utterly impossible for the +minority to secure a majority of the representation, he based his +objection solely on the fact that a minority is able with electorates +containing an even number of seats to secure one-half of the +representation, and thus lead to what he terms "the minority block." + +The force of the objection will entirely depend on the size of the +minority which is able thus to thwart the will of the majority. The +Federal Senate will consist of 36 senators, each of the original States +contributing six. No reasonable man would complain if the minority, +being only entitled to 17 senators, actually returned 18, but Mr. M'Cay +points out that it is possible for a minority entitled to 15 senators to +return 18. To bring about this result he makes the absurd assumption +that in each of the six States the minority polls exactly two whole +units of representation, and a bare majority of a third unit. It is safe +to say that this would not happen once in a thousand years. If the +relative proportions of the two parties vary in the slightest in the +different States some must be under and some over the assumed +proportion. It is most probable that it will be under it in three States +and over it in the other three States; and, under these circumstances, +the party will return 15 senators, the exact number to which it is +entitled. It may happen to be under the assumed proportion in only two +of the States and over in the other four, and that the party will get +one more senator than it is entitled to; but it is extremely improbable +that it will get two more, and virtually impossible that it will get +three more senators than its just proportion. Mr. M'Cay's conclusion +that proportional representation can only be used in electorates +returning an odd number of representatives is shown to be entirely +unwarranted. Equally fallacious is Professor Nanson's rebutting +statement that "scientific proportionalists recommend odd electorates." +While the number of States remains even, the mathematical chance of a +minority securing one-half of the representation is precisely the same +whether the States return an odd or an even number of senators. As a +matter of fact, the danger of a minority securing one-half of the +representation is much greater at the intermediate elections for the +Senate, when each State returns three senators, the reason being the +smaller field. + +We have dwelt at some length on the preceding example, because it serves +to refute another error into which some of the proportionalists have +fallen. It is held that the unit of representation should be ascertained +by dividing the total votes, not by the number of seats, but by the +seats increased by one. This unit is generally known as the Droop quota, +having been proposed in a work published by Mr. H.R. Droop in 1869. +Since one vote more than one-half of the total votes is sufficient for +election in a single-seat electorate, it is argued that one vote more +than one-third suffices in a two-seat electorate, one vote more than +one-fourth in a three-seat electorate, and so on. The unit in a six-seat +electorate would be one-seventh of the votes instead of one-sixth, and +it is pointed out that by this means the whole six seats would be filled +by whole units, leaving an unrepresented residuum of one-seventh of the +votes divided between the two parties. + +The error lies precisely as before in concentrating attention on one of +the electorates, and in neglecting the theory of probability. The Droop +quota introduces the condition that each party must pay a certain +minimum number of votes for each seat, and the real distinction is that, +instead of the minority and the majority having an equal chance of +securing any advantage, the chances are in the same proportion as their +relative strengths. If the majority be twice as strong as the minority, +it will have twice the chance of gaining the advantage. To prove this, +consider the position of a one-third minority in a number of five-seat +electorates. The Droop quota being one-sixth of the votes, the minority +will secure two seats or 40 per cent. in those electorates where it is +just over one-third, and one seat or 20 per cent. where it is just +under. Since the mathematical chances are that it will be over in one +half and under in the other half, it will, on the average, secure only +30 per cent., although entitled to 33 per cent. Again, if the 670 +members of the House of Commons were elected in three to five-seat +electorates, and the Droop quota used as proposed by Sir John Lubbock, +and if the Ministerialists were twice as strong as the Oppositionists, +they would, on the average, return 30 more members than the two-thirds +to which they are entitled, and this would count 60 members on a +division. + +The following table illustrates the erroneous result obtained by +applying the Droop quota when a number of grouped-electorates are +concerned. It will be noticed that where parties are nearly equal it +makes very little difference which unit is used:-- + ++-------------+--------------------------------------------+ +| STRENGTH OF | AVERAGE REPRESENTATION. | +| +----------------------+---------------------+ +| PARTY |Five-Seat Electorates.|Ten-Seat Electorates.| ++-------------+----------------------+---------------------+ +| 10 per cent.| 2 per cent. | 6 per cent. | +| 20 " " | 14 " " | 17 " " | +| 30 " " | 26 " " | 28 " " | +| 40 " " | 38 " " | 39 " " | +| 50 " " | 50 " " | 50 " " | ++-------------+----------------------+---------------------+ + +The Droop quota, therefore, gives, not proportional, but disproportional +representation. + ++Election by Each Party of its Most Popular Candidates.+--Still keeping +in mind the six-seat electorate for the Federal Senate, we may note that +there are two rival systems in the field--the _scrutin de liste_ or +Block Vote, in which each elector votes for any six of the candidates, +and the Hare system, which allows each elector an effective vote for one +candidate only. The adoption of either of these systems would be +unfortunate. To force each elector to vote for six candidates is +probably to require him to vote for more than he is inclined to support, +and certainly for more than his party is entitled to return; and, also, +to put it in the power of the majority to return all six senators. To +allow him to vote for one candidate only, on the other hand, is to break +up both parties into factions by allowing the favourites of sections +within the parties to be elected, instead of those most in general +favour with all sections composing each party. An intermediate position +is therefore best. No elector should be required to vote for more than +three candidates, and no elector should be allowed to vote for less. +Because in the first place it is evident that each party will, on the +average, return three senators, and, secondly, it may be taken for +granted that even the minority will nominate at least three candidates. +Two alternative proposals may be submitted as fulfilling these +conditions:-- + + _1. Each elector should vote for any three candidates, or + + 2. Each elector should have six votes, and have the option of giving + two votes to individual candidates._ + +The first plan is the simpler, but the second is probably the better, as +it allows more discrimination without sacrificing any of the advantages. +Either proposal is practically equivalent to applying the Block Vote to +each party separately; and whatever may be the objections to applying +the Block Vote to two or more parties it is the simplest and best system +to elect the candidates most in general favour when one party only is +concerned. It is true that the majority will return rather more than +one-half of the representatives and the minority rather less than +one-half, so that the minority will have more votes in proportion to its +strength. But with two parties of fairly equal but fluctuating strength +the fairest way is to require each elector to vote for at least one-half +of the number of representatives. Besides, apart from the fact that it +is not known before the election how many seats each party will obtain, +it is absolutely necessary that each elector shall have the same number +of votes in order that each party be allotted its just share of +representation. Moreover it is not proposed to limit the elector's +freedom of choice in the slightest by confining him to the candidates of +one party. The great majority of electors will vote on party lines, +because every vote given to a candidate of the opposing party tells +against the representation of their own party. The reason of this is +that every vote counts individually for the candidate and collectively +for the whole party. Any elector, therefore, who divides his voting +power equally between the two parties practically wastes it as far as +the party representation is concerned. But it is neither necessary nor +desirable to bring about such a rigid party division as prevails in +America, for instance, where a man is born, lives, and dies Republican +or Democrat. If electors were confined to the candidates of one party, +an elector who wished to vote for an individual candidate of the +opposing party would be placed in the dilemma of deserting either his +favourite or his party. The division into parties is really required in +the elected body, and not in the constituent body. + ++Rules for the Reform.+--We are now in a position to draw up a list of +rules for the proposed reform, applicable to all legislatures in which +party government prevails:-- + +1. Electorates to be grouped so as to contain at least three seats, and +preferably not less than five seats nor more than twenty seats. + +2. Candidates to declare when nominating, or a few days before the +election, whether they are in favour of or opposed to the party in +power, and to be classified accordingly as Ministerialists or +Oppositionists. + +3. Ballot papers to contain the names of all candidates nominated, +arranged in two parallel columns, one headed Ministerialists, and the +other Oppositionists. The list of candidates under each heading to be +arranged in alphabetical order. + +4. Each elector to have as many votes as there are seats, and to be +allowed to give either one or two votes to any candidate. The votes to +be distributed as he pleases among all the candidates of both lists. + +5. The total number of valid votes cast at the election to be divided by +the number of seats; the quotient to be known as the "unit of +representation." + +6. Each party to be allowed one seat for every whole unit of +representation contained in the aggregate votes polled by all its +candidates, and the last seat to go to the party which has the larger +remainder. + +7. The candidates of each party having the highest number of votes to be +declared elected to the number of seats to which each party is entitled +in accordance with the preceding rule. + +8. In case of a tie between candidates or parties the lot decides. + +The alternative plan for rule 4, which is somewhat simpler, would read +as follows:-- + +4. Each elector to vote for half the number of candidates that there are +seats, _i.e._, three votes in a five or six-seat electorate, four votes +in a seven or eight-seat electorate, &c. The votes to be distributed as +he pleases among all the candidates of both lists. + +It is unnecessary to dwell on the absolute simplicity of these rules. +They involve no radical departure from existing methods of voting or of +counting votes. Once the totals are added up, the calculations necessary +to decide the successful candidates are within the reach of a school +child. + +EXAMPLE.--Take as an example 13 candidates in a six-seat electorate who +poll as follows:-- + + MINISTERIALISTS. OPPOSITIONISTS. +BROWN 83,000 YOUNG 53,000 +RYAN 74,000 BELL 51,000 +COX 44,000 HUME 47,000 +WHITE 42,000 JONES 45,000 +PEEL 38,000 BLACK 34,000 +ADAMS 35,000 ------- +GREY 33,000 230,000 +SWIFT 21,000 + ------- + 370,000 + +Total votes = 370,000 + 230,000 = 600,000. + +Unit of representation = 600,000/6 = 100,000. + +Ministerialists: 3 units + 70,000 remainder = 4 seats. + +Oppositionists: 2 units + 30,000 remainder = 2 seats. + +The Ministerialists, having the larger remainder, secure the last seat. +The successful candidates are Brown, Ryan, Cox, and White (M.), Young +and Bell (O.) + +It will be noted that without the proportional principle the +Ministerialists would have returned two members only, and the +Oppositionists four. + +It is to be distinctly understood that the simpler plan of voting for +half the number of candidates that there are seats is practically as +good as the other. In order to show, however, that the plan we have +favoured may be simplified, we illustrate by a sample ballot paper a +method which has been used in Belgium. Two white spots are printed +opposite each candidate's name. An ink pad and stamp are then provided +at each polling booth, and the elector stamps out a white spot for each +vote he wishes to give. In the paper illustrated two votes are given to +Brown, two to Jones, one to Grey, and one to Swift. This elector has, +therefore, given two-thirds of his voting power to the Ministerial +party, and one-third to the Opposition, and has thus directly influenced +both policies. A further advantage of the proposal is the ease with +which such a paper can be read by the returning officer. + + +BALLOT PAPER + + * * * * * + +Ministerialists. Oppositionists. + ++---------------+ +---------------+ +| | | | | | +| o o | ADAMS | | o o | BELL | +| | | | | | ++---------------+ +---------------+ +| | | | | | +| x x | BROWN | | o o | BLACK | +| | | | | | ++-----+---------+ +---------------+ +| | | | | | +| o o | COX | | o o | HUME | +| | | | | | ++-----+---------+ +---------------+ +| | | | | | +| o x | GREY | | x x | JONES | +| | | | | | ++-----+---------+ +---------------+ +| | | | | | +| o o | PEEL | | o o | YOUNG | +| | | | | | ++-----+---------+ +---------------+ +| | | +| o o | RYAN | +| | | ++-----+---------+ +| | | +| x o | SWIFT | +| | | ++-----+---------+ +| | | +| o o | WHITE | +| | | ++-----+---------+ + +1. You are allowed Six votes, and can give either one or two votes to +any candidate on either list. + +2. Stamp out one of the white spots if you wish to give a candidate one +vote. + +3. Stamp out the two white spots if you wish to give a candidate two +votes. + +4. Your ballot paper will be invalid if you stamp out more or less than +Six white spots. + ++Character of Parties.+--We must now prove that the methods proposed +will actually organize the people into two coherent parties. Let us +suppose either party to be composed of three sections. The problem is to +induce these three sections to work together, and to sink their petty +differences in the general interest, in short to unite as a party, +aiming at the control of administration with a definite policy on public +questions. Let us further suppose the party entitled to three +representatives. Now, it is quite conceivable that exactly the same +three candidates would be elected if each elector had any number of +votes from one to three, and this would actually tend to be the case the +more united the party is. But herein lies the difference: that with one +vote only any one section holding narrow and violent views can return an +independent delegate, and therefore has a direct inducement to do so, +while with three votes it is forced to work with the other two sections, +for if it refuses to do so it is in their power to exclude its nominee. +It is this power to exclude independent factions which is the first +requisite to prevent the main parties degenerating into factions. Now, +the advocates of the Hare system declare that each elector should have +one effective vote only, no matter how many seats the party is entitled +to. The elector would therefore only express his opinion as to the +delegate of his own section, and not as to the constitution of the whole +party, and there would be nothing whatever to prevent the election of +the favourites of sections, instead of the representatives most in +general favour with all sections. + +But if there were only one party it would be impossible to make all the +sections work together in this manner. Some of them would combine into a +majority of the party, and would exclude the minority. With two great +competing parties, however, the case is quite different. So far from +either party wishing to exclude any small minority, both will compete +for its support, providing only that it will fall into line with the +other sections on the main questions of policy. Each section will +therefore support the party which will consent to embody the most +favourable compromise of its demands in its policy. If its demands are +such that both parties refuse to entertain them, it will exercise no +influence in the direction of furthering its own views. From this +statement it is evident that no system of independent direct +proportional representation within the party can be recognized as a +right to which the different sections are entitled, as it would +inevitably break up the party, and lead to sectional delegation. The +sections would then change in character, and become violent factions. +But, nevertheless, if the sections work together as described, every +section will be proportionately represented in the party policy, and +therefore by every representative of the party. Moreover, no section can +dictate to either party, or obtain more than a fair compromise. For all +the sections are interdependent, and any section which attempts to exert +more than its just share of influence will sink in general favour, and +will find those who are inclined to support its pretensions rejected at +the election. + +The difference between the two stages of representation may now be +clearly appreciated. In the first stage we have seen that the fear of +the aggression of the monarchy held all sections together in one party. +In the second stage, however, it has been abundantly demonstrated by +experience that the fear of each other will not hold the sections of the +two parties together. The electoral machinery must, therefore, supply +the deficiency. + ++Party Lines.+--With the altered character of parties there is ground +for hope that the basis of division will become questions of general +public policy, and that all causes of factious dissension and of social +disruption will tend to be repressed. This improvement is indeed +urgently needed. For if in any country party lines are decided by +geographical considerations, as town _v._ country; by class, as Capital +_v._ Labour; by race as in South Africa; by religion as in Belgium; or +by personal ambition for the spoils of office--in any of these cases the +future of that country is open to the gravest doubt. + +Perhaps the greatest danger which assails most democratic countries +to-day is the risk of the working classes being persuaded by demagogues +that equal political rights have been extended to them in order that +they shall govern, instead of in order that they shall not be +misgoverned. If the general welfare is to be advanced, all classes must +influence the policies of both parties. This condition is indispensable +to bring about the ideal condition of two parties differing only as to +what is best for all. + +Equally to be condemned is the narrow-minded and intolerant view of +those who can see no virtue in an opposing party; who define, for +instance, the distinction between parties as the party for things as +they are, and the party for things as they ought to be; the latter +being, of course, their own party. This is one of the objectionable +features of Australian newspaper-made politics. + +A more rational view of the distinction which often underlies party +divisions is between those who desire change and those who oppose +change. J.S. Mill points out how the latter may often be useful in +preventing progress in a wrong direction. There are times when such +attitude is called for, but generally speaking we may say that the +fundamental distinction between parties should be a difference of +opinion as to the direction of progress. Nor is it inconsistent for a +party to change its opinion or alter its policy; on the contrary, it is +essential to progress. The majority must often modify its policy in the +light of the criticism of the minority, and the minority must often drop +the unpopular proposals which have put it in a minority. These features +are all essential to the working of the political machine. + ++The Character of Representatives.+--Granting that all sections of each +party can be induced to work together, the beneficial effect on the +character of representatives would be incalculable. Instead of being +forced to pander to every small section for support, they would appeal +to all sections. The enlarged electorates which are contemplated would +be arranged to embrace the widest diversity of interest, and a +representative would then be free to follow his own independent +judgment, unfettered by the dictation of small cliques. His actions +might offend some sections who supported his election; but he has a wide +field, and may gain the support of other sections by them. Therefore, he +may actually improve his position by gaining more supporters than he +loses. Contrast this with the present system, in which the +representatives are cooped up in single-membered electorates to denned +sets of supporters. The very principle of community of interest on which +these electorates must be arranged in order to get a fair result is +destructive of the idea of representation. It is no wonder, then, that +the present system is tending towards delegation. Local delegation we +have always had, more or less, but we are now threatened by class +delegation also. + +The conclusion of Mr. Kent in "The English Radicals" may be quoted on +this point. He says:-- + + The question of the relationship of members to their constituents + is at the present time perplexed and undetermined; for though the + control of Parliament by the people is an indisputable fact, yet it + is maintained by means of quite another kind from those which the + early Radicals proposed. The result is somewhat paradoxical, for + while the system of pledges has been contemptuously rejected, yet + the theory that a member is a delegate tacitly prevails in English + politics. That members of the House of Commons have tended and do + tend to lose their independence it is impossible to doubt. A + distinguished French publicist, M. Boutmy, for instance, has + remarked the fact; and he thinks that in consequence a + deterioration of the tone of politicians is likely to recur. Mr. + E.L. Godkin, an American writer, whose judgments are entitled to + respect, has expressed much the same opinion; "the delegate + theory," he says, "has been gaining ground in England, and in + America has almost completely succeeded in asserting its sway, so + that we have seen many cases in which members of Congress have + openly declared their dissent from the measures for which they + voted in obedience to their constituents." + +It is one of the greatest merits of the proposed reform that this vexed +question of representation or delegation would be definitely settled. +For, although the area of independent action is enlarged, definite +limits are set to it. + ++Possible Objections.+--We may now reply to some objections which have +been or might be urged. At the outset we would point out that the +critics nearly always base their objections on the conditions which have +prevailed in the past or do exist in the present chaotic state of +parties; and seldom appreciate the fact that they would lose force if a +better condition could be brought about. Let us take the Melbourne +_Argus_ report of Professor Nanson's objections:-- + + Professor Nanson pointed out that the scheme depended for its + efficacy on the existence of party government, which the Professor + was glad to say was being pushed more and more into the background. + He took a practical illustration from the defeat of the O'Loghlen + Government in 1883. In that case, after the election the Government + came back with a following of one-tenth. The other combined party + had nine-tenths, and of these a little more than half were Liberals + and a little less than half were Conservatives. He pointed out that + under Mr. Ashworth's system the Liberals would have got the whole + of the Opposition seats and the Conservatives none, whereas under + any intelligent modification of the Hare system the parties would + have been returned in the proportion of five Liberals, four + Conservatives, and one O'Loghlenite. The system contained the evils + of the _scrutin de liste_ doubled by being applied to two parties, + the evils of the Limited Vote, which had been condemned by all + leading statesmen, and it played into the hands of these who were + best able to organize. + +Take the latter statements first. The evil of the Block Vote or +_scrutin de liste_ is that it gives all the representation to the +majority, and excludes the minority; its merit is that it prevents the +formation of a number of minorities. How this evil will be doubled if it +is entirely removed by allowing both majority and minority their just +share of representation we leave the Professor to explain. The statement +that the scheme would play into the hands of those who are best able to +organize is absolutely without foundation. On the contrary, the +organization is automatic. It would certainly encourage the formation of +organizations to influence the policies of the parties, since every +organization would be able to exert its proportionate influence, but +that is an advantage, not an evil. We will leave the statement about +party government alone, and now take the "practical illustration." The +Professor here assumes three distinct parties, but it is quite evident +there are only two. It is not usual for Liberal Unionists and +Conservatives to fight one another at elections in Great Britain at +present. In the same way, if a section of Liberals and a section of +Conservatives unite to oppose a Government, they will work together and +not try to exclude one another. Moreover, they will have a common +policy, so that it matters little who are elected so long as they are +the best men to carry out the policy. Is it likely the Conservatives +would join the Liberals, if the latter were trying to get all the +seats? Thus all the Professor's assumptions are incorrect. But even if +they were correct the conclusion is still wrong. The Liberal section +could not get all the seats if they tried. Imagine a ten-seat +electorate, in which the combined party is entitled to nine members. The +electors would not be required to vote for more than five candidates, +whereas the Professor has assumed that they would be forced to vote for +nine. He has forgotten that the Block Vote becomes the Limited Vote +under the conditions named, and that the Limited Vote allows the +minority a share of representation. Besides, in any case, these +conditions would never arise in a country in a healthy state of +political activity, because then parties would tend more nearly to +equalize each other in strength. + +It has also been objected that a Ministerialist candidate, say, might +stand as an Oppositionist, if the votes of the Opposition candidates +were more split up and it was likely to require less votes for election +in that party. This is a rather fantastic suggestion. The candidate in +question would have to declare himself in favour of a number of things +which he would oppose immediately he was elected. If not, he would have +to openly declare his intention, but that could easily be made illegal. +In any case there would be very little gained, and there is further the +risk that, if defeated, all his votes would count to the Opposition. + +Another possible objection is that too many candidates might stand, +since it is to the interest of each party to get all the support it can. +But candidates are not likely to stand to oblige the party or when there +is no chance of being elected. It is quite possible that, in a country +already split up into numerous groups, the groups would refuse to act +together, and that each group would nominate its own list. This is an +extreme assumption, and certainly would not happen in British countries. +And there would be a constant incentive to the groups to compromise, +since a combination can return its candidates. + +We hope now to have at least established the fact that the organization +of a democracy into two coherent parties--a majority and a minority--is +vitally connected with the electoral machinery. We do not claim that the +method we have proposed will induce a people to vote on true party lines +all at once, for human nature cannot be changed in a day; but we do +confidently assert that it will greatly accelerate that desirable +result, and will tend to give effect to the principles of organization +and responsible leadership. + + + + +CHAPTER V. + +HOW THE EVILS OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM WILL BE REMEDIED. + + +From the inception of the representative system it has been usual to +elect representatives in small districts, returning only one or two +members, and the single-membered electorate is now almost universal. In +the early Parliaments, however, elections were not contested as they are +nowadays. It was merely a choice of the most suitable men to represent a +corporate local community. Hence an indirect method of election was +generally resorted to, the final choice being left to a small committee +of the most important men. With the gradual rise of the party system the +conditions entirely changed; and it is important to gain a clear idea of +what is involved in the change. + +In the first stage we have referred to it is not probable that there +were any candidates at all. The position of member of Parliament was not +sought after; it was rather thrust upon the man selected as a duty he +owed the community. The choice would usually be unanimous, since there +would be some men whose recognized influence and attainments would mark +them off as most fitted for the position. If there was any difference of +opinion it would be merely as to who was best fitted to represent all, +and therefore there would never be any excluded minority. + +The essential difference in the second stage is that every election is +contested by two organized parties. The choice is now not of men only, +but of measures and of men as well. It is a contest in the first place +within each party as to who is best fitted to represent the party, and +in the second place between the two parties for the support of the +people. The party in a majority secures all the representation; the +party in a minority none. Now, the minority is certainly not represented +by the choice of the majority; on the contrary, its views are exactly +the opposite. Hence the question arises: Is not this exclusion of the +minority an injustice? Does it not amount to disfranchisement? The usual +reply is either that the majority must rule or that the injustice done +in some electorates is balanced in others, so that in the long run rough +justice is obtained. + +As to the first contention, it is the party which has the support of a +majority of the whole people which should rule; and the excluded +minority in some of the electorates belongs to this party. The second +practically amounts to the statement that two wrongs make a right. + +A practice prevails in the United States which will illustrate the +position. Each State sends a number of representatives to Congress +proportional to its population, and the division into electorates is +left to the State. By manipulating the electoral boundaries the party +which has a majority in each State is enabled to arrange that the +injustice done to itself is a minimum, and that the injustice done to +the opposing party is a maximum. By this iniquitous practice, which is +known as the gerrymander, the party in a minority in each State is +allowed to get only about one-half or one-quarter of its proper share of +representation. But as the practice is universal in all the States, the +injustice done to a party in some States is balanced in others. Will +those who seek to excuse the injustice done to the minority in each +electorate by the present system of election seriously contend that the +same argument justifies the gerrymander? + +The truth is that the present system has survived the passage from the +first stage of representation into the second, not because it does +justice to both parties, but because it has operated largely to prevent +the formation of more than two parties. It has, therefore, been a means +of giving effect to the central feature of representation, viz.: the +organization of public opinion into two definite lines of policy. But it +is a comparatively ineffective means, and it no longer suffices to +prevent sectional delegation in any of the democracies we have examined. +Besides, it is accompanied by a series of other evils, which in so far +as they lead to the suppression of responsible leadership, tend to the +degradation of public life. We propose now to consider the effect of the +reform in remedying these defects of the present system. + ++Parties Not Represented in the Legislature in the Same Proportion as in +the Country.+--Representation under the present system is purely +arbitrary; the amount which each party secures is a matter of chance. If +a party with a majority in the whole country has a majority in each of +the electorates it will secure all the representation. On the other +hand, if it splits up its votes in each electorate, or even only in +those electorates where it has a majority, it may secure none at all. +Theoretically, then, any result is possible. The argument would lose its +force, however, if in practice the result usually came out about right. +But this seldom happens, and, speaking generally, two cases may be +distinguished: first, when parties are nearly equal, the minority is +almost as likely as the majority to return a majority of the +representatives, thus defeating the principle of majority rule; and, +second, when one party has a substantial majority, it generally sweeps +the board and annihilates the minority. A few examples will illustrate +these facts. + +The 1895 election for the Imperial Parliament is analyzed by Sir John +Lubbock in the _Proportional Representation Review_. He shows that out +of 481 contested seats, the Liberals, with 1,800,000 votes were +entitled to 242, and the Conservatives and Liberal Unionists, with +1,775,000 to 239, a majority of three seats for the Liberals. But the +Conservatives and Unionists actually returned 279, and the Liberals only +202, a majority of 77 seats. The Conservatives and Unionists obtained +also a majority of 75 of the uncontested seats, giving them a total +majority of 152, instead of the 72 to which they were entitled. + +Recent elections for the United States Congress are shown by Professor +Commons to present striking inequalities. At the election for the 51st +Congress, 1888, the Republicans polled 5,348,379, and the Democrats +5,502,581. But the Republican minority actually secured 164 seats +against 161, a majority of 3, and were enabled to carry the McKinley +tariff law. For the 52nd Congress, 1890, the Republicans, with 4,217,266 +votes, only elected 88, while the Democrats, with 4,974,450 votes, +elected 235, and the Populists, with 354,217 votes, elected 9 +Congressmen. The Democratic majority should have been only 2, instead of +138. Compared with the 51st Congress, their proportion of the popular +vote increased only 1 per cent., but their proportion of the +representatives increased 21 per cent. It required 47,923 votes to elect +a Republican, 44,276 to elect a Populist, and only 21,078 to elect a +Democrat. + +To come nearer home, did not Mr. Reid return to power at the 1898 +election in New South Wales although the Opposition polled a majority of +15,000 against him? The last election in Victoria illustrates nothing so +much as the chaotic state of parties, brought about by newspaper +influence in promoting false lines of division. No less than 30 seats, +representing 81,857 votes, were contested only by candidates who +professed to be Ministerialists of various shades. Of 52 seats contested +by Ministerial and Opposition candidates, each party secured 26; but the +Ministerialists paid 59,255 votes for their seats as against 44,327 cast +for the Opposition. 13 seats were uncontested, 9 Ministerial and 4 +Opposition, giving a total of 65 members to the Ministerial party and 30 +members to the Opposition. + +The arbitrary and haphazard character of these results is obvious. It +would be entirely removed by the reform. Every election would reflect +the true feeling of the country; the right of the majority to rule would +be rendered certain, and the right of the minority to a fair hearing +would be assured. Taking the country as a whole, the Ministerialists +would pay almost exactly the same number of votes for each seat as the +Opposition. In each separate electorate the accuracy would not be so +great, but the rectification of even this slight and unavoidable +inequality would, instead of being arbitrary, be subject to the laws of +chance. + ++Ineffective Votes.+--Under the present system, all votes cast for +rejected candidates are ineffective; therefore nearly one-half of the +electors have no voice in the Government. A Liberal elector may live in +a Conservative constituency all his life without having the opportunity +to cast an effective vote. The evil of popular indifference is largely +to be explained by this fact. It is no answer to say that it affects +both parties equally. The trouble is that nearly one-half of the +electors of each party have no influence in deciding who are to +represent the party, and therefore do not help to frame its policy. + +This evil would also be entirely removed. Every vote cast would count to +one or the other party. It is not necessary that every vote should be +counted to some one candidate, as the advocates of the Hare system +claim. Votes given to rejected candidates would be in effect just as +much transferred to the successful candidates as by the Hare system. +Moreover, it is an important gain that the candidates of each party +would be ranged in order of favour, as the relative position of the +candidates would be an index of the feeling of each electorate, not only +as regards men but also as regards measures. Therefore, even the votes +given to rejected candidates would affect the framing of the party +policy, and show the progress of public opinion. + ++Uncontested Seats.+--At the 1895 election for the Imperial Parliament +no less than 189 seats out of 670 were uncontested. Thus one-quarter of +the people had no opportunity of expressing any opinion. In Australia +the proportion is often quite as large. The present Legislative Council +of Victoria is an extreme instance. One-third of the Council retires +every three years; and at the last election not a single seat was +contested. Only 4 out of the 48 sitting members have had to contest +election. Under these circumstances the holding of an election at all +becomes a farce. No doubt it is very convenient for the favoured +individuals; but as the primary object of elections is the ascertainment +of public opinion, it is very desirable that every seat should be +contested. + +The chief cause of this evil is that when one party is strong in an +electorate it is hopeless for the minority to contest it, unless the +majority nominates more than one candidate. On the other hand, the +majority knows that if it does split its votes the minority will +probably win the seat. The result is that the sitting member has a great +advantage, and is often tolerated even though he is acceptable to only a +minority of his own party. + +With the reform each electorate would become the scene of a contest +between the two parties for their proportional share of representation. +It is very unlikely, indeed, that in any electorate no more candidates +would be nominated than are required to be elected. + ++Limitation of Choice.+--Even when seats are contested, the elector's +choice is very limited under the present system. Wherever party +government is strong, each party nominates only one candidate, owing to +the danger of splitting up its votes and so losing the seat. The elector +has then practically no choice. He may disapprove of the candidate +standing for his own party, but the only alternative is to stultify +himself by supporting the opposing candidate. If in disgust he abstains +from voting altogether, it is the same as giving each candidate half his +vote. Even when two or three candidates of his own party are nominated, +and he supports the one whose views coincide most closely with his own, +he can exert very little direct influence on the party policy. Besides, +he will often think it wise to support the strongest candidate rather +than the one he favours most. + +These considerations show what a very imperfect instrument the present +system is for expressing public opinion. The test which should be +applied to any system of election is whether it allows each elector to +express his opinion on general policy, and from this point of view the +present system fails lamentably; all opinion which does not run in the +direct channel of party is excluded. Mr. Bryce has fixed on this defect +as the weak point of the party system, but the fault really lies in the +limitation of choice connected with the present system of election. It +is quite true that "in every country voting for a man is an inadequate +way of expressing one's views of policy, because the candidate is sure +to differ in one or more questions from many of those who belong to the +party."[4] But if, in the first place, the incentive to limit the number +of candidates be removed and the field of choice widened, and if, in the +second place, each elector be allowed to vote for several candidates +instead of one only, the defect would be remedied. Now, the reform makes +both these provisions, and the importance of the improvement can hardly +be overrated. It means, first, that every elector will be not only +allowed, but also induced, to express his opinion on general policy. He +may give his votes to candidates either for their general views or for +some particular view; or, if he lays less stress on measures than on +men, he may give them to men of high character or of great +administrative ability. It means, secondly, that every section of +opinion composing each party will be fairly represented, and that none +will be excluded, because the candidates of each party will compete +among themselves for the support of all sections, in order to decide +those most in general favour. Hence every section will directly help to +frame and influence the party policy, and there will be not the +slightest excuse for independent action outside the two main parties. In +the third place, it means the substitution of individual responsibility +for the corporate responsibility of parties, since the electors will +have the power to reject those who wish to modify party action in any +direction contrary to the general wish. It means, finally, that every +elector's opinion, as expressed by his vote, will have equal influence +in deciding the direction of party action. + ++Control of Nominations.+--There is a constant incentive with the +present system of election to limit the number of candidates to two, one +representing each party. For if either party splits up its votes on more +than one candidate it will risk losing the seat. But the necessity to +limit the candidates involves some control of the nominations, and this +is perhaps the worst feature of the system. It means that, instead of +the electors being allowed to select their representative, he is chosen +for them by some irresponsible body. We have seen how in the United +States the nominating system is the source of the power of the "boss" +and the "machine;" and the same result is only a matter of time in +British countries. The registration of voters is not yet conducted in +the same rigid manner as in America, nor is the farce of holding a +primary election gone through; but whether the control be exercised by a +political organization, a newspaper, a local committee, or a secret +society, the principle is the same. Mr. Bryce has noticed the rapid +change in the practice of England on this point:--"As late as the +general elections of 1868 and 1874 nearly all candidates offered +themselves to the constituency, though some professed to do so in +pursuance of requisitions emanating from the electors. In 1880 many--I +think most--Liberal candidates in boroughs and some in counties were +chosen by the local party associations, and appealed to the Liberal +electors on the ground of having been so chosen. In 1885, and again in +1892, all, or nearly all, new Liberal candidates were so chosen, and a +man offering himself against the nominee of the association was +denounced as an interloper and traitor to the party. The same process +has been going on in the Tory party, though more slowly. The influence +of the locally wealthy, and also that of the central party office, is +somewhat greater among the Tories, but in course of time choice by +representative associations will doubtless become the rule."[5] Is it to +be expected that this power will not be abused as in America? The +trouble is that no association can represent all the party electors, and +that the representative becomes responsible to the managers of the +association, to whom he really owes his election. Any control of this +kind is fatal to the principle of responsible leadership. And yet the +only alternative with the present method of election is the break-up of +the party system. This is the dilemma in which all modern democracies +are placed. The evil will be completely obviated by the reform. Instead +of limiting the candidates, it will be to the advantage of each party to +induce the strongest and most popular candidates to stand on its behalf, +since the number of seats it will obtain depends only on the aggregate +votes polled by all the candidates. With individual candidature there +can be no "machine" control of nominations. All are free to appeal +directly to the people. + ++Localization of Politics.+--The local delegate is unfortunately the +prevailing type of Australian politician. The value of a member is too +often measured by the services he renders to his constituents +individually or the amount of money he can get the Government to spend +in his constituency. Hence the nefarious practice of log-rolling in +Parliament. Is it any wonder that some of the colonies promise to rival +France in the proportion of unreproductive works constructed out of loan +money? + +How few of our members approach the ideal expressed by Edmund Burke in +his address to the electors of Bristol:--"Parliament is not a congress +of ambassadors from different and hostile interests, which interests +each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and +advocates; but Parliament is a deliberative assembly of our nation, with +one interest--that of the whole--where not local purposes, not local +prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the +general reason of the whole. You choose a member, indeed, but when you +have chosen him he is not a member of Bristol, but he is a member of +Parliament." It must be confessed, however, that Burke's ideal is rather +exalted; it is the duty of a member to make known the requirements of +his district. It is the ministry which is specially charged with +looking after the interest of the whole and of resisting illegitimate +demands. But it cannot do so if its position is so insecure that it must +purchase the support of the "parish pump" politician. + +The only way to nationalize politics is to ensure that every electorate +shall be contested on national issues by organized parties, and that +every locality shall be represented on both parties. The proposed system +will provide this remedy. In enlarged electorates each party will take +good care that its candidates are men of local influence in the most +important divisions of the electorate; therefore, sectional and local +interests will be represented, but they will be subordinated to the +interests of the whole electorate; and where there are a few large +divisions the interests of each will more nearly coincide with national +interests than where there are a large number of small divisions. +Besides, log-rolling will not be so easy between groups of +representatives as among single representatives. + ++Incentive to Bribery and Corruption.+--We now come to a class of evils +which to a large extent result from the fact that a few votes in each +electorate decide whether a party gets all the representation or none at +all. Candidates are impelled, in order to gain support from every +faction, to acts degrading to themselves and destructive to the moral +tone of the people. Foremost among these evils is the great incentive to +bribery and corruption; it is manifested not only in direct expenditure +at the elections, but also in promises of patronage and class +advantages. Direct bribery is perhaps worst in America; Professor M. +Cook states, in a paper on "The Alarming Proportion of Venal Voters" in +the _Forum_ for September, 1892, that in twenty-one towns of Connecticut +16 per cent, of the voters are venal. As Professor Commons remarks:--"It +is plain that the bribable voters themselves are adequate to hold the +balance of power between the parties. The single-membered district, +therefore, places a magnificent premium upon bribery." In England the +_Corrupt Practices Act_ has done immense good: nothing reflects so much +honour on the Imperial Parliament as the voluntary transference of the +duty of deciding cases to the judiciary. In Australia this much-needed +reform has not yet been introduced, and direct bribery prevails to a +much larger extent than would be supposed from the number of cases +investigated. Members of Parliament are naturally loth to convict one of +their own number, and the knowledge of this fact prevents petitions +being lodged. + +The mere existence of secret bribery is bad enough, but a greater danger +is that acts of indirect bribery are openly practised, with the tacit +approval of electors. "There have been instances," says Mr. Lecky, in +his "Democracy and Liberty," "in which the political votes of the police +force, of the P.O. officials, of the civil service clerks have been +avowedly marshalled for the purpose of obtaining particular class +advantages--a disintegrated majority is strongly tempted to conciliate +every detached group of votes." In Australia this has become a regular +practice; and a still worse feature is that Members of Parliament have +free access to public departments to promote class and local interests. +Class legislation is frequently brought forward on the eve of an +election with the sole object of influencing votes. These conditions +favour the wire-pullers and mere self-seekers, and, in so far as they +prevent the electors from voting on the political views and personal +merits of the candidates, they are inimical to the public interests. Mr. +Lecky has pointed out that a certain amount of moral compromise is +necessary in public life, and that a politician may indulge in +popularity-hunting from honourable public motives; the danger is that +unworthy politicians may screen themselves under shelter of this excuse. + +We do not claim that the proposed system would abolish corruption, but +we are justified in hoping that it would mitigate it very much. Even if +the venal vote still held the balance of power between parties, parties +are not so easily corrupted as individuals. But the most important gain +is that it could only exert an influence proportional to its numbers; it +could not decide whether a party gets all the representation or none at +all, as at present. In most cases it would be doubtful if it would +affect a single candidate. Consider, again, the case of individual +candidates of the same party; any candidate resorting to bribery in +order to increase his chance of election would do so partly at the +expense of the other candidates of his own party, who would immediately +denounce him. Instead of being forced to conciliate selfish factions, +the candidates would be free to appeal for the support of the unselfish +sections. + ++Continual Change in Electoral Boundaries.+--The irregular growth of +population necessitates a periodical revision of the electoral +boundaries of single-membered electorates. Owing to the influence of +vested interests, this is generally effected in an arbitrary manner; and +the glaring anomalies only are rectified. We have in Victoria at the +present day some country electorates with 6,000 electors on the rolls +and others with only 1,500. An elector in the latter has four times the +voting power of an elector in the former. The process of alteration of +the boundaries offers great temptation to unfairness; and in American +politics the opportunity is taken full advantage of by a practice which +has received the name of the gerrymander. In his work on "Proportional +Representation" Professor Commons writes:-- + + It is difficult to express the opprobrium rightly belonging to so + iniquitous a practice as the gerrymander; but its enormity is not + appreciated, just as brutal prize-fighting is not reprobated + providing it be fought according to the rules. Both political + parties practise it, and neither can condemn the other. They simply + do what is natural: make the most of their opportunities as far as + permitted by the constitution and system under which both are + working. The gerrymander is not produced by the iniquity of + parties, it is the outcome of the district system. If + representatives are elected in this way there must be some public + authority for outlining the districts. And who shall be the judge + to say where the line shall be drawn? Exact equality is impossible, + and who shall set the limit beyond which inequality shall not be + pressed? Every apportionment act that has been passed in this or + any other country has involved inequality; and it would be absurd + to ask a political party to pass such an act and give the advantage + of the inequality to the opposite party. Consequently, every + apportionment act involves more or less of the gerrymander. The + gerrymander is simply such a thoughtful construction of districts + as will economize the votes of the party in power by giving it + small majorities in a large number of districts, and coop up the + opposing party with overwhelming majorities in a large number of + districts. This may involve a very distortionate and uncomely + "scientific" boundary, and the joining together of distant and + unrelated localities into a single district; such was the case in + the famous original act of Governor Gerry, of Massachusetts, whence + the practice obtained its amphibian name.[6] But it is not always + necessary that districts be cut into distortionate shapes in order + to accomplish these unjust results. (pp. 49, 50.) + +He illustrates a gerrymander which actually made one Democratic vote +equal to five Republican votes. We have quoted this description of the +methods of the gerrymander not so much because the evil has attained any +magnitude in Australia as because it offers a warning of the probable +result of adopting the single-membered district system for our Federal +legislature. + +With enlarged or grouped electorates the periodical revision of +boundaries would be entirely obviated, because the size of the +electorate may be kept constant, and the number of representatives +varied. Under such a system all unfairness would disappear, and the +gerrymander would be impossible. Representation would automatically +follow the movements of population. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[4] Bryce, "The American Commonwealth," vol ii, p 325 + +[5] Bryce, "The American Commonwealth," vol. ii., note on p. 81. + +[6] Governor Gerry contrived an electorate which resembled a salamander +in shape. + + + + +CHAPTER VI. + +THE HARE SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL DELEGATION. + + +The single transferable vote, generally known as the Hare system, was +first invented by a Danish statesman, M. Andrae, and was used for the +election of a portion of the "Rigsraad" in 1855. In 1857 Mr. Thomas +Hare, barrister-at-law, published it independently in England in a +pamphlet on "The Machinery of Representation." This formed the basis of +the scheme elaborated in his "Election of Representatives," which +appeared in 1859. + +He proposed to abolish all geographical boundaries by constituting the +whole of the United Kingdom one electorate for the return of the 654 +members of the House of Commons. Each member was to be elected by an +equal unanimous number of electors. The method of election was therefore +so contrived as to allow the electors to group themselves into 654 +constituencies, each group bound only by the tie of voluntary +association, and gathered from every corner of the Kingdom. The total +number of votes cast (about a million) was to be divided by 654, and the +quotient, say about 1,500, would be the quota or number of votes +required to elect a member. But some of the candidates would naturally +receive more votes than the quota, and a great many more would receive +less. How were all the votes to be equally divided among 654 members so +that each should secure exactly the quota? The single transferable vote +was proposed to attain this result. Each elector's vote was to count for +one candidate only, but he was allowed to say in advance to whom he +would wish his vote transferred in case it could not be used for his +first choice. Each ballot paper was, therefore, to contain the names of +a number of candidates in order of preference--1, 2, 3, &c. Then all the +candidates having more than a quota of first choices were to have the +surplus votes taken from them and transferred to the second choice on +the papers, or if the second choice already had enough votes, to the +third choice, and so on. When all the surpluses were distributed a +certain number of members would be declared elected, each with a quota +of votes. The candidates who had received the least amount of support +were then to be gradually eliminated. The lowest candidate would be +first rejected, and his votes transferred to the next available +preference on his ballot papers; then the next lowest would be rejected, +and so on till all the votes were equally distributed among the 654 +members. Such was the Hare system as propounded by its author. The +electors were to divide themselves into voluntary groups; then the +groups which were too large were to be cut down by transferring the +surplus votes, and the smaller groups were to be excluded and the votes +also transferred until the groups were reduced to 654 equal +constituencies. These two processes, transferring surplus votes and +transferring votes from excluded candidates, are the main features of +the system. Mr. Hare's rules for carrying them out are drawn up in the +form of a proposed electoral law, and in the different editions of his +work the clauses vary somewhat. They are also complicated by an +impossible attempt to retain the local nomenclature of members. As +regards surplus votes it was provided that the ballot papers which had +the most preferences expressed should be transferred; still a good deal +was left to chance or to the sweet will of the returning officer, and +this has always been admitted as a serious objection. The process of +elimination is still more unsatisfactory. Mr. Hare was from the first +strongly opposed to the elimination of the candidate who had least first +preferences, and he therefore proposed that, in order to decide which +candidate had least support, all expressed preferences should be +counted. This involved such enormous complication that in the 1861 +edition of his work he abandoned the process of elimination altogether +in favour of a process of selection. He then proposed to distribute +surplus votes only, and to elect the highest of the remainder, +regardless of the fact that they had less than a quota. He then +wrote:--"The reduction of the number of candidates remaining at this +stage of the election may be effected by taking out the names of all +those who have the smallest number of actual votes--that is, who are +named at the _head_ of the smallest number of voting papers, and +appropriating each vote to the candidate standing _next_ in order on +each paper. This process would be so arbitrary and inequitable in its +operation as to be intolerable. It might have the effect of cancelling +step by step more votes given to one candidate than would be sufficient +to return another.... Such a process disregards the legitimate rights +both of electors and of candidates." But the process of selection was +not proportional representation at all, being practically equivalent to +a single untransferable vote, and Mr. Hare finally adopted, in spite of +its defects, the "arbitrary and inequitable" process of elimination in +his last edition in 1873. And all his recent disciples have been forced +to do the same, because nothing better is known. + +Mr. Hare's scheme has ceased to be of any practical interest, since it +is now generally admitted that electorates should not return more than +ten or twenty members. Moreover, it is admitted that the electors would +group themselves in very undesirable ways, and not as Mr. Hare expected. +And yet the only effect of limiting the size of the electorates is to +reduce the number of undesirable ways in which electors might group +themselves. Let us briefly note the different proposals which have been +made. + ++1. Sir John Lubbock's Method.+--In his work on "Representation," Sir +John Lubbock says:--"The full advantage of the single transferable vote +would require a system of large constituencies returning three or five +members each, thus securing a true representation of opinion." +Three-seat electorates are, however, too small to secure accurate +proportional representation; with parties evenly balanced, for instance, +one must secure twice as much representation as the other. + +The following rules are given to explain the working of the system:-- + +(1) Each voter shall have one vote, but may vote in the alternative for +as many of the candidates as he pleases by writing the figures 1, 2, 3, +&c, opposite the names of those candidates in the order of his +preference. + +COUNTING VOTES. + +(2) The ballot papers, having been all mixed, shall be drawn out in +succession and stamped with numbers so that no two shall bear the same +number. + +(3) The number obtained by dividing the whole number of good ballot +papers tendered at the election by the number of members to be elected +plus one, and increasing the quotient (or where it is fractional the +integral part of the quotient) by one, shall be called the quota. + +(4) Every candidate who has a number of first votes equal to or greater +than the quota shall be declared elected, and so many of the ballot +papers containing those votes as shall be equal in number to the quota +(being those stamped with the lowest numerals) shall be set aside as of +no further use. On all ballot papers the name of the elected candidate +shall be deemed to be cancelled, with the effect of raising by so much +in the order of preference all votes given to other candidates after +him. This process shall be repeated until no candidate has more than a +quota of first votes or votes deemed first. + +(5) Then the candidate or candidates having the fewest first votes, or +votes deemed first, shall be declared not to be elected, with the effect +of raising by so much in the order of preference all votes given to +candidates after him or them, and rule 4 shall be again applied if +possible. + +(6) When by successive applications of rules 4 and 5 the number of +candidates is reduced to the number of members remaining to be elected, +the remaining candidates shall be declared elected. + +Objection is commonly taken to this method on account of the element of +chance involved in the distribution of surplus votes. Suppose the quota +to be 1,000, and a candidate to receive 1,100 votes, the 100 votes to be +transferred would be those stamped with the highest numerals. But if the +hundred stamped with the lowest numerals or any other hundred had been +taken the second choices would be different. + +Strictly speaking, however, this is not a chance selection--it is an +arbitrary selection. The returning officer must transfer certain +definite papers; if he were allowed to make a chance selection it would +be in his power to favour some of the candidates. + +Sir John Lubbock points out that the element of chance might be +eliminated by distributing the second votes proportionally to the second +choices on the whole 1,100 papers, and that it might be desirable to +leave any candidate the right to claim that this should be done if he +thought it worth while. + ++2.--The Hare-Clark Method.+--The Hare system has been in actual use in +Tasmania for the last two elections. It is applied only in a six-seat +electorate at Hobart and a four-seat electorate at Launceston. The rules +for distributing surplus votes proportionally were drawn up by Mr. A.I. +Clark, late Attorney-General. The problem is not so simple as it appears +at first sight. There is no difficulty with a surplus on the first +count; it is when surpluses are created in subsequent counts by +transferred votes that the conditions become complicated. Mr. Clark +adopts a rule that in the latter case the transferred papers only are to +be taken into account in deciding the proportional distribution of the +surplus. Suppose, as before, the quota to be 1,000 votes, and a +candidate to have 1,100 votes, 550 of which are marked in the second +place to one of the other candidates. Then the latter is entitled to 50 +of the surplus votes, and a chance selection is made of the 550 papers. +The element of chance still remains, therefore, if this surplus +contributes to a fresh surplus. + ++3.--The Droop-Gregory Method.+--This method, advocated by Professor +Nanson, of the Melbourne University, is claimed to entirely eliminate +the element of chance. The Gregory plan of transferring surplus votes is +defined as a fractional method. If a candidate needs only nine-tenths of +his votes to make up his quota, instead of distributing the surplus of +one-tenth of the papers all the papers are distributed with one-tenth of +their value. Reverting to our former example, if a candidate is marked +second on 550 out of 1,100 votes, the quota being 1,000 and the surplus +100, then instead of selecting 50 out of the 550 papers, the whole of +them would be transferred in a packet, the value of the packet being 50 +votes, or, as Professor Nanson prefers to put it, the value of each +paper in the packet being one-eleventh of a vote. Should this packet +contribute to a new surplus the third choices on the whole of the papers +are available as a basis for the redistribution. The packet would be +divided into smaller packets, and each assigned its reduced value. It +might here be pointed out that the use of fractions is quite +unnecessary, the value of each packet in votes being all that is +required, and that the-same process may be used with the Hare-Clark +method to avoid the chance selection of papers. The only real +difference is this: that when a surplus is created by transferred votes +Mr. Clark distributes it by reference to the next preference on all the +transferred papers, and Professor Nanson by reference to the last packet +of transferred papers only--the packet which raises the candidate above +the quota. + +Which of these methods is correct? Should we select the surplus from all +votes, original and transferred, as Sir John Lubbock proposes; from all +transferred votes only, with Mr. Clark; or from the last packet only of +transferred votes, with Professor Nanson? Consider a group of electors +having somewhat more than a quota of votes at its disposal. If it +nominates one candidate only every one of the electors will have a voice +in the distribution of the surplus, but if it puts up three candidates, +two of whom are excluded and the third elected, Mr. Clark would allow +those who supported the two excluded candidates to decide the +distribution of the surplus, and Professor Nanson only those who +supported the last candidate excluded. Both are clearly wrong, for the +only rational view to take is that when a candidate is excluded it is +the same as if he had never been nominated and the transferred votes had +formed part of the original votes of those to whom they are transferred. +Whenever a surplus is created it should therefore be distributed by +reference to all votes, original and transferred. As regards these +surpluses, Mr. Clark and Professor Nanson have adopted an arbitrary +basis, which is no more than Sir John Lubbock has done; and they have +therefore eliminated the element of chance only for surpluses on the +first count. It may be asked, Why cannot all surpluses be distributed by +reference to all the papers, if that is the correct method? The answer +is that the complication involved is enormous. Yet this was the plan +first advocated by Professor Nanson, who wrote, in reply to a definite +inquiry how the Gregory principle was applied:--"I explain by an +example. A has 2,000 votes, the quota being 1,000. A then requires only +half the value of each vote cast for him. Each paper cast for him is +then stamped as having lost one-half of its value, and the whole of A's +papers are then transferred with diminished value to the second name +(unelected, of course). The same principle applies all through. Whenever +anyone has a surplus all the papers are passed to the next man with +diminished value." Now, the effect of this extraordinary proposal would +be that the whole of the papers would have to be kept in circulation +till the last candidate was elected, with diminishing compound +fractional values. In a ten-seat electorate a large proportion would +pass through several transfers, and would towards the end of the count +have such a ridiculously small fractional value that it would take +several millions of the ballot-papers to make a single vote! It is no +wonder that this method was abandoned when the complications to which +it would lead were realized. + +A simple method of avoiding this complexity would be to treat +transferred surplus papers as if the preferences were exhausted. It must +be remembered that in all transfers a certain number of papers are lost +owing to the preferences being exhausted, and the additional loss would +be small. Thus at the first Hobart election 206 votes were wasted, and +this number would have been increased by two only. Every surplus would +then be transferred by reference to the next choice, wherever expressed, +on both original papers and papers transferred from excluded candidates. + +It might be provided, however, for greater accuracy that all papers +contributing to surpluses on the first count only should be transferred +in packets. Should these contribute to a new surplus, it should be +divided into two parts, proportional to (1) original votes and votes +transferred from excluded candidates, and (2) the value of the packet in +votes. Each part would then be distributed proportionally to the next +available preferences wherever expressed. To divide the packets into +sub-packets is a useless complication. The loss involved in neglecting +them would usually be less than one-thousandth part of the loss due to +exhausted papers. + +Having now dealt with the main features of the different variations of +the Hare system, we may proceed to consider some details which are +common to all of them. A difference of opinion exists, however, as +regards the quota. Sir John Lubbock and Professor Nanson advocate the +Droop quota, which we have shown to be a mathematical error; Miss Spence +and Mr. Clark use the correct quota. + ++The Wrong Candidates are Liable to be Elected.+--The Hare system may be +criticised from two points of view; first, as applied to the conditions +prevailing when it is introduced, and, secondly, as regards the new +conditions it would bring about. Its advocates confine themselves to the +first point of view, and invariably use illustrations based on the +existence of parties. + +We readily grant that if the electors vote on party lines, and transfer +their votes within the party as assumed, the Hare system would give +proportional representation to the parties; but even then it would +sacrifice the interests of individual candidates, for it affords no +guarantee that the right candidates will be elected. The constant +tendency is that favourites of factions within the party will be +preferred to general favourites. This at the same time destroys party +cohesion, and tends to split up parties. Nor can this result be wondered +at, since the very foundation of the system is the separate +representation of a number of sections. + +One reason why the wrong candidates are liable to be elected is that the +electors will not record their honest preferences if the one vote only +is effective. They will give their vote to the candidate who is thought +to need it most, and the best men will go to the wall because they are +thought to be safe. Mr. R.M. Johnston, Government Statistician of +Tasmania, confirms this view when he declares--"The aggregate of all +counts, whether effective or not, would seem to be the truer index of +the general favour in which each candidate stands, because the numbers +polled at the first count may be greatly disturbed by the action of +those who are interested in the success of two or more favourites who +may be pretty well assured of success, but whose order of preference +might by some be altered if sudden rumour suggested fears for any one of +the favoured group. This accidental action would tend to conceal the +true exact measure of favour in the first count." If this statement +means anything it is that the three preferences which are required to be +expressed should have been all counted as effective votes at the Hobart +election instead of one only; and this is exactly what we advocate. It +is also admitted that when two candidates ran together at the first +Launceston election the more popular candidate was defeated; and again +the _Argus_ correspondent writes of the recent Hobart election:--"The +defeat of Mr. Nicholls was doubtless due to the fact of his supporters' +over-confidence--nothing else explains it. Many people gave him No. 2 +votes who would have given him No. 1 votes had they not felt assured of +his success." + +A second reason why the wrong candidates are liable to be elected is +that the process of elimination adopted by all the Hare methods has no +mathematical justification. The candidate who is first excluded has one +preference only taken account of, while others have many preferences +given effect to. We have shown that this glaring injustice was +recognized by Mr. Hare, and only adopted as a last resort. Professor +Nanson admits that "the process of elimination which has been adopted by +all the exponents of Hare's system is not satisfactory," and adds--"I do +not know a scientific solution of the difficulty." To bring home the +inequity of the process, consider a party which nominates six +candidates, A, B, C, D, E, and F, and whose numbers entitle it to three +seats, and suppose the electors to vote in the proportions and order +shown below on the first count. + + FIRST SECOND THIRD FOURTH + COUNT. COUNT. COUNT. COUNT. +7-vote ADEFBC ADEBC AEBC ABC +6-vote EFDACB EDACB EACB ACB +5-vote CEBDFA CEBDA CEBA CBA +4-vote BDFACE BDACE BACE BAC +4-vote DCEFBA DCEBA CEBA CBA +3-vote FBAECD BAECD BAEC BAC + +It will be noted that F, having fewest first votes, is eliminated from +the second count, D from the third count, and E from the fourth. A has +then 13 votes, B 7, and C 9. If the quota be 9 votes, A's surplus would +be passed on to B, and A, B, and C would be declared elected. But D, E, +and F are the candidates most in general favour, and ought to have been +elected. For if any one of the rejected candidates be compared with any +one of the successful candidates it will be found that in every case the +rejected candidate is higher in order of favour on a majority of the +papers. Again, if the Block Vote be applied, by counting three effective +votes, the result would be--A 10 votes, B 12, C 9, D 21, E 22, and F 13. +D, E, and F would therefore be elected. Thus we see that A, B, and C, +the favourites of sections within the party, are elected, and D, E, and +F, the candidates most in general favour--those who represent a +compromise among the sections--are rejected. + +In practice, then, the Hare system discourages compromise among parties, +and among sections of parties; and therefore tends to obliterate party +lines. This has already happened in Tasmania, where all experience goes +to show that the Hare system is equivalent to compulsory plumping. In +every election the result would have been exactly the same if each +elector voted for one candidate only. The theory that it does not matter +how many candidates stand for each party, since votes will be +transferred within the party, has been completely disproved. Votes are +actually transferred almost indiscriminately. The candidates have not +been slow to grasp this fact, and at the last election handbills were +distributed giving "explicit reasons why the electors should give their +No. 1 to Mr. So-and-so, and their No. 2 to any other person they +chose."[7] Three out of every four first preferences are found to be +effective, but only one out of every five second preferences, and one +out of fifty third preferences. The first preferences, therefore, decide +the election. + +The actual result is that, in the long run, the Hare system is +practically the same as the single untransferable vote. The whole of the +elaborate machinery for recording preferences and transferring votes +might just as well be entirely dispensed with. The "automatic +organization" which it was to provide exists only in the calculations of +mathematicians. + ++A Number of Votes are Wasted.+--It is claimed for the Hare system that +every vote cast is effective, because it counts for some one candidate. +But unless every elector places all the candidates in order of +preference some votes are wasted because the preferences become +exhausted. + +When a paper to be transferred has no further available preferences +expressed it is lost. In order to reduce this waste, a vote is held to +be informal in the six-seat electorate at Hobart unless at least three +preferences are given. Notwithstanding this, the number of such votes +wasted was 7 per cent, at the first election and 10 per cent, at the +second. + +The effect of this waste is that some of the candidates are elected +with less than the quota. At the last Hobart election only three out of +six members were elected on full quotas, and at Launceston only one out +of four. The result is to favour small, compact minorities, and to lead +sections to scheme to get representation on the lowest possible terms. + +The Droop quota, being smaller than the Tasmanian quota, would have the +effect of electing more members on full quotas, and it is often +recommended on that account. Indeed, Professor Nanson declares:--"In no +circumstances is any candidate elected on less than a quota of votes. +The seats for which a quota has not been obtained are filled one after +the other, each by a candidate elected by an absolute majority of the +whole of the voters. For the seats to be filled in this way all +candidates as yet unelected enter into competition. The matter is +settled by a reference to the whole of the voting papers. If any +unelected candidate now stands first on an absolute majority of all +these papers he is elected. But if not, then the weeding-out process is +applied until an absolute majority is obtained. The candidate who gets +the absolute majority is elected. Should there be another seat, the same +process is repeated. If an absolute majority of the whole of the voters +cannot be obtained for any candidate, then the candidate who comes +nearest to the absolute majority is elected." It will be seen that +Professor Nanson proposes to bring to life again all the eliminated +candidates, in order to compete against those who have less than the +quota. The proportional principle is then to be entirely abandoned, and +the seats practically given to the stronger party, although the minority +may be clearly entitled to them. The vaunted "one vote one value" is +also to be violated, because those who supported the elected candidates +are to have an equal voice with those still unrepresented. And finally, +the evil is not cured, it is only aggravated, if an eliminated candidate +is elected. + ++The Hare System is not Preferential.+--The idea is sedulously fostered +that the Hare system is a form of preferential voting, and many people +are misled thereby. The act of voting is exalted into an end in itself. +The most elaborate provisions are now suggested by Professor Nanson to +allow the elector to express his opinion only as far as he likes. The +simple and practical method in use in Tasmania of requiring each elector +to place a definite number of candidates in order of preference is +denounced as an infringement of the elector's freedom. Why force him to +express preferences where he does not feel any? The Professor has +therefore invented "the principle of the bracket." If the elector cannot +discriminate between the merits of a number of candidates he may bracket +them all equal in order of favour. Indeed, where he does not indicate +any preference at all, the names unmarked are deemed equal. Therefore, +if he does not wish his vote transferred to any candidate, he must +strike out his name. It is pointed out that a ballot paper can thus be +used if there is any kind of preference expressed at all, and the risk +of informality is reduced to a minimum. All the bracket papers are to be +put into a separate parcel, and do not become "definite" till all the +candidates bracketed, except one, are either elected or rejected; the +vote is then transferred to that candidate. And as bracketed candidates +will occur in original papers, surplus papers, and excluded candidates' +papers at every stage of the count, the degree of complication in store +for the unhappy returning officer can be imagined. + +The whole of these intricate provisions are founded on a patent fallacy. +Preferences are not expressed in the Hare system, as in true +preferential voting, that they may be given effect to in deciding the +election, but simply in order to allow the elector to say in advance to +whom he would wish his vote transferred if it cannot be used for his +first choice. The elector is allowed to express his opinion about a +number of candidates, certainly, but after being put to this trouble +only one of his preferences is used. And which one is used depends +entirely on the vagaries of the system. The principle of the bracket +illustrates this fact; if the elector has no preference the system +decides for him. If his first choice just receives the quota the other +preferences are not even looked at. Again, of all the electors who vote +for rejected candidates, those who are fortunate enough to vote for the +worst (who are first excluded) have their second or third preferences +given effect to, and few of their votes are wasted; but the votes of +those who support the best of them (who are last excluded) are either +wasted or given to their remote preferences. In Mr. Hare's original +scheme, for instance, the votes of the last 50 candidates excluded would +have been nearly all wasted, unless some hundreds of preferences were +expressed. + +Another claim on which great stress is laid is that by the process of +transferring votes every vote counts to some one candidate. This means +nothing more than that the votes of rejected candidates are transferred +to the successful candidates. Where is the necessity for this? So long +as each party secures its just share of representation and elects its +most favoured candidates, there is no advantage gained by transferring +the votes. Miss Spence even declares that "every Senator elected in this +way will represent an equal number of votes, and will rightly have equal +weight in the House. According to the block system, there is often a +wide disparity between the number of votes for the highest and the +lowest man elected." Surely the mere fact of transferring votes till +they are equally distributed does not make all the successful candidates +equally popular! On the contrary, it is very desirable to know which +candidates are most in favour with each party. + ++Ballot Papers Must be Brought Together for Counting.+--This is a +practical objection to the Hare system, which puts it out of court for +large electorates. If the whole of Victoria were constituted one +electorate, as at the Federal Convention election, the transference of +votes could not be commenced till all the ballot papers had come in from +the remote parts of the colony, two or three weeks after the election. +On this point Professor Nanson writes:--"In an actual election in +Victoria this 'first state of the poll' could be arrived at with the +same rapidity as was the result of the recent poll on the Commonwealth +Bill. In both cases but one fact is to be gleaned from each voting +paper. The results from all parts of the colony would be posted in +Collins-street on election day. These results would show exactly how the +cat was going to jump. The final results as regards parties would be +obvious to all observers, although the result as regards individual +candidates would be far from clear. But this, although of vast +importance to the candidates themselves, would be a matter of small +concern to the great mass of the people." These remarks are based on the +assumption that the electors vote on strictly party lines, which a +reference to Tasmanian returns will show is not usually the case. Few +will be disposed to agree that a knowledge of the successful candidates +is a matter of small moment. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[7] _Hobart Mercury_ + + + + +CHAPTER VII. + +FREE LIST SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL DELEGATION. + + +The _Liste Libre_, or Free List system, is a far simpler and more +practical method of proportional representation than the Hare system. +The distinctive feature is that it applies the proportional principle +not to individual candidates but to parties. But, like the Hare system, +it places no restriction on the number of parties. It is therefore +particularly adapted to the circumstances of the countries on the +Continent of Europe, which, having already a number of strong party +organizations, wish to retain them and to do justice to each. +Accordingly we find that nearly all experiments in proportional +representation to the present time have been confined to those +countries. + +Perhaps the very earliest attempt to apply the proportional principle +was that of Mr. Thomas Gilpin, in a pamphlet, "On the Representation of +Minorities of Electors to act with the Majority in Elected Assemblies," +published at Philadelphia in 1844. He proposed that electorates should +be enlarged, and that each party should nominate a list of candidates +equal to the number required to be elected, and should place them in +order of preference. Each elector could then vote for one of these +lists; and each party would be allotted a number of representatives +proportional to the amount of support it received. The highest on each +list, to the number allotted, would be elected. It will be seen that +this is really a system of double election; for the order of favour of +the candidates of any party would have to be decided before the +nominations were made. + +Only two years afterwards M. Victor Considerant published a similar +scheme at Geneva, Switzerland. Each elector was to vote first for a +party and then for any number of candidates on the party list whom he +preferred. The party votes were to decide the number of members allotted +to each list, and the individual votes the successful candidates. + +The little republic of Switzerland has been the scene of nearly all +subsequent improvement. In 1867 Professor Ernest Naville founded the +_Association Réformiste_ at Geneva to advocate the principle of +proportional representation. In 1871 the Association adopted the _Liste +Libre_ system, invented by M. Borely, of Nimes, France, in which each +elector was to place all the candidates of his party in order of +preference. But as this allows the electors little direct influence on +their own candidates and none outside of them, a combination of the +cumulative vote and the _Liste Libre_ was adopted in 1875. Each elector +was to have as many votes as there were seats to be filled, but he +could not only give them to any candidates on any list, but he could +also give as many votes as he liked to any one candidate. Thus if there +were ten seats to be filled the elector could give ten votes to one +candidate, or one vote to each of ten candidates, or five votes to one +candidate and divide the remaining five among others, and so on. The +only condition necessary was that his votes added up to ten. The +aggregate votes given to all the candidates of each party were then to +be taken as the basis of proportional distribution among the parties and +the highest on each list to the number decided were to be elected. + +It was not till the year 1890 that this scheme was actually put into +practice. The election of 1889 had resulted so unjustly to the Liberal +party in the canton of Ticino that an insurrection broke out. This +forced the hand of the Federal Government, which had to quell the +disturbance, and proportional representation was recommended and +adopted. Several other cantons followed suit, and it is expected that +the whole of Switzerland will soon adopt the reform. + +A modification of this plan has lately been adopted by the Swiss +Association. In this later plan electors can give a single vote only to +individual candidates, but if they do not use all their votes in this +way they may cumulate the balance on any one party list by marking at +the head of the list. Thus if the elector in a ten-seat electorate gives +five votes to individual candidates, and places a mark at the head of +one of the lists, the balance of five votes will count to that list. The +aggregate votes given to individual candidates on any list, plus the +votes placed at the head of the list, will form the basis of +proportional distribution among the lists. This is the plan adopted by +the American Proportional Representation League as most nearly suited to +American habits, and recommended by Professor Commons in his book on +"Proportional Representation." + +Belgium has also quite recently adopted a scheme of proportional +representation. As in Switzerland, its advent was hastened by political +disturbances. The Catholic party, not satisfied with exerting a +preponderating influence in the country districts, wished to obtain also +its proportionate share of representation in the cities, and proposed a +scheme of proportional representation for them only. This caused such +ill feeling that riots took place in the streets of Brussels. Finally, +proportional representation was promised all round, and became law for +both the Chamber of Representatives and the Senate at the latter end of +1899. In Brussels, where there are 18 seats to be filled, a trial +election had already been held in 1893 with satisfactory results. Six +lists were nominated, the largest being that of the Socialists, who +nominated ten candidates; and over 12,000 electors voted. Each elector +was allowed 18 votes, and the methods in which he could distribute them +were somewhat complicated. He might (1) mark at the head of a list, (2) +mark at the head of a list and also opposite one or more candidates on +the same list, (3) mark opposite the names of not more than 18 +candidates on any list. In the first case his 18 votes counted to the +list marked, in the second case one vote was counted to each of the +individual candidates marked and the balance counted for the list; in +the third case one vote was counted to each candidate marked. The +aggregate of votes marked at the head of each list, plus the individual +votes on the list, was then taken as the basis of proportional +distribution. So many of the votes were cumulated on lists that only +about one-fifth of the votes cast were operative in the selection of +candidates. + +In the bill which has recently become law a new method has therefore +been adopted, which gives more power to the party committees, but allows +the electors to modify their choice. For this purpose the party +organization nominates the candidates in order of preference. The +elector may then accept this order by marking at the head of the list, +or he may give his vote to any one candidate on the list. If all the +electors of a party vote in the first way, those nominated highest on +the list, to the number to which the party becomes entitled, are +elected. But if all the electors vote in the second way, those with the +highest single votes are elected. The actual result will usually be a +compromise between the two, and it is evidently the interest of the +party organization to place the candidates in their real order of +favour, in order that the electors may accept the list. For if an +unpopular candidate were placed at the head of the list few would accept +it. + +The first election under this system has just taken place, and the +result was, as expected, to reduce the Clerical representation +considerably. + +In all the above variations of the Free List system the distribution of +seats is effected by dividing the aggregate votes polled by each party +by a unit of representation, but three different methods of determining +this unit are in use. The first is obtained by simply dividing the total +number of votes by the number of seats. + +The objection to this unit is that when there are several parties, part +of the seats only can be allotted on full units, and the rest have to be +allotted to those parties which have the highest remainders or fractions +of a unit, and this unduly favours small parties, who do not poll even a +single unit. The rule to divide the total votes by the number of seats +increased by one, which was first proposed by Mr. H.R. Droop, reduces +slightly the number of seats allotted on remainders, and was adopted by +the canton of Soluthern in 1895. In Belgium a third plan, devised by +Professor D'Hondt, of Brussels, is used, which is designed to prevent +any seats being allotted on remainders. This unit is evidently smaller +than either of the others, and is to be found by trial. It is only +necessary that the sum of the quotients obtained by dividing it into +each of the lists shall be equal to the number of seats to be filled. + +Suppose a five-seat electorate in which 6,000 votes are divided among +four parties, who poll 2,500, 1,850, 900, and 750 votes respectively. +Then if we take one-fifth, or 1,200 votes, as the unit, the result would +be the following:-- + +(1) 2,500 = 2 units of representation + 100 remainder = 2 seats. + +(2) 1,850 = 1 unit of representation + 650 remainder = 1 seat. + +(3) 900 = unit of representation + 900 remainder = 1 seat. + +(4) 750 = unit of representation + 750 remainder = 1 seat. + +If the Droop unit of one-sixth, or 1,000 votes, be used, the result will +be different:-- + +(1) 2,500 = 2 units of representation + 500 remainder = 2 seats. + +(2) 1,850 = 1 unit of representation + 850 remainder = 2 seats. + +(3) 900 = unit of representation + 900 remainder = 1 seat. + +(4) 750 = unit of representation + 750 remainder = seat. + +By the third method any number of votes between 834 and 900 will be +found to comply with Professor D'Hondt's condition, and the result +would, in this instance, be the same as by the Droop method. Although +the highest number was at first used, the lower limit has been adopted +in the new bill. + +In no case can the proportional distribution be considered satisfactory. +If the electorates are small, and the number of parties large, accurate +proportional representation is quite out of the question. In +Switzerland, however, the electorates are made to contain sometimes as +many as 30 seats. The effect of such large electorates must be in time +to encourage the formation of a great number of small factions. At the +same time there is not so much incentive to split up the parties as by +the Hare system. + +Passing now to the selection of party candidates, none of the methods +can be said to ensure the election of those most in general favour. When +electors are allowed to cumulate on individual candidates, the +favourites of sections within the party will be elected. If, on the +other hand, they are allowed to cumulate on party lists, all votes thus +given are ineffective in the selection of the successful candidates. It +may be noted that although the nomination of candidates in lists by +party organizations is less in accordance with the practice of British +countries than the individual candidature of the Hare system, there is +nothing to prevent one candidate being nominated to stand in the place +of a party. + +A word of warning must be added as to the danger of holding up Belgium +and Switzerland as examples of true electoral justice to Australia. The +direct government of the people which Switzerland has adopted bears not +the slightest resemblance to the representative institutions of British +countries. Both the referendum and proportional delegation are suited to +direct government and are destructive to party responsible government. +The Swiss adopted the referendum to save themselves from the lobbying +and plutocratic character of their legislatures. The initiative and +proportional delegation have followed because they are complementary +reforms. The consequence is that the legislators have been degraded to +mere agents for drawing up measures, and leadership has been transferred +to the press. It is the peculiar conditions of Switzerland which enable +it to tolerate unrestrained majority rule. It is a small country, +surrounded by powerful neighbours, whose strength lies in its weakness. +Moreover, the people are very conservative. In Zurich, for instance, +which is largely devoted to manufactures, a proposal to limit the hours +of work in factories to twelve hours a day was rejected by the people. +Nor is direct government proving a success; the tyranny of the majority +is already apparent. The first federal initiative demanded a measure to +prevent the slaughter of animals by bleeding, designed to interfere +with the religious rites of the Jews. Despite the fact that it was +opposed by the Federal Council, as contrary to the right of religious +liberty guaranteed by the Constitution, it was carried by the +referendum. Belgium, again, can hardly be taken as a model of +constitutional liberty. Surely we in Australia do not want the factious +strife of religious, racial, and class sections, which so nearly brought +on a revolution last year. Yet this is exactly what proportional +delegation to sections would bring about. Belgium has a hard task to +reconcile two races so differently constituted as the Walloons and +Flemings, and has been able to avoid instability of the ministry so far +only because the Clerical party, which is mostly Flemish, still has a +majority. The new system has only consecrated the sectional principle, +and will do nothing to restore harmony. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII. + +PREFERENTIAL VOTING, THE BLOCK VOTE, ETC. + + ++Preferential Voting.+--Laplace, the great mathematician, to whom we owe +so much of the theory of probability, showed more than a century ago +that although individual electors may have very different views as to +the relative merits of a number of candidates for any office, still the +expression of the degree of favour in which the candidates are held by +the whole body of electors will be the same if each elector be assumed +to have a uniform gradation of preference. Suppose that there are ten +candidates, and it is required to place them in order of general favour. +Each elector should be required to place the whole ten in the order of +his preference, 1, 2, 3, &c. Let the maximum degree of merit be denoted +by ten marks, so that every first preference will count as ten marks. +Then, although an individual elector might be disposed to give his +second preference only five marks, and the rest of his preferences, say, +two marks, Laplace demonstrated that it is most probable that the total +result would be the same if each elector be assumed to give his second +preference nine marks, his third preference eight marks, and so on. +Therefore, if all first preferences be multiplied by ten, second +preferences by nine, and so on in regular order down to last preferences +multiplied by one, the total number of marks will be an index of the +order in general favour. If there is one office to be filled, the +candidate with the highest number of marks should be elected; if there +are two offices, the two highest candidates, and so on. + +But the assumed condition must be rigidly complied with; each elector +must express his honest preferences. Whether he will do so or not +depends upon the circumstances. Laplace recognized this element of human +nature, and declared that if electors are swayed by other considerations +independent of the merit of the candidates the system would not apply. +For instance, if the candidates are the nominees of a number of +independent sections, each of which is anxious only to secure the return +of its own candidate, and to defeat those who stand most in his way, the +tendency will be general to place the more popular candidates, those +whose success is most feared, at the bottom of the list, so as to give +them as few marks as possible. The result would be to favour mediocre +men, or even in extreme cases the most inferior. + +Practically, therefore, the system is not applicable where any of the +electors are personally interested in the result. If a number of judges +were called on to decide the relative merits of several essays or prize +designs, and the competitors' names were not known to them, the system +might be used. But even in such a case a simpler method is available; +for, although it may be difficult to pick out the best, it is generally +easy to agree upon the worst. It is usual, then, to gradually eliminate +the worst, and when the number is reduced to two to take the decision of +the majority. + +This process of elimination may be, however, combined with the +preferential system, and the result is more accurate than if one count +only be made. At the first count the candidate with the fewest marks +would be eliminated and his name struck out on all the papers. All those +under him on each paper would then go up one point in order of favour, +and further counts would be held, eliminating the lowest candidate each +time till the candidates were reduced to the number desired. This method +is very complicated, and involves a great amount of trouble. + +Consider now the case of a voluntary association of individuals, such as +a club or society; and suppose that it is required to elect a president +or committee. The condition is clearly that he or they should be most in +general favour with all the members; and the question whether +Preferential Voting is applicable will depend on how united the members +are. Now, clubs are not usually, nor should they be, divided into +cliques or parties; indeed, if a serious split does take place it +generally results in the resignation of part of the club and the +formation of a separate organization. But in a live club it is +impossible to prevent slight differences of opinion; and an +officer-bearer who has the interests of the club at heart must often +offend small sections who want to exert undue influence. In an election +for president this office-bearer would stand no chance of election if +there are several candidates and any small section likes to put him at +the bottom of the list, so as to give him as many bad marks as possible. +This is the weak point in Preferential Voting; any small section can +ensure the rejection of a general favourite. The greater the number of +candidates the smaller the minority which is able to do this; dummy +candidates may therefore be introduced to make it more certain. The risk +would, however, be very much lessened if the process of gradual +elimination we have described were adopted. + +When we come to the election of representatives to a legislature it is +evident at once that Preferential Voting is not applicable at all. We +have shown that the true condition required is not the return of +candidates most in general favour with both parties, but the return of +the candidates most in general favour with each party separately. +Preferential Voting would therefore only be applicable if the electors +of each party voted separately for its own candidates; and even then it +would be open to the objection we have already urged. If it were applied +to the two parties voting together the electors would certainly not be +influenced only by the merit of the candidates. They might record their +honest preferences as regards the candidates of their own party, but +they would naturally place the candidates of the opposing party in +inverse order of merit. The candidates most in general favour would be +those who represented neither party. Suppose there are three candidates +for a single seat, two representing large parties of 49 per cent, each, +and the third a small party of 2 per cent. The electors of the large +parties would be more afraid of one another than of the small party, and +would give their second preferences to its candidate. This candidate, +representing one-fiftieth of the electors, would then actually be +elected; he would receive 202 marks, and neither of the others could +possibly secure more than 200. Moreover, he would still be elected if +the process of elimination were adopted, since on the second count he +would beat either of the other candidates separately by 51 votes to 49. + +These plain facts are indisputable. What is to be thought, then, of the +claim made by Professor Nanson that Preferential Voting, with the +process of elimination, is the most perfect system known for +single-membered electorates. + ++The Block Vote.+--The Block Vote, General Ticket, or _scrutin de +liste_, is in general use when there is more than one seat to be filled. +Each elector has as many votes as there are members to be elected, and +the highest on the list, to the number of representatives required, are +successful. Dealing first with elections to a legislative body, the +system is eminently unjust to parties. A rigid control of nominations is +necessary in the first place, because any party which splits up its +votes spoils its chance. Each party will therefore nominate only as many +candidates as there are seats, and the stronger of two parties, or the +strongest of a number of parties, will elect the entire list. A minority +might in the latter case secure all the representation, but the +practical effect of the Block Vote is to force the electors to group +themselves into two parties only. It therefore has the same beneficial +effect as the single electorate of confining representation to the two +main parties. This is apparently nob recognized by Professor Nanson, who +writes, in his pamphlet on the Hare system:--"Contrast with this the +results of the Block system. With strict party voting, which has been +assumed throughout, each of the five parties would put forward seven +candidates. The seven seats would all be secured by Form, with 44 votes +out of a total of 125, and the remaining 81, or more than two-thirds of +the voters, would be wholly unrepresented." Does the Professor really +think that the 81 (who, by the way, are _less_ than two-thirds) would be +so foolish as not to combine and secure all the seats? + +The exclusion of the minority in a single-membered electorate excites +only a feeling of hopelessness, but when it fails to secure a single +representative in an electorate returning several members, a spirit of +rankling injustice is aroused. The Block Vote has, therefore, never been +tolerated for long in large electorates. In the early history of the +United States many of the States adopted it, and sent to Congress a +solid delegation of one party or the other. This proved so unjust, and +operated so adversely to the federal spirit in promoting combinations of +States, that Congress, in 1842, made the single-membered electorate +obligatory on all the States. + +In France it was adopted at the election for the Chamber of Deputies in +1885. The result as regards parties was about as good as with the single +electorate system. The Republicans and Conservative-Monarchists, whose +numbers entitled them to 311 and 257 seats respectively, actually +secured 366 and 202. But it was abandoned after a trial at this one +election. + +The Block Vote was adopted in Australia for the election of ten +delegates from each colony to the Federal Convention. This was a work in +which all parties might fairly have joined together; and in most +colonies the people did select the best men, regardless of party. In +Victoria, however, the newspapers took on the _rôle_ of the "machine," +and the ten candidates nominated by the _Age_ were elected. Many of the +supporters of the defeated candidates voted for some on the successful +list who just defeated their own favourites. Had this been foreseen they +would have thrown away these votes by giving them to those sure to be +elected or to those least likely to be elected. The injustice of forcing +each elector to vote for the whole ten is thus brought home. We are now +threatened with the adoption of the Block Vote for the Federal Senate, +and in some of the States for the House of Representatives as well; and +it is in the hope of preventing this wrong that the present book is +written. + +So far we have been considering the Block Vote as applied to the +election of a legislature with two or more parties; we now propose to +consider it as applied to one party only. It is a matter of common +knowledge that the Block Vote, when used for such an election as that of +the committee of a club, works very well, and results in the return of +the candidates most in general favour with all sections. The reason is, +of course, that all sections work together, and members vote for the +best men, regardless of sectional lines. We will go further and say that +the Block Vote is by far the best method for such purposes, and is +superior even to Preferential Voting. In the first place it is free from +the defect that a small section can ensure the rejection of a general +favourite; and in the second place it rests on at least as secure a +theoretical basis. To fix our ideas, suppose there are ten candidates +for five members of a committee. Laplace assumed (1) that each member +would have a knowledge of the merits of all the ten candidates, (2) that +his estimate of the respective candidates would vary arbitrarily +between nothing and a maximum degree of merit, (3) that each member +would express his honest preferences. The Block Vote, on the other hand, +assumes (1) that each member can pick out the five best candidates, and +therefore express his opinion as to how the committee should be +constituted, (2) that he will be inclined to place these five candidates +on one plane of favour and the other five on one plane of non-favour. We +submit that the latter assumptions agree more closely with the actual +state of affairs. The members can distinguish between candidates who +have merit and those who have no merit or of whose merit they are +ignorant; to force them, therefore, to place all the candidates in order +of preference is to make them express preferences where none exist.[8] +On the whole, then, the Block Vote is more likely to place the +candidates in their real order of favour. + +But some reservation must be made. The Block Vote works best when the +number of candidates does not exceed two or three times the number of +vacancies. Suppose, first, that the candidates present in the final +result a fairly regular order of favour from lowest to highest. Each of +the successful candidates will then be supported by at least an absolute +majority of the members, providing the number of candidates be not +greater than twice the number of vacancies. But if there are four or +five times as many candidates as vacancies, none of the successful +candidates will have the support of a majority of the members. On the +other hand, however, the candidates do not usually present a regular +order of favour from lowest to highest when there are a large number of +candidates, for there may be a long "tail" of candidates who receive +very few votes. The following general rule may therefore be laid +down:--The Block Vote works best when the total votes given to rejected +candidates do not exceed the total votes given to successful candidates. + +The difficulties indicated above were met by the Australian Natives' +Association by a plan which provided that no candidate should be elected +except by an absolute majority of the voters. The Block Vote is used +throughout; and if at the first ballot the required number of candidates +do not obtain an absolute majority a second ballot is held, from which +those at the bottom of the poll and those who have been elected are +eliminated. This process is continued till all the vacancies are filled. +Four or five ballots are sometimes required, and the proceedings become +very irksome. A sub-committee was recently appointed to investigate the +subject, and reported in favour of the Preferential System with one +count only. The process of elimination was considered too complicated to +be practicable. Now, the conditions presented by these elections, in +which a very large number of candidates are generally nominated, are +precisely those in which Preferential Voting lends itself most easily to +abuse. An insignificant minority may defeat a candidate who should be +elected, by placing him at the bottom of their lists. + +A variation of the Block Vote may be suggested which is much simpler and +better. The preferential ballot papers should be used, and two counts +should be made. At the first count the primary half of the preferences +should be counted as effective votes, and the candidates should be +reduced to twice the number of vacancies. A second count should then be +made of the ballot papers, using the Block Vote. All or nearly all the +candidates would then obtain an absolute majority, and it is practically +impossible that any candidate should be eliminated by the first count +who would have had any chance of election in the second. + +This plan is far superior to the original method. It is right that +members who vote for candidates who are hopelessly out of it should be +allowed to transfer their votes; but it is not right that members who +first help to elect some candidates at one ballot should have the same +voting power as others at subsequent ballots. + +The Hare system is sometimes advocated for clubs on account of its +supposed just principle. Any live club which adopts it runs the risk of +disruption. It merely encourages the formation of cliques and sections; +any slight split would be accentuated and rendered permanent. + ++The Limited Vote.+--The injustice of the Block Vote led to the +introduction of the Limited Vote, which allows the minority some share +of the representation. We have seen that the Block Vote forces each +party to try to return all the representation, and of course one party +only can succeed. But if neither party be forced to try to return more +than it is entitled to each party will get its correct share of +representation, providing both parties are equally organized. This leads +to the Limited Vote, in which each elector has a number of votes +somewhat less than the number of seats. + +The Limited Vote was used in England for a number of three-seat +electorates, which were created by the Reform Bill of 1867, each elector +being allowed to vote for two candidates only. By this means the +majority would usually return two candidates and the minority one. Thus +the Limited Vote has the same advantage as the Block Vote and the single +electorate system, that it tends to confine representation to the two +main parties, but it creates an artificial proportion of representation +between them. Moreover, it renders strict party organization even more +necessary, since each party must arrange to use its voting resources to +the best advantage. Consider the three-seat electorate, for instance. +The minority will, if it is wise, nominate two candidates only; and the +majority may nominate either two or three. But if the majority does +divide its votes among three candidates it runs the risk of securing one +only. It can do so safely when two conditions are fulfilled: first, it +must be sure of polling more than three-fifths of the votes; and, +second, it must arrange to distribute all its votes equally among the +three candidates. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the +Limited Vote was responsible for introducing "machine" tactics into +England. In Birmingham, when Mr. Joseph Chamberlain organized the +Liberals and succeeded in carrying all three seats, the electors in each +ward were directed how to vote so that as few votes as possible might be +wasted. These three-cornered constituencies were abolished by the +_Redistribution Act_ of 1884; and Sir John Lubbock, reviewing the +experiment, declared--"On the whole, it cannot be denied that under the +Limited Vote the views of the electors have been fairly represented." + +The system has also been tried to a smaller extent in the United States. +In New York 32 of the delegates to a constitutional convention were +elected from the State polled as one electorate, each elector being +allowed to vote for 16 candidates. Both parties were afraid to split +their votes, and the result was that each returned 16. The rest of the +delegates were elected in single-membered electorates, and of these the +Republicans secured 81 and the Democrats 47. It might here be pointed +out that the Republicans might have secured more than 16 of the +delegates from the State at large if they had nominated 20 candidates +and allowed the laws of chance to regulate their organization. Each +elector might have been directed to put the twenty names into his hat, +and to reject the first four he pulled out. The same evil is apparent in +Boston, where twelve aldermen are elected at large, each elector being +allowed seven votes. Each party nominates seven candidates only; and the +majority invariably elects seven and the minority five. + +The Limited Vote is therefore not a satisfactory solution of the problem +of representation. It gives an artificial instead of proportional +representation, and it necessitates strict party organization and +control of nominations. At the same time it will generally give a very +fair representation if parties are not strictly organized, and might +well have been adopted for the Federal Convention, five or six votes +being allowed instead of ten. Newspaper domination would thus have been +prevented. + ++Election of the Candidate Most in General Favour.+--It is often +required to ascertain the candidate most in general favour where one +party only is concerned, such as an election for leader of the +Opposition or president of a club; and the methods in general use are +very defective. We do not refer to the theoretical difficulty, which +perplexes some persons, of giving effect to the actual degree of favour +in which the candidates stand in the electors' minds, but to the simple +problem of finding out who is preferred most by the bulk of the +electors. Thus it is universally recognised that when two candidates +stand the candidate who has the support of an absolute majority of the +electors is entitled to election. Yet it is possible that the rejected +candidate may be nearly twice as popular. This might happen if the +majority held that there was little to choose between the two +candidates, while the minority thought they could not be compared. But +it is quite evident that such distinctions cannot be recognized; the +candidate who is preferred by an absolute majority must be elected. It +is when there are more than two candidates that the difficulty arises. +To elect the candidate who has most first preferences is open to very +serious objection; he may have a small minority of the total votes, and +each of the other candidates might be able to beat him single-handed. + +The best way to overcome the difficulty is undoubtedly by some process +of gradually eliminating the least popular candidates till the number is +reduced to two; the candidate with the absolute majority is then +elected. We propose to consider the different ways in which elimination +might be made. We assume, in the first place, that each elector has cast +an advance vote--_i.e._, that he has placed all the candidates in order +of preference. The most primitive method is to eliminate at each +successive count the candidate who has least first preferences. This is +the method adopted in the Hare system, and we have already shown that +it is very defective; in fact, it is no improvement at all. The +eliminated candidate might be most in general favour, and might be able +to beat each of the other candidates single-handed. A second method is +to use Preferential Voting to decide which candidate should be +eliminated at each successive count. This is far superior, but it is +extremely complicated, and is open to the objection that when there are +a large number of candidates a small section may cause the rejection of +the general favourite. We propose to describe a method based on the +Block Vote which is much simpler, and which does not lend itself to +abuse. We have shown that the Block Vote works best when the candidates +can be divided into two equal sections of favour and non-favour. Suppose +there are four candidates, the first two preferences should therefore be +counted as effective votes, instead of the first preference only. The +eliminated candidate will then be the least in general favour. A second +count is then made of the three candidates left, and the first +preferences and half of the second preferences are counted as effective, +and the lowest again eliminated. The candidate who has an absolute +majority is then elected. The method may be indefinitely extended; if +there are five candidates the first two preferences and one-half of the +third preferences are counted, and so on. But when there are a great +many candidates more than one might be eliminated. Any number up to +eight could be safely reduced to four at the first count. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[8] The bracket principle introduced by Professor Nanson into the Hare +system involves a partial recognition of this fact. + + + + +CHAPTER IX. + +ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE THE PRESENT SYSTEM. + + ++The Double Election.+--In the preceding chapter we have strongly +insisted that the different methods considered for ensuring the return +of the candidate acceptable to all sections are not applicable to the +election of legislators. The true principles of political representation +require, not the election of the candidate most in general favour with +both parties, but the election by each party separately of its own most +favoured candidates. But as it is impossible for both parties to be +represented in a single-membered electorate, the best alternative is +that both should contest the seat and one be represented. The present +system of election has largely tended to realize this alternative, +especially in those countries in which party government was strong, such +as England and the United States; and representation has in consequence +been confined to the two main parties. In England, where the party +system was gradually developed, this result was attained without any +rigid control of nominations, because the true party spirit prevailed +and personal ambition was subordinated to political principle; and in +the United States it was only brought about at the cost of "machine" +control of nominations. But on the Continent of Europe, where party +government was transplanted from England, it has never really taken +root. Each small group nominated its own candidates, and the successful +candidate represented only a plurality, and not a majority, of the +electors. Instead of a contest between two organized parties there was a +scramble among numerous factions. + +In France, Belgium, Italy, and Germany an attempt has been made to check +this evil by the double election. If at the first election no candidate +secures an absolute majority of the votes, a second election is held, +for which only the two candidates who head the poll at the first +election are allowed to compete. One must then get an absolute majority. +The double election has undoubtedly tended to prevent a further +splitting up into groups, but the Continental countries offer such poor +soil for the growth of party government that it has only restricted the +contest to two factions in each electorate; and, of course, the dominant +factions are not the same in the various electorates. + ++The Advance Vote.+--In Australia the same evil has become increasingly +evident, and it is now no uncommon thing for a candidate to be elected +by less than one-third or one-quarter of the total votes. In Queensland +a plan has been introduced to meet the evil, under the name of the +Advance Vote, which is designed to secure the advantages of the French +plan without the trouble and expense of a second election. The electors +simply declare in advance at the first election how they would vote at +the second election. All that is necessary is that they place the +candidates in order of preference, 1, 2, 3, 4, &c. Then, instead of +holding a second election between the two who have the greatest number +of first preferences, it is merely necessary for the returning officer +to consult each ballot paper and see which of these two candidates is +higher in order of favour. Thus if one is marked 3 and the other 4, the +vote is counted to the candidate marked 3. This device is assumed to +give exactly the same result as the French plan, providing only that the +same electors vote at both elections, and do not change their views +between the two elections. + +But in reality it possesses hardly any of the advantages of the French +plan. It is another instance of the danger of neglecting the factor of +human nature. The French do not go to the trouble and expense of a +second election for nothing. Their plan is far the better. First of all, +consider the candidates. They know well beforehand that unless one of +them gets an absolute majority of the votes at the first election they +will be put to the expense and delay of a second election, therefore it +is to their interest that the number of candidates be restricted. This +tends to keep down the representation to two sections. Next, consider +the electors. They know also that unless they give a majority of votes +to one of the candidates they will be put to the trouble of voting a +second time, therefore they will take good care the votes are not split +up, even if the candidates wanted it. What is the result? Simply that in +the vast majority of cases one of the candidates gets a majority at the +first election, and no second election is necessary; and, most important +of all, the tendency to split up is counteracted. + +Now take the Queensland system. None of these checks operate. The +splitting up into groups is actually encouraged, and it is to the +interest of each group to see as many more groups as possible formed, in +order to increase its own relative importance, for the delegates of the +two strongest groups have a chance of election instead of the strongest +group only. + +In practice the plan threatens to break down, owing to a practical point +being overlooked. It is evident that the success of the Advance Vote +depends on the electors marking all the preferences. The ballot paper +should be made informal unless all the preferences are given. In +Queensland this has not been done, and the consequence is that a large +proportion of the electors refuse to give more than one preference. No +more conclusive evidence is needed that the scheme has promoted the +growth of factions. These electors voluntarily disfranchise themselves +rather than vote for any of the other candidates, and of course the very +object of the scheme is defeated; the successful candidate cannot secure +a majority of the votes cast. + ++The Exhaustive Ballot.+--A bill has just been introduced into the +Legislative Assembly of Victoria, providing for a further extension of +the principle of the Advance Vote. The plan is favoured by Professor +Nanson, and professes to be an improvement on the Queensland plan, +although it is only an "instalment of reform" in view of the ultimate +adoption of the more perfect Preferential Voting. The Queensland plan is +objected to because all but the two highest candidates are thrown out. +Suppose, for instance, two candidates stand for the weaker party and +three for the stronger party, it is quite likely that all the candidates +of the stronger party will be thrown out. Therefore the lowest candidate +only of the five should be thrown out. All his papers should be +transferred to the candidate who is marked 2 on them; and those below +him on all the papers should go up one point in order of favour. If he +stood 3 on a paper, the candidate who was 4 would now become 3. Another +count of first preferences should then be made, and the lowest again +thrown out; and so on till one candidate gets an absolute majority. It +is pointed out triumphantly that this plan, which is known as the +Exhaustive Ballot, actually saves in this instance all the trouble and +expense of no less than three separate elections. The process of +elimination is the same as that adopted in the Hare system, and is +little, if at all, better than the Queensland plan in securing the +election of the right candidate, while as regards the formation of +groups it is worse. For this plan actually encourages the groups to +split up, since if one candidate nominated by a group is thrown out his +vote will be transferred to the others. Therefore the double election is +much better than either form of the Advance Vote. They would do nothing +towards restoring the one redeeming merit of the single electorate, of +confining representation to the two main parties. And all other +mathematical schemes founded on the _a priori_ assumption that the +candidate most favoured by all sections is entitled to the seat are just +as objectionable. + +The conclusion that must be reached from all these considerations is +that, except when there is a single candidate standing in the interests +of each of the two main parties, it is impossible to say with the +present system who ought to be elected. The difficulty is one of +fundamental principle. The only way to do justice to both parties is to +enlarge the electorates so that each can get its proportionate share of +representation, and then to provide such machinery as will allow each +party separately to elect its most favoured candidates. In no other way +can the people be induced to organize into two coherent parties. + + + + +CHAPTER X. + +APPLICATION OF THE REFORM TO AUSTRALIAN LEGISLATURES. + + ++Federal Legislatures.+--The keynote of the Australian Federal +Constitution, as expressed in the Commonwealth Bill, is full and +unreserved trust in the people. This is in direct contrast with the +American Constitution, which seeks to place checks on the people by +dividing power among the President, the Senate, and the House of +Representatives, and assigning to each separate functions. Do we fully +realize the dangers as well as the glorious possibilities of unfettered +action? Do we sufficiently feel the weight of the responsibility we have +undertaken? In reality we have declared to the world the fitness of the +Australian democracy to work a Constitution from which the most advanced +of the other nations would shrink! We do not hesitate to avow our firm +belief that there is only one thing that can save the situation. Unless +Australia is to show to the world a warning instead of an example, all +her energies must be bent on the formation of two coherent organized +parties, dividing each State on national issues, and competing for the +support of all classes and all interests in every electorate throughout +the Commonwealth. + +That is the lesson we have endeavoured to inculcate throughout this +book, and we are tempted to quote in support of it the opinion of an +American author, Professor Paul S. Reinsch, in a work just published on +"World Politics." He says:-- + + The political experience of the last two centuries has proved that + free government and party government are almost convertible terms. + It is still as true as when Burke wrote his famous defence of + party, in his _Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents_, + that, for the realization of political freedom, the organization of + the electorate into regular and permanent parties is necessary. + Parliamentary government has attained its highest success only in + those countries where political power is held alternately by two + great national parties. As soon as factional interests become + predominant; as soon as the stability of government depends upon + the artificial grouping of minor conflicting interests; as soon as + the nation lacks the tonic effect of the mutual criticisms of great + organizations, the highest form of free government becomes + unattainable. (pp. 327, 328.) + +The greatest strain on the Constitution will probably be felt at the +outset. Both people and politicians are suddenly called upon to rise to +a higher plane of political thought and action. The idea that each State +is to send representatives to fight for its own interests must first be +got rid of. The only way in which all interests can be reconciled is by +each State acting through the national parties. The greatest danger +which assails the Commonwealth is the risk of combinations of States +dominating party lines; and it is the more imminent that divergent +opinions between the larger and the smaller States were already apparent +at the Convention. The four smaller States, Western Australia, South +Australia, Queensland, and Tasmania, with about one-third of the +population, will have two-thirds of the representation in the Senate; +while the two large States, Victoria and New South Wales, will have +about two-thirds of the representation in the House of Representatives. +At the Convention the fear was expressed that the former, representing a +majority of the States, and the latter, representing a majority of the +people, might come into conflict, and that a deadlock would ensue. It +was on this issue that the great struggle at the Convention took place, +resulting in the adoption of a double dissolution and a subsequent joint +sitting of the two Houses if necessary. By this machinery all disputes +will be finally settled. But what will happen if some of the States +consider themselves unjustly treated? Even apart from conflicts between +the two Houses, if only one State stood aloof from the main parties it +could paralyze government, just as Ireland did in the Imperial +Parliament. It is evident, then, that the very existence of the Union is +bound up in the immediate formation of national parties. + +In the United States this lesson was not learned till the Civil War had +demonstrated the danger of combinations of States. Since then two great +parties have been maintained, even though their existence involves the +spoils system and machine organization. In Switzerland, too, the federal +tie was not drawn close till after the revolution in 1847, in which the +Catholic cantons attempted to secede. + +Unfortunately, another cause of dissension menaces the Commonwealth. We +allude to the class representation which we have already animadverted +upon. The separate representation of sections or classes within the +States is just as much to be dreaded as the separate representation of +States, and bodes as much ill. It seems not unlikely that the fate of +the first Federal ministry will be in the hands of the Labour party, +which will be able to dictate its policy. It is utterly inconsistent +with the democratic theory that a small minority should have this power; +and it is to be hoped that in the wider field of federal politics its +true character will be recognized. It is only by the mutual action of +two great national parties that the true direction of progress, favoured +by the people, can be worked out; a small minority studying only its own +interests is sure to be a bad guide. A steady pressure maintained +through the two national parties will ensure the recognition of all just +demands; such extreme and ill-considered demands as that for the +initiative and national referendum can only provoke opposition and cause +reaction. Even those who sympathize with the ultimate objects of the +Labour unions must see the folly of their present unpatriotic and +suicidal tactics. + +It is a matter for hope that in the wider sphere of federal politics the +irresponsible leadership of the press is not likely to be the power for +harm that it is in some of the individual States at present. But while +it may not dominate the Federal Parliament as a whole to the same +extent, its control over nominations in the States will be quite as +great, and immeasurably greater if the Block Vote is adopted. Nor are +signs wanting of a union of some of the larger newspaper ventures in the +principal States, with a view to increase their power. + +Such is a brief review of the outlook. The great requisites essential +for progress are the organization of two national parties and +responsible leadership in the Federal Parliament. The dangers to the +Commonwealth may be summed up under the two heads of lack of +organization and irresponsible leadership outside Parliament. Is it +possible that the dangers may be avoided and the requisites secured by a +change in electoral machinery? Those who have no conception of the +working of social forces, and who do not trace the law of causation into +the realm of mind, will be inclined to scoff at the suggestion. To them +the only hope of improvement lies in appealing to the people to elect +better men. They ignore entirely the reciprocal relation of the +Parliament and the people, and while recognizing the influence of the +people on the character of Parliament, they deny the influence of +Parliament on the character of the people. They declare that the people +are "free agents" and will have better government when they make up +their minds to get it; and no electoral machinery or parliamentary +machinery can influence the result. Such is the passive attitude which +consciously or unconsciously is almost universally assumed. Yet who can +study the history of the British Constitution without being impressed +with the fact that every step in the evolution of its machinery was a +true sociological invention and had the effect of directing the people's +will, which is the motive force, into channels conducive to the general +welfare? Take away the responsible leadership of the Cabinet in the +British Parliament, and it would become a sink of corruption like the +United States Congress; take away its organization into two national +parties, and it would become a rabble like the French Chambers. Now, is +not the electoral machinery the connecting link between the people and +Parliament, and therefore a vital part in the machinery of government? +Does it not actually decide the constitution of Parliament? If this be +granted, it follows that unless the electoral machinery be adapted to +give effect to these two great principles, parliaments will inevitably +decline; and that the present method of election is a very inadequate +means of giving effect to them few will deny. + +Our claim for the application of the electoral reform set forth in the +preceding pages rests simply on the fact that it will give effect to +these principles under conditions in which the present system would +fail. We press especially for its application to the Federal House of +Representatives, which will be the most important Australian +representative assembly; for it it there that organization and +responsible leadership are most urgently needed. That they will not be +obtained if the present schemes of dividing the States into +single-membered electorates are adopted is morally certain; and the +result can only be disaster and bitter disappointment. If the +mathematical devices described in the last chapter are added, the +disorganization will be still more complete. And as for the scheme for +allowing separate delegation to a number of sections, which is advocated +under the name of the Hare system, it would be absolutely fatal. Who can +believe that if Mr. Hare's wild scheme to divide the British people into +several hundred sections had been adopted 40 years ago the Imperial +Parliament would now be an organized assembly? + +Take the conditions presented by the first elections for the Federal +Parliament, to be held early next year. In some respects it is fortunate +that a definite issue is available as a basis of party organization; for +there is a general consensus of opinion that all other considerations +must be subordinated to a pronouncement on the tariff issue. In an +article on "The Liberal Outlook" in _United Australia_, the Hon. Alfred +Deakin writes:--"By the very circumstances of the case the tariff issue +cannot but dominate the first election, and determine the fate of the +first ministry of the Commonwealth. There will be no time for second +thoughts or for suspense of judgment. The first choice of the people +will be final on this head. The first Parliament must be either +Protectionist or anti-Protectionist, and its first great work an +Australian tariff. That is the clear-cut issue. The risk is that a +proportion of the representatives may be returned upon other grounds, as +the electors as a whole may not realize all that is at stake or make the +necessary sacrifices of opinions and preferences to express themselves +emphatically on this point." Now, the only way to avoid the risk +indicated is to take this one definite issue as the basis of +proportional representation. Each State should be divided on it, and +should elect its proportional number of Freetrade and Protectionist +representatives. Tasmania and Western Australia could conveniently be +polled for this purpose each as one electorate; South Australia might be +divided into two electorates, Queensland into three, and Victoria and +New South Wales into four or five. + +It is very desirable that the first election be contested on definite +policies advanced by the prospective party leaders; the suggestion that +the first ministry should be merely a provisional ministry, to act till +the first responsible ministry is formed after the election, is +therefore open to serious objection. The leader of the Freetrade party +or the leader of the Protectionist party should be chosen as first +Federal Premier, and the first election should decide which policy is to +be adopted. + +Contrast this scheme with the proposals now under consideration. In +Victoria, New South Wales, and Queensland bills have been introduced +dividing the States into single-membered electorates, and some of the +smaller States are inclined to use the Block Vote. In Victoria a bad +precedent has been established by giving the party in power the duty of +determining boundaries. From time to time it will be necessary to +rearrange the boundaries, not only on account of movements of population +within the State, but also because the number of representatives which +the State is entitled to will vary. Look forward to the time when the +State becomes entitled to one more representative; every one of the 23 +electorates, in which vested interests will have been created, will have +to be altered These are precisely the conditions which have led to the +growth of the gerrymander in the United States. + +Already the first scheme submitted to the Assembly has been defeated by +a combination of country members, who held that Melbourne was allotted a +larger share of representation than it now has in the local Parliament. +Whatever may be the arguments by which the disparity between the size +of town and country electorates be supported in local affairs, surely +they cannot apply where national issues only are at stake. The principle +of equal electorates is recognized in the Commonwealth Bill by the rules +for allotting representation to the States. Why not, then, for the +divisions of each State? It is said that a larger proportion of the +electors vote in the town, but it is not those only who vote who are +represented. + +In dividing a State into electorates for the purpose of the reform, the +number of electors in each division should therefore form the basis of +proportional distribution. The unit of representation would be the total +number of electors in the State divided by the number of seats. One +representative would be allowed to each division of the State for each +unit of representation, and the remaining seats, if any, would go to +those divisions with the largest remainders. + +Coming now to the Federal Senate, the bill provides that every State, +except Queensland, must be polled as one electorate for the election of +six senators at the first election and in case of a double dissolution; +at intermediate elections three senators only will be elected, as they +retire in rotation. This equal representation of the States might be +taken to imply that the Senate is intended to represent State rights, +and the provision that each State is to be polled as one electorate +would seem to support that view. On the other hand, the senators are not +required to vote according to States, for it is provided that "each +senator shall have one vote;" the vote of a State may therefore be +neutralized by its representatives. And again, the Senate is to be +elected directly by the people and not by the State legislatures, as at +first proposed. To some extent, therefore, the Federal Senate as now +constituted presents a new problem in representation, on which it is not +advisable to dogmatize. Personal considerations will probably have more +weight than in the selection of representatives; but when we reflect +that it is really little more than a revising assembly, elected by the +same voters as the House of Representatives to deal with the same +questions, and having no special functions of its own, the conclusion +seems irresistible that the election must be contested by the same +national parties, and that the same method of election should be +adopted. + +Until the Parliament of the Commonwealth prescribes a uniform method of +choosing senators, the duty is to be left to the State parliaments; and +it is to be regretted that the States have taken no steps to secure +uniform action at the first election. In Victoria a fierce newspaper +contest is being waged over the Block Vote and the Hare system, and the +arguments, being mutually destructive, only go to prove that both are +equally objectionable. The _Age_ naturally wishes to have the privilege +of electing six senators as it did ten delegates to the Federal +Convention, and contends that the majority should elect all the +senators; the _Argus_ rushes to the other extreme in declaring that six +separate minorities ought to be represented, and ignores the risk that +these minorities would be formed on a class or religious basis. The +middle position advocated in this book--namely, that majority and +minority should each return its proportional share of representation--is +free from the objections to both these extreme views. + ++State Legislatures.+--Even after federation the State Houses will still +continue to touch at most points the daily lives of the people; they +will merely be shorn of some of their powers and drained of some of +their best leaders. The fiscal issue, which has had great influence in +deciding party lines in the past, will be removed from the arena of +strife, leaving no other than an indefinite line of division into +Liberals and Conservatives, which in practice tends to become a division +into lower and upper classes. This is the danger ahead; and it can only +be avoided by the formation of strong party organizations appealing to +all classes to work together for the general welfare. Party government +is just as necessary in State politics as in national politics. + +The present position is intolerable; the disintegration of parties is so +complete that there is not a responsible ministry in Australia worthy of +the name. Among the causes which have led to this deplorable state of +affairs the present method of election is undoubtedly the most potent; +it frequently happens that four or five candidates, representing as +many groups, contest a single seat. In Victoria, where the state of +chaos is perhaps worst, the influence of the press, the existence of a +strong Labour section in the Lower House, and the class character of the +Upper House, representing property and capital, have been the principal +contributing causes. + +With the advent of federation a revision of the State constitution is +widely demanded, and is likely to be conceded. One of the first steps +necessary to restore harmony must be reform of the Upper House by a +gradual extension of the franchise and a lowering of the qualification, +so as to ensure that elections are freely contested; it is its present +unrepresentative character which gives force to the appeals of the +radical press and intensifies class divisions. + +The relation of State parties to the national parties is an important +subject. In the article from which we have already quoted, in _United +Australia_, Mr. Deakin writes:--"There cannot be a series of Liberal +parties, one Federal and the others in the States, each going its own +way. There must be but one party, with one programme, to which effect +will require to be given continuously in both the States and the +Commonwealth." He therefore deplores that the Liberal party, together +with its "left wing," the Labour class, will be split on the fiscal +issue. "It is this apparently unavoidable rupture in the party," he +declares, "which endangers its prospects and presents an opportunity to +the Conservative classes of either seizing or sharing an authority to +which they could not otherwise aspire." If this means that the "Liberal" +and Labour classes are entitled by reason of their numbers to a +perpetual lease of power in both domains, there can be no more dangerous +doctrine. Parties should be decided by questions of progress and +financial policy, and not on class lines; and since the State and +Federal legislatures have separate spheres of action, parties should be +separate also, unless, indeed, they are to be founded on corruption, as +in the United States, where the same two parties control not only +national and State politics, but city government also. + +In the consolidation of public opinion into two definite lines of policy +based on the questions to be dealt with lies the only hope, then, of the +progress of the individual States within their own range; and in +promoting this desirable result the reform advocated in these pages +finds its true application. + + + + +CHAPTER XI. + +THE CONDITIONS OF SOCIAL PROGRESS. + + ++The Agent of Progress.+--If the analysis made in the preceding pages of +the principles underlying political representation comes to be regarded +as correct, the science of sociology must be profoundly affected: for it +is a fact that not only the importance but the very existence of the +principles involved has been completely missed by speculators in that +field. The view we have taken is that representation is the most +important sociological invention which has been made in the whole +history of the human race; that the successive steps taken in the +evolution of the British Constitution mark a series of inventions +scarcely less important, and that the resulting institution of party and +responsible government is the indispensable agent of democratic +progress. We have traced throughout the electoral and parliamentary +machinery on which the institution is based the action of two great +principles--organization and responsible leadership--and we have shown +that these are the mainsprings of the whole mechanism. Yet we find even +such an authority as Mr. Herbert Spencer objecting to the party system, +on the ground that it lends itself to a one-man or a one-party +tyranny.[9] The fact is that it is only when representative government +is weak, and approaches direct government, that such a result can +happen, and the distinction is so little recognized that a brief +recapitulation may be permitted. + +The fundamental error is in conceiving representation as merely a means +of registering the popular will; many even go so far as to regard it as +an imperfect means of ensuring that each single question will be decided +according to the will of the majority. All such conceptions really +amount to direct government, and where they are given effect to, whether +by the referendum or sectional delegation, society is not organized for +consistent progress. Indeed, if the lessons of history can be trusted, +such a state of society is bound to be wrecked from within by +anti-social influences; political power becomes the object of factious +strife, and the rule of the majority degenerates into the tyranny of the +majority. + +We have endeavoured to show that the true conception of representative +government involves a recognition of the principles of organization and +leadership, and that representation is in consequence a means not only +of registering the popular will, but also of organizing and guiding it. +In both cases, therefore, the popular will is the ultimate motive force, +but in the one case the desires of the people clash, while in the other +they are directed into channels conducive to the general welfare. We +have regarded it as an essential condition of representative government +that the popular will be expressed only as to the direction of progress, +that is to say on general policy and not on single questions, and that +complete control of progress be then left to the representative body. In +no other way can the people be saved from their anti-social tendencies, +and induced to express their opinion as to what is best for all. We have +seen how the electoral machinery is adapted to organize this expression +of the popular will into two alternative directions of progress; how +this is effected by the fact of two parties competing for the support of +the people on policies expressing these lines of progress; and how the +parliamentary machinery allows the stronger of these two parties for the +time being complete control of administration and of the direction of +progress. The effect of this organization is that the popular will is +reduced to effective action in one direction at a time--a result which +is not possible with direct government. + +Nor is the principle of responsible leadership which is involved in the +reciprocal relation of the representative body and the people any less +important. Society cannot progress faster than the individual units +composing it. True progress lies therefore in raising the standard of +public opinion, and it is this principle which ensures that result by +reacting upon and moulding individual character. Hence we find that in +countries like England, where the principle is operative, progress is +effected without supervision and undue interference in the affairs of +the individual by the State, while in countries where the principle is +not operative, such as the Continental countries of Europe and some of +the Australian colonies, the contrary is the case. Legislation should +therefore be directed to changing the nature of the individual, and +should not be too far in advance of public opinion. This is what Mr. +Lester F. Ward, in his work on "Outlines of Sociology," calls attractive +legislation. He writes:-- + + The principle involved in attraction, when applied to social + affairs, is simply that of _inducing_ men to act for the good of + society. It is that of harmonizing the interests of the individual + with those of society, of making it advantageous to the individual + to do that which is socially beneficial; not merely in a negative + form as an alternative of two evils, as is done when a penalty is + attached to an action, but positively, in such a manner that he + will exert himself to do those things that society most needs to + have done. The sociologist and the statesman should co-operate in + discovering the laws of society and the methods of utilizing them, + so as to let the social forces flow freely and strongly, + untrammelled by penal statutes, mandatory laws, irritating + prohibitions, and annoying obstacles. (p. 274.) + +Now, we submit that this attractive legislation is possible only when +there is no oppressed minority, and is therefore the peculiar province +of representative government; for we have shown that the whole machinery +is adapted to induce the people to desire only what is best in the +interests of society. + +Let us briefly examine the bearing of the view that representative +machinery is the agent of progress on previous theories of social +progress. + ++Professor Huxley.+--No one has more clearly laid down the conditions of +social progress than the late Professor Huxley in his essay on +_Evolution and Ethics_. The gradual strengthening of the social bond by +the practise of self-restraint in the interests of society he called the +ethical process, and he showed that social progress means a checking of +the cosmic process at every step and the substitution of this ethical +process. This action he compares to that of a gardener in clearing a +patch of waste ground. If he relaxes his efforts to maintain the state +of art within the garden, weeds will overrun it and the state of nature +will return. So the human race is doomed to a constant struggle to +maintain the state of art of an organized polity in opposition to the +state of nature; to substitute as far as possible social progress for +cosmic evolution. He says:-- + + Let us understand, once for all, that the ethical progress of + society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in + running away from it, but in combating it. It may seem an audacious + proposal thus to pit the microcosm against the macrocosm, and to + set man to subdue nature to his higher ends; but I venture to think + that the great intellectual difference between the ancient times + with which we have been occupied and our day, lies in the solid + foundation we have acquired for the hope that such an enterprise + may meet with a certain measure of success....[10] + + Moreover, the cosmic nature born with us, and to a large extent + necessary for our maintenance, is the outcome of millions of years + of severe training, and it would be folly to imagine that a few + centuries will suffice to subdue its masterfulness to purely + ethical ends. Ethical nature may count upon having to reckon with a + tenacious and powerful enemy as long as the world lasts. But, on + the other hand, I see no limit to the extent to which intelligence + and will, guided by sound principles of investigation, and + organized in common effort, may modify the conditions of existence + for a period longer than that now covered by history. And much may + be done to change the nature of man himself. The intelligence which + has converted the brother of the wolf into the faithful guardian of + the flock ought to be able to do something towards curbing the + instincts of savagery in civilized men.[11] + +But Huxley never realized that the real cause of the better prospects of +success in modern as contrasted with ancient times is the discovery of +representative machinery. "The business," he declared, "of the sovereign +authority--which is, or ought to be, simply a delegation of the people +appointed to act for its good--appears to me to be not only to enforce +the renunciation of the anti-social desires, but wherever it may be +necessary to promote the satisfaction of those which are conducive to +progress."[12] There is no conception here of the principles of +organization and responsible leadership, so necessary in constituting +this "delegation." + ++Herbert Spencer.+--By a great many sociologists it is denied that man +has his destiny in his own hands, or can by common effort modify the +conditions of existence so as to promote progress. The conception which +is held to justify this view is that there is an exact correspondence +between the progress of human society and the growth of an organism. +Foremost among those who take this view is Mr. Herbert Spencer. The +close analogy which the progress of the assumed social organism bears to +the growth of the physiological organism is worked out in great detail +throughout the "Synthetic Philosophy," and is taken to establish "that +Biology and Sociology will more or less interpret each other." The +practical conclusion which is drawn is that the growth of society must +not be interfered with; if the State goes beyond the duty of protection, +it becomes an aggressor. So Mr. Spencer is a most uncompromising +opponent of State action, even education and public sanitation coming in +for his condemnation. Moreover, he holds that if the social organism be +let alone it will tend to a future state of society in which social +altruism will be so developed that the individual will voluntarily +sacrifice himself in the interests of society. + +In an essay on _The Social Organism_ ("Essays," Second Series), he +writes:-- + + Strange as the assertion will be thought, our Houses of Parliament + discharge in the social economy functions that are, in sundry + respects, comparable to those discharged by the cerebral masses in + a vertebrate animal.... We may describe the office of the brain as + that of _averaging_ the interests of life, physical, intellectual, + moral, social; and a good brain is one in which the desires + answering to their respective interests are so balanced that the + conduct they jointly dictate sacrifices none of them. Similarly we + may describe the office of Parliament as that of _averaging_ the + interests of the various classes in a community; and a good + Parliament is one in which the parties answering to these + respective interests are so balanced that their united legislation + concedes to each class as much as consists with the claims of the + rest. + +The error of regarding society merely as an aggregate is here clearly +shown, for if the "parties" in Parliament were based on class +delegation, as assumed, social progress would be blocked. The only real +foundation for the resemblance between society and an organism is this: +that unless the individual units composing society reduce themselves to +unity of action in a definite direction, society as a whole cannot +progress; or, in other words, that the principles of organization and +leadership are essential to progress. Yet Mr. Spencer denies that there +is any sphere of collective action for the operation of these +principles! + ++Benjamin Kidd.+--The "social organism" theory is also the foundation of +the theory of social progress with which Mr. Benjamin Kidd startled the +scientific world a few years ago in "Social Evolution." While +appreciating the importance of the factor of individual reason, he +contended that self-restraint by the individual in the interests of +society is impossible without an ultra-rational sanction; that, in +fact, without this the reason is the most anti-social and +anti-evolutionary of all human qualities. The central fact therefore +with which we are confronted in our progressive societies is stated as +follows:--"_The interests of the social organism and those of the +individuals comprising it at any particular time are actually +antagonistic; they can never be reconciled; they are inherently and +essentially irreconcilable._" What becomes of this extraordinary +proposition if it is clearly established that the amount of +reconciliation depends on the extent to which the principles of +organization and responsible leadership are given effect to by +representative machinery? + ++Past Progress.+--The question will naturally be raised: If a +representative body is now the indispensable agent of social progress, +how can progress previous to the introduction of representation be +explained? The answer is that the same principles were operative, but in +different forms, more suited to the stage of social development. Indeed, +we may say that, from the time that man emerged from the brute stage and +became a social animal, the types of society which have survived in the +struggle for existence with the state of nature and with other types +have been those in which the principles of organization and leadership +have been most active. Even the lowest types of savages, such as the +native tribes studied by Professor Baldwin Spencer and Mr. Gillen in +Central Australia, have a complicated system of organization, the +peculiar feature of which is totemism, or group marriage; but this is +more the result of development than of conscious effort. Leadership also +is rudimentary, for, although the old men have control of the elaborate +ceremonies described, they conform almost entirely to custom and +tradition. Out of this savage stage there grew in favoured countries the +second type of human society--the patriarchal, in which leadership +becomes personal, and centred in a chief who exercises despotic +authority. Patriarchal society grew out of the necessities of a pastoral +existence; indeed, it was the discovery of the domestication of animals +which gave rise to it. Among other interesting features which were +developed are permanent marriage, slavery, and ancestor worship. There +can be no doubt that the latter played an important part in binding the +tribe into one organization, and in inducing all the tribe to submit to +the leadership of the chief. There is a second stage of patriarchal +society in which the large tribes break up into clans and become less +nomadic. Professor Jenks has shown, in his "Short History of Politics," +how this stage originated in the adoption of agriculture. We begin now +to have the village community, bound by the tie of kinship, and +submitting to the leadership of a lord; and are already on the threshold +of modern political society, in which all these ancient barriers are +broken down and the individual becomes the social unit. The cause of +this momentous change is development of the art of warfare. But before +we reach the modern State there is an intermediate stage, namely, +feudalism. The feudal chief is simply the successful warrior--the leader +of a band of adventurers who get control of a definite territory and +exact military allegiance from its inhabitants. Out of the consolidation +of these bands, or by conquest, modern States were founded. Leadership +was now vested in an irresponsible despot--the king; and the trouble was +to render this new institution permanent, and to induce the people to +submit to it. The former result was attained by making the kingship +hereditary, but the latter has always been a difficult task. It is +doubtful if it would ever have been accomplished but for a significant +alliance--that of Church and State. The convenient fiction of the divine +right of kings was invented, and religion was used to bolster up the +institution and to provide a sanction for submission to absolutism. In +other words, irresponsible leadership was tolerated because +responsibility was supposed to exist to a Higher Power. So we find that +all the great religious movements--Christianity, Mohammedanism, and even +Buddhism--have been associated with the establishment of mighty +kingdoms. Moreover, the only two kingdoms in Europe in which absolutism +still holds out are Russia and Turkey, in which the head of the State is +also head of the Church. But military despotism, which was based solely +on the exploitation of weaker communities, of which ancient Rome was +the culminating type, wanted the elements of permanent progress, and was +bound to disappear before a new type which rested on the development of +internal resources. Militarism must therefore be looked on as a real +stage of progress; for in contrast with patriarchal society it was +competitive, and it broke down many ancient barriers, and prepared the +way for industrial co-operation. Thus we arrive at the conditions +favourable to the rise of representative institutions. For when the cost +of wars had to be raised out of the national resources kings found it +convenient to get the consent of the people to taxation. Hence the great +movement throughout Western Europe for the establishment of parliaments +in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Why is it that in England alone +this movement was successful? Partly no doubt because its isolated +position was favourable to internal progress, but mainly because it was +the only State in which the principles of organization and responsible +leadership were continuously given effect to. So it is that in England +there was developed that wonderful machinery of representative +government which has enabled the people to substitute responsible for +irresponsible leadership, and has made the national character what it +is. This machinery has now been adopted nearly all over the world, +wherever it has been desired to make the popular will felt, but in no +case has it sufficed to give effect to the underlying principles to the +same extent; and success has been attained only in so far as they have +been effective. The lesson of the last century has been that the +machinery which proved sufficient in England, where progress was uniform +through several centuries, breaks down when the pace of progress is +increased. An extreme instance is the recent attempt to introduce party +government into Japan, a country just emerging from the feudal stage, an +interesting account of which is given in the _Nineteenth Century_ for +July, 1899. The experiment failed because the clans could not be divided +on questions of political principle. In a greater or less degree that is +the fundamental source of difficulty everywhere; if the representative +machinery produces only sectional delegation the tendency is back +through anarchy to absolutism. Is it not an extraordinary fact, then, +that the vital distinction between representation and delegation is so +universally ignored? + +Such is a brief outline of the evolution of human society; however +inadequate it may be, it at least serves to illustrate the truth that +social progress has never been made in the past except when the +principles of organization and leadership have been operative. + ++Future Progress.+--As to the ultimate tendency of future progress it +would be pedantry to dogmatize; our task has been the humbler one of +pointing out the means by which progress is to be attained. We have +assumed, however, that there is a separate sphere of collective action +in which government is an instrument for the positive amelioration of +social conditions. We are aware that this conclusion is at variance with +the two extreme schools of modern thought; on the one hand, with the +individualists, who hold that government should only be used for mutual +protection and to keep order; and on the other hand, with the +socialists, who would leave nothing to individual action. Professor +Huxley has reduced the claims of these two schools to absurdity and +impossibility respectively; and we believe that the problem of the +future is to find out that middle course between the anarchy of the one +and the despotism of the other which makes for progress. It seems likely +that the state of society we are approaching will be one in which, while +natural inequalities will be recognized, neither the artificial +inequalities of fanatical individualism nor the artificial equalities of +regimental socialism will be tolerated, and every man will enter the +rivalry of life on terms of an equality of opportunity. This is the +state foreshadowed by Mr. Lester Ward in his "Outlines of Sociology" and +called by him _Sociocracy_. Such ideals, however, serve only to refute +false conceptions and offer little practical guidance. What is wanted is +a clear recognition of the fact that _progress depends on collective +effort acting through representative machinery, the efficiency of which +depends on the extent to which the principles of organization and +responsible leadership are operative._ The question with which +democratic countries are faced to-day is this: Must it be acknowledged +that the people are unfit for self-government, or is the representative +machinery defective? We have supported the view that the latter is the +case as regards English-speaking-countries at all events; and we have +shown that in British countries the remedy lies in improved electoral +machinery, while in the United States both electoral and parliamentary +machinery are at fault. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[9] "Principles of Ethics." + +[10] "Collected Essays," vol. ix., p. 83. + +[11] _Ibid._, p. 85. + +[12] "Collected Essays," vol. i., pp. 275-276. + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Proportional Representation Applied To +Party Government, by T. R. Ashworth and H. P. C. 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Ashworth and H.P.C. Ashworth + </title> + <style type="text/css"> +/*<![CDATA[ XML blockout */ +<!-- + p { margin-top: .75em; + text-align: justify; + margin-bottom: .75em; + } + h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6 { + text-align: center; /* all headings centered */ + clear: both; + } + hr { width: 33%; + margin-top: 2em; + margin-bottom: 2em; + margin-left: auto; + margin-right: auto; + clear: both; + } + + table {margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;} + + body{margin-left: 10%; + margin-right: 10%; + } + + + ul li { padding-top: .5em ; } + ul ul ul, ul li ul li { padding: 0; } + ul { list-style: none; } + ul, ul ul ul li { display: inline; } + .subitem { display: block; padding-left: 2em; } + + + .center {text-align: center;} + .right {text-align: right;} + + // --> + /* XML end ]]>*/ + </style> + </head> +<body> + + +<pre> + +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Proportional Representation Applied To +Party Government, by T. R. Ashworth and H. P. C. Ashworth + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Proportional Representation Applied To Party Government + +Author: T. R. Ashworth and H. P. C. Ashworth + +Release Date: December 25, 2004 [EBook #14459] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION *** + + + + +Produced by Martin Pettit and the PG Online Distributed Proofreading Team + + + + + +</pre> + + + +<h1>PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION APPLIED TO PARTY GOVERNMENT</h1> + +<h2>A NEW ELECTORAL SYSTEM</h2> + +<h3>BY</h3> + +<h2>T.R. ASHWORTH</h2> +<p class='center'>(<i>President of the Victorian Division, Australian Free Trade and Liberal Association</i>)</p> + +<h3>AND</h3> + +<h2>H.P.C. ASHWORTH</h2> +<p class='center'>(<i>Civil Engineer</i>)</p> + +<h3>LONDON</h3> + +<h3>SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO., LIM.</h3> + +<h3>PATERNOSTER SQUARE</h3> + +<h3>1901</h3> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CONTENTS" id="CONTENTS" />CONTENTS.</h2> + +<ul> + <li><a href="#CHAPTER_I">CHAPTER I</a>—THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION + </li> + <li><a href="#CHAPTER_II">CHAPTER II</a>—THE SO-CALLED REPRESENTATIVE PRINCIPLE + </li> + <li><a href="#CHAPTER_III">CHAPTER III</a>—THE PRESENT POSITION or PARTY GOVERNMENT + </li> + <li><a href="#CHAPTER_IV">CHAPTER IV</a>—THE REFORM: TRUE PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION + </li> + <li><a href="#CHAPTER_V">CHAPTER V</a>—HOW THE EVILS OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM WILL BE REMEDIED + </li> + <li><a href="#CHAPTER_VI">CHAPTER VI</a>—THE HARE SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL DELEGATION + </li> + <li><a href="#CHAPTER_VII">CHAPTER VII</a>—THE FREE LIST SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL DELEGATION + </li> + <li><a href="#CHAPTER_VIII">CHAPTER VIII</a>—PREFERENTIAL VOTING, THE BLOCK VOTE, THE LIMITED VOTE, ETC. + </li> + <li><a href="#CHAPTER_IX">CHAPTER IX</a>—ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE THE PRESENT SYSTEM + </li> + <li><a href="#CHAPTER_X">CHAPTER X</a>—APPLICATION OF THE REFORM TO AUSTRALIAN LEGISLATURES + </li> + <li><a href="#CHAPTER_XI">CHAPTER XI</a>—THE CONDITIONS OF SOCIAL PROGRESS + </li> + +</ul> + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> + +<blockquote><p>"Majority and minority, in and for themselves, are the first + requisite of popular government, and not the development or + representation of separate groups."—Bradford's "Lesson of Popular + Government," vol. ii., page 179.</p></blockquote> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="PREFACE" id="PREFACE" />PREFACE.</h2> + + +<p>The subject of electoral reform has been brought into prominence in +Australia by a clause in the Commonwealth Bill which provides that the +Federal Senate shall consist of six senators from each State, directly +chosen by the people, voting as one electorate. The problem thus +presented has been keenly discussed. On the one hand we have the +advocates of the Block Vote asserting that the party in a majority is +entitled to return all six senators; and on the other, a small band of +ardent reformers pressing the claims of the Hare system, which would +allow the people in each State to group themselves into six sections, +each returning one senator. The claim that every section of the people +is entitled to representation appears at first sight so just that it +seems intolerable that a method should have been used all these years +which excludes the minority in each electorate from any share of +representation; and, of course, the injustice becomes more evident when +the electorate returns several members. But in view of the adage that +it is the excellence of old institutions which preserves them, it is +surely a rash conclusion that the present method of election has no +compensating merit. We believe there is such a merit—namely, that <i>the +present method of election has developed the party system</i>. Once this +truth is grasped, it is quite evident that the Hare system would be +absolutely destructive to party government, since each electorate would +be contested, not by two organized parties, but by several groups. For +it is precisely this splitting into groups which is causing such anxiety +among thoughtful observers as to the future of representative +institutions; Mr. Lecky has attributed to it, in his "Democracy and +Liberty," the decline in the parliamentary system which has accompanied +the progress of democracy all over the world. The object of this book is +to suggest a reform, which possesses the advantages of both methods and +the disadvantages of neither; which will still ensure that each +electorate is contested by the two main parties, but will allow its just +share of representation to each; and which will, by discouraging the +formation of minor groups, provide a remedy for the evil instead of +aggravating it.</p> + +<p class='right'>T.R.A.<br /> +H.P.C.A.</p> + +<p>325 COLLINS STREET, MELBOURNE.</p> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="PROPORTIONAL_REPRESENTATION" id="PROPORTIONAL_REPRESENTATION" /><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1" />PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION APPLIED TO PARTY GOVERNMENT.</h2> + + +<hr style="width: 25%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_I" id="CHAPTER_I" />CHAPTER I.</h2> + +<p class='center'>THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION.</p> + + +<p>Old establishments, like the British Constitution, said Edmund Burke, +"are not often constructed after any theory; theories are rather drawn +from them." In setting out on an endeavour to understand the principles +underlying political representation, the saying expresses exactly the +course which should be followed. The inquiry is the more necessary as, +although representation more than anything else in the domain of +government distinguishes the modern from the ancient world, the ideas +which prevail as to the part it has played, is playing, and is destined +to play on the world's stage are not merely hazy, but extremely +inaccurate. The intimate connection of representation with the progress +which has followed its introduction is so little recognized that the +most advanced democracies are now willing to listen to any proposal to +return to direct government. In spite of <a name="Page_2" id="Page_2" />the fact that the nineteenth +century has witnessed the triumph of the historical method in most +fields of social inquiry, the dangers of <i>a priori</i> speculation on +political institutions are as much in evidence as when Burke wrote.</p> + +<p>If we would understand, then, the meaning of representative +institutions, it is in the gradual development of the "mother of +parliaments" that we must seek for the most reliable information. We +must be careful, however, to leave out of sight those features of the +growth of the British Constitution which are merely the expression of +transitory social conditions, and to confine our attention to the +landmarks which bear directly on the inquiry. The subject is best +divided into two stages; the first characterized by the origin of +representation; and the second by the division into parties, and the +creation of cabinet government.</p> + +<p><b>The First Stage of Representation.</b>—Rightly to understand the +conditions which led to the introduction and development of the +representative principle, we must look back to the period immediately +following the signing of the Great Charter by the tyrant King John.</p> + +<p>The Charter reaffirmed the ancient principle that free Englishmen should +not be taxed without their consent, and representation was the natural +outcome of that provision. A brief glance at the social conditions of +the time is necessary to understand why this was so. First, it must be +remembered <a name="Page_3" id="Page_3" />that the true political unit of ancient times was the city +or local community. England at that time was a collection of local +communities, having more or less a corporate life. Then, again, there +were the three estates of the realm—the clergy, the lords, and the +commons—who were accustomed to confer with the King on public affairs. +The stage which marks the birth of representation was when these +different estates and communities were asked to tax themselves to +relieve the necessities of the King. It was obviously impossible that +the consent of every freeman should be obtained, hence the duty had to +be deputed to agents. Now, the idea of agency was not unknown in the +ancient world, but that agents should have power to bind those for whom +they acted was something entirely new. It was necessary, however, that +they should have this power, and it suited the King's convenience that +they should exercise it. Already, in the earliest writ of which we have +knowledge, summoning each shire to send two good and discreet knights, +it was provided that they should be chosen in the stead of each and all. +This happened in 1254, and in the following year the clergy were also +summoned for the same purpose of granting aid to the King. In the +meantime the merchants and trade guilds in the cities were growing rich. +The King cast longing eyes on their possessions, and wished to tax them. +So we find that in 1264 Simon de Montfort, Earl of Leicester, issued the +celebrated writ summoning <a name="Page_4" id="Page_4" />each of the cities and boroughs to send two +of its more discreet and worthy citizens and burgesses. This is +sometimes regarded as the beginning of the House of Commons, but it was +really not until the fourteenth century that these several assemblies, +each of which up till then taxed itself separately and legislated in its +own sphere, coalesced into the present Houses. First the lower clergy +fell out, and, with the knights, citizens, and burgesses, were merged +into the House of Commons; and the higher prelates with the earls and +barons formed the House of Lords.</p> + +<p>This, then, is the first stage of representation. What was the nature of +this new force which had come into the world and was destined to so +profoundly affect the whole course of human affairs? One result of +immense importance is apparent at a glance. It solved a problem which +had baffled the ancients—that of the nationalization of local +communities on a free basis. But it is generally assumed that the only +difficulty overcome was that of size; that the representative assembly +is a mere substitute for the larger assembly of the whole nation. +Starting with this assumption, it is claimed that the representative +assembly should be a mirror of the people on a small scale, and the more +faithfully it reflects their faults as well as their virtues, their +ignorance as well as their intelligence, the more truly representative +it is said to be. It is even asserted that with the modern facilities +for taking a poll, representative government might be <a name="Page_5" id="Page_5" />dispensed with +and the people allowed to govern themselves. Democracy, we are assured, +means that every man should exercise an equality of political power. +Now, if this conception is correct, we should at once insist that every +law should be submitted to a direct referendum of the people; that +legislators should be mere agents for drawing up laws; and that the +executive should be directly responsible to and elected by the people. +But if representation is not a mere substitute for the direct action of +the people this idea as to the true line of democratic progress falls to +the ground. The whole question, therefore, hinges on what representation +is and what are the principles underlying it.</p> + +<p>Looking back to the history of its introduction, we have seen that it +was only in proportion as the deputies of the local communities were not +regarded as delegates or agents that they became representatives. +Professor E. Jenks has written an interesting article in the +<i>Contemporary Review</i> for December, 1898, in which he advances the +theory that representation is a union of the ideas of agency, borrowed +from the Roman law, and of vicarious liability from barbaric sources. As +to the latter he points out that in Anglo-Saxon times the only way for +the King to control the free local communities was to exact hostages +till crimes were punished or fines paid. In England, where these ideas +were combined, constitutional monarchy was firmly established; but in +France, <a name="Page_6" id="Page_6" />Germany, etc, in whose medieval parliaments the idea of agency +prevailed, and where in consequence the parliamentary idea was weak, +absolute monarchy held its ground. When Edward I. desired for purposes +of his own to emphasize the unlimited liability of political +representatives, and insisted that they should have "full and sufficient +power to do what of common council shall be ordained," he probably never +realized that a body having power to bind the shires and towns was a +formidable institution, or that the trembling hostages would become in +time haughty plenipotentiaries. But whatever may have been the social +conditions which gave rise to the idea, it is certain that it was the +power of binding those to whom they owed their selection which enabled +the representatives to resist the encroachments of the monarchy on the +liberties of the people. At first they were not legislators, but merely +sought to uphold the ancient laws. They presented petitions to redress +their grievances; but in time these petitions became demands; and they +refused to grant the King's subsidies till the demands were complied +with. It was, therefore, this first stage of representation which +enabled the people to start that long struggle against the power of the +King and nobles which has ended in complete self-government; nay, more, +it was necessary that they should pass through this first stage before +they could learn to govern themselves. Yet we have seen that if we apply +the modern ideas on representa<a name="Page_7" id="Page_7" />tion the start could never have been +made. In what respects, then, did these early representative +institutions differ from the modern conception as a reproduction of the +people on a small scale? One obvious difference at once suggests itself. +The representatives were not average members of the communities; they +were the most influential; they were selected because of their special +fitness for the work to be done; they were leaders of the people, not +followers; they did not take inspiration from the people, but brought it +to them; and having selected these men the people deferred to their +judgment to act for them and protect their interests. Here, then, we +arrive at the first principle involved in representation, which is +leadership.</p> + +<p>But there is another and still more important difference between a +representative assembly and a primary assembly of the people. It is +this: that a representative cannot be a violent partisan of a small +section of his constituents; he must be in general favour with all +sections. Therefore a representative assembly is composed of moderate +men, representing a compromise of the views of their individual +supporters. Moreover, the representatives appeal to the people to sink +their minor differences for the general welfare. This feature is very +prominent in the early parliaments. The local communities were arrayed +as a united people against the aggression of the monarchy. The principle +which is here apparent is that of organ<a name="Page_8" id="Page_8" />ization. In the first stage of +English parliamentary history we may say at once that these two +principles—organization and leadership—were most conspicuous. The +people, sinking all minor differences, formed one united party; and +recognised that their struggle against the party of prerogative depended +on the ability, influence, and integrity of their deputies.</p> + +<p><b>The Second Stage of Representation.</b>—There is no need to enter into +that long struggle between the nation and the monarchy which followed. +We pass on, then, to the time when the parliaments, having wrested a +share of power, began to split up into parties. It was natural that when +power became divided two parties should arise; one upholding the +authority of the Parliament against the King; and the other favouring +the divine right of Kings. The Puritans and Cavaliers in the troublous +times of Charles I. were the earliest signs of this tendency. The Long +Parliament, which met in 1640, was divided on these lines; the +misdemeanors of the King brought on civil war; the parliamentary troops +defeated the royal troops after a bloody struggle; and the King was +brought to execution. The succeeding events were full of instruction. +The Parliament attempted to govern the nation—or, rather, we should say +the House of Commons did, for the House of Lords was abolished. But it +proved quite unfit for the purpose. It was thoroughly disorganized, and +rent by violent factions. The anarchy which ensued was ended by a +military despot, Oliver <a name="Page_9" id="Page_9" />Cromwell, who entered the House of Commons in +1653 with his soldiers. The Speaker was pulled from his chair; the +members were driven from the House; and Cromwell was proclaimed +dictator. It is strange, indeed, that the lesson which is to be drawn +from this event, and which has been repeated in France time after time +since the Revolution, has not yet been learned: the only escape from +continued political anarchy is despotism. But the weakness of despotism +is that it ends with the life of the despot. Cromwell's son was forced +to abdicate, and the monarchy was restored. The same division of parties +in the Parliament continued, and they began to take the names of Whigs +and Tories. Towards the end of the seventeenth century, the dissensions +of these two factions again threatened to make government impossible. In +administration the evil was felt most; the union of ministers of both +parties was proving unworkable. So fickle did legislation become that no +one could say one day what the House would do the next. It was at this +crisis, and about the year 1693, that William III., who cared more for a +strong administration than for political differences, created what is +known as cabinet government, and, as Professor Gardiner says, "refounded +the government of England on a new basis." Recognizing that power should +not be separated from responsibility, he affirmed the principle that the +ministers of state should be selected from the party which had a +majority in the House of Commons. But <a name="Page_10" id="Page_10" />the time was not yet ripe for the +complete application of this principle. Early in the eighteenth century +Sir Robert Walpole set the example of resigning when he no longer +possessed the confidence of a majority of the House of Commons; but in +the latter half of the century the great Earl of Chatham introduced +again the practice of selecting ministers irrespective of party. Despite +the fact that he was supported by the personal influence of George III., +the attempt failed. A succession of weak ministries followed; and out of +the confusion the modern division of Liberals and Conservatives emerged. +Thus it was not until the beginning of the present century that the +doctrines of the solidarity of the Cabinet and its complete dependence +on a majority of the House of Commons were thoroughly developed in their +present form. England, now grown into the United Kingdom, had at last, +after six centuries of strife, won her national independence, and for +one brief century has enjoyed a full measure of self-government.</p> + +<p><b>Comparison of the Two Stages.</b>—How do the conditions presented by the +nineteenth century differ from those of the fourteenth? And how is the +problem of representation affected? We have seen that the great forces +which animated the nation in the fourteenth century were organization +and leadership. Have these forces ceased to operate? Assuredly not. In +the fourteenth century we had a united people organized under its chosen +leaders against the <a name="Page_11" id="Page_11" />encroachments of the King and nobility on its +national liberty. In the nineteenth century the people have won their +political independence, but the struggle is now carried on between two +great organized parties. The principle of leadership is still as strong +as ever. The careers of Pitt, Peel, Palmerston, Beaconsfield, and +Gladstone attest that fact. The one great difference, then, between the +fourteenth and the nineteenth centuries is that instead of one party +there are two. The problem of representation in the fourteenth century +was to keep the people together in one united party, and to allow them +to select their most popular leaders. Surely the problem is different in +the nineteenth century. The requirements now are to organize the people +into two great parties, and to allow each party separately to elect its +most popular leaders. And yet we are still using the same method of +election as our forefathers used six centuries ago. Although the +conditions have entirely changed, we have not adapted the electoral +machinery to the change. The system of single-membered electorates was +rational in the fourteenth century, because there was only one party. Is +it not on the face of it absurd to-day, when there are two parties?</p> + +<p><b>The Meaning of Party Government.</b>—Why should there be two parties +instead of one in order that the people should be able to govern +themselves? To answer this question we must start at the beginning, and +consider what is the problem of popular govern<a name="Page_12" id="Page_12" />ment. The best definition +is that it is to promote the general welfare—to reconcile or average +the real interests of all sections of the community. Now, if the people +could all agree what is best in the interests of all, unity of action +might certainly be obtained; but even then the problem would not be +solved, for the people are not infallible. The greater part of the +problem consists in finding out what is best in the interests of all, +and no amount of mere abstract speculation can solve this part. So +diverse and so complex are the interests to be reconciled, so interwoven +and interdependent one with another, that the problem of securing a just +balance is incapable of solution by anything short of omniscience. But +in any case the people cannot be always got to agree to one course of +action. Therefore the people cannot govern themselves as one united +party. The only workable basis is, then, the rule of the majority, and +the problem of popular government is how to ensure that the majority +shall rule in the interests of all.</p> + +<p>Party government provides the best known means of solving this problem. +The only way of finding out what is best for the whole people is by the +incessant action and interaction of two great organized parties under +their chosen leaders; each putting forth its energies to prove its +fitness to hold the reins of government; each anxious to expose the +defects of the other. This healthy emulation as to what is best for all, +with the people to judge, is the real secret of free govern<a name="Page_13" id="Page_13" />ment. The +two parties are virtually struggling as to which shall be king. Each is +striving to gain the support of a majority of the people; and the +grounds on which it appeals for support are that the measures it +proposes are the best for the country, and that the men it puts forward +are the best men for passing those measures into law and carrying on the +administration of the country. This constant agitation, and this mutual +competition to devise new measures, and to bring forward new men, +prevent stagnation. Both sides of every leading public question of the +day are presented in the rival party policies, and the people are +invited to decide between them. The forces on which the parties rely to +move the people are enthusiasm for measures and enthusiasm for +men—party and personality, or, in other words, organization and +leadership. It is in opposing these forces to counteract the selfish and +anti-social passions that party government acquires its virtue. By +appealing to their higher nature it induces the people to subordinate +their class prejudices to the general welfare, and by setting before +them definite moral ideals, and appealing to them by the force of +personality, it raises the character of public opinion, and moulds +individual and national character to an extent that is seldom +appreciated. Here, then, is the key of human progress. Direct +democracies may hold together so long as there are external enemies to +induce the people to sink their differences in the common interest, or +so long as there <a name="Page_14" id="Page_14" />is a slave caste to do the menial work, as in the +ancient democracies; but representative democracy offers the only hope +of welding together a free people into a united whole. The unrestrained +rule of the majority under direct democracy must degenerate into the +tyranny of the majority. Instead of the equality of political power +which it promises, the minority is deprived of all power. Representative +democracy, on the other hand, deprives the people of the personal +exercise of political power, in order to save them from the free play of +their self-assertive passions, but still leaves to every man an equality +of influence in deciding the direction of progress. Thus every man is +induced to express his opinion as to the direction of progress; and the +party policy is the resultant direction of progress of all the party +electors, and therefore represents their organized opinion. Now, bear in +mind that the true direction of progress is not known, and can only be +found out by constant experiment directed by the most far-seeing and +capable minds. It is the means of carrying on this experiment which +party government provides. The party representing the organized opinion +of the majority has, rightly, complete control of the direction of +progress so long as it remains in a majority. But, although deliberation +is the work of many, execution is the work of one. Hence the creation of +a small committee of the party in power—the cabinet—associated with +the leader of the party, <a name="Page_15" id="Page_15" />who becomes for the time being the Prime +Minister, the cabinet ministers being jointly responsible for the +control of administration and the initiation of measures for the public +good. But an organized minority is quite as essential to progress as an +organized majority—not merely to oppose, but to criticise and expose +the errors of the party in power, and to supplant it when it ceases to +possess the confidence of the country. Hence progress under party +government may be compared to a zigzag line, in which the changes in +direction correspond to changes in ministry. By this mutual action and +alternation of parties every vote cast has, in the long run, an equal +influence in guiding progress. The only justification for majority rule +sanctioned by free government is that when two parties differ as to what +is best for the whole people the majority shall prevail, and party +government tends to realize this condition. But direct government by the +people offers no check whatever on the power of the majority, which is +as absolute as that of the Czar of Russia. As Calhoun, the American +statesman, writes in his "Disquisition on Government," "the principle by +which constitutional governments are upheld, is <i>compromise</i>, that of +absolute governments is <i>force</i>!" Now, the significance of party +government as a guarantee of free government lies in this: that party +policies represent a compromise of what every section composing each +party supposes to be the interests of the whole people; and the parties +<a name="Page_16" id="Page_16" />are engaged in fighting out a compromise of the real interests of every +section of the people.</p> + +<p>Lest it be thought that in this panegyric on party government we have +been indulging in a wild flight into the region of speculative politics, +we hasten to add that the ideal condition we have pictured has never +been reached. The British Parliament has perhaps most nearly approached +it, but already shows signs of retrogression. America and the Australian +colonies are drifting further away from it. Already political +philosophers are shaking their heads and predicting the failure of +popular government. The cry everywhere is for a stronger executive. +Party organization is breaking down; small factions actuated by +self-interest hold the balance of power between the main parties, and +render government unstable and capricious. The main parties themselves +tend to degenerate into factions. Personality is declining—the demand +is for followers, not leaders. Compromise is supplanted by log-rolling +and lobbying. And, to crown all, the rumbling of class strife grows +ominously louder. The danger is that these tendencies may be allowed to +go too far before reform is attempted—that the confidence between +classes may be destroyed.</p> + +<p><b>Organization and Leadership.</b>—We have shown that the two great +principles underlying representation are organization and leadership. +Now, after all, there is nothing very profound in this conclusion. Is +there a <a name="Page_17" id="Page_17" />single department of concerted human action in which these same +principles are not apparent? What would be thought of an army without +discipline and without generals; or of a musical production in which +every performer played his own tune? Even in the region of sport, can a +cricket or a football team dispense with its captain and its places? And +yet many people imagine that a disorganized collection of delegates of +various sections can rule a nation? Such an assembly would be as much a +mob as any primary assembly of the people, and would in no sense be a +representative assembly. The fact is that the growing intensity of the +evils which beset representative institutions throughout the civilized +world to-day is due to imperfect expression of these two principles. +Representative assemblies are not properly organized into two coherent +parties, nor is each party allowed free play to select its most popular +leaders. What is the remedy?</p> + +<p><b>A Change in Electoral Machinery the Key to Reform.</b>—The great mistake +made by all writers on electoral reform is that they have failed to +recognize that the character of public opinion depends upon the way it +is expressed. If the electoral machinery be adapted to give effect to +those principles of organization and leadership which lie at the root of +representation, then the character of public opinion will be improved. +Representation, in fact, is not only a means of expressing public +opinion, but also of guiding, informing, <a name="Page_18" id="Page_18" />educating, and organizing it. +Therefore, the method of election is an all-important factor.</p> + +<p>The first and greatest necessity is to counteract the tendency of the +people to split up into factions. It may seem a startling conclusion +that this is a mere matter of electoral machinery, but it is +nevertheless quite true. It must be remembered that we are dealing with +human beings and not with insentient figures. If the method of election +allows representation to two sections only, the people will group +themselves into two sections. But if it allows representation to a large +number of sections, then the people will group themselves into as many +sections as are allowed. Now, party government offers every hope of +preventing two sections degenerating into factions, but with a number of +sections there is absolutely none.</p> + +<p>Here, then, we see the one great merit of the present system of +election, which explains why it has persisted so long, with all its +faults. It is that it tends to confine representation to the two main +parties, since each electorate is generally contested by them; but in so +far as it does not completely effect that object and allows +representation to independent factions it is defective. Moreover, the +merit we have indicated is purchased at too high a price. It is these +defects which are causing the degradation of representative institutions +throughout the world to-day.</p> + +<p>It is obviously impossible to give a just share of representation to two +parties and allow each party <a name="Page_19" id="Page_19" />to elect its most popular leaders, in an +electorate which returns only a single representative. Hence the first +necessity for reform is to enlarge electorates, so that each may return +several representatives. Now, the requirements for giving effect to the +principles of organization and leadership in such an electorate are:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>1. Proportional representation to the two main parties—Ministerial + and Opposition, the majority and the minority.</p> + +<p> 2. The election by each party of its most popular + candidates—<i>i.e.</i>, those most in general favour with all sections + of the party.</p></blockquote> + +<p>This is the problem of representation as it presents itself to us. +Leaving a detailed account of the means by which it is proposed to give +effect to these great desiderata to a later chapter, let us indicate +briefly where they strike at the root of the evils of the present +system.</p> + +<p><b>Enlarged Electorates.</b>—With enlarged electorates the minority will not +be excluded. Each party will secure its just share of representation. +When both parties are represented in each electorate the interests of +the electorate will not be bargained for as the price of support. +Members will cease to be mere local delegates.</p> + +<p><b>Proportional Representation to the Two Main Parties.</b>—Representation +must be absolutely confined to the two main parties, and each party must +be <a name="Page_20" id="Page_20" />allowed its just share. Every candidate should be required to +nominate either as a Ministerialist or Oppositionist, and each party +should be allotted a number of representatives proportional to the total +amount of support received. If democracy means that every man's opinion, +as expressed by his vote, is to have the same weight, it follows that +the parties should be represented in the Legislature in the same +proportion as among the people, otherwise it is ridiculous to talk of +the rule of the majority. The present system sometimes results in +minority rule and sometimes in minority extermination; it is difficult +to say which alternative is the worse.</p> + +<p><b>Election of its Most Popular Candidates by each Party.</b>—It would be +little use to confine representation to the two main parties if the +parties were allowed to split up into factions. The only way to prevent +this is to provide such electoral machinery as will ensure the return of +the candidates most in general favour with all sections, and will +exclude the favourites of sections within the party. This distinction is +vital. The general favourite is a representative; the favourite of a +faction is a delegate. A representative is not only independent of any +one section, but if he does favour a faction he will sink in general +favour. He therefore represents a compromise of the demands of all +sections. But a delegate is the mouthpiece of a faction—a follower, not +a leader of the people.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21" />No section will be disfranchised by this proposal, for the true +function of all minor sections is to influence the policies of the two +main parties. Thus every section will be proportionally represented in +one or the other policy and by all the party candidates. Not only will +each party be proportionally represented but all the sections which +compose each party will be proportionally represented in its policy. +This is the only true meaning of proportional representation.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_II" id="CHAPTER_II" /><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22" />CHAPTER II.</h2> + +<p class='center'>THE SO-CALLED REPRESENTATIVE PRINCIPLE.</p> + + +<p>All schemes of electoral reform hitherto proposed under the name of +proportional representation are based on the so-called "representative +principle"—viz., that every section of the people is entitled to +separate representation in proportion to its numbers. The ideal varies +somewhat, but the usual conception, is that if each member represents a +different section or interest the assembly will represent all sections +or all interests. Now this is simply an attempt to return to what we +have described as the first stage of representation, but without the +fear of the monarchy to keep the sections together. For a deliberative +body or a king's council it might be suitable, but for an assembly +charged with the complete control of government in the interests of all +it is utterly impracticable. Each representative must represent all +interests; he must be elected on a definite policy as to what is best +for all the people. If he is sent in as the agent of one interest or one +section of the people, he ceases to be a representative and becomes a +delegate. All these schemes are there<a name="Page_23" id="Page_23" />fore not proportional +representation at all, but proportional delegation.</p> + +<p>We have shown that representation means the organization of public +opinion into two definite lines of policy, and that this is the only way +to prevent political anarchy. But the proportionalists (as they like to +call themselves) say that it means representing men and the opinions +they hold in proportion to their numbers. The fundamental error is that +they neglect the all-important factor of human nature. They look on +public opinion as something having an independent existence apart from +the questions about which it is expressed and from the means of +expressing it; and they fail to recognize that the character of public +opinion depends on the manner in which it is expressed and organized. It +is but a natural consequence that they also conceive the number of +sections of opinion awaiting representation as pre-existing and +independent of the electoral machinery.</p> + +<p>In short, they reduce the whole problem to a nice little exercise in +mathematics, requiring only for its clear exposition some columns of +figures and a few coloured diagrams to represent the different shades of +public opinion. No better example of the dangers of <i>a priori</i> +speculation could be adduced than this chimerical idea of the +proportionalists that public opinion is something to be divided into +fractions like a mathematical quantity, unless it be, perhaps, the +conclusion that if you gather together delegates repre<a name="Page_24" id="Page_24" />senting these +fractions you will have an assembly representing the sum total of public +opinion.</p> + +<p>The issue is quite clear. Are we to have two parties aiming at the +control of administration and appealing to all sections for support, or +the separate delegation of a number of sections? In the one case we will +have parties based on national policies, and in the other case we will +have a number of factions, each wanting something different and +determined to block progress till it gets it. Remember that it is a mere +matter of electoral machinery which will determine the choice. It is +true that at present we do not have two very coherent parties, but that +is the fault of the present electoral system.</p> + +<p>It would seem that there can be but one answer to this question, and yet +the "representative principle" shows such wonderful vitality that it is +worth while considering the arguments on which it is based, and the +various stages through which the idea has passed.</p> + +<p><b>Mr. Hare's Scheme.</b>—The "representative principle" was first +propounded in England in 1857 by Mr. Thomas Hare. He proposed that the +United Kingdom should be constituted one huge electorate for the return +of the 654 members of the House of Commons. The people were to group +themselves into 654 voluntary unanimous sections, each returning one +member, and each gathered from every corner of the kingdom. We propose +to consider here not the scheme itself but only the principle on which +it was founded. Mr. Hare <a name="Page_25" id="Page_25" />rightly conceived that the great evil of the +present system is the exclusion of the minority in each electorate, but +he altogether failed to appreciate that the excluded minority nearly +always represented one of the two main parties. He could not see, in +fact, that to divide each electorate into majority and minority is to +divide the whole country into majority and minority, nor that the +injustice is tolerated because it is usually as bad for one party as the +other. Instead, therefore, of proposing to do justice to both the +majority and the minority in each electorate, he proposed to allow +representation to as many minorities as possible. To him, the rule of +the majority was the rule of a majority of interests; this he called the +constitutional majority, as opposed to the "mere rule of numbers." Now, +at the time Mr. Hare wrote party government was rather weak in England. +He quotes with approval a statement of Mr. Sidney Herbert, M.P., that +the House was divided into many parties, or rather no party, because the +country was divided into many parties or no party, and that the division +into two parties would never be restored again. It is amusing, in view +of after events, to find Mr. Hare asking what would be the result of any +contrivance to re-establish party. Assuming that <i>party</i> representation +was dead, Mr. Hare proposed to substitute <i>personal</i> representation. It +is positively ludicrous at this interval of time to note how the +electors were expected to group themselves. They <a name="Page_26" id="Page_26" />were to take personal +merit as the basis of representation; every vote cast was to be a +spontaneous tribute to the qualities and attainments of the person for +whom it was given. And in order, presumably, that they should choose +good men in preference to corrupt men, the polling-day was to be set +apart as a sacred holiday, and church services were to be held to +solemnize the public act and seek for the Divine blessing!</p> + +<p>The maintenance of a responsible ministry in such a House presented no +difficulty to Mr. Hare. The electors were to indicate whom they +considered the most illustrious statesmen, and no one would dare to +question their decision!</p> + +<p>It seems strange now that this scheme should have received serious +consideration. Mr. Hare was so much under the spell of the apparent +justice of the underlying principle that he was blind to its results. +But it was soon perceived that the electors would not group themselves +as Mr. Hare supposed; that the personal ideal of every class of electors +would be simply men of their own class. It was further pointed out that +cranks and faddists and every organization founded on questions of the +remotest interest would combine to secure representation. Mr. Disraeli +declared it to be "opposed to every sound principle, its direct effect +being to create a stagnant representation ... an admirable scheme for +bringing crotchety men into the House." Mr. Shaw-Lefevre <a name="Page_27" id="Page_27" />condemned it +as "a vicious principle based upon a theory of classes," and Mr. +Gladstone said that it regarded electors "not as rational and thinking +beings, but merely as the equivalents of one another." Walter Bagehot, +in his standard work on the "English Constitution," opposes the +principle of voluntary constituencies, because it would promote a +constituency-making trade. "But upon the plan suggested," he writes, +"the House would be made up of party politicians selected by a party +committee, chained to that committee, and pledged to party violence, and +of characteristic, and therefore unmoderate, representatives for every +'ism' in all England. Instead of a deliberate assembly of moderate and +judicious men, we should have a various compound of all sorts of +violence. I may seem to be drawing a caricature, but I have not reached +the worst. Bad as these members would be if they were left to +themselves—if in a free Parliament they were confronted with the perils +of government, close responsibility might improve them, and make them +tolerable. But they would not be left to themselves. A voluntary +constituency will nearly always be a despotic constituency."</p> + +<p>The practical difficulties in the application of Mr. Hare's scheme are +almost insuperable, but it is not worth while pursuing the subject, +since it is now admitted by recent advocates that the faddist argument +is fatal. This is an admission that Mr. Hare <a name="Page_28" id="Page_28" />completely neglected the +factor of human nature. Professor Nanson writes:—"Hare proposed that +there should be only one electorate, consisting of the whole State. It +is unfortunate that this proposal was made. There can be no doubt that +it has retarded the progress of true electoral reform for at least a +generation ... it would inevitably lead to the election of a certain +number of faddists."</p> + +<p><b>John Stuart Mill.</b>—The great vogue which the Hare system has obtained +is to be traced more to the influence of John Stuart Mill than to that +of anyone else. Mill was captivated by the apparent justice of the +proposal, and devoted a chapter of his "Representative Government" to +it, wherein he declared:—"Mr. Hare's scheme has the almost unparalleled +merit of carrying out a great principle of government in a manner +approaching to ideal perfection, while it attains incidentally several +other things of scarcely inferior importance." Believing in the absolute +justice of the principle, Mill and Hare were certainly consistent in +setting no limit to its application except the size of the assembly. +Mill is emphatic on this point. "Real equality of representation," he +asserted, "is not obtained unless any set of electors, amounting to +average number of a constituency, wherever they happen to reside, have +the power of combining with one another to return a representative." +Now, the recent disciples of Mr. Hare are never tired of claiming the +support of Mill, although they have thrown this <a name="Page_29" id="Page_29" />definition to the +winds. But they are guilty of far more than that, for in another chapter +of Mill's book we find that his conception of a representative assembly +elected by the Hare system is a purely deliberative body. He expressly +declares it to be radically unfit for legislation, which he proposes to +hand over to a commission appointed by the Crown. The value of his +testimony is very much discounted by this fact.</p> + +<p><b>Sir John Lubbock.</b><a name="FNanchor_1" href="#Footnote_1">[1]</a>—We have asserted that the proportional principle +should be applied to two parties only—the majority and the minority, +and that every section can then be represented. Mill and Hare thought +that no limit should be set except the size of the assembly. All the +recent advocates of the system take up an intermediate position. +Appreciating the serious objections against allowing independent +representation to a large number of small sections, Sir John Lubbock, +president of the English Proportional Representation Society, proposes +to constitute electorates returning only three to five members each, +thus confining representation to only three to five sections in each +electorate, and sacrificing to a great extent accurate proportional +representation. In his book on "Representation," he writes:—"I have +assumed that Parliament should be 'a mirror of the nation;' if the +object were to secure unity of action rather than freedom of discussion, +to form an executive body such as a Government, a Board of Directors, or +a <a name="Page_30" id="Page_30" />Vestry, the case would be quite different. It is, however, I presume, +our wish that Parliament should be a deliberative assembly in which all +parties should be fairly represented." But to make Parliament a +deliberative body is to destroy its power to secure unity of action at +all, and to render it useless as a working machine.</p> + +<p><b>Miss Spence.</b>—An active campaign has for some time been carried on for +the adoption of the Hare system in Australia. Miss C.H. Spence, of South +Australia, was the pioneer reformer, and has laboured in the cause by +pen and voice for no less than forty years. Great credit is undoubtedly +due to Miss Spence for the clear and simple manner in which she has +expounded the system, and for the good work she has done in exposing the +defects of the present methods. Not only has she lectured in all parts +of Australia, but she has made visits to England, where she met Mr. Hare +and Sir John Lubbock, and also to America. But we may admire Miss +Spence's courage and devotion to principle without agreeing with her +conclusions.</p> + +<p>At a meeting held at River House, Chelsea, London, in 1894, Miss Spence +submitted an analysis of 8,824 votes recorded at 50 public meetings in +South Australia. The audiences were in each case asked to select six +representatives out of twelve candidates. The result of a scrutiny of +all the votes combined was that the following six "parties" secured one +"representative" each—viz., Capital, Labour, Single Tax, <a name="Page_31" id="Page_31" />Irish +Catholic, Prohibition, and Women's Suffrage. Miss Spence frankly +confesses that these "parties" are minorities, but holds that a majority +can be formed by the union of minorities, and that party responsible +government can still be carried on. Now, can any sensible man or woman +imagine a working ministry formed by a union of any four of these +"parties?" Capital would certainly be permanently opposed to Labour and +to Single Tax, and as for the others, there is not a single principle in +common. How, then, could a union be formed? The only possible way is by +log-rolling; they must make a bargain to support one another's demands. +Such a union could not possibly be stable, because the minority is free +to offer a better bargain to any one of the "parties" to induce it to +desert. Again, it may be called the rule of the majority, but what sort +of a majority? Is it not plainly the rule of a majority in the interests +of minorities? That is very different to the rule of the majority in the +interests of all, which free government demands. The simple truth is +that the "parties" are factions, and that the "representatives" are mere +delegates of those factions.</p> + +<p>But in practice the case would be far worse than we have assumed. There +is not the slightest guarantee that the same six factions would be +elected in each six-seat electorate. We might have an unlimited number +of delegates of various religions, classes, races, localities, and +political organizations on <a name="Page_32" id="Page_32" />all kinds of single questions. An assembly +formed on these lines could hardly be dignified with the name of a +representative assembly.</p> + +<p>Mr. G. Bradford, in his work on "The Lesson of Popular Government," +displays a more intimate knowledge of human nature than any other recent +writer. Of these schemes for the representation of minorities he says:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>As an illustration of the effect in popular government of looking + to popular impulse for the initiation of measures, it may be + observed that perhaps the worst of all expedients for remedying the + defective working of a government by a legislature like ours, that + which combines the evils of them all, is one which is urged by + perfectly disinterested advocates of reform, and is known as + proportional representation. If there is one principle at the base + of popular government it is that the majority shall rule. If the + largest of three or four fractions is to rule it ceases to be + popular government, and becomes government by faction. If the + tyranny of the majority is bad a tyranny of the minority is still + worse. (Vol. i., p. 505.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>And the following picture could hardly be better drawn:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>If the basis of carrying on the government is to be the wishes of + some millions of units, it is evident that they must to a greater + or less extent agree in wishing for something. It is equally + evident that they cannot all agree in wishing for the same thing at + the same time, while if they, or any considerable number of groups, + want different things at the same time, the result in so far is + anarchy. Government is paralysed, and with the well-known + excitability of humanity in groups men begin to confound the + importance of the thing wanted with the importance of getting what + they want. The clash of contending factions is apt to suggest the + clash of arms. The first neces<a name="Page_33" id="Page_33" />sity, therefore, is the formation of + large and coherent parties, not merely for the purpose of + accomplishing what is desired by the majority of the people, but + also for suppressing agitation and social disturbance on behalf of + what may be called merely objects of passion or private interest + with comparatively small groups, at least until those objects + enlist the support of a large minority. (Vol. i., pp. 492, 493.)</p></blockquote> + +<p><b>Professor Nanson.</b>—In Victoria the Hare system is championed by Mr. +E.J. Nanson, Professor of Mathematics at Melbourne University. Professor +Nanson approaches the subject entirely from a mathematical standpoint, +and resolutely refuses to admit the factor of human nature into his +calculations. Following Mr. Hare, he is a declared opponent of party +government, and "would like to see it pushed further into the +background." Moreover, he regards every step in the process as an end in +itself. Thus the act of voting is one end, representation is another, +and the rule of the majority a third. Leaving aside for the present, +however, the elaborate mathematical devices which are proposed for +attaining these supposed ends, let us take only the principles on which +they are based. These are laid down as follows:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>(<i>a</i>) The rule of the majority.</p> + +<p> (<i>b</i>) The fair representation of all parties in proportion to their + strength.</p> + +<p> (<i>c</i>) Perfect freedom to every elector to vote exactly as he + pleases.</p> + +<p> (<i>d</i>) The emancipation of the voters from the tyranny of the + political "boss" or caucus.</p> + +<p> <a name="Page_34" id="Page_34" />(<i>e</i>) The full value of his vote to each voter without loss or + waste.</p></blockquote> + +<p>The principles involved, we are assured, "must appeal to every democrat, +to every Liberal, to every lover of true and just representation."</p> + +<p>As to the first claim, we are willing to grant the rule of the majority, +if the words are added "in the interests of minorities." The second +could also be granted if by "all parties" were meant both parties, for +there cannot be more than two parties in the true sense of the word. But +Professor Nanson proposes such large electorates that any small section, +from one-sixth to one-twelfth, can secure independent representation. +Notwithstanding this, he claims that it is quite possible to give fair +representation to the main parties and to small sections at the same +time. In illustrating the system he avoids the issue as to the character +of these sections by giving them a "scientific" nomenclature, such as +Colour, Place, Pursuits, Qualities, &c. These abstractions are very +misleading, as attention is diverted from the fact that they refer to +voluntary groups of men united for some political purpose. The real +question is, on what basis are these groups likely to be formed? When +the element of human nature is taken into account it must be apparent +that they will be formed for the propaganda of some sectional interest; +some on a religious basis, others on a class basis, &c. Now, if we were +to ask each candidate to declare his religion, <a name="Page_35" id="Page_35" />we could easily take +religions as the basis of representation and allow proportional +representation to each religion; and similarly with classes, races, and +so on. But we could only take one basis at a time, and the important +deduction is that if we were to take religions as the basis of +representation, the people would be induced to vote according to +religion; if we were to take classes, according to class, and so on. +Now, no one but the fanatic or the demagogue will claim that the +majority is entitled to rule where religions only or classes only are +represented. The questions then arise—What is the correct basis of +representation? How should the people be induced to vote? And the answer +is clearly that the people should be induced to vote on questions of +general public policy, on the leading questions of the day which decide +the party lines, and that, therefore, <i>the policies of the two main +parties should form the primary basis of proportional representation</i>. +But the Hare system, by taking individual candidates as the basis of +representation, induces the elector to vote on any basis or on sectional +lines. It promotes dissension instead of repressing it, and instead of +encouraging all sections to express their opinion as to what is best for +the general well-being, it encourages them to express their opinion as +to what they imagine to be best for themselves. Public opinion expressed +on these lines would be worse than useless. But Professor Nanson thinks +that the electors would <a name="Page_36" id="Page_36" />still have regard for the main parties, even +though they grouped themselves into small sections. He declares that +"any party amounting to anything like a quota would not only have two +candidates of its own—one Liberal and one Conservative—but would also +be wooed by candidates of both leading parties." We may well question +whether factions would trouble themselves about the main parties; but, +granting the assumption, the small parties might just as well be single +electorates as far as the main parties are concerned. The Liberal +candidates might be successful in all of them, and the Conservatives be +unrepresented. The peculiar feature is that the defeated Conservatives +are expected to transfer their votes to the Liberals to make up the +quotas for the small parties!</p> + +<p>The third claim is that electors should have perfect freedom to vote +exactly as they please, and yet Professor Nanson, in condemning Mr. +Hare's original scheme, has denied that they are free to vote as +faddists; but he still holds that they are free to vote on any basis if +only they form one-sixth to one-twelfth of an electorate. Thus the +amount of freedom is variable and a matter of opinion. Now, we +altogether deny that electors should be given the opportunity to +subordinate the national interests to factious interests. Just as the +faddist argument is fatal to Mr. Hare's original scheme, so the +splitting up into factions is fatal to Professor Nanson's present +<a name="Page_37" id="Page_37" />scheme. Where is the freedom which Professor Nanson claims under the +present system of election? Is it not the fact that throughout England, +America, and Australia the electors have very often a choice between two +candidates only—one Ministerialist and one Oppositionist? By all means +let us have as many political organizations as possible to make known +the wishes of all sections; but the true function of all such +organizations is to influence the policies of the two main parties, and +not to secure independent delegates in Parliament. This means simply +that the compromise among the different sections supporting a party must +be effected in the electors' minds, and at the elections, and not on the +floor of the Legislature.</p> + +<p>The fourth claim is the emancipation of the voters from the tyranny of +the "boss." Now, the power of the "boss" lies in the control of +nominations, and although to some extent this control is necessary with +the present system of election, it is not essential to party government, +as we hope to show. But with government by faction there would be no +escape from this control. The tyranny of a faction is worse than the +tyranny of the "boss." The voters need saving from their own selfish +passions far more than from the "boss."</p> + +<p>The final claim that each elector is entitled to the full value of his +vote, regardless of the way in which it is used, is really a claim to an +equality of political <a name="Page_38" id="Page_38" />power, <i>i.e.</i>, to direct government. It means +that electors are absolutely free to combine for their own interests, or +for their interest as a class, in opposition to the public welfare. +These combinations would, with an equality of direct political power, +soon bring on social disruption.</p> + +<p><b>Professor Jethro Brown.</b>—In the preface to "The New Democracy," by +Professor Jethro Brown, the two fundamental difficulties of present-day +politics are correctly stated to be—how to express public opinion, and +how to improve its value. For the first of these Professor Brown +recommends the Hare system, and for the second the study of history. +Later on he writes:—"How is the amelioration of popular sovereignty to +be effected? Not, I venture to believe, by the pursuit of the policy +which hopes to play off ignorance against ignorance and prejudice +against prejudice, and to secure good government by the arts of +flattery, manipulation, and intrigue; nor, indeed, by the improvement of +democratic machinery, though this is extremely desirable, and calls for +immediate attention. For, above all, towers the question of character." +It is quite evident that Professor Brown shares the delusion of the +other advocates of the Hare system, that the manner of expressing public +opinion has nothing to do with the character of public opinion. The two +difficulties laid down are essentially one. The cardinal fact underlying +representation is that it is a real <a name="Page_39" id="Page_39" />social force, capable of reacting +upon and moulding character, and therefore of improving the value of +public opinion. The independence, love of freedom, respect for +minorities, and capacity for self-government, which are the most +distinctive traits in the English character, are not innate, but are +largely the products of the British Constitution. If the only chance of +improving the value of public opinion lay in the hope of inducing the +individual electors to study the lessons of history, the prospect would +be indeed gloomy.</p> + +<p>Professor Brown regards party government as a necessary evil, resulting +from the mechanical difficulty of securing unity of action from a +plurality of wills. This is practically equivalent to saying that +legislation itself is a necessary evil. But he writes:—"Whatever may be +the evils of party government, there can be no doubt of the utility as +well as of the necessity of the institution itself. The alternative to +party government is the system of government by small groups. In +Australia the evils of this alternative have been occasionally displayed +in practical politics; but it is to France that we must look for their +supreme illustration." Turning to the chapter on the Hare system, we +find that Professor Brown believes that the electors would still divide +themselves into two parties, even if given the opportunity to form small +groups. "I cannot believe," he writes, "that the reputation of our race +for sound common-sense is so far misplaced that <a name="Page_40" id="Page_40" />a provision for the +faithful representation of the people would end in an immoderate +Legislature! For, although the Hare system is not perfect, it does +undoubtedly afford an opportunity for an absolutely <i>fair +representation</i>. Of course the opportunity would be abused by some; but +to argue that the abuse would be general, or if at all general, would +long continue, is to argue that the people would prove themselves +unworthy of the opportunity offered." While he was at the University of +Tasmania the first election under the Hare system was held, and +Professor Brown's opinions are based on the result. A second election +has, however, just been held, which shows the futility of his hopes.</p> + +<p><b>The Tasmanian Experiment.</b>—Despite the fact that it has been advocated +for over forty years, the trial now being made of the Hare system in +Tasmania is the first application of the "representative principle" to +any assembly modelled on the English plan of party government, and +therefore deserves more than passing notice. But the experiment is on +such a small scale, and has been conducted for such a short time, that +the result can hardly be expected to be conclusive as yet. The objection +against the Hare system is not so much that it is not suitable to +present conditions as that it will speedily bring about altered +conditions. It is interesting to find that this is exactly what is +taking place. The system is applied in two electorates only, at Hobart +and Launceston <a name="Page_41" id="Page_41" />the former returning six members and the latter four. At +the first election, in 1897, the possibilities of the system were not +appreciated, and electors voted on the old lines; and although the +results were rather erratic and unexpected, they were considered fairly +satisfactory. But the second election, held early in the present year, +proved a great blow to the system. No less than three of the successful +candidates were intensely unpopular; and one of them, an ex-minister, +had recently been banished from public life on the report of a select +committee of the House. His reinstatement aroused a storm of indignation +throughout the colony, and he was forced to retire again before +Parliament met. It will be as well to take the evidence of a strong +advocate of the system—the <i>Argus</i> correspondent. Of one candidate he +writes:—"Judging by all available definite evidences, it seemed that +five-sixths of the electors of Hobart were directly in favour of the +construction of the railway by the present Great Western Railway +Syndicate; while those of the remaining sixth were variously opposed to +the company or to the project of constructing such a railway by private +enterprise at all. This sixth is represented by Mr. R.C. Patterson, who +headed the poll." Of another candidate we learn that "Mr. Mulcahy had +fought a hard fight, and it is a fair assumption that on the list of the +elected he represents the Roman Catholic vote. As a member of a +generally popular Government, the extent of Mr. Mulcahy's personal +<a name="Page_42" id="Page_42" />unpopularity was remarkable and probably unique." But it was over the +return of Mr. Miles that the storm raged most. The excuse is made that +"the fault of Mr. Miles's return (assuming that it is a fault) lies with +the electors who returned him, and not with the system under which his +return was accomplished.... Once grant that a section of Hobart electors +have the right to select for their representative whom they choose, and +it would seem that the Hare system must be held free of all +responsibility for the return of Mr. Miles." But this is precisely what +cannot be granted for a moment, as we have endeavoured to show. The +assertion is made that Mr. Miles would have been returned as easily +under the old system, but this is not a fact. He polled only one-eighth +of the votes, so that, even supposing that his supporters were twice as +strong in a single electorate, he would have had only one-fourth of the +votes. It is safe to say, from the small proportion of second and third +preferences which he secured, that if the Block Vote had been adopted he +would have been at the bottom of the poll. Commenting on these results, +the <i>Argus</i> declares that the Hare system does not pretend to reform or +guide the people. Very likely not! But is it not quite evident that it +has the opposite effect?</p> + +<p>Is it too much to say that, if the Hobart experiment be persevered with, +the ultimate tendency will be the return of six members, each acceptable +to one-sixth of <a name="Page_43" id="Page_43" />the electors, and obnoxious to the other five-sixths? +It is quite obvious already that the usual party lines are entirely +disregarded.</p> + +<p><b>Professor Commons.</b>—The best book on the subject yet published is the +"Proportional Representation" of John E. Commons, Professor of Sociology +in Syracuse University, U.S. Its great merit is that the political and +social bearings of the reform are fully treated. Professor Commons +rejects the Hare system in favour of the Free List system. He +writes:—"The Hare system is advocated by those who, in a too +<i>doctrinaire</i> fashion, wish to abolish political parties. They +apparently do not realize the impossibility of acting in politics +without large groupings of individuals." He makes a great step in +advance of the disciples of Mr. Hare in recognizing that the +proportional principle should be applied to parties, and not to +individuals, and he even defines parties correctly as being based "not +altogether on sectional divisions, but on social and economic problems +of national scope;" but, unfortunately, he fails to see that there can +be only two parties, and that the representation of small parties would +not reform the main parties, but break them up altogether. At the same +time he is no mere theorist, for he declares:—"If a practicable and +effective method of proportional representation cannot be discovered, +the theoretical principle is a mere dream." Moreover, he prudently +recognizes that his arguments as regards Federal and State <a name="Page_44" id="Page_44" />Legislatures +in America are in advance of what the public is ready to accept, and +adds:—"We, as a people are not yet ready to abandon the notion that +party responsibility in Federal affairs is essential to safety." His +immediate object is, therefore, the reform of city councils, which in +America are controlled by the national parties, and are exploited by the +notorious "machine" organizations. We may sympathize with this object, +for parties in an administrative body are a serious evil, but with +legislatures the case is quite different. Professor Commons admits that +third and fourth parties, if given their proportionate weight in +legislation, would hold the balance of power, but he declares that "the +weight of this objection, the most serious yet presented against +proportional representation, varies in different grades of government." +He then proceeds to examine the objection "as applied to Congress (and +incidentally to the State Legislatures), where it has its greatest +force, and where pre-eminently party responsibility may be expected to +be decisive." And the only answer he can find is that the objection +"overlooks the principle of equality and justice in representation. It +may prove here that justice is the wisest expediency. It is a curious +anomaly, showing confusion of thought regarding democracy, that a people +who insist on universal suffrage, and who go to ludicrous limits in +granting it, should deny the right of representation to those minor +political parties whose existence is the <a name="Page_45" id="Page_45" />natural fruit of this +suffrage." But these minor parties would not be denied representation if +they were allowed to exercise freely their true function, which is to +influence the policies of the main parties; and it is essential to the +working of the political machine that they be limited to that function. +Professor Commons continues:—"The argument, however, of those who fear +that third parties will hold the balance of power is not based solely on +a dread of the corrupt classes, but rather of the idealists, the +reformers, 'faddists,' and 'cranks,' so called. They would retain +exclusive majority rule and party responsibility in order to prevent the +disproportionate influence of these petty groups. They overlook, of +course, the weight of the argument already made that individual +responsibility is more important for the people than the corporate +responsibility of parties." The assumption is here made that the +complete suppression of individuality is an essential feature of party +government, whereas it is in fact a peculiar feature of American +politics, due to "machine" control of nominations. The one point which +Professor Commons has missed is that individual candidature can be +permitted and representation still be confined to the two main parties.</p> + +<p><b>Conclusion.</b>—The advocates of proportional delegation have failed to +grasp the importance of the principles of organization and leadership, +which underlie representation. Mr. Hare thought that the effect of doing +away with organization would be to <a name="Page_46" id="Page_46" />improve leadership. But he reckoned +without his host—Human Nature. Organization cannot be dispensed with +without destroying leadership and bringing on the strife of factions.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47" />FOOTNOTE:</p> + +<p><a name="Footnote_1" href="#FNanchor_1">[1]</a> Now Lord Avebury.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_III" id="CHAPTER_III" />CHAPTER III.</h2> + +<p class='center'>THE PRESENT POSITION OF PARTY GOVERNMENT.</p> + + +<p><b>England.</b>—We have seen that the fundamental error of the +proportionalists is that they have failed to distinguish between the two +stages of representation. In constantly appealing back to the earlier +parliaments they altogether overlook the fact that the functions which +Parliament now exercises were then vested in the King. But this error is +not confined to the proportionalists, most of whom, indeed, however +inconsistently, favour party government. It is also put forth as an +argument by those who lay all the blame of present evils on the party +system, and who think that all sections should work together as one +united party. Take, for instance, the diatribe of Mr. W.S. Lilly on "The +Price of Party Government" in the <i>Fortnightly Review</i> for June, 1900. +Mr. Lilly complains bitterly that the infallible oracle in politics +to-day is "the man in the street." He asserts that all issues are +settled "by counting heads, in entire disregard of what the heads +contain." His bugbear is the extension of the franchise. "Representative +institutions, for example," he asks, "what do they represent? <a name="Page_48" id="Page_48" />The true +theory unquestionably is that they should represent all the features of +national life, all the living forces of society, all that makes the +country what it is; and that in due proportion. And such was the +Constitution of England up to the date of the first <i>Parliamentary +Reform Act</i>. Its ideal was, to use the words of Bishop Stubbs, 'an +organized collection of the several orders, states, and conditions of +men, recognized as possessing political power.'" Could anything be more +ridiculous? Political power is to be apportioned in the nineteenth +century as it was in the fourteenth century! The people are to be always +governed by their superiors! Mr. Lilly continues:—"It appears to me +that the root of the falsification of our parliamentary system by the +party game is to be found in the falsification of our representative +system by the principle of political atomism. Men are not equal in +rights any more than they are equal in mights. They are unequal in +political value. They ought not to be equal in political power."</p> + +<p>The mistake here is in the premise. Has not the demagogue more power +than his dupes, or the Member of Parliament more power than the elector? +We have hardly yet reached, and are never likely to reach, that ideal of +direct government. But what is this price which Mr. Lilly is railing at? +"The price may be stated in eight words. 'The complete subordination of +national to party interests.' The <i>complete</i> subordination. I use the +adjective <a name="Page_49" id="Page_49" />advisedly. Party interests are not only the first thought of +politicians in England, but, too often, the last and only thought." All +this is sheer nonsense. The coincidence of party aims with the real +interests of the people which the British Parliament has displayed since +the <i>Reform Act</i> of 1832 has never been even remotely approached by any +other country. Two causes have contributed to this great result; first, +the gradual extension of the franchise to all sections of the people, +and second, the fact that the principles of organization and leadership +have been highly developed. In one respect, however, Mr. Lilly is right. +The zenith has been passed. Party government is not the same to-day in +England as it was twenty years ago. But the fault lies not with the +extension of the suffrage, but with the fact that the principles of +organization and leadership are less operative. True, the extension of +the franchise is indirectly concerned in the failure, but the primary +cause is that the present system of election is unable to bear the +increased strain. It no longer suffices to organize the people into two +coherent parties. The effect on the parties is correctly noted by Mr. +Lilly. "A danger which ever besets them," he declares, "is that of +sinking into factions."</p> + +<p>Now, the result of the want of organization is the presence in +Parliament of small independent factions, which, by holding the balance +of power, cause the main parties to degenerate into factions.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50" />This tendency is apparent even in England, and the rock on which the +parties have split is the Irish faction. Into the merits of the Irish +question we do not propose to enter; it is the career of the faction in +Parliament which interests us. But it may be noted that the Irish party +rests on a three-fold basis as a faction; it is based mainly on a class +grievance, and is also partly racial and partly religious. It was the +Irish party in the House of Commons which first discovered that, by +keeping aloof from the two main parties, it could terrorize both; and +thus found out the weak spot in party government. Its tactics were +successful up to a certain point, for Mr. Gladstone succumbed to the +temptation to purchase its support, and brought in the Home Rule Bill. +The result is known to all; the historical Liberal party was rent in +twain; party lines were readjusted; Mr. Gladstone was left in a hopeless +minority; and the remnant of his following is to-day in the same +condition. What is the lesson to be learned from these events? That +these tactics cannot succeed in the long run. All interests suffer, but +the culprits most of all. Moreover, such tactics are unconstitutional, +and would in some circumstances justify retaliatory measures. Let us +trace the constitutional course. The Irish members could have exerted a +considerable influence on the policies of both Liberals and +Conservatives, just as the Scotch did. If they had followed this course, +might they not have been in a better position to-day?</p> + +<p><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51" />Of course, the Irish faction can hardly be said to be the result of the +present system of election; it is mainly the expression of old wrongs. +But it has set the example, and the disintegration of the old parties is +rapidly proceeding. One feature, however, in connection with the present +system in Ireland may be mentioned, and that is the permanent +disfranchisement of the minority. In the greater part of Ireland there +is no such thing as a contest between the main parties. If a system were +introduced by which the minority could get its share of representation +the parties would compete on even terms for the support of the people, +and good feeling would tend to be restored.</p> + +<p>To return to Mr. Lilly. The present position of party government in +England is not due to defects in the institution itself, still less to +the extension of the suffrage, but to imperfect organization. The true +remedy is, therefore, to improve organization, not to restrict the +suffrage. By this means such a condition will be brought about that if +either party favours a faction it will lose in general favour; then, +indeed, we may hope that the main parties themselves will cease to +degenerate into factions.</p> + +<p>The same number of the <i>Fortnightly</i> contains an unsigned article on +"Lord Rosebery and a National Cabinet," in which the party system is +alluded to as defunct, and in which the suggestion is thrown out that on +the retirement of Lord Salisbury a national <a name="Page_52" id="Page_52" />cabinet should be formed, +comprising both Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Rosebery. Impending foreign +complications are given as the excuse for terminating party action. Now, +it is not to be denied that party government is more suitable for what +Mr. Herbert Spencer calls the industrial type of society than for the +militant type. Quite recently Lord Salisbury blamed the British +Constitution for the state of unpreparedness for the present war. But it +is equally true that in foreign affairs party action is generally +suspended: in the control of India, for instance, it is so. The real +question, then, is this: Is the danger of foreign aggression so serious +that all questions of internal policy can be permanently set aside? If +we have reached this stage, the end of modern civilization is in sight. +In effect, the proposal is a return to the first stage of +representation, with the difference that all sections of the people are +expected to be held together by the fear of foreign aggression, instead +of the fear of the aggression of the monarchy.</p> + +<p>Mr. David Syme is a censor of a very different type. So far from wishing +to take control from the people, he would give the people absolute +control over everything, and at all times. Seldom has the case against +party government been more powerfully presented than in his work on +"Representative Government in England." But Mr. Syme founds his proposed +remedies on a theory of representation which is based <a name="Page_53" id="Page_53" />on the literal +meaning of the word. No one has put the delegation theory more clearly +than in the following passage, or gone so far in applying it:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>Representation is a mental act; it is the presentation or + reproduction of the state of mind of another person; and before one + person can represent another person he must first know what the + opinions of that other person are. A representative is a + substitute; he stands in the place of, and acts for, another + person. But one man cannot act for another unless he knows what + that other would do were he acting for himself. In other words, he + requires to know the motives which actuate that other person, or + what influences his motives, namely, his principles and beliefs. + The House of Commons is a representative body, not because every + individual member of it represents the opinions of the whole + nation, but because members in the aggregate represent those + opinions, (p. 170).</p></blockquote> + +<p>This position is diametrically opposed to the principles we have laid +down, for it eliminates entirely the ideas of organization and +leadership. Again, Mr. Syme says:—"If the government is to be carried +on for the benefit of all classes, representatives should be chosen from +all classes. We had class representation in the early parliaments, but +then all classes were fairly represented." We have shown that the +analogy from early parliaments is fallacious. Representatives should now +be chosen irrespective of class, and not as class delegates. But Mr. +Syme does not carry his theory to its logical conclusion. For if +representatives merely express the thoughts of others, and should be +class delegates, surely all classes are entitled to have <a name="Page_54" id="Page_54" />their thoughts +"represented;" and Mr. Syme should range himself among the disciples of +Mr. Hare. But here comes in an interesting difference. Mr. Syme would +retain the present system and make members continually responsible to a +majority of their constituents; he would even give this majority power +to dismiss them at any time. Now, this is practically an admission that +representation involves the existence of a majority and a minority, or, +in other words, is a means of organizing the people into a majority and +a minority. Again, as regards leadership, the theory will hardly bear +the test of facts. Could a man like Gladstone be said to merely express +the thoughts of his constituents? Was he not rather a guide and leader +of the thoughts of a great part of the British nation?</p> + +<p>In addition to the continual responsibility of members to their +constituents, Mr. Syme would also make the individual ministers of state +responsible to a majority of the members. He adds:—"The whole system of +party government could in this manner be quietly and effectively got rid +of." We do not propose to criticise the latter suggestion, as we do not +believe it would be put forward to-day, in the light of fuller +knowledge. Mr. Syme's book was written nearly twenty years ago. But, as +regards the continual responsibility of members, we consider it +important that the electors should not have their way on single +questions. They should periodically express their <a name="Page_55" id="Page_55" />opinion as to the +general line of progress, and the representatives should then have +complete control. The necessity for this is to save the people from +their anti-social tendencies, which we have already stated as the great +objection to all forms of direct government. Lord Macaulay once defined +the position exactly in a letter addressed to the electors of Edinburgh. +"My opinion," he declared, "is that electors ought at first to choose +cautiously; then to confide liberally; and when the term for which they +have selected their member has expired to review his conduct equitably, +and to pronounce on the whole taken together."</p> + +<p>We hope to have left on the reader's mind by this time no doubt as to +the intimate connection between the machinery of election and the +resulting character of the legislature. Now it is a most extraordinary +fact that this connection is hardly noticed by the leading +constitutional authorities. It is true they often recognize that +suggested changes like the Hare system would debase our legislatures, +but it never seems to occur to them that present evils might be cured by +a change in the electoral machinery. They point out the evils indeed, +but only to indulge in gloomy forebodings at the onward march of +democracy, or as warnings of the necessity for placing checks on the +people.</p> + +<p>Take Bagehot's study of the House of Commons in his standard work on +"The English Constitution," where he classifies the functions exercised +by the <a name="Page_56" id="Page_56" />House. He insists that the most important of these is the +elective function—its power to elect and dismiss the ministry. In +addition, it exercises an expressive function, a teaching function, an +informing function, and, lastly, the function of legislation. But not a +word is said of the relation of these functions to representation, or to +the method of election. It is asserted that the reason the House of +Commons is able to exercise these functions is because England is a +deferential nation, and the people leave government in the hands of +their betters, the higher classes. On one point he is emphatic, and that +is the absolute necessity of party. He writes:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>The moment, indeed, that we distinctly conceive that the House of + Commons is mainly and above all things an elective assembly, we at + once perceive that party is of its essence. The House of Commons + lives in a state of perpetual potential choice; at any moment it + can choose a ruler and dismiss a ruler. And therefore party is + inherent in it, is bone of its bone, and breath of its breath.</p></blockquote> + +<p>As to the present trend of affairs, the opinion of a foreign observer, +Gneist—"History of the English Constitution"—may be quoted:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>England, too, will experience the fact that the transition to the + new order of industrial society is brought about through a process + of dissolution of the old cohesions, upon which the constitution of + Parliament is based. The unrepresented social mass, which is now + flooding the substructure of the English Constitution, will only + stay its course at a universal suffrage, and a thorough and + arithmetical equalization of the constituencies, and will thus + attempt, and in a great measure achieve, a further dissolution of + the elective bodies. To meet <a name="Page_57" id="Page_57" />the coming storm a certain fusion of + the old parties seems to be immediately requisite, though the + propertied classes, in defending their possessions, will certainly + not at first display their best qualities. As, further, a regular + formation in two parties cannot be kept up, a splitting up into + fractions, as in the parliaments of the Continent, will ensue, and + the changing of the ministry will modify itself accordingly, so + that the Crown will no longer be able to commit the helm of the + state in simple alternation to the leader of the one or the other + majority. And then a time will recur in which the <i>King in Council</i> + may have to undertake the actual leadership. (Vol. ii., pp. 452, + 453.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>In other words, that an industrial society is incapable of +self-government! Note the reason for this remarkable conclusion—a +splitting up into fractions, <i>i.e.</i>, imperfect organization.</p> + +<p>Take now the evidence of the distinguished historian and publicist, Mr. +W.E.H. Leeky, M.P., as given in his recent work on "Democracy and +Liberty":—</p> + +<blockquote><p>After all due weight has been given to the possible remedies that + have been considered, it still seems to me that the parliamentary + system, when it rests on manhood suffrage, or something closely + approaching to manhood suffrage, is extremely unlikely to be + permanent. This was evidently the opinion of Tocqueville, who was + strongly persuaded that the natural result of democracy was a + highly concentrated, enervating, but mild despotism. It is the + opinion of many of the most eminent contemporary thinkers in France + and Germany, and it is, I think, steadily growing in England. This + does not mean that parliaments will cease, or that a wide suffrage + will be abolished. It means that parliaments, if constructed on + this type, cannot permanently remain the supreme power among the + nations of the world. Sooner or later they will sink by their own + vices and inefficiencies into a lower plane. They will lose the + power <a name="Page_58" id="Page_58" />of making and unmaking ministries, and it will be found + absolutely necessary to establish some strong executive + independently of their fluctuations. Very probably this executive + may be established, as in America and under the French Empire, upon + a broad basis of an independent suffrage. Very possibly upper + chambers, constituted upon some sagacious plan, will again play a + great restraining and directing part in the government of the + world. Few persons who have watched the changes that have passed + over our own House of Commons within the last few years will either + believe or wish that in fifty years' time it can exercise the power + it now does. It is only too probable that some great catastrophe or + the stress of a great war may accelerate the change. (Vol. i., pp. + 300, 301.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>And the reason assigned for this very unsatisfactory state of affairs is +precisely as before:</p> + +<blockquote><p>All the signs of the times point to the probability in England as + elsewhere of many ministries resting on precarious majorities + formed out of independent or heterogeneous groups. There are few + conditions less favourable to the healthy working of parliamentary + institutions or in which the danger of an uncontrolled House of + Commons is more evident. One consequence of this disintegration of + Parliament is a greatly increasing probability that policies which + the nation does not really wish for may be carried into effect. The + process which the Americans call "log-rolling" becomes very easy. + One minority will agree to support the objects of another minority + on condition of receiving in return a similar assistance, and a + number of small minorities aiming at different objects, no one of + which is really desired by the majority of the nation, may attain + their several ends by forming themselves into a political syndicate + and mutually co-operating. (Vol. i., pp. 152, 153.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>Mr. Lecky, too, holds out very little hope for the future:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>When the present evils infecting our parliamentary system have + grown still graver; when a democratic House, more and <a name="Page_59" id="Page_59" />more broken + up into small groups, more and more governed by sectional and + interested motives, shall have shown itself evidently incompetent + to conduct the business of the country with honour, efficiency, and + safety; when the public has learned more fully the enormous danger + to national prosperity as well as individual happiness of + dissociating power from property and giving the many an unlimited + right of confiscating by taxation the possessions of the few—some + great reconstruction of government is sure to be demanded. Fifty or + even twenty-five years hence the current of political opinion in + England will be as different from that of our own day as + contemporary political tendencies are different from those in the + generation of our fathers. Experience and arguments that are now + dismissed may then revive, and play no small part in the politics + of the future.</p></blockquote> + +<p>Why make democracy the scapegoat for all these evils, when they are +simply due to the imperfect organization of democracy? In any case, the +most that could rightly be urged would be that universal suffrage had +come before its time. The conclusion that its time will never come is +certainly not warranted. Universal suffrage cannot be condemned till it +has had a fair trial under a rational system of election. Mr. Lecky +appreciates so little the connection between the method of election and +the splitting up into groups that he views without alarm the Hare +system, which would still further develop groups.</p> + +<p>But perhaps no one has caught the spirit of party government more truly +than Mr. Lecky. Dealing with the motives which should actuate the +statesman, in his latest work, "The Map of Life," he writes:—<a name="Page_60" id="Page_60" /></p> + +<blockquote><p>In free countries party government is the best if not the only way + of conducting public affairs, but it is impossible without a large + amount of moral compromise; without a frequent surrender of private + judgment and will. A good man will choose his party through + disinterested motives, and with a firm and honest conviction that + it represents the cast of policy most beneficial to the country. He + will on grave occasions assert his independence of party, but in + the large majority of cases he must act with his party, even if + they are pursuing courses in some degree contrary to his own + judgment.</p> + +<p> Everyone who is actively engaged in politics—everyone especially + who is a member of the House of Commons—must soon learn that if + the absolute independence of individual judgment were pushed to its + extreme, political anarchy would ensue. The complete concurrence of + a large number of independent judgments in a complicated measure is + impossible. If party government is to be carried on there must be, + both in the Cabinet and in Parliament, perpetual compromise. The + first condition of its success is that the Government should have a + stable, permanent, disciplined support behind it, and in order that + this should be attained the individual member must in most cases + vote with his party. Sometimes he must support a measure which he + knows to be bad, because its rejection would involve a change of + government, which he believes would be a still greater evil than + its acceptance, and in order to prevent this evil he may have to + vote a direct negative to some resolution containing a statement + which he believes to be true, (p. 112.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>Mr. Lecky goes on to point out that "many things have to be done from +which a very rigid and austere nature would recoil;" but he +adds:—"Those who refuse to accept the conditions of parliamentary life +should abstain from entering into it." Moreover, he holds that +"inconsistency is no necessary condemnation <a name="Page_61" id="Page_61" />of a politician, and +parties as well as individual statesmen have abundantly shown it." But +still "all this curious and indispensable mechanism of party government +is compatible with a high and genuine sense of public duty."</p> + +<p>The American theory of government is that checks must be placed on a +democratic legislature by a fixed Constitution and a separate executive +exercising a veto. The late Professor Freeman Snow, of Harvard +University, was a strong supporter of this school. His objections to +cabinet government are given in the "Annals of the American Academy of +Political and Social Science" for July, 1892:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>Cabinet government is the government of a party; and for its + successful operation it must have at all times a majority at its + back in Parliament. If it were possible to direct the current of + public opinion into exactly two channels, there would be but two + parties, one of which would generally be in the ascendency; but in + practice this is found to be a very difficult thing to accomplish, + and it becomes the more difficult as the right of suffrage is + extended to the mass of the people, with their ever-varying + interests. In the countries of continental Europe parties, if + indeed they may be said to exist, are broken up into groups, no two + or more of which ever act together for any considerable length of + time; and ministries are without a moment's notice confronted at + brief intervals with opposing majorities, and must give place to + others, whose tenure of office is, however, equally unstable and + ephemeral. There is no other alternative; one of the two great + parties must yield to any faction which becomes strong enough to + hold the balance of power between them, or suffer the inevitable + consequences—instability and impotence of government.</p></blockquote> + +<p>Dr. Snow evidently thought that it is not possible <a name="Page_62" id="Page_62" />to direct the +current of public opinion into exactly two channels. He certainly had +not the slightest idea that it might be a matter of electoral machinery.</p> + +<p>Finally, we may quote the opinion of Mr. James Bryce, M.P., whose +"American Commonwealth" is one of the most complete studies of the +tendencies of democracy in existence. Comparing the English and American +systems, he writes of the former:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>That system could not be deemed to have reached its maturity till + the power of the people at large had been established by the Reform + Act of 1832. For its essence resides in the delicate equipoise it + creates between the three powers, the ministry, the House of + Commons, and the people. The House is strong because it can call + the ministry to account for every act, and can by refusing supplies + compel their resignation. The ministry are not defenceless, because + they can dissolve Parliament, and ask the people to judge between + it and them. Parliament, when it displaces a ministry, does not + strike at executive authority; it merely changes its agents. The + ministry when they dissolve Parliament do not attack Parliament as + an institution; they recognise the supremacy of the body in asking + the country to change the individuals who compose it. Both the + House of Commons and the ministry act and move in the full view of + the people, who sit as arbiters, prepared to judge in any + controversy that may arise. The House is in touch with the people, + because every member must watch the lights and shadows of sentiment + which play over his own constituency. The ministry are in touch + with the people, because they are not only themselves + representatives, but are heads of a great party, sensitive to its + feelings, forced to weigh the effect of every act they do upon the + confidence which the party places in them.... The drawback to this + system of exquisite equipoise is the liability of its equilibrium + to be frequently disturbed, each disturbance involving either a + change of government, with immense temporary inconvenience to the + departments, or a <a name="Page_63" id="Page_63" />general election, with immense expenditure of + money and trouble in the country. It is a system whose successful + working presupposes the existence of two great parties and no more, + parties each strong enough to restrain the violence of the other, + yet one of them steadily predominant in any given House of Commons. + Where a third, perhaps a fourth, party appears, the conditions are + changed. The scales of Parliament oscillate as the weight of this + detached group is thrown on one side or the other; dissolutions + become more frequent, and even dissolutions may fail to restore + stability. The recent history of the French Republic has shown the + difficulties of working a Chamber composed of groups, nor is the + same source of difficulty unknown in England. (Vol. i., pp. 286, + 287.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>Thus we find the opinion unanimously held that the one great fault to +which cabinet government is liable is instability of the ministry, owing +to imperfect organization of public opinion into two definite lines of +policy. Bagehot called it a case of unstable equilibrium, and Bradford, +in "The Lesson of Popular Government," goes further when he +declares:—"Not to speak disrespectfully, the ministry is like a company +of men who, after excessive conviviality, are able to stand upright only +by holding on to each other."</p> + +<p>Yet, after all, the amount of stability simply depends on the state of +organization; and England has demonstrated in the golden period of her +political history (about the middle of the present century) that the +cabinet form of government can be quite as stable as the presidential +form. Therefore, if the present position gives cause for alarm, it is +not in the <a name="Page_64" id="Page_64" />abolition of the cabinet or the restriction of the suffrage +that the remedy must be sought, but in improved organization. And this, +we hope to show, involves improved electoral machinery.</p> + +<p><b>France.</b>—Turn to France. Is there no lesson to be drawn from the +history of that unstable country since the Revolution let loose its +flood of human passions, ambitions, and aspirations? Has not every +attempt at popular government failed for the same cause—want of +organization?</p> + +<p>France before the Revolution had groaned for centuries under the burden +of a decayed feudalism and an absolute monarchy. The last vestige of +constitutional forms had disappeared. The representatives of the estates +had not been convened since the meeting of the States-General in 1614. +The widespread and unprecedented misery of the people caused them to +revolt against being taxed without their consent, and a cry went up for +a convocation of the estates. The finances were in such a bad way that +Louis XVI. was forced to consent, and the three estates—clergy, nobles, +and commons—met at Versailles in 1789. At first they called themselves +the National Assembly, but the King foolishly took up such a position +with regard to the people's representatives that they swore solemnly +that they would not separate till they had laid the foundation of a new +Constitution, and henceforth were known as the Constituent Assembly. It +was determined that the King should no longer be <a name="Page_65" id="Page_65" />absolute, and the +choice lay between a constitutional monarchy and a republic. The +Declaration of the Rights of Man was first drawn up, and the Assembly +settled down to its task. The leading spirit was Mirabeau. He had been +to England, and had studied the British Constitution, and he rightly saw +that France was too distracted by faction to maintain an independent +executive. He therefore openly advocated a constitutional monarchy with +a cabinet chosen from among the majority of the representatives. But, +unfortunately, the Assembly refused to follow his lead; nor would the +King take his advice to make a separate appeal to the people. In the +midst of the negotiations Mirabeau died, and the last chance of +establishing a constitutional monarchy disappeared. The King realized +this, and tried to escape to the German frontier but was brought back. +He then accepted the new Constitution, and the Legislative Assembly was +elected in 1791. From the first it had no elements of stability, being +split up into groups, and subject to the fear of the Paris mob. The King +continued to plot with the emigrant nobles against the Constitution, and +the foreign armies massed on the frontier. The danger brought on the +triumph of the revolutionary spirit in 1792. The Paris commune +overwhelmed both the King and the Assembly, and the republic was +proclaimed. Then followed the execution of the King, the Reign of +Terror, the control of the Committee of Public Safety, till finally <a name="Page_66" id="Page_66" />the +anarchy was ended by the military despotism of Bonaparte, who became +First Consul and afterwards Emperor.</p> + +<p>What is the significance of these events in the light of our previous +examination of English history? Simply this: That the French, in passing +at once from absolutism and feudalism to complete self-government, were +trying to jump to the Second stage of representation without passing +through the first stage. Mirabeau was right; the republic was foredoomed +to failure because the people had learned neither the power of nor the +necessity for organization.</p> + +<p>In many respects the French Revolution parallels the English Revolution. +In each case the King was beheaded; in each case the anarchy of a +disorganized representative body was succeeded by a military despotism; +and in each case the monarchy was restored.</p> + +<p>It was after the restoration that the English system of party government +was developed. Why did this system not now take root in France? Partly +because France was not blessed with a king like William of Orange, and +partly because the new <i>systeme de bascule</i>, the balance system, in +which the king allows each faction in turn to hold the reins of power, +was discovered. So, instead of the gradual growth of constitutional +liberty which took place in England, the tendency in France was back to +absolutism. In 1830 Charles X., finding that he could not manage the +<a name="Page_67" id="Page_67" />Chamber of Deputies, issued the ordinances of St. Cloud, suspending the +liberty of the press and dissolving the Legislature. Paris immediately +broke out into insurrection, and the King was forced to abdicate. The +crown was offered to Louis Philippe, and a second attempt at +constitutional monarchy was made. But France was too divided by her +unfortunate legacy of faction to maintain a continuous policy. The +Legitimists, the Republicans, and the Bonapartists were all awaiting +their opportunity. In 1848 the second revolution broke out in Paris; the +king fled to England, and a republic was again tried. But the +imperialist idea revived when Louis Napoleon was elected President. In +1851 he carried out his famous <i>coup d'etat,</i> and again the Constitution +was swept away. In the following year he was accepted as Emperor by an +almost unanimous vote. Thus France again elected to be ruled by an +irresponsible head. The Third Empire ended with the capture of Napoleon +III. at Sedan in 1870, and since then France has carried on her third +experiment in republicanism. But still the fatal defect of +disorganization retards her progress; the Legislature is still split up +into contending factions, and in consequence it has been found +impossible to maintain a strong executive. Occasionally the factions +sink their differences for a time when their patriotism is appealed to, +as they have agreed to do during the currency of the present Exhibition, +but it is abundantly evident that France <a name="Page_68" id="Page_68" />can never be well governed +till the people are able to organize two coherent parties. There is +ground for hope that the monarchical and imperialist ideas are +declining, and that the people are settling down to the conviction that +there is nothing left but the republic. What makes recovery difficult is +that the national character has been affected by the continual strife in +the direction of excitability and desire for change.</p> + +<p>Those who wish to understand the forces which brought about the +different changes and revolutions, traced by one who has grasped their +meaning, should read the account in the first volume of Mr. Bradford's +"Lesson of Popular Government." His conclusion only need be quoted +here:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>As has been said, that which constitutes the strength of the + English. Government, that which has made up its history for the + last two hundred years, is the growth and continuity of two solid + and coherent parties. Occasionally they have wavered when available + leaders and issues were wanting, but as soon as a strong man came + forward to take the reins the ranks closed up and the work of + mutual competition again went on. On the other hand, the curse and + the cause of failure of representative government on the Continent + of Europe is the formation within the legislature of unstable and + dissolving groups. In France the Extreme Eight, the Eight, the + Eight Centre, the Left Centre, the Left, and the Extreme Left are + names of differing factions which unite only for temporary purposes + and to accomplish a victory over some other unit, but which are + fatal to stable and firm government. The same is true of Italy, + Spain, and Austria, and if not of Germany it is because military + despotism holds all alike in subjection.</p></blockquote> + +<p><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69" />Mr. Bodley has come to the same conclusion in his work on "France." He +writes:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>There is no restraining power in the French parliamentary system to + arrest a member on his easy descent, and he knows that if he + escapes penal condemnation he will enjoy relative impunity. Many + deputies are men of high integrity; but virtue in a large assembly + is of small force without organization, and, moreover, a group of + legislators leagued together as a vigilance committee would have + neither consistency nor durability, which the discipline of party + can alone effect. Corruption of this kind, which has undermined the + republic, could not co-exist with party government. A party whose + ministers or supporters had incurred as much suspicion as fell on + the politicians acquitted in the Panama affair would under it be + swept out of existence for a period. When the first denunciations + appeared, the leaders of the party, to avert that fate, would have + said to their implicated colleagues—"In spite of your abilities + and of the manifest exaggeration of these charges we must part + company, for though you may have been culpable only of + indiscretion, we cannot afford to be identified with doubtful + transactions;" and the Opposition, eager not to lose its vantage, + would scan with equal keenness the acts of its own members. With + party government the electorate would not have appeared to condone + those scandals. But as it was, when a deputy involved in them went + down before his constituents, whose local interest he had well + served, with no opponent more formidable than the nominee of some + decayed or immature group, they gave their votes to the old member, + whose influence with the prefecture in the past had benefited the + district, rather than to the new comer, whose denunciations had no + authority; whereas, had each electoral district been the scene of a + contest between organized parties, the same spectacle would not + have been presented." (Vol. ii., pp. 302, 303.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>Mr. Bodley has, in this last sentence, touched the <a name="Page_70" id="Page_70" />heart of the +problem. If the salvation of France depends on making each electoral +district the scene of a contest between two organized parties, is not +electoral machinery destined to play an important part in the solution?</p> + +<p><b>The United States.</b>—The third great experiment in representative +democracy which the nineteenth century has furnished is that which is +being conducted in the United States. The contrast with France is +remarkable. Just as France is the supreme example of want of +organization, so America is the most conspicuous instance of perfect +organization into two great national parties which the world has seen. +Yet both experiments were started by a revolution, and practically at +the same time. The difference lay in the fact that the Americans +inherited the capacity for self-government from their British ancestors, +and had already practised it in colonial times, while the French only +inherited innumerable causes of dissension.</p> + +<p>But organization is not the only characteristic feature of American +politics. Strange to say, it is accompanied by a suppression of +individuality just as complete. It is organization without responsible +leadership. For, in the first place, the politicians look on themselves +not as leaders but as followers of the people; and in the second place, +there are no leaders in Congress, corresponding to the cabinet ministers +of British countries.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71" />Now, the view which we wish to emphasize here is that the present +position of American politics is the natural result of the principles +embodied in the Constitution adopted in 1789, when the Union was formed. +The complete organization and the want of leadership are directly to be +traced to the labours of George Washington and his associates. A brief +glance at the Constitution and the early history of its working will +make this clear.</p> + +<p>The thirteen States which revolted from England worked fairly well +together under the "Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union" as +long as the war lasted, but as soon as peace was proclaimed it was, as +Washington said, no better than anarchy. The famous Convention of 1787 +was therefore held, and the Constitution was drawn up. One guiding +principle of its framers was to divide power so as to place checks on +the will of the people, and on outbursts of popular passion, which were +then greatly dreaded. One means of attaining this object was the +attempted separation of the legislative and executive functions. We say +attempted advisedly, for time has but shown that the two are +inseparable. But the framers of the Constitution divided the legislative +function between the two Houses, and vested the executive function +almost entirely, as they thought, in the President. Montesquieu, in his +"<i>Esprit des Lois</i>" had laid down that the great merit of the English +Constitution was the separation of these functions, <a name="Page_72" id="Page_72" />and the Americans +accepted this view. But, in truth, the English cabinet system had not +then been fully developed. The King was still, not only in appearance, +but to some extent also in fact, the head of the executive, and there +was nothing to indicate that ministers were so soon to become the real +leaders.</p> + +<p>The effect of this provision was a struggle between the two branches for +supremacy, and the legislatures have won. The President has been +degraded to a mere agent, and the legislatures have absorbed the greater +part of executive functions, even to the control of finance. Now, the +framers of the Constitution were apprehensive that the President might +become a mere party agent, and they tried to strengthen his position by +two devices. First, they gave him the power to veto statutes unless +overruled by a two-thirds majority of Congress; and, secondly, they +provided for his election by an electoral college, or by a double system +of election. This second provision was designed to ensure the election +of a President for personal instead of for party reasons; but it has +proved a complete failure. Almost from the first the electoral delegates +have had to pledge themselves to support the party nominee. The veto, +therefore, has also become practically useless. Thus it has come about +that Congress is a body entirely without leaders.</p> + +<p>A second defect in the Constitution was that it said <a name="Page_73" id="Page_73" />nothing about the +right of any State to withdraw from the Union. After nearly 70 years +this omission was responsible for the Civil War. The legal basis for +secession was then abandoned, but combinations of States have since been +regarded with the greatest apprehension. This conviction that the Union +must be maintained at any price has had very important consequences on +the party system. The danger of allowing combinations of States to +dominate party lines was demonstrated; and the division of each State by +the same national parties was recognized as essential to safety.</p> + +<p>In the meantime, as we have seen, Congress had practically got control +of the executive functions, which were supposed to be exercised by the +President, including the nominations to office. Thus every member of the +party in a majority had a share of the plunder, and "the spoils to the +victors" became the basis of party organization. The system soon +underwent such a remarkable development that nearly 200,000 public +offices were at the disposal of the victors at each election. The party +organizations immediately became omnipotent. The secret of their power +lay in the control of nominations. Each party would nominate one +candidate only, and the electors voted neither for men nor measures, but +blindly for party. As Mr. Bryce declares:—"The class of professional +politicians was therefore the first crop which the spoils system—the +system of using public office <a name="Page_74" id="Page_74" />as private prize of war—bore. Bosses +were the second crop."</p> + +<p>The development which these party organizations have now reached is +extraordinary. Practically we may say that there are only two +parties—Republicans and Democrats—and they dominate not only Federal +and State politics but also city government. Each party has its list of +registered electors, and each holds a primary election before the real +election, to decide the party candidate. But these primary elections are +a mere matter of form. Only a small fraction of the electors attend +them, and only those who have always supported the party are allowed to +vote. The nominations are therefore really controlled, by fraud if +necessary, by the "ring" of party managers. Generally there is one man +who can pull the most strings, and he becomes the "boss." All power is +centred in the hands of this irresponsible despot. The men who are +elected owe their positions to him, and are responsible to him, not to +the public.</p> + +<p>Remember that these "machine" organizations have absolute sway in every +electorate, from one end of the United States to the other. It may be +wondered why the people tolerate them, but they are powerless. Sometimes +an independent movement is attempted, but it very rarely succeeds, and +even when it does the two "machines" combine against it and agree to +divide the spoils. Mr. Bryce writes:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>The disgust is less than a European expects, for it is mingled + <a name="Page_75" id="Page_75" />with amusement. The "boss" is a sort of joke, albeit an expensive + joke. "After all," people say, "it is our own fault. If we all went + to the primaries, or if we all voted an independent ticket, we + could make an end of the 'boss.'" There is a sort of fatalism in + their view of democracy. (Vol ii., p. 241.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>What is the meaning of all this wonderful party machinery? It is this: +that organization without responsible leadership can only be founded on +corruption. In other words, <i>the spoils system is the price which the +United States pay for maintaining the Union under the present +Constitution</i>. The fault lies ultimately, therefore, in the +Constitution, which tends to repress responsible leadership.</p> + +<p>Now, the mass of public opinion in America, as Mr. Bryce continually +points out, is sound, and attempts have not been wanting to put an end +to the system of rotation in public offices. A sustained agitation for +civil service reform was entered upon, and the system of competitive +examination was applied to a large number of offices. Now at last, the +reformers thought, American politics would be purified. But, no! The +corruption, simply took a new and more alarming turn. Direct money +contributions took the place of the spoils. It became the practice to +levy blackmail on corporations either to be let alone, or for the +purpose of fleecing the public. The monopolies granted to protected +industries are the source of a large share of these "campaign funds." +The Legislatures are crowded by professional lobbyists, and it is, <a name="Page_76" id="Page_76" />in +consequence, impossible to obtain justice against the corporations. +Surely no stronger proof can be needed that corruption is and must +remain the basis of organization so long as there is no responsible +leadership.</p> + +<p>It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that the Americans are not +alive to the failure of their representative institutions. Since Mr. +Bryce's great work on "The American Commonwealth" was published two +books by American authors have appeared which are very outspoken in +condemnation. These are "The Unforeseen Tendencies of Democracy," by Mr. +E.L. Godkin; and "The Lesson of Popular Government," by Mr. Gamaliel +Bradford. The keynote of the first of these two books is to abolish +corruption by destroying the power of the "machine" and the "boss," and +of the second to introduce responsible leadership. Mr. Godkin traces the +disappearance of distinguished men from public life to the control of +all entrance to it by the "machine." The reform of primary elections, he +holds, is then the first necessity, since "independent voting" has +ceased to be a remedy. But he fails to find a solution. The conclusion +he comes to is as follows:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>Is the situation then hopeless? Are we tied up inexorably simply to + a choice of evils? I think not. It seems to me that the nomination + of candidates is another of the problems of democracy which are + never seriously attacked without prolonged perception and + discussion of their importance. One of these was the formation of + the federal government; another was the abolition of slavery; + another was the reform of the <a name="Page_77" id="Page_77" />civil service. Every one of them + looked hopeless in the beginning; but the solution came in each + case, through the popular determination to find some better way. + (Pp. 92, 93.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>But the evil goes far deeper than Mr. Godkin appears to think. To +abolish corruption is to take away the present basis of organization +without substituting any other. If irresponsible leadership is to be +abandoned, responsible leadership must be introduced. Mr. Bradford's +plan, therefore, promises more, for if responsible leadership could be +introduced into Congress corruption would then be abolished also.</p> + +<p>Mr. Bradford's whole book may be said to be a study of the relations of +the executive to the legislature, and the conclusions at which he +arrives are a complete vindication of cabinet government. But he finds +one fault, and that is the instability of ministries, which he confesses +has not been apparent so far in the British House of Commons. He holds, +however, that it will become more apparent with the rising tide of +democracy. It is rather amusing to find that the greatest obstacle which +has to be overcome in proposing a responsible executive is the +veneration in which the Constitution is still held and the dislike to +copying anything from England. His plan is, therefore, an adaptation of +the cabinet to the conditions imposed by the Constitution. He holds that +the ministers appointed by the President should sit in Congress and have +control of the initiation of legislation. It is to be feared that this +would hardly realize <a name="Page_78" id="Page_78" />the idea of responsible leadership. Mr. Bradford +establishes a chain of responsibility by the fact that the ministers are +responsible to the President and the President is responsible to the +people; but that is a very different thing to the continual +responsibility of the cabinet to a majority of the legislature. It is +probable that the President's ministers would have to encounter the +opposition of a majority in one or both Houses, and it is difficult to +see how a deadlock could be avoided. Mr. Bradford contemplates that the +people would settle any issues which arise between the two branches at +the end of the Presidential term of four years; but it is just as likely +that there would then be a new President in any case. We are driven to +the conclusion, therefore, that responsible leadership is incompatible +with the American system of divided powers and fixed terms of office.</p> + +<p>Mr. Bryce comments on the proposal as follows:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>It is hard to say, when one begins to make alterations in an old + house, how far one will be led on in rebuilding, and I doubt + whether this change in the present American system, possibly in + itself desirable, might not be found to involve a reconstruction + large enough to put a new face upon several parts of that system. + (Vol. i, pp. 290, 291.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>This is very true, but is not a new building required? Is not the old +house built on a rotten foundation? Mr. Bradford has certainly +overlooked the effect of his proposal on party organization for one +thing. If the power over legislation, and especially over expenditure of +public money, is to be taken away from the <a name="Page_79" id="Page_79" />irresponsible committees of +Congress, the basis of party organization would cease to be corruption, +and both representatives and parties would have to take on an entirely +new character. As to the present character of representatives, Mr. Bryce +advances a number of reasons why the best men do not go in for politics, +such as the want of a social and commercial capital, the residential +qualification, the comparative dullness of politics, the attractiveness +of other careers, etc, but Mr. Bradford declares that the one explanation +which goes further than all these is the absorption of all the powers of +the government by the legislature, and the consequent suppression of +individuality. He writes:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>The voters are urged to send to Congress men of character, ability, + and public spirit. They might as well be asked to select men of + that quality to follow the profession of burglars, a comparison + which is not intended to convey any disrespect to the number of + honest and respectable men who constantly are sent to Congress. + Chosen as burglars, they would fail just the same in the + business.... It is the organization of Congress which offers every + facility to those who wish to buy and those who wish to be bought.</p></blockquote> + +<p>Again, as to the present character of parties, Mr. Bradford declares:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>The names of the two great parties, Republicans and Democrats, have + in themselves and at the present time no meaning at all.</p></blockquote> + +<p>Simply because the basis of organization is corruption, and not +questions of public policy. For the same <a name="Page_80" id="Page_80" />reason recent elections have +been fought on popular "crazes," such as the silver question. But Mr. +Bradford says:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>New parties cannot be formed on constantly changing issues, since + to have any strength they must have a certain degree of permanence. + The only two nations which have succeeded in forming great national + parties are Great Britain and the United States. In other European + countries the splitting into groups has almost made representative + government impossible.</p></blockquote> + +<p>What Mr. Bradford has failed to appreciate is that the absolutely rigid +division into two camps which prevails in America is founded on +corruption, and will disappear when corruption is abolished. In the +United States such a thing as a Congressman deserting one party for the +other is practically unknown. In Great Britain, on the contrary, party +lines do continually change as new issues arise; and when they are +founded on questions of public policy it must be so. What gives them +permanence is that certain principles underlie most questions, and men +who have the same political principles are likely to think the same on +any single question; and further that a member would rather follow his +party and sacrifice his opinion on a single question than sacrifice most +of his principles.</p> + +<p>Therefore, even if the Americans do succeed in purifying their politics, +they will be faced with the same difficulty as exists elsewhere—namely, +such improved organization as will secure the return of <a name="Page_81" id="Page_81" />representatives +on questions of general public policy only. The present system of +single-membered electorates will not suffice. The only remedy lies in +enlarged electorates with electoral machinery which will organize public +opinion into two definite lines of policy, and will, by allowing +individual candidature merge the primary election into the actual +election.</p> + +<p>All this involves a radical alteration, both in the Constitution and in +the methods of election. But the United States have the great advantage +over France that it does not involve also a serious change in the +national character. It is not unlikely that some such reform must be +brought about before long.</p> + +<p>The present position cannot last. The Republican party has so long +identified itself with Capital in all its forms, with the protected +monopolists, the trusts and the corporations, that the mass of Labour +threatens to support the Democrats; and as the latter party maintains +the doctrines of direct government and the infallibility of the +majority, the result will be such a financial crisis and such an +industrial revolution that the Americans will have at last to admit that +their government needs total reconstruction.</p> + +<p><b>Australia.</b>—On the first day of the nineteenth century the Union of +the Parliaments of Great Britain and Ireland was accomplished; on the +first day of the twentieth century Britain's daughters in the southern +seas will inaugurate, under her ægis, a new experiment <a name="Page_82" id="Page_82" />in +democracy—the Australian Commonwealth. The time is opportune, then, for +a review of the tendencies of Australian politics, and for a comparison +with the other great democracies. Thus only can we attempt to cast the +horoscope of the new nation.</p> + +<p>Australia starts with many advantages over France and America. The +science of government is better understood now than when they started; +the folly of placing too many checks on the people is recognized; and +the British system of responsible leadership by a cabinet in the +legislature is fully developed. All these features are embodied in the +Constitution, and it only remains for the people to prove their fitness +to work it.</p> + +<p>Applying the same tests as we have used in the case of the great +democracies to the present position of Australian politics, what is the +result? First, as regards organization, where do we stand? It must be +confessed that we are far behind Great Britain and America, though +certainly we are not in the same sad plight as France. Still there is +the fact that we are classed among the failures. Take the evidence of +Mr. E.L. Godkin in "Unforeseen Tendencies of Democracy:"—</p> + +<blockquote><p>In his Journals during a visit to Turin in 1850, Senior records a + conversation with Cesare Balbo, a member of the Chamber in the + first Piedmontese Parliament, in which Balbo said, after an + exciting financial debate:—"We have not yet acquired parliamentary + discipline. Most of the members are more anxious about their own + crotchets or their own consis<a name="Page_83" id="Page_83" />tency than about the country. The + ministry has a large nominal majority, but every member of it is + ready to put them in a minority for any whim of his own." This was + probably true of every legislative body on the Continent, and it + continues true to this day in Italy, Greece, France, Austria, + Germany, and the new Australian democracies. (Pp. 102, 103.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>He adduces in support of the statement the fact that the three colonies +of New South Wales, South Australia, and Victoria have had respectively +twenty-eight, forty-two, and twenty-six ministries in forty years. Is +the prospect any brighter for the new Commonwealth? It is to be feared +not, if the present tendencies towards disintegration are allowed to +grow. For in the last decade a change has come over Australian politics +which portends the gravest danger. We refer to the direct class +representation which, under the name of Labour parties, has spread all +over the colonies. These so-called Labour "parties" are neither more nor +less than class factions. Their policy is everywhere the same—viz., the +use of the "balance system," which has proved so disastrous to France. +The worst effect is that they prevent the main parties from working out +definite policies on public questions, and cause them also to degenerate +into factions. In Victoria we have actually had the ludicrous spectacle +of the Opposition saving the Government time after time when deserted by +its own followers. In New South Wales the individual member is sunk in +the party; he must vote as the majority decides. Mr. Reid's term of +office was ended <a name="Page_84" id="Page_84" />by one such caucus. In Queensland, where the party is +strongest, it has now practically become one of the main parties, and +the whole colony is divided on class lines. Already an Intercolonial +Labour Conference has been held, and a pledge drawn up which must be +signed by all candidates for the party support at Federal elections. The +danger of these tactics is not rightly apprehended in Australia. In +reality they mark the first step towards social disruption. We may cite +the authority of Mr. James Bryce on this point. After pointing out in +"The American Commonwealth" that since the Civil War combinations of +States have always acted through the national parties, he writes:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>This is an important security against disruption. And a similar + security against the risk of civil strife or revolution is to be + found in the fact that the parties are not based on or sensibly + affected by differences either of wealth or of social position. + Their cleavage is not horizontal, according to social strata, but + vertical. This would be less true if it were stated either of the + Northern States separately, or of the Southern States separately: + it is true of the Union taken as a whole. It might cease to be true + if the new Labour party were to grow till it absorbed or superseded + either of the existing parties. The same feature has characterized + English politics as compared with those of most European countries, + and has been a main cause of the stability of the English + government and of the good feeling between different classes in the + community. (Vol. ii., p. 38.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>How is it that the public conscience is not alive to the enormity of +this anti-social crime? Mainly, we think, because the true principles of +representation are not properly understood. It is almost universally +<a name="Page_85" id="Page_85" />assumed that there is no real distinction between direct and +representative government. Minorities are tacitly allowed to have as +much right to representation as the minority, and the confusion of terms +is passed over. The working classes are told by self-seeking demagogues +that they are in a majority; that the majority is entitled to rule; and +that they have only to organize to come into their heritage. These +sycophants, who, as Aristotle of old pointed out, bear the greatest +resemblance to the court favourite of the tyrant, ask the people to +believe the silly paradox that the united wisdom of the whole people is +greater than that of the wisest part. The truth is that no people is fit +to exercise equal political rights which is not sensible enough to +choose the wisest part to carry on the government, providing only they +have control over their selection, and can hold them responsible. Are +the working classes in Australia going to demonstrate that they are +unfit for the exercise of political rights? Are they going to justify +the prognostications of the opponents of popular government? That is the +real question at issue. Unless public opinion be aroused to the iniquity +of class delegation, the further degradation of Australian politics is +inevitable. Let it not be thought that we are decrying the organization +of the working classes for political purposes. On the contrary, we hold +that the organization of every class and every interest is necessary in +order that it shall exert its just share of influence. But the only way +in <a name="Page_86" id="Page_86" />which every class can get its just share is by acting through the +two main parties. A class which holds aloof can exert for a short time +an undue share of influence, as a faction holding the balance of power, +but only at the expense of paralyzing the government.</p> + +<p>But the working classes are hardly to be blamed in this matter, for it +is a fact that before their action they were not able to exert their +just share of influence. The government was such as to promote the rule +of private interests instead of the general welfare, and, consequently, +their interests were shamefully neglected. The real cause of the +mischief was, as in America, the nominating system, which is inseparably +connected with the present method of election. The consideration of this +question brings us to the second characteristic of Australian +politics—namely, the irresponsible leadership of the press.</p> + +<p>We have seen how in America organization has been effected without +responsible leadership in Congress, only at the expense of the +irresponsible leadership of the "rings" and "bosses" who control the +"machines." In Australia an analogous result has been brought about by +different causes. We have not had civil strife to teach us the necessity +of organization, nor have we a spoils system available as a basis, but +the disorganized state of the legislatures and the consequent weakness +of the executive have thrown a large share of leadership into the hands +of <a name="Page_87" id="Page_87" />the press. Both in America and in Australia the prevalence of the +ultra-democratic theory that representatives should follow and not lead +the people has been a powerful contributing cause. And yet it is as +clear as possible that the choice lies between two alternatives. The +people must either submit to responsible leadership in Parliament or to +irresponsible leadership outside. The ultra-democrats hold that +responsible leadership in Parliament is incompatible with popular +government. We believe that this is the fundamental error which is +leading both the Australian and the American democracies astray. On the +contrary, it is the irresponsible despotism which is exercised by the +"bosses" in America and the newspapers in Australia which is really +incompatible with free government.</p> + +<p>The source of the error lies in the failure to grasp the meaning of the +term "responsible leadership." It is assumed that either the people must +lead and the representatives follow, or the representatives must lead +and the people follow. Bagehot may be taken as an exponent of the latter +position. He thought that cabinet government was only possible with a +deferential nation as opposed to a democratic nation. England he held to +be the type of deferential nations, because the people were content to +leave the government to the "great governing families"—<i>i.e.</i>, to defer +to caste, which is in principle the same as deferring to a king, who is +supposed to rule by divine right. Mr. <a name="Page_88" id="Page_88" />Bradford also gives a somewhat +exaggerated idea of the importance of the force of personality when he +declares that the mass of the people have no "views" on public +questions; all they want is to be well governed. The late Professor +Freeman Snow, of Harvard University, U.S., was a supporter of the +ultra-democratic view. In the "Annals of the American Academy of +Political and Social Science" for July, 1892, he declares:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>Mr. Bryce thinks that, "like other crowds, a legislature must be + led and ruled." And he has formulated a theory which he believes to + be "the essence of free or popular government, and the + justification for vesting power in numbers." "Every question that + arises in the conduct of government," he asserts, "is either a + question of ends or a question of means." And as the "masses are + better judges of what will conduce to their happiness than are + the-classes placed above them, they must be allowed to determine + ends." But, assuming the end to be given, they—the masses—should + leave to their leaders—the trained statesmen—the choice of means. + The defect in this theory is that it depends for its successful + operation upon the continued "deference of the multitude for the + classes placed above them ... upon the principle of <i>noblesse + oblige</i>," a principle, by the way, derived from feudal monarchy, + which has no existence in the United States, and which ought to be + considered a misfortune in any free country....</p> + +<p> Mr. Bryce has made a step in advance of Mr Bagehot in trusting the + people to determine ends, whatever they may be; why not go one step + further, and trust them to determine all questions of policy?</p></blockquote> + +<p>These are the two opposite points of view. They are both equally wrong. +The first is simply irresponsible leadership, and the second amounts to +<a name="Page_89" id="Page_89" />the same thing in practice, however much the people may appear to lead +in theory. The true position is that the relation between the +representatives and the people is reciprocal. Both lead and both follow. +The people defer to the representatives, not on account of rank or +caste, nor upon the principle of <i>noblesse oblige</i>, but only in so far +as the representatives are able to demonstrate their fitness to devise +measures for the general welfare. The people, on the other hand, are the +ultimate judges, both of measures and of men. This mutual action and +reaction constitutes the responsible leadership, which is one of the +fundamental principles underlying the device of representation. To it we +have already traced the virtue of representation as a social force, +capable of moulding national character and of appealing to the higher +nature of the people.</p> + +<p>An elector who is unable or unwilling to decide grave questions of +public policy himself may be a very shrewd judge as to who is best +fitted to decide them; and deference to ability is totally different in +principle to deference to caste. In a country in the transitional stage +between aristocracy and democracy, his judgment may be based partly on +the principle of <i>noblesse oblige</i>; but there is not the slightest +reason why in a democratic country he should require the representative +to defer to him. He will merely require a higher standard and a closer +and a more constant demonstration that <a name="Page_90" id="Page_90" />the measures proposed are +conducive to the public well-being. Moreover, it is still necessary that +the representatives should be judged periodically on general lines of +policy, and that the elector should not have the power of exercising +control on single questions. Under these conditions the result of the +mutual relation will be an improvement on both sides. But if, under the +influence of irresponsible leadership outside Parliament, the people +insist on increasing control over their representatives, then not only +is Parliament degraded, but progress towards government in the general +welfare is stopped.</p> + +<p>This long digression as to the real meaning of responsible leadership is +necessary in order to gauge the drift of the prevailing tendency towards +the irresponsible leadership of the press in Australia. The evil exists +in all the colonies, but it is perhaps worse in our own colony of +Victoria than in any other country in the world, although it is said to +be very bad in Switzerland since the referendum was introduced. We have +two morning newspapers in Melbourne, which take opposite sides on nearly +every question which arises. They admit into their columns no facts and +no arguments which tell against the position they have taken up; nay, +more, they resort to downright misrepresentation to support it. It will +be said that this is only a form of the party game, but the danger lies +in the fact that they circulate in different classes, and therefore +these classes see only <a name="Page_91" id="Page_91" />one side of every question. Moreover, in their +competition for the support of classes in which they desire to increase +their circulation they use their influence to secure legislation which +will appeal to class prejudices, or even undertake a prolonged agitation +to relieve special interests from legitimate charges. The <i>Age</i> has for +a long time thrived by pandering to the prejudices of the working +classes, and especially of the artisans; the <i>Argus</i> now seeks to get +even by creating dissension between town and country.</p> + +<p>All this interference with the functions of Parliament has a baneful +influence on the working of the political machine. The party lines are +practically decided by the newspaper contest. We have spoken of the +resemblance to the "machine" control over American politics. One of the +newspapers is, in effect, managed by a "ring," the other by a "boss." +The despotism of David Syme in Melbourne is as unquestioned as that of +Richard Croker in New York, or Matthew Quay in Pennsylvania. How close +the analogy is may be inferred from the fact that Mr. Syme has +exercised, and still claims the right to exercise, control over +nominations to Parliament. It is notorious that the ten delegates who +"represented" Victoria at the Federation Convention were elected on the +<i>Age</i> "ticket." Again, Mr. Syme is known as "the father of protection," +and has been able, by the force of his indomitable will, to impose on +the colony a tariff which can be compared only to the M'Kinley <a name="Page_92" id="Page_92" />tariff +in America, thus showing that irresponsible leadership in either form is +more favourable to the rule of private interests than to the general +welfare.</p> + +<p>We have said enough to show that in internal affairs the influence of +the press, when it directly interferes with Parliament is an anti-social +force. In matters of foreign policy the case is still worse. The press +is almost universally jingoistic, because it is financially interested +in sensationalism. A war generally means a fortune to newspaper +proprietors. In such matters, therefore, responsible leadership by +Parliament is still more urgently required.</p> + +<p>We now come to the claim of those ultra-democrats who preach the +poisonous doctrines of direct government and of unrestrained majority +rule, that responsible leadership is incompatible with popular +government. This claim, is of course, supported by the radical press in +Australia. We have already quoted from Mr. Syme's work on +"Representative Government in England" the extreme views in which he +confuses representation with delegation. "Popular government," he +declares, "can only exist where the people can exercise control over +their representatives at all times and under all circumstances." The +method proposed to obtain this control is to give a majority of the +constituents power to dismiss a representative at any time, and is +utterly impracticable. Imagine the position of a member elected by a +majority of one or two votes! The true way to prevent members <a name="Page_93" id="Page_93" />abusing +their trust is not to increase the direct control of the people, but to +prevent the control of the press and all other irresponsible agencies +over them; and so to ensure the return of better men.</p> + +<p>Perhaps the most striking anomaly in Mr. Syme's position is that, while +he would confine the office of Parliament to expressing public opinion, +he declares in the same work that "the press at once forms and expresses +public opinion."<a name="FNanchor_2" href="#Footnote_2">[2]</a> Now, it is quite true that if Parliament is weak and +disorganized, or occupies itself in fighting for the spoils of office, +the power of forming public opinion is thrown into the hands of the +press. But the more power is seized by the press, the more Parliament is +degraded, and the less is the chance of recovery. The situation presents +little difficulty to Mr. Syme. Every newspaper reader, he declares, +"becomes, as it were, a member of that vast assembly, which may be said +to embrace the whole nation, so widely are newspapers now read. Had we +only the machinery for recording the votes of that assembly, we might +easily dispense with Parliament altogether."</p> + +<p>These ideas are not of mere academic interest; they have dominated the +trend of Victorian politics for many years. The time has now arrived for +the people to consider whether it is better to keep a Parliament of weak +delegates to express the public opinion which <a name="Page_94" id="Page_94" />is formed by the press +than to elect a Parliament of "leaders of the people," highly-trained +legists, economists, and sociologists, to form and direct the public +opinion which is expressed by the newspapers. Why should the principle +of leadership, as exemplified in Mr. Syme's own career, be given full +scope in the press, and entirely repressed in Parliament? As to the kind +of influence we mean, no better description could be given than that of +the well-known Labour leader, Mr. H.H. Champion. In an open letter to +Mr. David Syme in the <i>Champion</i> of 22nd June, 1895, he wrote:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>Yet, if you rose to-morrow morning with the resolve to dismiss the + ministry or to reverse the policy of the country, to stop + retrenchment or to recommence borrowing, that resolve would + infallibly translate itself into fact in a few weeks.</p> + +<p> In no country that I know of has any organ in the press so much + influence as your paper. It is practically the sole source of + information for the majority of the people. It has no competitors. + It can make any person or policy popular or unpopular. It can fail + to report any man or thing, and for four-fifths of the citizens it + is as though that man or thing were not. It can misrepresent any + speech or movement, and the printed lie alone will reach the + electors. It could teach the people anything you choose. It has + ruled the country for a couple of decades. It rules the country + to-day.</p></blockquote> + +<p>Professor Jethro Brown shows himself alive to the danger of press +domination in Australia. In "The New Democracy" he writes:—"The +<i>prestige</i> of Parliament is destroyed when its deliberations and +conclusions <a name="Page_95" id="Page_95" />cease to be the determining factor in legislation. The +transfer of the real responsibility for legislation to a new power +implies the discrediting of the old school for training leaders." And he +quotes with approval the expression of opinion by the Honourable B.R. +Wise in the Federal Convention:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>There may be, as Mr. David Syme suggests, no risk involved in the + change of masters; but for my part I would sooner trust the + destinies of the country to the worst Parliament the people of + Australia would elect than to the best newspaper the mind of man + has ever imagined.</p></blockquote> + +<p>It is little use, therefore, for the press to further degrade Parliament +in the eyes of the people by railing at it in the following terms:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>So it is that Parliament as a working machine is about the + clumsiest and least effective that can be conceived of. All our + Parliaments are modelled on the necessities of bygone centuries. We + want a working Parliament improved up to date; but we lack + political invention, and have to jog along with the old lumbering + machine—a sort of bullock dray trying to compete with an age of + electric railways and motor cars.<a name="FNanchor_3" href="#Footnote_3">[3]</a></p></blockquote> + +<p>The remedy lies with the press itself. Let it abandon all illegitimate +influence, and use its power in a legitimate direction to give effect to +the principles of organization and responsible leadership in Parliament. +But just as the Labour faction cannot altogether be blamed for the +present disintegration of Parliament, so the press cannot be held +responsible for <a name="Page_96" id="Page_96" />its degradation. In both eases cause and effect have +been interrelated. The mistake which the press has made has been in not +perceiving that the more it interferes with the legitimate functions of +Parliament, even although with the best intentions, the more it degrades +Parliament.</p> + +<p>We have now passed in review the two great dangers which assail the +Commonwealth at the inception of federation. We have shown how +intimately related they are to the two great principles underlying +representative government—organization and leadership. Nay, we have +seen that all the varied phenomena presented by the great democracies of +the world can be expressed in terms of the same two principles.</p> + +<p>It remains to show that to give effect to the expression of these two +principles in a more perfect manner than ever yet attained is a problem +of electoral machinery. This task we shall now undertake.</p> + +<p>FOOTNOTES:<a name="Page_97" id="Page_97" /></p> + +<p><a name="Footnote_2" href="#FNanchor_2">[2]</a> "Representative Government in England," p. 123.</p> + +<p><a name="Footnote_3" href="#FNanchor_3">[3]</a> <i>Age</i>, 28th June, 1900.</p> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IV" id="CHAPTER_IV" />CHAPTER IV.</h2> + +<p class='center'>THE REFORM: TRUE PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.</p> + + +<p>How to give effect to the principles of organization and leadership in +an electoral reform—that is the problem which we shall now attempt to +solve. We have already laid down the theoretical requirements, which are +(1) proportional representation to the two parties—the majority and the +minority, and (2) the election by each party separately of its most +popular leaders; and we shall now have to consider also how these +requirements are modified by practical considerations.</p> + +<p><b>Proportional Representation to the Two Parties, the Majority and the +Minority.</b>—It will be as well to illustrate the method proposed by +reference to the conditions imposed by an actual election, such as that +for the Federal Senate. The Commonwealth Bill provides that each State +shall be polled as a single electorate, returning six senators. Suppose +that 120,000 electors vote on party lines in any State. It is clear that +a party which has the support of 20,000 electors is entitled to one +senator; also, that a party <a name="Page_98" id="Page_98" />which has the support of 40,000 electors is +entitled to two senators; of 60,000 electors to three senators, and so +on. Now, suppose that one party has the support of 50,000 electors, and +the other of 70,000 electors, then the minority is entitled to two and a +half senators, and the majority to three and a half senators. But +senators are living units, and cannot be divided into fractions. The +question therefore arises, Which is entitled to the odd senator, the +majority or the minority? And the answer is that they are both equally +entitled to him; for it is as much a tie as if each party has the +support of 10,000 electors in a single-seat electorate. But if the +minority had the support of 49,999 electors, or one elector less, it +would be entitled to only two senators, and if it had the support of +50,001 electors, or one elector more, it would be entitled to three +senators.</p> + +<p>From the above simple facts can be deduced general rules applicable to +any particular case. It is evident that the result is not affected by +the number of votes allowed to each elector, providing only that each +elector has the same number of votes. It is also quite irrespective of +the number of candidates nominated in the interests of each party. But +it would never do to allow party organizations to control nominations. +How are we to combine individual candidature with party nomination? The +only way to do this is to require that each candidate shall declare, +either when nominating or a few days <a name="Page_99" id="Page_99" />before the election, on which side +of the House he intends to sit, and be classified accordingly as +Ministerialist or Oppositionist. To decide the relative strengths of the +two parties, it is then only necessary to take the aggregate votes +polled by all the candidates nominated for each party as a measure of +the amount of support which it receives.</p> + +<p>The great advantages of this provision are at once apparent. There is no +incentive to limit the number of candidates so as to prevent splitting +the votes. On the contrary, it is to the interest of each party to get +as many strong candidates as possible to stand in its interests. There +will be no necessity to ask any candidate to retire for fear of losing a +seat to the party. Thus the control of nominations, which leads to the +worst abuses of the present system, will be entirely obviated.</p> + +<p>Now, suppose that in the instance we have already given each elector is +allowed to vote for one candidate only, the total number of votes +recorded will be 120,000. Then the <i>unit of representation</i> or number of +votes which entitle a party to one senator will be 20,000 votes; each +party will be entitled to one senator for every whole unit of +representation, and the odd senator will go to the party having the +larger remainder. For instance, if the aggregate votes polled by all the +Ministerialist candidates be 72,000, and by the Oppositionist candidates +48,000, the Ministerialists, having three units plus 12,000 re<a name="Page_100" id="Page_100" />mainder, +are entitled to four senators, and the Opposition, having two units plus +8,000, to two senators.</p> + +<p>Similarly, if each elector be allowed to vote for a number of +candidates, all these figures will be increased in proportion. For +example, if each elector has three votes, the unit of representation +would be 60,000 votes. The following general rules may therefore be +stated:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>1. The unit of representation is equal to the total number of valid + votes cast at the election, divided by the number of seats.</p> + +<p> 2. Each party is entitled to one seat for every whole unit of + representation contained in the aggregate votes polled by all its + candidates, and the odd seat goes to the party which has the larger + remainder.</p></blockquote> + +<p>The fact that the last seat has to be assigned to the party which has +the larger remainder is sometimes advanced as an objection, but it is +evidently the fairest possible division that the size of the electorate +will permit. Of course, the larger the electorate the more accurately +proportioned will be the representation. Hence the representation would +be most accurate if the whole assembly were elected in one large +electorate. But if, for the sake of convenience, the assembly be elected +in a large number of electorates in which the relative proportions of +two parties vary the gains which a party makes in some electorates will +be balanced by losses in others, so <a name="Page_101" id="Page_101" />that the final result would be +almost as accurate as if the whole country were polled as one +electorate. It must be remembered that the result in any electorate +cannot be foreseen, and that it is a matter of chance which party gains +the advantage. Now, if the limits of variation comprise even a single +unit of representation, each party will stand an equal chance of +gaining, and therefore the laws of chance will ensure that the gains +balance the losses in the different electorates. Supposing a party which +averages 40 per cent. in the whole country to vary between 30 per cent. +and 50 per cent, in the different electorates (which may be taken as a +fair assumption), the unit of representation should equal 20 per cent., +or one-fifth. Under these conditions the laws of chance will ensure +correct representation, so long as the electorates do not contain less +than five seats.</p> + +<p>The above facts furnish a complete answer to the arguments advanced by +Mr. J.W. M'Cay, ex-M.L.A., in a series of articles in the <i>Age</i> against +the application of proportional representation to the Federal Senate. +While apparently recognizing that it is utterly impossible for the +minority to secure a majority of the representation, he based his +objection solely on the fact that a minority is able with electorates +containing an even number of seats to secure one-half of the +representation, and thus lead to what he terms "the minority block."</p> + +<p>The force of the objection will entirely depend on <a name="Page_102" id="Page_102" />the size of the +minority which is able thus to thwart the will of the majority. The +Federal Senate will consist of 36 senators, each of the original States +contributing six. No reasonable man would complain if the minority, +being only entitled to 17 senators, actually returned 18, but Mr. M'Cay +points out that it is possible for a minority entitled to 15 senators to +return 18. To bring about this result he makes the absurd assumption +that in each of the six States the minority polls exactly two whole +units of representation, and a bare majority of a third unit. It is safe +to say that this would not happen once in a thousand years. If the +relative proportions of the two parties vary in the slightest in the +different States some must be under and some over the assumed +proportion. It is most probable that it will be under it in three States +and over it in the other three States; and, under these circumstances, +the party will return 15 senators, the exact number to which it is +entitled. It may happen to be under the assumed proportion in only two +of the States and over in the other four, and that the party will get +one more senator than it is entitled to; but it is extremely improbable +that it will get two more, and virtually impossible that it will get +three more senators than its just proportion. Mr. M'Cay's conclusion +that proportional representation can only be used in electorates +returning an odd number of representatives is shown to be entirely +unwarranted. Equally fallacious is Professor Nanson's rebutting +<a name="Page_103" id="Page_103" />statement that "scientific proportionalists recommend odd electorates." +While the number of States remains even, the mathematical chance of a +minority securing one-half of the representation is precisely the same +whether the States return an odd or an even number of senators. As a +matter of fact, the danger of a minority securing one-half of the +representation is much greater at the intermediate elections for the +Senate, when each State returns three senators, the reason being the +smaller field.</p> + +<p>We have dwelt at some length on the preceding example, because it serves +to refute another error into which some of the proportionalists have +fallen. It is held that the unit of representation should be ascertained +by dividing the total votes, not by the number of seats, but by the +seats increased by one. This unit is generally known as the Droop quota, +having been proposed in a work published by Mr. H.R. Droop in 1869. +Since one vote more than one-half of the total votes is sufficient for +election in a single-seat electorate, it is argued that one vote more +than one-third suffices in a two-seat electorate, one vote more than +one-fourth in a three-seat electorate, and so on. The unit in a six-seat +electorate would be one-seventh of the votes instead of one-sixth, and +it is pointed out that by this means the whole six seats would be filled +by whole units, leaving an unrepresented residuum of one-seventh of the +votes divided between the two parties.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104" />The error lies precisely as before in concentrating attention on one of +the electorates, and in neglecting the theory of probability. The Droop +quota introduces the condition that each party must pay a certain +minimum number of votes for each seat, and the real distinction is that, +instead of the minority and the majority having an equal chance of +securing any advantage, the chances are in the same proportion as their +relative strengths. If the majority be twice as strong as the minority, +it will have twice the chance of gaining the advantage. To prove this, +consider the position of a one-third minority in a number of five-seat +electorates. The Droop quota being one-sixth of the votes, the minority +will secure two seats or 40 per cent. in those electorates where it is +just over one-third, and one seat or 20 per cent. where it is just +under. Since the mathematical chances are that it will be over in one +half and under in the other half, it will, on the average, secure only +30 per cent., although entitled to 33 per cent. Again, if the 670 +members of the House of Commons were elected in three to five-seat +electorates, and the Droop quota used as proposed by Sir John Lubbock, +and if the Ministerialists were twice as strong as the Oppositionists, +they would, on the average, return 30 more members than the two-thirds +to which they are entitled, and this would count 60 members on a +division.</p> + +<p>The following table illustrates the erroneous result <a name="Page_105" id="Page_105" />obtained by +applying the Droop quota when a number of grouped-electorates are +concerned. It will be noticed that where parties are nearly equal it +makes very little difference which unit is used:—</p> + +<table border='1' cellspacing="0" cellpadding="5" > + + <tr> + <th rowspan="2" align="center">STRENGTH OF <br />PARTY</th> + <th colspan="2" align="center">AVERAGE REPRESENTATION</th> + </tr> + <tr> + <th>Five-Seat Electorates</th> + <th>Ten-Seat Electorates</th> + </tr> + <tr align="center"> + <td>10 per cent.</td> + <td>6 per cent.</td> + <td>2 per cent.</td> + </tr> + <tr align="center"> + <td>20 per cent.</td> + <td>14 per cent.</td> + <td>17 per cent.</td> + </tr> + <tr align="center"> + <td>30 per cent.</td> + <td>26 per cent.</td> + <td>28 per cent.</td> + </tr> + <tr align="center"> + <td>40 per cent.</td> + <td>38 per cent.</td> + <td>39 per cent.</td> + </tr> + <tr align="center"> + <td>50 per cent.</td> + <td>50 per cent.</td> + <td>50 per cent.</td> + </tr> + +</table> + + +<p>The Droop quota, therefore, gives, not proportional, but disproportional +representation.</p> + +<p><b>Election by Each Party of its Most Popular Candidates.</b>—Still keeping +in mind the six-seat electorate for the Federal Senate, we may note that +there are two rival systems in the field—the <i>scrutin de liste</i> or +Block Vote, in which each elector votes for any six of the candidates, +and the Hare system, which allows each elector an effective vote for one +candidate only. The adoption of either of these systems would be +unfortunate. To force each elector to vote for six candidates is +probably to require him to vote for more than he is inclined to support, +and certainly for more than his <a name="Page_106" id="Page_106" />party is entitled to return; and, also, +to put it in the power of the majority to return all six senators. To +allow him to vote for one candidate only, on the other hand, is to break +up both parties into factions by allowing the favourites of sections +within the parties to be elected, instead of those most in general +favour with all sections composing each party. An intermediate position +is therefore best. No elector should be required to vote for more than +three candidates, and no elector should be allowed to vote for less. +Because in the first place it is evident that each party will, on the +average, return three senators, and, secondly, it may be taken for +granted that even the minority will nominate at least three candidates. +Two alternative proposals may be submitted as fulfilling these +conditions:—</p> + +<blockquote><p><i>1. Each elector should vote for any three candidates, or</i></p> + +<p><i>2. Each elector should have six votes, and have the option of giving two +votes to individual candidates.</i></p></blockquote> + +<p>The first plan is the simpler, but the second is probably the better, as +it allows more discrimination without sacrificing any of the advantages. +Either proposal is practically equivalent to applying the Block Vote to +each party separately; and whatever may be the objection<a name="Page_107" id="Page_107" />s to applying +the Block Vote to two or more parties it is the simplest and best system +to elect the candidates most in general favour when one party only is +concerned. It is true that the majority will return rather more than +one-half of the representatives and the minority rather less than +one-half, so that the minority will have more votes in proportion to its +strength. But with two parties of fairly equal but fluctuating strength +the fairest way is to require each elector to vote for at least one-half +of the number of representatives. Besides, apart from the fact that it +is not known before the election how many seats each party will obtain, +it is absolutely necessary that each elector shall have the same number +of votes in order that each party be allotted its just share of +representation. Moreover it is not proposed to limit the elector's +freedom of choice in the slightest by confining him to the candidates of +one party. The great majority of electors will vote on party lines, +because every vote given to a candidate of the opposing party tells +against the representation of their own party. The reason of this is +that every vote counts individually for the candidate and collectively +for the whole party. Any elector, therefore, who divides his voting +power equally between the two parties practically wastes it as far as +the party representation is concerned. But it is neither necessary nor +desirable to bring about such a rigid party division as prevails in +America, for instance,<a name="Page_108" id="Page_108" /> where a man is born, lives, and dies Republican +or Democrat. If electors were confined to the candidates of one party, +an elector who wished to vote for an individual candidate of the +opposing party would be placed in the dilemma of deserting either his +favourite or his party. The division into parties is really required in +the elected body, and not in the constituent body.</p> + +<p><b>Rules for the Reform.</b>—We are now in a position to draw up a list of +rules for the proposed reform, applicable to all legislatures in which +party government prevails:—</p> + +<p>1. Electorates to be grouped so as to contain at least three seats, and +preferably not less than five seats nor more than twenty seats.</p> + +<p>2. Candidates to declare when nominating, or a few days before the +election, whether they are in favour of or opposed to the party in +power, and to be classified accordingly as Ministerialists or +Oppositionists.</p> + +<p>3. Ballot papers to contain the names of all candidates nominated, +arranged in two parallel columns, one headed Ministerialists, and the +other Oppositionists. The list of candidates under each heading to be +arranged in alphabetical order.</p> + +<p>4. Each elector to have as many votes as there are seats, and to be +allowed to give either one or two votes to any candidate. The votes to +be distributed as he pleases among all the candidates of both lists.<a name="Page_109" id="Page_109" /></p> + +<p>5. The total number of valid votes cast at the election to be divided by +the number of seats; the quotient to be known as the "unit of +representation."</p> + +<p>6. Each party to be allowed one seat for every whole unit of +representation contained in the aggregate votes polled by all its +candidates, and the last seat to go to the party which has the larger +remainder.</p> + +<p>7. The candidates of each party having the highest number of votes to be +declared elected to the number of seats to which each party is entitled +in accordance with the preceding rule.</p> + +<p>8. In case of a tie between candidates or parties the lot decides.</p> + +<p>The alternative plan for rule 4, which is somewhat simpler, would read +as follows:—</p> + +<p>4. Each elector to vote for half the number of candidates that there are +seats, <i>i.e.</i>, three votes in a five or six-seat electorate, four votes +in a seven or eight-seat electorate, &c. The votes to be distributed as +he pleases among all the candidates of both lists.</p> + +<p>It is unnecessary to dwell on the absolute simplicity of these rules. +They involve no radical departure from existing methods of voting or of +counting votes. Once the totals are added up, the calculations necessary +to decide the successful candidates are within the reach of a school +child.</p> + +<p>EXAMPLE.—Take as an example 13 candidates in a six-seat electorate who +<a name="Page_110" id="Page_110" />poll as follows:—</p> + +<table border='0' cellspacing="5" cellpadding="5"> + + <tr> + <th colspan="2" align="center">MINISTERIALISTS.</th> + <td rowspan='10'></td> + <th colspan="2" align="center">OPPOSITIONISTS.</th> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>BROWN</td> + <td>83,000</td> + <td>YOUNG</td> + <td>53,000</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>RYAN</td> + <td>74,000</td> + <td>BELL</td> + <td>51,000</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>COX</td> + <td>44,000</td> + <td>HUME</td> + <td>47,000</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>WHITE</td> + <td>42,000</td> + <td>JONES</td> + <td>45,000</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>PEEL</td> + <td>38,000</td> + <td>BLACK</td> + <td>34,000</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>ADAMS</td> + <td>35,000</td> + <td valign="top" align="right" colspan="2" rowspan="4">---------<br />230,000</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>GREY</td> + <td>33,000</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td>SWIFT</td> + <td>21,000</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td align="right" colspan="2">---------<br />370,000</td> + </tr> +</table> + +<p class='center'>Total votes = 370,000 + 230,000 = 600,000.</p> + +<p class='center'>Unit of representation = 600,000/6 = 100,000.</p> + +<p class='center'>Ministerialists: 3 units + 70,000 remainder = 4 seats.</p> + +<p class='center'>Oppositionists: 2 units + 30,000 remainder = 2 seats.</p> + +<p class='center'>The Ministerialists, having the larger remainder, secure the last seat. +The successful candidates are Brown, Ryan, Cox, and White (M.), Young +and Bell (O.)</p> + + +<p>It will be noted that without the proportional principle the +Ministerialists would have returned two members only, and the +Oppositionists four.</p> + +<p>It is to be distinctly understood that the simpler plan of voting for +half the number of candidates that there are seats is practically as +good as the other. In order to<a name="Page_111" id="Page_111" /><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112" /> show, however, that the plan we have +favoured may be simplified, we illustrate by a sample ballot paper a +method which has been used in Belgium. Two white spots are printed +opposite each candidate's name. An ink pad and stamp are then provided +at each polling booth, and the elector stamps out a white spot for each +vote he wishes to give. In the paper illustrated two votes are given to +Brown, two to Jones, one to Grey, and one to Swift. This elector has, +therefore, given two-thirds of his voting power to the Ministerial +party, and one-third to the Opposition, and has thus directly influenced +both policies. A further advantage of the proposal is the ease with +which such a paper can be read by the returning officer.</p> + +<h2>BALLOT PAPER</h2> + +<hr style='width: 25%;' /> + +<h3>Ministerialists. Oppositionists.</h3> + +<table border='1' cellspacing="0" cellpadding="5" > + + <tr align="center"> + <td>O O</td> + <td>ADAMS</td> + <td rowspan="10"></td> + <td>O O</td> + <td>BELL</td> + </tr> + <tr align="center"> + <td></td> + <td>BROWN</td> + <td>O O</td> + <td>BLACK</td> + </tr> + <tr align="center"> + <td>O O</td> + <td>COX</td> + <td>O O</td> + <td>HUME</td> + </tr> + <tr align="center"> + <td>O </td> + <td>GREY</td> + <td></td> + <td>JONES</td> + </tr> + <tr align="center"> + <td>O O</td> + <td>PEEL</td> + <td>O O</td> + <td>YOUNG</td> + </tr> + <tr align="center"> + <td>O O</td> + <td>RYAN</td> + <td colspan="2" rowspan="3" ></td> + </tr> + <tr align="center"> + <td> O</td> + <td>SWIFT</td> + </tr> + <tr align="center"> + <td>O O</td> + <td>WHITE</td> + </tr> +</table> + +<blockquote><p>1. You are allowed Six votes, and can give either one or two votes to +any candidate on either list.</p> + +<p>2. Stamp out one of the white spots if you wish to give a candidate one +vote.</p> + +<p>3. Stamp out the two white spots if you wish to give a candidate two +votes.</p> + +<p>4. Your ballot paper will be invalid if you stamp out more or less than +Six white spots.</p></blockquote> + + +<p><b>Character of Parties.</b>—We must now prove that the methods proposed +will actually organize the people into two coherent parties. Let us +suppose either party to be composed of three sections. The problem is to +induce these three sections to work together, and to sink their petty +differences in the general interest, in short to unite as a party, +aiming at the control of administration with a definite policy on public +questions. Let us further suppose the party entitled to three +representatives. Now, it is quite conceivable that exactly the same +three candidates would be elected if each elector had any number of +votes from one to three, and this would actually tend to be the case the +more united the party is. But herein lies the dif<a name="Page_113" id="Page_113" />ference: that with one +vote only any one section holding narrow and violent views can return an +independent delegate, and therefore has a direct inducement to do so, +while with three votes it is forced to work with the other two sections, +for if it refuses to do so it is in their power to exclude its nominee. +It is this power to exclude independent factions which is the first +requisite to prevent the main parties degenerating into factions. Now, +the advocates of the Hare system declare that each elector should have +one effective vote only, no matter how many seats the party is entitled +to. The elector would therefore only express his opinion as to the +delegate of his own section, and not as to the constitution of the whole +party, and there would be nothing whatever to prevent the election of +the favourites of sections, instead of the representatives most in +general favour with all sections.</p> + +<p>But if there were only one party it would be impossible to make all the +sections work together in this manner. Some of them would combine into a +majority of the party, and would exclude the minority. With two great +competing parties, however, the case is quite different. So far from +either party wishing to exclude any small minority, both will compete +for its support, providing only that it will fall into line with the +other sections on the main questions of policy. Each section will +therefore support the party which will consent to embody the most +favourable<a name="Page_114" id="Page_114" /> compromise of its demands in its policy. If its demands are +such that both parties refuse to entertain them, it will exercise no +influence in the direction of furthering its own views. From this +statement it is evident that no system of independent direct +proportional representation within the party can be recognized as a +right to which the different sections are entitled, as it would +inevitably break up the party, and lead to sectional delegation. The +sections would then change in character, and become violent factions. +But, nevertheless, if the sections work together as described, every +section will be proportionately represented in the party policy, and +therefore by every representative of the party. Moreover, no section can +dictate to either party, or obtain more than a fair compromise. For all +the sections are interdependent, and any section which attempts to exert +more than its just share of influence will sink in general favour, and +will find those who are inclined to support its pretensions rejected at +the election.</p> + +<p>The difference between the two stages of representation may now be +clearly appreciated. In the first stage we have seen that the fear of +the aggression of the monarchy held all sections together in one party. +In the second stage, however, it has been abundantly demonstrated by +experience that the fear of each other will not hold the sections of the +two parties together. The electoral machinery must, therefore, supply +the deficiency.<a name="Page_115" id="Page_115" /></p> + +<p><b>Party Lines.</b>—With the altered character of parties there is ground +for hope that the basis of division will become questions of general +public policy, and that all causes of factious dissension and of social +disruption will tend to be repressed. This improvement is indeed +urgently needed. For if in any country party lines are decided by +geographical considerations, as town <i>v.</i> country; by class, as Capital +<i>v.</i> Labour; by race as in South Africa; by religion as in Belgium; or +by personal ambition for the spoils of office—in any of these cases the +future of that country is open to the gravest doubt.</p> + +<p>Perhaps the greatest danger which assails most democratic countries +to-day is the risk of the working classes being persuaded by demagogues +that equal political rights have been extended to them in order that +they shall govern, instead of in order that they shall not be +misgoverned. If the general welfare is to be advanced, all classes must +influence the policies of both parties. This condition is indispensable +to bring about the ideal condition of two parties differing only as to +what is best for all.</p> + +<p>Equally to be condemned is the narrow-minded and intolerant view of +those who can see no virtue in an opposing party; who define, for +instance, the distinction between parties as the party for things as +they are, and the party for things as they ought to be; the latter +being, of course, their own party. This is one of the objectionable +features of Australian newspaper-made politics<a name="Page_116" id="Page_116" />.</p> + +<p>A more rational view of the distinction which often underlies party +divisions is between those who desire change and those who oppose +change. J.S. Mill points out how the latter may often be useful in +preventing progress in a wrong direction. There are times when such +attitude is called for, but generally speaking we may say that the +fundamental distinction between parties should be a difference of +opinion as to the direction of progress. Nor is it inconsistent for a +party to change its opinion or alter its policy; on the contrary, it is +essential to progress. The majority must often modify its policy in the +light of the criticism of the minority, and the minority must often drop +the unpopular proposals which have put it in a minority. These features +are all essential to the working of the political machine.</p> + +<p><b>The Character of Representatives.</b>—Granting that all sections of each +party can be induced to work together, the beneficial effect on the +character of representatives would be incalculable. Instead of being +forced to pander to every small section for support, they would appeal +to all sections. The enlarged electorates which are contemplated would +be arranged to embrace the widest diversity of interest, and a +representative would then be free to follow his own independent +judgment, unfettered by the dictation of small cliques. His actions +might offend some section<a name="Page_117" id="Page_117" />s who supported his election; but he has a wide +field, and may gain the support of other sections by them. Therefore, he +may actually improve his position by gaining more supporters than he +loses. Contrast this with the present system, in which the +representatives are cooped up in single-membered electorates to denned +sets of supporters. The very principle of community of interest on which +these electorates must be arranged in order to get a fair result is +destructive of the idea of representation. It is no wonder, then, that +the present system is tending towards delegation. Local delegation we +have always had, more or less, but we are now threatened by class +delegation also.</p> + +<p>The conclusion of Mr. Kent in "The English Radicals" may be quoted on +this point. He says:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>The question of the relationship of members to their constituents + is at the present time perplexed and undetermined; for though the + control of Parliament by the people is an indisputable fact, yet it + is maintained by means of quite another kind from those which the + early Radicals proposed. The result is somewhat paradoxical, for + while the system of pledges has been contemptuously rejected, yet + the theory that a member is a delegate tacitly prevails in English + politics. That members of the House of Commons have tended and do + tend to lose their independence it is impossible to doubt. A + distinguished French publicist, M. Boutmy, for instance, has + remarked the fact; and he thinks that in consequence a + deterioration of the tone of politicians is likely to recur. Mr. + E.L. Godkin, an American writer, whose judgments are entitled to + respect, has expressed much the same opinion; "the delegate + theory," he says, "has been gaining ground in England, and in + America has almost completely succeeded in asserting its sway, so + that we have seen many cases in which members of Congress have + openly declared their dissent from the measures for which they + voted in obedience to their constituents."<a name="Page_118" id="Page_118" /></p></blockquote> + +<p>It is one of the greatest merits of the proposed reform that this vexed +question of representation or delegation would be definitely settled. +For, although the area of independent action is enlarged, definite +limits are set to it.</p> + +<p><b>Possible Objections.</b>—We may now reply to some objections which have +been or might be urged. At the outset we would point out that the +critics nearly always base their objections on the conditions which have +prevailed in the past or do exist in the present chaotic state of +parties; and seldom appreciate the fact that they would lose force if a +better condition could be brought about. Let us take the Melbourne +<i>Argus</i> report of Professor Nanson's objections:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>Professor Nanson pointed out that the scheme depended for its + efficacy on the existence of party government, which the Professor + was glad to say was being pushed more and more into the background. + He took a practical illustration from the defeat of the O'Loghlen + Government in 1883. In that case, after the election the Government + came back with a following of one-tenth. The other combined party + had nine-tenths, and of these a little more than half were Liberals + and a little less than half were Conservatives. He pointed out that + under Mr. Ashworth's system the Liberals would have got the whole + of the Opposition seats and the Conservatives none, whereas under + any intelligent modification of the Hare system the parties would + have been returned in the proportion of five Liberals, four + Conservatives, and one O'Loghlenite. The system contained the evils + of the <i>scrutin de liste</i> doubled by being applied to two parties, + the evils of the Limited Vote, which had been condemned by all + leading statesmen, and it played into the hands of these who were + best able to organize.<a name="Page_119" id="Page_119" /></p></blockquote> + +<p>Take the latter statements first. The evil of the Block Vote or +<i>scrutin de liste</i> is that it gives all the representation to the +majority, and excludes the minority; its merit is that it prevents the +formation of a number of minorities. How this evil will be doubled if it +is entirely removed by allowing both majority and minority their just +share of representation we leave the Professor to explain. The statement +that the scheme would play into the hands of those who are best able to +organize is absolutely without foundation. On the contrary, the +organization is automatic. It would certainly encourage the formation of +organizations to influence the policies of the parties, since every +organization would be able to exert its proportionate influence, but +that is an advantage, not an evil. We will leave the statement about +party government alone, and now take the "practical illustration." The +Professor here assumes three distinct parties, but it is quite evident +there are only two. It is not usual for Liberal Unionists and +Conservatives to fight one another at elections in Great Britain at +present. In the same way, if a section of Liberals and a section of +Conservatives unite to oppose a Government, they will work together and +not try to exclude one another. Moreover, they will have a common +policy, so that it matters little who are elected so l<a name="Page_120" id="Page_120" />ong as they are +the best men to carry out the policy. Is it likely the Conservatives +would join the Liberals, if the latter were trying to get all the +seats? Thus all the Professor's assumptions are incorrect. But even if +they were correct the conclusion is still wrong. The Liberal section +could not get all the seats if they tried. Imagine a ten-seat +electorate, in which the combined party is entitled to nine members. The +electors would not be required to vote for more than five candidates, +whereas the Professor has assumed that they would be forced to vote for +nine. He has forgotten that the Block Vote becomes the Limited Vote +under the conditions named, and that the Limited Vote allows the +minority a share of representation. Besides, in any case, these +conditions would never arise in a country in a healthy state of +political activity, because then parties would tend more nearly to +equalize each other in strength.</p> + +<p>It has also been objected that a Ministerialist candidate, say, might +stand as an Oppositionist, if the votes of the Opposition candidates +were more split up and it was likely to require less votes for election +in that party. This is a rather fantastic suggestion. The candidate in +question would have to declare himself in favour of a number of things +which he would oppose immediately he was elected. If not, he would have +to openly declare his intention, but that could easily be made illegal. +In any case there would be very little gained, and there is further the +risk that, if defeated, all his votes would count<a name="Page_121" id="Page_121" /> to the Opposition.</p> + +<p>Another possible objection is that too many candidates might stand, +since it is to the interest of each party to get all the support it can. +But candidates are not likely to stand to oblige the party or when there +is no chance of being elected. It is quite possible that, in a country +already split up into numerous groups, the groups would refuse to act +together, and that each group would nominate its own list. This is an +extreme assumption, and certainly would not happen in British countries. +And there would be a constant incentive to the groups to compromise, +since a combination can return its candidates.</p> + +<p>We hope now to have at least established the fact that the organization +of a democracy into two coherent parties—a majority and a minority—is +vitally connected with the electoral machinery. We do not claim that the +method we have proposed will induce a people to vote on true party lines +all at once, for human nature cannot be changed in a day; but we do +confidently assert that it will greatly accelerate that desirable +result, and will tend to give effect to the principles of organization +and responsible leadership.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122" /><a name="CHAPTER_V" id="CHAPTER_V" />CHAPTER V.</h2> + +<p class='center'>HOW THE EVILS OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM WILL BE REMEDIED.</p> + + +<p>From the inception of the representative system it has been usual to +elect representatives in small districts, returning only one or two +members, and the single-membered electorate is now almost universal. In +the early Parliaments, however, elections were not contested as they are +nowadays. It was merely a choice of the most suitable men to represent a +corporate local community. Hence an indirect method of election was +generally resorted to, the final choice being left to a small committee +of the most important men. With the gradual rise of the party system the +conditions entirely changed; and it is important to gain a clear idea of +what is involved in the change.</p> + +<p>In the first stage we have referred to it is not probable that there +were any candidates at all. The posit<a name="Page_123" id="Page_123" />ion of member of Parliament was not +sought after; it was rather thrust upon the man selected as a duty he +owed the community. The choice would usually be unanimous, since there +would be some men whose recognized influence and attainments would mark +them off as most fitted for the position. If there was any difference of +opinion it would be merely as to who was best fitted to represent all, +and therefore there would never be any excluded minority.</p> + +<p>The essential difference in the second stage is that every election is +contested by two organized parties. The choice is now not of men only, +but of measures and of men as well. It is a contest in the first place +within each party as to who is best fitted to represent the party, and +in the second place between the two parties for the support of the +people. The party in a majority secures all the representation; the +party in a minority none. Now, the minority is certainly not represented +by the choice of the majority; on the contrary, its views are exactly +the opposite. Hence the question arises: Is not this exclusion of the +minority an injustice? Does it not amount to disfranchisement? The usual +reply is either that the majority must rule or that the injustice done +in some electorates is balanced in others, so that in the long run rough +justice is obtained.</p> + +<p>As to the first contention, it is the party which has the support of a +majority of the whole people which should rule; and the excluded +minority in some of the electorates belongs to this party. The second +<a name="Page_124" id="Page_124" />practically amounts to the statement that two wrongs make a right.</p> + +<p>A practice prevails in the United States which will illustrate the +position. Each State sends a number of representatives to Congress +proportional to its population, and the division into electorates is +left to the State. By manipulating the electoral boundaries the party +which has a majority in each State is enabled to arrange that the +injustice done to itself is a minimum, and that the injustice done to +the opposing party is a maximum. By this iniquitous practice, which is +known as the gerrymander, the party in a minority in each State is +allowed to get only about one-half or one-quarter of its proper share of +representation. But as the practice is universal in all the States, the +injustice done to a party in some States is balanced in others. Will +those who seek to excuse the injustice done to the minority in each +electorate by the present system of election seriously contend that the +same argument justifies the gerrymander?</p> + +<p>The truth is that the present system has survived the passage from the +first stage of representation into the second, not because it does +justice to both parties, but because it has operated largely to prevent +the formation of more than two parties. It has, therefore, been a means +of giving effect to the central feature of representation, viz.: the +organization of public opinion into two definite lines of policy. But it +is a comparativ<a name="Page_125" id="Page_125" />ely ineffective means, and it no longer suffices to +prevent sectional delegation in any of the democracies we have examined. +Besides, it is accompanied by a series of other evils, which in so far +as they lead to the suppression of responsible leadership, tend to the +degradation of public life. We propose now to consider the effect of the +reform in remedying these defects of the present system.</p> + +<p><b>Parties Not Represented in the Legislature in the Same Proportion as in +the Country.</b>—Representation under the present system is purely +arbitrary; the amount which each party secures is a matter of chance. If +a party with a majority in the whole country has a majority in each of +the electorates it will secure all the representation. On the other +hand, if it splits up its votes in each electorate, or even only in +those electorates where it has a majority, it may secure none at all. +Theoretically, then, any result is possible. The argument would lose its +force, however, if in practice the result usually came out about right. +But this seldom happens, and, speaking generally, two cases may be +distinguished: first, when parties are nearly equal, the minority is +almost as likely as the majority to return a majority of the +representatives, thus defeating the principle of majority rule; and, +second, when one party has a substantial majority, it generally sweeps +the board and annihilates the minority. A few examples will illustrate +these facts.</p> + +<p>The 189<a name="Page_126" id="Page_126" />5 election for the Imperial Parliament is analyzed by Sir John +Lubbock in the <i>Proportional Representation Review</i>. He shows that out +of 481 contested seats, the Liberals, with 1,800,000 votes were +entitled to 242, and the Conservatives and Liberal Unionists, with +1,775,000 to 239, a majority of three seats for the Liberals. But the +Conservatives and Unionists actually returned 279, and the Liberals only +202, a majority of 77 seats. The Conservatives and Unionists obtained +also a majority of 75 of the uncontested seats, giving them a total +majority of 152, instead of the 72 to which they were entitled.</p> + +<p>Recent elections for the United States Congress are shown by Professor +Commons to present striking inequalities. At the election for the 51st +Congress, 1888, the Republicans polled 5,348,379, and the Democrats +5,502,581. But the Republican minority actually secured 164 seats +against 161, a majority of 3, and were enabled to carry the McKinley +tariff law. For the 52nd Congress, 1890, the Republicans, with 4,217,266 +votes, only elected 88, while the Democrats, with 4,974,450 votes, +elected 235, and the Populists, with 354,217 votes, elected 9 +Congressmen. The Democratic majority should have been only 2, instead of +138. Compared with the 51st Congress, their proportion of the popular +vote increased only 1 per cent., but their proportion of the +representatives increased 21 per cent. It required 47,923 votes to elect +a Republican, 44,276 to elect a Populist, and only 21,078 to elect a +Democrat.<a name="Page_127" id="Page_127" /></p> + +<p>To come nearer home, did not Mr. Reid return to power at the 1898 +election in New South Wales although the Opposition polled a majority of +15,000 against him? The last election in Victoria illustrates nothing so +much as the chaotic state of parties, brought about by newspaper +influence in promoting false lines of division. No less than 30 seats, +representing 81,857 votes, were contested only by candidates who +professed to be Ministerialists of various shades. Of 52 seats contested +by Ministerial and Opposition candidates, each party secured 26; but the +Ministerialists paid 59,255 votes for their seats as against 44,327 cast +for the Opposition. 13 seats were uncontested, 9 Ministerial and 4 +Opposition, giving a total of 65 members to the Ministerial party and 30 +members to the Opposition.</p> + +<p>The arbitrary and haphazard character of these results is obvious. It +would be entirely removed by the reform. Every election would reflect +the true feeling of the country; the right of the majority to rule would +be rendered certain, and the right of the minority to a fair hearing +would be assured. Taking the country as a whole, the Ministerialists +would pay almost exactly the same number of votes for each seat as the +Opposition. In each separate electorate the accuracy would not be so +great, but the rectification of even this slight and unavoidable +inequality would, instead of being arbitrary, be subject to the laws of +chance.<a name="Page_128" id="Page_128" /></p> + +<p><b>Ineffective Votes.</b>—Under the present system, all votes cast for +rejected candidates are ineffective; therefore nearly one-half of the +electors have no voice in the Government. A Liberal elector may live in +a Conservative constituency all his life without having the opportunity +to cast an effective vote. The evil of popular indifference is largely +to be explained by this fact. It is no answer to say that it affects +both parties equally. The trouble is that nearly one-half of the +electors of each party have no influence in deciding who are to +represent the party, and therefore do not help to frame its policy.</p> + +<p>This evil would also be entirely removed. Every vote cast would count to +one or the other party. It is not necessary that every vote should be +counted to some one candidate, as the advocates of the Hare system +claim. Votes given to rejected candidates would be in effect just as +much transferred to the successful candidates as by the Hare system. +Moreover, it is an important gain that the candidates of each party +would be ranged in order of favour, as the relative position of the +candidates would be an index of the feeling of each electorate, not only +as regards men but also as regards measures. Therefore, even the votes +given to rejected candidates would affect the framing of the party +policy, and show the progress of public opinion.</p> + +<p><b>Uncontes<a name="Page_129" id="Page_129" />ted Seats.</b>—At the 1895 election for the Imperial Parliament +no less than 189 seats out of 670 were uncontested. Thus one-quarter of +the people had no opportunity of expressing any opinion. In Australia +the proportion is often quite as large. The present Legislative Council +of Victoria is an extreme instance. One-third of the Council retires +every three years; and at the last election not a single seat was +contested. Only 4 out of the 48 sitting members have had to contest +election. Under these circumstances the holding of an election at all +becomes a farce. No doubt it is very convenient for the favoured +individuals; but as the primary object of elections is the ascertainment +of public opinion, it is very desirable that every seat should be +contested.</p> + +<p>The chief cause of this evil is that when one party is strong in an +electorate it is hopeless for the minority to contest it, unless the +majority nominates more than one candidate. On the other hand, the +majority knows that if it does split its votes the minority will +probably win the seat. The result is that the sitting member has a great +advantage, and is often tolerated even though he is acceptable to only a +minority of his own party.</p> + +<p>With the reform each electorate would become the scene of a contest +between the two parties for their proportional share of representation. +It is very unlikely, indeed, that in any electorate no more candidates +would be nominated than are required to be elected.<a name="Page_130" id="Page_130" /></p> + +<p><b>Limitation of Choice.</b>—Even when seats are contested, the elector's +choice is very limited under the present system. Wherever party +government is strong, each party nominates only one candidate, owing to +the danger of splitting up its votes and so losing the seat. The elector +has then practically no choice. He may disapprove of the candidate +standing for his own party, but the only alternative is to stultify +himself by supporting the opposing candidate. If in disgust he abstains +from voting altogether, it is the same as giving each candidate half his +vote. Even when two or three candidates of his own party are nominated, +and he supports the one whose views coincide most closely with his own, +he can exert very little direct influence on the party policy. Besides, +he will often think it wise to support the strongest candidate rather +than the one he favours most.</p> + +<p>These considerations show what a very imperfect instrument the present +system is for expressing public opinion. The test which should be +applied to any system of election is whether it allows each elector to +express his opinion on general policy, and from this point of view the +present system fails lamentably; all opinion which does not run in the +direct channel of party is excluded. Mr. Bryce has fixed on this defect +as the weak point of the party system, but the fault really lies in the +limitation of choice connected with the present system of election. It +is quite true that "in every countr<a name="Page_131" id="Page_131" />y voting for a man is an inadequate +way of expressing one's views of policy, because the candidate is sure +to differ in one or more questions from many of those who belong to the +party."<a name="FNanchor_4" href="#Footnote_4">[4]</a> But if, in the first place, the incentive to limit the number +of candidates be removed and the field of choice widened, and if, in the +second place, each elector be allowed to vote for several candidates +instead of one only, the defect would be remedied. Now, the reform makes +both these provisions, and the importance of the improvement can hardly +be overrated. It means, first, that every elector will be not only +allowed, but also induced, to express his opinion on general policy. He +may give his votes to candidates either for their general views or for +some particular view; or, if he lays less stress on measures than on +men, he may give them to men of high character or of great +administrative ability. It means, secondly, that every section of +opinion composing each party will be fairly represented, and that none +will be excluded, because the candidates of each party will compete +among themselves for the support of all sections, in order to decide +those most in general favour. Hence every section will directly help to +frame and influence the party policy, and there will be not the +slightest excuse for independent action outside the two main parties. In +the third place, it means the substitution of individual responsibility +for the corporate responsibility of parties, since the electors <a name="Page_132" id="Page_132" />will +have the power to reject those who wish to modify party action in any +direction contrary to the general wish. It means, finally, that every +elector's opinion, as expressed by his vote, will have equal influence +in deciding the direction of party action.</p> + +<p><b>Control of Nominations.</b>—There is a constant incentive with the +present system of election to limit the number of candidates to two, one +representing each party. For if either party splits up its votes on more +than one candidate it will risk losing the seat. But the necessity to +limit the candidates involves some control of the nominations, and this +is perhaps the worst feature of the system. It means that, instead of +the electors being allowed to select their representative, he is chosen +for them by some irresponsible body. We have seen how in the United +States the nominating system is the source of the power of the "boss" +and the "machine;" and the same result is only a matter of time in +British countries. The registration of voters is not yet conducted in +the same rigid manner as in America, nor is the farce of holding a +primary election gone through; but whether the control be exercised by a +political organization, a newspaper, a local committee, or a secret +society, the principle is the same. Mr. Bryce has noticed the rapid +change in the practice of England on this point:—"As late as the +general elections of 1868 and 1874 nearly all candidates offered +themselves to the constituency, though some<a name="Page_133" id="Page_133" /> professed to do so in +pursuance of requisitions emanating from the electors. In 1880 many—I +think most—Liberal candidates in boroughs and some in counties were +chosen by the local party associations, and appealed to the Liberal +electors on the ground of having been so chosen. In 1885, and again in +1892, all, or nearly all, new Liberal candidates were so chosen, and a +man offering himself against the nominee of the association was +denounced as an interloper and traitor to the party. The same process +has been going on in the Tory party, though more slowly. The influence +of the locally wealthy, and also that of the central party office, is +somewhat greater among the Tories, but in course of time choice by +representative associations will doubtless become the rule."<a name="FNanchor_5" href="#Footnote_5">[5]</a> Is it to +be expected that this power will not be abused as in America? The +trouble is that no association can represent all the party electors, and +that the representative becomes responsible to the managers of the +association, to whom he really owes his election. Any control of this +kind is fatal to the principle of responsible leadership. And yet the +only alternative with the present method of election is the break-up of +the party system. This is the dilemma in which all modern democracies +are placed. The evil will be completely obviated by the reform. Instead +of limiting the candidates, it will be to the advantage of each party to +induce the strongest and most popular can<a name="Page_134" id="Page_134" />didates to stand on its behalf, +since the number of seats it will obtain depends only on the aggregate +votes polled by all the candidates. With individual candidature there +can be no "machine" control of nominations. All are free to appeal +directly to the people.</p> + +<p><b>Localization of Politics.</b>—The local delegate is unfortunately the +prevailing type of Australian politician. The value of a member is too +often measured by the services he renders to his constituents +individually or the amount of money he can get the Government to spend +in his constituency. Hence the nefarious practice of log-rolling in +Parliament. Is it any wonder that some of the colonies promise to rival +France in the proportion of unreproductive works constructed out of loan +money?</p> + +<p>How few of our members approach the ideal expressed by Edmund Burke in +his address to the electors of Bristol:—"Parliament is not a congress +of ambassadors from different and hostile interests, which interests +each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and +advocates; but Parliament is a deliberative assembly of our nation, with +one interest—that of the whole—where not local purposes, not local +prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the +general reason of the whole. You choose a member, indeed, but when you +have chosen him he is not a member of Bristol, but he is a member of +Parliament." It must be confessed, however, that Bur<a name="Page_135" id="Page_135" />ke's ideal is rather +exalted; it is the duty of a member to make known the requirements of +his district. It is the ministry which is specially charged with +looking after the interest of the whole and of resisting illegitimate +demands. But it cannot do so if its position is so insecure that it must +purchase the support of the "parish pump" politician.</p> + +<p>The only way to nationalize politics is to ensure that every electorate +shall be contested on national issues by organized parties, and that +every locality shall be represented on both parties. The proposed system +will provide this remedy. In enlarged electorates each party will take +good care that its candidates are men of local influence in the most +important divisions of the electorate; therefore, sectional and local +interests will be represented, but they will be subordinated to the +interests of the whole electorate; and where there are a few large +divisions the interests of each will more nearly coincide with national +interests than where there are a large number of small divisions. +Besides, log-rolling will not be so easy between groups of +representatives as among single representatives.</p> + +<p><b>Incentive to Bribery and Corruption.</b>—We now come to a class of evils +which to a large extent result from the fact that a few votes in each +electorate decide whether a party gets all the representation or none at +all. Candidates are impelled, in order to gain support from every +faction, to acts degrading to themselves and destruct<a name="Page_136" id="Page_136" />ive to the moral +tone of the people. Foremost among these evils is the great incentive to +bribery and corruption; it is manifested not only in direct expenditure +at the elections, but also in promises of patronage and class +advantages. Direct bribery is perhaps worst in America; Professor M. +Cook states, in a paper on "The Alarming Proportion of Venal Voters" in +the <i>Forum</i> for September, 1892, that in twenty-one towns of Connecticut +16 per cent, of the voters are venal. As Professor Commons remarks:—"It +is plain that the bribable voters themselves are adequate to hold the +balance of power between the parties. The single-membered district, +therefore, places a magnificent premium upon bribery." In England the +<i>Corrupt Practices Act</i> has done immense good: nothing reflects so much +honour on the Imperial Parliament as the voluntary transference of the +duty of deciding cases to the judiciary. In Australia this much-needed +reform has not yet been introduced, and direct bribery prevails to a +much larger extent than would be supposed from the number of cases +investigated. Members of Parliament are naturally loth to convict one of +their own number, and the knowledge of this fact prevents petitions +being lodged.</p> + +<p>The mere existence of secret bribery is bad enough, but a greater danger +is that acts of indirect bribery are openly practised, with the tacit +approval of electors. "There have been instances," says Mr. Lecky, in +his "Demo<a name="Page_137" id="Page_137" />cracy and Liberty," "in which the political votes of the police +force, of the P.O. officials, of the civil service clerks have been +avowedly marshalled for the purpose of obtaining particular class +advantages—a disintegrated majority is strongly tempted to conciliate +every detached group of votes." In Australia this has become a regular +practice; and a still worse feature is that Members of Parliament have +free access to public departments to promote class and local interests. +Class legislation is frequently brought forward on the eve of an +election with the sole object of influencing votes. These conditions +favour the wire-pullers and mere self-seekers, and, in so far as they +prevent the electors from voting on the political views and personal +merits of the candidates, they are inimical to the public interests. Mr. +Lecky has pointed out that a certain amount of moral compromise is +necessary in public life, and that a politician may indulge in +popularity-hunting from honourable public motives; the danger is that +unworthy politicians may screen themselves under shelter of this excuse.</p> + +<p>We do not claim that the proposed system would abolish corruption, but +we are justified in hoping that it would mitigate it very much. Even if +the venal vote still held the balance of power between parties, parties +are not so easily corrupted as individuals. But the most important gain +is that it could only exert an influence proportional to its numbers; it +could not decide whether a party gets all the representation or none at +<a name="Page_138" id="Page_138" />all, as at present. In most cases it would be doubtful if it would +affect a single candidate. Consider, again, the case of individual +candidates of the same party; any candidate resorting to bribery in +order to increase his chance of election would do so partly at the +expense of the other candidates of his own party, who would immediately +denounce him. Instead of being forced to conciliate selfish factions, +the candidates would be free to appeal for the support of the unselfish +sections.</p> + +<p><b>Continual Change in Electoral Boundaries.</b>—The irregular growth of +population necessitates a periodical revision of the electoral +boundaries of single-membered electorates. Owing to the influence of +vested interests, this is generally effected in an arbitrary manner; and +the glaring anomalies only are rectified. We have in Victoria at the +present day some country electorates with 6,000 electors on the rolls +and others with only 1,500. An elector in the latter has four times the +voting power of an elector in the former. The process of alteration of +the boundaries offers great temptation to unfairness; and in American +politics the opportunity is taken full advantage of by a practice which +has received the name of the gerrymander. In his work on "Proportional +Representation" Professor Commons writes:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>It is difficult to express the opprobrium rightly belonging to so + iniquitous a practice as the gerrymander; but its enormity is not + appreciated, just as brutal prize-fighting is not reprobated + providing it be fought according to the rules. Both political + parties practise it, and neither can cond<a name="Page_139" id="Page_139" />emn the other. They simply + do what is natural: make the most of their opportunities as far as + permitted by the constitution and system under which both are + working. The gerrymander is not produced by the iniquity of + parties, it is the outcome of the district system. If + representatives are elected in this way there must be some public + authority for outlining the districts. And who shall be the judge + to say where the line shall be drawn? Exact equality is impossible, + and who shall set the limit beyond which inequality shall not be + pressed? Every apportionment act that has been passed in this or + any other country has involved inequality; and it would be absurd + to ask a political party to pass such an act and give the advantage + of the inequality to the opposite party. Consequently, every + apportionment act involves more or less of the gerrymander. The + gerrymander is simply such a thoughtful construction of districts + as will economize the votes of the party in power by giving it + small majorities in a large number of districts, and coop up the + opposing party with overwhelming majorities in a large number of + districts. This may involve a very distortionate and uncomely + "scientific" boundary, and the joining together of distant and + unrelated localities into a single district; such was the case in + the famous original act of Governor Gerry, of Massachusetts, whence + the practice obtained its amphibian name.<a name="FNanchor_6" href="#Footnote_6">[6]</a> But it is not always + necessary that districts be cut into distortionate shapes in order + to accomplish these unjust results. (pp. 49, 50.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>He illustrates a gerrymander which actually made one Democratic vote +equal to five Republican votes. We have quoted this description of the +methods of the gerrymander not so much because the evil has attained any +magnitude in Australia as because it offers a warning of the probable +result of adopting the single-membered district system for our Federal +<a name="Page_140" id="Page_140" />legislature.</p> + +<p>With enlarged or grouped electorates the periodical revision of +boundaries would be entirely obviated, because the size of the +electorate may be kept constant, and the number of representatives +varied. Under such a system all unfairness would disappear, and the +gerrymander would be impossible. Representation would automatically +<a name="Page_141" id="Page_141" />follow the movements of population.</p> + +<p>FOOTNOTES:</p> + +<p><a name="Footnote_4" href="#FNanchor_4">[4]</a> Bryce, "The American Commonwealth," vol ii, p 325</p> + +<p><a name="Footnote_5" href="#FNanchor_5">[5]</a> Bryce, "The American Commonwealth," vol. ii., note on p. 81.</p> + +<p><a name="Footnote_6" href="#FNanchor_6">[6]</a> Governor Gerry contrived an electorate which resembled a salamander +in shape.</p> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VI" id="CHAPTER_VI" />CHAPTER VI.</h2> + +<p class='center'>THE HARE SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL DELEGATION.</p> + + +<p>The single transferable vote, generally known as the Hare system, was +first invented by a Danish statesman, M. Andrae, and was used for the +election of a portion of the "Rigsraad" in 1855. In 1857 Mr. Thomas +Hare, barrister-at-law, published it independently in England in a +pamphlet on "The Machinery of Representation." This formed the basis of +the scheme elaborated in his "Election of Representatives," which +appeared in 1859.</p> + +<p>He proposed to abolish all geographical boundaries by constituting the +whole of the United Kingdom one electorate for the return of the 654 +members of the House of Commons. Each member was to be elected by an +equal unanimous number of electors. The method of election was therefore +so contrived as to allow the electors to group themselves into 654 +constituencies, each group bound only by the tie of voluntary +<a name="Page_142" id="Page_142" />association, and gathered from every corner of the Kingdom. The total +number of votes cast (about a million) was to be divided by 654, and the +quotient, say about 1,500, would be the quota or number of votes +required to elect a member. But some of the candidates would naturally +receive more votes than the quota, and a great many more would receive +less. How were all the votes to be equally divided among 654 members so +that each should secure exactly the quota? The single transferable vote +was proposed to attain this result. Each elector's vote was to count for +one candidate only, but he was allowed to say in advance to whom he +would wish his vote transferred in case it could not be used for his +first choice. Each ballot paper was, therefore, to contain the names of +a number of candidates in order of preference—1, 2, 3, &c. Then all the +candidates having more than a quota of first choices were to have the +surplus votes taken from them and transferred to the second choice on +the papers, or if the second choice already had enough votes, to the +third choice, and so on. When all the surpluses were distributed a +certain number of members would be declared elected, each with a quota +of votes. The candidates who had received the least amount of support +were then to be gradually eliminated. The lowest candidate would be +first rejected, and his votes transferred to the next available +preference on his ballot papers; then the next lowest w<a name="Page_143" id="Page_143" />ould be rejected, +and so on till all the votes were equally distributed among the 654 +members. Such was the Hare system as propounded by its author. The +electors were to divide themselves into voluntary groups; then the +groups which were too large were to be cut down by transferring the +surplus votes, and the smaller groups were to be excluded and the votes +also transferred until the groups were reduced to 654 equal +constituencies. These two processes, transferring surplus votes and +transferring votes from excluded candidates, are the main features of +the system. Mr. Hare's rules for carrying them out are drawn up in the +form of a proposed electoral law, and in the different editions of his +work the clauses vary somewhat. They are also complicated by an +impossible attempt to retain the local nomenclature of members. As +regards surplus votes it was provided that the ballot papers which had +the most preferences expressed should be transferred; still a good deal +was left to chance or to the sweet will of the returning officer, and +this has always been admitted as a serious objection. The process of +elimination is still more unsatisfactory. Mr. Hare was from the first +strongly opposed to the elimination of the candidate who had least first +preferences, and he therefore proposed that, in order to decide which +candidate had least support, all expressed preferences should be +counted. This involved such enormous complication that in the 1861 +edition of his work <a name="Page_144" id="Page_144" />he abandoned the process of elimination altogether +in favour of a process of selection. He then proposed to distribute +surplus votes only, and to elect the highest of the remainder, +regardless of the fact that they had less than a quota. He then +wrote:—"The reduction of the number of candidates remaining at this +stage of the election may be effected by taking out the names of all +those who have the smallest number of actual votes—that is, who are +named at the <i>head</i> of the smallest number of voting papers, and +appropriating each vote to the candidate standing <i>next</i> in order on +each paper. This process would be so arbitrary and inequitable in its +operation as to be intolerable. It might have the effect of cancelling +step by step more votes given to one candidate than would be sufficient +to return another.... Such a process disregards the legitimate rights +both of electors and of candidates." But the process of selection was +not proportional representation at all, being practically equivalent to +a single untransferable vote, and Mr. Hare finally adopted, in spite of +its defects, the "arbitrary and inequitable" process of elimination in +his last edition in 1873. And all his recent disciples have been forced +to do the same, because nothing better is known.</p> + +<p>Mr. Hare's scheme has ceased to be of any practical interest, since it +is now generally admitted that electorates should not return more than +ten or twenty members. M<a name="Page_145" id="Page_145" />oreover, it is admitted that the electors would +group themselves in very undesirable ways, and not as Mr. Hare expected. +And yet the only effect of limiting the size of the electorates is to +reduce the number of undesirable ways in which electors might group +themselves. Let us briefly note the different proposals which have been +made.</p> + +<p><b>1. Sir John Lubbock's Method.</b>—In his work on "Representation," Sir +John Lubbock says:—"The full advantage of the single transferable vote +would require a system of large constituencies returning three or five +members each, thus securing a true representation of opinion." +Three-seat electorates are, however, too small to secure accurate +proportional representation; with parties evenly balanced, for instance, +one must secure twice as much representation as the other.</p> + +<p>The following rules are given to explain the working of the system:—</p> + +<p>(1) Each voter shall have one vote, but may vote in the alternative for +as many of the candidates as he pleases by writing the figures 1, 2, 3, +etc, opposite the names of those candidates in the order of his +preference.</p> + +<p class='center'>COUNTING VOTES.</p> + +<p>(2) The ballot papers, having been all mixed, shall be drawn out in +succession and stamped with numbers so that no two shall bear the same +number.</p> + +<p>(3) The number obtained by dividing the whole number of good ballot +papers tendered at the election by the number of members to be elected +plus one, and increasing the quotient (or where it is fractional the +<a name="Page_146" id="Page_146" />integral part of the quotient) by one, shall be called the quota.</p> + +<p>(4) Every candidate who has a number of first votes equal to or greater +than the quota shall be declared elected, and so many of the ballot +papers containing those votes as shall be equal in number to the quota +(being those stamped with the lowest numerals) shall be set aside as of +no further use. On all ballot papers the name of the elected candidate +shall be deemed to be cancelled, with the effect of raising by so much +in the order of preference all votes given to other candidates after +him. This process shall be repeated until no candidate has more than a +quota of first votes or votes deemed first.</p> + +<p>(5) Then the candidate or candidates having the fewest first votes, or +votes deemed first, shall be declared not to be elected, with the effect +of raising by so much in the order of preference all votes given to +candidates after him or them, and rule 4 shall be again applied if +possible.</p> + +<p>(6) When by successive applications of rules 4 and 5 the number of +candidates is reduced to the number of members remaining to be elected, +the remaining candidates shall be declared elected.</p> + +<p>Objection is commonly taken to this method on account of the element of +chance involved in the distribution of surplus votes. Suppose the quota +to be 1,000, and a candidate to receive 1,100 votes, t<a name="Page_147" id="Page_147" />he 100 votes to be +transferred would be those stamped with the highest numerals. But if the +hundred stamped with the lowest numerals or any other hundred had been +taken the second choices would be different.</p> + +<p>Strictly speaking, however, this is not a chance selection—it is an +arbitrary selection. The returning officer must transfer certain +definite papers; if he were allowed to make a chance selection it would +be in his power to favour some of the candidates.</p> + +<p>Sir John Lubbock points out that the element of chance might be +eliminated by distributing the second votes proportionally to the second +choices on the whole 1,100 papers, and that it might be desirable to +leave any candidate the right to claim that this should be done if he +thought it worth while.</p> + +<p><b>2.—The Hare-Clark Method.</b>—The Hare system has been in actual use in +Tasmania for the last two elections. It is applied only in a six-seat +electorate at Hobart and a four-seat electorate at Launceston. The rules +for distributing surplus votes proportionally were drawn up by Mr. A.I. +Clark, late Attorney-General. The problem is not so simple as it appears +at first sight. There is no difficulty with a surplus on the first +count; it is when surpluses are created in subsequent counts by +transferred votes that the conditions become complicated. Mr. Clark +adopts a rule that in the latter case the transferred papers only are to +be taken into account in deciding the proportional distribution of the +surplus. <a name="Page_148" id="Page_148" />Suppose, as before, the quota to be 1,000 votes, and a +candidate to have 1,100 votes, 550 of which are marked in the second +place to one of the other candidates. Then the latter is entitled to 50 +of the surplus votes, and a chance selection is made of the 550 papers. +The element of chance still remains, therefore, if this surplus +contributes to a fresh surplus.</p> + +<p><b>3.—The Droop-Gregory Method.</b>—This method, advocated by Professor +Nanson, of the Melbourne University, is claimed to entirely eliminate +the element of chance. The Gregory plan of transferring surplus votes is +defined as a fractional method. If a candidate needs only nine-tenths of +his votes to make up his quota, instead of distributing the surplus of +one-tenth of the papers all the papers are distributed with one-tenth of +their value. Reverting to our former example, if a candidate is marked +second on 550 out of 1,100 votes, the quota being 1,000 and the surplus +100, then instead of selecting 50 out of the 550 papers, the whole of +them would be transferred in a packet, the value of the packet being 50 +votes, or, as Professor Nanson prefers to put it, the value of each +paper in the packet being one-eleventh of a vote. Should this packet +contribute to a new surplus the third choices on the whole of the papers +are available as a basis for the redistribution. The packet would be +divided into smaller packets, and each assigned its reduced value. It +might here be pointed out that the use of fractions is quite +unneces<a name="Page_149" id="Page_149" />sary, the value of each packet in votes being all that is +required, and that the-same process may be used with the Hare-Clark +method to avoid the chance selection of papers. The only real +difference is this: that when a surplus is created by transferred votes +Mr. Clark distributes it by reference to the next preference on all the +transferred papers, and Professor Nanson by reference to the last packet +of transferred papers only—the packet which raises the candidate above +the quota.</p> + +<p>Which of these methods is correct? Should we select the surplus from all +votes, original and transferred, as Sir John Lubbock proposes; from all +transferred votes only, with Mr. Clark; or from the last packet only of +transferred votes, with Professor Nanson? Consider a group of electors +having somewhat more than a quota of votes at its disposal. If it +nominates one candidate only every one of the electors will have a voice +in the distribution of the surplus, but if it puts up three candidates, +two of whom are excluded and the third elected, Mr. Clark would allow +those who supported the two excluded candidates to decide the +distribution of the surplus, and Professor Nanson only those who +supported the last candidate excluded. Both are clearly wrong, for the +only rational view to take is that when a candidate is excluded it is +the same as if he had never been nominated and the transferred votes had +formed part of the original votes of those to whom they are transferred. +Whenever a <a name="Page_150" id="Page_150" />surplus is created it should therefore be distributed by +reference to all votes, original and transferred. As regards these +surpluses, Mr. Clark and Professor Nanson have adopted an arbitrary +basis, which is no more than Sir John Lubbock has done; and they have +therefore eliminated the element of chance only for surpluses on the +first count. It may be asked, Why cannot all surpluses be distributed by +reference to all the papers, if that is the correct method? The answer +is that the complication involved is enormous. Yet this was the plan +first advocated by Professor Nanson, who wrote, in reply to a definite +inquiry how the Gregory principle was applied:—"I explain by an +example. A has 2,000 votes, the quota being 1,000. A then requires only +half the value of each vote cast for him. Each paper cast for him is +then stamped as having lost one-half of its value, and the whole of A's +papers are then transferred with diminished value to the second name +(unelected, of course). The same principle applies all through. Whenever +anyone has a surplus all the papers are passed to the next man with +diminished value." Now, the effect of this extraordinary proposal would +be that the whole of the papers would have to be kept in circulation +till the last candidate was elected, with diminishing compound +fractional values. In a ten-seat electorate a large proportion would +pass through several transfers, and would towards the end of the count +have such a ridiculously small f<a name="Page_151" id="Page_151" />ractional value that it would take +several millions of the ballot-papers to make a single vote! It is no +wonder that this method was abandoned when the complications to which +it would lead were realized.</p> + +<p>A simple method of avoiding this complexity would be to treat +transferred surplus papers as if the preferences were exhausted. It must +be remembered that in all transfers a certain number of papers are lost +owing to the preferences being exhausted, and the additional loss would +be small. Thus at the first Hobart election 206 votes were wasted, and +this number would have been increased by two only. Every surplus would +then be transferred by reference to the next choice, wherever expressed, +on both original papers and papers transferred from excluded candidates.</p> + +<p>It might be provided, however, for greater accuracy that all papers +contributing to surpluses on the first count only should be transferred +in packets. Should these contribute to a new surplus, it should be +divided into two parts, proportional to (1) original votes and votes +transferred from excluded candidates, and (2) the value of the packet in +votes. Each part would then be distributed proportionally to the next +available preferences wherever expressed. To divide the packets into +sub-packets is a useless complication. The loss involved in neglecting +them would usually be less than one-thousandth part of the loss due to +exhausted papers.<a name="Page_152" id="Page_152" /></p> + +<p>Having now dealt with the main features of the different variations of +the Hare system, we may proceed to consider some details which are +common to all of them. A difference of opinion exists, however, as +regards the quota. Sir John Lubbock and Professor Nanson advocate the +Droop quota, which we have shown to be a mathematical error; Miss Spence +and Mr. Clark use the correct quota.</p> + +<p><b>The Wrong Candidates are Liable to be Elected.</b>—The Hare system may be +criticised from two points of view; first, as applied to the conditions +prevailing when it is introduced, and, secondly, as regards the new +conditions it would bring about. Its advocates confine themselves to the +first point of view, and invariably use illustrations based on the +existence of parties.</p> + +<p>We readily grant that if the electors vote on party lines, and transfer +their votes within the party as assumed, the Hare system would give +proportional representation to the parties; but even then it would +sacrifice the interests of individual candidates, for it affords no +guarantee that the right candidates will be elected. The constant +tendency is that favourites of factions within the party will be +preferred to general favourites. This at the same time destroys party +cohesion, and tends to split up parties. Nor can this result be wondered +at, since the very foundation of the system is the separate +representation of a number of sections.</p> + +<p>One reason why<a name="Page_153" id="Page_153" /> the wrong candidates are liable to be elected is that the +electors will not record their honest preferences if the one vote only +is effective. They will give their vote to the candidate who is thought +to need it most, and the best men will go to the wall because they are +thought to be safe. Mr. R.M. Johnston, Government Statistician of +Tasmania, confirms this view when he declares—"The aggregate of all +counts, whether effective or not, would seem to be the truer index of +the general favour in which each candidate stands, because the numbers +polled at the first count may be greatly disturbed by the action of +those who are interested in the success of two or more favourites who +may be pretty well assured of success, but whose order of preference +might by some be altered if sudden rumour suggested fears for any one of +the favoured group. This accidental action would tend to conceal the +true exact measure of favour in the first count." If this statement +means anything it is that the three preferences which are required to be +expressed should have been all counted as effective votes at the Hobart +election instead of one only; and this is exactly what we advocate. It +is also admitted that when two candidates ran together at the first +Launceston election the more popular candidate was defeated; and again +the <i>Argus</i> correspondent writes of the recent Hobart election:—"The +defeat of Mr. Nicholls was doubtless due to the fact of his supporters' +over-confidence—nothing else explains it. Many people gave him No. 2 +votes who would have given him No. 1 votes had they not felt assured of +<a name="Page_154" id="Page_154" />his success."</p> + +<p>A second reason why the wrong candidates are liable to be elected is +that the process of elimination adopted by all the Hare methods has no +mathematical justification. The candidate who is first excluded has one +preference only taken account of, while others have many preferences +given effect to. We have shown that this glaring injustice was +recognized by Mr. Hare, and only adopted as a last resort. Professor +Nanson admits that "the process of elimination which has been adopted by +all the exponents of Hare's system is not satisfactory," and adds—"I do +not know a scientific solution of the difficulty." To bring home the +inequity of the process, consider a party which nominates six +candidates, A, B, C, D, E, and F, and whose numbers entitle it to three +seats, and suppose the electors to vote in the proportions and order +shown below on the first count.</p> + + +<table border='0' cellspacing="0" cellpadding="10"> + + <tr align="center"> + <th></th> + <th>FIRST<br />COUNT.</th> + <th>SECOND<br />COUNT.</th> + <th>THIRD<br />COUNT.</th> + <th>FOURTH<br />COUNT.</th> + </tr> + <tr align="center"> + <td>7-vote</td> + <td>ADEFBC</td> + <td>ADEBC</td> + <td>AEBC</td> + <td>ABC</td> + </tr> + <tr align="center"> + <td>6-vote</td> + <td>EFDACB</td> + <td>EDACB</td> + <td>EACB</td> + <td>ACB</td> + </tr> + <tr align="center"> + <td>5-vote</td> + <td>CEBDFA</td> + <td>CEBDA</td> + <td>CEBA</td> + <td>CBA</td> + </tr> + <tr align="center"> + <td>4-vote</td> + <td>BDFACE</td> + <td>BDACE</td> + <td>BACE</td> + <td>BAC</td> + </tr> + <tr align="center"> + <td>4-vote</td> + <td>DCEFBA</td> + <td>DCEBA</td> + <td>CEBA</td> + <td>CBA</td> + </tr> + <tr align="center"> + <td>3-vote</td> + <td>FBAECD</td> + <td>BAECD</td> + <td>BAEC</td> + <td>BAC</td> + </tr> + +</table> + +<p>It will be noted that F, having fewest first votes, is eliminated <a name="Page_155" id="Page_155" />from +the second count, D from the third count, and E from the fourth. A has +then 13 votes, B 7, and C 9. If the quota be 9 votes, A's surplus would +be passed on to B, and A, B, and C would be declared elected. But D, E, +and F are the candidates most in general favour, and ought to have been +elected. For if any one of the rejected candidates be compared with any +one of the successful candidates it will be found that in every case the +rejected candidate is higher in order of favour on a majority of the +papers. Again, if the Block Vote be applied, by counting three effective +votes, the result would be—A 10 votes, B 12, C 9, D 21, E 22, and F 13. +D, E, and F would therefore be elected. Thus we see that A, B, and C, +the favourites of sections within the party, are elected, and D, E, and +F, the candidates most in general favour—those who represent a +compromise among the sections—are rejected.</p> + +<p>In practice, then, the Hare system discourages compromise among parties, +and among sections of parties; and therefore tends to obliterate party +lines. This has already happened in Tasmania, where all experience goes +to show that the Hare system is equivalent to compulsory plumping. In +every election the result would have been exactly the same if each +elector voted for one candidate only. The theory that it does not matter +how many candidates stand for each party, since votes will be +transferred within the party, has been completely disproved. Votes are +actually transferre<a name="Page_156" id="Page_156" />d almost indiscriminately. The candidates have not +been slow to grasp this fact, and at the last election handbills were +distributed giving "explicit reasons why the electors should give their +No. 1 to Mr. So-and-so, and their No. 2 to any other person they +chose."<a name="FNanchor_7" href="#Footnote_7">[7]</a> Three out of every four first preferences are found to be +effective, but only one out of every five second preferences, and one +out of fifty third preferences. The first preferences, therefore, decide +the election.</p> + +<p>The actual result is that, in the long run, the Hare system is +practically the same as the single untransferable vote. The whole of the +elaborate machinery for recording preferences and transferring votes +might just as well be entirely dispensed with. The "automatic +organization" which it was to provide exists only in the calculations of +mathematicians.</p> + +<p><b>A Number of Votes are Wasted.</b>—It is claimed for the Hare system that +every vote cast is effective, because it counts for some one candidate. +But unless every elector places all the candidates in order of +preference some votes are wasted because the preferences become +exhausted.</p> + +<p>When a paper to be transferred has no further available preferences +expressed it is lost. In order to reduce this waste, a vote is held to +be informal in the six-seat electorate at Hobart unless at least three +preferences are given. Notwithstanding this, the number of such votes +wasted was 7 per cent, at the first election and 10 per cent, at the +second.<a name="Page_157" id="Page_157" /></p> + +<p>The effect of this waste is that some of the candidates are elected +with less than the quota. At the last Hobart election only three out of +six members were elected on full quotas, and at Launceston only one out +of four. The result is to favour small, compact minorities, and to lead +sections to scheme to get representation on the lowest possible terms.</p> + +<p>The Droop quota, being smaller than the Tasmanian quota, would have the +effect of electing more members on full quotas, and it is often +recommended on that account. Indeed, Professor Nanson declares:—"In no +circumstances is any candidate elected on less than a quota of votes. +The seats for which a quota has not been obtained are filled one after +the other, each by a candidate elected by an absolute majority of the +whole of the voters. For the seats to be filled in this way all +candidates as yet unelected enter into competition. The matter is +settled by a reference to the whole of the voting papers. If any +unelected candidate now stands first on an absolute majority of all +these papers he is elected. But if not, then the weeding-out process is +applied until an absolute majority is obtained. The candidate who gets +the absolute majority is elected. Should there be another seat, the same +process is repeated. If an absolute majority of the whole of the voters +cannot be obtained for any candidate, then the candidate who comes +nearest to the absolute <a name="Page_158" id="Page_158" />majority is elected." It will be seen that +Professor Nanson proposes to bring to life again all the eliminated +candidates, in order to compete against those who have less than the +quota. The proportional principle is then to be entirely abandoned, and +the seats practically given to the stronger party, although the minority +may be clearly entitled to them. The vaunted "one vote one value" is +also to be violated, because those who supported the elected candidates +are to have an equal voice with those still unrepresented. And finally, +the evil is not cured, it is only aggravated, if an eliminated candidate +is elected.</p> + +<p><b>The Hare System is not Preferential.</b>—The idea is sedulously fostered +that the Hare system is a form of preferential voting, and many people +are misled thereby. The act of voting is exalted into an end in itself. +The most elaborate provisions are now suggested by Professor Nanson to +allow the elector to express his opinion only as far as he likes. The +simple and practical method in use in Tasmania of requiring each elector +to place a definite number of candidates in order of preference is +denounced as an infringement of the elector's freedom. Why force him to +express preferences where he does not feel any? The Professor has +therefore invented "the principle of the bracket." If the elector cannot +discriminate between the merits of a number of candidates he may bracket +them all equal in order of favour. Indeed, where he does no<a name="Page_159" id="Page_159" />t indicate +any preference at all, the names unmarked are deemed equal. Therefore, +if he does not wish his vote transferred to any candidate, he must +strike out his name. It is pointed out that a ballot paper can thus be +used if there is any kind of preference expressed at all, and the risk +of informality is reduced to a minimum. All the bracket papers are to be +put into a separate parcel, and do not become "definite" till all the +candidates bracketed, except one, are either elected or rejected; the +vote is then transferred to that candidate. And as bracketed candidates +will occur in original papers, surplus papers, and excluded candidates' +papers at every stage of the count, the degree of complication in store +for the unhappy returning officer can be imagined.</p> + +<p>The whole of these intricate provisions are founded on a patent fallacy. +Preferences are not expressed in the Hare system, as in true +preferential voting, that they may be given effect to in deciding the +election, but simply in order to allow the elector to say in advance to +whom he would wish his vote transferred if it cannot be used for his +first choice. The elector is allowed to express his opinion about a +number of candidates, certainly, but after being put to this trouble +only one of his preferences is used. And which one is used depends +entirely on the vagaries of the system. The principle of the bracket +illustrates this fact; if the elector has no preference the system +decides for him. I<a name="Page_160" id="Page_160" />f his first choice just receives the quota the other +preferences are not even looked at. Again, of all the electors who vote +for rejected candidates, those who are fortunate enough to vote for the +worst (who are first excluded) have their second or third preferences +given effect to, and few of their votes are wasted; but the votes of +those who support the best of them (who are last excluded) are either +wasted or given to their remote preferences. In Mr. Hare's original +scheme, for instance, the votes of the last 50 candidates excluded would +have been nearly all wasted, unless some hundreds of preferences were +expressed.</p> + +<p>Another claim on which great stress is laid is that by the process of +transferring votes every vote counts to some one candidate. This means +nothing more than that the votes of rejected candidates are transferred +to the successful candidates. Where is the necessity for this? So long +as each party secures its just share of representation and elects its +most favoured candidates, there is no advantage gained by transferring +the votes. Miss Spence even declares that "every Senator elected in this +way will represent an equal number of votes, and will rightly have equal +weight in the House. According to the block system, there is often a +wide disparity between the number of votes for the highest and the +lowest man elected." Surely the mere fact of transferring votes till +they are equally distributed does not make all the successful candidates +equally popular! On the contrary, it is very desirable to know which +<a name="Page_161" id="Page_161" />candidates are most in favour with each party.</p> + +<p><b>Ballot Papers Must be Brought Together for Counting.</b>—This is a +practical objection to the Hare system, which puts it out of court for +large electorates. If the whole of Victoria were constituted one +electorate, as at the Federal Convention election, the transference of +votes could not be commenced till all the ballot papers had come in from +the remote parts of the colony, two or three weeks after the election. +On this point Professor Nanson writes:—"In an actual election in +Victoria this 'first state of the poll' could be arrived at with the +same rapidity as was the result of the recent poll on the Commonwealth +Bill. In both cases but one fact is to be gleaned from each voting +paper. The results from all parts of the colony would be posted in +Collins-street on election day. These results would show exactly how the +cat was going to jump. The final results as regards parties would be +obvious to all observers, although the result as regards individual +candidates would be far from clear. But this, although of vast +importance to the candidates themselves, would be a matter of small +concern to the great mass of the people." These remarks are based on the +assumption that the electors vote on strictly party lines, which a +reference to Tasmanian returns will show is not usually the case. Few +will be disposed to agree that a knowledge of the successful candidates +<a name="Page_162" id="Page_162" />is a matter of small moment.</p> + +<p>FOOTNOTE:</p> + +<p><a name="Footnote_7" href="#FNanchor_7">[7]</a> <i>Hobart Mercury</i></p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VII" id="CHAPTER_VII" />CHAPTER VII.</h2> + +<p class='center'>FREE LIST SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL DELEGATION.</p> + + +<p>The <i>Liste Libre</i>, or Free List system, is a far simpler and more +practical method of proportional representation than the Hare system. +The distinctive feature is that it applies the proportional principle +not to individual candidates but to parties. But, like the Hare system, +it places no restriction on the number of parties. It is therefore +particularly adapted to the circumstances of the countries on the +Continent of Europe, which, having already a number of strong party +organizations, wish to retain them and to do justice to each. +Accordingly we find that nearly all experiments in proportional +representation to the present time have been confined to those +countries.</p> + +<p>Perhaps the very earliest attempt to apply the proportional principle +was that of Mr. Thomas Gilpin, in a pamphlet, "On the Representation of +Minorities of Electors to act with the Majority in Elected Assemblies," +publis<a name="Page_163" id="Page_163" />hed at Philadelphia in 1844. He proposed that electorates should +be enlarged, and that each party should nominate a list of candidates +equal to the number required to be elected, and should place them in +order of preference. Each elector could then vote for one of these +lists; and each party would be allotted a number of representatives +proportional to the amount of support it received. The highest on each +list, to the number allotted, would be elected. It will be seen that +this is really a system of double election; for the order of favour of +the candidates of any party would have to be decided before the +nominations were made.</p> + +<p>Only two years afterwards M. Victor Considerant published a similar +scheme at Geneva, Switzerland. Each elector was to vote first for a +party and then for any number of candidates on the party list whom he +preferred. The party votes were to decide the number of members allotted +to each list, and the individual votes the successful candidates.</p> + +<p>The little republic of Switzerland has been the scene of nearly all +subsequent improvement. In 1867 Professor Ernest Naville founded the +<i>Association Réformiste</i> at Geneva to advocate the principle of +proportional representation. In 1871 the Association adopted the <i>Liste +Libre</i> system, invented by M. Borely, of Nimes, France, in which each +elector was to place all the candidates of his party in order of +preference. But as this allows the electors little direct influence on +their own candi<a name="Page_164" id="Page_164" />dates and none outside of them, a combination of the +cumulative vote and the <i>Liste Libre</i> was adopted in 1875. Each elector +was to have as many votes as there were seats to be filled, but he +could not only give them to any candidates on any list, but he could +also give as many votes as he liked to any one candidate. Thus if there +were ten seats to be filled the elector could give ten votes to one +candidate, or one vote to each of ten candidates, or five votes to one +candidate and divide the remaining five among others, and so on. The +only condition necessary was that his votes added up to ten. The +aggregate votes given to all the candidates of each party were then to +be taken as the basis of proportional distribution among the parties and +the highest on each list to the number decided were to be elected.</p> + +<p>It was not till the year 1890 that this scheme was actually put into +practice. The election of 1889 had resulted so unjustly to the Liberal +party in the canton of Ticino that an insurrection broke out. This +forced the hand of the Federal Government, which had to quell the +disturbance, and proportional representation was recommended and +adopted. Several other cantons followed suit, and it is expected that +the whole of Switzerland will soon adopt the reform.</p> + +<p>A modification of this plan has lately been adopted by the Swiss +Association. In this later plan electors can give a sing<a name="Page_165" id="Page_165" />le vote only to +individual candidates, but if they do not use all their votes in this +way they may cumulate the balance on any one party list by marking at +the head of the list. Thus if the elector in a ten-seat electorate gives +five votes to individual candidates, and places a mark at the head of +one of the lists, the balance of five votes will count to that list. The +aggregate votes given to individual candidates on any list, plus the +votes placed at the head of the list, will form the basis of +proportional distribution among the lists. This is the plan adopted by +the American Proportional Representation League as most nearly suited to +American habits, and recommended by Professor Commons in his book on +"Proportional Representation."</p> + +<p>Belgium has also quite recently adopted a scheme of proportional +representation. As in Switzerland, its advent was hastened by political +disturbances. The Catholic party, not satisfied with exerting a +preponderating influence in the country districts, wished to obtain also +its proportionate share of representation in the cities, and proposed a +scheme of proportional representation for them only. This caused such +ill feeling that riots took place in the streets of Brussels. Finally, +proportional representation was promised all round, and became law for +both the Chamber of Representatives and the Senate at the latter end of +1899. In Brussels, where there are 18 seats to be filled, a trial +election had already been held in 1893 with satisfactory result<a name="Page_166" id="Page_166" />s. Six +lists were nominated, the largest being that of the Socialists, who +nominated ten candidates; and over 12,000 electors voted. Each elector +was allowed 18 votes, and the methods in which he could distribute them +were somewhat complicated. He might (1) mark at the head of a list, (2) +mark at the head of a list and also opposite one or more candidates on +the same list, (3) mark opposite the names of not more than 18 +candidates on any list. In the first case his 18 votes counted to the +list marked, in the second case one vote was counted to each of the +individual candidates marked and the balance counted for the list; in +the third case one vote was counted to each candidate marked. The +aggregate of votes marked at the head of each list, plus the individual +votes on the list, was then taken as the basis of proportional +distribution. So many of the votes were cumulated on lists that only +about one-fifth of the votes cast were operative in the selection of +candidates.</p> + +<p>In the bill which has recently become law a new method has therefore +been adopted, which gives more power to the party committees, but allows +the electors to modify their choice. For this purpose the party +organization nominates the candidates in order of preference. The +elector may then accept this order by marking at the head of the list, +or he may give his vote to any one candidate on the list. If all the +electors of a party vote in the first way, those nominated highest on +the list<a name="Page_167" id="Page_167" />, to the number to which the party becomes entitled, are +elected. But if all the electors vote in the second way, those with the +highest single votes are elected. The actual result will usually be a +compromise between the two, and it is evidently the interest of the +party organization to place the candidates in their real order of +favour, in order that the electors may accept the list. For if an +unpopular candidate were placed at the head of the list few would accept +it.</p> + +<p>The first election under this system has just taken place, and the +result was, as expected, to reduce the Clerical representation +considerably.</p> + +<p>In all the above variations of the Free List system the distribution of +seats is effected by dividing the aggregate votes polled by each party +by a unit of representation, but three different methods of determining +this unit are in use. The first is obtained by simply dividing the total +number of votes by the number of seats.</p> + +<p>The objection to this unit is that when there are several parties, part +of the seats only can be allotted on full units, and the rest have to be +allotted to those parties which have the highest remainders or fractions +of a unit, and this unduly favours small parties, who do not poll even a +single unit. The rule to divide the total votes by the number of seats +increased by one, which was first proposed by Mr. H.R. Droop, reduces +slightly the number of seats allotted on remainder<a name="Page_168" id="Page_168" />s, and was adopted by +the canton of Soluthern in 1895. In Belgium a third plan, devised by +Professor D'Hondt, of Brussels, is used, which is designed to prevent +any seats being allotted on remainders. This unit is evidently smaller +than either of the others, and is to be found by trial. It is only +necessary that the sum of the quotients obtained by dividing it into +each of the lists shall be equal to the number of seats to be filled.</p> + +<p>Suppose a five-seat electorate in which 6,000 votes are divided among +four parties, who poll 2,500, 1,850, 900, and 750 votes respectively. +Then if we take one-fifth, or 1,200 votes, as the unit, the result would +be the following:—</p> + +<p>(1) 2,500 = 2 units of representation + 100 remainder = 2 seats.</p> + +<p>(2) 1,850 = 1 unit of representation + 650 remainder = 1 seat.</p> + +<p>(3) 900 = unit of representation + 900 remainder = 1 seat.</p> + +<p>(4) 750 = unit of representation + 750 remainder = 1 seat.</p> + +<p>If the Droop unit of one-sixth, or 1,000 votes, be used, the result will +be different:—</p> + +<p>(1) 2,500 = 2 units of representation + 500 remainder = 2 seats.</p> + +<p>(2) 1,850 = 1 unit of representation + 850 remainder = 2 seats.</p> + +<p>(3) 900 = unit of representation + 900 remainder = 1 seat.</p> + +<p><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169" />(4) 750 = unit of representation + 750 remainder = seat.</p> + +<p>By the third method any number of votes between 834 and 900 will be +found to comply with Professor D'Hondt's condition, and the result +would, in this instance, be the same as by the Droop method. Although +the highest number was at first used, the lower limit has been adopted +in the new bill.</p> + +<p>In no case can the proportional distribution be considered satisfactory. +If the electorates are small, and the number of parties large, accurate +proportional representation is quite out of the question. In +Switzerland, however, the electorates are made to contain sometimes as +many as 30 seats. The effect of such large electorates must be in time +to encourage the formation of a great number of small factions. At the +same time there is not so much incentive to split up the parties as by +the Hare system.</p> + +<p>Passing now to the selection of party candidates, none of the methods +can be said to ensure the election of those most in general favour. When +electors are allowed to cumulate on individual candidates, the +favourites of sections within the party will be elected. If, on the +other hand, they are allowed to cumulate on party lists, all votes thus +given are ineffective in the selection of the successful candidates. It +may be noted that although the nomination of candidates in lists by +party organizations is less in ac<a name="Page_170" id="Page_170" />cordance with the practice of British +countries than the individual candidature of the Hare system, there is +nothing to prevent one candidate being nominated to stand in the place +of a party.</p> + +<p>A word of warning must be added as to the danger of holding up Belgium +and Switzerland as examples of true electoral justice to Australia. The +direct government of the people which Switzerland has adopted bears not +the slightest resemblance to the representative institutions of British +countries. Both the referendum and proportional delegation are suited to +direct government and are destructive to party responsible government. +The Swiss adopted the referendum to save themselves from the lobbying +and plutocratic character of their legislatures. The initiative and +proportional delegation have followed because they are complementary +reforms. The consequence is that the legislators have been degraded to +mere agents for drawing up measures, and leadership has been transferred +to the press. It is the peculiar conditions of Switzerland which enable +it to tolerate unrestrained majority rule. It is a small country, +surrounded by powerful neighbours, whose strength lies in its weakness. +Moreover, the people are very conservative. In Zurich, for instance, +which is largely devoted to manufactures, a proposal to limit the hours +of work in factories to twelve hours a day was rejected by the people. +Nor is direc<a name="Page_171" id="Page_171" />t government proving a success; the tyranny of the majority +is already apparent. The first federal initiative demanded a measure to +prevent the slaughter of animals by bleeding, designed to interfere +with the religious rites of the Jews. Despite the fact that it was +opposed by the Federal Council, as contrary to the right of religious +liberty guaranteed by the Constitution, it was carried by the +referendum. Belgium, again, can hardly be taken as a model of +constitutional liberty. Surely we in Australia do not want the factious +strife of religious, racial, and class sections, which so nearly brought +on a revolution last year. Yet this is exactly what proportional +delegation to sections would bring about. Belgium has a hard task to +reconcile two races so differently constituted as the Walloons and +Flemings, and has been able to avoid instability of the ministry so far +only because the Clerical party, which is mostly Flemish, still has a +majority. The new system has only consecrated the sectional principle, +and will do nothing to restore harmony.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172" /><a name="CHAPTER_VIII" id="CHAPTER_VIII" />CHAPTER VIII.</h2> + +<p class='center'>PREFERENTIAL VOTING, THE BLOCK VOTE, ETC.</p> + + +<p><b>Preferential Voting.</b>—Laplace, the great mathematician, to whom we owe +so much of the theory of probability, showed more than a century ago +that although individual electors may have very different views as to +the relative merits of a number of candidates for any office, still the +expression of the degree of favour in which the candidates are held by +the whole body of electors will be the same if each elector be assumed +to have a uniform gradation of preference. Suppose that there are ten +candidates, and it is required to place them in order of general favour. +Each elector should be required to place the whole ten in the order of +his preference, 1, 2, 3, &c. Let the maximum degree of merit be denoted +by ten marks, so that every first preference will count as ten marks. +Then, although an individual elector might be disposed to give his +second preference only five marks, and the rest of his preferences, say, +two marks, Laplace demonstrated that <a name="Page_173" id="Page_173" />it is most probable that the total +result would be the same if each elector be assumed to give his second +preference nine marks, his third preference eight marks, and so on. +Therefore, if all first preferences be multiplied by ten, second +preferences by nine, and so on in regular order down to last preferences +multiplied by one, the total number of marks will be an index of the +order in general favour. If there is one office to be filled, the +candidate with the highest number of marks should be elected; if there +are two offices, the two highest candidates, and so on.</p> + +<p>But the assumed condition must be rigidly complied with; each elector +must express his honest preferences. Whether he will do so or not +depends upon the circumstances. Laplace recognized this element of human +nature, and declared that if electors are swayed by other considerations +independent of the merit of the candidates the system would not apply. +For instance, if the candidates are the nominees of a number of +independent sections, each of which is anxious only to secure the return +of its own candidate, and to defeat those who stand most in his way, the +tendency will be general to place the more popular candidates, those +whose success is most feared, at the bottom of the list, so as to give +them as few marks as possible. The result would be to favour mediocre +men, or even in extreme cases the most inferior.</p> + +<p>Practically, therefore, the system is not applicable where any of the +electors are personally interested in the result. I<a name="Page_174" id="Page_174" />f a number of judges +were called on to decide the relative merits of several essays or prize +designs, and the competitors' names were not known to them, the system +might be used. But even in such a case a simpler method is available; +for, although it may be difficult to pick out the best, it is generally +easy to agree upon the worst. It is usual, then, to gradually eliminate +the worst, and when the number is reduced to two to take the decision of +the majority.</p> + +<p>This process of elimination may be, however, combined with the +preferential system, and the result is more accurate than if one count +only be made. At the first count the candidate with the fewest marks +would be eliminated and his name struck out on all the papers. All those +under him on each paper would then go up one point in order of favour, +and further counts would be held, eliminating the lowest candidate each +time till the candidates were reduced to the number desired. This method +is very complicated, and involves a great amount of trouble.</p> + +<p>Consider now the case of a voluntary association of individuals, such as +a club or society; and suppose that it is required to elect a president +or committee. The condition is clearly that he or they should be most in +general favour with all the members; and the question whether +Preferential Voting is applicable will depend on how united the members +are. Now, clubs are not usually, nor should they be, divided into +cliques or parties; indeed, if a serious split does take place it +ge<a name="Page_175" id="Page_175" />nerally results in the resignation of part of the club and the +formation of a separate organization. But in a live club it is +impossible to prevent slight differences of opinion; and an +officer-bearer who has the interests of the club at heart must often +offend small sections who want to exert undue influence. In an election +for president this office-bearer would stand no chance of election if +there are several candidates and any small section likes to put him at +the bottom of the list, so as to give him as many bad marks as possible. +This is the weak point in Preferential Voting; any small section can +ensure the rejection of a general favourite. The greater the number of +candidates the smaller the minority which is able to do this; dummy +candidates may therefore be introduced to make it more certain. The risk +would, however, be very much lessened if the process of gradual +elimination we have described were adopted.</p> + +<p>When we come to the election of representatives to a legislature it is +evident at once that Preferential Voting is not applicable at all. We +have shown that the true condition required is not the return of +candidates most in general favour with both parties, but the return of +the candidates most in general favour with each party separately. +Preferential Voting would therefore only be applicable if the electors +of each party voted separately for its own candidates; and even then it +would be open to the objection w<a name="Page_176" id="Page_176" />e have already urged. If it were applied +to the two parties voting together the electors would certainly not be +influenced only by the merit of the candidates. They might record their +honest preferences as regards the candidates of their own party, but +they would naturally place the candidates of the opposing party in +inverse order of merit. The candidates most in general favour would be +those who represented neither party. Suppose there are three candidates +for a single seat, two representing large parties of 49 per cent, each, +and the third a small party of 2 per cent. The electors of the large +parties would be more afraid of one another than of the small party, and +would give their second preferences to its candidate. This candidate, +representing one-fiftieth of the electors, would then actually be +elected; he would receive 202 marks, and neither of the others could +possibly secure more than 200. Moreover, he would still be elected if +the process of elimination were adopted, since on the second count he +would beat either of the other candidates separately by 51 votes to 49.</p> + +<p>These plain facts are indisputable. What is to be thought, then, of the +claim made by Professor Nanson that Preferential Voting, with the +process of elimination, is the most perfect system known for +single-membered electorates.</p> + +<p><b>The Block Vote.</b>—The Block Vote, General Ticket, or <i>scrutin de +liste</i>, is in general use when there is more than<a name="Page_177" id="Page_177" /> one seat to be filled. +Each elector has as many votes as there are members to be elected, and +the highest on the list, to the number of representatives required, are +successful. Dealing first with elections to a legislative body, the +system is eminently unjust to parties. A rigid control of nominations is +necessary in the first place, because any party which splits up its +votes spoils its chance. Each party will therefore nominate only as many +candidates as there are seats, and the stronger of two parties, or the +strongest of a number of parties, will elect the entire list. A minority +might in the latter case secure all the representation, but the +practical effect of the Block Vote is to force the electors to group +themselves into two parties only. It therefore has the same beneficial +effect as the single electorate of confining representation to the two +main parties. This is apparently nob recognized by Professor Nanson, who +writes, in his pamphlet on the Hare system:—"Contrast with this the +results of the Block system. With strict party voting, which has been +assumed throughout, each of the five parties would put forward seven +candidates. The seven seats would all be secured by Form, with 44 votes +out of a total of 125, and the remaining 81, or more than two-thirds of +the voters, would be wholly unrepresented." Does the Professor really +think that the 81 (who, by the way, are <i>less</i> than two-thirds) would be +so foolish as not to combine and secure all the seats?</p> + +<p>The exclusion of the <a name="Page_178" id="Page_178" />minority in a single-membered electorate excites +only a feeling of hopelessness, but when it fails to secure a single +representative in an electorate returning several members, a spirit of +rankling injustice is aroused. The Block Vote has, therefore, never been +tolerated for long in large electorates. In the early history of the +United States many of the States adopted it, and sent to Congress a +solid delegation of one party or the other. This proved so unjust, and +operated so adversely to the federal spirit in promoting combinations of +States, that Congress, in 1842, made the single-membered electorate +obligatory on all the States.</p> + +<p>In France it was adopted at the election for the Chamber of Deputies in +1885. The result as regards parties was about as good as with the single +electorate system. The Republicans and Conservative-Monarchists, whose +numbers entitled them to 311 and 257 seats respectively, actually +secured 366 and 202. But it was abandoned after a trial at this one +election.</p> + +<p>The Block Vote was adopted in Australia for the election of ten +delegates from each colony to the Federal Convention. This was a work in +which all parties might fairly have joined together; and in most +colonies the people did select the best men, regardless of party. In +Victoria, however, the newspapers took on the <i>rôle</i> of the "machine," +and the ten candidates nominated by the <i>Age</i> were elected. Many of the +supporters <a name="Page_179" id="Page_179" />of the defeated candidates voted for some on the successful +list who just defeated their own favourites. Had this been foreseen they +would have thrown away these votes by giving them to those sure to be +elected or to those least likely to be elected. The injustice of forcing +each elector to vote for the whole ten is thus brought home. We are now +threatened with the adoption of the Block Vote for the Federal Senate, +and in some of the States for the House of Representatives as well; and +it is in the hope of preventing this wrong that the present book is +written.</p> + +<p>So far we have been considering the Block Vote as applied to the +election of a legislature with two or more parties; we now propose to +consider it as applied to one party only. It is a matter of common +knowledge that the Block Vote, when used for such an election as that of +the committee of a club, works very well, and results in the return of +the candidates most in general favour with all sections. The reason is, +of course, that all sections work together, and members vote for the +best men, regardless of sectional lines. We will go further and say that +the Block Vote is by far the best method for such purposes, and is +superior even to Preferential Voting. In the first place it is free from +the defect that a small section can ensure the rejection of a general +favourite; and in the second place it rests on at least as secure a +theoretical basis. To fix our ideas, suppose there are ten candidates +<a name="Page_180" id="Page_180" />for five members of a committee. Laplace assumed (1) that each member +would have a knowledge of the merits of all the ten candidates, (2) that +his estimate of the respective candidates would vary arbitrarily +between nothing and a maximum degree of merit, (3) that each member +would express his honest preferences. The Block Vote, on the other hand, +assumes (1) that each member can pick out the five best candidates, and +therefore express his opinion as to how the committee should be +constituted, (2) that he will be inclined to place these five candidates +on one plane of favour and the other five on one plane of non-favour. We +submit that the latter assumptions agree more closely with the actual +state of affairs. The members can distinguish between candidates who +have merit and those who have no merit or of whose merit they are +ignorant; to force them, therefore, to place all the candidates in order +of preference is to make them express preferences where none exist.<a name="FNanchor_8" href="#Footnote_8">[8]</a> +On the whole, then, the Block Vote is more likely to place the +candidates in their real order of favour.</p> + +<p>But some reservation must be made. The Block Vote works best when the +number of candidates does not exceed two or three times the number of +vacancies. Suppose, first, that the candidates present in the final +result a fairly regular order of favour from lowest to highest. Each of +<a name="Page_181" id="Page_181" />the successful candidates will then be supported by at least an absolute +majority of the members, providing the number of candidates be not +greater than twice the number of vacancies. But if there are four or +five times as many candidates as vacancies, none of the successful +candidates will have the support of a majority of the members. On the +other hand, however, the candidates do not usually present a regular +order of favour from lowest to highest when there are a large number of +candidates, for there may be a long "tail" of candidates who receive +very few votes. The following general rule may therefore be laid +down:—The Block Vote works best when the total votes given to rejected +candidates do not exceed the total votes given to successful candidates.</p> + +<p>The difficulties indicated above were met by the Australian Natives' +Association by a plan which provided that no candidate should be elected +except by an absolute majority of the voters. The Block Vote is used +throughout; and if at the first ballot the required number of candidates +do not obtain an absolute majority a second ballot is held, from which +those at the bottom of the poll and those who have been elected are +eliminated. This process is continued till all the vacancies are filled. +Four or five ballots are sometimes required, and the proceedings become +very irksome. A sub-committee was recently appointed to investigate the +subject, and reported in favour of t<a name="Page_182" id="Page_182" />he Preferential System with one +count only. The process of elimination was considered too complicated to +be practicable. Now, the conditions presented by these elections, in +which a very large number of candidates are generally nominated, are +precisely those in which Preferential Voting lends itself most easily to +abuse. An insignificant minority may defeat a candidate who should be +elected, by placing him at the bottom of their lists.</p> + +<p>A variation of the Block Vote may be suggested which is much simpler and +better. The preferential ballot papers should be used, and two counts +should be made. At the first count the primary half of the preferences +should be counted as effective votes, and the candidates should be +reduced to twice the number of vacancies. A second count should then be +made of the ballot papers, using the Block Vote. All or nearly all the +candidates would then obtain an absolute majority, and it is practically +impossible that any candidate should be eliminated by the first count +who would have had any chance of election in the second.</p> + +<p>This plan is far superior to the original method. It is right that +members who vote for candidates who are hopelessly out of it should be +allowed to transfer their votes; but it is not right that members who +first help to elect some candidates at one ballot should have the same +voting power as others at subsequent ballots.</p> + +<p>The Hare system is sometimes advocated for clubs on account of it<a name="Page_183" id="Page_183" />s +supposed just principle. Any live club which adopts it runs the risk of +disruption. It merely encourages the formation of cliques and sections; +any slight split would be accentuated and rendered permanent.</p> + +<p><b>The Limited Vote.</b>—The injustice of the Block Vote led to the +introduction of the Limited Vote, which allows the minority some share +of the representation. We have seen that the Block Vote forces each +party to try to return all the representation, and of course one party +only can succeed. But if neither party be forced to try to return more +than it is entitled to each party will get its correct share of +representation, providing both parties are equally organized. This leads +to the Limited Vote, in which each elector has a number of votes +somewhat less than the number of seats.</p> + +<p>The Limited Vote was used in England for a number of three-seat +electorates, which were created by the Reform Bill of 1867, each elector +being allowed to vote for two candidates only. By this means the +majority would usually return two candidates and the minority one. Thus +the Limited Vote has the same advantage as the Block Vote and the single +electorate system, that it tends to confine representation to the two +main parties, but it creates an artificial proportion of representation +between them. Moreover, it renders strict party organization even more +necessary, since each party must arrange to use its voting<a name="Page_184" id="Page_184" /> resources to +the best advantage. Consider the three-seat electorate, for instance. +The minority will, if it is wise, nominate two candidates only; and the +majority may nominate either two or three. But if the majority does +divide its votes among three candidates it runs the risk of securing one +only. It can do so safely when two conditions are fulfilled: first, it +must be sure of polling more than three-fifths of the votes; and, +second, it must arrange to distribute all its votes equally among the +three candidates. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the +Limited Vote was responsible for introducing "machine" tactics into +England. In Birmingham, when Mr. Joseph Chamberlain organized the +Liberals and succeeded in carrying all three seats, the electors in each +ward were directed how to vote so that as few votes as possible might be +wasted. These three-cornered constituencies were abolished by the +<i>Redistribution Act</i> of 1884; and Sir John Lubbock, reviewing the +experiment, declared—"On the whole, it cannot be denied that under the +Limited Vote the views of the electors have been fairly represented."</p> + +<p>The system has also been tried to a smaller extent in the United States. +In New York 32 of the delegates to a constitutional convention were +elected from the State polled as one electorate, each elector being +allowed to vote for 16 candidates. Both parties were afraid to split +their votes, and the result was that each returned 16. The rest of the +delegates were elected in single-mem<a name="Page_185" id="Page_185" />bered electorates, and of these the +Republicans secured 81 and the Democrats 47. It might here be pointed +out that the Republicans might have secured more than 16 of the +delegates from the State at large if they had nominated 20 candidates +and allowed the laws of chance to regulate their organization. Each +elector might have been directed to put the twenty names into his hat, +and to reject the first four he pulled out. The same evil is apparent in +Boston, where twelve aldermen are elected at large, each elector being +allowed seven votes. Each party nominates seven candidates only; and the +majority invariably elects seven and the minority five.</p> + +<p>The Limited Vote is therefore not a satisfactory solution of the problem +of representation. It gives an artificial instead of proportional +representation, and it necessitates strict party organization and +control of nominations. At the same time it will generally give a very +fair representation if parties are not strictly organized, and might +well have been adopted for the Federal Convention, five or six votes +being allowed instead of ten. Newspaper domination would thus have been +prevented.</p> + +<p><b>Election of the Candidate Most in General Favour.</b>—It is often +required to ascertain the candidate most in general favour where one +party only is concerned, such as an election for leader of the +Opposition or president of a club; and the methods in general use are +very defective. We do not refer to the theoretical difficulty, wh<a name="Page_186" id="Page_186" />ich +perplexes some persons, of giving effect to the actual degree of favour +in which the candidates stand in the electors' minds, but to the simple +problem of finding out who is preferred most by the bulk of the +electors. Thus it is universally recognised that when two candidates +stand the candidate who has the support of an absolute majority of the +electors is entitled to election. Yet it is possible that the rejected +candidate may be nearly twice as popular. This might happen if the +majority held that there was little to choose between the two +candidates, while the minority thought they could not be compared. But +it is quite evident that such distinctions cannot be recognized; the +candidate who is preferred by an absolute majority must be elected. It +is when there are more than two candidates that the difficulty arises. +To elect the candidate who has most first preferences is open to very +serious objection; he may have a small minority of the total votes, and +each of the other candidates might be able to beat him single-handed.</p> + +<p>The best way to overcome the difficulty is undoubtedly by some process +of gradually eliminating the least popular candidates till the number is +reduced to two; the candidate with the absolute majority is then +elected. We propose to consider the different ways in which elimination +might be made. We assume, in the first place, that each elector has cast +an advance vote—<i>i.e.</i>, that he has placed all the candidates in order +of preference. The most primitive method is to elim<a name="Page_187" id="Page_187" />inate at each +successive count the candidate who has least first preferences. This is +the method adopted in the Hare system, and we have already shown that +it is very defective; in fact, it is no improvement at all. The +eliminated candidate might be most in general favour, and might be able +to beat each of the other candidates single-handed. A second method is +to use Preferential Voting to decide which candidate should be +eliminated at each successive count. This is far superior, but it is +extremely complicated, and is open to the objection that when there are +a large number of candidates a small section may cause the rejection of +the general favourite. We propose to describe a method based on the +Block Vote which is much simpler, and which does not lend itself to +abuse. We have shown that the Block Vote works best when the candidates +can be divided into two equal sections of favour and non-favour. Suppose +there are four candidates, the first two preferences should therefore be +counted as effective votes, instead of the first preference only. The +eliminated candidate will then be the least in general favour. A second +count is then made of the three candidates left, and the first +preferences and half of the second preferences are counted as effective, +and the lowest again eliminated. The candidate who has an absolute +majority is then elected. The method may be indefinitely extended; if +there are five candidates the first two preferences and one-half of the +third preferences are counted, and so on. But when there are a great +many candidates more than one might be eliminated. Any number up to +<a name="Page_188" id="Page_188" />eight could be safely reduced to four at the first count.</p> + +<p>FOOTNOTE:</p> + +<p><a name="Footnote_8" href="#FNanchor_8">[8]</a> The bracket principle introduced by Professor Nanson into the Hare +system involves a partial recognition of this fact.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IX" id="CHAPTER_IX" />CHAPTER IX.</h2> + +<p class='center'>ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE THE PRESENT SYSTEM.</p> + + +<p><b>The Double Election.</b>—In the preceding chapter we have strongly +insisted that the different methods considered for ensuring the return +of the candidate acceptable to all sections are not applicable to the +election of legislators. The true principles of political representation +require, not the election of the candidate most in general favour with +both parties, but the election by each party separately of its own most +favoured candidates. But as it is impossible for both parties to be +represented in a single-membered electorate, the best alternative is +that both should contest the seat and one be represented. The present +system of election has largely tended to realize this alternative, +especially in those countries in which party government was strong, such +as England and the United States; and representation has in consequence +been confined to the two main parties. In England, where the party +system was gradually developed, this result was attained without an<a name="Page_189" id="Page_189" />y +rigid control of nominations, because the true party spirit prevailed +and personal ambition was subordinated to political principle; and in +the United States it was only brought about at the cost of "machine" +control of nominations. But on the Continent of Europe, where party +government was transplanted from England, it has never really taken +root. Each small group nominated its own candidates, and the successful +candidate represented only a plurality, and not a majority, of the +electors. Instead of a contest between two organized parties there was a +scramble among numerous factions.</p> + +<p>In France, Belgium, Italy, and Germany an attempt has been made to check +this evil by the double election. If at the first election no candidate +secures an absolute majority of the votes, a second election is held, +for which only the two candidates who head the poll at the first +election are allowed to compete. One must then get an absolute majority. +The double election has undoubtedly tended to prevent a further +splitting up into groups, but the Continental countries offer such poor +soil for the growth of party government that it has only restricted the +contest to two factions in each electorate; and, of course, the dominant +factions are not the same in the various electorates.</p> + +<p><b>The Advance Vote.</b>—In Australia the same evil has become increasingly +evident, and it is now no uncommon thing for a candidate to be elected +by less than one-third or one-quarter of the total votes. In Queensland +<a name="Page_190" id="Page_190" />a plan has been introduced to meet the evil, under the name of the +Advance Vote, which is designed to secure the advantages of the French +plan without the trouble and expense of a second election. The electors +simply declare in advance at the first election how they would vote at +the second election. All that is necessary is that they place the +candidates in order of preference, 1, 2, 3, 4, &c. Then, instead of +holding a second election between the two who have the greatest number +of first preferences, it is merely necessary for the returning officer +to consult each ballot paper and see which of these two candidates is +higher in order of favour. Thus if one is marked 3 and the other 4, the +vote is counted to the candidate marked 3. This device is assumed to +give exactly the same result as the French plan, providing only that the +same electors vote at both elections, and do not change their views +between the two elections.</p> + +<p>But in reality it possesses hardly any of the advantages of the French +plan. It is another instance of the danger of neglecting the factor of +human nature. The French do not go to the trouble and expense of a +second election for nothing. Their plan is far the better. First of all, +consider the candidates. They know well beforehand that unless one of +them gets an absolute majority of the votes at the first election they +will be put to the expense and delay of a second election, therefore it +is to their interest that the number of c<a name="Page_191" id="Page_191" />andidates be restricted. This +tends to keep down the representation to two sections. Next, consider +the electors. They know also that unless they give a majority of votes +to one of the candidates they will be put to the trouble of voting a +second time, therefore they will take good care the votes are not split +up, even if the candidates wanted it. What is the result? Simply that in +the vast majority of cases one of the candidates gets a majority at the +first election, and no second election is necessary; and, most important +of all, the tendency to split up is counteracted.</p> + +<p>Now take the Queensland system. None of these checks operate. The +splitting up into groups is actually encouraged, and it is to the +interest of each group to see as many more groups as possible formed, in +order to increase its own relative importance, for the delegates of the +two strongest groups have a chance of election instead of the strongest +group only.</p> + +<p>In practice the plan threatens to break down, owing to a practical point +being overlooked. It is evident that the success of the Advance Vote +depends on the electors marking all the preferences. The ballot paper +should be made informal unless all the preferences are given. In +Queensland this has not been done, and the consequence is that a large +proportion of the electors refuse to give more than one preference. No +more conclusive evidence is needed that the scheme has promoted the +growth of factions. These electors voluntarily disfranchise themselves +rather than vote for any of the other candidates, and of course the very +object of the scheme is defeated; the successful candidate cannot secure +<a name="Page_192" id="Page_192" />a majority of the votes cast.</p> + +<p><b>The Exhaustive Ballot.</b>—A bill has just been introduced into the +Legislative Assembly of Victoria, providing for a further extension of +the principle of the Advance Vote. The plan is favoured by Professor +Nanson, and professes to be an improvement on the Queensland plan, +although it is only an "instalment of reform" in view of the ultimate +adoption of the more perfect Preferential Voting. The Queensland plan is +objected to because all but the two highest candidates are thrown out. +Suppose, for instance, two candidates stand for the weaker party and +three for the stronger party, it is quite likely that all the candidates +of the stronger party will be thrown out. Therefore the lowest candidate +only of the five should be thrown out. All his papers should be +transferred to the candidate who is marked 2 on them; and those below +him on all the papers should go up one point in order of favour. If he +stood 3 on a paper, the candidate who was 4 would now become 3. Another +count of first preferences should then be made, and the lowest again +thrown out; and so on till one candidate gets an absolute majority. It +is pointed out triumphantly that this plan, which is known as the +Exhaustive Ballot, actually saves in this instance all the trouble and +expense of no less than three separate elections. The process of +elimination is the same as that adopted in the Hare sy<a name="Page_193" id="Page_193" />stem, and is +little, if at all, better than the Queensland plan in securing the +election of the right candidate, while as regards the formation of +groups it is worse. For this plan actually encourages the groups to +split up, since if one candidate nominated by a group is thrown out his +vote will be transferred to the others. Therefore the double election is +much better than either form of the Advance Vote. They would do nothing +towards restoring the one redeeming merit of the single electorate, of +confining representation to the two main parties. And all other +mathematical schemes founded on the <i>a priori</i> assumption that the +candidate most favoured by all sections is entitled to the seat are just +as objectionable.</p> + +<p>The conclusion that must be reached from all these considerations is +that, except when there is a single candidate standing in the interests +of each of the two main parties, it is impossible to say with the +present system who ought to be elected. The difficulty is one of +fundamental principle. The only way to do justice to both parties is to +enlarge the electorates so that each can get its proportionate share of +representation, and then to provide such machinery as will allow each +party separately to elect its most favoured candidates. In no other way +can the people be induced to organize into two coherent parties.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194" /><a name="CHAPTER_X" id="CHAPTER_X" />CHAPTER X.</h2> + +<p class='center'>APPLICATION OF THE REFORM TO AUSTRALIAN LEGISLATURES.</p> + + +<p><b>Federal Legislatures.</b>—The keynote of the Australian Federal +Constitution, as expressed in the Commonwealth Bill, is full and +unreserved trust in the people. This is in direct contrast with the +American Constitution, which seeks to place checks on the people by +dividing power among the President, the Senate, and the House of +Representatives, and assigning to each separate functions. Do we fully +realize the dangers as well as the glorious possibilities of unfettered +action? Do we sufficiently feel the weight of the responsibility we have +undertaken? In reality we have declared to the world the fitness of the +Australian democracy to work a Constitution from which the most advanced +of the other nations would shrink! We do not hesitate to avow our firm +belief that there is only one thing that can save the situation. Unless +Australia is to sh<a name="Page_195" id="Page_195" />ow to the world a warning instead of an example, all +her energies must be bent on the formation of two coherent organized +parties, dividing each State on national issues, and competing for the +support of all classes and all interests in every electorate throughout +the Commonwealth.</p> + +<p>That is the lesson we have endeavoured to inculcate throughout this +book, and we are tempted to quote in support of it the opinion of an +American author, Professor Paul S. Reinsch, in a work just published on +"World Politics." He says:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>The political experience of the last two centuries has proved that + free government and party government are almost convertible terms. + It is still as true as when Burke wrote his famous defence of + party, in his <i>Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents</i>, + that, for the realization of political freedom, the organization of + the electorate into regular and permanent parties is necessary. + Parliamentary government has attained its highest success only in + those countries where political power is held alternately by two + great national parties. As soon as factional interests become + predominant; as soon as the stability of government depends upon + the artificial grouping of minor conflicting interests; as soon as + the nation lacks the tonic effect of the mutual criticisms of great + organizations, the highest form of free government becomes + unattainable. (pp. 327, 328.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>The greatest strain on the Constitution will probably be felt at the +outset. Both people and politicians are suddenly called upon to rise to +a higher plane of political thought and action. The idea that each State +is to send representatives to fight for its own interests mus<a name="Page_196" id="Page_196" />t first be +got rid of. The only way in which all interests can be reconciled is by +each State acting through the national parties. The greatest danger +which assails the Commonwealth is the risk of combinations of States +dominating party lines; and it is the more imminent that divergent +opinions between the larger and the smaller States were already apparent +at the Convention. The four smaller States, Western Australia, South +Australia, Queensland, and Tasmania, with about one-third of the +population, will have two-thirds of the representation in the Senate; +while the two large States, Victoria and New South Wales, will have +about two-thirds of the representation in the House of Representatives. +At the Convention the fear was expressed that the former, representing a +majority of the States, and the latter, representing a majority of the +people, might come into conflict, and that a deadlock would ensue. It +was on this issue that the great struggle at the Convention took place, +resulting in the adoption of a double dissolution and a subsequent joint +sitting of the two Houses if necessary. By this machinery all disputes +will be finally settled. But what will happen if some of the States +consider themselves unjustly treated? Even apart from conflicts between +the two Houses, if only one State stood aloof from the main parties it +could paralyze government, just as Ireland did in the Imperial +Parliament. It is evident, then, that the very existence of the Union is +bound up in the immediate formation of national parties.<a name="Page_197" id="Page_197" /></p> + +<p>In the United States this lesson was not learned till the Civil War had +demonstrated the danger of combinations of States. Since then two great +parties have been maintained, even though their existence involves the +spoils system and machine organization. In Switzerland, too, the federal +tie was not drawn close till after the revolution in 1847, in which the +Catholic cantons attempted to secede.</p> + +<p>Unfortunately, another cause of dissension menaces the Commonwealth. We +allude to the class representation which we have already animadverted +upon. The separate representation of sections or classes within the +States is just as much to be dreaded as the separate representation of +States, and bodes as much ill. It seems not unlikely that the fate of +the first Federal ministry will be in the hands of the Labour party, +which will be able to dictate its policy. It is utterly inconsistent +with the democratic theory that a small minority should have this power; +and it is to be hoped that in the wider field of federal politics its +true character will be recognized. It is only by the mutual action of +two great national parties that the true direction of progress, favoured +by the people, can be worked out; a small minority studying only its own +interests is sure to be a bad guide. A steady pressure maintained +through the two national parties will ensure the recognition of all just +demands; such extreme and ill-considered demands as that for the +initiat<a name="Page_198" id="Page_198" />ive and national referendum can only provoke opposition and cause +reaction. Even those who sympathize with the ultimate objects of the +Labour unions must see the folly of their present unpatriotic and +suicidal tactics.</p> + +<p>It is a matter for hope that in the wider sphere of federal politics the +irresponsible leadership of the press is not likely to be the power for +harm that it is in some of the individual States at present. But while +it may not dominate the Federal Parliament as a whole to the same +extent, its control over nominations in the States will be quite as +great, and immeasurably greater if the Block Vote is adopted. Nor are +signs wanting of a union of some of the larger newspaper ventures in the +principal States, with a view to increase their power.</p> + +<p>Such is a brief review of the outlook. The great requisites essential +for progress are the organization of two national parties and +responsible leadership in the Federal Parliament. The dangers to the +Commonwealth may be summed up under the two heads of lack of +organization and irresponsible leadership outside Parliament. Is it +possible that the dangers may be avoided and the requisites secured by a +change in electoral machinery? Those who have no conception of the +working of social forces, and who do not trace the law of causation into +the realm of mind, will be inclined to scoff at the suggestion. To them +the only hope of improvement lies in appealing to the people to elect +better men. Th<a name="Page_199" id="Page_199" />ey ignore entirely the reciprocal relation of the +Parliament and the people, and while recognizing the influence of the +people on the character of Parliament, they deny the influence of +Parliament on the character of the people. They declare that the people +are "free agents" and will have better government when they make up +their minds to get it; and no electoral machinery or parliamentary +machinery can influence the result. Such is the passive attitude which +consciously or unconsciously is almost universally assumed. Yet who can +study the history of the British Constitution without being impressed +with the fact that every step in the evolution of its machinery was a +true sociological invention and had the effect of directing the people's +will, which is the motive force, into channels conducive to the general +welfare? Take away the responsible leadership of the Cabinet in the +British Parliament, and it would become a sink of corruption like the +United States Congress; take away its organization into two national +parties, and it would become a rabble like the French Chambers. Now, is +not the electoral machinery the connecting link between the people and +Parliament, and therefore a vital part in the machinery of government? +Does it not actually decide the constitution of Parliament? If this be +granted, it follows that unless the electoral machinery be adapted to +give effect to these two great principles, parliaments will inevitably +decline; and that the present method of election is a very inadequate +<a name="Page_200" id="Page_200" />means of giving effect to them few will deny.</p> + +<p>Our claim for the application of the electoral reform set forth in the +preceding pages rests simply on the fact that it will give effect to +these principles under conditions in which the present system would +fail. We press especially for its application to the Federal House of +Representatives, which will be the most important Australian +representative assembly; for it it there that organization and +responsible leadership are most urgently needed. That they will not be +obtained if the present schemes of dividing the States into +single-membered electorates are adopted is morally certain; and the +result can only be disaster and bitter disappointment. If the +mathematical devices described in the last chapter are added, the +disorganization will be still more complete. And as for the scheme for +allowing separate delegation to a number of sections, which is advocated +under the name of the Hare system, it would be absolutely fatal. Who can +believe that if Mr. Hare's wild scheme to divide the British people into +several hundred sections had been adopted 40 years ago the Imperial +Parliament would now be an organized assembly?</p> + +<p>Take the conditions presented by the first elections for the Federal +Parliament, to be held early next year. In some respects it is fortunate +that a definite issue is available as a basis of party organization; for +there is a general consensus of o<a name="Page_201" id="Page_201" />pinion that all other considerations +must be subordinated to a pronouncement on the tariff issue. In an +article on "The Liberal Outlook" in <i>United Australia</i>, the Hon. Alfred +Deakin writes:—"By the very circumstances of the case the tariff issue +cannot but dominate the first election, and determine the fate of the +first ministry of the Commonwealth. There will be no time for second +thoughts or for suspense of judgment. The first choice of the people +will be final on this head. The first Parliament must be either +Protectionist or anti-Protectionist, and its first great work an +Australian tariff. That is the clear-cut issue. The risk is that a +proportion of the representatives may be returned upon other grounds, as +the electors as a whole may not realize all that is at stake or make the +necessary sacrifices of opinions and preferences to express themselves +emphatically on this point." Now, the only way to avoid the risk +indicated is to take this one definite issue as the basis of +proportional representation. Each State should be divided on it, and +should elect its proportional number of Freetrade and Protectionist +representatives. Tasmania and Western Australia could conveniently be +polled for this purpose each as one electorate; South Australia might be +divided into two electorates, Queensland into three, and Victoria and +New South Wales into four or five.</p> + +<p>It is very desirable that the first election be contested on definite +poli<a name="Page_202" id="Page_202" />cies advanced by the prospective party leaders; the suggestion that +the first ministry should be merely a provisional ministry, to act till +the first responsible ministry is formed after the election, is +therefore open to serious objection. The leader of the Freetrade party +or the leader of the Protectionist party should be chosen as first +Federal Premier, and the first election should decide which policy is to +be adopted.</p> + +<p>Contrast this scheme with the proposals now under consideration. In +Victoria, New South Wales, and Queensland bills have been introduced +dividing the States into single-membered electorates, and some of the +smaller States are inclined to use the Block Vote. In Victoria a bad +precedent has been established by giving the party in power the duty of +determining boundaries. From time to time it will be necessary to +rearrange the boundaries, not only on account of movements of population +within the State, but also because the number of representatives which +the State is entitled to will vary. Look forward to the time when the +State becomes entitled to one more representative; every one of the 23 +electorates, in which vested interests will have been created, will have +to be altered These are precisely the conditions which have led to the +growth of the gerrymander in the United States.</p> + +<p>Already the first scheme submitted to the Assembly has been defeated by +a combination of country membe<a name="Page_203" id="Page_203" />rs, who held that Melbourne was allotted a +larger share of representation than it now has in the local Parliament. +Whatever may be the arguments by which the disparity between the size +of town and country electorates be supported in local affairs, surely +they cannot apply where national issues only are at stake. The principle +of equal electorates is recognized in the Commonwealth Bill by the rules +for allotting representation to the States. Why not, then, for the +divisions of each State? It is said that a larger proportion of the +electors vote in the town, but it is not those only who vote who are +represented.</p> + +<p>In dividing a State into electorates for the purpose of the reform, the +number of electors in each division should therefore form the basis of +proportional distribution. The unit of representation would be the total +number of electors in the State divided by the number of seats. One +representative would be allowed to each division of the State for each +unit of representation, and the remaining seats, if any, would go to +those divisions with the largest remainders.</p> + +<p>Coming now to the Federal Senate, the bill provides that every State, +except Queensland, must be polled as one electorate for the election of +six senators at the first election and in case of a double dissolution; +at intermediate elections three senators only will be elected, as they +retire in rotation. This equal representation of the States might be +taken to imply that the Senate is intended to represent State rights, +and the provision<a name="Page_204" id="Page_204" /> that each State is to be polled as one electorate +would seem to support that view. On the other hand, the senators are not +required to vote according to States, for it is provided that "each +senator shall have one vote;" the vote of a State may therefore be +neutralized by its representatives. And again, the Senate is to be +elected directly by the people and not by the State legislatures, as at +first proposed. To some extent, therefore, the Federal Senate as now +constituted presents a new problem in representation, on which it is not +advisable to dogmatize. Personal considerations will probably have more +weight than in the selection of representatives; but when we reflect +that it is really little more than a revising assembly, elected by the +same voters as the House of Representatives to deal with the same +questions, and having no special functions of its own, the conclusion +seems irresistible that the election must be contested by the same +national parties, and that the same method of election should be +adopted.</p> + +<p>Until the Parliament of the Commonwealth prescribes a uniform method of +choosing senators, the duty is to be left to the State parliaments; and +it is to be regretted that the States have taken no steps to secure +uniform action at the first election. In Victoria a fierce newspaper +contest is being waged over the Block Vote and the Hare system, and the +arguments, being mutually destructive, only go to prove that both are +equally objectionable. The <i>Age</i> naturally wishes t<a name="Page_205" id="Page_205" />o have the privilege +of electing six senators as it did ten delegates to the Federal +Convention, and contends that the majority should elect all the +senators; the <i>Argus</i> rushes to the other extreme in declaring that six +separate minorities ought to be represented, and ignores the risk that +these minorities would be formed on a class or religious basis. The +middle position advocated in this book—namely, that majority and +minority should each return its proportional share of representation—is +free from the objections to both these extreme views.</p> + +<p><b>State Legislatures.</b>—Even after federation the State Houses will still +continue to touch at most points the daily lives of the people; they +will merely be shorn of some of their powers and drained of some of +their best leaders. The fiscal issue, which has had great influence in +deciding party lines in the past, will be removed from the arena of +strife, leaving no other than an indefinite line of division into +Liberals and Conservatives, which in practice tends to become a division +into lower and upper classes. This is the danger ahead; and it can only +be avoided by the formation of strong party organizations appealing to +all classes to work together for the general welfare. Party government +is just as necessary in State politics as in national politics.</p> + +<p>The present position is intolerable; the disintegration of parties is so +complete that there is not a responsible ministry in Australia worthy of +the name. Among the ca<a name="Page_206" id="Page_206" />uses which have led to this deplorable state of +affairs the present method of election is undoubtedly the most potent; +it frequently happens that four or five candidates, representing as +many groups, contest a single seat. In Victoria, where the state of +chaos is perhaps worst, the influence of the press, the existence of a +strong Labour section in the Lower House, and the class character of the +Upper House, representing property and capital, have been the principal +contributing causes.</p> + +<p>With the advent of federation a revision of the State constitution is +widely demanded, and is likely to be conceded. One of the first steps +necessary to restore harmony must be reform of the Upper House by a +gradual extension of the franchise and a lowering of the qualification, +so as to ensure that elections are freely contested; it is its present +unrepresentative character which gives force to the appeals of the +radical press and intensifies class divisions.</p> + +<p>The relation of State parties to the national parties is an important +subject. In the article from which we have already quoted, in <i>United +Australia</i>, Mr. Deakin writes:—"There cannot be a series of Liberal +parties, one Federal and the others in the States, each going its own +way. There must be but one party, with one programme, to which effect +will require to be given continuously in both the States and the +Commonwealth." He therefore deplores that the Liberal party, together +<a name="Page_207" id="Page_207" />with its "left wing," the Labour class, will be split on the fiscal +issue. "It is this apparently unavoidable rupture in the party," he +declares, "which endangers its prospects and presents an opportunity to +the Conservative classes of either seizing or sharing an authority to +which they could not otherwise aspire." If this means that the "Liberal" +and Labour classes are entitled by reason of their numbers to a +perpetual lease of power in both domains, there can be no more dangerous +doctrine. Parties should be decided by questions of progress and +financial policy, and not on class lines; and since the State and +Federal legislatures have separate spheres of action, parties should be +separate also, unless, indeed, they are to be founded on corruption, as +in the United States, where the same two parties control not only +national and State politics, but city government also.</p> + +<p>In the consolidation of public opinion into two definite lines of policy +based on the questions to be dealt with lies the only hope, then, of the +progress of the individual States within their own range; and in +promoting this desirable result the reform advocated in these pages +finds its true application.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208" /><a name="CHAPTER_XI" id="CHAPTER_XI" />CHAPTER XI.</h2> + +<p class='center'>THE CONDITIONS OF SOCIAL PROGRESS.</p> + + +<p><b>The Agent of Progress.</b>—If the analysis made in the preceding pages of +the principles underlying political representation comes to be regarded +as correct, the science of sociology must be profoundly affected: for it +is a fact that not only the importance but the very existence of the +principles involved has been completely missed by speculators in that +field. The view we have taken is that representation is the most +important sociological invention which has been made in the whole +history of the human race; that the successive steps taken in the +evolution of the British Constitution mark a series of inventions +scarcely less important, and that the resulting institution of party and +responsible government is the indispensable agent of democratic +progress. We have traced throughout the electoral and parliamentary +machinery on which the institution is based the action of two great +principles—organization and responsible leadership—and we have shown +<a name="Page_209" id="Page_209" />that these are the mainsprings of the whole mechanism. Yet we find even +such an authority as Mr. Herbert Spencer objecting to the party system, +on the ground that it lends itself to a one-man or a one-party +tyranny.<a name="FNanchor_9" href="#Footnote_9">[9]</a> The fact is that it is only when representative government +is weak, and approaches direct government, that such a result can +happen, and the distinction is so little recognized that a brief +recapitulation may be permitted.</p> + +<p>The fundamental error is in conceiving representation as merely a means +of registering the popular will; many even go so far as to regard it as +an imperfect means of ensuring that each single question will be decided +according to the will of the majority. All such conceptions really +amount to direct government, and where they are given effect to, whether +by the referendum or sectional delegation, society is not organized for +consistent progress. Indeed, if the lessons of history can be trusted, +such a state of society is bound to be wrecked from within by +anti-social influences; political power becomes the object of factious +strife, and the rule of the majority degenerates into the tyranny of the +majority.</p> + +<p>We have endeavoured to show that the true conception of representative +government involves a recognition of the principles of organization and +leadership, and that representation is in consequence a means not only +of registering the popular will, but also of o<a name="Page_210" id="Page_210" />rganizing and guiding it. +In both cases, therefore, the popular will is the ultimate motive force, +but in the one case the desires of the people clash, while in the other +they are directed into channels conducive to the general welfare. We +have regarded it as an essential condition of representative government +that the popular will be expressed only as to the direction of progress, +that is to say on general policy and not on single questions, and that +complete control of progress be then left to the representative body. In +no other way can the people be saved from their anti-social tendencies, +and induced to express their opinion as to what is best for all. We have +seen how the electoral machinery is adapted to organize this expression +of the popular will into two alternative directions of progress; how +this is effected by the fact of two parties competing for the support of +the people on policies expressing these lines of progress; and how the +parliamentary machinery allows the stronger of these two parties for the +time being complete control of administration and of the direction of +progress. The effect of this organization is that the popular will is +reduced to effective action in one direction at a time—a result which +is not possible with direct government.</p> + +<p>Nor is the principle of responsible leadership which is involved in the +reciprocal relation of the representative body and the people any less +important. Society cannot progress faster than the individual units +composing it. True<a name="Page_211" id="Page_211" /> progress lies therefore in raising the standard of +public opinion, and it is this principle which ensures that result by +reacting upon and moulding individual character. Hence we find that in +countries like England, where the principle is operative, progress is +effected without supervision and undue interference in the affairs of +the individual by the State, while in countries where the principle is +not operative, such as the Continental countries of Europe and some of +the Australian colonies, the contrary is the case. Legislation should +therefore be directed to changing the nature of the individual, and +should not be too far in advance of public opinion. This is what Mr. +Lester F. Ward, in his work on "Outlines of Sociology," calls attractive +legislation. He writes:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>The principle involved in attraction, when applied to social + affairs, is simply that of <i>inducing</i> men to act for the good of + society. It is that of harmonizing the interests of the individual + with those of society, of making it advantageous to the individual + to do that which is socially beneficial; not merely in a negative + form as an alternative of two evils, as is done when a penalty is + attached to an action, but positively, in such a manner that he + will exert himself to do those things that society most needs to + have done. The sociologist and the statesman should co-operate in + discovering the laws of society and the methods of utilizing them, + so as to let the social forces flow freely and strongly, + untrammelled by penal statutes, mandatory laws, irritating + prohibitions, and annoying obstacles. (p. 274.)</p></blockquote> + +<p>Now, we submit that this attractive legislation is possible only when +there is no oppressed minority, and<a name="Page_212" id="Page_212" /> is therefore the peculiar province +of representative government; for we have shown that the whole machinery +is adapted to induce the people to desire only what is best in the +interests of society.</p> + +<p>Let us briefly examine the bearing of the view that representative +machinery is the agent of progress on previous theories of social +progress.</p> + +<p><b>Professor Huxley.</b>—No one has more clearly laid down the conditions of +social progress than the late Professor Huxley in his essay on +<i>Evolution and Ethics</i>. The gradual strengthening of the social bond by +the practise of self-restraint in the interests of society he called the +ethical process, and he showed that social progress means a checking of +the cosmic process at every step and the substitution of this ethical +process. This action he compares to that of a gardener in clearing a +patch of waste ground. If he relaxes his efforts to maintain the state +of art within the garden, weeds will overrun it and the state of nature +will return. So the human race is doomed to a constant struggle to +maintain the state of art of an organized polity in opposition to the +state of nature; to substitute as far as possible social progress for +cosmic evolution. He says:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>Let us understand, once for all, that the ethical progress of + society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in + running away from it, but in combating it. It may seem an audacious + proposal thus to pit the microcosm against the macrocosm, and to + set man to subdue nature to his higher ends; but I venture to think + that the great inte<a name="Page_213" id="Page_213" />llectual difference between the ancient times + with which we have been occupied and our day, lies in the solid + foundation we have acquired for the hope that such an enterprise + may meet with a certain measure of success....<a name="FNanchor_10" href="#Footnote_10">[10]</a></p> + +<p> Moreover, the cosmic nature born with us, and to a large extent + necessary for our maintenance, is the outcome of millions of years + of severe training, and it would be folly to imagine that a few + centuries will suffice to subdue its masterfulness to purely + ethical ends. Ethical nature may count upon having to reckon with a + tenacious and powerful enemy as long as the world lasts. But, on + the other hand, I see no limit to the extent to which intelligence + and will, guided by sound principles of investigation, and + organized in common effort, may modify the conditions of existence + for a period longer than that now covered by history. And much may + be done to change the nature of man himself. The intelligence which + has converted the brother of the wolf into the faithful guardian of + the flock ought to be able to do something towards curbing the + instincts of savagery in civilized men.<a name="FNanchor_11" href="#Footnote_11">[11]</a></p></blockquote> + +<p>But Huxley never realized that the real cause of the better prospects of +success in modern as contrasted with ancient times is the discovery of +representative machinery. "The business," he declared, "of the sovereign +authority—which is, or ought to be, simply a delegation of the people +appointed to act for its good—appears to me to be not only to enforce +the renunciation of the anti-social desires, but wherever it may be +necessary to promote the satisfaction of those which are conducive to +progress."<a name="FNanchor_12" href="#Footnote_12">[12]</a> There is no conception here of the principles of +organization and responsible leadership, so necessary in constituting +<a name="Page_214" id="Page_214" />this "delegation."</p> + +<p><b>Herbert Spencer.</b>—By a great many sociologists it is denied that man +has his destiny in his own hands, or can by common effort modify the +conditions of existence so as to promote progress. The conception which +is held to justify this view is that there is an exact correspondence +between the progress of human society and the growth of an organism. +Foremost among those who take this view is Mr. Herbert Spencer. The +close analogy which the progress of the assumed social organism bears to +the growth of the physiological organism is worked out in great detail +throughout the "Synthetic Philosophy," and is taken to establish "that +Biology and Sociology will more or less interpret each other." The +practical conclusion which is drawn is that the growth of society must +not be interfered with; if the State goes beyond the duty of protection, +it becomes an aggressor. So Mr. Spencer is a most uncompromising +opponent of State action, even education and public sanitation coming in +for his condemnation. Moreover, he holds that if the social organism be +let alone it will tend to a future state of society in which social +altruism will be so developed that the individual will voluntarily +sacrifice himself in the interests of society.</p> + +<p>In an essay on <i>The Social Organism</i> ("Essays," Second Series), he +writes:—</p> + +<blockquote><p>Strange as the assertion will be thought, our Houses of Parliament<a name="Page_215" id="Page_215" /> + discharge in the social economy functions that are, in sundry + respects, comparable to those discharged by the cerebral masses in + a vertebrate animal.... We may describe the office of the brain as + that of <i>averaging</i> the interests of life, physical, intellectual, + moral, social; and a good brain is one in which the desires + answering to their respective interests are so balanced that the + conduct they jointly dictate sacrifices none of them. Similarly we + may describe the office of Parliament as that of <i>averaging</i> the + interests of the various classes in a community; and a good + Parliament is one in which the parties answering to these + respective interests are so balanced that their united legislation + concedes to each class as much as consists with the claims of the + rest.</p></blockquote> + +<p>The error of regarding society merely as an aggregate is here clearly +shown, for if the "parties" in Parliament were based on class +delegation, as assumed, social progress would be blocked. The only real +foundation for the resemblance between society and an organism is this: +that unless the individual units composing society reduce themselves to +unity of action in a definite direction, society as a whole cannot +progress; or, in other words, that the principles of organization and +leadership are essential to progress. Yet Mr. Spencer denies that there +is any sphere of collective action for the operation of these +principles!</p> + +<p><b>Benjamin Kidd.</b>—The "social organism" theory is also the foundation of +the theory of social progress with which Mr. Benjamin Kidd startled the +scientific world a few years ago in "Social Evolution." While +appreciating the importance of<a name="Page_216" id="Page_216" /> the factor of individual reason, he +contended that self-restraint by the individual in the interests of +society is impossible without an ultra-rational sanction; that, in +fact, without this the reason is the most anti-social and +anti-evolutionary of all human qualities. The central fact therefore +with which we are confronted in our progressive societies is stated as +follows:—"<i>The interests of the social organism and those of the +individuals comprising it at any particular time are actually +antagonistic; they can never be reconciled; they are inherently and +essentially irreconcilable.</i>" What becomes of this extraordinary +proposition if it is clearly established that the amount of +reconciliation depends on the extent to which the principles of +organization and responsible leadership are given effect to by +representative machinery?</p> + +<p><b>Past Progress.</b>—The question will naturally be raised: If a +representative body is now the indispensable agent of social progress, +how can progress previous to the introduction of representation be +explained? The answer is that the same principles were operative, but in +different forms, more suited to the stage of social development. Indeed, +we may say that, from the time that man emerged from the brute stage and +became a social animal, the types of society which have survived in the +struggle for existence with the state of nature and with other types +have been those in which the principles of organization and leadership +have been most active. Eve<a name="Page_217" id="Page_217" />n the lowest types of savages, such as the +native tribes studied by Professor Baldwin Spencer and Mr. Gillen in +Central Australia, have a complicated system of organization, the +peculiar feature of which is totemism, or group marriage; but this is +more the result of development than of conscious effort. Leadership also +is rudimentary, for, although the old men have control of the elaborate +ceremonies described, they conform almost entirely to custom and +tradition. Out of this savage stage there grew in favoured countries the +second type of human society—the patriarchal, in which leadership +becomes personal, and centred in a chief who exercises despotic +authority. Patriarchal society grew out of the necessities of a pastoral +existence; indeed, it was the discovery of the domestication of animals +which gave rise to it. Among other interesting features which were +developed are permanent marriage, slavery, and ancestor worship. There +can be no doubt that the latter played an important part in binding the +tribe into one organization, and in inducing all the tribe to submit to +the leadership of the chief. There is a second stage of patriarchal +society in which the large tribes break up into clans and become less +nomadic. Professor Jenks has shown, in his "Short History of Politics," +how this stage originated in the adoption of agriculture. We begin now +to have the village community, bound by the tie of kinship, and +submitting to the leadership of a lord; and are already on the threshold +of mo<a name="Page_218" id="Page_218" />dern political society, in which all these ancient barriers are +broken down and the individual becomes the social unit. The cause of +this momentous change is development of the art of warfare. But before +we reach the modern State there is an intermediate stage, namely, +feudalism. The feudal chief is simply the successful warrior—the leader +of a band of adventurers who get control of a definite territory and +exact military allegiance from its inhabitants. Out of the consolidation +of these bands, or by conquest, modern States were founded. Leadership +was now vested in an irresponsible despot—the king; and the trouble was +to render this new institution permanent, and to induce the people to +submit to it. The former result was attained by making the kingship +hereditary, but the latter has always been a difficult task. It is +doubtful if it would ever have been accomplished but for a significant +alliance—that of Church and State. The convenient fiction of the divine +right of kings was invented, and religion was used to bolster up the +institution and to provide a sanction for submission to absolutism. In +other words, irresponsible leadership was tolerated because +responsibility was supposed to exist to a Higher Power. So we find that +all the great religious movements—Christianity, Mohammedanism, and even +Buddhism—have been associated with the establishment of mighty +kingdoms. Moreover, the only two kingdoms in Europe in which absolutism +still holds out are <a name="Page_219" id="Page_219" />Russia and Turkey, in which the head of the State is +also head of the Church. But military despotism, which was based solely +on the exploitation of weaker communities, of which ancient Rome was +the culminating type, wanted the elements of permanent progress, and was +bound to disappear before a new type which rested on the development of +internal resources. Militarism must therefore be looked on as a real +stage of progress; for in contrast with patriarchal society it was +competitive, and it broke down many ancient barriers, and prepared the +way for industrial co-operation. Thus we arrive at the conditions +favourable to the rise of representative institutions. For when the cost +of wars had to be raised out of the national resources kings found it +convenient to get the consent of the people to taxation. Hence the great +movement throughout Western Europe for the establishment of parliaments +in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Why is it that in England alone +this movement was successful? Partly no doubt because its isolated +position was favourable to internal progress, but mainly because it was +the only State in which the principles of organization and responsible +leadership were continuously given effect to. So it is that in England +there was developed that wonderful machinery of representative +government which has enabled the people to substitute responsible for +irresponsible leadership, and has made the national character what it +is. This mac<a name="Page_220" id="Page_220" />hinery has now been adopted nearly all over the world, +wherever it has been desired to make the popular will felt, but in no +case has it sufficed to give effect to the underlying principles to the +same extent; and success has been attained only in so far as they have +been effective. The lesson of the last century has been that the +machinery which proved sufficient in England, where progress was uniform +through several centuries, breaks down when the pace of progress is +increased. An extreme instance is the recent attempt to introduce party +government into Japan, a country just emerging from the feudal stage, an +interesting account of which is given in the <i>Nineteenth Century</i> for +July, 1899. The experiment failed because the clans could not be divided +on questions of political principle. In a greater or less degree that is +the fundamental source of difficulty everywhere; if the representative +machinery produces only sectional delegation the tendency is back +through anarchy to absolutism. Is it not an extraordinary fact, then, +that the vital distinction between representation and delegation is so +universally ignored?</p> + +<p>Such is a brief outline of the evolution of human society; however +inadequate it may be, it at least serves to illustrate the truth that +social progress has never been made in the past except when the +principles of organization and leadership have been operative.</p> + +<p><b>Future Progres<a name="Page_221" id="Page_221" />s.</b>—As to the ultimate tendency of future progress it +would be pedantry to dogmatize; our task has been the humbler one of +pointing out the means by which progress is to be attained. We have +assumed, however, that there is a separate sphere of collective action +in which government is an instrument for the positive amelioration of +social conditions. We are aware that this conclusion is at variance with +the two extreme schools of modern thought; on the one hand, with the +individualists, who hold that government should only be used for mutual +protection and to keep order; and on the other hand, with the +socialists, who would leave nothing to individual action. Professor +Huxley has reduced the claims of these two schools to absurdity and +impossibility respectively; and we believe that the problem of the +future is to find out that middle course between the anarchy of the one +and the despotism of the other which makes for progress. It seems likely +that the state of society we are approaching will be one in which, while +natural inequalities will be recognized, neither the artificial +inequalities of fanatical individualism nor the artificial equalities of +regimental socialism will be tolerated, and every man will enter the +rivalry of life on terms of an equality of opportunity. This is the +state foreshadowed by Mr. Lester Ward in his "Outlines of Sociology" and +called by him <i>Sociocracy</i>. Such ideals, however, serve only to refute +false conceptions and offer little practical guidance. What is wanted is +a clear recogni<a name="Page_222" id="Page_222" />tion of the fact that <i>progress depends on collective +effort acting through representative machinery, the efficiency of which +depends on the extent to which the principles of organization and +responsible leadership are operative.</i> The question with which +democratic countries are faced to-day is this: Must it be acknowledged +that the people are unfit for self-government, or is the representative +machinery defective? We have supported the view that the latter is the +case as regards English-speaking-countries at all events; and we have +shown that in British countries the remedy lies in improved electoral +machinery, while in the United States both electoral and parliamentary +machinery are at fault.</p> + +<p>FOOTNOTES:</p> + +<p><a name="Footnote_9" href="#FNanchor_9">[9]</a> "Principles of Ethics."</p> + +<p><a name="Footnote_10" href="#FNanchor_10">[10]</a> "Collected Essays," vol. ix., p. 83.</p> + +<p><a name="Footnote_11" href="#FNanchor_11">[11]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 85.</p> + +<p><a name="Footnote_12" href="#FNanchor_12">[12]</a> "Collected Essays," vol. i., pp. 275-276.</p> + + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Proportional Representation Applied To +Party Government, by T. R. Ashworth and H. P. C. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Proportional Representation Applied To Party Government + +Author: T. R. Ashworth and H. P. C. Ashworth + +Release Date: December 25, 2004 [EBook #14459] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION *** + + + + +Produced by Martin Pettit and the PG Online Distributed Proofreading Team + + + + + + +PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION APPLIED TO PARTY GOVERNMENT + +A NEW ELECTORAL SYSTEM + +BY + +T.R. ASHWORTH (_President of the Victorian Division, Australian Free +Trade and Liberal Association_) + +AND + +H.P.C. ASHWORTH (_Civil Engineer_) + + + +LONDON + +SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO., LIM. + +PATERNOSTER SQUARE + +1901 + + + + +CONTENTS. + + +CHAPTER PAGE + +I.--THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 1 + +II.--THE SO-CALLED REPRESENTATIVE PRINCIPLE 22 + +III.--THE PRESENT POSITION or PARTY GOVERNMENT 47 + +IV.--THE REFORM: TRUE PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION 97 + +V.--HOW THE EVILS OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM WILL + BE REMEDIED 122 + +VI.--THE HARE SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL DELEGATION 141 + +VII.--THE FREE LIST SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL + DELEGATION 162 + +VIII.--PREFERENTIAL VOTING, THE BLOCK VOTE, + THE LIMITED VOTE, &C. 172 + +IX.--ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE THE PRESENT SYSTEM 188 + +X.--APPLICATION OF THE REFORM TO AUSTRALIAN + LEGISLATURES 194 + +XI.--THE CONDITIONS OF SOCIAL PROGRESS 208 + + + + + "Majority and minority, in and for themselves, are the first + requisite of popular government, and not the development or + representation of separate groups."--Bradford's "Lesson of Popular + Government," vol. ii., page 179. + + + + +PREFACE. + + +The subject of electoral reform has been brought into prominence in +Australia by a clause in the Commonwealth Bill which provides that the +Federal Senate shall consist of six senators from each State, directly +chosen by the people, voting as one electorate. The problem thus +presented has been keenly discussed. On the one hand we have the +advocates of the Block Vote asserting that the party in a majority is +entitled to return all six senators; and on the other, a small band of +ardent reformers pressing the claims of the Hare system, which would +allow the people in each State to group themselves into six sections, +each returning one senator. The claim that every section of the people +is entitled to representation appears at first sight so just that it +seems intolerable that a method should have been used all these years +which excludes the minority in each electorate from any share of +representation; and, of course, the injustice becomes more evident when +the electorate returns several members. But in view of the adage that +it is the excellence of old institutions which preserves them, it is +surely a rash conclusion that the present method of election has no +compensating merit. We believe there is such a merit--namely, that _the +present method of election has developed the party system_. Once this +truth is grasped, it is quite evident that the Hare system would be +absolutely destructive to party government, since each electorate would +be contested, not by two organized parties, but by several groups. For +it is precisely this splitting into groups which is causing such anxiety +among thoughtful observers as to the future of representative +institutions; Mr. Lecky has attributed to it, in his "Democracy and +Liberty," the decline in the parliamentary system which has accompanied +the progress of democracy all over the world. The object of this book is +to suggest a reform, which possesses the advantages of both methods and +the disadvantages of neither; which will still ensure that each +electorate is contested by the two main parties, but will allow its just +share of representation to each; and which will, by discouraging the +formation of minor groups, provide a remedy for the evil instead of +aggravating it. + + T.R.A. + H.P.C.A. + +325 COLLINS STREET, MELBOURNE. + + + + +PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION + +APPLIED TO + +PARTY GOVERNMENT. + + + + +CHAPTER I. + +THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION. + + +Old establishments, like the British Constitution, said Edmund Burke, +"are not often constructed after any theory; theories are rather drawn +from them." In setting out on an endeavour to understand the principles +underlying political representation, the saying expresses exactly the +course which should be followed. The inquiry is the more necessary as, +although representation more than anything else in the domain of +government distinguishes the modern from the ancient world, the ideas +which prevail as to the part it has played, is playing, and is destined +to play on the world's stage are not merely hazy, but extremely +inaccurate. The intimate connection of representation with the progress +which has followed its introduction is so little recognized that the +most advanced democracies are now willing to listen to any proposal to +return to direct government. In spite of the fact that the nineteenth +century has witnessed the triumph of the historical method in most +fields of social inquiry, the dangers of _a priori_ speculation on +political institutions are as much in evidence as when Burke wrote. + +If we would understand, then, the meaning of representative +institutions, it is in the gradual development of the "mother of +parliaments" that we must seek for the most reliable information. We +must be careful, however, to leave out of sight those features of the +growth of the British Constitution which are merely the expression of +transitory social conditions, and to confine our attention to the +landmarks which bear directly on the inquiry. The subject is best +divided into two stages; the first characterized by the origin of +representation; and the second by the division into parties, and the +creation of cabinet government. + ++The First Stage of Representation.+--Rightly to understand the +conditions which led to the introduction and development of the +representative principle, we must look back to the period immediately +following the signing of the Great Charter by the tyrant King John. + +The Charter reaffirmed the ancient principle that free Englishmen should +not be taxed without their consent, and representation was the natural +outcome of that provision. A brief glance at the social conditions of +the time is necessary to understand why this was so. First, it must be +remembered that the true political unit of ancient times was the city +or local community. England at that time was a collection of local +communities, having more or less a corporate life. Then, again, there +were the three estates of the realm--the clergy, the lords, and the +commons--who were accustomed to confer with the King on public affairs. +The stage which marks the birth of representation was when these +different estates and communities were asked to tax themselves to +relieve the necessities of the King. It was obviously impossible that +the consent of every freeman should be obtained, hence the duty had to +be deputed to agents. Now, the idea of agency was not unknown in the +ancient world, but that agents should have power to bind those for whom +they acted was something entirely new. It was necessary, however, that +they should have this power, and it suited the King's convenience that +they should exercise it. Already, in the earliest writ of which we have +knowledge, summoning each shire to send two good and discreet knights, +it was provided that they should be chosen in the stead of each and all. +This happened in 1254, and in the following year the clergy were also +summoned for the same purpose of granting aid to the King. In the +meantime the merchants and trade guilds in the cities were growing rich. +The King cast longing eyes on their possessions, and wished to tax them. +So we find that in 1264 Simon de Montfort, Earl of Leicester, issued the +celebrated writ summoning each of the cities and boroughs to send two +of its more discreet and worthy citizens and burgesses. This is +sometimes regarded as the beginning of the House of Commons, but it was +really not until the fourteenth century that these several assemblies, +each of which up till then taxed itself separately and legislated in its +own sphere, coalesced into the present Houses. First the lower clergy +fell out, and, with the knights, citizens, and burgesses, were merged +into the House of Commons; and the higher prelates with the earls and +barons formed the House of Lords. + +This, then, is the first stage of representation. What was the nature of +this new force which had come into the world and was destined to so +profoundly affect the whole course of human affairs? One result of +immense importance is apparent at a glance. It solved a problem which +had baffled the ancients--that of the nationalization of local +communities on a free basis. But it is generally assumed that the only +difficulty overcome was that of size; that the representative assembly +is a mere substitute for the larger assembly of the whole nation. +Starting with this assumption, it is claimed that the representative +assembly should be a mirror of the people on a small scale, and the more +faithfully it reflects their faults as well as their virtues, their +ignorance as well as their intelligence, the more truly representative +it is said to be. It is even asserted that with the modern facilities +for taking a poll, representative government might be dispensed with +and the people allowed to govern themselves. Democracy, we are assured, +means that every man should exercise an equality of political power. +Now, if this conception is correct, we should at once insist that every +law should be submitted to a direct referendum of the people; that +legislators should be mere agents for drawing up laws; and that the +executive should be directly responsible to and elected by the people. +But if representation is not a mere substitute for the direct action of +the people this idea as to the true line of democratic progress falls to +the ground. The whole question, therefore, hinges on what representation +is and what are the principles underlying it. + +Looking back to the history of its introduction, we have seen that it +was only in proportion as the deputies of the local communities were not +regarded as delegates or agents that they became representatives. +Professor E. Jenks has written an interesting article in the +_Contemporary Review_ for December, 1898, in which he advances the +theory that representation is a union of the ideas of agency, borrowed +from the Roman law, and of vicarious liability from barbaric sources. As +to the latter he points out that in Anglo-Saxon times the only way for +the King to control the free local communities was to exact hostages +till crimes were punished or fines paid. In England, where these ideas +were combined, constitutional monarchy was firmly established; but in +France, Germany, &c, in whose medieval parliaments the idea of agency +prevailed, and where in consequence the parliamentary idea was weak, +absolute monarchy held its ground. When Edward I. desired for purposes +of his own to emphasize the unlimited liability of political +representatives, and insisted that they should have "full and sufficient +power to do what of common council shall be ordained," he probably never +realized that a body having power to bind the shires and towns was a +formidable institution, or that the trembling hostages would become in +time haughty plenipotentiaries. But whatever may have been the social +conditions which gave rise to the idea, it is certain that it was the +power of binding those to whom they owed their selection which enabled +the representatives to resist the encroachments of the monarchy on the +liberties of the people. At first they were not legislators, but merely +sought to uphold the ancient laws. They presented petitions to redress +their grievances; but in time these petitions became demands; and they +refused to grant the King's subsidies till the demands were complied +with. It was, therefore, this first stage of representation which +enabled the people to start that long struggle against the power of the +King and nobles which has ended in complete self-government; nay, more, +it was necessary that they should pass through this first stage before +they could learn to govern themselves. Yet we have seen that if we apply +the modern ideas on representation the start could never have been +made. In what respects, then, did these early representative +institutions differ from the modern conception as a reproduction of the +people on a small scale? One obvious difference at once suggests itself. +The representatives were not average members of the communities; they +were the most influential; they were selected because of their special +fitness for the work to be done; they were leaders of the people, not +followers; they did not take inspiration from the people, but brought it +to them; and having selected these men the people deferred to their +judgment to act for them and protect their interests. Here, then, we +arrive at the first principle involved in representation, which is +leadership. + +But there is another and still more important difference between a +representative assembly and a primary assembly of the people. It is +this: that a representative cannot be a violent partisan of a small +section of his constituents; he must be in general favour with all +sections. Therefore a representative assembly is composed of moderate +men, representing a compromise of the views of their individual +supporters. Moreover, the representatives appeal to the people to sink +their minor differences for the general welfare. This feature is very +prominent in the early parliaments. The local communities were arrayed +as a united people against the aggression of the monarchy. The principle +which is here apparent is that of organization. In the first stage of +English parliamentary history we may say at once that these two +principles--organization and leadership--were most conspicuous. The +people, sinking all minor differences, formed one united party; and +recognised that their struggle against the party of prerogative depended +on the ability, influence, and integrity of their deputies. + ++The Second Stage of Representation.+--There is no need to enter into +that long struggle between the nation and the monarchy which followed. +We pass on, then, to the time when the parliaments, having wrested a +share of power, began to split up into parties. It was natural that when +power became divided two parties should arise; one upholding the +authority of the Parliament against the King; and the other favouring +the divine right of Kings. The Puritans and Cavaliers in the troublous +times of Charles I. were the earliest signs of this tendency. The Long +Parliament, which met in 1640, was divided on these lines; the +misdemeanors of the King brought on civil war; the parliamentary troops +defeated the royal troops after a bloody struggle; and the King was +brought to execution. The succeeding events were full of instruction. +The Parliament attempted to govern the nation--or, rather, we should say +the House of Commons did, for the House of Lords was abolished. But it +proved quite unfit for the purpose. It was thoroughly disorganized, and +rent by violent factions. The anarchy which ensued was ended by a +military despot, Oliver Cromwell, who entered the House of Commons in +1653 with his soldiers. The Speaker was pulled from his chair; the +members were driven from the House; and Cromwell was proclaimed +dictator. It is strange, indeed, that the lesson which is to be drawn +from this event, and which has been repeated in France time after time +since the Revolution, has not yet been learned: the only escape from +continued political anarchy is despotism. But the weakness of despotism +is that it ends with the life of the despot. Cromwell's son was forced +to abdicate, and the monarchy was restored. The same division of parties +in the Parliament continued, and they began to take the names of Whigs +and Tories. Towards the end of the seventeenth century, the dissensions +of these two factions again threatened to make government impossible. In +administration the evil was felt most; the union of ministers of both +parties was proving unworkable. So fickle did legislation become that no +one could say one day what the House would do the next. It was at this +crisis, and about the year 1693, that William III., who cared more for a +strong administration than for political differences, created what is +known as cabinet government, and, as Professor Gardiner says, "refounded +the government of England on a new basis." Recognizing that power should +not be separated from responsibility, he affirmed the principle that the +ministers of state should be selected from the party which had a +majority in the House of Commons. But the time was not yet ripe for the +complete application of this principle. Early in the eighteenth century +Sir Robert Walpole set the example of resigning when he no longer +possessed the confidence of a majority of the House of Commons; but in +the latter half of the century the great Earl of Chatham introduced +again the practice of selecting ministers irrespective of party. Despite +the fact that he was supported by the personal influence of George III., +the attempt failed. A succession of weak ministries followed; and out of +the confusion the modern division of Liberals and Conservatives emerged. +Thus it was not until the beginning of the present century that the +doctrines of the solidarity of the Cabinet and its complete dependence +on a majority of the House of Commons were thoroughly developed in their +present form. England, now grown into the United Kingdom, had at last, +after six centuries of strife, won her national independence, and for +one brief century has enjoyed a full measure of self-government. + ++Comparison of the Two Stages.+--How do the conditions presented by the +nineteenth century differ from those of the fourteenth? And how is the +problem of representation affected? We have seen that the great forces +which animated the nation in the fourteenth century were organization +and leadership. Have these forces ceased to operate? Assuredly not. In +the fourteenth century we had a united people organized under its chosen +leaders against the encroachments of the King and nobility on its +national liberty. In the nineteenth century the people have won their +political independence, but the struggle is now carried on between two +great organized parties. The principle of leadership is still as strong +as ever. The careers of Pitt, Peel, Palmerston, Beaconsfield, and +Gladstone attest that fact. The one great difference, then, between the +fourteenth and the nineteenth centuries is that instead of one party +there are two. The problem of representation in the fourteenth century +was to keep the people together in one united party, and to allow them +to select their most popular leaders. Surely the problem is different in +the nineteenth century. The requirements now are to organize the people +into two great parties, and to allow each party separately to elect its +most popular leaders. And yet we are still using the same method of +election as our forefathers used six centuries ago. Although the +conditions have entirely changed, we have not adapted the electoral +machinery to the change. The system of single-membered electorates was +rational in the fourteenth century, because there was only one party. Is +it not on the face of it absurd to-day, when there are two parties? + ++The Meaning of Party Government.+--Why should there be two parties +instead of one in order that the people should be able to govern +themselves? To answer this question we must start at the beginning, and +consider what is the problem of popular government. The best definition +is that it is to promote the general welfare--to reconcile or average +the real interests of all sections of the community. Now, if the people +could all agree what is best in the interests of all, unity of action +might certainly be obtained; but even then the problem would not be +solved, for the people are not infallible. The greater part of the +problem consists in finding out what is best in the interests of all, +and no amount of mere abstract speculation can solve this part. So +diverse and so complex are the interests to be reconciled, so interwoven +and interdependent one with another, that the problem of securing a just +balance is incapable of solution by anything short of omniscience. But +in any case the people cannot be always got to agree to one course of +action. Therefore the people cannot govern themselves as one united +party. The only workable basis is, then, the rule of the majority, and +the problem of popular government is how to ensure that the majority +shall rule in the interests of all. + +Party government provides the best known means of solving this problem. +The only way of finding out what is best for the whole people is by the +incessant action and interaction of two great organized parties under +their chosen leaders; each putting forth its energies to prove its +fitness to hold the reins of government; each anxious to expose the +defects of the other. This healthy emulation as to what is best for all, +with the people to judge, is the real secret of free government. The +two parties are virtually struggling as to which shall be king. Each is +striving to gain the support of a majority of the people; and the +grounds on which it appeals for support are that the measures it +proposes are the best for the country, and that the men it puts forward +are the best men for passing those measures into law and carrying on the +administration of the country. This constant agitation, and this mutual +competition to devise new measures, and to bring forward new men, +prevent stagnation. Both sides of every leading public question of the +day are presented in the rival party policies, and the people are +invited to decide between them. The forces on which the parties rely to +move the people are enthusiasm for measures and enthusiasm for +men--party and personality, or, in other words, organization and +leadership. It is in opposing these forces to counteract the selfish and +anti-social passions that party government acquires its virtue. By +appealing to their higher nature it induces the people to subordinate +their class prejudices to the general welfare, and by setting before +them definite moral ideals, and appealing to them by the force of +personality, it raises the character of public opinion, and moulds +individual and national character to an extent that is seldom +appreciated. Here, then, is the key of human progress. Direct +democracies may hold together so long as there are external enemies to +induce the people to sink their differences in the common interest, or +so long as there is a slave caste to do the menial work, as in the +ancient democracies; but representative democracy offers the only hope +of welding together a free people into a united whole. The unrestrained +rule of the majority under direct democracy must degenerate into the +tyranny of the majority. Instead of the equality of political power +which it promises, the minority is deprived of all power. Representative +democracy, on the other hand, deprives the people of the personal +exercise of political power, in order to save them from the free play of +their self-assertive passions, but still leaves to every man an equality +of influence in deciding the direction of progress. Thus every man is +induced to express his opinion as to the direction of progress; and the +party policy is the resultant direction of progress of all the party +electors, and therefore represents their organized opinion. Now, bear in +mind that the true direction of progress is not known, and can only be +found out by constant experiment directed by the most far-seeing and +capable minds. It is the means of carrying on this experiment which +party government provides. The party representing the organized opinion +of the majority has, rightly, complete control of the direction of +progress so long as it remains in a majority. But, although deliberation +is the work of many, execution is the work of one. Hence the creation of +a small committee of the party in power--the cabinet--associated with +the leader of the party, who becomes for the time being the Prime +Minister, the cabinet ministers being jointly responsible for the +control of administration and the initiation of measures for the public +good. But an organized minority is quite as essential to progress as an +organized majority--not merely to oppose, but to criticise and expose +the errors of the party in power, and to supplant it when it ceases to +possess the confidence of the country. Hence progress under party +government may be compared to a zigzag line, in which the changes in +direction correspond to changes in ministry. By this mutual action and +alternation of parties every vote cast has, in the long run, an equal +influence in guiding progress. The only justification for majority rule +sanctioned by free government is that when two parties differ as to what +is best for the whole people the majority shall prevail, and party +government tends to realize this condition. But direct government by the +people offers no check whatever on the power of the majority, which is +as absolute as that of the Czar of Russia. As Calhoun, the American +statesman, writes in his "Disquisition on Government," "the principle by +which constitutional governments are upheld, is _compromise_, that of +absolute governments is _force_!" Now, the significance of party +government as a guarantee of free government lies in this: that party +policies represent a compromise of what every section composing each +party supposes to be the interests of the whole people; and the parties +are engaged in fighting out a compromise of the real interests of every +section of the people. + +Lest it be thought that in this panegyric on party government we have +been indulging in a wild flight into the region of speculative politics, +we hasten to add that the ideal condition we have pictured has never +been reached. The British Parliament has perhaps most nearly approached +it, but already shows signs of retrogression. America and the Australian +colonies are drifting further away from it. Already political +philosophers are shaking their heads and predicting the failure of +popular government. The cry everywhere is for a stronger executive. +Party organization is breaking down; small factions actuated by +self-interest hold the balance of power between the main parties, and +render government unstable and capricious. The main parties themselves +tend to degenerate into factions. Personality is declining--the demand +is for followers, not leaders. Compromise is supplanted by log-rolling +and lobbying. And, to crown all, the rumbling of class strife grows +ominously louder. The danger is that these tendencies may be allowed to +go too far before reform is attempted--that the confidence between +classes may be destroyed. + ++Organization and Leadership.+--We have shown that the two great +principles underlying representation are organization and leadership. +Now, after all, there is nothing very profound in this conclusion. Is +there a single department of concerted human action in which these same +principles are not apparent? What would be thought of an army without +discipline and without generals; or of a musical production in which +every performer played his own tune? Even in the region of sport, can a +cricket or a football team dispense with its captain and its places? And +yet many people imagine that a disorganized collection of delegates of +various sections can rule a nation? Such an assembly would be as much a +mob as any primary assembly of the people, and would in no sense be a +representative assembly. The fact is that the growing intensity of the +evils which beset representative institutions throughout the civilized +world to-day is due to imperfect expression of these two principles. +Representative assemblies are not properly organized into two coherent +parties, nor is each party allowed free play to select its most popular +leaders. What is the remedy? + ++A Change in Electoral Machinery the Key to Reform.+--The great mistake +made by all writers on electoral reform is that they have failed to +recognize that the character of public opinion depends upon the way it +is expressed. If the electoral machinery be adapted to give effect to +those principles of organization and leadership which lie at the root of +representation, then the character of public opinion will be improved. +Representation, in fact, is not only a means of expressing public +opinion, but also of guiding, informing, educating, and organizing it. +Therefore, the method of election is an all-important factor. + +The first and greatest necessity is to counteract the tendency of the +people to split up into factions. It may seem a startling conclusion +that this is a mere matter of electoral machinery, but it is +nevertheless quite true. It must be remembered that we are dealing with +human beings and not with insentient figures. If the method of election +allows representation to two sections only, the people will group +themselves into two sections. But if it allows representation to a large +number of sections, then the people will group themselves into as many +sections as are allowed. Now, party government offers every hope of +preventing two sections degenerating into factions, but with a number of +sections there is absolutely none. + +Here, then, we see the one great merit of the present system of +election, which explains why it has persisted so long, with all its +faults. It is that it tends to confine representation to the two main +parties, since each electorate is generally contested by them; but in so +far as it does not completely effect that object and allows +representation to independent factions it is defective. Moreover, the +merit we have indicated is purchased at too high a price. It is these +defects which are causing the degradation of representative institutions +throughout the world to-day. + +It is obviously impossible to give a just share of representation to two +parties and allow each party to elect its most popular leaders, in an +electorate which returns only a single representative. Hence the first +necessity for reform is to enlarge electorates, so that each may return +several representatives. Now, the requirements for giving effect to the +principles of organization and leadership in such an electorate are:-- + + 1. Proportional representation to the two main parties--Ministerial + and Opposition, the majority and the minority. + + 2. The election by each party of its most popular + candidates--_i.e._, those most in general favour with all sections + of the party. + +This is the problem of representation as it presents itself to us. +Leaving a detailed account of the means by which it is proposed to give +effect to these great desiderata to a later chapter, let us indicate +briefly where they strike at the root of the evils of the present +system. + ++Enlarged Electorates.+--With enlarged electorates the minority will not +be excluded. Each party will secure its just share of representation. +When both parties are represented in each electorate the interests of +the electorate will not be bargained for as the price of support. +Members will cease to be mere local delegates. + ++Proportional Representation to the Two Main Parties.+--Representation +must be absolutely confined to the two main parties, and each party must +be allowed its just share. Every candidate should be required to +nominate either as a Ministerialist or Oppositionist, and each party +should be allotted a number of representatives proportional to the total +amount of support received. If democracy means that every man's opinion, +as expressed by his vote, is to have the same weight, it follows that +the parties should be represented in the Legislature in the same +proportion as among the people, otherwise it is ridiculous to talk of +the rule of the majority. The present system sometimes results in +minority rule and sometimes in minority extermination; it is difficult +to say which alternative is the worse. + ++Election of its Most Popular Candidates by each Party.+--It would be +little use to confine representation to the two main parties if the +parties were allowed to split up into factions. The only way to prevent +this is to provide such electoral machinery as will ensure the return of +the candidates most in general favour with all sections, and will +exclude the favourites of sections within the party. This distinction is +vital. The general favourite is a representative; the favourite of a +faction is a delegate. A representative is not only independent of any +one section, but if he does favour a faction he will sink in general +favour. He therefore represents a compromise of the demands of all +sections. But a delegate is the mouthpiece of a faction--a follower, not +a leader of the people. + +No section will be disfranchised by this proposal, for the true +function of all minor sections is to influence the policies of the two +main parties. Thus every section will be proportionally represented in +one or the other policy and by all the party candidates. Not only will +each party be proportionally represented but all the sections which +compose each party will be proportionally represented in its policy. +This is the only true meaning of proportional representation. + + + + +CHAPTER II. + +THE SO-CALLED REPRESENTATIVE PRINCIPLE. + + +All schemes of electoral reform hitherto proposed under the name of +proportional representation are based on the so-called "representative +principle"--viz., that every section of the people is entitled to +separate representation in proportion to its numbers. The ideal varies +somewhat, but the usual conception, is that if each member represents a +different section or interest the assembly will represent all sections +or all interests. Now this is simply an attempt to return to what we +have described as the first stage of representation, but without the +fear of the monarchy to keep the sections together. For a deliberative +body or a king's council it might be suitable, but for an assembly +charged with the complete control of government in the interests of all +it is utterly impracticable. Each representative must represent all +interests; he must be elected on a definite policy as to what is best +for all the people. If he is sent in as the agent of one interest or one +section of the people, he ceases to be a representative and becomes a +delegate. All these schemes are therefore not proportional +representation at all, but proportional delegation. + +We have shown that representation means the organization of public +opinion into two definite lines of policy, and that this is the only way +to prevent political anarchy. But the proportionalists (as they like to +call themselves) say that it means representing men and the opinions +they hold in proportion to their numbers. The fundamental error is that +they neglect the all-important factor of human nature. They look on +public opinion as something having an independent existence apart from +the questions about which it is expressed and from the means of +expressing it; and they fail to recognize that the character of public +opinion depends on the manner in which it is expressed and organized. It +is but a natural consequence that they also conceive the number of +sections of opinion awaiting representation as pre-existing and +independent of the electoral machinery. + +In short, they reduce the whole problem to a nice little exercise in +mathematics, requiring only for its clear exposition some columns of +figures and a few coloured diagrams to represent the different shades of +public opinion. No better example of the dangers of _a priori_ +speculation could be adduced than this chimerical idea of the +proportionalists that public opinion is something to be divided into +fractions like a mathematical quantity, unless it be, perhaps, the +conclusion that if you gather together delegates representing these +fractions you will have an assembly representing the sum total of public +opinion. + +The issue is quite clear. Are we to have two parties aiming at the +control of administration and appealing to all sections for support, or +the separate delegation of a number of sections? In the one case we will +have parties based on national policies, and in the other case we will +have a number of factions, each wanting something different and +determined to block progress till it gets it. Remember that it is a mere +matter of electoral machinery which will determine the choice. It is +true that at present we do not have two very coherent parties, but that +is the fault of the present electoral system. + +It would seem that there can be but one answer to this question, and yet +the "representative principle" shows such wonderful vitality that it is +worth while considering the arguments on which it is based, and the +various stages through which the idea has passed. + ++Mr. Hare's Scheme.+--The "representative principle" was first +propounded in England in 1857 by Mr. Thomas Hare. He proposed that the +United Kingdom should be constituted one huge electorate for the return +of the 654 members of the House of Commons. The people were to group +themselves into 654 voluntary unanimous sections, each returning one +member, and each gathered from every corner of the kingdom. We propose +to consider here not the scheme itself but only the principle on which +it was founded. Mr. Hare rightly conceived that the great evil of the +present system is the exclusion of the minority in each electorate, but +he altogether failed to appreciate that the excluded minority nearly +always represented one of the two main parties. He could not see, in +fact, that to divide each electorate into majority and minority is to +divide the whole country into majority and minority, nor that the +injustice is tolerated because it is usually as bad for one party as the +other. Instead, therefore, of proposing to do justice to both the +majority and the minority in each electorate, he proposed to allow +representation to as many minorities as possible. To him, the rule of +the majority was the rule of a majority of interests; this he called the +constitutional majority, as opposed to the "mere rule of numbers." Now, +at the time Mr. Hare wrote party government was rather weak in England. +He quotes with approval a statement of Mr. Sidney Herbert, M.P., that +the House was divided into many parties, or rather no party, because the +country was divided into many parties or no party, and that the division +into two parties would never be restored again. It is amusing, in view +of after events, to find Mr. Hare asking what would be the result of any +contrivance to re-establish party. Assuming that _party_ representation +was dead, Mr. Hare proposed to substitute _personal_ representation. It +is positively ludicrous at this interval of time to note how the +electors were expected to group themselves. They were to take personal +merit as the basis of representation; every vote cast was to be a +spontaneous tribute to the qualities and attainments of the person for +whom it was given. And in order, presumably, that they should choose +good men in preference to corrupt men, the polling-day was to be set +apart as a sacred holiday, and church services were to be held to +solemnize the public act and seek for the Divine blessing! + +The maintenance of a responsible ministry in such a House presented no +difficulty to Mr. Hare. The electors were to indicate whom they +considered the most illustrious statesmen, and no one would dare to +question their decision! + +It seems strange now that this scheme should have received serious +consideration. Mr. Hare was so much under the spell of the apparent +justice of the underlying principle that he was blind to its results. +But it was soon perceived that the electors would not group themselves +as Mr. Hare supposed; that the personal ideal of every class of electors +would be simply men of their own class. It was further pointed out that +cranks and faddists and every organization founded on questions of the +remotest interest would combine to secure representation. Mr. Disraeli +declared it to be "opposed to every sound principle, its direct effect +being to create a stagnant representation ... an admirable scheme for +bringing crotchety men into the House." Mr. Shaw-Lefevre condemned it +as "a vicious principle based upon a theory of classes," and Mr. +Gladstone said that it regarded electors "not as rational and thinking +beings, but merely as the equivalents of one another." Walter Bagehot, +in his standard work on the "English Constitution," opposes the +principle of voluntary constituencies, because it would promote a +constituency-making trade. "But upon the plan suggested," he writes, +"the House would be made up of party politicians selected by a party +committee, chained to that committee, and pledged to party violence, and +of characteristic, and therefore unmoderate, representatives for every +'ism' in all England. Instead of a deliberate assembly of moderate and +judicious men, we should have a various compound of all sorts of +violence. I may seem to be drawing a caricature, but I have not reached +the worst. Bad as these members would be if they were left to +themselves--if in a free Parliament they were confronted with the perils +of government, close responsibility might improve them, and make them +tolerable. But they would not be left to themselves. A voluntary +constituency will nearly always be a despotic constituency." + +The practical difficulties in the application of Mr. Hare's scheme are +almost insuperable, but it is not worth while pursuing the subject, +since it is now admitted by recent advocates that the faddist argument +is fatal. This is an admission that Mr. Hare completely neglected the +factor of human nature. Professor Nanson writes:--"Hare proposed that +there should be only one electorate, consisting of the whole State. It +is unfortunate that this proposal was made. There can be no doubt that +it has retarded the progress of true electoral reform for at least a +generation ... it would inevitably lead to the election of a certain +number of faddists." + ++John Stuart Mill.+--The great vogue which the Hare system has obtained +is to be traced more to the influence of John Stuart Mill than to that +of anyone else. Mill was captivated by the apparent justice of the +proposal, and devoted a chapter of his "Representative Government" to +it, wherein he declared:--"Mr. Hare's scheme has the almost unparalleled +merit of carrying out a great principle of government in a manner +approaching to ideal perfection, while it attains incidentally several +other things of scarcely inferior importance." Believing in the absolute +justice of the principle, Mill and Hare were certainly consistent in +setting no limit to its application except the size of the assembly. +Mill is emphatic on this point. "Real equality of representation," he +asserted, "is not obtained unless any set of electors, amounting to +average number of a constituency, wherever they happen to reside, have +the power of combining with one another to return a representative." +Now, the recent disciples of Mr. Hare are never tired of claiming the +support of Mill, although they have thrown this definition to the +winds. But they are guilty of far more than that, for in another chapter +of Mill's book we find that his conception of a representative assembly +elected by the Hare system is a purely deliberative body. He expressly +declares it to be radically unfit for legislation, which he proposes to +hand over to a commission appointed by the Crown. The value of his +testimony is very much discounted by this fact. + ++Sir John Lubbock.+[1]--We have asserted that the proportional principle +should be applied to two parties only--the majority and the minority, +and that every section can then be represented. Mill and Hare thought +that no limit should be set except the size of the assembly. All the +recent advocates of the system take up an intermediate position. +Appreciating the serious objections against allowing independent +representation to a large number of small sections, Sir John Lubbock, +president of the English Proportional Representation Society, proposes +to constitute electorates returning only three to five members each, +thus confining representation to only three to five sections in each +electorate, and sacrificing to a great extent accurate proportional +representation. In his book on "Representation," he writes:--"I have +assumed that Parliament should be 'a mirror of the nation;' if the +object were to secure unity of action rather than freedom of discussion, +to form an executive body such as a Government, a Board of Directors, or +a Vestry, the case would be quite different. It is, however, I presume, +our wish that Parliament should be a deliberative assembly in which all +parties should be fairly represented." But to make Parliament a +deliberative body is to destroy its power to secure unity of action at +all, and to render it useless as a working machine. + ++Miss Spence.+--An active campaign has for some time been carried on for +the adoption of the Hare system in Australia. Miss C.H. Spence, of South +Australia, was the pioneer reformer, and has laboured in the cause by +pen and voice for no less than forty years. Great credit is undoubtedly +due to Miss Spence for the clear and simple manner in which she has +expounded the system, and for the good work she has done in exposing the +defects of the present methods. Not only has she lectured in all parts +of Australia, but she has made visits to England, where she met Mr. Hare +and Sir John Lubbock, and also to America. But we may admire Miss +Spence's courage and devotion to principle without agreeing with her +conclusions. + +At a meeting held at River House, Chelsea, London, in 1894, Miss Spence +submitted an analysis of 8,824 votes recorded at 50 public meetings in +South Australia. The audiences were in each case asked to select six +representatives out of twelve candidates. The result of a scrutiny of +all the votes combined was that the following six "parties" secured one +"representative" each--viz., Capital, Labour, Single Tax, Irish +Catholic, Prohibition, and Women's Suffrage. Miss Spence frankly +confesses that these "parties" are minorities, but holds that a majority +can be formed by the union of minorities, and that party responsible +government can still be carried on. Now, can any sensible man or woman +imagine a working ministry formed by a union of any four of these +"parties?" Capital would certainly be permanently opposed to Labour and +to Single Tax, and as for the others, there is not a single principle in +common. How, then, could a union be formed? The only possible way is by +log-rolling; they must make a bargain to support one another's demands. +Such a union could not possibly be stable, because the minority is free +to offer a better bargain to any one of the "parties" to induce it to +desert. Again, it may be called the rule of the majority, but what sort +of a majority? Is it not plainly the rule of a majority in the interests +of minorities? That is very different to the rule of the majority in the +interests of all, which free government demands. The simple truth is +that the "parties" are factions, and that the "representatives" are mere +delegates of those factions. + +But in practice the case would be far worse than we have assumed. There +is not the slightest guarantee that the same six factions would be +elected in each six-seat electorate. We might have an unlimited number +of delegates of various religions, classes, races, localities, and +political organizations on all kinds of single questions. An assembly +formed on these lines could hardly be dignified with the name of a +representative assembly. + +Mr. G. Bradford, in his work on "The Lesson of Popular Government," +displays a more intimate knowledge of human nature than any other recent +writer. Of these schemes for the representation of minorities he says:-- + + As an illustration of the effect in popular government of looking + to popular impulse for the initiation of measures, it may be + observed that perhaps the worst of all expedients for remedying the + defective working of a government by a legislature like ours, that + which combines the evils of them all, is one which is urged by + perfectly disinterested advocates of reform, and is known as + proportional representation. If there is one principle at the base + of popular government it is that the majority shall rule. If the + largest of three or four fractions is to rule it ceases to be + popular government, and becomes government by faction. If the + tyranny of the majority is bad a tyranny of the minority is still + worse. (Vol. i., p. 505.) + +And the following picture could hardly be better drawn:-- + + If the basis of carrying on the government is to be the wishes of + some millions of units, it is evident that they must to a greater + or less extent agree in wishing for something. It is equally + evident that they cannot all agree in wishing for the same thing at + the same time, while if they, or any considerable number of groups, + want different things at the same time, the result in so far is + anarchy. Government is paralysed, and with the well-known + excitability of humanity in groups men begin to confound the + importance of the thing wanted with the importance of getting what + they want. The clash of contending factions is apt to suggest the + clash of arms. The first necessity, therefore, is the formation of + large and coherent parties, not merely for the purpose of + accomplishing what is desired by the majority of the people, but + also for suppressing agitation and social disturbance on behalf of + what may be called merely objects of passion or private interest + with comparatively small groups, at least until those objects + enlist the support of a large minority. (Vol. i., pp. 492, 493.) + ++Professor Nanson.+--In Victoria the Hare system is championed by Mr. +E.J. Nanson, Professor of Mathematics at Melbourne University. Professor +Nanson approaches the subject entirely from a mathematical standpoint, +and resolutely refuses to admit the factor of human nature into his +calculations. Following Mr. Hare, he is a declared opponent of party +government, and "would like to see it pushed further into the +background." Moreover, he regards every step in the process as an end in +itself. Thus the act of voting is one end, representation is another, +and the rule of the majority a third. Leaving aside for the present, +however, the elaborate mathematical devices which are proposed for +attaining these supposed ends, let us take only the principles on which +they are based. These are laid down as follows:-- + + (_a_) The rule of the majority. + + (_b_) The fair representation of all parties in proportion to their + strength. + + (_c_) Perfect freedom to every elector to vote exactly as he + pleases. + + (_d_) The emancipation of the voters from the tyranny of the + political "boss" or caucus. + + (_e_) The full value of his vote to each voter without loss or + waste. + +The principles involved, we are assured, "must appeal to every democrat, +to every Liberal, to every lover of true and just representation." + +As to the first claim, we are willing to grant the rule of the majority, +if the words are added "in the interests of minorities." The second +could also be granted if by "all parties" were meant both parties, for +there cannot be more than two parties in the true sense of the word. But +Professor Nanson proposes such large electorates that any small section, +from one-sixth to one-twelfth, can secure independent representation. +Notwithstanding this, he claims that it is quite possible to give fair +representation to the main parties and to small sections at the same +time. In illustrating the system he avoids the issue as to the character +of these sections by giving them a "scientific" nomenclature, such as +Colour, Place, Pursuits, Qualities, &c. These abstractions are very +misleading, as attention is diverted from the fact that they refer to +voluntary groups of men united for some political purpose. The real +question is, on what basis are these groups likely to be formed? When +the element of human nature is taken into account it must be apparent +that they will be formed for the propaganda of some sectional interest; +some on a religious basis, others on a class basis, &c. Now, if we were +to ask each candidate to declare his religion, we could easily take +religions as the basis of representation and allow proportional +representation to each religion; and similarly with classes, races, and +so on. But we could only take one basis at a time, and the important +deduction is that if we were to take religions as the basis of +representation, the people would be induced to vote according to +religion; if we were to take classes, according to class, and so on. +Now, no one but the fanatic or the demagogue will claim that the +majority is entitled to rule where religions only or classes only are +represented. The questions then arise--What is the correct basis of +representation? How should the people be induced to vote? And the answer +is clearly that the people should be induced to vote on questions of +general public policy, on the leading questions of the day which decide +the party lines, and that, therefore, _the policies of the two main +parties should form the primary basis of proportional representation_. +But the Hare system, by taking individual candidates as the basis of +representation, induces the elector to vote on any basis or on sectional +lines. It promotes dissension instead of repressing it, and instead of +encouraging all sections to express their opinion as to what is best for +the general well-being, it encourages them to express their opinion as +to what they imagine to be best for themselves. Public opinion expressed +on these lines would be worse than useless. But Professor Nanson thinks +that the electors would still have regard for the main parties, even +though they grouped themselves into small sections. He declares that +"any party amounting to anything like a quota would not only have two +candidates of its own--one Liberal and one Conservative--but would also +be wooed by candidates of both leading parties." We may well question +whether factions would trouble themselves about the main parties; but, +granting the assumption, the small parties might just as well be single +electorates as far as the main parties are concerned. The Liberal +candidates might be successful in all of them, and the Conservatives be +unrepresented. The peculiar feature is that the defeated Conservatives +are expected to transfer their votes to the Liberals to make up the +quotas for the small parties! + +The third claim is that electors should have perfect freedom to vote +exactly as they please, and yet Professor Nanson, in condemning Mr. +Hare's original scheme, has denied that they are free to vote as +faddists; but he still holds that they are free to vote on any basis if +only they form one-sixth to one-twelfth of an electorate. Thus the +amount of freedom is variable and a matter of opinion. Now, we +altogether deny that electors should be given the opportunity to +subordinate the national interests to factious interests. Just as the +faddist argument is fatal to Mr. Hare's original scheme, so the +splitting up into factions is fatal to Professor Nanson's present +scheme. Where is the freedom which Professor Nanson claims under the +present system of election? Is it not the fact that throughout England, +America, and Australia the electors have very often a choice between two +candidates only--one Ministerialist and one Oppositionist? By all means +let us have as many political organizations as possible to make known +the wishes of all sections; but the true function of all such +organizations is to influence the policies of the two main parties, and +not to secure independent delegates in Parliament. This means simply +that the compromise among the different sections supporting a party must +be effected in the electors' minds, and at the elections, and not on the +floor of the Legislature. + +The fourth claim is the emancipation of the voters from the tyranny of +the "boss." Now, the power of the "boss" lies in the control of +nominations, and although to some extent this control is necessary with +the present system of election, it is not essential to party government, +as we hope to show. But with government by faction there would be no +escape from this control. The tyranny of a faction is worse than the +tyranny of the "boss." The voters need saving from their own selfish +passions far more than from the "boss." + +The final claim that each elector is entitled to the full value of his +vote, regardless of the way in which it is used, is really a claim to an +equality of political power, _i.e._, to direct government. It means +that electors are absolutely free to combine for their own interests, or +for their interest as a class, in opposition to the public welfare. +These combinations would, with an equality of direct political power, +soon bring on social disruption. + ++Professor Jethro Brown.+--In the preface to "The New Democracy," by +Professor Jethro Brown, the two fundamental difficulties of present-day +politics are correctly stated to be--how to express public opinion, and +how to improve its value. For the first of these Professor Brown +recommends the Hare system, and for the second the study of history. +Later on he writes:--"How is the amelioration of popular sovereignty to +be effected? Not, I venture to believe, by the pursuit of the policy +which hopes to play off ignorance against ignorance and prejudice +against prejudice, and to secure good government by the arts of +flattery, manipulation, and intrigue; nor, indeed, by the improvement of +democratic machinery, though this is extremely desirable, and calls for +immediate attention. For, above all, towers the question of character." +It is quite evident that Professor Brown shares the delusion of the +other advocates of the Hare system, that the manner of expressing public +opinion has nothing to do with the character of public opinion. The two +difficulties laid down are essentially one. The cardinal fact underlying +representation is that it is a real social force, capable of reacting +upon and moulding character, and therefore of improving the value of +public opinion. The independence, love of freedom, respect for +minorities, and capacity for self-government, which are the most +distinctive traits in the English character, are not innate, but are +largely the products of the British Constitution. If the only chance of +improving the value of public opinion lay in the hope of inducing the +individual electors to study the lessons of history, the prospect would +be indeed gloomy. + +Professor Brown regards party government as a necessary evil, resulting +from the mechanical difficulty of securing unity of action from a +plurality of wills. This is practically equivalent to saying that +legislation itself is a necessary evil. But he writes:--"Whatever may be +the evils of party government, there can be no doubt of the utility as +well as of the necessity of the institution itself. The alternative to +party government is the system of government by small groups. In +Australia the evils of this alternative have been occasionally displayed +in practical politics; but it is to France that we must look for their +supreme illustration." Turning to the chapter on the Hare system, we +find that Professor Brown believes that the electors would still divide +themselves into two parties, even if given the opportunity to form small +groups. "I cannot believe," he writes, "that the reputation of our race +for sound common-sense is so far misplaced that a provision for the +faithful representation of the people would end in an immoderate +Legislature! For, although the Hare system is not perfect, it does +undoubtedly afford an opportunity for an absolutely _fair +representation_. Of course the opportunity would be abused by some; but +to argue that the abuse would be general, or if at all general, would +long continue, is to argue that the people would prove themselves +unworthy of the opportunity offered." While he was at the University of +Tasmania the first election under the Hare system was held, and +Professor Brown's opinions are based on the result. A second election +has, however, just been held, which shows the futility of his hopes. + ++The Tasmanian Experiment.+--Despite the fact that it has been advocated +for over forty years, the trial now being made of the Hare system in +Tasmania is the first application of the "representative principle" to +any assembly modelled on the English plan of party government, and +therefore deserves more than passing notice. But the experiment is on +such a small scale, and has been conducted for such a short time, that +the result can hardly be expected to be conclusive as yet. The objection +against the Hare system is not so much that it is not suitable to +present conditions as that it will speedily bring about altered +conditions. It is interesting to find that this is exactly what is +taking place. The system is applied in two electorates only, at Hobart +and Launceston the former returning six members and the latter four. At +the first election, in 1897, the possibilities of the system were not +appreciated, and electors voted on the old lines; and although the +results were rather erratic and unexpected, they were considered fairly +satisfactory. But the second election, held early in the present year, +proved a great blow to the system. No less than three of the successful +candidates were intensely unpopular; and one of them, an ex-minister, +had recently been banished from public life on the report of a select +committee of the House. His reinstatement aroused a storm of indignation +throughout the colony, and he was forced to retire again before +Parliament met. It will be as well to take the evidence of a strong +advocate of the system--the _Argus_ correspondent. Of one candidate he +writes:--"Judging by all available definite evidences, it seemed that +five-sixths of the electors of Hobart were directly in favour of the +construction of the railway by the present Great Western Railway +Syndicate; while those of the remaining sixth were variously opposed to +the company or to the project of constructing such a railway by private +enterprise at all. This sixth is represented by Mr. R.C. Patterson, who +headed the poll." Of another candidate we learn that "Mr. Mulcahy had +fought a hard fight, and it is a fair assumption that on the list of the +elected he represents the Roman Catholic vote. As a member of a +generally popular Government, the extent of Mr. Mulcahy's personal +unpopularity was remarkable and probably unique." But it was over the +return of Mr. Miles that the storm raged most. The excuse is made that +"the fault of Mr. Miles's return (assuming that it is a fault) lies with +the electors who returned him, and not with the system under which his +return was accomplished.... Once grant that a section of Hobart electors +have the right to select for their representative whom they choose, and +it would seem that the Hare system must be held free of all +responsibility for the return of Mr. Miles." But this is precisely what +cannot be granted for a moment, as we have endeavoured to show. The +assertion is made that Mr. Miles would have been returned as easily +under the old system, but this is not a fact. He polled only one-eighth +of the votes, so that, even supposing that his supporters were twice as +strong in a single electorate, he would have had only one-fourth of the +votes. It is safe to say, from the small proportion of second and third +preferences which he secured, that if the Block Vote had been adopted he +would have been at the bottom of the poll. Commenting on these results, +the _Argus_ declares that the Hare system does not pretend to reform or +guide the people. Very likely not! But is it not quite evident that it +has the opposite effect? + +Is it too much to say that, if the Hobart experiment be persevered with, +the ultimate tendency will be the return of six members, each acceptable +to one-sixth of the electors, and obnoxious to the other five-sixths? +It is quite obvious already that the usual party lines are entirely +disregarded. + ++Professor Commons.+--The best book on the subject yet published is the +"Proportional Representation" of John E. Commons, Professor of Sociology +in Syracuse University, U.S. Its great merit is that the political and +social bearings of the reform are fully treated. Professor Commons +rejects the Hare system in favour of the Free List system. He +writes:--"The Hare system is advocated by those who, in a too +_doctrinaire_ fashion, wish to abolish political parties. They +apparently do not realize the impossibility of acting in politics +without large groupings of individuals." He makes a great step in +advance of the disciples of Mr. Hare in recognizing that the +proportional principle should be applied to parties, and not to +individuals, and he even defines parties correctly as being based "not +altogether on sectional divisions, but on social and economic problems +of national scope;" but, unfortunately, he fails to see that there can +be only two parties, and that the representation of small parties would +not reform the main parties, but break them up altogether. At the same +time he is no mere theorist, for he declares:--"If a practicable and +effective method of proportional representation cannot be discovered, +the theoretical principle is a mere dream." Moreover, he prudently +recognizes that his arguments as regards Federal and State Legislatures +in America are in advance of what the public is ready to accept, and +adds:--"We, as a people are not yet ready to abandon the notion that +party responsibility in Federal affairs is essential to safety." His +immediate object is, therefore, the reform of city councils, which in +America are controlled by the national parties, and are exploited by the +notorious "machine" organizations. We may sympathize with this object, +for parties in an administrative body are a serious evil, but with +legislatures the case is quite different. Professor Commons admits that +third and fourth parties, if given their proportionate weight in +legislation, would hold the balance of power, but he declares that "the +weight of this objection, the most serious yet presented against +proportional representation, varies in different grades of government." +He then proceeds to examine the objection "as applied to Congress (and +incidentally to the State Legislatures), where it has its greatest +force, and where pre-eminently party responsibility may be expected to +be decisive." And the only answer he can find is that the objection +"overlooks the principle of equality and justice in representation. It +may prove here that justice is the wisest expediency. It is a curious +anomaly, showing confusion of thought regarding democracy, that a people +who insist on universal suffrage, and who go to ludicrous limits in +granting it, should deny the right of representation to those minor +political parties whose existence is the natural fruit of this +suffrage." But these minor parties would not be denied representation if +they were allowed to exercise freely their true function, which is to +influence the policies of the main parties; and it is essential to the +working of the political machine that they be limited to that function. +Professor Commons continues:--"The argument, however, of those who fear +that third parties will hold the balance of power is not based solely on +a dread of the corrupt classes, but rather of the idealists, the +reformers, 'faddists,' and 'cranks,' so called. They would retain +exclusive majority rule and party responsibility in order to prevent the +disproportionate influence of these petty groups. They overlook, of +course, the weight of the argument already made that individual +responsibility is more important for the people than the corporate +responsibility of parties." The assumption is here made that the +complete suppression of individuality is an essential feature of party +government, whereas it is in fact a peculiar feature of American +politics, due to "machine" control of nominations. The one point which +Professor Commons has missed is that individual candidature can be +permitted and representation still be confined to the two main parties. + ++Conclusion.+--The advocates of proportional delegation have failed to +grasp the importance of the principles of organization and leadership, +which underlie representation. Mr. Hare thought that the effect of doing +away with organization would be to improve leadership. But he reckoned +without his host--Human Nature. Organization cannot be dispensed with +without destroying leadership and bringing on the strife of factions. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[1] Now Lord Avebury. + + + + +CHAPTER III. + +THE PRESENT POSITION OF PARTY GOVERNMENT. + + ++England.+--We have seen that the fundamental error of the +proportionalists is that they have failed to distinguish between the two +stages of representation. In constantly appealing back to the earlier +parliaments they altogether overlook the fact that the functions which +Parliament now exercises were then vested in the King. But this error is +not confined to the proportionalists, most of whom, indeed, however +inconsistently, favour party government. It is also put forth as an +argument by those who lay all the blame of present evils on the party +system, and who think that all sections should work together as one +united party. Take, for instance, the diatribe of Mr. W.S. Lilly on "The +Price of Party Government" in the _Fortnightly Review_ for June, 1900. +Mr. Lilly complains bitterly that the infallible oracle in politics +to-day is "the man in the street." He asserts that all issues are +settled "by counting heads, in entire disregard of what the heads +contain." His bugbear is the extension of the franchise. "Representative +institutions, for example," he asks, "what do they represent? The true +theory unquestionably is that they should represent all the features of +national life, all the living forces of society, all that makes the +country what it is; and that in due proportion. And such was the +Constitution of England up to the date of the first _Parliamentary +Reform Act_. Its ideal was, to use the words of Bishop Stubbs, 'an +organized collection of the several orders, states, and conditions of +men, recognized as possessing political power.'" Could anything be more +ridiculous? Political power is to be apportioned in the nineteenth +century as it was in the fourteenth century! The people are to be always +governed by their superiors! Mr. Lilly continues:--"It appears to me +that the root of the falsification of our parliamentary system by the +party game is to be found in the falsification of our representative +system by the principle of political atomism. Men are not equal in +rights any more than they are equal in mights. They are unequal in +political value. They ought not to be equal in political power." + +The mistake here is in the premise. Has not the demagogue more power +than his dupes, or the Member of Parliament more power than the elector? +We have hardly yet reached, and are never likely to reach, that ideal of +direct government. But what is this price which Mr. Lilly is railing at? +"The price may be stated in eight words. 'The complete subordination of +national to party interests.' The _complete_ subordination. I use the +adjective advisedly. Party interests are not only the first thought of +politicians in England, but, too often, the last and only thought." All +this is sheer nonsense. The coincidence of party aims with the real +interests of the people which the British Parliament has displayed since +the _Reform Act_ of 1832 has never been even remotely approached by any +other country. Two causes have contributed to this great result; first, +the gradual extension of the franchise to all sections of the people, +and second, the fact that the principles of organization and leadership +have been highly developed. In one respect, however, Mr. Lilly is right. +The zenith has been passed. Party government is not the same to-day in +England as it was twenty years ago. But the fault lies not with the +extension of the suffrage, but with the fact that the principles of +organization and leadership are less operative. True, the extension of +the franchise is indirectly concerned in the failure, but the primary +cause is that the present system of election is unable to bear the +increased strain. It no longer suffices to organize the people into two +coherent parties. The effect on the parties is correctly noted by Mr. +Lilly. "A danger which ever besets them," he declares, "is that of +sinking into factions." + +Now, the result of the want of organization is the presence in +Parliament of small independent factions, which, by holding the balance +of power, cause the main parties to degenerate into factions. + +This tendency is apparent even in England, and the rock on which the +parties have split is the Irish faction. Into the merits of the Irish +question we do not propose to enter; it is the career of the faction in +Parliament which interests us. But it may be noted that the Irish party +rests on a three-fold basis as a faction; it is based mainly on a class +grievance, and is also partly racial and partly religious. It was the +Irish party in the House of Commons which first discovered that, by +keeping aloof from the two main parties, it could terrorize both; and +thus found out the weak spot in party government. Its tactics were +successful up to a certain point, for Mr. Gladstone succumbed to the +temptation to purchase its support, and brought in the Home Rule Bill. +The result is known to all; the historical Liberal party was rent in +twain; party lines were readjusted; Mr. Gladstone was left in a hopeless +minority; and the remnant of his following is to-day in the same +condition. What is the lesson to be learned from these events? That +these tactics cannot succeed in the long run. All interests suffer, but +the culprits most of all. Moreover, such tactics are unconstitutional, +and would in some circumstances justify retaliatory measures. Let us +trace the constitutional course. The Irish members could have exerted a +considerable influence on the policies of both Liberals and +Conservatives, just as the Scotch did. If they had followed this course, +might they not have been in a better position to-day? + +Of course, the Irish faction can hardly be said to be the result of the +present system of election; it is mainly the expression of old wrongs. +But it has set the example, and the disintegration of the old parties is +rapidly proceeding. One feature, however, in connection with the present +system in Ireland may be mentioned, and that is the permanent +disfranchisement of the minority. In the greater part of Ireland there +is no such thing as a contest between the main parties. If a system were +introduced by which the minority could get its share of representation +the parties would compete on even terms for the support of the people, +and good feeling would tend to be restored. + +To return to Mr. Lilly. The present position of party government in +England is not due to defects in the institution itself, still less to +the extension of the suffrage, but to imperfect organization. The true +remedy is, therefore, to improve organization, not to restrict the +suffrage. By this means such a condition will be brought about that if +either party favours a faction it will lose in general favour; then, +indeed, we may hope that the main parties themselves will cease to +degenerate into factions. + +The same number of the _Fortnightly_ contains an unsigned article on +"Lord Rosebery and a National Cabinet," in which the party system is +alluded to as defunct, and in which the suggestion is thrown out that on +the retirement of Lord Salisbury a national cabinet should be formed, +comprising both Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Rosebery. Impending foreign +complications are given as the excuse for terminating party action. Now, +it is not to be denied that party government is more suitable for what +Mr. Herbert Spencer calls the industrial type of society than for the +militant type. Quite recently Lord Salisbury blamed the British +Constitution for the state of unpreparedness for the present war. But it +is equally true that in foreign affairs party action is generally +suspended: in the control of India, for instance, it is so. The real +question, then, is this: Is the danger of foreign aggression so serious +that all questions of internal policy can be permanently set aside? If +we have reached this stage, the end of modern civilization is in sight. +In effect, the proposal is a return to the first stage of +representation, with the difference that all sections of the people are +expected to be held together by the fear of foreign aggression, instead +of the fear of the aggression of the monarchy. + +Mr. David Syme is a censor of a very different type. So far from wishing +to take control from the people, he would give the people absolute +control over everything, and at all times. Seldom has the case against +party government been more powerfully presented than in his work on +"Representative Government in England." But Mr. Syme founds his proposed +remedies on a theory of representation which is based on the literal +meaning of the word. No one has put the delegation theory more clearly +than in the following passage, or gone so far in applying it:-- + + Representation is a mental act; it is the presentation or + reproduction of the state of mind of another person; and before one + person can represent another person he must first know what the + opinions of that other person are. A representative is a + substitute; he stands in the place of, and acts for, another + person. But one man cannot act for another unless he knows what + that other would do were he acting for himself. In other words, he + requires to know the motives which actuate that other person, or + what influences his motives, namely, his principles and beliefs. + The House of Commons is a representative body, not because every + individual member of it represents the opinions of the whole + nation, but because members in the aggregate represent those + opinions, (p. 170). + +This position is diametrically opposed to the principles we have laid +down, for it eliminates entirely the ideas of organization and +leadership. Again, Mr. Syme says:--"If the government is to be carried +on for the benefit of all classes, representatives should be chosen from +all classes. We had class representation in the early parliaments, but +then all classes were fairly represented." We have shown that the +analogy from early parliaments is fallacious. Representatives should now +be chosen irrespective of class, and not as class delegates. But Mr. +Syme does not carry his theory to its logical conclusion. For if +representatives merely express the thoughts of others, and should be +class delegates, surely all classes are entitled to have their thoughts +"represented;" and Mr. Syme should range himself among the disciples of +Mr. Hare. But here comes in an interesting difference. Mr. Syme would +retain the present system and make members continually responsible to a +majority of their constituents; he would even give this majority power +to dismiss them at any time. Now, this is practically an admission that +representation involves the existence of a majority and a minority, or, +in other words, is a means of organizing the people into a majority and +a minority. Again, as regards leadership, the theory will hardly bear +the test of facts. Could a man like Gladstone be said to merely express +the thoughts of his constituents? Was he not rather a guide and leader +of the thoughts of a great part of the British nation? + +In addition to the continual responsibility of members to their +constituents, Mr. Syme would also make the individual ministers of state +responsible to a majority of the members. He adds:--"The whole system of +party government could in this manner be quietly and effectively got rid +of." We do not propose to criticise the latter suggestion, as we do not +believe it would be put forward to-day, in the light of fuller +knowledge. Mr. Syme's book was written nearly twenty years ago. But, as +regards the continual responsibility of members, we consider it +important that the electors should not have their way on single +questions. They should periodically express their opinion as to the +general line of progress, and the representatives should then have +complete control. The necessity for this is to save the people from +their anti-social tendencies, which we have already stated as the great +objection to all forms of direct government. Lord Macaulay once defined +the position exactly in a letter addressed to the electors of Edinburgh. +"My opinion," he declared, "is that electors ought at first to choose +cautiously; then to confide liberally; and when the term for which they +have selected their member has expired to review his conduct equitably, +and to pronounce on the whole taken together." + +We hope to have left on the reader's mind by this time no doubt as to +the intimate connection between the machinery of election and the +resulting character of the legislature. Now it is a most extraordinary +fact that this connection is hardly noticed by the leading +constitutional authorities. It is true they often recognize that +suggested changes like the Hare system would debase our legislatures, +but it never seems to occur to them that present evils might be cured by +a change in the electoral machinery. They point out the evils indeed, +but only to indulge in gloomy forebodings at the onward march of +democracy, or as warnings of the necessity for placing checks on the +people. + +Take Bagehot's study of the House of Commons in his standard work on +"The English Constitution," where he classifies the functions exercised +by the House. He insists that the most important of these is the +elective function--its power to elect and dismiss the ministry. In +addition, it exercises an expressive function, a teaching function, an +informing function, and, lastly, the function of legislation. But not a +word is said of the relation of these functions to representation, or to +the method of election. It is asserted that the reason the House of +Commons is able to exercise these functions is because England is a +deferential nation, and the people leave government in the hands of +their betters, the higher classes. On one point he is emphatic, and that +is the absolute necessity of party. He writes:-- + + The moment, indeed, that we distinctly conceive that the House of + Commons is mainly and above all things an elective assembly, we at + once perceive that party is of its essence. The House of Commons + lives in a state of perpetual potential choice; at any moment it + can choose a ruler and dismiss a ruler. And therefore party is + inherent in it, is bone of its bone, and breath of its breath. + +As to the present trend of affairs, the opinion of a foreign observer, +Gneist--"History of the English Constitution"--may be quoted:-- + + England, too, will experience the fact that the transition to the + new order of industrial society is brought about through a process + of dissolution of the old cohesions, upon which the constitution of + Parliament is based. The unrepresented social mass, which is now + flooding the substructure of the English Constitution, will only + stay its course at a universal suffrage, and a thorough and + arithmetical equalization of the constituencies, and will thus + attempt, and in a great measure achieve, a further dissolution of + the elective bodies. To meet the coming storm a certain fusion of + the old parties seems to be immediately requisite, though the + propertied classes, in defending their possessions, will certainly + not at first display their best qualities. As, further, a regular + formation in two parties cannot be kept up, a splitting up into + fractions, as in the parliaments of the Continent, will ensue, and + the changing of the ministry will modify itself accordingly, so + that the Crown will no longer be able to commit the helm of the + state in simple alternation to the leader of the one or the other + majority. And then a time will recur in which the _King in Council_ + may have to undertake the actual leadership. (Vol. ii., pp. 452, + 453.) + +In other words, that an industrial society is incapable of +self-government! Note the reason for this remarkable conclusion--a +splitting up into fractions, _i.e._, imperfect organization. + +Take now the evidence of the distinguished historian and publicist, Mr. +W.E.H. Leeky, M.P., as given in his recent work on "Democracy and +Liberty":-- + + After all due weight has been given to the possible remedies that + have been considered, it still seems to me that the parliamentary + system, when it rests on manhood suffrage, or something closely + approaching to manhood suffrage, is extremely unlikely to be + permanent. This was evidently the opinion of Tocqueville, who was + strongly persuaded that the natural result of democracy was a + highly concentrated, enervating, but mild despotism. It is the + opinion of many of the most eminent contemporary thinkers in France + and Germany, and it is, I think, steadily growing in England. This + does not mean that parliaments will cease, or that a wide suffrage + will be abolished. It means that parliaments, if constructed on + this type, cannot permanently remain the supreme power among the + nations of the world. Sooner or later they will sink by their own + vices and inefficiencies into a lower plane. They will lose the + power of making and unmaking ministries, and it will be found + absolutely necessary to establish some strong executive + independently of their fluctuations. Very probably this executive + may be established, as in America and under the French Empire, upon + a broad basis of an independent suffrage. Very possibly upper + chambers, constituted upon some sagacious plan, will again play a + great restraining and directing part in the government of the + world. Few persons who have watched the changes that have passed + over our own House of Commons within the last few years will either + believe or wish that in fifty years' time it can exercise the power + it now does. It is only too probable that some great catastrophe or + the stress of a great war may accelerate the change. (Vol. i., pp. + 300, 301.) + +And the reason assigned for this very unsatisfactory state of affairs is +precisely as before: + + All the signs of the times point to the probability in England as + elsewhere of many ministries resting on precarious majorities + formed out of independent or heterogeneous groups. There are few + conditions less favourable to the healthy working of parliamentary + institutions or in which the danger of an uncontrolled House of + Commons is more evident. One consequence of this disintegration of + Parliament is a greatly increasing probability that policies which + the nation does not really wish for may be carried into effect. The + process which the Americans call "log-rolling" becomes very easy. + One minority will agree to support the objects of another minority + on condition of receiving in return a similar assistance, and a + number of small minorities aiming at different objects, no one of + which is really desired by the majority of the nation, may attain + their several ends by forming themselves into a political syndicate + and mutually co-operating. (Vol. i., pp. 152, 153.) + +Mr. Lecky, too, holds out very little hope for the future:-- + + When the present evils infecting our parliamentary system have + grown still graver; when a democratic House, more and more broken + up into small groups, more and more governed by sectional and + interested motives, shall have shown itself evidently incompetent + to conduct the business of the country with honour, efficiency, and + safety; when the public has learned more fully the enormous danger + to national prosperity as well as individual happiness of + dissociating power from property and giving the many an unlimited + right of confiscating by taxation the possessions of the few--some + great reconstruction of government is sure to be demanded. Fifty or + even twenty-five years hence the current of political opinion in + England will be as different from that of our own day as + contemporary political tendencies are different from those in the + generation of our fathers. Experience and arguments that are now + dismissed may then revive, and play no small part in the politics + of the future. + +Why make democracy the scapegoat for all these evils, when they are +simply due to the imperfect organization of democracy? In any case, the +most that could rightly be urged would be that universal suffrage had +come before its time. The conclusion that its time will never come is +certainly not warranted. Universal suffrage cannot be condemned till it +has had a fair trial under a rational system of election. Mr. Lecky +appreciates so little the connection between the method of election and +the splitting up into groups that he views without alarm the Hare +system, which would still further develop groups. + +But perhaps no one has caught the spirit of party government more truly +than Mr. Lecky. Dealing with the motives which should actuate the +statesman, in his latest work, "The Map of Life," he writes:-- + + In free countries party government is the best if not the only way + of conducting public affairs, but it is impossible without a large + amount of moral compromise; without a frequent surrender of private + judgment and will. A good man will choose his party through + disinterested motives, and with a firm and honest conviction that + it represents the cast of policy most beneficial to the country. He + will on grave occasions assert his independence of party, but in + the large majority of cases he must act with his party, even if + they are pursuing courses in some degree contrary to his own + judgment. + + Everyone who is actively engaged in politics--everyone especially + who is a member of the House of Commons--must soon learn that if + the absolute independence of individual judgment were pushed to its + extreme, political anarchy would ensue. The complete concurrence of + a large number of independent judgments in a complicated measure is + impossible. If party government is to be carried on there must be, + both in the Cabinet and in Parliament, perpetual compromise. The + first condition of its success is that the Government should have a + stable, permanent, disciplined support behind it, and in order that + this should be attained the individual member must in most cases + vote with his party. Sometimes he must support a measure which he + knows to be bad, because its rejection would involve a change of + government, which he believes would be a still greater evil than + its acceptance, and in order to prevent this evil he may have to + vote a direct negative to some resolution containing a statement + which he believes to be true, (p. 112.) + +Mr. Lecky goes on to point out that "many things have to be done from +which a very rigid and austere nature would recoil;" but he +adds:--"Those who refuse to accept the conditions of parliamentary life +should abstain from entering into it." Moreover, he holds that +"inconsistency is no necessary condemnation of a politician, and +parties as well as individual statesmen have abundantly shown it." But +still "all this curious and indispensable mechanism of party government +is compatible with a high and genuine sense of public duty." + +The American theory of government is that checks must be placed on a +democratic legislature by a fixed Constitution and a separate executive +exercising a veto. The late Professor Freeman Snow, of Harvard +University, was a strong supporter of this school. His objections to +cabinet government are given in the "Annals of the American Academy of +Political and Social Science" for July, 1892:-- + + Cabinet government is the government of a party; and for its + successful operation it must have at all times a majority at its + back in Parliament. If it were possible to direct the current of + public opinion into exactly two channels, there would be but two + parties, one of which would generally be in the ascendency; but in + practice this is found to be a very difficult thing to accomplish, + and it becomes the more difficult as the right of suffrage is + extended to the mass of the people, with their ever-varying + interests. In the countries of continental Europe parties, if + indeed they may be said to exist, are broken up into groups, no two + or more of which ever act together for any considerable length of + time; and ministries are without a moment's notice confronted at + brief intervals with opposing majorities, and must give place to + others, whose tenure of office is, however, equally unstable and + ephemeral. There is no other alternative; one of the two great + parties must yield to any faction which becomes strong enough to + hold the balance of power between them, or suffer the inevitable + consequences--instability and impotence of government. + +Dr. Snow evidently thought that it is not possible to direct the +current of public opinion into exactly two channels. He certainly had +not the slightest idea that it might be a matter of electoral machinery. + +Finally, we may quote the opinion of Mr. James Bryce, M.P., whose +"American Commonwealth" is one of the most complete studies of the +tendencies of democracy in existence. Comparing the English and American +systems, he writes of the former:-- + + That system could not be deemed to have reached its maturity till + the power of the people at large had been established by the Reform + Act of 1832. For its essence resides in the delicate equipoise it + creates between the three powers, the ministry, the House of + Commons, and the people. The House is strong because it can call + the ministry to account for every act, and can by refusing supplies + compel their resignation. The ministry are not defenceless, because + they can dissolve Parliament, and ask the people to judge between + it and them. Parliament, when it displaces a ministry, does not + strike at executive authority; it merely changes its agents. The + ministry when they dissolve Parliament do not attack Parliament as + an institution; they recognise the supremacy of the body in asking + the country to change the individuals who compose it. Both the + House of Commons and the ministry act and move in the full view of + the people, who sit as arbiters, prepared to judge in any + controversy that may arise. The House is in touch with the people, + because every member must watch the lights and shadows of sentiment + which play over his own constituency. The ministry are in touch + with the people, because they are not only themselves + representatives, but are heads of a great party, sensitive to its + feelings, forced to weigh the effect of every act they do upon the + confidence which the party places in them.... The drawback to this + system of exquisite equipoise is the liability of its equilibrium + to be frequently disturbed, each disturbance involving either a + change of government, with immense temporary inconvenience to the + departments, or a general election, with immense expenditure of + money and trouble in the country. It is a system whose successful + working presupposes the existence of two great parties and no more, + parties each strong enough to restrain the violence of the other, + yet one of them steadily predominant in any given House of Commons. + Where a third, perhaps a fourth, party appears, the conditions are + changed. The scales of Parliament oscillate as the weight of this + detached group is thrown on one side or the other; dissolutions + become more frequent, and even dissolutions may fail to restore + stability. The recent history of the French Republic has shown the + difficulties of working a Chamber composed of groups, nor is the + same source of difficulty unknown in England. (Vol. i., pp. 286, + 287.) + +Thus we find the opinion unanimously held that the one great fault to +which cabinet government is liable is instability of the ministry, owing +to imperfect organization of public opinion into two definite lines of +policy. Bagehot called it a case of unstable equilibrium, and Bradford, +in "The Lesson of Popular Government," goes further when he +declares:--"Not to speak disrespectfully, the ministry is like a company +of men who, after excessive conviviality, are able to stand upright only +by holding on to each other." + +Yet, after all, the amount of stability simply depends on the state of +organization; and England has demonstrated in the golden period of her +political history (about the middle of the present century) that the +cabinet form of government can be quite as stable as the presidential +form. Therefore, if the present position gives cause for alarm, it is +not in the abolition of the cabinet or the restriction of the suffrage +that the remedy must be sought, but in improved organization. And this, +we hope to show, involves improved electoral machinery. + ++France.+--Turn to France. Is there no lesson to be drawn from the +history of that unstable country since the Revolution let loose its +flood of human passions, ambitions, and aspirations? Has not every +attempt at popular government failed for the same cause--want of +organization? + +France before the Revolution had groaned for centuries under the burden +of a decayed feudalism and an absolute monarchy. The last vestige of +constitutional forms had disappeared. The representatives of the estates +had not been convened since the meeting of the States-General in 1614. +The widespread and unprecedented misery of the people caused them to +revolt against being taxed without their consent, and a cry went up for +a convocation of the estates. The finances were in such a bad way that +Louis XVI. was forced to consent, and the three estates--clergy, nobles, +and commons--met at Versailles in 1789. At first they called themselves +the National Assembly, but the King foolishly took up such a position +with regard to the people's representatives that they swore solemnly +that they would not separate till they had laid the foundation of a new +Constitution, and henceforth were known as the Constituent Assembly. It +was determined that the King should no longer be absolute, and the +choice lay between a constitutional monarchy and a republic. The +Declaration of the Rights of Man was first drawn up, and the Assembly +settled down to its task. The leading spirit was Mirabeau. He had been +to England, and had studied the British Constitution, and he rightly saw +that France was too distracted by faction to maintain an independent +executive. He therefore openly advocated a constitutional monarchy with +a cabinet chosen from among the majority of the representatives. But, +unfortunately, the Assembly refused to follow his lead; nor would the +King take his advice to make a separate appeal to the people. In the +midst of the negotiations Mirabeau died, and the last chance of +establishing a constitutional monarchy disappeared. The King realized +this, and tried to escape to the German frontier but was brought back. +He then accepted the new Constitution, and the Legislative Assembly was +elected in 1791. From the first it had no elements of stability, being +split up into groups, and subject to the fear of the Paris mob. The King +continued to plot with the emigrant nobles against the Constitution, and +the foreign armies massed on the frontier. The danger brought on the +triumph of the revolutionary spirit in 1792. The Paris commune +overwhelmed both the King and the Assembly, and the republic was +proclaimed. Then followed the execution of the King, the Reign of +Terror, the control of the Committee of Public Safety, till finally the +anarchy was ended by the military despotism of Bonaparte, who became +First Consul and afterwards Emperor. + +What is the significance of these events in the light of our previous +examination of English history? Simply this: That the French, in passing +at once from absolutism and feudalism to complete self-government, were +trying to jump to the Second stage of representation without passing +through the first stage. Mirabeau was right; the republic was foredoomed +to failure because the people had learned neither the power of nor the +necessity for organization. + +In many respects the French Revolution parallels the English Revolution. +In each case the King was beheaded; in each case the anarchy of a +disorganized representative body was succeeded by a military despotism; +and in each case the monarchy was restored. + +It was after the restoration that the English system of party government +was developed. Why did this system not now take root in France? Partly +because France was not blessed with a king like William of Orange, and +partly because the new _systeme de bascule_, the balance system, in +which the king allows each faction in turn to hold the reins of power, +was discovered. So, instead of the gradual growth of constitutional +liberty which took place in England, the tendency in France was back to +absolutism. In 1830 Charles X., finding that he could not manage the +Chamber of Deputies, issued the ordinances of St. Cloud, suspending the +liberty of the press and dissolving the Legislature. Paris immediately +broke out into insurrection, and the King was forced to abdicate. The +crown was offered to Louis Philippe, and a second attempt at +constitutional monarchy was made. But France was too divided by her +unfortunate legacy of faction to maintain a continuous policy. The +Legitimists, the Republicans, and the Bonapartists were all awaiting +their opportunity. In 1848 the second revolution broke out in Paris; the +king fled to England, and a republic was again tried. But the +imperialist idea revived when Louis Napoleon was elected President. In +1851 he carried out his famous _coup d'etat,_ and again the Constitution +was swept away. In the following year he was accepted as Emperor by an +almost unanimous vote. Thus France again elected to be ruled by an +irresponsible head. The Third Empire ended with the capture of Napoleon +III. at Sedan in 1870, and since then France has carried on her third +experiment in republicanism. But still the fatal defect of +disorganization retards her progress; the Legislature is still split up +into contending factions, and in consequence it has been found +impossible to maintain a strong executive. Occasionally the factions +sink their differences for a time when their patriotism is appealed to, +as they have agreed to do during the currency of the present Exhibition, +but it is abundantly evident that France can never be well governed +till the people are able to organize two coherent parties. There is +ground for hope that the monarchical and imperialist ideas are +declining, and that the people are settling down to the conviction that +there is nothing left but the republic. What makes recovery difficult is +that the national character has been affected by the continual strife in +the direction of excitability and desire for change. + +Those who wish to understand the forces which brought about the +different changes and revolutions, traced by one who has grasped their +meaning, should read the account in the first volume of Mr. Bradford's +"Lesson of Popular Government." His conclusion only need be quoted +here:-- + + As has been said, that which constitutes the strength of the + English. Government, that which has made up its history for the + last two hundred years, is the growth and continuity of two solid + and coherent parties. Occasionally they have wavered when available + leaders and issues were wanting, but as soon as a strong man came + forward to take the reins the ranks closed up and the work of + mutual competition again went on. On the other hand, the curse and + the cause of failure of representative government on the Continent + of Europe is the formation within the legislature of unstable and + dissolving groups. In France the Extreme Eight, the Eight, the + Eight Centre, the Left Centre, the Left, and the Extreme Left are + names of differing factions which unite only for temporary purposes + and to accomplish a victory over some other unit, but which are + fatal to stable and firm government. The same is true of Italy, + Spain, and Austria, and if not of Germany it is because military + despotism holds all alike in subjection. + +Mr. Bodley has come to the same conclusion in his work on "France." He +writes:-- + + There is no restraining power in the French parliamentary system to + arrest a member on his easy descent, and he knows that if he + escapes penal condemnation he will enjoy relative impunity. Many + deputies are men of high integrity; but virtue in a large assembly + is of small force without organization, and, moreover, a group of + legislators leagued together as a vigilance committee would have + neither consistency nor durability, which the discipline of party + can alone effect. Corruption of this kind, which has undermined the + republic, could not co-exist with party government. A party whose + ministers or supporters had incurred as much suspicion as fell on + the politicians acquitted in the Panama affair would under it be + swept out of existence for a period. When the first denunciations + appeared, the leaders of the party, to avert that fate, would have + said to their implicated colleagues--"In spite of your abilities + and of the manifest exaggeration of these charges we must part + company, for though you may have been culpable only of + indiscretion, we cannot afford to be identified with doubtful + transactions;" and the Opposition, eager not to lose its vantage, + would scan with equal keenness the acts of its own members. With + party government the electorate would not have appeared to condone + those scandals. But as it was, when a deputy involved in them went + down before his constituents, whose local interest he had well + served, with no opponent more formidable than the nominee of some + decayed or immature group, they gave their votes to the old member, + whose influence with the prefecture in the past had benefited the + district, rather than to the new comer, whose denunciations had no + authority; whereas, had each electoral district been the scene of a + contest between organized parties, the same spectacle would not + have been presented." (Vol. ii., pp. 302, 303.) + +Mr. Bodley has, in this last sentence, touched the heart of the +problem. If the salvation of France depends on making each electoral +district the scene of a contest between two organized parties, is not +electoral machinery destined to play an important part in the solution? + ++The United States.+--The third great experiment in representative +democracy which the nineteenth century has furnished is that which is +being conducted in the United States. The contrast with France is +remarkable. Just as France is the supreme example of want of +organization, so America is the most conspicuous instance of perfect +organization into two great national parties which the world has seen. +Yet both experiments were started by a revolution, and practically at +the same time. The difference lay in the fact that the Americans +inherited the capacity for self-government from their British ancestors, +and had already practised it in colonial times, while the French only +inherited innumerable causes of dissension. + +But organization is not the only characteristic feature of American +politics. Strange to say, it is accompanied by a suppression of +individuality just as complete. It is organization without responsible +leadership. For, in the first place, the politicians look on themselves +not as leaders but as followers of the people; and in the second place, +there are no leaders in Congress, corresponding to the cabinet ministers +of British countries. + +Now, the view which we wish to emphasize here is that the present +position of American politics is the natural result of the principles +embodied in the Constitution adopted in 1789, when the Union was formed. +The complete organization and the want of leadership are directly to be +traced to the labours of George Washington and his associates. A brief +glance at the Constitution and the early history of its working will +make this clear. + +The thirteen States which revolted from England worked fairly well +together under the "Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union" as +long as the war lasted, but as soon as peace was proclaimed it was, as +Washington said, no better than anarchy. The famous Convention of 1787 +was therefore held, and the Constitution was drawn up. One guiding +principle of its framers was to divide power so as to place checks on +the will of the people, and on outbursts of popular passion, which were +then greatly dreaded. One means of attaining this object was the +attempted separation of the legislative and executive functions. We say +attempted advisedly, for time has but shown that the two are +inseparable. But the framers of the Constitution divided the legislative +function between the two Houses, and vested the executive function +almost entirely, as they thought, in the President. Montesquieu, in his +"_Esprit des Lois_" had laid down that the great merit of the English +Constitution was the separation of these functions, and the Americans +accepted this view. But, in truth, the English cabinet system had not +then been fully developed. The King was still, not only in appearance, +but to some extent also in fact, the head of the executive, and there +was nothing to indicate that ministers were so soon to become the real +leaders. + +The effect of this provision was a struggle between the two branches for +supremacy, and the legislatures have won. The President has been +degraded to a mere agent, and the legislatures have absorbed the greater +part of executive functions, even to the control of finance. Now, the +framers of the Constitution were apprehensive that the President might +become a mere party agent, and they tried to strengthen his position by +two devices. First, they gave him the power to veto statutes unless +overruled by a two-thirds majority of Congress; and, secondly, they +provided for his election by an electoral college, or by a double system +of election. This second provision was designed to ensure the election +of a President for personal instead of for party reasons; but it has +proved a complete failure. Almost from the first the electoral delegates +have had to pledge themselves to support the party nominee. The veto, +therefore, has also become practically useless. Thus it has come about +that Congress is a body entirely without leaders. + +A second defect in the Constitution was that it said nothing about the +right of any State to withdraw from the Union. After nearly 70 years +this omission was responsible for the Civil War. The legal basis for +secession was then abandoned, but combinations of States have since been +regarded with the greatest apprehension. This conviction that the Union +must be maintained at any price has had very important consequences on +the party system. The danger of allowing combinations of States to +dominate party lines was demonstrated; and the division of each State by +the same national parties was recognized as essential to safety. + +In the meantime, as we have seen, Congress had practically got control +of the executive functions, which were supposed to be exercised by the +President, including the nominations to office. Thus every member of the +party in a majority had a share of the plunder, and "the spoils to the +victors" became the basis of party organization. The system soon +underwent such a remarkable development that nearly 200,000 public +offices were at the disposal of the victors at each election. The party +organizations immediately became omnipotent. The secret of their power +lay in the control of nominations. Each party would nominate one +candidate only, and the electors voted neither for men nor measures, but +blindly for party. As Mr. Bryce declares:--"The class of professional +politicians was therefore the first crop which the spoils system--the +system of using public office as private prize of war--bore. Bosses +were the second crop." + +The development which these party organizations have now reached is +extraordinary. Practically we may say that there are only two +parties--Republicans and Democrats--and they dominate not only Federal +and State politics but also city government. Each party has its list of +registered electors, and each holds a primary election before the real +election, to decide the party candidate. But these primary elections are +a mere matter of form. Only a small fraction of the electors attend +them, and only those who have always supported the party are allowed to +vote. The nominations are therefore really controlled, by fraud if +necessary, by the "ring" of party managers. Generally there is one man +who can pull the most strings, and he becomes the "boss." All power is +centred in the hands of this irresponsible despot. The men who are +elected owe their positions to him, and are responsible to him, not to +the public. + +Remember that these "machine" organizations have absolute sway in every +electorate, from one end of the United States to the other. It may be +wondered why the people tolerate them, but they are powerless. Sometimes +an independent movement is attempted, but it very rarely succeeds, and +even when it does the two "machines" combine against it and agree to +divide the spoils. Mr. Bryce writes:-- + + The disgust is less than a European expects, for it is mingled + with amusement. The "boss" is a sort of joke, albeit an expensive + joke. "After all," people say, "it is our own fault. If we all went + to the primaries, or if we all voted an independent ticket, we + could make an end of the 'boss.'" There is a sort of fatalism in + their view of democracy. (Vol ii., p. 241.) + +What is the meaning of all this wonderful party machinery? It is this: +that organization without responsible leadership can only be founded on +corruption. In other words, _the spoils system is the price which the +United States pay for maintaining the Union under the present +Constitution_. The fault lies ultimately, therefore, in the +Constitution, which tends to repress responsible leadership. + +Now, the mass of public opinion in America, as Mr. Bryce continually +points out, is sound, and attempts have not been wanting to put an end +to the system of rotation in public offices. A sustained agitation for +civil service reform was entered upon, and the system of competitive +examination was applied to a large number of offices. Now at last, the +reformers thought, American politics would be purified. But, no! The +corruption, simply took a new and more alarming turn. Direct money +contributions took the place of the spoils. It became the practice to +levy blackmail on corporations either to be let alone, or for the +purpose of fleecing the public. The monopolies granted to protected +industries are the source of a large share of these "campaign funds." +The Legislatures are crowded by professional lobbyists, and it is, in +consequence, impossible to obtain justice against the corporations. +Surely no stronger proof can be needed that corruption is and must +remain the basis of organization so long as there is no responsible +leadership. + +It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that the Americans are not +alive to the failure of their representative institutions. Since Mr. +Bryce's great work on "The American Commonwealth" was published two +books by American authors have appeared which are very outspoken in +condemnation. These are "The Unforeseen Tendencies of Democracy," by Mr. +E.L. Godkin; and "The Lesson of Popular Government," by Mr. Gamaliel +Bradford. The keynote of the first of these two books is to abolish +corruption by destroying the power of the "machine" and the "boss," and +of the second to introduce responsible leadership. Mr. Godkin traces the +disappearance of distinguished men from public life to the control of +all entrance to it by the "machine." The reform of primary elections, he +holds, is then the first necessity, since "independent voting" has +ceased to be a remedy. But he fails to find a solution. The conclusion +he comes to is as follows:-- + + Is the situation then hopeless? Are we tied up inexorably simply to + a choice of evils? I think not. It seems to me that the nomination + of candidates is another of the problems of democracy which are + never seriously attacked without prolonged perception and + discussion of their importance. One of these was the formation of + the federal government; another was the abolition of slavery; + another was the reform of the civil service. Every one of them + looked hopeless in the beginning; but the solution came in each + case, through the popular determination to find some better way. + (Pp. 92, 93.) + +But the evil goes far deeper than Mr. Godkin appears to think. To +abolish corruption is to take away the present basis of organization +without substituting any other. If irresponsible leadership is to be +abandoned, responsible leadership must be introduced. Mr. Bradford's +plan, therefore, promises more, for if responsible leadership could be +introduced into Congress corruption would then be abolished also. + +Mr. Bradford's whole book may be said to be a study of the relations of +the executive to the legislature, and the conclusions at which he +arrives are a complete vindication of cabinet government. But he finds +one fault, and that is the instability of ministries, which he confesses +has not been apparent so far in the British House of Commons. He holds, +however, that it will become more apparent with the rising tide of +democracy. It is rather amusing to find that the greatest obstacle which +has to be overcome in proposing a responsible executive is the +veneration in which the Constitution is still held and the dislike to +copying anything from England. His plan is, therefore, an adaptation of +the cabinet to the conditions imposed by the Constitution. He holds that +the ministers appointed by the President should sit in Congress and have +control of the initiation of legislation. It is to be feared that this +would hardly realize the idea of responsible leadership. Mr. Bradford +establishes a chain of responsibility by the fact that the ministers are +responsible to the President and the President is responsible to the +people; but that is a very different thing to the continual +responsibility of the cabinet to a majority of the legislature. It is +probable that the President's ministers would have to encounter the +opposition of a majority in one or both Houses, and it is difficult to +see how a deadlock could be avoided. Mr. Bradford contemplates that the +people would settle any issues which arise between the two branches at +the end of the Presidential term of four years; but it is just as likely +that there would then be a new President in any case. We are driven to +the conclusion, therefore, that responsible leadership is incompatible +with the American system of divided powers and fixed terms of office. + +Mr. Bryce comments on the proposal as follows:-- + + It is hard to say, when one begins to make alterations in an old + house, how far one will be led on in rebuilding, and I doubt + whether this change in the present American system, possibly in + itself desirable, might not be found to involve a reconstruction + large enough to put a new face upon several parts of that system. + (Vol. i, pp. 290, 291.) + +This is very true, but is not a new building required? Is not the old +house built on a rotten foundation? Mr. Bradford has certainly +overlooked the effect of his proposal on party organization for one +thing. If the power over legislation, and especially over expenditure of +public money, is to be taken away from the irresponsible committees of +Congress, the basis of party organization would cease to be corruption, +and both representatives and parties would have to take on an entirely +new character. As to the present character of representatives, Mr. Bryce +advances a number of reasons why the best men do not go in for politics, +such as the want of a social and commercial capital, the residential +qualification, the comparative dullness of politics, the attractiveness +of other careers, &c, but Mr. Bradford declares that the one explanation +which goes further than all these is the absorption of all the powers of +the government by the legislature, and the consequent suppression of +individuality. He writes:-- + + The voters are urged to send to Congress men of character, ability, + and public spirit. They might as well be asked to select men of + that quality to follow the profession of burglars, a comparison + which is not intended to convey any disrespect to the number of + honest and respectable men who constantly are sent to Congress. + Chosen as burglars, they would fail just the same in the + business.... It is the organization of Congress which offers every + facility to those who wish to buy and those who wish to be bought. + +Again, as to the present character of parties, Mr. Bradford declares:-- + + The names of the two great parties, Republicans and Democrats, have + in themselves and at the present time no meaning at all. + +Simply because the basis of organization is corruption, and not +questions of public policy. For the same reason recent elections have +been fought on popular "crazes," such as the silver question. But Mr. +Bradford says:-- + + New parties cannot be formed on constantly changing issues, since + to have any strength they must have a certain degree of permanence. + The only two nations which have succeeded in forming great national + parties are Great Britain and the United States. In other European + countries the splitting into groups has almost made representative + government impossible. + +What Mr. Bradford has failed to appreciate is that the absolutely rigid +division into two camps which prevails in America is founded on +corruption, and will disappear when corruption is abolished. In the +United States such a thing as a Congressman deserting one party for the +other is practically unknown. In Great Britain, on the contrary, party +lines do continually change as new issues arise; and when they are +founded on questions of public policy it must be so. What gives them +permanence is that certain principles underlie most questions, and men +who have the same political principles are likely to think the same on +any single question; and further that a member would rather follow his +party and sacrifice his opinion on a single question than sacrifice most +of his principles. + +Therefore, even if the Americans do succeed in purifying their politics, +they will be faced with the same difficulty as exists elsewhere--namely, +such improved organization as will secure the return of representatives +on questions of general public policy only. The present system of +single-membered electorates will not suffice. The only remedy lies in +enlarged electorates with electoral machinery which will organize public +opinion into two definite lines of policy, and will, by allowing +individual candidature merge the primary election into the actual +election. + +All this involves a radical alteration, both in the Constitution and in +the methods of election. But the United States have the great advantage +over France that it does not involve also a serious change in the +national character. It is not unlikely that some such reform must be +brought about before long. + +The present position cannot last. The Republican party has so long +identified itself with Capital in all its forms, with the protected +monopolists, the trusts and the corporations, that the mass of Labour +threatens to support the Democrats; and as the latter party maintains +the doctrines of direct government and the infallibility of the +majority, the result will be such a financial crisis and such an +industrial revolution that the Americans will have at last to admit that +their government needs total reconstruction. + ++Australia.+--On the first day of the nineteenth century the Union of +the Parliaments of Great Britain and Ireland was accomplished; on the +first day of the twentieth century Britain's daughters in the southern +seas will inaugurate, under her aegis, a new experiment in +democracy--the Australian Commonwealth. The time is opportune, then, for +a review of the tendencies of Australian politics, and for a comparison +with the other great democracies. Thus only can we attempt to cast the +horoscope of the new nation. + +Australia starts with many advantages over France and America. The +science of government is better understood now than when they started; +the folly of placing too many checks on the people is recognized; and +the British system of responsible leadership by a cabinet in the +legislature is fully developed. All these features are embodied in the +Constitution, and it only remains for the people to prove their fitness +to work it. + +Applying the same tests as we have used in the case of the great +democracies to the present position of Australian politics, what is the +result? First, as regards organization, where do we stand? It must be +confessed that we are far behind Great Britain and America, though +certainly we are not in the same sad plight as France. Still there is +the fact that we are classed among the failures. Take the evidence of +Mr. E.L. Godkin in "Unforeseen Tendencies of Democracy:"-- + + In his Journals during a visit to Turin in 1850, Senior records a + conversation with Cesare Balbo, a member of the Chamber in the + first Piedmontese Parliament, in which Balbo said, after an + exciting financial debate:--"We have not yet acquired parliamentary + discipline. Most of the members are more anxious about their own + crotchets or their own consistency than about the country. The + ministry has a large nominal majority, but every member of it is + ready to put them in a minority for any whim of his own." This was + probably true of every legislative body on the Continent, and it + continues true to this day in Italy, Greece, France, Austria, + Germany, and the new Australian democracies. (Pp. 102, 103.) + +He adduces in support of the statement the fact that the three colonies +of New South Wales, South Australia, and Victoria have had respectively +twenty-eight, forty-two, and twenty-six ministries in forty years. Is +the prospect any brighter for the new Commonwealth? It is to be feared +not, if the present tendencies towards disintegration are allowed to +grow. For in the last decade a change has come over Australian politics +which portends the gravest danger. We refer to the direct class +representation which, under the name of Labour parties, has spread all +over the colonies. These so-called Labour "parties" are neither more nor +less than class factions. Their policy is everywhere the same--viz., the +use of the "balance system," which has proved so disastrous to France. +The worst effect is that they prevent the main parties from working out +definite policies on public questions, and cause them also to degenerate +into factions. In Victoria we have actually had the ludicrous spectacle +of the Opposition saving the Government time after time when deserted by +its own followers. In New South Wales the individual member is sunk in +the party; he must vote as the majority decides. Mr. Reid's term of +office was ended by one such caucus. In Queensland, where the party is +strongest, it has now practically become one of the main parties, and +the whole colony is divided on class lines. Already an Intercolonial +Labour Conference has been held, and a pledge drawn up which must be +signed by all candidates for the party support at Federal elections. The +danger of these tactics is not rightly apprehended in Australia. In +reality they mark the first step towards social disruption. We may cite +the authority of Mr. James Bryce on this point. After pointing out in +"The American Commonwealth" that since the Civil War combinations of +States have always acted through the national parties, he writes:-- + + This is an important security against disruption. And a similar + security against the risk of civil strife or revolution is to be + found in the fact that the parties are not based on or sensibly + affected by differences either of wealth or of social position. + Their cleavage is not horizontal, according to social strata, but + vertical. This would be less true if it were stated either of the + Northern States separately, or of the Southern States separately: + it is true of the Union taken as a whole. It might cease to be true + if the new Labour party were to grow till it absorbed or superseded + either of the existing parties. The same feature has characterized + English politics as compared with those of most European countries, + and has been a main cause of the stability of the English + government and of the good feeling between different classes in the + community. (Vol. ii., p. 38.) + +How is it that the public conscience is not alive to the enormity of +this anti-social crime? Mainly, we think, because the true principles of +representation are not properly understood. It is almost universally +assumed that there is no real distinction between direct and +representative government. Minorities are tacitly allowed to have as +much right to representation as the minority, and the confusion of terms +is passed over. The working classes are told by self-seeking demagogues +that they are in a majority; that the majority is entitled to rule; and +that they have only to organize to come into their heritage. These +sycophants, who, as Aristotle of old pointed out, bear the greatest +resemblance to the court favourite of the tyrant, ask the people to +believe the silly paradox that the united wisdom of the whole people is +greater than that of the wisest part. The truth is that no people is fit +to exercise equal political rights which is not sensible enough to +choose the wisest part to carry on the government, providing only they +have control over their selection, and can hold them responsible. Are +the working classes in Australia going to demonstrate that they are +unfit for the exercise of political rights? Are they going to justify +the prognostications of the opponents of popular government? That is the +real question at issue. Unless public opinion be aroused to the iniquity +of class delegation, the further degradation of Australian politics is +inevitable. Let it not be thought that we are decrying the organization +of the working classes for political purposes. On the contrary, we hold +that the organization of every class and every interest is necessary in +order that it shall exert its just share of influence. But the only way +in which every class can get its just share is by acting through the +two main parties. A class which holds aloof can exert for a short time +an undue share of influence, as a faction holding the balance of power, +but only at the expense of paralyzing the government. + +But the working classes are hardly to be blamed in this matter, for it +is a fact that before their action they were not able to exert their +just share of influence. The government was such as to promote the rule +of private interests instead of the general welfare, and, consequently, +their interests were shamefully neglected. The real cause of the +mischief was, as in America, the nominating system, which is inseparably +connected with the present method of election. The consideration of this +question brings us to the second characteristic of Australian +politics--namely, the irresponsible leadership of the press. + +We have seen how in America organization has been effected without +responsible leadership in Congress, only at the expense of the +irresponsible leadership of the "rings" and "bosses" who control the +"machines." In Australia an analogous result has been brought about by +different causes. We have not had civil strife to teach us the necessity +of organization, nor have we a spoils system available as a basis, but +the disorganized state of the legislatures and the consequent weakness +of the executive have thrown a large share of leadership into the hands +of the press. Both in America and in Australia the prevalence of the +ultra-democratic theory that representatives should follow and not lead +the people has been a powerful contributing cause. And yet it is as +clear as possible that the choice lies between two alternatives. The +people must either submit to responsible leadership in Parliament or to +irresponsible leadership outside. The ultra-democrats hold that +responsible leadership in Parliament is incompatible with popular +government. We believe that this is the fundamental error which is +leading both the Australian and the American democracies astray. On the +contrary, it is the irresponsible despotism which is exercised by the +"bosses" in America and the newspapers in Australia which is really +incompatible with free government. + +The source of the error lies in the failure to grasp the meaning of the +term "responsible leadership." It is assumed that either the people must +lead and the representatives follow, or the representatives must lead +and the people follow. Bagehot may be taken as an exponent of the latter +position. He thought that cabinet government was only possible with a +deferential nation as opposed to a democratic nation. England he held to +be the type of deferential nations, because the people were content to +leave the government to the "great governing families"--_i.e._, to defer +to caste, which is in principle the same as deferring to a king, who is +supposed to rule by divine right. Mr. Bradford also gives a somewhat +exaggerated idea of the importance of the force of personality when he +declares that the mass of the people have no "views" on public +questions; all they want is to be well governed. The late Professor +Freeman Snow, of Harvard University, U.S., was a supporter of the +ultra-democratic view. In the "Annals of the American Academy of +Political and Social Science" for July, 1892, he declares:-- + + Mr. Bryce thinks that, "like other crowds, a legislature must be + led and ruled." And he has formulated a theory which he believes to + be "the essence of free or popular government, and the + justification for vesting power in numbers." "Every question that + arises in the conduct of government," he asserts, "is either a + question of ends or a question of means." And as the "masses are + better judges of what will conduce to their happiness than are + the-classes placed above them, they must be allowed to determine + ends." But, assuming the end to be given, they--the masses--should + leave to their leaders--the trained statesmen--the choice of means. + The defect in this theory is that it depends for its successful + operation upon the continued "deference of the multitude for the + classes placed above them ... upon the principle of _noblesse + oblige_," a principle, by the way, derived from feudal monarchy, + which has no existence in the United States, and which ought to be + considered a misfortune in any free country.... + + Mr. Bryce has made a step in advance of Mr Bagehot in trusting the + people to determine ends, whatever they may be; why not go one step + further, and trust them to determine all questions of policy? + +These are the two opposite points of view. They are both equally wrong. +The first is simply irresponsible leadership, and the second amounts to +the same thing in practice, however much the people may appear to lead +in theory. The true position is that the relation between the +representatives and the people is reciprocal. Both lead and both follow. +The people defer to the representatives, not on account of rank or +caste, nor upon the principle of _noblesse oblige_, but only in so far +as the representatives are able to demonstrate their fitness to devise +measures for the general welfare. The people, on the other hand, are the +ultimate judges, both of measures and of men. This mutual action and +reaction constitutes the responsible leadership, which is one of the +fundamental principles underlying the device of representation. To it we +have already traced the virtue of representation as a social force, +capable of moulding national character and of appealing to the higher +nature of the people. + +An elector who is unable or unwilling to decide grave questions of +public policy himself may be a very shrewd judge as to who is best +fitted to decide them; and deference to ability is totally different in +principle to deference to caste. In a country in the transitional stage +between aristocracy and democracy, his judgment may be based partly on +the principle of _noblesse oblige_; but there is not the slightest +reason why in a democratic country he should require the representative +to defer to him. He will merely require a higher standard and a closer +and a more constant demonstration that the measures proposed are +conducive to the public well-being. Moreover, it is still necessary that +the representatives should be judged periodically on general lines of +policy, and that the elector should not have the power of exercising +control on single questions. Under these conditions the result of the +mutual relation will be an improvement on both sides. But if, under the +influence of irresponsible leadership outside Parliament, the people +insist on increasing control over their representatives, then not only +is Parliament degraded, but progress towards government in the general +welfare is stopped. + +This long digression as to the real meaning of responsible leadership is +necessary in order to gauge the drift of the prevailing tendency towards +the irresponsible leadership of the press in Australia. The evil exists +in all the colonies, but it is perhaps worse in our own colony of +Victoria than in any other country in the world, although it is said to +be very bad in Switzerland since the referendum was introduced. We have +two morning newspapers in Melbourne, which take opposite sides on nearly +every question which arises. They admit into their columns no facts and +no arguments which tell against the position they have taken up; nay, +more, they resort to downright misrepresentation to support it. It will +be said that this is only a form of the party game, but the danger lies +in the fact that they circulate in different classes, and therefore +these classes see only one side of every question. Moreover, in their +competition for the support of classes in which they desire to increase +their circulation they use their influence to secure legislation which +will appeal to class prejudices, or even undertake a prolonged agitation +to relieve special interests from legitimate charges. The _Age_ has for +a long time thrived by pandering to the prejudices of the working +classes, and especially of the artisans; the _Argus_ now seeks to get +even by creating dissension between town and country. + +All this interference with the functions of Parliament has a baneful +influence on the working of the political machine. The party lines are +practically decided by the newspaper contest. We have spoken of the +resemblance to the "machine" control over American politics. One of the +newspapers is, in effect, managed by a "ring," the other by a "boss." +The despotism of David Syme in Melbourne is as unquestioned as that of +Richard Croker in New York, or Matthew Quay in Pennsylvania. How close +the analogy is may be inferred from the fact that Mr. Syme has +exercised, and still claims the right to exercise, control over +nominations to Parliament. It is notorious that the ten delegates who +"represented" Victoria at the Federation Convention were elected on the +_Age_ "ticket." Again, Mr. Syme is known as "the father of protection," +and has been able, by the force of his indomitable will, to impose on +the colony a tariff which can be compared only to the M'Kinley tariff +in America, thus showing that irresponsible leadership in either form is +more favourable to the rule of private interests than to the general +welfare. + +We have said enough to show that in internal affairs the influence of +the press, when it directly interferes with Parliament is an anti-social +force. In matters of foreign policy the case is still worse. The press +is almost universally jingoistic, because it is financially interested +in sensationalism. A war generally means a fortune to newspaper +proprietors. In such matters, therefore, responsible leadership by +Parliament is still more urgently required. + +We now come to the claim of those ultra-democrats who preach the +poisonous doctrines of direct government and of unrestrained majority +rule, that responsible leadership is incompatible with popular +government. This claim, is of course, supported by the radical press in +Australia. We have already quoted from Mr. Syme's work on +"Representative Government in England" the extreme views in which he +confuses representation with delegation. "Popular government," he +declares, "can only exist where the people can exercise control over +their representatives at all times and under all circumstances." The +method proposed to obtain this control is to give a majority of the +constituents power to dismiss a representative at any time, and is +utterly impracticable. Imagine the position of a member elected by a +majority of one or two votes! The true way to prevent members abusing +their trust is not to increase the direct control of the people, but to +prevent the control of the press and all other irresponsible agencies +over them; and so to ensure the return of better men. + +Perhaps the most striking anomaly in Mr. Syme's position is that, while +he would confine the office of Parliament to expressing public opinion, +he declares in the same work that "the press at once forms and expresses +public opinion."[2] Now, it is quite true that if Parliament is weak and +disorganized, or occupies itself in fighting for the spoils of office, +the power of forming public opinion is thrown into the hands of the +press. But the more power is seized by the press, the more Parliament is +degraded, and the less is the chance of recovery. The situation presents +little difficulty to Mr. Syme. Every newspaper reader, he declares, +"becomes, as it were, a member of that vast assembly, which may be said +to embrace the whole nation, so widely are newspapers now read. Had we +only the machinery for recording the votes of that assembly, we might +easily dispense with Parliament altogether." + +These ideas are not of mere academic interest; they have dominated the +trend of Victorian politics for many years. The time has now arrived for +the people to consider whether it is better to keep a Parliament of weak +delegates to express the public opinion which is formed by the press +than to elect a Parliament of "leaders of the people," highly-trained +legists, economists, and sociologists, to form and direct the public +opinion which is expressed by the newspapers. Why should the principle +of leadership, as exemplified in Mr. Syme's own career, be given full +scope in the press, and entirely repressed in Parliament? As to the kind +of influence we mean, no better description could be given than that of +the well-known Labour leader, Mr. H.H. Champion. In an open letter to +Mr. David Syme in the _Champion_ of 22nd June, 1895, he wrote:-- + + Yet, if you rose to-morrow morning with the resolve to dismiss the + ministry or to reverse the policy of the country, to stop + retrenchment or to recommence borrowing, that resolve would + infallibly translate itself into fact in a few weeks. + + In no country that I know of has any organ in the press so much + influence as your paper. It is practically the sole source of + information for the majority of the people. It has no competitors. + It can make any person or policy popular or unpopular. It can fail + to report any man or thing, and for four-fifths of the citizens it + is as though that man or thing were not. It can misrepresent any + speech or movement, and the printed lie alone will reach the + electors. It could teach the people anything you choose. It has + ruled the country for a couple of decades. It rules the country + to-day. + +Professor Jethro Brown shows himself alive to the danger of press +domination in Australia. In "The New Democracy" he writes:--"The +_prestige_ of Parliament is destroyed when its deliberations and +conclusions cease to be the determining factor in legislation. The +transfer of the real responsibility for legislation to a new power +implies the discrediting of the old school for training leaders." And he +quotes with approval the expression of opinion by the Honourable B.R. +Wise in the Federal Convention:-- + + There may be, as Mr. David Syme suggests, no risk involved in the + change of masters; but for my part I would sooner trust the + destinies of the country to the worst Parliament the people of + Australia would elect than to the best newspaper the mind of man + has ever imagined. + +It is little use, therefore, for the press to further degrade Parliament +in the eyes of the people by railing at it in the following terms:-- + + So it is that Parliament as a working machine is about the + clumsiest and least effective that can be conceived of. All our + Parliaments are modelled on the necessities of bygone centuries. We + want a working Parliament improved up to date; but we lack + political invention, and have to jog along with the old lumbering + machine--a sort of bullock dray trying to compete with an age of + electric railways and motor cars.[3] + +The remedy lies with the press itself. Let it abandon all illegitimate +influence, and use its power in a legitimate direction to give effect to +the principles of organization and responsible leadership in Parliament. +But just as the Labour faction cannot altogether be blamed for the +present disintegration of Parliament, so the press cannot be held +responsible for its degradation. In both eases cause and effect have +been interrelated. The mistake which the press has made has been in not +perceiving that the more it interferes with the legitimate functions of +Parliament, even although with the best intentions, the more it degrades +Parliament. + +We have now passed in review the two great dangers which assail the +Commonwealth at the inception of federation. We have shown how +intimately related they are to the two great principles underlying +representative government--organization and leadership. Nay, we have +seen that all the varied phenomena presented by the great democracies of +the world can be expressed in terms of the same two principles. + +It remains to show that to give effect to the expression of these two +principles in a more perfect manner than ever yet attained is a problem +of electoral machinery. This task we shall now undertake. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[2] "Representative Government in England," p. 123. + +[3] _Age_, 28th June, 1900. + + + + +CHAPTER IV. + +THE REFORM: TRUE PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. + + +How to give effect to the principles of organization and leadership in +an electoral reform--that is the problem which we shall now attempt to +solve. We have already laid down the theoretical requirements, which are +(1) proportional representation to the two parties--the majority and the +minority, and (2) the election by each party separately of its most +popular leaders; and we shall now have to consider also how these +requirements are modified by practical considerations. + ++Proportional Representation to the Two Parties, the Majority and the +Minority.+--It will be as well to illustrate the method proposed by +reference to the conditions imposed by an actual election, such as that +for the Federal Senate. The Commonwealth Bill provides that each State +shall be polled as a single electorate, returning six senators. Suppose +that 120,000 electors vote on party lines in any State. It is clear that +a party which has the support of 20,000 electors is entitled to one +senator; also, that a party which has the support of 40,000 electors is +entitled to two senators; of 60,000 electors to three senators, and so +on. Now, suppose that one party has the support of 50,000 electors, and +the other of 70,000 electors, then the minority is entitled to two and a +half senators, and the majority to three and a half senators. But +senators are living units, and cannot be divided into fractions. The +question therefore arises, Which is entitled to the odd senator, the +majority or the minority? And the answer is that they are both equally +entitled to him; for it is as much a tie as if each party has the +support of 10,000 electors in a single-seat electorate. But if the +minority had the support of 49,999 electors, or one elector less, it +would be entitled to only two senators, and if it had the support of +50,001 electors, or one elector more, it would be entitled to three +senators. + +From the above simple facts can be deduced general rules applicable to +any particular case. It is evident that the result is not affected by +the number of votes allowed to each elector, providing only that each +elector has the same number of votes. It is also quite irrespective of +the number of candidates nominated in the interests of each party. But +it would never do to allow party organizations to control nominations. +How are we to combine individual candidature with party nomination? The +only way to do this is to require that each candidate shall declare, +either when nominating or a few days before the election, on which side +of the House he intends to sit, and be classified accordingly as +Ministerialist or Oppositionist. To decide the relative strengths of the +two parties, it is then only necessary to take the aggregate votes +polled by all the candidates nominated for each party as a measure of +the amount of support which it receives. + +The great advantages of this provision are at once apparent. There is no +incentive to limit the number of candidates so as to prevent splitting +the votes. On the contrary, it is to the interest of each party to get +as many strong candidates as possible to stand in its interests. There +will be no necessity to ask any candidate to retire for fear of losing a +seat to the party. Thus the control of nominations, which leads to the +worst abuses of the present system, will be entirely obviated. + +Now, suppose that in the instance we have already given each elector is +allowed to vote for one candidate only, the total number of votes +recorded will be 120,000. Then the _unit of representation_ or number of +votes which entitle a party to one senator will be 20,000 votes; each +party will be entitled to one senator for every whole unit of +representation, and the odd senator will go to the party having the +larger remainder. For instance, if the aggregate votes polled by all the +Ministerialist candidates be 72,000, and by the Oppositionist candidates +48,000, the Ministerialists, having three units plus 12,000 remainder, +are entitled to four senators, and the Opposition, having two units plus +8,000, to two senators. + +Similarly, if each elector be allowed to vote for a number of +candidates, all these figures will be increased in proportion. For +example, if each elector has three votes, the unit of representation +would be 60,000 votes. The following general rules may therefore be +stated:-- + + 1. The unit of representation is equal to the total number of valid + votes cast at the election, divided by the number of seats. + + 2. Each party is entitled to one seat for every whole unit of + representation contained in the aggregate votes polled by all its + candidates, and the odd seat goes to the party which has the larger + remainder. + +The fact that the last seat has to be assigned to the party which has +the larger remainder is sometimes advanced as an objection, but it is +evidently the fairest possible division that the size of the electorate +will permit. Of course, the larger the electorate the more accurately +proportioned will be the representation. Hence the representation would +be most accurate if the whole assembly were elected in one large +electorate. But if, for the sake of convenience, the assembly be elected +in a large number of electorates in which the relative proportions of +two parties vary the gains which a party makes in some electorates will +be balanced by losses in others, so that the final result would be +almost as accurate as if the whole country were polled as one +electorate. It must be remembered that the result in any electorate +cannot be foreseen, and that it is a matter of chance which party gains +the advantage. Now, if the limits of variation comprise even a single +unit of representation, each party will stand an equal chance of +gaining, and therefore the laws of chance will ensure that the gains +balance the losses in the different electorates. Supposing a party which +averages 40 per cent. in the whole country to vary between 30 per cent. +and 50 per cent, in the different electorates (which may be taken as a +fair assumption), the unit of representation should equal 20 per cent., +or one-fifth. Under these conditions the laws of chance will ensure +correct representation, so long as the electorates do not contain less +than five seats. + +The above facts furnish a complete answer to the arguments advanced by +Mr. J.W. M'Cay, ex-M.L.A., in a series of articles in the _Age_ against +the application of proportional representation to the Federal Senate. +While apparently recognizing that it is utterly impossible for the +minority to secure a majority of the representation, he based his +objection solely on the fact that a minority is able with electorates +containing an even number of seats to secure one-half of the +representation, and thus lead to what he terms "the minority block." + +The force of the objection will entirely depend on the size of the +minority which is able thus to thwart the will of the majority. The +Federal Senate will consist of 36 senators, each of the original States +contributing six. No reasonable man would complain if the minority, +being only entitled to 17 senators, actually returned 18, but Mr. M'Cay +points out that it is possible for a minority entitled to 15 senators to +return 18. To bring about this result he makes the absurd assumption +that in each of the six States the minority polls exactly two whole +units of representation, and a bare majority of a third unit. It is safe +to say that this would not happen once in a thousand years. If the +relative proportions of the two parties vary in the slightest in the +different States some must be under and some over the assumed +proportion. It is most probable that it will be under it in three States +and over it in the other three States; and, under these circumstances, +the party will return 15 senators, the exact number to which it is +entitled. It may happen to be under the assumed proportion in only two +of the States and over in the other four, and that the party will get +one more senator than it is entitled to; but it is extremely improbable +that it will get two more, and virtually impossible that it will get +three more senators than its just proportion. Mr. M'Cay's conclusion +that proportional representation can only be used in electorates +returning an odd number of representatives is shown to be entirely +unwarranted. Equally fallacious is Professor Nanson's rebutting +statement that "scientific proportionalists recommend odd electorates." +While the number of States remains even, the mathematical chance of a +minority securing one-half of the representation is precisely the same +whether the States return an odd or an even number of senators. As a +matter of fact, the danger of a minority securing one-half of the +representation is much greater at the intermediate elections for the +Senate, when each State returns three senators, the reason being the +smaller field. + +We have dwelt at some length on the preceding example, because it serves +to refute another error into which some of the proportionalists have +fallen. It is held that the unit of representation should be ascertained +by dividing the total votes, not by the number of seats, but by the +seats increased by one. This unit is generally known as the Droop quota, +having been proposed in a work published by Mr. H.R. Droop in 1869. +Since one vote more than one-half of the total votes is sufficient for +election in a single-seat electorate, it is argued that one vote more +than one-third suffices in a two-seat electorate, one vote more than +one-fourth in a three-seat electorate, and so on. The unit in a six-seat +electorate would be one-seventh of the votes instead of one-sixth, and +it is pointed out that by this means the whole six seats would be filled +by whole units, leaving an unrepresented residuum of one-seventh of the +votes divided between the two parties. + +The error lies precisely as before in concentrating attention on one of +the electorates, and in neglecting the theory of probability. The Droop +quota introduces the condition that each party must pay a certain +minimum number of votes for each seat, and the real distinction is that, +instead of the minority and the majority having an equal chance of +securing any advantage, the chances are in the same proportion as their +relative strengths. If the majority be twice as strong as the minority, +it will have twice the chance of gaining the advantage. To prove this, +consider the position of a one-third minority in a number of five-seat +electorates. The Droop quota being one-sixth of the votes, the minority +will secure two seats or 40 per cent. in those electorates where it is +just over one-third, and one seat or 20 per cent. where it is just +under. Since the mathematical chances are that it will be over in one +half and under in the other half, it will, on the average, secure only +30 per cent., although entitled to 33 per cent. Again, if the 670 +members of the House of Commons were elected in three to five-seat +electorates, and the Droop quota used as proposed by Sir John Lubbock, +and if the Ministerialists were twice as strong as the Oppositionists, +they would, on the average, return 30 more members than the two-thirds +to which they are entitled, and this would count 60 members on a +division. + +The following table illustrates the erroneous result obtained by +applying the Droop quota when a number of grouped-electorates are +concerned. It will be noticed that where parties are nearly equal it +makes very little difference which unit is used:-- + ++-------------+--------------------------------------------+ +| STRENGTH OF | AVERAGE REPRESENTATION. | +| +----------------------+---------------------+ +| PARTY |Five-Seat Electorates.|Ten-Seat Electorates.| ++-------------+----------------------+---------------------+ +| 10 per cent.| 2 per cent. | 6 per cent. | +| 20 " " | 14 " " | 17 " " | +| 30 " " | 26 " " | 28 " " | +| 40 " " | 38 " " | 39 " " | +| 50 " " | 50 " " | 50 " " | ++-------------+----------------------+---------------------+ + +The Droop quota, therefore, gives, not proportional, but disproportional +representation. + ++Election by Each Party of its Most Popular Candidates.+--Still keeping +in mind the six-seat electorate for the Federal Senate, we may note that +there are two rival systems in the field--the _scrutin de liste_ or +Block Vote, in which each elector votes for any six of the candidates, +and the Hare system, which allows each elector an effective vote for one +candidate only. The adoption of either of these systems would be +unfortunate. To force each elector to vote for six candidates is +probably to require him to vote for more than he is inclined to support, +and certainly for more than his party is entitled to return; and, also, +to put it in the power of the majority to return all six senators. To +allow him to vote for one candidate only, on the other hand, is to break +up both parties into factions by allowing the favourites of sections +within the parties to be elected, instead of those most in general +favour with all sections composing each party. An intermediate position +is therefore best. No elector should be required to vote for more than +three candidates, and no elector should be allowed to vote for less. +Because in the first place it is evident that each party will, on the +average, return three senators, and, secondly, it may be taken for +granted that even the minority will nominate at least three candidates. +Two alternative proposals may be submitted as fulfilling these +conditions:-- + + _1. Each elector should vote for any three candidates, or + + 2. Each elector should have six votes, and have the option of giving + two votes to individual candidates._ + +The first plan is the simpler, but the second is probably the better, as +it allows more discrimination without sacrificing any of the advantages. +Either proposal is practically equivalent to applying the Block Vote to +each party separately; and whatever may be the objections to applying +the Block Vote to two or more parties it is the simplest and best system +to elect the candidates most in general favour when one party only is +concerned. It is true that the majority will return rather more than +one-half of the representatives and the minority rather less than +one-half, so that the minority will have more votes in proportion to its +strength. But with two parties of fairly equal but fluctuating strength +the fairest way is to require each elector to vote for at least one-half +of the number of representatives. Besides, apart from the fact that it +is not known before the election how many seats each party will obtain, +it is absolutely necessary that each elector shall have the same number +of votes in order that each party be allotted its just share of +representation. Moreover it is not proposed to limit the elector's +freedom of choice in the slightest by confining him to the candidates of +one party. The great majority of electors will vote on party lines, +because every vote given to a candidate of the opposing party tells +against the representation of their own party. The reason of this is +that every vote counts individually for the candidate and collectively +for the whole party. Any elector, therefore, who divides his voting +power equally between the two parties practically wastes it as far as +the party representation is concerned. But it is neither necessary nor +desirable to bring about such a rigid party division as prevails in +America, for instance, where a man is born, lives, and dies Republican +or Democrat. If electors were confined to the candidates of one party, +an elector who wished to vote for an individual candidate of the +opposing party would be placed in the dilemma of deserting either his +favourite or his party. The division into parties is really required in +the elected body, and not in the constituent body. + ++Rules for the Reform.+--We are now in a position to draw up a list of +rules for the proposed reform, applicable to all legislatures in which +party government prevails:-- + +1. Electorates to be grouped so as to contain at least three seats, and +preferably not less than five seats nor more than twenty seats. + +2. Candidates to declare when nominating, or a few days before the +election, whether they are in favour of or opposed to the party in +power, and to be classified accordingly as Ministerialists or +Oppositionists. + +3. Ballot papers to contain the names of all candidates nominated, +arranged in two parallel columns, one headed Ministerialists, and the +other Oppositionists. The list of candidates under each heading to be +arranged in alphabetical order. + +4. Each elector to have as many votes as there are seats, and to be +allowed to give either one or two votes to any candidate. The votes to +be distributed as he pleases among all the candidates of both lists. + +5. The total number of valid votes cast at the election to be divided by +the number of seats; the quotient to be known as the "unit of +representation." + +6. Each party to be allowed one seat for every whole unit of +representation contained in the aggregate votes polled by all its +candidates, and the last seat to go to the party which has the larger +remainder. + +7. The candidates of each party having the highest number of votes to be +declared elected to the number of seats to which each party is entitled +in accordance with the preceding rule. + +8. In case of a tie between candidates or parties the lot decides. + +The alternative plan for rule 4, which is somewhat simpler, would read +as follows:-- + +4. Each elector to vote for half the number of candidates that there are +seats, _i.e._, three votes in a five or six-seat electorate, four votes +in a seven or eight-seat electorate, &c. The votes to be distributed as +he pleases among all the candidates of both lists. + +It is unnecessary to dwell on the absolute simplicity of these rules. +They involve no radical departure from existing methods of voting or of +counting votes. Once the totals are added up, the calculations necessary +to decide the successful candidates are within the reach of a school +child. + +EXAMPLE.--Take as an example 13 candidates in a six-seat electorate who +poll as follows:-- + + MINISTERIALISTS. OPPOSITIONISTS. +BROWN 83,000 YOUNG 53,000 +RYAN 74,000 BELL 51,000 +COX 44,000 HUME 47,000 +WHITE 42,000 JONES 45,000 +PEEL 38,000 BLACK 34,000 +ADAMS 35,000 ------- +GREY 33,000 230,000 +SWIFT 21,000 + ------- + 370,000 + +Total votes = 370,000 + 230,000 = 600,000. + +Unit of representation = 600,000/6 = 100,000. + +Ministerialists: 3 units + 70,000 remainder = 4 seats. + +Oppositionists: 2 units + 30,000 remainder = 2 seats. + +The Ministerialists, having the larger remainder, secure the last seat. +The successful candidates are Brown, Ryan, Cox, and White (M.), Young +and Bell (O.) + +It will be noted that without the proportional principle the +Ministerialists would have returned two members only, and the +Oppositionists four. + +It is to be distinctly understood that the simpler plan of voting for +half the number of candidates that there are seats is practically as +good as the other. In order to show, however, that the plan we have +favoured may be simplified, we illustrate by a sample ballot paper a +method which has been used in Belgium. Two white spots are printed +opposite each candidate's name. An ink pad and stamp are then provided +at each polling booth, and the elector stamps out a white spot for each +vote he wishes to give. In the paper illustrated two votes are given to +Brown, two to Jones, one to Grey, and one to Swift. This elector has, +therefore, given two-thirds of his voting power to the Ministerial +party, and one-third to the Opposition, and has thus directly influenced +both policies. A further advantage of the proposal is the ease with +which such a paper can be read by the returning officer. + + +BALLOT PAPER + + * * * * * + +Ministerialists. Oppositionists. + ++---------------+ +---------------+ +| | | | | | +| o o | ADAMS | | o o | BELL | +| | | | | | ++---------------+ +---------------+ +| | | | | | +| x x | BROWN | | o o | BLACK | +| | | | | | ++-----+---------+ +---------------+ +| | | | | | +| o o | COX | | o o | HUME | +| | | | | | ++-----+---------+ +---------------+ +| | | | | | +| o x | GREY | | x x | JONES | +| | | | | | ++-----+---------+ +---------------+ +| | | | | | +| o o | PEEL | | o o | YOUNG | +| | | | | | ++-----+---------+ +---------------+ +| | | +| o o | RYAN | +| | | ++-----+---------+ +| | | +| x o | SWIFT | +| | | ++-----+---------+ +| | | +| o o | WHITE | +| | | ++-----+---------+ + +1. You are allowed Six votes, and can give either one or two votes to +any candidate on either list. + +2. Stamp out one of the white spots if you wish to give a candidate one +vote. + +3. Stamp out the two white spots if you wish to give a candidate two +votes. + +4. Your ballot paper will be invalid if you stamp out more or less than +Six white spots. + ++Character of Parties.+--We must now prove that the methods proposed +will actually organize the people into two coherent parties. Let us +suppose either party to be composed of three sections. The problem is to +induce these three sections to work together, and to sink their petty +differences in the general interest, in short to unite as a party, +aiming at the control of administration with a definite policy on public +questions. Let us further suppose the party entitled to three +representatives. Now, it is quite conceivable that exactly the same +three candidates would be elected if each elector had any number of +votes from one to three, and this would actually tend to be the case the +more united the party is. But herein lies the difference: that with one +vote only any one section holding narrow and violent views can return an +independent delegate, and therefore has a direct inducement to do so, +while with three votes it is forced to work with the other two sections, +for if it refuses to do so it is in their power to exclude its nominee. +It is this power to exclude independent factions which is the first +requisite to prevent the main parties degenerating into factions. Now, +the advocates of the Hare system declare that each elector should have +one effective vote only, no matter how many seats the party is entitled +to. The elector would therefore only express his opinion as to the +delegate of his own section, and not as to the constitution of the whole +party, and there would be nothing whatever to prevent the election of +the favourites of sections, instead of the representatives most in +general favour with all sections. + +But if there were only one party it would be impossible to make all the +sections work together in this manner. Some of them would combine into a +majority of the party, and would exclude the minority. With two great +competing parties, however, the case is quite different. So far from +either party wishing to exclude any small minority, both will compete +for its support, providing only that it will fall into line with the +other sections on the main questions of policy. Each section will +therefore support the party which will consent to embody the most +favourable compromise of its demands in its policy. If its demands are +such that both parties refuse to entertain them, it will exercise no +influence in the direction of furthering its own views. From this +statement it is evident that no system of independent direct +proportional representation within the party can be recognized as a +right to which the different sections are entitled, as it would +inevitably break up the party, and lead to sectional delegation. The +sections would then change in character, and become violent factions. +But, nevertheless, if the sections work together as described, every +section will be proportionately represented in the party policy, and +therefore by every representative of the party. Moreover, no section can +dictate to either party, or obtain more than a fair compromise. For all +the sections are interdependent, and any section which attempts to exert +more than its just share of influence will sink in general favour, and +will find those who are inclined to support its pretensions rejected at +the election. + +The difference between the two stages of representation may now be +clearly appreciated. In the first stage we have seen that the fear of +the aggression of the monarchy held all sections together in one party. +In the second stage, however, it has been abundantly demonstrated by +experience that the fear of each other will not hold the sections of the +two parties together. The electoral machinery must, therefore, supply +the deficiency. + ++Party Lines.+--With the altered character of parties there is ground +for hope that the basis of division will become questions of general +public policy, and that all causes of factious dissension and of social +disruption will tend to be repressed. This improvement is indeed +urgently needed. For if in any country party lines are decided by +geographical considerations, as town _v._ country; by class, as Capital +_v._ Labour; by race as in South Africa; by religion as in Belgium; or +by personal ambition for the spoils of office--in any of these cases the +future of that country is open to the gravest doubt. + +Perhaps the greatest danger which assails most democratic countries +to-day is the risk of the working classes being persuaded by demagogues +that equal political rights have been extended to them in order that +they shall govern, instead of in order that they shall not be +misgoverned. If the general welfare is to be advanced, all classes must +influence the policies of both parties. This condition is indispensable +to bring about the ideal condition of two parties differing only as to +what is best for all. + +Equally to be condemned is the narrow-minded and intolerant view of +those who can see no virtue in an opposing party; who define, for +instance, the distinction between parties as the party for things as +they are, and the party for things as they ought to be; the latter +being, of course, their own party. This is one of the objectionable +features of Australian newspaper-made politics. + +A more rational view of the distinction which often underlies party +divisions is between those who desire change and those who oppose +change. J.S. Mill points out how the latter may often be useful in +preventing progress in a wrong direction. There are times when such +attitude is called for, but generally speaking we may say that the +fundamental distinction between parties should be a difference of +opinion as to the direction of progress. Nor is it inconsistent for a +party to change its opinion or alter its policy; on the contrary, it is +essential to progress. The majority must often modify its policy in the +light of the criticism of the minority, and the minority must often drop +the unpopular proposals which have put it in a minority. These features +are all essential to the working of the political machine. + ++The Character of Representatives.+--Granting that all sections of each +party can be induced to work together, the beneficial effect on the +character of representatives would be incalculable. Instead of being +forced to pander to every small section for support, they would appeal +to all sections. The enlarged electorates which are contemplated would +be arranged to embrace the widest diversity of interest, and a +representative would then be free to follow his own independent +judgment, unfettered by the dictation of small cliques. His actions +might offend some sections who supported his election; but he has a wide +field, and may gain the support of other sections by them. Therefore, he +may actually improve his position by gaining more supporters than he +loses. Contrast this with the present system, in which the +representatives are cooped up in single-membered electorates to denned +sets of supporters. The very principle of community of interest on which +these electorates must be arranged in order to get a fair result is +destructive of the idea of representation. It is no wonder, then, that +the present system is tending towards delegation. Local delegation we +have always had, more or less, but we are now threatened by class +delegation also. + +The conclusion of Mr. Kent in "The English Radicals" may be quoted on +this point. He says:-- + + The question of the relationship of members to their constituents + is at the present time perplexed and undetermined; for though the + control of Parliament by the people is an indisputable fact, yet it + is maintained by means of quite another kind from those which the + early Radicals proposed. The result is somewhat paradoxical, for + while the system of pledges has been contemptuously rejected, yet + the theory that a member is a delegate tacitly prevails in English + politics. That members of the House of Commons have tended and do + tend to lose their independence it is impossible to doubt. A + distinguished French publicist, M. Boutmy, for instance, has + remarked the fact; and he thinks that in consequence a + deterioration of the tone of politicians is likely to recur. Mr. + E.L. Godkin, an American writer, whose judgments are entitled to + respect, has expressed much the same opinion; "the delegate + theory," he says, "has been gaining ground in England, and in + America has almost completely succeeded in asserting its sway, so + that we have seen many cases in which members of Congress have + openly declared their dissent from the measures for which they + voted in obedience to their constituents." + +It is one of the greatest merits of the proposed reform that this vexed +question of representation or delegation would be definitely settled. +For, although the area of independent action is enlarged, definite +limits are set to it. + ++Possible Objections.+--We may now reply to some objections which have +been or might be urged. At the outset we would point out that the +critics nearly always base their objections on the conditions which have +prevailed in the past or do exist in the present chaotic state of +parties; and seldom appreciate the fact that they would lose force if a +better condition could be brought about. Let us take the Melbourne +_Argus_ report of Professor Nanson's objections:-- + + Professor Nanson pointed out that the scheme depended for its + efficacy on the existence of party government, which the Professor + was glad to say was being pushed more and more into the background. + He took a practical illustration from the defeat of the O'Loghlen + Government in 1883. In that case, after the election the Government + came back with a following of one-tenth. The other combined party + had nine-tenths, and of these a little more than half were Liberals + and a little less than half were Conservatives. He pointed out that + under Mr. Ashworth's system the Liberals would have got the whole + of the Opposition seats and the Conservatives none, whereas under + any intelligent modification of the Hare system the parties would + have been returned in the proportion of five Liberals, four + Conservatives, and one O'Loghlenite. The system contained the evils + of the _scrutin de liste_ doubled by being applied to two parties, + the evils of the Limited Vote, which had been condemned by all + leading statesmen, and it played into the hands of these who were + best able to organize. + +Take the latter statements first. The evil of the Block Vote or +_scrutin de liste_ is that it gives all the representation to the +majority, and excludes the minority; its merit is that it prevents the +formation of a number of minorities. How this evil will be doubled if it +is entirely removed by allowing both majority and minority their just +share of representation we leave the Professor to explain. The statement +that the scheme would play into the hands of those who are best able to +organize is absolutely without foundation. On the contrary, the +organization is automatic. It would certainly encourage the formation of +organizations to influence the policies of the parties, since every +organization would be able to exert its proportionate influence, but +that is an advantage, not an evil. We will leave the statement about +party government alone, and now take the "practical illustration." The +Professor here assumes three distinct parties, but it is quite evident +there are only two. It is not usual for Liberal Unionists and +Conservatives to fight one another at elections in Great Britain at +present. In the same way, if a section of Liberals and a section of +Conservatives unite to oppose a Government, they will work together and +not try to exclude one another. Moreover, they will have a common +policy, so that it matters little who are elected so long as they are +the best men to carry out the policy. Is it likely the Conservatives +would join the Liberals, if the latter were trying to get all the +seats? Thus all the Professor's assumptions are incorrect. But even if +they were correct the conclusion is still wrong. The Liberal section +could not get all the seats if they tried. Imagine a ten-seat +electorate, in which the combined party is entitled to nine members. The +electors would not be required to vote for more than five candidates, +whereas the Professor has assumed that they would be forced to vote for +nine. He has forgotten that the Block Vote becomes the Limited Vote +under the conditions named, and that the Limited Vote allows the +minority a share of representation. Besides, in any case, these +conditions would never arise in a country in a healthy state of +political activity, because then parties would tend more nearly to +equalize each other in strength. + +It has also been objected that a Ministerialist candidate, say, might +stand as an Oppositionist, if the votes of the Opposition candidates +were more split up and it was likely to require less votes for election +in that party. This is a rather fantastic suggestion. The candidate in +question would have to declare himself in favour of a number of things +which he would oppose immediately he was elected. If not, he would have +to openly declare his intention, but that could easily be made illegal. +In any case there would be very little gained, and there is further the +risk that, if defeated, all his votes would count to the Opposition. + +Another possible objection is that too many candidates might stand, +since it is to the interest of each party to get all the support it can. +But candidates are not likely to stand to oblige the party or when there +is no chance of being elected. It is quite possible that, in a country +already split up into numerous groups, the groups would refuse to act +together, and that each group would nominate its own list. This is an +extreme assumption, and certainly would not happen in British countries. +And there would be a constant incentive to the groups to compromise, +since a combination can return its candidates. + +We hope now to have at least established the fact that the organization +of a democracy into two coherent parties--a majority and a minority--is +vitally connected with the electoral machinery. We do not claim that the +method we have proposed will induce a people to vote on true party lines +all at once, for human nature cannot be changed in a day; but we do +confidently assert that it will greatly accelerate that desirable +result, and will tend to give effect to the principles of organization +and responsible leadership. + + + + +CHAPTER V. + +HOW THE EVILS OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM WILL BE REMEDIED. + + +From the inception of the representative system it has been usual to +elect representatives in small districts, returning only one or two +members, and the single-membered electorate is now almost universal. In +the early Parliaments, however, elections were not contested as they are +nowadays. It was merely a choice of the most suitable men to represent a +corporate local community. Hence an indirect method of election was +generally resorted to, the final choice being left to a small committee +of the most important men. With the gradual rise of the party system the +conditions entirely changed; and it is important to gain a clear idea of +what is involved in the change. + +In the first stage we have referred to it is not probable that there +were any candidates at all. The position of member of Parliament was not +sought after; it was rather thrust upon the man selected as a duty he +owed the community. The choice would usually be unanimous, since there +would be some men whose recognized influence and attainments would mark +them off as most fitted for the position. If there was any difference of +opinion it would be merely as to who was best fitted to represent all, +and therefore there would never be any excluded minority. + +The essential difference in the second stage is that every election is +contested by two organized parties. The choice is now not of men only, +but of measures and of men as well. It is a contest in the first place +within each party as to who is best fitted to represent the party, and +in the second place between the two parties for the support of the +people. The party in a majority secures all the representation; the +party in a minority none. Now, the minority is certainly not represented +by the choice of the majority; on the contrary, its views are exactly +the opposite. Hence the question arises: Is not this exclusion of the +minority an injustice? Does it not amount to disfranchisement? The usual +reply is either that the majority must rule or that the injustice done +in some electorates is balanced in others, so that in the long run rough +justice is obtained. + +As to the first contention, it is the party which has the support of a +majority of the whole people which should rule; and the excluded +minority in some of the electorates belongs to this party. The second +practically amounts to the statement that two wrongs make a right. + +A practice prevails in the United States which will illustrate the +position. Each State sends a number of representatives to Congress +proportional to its population, and the division into electorates is +left to the State. By manipulating the electoral boundaries the party +which has a majority in each State is enabled to arrange that the +injustice done to itself is a minimum, and that the injustice done to +the opposing party is a maximum. By this iniquitous practice, which is +known as the gerrymander, the party in a minority in each State is +allowed to get only about one-half or one-quarter of its proper share of +representation. But as the practice is universal in all the States, the +injustice done to a party in some States is balanced in others. Will +those who seek to excuse the injustice done to the minority in each +electorate by the present system of election seriously contend that the +same argument justifies the gerrymander? + +The truth is that the present system has survived the passage from the +first stage of representation into the second, not because it does +justice to both parties, but because it has operated largely to prevent +the formation of more than two parties. It has, therefore, been a means +of giving effect to the central feature of representation, viz.: the +organization of public opinion into two definite lines of policy. But it +is a comparatively ineffective means, and it no longer suffices to +prevent sectional delegation in any of the democracies we have examined. +Besides, it is accompanied by a series of other evils, which in so far +as they lead to the suppression of responsible leadership, tend to the +degradation of public life. We propose now to consider the effect of the +reform in remedying these defects of the present system. + ++Parties Not Represented in the Legislature in the Same Proportion as in +the Country.+--Representation under the present system is purely +arbitrary; the amount which each party secures is a matter of chance. If +a party with a majority in the whole country has a majority in each of +the electorates it will secure all the representation. On the other +hand, if it splits up its votes in each electorate, or even only in +those electorates where it has a majority, it may secure none at all. +Theoretically, then, any result is possible. The argument would lose its +force, however, if in practice the result usually came out about right. +But this seldom happens, and, speaking generally, two cases may be +distinguished: first, when parties are nearly equal, the minority is +almost as likely as the majority to return a majority of the +representatives, thus defeating the principle of majority rule; and, +second, when one party has a substantial majority, it generally sweeps +the board and annihilates the minority. A few examples will illustrate +these facts. + +The 1895 election for the Imperial Parliament is analyzed by Sir John +Lubbock in the _Proportional Representation Review_. He shows that out +of 481 contested seats, the Liberals, with 1,800,000 votes were +entitled to 242, and the Conservatives and Liberal Unionists, with +1,775,000 to 239, a majority of three seats for the Liberals. But the +Conservatives and Unionists actually returned 279, and the Liberals only +202, a majority of 77 seats. The Conservatives and Unionists obtained +also a majority of 75 of the uncontested seats, giving them a total +majority of 152, instead of the 72 to which they were entitled. + +Recent elections for the United States Congress are shown by Professor +Commons to present striking inequalities. At the election for the 51st +Congress, 1888, the Republicans polled 5,348,379, and the Democrats +5,502,581. But the Republican minority actually secured 164 seats +against 161, a majority of 3, and were enabled to carry the McKinley +tariff law. For the 52nd Congress, 1890, the Republicans, with 4,217,266 +votes, only elected 88, while the Democrats, with 4,974,450 votes, +elected 235, and the Populists, with 354,217 votes, elected 9 +Congressmen. The Democratic majority should have been only 2, instead of +138. Compared with the 51st Congress, their proportion of the popular +vote increased only 1 per cent., but their proportion of the +representatives increased 21 per cent. It required 47,923 votes to elect +a Republican, 44,276 to elect a Populist, and only 21,078 to elect a +Democrat. + +To come nearer home, did not Mr. Reid return to power at the 1898 +election in New South Wales although the Opposition polled a majority of +15,000 against him? The last election in Victoria illustrates nothing so +much as the chaotic state of parties, brought about by newspaper +influence in promoting false lines of division. No less than 30 seats, +representing 81,857 votes, were contested only by candidates who +professed to be Ministerialists of various shades. Of 52 seats contested +by Ministerial and Opposition candidates, each party secured 26; but the +Ministerialists paid 59,255 votes for their seats as against 44,327 cast +for the Opposition. 13 seats were uncontested, 9 Ministerial and 4 +Opposition, giving a total of 65 members to the Ministerial party and 30 +members to the Opposition. + +The arbitrary and haphazard character of these results is obvious. It +would be entirely removed by the reform. Every election would reflect +the true feeling of the country; the right of the majority to rule would +be rendered certain, and the right of the minority to a fair hearing +would be assured. Taking the country as a whole, the Ministerialists +would pay almost exactly the same number of votes for each seat as the +Opposition. In each separate electorate the accuracy would not be so +great, but the rectification of even this slight and unavoidable +inequality would, instead of being arbitrary, be subject to the laws of +chance. + ++Ineffective Votes.+--Under the present system, all votes cast for +rejected candidates are ineffective; therefore nearly one-half of the +electors have no voice in the Government. A Liberal elector may live in +a Conservative constituency all his life without having the opportunity +to cast an effective vote. The evil of popular indifference is largely +to be explained by this fact. It is no answer to say that it affects +both parties equally. The trouble is that nearly one-half of the +electors of each party have no influence in deciding who are to +represent the party, and therefore do not help to frame its policy. + +This evil would also be entirely removed. Every vote cast would count to +one or the other party. It is not necessary that every vote should be +counted to some one candidate, as the advocates of the Hare system +claim. Votes given to rejected candidates would be in effect just as +much transferred to the successful candidates as by the Hare system. +Moreover, it is an important gain that the candidates of each party +would be ranged in order of favour, as the relative position of the +candidates would be an index of the feeling of each electorate, not only +as regards men but also as regards measures. Therefore, even the votes +given to rejected candidates would affect the framing of the party +policy, and show the progress of public opinion. + ++Uncontested Seats.+--At the 1895 election for the Imperial Parliament +no less than 189 seats out of 670 were uncontested. Thus one-quarter of +the people had no opportunity of expressing any opinion. In Australia +the proportion is often quite as large. The present Legislative Council +of Victoria is an extreme instance. One-third of the Council retires +every three years; and at the last election not a single seat was +contested. Only 4 out of the 48 sitting members have had to contest +election. Under these circumstances the holding of an election at all +becomes a farce. No doubt it is very convenient for the favoured +individuals; but as the primary object of elections is the ascertainment +of public opinion, it is very desirable that every seat should be +contested. + +The chief cause of this evil is that when one party is strong in an +electorate it is hopeless for the minority to contest it, unless the +majority nominates more than one candidate. On the other hand, the +majority knows that if it does split its votes the minority will +probably win the seat. The result is that the sitting member has a great +advantage, and is often tolerated even though he is acceptable to only a +minority of his own party. + +With the reform each electorate would become the scene of a contest +between the two parties for their proportional share of representation. +It is very unlikely, indeed, that in any electorate no more candidates +would be nominated than are required to be elected. + ++Limitation of Choice.+--Even when seats are contested, the elector's +choice is very limited under the present system. Wherever party +government is strong, each party nominates only one candidate, owing to +the danger of splitting up its votes and so losing the seat. The elector +has then practically no choice. He may disapprove of the candidate +standing for his own party, but the only alternative is to stultify +himself by supporting the opposing candidate. If in disgust he abstains +from voting altogether, it is the same as giving each candidate half his +vote. Even when two or three candidates of his own party are nominated, +and he supports the one whose views coincide most closely with his own, +he can exert very little direct influence on the party policy. Besides, +he will often think it wise to support the strongest candidate rather +than the one he favours most. + +These considerations show what a very imperfect instrument the present +system is for expressing public opinion. The test which should be +applied to any system of election is whether it allows each elector to +express his opinion on general policy, and from this point of view the +present system fails lamentably; all opinion which does not run in the +direct channel of party is excluded. Mr. Bryce has fixed on this defect +as the weak point of the party system, but the fault really lies in the +limitation of choice connected with the present system of election. It +is quite true that "in every country voting for a man is an inadequate +way of expressing one's views of policy, because the candidate is sure +to differ in one or more questions from many of those who belong to the +party."[4] But if, in the first place, the incentive to limit the number +of candidates be removed and the field of choice widened, and if, in the +second place, each elector be allowed to vote for several candidates +instead of one only, the defect would be remedied. Now, the reform makes +both these provisions, and the importance of the improvement can hardly +be overrated. It means, first, that every elector will be not only +allowed, but also induced, to express his opinion on general policy. He +may give his votes to candidates either for their general views or for +some particular view; or, if he lays less stress on measures than on +men, he may give them to men of high character or of great +administrative ability. It means, secondly, that every section of +opinion composing each party will be fairly represented, and that none +will be excluded, because the candidates of each party will compete +among themselves for the support of all sections, in order to decide +those most in general favour. Hence every section will directly help to +frame and influence the party policy, and there will be not the +slightest excuse for independent action outside the two main parties. In +the third place, it means the substitution of individual responsibility +for the corporate responsibility of parties, since the electors will +have the power to reject those who wish to modify party action in any +direction contrary to the general wish. It means, finally, that every +elector's opinion, as expressed by his vote, will have equal influence +in deciding the direction of party action. + ++Control of Nominations.+--There is a constant incentive with the +present system of election to limit the number of candidates to two, one +representing each party. For if either party splits up its votes on more +than one candidate it will risk losing the seat. But the necessity to +limit the candidates involves some control of the nominations, and this +is perhaps the worst feature of the system. It means that, instead of +the electors being allowed to select their representative, he is chosen +for them by some irresponsible body. We have seen how in the United +States the nominating system is the source of the power of the "boss" +and the "machine;" and the same result is only a matter of time in +British countries. The registration of voters is not yet conducted in +the same rigid manner as in America, nor is the farce of holding a +primary election gone through; but whether the control be exercised by a +political organization, a newspaper, a local committee, or a secret +society, the principle is the same. Mr. Bryce has noticed the rapid +change in the practice of England on this point:--"As late as the +general elections of 1868 and 1874 nearly all candidates offered +themselves to the constituency, though some professed to do so in +pursuance of requisitions emanating from the electors. In 1880 many--I +think most--Liberal candidates in boroughs and some in counties were +chosen by the local party associations, and appealed to the Liberal +electors on the ground of having been so chosen. In 1885, and again in +1892, all, or nearly all, new Liberal candidates were so chosen, and a +man offering himself against the nominee of the association was +denounced as an interloper and traitor to the party. The same process +has been going on in the Tory party, though more slowly. The influence +of the locally wealthy, and also that of the central party office, is +somewhat greater among the Tories, but in course of time choice by +representative associations will doubtless become the rule."[5] Is it to +be expected that this power will not be abused as in America? The +trouble is that no association can represent all the party electors, and +that the representative becomes responsible to the managers of the +association, to whom he really owes his election. Any control of this +kind is fatal to the principle of responsible leadership. And yet the +only alternative with the present method of election is the break-up of +the party system. This is the dilemma in which all modern democracies +are placed. The evil will be completely obviated by the reform. Instead +of limiting the candidates, it will be to the advantage of each party to +induce the strongest and most popular candidates to stand on its behalf, +since the number of seats it will obtain depends only on the aggregate +votes polled by all the candidates. With individual candidature there +can be no "machine" control of nominations. All are free to appeal +directly to the people. + ++Localization of Politics.+--The local delegate is unfortunately the +prevailing type of Australian politician. The value of a member is too +often measured by the services he renders to his constituents +individually or the amount of money he can get the Government to spend +in his constituency. Hence the nefarious practice of log-rolling in +Parliament. Is it any wonder that some of the colonies promise to rival +France in the proportion of unreproductive works constructed out of loan +money? + +How few of our members approach the ideal expressed by Edmund Burke in +his address to the electors of Bristol:--"Parliament is not a congress +of ambassadors from different and hostile interests, which interests +each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and +advocates; but Parliament is a deliberative assembly of our nation, with +one interest--that of the whole--where not local purposes, not local +prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the +general reason of the whole. You choose a member, indeed, but when you +have chosen him he is not a member of Bristol, but he is a member of +Parliament." It must be confessed, however, that Burke's ideal is rather +exalted; it is the duty of a member to make known the requirements of +his district. It is the ministry which is specially charged with +looking after the interest of the whole and of resisting illegitimate +demands. But it cannot do so if its position is so insecure that it must +purchase the support of the "parish pump" politician. + +The only way to nationalize politics is to ensure that every electorate +shall be contested on national issues by organized parties, and that +every locality shall be represented on both parties. The proposed system +will provide this remedy. In enlarged electorates each party will take +good care that its candidates are men of local influence in the most +important divisions of the electorate; therefore, sectional and local +interests will be represented, but they will be subordinated to the +interests of the whole electorate; and where there are a few large +divisions the interests of each will more nearly coincide with national +interests than where there are a large number of small divisions. +Besides, log-rolling will not be so easy between groups of +representatives as among single representatives. + ++Incentive to Bribery and Corruption.+--We now come to a class of evils +which to a large extent result from the fact that a few votes in each +electorate decide whether a party gets all the representation or none at +all. Candidates are impelled, in order to gain support from every +faction, to acts degrading to themselves and destructive to the moral +tone of the people. Foremost among these evils is the great incentive to +bribery and corruption; it is manifested not only in direct expenditure +at the elections, but also in promises of patronage and class +advantages. Direct bribery is perhaps worst in America; Professor M. +Cook states, in a paper on "The Alarming Proportion of Venal Voters" in +the _Forum_ for September, 1892, that in twenty-one towns of Connecticut +16 per cent, of the voters are venal. As Professor Commons remarks:--"It +is plain that the bribable voters themselves are adequate to hold the +balance of power between the parties. The single-membered district, +therefore, places a magnificent premium upon bribery." In England the +_Corrupt Practices Act_ has done immense good: nothing reflects so much +honour on the Imperial Parliament as the voluntary transference of the +duty of deciding cases to the judiciary. In Australia this much-needed +reform has not yet been introduced, and direct bribery prevails to a +much larger extent than would be supposed from the number of cases +investigated. Members of Parliament are naturally loth to convict one of +their own number, and the knowledge of this fact prevents petitions +being lodged. + +The mere existence of secret bribery is bad enough, but a greater danger +is that acts of indirect bribery are openly practised, with the tacit +approval of electors. "There have been instances," says Mr. Lecky, in +his "Democracy and Liberty," "in which the political votes of the police +force, of the P.O. officials, of the civil service clerks have been +avowedly marshalled for the purpose of obtaining particular class +advantages--a disintegrated majority is strongly tempted to conciliate +every detached group of votes." In Australia this has become a regular +practice; and a still worse feature is that Members of Parliament have +free access to public departments to promote class and local interests. +Class legislation is frequently brought forward on the eve of an +election with the sole object of influencing votes. These conditions +favour the wire-pullers and mere self-seekers, and, in so far as they +prevent the electors from voting on the political views and personal +merits of the candidates, they are inimical to the public interests. Mr. +Lecky has pointed out that a certain amount of moral compromise is +necessary in public life, and that a politician may indulge in +popularity-hunting from honourable public motives; the danger is that +unworthy politicians may screen themselves under shelter of this excuse. + +We do not claim that the proposed system would abolish corruption, but +we are justified in hoping that it would mitigate it very much. Even if +the venal vote still held the balance of power between parties, parties +are not so easily corrupted as individuals. But the most important gain +is that it could only exert an influence proportional to its numbers; it +could not decide whether a party gets all the representation or none at +all, as at present. In most cases it would be doubtful if it would +affect a single candidate. Consider, again, the case of individual +candidates of the same party; any candidate resorting to bribery in +order to increase his chance of election would do so partly at the +expense of the other candidates of his own party, who would immediately +denounce him. Instead of being forced to conciliate selfish factions, +the candidates would be free to appeal for the support of the unselfish +sections. + ++Continual Change in Electoral Boundaries.+--The irregular growth of +population necessitates a periodical revision of the electoral +boundaries of single-membered electorates. Owing to the influence of +vested interests, this is generally effected in an arbitrary manner; and +the glaring anomalies only are rectified. We have in Victoria at the +present day some country electorates with 6,000 electors on the rolls +and others with only 1,500. An elector in the latter has four times the +voting power of an elector in the former. The process of alteration of +the boundaries offers great temptation to unfairness; and in American +politics the opportunity is taken full advantage of by a practice which +has received the name of the gerrymander. In his work on "Proportional +Representation" Professor Commons writes:-- + + It is difficult to express the opprobrium rightly belonging to so + iniquitous a practice as the gerrymander; but its enormity is not + appreciated, just as brutal prize-fighting is not reprobated + providing it be fought according to the rules. Both political + parties practise it, and neither can condemn the other. They simply + do what is natural: make the most of their opportunities as far as + permitted by the constitution and system under which both are + working. The gerrymander is not produced by the iniquity of + parties, it is the outcome of the district system. If + representatives are elected in this way there must be some public + authority for outlining the districts. And who shall be the judge + to say where the line shall be drawn? Exact equality is impossible, + and who shall set the limit beyond which inequality shall not be + pressed? Every apportionment act that has been passed in this or + any other country has involved inequality; and it would be absurd + to ask a political party to pass such an act and give the advantage + of the inequality to the opposite party. Consequently, every + apportionment act involves more or less of the gerrymander. The + gerrymander is simply such a thoughtful construction of districts + as will economize the votes of the party in power by giving it + small majorities in a large number of districts, and coop up the + opposing party with overwhelming majorities in a large number of + districts. This may involve a very distortionate and uncomely + "scientific" boundary, and the joining together of distant and + unrelated localities into a single district; such was the case in + the famous original act of Governor Gerry, of Massachusetts, whence + the practice obtained its amphibian name.[6] But it is not always + necessary that districts be cut into distortionate shapes in order + to accomplish these unjust results. (pp. 49, 50.) + +He illustrates a gerrymander which actually made one Democratic vote +equal to five Republican votes. We have quoted this description of the +methods of the gerrymander not so much because the evil has attained any +magnitude in Australia as because it offers a warning of the probable +result of adopting the single-membered district system for our Federal +legislature. + +With enlarged or grouped electorates the periodical revision of +boundaries would be entirely obviated, because the size of the +electorate may be kept constant, and the number of representatives +varied. Under such a system all unfairness would disappear, and the +gerrymander would be impossible. Representation would automatically +follow the movements of population. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[4] Bryce, "The American Commonwealth," vol ii, p 325 + +[5] Bryce, "The American Commonwealth," vol. ii., note on p. 81. + +[6] Governor Gerry contrived an electorate which resembled a salamander +in shape. + + + + +CHAPTER VI. + +THE HARE SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL DELEGATION. + + +The single transferable vote, generally known as the Hare system, was +first invented by a Danish statesman, M. Andrae, and was used for the +election of a portion of the "Rigsraad" in 1855. In 1857 Mr. Thomas +Hare, barrister-at-law, published it independently in England in a +pamphlet on "The Machinery of Representation." This formed the basis of +the scheme elaborated in his "Election of Representatives," which +appeared in 1859. + +He proposed to abolish all geographical boundaries by constituting the +whole of the United Kingdom one electorate for the return of the 654 +members of the House of Commons. Each member was to be elected by an +equal unanimous number of electors. The method of election was therefore +so contrived as to allow the electors to group themselves into 654 +constituencies, each group bound only by the tie of voluntary +association, and gathered from every corner of the Kingdom. The total +number of votes cast (about a million) was to be divided by 654, and the +quotient, say about 1,500, would be the quota or number of votes +required to elect a member. But some of the candidates would naturally +receive more votes than the quota, and a great many more would receive +less. How were all the votes to be equally divided among 654 members so +that each should secure exactly the quota? The single transferable vote +was proposed to attain this result. Each elector's vote was to count for +one candidate only, but he was allowed to say in advance to whom he +would wish his vote transferred in case it could not be used for his +first choice. Each ballot paper was, therefore, to contain the names of +a number of candidates in order of preference--1, 2, 3, &c. Then all the +candidates having more than a quota of first choices were to have the +surplus votes taken from them and transferred to the second choice on +the papers, or if the second choice already had enough votes, to the +third choice, and so on. When all the surpluses were distributed a +certain number of members would be declared elected, each with a quota +of votes. The candidates who had received the least amount of support +were then to be gradually eliminated. The lowest candidate would be +first rejected, and his votes transferred to the next available +preference on his ballot papers; then the next lowest would be rejected, +and so on till all the votes were equally distributed among the 654 +members. Such was the Hare system as propounded by its author. The +electors were to divide themselves into voluntary groups; then the +groups which were too large were to be cut down by transferring the +surplus votes, and the smaller groups were to be excluded and the votes +also transferred until the groups were reduced to 654 equal +constituencies. These two processes, transferring surplus votes and +transferring votes from excluded candidates, are the main features of +the system. Mr. Hare's rules for carrying them out are drawn up in the +form of a proposed electoral law, and in the different editions of his +work the clauses vary somewhat. They are also complicated by an +impossible attempt to retain the local nomenclature of members. As +regards surplus votes it was provided that the ballot papers which had +the most preferences expressed should be transferred; still a good deal +was left to chance or to the sweet will of the returning officer, and +this has always been admitted as a serious objection. The process of +elimination is still more unsatisfactory. Mr. Hare was from the first +strongly opposed to the elimination of the candidate who had least first +preferences, and he therefore proposed that, in order to decide which +candidate had least support, all expressed preferences should be +counted. This involved such enormous complication that in the 1861 +edition of his work he abandoned the process of elimination altogether +in favour of a process of selection. He then proposed to distribute +surplus votes only, and to elect the highest of the remainder, +regardless of the fact that they had less than a quota. He then +wrote:--"The reduction of the number of candidates remaining at this +stage of the election may be effected by taking out the names of all +those who have the smallest number of actual votes--that is, who are +named at the _head_ of the smallest number of voting papers, and +appropriating each vote to the candidate standing _next_ in order on +each paper. This process would be so arbitrary and inequitable in its +operation as to be intolerable. It might have the effect of cancelling +step by step more votes given to one candidate than would be sufficient +to return another.... Such a process disregards the legitimate rights +both of electors and of candidates." But the process of selection was +not proportional representation at all, being practically equivalent to +a single untransferable vote, and Mr. Hare finally adopted, in spite of +its defects, the "arbitrary and inequitable" process of elimination in +his last edition in 1873. And all his recent disciples have been forced +to do the same, because nothing better is known. + +Mr. Hare's scheme has ceased to be of any practical interest, since it +is now generally admitted that electorates should not return more than +ten or twenty members. Moreover, it is admitted that the electors would +group themselves in very undesirable ways, and not as Mr. Hare expected. +And yet the only effect of limiting the size of the electorates is to +reduce the number of undesirable ways in which electors might group +themselves. Let us briefly note the different proposals which have been +made. + ++1. Sir John Lubbock's Method.+--In his work on "Representation," Sir +John Lubbock says:--"The full advantage of the single transferable vote +would require a system of large constituencies returning three or five +members each, thus securing a true representation of opinion." +Three-seat electorates are, however, too small to secure accurate +proportional representation; with parties evenly balanced, for instance, +one must secure twice as much representation as the other. + +The following rules are given to explain the working of the system:-- + +(1) Each voter shall have one vote, but may vote in the alternative for +as many of the candidates as he pleases by writing the figures 1, 2, 3, +&c, opposite the names of those candidates in the order of his +preference. + +COUNTING VOTES. + +(2) The ballot papers, having been all mixed, shall be drawn out in +succession and stamped with numbers so that no two shall bear the same +number. + +(3) The number obtained by dividing the whole number of good ballot +papers tendered at the election by the number of members to be elected +plus one, and increasing the quotient (or where it is fractional the +integral part of the quotient) by one, shall be called the quota. + +(4) Every candidate who has a number of first votes equal to or greater +than the quota shall be declared elected, and so many of the ballot +papers containing those votes as shall be equal in number to the quota +(being those stamped with the lowest numerals) shall be set aside as of +no further use. On all ballot papers the name of the elected candidate +shall be deemed to be cancelled, with the effect of raising by so much +in the order of preference all votes given to other candidates after +him. This process shall be repeated until no candidate has more than a +quota of first votes or votes deemed first. + +(5) Then the candidate or candidates having the fewest first votes, or +votes deemed first, shall be declared not to be elected, with the effect +of raising by so much in the order of preference all votes given to +candidates after him or them, and rule 4 shall be again applied if +possible. + +(6) When by successive applications of rules 4 and 5 the number of +candidates is reduced to the number of members remaining to be elected, +the remaining candidates shall be declared elected. + +Objection is commonly taken to this method on account of the element of +chance involved in the distribution of surplus votes. Suppose the quota +to be 1,000, and a candidate to receive 1,100 votes, the 100 votes to be +transferred would be those stamped with the highest numerals. But if the +hundred stamped with the lowest numerals or any other hundred had been +taken the second choices would be different. + +Strictly speaking, however, this is not a chance selection--it is an +arbitrary selection. The returning officer must transfer certain +definite papers; if he were allowed to make a chance selection it would +be in his power to favour some of the candidates. + +Sir John Lubbock points out that the element of chance might be +eliminated by distributing the second votes proportionally to the second +choices on the whole 1,100 papers, and that it might be desirable to +leave any candidate the right to claim that this should be done if he +thought it worth while. + ++2.--The Hare-Clark Method.+--The Hare system has been in actual use in +Tasmania for the last two elections. It is applied only in a six-seat +electorate at Hobart and a four-seat electorate at Launceston. The rules +for distributing surplus votes proportionally were drawn up by Mr. A.I. +Clark, late Attorney-General. The problem is not so simple as it appears +at first sight. There is no difficulty with a surplus on the first +count; it is when surpluses are created in subsequent counts by +transferred votes that the conditions become complicated. Mr. Clark +adopts a rule that in the latter case the transferred papers only are to +be taken into account in deciding the proportional distribution of the +surplus. Suppose, as before, the quota to be 1,000 votes, and a +candidate to have 1,100 votes, 550 of which are marked in the second +place to one of the other candidates. Then the latter is entitled to 50 +of the surplus votes, and a chance selection is made of the 550 papers. +The element of chance still remains, therefore, if this surplus +contributes to a fresh surplus. + ++3.--The Droop-Gregory Method.+--This method, advocated by Professor +Nanson, of the Melbourne University, is claimed to entirely eliminate +the element of chance. The Gregory plan of transferring surplus votes is +defined as a fractional method. If a candidate needs only nine-tenths of +his votes to make up his quota, instead of distributing the surplus of +one-tenth of the papers all the papers are distributed with one-tenth of +their value. Reverting to our former example, if a candidate is marked +second on 550 out of 1,100 votes, the quota being 1,000 and the surplus +100, then instead of selecting 50 out of the 550 papers, the whole of +them would be transferred in a packet, the value of the packet being 50 +votes, or, as Professor Nanson prefers to put it, the value of each +paper in the packet being one-eleventh of a vote. Should this packet +contribute to a new surplus the third choices on the whole of the papers +are available as a basis for the redistribution. The packet would be +divided into smaller packets, and each assigned its reduced value. It +might here be pointed out that the use of fractions is quite +unnecessary, the value of each packet in votes being all that is +required, and that the-same process may be used with the Hare-Clark +method to avoid the chance selection of papers. The only real +difference is this: that when a surplus is created by transferred votes +Mr. Clark distributes it by reference to the next preference on all the +transferred papers, and Professor Nanson by reference to the last packet +of transferred papers only--the packet which raises the candidate above +the quota. + +Which of these methods is correct? Should we select the surplus from all +votes, original and transferred, as Sir John Lubbock proposes; from all +transferred votes only, with Mr. Clark; or from the last packet only of +transferred votes, with Professor Nanson? Consider a group of electors +having somewhat more than a quota of votes at its disposal. If it +nominates one candidate only every one of the electors will have a voice +in the distribution of the surplus, but if it puts up three candidates, +two of whom are excluded and the third elected, Mr. Clark would allow +those who supported the two excluded candidates to decide the +distribution of the surplus, and Professor Nanson only those who +supported the last candidate excluded. Both are clearly wrong, for the +only rational view to take is that when a candidate is excluded it is +the same as if he had never been nominated and the transferred votes had +formed part of the original votes of those to whom they are transferred. +Whenever a surplus is created it should therefore be distributed by +reference to all votes, original and transferred. As regards these +surpluses, Mr. Clark and Professor Nanson have adopted an arbitrary +basis, which is no more than Sir John Lubbock has done; and they have +therefore eliminated the element of chance only for surpluses on the +first count. It may be asked, Why cannot all surpluses be distributed by +reference to all the papers, if that is the correct method? The answer +is that the complication involved is enormous. Yet this was the plan +first advocated by Professor Nanson, who wrote, in reply to a definite +inquiry how the Gregory principle was applied:--"I explain by an +example. A has 2,000 votes, the quota being 1,000. A then requires only +half the value of each vote cast for him. Each paper cast for him is +then stamped as having lost one-half of its value, and the whole of A's +papers are then transferred with diminished value to the second name +(unelected, of course). The same principle applies all through. Whenever +anyone has a surplus all the papers are passed to the next man with +diminished value." Now, the effect of this extraordinary proposal would +be that the whole of the papers would have to be kept in circulation +till the last candidate was elected, with diminishing compound +fractional values. In a ten-seat electorate a large proportion would +pass through several transfers, and would towards the end of the count +have such a ridiculously small fractional value that it would take +several millions of the ballot-papers to make a single vote! It is no +wonder that this method was abandoned when the complications to which +it would lead were realized. + +A simple method of avoiding this complexity would be to treat +transferred surplus papers as if the preferences were exhausted. It must +be remembered that in all transfers a certain number of papers are lost +owing to the preferences being exhausted, and the additional loss would +be small. Thus at the first Hobart election 206 votes were wasted, and +this number would have been increased by two only. Every surplus would +then be transferred by reference to the next choice, wherever expressed, +on both original papers and papers transferred from excluded candidates. + +It might be provided, however, for greater accuracy that all papers +contributing to surpluses on the first count only should be transferred +in packets. Should these contribute to a new surplus, it should be +divided into two parts, proportional to (1) original votes and votes +transferred from excluded candidates, and (2) the value of the packet in +votes. Each part would then be distributed proportionally to the next +available preferences wherever expressed. To divide the packets into +sub-packets is a useless complication. The loss involved in neglecting +them would usually be less than one-thousandth part of the loss due to +exhausted papers. + +Having now dealt with the main features of the different variations of +the Hare system, we may proceed to consider some details which are +common to all of them. A difference of opinion exists, however, as +regards the quota. Sir John Lubbock and Professor Nanson advocate the +Droop quota, which we have shown to be a mathematical error; Miss Spence +and Mr. Clark use the correct quota. + ++The Wrong Candidates are Liable to be Elected.+--The Hare system may be +criticised from two points of view; first, as applied to the conditions +prevailing when it is introduced, and, secondly, as regards the new +conditions it would bring about. Its advocates confine themselves to the +first point of view, and invariably use illustrations based on the +existence of parties. + +We readily grant that if the electors vote on party lines, and transfer +their votes within the party as assumed, the Hare system would give +proportional representation to the parties; but even then it would +sacrifice the interests of individual candidates, for it affords no +guarantee that the right candidates will be elected. The constant +tendency is that favourites of factions within the party will be +preferred to general favourites. This at the same time destroys party +cohesion, and tends to split up parties. Nor can this result be wondered +at, since the very foundation of the system is the separate +representation of a number of sections. + +One reason why the wrong candidates are liable to be elected is that the +electors will not record their honest preferences if the one vote only +is effective. They will give their vote to the candidate who is thought +to need it most, and the best men will go to the wall because they are +thought to be safe. Mr. R.M. Johnston, Government Statistician of +Tasmania, confirms this view when he declares--"The aggregate of all +counts, whether effective or not, would seem to be the truer index of +the general favour in which each candidate stands, because the numbers +polled at the first count may be greatly disturbed by the action of +those who are interested in the success of two or more favourites who +may be pretty well assured of success, but whose order of preference +might by some be altered if sudden rumour suggested fears for any one of +the favoured group. This accidental action would tend to conceal the +true exact measure of favour in the first count." If this statement +means anything it is that the three preferences which are required to be +expressed should have been all counted as effective votes at the Hobart +election instead of one only; and this is exactly what we advocate. It +is also admitted that when two candidates ran together at the first +Launceston election the more popular candidate was defeated; and again +the _Argus_ correspondent writes of the recent Hobart election:--"The +defeat of Mr. Nicholls was doubtless due to the fact of his supporters' +over-confidence--nothing else explains it. Many people gave him No. 2 +votes who would have given him No. 1 votes had they not felt assured of +his success." + +A second reason why the wrong candidates are liable to be elected is +that the process of elimination adopted by all the Hare methods has no +mathematical justification. The candidate who is first excluded has one +preference only taken account of, while others have many preferences +given effect to. We have shown that this glaring injustice was +recognized by Mr. Hare, and only adopted as a last resort. Professor +Nanson admits that "the process of elimination which has been adopted by +all the exponents of Hare's system is not satisfactory," and adds--"I do +not know a scientific solution of the difficulty." To bring home the +inequity of the process, consider a party which nominates six +candidates, A, B, C, D, E, and F, and whose numbers entitle it to three +seats, and suppose the electors to vote in the proportions and order +shown below on the first count. + + FIRST SECOND THIRD FOURTH + COUNT. COUNT. COUNT. COUNT. +7-vote ADEFBC ADEBC AEBC ABC +6-vote EFDACB EDACB EACB ACB +5-vote CEBDFA CEBDA CEBA CBA +4-vote BDFACE BDACE BACE BAC +4-vote DCEFBA DCEBA CEBA CBA +3-vote FBAECD BAECD BAEC BAC + +It will be noted that F, having fewest first votes, is eliminated from +the second count, D from the third count, and E from the fourth. A has +then 13 votes, B 7, and C 9. If the quota be 9 votes, A's surplus would +be passed on to B, and A, B, and C would be declared elected. But D, E, +and F are the candidates most in general favour, and ought to have been +elected. For if any one of the rejected candidates be compared with any +one of the successful candidates it will be found that in every case the +rejected candidate is higher in order of favour on a majority of the +papers. Again, if the Block Vote be applied, by counting three effective +votes, the result would be--A 10 votes, B 12, C 9, D 21, E 22, and F 13. +D, E, and F would therefore be elected. Thus we see that A, B, and C, +the favourites of sections within the party, are elected, and D, E, and +F, the candidates most in general favour--those who represent a +compromise among the sections--are rejected. + +In practice, then, the Hare system discourages compromise among parties, +and among sections of parties; and therefore tends to obliterate party +lines. This has already happened in Tasmania, where all experience goes +to show that the Hare system is equivalent to compulsory plumping. In +every election the result would have been exactly the same if each +elector voted for one candidate only. The theory that it does not matter +how many candidates stand for each party, since votes will be +transferred within the party, has been completely disproved. Votes are +actually transferred almost indiscriminately. The candidates have not +been slow to grasp this fact, and at the last election handbills were +distributed giving "explicit reasons why the electors should give their +No. 1 to Mr. So-and-so, and their No. 2 to any other person they +chose."[7] Three out of every four first preferences are found to be +effective, but only one out of every five second preferences, and one +out of fifty third preferences. The first preferences, therefore, decide +the election. + +The actual result is that, in the long run, the Hare system is +practically the same as the single untransferable vote. The whole of the +elaborate machinery for recording preferences and transferring votes +might just as well be entirely dispensed with. The "automatic +organization" which it was to provide exists only in the calculations of +mathematicians. + ++A Number of Votes are Wasted.+--It is claimed for the Hare system that +every vote cast is effective, because it counts for some one candidate. +But unless every elector places all the candidates in order of +preference some votes are wasted because the preferences become +exhausted. + +When a paper to be transferred has no further available preferences +expressed it is lost. In order to reduce this waste, a vote is held to +be informal in the six-seat electorate at Hobart unless at least three +preferences are given. Notwithstanding this, the number of such votes +wasted was 7 per cent, at the first election and 10 per cent, at the +second. + +The effect of this waste is that some of the candidates are elected +with less than the quota. At the last Hobart election only three out of +six members were elected on full quotas, and at Launceston only one out +of four. The result is to favour small, compact minorities, and to lead +sections to scheme to get representation on the lowest possible terms. + +The Droop quota, being smaller than the Tasmanian quota, would have the +effect of electing more members on full quotas, and it is often +recommended on that account. Indeed, Professor Nanson declares:--"In no +circumstances is any candidate elected on less than a quota of votes. +The seats for which a quota has not been obtained are filled one after +the other, each by a candidate elected by an absolute majority of the +whole of the voters. For the seats to be filled in this way all +candidates as yet unelected enter into competition. The matter is +settled by a reference to the whole of the voting papers. If any +unelected candidate now stands first on an absolute majority of all +these papers he is elected. But if not, then the weeding-out process is +applied until an absolute majority is obtained. The candidate who gets +the absolute majority is elected. Should there be another seat, the same +process is repeated. If an absolute majority of the whole of the voters +cannot be obtained for any candidate, then the candidate who comes +nearest to the absolute majority is elected." It will be seen that +Professor Nanson proposes to bring to life again all the eliminated +candidates, in order to compete against those who have less than the +quota. The proportional principle is then to be entirely abandoned, and +the seats practically given to the stronger party, although the minority +may be clearly entitled to them. The vaunted "one vote one value" is +also to be violated, because those who supported the elected candidates +are to have an equal voice with those still unrepresented. And finally, +the evil is not cured, it is only aggravated, if an eliminated candidate +is elected. + ++The Hare System is not Preferential.+--The idea is sedulously fostered +that the Hare system is a form of preferential voting, and many people +are misled thereby. The act of voting is exalted into an end in itself. +The most elaborate provisions are now suggested by Professor Nanson to +allow the elector to express his opinion only as far as he likes. The +simple and practical method in use in Tasmania of requiring each elector +to place a definite number of candidates in order of preference is +denounced as an infringement of the elector's freedom. Why force him to +express preferences where he does not feel any? The Professor has +therefore invented "the principle of the bracket." If the elector cannot +discriminate between the merits of a number of candidates he may bracket +them all equal in order of favour. Indeed, where he does not indicate +any preference at all, the names unmarked are deemed equal. Therefore, +if he does not wish his vote transferred to any candidate, he must +strike out his name. It is pointed out that a ballot paper can thus be +used if there is any kind of preference expressed at all, and the risk +of informality is reduced to a minimum. All the bracket papers are to be +put into a separate parcel, and do not become "definite" till all the +candidates bracketed, except one, are either elected or rejected; the +vote is then transferred to that candidate. And as bracketed candidates +will occur in original papers, surplus papers, and excluded candidates' +papers at every stage of the count, the degree of complication in store +for the unhappy returning officer can be imagined. + +The whole of these intricate provisions are founded on a patent fallacy. +Preferences are not expressed in the Hare system, as in true +preferential voting, that they may be given effect to in deciding the +election, but simply in order to allow the elector to say in advance to +whom he would wish his vote transferred if it cannot be used for his +first choice. The elector is allowed to express his opinion about a +number of candidates, certainly, but after being put to this trouble +only one of his preferences is used. And which one is used depends +entirely on the vagaries of the system. The principle of the bracket +illustrates this fact; if the elector has no preference the system +decides for him. If his first choice just receives the quota the other +preferences are not even looked at. Again, of all the electors who vote +for rejected candidates, those who are fortunate enough to vote for the +worst (who are first excluded) have their second or third preferences +given effect to, and few of their votes are wasted; but the votes of +those who support the best of them (who are last excluded) are either +wasted or given to their remote preferences. In Mr. Hare's original +scheme, for instance, the votes of the last 50 candidates excluded would +have been nearly all wasted, unless some hundreds of preferences were +expressed. + +Another claim on which great stress is laid is that by the process of +transferring votes every vote counts to some one candidate. This means +nothing more than that the votes of rejected candidates are transferred +to the successful candidates. Where is the necessity for this? So long +as each party secures its just share of representation and elects its +most favoured candidates, there is no advantage gained by transferring +the votes. Miss Spence even declares that "every Senator elected in this +way will represent an equal number of votes, and will rightly have equal +weight in the House. According to the block system, there is often a +wide disparity between the number of votes for the highest and the +lowest man elected." Surely the mere fact of transferring votes till +they are equally distributed does not make all the successful candidates +equally popular! On the contrary, it is very desirable to know which +candidates are most in favour with each party. + ++Ballot Papers Must be Brought Together for Counting.+--This is a +practical objection to the Hare system, which puts it out of court for +large electorates. If the whole of Victoria were constituted one +electorate, as at the Federal Convention election, the transference of +votes could not be commenced till all the ballot papers had come in from +the remote parts of the colony, two or three weeks after the election. +On this point Professor Nanson writes:--"In an actual election in +Victoria this 'first state of the poll' could be arrived at with the +same rapidity as was the result of the recent poll on the Commonwealth +Bill. In both cases but one fact is to be gleaned from each voting +paper. The results from all parts of the colony would be posted in +Collins-street on election day. These results would show exactly how the +cat was going to jump. The final results as regards parties would be +obvious to all observers, although the result as regards individual +candidates would be far from clear. But this, although of vast +importance to the candidates themselves, would be a matter of small +concern to the great mass of the people." These remarks are based on the +assumption that the electors vote on strictly party lines, which a +reference to Tasmanian returns will show is not usually the case. Few +will be disposed to agree that a knowledge of the successful candidates +is a matter of small moment. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[7] _Hobart Mercury_ + + + + +CHAPTER VII. + +FREE LIST SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL DELEGATION. + + +The _Liste Libre_, or Free List system, is a far simpler and more +practical method of proportional representation than the Hare system. +The distinctive feature is that it applies the proportional principle +not to individual candidates but to parties. But, like the Hare system, +it places no restriction on the number of parties. It is therefore +particularly adapted to the circumstances of the countries on the +Continent of Europe, which, having already a number of strong party +organizations, wish to retain them and to do justice to each. +Accordingly we find that nearly all experiments in proportional +representation to the present time have been confined to those +countries. + +Perhaps the very earliest attempt to apply the proportional principle +was that of Mr. Thomas Gilpin, in a pamphlet, "On the Representation of +Minorities of Electors to act with the Majority in Elected Assemblies," +published at Philadelphia in 1844. He proposed that electorates should +be enlarged, and that each party should nominate a list of candidates +equal to the number required to be elected, and should place them in +order of preference. Each elector could then vote for one of these +lists; and each party would be allotted a number of representatives +proportional to the amount of support it received. The highest on each +list, to the number allotted, would be elected. It will be seen that +this is really a system of double election; for the order of favour of +the candidates of any party would have to be decided before the +nominations were made. + +Only two years afterwards M. Victor Considerant published a similar +scheme at Geneva, Switzerland. Each elector was to vote first for a +party and then for any number of candidates on the party list whom he +preferred. The party votes were to decide the number of members allotted +to each list, and the individual votes the successful candidates. + +The little republic of Switzerland has been the scene of nearly all +subsequent improvement. In 1867 Professor Ernest Naville founded the +_Association Reformiste_ at Geneva to advocate the principle of +proportional representation. In 1871 the Association adopted the _Liste +Libre_ system, invented by M. Borely, of Nimes, France, in which each +elector was to place all the candidates of his party in order of +preference. But as this allows the electors little direct influence on +their own candidates and none outside of them, a combination of the +cumulative vote and the _Liste Libre_ was adopted in 1875. Each elector +was to have as many votes as there were seats to be filled, but he +could not only give them to any candidates on any list, but he could +also give as many votes as he liked to any one candidate. Thus if there +were ten seats to be filled the elector could give ten votes to one +candidate, or one vote to each of ten candidates, or five votes to one +candidate and divide the remaining five among others, and so on. The +only condition necessary was that his votes added up to ten. The +aggregate votes given to all the candidates of each party were then to +be taken as the basis of proportional distribution among the parties and +the highest on each list to the number decided were to be elected. + +It was not till the year 1890 that this scheme was actually put into +practice. The election of 1889 had resulted so unjustly to the Liberal +party in the canton of Ticino that an insurrection broke out. This +forced the hand of the Federal Government, which had to quell the +disturbance, and proportional representation was recommended and +adopted. Several other cantons followed suit, and it is expected that +the whole of Switzerland will soon adopt the reform. + +A modification of this plan has lately been adopted by the Swiss +Association. In this later plan electors can give a single vote only to +individual candidates, but if they do not use all their votes in this +way they may cumulate the balance on any one party list by marking at +the head of the list. Thus if the elector in a ten-seat electorate gives +five votes to individual candidates, and places a mark at the head of +one of the lists, the balance of five votes will count to that list. The +aggregate votes given to individual candidates on any list, plus the +votes placed at the head of the list, will form the basis of +proportional distribution among the lists. This is the plan adopted by +the American Proportional Representation League as most nearly suited to +American habits, and recommended by Professor Commons in his book on +"Proportional Representation." + +Belgium has also quite recently adopted a scheme of proportional +representation. As in Switzerland, its advent was hastened by political +disturbances. The Catholic party, not satisfied with exerting a +preponderating influence in the country districts, wished to obtain also +its proportionate share of representation in the cities, and proposed a +scheme of proportional representation for them only. This caused such +ill feeling that riots took place in the streets of Brussels. Finally, +proportional representation was promised all round, and became law for +both the Chamber of Representatives and the Senate at the latter end of +1899. In Brussels, where there are 18 seats to be filled, a trial +election had already been held in 1893 with satisfactory results. Six +lists were nominated, the largest being that of the Socialists, who +nominated ten candidates; and over 12,000 electors voted. Each elector +was allowed 18 votes, and the methods in which he could distribute them +were somewhat complicated. He might (1) mark at the head of a list, (2) +mark at the head of a list and also opposite one or more candidates on +the same list, (3) mark opposite the names of not more than 18 +candidates on any list. In the first case his 18 votes counted to the +list marked, in the second case one vote was counted to each of the +individual candidates marked and the balance counted for the list; in +the third case one vote was counted to each candidate marked. The +aggregate of votes marked at the head of each list, plus the individual +votes on the list, was then taken as the basis of proportional +distribution. So many of the votes were cumulated on lists that only +about one-fifth of the votes cast were operative in the selection of +candidates. + +In the bill which has recently become law a new method has therefore +been adopted, which gives more power to the party committees, but allows +the electors to modify their choice. For this purpose the party +organization nominates the candidates in order of preference. The +elector may then accept this order by marking at the head of the list, +or he may give his vote to any one candidate on the list. If all the +electors of a party vote in the first way, those nominated highest on +the list, to the number to which the party becomes entitled, are +elected. But if all the electors vote in the second way, those with the +highest single votes are elected. The actual result will usually be a +compromise between the two, and it is evidently the interest of the +party organization to place the candidates in their real order of +favour, in order that the electors may accept the list. For if an +unpopular candidate were placed at the head of the list few would accept +it. + +The first election under this system has just taken place, and the +result was, as expected, to reduce the Clerical representation +considerably. + +In all the above variations of the Free List system the distribution of +seats is effected by dividing the aggregate votes polled by each party +by a unit of representation, but three different methods of determining +this unit are in use. The first is obtained by simply dividing the total +number of votes by the number of seats. + +The objection to this unit is that when there are several parties, part +of the seats only can be allotted on full units, and the rest have to be +allotted to those parties which have the highest remainders or fractions +of a unit, and this unduly favours small parties, who do not poll even a +single unit. The rule to divide the total votes by the number of seats +increased by one, which was first proposed by Mr. H.R. Droop, reduces +slightly the number of seats allotted on remainders, and was adopted by +the canton of Soluthern in 1895. In Belgium a third plan, devised by +Professor D'Hondt, of Brussels, is used, which is designed to prevent +any seats being allotted on remainders. This unit is evidently smaller +than either of the others, and is to be found by trial. It is only +necessary that the sum of the quotients obtained by dividing it into +each of the lists shall be equal to the number of seats to be filled. + +Suppose a five-seat electorate in which 6,000 votes are divided among +four parties, who poll 2,500, 1,850, 900, and 750 votes respectively. +Then if we take one-fifth, or 1,200 votes, as the unit, the result would +be the following:-- + +(1) 2,500 = 2 units of representation + 100 remainder = 2 seats. + +(2) 1,850 = 1 unit of representation + 650 remainder = 1 seat. + +(3) 900 = unit of representation + 900 remainder = 1 seat. + +(4) 750 = unit of representation + 750 remainder = 1 seat. + +If the Droop unit of one-sixth, or 1,000 votes, be used, the result will +be different:-- + +(1) 2,500 = 2 units of representation + 500 remainder = 2 seats. + +(2) 1,850 = 1 unit of representation + 850 remainder = 2 seats. + +(3) 900 = unit of representation + 900 remainder = 1 seat. + +(4) 750 = unit of representation + 750 remainder = seat. + +By the third method any number of votes between 834 and 900 will be +found to comply with Professor D'Hondt's condition, and the result +would, in this instance, be the same as by the Droop method. Although +the highest number was at first used, the lower limit has been adopted +in the new bill. + +In no case can the proportional distribution be considered satisfactory. +If the electorates are small, and the number of parties large, accurate +proportional representation is quite out of the question. In +Switzerland, however, the electorates are made to contain sometimes as +many as 30 seats. The effect of such large electorates must be in time +to encourage the formation of a great number of small factions. At the +same time there is not so much incentive to split up the parties as by +the Hare system. + +Passing now to the selection of party candidates, none of the methods +can be said to ensure the election of those most in general favour. When +electors are allowed to cumulate on individual candidates, the +favourites of sections within the party will be elected. If, on the +other hand, they are allowed to cumulate on party lists, all votes thus +given are ineffective in the selection of the successful candidates. It +may be noted that although the nomination of candidates in lists by +party organizations is less in accordance with the practice of British +countries than the individual candidature of the Hare system, there is +nothing to prevent one candidate being nominated to stand in the place +of a party. + +A word of warning must be added as to the danger of holding up Belgium +and Switzerland as examples of true electoral justice to Australia. The +direct government of the people which Switzerland has adopted bears not +the slightest resemblance to the representative institutions of British +countries. Both the referendum and proportional delegation are suited to +direct government and are destructive to party responsible government. +The Swiss adopted the referendum to save themselves from the lobbying +and plutocratic character of their legislatures. The initiative and +proportional delegation have followed because they are complementary +reforms. The consequence is that the legislators have been degraded to +mere agents for drawing up measures, and leadership has been transferred +to the press. It is the peculiar conditions of Switzerland which enable +it to tolerate unrestrained majority rule. It is a small country, +surrounded by powerful neighbours, whose strength lies in its weakness. +Moreover, the people are very conservative. In Zurich, for instance, +which is largely devoted to manufactures, a proposal to limit the hours +of work in factories to twelve hours a day was rejected by the people. +Nor is direct government proving a success; the tyranny of the majority +is already apparent. The first federal initiative demanded a measure to +prevent the slaughter of animals by bleeding, designed to interfere +with the religious rites of the Jews. Despite the fact that it was +opposed by the Federal Council, as contrary to the right of religious +liberty guaranteed by the Constitution, it was carried by the +referendum. Belgium, again, can hardly be taken as a model of +constitutional liberty. Surely we in Australia do not want the factious +strife of religious, racial, and class sections, which so nearly brought +on a revolution last year. Yet this is exactly what proportional +delegation to sections would bring about. Belgium has a hard task to +reconcile two races so differently constituted as the Walloons and +Flemings, and has been able to avoid instability of the ministry so far +only because the Clerical party, which is mostly Flemish, still has a +majority. The new system has only consecrated the sectional principle, +and will do nothing to restore harmony. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII. + +PREFERENTIAL VOTING, THE BLOCK VOTE, ETC. + + ++Preferential Voting.+--Laplace, the great mathematician, to whom we owe +so much of the theory of probability, showed more than a century ago +that although individual electors may have very different views as to +the relative merits of a number of candidates for any office, still the +expression of the degree of favour in which the candidates are held by +the whole body of electors will be the same if each elector be assumed +to have a uniform gradation of preference. Suppose that there are ten +candidates, and it is required to place them in order of general favour. +Each elector should be required to place the whole ten in the order of +his preference, 1, 2, 3, &c. Let the maximum degree of merit be denoted +by ten marks, so that every first preference will count as ten marks. +Then, although an individual elector might be disposed to give his +second preference only five marks, and the rest of his preferences, say, +two marks, Laplace demonstrated that it is most probable that the total +result would be the same if each elector be assumed to give his second +preference nine marks, his third preference eight marks, and so on. +Therefore, if all first preferences be multiplied by ten, second +preferences by nine, and so on in regular order down to last preferences +multiplied by one, the total number of marks will be an index of the +order in general favour. If there is one office to be filled, the +candidate with the highest number of marks should be elected; if there +are two offices, the two highest candidates, and so on. + +But the assumed condition must be rigidly complied with; each elector +must express his honest preferences. Whether he will do so or not +depends upon the circumstances. Laplace recognized this element of human +nature, and declared that if electors are swayed by other considerations +independent of the merit of the candidates the system would not apply. +For instance, if the candidates are the nominees of a number of +independent sections, each of which is anxious only to secure the return +of its own candidate, and to defeat those who stand most in his way, the +tendency will be general to place the more popular candidates, those +whose success is most feared, at the bottom of the list, so as to give +them as few marks as possible. The result would be to favour mediocre +men, or even in extreme cases the most inferior. + +Practically, therefore, the system is not applicable where any of the +electors are personally interested in the result. If a number of judges +were called on to decide the relative merits of several essays or prize +designs, and the competitors' names were not known to them, the system +might be used. But even in such a case a simpler method is available; +for, although it may be difficult to pick out the best, it is generally +easy to agree upon the worst. It is usual, then, to gradually eliminate +the worst, and when the number is reduced to two to take the decision of +the majority. + +This process of elimination may be, however, combined with the +preferential system, and the result is more accurate than if one count +only be made. At the first count the candidate with the fewest marks +would be eliminated and his name struck out on all the papers. All those +under him on each paper would then go up one point in order of favour, +and further counts would be held, eliminating the lowest candidate each +time till the candidates were reduced to the number desired. This method +is very complicated, and involves a great amount of trouble. + +Consider now the case of a voluntary association of individuals, such as +a club or society; and suppose that it is required to elect a president +or committee. The condition is clearly that he or they should be most in +general favour with all the members; and the question whether +Preferential Voting is applicable will depend on how united the members +are. Now, clubs are not usually, nor should they be, divided into +cliques or parties; indeed, if a serious split does take place it +generally results in the resignation of part of the club and the +formation of a separate organization. But in a live club it is +impossible to prevent slight differences of opinion; and an +officer-bearer who has the interests of the club at heart must often +offend small sections who want to exert undue influence. In an election +for president this office-bearer would stand no chance of election if +there are several candidates and any small section likes to put him at +the bottom of the list, so as to give him as many bad marks as possible. +This is the weak point in Preferential Voting; any small section can +ensure the rejection of a general favourite. The greater the number of +candidates the smaller the minority which is able to do this; dummy +candidates may therefore be introduced to make it more certain. The risk +would, however, be very much lessened if the process of gradual +elimination we have described were adopted. + +When we come to the election of representatives to a legislature it is +evident at once that Preferential Voting is not applicable at all. We +have shown that the true condition required is not the return of +candidates most in general favour with both parties, but the return of +the candidates most in general favour with each party separately. +Preferential Voting would therefore only be applicable if the electors +of each party voted separately for its own candidates; and even then it +would be open to the objection we have already urged. If it were applied +to the two parties voting together the electors would certainly not be +influenced only by the merit of the candidates. They might record their +honest preferences as regards the candidates of their own party, but +they would naturally place the candidates of the opposing party in +inverse order of merit. The candidates most in general favour would be +those who represented neither party. Suppose there are three candidates +for a single seat, two representing large parties of 49 per cent, each, +and the third a small party of 2 per cent. The electors of the large +parties would be more afraid of one another than of the small party, and +would give their second preferences to its candidate. This candidate, +representing one-fiftieth of the electors, would then actually be +elected; he would receive 202 marks, and neither of the others could +possibly secure more than 200. Moreover, he would still be elected if +the process of elimination were adopted, since on the second count he +would beat either of the other candidates separately by 51 votes to 49. + +These plain facts are indisputable. What is to be thought, then, of the +claim made by Professor Nanson that Preferential Voting, with the +process of elimination, is the most perfect system known for +single-membered electorates. + ++The Block Vote.+--The Block Vote, General Ticket, or _scrutin de +liste_, is in general use when there is more than one seat to be filled. +Each elector has as many votes as there are members to be elected, and +the highest on the list, to the number of representatives required, are +successful. Dealing first with elections to a legislative body, the +system is eminently unjust to parties. A rigid control of nominations is +necessary in the first place, because any party which splits up its +votes spoils its chance. Each party will therefore nominate only as many +candidates as there are seats, and the stronger of two parties, or the +strongest of a number of parties, will elect the entire list. A minority +might in the latter case secure all the representation, but the +practical effect of the Block Vote is to force the electors to group +themselves into two parties only. It therefore has the same beneficial +effect as the single electorate of confining representation to the two +main parties. This is apparently nob recognized by Professor Nanson, who +writes, in his pamphlet on the Hare system:--"Contrast with this the +results of the Block system. With strict party voting, which has been +assumed throughout, each of the five parties would put forward seven +candidates. The seven seats would all be secured by Form, with 44 votes +out of a total of 125, and the remaining 81, or more than two-thirds of +the voters, would be wholly unrepresented." Does the Professor really +think that the 81 (who, by the way, are _less_ than two-thirds) would be +so foolish as not to combine and secure all the seats? + +The exclusion of the minority in a single-membered electorate excites +only a feeling of hopelessness, but when it fails to secure a single +representative in an electorate returning several members, a spirit of +rankling injustice is aroused. The Block Vote has, therefore, never been +tolerated for long in large electorates. In the early history of the +United States many of the States adopted it, and sent to Congress a +solid delegation of one party or the other. This proved so unjust, and +operated so adversely to the federal spirit in promoting combinations of +States, that Congress, in 1842, made the single-membered electorate +obligatory on all the States. + +In France it was adopted at the election for the Chamber of Deputies in +1885. The result as regards parties was about as good as with the single +electorate system. The Republicans and Conservative-Monarchists, whose +numbers entitled them to 311 and 257 seats respectively, actually +secured 366 and 202. But it was abandoned after a trial at this one +election. + +The Block Vote was adopted in Australia for the election of ten +delegates from each colony to the Federal Convention. This was a work in +which all parties might fairly have joined together; and in most +colonies the people did select the best men, regardless of party. In +Victoria, however, the newspapers took on the _role_ of the "machine," +and the ten candidates nominated by the _Age_ were elected. Many of the +supporters of the defeated candidates voted for some on the successful +list who just defeated their own favourites. Had this been foreseen they +would have thrown away these votes by giving them to those sure to be +elected or to those least likely to be elected. The injustice of forcing +each elector to vote for the whole ten is thus brought home. We are now +threatened with the adoption of the Block Vote for the Federal Senate, +and in some of the States for the House of Representatives as well; and +it is in the hope of preventing this wrong that the present book is +written. + +So far we have been considering the Block Vote as applied to the +election of a legislature with two or more parties; we now propose to +consider it as applied to one party only. It is a matter of common +knowledge that the Block Vote, when used for such an election as that of +the committee of a club, works very well, and results in the return of +the candidates most in general favour with all sections. The reason is, +of course, that all sections work together, and members vote for the +best men, regardless of sectional lines. We will go further and say that +the Block Vote is by far the best method for such purposes, and is +superior even to Preferential Voting. In the first place it is free from +the defect that a small section can ensure the rejection of a general +favourite; and in the second place it rests on at least as secure a +theoretical basis. To fix our ideas, suppose there are ten candidates +for five members of a committee. Laplace assumed (1) that each member +would have a knowledge of the merits of all the ten candidates, (2) that +his estimate of the respective candidates would vary arbitrarily +between nothing and a maximum degree of merit, (3) that each member +would express his honest preferences. The Block Vote, on the other hand, +assumes (1) that each member can pick out the five best candidates, and +therefore express his opinion as to how the committee should be +constituted, (2) that he will be inclined to place these five candidates +on one plane of favour and the other five on one plane of non-favour. We +submit that the latter assumptions agree more closely with the actual +state of affairs. The members can distinguish between candidates who +have merit and those who have no merit or of whose merit they are +ignorant; to force them, therefore, to place all the candidates in order +of preference is to make them express preferences where none exist.[8] +On the whole, then, the Block Vote is more likely to place the +candidates in their real order of favour. + +But some reservation must be made. The Block Vote works best when the +number of candidates does not exceed two or three times the number of +vacancies. Suppose, first, that the candidates present in the final +result a fairly regular order of favour from lowest to highest. Each of +the successful candidates will then be supported by at least an absolute +majority of the members, providing the number of candidates be not +greater than twice the number of vacancies. But if there are four or +five times as many candidates as vacancies, none of the successful +candidates will have the support of a majority of the members. On the +other hand, however, the candidates do not usually present a regular +order of favour from lowest to highest when there are a large number of +candidates, for there may be a long "tail" of candidates who receive +very few votes. The following general rule may therefore be laid +down:--The Block Vote works best when the total votes given to rejected +candidates do not exceed the total votes given to successful candidates. + +The difficulties indicated above were met by the Australian Natives' +Association by a plan which provided that no candidate should be elected +except by an absolute majority of the voters. The Block Vote is used +throughout; and if at the first ballot the required number of candidates +do not obtain an absolute majority a second ballot is held, from which +those at the bottom of the poll and those who have been elected are +eliminated. This process is continued till all the vacancies are filled. +Four or five ballots are sometimes required, and the proceedings become +very irksome. A sub-committee was recently appointed to investigate the +subject, and reported in favour of the Preferential System with one +count only. The process of elimination was considered too complicated to +be practicable. Now, the conditions presented by these elections, in +which a very large number of candidates are generally nominated, are +precisely those in which Preferential Voting lends itself most easily to +abuse. An insignificant minority may defeat a candidate who should be +elected, by placing him at the bottom of their lists. + +A variation of the Block Vote may be suggested which is much simpler and +better. The preferential ballot papers should be used, and two counts +should be made. At the first count the primary half of the preferences +should be counted as effective votes, and the candidates should be +reduced to twice the number of vacancies. A second count should then be +made of the ballot papers, using the Block Vote. All or nearly all the +candidates would then obtain an absolute majority, and it is practically +impossible that any candidate should be eliminated by the first count +who would have had any chance of election in the second. + +This plan is far superior to the original method. It is right that +members who vote for candidates who are hopelessly out of it should be +allowed to transfer their votes; but it is not right that members who +first help to elect some candidates at one ballot should have the same +voting power as others at subsequent ballots. + +The Hare system is sometimes advocated for clubs on account of its +supposed just principle. Any live club which adopts it runs the risk of +disruption. It merely encourages the formation of cliques and sections; +any slight split would be accentuated and rendered permanent. + ++The Limited Vote.+--The injustice of the Block Vote led to the +introduction of the Limited Vote, which allows the minority some share +of the representation. We have seen that the Block Vote forces each +party to try to return all the representation, and of course one party +only can succeed. But if neither party be forced to try to return more +than it is entitled to each party will get its correct share of +representation, providing both parties are equally organized. This leads +to the Limited Vote, in which each elector has a number of votes +somewhat less than the number of seats. + +The Limited Vote was used in England for a number of three-seat +electorates, which were created by the Reform Bill of 1867, each elector +being allowed to vote for two candidates only. By this means the +majority would usually return two candidates and the minority one. Thus +the Limited Vote has the same advantage as the Block Vote and the single +electorate system, that it tends to confine representation to the two +main parties, but it creates an artificial proportion of representation +between them. Moreover, it renders strict party organization even more +necessary, since each party must arrange to use its voting resources to +the best advantage. Consider the three-seat electorate, for instance. +The minority will, if it is wise, nominate two candidates only; and the +majority may nominate either two or three. But if the majority does +divide its votes among three candidates it runs the risk of securing one +only. It can do so safely when two conditions are fulfilled: first, it +must be sure of polling more than three-fifths of the votes; and, +second, it must arrange to distribute all its votes equally among the +three candidates. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the +Limited Vote was responsible for introducing "machine" tactics into +England. In Birmingham, when Mr. Joseph Chamberlain organized the +Liberals and succeeded in carrying all three seats, the electors in each +ward were directed how to vote so that as few votes as possible might be +wasted. These three-cornered constituencies were abolished by the +_Redistribution Act_ of 1884; and Sir John Lubbock, reviewing the +experiment, declared--"On the whole, it cannot be denied that under the +Limited Vote the views of the electors have been fairly represented." + +The system has also been tried to a smaller extent in the United States. +In New York 32 of the delegates to a constitutional convention were +elected from the State polled as one electorate, each elector being +allowed to vote for 16 candidates. Both parties were afraid to split +their votes, and the result was that each returned 16. The rest of the +delegates were elected in single-membered electorates, and of these the +Republicans secured 81 and the Democrats 47. It might here be pointed +out that the Republicans might have secured more than 16 of the +delegates from the State at large if they had nominated 20 candidates +and allowed the laws of chance to regulate their organization. Each +elector might have been directed to put the twenty names into his hat, +and to reject the first four he pulled out. The same evil is apparent in +Boston, where twelve aldermen are elected at large, each elector being +allowed seven votes. Each party nominates seven candidates only; and the +majority invariably elects seven and the minority five. + +The Limited Vote is therefore not a satisfactory solution of the problem +of representation. It gives an artificial instead of proportional +representation, and it necessitates strict party organization and +control of nominations. At the same time it will generally give a very +fair representation if parties are not strictly organized, and might +well have been adopted for the Federal Convention, five or six votes +being allowed instead of ten. Newspaper domination would thus have been +prevented. + ++Election of the Candidate Most in General Favour.+--It is often +required to ascertain the candidate most in general favour where one +party only is concerned, such as an election for leader of the +Opposition or president of a club; and the methods in general use are +very defective. We do not refer to the theoretical difficulty, which +perplexes some persons, of giving effect to the actual degree of favour +in which the candidates stand in the electors' minds, but to the simple +problem of finding out who is preferred most by the bulk of the +electors. Thus it is universally recognised that when two candidates +stand the candidate who has the support of an absolute majority of the +electors is entitled to election. Yet it is possible that the rejected +candidate may be nearly twice as popular. This might happen if the +majority held that there was little to choose between the two +candidates, while the minority thought they could not be compared. But +it is quite evident that such distinctions cannot be recognized; the +candidate who is preferred by an absolute majority must be elected. It +is when there are more than two candidates that the difficulty arises. +To elect the candidate who has most first preferences is open to very +serious objection; he may have a small minority of the total votes, and +each of the other candidates might be able to beat him single-handed. + +The best way to overcome the difficulty is undoubtedly by some process +of gradually eliminating the least popular candidates till the number is +reduced to two; the candidate with the absolute majority is then +elected. We propose to consider the different ways in which elimination +might be made. We assume, in the first place, that each elector has cast +an advance vote--_i.e._, that he has placed all the candidates in order +of preference. The most primitive method is to eliminate at each +successive count the candidate who has least first preferences. This is +the method adopted in the Hare system, and we have already shown that +it is very defective; in fact, it is no improvement at all. The +eliminated candidate might be most in general favour, and might be able +to beat each of the other candidates single-handed. A second method is +to use Preferential Voting to decide which candidate should be +eliminated at each successive count. This is far superior, but it is +extremely complicated, and is open to the objection that when there are +a large number of candidates a small section may cause the rejection of +the general favourite. We propose to describe a method based on the +Block Vote which is much simpler, and which does not lend itself to +abuse. We have shown that the Block Vote works best when the candidates +can be divided into two equal sections of favour and non-favour. Suppose +there are four candidates, the first two preferences should therefore be +counted as effective votes, instead of the first preference only. The +eliminated candidate will then be the least in general favour. A second +count is then made of the three candidates left, and the first +preferences and half of the second preferences are counted as effective, +and the lowest again eliminated. The candidate who has an absolute +majority is then elected. The method may be indefinitely extended; if +there are five candidates the first two preferences and one-half of the +third preferences are counted, and so on. But when there are a great +many candidates more than one might be eliminated. Any number up to +eight could be safely reduced to four at the first count. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[8] The bracket principle introduced by Professor Nanson into the Hare +system involves a partial recognition of this fact. + + + + +CHAPTER IX. + +ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE THE PRESENT SYSTEM. + + ++The Double Election.+--In the preceding chapter we have strongly +insisted that the different methods considered for ensuring the return +of the candidate acceptable to all sections are not applicable to the +election of legislators. The true principles of political representation +require, not the election of the candidate most in general favour with +both parties, but the election by each party separately of its own most +favoured candidates. But as it is impossible for both parties to be +represented in a single-membered electorate, the best alternative is +that both should contest the seat and one be represented. The present +system of election has largely tended to realize this alternative, +especially in those countries in which party government was strong, such +as England and the United States; and representation has in consequence +been confined to the two main parties. In England, where the party +system was gradually developed, this result was attained without any +rigid control of nominations, because the true party spirit prevailed +and personal ambition was subordinated to political principle; and in +the United States it was only brought about at the cost of "machine" +control of nominations. But on the Continent of Europe, where party +government was transplanted from England, it has never really taken +root. Each small group nominated its own candidates, and the successful +candidate represented only a plurality, and not a majority, of the +electors. Instead of a contest between two organized parties there was a +scramble among numerous factions. + +In France, Belgium, Italy, and Germany an attempt has been made to check +this evil by the double election. If at the first election no candidate +secures an absolute majority of the votes, a second election is held, +for which only the two candidates who head the poll at the first +election are allowed to compete. One must then get an absolute majority. +The double election has undoubtedly tended to prevent a further +splitting up into groups, but the Continental countries offer such poor +soil for the growth of party government that it has only restricted the +contest to two factions in each electorate; and, of course, the dominant +factions are not the same in the various electorates. + ++The Advance Vote.+--In Australia the same evil has become increasingly +evident, and it is now no uncommon thing for a candidate to be elected +by less than one-third or one-quarter of the total votes. In Queensland +a plan has been introduced to meet the evil, under the name of the +Advance Vote, which is designed to secure the advantages of the French +plan without the trouble and expense of a second election. The electors +simply declare in advance at the first election how they would vote at +the second election. All that is necessary is that they place the +candidates in order of preference, 1, 2, 3, 4, &c. Then, instead of +holding a second election between the two who have the greatest number +of first preferences, it is merely necessary for the returning officer +to consult each ballot paper and see which of these two candidates is +higher in order of favour. Thus if one is marked 3 and the other 4, the +vote is counted to the candidate marked 3. This device is assumed to +give exactly the same result as the French plan, providing only that the +same electors vote at both elections, and do not change their views +between the two elections. + +But in reality it possesses hardly any of the advantages of the French +plan. It is another instance of the danger of neglecting the factor of +human nature. The French do not go to the trouble and expense of a +second election for nothing. Their plan is far the better. First of all, +consider the candidates. They know well beforehand that unless one of +them gets an absolute majority of the votes at the first election they +will be put to the expense and delay of a second election, therefore it +is to their interest that the number of candidates be restricted. This +tends to keep down the representation to two sections. Next, consider +the electors. They know also that unless they give a majority of votes +to one of the candidates they will be put to the trouble of voting a +second time, therefore they will take good care the votes are not split +up, even if the candidates wanted it. What is the result? Simply that in +the vast majority of cases one of the candidates gets a majority at the +first election, and no second election is necessary; and, most important +of all, the tendency to split up is counteracted. + +Now take the Queensland system. None of these checks operate. The +splitting up into groups is actually encouraged, and it is to the +interest of each group to see as many more groups as possible formed, in +order to increase its own relative importance, for the delegates of the +two strongest groups have a chance of election instead of the strongest +group only. + +In practice the plan threatens to break down, owing to a practical point +being overlooked. It is evident that the success of the Advance Vote +depends on the electors marking all the preferences. The ballot paper +should be made informal unless all the preferences are given. In +Queensland this has not been done, and the consequence is that a large +proportion of the electors refuse to give more than one preference. No +more conclusive evidence is needed that the scheme has promoted the +growth of factions. These electors voluntarily disfranchise themselves +rather than vote for any of the other candidates, and of course the very +object of the scheme is defeated; the successful candidate cannot secure +a majority of the votes cast. + ++The Exhaustive Ballot.+--A bill has just been introduced into the +Legislative Assembly of Victoria, providing for a further extension of +the principle of the Advance Vote. The plan is favoured by Professor +Nanson, and professes to be an improvement on the Queensland plan, +although it is only an "instalment of reform" in view of the ultimate +adoption of the more perfect Preferential Voting. The Queensland plan is +objected to because all but the two highest candidates are thrown out. +Suppose, for instance, two candidates stand for the weaker party and +three for the stronger party, it is quite likely that all the candidates +of the stronger party will be thrown out. Therefore the lowest candidate +only of the five should be thrown out. All his papers should be +transferred to the candidate who is marked 2 on them; and those below +him on all the papers should go up one point in order of favour. If he +stood 3 on a paper, the candidate who was 4 would now become 3. Another +count of first preferences should then be made, and the lowest again +thrown out; and so on till one candidate gets an absolute majority. It +is pointed out triumphantly that this plan, which is known as the +Exhaustive Ballot, actually saves in this instance all the trouble and +expense of no less than three separate elections. The process of +elimination is the same as that adopted in the Hare system, and is +little, if at all, better than the Queensland plan in securing the +election of the right candidate, while as regards the formation of +groups it is worse. For this plan actually encourages the groups to +split up, since if one candidate nominated by a group is thrown out his +vote will be transferred to the others. Therefore the double election is +much better than either form of the Advance Vote. They would do nothing +towards restoring the one redeeming merit of the single electorate, of +confining representation to the two main parties. And all other +mathematical schemes founded on the _a priori_ assumption that the +candidate most favoured by all sections is entitled to the seat are just +as objectionable. + +The conclusion that must be reached from all these considerations is +that, except when there is a single candidate standing in the interests +of each of the two main parties, it is impossible to say with the +present system who ought to be elected. The difficulty is one of +fundamental principle. The only way to do justice to both parties is to +enlarge the electorates so that each can get its proportionate share of +representation, and then to provide such machinery as will allow each +party separately to elect its most favoured candidates. In no other way +can the people be induced to organize into two coherent parties. + + + + +CHAPTER X. + +APPLICATION OF THE REFORM TO AUSTRALIAN LEGISLATURES. + + ++Federal Legislatures.+--The keynote of the Australian Federal +Constitution, as expressed in the Commonwealth Bill, is full and +unreserved trust in the people. This is in direct contrast with the +American Constitution, which seeks to place checks on the people by +dividing power among the President, the Senate, and the House of +Representatives, and assigning to each separate functions. Do we fully +realize the dangers as well as the glorious possibilities of unfettered +action? Do we sufficiently feel the weight of the responsibility we have +undertaken? In reality we have declared to the world the fitness of the +Australian democracy to work a Constitution from which the most advanced +of the other nations would shrink! We do not hesitate to avow our firm +belief that there is only one thing that can save the situation. Unless +Australia is to show to the world a warning instead of an example, all +her energies must be bent on the formation of two coherent organized +parties, dividing each State on national issues, and competing for the +support of all classes and all interests in every electorate throughout +the Commonwealth. + +That is the lesson we have endeavoured to inculcate throughout this +book, and we are tempted to quote in support of it the opinion of an +American author, Professor Paul S. Reinsch, in a work just published on +"World Politics." He says:-- + + The political experience of the last two centuries has proved that + free government and party government are almost convertible terms. + It is still as true as when Burke wrote his famous defence of + party, in his _Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents_, + that, for the realization of political freedom, the organization of + the electorate into regular and permanent parties is necessary. + Parliamentary government has attained its highest success only in + those countries where political power is held alternately by two + great national parties. As soon as factional interests become + predominant; as soon as the stability of government depends upon + the artificial grouping of minor conflicting interests; as soon as + the nation lacks the tonic effect of the mutual criticisms of great + organizations, the highest form of free government becomes + unattainable. (pp. 327, 328.) + +The greatest strain on the Constitution will probably be felt at the +outset. Both people and politicians are suddenly called upon to rise to +a higher plane of political thought and action. The idea that each State +is to send representatives to fight for its own interests must first be +got rid of. The only way in which all interests can be reconciled is by +each State acting through the national parties. The greatest danger +which assails the Commonwealth is the risk of combinations of States +dominating party lines; and it is the more imminent that divergent +opinions between the larger and the smaller States were already apparent +at the Convention. The four smaller States, Western Australia, South +Australia, Queensland, and Tasmania, with about one-third of the +population, will have two-thirds of the representation in the Senate; +while the two large States, Victoria and New South Wales, will have +about two-thirds of the representation in the House of Representatives. +At the Convention the fear was expressed that the former, representing a +majority of the States, and the latter, representing a majority of the +people, might come into conflict, and that a deadlock would ensue. It +was on this issue that the great struggle at the Convention took place, +resulting in the adoption of a double dissolution and a subsequent joint +sitting of the two Houses if necessary. By this machinery all disputes +will be finally settled. But what will happen if some of the States +consider themselves unjustly treated? Even apart from conflicts between +the two Houses, if only one State stood aloof from the main parties it +could paralyze government, just as Ireland did in the Imperial +Parliament. It is evident, then, that the very existence of the Union is +bound up in the immediate formation of national parties. + +In the United States this lesson was not learned till the Civil War had +demonstrated the danger of combinations of States. Since then two great +parties have been maintained, even though their existence involves the +spoils system and machine organization. In Switzerland, too, the federal +tie was not drawn close till after the revolution in 1847, in which the +Catholic cantons attempted to secede. + +Unfortunately, another cause of dissension menaces the Commonwealth. We +allude to the class representation which we have already animadverted +upon. The separate representation of sections or classes within the +States is just as much to be dreaded as the separate representation of +States, and bodes as much ill. It seems not unlikely that the fate of +the first Federal ministry will be in the hands of the Labour party, +which will be able to dictate its policy. It is utterly inconsistent +with the democratic theory that a small minority should have this power; +and it is to be hoped that in the wider field of federal politics its +true character will be recognized. It is only by the mutual action of +two great national parties that the true direction of progress, favoured +by the people, can be worked out; a small minority studying only its own +interests is sure to be a bad guide. A steady pressure maintained +through the two national parties will ensure the recognition of all just +demands; such extreme and ill-considered demands as that for the +initiative and national referendum can only provoke opposition and cause +reaction. Even those who sympathize with the ultimate objects of the +Labour unions must see the folly of their present unpatriotic and +suicidal tactics. + +It is a matter for hope that in the wider sphere of federal politics the +irresponsible leadership of the press is not likely to be the power for +harm that it is in some of the individual States at present. But while +it may not dominate the Federal Parliament as a whole to the same +extent, its control over nominations in the States will be quite as +great, and immeasurably greater if the Block Vote is adopted. Nor are +signs wanting of a union of some of the larger newspaper ventures in the +principal States, with a view to increase their power. + +Such is a brief review of the outlook. The great requisites essential +for progress are the organization of two national parties and +responsible leadership in the Federal Parliament. The dangers to the +Commonwealth may be summed up under the two heads of lack of +organization and irresponsible leadership outside Parliament. Is it +possible that the dangers may be avoided and the requisites secured by a +change in electoral machinery? Those who have no conception of the +working of social forces, and who do not trace the law of causation into +the realm of mind, will be inclined to scoff at the suggestion. To them +the only hope of improvement lies in appealing to the people to elect +better men. They ignore entirely the reciprocal relation of the +Parliament and the people, and while recognizing the influence of the +people on the character of Parliament, they deny the influence of +Parliament on the character of the people. They declare that the people +are "free agents" and will have better government when they make up +their minds to get it; and no electoral machinery or parliamentary +machinery can influence the result. Such is the passive attitude which +consciously or unconsciously is almost universally assumed. Yet who can +study the history of the British Constitution without being impressed +with the fact that every step in the evolution of its machinery was a +true sociological invention and had the effect of directing the people's +will, which is the motive force, into channels conducive to the general +welfare? Take away the responsible leadership of the Cabinet in the +British Parliament, and it would become a sink of corruption like the +United States Congress; take away its organization into two national +parties, and it would become a rabble like the French Chambers. Now, is +not the electoral machinery the connecting link between the people and +Parliament, and therefore a vital part in the machinery of government? +Does it not actually decide the constitution of Parliament? If this be +granted, it follows that unless the electoral machinery be adapted to +give effect to these two great principles, parliaments will inevitably +decline; and that the present method of election is a very inadequate +means of giving effect to them few will deny. + +Our claim for the application of the electoral reform set forth in the +preceding pages rests simply on the fact that it will give effect to +these principles under conditions in which the present system would +fail. We press especially for its application to the Federal House of +Representatives, which will be the most important Australian +representative assembly; for it it there that organization and +responsible leadership are most urgently needed. That they will not be +obtained if the present schemes of dividing the States into +single-membered electorates are adopted is morally certain; and the +result can only be disaster and bitter disappointment. If the +mathematical devices described in the last chapter are added, the +disorganization will be still more complete. And as for the scheme for +allowing separate delegation to a number of sections, which is advocated +under the name of the Hare system, it would be absolutely fatal. Who can +believe that if Mr. Hare's wild scheme to divide the British people into +several hundred sections had been adopted 40 years ago the Imperial +Parliament would now be an organized assembly? + +Take the conditions presented by the first elections for the Federal +Parliament, to be held early next year. In some respects it is fortunate +that a definite issue is available as a basis of party organization; for +there is a general consensus of opinion that all other considerations +must be subordinated to a pronouncement on the tariff issue. In an +article on "The Liberal Outlook" in _United Australia_, the Hon. Alfred +Deakin writes:--"By the very circumstances of the case the tariff issue +cannot but dominate the first election, and determine the fate of the +first ministry of the Commonwealth. There will be no time for second +thoughts or for suspense of judgment. The first choice of the people +will be final on this head. The first Parliament must be either +Protectionist or anti-Protectionist, and its first great work an +Australian tariff. That is the clear-cut issue. The risk is that a +proportion of the representatives may be returned upon other grounds, as +the electors as a whole may not realize all that is at stake or make the +necessary sacrifices of opinions and preferences to express themselves +emphatically on this point." Now, the only way to avoid the risk +indicated is to take this one definite issue as the basis of +proportional representation. Each State should be divided on it, and +should elect its proportional number of Freetrade and Protectionist +representatives. Tasmania and Western Australia could conveniently be +polled for this purpose each as one electorate; South Australia might be +divided into two electorates, Queensland into three, and Victoria and +New South Wales into four or five. + +It is very desirable that the first election be contested on definite +policies advanced by the prospective party leaders; the suggestion that +the first ministry should be merely a provisional ministry, to act till +the first responsible ministry is formed after the election, is +therefore open to serious objection. The leader of the Freetrade party +or the leader of the Protectionist party should be chosen as first +Federal Premier, and the first election should decide which policy is to +be adopted. + +Contrast this scheme with the proposals now under consideration. In +Victoria, New South Wales, and Queensland bills have been introduced +dividing the States into single-membered electorates, and some of the +smaller States are inclined to use the Block Vote. In Victoria a bad +precedent has been established by giving the party in power the duty of +determining boundaries. From time to time it will be necessary to +rearrange the boundaries, not only on account of movements of population +within the State, but also because the number of representatives which +the State is entitled to will vary. Look forward to the time when the +State becomes entitled to one more representative; every one of the 23 +electorates, in which vested interests will have been created, will have +to be altered These are precisely the conditions which have led to the +growth of the gerrymander in the United States. + +Already the first scheme submitted to the Assembly has been defeated by +a combination of country members, who held that Melbourne was allotted a +larger share of representation than it now has in the local Parliament. +Whatever may be the arguments by which the disparity between the size +of town and country electorates be supported in local affairs, surely +they cannot apply where national issues only are at stake. The principle +of equal electorates is recognized in the Commonwealth Bill by the rules +for allotting representation to the States. Why not, then, for the +divisions of each State? It is said that a larger proportion of the +electors vote in the town, but it is not those only who vote who are +represented. + +In dividing a State into electorates for the purpose of the reform, the +number of electors in each division should therefore form the basis of +proportional distribution. The unit of representation would be the total +number of electors in the State divided by the number of seats. One +representative would be allowed to each division of the State for each +unit of representation, and the remaining seats, if any, would go to +those divisions with the largest remainders. + +Coming now to the Federal Senate, the bill provides that every State, +except Queensland, must be polled as one electorate for the election of +six senators at the first election and in case of a double dissolution; +at intermediate elections three senators only will be elected, as they +retire in rotation. This equal representation of the States might be +taken to imply that the Senate is intended to represent State rights, +and the provision that each State is to be polled as one electorate +would seem to support that view. On the other hand, the senators are not +required to vote according to States, for it is provided that "each +senator shall have one vote;" the vote of a State may therefore be +neutralized by its representatives. And again, the Senate is to be +elected directly by the people and not by the State legislatures, as at +first proposed. To some extent, therefore, the Federal Senate as now +constituted presents a new problem in representation, on which it is not +advisable to dogmatize. Personal considerations will probably have more +weight than in the selection of representatives; but when we reflect +that it is really little more than a revising assembly, elected by the +same voters as the House of Representatives to deal with the same +questions, and having no special functions of its own, the conclusion +seems irresistible that the election must be contested by the same +national parties, and that the same method of election should be +adopted. + +Until the Parliament of the Commonwealth prescribes a uniform method of +choosing senators, the duty is to be left to the State parliaments; and +it is to be regretted that the States have taken no steps to secure +uniform action at the first election. In Victoria a fierce newspaper +contest is being waged over the Block Vote and the Hare system, and the +arguments, being mutually destructive, only go to prove that both are +equally objectionable. The _Age_ naturally wishes to have the privilege +of electing six senators as it did ten delegates to the Federal +Convention, and contends that the majority should elect all the +senators; the _Argus_ rushes to the other extreme in declaring that six +separate minorities ought to be represented, and ignores the risk that +these minorities would be formed on a class or religious basis. The +middle position advocated in this book--namely, that majority and +minority should each return its proportional share of representation--is +free from the objections to both these extreme views. + ++State Legislatures.+--Even after federation the State Houses will still +continue to touch at most points the daily lives of the people; they +will merely be shorn of some of their powers and drained of some of +their best leaders. The fiscal issue, which has had great influence in +deciding party lines in the past, will be removed from the arena of +strife, leaving no other than an indefinite line of division into +Liberals and Conservatives, which in practice tends to become a division +into lower and upper classes. This is the danger ahead; and it can only +be avoided by the formation of strong party organizations appealing to +all classes to work together for the general welfare. Party government +is just as necessary in State politics as in national politics. + +The present position is intolerable; the disintegration of parties is so +complete that there is not a responsible ministry in Australia worthy of +the name. Among the causes which have led to this deplorable state of +affairs the present method of election is undoubtedly the most potent; +it frequently happens that four or five candidates, representing as +many groups, contest a single seat. In Victoria, where the state of +chaos is perhaps worst, the influence of the press, the existence of a +strong Labour section in the Lower House, and the class character of the +Upper House, representing property and capital, have been the principal +contributing causes. + +With the advent of federation a revision of the State constitution is +widely demanded, and is likely to be conceded. One of the first steps +necessary to restore harmony must be reform of the Upper House by a +gradual extension of the franchise and a lowering of the qualification, +so as to ensure that elections are freely contested; it is its present +unrepresentative character which gives force to the appeals of the +radical press and intensifies class divisions. + +The relation of State parties to the national parties is an important +subject. In the article from which we have already quoted, in _United +Australia_, Mr. Deakin writes:--"There cannot be a series of Liberal +parties, one Federal and the others in the States, each going its own +way. There must be but one party, with one programme, to which effect +will require to be given continuously in both the States and the +Commonwealth." He therefore deplores that the Liberal party, together +with its "left wing," the Labour class, will be split on the fiscal +issue. "It is this apparently unavoidable rupture in the party," he +declares, "which endangers its prospects and presents an opportunity to +the Conservative classes of either seizing or sharing an authority to +which they could not otherwise aspire." If this means that the "Liberal" +and Labour classes are entitled by reason of their numbers to a +perpetual lease of power in both domains, there can be no more dangerous +doctrine. Parties should be decided by questions of progress and +financial policy, and not on class lines; and since the State and +Federal legislatures have separate spheres of action, parties should be +separate also, unless, indeed, they are to be founded on corruption, as +in the United States, where the same two parties control not only +national and State politics, but city government also. + +In the consolidation of public opinion into two definite lines of policy +based on the questions to be dealt with lies the only hope, then, of the +progress of the individual States within their own range; and in +promoting this desirable result the reform advocated in these pages +finds its true application. + + + + +CHAPTER XI. + +THE CONDITIONS OF SOCIAL PROGRESS. + + ++The Agent of Progress.+--If the analysis made in the preceding pages of +the principles underlying political representation comes to be regarded +as correct, the science of sociology must be profoundly affected: for it +is a fact that not only the importance but the very existence of the +principles involved has been completely missed by speculators in that +field. The view we have taken is that representation is the most +important sociological invention which has been made in the whole +history of the human race; that the successive steps taken in the +evolution of the British Constitution mark a series of inventions +scarcely less important, and that the resulting institution of party and +responsible government is the indispensable agent of democratic +progress. We have traced throughout the electoral and parliamentary +machinery on which the institution is based the action of two great +principles--organization and responsible leadership--and we have shown +that these are the mainsprings of the whole mechanism. Yet we find even +such an authority as Mr. Herbert Spencer objecting to the party system, +on the ground that it lends itself to a one-man or a one-party +tyranny.[9] The fact is that it is only when representative government +is weak, and approaches direct government, that such a result can +happen, and the distinction is so little recognized that a brief +recapitulation may be permitted. + +The fundamental error is in conceiving representation as merely a means +of registering the popular will; many even go so far as to regard it as +an imperfect means of ensuring that each single question will be decided +according to the will of the majority. All such conceptions really +amount to direct government, and where they are given effect to, whether +by the referendum or sectional delegation, society is not organized for +consistent progress. Indeed, if the lessons of history can be trusted, +such a state of society is bound to be wrecked from within by +anti-social influences; political power becomes the object of factious +strife, and the rule of the majority degenerates into the tyranny of the +majority. + +We have endeavoured to show that the true conception of representative +government involves a recognition of the principles of organization and +leadership, and that representation is in consequence a means not only +of registering the popular will, but also of organizing and guiding it. +In both cases, therefore, the popular will is the ultimate motive force, +but in the one case the desires of the people clash, while in the other +they are directed into channels conducive to the general welfare. We +have regarded it as an essential condition of representative government +that the popular will be expressed only as to the direction of progress, +that is to say on general policy and not on single questions, and that +complete control of progress be then left to the representative body. In +no other way can the people be saved from their anti-social tendencies, +and induced to express their opinion as to what is best for all. We have +seen how the electoral machinery is adapted to organize this expression +of the popular will into two alternative directions of progress; how +this is effected by the fact of two parties competing for the support of +the people on policies expressing these lines of progress; and how the +parliamentary machinery allows the stronger of these two parties for the +time being complete control of administration and of the direction of +progress. The effect of this organization is that the popular will is +reduced to effective action in one direction at a time--a result which +is not possible with direct government. + +Nor is the principle of responsible leadership which is involved in the +reciprocal relation of the representative body and the people any less +important. Society cannot progress faster than the individual units +composing it. True progress lies therefore in raising the standard of +public opinion, and it is this principle which ensures that result by +reacting upon and moulding individual character. Hence we find that in +countries like England, where the principle is operative, progress is +effected without supervision and undue interference in the affairs of +the individual by the State, while in countries where the principle is +not operative, such as the Continental countries of Europe and some of +the Australian colonies, the contrary is the case. Legislation should +therefore be directed to changing the nature of the individual, and +should not be too far in advance of public opinion. This is what Mr. +Lester F. Ward, in his work on "Outlines of Sociology," calls attractive +legislation. He writes:-- + + The principle involved in attraction, when applied to social + affairs, is simply that of _inducing_ men to act for the good of + society. It is that of harmonizing the interests of the individual + with those of society, of making it advantageous to the individual + to do that which is socially beneficial; not merely in a negative + form as an alternative of two evils, as is done when a penalty is + attached to an action, but positively, in such a manner that he + will exert himself to do those things that society most needs to + have done. The sociologist and the statesman should co-operate in + discovering the laws of society and the methods of utilizing them, + so as to let the social forces flow freely and strongly, + untrammelled by penal statutes, mandatory laws, irritating + prohibitions, and annoying obstacles. (p. 274.) + +Now, we submit that this attractive legislation is possible only when +there is no oppressed minority, and is therefore the peculiar province +of representative government; for we have shown that the whole machinery +is adapted to induce the people to desire only what is best in the +interests of society. + +Let us briefly examine the bearing of the view that representative +machinery is the agent of progress on previous theories of social +progress. + ++Professor Huxley.+--No one has more clearly laid down the conditions of +social progress than the late Professor Huxley in his essay on +_Evolution and Ethics_. The gradual strengthening of the social bond by +the practise of self-restraint in the interests of society he called the +ethical process, and he showed that social progress means a checking of +the cosmic process at every step and the substitution of this ethical +process. This action he compares to that of a gardener in clearing a +patch of waste ground. If he relaxes his efforts to maintain the state +of art within the garden, weeds will overrun it and the state of nature +will return. So the human race is doomed to a constant struggle to +maintain the state of art of an organized polity in opposition to the +state of nature; to substitute as far as possible social progress for +cosmic evolution. He says:-- + + Let us understand, once for all, that the ethical progress of + society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in + running away from it, but in combating it. It may seem an audacious + proposal thus to pit the microcosm against the macrocosm, and to + set man to subdue nature to his higher ends; but I venture to think + that the great intellectual difference between the ancient times + with which we have been occupied and our day, lies in the solid + foundation we have acquired for the hope that such an enterprise + may meet with a certain measure of success....[10] + + Moreover, the cosmic nature born with us, and to a large extent + necessary for our maintenance, is the outcome of millions of years + of severe training, and it would be folly to imagine that a few + centuries will suffice to subdue its masterfulness to purely + ethical ends. Ethical nature may count upon having to reckon with a + tenacious and powerful enemy as long as the world lasts. But, on + the other hand, I see no limit to the extent to which intelligence + and will, guided by sound principles of investigation, and + organized in common effort, may modify the conditions of existence + for a period longer than that now covered by history. And much may + be done to change the nature of man himself. The intelligence which + has converted the brother of the wolf into the faithful guardian of + the flock ought to be able to do something towards curbing the + instincts of savagery in civilized men.[11] + +But Huxley never realized that the real cause of the better prospects of +success in modern as contrasted with ancient times is the discovery of +representative machinery. "The business," he declared, "of the sovereign +authority--which is, or ought to be, simply a delegation of the people +appointed to act for its good--appears to me to be not only to enforce +the renunciation of the anti-social desires, but wherever it may be +necessary to promote the satisfaction of those which are conducive to +progress."[12] There is no conception here of the principles of +organization and responsible leadership, so necessary in constituting +this "delegation." + ++Herbert Spencer.+--By a great many sociologists it is denied that man +has his destiny in his own hands, or can by common effort modify the +conditions of existence so as to promote progress. The conception which +is held to justify this view is that there is an exact correspondence +between the progress of human society and the growth of an organism. +Foremost among those who take this view is Mr. Herbert Spencer. The +close analogy which the progress of the assumed social organism bears to +the growth of the physiological organism is worked out in great detail +throughout the "Synthetic Philosophy," and is taken to establish "that +Biology and Sociology will more or less interpret each other." The +practical conclusion which is drawn is that the growth of society must +not be interfered with; if the State goes beyond the duty of protection, +it becomes an aggressor. So Mr. Spencer is a most uncompromising +opponent of State action, even education and public sanitation coming in +for his condemnation. Moreover, he holds that if the social organism be +let alone it will tend to a future state of society in which social +altruism will be so developed that the individual will voluntarily +sacrifice himself in the interests of society. + +In an essay on _The Social Organism_ ("Essays," Second Series), he +writes:-- + + Strange as the assertion will be thought, our Houses of Parliament + discharge in the social economy functions that are, in sundry + respects, comparable to those discharged by the cerebral masses in + a vertebrate animal.... We may describe the office of the brain as + that of _averaging_ the interests of life, physical, intellectual, + moral, social; and a good brain is one in which the desires + answering to their respective interests are so balanced that the + conduct they jointly dictate sacrifices none of them. Similarly we + may describe the office of Parliament as that of _averaging_ the + interests of the various classes in a community; and a good + Parliament is one in which the parties answering to these + respective interests are so balanced that their united legislation + concedes to each class as much as consists with the claims of the + rest. + +The error of regarding society merely as an aggregate is here clearly +shown, for if the "parties" in Parliament were based on class +delegation, as assumed, social progress would be blocked. The only real +foundation for the resemblance between society and an organism is this: +that unless the individual units composing society reduce themselves to +unity of action in a definite direction, society as a whole cannot +progress; or, in other words, that the principles of organization and +leadership are essential to progress. Yet Mr. Spencer denies that there +is any sphere of collective action for the operation of these +principles! + ++Benjamin Kidd.+--The "social organism" theory is also the foundation of +the theory of social progress with which Mr. Benjamin Kidd startled the +scientific world a few years ago in "Social Evolution." While +appreciating the importance of the factor of individual reason, he +contended that self-restraint by the individual in the interests of +society is impossible without an ultra-rational sanction; that, in +fact, without this the reason is the most anti-social and +anti-evolutionary of all human qualities. The central fact therefore +with which we are confronted in our progressive societies is stated as +follows:--"_The interests of the social organism and those of the +individuals comprising it at any particular time are actually +antagonistic; they can never be reconciled; they are inherently and +essentially irreconcilable._" What becomes of this extraordinary +proposition if it is clearly established that the amount of +reconciliation depends on the extent to which the principles of +organization and responsible leadership are given effect to by +representative machinery? + ++Past Progress.+--The question will naturally be raised: If a +representative body is now the indispensable agent of social progress, +how can progress previous to the introduction of representation be +explained? The answer is that the same principles were operative, but in +different forms, more suited to the stage of social development. Indeed, +we may say that, from the time that man emerged from the brute stage and +became a social animal, the types of society which have survived in the +struggle for existence with the state of nature and with other types +have been those in which the principles of organization and leadership +have been most active. Even the lowest types of savages, such as the +native tribes studied by Professor Baldwin Spencer and Mr. Gillen in +Central Australia, have a complicated system of organization, the +peculiar feature of which is totemism, or group marriage; but this is +more the result of development than of conscious effort. Leadership also +is rudimentary, for, although the old men have control of the elaborate +ceremonies described, they conform almost entirely to custom and +tradition. Out of this savage stage there grew in favoured countries the +second type of human society--the patriarchal, in which leadership +becomes personal, and centred in a chief who exercises despotic +authority. Patriarchal society grew out of the necessities of a pastoral +existence; indeed, it was the discovery of the domestication of animals +which gave rise to it. Among other interesting features which were +developed are permanent marriage, slavery, and ancestor worship. There +can be no doubt that the latter played an important part in binding the +tribe into one organization, and in inducing all the tribe to submit to +the leadership of the chief. There is a second stage of patriarchal +society in which the large tribes break up into clans and become less +nomadic. Professor Jenks has shown, in his "Short History of Politics," +how this stage originated in the adoption of agriculture. We begin now +to have the village community, bound by the tie of kinship, and +submitting to the leadership of a lord; and are already on the threshold +of modern political society, in which all these ancient barriers are +broken down and the individual becomes the social unit. The cause of +this momentous change is development of the art of warfare. But before +we reach the modern State there is an intermediate stage, namely, +feudalism. The feudal chief is simply the successful warrior--the leader +of a band of adventurers who get control of a definite territory and +exact military allegiance from its inhabitants. Out of the consolidation +of these bands, or by conquest, modern States were founded. Leadership +was now vested in an irresponsible despot--the king; and the trouble was +to render this new institution permanent, and to induce the people to +submit to it. The former result was attained by making the kingship +hereditary, but the latter has always been a difficult task. It is +doubtful if it would ever have been accomplished but for a significant +alliance--that of Church and State. The convenient fiction of the divine +right of kings was invented, and religion was used to bolster up the +institution and to provide a sanction for submission to absolutism. In +other words, irresponsible leadership was tolerated because +responsibility was supposed to exist to a Higher Power. So we find that +all the great religious movements--Christianity, Mohammedanism, and even +Buddhism--have been associated with the establishment of mighty +kingdoms. Moreover, the only two kingdoms in Europe in which absolutism +still holds out are Russia and Turkey, in which the head of the State is +also head of the Church. But military despotism, which was based solely +on the exploitation of weaker communities, of which ancient Rome was +the culminating type, wanted the elements of permanent progress, and was +bound to disappear before a new type which rested on the development of +internal resources. Militarism must therefore be looked on as a real +stage of progress; for in contrast with patriarchal society it was +competitive, and it broke down many ancient barriers, and prepared the +way for industrial co-operation. Thus we arrive at the conditions +favourable to the rise of representative institutions. For when the cost +of wars had to be raised out of the national resources kings found it +convenient to get the consent of the people to taxation. Hence the great +movement throughout Western Europe for the establishment of parliaments +in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Why is it that in England alone +this movement was successful? Partly no doubt because its isolated +position was favourable to internal progress, but mainly because it was +the only State in which the principles of organization and responsible +leadership were continuously given effect to. So it is that in England +there was developed that wonderful machinery of representative +government which has enabled the people to substitute responsible for +irresponsible leadership, and has made the national character what it +is. This machinery has now been adopted nearly all over the world, +wherever it has been desired to make the popular will felt, but in no +case has it sufficed to give effect to the underlying principles to the +same extent; and success has been attained only in so far as they have +been effective. The lesson of the last century has been that the +machinery which proved sufficient in England, where progress was uniform +through several centuries, breaks down when the pace of progress is +increased. An extreme instance is the recent attempt to introduce party +government into Japan, a country just emerging from the feudal stage, an +interesting account of which is given in the _Nineteenth Century_ for +July, 1899. The experiment failed because the clans could not be divided +on questions of political principle. In a greater or less degree that is +the fundamental source of difficulty everywhere; if the representative +machinery produces only sectional delegation the tendency is back +through anarchy to absolutism. Is it not an extraordinary fact, then, +that the vital distinction between representation and delegation is so +universally ignored? + +Such is a brief outline of the evolution of human society; however +inadequate it may be, it at least serves to illustrate the truth that +social progress has never been made in the past except when the +principles of organization and leadership have been operative. + ++Future Progress.+--As to the ultimate tendency of future progress it +would be pedantry to dogmatize; our task has been the humbler one of +pointing out the means by which progress is to be attained. We have +assumed, however, that there is a separate sphere of collective action +in which government is an instrument for the positive amelioration of +social conditions. We are aware that this conclusion is at variance with +the two extreme schools of modern thought; on the one hand, with the +individualists, who hold that government should only be used for mutual +protection and to keep order; and on the other hand, with the +socialists, who would leave nothing to individual action. Professor +Huxley has reduced the claims of these two schools to absurdity and +impossibility respectively; and we believe that the problem of the +future is to find out that middle course between the anarchy of the one +and the despotism of the other which makes for progress. It seems likely +that the state of society we are approaching will be one in which, while +natural inequalities will be recognized, neither the artificial +inequalities of fanatical individualism nor the artificial equalities of +regimental socialism will be tolerated, and every man will enter the +rivalry of life on terms of an equality of opportunity. This is the +state foreshadowed by Mr. Lester Ward in his "Outlines of Sociology" and +called by him _Sociocracy_. Such ideals, however, serve only to refute +false conceptions and offer little practical guidance. What is wanted is +a clear recognition of the fact that _progress depends on collective +effort acting through representative machinery, the efficiency of which +depends on the extent to which the principles of organization and +responsible leadership are operative._ The question with which +democratic countries are faced to-day is this: Must it be acknowledged +that the people are unfit for self-government, or is the representative +machinery defective? We have supported the view that the latter is the +case as regards English-speaking-countries at all events; and we have +shown that in British countries the remedy lies in improved electoral +machinery, while in the United States both electoral and parliamentary +machinery are at fault. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[9] "Principles of Ethics." + +[10] "Collected Essays," vol. ix., p. 83. + +[11] _Ibid._, p. 85. + +[12] "Collected Essays," vol. i., pp. 275-276. + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Proportional Representation Applied To +Party Government, by T. R. Ashworth and H. P. C. 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